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A Comparative Study of the Cultural Diplomacy
of Canada, New Zealand and India

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Abstract

This thesis examines the concept and practice of cultural diplomacy. Cultural diplomacy is carried out by a government to support its foreign policy goals or diplomacy (or both) by using a wide range of cultural manifestations for a variety of purposes. The thesis examines aspects of the cultural diplomacy of Canada, Québec, New Zealand and India in order to investigate how cultural diplomacy presents a national image abroad (potentially as part of a national brand); its role in the protection of cultural sovereignty; and how it advances domestic objectives.

The thesis argues that cultural diplomacy, in presenting a national image abroad, frequently emphasises a state’s modern-ness or its cultural distinctiveness. This raises the question of the link between national image and national brand and highlights the limitations inherent in national branding.

For some states, cultural diplomacy plays a role in the protection of cultural sovereignty. Canadian cultural diplomacy supports the international activities of domestic cultural industries and has sought to maintain the right to provide this support within the multilateral free trade framework. Québec’s cultural diplomacy has sought to protect the province’s cultural sovereignty from a perceived threat from the Canadian federation.

Cultural diplomacy helps advance domestic objectives. The cultural diplomacy of Canada has asserted the right of the federal government to be Canada’s only diplomatic voice, and to counter Québec’s claims to sovereignty. Québec’s cultural diplomacy has asserted the province’s constitutional rights and distinctiveness within the Canadian federation. In a similar way, the international exhibition Te Maori advanced the interests of Maori in New Zealand. Cultural diplomacy’s domestic impacts include positive international recognition for a state’s culture, which contributes to a state’s sense of being a distinctive national community and to its confidence, economic prosperity and nation-building.

The thesis concludes that cultural diplomacy remains a valuable tool of diplomacy and is likely to become more important to governments, particularly to their public diplomacy and as a contributor to soft power, because of cultural diplomacy’s promulgation of a distinctive national identity, the increasing importance of a cultural aspect in economic interests, and the intrinsic appeal of culture to globalised populations.
For Caroline McDonald

my late parents, Yo Mark and Gog Mark

and my siblings, Liz, Carolyn and Andrew Mark
I would like to thank those members of the staff of the Political Studies Department of the University of Auckland who have supported me during the writing of this thesis, in particular Dr Jacqui True, who acted as my initial principal supervisor, Professor Andrew Sharp, who acted as the principal supervisor for most of the term of the project, and Associate Professor Steve Hoadley, who took over the reins from Professor Sharp after his retirement.

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# Table of Contents

**CHAPTER 1**
CULTURAL DIPLOMACY 1

**CHAPTER 2**
OUTLINING, AND RESOLVING, CULTURAL DIPLOMACY’S AMBIGUITY 39

**CHAPTER 3**
THE CULTURAL DIPLOMACY OF CANADA, AND OF QUEBEC 70

**CHAPTER 4**
THE CULTURAL DIPLOMACY OF NEW ZEALAND 122

**CHAPTER 5**
THE CULTURAL DIPLOMACY OF INDIA 181

**CHAPTER 6**
CONCLUSION 224

**BIBLIOGRAPHY** 248
Chapter One: Cultural diplomacy

I begin this chapter by setting out the origins of my interest in cultural diplomacy. Following a brief summary of the conceptual framework which informs this thesis, I explore the range of perspectives on cultural diplomacy of those who have examined the subject, and the new diplomatic environment within which the current practice of cultural diplomacy is undertaken.

My own involvement in the practice of cultural diplomacy began by accident. In 1988, my wife was posted as first secretary to the New Zealand High Commission in London. A year later, I was asked to assist in the development of a programme of New Zealand cultural activities in the UK. That work continued for the next three years, and is discussed at length in chapter four. Upon my return to New Zealand, I headed the Museum Directors’ Federation of New Zealand, a body which sought to improve the work of New Zealand museums and art galleries, and those who worked in them. That organisation helped manage tours of New Zealand of art exhibitions from other countries, an activity often viewed as the bread and butter of cultural diplomacy. In 1996, my wife was posted to Vanuatu, a small independent state north of New Zealand. For almost half the time I lived in Vanuatu, I worked with the staff of the Vanuatu Cultural Centre on developing an exhibition of aspects of the contemporary art of Vanuatu.¹ That exhibition subsequently toured art galleries and museums in New Zealand and Australia. The exhibition seemed to be a very effective way of raising awareness in both countries of Vanuatu, a state about which few New Zealanders and Australians seemed to have much knowledge. When my wife was posted in India, I had the opportunity to experience the other side of cultural diplomacy, as an exhibiting photographer. The exhibitions with which I was associated sought, in part, to raise awareness in India of contemporary New Zealand, and to provide New Zealand diplomats such as my wife with an opportunity to develop their relationships with their contacts. New Zealand’s cultural diplomacy in India at that time also incorporated activity associated with the launch of the film trilogy The Lord of the Rings, directed by New Zealander Peter Jackson, and took advantage of the visit to India of the New Zealander Sir Edmund Hillary, who with Sherpa Tenzing Norgay was the first to ascend the world’s highest peak, Mt Everest. The name of the street on which the New Zealand High Commission is situated was subsequently named Sir Edmund Hillary Marg.² Finally, on my return to New Zealand, I was involved in the formulation and implementation of New Zealand’s new cultural diplomacy programme.³ That

² Another street was named ‘Tenzing Norgay Marg.’
³ This forms an important part of chapter four of this thesis.
programme heralded the first occasion in approximately thirty years that the New Zealand government had allocated funding specifically for a broad cultural diplomacy initiative.

This experience of cultural diplomacy, in four countries, suggested to me that the practice of cultural diplomacy warranted greater critical examination. That cultural diplomacy was an instrument used by countries to advance their interests was beyond dispute. Every day, somewhere in Delhi, or London, or Paris, or Wellington, diplomats used their national cultural resources as part of their work. Concerts, exhibitions, lectures and other cultural events were held. Politicians, journalists, bureaucrats, academics and others were invited. Attempts were made to try and attract to these events those whom the diplomats sought to reach on behalf of their government - students, investors, tourists and others. Some contacts usually turned up to the cultural event, and it was assumed that some would not have done so were it not for the lure of culture. In Delhi, the Norwegian ambassador told the author that the greatest advantage his cultural diplomacy programme provided to him in his work was the access it provided to him to Indian journalists.4 In Paris, the Australian ambassador informed the author that she regarded cultural diplomacy ‘by far and away’ the most powerful tool at her disposal. The French, she said, paid attention to culture, and to countries showing their culture in France.5 Hence the instrumental aspect of the practice seemed obvious. But my involvement in cultural diplomacy, as an administrator and artist, over more than a decade, along with my reading on the subject, indicated that there may have been a change in how cultural diplomacy was used, a change in the nature of its instrumentality. On the face of it, the type of national image which cultural diplomacy presented seemed to have become more important, and some countries seemed also to use the practice as one of a number of tools in the battle to protect their national identity from the impact of globalisation. There seemed also to be another dimension to cultural diplomacy which warranted examination, that of the role the practice played in seeking to advance domestic objectives.

Research and conceptual framework

The focus of this thesis is an examination of aspects of the cultural diplomacy of three countries – Canada, New Zealand and India – in order to examine three aspects of the current practice of cultural diplomacy that have been overlooked, and which warrant an in-depth, comparative, examination. These are 1) cultural diplomacy’s role in the presentation abroad of a national

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4 Truls Hanevold (Norwegian ambassador to India), private conversation, Delhi, India, 2003.
5 Penny Wensley (Australian ambassador to France), private conversation, Paris, France, August 2006.
image, and the extent of linkage of such a presentation to a national brand 2) the role of cultural diplomacy in the protection of cultural sovereignty and 3) the domestic objectives and impacts of cultural diplomacy. There is considerable confusion about what precisely constitutes cultural diplomacy: a range of meanings, the interchanging use of terms, and overlapping concepts. The extent of this confusion is discussed in chapter two in the context of setting out cultural diplomacy’s characteristics and how it might be distinguished from related concepts such as public diplomacy, foreign cultural policy and international cultural relations, as a prelude to the three case studies. Despite the semantic confusion, it is nevertheless possible to conceive of cultural diplomacy as a diplomatic practice of governments, carried out in support of a government’s foreign policy goals or its diplomacy (or both), usually involving directly or indirectly the government’s foreign ministry, involving a wide range of manifestations of the culture of the state which the government represents, targeted at a wider population as well as elites. In this respect, whilst it would be easiest to describe cultural diplomacy as a practice of countries which draws on an aspect of a state’s culture, that would fail to recognise the cultural diplomacy of parts of countries such as provinces and states, and groups of governments such as the European Union. In terms of the practice’s relationship to other related concepts, cultural diplomacy is viewed as an element of public diplomacy (and hence of diplomacy), but the scope of cultural diplomacy’s work also includes the negotiation and promulgation of cultural agreements. Cultural diplomacy is not defined simply as a government’s foreign cultural policy: cultural diplomacy is a practice of governments, rather than a statement of how they approach international relations, and cultural diplomacy has a wider focus than simply foreign policy goals.

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6 These are overwhelmingly single governments, but also groups of governments such as the European Union and sub-national governments, such the government of the Canadian province of Québec.

7 The cultural diplomacy of the UK is undertaken primarily by the British Council which receives some of its funding from the UK government through the foreign ministry. The Council is provided funding by the government of the UK to carry out public diplomacy activity which contributes to the medium and long term goals of the government. See Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Public Diplomacy Review.

8 Hence, rather than use the word country throughout this thesis to describe the practitioner of cultural diplomacy or the location of a national culture (i.e. a country’s cultural diplomacy or a ‘country’s culture), the terms government and state are preferred, with the term state including parts of federations such as Québec.

9 Incorporating the negotiation and promulgation of cultural agreements within cultural diplomacy’s scope reflects the practice’s historical focus on establishing via a cultural agreement a framework within which cultural diplomacy would take place. As noted in chapter two, the nature of these agreements has shifted from a focus on how cultural relations should be managed to a greater focus on economic interests with a cultural aspect. The negotiation of the UNESCO Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expressions, discussed in chapter three, is viewed as an element of the cultural diplomacy of both the federal government of Canada and of Quebec. Canadian diplomacy associated with the Convention's ratification drew on cultural resources (arts and cultural organisations) in support of Canada's foreign policy goals, and although the Convention’s primary aim is to enable governments to continue to protect their culture and cultural industries, its objectives include advancing international cultural cooperation. In this context, as noted in chapter two, Japan regards its work on UNESCO cultural agreements as an element of its cultural diplomacy.
associated with culture. Cultural diplomacy is closely related to governmental international cultural relations, but not all such relations are regarded as falling within cultural diplomacy’s remit, because some government entities undertake international cultural relations of a type which are not aimed at contributing to foreign policy goals or to diplomacy. Cultural diplomacy is an element of soft power.\(^\text{10}\)

Cultural diplomacy is managed both by diplomats working for a government’s foreign ministry and by those working for stand-alone entities with varying degrees of governance and funding links to foreign ministries. Activities undertaken within cultural diplomacy’s scope manifest an aspect of the culture of the state which the government represents, and involve a wide range of participants such as artists, singers and so on, the manifestations of their artistry, the promotion of aspects of the culture of a state (language, for instance), and the exchange of people, such as academics. The practice incorporates a wide range of activities and now more often includes cultural activity targeted at the wider population rather than elites, as well as sport.\(^\text{11}\)

A government’s official support for the presentation in its country of cultural activity of another government represents a form of cultural diplomacy, as it may serve either to advance the goals of the government funding the cultural diplomacy or link in with its diplomacy, or both. Hence cultural diplomacy need not only draw on the culture of a cultural diplomacy practitioner but show the culture of another state. Cultural diplomacy’s timeframe ranges from the length of time of a cultural performance (possibly a matter of minutes) to many years. Cultural diplomacy’s audiences include not only foreign audiences but also members of a national diaspora.

Cultural diplomacy is undertaken for a range of purposes. It helps advance national interests, contributes to a government’s diplomacy, and enhances mutual understanding between countries and their peoples. Cultural diplomacy also raises a state’s profile, helps counter negative impacts of contentious issues, ‘puts the record straight’, and is now more frequently implicated in contributing to governmental efforts to ‘brand’ a state. The practice supports efforts to protect a national culture in order to counter the impact of cultural ‘invasion.’ Cultural

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\(^{10}\) Soft power is the power of a government to attract others to adopt its goals. See Nye, “Propaganda Isn't the Way: Soft Power.”

\(^{11}\) This thesis has eschewed examining examples of sport in the cultural diplomacy of Canada, India or New Zealand. Whilst such an examination would have no doubt provided very interesting material, it was judged that the considerable additional effort such a focus would have entailed would have added little extra to the thesis’s core conclusions.
diplomacy is also undertaken in order to attain domestic objectives. These characteristics of the practice, summarised above, are explored in depth in chapter two.

**The extent of scholarship about, and various perspectives of, cultural diplomacy**

Cultural diplomacy has not been the subject of as much scholarly attention as might be expected. This is puzzling given the practice’s intersection with a range of subjects (such as *inter alia*, diplomacy, national identity, the history of the Cold War, and international relations), its historical pedigree, the huge investment in the practice by several wealthy countries, and the sheer interest of the subject.\(^{12}\) Scholarship about diplomacy - a more traditional field - has paid little attention to cultural diplomacy, and despite the recent exponential growth in scholarship of the various schools of international relations theory (sometimes known as simply IR\(^{13}\)), cultural diplomacy has been almost entirely ignored by the discipline of IR. General texts on diplomacy, which might be assumed to include cultural diplomacy, barely mention, or discuss, the practice. Barston’s general text on modern diplomacy (published in 1997) does not address the subject of cultural diplomacy at all.\(^{14}\) Keith Hamilton and Richard Langhorne, writing about the practice of diplomacy in 1995, make only two references to cultural diplomacy. In one reference, they provide a definition (‘Government backing for the projection and protection of national culture abroad’\(^{15}\)), and in the other, they briefly discuss the beginnings of French cultural diplomacy.\(^{16}\)

Shaun Riordan, writing about new diplomacy, in 2003, discusses public diplomacy, and soft power, but his only reference to cultural diplomacy is to note that cultural promotion, as undertaken by practitioners of cultural diplomacy such as the British Council, the Goethe Institute and the (now defunct) United States Information Service, ‘is not regarded as a serious part of diplomacy.’\(^{17}\) Even Adam Watson, regarded by many as one of the seminal writers on diplomacy, does not touch on cultural diplomacy.\(^{18}\)

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\(^{12}\) The fact that cultural diplomacy has not always been taken seriously by politicians, and diplomats, may also serve to explain the absence of scholarly attention given to the practice. Until recently, it has been regarded as a lesser tool of diplomacy, itself seen as a lesser tool of foreign policy. Most diplomats would have supported the practice in principle, but tended to place it at the lower end of their agendas.

\(^{13}\) The discipline of international relations is most frequently referred to in its shorthand version as IR. Some refer to IR as the *field* of international relations. For many, IR is shorthand for international relations *theory*. See Burchill, *Introduction*, 7.

\(^{14}\) Barston, *Modern Diplomacy*.

\(^{15}\) Hamilton and Langhorne, *The Practice of Diplomacy*, 127.


\(^{17}\) Riordan, *The New Diplomacy*, 121.

\(^{18}\) Watson, *Diplomacy: The Dialogue between States*. 


practice of diplomacy has no index reference to cultural diplomacy.\textsuperscript{19} A series of over one hundred papers on diplomacy, published by the University of Leicester over the period 1995-2005 (arguably the most active location of new scholarship on diplomacy in this period), included just one on cultural diplomacy.\textsuperscript{20} A three-volume collection of articles on diplomacy published in 2004, comprising a total of sixty articles, did not include a single article on cultural diplomacy.\textsuperscript{21} The comparative lack of interest in cultural diplomacy shown by scholars of diplomacy has been more than matched by those writing within the discipline of IR, despite a recent broadening of the scope of the discipline.\textsuperscript{22}

Notwithstanding the relative paucity of scholarship, cultural diplomacy has not been entirely neglected as a subject of investigation. Three broad categories of scholarship on the subject will be discussed in turn (the fourth, the history of cultural diplomacy, particularly its role in the Cold War, will not be examined\textsuperscript{23}): those that examine the cultural diplomacy of a single state,\textsuperscript{24} those that investigate the practice in general, often by comparing the cultural diplomacy of a number of states,\textsuperscript{25} and those that look at specific aspects of the practice or as a way of examining other subjects (such as, for instance, cultural diplomacy’s relationship to foreign policy or to security). The most common approach within these categories of scholarship has been descriptive. Few scholars have undertaken theoretical or critical examinations of cultural diplomacy.

\textsuperscript{19} Berridge, Diplomacy: Theory and Practice.
\textsuperscript{20} See Clingendael Discussion Papers in Diplomacy.
\textsuperscript{21} Jönsson and Richard Langhorne, Diplomacy.
\textsuperscript{22} IR has changed from ‘an essentially problem solving approach to strategic interaction between existing bounded communities’ to a ‘spectrum of contending theoretical approaches.’ Burchill, \textit{Introduction}, 7.
\textsuperscript{23} The focus of this thesis is on the current day practice of cultural diplomacy rather than its history, and on cultural diplomacy practiced in a diplomatic environment which, as we have seen, has changed markedly from the days of the Cold War. The cultural diplomacy of the United States and the USSR during the Cold War is a fascinating subject, and is well set out by three authors in particular: Hixon, Caute and Saunders (Walter Hixon, \textit{Propaganda}; David Caute, \textit{The Dancer Defects}; Frances Conor Saunders, \textit{Who Paid the Piper}). The Cold War was a conflict between two imperial powers obliged by the possibility of mutual annihilation to pursue victory by other means, through ideology and culture. Huge efforts were made by both sides to win the ‘hearts and minds’ of the undecided, including using large exhibitions and music to show the persuasive face of a country. During the Cold War, the power of culture as a tool of diplomacy was recognised: the strident propaganda of the Voice of America came to be seen as less effective than the transmission of aspects of United States culture, particularly music, and specifically jazz. Culture was powerful, appealing, persuasive, and credible.
\textsuperscript{24} These include Higham, \textit{The World Needs More Canada}, Mulcahy, “Cultural diplomacy and the exchange programs,” and Werz, “External Cultural Policy.”
\textsuperscript{25} These include Chartrand, “International Cultural Affairs,” Fox, \textit{Cultural Diplomacy at the Crossroads}, Lending, \textit{Change and Renewal} and Williams, “Canada and Australia Compared.”
The cultural diplomacy of selected states

The United States

Much of the writing about the cultural diplomacy of single countries has been concerned with the cultural diplomacy of the United States. Several themes can be discerned in this body of work. First, the differing ideas of what precisely constitutes cultural diplomacy and how it is related to other practices applies equally to writing about the cultural diplomacy of the United States as it does to other scholarship. The relationship between cultural diplomacy and public diplomacy, for instance, is not agreed upon: for some of those writing about or reporting on cultural diplomacy, it is an element of public diplomacy, for others, not. The United States Advisory Committee on Cultural Diplomacy sees cultural diplomacy as ‘the linchpin of public diplomacy,’ but Kevin Mulcahy regards cultural diplomacy as distinct from public diplomacy (or what he terms ‘informational diplomacy’). Feigenbaum sees cultural diplomacy linked to but separate from public diplomacy: cultural diplomacy involves exchanges which ‘allow people from different countries and cultures to get to know and understand each other,’ whereas ‘public diplomacy, in the service of which cultural diplomacy has sometimes been enlisted, gets America’s word out.’ This dichotomy reflects the ongoing tension, over many years (prior to, during and since World War Two) between the United States government’s approach to the purpose of broad governmental international cultural relations: using Feigenbaum’s terminology, between cultural relations programmes (involving the exchange of people, art exhibitions, theatre and music performances etc) which sought to enhance mutual understanding, and government information programmes aimed at ‘getting America’s word out.’ In the cultural diplomacy of the United States, government support has favoured information programmes, primarily because of the length of period covered by war – essentially from 1939 through World War Two and the Cold War, until the late 1980s.

Second, from its earliest beginnings, the cultural diplomacy of the United States has been characterised by a deep ambivalence about government involvement in the practice. Frank Ninkovich notes that the United States Department of State’s programmes in cultural relations

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26 Advisory Committee on Cultural Diplomacy, Cultural Diplomacy. For Schneider, cultural diplomacy forms an important component of the broader endeavour of public diplomacy, which basically ‘comprises all that a nation does to explain itself to the world.’ Schneider, Culture Communicates, 147.
27 For Mulcahy cultural programmes represent cultural diplomacy. Mulcahy, “Cultural Diplomacy and the Exchange Programs.”
29 See Mulcahy, “Cultural Diplomacy and the Exchange Programs”, 13, and Frankel, "The Scribblers and International Relations."
have been a minor cog in the gearbox of foreign policy,’ and despite a great increase in their size, have ‘continued to occupy a lowly position in the diplomatic pecking order.’ Cultural diplomacy has been viewed by most members of Congress as outside government business, reflecting the widely held preference for government to stay out of things cultural, but also reflecting the quite distinct lack of involvement in the arts and culture by the government of the United States. Only during periods in which the United States was at war (including the Cold War) was government involvement in cultural diplomacy seen as being justified. In times of peace, the justification for government support diminished. Hence, since the end of the Cold War, overall funding for government-sponsored cultural and educational programmes abroad fell by over one third in the period 1993-2003, despite calls for major increases in funding.

Third, writing about the cultural diplomacy of the United States invariably sets out the numerous legislative and administrative changes that have been made to the cultural diplomacy of the United States, and on the domestic political machinations associated with these changes and the official programmes. This approach emphasises that United States cultural diplomacy has been much affected by domestic political infighting, by personalities, and by the ease with which some representatives have made official support for cultural diplomacy a focus of their wrath (frequently with regard to art exhibitions), a tendency exacerbated during the McCarthy years. Coombs has described how the educational and cultural component of the foreign policy of the United States had been shaped by strong international and domestic pressures such as war, changes in administration, new legislation, conflicting philosophies and bureaucratic rivalries, and as a result, its purposes often had been unclear, ‘intelligent people had differed about its

31 This point is made by Cummings, *Cultural Diplomacy and the United States Government*, 12.
32 It must be noted that even with such a reduction, the work of the former United States Information Service (USIS), now subsumed into the Department of State, remains substantial. Fox notes that at the end of 1996, the service had 200 posts in 143 countries. Fox, *Cultural Diplomacy at the Crossroads*.
33 Articles dealing with some or all of this aspect include Cummings, *Cultural Diplomacy and the United States Government*; Sablosky, *Recent Trends in Department of State Support for Cultural Diplomacy*; Arndt, *The First Resort of Kings*; Ninkovich, *The Diplomacy of Ideas*; Mulcahy, “Cultural Diplomacy and the Exchange Programs”; and Mulcahy, “Cultural Diplomacy in the Post-Cold War World: Introduction.” The chronological roll call of administrative and legislative aspects which invariably are cited are the establishment, by the United States Department of State, of a Division of Cultural Relations in 1938, the amalgamation in 1945 of wartime information agencies, the Fulbright Act of 1946, the Smith-Mundt Act of 1948, and the concomitant reorganisation of the State Department’s cultural division, the Fulbright-Hays Act of 1961, the merging of the USIA with the Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs under President Jimmy Carter in 1978, and the subsumation of this agency (renamed the USIA in 1982) into the State Department in 1999.
34 Coombs notes that ‘in the field of educational and cultural affairs, a small number of appropriations committee members could frustrate what quite evidently had been the will of an overwhelming majority of Congress.’ Coombs, *The Fourth Dimension*, 153. Cummings describes the controversy over the exhibition ‘Advancing American Art,’ in 1946. In reference to one of the paintings in the collection, President Truman declared ‘if that is art, I’m a Hottentot.’ Cummings, *Cultural Diplomacy and the United States Government*, 7.
importance,’ and key policy issues had never been fully resolved.’ Sablosky has described United States cultural diplomacy as ‘marked by a degree of policy incoherence, organizational instability, popular indifference and political vulnerability,’ and as ‘persistence in the face of adversity.’ Richard Arndt’s massive history of United States cultural diplomacy, the *First Resort of Kings*, sets out these legislative and administrative changes in extraordinary detail, to the exclusion of other aspects of the practice. Less attention has been placed by scholars (Arndt and others) on the programmes themselves, although the Fulbright exchange scheme has consistently been cited as the jewel in the crown of United States cultural diplomacy.

Fourth, writing about United States cultural diplomacy in the post-Cold War has invariably been tinged with a persuasive tone. Those who have written about the cultural diplomacy of the United States seem mostly to be in favour of it. They believe that the United States has wasted a very good opportunity to use the practice to counter the declining support internationally for the United States, and its foreign policy. The series of papers published by the United States-based Center for Arts and Culture reflects the Center’s intention to commission ‘much needed research’ on varying aspects of the contemporary state of United States cultural diplomacy, in order to ‘raise awareness of the importance of cultural diplomacy,’ and seek to have resources for cultural diplomacy increased, particularly those for the Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs at the United States Department of State. Writers such as former United States ambassadors Cynthia Schneider and Helena Finn might best be described as lobbyists. Finn, writing in *Foreign Affairs* under the title ‘The Case for Cultural Diplomacy,’ describes United States cultural diplomacy as ‘one of its most ‘potent weapons,’ although she seems not to recognise the limits which the foreign policy of the United States places on the effectiveness of its cultural diplomacy, despite her insistence that cultural diplomacy should involve ‘winning foreigners’ voluntary allegiance to the American project.’ Finn describes the resources allocated by the United States to its cultural diplomacy and public diplomacy as ‘utterly inadequate,’ and is most damning when condemning the closure or downgrading of the American centres abroad, extensions of the American diplomatic presence which provided not only a library and acted as a venue for other cultural activity, but which also provided a venue for

36 Sablosky, *Recent Trends*.
38 Ibid.
foreigners to engage with one another as well as with Americans.\footnote{However, as Schneider notes, writing after the terrorists attacks on the United States on 11 September 2001, American centres abroad would be prime terrorist targets and hence unable to operate as before. Schneider, \textit{Culture Communicates}, 163. The author’s experience visiting the American Center in Delhi after the attacks in September 2001 on the World Trade Center supports this view.} Schneider believes cultural diplomacy to be ‘one of the most effective tools in any diplomatic toolbox.’\footnote{Schneider, \textit{Culture Communicates}, 147.} She provides a useful glimpse into the practical way in which cultural diplomacy can be used as a tool of diplomats and of diplomacy, and the strong linkage between culture and diplomacy that is at the heart of the practice. It is also useful to be reminded that the free market distribution of popular culture (in the case of the United States, that most notably of Hollywood films, but also of its music) does not guarantee reaching target markets. As with Finn, Schneider laments the lack of commitment to and resources for United States cultural diplomacy, a situation made more lamentable given ‘the potency of cultural diplomacy.’\footnote{Schneider, \textit{Culture Communicates}, 148.}

\textit{Canada}

A number of Canadian scholars have examined cultural diplomacy, and several have touched upon aspects of the practice with which this thesis is primarily concerned. Robyn Higham’s examination of the cultural diplomacy of the federal government of Canada sets out aspects of that country’s cultural diplomacy, touches upon the cultural diplomacy of other countries, and provides general insights into cultural diplomacy’s objectives and impacts, including those with a domestic focus, and the role which the presentation of a national image abroad can play in achieving national foreign policy goals.\footnote{Ibid.} Higham defines cultural diplomacy as a one directional practice, best understood as ‘self-interested national-propaganda, distributed, broadcast or narrowcast internationally,’ a part of public diplomacy.\footnote{Higham, \textit{The World Needs More Canada}, 135. Higham says that public diplomacy is generally understood to be what governments do to influence foreign democracies through initiatives aimed at their citizens, and comprises media relations, academic relations, and cultural diplomacy.} In this context, cultural diplomacy is a way of making a country interesting to opinion- and decision-makers, and the public, in other countries. Higham has great hopes for the capacity of a well funded ‘national project of cultural diplomacy’ to achieve a wide range of domestic objectives. These include helping build an improved identity awareness within Canada, thus contributing to Canada’s social cohesion,\footnote{Higham suggests that social cohesion can also be improved through federal cultural diplomacy because the practice provides a stage for more French-English collaboration ‘through the low-risk medium of joint cultural initiatives.’ Higham, \textit{The World Needs More Canada}, 140.}
helping counter-balance the pressures of global homogenisation (which can lead to countries losing the ‘habit of self expression’ and hence ending up ‘having nothing to say’), and making Canada interesting to Canadians by ‘discovering what makes Canada interesting to others.’ In addition, cultural diplomacy has a clear impact domestically through what Higham terms the phenomenon of the ‘conditioning stereotype’:

We may eventually become what we claim to be. Cultural diplomacy can have an important impact on domestic policies by instigating national compliance with our own image abroad. It is more difficult to sin while you are claiming saintliness.

Higham suggests that the cultural diplomacy of the province of Québec has served to demonstrate its ‘national character’ abroad, ensuring that its ‘remarkable success abroad is understood at home.’

Canadian cultural diplomacy requires a theme for its national image, in Higham’s view, in order to attract the sort of funding that has always been absent. That image should be one which is ‘relatively unique to Canada and yet supportive of both international and domestic objectives,’ reinforce and sustain Canada’s soft power (its ability to persuade others to share Canadian perspectives and values in the multilateral fora and in bilateral relationships), make Canada more attractive to tourists and others, and provoke positive public policy and citizen responses at home. He thinks one suitable theme would be the Canadian model for governing and building on its diversities.

Higham’s list of the benefits to Canada internationally (rather than domestically) of enhanced Canadian federal cultural diplomacy provides a useful reminder of the potential of the practice. They include generating more interest in Canada by foreign tourists, investors and others, generating more export business for Canada’s cultural industries, building Canada’s soft power, suggesting how the Canadian model for governing its diversity might be employed to assist peaceful co-existence, and making Canada interesting. In this context, he notes that the cultural diplomacy of France, ‘quite simply seeks to demonstrate, and generate respect for,

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46 Other objectives he cites are developing and strengthening culture and arts communities domestically and helping ‘legitimize’ diversity in Canada, by demonstrating Canada’s ‘diversity advantage’ abroad. Higham, *The World Needs More Canada*, 140.
47 Higham, *The World Needs More Canada*, 139-140. His point retains its logic only by assuming that the presentation internationally of a national image includes those aspects of Canada he cites as examples of the effect: Canada’s forest management practices, its championing of international human rights, as self-proclaimed humanitarians, and as ‘proud peace-builders.’
50 Books, films, and television productions, and professional artists’ services in all disciplines.
French artistic and intellectual supremacy,\textsuperscript{51} and proves the exploitable economic and trade consequences of cultural diplomacy, because it translates into international markets for French fashion, jewellery, wine, food products, and tourism (the love of French culture has long established it as by far the number one world tourist destination). The motivation for the cultural diplomacy of the United States, in his view, is largely driven by a desire to demonstrate its model of democratic capitalism, the ‘model of the supremacy of private enterprise,’\textsuperscript{52} and the mission of the cultural diplomacy of Japan, since the end of World War Two, has been aimed at ‘escaping an overly tenacious image of a closed and strictly traditional society,’ to ‘demonstrate (and to market) the remarkable Japanese competencies in “Western” technologies, western design, and cultures and the arts too.’\textsuperscript{53} Hence Japan’s cultural diplomacy, in his view, seeks both to change Japanese society and to enhance Japanese pride in its achievements. And Australia’s most recent major cultural diplomacy event, the Olympic Games held in Sydney in 2000, demonstrated before a global audience that country’s unique national style of self confidence, enthusiasm and energy.\textsuperscript{54} In Higham’s view, fighting for survival internationally means staking out a space for Canada in the international media. Silence leaves Canada ‘disenfranchised and without influence or legitimacy in the global arena.’\textsuperscript{55}

This comment echoes a key point of the article on cultural diplomacy written by John Ralston Saul for a joint Parliamentary committee which examined Canadian foreign policy in 1994.\textsuperscript{56} The promotion of a national image abroad is essential for any country, especially for a small country competing with large competitors who have other ways of projecting their image:\textsuperscript{57}

Canada's profile abroad is, for the most part, its culture. It is our image. That is what Canada becomes in people's imaginations around the world. When time comes for non-Canadians to buy, to negotiate, or to travel, chances are, the attitude towards Canada will already have been determined to as surprising extent by the projection of our culture abroad….not being a player in international communications today implies disappearing from the planet. It isn't simply a lost cultural and financial opportunity. It is a major problem for foreign policy. Countries dependent on American structures to present them will be visible only as much and in the way that that structure wishes.\textsuperscript{58}

\textsuperscript{51} Higham, \textit{The World Needs More Canada}, 137.  
\textsuperscript{52} Ibid.  
\textsuperscript{55} Higham, \textit{The World Needs More Canada}, 139.  
\textsuperscript{56} Saul, “Culture and Foreign Policy.”  
\textsuperscript{57} Saul, “Culture and Foreign Policy,” 86.  
\textsuperscript{58} Saul, “Culture and Foreign Policy,” 85.
The projection abroad of a national image is so important because the manoeuvrability and influence of countries in the world community is affected by their image, cultural exports are ‘extremely’ profitable, and because trade penetration abroad depends on the image. Saul declares that ‘nations which do not make every effort to export their cultures are naïve and self-destructive. They are attempting to function without a public image in an international climate where those images play an important role.’ Canada had neglected the promotion of its culture abroad because of the failure of trade specialists and politicians to recognise just how valuable culture is to Canada’s economy and its role as the content of the service industry, and because many public figures feel that ‘culture is a difficult area because its content can’t be defined’ as it can with others. Culture is not an ‘adjunct’ of politics and business, a ‘sort of decoration or diversionary entertainment,’ but a value in itself, the ‘real expression of a country, as well as being a money-making business.’ Indeed, trade is more an adjunct of culture, because the ‘widespread, varied and accessible presence of Canadian culture in a foreign culture’ creates the conditions in which trade can flourish. Yet despite having had to compete with favoured foreign imports, Canadian culture had succeeded in establishing a presence abroad, due partly to ‘small programs and imaginative support’ from elements in Foreign Affairs.

Saul argues that in discussing foreign policy it is impossible to ignore the state of the home market: ‘much foreign policy is national policy.’ The link between national and foreign policy needs to be recognised and addressed, and the promotion of a national culture abroad can only be undertaken if a national culture is properly supported domestically, particularly culture’s production and distribution. To insist that the market will do this is ‘abstract ideological nonsense.’ The real problem over time for Canadian culture is not an absence of the creation of culture, nor a market for its consumption, but that it has had to deal with structures of the internal market controlled by the United States, the UK and France. Canada’s domestic cultural producers have had to operate in a domestic market overwhelmingly dominated by foreign producers. As he observes, ‘a film industry which tries to finance itself on 4 percent of the home market is in no

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59 As Saul puts it crassly, ‘American films sell America. They sell soft-drinks, clothes, cars, tourism. They sell the myth.’ Ibid.
60 Ibid.
61 Saul, “Culture and Foreign Policy,” 87.
62 Ibid.
63 Saul, “Culture and Foreign Policy,” 86.
64 Ibid.
65 Saul, “Culture and Foreign Policy,” 87.
position to be active abroad.’66 What is required by Canadian politicians and others is to eschew the ‘prevailing fashionable fatalism attached to public policy and in particular foreign policy.’67 Saul’s list of actions that should be taken by Canada includes substantially increasing funding for cultural policy, addressing the contradictions concerning national support for cultural industries in free trade agreements and national cultural policy, and focusing Canada’s cultural promotion work on markets other than the United States.68 Saul suggests that although the establishment of a Canadian version of the British Council might focus attention inside and outside the government on the role of culture, the small number of Canadian cultural centres and cultural attaches could mean such an entity could sink into the status of an isolated ghetto. Rather, the focus should be on ensuring that the foreign ministry makes the promotion of culture one of its main tasks, because ‘culture is a fundamental of foreign policy.’69 Saul notes that there is a contradiction between the diplomatic approach and culture: culture depends on creativity and salesmanship, whereas diplomacy (or at least those undertaking it) values discretion. The Canadian foreign ministry’s fear of making an error can make it favour representational culture, which he seems to imply involves careful, muted, and respectful cultural activity abroad which seeks to convey prestige and dignity, rather than the best sort of cultural activity aboard, which is ‘noisy, unleashed, unexpected, often shocking or outrageous.’70

Saul believes that the image which Canada should present abroad should be that of a ‘northern country, with two official cultures and languages, an astonishing undeveloped north, a large indigenous population, and unprecedented mix of races and cultural origins.’71 This is in stark contrast, he suggests, to countries which are ‘small, centralized, fully developed’ and monocultural.’ One senses that Saul places equal emphasis these two aspects of his ‘exportable’ image

66 Ibid.
67 Saul, “Culture and Foreign Policy,” 90.
68 Other ideas include establishing a cultural coordinating committee with a ‘healthy selection of artists’ as members, the production of a booklet setting out government culture and foreign policy programmes, and an annual ‘pictionary’ of Canadian culture’ (an illustrated dictionary). Saul recommends against too great a focus on the exchange of technocrats, because such exchanges ‘don’t cause culture to flower or to be sold…don’t produce much in the way of foreign markets’ and ‘have limited political value,’ but argues that Canada’s cultural diplomacy should support people such as journalists, festival organisers, museum and gallery directors, publishers etc. visiting Canada, partly to develop long term relationships, but also to enable them to witness Canada first-hand rather than simply hearing about it.’ Saul, “Culture and Foreign Policy,” 100-101.
69 Saul, “Culture and Foreign Policy,” 95. Arts promotion should become a mainstream career option in the department, at least a quarter of every Canadian diplomat’s career be spent outside Ottawa, on loan or exchange to NGOs, provinces and companies, that each diplomat be ‘linguistically and culturally fluent’ fluent in the language and culture of the country to which they are posted.
70 Saul, “Culture and Foreign Policy,” 98. I use the word imply because these reference are made by Saul in his discussion on cultural centres, rather specifically about what representational culture means.
71 Saul, “Culture and Foreign Policy,” 100.
of Canada: the great northern nation, and the world’s model for multi-ethnic cooperation. Whilst the northern-ness of Canada could arguably seem rather obscure to a non-Canadian, and prompt the response ‘so what?’ (this may of course be less the case for those from Scandinavian countries), it does serve to highlight the issues associated with the promotion abroad of a national image: which image is to be chosen and promoted, who it is to be promoted to, and why?\textsuperscript{72}

A report of the proceedings of a conference held in Canada in 2000 to examine culture and Canadian foreign policy supports Saul’s contention that it is important to support culture ‘at home’ if a country is to be able to promote its culture abroad, the more so given Canada’s ‘deepening poly-ethnic character,’ which the report suggests has never been tried anywhere else in the world.\textsuperscript{73} Because of the broadening of culture’s role (it has become a ‘regular feature in World Bank and G-8 documents), promoting Canadian culture abroad may no longer be ‘best seen as a tool of foreign policy but rather an issue in its own right.’\textsuperscript{74}

Despite a regression in financial and institutional support provided to Canada’s third foreign policy objective, the third pillar, over the period 1995 to 2000, the report notes that there had been enviable progress in promoting Canadian culture abroad, through Canadian writers such as a Margaret Atwood, the Canadian studies abroad programme, and the work of Canada’s foreign ministry. Globalisation, which can foster a loss of identities and culture, and reinforce differences instead of ‘celebrating cultural diversity,’\textsuperscript{75} has also resulted in multiculturalism in Canada: heterogeneity rather than homogenisation. Canada’s multicultural complexity has meant that in every conflict in the world all sides of the conflict will be represented by some portion of the Canadian population. Hence Canada’s cultural and foreign policies must become more complex, and must reflect this new demographic complexity. Canada’s new populations must be able to make a contribution to foreign policy development, and must also be able to be involved in promoting the ‘dynamic, complex, Canadian culture at home and abroad.’\textsuperscript{76}

The report suggests that Canada’s ‘cultural toolbox’\textsuperscript{77} might usefully be supplemented with a new international cultural instrument on diversity, so that cultural exemptions in trade instruments could be removed and place within the new instrument, so as to enable governments

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{72} Saul, “Culture and Foreign Policy,” 101.
\item \textsuperscript{73} Canadian Institute of International Affairs, \textit{Culture Sans Frontière}, 4.
\item \textsuperscript{74} Canadian Institute of International Affairs, \textit{Culture Sans Frontière}, 3.
\item \textsuperscript{75} Canadian Institute of International Affairs, \textit{Culture Sans Frontière}, 4.
\item \textsuperscript{76} Canadian Institute of International Affairs, \textit{Culture Sans Frontière}, 4.
\item \textsuperscript{77} This means the group of tools that can be used to protect and promote culture in the face on increasingly acrimonious trade disputes over cultural products.
\end{itemize}
to support culture without facing ‘arbitrary rules.’  The report serves to highlight the difficulties faced by a country with an increasingly complex culture, ‘striving to have its voice heard over all the shouting about globalization,’ wishing to pursue simultaneously trade and cultural policies that support its aims of social cohesion and economic prosperity, whilst located geographically next door to the ‘largest exporter of mass cultural products in the world.’

Some perspectives on the cultural diplomacy of Germany, Japan and the UK

Germany

Werz, in his examination of the external cultural policy of Germany, observes that Germany’s external cultural policy, which ranks as the ‘third pillar’ of foreign policy, fluctuates ‘between the probably unsuccessful attempt to present who the Germans really are and the attempt to show others how we would like to be seen.’ A third aspect – the mediation of foreign cultures at home – was ‘added’ to the scope of Germany’s external cultural policy in the 1970s. The focus remains on European states and the United States, with funds for external cultural policy activity provided not directly to the foreign ministry but to ‘mediator’ organisations, primarily the Goethe Institute, but also to the Institute of Foreign Cultural Relations which links to expatriate Germans, and the ‘Haus der Kulturen der Welt,’ set up in 1989 as a forum for non-European cultures. German states also undertake cultural diplomacy. Werz briefly charts the changing focus of Germany’s cultural diplomacy over the period from the 1970s to the mid 1990s, with its varying emphases on exchange versus one-way image presentation. In the 1990s, the focus of Germany’s external cultural policy included the ‘consolidation of the unity of the German Kulturnation.’ German unification changed the overall setting of Germany’s external cultural policy: as Wertz notes,

78 Canadian Institute of International Affairs, Culture Sans Frontière, 4.
79 Canadian Institute of International Affairs, Culture Sans Frontière, 4. The interaction between Canada’s cultural and trade policies is examined in detail in the Canada case study.
80 Kishan Rana’s recent chapter on Indian cultural diplomacy, whilst partly a personal reminiscence of a former diplomat now turned academic, sets out some notable characteristics of that country’s cultural diplomacy, particularly its bureaucratic nature, and its focus on educational exchanges. Rana notes, briefly, the limits placed on cultural diplomacy by a country’s foreign policy, the impact that events can have on a country’s ‘fragile, intangible, easily distorted’ cultural image, and the early developments of an official brand for India. Rana, Inside Diplomacy.
82 Werz, Ibid. Katzenstein notes that in 1970, the new guidelines for German cultural diplomacy not only insisted on the introduction of other cultures into Germany, but also had the effect of broadening its concept to include popular diplomacy. A European dimension was added in 1977 - cultural diplomacy was required to aid European cultural integration. Katzenstein, Open Regionalism, 24.
83 The full title of the organisation provides a sense of its scope: The Goethe Institute for the Cultivation of the German Language Abroad and for the Promotion of International Cultural Cooperation.
the “socialist German national culture” propagated by the GDR, which was based on the attempt to selectively appropriate the humanist-progressive heritage, hardly left its mark abroad. Whereas activities abroad were officially intended “as a major contribution towards the further strengthening of the socialist community of states and towards the offensive ideological conflict with imperialism”, its de facto emphasis was placed on traditional cultural activities.\textsuperscript{85}

In Katzenstein’s view, Germany’s post war cultural diplomacy has been about rehabilitation of its battered reputation: an image of normality, rather than the image of national greatness which he suggests most commentators agree remains the objective of French cultural diplomacy.\textsuperscript{86}

Japan

Recent articles on the cultural diplomacy of Japan focus on the establishment, by the Japanese government, of a Council on the Promotion of Cultural Diplomacy, in 2004, and the Council’s report, in 2005, setting out the shape of Japan’s new cultural diplomacy initiative.\textsuperscript{87} According to Kondo (one of the architects of the Council’s establishment), the Council aims to promote appreciation of Japan and friendly relations through cultural exchange. He notes that since the end of the Cold War, the world has moved from an age of ideological confrontation to an age in which nations compete to present attractive ideals and culture. The spread of democracy and of the market economy has made it possible for ordinary citizens to play a much larger role in determining their nation’s direction, and diplomacy must now appeal ‘not just to the governments of other countries but also to their publics.’\textsuperscript{88} Because ‘waves of globalisation’ have been ‘relentlessly washing the ideas and culture of big countries across borders faster than they can be absorbed,’ so much so that they threaten to engulf ‘the very identities of smaller countries,’ the

\textsuperscript{85} Werz, “External Cultural Policy,” 254. The term ‘selectively appropriate’ can well be applied to all cultural diplomacy, regardless of the ideology of the country with which it is associated, and it is a fascinating aspect of the cultural diplomacy of the Cold War that much of each of the main combatant’s cultural diplomacy drew on a shared humanist-progressive heritage.

\textsuperscript{86} Ibid. Katzenstein draws on examples of the practice of cultural diplomacy of Japan and Germany to investigate the way in which internationalisation and globalisation are jointly creating an open regionalism in contemporary world politics that is in contrast to the bloc regionalism of the 1930s. He notes that despite ‘very noticeable differences’ between the content and strength of the national and international elements in Japan’s and Germany’s state identities, the cultural diplomacy of each country champions cultural exchange, which serves to build closer links between countries, and hence support open regionalism. States typically regard themselves as the ‘privileged carriers of national culture,’ and that they regard it as their special prerogative to represent the cultural achievements of the political community in the international society. Katzenstein, “Open Regionalism,” 2-10.

\textsuperscript{87} The Council and its report are discussed in Kondo, “A Major Stride for Japan’s Cultural Diplomacy,” and Aoki, Kondo and Wang, “Cultural Exchange: A National Priority.”

\textsuperscript{88} Kondo, “A Major Stride for Japan’s Cultural Diplomacy,” 36.
new Council was given the mandate of suggesting new ways to preserve and develop the diversity of global culture and contribute to global peace and prosperity.\textsuperscript{89}

Despite this ambitious mandate, the three principles for the conduct of cultural diplomacy on which the Council settled seem less to focus on maintaining global cultural diversity and more on showing Japan to the world. The first principle posits a greater importance on the use of Japan’s international reputation in popular culture, particularly Japanese animation and comic books, in order to provide a starting point for understanding Japan. The second principle aims to increase the number of non-Japanese using Japan as a base for creative activities. This seems to be more concerned with enabling non-Japanese to ‘accurately understand Japan’s good points’ than it is with enabling the Japanese to get to know better other cultures.\textsuperscript{90} The third principle of coexistence, focussed on east Asia, whilst couched in the language of ‘harmony and peaceful coexistence,’ seems more to aimed at improving diplomatic relations between Japan and its near neighbours on a long term basis.\textsuperscript{91} Kondo notes that the work of the new Council will serve to help Japan itself: it can ‘help the Japanese people recover the self-confidence that has been battered by the long spell of economic stagnation starting in the early 1990s.’ The Council’s work ‘can reinvigorate Japanese society, stimulate the economy, and enhance Japan’s international position as a country to be admired.’\textsuperscript{92}

In a speech given in 2006, Japan’s foreign minister noted that the focus on Japanese popular culture (and also on developing an English-language channel for non-Japanese viewers) was motivated by a wish to convey to the world more extensively ‘a more true-to-life image of modern Japan’ in order to gradually increase the depth of support that exists for Japanese diplomacy.\textsuperscript{93} The minister noted that popular opinion was having an increasingly important role on diplomacy, and as a result Japan should use popular culture to assist with its diplomacy. Popular culture could also contribute to Japan’s competitive brand image, which would make it easier for Japan to get its views across ‘over the long term.’\textsuperscript{94} The use of Japan’s popular culture (which was to work in combination with the existing positive traditional images of Japan, such as the tea ceremony, geisha, Mt Fujiyama and cherry blossom) would also serve to draw in a wide

\textsuperscript{89} Kondo, “A Major Stride for Japan’s Cultural Diplomacy,” 36.
\textsuperscript{90} Kondo, “A Major Stride for Japan’s Cultural Diplomacy,” 37.
\textsuperscript{91} Aoki, Kondo and Wang, “Cultural Exchange: A National Priority,” 34-35.
\textsuperscript{92} Kondo, “A Major Stride for Japan’s Cultural Diplomacy,” 37.
\textsuperscript{93} Aso, “A New Look at Cultural Diplomacy,” 7. Japanese animation and cartoons have gained considerable audiences throughout the world, including France, China and Thailand. See Aoki, Kondo, and Wang, "Cultural Exchange: A National Priority," 32.
\textsuperscript{94} Aso, “A New Look at Cultural Diplomacy,” 4.
range of people, not just diplomats, to help with Japan’s diplomacy. The ultimate goal of cultural diplomacy, the minister declared, was to expand the number of people throughout the world who had a friendly feeling towards the Japanese.

In Katzenstein’s view, Japan’s cultural diplomacy has sought to increase other peoples’ understanding of Japan’s uniqueness, teach Japanese language, and act as a form of economic instrument that would create a stable economic environment for Japanese business abroad as well as ‘smooth ruffled feathers’ caused by Japan’s economic ascendancy. He notes that well into the 1980s, Japan’s cultural diplomacy showed a remarkable consistency of purpose – to instruct others of Japan’s uniqueness. The Japan Foundation, set up in 1972 and administratively located within Japan’s foreign ministry, was set up to ‘combat both the misunderstandings of Japanese foreign policy and Japanese business practices abroad and to counteract an underlying fear of isolation that remains a constant theme in Japan's cultural diplomacy.’ The head of the Foundation, interviewed in 2004, was clear that one of the Foundation’s primary objectives was to contribute to Japan’s foreign policy, to create an environment which would enable that foreign policy to ‘function on a wider scale and more flexibly’ (and also to help ‘correct ways of thinking in the world that oppose or reject Japan.’)

In addition, Katzenstein sees the provision of substantial financial support for UNESCO, which was rewarded when Koichiro Matsuura of Japan was elected the first Asian head of that body, as a form of status politics that sought in part to make up for Japan’s absence on the UN Security Council. And greater emphasis has been placed on regionalism - the Japan Foundation’s increased support for cultural exchanges with Asia became an important political symbol of Japan’s interest in Asia.

