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Being Pākehā:

White Settler Narratives of Politics, Identity, and Belonging in Aotearoa/New Zealand

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A thesis submitted in fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Sociology

The University of Auckland

2015
Abstract

Since the 1970s, Aotearoa/New Zealand has undergone wide-ranging social, political and cultural transformations both with respect to the politics of settler-indigenous relations and the ethnocultural diversification of the country’s population. Indigenous rights movements and the politics of biculturalism, as well as rapid increases in immigration from non-traditional source countries have disrupted deeply entrenched settler narratives that naturalised white settler colonialism and destabilised the dominant position of the white settler majority (Pākehā), forcing Pākehā to re-articulate identities and re-imagine the nation.

This thesis investigates how Pākehā experience ‘being Pākehā’ today. Taking account of several decades of living with or growing up with biculturalism and increasing ethnic diversity, it explores how Pākehā construct and manage identity and their ‘social imaginaries’ (Taylor, 2002), that is, how they conceptualise their own position in society vis-à-vis both indigenous and migrant communities as well as the normative and ideological assumptions that guide their expectations. Life story interviews with 38 Auckland-based Pākehā form the empirical basis of this study. The biographical approach produced stories of lived experience, of memories, expectations and anticipations that allowed me to analyse how Pākehā negotiate majority group identity, and the role of wider discursive repertoires in enabling and constraining participant narratives. Guided by critical whiteness and settler colonial studies, the analysis primarily aims to reveal discursive practices that consolidate and/or challenge whiteness and settler colonial practices.

The empirical data demonstrates that participants discursively construct post-colonial cosmopolitan identities, as expressed in stories of personal transformation, which highlight a new recognition of and engagement with Māori culture, as well as the normality of everyday multiculturalism. However, despite genuine intentions, such narratives often remain wedded to colonial, nationalist, and racialised assumptions and thereby serve to protect the majority’s normative and privileged position. Analysing in detail the politics of naming the majority group, the role of collective ‘living memory’ in perpetuating old myths and creating new ones, and visions of a multicultural future as prime sites of Pākehā identity construction, the thesis contributes to the international literature by providing a current and empirically based analysis of Pākehā identities and imaginaries that helps to deepen our understanding of the processes that secure white settler normativity and privilege in settler societies.
Acknowledgements

Writing a PhD thesis may seem like a solitary endeavour, but it truly takes a village to bring it to completion. I have been privileged to have the help and support of institutions, colleagues, friends and family and would like to thank them here.

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# Table of Contents

## Glossary of Māori Words

## Chapter One: Introduction

- Who are Pākehā? Defining the White Settler Majority
- Situating the Research: Re-making Identities and Imaginaries
- Research Aims, Questions, and Approach
- Writing Conventions
- Thesis Outline

## Chapter Two: Contextualising Pākehā Narratives

- Building a Better Britain
  - ‘Benign Colonisation’, a ‘Fair Go’, and other Myths
  - 98% Pure
- Crumbling Myths and Identity Crises
  - The Māori Renaissance
  - Looking towards the Pacific
- Wanted: A New Identity for Aotearoa/New Zealand
  - Becoming Bicultural and the Politics of Redress
  - ‘Becoming Pākehā’ and ‘the Politics of Rejection’
  - Becoming Multicultural and the Politics of Recognition
- Conclusion

## Chapter Three: Theorising Settler Whiteness

- Critical Whiteness and Settler Colonial Studies: A Brief Introduction
- Making Settler Whiteness
  - … an Invisible Norm
  - … a Desirable Social Location of Privilege
- Maintaining Settler Whiteness
  - ‘Post-colonialism’ and White Settler Amnesia
  - Colour Blindness and White Settler Entitlement
  - Core Cultures and White Settler Normativity
  - Indigenisation and White Settler Belonging
- Conclusion

## Chapter Four: Studying Storied Selves

- Narrative Inquiry
  - Definitions of Narratives
  - Functions of Narratives
  - Implications for the Research Process
  - The Short Life Story Interview
- Research Design and Fieldwork
Chapter Five: The Politics of Naming the Majority

Strategies: (Not) Picking, Choosing, and Refusing

“I don’t care what you call me.”
“I’m other. My other is Kiwi.”
“I get offended.”
“I always make a point of choosing Pākehā.”

Stories: What Is in a Name?

“How far do I have to go before I’m not European?”
“You Pākehās don’t belong here!”
“It’s all part of us.”
“Then I had to come to terms with the fact that I was white.”
“Am I always going to be an absolute outsider?”

Conclusion

Chapter Six: The Politics of Memory & Settler Identity

Roger’s Memories

Techniques of Remembering and Forgetting

Disrupting Oblivion?

“Everything is Different Now” – Narratives of Change

Narratives of Learning

“Grabbing hold of Māori identity”

A Finite and Limited Process of Redress

Conclusion

Chapter Seven: Fantasies of a Multicultural Future

Conflicted Cosmopolitans

Urbane Cosmopolites

Space, Nation, and White Self-Segregation
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chapter</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Regulating the Other</td>
<td>174</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Regulating the Self</td>
<td>178</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Strategic Cosmopolitans</td>
<td>182</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The Death of Biculturalism</td>
<td>183</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Conflating Māori and Migrants</td>
<td>187</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Conflating Settlers and Migrants</td>
<td>193</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Conclusion</td>
<td>196</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter</td>
<td>Chapter Eight: Conclusion</td>
<td>198</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Post-Colonial Cosmopolitan Identities</td>
<td>198</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Post-Settler Imaginaries</td>
<td>199</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>White Settler Futures</td>
<td>205</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Concluding Remarks</td>
<td>207</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Appendices</td>
<td>Appendix 1: Participant Information Sheet</td>
<td>208</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Appendix 2: Consent Form</td>
<td>210</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Appendix 3: Advertisement</td>
<td>211</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Appendix 4: Interview Guide</td>
<td>212</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>References</td>
<td></td>
<td>214</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Glossary of Māori Words

The translations in this glossary are drawn from Ryan (2008) and Moorfield (2011).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Māori Word</th>
<th>English Translation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Aotearoa</td>
<td>New Zealand; literally ‘long white cloud’</td>
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<tr>
<td>aroha</td>
<td>affection, sympathy, charity, compassion, love, empathy</td>
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<tr>
<td>haka</td>
<td>dance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>hapū</td>
<td>sub-tribe, clan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>hīkoi</td>
<td>march</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>iwi</td>
<td>tribe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>kapa haka</td>
<td>dance group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>karakia</td>
<td>incantation, ritual chant, prayer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>kaumātua</td>
<td>elder, person with status</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>kaupapa</td>
<td>philosophy, strategy, policy, agenda</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>kāwanatanga</td>
<td>governance, government, authority</td>
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<tr>
<td>Kīngitanga</td>
<td>Māori King movement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>mana</td>
<td>prestige, authority, control, power, influence, status, spiritual power</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>manuhiri</td>
<td>visitor, guest</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>māori</td>
<td>normal, usual, aboriginal inhabitant, indigenous person, native</td>
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<tr>
<td>māoritanga</td>
<td>Māori culture, Māori practices and beliefs, Māoriness, Māori way of life</td>
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<tr>
<td>marae</td>
<td>meeting area for iwi, meeting house</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Matariki</td>
<td>Māori New Year; Pleiades, The Seven Sisters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>noa</td>
<td>free from the extensions of tapu, ordinary, unrestricted, void</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pākehā</td>
<td>non-Māori, New Zealander of European descent</td>
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<tr>
<td>poi</td>
<td>a light ball on a string which is twirled and swung to accompanying songs (in a poi dance)</td>
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<tr>
<td>rangatira</td>
<td>chief, leader</td>
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<tr>
<td>rangatiratanga</td>
<td>chieftainship, right to exercise authority, realm, sovereignty</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tāmaki Makaurau</td>
<td>Auckland</td>
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<tr>
<td>tangata whenua</td>
<td>local people, hosts, indigenous people, people born of the land</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>taonga</td>
<td>property, possessions, treasure</td>
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<tr>
<td>tapu</td>
<td>sacred, prohibited, restricted, set apart, forbidden</td>
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<tr>
<td>Term</td>
<td>Translation/Description</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------------</td>
<td>--------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>tauiwi</td>
<td>foreigner, outsider, non-Māori</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>te ao Māori</td>
<td>the Māori world</td>
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<tr>
<td>te reo</td>
<td>the Māori language</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Te Puni Kōkiri</td>
<td>Ministry of Māori Development</td>
</tr>
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<td>Te Tiriti o Waitangi</td>
<td>the Treaty of Waitangi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>tikanga</td>
<td>custom, protocol, correct procedure</td>
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<tr>
<td>tino rangatiratanga</td>
<td>self-determination, sovereignty, autonomy, self-government</td>
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<tr>
<td>whakapapa</td>
<td>genealogy, lineage, descent</td>
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<tr>
<td>whānau</td>
<td>extended family, family group</td>
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<tr>
<td>waiata</td>
<td>song, chant</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
Chapter One
Introduction

In December 2009, the New Zealand Parliament recognised the tino rangatiratanga (sovereignty) flag as the national Māori flag and announced its decision to hoist it alongside the New Zealand flag on all government buildings on Waitangi Day, Aotearoa/New Zealand’s national day, which commemorates the signing of the Treaty of Waitangi between Māori and the British Crown on 6 February 1840. This decision, described as a symbolic recognition of partnership and unity between Māori and the Crown by Prime Minister John Key and Māori Party co-leader Pita Sharples (tangatawhenua.com, 14 Dec 2009), proved polarising. While some saw it as a mere token gesture to Māori, others saw it as yet another step towards Māori separatism. Sandra Koster, a Pākehā resident of the small South Island town of Timaru was amongst the latter. As reported by the Timaru Herald (Filipe, 12 Jan 2010), Koster ripped up a Māori flag in protest, arguing that Māori aspirations for greater self-determination posed a threat to the nation and to present and future generations of Pākehā. Calls for separate institutions in particular led Koster to feel “really quite frightened for my grandchildren because I can see us becoming just like South Africa” (cited in Filipe, 12 Jan 2010). Koster consequently stressed that her actions were not racist but, on the contrary, justified by her desire for “harmony” between Māori and Pākehā in order to re-make Aotearoa/New Zealand “a wonderful, beautiful country to live in” (cited in Filipe, 12 Jan 2010).

I have chosen this story to open my thesis on white settler narratives of politics, identity and belonging in Aotearoa/New Zealand because it exemplifies a pervasive, though not universal, publicly articulated unease amongst the white settler majority of Pākehā about “the self-determinative politics of aboriginality” (Pearson, 2001: 2) and, more specifically, what Turner (2007) describes as the “persistent presence” of indigeneity. ‘Indigeneity’ – as I use it in this thesis – denotes the conceptual substance of “socio-legal, political and cultural meanings” (Pearson, 2001: 50) which form the basis for indigenous peoples’ legal struggles for indigenous rights and political aspirations for self-determination in settler societies. In Aotearoa/New Zealand, Pākehā discontent is primarily directed at what is perceived as preferential treatment of Māori, and ongoing Māori grievances against Crown breaches of the Treaty of Waitangi. This is reflected in phrases such as ‘Treaty fatigue’ (Hoby, 2003) and what conservative politician Don Brash (2004: np) referred to in his incendiary Nationhood speech (which I will return to in later
chapters) as the “Treaty grievance industry.” Both aptly express a growing sense of impatience with ongoing indigenous rights claims.

What makes this phenomenon worthy of investigation is its congruence with the growing resentment of indigenous and ethnic and immigrant minority claims-making observed internationally. As Hund and Lentin (2014: 14) note, “in just a few decades following the generalised, if at times begrudging, acceptance that racism is unjust, we have hit ‘racism fatigue’.” More than that, amongst majorities these processes of addressing the legacies of racism and colonialism have led to a sense of feeling beleaguered and exploited for what is regarded as “excessive generosity and inclusivity” (Schick, 2014: 88). This often manifests in anti-minority sentiments and “white outrage” (Povinelli, 2002: 40) about ‘reverse racism’. Critical whiteness theories which, alongside theories of settler colonialism, frame my study of Pākehā identities and imaginaries posit that such majority resentment is part of current attempts to “recuperate, reconstitute and restore white identities and the supremacy of whiteness in post-apartheid, post-industrial, post-imperial, post-Civil Rights [societies]” (Twine & Gallagher, 2008: 13). Hage’s (2003) analytical trope of the ‘white worrier’, developed in the Australian context, fits well into this picture. This figure embodies widespread concern about indigenous rights claims as well as increasing numbers of non-white, ethno-culturally ‘different’ migrants. While purportedly animated by a concern for the nation, white worriers are more often than not concerned about losing the privileges they are accustomed to. As Hage (2003: 3, emphasis added) claims: “[y]ou worry about the nation when you feel threatened – ultimately, you are only worrying about yourself.” This difference is clearly observable in Koster’s story above: while she claims to care for national harmony and unity, her defensive discourses ultimately aim to protect the “[white] settler future” (Tuck & Yang, 2012: 3), that is, the status quo of settler-indigenous relations and the hegemony of white settler values, norms, and institutions in Aotearoa/New Zealand.

Inspired by international critical studies of white/settler identities but also by local calls for more detailed examinations of “how majorities are resisting or adapting to the challenges they face to their dominant ethnicity position” (Pearson, 2009: 52), this thesis examines how Pākehā construct and negotiate identity. I am specifically interested in what it means to be Pākehā in twenty-first century Aotearoa/New Zealand and how the majority’s sense of self has been affected by more than three decades of socio-cultural and political shifts that have entailed a major reframing of settler-indigenous relations as a bicultural partnership as well as rapidly increasing ethnic diversity, both bound up with dramatic economic and social reforms that entrenched a neoliberal ideology and led to significant increases in inequality.
As social identities are always relational, I am also interested in ‘Pākehā imaginaries’ for which I draw on Taylor’s (2002) notion of “social imaginaries,” complemented by Bell’s (2014: 11) more specific analytical category of a “settler imaginary.” Social imaginaries are, as defined by Taylor (2002: 106), “the ways people imagine their social existence, how they fit together with others, how things go on between them and their fellows, the expectations that are normally met, and the deeper normative notions and images that underlie these expectations.” While this definition fits my purpose of examining Pākehā imaginaries well, Taylor’s (2002: 106) assertion that these imaginaries are “shared by large groups of people if not the whole society” neglects the potential for conflicting imaginaries and interests. It is important to bear in mind that settler societies are characterised by complex asymmetrical power relations between settlers, indigenous peoples, and migrant communities (Pearson, 2001; Veracini, 2010b, 2012). The contestations that have accompanied the political and cultural transformations that Aotearoa/New Zealand has undergone since the 1970s are certainly testament to the struggles over collective imaginaries but also to the potential of their transformation. Bell’s (2014: 11) definition of “settler imaginaries” as “the set of ideas and values that underpin a peculiarly settler discourse of nationhood, identity and indigenous-settler relations” adds the necessary element of structural location missing in Taylor’s (2002) concept and thus provides a more amenable frame for my study. However, one alteration is necessary. Given the increasingly multicultural demographic make-up of Aotearoa/New Zealand (see Chapter Two for details), the settler imaginary arguably no longer revolves exclusively around the settler-indigenous relation. As Pearson (2001: 153, original emphasis) stresses, “[t]he persistent reconfiguration of an analytic triangle – aboriginal/settler/immigrant – is … the quintessential feature of ethnic politics in post-settler societies.”

In the remainder of this chapter I introduce the research problematic in more detail. I present the rationale for my research project through a succinct contextualised review of the available local literature on aspects of Pākehā identities and imaginaries. In particular, I make a case for going beyond the exclusive attention to settler-indigenous relations that characterises previous research, arguing that it is increasingly important to examine how globalisation and increasing immigration from ‘non-traditional source countries’ alter the white settler imaginary in Aotearoa/New Zealand. Ending this section with a detailed formulation of my research questions and objectives, I will then sketch my methodological approach to the subject matter, highlighting the role of collective and individual narratives for the re-articulation of majoritarian identities and

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1 Traditional source countries of immigration to Aotearoa/New Zealand were the United Kingdom and Europe. The phrase ‘non-traditional source countries’ is commonly used to refer to more recent immigration from other regions, such as Asia.
imaginaries. But before I embark on situating the study and spelling out the precise research questions, it is necessary to say a few more words about ‘Pākehā’, the population that is at the centre of this study. More specifically, I discuss who Pākehā are and how I apply the term in this thesis.

Who are Pākehā? Defining the White Settler Majority

In this thesis, Pākehā are conceptualised as “New Zealanders of a European background, whose cultural values and behaviour have been primarily formed from the experiences of being a member of the dominant group of New Zealand” (Spoonley, 1993: 57). Both ‘Pākehā’ and ‘Māori’ are mutually constitutive colonial constructs which became the basis for new identities (Bell, 2004b; Pearson, 2001: 42). Pre-contact, the indigenous peoples present in New Zealand identified along the lines of whānau, hāpu and iwi (family, sub-tribe, and tribe, respectively) but came to identify as Māori, meaning ‘normal’ or ‘ordinary’ people, in order to differentiate themselves from the white European invaders. The whalers, missionaries, escaped convicts and, later, settlers who identified with their various – mostly British – home countries were designated Pākehā, which most likely meant ‘stranger’ or ‘white’ (Baker, 1945). Today, the term ‘Pākehā’ sometimes also refers to all non-Māori including non-white immigrants in Aotearoa/New Zealand, or, alternatively, white people in general (see Bell, 2004b: 4, n3). These definitions place particular emphasis on either the colonial relationship between indigenous and non-indigenous New Zealanders or on the aspect of race. For the purpose of this thesis I use Spoonley’s (1993) definition because it emphasises a shared structural location and history as the ‘dominant group’ or majority\(^2\) in Aotearoa/New Zealand while also taking into account shared ethno-racial characteristics, which are part and parcel of domination.

It is worth elaborating on my understanding of ‘majority’ because, as Pearson (2001: 14) rightly notes, too often “[t]he majority is simply what is left over after minorities are defined.” Arguably, work in critical whiteness studies has begun to rectify this omission and provides my working definition of Pākehā as the majority in Aotearoa/New Zealand as:

\(^2\) Throughout this thesis I use the term ‘majority’ and sometimes the adjective ‘majoritarian’ rather than ‘dominant ethnic group’ to refer to the structural location of Pākehā. I acknowledge that not all dominant groups are numerical majorities but the term poignantly emphasises that settler societies are the product of mass settlement and “premised on the domination of a majority that has become indigenous” (Veracini, 2010b: 5). It also avoids the problematic assumption that majorities constitute ‘ethnic groups’, which presupposes a conscious sense of collective belonging.
the ethnic group in a society that exercises power to create and maintain a pattern of economic, political, and institutional advantage, which in turn results in the unequal (disproportionately beneficial to the dominant group) distribution of resources. With respect to intergroup relations, a key element of dominance is the disproportionate ability to shape the sociocultural understandings of society, especially those involving group identity and intergroup interaction (Doane, 1997: 376).

According to this definition, majorities are primarily characterised by their normative and privileged position but Doane (1997) also highlights an element of agency in creating and maintaining stratification. As I will discuss in greater detail in Chapter Three, normativity and privilege have been historically accrued at the expense of non-white peoples through processes of exploitation, exclusion, marginalisation, and dispossession justified through racial doctrines of white supremacy. In settler societies, such as Aotearoa/New Zealand, both whiteness and ‘settleness’ converge in that, as Giuliani (2012: 108) argues, “whiteness as a bio-political identity forms a foundational component in the definition of the settler” vis-à-vis both indigenous and exogenous Others. As Bell (2014: 6) thus notes, structurally, Pākehā are defined by colonisation: “We are structurally, if not biologically, ‘settler descendants’. We have inherited the political, material and symbolic privileges secured by their practices of colonization.” Like Bell (2004b, 2014), I hasten to stress that neither Pākehā nor Māori identities are constituted solely through the coloniser-colonised relationship, but I argue that identities and imaginaries are shaped by our position in the social structure.

The strong focus on structure in defining majorities has received some criticism for neglecting that majorities are “real communities with subjective narratives rather than simply vessels of power” (Kaufmann & Haklai, 2008: 745) and some scholars within ethnic, critical whiteness, and nationalism studies recommend conceptualising majorities as ethnic groups. Jenkins (2008: 15), for instance, contends that “we need to remind ourselves all the time that each of us participates in an ethnicity – perhaps more than one – just like them, just like the Other, just like ‘the minorities’.” Kaufmann (2004: 5) further proposes to think of majorities not as “abstract states, nations or host ‘societies’, but as ethnic communities like any other.” This seems problematic in three ways. Firstly, it risks reifying essentialising understandings of ethnic groups because it presupposes and reinforces clearly demarcated groups (Brubaker, 2009); secondly, it assumes a self-conscious collective ethnic identity or sense of belonging to a group; and thirdly, declaring majorities to be “like any other” (Kaufmann, 2004: 5) ethnic group risks erasing important structural differences between majorities and minorities.
Doane’s (1997: 378) claim that because majorities have the power and means to appropriate the mainstream, they lack “awareness” of their ethnic identity aptly illustrates these concerns. As Pearson (2001: 16) argues, it is important to remember that “categories are not necessarily groups, and not all groups are communities.” In Aotearoa/New Zealand, this problematic is manifest in the contestations surrounding the appellation Pākehā. In the 1990s, a survey found that only 17 percent of New Zealand European respondents always or often used the term (Pearson & Sissons, 1997: 66). According to the most recent survey available, now only ten percent of New Zealand European respondents prefer the term Pākehā to refer to themselves (Sibley, Houkamau, & Hoverd, 2011: 209). Thus there has been considerable academic debate as to whether the moniker Pākehā was providing the basis for an ethnic identity, or whether it was merely an ethnic category (Pearson, 1989, 1990), or, even less than that, an “empty category [...] that merely means non-Maori” (Urry, 1990: 20).

This phenomenon is in itself of particular interest for my study of Pākehā identities. The above figures suggest an active investment in claiming and/or avoiding specific identities. This is also supported by an increasing preference for the national label ‘New Zealander’. In 2006, nearly 430,000 people, or over ten percent of the resident population, followed the call of the “Declare Your Pride” email campaign which encouraged people to state their ethnic identity as ‘New Zealander’ in that year’s census (Callister, Didham, & Kivi, 2009: 39). While this figure dropped in later census counts, Sibley et al.’s (2011: 209) survey showed that 50 percent of the sample preferred the national appellation to refer to themselves. Because of comparable trends amongst majorities in other settler states, Kukutai and Didham (2012: 1427) argue that the “New Zealander phenomenon reflects a broader shift by settler state majorities to reimagine their identities.” In Chapter Five, I will present findings from this study to illuminate the stories participants tell with the naming choices they make.

These politics of naming also present specific challenges for researchers, as recently highlighted by Bell (2009b: 160-61, n8) in a methodological research note:

Given the lack of a shared self-ascription amongst Pakeha/European New Zealanders, my choice of language in the project publicity was necessarily cumbersome. Where you might ideally use commonsense identity labels to interpellate research participants, I referred to

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3 Based on a comparison with the 2001 census, it can be assumed that a large percentage of these New Zealander responses were given by New Zealanders of European descent (Kukutai & Didham, 2009).
the ‘majority culture’ to minimise use of either ‘Pakeha’ or ‘European’, with either choice being likely to alienate a proportion of the group I wished to reach.

For this research project, it was important to attract the majority broadly. I thus invited “New Zealanders of European descent who identify as Pākehā, European New Zealander, New Zealander or other” to participate (see Appendix 3). In this thesis, however, I consistently use the term Pākehā to refer to all European New Zealanders, including my participants, regardless of whether they identify as such.4

To return to the point of whether majorities should be conceptualised as ethnic groups, I argue that while it is vital to dislodge majorities from their powerful default position as the unmarked, mainstream norm (Dyer, 1997), it is equally important to avoid the pitfalls of reinforcing essentialising cultural boundaries and presupposing a sense of community. For the purpose of this thesis, I adopt the perspective that “white identity grew from the experience of dominating, rather than biology or culture” (Roediger, 2001: 81) and Cornell and Hartmann’s (2007: 88-89) argument that,

One can belong to a collection of people distinguished by its position in relationships of power and privilege and by cultural commonalities among members without any substantive awareness that this position and culture – and the identity embedded in both – are primary factors organizing life and experience.

Situating the Research: Re-making Identities and Imaginaries

My analysis of Pākehā identities and imaginaries is anchored in the specific historical moment and space of early twenty-first century Aotearoa/New Zealand but also tied to the transnational literature that critically analyses how whites/settlers are currently rearticulating the majoritarian identities alluded to above. My premise is that, like majorities in other Western societies, Pākehā are responding and adapting to challenges to their hitherto dominant position. Like other white British settler societies, Aotearoa/New Zealand has been in the process of addressing its history of settler colonisation through a “politics of regret” (Olick, 2007) which, as Toth (2015: 553) argues, “always exists alongside and in contestation with non-regretful coping strategies” such as the politics of denial and silence. For Toth (2015: 556), all these strategies are part of a “mythscape”

4 An exception is Chapter Five in which I detail participants’ naming choices.
that contains contested and politically motivated myths, rather than one single dominating or consensual collective narrative. In addition, processes of globalisation and a human capital approach to immigration driven by neoliberal developments have led to increasing ethno-cultural diversity that marks a significant departure from traditional British kinship migration (Spoonley, 2005: 98).

I am interested in how Pākehā re-articulate identities and imaginaries in response to such developments. In order to address this question, I engage with both local and international research. In Aotearoa/New Zealand, the 1980s and 1990s were a time of intensive academic debate about the potential of ‘becoming Pākehā’ and, to a large degree, these debates focused specifically on the role the label ‘Pākehā’ might play in re-articulating settler identities. To give some examples, Spoonley (1991) argued that European New Zealanders who chose to adopt the term Pākehā did so as a way of expressing a new politicised post-colonising identity entailing its bearer’s acknowledgement of the colonial past, as well as respect for the centrality of the Treaty of Waitangi and support for the newly instituted ideal of bicultural partnership (see Chapter Two). Bell (1996: 154) also emphasised the potential of the label arguing that, because it marked white New Zealanders as particular and as Other in relation to Māori, the coloniser-colonised relationship could be discursively reversed. Last but not least, Tilbury (2000: 75) assigned the widespread use of the ‘Pākehā’ the potential of “an ethnic revolution, the ethnogenesis of a majority white identity in a postcolonial state,” and Fleras and Spoonley (1999: 80) accorded ‘Pākehāness’ the potential to successfully act as a tool in the “cultural politics of post-colonialism.”

However, not everyone displayed the same confidence in the potential of becoming Pākehā. MacLean (1996: 110) argued that Pākehāness remained an “empty alterity” allowing the majority to remain the silent and normative centre of biculturalism. This argument suggests that, despite being marked as particular, Pākehā retained a hegemonic position within the new bicultural formation. As mentioned in the previous section, Pearson and Sissons (1997) found that ‘being Pākehā’ was a small project. Moreover, there was little evidence to support the idea that choosing to identify as Pākehā was an explicitly political project. In fact, there was no difference in attitudes to Māori rights between people who always identified as Pākehā and those who never did. Furthermore, 43 percent of those who called themselves Pākehā at least sometimes explicitly rejected the notion of partnership with Māori (Pearson & Sissons, 1997: 79). More than that, Lawn (1994: 298) argued that developing a conscious collective Pākehā identity may strengthen an oppositional rather than post-colonising identity because,
the concept of collectivity, so powerfully invoked as a resistance strategy by oppressed groups, becomes problematic when applied to hegemonic groups, for ‘group identity’ almost always operates self-defensively. Pākehā as a group, like men, already bond in ways that often pass unacknowledged.

Others warned of the danger that a new settler identity was being built on an imaginary of moral equivalence to Māori. As a response to King’s (1985) Being Pakeha, Jesson (cited in Mikaere, 2004: 33) asserted that while Māori activism had successfully debunked the myth of racial harmony, settlers were “in the process of laying down new layers of hypocrisy.” These included a new claim to rightful settler belonging which became more pronounced throughout the 1990s and caused increasing scepticism about the decolonising potential of an identity tied to this label. Indeed, in Being Pakeha Now, King (1999) explicitly promoted a new identity as a ‘white native’ who had the same right to belong as Māori.

By the end of the 1990s, it was widely accepted that Pākehā responses and attitudes varied widely. Bell (1999) referred to a “field of possible relations between settler and Maori in New Zealand society,” and Spoonley (1997: 38) conceded that even though Māori identity politics had initiated a re-thinking of national identity and settler responsibility, “the term Pakeha, and its politics, reflect a degree of ambiguity and while some variants might be sympathetic to biculturalism and the Treaty of Waitangi, there are nevertheless those that are vociferously opposed to such politics.” Later on, Spoonley (2005: 102) also emphasised the variety of attitudes towards the label Pākehā, arguing that they ranged from opposition, via indifference to acceptance. While he attributed opposition to alleged derogatory or divisive connotations of the term, he interpreted acceptance as signifying support for biculturalism.

While these intellectual debates largely abated from the mid-1990s onwards, they clearly informed the corpus of empirical analyses of Pākehā that burgeoned in the new millennium. I will return to some of these studies in more detail at appropriate times throughout this thesis; here, I want to highlight some commonalities and central points of this body of literature in order to situate my own work. A review of this literature reveals two broad strands: firstly, there are qualitative studies which share an interest in exploring Pākehā change as a result of explicit ‘bicultural’ engagement. Jellie (2001), Mitcalfe (2008) and Brown (2011), for instance, each interviewed small numbers of Pākehā engaged in ‘Māori learning contexts’ in order to examine how their experiences shaped Pākehā attitudes and identities and theorised the role of learning and contact as an effective pathway to social change and a means for Pākehā to develop “postcolonial
thinking” (Brown, 2011: 99). These contexts included taking te reo (the Māori language) lessons (Jellie, 2001), learning in contexts “where tikanga Māori was the foundation for teaching and learning and where Māori were in the majority” (Mitcalfe, 2008: 23), or working with Māori in contexts such as Māori media, Māori church, and academia (Brown, 2011). In addition, Huygens (2007) and Black (2010) examined Pākehā change specifically within the context of current Treaty of Waitangi education, focussing specifically on how Pākehā who work as activists and are committed to promoting a post-colonial politics have learned about themselves and changed through the experience of being Treaty activists. All of these studies portray education as an effective pathway for social change and conclude that learning experiences significantly contributed to Pākehā adopting attitudes that were more sympathetic to indigenous rights. As a result of their experiences, Pākehā were shown to act as “translators” (Huygens, 2007: 89), “bridge makers and border crossers” (Mitcalfe, 2008: 110), and “facilitators” (Brown, 2011: 277).

Within this corpus of qualitative studies, Gibson (2006) and Gray (2012) took a different approach, and are to my knowledge the only researchers who have explicitly employed a critical whiteness perspective in their research. While Gibson (2006) investigated the racial dimension of Pākehā women’s lives, replicating a seminal study first carried out in the North American context by Frankenberg (1993), Gray (2012) examined whether the use of the word Pākehā correlated with an awareness of white privilege. Gray (2012) concluded from her research that being Pākehā was largely a self-serving strategy of fostering belonging because the label enabled pretence of an equal indigenous-settler relationship especially when people who identify as Pākehā strain to set themselves apart from other New Zealanders of European descent who are perceived to adhere to the one nation paradigm. My main reservation about these two studies is a concern that the concept of whiteness was applied too literally to the New Zealand context. Both interpreted a lack of acknowledgement or opposition to the term ‘white’ amongst Pākehā as an evasion of power (Gibson, 2006; Gray, 2012: 56).

The second strand of research in the new millennium consists of quantitative studies of Pākehā attitudes to biculturalism which were predominately carried out in the field of social psychology (Liu & Sibley, 2006; Sibley & Duckitt, 2010; Sibley & Liu, 2004; Sibley, Robertson, & Kirkwood, 2005). For the purpose of my thesis, the most noteworthy findings are those that consistently show a stark discrepancy between support for symbolic biculturalism (e.g. recognition of Māori cultural practices as part of New Zealand identity) and opposition to material biculturalism (e.g. redistributing resources and power through, for example, land claims or affirmative action). Liu and Sibley (2004: 94-95) found that while 53 percent of a sample of
Pākehā university students supported symbolic biculturalism, only three percent supported a redistributive biculturalism. In fact, 76 percent of the sample opposed material redistribution. More recently, Sibley (2010) demonstrated that a sample of New Zealand born non-Māori valued Māori culture but also thought that historic injustices should no longer play a role in resource allocation. Honing in on this discrepancy, the researchers tested various hypotheses. Liu and Sibley (2006) suggest that support for symbolic biculturalism might be either the product of collective guilt over the historical Pākehā dominance of Māori or, alternatively, signify the appropriation of Māori cultural markers to shape national identity, while opposition to redistribution may be an expression of ‘social dominance’ or a way of warding off perceived symbolic and material threats (Sibley & Duckitt, 2010; Sibley & Liu, 2004; Sibley, et al., 2005). Sibley (2010) furthermore suggested that endorsing cultural solutions may in itself justify opposition to material or transformative solutions to disparities because it is regarded as a sufficient way of addressing inequalities.

As has become evident, all of these studies share a firm focus on the Pākehā-Māori relationship and, overwhelmingly, also on a constituency of self-identified Pākehā involved in Māori learning settings or in anti-racist and Treaty organisations. Studies with such specific foci, I decided, could – and should – be usefully complemented by a study that cast the net wider, including those people who a) do not necessarily identify as Pākehā or even reject the label, and b) who are not part of a relatively small group of activists involved in decolonising and anti-racist work. This decision was validated by Pearson’s (2008: 52) argument that the continued exclusive focus on what it means to identify as Pākehā fails to take into account clear shifts in identification, such as the growing preference for a Kiwi or New Zealander identification. Pearson (2008: 53) further called for studies that achieve “a finer grained sense of the way ‘nations’ are constructed and reinvented [by majorities] through forms of living, personal histories and everyday routines and consumption in the face of major changes over the past few decades.” As Huygens (2007: iv) concedes, it is difficult to gage the wider effect of anti-racist education, and in some ways the broader scope of my study may help to shed some light on this question.

In addition, my thesis addresses a significant lacuna in the local research literature with respect to how increasing numbers of immigrants inflect processes of re-making majoritarian identities and Pākehā imaginaries of the nation and settler-indigenous relations. Given the predominance of biculturalism in New Zealand public and political discourse, it is not surprising that attention to the impact of increasing ethno-cultural diversity on Pākehā identity has been largely absent from research. So far it is assumed that Pākehā construct their identities “in relation to two primary
others, the peoples of the metropolitan homelands of their ancestors and the indigenous peoples of their national homeland” (Bell, 2009b: 147). However, this narrow focus neglects the increasing presence of exogenous Others. While there are a number of works that discuss the place of ethnic minorities in Aotearoa/New Zealand (Greif, 1995b; Ip, 2003, 2005; Pearson & Kothari, 2007) and general attitudinal surveys that measure New Zealanders’ attitudes to immigration (Gendall, Spoonley, & Butcher, 2013; Gendall, Spoonley, & Trlin, 2007; Johnston, Gendall, Trlin, & Spoonley, 2010; Spoonley, Gendall, & Trlin, 2007), so far only a small number of studies have examined Pākehā discourses about immigration. Both Bell (2010) and Lyon et al. (2011) examined talk about immigration elicited in interviews and focus groups with young Pākehā. Echoing international findings which I will discuss in Chapter Three, Lyons et al. (2011) note that participants’ talk was permeated by nationalist discourses as expressed in naturalised demands that migrants adapt to New Zealand culture. The researchers particularly note a conflation of immigrants and non-white people which perpetuates an image of Aotearoa/New Zealand “as a white, British-European, English-speaking country” (Lyons, et al., 2011: 21). Bell’s (2010) analysis of discourses of hospitality amongst young Pākehā adds a further dimension to researching this topic in settler locales. While Bell also found that hospitality is tied to a number of conditions, she highlighted how hospitality reasserts the settler’s position as ‘the national people’. This finding in particular provides an important starting point that I develop further in this thesis.

Research Aims, Questions, and Approach

This study of Pākehā identities and imaginaries engages with and aims to contribute to international theorisations of contemporary expressions of whiteness and settler colonialism as systems of domination. It responds to calls to “broaden [whiteness studies’] empirical base and deepen its international contours” (Twine & Gallagher, 2008: 15). As I will discuss in more detail in Chapter Three, the field of critical whiteness studies emanates from the United States (US) where it is primarily theorised within a black-white dichotomy that has its origins in the institution of chattel slavery (Smith, 2006). However, ‘whiteness’ has increasingly become conceptualised as a transnational Western phenomenon that manifests in different ways and in relation to different racialised Others, including indigenous peoples and immigrants. In this study, I combine

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5 In this thesis I do not have space to discuss work that examines the place of minorities. The results of attitude surveys will be outlined in the next chapter.
whiteness with key ideas from settler colonial studies to frame my analysis of how whiteness works in settler contexts.

My thesis also contributes to the existing local literature on Pākehā identities by offering an alternative and wider angle to the research problematic. First of all, I go beyond the focus on self-identified Pākehā. Secondly, I interview ‘ordinary’ Pākehā rather than specifically those who are in various ways already engaged in educational or anti-racist/colonial practices. Thirdly, I bring settler-indigenous-immigrant relations into one analytical frame in order to examine how increasing ethnic diversity influences Pākehā identities and how it features in white settler imaginaries of the nation and intergroup relations.

I formulated my specific research questions as follows:

- How do Pākehā construct and negotiate majority identity?
- How do Pākehā experience and imagine current settler-indigenous and settler-migrant relations?
- How have Pākehā experienced and adapted to the socio-cultural transformations that Aotearoa/New Zealand has experienced over the past three decades?
- Are Pākehā actively invested in protecting and recuperating white settler normativity and privilege?
- How do participant narratives intersect with the hegemonic collective narratives that permeate New Zealand public and political discourses?
- What continuities and discontinuities with traditional settler colonial and racialised discourses are evident in their narratives?

I address these research questions by examining Pākehā life stories which allow me to hone in on people’s narratives of lived experiences, their memories and aspirations. What was it like to be Pākehā when they were growing up? What, if anything, made them aware of their social position as the majority in Aotearoa/New Zealand? How have they personally experienced politico-cultural transformations and how do these experiences inflect their identities and imaginaries of settler-indigenous-migrant relations? What does the future of Pākehā look like in these imaginaries?

In the course of my engagement with the theoretical and empirical research literature in whiteness and settler colonial studies that frame my research, the concept of ‘narrative’ crystallised as a suitable analytical and methodological tool. In his book *The Truth About Stories: A Native*
Narrative, King (2005: 2) argues that “[t]he truth about stories is that that’s all we are.” What he means is that we come to understand the world through the collective narratives that surround us and that our social imaginaries and identities are both enabled and constrained by the cultural frames we are embedded in. Collective myths, or “identity-constitutive historical narratives” (Toth, 2015: 555), are at the heart of every nation where they “serve the function of a foundational myth for a society, defining rights and obligations for a group and legitimizing its social and political arrangements” (Liu & Hilton, 2005: 538). In settler societies such as Aotearoa/New Zealand, they served to legitimise the displacement of indigenous populations but currently also make some forms of redress acceptable, while curtailing others. In Chapter Three, I will discuss in more detail Veracini’s (2010b: 95) theory that settler societies experience a “narrative deficit” that impedes imagining decolonisation because all settler projects aim for permanence and supersession.

Thus collectively, as much as individually, we are what McAdams (1993) calls “storied selves.” A key assumption I follow in this study is that we construct our identities through telling stories about ourselves, and that, as Taylor (2002:106) notes, we express our social imaginaries “in images, stories, and legends,” rather than theoretical terms. In constructing narrative identities, people are enabled and constrained by the “prevailing cultural norms and the images, metaphors, and themes that run through the many narratives they encounter in social life” (McAdams, 2011: 99). Consequently, narrative accounts of people’s lives enable us to analyse the discursive repertoires people are embedded in and draw meaning from (McAdams, 2011: 100). It is exactly this connection between collective and individual narratives that interests me in this thesis because, as Frankenberg (2009: 528) suggests, “[a]nalyzing the connections between white daily lives and discursive orders may help make visible the processes by which the stability of whiteness – as location of privilege, as culturally normative space, and as standpoint – is secured and reproduced.”

The methodological tenets underlying narrative identity and life story interviewing will be outlined fully in Chapter Four, accompanied by a transparent outline of and reflections on the research process. This thesis does not explicitly aim to contribute to the methodological literature but I contend that the life story approach helps to open up new ways of thinking about white settler identities and imaginaries and new avenues for further research.
Writing Conventions

As has already become apparent in these first pages, a number of Māori words have entered the New Zealand English vernacular and are now commonly inserted into New Zealand English writing. In this thesis, I use Māori words to denote Māori concepts where appropriate because English terminology cannot always appropriately convey their meaning. Upon first use, I provide a brief English translation to avoid interrupting the reading experience but for subsequent uses I refer the reader to the glossary of Māori words at the start of this thesis. I purposefully do not italicise Māori words in order to emphasise that in the context of Aotearoa/New Zealand they do not constitute foreign language words. In my own writing, I use macrons to indicate long vowels, and treat both Māori and Pākehā as proper nouns but follow the authors’ linguistic conventions in quotes and references. In keeping with examples from the international literature on whiteness and settler colonialism, I use the word ‘Other’ (capitalised but without quotation marks) when referring to variously racialised non-white peoples in order to highlight the social construction of Others through a processes of othering.

Thesis Outline

Following on from this first chapter which has introduced the research problematic, laid out the research questions and objectives, and outlined the approach to this research project, Chapter Two charts the local history of settler-indigenous-migrant relations which provides a backdrop to the Pākehā life stories and my analysis of them as presented in Chapters Five through Seven. Conceived as a ‘background chapter’, I purposefully apply broad brush strokes but nevertheless illuminate enough nuances to familiarise the reader with the economic, political, cultural and social conditions and master narratives that frame Pākehā lives. The chapter is divided into three sections, each covering key events, concepts and master narratives central to the phases of 1) colonisation and nation-building from the mid-nineteenth to the mid-twentieth century, 2) the post-World War II turning point which saw indigenous protest movements and non-white immigration disrupt the moral foundations of the white settler state, and 3) the period of re-articulating the national imaginary and settler identities in conjunction with the political, legal, social and cultural transformations that centrally included the institutionalisation of biculturalism from the 1980s onwards.
In Chapter Three, I provide a review and discussion of key arguments from the fields of critical whiteness and settler colonial studies which, in combination, frame my critical analysis of Pākehā imaginaries and identity constructions. The central argument of this chapter, which is foundational to my thesis, is that whiteness is a socio-historical construct that remains relevant today. A discussion of the historical processes that turned settler whiteness into a social location of normativity and privilege is complemented with a review of the international literature on four key areas that have been identified as integral to restoring settler/whiteness. These are 1) discourses that posit that racism and colonialism are phenomena of the past which are no longer relevant, 2) a ‘colour blind racism’ (Bonilla-Silva, 2014) that allows majorities to portray themselves as victims of reverse discrimination, 3) practices of protecting majorities’ status as core cultures in the context of increasingly multicultural societies, and 4) discursive practices of settler indigenisation through which settlers are shown to re-assert belonging.

Chapter Four introduces the empirical research component that forms the core of this thesis. I begin the chapter with a discussion of the key tenets of a narrative research methodology and an explanation of why the short life story interview approach I adopted for this project lends itself particularly well to this investigation of Pākehā identity constructions. In the second part of the chapter, I explicate the research process and transparently reflect on the research experience. Ethical considerations permeate both parts of the chapter.

Chapter Five is the first of three results chapters. In this one, I discuss the strategies participants employ with regards to ethnic naming and the stories they tell through their preferences in the context of the politics of naming the majority in Aotearoa/New Zealand. Does the label Pākehā do political work or does it help to evade power? What makes the national New Zealander label so attractive to Pākehā? I argue that all choices are aimed at developing post-settler subjectivities: as New Zealanders distinct from ‘Europe’. All naming choices show traces of colonial continuity in claiming belonging and in appropriating Māoriness.

Some of the themes introduced in Chapter Five are furthered in Chapter Six which examines how participants remember the transformations initiated by the indigenous protest movements. Mnemonic practices emerged as a key site of re-articulating Pākehā identities and imaginaries with respect to settler-indigenous relations. While much of the existing literature emphasises the role forgetting and ‘settler amnesia’ plays in legitimating settler colonialism and re-asserting settler belonging, I argue that an analysis of living memories contributes significantly to understanding how settlers are re-articulating identities and imaginaries. I found that narratives of
tremendous change underpin the construction of ‘post-settler identities’ in which participants present themselves as ‘reformed’. However, these narratives of change simultaneously fuel and justify a politics of rejection based on the assumption that decolonisation has been achieved.

While Chapter Six focuses exclusively on settler-indigenous relations and predominately on shifts from the past to the present, **Chapter Seven** brings ethnic diversity into the analytical frame and hones in on how participants imagine the future. The central argument I make is that participants are both ‘conflicted’ and ‘strategic’ cosmopolitans. Overall, they construct cosmopolitan identities akin to the post-settler identities I discuss in Chapter Six. However, my findings show that participants position themselves as ‘spatial managers’ (Hage, 2000) who claim the nation as their space and aim to control all kinds of difference that purportedly threatens the nation. In addition though, ethnic diversity is strategically instrumentalised to dismiss the continued relevance of settler colonialism, biculturalism, and indigenous rights claims. In demonstrating the entanglement of discourses about multiculturalism and indigeneity, I argue that we need to overcome the separation of examinations of settler-migrant relations and settler-indigenous relations that characterises much of the existing literature.

**Chapter Eight** concludes this thesis with a summary of my research questions and the main findings and a discussion of their relationship to the theoretical underpinnings, a reflection on the contributions and limitations of this study as well as suggestions for carrying this research forward.
Chapter Two
Contextualising Pākehā Narratives

The purpose of this chapter is to draw a picture of the socio-political landscape my participants’ lives, and life stories, are situated in and shaped by. Purposefully applying broad brushstrokes, this chapter sketches those main aspects of race and settler colonial relations in Aotearoa/New Zealand that help to understand the Pākehā life stories at the heart of this project and my analysis of them. I specifically illuminate the continuities and shifts in the master narratives that have reflected and informed settler-indigenous and settler-migrant relations over time. While this chapter is largely descriptive, its framing reflects my epistemological standpoint that settler colonialism and whiteness are contemporary phenomena that confer privileges on Pākehā as the majority group. A theoretical discussion of the historical and contemporary modus operandi of settler colonialism and whiteness is reserved for Chapter Three.

The chapter is divided into three parts covering the phases of making, undoing, and re-making majority group identities and imaginaries. Starting with the transformation of the colony of New Zealand into a white Pākehā nation during the nineteenth century, I delineate historical developments and concurrent processes of myth-making that legitimised the colonisation of Māori and the exclusion of non-white immigrants. In the second part of this chapter, I detail how the indigenous protest movements of the 1960s and 1970s and non-white immigration from the Pacific Islands undid the collective settler narratives and myths that had hitherto been taken for granted. The third part covers responses to these challenges from the 1980s to today. I discuss the politics of redress and biculturalism, and the contestations surrounding it which are evident in indigenous struggles for greater autonomy as well as Pākehā rejection of “race-based” measures of redress.

Building a Better Britain

This first part of the chapter traces the settler colonial nation-building project which spanned the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. New Zealand Company director Edward Gibbon Wakefield’s dream of ‘building a better Britain’ (Brooking, 2004: 43) supplies a focal point here, encapsulating, as it does, the building blocks of the settler enterprise in New Zealand: The settler colony was to replicate the mother country through importing Anglo-centric institutions and value
systems but also improve on it, especially by leaving behind the crippling class divisions. This settler colonial project relied on and fostered foundational myths that justified the settler colonial enterprise and shaped white settler identities and imaginaries into the latter half of the twentieth century. Most notable and discussed below are collective narratives of egalitarianism coupled with a myth of benevolence towards the indigenous population. This imaginary of a ‘better Britain’ was based on assumptions of white racial superiority which also manifested in a naturalised insistence on a racially homogenous nation, leading to the exclusion of non-white immigrants as will also be discussed in this section.

‘Benign Colonisation’, a ‘Fair Go’, and other Myths

The British colonisation of Aotearoa/New Zealand formed part of an immense migration of 50 million people over 200 years that created “neo-Europeans” throughout the New World (King, 2003: 170). Compared to its forays into other parts of the world, European settlement in Aotearoa/New Zealand was slow. Even though European whalers, sealers and missionaries had been coming to New Zealand shores since 1769, by 1830 there were still no more than 300 of them and by 1840, no more than 2000 (King, 2003: 169). Up until then, relations between the indigenous population and these European sojourners and settlers were mostly amicable and often mutually beneficial (King, 2003).

However, indigenous-settler relations were transformed by a large influx of land hungry settlers following the signing of the Treaty of Waitangi by representatives of the British Crown and several hundred Māori hapū (clan, sub-tribe) leaders on 6 February 1840 in Waitangi in the Bay of Islands and subsequently in various other locations around the country. The Treaty’s three articles ostensibly envisaged a relationship between the Treaty signatories “based on Crown obligations to protect rangatiratanga [sovereignty] rights in exchange for Crown rights to occupancy and governance” (Fleras & Spoonley, 1999: 9). Yet, differences in translation and interpretation of the text soon provided the ground for contestation. In the first article of the English version of the Treaty the Crown claimed sovereignty over Aotearoa/New Zealand. However, having read and signed a version of the Treaty in te reo Māori (Te Tiriti o Waitangi), iwi (tribe) and hapū leaders were under the impression of having agreed to the establishment of governance [kawanatanga] “at the behest and on behalf of the chiefs” (Walker, 1990: 93). The

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6 Population estimates place the Māori population at around 80,000 in 1840. Their numbers are said to have been greatly reduced before the advent of systematic colonisation through the introduction of European diseases but also through intertribal musket warfare in the 1820s and 1830s (Belich, 1996).
second article was equally disputed: while the English version guaranteed Māori “the full, exclusive, and undisturbed possession of their Lands and Estates, Forests, Fisheries, and other properties,” the Māori version guaranteed “the absolute Chieftainship [tino rangatiratanga] of their lands, of their homes and all their treasured possessions” (Walker, 1990: 93, emphasis added). The third article, which was similar in both languages and less controversial guaranteed Māori the rights and privileges of British subjects and Crown protection.

While this contract between the Crown and Māori, who were acknowledged as a sovereign polity based on the Declaration of Independence signed in 1835, is often described as “a relatively enlightened social contract for its time” (Fleras & Spoonley, 1999: 112), it was undoubtedly a vehicle of annexation. It paved the way for systemic settler colonisation and ushered in large-scale dispossession and marginalisation of indigenous communities (Pearson, 2005). Over the next 40 years, the Pākehā population surged to nearly half a million people. This veritable population boom was motivated by “the promise of prosperity and healthier environments, prospects for social advancement without the hurdles of a class system and, for investors, opportunities to enlarge capital” (King, 2003: 170). These expectations were perfectly encapsulated in New Zealand Company founder Edward Gibbon Wakefield’s vision of creating a ‘Better Britain’ or ‘Britain of the South’. Building a Better Britain that could accommodate the steady stream of colonists relied on the availability of land and prospective settlers were given the impression that the land was docile and theirs for the taking. While some Māori were initially eager to sell parts of their land to Pākehā for strategic and economic reasons (Belich, 1996: 225-6), their willingness diminished as settler tactics became more aggressive under Governor Grey, who Walker (1990: 110) calls “the author of colonial dispossession.” In turn, Pākehā grew increasingly impatient with this reluctance and acquired land through forced purchases as well as legally sanctioned confiscation and theft, seeing Māori alienated from their traditional lands in large numbers. By 1865, 99 percent of the South Island was owned by the Crown or New Zealand Company. On the North Island, land alienation happened more gradually, but steadily nonetheless: between 1860 and 1910, Māori ownership of land decreased from 80 to 27 percent (New Zealand History, 2014). Land alienation and the transformation from collective to individual land tenure destroyed the economic basis of Māori communities and undermined tribal collective identity and belonging which were intrinsically linked to land.

Over the course of the nineteenth century, the colony was transformed into a British settler nation-state. As Bell (2008: 852) states, “white settlers have historically centred themselves through myriad institutional arrangements, discourses and practices of domination and marginalisation of
indigenous peoples.” Alongside British settlers came British flora and fauna, values, norms, and knowledge systems, as well as social, cultural, political and economic institutions. In 1852, the New Zealand Constitution Act established a ‘Responsible Settler Government,’ which some commentators describe as the primary breach of the Treaty of Waitangi (Huygens, 2007: 31). Walker (1990: 111), for example, argues that the “white minority government” installed in 1854 constituted an “institutionalisation of racism at the inception of democracy in New Zealand [that] was the root cause of conflict between Maori and Pakeha in the North Island and the colonial spoliation which followed.” Similarly to other settler colonies, devolving legislative power over indigenous affairs to the settler government effectively entrenched settler colonialism and hastened the subjugation of Māori because it was less concerned with their welfare than the Crown (Huygens, 2007: 25). In her seminal work, *The Treaty of Waitangi*, Orange (1987: 185) argues that by the 1870s the population increase alone had consolidated the British colony to such an extent that the Treaty of Waitangi and the obligations it entailed receded from settler consciousness. In addition, Māori could no longer appeal to the Crown for protection when faced with settler abuse. To illustrate this point, in 1881 King Tawhiao took a petition for self-governance to Queen Victoria but was turned away and told to address their request to the New Zealand government which later dismissed it as “unreasonable and absurd” (Huygens, 2007: 275).

The building of this settler society was accompanied by a desire to amalgamate Māori into the new settler nation and to craft ‘one people’ – a vision first expressed by Governor Hobson at the signing of the Treaty of Waitangi (Orange, 1987: 57). Alongside military force and legal strategies to subjugate the indigenous population, this assimilatory approach formed part of the “curious blend of genuine humanitarianism and conspicuous social control” (Pearson, 1990: 149) that characterised settler colonialism in nineteenth-century Aotearoa/New Zealand. Assimilation served as a form of covert social control as the following policy examples demonstrate. Education was a key domain of assimilation. The Native Schools Act of 1867, for instance, initially led to the establishment of primary schools for Māori as requested by Māori communities. However, these schools increasingly became sites of cultural colonisation by punishing children for speaking the Māori language because English language proficiency was regarded as a gateway to civilisation and social betterment (King, 2003: 234). The judicial system was another cornerstone of assimilation. While the establishment of four Māori parliamentary seats in 1867 is often described as progressive, it can equally be interpreted as a strategy to limit indigenous representation (Durie, 2005b). To begin with, Māori were allocated four seats out of a total of 76 instead of the 14 or 15 their population numbers would have warranted (King, 2003: 257). In
addition, Ward (1995) argues, nominal equality before the law was based on ideas of homogeneity and European superiority that did not allow for alternative worldviews. Thus, while Māori were amalgamated into the nation-state as imperial subjects rather than expunged from it, they were nevertheless marginalised and subjugated to the control of the settler state.

The conflicting interests of settlers and indigenous peoples set in motion an “endless struggle by Maori for social justice, equality and self-determination” (Walker, 1990) through various means, including armed and non-violent resistance, court cases, petitions and submissions, occupation of land (Huygens, 2007), as well as the Kīngitanga (King movement) which ignited “an emerging sense of Maori nationalism” (Walker, 1990: 111). Notably, all of these acts of resistance were based on an interpretation of the Treaty as “a charter for biculturalism” (Walker, 1986: 4), that is, a partnership of two peoples and an assertion of sovereignty rather than the assimilationist ‘one people’ paradigm. The New Zealand Wars which were fought between 1845 and the early 1870s in various parts of the North Island form part of this historical contest between European settlers and Māori (Belich, 1986). Although land was central to these wars, they were ultimately a struggle over sovereignty (J. Smith, 2007: 74). Even though the story that Māori were defeated by superior colonial troops has been refuted (Belich, 1986), further land alienation justified through legal means, quelled indigenous resistance. In 1877, in a court hearing over contested Māori land, Chief Justice John Prendergast finally declared the Treaty of Waitangi void, stating that “the whole treaty was worthless – a simple nullity [which] pretended to be an agreement between two nations but [in reality] was between a civilised nation and a group of savages” (cited in King, 2003: 326). As Durie (2005a: 15) notes, “overt” Māori opposition during the 1860s and 1870s turned into “withdrawal” characterised by “retreat, isolation, and detachment” in the last two decades of the nineteenth century.