Katzenstein argues that Japanese cultural diplomacy has recently been more focussed on gaining a better understanding of and respect for foreign cultures, in order to make Japan less insular, a view supported by Hirano, who cites the recent establishment of the Japan Foundation’s Asian Cultural Centre, the first public organisation in Japan charged with

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95 Aso, “A New Look at Cultural Diplomacy,” 1. The need to draw on both strands of Japanese culture – the traditional and the contemporary – is discussed in Aoki, Kondo, and Wang, "Cultural Exchange: A National Priority,” 34.
97 This view is shared by Hirano, “International Cultural Conflicts,” 157.
98 The Foundation became an independent administrative institution in October 2003.
100 Kentaro, “Exchange for the Better,” 1.
introducing the cultures of other countries to the Japanese.\textsuperscript{103} This change in approach contrasts with that adopted by Japan in the years immediately following the establishment of the Japan Foundation in 1972, which Hirano sees as showing signs of aggressiveness, with little thought given to the need for the Japanese to try and understand other peoples’ cultures.\textsuperscript{104} It is worth noting that Japan considers its cultural diplomacy to include Japanese diplomacy concerned with the negotiation and promulgation of international cultural agreements.\textsuperscript{105}

\textit{The UK}

The 2007 report on cultural diplomacy of the British think tank Demos argues that governments should no longer regard cultural diplomacy as simply desirable, but essential, no longer an ‘addon’ but rather a part of the core business of foreign relations.\textsuperscript{106} The report posits cultural diplomacy as one facet of international relations, an element of soft power, distinct from public diplomacy (but not able to be totally separated from it\textsuperscript{107}), involving the ‘quest for the tourist dollar as well as the battle for hearts and minds,’\textsuperscript{108} but a term ‘not easily defined.’\textsuperscript{109} Major UK cultural institutions such as the British Museum\textsuperscript{110} are regarded as part of the UK’s cultural diplomacy resources, in addition to the ‘standard’ cultural diplomacy bodies such as the BBC World Service and the British Council. In the report’s conceptualisation of cultural diplomacy, the UK’s great cultural institutions (and small regional and amateur organisations) are seemingly deemed participants in the UK’s cultural diplomacy because of their public service, rather than due to a more explicit connection to UK diplomacy, or foreign policy, or both: ‘the public service nature of these institutions makes them effective, but unofficial, ambassadors for the UK while their public appeal makes them a valuable bridge between diplomacy, international relations and public opinion.’\textsuperscript{111} The authors do note that some major institutions such as the British Library have well-articulated international policies that take into account FCO priorities, and argue that the increased funding they urge be made available for UK cultural diplomacy should only be provided to those cultural institutions willing to undertake work which aligns with government

\textsuperscript{103} Hirano, “Internationalization of the Japanese,” 1.
\textsuperscript{104} Hirano, “International Cultural Conflicts,” 158.
\textsuperscript{105} Aso, “A New Look at Cultural Diplomacy,” 2.
\textsuperscript{106} Bound, Briggs, Holden and Jones, \textit{Cultural Diplomacy}, 22.
\textsuperscript{107} Bound, Briggs, Holden and Jones, \textit{Cultural Diplomacy}, 23. The authors later in the report (page 65) suggest that culture’s distinct role in public diplomacy can broadly be defined as cultural diplomacy.
\textsuperscript{110} And also includes the British Library, Natural History Museum, Victoria and Albert Museum, Royal Botanic Gardens, Kew, and Natural History Museum, the Royal Opera House. Ibid.
\textsuperscript{111} Bound, Briggs, Holden and Jones, \textit{Cultural Diplomacy}, 49.
priorities. However, the cultural or scholarly objectives of such institutions should not be driven by the government’s foreign policy agenda, because that would ‘not be in the UK’s long term interests and might give the impression that …institutions are political tools.’ The report argues that culture has become much more significant in public diplomacy because of changes to the international environment in which the construction and projection of countries’ national identity has become important, and in which the ‘the emerging Asian powers understand the important of culture and are consciously using it as a means to project themselves not just to foreign governments, but also to global public opinion and potential partners and allies.’ The authors argue that the UK’s cultural activity has the potential to contribute to that country’s management of others perceptions of it, and the development of lasting relationships (both seen as elements of public diplomacy), but that this cultural activity remains undervalued and poorly coordinated. Culture can become the most important tool for the UK’s public diplomacy practitioners (in the new, complex world within which public diplomacy must now operate) because of its capacity to connect in an age in which there is increasing cynicism about the credibility of national governments, increased sources of information, particularly the Internet, and an enhanced capacity of the Internet to subvert governments’ ability to manage their relationships with their populations (especially when married with popular mass television programmes). Culture can showcase a ‘diversity of views, perspectives and opinions,’ break down persistent national stereotypes and challenge the perception that a country’s political leaders and their policies are identical with the views of their citizens. This capacity to differentiate the views of political leaders and their policies with those of citizens is particularly important when a country ‘suffers reputational damage,’ such as that experienced by the United States and UK following the invasion of Iraq in 2003.

The report’s authors argue for a substantial increase in UK government funding in cultural infrastructure (the lack of which it describes as ‘almost a national embarrassment’), for several reasons. First, the UK’s significant cultural institutions and cultural industries are internationally

112 Bound, Briggs, Holden and Jones, Cultural Diplomacy, 22.
113 Bound, Briggs, Holden and Jones, Cultural Diplomacy, 17. Public diplomacy takes a variety of forms based on the differences in countries’ global outlooks, capacities and profiles, and the models include the niche public diplomacy of the Norwegian states, the arms length ‘distributed’ system of the UK, the centralised and state-funded French approach and the ‘propaganda’ model of the United States and China.
114 The authors ‘take a broad view of what the term culture includes’: science, sport and popular culture as well as the performing and visual arts and heritage – and food. Bound, Briggs, Holden and Jones, Cultural Diplomacy, 16.
116 Ibid.
117 Bound, Briggs, Holden and Jones, Cultural Diplomacy, 44.
reputable. Second, they are economically vital to the UK’s future prosperity, international reputation and international image. Third, cultural tourism, cultural exports and the ‘cultural battle for hearts and minds’ are competitive marketplaces,118 and as a result there is a danger that a country such as the UK will lose this competition if it does not adequately support its culture and cultural infrastructure. Fourth, the UK and many other ‘traditional powers’ need to ‘renegotiate their place in the world,’ by changing their relationship with a handful of key countries, and culture can play a key role in this process, ‘easing relations when they are strained, re-brokering them for changed times, and establishing fresh links in uncharted waters.’119 At all times, the right balance needs to be struck between ‘culture being used instrumentally for political ends, where behaviour can seem Machiavellian and both politics and culture suffer, and maintaining too much distance between the two.’120 The authors suggest that the UK’s traditional focus on the arms-length principle has resulted in lost opportunities for its cultural diplomacy: ‘distance can at times be taken too far at the expense of significant opportunities.’121 Whilst acknowledging that adopting the French model, in which the structures of diplomacy are integrated with those of culture, would be a step too far for the UK (because the UK’s cultural institutions guard their independence fiercely), the authors urge the UK to let go of its hang-ups about the relationship between culture and politics.122 And the authors also warn of the dangers of a ‘pick and mix’ approach to national image, and of the need for a state to maintain a relatively coherent national ‘story’ or image.123 The issue of multiple national identities – in the case of the UK, exemplified by the thatched cottage sitting alongside the Tate Modern – should not be a cause for alarm.

The cultural diplomacy of Scandinavia

Mette Lending places Norway’s cultural diplomacy (and that of other Scandinavian countries) in the wider context of the history and current practice of international foreign cultural policy.124 Norway’s cultural diplomacy has in recent years has been motivated by the ‘desire for the greatest possible degree of visibility on an international arena where there are a large number of

120 Bound, Briggs, Holden and Jones, *Cultural Diplomacy*, 53. See also pp. 62-64.
121 Ibid.
122 Bound, Briggs, Holden and Jones, *Cultural Diplomacy*, 64.
124 Lending notes that Scandinavian countries deliver their cultural diplomacy in varying mixes of foreign, education and culture ministries and independent entities such as the Swedish Institute. Only in Denmark does the foreign ministry play little part in determining or administering the country’s foreign cultural policy.
players and an increasingly broad range of high quality cultural offerings.\textsuperscript{125} Lending defines cultural diplomacy as ‘international cultural relations in which public authorities are directly or indirectly involved’ (without defining what constitutes ‘indirectly’), noting that the varying definitions used by countries undertaking cultural diplomacy ‘reveal major semantic differences,’ and the number and type of activities covered by the varying terms ‘refer to specific national projects with different scope and historical notions.’\textsuperscript{126} The traditional division between cultural and informational activities is being eradicated: cultural exchange concerns not only art and culture but also communicating a country’s thinking, research, journalism and national debate. ‘In this perspective…the growth of “public” diplomacy becomes a reaction to the close connection between cultural, press and information activities, as a result of new social, economic and political realities.’\textsuperscript{127}

In his view, the three main contemporary issues in the ‘foreign cultural field’ are the relationship between exchange and national self-promotion (‘export’ and ‘import’), national image, and the relationship between culture and foreign policy. The emphasis of most states has been on promotion rather than two way exchange, despite some countries promoting the presentation of a foreign culture ‘at home’ to a domestic audience in order to place cultural diplomacy on more reciprocal basis (such as the UK’s Visiting Arts programme and Germany’s House of World Cultures). Lending argues that before and during the two world wars, national self-presentation was associated with propaganda, because it was ‘the dissemination of more or less doubtful truths for the purpose of influence and manipulation,’\textsuperscript{128} but since the end of the second world war, the expressed goal has moved towards presenting ‘diversified pictures that “neither pretend that warts are not there nor…parade them to the repugnance of others,”’\textsuperscript{129} despite the trend in the period of the Cold War to show a country’s best aspects. In the 1990s and following, most states have tried to present as varied and realistic image of themselves as possible, opposed ‘conscious efforts to conceal any domestic political problems or conflicts’, but have struggled to reach agreement on which image of the country should be presented to the

\textsuperscript{125} Lending, \textit{Change and Renewal}, 13.

\textsuperscript{126} Cultural diplomacy can for instance be an effective tool for maintaining minimum contacts between countries during those periods (such as the Cold War) when more high profile political contacts were difficult to cultivate. Lending, \textit{Change and Renewal}, 5.

\textsuperscript{127} Lending, \textit{Change and Renewal}, 3. This point is made also by Melissen: the overlap between what he terms cultural relations, and public diplomacy, will grow, in part because of the need for public diplomacy to focus less on ‘messaging’ and promotion campaigns and more on building relationships with civil society actors in other countries. Melissen, \textit{The New Public Diplomacy}, 22.

\textsuperscript{128} Lending, \textit{Change and Renewal}, 19.

\textsuperscript{129} The quote should be attributed to (but is not) J. M. Mitchell. See Mitchell, \textit{International Cultural Relations}, 5.
outside world.\(^{130}\) Re-branding has been linked to the question of national identity and to what it means to be a national. National identities are ‘neither natural nor immutable, but are constructed and reconstructed in reaction to changing needs and opportunities.’\(^{131}\) Lending sees efforts to re-brand a country as involved with the replacement of ‘outdated and negative national stereotypes,’ but the real difficulty for those government entities involved in deriving a new national image is agreeing on a coherent image that can be presented abroad – for a range of sometimes contradictory purposes.\(^ {132}\) As Lending notes, Mark Leonard’s seminal article on national branding written in 1997\(^ {133}\) caused controversy in the UK, with some – but not all - decrying the ‘intentions of marketing Britain like any other commercial product.’\(^ {134}\)

Lending believes that organisational models have little effect on the capacity of authorities such as foreign ministries to influence foreign cultural priorities, by which he means the contribution to foreign policy objectives.\(^ {135}\) He cites the British Council as an example of an independent organisation which has become more closely linked than before to foreign political activities: the British Council’s goal to ‘project the United Kingdom’s creativity, cultural diversity and recent achievements, and to challenge outmoded stereotypes of the UK abroad’ is ‘an element of broad public diplomacy aimed at establishing a new British image in the world.’\(^ {136}\) The Swedish Institute’s linking to the Swedish foreign ministry, the subsumation of the United States Information Service into the State Department, the declaration by the German

\(^{130}\) Lending, *Change and Renewal*, 20. Lending’s general assertion concerning an apparent trend of countries towards presenting as varied and realistic image abroad as possible arguably overstates the case. Certainly there has been a move towards eschewing the presentation abroad of a national image which glosses over national ‘warts’ (or is inaccurate, or is selective to the point of duplicity), and this reflects the impact of the global information and communication revolution which has enabled the public to access information about a country and therefore judge the accuracy or otherwise of an official national image. But it can be argued that governments do not aim to maximise the varied or realistic characteristics of their image when presenting it abroad. Rather, states wish to show themselves in the very best possible light whilst avoiding being accused of fabrication or duplicity. It is a question of balance. Cultural diplomacy aims to persuade, not dissuade. Lending’s assertion that most states oppose ‘conscious efforts to conceal any domestic political problems or conflicts’ may well be true but is not strictly the point. Opposing conscious efforts to conceal any domestic political problems or conflicts is not the same as consciously seeking to bring to people’s attention domestic political problems or conflicts.

\(^ {131}\) Lending, *Change and Renewal*, 20.

\(^ {132}\) This problem most frequently manifests itself in the conflicting goals of national tourist promotion bodies, with their focus on those aspects of a country most likely to appeal to tourists, and national trade promotion bodies, with their focus on what most appeals to investors and business people.

\(^ {133}\) Leonard, *Britain™ Renewing our Identity*.

\(^ {134}\) Lending, *Change and Renewal*, 21. Fox notes that the journalist Mark Steyn commented that ‘Cool Britannia is a Fool’s Britannia: a present-tense culture that disdains its past is unlikely to have much of a future.’ Fox, *Cultural Diplomacy at the Crossroads*, 11.

\(^ {135}\) He notes as well that it is not possible to assess the role and importance various states ascribe to official cultural cooperation by simply comparing respective budgets because the type and number of activities that are regarded as being part of foreign cultural activity vary from one country to the next and are ‘posted under many different budget items.’ Lending, *Change and Renewal*, 4.

\(^ {136}\) Lending, *Change and Renewal*, 23.
foreign minister to use culture as an element in the promotion of human rights and to help spread ‘German democratic values,’ and the ‘new emphasis on international cultural co-operation and public diplomacy in ‘country after country’ is a clear sign that culture and communication are beginning to play a far more important role in foreign policy everywhere.’

Several comparative perspectives
Several authors have undertaken comparative analyses of cultural diplomacy, usually in order to explicate key aspects of and trends in the practice. Robert Fox’s report on the proceedings of a conference involving cultural diplomacy practitioners held in 1997 focuses on the cultural diplomacy of Europe, and he provides a useful summary of the pertinent aspects of the cultural diplomacy of the United States, Canada, France, the UK and Germany (and particularly the focus on language in the cultural diplomacy of the latter three). Fox suggests that the reason why cultural diplomacy is so difficult to define lies in its two terms, diplomacy and culture and their ‘semantic baggage.’

New terms of diplomacy have emerged, such as popular or people’s diplomacy and public diplomacy, and each implies a different degree of public profile and government agency involvement. For Fox, the term cultural diplomacy implies the involvement of government ‘to whatever extent’ in the business of projecting the nation’s image abroad. Fox uses the term public diplomacy interchangeably with cultural diplomacy, and observes that ‘cultural, or public, diplomacy is an arm of diplomacy itself, the business of winning friends and influencing people.’ The independence of agencies such as the British Council (which Fox notes is regarded as arguably the market leader in the arena of cultural diplomacy) and the Goethe Institute will be hard, if not impossible, to achieve so long as they ‘rely on central funds raised from taxation revenue.’

In his brief look at the cultural diplomacy of Canada, Fox, as with many before him, begins with Saul’s comment concerning the naivety and self-destructiveness of nations which do not make every effort to export their cultures. Fox believes that Canadian uncertainty about the nature of Canadian society, and Saul’s efforts to make Canada’s demographic and ethnic diversity ‘a plus’, demonstrates

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137 Lending, Change and Renewal, 23.
138 Fox, Cultural Diplomacy at the Crossroads, 2.
139 Ibid.
140 Fox, Cultural Diplomacy at the Crossroads, 7.
141 Fox, Cultural Diplomacy at the Crossroads, 3.
142 Fox describes Saul’s report as ‘colourful and highly personalized.’ Fox, Cultural Diplomacy at the Crossroads, 12.
one of the major pitfalls of the cultural diplomacy/public diplomacy debate. National ideas, like national branding, and indeed national focus groups, are creatures of fashion, and easily become dated. Like fashion items they may be the dernier cri for the initiates and cognoscenti, but they only work if they are an internationally convertible intellectual currency; they have to attract the buyers as much as they please the seller.143

Robert Williams’ comparative examination of the international cultural programmes of Canada and Australia provides a valuable analysis of cultural diplomacy’s relationship to international cultural relations, and the connection between cultural diplomacy and foreign policy objectives. Williams takes as his starting point a comment made by a report of a federal committee reviewing Canada’s cultural policy in the early 1980s, which criticised Canada’s foreign ministry for ‘letting “the political concerns of foreign policy predominate to the detriment of Canada’s international cultural relations when budgetary and administrative decisions are made.”’ 144 Williams posits two forms of government international cultural programmes and policies. International cultural relations facilitate the achievement of cultural policy objectives (the autonomist approach). By contrast, cultural diplomacy (the auxiliary approach) is undertaken in order to facilitate the achievement of foreign policy objectives. Both forms have a common element – the “extension of the understanding and appreciation of one society by another through the achievements of “cultural agents.””145 Distinguishing one form from another does not rest on the nature of the administrative entity used: Williams notes that examples often cited of international cultural relations include the activities of France through its foreign ministry and the UK through the British Council. In the autonomist approach, ‘the pursuit of international cultural relations has a rationale and a viability somewhat distinct from the mainstream of foreign policy.’146 In the auxiliary approach, cultural diplomacy is heavily influenced by foreign policy considerations, to the extent that the priorities for cultural programmes will be established on the basis of such criteria as cementing strategic or commercial affiliations, or offsetting sympathy which might lie with a potential adversary, or achieving co-ordinated appeals to influential opinion-leaders or decision-makers.’147

Williams believes that the review committee, rather than drawing on French, British and German models of the ‘export of cultural riches’ to evaluate the appropriateness of an independent agency

143 Fox, Cultural Diplomacy at the Crossroads, 17.
144 Williams, “Canada and Australia Compared,” 84.
145 Williams, “Canada and Australia Compared,” 86.
146 Williams, “Canada and Australia Compared,” 87.
147 Ibid.
for international cultural programmes, should have looked at a country such as Australia. Australia’s international cultural policies seemed to ‘be moving purposefully to adopt the auxiliary approach’ while Canada’s foreign ministry operated a ‘dualistic international cultural programme’ in which the two approaches were intermingled, albeit with ‘top billing’ being given to international cultural relations. Williams’ comparative examination of the priority countries of Canadian international cultural relations and those of Canadian cultural diplomacy is a useful method of assessing the extent to which the two approaches intersect, and a useful reminder that the target audiences of government international cultural relations and cultural diplomacy simultaneously differ and coincide.

In his fourteen country survey on international cultural affairs carried out for the government of Canada (a survey in which only ten of fourteen countries replied in whole or part to the survey), Chartrand asserts that ‘cultural affairs are being transformed from an internal domestic concern into an external security question, involving national identity, sovereignty, and survival.’ He notes that a fundamental characteristic of cultural goods and services is that ‘they are essentially carriers of values,’ and this is important because of the ongoing debate about cultural sovereignty. One side of this debate argues that regional identity is based upon a distinct set of values and is important in countering the impact of a homogenising, standardised global culture, whilst the other side of the debate argues for the universality of human values such as freedom, dignity and prosperity, transmitted through new communication and information technology. Chartrand defines international cultural affairs as a national foreign policy instrument comprising a wide range of activities ‘conducted or directed by a given nation to an audience outside its borders, as well as the activities of other nations conducted or directed within a nation’s borders,’ and includes in this rubric broadcasting and sport as well as the ‘usual’ activities of academic relations. He sees these activities being undertaken for three reasons (‘motivations’); cultural diplomacy, cultural relations and cultural sales. The categories are not necessarily mutually exclusive: ‘they are a question of degree, not of kind.’ Defining cultural

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148 Australia ‘shares many similarities in foreign policy, cultural dynamics, and government systems’ with Canada.
149 Williams, “Canada and Australia Compared,” 89. Williams’ article was written in the early 1980s. Williams notes that the reforming zeal of the Whitlam government elected in 1972 included a desire to ensure that in both cultural and foreign policy, Australia’s distinctiveness was to be emphasised, and that under the Whitlam government, international cultural programmes of Australia’s foreign ministry came to be seen as an integral part of foreign policy and a diplomatic tool to help achieve broad national objectives, including the projection of Australia’s image abroad as a country with a strong and vigorous cultural and intellectual life.
150 Williams, “Canada and Australia Compared,” 99.
diplomacy, Chartrand draws entirely on Mitchell’s definition: cultural diplomacy is essentially the business of governments with two levels of meaning; the negotiating of a range of cultural agreements between governments to permit, facilitate or prescribe cultural exchanges, and execution of these agreements and cultural relations flowing from them.\textsuperscript{153} By contrast (again echoing Mitchell), cultural relations are ‘neutral and mutual in their intent and impact, seeking ‘not one-sided advantage’ but mutual understanding and cooperation. He notes that ‘best and most subtle’ cultural diplomacy is veiled as cultural relations.\textsuperscript{154} The third side of his ‘cultural affairs triangle’ is commercial pop or mass culture.

\textit{Cultural diplomacy and security}

The two Canadian authors, Pennee and Belanger, have examined cultural diplomacy’s relationship to foreign policy within a security framework. Pennee applies the gaze of a scholar of literature to an examination of selected federal policy statements covering the period 1951 to 1998, including the federal government foreign policy statement which declared the promotion of Canadian culture and values as the third pillar of Canada’s foreign policy.\textsuperscript{155} Pennee notes that the role of culture and cultural policy within international policy ‘remains conspicuous by its near-absence from the scholarship,’ and wonders if this state of affairs may be attributed to the power of disciplinary boundaries or to the place which cultural diplomacy has in the practice of diplomacy (it is not the ‘real’ work of foreign ministries but rather the ‘third pillar’ or the ‘fourth dimension’, the ‘soft’ side of diplomacy and of power). Despite all this, Pennee believes that the history of a nation-state’s use of culture in foreign policy can be read as a ‘sort of barometer’ of change in the way that culture is implicated in the protection of the nation-state, and in how the notion and identity of ‘the enemy’ is understood and articulated.\textsuperscript{156} The beginnings of Canada’s cultural diplomacy were prompted by threats from the ‘enemy within’ - Québec representing its unique language and culture as a separate nation-state. In response, the federal government of Canada presented a ‘united, federalist, civic-nationalist front in the field of foreign relations.’\textsuperscript{157}

\textsuperscript{153} Chartrand, “International Cultural Affairs,” 138. Whilst acknowledging Mitchell in his bibliography, Chartrand might usefully have also placed his definition of cultural diplomacy (almost entirely that of Mitchell’s) in quotation marks.
\textsuperscript{154} Chartrand, “International Cultural Affairs,” 139.
\textsuperscript{155} Pennee’s article is posited as an initial mapping of proposed research that examines the function of Canadian literature in Canadian studies programmes in Canada and overseas, research which seeks in part to answer the question ‘how is the historically prominent role of literary culture in the making of a nation understood in the present context of international culture and international economic pressures on nation-states?’
\textsuperscript{156} Pennee, “Culture as Security,” 196.
\textsuperscript{157} Pennee, “Culture as Security,” 194.
These origins in ‘crisis management’ marked the start of a move towards using the presentation of Canada’s image abroad as one part of the management of Canada’s economic relations abroad. The Massey Commission, in the early 1950s, saw securing and protecting Canadian culture ‘at home’ through cultural policy as a means of cultivating the Canadian population, having a culture which was worthy of Canada’s new international role, defending Canada’s share of, and contribution to, civilisation, and defending Canada from the invasion by cultural material from the United States, which had had the impact of weakening Canada’s creative effort – a ‘cultural declaration of independence.’\(^\text{158}\) The focus of that policy in the 1980-82 federal review of cultural policy had become aligned towards the ‘more efficient international marketing of cultural product.’\(^\text{159}\) By the time of the 1995 foreign policy review, Pennee observes that the security of Canada had come to depend not on cultural independence but on the capacity to continue to pursue capital. However, whereas the ideological nature of the threat engendered by the Cold War was made obvious, there is now silence with regard to the ideological nature of the threat to national security engendered by challenges to economic prosperity. One ideology, that of the Cold War, of communism versus capitalism, has been replaced by another - that of capitalism and international access to foreign capital – yet the role which unabated economic growth for all, aided and abetted by cultural diplomacy, now plays in attaining security remains silent, despite such a goal carrying ‘precisely the contradictions that threaten world order.’\(^\text{160}\)

Pennee notes that the move in rhetoric from the obvious enemy of the Cold War to the silent enemy of the market wars has even infiltrated the world of international aid: foreign aid has now become ‘an investment in prosperity and employment.’ In this scenario of silent ideology, Penne notes that ‘culture’ becomes ‘in official policy synonymous with the culture of capital.’\(^\text{161}\) The privileging of capitalist economics as the foundation of states’ relations with one another after the Cold War occurs at the expense of the role of ‘social forces’ or of pockets of civil society which may have different values and different means. And whilst culture may have the capacity to challenge the primacy of economics, to contribute to a ‘counter-hegemony’ that challenges the ‘institution and maintenance of a world order which serves the interests of the dominant class of the dominant state’ while at the same time serving ‘the interest of the dominant classes of other states as well,’\(^\text{162}\) one wonders how effective such a possible challenge may be

\(^{158}\) Pennee, “Culture as Security,” 197-199.
\(^{159}\) Pennee, “Culture as Security,” 195.
\(^{160}\) Pennee, “Culture as Security,” 196.
\(^{161}\) Pennee, “Culture as Security,” 196. The italics are Pennee’s.
\(^{162}\) Pennee, “Culture as Security,” 201.
without, ironically, increased funding for culture that would most likely only be provided in the cause of the pursuit of global capital.

Belanger draws on the case study of the official designation of culture as the third pillar of Canadian foreign policy, in 1995, to explicate the changing relationship between culture, foreign policy and security.\footnote{The third pillar decision was sudden: Canada went from a country which, prior to 1995, had never included culture amongst its foreign policy priorities, and had the distinction of being ‘a country which devoted the least resources to cultural diplomacy,’ to declaring, seemingly almost overnight, culture’s status as a priority of foreign policy. Belanger, “Globalization, Culture and Foreign Policy,” 170.} Belanger notes that cultural diplomacy (which he variously defines as the place of culture within state foreign policy and the state’s cultural mission on the international scene) has changed considerably in recent years. It ‘no longer simply entails promoting an already existing culture abroad,’ involving the strengthening of a state’s cultural influence abroad (through the likes of artists’ tours and promoting the study of language and culture, in part in the multi-lateral arena of UNESCO).\footnote{Belanger, “Redefining Cultural Diplomacy,” 678.} Rather, cultural diplomacy is now situated within a new international cultural agenda situated around the tension between those states which deny that the cultural content of products have any relevance in the application of trade rules, and those states or groups of states - the European Union and Canada – which seek to have cultural industries exempted from the application of agreements on economic liberalisation. Hence a state’s international cultural mission now involves a more active role in protecting and developing national culture, ‘with such goals as seeking cultural exemption provisions in trade agreements or gaining access to a foreign partner’s telecommunications network,’ and devising new international regimes that would ‘provide the framework for and legitimize intervention by government in the field of culture.’\footnote{Belanger, “Redefining Cultural Diplomacy,” 678.} The new agenda is driven by global economic forces, rather than by the global ideological battle of the Cold War – it is more ‘structured by the challenges faced by each culture in the age of globalisation, as cultural products are increasingly swept into transnational communication and economic flows.’\footnote{Belanger, “Globalization, Culture and Foreign Policy,” 163.} Belanger eschews examining the politicisation of cultural diplomacy (which has never been apolitical, even if ‘in general, and quite naturally, it claims to be so’\footnote{Belanger, “Redefining Cultural Diplomacy,” 677.}), but rather seeks to address the issue of how the linkages between culture and foreign policy are changing in a ‘context of growing cultural insecurity.’\footnote{Ibid.}
Belanger undertakes his examination of cultural diplomacy drawing on a constructivist perspective of security, particularly the analytical framework of the ‘Copenhagen School.’ That framework examines how objects are securitised: how an issue is presented as an existential threat requiring emergency measures and justifying actions outside the normal bounds of political procedure.\textsuperscript{170} The framework posits a spectrum which ranges from non-politicised public issues (those which the state does not deal with and which are in no other way made an issue of public debate and decision), through politicised public issues (those which are part of public policy, requiring government decision and resources allocations) to securitisation. Belanger suggests that an additional category of politicisation be added to this spectrum – that of foreign-politicisation, meaning the issue is ‘recognized as being the concern of state national interest and identity on the world political stage.’\textsuperscript{171} Belanger notes that the impact of cultural aspects of globalisation is that it generates a fundamental redefinition of the problem of security. Simply stated, threats to security caused by cultural interpenetration are not threats to state sovereignty (which is certainly being threatened by the growing interpenetration of states in the political, military, economic, and even environmental spheres) but rather threats both real and perceived to the identity of societies, whether it takes the form of migration, overriding cultural influence from a dominant culture, or assimilation.\textsuperscript{172} The threat caused by cultural interpenetration produces ‘a duality in the way the question of security is tackled – state security versus societal security.’\textsuperscript{173} The ‘community’s interest and identity are no longer necessarily or directly compatible with the state’s interest and sovereignty.’\textsuperscript{174} The net impact of this duality will include demands from societal actors or groups that foreign policy devise and implement its cultural activities within a logic of security, that foreign policy will be required to accept culture as a ‘referent object’ (‘things which are seen to be existentially threatened and that have a legitimate claim to survival’\textsuperscript{175}) and no longer simply an instrument for policies directed at other referent objects in more traditional sectors such as the military, the economy and politics. Belanger suggests the emergence of a new international cultural agenda in fact challenges the ‘terms on which the legitimacy of foreign policy was traditionally built’:\textsuperscript{176}

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\textsuperscript{170} Belanger, “Globalization, Culture and Foreign Policy,” 167.
\textsuperscript{171} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{172} Belanger, “Globalization, Culture and Foreign Policy,” 167, and “Redefining Cultural Diplomacy,” 679.
\textsuperscript{173} Belanger, “Redefining Cultural Diplomacy,” 680.
\textsuperscript{174} Belanger, “Globalization, Culture and Foreign Policy,” 167.
\textsuperscript{175} Belanger, “Globalization, Culture and Foreign Policy,” 167.
\textsuperscript{176} Belanger, “Globalization, Culture and Foreign Policy,” 165.
\end{flushleft}
Whereas foreign policy is presented as the external political expression of an independent identity and culture, thus contributing to the reification of the political and national character of this political reality…cultural insecurity associated with globalization is generating demands on the state, suggesting that the independence of culture vis-à-vis foreign policy is being called into question.  

Foreign policy can no longer be satisfied with ‘simply promoting an already existing culture abroad,’ but rather must actively defend a state’s culture, and ensure its development internationally. Because of this, there is likely to be tension between the state’s need to pursue a foreign policy as an expression of a prior cultural and political identity and a growing need for a foreign policy in which ‘this cultural reality is an object for intervention.’ In Belanger’s view, this tension will be stronger and more politically significant where political and cultural identities do not coincide, ‘as in the case of multinational states’ such as Canada.

The perspective of Kennedy

Liam Kennedy’s examination of a cultural diplomacy event - an exhibition of photographs of the ruins of the World Trade Centre in New York, After September 11 – looks at how this specific cultural diplomacy event has suggestions of neo-colonialism, and seeks also to analyse the intersection between photography’s aesthetic and documentary frames, and the implications of this. The exhibition toured sixty countries over the period 2002-2004. He believes the exhibition to be more about propaganda, and less about cultural diplomacy. Kennedy notes that all photography raises issues of meaning, and requires that questions be asked as to what framework of understanding is being used at any one time to present photographs as the real. The key framework of After September 11 is propagandistic, the political mandate of American cultural diplomacy to ‘tell America’s story’ to the world, and the exhibition’s planning reveals a ‘propaganda impetus.’ Cities chosen for the exhibition’s tour were not chosen at random. Most were situated in the Middle East and North Africa. He highlights the efforts to connect the exhibition to ‘local contexts and occasions’ which resulted in the exhibition’s photographs dwarfing the photographs by local photographers which recorded the heroic attempts of Kenyan citizens to recover the dead and rescue the injured of the Nairobi attack, often scrabbling through...

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177 Ibid.
178 Belanger, “Globalization, Culture and Foreign Policy,” 166.
179 The same exhibition has been cited as an example of the best type of cultural diplomacy by Cynthia Schneider, who notes that the ‘stunning’ collection of photographs caused visitors to stand ‘silently and respectfully’ before the photographs, ‘cognizant that these were photos not of a superpower but fellow members of the human family.’ See Schneider, Diplomacy That Works.
the rubble with bare hands.\textsuperscript{180} It is difficult to agree with Kennedy that choosing cities at which to show the exhibition in itself transforms a cultural diplomacy product into propaganda - cultural diplomacy has always had to limit its scope, and its reach, but his approach to examining the context of the material of cultural diplomacy is a refreshing one. Kennedy for instance, draws attention not only to the possible propagandistic nature of cultural manifestations, but also to the nature of the manifestations themselves. In his view, the seemingly uncontrived manner in which the photographs of the exhibition \textit{After September 11} have been framed disguises their aestheticism. These are clearly photographs that are part art, part documentary, despite their subject matter being a site of devastation and death. Kennedy notes that the photographer disclaims an aesthetic response to ‘other people’s tragedies,’ but Kennedy dismisses this as ingenuous.\textsuperscript{181} But to the public at large viewing the exhibition, the artistic aspect of the photographs might presumably make the exhibition more appealing as a product of cultural diplomacy; culture which is not simply presenting a record of a major global event but looks good as well.

\textit{The new diplomatic environment and the new diplomacy}

Despite the insights into cultural diplomacy offered by these perspectives, several aspects of cultural diplomacy warrant greater attention. These are set out more fully in the concluding chapter, but include \textit{inter alia} the relationship between government objectives and those of cultural diplomacy, and how these might be affected by various models of delivery, the relationship between cultural diplomacy and national identity, and a comparative examination of the cultural diplomacy of several federations. In addition, three important aspects of the subject warrant a more in-depth, comparative, examination. First, cultural diplomacy has in recent years placed greater emphasis on presenting abroad a state’s image, and it has often been assumed that this trend has been connected to the rise in importance of a national brand. Second, in recent years, some governments have actively sought to protect their national cultural sovereignty from threats from other countries, in part through their foreign policy and diplomacy. Third, cultural diplomacy has aimed to achieve domestic objectives and has had domestic impacts.

It is important to place these three aspects within the context of recent changes to the environment within which diplomacy takes place and the recent changes to the broader practice of diplomacy itself that have occurred in response to changes – termed by some as the ‘new

\textsuperscript{180} Kennedy, “Remembering September 11,” 325.
\textsuperscript{181} Kennedy, “Remembering September 11,” 321.
In recent years, diplomacy has become much more complex, because the world within which diplomacy takes place has become more complex. The world of the 21st century requires diplomats of sovereign states to deal with more issues of greater complexity, deal with more actors (more states and more non-state actors), in a more complex environment, undertake a wider set of tasks (including those concerned with presenting abroad a state’s national image and brand, as well as a greater emphasis on economic and trade interests), and to do all this more quickly than before, and in a far more public manner.

‘New’ issues such as human rights, environmental sustainability, cultural sovereignty, trade liberalisation and foreign exchange flows have become important, and these issues more frequently and more easily cross national boundaries, partly due to the effectiveness of transnational networks of activists. New ideational security issues, based on ideals, ideas and identity, such as nationality, ethnicity, language and religion, have become relevant. The border between the domestic and the international has become frequently blurred. Domestic issues can become international, and vice-versa, with much greater ease, enhanced by new networks and new approaches to using rapid, mass, international communication exemplified by the Internet, and the global reach of television services such as CNN and the BBC. International issues that might once have resided in the secure confines of the foreign ministry, safe from the attention of domestic groups, now have the capacity to become very domestic very quickly. This has been especially true of issues around which international networks have gathered and organised, such as the environment (genetically-modified foods, whale slaughter and so on), human rights, and global poverty, taking advantage of the rapidly evolving international communication system of computers, emails, fibre-optic networks, teleconferencing, and software. The foreign service of old, which might once have been seen as the gatekeeper of reliable information on global issues and trends no longer holds such a privileged position. Diplomats wishing to learn of events taking place internationally, and in the country in which they are posted, tune into the BBC and CNN, and surf the Internet, just like anyone else.

182 Such as for instance Riordan, *The New Diplomacy*.
184 Cooper, “Diplomacy in the Information Age.”
185 See Kick and Sikkink, *Activists Beyond Borders*.
Diplomacy can no longer be considered only in terms of relations centered on central governments or foreign ministries. Diplomacy must incorporate a much wider and complicated set of relations. Not only are there more states differing more widely in type, size and relative power (in part as a result of the republics of the former Soviet Union and the former republics of Yugoslavia all establishing their own foreign services and diplomatic networks), but the constitutional components of states themselves, such as provinces, regions and special economic zones, have served to greatly increase the quantity of diplomatic activity and the range of topics that are discussed. In addition, the diplomatic world now includes more actors who can be, or think they should be, deemed practitioners of diplomacy, and more entities with which practitioners need to engage. These include regional and international organisations such as La Francophonie and the International Committee of the Red Cross, supra-national bodies such the European Union, multinational corporations, local and city government, advocacy networks, and influential individuals. State and international actors have been joined by domestic actors linking across borders with sometimes powerful effects, such as the international network of national cultural groups which played an important role in the move to have a new instrument on cultural diversity adopted by UNESCO. Diplomacy must reach beyond the narrow bounds of constituencies traditionally interested in foreign affairs, and address a broader range of national interests and constituencies. As Hamilton and Langhorne note, ‘the desire to attract investment and tourism and the need to regulate migration have persuaded all but seven of the United States to establish offices abroad.’

As might be expected, because of the changes that have taken place to the environment within which it must operate, the work of diplomacy has changed. Traditional bilateral and multilateral diplomacy has become less dominant. There has been an explosion of diplomatic and quasi-diplomatic activity. The pace of diplomacy has increased markedly, and the workload of foreign ministries has increased markedly. More government agencies are now involved in a government’s overall diplomatic effort, ‘at home’ and in other countries, including for instance government agencies associated with education, immigration, science, culture and police (in

187 Hamilton and Langhorne, *The Practice of Diplomacy*. Costa Constantinou, one of few scholars in recent times who has examined diplomacy in depth, says that diplomacy ‘may not simply consist of that interstate, inter-sovereign, and inter-ambassadorial side that is seen as an anachronism.’ Constantinou, *On the Way to Diplomacy*, xv.
189 For an excellent examination of the enhanced power that cross border networks can bring to bear on issues, see Kick and Sikkink, *Activists Beyond Borders*.
addition to the ‘usual’ representatives such as defence attaches). There are more agreements: informal agreements, technical agreements, and memoranda of understanding that are ‘not even known of let alone formally catalogued by foreign ministries and legal departments,’ as Hurrell notes. Whilst the classic diplomatic functions of representation, reporting and negotiation, and other functions such as consular work, remain important and relevant, the role of diplomacy in serving to advance national economic interests has gained much more recognition, and been supported more significantly by Cabinets and foreign ministries. Commercial and economic diplomacy have become very much mainstream, and for some foreign services, those of New Zealand and Australia, for instance, can almost be described as the core business of diplomacy.

The nature of economic interests has expanded to incorporate national economic interests with a cultural aspect. For some countries, cultural industries, such as film production, design, book publishing and so on, have become important to the national economy, for several reasons. First, the international sales of the products of these industries has become increasingly more significant in terms of their contribution to GDP. National cultural industries have tended to expand faster than more traditional industries, in terms of earnings and employment. Second, national cultural industries help generate innovation and creativity, both of which have become more widely viewed as crucial to the expansion of the knowledge economy, itself viewed as a crucial component of improved national economic performance. The culture of a state has become more recognised as a useful way for it to underpin its economic competitiveness. Third, national cultural industries provide states with a good part of the material of national identity, and national identity is more readily acknowledged as a contributor to national self confidence, national social cohesion, and as a way of protecting states against the impacts of cultural homogenisation resulting from the impacts of globalisation. Hence more governments are more involved in providing support for the international marketing of national cultural industries, and the business of diplomacy now more frequently incorporates activity associated with participating in international fora connected to cultural policies and with international instruments with a cultural aspect. More areas of cultural activity have become the focus of international instruments, such as those concerned with global standards, intellectual property and intangible heritage, and technological advances have added still more to the complexity of the cultural sector.

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192 Informal agreements, technical agreements, and memoranda of understanding that are ‘not even known of let alone formally catalogued by foreign ministries and legal departments.’ Hurrell, “Hedley Bull and Diplomacy,” 9-10.
Just as the work of diplomats and foreign ministries has expanded to include economic interests with a cultural aspect, governments have become more attuned to the importance of presenting abroad their national image and a national brand, as a valuable method of advancing national economic interests, as well as other foreign policy and diplomatic objectives. As Van Ham notes, ‘globalization and the media revolution have made each state more aware of itself, its image, its reputation, and its attitude – in short, its brand.’ A state’s image or brand is now viewed as providing a way of standing out from other countries in order to attract investment (an important factor in economic development and national economic prosperity), and attract people viewed by many countries as important to their economic prosperity. Wealthy immigrants (and wealthy citizens living abroad) can provide not simply investment but their entrepreneurial skills and links to international markets and innovation, and students and tourists from abroad can and do make significant contributions to the economies of some countries. In addition, a state’s image, reputation and brand are now viewed as important elements of a state’s ‘soft power.’ As Riordan notes, ‘by engaging in a country’s political and social debates, you can create the intellectual and political climate in which your specific policies can flourish.’ And negative perceptions can be extremely damaging to foreign policy goals, including economic interests. The image and reputation of a country are public goods which can create either an enabling or disabling environment for individual transactions.

In response to the changing diplomatic environment and to the practice of diplomacy, new concepts of diplomacy, including that of public diplomacy, have been created, developed, or reconfigured. Aspects of diplomacy which have been examined, and approaches which have been undertaken, have included the notion of an international society explored by scholars of the English school; the idea of a diplomatic culture, a ‘deeply rooted, state-based diplomatic culture with its own distinctive institutions, values, and norms’; bilateral diplomacy; theorising of diplomacy as a practice which seeks to mediate Western estrangement; an exploration of the politics of the writing of diplomacy, applying a deconstructivist methodology to diplomacy as a

195 Riordan, The New Diplomacy, 122.
197 These scholars have looked at aspects of diplomacy through their specific lens, placing diplomacy as one of a set of practices which maintain an international society, a political framework for the promotion of international order.
198 Wiseman, "Pax Americana."
199 Rana, Bilateral Diplomacy.
200 Der Derian, On Diplomacy.
textual practice; and examination of a specific type of diplomacy event such as the working funeral, those state funerals used by politicians and diplomats as opportunities to do diplomacy’s business. New concepts of diplomacy have been created, and old concepts dusted off and given a new lease of life, such as ‘triangular diplomacy,’ ‘multilayered diplomacy,’ ‘second-track diplomacy,’ ‘multitrack diplomacy,’ ‘niche diplomacy,’ ‘preventive diplomacy,’ ‘virtual diplomacy,’ and ‘polylateral diplomacy,’

the conduct of relations between official entities (such as a state, several states acting together, or a state-based international organisation) and at least one unofficial, non-state entity in which there is a reasonable expectation of systematic relationships, involving some form of reporting, communication, negotiation, and representation, but not involving mutual recognition as sovereign, equivalent entities.

Despite this burgeoning of scholarship on public diplomacy and diplomacy, despite the insights into cultural diplomacy and related practices which the above perspectives provide, despite the efforts of some scholars to delineate cultural diplomacy from neighbouring concepts, and despite a resurgence of interest in many countries in the practice, there is, as we have seen, considerable variation in understanding about constitutes cultural diplomacy, and no one single, accepted, definition of the practice. And although it may on the face of it seem an insurmountable task to set out cultural diplomacy’s scope, and its intersection with neighbouring concepts, it is this task with which the following chapter is concerned.

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201 Constantinou, *On the Way to Diplomacy*.
202 Berridge, “Diplomacy after Death”.
203 Diplomacy involving state-to-state, state-to-firm, and firm-to-firm relations, according to Wiseman, See Wiseman, “Polylateralism.” This definition differs from that of C. Raja Mohan, who sees triangular diplomacy as diplomacy involving three states. See Mohan, *Crossing the Rubicon*. Other terms, and their definitions, set out here are discussed by Wiseman in “Polylateralism’, and are also certain to be contested.
204 Rana, *Bilateral Diplomacy*. 
Chapter Two: Outlining, and resolving, cultural diplomacy’s ambiguity

I begin this chapter by explicating the conceptual framework of the thesis, setting out cultural diplomacy’s characteristics and what distinguishes the practice from related concepts. I then discuss three aspects of cultural diplomacy which warrant a substantive, and comparative, examination. These are, first, cultural diplomacy’s role in presenting abroad a national image, potentially as part of a national brand; second, the role which cultural diplomacy plays in the protection of cultural sovereignty; and third, the role of cultural diplomacy in advancing national domestic objectives, and the domestic impacts of cultural diplomacy. I finish this chapter by setting out the rationale for using a case study method to examine these aspects of cultural diplomacy, setting out the range of sources used in undertaking the case studies, and briefly describing the content of each of the three case studies which follow.

There is no general agreement among scholars about cultural diplomacy’s relationship to the practice of diplomacy, its objectives, practitioners, activities, timeframe, or whether the practice is reciprocal or not. Some regard cultural diplomacy as a synonym for public diplomacy, others or international cultural relations, or a state’s foreign cultural mission, and others regard these as distinct practices.

For many scholars, cultural diplomacy seems to be assumed to be a subset of diplomacy, with little explanation provided as to why cultural diplomacy is a practice of diplomacy. The objectives of cultural diplomacy vary: frequently cultural diplomacy is viewed as a practice which is undertaken in order to achieve normative, idealistic goals, usually couched in terms of ‘mutual understanding.’ Other definitions focus more on the practice’s contribution to advancing national interests, rather than enhancing mutual understanding. For some writing about the practice, it is the type of political entity undertaking cultural diplomacy which is important: independent agencies undertake international cultural relations, governments undertake cultural diplomacy.

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205 For instance Fox, although his is contextualised by a discussion on the confusion around terminology. Fox, *Cultural Diplomacy at the Crossroads*, 3.

206 Kevin Mulcahy, for instance, notes that cultural programmes represent cultural diplomacy, whereas activities designed to explain and defend American political objectives abroad represent ‘informational diplomacy.’ Mulcahy, “Cultural Diplomacy and the Exchange Programs.” The issue of cultural diplomacy’s synonyms is discussed briefly by Wyszomirski, *International Cultural Relations: A Multi-Country Comparison*.


208 For instance, the definition offered by New Zealand’s Ministry for Culture and Heritage, *The Place of Culture*, 4.

A range of administrative mechanisms are cited as being involved in cultural diplomacy: government ministries and departments, stand-alone, independent agencies, and private, not-for-profit foundations.

There is no agreement on what is meant by the word ‘cultural’ probably because ‘culture’ is such a difficult word to define. The ‘cultural’ part of cultural diplomacy has usually, in practice, meant what has been termed ‘high culture’: visual arts, literature, theatre, dance (ballet and contemporary), and music; cultural expressions that have been the preserve of the intellectual elites. In recent years, this assumption has changed: more frequently, cultural diplomacy has included ‘popular culture,’ that cultural activity which has a mass audience. Others think that it is the type of cultural activity that defines the practice: cultural diplomacy is art diplomacy, when the activities involve art, and educational diplomacy when it involves education. But is a government-funded exhibition of art used to attract students, and used also to advance the diplomatic objectives of an embassy, cultural diplomacy, art diplomacy, educational diplomacy, or all three?

For some writing about cultural diplomacy and its related subjects, cultural diplomacy can be distinguished from the likes of public diplomacy through the timeframe of the practice. Leonard, for instance, sees cultural diplomacy as part of public diplomacy but that part of public diplomacy which is concerned with the building of long term relationships.  

For others, one key characteristic of the practice is that it occurs abroad. The definition of cultural diplomacy put forward by New Zealand’s Ministry for Culture and Heritage, for instance (the ministry manages New Zealand’s recently set-up cultural diplomacy programme), views the practice as occurring abroad, and in one direction. That ministry defines cultural diplomacy as ‘the international presentation of cultural activities by a state to improve understanding of its cultural life and to create a favourable image in order to facilitate improved diplomatic and trade relationships.’

Those who have discussed this matter of the range of definitions of cultural diplomacy include Fox, Lending and Wyszomirski. Fox suggests that much of the difficulty in defining what cultural diplomacy ‘is and should be lies in the terms ‘Diplomacy’ and ‘Culture’ and their semantic baggage.’ Lending notes that the varying terminology used by countries undertaking

210 Sablosky agrees, noting that ‘cultural diplomacy’s emphasis is on long-term interchange among nations.’ Sablosky, *Recent Trends in Department of State Support for Cultural Diplomacy*, 2.
212 Fox, *Cultural Diplomacy at the Crossroads*, 2.
cultural diplomacy reveals ‘major semantic differences.’\textsuperscript{213} Wyszomirski notes that the practice which France terms cultural diplomacy has been known as international cultural relations by Australia, Canada, Singapore and the UK, and as international cultural policy by Austria, Holland and Sweden.\textsuperscript{214} Whilst for the purposes of scholarship, it would be helpful for the semantic muddle to be tidied up, the problems of definition reflect cultural diplomacy’s characteristic as a real world practice undertaken by a variety of political entities for a variety of reasons in a variety of ways.