Over the course of the nineteenth century, the belief that Māori were dying out took hold in New Zealand (Murphy, 2009: 69). The mass arrival of European settlers in Aotearoa/New Zealand was matched by a steep decline of the Māori population due to disease and conflict. In 1896, 42,500 Māori compared to approximately 700,000 Pākehā (Pool, no date). While some contemporaries expressed a modicum of regret (Reeves, 1973 [1898]), it was generally regarded as the inevitable result of the superiority of the white race. As Featherstone (cited in Rangiwai, 2011: 53) noted in 1881, “[t]he Maoris [sic] are dying out, and nothing can save them. Our plain duty, as good, compassionate colonists, is to smooth down their dying pillow. The history will have nothing to reproach us with.” Thus, the idea of a naturally and inevitably ‘vanishing race’ served to
naturalise the settler colonial project and gave further impetus to the project of assimilation as the only way for Māori to survive (Stafford & Williams, 2006: 112).

In tandem with the belief that ‘the Māori race’ would eventually disappear, a sense of national identity emerged as the local-born settler population began to outnumber new arrivals from the British Isles. With the settlement securely in place, the settler imaginary of the nation was dominated by an image of Aotearoa/New Zealand as progressive, egalitarian, and benevolent towards the indigenous population. Far-reaching social policy reforms introduced by the Liberal government of the time (1890-1912) laid the foundations for the welfare state, improved employment conditions and encouraged the formation of trade unions along with universal suffrage for women in 1893. This earned the country a designation as a ‘social laboratory’ and international role model, and a self-image as “God’s own country,” as Prime Minister Richard Seddon, an advocate for ‘the ordinary man’, liked to call it (King, 2003: 265). However, these settler narratives of egalitarianism, a ‘fair go’ mentality, and mateship – which remain prominent today – intersected with indigenous dispossession, the unequivocal exclusion of non-white immigrants (see next section), and Aotearoa/New Zealand’s own colonial aspirations in the Pacific. The time of the Liberal Party’s administration corresponded with the steepest land loss for Māori because, as Murphy (2009: 69) argues, “land was essential to the Liberal’s plan for creating its vision for New Zealand.” Nevertheless, the myth of egalitarianism, coupled with racial doctrines of white superiority, naturalised dominant narratives that portrayed colonisation as a benign process and justified the dispossession and subjugation of Māori. As Fleras and Spoonley (1999: 114) stress, assimilation conformed to dominant ideas about European racial superiority, paternalistic doctrines of protection, and the White Man’s burden of civilising ‘the natives’.

Assumptions of benevolence and progressiveness gave birth to a further myth which endured into the second half of the twentieth century. During the celebrations of the Centennial of the Treaty of Waitangi in 1940, the Governor General enthusiastically proclaimed that Aotearoa/New Zealand had the “best race relations in the world” (cited in Huygens, 2007: 27). Wholly untroubled by one hundred years of indigenous resistance to Crown and settler authority, the Treaty was celebrated as an expression of goodwill towards Māori that was unmatched in other settler colonies. Māori were seen to have had “a good deal” (Consedine & Consedine, 2012: 101) in comparison to indigenous peoples elsewhere. The best race relations myth was to endure into the 1970s as the following statement by Justice Secretary Eric Missen (cited in Human Rights Commission, 2012: np) regarding the public response to the Race Relations Act of 1971 shows:
Hitherto this legislation has been regarded with some suspicion in New Zealand, not because of any lack of commitment to racial equality but in part because of a feeling that the great degree of harmony and the genuine fund of goodwill between different races in New Zealand, and in particular between Māori and Pākehā, renders legislative intervention unnecessary.

However, that same decade the myths produced in the nineteenth century crumbled under pressure from a growing indigenous rights and anti-racist movement. I will return to these developments in the second part of this chapter.

98% Pure

Racial doctrines also explicitly operated in policies designed to keep Aotearoa/New Zealand white. In contrast to Māori, non-white immigrants suffered outright exclusion (Murphy, 2009; Pearson, 2009). Assisted migration schemes for people of British or Irish parentage, coupled with legislation designed to deter non-white immigrants, preserved racial and cultural homogeneity to such an extent that New Zealand’s population in the late nineteenth century was ‘98.5 percent’ British (Belich, 1996: 232). Only small numbers of non-white immigrants, mainly Chinese men who first arrived in the 1860s lured by the Otago gold rush resided in Aotearoa/New Zealand. While the Chinese were initially merely seen as competitors on the goldfields, 20 years on, the discourse began to shift and they were portrayed as subhuman, depraved, and as a substantial threat to the purity of the nation (Murphy, 2009: 72). Contact with Chinese immigrants was strongly discouraged and the perceived threat was exemplified in the phrase ‘Yellow Peril’. Legislation passed in 1881, 1888, 1896 and 1907 progressively restricted the quota of Chinese immigrants allowed into the country and, in addition, a poll tax and English language requirements were introduced as deterrents (Murphy, 2009).

The explicit exclusion of non-white immigrants around the turn of the century corresponded with the peak of indigenous dispossession and marginalisation during this intense period of nation-building. Just like the acquisition of land, policies designed to ensure racial homogeneity were a vital component of creating a ‘Britain of the South Seas’ (Murphy 2009). Throughout the first half of the twentieth century, a ‘98% British’ somatic and cultural homogeneity remained the aim and various immigration policies were passed that excluded all non-white immigrants based on assumptions of racial and cultural suitability. In the 1920s and 1930s, for example, policies that

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7 This figure included Māori which, as Belich (1996: 232) argues, is indicative of the assimilationist approach.
restricted the rights of Chinese residents were introduced as a further measure to exclude those already present and deter potential new arrivals (Murphy, 2009). In 1925, access was restricted specifically for Chinese women in order to undermine the formation of Chinese families and communities, and in 1926, entitlement to old age pensions and family allowances were withdrawn from Chinese residents, whether they were naturalised or not (Bedford, Didham, & Ip, 2009). Due to labour market shortages after World War II, immigration was finally encouraged but, at first, only from Northern Europe, Australia and North America, in addition to British migrants (Pearson, 1990). Subsequently, census figures (see Pearson, 1990) show that by 1961, the New Zealand population remained 92 percent European and seven percent Māori while ‘others’ accounted for less than two percent.

**Crumbling Myths and Identity Crises**

The 1970s and 1980s have been described as turbulent “watershed decades” (Pearson, 2008: 53) because a convergence of internal and external factors challenged the by then well-established dominance of Pākehā society and the taken-for-granted master narratives just mapped. In this part of the chapter I discuss two key factors. Firstly, a strong indigenous rights movement exposed settler colonial injustices and forced Pākehā to reconsider their position in relation to Māori. Secondly, and simultaneously, processes of globalisation led to loosening ties with Britain and a geo-political realignment towards the Asia-Pacific region. This resulted in a rapid increase in the number of immigrants from non-traditional source countries and thus greater ethno-cultural diversity, as well as to a re-imagining of Pākehā identity as distinct from Britain and Europe.

**The Māori Renaissance**

The revitalisation of Māori communities began in the early 1900s. Contradicting common predictions, Māori did not vanish; instead, their population began to recover after 1896 so that by the end of the Second World War the pre-contact figure of approximately 100,000 Māori was re-established. However, the social, economic and cultural base of Māori communities continued to be eroded further during that time. For example, te reo Māori proficiency of Māori school children declined from 90 percent in 1913 to less than five percent in 1975 (Durie, 1998: 60). Land alienation also progressed further, with Māori ownership dropping from 27 percent in 1910 to nine percent in 1939 (New Zealand History, 2014).
In the second half of the twentieth century though, a ‘Māori renaissance’ – a “major reassertion of their cultural, social, economic and political aspirations” (Hill 2012: 273) – took hold. Its roots lie in the Māori urban migration which gathered momentum after the Second World War: in 1946, nearly three quarters of all Māori lived rurally, while one quarter lived in urban areas. Thirty years on, the population stood at 276,000 and the urban-rural ratio was reversed (Pearson, 1990: 111). For the state and many Pākehā, urbanisation held the promise of further assimilating Māori because it entailed greater distance to traditional home lands, less exposure to the Māori language and other customary cultural expressions, as well as increased proximity with Pākehā (Hill, 2012).

In 1961, the Hunn Report, which revealed dramatic inequalities between Māori and Pākehā, proposed to hasten integration in order to uplift Māori into modernity (Harris, 2004: 21). Typical for the time and congruent with racialised colonial discourses, deficit theories – which see the causes for inequalities in cultural or even genetic deficiencies of disadvantaged groups – dominated explanations for these inequalities and provided the justification for further assimilation under the new moniker of ‘integration’.

This affected both rural and urban Māori. In rural areas, Māori schools were closed from 1969, while in the cities, the practice of ‘pepper potting’ (dispersing Māori families in Pākehā streets) was used to encourage integration and avoid the formation of Māori enclaves. Yet, rather than subduing Māoritanga, evidence suggests that the integrationist approach ultimately ignited a reassertion of indigeneity and catalysed the sovereignty movement (Hill, 2012). Against all expectations, urban Māori retained their iwi, hapū, and whānau connections and, in addition, developed complementary collective pan-tribal identities (Hill, 2012: 263). Urban Māori congregated and initiated new networks and social groups in order to maintain community cohesion, extending the boundaries of whānau beyond kin. In the process, new leadership developed to complement the traditional ruraly based rangatira (Chiefs) and kaumātua (elders).

Various new organisations, such as the Māori Women’s Welfare League (MWWL) and the New Zealand Māori Council (NZMC)8 successfully argued that Māoritanga (Māori culture and language) needed to be nurtured and revived in order to assist Māori in dealing with the challenges the urban environment posed (Hill, 2012: 267). Simultaneously, activist groups such as Ngā Tamatoa initiated street level protests against land alienation, and the suppression of Māori language and culture, breaches of the Treaty of Waitangi, and systemic discrimination. Indigenous protests took various forms but the activism of the 1970s in particular was characterised by highly visible events. Landmark protests included the land march of 1975 which protested – under the

8 These organisations were established in 1951 and 1961 respectively.
slogan ‘not one acre more’ – against contemporary government policies that enabled land alienation, for example through the compulsory acquisition of what was deemed ‘unproductive’ land (Harris, 2004). In 1977-78, Ngati Whatua⁹ occupied Bastion Point in Auckland for 506 days in an attempt to hold on to a last remaining piece of land which had been gradually seized by the Crown since 1869. The non-violent occupation ended with the forced eviction of the occupiers under the Trespass Act 1968 (Harris, 2004).

While it fitted with the long tradition of Māori resistance since 1840, the movement’s visibility and connection to international liberation, civil rights and anti-racist movements made it impossible to ignore. Broadcast into Pākehā homes only recently fitted with television sets, the protests revealed the colonial, racist underbelly of New Zealand society. Poata-Smith (2013: 150) argues that the growing evidence of stark disparities between Māori and Pākehā across a range of social indicators and an inability of the state to improve the situation “made Māori challenges to the legitimacy of the state all the more potent and forceful.” As a result of these protests, a sense of dislodgment from their taken-for-granted position as the national people spread amongst the white settler majority (Johnson, 2005: 137). Many Pākehā felt confused that Māori were able to assume authority for re-defining what it meant to be a New Zealander. As research into Pākehā discourses about race relations in the 1970s and 1980s demonstrates, many Pākehā employed “standard stories” (Nairn & McCreanor, 1990, 1991) in order to deflect the threat to the status quo posed by the indigenous rights movement. Nairn and McCreanor’s (1990, 1991) analyses of Pākehā submissions to the Human Rights Commission following the haka party incident at the University of Auckland in 1979¹⁰ showed that Pākehā created, for example, a dichotomy of good and bad Māori: “Maori who are seen to fit within the mainstream of society and are seen to be contributing to its maintenance are presented as ‘good’, while those who fail, resist or oppose in any way are seen as ‘bad’” (Nairn & McCreanor, 1991: 251). The ‘bad Māori’ was a rather vague and flexible construct, including those dependent on welfare and overlapped substantially with that of the “Māori stirrer” who is intent on undermining the harmonious race relations that supposedly prevailed throughout colonial history (Nairn & McCreanor, 1991: 252). Both patterns construct the behaviour of some Māori as problematic, and assign blame for the perceived deterioration in race relations to a change in Māori (i.e. their ‘radicalisation’) rather than to Pākehā and settler colonial oppression. But the reaction to the protests was not as uniform as the

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⁹ Ngati Whatua are the tangata whenua of Tāmaki Makaurau (Auckland).
¹⁰ In the haka party incident a group of Māori students (He Taua) took exception to the annual performance of a ‘mock haka’ by Pākehā Engineering students at the University of Auckland during capping week. This confrontation ended in the arrest, trial and conviction of a number of the Māori students.
above research suggests; while some Pākehā clearly held on to the ‘one nation’ discourse that had dominated the national imaginary thus far, others sympathised with indigenous aspirations and joined anti-racist movements such as the Citizen Association for Racial Equality (CARE) and the ‘Halt All Racist Tours’ (HART) organisation which campaigned against sporting contact with apartheid South Africa. The 1981 protests against the Springbok Tour in particular are etched into the Pākehā memory as a defining moment in which New Zealanders stood up against racism (Pollock, 2004). However, as Pollock (2004) also argues, many Pākehā who fought against racism abroad failed to see the parallels to their own society.

The publication of *Maori Sovereignty*, Awatere’s (1984) powerful critique of settler colonialism, has been described as “one of those defining historical moments that challenged people’s perception of society” (Fleras & Spoonley, 1999: 45). Awatere (1984: 13) argued that the Treaty was a fraud masking the violence of colonisation. Turning the dominant paradigm of ‘the Māori problem’ on its head, Awatere (1984) asserted that Pākehā were ‘the problem’. This critique was not just a rejection of Pākehā domination but also of the moderate path to a treaty-based bicultural partnership which was also advocated by some indigenous leaders at the time. According to Awatere (1984), calls to honour the Treaty of Waitangi within a bicultural framework amounted to relinquishing the sovereignty Māori had tried to hold on to for the past 144 years. Such analyses of settler colonialism further challenged hegemonic Pākehā narratives, eventually leading to “the realisation that New Zealand identity was inextricably linked with European culture, infused with colonial assumptions, overwhelmingly White in orientation, and larded with self-serving myths” (Fleras & Spoonley, 1999: 43). I will return to how Pākehā re-conceptualised identity in response to these challenges in part three of this chapter.

**Looking towards the Pacific**

The period of Māori urbanisation, politicisation, and revitalisation that discredited Pākehā narratives of benevolence and good race relations coincided with the beginnings of a geo-political re-orientation towards the Pacific and Asia and the first significant wave of non-white immigration to New Zealand. A sense of an independent national identity, which had first emerged in the first half of the twentieth century\(^{11}\) but co-existed with a strong loyal bond to Britain, grew stronger in the post-World War II era. Even though immigration policy continued to

\(^{11}\) A sense of patriotism was galvanised, for instance, by the significant losses of New Zealand soldiers in the First World War Gallipoli campaign (Moon, 2011: 116).
favour kinship migration from the British Isles,\textsuperscript{12} the establishment of New Zealand citizenship in 1949 subjected immigrants from the British Isles to visa requirements, and labour shortages in unskilled manufacturing and forestry professions started to be filled with immigrants from the nearby Pacific Islands (Pearson, 1990). The number of Pasifika residents increased from approximately 2,000 in 1945 to over 43,000 in 1971 and nearly 128,000 in 1986 when immigration policy shifted even further (Pearson, 1990: 117). Due to Aotearoa/New Zealand’s own imperial aspirations in the Pacific, immigrants from the Cook Islands, Niue and Tokelau could enter freely as New Zealand citizens, while a generous laissez-faire policy was applied to immigrants from Pacific Island states that were not colonies of Aotearoa/New Zealand, such as Samoa and Tonga (Anae, 2012).

Upon settling in the major urban areas of Aotearoa/New Zealand, the working class Pasifika communities experienced varied forms of disadvantage and discrimination. As Anae (2012: 223) notes “communities of Islanders living in enclaves such as Auckland’s Ponsonby had disproportionate poverty and unemployment rates, received substandard education and health care and were being exploited by unscrupulous landlords,” paralleling the experience of urban Māori. Like Māori, Pasifika immigrants organised and rallied against this discrimination. In 1971, the Polynesian Panthers were founded in collaboration with the indigenous rights movement. Despite some conflict regarding, for instance, competition for un- and semi-skilled jobs, as well as diverging interests (Māori fought specifically for indigenous rights and a biculturalism based on a duality of Pākehā and Māori to the exclusion of other ethnic groups), Māori and Pasifika joined forces and formed an internationally inspired and networked movement against imperialism, colonialism, capitalism and exploitation (Hill, 2010: 296).

From the early 1970s, a confluence of events provided fertile ground for moral panics and a more overt and invidious racist vilification of Pasifika immigrants. When Britain joined the European Economic Community in 1973, Aotearoa/New Zealand’s traditional export markets were greatly diminished and, the same year, the oil crisis led to an economic recession and growing unemployment. The declining economy led to a review of immigration policies aimed at curtailing numbers and detecting people who resided in the country illegally. Up until then, staying beyond the terms prescribed by visa had been largely overlooked but now ‘overstayers’ were prosecuted. The authorities employed racial profiling, random identity checks, and the now infamous ‘Dawn Raids’ of 1974 and 1976 in which Pacific immigrants suspected of overstaying their visa were forcefully removed from their homes in the early hours of the morning and

\textsuperscript{12} In the period 1947-1958, 85 percent of all immigrants to New Zealand arrived from Britain (D. Pearson, 1990: 114)
deported (Anae, 2012). A later investigation by the Race Relations Conciliator found that the ‘ overstayer’ was a highly racialised trope. Even though Pasifika immigrants and those from the United Kingdom (UK) and the US constituted similar proportions of immigrants staying beyond the terms of their visa, Pasifika immigrants were much more likely to be prosecuted, and were the only group to be subjected to dawn raids (Spoonley & Bedford, 2012).

Even though, as Moon (2011: 479) argues, the settler nation thought of itself as benevolent, the 1970s were characterised by “bare-faced racism” in media headlines and political discourses. Pākehā reactions to this first significant wave of non-white immigrants are not well documented although it is safe to assume that it was as mixed as the reaction to indigenous protests. The anti-racist activism of Pākehā also extended to supporting new immigrants and to combine the issues of colonialism and discrimination against other ethnic minorities.

**Wanted: A New Identity for Aotearoa/New Zealand**

It has been argued that since the 1970s Aotearoa/New Zealand has been involved in a “modern nation-building project” (Hill & Bönisch-Brednich, 2009: 240), or, a process of “reinventing the nation” (Macpherson, 2005). This ongoing project of transforming settler imaginaries involves, as Nairn and McCreanor (1997: 28) note, “a major discursive struggle over how we understand and enact ourselves in relation to race, culture and justice.” The final part of this chapter charts some of the complexities of this struggle, and the possibilities and limits of forging new social imaginaries with respect to settler-indigenous but also settler-migrant relations.

**Becoming Bicultural and the Politics of Redress**

The post-war immigration just described initially prompted a multicultural rhetoric similar to that articulated in other settler states at the time. Unlike Australia or Canada, however, Aotearoa/New Zealand eventually adopted a bicultural framework. Several locally specific reasons explain this. First, instituting biculturalism was a direct response to the substantial pressures the indigenous rights movement put on the New Zealand government, forcing it to address indigenous grievances (Hill, 2010; Pearson, 2000). In addition, as Pearson (2000: 101) argues, Māori were both a larger and more homogenous group than other immigrant minorities, and were also more fully amalgamated into the settler state. This enabled the development of a “treaty-driven myth of the co-founding origins of New Zealand, within a bicultural vision of a common destiny with its accompanying ideological and political framework” (Pearson, 2000: 102).
Defining biculturalism is far from easy, however, and perspectives and approaches have fluctuated over time and with changing political environments. While generally centred on the idea that the state should meet its Treaty responsibilities, the lack of consensus in interpreting the Treaty has been one of the main sources of contestation over the meaning of biculturalism (Fleras & Spoonley, 1999: 9). Johnson (2008: 36) identified a continuum of definitions. At one end, “soft” approaches focus on mainstreaming Māori culture and abolishing discrimination and prejudice. “Moderate,” “inclusive” and “strong” forms aim at alleviating inequalities, being culturally responsive and allowing Māori a modicum of autonomy. At the other end, proponents of “hard” definitions work towards transforming society with a view to establish tino rangatiratanga. In practice, biculturalism has largely revolved around the middle ground of responding to and accommodating Māori needs. Four key elements of biculturalism will be briefly explained below in order to provide a sense of the types of transformations that have taken place. These are settlements for Māori grievances against breaches of the Treaty of Waitangi, recognition of Māori culture, a policy focus on ‘Māori development’, and devolution of social service delivery.

One of the primary sites of bicultural discourse and the politics of redress is the Waitangi Tribunal, a statutory authority that examines Māori claims of breaches of the Treaty of Waitangi and makes recommendations to the government for appropriate compensation. First established in 1975 to investigate contemporary Treaty violations, its powers were extended in 1985 to include historic grievances. Since then, major settlements have been achieved with a number of iwi. These typically consist of financial compensation and a Crown apology but also variously include transfers of assets and property and other forms of cultural recognition, such as the renaming of places. The Waitangi settlement process is often seen as a pivotal element of decolonisation and the Māori Renaissance and it has certainly benefitted indigenous communities. Macpherson (2005: 217), for instance, emphasises that the Crown and Courts, former “agents of colonial domination,” have become instrumental in protecting Māori rights and promoting reconciliation. However, some commentators are more critical of the settlements process. Mikaere (2004: 43), for instance, notes that the Tribunal is under-resourced and its recommendations not binding, and that “claimants are typically presented with a ‘take-it-or-leave-it’ bottom line, with the Crown prepared to negotiate on minor matters only.” Mikaere (2004) is particularly critical of how the coloniser – rather than the colonised – dictates the terms and conditions of redress, often with a view to minimising interference with the settler state. Nonetheless, the Waitangi Tribunal has certainly played a pivotal role in revising dominant settler colonial historiography. Recovering
hapū and iwi histories has been the catalyst for a “renewed sense of social and cultural identity” amongst Māori (Moon, 2011: 524) but has also had an effect on the majority. As Veracini (2001) shows, the research conducted by the Tribunal was part and parcel of a broader radical revision of history\textsuperscript{13} that exposed hegemonic settler narratives as myths, and made New Zealanders aware of the nation’s settler colonial history.

Apart from compensation, the Treaty responsibilities and partnership discourse has centrally entailed efforts to ensure the recognition of Māori culture as central to ‘mainstream’ institutions. In 1986, the Māori Language Commission was established and tasked with promoting te reo Māori as a taonga (treasure) that is guaranteed protection under the Treaty of Waitangi. Soon after, the first Māori radio stations opened and, in 1989, the country became officially bilingual. Much later, in 2004, a Māori Television channel was created under the same provisions. Overall, Māori words have entered the everyday and formal New Zealand vernacular. The addition of Aotearoa to New Zealand is one example. The use of Māori terms in legislation has been described as an “attempt to incorporate and be sensitive to Māori interests” (Iorns, 2011: 263). Two further examples illustrate the importance placed on cultural recognition. In 1988, a landmark study of institutional practices in the Department of Social Welfare was published. In it, the Māori Perspective Advisory Committee (1988: 71) highlighted the “current failure to deliver Government services with sensitivity to Maori needs” and concluded that this failure should be understood as the accumulated effect of settler colonial policies and legislation that had systematically marginalised and assimilated indigenous communities. Soon after, a ‘Cultural Safety’ component was added to the nursing curriculum requiring health care professionals to consider Aotearoa/New Zealand’s colonial history and their own cultural background in order to be able to provide culturally appropriate health care (Papps & Ramsden, 1996).

In addition, there has been a strong focus on Māori development and alleviating inequalities. The socio-economic disparities between Māori and non-Māori first exposed in the Hunn Report of 1961 have remained significant. Moon (2011: 521) argues that in the early 1980s these were so stark that it was possible to speak of “two New Zealands.” Consequently, the introduction of comprehensive neoliberal reforms by the Fourth Labour government in 1984 caused optimism amongst many Māori. Disenchanted with the paternalism and racism of previous governments, Māori were hopeful that the envisaged economic and social reforms with their promise of

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\textsuperscript{13}The most prominent works include Ballara’s (1986) analysis of the history of racism in Aotearoa/New Zealand, Orange’s (1987) seminal and authoritative work on the Treaty of Waitangi, and Walker’s (1990) \textit{Struggle Without End} which dispelled the best race relations myth and highlighted continuous Māori resistance.
opportunity, choice and devolution would be beneficial to indigenous communities (L.T. Smith, 2007: 335). Instead, Aotearoa/New Zealand experienced a more significant increase in inequality than any other Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) country in the 1980s and 1990s. While the social and economic reforms certainly had far-reaching material consequences for all New Zealanders, they hit Māori and Pasifika communities the hardest (Moon, 2011: 522) because their younger and less educated populations were more vulnerable to economic restructuring than non-Māori when jobs in low skilled occupations disappeared en masse during the 1980s (Poata-Smith, 2013; L. T. Smith, 2007). Between 1988 and 1992 alone, Māori unemployment rose from 13.5 percent to 27.3 percent (Poata-Smith, 2013: 151), contrasting with a rise in the general unemployment rate from 5.7 to 10.8 percent (OECD, 2014).

Even though the economy recovered after 1992, by the end of the century, Te Puni Kōkiri (the Ministry of Māori Development) drew urgent attention to the stark socio-economic disparities between Māori and non-Māori in its 1998 report *Progress towards Closing the Social and Economic Gaps Between Māori and non-Māori*. A subsequent ‘Closing the Gaps’ policy sought to address these inequalities. For brevity’s sake, suffice to say that this was a whole of government approach that included ‘capacity building’ for Māori communities which was also promoted as a way of fostering partnership and Māori autonomy (Humpage, 2006: 52).

Yet, despite this focus on Māori development, the rift between Māori and Pākehā remains wide across a range of social indicators, such as wealth, health, education, employment, and criminal justice. To give just a few pertinent examples, in 2013, annual personal earnings of Europeans and Māori were $30,900 and $22,500 respectively (Statistics NZ, 2013 Census cited in Collins, 2014: np). In the same year, European unemployment was 3.4 percent while Māori unemployment was 8.5 percent, and the 7.5 percent of Europeans of working age (18-64) receiving welfare stood in stark contrast to the 33.1 percent of working age Māori (Statistics NZ, Household Labour Force Survey cited in Collins, 2014: np). Social indicators of health and education continue to show equally plain discrepancies despite overall gains and improvements across the population. For example, life expectancy has increased consistently over past decades for all New Zealanders but a gap of 7.3 years remained between Māori and non-Māori in 2010-12 (Statistics NZ, NZ Period Life Tables, cited in Ihaka, 2014: np). Educational achievement has likewise increased across ethnic groups, as evidenced in the number of students achieving university entrance (UE) qualifications but there is still a big gap between Europeans and Māori. In 2012, 26.7 percent of Māori students obtained UE, up from only 7.5 percent in 1993, compared to 54 percent of European students, up from 29.8 percent in 1993 (Education Counts, cited in Tapaleao, 2014: np).
Last but not least, devolving responsibilities of social service delivery to Māori providers has been central to Māori affairs policy since the 1980s, and has been conceptualised as a means for granting Māori greater self-determination and control over their own affairs. Linda T. Smith (2007: 339) highlights the significance of Māori-led institutions and initiatives as sites in which “Maori people could free their mind from the colonizer and exercise agency in a purposeful, tactical, and constructive way.” However, Moore’s (2014) analysis of ‘Whanau Ora’, a recently instituted cross-government approach to service delivery that draws on kaupapa Māori (Māori philosophy) and places the whānau at the centre of service delivery, shows that there is often a significant gap between philosophy and practice. As Moore (2014) demonstrates, by-Māori-for-Māori service provision often amounts to self-administration rather than determination, leaves Māori service providers underfunded compared to ‘mainstream’ providers, and places particular constraints on them.

Interpretations vary on the extent and effect of the transformations that have taken place under the umbrella of state biculturalism. King (2003: 487) argued that the set of measures designed to address grievances and inequalities “so changed the face of New Zealand life in the 1980s and 1990s that their cumulative effect could legitimately be called a revolution.” But not everyone shares his optimism. Johnson (2008: 48), for instance, calls biculturalism an “as yet unfulfilled promise,” and O’Sullivan (2007: 3) argues that, in its current incarnation, biculturalism keeps Māori in the position of a junior partner dependent on the government. One particular shortcoming is found in the focus on material disadvantage and individual needs, rather than on Māori as a collective with indigenous rights (Durie, 2005a: 205). Some of these perspectives echo Awatere’s (1984: 60) early insistence that “the kaupapa is Maori Sovereignty. It must not be biculturalism. All efforts at biculturalism have only resulted in integration and assimilation, bitterness and tears.” While policies such as ‘Closing the Gaps’ and ‘Whanau Ora’ are promoted as offering greater self-determination, some commentators are sceptical. Hill and Bönisch-Brednich (2009: 250), for instance, argue that devolution amounts to an “‘unburdening of the welfare state’ partly in the guise of addressing Maori aspirations.” While the ‘pretext’ argument may be seen as controversial, it is certainly the case that Māori service providers were “believed to most ‘efficiently’ reduce Māori disparity and dependency” (Humpage, 2008: 255).

In sum, falling short of granting sovereignty and failing to decolonise settler state structures, such “ameliorative measures have always been ambivalent […] and in some ways have served to reaffirm settler sovereignties over indigenous peoples” (Ford, 2013: 3). Occasionally, the extent of settler state control is revealed particularly clearly. The 2004 Foreshore and Seabed Act is a
poignant example. Following public concern that Māori might be able to claim customary rights to the foreshore and seabed of New Zealand beaches, the government made it impossible to test these rights in court by passing the Foreshore and Seabed Act which established exclusive Crown ownership of the contested area. Pearson (2009: 52) argues that the Act demonstrates that,

Maori may have moved from being second-class subjects and citizens to a place where the possibilities of citizenship-plus status may be realised. But they remain within a position of controlled coexistence given the limits that the state and the majority still place on them.

More than that, this piece of legislation was criticised as “the most recent example of illegitimate colonial land confiscation” (Borell, Gregory, McCreanor, Jensen, & Barnes, 2009: 34). Indeed, the legislation caused consternation amongst Māori, leading to large scale protests, including a hīkoi from Northland to Parliament in Wellington reminiscent of the 1975 land march (Harris, 2004). Most significantly, the Foreshore and Seabed Act culminated in the formation of the Māori Party which has been able to negotiate critical issues for Māori communities, especially since entering the government as the National Party’s coalition partner in 2008. Repealing the Foreshore and Seabed Act was central to the party’s platform but its mandate also included wider social and economic reforms. They were instrumental in negotiating Aotearoa/New Zealand’s signature of the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP) in 2010 and a currently ongoing constitutional review which includes discussions of how to anchor Treaty rights in a potential constitution.

Thus, the politics of biculturalism are a visible, public and contested part of political culture in Aotearoa/New Zealand. How the political, legal and socio-cultural transformations I have just described have been entwined with changes in settler subjectivities will be discussed in the following section.

‘Becoming Pākehā’ and ‘the Politics of Rejection’

In his assessment of the processes of ‘becoming bicultural’, Macpherson (2005: 235) summarises the effects on Pākehā as follows:

[T]hey have now to acknowledge that the conventional explanations of their dominance with which they grew up were fundamentally flawed and that the legitimacy of their political, economic, and social domination is now contested. They are confronted with increasingly frequent challenges to their domination in a range of social spheres in the name
of biculturalism. Pākehā are called on to acknowledge the centrality of the Treaty of Waitangi, to share their power in the name of bicultural partnership, and to accept the redistribution of part of the nation’s resources to redress injustices of the past.

The 1980s saw a distinct type of Pākehā identity work become commonplace. In academic circles, this identity work was encapsulated in the idea of ‘becoming Pākehā’. Adopting a Pākehā identity, which centrally included adopting this Māori term to refer to one’s self, indicated an acknowledgement of particularity, and a position as Other in relation to Māori. From this relational aspect evolved the moral obligations and responsibilities of being Pākehā. In his seminal book Being Pakeha, historian King (1985) promoted indigenous rights, arguing that Pākehā had a moral obligation to support redress and reconciliation. Such efforts of taking responsibility were evident in flaxroots activism such as Project Waitangi, a mainly Pākehā-led group established in 1986 which was dedicated to educating Pākehā and other New Zealanders about colonial history and the Treaty of Waitangi through publications and workshops (Huygens, 2011). Spoonley (1991) asserted that by igniting discussion of particularity of settler identity and the idea of taking responsibility for colonial injustices, becoming Pākehā was a process of both ethnogenesis and politicisation, and thus constitutive of becoming post-colonial.

But ‘becoming Pākehā’ arguably also worked in favour of the settler majority. Firstly, it replaced an identity closely tied to Britain just when this colonial connection fell away (Hill & Bönisch-Brednich, 2009); secondly, the Treaty partnership discourse provided Pākehā with a new foundational myth that re-legitimised their presence, allowing them to shake off the stigma of being colonisers and invaders and to replace it with an identity as one of two ‘founding peoples’ in Aotearoa/New Zealand (Bell, 2006). Increasingly, this new politics of re-legitimating belonging manifested in efforts to turn Pākehā from an ‘other’ into a “second indigenous people.” Interestingly, it was again King’s writings that catalysed a shift in imagining ‘Pākehāness’ in the 1990s. In his edited collection Pakeha: The Quest for Identity (King, 1991), he established that becoming Pākehā was a dual project of developing a relation to Māori but also becoming less European. While King remained committed to taking responsibility for rectifying colonial injustices, he also advocated for Pākehā to be accepted as belonging to the country as a prerequisite for reconciliation and harmonious Pākehā-Māori relations because it provided Pākehā with a sense of security that had been lost in the wake of the Māori renaissance. In Being Pakeha Now, King (1999: 235) thus explicitly ascertained that people “who are committed to this land and its people and steeped in their knowledge of both, are no less ‘indigenous’ than Maori.” Reflecting on the period that had passed since publishing Being Pakeha in 1985, King (1999: 9)
argued that the transformations that had taken place to address Māori grievances had to be matched with granting Pākehā the “right to live in this country, practice their values and culture and be themselves.”

Such claims to indigeneity are often presented as a natural result of a post-colonial re-articulation of identities, as in this speech by Race Relations Minister Trevor Mallard (2004: np):

> New Zealand also has to get its British imperial past behind it. Maori and Pakeha are both indigenous people to New Zealand now. I regard myself as an indigenous New Zealander – I come from Wainuiomata. We've left behind a British identity. This has meant that we no longer easily understand the people who tried to tear up the Treaty and went to war with Maori in 1863. Once were Warriors. Once were British.

The politics of redress were undoubtedly matched by a wider acceptance of symbolic biculturalism (Hill & Bönisch-Brednich, 2009; Sibley & Liu, 2004), such as accepting Māori cultural expressions and worldviews; integrating Māori vocabulary into New Zealand English, making Māori protocol part of many official functions; and, to some extent, acknowledging the need for reparations and policies that address persisting inequalities. Nonetheless, a pronounced reactionary stance, and ‘Treaty fatigue’, could be discerned by the turn of the century (Hill & Bönisch-Brednich, 2009: 246). While being mindful not to over-generalise attitudes, evidence suggests that initial politicisation was replaced by a return to a one nation narrative and that the potential of ‘becoming Pākehā’ was diminishing and only a small middle class project (Pearson & Sissons, 1997). MacLean (1996: 116) likewise claimed that only a “tiny minority” supported the work of the Waitangi Tribunal in the 1990s and that Pākehā remained largely removed from these processes. This unease was also expressed in a backlash against the term Pākehā itself, a topic I will return to when I present my participants naming preferences and discuss the politics of naming the majority in Chapter Five.

Since then various commentators have noted an increasing “rejection” (Spoonley, 2005: 108), and “resentment” (Barber, 2008: 149) of Treaty settlements and policies specifically aimed at Māori, and a more general “refusal” to see and acknowledge “poverty, racism, discrimination and marginalization” as the pervasive social problems they are (L. T. Smith, 2013: 230). Don Brash’s 2004 Nationhood speech, delivered against the backdrop of the Seabed and Foreshore debate, is perhaps the epitome of the revival of the ‘one people’ paradigm, and constitutes a watershed moment in the process of re-articulating the settler imaginary. In this speech, Brash (2004), then head of the National Party and leader of the opposition, attacked policies aimed specifically at
Māori as preferential treatment based on race/ethnicity, and diagnosed a Māori ‘grievance industry’ designed to keep Pākehā in a perpetual position of blameworthy coloniser. Couching his arguments in equal opportunities rhetoric, he evoked traditional values of egalitarianism which have come to be overlaid by neoliberal discourses of individual responsibility. As Johnson (2005: 149) argues, targeted policies were perceived as confrontational because they “disrupted both the civic equality and fictive ethnicity of one-New Zealandness.”

According to Wong (2004: 72), “[t]he speech worked like an on-switch, giving many Pakeha licence to say what they might have been thinking but were rarely prepared to say. A generation’s worth of goodwill evaporated overnight.” Accordingly, National Party support increased by 17 percent in the aftermath of the speech, revealing the fears and resentment many Pākehā harboured towards Māori in the first decade of the twenty-first century. The politics of rejection are as visible as the politics of redress. Annual debates about indigenous protests taking place on Waitangi Day illustrate that even though protest is often seen to be part of the national culture (Harris, 2004), a vocal section of the Pākehā population despises what they perceive as the hijacking of ‘their’ national day by radical Māori. Thus, the standard stories about good and bad Māori identified by Nairn and McCreanor (1990, 1991) in the 1970s and 1980s are still being evoked, while new ones, such as ‘privileged Māori’ are added (Huygens, 2007). Since the mid-1990s, a number of academic publications have argued that the Treaty has been misappropriated and incorrectly re-interpreted to justify a ‘grievance industry’ that undermines democracy and disadvantages non-Māori New Zealanders. In addition, Tyson (2007) detected a recent surge in popularity of historical fiction which resists revisionist histories and promotes a return to celebrating the pioneers of the colonial past. Published after 2000, these novels, some of them bestsellers, reinforce the rejection apparent in the political and academic domains.

While it is important to acknowledge that attitudes are never uniform, and that several political discourses coexist, I have shown here that, as Spoonley (2005: 107-8) argues,

New Zealand today has a much more explicit set of ‘one nation’ politics which reject many of the policy developments of the 1980s and 1990s, as well as the biculturalism that

followed and the possibility of a progressive multiculturalism. And the most significant
constituency in these ‘politics of rejection’ is Pakeha.

While Aotearoa/New Zealand has been grappling with biculturalism, a drastic increase in
immigration, largely from Asian countries, has added another layer to the reconfiguration of
ethnic relations in Aotearoa/New Zealand. In the final section of this chapter, I chart the most
prominent discourses emerging from this relatively recent development, and how it has thus far
shaped the national imaginary.

**Becoming Multicultural and the Politics of Recognition**

Influenced by neoliberal developments, the 1987 Immigration Act shifted immigration criteria
away from racial and cultural to economic suitability, thus removing the last vestiges of race-
based preferences that had dominated New Zealand’s approach to immigration for more than a
century (Simon-Kumar, 2014: 2). This human capital approach to immigration has since sought to
attract highly skilled, entrepreneurial immigrants and investment. This resulted in a drastic and
swift transformation of the ethnic make-up of the country. As Figure 1 below shows, the
percentage of immigrants from Asia jumped from a mere three percent in 1991 to nearly 12
percent in 2013 nationwide. This increase is most pronounced in Auckland which has become a
gateway city for new immigrants. Here, the percentage of residents of Asian origins leapt from
five to 23 percent in the same time. According to the latest Census results, nearly 40 percent of
Auckland residents are overseas-born (Statistics New Zealand, 2014).
While Pearson (2009: 48) attests to a resultant gradual shift from an exclusive ethnic nationalism to an inclusive civic nationalism, he is careful to note that this process was uneven. Especially in the 1990s, Asian immigration became the subject of moral panics and scapegoating. This included most prominently the media scaremongering of an “Inv-Asian” in 1993 which was reminiscent of the ‘yellow peril’ discourse of the turn of the twentieth century. In 1996, New Zealand First, a party founded in 1993, based its election campaign on an anti-immigration platform (Simon-Kumar, 2014: 5). With ethnic nationalist imaginaries remaining popular, immigration policy has had to respond to the public mood. At various times, public antipathies have been reflected in policy changes and stricter requirements for immigrants (Simon-Kumar, 2014; Skilling, 2008). However, as Bedford (2002) argues, by the early 2000s a bipartisan consensus was achieved that immigration would continue, that Aotearoa/New Zealand would grow more diverse, and that immigration would make positive contributions and was not something to be avoided or fearful of. Simon-Kumar (2011: 83) notes that,

ethnicity is associated with contemporary – and the future of – New Zealand. An image of ethnic harmony was actively constructed through government efforts – the presence of
politicians at cultural events, high profile conferences and symposiums, posters, books, research and media aimed at demonstrating a futuristic harmony in diversity.

While, so far, Aotearoa/New Zealand has not implemented any explicit overarching policies of multiculturalism, politically there has been a greater emphasis on the benefits of diversity since the early 2000s (Simon-Kumar, 2014; Skilling, 2008, 2010). A number of mechanisms have been instituted with the aim of supporting integration and settlement of immigrants as well as promoting community cohesion and the celebration of diversity. At the national level, an Office of Ethnic Affairs was established in 2001 (Trlin & Watts, 2004: 128), and the Human Rights Commission’s Diversity Action Programme initiated in 2004 (Human Rights Commission, no date). To some extent, immigrant and ethnic minority groups such as Pasifika have benefited from the neoliberal ideology of consumer choice and diversity, the focus on recognition, and the contracting out of services to deliver culturally specific programmes. Government funded research such as the New Settlers research programme (1998-2006) and subsequent Integration of Immigrants programme (2007-2012) were tasked to inform policy, assist settlement and devise strategies to capitalise on the benefits of diversity. Centring on the relation between immigration and economic growth and ethnic entrepreneurship, research outputs reflect contemporary concerns emanating from an immigration approach focused on attracting talented, highly skilled, middle-class business migrants to Aotearoa/New Zealand (Trlin, Spoonley, & Bedford, 2010).

With these demographic shifts, the triangular nature of settler state ethnic relations and questions of how to address both indigenous and ethnic minority rights have manifested in “the contested politics of ‘isms’” (Fleras, 1998: 62). Academic debates feature different ways of conceptualising bi- and multiculturalism. At times, multiculturalism is expected to eventually succeed biculturalism. According to this perspective, once a bicultural foundation is properly instituted, multiculturalism can be developed, guaranteeing equality for all New Zealanders. Greif (1995a: 17), for instance, supports the adoption of multiculturalism because biculturalism promotes an image “that the only real New Zealanders are either Maori or of British or racially related stock.” That immigrants find it difficult to negotiate a space in a bicultural nation is supported by Asian Studies scholar Ip (2005: np) who argues that immigrants are uncertain about how the Treaty applies to them and “how […] an evolving bicultural document support[s] the multicultural reality of New Zealand.” While based on rhetoric of inclusion, such temporal definitions are problematic because, as Goldsmith (2003: 285) argues, it necessarily assumes that the need for a treaty-based partnership between Māori and Pākehā will vanish. The counter perspective is that bi- and multiculturalism are “politically antagonistic, incompatible or at the very least unequal”
(Goldsmith, 2003: 285). Canadian political philosopher Kymlicka (1995) has most prominently noted that liberal multiculturalism does not have the capacity to address the rights of indigenous peoples. According to Larner and Spoonley (1995: 52), multiculturalism and biculturalism differ in so far as the former advocates diversity and tolerance while the latter “is identified with the issues of social justice, cultural integrity and the redistribution of resources.” As Skilling (2008) notes, a degree of congruence marks liberal concerns about how immigration would affect Māori status as tangata whenua (people of the land) and conservative anti-immigration stances. Māori scholar and indigenous rights activist Walker (1995) expressed his concern over immigration arguing that newcomers with no commitment to the Treaty of Waitangi posed a threat to Māori. Pearson (2001: 146) explains that New Zealand First appealed to both Pākehā and Māori who were united by fear of “increasing foreign ownership and rising levels of ‘foreign’ immigration.”

As Spoonley (1993) surmised in the early 1990s, and Fleras (2009: 134) more recently, many Pākehā may experience multiculturalism as less threatening to their status than biculturalism because “much of what passes for New Zealand multiculturalism does not involve major public resources, does little to make Pakeha uncomfortable, and puts the onus on minority communities to preserve their identity and culture.” However, there is very little research beyond quantitative attitudinal surveys. These studies conclusively suggest that Pākehā (and New Zealanders in general) have developed more favourable attitudes to immigration and ethnic diversity. Ward and Masgoret (2008) show that 89 percent of New Zealanders endorse multiculturalism, a figure much higher than European countries and only matched by Canada. Further, a large-scale survey carried out by Spoonley and colleagues (2007: 18) found that more than half of all respondents agreed that “the ‘white majority’ in New Zealand needs to get used to a more multicultural society.” In 2012, a *New Zealand Herald* survey of 214 Aucklanders showed that 60 percent of respondents “felt New Zealand society today was ‘multicultural’” (Tan, 2012a). Recent research by the Asia New Zealand Foundation (Gendall, et al., 2013: np) demonstrates that New Zealanders have developed increasingly positive attitudes towards Asian migrants in the period from 1997 to 2011, with favourable views climbing from 31 to 55 percent during that period, although its latest report suggests that attitudes have somewhat cooled since then (Colmar Brunton, 2013: 23). In this thesis I draw on this research, but also examine the question of how ethnic diversity inflects Pākehā imaginaries. The findings on this topic are presented in Chapter Seven.

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15 This survey was part of a four part series on ethnic diversity ran by the *New Zealand Herald* in October 2012, to mark the 25th anniversary of the 1987 Immigration Act that catalysed the dramatic shifts in New Zealand’s and especially Auckland’s ethnic make-up.
Conclusion

In this chapter I have sketched the socio-historical backdrop against which to interpret the life stories told in this research project. The context given here helps to understand the discursive repertoires people had at their disposal when they related their ‘Pākehā life stories’. Some of the Pākehā I spoke with in the course of this study were born into the period of redress and ethnic diversity but many remembered the height of the Māori protest movement, and some the time before that.

I have described how the New Zealand settler state – similar to other settler states – promulgated myths that helped to legitimise colonisation as benevolent. In Aotearoa/New Zealand, ideas of benevolence were underpinned by an approach that saw Māori amalgamated into the settler state rather than excluded or exterminated. Closely related, the myth of perfect race relations drew on the dominant settler imaginary of Aotearoa/New Zealand as an egalitarian and progressive nation and relied on overlooking continuous indigenous resistance and systematically racist immigration policies. During the 1970s, these settler myths were severely disrupted by a forceful indigenous rights movement partnered with anti-racism protests of Pasifika immigrants and global anti-colonial, anti-racist activism. For the very first time, Pākehā were forced to reflect on the colonial basis of their hitherto secure position as the national people in the settler state of Aotearoa/New Zealand. The subsequent Māori renaissance and the politics of redress have effected major transformations but, as I have shown, the settler state remains intact. The form reconciliation for violations of the Treaty of Waitangi takes, and how the postcolonial future is imagined remains in the hands of the settler government and indigenous sovereignty is curtailed.

Throughout the chapter I have aimed to highlight that both the myths that naturalise settler state hegemony and indigenous resistance have proven to be resilient. The politics of rejection and the politics of indigeneity suggest that Aotearoa/New Zealand is not yet postcolonial. While many New Zealanders are aware of colonial history and some Pākehā strive to work towards decolonisation alongside Māori, the politics of rejection make clear that the standard stories formulated as early as the nineteenth century are being adapted in ways that continue to legitimise the control of the settler state over processes of reconciliation and the future of settler-indigenous relations. At the same time, a politics of indigeneity demonstrates that Māori will continue to contest the dominance of the settler state. In the next chapter, I move from a descriptive to an analytical level and go beyond the local to consider transnational patterns of whiteness and settler colonialism.
Chapter Three
Theorising Settler Whiteness

My examination of Pākehā identities and social imaginaries is framed by two epistemological paradigms that have been at the forefront of examining majorities in Western nations and that, more specifically, problematise the role majorities play in the contemporary perpetuation of racialised systems of domination. These paradigms are critical whiteness and settler colonial studies. While these are separate fields of enquiry which have so far rarely been synthesised, I argue that since my research is situated in the context of a white (British) settler society, with Pākehā as white settlers at the heart of this study, they can be usefully combined. As Wolfe (2013: 264) argues:

Since most of the world has been colonised – or, more specifically, settler-colonised – by White people, it is only to be expected that the critique of settler supremacism should converge with the critique of White supremacism as consistently as the two converge in practice. In addition to benefiting from dispossession, White settlers also benefit from race, the two colonial privileges being fused and mutually compounding in social life.

In the opening part of this chapter, I detail those key analytical concepts and theories from both fields which underlie my research project. From the field of whiteness studies, I draw the idea that whiteness is a system of racialised domination that affords white people a normative and privileged position at the expense of non-white Others. Whiteness is a transnational phenomenon but manifests in different ways depending on the idiosyncratic conditions of various contexts. It is at this point that settler colonial studies offer useful concepts which help explain how whiteness ‘works’ in settler locales. I will specifically focus on the “logic of elimination” according to which settler projects inherently rely on making indigeneity disappear (Wolfe, 1994).

The central argument of this chapter, which is foundational to my thesis, is that whiteness is a socio-historical construct that remains relevant today. Thus, I will discuss the historical processes that created settler whiteness as a position of normativity and privilege and subsequently hone in on current conditions. I specifically focus on key ideas which help to explain how settler whiteness is “redefined and reasserted through various political discourses and cultural practices that privilege whiteness even when the prerogatives of the dominant group are contested” (Twine & Gallagher, 2008: 7). For the purpose of this thesis, I discuss four specific discourses which
international scholarship has identified as key strategies for protecting historically accumulated privileges. These are, in turn, discourses that posit that racism and settler colonialism are a thing of the past; calls for colour blindness that reject ameliorative measures for past and continuing discrimination as ‘preferential treatment’ with the help of an ostensibly egalitarian rhetoric; attempts to position majorities as core cultures that present the nation; and, lastly, settler context specific claims that settlers are also indigenous.

Critical Whiteness and Settler Colonial Studies: A Brief Introduction

Contemporary critical whiteness studies – what Twine and Gallagher (2008) describe as the ‘third wave’ of this line of inquiry – gathered momentum in the late twentieth century US academy but has since burgeoned internationally, most notably in the UK and settler societies, such as Australia and Canada, as well as South Africa. Its seedbed were the post-civil rights transformations that brought greater numbers of non-white students and faculty into American universities and encouraged engagement with the tradition of non-white writing on whiteness, as well as theoretical shifts that discredited biological theories of race (Roediger, 2001). These developments revealed that the norms, values, and institutions hitherto considered ‘mainstream’ were, in fact, particular to whites. Frankenberg’s (2009) reflections on what first compelled her to investigate whiteness illustrate this point well. For Frankenberg, a white American feminist, ‘whiteness’ became salient when she was faced with black women’s accusations that the feminist movement she was involved in was complicit in perpetuating the racial status quo because it clearly emanated from the position of white (middle class) women and reflected their interests. In purporting to speak for all women, white activists ignored that American women were differently located in systems of social stratification based on race (as well as class, sexuality and other social locations).

The realisation that whiteness was not universal led to attempts to make whiteness visible, to dislodge it from its default position (Dyer, 1997), and to problematise its role in making and maintaining racialised asymmetrical power relations (Roediger 2001: 82). As such, whiteness studies present themselves as a corrective to the Western social sciences’ traditional “epistemology of ignorance” (Steinberg, 2007: 66) which dissected minorities in the quest to explain the disadvantages minorities faced but failed to examine the role of majorities. As novelist and literary critic Morrison (1992: 90) once declared: “[m]y project is an effort to avert the critical
gaze from the racial object to the racial subject; from the described and imagined to the describers and imaginers; from the serving to the served.”

From the above, ‘whiteness’ emerges as a relational and dominant position but, to be analytically useful, the concept requires further definition. Given that the area has come to comprise of many disciplines, epistemological perspectives and methodologies, a clear cut definition is somewhat elusive (Andersen, 2003; Nayak, 2007). Indeed, Anderson (2003: 25) notes that definitions of whiteness include “identity, self-understanding, social practices, group beliefs, ideology, and a system of domination.” While Anderson regards this ‘vagueness’ as grounds for concern, I argue that this multiplicity of definitions is always subsumed under three overarching interrelated elements which also form the basis for this project on Pākehā identities and imaginaries. These are whiteness as an invisible norm, a structural location of privilege, and a set of cultural practices and discourses that serve to reinforce white supremacy. To briefly exemplify these three aspects, Frankenberg’s (1993) seminal study, White Women, Race Matters, which explored the role race played in white women’s lives in the US demonstrated its invisibility, as did Dyer’s (1997) White which revealed the ubiquitous exnomination of whiteness in cultural texts. Some scholars focus particularly on the aspect of privilege: Harris (1993) famously equates whiteness to “property”, and Lewis (2003: 171) describes it as a form of “symbolic capital – a resource that may be accessed or deployed to provide access to additional resources.” Lastly, Levine-Rasky (2002: 2) emphasises the aspect of practice in her definition of whiteness as “the processes through which whites acquire and deploy social dominance.” Based on ethnographic research with white mothers in London, Byrne (2006: 3), argues that “whiteness is much more than a conscious identity, it is also a position within racialised discourses as well as a set of practices and imaginaries.”

Importantly for this study, whiteness is understood to be a contemporary phenomenon which persists at a time when most white people insist that racism is a thing of the past. Informing my analysis of Pākehā identities and imaginaries are theories and research that examine how majorities respond and adapt to “dilemmas about how to maintain their own identity and the national identity they largely shaped, when their hitherto privileged situation is increasingly under threat” (Forrest & Dunn, 2006: 204).

From surveying the international research literature, it is clear that whiteness is a transnational phenomenon which manifests differently in various national contexts. In order to conceptualise these differences, I find it helpful to work with Smith’s (2010) contention that whiteness operates in three distinct but sometimes concurrent or overlapping ways: these are a ‘logic of slavery’, a
‘logic of genocide’, and/or a ‘logic of orientalism’. Arguably, in the US, whiteness operates in all three ways even though it has largely been theorised in relation to slavery and a black-white binary at the expense of its other expressions. In the UK and other European nations but also multicultural settler societies such as Australia, nationalisms that entail a logic of orientalism are emphasised as key sites of asserting whiteness vis-à-vis various Others, such as non-white immigrants, asylum seekers, and Muslims (Clarke & Garner, 2010; Hage, 2000, 2003). In white British settler societies, especially in Australia and Canada, the concept of whiteness has also gained currency as a way of problematising how whiteness is created and maintained in relation to indigenous populations (Lake & Reynolds, 2008; Moreton-Robinson, 2000; Moreton-Robinson, Casey, & Nicoll, 2008).

Taking Smith’s (2010) notion of a ‘logic of genocide’ as one modus operandi of whiteness as a starting point, I argue that settler colonial studies offer useful analytical tools that help to examine the settler locale specific expressions of whiteness. The key idea I want to introduce at this point is the ‘logic of elimination’ (Wolfe, 1994: 93) which is regarded to be integral to both historical and contemporary settler societies. Wolfe (1994, 1999) and Veracini (2010b), two of the most eminent scholars in the field, argue that settler colonies such as Aotearoa/New Zealand are territorial and permanent projects which are first and foremost about land and the establishment of new societies. As such, they are inevitably based on mass settlement and aspirations for “sovereign entitlement” (Veracini, 2010b: 20). Since settler projects are united by a common goal and imaginary of “settler domination” (Veracini, 2010a: 187) and “demands for self-rule” (Pearson, 2001: 74), that is, independence from the mother country, their ultimate goal is supersession. This entails “having ceased to be a dependency of a colonising metropole, having tamed the surrounding ‘wilderness’, having extinguished indigenous autonomy, and having successfully integrated various migratory waves” (Veracini, 2010b: 22).

This set of characteristics relies on what Wolfe (1994: 93) calls a “logic of elimination.” In order to create a permanent, sovereign nation that supersedes itself, ‘indigeneity’ must disappear because it presents an inherent threat to the success of the settler project. Indigeneity here encompasses the simple presence of indigenous peoples on the land the settler project depends on, their resistance to colonisation, as well as contemporary indigenous rights claims that serve as persistent reminders that indigenous autonomy has not been successfully extinguished. In this thesis, I use Veracini’s (2010b: 35-50) typology of forms of elimination, or “transfers” as he calls
them, because it persuasively draws attention to the manifold and often seemingly contradictory historical and contemporary attempts to eliminate indigeneity. I will discuss the kinds of transfers as they apply to the historical and contemporary New Zealand context throughout the remainder of this chapter. For now, I cite Strakosch and Macoun (2012: 45) to emphasise this multiplicity:

There are a number of ways to eliminate Indigenous political difference: by physically eliminating Indigenous people; by severing their physical connections to lands that lie at the heart of their political systems; by breaking down families and communities; by drawing Indigenous polities into the state and reforming them; and by entering into explicit, contractual exchanges (such as treaties) which publicly erase the political distinctions between colonizer and colonized.

Like whiteness, settler colonialism is regarded as a contemporary and transnational phenomenon that is inflected by idiosyncratic local socio-historical conditions. As Wolfe (1999: 2) famously stated, settler colonialism is “a structure not an event.” In other words, settler colonialism is not simply a point of origin that is no longer relevant but a structure that is foundational to settler societies. Paralleling whiteness studies further, the study of settler colonialism directs its attention to the question of how historic and contemporary settler colonial power relations are (re-)produced at a time that is commonly described as ‘post-colonial’. In doing so, it hones in on the majority – the settler descendants – as agents and beneficiaries of settler colonialism. Indeed, Veracini (2011b) suggests the term ‘settlerliness’ to demarcate the position of power and privilege conferred to the settler population and their descendants through settler colonialism. Referring to Frankenberg’s (1993) call to mark whiteness as a particular and privileged social location, Veracini (2010b: 121, n48) adds that “[w]e should focus on ‘settlerliness’ in order to unsettle the ‘unmarked marker’ status of being a settler in a settler society (and to produce a critique of the ‘seeming transparency’ of settler positionings).”

Despite these similarities, whiteness is seldom referred to in the literature and, as both Wolfe (2013: 264) and Veracini (2011b) stress, whiteness and settlerliness are regarded as distinct phenomena. It is true that internationally, not all settlers are white and not all whites are settlers. As Wolfe (1994: 111) argues, settler colonial relations are not primarily marked by race but by the “historical relationship of invasion” and a resulting dichotomy of coloniser and colonised,

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16 Veracini (2010b) proposes the term ‘transfer’ because it conveys an inverse relation between the mass transfer of settlers into the colony and settler efforts to transfer indigenous (and also exogenous) others out of the literal and metaphorical space settlers claim for themselves.
expropriating and expropriated parties. However, in white British settler states such as Aotearoa/New Zealand, Australia, Canada and the US, whiteness and settlerness are undeniably linked in an intricate interplay of imperialism, colonisation and racialisation. As Veracini (2010a: 184) argues himself, “with the emergence and consolidation of a global system of independent white settler polities, a settler colonial network of ‘white men’s countries’ became established.” In the following section, I hone in on the historical interplay of white supremacy and imperialism and how it created ‘settler whiteness.’

Making Settler Whiteness

... an Invisible Norm

The origins of modern conceptions of ‘race’ and ‘whiteness’ lie in the nexus of European imperialism and science, although, the terminology has existed for much longer. The term race was in use prior to European colonial expansion usually denoting nobility, lineage, and status. Likewise, a white complexion, usually alongside other physical attributes, often signified beauty, purity and elite status both in and outside of Europe, such as China and the Middle East (Bonnett, 1998). However, in the eighteenth century, European imperialism, coupled with a newly emergent scientific endeavour to categorise populations, led to a new kind of racialisation and whiteness acquired a new meaning. As Bonnett (1998) argues, whiteness and European-ness became synonymous. In the process, the meaning of whiteness expanded from a marker of status for a few to a racial identity for a people (or peoples) in a specific geographical territory. At the same time, access to this form of whiteness became restricted to Europeans through its relational construction in juxtaposition to the non-white peoples of the New World.

This new racialised identity had particular significance in the context of the mass movement of Europeans\(^\text{17}\) to the new settler colonies. For example, while racialised whiteness in nineteenth century Britain remained reserved for the upper classes, all settlers, regardless of class, represented white Britishness in its various (settler) colonies (2000). White Britishness was the basis of both transnational and local identities. Based on an analysis of political rhetoric, Lake and Reynolds (2008: 6) claim that Anglo-Saxon settlers imagined themselves as a race that “shared an

\(^{17}\) In this thesis I focus on British settlers but Lewis (cited in Bonnett, 1998: 1039) showed that the same new identity formation was evident in Spanish colonies: “[T]he traditional Old World distinction between Spanish nobility and Spanish commoners gave way to distinctions among Spaniards, Indians, mixed-races, and blacks. The social hierarchy in New Spain was dominated by the white (Spanish) elite, the index of legitimacy.”

49
English-speaking culture and newly ascendant democratic politics [and] a distinctive capacity, indeed a genius, for self-government.” Pearson’s (2001) notion of Pākehā as part of an “imperial diaspora” – a people with a common identity that disperse to a number of colonial settings in support of settler colonial projects – fits with this view of a transnationally shared identity.

Locally, opinion has been divided. On the one hand, it has been argued that the relative insignificance of class divisions amongst the European settlers allowed for a more inclusive shared white British identity which served as a boundary marker against both Māori and immigrants such as the Chinese, who could become British subjects but not white (Murphy, 2009). On the other hand, historical analysis shows that ethnic and regional affiliations – such as Scottish, English, Irish or Yorkshire men – remained important aspects of settler identities in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries (Akenson, 1990; McCarthy, 2011). Since abundant examples of ways of maintaining cultural traditions testify to the longevity of ethnic identities, McCarthy (2011: 71) argues that “[w]hile Britishness may have been a broad identity proclaimed in politics and public life this can be seen as superficial.” Instead of regarding it as superficial, I argue that it is important to distinguish between subjective identities and public and political discourse as two different but interrelated levels of identity. At the public and political level, race, ethnicity and nation became intertwined categories. Awatere (1984: 11) argues that colonisation and the desire for land levelled ethnic differences between European groups in Aotearoa/New Zealand and “sublimated [them] to the greater racial demand for white ownership and white power.” In addition, the construction of the nation as a better Britain clearly relied on contemporaneous racial ideologies which translated into the twin strategies of preventing entry of non-white exogenous Others while attracting kin migration. As emphasised by Pearson (1990: 97) and Stasiulis and Yuval-Davis (1995: 6), racial and cultural homogeneity characterised both Aotearoa/New Zealand and other white dominions such as Canada and Australia. According to Cormack and Robson (2010: 3), racial and cultural homogeneity as exemplified in the “98.5% British” slogan mentioned in the previous chapter was emphasised in promoting Aotearoa/New Zealand “as a desirable place for settlement.” Evidence for shared identities in the name of nation-building can also be found in poetry such as that of Scottish poet Andrew Kinross who wrote in 1899: “Let English, Scots and Irish join upon New Zealand’s strand / And show that over all the earth there is no freer land” (cited in McCarthy, 2011: 72).

First and foremost, shared white identities served to distinguish “between colonizer and colonized, dominant and subject peoples” (Bonnett, 1998: 1039), and to create what African American scholar Du Bois (1989 [1903]: 15) famously called “the color line” which became an
organising principle for “the relation of the darker to the lighter races of men in Asia and Africa, in America and in the islands of the sea.” Du Bois identified the connections between European imperial expansion and whiteness long before contemporary critical whiteness theorists returned to this idea and is thus often acknowledged as the founder of the ‘First Wave’ of whiteness studies (Twine & Gallagher, 2008). He argued that imperialism created “a new religion of whiteness” (Du Bois, 1995 [1920]: 454) – a celebratory consciousness of white racial superiority that was created and sustained through the concurrent construction of blackness as inferior. As such, whiteness is defined through what it is not: “the non-European, the ‘savage’, the colonized” (Lentin, 2014b: 73). As Rohrer (2010: 8) states in the context of settler colonial Hawai’i, “colonial racialization of native Hawaiians and nonwhite immigrants (locals) served to provide negative referents for haole.”

This dual process of ‘fetishising’ (Bonnett, 1998) white racial identity and degrading blackness normalised whiteness and made it ‘universal’. As Lentin (2014b) and others (e.g. Hage, 2000: 58) argue, racism and universalism operated in tandem. Based on new nineteenth-century conceptions of race as a biological indicator of (arrested) developmental stages, white bodies and white knowledge became normative. Scientific discourses of deviance and degeneracy (which became the basis for programmes of euthanasia in the first half of the twentieth century), marked white Europeans as:

the norm of health and functionality, with red, black, yellow, and brown peoples construed as less well developed or evolved, nearer to nature and savagery, and requiring careful monitoring and management lest they endanger the productive white population and its reproductively ensured future (McWorther, 2005: 543).

Beyond physical and mental normality, Europe became the epitome of civilisation against which the backwardness of non-white peoples was constructed. As Smith (2012: 61) aptly notes, “knowledge and culture were as much part of imperialism as raw materials and military strength.” European ideals of progress and civilisation legitimised the “seizure, expropriation, settlement, development – in a word, peopling” (Mills, 1997: 49, emphasis original) of New World spaces. The popular narrative that civilising the variously savage or noble but always primitive ‘natives’ was the “white man’s burden” (Kipling 1899) depicted (settler) colonial rule as well as slavery as benevolent institutions and justified genocide, dispossession, exploitation, and marginalisation. By dehumanising them, non-white Others were made responsible for their own oppression.
Rohrer (2010) argues that the success of the settler project is predicated on the ability to spin a “linear narrative” that naturalises the settler presence and allows for the creation of a coherent collective identity. These narratives are necessarily often grounded in ‘doctrines of discovery’ which portray European colonisation as the beginning of civilisational history, claiming that “before discovery, there was no history, only ‘darkness,’ chaos, and wilderness” (Rohrer, 2010: 36). Such perceptions of indigenous populations as part of nature rather than rightful occupants of a territory effectively transfer them by undermining their claims to the land (Veracini, 2010b: 37). As Johnston and Lawson (2004) aptly note, “[e]mpty land can be settled, but occupied land can only be invaded.” The Australian ‘terra nullius’ doctrine epitomises this approach but even without such overt declarations of emptiness, all settler societies legitimised the expropriation of indigenous lands in various ways. As such, the benign terminology of ‘settling’ assisted the disavowal of foundational violence towards indigenous populations. In addition, the language of settling helped to construct an image of settlers as “pious, hardworking, [and] peaceful […] to counter representations emphasizing indolent profanity and senseless violence” (Veracini, 2014: 245) often associated with ‘colonials’. Pioneer narratives, for instance, were instrumental in creating and popularising an imaginary of settler colonisation as natural, progressive, laudable, and caring towards the indigenous population and, subsequently, shaped settler identities and their normative expectations of settler colonial relations.

By omitting the violence inherent in processes of colonisation, settlers were able to construct a collective “plausible identity” (Rosenwald & Ochberg, 1992: 9). Normative expectations of white European superiority integral to these highly racialised stories naturalised the potential demise of the indigenous population. In the late nineteenth century, William Pember Reeves, then Agent General for Aotearoa/New Zealand in the UK, commended the colony to an English audience as “the stuff for a fine book.” A grand natural landscape, Reeves (1973 [1898]: preface) wrote, provided the backdrop to “the adventures of the gold-seekers and other pioneers; the high aims of the Colony’s founders, and the venturesome democratic experiments of those who have succeeded them,” coupled with “the mixture of quaintness, poetry, and ferocity in the Maori, and the gallant drama of their struggle against our overwhelming strength.” The publication of Reeves’ prose in *The Long White Cloud* in 1898 coincided with the lowest count of the Māori population since colonisation and a general belief amongst the settlers that Māori would either die out or else vanish through assimilation into the white settler society. As the quote shows, such narratives of the ‘vanishing native’, popular across settler societies, legitimised rather than undermined the settler project because they ostensibly confirmed racial ideologies of white European supremacy.
The ideology of white supremacy also informed a sense of entitlement to govern self and others. In fact, it “came to be a crucial marker of whiteness” (Lake, 2009: 130). In settler colonies where new sovereign polities were imposed on invaded territory, settlers, “[s]ecure in their Eurocentric beliefs, derived from a combination of secular and religious ideologies, [...] set out to consolidate their position, and to establish a ‘nation’ and ‘national culture,’ which was based on and re-affirmed these ideologies” (Macpherson, 2005: 215). Imposing a new polity is premised on what Pateman (2007) calls a “settler contract” which is enacted without including indigenous peoples in the decision to form a new nation on their territory. While the Treaty of Waitangi provided a greater degree of inclusion for Māori, Pateman’s (2007) core arguments do apply in the New Zealand context. For one, indigenous “lives, lands, and nations are reordered” (Pateman, 2007: 56) by the settler contract, and indigenous peoples in settler states “have never been seen as candidates for sovereignty” (Pateman, 2007: 73).

This rationalisation of white domination was, as Du Bois (1995 [1920]) argued, intrinsic to Western modernity and the capitalist enterprise. For Du Bois, white supremacy was a global multi-dimensional system of domination in which racism, colonialism, and capitalism merged. As the exploitation of the white working classes became increasingly untenable due to improvements in education, the work of labour unions and democratising structures in Western nation states, the use of physical and structural violence against racialised peoples facilitated the ongoing generation of profit. Du Bois (1995 [1920]: 461) contended that racial ideologies allowed for the exploitation of non-white peoples without the threat of “labor unions or votes or questioning onlookers or inconvenient consciences.”

In settler colonies, white supremacy historically underwrote various forms of transferring indigeneity. Perhaps the most literal use of biological ideas of race is to be found in what Veracini (2010b: 39) calls “transfer by accounting” which employs ‘race’ and blood quantum categories to determine a person’s indigenous status. “[B]reeding nativeness out” (Wolfe, 2011: 276) was a distinct possibility for most indigenous peoples in settler societies, including Aotearoa/New Zealand. Wanhalla’s (2010) analysis of nineteenth-century practices of enumeration in Aotearoa/New Zealand demonstrates that the South Island Ngāi Tahu, who had a high rate of intermarriage with Pākehā, were first robbed of their economic resources when a census that determined allocation of land on the basis of population numbers inaccurately counted many of them as European. After 1916, Ngāi Tahu, often called ‘the white tribe’, were no longer counted as Māori at all and were instead included in the general census (rather than the separate Māori census that applied to other iwi) (Wanhalla, 2010: 206). As an obvious point of contrast, North
American black Africans whose slave labour was indispensable were subjected to the one-drop rule which ensured that they could never become white, no matter how fractional their black ancestry. This way of measuring race was instrumental in ensuring a continuous supply of free labour while ‘breeding nativeness out’ facilitated access to land (Hixson, 2013).

A further way of eliminating indigeneity that dominated much of Aotearoa/New Zealand’s settler colonial history was, as described in the previous chapter, assimilation. Across settler societies, assimilation “was almost invariably couched in a rhetoric of improvement which echoed the missionary project of uplifting and civilising” (Wolfe, 1994: 107) even though it often had the same damaging effects as other forms of elimination. For instance, assimilation undermined indigenous difference by setting European standards as the yardstick of civilisation and requiring indigenous people to mimic the settlers. As Wolfe (2011: 273) argues “[t]hrough the alchemy of assimilation, the social death of the Native becomes the birth of the settler.” The meaning of this statement is conveyed in the following words from a 1901 New Zealand Herald editorial (cited in Ballara, 1986: 55; and in Bennett, 2001: 37):

In our singularly favoured islands we have a completely isolated country, which in every part is suited to the European [...] we have been and shall always be, united in maintaining it as a heritage for our own people. Owing to his exceptional characteristics, the Maori interferes in no way with our national homogeneity.

Historically in Aotearoa/New Zealand, assimilation relied on the perception that Māori were better natives and compatible with white settlers. Throughout the nineteenth century, a number of theories regarding ‘the Māori race’ were advanced with Treagar’s Aryan race theory proving popular around the turn of the twentieth century when building a racially pure ‘Better Britain’ was top of the nation-building agenda (Ballantine, 2001). Treagar’s theory “naturalized the settler presence by denying racial difference and viewing the British empire not as a series of highly unequal power relations but as the product of a new wave of Aryan migration” (Ballantine, 2001: 77). Subsequently, European colonisation could be legitimised as a ‘family reunion’ between European settlers and Māori who were themselves settlers from Polynesia. Such a portrayal of indigenous peoples as immigrants has been described as a “civilisational transfer” (Veracini, 2010b: 36) which serves to undermine their indigenous status and naturalise the settler presence as just another wave of immigration.

Defining Māori as ‘better natives’ also went hand in hand with defining Pākehā as better colonisers – especially in comparison to their Australian neighbours (Bennett, 2001: 38). Even
though their ‘better treatment’ of Māori rested solely on the assumption that they would more easily assimilate than ‘darker’ and ‘less advanced’ indigenous peoples, Pākehā derided rather than pitied their Anglo-Australian neighbours. Bennett (2001: 49-50) concludes that “[t]he rhetoric of Pakeha benevolence and a natural disposition for greater racial tolerance needs to be approached sceptically, yet it has a fundamental role to play in understanding white New Zealand perceptions of identity.”

If racialised whiteness entered the world in hyper-visible form, its universalisation rendered its normative status invisible. As Doane (2003: 7) emphasises in the context of the US, “[b]ecause whites have historically controlled the major institutions of American society, they have been able to appropriate the social and cultural ‘mainstream’ and make white understandings and practices normative.” While the American body of whiteness literature juxtaposes this to the marginalisation of African Americans, the same is certainly true in settler contexts. As Australian scholar Moreton-Robinson (2000: xix) poignantly states, “‘[r]ace’ is the prison reserved for the ‘Other’.” Moreton-Robinson’s (2000) statement implies that race is a punishment, and a location that is difficult to escape. Indeed, equating whiteness with the mainstream individualises white people, casting their thoughts, values, and norms as neutral and universal while, simultaneously, homogenising non-white people and reducing them to representatives of their ‘race’ or ethnic group. Consequently, race is often imposed as a primary marker of identity, and the knowledge, values and norms of non-white peoples are cast as particular, and representative only of its specific position. Chambers (1997: 192) concludes that “[w]hiteness itself is thus atomized into invisibility through the individualization of white subjects.” This individualisation, which stands in stark contrast to the homogenisation of non-white Others, serves as the source for the continuous reproduction of white hegemony. As Dyer (1997: 10) notes “[t]here is no more powerful position than that of being ‘just’ human. The claim to power is the claim to speak for the commonality of humanity. Raced people can’t do that – they can only speak for their race.”

It has been argued that occupying the position atop the racial hierarchy means white people have no need for – or awareness of – race as an aspect of identity but, I argue, it is important to understand the contingent nature of the invisibility of whiteness as a racial identity. Frankenberg’s (1993, 2009) previously mentioned study of white women’s life stories in the US revealed that the majority of her interviewees did not think of themselves as possessing a particular racial identity; nor did they “consider themselves particularly interested in the racial order, or especially implicated in racism” (Frankenberg, 2009: 526). Frankenberg interprets the finding that the white women in her study saw themselves as colourless or simply as American as an evasion of
whiteness and questions of power. Hartmann et al. (2009), who empirically tested the theory that race does not matter to white Americans in a survey, found that even though the white sample attached less importance to their racial identity than the non-white sample, nearly three quarters of white respondents found their racial identity to be somewhat or very important (compared to almost 90 percent of the non-white sample). The gap between white and non-white respondents widened when asked about how important racial identity was while growing up but even then more than half of all white respondents stated that their racial identity was of importance while growing up, compared to three quarters of non-white respondents. These figures seem to suggest that whiteness is not as invisible as formerly theorised, and this is certainly the way Hartmann et al. (2009) cautiously interpret them. However, as the authors concede, their quantitative data set is arguably unsuitable to convey the meaning white people attach to their racial identity. McKinney’s (2005) study of students’ written racial consciousness autobiographies sheds more light on the situational contingency of white racial awareness. McKinney (2005: 17) notes that while being white went indeed largely unnoticed by her participants, at times their race became “visible and salient.” Specifically, this was the case when whiteness was perceived as a liability (McKinney, 2005: 18). Accusations of racism levelled against whites, and affirmative action policies were interpreted as victimising whites and, hence, made white group identity relevant as a resource to mobilise against ‘reverse discrimination’. Awareness of whiteness was thus mainly triggered by a perceived threat to white privileges.

In contemporary Aotearoa/New Zealand, the claim that whiteness is invisible is arguably less salient because the politics of biculturalism discursively place Pākehā alongside Māori as one of two founding peoples and the term ‘Pākehā’ marks the majority as particular, thus to some extent compromising the majority’s default position. The same can be said of societies where majorities are challenged in similar ways, such as Hawai‘i. There, Rohrer (2010: 2) notes, “whiteness [...] is always marked and often challenged.”

Arguably, whiteness may have become more visible at least for some people over time in either its variant as a beleaguered identity, as in McKinney’s (2005) research above, or as a re-articulation of identity as conveyed in Black’s (2010) doctoral research on how ‘Treaty People’ – Pākehā activists who advocate Treaty of Waitangi education – came to recognise Pākehā culture. Recollecting her own experiences of setting up Treaty workshops in the wake of the 1981 protests against the Springbok Tour (see previous chapter), Black (2010: 10) stresses that:
As we set about educating ourselves and facilitating workshops about the Treaty of Waitangi, our sense of not having a culture was exposed, both within our group of anti-racism people, and in ‘Treaty’ workshops with participants. We lacked understanding of our own cultural positions and a language to describe who we were. Our sense of not having a culture often resulted in intense arguments about, for example, Māori having a culture and us not having one. We did not know how to relate the concepts of culture to our own experiences of being part of the dominant group in Aotearoa.

... a Desirable Social Location of Privilege

As a result of the historical creation of racialised social structures, race has become “a social fact with all-too-real consequences for the distribution of wealth, prestige, and opportunity” (Lipsitz, 1998: vii). While inequalities have been of concern to academics interested in ethnic relations, Western scholarship has traditionally only paid attention to one side of the equation, that of the disadvantages or ‘problems’ experienced by ethno-racial minorities (Steinberg, 2007). However, recent scholarship – especially in whiteness, as well as gender, studies – has begun to problematise the notion of privilege (Lipsitz, 1998; Lucal, 1996; McIntosh, 1989). The central argument is that disadvantage and privilege are two sides of the same coin, causally linked through historical and contemporary forms of marginalisation and preferential treatment. Black and Stone (2005: 244) define privilege as follows:

First, privilege is a special advantage; it is neither common nor universal. Second, it is granted, not earned or brought into being by one’s individual effort or talent. Third, privilege is a right or entitlement that is related to a preferred status or rank. Fourth, privilege is exercised for the benefit of the recipient and to the exclusion or detriment of others. Finally, a privileged status is often outside of the awareness of the person possessing it.

Mills’ (1997) ‘racial contract’ is indispensable for thinking through these dimensions of privilege. Mills (1997: 11) argues that modern states are racial polities intent on “the differential privileging of the whites as a group with respect to the nonwhites as a group, the exploitation of their bodies, land, and resources, and the denial of equal socioeconomic opportunities to them.” Racial inequalities, Mills (1997) contends, are built into modern discourses of liberalism and individual rights because the ideology of white supremacy used to legally sanction the exclusion of non-white peoples from the rights ‘men’ enjoyed. Consequently, we need to see not just
marginalisation but the preferential treatment of whites/settlers. Brown et al. (2003: 26) argue that,

[s]ince the inception of the United States wealth and institutional support have been invested on the white side of the color line, leading to an accumulation of economic and social advantages among European Americans. On the black side, economic and institutional disinvestment has been the practice, resulting in a process of disaccumulation.

In settler societies such as Aotearoa/New Zealand, white settler privilege was largely established through indigenous dispossession and through what Wolfe (2013: 266) calls “preaccumulation,” that is, through importing and imposing settler institutions, values and norms. As a result, Pākehā and settlers elsewhere have been “advantaged by a social order that is based upon their cultural beliefs, practices, institutions and processes” (Borell, et al., 2009: 31).

Mills (1997) insists that all whites benefit in some way from the racial contract. Given that social stratification operates along a number of lines, including most notably class and gender alongside race/ethnicity, this requires qualification. Certainly, not all whites enjoy the same material benefits. However, in returning to the idea of whiteness as symbolic, rather than simply economic privilege, the argument that all whites are beneficiaries of the racial contract is more convincing. Du Bois (1999) perhaps put it best when he said that being white entails material and psychological privileges, an argument that is echoed by Bonilla-Silva (2014: 15) who refers to material and ideological effects. According to Du Bois, ‘being white’ served as a mark of distinction from black people even in the presence of class differences. As Du Bois (1999) and also labour historian Roediger (1991) stress, in the nineteenth century US, racial solidarity between white labourers and the white elite overrode class solidarity between white labourers and free blacks because a racial identity provided white workers (and especially those at the margins such as southern and eastern Europeans as well as the Irish) with capital.

In addition, the normative and individualised status of whiteness arguably constitutes one of the greatest privileges and, in some ways, extends beyond class divisions.18 As Doane (2003: 14) asserts, “the core of ‘white privilege’ is the ability to be treated as individuals in a white-dominated society, as opposed to being ‘profiled’ by police or viewed as a representative of one’s race.” McIntosh’s (1989) analogy of a ‘knapsack’ filled with invisible advantages such as the

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18 I say this with the qualification that norms and values are always also classed and gendered but in this thesis I do not have the scope to discuss this fully. For an analysis of whiteness and class in the United States, see for example Wray and Nevitz’ (1997) edited collection White Trash: Race and Class in America.
‘flesh-coloured band aid’ remains the go-to illustration of the varied privileges associated with being white because it eloquently demonstrates how economic, cultural, and symbolic privileges are intertwined and mutually reinforcing. Her examples speak to the ubiquity and dominance of white culture in society and illustrate the individualisation and universalisation of white thought. As McIntosh (1989) stresses, neither success nor failure, in fact, no behaviour of white people in general will be interpreted or evaluated as a sign of their racial background. Personal failure or misfortune will not reflect badly on white people ‘as a race’; neither will successful white people be called a credit to their race. White people will never be asked to speak on behalf of their race. Instead, they can speak for the commonality of humanity and be sure that their authority will not be questioned.

Importantly for this study, it has been argued that these privileges make whiteness a desirable social location (Hage, 2000). Drawing on Bourdieu, Hage (2000: 57) proposes to conceptualise majorities as variously occupying a “field of whiteness.” The notion of the field is helpful for understanding the blurred boundaries of whiteness as a social location and that whiteness is something people outside the field aspire to. Hage (2000: 58) claims that people yearn to occupy the field of whiteness and that “by feeling qualified to yearn for such a position […] people can become identified as White.” It is worth adding that the boundaries of the field are also heavily policed and that the field is internally differentiated as other social locations cut across it. Nayak (2007: 738) puts it this way: “some people are ‘whiter’ than others, some are not white enough and many are inescapably cast beneath the shadow of whiteness.” The main characteristic of the field of whiteness is thus not a cultural essence but the capital it confers on people who are located within the field. This definition links back to my conceptualisation of Pākehā as occupying a specific structural location as discussed in Chapter One.

One of the key tenets in theorisations of white privilege is that it is invisible because it passes as the norm against which disadvantage is measured although this assumption may have lost some validity since it was first formulated. McIntosh (1989: np) stresses that “[t]he silences and denials surrounding privilege are the key political tool here. They keep the thinking about equity incomplete, protecting unearned advantage and conferred dominance by making these taboo subjects.” As discussed in the previous section, whiteness has become more visible and more recent work suggests that majorities are actively involved in defending the privileges that whiteness entails, as expressed in Lipsitz’s (1998) diagnosis of a ‘possessive investment in whiteness’ and Twine and Gallagher’s (2008) suggestion that whites actively ‘recuperate’ white identities. More than that it has been argued that the notion that white privilege is invisible
obscures white people’s agency in preserving them (Leonardo, 2004). Discourses and practices that evidence how majorities invest in preserving the normativity and privileges of whiteness will be discussed below.

**Maintaining Settler Whiteness**

Having established that settler whiteness is a historically constructed position of normativity and privilege, I now want to turn to the present. It has been argued that the social movements of the mid-twentieth century which revealed histories of white supremacy, as well as new migration flows that challenged taken-for-granted assumptions of national homogeneity, caused a crisis of legitimation for majorities in settler and other Western states (Kaufmann, 2004). Harvey (2007: 8), for instance diagnoses an “acute moral crisis” of whiteness in the US. In Aotearoa/New Zealand, Mikaere (2011: 93) claims that Pākehā experience guilt and insecurity as a result of being faced with “uncomfortable truths” about how their belonging and privileged positions was historically secured.

My main interest lies in how majorities respond to such challenges to their dominant position. The critical whiteness and settler colonialism literature suggests that majorities are invested in protecting their normative position. Bonilla-Silva (2000: 202-3), for instance, argues that,

> [f]aced with economic insecurity, restructuring, transnationalism, and new political alignments, Whites in the Western world are struggling – ideologically and practically – to maintain what they regard as their ‘rights’ to cultural, social, political, economic, and psychological advantages as White, ‘civilized,’ and ‘Christian’ citizens over racial minorities, immigrants, or any representative of the Other.

It is important to acknowledge that certainly not all whites, and not all Pākehā, aim to support the racialised systems of domination they are inevitably embedded in and that some actively challenge the status quo (Huygens, 2011). However, as I discuss below, the literature clearly demonstrates larger patterns of restoring white settler privilege, and reveals transnational commonalities in the discourses that sustain these efforts. While my analysis of the Pākehā life stories at the heart of this project tries to grasp the varied ways of responding and adapting to such challenges, including counter-hegemonic ways of re-imagining Pākehā identities, I expressly aim to problematise instances of protecting settler whiteness.
In the remainder of this chapter, I examine in more detail four discursive sites which the available literature shows to be central to maintaining settler whiteness. I begin with claims that we have entered a ‘post-racial’ or ‘post-colonial’ era in which racism and settler colonialism are no longer relevant, and argue that the narrative of a break with the past allows white settlers to re-imagine themselves as innocent.

‘Post-colonialism’ and White Settler Amnesia

Since the late twentieth century, proclamations of a post-racial and post-colonial era have become commonplace (Lentin, 2014a). Pronouncements such as “the civil rights revolution changed hearts and minds, as well as the law” (Thernstrom & Thernstrom, 1997: 18) are employed to argue that racism no longer exists and no longer structures people’s life chances. Such perceptions of change and progress typically evoke an image of a break in time – a before and after – as expressed in language that highlights the history or legacy of racism and/or colonialism. This temporal logic has been identified as a discursive strategy that allows majorities to recuperate normativity and privilege (Strakosch & Macoun, 2012).

In line with such arguments that societies have undergone transformative change over recent decades, Sissons (1997: 33) asserts that “[n]o one could reasonably argue […] that the New Zealand State’s strategies conform to a logic of elimination and nor, I suggest, can this be convincingly argued for the post-colonizing Australian state.” Certainly, the politics of regret, recognition and reconciliation ostensibly include indigenous peoples leading some scholars to argue that they have “replaced” fantasies of disappearance (Bell, 2014: 14). However, it is exactly this very image of a rupture of settler colonial discourses and practices that Wolfe (1994) critiqued when he proposed that settler projects are governed by a logic of elimination. More specifically, Wolfe (1994) claims that strategies of invasion and confrontation, which characterised early settler colonial history, and contemporary government policies such as the Native Title Act based on the 1992 Mabo decision in Australia, reflect continuity, not disruption.

The key argument against the idea of a break with the past is that in settler societies, becoming ‘post-colonial’ cannot be equated with de-colonisation. Strakosch and Macoun (2012: 43) argue that the concept ‘post-colonialism’ has been adopted without reflection from the context of extractive colonies which gained independence from metropolitan powers. In settler societies, however, decolonisation is more problematic because settlers make the colony their home and do not intend to return to their homelands. As discussed earlier, settler colonial projects follow a
linear trajectory from settlement to supersession. As a consequence, there is no room for decolonisation in the settler imaginary. Veracini (2007, 2010b) calls this a “narrative deficit,” and argues that decolonisation inevitably constitutes failure, “signalling the demise of original settler claims and their legitimacies” (Veracini, 2010b: 112).

This argument requires consideration of how to define decolonisation and this is no easy feat. The fact that even the literature on settler colonialism does not provide a straightforward definition is perhaps in itself evidence of the narrative deficit and the problem of overcoming settler colonial structures in societies that remain controlled by settler governments, institutions, norms and values. Tuck and Yang (2012) have advanced the most radical definition, insisting that only the return of indigenous lands and the abolishment of private property constitute decolonisation. They further argue that current settler states turn decolonisation into a “metaphor” by falsely conflating it with various social justice projects (Tuck & Yang, 2012). I argue that the notion of metaphor, of ‘dressing up’ redress, compensation and reconciliation as decolonisation is useful even if we subscribe to more ‘moderate’ definitions. Smith (2012: 101), for instance defines decolonisation as a “long-term process involving the bureaucratic, cultural, linguistic and psychological divesting of colonial power.” Veracini (2010: 116) lists recognition, access to native title, apologies and compensation as elements of decolonisation but emphasises sovereignty as a key requirement. Thus, all these definitions emphasise structural transformations and indigenous self-determination. However, the latter especially is anathema to settlers and settler states. As Turner (2002: 63) stresses, Māori sovereignty constitutes an “intolerable alternative” to the predominant modes of imagining Aotearoa/New Zealand which include the ‘One Nation’ paradigm, a bicultural paradigm, and a multicultural paradigm which, in its neoliberal embodiment, strongly resembles the One Nation paradigm.

As such, biculturalism in its current format (see Chapter Two for details) can be, and has been, interpreted as a type of eliminating indigenous difference (Veracini, 2010b: 43). O’Sullivan (2007: 209) claims that biculturalism only “offers colonial dependence. Self-determination at least legitimises and to some extent offers autonomy, not as an act of government benevolence, but as an inherent right of indigeneity.” Complementing this critique, Veracini (2011a: 8) rightly argues that “an ostensible partnership does not alter the fundamental and original demand of settler colonialism, and indigenous alterities are still being subsumed/neutralised/extinguished.” Moreover, even though measures such as resourcing indigenous communities appear de-colonising, they can, as Strakosch and Macoun (2012: 46) argue, “constitute ‘the most successful practices’ of settler-colonial political assimilation” because they appease indigenous communities
and thereby help to contain the more threatening aspirations to sovereignty. In Aotearoa/New Zealand both the practice of Treaty settlements and the Closing the Gaps Strategy have been criticised as forms of assimilation (Mikaere, 2004) because one draws Māori into an exploitative system that creates class divisions, while the other positions Pākehā as a benchmark to which Māori should aspire.

Crucially, the hegemonic idea of a post-colonial era benefits white settlers in a number of ways. By depicting settler colonialism as “finished business” (Smith, 2012: 101), temporal narratives deny that settler colonialism is a structural feature of settler states (Wolfe, 1999). This allows settlers to construct a narrative according to which:

colonisation was ‘something bad’ that happened a long time ago, that indigenous people of the past suffered, but that present-day people of European descent were not directly part of this process and therefore should not be blamed. Indigenous people should move on from the past and take responsibility for improving their status (Kirkwood, Liu, & Weatherall, 2005: 495).

Hence, the post-colonial narrative positions contemporary white settler majorities as innocent and simultaneously denies indigenous rights claims. As some commentators have rightly noted, Pākehā are both cognisant and accepting of colonial history (Liu, 2005; Veracini, 2001). Public discourse and my own research confirm this observation. For instance, in a recent newspaper series following the Waitangi Tribunal finding that Ngapuhi did not cede sovereignty when they signed the Treaty of Waitangi, Morgan (8 Jan 2015) wrote: “[w]e’re [...] aware that Maori were grossly assaulted as a people and that assault wasn’t just via land seizure, it included the crushing and marginalisation of Maori society. The damage has been massive and intergenerational, deep and lasting.” Importantly though, it has also been shown that this knowledge does not automatically translate into support for indigenous rights. Instead, these “uncomfortable truths” (Mikaere, 2011: 93) are deflected by the temporal logic which positions contemporary settler descendants as innocent.

A settler desire for redemption has been diagnosed as a central component of the settler fantasy (Bell, 2014; A. Jones, 1999). Manne (2009) argues that settler descendants have “a deep yearning for a history in which no serious crimes against the Aborigines had been committed.” While this appears to be a positive sentiment, it is often found to be a self-serving yearning in the interest of securing the settler future through redemption. This is evident in the fact that contestations over settler colonial histories are dominated by the question of what role ‘past injustices’ should play in
the image of the contemporary nation. Do they define the nation or are they merely small blemishes that should not deflect from the positive achievements of nation-building and progress? These notions find expression in the idea of a “balance sheet” (Manne, 2009), a weighing up of positive and negative aspects of colonisation. Recent remarks by Australian Prime Minister Tony Abbott and New Zealand Prime Minister John Key who claimed, respectively, that colonisation was the “foundation for Australia to become one of the most prosperous societies on Earth” (Dingle, 2014) and that the British who settled in Aotearoa/New Zealand “brought with them a lot of skills and a lot of capital” (New Zealand ‘Settled Peacefully’, 2014) are poignant examples of distorting the truth. By obscuring the role settler colonialism has played in expropriating indigenous lands and destroying indigenous communities and cultures they perpetuate the myth of ‘benevolence’ and, as Manne (2009) stresses, construct a false comfortable middle ground that evades confronting foundational violence.

Reconciliation, rather than decolonisation, plays a key role in achieving redemption. Tuck and Yang (2012: 35) argue that “reconciliation is about rescuing settler normalcy, about rescuing a settler future” because in posing as decolonisation it promotes a sense of settler innocence without impinging on the privileged position of the majority. As Veracini (2010b: 50) claims, the “Reconciled Nation” incorporates and assimilates indigeneity into the settler state, thereby eliminating indigenous political difference and aspirations and protecting settler state control. At the micro-level, this combination of reconciliation and control, coupled with a colonial discourse of benevolence, was also found in post-apartheid South Africa (Steyn, 2001) and in Australia (Green & Sonn, 2005). Steyn’s (2001) research shows that, in re-imagining their identities, her white South African respondents continued to claim expertise over the black Other, often discursively intervening on behalf of black South Africans. Similarly, Green and Sonn (2005) observed that white Australians who aligned themselves with Aboriginal Australians in the Reconciliation movement positioned themselves as ‘experts’ on indigenous issues and retained control.

Reconciliation relies on re-writing the national narrative and thus on ‘settler amnesia’. In Aotearoa/New Zealand, biculturalism has enabled a new collective foundation myth that re-legitimises settler belonging by positioning Pākehā as ‘tangata tiriti’ – ‘people of the Treaty’ – alongside Māori, the tangata whenua and ‘people of the land’ (Bell, 2006: 257). By maintaining a version of history in which Māori signed away sovereignty, this narrative facilitates settler amnesia because it does not demand that Pākehā face the past (Bell, 2006). Bozic-Vrbancic’s (2003, 2008) analysis of Te Marae o Te Papa Tongarewa, a purpose built functioning marae at
the National Museum Te Papa, reveals that the construction of a false shared national history also extends to settler-indigenous-migrant relations. In the narrative the museum creates, ethnic difference is and always has been part of the nation. Historical realities of exclusion and discrimination, such as those outlined in the previous chapter, are excluded from this image. In this imagined reality, “people are shown not what they were but what they must remember having been” (Bozic-Vrbancic, 2008: 224) in order to proceed into a united harmonious future. As Mikaere (2011: 93-94) argues, the settler desire for innocence and reconciliation relies on “selective amnesia,” a “denial and distortion of the truth,” and an “obsession with looking forward.” This also means that asking Māori to ‘move on’ equates to asking them to forget the history of dispossession. As Burke (1989: 108) reminds us, it is important to:

investigat[e] the social organization of forgetting, the rules of exclusion, suppression or repression, and the question of who wants whom to forget what, and why. Amnesia is related to ‘amnesty’, to what used to be called ‘acts of oblivion’, official erasure of memories of conflict in the interests of social cohesion.

In Aotearoa/New Zealand, recent academic work has highlighted the potential of ‘knowing’, of learning and conscientisation for transforming settler subjectivities and attitudes. Based on an earlier study by Liu (1999), Liu and Hilton (2005: 551) argue that “majority group members who know most about the minority’s historical perspective are also most likely to favour conciliatory policies to the minority.” The authors consequently surmise that education can be a powerful decolonising tool. Recent qualitative research supports this claim. Investigating Pākehā activism, Huygens (2007: 89) describes Treaty education facilitators as “translators” who explain indigenous demands to participants who, in turn, become “early adopters” and carry their newfound understanding into new contexts. This suggests a trickle-down effect through which settler imaginaries can be affected. Mitcalfe (2008: 110), similarly concludes from her interviews with a small group of Pākehā engaged in Māori learning contexts that this experience turned Pākehā into “bridge makers and border crossers.” Yet, Mitcalfe (2008) is careful to stress that being postcolonial is neither a finite endpoint nor a unitary identity as participants espoused various and often contradictory positions. Last but not least, Brown (2011: 277) describes his Pākehā participants, all professionals who work with Māori or in Māori environments, as “facilitators of decolonisation.”

Tuck and Yang (2012) critique Freire’s vision of individualised enlightenment which returns us to the argument that only those types of decolonisation that do not require (too) much change are
accepted. Learning is no substitute for decolonisation but may appear as such because for white settlers “the experience of teaching and learning to be critical of settler colonialism can be so powerful it can feel like it is indeed making change” (Tuck & Yang, 2012: 19). Huygens (2011: 73) maintains that Treaty education is a de-colonising practice because it has been instrumental in promulgating an ‘honouring the Treaty’ discourse, leading many organisations in the non-governmental sector to change their institutional structures in an effort to ensure indigenous autonomy and authority. However, there are two problems here. First, the wider effect is unknown. Huygens’ (2007: 251) conclusion that “a ‘Pākeha honouring the Treaty’ discourse is a sustained, coherent alternative to the dominant colonial and racist discourse,” implies that it remains marginal. This aligns with Pearson and Sissons’ (1997) suggestion that Pākehāness as a political post-colonising identity is a small project, and as Spoonley (1995) argued, essentially a middle class phenomenon. Indeed, Barber (1999: 38) claims that “enthusiasm for the development of a Pakeha ethnicity faltered and died” when middle-class support for biculturalism declined in the late 1990s.

A second point of critique is that these works often remain wedded to transferist discourses and metaphors for decolonisation and thus forego the possibility of transformative structural change. While I am uneasy about criticising work that is dedicated to counter settler colonial discourses and practices, it is nonetheless important to be draw awareness to such continuities. Brown (2011: 230), for instance, emphasises that the effectiveness of ‘facilitating change’ is based on promoting “interconnectedness and equality between Māori and Pākehā ahead of any aspect of separatism.” Such imaginaries of settler-indigenous relations as fundamentally harmonious can have the effect of reinforcing liberal notions of equality that undermine indigenous rights to self-determination.

**Colour Blindness and White Settler Entitlement**

Such imaginaries of a break with the past (whether racist or settler colonial) centrally feature calls for ‘colour blindness’. Put simply, proponents of colour blindness assert that the end of racism/colonialism has created a level playing field which affords everyone equal opportunities and the same life chances regardless of social location. Based on this contention, they decry any ameliorative measures for past and continuing discrimination as preferential treatment and reverse racism, and as divisive (Bonilla-Silva, 2014; Brown, et al., 2003). As hooks (1997: 167) notes, colour blindness typifies the “liberal conviction that it is the assertion of universal subjectivity (we are all just people) that will make racism disappear.”
These discourses are a transnational phenomenon but they coalesce around locally specific issues. In the US, affirmative action (such as quota for university admissions or jobs) for African American and other racialised minorities has crystallised as the most prominent site for articulating claims of reverse discrimination (Feagin & O'Brien, 2003; Lipsitz, 1998; McKinney, 2005). By contrast, in the UK, “welfare, empire and re-evaluation of Britishness” are the predominant local expressions (Clarke & Garner, 2010: 59). This means that opposition to preferential treatment is most clearly expressed in nationalistic discourses that portray non-white/immigrant minorities and, more recently, asylum seekers as privileged vis-à-vis ‘local’ (read white) British people, especially in the contexts of housing, healthcare, and welfare (Garner, 2010). In settler societies, such opposition to preferential treatment additionally manifests in opposition to measures that address indigenous rights. In Aotearoa/New Zealand, calls for colour blindness are largely (though not exclusively) responses to perceptions that Māori are now the privileged group (see Chapter Two). As I argue further below, this adds a further dimension to colour blindness because it relies on redefining indigenous peoples as an ethno-racial minority with needs rather than an indigenous community with inherent rights, which is in itself a further strategy of eliminating indigeneity (Veracini, 2010b: 48).

As I alluded to earlier in this thesis, such perceptions of ‘reverse discrimination’ translate into a politics of resentment which, as Schick (2014) notes, “arises in the affective economy of emotional space in which one’s identity is no longer secure.” This insecurity manifests, again internationally, in the conviction that whiteness has become a liability and that majorities are treated unfairly (Garner, 2010; McKinney, 2005; Mikaere, 2004). Especially in the US and other settler societies, where ameliorative measures are largely designed to compensate for historical injustices, the discourse of unfairness is dominated by the argument that white people – as individuals – are unduly held accountable for actions they were not personally involved in. McKinney’s (2005) autobiographical research with white American undergraduate students demonstrates that participants felt their opportunities, especially in education and the labour market, were curtailed by measures that punished them for injustices committed by their ancestors. In Aotearoa/New Zealand, this is matched by the previously discussed Pākehā desire to set themselves apart from their colonising forebears to ward off responsibility. As Brash (2004) emphasised in his *Nationhood* speech: “None of us was around at the time of the New Zealand wars. None of us had anything to do with the confiscations. There is a limit to how much any generation can apologise for the sins of its great grandparents.”
Colour blindness – often in combination with the temporal logic – is thus a vital discursive strategy that seeks to justify and protect white settler privilege without being outwardly racist. While this ideology is presented as liberal, egalitarian, and non-racist, Bonilla-Silva (2014) argues that it constitutes a modern form of racism, and that racialised social relations and inequalities are reproduced not despite but because of it. According to Bonilla-Silva (2014: 74), this seemingly paradoxical phenomenon of “racism without racists” is sustained by four principles – abstract liberalism, the naturalisation of the status quo, cultural racism, and minimisation of racism – which, in combination, work to naturalise white entitlement to remain in a normative and privileged position. ‘Abstract liberalism’ equates to what McIntosh (1989) more poignantly calls the “myth of meritocracy,” that is, the idea that success is solely the result of individual achievement. As critical whiteness scholars commonly argue, upholding the myth of meritocracy relies on an elision of socio-historical analyses of contemporary inequalities (Bonilla-Silva, 2014; Brown, et al., 2003; Mills, 2007), and on obscuring the intergenerational transfer of wealth and capital as well as poverty through historical processes of ‘accumulation’ and ‘disaccumulation’ (Brown, et al., 2003: 26). As a result “advantages only carry a stigma when people of color receive them” (Lipsitz, 1998: 222).

The myth of meritocracy is further supported by cultural racism, minimising racism, and naturalising inequalities. These cannot be divorced from the neoliberal ideology of individual choice and responsibility. As Giroux (2007: 30), a prominent critic of the destructive effects of neoliberalism notes, discourses “of self-reliance and self-responsibility demonize those populations for whom the very economic, educational, political and social conditions that make agency possible barely exist.” The current, often racialised, vilification of welfare recipients in Aotearoa/New Zealand which coincides with dramatically increasing income inequality is testament to this ideology. While political discourse is saturated with themes of intergenerational poverty and welfare dependency, the concurrent intergenerational accumulation of privilege escapes examination. As Moreton-Robinson (2009: 68) stresses in the context of Australia, the neoliberal promotion of individualism reinforces the dominant discourse that the disadvantages Aboriginal communities experience are the result of pathologies and cultural deficits rather than racism. Borell et al. (2009: 44) argue that “[t]his skewing within the socioeconomic discourse strengthens the ‘gaze’ on deprivation, justifies enhanced levels of institutional scrutiny of disadvantaged groups and their personal behaviours, and reiterates societal notions about ‘the deserving poor.’”
Thus, in settler societies, discourses of reverse racism and white settler victimhood bear all the hallmarks of attempts to preserve white privilege described in the international whiteness literature. However, because indigenous rights claims are based on indigeneity, that is, on “status as colonized people – peoples dispossessed in their own homelands” (Bell 2008: 851), invoking colour-blindness to justify opposition to ‘race-based preferential treatment’ relies on “transfer by racialisation” (Veracini, 2010b: 48) which undermines collective indigenous rights claims by re-defining indigenous peoples as one ethno-racial group amongst many. While Moran (2009: 791) attests to a “conditional sympathy for the Aboriginal plight” amongst the non-indigenous Australian participants of a study, he also notes that they conceptualised ‘indigenous issues’ in terms of “individual responsibility, equality and reciprocity rather than political and philosophical formulations of indigenous rights and notions of historical justice” (Moran, 2009: 789). In Canada, Mackey (2013: 54) argues that in focusing on the effects of settler colonial injustices on indigenous culture, rather than how land theft left indigenous peoples without sovereignty while settlers accrued wealth, the Canadian politics of regret diminish indigenous communities to one distinct cultural group amongst many others. In Aotearoa/New Zealand, a similar conflation of needs and rights is evident. For instance, in stating that “[m]uch of the non-Maori tolerance for the Treaty settlement process […] is based on a perception of relative Maori poverty,” Brash (2004) articulates a majoritarian understanding of compensation as assisting Māori to overcome socio-economic disadvantage rather than as a way of acknowledging indigenous rights. As a result, “indigenous rights become settler generosity, [and] indigenous sovereign capabilities are transferred away” (Veracini, 2010b: 46). Subsequently, the discourse of colour-blindness can also be applied in settler locales, and “the defenders of ‘indigenous rights’ are cast as racist, whereas the opponents of ‘indigenous rights’ cast themselves as ‘antiracist’” (Barber, 2008: 143).

Integral to this transfer by racialisation is a burden of authenticity which is imposed on indigenous peoples as a prerequisite for recognising indigenous claims. This “repressive authenticity” (Wolfe, 1994: 110) engenders expectations of an a-historical essence of Aboriginality. Smith’s (2012: 74) quote sums this up:

[W]hat counts as ‘authentic’ is used by the West as one of the criteria to determine who really is indigenous, who is worth saving, who is still innocent and free from Western contamination. There is a very powerful tendency in research to take this argument back to a biological ‘essentialism’ related to race, because the idea of culture is much more difficult to control. At the heart of such a view of authenticity is a belief that indigenous cultures
cannot change, cannot recreate themselves and still claim to be indigenous. Nor can they be complicated, internally diverse or contradictory. Only the West has that privilege.

Ultimately, repressive authenticity is a tool of eliminating indigeneity because it works as a “formula for disqualification” (Wolfe, 1999: 204). In the settler imaginary, only those deemed genetically and culturally authentic are entitled to make claims. In a qualitative study with non-indigenous Australians in rural and urban Victoria, Moran (2009: 797) found that interviewees used a narrow racial definition of indigeneity which justified “limiting [indigenous peoples’] access to land and other Aboriginal rights.” This is clearly a continuation of the traditional colonial transfers by accounting (discussed in the first part of this chapter) that ensured that indigenous populations, and thus the threat they posed to settler projects, diminished over time (Hixson, 2013; Tuck & Yang, 2012). As Bell (2014: 50) notes, in Aotearoa/New Zealand the argument that ‘real’ Māori no longer exist always sits in paradoxical tension with the settler need for indigenous authenticity as a source of identity, a point I will return to below.

In order to carry this theme forward into my examination of Pākehā identities and imaginaries, I thought it useful to take into account theorising as to how the myth of meritocracy is maintained, despite the overwhelming evidence of continued socio-economic and power disparities and want, to consider the notions of “social distance” (Sacks & Lindholm, 2002) and “white ignorance” (Mills, 2007). Social distance from experiences of disadvantage and oppression has been advanced as one explanation for a continued belief in meritocracy. Based on ethnographic research with white male middle-class Americans, Sacks and Lindholm (2002: 146) argue that being unfamiliar with the experience of being disadvantaged and unaware of privilege sustains concurrent contradictory ideas around egalitarianism and personal responsibility because “dominants are structurally removed from understanding what it is like to work hard and get nowhere” (Sacks & Lindholm, 2002: 136). This unfamiliarity aligns with Bonilla-Silva’s (2014: 16) argument that continued segregation and a lack of meaningful interracial interaction with non-white Others nurture a ‘white habitus’, defined as a “set of primary networks and associations with other whites that reinforces the racial order by fostering racial solidarity among whites and negative affect toward racial ‘others’.” In turn, this white habitus sustains social distance. Part of social distance is also unfamiliarity with ‘identity politics’ (Sacks & Lindholm, 2002). Since majorities have no need to rally around a collective identity in order to resist marginalisation, such identity politics is understood as an agenda, often manifest in accusations that ethno-racial minorities are ‘playing the race card’. White people on the other hand are portrayed as objective and unbiased. Consequently, it remains hidden from view that ostensibly neutral policies,
programmes and institutions often further white interests (Doane, 2003). As Chambers (1997: 197) rightly concludes, “there is more political strength in that than in all the identity politics in the world.”

These explanations imply a great degree of passivity. Some critical whiteness scholars have convincingly argued that entitlement is naturalised in a more active and strategic manner (Leonardo, 2004, 2009; Mills, 1997, 2007; Steyn, 2012; Sullivan & Tuana, 2007). These explanations tie back in with the question of whether white privilege is invisible or not and also with the notion of settler amnesia, discussed earlier in this chapter. Mills (2007: 21), whose work is foundational here, proposes that the racial (or settler colonial) status quo is protected by “white ignorance,” which is not merely a lack of knowledge but the result of the “social suppression of […] pertinent knowledge.” Mills (2007) is careful to highlight that individual processes of cognition are conditioned by the discursive repertoires available in society. Discussing common claims that white Australians were not aware of settler colonial injustices such as the Stolen Generation, Morris (2006: 107) argues that rather than not knowing, white Australians were unable or unwilling to recognise injustice because they lacked the necessary cultural frames and had to “develop a collective capacity” to understand and care. Combining Mills’ (2007) notions of the racial contract and white ignorance, Steyn (2012: 21) posits that an “ignorance contract” is foundational to racialised systems of domination because “oppressor populations need ignorance to shield them from knowing the realities that undergird their privileges for their psychological well-being and for the perpetuation of privilege to remain unquestioned.” As such, Steyn (2012: 9) argues, ignorance is learned and performed, and just like knowledge, ignorance is produced within a system of power relations.

**Core Cultures and White Settler Normativity**

As previously discussed, many Western nations, including Aotearoa/New Zealand, have come to imagine themselves as ‘diverse’ (Bozic-Vrbancic, 2008), and in some ways, neoliberalism and globalisation have helped to break down narrow ethnic conceptions of nationhood, making ‘multiculturalism’, ‘openness’, and ‘tolerance’ part of people’s everyday vocabulary. Brett and Moran (2011) suggest that as once homogenous nations adapt to greater ethnic diversity, cosmopolitan dispositions can become integral to national values, and manifest as “cosmopolitan nationalism.” In qualitative studies with a diverse sample of Australians conducted in the late 1980s and again in the early 2000s, Brett and Moran (2011) explored how participants imagined the nation and found that interviewees concurrently articulated a strong attachment to the nation
and ‘openness’ to ethnic diversity as beneficial for the nation. From their research, Brett and Moran (2011: 194) conclude that nationalist and cosmopolitan values are not only reconcilable but that Australian national values constitute a “resource” that can strengthen cosmopolitanism.