The definition of cultural diplomacy used by the American scholar Milton Cummings provides a useful example of some of the issues raised by a myriad of differing conceptions of cultural diplomacy. Cummings defines cultural diplomacy as ‘the exchange of ideas, information, art and other aspects of culture among nations and their peoples in order to foster mutual understanding’ which ‘can also be more of a one-way street than a two-way exchange, as when one nation concentrates its efforts on promoting the national language, explaining its policies and point of view, or “telling its story” to the rest of the world.’\textsuperscript{215} This definition raises several issues. First, his definition seems not to explicate why cultural diplomacy includes the term ‘diplomacy.’ There is little sense in this definition of a practice that is related to diplomacy in some way, whether through its relationship to a government, or to diplomats, or to foreign policy. Cummings’ definition does include a sense that cultural diplomacy is concerned with the international, and with nations, and with their peoples, and presumably the presence of these three aspects jointly serve to make cultural diplomacy a practice of diplomacy, linked to foreign policy, or both. Second, Cummings’ definition does not address the relationship of cultural diplomacy to public diplomacy, or to international cultural relations or soft power. Public diplomacy may only recently have become the focus of much work by scholars and diplomats alike, and this may seem to excuse Cummings’ oversight, but any scholar writing about the cultural diplomacy of the United States would be well aware that a definition of the practice is likely to raise issues concerning its relationship with public diplomacy, given that public diplomacy has been a term used often in the United States for many years. Third, Cummings’ use of the term ‘nations and their peoples’ lacks precision as to which political entities undertake

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{213} Lending, Change and Renewal.
  \item \textsuperscript{214} Wyszomirski, International Cultural Relations: A Multi-Country Comparison.
  \item \textsuperscript{215} Cummings, Cultural Diplomacy and the United States Government, 1. For examples of others who have adopted Cummings’ definition, see Schneider, Diplomacy That Works, and the United States Advisory Committee on Cultural Diplomacy, Cultural Diplomacy. The Linchpin of Public Diplomacy.
\end{itemize}
cultural diplomacy. Does he mean that nations which are without a state might practise cultural diplomacy? If he means, by the term ‘nation,’ nation-states, then his definition excludes parts of nation-states, or groups of nation-states. If the practice involves people-to-people exchanges, and in no way involves the government of either people, what part of the exchange represents diplomacy, and how? If all cultural exchanges between nations and their peoples constitute diplomatic practice, this may serve to give diplomacy a width of meaning that makes it meaningless. Fourth, Cummings makes no mention of the role which agents may play in defining whether a certain practice is cultural diplomacy or some other practice. If an ‘independent’ agent carries out the cultural diplomacy, does it in fact become a form of international cultural relations? Fifth, Cummings lists a range of ‘usual’ activities of cultural diplomacy, but does not set out where the boundary of ‘other aspects of culture’ sits. Sixth, Cummings’ definition seeks to capture the range of objectives that practitioners set themselves when undertaking cultural diplomacy. The fostering of mutual understanding has not been the sole objective of cultural diplomacy. This may have been one objective, and a frequently cited objective at that, but as Cummings notes, other objectives have included national promotion, explanation, and ‘story telling’ to the outside world, as well as seeking to achieve domestic objectives. Finally, Cummings’ definition raises the issue of mutuality, but leaves its meaning unresolved. Does the absence of mutuality make cultural diplomacy something else? If this is the case, what might constitute the presence of mutuality? All cultural diplomacy has an aspect of mutuality, because all cultural diplomacy activity is aimed at someone. A message is sent, and a message is received. One way messages, those undertaken in one direction only, from the sender to the receiver, can be regarded as mutual as a cultural diplomacy relationship involving the sending and receiving by both parties. Mutuality is a very vague concept, and seems not to be a useful tool to use when attempting to distinguish cultural diplomacy from some other type of practice.216

Cultural diplomacy – a practice of governments involving culture

With these problems in mind, and recognising the difficulty in establishing an agreed-upon definition, it is possible nevertheless to suggest a way through the semantic quagmire. What follows is not meant to be regarded as the final word on what is, or is not, cultural diplomacy:

216 In some respects, the above critique of Cummings’ definition is unfair. It is not meant to be so, but has simply been used as an example of the problems that arise when one seeks to define the practice. In fairness to Cummings, the confusion surrounding what precisely constitutes cultural diplomacy is likely to compel those attempting a definition of the practice to recognise the problems of delineating the concept of cultural diplomacy and other related concepts, and hence speak of ‘other aspects’ or ‘more of a one-way street than a two-way exchange.’
even if that were possible, as with other forms of diplomacy, the practice is likely to evolve in years to come. Rather, drawing on the perspectives of the practice discussed above, and on hands-on involvement in the practice over many years, the following explication of cultural diplomacy provides a foundation on which it will be possible to build a better understanding of the three aspects of the practice with which this thesis is particularly concerned, as well as a better understanding of cultural diplomacy in general.

Simply stated, cultural diplomacy is the deployment of a state’s culture in support of its foreign policy goals or diplomacy, and the practice includes the negotiation and promulgation of cultural agreements. Cultural diplomacy is a diplomatic practice of governments – mostly single governments, but also groups of governments such as the European Union and sub-national governments, such as the government of the Canadian province of Quebec. In this respect, Fox’s argument – that the term cultural diplomacy implies the involvement of government ‘to whatever extent’ in the business of projecting the nation’s image abroad - is persuasive. Cultural diplomacy is carried out in support of a government’s foreign policy goals or its diplomacy, or both. Because of its connection to foreign policy or diplomacy, cultural diplomacy usually involves directly or indirectly the government’s foreign ministry, or, in the case of governments representing parts of a federation, that ministry responsible for international engagement (such as for example Quebec’s Ministry des Relations Internationales). The recent cultural diplomacy of New Zealand, for instance, whilst administered by New Zealand’s cultural ministry, nevertheless involves its foreign ministry, both in terms of setting cultural diplomacy policy and implementing activities arising out of that policy in accordance with New Zealand’s foreign policy objectives. That ministry also undertakes the New Zealand government’s work with regard to UNESCO instruments and cultural agreements in general, and this invariably involves at some stage New Zealand’s foreign ministry. Naturally, cultural diplomacy’s connection to a government’s foreign policy goals, to its diplomacy, and to its foreign ministry varies between states, but the absence of any such link precludes an activity from being deemed cultural diplomacy. Those activities of governments examined in the three case studies which follow all intersect in some way with the respective state’s foreign policy, diplomacy or foreign ministry.

One outcome of the recent increase in scholarship about the broad subject of diplomacy is that cultural diplomacy has now become situated within public diplomacy’s scope, conceptually

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217 Fox, Cultural Diplomacy at the Crossroads, 2.
and in practice, \textsuperscript{218} with most foreign ministries now describing and carrying out their cultural diplomacy activity within the remit of their public diplomacy work, including, for instance, the foreign ministries of New Zealand, Canada, the UK, Australia, and Japan. \textsuperscript{219} The inclusion of cultural diplomacy within public diplomacy’s remit represents a recent major sea change in the way cultural diplomacy is regarded and practised. For many years cultural diplomacy was regarded as a practice concerned with the promulgation and implementation of cultural agreements, rather than a practice which in any way was connected to public diplomacy. Of course this in itself reflects public diplomacy’s recent ascendancy: whilst that practice has always been part of the landscape of the diplomacy and cultural diplomacy of the United States, it has only been in recent times that public diplomacy has become an important component of the work of foreign ministries. Some countries, particularly the UK, France and Germany, regard cultural diplomacy as a very important element of their public diplomacy, particularly their language teaching and promotion. Even the cultural diplomacy of those governments which have yet fully to embrace public diplomacy (such as India, discussed in chapter five) now more frequently focuses on reaching a wider set of audiences and showing the modern face of themselves to the world, both hallmarks of current public diplomacy practice.

As with cultural diplomacy, there are varying definitions of public diplomacy, which makes the task of delineating the boundaries between one concept and another twice as difficult. The head of the British Council in India (its largest office anywhere in the world), Edmund Marsden, uses the term public diplomacy to describe the council’s work, and sees cultural diplomacy as a small part of that. \textsuperscript{220} Tuch defines public diplomacy as “a government’s process of communicating with foreign publics in an attempt to bring about understanding for its nation’s ideas and ideals, its institutions and culture, as well as its national goals and current policies.” \textsuperscript{221} Siobhan McEvoy-Levy considers public diplomacy as the rhetoric of officials of the United States aimed at international and domestic audiences. \textsuperscript{222} Christopher Ross, a senior United States diplomat brought back from retirement to head the diplomatic effort of the United States in the Arab world following the terrorist attacks on New York in September 2001, defines public diplomacy.

\textsuperscript{219} But not, however, the foreign ministry of the Republic of Ireland, which continues to use the term cultural diplomacy.
\textsuperscript{220} Edmund Marsden, interview by the author, Delhi, 2003.
\textsuperscript{221} Quoted in Potter, “Canada and the New Public Diplomacy,” 3.
\textsuperscript{222} McEvoy-Levy, \textit{American Exceptionalism}. 
diplomacy as being ‘the public face of traditional diplomacy. Traditional diplomacy seeks to advance the interests of the US through private exchanges with foreign governments. [Public diplomacy] works very much in coordination with and in parallel to the traditional diplomatic effort.’

Mark Leonard’s articulation of the concept has been influential. The concept of public diplomacy as articulated by Leonard sees cultural diplomacy as a subset, one of three tiers characterised by the timeframe of the relationship. For Leonard, public diplomacy is a way to advance national interests in the new global environment of more democracies, new communication technologies, global media, and international networks. Two aspects are important: the audience you reach, and the message with which you reach them. The attitude of publics abroad, based on reputation, plays a determining role in governments’ ability to pursue their foreign policy objectives. Perceptions of countries matter. ‘By engaging in a country’s political and social debates, you can create the intellectual and political climate in which your specific policies can flourish.’ Positive perceptions can create a premium for products and help attract investment, students, and tourists. And negative perceptions can be extremely damaging to foreign policy goals, including economic interests. Hence public diplomacy – and cultural diplomacy – are elements of soft power, ‘the ability to get what you want by attracting and persuading others to adopt your goals’ (rather than the ability to use the carrots and sticks of economic and military might to make others follow your will, or hard power).

Joseph Nye regards soft power as incorporating a wide range of government and non-government interactions with other countries, including a country’s foreign policy, values and ideals, and popular culture (in the case of the United States, especially the films of Hollywood). In Nye’s view, public diplomacy is an important method of developing a country’s soft power: in the short term through the media and broadcasting, in the medium term through developing and making known a few ‘key strategic themes’ in order to better explain policies of the United States and brand it as a

\[225\] The first tier, short term, reactive news management, takes hours and days. The next tier, medium term strategic communications, takes months. The third tier, cultural diplomacy, is about the development of long term relationships, and can take years.
\[228\] As defined by Joseph Nye, the American academic who first articulated the concept. Nye, “Propaganda Isn't the Way: Soft Power.”
democratic nation, and, most important, in the long term through cultural diplomacy, by implementing a long-term strategy built around cultural and educational exchanges.  

A British government review of public diplomacy, in 2002, taking its lead from Leonard, defined the public diplomacy of the UK as ‘that work which aims at influencing in a positive way the perceptions of individuals and organisations abroad about the UK, and their engagement with the UK.’ A second review of UK public diplomacy, in 2004, changed the earlier review’s definition so as better to link public diplomacy with a government’s medium and long term goals: the definition adopted in the second review was work which seeks to ‘inform and engage individuals and organisations overseas, in order to improve understanding of and influence for’ a country ‘in a manner consistent with governmental medium and long term goals.’ This definition has considerable appeal: it includes the ideas of diplomacy and audience, and the need to inform and engage. No mention, however, is made of the importance of presenting or using a national image. The review committee noted that it had avoided defining public diplomacy simply in terms of creating positive perceptions because of the sensitivity of this approach of two independent UK public diplomacy organisations, the BBC World Service and the British Council (it is easy to understand why a news organisation such as the BBC World Service would wish to avoid any suggestion of an obligation to create positive perceptions). The definition of public diplomacy adopted by the UK’s second review team, with its emphasis on the practice’s connection to a government’s broad foreign policy goals (as well as its focus on non-official audiences), is preferred to a definition of public diplomacy based only on the practice’s connection with audience.

It is indeed possible to distinguish public diplomacy from cultural diplomacy in terms of the type of audience that each seeks to reach, but this distinction depends entirely on which definition of public diplomacy one uses. For some, public diplomacy’s audiences are viewed as including both officials of another government (the traditional audiences of classical diplomacy) and the public. Some definitions of public diplomacy, however, imply that the practice’s target

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231 Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Public Diplomacy Review.
232 Bound, Briggs, Holden and Jones quote Lord Carter, who headed the 2004 review of the UK’s public diplomacy, as saying that ‘If the BBC World Service were to carry a by-line stating “Working in a manner consistent with governmental medium and long-term goals” then its international credibility would be fatally undermined.’ Bound, Briggs, Holden and Jones Cultural Diplomacy, 63.
233 The definition of public diplomacy set out in the 2005 UK review, for instance, includes all individuals and groups overseas, and this must be assumed to include government officials. Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Review of Public Diplomacy.
audience excludes the ‘usual’ official audiences of traditional diplomacy such as government politicians, diplomats and other government officials. Hans Tuch’s definition of public diplomacy, for instance (cited above), sees the practice as entailing a government communicating with foreign publics, and therefore possibly by implication not with officials of another government. By contrast, cultural diplomacy continues to include government officials as one of its important target audiences.

When public diplomacy is defined in terms of the audience it seeks to reach, it can logically include within that term any number of entities able to deliver public diplomacy, including those that are not diplomats, a foreign ministry, or a body funded by the state to carry out work that contributes to foreign policy goals. In fact when public diplomacy is defined in terms of who it reaches, it can be delivered or undertaken by anyone or any organisation: a wide range of national entities, official state entities as well as private sector companies, non-government organisations and others. When defined according to audience alone, public diplomacy becomes a type of communication that can be undertaken by any entity wishing to communicate with a wide set of audiences; not simply government officials, or customers, but the wider public, at home and abroad. However, in the context of the practice of diplomacy, it is more useful to view public diplomacy as a diplomatic practice, not a style of communication.

It is worth noting in this context that the reaching of domestic audiences by a government to explain its foreign policy or seek input into that policy is seen by some as an aspect of public diplomacy, but others exclude this work from public diplomacy’s remit.

Whilst for the purposes of this conceptual framework cultural diplomacy is regarded as a subset of public diplomacy, there are differences between cultural diplomacy and public diplomacy, and hence they are not simply able to be used interchangeably. Public diplomacy incorporates a wider set of activities than cultural diplomacy (a slightly wider set, in practice), primarily those government media and public relations activities aimed at a foreign public in order to explain a course of action, or present a case. It is of course possible, drawing on a broad enough definition of culture, to include government information, media and public relations activities within the scope of cultural diplomacy, but for the purposes of this conceptual framework, their link with aspects of a state’s culture is viewed as too tenuous to constitute

235 Leonard, for instance, argues that three groups that can add to the effectiveness of public diplomacy are political parties, diasporas, and NGOs. Leonard, “Diplomacy by Other Means,” 6.
236 Potter thinks Canada’s DFAIT is wrong for instance to include within its public diplomacy business line its work aimed at Canadian domestic audiences.
cultural diplomacy. Certainly the boundaries between the terms are not always that clear, and as the two practices overlap, are becoming less clear. For instance, does the visit of a journalist to another country, funded by that other government as part of a media campaign, constitute public diplomacy but not cultural diplomacy? Exchanges of academics, writers, students, artists and intellectuals have long been regarded as the bread and butter of cultural diplomacy, and journalists are no different to these people. Lending’s comment (alluded to previously) is relevant in this context: the traditional division between cultural and informational activities is being eradicated because cultural exchange concerns not only art and culture but also communicating a state’s thinking, research, journalism and national debate. Hence in his view the growth of “public” diplomacy becomes a reaction to the close connection between cultural, press and information activities, as a result of new social, economic and political realities.\footnote{Lending, \textit{Change and Renewal}, 3. This point is made also by Melissen, who believes that the overlap between what he terms cultural relations, and public diplomacy, will grow, in part because of the need for public diplomacy to focus less on ‘messaging’ and promotion campaigns and more on building relationships with civil society actors in other countries. Melissen, \textit{The New Public Diplomacy}, 22.}

Notwithstanding Lending’s point, there are instances of public diplomacy which do not involve a state’s culture, such as the public diplomacy activity of briefing foreign correspondents (and facilitating greater access for them to government officials), and work undertaken to explain to foreign audiences aspects of, and the reasons for, a state’s foreign policy stance or behaviour. The recent Australian public diplomacy campaign against Japanese whaling targeted at Japanese children, which uses the Internet, is a good example of public diplomacy which falls outside the scope of cultural diplomacy as enunciated in this chapter.\footnote{\textit{Reuters}, October 12, 2007.} Because cultural diplomacy involves the use of a state’s culture to achieve its objectives, it is much more implicated than public diplomacy in national identity.\footnote{A point made by Bound, Briggs, Holden and Jones, \textit{Cultural Diplomacy}, 17.} Hence whilst cultural diplomacy is conceived as being a subset of public diplomacy, it is not simply public diplomacy by another name.

For the purposes of this conceptual framework, public diplomacy is defined as a practice that has both an audience in mind (not officials alone, but foreign publics as well) and is connected to foreign policy and to diplomacy. And as we shall explore in the case studies, public diplomacy is also concerned, in practice, with presenting an image of a state abroad. The negotiating and promulgation of cultural agreements remains a part of the practice of cultural diplomacy, despite a general decline in regarding this as one of its core elements.\footnote{It was not that many years ago that many governments practised cultural diplomacy on this basis – the negotiating and promulgation of cultural agreements, followed by the implementation of these agreements.} As noted
above, the government of Japan, for instance, regards its work on securing the promulgation of international cultural agreements (such as the UNESCO Convention for the Safeguarding of the Intangible Cultural Heritage signed in April 2006) as a form of its cultural diplomacy. The old form of cultural agreement has mostly – but not entirely - become redundant. Even India, which has a large number of cultural agreements within which its cultural diplomacy has traditionally been managed, now places less importance on this framework when undertaking cultural diplomacy. Cultural agreements have moved from setting out how cultural relations between countries should be managed to a much greater focus on economics: on how economic relations with a cultural aspect to them should be managed (for example film co-production agreements), or dealing with the economic impacts of globalisation, as was the case of the diplomacy associated with the new UNESCO instrument on the protection of cultural diversity (discussed in the Canada case study). Québec’s increased focus in its cultural diplomacy on cultural agreements has been concerned not only with Québec’s economic interests (the province has a huge, successful and expanding economy with a growing cultural sector) but with the issue of its constitutional prerogatives. For many countries, cultural diplomacy activity associated with the negotiating and promulgation of cultural agreements involves the work of its national cultural ministry or department, as well as its foreign ministry.

Cultural diplomacy then is conceived as a part of public diplomacy, but there are a number of other practices which are sometimes used as synonyms for, have a close resemblance to, or overlap with, cultural diplomacy. These include foreign cultural policy, international cultural relations, and soft power.

Cultural diplomacy is not defined for the purposes of this conceptual framework as a government’s foreign cultural policy, that is, that part of foreign policy associated with culture. Assuming that a government’s foreign policy represents its approach to international relations and the international environment, cultural diplomacy can best be viewed more as a practice of

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241 See Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, “A New Look at Cultural Diplomacy.” Japan also regards its cultural diplomacy as part of public diplomacy, and the cultural diplomacy work of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan in subsumed within the ministry’s public diplomacy division. Lending notes that cultural diplomacy has several layers of meaning: it refers on the one hand to agreements (bi and multi-lateral) entered into by authorities to regulate, encourage and facilitate cultural exchange: cultural agreements, conventions and exchange programmes, and on the other hand to the practical implementation of such agreements and to the cultivation of the cultural contacts they help establish. See Lending, Change and Renewal, 3.

242 For instance, New Zealand’s Ministry for Culture and Heritage, Canada’s Department of Canadian Heritage, and India’s Department of Culture.

243 This approach would include its principles and goals concerning its international relations and the international environment, its national interests, values, and national identity which it seeks to promote and secure abroad, and its agenda, areas of priority, and actions and activities that it wishes to undertake in fulfillment of its foreign policy.
governments than a statement of their approach to international relations. And even if cultural
diplomacy and foreign cultural policy were deemed synonymous, that would understate cultural
diplomacy’s scope. Cultural diplomacy has shown its utility in reaching, informing and
engaging people from other countries in order to help a government pursue a wide range of
foreign policy goals, not simply those associated in some way with culture. This represents the
practice’s role as an instrument of diplomacy.

Cultural diplomacy can be distinguished from international cultural relations. First, the
scope of international cultural relations between countries entails relations which do not in any
way involve a government - such as for instance commercial cultural activity or tours of school
choirs abroad - as well as those which do. Second, some governmental international cultural
relations are undertaken in order to contribute to a government’s national domestic cultural
policy, but do not contribute to foreign policy goals or to diplomacy, either ‘at home’ through the
foreign ministry, or abroad through the foreign ministry’s network of embassies. As Higham
notes,

International Cultural Relations, as funded and encouraged by national governments at
least, generally have a different objective, cultural development...that of building a
country’s competence and capacity for its own artistic expression through international
exposure and collaborations abroad with other artistic or cultural professionals. The
Alliance Française, the Goethe Institute, the British Council, the Japan Foundation and
even Canada Council were founded in varying degrees on the cultural
development/international cultural relations rationale and less as tools designed
exclusively for cultural diplomacy.

Whilst a standalone entity may have been established with international cultural relations in mind
(i.e. developing a state’s artistic and cultural life), when these entities undertake cultural activity
in pursuit of foreign policy objectives, or intersect with diplomacy, that activity can then be
deemed cultural diplomacy. Much of the work of government cultural development agencies such
as the Canada Council and Creative New Zealand has nothing at all to do with cultural
diplomacy, in the conceptualisation adopted in this thesis, because the activities have no
connection to foreign policy goals or to diplomacy.

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244 The implementation of a state’s foreign cultural policy will in practice comprise cultural diplomacy (as defined in
this thesis, both the deployment of a state’s culture in support of its foreign policy goals, and the negotiation and
promotion of cultural agreements) as well as diplomacy related to culture but which does not deploy culture, or is
not concerned with cultural agreements.

245 Bound, Briggs, Holden and Jones, Cultural Diplomacy, 76, note Richard Arndt’s comment that there are ‘millions
of daily cross-cultural encounters.’

246 “At home” is a useful way of describing cultural diplomacy activity that takes place in the country which is
undertaking (and funding) it rather than abroad, and hence this term will be used throughout this thesis.

The former British Council official, J. M. Mitchell, writing in the 1980s on the subject of international cultural relations, notes that although both international cultural relations and cultural diplomacy apply to the ‘practice followed by modern states of interrelating through their cultures,’ the difference between the two is fundamental, complex and subtle. For Mitchell, cultural diplomacy ‘is essentially the business of governments.’ It has two levels of meaning: 1) the making of cultural agreements between governments, and 2) the execution of these agreements, and cultural relations flowing from them. The execution is carried out by diplomats. Its ‘ulterior purpose is political and economic,’ and it is ‘closely aligned to official policy and national interest,’ although this may or may not be perceptible depending on the ‘tact and restraint with which it is executed.’ By contrast, international cultural relations go beyond the actions of governments and their agencies, and can be conducted on the initiative of public and private institutions. Governments carry out cultural diplomacy, independent entities carry out international cultural relations, and the objectives for each differ. International cultural relations do not seek one-sided advantage. Cultural relations at their most effective aim to achieve understanding and cooperation between national societies for their mutual benefit. They should do this not through selective self-projection, but through presenting an honest, rather than beautiful, picture of each country. National problems should not be concealed nor made a show of. Cultural relations ‘neither pretend that warts are not there nor do they parade them to the repugnance of others.’

Mitchell sets out his hope that countries would handle their cultural relations ‘objectively’ and not link them ‘inexorably’ with national interest. The boycott, for instance, belongs to cultural diplomacy, and its political motivation is ‘alien to the spirit of cultural relations.’ The ‘real’ return on the investment by countries in international cultural relations is not short-term advantage, but long term relationships. Because such relationships can flourish only if they are ‘not subject to politics,’ the work of cultural relations is best done by organisations which enjoy an appropriate degree of independence of the state machinery. ‘The concept of the cultural

250 Ibid.
252 Ibid.
254 Mitchell, International Cultural Relations.
attaché slavishly scoring points for his political masters’ is the very antithesis of ‘right-minded cultural relations.’ But in Mitchell’s view, cultural diplomacy is not all bad:

No Government and no people wishes to fade into oblivion. Flying the flag is a common manifestation of national identity. Of the colours to be hoisted at the masthead, those that unfurl a nation’s cultural achievements are in many modern situations the most appealing. And it is, of course, part of cultural diplomacy to appeal.

Mitchell’s conceptualisation of the difference between cultural diplomacy and international cultural relations is ultimately unconvincing, although it is very easy to sympathise with his desire to see the conduct of international cultural relations devoid of the taint of politics.

First, to suggest that international cultural relations differ from cultural diplomacy because international cultural relations seeks to achieve understanding and cooperation between national societies for their mutual benefit whilst cultural diplomacy ‘seeks one-sided advantage,’ fails to acknowledge that a state’s foreign policy objectives may well include the achievement of understanding and cooperation between national societies for their mutual benefit (and indeed for this objective to be attained through the work of an independent organisation). India’s cultural diplomacy agency, the Indian Council for Cultural Relations, seeks to achieve such an objective, and whilst it is described as an independent agency with its own Council, the organisation is essentially a division of the Indian foreign ministry.

Second, it is problematic implying that international cultural relations differs from cultural diplomacy because cultural diplomacy uses ‘selective self-projection,’ whereas international cultural relations presents an honest, rather than beautiful, picture of a country, in which national problems should not be ‘concealed nor made a show of.’ The distinction is not that clear-cut. Cultural diplomacy’s ‘selective self-projection’ has not been quite as duplicitous as Mitchell suggests. Much culture has an inherent honesty to it, and cultural diplomacy has often presented abroad a state ‘warts and all,’ particularly in its use of film, especially documentaries.

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257 Despite eschewing Mitchell’s approach to distinguishing international cultural relations from cultural diplomacy, his faith in the benefits of long term, apolitical relationships, and of an independent organisation to carry out international cultural relations, is appealing. As I note in the concluding chapter, one of the drawbacks of cultural diplomacy is that it is limited by its official-ness. This limitation can be minimised when the capacity for a government to approve or otherwise those cultural diplomacy activities is minimised. It is far harder for a politician, and much easier for a cultural diplomacy bureaucrat, to undertake cultural activities which are free of political constraints (such as, for instance, an exhibition or film critical of a current government or its policies) if there is a genuine arms-length relationship between the government and the organisation the government funds to deliver its cultural diplomacy.
Moreover, governments are more frequently recognising the importance of presenting an honest image of themselves through their public diplomacy and cultural diplomacy activities, because to do otherwise runs the risk of losing credibility in an era in which there is significant access to alternative sources of information concerning what a country, and its government, are ‘really’ like.258

Third, it is possible for a government to carry out its foreign policy and diplomatic objectives through an organisation which has a degree of administrative independence, and the most recent UK review of UK public diplomacy makes this point clear. Cultural diplomacy is a diplomatic practice of a government, but is not undertaken exclusively by diplomats working for a government’s foreign ministry. The practice of cultural diplomacy is managed by or involves foreign ministries and by stand-alone entities with varying degrees of governance links to foreign ministries. For instance, India’s cultural diplomacy is managed by the India Council for Cultural Relations, which, whilst professing its independence, is essentially an arm of India’s foreign ministry, and the UK’s cultural diplomacy is undertaken by the British Council, a body which fiercely protects its day-to-day operational independence status but which nevertheless supports the goals and objectives of the UK government, receives close to two hundred million pounds annually of government funding, and has a board of trustees of which one member is nominated by the foreign secretary. Distinguishing cultural diplomacy from any other contiguous term on the basis of the degree of independence of the delivering agency not only misses the point about the linkage of cultural diplomacy to a government’s foreign policy or diplomacy (a link which can be met through an independent agency), but also raises real issues concerning the degree of independence of a delivering agency. Should the degree of independence be determined on the basis of level and type of funding, or the degree of linkage to government, or some other test? The recent Demos report discussed in chapter one suggests that it is possible to strengthen relations between a government and national cultural institutions without being directive. Demos, whilst acknowledging ‘the UK’s independent model is admired the world over’ suggests that the UK needs to ‘let go of its hang-ups about the relationship between politics and culture,’259 and cites the hands-on approach of France, which ‘highlights the benefits that can be gained when a government works more collaboratively and strategically with culture.’260

258 This point is made by Lending, Change and Renewal, 20.
259 Bound, Briggs, Holden and Jones, Cultural Diplomacy, 64.
260 Bound, Briggs, Holden and Jones, Cultural Diplomacy, 63.
Cultural diplomacy incorporates cultural activities undertaken by, or involving, a wide range of participants such as artists, singers and so on, but also the manifestations of their artistry (such as a film), the promotion of aspects of the culture of a state (language, for instance), and the exchange of people, such as academics. It is cultural diplomacy’s practical characteristic, its role as a practice, which may help explain why some scholars wishing to define cultural diplomacy do so based on those activities cultural diplomacy entails. Activities undertaken within cultural diplomacy’s scope manifest an aspect of the culture of the polity which the government represents. The range of activities is wide, and is no longer limited to ‘high culture’ (that cultural activity viewed as being produced for, and viewed by, elites) but now more often includes cultural activity targeted at the wider population.

Cultural diplomacy activities undertaken by the three countries explored in the case studies include the production and screening abroad of a documentary series, educational scholarships, visits of scholars, intellectuals, academics and artists both ‘at home’ and abroad, cultural group performances, artist performances and exhibitions, seminars and conferences, the operation of libraries, the publication and dissemination of journals, DVDs and compact discs, festivals abroad and support for festivals of other countries held ‘at home’, and establishing and maintaining professorships and chairs in universities abroad. The activity of these states has also included the commissioning of busts, statues and portraits of national leaders, the installation of a corrugated iron kiwi in a zoo and a bronze statue on a bridge, the manufacturing (and flying) of a hot air balloon, sports events, the presentation of books and musical instruments to visiting dignitaries and to diplomatic missions abroad, an essay award and an annual lecture, the organisation of a UN day and a PLO day, the naming of a road in the capital city of another country after a cultural diplomacy practitioner’s national hero, and the presentation of a horse. As these activities indicate, cultural diplomacy takes place both ‘at home’ and in other countries (such as for instance educational exchanges). Sport is an element of a state’s culture, and is becoming more frequently recognised as a very powerful element of cultural and public diplomacy, but it has not in the past been usually situated within the remit of cultural diplomacy. The broadcasting of television and radio programmes internationally (whether through a national broadcaster such as the BBC World Service or on a foreign service), when undertaken to support governmental foreign policy objectives or diplomacy, constitutes cultural diplomacy, but this area does highlight Lending’s point that the lines between culture and

\[261\] The relative absence of sport in the three case studies partly reflects this situation, but also reflects the choice of initiatives and programmes drawn upon to explicate the three themes of this thesis and cultural diplomacy in general.
information (and hence between cultural and public diplomacy) are blurring. A television or radio programme, even if made to explain government policy or provide information about government policies, can be viewed as a cultural expression because the making of the programme represents a creative act. In the case of the BBC World Service, television and radio programmes comprise an important element of the UK’s cultural and public diplomacy. For the purposes of this thesis, support provided by a state for the international marketing efforts of its cultural industries is not deemed an aspect of cultural diplomacy. This activity lacks a sufficient connection to a manifestation of a state’s culture, and is regarded as more sensibly fitting within the area of trade diplomacy.

A government’s official support for the presentation ‘at home’ of cultural activity of another government can be conceptualised as a form of cultural diplomacy, as it may serve either to advance the practitioner’s goals or link in with its diplomacy. National interests can be advanced by using the culture of other states. For instance, the provision of government support for the bringing to New Zealand of a Chinese cultural group clearly enhances New Zealand’s bilateral relationship with China, a state which places considerable importance on two-way cultural exchange, and in doing so contributes to New Zealand’s foreign policy goals and to its diplomacy. Cultural diplomacy’s audiences include not only foreign audiences but also members of a national diaspora. A national diaspora includes a state’s citizens domiciled abroad who retain their citizenship (or a joint citizenship), as well as those citizens of another state who have strong ethnic or linguistic connection, such as for example members of Indian communities throughout the world.

Despite some scholars characterising cultural diplomacy as a practice which can be distinguished from other concepts, such as public diplomacy, on the basis of timeframe, it is more persuasive to suggest that cultural diplomacy’s timeframe ranges from the length of time of a cultural performance (possibly a matter of minutes, during which time a key contact may find him or herself more favourably inclined towards the government and policies of the host) to many years, the period over which a programme of educational exchange, for instance, may have been in operation and may have had in mind when initially established. It may well be that a state, in undertaking cultural diplomacy, seeks to develop long term relationships with those

262 As noted previously, Leonard sees cultural diplomacy as a subset of public diplomacy, one of three tiers characterised by the timeframe of the relationship. The third tier, cultural diplomacy, is about the development of long term relationships, and can take years. The first tier, short term, reactive news management, takes hours and days. The next tier, medium term strategic communications, takes months. See Leonard, Public Diplomacy.
reached by the cultural diplomacy, but that it not the same as suggesting that cultural diplomacy can be defined as something which has a long time frame, and if the practice has a short time frame it cannot be cultural diplomacy.

Cultural diplomacy is undertaken for a range of purposes, but the type of purpose does not in itself serve to distinguish cultural diplomacy from contiguous practices. Traditionally, governments have said that they undertake cultural diplomacy to achieve idealistic purposes - to develop mutual understanding, combat ethnocentrism and stereotyping,\textsuperscript{263} and prevent conflicts.\textsuperscript{264} These idealistic objectives frequently include the idea of exchange, of a two-way relationship, although in practice cultural diplomacy has tended not to be nearly as reciprocal as practitioners intend. But cultural diplomacy’s objectives also include advancing trade, political, diplomatic, and economic interests (including those with a cultural aspect, such as cultural industries), developing bilateral relationships (across the board, including economic, trade, political, cultural and diplomatic elements of the relationships), showing commitment to multilateral bodies such as La Francophonie and to the international community of countries on issues seen as important, connecting with groups abroad that are important to the cultural diplomacy practitioner (such as diasporas), raising a state’s profile, asserting a state’s greatness (or strengths), presenting a state’s values, advancing the interests of specific groups, helping to maintain bilateral relationships in times of tension,\textsuperscript{265} and benefiting partners of cultural diplomacy (not simply advance a state’s national interests).

Cultural diplomacy sometimes seeks also to counter negative impacts of contentious issues, or ‘put the record straight’ by attempting to counter prevailing stereotypes, and it the pursuit of such objectives which most closely situates cultural diplomacy with the realm or practice of propaganda. Several points are pertinent in this context. First, what is meant by propaganda, and how it relates to cultural diplomacy, depends entirely on which definition of propaganda is used. If propaganda is defined, for instance, as ‘information, ideas, opinions or images, often only giving one part of an argument, which are broadcast, published or in some

\textsuperscript{263} Mulcahy, “Cultural Diplomacy in the Post-Cold War World,” 1.
\textsuperscript{264} Lending notes that ‘the idea that culture can function as a peace-making instrument has been strongly supported in Europe throughout the post-war era. Germany’s and France’s comprehensive exchange programmes…are a prime example of cultural co-operation based on the conviction that knowledge of tradition or potential enemies and their social life promotes international understanding, thereby preventing conflicts in the longer term.’ See Lending, \textit{Change and Renewal}, 4.
\textsuperscript{265} See Bound, Briggs, Holden and Jones, \textit{Cultural Diplomacy}, 54-55, for examples of how this can work in practice.
other way spread with the intention of influencing people's opinions', then one could suggest a reasonably strong link with cultural diplomacy, whilst keeping in mind cultural diplomacy’s link to foreign policy and diplomacy, and to cultural manifestations. Whilst propaganda is not always only defined pejoratively, most definitions suggest that propaganda concerns the dissemination of biased or misleading information (or ideas, or rumour), to further one's cause or injure another’s. In determining if cultural diplomacy is the same as propaganda, it might be more useful to delineate cultural diplomacy and propaganda by adopting Melissen’s approach, which he uses to assess public diplomacy’s relationship to propaganda. Melissen situates public diplomacy and propaganda as being on a continuum ranging from crude and manipulative propaganda aiming at short-term political effects to two-way public diplomacy for the ‘long haul’ based on dialogue with foreign audiences. It would be naïve to ignore the fact that public diplomacy and propaganda often go hand in hand.

Melissen sees public diplomacy differing from propaganda not because of a difference in objectives, but in a difference in the pattern of communication. Propaganda, and the most base form of public diplomacy, involves the ‘rather primitive business of peddling one’s own views and narrowing other people’s minds.’ By contrast, modern public diplomacy has ‘distinct basic characteristics’: it is two way, involving engagement, dialogue and mutuality (an approach which Melissen notes might sound like ‘reinventing the wheel’ to practitioners of cultural relations), and it recognises that there are domestic audiences which a foreign service can communicate with in order to ‘get through to foreign audiences.’ These comments made concerning public diplomacy can apply equally to cultural diplomacy. As noted in chapter one, Kennedy suggests that the exhibition of photographs of the attack in 2001 on New York’s World Trade Center may have been more to do with peddling the views of the United States than with genuine dialogue. Gujarat’s cultural diplomacy following the communal carnage in the state in 2002 (dealt with in the Indian case study) suggests that propaganda can involve not only ‘peddling one’s own views

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and narrowing other people’s minds’ but a form of glossing over of the ‘truth,’ making a racist and violent state seem appealing or normal through the attraction of culture. Lending’s suggestion that propaganda involves ‘the dissemination of more or less doubtful truths for the purpose of influence and manipulation,’ highlights the difficulty of establishing or otherwise cultural diplomacy’s propaganda credentials: one government’s cultural diplomacy ‘truth’ undertaken to influence could conceivably be another government’s ‘lies’ for the purposes of manipulation. Notwithstanding this, cultural diplomacy is not simply a synonym of propaganda.

Image and brand, cultural sovereignty and domestic objectives
Cultural diplomacy must now take place within the ‘new’ diplomacy, in which states and their diplomats must deal with more issues of greater complexity and more actors, in a more complex environment, and undertake a wider set of tasks more quickly than before, and in a far more public manner. These ‘new’ issues associated with globalisation include those in which culture plays an important role, including those of cultural sovereignty and trade liberalisation, national, ethnic, religious and linguistic identity, and the role of polities in the global economy. Issues now more frequently are simultaneously domestic and international. As a result of these changes to the diplomatic and international environment within which cultural diplomacy operates, the practice itself has changed. Three aspects of cultural diplomacy’s contemporary manifestation, whilst touched upon by those writing about the subject, have not been the subject of extensive examination, and hence form a major focus of this thesis. These are cultural diplomacy’s use of the presentation of a national image and its possible link to a national brand, cultural diplomacy’s role in the protection of cultural sovereignty, and the domestic objectives and impacts of cultural diplomacy.

The renewed emphasis placed on using public diplomacy by foreign ministries has served to focus attention on the manner in which governments use constructed articulations of their national identity as an international marketing tool to advance national economic objectives, as well as other foreign policy and diplomatic objectives. Projecting an up-to-date image has come to be seen as a way of setting apart a state from others, in what has become a highly competitive global economy in which states compete against each other for foreign direct investment and the sale of services and products, ‘as if in a beauty contest.’273 As Potter notes

272 Lending, Change and Renewal, 19.
the diplomatic advantage goes to countries that are able to present distinct voices or “information edges,” attract support, project identifiable three dimensional national images and that can provide credible timely information.  

The public diplomacy of governments has increasingly focused on the benefits of presenting abroad a national image, but to date there has not been any substantial research into the extent to which cultural diplomacy has also taken up this focus. Governments are now more convinced that a national image can influence the behaviour of citizens and elites in other countries. All things considered, people who know and like another country are assumed to be more inclined to buy things from that country (or invest in it, or travel to it) than if they neither like it, nor know much about it. And the same is assumed of the behaviour of politicians and elites, who have been assumed to be more likely to support a state’s efforts to advance national political interests if they like and know the country. Most frequently, this articulation of a version of national identity has been described by countries as their national image, but sometimes this articulation of national identity has been presented as that of a national brand, reflecting the crossover of a tool of business used to develop an emotional attraction to and positive image of a company or product. Van Ham notes that a brand is ‘a ‘customer’s idea about a product’, and the “brand state” comprises the outside world’s ideas about a particular country.’ As noted previously, Van Ham observes that globalisation and the media revolution have made each state more aware of the power of a brand. Strong brands are now seen as important to advancing national economic objectives, as well as other foreign policy and diplomatic objectives, and a state’s culture is now seen as an important way of making a state more appealing to those it wishes to attract in order to aid economic development and progress (immigrants, tourists, and students, for instance) and helping attract foreign direct investment. Despite Anholt’s comment that governments ‘are simply not in control of all of the forces that shape their country’s image, and neither is any other single body within the nation,’ this has not precluded governments from seeking to develop a national brand - a measured, strategic, thought-out approach to using the articulation of a national identity to achieve national objectives. 

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275 This point is made by Bryce Harland. Harland, “The Opportunities and Limits of Diplomacy,” 47.  
278 Simon Anholt, “Public diplomacy and place branding: Where’s the link?,” 274  
279 In Anholt’s articulation of the concept of nation branding (which he equates with national reputation), he posits six components of a nation brand or national reputation: how people think about a country’s governance, people, culture, branded products (such as, for instance, Coca Cola), its business-to-business communications and its
The use by a state of cultural diplomacy to present abroad a national image or a national brand raises issues concerning the political and economic impacts of, and interests served by, such marketing, and the purpose and role of culture. Cultural diplomacy provides opportunities for practitioners to construct, and present abroad, a single, inclusive version of national identity which gives the impression of a united, if diverse, well-functioning, even contented, political entity. As Mitchell notes, it is part of cultural diplomacy to appeal, and often the aim of the presentation of a version of national identity is to do just that – to appeal to would-be investors, immigrants, tourists and students. States wish usually to show themselves in the best possible light. The version of national identity presented abroad by a state through its cultural diplomacy will be selective: not every aspect of the state can possibly be included in such an image, even were this the aim. Whilst much more emphasis has been placed on the benefits (and necessity) of showing a state ‘warts and all,’ this is not the same as always showing the ‘truth’ about a state, such as, for instance, the ‘truth’ about the impact of a government’s policies towards minority groups (such as Maori in New Zealand, Muslims in Gujarat, and First Nations people in Canada), or the ‘real’ state of federal unity. All this serves to suggest that there may be more to the use of cultural diplomacy as a marketing tool than meets the eye. Cultural diplomacy may serve to favour the interests of one group or state over another (a federal government over one or more of its constituent parts, a dominant group over a minority, or one ethnic or religious group over another). It may provide legitimacy to the practitioner when arguably such legitimacy is undeserved, legitimacy which is made persuasive by a combination of the official-ness of cultural diplomacy, and the inherent appeal of culture, which is often enjoyable, appealing, and stimulating, and can induce a sense of well-being in those interacting with it. Or cultural diplomacy, when implicated in the use of national brand, may indeed help supplant nationalism:

The brand state’s use of its history, geography, and ethnic motifs to construct its own distinct image is a benign campaign that lacks the deep-rooted and often antagonistic sense of national identity and uniqueness that can accompany nationalism. By marginalizing nationalist chauvinism, the brand state is contributing greatly to the further pacification of Europe.

Cultural diplomacy, when used as a marketing tool, may also serve to advance the interests of global economic players. By helping to market a state to international investors through the appeal of cultural diplomacy, the practice becomes implicated in supporting a state tourism. Simon Anholt interviewed by Anita McNaught, New Zealand Trade and Enterprise video transcription titled “Simon Anholt – Author, “GMI nation brands Index”, London, August 2005.


system of the late 20th century which, for some scholars critical of the aims and impact of neo-liberal economics (a framework within which the practice of national marketing and branding sits), can be seen as ‘coming to act more as a support to the opening of the world to global finance and global production, less as a means of defence of the welfare of the people.’ Global orthodox economic policy, in their view, has been favoured over domestic socio-political demands, and the interests of the major players of the global economy over national interests. The former, presumed, distinction between national and private economic interests, possibly greater in the theory than in the practice, may now be viewed as a casualty of globalisation. As Burchill notes

Finance markets, dominated by large banks and financial institutions, insurance companies, brokers and speculators, exist only to maximise their own wealth. There is no compelling reason for them to act in the interests of the poor, the homeless, the infirm or those who are deprived of human rights by their own governments. These are irrelevant considerations, unless they impinge in some way on the ‘stability’ of the host economy.

In this conceptualisation, culture’s role is less to do with its contribution to national life, and to personal and community well-being, and more to do with its role as a commodity in support of an ideology (that of global capital), supporting, in Pennee’s words, the ‘institution and maintenance of a world order which serves the interests of the dominant class of the dominant state’ while at the same time serving ‘the interest of the dominant classes of other states as well.’

Cultural diplomacy, when used as a marketing tool, may indeed serve to advance the interests of global economic players, but it may be possible that the interests it advances will not be limited to these international players. Cultural diplomacy, when used to market a state, could also advance the interests of minority groups able, and willing, to use the benefits that such marketing might provide to reassert economic, political and cultural power (by for instance, increasing respect for the minority, or increasing the number of tourists). In addition, those opposed to a state preferring the interests of major players of the global economy over national interests are assuming that the two are mutually exclusive. Some argue that there is a fit between the interests of major global players (such as investment banks and international corporations) and national interests. Only by attracting to a state such international players is it possible to maintain a level of foreign direct investment that allows a sustainable level of economic growth.

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282 Cox, “Multilateralism,” 516.
Examining cultural diplomacy’s connection to national marketing and branding will help explicate these issues, update understanding of contemporary cultural diplomacy, and help explicate the relationship between image and brand, a relationship that is not possibly as clear-cut as it may seem.

**Cultural diplomacy and cultural sovereignty**

Just as there has been a greater emphasis, in recent years, on the role which the presentation of national image plays in diplomacy, and in cultural diplomacy, there are indications that cultural diplomacy has been used in part to help countries protect what they conceive of as their cultural sovereignty. Canada, for example, has regarded its culture as under threat from the United States, has seen this as a threat to its sovereignty, and has taken the threat seriously. For decades, successive Canadian governments have supported the domestic production of Canadian stories because of the threat of foreign cultural domination. Countering the threat to cultural sovereignty that foreign cultural domination represents, depends on strong domestic cultural industries. Justifications for Canadian support for the arts have often drawn on the imagery, and language, of cultural sovereignty. In 1987, Canada’s minister of trade declared that ‘the dominance of US firms of our sound recording, film, television, and publishing sectors impinges on our cultural sovereignty,’ a view shared at that time by the Canadian Office of the Trade Negotiator, which said that ‘the future of Canadian culture, the future of Canada, is secure as long as Canadian artists, performers, and writers, Canadian broadcasters and publishers, have the opportunity to reach their fellow Canadians.’ A federal government report in 1999 explained that ‘nations need strong domestic cultures and cultural expression to maintain their sovereignty and sense of identity.’ In mid 2005, the Canadian federal minister of Canadian heritage, speaking about cultural sovereignty, noted that the cultural dynamism and vibrancy represented by the city of Toronto had to be ‘nurtured, invested in, fought for, and celebrated’ because of Canada’s proximity to the cultural powerhouse that is the United States.

Cultural diplomacy’s role in protecting cultural sovereignty raises a number of important issues. These include the relationship between the global free-trade economic agenda and what might be termed the global cultural diversity agenda, the relationship between national cultural

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286 Quoted in Ibid.
288 Frulla, “Speaking Points for the Honourable Liza Frulla.”
and foreign policies, the location of the source of potential cultural threats to states, the nature of a redefined role for the cultural agreement in international affairs, and the way in which countries are seeking to deal with the impacts of globalisation.

Cultural diplomacy’s role in defending cultural sovereignty can fruitfully be explored by examining not simply the ‘standard’ cultural promotion activities of foreign services abroad, but also the practice’s role in supporting that aspect of a state’s diplomacy concerned with promoting international cultural agreements. A sense of déjà vu can be discerned here. Many years ago, a standard definition of cultural diplomacy would have been that cultural diplomacy was that diplomacy concerned with the promulgation of cultural agreements, and the implementation of activities under these agreements. For a period, in the 1980s and 1990s, the allure of the cultural agreement declined. Countries found that these took time to manage, and often were empty, symbolic gestures, lacking much in the way of substance because of national parsimony for the funding of cultural diplomacy in peace time, particularly given fluctuating fiscal considerations and a frequent inability to measure with much accuracy the impact and effectiveness of cultural diplomacy. The rise of cultural industries as major contributors to national economic wellbeing, combined with the increasing important of international agreements, both cultural and trade, has had the effect of resurrecting a formerly important aspect of cultural diplomacy, the negotiation and promulgation of cultural agreements.

Cultural diplomacy’s domestic objectives and impacts

There are indications that the objectives of cultural diplomacy have incorporated domestic objectives, and that cultural diplomacy has had domestic impacts. A distinction needs to be made between objectives and impacts. The term domestic objective implies a conscious decision on the part of the state undertaking cultural diplomacy to use the practice not to advance its national interests abroad, but to achieve benefit ‘at home.’ As I argue in subsequent chapters of this thesis, there have been examples of the cultural diplomacy of Canada and New Zealand having been undertaken in order to achieve domestic objectives. By contrast, the idea of cultural diplomacy having a domestic impact implies that such an impact was not so much intended from the outset as a happy by-product of the practice. Hence, as I discuss in the Indian case study, although the great festivals of India may not specifically have had the objective of increasing national pride in India, and of satisfying the pride which its leaders had in their country, these impacts were
nevertheless evident, in part through reporting in India of the reaction to the festivals abroad, reportage which was without exception highly positive.

Cultural diplomacy’s constructions of inclusion (those instances when the practice puts forward an image of a state that is united and which values the cultures of minority and marginalised groups) may serve to enhance national social cohesion, to enhance the feeling of belonging to the imagined national community. The reaction abroad to the presentation of a version of national identity, when reported ‘back home’ by the media to citizens of the community, can be thought of as another form of imagining (to use Patricia Goff’s term, borrowed from Benedict Anderson\textsuperscript{289}), in the same manner as national sporting events, political ceremonies, and recently, and not so recently, invented traditions. These events and traditions provide the material which the media can use to give shape and substance to the idea of an imagined community. In a similar vein, cultural success abroad, also refracted back via the media, has a positive impact on how a state feels about itself. For certain governments, the ‘feel good’ factor – engendering a national sense of national pride and confidence - has become an important component of their national economic agenda and nation-building. This has been evident in New Zealand in recent years: the government has consciously sought to use the resources of the state to engender a greater confidence in New Zealanders, on the basis that a confident New Zealand is better able to meet a range of national objectives. Finally, in so far as cultural diplomacy might play a domestic, nation-building role, it has been used by states to ‘put the record straight,’ to contribute to nation-building by countering stereotypical versions of the state held by the citizens, leaders, or media, of other states. In this way, cultural diplomacy may act as a practice which enables a state to assert and enhance national pride in its history, its achievements and its future prospects.

Assessing the extent of this under-explored aspect of the practice will help improve understanding of the extent of cultural diplomacy’s contribution to national cohesion, pride, and self confidence, and to assess if the domestic imperatives of cultural diplomacy favour some groups over others. In this respect, examining this theme will potentially serve to broaden the

\textsuperscript{289} Goff draws on the work of Benedict Anderson to explain the influence that national cultural industries can have in the formation of national identity. For Andersen, the spread of print capitalism enabled people who had never met, or were never likely to meet, to nevertheless conceive of themselves as belonging to, and having a strong loyalty towards, a country, or a nation. As Goff notes, today, Andersen’s ‘forms of imagining’ have expanded to include radio and television broadcasts, film, periodical and book publishing, and sound recordings. Goff, “Invisible Borders,” 539. See also Anderson, \textit{Imagined Communities}.  

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manner in which cultural diplomacy is conceptualised, from a (mostly) international practice to one which seeks to advance both international and domestic objectives.

Research method, approach, sources of data, and outline of case studies

In order better to understand cultural diplomacy’s role in protecting cultural sovereignty and the marketing of countries, and its domestic objectives and impacts, the cultural diplomacy of three countries - New Zealand, Canada and India - has been examined, applying a case study method. Each of these three case studies provided an opportunity to explore and elaborate on aspects of the practice that had been identified, to show how these aspects did not occur in isolation, and to provide a starting point for new studies. A comparative case study approach was selected as the most appropriate method for examining the practical characteristics of the cultural diplomacy of countries, and making good use of the author’s unique experience and participant observations.

As a research strategy, this method enabled a detailed examination of a complex practice actively undertaken in the real world (one which did not allow control of behavioural events) by a discrete set of entities which were easily able to be distinguished one from the other. A comparative case study approach was able to use theoretical propositions to guide collection and analysis, and use a ‘variety of sources, a variety of types of data and a variety of research methods.’

In some respects, the key conundrum associated with this research project was not the choice of method (or research strategy) but rather, having chosen the comparative case study strategy, how to choose the cases to study. Platt notes that ‘cases to be studied are or should be chosen for particular intellectual purposes.’ The three case study chapters which follow this chapter were selected because they provided opportunities to explore cultural diplomacy in general, and to explore the three aspects of cultural diplomacy which form the focus of this thesis. I also chose the New Zealand and India case studies in order to be able to draw on my knowledge of the cultural diplomacy of each country, gathered through personal experience.

General aspects of cultural diplomacy explored in the case studies included the objectives of cultural diplomacy, the extent to which it was used as an instrument of diplomacy, and the degree to which the practice may have, in recent years, contributed to the advancement of national economic and trade interests which have a cultural aspect. Each case study provided

291 Yin, Case Study Research, 14.
293 Platt, "Cases of cases…of cases,” 41.
strong insight into one particular general aspect of cultural diplomacy. Hence the Canadian case study provided the opportunity to examine the extent to which cultural interests have become more important to countries. The New Zealand case study provided the opportunity to explore cultural diplomacy’s instrumentality. The Indian case study provided the opportunity to explore the normative objectives of cultural diplomacy. The foundations of India’s cultural diplomacy suggest that its cultural diplomacy was not undertaken as an instrument of diplomacy, but rather as a genuine method of enhancing understanding between countries and their peoples, in order to advance the cause of peace and international understanding.

More importantly, each case study provided an opportunity to explore thoroughly one or more of the three aspects of cultural diplomacy which form the focus of this thesis: cultural diplomacy’s use of the presentation of a national image and its possible link to a national brand, cultural diplomacy’s role in the protection of cultural sovereignty, and other aspects of cultural diplomacy’s domestic objectives and impacts.

The New Zealand case study enabled an exploration of cultural diplomacy’s role in the presentation of a contemporary image abroad, the reasons for this, and the link this may have with the use of a national brand. For most of the period 1970–1990, New Zealand’s cultural diplomacy was characterised by a lack of funding and by its ad hoc approach. In 1999, the overall framework within which this cultural diplomacy had previously taken place changed following the election of a new government. In future, New Zealand was to show itself to the world, in part through cultural diplomacy. In 2004, a new cultural diplomacy programme was established. An important focus of that new programme was the presentation abroad of an image of New Zealand as an advanced economy, an image which was also expected to adhere to a national brand.

The Canadian case study provided the opportunity to explore in particular two of the three aspects of cultural diplomacy which form the focus of this thesis: the role the practice has played in the protection of a state’s cultural sovereignty, and the domestic objectives of the cultural diplomacy of Canada’s federal government and that of the province of Québec. For many years Canada sought to limit the impact that cultural domination had on its national identity, and this was often couched in terms of the need to protect its cultural sovereignty. Its federal cultural diplomacy played a role in supporting Canada’s cultural industries, which were regarded as the primary method of securing Canada culturally against ‘invasion.’ The federal cultural diplomacy of Canada was also part of a project undertaken by some federal governments to assert the federal government’s right to be the only voice of Canada abroad, to act in opposition to the impact of
the international engagement of the province of Québec, which used its cultural diplomacy to assert its distinctiveness internationally. Hence the province, and its cultural diplomacy, have been implicated in a political battle between two levels of the Canadian federation.

As with the Canadian and New Zealand case studies, the Indian case study provided an opportunity to explore aspects of cultural diplomacy which form the focus of this thesis, in particular the presentation abroad of a national image, and the domestic objectives and impacts of cultural diplomacy. India’s cultural diplomacy, as represented by the programme of festivals of India of the 1980s and 1990s, sought to counter negative perceptions of India held abroad by asserting an image of India as a great country with a magnificent civilisation and a modernising economy. This assertion had a domestic impact. It allowed a proud country to assert to others its own version of itself.

I have also selected the New Zealand and Indian case studies in part because they provided an opportunity to draw on the knowledge of the cultural diplomacy of each country that I have gathered through personal experience. As noted at the start of this chapter, this personal experience of New Zealand’s cultural diplomacy, over an eighteen year period, included work as a cultural diplomacy bureaucrat (including working for a New Zealand high commission on a cultural diplomacy project over the period 1989-1991, and for the Ministry responsible for the new cultural diplomacy programme established by the New Zealand government in 2004) and as an administrator of an arts body that undertook cultural diplomacy. Over the three year period during which I lived in India, I was frequently involved in a range of cultural diplomacy activities. These included assisting the New Zealand High Commission with its cultural diplomacy in India; attending numerous cultural diplomacy offerings of India and other countries; discussing the subject with Indian friends, and with diplomats stationed in Delhi; and having a number of solo exhibitions of my photography which were used by the high commission to help carry out its work (in Nepal, as well as India). Both the Indian and New Zealand case studies draw heavily on my experience of cultural diplomacy in each country. This experience has provided me with an understanding of cultural diplomacy’s objectives and practice (including gaps between stated objectives and the reality of cultural diplomacy’s daily enactment) from a range of perspectives, and with the opportunity to observe some of the imperatives which have persuaded countries to use cultural diplomacy.
General approach

It is important to note that the case studies which follow do not seek to set out the entire history of the cultural diplomacy of Canada, New Zealand and India. Rather, aspects of the cultural diplomacy of each have been selected, particularly instances of major cultural diplomacy initiatives or examples. For each of the three case studies which follow, the primary focus of investigation has been on the cultural diplomacy of the state’s foreign ministry. Cultural diplomacy is a practice of governments associated with foreign policy and with diplomacy, and the foreign policy of a polity is managed by its foreign ministry. Neither Canada nor New Zealand has established a cultural diplomacy agency, and hence the primary, but not exclusive, focus of each case study has been on the work of the respective foreign ministries. Because Canada has grappled over many years with the issue of Québec’s role in the federation (and the ongoing issue of the province’s possible secession), and because Québec has become the most active internationally of any part of any federation, the case study on Canada also examines the cultural diplomacy of Québec. In the case study on India, the focus has been on the work of the Indian Council for Cultural Relations (ICCR), India’s cultural diplomacy agency, which, although described as an independent entity, has been a division of India’s foreign ministry since 1960.

Within each case study, the stated, and unstated, objectives of the state’s cultural diplomacy programme have been examined. A particular focus has been placed in all three cases on the practical aspects of the cultural diplomacy of each state - instances of cultural diplomacy in the field, and, where possible, instances of a discrete cultural diplomacy initiative. Hence the case study on Canada, whilst also examining Canada’s federal cultural diplomacy in Asia, has placed considerable focus on Canada’s foreign policy and on the cultural diplomacy of Québec. The case study on New Zealand examines three quite distinct cultural diplomacy initiatives (an exhibition, a programme based around a national commemoration, and a new cultural diplomacy fund). The case study on India examines the programme of major festivals of India held abroad in the 1980s and 1990s. Other aspects of each state’s respective cultural diplomacy activity which have been examined include funding and the nature of the image of the cultural diplomacy activity. An open-minded approach to each case study has been adopted, rather than a rigid adherence to examining only that characteristic (or characteristics) of the cultural diplomacy programme which informed the initial selection of the case. As noted previously, examples of sport and broadcasting cultural diplomacy have not been examined.
Data collection has included face-to-face interviews, documentation such as annual reports, newsletters, programmes and reports associated with the respective nation-state’s cultural diplomacy, archival material in library collections in India and New Zealand, and press releases and speeches, as well as information provided in scholarly articles and books. Interviews comprised face-to-face semi-structured interviews with representatives of those states chosen as case studies and with others associated with the cultural diplomacy programme, such as artists.

In chapters three to five, I set out the three case studies. Chapter three examines the federal cultural diplomacy of Canada, and the cultural diplomacy of Québec. I begin by placing federal cultural diplomacy in the context of Canada’s national cultural policy. Canada has attempted to counter what it regards as a cultural invasion, primarily from the United States, and these efforts have included Canada’s leadership of the international campaign to have ratified a new international instrument protecting cultural diversity. I then examine recent Canadian foreign policy, and the declaration in 1995 that the presentation abroad of Canadian values and culture was to be Canada’s third foreign policy objective. Following the setting out of the cultural diplomacy activities of Foreign Affairs Canada (including federal cultural diplomacy undertaken in Japan), and of the Department of Canadian Heritage (including efforts to brand Canada), I examine the cultural diplomacy of Québec, a province which has the most active international engagement in the world of any sub-national polity.

In chapter four, I examine New Zealand’s cultural diplomacy. After briefly discussing the early, post World War Two beginnings of New Zealand’s cultural diplomacy, I examine two major cultural diplomacy projects with which New Zealand’s foreign ministry has been involved - the Te Maori exhibition in the 1980s, and the cultural diplomacy programme of the New Zealand High Commission in the UK, over the period 1988-1991. I conclude the chapter by examining the cultural diplomacy initiative established in 2004. In chapter five, I begin by setting out the foreign policy stance of India’s first prime minister, Jawaharlal Nehru, then examine the cultural diplomacy of the ICCR and then examine the festivals of India in the UK, the United States, France and Germany.

These case studies serve to update and broaden the current understanding of cultural diplomacy. The nature of the practice undertaken by each government has differed, but the similarities have also been significant. These similarities, differences, and varying emphases will be drawn out in the following chapters, and expanded upon and summarised in the concluding chapter.
Chapter Three: The cultural diplomacy of Canada

Introduction

There are a number of characteristics of the cultural diplomacy of the federal government of Canada, and of the province of Québec, which are particularly pertinent to the three aspects of cultural diplomacy on which this thesis places particular focus.

First, of all states, the federation of Canada has been arguably the most focused on the threat posed to its cultural sovereignty, and Québec, of all states which are constituent parts of a federation, has been similarly intensely focused on this issue. The federal government of Canada’s national cultural policy, since the end of World War Two, has sought to preserve a space for Canadian culture within the context of Canada’s support for free trade. Hence Canada has aimed to ensure that Canadians have had access to the ‘best the world has to offer’ – the best cultural performances and products from other countries - whilst simultaneously devoting substantial energy, thought, and money to establishing and protecting a distinctive Canadian culture in the face of foreign cultural challenges, particularly those of American mass culture. Federal government support for Canadian culture has included a wide range of tools and initiatives, and these are explored below. And whilst the threat to Canada’s national cultural sovereignty has been from abroad, the threat to Québec’s cultural sovereignty has been perceived by that state as emanating from the federation itself.

Second, since the 1960s, Québec’s international engagement has resembled that of an independent state. Since 1985, Québec has operated its own ‘paradiplomatic service,’ complete with its ‘own minister, a corps of officials specialising in international affairs, and a network of foreign representatives. By the end of the twenty first century, the province had become the world’s foremost proponent of sub-national government activity in the international sphere.

Third, both the federal government of Canada and Québec have placed importance on presenting an up-to-date image of themselves abroad. Hence two states, one ostensibly the part of another, have promoted abroad constructions of their respective national images. This seemingly runs counter to what might be regarded as a basic tenet of diplomacy, the right of the government of a federation to speak internationally for that federation, and all its constituent parts. Diplomacy assumes that there should be only one diplomatic ‘voice’, one entity charged to undertake

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294 These have included subsidies to individual artists and efforts to limit the flow of cultural products into Canada (especially from the United States), through tariffs, taxes, quotas, restrictions on ownership, and restrictions on content. See Thompson, “Canada's Quest for Cultural Sovereignty,” for a very useful examination of part of this issue.
diplomacy on its behalf. The same might be assumed to apply to cultural diplomacy, particularly given the practice’s role in showing abroad a constructed image of a state.

Fourth, both the federal government of Canada and the province of Québec have pursued their cultural diplomacy in order to achieve domestic objectives. The federal government’s cultural diplomacy has sought to reinforce its right to speak on behalf of Canada abroad, and the cultural diplomacy of Québec has been concerned with asserting the province’s rights within the federation, and at one time, supporting the secessionist movement. Finally, both states have undertaken cultural diplomacy associated with the negotiation and promulgation of cultural agreements, including a joint push on a new international convention.

In the following pages I examine the national cultural policy and foreign policy contexts within which Canada’s federal cultural diplomacy takes place. I then examine the federal government’s cultural diplomacy as undertaken by its foreign service, the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT), and by the Department of Canadian Heritage (henceforth known as Canadian Heritage). Following this, I set out the diplomacy, and cultural diplomacy, of Québec, the province at the centre of the national debate on Canadian cultural nationalism (and Canadian sovereignty) in the post-war years.

Canadian cultural policy – the battle for cultural sovereignty

In 1997, Canadian foreign minister Lloyd Axworthy said that developing the international dimensions of Canadian culture was important not just in projecting an image of Canada in other countries, but also for the benefits to Canadian culture when our artists and performers gain a world stage. Given the relatively small audience base in Canada, Canadian artists must have access to the international marketplace to survive and flourish. Since we are increasingly obliged to share our domestic cultural markets with imports, we need to ensure access for Canadian cultural exports to foreign markets. This is, after all, an important part of our economy: there are now more Canadians employed in the cultural sector than in agriculture, for example, or in transport or construction.296

Axworthy’s comment on the increasing ‘obligation’ to share Canada’s domestic cultural markets with imports alludes to Canada’s cultural policy. The term ‘obligation’ implies an absence of choice in fulfilling a duty. Canada could choose not to share its domestic cultural market with

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295 As with the foreign service in New Zealand, Canada’s foreign service has had a number of names. The most recent iteration, the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT), came into force on 6 February 2006. It replaced the name Foreign Affairs Canada, which had itself replaced the name of the department now in use.

296 Axworthy, “Launch of Canada's Year of Asia Pacific Cultural Program.”
imports, but this would run counter to Canada’s strong support for free trade, and to its cultural policy. This policy asserts the importance of allowing Canadians to access foreign cultural products whilst also ensuring the protection of Canadian cultural sovereignty, assumed in this context to mean the power of a sovereign government effectively to regulate the operation of its cultural industries. Successive Canadian governments, over decades, have steadfastly supported the domestic production of Canadian stories. This is because of foreign cultural domination of the cultural sector of the United States throughout Canada, and of France in Québec. As early as 1951, the report of the Royal Commission on National Development in the Arts, Letters and Sciences (known as the Massey Commission, after its chairman, Vincent Massey) recommended building up Canada’s cultural defences, that is the protection of Canada’s unique cultural forms against the stifling effect of ‘a vast and disproportionate amount of material coming from a single alien source.’ The report was credited with legitimising state support for culture, and it gave rise to a number of cultural institutions, most noticeably the Canada Council.

Two factors explain Canada’s continuing concern about foreign cultural predomination. These are its sheer scope and nature, and the desire by Canadians to develop and protect a Canadian national identity by ensuring that the main producers of that identity, artists and cultural industries, are able to do so. The statistics concerning foreign cultural products in Canada indicate the scope of predomination:

- foreign firms and products account for 45 percent of book sales in Canada, 81 percent of English-language consumer magazines on Canadian newsstands and over 63 percent of magazine circulation revenue, 79 percent…of the retail sales of tapes, CDs, concerts, merchandise and sheet music, 85 percent…of the revenues from film distribution in Canada; and between 94 and 97 percent of screen time in Canadian theatres. The situation is most extreme in the film industry where the Hollywood studios have historically treated Canada as part of the U.S. market.

As Thompson notes, ‘allowing for the appearance of new technologies, similar figures could be provided for any decade back to the 1920s.’ The above statistics do not reflect the overwhelming position of the cultural goods of the United States as a proportion of foreign cultural goods, so much so that it would be reasonable, if not entirely accurate, to talk of the domination of United States cultural goods when referring to foreign domination of the whole of Canada (it should be noted in this context the domination of French cultural goods in Québec).

297 This definition is based on that of John Herd Thompson, but I have substituted the word ‘control’ with ‘effectively to regulate.’ Cultural industries tend to be privately owned, and control implies ownership.
299 Cultural Industries Sectoral Advisory Group, New Strategies for Culture and Trade.
300 Thompson, "Canada's Quest for Cultural Sovereignty," 271.
There are several reasons for the domination of the United States. At the end of the twenty-first century, eighty percent of Canadians lived within 100kms of the United States’ border, so Canadian exposure to the mass media of the United States remained unmediated by distance. Seventy percent of Canadians share a language with Americans. Hence the language barriers to foreign exports from the United States to, for example, Mexico or France, have not applied to Canada. The United States, this very close neighbour whose people mostly speak the same language as Canadians, has become by far the largest producer of cultural goods and services in the world. The most frequently cited statistic in this context is that cultural exports from the United States total in value US$80 billion every year.\(^{301}\) The United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO) report on world culture in 2000 noted that the eight leading Hollywood studios shared 85 percent of the world market, the three biggest audiovisual firms were United States owned and based, and nine of the ten most translated authors were English-language writers.\(^{302}\)

Two additional factors, in addition to those of proximity, language, and the size of the cultural output of the United States, explain the extent of foreign predominance. The first is simply that Canadian consumers buy foreign cultural goods, especially those from the United States. Canada ‘has been and remains’ the most important single market for the popular culture of the United States, at prices slightly higher than those in the United States.\(^{303}\) In 1989, for instance, Canadians bought almost forty percent of all books and a staggering seventy eight percent of all magazines sold abroad by the United States.\(^{304}\)

The second is the willingness of Canada to permit foreign cultural imports. The Cultural Industries Sectoral Advisory Group on International Trade,\(^{305}\) reporting in 1999, noted that Canada had one of the most open markets for foreign cultural goods in the world.\(^{306}\) No comparative evidence was provided to support this contention. The group’s report set out the principles guiding Canada's cultural policies and programmes. These included freedom of choice – ensuring Canadians could choose from a broad range of domestic and foreign cultural goods by

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\(^{303}\) Thompson, “Canada's Quest for Cultural Sovereignty,” 275.
\(^{304}\) Ibid. It is worth sounding the same note of caution over the accuracy of statistics associated with the cultural industries as that sounded by Acheson and Maule, who note that the domestic and international debates over culture have not been well served by the available official statistics. See chapter 3 of Acheson and Maule, *Much Ado About Culture*.
\(^{305}\) A federal advisory group set up to enable officials from Canada’s foreign and heritage agencies to consult with representatives of Canada’s cultural industries, referred to as SAGIT.
\(^{306}\) Cultural Industries Sectoral Advisory Group, *New Strategies for Culture and Trade*.
opening Canada's domestic market to the world, and access, which the group noted involved the
government using policy tools, such as regulation and support, to maintain a place for Canadian
cultural products in the Canadian market, and to give Canadians ready access to their culture.\footnote{307}
The group’s report simultaneously asserted that that Canada’s market was one of the most open
for foreign cultural goods in the world, whilst setting out a number of government initiatives and
actions which limited these imports. No specific explanation about this contradiction was
provided. It can be inferred from the report that the group believed that Canada has one of the
most open markets in the world for foreign cultural goods because the statistics show
overwhelming foreign predominance (therefore the market must be open), and the federal
government did not directly ban imports:

In the past, the government tended to rely on subsidies to support the cultural industries
and achieve the country's cultural objectives. Over time, government support has evolved
to take the form of tax and investment measures, coupled with regulatory measures in the
TV, film, music and book publishing industries. Border measures (e.g., tariffs) were used
in the past, but these measures are gradually being phased out.\footnote{308}

The cultural predominance of the United States has been brought about by proximity, language,
the size of the its cultural output, high level of purchasing of foreign cultural goods by Canadian
consumers, and a policy which supports the right of Canadians to buy foreign imports. One final
factor is relevant. Canada’s cultural producers have not been a match for foreign cultural
producers, and the primary reason given for this lack of capacity to compete effectively is
economic.\footnote{309} Canadian cultural producers have been constrained by a domestic market many
times smaller than those of foreign cultural producers. Foreign producers, especially those in the
United States, have been able to recoup their costs in their own large domestic markets, and this
has meant that sales in Canada of films, magazines and other such cultural goods and services
became extremely cheap and profitable. The dilemma for a Canadian television channel, for
instance, in such an environment, is whether to spend C$1 million to produce an hour of home-

\footnote{307} Others were: ‘1) freedom of expression. Canadians live in a free and democratic society where freedom of
cultural expression is both necessary and desirable. 2) Cultural diversity. Canada is a diverse, multicultural nation,
and its cultural products reflect that diversity. Products are developed to support the two linguistic markets and the
country's many regional and local services. 3) Partnerships. The federal government on its own cannot achieve a
strong, prosperous culture in Canada. The federal government works in partnership with provincial and municipal
governments and with the private sector to nurture and promote Canadian culture.’\footnote{Cultural Industries Sectoral
Advisory Group, \textit{New Strategies for Culture and Trade}.}

\footnote{308} Ibid.

\footnote{309} Some in Canada argue that the statistics of overwhelming, but not total, foreign predomination should be read, in
part, as proof that Canadian cultural producers have done remarkably well given the nature of the competition they
have faced. That is to say, had these domestic cultural producers not been as successful as they have been, the
statistics would have shown even greater domination.
grown drama, or buy for one tenth of the cost an hour of drama from an American company. American films can easily enter markets such as Canada, with very low marginal costs, having already recouped high fixed cost in the United States.\textsuperscript{310}

The issue of foreign predominance has caused such concern in Canada because of the role that culture plays in Canada’s national identity, which is itself crucial to setting apart Canada from the United States. The 1999 report of the Cultural Industries Sectoral Advisory Group on International Trade explained why culture was so important to Canada:

Culture is the heart of a nation. As countries become more economically integrated, nations need strong domestic cultures and cultural expression to maintain their sovereignty and sense of identity….Cultural industries shape our society, develop our understanding of one another and give us a sense of pride in who we are as a nation.\textsuperscript{311}

The Advisory Group noted that the benefits of support for Canadian culture were to build a cohesive, multicultural society, a sense of community and a sense of pride in Canada, and act as a ‘critical tool in the task of nation building’ because culture represents the values that make Canada distinct from other nations. In mid 2005, the Canadian federal minister of Canadian heritage noted that the cultural dynamism and vibrancy represented by the city of Toronto ‘doesn’t just happen like magic.’ It has to be ‘nurtured, invested in, fought for, and celebrated’ because Canada is in such open proximity to the cultural powerhouse that is the United States:

Without uniquely Canadian voices, we would be a country of disconnected fragments. We could not share with each other, and the world, our stories, our viewpoints and our experiences. These voices – of our artists, songwriters, authors, and performers – tell us about who we are; about where we have come from; about what matters to us. They tell us that we are not a pale imitation of anyone else….Today, Canada is a country that proudly stands for accommodation, not assimilation. We have learned not just to accept differences, but to value them. Indeed, we stand up for the right to be different – for the right of diverse peoples to participate in Canadian society as equals, with dignity, and thereby to achieve their potential….We strive for a vision of a country that is far greater than the sum of its parts.\textsuperscript{312}

\textsuperscript{310} Footer and Graber, “Trade Liberalization,” 8.

\textsuperscript{311} Cultural Industries Sectoral Advisory Group, \textit{New Strategies for Culture and Trade}. This report was influential in setting in train Canada’s leadership of the international push for a new convention on cultural diversity. The report noted that federal government measures enacted to encourage the creation, production and distribution of Canadian cultural products included financial incentives, regulatory and tax measures, rules on foreign investment and ownership, and measures to protect intellectual property. The report does not address Canadian federal support for international promotion of Canadian cultural industries. Its focus is on the domestic policy and regulatory environment.

\textsuperscript{312} Frulla, “How Culture Defines Who We Are.”
Protecting and supporting Canadian culture – the split-run magazine dispute

A useful insight into the Canadian government’s response to the combined issues of foreign cultural invasion and a deeply held belief in the importance of protecting and supporting Canadian culture is provided by an examination of the Canadian government’s actions concerning American periodicals, known as the split-run magazine issue. A split-run is a commercial technique used in the magazine industry to combine common editorial content with advertising tailored to particular markets. The term ‘split’ refers to the separation of the editorial and advertising content. The separation allows foreign split-runs to dump editorial content in a domestic market. Because the costs of the editorial content have already been covered through sales of the magazine in the magazine’s home market, much cheaper advertising rates can be offered, rates which cannot be matched by competing magazines still required to cover their editorial costs. In Canada, there has been an ongoing dispute centered on the economic advantage of split-run magazines. This dispute has involved the ‘most unambiguously protective cultural legislation.’

The first government foray took place in 1957 with a twenty percent tax on all advertising in split-runs of foreign periodicals in Canada. A royal commission on publications, in 1961, made two substantive recommendations, both enacted by the government, both of which continue to the present. First, Canadian advertisers were prohibited, through an amendment to the Income Tax Act, from claiming tax deductions on expenditure on advertising directed at the Canadian market and placed in a foreign periodical. Second, a tariff was enacted to block the importation of foreign periodicals with advertising aimed at the Canadian market.

The two largest split-run magazines, Time and Reader’s Digest, were exempted, because, according to Acheson and Maule, they wielded the most political influence. About a decade later, in 1970, a report of a Senate committee found that seventy percent of all magazines distributed in Canada had come from the United States, that Time and Reader’s Digest had increased their share of periodical advertising revenue from forty three to fifty six percent over a period of eleven years, and concluded that exempting Time and Reader’s Digest had been a mistake. In 1976 the government introduced Bill C-58 to address the omission. Bill C-58 required Time and Reader’s Digest to become at least seventy five percent Canadian owned, and also

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313 This is well covered in the chapter titled “Sports Illustrated”, in Acheson and Maule, Much Ado About Culture. The discussion on this issue draws heavily on their work.
314 Thompson, “Canada's Quest for Cultural Sovereignty.”
315 Acheson and Maule, Much Ado About Culture, 188.
stipulated that the content of their Canadian editions had be at least eighty percent different from that of the edition printed edited or published outside Canada, i.e. their American editions. In reaction to this, the publisher of the Canadian edition of Reader’s Digest became Canadian. The Canadian edition was published by a new foundation, controlled by Canadian directors, with the foundation’s equity provided by a subsidiary of the magazine’s American owners, which provided editorial services through a contract. Reader’s Digest in Canada was no longer a split-run in the usual sense: it was licensed by the United States company to use the trademark names and logo, and the published material emanated from a range of sources. Reader’s Digest became, and remained in 1999, Canada’s largest circulation Canadian magazine. Time closed its Canadian editorial office in 1976, and discounted its advertising rates for Canadian advertisers in the Canadian edition. It transferred editorial copy across the border on microfilm, and continued to publish a split-run edition, profitably, with less Canadian content.

In the early 1990s, in response to the American firm Time Warner’s announcement of its intention to publish a split-run edition of Sports Illustrated, the government legislated to remove a loophole concerning investments in a magazine by a non-Canadian publisher already operating in Canada, so as to ensure that approval could be denied on the basis that the investment threatened the cultural objectives of the government. In 1993, Time Warner announced the impending publication of Sports Illustrated. Most of the edition’s editorial content would emanate from outside Canada, and would be transmitted electronically across the border for printing in Canada. Its advertising would be targeted at the Canadian market. Because the existing tariff regulation was not able to stop this transfer, the government set up a task force. The task force agreed that the redundancy of the tariff measure bought about by electronic transfer threatened the health of the Canadian magazine industry. Its main recommendation was that an eighty percent tax be imposed per issue, based on advertising and editorial content levels. The government ‘reaffirmed its commitment to the long-standing policy objective of protecting the economic foundations of the Canadian periodical industry,’ and introduced Bill C-103 to put into effect the eighty percent tax. The Canadian split-run edition of Sports Illustrated ceased publication at the end of 1995, having published a total of thirty editions over the period 1993-1995. Time Warner responded by using the dispute resolution process of the World Trade Organization (WTO) to adjudicate the issue. Time Warner asked that two other measures be included – the tariff regulation which the electronic transfer had circumvented, and the postal

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317 Acheson and Maule, Much Ado About Culture, 192.
subsidy available to Canadian periodicals. The outcome of the WTO process was that the position taken by the United States was supported on all the issues.\textsuperscript{318}

The Canadian government responded by seeking to develop a new magazine policy that would not run counter to either the WTO or the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). Prior to the passing into law of Bill C-55 in mid 1999, the United States and Canada had agreed to amendments which allowed foreign publishers access to the Canadian market, subject to meeting ownership and content criteria.\textsuperscript{319} Under this agreement, the United States provided Canada with assurances that it would not take any trade action under WTO agreements, the NAFTA or the United States Trade Act.\textsuperscript{320} In late 1999, the federal government made a commitment to provide assistance to Canadian magazine publishers through the establishment of a Canadian Magazine Fund. The fund aimed to reward investment in the production of Canadian editorial content by magazines which were majority-owned and controlled by Canadians and which had at least 80 percent Canadian editorial content.\textsuperscript{321}

The periodicals issue involved regulations and taxes on ownership, content, the method of transfer of information, and investment.\textsuperscript{322} The range of measures used to address the periodicals issue, and their mixed impact, served to emphasise how new, rapidly changing, technologies could easily make legislation redundant. The same sort of measures had been drawn up with regard to other cultural industries. Since 1971, Canada has had content rules which aim to ensure that Canadian-produced television and radio are prominently represented on Canadian airwaves. At least sixty percent of programming by Canadian television stations must be Canadian. On English language radio stations, thirty five percent of popular music selections must be Canadian, and on French language stations sixty five percent of vocal music must be in French.\textsuperscript{323} Licensing restrictions have been applied: in 1994, the Canadian Radio-Television and Telecommunications Commission (CRTC), which licences broadcast, cable and satellite services, using powers under the Broadcasting Act, removed the Country Music Television channel from a list of American

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\item\textsuperscript{318} Acheson and Maule, \textit{Much Ado About Culture}, 194.
\item\textsuperscript{319} A very good outline of the periodicals issue is provided in Armstrong, “Magazines, Cultural Policy and Globalization.”
\item\textsuperscript{320} Canada Library of Parliament, “Cultural Exemptions.”
\item\textsuperscript{321} Armstrong, “Magazines, Cultural Policy and Globalization,” 378.
\item\textsuperscript{322} For some, the range of measures can best be characterised as falling into two types, protective and promotional, but the distinction has its problems. The postal subsidy available to Canadian periodicals, for instance, might be placed on the promotion ledger, but can just as easily be viewed as a protective measure. See Thompson, “Canada's Quest for Cultural Sovereignty.”
\item\textsuperscript{323} The Canadian Radio-television and Telecommunications Commission administers these rules, and is responsible for giving particular impetus to the Canadian music and television production industries. See Department of Canadian Heritage, “Sharing Canadian Stories.”
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services allowed to be carried by Canadian cable companies. Less than two years later, the same channel was back in service ‘as the minority investor in a split-run type format for cable that for magazine publishers was considered by the Canadian government to be unacceptable.’

The battle over split-run magazines highlights the tenacity of the Canadian government in its efforts to devise and implement a national cultural policy that supported Canadian cultural industries. The range of measures Canada employed to support and protect its cultural sector included two cultural diplomacy elements: 1) an emphasis on ensuring that international agreements to which Canada was a party allowed Canada to support and protect its cultural sector, and 2) the promotion of Canadian culture abroad, through the foreign ministry and Canadian Heritage. This international promotion sought to expand the market for Canadian cultural producers, through international exposure, and to present abroad an updated image of Canada, from a country of mountains, moose, Mounties, and ‘nice’ people, to one of a multicultural, creative, technologically-advanced country. Both these aspects - international agreements and cultural promotion abroad - will now be discussed.

_ International agreements and the protection of culture_

The Canadian government’s international efforts to mitigate the impact on its cultural industries of its bi-, tri- and multi-lateral free trade agreements was initially focussed on securing a cultural exception within the multilateral free trade framework negotiated through and monitored by the World Trade Organisation (WTO). As the effectiveness of this approach diminished, Canada promoted through UNESCO the adoption of a new international agreement on cultural diversity, the Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expressions. The convention, co-sponsored by Canada and France, was approved on 20 October 2005 by all but six of the 154 members of UNESCO. Canada’s decision to rally international support for a convention arose out of its increasing inability to limit the impact of its commitments under the framework of the intergovernmental body, the WTO.

The WTO framework was established in 1994. Its aim was to liberalise trade, conduct international trade according to multilaterally agreed rules, and handle trade disputes. The WTO was the successor to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, or GATT, which, over

324 Acheson and Maule, _Much Ado About Culture_, 206.
325 Canada and France co-sponsored the Convention. The United States and Israel voted against the Convention, and Australia, Nicaragua, Honduras and Liberia abstained.
326 A very good outline of issues associated with the WTO is provided in Sampson, _The Role of the World Trade Organization_.


the period 1948-1994, provided a forum for negotiating rules for much of world trade. Efforts to reduce customs duties and other trade barriers were undertaken through a series of multilateral trade negotiations, known as trade rounds. The Uruguay Round negotiation, over the period 1986-1994, resulted in the creation of the WTO.

Under the WTO, trade in goods continued to be dealt with under what is known as GATT 1994, which updated GATT 1947. But the remit of the WTO also included services and intellectual property, neither of which were dealt with under the original GATT brought into effect in 1948. Following the WTO’s establishment, trade in services was dealt with under the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS), and trade-related aspects of intellectual property under the agreement on Trade-related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS). Both GATS and TRIPS were agreements adopted in 1994 as a result of the Uruguay Round.

It may have been assumed, when Canada signed up to the WTO, that the new regime would have provided Canada with the capacity to support and protect its culture and cultural industries that had not been available under the GATT 1947, because the new regime extended the WTO’s remit to cover services and intellectual property, and provided for signatories to the WTO to opt out of certain obligations under the regime. Over the period 1947 to 1994, the growth in national economies, and in concomitant disposable incomes, combined with the advent of commercial television, served to highlight the ambiguity of the GATT concerning trade in cultural goods and services. Goods were covered by the GATT, but services were not. The boundary between the two was, at best, blurred. By the time that the WTO was established in 1994, most cultural products and activity were services, not goods (the simple rule of thumb distinction between the two was that a good could be dropped on a person’s foot whereas a service could not). When the GATT was negotiated in 1947, only two articles dealt with trade in cultural goods. Article IV allowed for the imposition of theatrical screen quotas, and the GATT also permitted exceptions to be taken for measures imposed for the protection of national treasures of artistic, historic and archaeological value. But the 1947 agreement did not include a general clause enabling signatories to undertake measures to protect their culture or cultural industries. Hence the GATT of 1947 provided only limited powers for countries wishing to exclude their culture from its remit.

Following the establishment of the WTO in 1994, the treatment of culture depended on whether it was considered a good or a service. If it was a good, the GATT 1994 applied. If it was

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a service, the GATS applied, and subjected all services, including cultural services, to its provisions. A general exemption clause for culture was not included. But the GATS did allow countries to choose those services for which they were prepared to make an offer of liberalisation and those for which they were not. It did this by enabling countries to opt out of most-favoured-nation commitment, and national treatment obligations. These obligations can be conceived of as core principles of the international trading system as promulgated by the WTO/GATT. Most-favoured-nation meant that WTO member states were obliged to give equal treatment to goods and services from all WTO members. The national treatment principle meant that imported and locally produced goods should be treated equally. The GATS asserted these and other GATT principles, but for these to apply, countries had to commit a sector or sectors to which national treatment and market access were to apply. A country can commit to all or some categories of a sector: the audio-visual sector, for instance, itself a subsector of communication services as set out in GATS, incorporates six subcategories of audiovisual services. Commitments may be complete or partial. Partial commitments may incorporate limits on the likes of foreign ownership, screen time for foreign productions and so on. Governments could also make reservations for most-favoured-nation which were intended to be phased out over time. That is to say, a country could indicate that, for a sector or sectors, it intended to treat some other countries more favourably than others. Despite this being an apparent contravention of the most-favoured-nation principle of equality of treatment it was allowed as a compromise to facilitate adoption of the GATS, and worked in Canada’s favour.\textsuperscript{328}

Following the adoption of GATS, Canada took most-favoured-nation reservations with respect to its film and television co-production agreements, as these agreements provide more favourable treatment for partner countries, so as to ‘preserve the Canadian and Québécois cultures.’\textsuperscript{329} Canada did not make most-favoured-nation reservations for its film distribution policy, which provides preferred status to Hollywood majors relative to new film distributors. This decision not to take a reservation for film distribution led to a complaint by the European Union, lodged on behalf of the Dutch company Polygram, which at that time distributed films, but the action ceased because Polygram was taken over by a Canadian firm. Canada did not opt in to the GATS for audiovisual services, and hence ‘protected that sector from the market access and national treatment disciplines of the agreement.’\textsuperscript{330} As Acheson and Maule note,

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{328} Acheson and Maule, \textit{Much Ado About Culture}, 80-81.
\item \textsuperscript{329} Ibid., 80.
\item \textsuperscript{330} Ibid.
\end{itemize}
The net effect is that in the WTO, a country can protect its culture if it is considered a service such as audiovisual services and is subject to the GATS. It does so by a combination of taking reservations for MFN [most-favoured-nation] and not making any national treatment and market access commitments for the sector or by making only qualified commitments.\footnote{Acheson and Maule, \textit{Much Ado About Culture}, 82.}

In addition to this capacity to protect national culture if considered a service, Canada was also successful in fashioning a cultural exception in its free trade agreements with the United States, in 1988, and with Mexico and the United States, later, in 1998. Despite strong opposition by the United States, Canada ensured that both the Canada-United States Free Trade Agreement (CUSFTA), signed in 1988, and the NAFTA, signed between Canada, the United States and Mexico in 1994, exempted cultural industries for the provisions of the Agreement. Both Agreements can be considered together, as wording from CUSFTA carried over to NAFTA with respect to Canada and the United States.

Articles 2005(1) and 2005(2) of the CUSFTA simultaneously allowed cultural industries to be exempt from the Agreement whilst allowing retaliation, should the exemption article be used. Cultural industries included ‘enterprises engaged in the print media, film and video recordings, audio or video music recordings, music in print or machine readable form, and broadcasting.’ Multimedia was not listed separately. Article 2005(1) stated that ‘cultural industries are exempt from the provisions of this Agreement except as specifically provided. The three exceptions to this article that relate to trade and investment were first, a commitment to eliminate tariffs for goods that were inputs to the cultural industries, second, assurance of fair market value for the sale of assets of foreign companies divesting those assets due to foreign ownership restrictions, and third, removal of a restriction that magazines must be typeset and printed in Canada for a company to be able to deduct advertising in the magazine as a business expense in Canada. Article 2005(2) stated that notwithstanding any other provision of the Agreement ‘a party may take measures of equivalent commercial effect in response to actions that would have been inconsistent with this Agreement but for paragraph 1.’

\textit{The new UNESCO instrument}

Canada may have been successful with regard to a cultural exemption in the NAFTA, and it had used the cultural exemption provisions of the GATS, but it could not successfully defend its periodicals policy in the WTO. This incapacity, along with a seminal report by the Cultural
Industries Sectoral Advisory Group on International Trade, in 1999, seem jointly to have been instrumental in persuading the Canadian government to undertake very active cultural diplomacy to garner support for the ratification of a new international cultural instrument.

In its report, the Advisory Group deemed that the cultural exemption approach had reached its limits. Canada’s cultural policies had helped build a vibrant cultural industries sector, and promote a Canadian identity and a sense of pride. Internationally, Canada had been a ‘strong persuasive voice in the “culture is more than a commodity” debate.’ It had been at the ‘forefront of international efforts to liberalize global markets…and a champion of cultural sovereignty and cultural diversity.’ But digitisation and the convergence of key sectors associated with cultural industries were creating new technologies which challenged the government's ability to effectively regulate continued access by Canadians to Canadian cultural products. The Advisory Group recommended that Canada actively pursue a new approach to protecting culture and cultural industries, a new international agreement on cultural diversity that would positively ‘lay out the ground rules for cultural policies and trade.’ The group noted that the failure of Canada to defend successfully its periodicals policy in the WTO was indicative of the increasing difficulty it faced marrying the objectives of its cultural policy with its international trade obligations.

In response to the group’s report, the federal government agreed to pursue a new instrument, which it said would set out clear ground rules to enable Canada and other countries to maintain policies that promote their culture while respecting the rules of the international trading system and ensuring markets for cultural exports. The agreement would recognize the special role of cultural goods and services and the right of governments to preserve and promote cultural diversity.

Over the period 1998-2005, Canada ‘spared no effort’ to establish an instrument on the diversity of cultural expressions. The federal minister of cultural heritage said that Canada pursued an aggressive international strategy, taking advantage of major events…to advance our objectives. Canada has been at the forefront of a well-orchestrated diplomatic

332 Cultural Industries Sectoral Advisory Group, New Strategies for Culture and Trade.
333 Ibid.
335 Cultural Industries Sectoral Advisory Group, An International Agreement on Cultural Diversity. The new instrument’s full title, should it be adopted, would be the ‘Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expressions.’
336 Ibid.
337 These were the words used by Liza Frulla, the federal Minister of Canadian Heritage, at the time the Convention was adopted at the UNESCO General Conference in October 2005.
offensive. …On several occasions, Canadian diplomatic missions were asked to help build international support. The Canadian team took the lead during the negotiations in Paris to ensure that we would obtain not only a good text, but also the support of the great majority of UNESCO members. More recently, Canada succeeded in obtaining a decision by the UNESCO Executive Council to recommend that the Convention be put forward for approval at the General Assembly.  

The minister singled out the role which the government of Québec, cultural entities, and an international cultural network had played in moving the issue forward. The key cultural entity involved in the issue was a network comprising Canadian cultural sector associations, the Canadian Coalition for Cultural Diversity. The coalition was set up in 1998, with Francophone arts organisations forming the original nucleus. It included thirty two cultural sector associations representing artists and others working in a wide range of cultural industries. Two international cultural networks promoted the new instrument, one comprising ministers of culture and associated portfolios, the other comprising associations of artists and creative professions. An important aspect of the new UNESCO convention for the Canadian government was its ‘equal footing’ with other international agreements. The convention was not subject to agreements such as those incorporated under the WTO. The convention’s relationship to other instruments, especially trade instruments, was the most contentious aspect during the entire period of its gestation. The push to ensure that the new convention did not prevail over other instruments was led by the United States, with France leading the opposing group of states. At heart lay the issue of whether culture was to be treated as a commodity, or as a ‘way of life.’ For the French culture minister, the convention was as much about the cultural domination of the United States, as it was about defending the ‘diversity of identities’.  

According to UNESCO’s 2000 world report on culture…the eight leading Hollywood studios share 85% of the world market; the three biggest audiovisual firms are located in the United States (Time Warner, Viacom, and Walt Disney); nine of the world’s ten most

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340 The coalition’s aim is to ensure that Canada ‘retains its right to develop, implement and maintain policies designed to promote a domestic space for Canadian cultural production.’ For the Coalition, the new instrument ‘would affirm in international law the sovereign right of countries to develop, implement and maintain their own cultural policies.’ Coalition for Cultural Diversity (Canada), “Canadian Coalition for Cultural Diversity Backs Moroccan Colleagues.”
341 The International Network for Cultural Policy, a world-wide network of artists and cultural groups dedicated to countering the homogenizing effects of globalization on culture.
translated authors are English-language writers; and in 2004, four companies shared the bulk of the world recording market.\textsuperscript{343}

It is fair to say that had the tables been reversed, and French studios shared eighty five percent of the world market, the three biggest audiovisual firms were located in France, and nine of the world’s ten most translated authors were French language writers, the minister might not have nearly been as concerned with threats to international cultural diversity.

Canada’s cultural trade policy has been described by Maule as ‘complex bordering on confused,’ and as showing more than one face to the world. Canadian consumers favour greater liberalisation (by watching a wide array of foreign material in large quantities) whilst voting for parties which pursue protectionist policies.\textsuperscript{344} Yet despite the problems associated with the pursuit by the Canadian federal government of contradictory policy stances, in practice the Canadian federal government has shown far less confusion about the contradiction. It has simultaneously sought, through cultural diplomacy, to protect and promote Canada’s culture internationally. It pursued the new instrument on cultural diversity with commendable energy. And it has promoted Canadian culture though its diplomatic network. This promotional activity will now be examined.

\textit{Canada’s foreign policy: international activism and the Third Pillar}

Canada’s foreign service, DFAIT, and Canadian Heritage, both undertake cultural diplomacy in the field. This includes the provision of support for international cultural tours, supporting Canadian studies abroad, and supporting the international activities of Canada’s cultural industries. These activities, examined in greater detail below, have occurred within a foreign policy framework characterised not just by its commitment to free trade, but also by its international activism, and by the decision in 1995 to make the projection of Canadian values and culture one of three principal objectives of Canadian foreign policy (this is known as the third pillar).

On the face of it, Canada’s international activism, and the commitment it made to cultural diplomacy as shown by the third pillar, would clearly point towards a strong financial commitment to federal cultural diplomacy, of the same order that Canada has provided to its domestic cultural industries, artists and arts companies under its national cultural policy. But there has been a dislocation between the commitment given to cultural diplomacy as suggested

\textsuperscript{343} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{344} Maule, “Trade and Culture,” 1.
by the third pillar, and actual funding for federal cultural diplomacy. The money has not matched the rhetoric.

Canada has for many years prided itself on being a very active international citizen. A foreign policy review of 1970 noted that ‘Canada’s action to advance self-interest often coincides with the kind of worthwhile contribution to international affairs that most Canadians clearly favour.’\textsuperscript{345} Canada’s foreign policy activism has included its involvement in international peacekeeping: Canada invented it, its prime minister, Lester Pearson, won the Nobel Peace Prize for it, and Canada has undertaken more of it than any other country. Canada also led the world movement for a ban on land mines, has been a member of numerous international institutions, was a ‘key architect in the field of international human rights,’\textsuperscript{346} and played leading roles in international bodies and initiatives such as the International Criminal Court and the multinational force in Haiti. This activism has been supported by Canadians and Canadian politicians alike. The most recent foreign policy review, in 2005, noted that ‘the Canadian population is both keenly interested in international affairs and strongly oriented toward taking an active role on the world stage.’\textsuperscript{347} Welsh notes that ‘public opinion research reveals that Canada is a country deeply interested in foreign policy, whose citizens are strongly oriented toward taking an active role on the world stage and willing to commit Canadian troops in a wide array of scenarios.’\textsuperscript{348} Canada’s international activism has attained the status of a core Canadian value. It has remained a source of pride for Canadians, and has served to distinguish Canada from the United States, a country far less committed to a United Nations-centred multilateralism.

In 1995, this commitment to international activism seemed to reach its apex. The foreign policy review of that year declared the ‘projection of Canadian values and culture’ as the third objective of Canadian foreign policy.

The first pillar (objective) - promoting prosperity and employment – was to be pursued through reforming domestic economic policy, gaining access for Canadian goods and services abroad, supporting an open, fair and predictable set of rules governing international trade and investment, and helping Canadian firms take advantage of opportunities abroad. But Canadian prosperity alone would be insufficient. Global prosperity anchored international stability and contributed to sustainable development. Prosperous people in other countries would be more able

\textsuperscript{345} Department of External Affairs, \textit{Foreign Policy for Canadians}, 11.  
\textsuperscript{347} Ibid, 2.  
\textsuperscript{348} Welsh, “Fulfilling Canada’s Global Promise.”
to maintain economic partnerships with Canada, more open to Canadian values, and hence more active partners in building the international system.\textsuperscript{349}

The second objective - the protection of Canada’s security within a stable global framework - was linked to the first objective, as stability and security were viewed as prerequisites for economic growth and development. Threats to security had become more complex than before. Because many issues such as mass migration, crime, disease, environmental degradation, overpopulation, and underdevelopment transcended borders, Canada’s security, including its economic security, increasingly depended on the security of others. Markets for Canadian goods could only remain viable if the countries buying these goods remained stable. If Canada’s security was in part defined in terms of the absence of crime, especially crime which by its very nature had a strong international dimension (such as for instance the trafficking of humans or drugs), then it was essential that Canada worked to assist other countries to deal with these issues. ‘The forces of globalization, technological development, and the scale of human activity’ reinforced Canada’s interdependence with the rest of the world.\textsuperscript{350}

The third pillar incorporated both values and culture. Different reasons were given for each aspect. The promotion abroad of Canada’s \textit{values}, which the 1995 review identified as ‘respect for human rights, democracy, the rule of law, and the environment,’ was seen as key to the achievement of prosperity within Canada and to the protection of global security. Canadian values and rights could be safeguarded only if they were enshrined internationally, because Canada could not be secure in a world community that devalued beliefs and violated rights central to its identity. The promotion abroad of Canadian \textit{culture} was to be undertaken for three purely instrumental reasons. First, Canadian culture should be promoted abroad because it made money and created jobs:

\begin{quote}
\textit{in the short term, the economic activity generated by cultural, scientific and educational activities is extremely important for Canada's economy. Canada's cultural industries have experienced unprecedented growth in the past ten years, and provide employment to hundreds of thousands of Canadians, mainly through exports. Canada also excels in the field of higher education: 60,000 foreign students have chosen our colleges and universities at which to study or to perfect their skills.}\textsuperscript{351}
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{349} As Pennee suggests, however, the view that global prosperity anchors international stability and contributes to sustainable development depends on the nature of that prosperity, whether it is spread equitably amongst (and within) nation-states. In her view, the goal of unabated economic growth for all carries ‘precisely the contradictions that threaten world order.’ Pennee, ‘Culture as Security,” 196.

\textsuperscript{350} Foreign Affairs Canada, \textit{Canada in the World}, 2.

\textsuperscript{351} Foreign Affairs Canada, \textit{Canada in the World}, section V, 3.
The economic imperative was supported, the government noted, by Canada’s participation in the international television network TV5, which represented an ‘exceptional showcase for our francophone televisual productions.’ This also ‘projects daily a Canadian presence to millions of homes on five continents.’

Second, Canada must promote its culture abroad, because in the medium- and long-term, a country that does not project a clearly defined image of what it is and what it represents, is doomed to anonymity on the international scene. Only Canadian culture can express the uniqueness of our country, which is bilingual, multicultural, and deeply influenced by its Aboriginal roots, the North, the oceans, and its own vastness.\(^{352}\)

Third, Canada should promote its culture abroad because doing so supports the capacity of Canadian artists and cultural industries to survive against foreign competition:

The celebration of Canadian culture and the promotion of Canadian cultural and educational industries, so that they can continue to compete at home and abroad, are central tenets of Canadian policy….The Government is convinced that we can and should manage our international economic relationships so that Canadian cultural industries are effectively supported. We will remain vigilant in protecting and promoting the capacity of our important cultural industries to flourish in the global environment.\(^{353}\)

The influence of the Canadian historian and philosopher John Ralston Saul is evident in this support for the notion that Canada should counter international anonymity.\(^{354}\) As discussed previously, Saul’s report to the joint Parliamentary committee which examined Canadian foreign policy in 1994 (out of which came the decision to make the promotion abroad of Canadian culture and values the third pillar of Canada’s foreign policy), declared that national images play an important role in the international climate because the influence of countries in the world community is affected by their image. International presence depends on image projection, and the absence of such a presence not only means ‘disappearing from the planet,’ or simply a lost cultural and financial opportunity, but is a major problem for foreign policy.\(^{355}\) Because Canada's profile abroad is, for the most part, its culture, its image, it is crucial to support national cultural capacity and to promote culture abroad.