However, critical studies of whiteness have highlighted the nation as one of the key sites of reproducing and defending white/settler normativity and privilege (Clarke & Garner, 2010; Green, Sonn, & Matsebula, 2007; Hage, 2000, 2003; Lentin & Titley, 2011). Recent anti-immigration sentiment in much of Europe and beyond, the success of far right parties and declarations that multiculturalism has failed because minorities are unwilling to integrate exemplify a very overt ‘paranoid nationalism’ (Hage, 2003) that seeks to protect the fabric of society against the threatening difference and strain on national resources posed by exogenous Others. Through such hostile discourses and practices but also through more benign discourses of multiculturalism and tolerance, majorities remain in control of what they regard as ‘their’ nation. As Hage (2000: 46) argues, both white nationalists and white multiculturalists exert “governmental belonging,” that is the right to speak on behalf of the nation and to manage “especially those who are perceived to be lesser nationals or non-nationals.” Empirical research revealing often contradictory attitudes to ethnic diversity confirms Hage’s (2000) argument that there is easy slippage between extending and denying tolerance. In a focus group study with 76 Australians in Brisbane, Skrbis and Woodward (2007: 745) found frequent contradictions between “people’s philosophical commitment to cosmopolitan openness and often parochial practices,” with participants embracing “enjoyable experiences that cultivate one’s identity” while rejecting threatening elements of difference. Forrest and Dunn’s (2010) respondents accepted ethnic diversity as beneficial for Australia and felt secure amongst people from other ethnic groups but simultaneously argued that the country is weakened if people maintain their cultures. Weenink’s (2008) research, which examined the meaning of cosmopolitanism for Dutch parents whose children attend international streams at their schools, illuminates these contradictions, too. The former, he argues, displayed an eagerness to prepare their children to be “open to foreign cultures” and to explore the world, whereas the latter mostly cared about improving their children’s career prospects through extra skills. However, Weenink (2008: 1099) concludes that in all cases, “parents’ orientation to be flexible and open minded towards other cultures is inspired predominantly by pragmatic motives, rather than […] cultural curiosity.” Moreover, Weenink (2008) also found that all parents differentiated between acceptable and unacceptable difference.

A central element of exercising governmental belonging is opposition against ‘too many’ immigrants and too much inassimilable difference (Lentin & Titley, 2011). I want to return to
Hage’s (2003: 3) analytical figure of the “white worrier” whom I introduced in the introduction to this thesis. As Hage argues, while white worriers are purportedly concerned about the nation, they often worry about their own position and privileges. According to international research, especially recent research in the UK, white unease coalesces around a twin set of entitlement to resources and a sense of national belonging (Clarke & Garner, 2010; Garner, 2010; Skey, 2011, 2014). Hage (2008) attributes the rise of paranoid nationalism to the disintegration of national economies and welfare states since the 1990s. With the economy losing its “national-integrative function,” culture became the source of social cohesion (Hage, 2008: 501): “In the face of the insecurity of belonging, most people were opting for a revalorization of their own culture as the national cultural [sic]” (Hage, 2008: 501, original emphasis). Hage’s (2008) argument finds support in two observations made by Garner (2012: 451) on the basis of research in the UK. Firstly, Garner (2012) claims that opposition to immigration has widened; while previously the working class (more specifically the older, rural, uneducated male) was the repository for ‘racist attitudes’, since the 1990s, the gap (measured in voting behaviour) between the working and middle class has become significantly smaller. Secondly, perceptions that migrants receive preferential treatment are “premised on the idea of national entitlement and priority” to resources, especially welfare, jobs, and housing (Garner, 2012: 454). Entitlement to resources is particularly threatened by greater number of immigrants. As one of Skey’s (2014: 329) focus group respondents noted with respect to this: “I think we are the victims of our own tolerance.”

Alongside a perceived competition for resources, majorities are also concerned about their sense of belonging in societies that seem to change beyond recognition (Garner, 2010; Hage, 2000; Skey, 2014). Within this fear, the inassimilable Other plays a central role. As Garner (2010: 7) observes, in the UK, especially Muslims are perceived as a ‘group’ that is unwilling to integrate. Bonnett (2002: 86-87) cogently argues that contemporary discourses of tolerance and celebrating diversity:

are continuously compromised by the much more powerful normative and antiegalitarian currents within neo-liberalism. Multiculturalism and anti-racism may, sometimes, be encouraged by free-market reforms, but it is a celebration of equality that takes place within societies where the appeal and power of whiteness is being both sustained and, at least in certain areas, strengthened.

Whiteness is, for instance, sustained by new imaginaries of the ‘desirable migrant’ whose attractiveness is no longer necessarily determined by phenotype but by his/her ability to conform
to liberal Western and, more specifically, neoliberal values (Simon-Kumar, 2014: 8). Bozic-Vrbancic (2008: 226) contends that while ethnic difference is central to Aotearoa/New Zealand’s national imaginary, only those forms of difference that “are assimilable into the body of the nation and do not threaten the ‘we’ of the nation” are acceptable.” This observation is supported in anti-immigration fear mongering. In a speech criticising Labour’s immigration strategy, Brash (2005: np) asserted that “[i]nstead of immigration adding interesting diversity, skills and energy to our society, under current policies immigration has become a process which is threatening to change the very nature of our society.” A human capital based vernacular of ‘net benefits’, ‘productivity’, ‘investment’ and ‘quality immigrants’ was matched by expectations of integration if not assimilation into ‘the mainstream’. Brash’s (2005: np) take-home message was: “We want immigrants who want to become New Zealanders.”

These examples support Hage’s (2000) argument that governmental belonging is an expression of nationalism, rather than racism. However, it is important to bear in mind that nationalism is, with few exceptions, inherently racialised as a look at the international literature confirms. Hage (2000: 18) himself refers to those most at risk of exclusion in Australia as “Third-World-looking people,” and in the US, Bonilla-Silva (2000: 193) argues that “the ‘immigrants’ that matter are those defined as ‘Black,’ ‘non-Western,’ ‘unchristian’.” In Europe, these Others are also largely defined as non-European immigrants, asylum seekers, and increasingly the looming figure of the Islamist (Clarke & Garner, 2010). The conflation of nation and whiteness is demonstrated in further qualitative research in the UK (Garner, 2010, 2012) which showed that white British participants routinely equated locals with being white and migrants and asylum seekers with non-whiteness. Effectively, this conflation denies non-white minorities an opportunity to become part of the national imaginary. As Garner (2010: 8) also found, this conflation leads majorities to “grossly overestimate the proportion of foreigners in a given space (local or national).”

Lastly, research available in Aotearoa/New Zealand confirms crucial differences in perceptions of immigrants depending on their origins. For instance, immigrants from Australia, the UK, and South Africa (read: white) are viewed more favourably than immigrants from Asia, the Pacific Islands and African countries (read: non-white) (C. Ward & Masgoret, 2008). Gendall et al.’s (2007: 18) survey results on perceptions of immigrants from different world regions show that British, South African and other European immigrants are perceived as making a positive contribution to the economy while Pasifika are seen to contribute the least. On the contrary, this group is seen as committing the most crime. Bonilla-Silva (2000: 194) argues that anti-immigrant
attitudes are not just about class because there are clear differences in attitudes towards visible and white immigrants and that this is a continuation of histories of colonisation and racialisation.

Moran (2011) argues that the backlash against ethnic diversity was less pronounced in settler states because immigration has a longer history and is consequently more engrained in their national identity. This argument is based on hegemonic imaginaries of settler states as “classic immigrant societies, [which] have sought to build a nation state through immigration” (Spoonley, 2014: 654). However, both Moran’s (2011) argument and Spoonley’s (2014) claim are problematic for a number of reasons. Firstly, portraying settler states as immigrant nations risks conflating the structural positions of settlers and migrants, and obscures the settler colonial project of supplanting indigenous societies (Tuck & Yang, 2012: 7). Secondly, it ignores the long history of exclusionary immigration policies that only allowed white settlers and immigrants to become part of the nation. As mentioned in the previous chapter, in all settler states, nation-building was based on a “narrowly conceived ethnic core” (Pearson, 2001: 20-21). It also disregards the current political retreat from multiculturalism as well as pervasive discourses and practices designed to exclude Others, most notably asylum seekers and Muslims. With specific reference to Australia’s settler context and location, Hage (2003) maintains that white settlers carefully construct and maintain an Anglo identity because in the Pacific region they are surrounded by non-white Others who threaten this identity. By contrast, Spoonley (2014: 652) speculates that the politics of decolonisation in settler societies may affect responses to ethnic diversity in a number of ways because settlers are familiar with debates about collective rights, and have experienced a sustained challenge to their hegemonic position.

Here, the significance of the triadic structure of settler-indigenous-immigrant power relations which are grounded in the settler colonial project reveals itself fully. For one, settler hegemony is exerted simultaneously over indigenous and exogenous Others. As Hage (2003: 152) puts it, whenever hospitality is extended to new immigrants, they are effectively offered “stolen goods.” As such, migrants can be positioned alongside settlers as complicit in settler colonialism. However, migrants enter an already existing political entity rather than create a new one, and especially non-white migrants are also marginalised in settler societies and can thus be understood to share experiences of socio-economic and cultural marginalisation with indigenous peoples. With respect to immigration this means that “a settler collective appropriates the indigenous right to welcome people to country and simultaneously retain[s] the right to unwelcome exogenous Others” (Veracini, 2012: 191, original emphasis). As Bell’s (2010) analysis of Pākehā discourses of hospitality towards migrants shows, in the process of welcoming exogenous Others,
participants often unreflectively reinforced their position as the national people and thus their governmental belonging. While Bell (2010: 251) identified some instances of problematising the fact that Pākehā have usurped the position of tangata whenua as the host, by and large hospitality enabled participants to “simultaneously enact[…] their own claim to be ‘at home’ and to a national homeland.”

Despite their subjugation to settler sovereignty, indigenous peoples cannot be excluded from the national imaginary because they possess “undeniable nationality” (Sibley, 2010: 110) and are, according to Hage (2000), able to claim national belonging. Based on Implicit Association Testing, researchers (Sibley & Barlow, 2009; Sibley, Liu, & Khan, 2008) found that the New Zealand European sample included both European and Māori cultural markers in equal measure as representative of the nation (but not Asian). By contrast, white Australian respondents associated national identity predominantly with whiteness and excluded Aboriginality. Indigenous peoples are thus not automatically included as representing the nation. Sibley and Barlow (2009: 125) conclude that “learned patterns of associations” determine whether indigenous minorities become part of the majority national imaginary. While the researchers interpret this finding as evidence of an inclusive national imaginary, the literature on settler colonialism suggests that indigeneity may help the settler to create an authentic identity. These arguments will be discussed further in the following section. To finish this thought, the finding that indigeneity is not always included as part of the nation suggests that further research would be useful.

One solution is to discursively turn indigenous peoples into one ethnic group amongst many, as indicated in the previous section:

The difference between settler and non-settler so-called multicultural or post-racial nation-states derives in the first case from the presence of the third pole: the only way for prior-ness to be included in social and legal citizenship is through its symbolic or physical absorption (whitening) or its representation as outsider, or ‘browning’, which reduces the subject’s condition to that of migrant (Giuliani, 2012: 128).

Thus far, there has been little empirical research on how ethnic diversity reacts with indigenous politics in the settler imaginary. A key question in this study is how Pākehā imaginaries of contemporary settler-indigenous relations are inflected by the drastically growing number of immigrants in Aotearoa/New Zealand. While the defence of core cultures against exogenous

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19 Implicit Association Tests are used primarily in social psychology in order to measure people’s automatic or subconscious beliefs and attitudes.
Others is patterned similarly in settler and non-settler societies, a settler society specific politics of belonging that is designed to ground settlers is evident in settler claims to be indigenous too and have an equal right to belong. This key component of protecting white settler privilege in the context of ‘the nation’ will be discussed in the next and final section of this chapter.

**Indigenisation and White Settler Belonging**

As described in the previous chapter, Aotearoa/New Zealand experienced a wave of Pākehā claims to be ‘indigenous’ from the 1990s onwards. Such claims are not unique to this country; they can be found across the British settler states, and have been observed in Canada (Mackey, 1998), Australia (Garbutt, 2011), the US (Deloria, 1999; Huhndorf, 2001), and Hawai‘i (Rohrer, 2010), suggesting a transnational settler colonial phenomenon (Pearson, 2002). As I will detail below, such claims are theorised as responses to an assertive politics of indigeneity which challenges the legitimacy of settler belonging.

Interestingly, indigenising discourses are also increasingly gaining currency in European far right politics. For instance, leader of the British National Party (BNP) Nick Griffin claimed, “[t]he indigenous people of this island are the English, the Scots, the Welsh and the Irish … We are the aborigines here” (cited in Mackay & Stirrup, 2010: np), and a recent anti-immigration leaflet distributed by the UK Independence Party (UKIP) likened immigration to the UK to the colonisation of Native Americans. Presenting perhaps the epitome of irony given the history of British imperialism, the leaflet featured the sentence “He used to ignore immigration … now he lives on a reservation” superimposed over a Native American figure in full headdress. This suggests that indigenising claims are also enacted in relation to exogenous Others. In settler societies, the two can and often do converge.

Settler indigenisation is not a new phenomenon. Historically, settlers occupied an awkward position as “human hinges” (Morris, 1992: 471). Simultaneously coloniser and colonial (Bell, 2004b), settlers inhabited, as Lawson (1991, 1995) put it, a ‘Second World’ which is suspended between two first worlds, that of the imperial centre and that of the First Nations. The resulting “ontological anxiety” (Bell, 2004b: 57) led settlers to strive for authority and authenticity. As Lawson (1995) argues, the *colonial* settler subject desired the authority of the imperial centre but

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20 Some commentators describe settlers as colonising and colonised (Lawson, 1995), but like Bell (2004b), I prefer the term ‘colonial’. While Pākehā and settlers elsewhere were certainly dependent on the metropole, referring to them as colonised obscures the real power differences between settlers and indigenous peoples.
could ultimately only represent and mimic it; the colonising settler subject desired indigenous authenticity but again fell short and had to mimic or eliminate it.

In today’s sovereign settler states, there is no further need to emulate the mother country’s authority. However, a sense of ontological insecurity remains. For one, this unease is the result of a migrant background that leaves settlers ostensibly cultureless. Bell (2009b), for instance, found that the young Pākehā she interviewed experienced a troubling lack of cultural specificity and roots in the country. Consequently, settlers are still striving for an authentic identity that is distinct from British identity. It is partly this project of creating an independent identity that encourages appropriation of indigenous culture (Bell, 2014: 97-98). In settler societies, ‘indigenous culture’ – often boiled down to an a-historic and static set of ‘authentic’ cultural markers – serves as a foil for this new identity. Secondly, a sense of ontological insecurity also remains because current indigenous rights discourses are disputing settler authority and belonging. As Gooder and Jacobs (2002: 205) observe in the Australian context, “in the process of reconstituting the nation’s sense of itself, some settlers come to feel they are an illegitimate presence in relation to indigenous Australians.” Here, the very process of reconciliation and redress for a history of indigenous dispossession and marginalisation results in “settler envy” of an assumed authoritative and morally superior status of indigenous peoples. As a result, Gooder and Jacobs (2002: 206) note, “a new urgency has arisen. How might the ‘dispossessed settler access that primary belonging over which they now imagine indigeneity lays claim?’

Research shows that the answer to this question lies in indigenisation as a way of achieving redemption and innocence (Bell, 2004a). Settler claims to be indigenous are centrally based on two main elements: settler amnesia and mimicry. Turner’s (2002: 51) analysis of indigenisation discourses in Aotearoa/New Zealand found ‘indignation’ and ‘decency’ to be two key elements of re-asserting belonging, as expressed in claims that Pākehā have “as much moral and legal right to be here as Maori” (King, 1999: 235) and in declarations of being equally committed to the country. While indigenising strategies are locally specific, there is some transnational overlap in that all settlers rely on appropriating indigenous culture. In Hawai‘i, indigenising strategies include claiming native terms that denote being ‘native born’ (similar to tangata whenua in Aotearoa/New Zealand); claiming a “Hawaiian at heart” identity, and/or a ‘hapa’ identity which is particularly popular amongst young people and indicates mixed ancestry or a hybrid identity which is used to bolster an imaginary of harmonious race relations (Rohrer, 2010: 44-45). Tuck and Yang (2012) identify various form of settler indigenisation, including an ‘Indian grandmother complex in which settlers claim to have a female Native American ancestor, and ‘adoption
fantasies’ in which white settlers come to see themselves as part of and accepted by the indigenous community. These efforts conceptualise indigenous culture as pure and intact which allows settlers to forget the damaging effects of settler colonial violence.

Overall, scholars assert that these indigenising strategies represent attempts to leave behind a problematic, morally dubious, settler identity and re-legitimate belonging (Tuck & Yang, 2012). As Rohrer (2010: 43) argues too, efforts to ‘go native’ reflect a “desperate longing to escape haole and become naturalized.” As such, settler indigenisation relies on forgetting, and, more specifically, on disavowing collusion in colonisation (Bell, 1996; Mikaere, 2004; Veracini, 2010b). Consequently, indigenisation also serves to refute the need for decolonisation because, as Tuck and Yang (2012: 17) cogently argue, “decolonization is already completed by the indigenized consciousness of the settler. Now ‘we’ are all Indian, all Hawaiian, and decolonization is no longer an issue. ‘Our’ only recourse is to move forward, however regretfully, with ‘our’ settler future.” As Bell (2004b: 120) argues, once the notion of greater indigenous authority is eliminated through claims to equivalent belonging, redemption is no longer necessary. Thus, settler indigenisation must be understood as a further type of transfer which allows the settler to replace the indigenous population’s exclusive status as indigenous (Veracini, 2010b: 46). As Turner (2007: 102) argues, “it is illegitimate, ahistorical and pathological for second settlers to claim that they are indigenous too.”

Since my study extends beyond the aspect of settler-indigenous relations, it is worth elaborating on the role that settler indigenisation plays in relation to exogenous Others. Paradoxically, indigenising discourses can be used to either exclude or include ethnic and immigrant minorities. The ‘we grew here, you flew here’ slogan which became the familiar anti-Lebanese rallying call of Anglo-Australians during the 2005 Cronulla Riots illustrates the way white settler Australians lay claim to the nation as ‘true’ Australians (Dunn, 2009). However, as discussed in the previous section, ethnic diversity can also work in the settlers’ favour. For one, it enables the transfer of indigeneity to an ethno-racial minority and thus, as Wolfe (2013: 259) argues, “maintains settler authorities’ historical suppression of Indigenous specificity into the so-called ‘post-racist’ era.” However, exogenous Others can also help to re-legitimate settler belonging and assert settler indigenisation by conflating the differences between settlers and migrants (Veracini, 2010b). This is exemplified in this statement from Race Relations Minister Trevor Mallard (2004: np) who extended the offer of becoming indigenous to immigrant and ethnic minority communities in Aotearoa/New Zealand:
Indigeneity is about the diversity of ways in which we belong and identify with our country. There are Chinese and Indian New Zealanders who have become deeply indigenous too, just like other kiwis whose forbears come from a huge range of other countries.

Conclusion

In this chapter I have discussed the historical processes that have made settler whiteness a normative and privileged social position and reviewed arguments which posit that majorities are invested in protecting or recovering their normative and privileged position against perceived threats in a number of ways. These theoretical propositions, and the international empirical evidence discussed in this chapter, frame my own exploration of how Pākehā manage and negotiate collective white settler identities and how they imagine settler-indigenous-migrant relations and the position of these groups in twenty-first century Aotearoa/New Zealand.

Based on a review of the international and local literature I have particularly highlighted four discursive sites which are integral to re-making settler whiteness: First, the temporal logic of ‘post-colonialism’ serves as a way of attaining redemption while dismissing the demands of indigenous and ethno-racial minorities as no longer relevant. This discursive strategy relies on ‘settler amnesia’ (Mikaere, 2004; Turner, 1999), a disavowal of the continued relevance of racism and settler colonial structures. Closely related to the temporal logic is a ‘colour-blind racism’ (Bonilla-Silva, 2014) which allows majorities to naturalise persistent socio-economic inequalities and power discrepancies using an ostensibly egalitarian and thus non-racist frame of reference. Crucially, this rhetoric involves a ‘role reversal’ according to which “the dominant group in society was now the oppressed, and the disadvantaged and marginalised had become the oppressors” (Forrest & Dunn, 2006: 208), enabling a beleaguered identity and sense of victimhood amongst majorities. Since my study examines how Pākehā respond and adapt to changing conditions, these notions are particularly important. In Chapter Six, where I present the findings on how participants remember the transformations related to becoming bicultural, I argue that the politics of memory are an integral component of re-articulating Pākehā identities.

Further, I have highlighted the nation as a site where majorities are seen to preserve their normative status as the national core culture against exogenous Others (Hage, 2002). This is an area that is yet to be fully investigated in Aotearoa/New Zealand. My research findings contribute to understanding how Pākehā exercise ‘governmental belonging’ in managing the presence of migrant and ethnic minority communities. In Chapter Seven, I present findings on how Pākehā
envision the place of migrant and ethnic minority communities in Aotearoa/New Zealand and how this imaginary inflects their conceptualisations of settler-indigenous relations. With my analysis, I hope to advance discussion about the specific place of multiculturalism in the settler context. Indigenisation, the fourth discursive site of restoring settler whiteness highlighted in this chapter, was discussed as a strategy of restoring and re-legitimating settler belonging in response to indigenous rights discourses that clearly disturb the ontological security of the settler. In my study, various forms of indigenisation were evident in participant narratives. As such, the topic appears in both results chapters mentioned above but is most prominent in my discussion of the politics of naming the majority presented in Chapter Five.

Before I embark on presenting and discussing the findings of my research project in Chapters Five to Seven, I outline the methodological tenets of this study and provide details of my fieldwork in order to enable the reader to follow my approach.
Chapter Four  
Studying Storied Selves

In searching for a suitable approach to ‘access’ Pākehā identities and imaginaries, I turned to the concept of ‘narrative identity’. As has become clear over the course of the preceding chapters, collective settler and indigenous narratives have been integral to naturalising settler colonial whiteness, challenging asymmetrical power relations and re-articulating settler imaginaries. Since I am interested in examining how Pākehā negotiate white settler identity in light of socio-cultural transformations, a narrative approach that centres on the idea of the “storied self” (McAdams, 1993) – which constructs and negotiates identity through stories – and the life story method are useful tools for addressing my research questions. Engaging with participants as ‘storytellers’ and facilitating narratives of personal lived experience, memories of transformations, and visions of the future allowed me to analyse how Pākehā construct and manage identity, and how these individual stories are enabled and constrained by wider political and public discourses.

This chapter consists of two parts. The first part lays the methodological groundwork with a discussion of the main tenets of narrative inquiry, including the operational definition of narrative used in this thesis, the functions and characteristics of narratives and implications for research, as well as details on the life story interview method. In the second part of this chapter, I chronicle and reflect on all stages of the research process, from sampling and recruiting through to presenting the findings. Throughout this chapter, I aim to be transparent about how my own position as a researcher impacts on this study and the research results presented in subsequent chapters. In a similar vein, I address ethical considerations, which arguably permeate the entire research process, at appropriate times rather than in one separate section.
Narrative Inquiry

Narrative inquiry is a diverse field that transcends academic disciplines and employs a plethora of theoretical perspectives (Plummer, 2001: 186-187) as well as methods (Elliott, 2005). In this thesis, I employ a social constructionist approach that regards language as constitutive rather than reflective of reality, and as such as a tool of constructing identities. I use life story interviews in order to examine the narrative construction of identity amongst Pākehā. In this part of the chapter, I clarify my definition of narrative and the implications of using a narrative approach for the research process. Following this, I will provide a rationale for my chosen method.

Definitions of Narratives

At the core of narrative inquiry lies the conceptual term ‘narrative’. Unfortunately, there is no clear cut definition of it, although it is usually equated with a ‘story’ (Cohen, 2015). The linguist Labov defines narratives in the narrowest sense as discrete units of speech that follow a precise formula of speech acts and narrate past events (see Patterson, 2008) while others, such as Barthes (1977 [1966]), define narratives as ‘stories’ in the widest sense. While Labov’s linguistic definition seems overly constrictive regarding both form and content, vague definitions have resulted in an inflated use of the concept. Riessman (2008: 5), for example, laments the current “tyranny of narrative” in popular usage and cautions researchers that some specific criteria need to be met for acts of communication to qualify as narrative.

For the purpose of this thesis, I adopt Patterson’s (2008: 37, emphasis original) definition of narratives as “texts which bring stories of personal experience into being by means of the first person oral narration of past, present, future or imaginary experience.” Patterson’s (2008) focus on experience, rather than events, allows me to analyse accounts of personal lived experiences, including emotions and processes of meaning making. The temporal aspects of Patterson’s (2008) definition lend themselves well to an exploration of social imaginaries, including participant memories, how they experience and make sense of their current situation, how they imagine the future, and the connections between all three temporal levels.

Functions of Narratives

Scholars agree that narratives are conceptually tied to ‘reality’ but are divided on the exact nature of this relationship. From a realist perspective, narratives reflect an independently existing objective reality. In this case, life stories (the told life) reflect life histories (the events that
comprise the narrator’s life). Poststructuralists, by contrast, argue that narratives create reality (Bruner, 1991; Gubrium & Holstein, 2009). More than that, they regard reality as “primarily a narrative reality” (Spector-Mersel, 2010: 211, emphasis added). As such, reality is always subjectively constructed through the stories we tell. King’s (2005: 2) argument that “the truth about stories is that that’s all we are” which I discussed in the introduction to this thesis epitomises this position by emphasising that there is no objective reality that exists outside of our interpretations.

Arguably, there is good reason to combine these two perspectives as the following story by Riessman (2008) shows. In a study on divorce (Riessman, 1990), she asked her participants to state the main factors that led to the break-up of their marriage. As Riessman (2008) recalls, she expected an itemised list of reasons she hoped to be able to neatly code. However, participants instead replied with stories, which were used to interpret past events and to make sense of the present and the future. Interestingly, Riessman (2008) recalls, male and female participants created quite disparate versions of events, interpreting ‘what had happened’ differently. As such, I work with the understanding that stories are based on real events, but that narrators frame their experience of them in a particular ways, creating subjective realities and situated truths.

The primary function of interpreting events in this fashion then is to make sense of the world and ourselves. In telling stories, social constructionists argue, people construct identity. We produce a “coherent self” (Holstein & Gubrium, 2000), or “plausible identity” (Rosenwald & Ochberg, 1992: 9). That individuals create a certain image of themselves is evident in manifold everyday situations that require people to present themselves convincingly to a variety of audiences including “job, credit and school applications, confessions both religious and criminal, reunions of various sorts, diary writing, the display of photo albums, and therapies of various sorts” (Zussman, 2000: 5). This effort, Zussman (2000: 6) argues, requires in-depth reflection “on who we are and what we are.” At the collective level, too, socially shared narratives of who and what we are create coherent social identities, promote societal cohesion and serve political legitimation. In the words of Liu (2005: 70), “the way the events of history are put together and interpreted creates meaningful positions for people in a narrative connecting past, present and future.” At the individual level, a coherent identity conveys a “moral justification of who a person was, is, and will be” (McAdams, 2011: 100).

Crucially, social constructionists understand coherent or plausible identities as contingent and malleable in order to avoid reifying problematic essentialist notions of identities as fixed and unchanging. From the examples given above, it is easy to imagine that people construct different
 personas for different purposes and audiences, so ‘who and what we are’ is not immutable but context specific. Moreover, narrative constructions of plausible identities are also contingent in two other ways: they are subject to change over time, and they are dependent on the discourses or master narratives available in society at any given time. French philosopher Ricoeur (1991) is credited with producing the most complex treatise (comprising three volumes) of the temporality of narrative. For the purpose of this project, it is sufficient to say that “we are always rewriting our pasts in light of new circumstances in the present. Certain events which once seemed crucial to who we are later appear devoid of significance, while other experiences are recalled with a new-found importance” (Andrews, 2007: 125). In the meantime, experiences may have changed our perspective and ideas of who we are and transformations in the grand narratives that surround us may enable new interpretations of events.

How we think about and narrate our selves is also influenced by the discourses and power relations that dominate society at the point of telling our story. Stories are not idiosyncratic but “somehow symptomatic of cultural constructions at play in the wider culture from which they are drawn” (Maynes, Pierce, & Laslett, 2008: 130). As Spector-Mersel (2010: 208) puts it:

Through the stories common to the groups we belong to we create our familial, organizational, community and national identities. Our culture’s ‘grand stories’ teach us what ‘worthy’ life is, what we should aspire to and what we should avoid, what is good and what is evil, what is forbidden and what is permitted.

Those grand stories are not necessarily uniformly accepted by society as a whole. The gender differences Riessman (1990) encountered speak to the ways our social locations and the expectations, values and norms associated with these shape our interpretations of events. Mills (2007), who explicitly refers to the connections of power and knowledge in his previously discussed analysis of white ignorance, also highlights that differences in interest between collectives that are differently located in networks of power shape the construction of identities. He argues that,

[...] the individual represses unhappy or embarrassing memories that may also reveal a great deal about his identity, about who he is, so in all societies, especially those structured by domination, the socially recollecting ‘we’ will be divided, and the selection will be guided by different identities, with one group suppressing precisely what another wishes to commemorate (Mills, 2007: 29).
As Mills’ (2007) statement indicates and narrative researchers also argue, collective narratives “do political work” (Riessman, 2008: 8). They are used to foster belonging, to mobilise groups, and, in systems of domination, to both naturalise and challenge forms of oppression. The ‘narrative turn’ – that is, a turn to stories as political tools – was closely linked to the political upheavals of the 1960s and a disenchantment with the positivist research tradition that had dominated intellectual discourse in the social sciences throughout the twentieth century (Chase, 2005). The questioning of the legitimacy of white male heterosexual middle class values as the invisible norm against which deviance is measured was deeply enmeshed with academic critiques of the positivist belief in an objectively existing and scientifically measurable reality or universal truth. The slogan ‘the personal is political’ infused feminist and, more occasionally, other scholarly work with notions of ‘subjective experience’ and ‘situated truths’. “Conceived as a way of honouring lived experience as a source of important knowledge and understanding” (Clandinin & Rosiek, 2007: 42), narrative inquiry helped to foreground subjective experiences of marginalised groups such as women, LGBT (lesbian, gay, bi- and transsexual) people, the (mentally) ill, racial and ethnic minorities, and other people deemed to deviate from dominant norms and to juxtapose their perspectives with the prevailing hegemonic discourses that had served to label them as deviant. In Aotearoa/New Zealand, indigenous narratives which revealed alternative realities of colonial oppression and indigenous resistance helped to discredit settler versions of history and challenge their dominant position. Not surprisingly, such alternative narratives were valued as “reports from the front lines of poverty and oppression” (Rosenwald & Ochberg, 1992: 2), serving to muster support, build communities, and strengthen positive identities.

These aspects are central to my study of Pākehā identities. The notions of coherent identities, temporality, and the connection between individual narratives and hegemonic discourses provide useful avenues into studying Pākehā identity constructions and social imaginaries. As I discussed in previous chapters, I am working on the assumption that Pākehā are actively involved in re-making identities in response to the challenges they have faced and the socio-cultural and political transformations the settler state of Aotearoa/New Zealand has undergone. How do they collectively, as members of the dominant group re-create a ‘plausible’ identity? Given its role in helping to reveal the validity of alternatives to the hegemonic narratives that create deviance, it could feasibly be argued that my research risks re-centring the voices of the majority. However, embedded in a critical analytical framework, the study helps to identify the longevity or porosity of dominant master narratives. Rosenwald and Ochberg (1992: 5) argue for an alliance between
narrative inquiry and critical theory in the hope that “together they would undertake to describe and conceptualize how social ideology is individually appropriated in the construction of life histories and selves.”

Implications for the Research Process

To recap, narratives serve to create meaning and coherent identities. This production of meaning is not simply the result of an internal order but context dependent along three dimensions. Firstly, all stories are told for an audience. Their raison d’être is to be heard, one might say. The audience for whom the story is intended may be present (such as a social researcher in a face-to-face interview) or imagined (for instance, the readers of an autobiography). Secondly, narratives are situated within a particular time and space which means that narratives are moulded by the cultural scripts and discursive conventions available in wider society at the time they are told. Thirdly, they are reflective of and impacted by the narrator’s social location. The stories people tell and the way they tell them are bound up with the social structures and power relations which shape their personal experiences. In sum, a narrator does not just tell stories but is also a performer (Riessman, 2008), and “an editor who constantly monitors, manages, modifies, and revises the emergent story” (Gubrium & Holstein, 1998: 170). McAdam’s (2011: 106-7) analogy neatly encapsulates this: “[t]he task of constructing a narrative identity requires people to assume a role that is more like a novelist than a secretary. The job is to tell a good story rather than to report exactly what happened in the meeting.”

These functions and characteristics of narratives have a number of implications for research with respect to eliciting narratives in face-to-face interviews, the subsequent analytical process and the claims we are able to make on the basis of narrative data, and thus for expectations of generalisability, validity, and reliability. To begin with the interview context itself, if the stories participants tell are produced for an audience, researchers must be understood as actively involved in the making of narratives. As such, the production of meaning is relational, making narratives “joint actions” (Plummer, 1995) of speaker and listener/reader. Participant narrations will vary according to their “perceptions, presumptions and fantasies” (Lucius-Hoene & Depermann, 2000: 213) about the researcher’s social background, role, and interests, and according to their “own presentational aims” (Lucius-Hoene & Depermann, 2000: 213). Unlike the positivist research tradition that emphasises the importance of researcher objectivity and neutrality, this is not seen as detrimental to producing credible research results.

21 For example, a researcher may be perceived as an expert, an authority, or a listener.
Further, if stories are co-produced and can change over time, it follows that narrative interviews are not replicable. Taking place at a specific point in time and in interaction with a particular researcher, interviews constitute a particular narrative moment. The same participants may narrate their lives differently at another point in time or in the presence of another researcher. Instead of validity and reliability, Maynes et al. (2008: 143-145) emphasise trustworthiness and credibility which require a transparent account of how the fieldwork was conducted, how data was analysed, and findings presented. I will provide such detailed reflections on the research process in the second part of this chapter.

How narrative data is analysed is informed by the researcher’s epistemological assumptions regarding the narrative reflection or creation of reality. If, according to a poststructuralist perspective, there are only idiosyncratic experiences and truths, we cannot make any sociological arguments based on these texts. Indeed, poststructuralists oppose interpretation of individual narratives because these analytical processes threaten to superimpose the speaker’s story with the story of the researcher. As Denzin (1997) argues, all we can and should do as researchers is to frame and represent these stories as authentic subjective expressions. However, such an approach seems to defeat the purpose of doing social research. Some scholars (see, for instance, Atkinson & Delamont, 2006; Rosenwald & Ochberg, 1992) have criticised the interpretive turn for its excessive relativism that eschews critical commentary in favour of equally valid situated truths. In this study, I adopt Maynes et al.’s (2008: 145) argument that while stories can speak for themselves, researchers can make “analytic argument[s].” In my analysis, I am mainly interested in patterns across participant narratives in order to theorise commonalities suggestive of a particular settler imaginary and strategies of recuperating a coherent, moral white settler identity. As such, I aim to make sociological generalisations about how “a given personal narrative illuminates a particular social position or social-structural location in a society or institution or social process” (Maynes, et al., 2008: 129).

I understand analysis as a “fundamentally subjective, interpretative process” (Mauthner & Doucet, 2003: 415). In this context, it is important to note that this critical analysis does not aim to judge individual narrators or question the validity of their story but to analyse what their stories reveal about the social structures the narrators are located in and the discourses and collective narratives that surround them. In order to critically analyse the narratives told by members of the ethnic majority, I analyse how individuals adhere to and/or resist hegemonic cultural frames by taking into account the context of their production. It is a sociological analysis that is less concerned with
the inner worlds and validity of participants’ stories but with the connection between identities, imaginaries and the cultural frames available in society.

**The Short Life Story Interview**

Overwhelmingly, narrative researchers opt for qualitative data collection and production methods such as interviews, focus groups, observation, or archival work. In fact, textbook authors routinely list narrative as one qualitative research method amongst many (Spector-Mersel, 2010). However, quantitative methods such as longitudinal panel studies are also used to generate narrative data (Elliott, 2005). After considering different options for addressing my research questions, I opted for ‘short life story’ interviews (Plummer, 2001) that asked participants to tell their life stories as Pākehā. In this section I briefly outline the rationale for this approach.

My decision to use a life story approach was informed by my review of the available research literature and bolstered by a number of excellent international studies which convincingly demonstrate the value of a biographical approach for critical analyses of majoritarian identities and the perpetuation of racialised and settler colonial ideologies and power relations. The most notable, and for my work influential, examples are Steyn’s (2001) exploration of the remaking of white identities in post-apartheid South Africa, McKinney’s (2005) analysis of autobiographical writings that examined the role of race in white American students’ lives, Herbert’s (2008) study of white local-born working class and South Asian immigrant identities in Leicester, an English town hailed as a model of multicultural harmony, and last but not least, Clark and Garner’s (2010) study of white working class English people’s identities in the cities of Bristol and Plymouth. All of these studies demonstrate that biographical methods are particularly useful for two reasons. Most importantly, they elicit narratives of lived experiences, including memories and expectations, practices and emotions through which we can trace how identities are constructed. Rather than using the classical life story interview which attempts to achieve “a fairly complete narrating of one’s entire experience of life as a whole, highlighting the most important aspects” (Atkinson, 1998: 8), for the purpose of studying constructions of Pākehā identities the ‘short life story’ which focuses on a specific aspect of an individual’s life (Plummer, 2001: 24) was most appropriate. These aspects are often specific momentous events such as divorce (Riessman, 1990), or migration (Meares, 2007), but also broader ones, such as political change (Andrews, 2007). In this study, I specifically focus on Pākehā experiences of being a member of the majority group of white settlers in Aotearoa/New Zealand. I invited participants to “tell me [their] life story as Pākehā freely and in as much detail as possible beginning with their childhood.” The narration
was coupled with narrative questions as required. These included both ‘internal’ questions that aim to clarify and elicit examples and ‘external’ questions that provide a prompt for a new topic if needed. The life story interviews focused on memories of growing up, how society has changed since their childhood, how their children’s upbringing might differ from their own, what personal or social/political events have impacted on their identities as Pākehā, how what it means to be Pākehā may have changed over time, and what they expect of the future.

The value of life stories for this project is that they provide insight into “how the social and political penetrate people’s lives” (Herbert, 2008: 8). Atkinson (1998: 13-14), who I drew on most for guidance on the life story approach, summarises this perfectly:

A life story can help the researcher define an individual’s place in the social order of things and the process used to achieve that fit. It can help explain an individual’s understanding of social events, movements, and political causes or how individual members of a group, generation, or cohort see certain events or movements and how the way they see, experience, or interpret those social events links to their individual development.

Secondly, the narrative studies mentioned above show that engaging with participants as individuals with stories to tell, rather than as vessels holding information or opinions, both balances the researcher-researched relationship, and helps to overcome some of the problems commonly associated with researching topics such as racism. Herbert (2008), as well as Clarke and Garner (2010), recall that participants evaded direct questions regarding issues such as immigration for fear of being labelled racist. Herbert (2008: 10) thus proposes that questions that elicit stories of personal experience (e.g., “asking them about their relationships with their neighbours”) instead of opinion questions (such as views on immigration) assist in avoiding ‘defended subjects’. Clarke and Garner’s (2010) insights are particularly helpful. Their research on white British identities consisted of two interviews, one asking narrative questions about personal experience, followed up by a session of semi-structured interviews eliciting information or opinions. Reflecting on one particular participant, Clarke and Garner (2010: 191) note that while the participant seemed to enjoy the experience of the narrative interview, in the semi-structured sessions, “he felt very uncomfortable, found it difficult to answer the questions and felt like he was being tested.” This not only affects the researcher-researched relationship but, the authors argue, can also lead to misrepresentations of participants. I reflect in more detail on my experience of conducting life story interviews and evaluate the benefits and limitations of this method as part of my discussion of the research process below.
Research Design and Fieldwork

Guided by this set of methodological assumptions, and its implications for conducting research, I designed the empirical study and carried out the fieldwork and data analysis. In this section I chronicle and reflect on all stages of the research process in order to make decisions transparent and to evaluate the method.

Sampling and Recruiting

Sampling Criteria

Decisions regarding my sample composition were guided by my research objectives and the epistemological and methodological assumptions just discussed. My primary sample criterion pertained to the self-identification of participants as New Zealanders of European descent. As explained in the previous chapters, inviting people based on ethnic self-identification poses a particular problem in Aotearoa/New Zealand because some available naming options, such as Pākehā and European New Zealander, are highly contested (Callister, 2004). In order to stress the inclusivity of the study, I decided to include a number of formally and informally used identity labels on the advertisement I used to recruit participants. The final version of the advertisement invited “New Zealanders of European descent who identify as Pākehā, European New Zealander, New Zealander, Kiwi, or other” (see Appendix 3). In retrospect, providing alternative identifiers proved beneficial because it gave people a first impression of the study and, as it happened, a first talking point. Some people explicitly referred to the words used on the flyer when they first contacted me by email or phone to express their interest in the study. Some specified their preferred way of identifying and offered an interpretation or explanation; others signalled that these terms were interchangeable.

My second sample criterion was that participants were born and raised in Aotearoa/New Zealand. This is based on two considerations. Firstly, my research question concerns Pākehā as the majority who have a naturalised claim to the nation. I assumed that having been born elsewhere may impact on perceptions of issues like belonging and national identity. Secondly, I reasoned that a project that seeks to examine identities and social imaginaries through lived experience required participants who could reflect on their lived experiences in Aotearoa/New Zealand, including the biographical stages of childhood and education.
Lastly, I recruited people from four different Auckland suburbs: Devonport, Papatoetoe, Ponsonby, and New Lynn. First and foremost, I wanted to conduct the research in Auckland, Aotearoa/New Zealand’s largest and most diverse city. As outlined in Chapter Two, Auckland has undergone significant demographic transformations over the past three decades: Its population has grown rapidly, and, of most importance for my project, its ethnic composition has changed drastically since the 1987 Immigration Act. To briefly recap, 40 percent of Auckland’s population are overseas-born. The increase in the proportion of Auckland residents stating Asian ethnicities has been most pronounced, moving from five percent in 1991 to 23 percent in 2013. Māori and Pasifika communities constitute approximately one quarter of Auckland’s resident population. Concurrently, the proportion of Europeans decreased from 76 percent in 1991 to 59 percent in 2013. Owing to this increasing ‘superdiversity’ of Auckland (Spoonley, 2015), the site lends itself well to examining how Pākehā experience and adapt to changes in their local surroundings.

However, Auckland is far from uniform. It is made up of many distinct suburbs that differ markedly from one another with respect to ethnic composition and socio-economic characteristics (amongst other variables). Selecting specific suburbs was a way of recruiting participants from different socio-economic strata and, I surmised, with different opportunities for intercultural encounters in their everyday lives. Devonport, Papatoetoe, Ponsonby, and New Lynn were chosen based on considerations of socio-economic and ethnic composition. As Table 1 shows, both ethnic composition and the deprivation index scores of the four suburbs included in this study are very different, and two of these suburbs have undergone dramatic changes since the early 1990s. For example, Devonport has traditionally been overwhelmingly Pākehā with a large resident population of English immigrants. While the North Shore region where Devonport is located has seen significant increases in residents of Asian ethnicities since the 1990s, the suburb itself has changed little. Its population size has remained virtually unchanged, as has its relatively low level of socio-economic deprivation and its ethnic composition which, in 2013, was made up of 92 percent Europeans and very small numbers of Māori, Pasifika and Asian residents. Papatoetoe, on the other hand, has experienced dramatic shifts in all these respects. Between 1991 and 2013, the suburb’s population increased by over 9,000 people. In 1991, Europeans constituted 74 percent of this suburb’s population making it reputedly a ‘white haven’ in the South Auckland region, which generally features large concentrations of Māori, Pasifika and Asian communities. By 2013, however, the European population had dwindled to 27 percent while the proportion of Asian communities had increased.

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22 See Figure 2 below for a map of Auckland and the approximate geographical location of each suburb.
23 All data for population figures and ethnicity provided in this section are based on adapted time series NZ Census data provided by RIMU, the Research, Investigation and Monitoring Unit of Auckland Council. Census data is accessible at http://www.stats.govt.nz/Census.aspx
residents increased from 7 percent to 46 percent and the Pasifika population from 12 to 25 percent. At the same time, the area’s socio-economic deprivation worsened, positioning it as one of the most deprived areas in the Auckland region. Ponsonby went the opposite way, albeit not as dramatically. Up until the 1970s, this inner city suburb was home to a great number of working class Māori and Polynesian residents who were driven out when gentrification saw large numbers of young professional Pākehā move in and house prices skyrocket (Carlyon & Morrow, 2008; Friesen, 2009). With living in Ponsonby becoming increasingly unaffordable, many Pasifika families moved to South Auckland. Although Ponsonby is less homogenous than Devonport, in 2013 Europeans constituted 87 percent of the population, up from 79 percent in 1991. Perhaps not surprisingly, Ponsonby’s deprivation index score improved substantially. Lastly, New Lynn, which is situated in West Auckland, has developed into a gateway suburb for new migrants from a variety of Asian countries. Similarly to Papatoetoe, the European population decreased significantly (from 75% to 43%) while the Asian population increased from six to 40 percent. Its deprivation level remained relatively unchanged over that period.

Selecting specific suburbs also allowed me to recruit potential participants more strategically in the absence of other specific selection criteria, such as membership in specific professions or institutional attachments. It allowed me to ‘reach’ people without resorting to opportunity sampling which can compromise the diversity of the sample by relying on a small pool of people from personal and easily accessible networks, such as friends or fellow university students.
Figure 2: Map of the Auckland Region and geographical location of research sites
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Ethnic Composition</th>
<th>Deprivation Index Score</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Auckland</td>
<td>European: 76% Māori: 11% Pacific: 12% Asian: 6%</td>
<td>European: 59% Māori: 11% Pacific: 15% Asian: 23%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Devonport</td>
<td>European: 94% Māori: 6% Pacific: 2% Asian: 2%</td>
<td>European: 92% Māori: 6% Pacific: 2% Asian: 4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Papatoetoe</td>
<td>European: 74% Māori: 13% Pacific: 12% Asian: 7%</td>
<td>European: 27% Māori: 13% Pacific: 25% Asian: 46%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ponsonby</td>
<td>European: 79% Māori: 6% Pacific: 13% Asian: 5%</td>
<td>European: 87% Māori: 6% Pacific: 6% Asian: 7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Lynn</td>
<td>European: 75% Māori: 11% Pacific: 13% Asian: 6%</td>
<td>European: 43% Māori: 10% Pacific: 15% Asian: 40%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1: Ethnic composition of Auckland region, Devonport, Papatoetoe, Ponsonby and New Lynn 1991 and 2013 and 1991 and 2013 Deprivation Index Scores

**Sample Size**

With respect to determining the sample size, saturation is often recommended as the main consideration. However, this principle bears limited weight in biographical research which produces idiosyncratic narratives. Instead, I followed advice that suggests determining the sample size based on what type of generalisations the researcher wants to be able to make (Maynes, et al., 2008). Similar to Squire (2008: 48) who interviewed 37 people in a study on HIV, I am “interested less in biography, more in narrative themes’ commonalities and differences across groups of individuals.” In my study, these pertain specifically to how participants negotiate settler identity and how they imagine settler-indigenous and ethnic relations. To address this research

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24 Source: Census 2013. Figures do not add up to 100 percent because respondents are able to state multiple ethnic identities. I have omitted the categories ‘Middle Eastern, Latin American, or African’ (MELAA) and ‘Other’ because despite increases over the time period, percentages in 2013 do nowhere exceed three percent and are thus deemed irrelevant for this demonstration of the major changes in ethnic composition.

25 The New Zealand Deprivation Index measures socio-economic deprivation taking into account a number of variables, such as income, employment and qualifications, home ownership, living space as well as access to communication and private transport. A score of 1 indicates low and a score of 10 high levels of deprivation. A range is given because the suburbs are made up of several Census Area Units (CAU) which may experience different levels of deprivation.

26 Data for 1991 see (NZDep 1991 Census Area Unit Data).

27 Data for 2013 see (NZDep 2013 Census Area Unit Data).
question, I did not need a large stratified sample yet wanted enough participants to allow comparisons across people of different ages, socio-economic positions, and educational backgrounds. Based on a review of sample sizes in studies deploying similar methods, such as the one by Squire (2008) just mentioned, I settled on 40 participants as the target number, ideally interviewing ten people in each of the four chosen suburbs. As I will explain in more detail in the following section, I ultimately recruited and interviewed 38 participants.

**Recruiting Strategy**

Once all selection criteria were determined, I began recruiting participants through placing advertisements on notice boards of local institutions, including community centres, libraries, transport hubs, supermarkets, and local shops, in all four suburbs, beginning with Devonport in August 2011. My initial anxiety over whether the topic would entice anyone to take part in the study was quickly alleviated when the first inquiries arrived in my email inbox the following day. Considering that I used the same strategy in all four suburbs, it was interesting to note the differences in response numbers. In Devonport, I quickly reached my target number of ten interviewees exclusively through this form of advertising, and had to turn several interested people away. I interviewed a total of 12 participants in Devonport, which included one pilot interview and one person referred to me by another participant. In Ponsonby, I quickly recruited ten participants through a mixture of advertising and snowballing. By comparison, in both New Lynn and Papatoetoe the success of this approach was much more limited. In Papatoetoe, only two people replied to the advertisements. Eventually, I was able to enlist several more participants with the help of a local contact in Papatoetoe. In total, I interviewed seven people there. In New Lynn, a second advertising round boosted my sample from one to four participants. I recruited a further five people through personal contacts (3), in person advertising at a public lecture (1) and snowballing (1). However, to include these participants I had to widen my initial definition of New Lynn to the electorate of New Lynn which means I also recruited from the more affluent suburbs bordering New Lynn to the west.

One of the reasons for the difference in recruiting success, I was given to understand by locals in Papatoetoe, may have been people’s lack of the financial or technical means to contact the mobile phone number and email address I had provided, clearly indicating a digital and socio-economic divide. But there are also other reasons that account for the discrepancy. In both Devonport and Ponsonby, the often tertiary-educated interviewees were more familiar with research environments. Some participants explicitly stated that they volunteered in order to assist the
researcher but many also stated that they found the topic intriguing. In different ways and triggered by a variety of cues, these people had been led to reflect on what it means to be Pākehā and were keen to discuss their thoughts as some indicated in initial email correspondence or during the interview. The following interview excerpt shows that people chose to take part in an attempt to create a better self understanding:

It is hard I think as a New Zealand European, Pākehā, to have a clear sense of what your culture is when you compare yourself to Māori, you know, and it’s quite clearly defined then. For us, it is more like, “oh what does it mean to be, you know, a New Zealand European, Pākehā, whatever?” I thought it would be interesting to actually kind of get a better feel for what my understanding is of my culture, you know? So it was kind of self-driven, selfishly like that (Claire, 40s, Ponsonby).

Only one person explicitly volunteered because “everything seems to be about Māori these days” (Robert, 50s). This alleviated my fear that I would attract many people to the right of the political spectrum who wanted to make ‘their side’ of the story heard. There is certainly a risk, as I have discussed earlier, that research with majorities can reinforce white privilege by re-centring white voices.

All participants who contacted me by email were sent a Participant Information Sheet (see Appendix 1) detailing my research interest and the interview procedure on the basis of which they decided whether they wanted to take part in the study. The people who were approached directly in Papatoetoe were not recruited immediately but given a Participant Information Sheet. I took their contact details to avoid costs for them and rang them back a few days later to ask whether they were still interested in taking part. All but one of the people recruited in this manner agreed to take part. In addition, people who first contacted me by phone were given detailed information on the phone and received a Participant Information Sheet at the time of the interview.

**Final Sample**

In total I carried out 36 interviews with 38 individuals. While interviews were generally conducted one-to-one, I interviewed one couple and one mother and daughter jointly at their request. Of those 38 participants, 12 lived in Devonport, seven in Papatoetoe, ten in Ponsonby, and nine in New Lynn. I interviewed 23 females and 15 males who ranged in age from 20 to 71 years old. Despite the wide spread, the final sample is dominated by middle-aged people with 21 participants aged between 40 and 59 years old and a further 12 participants aged 60 years and over, compared to only five participants between the ages of 20 and 39. While this limited my
ability to draw meaningful conclusions about differences between age groups, having a large number of people old enough to remember some of the politico-cultural transformations in settler-indigenous relations enhanced my ability to analyse how participants responded to these changes and subsequently re-articulated what it means to be Pākehā. Further research with younger Pākehā could be an interesting follow-up project. The sample is also dominated by tertiary-educated participants. Twenty-six participants obtained a tertiary qualification, compared to 11 who did not go on to higher education. One participant did not provide information about higher education. All but one of those who did not attend higher education were 50 years and older. The following table provides gender, age and qualification characteristics of all participants organised by suburb and can be used as a reference when reading the findings presented in Chapters Five through to Seven.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Gender</th>
<th>Age</th>
<th>Tertiary Qualification</th>
<th>Suburb</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
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Table 2: Final Sample Characteristics

28 All names are pseudonyms.
Interviewing

I conducted the 36 interviews between August 2011 and February 2012. On average, they lasted approximately two hours. In this section, I reflect on my experience of conducting these interviews in order to evaluate the method.

Pilots and Interview Schedule

I conducted two pilot interviews to test the biographical approach which helped me to settle on how to introduce the research and on the chronological format I adopted. The schedule attached in Appendix 4, which was submitted to obtain ethics approval before I carried out the pilot interviews, shows that I initially planned to focus more specifically on events and experiences in various domains of everyday life that had made participants aware of being the majority group. However, during the pilot interviews it transpired that participants found it easier to follow a basic chronological life story format. The second pilot interview went well enough to be included in the data but the first one was excluded.

Interview Settings

During our initial communication, the participants and I arranged a time and place for the interview that was convenient for them. The majority of people invited me to conduct the interview in their own homes (23 interviews with 25 individuals). Other interviews were conducted either at the University of Auckland (4), a neighbourhood café (6), or participants’ work places (3).

Conducting interviews in participants’ private surroundings contributed significantly to their story telling as their homes invariably provided cues in the form of family photographs, books, artworks, framed degrees and other personal belongings. In a similar vein, exploring the neighbourhoods that my participants called home and observing their characteristics helped me to get a better sense of participants’ local environments.

Conducting Life Story Interviews

Nearly every interview was preceded by some small talk over a cup of tea or coffee – and occasionally some home baking kindly prepared in advance by participants – from which we often gradually slipped into a conversation about the research. The few participants who I had not been able to give a Participant Information Sheet beforehand were given one at this point and talked through its content. All participants were informed of their rights as research participants as
outlined in the Consent Form (see Appendix 2) which was signed by all participants before the start of the interview. At this stage, I aimed to explain the purpose of the study as well as the procedure for the interview and invited participants to ask any questions they might have because, as Spector-Mersel (2010: 213, original emphasis) stresses,

> the stories [participants tell] are created for the researcher; they are told to him or her and are influenced by the way the teller has understood the purpose of the study, by his or her aims in telling the story to the researcher and by their personal interaction.

Being able to explain the project and procedure in the same detail for every participant and not cutting off participants’ trains of thought proved to be a balancing act. Some participants picked up on aspects I mentioned while still explaining the research purpose and embarked on long stories. In some cases, these initial thoughts proved so interesting that I only briefly interrupted them to ask for permission to turn on the voice recorder and then let them finish their thoughts. As the interviews proper commenced, many participants launched directly into their life stories – often beginning with an account of their ancestral genealogy – ignoring my request to initially state some personal information such as age, occupation, and family status. I briefly considered collecting this information in written form but concluded that this was unnecessary because all the information was generated as part of the life story.