\(^{352}\) Ibid.
\(^{353}\) Foreign Affairs Canada, \textit{Canada in the World}, section V, 5.
\(^{354}\) Stairs concurs, but also credits the influence of the two chairs of the Joint Parliamentary Committee which undertook the review, and three others. See Stairs, “Myths, Morals and Morality.”
\(^{355}\) Saul, “Culture and Foreign Policy,” 85.
Foreign policy reviews in 2003 and 2005

The foreign policy ‘dialogue’ of 2003 continued the commitment in the previous review to the projection of Canadian values and culture abroad. Canada’s foreign minister, Bill Graham, said the dialogue revealed a large measure of agreement with much of the broad thrust of Canadian foreign policy since 1995, including a continued commitment to the third pillar, and agreement that Canadian values should underpin Canada’s foreign policy, as well as playing a role in projecting Canada's identity abroad. The report which summarised respondents’ views noted that many valued the contribution of cultural diplomacy to Canada's international relations. It was seen as one of the most effective ways of enabling the Canadian voice to be heard abroad and of creating a positive high profile for Canada in the foreign media and among opinion leaders and decision makers from business, government, politics, academia and the arts. Many respondents argued that Canada needed to update its image and define more clearly what it wanted to project. Provincial government contributions to the report had encouraged the ‘branding’ of Canada as a location for economic partners, visitors, students and skilled immigrants.

By contrast, the 2005 foreign policy review dispensed with the three pillar framework of the preceding decade. The 2005 review placed the promotion of Canadian culture abroad within an expanded Canadian public diplomacy, rather than as one component of a third pillar of Canada’s foreign policy. Public diplomacy was defined as projecting in another country ‘a coherent and influential voice to all those who have influence within a society - not just within its government.’ This public diplomacy would build Canada’s credibility and influence, cultivate long-term relationships, dialogue and understanding abroad, and would ‘modernize Canada's image abroad, in cooperation with Canadians.’ The expanded public diplomacy would have an economic dimension: the arts and cultural sector was ‘economically important in its own right (worth C$38 billion to the economy, with exports totalling almost C$5 billion annually),’ and

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356 Nossal believes that this was a less than fully-fledged foreign policy review. Nossal, “The World We Want?” The process of dialogue began by seeking would-be respondents’ views on several foreign policy issues, including whether the three pillars of Canadian foreign policy should be endorsed, and whether or not the right Canadian values were being promoted abroad. The 2003 dialogue was a good example of a noticeable characteristic of Canada’s approach to the making of foreign policy, the seeking of citizen input.

357 Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, A Dialogue on Foreign Policy.

358 The statement’s five priorities included ‘creating a new multilateralism and flexible diplomacy.’ Foreign Affairs Canada, Canada's International Policy Statement: A Role of Pride and Influence in the World. Overview, 24. The other four are revitalising Canada’s relationship with the United States; addressing security challenges, including international terrorism; increasing prosperity; and promoting respect for human rights.
played a special role in ‘opening doors for Canadians in other sectors.’ The review also noted that public diplomacy was
crucial to achieving our foreign policy goals. By persuading others as to the value of our proposals and strategies, or by engaging in cross-cultural dialogue, we can take important steps in furthering shared objectives of importance to Canadians.\textsuperscript{359}

Not only would the arts and cultural sector contribute to the economy, but it would also play a special role in attracting others to the Canadian perspective and in opening doors for Canadians in other sectors.\textsuperscript{360} The 2005 Internet-based ‘eDiscussion’ further elucidated the role of the promotion abroad of Canadian culture.\textsuperscript{361} DFAIT’s response to public input reiterated that the promotion of Canadian culture and know-how abroad remained an important goal of Canadian foreign policy. The response noted that Canada was working to better communicate its ideas, culture and innovations throughout the United States, through conferences, cultural events, trade shows, university exchanges and reciprocal visits of opinion leaders, and through other cultural promotion activities such as DFAIT’s arts promotion initiative, Canadian Heritage’s \textit{Trade Routes} initiative, and Canadian work on the international convention on the protection and promotion of cultural diversity. Remarkably, Canadian culture was seen to include various international activities such as Canada's long-term commitment in Afghanistan.

\textit{Analysis of the Third Pillar}

What can be made of the 1995 third pillar decision, and the subsequent lessening of the commitment in the 2005 review? Why was the commitment never backed up with the sort of federal funding it implied was warranted?

In the view of a leading Canadian foreign policy academic, Denis Stairs, the main thrust of the third pillar commitment was instrumental. In his view, it was based on the assumption that it was in the Canadian interest to have the ‘most sophisticated’ citizens of other countries better understand Canada, that there was ‘more to Canada than green trees, blue lakes, and white snow….it is an exciting, vibrant, intellectually stimulating and culturally creative place in which to live, work and shop.’ Stairs regarded such an enhanced understanding as raising Canada’s

\textsuperscript{359} See Foreign Affairs Canada, \textit{Canada’s International Policy Statement: A Role of Pride and Influence in the World. Diplomacy} (one of the four papers comprising the 2005 review).

\textsuperscript{360} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{361} The ‘eDiscussion,’ the most recent iteration of citizen input into Canadian foreign policy, asked Canadians to share their thoughts on ‘Showcasing Canadian culture and know-how abroad.’ It posed two broad questions: 1) what role does Canadian culture and know-how play in its foreign policy?, and 2) how might the government best promote Canadian talent and expertise to the world? In late 2004, the eDiscussion topic was ‘renewing multilateral institutions,’ in early 2005, ‘security,’ and in late 2005, ‘failed and fragile states.’
international stature, strengthening the credibility of its diplomacy, enhancing its economic appeal, and ‘at rock bottom,’ promoting Canada’s academic and cultural exports.\textsuperscript{362} In Stairs’ view, the decision to raise to the top of the foreign policy agenda the promotion of Canadian values and culture was influenced in part by John Ralston Saul’s ‘persuasive position paper’ on the subject for the Committee undertaking the 1995 review, and was also driven by a combination of politicians, bureaucrats, academics and cultural organisations which supported the instrumental benefits that such a promotion would have for Canadian interests.

The reason why the third pillar was never supported with funding had much to do with timing. As Stairs notes, the 1995 decision to highlight the projection of Canadian values and culture abroad coincided with finance minister Paul Martin’s budget-cutting exercise. DFAIT dramatically reduced its cultural and academic relations allocations. For Stairs, one measure of the impact that the third pillar decision had was that it at least saved the foreign ministry’s International Cultural Relations Bureau from the chopping block (on which it had been at the time the third pillar was enshrined as one of Canada’s three foreign policy objectives). Potter notes that despite cuts to the federal budget over the period 1995-1998, the foreign affairs ministry nevertheless managed to refurbish Canada House in London, and the Canadian Cultural Centre in Paris, and protect its cultural grants programme.\textsuperscript{363}

There is another aspect to the third pillar declaration which warrants brief discussion. The focus on the projection of Canadian values and culture abroad – that strong strand of activism in Canadian foreign policy discussed above – has been viewed by some commentators as flawed. For Stairs,

Canadians have grown alarmingly smug, complacent, and self-deluded in their approach to international affairs…They have come to think of themselves as morally superior. They believe in particular, that they subscribe to a distinctive set of values - ‘Canadian’ values – and that those values are special in the sense of being unusually virtuous.\textsuperscript{364}

Stairs concedes that Canada’s multiculturalism, which he noted usually rated ‘first billing in received lists of Canadian values,’ may hint at grounds for a distinctive trace in the Canadian version of the liberal ideal.\textsuperscript{365} But he sees the Canadian propensity for ‘morally superior’ rhetorical displays as tiresome, self-serving and reflecting Canada’s declining influence and growing incapacity in the world at large. Stairs also sees the values approach as being easily and

\textsuperscript{362} Stairs, “Myths, Morals and Reality.”
\textsuperscript{364} Stairs, “Myths, Morals and Reality,” 1.
\textsuperscript{365} Stairs, “Myths, Morals and Reality,” 6.
speedily abandoned as soon as a competing self-interest ‘comes down the pike.’ Stairs has not been alone in criticising the Canadian values approach to foreign policy. A former Canadian trade negotiator described the values driven approach as Canada’s ‘romantic quest.’

Kim Richard Nossal, another leading Canadian foreign policy academic, notes that the 2005 foreign policy statement (in his view, self-flatteringly titled *A Role of Pride and Influence in the World*) constantly reminds Canadians ‘how important Canada is in the world, how Canada has led the way, or will lead the way in the future, how much good Canada has done or will do, how much ‘difference’ Canada will make in the world.’ Nossal terms this the ‘ear candy’ approach to Canadian foreign policy:

> Canada’s role in the world is described by government ministers in terms that are so sweet-sounding that the rhetoric produces considerable political support from the public. And the more that their governors feed them feel-good rhetoric about what a marvellous contribution Canada makes in the world, the more that Canadians have become addicted to that rhetoric and are dissatisfied with more honest or sober assessments.

In Nossal’s view, the Canadian studies programmes abroad, a core component of DFAIT’s cultural diplomacy, ‘feeds this addiction perfectly.’ Canadian studies centres, programmes and associations allow the government in Ottawa to show Canadians that foreigners find them fascinating, that they ‘want to learn from Canada, neatly fulfilling the rhetorical spin that ‘the world needs more Canada.’ This rhetoric may partly explain the comparatively low level of funding for the foreign ministry’s cultural diplomacy: when governments engage in rhetoric, it often happens that the words do not match the deeds. The gap between the rhetoric and practice led the former head of the International Cultural Relations Bureau, Robin Higham, in 2001, to describe the notion that cultural diplomacy was a real policy priority in Canada as one of the ‘most durable of Canada’s foreign affairs myths,’ at best a ‘sidebar activity with marginal resources and staffing’ in the foreign affairs department, and ‘equally marginal collaboration and support from the various cultural and funding agencies of the federal government.’

An evaluation of the arts promotion grants of the International Cultural Relations Bureau carried out by the foreign ministry’s audit section in 2002, noted that highly successful cultural offerings occurred abroad despite a foreign ministry environment which lacked ‘vision, mission and advocacy for the Third Pillar,’ and the weak position which the arts and cultural section held

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367 Nossal, “Painting the Map with Maple Leaves.”
368 Ibid.
within the Ministry. A Canadian Arts Summit brief to the 2003 foreign policy dialogue recommended a doubling of the foreign ministry’s cultural diplomacy budget. The summit’s report noted that Canada’s federal spending on cultural diplomacy compared very unfavourably with that of its G8 partners (particularly France, which spent one third of its entire foreign affairs budget on cultural diplomacy) and with the province of Québec, which spent C$20 million annually.

To sum up thus far, Canada’s national cultural and foreign policy framework has meant that the cultural diplomacy of the federal government has included work on ensuring ratification of a new international cultural instrument, so as to enable continued support for and protection of Canada’s domestic cultural industries so that these can continue to help maintain national cultural sovereignty and a sense of identity. The federal commitment to cultural diplomacy represented by the third pillar, whilst sending a message about the importance attached to international cultural promotion, has not been matched by the level of funding that would be expected given the strength of the third pillar’s commitment and the history of federal funding for Canada’s domestic producers. But whilst there has been a gap between rhetoric and practice, funding has nevertheless been made available to support cultural diplomacy activities of DFAIT and Canadian Heritage. It is to this cultural diplomacy that I now turn.

Promoting Canadian culture abroad
Cultural promotion has been the shared responsibility of DFAIT, Canadian Heritage, and the Canada Council for the Arts. Each has promoted artists internationally. This examination of federal cultural diplomacy will focus on activity undertaken by DFAIT and Canadian Heritage, the two government departments most intimately involved in Canadian federal cultural diplomacy (as enunciated in chapter two). DFAIT’s International Cultural Relations Bureau has undertaken arts promotion, the promotion of Canada’s cultural industries, and education activity, including the Canadian Studies Program. Canadian Heritage was responsible for Canada’s push on the new instrument on cultural diversity (and also undertook considerable work in the field of marketing cultural industries internationally and supporting their development domestically). The

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370 Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, Evaluation of Arts Promotion, Arts and Cultural Industries Program.

371 The Canadian Arts Summit is an annual meeting co-ordinated by the Council for Business and the Arts in Canada involving chief executives, artistic directors and board chairs of Canada's largest 50 not-for-profit cultural institutions such as symphony orchestras, theatres, opera and ballet companies, and art museums, primarily those with budgets over $4 million.
work of the Canada Council has been domestically focussed, and when it has had an international
dimension, has been more associated with international cultural development, rather than
achieving Canada’s diplomatic objectives. Many of the writers and musicians that now form the
basis of Canadian cultural recognition abroad received support early in their careers from the
Canada Council.

DFAIT: the International Cultural Relations Bureau
The management of DFAIT’s cultural diplomacy activity has been undertaken by its International
Cultural Relations Bureau. The bureau had two distinct sections: the Arts and Cultural Industries
Promotion Division, and the Academic Relations Division.

DFAIT’s Arts and Cultural Industries Promotion Division has three objectives. First, it
aims to advance Canada’s diplomacy, by in part showcasing Canada through promotional activity
at Canadian missions and by promoting awareness of Canadian cultural diversity among specific
international audiences. Second, it aims to help Canada’s cultural industries establish markets and
partnerships abroad; and third, it aims to act as a facilitator between the foreign ministry and the
large number of actors in the Canadian arts and cultural industries. The aims of the Academic
Relations Division were to enhance the understanding and awareness of Canada in other
countries, and promote the international dimension of education to Canadians.

These two strands - cultural promotion and education - have remained constant from 1963
(when Canada’s federal cultural diplomacy began), to the present. In that year the first step was
taken to develop a coordinated federal programme of international cultural relations, a step taken,
in Cooper’s view, in response to Québec’s efforts in the field, and in 1975, a chair of Canadian
Studies was set up at Edinburgh University. In the 2003-2004 fiscal year, funding for cultural
relations totalled C$10.2 million, and funding for academic relations totalled C$14 million. (In
2002-3, the total budget for the foreign affairs ministry was C$1,859 million. Québec spends
C$20 million annually.)

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372 Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, Evaluation of Arts Promotion, Arts and Cultural
Industries Program.
373 Cooper, “Introduction,” 5. Modest reciprocal programmes with France, Belgium and Switzerland were extended
two years later, in 1965, to include Italy, Germany and the Netherlands. In 1971 a programme of exchanges was
developed with the USSR, and in 1972 with China.
The arts and cultural industries section has itself two sections, as its name suggests: that dedicated to arts promotion, and that dedicated to promoting Canada’s cultural industries. The arts promotion division’s budget in 2003 was C$6.5 million.

The arts promotion section promoted Canadian culture internationally by ‘providing financial support to professional artists and cultural organizations to showcase their work abroad.’ It did so in order to promote Canada’s interests abroad. The criteria for grants for performing arts groups included not only artistic quality, Canadian content, capacity to undertake an international project and so on, but also the relevance of the location of the performances abroad ‘to Canada’s current foreign trade policy.’ For grants in the field of the performing arts, these locations were the United States, the UK, France, Germany, Italy, Russia, Japan, Mexico, Brazil, China and India. The arts promotion section also provided policy guidance to DFAIT, including Canadian missions abroad, in ‘order to maximize the impact of Canadian cultural events in foreign countries,’ and also helped Canadian artists to ‘pursue their international initiatives.’

Arts promotion grants were made by the ministry on the basis of ‘relevance to the three pillars of foreign policy,’ and ‘particularly in reference to the Third Pillar,’ despite the disappearance, in 2005, of the third pillar as one of the Canadian government’s priority foreign policy objectives. The arts promotion section provided partial funding (up to thirty percent) for travel grants for international projects of Canadian artists and companies which created, interpreted, promoted or marketed Canadian cultural products for the international market in the fields of music, theatre, dance and multi-disciplinary creation and performance. The cultural activity should show ‘artistic and cultural creativity, innovation and excellence.’ Most artists and companies were expected to have undertaken cultural activity in Canada for at least three years, although special consideration could be given to Aboriginal Canadians and younger artists. There was a two-way component: support was also provided to Canadian festivals and conferences to

374 The focus of this examination of the work of the Bureau is on its arts promotion activity. The Bureau’s work to promote Canada’s cultural industries is not explored, as in the conceptual framework which informs this thesis such work sits outside a definition of cultural diplomacy (export development, even that associated with cultural industries, sits very comfortably within the gamut of trade diplomacy). As noted elsewhere, the boundaries between what activity constitutes cultural diplomacy and that which sits outside it (and might for instance sit within trade or economic diplomacy) is seldom clear cut. Researchers into the subject could equally decide that the marketing of cultural industries is an obvious form of cultural diplomacy. The inclusion of diplomacy associated with the promulgation of cultural agreements has been included in cultural diplomacy’s remit in this thesis partly because of this activity was a traditional aspect of cultural diplomacy.

375 Foreign Affairs Canada. “Arts and Cultural Industries.”

376 Foreign Affairs Canada, Cultural Program: General Eligibility Guidelines.

377 This inconsistency might normally be attributed to a failure to update the website, but the website, accessed on 21 October 2006, indicates that it was updated on 7 February 2006. The division used to have responsibility for a visiting foreign artists programme, but that was transferred to the Canada Council for the Arts.
invite international presenters or buyers to their events. Applicants were also invited to check with other sources of funding, including the Canada Council for the Arts, and provinces.

The arts promotion section’s work had a strong linkage to a network of cultural attachés which DFAIT employed in Canadian diplomatic missions. The selection of cultural activity to be supported was made in close consultation with diplomatic missions abroad, and applicants for funding must have shown that cultural attachés and cultural officers had been consulted. In the 2004-2005 financial year, C$1.8 million was provided to thirty Canadian missions abroad, for a range of cultural projects, such as a Canadian presence at a summer festival in Central Park in New York, and two book fairs. Grants totalling C$4.7 million were awarded to cultural groups and individuals working in film, dance, music, theatre, the visual arts, and literature, to enable them to tour internationally, and to help bring foreign buyers to arts festivals in Canada. About 70 percent of these grants contributed to activities in G8 countries in recognition of their strategic importance to Canadian foreign policy. In addition, about fifteen percent of total grants contributed to activities in additional priority countries: China, India, Brazil and Mexico. These grants were awarded to applicants from all provinces and two of the three territories. The section also sought to ensure that, over time, it had supported activity which was representative of all artistic types, all Canadian provinces and territories, both official languages, Aboriginal people and youth, and different cultural communities.

Despite this all-inclusive, albeit potentially unworkable, aim, the International Cultural Relations Bureau was, in 1996, accused of having a pro-Québec bias in the manner in which arts companies were supported. This, Maclean’s magazine charged, was due to an over representation of Francophones in the higher echelons of the bureau and DFAIT.

The Academic Relations Division aimed to enhance the understanding and awareness of Canada in other countries and promote the international dimension of education to Canadians, and it also oversaw foreign policy positions and priorities relating to all matters of international education. Activities of the division included the provision of funding for advanced studies in Canada for promising young people, towards the Canada-United States Fulbright programme, and for travel abroad of young Canadians; to support the international marketing of Canadian

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378 This sum excluded funds for a four year promotion in France, called Canada-France 2004-2008. Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, Evaluation of Arts Promotion, Arts and Cultural Industries Program.
379 This point is made by the division’s director, Curtis Barlow, quoted in “Overview. For Canada, all the World’s a Stage,” Canada World View.
education; and to support the Canadian Studies Program, which facilitated the study of and teaching about Canada in more than thirty countries.\textsuperscript{381}

The Academic Relations Division also worked at the bilateral and multilateral level, in particular with organisations such as the Commonwealth, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and UNESCO, as well as at forums such as the Summit of the Americas and the Group of Eight (G8).\textsuperscript{382} DFAIT notes that the Canadian Studies Program - arguably the best known activity of the Academic Relations Division - aimed to advance Canadian foreign policy through a network of well-informed foreign professionals and leaders with sustained interest in Canada. Nossal notes that the Canadian Studies ‘enterprise’ has been justified by government in Ottawa on instrumental grounds: the ‘returns that are likely to be yielded by having an ever-growing number of ‘Canadianists’ located in a plethora of centres, institutes, and universities around the world.’\textsuperscript{383} He sees the origins of the establishment of Canadian studies abroad as strongly connected to the imperatives which led to the formation of the British Council and the other similar institutions: the promotion of themselves and their cultures abroad, often with a focus on university studies. But Nossal remains unconvinced that the Canadian Studies Program has achieved the instrumental outcomes that have been sought from it. In his view, the continued support for the programme was partly associated with a movement to protect the number of Canadian academics in Canadian universities in the 1960s and 1970s (in particular to counter the large number of American academics taking up positions).

\textit{Canada World View}

DFAIT also published a quarterly magazine called \textit{Canada World View}, which sought to provide an overview of Canada’s perspective on foreign policy issues and highlight the Government of Canada’s international initiatives and contributions.\textsuperscript{384} One of the journal’s issues in 2003 focussed on cultural diplomacy, and provides a useful insight into the foreign ministry’s cultural diplomacy programme abroad. Several themes were discernible in this coverage.

First, Canadian cultural activity abroad provided a feel good factor that served to make Canadians proud of their country, enhance social cohesion (partly through the presentation abroad of aspects of Canada’s multiculturalism), and refashion Canada’s national identity.

\textsuperscript{381} For details about Canadian Studies, including its history, see Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, \textit{Canadian Studies}.
\textsuperscript{382} Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, \textit{International Academic Relations}.
\textsuperscript{383} Nossal, “Painting the Map with Maple Leaves.”
\textsuperscript{384} The magazine is available on the Internet: see “About Canada World View.”
Canada's artists were winning acclaim, and prestigious international awards, and making a name for themselves and their country. These artists were musically and culturally diverse. They included Aboriginal composers of world music, Acadians fusing Celtic and modern rhythms, Québécois chamber players, Torontonians playing authentic baroque instruments, plus Canadian authors, assisted in part by federal government support for the costs of translation provided to smaller publishers.\footnote{385 “Canadian Musicians Hit High Notes,” \textit{Canada World View}.} Canadian writers in English used to be ‘overshadowed by more famous writers from Britain and the US,’ but now themselves ‘cast a long shadow.’ Canada’s culture was as good as any in the world, was the theme, and Canadians could rightfully be proud of this.

Second, cultural activity abroad helped advance Canadian interests, especially its economic interests. Canadian artists, by telling the world about Canada as only they could, influenced the way people abroad saw Canada when it came ‘to invest, immigrate, import goods, travel or pursue post-secondary education.’\footnote{386 Curtis Barlow, “Overview. For Canada, all the World’s a Stage,” \textit{Canada World View}.} Arts and culture could ‘open international doors.’ Culture was also very important to the Canadian economy.\footnote{387 The ‘usual’ range of economic indicators are cited: exports worth $5 billion in 2000; cultural products and services contribute over $20 billion to GDP; domestic product; cultural industries are said to be the country's fifth-largest employer, accounting for over 600,000 jobs. Ibid.}

Third, the journal’s coverage emphasized the role which cultural activity played in presenting abroad an up-to-date image of Canada. Canada was not simply a nation of forests and lakes, but also a creative, innovative, culturally diverse and tolerant nation. Reporting on the use of Canadian films abroad for cultural diplomacy purposes, the journal noted that festivals of Canadian films were used by Canadian missions and consulates to ‘shake up perceptions’ about Canada, promote its culture and encourage interest in its cultural industries. In its coverage of a film festival in Taiwan, the journal noted that many Taiwanese still viewed Canada as a land of ‘mountains, snow and maple trees,’ but this stereotypical view of Canada would hopefully, for those attending the film festival’s programme of events, change to one of an innovative, cosmopolitan and multicultural society. More generally, Canada’s filmmakers reflected Canada’s diverse society, ‘presenting different angles on issues such as race, gender, sexuality, history, identity and the nature of the cinema itself.’\footnote{388 “Wide Screen, Canada’s Diversity on Film,” \textit{Canada World View}.} The journal reported that Canadian theatre was at the ‘front and centre’ of Canada’s efforts to reach across international boundaries and highlight its creativity and artistic expression.\footnote{389 “Canada Theatre a Star Performer,” \textit{Canada World View}.} Canadian artists abroad, it said, were ‘messengers who
say to the world, in a way that may not be typical of Canadians' famous modesty, “Look at us: we are a young nation, vibrant and creative, with much for you to explore and learn from.”

**Think Canada 2001**

Updating Canada’s image was the primary objective of two recent instances of the promotion of Canadian culture in Japan, the ‘Think Canada 2001’ festival and the Canadian pavilion at the 2005 World Exposition at Aichi, Japan (discussed in the following section on the work of Canadian Heritage).

The ‘Think Canada 2001’ festival took place throughout Japan over the period March to May 2001. It incorporated 189 events organised by the Canadian embassy and consulates. Seventy three of the events were cultural, and the remainder focussed overwhelmingly on trade and investment. The festival’s genesis was a perception held by unidentified policy-makers that Canada’s unsophisticated image in Japan was the cause of its less than satisfactory Canadian business performance in Japan, and its inability to engage the Japanese in other areas of interest to Canada. Earlier efforts to change Canada’s image in Japan had proved ineffective, partly because of a ‘lack of substance to support a stronger image,’ a reference to the type of Canadian exports and number of Canadian exporters to Japan before 2001. A report evaluating the festival’s effectiveness, commissioned by DFAIT, noted that research by the Canadian embassy before the festival confirmed the view that Japanese people viewed Canada in terms of natural resources and as lacking sophistication, although the image was largely positive – ‘a beautiful country, environmentally friendly and committed to world peace.’ Updating this image would fit in with the Japanese cultural norm of seeking international business partners from countries they deem culturally diverse and highly advanced in business and industry. The cultural events were an integral part of the festival. Research had revealed that possession of a vibrant and interesting culture is a key component if a country is to be perceived by the Japanese as having a sophisticated and innovative society. An updated image would assist in paving the way for a possible free trade agreement with Japan.

In keeping with the earlier findings, the festival’s overarching objective was to re-brand the image of Canada from not only a land of ‘vast beauty, abundant natural resources and “nice”

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390 “Overview. For Canada, all the World’s a Stage,” *Canada World View.*
391 Foreign Affairs Canada, *Evaluation of the Think Canada Festival in Japan.*
392 Foreign Affairs Canada, *Evaluation of the Think Canada Festival in Japan,* appendix A.
393 Ibid.
people,’ but one which was also a diverse, culturally sophisticated and technologically advanced society.\textsuperscript{394} The evaluation report, whilst acknowledging the success of the re-branding,\textsuperscript{395} did note that there were many events that would reinforce the old stereotypes about Canada, including exhibitions about Orca whales, nature in British Columbia, and quilts. The festival also aimed to increase awareness of Canada in the short term and increase trade, partnerships and joint ventures between Canada and Japan over the long term.\textsuperscript{396} The festival was a private-public partnership, with about C$1 million of the total funding of C$3.2 million being raised from Canadian and Japanese businesses. The use of the Think Canada theme was chosen in part because it allowed for the same theme to be used in a number of sectors in Japan: Think Canada – Think Culture; Think Canada - Think Investment; Think Canada – Think Education, and so on. Certainly the Canadian embassy in Japan believed the festival had had an impact. Think Canada 2001

deepened understanding of the real Canada; the one that is alive with the benefits that come from a multicultural society; the one that fosters the creation of sophisticated levels of cultural artistry; and the one which, with our advances in communication and transportation technologies is envied throughout the world.\textsuperscript{397}

\textit{World Expo in Aichi and the work of Canadian Heritage}

Management of Canada’s involvement in international expositions, the most recent of which was the Expo at Aichi in Japan in 2005, rests with Canadian Heritage, and the department also operates, in association with DFAIT, an International Francophonie secretariat. The department’s International Affairs Branch manages Canada's international cultural diversity agenda and the pursuit of the new international instrument on cultural diversity, discussed earlier in the chapter. The branch’s multilateral relations unit aims to advance ‘Canada's overall foreign policy agenda at numerous multilateral venues,’ and its bilateral relations unit manages Canada’s bilateral cultural discussions. The United States was described by the department as one of three key strategic partners in the advancement of its international cultural diversity agenda, despite the unwavering hostility of the United States to that agenda. The bilateral relations unit leads

\textsuperscript{394} Foreign Affairs Canada, \textit{Evaluation of the Think Canada Festival in Japan}, section titled ‘Rebranding Canada.’
\textsuperscript{395} The evaluation report noted that respondents to a telephone survey carried out as part of the assessment of the festival’s efficacy consistently stated that they had a much improved image of Canada or learned that Canada was more advanced or sophisticated that they previously thought, and that 94 percent of those who attended events related to high technology thought Canada was more active in high technology than they had thought before attending the event.
\textsuperscript{396} Foreign Affairs Canada, \textit{Evaluation of the Think Canada Festival in Japan}, section titled ‘Background.’
\textsuperscript{397} Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, \textit{Canada-Japan Cultural Relations}.
negotiations concerning, and manages, the federal government’s bilateral audio-visual co-production agreements, of which fifty-three have been signed in a twenty-five year period.398

Canada’s theme for the World Expo in Aichi, in 2005, was *Wisdom of Diversity*. The objectives of Canadian presence at the exposition included the image-broadening focus of the 2001 festival, as well as supporting Canada’s economic, diplomatic, and cultural objectives worldwide, making Canada better known in Japan and Asia, and engaging Canadians in Canada in the exposition. Canada has had a long history of involvement in the international exposition movement (its periodic manifestations are better known as expos). Its presence at international expositions has been almost unbroken since 1851. Canada hosted Expo '67 in Montréal and Expo '86 in Vancouver. The ‘furs, agricultural products and birch bark canoes’ of early expositions have, in the modern era, given way to ‘more modern, technologically-sophisticated exhibits,’ which have been immensely popular and met with repeated critical acclaim, according to the government of Canada. Canada's pavilions at Brisbane (1988), Seville (1992), Taejon (1993) and Lisbon (1998) were among the top international pavilions.399

The 2005 Canadian pavilion at Aichi sought to present an image of Canada that was ‘more than just a panorama of natural landscapes, places and people.’ The image to be presented through the cultural programme was concerned with presenting a diverse Canada. For the Minister for Canadian Heritage, Canada’s presence enabled it to promote Canadian interests, allowed Canadians to be recognised for their tradition of excellence, and highlight all of Canada’s diversity, ‘whether in cultural, environmental, economic, or innovative technological terms.’400

The programme of visual, literary and performing arts sought to highlight Canada’s diversity and creativity. Performers included the international star Alanis Morissette, who sang in English; a Rwandan-born Canadian singer in French; a native dance troupe; an Acadian fiddler;401 Senegalese-Canadian brother musicians; a breakdance and hip-hop contemporary dance company; a Canadian version of Bob Dylan; a First Nation hip-hop trio; a Japanese-Canadian classical pianist, and so on. The stories of six storytellers aimed further to emphasise the strength

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398 The department describes these co-production agreements as enabling Canadian and foreign producers to pool their creative, artistic, technical, and financial resources in order to co-produce quality culturally-significant films and television programmes which are granted domestic status in their respective countries. These agreements provide producers increased access to sources of funding and to foreign markets, therefore reducing the risks associated with the increasingly high costs of audio-visual productions. See Department of Canadian Heritage, *Canada at International Expositions*.

399 Department of Canadian Heritage, *Canada at International Expositions*.

400 Department of Canadian Heritage. “Minister Frulla Announces Canada's Cultural Programming at Expo 2005.”

401 The Acadians were French settlers of eastern Canada who were exiled from their land in the 1750s. The Cajuns are their descendants who settled in Louisiana.
of Canadian diversity. The young French-speaking dancer’s Canada ‘within her’ reflected her ‘homeland’s sense of international fairness and cooperation and its acceptance of internal diversity.’ The successful Chinese-born landscape architect had tolerance come to her ‘by osmosis’ in Canada, from having lived side-by-side with so many from all over the world, thereby recognising the ‘strengths that bind us.’ The other Canadians were a white, English-speaking Midwestern male with a PhD; a young, male, Inuit filmmaker; a young, female, Somali-Canadian media star; and a middle-aged, French speaking, male scientific researcher. International Trade Canada used the exposition for trade promotion purposes, including promoting Canadian cultural industries and education services, with a focus on Aboriginal cultural industries, book publishing, sound recording and design. Activities included an Aboriginal silver jewellery exhibition and sales promotion at a department store in Nagoya; a publishers' trade mission and participation in the Tokyo Book Fair; performances by young musicians in partnership with a Japanese promoter; and an exhibition of Canadian designers. The education promotion targeted the general public, education contacts, and offered a dedicated web portal on Canadian education. Canadian companies were able to hire facilities in the pavilion on a cost recovery basis.

Although Canadian Heritage's initiative to expand international markets for Canada's arts and cultural sector, the Trade Routes programme, is regarded as an example of trade rather than cultural diplomacy, the initiative highlights the extent to which cultural industries have become a focus of the diplomacy of states such as Canada, and provides a useful example of how the two related practices of trade and cultural diplomacy can sometimes intersect. Trade Routes was established in May 2001 in recognition of the growing importance of the Canadian cultural sector to the Canadian economy. The significance of this sector is not so much due to its size, which averaged around four percent of GDP over the period 1996-2001, but to the number and type of people it employed, and the role it played, and will play in the future, in the Canadian economy. Over the period 1996-2001, the cultural sector employed over half a million jobs, or about four percent of Canadian employment. Employment in the sector grew faster over this
period than that of the overall Canadian economy. Over the period 1990-91 to 1996-97, the rate of growth in the cultural sector of fourteen percent outpaced sectors such as automotives and agriculture. Trade contributed significantly to this growth: over the same period, Canadian cultural exports increased by an average of seventeen percent annually. Importantly, the sector was perceived as the most likely engine of innovation for the Canadian economy, and cultural institutions such as art galleries and museums were core components of Canada’s tourist industry, itself a major contributor to Canadian wealth. According to the Canadian Heritage minister, Canada’s cultural sector generated almost C$40 billion in economic activity, employed about 600,000 people (the same, she said, as in farming, forestry, fishing, mining, oil and gas combined), and accounted for close to C$5 billion in exports annually. Canada was competing in a global marketplace for market share and brand recognition, this was as true in the cultural sector as in any other, and hence Canadian artists and creators, and its cultural industries, needed world markets to thrive.

Trade Routes, a comprehensive trade development program specifically designed for the arts and cultural sector, provided start-up funding of C$21 million in 2001 as part of the federal government’s C$500 million cultural funding initiative, Tomorrow Starts Today. Trade Routes sought to expand international markets for Canada's arts and cultural sector, increase the number of Canadian cultural exporters, attract investment in and support exports of English and French language products and services, and link arts and cultural entrepreneurs to government trade programmes (including cultural trade development officers in London, New York, Paris, Singapore, and Los Angeles, and in seven Canadian provinces). The programme’s work, which is focussed on business activities such as market assessments and attendance at trade shows, all undertaken in support of Canada’s foreign policy objectives, can be described as cultural diplomacy on those occasions when activities supported by the programme manifest an aspect of Canadian culture. For instance, a 2003 trade mission from Winnipeg to Los Angeles, which aimed to build networks and partnerships with that city’s entertainment and sound recording industries, included a showcase of Manitoban artists for the Los Angeles sound recording industry, and a Trade Routes initiative in Halifax in the same year involved bringing to Canada

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405 Singh, Economic Contribution of Culture.
406 Canadian Heritage, Telling Our Story to the World.
407 Frulla, “Liza Frulla speech at the Prime Time in Ottawa Luncheon.”
408 This was subsequently topped up in 2005 with additional funding of over C$850 million for arts and culture Canadian Department of Finance, Budget in Brief, 9. Overall investment in the arts and culture by the three levels of government in Canada in the 2004-2005 totalled C$7.4 billion. Canada Council for the Arts, Statistics FAQs.
forty five trade commissioners from eight countries to the East Coast Music Awards. Trade diplomacy can become cultural diplomacy in a seamless manner, and it may well be the case that future researchers into the practice incorporate within its scope the marketing (rather than the promotion) of a state’s culture abroad.

*Brand Canada*

One of the three themes which form the focus of this thesis is cultural diplomacy’s role in the presentation abroad of a national image, and the extent of linkage of such a presentation to a national brand. A 2005 report by the international branding company, Interbrand, commented on the absence of an umbrella brand for Canada, an absence lamented by a group of panellists attending a Canadian Institute of International Affairs conference on Canadian foreign policy, in 2003. One of the panellists, Canadian diplomat Daryl Copeland, commented that Canada’s international reputation was out of date, failing to accurately reflect Canada’s true capabilities on the world stage, because of its failure to purposefully brand Canada abroad. In his view, foreigners’ perceptions of Canada were dominated by ‘Mounties, open space, and clean air,’ rather than a high tech, knowledge-driven, sophisticated and cosmopolitan economy. Another panellist, the academic Evan Potter, argued that Canada had not been aggressive enough in pushing a national brand abroad to differentiate itself from the United States, especially in terms of foreign policy. In an article on Canadian public diplomacy, Potter blamed Canada’s image problem partly on the domestic focus of the foreign ministry’s website, partly on the anonymity of Canadian television programming shown abroad (much of which lacked a specific Canadian brand), and partly on the activism of actors other than the foreign ministry (in particular the federal tourism marketing entity and those provinces such as Québec that were active internationally). Potter argued that the Canadian Tourism Commission promoted Canada as a pristine and clean vacation destination, which was at odds with the federal trade commissioners’

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409 Department of Canadian Heritage, “Trade Routes Program Areas.”

410 An umbrella brand can be viewed as a brand that was able to be used to market the country called Canada, rather than one of its sectors, such as tourism, or one of its provinces, or a specific Canadian initiative. Interbrand, *Branding in Canada.*

411 The panellists in general were of the view that the general perception of Canada abroad was a holdover from a previous era, with ‘a lingering emphasis on forest environments and friendly people.’ While these were positive perceptions, they did not represent the ‘forward-looking, competitive, and sophisticated nature of contemporary Canadian society.’ They argued that promoting Canada abroad, through foreign policy and more generally, required an active, well-branded campaign highlighting Canadian competitiveness that should also promote Canadian values.

412 Canadian Institute of International Affairs, *Canada Now.*
desire to project an image of Canada as a sophisticated, high technology country.\textsuperscript{413} Although the most recent ‘Brand Canada’ initiative of the Canadian Tourism Commission aimed to ‘refresh’ Canada’s image by promoting it as a destination to be ‘experienced as a whole rather than simply for its picturesque scenery,’\textsuperscript{414} the marketing campaign still placed its primary focus on marketing Canada’s greatest appeal to international tourists, its extraordinary scenery. Potter also noted that several provinces, most notably Québec, undertook international promotional activity.

\textbf{Some attempts at developing a national brand for Canada}

Despite the criticisms Copeland and Potter, amongst others, made concerning the absence of a national brand for Canada, there have been a number of federal government funded tourism, diplomatic and trade efforts to market Canada abroad. For those seeking a coherent, up-to-date umbrella brand for Canada, these initiatives may not have been satisfactory, but they nevertheless warrant a brief examination to determine the extent to which federal cultural diplomacy was part of these.

One major trade-related international brand initiative of the federal government, the Team Canada (and the smaller Canada Trade) trade missions, were invariably huge (numbering hundreds of political and business leaders), and although their primary purpose was to advance Canada’s economic interests,\textsuperscript{415} they also sought to brand Canada to the world by highlighting Canada’s political, economic, cultural and educational links to the countries being visited.\textsuperscript{416} In Potter’s view, the Team Canada trade missions were successful in countering Canada’s image as a resource economy with beautiful scenery. In 1997, the Team Canada concept was used to set up a federal trade promotion agency which sought to make more effective federal trade promotion functions, as well as manage continuing trade missions abroad.\textsuperscript{417} This initiative, undertaken under the name ‘Brand Canada,’ incorporated cultural events.\textsuperscript{418} The initiative was launched in 2001 as a four year pilot initiative. Its focus was on raising the profile and improving the image of Canada at international trade shows in sectors deemed important by Team Canada Inc. Over

\textsuperscript{413} Potter, “Canada and the New Public Diplomacy,” 16.
\textsuperscript{414} Canadian Tourism Commission, \textit{Canada’s National Brand}.
\textsuperscript{415} These mission seem to have been very successful at this: the Team Canada mission to Europe, in 2002, resulted in the securing of over 100 new business deals totaling over C$500 million.
\textsuperscript{416} Potter, “Branding Canada.”
\textsuperscript{417} Federal funding for the international marketing of Canada’s cultural industries, under the Tomorrow Starts Today initiative discussed above, was administered by Team Canada Inc. See Department of Canadian Heritage, \textit{Tomorrow Starts Today}.
\textsuperscript{418} Foreign Affairs Canada, \textit{Evaluation of the Brand Canada Program}. The initiative was confusingly given the same title as the Canadian Tourism Commission’s 2006 marketing campaign.
the period 2001-2005, ninety one trade shows were allocated funding, covering twelve priority trade sectors. Funding provided under this programme was used to expand and re-design Canadian pavilions, to pay for ‘graphics and visuals,’ and on hospitality and networking events. A small part of the funding was used to pay for cultural events.

The diplomatic initiative, ‘Promoting Canada Abroad,’ was devised and implemented by the foreign ministry in order to address what was perceived as the problem of Canada’s outdated image as a resource economy, an image that lacked the contemporary elements of ‘dynamism, innovation, technology, tolerance, competitiveness and multiculturalism.’

‘Promoting Canada Abroad’ was built around the slogan ‘Canada-Cool-Connected.’ The initiative featured six specific themes, all happily beginning with a ‘C,’ around which promotion would take place. These were ‘Captivating,’ ‘Civil,’ ‘Competitive,’ ‘Creative,’ ‘Caring,’ and ‘Cosmopolitan.’ Promotional materials such as speech modules, fact sheets, web-ready papers were included in a binder sent to all Canadian diplomatic missions abroad. A password-protected web-site was also established to enable Canadian representatives to download up-to-date promotional material. The initiative foundered, in Josef Batora’s view, for several reasons: bureaucratic turf-battles, the international image presentation activities of provinces, and problems in some countries in interpreting what exactly was meant by ‘cool’ (in China it was taken to mean cold, for instance, rather than trendy).

Batora notes that promoting Canada as a competitive and technologically advanced nation had traditionally been the responsibility of Industry Canada, whilst the promotion of Canada as a cosmopolitan and multicultural society, for instance, had been the responsibility of Canadian Heritage.

Batora’s comments are pertinent, and perceptive. Several points are worth noting. First, Batora asserts that problems associated with implementing ‘Promoting Canada Abroad’ were partly the result of bureaucratic turf-battles. There seems to be ample evidence of such battles amongst those government departments involved in presenting Canada abroad. Gordon Smith, the former head of the Canadian foreign service (and hence very well placed to comment on this subject), notes that ‘sectoral departments such as Trade and Industry…bridle at the thought that they should somehow be “co-ordinated” – not to mention “led” – by the Department of Foreign Affairs.’

In Smith’s view, neither the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA), nor the Department of National Defence (DND), looked for input, ‘let alone leadership,’ from

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420 Batora, “Public Diplomacy in Small and Medium Sized States.”
421 Smith, Managing Canada’s Foreign Affairs.
A senior Canadian diplomat, David Malone, conurs, noting that ‘as in most capitals,’ departments and agencies involved in foreign affairs (in Canada’s case, DFAIT, CIDA, DND and the finance department) ‘are never happier than when engaged in solo ventures and trench warfare over turf with others.’\textsuperscript{423} Smith comments that DFAIT was constantly battling for funds, and had great difficulty in securing and keeping resources to support ‘more than a very weak cultural program.’ In the fiscal austerity of the 1990s, all departments would have battled for funds, and in such circumstances, would have been more likely to engage in turf battles than in times of plenty. The 2005 foreign policy review clearly recognised that co-ordination amongst departments in the area of foreign policy had become a problem that warranted attention, declaring that the department would cooperate ‘more closely’ with partners, including federal departments with international interests, Parliament, the provinces and territories, and as Canadian citizens.\textsuperscript{424} The days of protecting Foreign Affairs turf, it seemed, were over:

Other departments have become more active abroad, a reflection of the importance of international developments for the domestic agenda for which these departments are responsible. Today, Canada’s missions abroad host 15 government departments, six agencies and three provinces. In total, only 23 percent of the over 1,600 Canadian government personnel in missions abroad are officers from Foreign Affairs….Foreign policy leadership is key to bringing coherence to the international activity of the Government as a whole, to anticipating change and to advancing innovative solutions to the many challenges we face.\textsuperscript{425}

By implication, the same issues applied to other departments.

Second, although Batora cites as evidence of turf battles the fact that Industry Canada was responsible for promoting Canada’s technological advancement and competitiveness, whilst Canadian Heritage was responsible for promoting Canada as a cosmopolitan and multicultural society, the presentation abroad of differing images of Canada does not itself prove the existence of turf battles. It can be seen more as an indication of the nature of modern, national, brand marketing. All brands seek to reach a target audience: a tourism brand aims at a specific group of would be tourists (or those tourists one seeks to persuade to visit again), a trade brand sets its sights on would-be investors or buyers, a brand to be used by diplomats may target their contacts and so on. One of the strengths of branding is the connection the brand makes with a specific, targeted person. This naturally inclines the developers and users of brands - such as Canadian departments - to have a narrow target audience in mind, rather than a wide range of differing

\textsuperscript{422} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{423} Malone, \textit{Canadian Foreign Policy Post 9/11}.
\textsuperscript{424} Foreign Affairs Canada. \textit{Canada in the World}.
\textsuperscript{425} Ibid.
audiences. Hence, the natural tendency in the world of branding has been to have many brands, not a small number of them. The more brands there are, the greater the chance that the messages of those brands will run counter to one another. The Canadian Tourism Board’s branding campaign, ‘Canada. Keep Exploring,’ launched in 2005, offered little by way of attraction to a would-be investor from the United States, whose primary interest may have been to ensure that Canada had a skilled labour market, competitive labour and other business costs, and a stable business environment. And Industry Canada’s goal of having Canada branded and recognised as an investment location of choice would find little resonance with the efforts of Canadian Heritage. That department supported the use of culture to enhance national cohesion and national identity, placed diversity at the heart of that identity, and had a mandate to share that diversity with the world.

Third, Batora was right to comment on the impact that the provinces’ international activity had on the effectiveness of the ‘Promoting Canada Abroad Initiative.’ The 2005 foreign policy review’s declaration that there was a ‘requirement for one coherent voice abroad,’ seemed to overlook the international activity of Canadian provinces. Several examples will suffice. Québec’s international engagement (discussed at length in the following section) has shown a clear history of a polity that has presented abroad its distinctiveness and uniqueness, rather than its location within the Canadian federation. In 2006, the province of Alberta spent C$3.8 million on the ‘Alberta Week in Washington,’ which the provincial government said aimed to ‘highlight and strengthen Alberta’s more than C$60 billion a year export relationship with the United States.’ The promotion included ‘Alberta at the Smithsonian,’ the core of which was participation in the Smithsonian’s annual folklore festival (but included as well activities at the Canadian embassy in Washington). The province of Manitoba aimed to enhance its image internationally to advance its economic interests and to demonstrate the province’s ‘attractiveness as a destination for international tourists, immigrants, and students.’ All this activity served to reinforce Batora’s contention that independent promotions by provinces played a part in undermining the effectiveness of the ‘Promoting Canada Abroad Initiative.’

426 Foreign Affairs Canada, Canada’s International Policy Statement: A Role of Pride and Influence in the World. Diplomacy.
427 Government of Alberta, “Alberta at the Smithsonian.”
Québec’s international engagement and its cultural diplomacy

As noted at the beginning of this chapter, one significant characteristic of the cultural diplomacy of Canada has been the competition between the federal government’s cultural diplomacy, and the cultural diplomacy of the province of Québec. Québec’s cultural diplomacy has involved support for the preservation internationally of the French language, work associated with international agreements, and support for artists, arts companies and cultural industries in Québec and abroad. It has been one component of an extensive international engagement by the province. Since 1985, Québec has operated its own ‘paradiplomatic service,’ complete with its ‘own minister, a corps of officials specialising in international affairs, and a network of foreign representatives.’\textsuperscript{429} By the end of the twenty first century, the province had become the world’s foremost proponent of sub-national government activity in the international sphere. In 1996, Québec spent more, and had a larger international staff than all fifty of the states of the United States combined.\textsuperscript{430} It had more offices abroad (nearly thirty offices in eighteen countries in 2006), more staff devoted to international activities, and more money appropriated to international pursuits - C$100 million in 2004 - than the nine other Canadian provinces combined.\textsuperscript{431} Québec’s cultural diplomacy activities have been undertaken to achieve a number of cultural, economic and political objectives. These include the projection abroad of Québec’s cultural distinctiveness, the showing of the province to the world; advancing Québec’s economic interests; providing support to its artists and creators; and advancing a number of domestic objectives, particularly asserting the province’s international capability in domestic fields of jurisdiction (and hence the place of Québec in the Canadian federation), and, at times, the province’s secessionist claims. These aspects will now be discussed in turn.

The projection abroad of Québec’s cultural distinctiveness

\textsuperscript{429} The number of locations had varied over the 1990s due to budget constraints. In the latter part of the nineteenth century Canadian representatives created a Québec agency in London so that they could be heard directly. In the period from World War Two to the 1960s, the only Québec presence abroad was a tourist and commercial office, opened in New York in 1941. Québec established its own international relations department in 1967. Balthazar, "A Response to Needs and Necessities," 141.

\textsuperscript{430} Fry, quoted in Belanger, “The Domestic Politics of Québec's Quest for External Distinctiveness,” 197.

\textsuperscript{431} The general delegation, the most substantive Québec diplomatic office, provided services in all sectors under the constitutional jurisdiction of Canadian provinces, exclusive or shared, particularly the economy, education, culture, and immigration, as well as public affairs. By 2005, general delegations were located in Brussels, London, Mexico City, New York City, Paris and Tokyo.
Québec’s cultural diplomacy has sought to project abroad Québec’s cultural distinctiveness, a distinctiveness that has been based primarily on language (Québec as the only French-speaking polity on the American continent), but also a range of cultural practices in which Québec’s creative community has excelled internationally. Québec wishes to present abroad its culture because it has sought international recognition for its cultural distinctiveness. Ironically, this recognition, missing ‘at home’ in the Canadian federation, has been found abroad. Québec’s distinctiveness has always been acknowledged by France, and by La Francophonie, a community of French speaking political entities, which has been created and nurtured by France. In such circumstances, cultural diplomacy would inevitably wish to focus its gaze on those prepared to provide recognition, and to respond to the province on the basis of equality and friendship.

The foundations of Québec’s quest for international recognition were laid during the period of the Quiet Revolution, the fundamental transformation of Québec society that took place in the 1960s. That transformation modernised and secularised Québec society, brought greater political and economic power to the French-speaking majority, and sought to raise Québec’s status within the Canadian confederation. Québec changed, in a very short space of time, from a ‘state-less,’ insular, conservative, Catholic polity to a modern, open, secular, and outward-looking state. The Revolution had a strong nationalistic, and international, dimension. Its nationalist tone was encapsulated in the speech, in 1965, of the Minister of Education, Paul Gérin-Lajoie, to the members of the Montréal consular corps:

Québec is not sovereign in all domains: it is a member of a federation. But, from a political point of view, it constitutes a state. It possesses all the characteristics of a state: territory, population, autonomous government. Beyond this, it is the political expression of a people distinguished, in a number of ways, from the English-language communities inhabiting North America. Québec has its own vocation on this continent. As the most populous of French-language communities, outside France, French Canada belongs to a cultural universe having its axis in Europe and not in America. By virtue of this fact, Québec is more than a simple, federated state among other federated states. It is the political instrument of a cultural group, distinct and unique in all of North America. During the past few years, Québec society has been transformed to a degree that, even

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432 Government of Québec, Québec's International Policy. Chapter 6.
433 Fry, “Québec's Relations with the United States,” 326.
434 Belanger, “The Domestic Politics of Québec's Quest for External Distinctiveness,” 198. In Ryan’s view, the Quiet Revolution was ‘the Age of Enlightenment in Québec… a great opening out upon the rest of the world.’ Ryan, ‘The Origins of Québec's Cultural Diplomacy,’ 61. The Revolution was partly a reaction by Québec society to the traditional conservatism of the province, particularly the domination of political and social life by the Catholic Church. The acceptance of American influences by Québec’s urban working-class masses, for instance, which stands in contrast to the rest of Canada’s attempts to ‘build an identity to resist American cultural influence,’ was because American influence was a tool of emancipation from the conservative ideological hold of the past. Pacom, “Being French in North America,” 441.
yesterday, no one would have thought possible. Filled with a new spirit and superabundant energy, this society, predominantly French in language and culture, knows that from now on the realization of its own ends and aspirations lies within its reach. 435

Within such a framework, a ‘cultural universe’ with its axis in Europe, it was natural that Québec would seek to develop its international relations, and that the focus of these relations would be cultural. There was also a strong desire amongst French Canadians to ‘open windows’ and establish rapport with other peoples, 436 and a marked determination to assert what Québec believed was its right to engage with other countries under the Canadian constitution. 437

The assertion of an international presence and of the right to engage internationally, at the time of the Quiet Revolution, was also partly a response to the Anglo-centric nature of the rest of Canada at that time, including institutions of the federal polity, such as the foreign ministry. 438 In the first years of Québec’s diplomacy, there were, in Balthazar’s view, ‘persistent antagonisms’ between French-speaking diplomats in the Québec diplomatic service and their counterparts in the federal diplomatic service, and he notes that the French-speaking diplomats from Québec, who had ‘painfully found their way into what had been a very select English-speaking club in the department of External Affairs were naturally quite shocked at Québec’s efforts to promote…international relations.’ 439 This sense of displacement within an Anglo federation coincided with the coming to power in Québec, during the Quiet Revolution, of a new generation of leaders with considerable experience on the international scene. Most of them had studied abroad and developed extensive relations in England and the United States, but especially France. Long before the Québec government began to involve itself in international relations, during the 1960s, ‘dozens if not hundreds’ of Québeckers had had international experience. 440

The primary activities associated with the presentation of Québec’s cultural distinctiveness abroad have been the province’s support for the French language, and its concomitant relationship with France. Québec’s most noticeable distinction has always been its use of French, and the province’s relationship with France has been at the heart of its

435 Government of Québec, Québec’s Positions on Constitutional and Intergovernmental Issues.
437 Speaking shortly after the signing of an agreement on educational matters with the government of France, in 1965, Gérin-Lajoie said that Québec planned to play a direct role ‘in all the domains which are completely or partially within its competence.’ Government of Québec, Québec’s Positions on Constitutional and Intergovernmental Issues.
438 Granatstein notes that in the 1950s, the senior federal civil servants, the mandarins, were ‘English Canadians to a man’ (and they were all men) and ‘somehow forgot about Québec.’ Granatstein, The Ottawa Men, 274.
439 Balthazar, “The Québec Experience,” 156.
international engagement. In 2005, Québec’s foreign minister noted that France was ‘at the top of the list’ of Québec’s relationships with the countries of Europe. ‘It is no secret that it holds a special place in our international relations, both bilaterally and multilaterally.’ Ryan notes that Québec’s relations with France have been

relations between French-speaking peoples who have the luxury of talking amongst themselves about any subject they may wish to raise without having to ask permission of anyone. Québec has found in France a powerful and faithful friend who will support it to almost any extent to which it wishes to go.

Québec’s new international policy framework, released in May 2006, a ‘comprehensive international vision’ which aimed to strengthen Québec's international influence, declared that the vulnerability of the French language would remain a ‘major driver of the government’s international initiatives.’ Québec has supported the worldwide promotion and recognition of the French language: primarily through La Francophonie, but also by supporting the new instrument on international cultural diversity, and developing new technologies and French Internet content within the francophone community.

But La Francophonie has provided more to Québec than a method of supporting French internationally. It has provided a source of support for Québec’s aspirations to be recognised as a distinct culture, with a unique position on the American continent. The organisation has provided the province with a tool that helps it achieve its wish to be treated internationally as an equal amongst sovereign nation-states, and has provided a precedent for the sort of role Québec wishes to undertake internationally, one free from Ottawa’s constraints and interference. Belanger argues that Québec’s involvement in the organisation, and the organisation’s precursor bodies, has been the ‘the preferred battleground for the Québec-Canada conflict over Québec’s international personality.’

The first major international agreements were signed in 1965 with the French government in the fields of education and culture. Ryan notes that in the 1960s, a French office was set up in Québec with direct links to the Elysée Palace. He notes too that Québec found a willing friend in France, at a serendipitous time in France’s history. In the mid 1960s, France was also looking outwards, to countries of the former French empire, which might provide a renewed raison-d’etre for French global aspirations. Ryan, “The Origins of Québec's Cultural Diplomacy,” 63.

Government of Québec, Québec’s Positions on Constitutional and Intergovernmental Issues.


Government of Québec, Québec’s International Policy.

Québec’s support for the organisation has sought to increase the number of French-speakers around the world through the TV5 television network, and by increasing French-language content available on the World Wide Web.

Government of Québec, Francophonie.

Belanger, “The Domestic Politics of Québec's Quest for External Distinctiveness,” 5. Québec's decision, in 1968, to accept an invitation to attend the francophone education ministers’ conference in Gabon resulted in the federal government expelling Gabon’s ambassador. The education minister’s meeting, whilst not within a formal La Francophonie entity, was attended by ministers of Francophone countries.
Pride in Québec’s achievements

A second, and related, objective of Québec’s cultural diplomacy has been the desire of the province to show itself to the world, not just to seek recognition for its distinctiveness, but to celebrate that distinctiveness abroad, and to take pride in the recognition by others of its achievements. This was particularly true in, and immediately following, the Quiet Revolution. It has also aimed to shape an accurate perception of Québec internationally, stimulate interest internationally in Québec, and raise the province’s profile abroad. Support was provided for a programme of Québec Studies Abroad. This aimed to ensure that opinion leaders outside Québec, as well as the experts they consult, had ‘a balanced understanding of various aspects of Québec society.’

Hence, as with the cultural diplomacy of the federal government of Canada, there has been an instrumental aspect to its cultural diplomacy, an instrumentality based on updating an image and perceptions of Québec.

Advancing economic interests

The instrumental objective of Québec’s cultural diplomacy has found its clearest manifestation in the economic objectives which Québec's presentation abroad of its culture has sought to achieve. As with the federation of Canada, Québec's cultural sector has become a major component of the province’s economy, an economy which, since the 1960s, had grown to become the twenty eighth largest economy, slightly smaller than the economy of Norway. Rémy Charest, writing in 2000, noted that total activity in the cultural sector was estimated at C$13.8 billion dollars or 8.4 percent of Québec's GDP, with employment at around 177,000 people, in a province with a population of seven million. The government of Québec has been of the view that presenting Québec’s ‘characteristics and strong points’ abroad contributes directly to the attainment of its international economic, scientific and political goals, including the attraction of foreign direct investment, positioning Montréal as one of the major cities of the world, promoting tourism, and making Québec’s education opportunities better known. In order to ensure that this increasingly important sector of the Québec economy continued to grow, over the years Québec provided substantial support for artists, arts companies and cultural industries, both in Québec and for their work abroad. C$400 million was provided to support the creation of artistic works in

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448 Government of Québec, Québec's International Policy. Chapter 6.
449 Fry, "Québec's Relations with the United States," 6.
450 Charest, “Québec: Growing into the World.”
451 Government of Québec, Québec's International Policy. 86.
Québec also provided substantial support for major international events, such as conventions, conferences, and festivals, in order to enhance its international reputation, support tourism, and ‘offer a worldwide window on the enterprising spirit of Québécois.’ The government noted that it invested over C$20 million in support of Québec artists abroad, which, it said, enabled ‘two hundred cultural organizations, aided by advisers and cultural attachés at Québec delegations abroad, to put on tours, prepare co-productions, or explore new markets.’ Québec's 2006 international policy noted that ‘a substantial part of what is written about Québec in the foreign press concerns its artists and creators,’ who directly shaped Québec's image and reputation abroad, and were among the major expressions of its identity. International activity provided them with ‘stimulation and inspiration.’ It allowed for international collaboration, which helped spread risk. It helped them stay economically viable, by developing their money-making capacity by expanding their markets. The international policy noted that the revolution in information and communications technology posed a challenge to the vitality of culture and arts. Meeting this challenge depended on the continued vigour and growth of ability of artistic groups and cultural businesses, which were strongly dependent on their ability to remain active in foreign markets. But access to markets had narrowed because of new border regulations, stricter visa requirements, and budgetary constraints. The 2006 policy set out specific actions to enhance the international marketing and access to international markets of Québec's cultural products and events abroad.

**Domestic objectives of Québec’s cultural diplomacy**

The assertion of Québec’s cultural distinctiveness has been the key objective of its cultural diplomacy. It would however be feasible to argue that an equally important objective of its cultural diplomacy has been the assertion of the province’s international capability in domestic fields of jurisdiction, such as culture, education and immigration. This has been particularly the case with regard to the province’s activism in negotiating and promulgating international cultural

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452 The Québec Arts Council provided grants to artists and troupes, and the Société de Développement des Entreprises Culturelles was created specially to develop the commercial side of culture. For Charest, this two-pronged involvement, which included wide-ranging support for professional training and cultural exports, was a key element to the remarkably dynamic development of Québec culture, which he notes has resulted in an artist from Québec performing every second day, somewhere in Britain, Wales, Scotland or Ireland. Charest, “Québec: Growing into the World.”

453 Government of Québec, *Culture Québec. A Culture That Travels the World*. 11. In the document, the customary accent over the ‘é’ in Québec is missing.


agreements, and participating in international cultural fora. This type of cultural diplomacy activity has been more to do with trying to achieve domestic objectives than with advancing Québec’s international interests. The assertion of the province’s international capability in domestic fields of jurisdiction goes to very heart of the battle which Québec has waged with the federal government, since the Quiet Revolution, over the place it has in the Canadian federation, and hence the nature of the federation itself. Québec’s cultural diplomacy has not simply an international dimension, but a strong domestic objective as well.

The foundation of Québec’s assertion of its international capability in domestic fields of jurisdiction has been those principles set out by Minister Gérin-Lajoie, in 1965, in his statement to the consular corps (referred to and quoted above). The Gérin-Lajoie doctrine declares, in part, that the Québec government has the constitutional authority to manage its own foreign policy in fields relevant to its constitutional powers. This principle has consistently been reaffirmed by governments of Québec since that time. It has also consistently been opposed by federal governments, although as we shall see, the degree of opposition has varied according to which political party has been in power in Ottawa. On the one hand, the federal government has maintained that it is the only government ‘constitutionally empowered to represent the federation in matters of foreign policy - that is, the only government with the authority to undertake international commitments, appoint ambassadors, and express itself during international conferences.’ On the other hand, Québec has argued that the Canadian Constitution enables it to make treaties in ‘their area of competence.’ In Québec’s 2006 international policy framework, the province’s premier, Jean Charest, noted that the policy reaffirmed Québec's prerogative to ‘vigorously and independently pursue international initiatives wherever appropriate: whatever falls under Québec's jurisdiction at home falls under its jurisdiction everywhere.’

The province has been active in negotiating and promulgating international cultural agreements (and participating in international cultural fora). It had more than 300 bilateral agreements in effect with national governments and federated states in nearly eighty countries. These included agreements with Bavaria, the French-speaking community of Belgium, Catalonia,
the federal district of Mexico City, New York City, the Brazilian state of Minas Gerais, and Hubei province in China. The province placed emphasis on participating in international fora connected to cultural policies. This was important because more areas of cultural activity have become the focus of international instruments (such as those concerned with global standards, intellectual property and intangible heritage), and technological advances were adding still more to the complexity of the cultural sector. Over the period 1999 to 2005, much of the focus of its cultural diplomacy was on supporting the adoption and ratification of the new instrument on the protection of cultural diversity. Québec regarded itself as very much a model of the type of distinct, threatened, cultural group which that instrument sought to protect.

In 2005, Québec sought to negotiate a formal mechanism with the federal government that would provide Québec with a ‘more coherent and predictable framework’ for the exercise of its international responsibilities. In Québec’s view, a formal mechanism would eliminate the source of much friction arising from the ‘arbitrary nature’ of the decisions by the federal government concerning Québec’s participation in international fora, and remove the irritant of ‘arduous’ federal government discussions about the number of Québec representatives in official Canadian delegations undertaking negotiations.

The province argued that globalisation was more frequently blurring the boundary between the domestic and the international. This was having an impact on Québec’s constitutional jurisdictions: those which shaped its identity, such as language, culture and education, and its other interests, such as health, labour, trade, sustainable development, the environment and human rights. The province’s identity and interests were becoming more often constrained by restrictive international standards negotiated by international organisations or at international conferences. The federal government was negotiating more international agreements which required implementation in part or in whole by the provinces. These processes were resulting in an encroachment of Québec’s jurisdiction.

Québec argued that there was a precedent for a formal mechanism. Québec’s participation in La Francophonie was not subject to the ‘vagaries of the moment,’ and since 1975, the ‘means and mechanisms’ existed to enable the province to participate in the drafting of agreements concerning human rights.461

Québec asked that Canada’s federal diplomacy be undertaken in a federal manner, which it said would make Canada’s international actions much more effective, ‘strengthen Canada’s

461 Government of Québec, “Québec in International Forums.”
Québec’s efforts to secure what it regarded as its constitutional rights need to be situated within the broad context of the relationship between Québec and the federal government over the nature of the Canadian federation. Was the federation to comprise English and French speakers, and a unique province called Québec, or was it to be a federation based on multiculturalism, in which French was just another ethnicity, and Québec just one of many provinces? Québec’s quest for recognition of its cultural distinctiveness, and its ongoing assertion to rights to negotiate international cultural agreements and participate in international cultural conferences (both very much part of its cultural diplomacy) would have had a very different complexion were it not for the efforts of the Canadian prime minister, the late Pierre Trudeau. Trudeau’s attitude towards Québec’s distinctiveness was antagonistic. Trudeau sought to negate Québec’s claims to specialness by subsuming that specialness in a national identity based on bilingualism and multiculturalism. During the middle and late 1960s, Trudeau’s ‘very clearly defined strategy’ to solve the Québec question was embraced, with varying degrees of enthusiasm, by English Canadians. His view was that Québec could be fully integrated with Canada as a whole, rather than sit apart from it (or to the side of it) as a distinct polity. McRoberts notes that the Trudeau strategy proceeded from the assumption that ‘Québec nationalism, like any other nationalism, cannot and should not be accommodated within political institutions: the only result would be to legitimize demands for the creation of an independent Québec state.’ What was needed was ‘an alternative vision which would incorporate Québec within a broader pan-Canadian experience - or at least a French-Canadian experience which was integral to all of Canada.’

The heart of this new strategy was official bilingualism. If all of Canada was bilingual, just like Québec, the province’s claim to distinctiveness would be nullified. The bilingual core of the Trudeau strategy was accompanied by three additional prongs. Uniform federalism insisted that all provinces would have ‘precisely the same status and role.’ The Charter of Rights and

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462 Government of Québec, “Québec in International Forums.” In the 1960s, Québec and the federal government fell out over the nature of the participation by Québec in La Francophonie. Québec’s decision, in 1968, to accept an invitation to attend the francophone education ministers’ conference in Gabon resulted in the federal government breaking diplomatic relations with Gabon.

463 The Trudeau approach contrasted with that of his predecessor, Lester Pearson. Pearson viewed Québec as a ‘nation within a nation,’ and was well disposed to find solutions to disputes that arose concerning the simultaneous presentation of Canada’s foreign policy by a federal government keen to retain its prerogative to represent the sovereign state of Canada abroad, and the foreign policy of Québec. Ryan, “The Origins of Québec's Cultural Diplomacy,” 63.

464 McRoberts, English Canada and Québec, 6.
Freedoms, whilst mostly about language rights, had additional rights ‘added’ to it to dilute the impression that would have been created had it incorporated language rights only. And the prong of multiculturalism was aimed at Québec. By recognising a multitude of cultures, ‘multiculturalism could rein in the notion of duality and nullify Québec’s claims to distinctiveness on the basis of culture.’ Trudeau’s view was that ‘the term biculturalism does not accurately depict’ Canada’s society; ‘the word multiculturalism is more precise in this respect.’ The patriation of the Canadian constitution without Québec’s assent, in 1982, and subsequent constitutional battles, further exacerbated Québec’s sense of isolation from the federation.

Whilst the assertion of Québec’s cultural distinctiveness and its international capability in domestic fields of jurisdiction has been driven in part by domestic considerations, and has resulted in moments of high tension between the federal government and Québec (such as the breaking of diplomatic relations with Gabon referred to above), the relationship between the federal government and Québec over international matters has not always been antagonistic. The very nature of diplomacy means that polities compromise, and get along with one another, as a matter of course. The task of achieving interests frequently involves compromise. For instance, although the relationship between Ottawa and Québec regarding the adoption by UNESCO of the new instrument on cultural diversity, in 2005, did not get off to such a harmonious start, eventually cooperation between Ottawa and Québec on the issues was very good, because it suited both parties for this to be so. Similarly, there are always occasions in which one party is required to get along with another because in effect it has to. The federal government of Canada’s right to grant visas for Québec diplomats required to live and work abroad, for instance, makes it very much in Québec’s interest to maintain cordial relations with the federal government. In

466 Ibid., 15.
467 The patriation of the Canadian constitution refers to the process whereby the power to amend the Canadian constitution held by the Parliament of the UK was transferred to Canada. Under the 1982 Constitution Act, the right of modification of the Canadian Constitution, formerly held by the UK, was transferred to Canada. Patriation was agreed upon in 1981, and signed into effect by Queen Elizabeth II in 1982. Gagnon notes that the impact of the patriation episode was that ‘instead of being granted special recognition, Québec was weakened by the federal order.’ Gagnon, “Québec-Canada's Constitutional Dossier.”
468 Ryan makes the point that Canadian and Québécois diplomats abroad, for instance, seem mostly to have got on very well with one another. Ryan, Québec’s Cultural Diplomacy, 66. Balthazar notes that ‘the greatest part of Québec’s activities are conducted in harmony with the federal government.’ Balthazar, “A Response to Needs and Necessities,” 150.
469 The irony of this initial lack of cooperation was not lost on Louis Belanger: the federal government supported cultural diversity within the international community while at the same time refusing Québec the right to become a partner in the process.’ Belanger, “The Domestic Politics of Québec's Quest for External Distinctiveness.”
470 Ibid.
addition, the ardour of diplomatic players waxes and wanes. A country which one year (or decade) may have actively supported Québec may have lost some of its enthusiasm in subsequent years. Diplomacy involves long term relationships, and bilateral relationships usually involve a range of issues, some on which there is considerable agreement and others where the parties may beg to differ. France may have always been a friend of Québec, but it was a much more active friend under de Gaulle than when he was no longer president. And, as noted below, the United States has never endorsed the idea of Québec sovereignty. In addition, the attitude towards Québec’s international engagement by federal governments changed depending on which party was in government. The Conservatives were far more sanguine about Québec’s international activity than Liberal governments.  

One additional domestic objective of Québec’s cultural diplomacy should be noted. Québec's cultural diplomacy was also driven, at one time, by a wish on the part of the province to gather international support for and recognition of its right to secede from the Canadian federation. Balthazar is of the view that the government of Québec was involved in promoting abroad sovereignty for Québec in the brief pre-referendum period of 1994-1995, under the leadership of premier Jacques Parizeau. It would, however, be incorrect to suggest that the pursuit of a secessionist objective has always been an element Québec's cultural diplomacy. The international activism of the Jean Charest government, elected in 2003, was that of a federalist, not secessionist, government. That was to be expected, of course, given his party did not seek sovereignty for Québec. During the Parti Québécois’ government of 1976-1985, the range and intensity of Québec’s international relations was not significantly extended, except at the

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471 The Liberal’s foreign minister, in early 2005, had called the Gérin-Lajoie doctrine outdated, and was reported as having said that Québec government demands for an enhanced international role for the province would create a precedent that could be used by a government ‘led by a Québec independence fanatic.’ (“Québec’s international role: Québec raises its voice,” Le Devoir, September 10, 2005). Prime minister Paul Martin, a Liberal, was badly disposed towards Québec’s bid for a formal mechanism concerning the exercise of its international responsibilities. During the election campaign leading up to the 2006 federal election, and was reported as saying that ‘Canada will speak with only one voice on the international stage. Canada cannot speak with several voices.’ By contrast, the Conservative leader, Stephen Harper, was reported as saying that his government would allow the province to play a greater international role, particularly in areas that touched upon culture and language, and that Québec would be allowed to increase its presence on the world stage and to represent itself at UNESCO. As Québec already participated in La Francophonie summit, Québec could ‘express that side of its nature, that distinctiveness without having any necessary recourse to sovereignty.’ (“Harper promises Québec greater role in international affairs,” CBC, December 19, 2005.) Just four months after Harper’s election victory, Québec and Canada signed an agreement under which Québec became a full member of Canada’s permanent delegation to UNESCO.

economic level, and Québec’s missions abroad were not used to ‘promote the ideal of sovereignty.’

**Conclusion**

Canada’s cultural diplomacy and that of Québec provides insights into all three aspects of cultural diplomacy with which this thesis places emphasis. The cultural diplomacy of both states has been involved in efforts to protect their respective cultural sovereignty. The cultural diplomacy of the federal government has focused on securing a cultural exception within the multilateral free trade framework (the WTO and GATS), and, when this approach failed, on the promulgation of the new UNESCO instrument for the protection of cultural diversity, which was regarded as a new method of providing support to and protection of domestic cultural industries without compromising or running counter to Canada’s pro free trade policy. Federal cultural diplomacy has also sought to support the work of Canadian artists and Canadian cultural industries in part to help both remain viable, by expanding their market size and their income. Successive Canadian governments have adhered to the notion that closer economic integration demands strong domestic cultures and cultural expression to maintain national cultural sovereignty and a sense of identity, so as to help distinguish Canada from other nations, particularly from the United States. The cultural diplomacy of Québec has been entirely concerned with the protection of Québec’s cultural sovereignty, but the reason for this has not been the threat of cultural ‘invasion’ by another country, but the threat of posed by the Canadian federation.

The cultural diplomacy of the federal government and that of the Québec government has sought to present their respective international profiles and up-to-date images abroad, in order to influence favourably the way people abroad viewed each state when considering investing, immigrating, buying or selling goods, travelling, or undertaking education. In the case of federal Canada, that image has focused on Canada’s modern economy, and its multiculturalism. It has sought to update the image from a country of forests and lakes to a multicultural, modern, creative, innovative, and technologically advanced country. The presentation of this new image has not been linked particularly to a national brand, something which has remained absent from the Canadian political landscape. Efforts to undertake a diplomacy branding exercise ran into problems associated in part with the activity abroad of a number of Canadian provinces. In the

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473 Ibid. It can be assumed that the continued negative reaction by the United States to the idea of Québec sovereignty had an influence on the manner in which the secessionist issue was managed in that country.
case of Québec, the province’s brand can be regarded as the province itself. The image presented abroad has been of a vibrant, creative and distinctive French-speaking polity.

Both the cultural diplomacy of the federal government and that of Québec have had clear domestic objectives. Federal cultural diplomacy has sought to reinforce the federal government’s right to speak on behalf of Canada abroad. This was part of Trudeau’s agenda to negate Québec’s nationalist claims. It has done this by emphasising the multicultural nature of the Canadian federation, a federation in which Québec is one of ten provinces and French-ness simply another form of ethnicity. By contrast, the domestic objectives of the cultural diplomacy of Québec have been concerned with asserting the province’s rights within the federation, and at one time, supporting the secessionist movement. As we have seen, although Québec’s cultural diplomacy has had an important economic dimension, the province’s cultural diplomacy has been primarily about asserting its cultural distinctiveness abroad, and asserting its rights within the federation. Québec has not accepted that the federal government has the sole power to devise and implement foreign policy, and to speak abroad for Canada. At its core, Québec’s cultural diplomacy has been an important element of the province’s efforts to define the federation, in concept and in practice, as one which is bicultural, rather than multicultural in nature, and which can be distinguished as incorporating a unique polity, a French-speaking nation on the American continent.

In the next chapter, the cultural diplomacy of a unitary state, New Zealand, provides a useful contrast to Canada with regard to the main themes of this thesis. It is to this case that I now turn.
Chapter Four: New Zealand’s cultural diplomacy

Introduction

This chapter argues that New Zealand’s cultural diplomacy provides a valuable example of the role which cultural diplomacy plays in the presentation abroad of a national image, and a valuable opportunity to explore the extent to which such an image is tied to a national brand. New Zealand’s cultural diplomacy also offers an opportunity to explore cultural diplomacy’s role in the pursuit of domestic objectives. The culture of New Zealand’s indigenous people, the Maori, has played an important role in New Zealand’s cultural diplomacy, and arguably New Zealand’s most successful cultural diplomacy event, a tour of the United States of an exhibition of Maori artifacts, had a strong domestic aspect to it. However, New Zealand’s cultural diplomacy is not seen as offering an example of how the practice is tied to the protection of cultural sovereignty. New Zealand has remained relatively unconcerned about the impact that the culture of another state has had on its national identity. Certainly there have been times when politicians and the public alike have shown concern about the relative lack of New Zealand-made cultural products (such as television programmes and music), but these concerns have never reached the same level as those in Canada.

New Zealand’s foreign ministry was a relative latecomer to the world of diplomacy. A separate department was first established in 1943 (prior to this, the administration of New Zealand’s foreign affairs was located in the Imperial Affairs Section of the Prime Minister’s department headed by Carl Berendsen). As Ian McGibbon notes, the department’s first two decades were characterised by ‘many frustrations for those who sought to place New Zealand’s overseas representation on a professional and well-ordered basis.’ The ministry remained ‘at first a very rudimentary organisation,’ with too few people doing too much work for politicians who remained unsympathetic towards, and who had little understanding of, diplomats and their work.\textsuperscript{474} In the following four decades - from the 1960s to the first years of the twenty-first century, New Zealand’s foreign ministry developed into an accomplished and professional foreign service. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade (hereafter referred to as MFAT\textsuperscript{475}) became well respected by politicians, other departments and other foreign services alike, with a strong reputation for its work in the area of international trade policy, at the United Nations.

\textsuperscript{474} McGibbon, \textit{Unofficial Channels}, 27.

\textsuperscript{475} The government department responsible for the management of New Zealand’s external relations was, until 1969, called the Department of External Affairs, when it became Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA). On 1 December 1988 it became the Ministry of External Relations and Trade (MERT). In 1993 it became the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, referred to by many as MFAT. See Templeton, “Beginnings.”
(where it established a strong record of contributions to United Nations peace operations and in other areas of the United Nations’ work), and for its role in the South Pacific. New Zealand diplomats posted abroad have earned a reputation for their willingness and ability to find solutions, being positive and constructive, and being able to engage with a wide range of people from other cultures in a friendly and easygoing way. In 2006, the ministry had almost fifty embassies and high commissions abroad, and a staff of almost 700, of which over 200 were posted abroad.\textsuperscript{476} Because New Zealand’s cultural diplomacy has always been undertaken primarily by New Zealand’s foreign ministry, MFAT,\textsuperscript{477} the cultural diplomacy work of the ministry in the post World War Two period forms the primary focus of this chapter. Two major cultural diplomacy projects with which the ministry was involved – the \textit{Te Maori} exhibition in the mid 1980s, and the cultural diplomacy programme of the New Zealand High Commission in London, over the period 1988-1991 – are examined in depth. The rest of the chapter examines the cultural diplomacy of the fifth Labour Government, one component of a number of cultural initiatives of a government committed to supporting a New Zealand cultural renaissance. Particular emphasis will be placed on examining the government’s cultural diplomacy initiative, the Cultural Diplomacy International Programme, for which the Ministry for Culture and Heritage, rather than the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, was appointed the lead agency.

\textbf{Beginnings: the Cultural Exchange Programme}

In the years immediately following its establishment in 1943, the focus of the foreign ministry was on building a professional diplomatic service whilst grappling with significant international issues with which New Zealand was inevitably (and sometimes reluctantly) involved.\textsuperscript{478} There was little cultural diplomacy activity, or funding for it.\textsuperscript{479} Some exchanges of people took place, such as the annual placement of New Zealand students in French schools and universities funded by the French government. The limited cultural diplomacy activity that the ministry undertook in

\begin{footnotesize}
\textsuperscript{476} Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade Statement of Intent 2006-2009. For the remainder of this chapter, for the sake of brevity, the term ‘New Zealand embassies’ will include New Zealand high commissions (embassies based in Commonwealth countries).

\textsuperscript{477} As noted below, New Zealand never established a stand-alone cultural diplomacy agency, although establishing such an agency was one of the options put forward in a report compiled by the Ministry for Culture and Heritage in 2000 concerning the future of NZ cultural diplomacy. However, the least expensive option was chosen, that of establishing an inter-departmental coordinating committee.

\textsuperscript{478} Such as, \textit{inter alia}, New Zealand’s role in the western security alliance in the face of major changes to the scope and reach of British influence and its role in the process of decolonisation.

\textsuperscript{479} Bryce Harland, New Zealand’s first ambassador to China, says that in the early 1970s Wellington was not at the time accustomed to this sort of diplomacy.’ Harland, "The Opportunities and Limits of Diplomacy," 43.
\end{footnotesize}
its early years, from 1943 to the early 1970s, was not able to draw on funds specially set aside for that purpose. This meant that New Zealand diplomats resorted to ad hoc financing and planning, and were not able always to use the presence abroad of New Zealand artists, performers and writers to help their work. These have been the two constants of New Zealand cultural diplomacy in the post-war period, even during rare times of relative plenty: ad hoc cultural diplomacy, and lost opportunities.

In the early 1970s, the then head of the ministry, Frank Corner, was instrumental in pushing for and securing government funding for what was to be called the Cultural Exchange Programme. The programme was set up in 1974 with an initial sum of NZ$50,000 per annum. Setting out reasons for the programme’s establishment, a draft cabinet paper noted that:

one of the most important changes in foreign policy introduced by Government this year has been to conceive it as a unified projection abroad of our beliefs and attitudes - the New Zealand personality. To do this we are organising our efforts overseas so that all segments of our policy - on trade, aid, defence, information - are brought into overall harmony. One major segment is missing – cultural exchanges…[these] are in some ways the most obvious and effective means of projecting the New Zealand personality abroad and of helping to deepen the cultural experience of New Zealanders at home…The purpose of the fund would be to finance tours abroad by Government-sponsored exhibitions and cultural groups, and to assist the visit of similar groups to New Zealand.480

In a letter to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, to which the draft cabinet paper was attached, Corner noted that the new programme’s frame of reference should not be defined too narrowly, but should be limited to the arts in case ‘sporting groups and other associations’ should seek funding under the programme. The types of cultural activity anticipated to be funded included ‘travelling exhibitions, the performing arts, Maori groups, painting and sculpture, and crafts’ as well as exchanges of people. In a later memo reporting on the programme’s first year, Corner reported that it had two purposes: ‘First to cement and to broaden our bilateral relations with countries with which we have important political, economic, and defence interests. Secondly, to foster the development and enjoyment of the arts in New Zealand.’481 The contribution to bilateral relations was to occur when projects under the Programme come to the attention of Governments with which we deal in political, economic and other fields. Political leaders, officials and other key decision-makers are invited to concerts and exhibitions which, apart from publicising in the local media an aspect of New Zealand often overlooked abroad, provide a persuasive context for other New Zealand promotions…

fact that New Zealand has a culture which can stand up overseas on its own merits reinforces our independent nationhood in foreign eyes. 482

The domestic impact of cultural exchanges set out by Corner saw the exposure of New Zealand artists and the public to ‘overseas influences which will entertain and stimulate us, fertilise our own cultural development and also subject our achievements to international appreciation and assessment.’ 483

Over time, the initial focus on exchanges to and from New Zealand changed to a quite noticeable focus on the presentation of New Zealand culture abroad. In a memo to the Minister of Foreign Affairs and Trade in 1978, the ministry noted that in 1977 and in 1978 almost all the exchange programme funds would be used to promote New Zealand abroad, and that the focus of the programme in that year would be on Europe, given the need to ‘establish ourselves in Europe as something other than just an agricultural country.’ 484 The focus on the promotion of New Zealand abroad (rather than two way exchanges) was not supported by all diplomats. An unattributed annotation on an internal memo concerning ideas for two way exchanges with Indonesia in 1985 noted sardonically that ‘Our deep-rooted conviction that people should learn all about us while we need to learn nothing of them will keep the visitor programmes tucked up safe and sound for a long time yet.’ 485

Corner’s enthusiasm for the ‘unified projection abroad of the New Zealand personality’ was manifested in other ways during the period he headed the foreign ministry. In the 1970s and 1980s, the ministry appointed cultural attachés to its most significant posts. These positions were filled by career diplomats. More cultural diplomacy activities were undertaken by the Ministry, in addition to those funded under the Cultural Exchange Programme. These included a regular programme of exhibitions and displays, the New Zealand China exchange programme, the work of the Australia-New Zealand Foundation, administrative support for the New Zealand-United States Arts Foundation (a separate entity from the Fulbright programme), administering the annual contribution to the Commonwealth Institute, and management of a programme of official visits to New Zealand. Books were provided to posts abroad and for those universities abroad

484 Ministry of Foreign Affairs memorandum to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, 5 May 1978 (file 66/1/2. Part 1. New Zealand Affairs: Educational and Cultural Relations).
485 J.C. Clarke memorandum to the Ambassador and Mr Wilson, 1985 (file JKA 26/4/1. Part 2. New Zealand Relations with Indonesia).
which taught courses on aspects of New Zealand, speeches of prime ministers were reprinted for international dissemination, and funding provided for the publication of complimentary copies of New Zealand literary journals such as *Landfall*, *Islands*, and *Mate*.

In addition, the ministry managed a collection of New Zealand art for showing at missions abroad. The art collection was begun in the 1960s, initially almost as a hobby for senior diplomats interested in modern art and determined to see it in New Zealand missions abroad. Although the collection started as furnishings for these missions, it transformed after time, and through some astute buying, into a very valuable collection. In 2001, the ministry was forced to reassess its holdings of works of art, among other assets, because of the introduction of a capital charge on the assets of government departments.\footnote{Charlotte Williams, a former Treasury official, New Zealand diplomat, and senior bureaucrat with the Ministry of Justice, notes that the aim of the Treasury policy was to ensure that the government and its agencies recognised and paid the opportunity cost of capital - what the government would have earned if it had put its money into other assets (or debt repayment). Capital was not free and the capital charge reflected this. Of course it was also a useful way to put the squeeze on departments which might be profligate or inefficient. But transparency enabled the government to decide how much it was prepared to have invested in assets such as, for instance, foreign service houses and communications systems. The capital charge policy was part of the major financial reform of the government’s accounts from a purely cash basis to accrual accounting and attention to the balance sheet as well as to the true cost of government activity, a cost formerly hidden or obscured. Charlotte Williams, personal communication, September 19, 2006.} Not only did the collection's high value attract a high capital cost, it also raised questions about the ministry's ability to maintain and bear the cost of insurance of a collection which was spread over many locations around the world. The capital charge compelled the ministry to assess whether an art collection was still a manageable and effective asset for a small foreign service. The conclusions reached by the ministry were that the high value of some art works was an issue, and not just with respect to the capital charge, and that art remained a useful aspect of New Zealand’s diplomacy, an effective expression of New Zealand and its cultures. It was decided to remove works of high value from the existing collection, pass them to public galleries in New Zealand, and adopt a purchasing and maintenance policy that would keep the collection within manageable value limits while still achieving its promotional objectives.\footnote{Clark, *Major Arts Works Coming Home*.} The effect of this change was for the collection to favour new, emerging artists.\footnote{I am grateful to Rob Hole and Jill Trevelyan of MFAT for explaining the difference between the old and new collection policies.} At the same time as the art collection was being built up in the 1960s and 1970s, the foreign ministry also made some effort to ensure that other aspects of these missions, including the buildings themselves, looked like New Zealand, or at least presented an image of which New Zealand could be proud. New Zealand House in London, for instance,
sought to convey to Londoners a sense of New Zealand as a modern state, rather than as a very large farm in the South Pacific.\footnote{For some living in London, New Zealand House conveyed more the lack of judgment of London’s urban planners than a modern image of New Zealand. The building had a very modern façade, but its location near Trafalgar Square (not an area of London known for its modern buildings) attracted some criticism.} The look of the New Zealand High Commission in Canberra, a short distance from the new Parliament, had a similar objective.

Despite the ministry’s antipathy to negotiating cultural agreements with other countries (because there were never sufficient funds available to make anything of them), three such agreements were signed. The agreement with France in 1977 was recognised as moribund in 1992 with the mutually-agreed decision that the body overseeing the agreement (known as a mixed commission, comprising representatives of both governments) ‘would no longer meet due to the inability of New Zealand to provide resources to maintain a funded programme of activities.’\footnote{New Zealand Ministry for Culture and Heritage. The Place of Culture in New Zealand’s International Relations, 14. The report provides a succinct and useful summary of New Zealand’s cultural agreements.} The cultural exchange agreement with Italy, drafted in 1979, was never promulgated by the Italian government and was never activated. In 1992, a memorandum of understanding was signed with the Chinese government. No specific commitments were made. The arrangement expressed the desire of both sides ‘to promote cultural exchange and cooperation between the two countries in the conviction that such exchange and cooperation will enhance mutual understanding and friendship between peoples of the two countries and further develop friendly relations between the two countries.’\footnote{Ibid., 13.} Several exchanges occurred under this informal agreement.

\textit{Te Maori}

The peak of this period of high activity, from the setting up of the Cultural Exchange Programme in 1974 to the beginning of the cutbacks to ministry funding in the late 1980s, was the triumphant tour of the United States of \textit{Te Maori}, an exhibition of Maori artifacts drawn from museum collections throughout New Zealand. \textit{Te Maori} opened its international tour at the Metropolitan Museum of Art, New York, on 10 September 1984. The exhibition was shown at three other museums in the United States, in St Louis, San Francisco and Chicago. Following the United States tour, it was shown in Wellington, Dunedin, Christchurch and Auckland. The exhibition ‘showcased traditional Maori material culture,’ although it did not include women’s arts, for
which it was criticised. At each venue, the exhibition was opened with a dawn ceremony, and included traditional cultural performances.

The ministry played a key role in facilitating the exhibition’s international tour, and the exhibition would not have taken place, nor have been the success it was, were it not for the role the ministry played. It devoted considerable funding and staff time to *Te Maori* through its consulates in New York, Los Angeles, San Francisco and Chicago and its Wellington head office. Its role was threefold: first, managing liaison between venues and sponsors in the United States and relevant New Zealand entities; second, managing programmes for ministers, officials and cultural performers visiting the United States for the exhibition; and third, facilitating a series of associated activities to help advance New Zealand trade and tourism interests in the United States. These activities were frequently carried out in conjunction with either the Department of Trade and Industry or the Department of Tourism and Publicity. Those held at the exhibiting museums included performances, lectures, and demonstrations of Maori weaving and carving. Those which sought to reach a wider audience through the media included a special insert in the *New York Times* funded by the private sector, production of a film on *Te Maori* shown on public television, and support for the visit to New Zealand of a well-placed American journalist. The Department of Tourism and Publicity’s Maori cultural group undertook two tours: one, on its own, under a promotion titled ‘Discover New Zealand,’ the other with New Zealand performers Brendan Dugan and Gray Bartlett. There were also workshops for American travel agents, and food and product promotions, such as the black tie dinner for 500 people the night before the exhibition’s opening in San Francisco at which New Zealand food was served.

The ministry’s involvement in *Te Maori* began in the early 1970s, when Frank Corner was New Zealand ambassador to the United States. He sought initially three major exhibitions from New Zealand: 19th century landscapes, contemporary works, and an exhibition of the type that *Te Maori* became. His aim was to enable New Zealand to make an impact in a country that was becoming increasingly more important to New Zealand, as the focus of New Zealand’s political, economic and defence interests moved towards the United States and away from the

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493 I am grateful for the thoughts of New Zealand diplomats Nigel Moore and Wyn Cochrane – both of whom were involved in the management of *Te Maori*’s tour of the United States - on this matter.
494 Priscilla Williams, head of the Ministry’s information division, comments that the foreign ministry had two roles in this – the usual role of handling the international aspects, and also to bring some cohesion and organisation into the New Zealand side. She notes that the shambles at the New Zealand end was due partly to no one organisation or person being formally responsible for the exhibition. Priscilla Williams note to Mr Norrish, 5 May 1981 (ABHS 950 W4627. Box 1865. 71/4/4. Part 1. Te Maori).
UK. Corner believed that the exhibitions had to be large, because museums in the United States were large, and they should seek to show Americans that New Zealand and the United States had similarities: new countries, settled relatively recently, with indigenous populations displaced by that process. Corner also saw an exhibition of the type that became *Te Maori* as helping raise Maori prestige.495

*Te Maori’s objectives*

The New Zealand government’s objectives for the exhibition’s international tour were set out in the speech by the Minister of Maori Affairs, Koro Wetere, at the opening of *Te Maori* at the Metropolitan Museum, and reflected Corner’s initial aims. Three themes were evident. First, the exhibition sought to enhance Maori mana:

> It is our hope that [Te Maori will] increase the mana of the Maori people…Te Maori shows that the Maori culture is a living one and that the Maori people are alive, vibrant and creative…The Maori are proud members of that country: proud of the contribution we make to the wealth of the country…: proud of the history and culture that we give and participate in: proud of the contribution that we make to the shaping of a distinct New Zealand society and nation…the Maori people retain their separate identity, culture and language…All this is underpinned by a strong resurgence of and identification with Maori culture and history.496

This aim, emphasised by Wetere, was noted in less emphatic terms by the ministry early in the exhibition’s planning. The ministry anticipated that the exhibition would increase public consciousness of the value of the exhibition’s artifacts and lead to improved care of them in New Zealand.497 Second, the exhibition provided a ‘soft-sell’ approach to add a further dimension to Americans’ awareness of New Zealand and more depth to their understanding of it.498 This too was mentioned by Wetere:

> America is not as well acquainted with New Zealand, and especially not with the Maori people. I hope that in the 18 months this exhibition tours through the US millions are educated and made aware of our country. New Zealand and the US have many common

497 As might be expected, given the ministry’s apolitical, public service role, this outcome seemed not to be particularly linked to enhancing Maori self-esteem.
bonds and shared experiences. These bonds have been forged in war and peace, through trade, sport and tourism.499

Third, the exhibition provided an opportunity to further wider interests. These included trade, investment and tourism:500 the exhibition would be ‘set alongside other efforts to secure the attention of our American friends and commercial opportunities in that country.’501 The extraordinary success of Te Maori provided ‘considerable scope’ for extending its impact beyond the generation of goodwill at a time when New Zealand needed all the positive publicity it could garner.502 New Zealand had a winner on its hands that could be used to counter the impact in the United States of the Lange government’s ban on visits to New Zealand waters by nuclear-armed and nuclear-powered ships. This was specifically set out by the foreign ministry in March 1985:

the goodwill created by showing the exhibition in Chicago could be expected to advance New Zealand’s broad political, economic and cultural interests in the United States. In particular it would be a useful counterbalance to adverse publicity generated by the ship visits issue.503

Co-curator Sidney Moko Mead shared the government’s view that the exhibition would enhance Maori mana.504 Mead saw the theme of Te Maori as ‘the return and rise of Maori mana’505 Maori art would be seen in a new light. Its customary placement in museums in New Zealand alongside ‘stuffed animals, birds, insects and fishes’ would no longer be acceptable once the same artefacts were shown as art objects in the very highest altar of institutional art, ‘The Met.’ Mead in fact preferred the title ‘Mana Maori’ for the exhibition, and was instrumental, with the director of the Auckland City Art Gallery, Rodney Wilson, in ensuring that the exhibition was shown in Auckland not at the Auckland Museum but at the gallery.506 Mead thought the exhibition was

a good public relations exercise which might do us a lot of good at a time when we are calling for a greater measure of autonomy for the Maori in New Zealand and when we

504 The other curator was Douglas Newton, head of Primitive Arts at the Metropolitan Museum of Arts.
505 Mead, Te Maori: Maori Art form the New Zealand Collections, 32.
506 Mead, Magnificent Maori, 97. The title was rejected as being too close to the Maori party Mana Motuhake. Instead Te Maori was decided upon.
want our Treaty of Waitangi recognised internationally as the instrument which permits us to demand limited autonomy.\textsuperscript{507}

\textit{Assessment of Te Maori}

\textit{Te Maori} was, to paraphrase Kernot, a cultural phenomenon, one of the most remarkable New Zealand had ever seen.\textsuperscript{508} It broke attendance records in the United States and in New Zealand.\textsuperscript{509} The total New Zealand attendance was 917,500, about one fifth the New Zealand population at that time.\textsuperscript{510} \textit{Te Maori} was widely covered in the media. Press coverage of the exhibition abroad was ‘phenomenal.’\textsuperscript{511} Television coverage in New Zealand was so thorough that ‘\textit{Te Maori} entered most of the nation’s households.’\textsuperscript{512} A high percentage of visitors to the exhibition in New Zealand were Maori, a noticeable feature, given the low numbers of Maori who normally visited the exhibition’s New Zealand venues. Mead was of the view that \textit{Te Maori} achieved ‘more international recognition for [New Zealand] as a nation than anything else [it had] done overseas.’\textsuperscript{513} \textit{Te Maori}’s extraordinary success in the United States was in part due to the quality and power of the exhibition itself, but had also much to do with the involvement of Maori elders and cultural performers in the exhibition’s dawn ceremonies. These served to set the exhibition above other exhibitions at important New York institutions of the same ilk as The Met. In the same week that \textit{Te Maori} opened in New York, major exhibitions, unrelated to \textit{Te Maori}, opened at the Whitney Museum, Guggenheim and the National History Museum, but these three received hardly any publicity.

\textit{Te Maori}’s international and national success had a number of significant impacts, although McCarthy rightly cautions against overstating these.\textsuperscript{514} There is little doubt that the exhibition’s success had a significant impact on an already burgeoning Maori self-esteem: rather than the usual sporting achievements of Olympians and All Blacks ‘carrying our national honour

\textsuperscript{508} Kernot, "\textit{Te Maori} Te Hokinga Mai: Some Reflections," 1.
\textsuperscript{509} Brake, \textit{Te Maori}, 4. Attendance at the Metropolitan Museum of Art was 202,000 people. Attendance figures for the whole of the tour of the United States vary – the \textit{Te Maori} Management Committee put the figure at 621,000 (this figure excludes school children). \textit{Te Maori} Management Committee, \textit{Te Maori}, 9.
\textsuperscript{510} \textit{Te Maori} Management Committee, \textit{Te Maori}, 10.
\textsuperscript{511} Mead, \textit{Maori Art on the World Scene}, 163. Mead sets out in some detail the press coverage of \textit{Te Maori} in the United States and notes that the international press coverage reached ‘from the United States to Great Britain, Europe and, almost simultaneously, New Zealand.’ Mead, \textit{Maori Art on the World Scene}, 159.
\textsuperscript{512} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{513} Mead, \textit{Maori Art on the World Scene}, 163.
\textsuperscript{514} According to McCarthy, the exhibition has been cast as the ‘genesis of enlightened museology.’ McCarthy notes that prior to the exhibition, carvings had already been displayed as art and museum reforms had begun to involve Maori people and their values. McCarthy, “From Curio to Taonga.”
abroad,’ this time it was Maori art.\textsuperscript{515} Mead claims it had the effect of making Maori people become more aware of their heritage.\textsuperscript{516} The exhibition expanded enormously the number of people in the world who knew about Maori art, particularly non-Maori New Zealanders, as the extraordinary attendances in New Zealand indicate.\textsuperscript{517} \textit{Te Maori} also ‘initiated wide-ranging changes in the museum display of Maori culture\textsuperscript{518} and ‘had far-reaching consequences for the relationship of Maori to cultural institutions.’\textsuperscript{519} For some such as Kernot, \textit{Te Maori’s} success was a major factor in the eventual establishment of a bicultural Museum of New Zealand Te Papa Tongarewa, in which ‘Maori material [was] to be under Maori control.’\textsuperscript{520}

\textit{Domestic consequences}

\textit{Te Maori}’s international tour had much to do with diplomacy, with using an important aspect of New Zealand’s culture to advance its interests in the United States. But the exhibition also had a good deal to do with the place that Maori held in New Zealand. As noted above, the New Zealand government’s objectives for the exhibition’s international tour, as set out by the Minister of Maori Affairs, Koro Wetere, at the opening of \textit{Te Maori} at the Metropolitan Museum, included that of increasing the mana of the Maori people. Some leading Maori were fully aware of the political potential of the exhibition, and it can be seen as one component in a programme of initiatives that used Maori customary culture for social and political ends.\textsuperscript{521} For Maori such as Kara Puketapu and Sidney Moko Mead, the exhibition provided an opportunity to use the

\textsuperscript{515} Mead, \textit{Maori Art on the World Scene}, 162. Mead says ‘every New Zealand Maori out of a population of 385,000 can identify with the exhibition and enjoy the praise which critics write…there is a special sort of identification with this art: our ideas of self-image, self-esteem, and ethnic identity are at stake.’ Mead, \textit{Maori Art on the World Scene}, 170. Kernot thinks that \textit{Te Maori} raised Maori confidence and self-esteem to new heights. Kernot, “\textit{Te Maori} Te Hokinga Mai: Some Reflections.” The exhibition’s management committee reported that as a result of the United States tour, ‘the self-esteem of the Maori people rose to a new level.’ \textit{Te Maori} Management Committee, \textit{Te Maori}, 26. Brooking sees \textit{Te Maori} as ‘the most positive by-product of the second great Maori cultural renaissance which began in the 1960s.’ Brooking, \textit{Milestones}, 196.

\textsuperscript{516} Ibid., 161-162.

\textsuperscript{517} For Mead, \textit{Te Maori} marked the beginning of ‘a new deal, of a heightened respect for the Maori people and their culture, of a realisation dramatically publicized internationally that our modern identity as New Zealanders is founded upon a solid base of Maori culture.’ Ibid., 163-4.