My greatest initial concern pertained to how participants would cope with the task of telling me their Pākehā life stories freely and in detail. Some literature on narrative research suggests that we live in an “interview society” (Gubrium & Holstein, 2003: 28) in which ‘respondents’ passively respond to the researcher’s questions in a question and answer format, while others have suggested that we live in an “auto/biographical society” (Plummer, 2001: 78) in which life stories are omnipresent and people can tap into their knowledge of the life story form. Indeed, several participants initially worried about their ability to produce a life story (asking, for example, “will you guide me through this?”), or displayed signs of uncertainty and asked for more detailed questions if they felt unsure if what they told me was ‘the kind of thing I wanted to hear’. Others expressed gratitude for internal probing questions or summaries that helped them gather their thoughts or to remember defining moments in their lives. Yet, most participants told their life stories with ease and spoke freely for long stretches of time. Some, however, told me after the interview that they had expected more concrete questions and one participant was concerned about the lack of a ‘questionnaire’ and suspected me of having a hidden agenda, “like psychologists.”
Of course, I did not just ask participants to tell their life story but to tell their life story as Pākehā. I was unsure what to expect. Previous research with ethnic majorities in other countries suggested that participants would rarely have thought about questions of collective identity but in light of the public identity work that has been part of Aotearoa/New Zealand’s recent development, Pākehāness is marked and even people who chose not to identify as such are aware of it. One interesting example illustrating people’s understanding of speaking about themselves emerged when replies to my request to talk about what it means to be a New Zealander of European descent were met with replies such as: “I suppose you want me to talk about Māori.” Similarly, the wife of another interviewee who joined us after the interview greeted us with the words “Are you done talking about the Māori?” To a degree, these replies are indicative of the relationality of Pākehā and Māori identities but they potentially also signal the emptiness and lack of content that leads to definitions through ‘the other’ that has been discussed extensively in the whiteness literature (Frankenberg, 1993).

These different scenarios, and the different types of interventions they required, play into my second concern. Am I able to elicit ‘good’ life stories? Do I, as a relative novice to interviewing, have the prerequisite skills to conduct ‘good’ life story interviews? And what makes a life story a good life story? As an emergent researcher without much research experience, I aimed to be well prepared. But here the dilemma starts. As Susan Chase (2005: 662) points out, the “researcher needs to be well prepared to ask good questions that will invite the other’s particular story; on the other hand, the very idea of a particular story is that it cannot be known, predicted, or prepared for in advance.” Whenever possible, I initially simply invited participants to tell me their life story as a New Zealander of European descent. I had a list of prompts to use as needed, internal probing questions that emerged out of the individual situations as well as external probing questions which I asked at the end of the interview if these had not been covered.

Some narrative researchers advocate a non-interventionist approach while others favour a more interactive approach to interviewing. Plummer (2001: 140), for instance, suggests that, “the ‘life story method’ tends to favour conducting open and in-depth interviews in a highly active and interactive fashion using only the most general of guides in order to help the subject construct a sense of their cultural world.” More often than not, how much and what kind of interaction an interview entailed was decided in an ad hoc manner. So as not to interrupt narratives, prompts such as nods, laughs, and short exclamations proved irreplaceable as tacit invitations to continue. Whenever participants required prompts I made sure to follow the advice of narrative researchers and asked questions aimed at eliciting stories about specific situations and experiences, such as
‘Could you tell me a little more about what it was like to grow up in Auckland in the 1970s?’, or ‘Could you tell me more about how you experienced the Springbok Tour protests?’ However, it is not always possible or even helpful to strictly avoid ‘why’ questions. In order to understand a participant’s point of view it was at times necessary, and natural, to insert opinion questions. Especially in the more conversational interviews, I also asked opinion questions when they seemed to fit into the conversation and realised that they often resulted in storied responses.

The types of interaction depended strongly on the atmosphere of the interview and whether I felt the participant and I had developed a good rapport. With some interviewees I assumed quite a conversational tone and felt I could safely ask potentially provocative probing questions that challenged opinions or pointed to contradictions in what they had been telling me. In other interviews though, I quickly learned that these questions threatened the trust we had established and I assumed a more distanced position. For example, a small number of participants seemed particularly reluctant to talk about being Pākehā and appeared as what Hollway and Jefferson (2000: 27) refer to as “defended subjects,” who may feel that certain questions assail a vulnerable aspect of their selves which they consequently aim to protect. While they were happy to tell their life story they avoided the aspect of being Pākehā and found probing questions slightly upsetting. It was noticeable that these were exclusively older participants and mostly those who had not replied to one of my flyers but had been recruited through a personal contact.

Through the fieldwork I learned that intuition and flexibility are key skills and that developing these skills takes practice. Listening, narrative researchers (Plummer, 2001) argue, is by far the most vital skill to have. The unhindered telling of a life story presents researchers with the task of following participants down the varied trails they pursue. Keeping up seemed to be the most substantial problem. When listening to recordings or reading transcripts later on I sometimes regretted not having asked a probing question or felt I could have asked a better one. Ultimately though, it is impossible to follow up every single aspect in a time-constrained interview.

Being flexible and an empathetic listener are also invaluable skills when emotional responses arise. In preparing researchers for the field and discussing ethical considerations, practical research literature inevitably points to the hazard of “sensitive topics” (for example, N. King & Horrocks, 2010: 58). Most of this material, I argue, departs from the mistaken conception that there are topics that are not sensitive. The life story is inevitably a sensitive ‘topic’ because its telling is bound to excavate at least some painful memories, along with many positive ones. Recalling the interviews I conducted, emotional moments arose in expected and unexpected places. For instance, for one participant my seemingly straightforward question about his wife’s
occupation opened a Pandora’s Box of stressful feelings about mental illness and recurrent domestic disputes. A further participant was tearful at the thought that her belonging to this country was being challenged. In such situations it paid to be flexible. In the two interviews where I felt that participants were in some distress, I suggested taking a break but both participants decided to continue. After the interview ended, I conducted a detailed debrief to ensure their emotional wellbeing. I also carried contact details for psychological counselling services with me but these were not required.

**Evaluating the Life Story Method**

My third most taxing concern, which accompanied me through the better part of the fieldwork, related to the value of life story data: What was I getting out of these life story interviews? Could I trust my chosen method to produce data appropriate to answer my research question? Josselson and Lieblich’s (2003: 272) observation that narrative researchers need to be able to cope with uncertainty resonated strongly with me. Despite the sound methodological foundation and evidence from existing research, at times I felt like I had to take a leap of faith and my interview field notes recorded after each interview reflect my uncertainty over the messy data the interviews produced. In hindsight, I am able to conclude that the life story interviews proved to be an adequate research tool. Just like other research methods, the life story approach has advantages and limitations. Life stories generate complex, rounded, nuanced and often contradictory pictures.

One beneficial effect of life story interviewing lies in its propensity for participants to learn about themselves, to change their minds, to contradict themselves over the course of the interview and to become aware of these contradictions, sometimes through gentle probing, but often also by themselves. In reflecting on their life experiences, participants came to grasp how their lives and the world they live in are connected. One participant suddenly exclaimed: “I wouldn’t have thought that my life was a map of the cultural changes in New Zealand, and it is, it is” (Helen, 40s). In this sense, the biographical interview truly is a space in which identities are made or remade rather than presented. Some participants became quite aware of their own contradictions, jokingly commenting that it would be my task to make sense of them.

The question of relevance is justified, especially with largely unstructured interviews. Narrative research always produces data that exceeds what is necessary to address the research question. In this respect not everything is relevant and analysing narrative data is time consuming. However, what is and is not relevant should not be determined prematurely. As Andrews (2007: 14) rightly

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29 I analyse this example in depth in Chapter Six.
argues, our academic training may predispose us to only listen for information pertaining directly to our research question rather than listening to what is relevant to our participants. Interestingly, my participants were much attuned to this. Many asked me whether I was getting anything useful out of their accounts. Requests for reassurance ranged from “Is this the kind of thing you want to hear?” and “I don’t know if this is useful for your study” to “It’s just me rambling. What’s it good for?” While I assumed that this was particular to this methodology, I was glad to learn from discussions with peers who used more structured interview methods that they had identical experiences.

The Researcher – Researched Relationship

Being a recent immigrant to Aotearoa/New Zealand was the one aspect that marked me as different from all participants. As a white, middle class woman in my mid-30s I differed from some participants with regards to gender, class, or age, or a combination of these social locations. Most pertinently, I felt that my migrant status allowed me to explain my observations of Pākehā-Māori relations, biculturalism, and multiculturalism without reproach. They were just ‘outsider observations’. The following interview extract shows Lisa’s (40s) reply to my question as to whether she could tell me how biculturalism affected her day to day life, for example in her workplace:

Lisa: Yeah. I don’t know. Maybe people that immigrate to New Zealand that weren’t born here are more enthusiastic to embrace it.

Jessica: Embrace what?

Lisa: The whole bicultural legislation and requirement in the workplace that you have policies and everything is translated into a second official language.

I felt her remark was directed at my interest in the topic to begin with because we were not speaking about differences between migrants and non-migrants. But it also shows that she tolerated my interest as something I share with fellow immigrants.

A combination of gender, age and class affected the power dynamics in a small number of interviews with middle aged to older men. A small number of participants attempted to dominate the interview procedure and to demonstrate their superiority through questioning my research approach and interview questions, testing my general knowledge and criticising my accent. A

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30 When I started the fieldwork in August 2011 I had lived in New Zealand for three years.
further participant drank steadily throughout the interview and repeatedly offered me a can of beer. I felt somewhat pressured to accept so as not to come across as aloof. He also asked me repeatedly to join him for a drink afterwards, rebutting my insistence that I needed to be elsewhere as a sign that I was not really interested in his life story. At no point did I feel directly under threat or the interview was out of control but it underlined the particular dangers that especially female researchers can face. For all interviews that I conducted in participants’ homes, I had left with my partner a secure envelope containing the participant’s address which was to be opened if I did not return and was not able to be contacted after an agreed time.

One factor that I had not anticipated but which influenced interviews with mothers was my status as a childfree woman. Many mothers asked me directly whether I had children and always seemed somewhat disappointed that I did not. Presumably assuming that I would not comprehend their experiences, this noticeably curtailed accounts of their identities as mothers and of their children’s experiences.

Transcribing

All 36 interviews were transcribed verbatim. I transcribed 14 interviews but opted for getting assistance from a professional transcription service for the remaining 22 interviews. I briefed the two transcribers, who both signed confidentiality agreements, on the purpose of the project, the nature of the interviews and agreed on transcription conventions. The transcripts included false starts, pauses, emotional expressions such as laughter, and the interaction between the participants and myself in order to retain as much of the interviewees’ voice and interview atmosphere as possible to help with the analysis. In order to make the excerpts more legible for the reader, I decided to remove most fill words (such as ‘um’ and ‘you know’) unless they played a significant discursive role, such as indicating hesitance. The following transcription regulations guide the reader through the interview excerpts presented in the following three chapters.

participant’s emphasis underlined

my emphasis Italics

broken off speech - (e.g. Auckl-)

pause (p)
The process of transcribing audio data is often seen as an integral part of the data analysis because it gives the researcher the opportunity to relive the interview, to jot down first impressions, and to even do some initial coding. However, transcribing is an extremely time consuming process and with many interviews scheduled in quick succession, it became impossible to follow the recommendations that stipulate to concurrently produce, transcribe, and analyse data. Once I received the text files, I double checked the transcription. I listened to every recording and corrected and amended the transcription where necessary to ensure accuracy. This allowed me to get immersed in the interviews. I repeatedly listened to interviews later on, during the initial coding and analysis in order to stay close to the atmosphere of the interview and the participants’ life stories. From this experience I have come to conclude that it is not the process of transcribing itself but attentive and repeated listening and reading of interview data that is integral to the analytical process.

**Identifying Themes**

There are many different ways of analysing biographical data and which approach is used depends largely on the researcher’s epistemological perspective and research question (Merrill & West, 2009). My main rationale for using a biographical method was to elicit narratives of lived experiences in order to analyse patterns in constructions of Pākehā identity and social imaginaries.

As I stated earlier, I am less interested in the actual biography than the collective *Pākehā life stories* that may reveal a shared ‘settler imaginary’. Consequently, I opted for a thematic analysis that reveals common patterns while paying sufficient attention to the individual life stories.

I read each transcript while listening to the recording to get a first impression of the overall structure, feel, and focus of the interview. At that stage, I only took minimal notes of aspects that seemed particularly interesting. After I had read a small number of transcripts this way, I re-read these transcripts and did two things: Firstly, I analysed the internal structure of the life stories and wrote a memo in note form for each individual based on the transcript and my field notes. These memos noted the progression of the life story, sites of identity constructions that stood out as
important, as well as emotions and contradictions. Secondly, and in tandem with the first step, I began the systematic thematic analysis by coding the interview data. First on paper, then in NVivo, I identified initial themes and on that basis established broader categories that consequently provided the scaffolding for more nuanced coding of themes and a template for the remaining interviews. Careful not to dismiss information as irrelevant, I opted for full rather than selective coding. This means I also coded parts of the life stories that did not seem immediately relevant to my research question. For instance, some of the broad categories such as ‘Pākehā-Māori relations’ and ‘Pākehā-migrant relations’ were chosen because they directly linked to my research question but I also coded all ‘personal information’ which included information and stories about relationships and family, living arrangements, and career aspirations, and a ‘gender’ category which came to include narratives about how gender roles and expectations shaped the identities of mostly female participants in various domains such as relationships, motherhood, career choices, or engagement with feminist issues.

**Ethical Considerations**

The researcher’s authority to impose his or her analytical perspective raises an important ethical issue. The potential of causing research participants harm and distress is most often mentioned in the context of interviewing but is neglected in considerations of analysing and presenting the data. Given the high degree of subjectivity involved in analysing narrative and other qualitative data (N. King & Horrocks, 2010), it is important to be aware of the potential to do epistemological violence to participants. This is especially true for research that deals with participants’ self-understandings. As Borland (1991: 71) notes:

> The performance of a personal narrative is a fundamental means by which people comprehend their own lives and present a ‘self’ to their audience. Our scholarly representations of those performances, if not sensitively presented, may constitute an attack on our collaborators’ carefully constructed sense of self.

Borland (1991) speaks from experience. Having conducted a life story interview with her grandmother, Borland proceeded to interpret a specific story – which spoke to gendered family relations – through a feminist lens, arguing that the story teller could be defined as a feminist. This interpretation of her identity, Borland recalls, did not at all resonate with her grandmother who felt gravely misrepresented.

Post-structuralist perspectives that eschew any interpretation and propose that researchers should only act as scribe are an exception.
How then do we reconcile our aim as researchers to analyse interview data with the fact that participants may not agree with our analysis? Bringing my own epistemological perspective and expertise to bear on the analysis is unavoidable but the risk of undermining participants’ self-representations can be minimised in two ways. Borland’s (1991) call for a ‘sensitive representation’ cautions us to mark the researcher as a narrator who is involved and invested in the research at all times. This role begins at the latest with formulating the research question, makes itself known in the choice of methodology and research design, and extends into the data analysis and presentation of the findings. I have made sure to mark my analysis as a subjective interpretation that proceeds from a critical engagement with dominant groups. During the analysis I have received feedback on my interpretations from supervisors, from peer researchers when I presented research findings and from reviewers of two refereed conference papers (Terruhn, 2013, 2014).

Presenting

In line with my analytical approach, the results of this research project are presented as separate but intersecting topics in the following three chapters. I foreground common patterns but also highlight some of the nuances and ambiguities in participants’ narratives. In presenting the research, I decided to draw on most participant interviews but I do so to varying degrees. Presenting individual case studies strikes me as more useful for research that examines clearly bounded experiential aspects of lives, such as Meares’ (2007) study of the gendered migration experience of South African immigrants in Aotearoa/New Zealand.

For my discussion of the politics of naming in Chapter Five, I decided to use a mixture of short and long quotes and a mix of statements and narratives because some of the data presented is based on questions external to the life stories In Chapter Six, I follow a slightly different approach. I chronicle one participant’s memories of the Māori protest movement and his perceptions of how settler-indigenous relations have changed since and what they should be like now. The themes that this chronicle contains are then further elaborated using examples from other participants as an effective way of transparently showing the commonalities in participants’ imaginaries. Chapter Seven contains a range of participant voices to which I return regularly throughout the chapter in order to reveal some of the contradictions within participant discourses.

I actively aimed for a balanced presentation of participants’ voices and my own. I present often extensive interview excerpts embedded in both contextualisation and sociological interpretation, relating my analysis to other research and to theory. As a way of emphasising that my analysis is
grounded in participants’ stories I relied as much as possible on their own words to describe themes in chapter and section headings.

In order to give emphasis to the individual narrators who are contradictory beings rather than merely respondents who provide information to the researcher, I aimed to create a sense of familiarity with the research participants. Throughout the following three chapters, the reader will encounter some participants repeatedly. I will introduce them on first mention and link excerpts by the same participant by referring back to earlier excerpts. While this means that some flipping back through the pages will be helpful (but not obligatory), I felt this was important in order to produce a rounded picture of participants and, perhaps most importantly, to draw attention to some of the inconsistencies and contradictions within the narratives people told me.

Creating familiarity and presenting life story excerpts which inevitably contain much personal information had to be reconciled with preserving participants’ anonymity and confidentiality. Due to the nature of this study, anonymity could not be guaranteed. This was laid out in the application to the Ethics Committee and explained to participants (see Appendix 1). However, in order to minimise the chances of identification, all participants were given pseudonyms, all other names mentioned were deleted, ages were reduced to age brackets, occupations were rendered more generic, and concrete place names were deleted whenever possible. Some references to place are crucial, however, because they form part of my analysis of the role of space in imaginaries of the nation.

**Conclusion**

This chapter has outlined my rationale for adopting a narrative approach coupled with short life story interviews and a thematic analysis for addressing my research questions. Most importantly, I understand narratives of lived experience as a discursive site of identity construction. Since such narratives are inherently social, that is, they are produced for (and with) an audience, as well as enabled and constrained by the discursive repertoires available at the time of narration, I argue that life stories lend themselves perfectly for a critical exploration of Pākehā identities and imaginaries. I am interested in themes and patterns across participants that allow me to critically analyse commonalities that speak to a “settler imaginary” (Bell, 2014: 11) reflective of the specific social location of Pākehā as the white settler majority in twenty-first century Aotearoa/New Zealand. In keeping with an ethical research practice and in order to make my research credible and trustworthy (Maynes, et al., 2008), I have provided a detailed account and
reflection on my research practice. Over the course of the next three chapters I present the findings from this research, beginning with the role the politics of naming the majority plays in participant constructions of identity.
Chapter Five
The Politics of Naming the Majority

Language is a key point of contestation in any colonial situation. The ability to continue to define and name places, experiences, and people is central to the life of native cultures and their resistance to colonial forces. Part of that is being able to name the colonizer (Rohrer, 2010: 31-32).

In Aotearoa/New Zealand, naming the majority has been a site of considerable contestation. As previously explained, the 1980s and 1990s were laden with discussions about the potential of ‘becoming Pākehā’ as a signifier of changing settler subjectivities accompanying politico-cultural processes of decolonisation. Some were optimistic; others were more sceptical, especially when it became apparent that claiming a Pākehā identity may constitute an indigenising strategy. From the mid-2000s though, and especially following the steep rise in ‘New Zealander’ responses in the 2006 census, the focus has shifted to the role of the national label. While some of this recent literature is foremost concerned with the question of whether a national label can – for statistical purposes – be an ethnic category (Callister, 2004), other research has begun to consider why the majority prefers this label (Kukutai & Didham, 2009, 2012).

In the two parts this chapter comprises, I examine various naming strategies employed by participants and the work labels do for them. I first discuss participants’ preferences and the ways they spoke about choosing or, as it were, refusing to choose an ethnic name to refer to themselves. My analysis draws on previous international research on naming practices, which demonstrates that majorities employ a number of ‘rhetoric strategies’ to secure the normative ‘mainstream’ position of whiteness (Martin, Krizek, Nakayama, & Bradford, 1996, 1999; Nakayama & Krizek, 1995). In the second part, I analyse the stories that participants told about and through the choices they make in an attempt to gain a better understanding of the role that the politics of naming the majority plays in (re-)constructing Pākehā identities and imaginaries.

Strategies: (Not) Picking, Choosing, and Refusing

My call for participants read that I was seeking to interview “New Zealanders of European descent who identify as European New Zealander, Pākehā, New Zealander, Kiwi or other” (see
Appendix 3), indicating the multiplicity of labels available to the majority. As part of the interviews, my participants and I discussed their preferred way of naming themselves, why they chose particular terms and rejected others, and how they interpreted the various terms. Some of this talk about naming choices occurred naturally during the course of the life story, but statements about preferences for and meanings of labels were usually also elicited separately in an external probing question either at the beginning or the end of the interview. In order to gain new knowledge that meaningfully complements previous research findings, I aimed to get a sense of whether (and, if so, how) labels are integral to the participants’ sense of self.

Responses to my questions about ethnic naming preferences were seldom straightforward and generated ‘messy’ data but I am able to indicate how my sample of thirty-eight participants compares to previous quantitative findings. The well-documented contestations surrounding the label Pākehā were, as expected, clearly reflected in the interviews. This label undoubtedly elicited the most categorical endorsements and rejections. Eleven participants emphatically always identified as Pākehā and eight participants stated that they never used the term. While the number of participants endorsing the label exceeds the ten percent of survey respondents who did the same in Sibley et al.’s (2011) research, this difference might be explained by the nature of my study. If it is true that identifying as Pākehā signifies an active articulation of collective identity, we can assume that self-identified Pākehā would be more likely to follow a call to discuss “the construction of identity amongst New Zealanders of European descent in Auckland” (see Appendix 3) than people who have not given the issue much thought. Conversely, the number of participants rejecting the label is much lower than the approximately 50 percent rejection rate found in both Jellie (2001) and a New Zealand Herald DigiPoll from 2001 (cited in Jellie, 2001: 44).

The remainder of replies was much more ambiguous, however. Sixteen participants preferred the national label New Zealander; of these, all bar one were happy to use New Zealand European, and eight the term Pākehā, sometimes. A further eight participants stressed that they had no specific preference at all, yet indicated that, after all, they were ‘just’ New Zealanders. Interestingly, not one participant claimed the label ‘New Zealand European’ as a preferred identifier which strongly contrasts with the 25 percent of Sibley et al.’s (2011) respondents. At the same time, only one single participant stated that she would never refer to herself as such. The fact that the label New Zealand European was never a preferred self-referent yet was simultaneously less categorically rejected than Pākehā invites a more detailed look at the meanings people attach to these terms. Three participants did not provide any information either because they were not asked or they
refused to answer this question. Below, I examine all these practices of ‘(not) picking, choosing, and refusing’ in more detail in order to explore the extent to which these practices constitute rhetoric strategies that preserve the normative status of settler whiteness.

“I don’t care what you call me.”

A number of participants struggled to pick a preferred ethnic identity label, or felt it was a trifling topic of conversation. Paula, a Devonport-based retiree in her 60s, illustrates this point in her response to my question as to what label she would use to describe herself:

I never care about stuff like that. I’m quite happy to be Pākehā, I’m quite happy to be Caucasian, New Zealander of European descent. I just don’t care about labels, like I don’t care about Miss, Mrs, Ms. I don’t get uptight about stuff like that. It’s so trivial. [laughs] Sorry. [edit] I don’t care what you call me. And I would usually, if I was asked and it was on an official form, I would usually give an answer that was as clarifying as possible. I would think they want to know if I’m white, black, [or] brown. They don’t want to know that I’m just a New Zealander. So I would usually say Pākehā New Zealander or something, so that the census would accurately reflect my race if that’s what they want. Otherwise why are they asking?

Paula’s reply helps to unpack a number of issues. First of all, participants who had no specific preference frequently stated that they perceived available terminology to be interchangeable. As the quote shows, Paula accepts even terms that are not commonly used in Aotearoa/New Zealand, such as Caucasian. George, a retiree in his 70s from Papatoetoe, replied to my question as to whether he thought that ‘Pākehā’ and ‘New Zealand European’ mean different things in a similar fashion: “No. It’s more of a question out of a questionnaire than kind of conversation of anything. I can’t really think of, in conversation I can’t see- ever think of it coming up.” Clearly then, indifference towards ethnic labels arises from the fact that none of these terms are experienced as identity-constituting or as important for a sense of collective belonging. Instead, as both Paula’s and George’s replies show, they merely denote categories imposed by state bureaucracies for purposes of enumeration.

Furthering this theme, indifference for some participants was based on the idea that labelling the majority is redundant because being white does not warrant a precise ethnic designation beyond specifying their nationality. Andrew, a university student in his 20s explained, “I’m just white middle class. I’m not anything else,” adding, “I define myself as Kiwi because that’s the closest
thing I have to culture but I don’t pay much attention to it because there’s nothing to pay attention to.” Roger (50s) likewise argued that ethnic labelling is unnecessary, saying: “Pākehā, I don’t use that phrase, don’t use the phrase Kiwi and I wouldn’t say white New Zealander; I’d just say New Zealander because clearly I’m white.” Roger’s reference to his ‘obvious’ white skin and Andrew’s insistence that whiteness does not have any substance to pay attention to is consistent with Nakayama and Krizek’s (1995: 300) finding that white Americans render white a colour only “drained of its history and its social status.” As Nakayama and Krizek (1995) have shown, definitions of ethno-racial identities were characterised by both negative (i.e., white = not black) and tautological expressions (i.e., white American = white skinned person). The former denotes a lack of positive content in that whiteness is only defined by what it is not; the latter a depoliticised and de-historicised understanding of white as skin colour only rather than as a particular structural location. This lack of cultural and political meaning attached to ‘being white’ demonstrates that, despite the recent history of explicitly marking white New Zealanders as particular (as Pākehā), this particularity can remain invisible. Consequently, whiteness continues to be treated as a default category that has no inherent meaning and consequently does not need to be named.

Importantly, Paula revealed what constitutes her identity – who she is rather than what categories she fits into – in one throwaway line (highlighted in the extract above): “they don’t want to know that I’m just a New Zealander.” I address the explicit preference for the national label as the only one that entailed meaning for nearly half of my participants later on in this chapter but want to consider the question of curtailed choice also imputed in this sentence. Like Paula, many participants felt that official requests to choose an ethnic category did not allow them to express who they are. Robert, a Papatoetoe resident in his 50s, found ethnic naming to be a “restrictive” box-filling exercise that he only adhered to because it was “the pc thing to do.” He further explained:

Well I’m a Kiwi, you know what I mean, but when you’ve got to answer a box and it says you know ‘are you Māori, Cook Island, Samoan, New Zealand European?’ well obviously I tick New Zealand European, you know what I mean. Yeah. They don’t give you many choices, you know.

In addition, some of those participants who described themselves as New Zealanders experienced ethnic naming as divisive and threatening, supporting Martin et al.’s (1996: 129) argument that “with the loss of choices comes a perception of the loss of power.” Participants who felt this way
commonly evoked an image of ethnic terminology being imposed as a result of the politics of redress and biculturalism. Ruth, a Papatoetoe-based retiree in her 60s, remembered:

Ruth: I always thought of myself as a New Zealander, I didn’t think of myself as New Zealand European. We got told that later.

Jessica: By who? Who told you?

Ruth: Well, they had it on the form. There was only- the only thing you could tick. [edit] So it wasn’t anything- because before that you could just put down New Zealander.

Jessica: Right. So what did you think about that [shift]?

Ruth: Well, I didn’t like it. I thought, well, I suppose I am that but (p). It didn’t bother me really. I thought, well yeah, you had been a New Zealander or a foreigner before that, now you have to say whether you’re, you know, a New Zealand European.

Ruth’s memories are interesting because a look at the census history (Pearson, 2012) shows that until 1991 there was, in fact, no mention of ‘New Zealander’ in the census question on race and later ethnicity. Until 1981, people were asked to state their ‘race’, including particular fractions if necessary, and from 1986, their ‘ethnic origins.’ Up until 1991, these race and ethnicity options for the majority were ‘European’. In 1991, ‘New Zealand European’ was introduced as separate from ‘other European’, and in 1996, ‘or Pākehā’ was added to this. Callister (2004: 4) has argued that “[t]his separation of ‘New Zealand European’ and ‘Other European’ provided some sense that ‘New Zealand Europeans’ were ‘native’ New Zealanders. The term ‘Pakeha’ reinforced this idea.” My findings suggest that the opposite is true. At least according to the memories of a number of participants, the introduction of both these terms created unease because it was experienced as challenging their place in Aotearoa/New Zealand.

This disquiet about the imposition of ethnic categories was amplified – and clarified – by Ruth a little later, in the context of a story about how she experienced the protest movements of the early 1980s. Stating, “I’m a New Zealander. And most of the ones I worked with are also New Zealanders. They never took exception to anybody. Always tried to get along with everybody [laughs],” Ruth told me about how frightened she and her colleagues were when, in 1981, Springbok Tour protesters demonstrated against hosting the racially segregated South African
rugby team and apartheid outside her work place in Auckland’s city centre where she worked in close proximity to a South African Airlines office. Even though this protest was not directed at her, it was deeply entwined with Māori activism challenging colonialism and racism in Aotearoa/New Zealand, which, as explained in Chapter Two, “not only upset the sublime secret of the myth of racial harmony, but the very claim to New Zealand-ness in New Zealand” (Pollock, 2004: 41). It is against this backdrop of social upheaval that Ruth remembers naming the majority as an unjust penalty imposed on white New Zealanders; even on those who were, by their own account, not racist (like herself and her co-workers).

Statements so far demonstrate that ethnicity is marginal to many participants’ identities. The resultant non-choices, whether based on indifference or more overt resistance, are imbued with the power of the majority group to claim universality because ethnicity does not “intrude upon” their day-to-day lives in the way it does for subordinate ethnic groups (Doane, 1997: 378). While Ruth, as well as the other participants discussed above, did not pick an ethnic label, some participants made their stake in identity claims more obvious by defiantly re-claiming the choice they believe they have lost. These will be discussed below.

“I’m other. My other is Kiwi.”

Nakayama and Krizek’s (1995) finding that their white American respondents tended to resist ethnic labelling in general and favoured the national label over more specific ethnic categories was also evident in this study. Instead of conforming to the available naming options on official forms, some participants took action, such as crossing out options or writing letters of complaint, thereby demonstrating their investment in the politics of naming and reinforcing the argument that the loss of choice is experienced as a loss of power (Martin, et al., 1996: 129). Caitlyn, a Papatoetoe resident in her 50s, illustrates this point:

I’m a Kiwi. I don’t care if my skin is white, brown, grey, purple, I’m a Kiwi. I was born in New Zealand, I was raised as a New Zealander, I’m a Kiwi and, I don’t know, if you see forms and they say ‘what race?’ I always put other and I put Kiwi. I was told I’m not allowed to do that and I said ‘where does it say I’m not allowed to do that? It’s got other and I’m other. My other is Kiwi.’

Caitlyn’s story suggests a lack of awareness of the difference between nationality and ethnicity, that is, that one can be a New Zealander/Kiwi in terms of civic belonging but also have an ethnic identity alongside this. Conflating racial/ethnic and national identity has been interpreted as one
element of the majority’s repertoire of rhetoric strategies that maintain a normative position (Nakayama & Krizek, 1995). In Aotearoa/New Zealand, this argument has been echoed by a number of scholars (Bell, 1996; Spoonley, 1995) but more recent discussions about the increase in ‘New Zealander’ responses have ignited the question of whether ‘becoming New Zealander’ is a new form of ethnogenesis for majorities in settler societies. In this context, Callister (2004: 9) defends opting for the national label against criticism arguing that “an individual, or groups of individuals, choosing ‘New Zealander’ as their ethnic group is quite different from the claim that ‘we are all New Zealanders.’ The creation of a ‘New Zealander’ ethnic group does not deny choices for others.” This argument is problematic in a number of ways. For one, claiming the national label and conflating it with ethnicity reinforces the idea that only (non-white) minorities are ethnic and that white New Zealanders are the national people. Secondly, in the context of settler-indigenous politics, insisting on a ‘New Zealander only’ identity can be interpreted as a tactic of resisting processes that reveal settler whiteness as a structural location of dominance. Thirdly, it has been claimed that insisting on the national appellation constitutes an attempt to indigenise the settler (Veracini, 2010b: 46). I will return to participants’ reasons for choosing the national label in the second part of this chapter but will demonstrate next that these criticisms achieve more gravity when we consider the rejection of the Pākehā label that accompanies these identity claims for some participants.

“I get offended.”

Eight of the 16 participants who preferred to identify as New Zealanders stated that they would never describe themselves as Pākehā but only one also categorically rejected the label ‘New Zealand European’. Bearing in mind the continuum from indifference to resistance against ethnic identifiers in general, the different reaction to ‘Pākehā’ and ‘European New Zealander’ deserves closer consideration. A short statement from Gene, (70s, retiree from Devonport) sheds light on the discursive construction of difference between the two concepts: “I get offended when I am faced with a thing that says Pākehā but if it says European I’ll tick that. I come from European stock. I can’t help that. That’s my whakapapa, as they call it, is European.”

Gene’s statement is representative of many participants’ conceptions of ‘European’ as an innate and therefore inescapable ethno-racial ancestry. The biological term ‘stock’ is indicative of this, as is his reference to whakapapa, a Māori term denoting ancestry. While European-ness does not contribute to participants’ ethno-cultural identity, expressions such as Gene’s “I can’t help that,”
or Ruth’s “I suppose I am that” (see above), were frequent and underscore the naturalisation of this category. This then explains why there was hardly any categorical opposition to the label.

By contrast, ‘Pākehā’ was regarded as an artificial construct which was “shoved down your throat” as the result of Māori identity politics, as one participant put it. As such, ‘Pākehā’ is experienced as a greater affront, and one that can be and is frequently resisted. For example, in 2001, the Human Rights Commission reported that “one of the most common complaints to the former Race Relations Office was from people objecting to being labelled ‘Pakeha’” (Callister, et al., 2009: 42). Such complaints were also manifest in my research. Lisa, a Devonport resident in her 40s, who prefers to identify as New Zealander or Kiwi and rejects the Pākehā label, explained why she took action against having to identify as Pākehā in a form her employer requested staff to complete:

I wrote a letter and I said that I took offence because I’m not a Pākehā, I’m a European descent New Zealander. And they wrote back and they apologised and they said ‘well actually we’ve got quite a few complaints.’ And every year thereafter, I think they had Pākehā slash, or maybe it was New Zealand European descent slash Pākehā. So they still kept it there but it wasn’t quite so, you know, objectionable.

Given that ‘Pākehā’ is commonly equated with ‘European New Zealander’, why do some find the term so intolerable? Is it caused by “discomfort with a label in a ‘foreign language’, a desire to avoid negative associations with the past, or a need for a more meaningful self-ascription,” as Liu et al. (1999: 1043) speculate? Pearson and Sissons (1997), as well as Jellie (2001: 81), found that the belief that Pākehā is used in a derogatory manner overwhelmingly accounted for its rejection. This was also the case in my study. All eight participants who expressly refused to use the term Pākehā did so partly because they perceived the word to have a derogatory meaning in the Māori language with most participants citing the popular myth that the literal translation of the term is – or at least may be – ‘white pig.’ Karen (40s, Devonport), who admitted that its derogatory meaning was not fully verified nevertheless concluded: “if I don’t understand the word I don’t want to use it on me because it’s not in my heart, it’s just an outside word coming in.” Caitlyn, who as just mentioned identified as a New Zealander/Kiwi, claimed to recall, as did many others, that “it was chucked at you as an insult” by Māori.

Research has shown that there is a distinct mismatch between Pākehā perceptions and Māori perceptions and usage of the term. Jellie (2001: 56) demonstrated that the Māori respondents in her survey were least likely to understand Pākehā as a pejorative term, and more recently, Sibley
and colleagues (2011) discredited the idea that Māori use the term in a hostile manner. On the contrary, Māori use of the label Pākehā to refer to New Zealanders of European descent was primarily associated with how central ethnicity was to their identity. The authors conclude that “Māori for whom ethnicity is a central part of self-concept will be simply more likely to employ terms from Te Reo Māori (the Māori language) in their everyday discourse” (Sibley, et al., 2011: 214).

A smaller number of participants highlighted their discomfort with a non-English term as a reason for not identifying as Pākehā. However, the data reveals that the same participants were happy to use other words in te reo Māori. Lisa, for instance, who rejects the label Pākehā in part because she “speaks English” is simultaneously very fond of other Māori terms such as ‘whānau,’ ‘whenua,’ and, particularly, ‘Aotearoa’: “I love Aotearoa, I think it’s a beautiful sound and I think- the land of the long white cloud, to me that’s just, you know, it’s a magical term about our uniqueness.” Compared to this overt selectivity, which is in itself a white settler privilege, Chloe’s (40s, Devonport) explanation of ‘appropriate’ terms was nuanced in an interesting way:

I guess [...] I just naturally wouldn’t use the Māori word for it. But then I use Māori words for a lot of other things when they’re more appropriate than using European words. Like my children use Māori words for native birds and things like that because that’s- we call them by their native name. I don’t know. I guess yes it’s from- mm. No, I’m not sure. There are- I mean there definitely aren’t many people in this neighbourhood who probably think much about or would have much to do with Māori culture.

Like Lisa, Chloe argued that it was appropriate to use te reo for some things but not others. To some extent though, Chloe’s claim that it is appropriate to name only things native to Aotearoa/New Zealand, such as native flora and fauna in te reo Māori could be read as refusing settler indigenisation. However, her reflection then reverts to indicating that distance from Māori culture may explain why the Pākehā label would be unpopular.

For some participants of this study though, ‘Pākehā’ denotes a denial of full New Zealander status. An excerpt from my interview with Ann, a Ponsonby-based participant in her late 40s who at the time I interviewed her was actively exploring questions of national belonging in her work in the creative industry, illustrates this association:

Before I started doing this investigation I would have identified myself as Pākehā but now I would prefer to describe myself as a New Zealander of European descent [...] and I don’t
know, I think it’s a subtle shift in terms of the fact that I am actually a New Zealander. Pākehā doesn’t say that I’m a New Zealander. And [...] I know it could only be a New Zealand word but it doesn’t actually describe me as a New Zealander.

Ann acknowledged that the term Pākehā is unique to Aotearoa/New Zealand, and thus that “there is nowhere else in the world that one can be Pākehā,” as Mikaere (2004: 44) notes. Nonetheless, for Ann and some other participants the label signifies a threat to national belonging. Since rejecting the label Pākehā was always explicitly linked to insisting on the national label instead, I will discuss this point in more detail in the second part of this chapter.

“I always make a point of choosing Pākehā.”

In this study, 11 participants stated that they always identified as Pākehā. These participants were very categorical about their choice, as evident in statements such as “I always make a point of choosing Pākehā. I really tick that box quite definitely. Particular, you know, I’m pleased that there’s that option” (Claire, 40s). Just as many other participants did, those describing themselves as Pākehā recalled the shift in nomenclature that required an ethnic self-description. Lynn (60s, Ponsonby) remembered the following phases of identity ascriptions:

When did I first hear about Pākehā? I suppose the biggest change is people thought of themselves as Poms and then, I don’t know what we referred to ourselves as, New Zealanders I suppose. And then of course gradually it started coming into forms that you fill in. You know, you can choose Pākehā, or European, or other.

While some of those who identified as Pākehā experienced Māori politicisation as creating divisions, they were more likely than people who did not expressly identify as Pākehā to understand these as a necessary stage in the process of decolonisation. In contrast to the people who concluded that ethnic labels are unnecessary or divisive, a number of self-identified Pākehā stressed how important it was to name their specific position within Aotearoa/New Zealand. As Audrey (40s) explained, “New Zealander to me encompasses all New Zealanders, but that doesn’t say who I am in New Zealand or how I belong.” Such statements indicate that these participants are aware of occupying a particular structural location rather than the mainstream. This location is clearly relational to Māori. For instance, all of them recalled processes of ‘becoming’ that led them to adopt a Pākehā identity when it became available. Claire, who, as stated above, always identifies as Pākehā recalled that while she was called Pākehā by fellow Māori pupils during her
childhood, she only came to actively endorse the term as a signifier of identity when she undertook a cultural safety course as part of her nursing curriculum.

At first glance then, opting for ‘Pākehā’ appears to counter white normativity through its active rejection of the more generic national label. The question whether the term carries the potential of challenging settler whiteness will be taken up in the following part of the chapter detailing the stories participants told through their choices.

**Stories: What Is in a Name?**

Further to this overview of participant preferences, I present a more detailed analysis of the work labels do – that is, the meanings attached to Pākehā, New Zealand European, and New Zealander – in order to illuminate the role the politics of naming play in constructing identities and imaginaries. I base this section on Tanno’s (2011: 35) contention that “each ‘name’ is a rhetorical device insofar as it communicates a particular story.” To illustrate this point, Tanno explicates the distinct meanings evoked when she thinks of herself as either ‘Spanish,’ ‘Mexican-American,’ ‘Latina,’ or ‘Chicana’. While using the term ‘Spanish’ emphasises her cultural heritage, ‘Mexican-American’ stresses a sense of duality in both “historical consciousness” and “visions” so characteristic for hyphenated identities in the US American context (Tanno, 2011: 36). Being ‘Latina,’ by contrast, is expressive of belonging to a much broader cultural community, and, last but not least, identifying as ‘Chicana’ denotes a political strategy. While processes and meanings of labelling arguably differ for minority and majority groups, I contend that Tanno’s (2011: 37) argument that “each name implies a narrative of experiences gained in responding to circumstance, time, and place and motivated by a need to belong” can be applied to an investigation of ethnic majority naming choices, especially in Aotearoa/New Zealand where several appellations are commonly used. In the spirit of the optimistic conceptions of Pākehānness as a post-colonising device, Tilbury (2000: 83) once said that it is “not just a name, it is an attitude.” I argue that this is the case for all names; none are empty signifiers.

Overall, naming the majority was a significant site of (re-)claiming an undisputable New Zealand-specific identity. I begin by discussing the role of labels in creating distinctly non-European identities and fostering settler belonging in response to perceived challenges to settler legitimacy. No doubt of most interest here for existing debates on the decolonising potential of a ‘Pākehā project’ is that the labels ‘New Zealander’ and ‘Pākehā’ do much the same work in this respect. Nonetheless, there are also significant differences in the work these labels do which I will discuss
subsequently. One such difference lies in the importance of developing new ways of relating to Māoriness which was central to self-identified Pākehā narratives but not to those who prefer other labels. The stories also show that this was clearly a process of becoming. As my analysis also shows, such processes of ‘conscientisation’ were seldom straightforward. In fact, the various stories about engaging with settler colonial history and Māori contexts entailed a set of insecurities about settler whiteness which often resulted in feelings of being disadvantaged.

“How far do I have to go before I’m not European?”

As outlined earlier, no participant chose ‘European New Zealander’ as their preferred self-referent. In fact, an explicit distance to Europe was stressed by all participants, regardless of whether they described themselves as New Zealanders or Pākehā. For example, Eileen (30s) who identifies exclusively as New Zealander/Kiwi stated, “I always thought that Europeans came from Europe, you know, that part of the world. So I never classed as European but sometimes you’ve got no choice.” By comparison, Olivia (40s) who wholeheartedly identifies as Pākehā, replied to my question of why she chooses to describe herself this way as follows: “because I can’t relate to being European at all. I just think the generations of my family have been born in this land too long for me to have a connection to being European.”

This multigenerational presence in Aotearoa/New Zealand was a common feature amongst participants who sought to distance themselves from being European, and was equally prevalent amongst those identifying as ‘Pākehā’ and as ‘New Zealander’. Even though many participants showed a great interest in genealogy, tracing their ancestry and travelling to the regions their ancestors came from, they stressed that they were “grounded” in New Zealand. This is also central to Amanda’s (40s) account of choosing to be Pākehā, as the following extract shows:

I guess I feel part of, more part of Aotearoa, as being a, you know, like not thinking about it being part of the British Commonwealth, it’s more about its own, its very own country, and not having that kind of British colony history. And yeah I mean it’s- there are some other things about it I think for me that I feel that I’m very much a part of this country. In the last ten years I found that my family has actually been here on my dad’s side since 1851. So you know we’ve actually been here a long time relatively, you know, in terms of New Zealand history.

In addition, Amanda’s account of tracing her multigenerational family history back to within ten years of the signing of the Treaty of Waitangi paradoxically converges with a desire to erase
British colonial history from this picture. Portraying herself as sympathetic to biculturalism throughout the interview, her desire to be freed from colonial history is strongly reminiscent of Race Relations Minister Trevor Mallard’s (2004) call (discussed in Chapter Two) for a break with the colonial past. As I further explained in Chapter Three, this imagined break with the past allows Pākehā to re-invent themselves as innocent while settler colonial structures continue to protect the hegemonic and privileged position of Pākehā while curtailing the rights of indigenous peoples (Mikaere, 2004).

“You Pākehās don’t belong here!”

For some participants, only a national identity provides a sufficient measure of belonging, which is suggestive of a great degree of settler insecurity caused by the process of ‘othering’ that indigenous rights discourses entailed. Reflecting on why exactly he prefers to describe himself as a New Zealander, Roger (50s) juxtaposed it to the label Pākehā:

Roger: Pākehā was not a word we would use about ourselves but a word that Māori friends or enemies would use about us. You know, Pākehā was-

Jessica: You say Māori friends or enemies?

Roger: Yeah. [laughs] Pākehā, Pākehā [whispered] It was probably actually not used in a derogatory way but kind of used when something negative was being said like ‘you Pākehās don’t belong here,’ things like that so it was a word that- that’s the best memory that I have of it. We’d never call ourselves Pākehās. But other people would call us Pākehās, and typically it would be Māoris [sic] would call us Pākehā to distinguish us from them. Because they couldn’t distinguish us from them by calling us New Zealanders or they didn’t accept that we were New Zealanders. Okay, so I think that Pākehā in my experience is a word that’s being used to label me or other white people like me to differentiate us from the person who’s using the word. And maybe that’s why we call ourselves New Zealanders because we say we’re from New Zealand. As I said before kind of like we do- I belong here, I was born here. I travelled the world; I don’t feel like I belong anywhere else unless it’s on a super yacht somewhere. So, I use New Zealander because that phrase says I’m of this place or I’m from this place. Pākehā almost to me means, well, it’s almost a denial of the fact that you’re a New Zealander in a funny sort of way. It’s a label- someone, a white
person born in New Zealand, but to me it’s got that connotation that you don’t belong here, yeah, from the way it was used.

This extract is exemplary of the experiences and sentiments expressed by those participants who insist on the national label and reject being called Pākehā. The use of “Māori enemies” in Roger’s narrative of being ascribed a name – an identity – that he and others like him would have never chosen themselves is quite striking and even though this is an outlier, the idea of being ‘othered’ by Māori (usually school was given as a context of that experience) was commonly recounted by participants, including those who do identify as Pākehā. While Roger first stresses ‘differentiation’ he swiftly moves to the issue of belonging. Being named constitutes a challenge to belonging and choosing to be ‘New Zealander’ is a direct response to this threat of Māori politicisation that cast doubt on the legitimacy of settler presence. Kukutai and Didham (2009: 56) suggest that the national label may resonate particularly with members of the majority as a response to “the twin threats of Māori politicisation and growing ethnic diversification.” My own research confirms that for some the politics of indigeneity pose a threat but with respect to ethnic diversity, if anything, the national label was used as an inclusionary strategy.

Within whiteness studies, the dominant group’s tendency to opt for an overarching national label has been interpreted as an evasion of particularity. While this may be a strategy to preserve a powerful normative position, it is usually regarded as a passive reaction and consequence of the fact that ethnicity is often invisible (Doane, 1997). But in settler societies, especially those that name white settlers in the language of the colonised, choosing the national label is a more active response. Veracini (2010b: 46) argues that efforts to turn ‘New Zealander’ into an ethnic category constitute a transfer by “settler indigenisation.” Based on my research, I agree that ‘being New Zealander’ tells a story of ‘we are New Zealanders, too!’ Despite the privileged position of settler whiteness, settler belonging is complicated by indigeneity. For some participants, the national label is a site in which the settler subject explicitly re-asserts belonging. Roger’s perception that being called Pākehā undermines belonging and Ruth’s feeling that all ethnic labelling constitutes a form of punishment for white settlers (discussed earlier in this chapter) suggest that the preference for the national label signals nostalgia for the time preceding recriminations against Pākehā. This supports Johnson’s (2005: 149) argument that the ‘New Zealander’ identity:

indicates a search for security as ‘Pakeha’ became dislocated from its normal connection to New Zealandness, a dislocation that became ever more marked as the colonized both
revealed the ongoing practices of colonization and interrupted these processes with increasing forcefulness.

However, the claim that the increasing use of ‘New Zealander’ denotes indigenisation is complicated by the finding that the label Pākehā does much the same work. Both Pearson and Sissons (1997), as well as Jellie (2001: 80) who partly replicated the former study, found that the self-identified Pākehā respondents in their surveys primarily used the term because it defined them as “being from New Zealand.” This finding is confirmed in my research. Yet, there is one important difference in the way ‘New Zealanders’ and ‘Pākehā’ make themselves at home. Those who, like Roger, prefer the national appellation, claim belonging against Māori, while those who identify as Pākehā do so through Māori. Amanda, who stressed her desire to create greater distance from colonial history (see above) further explained why she identified as Pākehā, saying, “I guess because I am very much a New Zealander and I guess maybe in some ways I feel that by calling myself a Pākehā rather than a New Zealand European I feel more connected perhaps to Māoridom, to the land even.”

For some then, identifying as Pākehā creates exactly that sense of belonging to Aotearoa/New Zealand that Roger feels it denies, substantiating Sibley et al.’s (2011: 214, emphasis original) argument that in contrast to ‘New Zealand European’, “use of the term Pākehā positions New Zealanders of European descent using a reference that exists fundamentally in relation to Māori.” But what characterises this relationship? Do self-identified Pākehā act as “bridge makers and border crossers”, as Mitcalfe (2008: 110) suggested, or do they, as Gray (2013: 90) concluded, exploit the hegemonic bicultural “relationship metaphor” in order to claim belonging without challenging the asymmetric nature of that relation? In interviews with Treaty educators, Black (2010: iv) found that,

[a]ccepting the name Pākehā implied having a position of responsibility to tangata whenua and to the land. In turn those who have accepted being Pākehā receive a sense of belonging to Aotearoa and a place to stand in justice alongside Māori and other people who are culturally different from them.

This finding is particularly interesting because, while Pākehā assume responsibility, they also reassert their belonging in what appears to be a reward for developing post-colonial subjectivities. This is strongly reminiscent of King’s (1999) assertion that those Pākehā who are committed to the nation deserve to belong, and deserve to claim indigeneity (see Chapter Three). In the remainder of this chapter, I analyse the Pākehā narratives that emerged in this study.
“It’s all part of us.”

While most participants described some kind of ‘connection’ to Māori (most often in the form of cultural expressions) during the course of the interview, only self-identified Pākehā expressly referred to the relationship to Māori in their ethnic naming stories and explanations. As the following examples show, the form these connections took varied widely, ranging from an incorporation of Māori culture into ‘the national culture’, via an abstract position in a bicultural society, to acknowledging colonial history and one’s resulting position relative to Māori via the Treaty of Waitangi. Lynn (60s) gave this explanation when discussing what being Pākehā means to her:

When I was at university they started wanting, was it Māori on the radio to start with? There was a tiny wee bit of Māori on the radio, and then calling for Māori in schools. So, all of that has started since I was in my 20s. And so now there is- and that sort of makes me a Pākehā I suppose, being- because other countries don’t have Māori on their radio or don’t have the- I don’t think they have Aboriginal shows in Australia and I don’t know that they have North American Indian shows in America. I don’t know. But here I suppose we are more- you know, sort of feel it is all part of us I think.

Here, becoming Pākehā is a response to the Māori Renaissance and embodies Moran’s (2002: 1014) idea of an “indigenizing settler nationalism,” that is, as efforts to acknowledge and incorporate indigenous culture into the imaginary of the settler nation. Lynn emphasises that, in contrast to other settler states, Māoriness is a central element of New Zealand society; it is a visible, normal part of national culture and therefore bound up with Pākehā lives and identities. Some participants, such as Elaine (60s) below, explicitly evoked the bicultural relationship discourse as a central element of her Pākehā identity:

I would only ever see myself as Pākehā and I like the term Pākehā because I think that it adequately sums up, you know, European New Zealander and it’s a Māori term that in a bicultural society I think works really well. And I accept […] it and I’m very comfortable with it because of the bicultural sort of relationship that I like to be part of in New Zealand really I guess.
It was mainly self-identified Pākehā who thought of Aotearoa/New Zealand as bicultural and integrated the concept into their self-understanding. Mostly, this involved being sympathetic to Māori aspirations, not feeling threatened by Māori politicisation, and not holding on to a monocultural paradigm. In this context, Pākehā set themselves apart from those European New Zealanders who object to the label, interpreting this as a sign of insecurity.

A smaller number of self-identified Pākehā – and only those – stressed the role of the Treaty of Waitangi for their identity. Mark (40s) told me that being Pākehā is “fundamental to who you are in this country if you happen to be of European heritage” and elaborated upon my request:

Well, I mean I kind of go back to the Treaty of Waitangi as the founding document of this nation state and that that document basically outlined an agreement between two people, the tangata whenua Māori and the settler government who we refer to as Pākehā and that we must live in partnership and ensure each other the ability to make our own decisions and to work alongside each other so I think that’s where I go back to being a Pākehā is back to the Treaty I think.

Mark’s explanation exemplifies the dominant bicultural partnership discourse according to which both Māori and Pākehā are relational colonial constructs which determine today’s positionalities of tangata whenua and tangata tiriti. As such, Mark’s and all excerpts in this section support Sibley et al.’s (2011: 205) argument that identifying as Pākehā “expresses a positive symbolic association with Māori culture” and “reflect[s] the desire to recognize a relationship with Māori.” However, the “relationship metaphor” (Gray, et al., 2013: 90) often dominated the Pākehā imaginary which perhaps explains why self-identified Pākehā felt more secure in their belonging.

“Then I had to come to terms with the fact that I was white.”

Olivia, a school teacher in her 40s, speaks te reo fluently, has brought up her child bilingually, feels very spiritually connected to the land and has, as she told me, a strong sense of justice that developed from an early age. She thinks her role in life is to “build a bridge between Pākehā and Māori.” As part of becoming Pākehā, Olivia underwent a difficult phase of coming to terms with her whiteness:

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32 A large number of participants thought of Aotearoa/New Zealand as multicultural, disputing the persistence of biculturalism. This theme will be discussed in detail in the following chapter.
I had to go through a journey of really—well firstly realising that I wasn’t African American and I didn’t live in America so I probably wasn’t going to become the next Martin Luther King and that was a huge, it was quite a, you know, slap in the face [both laughing], and I probably went through a time of wishing I was Māori as well. You know like, ‘surely dad, couldn’t there have been something somewhere?’ And I think also because I’m the only dark-haired, olive-skinned person in my family, so there was something like, well, sometimes people mistake me as part Māori and stuff, like you know, maybe I am da-da-da so I had to go through all that. There’s no Māori in my family history. And so then I had to come to terms with the fact that I was white, a white European living in New Zealand, girl.

Olivia’s narrative illustrates a response to the “moral crisis of being white” (Harvey, 2007: 36), and to “recogniz[ing] how deeply our racial subjectivities are embedded in white supremacist power relations” (Harvey, 2007: 35). Olivia’s account stands in stark contrast to statements in the first part of this chapter where participants regarded whiteness as a skin colour without content, barely worth mentioning. Interestingly, Olivia responds to this moral crisis by trying to be someone who is deemed morally superior – the oppressed. Renee, who is also in her 40s, underwent a similar phase of wanting to be Māori as an adolescent during the Māori Renaissance. She explained: “I didn’t want to identify with what I thought were the negative aspects of Pākehā New Zealand culture or European New Zealand culture, and politics and values [edit]. But also I knew I wasn’t Māori.” Thus, while the process of learning to be white entailed acknowledging one’s dominant group status, for the participants who spoke about it, the most painful part of the process was coming to terms with not being Māori.

An active member in the Mana party and the only participant to speak favourably about tino rangatiratanga, Olivia spoke about the process of finding her place as Pākehā, learning to be able to ‘know your place’ as an ally who does not dominate. However, these race and power cognisant stories were, I argue, undermined by instances of appropriation which were most fully expressed in Olivia’s practices of passing as Māori:

At school, everyone presumes I’m Māori. […] So and a lot of my kids do as well. They’re really cute, they write me cards and they say ‘you’re the best Māori teacher ever.’ Or, you know, ‘I love Ms [name], I love that she’s Māori.’ [laughs] And I usually let them go for most of this. At some point during the year I go, I’ll say something and they’ll go ‘aren’t you Māori?’ I’m like ‘no, I’m just- I’m only Pākehā’. ‘Oh we thought you were Māori’. It’s quite good for them really I think, it just shakes them up a little bit. They’re like ‘oh okay’.
Olivia tries to overcome the moral deficit of being white by demonstrating that she is a “good” liberal Pākehā; equally as good as the morally superior indigenous people. Her justification of making the children think particularly reinforces the notion of creating the possibility of the good white person. Olivia’s story thus entails a desire for innocence and redemption from the stain of foundational violence and white supremacy.