\textsuperscript{518} McCarthy, “From Curio to Taonga,” 27. Mead thinks \textit{Te Maori} established the custom of a dawn ritual opening of Maori exhibitions; new styles of display far removed from association with ‘stuffed animals, birds, insects and fishes’; and new methods of attribution. Mead, \textit{Maori Art on the World Scene}, 160-3.

\textsuperscript{519} McCarthy, “From Curio to Taonga,” 220-1.

\textsuperscript{520} Kernot, “\textit{Te Maori} Te Hokinga Mai: Some Reflections.” Kernot thinks that Mead’s call for an autonomous state-funded national Centre for Maori Culture at the time of \textit{Te Maori} in fact transpired into a reconstituted national museum called Te Papa.

\textsuperscript{521} McCarthy quotes the then Secretary for Maori Affairs, Kara Puketapu, as saying that ‘we hope this exhibition will stimulate young Maoris …and raise their awareness of their rich culture and heritage.’ McCarthy, “From Curio to Taonga,” 225. Mead says that in most cases, tribal leaders were quick to grasp the importance of sending taonga to New York as it would ‘do wonders’ for morale and self esteem.’ Mead, \textit{Magnificent Te Maori}, 99.
power of international recognition for the benefit of Maori interests at home in the manner articulated by Tipene O’Regan: ‘the surest way to raise Pakeha awareness of the value of anything…is for distinguished overseas institutions to pay laudatory attention to it.’ The extraordinary success of the exhibition may have taken all those involved in it by surprise. But for some, a pre-determined objective of the exhibition was that it would change the nature of the relationship between Maori and Pakeha.

This domestic objective of improving the mana and power of Maori in New Zealand through the exhibition’s international success was not the primary objective of either the Ministry of Foreign Affairs or the Arts Council before the international tour began, although both organisations cited the international and domestic benefits of the exhibition. As might be expected, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs believed in 1981 that the exhibition’s ‘principal impact would of course be in the United States…and there would also be a certain spin-off around the world.’ Domestic impacts would be to increase public consciousness of the value of Maori artifacts and to improve their care, as well as ensure every major object of Maori art in New Zealand collections involved in the exhibition would be restored for free.

The Arts Council, in 1980, saw the ‘incidental benefits’ of the project as being both domestic and international, with a slight weighting on the domestic. These included the impact that the recognition of the cultural heritage of ‘New Zealand’ (not the cultural heritage of ‘Maori’) by an institution so august as The Met would have on increasing public consciousness of its value. This in turn would mean that New Zealand’s cultural heritage (not Maori cultural heritage despite the exhibition being entirely comprised of Maori artifacts) would be better housed and cared for in New Zealand. For the Arts Council, incidental domestic benefits also included getting a free showing in New Zealand museums of great Maori artifacts, an undertaking which according to the council was ‘beyond New Zealand's own resources."

By the time the international and domestic tours were completed, the exhibition had become, for the Te Maori Management Committee, a celebration of Maori culture and an

522 McCarthy, “From Curio to Taonga,” chapter 4.
524 ‘Every major object of Maori art in New Zealand collections would be subject to conservation assessment and treatment where necessary, an exercise urgently needed and hitherto beyond New Zealand’s technical and financial resources.’ Ibid.
525 For the Arts Council, the 1980 report on the exhibition (included as an appendix to the 1988 management committee report) ‘aimed to outline in detail the background to this exhibition proposal for the benefit of interested parties,’ which can be assumed from the report to be potential members of the inter-department committee the report recommends be set up. These are the departments of Maori Affairs and Internal Affairs, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Arts Council. Te Maori Management Committee, Te Maori.
opportunity to push for changes to the role and representation of Maori in New Zealand and abroad. The committee, which included representatives of the foreign ministry and the Arts Council, presented in July 1988, at the completion of both the United States and New Zealand tours, a report to the ministers of Maori Affairs, Foreign Affairs and Internal Affairs. The focus of the final report was on two matters: Maori culture, and the need to change New Zealand’s projection abroad to better reflect Maori culture. The report spent considerable time on the New Zealand tour, and the recommendations had little to do with the contribution the exhibition had made to New Zealand interests abroad or how future exhibitions of the same kind might better carry out this role. Just one short paragraph set out how the exhibition was used by New Zealand agencies based in the United States to advance their objectives. Two pages setting out significant international results noted that the exhibition created a strong public awareness of New Zealand in the United States.

A slightly gloating tone was introduced: ‘there is now an acceptance overseas of Maori art as a subject worth exhibiting because it has a living dimension not known in other cultures.’\(^{526}\) No doubt this would have come as a surprise to some other cultures. No details were provided in the report about the ‘whole range of associated activities of a cultural and commercial nature’ and the ‘substantial programme’ organised by the Department of Tourism and Publicity.\(^{527}\) Recommendations by the management committee made no suggestions about how a cultural initiative abroad such as Te Maori might be used more effectively in future to better advance New Zealand interests. Recommendations which dealt with how New Zealand was presented abroad implied that the benefits accruing from this were to do with equity (it is fair to represent more accurately New Zealand as a bi-cultural country) than with how such a more realistic image might benefit New Zealand interests.\(^{528}\)

Te Maori had little to do with the presentation of a constructed image of New Zealand abroad and nothing at all to do with the branding of New Zealand as a contemporary state.\(^{529}\)

The exhibition was used by New Zealand diplomats to advance New Zealand interests in the United States, by showing an aspect of New Zealand with which Americans were unfamiliar, and by showing Americans that New Zealand had a cultural aspect to it that was on a par with the

\(^{526}\) Ibid., 27.
\(^{527}\) Of the report’s fifty nine pages, just one nine line paragraph, most of which is provided above, sets out how the exhibition was used by New Zealand agencies based in the United States to advance their objectives. Ibid., 17.
\(^{528}\) Ibid.
\(^{529}\) Its lack of connection to a national brand is to be expected: in the 1980s, the idea of applying the business practice of branding to countries was several years away. As we shall see, the crossover was made in the late 1990s.
great cultures of the world. The exhibition was used by some Maori to use the power of international recognition for the benefit of Maori interests at home, to improve the mana and power of Maori in New Zealand, and to change the relationship between Maori and Pakeha.

New Zealand’s sesqui-centenary

With the completion of the Te Maori initiative, and the demise of the Cultural Exchange Programme due to budget cuts in the late 1980s, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs refocused on its core business. This did not include cultural diplomacy. The intense resource demands of this type of diplomatic activity and the ongoing constraint on ministry funding precluded a return to the level of activity of the mid 1980s.

However, some missions abroad took advantage of the opportunity that New Zealand's sesqui-centenary in 1990 presented for cultural diplomacy. The extensive cultural diplomacy programme in the UK over the period 1989-1991, initiated by the New Zealand high commission in London, was by far and away the largest of these. The size and success of the programme were due to the leadership of the then high commissioner, the late Bryce Harland, and the substantial financial support provided by mostly UK sponsors. The programme in the UK was prompted by a request from the New Zealand 1990 Commission. That commission was set up by the New Zealand government in 1988 with the primary objective of ensuring that the 150th anniversary of the signing of the Treaty of Waitangi in 1840 was commemorated in New Zealand. Early on its work, the commission asked that posts abroad consult with the New Zealanders living abroad to work out what could be done to commemorate the sesqui-centenary in other countries. Harland saw the query as an opportunity:

1990 gave us a chance to tackle a problem that had been worrying us for some time – the problem that the picture of New Zealand held by many people in Britain was getting dated and they were beginning to get unwelcome surprises. 1990 also gave us an opportunity to rally New Zealanders in Britain, and the friends of New Zealand, and make them more aware of the challenges confronting us. This we thought would be helpful in the on-going effort to uphold New Zealand’s interests in Britain.

In early 1988, Harland put in train a process of consultation that would result in the establishment, in early 1989, of a committee to develop, secure funding for, and implement a programme of cultural events to commemorate the sesqui-centenary.

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530 Harland, "New Zealand’s 1990 in Britain. Speech Given at the New Zealand Graduates Association AGM,” 2.
Committee members and patronage of the UK/New Zealand 1990 Committee

That committee became known as the UK/New Zealand 1990 Committee. It had the usual committee components – chair, deputy chair, members, sub-committees and a secretariat. Its chairman was Sir Alan Traill, a former Lord Mayor of London. Traill was extremely well connected through his work with the City of London Corporation (the local authority that oversaw ‘The City,’ the financial heart of the UK and one of the world’s leading financial centers), the Lloyds insurance market and a host of City-based charities, and had the added advantage of a strong historical connection to New Zealand through marriage: the New Zealand cities of Lower Hutt and Upper Hutt were named after a member of his wife’s family. The committee’s deputy chairman, Sir Brian Shaw, was the chairman of ANZ Grindlays Bank.

Members of the UK/New Zealand 1990 Committee represented a range of components of British society, commercial and other, such as senior executives of major companies and a representative of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office. It included some well-placed Britons with strong New Zealand connections. Mrs Alice Renton, for example, was not only married to the then chief whip but was also related to the Fergusson family that had provided three governors-general of New Zealand. The committee included New Zealanders living in the UK who had done well, were well known, or represented New Zealand commercial and other organisations in the UK, such as the New Zealand producer boards, the New Zealand Society and the London Maori Club, Ngati Ranana. The committee had a sizeable patronage. The Princess Royal was its patron. Dame Kiri Te Kanawa, the international opera star who at that time was the best-known New Zealander in the UK, was its president. Its numerous vice-presidents were chosen, as with members of the committee, because they were well placed to advance New Zealand defence and economic interests in the UK, to ensure a range of connections to British society, and to emphasise the strength and breadth of the UK-New Zealand relationship, through both British- and New Zealand-born vice-presidents. Hence the line-up included members of the House of Lords whose families had provided governors-general to New Zealand or names for New Zealand cities;\textsuperscript{531} former British politicians;\textsuperscript{532} former heads of the UK armed services;\textsuperscript{533} former senior British business leaders and officials;\textsuperscript{534} famous,

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{531} The Duke of Wellington, the Marquis of Normanby, the earls of Glasgow, Onslow, and Jellicoe, Viscount Cobham and Lord Auckland.
  \item \textsuperscript{532} Lords Callaghan, Home, Young, Jenkins and Whitelaw.
  \item \textsuperscript{533} British-born lords Lewin and Carver, and New Zealand-born Marshal of the RAF Lord Elworthy, supplemented by the New Zealand war hero Captain Charles Upham VC and Bar and Admiral Sir Gordon Tait.
  \item \textsuperscript{534} Lords Thomson, Vestey, Roll and Armstrong, and Sir Peter Baxendell.
\end{itemize}
The UK/New Zealand 1990 Committee’s usual components and its patronage did three things. First, they provided legitimacy: royal patronage still counted in the UK, as did impressive titles and great achievements. Second, the committee’s vice-presidents and members provided a very strong fundraising capability by providing access to funding sources, commercial and other entities such as charities. Third, securing agreement of vice-presidents and members of the committee to act in these capacities ensured their active involvement in the 1990 programme and provided access to and support for the achievement of the committee’s objectives. The committee’s work was supported by a secretariat and the New Zealand High Commission.

**UK/New Zealand 1990 Committee objectives**

The UK/New Zealand 1990 Committee had both stated and unstated objectives. There were six stated objectives. These were: first, to arrange in Britain appropriate ways of commemorating the 150th anniversary of the signing of the Treaty of Waitangi between Britain and Maori leaders in New Zealand; second, to involve as many New Zealanders as possible in these activities, as well as a wide range of people in Britain; third, to raise the level of awareness of New Zealand – its products, achievements, and prospects; fourth, to promote in Britain a better understanding of New Zealand as it is today, and of the challenges and opportunities before it; fifth, to encourage New Zealanders in Britain to study the changes taking place in the UK and the potential these changes create; and sixth, to strengthen the special relationship between Britain and New Zealand, from which both countries benefit, by establishing enduring arrangements for practical cooperation, and in particular the 1990 Education Foundation, for the purpose of enlarging student exchange schemes and encouraging those involved to publicise their impressions.

The establishment of an education foundation was designed to provide a destination for donations

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535 For example, the New Zealand-born vice-president Mary Weston, the daughter of one of New Zealand’s most respected and well-known World War Two soldiers, General Howard Kippenberger, and married to one of the UK’s wealthiest men, Garfield Weston, was able to facilitate a major contribution to the Committee’s education foundation from the Weston Foundation.

536 Harland, "The Opportunities and Limits of Diplomacy," 48-49.

537 New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, The UK/New Zealand 1990 Committee. A Summary of the Committee’s Activities in the 1990 Commemoration Year in Britain.
from charities and livery companies\textsuperscript{538} that might otherwise have been unable (or unwilling) to contribute.

These were the stated objectives. The primary unstated objective of the commemoration in the UK was to ensure those in the UK able to do so would work on New Zealand’s behalf to uphold New Zealand’s interests in Britain, in particular its economic and defence interests. New Zealand’s economic interests in the UK were considerable: at that time, the UK was one of New Zealand’s largest trading partners and the UK was a significant source of investment for the New Zealand economy. An important part of the work of the New Zealand High Commission in London in the 1980s was ensuring that New Zealand retained favourable continued access to European markets for New Zealand butter. The volume of butter was sizeable and important to New Zealand economic interests. Defence interests in the UK were also significant. New Zealand-UK defence ties were perceived by New Zealand defence personnel and diplomats as remaining important to New Zealand, despite the move in the preceding decades away from an almost total reliance on the UK for the advancement of New Zealand’s defence interests towards the ANZUS alliance as their focus.\textsuperscript{539}

The issue for New Zealand in 1987 and 1988 in relation to its relationship with the UK was how to maximise support for New Zealand interests when the British prime minister, Margaret Thatcher, was opposed to New Zealand’s anti-nuclear policy, the UK minister of agriculture was ‘under fire from his farmers about New Zealand butter,’\textsuperscript{540} and New Zealand seemed to be more remote to Britain, a remoteness exemplified by the incident of the throwing of a towel at the Queen by a Maori activist during the Queen’s tour of New Zealand in 1986. In 1988, the campaign undertaken by Harland and his staff at the high commission to ensure UK support for New Zealand’s access to the UK achieved two positive results for New Zealand.

\textsuperscript{538} The City of London Corporation describes the trade and craft associations in the City of London companies, collectively known as the Livery, as ‘unique in their survival, number and diversity. The social and economic conditions which gave birth to the original guilds have long since been overtaken by the development of industry and commerce, but the livery companies still flourish today as living institutions. Their survival has been achieved by doing what they have always done: fostering their trade in a wide context, serving the community, and embracing modern skills and professions. Today there are 107 livery companies in the City of London.’ See City of London Corporation, ‘City Livery Companies’.

\textsuperscript{539} Norrish, Merwyn Norris, 144.

\textsuperscript{540} Harland, "The Opportunities and Limits of Diplomacy," 47.
First, the ANZAC Group in the House of Commons put forward a motion urging the Government to insist on the British consumer’s right to buy New Zealand butter, which attracted ‘over two hundred signatures – something like a record.’

Second, in May 1988, this success was crowned by Thatcher telling the House of Commons that New Zealand’s anti-nuclear policy was no excuse for not supporting New Zealand’s access to the EC. Harland credits Thatcher with publicly declaring her understanding that New Zealand’s economic policies under Roger Douglas were ‘somewhat similar’ to her own. New Zealand’s sesqui-centenary provided an opportunity to build on this. The economic component of the unstated objective of the 1990 cultural diplomacy programme was obliquely referred to in the UK/New Zealand 1990 Committee’s stated objectives: ‘To raise the level of awareness of New Zealand – its products, achievements, and prospects’ and ‘To promote in Britain a better understanding of New Zealand as it is today, and of the challenges and opportunities before it.’ But the objective of maintaining and increasing support for New Zealand economic interests in the UK was never specifically spelled out in written documentation associated with the committee. Reference in the written objectives to the continuing importance of the UK in advancing New Zealand’s defence interests was equally oblique. The stated objective of strengthening the special relationship between Britain and New Zealand referred to the close historical defence ties between the two countries, as much as to close constitutional, economic and family ties.

**The UK/New Zealand 1990 Committee’s funding**

The closeness of the economic ties between New Zealand and the UK enabled the UK/New Zealand 1990 Committee to raise about £1 million (NZ$3 million) for its programme. This was a huge sum in the context of annual funding for New Zealand’s cultural diplomacy: even a discrete programme such as the Cultural Exchange Programme of the mid 1970s attracted start-up annual funding of just NZ$50,000. Two thirds of the UK/New Zealand 1990 Committee’s funding was provided for events. The remainder was provided for the committee’s education foundation. A large proportion of the total was provided by non-government entities. The 1990 Commission in New Zealand provided some New Zealand government funding for the programme of activities,

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541 Ibid., 46. The purpose of the ANZAC Group, one of several all-party country groups in the House of Commons, is to meet with Australian and New Zealand high commissioners, and also with ANZAC politicians, to discuss Australia, New Zealand and UK politics.

542 Harland, "The Opportunities and Limits of Diplomacy," 47.
and the three producer boards - the Dairy Board, the Apple and Pear Marketing Board, and the Meat Board - provided about £30,000 for the UK/New Zealand 1990 Committee’s secretariat through their offices in London. The New Zealand High Commission itself provided administrative and financial support.

About sixty percent of the total funding was provided by UK companies and organisations, primarily by British entities with a strong investment or interest in New Zealand. The £100,000 contribution by the City of London Corporation to the UK/New Zealand 1990 Committee’s work was provided in recognition of the international dimension of the Corporation’s aim to ensure that the City of London remained the world's leading international financial and business centre. Major UK companies such as General Accident, the Bank of Scotland, Lloyds Bank and British Petroleum sponsored parts of the committee’s programme because of each entity’s respective commercial connection to New Zealand. General Accident, the Scottish insurance company, fully owned the New Zealand insurance company, New Zealand Insurance. The Bank of Scotland fully owned the New Zealand bank Countrywide. Lloyds Bank fully owned the National Bank of New Zealand, and British Petroleum had a long and sizeable presence in New Zealand. UK non-government not-for-profit entities which provided support for the programme in cash or kind, or both, included worshipful companies,\textsuperscript{543} the Royal Society, the Rhodes Trust and UK universities. New Zealand private sector sponsors included Westpac Banking Corporation, the New Zealand Electricity Corporation,\textsuperscript{544} Goodman Fielder Wattie, New Zealand Holdings (UK) Ltd and Fay Richwhite (UK) Ltd.

\textit{The UK/New Zealand 1990 Committee’s programme of events}

The UK/New Zealand 1990 Committee’s core function was to conceive, organise and fund a large, varied programme of cultural activity throughout the UK. The committee sought to convey through its programme of events ‘the dual message that New Zealand is changing but its ties are still important to both countries.’\textsuperscript{545} As a result of involvement in the committee’s programme of events, publications and media coverage, members of British elites would better understand that, in some issue areas, contemporary New Zealand was very similar to the UK. Target groups

\begin{footnotes}
\textsuperscript{543} These are the modern remnants of ancient trades-based guilds that had over the years lost much of their connection to the trades after which they were named.

\textsuperscript{544} It is reasonable to describe as private sector entities, those entities such as the NZEC that were formerly government owned departments but which had been placed on a commercial footing as part of the raft of economic and political reforms of the third Labour government.

\textsuperscript{545} Harland, "The Opportunities and Limits of Diplomacy," 50.
\end{footnotes}
would be reminded of the UK’s historical closeness to New Zealand, based on a history of defence cooperation, family ties, the Queen and the Commonwealth, that New Zealand remained one of its closest friends, and that the ties were still very strong. One misconception that Harland sought to correct was that New Zealand benefited more from the relationship than Britain. To paraphrase Harland, that belief was entirely without foundation, and the truth was precisely the opposite. Britain still earned significantly more from New Zealand than New Zealand earned from Britain, mainly because Britain still had big investments in New Zealand, and sold a lot of services.  

The committee’s extensive programme of events throughout the UK over the period mid-1989 to the end of 1990 was aimed first and foremost at members of the UK elite, particularly politicians and senior bureaucrats. It was also aimed at well-placed members of the New Zealand diaspora in the UK. Events were of two types. There were those already taking place regardless of the committee’s involvement, such as a number of tours of the UK by New Zealand sport and cultural groups. The committee used these events to its advantage by attaching a New Zealand element or component to the event. Other events were organised entirely by the committee, and would not have taken place were it not for the committee’s work. These included conferences; commemorative services (including that held at Westminster Abbey on 6 February 1990); receptions; performances at events in the programme by the London Maori Club; several choir tours, music galas and concerts; a number of exhibitions; and, for publicity purposes, the manufacturing and hoisting of a sixty foot high hot air balloon shaped as a kiwi, called ‘Twinkle Toes.’

A conference on economic and social reform
The UK/New Zealand 1990 Committee’s conference on economic and social reform in New Zealand and the UK was seen by it as one of the main events in its programme. It was the most expensive single event organised entirely by the committee. Funding was provided by three city

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547 As noted previously, government funded sporting activity abroad (even when undertaken to achieve foreign policy objectives or tied to diplomacy), is not considered cultural diplomacy within the conceptual framework of this thesis.
548 Examples of this were the attendance of the waka (large Maori canoe) “Taheretikitiki” at the Henley Regatta, and funding and building a NZ float in the Lord Mayor’s show. The programme of events began in July 1989 to allow the Committee to use for its purposes a number of already-planned events in the second part of 1989, with which it was possible to emphasise the New Zealand connection.
Lloyds insurance brokers and by the City of London Corporation. The conference provided an opportunity for ‘those in each country with interest or influence in the economic and social spheres to pass on their own experiences and learn from the lessons drawn by those in the other.’ Topics included privatisation, protectionism, tax reform, money and central banking, the labour market, health reform, and education reform.

The choice of speakers and commentators, and the approach each took when presenting their paper at the conference, on the whole reflected the prevailing economic policy ethos of the governments of New Zealand and UK at that time (colloquially known as ‘Rogernomics’ and ‘Thatcherism’). The conference did not set out to provide alternative viewpoints of the sort that might have served to fundamentally challenge, for instance, privatisation, free trade, or the need for an independent central bank as sensible national economic policies. Keynote addresses were provided by the then New Zealand minister of finance, David Caygill, who was, as his speech at the conference indicated, a strong supporter of the economic reform process of his predecessor Roger Douglas, and by the chief economic adviser to the UK Treasury, Sir Terence Burns. Speakers and participants included those who had been and remained involved at the highest levels of policy making and implementation associated with the monetarist, free–market economic and social reforms of the New Zealand Labour government and the UK conservative government. These included Dr Roderick Deane, a strong supporter of the raft of economic reforms undertaken by the New Zealand Labour government elected in 1984. Deane ensured that the Electricity Corporation of New Zealand, a state owned enterprise of which he was chief executive, provided funding for the publication of the conference papers. In the view of the author, it is very unlikely that this support would have been forthcoming for publishing the conference proceedings had the conference dealt with alternative views on neo-liberal reforms. Other New Zealanders included Sir Spencer Russell, the governor of New Zealand’s central bank at the time of the Douglas economic reforms and Roger Kerr, the head of the New Zealand Business Roundtable, a pro-business free-market think-tank. From the UK, speakers included Professor Geoffrey Wood (at that time a columnist for the journal of the Institute of Economic Affairs, a leading UK free-market think-tank), Dr David Green (who headed at that time the

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549 The three were “responsible for negotiating the New Zealand government earthquake protection, believed to be the largest of its kind in the world”. Traill, “Preface.”
550 Ibid.
551 Harland lists the key economic reforms in his speech to the Rotary Club of Manchester. Harland, “New Zealand, Britain and Europe,” 2-3.
institute’s health unit), and Martin Wolf, the chief economics leader writer for the *Financial Times* of London.\textsuperscript{552}

**Other colloquia**

The UK/New Zealand 1990 Committee organised several other seminars. The colloquium on New Zealand race relations held at Rhodes House, Oxford, in 1989 sought to update for UK participants their understanding of aspects of New Zealand race relations. Speakers at the colloquium included three eminent Maori – the late Professor Sir Hugh Kawharu (professor of Anthropology and Maori Studies at the University of Auckland), Chief Judge Eddie Durie (chairman of the Waitangi Tribunal) and the late Mr (later Sir) Robert Mahuta (director of the Centre for Maori Studies and Research at Waikato University). The colloquium addressed the issue noted by Harland, that ‘the picture of New Zealand held by many people in Britain was getting dated and they were beginning to get unwelcome surprises.’ This was an oblique reference to coverage in the UK of the towel-throwing incident mentioned above.

The agricultural seminar sought to persuade UK farmers that it was indeed possible to live without subsidies, like New Zealand farmers. A seminar on Antarctica and global climatic change, held at Cambridge University, brought together scholars from New Zealand and the UK. Seminars were also held on Captain Cook (at the Royal Society in London) and on New Zealand ‘past and present’ at Edinburgh University. Exhibitions included those of Maori artifacts (at the Museum of Mankind and the Manchester Museum), on the New Zealand Nobel laureate Lord Rutherford, on the art of the New Zealand artist Frances Hodgkins, and on young New Zealand artists. Several events sought to remind Britons of New Zealand’s contribution to the UK’s defence during the Battle of Britain (and on other occasions), and the royal links between the two countries: a special church service in Westminster Abbey on Waitangi Day 1990; a service at the Cenotaph followed by another service at Westminster Abbey; an exhibition at the Imperial War Museum and a function in Cambridge attended by the Duke of Edinburgh.

**Advancing New Zealand’s interests**

Just as the exhibition *Te Maori* had little to do with the presentation of a certain image of New Zealand abroad (and because it pre-dated the practice, nothing at all to do with the branding of New Zealand as an advanced economy), the activities of the UK/New Zealand 1990 Committee

\textsuperscript{552} Wolf was one of a number of recipients of the New Zealand 1990 Commemoration Medal nominated by the high commission for services to New Zealand.
were not concerned with the nature of the image that its overall programme presented. No consideration was given to whether the programme in its entirety showed New Zealand as a country that was of one sort (i.e. clean and green) or another (i.e. innovative and technologically savvy). The Committee did not meet early on and ask itself – what image of New Zealand do we want to present here?

There were two major events which can be described as seeking to convey a certain image of New Zealand. The conference on economic and social reform sought to show New Zealand as economically progressive, defined as the extent to which its economy was liberalising and open. The colloquium on race relations sought to show New Zealand as something more complex than the haven of race relations some Britons may have thought it to be. And some elements of the programme, such as the music concerts, would have had the effect of highlighting New Zealand’s considerable achievements internationally (in music in particular), and would have served to show New Zealand’s creativity.

But this was not planned as part of an overall strategy for the programme. The 1990 programme was not about image. It was about interests – New Zealand’s - and how to advance these, in the UK, using cultural diplomacy aimed at target elites. If it happened (and it did indeed happen) that this could be achieved through, for instance, building a plywood Maori waka, placing it on the back of a truck, selecting several New Zealanders (Maori and Pakeha) to sit in the waka, drawing makeup moko (tattoos) on their faces, and parading the fully laden waka through the streets of London as part of the annual Lord Mayor’s parade, so be it. 553 In fact, the aesthetic look of the overall programme was curiously anachronistic, almost out of date, despite the Committee’s declared wish to update the image of New Zealand held by Britons. The Maori performing group Ngati Ranana lacked the slick professionalism that was frequently evident in kapa haka groups of the early 21st century. The kiwi balloon, family picnic, New Zealand day at the Newmarket races, various pipe band and choir performances, exhibitions on Rutherford and Frances Hodgkins, the after dinner talk by Sir Edmund Hillary, the seminar on Captain Cook – all these had a faintly antique feel to them. Whilst this was to be expected - many events were in the programme to highlight historical links – it might be argued that the 1990 programme did more to reinforce the stereotypical image of New Zealand than update it.

553 The plywood Maori waka’s participation in the Lord Mayor’s parade of 1990 seemed - to those taking part in it, at least – a huge success.
New Zealand’s cultural diplomacy in the 21st Century

During the decade of the 1990s, New Zealand’s official cultural diplomacy reverted to its usual state of poorly funded ad hocism. A report to prime minister Helen Clark by the Ministry for Culture and Heritage, in 2000, noted that there had been little formal cultural diplomacy undertaken at an official level in the 1990s:

While there have been cultural exchanges, these have generally been organised on an ad hoc basis by individual agencies such as Trade New Zealand, Creative New Zealand and the New Zealand Tourism Board for their own purposes. Neither the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade nor the Ministry for Culture and Heritage have had the resources to promote New Zealand’s culture overseas and the cultural exchange agreements have effectively been moribund.\(^{554}\)

This situation changed in the early 21st century. The Cultural Diplomacy International Programme (CDIP) was approved by the New Zealand Cabinet on 31 May 2004, and launched on 5 July 2004 by prime minister, Helen Clark,\(^ {555}\) who also held at that time the portfolio of Minister of Arts, Culture and Heritage.

The CDIP, discussed at length below, is best examined in the context of the activism in the arts and culture portfolio of the Labour governments of 1999, 2002 and 2005. The Labour Party’s 1999 manifesto ‘Uniquely New Zealand’ provided some indications of the activism that was to follow. There was a marked nationalist tone to the 1999 manifesto’s arts and culture offering. Arts and cultural activities were not only intrinsically worthy of government support, they were at the heart of the preservation, development, and presentation, domestically and internationally, of a unique national identity - how New Zealanders ‘express our aspirations as a nation, who we are, and where we stand in the world.’\(^ {556}\) Labour wanted arts and culture ‘to express a strong sense of New Zealand identity as a dynamic and creative nation in the 21st Century.’ New Zealanders were to have the opportunity to see their ‘own stories reflected on our stage and screen and through our music.’ Future New Zealanders were to have the opportunity to ‘understand their present through their past.’\(^ {557}\) And because arts and culture played such a critical role in defining New Zealand’s national identity, it was ‘essential that they play a role in the promotion of New Zealand itself.’\(^ {558}\)

The subsequent activism had international and domestic dimensions. Internationally initiatives, in addition to the CDIP, included the launch of a Latin America Strategy, the setting

\(^ {554}\) New Zealand Ministry for Culture and Heritage, “The Place of Culture in New Zealand’s International Relations.”

\(^ {555}\) Clark, “Govt [sic] Launches New Cultural Diplomacy Programme.”

\(^ {556}\) Clark, Building Cultural Identity.

\(^ {557}\) New Zealand Labour Party, Uniquely New Zealand.

\(^ {558}\) Ibid., 17.
up of a government committee to co-ordinate cultural diplomacy, support for the development of a revamped New Zealand brand, including international promotion and events associated with *The Lord of the Rings* film trilogy, support for New Zealand’s participation in the America’s Cup yacht regatta, a New Zealand presence at the 2005 World Expo, in Aichi, Japan, including a New Zealand national day, and the Seriously Asia project, which aimed to boost New Zealand’s relationship with Asia and to address differences between New Zealanders and Asian peoples.

Domestic initiatives aimed at fostering a greater sense of New Zealand national identity, ‘giving people a sense of what forces shaped New Zealand,’ in Helen Clark’s words, included the ‘Cultural Recovery Package’, the return of the ‘Unknown Warrior,’ funding of an online dictionary and an online cultural portal, support for the work of the history section of the Ministry for Culture and Heritage, including its publications on New Zealand history, support for an increase in New Zealand content on radio and television, commemorations of the 90th anniversary of Gallipoli and the 60th anniversary of the Battle of Monte Cassino, and support for the Maori cultural renaissance through, for instance, the revival of the national kapa haka competition and supporting the preservation of Maori heritage.

The Cultural Recovery Package was announced early in the new government’s term. The package provided an immediate NZ$80 million for the arts and culture sector, and ongoing funding increases of NZ$20 million a year for the next three years. Substantial grants or ongoing increases in annual funding (sometimes both) allocated to government–funded arts bodies included NZ$20 million to Creative New Zealand to address New Zealand’s ‘fragile performing arts infrastructure,’ a NZ$2 million grant establishing a Music Industry Commission to enable young New Zealanders to ‘hear more of their country in their music’ and for all New Zealanders to experience the ‘cultural and economic advantages this brings,’ and

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559 The Cultural Diplomacy Co-ordination Committee.
560 The Seriously Asia Project is discussed later in the chapter.
562 The Gallipoli campaign, in World War One, and the Battle of Monte Cassino, in World War Two, were battles at which New Zealand played a major role and at which its soldiers suffered significant fatalities and injuries.
564 The package was described as ‘a spectacular conversion in the status of the New Zealand cultural sector from the grudgingly state-protected Oliver Twist of market forces to poster kid for global market innovation.’ Lawn, ‘Creativity Inc,’’ 2.
566 Clark, “Building Cultural Identity.”
increased funding for a raft of national cultural institutions including the Ministry for Culture and Heritage.  

Reasons for the activism

There were several reasons for the Labour government’s emphasis on arts and culture, and on fostering a greater sense of New Zealand’s national identity. First, there was little doubt that the government saw national identity and the arts and culture as playing a key role in New Zealand’s economic growth in the 21st century. For Labour, arts and culture were viewed as economically important. They provided employment. They were key components of successful cultural tourism. In 2000, Clark declared that ‘cultural tourism which displays the unique talents of New Zealanders, combined with the fine attributes of our lifestyle and environment has a special part to play’ in asserting New Zealand's identity as ‘a unique, innovative, dynamic and creative nation.’  

New Zealand’s creative industries, along with its bio-technology and information and communication sectors, were seen as having the potential to become among the key growth industries of the twenty-first century. Huge growth was predicted in the service sector around industries based on creative talent, and New Zealand, ‘with its talented people,’ had the potential for its creative sector to do exceptionally well. Certainly, the government’s overarching economic strategy, the Growth and Innovation Framework (GIF), placed emphasis on the role that national identity, presented abroad through a national brand, had in securing adequate economic growth rates in the 21st century by raising New Zealand’s profile internationally, particularly in the international global markets which provided foreign direct investment. The GIF also emphasised the importance of innovation in future economic success for New Zealand. In turn, creativity was seen as at the heart of innovation.

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567 Other major cultural institutions which received extra funding included the Museum of New Zealand Te Papa Tongarewa and the New Zealand Symphony Orchestra. Lawn notes that ‘Labour coalition governments since 1999 have provided at least NZ$138.2 million in additional funding for arts and cultural industries.’ Lawn, “Creativity Inc.” 2.

568 Clark, “Opening address to the New Zealand Tourism Industry Association Conference.” See also New Zealand Labour Party, Uniquely New Zealand, 7.

569 A definition of the creative industries is set out in the UK Department for Culture, Media and Sport, Creative Industries, 5. These industries include advertising, architecture, the art and antiques market, crafts, design, designer fashion, film and video, interactive leisure software, music, the performing arts, publishing, software and computer services, television and radio.

570 Helen Clark to Phil Goff, 7 July 2000 (IPD2/1/3. Part 2. Information and Public Affairs Division).

571 I am grateful to Peter Skilling for providing his insight into some of the factors that have driven Labour’s support for the arts and culture, and for national identity. Those on the left of the political spectrum would regard this focus on international markets, and on branding, as doing little more than protecting the rights and attracting the interest of multinational capital, and justifying this protection as being for the benefit of all New Zealanders.
Second, the arts, culture and national identity programme of the Labour government aimed to enhance New Zealand’s capacity to deal with change brought about through the process of globalisation. In Helen Clark’s view, a proud and confident nation was better able to deal with change than one which was not:

New Zealand is but a small nation in an increasingly globalised world. What is unique about us are our arts, our culture, and our heritage. In the twenty-first century, they will define us as the confident, proud, and creative peoples we are. Our cultural renaissance sits alongside our transition to a new economy, our reassertion of the timeless New Zealand values of fairness, opportunity, and security, and our determination to have our voice heard internationally on disarmament, development, human rights, and the environment. I believe we as New Zealanders can enter the twenty-first century full of pride for the unique contribution we have to make.  

Third, instilling in the population a sense of pride in New Zealand made good political sense for the Labour government. It was a way of distinguishing the patriotic, inclusive, community-minded Labour government from what the Labour Party perceived as the stark individualism of its main opponent – the National Party, and the right-wing ACT Party. In early 2000 Helen Clark was reported as saying that the arts should be encouraged because of the role they played as a contrast to ‘hard economic rationalism’:

For 15 years we’ve had economic pragmatism preached at us and everyone’s been told to look at their own economic self-interest and nothing matters except making money. Actually, there’s a yearning for something different. People value the non-material. This is not going to be a government obsessed with hard economic rationalism. People are more than economic units. At a community level there’s a real hunger for a different value structure.

Finally, there was a sense that the Labour government’s support for arts, culture and national identity was in part driven by a genuine desire to assert New Zealand’s independence and distinctiveness. Helen Clark, Phil Goff, Michael Cullen and other senior leaders came from a generation of left-wing politicians who had, to paraphrase Skilling, cut their political teeth on asserting New Zealand’s independent foreign policy over issues such as United States wars in Asia, French nuclear testing, and apartheid in South Africa. Their support for the development of vibrant arts and culture, and support for national identity, may well have been based simply on a genuine nationalistic desire.

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572 Clark, “Building Cultural Identity.”
573 The distinction would be less obvious when Labour compared itself to those parties in the centre of left of the new Zealand political spectrum, such as the Green Party or Progressive Party.
575 Peter Skilling (doctoral student, University of Auckland), private correspondence, 2004.
International initiatives 1999-2002

The activism of the Labour government in its first term included a number of international initiatives. The government set up a new committee to help co-ordinate the ad hoc cultural diplomacy activities of government entities such as MFAT, New Zealand Trade and Enterprise and Creative New Zealand; launched a new Latin America strategy, to which there was a strong cultural aspect; and provided considerable funding to enable the New Zealand-made Lord of the Rings trilogy to be used for New Zealand diplomacy. These will be discussed in turn.

The Cultural Diplomacy Co-ordinating Committee was established as a result of a report into the place of culture in New Zealand’s international relations, which the Ministry for Culture and Heritage completed in May 2000. The report set out the long term benefits of using cultural diplomacy:

The positive image that international cultural promotion creates would have the ability to facilitate the improvement of New Zealand’s political and diplomatic relationships; improve New Zealand’s performance and competitiveness in economic areas such as trade and tourism; enable cultural performers and artists to explore new markets for cultural goods and services and provide them with professional development opportunities; and promote New Zealand as a country of diverse cultures with a talented and sophisticated population.576

The report identified two issues associated with New Zealand cultural diplomacy: the lack of co-ordination, and inadequate funding. Four options were offered to the government for its consideration: two to address co-ordination, two to address funding. When sending a copy of the report to Phil Goff, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Helen Clark said she was:

interested in exploring ways in which the promotion and presentation of New Zealand’s culture abroad can play a role in supporting New Zealand’s international relations; cultural diplomacy is one of the key commitments in the [Labour] arts and culture policy framework.578

The first, and cheapest, option set out in the report, an inter-departmental coordinating committee known as the Cultural Diplomacy Co-ordinating Committee, was set up several months after the report. Its primary role was to co-ordinate the dissemination amongst government agencies of

576 New Zealand Ministry for Culture and Heritage. The Place of Culture in New Zealand’s International Relations, 22.
577 These were: 1) charging a central body with responsibility for coordinating and enhancing the effectiveness of international cultural activity already supported through Government agencies; 2) setting up a high level advisory body similar to the Australia International Cultural Council: 3) providing additional funding for cultural diplomacy, managed either by the advisory council of the second option or by a Government department; and 4) setting up an arms-length agency similar to the British Council. Ibid., 22-26.
578 Helen Clark to Phil Goff, 7 July 2000 ( IPD2/1/3. Part 2. Information and Public Affairs Division).
information on New Zealand cultural activity abroad, to enable better use of this activity to advance New Zealand interests.

In August 2000 the government launched its Latin America Strategy. That strategy aimed to lift New Zealand’s level of engagement with Latin America in order to increase trade, tourism, investment, student, scientific and academic exchanges and collaboration, and international and regional co-ordination and cooperation. Helen Clark said that the strategy was based on the assumption that ‘quality’ foreign relationships had to be multi-dimensional. In other words, it is difficult to have a good economic and trade relationship with a country or region if other elements of interaction were not active and healthy.\(^579\) This assertion seems a convenient article of faith used to justify the strategy, and a tautology. It is undeniably true that ‘quality’ foreign relationships have to be multi-dimensional if the quality of such relationships is judged by the extent to which they are multi-dimensional. And one might ask if all of New Zealand’s ‘good’ economic and trade relationships had only been with countries with which the other aspects of the relationship were active and healthy. The Latin America Strategy incorporated a range of initiatives: links between universities, including more scholarships ‘to bring students from Latin America to our universities and polytechnics’; an increase in the number of places available through a working holiday scheme; and increased funding for people-to-people visits and exchanges in the media, arts and culture, science and education, and sports. In the year following the launch of the strategy, cultural acts from New Zealand performed in Mexico, Venezuela, Chile, and Colombia, and the International Festival of the Arts, in Wellington, in 2004, included a Latin America component.\(^580\)

In November 2001 the government announced a NZ$9 million funding package, spread over two years, ‘to secure spin-offs’ from \textit{The Lord of the Rings} trilogy (together with the America’s Cup regatta).\(^581\) For the film trilogy, funding was used to support a range of activities abroad. These included premieres of the first film,\(^582\) and additional print runs for maps

\(^{579}\) Clark, \textit{Launch of New Zealand’s Strategy for Developing Relations with Latin America}. \\
\(^{580}\) Ibid. \\
\(^{581}\) In May 2000, the government announced a grant of NZ$5.6 million, associated with Brand New Zealand, towards the costs of New Zealand staging a second defence of the America’s Cup, which the New Zealand yachting team (Team New Zealand) had successfully defended in Auckland in 2000. In 2002 a further NZ$3 million was provided advance trade and tourism arising from the second defence. In October 2003, the government announced that it had allocated NZ$4 million for promotion of the third \textit{Lord of the Rings} film, \textit{The Return of the King}. \\
\(^{582}\) These included the world premiere in London, the New Zealand premiere in Wellington, and first night screenings in other cities. The first night screening in Delhi (at which New Zealand wine and ‘Hobbit food’ were served), was not a success. Shortly after speeches extolling New Zealand’s technological brilliance, the two ancient film projectors supplied by Warner Brothers (owners of New Line Cinema who financed the trilogy), failed. Indian guests leaving the event, having not seen the film, tended to blame the failure on Indian technology.
identifying New Zealand as ‘Home of Middle Earth.’ ‘Distinctly New Zealand gift items’ were manufactured. NZ$1.25 million was provided towards the cost of an exhibition titled *The Lord of the Rings Motion Picture Trilogy - The Exhibition*, curated and managed by the national museum Te Papa. The government viewed the trilogy as providing opportunities to help promote New Zealand abroad as ‘technologically advanced, creative and successful,’ as well as showcasing New Zealand’s landscape to the world. In late 2003, a further NZ$4 million was allocated by the government for events associated around the completion and international release of the last movie of the trilogy. These events included up to NZ$2 million for costs associated with the film’s international premiere, in Wellington, in December 2003, premieres in ten cities abroad, and support for activities in New Zealand diplomatic posts.

**The Cultural Diplomacy International Programme (The CDIP)**

The high priority placed by the Labour Government in its first term on arts and culture, and on the use of culture in New Zealand’s diplomacy, continued in the second term. The Labour Party’s 2002 manifesto repeated the vision enunciated in the 1999 manifesto. Arts and culture were to contribute to the emergence of a ‘strong and confident’ cultural identity, and support the development of a ‘strong and vibrant’ creative industry sector. Twenty specific actions were listed in the 2002 manifesto under arts and culture. One of these was to ‘continue to enhance New Zealand’s profile overseas with cultural diplomacy initiatives such as sponsoring New Zealand artists to international festivals and investigate the feasibility of establishing an artists touring fund.’ Following Labour’s re-election in 2002, the Ministry for Culture and Heritage, in November 2003, submitted a paper to Helen Clark in her capacity as minister for arts, culture and heritage setting out two options for the touring fund mentioned in the 2002 manifesto. One

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583 The press release announcing the package was at pains to explain these as being ‘part of film industry tradition and custom.’ Clark, “Govt (sic) to Secure Spin-Offs from the Lord of the Rings and America’s Cup Regatta.” Other activities included supplements in United States’ film trade magazines, and funding United States journalists to attend film premieres in New Zealand.


586 Hodgson, “Govt (sic) Ready for the Return of the King.”


588 Briefing, “International Fund: Preliminary Policy Options,” November 18, 2003 (POL 311. Cultural Diplomacy). The briefing notes that ‘an international fund for cultural activities overseas was indicated in the government’s 2002 manifesto on Arts & Culture, which referred specifically to investigating the feasibility of an artists touring fund. The manifesto outlined the government’s commitment to continuing to enhance New Zealand’s profile abroad with cultural diplomacy initiatives.’ The submission notes that despite the establishment in 2000 of a cultural diplomacy
option focussed on providing further opportunities for professional development for New Zealand artists, and supporting the development and growth of arts and culture. The other option, approved by the minister as warranting further development by the ministry, was:

to project, through arts and cultural activities in international settings, a distinctively New Zealand image which builds cultural affinities with New Zealand and which also advances foreign policy, trade, or tourism interests.\(^589\)

In mid 2004, at Clark’s suggestion, an application for funding for the international fund was sought from the budget of the Growth and Innovation Framework (GIF). The framework, the government’s overarching strategy for economic growth, was launched by the prime minister in February 2002 (it is discussed further below). Subsequently, a paper setting out details of the CDIP was presented by Clark for Cabinet approval.

The CDIP was launched on 5 July 2004 by Clark.\(^590\) Annual funding for the programme was NZ$2.35 million. Of this, a sum of up to NZ$500,000 was allocated to what became known as the discretionary fund, which Cabinet decreed be set aside each year for discretionary activities. This allowed politicians - primarily the minister who had primary oversight of and the greatest personal interest in the programme – to use the fund for cultural diplomacy opportunities outside the priority region, or for those which come up on an ad hoc basis.

The CDIP was overseen by the Ministry for Culture and Heritage. The programme’s steering group included, in addition to the ministries of Culture and Heritage and Foreign Affairs, New Zealand Trade and Enterprise,\(^591\) and Tourism New Zealand.\(^592\) Cabinet agreed that four ministers would oversee the programme. These were the ministers of Arts, Culture and Heritage (Helen Clark) and Foreign Affairs (Phil Goff), who approved decisions, and the ministers of Tourism and Trade Negotiations, who were required to be consulted prior to final approval. This oversight framework was subsequently changed in late 2006 to a requirement for approval of decisions by the minister of arts, culture and heritage only. This reflected the difficulty that Ministry for Culture and Heritage bureaucrats had encountered up until that time coordinating group (one of four recommendations of the MCH report that year on the place of culture and New Zealand’s international relations) the absence of dedicated funds limited efforts at a strategic, whole of government approach to cultural diplomacy.

\(^589\) Ibid.

\(^590\) Ibid.

\(^591\) New Zealand Trade and Enterprise is ‘charged with helping New Zealand businesses achieve success at home and in the global marketplace.’ Its activities included management of the government’s branding initiative, ‘Brand New Zealand.’

\(^592\) Tourism New Zealand’s role is to market the New Zealand tourism industry internationally. It sometimes uses New Zealand cultural imagery, groups and artists in undertaking its promotional work abroad, sometimes under the marketing slogan ‘100 % Pure New Zealand.’
in securing approval from all four ministers, or at least confirmation that they had been consulted.

The CDIP’s objectives and principles

Cabinet agreed that the objectives of the CDIP were first, to project, in targeted settings, a distinctive profile of New Zealand as a creative and diverse society with a unique, contemporary culture strongly rooted in its diverse heritage, and second, to position New Zealand among targeted overseas senior government and business leaders, representatives of the creative economy, and thereby the wider population, as a country they understand and want to engage with. A first step getting the programme underway was to identify priority regions, countries or international relationships where cultural diplomacy initiatives would substantially impact on New Zealand’s international standing and significantly advance New Zealand’s diplomatic, trade, economic, tourism and cultural interests and its profile on a long-term basis.\(^\text{593}\)

Cabinet also agreed to seven principles ‘underpinning’ the operation of the programme.\(^\text{594}\) These principles were developed initially by the Ministry for Culture and Heritage at an in-house discussion, a tool often used by its policy group to develop thinking associated with briefings to ministers, or on issues with which the ministry had an interest or involvement. Following this discussion, an interagency steering group was established to further develop the programme’s principles and assumptions. Consultation also took place with the Ministry of Economic Development on aspects of the programme’s shape prior to a submission being made for GIF funding. Four of the seven principles concerned agencies involved in the programme, and co-ordination amongst them. The remaining three were first, proactive, strategic planning of targeted programmes and a sustained approach leading to higher exposure and added value for New Zealand Inc., second, funded cultural activity will be excellent, distinctive and suited to promoting the broader interests of New Zealand, and third, programme messages will not be inconsistent with the national brand position of clean, green, innovative, creative and technologically advanced.\(^\text{595}\)


\(^{594}\) Ibid.

\(^{595}\) I discuss the programme’s relationship to Brand New Zealand, old and new, later in the chapter.
The geographic focus

The geographic focus of the main fund of the CDIP, in its first three years, was Asia, with a primary focus on China, Japan and Korea. The decision to focus on Asia was based on the likely impact of cultural diplomacy in that region, and on the importance of that region to New Zealand’s interests. Asia was viewed as a region where cultural diplomacy was ‘part of doing business,’ as ‘an understood way of cultivating ties, fostering understanding and long-term relationships, and building a platform for business interests.’

The selection of Asia as a priority region for the CDIP was also very much influenced by the government’s recognition of the importance of Asia to New Zealand, and of the need to focus New Zealand’s political, economic, trade, diplomatic and cultural attention on this region.

A tangible manifestation of this recognition was the launch, in 2003, of the ‘2003 Seriously Asia’ project. This specifically aimed to give a boost to New Zealand’s relationship with Asia and to address differences between New Zealanders and Asian peoples, in part by creating mutual understanding through the development of multifaceted relationships with countries, the same theme that had been enunciated by Helen Clark when launching the Latin America Strategy. The Seriously Asia project incorporated a large number of initiatives in Asia and in New Zealand. Several had cultural aspects to them, and fell under the management of the Asia 2000 Foundation. The Asia 2000 Foundation (renamed in 2004 the Asia: New Zealand Foundation), an independent, non-political trust, was established in 1994, funded jointly by government and the private sector, to promote knowledge, understanding and links between New Zealanders and the countries and peoples of Asia. It sought to do this through developing partnerships, initiating and providing input into policy related to New Zealand’s relationship with Asia, increasing New Zealanders’ experience of and knowledge about Asian countries and

597 Sir Dryden Spring, chair of the Asia 2000 Foundation, was of the view that no other region of the world was as important to New Zealand as Asia. Half of New Zealand’s top twenty trading partners were Asian, the value of New Zealand exports to Asia was 70 percent higher than those to Australia or the Americas, one third of New Zealand’s tourism revenue came from Asian visitors, and 80 percent of revenue from the international education sector came from Asia. See Asia 2000 Foundation Annual Report 2003-2004.
598 Clark, “Address to Seriously Asia Forum.”
599 These included negotiations on possible free trade agreements with China, with Malaysia, and with ASEAN and Australia; negotiations on possible closer economic partnerships with Thailand, and with Chile and Singapore; and a New Zealand pavilion at the World Expo at Aichi in Japan in 2005.
600 The package of measures to mark the 30th anniversary of New Zealand’s ASEAN relationship, for instance, included the production of a DVD of New Zealand music for distribution within ASEAN countries, targeted at the 15-25 age group. The DVD incorporated footage of students from ASEAN countries studying in New Zealand, talking about their experience of New Zealand and its education system. The DVD was fully funded by the cultural diplomacy programme.
peoples, and connecting people in New Zealand and Asia. The appointment of a former staff member of the World Bank, in mid 2005, was the first occasion on which the foundation was not headed by a senior New Zealand diplomat. From its inception, the foundation supported cultural exchanges, ‘to develop mutual respect and understanding.’ These were predominantly inward. Most of the cultural activity it provided funding for took place in New Zealand. Some funding was provided to allow New Zealand artists and curators to travel to Asia, and the foundation annually provided funding assistance to four graduates from Massey University’s journalism school to allow them to work in Asia. In 2004, the foundation provided support for a New Zealand film festival in China and for a Korean film festival in Auckland. The foundation joined with Creative New Zealand to fund artist-in-residency programmes in China and India.