The idea that being a white settler descendant is a liability or disadvantage was also regularly and most prominently expressed in narratives that detailed instances of intercultural contact (such as marae visits) or efforts to take an active interest in political issues pertaining to biculturalism.

“Am I always going to be an absolute outsider?”

Many Pākehā participants who engaged with tikanga Māori expressed a sense of insecurity, either about lacking knowledge, about ‘getting it wrong’ or about feeling out of place. Consequently, self-identified Pākehā often stressed the burden of being a white New Zealander rather than the privileges attached to it. Asked for a concrete example of where she has experienced being Pākehā as a disadvantage, Amanda – who, just like Olivia and Renee was disappointed not to have found any trace of “Māori blood” in her family tree – recalled that a workshop on the foreshore and seabed debate[^33] she attended was one of those situations:

> The majority of the other people in there, from the way they spoke and the things that they talked about clearly had a lot more knowledge about the Treaty, a lot of them had some Māori background and they were- like I kind of felt like I was the real beginner around it and they were just so much more culturally aware. It just made me really realise you know like again that gap. And yeah it’s- I don’t know how you address that. Because in some ways it is almost as if it is kind of a place that is over there but it’s not reachable and I don’t know how welcoming it is, or how you actually reach it. And I guess it’s times like that when I kind of feel my absolute Pākehāness and kind of wonder whether you know ‘can I ever actually reach into that world? Am I always going to be an absolute outsider?’

The “gap” Amanda referred to and ways of “bridging the gap” between what was frequently referred to as the Māori and Pākehā worlds were a common theme amongst the self-identified Pākehā in this study. For some, working through difference made their “absolute Pākehāness” visible and entailed a painful sense of exclusion.

[^33]: See Chapter Two for details on the 2004 Foreshore and Seabed Act.
From this analysis I conclude that self-identified Pākehā are more likely to be politicised, to be conscious and to subsequently attempt to learn, to develop new identities and new relationships cognisant of bicultural ideals and there are examples of empathy and support. Ironically though, it is these same people who are also much more likely to appropriate Māori culture. It seems that it is the very process of conscientisation that results in insecurities which, in turn, result in appropriation. The key problem with such accounts is that they imagine being Māori as a privilege, a source of moral legitimacy and cultural capital that puts Pākehā at a disadvantage.

**Conclusion**

Participants displayed a number of the rhetoric strategies identified in previous research with white Americans (Martin, et al., 1999; Nakayama & Krizek, 1995) as protective of the normative and universalised status of majorities. Most notable, and in line with previous local findings, is the strong preference for the national label amongst participants in my study. Indifference to ethnic naming options also confirms that ethnicity is of little import to the majority group. That labels are devoid of meaning reflects the majority’s privilege of remaining mainstream and equated with the nation even in a post-colonising settler society that has become bicultural and has a name available for the majority group. Many perceived the request to choose an ethnic identity as a curtailing of choice that did not reflect their ‘true’ identity as New Zealanders.

Due to the specificities of the politics of naming in Aotearoa/New Zealand, however, rhetoric strategies are not all about absence or resistance. Pākehā is a unique option available to the majority. My findings demonstrate that this label provides a meaningful identity rather than simply a category. But is ‘being Pākehā’ different from ‘being New Zealander’? My findings suggest both parallels and differences in the work these identifiers do. Evidently, ‘New Zealander’ and ‘Pākehā’ play much the same role in reinforcing boundaries and belonging: They are both equally used to construct an identity free from associations with Europe, and equally integral to reinforcing national belonging. In effect, both labels equally indigenise the settler subject. Yet, there is also evidence that supports the argument that self-identified Pākehā are more invested in cultivating a politicised relational identity as counterparts to Māori in a bicultural partnership. My findings suggest that for many self-identified Pākehā, this relation is explicitly at the heart of their self-understanding. Stories of developing an identity that acknowledges their position relative to Māori were common. However, the nature of these relations appeared sometimes problematic. The process of becoming is not straightforward, leading at times to experiences of whiteness as a
liability. Contradictory sentiments were often intertwined and may even be unavoidable stages in a process of working through differences.

‘We are New Zealanders too’ was thus the overwhelming collective narrative participants told through labels. Belonging is (re-)asserted as a response to indigenous claims that challenge the legitimacy of the coloniser’s presence. As a result, in relation to naming, the assertion that ‘we are New Zealanders’ appeared as more dominant than the ‘we are all New Zealanders’ narrative with its emphasis on sameness. This fits with Bell’s (2009b) finding from a study with young Pākehā that settler descendants feel caught in a dilemma: they strain to set themselves apart from Europe and to assert their own unique New Zealand identity while indigeneity threatens their belonging to Aotearoa/New Zealand. In the following chapter I focus in more depth on participants’ experiences of the transformation of race relations and of becoming bicultural.
Chapter Six
The Politics of Memory & Settler Identity

Memory and anticipation are not merely modes of cognitive access to what we did in the past and will do in the future, but are the very forms through which our identity is constructed (Poole, 1999: 64).

This study foregrounds participants’ narrations of lived experiences as a way of investigating how they construct and negotiate Pākehā identities. In this chapter, I turn to the politics of memory because mnemonic practices emerged as a key site of re-articulating Pākehā identities and imaginaries with respect to settler-indigenous relations. As part of telling me their life stories, participants recalled how they experienced some of the socio-cultural shifts Aotearoa/New Zealand has undergone and reflected on the impacts these changes have had on them.

The importance of collective memory for settler projects has been theorised in the past. In Chapter Three, I discussed that much of the literature on settler colonialism highlights settler amnesia as a settler colonial condition (Turner, 2002). However, it was also suggested that Pākehā are aware of the colonial past and that remembering and forgetting go hand in hand (Lozanski, 2007). Based on my research, I argue that the empirical evidence on how Pākehā remember shifts in settler-indigenous relations over time contributes significantly to understanding the role of mnemonic practices for re-making contemporary white settler identities and imaginaries.

Since the living memories of participants, as recalled during the interviews, form the core of this chapter, I begin by chronicling one participant’s autobiographical recollections – experiences, emotions, attitudes and understandings – of Māori-Pākehā relations over time. Using one participant’s chronicle offers a glimpse into the narrative performance of memory during the interview. I selected the particular participant (Roger) as the protagonist of this chapter for two reasons. Firstly, Roger was happy to engage in conversation – I remember this interview as lively and interactive – and to contemplate at length how he experienced Māori-Pākehā relations during his life time. Secondly, his recollections comprise the key themes that are representative of the wider sample. These themes will then be elaborated further in the second part of this chapter, complemented with examples from various participants, and discussed in relation to secondary literature and relevant theories in the section Techniques of Remembering and Forgetting.
Roger’s Memories

In this section I present multiple passages from one participant’s life story which chronicle his memories of the Māori protest movements and subsequent social transformations. This participant is Roger, a tertiary educated professional, husband, and father in his 50s. Roger’s reflections about Māori-Pākehā relations begin with school. In his memories, ethnic differences played no role in the “racially mixed” primary school he attended in the 1960s but he remembers “a little bit of probably race-based clan grouping” and fear of a Māori gang at secondary school. He left school and enrolled at the University of Auckland in the 1970s, the decade that saw the land march (1975), the occupation of Bastion Point (1977/78), and other high profile protests, including ones at the University of Auckland campus (see Chapter Two). This period of burgeoning Māori activism had a profound impact on him, prompting detailed reflections during the interview. While Roger does not relate experiences of specific events, he vividly recalls his emotions at the time:

Roger: It was almost confrontational I think, because the way I saw the Māori Renaissance it was asserting rights, you know an assertion of rights, one of the examples of which is land claims, asserting rights. My first reaction and a lot of those around me of people asserting rights is you want to fight back. It was an aggressive reaction almost, not physically aggressive but attitudinally aggressive towards it.

Jessica: So did you experience it as a kind of challenge?

Roger: It was a challenge, it was a challenge to us. It was sort of like, probably it was the first, kind of like, it was the first time we had to, because we would think of ourselves as naturally belonging to this place. This place is naturally our place, we’re born in this place and suddenly we’re being challenged as actually being occupiers of a place. And that, you know, so people telling us we don’t actually belong here. We’re only here you know, well yeah, I can’t put it any better than that but suddenly we don’t belong here. Well, if we don’t belong here where do we belong? You know, we do belong here. I think there was a lot of overreaction to it. In my group at least the assertion of Māori identity was- We didn’t have any problem with the assertion of Polynesian identity through the Pacific or even in this country, you know. But assertion of Māori identity was a challenge to us because they were here before us. So that’s how it was at the start. Um (p) I’d like to say, though it’s an
exaggeration, you almost acquired, white New Zealanders almost acquired a collective identity out of opposition.

Roger clearly remembers an enormous disruption of previously held beliefs and this was a prominent theme amongst all participants old enough to remember the indigenous protest movement but it was common even amongst younger ones. Roger particularly remembers a sense of dislocation caused by indigenous activism that highlighted the foreign roots of Pākehā and questioned their taken-for-granted sense of belonging. These sentiments square with Johnson’s (2005: 137) findings of a widespread Pākehā “confusion over shifting definitions of New Zealandness and who defined its terms” in the 1970s and 1980s.

While the specific experiences differed across interviews, I found two key commonalities in the majority of stories of disruption. One element is the tension between the strong emotional opposition to the indigenous rights discourse and the concurrent acknowledgement that the claims of the colonised indigenous people could not be easily dismissed. For Roger, the indigenous rights discourse presents a clear threat to Pākehā as a group (note his repeated use of the plural “we,” or “my group,” and “a lot of those around me”), yet it needs to be heard “because they were here before us.” A second element is that of surprise. The disruption was such a shock because Roger was, by his own account, wholly unsuspecting. Despite continuous Māori resistance since colonial settlement, according to Roger nothing had ever before challenged the taken-for-granted sense of belonging. These two strands of disruption stories will be discussed in more detail in the second part of the chapter. Key questions to consider are why participants were oblivious to Māori discontent and what happens when ignorance is no longer possible? How does the new knowledge inflect participants’ identities as Pākehā?

The following excerpt demonstrates what happened to Roger’s antagonism. In the excerpt above he evaluated his anger as an “overreaction” and indicated that his feelings subsequently changed (“this is how it was at the start”). In the following passage, he remembers how he experienced Aotearoa/New Zealand when he returned around 1990 after an extended period of travelling and living in Europe. In the meantime, biculturalism had been adopted as the official framework for the nation and several measures instituted to address inequalities and off-set past injustices (see Chapter Two):

When I really settled back in New Zealand, I guess end of the 80s beginning of the 90s, the Māori Renaissance had kind of happened, I think. Or that was my feeling when I got back, it was very different. It was kind of like in a really good way, because I was brought up in the
eastern suburbs and since I’ve moved back to New Zealand I’ve always lived in Ponsonby, Grey Lynn, Westmere, Freeman’s Bay\textsuperscript{34} which is really mixed and I love that. I love the mix on that side of the city. But again the mix is as far as I see it is not heavily Māori / white New Zealander, it’s white New Zealander / Polynesian sort of mix which is interesting really. Yes, for me the Māori Renaissance apart from what I say about the- you know, didn’t really much like it in the beginning because it was all about assertion of rights, just kind of happened and we didn’t notice it and suddenly my daughter is going doing kapa haka and everyone does it and loves it and it’s all different and even I’m picking up words. A language I swore I’d never learn, why do you want to learn a dead language? Because we were brought up at a time when it was regarded as- well it was a dead language as far as we were concerned. I would have been surprised when I was at primary school or early secondary school to find that anyone still spoke Māori.

The central theme in this passage is ‘change’. The phrase that struck me most is that the Māori Renaissance had “just kind of happened and we didn’t notice it.” This stands in stark contrast to the hyper-visibility of indigeneity Roger described earlier. Roger no longer speaks about the claims with which Māori had confronted Pākehā. In his memory, the assertion of Māori rights had morphed into something altogether more agreeable, making his initial opposition redundant. Roger’s memories are ‘correct’ in that the adoption of biculturalism during the 1980s reduced public activism considerably, even though Māori have continued to resist and critique on-going colonial practices, including biculturalism as a governance model. In addition, the most visible transformations consisted of incorporating Māori protocol into mainstream institutional settings and acknowledging te reo Māori as an official language of Aotearoa/New Zealand.

While it could be concluded that there were no noticeable effects on Pākehā, Roger highlights aspects of cultural integration when he explains that by the early 1990s everything was different, and better. These shifts also had an effect on Pākehā. Doing kapa haka was now a Pākehā pastime, and picking up words in te reo Māori was natural. While Roger mainly describes an inter-generational shift, he also portrays himself as reformed when he says that despite his former opposition he became willing to learn some te reo Māori.

Despite these positive transformations, there were still remnants of the confrontation and some negative sentiments “still hung around” because:

\textsuperscript{34} These are all adjoining central city suburbs which have undergone similar processes of gentrification and whitening over the past decades.
Roger: [t]he Treaty of Waitangi process was in full swing and you suddenly realise it’s a process you have to go through. What do they call the commissions in South Africa, the Truth and-

Jessica: Reconciliation.

Roger: Yeah, yeah, yeah. It’s just that there’s a process to go through, you just go through the process. And it’s a necessary process. You know, you can’t bottle grievance up. It just comes out somewhere else. So it was more an acceptance of the fact that this is the right process. Some sort of process has to take place for grievances to be heard.

Roger’s “acceptance” of the Waitangi Tribunal land settlements process which began in 1975 and accelerated when the institution’s mandate was extended in 1985 indicates that he acknowledges colonial injustices. This is further confirmed by likening the need for reparations in Aotearoa/New Zealand to the process of reconciliation in post-apartheid South Africa. However, the language of necessity conveys that his acceptance is informed by a concern that grievances will not recede by themselves rather than by a sense of doing justice. It is merely “inevitable” as he says at a later point. It was noticeable that for Roger redress does not form part of the positive changes.

Overall, Roger’s memories shift from Māori “asserting rights” and disrupting Pākehā’s sense of natural belonging to the renaissance of Māori culture. This is particularly evident in the next short extract in which he makes the shift from rights to culture from one sentence to the next:

There’s been some, a Māori Renaissance, some assertion of rights. You come in and you can’t ignore this Māori culture anymore. You know, it’s in your face, you can’t ignore it. You go oh wow, here it is. So yeah, when I was a young kid I could ignore it and there was nothing in the way we were brought up or the way we were educated that made us need to embrace it at all. It was quite the reverse.

Of course, rights and culture are not diametrically opposed or even mutually exclusive concepts. Given the damage that dispossession and assimilationist policies had inflicted on Māori culture, its regeneration was a central objective of the Māori protest movements. However, it strikes me that Roger’s memories of confrontation and challenges to Pākehā belonging and colonial domination recede and make way for contemplating the task of embracing indigenous culture.

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35 In 2002, Race Relations Commissioner Joris de Bres likened the actions of the settlers to the Taliban destroying the Bamyian Buddhas in Afghanistan. For a discussion of the Pākehā response see Avril Bell (2004a, 2009a).
There seems to be a process of forgetting what Māori activism was initially about. While Roger’s observation that he could ignore Māori culture is certainly correct, it is notable that this now also becomes the main focus in defining the problems of the past. For example, before the Māori Renaissance,

there was not much spread from Māori culture [into the “mainstream”] at all, kind of like grass skirts and pois\(^{36}\) on school sports days and things but it was really kind of like a token adoption. It was tolerated as something cute out on the side. […] Cute. Isn’t that cute? But that’s what I mean sort of like, but it’s not really been adopted as part of the mainstream. So, Māori culture had not been adopted as being part of the mainstream. Now I think it is.

By casting the marginalisation of Māori culture as the central problem of the past, it is possible to paint a very rosy picture of decolonisation. From that perspective, there have been tremendous changes from marginalising Māori culture to mainstreaming it. Indeed, these are the points Roger stresses reflecting on the transformations from today’s vantage point:

Now for someone like me who’s been through it to kind of like to see what’s happened in the last ten years I’d say, because I think it’s been that short, it’s for me it’s huge and I think it’s wonderful. You go along to the rugby, I’m not a rugby fan, I used to go along to the rugby and you have the National Anthem sung in two languages, that’s wonderful. You know, Māori greeting, my daughter throws in Māori words, my son is six teaches me Māori words. “Don’t you know what that means?” You know, so I think it’s fantastic and I think that it’s not only been great for Māori, I think it’s great for white New Zealanders as well because I think that we are kind of like grabbing hold of this Polynesian identity more and more, this Māori identity more and more. I think we’ve grabbed hold of a Pacific identity and I think we’re starting to grab hold of this Māori identity to give us an identity. Kind of bits of it.

It is evident that the text is filled with emphatic expressions that are vastly different from the first excerpt. Painful has turned into wonderful; fighting into embracing. But in order to do so, rights, land, occupation and belonging had to turn into culture, language, learning and identity. Identity is easier to deal with than political aspirations or accusations of on-going colonising practices and structural racism. Put another way, recognition is more comfortable than redistribution of resources and political power. Recognition of cultural difference does not threaten Pākehā belonging, normativity or privilege. Thus, the assumption that the transformations have been

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\(^{36}\) Poi is a dance in which light balls on a string are swung and twirled to accompanying songs.
“great” for Māori ignores persistent socio-economic inequalities and power discrepancies and the celebration of reformed Pākehāness cloaks the fact that mechanisms of settler domination remain intact and Pākehā continue to enjoy the privileges associated with settler whiteness.

What is more, select and mostly traditional Māori cultural markers also provide an identity for Pākehā to “grab hold of.” As an example of one of those “bits” alluded to in the extract above, Roger explains that he has come to see the benefits of learning te reo Māori because:

It’s something that makes you have something in common with other people who are from the same place as you that is unique. In other words it’s like, Māori language is native to New Zealand so if you know Māori language then you know something that is native to New Zealand and distinguishes you from the rest of the world. So it gives you a sense of community with other people who live in the same place, a sense of physical connection with the place because it’s something that’s unique to the place.

The central element here, which I frequently found across interviews and will elaborate on in the second part of this chapter, is that learning serves as a path to forging a connection through “knowing something that is native.” Learning creates a connection with Māori which, in turn, re-affirms belonging and even creates a “physical connection with the place.” Here we come full circle: for Roger, the solution to the challenge to belonging lies in forging a new connection through Māori: through learning about Māori and through adopting Māori culture into the image of the nation and Pākehā identity. These two aspects are the primary vehicles of Roger’s narratives of change.

In contrast to the positive transformations, Roger continues to be averse to redistributive measures designed to address socio-economic inequalities and concerned about what he perceives as separatist tendencies.

I toss and turn as to whether I support the positive discrimination stuff they have in the States you know where say there’s a quota for a med school. I think there currently is, isn’t there? There’s a quota. Is it like twelve percent or ten percent Māori? I’m not sure that I- I can see why it’s there. I can see that you can’t criticise the reason for it, you know. Is it right? Because you’ll always get this example of here’s this really, really bright student who has been kept out. Mm. So it depends how far you’re talking. I can see the right in that and I think you have to have positive discrimination for a period like this. It’s got to be dropped out of the system sooner or later. You don’t want it there forever because it’s a transition
phase, right? So things like that I think I support but if you’ve got separate sovereignty, separate legal systems, separate justice system, separate taxing systems, no I don’t agree with that. [...] If this country drifted that way I’d probably leave it. Yeah, it would feel so un-right to me.

While willing to make concessions (using the same language of necessity that marked his feelings about the Waitangi Tribunal process), measures aimed at alleviating inequalities can only be temporary and encompass some kinds of redress but not others. Roger presents a continuum from acceptable to unacceptable modes of redress that mirrors ambiguities around the meaning of biculturalism and fits squarely with previous research that has shown that Pākehā support for biculturalism is largely limited to symbolic aspects (Sibley, et al., 2005). Roger rejects any transformative measures as well as political aspirations that cannot be accommodated within the boundaries of the nation-state format. It is noteworthy at this point that Roger does not relate current sovereignty discourses to the indigenous activism that angered him in the 1970s; perhaps, because to do so would be a concession that his memories of profound transformations are a version of history that benefits the dominant group.

As before, there are many parallels between Roger’s attitudes and those of other participants. Moving away from memory, Roger’s considerations above are characterised by a concern about the future which is epitomised by his contemplation of white flight. I will discuss similar examples as forms of investment in white privilege through determining the terms and conditions of redress, a habit that Mikaere (2004) calls the Pākehā “obsession with control over the Māori-Pākehā relationship.”

This chronicle of one participant’s living memories has paved the way for the next part of this chapter in which I will return to the key themes introduced here. I will begin by detailing experiences of disruption.
Techniques of Remembering and Forgetting

Disrupting Oblivion?

Just like Roger, most participants recalled particular events which disrupted the conventional narratives that constituted their sense of reality as the dominant ethnic group. As the following two examples show, these experiences include the Māori protest movement in the broadest sense to idiosyncratic and small-scale events in the day-to-day life of participants. These disruption narratives display two distinct commonalities. Firstly, participants in this study often stated that they had been unaware of indigenous discontent prior to the Māori protest movement of the 1970s (and a small number of older participants held steadfast to the belief that no harm was done to the indigenous community). Secondly, this shock produced a strong oppositional reaction which stood in tension with the inability to ignore indigenous counter narratives.

For example, Helen (40s), who grew up in a community with a large number of Māori families, recalled the first time she was faced with the notion of white racism when I asked her whether she remembered any instances or people during her childhood that made her reflect on being a New Zealander of European descent:

Mm, there was one very um (p) uh what would you say, important experience that I had. I think it was either at the end of my third form or possibly in my fourth form year. For some reason, I had no idea what the reason was, I was chosen or volunteered or something to be a delegate at the first ever secondary schools race relations conference. So it was the first time it was ever held in New Zealand. I guess that would have been about 74? 1974, 1975. You can look it up, I’m sure you’d be able to find it somewhere because Donna Awatere was there as another delegate and she spoke at this conference and the same as she was for quite a number of years after that, she was very aggressive, very defiant, very resentful, very [inaudible], very- and I can remember being totally shocked at what she said and how it didn’t marry up with my own experience of- she was very accusatory. You know, you people, you this, you that and I guess her life experience must have made her feel like that, and of course we were 13, 14, 15-year-olds, so you tend to be quite emotional but I can remember being really affronted and taken aback and thinking “does she live in the same country as me?” you know. Where did these things happen to her? Where does she come from that she feels like this? Do people really treat other people like that? You know, I wasn’t really aware of it. I had one grandfather who was definitely racist. (p) Um (p) but
aside from that I really hadn’t experienced anything like that before. I mean he was also very opinionated about quite a number of other things, so we just sort of thought ‘that’s just granddad.’ So I do remember that experience.

‘Incredulity’ encapsulates Helen’s response to Awatere’s speech. Not surprisingly, at a time when structural inequalities and forms of oppression were invisible to the majority of Pākehā and the narrative of the best race relations in the world was still intact, the only racism Helen was aware of is the “that’s just granddad” variety. Interestingly, much is left unsaid in this extract and anyone unfamiliar with Awatere’s (1984) seminal critiques of white settler colonialism (which I have discussed in Chapter Two) may be left wondering what Helen was shocked by and what the accusations were. Helen seems to be unable (even in hindsight) to articulate the accusations, so that the term racist is only used once in relation to the grandfather but left unspoken in other places.

That Awatere’s claims of racism were clearly at odds with Helen’s life experience suggests a great degree of social distance. As Sacks and Lindholm (2002) stress, privileged groups often universalise their own experiences and are unfamiliar with experiences of inequality and racism. This social distance to oppression enables an ignorance of the experiences of marginalised groups that has been identified as a strategy of preserving white privilege (see Chapter Three). Mills (1997, 2007) and Steyn (2012) argue that ignorance is integral to racial states because it normalises systemic racial inequalities and oppression. In settler societies, ignorance of oppression and resistance maintains the dominant narrative of benign settlement that legitimised settler nation-building on what was actually confiscated land (Turner, 1999).

Importantly, ignorance is not just an absence of knowledge but a learned inability or unwillingness to know. Steyn (2012: 18) argues that the system of apartheid taught white South Africans “to ignore social injustice, to collude with structured ignorance and take the good life without thinking too much or inconveniencing themselves.” In Aotearoa/New Zealand, Huygens (2007: 31) criticises the broad tradition of Pākehā indifference to indigenous concerns. That this indifference is socially conditioned is illustrated in the fact that New Zealand school books and other types of literature continued to disseminate stories of benign colonisation and ‘best race relations’ even after indigenous counter narratives had called this version of history into question (Gibbons, 2002; 2007). Consequently, the “suppression of pertinent knowledge” (Mills, 2007: 21) shuts off discursive repertoires to recognise and problematise racism and colonialism. If ignorance is learned, white people can learn to care, Morris (2006) argues. But this can take time. Studying
Pākehā anti-racist activism between 1964 and 1981 led Johnson (2002: 3) to conclude that after more than a decade of visible indigenous rights protests, “widespread Pakeha ignorance of their own past and present continued.”

It thus becomes important to analyse what happens once ignorance has been suspended. Some of Helen’s questions in the excerpt above suggest a sincere interest and willingness to engage with Awatere’s perspective. Yet, when Helen proceeds to tell me about a further experience involving Awatere approximately ten years later it becomes clear that this was only a momentary interest:

And I can remember being quite (p) relieved I suppose is the right word when a number of years later when I was living in the North again in [place] where I had my second child, Donna Awatere who was a quite well-known activist by this stage was doing a tour of marae and a couple of […] the results of a meeting at the marae that she’d been to where she had been told to leave. Because she was rude. And she used bad language, and she didn’t follow protocol. She wasn’t respectful to her elders and those sorts of things and I was thinking “Ok. Because that’s what I thought she was like, too when I met her.” So thank goodness it’s not just me who thought that. There were these old ladies, Māori ladies, talking about the same person. So it wasn’t because she was Māori and I wasn’t. It was because she was angry and rude and disrespectful [laughs]. I think she toned it down somewhat after that.

This passage indexes a performance of ignorance. Instead of acknowledging that Awatere turned out to be one of the many voices that came to form the indigenous rights movement after her initial ‘rude awakening’, Helen chooses to dismiss Awatere’s arguments through deploying the well-worn standard story of the angry Māori stirrer who is different from the more docile and content indigenous population and can hence be disregarded (Nairn & McCreanor, 1991). With the discursive support of “old Māori ladies,” Awatere is cast as a sole voice; angry, and disrespectful. The strategy of ignoring collective resistance, Helen restores her conviction that Māori and Pākehā life experiences did not differ after all. It is a means to avoid uncomfortable truths that threaten the status quo.

Learning to care, my findings suggest, was greatly hindered by social distance between Pākehā and Māori. This became evident in stories of many female participants who juxtaposed their memories of Māori protests to those of other social movements of the time, especially the women’s and gay rights movements. In the following passage, Ann remembers this difference:
We actually used to have quite heated debates about rights and wrongs and things like homosexuality and equal pay for women and those sorts because things like feminism and those sorts of things had become quite mainstream and were talked about, you know. It wasn’t radical to support equal rights for women particularly when mum’s working full time and those sorts of things. So they became quite heated topics of debate around the table at times. So yeah we would have talked about those sorts of things far more then but we never ever, even with the Bastion Point occupation, we never talked about Bastion Point occupation and I didn’t become aware; I mean, I knew it was happening, you could see it. Like it was on the news every night and those sorts of things [...]. So yeah, we just had no-we didn’t even talk about it, which is really weird. But it wasn’t a part of Auckland that we ever went to and didn’t get- so it’s not it was like something we encountered every day.

Greater affinity to other social movements of the time was a recurring theme amongst the women, but not the men I interviewed. These gender differences demonstrate the multi-layered nature of oppression and privilege. While gender inequalities were tangible for Ann and her family, they were removed from the issues of racism and colonialism. Ann explicitly confirms the conceptual difference between ‘knowing’ and ‘being aware’. While from today’s vantage point Ann seems somewhat puzzled that her family never paid attention to indigenous protests, she subsequently justifies this lack of awareness through geographical distance from Bastion Point, emphasising that “it wasn’t a part of Auckland that we ever went to.” In fact, Ann elaborates extensively on this theme in what followed the passage above, and other participants similarly recall that it was nothing more than a news item at the time, a distant event that did not touch their lives. Highlighting geographical distance to this event turns land rights into a local issue that is wholly unconnected to wider national or global movements against colonialism. This suggests an inability or unwillingness to see the bigger picture. The Bastion Point occupation was a widely televised protest that lasted 506 days, and culminated in the forced eviction of the activists. Johnson (2005: 151) identifies the event as the epitome of the land rights movement and argues that it was “particularly potent because of its urban location.”

However, Ann remembers other, more recent and tangible experiences that have prompted her to reflect on being implicated in colonial injustices. In the passage below, Ann tells me about a theatre performance she had recently attended which dealt with land theft by the Crown. What she remembers most prominently is that:

I felt like I personally was being blamed for something that I had no control and no input into, I can’t do anything to rectify, and you kind of wonder how productive that dialogue
can be if you’re made to feel like you’re to blame, but there’s nothing you can do to undo what’s been done. I mean I personally can’t do anything apart from being made to feel guilty and, and then- so I had a really emotional response and five other people that I’ve spoken to all had the same response which was really- and it wasn’t that I was going out looking for that feedback, it was just that that was the way that it was offered. And so I was like you know it’s a really interesting- and it starts raising some really interesting dynamics and one of the things that it um (p) that it’s pro- that it’s continued a provocation in me around is that if I can’t (p) if New Zealand can’t be my home (p) then, you see it gets quite emotional (J: yeah), then where is it? [cries] (J: right) And where do you belong? And so and that’s part of what I’ve been exploring is the sense of I couldn’t go back to the UK, they wouldn’t let me in, you know. I have no passport or no right that says that I could go and- I mean even if I wanted to and I mean I don’t even- I don’t want to but even if I did want to I couldn’t and then um (p) so (p) it means that (p) how do you live somewhere where there’s an element which doesn’t want you?

Like Roger, Ann finds it difficult to grapple with the challenge to Pākehā belonging, and experiences a profound sense of unsettlement. While she takes the claims seriously, she immediately questions the approach and its effectiveness. In her view, contemporary Pākehā have become victims of their colonising forebears and the target of unreasonable Māori blame. A frequent point of debate in the politics of regret is the question of intergenerational responsibility and the distinction between the “time-bounded individual” on the one hand and the “transgenerational subject” which is the “culmination of multiple strands of inheritance, including familial, ethnic and national filiations” (Lawn, 2008: 32) on the other. Ann ponders exactly this tension as she considers her own family’s possible complicity in colonial injustices:

When I think about it- not that I have ever thought of myself as a colonialist, as a colonist because, I don’t know, it just had never figured in my lexicon until people start putting that idea at you and then I suppose being a fifth generation New Zealander makes you think well, I must have come- somebody in my family came to New Zealand at a time of colonisation, it wasn’t me but you know it was somebody and so and then the provocation becomes so why did they decide to come to New Zealand? What were they fleeing if they were fleeing? Or what were they looking for if they didn’t come by force? But if they came by choice then what was the choice that they were faced with making and what was the culture in the country that they came to which has obviously changed beyond all recognition and then what part if any did my family play in both injustices and um (p) and then you
In Ann’s reflections, colonialism is confined to the period of colonisation, and colonial injustices are the result of individual decisions. The excerpt is dominated by the questions and the many uncertain ‘ifs’ she contends with. All ‘ifs’ carry the hope that her family did not play a role in Māori dispossession or that they had no other choice. Both discursive strategies are instrumental in warding off uncomfortable notions of colonial complicity through ignoring, firstly, that colonialism is a contemporary system that Ann herself benefits from right now, and secondly, that settler colonial processes of indigenous dispossession and marginalisation are systemic rather than individual.

However, not everyone reacted in the same defensive way and the following two excerpts from my interview with Claire, a nurse-cum-researcher and self-identified Pākehā demonstrate a process of conscientisation. Born into the turbulent 1970s, Claire attended primary and secondary school near the site of the Bastion Point occupation and she remembers a period of white flight as the children of Māori protesters joined the school temporarily. She remembers her mother taking her along to the Springbok protests of 1981, and attending a peace march in the mid-1980s. Of that time she vividly remembers the passion and energy of political activism and that “it was a time when everyone used to wear badges. You know it was quite cool to be involved in that sort of thing” in a sense of “being on the right side.” The instances of learning about colonialism Claire recalled in most detail were those tied to the institutional setting of Cultural Safety courses which she attended after they became part of the nursing curriculum in 1992:37

When I did my cultural competency for nursing I immediately thought back to primary school and what I’d learned about the Treaty and I remembered I had learned at primary school about the Treaty of Waitangi and that- and all I could remember was it being described as this lovely union, as this honourable agreement and it being just in that superficial kind of manner that it was just an agreement and that we’d moved on from that and that was all. I don’t remember having- I didn’t learn anything about the grievances and so that was what was so fascinating for me and about myself and my culture and the culture I’d come from to learn that we as New Zealand Europeans had been a party to a contract which had not been honoured you know and that Māori had been robbed, so yeah it was quite shocking in a way.

37 For detail on the aims of Cultural Safety and the controversy it caused, see Chapter Two.
Claire is shocked but accepting of the new knowledge. In contrast to the participants discussed above, she accepts collective and inter-generational responsibility. She also critically questions the misinformation about the Treaty of Waitangi circulated through schools. In reflecting further on her reaction to this knowledge, she felt that:

it probably helped that I had actually thought about that issue when it came to doing my cultural competency course because the other nurses in my class, some of them, really found it difficult to accept and sort of almost were-. I think it’s probably moved on from the way they taught it back then but I think they felt it was brainwashing or you know they were really resistant to it whereas I was more open to it and I sort of took very much the view that this is really important, we need to be here and need to be doing this and if anyone questioned that you know I’d quite quickly come to the support of it and certainly afterwards when we were discussing it in the courtyard or something, I found myself having to defend the cultural competency part of the nursing programme.

Claire’s narrative is an example of developing empathy and learning to care (Morris, 2006). Claire herself highlights the processual nature of coming to terms with the confronting knowledge of settler colonial injustices when she ascribes her openness and acceptance to a prior period of conscientisation. Implicitly, she justifies the resistance of her fellow nurses who might not have had the benefit of a period of learning. It underlines the sense of disruption and anger felt when first confronted with counter narratives as was evident in all examples discussed in this chapter thus far.

It has been argued that,

a hegemonic representation of history as produced by colonial power is on the wane in New Zealand. The situation is much more disputed now. If history is part of a ‘legitimizing myth’ to justify the unequal division of value in society, then New Zealand is one society where this legitimacy is being actively challenged (Liu, et al., 1999: 1042).

Indeed, all four participants in this section – and all others interviewed – remember instances of contending with accusations and claims and questions of Pākehā responsibility and complicity. In recalling these experiences, all participants used the vocabulary of ‘colonialism,’ ‘occupation,’ ‘injustices,’ and ‘racism.’ These disruptions were painful or shocking not least because they could not be easily dismissed. The four examples of Roger, Helen, Ann, and Claire have demonstrated different responses ranging from discursive strategies designed to weaken Māori allegations to acknowledgement and conscientisation.
While these memories form part of their lived experiences and identities, the data also suggest that it is important to analyse how this knowledge further affected Pākehā identities and imaginaries. In Chapter Three, I discussed the power to determine what is remembered and how and whether remembering is sustained or undone. In the following section I will analyse how these stories of disruption turned into narratives of change.

“Everything is Different Now” – Narratives of Change

All participants claimed that there had been significant transformations in the wake of the Māori protest movements, making ‘narratives of change’ a widespread theme in their living memories of settler-indigenous relations. The two aspects which dominated these recollections of change, learning about Māori culture and turning Māori cultural markers into signifiers of national and Pākehā identity, will be discussed below.

Narratives of Learning

Narratives of learning were the primary vehicle for conveying the perception that the Māori protest movements and biculturalism had brought about significant changes. Parents, such as Roger in the first part of this chapter, highlighted intergenerational shifts by contrasting their children’s learning experiences with their own. Karen, a mother of school-age children similarly recalled:

When I graduated, when I went to university and teachers’ training college [...], there was the welcomes, the powhiris and the speeches and before that no one had taught me what to do and where to stand and what to say and when to say and how long it lasts and the reasons for it but I can remember at my graduation the first guy got up and spoke for what seemed like ages in Māori, and I was thinking “why are you doing this?” I don’t understand for a start, there’s no relevance to me why you’re doing it and it felt like half an hour. It was probably only ten minutes but ten minutes is a long time when you’re bored. But my daughter has learned that at welcomings you’ve got to stand here. So [for an event her school is involved in] the kapa haka [group] went across and welcomed people and there was the speeches and the calling on, so people came. So, she knows all that and how to behave in Māori, where I didn’t. It’s a generation difference as well. (p) So, I think that’s another thing I reflected on since thinking about who I am and whatever, is that when I was
a child being Māori or acknowledging Māori or having Māori within your culture it wasn’t really celebrated. Or it was not, acceptable is not the right word, but valued, maybe valued.

In Karen’s and other participants’ reflections, developing familiarity with Māori culture is the predominant indicator of how society and how Pākehā have changed as a result of the Māori Renaissance. I propose that this elevation of ‘Māori culture’ as primary evidence that “everything is different now,” to repeat Roger’s words, is a way of masking past and present settler colonial structures. For example, Karen’s assessment that in the past Māori culture was simply “not valued” downplays settler colonial practices of marginalising and destroying indigenous culture. It also paints a benign picture of colonialism in which the failure to value Māori culture was the principal injustice.

Notably, many participants, such as tertiary student Laura (20s) below, stated that knowledge of Māori culture should be required of all Pākehā today:

I do think that it’s really important and it should be, you know, any Pākehā should have a lot more knowledge of Māori culture than they do. Like I’m almost ashamed of how little I know about Māori culture just because, you know, we weren’t taught it in schools.

Laura and many other participants thought that Pākehā had a responsibility to acquire cultural competence in a bicultural society. For example, a majority of participants stated that all Pākehā should be able to speak te reo. As such, learning is presented as a way of forging new post-settler Pākehā identities. Conversely, a lack of knowledge is shameful (I will return to this aspect shortly). While this seems commendable, the presentation of learning in this fashion raises two difficulties. Firstly, the obsession with cultural competence, so ubiquitous today, is that it forecloses a more progressive political competence. This argument is substantiated when taking into account that participants defined biculturalism almost exclusively as ‘promoting Māori culture’ and saw their prime role as becoming familiar with Māori culture which was frequently reduced to select ‘authentic’ markers including most prominently the haka, songs, and some te reo.

Secondly, these narratives of learning can be read as a desire for what Jones (1999) refers to as “colonial mastery.” Based on her research with Pākehā students, Jones argues that discourses of Pākehā learning about Māori show that it is self-serving rather than altruistic. Instead of serving to establish de-colonised relationships, learning about the Other is often a neo-colonial practice. It “is not an act of logic or an accumulation of information or even a call to action, but an
experience of redemption” (A. Jones, 1999: 313). The findings in this study very clearly show that cultural expertise is regarded as a key to “connecting” with the indigene. As Roger explained earlier, he conceded to learning some te reo chiefly because he feels it connects Pākehā and Māori through shared knowledge. Below, Claire, who earlier described her experiences with cultural safety education, echoes Roger’s sentiments:

I’m really so pleased that I had, I compared with my husband who [having grown up on the South Island] didn’t have any interactions or, you know, and I can, we did do Māori singing, Māori culture and we did the haka and sang songs and we did the poi and I have a connection and I’ve been to the marae and I made a friend who actually was a Pākehā girl but she lived with a Māori family up in [place] and had great fun times with her and her family. And yeah so I feel at least I’ve had some experience although it’s probably quite minimal compared to some.

It becomes clear that knowing some Māori cultural expressions is seen as a form of capital. Claire boldly claims that based on her cultural “experiences” she has “a connection.” What characterises this connection, and who she is connected with remains unclear. Bearing in mind that Claire previously reflected on taking part in cultural safety courses which helped her to learn how her own colonial history and culture relate to that of the indigenous peoples of Aotearoa/New Zealand, it is interesting to find that she chooses to emphasise the role of cultural expertise for forging this somewhat nebulous – though doubtless from her perspective sincere – connection.

The life stories also showed that the effort Pākehā feel they put into learning about Māori is often accompanied by insecurities, a sense of disadvantage and at times even resentment, or at least frustration, at what they perceive as a lack of gratitude on the part of Māori. Much like Amanda, whom I cited in the previous chapter as saying that she felt like “an absolute outsider” in certain Māori learning contexts, other participants such as Mark (40s) also stressed that a lack of cultural knowledge constituted a distinct disadvantage:

Mark: I do feel sometimes really uncomfortable being- not having as much knowledge of te reo and tikanga Māori as I should have in certain situations. So if I’m in a powhiri and I kind of really get a huge sense of I am this Pākehā white guy sitting here and I’m saying these words that I know I’m meant to say but I don’t know if they’re coming from any genuine place other than me just trying not to look foolish at this point in time. So I think sometimes there are those moments where you feel your Pākehā-ness is a distinct disadvantage and it’s not very often that you end up being in a situation where the Māori
viewpoint, the Māori worldview, the Māori customs and cultures are predominant and you are the outsider there and it makes me feel uncomfortable and to an extent ashamed as well that I don’t know enough and I’m so self-conscious of that that my experience tends to be on a marae in those situations one of self-consciousness rather than of enjoying that cultural immersion.

Jessica: Interesting, yeah. So, it’s almost like a lack of cultural capital or so?

Mark: Yeah, yeah, yeah. Yeah I think so. In a way it is. You’re suddenly- the roles have been reversed and I think you know your question earlier was what does a bicultural New Zealand look like and I don’t think it looks like that because that means it’s just once in a very- once in a while I’m put in a position where my cultural worldview is not to the fore, it’s the other Treaty partner’s. That only happens once, I think in a bicultural country we would be in each other’s, we would be needing to be in each other’s cultural spaces a lot more than we are.

In this excerpt, Mark highlights power imbalances and the continuing dominance of the Pākehā worldview; yet, he also emphasises the realm of cultural performance and the disadvantaged position of Pākehā in Māori settings. Mark feels uncomfortable, ashamed and self-conscious because he “does not know enough.” Here, a monocultural history intent on assimilating Māori leaves Pākehā in a position where they have to ‘catch up’.

From these examples, it can be argued that the desire to learn is an active departure from a monocultural standpoint towards a nascent politics of recognising cultural difference. However, the narratives in this section have also illustrated that learning may perpetuate colonial relations. For one, the forms of learning described by participants require very little adjustment from Pākehā and do not undermine white values, norms, institutions or existing power relations. As such, it has only limited effects in forging equal relationships (Bell, 2008). In addition, learning about the Other harbours the risk of exploiting indigenous people as experts, and turning them into spokespeople of their ethnic group. In this context, a further harmful effect of learning ‘about Māori’ is that it often reduces indigenous people to a-historic essentialised objects. In the next section I detail how such a limited understanding of authentic Māori culture benefits Pākehā constructions of post-settler identities.
“Grabbing hold of Māori identity”

Making Māori identity an integral component of national and Pākehā identity was a predominant theme that permeated participants’ narratives of change. The instances I detail below substantiate Bell’s (1996: 149) now quite old observation that “Pakeha culture may be the national culture in terms of providing the pervasive, commonsense underpinnings for the ordering of social life, but Māori culture is the national culture when distinctiveness and ethnic exoticism is called for.” In my interpretation of participants’ recollections, selected Māori cultural markers serve a dual representative purpose. Firstly, authentic indigenous culture produces a unique nation and provides Pākehā with the ingredients to remodel their identities as authentic New Zealanders distinct from their more European forebears. Beyond that, the presence of a thriving Māori culture also serves as evidence of harmonious race relations and as a signifier of post-coloniality.

For many participants, reflecting on collective Pākehā and national identity was tied to recalling experiences of being overseas. The majority of tertiary educated, financially secure participants recounted going on their ‘OE’, travelling to the UK to trace their roots, or travelling internationally as part of their jobs. The following excerpt, in which Renee, a tertiary educated self-identified Pākehā speaks about missing Aotearoa/New Zealand while overseas, epitomises this centrality of Māori culture that nevertheless remains a ‘contribution’ to a more generic national identity:

Interestingly when I’m overseas the one thing that makes me feel patriotic to New Zealand and makes me miss New Zealand is not seeing the flag. It’s not all those basic cultural icons; like I was saying, sheep and grass and rugby and beer, and that really misogynistic patriarchal kind of history, but it’s anything to do with Māori. Hearing karakia, you know (p) not so much the haka now unfortunately because that’s just been totally destroyed in the last 12 months39 [laughs]. But any identifying factors that are and genuinely- how can I say genuinely- that haven’t been commercialised too much like Māori cultural artefacts and taonga that have not been overly commercialised, because they lose their- I guess they lose their mana, I’m not quite sure what the word is. So yeah, that makes me feel proud, that connection there because it’s very strong. And even though I am not tangata whenua, there’s not a drop in me that I know of, it’s still, I have a lot of respect for that culture and the

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38 The OE, a colloquial term for ‘overseas experience’, is a cultural institution and rite of passage for young Pākehā involving an extended period of travelling and working overseas (often in Europe). As Bell (2002: 153) puts it, the OE is, at least in part, “all about honing our sense of national identity.”

39 Renee argued that the haka was overly commercialised during the Rugby World Cup which took place in Aotearoa/New Zealand in 2011, while I was conducting the interviews.
contribution, which is a **massive** contribution, that Māori culture has given to overall New Zealand culture, and Pākehā identity, because it’s a huge element.

Renee, who is generally speaking critically of contemporary New Zealand politics, derives a sense of pride and patriotism and a strong emotional connection to her country specifically and exclusively through “Māori cultural artefacts,” such as karakia, haka, and taonga. Renee’s image of Māori culture as a contribution and a gift to the settler nation and to Pākehā contrasts with Roger’s more forceful expression of Pākehā “grabbing hold” of Māori culture, but both participants view it as a source for Pākehā reinvention.

Lisa’s story more explicitly highlights the representational function of Māori culture:

> When you’re in a place like Bahrain and you’ve got the New Zealand Māori culture group up there doing the pois and the skirts and, you know, maybe a guitar is going somewhere in the background, and you’ve got all these international dignitaries and they’re standing there on what is part of New Zealand sovereign land so to speak, because it’s a frigate halfway across the world. And to think that they’re just in awe of this uniqueness that New Zealand has to offer. And you certainly get quite nostalgic and think ‘oh, I’m quite proud to be a Kiwi.’

In all cases, Māori culture is New Zealand culture. This finding squares with Sibley and Barlow’s (2009) results from an Implicit Association Test which showed that Pākehā see Māori as representative of the nation. Contrasting it with the absence of Aboriginal Australians from white understandings of who represents the Australian nation, Sibley and Barlow (2009) argue that this is a result of socialisation into greater familiarity with indigeneity within the bicultural framework of the nation. However, while greater familiarity between Pākehā and Māori compared to white and Aboriginal Australians may be a contributing factor to explain the difference, this is undermined by American research (cited in Sibley & Liu, 2007) that shows that African Americans are not seen as representative of the nation. Notably, in this research the New Zealand findings are interpreted as a sign of an inclusive national imaginary and thus entirely positive without considering the meanings and motivations for this foregrounding of Māori culture.

It thus becomes important to critically analyse the discourses underlying such endorsements of indigenous culture into the national imaginary. It could be argued that Pākehā rely on Māori culture to gain the authenticity the settler subject lacks (Bell, 1999). In addition, Māori culture has become increasingly commodified and used to market Aotearoa/New Zealand. As Turner (2007: 104) argues, “non-Maori no longer expect Maori to disappear. Rather Maori is made to work for
you and me – to brand New Zealand.” While at first glance the seems to counter the logic of elimination, difference is only acceptable within the parameters of the nation (Turner, 2007). The same patterns have been observed in other settler societies such as Canada, where, as both Lozanski (2007) and Mackey (1998) argue, ‘authentic’ indigeneity is integral to the image of the nation but its inclusion into the national imaginary is carefully managed.

Beyond representing the nation, my research shows that Māori culture has also become integral to individual Pākehā identity. The way many participants spoke about cultural practices is reminiscent of what Waters (1990) described as ‘ethnic options’. According to Waters’ research, white Americans – who often feel cultureless – regularly choose to engage in ‘ethnic practices’ because it gives them a sense of who they are; it makes them feel more interesting or special. This, Waters (1990: 155) argues, fosters the white privilege of enjoying having a culture without having to bear the costs that come with being an ethnic minority. In Aotearoa/New Zealand, the situation is similar but here Pākehā have another source to fill the lacuna of white settler identity: indigenous culture. Mimicking the colonised, it has been argued, serves the Pākehā quest for identity. A further excerpt from my interview with Renee in which she continues her earlier thoughts illustrates this point well:

There were places [overseas] that felt powerful, [but] nothing like tapu. Nothing like the feeling of Tapu Rock and Anawhata Beach. Nothing like some of the areas here. This is where the Māori culture influences us so much. You grow up here and you get to learn some of these concepts and personally I think that, I mean I’m not being arrogant, I don’t know, I just feel that some of these sort of concepts are accessible to Pākehā, who are open to them. Some Māori might not like to, you know, agree with that. [edit]

That’s understandable too. If your culture has been that fucking much decimated and the language is under such threat and you know there’s never ever going to be any hope of you having your land back under your, you know, sovereignty, you know what I mean, you would be damn insecure about “this is mine. I’m not fucking sharing it with you. It’s mine. It’s who I am. It’s my identity. You can’t borrow it. You have your own. Piss off.” I can understand that. But at the same time I feel that I know that if I’m somewhere that is tapu, I know, I can feel it.

I do things like when my baby was born, and this is coming from my grandmother and coming from that family background [of living in close proximity with Māori communities], from [place], I kept her placenta. I didn’t keep it in the fridge with the rest of the food, because you just don’t do that. Food is noa. Placenta is extraordinarily tapu. I had a friend of
mine from [place] who lives on her own family’s land. She’s from [name of hapū] branch of [name of iwi]. Buried it out at [place], with my mother and my brother there, and [name of daughter] of course, just after a week after she was born. Buried it out there by [place]. It’s quite a public place, but I know exactly where it is. I needed to have that done because that-I guess the Māori stuff serves my spiritual, that kind of hunger for, even though I’m an atheist, there’s still that, probably Catholic background, I like having that connection to the land that is on a spiritual level through these sorts of rituals. You know what I mean? So I’m quite contradictory in my beliefs, but I’m quite happy in my contradiction. I’m comfortable with it. So yeah tapu and aroha, you know.

Is this an “indigenising strategy” that is designed to achieve the “rebirth of Pākehā, innocent of past transgressions” as Matthewman and Hoey (2007: np) have suggested? Arguably, it is difficult to think of anything more symbolic of forging a permanent connection with the land than burying placenta in the soil. Just like learning about the Other, mimicking indigenous rituals and being familiar with indigenous philosophy is here understood as a sign of openness. Renee presents her knowledge of Māori concepts and rituals as the natural result of growing up in Aotearoa/New Zealand. For Renee and many other participants, familiarity with Māoritanga is what makes Pākehā unique, and what sets them apart from other, less open-minded Pākehā.

While Renee is aware that this may be interpreted as appropriation, participants generally presented both stories of learning and of adopting indigenous culture as genuine attempts to develop new post-colonial identities. It was notable in this study that those participants who engaged in such mimetic practices were also the ones who expressed more support for indigenous political aspirations and identified categorically as Pākehā (see Chapter Five). As Johnson (2005) argues, for many Pākehā adopting Māori culture is a way of critiquing Western values of individualism and of acknowledging the value of indigenous worldviews. Yet, it can also reproduce colonial knowledge that regards indigenous culture as traditional, a-historical, and static, and constructs Pākehā as oppressed by their own values (Johnson, 2005: 143). Renee distinctly romanticises Māori culture as pure and genuine and uses it to satisfy a need for spirituality. She packages her experience as something only available to open Pākehā and demonstrates that she is clearly aware of the problematic of cultural appropriation. In this respect, her narrative is evidence of the tension between transformations of settler subjectivities and re-productions of colonial relationships.
But not only does “the Māori stuff,” as Renee called it, represent Aotearoa/New Zealand, Māoriness is also being exhibited to the world as evidence of harmonious race relations. Once again, this involves a Pākehā re-fashioning as post-colonial cosmopolitan citizens. This is illustrated below when Karen, who earlier stressed the inter-generational changes she perceives through her children, went on to speak about incorporating Māoriness into her Kiwi identity (her preferred term of reference) and the subsequent need to present and even protect Māori from stereotyped views:

I had never considered Māori to be part of my culture back then. It was only becoming an adult, becoming very strongly Kiwi and when I travel overseas I’m New Zealander that Māori is part of my cultural- although I don’t know very much about it, I feel that it’s, it is New Zealand so I need to know and I need to represent the two sides of my country.

As someone who travels frequently overseas, Karen feels she has to represent and explain Māori and the nature of race relations in Aotearoa/New Zealand to people overseas:

The other thing is representing Māori overseas, people saying ‘oh, do Māori people wear traditional clothes in the city?’ Oh my gosh. They’re people. Of course they’re not wearing their traditional clothes. Only for tourists. So having to represent that as well and say- you proudly say that New Zealand is Māori as well as being white and people go “What? What are you talking about? How does that work?” And proudly saying that New Zealand have a treaty with the natives and we’re one of the only countries that signed a treaty a hundred and fifty years ago and still stand by it compared to Australia and the Aborigines and America and the Indians. So people go “What? What’s a treaty? Why do you do that? What, eh?” And proudly saying that we’re not like Americans who put Indians on the reserves, or Native Americans, and not like the Australians who literally killed a lot of Aborigines. I won’t say, you know- we have done a lot of horrible things but representing a side of my culture that I hadn’t considered part of my culture.

In Karen’s narrative, we find Pākehā as progressive Treaty partners, who are proud of having good relations with “the natives.” What struck me most in these two passages is what Karen chooses to highlight and what she leaves silent. Despite better knowledge – for Karen is quite aware of Treaty breaches and grievances in relation to them, here best expressed in the brief acknowledgement that “we have done a lot of horrible things” – she chooses to create a myth of continuity according to which Pākehā “still stand by” the Treaty of Waitangi signed over 170 years ago. By way of favourably comparing Aotearoa/New Zealand to other settler societies, she
simply ignores the long history of colonial injustices. By contrast, the transformation that Karen
does emphasise, and that seems to almost astonish her, is Māori becoming part of her culture.
What she foregrounds is that she needs to know about this culture that used to be irrelevant but is
now a part of her.

The narrow focus on cultural competence and adopting indigeneity allows Pākehā to genuinely
believe that the change has been “huge” as Roger proclaimed. This way, Pākehā not only break
with the “distant” and “unfortunate” history of their settler ancestors (Wetherell & Potter, 1992)
but also with the more recent history that falls into their own or their parents’ life times.
“Historicism,” as Attwood (2009) calls this distancing strategy, extends not only to colonisation
but also to de-colonisation. Thus, the hegemonic narrative that contemporary Pākehā should not
be made responsible for their forebears’ mistakes is transformed into a version in which they have
taken responsibility by making a space for Māori culture.

These narratives are shaped and constrained by a ubiquitous culturalisation of politics that
promotes cultural solutions for political issues. With the ascent of multicultural rhetoric
throughout the Western world, recognition of cultural difference has come to “displac[e]
socioeconomic redistribution as the remedy for injustice and the goal of political struggle”
(Fraser, 1995: 68). However, as Fraser (1995: 74) rightly argues, marginalised groups are usually
“bivalent collectivities” that require both recognition and redistribution to offset cultural as well
as socioeconomic injustices. In addition, indigenous peoples in settler societies are not simply
socio-economically marginalised but have specific political rights as set out in the UN Declaration
of Indigenous Rights. Consequently, focusing exclusively on cultural aspects may serve to
maintain epistemologies of ignorance. The narratives of change discussed here do not bear any
traces of the uncomfortable experiences many participants also recalled. It struck me that amidst
the praise for positive transformations not a single participant wondered what had happened to
those uncomfortable Māori claims they had been faced with. Citing the Howard government’s
return to assimilationist policies in Australia, Healy (2008) argues that remembering and
forgetting are not necessarily continuous processes in that once we know, we cannot forget.
Political environments can stimulate or suppress remembering.

As explained in Chapter Two, indigenous political claims remain visible in Aotearoa/New
Zealand but are increasingly dismissed by discourses of Māori privilege. Roger’s narrative
demonstrates that measures addressing socio-economic inequalities and compensation for Treaty
breaches are accepted as inevitable but imagined as finite processes. Roger’s perspective backs
Sibley and Liu’s (2004) findings of a stark discrepancy between Pākehā support for “symbolic” and opposition to “resource-based” biculturalism. While 53 percent of a sample of Pākehā university students espoused favourable attitudes towards symbolic aspects of biculturalism, only three percent supported redistributive policies. In fact, 76 percent of the sample opposed those types of bicultural policies (Sibley & Liu, 2004: 88). In a later publication, Liu (2005: 76) insists that this opposition to resource-based bicultural policies was mostly expressed in terms of equal opportunities and thus denotes a “genuine concern that categorical preferences for Māori could lead to new injustices or reverse discrimination.” What Liu (2005) fails to problematise is that white hegemony commonly relies on notions of equality and meritocracy. In the next section, I discuss participants’ visions of redress as finite (temporal) and limited (material).

**A Finite and Limited Process of Redress**

*Time does not heal the wounds of injustice when it leaves in place the institutions and practices that embody that injustice (Williams, 1998: 197).*

Participant discourses about positive discrimination, the Treaty of Waitangi, and indigenous sovereignty are entwined with social memory which, in turn, informs expectations of the future. The “insistent presence of Māori” problems, demands and aspirations, to extend Turner’s (1999: 22) phrase, are regular reminders that their own memories of the past, perceptions of the present, and visions of the future may be at odds with those of many Māori. Presently, many Pākehā cannot admit that biculturalism may be an “as yet unfulfilled promise” – as Johnson (2008: 48) has claimed it is – because this would amount to conceding that settler colonialism is not an artefact of the distant past but a feature of the present. White settlers, Lozanski (2007: 224) argues, “can never fully remember colonialism because of its economic, political and geographical proximity to, and implication in, the continuing legacies of colonialism.” As such they have to reinterpret the past. Participant narratives concerning contemporary forms of redress are informed by the popular discourse that de-colonisation has been achieved.

At the same time they are also informed by visions of the future. Baldwin (2012) observed that much of the research into the reproduction of whiteness is oriented towards the past. In order to decentre whiteness in the present, scholars aimed to unearth the genealogies and historic origins of whiteness. However, Baldwin (2012: 181) claims, it would be fruitful to consider “how whiteness is constituted through an imagined future, even if that future itself is a colonial
artefact.” In this study, future imaginaries emerged as a relevant concept for analysing one of the most prevailing themes in participants’ talk about present Pākehā-Māori relations: the notion of finitude. For the majority of participants, addressing current socio-economic inequalities and redressing past wrongs is a finite process. If redress is conceptualised as finite, what comes after? The analysis of participants’ social imaginaries revealed that the future looks much like the mythical past in which racial harmony and equality prevailed, and all New Zealanders were the same.

While participants generally acknowledged the need for redress, it was limited in time and scope. As a general rule, forms of redress that can be provided without endangering the nation-state and the normative position of Pākehā (such as positive discrimination in education and employment as well as land claims settlements) were acceptable (for a time), while Māori sovereignty was unacceptable. I will theorise the notion of “limited concessions” (Huygens, 2007: 43) as one important cornerstone of white hegemony.

Participants’ perceptions about redress were shaped by the idea that enough has been done to make up for past injustices. In the following extract, Lisa, a self-identified first generation “true blue Kiwi” describes her feelings towards redress for colonial injustices:

In some ways I can sort of see, yeah okay, they [Māori] were here first or they do need to be represented. But in some ways I think well, you know, isn’t that just discrimination in reverse? And so as I said earlier, even some of my Māori friends will say the pendulum has swung too far against the Europeans. So why should the Māori actually be in such a privileged position as they are now? Whereas you know maybe 30 years ago, it needed to be acknowledged. And so now let’s just get on with it, because we’re all Kiwis, we’re all New Zealanders. Who cares?

The understanding that ‘everything is different now’ is a strategy that lets Pākehā establish a temporal distance from injustices of the colonial past and also from decolonisation. Lisa’s comparison of the 1980s and today discursively turns decolonisation into a discrete period that lies in the past and has been completed. “Now” is very different – the ever recurring theme – from “30 years ago.” Back then, Lisa concedes, inequalities had to be addressed but now there is no further need for it. What has changed from 30 years ago? What gives Lisa the impression that redress is no longer necessary? While there have been improvements in many areas, socio-economic inequalities between Māori and Pākehā remain significant and while neoliberal contractualism has led to pockets of greater autonomy, more often than not self-determination
remains at the level of self-administration and always within the confining framework of the settler state (see Chapter Two).

One thing that certainly has changed since then is the racial climate. The 1980s, which Lisa remembers here, were the heyday of decolonising practices which, as outlined in Chapter Two, included investigations of institutional racism in government institutions and services and compulsory decolonisation courses for health professionals. By contrast, today’s racial climate is undergirded by a neoliberal, post-racial, individualised ideology which does not encourage considerations of ongoing colonialism or institutional racism. There has been a return to the rhetoric of ‘the Māori problem’ and a simultaneous move towards rhetoric of ‘Māori privilege,’ the dismissal of race-based measures and identity politics in favour of a one nation narrative which ignores the intergenerational accumulation of disadvantage and advantage.

Even when participants were cognisant of persisting ethnic inequalities, they deployed strategies that discredited positive discrimination. The following excerpt from my interview with Andrew shows that in some cases these discourses were justified through a particular vision of the future rather than the past:

I wish I had some Māori blood in me so I could get a scholarship. That’d be freaking awesome. I understand the reason why they have them and from a high up level it is definitely a good thing but from [the level of] a person that’s not entitled to any benefits I’m slightly jealous. The other thing I would say, which probably sounds the opposite, is being white middle class I am sort of unbelievably lucky in that I just have- and also male, I have so many doors open to me just purely because I can look someone in the eyes and speak the way they expect to be- you know connotation, I know the nuances of uh subtleties of conversation and things like that like it’s just purely because I am white middle class that I can, when it comes to the job market, I am better able to get a job than someone who’s got the same experience but has a different background. So that is quite a lesson.

But that said, one of the other reasons I’m going to university is I don’t think it’s going to stay that way forever. Like avoiding glass ceilings was one of the reasons I went to university, the other was future-proofing. Because so many people are getting degrees now and bettering themselves that I can’t rest on my laurels and think that that’ll be ok? You know that’s almost laziness that is- the reason America’s stuffed at the moment is you’ve got to continually invest otherwise you get overtaken because like when it comes to university, especially the Asian kids, God they work so hard, they really do, like white people are by far the laziest people at uni.
For the purposes of this discussion, the most important element in this narrative is Andrew’s anticipation of a future loss of white privilege. He explains his expectation with the growing number of “hard-working” Asian students which taps into recurring anxieties in Aotearoa/New Zealand that are frequently fuelled by the media and have also been found in previous attitudinal research. A recent magazine article, for example, reported on *The Disappearance of the White Male Doctor* (Chisholm, 2010) citing medical professionals who lamented the growing number of Asian students in Aotearoa/New Zealand’s medical schools. Focus group research suggests that a cooling of attitudes towards Asians over the last four years may have to do with a perceived threat posed by Asian immigrants who are presumed to do better (high achievers), be well off, and less affected by economic crisis (Colmar Brunton, 2013). That Andrew uses the phrase ‘glass ceilings’ which usually refers to the invisible barriers faced by women and ethnic minorities in advancing their careers is reflective of a sense of growing disadvantage amongst white males.

The merging of past and future is most prominent in discourses about the Treaty of Waitangi and the settlement of land claims through the Waitangi Tribunal. Even though the Treaty arguably invents Pākehā as one of the two founding peoples granting them legitimacy in hindsight, by and large participants did not regard the document as the basis of a permanent partnership. First and foremost, the Treaty signified the settlement of land claims and a related grievance industry and Māori privilege. Processes of redress via the Waitangi Tribunal were commonly talked about in a way that showed an understanding of the rationale but also conveyed an air of benevolence coupled with impatience. For example, Eileen (30s) stated:

> I think the Treaty should be- get it over and done with. It’s gone on too long. Yeah, it just seems that they keep dragging up old things over and over and over again and I think, you know, you can’t keep bringing it up. What’s done is done. […] They’ve carried it on too long. They should just say that’s it, no more. […] I think they just keep going on about it and it just drives me crazy.

According to Eileen and many other participants, Treaty claims should come to an end. According to this discourse, the persistence of Māori claims is testing Pākehā goodwill. In a favourable interpretation this may to some extent be a matter of a lack of knowledge. Comparing the politics of redressing past wrongs in Australia and Aotearoa/New Zealand, Lawn (2008: 28) argues that the Australian public apology led to “an intense round of self-interrogation on the part of some settler Australians” while the bureaucratic settlement process in New Zealand afforded “no place, no need, and little effort to engage settler identities in this process”. However, the notion of
finitude was too pervasive to be dismissed as the result of a lack of information. Many participants imagined a future without further claims and often this also implied that the Treaty itself would be obsolete.

That the Treaty is merely the basis for a finite project of redressing past wrongs rather than the foundation for a permanent partnership or indigenous self-determination was acutely evident in the absence of such notions from participants’ discourses about biculturalism and the Treaty of Waitangi. As Belich and Wevers (2008: 9-10) argue,

> [w]e often talk as if the Treaty has an expiry date – as if we are moving towards a post-Treaty utopia in which all grievances are settled in a perfect bicultural society. Are these beliefs simply political expediency, or are they fundamental components of our cultural identity – a naïve optimism, a wish for perfection which is also a complacency?

In my reading it is less a wish for perfection than a wish to stifle the possible obligations implied by alternative interpretations of the Treaty. My research confirms Huygens’ (2007: 43) assessment that accepting redress through the Waitangi Tribunal amounts to little more than “limited concessions” allowing Pākehā to uphold the myth that everyone is getting a “fair go.” To the public, Huygens (2007: 26) argues,

> Pakeha breaches of the original agreement for colonisation are presented as occurring in the past, needing only redress through official means for the Treaty to be fully settled. Left unarticulated is the ongoing struggle by Maori to give expression to their mana and te tino rangatiratanga as guaranteed in te Tiriti.

Limited concessions are a cornerstone of Pākehā hegemony. The result of a continual process of negotiation, its maintenance requires concessions in order to secure allegiance to the hegemonic order. With regards to settling claims through the Waitangi Tribunal, Turner (1999: 33) argues that “[t]he pragmatic response of whites to Maori grievances is perfectly colonial” because they ensure that redress does not threaten the national frame.

Narrow definitions of the meaning of the Treaty and their own role in biculturalism inhibited considerations of partnership or sovereignty. My findings suggest that Turner (1999: 33) rightly assumes that “sovereignty is in any case regarded by whites as a merely theoretical issue.” As Roger said, “if the country drifted that way, I’d probably leave it,” and even the most liberal of participants stopped short of sovereignty. Turner (2002: 63) further argues that sovereignty in the

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40 This quote relates to Huygens’ (2007) analysis of a Treaty of Waitangi Information Programme.
form of binationalism is seen as an “intolerable alternative” because Pākehā need to be in control of (imagining) the nation. Illustrating this fear of losing control is Dorothy (70s), whose statement may be the quintessential representation of white settler identity in the force field of “anticipation” of the future and “melancholy” for the past (Baldwin, 2012: 182). She says:

You know I think they’re getting too greedy with things. You didn’t hear this in the earlier days. You didn’t hear this. They never moaned and groaned about anything. Then these activists come along and (p) yeah. No, no some things I agree with, some things I don’t, the majority I don’t. [edit] I think they’d like to rule the country. And that’s not- we’re supposed to be one family. We were years ago. We were all one family. But uh (p).

Here Dorothy breaks off. Just like Helen earlier in this chapter, who recalled her experience of hearing Māori activist Donna Awatere speak, she evokes the familiar trope of the Māori stirrer (Nairn & McCreanor, 1990, 1991) as an aberration to a more docile indigenous population. This undermines the legitimacy of Māori demands and aspirations which embody a daunting future of Māori authority over Pākehā. Dorothy envisions a future that is very much like the mythical past, when “we were all one family.” While Dorothy was an outlier in the sample in that she largely denied or downplayed colonial injustices, her quest for racial harmony is shared by most participants. Pākehā disregard the idea that harmony may not work as well for Māori as it does for them. During the Civil Rights Movement, Martin Luther King, Jr. (1964) criticised white Americans for suggesting that African Americans “slow down” their protests so as not to aggrieve and upset the white majority. This demand, he concluded, signified the pursuit of order rather than justice and a preference for “a negative peace which is the absence of tension to a positive peace which is the presence of justice” (King Jr., 1964: 84).

The temporal and material limits Pākehā place on redress for past colonial injustices can be read as forms of a “possessive investment in whiteness” (Lipsitz, 1998). Limited concessions as well as an insistence on harmony and sameness as a basis for contemporary settler-indigenous relations continue discourses of control over the settler-indigenous relation and the place of indigeneity in the nation. Mikaere (2004: 19) encourages Pākehā to take a “leap of faith” and to give up control over Māori-Pākehā relations by accepting their place as manuhiri (guests) in a Māori land “if they truly want to gain the sense of belonging they so crave, the sense of identity that until now has proven so elusive.” However, many Pākehā are only willing to make concessions as long as they do not undermine their social, economic and political dominance. Cultural recognition is the most comfortable form of redress because it does not de-centre the dominant group. As I have shown,
the Māori cultural revival has been hugely beneficial for Pākehā. Other forms of symbolic or material redress on the other hand are more uncomfortable because they “not only reference feelings of guilt and shame, but also raise anxiety because they open up the past and keep open the future” (Lawn, 2008: 21).

**Conclusion**

The purpose of this chapter was to demonstrate how mnemonic practices are deployed in remodelling white settler identities in Aotearoa/New Zealand. Guided by critical whiteness and settler colonial scholarship, I was interested in exploring Pākehā perceptions of settler-indigenous relations over time, whether they experienced a crisis of legitimation and how it affected them. The life story approach lent itself well to exploring participants’ autobiographical memories and how aspects of white settlerness are both reflected and re-produced in their narratives.

I have shown that mnemonic practices are vital tools for the negotiation of dominant identities. Lozanski (2007: 223) argues that white settlers inhabit a “paradoxical space between the inability to forget and the inability to remember”. This paradox transpires in narratives of change which enable Pākehā to re-create a positive coherent identity as authentic and postcolonial through a discursive emphasis on acquiring cultural competence and incorporating Māori cultural markers into Pākehā and national identity. These memories are enabled by the bicultural framework in its current form which is little more than “multiculturalism for Māori” (Fleras, 2009: 131). Pākehā maintain that the transformations they remember are also sufficient for Māori. They dismiss Māori concerns and aspirations because they cannot allow themselves to acknowledge colonialism as an on-going process because it would make whiteness visible. By the same token their vision of the future of the nation resembles an idealised past of racial harmony and equal opportunity.

These findings add new facets to the local literature on settler amnesia by focusing on what and how Pākehā remember and how their memories of the past but also anticipations of the future shape current understandings and vice versa. In addition, the findings suggest that mnemonic practices play an important role in the re-production of white settler normativity and privilege.

The visions of the future discussed at the end of this chapter form the starting point for the following chapter. Focusing on the impact of the transnational hegemonic multi-culturalist rhetoric and growing ethnic diversity in Auckland on Pākehā identities, I explore how participants
produce identities as cosmopolitan global citizens that are an extension of the ‘open Pākehā’ subjectivities presented in this chapter. I illuminate the role of space and everyday experiences in re-making Pākehā subjectivities, and explore the impact of mapping the multicultural logic onto the settler society Aotearoa/New Zealand.
Chapter Seven
Fantasies of a Multicultural Future

As demonstrated in the previous chapter, both memory and anticipation are integral to participants’ efforts of constructing post-colonial identities. While my analysis concentrated mostly on mnemonic practices, I indicated that participants in this study eagerly anticipate a ‘post-Treaty future’ in which the concepts of colonialism and settler-indigenous relations will be irrelevant. The data discussed in the present chapter suggest that this imaginary is not only driven by memories of the past but also by a vision of a poly-ethnic, cosmopolitan society in which indigeneity, settleriness and the uncomfortable politics of redress will be rendered obsolete through the increasing presence of immigrants. The central argument of this chapter is that immigrants and ethnic diversity are instrumentalised to foster the dominant position of Pākehā as sovereign host both in relation to Māori and ethnic minorities. In demonstrating the entanglement of discourses about multiculturalism and indigeneity, I also argue that we need to overcome the separation of examinations of settler-migrant relations and settler-indigenous relations that characterises much of the existing literature.

In the first part of this chapter, I analyse participants as ‘conflicted cosmopolitans’ who construct ‘cosmopolitan identities’ analogous to the post-settler identities open to Māori culture examined in the previous chapter but simultaneously act as “national-spatial managers” (Hage, 2000: 42) intent on preserving the white core of the multicultural nation. In the second part of this chapter, I elaborate on the intersections of cosmopolitan discourses and settler colonialism. I argue that narratives endorsing immigration and ethnic diversity were often entwined with narratives that dismiss the continued relevance of settler colonialism. Three distinct but in themselves nuanced themes emerged here: 1) a temporal logic according to which multiculturalism is forward-looking whereas biculturalism is outmoded and an obstacle on the nation’s ostensibly natural path to an inclusive and egalitarian society; 2) an image of settler-migrant relations as free from conflict and obligations which is posited as a benchmark for Māori; and 3) a levelling of differences between settlers and migrants which is employed to foster settler belonging.
Conflicted Cosmopolitans

These participant experiences of ethnic diversity echo the widespread inclination to welcome immigrants and ethnic diversity that has been found in New Zealand attitudinal research over recent years (see Chapter Two), in so far as participants stressed the value of abstract ethnic diversity and constructed images of themselves as urbane cosmopolites, open to and accepting of cultures different from their own. However, the analysis also revealed a number of common themes in participant narratives that directly contradicted these cosmopolitan identities.

Urbane Cosmopolites

At the most basic level, all participants described Aotearoa/New Zealand as a multicultural society. Overwhelmingly, this perception was shaped by their urban environment, which is characterised by the increasing visibility and proximity of immigrants from non-traditional source countries. By 2011, the year participants were interviewed, the proportion of Auckland residents who were overseas born had reached close to 40 percent, and came predominantly from Asia and the Pacific Islands, followed by the UK and Ireland (Statistics New Zealand, 2014). In the extract below, Tom (50s) stresses exactly this demographic shift to a ‘visible’ immigrant presence in Auckland and his neighbourhood, New Lynn:

If they [Pākehā from the South Island] came to Auckland they would wonder what had hit them I think, a lot of those lower New Zealanders, if they came up here, ‘huh who are these people?’ you know. Sometimes I wonder where the [Pākehā] population has gone. If you go down to [local shopping centre], for example, over half, well most of the people you see are dark skinned so I don’t know what’s happened.

Even though Tom is evidently still grappling with these demographic shifts, he presents ethnic diversity as something Auckland residents are exposed to as a matter of day-to-day life. Tom’s experience is exemplary of the wider sample. Without exception, participants described a plethora of everyday encounters with people of migrant backgrounds ranging from basic exchanges with service providers such as shop assistants to more intimate and sustained contact with neighbours and colleagues, close friends and family members.

Participants routinely used the term multiculturalism to refer to the presence of overseas-born immigrants and subsequent local born descendants of immigrants.
Narratives about local communities emerged as a context in which participants constructed cosmopolitan identities, confirming Johnston et al.’s (2002: 259) argument that “people’s local context, and their manipulation of local space, remain central components of the making and remaking of their individual and group identities.” Recent literature on “quotidian” intercultural encounters (Wise, 2005: 172) has drawn attention to the role of such micro-level interactions for community cohesion. Wise (2005: 177) argues that it is important to bear in mind that there are not only national “imagined communities” in Andersen’s (1991 [1983]) sense but also communities that are real and embodied, made up of real relationships between real people. These usually local settings have variously been referred to as sites that enable ‘conviviality’ (Gilroy, 2004) and ‘politics of connectivity’ (Amin, 2006). Cities are often seen as classic sites of encounters and as “the ultimate site for the development of cosmopolitan sensibilities” (Müller, 2011: 3415). With over 200 ethnic groups living in Auckland (Manning, 2011), this city certainly provides ample opportunity for such everyday interactions.

In the following extract, Amanda explains that diversity – with respect to ethnicity but also class – is crucial to her sense of belonging in her neighbourhood:

The people who live in the middle part of the house [I live in] I think they are actually Filipino. And then the people next to them are Brazilian. The people who own the dairy just at the bottom of the hill are Indian. There’s an African family that lives nearby. I often see them walking past. There’s an Indian guru who lives up the road. It’s really, really diverse. So it actually feels like, it just feels like my kind of community, the kind of community that I am comfortable with. I go up onto Ponsonby Road and it’s a huge mix up there always. You do have, I guess the kind of wealthy, the gentrifying ones stand out. But it’s still very, very mixed. There are people who clearly have mental health issues living in the area. There are some halfway houses. There are a number of homeless people on the street. You know, ones that you know and you just see all the time. So it is really, really different and very diverse. And I love it. To me it’s the place I’ve lived longest in, apart from where I grew up in my dad’s house. So it’s very much home for me and I feel completely like I belong there.

Notably, this particular narrative of seeking out “my kind of community” was an exclusive Ponsonby phenomenon where the majority of participants related stories of appreciating the suburb specifically for its diversity, or even of moving there for that particular reason. Amanda, along with many other participants, displayed a genuine enjoyment of ethno-cultural diversity. However, her narrative could also be interpreted as an illustration of middle class urbane
cosmopolitanism which is only appreciative of a specific colourful mix – comprised of individual others – that does not interfere with white middle class norms. To begin with, her narrative conveys a sense of being surrounded by but not interacting with Others. Her narrative also reflects a hegemonic discourse of ethnic diversity as enrichment which is regularly echoed in findings from the *Quality of Life Survey* (Nielsen, 2009, 2011, 2013): as these surveys show, those respondents who agree that “cultural diversity makes their area a better place to live” consistently list the vibrancy and multicultural feel it adds to the city amongst the top reasons. The interpretation that Others may be merely decorative elements gains most credence when we take into account that even homeless people are seen to be adding to the feel of the community.

However, participants also highlighted that ethnic diversity provided opportunities to interact with and learn from immigrants. Akin to the narratives of developing post-colonial identities that are open to and engaged with indigenous culture analysed in the previous chapter, participants often stressed a desire, need, or even responsibility to personally engage with people from other ethnic groups, with different cultural expressions more broadly, or to acquire knowledge about other cultures. Without exception, participants mentioned food, commodities of various kinds, or entertainment as forms of engagement with other cultures. Yet, in addition to what could be critiqued as simply ‘consuming Otherness’, participants also highlighted the importance of interacting with people from different cultural/national backgrounds for their personal development. Andrew, whose “best friends at uni [were] one Kiwi, one Russian, one Chinese, and one Indian,” explained that “it’s a good thing that I’m going to university because it’s opening me up to these other cultures.” He felt that being exposed to different viewpoints and collaborating with people who had different “skills” helped to overcome a narrow mind-set. In a similar vein, Karen asserted that “interacting with different cultures has made me the multifaceted person I am.” Karen also explicitly described herself as a ‘global citizen’ which, she explained, entailed a responsibility to be knowledgeable about other cultures. She illustrated this necessity in the following story relating to her job, which involves frequent and sustained interpersonal contact with people of non-English speaking backgrounds:

In the [workplace] at the moment we’ve got a refugee from Congo and when I talked to him I realised I didn’t know anything about Congo and I felt embarrassed that I had no idea why he was a refugee from his country. I didn’t even know the capital city which makes me angry because beyond your country you are a global citizen in a way and you think- I don’t think it needs to change people but be accepting and knowledgeable about every culture and understand that one side of the culture is not representative of that culture.
As discussed in Chapter Three, part of being cosmopolitan is the ability to code switch, to be versed in and accept cultural expressions different from your own. Participant narratives of enrichment and personal development reflect widely available discourses that encourage people to accumulate “cosmopolitan capital” (Weenink, 2008: 1092) as an increasingly vital tool for living in diverse societies. However, Karen’s story positions her as a ‘dedicated cosmopolitan’ as separate from a ‘pragmatic cosmopolitan’ whom Weenink (2008) describes as focused on accumulating intercultural competencies for the sake of competitiveness in a globalised market. This desire to learn about immigrant cultures has recently been shown to be widespread in Aotearoa/New Zealand. For instance, the most recent annual survey conducted by the Asia New Zealand Foundation (Colmar Brunton, 2014: 2) showed that 63 percent of respondents thought that “this country should do more to help New Zealanders understand Asian cultures and traditions.”

The various day-to-day encounters participants described were complemented by more abstract statements which indicated an acceptance of and confidence in a harmonious multicultural future. Multiculturalism was portrayed as the normal outcome of globalisation as the following remark by Paula illustrates:

I mean multiculturalism is inevitable for every country, isn’t it? Although I don’t know that thousands of us want to go and live in Pakistan, thousands of white people. The third world is going to go and mix with the first world, second world, and we’re all going to get so mixed up anyway. Can’t fight it.

Paula describes multiculturalism as a phenomenon that increasingly characterises all developed societies and as something that cannot be avoided. Even though “inevitability” may be interpreted as resignation rather than enthusiasm, the resultant “can’t fight it” attitude is noteworthy because it so starkly contrasts with the control Pākehā often aim to exert over settler-indigenous relations and the nature and scope of reconciliation, as discussed in the previous chapter. This broad acceptance of ethnic diversity was accompanied by a vision of a harmonious future. Reflecting on the sudden increase in new immigrants from a variety of Asian countries over the past decades, Paula continued her thought on getting “mixed up”:

It’s nice to have the Asians, I like the Asians, I think with the next generation they’ll be so integrated the parents who come here and the older ones who don’t integrate because they

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42 I will return to this point in the second part of this chapter.
never actually get to learn English and who can blame them? It is so hard to go to a new country I’m sure. But their children, they’ll be so integrated, we’re gonna be so mixed.

In this extract, we can glimpse some of the taken-for-granted expectations that underlie Paula’s welcoming attitude and her vision of a socially cohesive future. As was common amongst participants, she conceptualised integration as a process, as something that migrants do, and as a natural and unproblematic intergenerational achievement. In envisioning this process, Paula relies on “conventional images of a western modernization trajectory – of a linear move from a point somewhere in the ‘undeveloped’ world to a place in a more ‘developed’ country, where migrants are thought to face a period of difficult but irreversible ‘integration’” (K. Anderson, 2000: 384). Paula’s view that English language proficiency is a prerequisite for integration was common amongst participants. This finding is congruent with results from various surveys which have, for example, shown that New Zealanders regard English language ability as one of the most important immigrant selection criteria (Spoonley, et al., 2007: 21), that New Zealanders are in favour of English courses for both adult migrants and their children as a form of settlement support and oppose the teaching of major immigrant languages in New Zealand schools (Spoonley, et al., 2007: 23), and that insufficient language skills are consistently amongst the top reasons given by survey respondents who think ethnic diversity makes their area a worse place to live (Nielsen, 2011). These requirements demonstrate that the onus of doing the work of integration is firmly placed on immigrants. More than that though, a perceived lack of English language skills often caused concern and was, as I show in more detail in the next section of this chapter, central to practices of managing both Other and self.

Nonetheless, participants frequently described Aotearoa/New Zealand as welcoming and accepting of ethno-cultural difference and for some, such as Caitlyn, this characteristic explicitly provided a source of national pride:

[Ethnic diversity has] made me prouder of my country because we are tolerant of different races and we don’t really put restrictions on other cultures if you understand what I mean. We don’t say ‘you’re here, you’ve got to do what we want’. So I think we’re freer than other countries.

While such endorsements of cultural difference at the level of the nation can be interpreted as examples of ‘cosmopolitan nationalism’ (Brett & Moran, 2011), Caitlyn assumes the powerful

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43 This is evident in her reference to Pakistan in the quote above, in which she presupposes that people from the developed world (i.e. ‘white people’) would not want to migrate to the underdeveloped world.
role of ‘tolerator’ (Hage, 2000). Moreover, the self-image of the tolerant society conveniently erases expectations placed on immigrants, perhaps because they are regarded as common sense. Moran (2009) urges academics not to underestimate the positive effects of cultural shifts towards civic definitions of citizenship and national belonging which are inclusive of people from all ethnic backgrounds against Hage’s (2000, 2003) critique of tolerance as an expression of power.

Within these narratives of embracing ethnic diversity, the portrayal of Aucklanders as exceptionally cosmopolitan was a specific and pervasive theme. Participants compared themselves favourably with Pākehā in other places, most notably the South Island cities of Dunedin and Christchurch and small town New Zealand, as illustrated by Andrew’s account of living in Dunedin for a period of time:

Moving to Dunedin which was spot-the-black-person [...] it’s just so- the South Island is so white and the further south you go the whiter it is, it’s yeah it’s quite racist. I found that I really stood out because a) I was from Auckland but b) you know like in my first eleven cricket team I was the only white kid there. There was heaps of Indians and you know that was just normal interacting with them like whereas- and you’ve got like divergent views and things like that which is good, you know, it’s why in business you want teams with diverse backgrounds and things like that because you get those views. But Dunedin, yeah, Dunedin was just closed in comparison to so much of Auckland.

[edit]

With my Auckland ways I definitely stood out [in Dunedin]. An example like was [name of high school in Auckland]. ‘Cos [name of high school] was quite open I would say. Like ‘cos especially I think with the Samoan influence. We got fa’afafine and like if families have all boys then they’ll train the youngest one to grow up like a girl so they can care for the parents when they get old? And that’s just the way it is, that’s like- and they don’t seem to care about it and embrace it and so it’s quite a more open culture and I remember like one of the coolest groups in school had the gay kid ‘cos you know that was out there enough that was cool but going to Dunedin was going back twenty years, and anything that was pink was gay and radaradarada, and so me, as an Auckland kid, not being gay myself but I wouldn’t give a crap if you were or not, yeah, stood out like a sore thumb.

Andrew echoes Allport’s (1954) contact hypothesis when arguing that Aucklanders are less prejudiced than other New Zealanders because living with difference – whether ethnic, gender, or sexual – is a normal part of everyday life. Many younger participants and parents chose examples
from school or childhood to emphasise that Aucklanders now grow up with diversity. This means that Aucklanders are not just accustomed to dealing with ethnic diversity in the course of everyday life but that their identities are shaped by it. From this perspective, being exposed to ethnic diversity and interacting with people from other ethnic groups results in a natural progression towards cosmopolitan identities. Such a view has also been expressed by Gendall and colleagues (2013). In explaining the apparent trend that New Zealanders have developed increasingly positive attitudes towards Asian immigrants since the late 1990s, the authors argue that the extent of contact with immigrants is the most important predictor of positive attitudes towards immigrants (Gendall, et al., 2013).

Even though Andrew is a white, heterosexual, middle class male, he feels that his cosmopolitan sensibilities set him apart from the more parochial Pākehā in Dunedin. Andrew conveys a sense of moral superiority which has been observed in other studies on cosmopolitan attitudes. As Skey (2013: 13) concluded from a focus group study in the UK, “in particular contexts cosmopolitan discourse produces subject positions that can be delighted in and embraced, assigning status to oneself as an enlightened and rational being, able to engage productively with other people and cultures.” In Andrew’s story, difference is enriching and cool. This coolness rubs off onto those who possess ‘the Other’. Using verbs that indicate possession (“we got” and “one of the coolest groups in school had …”), fa’afafine and “the gay kid” are owned and worn like badges attesting to its wearer’s openness and tolerance.

So far, I have concentrated on the ubiquitous avowals of the normality and value of ethnic diversity. In most cases, a critical analysis of these endorsements reveals assertions of governmental belonging (Hage, 2000) that, like privilege, remain invisible to the majority. However, the life story approach poignantly highlighted that ethnic diversity was also frequently experienced as problematic, leading participants to enact managerial control over who belongs to the nation more overtly and to slip from tolerance into intolerance. Such efforts manifested in various practices of controlling ‘the Other’ but also the Self and are discussed below.

**Space, Nation, and White Self-Segregation**

In this study, contradictions came to light most clearly in accounts of concrete lived experiences. More specifically, participants experienced the presence of larger numbers of migrants, especially in prominent places or in close proximity to participants, as uncomfortable or even threatening. Space emerged as a particular site in which participants experienced difference as threatening and espoused ideas informed by nationalist and racialised discourses that contradicted their professed
favourable attitudes. The ways in which participants regulated both Others and their own behaviours confirms space as a site where struggles over national belonging take place (K. Anderson, 2000). Spatial restrictions signify nationalist and racialised discourses but in settler societies they also confirm settler sovereignty (Bell, 2010). While similar to discourses of exclusion or assimilation in non-settler states, in settler states claiming space and making themselves at home is an important element of reaffirming settler sovereignty. In order to highlight these internal contradictions, I deliberately return to some of those participants whose endorsements of ethnic diversity I analysed above.

**Regulating the Other**

The first example illustrating the contradictions between valuing and regulating difference is a participant’s concern about the presence of migrants in prominent places, such as Queen Street, the high street of the Auckland city centre. The participant is Paula, whom I just cited as embracing ethnic diversity and expecting a natural process of mixing and integration:

> I don’t like things like, you know, the way Queen Street is nowadays. Queen Street’s just kind of all the shops are like for the student market. It’s full of internet cafes and, you know, little shops and that seems a bit strange in Queen Street which should be very New Zealand oriented which always comes back to thinking you know ‘people like me’, Pākehā New Zealanders. It’s funny that it’s Asian dominated. I mean I don’t mind the Asian domination of Northcote[44], shopping centre and little Asia here and there but it seems like the main stretch should be more- reflect New Zealand culture as it used to be. So that’s just an older, older idea. That’s not today, is it? Not today at all.

Paula’s stance backs Hage’s (2000) argument that anti-immigrant sentiments are an expression of nationalism rather than racism. Immigrants are not a problem per se but their presence – in particular, their numbers, location, and behaviour – needs to be controlled. Rather than inferior, some people are seen as undesirable or unfitting with a particular image of the nation. In such nationalist discourses white settlers assume a position of entitlement over ‘their’ nation. Paula clearly acts as a “national-spatial manager” (Hage, 2000: 42) who tolerates a stronger concentration of Asian retailers in peripheral suburban areas but not in Auckland’s city centre in an effort to protect what is perceived as “a privileged relationship between my race, ethnicity and so on, and a territory” (Hage, 2000: 32). As Hage (2000: 38) has pointed out, “even when people

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[44] Northcote is a suburb on Auckland’s North Shore and the site of one of Auckland’s larger ‘ethnic precincts’ featuring mainly Chinese and Korean retail and cuisines (Cain, Meares, Spoonley, & Peace, 2011).
are speaking about specific localities, they often end up articulating these to the space of the nation.” For Paula, Queen Street clearly represents the nation and ‘Asians’ are not (yet) part of the national imaginary.

While Paula’s realisation that immigration is changing the nation, and that the Aotearoa/New Zealand she has in mind no longer exists hints at the possibility of a new national imaginary, the explicit conflation of New Zealander and “people like me,” that is Pākehā New Zealanders, serves to exclude Others from governmental belonging. In settler societies, this practice also buttresses white settler dominance. In the previous chapter, I demonstrated that many participants were well aware of the unsound basis of Pākehā normativity but this was not reflected in discourses about immigration. Bell (2010) analysed Pākehā discourses of hospitality towards immigrants and found a similar naturalised claim to the nation. She notes that “the embrace of migrants within the national family is itself not a straightforward indication of the willingness to share the position of the sovereign national subject” (Bell, 2010: 248). Her participants exercised a ‘conditional’ form of hospitality, welcoming immigrants but also imposing certain behavioural standards upon them. They viewed immigration as a reciprocal agreement according to which immigrants must contribute to society in return for the opportunity to live here. In unreflectively claiming this managerial position, Pākehā disregard their own questionable belonging. Bell (2010: 251) thus argues that “the act of the national welcome to new migrants is certainly an exercise in Pākehā power.”

A little later in the interview I asked Paula to reflect further on the meaning of New Zealand in her vision of Queen Street:

Jessica: You said Queen Street is so Asian now and is not representing New Zealand. What would it look like if it did represent New Zealand?

Paula: Um (p) it’s a hard question, isn’t it? Because I’m thinking Ponsonby Road that doesn’t really represent New Zealand but it’s a nice road to shop in, Newmarket is not particularly nice but very popular to shop in, isn’t it? Um, (p) I think it’s a bit tacky, I’d like to see Queen Street to be more classy, I’d like to see a bit you know good qual- there are some good quality shops but I’d like to see more good quality shops, galleries, I’d like it to be classy, I’d like it to be Polynesian in terms of art and- well it does have a nice Māori statue at the bottom and I do like the Nikau palms they’ve planted all the way up but- I’d like it more like that? I’d like New Zealand vegetation, New Zealand art, not so much tacky


stuff and not so much food halls and Asian noodle stalls and internet cafes and-. More diversity. Diversity for different age groups, different you know-

Jessica: Yeah. I mean it very much caters to the international student population.

Paula: It does yeah. It’s not somewhere for tourists to go and see New Zealand and that bothers me that sometimes they come here and sometimes they go up Queen Street and must think ‘I wonder where I’ve landed.’ But maybe other big cities have the same- no they don’t, their main streets are more classy than Queen Street [laughs].

The notion that tourists visiting Queen Street get the wrong impression suggests that, even though people accept the ethno-cultural diversity as a demographic reality of Auckland, it has not yet become part of the national imaginary. Paula’s vision of the nation – as embodied in Queen Street – revolves less around nostalgia for a homogenous white New Zealand than around a mix of ethnicity, class, and age, confirming Anderson’s (2000: 387) argument that “issues of space and place making are never neatly reducible to racialized positioning and subjectivities alone. Multiple axes of identity converge and conflict.” In Paula’s mental picture, where consumption takes centre stage, Pākehāness signifies sophistication, whereas Asians stand for tackiness. While she articulates a desire for Queen Street to be more Polynesian, this element is merely a decorative add-on. At a later point in the interview it became even clearer that Paula has a very specifically middle class idea of acceptable Polynesian influences. There, Paula told me about a recent visit to Otara, a South Auckland suburb with a large Polynesian population and a high degree of socio-economic deprivation. In her story, Paula complained about the ‘ghastliness’ of Otara and that “there are no shops like we think of.” Class and ethnicity mesh in these attempts to control public space.

Concern over the use of Asian languages in prominent urban spaces was a nuance within this theme. Karen, who earlier presented herself as a “global citizen” and “multifaceted person” thanks to her daily interactions with people from other cultures, also expressed her discomfort with non-English shop signage:

Karen: You walk down Queen Street, you walk just about everywhere and you’ll see signs in different languages, so I feel myself- I get racist. You- [sighs] I think it’s the fear of the change because the influences of people coming in do change society [edit].

Jessica: So what’s your worry in, you know, how it’s going to change society?
Karen: (p) I don’t know. I just see it as cultures coming in and not- I don’t know, assimilation is not the right w-. I don’t expect people to change to a Kiwi culture because I don’t think there is one Kiwi culture. [edit] It just looks like that they’re coming in and not taking part of, and especially if the sign is completely in the first language and not English. There’s no English around. If it was half half, equal half, not big Korean, Japanese, Chinese whatever, small English because it’s also marketing only to a select group which is- that’s isolating. And maybe it’s not a service I need or want or require but you shouldn’t isolate, you should be inclusive but there’s all this dilemma in my head of ‘Am I being racist?’

In 2012, the issue of “Kiwi” discomfort with increasing “ethnic” shop signage discussed by Karen received some media publicity (Tan, 2012b). This followed research by Peace and Goodwin (2010) into the visual landscape of Chinese shopping precincts in Auckland. While the researchers focused on the positive contributions of native language shop signage for both immigrant communities and the non-immigrant population, the New Zealand Herald (Tan, 2012b) highlighted the aspect of unease with foreign language signage. The automatic conflation of ‘Kiwi’ with what we can safely assume to be largely Pākehā and ‘ethnic’ with ‘Asian/Chinese’ are further attempts to defend white settler privilege and status as the national people.

This excerpt also shows that the responsibility to learn about other cultures that Karen highlighted earlier is also expected of immigrants. While she frames her expectations in terms of participation, rather than assimilation, using their first language ‘excessively’ is seen as non-participation. It suggests that ethnic difference is a private matter or one only displayed on sanctioned occasions. Spoonley et al (2007: 18) found that there was no consensus on whether “New Zealanders should all be part of one common culture,” with 38.1 percent of respondents agreeing, and 39.5 percent disagreeing. Recent attitudinal research (Colmar Brunton, 2013: 64) found that one in three respondents agreed that “Asian people do not mix well with New Zealanders,” and two in three thought that “Asian people could do more to learn about New Zealand’s culture.” Such findings are congruent with Australian research which found that even those respondents who accepted ethnic diversity as beneficial and felt secure amongst people from other ethnic groups simultaneously felt that the country is weakened if people stick to their cultures (Forrest & Dunn, 2010). These inconsistencies, the authors argue, are the result of contradictory public discourses about the value of ethnic diversity and about national homogeneity, shifting between cultural pluralism and assimilation. This dilemma is clearly evident in Karen’s reflection on the racist undertones of her expectations for immigrants to integrate into a Kiwi culture she is unable to define.
While the excerpts presented so far primarily demonstrate the role of geographic space, they also hint at the significance of numbers. While individual migrants are welcome and ethnic diversity is often seen as enriching, larger numbers of visible migrants foster fears of being overtaken or excluded. These findings mirror those of a recent qualitative study on social cohesion in Auckland (Meares & Gilbertson, 2013). In line with my own findings, the authors note that while their interview and focus group participants generally valued ethno-cultural diversity in their neighbourhoods, many feared “cultural domination” and criticised migrants for not integrating well enough (Meares & Gilbertson, 2013: 61). As in Hage’s (2000) work, the presence of larger numbers of immigrants are associated with changing neighbourhoods, and ‘unrecognisable’ streetscapes, threatening the majority’s sense of the nation as ‘their’ home. In this study, this was expressed most succinctly by Robert (50s):

There’s too many immigrants, you know what I mean, but mostly they are in Auckland so that doesn’t really matter because if you don’t like it, there’s plenty of room, you can go south you know or whatever, so it doesn’t matter but I mean for example my daughter grew up mostly in Australia, right and I brought her back here four years ago and she was seven then and we were in Queen Street, Auckland City and we were in MacDonald’s waiting to get a burger and she said to me she said, ‘dad, dad, we’re in the wrong place’ right, and I said ‘what do you mean?’, and she said ‘this place is for Chinese people’ right, you have to be Chinese to be here because every single person in there was Asian and she thought- this is coming from Australia, she’s only been here a couple of weeks, she thought we were in the wrong, she thought we were in the wrong MacDonald’s. She thought we were in an Asian one, yeah, she thought you had to be Chinese or whatever to get in there because there was no other white people in the restaurant, in the MacDonald’s at that time.

While Robert thus reiterates feelings of frustration with ‘too much otherness’, his statement “if you don’t like it, there’s plenty of room” indicates the option of avoiding difference and escaping to more comfortable and familiar spaces. Indeed, such practices of actively evading sustained contact were frequently mentioned in this study and will be discussed below as examples of ‘regulating the self’.

**Regulating the Self**

In this section I will map strategies of spatial management that pertain to controlling the movement of the majority. I want to return to Paula, who has so far endorsed the prospect of a multicultural future but also pointed to her particular discomfort with the large presence of
‘Asians’ in Auckland’s centre (Queen Street) versus its periphery (Northcote). Later on, however, this latter aspect was complicated by the following story:

I know that having Asians around has been hard on some of my friends. I’ve got two friends who live out in Northcote way and the units and flats around them gradually sold to Asians and that made my friends feel a bit lonely because they didn’t- they can’t relate terribly well to these Asian neighbours. They’re just not on the same wavelength. [edit ]

They found that the Asian neighbours are not house proud like Kiwis, so they don’t do their houses and gardens to be pretty, you know, they don’t care about stuff like that and so the gardens would all get run down and all the big privet trees would grow and nothing was tended so that kind of didn’t look so nice. So, it’s just a different culture, they don’t care about stuff like that, at least the Chinese, they live more indoorsy and they’re not bothered about spending money on houses. They’re more bothered about their businesses and their children, education. Yeah, so the area’s kind of changed too much for my friends so they both moved.

Such accounts of white flight emerged in a number of participants’ life stories. Forrest and Dunn (2010: 85) have argued that “residential patterns often speak to a desire for homogeneity” even when diversity is generally accepted and consumed in other spaces. While ethnic minorities are often seen to contribute positively to the mix of a neighbourhood, usually through service industries, they are also perceived to devalue it. In Paula’s story, Asian people are seen to physically degrade the environment. Her example centres on a lack of appreciation amongst Asian migrants for the ‘Kiwi quarter acre dream’ of domesticated nature. This Pākehā value – which has been problematised as inherently colonial (Awatere, 1984) – becomes the benchmark of integration. This difference in values prevents her friends from forming intimate connections. While these divergent values are not explicitly marked as superior or inferior, the Asian neighbours’ failure to adapt to Pākehā values makes them undesirable neighbours. Implicit in this story is a sense of Pākehā victimhood: robbed of opportunities for friendships with likeminded neighbours and socially and economically threatened by the perceived physical degradation of the environment, white flight is presented as a rational choice in the search for a more compatible environment.

45 It is unclear whether these neighbours are first generation immigrants or New Zealand born.
Inherent difference that presents a threat to Pākehā is also at the core of the next story. Here, Andrew, who grew up in a South Auckland suburb with a large Polynesian community, recalls his decision to change schools due to experiences of bullying and ‘reverse racism’:

In secondary school I went to [school 1] which I went there from form one to end of form three [edit] and that was 80 percent Samoan, ten percent Māori, ten percent whatever [laughs] and like that was one of the few times that I’ve experienced reverse racism. I was in a class with thirty-five people and there was myself and one other white person in there and, yeah, it was pretty toxic like. The school had a really good community spirit like a-always does well on the Polyfest and rugby and all those things because they had such a large Pacific Island base but academia and stuff like that it sucks and I wasn’t doing so well with all the bullying and stuff so I got- I went to [school 2] which I thought was an oasis being 60 percent white.

Central to Andrew’s story is a racialised discourse of innate differences in values and abilities. Many participants who recalled a multicultural schooling gave examples that perpetuate a negative image of the Other, including deviant behaviour (graffiti, brawls, and teenage pregnancies), underachievement, and a related lack of academic rigour in these schools. These perceptions, in particular the latter aspect, also informed parents’ schooling choices. Claire, for example, who loves the diversity of Ponsonby told me that she and her husband had decided against sending their children to a local school in which “40 or 60 percent or something had English as a second language” because her husband was concerned that “the quality of the education won’t be as good or that they’ll be surrounded by people who don’t speak as good English. He just thinks it would affect their- I presume he thinks it would affect their education.” Claire’s narrative echoes Andrew’s experience of the lower academic standard of schools that cater to large numbers of people from non-Pākehā ethnicities. English as a second language becomes a marker of inferiority and a liability rather than a marker of an ability to learn several languages. In such stories, participants drew on commonly available racialised and classed discourses that portray academic achievement and aspirations as the domain of Pākehā, and, following the model minority paradigm, ‘Asians’. As with Paula’s story, inassimilable difference here presents a threat to Pākehā success and well-being.

Without discrediting Andrew’s experience of being bullied, as described in the quote above, the ethnic connotations that imply that there is no bullying at white schools are revealing. Without

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46 Polyfest is an annual competition featuring Polynesian dance performances.
being prompted, Andrew later on justified his image of a “white oasis” by claiming that “it is easier being amongst your own kind.” Like many other participants, Andrew deployed a ‘birds of a feather’ argument which naturalises white flight. This theme was furthered when he discussed where to live. My question as to whether he still sometimes visited his childhood neighbourhood in South Auckland prompted him to think about where he wanted to live. He told me that he was “loyal” to the suburb he grew up in, in so far as he shopped on the local high street when visiting family but that he would not want to live there. While he initially stressed the distance to central Auckland and commuting time as an issue, he quickly moved on to the subject of ethnicity:

Andrew: I don’t know if I could live—when it comes time for me to own a house—South Auckland? I don’t really know if I could really live there. I’ve got some kind of phobias about it a little bit like I don’t know, just through [name of his first high school] and stuff like that quite a lot of racism that I’m just a little bit loath to go there now. Like, I don’t know.

Jessica: So, the reverse racism you were talking about?

Andrew: Yeah, yeah I said I was bullied quite badly and it’s— it is childish, I won’t lie, but at the same time it’s my life, I can choose where I want to live. [laughs] […] And I don’t know, like just Indian and Asian people—maybe it’s because of their business mindset? Because like there’s so many of them at [department at university] um (p) yeah I get along with them fine. This is just so stereotypical but, yeah, maybe it’s even just the verboseness of Pacific Islanders that I struggle with because I’m a little bit more reserved. I don’t know. But yeah, when it comes down to buying a house I don’t know whether I’m [inaudible] South Auckland.

In Andrew’s deliberations about where to buy a house, space becomes enmeshed with racialised hierarchies. The contrasts he constructs between easy to get along with Indian and Asian people on the one hand, and Pasifika peoples on the other is reminiscent of attitudinal research suggesting the existence of significant differences in perceptions of different ethnic groups. Ward and Masgoret’s (2008: 235) research showed that survey respondents had clear preferences for immigrants from Australia, Great Britain, and South Africa over immigrants from India, China, Samoa, or Somalia, indicating a distinct preference for whiteness. Spoonley et al.’s (2007) research produced identical findings. For instance, while many respondents felt there were too

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47 In Andrew’s narrative home ownership, which remains a core Pākehā value, is taken for granted.
many immigrants from the Pacific (54%), China (49.7%) and other Asian countries (49.8%), they felt that the numbers of British, other European, or South African migrants were about right (Spoonley, et al., 2007: 20). This survey also provided more details, showing that Pasifika Peoples were perceived least favourably on a number of counts. While, for instance, only 12 percent of respondents agreed that Pacific migrants contribute to the economy (compared to 55% for British migrants), 70 percent agreed that they increased the crime rate (Spoonley, et al., 2007: 17).

So far, I have discussed participants as ‘conflicted cosmopolitans’, whose regularly avowed cosmopolitan dispositions stood in contrast to a variety of discursive and material practices that demonstrated participants’ investment in settler whiteness. In Aotearoa/New Zealand, positioning Pākehā as the national people vis-à-vis exogenous Others also serves the settler project. While the conditionality of the national welcome follows similar patterns in settler and non-settler societies, we need to consider the specificity of this context. Veracini (2010b: 34) has argued that “the sustained presence of exogenous Others confirms the indigenisation of the settler collective.” This will become more pronounced in the following section in which I demonstrate how participants used the presence of immigrants and ethnic minorities to erase indigeneity and to escape settlerness.

**Strategic Cosmopolitans**

Despite their ambivalent feelings towards immigrants as shown in the first part of this chapter, participants frequently upheld immigrants as positive role models for Māori and diversity as a strategy to become a more harmonious society. As I will show in this part of the chapter, positive discourses about ethnic diversity and immigrants play a strategic role in “heal[ing] the ambivalent condition of the settler subject” (J. Smith, 2007: 70). Multiculturalism is seen as a chance to escape settlerness and the responsibilities of reconciliation through dismissing biculturalism and indigenous rights discourses and to legitimise Pākehā belonging alongside that of other immigrants. Based on these findings, I argue that endorsing multiculturalism and rejecting Indigenous rights claims are flipsides of the same coin of Pākehā control.

I will discuss three overlapping strategies that emerged in participants’ narratives: 1) the dismissal of biculturalism as exclusionary, isolationist, and backward; 2) the comparisons drawn between migrants and Māori that posit the former as the benchmark against which to measure the latter, and 3) the levelling of differences between settlers and migrants as part of the attempt to
indigenise the settler. All three themes contain various forms of “transfers” of indigeneity (Veracini, 2010b: 35-50).

**The Death of Biculturalism**

In Chapter Two, I explained that Aotearoa/New Zealand adopted a bicultural model in response to indigenous political pressure. As time passes and decolonisation is portrayed as accomplished, “the politics of isms” (Fleras, 1998) become more pronounced. In the 1990s, Brooking and Rabel (1995: 49) argued that “the debate about the meaning of New Zealand national identity […] has been dramatized, above all, by the choice between bicultural and multicultural visions of nationhood.” Jo Smith (2007) argues that this choice is often portrayed as a tension between the demands of the past and the demands of the future. What she means is illustrated in this statement from the Cabinet Policy Committee from 2006 (cited in Spoonley & Bedford, 2012: 274):

> New Zealand continues to face challenges in reconciling its past and adjusting to the increasing diversity of the present to ensure a strong and vibrant society. While New Zealand has had some success in maintaining social cohesion […] New Zealanders cannot be complacent about the future.

This discourse found expression in participants’ understanding of biculturalism as outdated and multiculturalism as progressive. As I have shown in the previous chapter, participants felt that the past has been sufficiently if not excessively addressed. Furthermore, many participants, such as Helen below, readily dismissed biculturalism in favour of multiculturalism:

> I think it’s ridiculous to consider New Zealand to be bicultural. It isn’t. It hasn’t been for quite a long time. It’s multicultural and it needs, probably needs to continue in that direction because I can’t see how we can survive as a bicultural society. I don’t see how we can divorce ourselves from the rest of the world.

Helen’s argument is grounded in a temporal colonial logic (see Chapter Three). She clearly places biculturalism in the past and insists that multiculturalism is vital for the future – and the survival – of the nation. Her insistence on joining other states in adopting multiculturalism is, I argue, indicative of what Kymlicka (2007: 3) refers to as “the internationalisation of multiculturalism” and discourses of celebrating diversity. Helen’s concern about being different neglects the specific socio-historic circumstances of Aotearoa/New Zealand and cloaks the variety of “multiculturalisms” (Pearson, 2000: 96) which are “extensions of the particular historical trajectories of
state and nation building and rebuilding that settler and post-settler societies have experienced” (Pearson, 2000: 97). Kymlicka (1995) has most prominently critiqued multiculturalism for its inability to address the rights of indigenous peoples because its preoccupation with recognising individual rights cannot accommodate the recognition of collective indigenous rights. Furthermore, cultural pluralism is always subsumed under the purview of the nation state leaving no room for aspirations to sovereignty. As such, rejecting biculturalism as outdated and isolationist can be interpreted as an attempt to dismiss the significance of settler colonial history and deny the continued existence of settler colonialism. It extends the theme of a vision of biculturalism as finite and the anticipation of a post-settlement era that is also a post-Treaty utopia. Veracini (2010b: 42) describes this as a narrative transfer which aims to make indigenous difference and the idea of settler-indigenous relations irrelevant by claiming to be postcolonial.

A straightforward chronological progression from bi- to multiculturalism was a frequent theme amongst participants. To be fair, most commonly this vision was based on limited definitions of both concepts purely as demographic fact rather than political and legislative framework. Participants rarely spoke about biculturalism in political terms or as a defining feature of national identity (as opposed to Māori cultural markers). Neither was biculturalism understood as part of decolonisation (other than the cultural mainstreaming and development of post-colonial subjectivities discussed at length in the previous chapter). When asked how they defined biculturalism, many participants offered answers such as “it’s just two cultures living in the same space” (Amy, 20s), or alternatively, answers that mirrored the culturalisation of biculturalism discussed in the previous chapter such as that “[the state] sort of recognises the importance of Māori culture and nurtures it in terms of learning it at school and on TV and in everyday things” (Sean, 40s). Participants did not understand bi- and multiculturalism as normative, political concepts that address different needs and are thus potentially antagonistic. It could be argued that this focus on population demographics rather than politics allows participants to dismiss biculturalism as outdated and accuse it of being exclusionary. Sean, for example, stated:

Nowadays there are so many cultures in New Zealand I don’t know if this term [biculturalism] is still used much. Because you’ve got so many Chinese, Samoan people, just to talk about biculturalism seems to isolate, seems to just focus on European and Māori.

The idea that biculturalism excludes immigrants frequently occurred in participant narratives about workplace experiences, especially of those in health and education professions. A prominent idea was that we must acquire intercultural competence to be able to interact with
people from other cultural backgrounds. Lisa, whose training as a nurse required her to take part in decolonisation workshops, stated:

When I was training to be a nurse, we talked a lot about biculturalism. I didn’t like the term because I’m a New Zealander and New Zealand is a multicultural, multi-ethnic society which is not just New Zealanders of European descent [...] and Māori. But it’s Asian and we are quite a monopoly [sic] of different mixes of backgrounds. In fact there are more Asians in New Zealand than there are Māoris [sic] or Pacific Islanders anyway.

Despite attending decolonisation courses, Lisa fails, or refuses, to acknowledge the political dimensions of biculturalism. The phrase ‘I’m a New Zealander’ strongly evokes the ‘one people’ narrative and its rejection of ‘special treatment,’ a Pākehā narrative that originated in Prime Minister Robert Muldoon’s rejection of Norman Kirk’s decolonisation attempts in the mid-1970s and which has been repeatedly revived over the past decades. In the early 1990s, Māori scholar and activist Walker (1995: 292) boldly claimed that the changes in immigration policy in 1987 were the result of a covert government strategy to undermine the Māori struggle for sovereignty. Immigration, Walker claimed, would turn Māori into one ethnic group amongst many, and bring in people who have no commitment to the Treaty of Waitangi. While there is no evidence that supports Walker’s (1995: 292) ‘deliberate strategy’ claim, participants’ narratives demonstrate that the presence of diverse Others is being used to undermine Māori demands for indigenous rights.

In this study, participants often argued that the presence of a variety of ethnic Others required cultural competency. Policies focusing on Māori were not only regarded as exclusionary but also as unhelpful ‘on the ground’ where Pākehā have to be able to interact with people from various cultural backgrounds. Claire, for example, recalled that many of her fellow trainee nurses opposed the cultural safety classes that were a mandatory part of the nursing curriculum because “people wanted some kind of practical help in terms of interacting with different cultures and people got frustrated that it was only about Māori culture and not about other cultures.” This confirms Jo Smith’s (2007: 69) observation that tending to ethnic diversity is usually presented as “a pragmatic response to global flows of labour, people and resources” and as preparing for future demands. Cultural safety training was concerned with overcoming the effects of colonisation and respecting the Treaty relationship (Ramsden & Spoonley, 1994). One of the main problems cultural safety education faced was being misunderstood as a form of intercultural competency training. This culturalisation makes it easier to dismiss the special status of tangata whenua.
A common theme in dismissing biculturalism was that participants experienced multiculturalism as more tangible. While all participants, no matter which suburb they resided in, spoke about interactions with people of migrant background, some, such as Andrew below, noted a relative invisibility of Māori: 48

On a regional city wide level it doesn’t really, biculturalism doesn’t have any impact I would say like and uh (p) like (p) I don’t know (p) there’s nothing- there was Matariki49 recently but I wouldn’t really see or do anything much for that. I went to Diwali50 when that was on, that was awesome and I went to the Lantern Festival51 as well, and that was awesome, though it was packed, but yeah like Māori culture, you see it but it doesn’t really impact on a daily level. Other cultures, yeah, you know, you interact with them. Maybe it’s just the place I am at in life. That and living where I’m living, so-

While I have shown in the previous chapter that Māori cultural elements are clearly integral to national identity, in daily life participants interact much more frequently with people from other cultural backgrounds, mainly through consumption and entertainment (food, shops, and festivals). Auckland is exceptional with regards to ethnic diversity but Māori are slightly under-represented compared to the national average (11% and 14% respectively) and not very prevalent in the suburbs that were included in my research.52

As the following excerpt shows, some participants believed that ethnic diversity is indeed also beneficial for Māori. Amanda said:

I think all of that change of different cultures coming in actually also brings in the fact that the Māori culture is huge and hugely important [...] Just the fact that there is a Matariki celebration now is amazing. It’s fantastic that we are actually, we’re not just going okay there’s the Chinese New Year but there’s actually our New Year. So I think that huge migration has actually been a really, really beneficial thing for Pākehā and Māori in that it’s actually allowed our cultures to become stronger as well. For people to actually be more curious and engage more and just be more involved. Know a bit more about what is happening. You know things like Māori arts. I think it is hard for Māori identity to stay at a

48 I will return to this theme in the following section because it played a significant role in participants’ differential perceptions of migrant and Māori behaviour.
49 Māori New Year.
50 Diwali is the Hindu Festival of Light. Originally a neighbourhood festival celebrated in local communities, the Diwali: Festival of Lights is now a major event taking place annually at Aotea Square in Auckland’s city centre.
51 Chinese New Year’s celebration held annually since the year 2000 in Auckland’s Albert Park.
52 See Chapter Four for the ethnic composition of the four suburbs participants were recruited from.
high level because it’s, to me it’s competing with all those other cultures that are here as well. And I kind of think about, you know, we talk about New Zealand, is it bicultural or is it multicultural, and to me it’s multicultural, but there’s a rider on that, that the Māori culture is really, really important for us and how do we make sure that that is equally important.

This rhetoric rests entirely on a culturalist perspective that highlights the ‘enriching’ effect of diversity. The global rhetoric of celebrating diversity not only promotes engagement with other cultural expressions but heightens the value of ‘culture’ more broadly allowing Māori and Pākehā cultures to become “stronger.” Amanda highlights the possibility of competition but does not differentiate between indigenous rights and the rights of other ethnic minority groups. This amounts to what Veracini (2010b: 43) describes as a “multicultural transfer” through which indigenous peoples become one ethnic group amongst many and indigenous and ethnic minority rights are collapsed. While this type of transfer does apply much less to the New Zealand political context than in other settler societies, participants in this study clearly desired such a transfer. This is also evident in the following section which explores discursive strategies of erasing the difference between Māori and migrants.

**Conflating Māori and Migrants**

In this study, ethnic diversity played a crucial part in participants’ efforts to escape settlerness, an identity that entails complicated ontological insecurities and responsibilities (J. Smith, 2007; Tuck & Yang, 2012). As I will demonstrate here, the presence of migrants – of people outside the settler-indigenous dichotomy – is seen to hold the promise of freedom from obligations and white colonial guilt, and of fairness and racial harmony.

A sense of freedom from obligations was central to participant discourses about immigrants, and, crucially, this was constructed as reciprocal. A presumed lack of expectations on the part of immigrants acted as a discursive device for subduing Māori demands and minimising Pākehā responsibility for colonial injustices. My analysis of participants’ narratives revealed an often automatic merging of talk about migrants and talk about Pākehā-Māori relations. Interviewees regularly compared migrants and ethnic minorities with Māori as the extract below shows. Here Tom (50s) replied to my question about whether he thinks growing ethnic diversity changes what it means to be a New Zealander:
Tom: Well, there doesn’t appear to be any pressure on me to learn another language and they seem happy to learn English so as far as the change, you’ve just got to take things a bit easy I think, because you talk to- I’d be interested to know what the Chinese think about this thing about Waitangi, they must think we’re crazy.

Jessica: Why is that?

Tom: Well, they come in here and they’re very industrious and the next thing they’ve opened a business. The roast shop down the road or the Chinese takeaways or the um-there’s no Māoris [sic] doing those things. The Chinese walk in there and they don’t expect anything. They don’t want welfare, they don’t want compensation, they’re not complaining, they’re never in the news complaining about the Pākehā and the bad treatment they get and the victimisation, all this bullshit, they just do it. So as far as multiculturalism- everywhere I go I’ve got to deal, you know, I buy tyres from an Indian and if I go to the bank I’m dealing with an Asian. Gone are the days they’re all English settlers. That was the 1960s. So it’s just, you know, if you want to deal with anybody, you’ve got to deal with some of the other, presumably they’re a different culture and you can’t quite assume that they think-well a lot of them appear to be very industrious, very determined to make a dollar, yeah, and keen to get employment. They’re not sort of waiting around, waiting for somebody to give them an opportunity. They’re making it happen.

Central to Tom’s account is what he perceives to be behavioural differences between immigrants and Māori. By portraying the former as proactive, resourceful, and uncomplaining, and the latter as demanding, belligerent, and imbued with a false sense of entitlement, he constructs settler-migrant relations as more harmonious and free from obligations. This relies on a conceptualisation of multiculturalism in individualistic terms, a finding that is congruent with Brett and Moran’s (2011: 196) observation that amongst their Australian focus group participants multiculturalism “was not immediately associated with the rights of groups, with arguments about cultural relativism or rights to cultural maintenance, or even with government policy.”

This perceived lack of demands for collective rights becomes the benchmark against which Māori are measured. This view collapses crucial differences between settler-indigenous and settler-migrant relations. By ignoring that colonial grievances and indigenous rights discourses are not an issue for immigrants, Tom dismisses Māori complaints as ‘bullshit’. On this basis, Tom attempts to recruit migrant support for the idea that the politics of reconciliation are ‘crazy.’ The validity of
indigenous rights struggles is also belittled by conflating reparations for colonial injustices with state support based on citizenship rights. In Tom’s narrative, compensation for Treaty breaches settled through the Waitangi Tribunal and welfare benefits are used in the same breath to underscore the extent of the burden Māori ostensibly put on the state and on Pākehā. This discursive conflation demeans legitimate Māori political claims by reducing them to ‘asking for hand-outs’ which, drawing on a widely available discourse of a culture of dependency, is construed to be the result of laziness. Tom’s argument is a good example of transferring indigeneity by redefining Māori as a minority that has and causes problems, such as welfare dependency (Veracini, 2010b: 45). As Māori are problematised as people with needs rather than rights, “indigenous rights become settler generosity, [and] indigenous sovereign capabilities are transferred away” (Veracini, 2010b: 46).

To some degree, such unfavourable comparisons between migrants and Māori are cast as an effect of a perceived invisibility of Māori that is contrasted with an almost hyper-visibility of non-white migrants as already indicated by Andrew’s comparison of ethnic and Māori festivals in the previous section. Tom’s account of the everydayness of dealing with people from various ethnic backgrounds is thus juxtaposed with an apparent absence of Māori in his life, a theme he repeated at various points during the interview, speaking in turn about his neighbourhood, a former school, and the church at which he volunteers. Invisibility (here expressed in the phrase “there’s no Māoris [sic] doing these things”) forms the basis of the argument that Māori lack initiative and prefer to rely on government support. There are several possible explanations for this perceived invisibility: residential segregation which means Māori are more concentrated in areas which Pākehā avoid; labour market divisions which means Māori are more prominent in particular labour market segments; and a racialised image of what Māori look like.

In the following extract, Dorothy, a retiree in her 70s, furthers Tom’s theme of transferring indigenous rights to the domain of welfare. Just like Tom, Dorothy also employs a comparison with ethnic minorities, in this case the next door neighbours’ Pasifika children, to strengthen her argument:

We should be all one, we should be all one. There’s too much of that [separatism]. We never got that in the early days. There’s too much of that. They [Māori] want everything on a plate. Do we as Europeans get it all on a plate? No, we don’t. We have to work for what we get. (p) We’ve got an Island family that live next door here, number […]. Those kids are out there weeding the garden. They go for a run the young girls and that and I think that’s
good, that’s good, get them into doing things. We didn’t know what it was like to go to the pictures or anything like that when we were kids. No, I think get them interested, get them doing things, get them into sports, get them into music and things like that, after school things, but none of that happens unfortunately, none of that happens.

Following on from a discussion about Pākehā-Māori relations during which Dorothy grew increasingly agitated, she quickly turned from the threat of Māori privilege and separatism to socialisation and values. Drawing on a widespread neo-conservative discourse that blames welfare recipients for bad lifestyle choices, indigenous political claims are once again conflated with social benefits and discussed as a matter of parents socialising their children into a mentality of entitlement and dependency.

A related discursive strategy of eliminating indigeneity was to assert that the growing number of migrants will put an end to the politics of reconciliation. Helen’s speculation on the future of the politics of redress illustrates this well:

Switched on political Māori are also aware of the fact that they’re going to lose their bargaining power very soon. The Asian population just reaching the numbers that it does and starting to enter politics, I mean they’re only just starting to enter politics, but immediately they do. They are not going to have the same tolerance for Māori and Māori issues as do the post-colonial Anglo-Saxons who have a guilt. Asians don’t feel like that. ‘We came here with nothing. Nobody gave us any sort of tolerance or concessions or anything like that, get over it.’ They won’t say it like that because it would be too rude but they’ll just get on with it and take over.

Helen inadvertently characterises the settler-indigenous relation as adversarial, and processes of reconciliation as a form of bargaining that presuppose Pākehā guilt. In this scenario, Māori ‘get a good deal’ with Pākehā because the presence of migrants is understood to dilute questions of intergenerational accountability for the colonial past, and to curtail the politics of reconciliation. Helen also anticipates a shift in power relations. In this scenario, once migrants ‘take over’, Pākehā will be no longer in control of the politics of redress and will be unable to ensure that the demands of indigenous people are met. Here, Pākehā are seen as the guarantors of adequate redress. Ultimately then, multiculturalism provides an exit strategy from settler responsibility.

To some extent, Helen’s statement supports Walker’s (1995) concern that immigrants have no commitment to the Treaty of Waitangi. It may also explain why Māori are consistently more
opposed to immigration than non-Māori (Grbic, 2010; Spoonley, et al., 2007). In a survey on attitudes towards ethnic diversity, 55.7 percent of Māori respondents agreed that “Maori interests will be overwhelmed as New Zealand becomes more multicultural,” compared with only 26.1 percent of non-Māori respondents (Gendall, et al., 2007: 31) This discrepancy is interesting but the meaning of the much lower proportion of non-Māori agreeing is ambiguous. Does it suggest that respondents think Māori interests will still be placed at the forefront, or does it suggest that Māori interests should rightly be subsumed under ethnic interests more broadly and thus there is no reason to be concerned? The discursive strategies of dismissing biculturalism and eliminating indigeneity discussed so far suggest that multicultural transfer is regarded as an attractive option.

Within this paradigm of exiting settlerness and settler-indigenous relations, racial hybridity was advanced as a natural solution. The following passage from an interview with Gene and Deborah, a retired couple from Devonport, epitomises a common desire for racial harmony:

Gene: Although the combination down in Wellington now is not so much Pākehā driven as you’d put it because the National government did the right thing. It let the Māori Party exist and continue to exist by including it into its government make-up, as long as they don’t try and turn the tables on us like we did to them because if they do, the backlash will be bloody awful.

Deborah: Well I think that question, if I might say so, might be totally irrelevant in however many years. Now if you go to Hawaii, they’ve turned out to be a race of beautiful looking people with lovely skin, olive skin and Asian eyes and just beautiful looking people because they’ve melded in but they’ve had a hundred and something years to do that. And time is maybe not on our side. So everybody has a Portuguese grandmother or you know Chinese aunties and things like that so everybody is a jumble.

Jessica: And you think that’s going to happen here?

Gene: Yeah.

Deborah: Well it might eventually if we give it time. Now the bad thing about that is that you’re losing bits of yourself and your culture I think and you’ve got to work hard at working out what you are. Now, in Hawaii a few years ago we went and stayed there [...] and it was hula week. Now I’ve never been to anything so lovely as to be there in hula
week. Little kids eight or nine, now they were all different mixtures but they could swing their hips, they had double jointed hips, they had everything and they were just beautiful, weren’t they, Gene?

Gene: It was nice, yes.

Deborah: And I sat by the TV, it was a relaxed sort of a thing and it was how people can be, you know. It was just something else, wasn’t it? It was a beautiful occasion.

Gene’s opening comment echoes a ubiquitous Pākehā ambivalence about sharing power with Māori. While he is supportive of the Māori Party being in a government coalition with the National Party, he exhibits concern over potential shifts in power that could threaten Pākehā. Of most interest for the present discussion though is that Gene’s concerns are immediately muted by Deborah’s prediction that racial hybridisation through intermarriage will make current racial politics irrelevant. As a good practice example, Deborah cites Hawai‘i, whose reputation as “an idyllic paradise where everyone lives in peace, fellowship and equality - a sort of multicultural nirvana” (Rohrer, 2008: 1112) is indeed widespread. Of course, Hawai‘i is not free from racial politics. In fact, due to its settler colonial history there are strong parallels with Aotearoa/New Zealand. Hawai‘i has a strong indigenous sovereignty movement partly inspired by Māori and “claims of ‘reverse racism’ [from haole] have increased in the wake of a resurgence in the Hawaiian sovereignty movement” (Rohrer, 2008: 1116). Ignoring these political issues, Deborah presents the cultural spectacle of ‘hula week’ and its showcasing of ‘beautiful mixed children’ as the epitome of the racial harmony she – like many other participants – strives for.

Intermarriage between Pākehā and Māori has featured centrally in colonial narratives of nation-building in Aotearoa/New Zealand. While Rocha (2012: 5) argues that intermarriage was acceptable because it “was seen as a viable method of social and biological assimilation, as well as of appropriation of land,” in popular discourse, it is frequently used to bolster the myth of healthy race relations. Today, reference to historically high rates of intermarriage is used to justify opposition to ‘race-based’ policies by claiming that there are no ‘pure’ or ‘full-blood’ Māori. This claim was central to Brash’s (2004: np) Nationhood speech in which he – similarly to Deborah – conjured up an image of an emerging “distinct South Seas race of New Zealanders – where more and more of us will have a diverse ancestry.”
Gene and Deborah’s narrative illustrates two types of transfer, that of assimilation and that of repressive authenticity, which I have discussed in Chapter Three. This return to a racial discourse of blood quantum is reminiscent of colonial practices of amalgamation and disregard Māori conceptions of identity based on whakapapa. Intermarriage leads to an erasure of difference typical of assimilation. This in turn, confirms the conviction that there are no real Māori and thus no-one to claim indigenous rights. Moran (2009: 797) found similar ways of reasoning in Australia, and argues that his interview participants used such narrow racial definitions of indigeneity in order to justify “limiting [indigenous peoples’] access to land and other Aboriginal rights.”

To summarise, indigenous difference is eliminated on three levels within the theme of ‘conflating Māori and migrants’: firstly, the differences between indigenous people and migrants are conflated and indigenous political demands are transferred to the domain of welfare. Secondly, the presence of immigrants is portrayed as an end to Pākehā ability to control redress. Thirdly, increasing numbers of immigrants will result in a ‘racial mix’ that will make indigenous, settler, and migrant categories superfluous. Intertwined with these conceptualisations of how immigrants affect settler-indigenous relations are narratives that cancel out differences between settlers and migrants. In the following section I will discuss this theme as a further indigenising strategy that allows Pākehā to cement settler belonging.

**Conflating Settlers and Migrants**

Previous academic work has highlighted how Pākehā systematically erase differences between themselves and Māori through indigenising efforts, or mimicry such as I have discussed in the previous chapters. In order to overcome the precariousness of settler belonging, Pākehā appropriate indigenous concepts, and attempt to connect to Māori by gaining knowledge of indigenous language and culture. These practices have been criticised for neutralising tangata whenua status (Turner, 2007).

Concomitantly though, and this is the focus of the current section, migrants are drawn into the question of settler belonging. Multiculturalism, Veracini (2007: 26) argues, “allows for an expanded definition of who can claim belonging to the settler body politic that leaves settler colonial structures unchallenged.” More than that, it devalues and transfers indigeneity. In the context of Aotearoa/New Zealand, this point is illustrated by Mallard’s (2004: np) claim that indigeneity is about the “divers[e …] ways in which we belong and identify with our country.”
Indigeneity becomes available to everyone who resides in the country, ostensibly equalising indigene, settlers, and migrants. Not only is tangata whenua status devalued and colonial occupation downplayed but, in addition, Pākehā instrumentalise the presence of migrants “to naturalize settler relationships to the land as part of a continuing and universal process of becoming indigenous” (J. Smith, 2007: 71) under the guise of multicultural inclusion.

By cloaking questions of settler belonging as concern for the inclusion of migrants, participants promoted multicultural values to extend settler colonialism. The following passage from my interview with Ann illustrates this argument well. In the previous chapter, I discussed Ann’s sense of an extremely precarious belonging. Despite acknowledging the potential complicity of her ancestors in colonisation, she ultimately felt that the current generation of Pākehā was being excessively blamed for the mistakes of their forebears. “How do you live somewhere where there’s an element which doesn’t want you?” was the question that concluded her emotional reflections. A little later, she returned to the topic of belonging, saying:

I think, you know, if it’s as challenging for me to feel that I belong here after five generations and not having anywhere else I can go, how much more challenging must it be if you’re Korean or Indian or Chinese or, you know, I mean the Chinese have been here for as long as the Europeans have. How much more challenging must it be for them where they don’t even have the advantage as it were of having been the dominant colonial culture, or if you’re Italian or any of those other groups that come to New Zealand. How much less legitimate must they feel? I have no idea.

It is important to remember that Ann’s concern for ethnic minority belonging grew out of the theme of indigenous challenges to Pākehā belonging. This implies (even though it is not explicitly stated in this passage) that she holds Māori and biculturalism responsible for the difficulties migrants may face. Her reasoning that it must be even harder for migrants than Pākehā seems forgetful of the fact that settler belonging is questioned precisely because they are ‘settlers’ and thus usurpers of Māori land. The dilemmas of settler belonging are different from questions of migrant belonging. While Māori are concerned that increasing numbers of other ethnic minorities will reduce them to the status of an ethnic minority group in their own country, their main criticism rests with the way Pākehā continue to exert control through legislating immigration without consultation and through assuming the position of ‘host’. For example, Walker (1995) has argued that legislating immigration from non-traditional source countries without consultation of tangata whenua constitutes a violation of the Treaty of Waitangi and, more recently, survey
research (Spoonley, et al., 2007) has shown that 44 percent of Māori respondents agreed that Māori should be consulted about Aotearoa/New Zealand’s immigration policy as a matter of right, compared with only 16 percent of non-Māori respondents. Further, Mikaere (2004) argues that Pākehā are ‘manuhiri’ (guests) in this country, yet they act as ‘hosts’ for new migrants. However, as discussed earlier, Pākehā do not see themselves as guests but as the national people who occupy a position of “governmental belonging” (Hage, 2000: 46).

In positioning only Māori (and biculturalism) as unwelcoming of immigrants, Ann also neglects the various examples of discrimination and exclusion of ethnic Others that was part and parcel of the history of colonisation and nation building. New Zealand history is replete with instances of white nationalist practices, including the early discourses of the ‘yellow peril’ directed at Chinese migrants of the gold rush era and the subsequent introduction of the poll tax as a deterrent for prospective Chinese immigrants (Murphy, 2009), assisted kinship migration for people from the British Isles that amounted to a ‘white New Zealand policy’ and lasted into the 1950s (Ip & Pang, 2005), the dawn raids targeting Pacific Island ‘overstayers’ in the mid-1970s (Anae, 2012), and the most recent waves of anti-Asian sentiments (Simon-Kumar, 2014).

In collapsing differences between these collectives, participants also established what settlers, migrants, and indigenous people have in common: a connection and commitment to the land. Land, which has been at the centre of the settler colonial project, remains critical in re-articulations of settler identities and imaginaries. As I have shown in this thesis, for some participants, choosing the indigenous term Pākehā served as a way of forging a tie to the land, others relied on mimicking indigenous practices (epitomised in Renee’s story of burying her daughter’s placenta) to secure this bond needed to indigenise the settler. Crucially, the invitation to connect to the land is also extended to immigrants, resulting in a levelling of differences between all three groups making up the triangular relations of settler societies, settlers, indigenous peoples, and migrants. Andrew envisions the future as follows:

I have suspicions that there’s going to be an overall culture of living in New Zealand and the love of the land and the lifestyle and then your own tweak on it, whether you’re from Argentina, from Europe, from India, from wherever you have your own little- you’re tweak on it.

My analysis of the three main discursive strategies covered in this part of the chapter established that the rhetoric of inclusivity and equality is an essential tool in re-imagining the nation as one in which settlermess and indigeneity will be irrelevant. Central to the excerpts above is that relations
between Pākehā and migrants are generally portrayed as free from conflict and obligations. Migrants are appreciated for their contribution to society; migrants are welcome to mix and mingle, and if migrants are not made to feel welcome it is because Māori refuse to extend this welcome.

**Conclusion**

In Aotearoa/New Zealand, increasing immigration is changing national and settler identities. Based on the findings of this study, I argue that we need to overcome traditional binaries in research on contemporary settler politics of identity and belonging and develop an understanding of the connection between multiculturalism and settler colonialism. Complementing the previous chapter’s findings on the role of memory, I have argued here that the vision of a harmonious multicultural future functions as a discursive tool to erase settlerness and indigeneity.

In a similar vein to the postcolonial identities discussed in the previous chapter, participants were eager to develop cosmopolitan identities. They portrayed themselves and the country as welcoming and accepting of cultural difference. Often with reference to Auckland, they presented themselves as morally superior to more parochial Pākehā outside the main centres of the country. However in a number of instances, especially related to space, the limits of cosmopolitanism emerged as participants tried to defend Pākehā normativity. Participants often practiced an “art of mixing” (Hage, 2000: 122) which involved the spatial management of Other and self.

It is at this point that the binary between settler-migrant and settler-indigenous relations dissolves. While the defence of white normativity through assuming the position of host has been observed in other countries, in settler colonial contexts this also always involves a subjugation of indigenous peoples. In this study, it was acutely obvious that migrants and ethnic minorities were instrumentalised to transfer indigeneity to other domains and to escape from the constraints of being settler colonial. By promoting multiculturalism, participants sought to escape from the focus on reconciliation for past injustices that is emphasised by biculturalism. This opposition was well cloaked in claims to be *in favour of* diversity, inclusiveness, and equal rights rather than *against* Māori demands and aspirations. Within this theme, the colonial temporal logic is one key problem: settler-indigenous relations and indigenous rights are confined to the realm of the past in the form of redress. They are denied a space in the present and the future. Thus we have a situation where one project ends and another can begin. This is how biculturalism and the Treaty can be depicted as relics of the past rather than a foundation for the future.
Furthermore, participants collapsed differences between migrants and Māori as a strategy of de-legitimising indigenous rights discourses. This is what Veracini (2010b: 43) describes as a “multicultural transfer.” Migrants promise freedom from those obligations and responsibilities that indigenous people demand of Pākehā. In this light, Fleras’ (2009: 130) assessment that Pākehā “may prefer a commitment to multiculturalism over biculturalism – not necessarily out of principle but from fear that excessive bicultural demands could topple a Eurocentric status quo” certainly rings true.

Last but not least, while settler indigenisation has repeatedly been shown to rely on the conflation of settler and indigenous positions (i.e. ‘settlers are native too’), this project shows that settler belonging is also fostered by conflating the positions of settlers and migrants. According to this logic, we are all migrants (a fact that is often the source of the dilemma of Pākehā belonging) and can, simultaneously, all be indigenous.
Chapter Eight
Conclusion

As Bell (2014: 140) recently noted, “[c]ontemporary settler descendants […] may not be the generations that perpetrated the crimes of colonization, but are the generations who choose to continue or address them.” This statement speaks to the connections between past and present, and the variety of ways in which settlers, such as Pākehā in Aotearoa/New Zealand, respond to the challenges indigenous rights claims pose to their dominant status. Last but not least, the statement also implies agency in choosing how to respond. This thesis investigated how Pākehā in twenty-first century Aotearoa/New Zealand, and more specifically in its largest and most ethnoculturally diverse city Auckland, construct and negotiate white settler identities and imagine the social relations they are part of. I engaged with my research questions and the life stories told by the 38 participants of this study from a critical perspective informed by theories of whiteness and settler colonialism. Overall, I aimed to examine and problematise the ways in which majorities invest in those aspects of racialised and settler colonial structures that serve to protect their privileged hegemonic position vis-à-vis both indigenous and ethnic minorities. To conclude this thesis, I relate the key findings I have presented in the previous three chapters to my research questions and epistemological framework in order to consider the contributions of this study and to suggest avenues for further research.

Post-Colonial Cosmopolitan Identities

The participants of this study consistently presented themselves as post-colonial and cosmopolitan New Zealanders. This centrally entailed an acceptance of and openness to both indigenous and ethno-cultural difference. Post-colonial identities were primarily constructed in narratives of personal and intergenerational changes regarding participants’ ability and willingness to ‘connect’ with Māoriness. Depending on age, participants presented themselves as different from the preceding generation but also pointed out the differences they perceived between themselves and their children. Many middle-aged participants recalled having to get accustomed to the greater prominence of indigeneity in New Zealand society but thought that the next generation was much better equipped for everyday biculturalism because indigenous culture has been incorporated into
school curricula. Overwhelmingly, these narratives detailed instances of learning about Aotearoa/New Zealand’s indigenous culture and accepting it as integral to national identity and their own sense of self. For some participants, though, developing post-colonial identities also explicitly entailed acknowledging biculturalism and the Treaty of Waitangi, forging new relationships with Māori(ness) and a desire to ‘bridge gaps’ between Māori and Pākehā worlds. In Chapter Five I showed that especially self-identified Pākehā described processes of re-imagining their identity explicitly in relation to Māori. For these participants, this relation is a pivotal part of who they are.

Cosmopolitan identities were most prominently constructed in narratives of everyday intercultural encounters in which participants frequently highlighted the ordinariness of living in an ethno-culturally diverse urban environment. Describing a variety of interactions (from consumption, contact to service providers to more sustained contact with neighbours, colleagues, friends and family members), participants stressed that proximity and regular exposure to ethno-culturally diverse people enriched their lives and made them more accepting and cosmopolitan. Participants commonly described Aotearoa/New Zealand as multicultural and, at least on the surface, embraced ‘everyday multicultur alism’ (Wise & Velayutham, 2009) to such an extent that cherishing ethnic diversity was portrayed as a national value. Many participants argued that Auckland was exceptional and set themselves apart from Pākehā in rural and smaller urban centres of Aotearoa/New Zealand who were generally considered to be ‘behind the times’ and inherently more racist as a result of limited intercultural contact.

Overall then, participants constructed identities in ways that highlighted discontinuities, transformations, and shifts in dispositions. Such re-articulations of identities are congruent with Mallard’s (2004: np) claim that “New Zealanders do not want to be condemned and cursed as if they are the British imperialist white ascendancy colonialists. We see ourselves as egalitarian, fair-minded, people who have little sympathy for elitism.”

Post-Settler Imaginaries

However, my analysis of these identity constructions demonstrates that participants often remain tied to racialised and settler colonial discourses which serve to protect settler whiteness as a normative and privileged position and to reassert settler belonging. I argue that in re-articulating identities, participants attempt to escape settlerlessness because it is an identity that marks them as
colonisers and begets dilemmas, insecurities, and obligations. My findings confirm Tuck and Yang’s (2012: 7, n7) observation that settlerness “is eschewed as an identity.”

Instead, participant narratives revealed a ‘post-settler imaginary’ in four interrelated themes, which I will address below. First, participants ‘narratives of change’ showed a temporal logic as discussed in Chapter Three as a means of dismissing racism and settler colonialism as contemporary phenomena. Second, participants anticipate settlerness and indigeneity to become redundant concepts as soon as ‘appropriate’ redress has paved the way for a reconciled nation without further indigenous rights claims. Third, participants acted as ‘strategic cosmopolitans’ who instrumentalised the presence of ethnic minorities to imagine a multicultural future free from the current contestations around the politics of indigeneity. Fourth, re-articulations of identities entailed a number of instances in which participants naturalised settler belonging and re-invented themselves as innocent through mimicking indigenous culture. Overall, these four themes bear many parallels to the strategies of maintaining settler whiteness discussed in the international literature as reviewed in Chapter Three.

As I have demonstrated in Chapter Six, participants’ living memories were dominated by narratives of profound transformations. But these narratives also showed that, despite initial confrontations or continuous instances of being reminded of their position as colonisers, these changes did not significantly affect participants. As Roger so poignantly stated, ‘the Māori Renaissance […] just kind of happened and we didn’t notice it.” Much of the critical whiteness and settler colonial scholarship emphasises that in order to de-centre settler whiteness and to develop non-dominating relations, transformative structural change is indispensable. As Harvey (2007: 43) puts it, “[w]e must craft the ground for this reconstituted self through social and political activity that disturbs that which has constituted whiteness thus far.” Harvey (2007: 8) centrally argues that in order to resume “moral agency,” whites/settlers need to support reparations and indigenous rights to sovereignty even if these pose existential threats by calling into question the legitimacy of the settler state itself. This stance is echoed in Tuck and Yang’s (2012) previously discussed position that true decolonisation cannot fall short of abolishing property rights and settler sovereignty because, as they argue, “[w]hen metaphor invades decolonization, it kills the very possibility of decolonization; it recenters whiteness, it resettles theory, it extends innocence to the settler, it entertains a settler future” (Tuck & Yang, 2012: 3).

Participant narratives of change highlight the role living memory plays in creating new myths. Here, my analysis makes a significant contribution to the existing literature. As I have shown,
much of the literature on settler colonialism emphasises that settlers attempt to forget the acts of violence on which settler states are founded and thus propose remembering migration and colonial history as integral to overcoming asymmetrical power relations (Bell, 2004b; Turner, 1999). Based on this study’s findings, I argue that this is less problematic than the new myths of post-colonialism that arise from the narrative that colonialism is a thing of the past and decolonisation has been achieved (or is near completion pending the finalisation of redress). While almost all participants acknowledged historical colonial injustices, their living memories were dominated by narratives of change. As such, awareness of past injustices is not enough, and perhaps even detrimental, if it substitutes awareness of the colonial present. It could be argued that the element of transcending the past and the settler mentality that naturalised the elimination of indigeneity through various mechanisms has the potential to enable decolonising narratives and the type of indigenising settler nationalism Moran (2002) envisages. However, currently this is hindered by the belief that decolonisation has been accomplished. The clear memory of ‘change’, of a break with the past, does not deny the past but forms the basis for a new myth.

Ultimately, the temporal logic according to which ‘everything is different now’ allows participants to anticipate an imminent united and reconciled nation in which settlements have been finalised and Māori have been subsumed into the ethnic diversity of the multicultural post-settler nation. This was most evident in participants envisioning settlerness and indigeneity as losing currency as soon as limited and finite forms of redress have ended the painful process of settling past injustices. While almost all participants accepted compensation for breaches of the Treaty of Waitangi, many participants drew on readily available discourses of reverse racism and ‘Māori privilege’ and portrayed themselves as victims of incessant demands and a ‘grievance industry’. Despite its New Zealand specific particularities, opposition to indigenous rights claims was couched in internationally observed terms of colour blindness and equal rights. This strategy of transferring indigenous peoples to the category of an ethnic group eliminates indigeneity as the basis for rights rather than needs. Akin to assuming a role as ‘spatial managers’ (Hage, 2000) in charge of controlling the presence of immigrant communities, participants took charge of defining the terms and conditions of appropriate redress. Pākehā look for ‘closure’ without sacrificing the status quo. My findings support Bell’s (2014: 171) observation that “[t]he desire for finality in settlements evidences […] the failure to grasp the reality that the entanglement of settler and indigenous lives means that a final settlement can never come.” Instead, their understanding of decolonisation is shaped by hegemonic political discourses of compensation for past wrongs.
rather than a future defined by indigenous sovereignty. In other words, Pākehā want indigeneity to disappear and re-secure stable settler sovereignty.

Such a reliance on discursive repertoires that limit a decolonising imaginary substantiates international observations that decolonisation is imagined to affect only indigenous peoples (Green, et al., 2007: 405) and Veracini’s (2011c) claim that settler societies lack narratives of decolonisation because the concept is at odds with settler colonialism’s objective of supersession. The hegemony of cultural recognition and the marked absence of Māori as people in participant narratives helps to conceal that decolonisation is unfinished business. In Aotearoa/New Zealand the discourse of ‘partnership’ is a vehicle of transfer by reconciliation (Veracini, 2010b). It is designed to pave the way into a harmonious, reconciled future. The reconciled nation is not one in which indigenous self-determination is restored, it is one in which indigenous claims to self-determination are carefully managed. Any signs of separatism, even as symbolic as flying the tino rangatiratanga flag on Waitangi Day (see Chapter One), are a threat to the vision of cohesion and harmony. As Tuck and Yang (2012: 9) argue, “[t]he desire to reconcile is just as relentless as the desire to disappear the Native; it is a desire to not have to deal with this (Indian) problem anymore”. My findings confirm that for the participants of this study reconciliation works to contain and thus eliminate indigenous aspirations for sovereignty. As I have discussed in the theory chapter, reconciliation as a simile for decolonisation problematically subsumes indigenous political difference within the settler state. As Gooder and Jacobs (2002: 213) argue, using the device of a rhetorical question: “Does this mark the beginning of reconciled co-existence, or inaugurate a more penetrating stage of occupation? Indeed, when the settler nation fantasizes about co-existence, is it engaged in remembering or in forgetting?”

A further major finding of this study is that increasing ethno-cultural diversity emerged as a crucial tool in leaving a settler identity behind. In Chapter Seven, I demonstrated that participants acted as ‘strategic cosmopolitans’. By promoting multiculturalism, participants sought to overcome and dismiss the relevance of biculturalism and the politics of redress. In participant narratives, biculturalism and multiculturalism were frequently presented as binary opposites, such as: past and future; divisive and harmonious; exclusive and inclusive; and, imposed and natural. Thus, opposition to biculturalism was cloaked in claims to be in favour of diversity, inclusiveness, and equal rights rather than against Māori demands and aspirations. Within this theme, the colonial temporal logic stood out clearly: settler-indigenous relations and indigenous rights represent the realm of the past in the form of redress and are denied a space in the present and the future. This logic creates an imaginary in which one project ends and another one can begin. This
is how biculturalism and the Treaty can be depicted as relics of the past rather than a foundation for the future.

Within this theme, participants collapsed structural differences between migrants and Māori, and, in some instances, positioned migrants as a benchmark for Māori as a strategy of de-legitimising indigenous rights discourses, thus transferring indigeneity to the realm of ethnic Other (Veracini, 2010b: 43). Requesting that Māori do not ask for more than migrants compromises tangata whenua status. Migrants promise freedom from those obligations and responsibilities that indigenous people demand.

While scholars have widely debated whether bi- and multiculturalism – or indigenous and ethnic minority rights – are compatible and have pointed to the risk of eliminating indigeneity by subsuming it within the multicultural nation (Fleras, 1984, 2009; Kymlicka, 1995; Veracini, 2010b), to my knowledge, no research has previously shown how migrant and ethnic minorities are operationalised as accessories in the Pākehā escape from the constraints of being settlers. This is certainly an area that would benefit from further research in settler societies.

However, in this context it must be noted that participants were also ‘conflicted cosmopolitans’ who regularly asserted their position as the national people vis-à-vis exogenous Others. Thus, despite some significant divergences, the empirical findings also parallel international research that identifies the nation as one of the primary sites of defending settler/whiteness. Notwithstanding the overall endorsement of ethnic diversity, participant narratives revealed a number of concrete instances of securing Pākehāness as the core culture of Aotearoa/New Zealand. Much like Māori, migrants seem to be more amenable in abstract form. While ethnic diversity was generally valued as enriching, the presence of greater numbers of migrants result in discourses or practices that aimed to regulate interactions. The instances of regulating both Other and self discussed in Chapter Seven show how participants act as ‘spatial managers’ (Hage, 2000) when migrant or ethnic minorities are perceived as a threat. These findings are echoed in recent media reports that have pointed to the phenomenon of white flight in New Zealand schools. For instance, The New Zealand Herald reported that Pākehā enrolments in decile 1-4 schools fell from 45 percent in 1996 to 26 percent in 2014 while Māori and Pasifika enrolments increased from 35 to 42 percent and from 14 to 22 percent respectively (N. Jones & Singh, 10 Nov 2014: np).

Given the paucity of qualitative examinations of majoritarian experiences with immigrant minorities in Aotearoa/New Zealand, my findings on this topic significantly contribute to local and international research. As I have shown, there are many parallels between Pākehā and
majorities in other Western states in the way they exercise governmental belonging in an effort to protect their position as the core culture. Immigrants are discursively deployed as arbiters of a decline in the politics of regret and as a measure for Māori to live up to. They are portrayed as different from Pākehā in that they do not share settler colonial guilt vis-à-vis the indigene and as different from Māori in that they do not share the sense of victimisation that leads to blaming Pākehā. This enables them to neglect indigeneity as a concept on which collective rights are based.

The findings of this study clearly reflect Auckland as the research location. This was particularly evident in participant narratives of experiencing ethnic diversity as an ordinary part of everyday life and their frequent references to small town and rural Aotearoa/New Zealand as unaccustomed and thus hostile to ethno-racial difference. Work that examines white settler identities outside the main metropolitan area of Aotearoa/New Zealand could usefully complement this study. As Forrest and Dunn (2010) argue, research on intra-national differences in attitudes to multiculturalism commonly prioritises aspatial factors, such as class, age, and education. Their own phone survey based research in Sydney and Melbourne demonstrates a complex interplay of spatial and structural factors in determining support or opposition to multiculturalism as value and ethos. There is some statistical analysis of ethnic composition and concentration including diversity indices of ethnic diversity (Johnston, et al., 2002; Johnston, Poulsen, & Forrest, 2011; Statistics New Zealand, 2009) but little qualitative research on peoples’ residential preferences, feelings of belonging and attempts to regulate Others but also the self through, for example, white flight.

Last but not least, participants escaped settleress through indigenising strategies that naturalised their belonging. Such discursive strategies primarily found expression in ethnic naming practices and narratives of adopting Māori identity. My qualitative exploration of naming practices presented in Chapter Five, complements previous local research by illuminating the work available terms do for settlers and the role they play in the politics of settler belonging. One of the most significant findings in this context is that ‘Pākehā’ and ‘New Zealander’ fulfil similar functions, that is, participants who insisted on being ‘New Zealanders’ and participants who always identified as ‘Pākehā’ provided much the same rationale for their choices. First and foremost, both labels were used to create distance from a European identity and served to ground participants in Aotearoa/New Zealand. Significantly, self-identified Pākehā created belonging in connection to Māori whereas self-identified New Zealanders stressed that the label assisted them in asserting their presence against perceived challenges to it.
Furthermore, the data contained a number of practices of appropriating indigenous culture in an effort to become naturalised. Interestingly, such practices were much more pronounced in—although not exclusive to—the narratives of self-identified Pākehā. Overall, mimicking indigenous cultural expressions was presented as an unproblematic and, indeed, normal part of being open to Māori culture. It was notable that participants spoke about Māori culture as a ‘contribution’ to New Zealand and Pākehā identity and that the ‘connection’ to Māoriness mentioned by so many people as a sign of developing post-colonial identities was abstract and often a-historic. Māori as people were conspicuously absent from these stories. In object form, Māoriness is knowable and can be owned to attest to Pākehā openness and a new cosmopolitan sensibility which is continued in imaginaries of settler-migrant relations. In object form, it is also unthreatening and does not serve as a reminder that Māori continue to be marginalised and disadvantaged. As Bell (2004a: 96) argues, the existence of an intact indigenous culture is even held up as proof that the damage done by colonisation was not fatal in order to exonerate the settler from complicity in settler colonial violence.

**White Settler Futures**

Based on this study, I argue that notwithstanding examples of genuine attempts to re-articulate Pākehā identities, my discussion of the post-settler imaginaries exposed in these constructions demonstrates that participants restored and protected settler whiteness in a variety of ways. The title of this section draws on the terminology used by Tuck and Yang (2012) and Tuck and Gaztambide-Fernández (2013) who argue that in evading decolonisation through ‘metaphors’ such as reconciliation, settlers protect their ‘future’ and the future of the settler state. As just discussed, participants did so in a variety of ways. In some instances, attempts to preserve a normative and privileged position were explicitly active; in others, it could be argued that participants were constrained by the available discursive repertoires and the ‘narrative deficit’ that makes it impossible to imagine decolonisation (Strakosch & Macoun, 2012; Veracini, 2011c). The literature on settler colonialism has been criticised for its overwhelming defeatism regarding the possibility of transforming settler colonial structures (Macoun & Strakosch, 2013; Rowse & Smith, 2010; Sissons, 1997; Svirsky, 2014). Svirsky (2014), for example, urges scholars to take into account the potential of agency and the possible permeability of settler colonial structures. That such agency is possible is also assumed by Mikaere (2004: 44) who argues that Pākehā need to take “a leap of faith” in order to surrender control over the terms and conditions of decolonisation. Taking her cue from this suggestion, Jo Smith (2007: 79) rightly asks:
But what are the conditions necessary for this great leap of faith? How can a dominant majority work assertively to relinquish control when colonization has established the cultural norms of maintaining and pursuing control, norms that are embedded in governance and the economy?

If we agree with premise that settler societies strive for supersession (see Chapter Three), it could be argued that especially at a time when indigeneity re-emerges as a potent source of disrupting the settler project the logic of elimination may come to the fore rather than recede. As is the case with modern racism, expressions and manifestations may change but the underlying ideologies continue to shape imaginaries and social relations. Nairn and McCreanor (1991: 257) demonstrated that in the 1980s, the standard stories that naturalised Pākehā dominance were “tightened and strengthened” despite the transformations society was undergoing. Nairn and McCreanor (1997: 28) concluded that a “trance-like commitment to the racism that was established during colonisation [...] is currently sustained by the prevalent Pakeha discourse about Maori/Pakeha relations.” Later, Huygens (2007: 43) argued that the standard stories identified by Nairn and McCreanor (1990, 1991, 1997) had been supplemented with new ones, such as that “‘The Treaty is a flawed historical document’, ‘Maori receive unfair privileges’, ‘Maori culture is inadequate in modern society’, [and] ‘Maori are hypersensitive about their culture’.”

Liu (2005) argues that the Treaty of Waitangi equips Pākehā with a broader discursive repertoire than settlers elsewhere but this raises the question of what these repertoires are and how they are used. As Kirkwood et al. (2005: 495) remark, “[i]n New Zealand, it is relatively easy to talk about subject positions envisioning a partnership between Maori and Pakeha as part of the national identity, provided this does not involve categorical privileges to the minority in terms of resource allocation.” In addition, Sibley (2010) suggests that the very act of accepting symbolic biculturalism may account for why Pākehā feel they can rightfully reject more challenging aspects, such as redistribution of resources and power. In my interpretation, this was clearly borne out in my research as the narratives of personal transformations analysed in Chapter Six show that embracing symbolic elements of biculturalism and learning about Māori culture ‘counts’ as taking responsibility and allows Pākehā to present themselves as reformed, as post-colonial and cosmopolitan without forfeiting power and privileges. However, as Walker (1986: 5) adamantly insisted nearly 30 years ago, “biculturalism means more than Pakehas [sic] learning a few phrases of Maori language and how to behave on the marae. It means they will have to share what they have monopolised for so long, power, privilege and occupational security.”
Concluding Remarks

As a final reflection on conducting this study, I would like to stress that sociology needs to develop a more sustained critique of racial and settler colonial domination because too often white sociology remains focused on ‘improving’ ethnic and settler-indigenous relations (Steinberg, 2007). Critical whiteness and settler colonial studies provide valuable analytical tools for this challenge but, unfortunately, thus far they remain separate endeavours. Based on my review of the literature and international empirical data as well as my own research I propose a stronger synthesis of these two fields. In this I follow other scholars such as Roediger (2001) and Anderson (2000: 381) who have criticised the separation of ethnic, indigenous, and whiteness studies. Following Smith (2006), I argue that the logic of elimination particular to settler locales is one manifestation of whiteness. However, alongside it operates the logic of orientalism which manifests in fears of inassimilable Others who threaten the fabric of nations. Arguably, this logic can be found across Western states, whether settler or non-settler. As such, a synthesis would further enable researchers in settler contexts to better consider triangular settler-indigenous-migrant relations within one analytical frame and examine the intersections of different expressions of whiteness. While this study is grounded in the dynamics of settler states and specific to the idiosyncratic socio-historical context of Aotearoa/New Zealand, there are, as just discussed, a number of parallels when we consider the four sites of re-making settler whiteness mapped in the international literature. While whiteness and settlerliness are not always equivalent, in the context of British settler societies it is arguably difficult and perhaps even counterproductive to separate the two when colonisation and racialisation are so closely intertwined.
Appendices

Appendix 1: Participant Information Sheet

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The Construction of Identity amongst New Zealanders of European Descent in Auckland

Participant Information Sheet

I am a PhD student in the Department of Sociology at the University of Auckland, carrying out a research project which is funded through a New Zealand International Doctoral Scholarship awarded by Education New Zealand.

I would like to invite you to take part in a research project that explores how New Zealanders with European heritage describe and construct their cultural identity. In this project I am particularly interested in talking to people who live in one of the following Auckland suburbs: Devonport, New Lynn, Papatoetoe, and Ponsonby.

If you agree to take part in this study you will be asked to talk about your life; specifically about times, experiences, or events in your life that have shaped your cultural identity. As part of this, I am interested in finding out what ethnic identity categories, such as Pākehā, European New Zealander, Kiwi, or New Zealander you choose to describe yourself and why, what this identity means to you, how important it is to who you are, and whether this identity has changed over time and why.

If you agree to participate we will meet for a confidential one-on-one interview. This interview will be carried out at a time and place convenient to you and will take approximately 2 hours. This interview will take the form of a loosely structured informal conversation.

Your participation in the study will be entirely voluntary. Recalling your life experiences and reflecting on your identity may cause some discomfort. Should this be the case, you may refuse to answer questions and withdraw from the research at any time. If necessary, I will be able to provide you with contact details of appropriate qualified counselling services.
If you agree to take part in this research, I will tape your interview with a digital recorder to ensure I have an accurate record of the information you provide. However, if at any point during the interview you wish to have an answer not recorded, you may choose to have the recorder turned off.

Following the interview I will transcribe the digital recording. The audio and data files of your interview will only be available to myself. Once the transcription is completed I would like to send you the data file of your interview. This will allow you to revisit the interview, comment on, add information or make changes to your data file. You are also fully in your rights to withdraw your interview data from this study. However, please be aware that there is a time limit of 8 weeks (from the day of the interview) on withdrawing your data. Once the analysis of the data has been finished, I would like to send you a summary of the findings and invite any feedback you would like to give me.

All digital and data files will be stored securely on a password protected computer. Hard copies will be stored in a locked cabinet at the University of Auckland for a period of six years. After that time all digital and data files will be destroyed.

The data collected in the interview will be used in my doctoral thesis as well as for conference presentations and publications. Although anonymity cannot be guaranteed, any use of this research which may reproduce passages from your interview will try to protect your identity. For example, your name will be replaced by a pseudonym and names of other persons mentioned will be deleted.

If you do agree to participate in the study, you will be asked to sign a consent form.

As a way to thank you for your time and valuable input you will receive a small gift of a $20 supermarket or petrol voucher.

Whether you choose to take part or not, I would like to thank you for your consideration of participation in this important research project.

If you have any queries or require further information regarding this research, please use the contacts given below:

Researcher: Jessica Terruhn
jter023@aucklanduni.ac.nz
021-08164468

Supervisor: Dr Louise Humpage
l.humpage@auckland.ac.nz
373 7599 ext. 85115

Head of Department: Prof Alan France
a.france@auckland.ac.nz
373 7599 ext. 84507

For any queries regarding ethical concerns you may contact the Chair, The University of Auckland Human Participants Ethics Committee, The University of Auckland, Office of the Vice Chancellor, Private Bag 92019, Auckland 1142. Telephone 09 373-7599 ext. 83711.

APPROVED BY THE UNIVERSITY OF AUCKLAND HUMAN PARTICIPANTS ETHICS COMMITTEE ON 12/08/2011 for 3 years from 12/08/2011, Reference Number 2011 / 389
CONSENT FORM

THIS FORM WILL BE HELD FOR A PERIOD OF 6 YEARS

Title: The Construction of Identity amongst New Zealanders of European Descent in Auckland

Researcher: Jessica Terruhn, Department of Sociology, University of Auckland

I have read the Participant Information Sheet, and I understand the nature of the research and why I have been selected. I have had the opportunity to ask the researcher questions about the project and these have been answered to my satisfaction.

- I agree to take part in this research.
- I agree / do not agree to be audio taped.
- I understand that the audio tape can be switched off at any time.
- I understand that I am free to withdraw participation at any time, and to withdraw any data up to 8 weeks after the interview.
- I understand that data will be kept for six years, after which they will be destroyed.
- I understand that parts of my interview may be used in future publications and that my identity will be disguised through the use of pseudonyms.
- I wish / do not wish to receive a data file of my interview.
- I wish / do not wish to receive a summary of the findings.

Name ____________________________
Signature _________________________ Date ____________________

APPROVED BY THE UNIVERSITY OF AUCKLAND HUMAN PARTICIPANTS ETHICS COMMITTEE ON 12/08/2011 for 3 years from 12/08/2011, Reference Number 2011 / 389
Appendix 3: Advertisement

PARTICIPANTS WANTED FOR A STUDY OF

The Construction of Identity amongst New Zealanders of European Descent in Auckland

Do you currently live in [fill in: Devonport / New Lynn / Papatoetoe / Ponsonby]?

Were you born and raised in New Zealand?

Are you a New Zealander of European descent?

And do you identify as Pākehā, European New Zealander, New Zealand European, Kiwi, or New Zealander?

If you have answered ‘yes’ to these questions and are at least 18 years old, I invite you to take part in a confidential interview that will explore what experiences and events in your life have shaped your cultural identity. This interview will take approximately two hours and will be carried out at a time and place convenient to you. Each participant will receive a $20 gift voucher as a thank you for their time and valuable input.

For more information, please contact:
Jessica Terruhn, Department of Sociology, University of Auckland, at jter023@aucklanduni.ac.nz or 021-08164468

APPROVED BY THE UNIVERSITY OF AUCKLAND HUMAN PARTICIPANTS ETHICS COMMITTEE ON 12/08/2011 for 3 years from 12/08/2011, Reference Number 2011 / 389
Appendix 4: Interview Guide

TOPIC GUIDE FOR NARRATIVE INTERVIEWS

1) Processes of identification

a) How would you describe your cultural background?
b) When it comes to the census, which ethnic identity categories do you chose?
c) Can you explain to me why this is the label you prefer?
d) What does being [use preferred label(s)] mean to you?
e) Have you always identified as [use preferred label(s)]
f) How important is being [use preferred label(s)] to who you are?

2) Growing up

a) Could you tell me about your childhood, where you grew up and what it was like?
b) Do you remember if being Pākehā was ever an important issue when you were growing up? Can you give me an example? (place, family, school, relations with peers?)
c) Do you remember any specific experiences in your childhood that have influenced your ethnic identity?

3) Geographical location/local community

a) You were saying you grew up in ..., what made you come to Auckland? (if applicable)
b) Why did you choose to live in [suburb]? 
c) How do you feel about living in this area? (housing, neighbours, friends, local community)
d) How does it compare to other places you have lived?
e) How does it compare to when you first moved here / when you were growing up here?
f) How do you experience these changes in your neighbourhood/Auckland?
g) If you could choose, where would you want to live?

4) Work

a) You were saying you work as [...]. Do cultural issues ever play a role in your work life, or in previous jobs? In what way? (relations to colleagues, superiors, employees, clients/customers, decision making processes, intercultural training, etc)
5) Family

a) Do cultural issues ever play a role in your family? (spouse, children, grandchildren) Can you give me an example?

6) Reflecting on the Interview

We have talked about a whole range of interesting aspects of how you see yourself/how your identity has been influenced by.../how your identity has changed over time [options depending on interview].

a) Are there any aspects we’ve talked about you would like to tell me more about?
b) Is there anything we have not touched on that you would like to add?
c) What has it been like for you to reflect on your life experiences and your identity?
d) What aspects have you found most easy/difficult/interesting/uncomfortable to talk about? Why do you think this is?
e) How does this experience compare to the expectations you had when you decided to take part in the interview?
References


Zealand Identities: Departures and Destinations (pp. 174-190). Wellington: Victoria University Press.