The CDIP’s programme
A list of possible activities for the first year of the programme (covering the period 1 July 2004 to 30 June 2005) was developed by the Ministry for Culture and Heritage in the second half of 2004. The list was developed in consultation with MFAT. The Ministry for Culture and Heritage also sought the views of cultural funding agencies such as the New Zealand Film Commission and Creative New Zealand, and the views of the ambassadors of China, Japan and Korea in New Zealand. The two other members of the programme’s steering group, Tourism New Zealand and New Zealand Trade and Enterprise, were involved more in the approval of a final list for submission to the minister, than in the drawing up of the list itself.

The CDIP’s programme of cultural diplomacy activity in the first year of its operation incorporated a range of activities in Asia, and elsewhere. These included, from the main fund, New Zealand film festivals or a New Zealand focus in film festivals in Taiwan, Korea and Singapore, performances by the New Zealand dance company, Black Grace, and by the New

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601 His replacement, however, was a senior New Zealand diplomat, appointed in 2007.
602 These included support for the inclusion of an Asian dimension in New Zealand festivals, the inclusion of Asian exhibitions and performers in the programmes of ‘mainstream New Zealand arts and organisations,’ its support for the Indian Diwali festival staged annually in Wellington and Auckland, and a Chinese lantern festival staged annually in Christchurch and Auckland. Both festivals include activity for school children and material for teachers, to increase the level of Asian-related activity in New Zealand schools.
603 New Zealand posts abroad were asked to provide, for the country or countries to which they were accredited or in which they did business, information on major initiatives, types of most effective cultural activity, lessons from previous cultural diplomacy work that had worked and not worked, and target audiences. Diplomatic cable C45557/Wln, September 10, 2004 (POL 311. Cultural Diplomacy). New Zealand posts included embassies and high commissions, plus offices in Asia of New Zealand Trade and Enterprise and Tourism New Zealand.
604 It was also noted by Ministry bureaucrats responsible for the programme that whatever was selected under the CDIP should represent maximum value for money, and the film festivals were seen as a very cost-effective way of
Zealand String Quartet, in Japan, a tour of Korea by the Patea Maori Club, the production of a youth-focussed music DVD for distribution by New Zealand posts in to South East Asian countries, participation in a New Zealand Festival in Singapore by World of Wearable Arts, and performances by the New Zealand theatre group Indian Ink in Singapore. Activities funded from the CDIP’s discretionary fund included a New Zealand government gift to the new Musée du Quai Branly, in Paris, the provision of NZ$400,000 towards the cost of the New Zealand Symphony Orchestra’s performances in the UK, Europe and at the World Expo in Aichi, Japan, and cultural activity at the opening of New Zealand’s embassy in Warsaw.

The programme’s primary focus in its second year, the period from 1 July 2005 to 30 June 2006, was on China, and on major events, mostly in China. Three events were to have accounted for the bulk of second year funding. These were an exhibition curated by the national museum Te Papa, a series of five documentaries to be screened on Chinese television, and an exhibition of contemporary New Zealand art curated by Victoria University of Wellington’s Adam Art Gallery. Subsequently, the Adam Art Gallery exhibition did not proceed.

Two aspects of these cultural projects were emphasised in the submission to ministers seeking their approval of the cultural diplomacy programme’s second year of activity: the opportunity each provided to advance New Zealand interests through associated activities, and the image of New Zealand that each presented. Consistent elements of the preferred image to be presented were innovation, technological advancement, creativity and vibrancy. Hence the Te Papa exhibition, to be shown in China, sought to convey New Zealand as a diverse, vibrant, distinctive and innovative country to cultural, business and diplomatic circles and to audiences of potential consumers of New Zealand’s products and services. The documentary series for screening on Chinese television sought to broadcast in China an image of New Zealand that included innovation in science and technology, expertise in the creative industries and other

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605 The gift comprised art works by New Zealand Maori artists Fiona Pardington and Michael Parekowhai.
606 Other activities in year one funded under the CDIP’s discretionary fund included part funding of a cultural group in a New Zealand delegation to the Pacific and the commissioning and installation of a corrugated iron kiwi by the New Zealand artist Jeff Thomson at the Berlin Zoo.
607 The Ministry for Culture and Heritage recommended to ministers that support for the Adam Art Gallery exhibition be cancelled because it did not believe that the Gallery was large enough to manage a project of the size of the exhibition, nor its budget.
commercial achievements. The exhibition would present a contemporary image of New Zealand as fresh, energetic, creative and innovative.

Factors influencing the selection of cultural activity within the CDIP

When compiling the list for recommendation to ministers, five factors (in addition to the geographic location) were taken into consideration by the Ministry for Culture and Heritage and its steering group partners.

First, cultural activity should, if possible, adhere to Cabinet’s injunction that it be suited to promoting the broader interests of New Zealand in the particular country or region.

Second, consideration was given to the extent to which cultural activity was able to help project a ‘distinctive profile’ of New Zealand - a ‘creative and diverse society with a unique, contemporary culture strongly rooted in its diverse heritage.’ This tended to rule out pipe bands, for instance.

Third, appropriate cultural activity for inclusion in the programme was judged, in part, on the preferences of target audiences. There were several instances in 2004, during the development of a first year programme of cultural activity, when bureaucrats in the Ministry for Culture and Heritage sought to ensure that cultural activity was not likely to offend Asian audiences and Asian governments. A DVD of short films for Korea was produced with Korean sensibilities in mind. Films with too much nudity or bad language were left out. Bureaucrats informally asked New Zealand and Chinese diplomats about the suitability of kapa haka in China because of a perception that the semi-nakedness of some of those performing the haka might offend. The production of a DVD featuring New Zealand music for dissemination in ASEAN countries was careful not to incorporate music videos which included nudity, sex or vulgar

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608 This would be achieved by examining topics such as New Zealand as viewed through the lens of a renowned Chinese photographer, Auckland’s place as the Polynesian capital of the world, and the success of the New Zealand film industry. Briefing, "Cultural Diplomacy International Programme: Proposed Year Two Programme," May 17, 2005 (POL 311. Cultural Diplomacy).
609 Ibid., 7.
610 In the first year, several approaches were made to the Ministry for Culture and Heritage by New Zealand pipe bands for support through the fund, but these were rejected on the grounds that they did not meet the criteria, particularly the requirement that the activity present a distinctive face of New Zealand. Pipe bands could be mistaken as being Scottish.
611 The author recalls sitting in a meeting with the ambassador of China, held at the Ministry for Culture and Heritage, sometime in 2004, during which the issue of the suitability of kapa haka for Chinese audiences was raised. In addition, a senior bureaucrat at the Ministry reported verbally on her conversation with the New Zealand ambassador based in Beijing on the same issue.
language, but also those that might offend religious sensibilities. The date for the official launch of a New Zealand centre in Hong Kong, at which New Zealand cultural performers funded under the cultural diplomacy programme were to perform, was chosen with Fueng Shui in mind.

Fourth, target audiences for the programme were taken into consideration, as was the best type of cultural activity for those target groups in each country. Early assumptions that the programme would invariably be aimed at projecting an image of New Zealand to the ‘usual suspects’ - the top echelons of elites and those with an existing, favourable disposition towards New Zealand - were changed in some instances following feedback from posts abroad. In China, for instance, the New Zealand Embassy in Beijing, and the Chinese ambassador to New Zealand, recommended that the target audience for cultural diplomacy activity should be the huge and growing Chinese middle class and the media with which the Chinese middle class engaged, because China’s middle class was the source of future investors in, and students and immigrants to, New Zealand. Leading members of political, bureaucratic and business elites were, in the view of the embassy, already well-disposed towards New Zealand. The proposed documentary on New Zealand for screening in Chinese television sought to update the image of New Zealand held by those in the target audience in China (the well-off middle class). Once the target group had been identified, an assessment was made as to the most effective cultural activity for that group.

Fifth, when assessing what was appropriate New Zealand cultural activity, consideration was given to the competitive nature of cultural diplomacy in the early years of the 21st century. Bureaucrats in agencies represented on the programme’s steering group were acutely aware of this issue when working on the programme’s development. If target audiences were overloaded with cultural diplomacy offerings, new or different approaches may have been required. Early on

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612 In a cable from the New Zealand embassy in Manila to Wellington in response to a Ministry for Culture and Heritage query about the DVD’s content, the embassy noted that ‘while the Philippines is probably less strict than other neighbouring countries, there are definite sensitivities about what is broadcast. Advice…indicates that video images should not contain nudity, scenes involving sex, or vulgar lyrics.’ Diplomatic cable C07540/Mla, January 31, 2005 (POL 311. Cultural Diplomacy).

The New Zealand Embassy in Indonesia, responding to the same query, noted that ‘content would need to be carefully selected, taking into account Indonesian sensitivities…music/visual content would need to be culturally sensitive, apolitical and religion-neutral.’ It would need also to avoid, according to the embassy, ‘content that could impact on national security.’ Diplomatic cable C05959/Jak, February 3, 2005 (POL 311. Cultural Diplomacy).

613 Andrew Maclean, New Zealand Trade and Enterprise’s project manager for the Hong Kong Centre, email message to author, June 20, 2005.

614 Both the New Zealand ambassador to China and the Chinese ambassador to New Zealand, at separate meetings held at the Ministry for Culture and Heritage in 2004 (precise dates not known), recommended this audience focus.

615 By the second year of the programme this had transformed into a series of five documentaries.
in the process of developing a draft programme of cultural activity for ministerial consideration, the New Zealand consul-general in Shanghai described the competition which New Zealand cultural diplomacy was up against in that city. In one week alone in Shanghai, the international cultural diplomacy activity on offer included two ballets, two orchestras, one string ensemble, two violin recitals, two operas, a photo exhibition, a puppet show, two exhibitions of painters, an exhibition of video art, and a bullfight from Spain.  

### What to leave out of the CDIP

Despite the thoroughness applied to the selection of cultural activity, some projects selected and approved for inclusion in the first year of the programme were incorporated despite not strictly adhering to the programme’s criteria. These activities attracted support for pragmatic reasons, because they were opportunities worth taking, or because of particular prime ministerial interest. Hence funding was provided for a ‘replacement ceremonial (sacred) white horse’ to be given to the Toshogu Shrine in Japan, the fourth horse gifted to the shrine by New Zealand since 1964. Three members of the steering group believed that the gift of the horse would not meet any of the criteria of the programme, particularly that a horse was hardly the best vehicle for showing a contemporary, moving-ahead New Zealand. In the finest traditions of public service collegiality, however, the three dissenters did concede that ‘the gift would achieve New Zealand broader foreign policy objectives in Japan, which is the basis of support for the proposal from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade.’

Aside from those cultural activities which were included in the programme despite breaching all or most of its criteria, other projects were kept out of the programme. The Ministry for Culture and Heritage sought, and gained approval from ministers for, the exclusion from the programme of two exhibitions which had sought government funding, on the basis that neither exhibition met the programme’s criteria. The Auckland War Memorial Museum’s proposed exhibition on Pacific migration, titled *Waka Moana*, was seen by bureaucrats as ‘conceptually well removed from the focus that is envisaged for the Programme’ – that projects should

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616 Pam Dunn, e-mail to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, October 25, 2004.
617 Culture and Heritage, Trade and Enterprise, and Tourism.
618 Briefing, “Cultural Diplomacy International Programme: Year One Programme,” November 12, 2005 (POL 311. Cultural Diplomacy). Another animal also featured in the programme. Funding was approved by ministers from the programme for part of the cost of purchasing, freighting and installing a very large corrugated iron kiwi at the Berlin Zoo, made by the New Zealand artist Jeff Thompson.
The CDIP: advancing New Zealand’s interests abroad
The CDIP was expected both to advance New Zealand interests abroad and to update and broaden its image abroad. The CDIP was not about advancing mutual understanding, or developing New Zealand artists and cultural groups by providing them with international performance opportunities, and links to international cultural networks. This was an instrumental programme, set up to help New Zealand’s diplomacy and help in the achievement of New Zealand foreign policy goals. New Zealand’s interests were to be advanced, by, for instance, a profile-raising undertaking such as the series of documentaries, or by providing opportunities for New Zealand agencies’ representatives and companies abroad to engage with targeted individuals and audiences. The documentary series had as its primary objective the advancement of New Zealand’s interests in China, and was expected to have a behavioural impact (albeit slight) on those Chinese who saw one or more of the documentaries, in so far as they may have been more inclined, having seen an aspect of contemporary New Zealand, to invest in, travel to, or have their children educated in New Zealand. New Zealand agencies with offices abroad such as MFAT, New Zealand Trade and Enterprise and Tourism New Zealand were expected to adopt a ‘New Zealand Inc.’ approach (shorthand for New Zealand Incorporated), a coordinated approach to activity abroad which sought to maximise the impact of agencies’ international work by ensuring communication and coordination on a regular basis between offices abroad.\footnote{\textit{Ibid.}}

\footnote{\textit{Ibid.}}\textsuperscript{620} In practice, in the author’s experience, the level of communication and coordination amongst agencies abroad varied considerably. Those agencies which interacted well with one another in the field invariably did so because the heads of the respective agencies got on with one another, or because the offices were situated in the same building. This was the case in India, for instance, as observed by the author whilst he lived at the New Zealand High Commission in New Delhi. The very good relationships between New Zealand diplomats and their colleagues from New Zealand Trade and Enterprise and New Zealand Immigration were due in part to the personalities of the New Zealand representatives and in part to the location of all three agencies in the same building. Frequently, the New Zealand Inc. approach was poorly executed because agencies abroad were too busy doing their own work to undertake effective, coordinated activity with other New Zealand agencies.
The CDIP: presenting New Zealand’s image abroad, within a new brand for New Zealand

Just as the CDIP was expected to advance New Zealand’s interests abroad, so too was the programme expected to present abroad a contemporary image of New Zealand. This issue was of considerable importance to the programme, and to its most powerful supporter, Helen Clark. The CDIP was to present abroad an up-to-date image of New Zealand, and it was to do this within an up-to-date brand for New Zealand. For Clark, cultural diplomacy was about branding.622

When approving the CDIP, Cabinet stipulated that the programme present a ‘distinctive profile’ of New Zealand - a ‘creative and diverse society with a unique, contemporary culture strongly rooted in its diverse heritage.’ The distinctive profile was subsequently varied slightly, in practice, by Helen Clark. A paper to her from the Ministry for Culture and Heritage, seeking her approval for recommendations on the programme’s strategic priorities, included a number of annotations from Clark, one of which was that the programme should project the contemporary face of New Zealand as ‘unique, creative, innovative and moving ahead.’ This annotation was taken up in a subsequent document.623 It became for officials, as well as Clark, the principal guideline as to the type of activity that should be funded under the cultural diplomacy programme, and the principal guideline as to the overall image of New Zealand portrayed by the programme. The key image characteristics of uniqueness, creativity, and technological savvy, and a sense that New Zealand was ‘moving ahead,’ were repeated and reinforced in the programme’s body of submissions and in the type of cultural activity that was selected – and rejected.

The view that a new image was crucial to advancing New Zealand interests was based upon a number of assumptions.

First, it was assumed that the image of New Zealand held by people abroad was outdated and inaccurate. This was likely to have been the case: perceptions date quickly, even between countries with strong historical, cultural, economic and other connections. Feedback from New Zealand diplomatic and trade posts abroad supported this assumption. Ironically, there seemed to be a sense within government that Tourism New Zealand’s ‘100% Pure’, which had been very

622 Clark said as much in a radio interview. Answering the question ‘do you have a vision for how Maori art and music and so on, could be expressed overseas in the future,’ Clark says ‘I think we can see it as part of our cultural diplomacy, part of our branding New Zealand as a unique and creative nation.’ Helen Clark, interview on Mana News, Radio New Zealand, October 16, 2003.
successful in attracting tourists to New Zealand, contributed to the inaccurate image of New Zealand by showing New Zealand as clean, green and beautiful, and not much else.

Second, it was assumed that culture was an effective tool with which to update New Zealand’s image as a country that was creative, technologically advanced and moving ahead. Such an assumption seems reasonable with regard to persuading people that New Zealand was a creative country, and moving ahead: using art and culture to paint a picture of New Zealand as a creative country makes sense, and the presentation of contemporary cultural activity would help convey a sense of dynamism. The connection between culture and innovation was less obvious: did attending a modern dance company performance persuade the audience that New Zealand was an innovative country? The possible gap may explain why many cultural diplomacy activities abroad came to include seminars focused specifically on aspects of New Zealand innovation, and a trend towards developing cultural products that sought to present an aspect of innovation as part of their rationale. An example of this was the exhibition on New Zealand innovation funded through the CDIP’s second year budget. Seminars, media promotions, and exhibitions about innovation can make an impact on perceptions. But the author observed, from his involvement in the work of the New Zealand high commission and New Zealand Trade and Enterprise in India, that there sometimes seemed to be an assumption that any, or all, New Zealand cultural presentation abroad updated New Zealand’s image. The Lord of the Rings trilogy, for example, was assumed to be understood by those who viewed it abroad as featuring New Zealand landscape, being made in New Zealand, by mostly New Zealanders, using New Zealand expertise and technological advancements. This assumption was problematic. Some films which seemed to New Zealanders to be obviously New Zealand-made might quite easily be seen by non-New Zealanders as made in another country – Switzerland, for instance.

Third, it was assumed that the new image of New Zealand had a favourable impact on the behaviour of people who were the targets of the presentation of that image. If New Zealand was seen as innovative, for example, it was assumed that those wishing to buy innovative goods would think about buying New Zealand products, or might actually buy these. In the same vein, students looking to be educated abroad would be attracted to New Zealand not only because it offered first-world, high ranking universities, but because New Zealand was ‘sophisticated,

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624 Alas, the New Zealand defence of the America’s Cup (an international yachting regatta) in 2003, which received government support in part because of its capacity to showcase New Zealand technology, was marred by the yacht sinking and its high-technology mast breaking.
upmarket, first world, truly 21st century. This assumption, that image would affect behaviour, was well expressed in the comment of a New Zealand diplomat:

The promotion of the film [Whale Rider] in a country like South Africa would enhance all aspects of our relationship with South Africa, from trade and tourism to international co-operation where it would be to our advantage to counter the general perception (amongst much of the new ANC leadership) that we are quasi Brits.

The implication is clear: if New Zealanders were seen as something other than ‘quasi Brits,’ the behaviour of the new ANC leadership towards New Zealand and New Zealanders, would change for the better.

**Brand New Zealand**

The CDIP was not only required by Cabinet to present a contemporary image of New Zealand, but was to do so in a manner that was the modern articulation of Brand New Zealand. Cabinet’s stipulation that ‘programme messages will not be inconsistent with the national brand position of clean, green, innovative, creative and technologically advanced’ was a valiant attempt by Ministry for Culture and Heritage bureaucrats who had drafted it to merge two contradictory strands in the official presentation abroad by two government agencies of an image of New Zealand.

These two contradictory strands were those of the national tourism promotion entity, Tourism New Zealand, which marketed New Zealand abroad as a tourist destination of considerable natural beauty, and the branding activity of the national trade promotion entity, New Zealand Trade and Enterprise, which sought to brand New Zealand abroad as modern, innovative, technologically advanced, and hence worth investing in, moving to, or being educated in. The contradiction was well set out in 2002 in the Growth and Innovation Framework, the government’s overarching economic strategy under which the CDIP was funded:

Offshore perceptions of New Zealand are outdated. While there is some awareness internationally of our "clean green image" from a tourism point of view there is too little awareness of New Zealand as an innovative country at the leading edge of knowledge. [New Zealand needs] to develop and promote a contemporary and future-focused Brand NZ, which projects New Zealand as a great place to invest in, live in, and visit. Maori have a unique contribution to make in this regard, and the government is working with Maori to find ways of leveraging this for the benefit of all New Zealanders. Government has committed a significant level of resources in conjunction with events such as the

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625 Clark, “Opening Address to the New Zealand Tourism Industry Association Conference.”
America’s Cup and The Lord of the Rings to help promote an image of New Zealand as technologically advanced, creative and successful.\[^{627}\]

The Growth and Innovation Framework stipulated that initiatives funded under the framework would adhere to a consistent brand, a brand that presented abroad an image of a modern New Zealand with an advanced economy.\[^{628}\] The framework’s objective, to return New Zealand's per capita income to the top half of the OECD rankings, was to be achieved by focusing on nurturing and supporting innovation in New Zealand, and presented New Zealand’s innovation abroad using a ‘future-focused Brand New Zealand’\[^{629}\] and through using major events such as the America’s Cup and Lord of the Rings. A new image for New Zealand, according to the framework, would attract ‘overseas talent,’ foreign direct investment, students and tourists. Overseas talent would be attracted to the already established image of New Zealand as a beautiful and clean environment, and a safe and secure lifestyle, but would also respond to the added appeal of a New Zealand that was technologically advanced, innovative, creative and successful.\[^{630}\]

The task of revamping New Zealand’s national brand, promised by the government, was undertaken by New Zealand Trade and Enterprise. New Zealand’s ‘old’ official brand, the rather confusingly titled ‘Brand New Zealand fern mark brand’\[^{631}\] was replaced with a new brand, the slogan of which was ‘New Zealand New Thinking.’\[^{632}\] The new national brand for New Zealand aimed to

\[\text{differentiate New Zealand internationally, better support leading sectors, and enhance New Zealand’s established and emerging areas of competitive advantage.}\]

\[^{627}\] Government of New Zealand, Growing an Innovative New Zealand.
\[^{628}\] This was acknowledged in the application to the Cabinet Policy Committee, by the Minister for Culture and Heritage, seeking funding for the cultural diplomacy programme from the Growth and Innovation Framework’s budget. The application notes that ‘National brand enhancement extends and complements New Zealand’s current clean green image, but also conveys a richer set of messages about New Zealand as a place where innovative, creative and technologically-advanced ideas are pursued.’ New Zealand Cabinet Minute. “GIF Budget Allocation: Cultural Diplomacy International Programme: Policy and NZSO Funding Support,” May 25, 2004, 3.
\[^{629}\] Clark, “Address to the 2002 Labour Party Congress.
\[^{630}\] Government of New Zealand, Growing an Innovative New Zealand.
\[^{631}\] The fern mark was a stylised representation of New Zealand’s native fern frond. Rights to the fern mark were co-owned by Trade and Enterprise and Tourism New Zealand, which urged New Zealand companies to use the fern mark abroad because it represented New Zealand excellence.
\[^{632}\] Many New Zealanders assumed that the old brand was either the slogan ‘clean and green,’ or the ‘100% Pure New Zealand’ slogan of Tourism New Zealand’s international marketing campaign, PureNZ (the very campaign that been so successful in marketing New Zealand as ‘clean and green’ destination but not much else, certainly not a first world, technologically advanced, innovative and creative economy). The slogan ‘100% Pure New Zealand’ is known in marketing parlance as the strap mark. The Tourism New Zealand international marketing campaign, PureNZ, incorporated international media events, the facilitation of visits to New Zealand by journalists covering international tourist destinations, a website, and advertising which used variations of the ‘100 % Pure New Zealand’ slogan - ‘100% Pure Excitement,’ ‘100% Pure Wonder,’ ‘100% Pure Discovery,’ and so on. See Tourism New Zealand, “The Official Tourism New Zealand Site for Destination New Zealand.”
years, common perceptions of New Zealand have revolved around its landscape and accompanying clean, green image. These are important but we also need convey a richer set of messages that create recognition for the broader characteristics that define our people, business and country. Raising global recognition of New Zealand’s competitive edge through the New Zealand New Thinking programme will benefit every New Zealander by increasing opportunities for international trade and economic growth, securing foreign investment and enhancing New Zealand’s attractiveness for skilled or business migrants.633

In keeping with its stated aim of using opportunities ‘to showcase New Zealand on the world stage and promote our point of difference’ through the new brand, New Zealand Trade and Enterprise provided substantial logistical and financial support for a programme of events in 2004 centred around an exhibition of contemporary New Zealand art, titled *Paradise Now? Contemporary Art from the Pacific*, at the Asia Society Museum in New York.634 Other New Zealand agencies such as Creative New Zealand, Investment New Zealand and the New Zealand Film Commission also provided funding.635 Whilst the New York programme of events was not marketed under the ‘New Zealand New Thinking’ slogan, it was funded under Trade and Enterprise’s budget used for developing and promoting New Zealand’s new brand, and the messages of the overall programme, and particularly the seminar on New Zealand’s creative economy, were aimed at matching the key messages of ‘New Zealand New Thinking’: New Zealand creativity and innovation. The New York programme was replicated in May 2004 within the CDIP’s first year of activities, through a New Zealand festival in Singapore.636

**The CDIP and the New Zealand national brand**

The CDIP sought to both advance New Zealand’s interests (mostly in a priority market) and to show a modern face of New Zealand abroad. It was also expected to contribute to the presentation abroad on the New Zealand brand. Cabinet stipulated that CDIP messages should

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633 New Zealand Trade and Enterprise, “New Zealand New Thinking.”

634 Other events in New York included a festival of New Zealand films, a multimedia performance by ‘four larger-than-life Island Divas’ titled *Gauguin is Dead, There is No Paradise*; a roundtable discussion on New Zealand art; a performance piece by the New Zealand artist Michel Tuffery; and a seminar hosted by New Zealand’s minister of science, research and technology on New Zealand’s creative economy. The seminar was aimed at members of the New York business, entertainment, advertising, information technology and multimedia communities, including high-level executives, investors and policy-makers.

635 Creative New Zealand provided NZ$75,000 towards the exhibition.

636 The Festival was organised by a committee comprising New Zealand government agencies in Singapore, had as its anchor a performance by the World of Wearable Arts, and incorporated a festival of New Zealand films, a ball for the New Zealand community in Singapore, and two seminars, on innovation and on bio-technology. It was marketed under the slogan ‘New Zealand New Thinking.’
not be inconsistent with the national brand position of ‘clean, green, innovative, creative and technologically advanced.’

In practice, however, cultural activities in the CDIP ranged from those which bore very little resemblance to the catchwords of a new image of New Zealand (such as the presentation of a sacred white horse to a shrine in Japan) to those which strongly adhered to those messages (such as the exhibition on New Zealand innovation developed by New Zealand’s national museum, Te Papa). The model which eventually emerged – a set of events such as seminars, lectures, media engagement, a launch event, and others, based on a core cultural activity - was settled upon in part because it increased the capability of cultural diplomacy to present the sort of image of New Zealand which the programme decision-makers wished to put forward. It was difficult for a single event to show New Zealand as unique, distinctive, creative, technologically advanced, innovative, proud, confident, contemporary, and ‘moving ahead,’ all at the same time.

And the criteria of the CDIP were contradictory. A cultural activity that was selected because it showed New Zealand as distinctive, such as for instance a Maori kapa haka group, was very unlikely to show New Zealand as being technologically advanced. Bureaucrats in the Ministry for Culture and Heritage (including the author), who had the primary responsibility for the programme’s development, placed greater focus on the presentation of aspects of modern New Zealand than on the presentation of a distinctive New Zealand. The bureaucrats’ efforts to steer the programme towards the modern rather than the distinctive was driven mostly by the perceived preference for such a focus by the minister with the greatest oversight of, and interest in, the programme, Helen Clark. But it was also driven by a desire to use the opportunity that the new programme represented to move New Zealand’s cultural diplomacy away from the old-fashioned ad-hocism of the past to a cultural diplomacy that was targeted and contemporary.

Naturally, where possible, the aim was to support cultural activity which was both very modern, and very distinctive. This approach was evident in the New Zealand presence at the World Expo, at Aichi, in Japan, in 2005. The New Zealand government provided funding of NZ$8.5 million for the construction of a pavilion at the expo. According to New Zealand Trade and Enterprise, the pavilion depicted New Zealand as a land of ‘great natural beauty and New Zealanders as creative and technologically sophisticated people.’\(^{637}\) The centrepiece of the pavilion was a giant piece of New Zealand greenstone. Each day, for the six months of the expo, a New Zealand kapa haka group performed twice near the New Zealand pavilion. The New

\(^{637}\) New Zealand Trade and Enterprise, “Aichi.”
Zealand national day at Aichi, on 3 June 2005, involved performances by New Zealand artists and art groups, Hayley Westenra, World of Wearable Art, the New Zealand String Quartet, the dance company Black Grace, and singer Hinewehi Mohi. The government provided additional funding of NZ$3.5 million for a programme of six projects which aimed to take advantage of the opportunities the New Zealand pavilion provided for advancing trade interests. Phil Goff, New Zealand’s foreign minister, when announcing the additional funding, said that New Zealand’s presence at Aichi was ‘aimed at broadening the Japanese perception of New Zealand; to show there is more to us than just being “clean and green.” It will also show we are creative, innovative and stylish in many areas of interest to discerning Japanese consumers.’ Whilst elements of the pavilion’s design, and cultural activity which took place at (or in association with) the pavilion may have served to show New Zealand as being creative and stylish, as well as clean and green, it is difficult to see how a large slab of greenstone, daily kapa haka performances, and depicting inside and outside the pavilion a long white cloud (the Maori name for New Zealand, Aotearoa, means ‘long white cloud’), jointly show New Zealand to be innovative.

Problems with the CDIP

Despite the CDIP’s newness, and the opportunity that provided to set up a modern cultural diplomacy programme that adopted the best practices and management of existing cultural diplomacy programmes of other countries, the CDIP had two problems which warrant examination. First it was overly bureaucratic, and possibly located administratively in the wrong ministry. Second, there were differing conceptions of cultural diplomacy held by the CDIP’s steering group members.

The CDIP was quite bureaucratic for a programme of its size. The programme’s steering group comprised four agencies. In the first three years of the programme, all ministerial briefings concerning the programme were required to be sent to four ministers – two for approval, two for consultation. On those occasions when, for instance, one minister sought additional information,

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638 One project incorporated paying for and organising a visit to New Zealand by twenty Japanese students selected through a web-based knowledge contest, and screening a documentary about a modern and environmentally sensitive New Zealand to an Aichi audience. The documentary included coverage of the students’ trip, filmed by Aichi television.
639 Goff, “Budget 2004.”
or there was disagreement amongst them, the delay could be very long. On one occasion, it took four months for all approvals to be secured.

In addition, when the CDIP was set up in mid 2004, no discretionary financial authority was provided to bureaucrats, which meant that all sums of money had to be approved by those ministers stipulated in the cabinet paper as being responsible for the CDIP. Subsequently, bureaucrats at the Ministry for Culture and Heritage sought limited discretionary financial authority from Helen Clark in her capacity of minister of arts, culture and heritage, in order to make the programme easier to manage. This request for limited discretionary financial authority was declined. Hence for the period of the programme with which this thesis has been concerned (mid 2004 to the end of 2007), when an approved event went over budget, even by a small sum, a ministerial briefing was required to secure the additional funding.640

The CDIP also was more bureaucratic than perhaps it needed to have been because of its administrative location within the Ministry for Culture and Heritage, and a strong argument could have been made for transferring the CDIP’s administration to MFAT. In the first three years of the programme, communication between the CDIP’s lead agency, the Ministry for Culture and Heritage, and New Zealand embassies was undertaken through MFAT. This was a cumbersome process. This resulted in three problems.

First, anecdotal evidence suggests that embassies had neither a proper understanding of the CDIP, nor reasonable expectations about the programme. Embassies have always played a crucial role in cultural diplomacy. They provide advice on the most appropriate cultural activity for the most useful targets of cultural diplomacy, and they make cultural diplomacy happen in the field. It was therefore essential for the efficacy of the CDIP that embassies fully understood the CDIP (its aims, principles, and level of funding, but also the sort of cultural activity that would attract CDIP support), and that embassies had realistic expectations. Many naturally expected that the CDIP might act as a fund which they could draw on for a range of cultural diplomacy activities. But the CDIP had tended to focus on a few countries. MFAT had responsibility for communication with embassies, but the overall responsibility for the CDIP’s management lay with the Ministry for Culture and Heritage.

Second, the process through which CDIP activity was selected could have been better managed. Each year, only a few embassies were likely to have had their suggestions concerning

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640 This was also true on those occasions when more funding may have been required in one category of an event, and funding was available from another category of the same event due to underspend. Even on these occasions, bureaucrats were obliged to seek Ministerial approval.
future CDIP cultural activity accepted, yet each year all embassies were asked to provide suggestions about cultural diplomacy activity they would wish to undertake. Smaller New Zealand embassies may have suggested cultural activity three years in a row and had no support from the CDIP for any of that activity. For overworked and understaffed embassies, this would have been a source of irritation, one made worse when the request for suggested CDIP activity was sought by an agency (the Ministry for Culture and Heritage) that embassies hardly ever heard from directly and never saw face to face, and which seemingly had a rather narrow idea of what constituted cultural diplomacy. It would have been of benefit had staff of the Ministry for Culture and Heritage involved in developing and managing the CDIP visited MFAT embassies abroad to explain the CDIP to staff in those embassies, rather than relying on staff at MFAT’s head office to do this, either by cable or e-mail, or by undertaking visits.

Third, those embassies which did receive CDIP funds for cultural diplomacy activity were soon reminded of the drain which cultural diplomacy placed on embassy resources. Whilst some CDIP funding was made available to embassies to pay for extra staff, and the hiring of specialist firms (such as those working in public relations or in arts management), this aspect of the CDIP’s management also caused irritation between embassies and the Ministry for Culture and Heritage. Had the administrative location of the CDIP been situated in MFAT, this aspect could have been better managed. It has always been easier for the head office of a foreign service to manage resource issues at its embassies than for another agency to do this. However, whilst there may be good reasons to transfer responsibility for the CDIP from the Ministry for Culture and Heritage to MFAT, it is very unlikely that this would have been contemplated by the Ministry for Culture and Heritage. The Ministry would have argued that its connection to New Zealand’s cultural sector provided it, and the CDIP, with a real advantage, because good cultural diplomacy depended on choosing good culture, a task to which it was well suited. The Ministry for Culture and Heritage may also have viewed such a transfer as an indictment of its management of the CDIP. Even were such a recommendation to emerge from the New Zealand bureaucracy, it is very reasonable to assume that the transfer would have been strongly resisted by the minister for arts, culture and heritage, who in this case was also the prime minister. It would have also been possible to argue that the continuing provision of funding for the CDIP was dependent in large measure on the support of Helen Clark, and the influence on budget allocations which a prime minister can bring to bear.
Varying conceptions of cultural diplomacy

The second problem with the CDIP concerned the differing conceptions of cultural diplomacy by the Ministry for Culture and Heritage and MFAT. Almost all cultural activity can be located within a stipulation that it project the contemporary face of New Zealand as ‘unique, creative, innovative and moving ahead.’ The management of the CDIP, primarily by the Ministry for Culture and Heritage, but also with strong involvement of MFAT, constantly threw up issues to do with differing conceptions of cultural diplomacy. The Ministry for Culture and Heritage sought to emphasise two or three of the CDIP’s criteria: activity which was sizeable if possible, which was suited to promoting the broader interests of New Zealand (known as the New Zealand Inc. criterion), and had a sense of excitement and newness about it, rather than being selected on the basis of old habits. By contrast, MFAT bureaucrats and diplomats, many of whom had in-the-field experience of cultural diplomacy, were seemingly more inclined to be more flexible about the extent to which cultural activity supported by the CDIP met its criteria. That approach made sense to a foreign service which had embassies in the field, embassies which could see the benefit to New Zealand of using a range of cultural activities in a range of ways to reach a number of different target groups in different countries.

An example of these different approaches was that of the funding provided in late 2006 by the CDIP for a New Zealand plaza in Santiago, Chile, to be named the Plaza Nueva Zelandia. This was supported by MFAT, but was opposed by the Ministry for Culture and Heritage, on the grounds that the plaza fell outside that CDIP criteria which stipulated that cultural activity funded by the CDIP should be suited to promoting the broader interests of New Zealand – the New Zealand Inc. criterion. But for the embassy in Santiago, the plaza was a perfectly suitable example of cultural diplomacy: it would send to politicians and people of Chile a strong message of friendship, show a modern aspect of New Zealand (albeit in the form of parkbenches), and would also have provided an opportunity for a New Zealand leader such as the governor-general or prime minister to open the plaza, thus possibly resulting in good publicity for New Zealand in Chile.

Another area of disagreement between the Ministry for Culture and Heritage and MFAT concerned the issue of kapa haka. For the Ministry for Culture and Heritage, kapa haka was not, when presented by itself, a cultural activity that was consistent with the CDIP’s primary focus on presenting New Zealand as an economically advanced and contemporary country that was ‘moving ahead.’ The Ministry for Culture and Heritage was more in favour of kapa haka when it
was part of a wider group of cultural activities which showed a number of different and contrasting aspects of modern New Zealand. For many in MFAT, however, kapa haka was a tried and true cultural activity which made a strong impression on people abroad, attracted media attention, and was clearly New Zealand’s most noticeably distinctive cultural aspect.

Neither the Ministry for Culture and Heritage nor MFAT were wrong in their respective approaches. But their different approaches did highlight that cultural diplomacy has the capacity to include a range of cultural forms in pursuit of a variety of objectives aimed at a number of target groups, and the difficulty which can occur when funds must be used most effectively. The structure of the CDIP also highlighted how some cultural diplomacy programmes can become too administratively burdensome. The CDIP’s administrative structure, is location in the Ministry for Culture and Heritage, and seemingly all-inclusive criteria, meant that at times the main function of bureaucrats managing the programme seemed to be writing briefing papers, organising steering group meetings, and trying to reach positions with which all members of the steering group could agree, rather than assessing the best match of cultural activity to target audience, and making cultural activity happen in the field.

Creative New Zealand’s international cultural activity

The Labour government’s high level of international cultural activity over the period of its first two terms also included a number of international activities funded by Creative New Zealand, the national arts development and marketing agency. As set out in chapter two, it is assumed that cultural diplomacy excludes from its remit government-funded cultural activity abroad undertaken for arts development purposes which fails to intersect either with foreign policy objectives or diplomacy. This often means that the work of state’s cultural development agencies is better deemed international cultural relations than cultural diplomacy. However, as we shall see, some of the international work of Creative New Zealand contributes to New Zealand’s cultural diplomacy.

The organisation’s mandate, set out in the Arts Council of New Zealand Toi Aotearoa Act 1994, stipulated that one of its principles was ‘promoting New Zealand’s arts and artists locally, nationally and internationally.’ Creative New Zealand’s four strategic plans, covering the period 1995-2007, indicated an increased emphasis on activity abroad and a growing emphasis on

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641 Formerly the Queen Elizabeth II Arts Council.
642 Creative New Zealand, Art Matters.
the economic advantages of this to artists and arts organisations. In the first plan, specific mention was made of advancing New Zealand interests by supporting events such as international exhibitions and tours ‘which lead to a greater appreciation of New Zealand art, culture and national identity.’\(^6\) In the next three plans, international activity was justified because of the economic impact it provided to artists and arts organisations: sustainable careers for artists, including Maori artists,\(^7\) and financial sustainability for arts organisations. All four plans incorporated an intention to strengthen links between Maori and the indigenous people of the Pacific and other nations. In the strategic plan covering the period 2004-2007, the objective of developing international audiences was elevated to one of three priority objectives.

Two secondary goals, more akin to those of the CDIP, can be discerned in Creative New Zealand’s international activity. First, New Zealand arts presented abroad by Creative New Zealand were seen by the organisation as playing a role in profiling New Zealand abroad, not just its artists. This was seen by the organisation as playing a positive role in enhancing New Zealand’s national confidence. In a press release titled ‘We’re on the world stage: celebrating New Zealand arts,’ Creative New Zealand’s chair said that New Zealand artists showed they could ‘foot it with the best in the world.’\(^8\) He noted elsewhere that New Zealand’s creative talent was ‘capturing the attention of the world’ as New Zealand’s artists performed to ‘critical acclaim,’ and won awards.\(^9\) The organisation’s chief executive supported this theme, seeing New Zealand artists as on the same level as its sporting heroes.\(^7\) Second, Creative New Zealand saw its international activity as playing its part in the government’s economic strategy, the Growth and Innovation Framework.

International activity which received Creative New Zealand support over the period 1999-2005 included the exhibition of contemporary art in New York, \textit{Paradise Now}, the exhibition of \textit{The Lord of the Rings}, funding for New Zealand artists to attend the Pacific Arts Festival, held every four years somewhere in the Pacific,\(^1\) support for a New Zealand presence at the

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\(^8\) The organisation signified its intention to undertake international arts promotion ‘to encourage promotion of New Zealand arts internationally to enhance the country’s cultural, social and economic interests.’

\(^9\) Creative New Zealand, \textit{Art Matters.}

\(^1\) Biggs, ‘We’re on the World Stage.’

\(^2\) Creative New Zealand, \textit{Annual Report 2003-2004, 4.}

\(^3\) Ibid. She also bemoans the relative lack of media attention given to the achievements of New Zealand’s arts heroes.

\(^4\) It participates in the festival because the event ‘supports the protection, maintenance and development of indigenous cultures and artforms in the Pacific, provides a valuable meeting place for artists in the Pacific to
Australian Performing Arts Market, and funding of a set of artists residencies. In addition, Creative New Zealand provided funding for Toi Maori Aotearoa, an arts body which fostered Maori arts (in part through international activity).

In August 2005, the organisation, along with Tourism New Zealand and Air New Zealand, staged a festival of Maori arts at the Yerba Buena Centre of the Arts in downtown San Francisco. The festival’s overall aim was to deliver to New Zealand ‘significant economic return and international profile.’

Toi Maori Aotearoa’s objectives for the festival included promoting Maori arts to new audiences, promoting ‘Maori people and their relationship to New Zealand’s natural environment through the arts,’ and establishing relationships with local artisans and indigenous people in San Francisco. Tourism New Zealand’s objectives for the festival included ‘amplifying’ the 100% Pure NZ campaign, through a media public relations and advertising campaign; hospitality, training and seminars for the travel trade; and a VIP dinner. Air New Zealand’s primary objective for the festival was to raise awareness of, and then fill up, the airline’s increased passenger and freight capacity.

The festival included an exhibition of Maori weaving covering both traditional and contemporary practice; an exhibition of contemporary Maori art; an exhibition of ta moko; kapa haka performances, and a Maori war canoe with eighteen crew, greeted in a dawn ceremony by the First Nation people of San Francisco.

The festival was about presenting New Zealand as a creative and unique nation, using Maori culture to attract more of the most sought after American tourists to New Zealand – the high spending, longer-staying interactive traveller. The fundraising document for the festival noted that, following Te Maori, annual visitor arrival growth to New Zealand increased by twenty one percent for three years, and from those states in the United States which hosted Te Maori, even more than that.

**Creative New Zealand and the Venice Biennale**

Arguably New Zealand’s highest profile cultural diplomacy activity over the period 2001-2005 - a profile brought about through the controversy it generated – was the New Zealand participation

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650 Creative New Zealand, “International Artists Residencies Announced.”
651 Toi Maori, *New Zealand in San Francisco.*
652 These were estimated as totaling 1278 more seats per week and a doubling of freight.
653 The Maori art of symbolic body tattoo.
654 Those organising the festival believed that the war canoe would have a good chance of being seen on national television in the United States.
in the Venice Biennale in 2001, 2003 and 2005. In November 2000, Helen Clark announced that the government, through Creative New Zealand, would provide NZ$1.5 million to enable a New Zealand presence at the biennale. Each allocation of NZ$500,000 was to be regarded as seed funding, and sponsors and patrons would supplement the government’s money. The biennale was described in Clark’s press release as ‘the most important event on the international visual arts calendar.’ It was to provide, amongst other objectives, an ‘extraordinary opportunity for cultural diplomacy, enhancing New Zealand’s profile as a vibrant and creative Pacific nation.’ The two clear objectives of the CDIP – the advancing of New Zealand’s interests, and the updating of its image - were replicated.

Speaking about the first New Zealand presence at the biennale, Helen Clark said:

It is a big opportunity for New Zealand to profile itself in Europe and to a very influential audience. We certainly see benefits flowing from this for our trade, our tourism and for boosting the overall image of New Zealand as a nation which produces not only primary produce, but also sophisticated products, has great tourist attractions, is very competitive in sporting terms, and is up with the best in its arts and cultural products and work.

The first New Zealand presence at Venice in 2001 included a Ngai Tahu kapa haka group performing in St Mark’s Square, at dawn, in front of 100 people. The performance was reported on the BBC News under the heading ‘Maori Dancers Wow Venice.’ The New Zealand presence at the Venice Biennale in 2003 passed without controversy. This was not the case with the New Zealand presence at the 2005 biennale, however. The artist chosen to represent New Zealand, Merylyn Tweedie, became the object of controversy immediately after her selection was announced, in mid 2004. An important aspect of Tweedie’s art was her refusal to identify herself by her name as the artist responsible for the art in Venice. Rather, she presented herself as a collective of artists, under the rubric et al. The commissioner of the New Zealand presence at the Venice Biennale in 2005, art curator and gallery director Greg Burke, when attempting to explain the artist’s approach to her identity, said

People ask, is et al. really Merylyn Tweedie?…Merylyn Tweedie exhibited under that name from the 1970s until the early 1990s….From the late 1980s a number of aliases began to emerge in public exhibitions. One was L Budd…Let's face it, your name defines you and can lead to assumptions, and thereby prejudice, concerning your gender, ethnicity, age, religious beliefs and sexual preferences. Et al.'s aliases have allowed the artist to adopt the

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655 The first three benefits were 1) promoting New Zealand at an event that drew ‘huge audiences’; 2) promoting New Zealand art to the art industry; and 3) contributing to the ‘creative and professional development of the artists’ through the ‘exhibition experience itself and by placing them alongside their international peers.’ Creative New Zealand, “New Zealand Art Profiled at Venice Biennale for First Time.”

656 Creative New Zealand, “Why the Venice Biennale is important for New Zealand.”
female gender, as in Lillian Budd, the male gender as in Lionel B or an uncertain gender, as in L Budd. Their work reveals a sophisticated analysis of the politics of naming.\textsuperscript{657}

Shortly after Creative New Zealand announced that Tweedie would be the New Zealand artist at the 2005 biennale, a member of Parliament for the right-of-centre ACT party, Deborah Coddington, called Tweedie’s art ‘crap,’ complained that Tweedie’s installation at Venice would be the same as one of her former installations, which involved, according to Coddington, a ‘braying exploding port-a-loo,’\textsuperscript{658} and raised issues concerning Tweedie’s refusal to use her own name. Responding to Coddington’s attack, the associate minister of arts, culture and heritage, Judith Tizard, said that assurances had been given by Creative New Zealand that Tweedie would undertake a role as an ambassador for New Zealand, and would ‘engage extensively with international arts professionals at the event, conduct selected interviews with international arts media, and provide considered responses in writing to questions.’\textsuperscript{659} The minister said:

The Government recognises that participation in international events results in better international understanding of what New Zealand has to offer, and may result in increased tourism, exports, and employment in New Zealand.\textsuperscript{660}

In this case, the New Zealand presence abroad had nothing to do with the domestic New Zealand audience or public. Its focus was entirely offshore. The target audience of the New Zealand presence at the 2005 Venice Biennale was the ‘tens of thousands of the most influential international artists, curators, gallery directors, critics and collectors.’\textsuperscript{661} To make an impact on that audience, an independent selection panel chose an artist who worked as a collective, refused to talk to the New Zealand media, and created an installation that served to reinforce perceptions amongst many New Zealanders that publicly funded modern art was a waste of taxpayers’ money.

Creative New Zealand’s decision to confirm the selection panel’s selection of et al. as the New Zealand artist for the Venice Biennale in 2005 was understandable. The choice of artist for an international event such as the Venice Biennale was best based on artistic merit, not on whether the artist chosen was competent to interact with the media, especially a New Zealand media which showed considerable hostility to the work of et al. The Venice Biennale was first and foremost an international contemporary art event, and the New Zealand entry was judged on

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{657} New Zealand Herald, 22 July 2004.
  \item \textsuperscript{658} Coddington, “Just What Exactly Is Going on, Prime Minister?”
  \item \textsuperscript{659} Tizard, Parliamentary Answer.
  \item \textsuperscript{660} Ibid.
  \item \textsuperscript{661} Creative New Zealand, “Et Al. To Create New Work for New Zealand Exhibition at Venice Biennale 2005.”
\end{itemize}
the artistic merit of that entry. Its entry was not judged on the diplomacy skills of the New Zealand artist. If it so happened that the artist chosen for the Venice Biennale was happy to interact with the media, and was good at doing this, that was a bonus. The reaction of both government ministers and opposition members of Parliament alike raised issues about the boundary between international cultural relations and cultural diplomacy, and the grey area between the two. The politicians’ reaction was indicative of a general approach to cultural diplomacy which placed considerable importance on the instrumentality of that diplomacy. For politicians, it seemed to be inconceivable that the artist chosen to represent New Zealand at the Venice Biennale would not be available for diplomatic duties. Spending NZ$500,000 of taxpayers’ money on such a project demanded tangible benefits. The impression one had of Helen Clark’s reaction, as well as those of her associate minister and members of Parliament from the opposition benches, was that one important way of measuring how tangible the benefits had been was the amount of media coverage that the event generated. To have an artist unwilling to interact with the media would significantly serve to reduce this coverage.

It may have made more sense, in hindsight, for Creative New Zealand to have been clearer about what New Zealand’s presence at the 2005 Venice Biennale was aiming to achieve in terms of its cultural diplomacy objective. It may have pointed out to ministers, the media, and the public, that the advancement of New Zealand’s interests resulting from the New Zealand presence was not dependent on the artist interacting with the media. To have insisted to the artist that this was a requirement of his or her selection would be to have selected that artist, in part, on their availability for (and by implication, competency in) diplomacy. Rather, Creative New Zealand could have argued that it would achieve cultural diplomacy benefits through the use of ancillary events, such as a launch event, trade-related activity, and media coverage in international arts magazines that would happen regardless of the artist’s media attitude – and would ask the artist to carry out cultural diplomacy duties, but would not insist that she or he do so. To be fair to Creative New Zealand, it had sought a way around the problem caused by the selection of an artist whose art practice included the use of multiple identities by insisting that someone was able to speak on behalf of the artist, if the artist her or himself was unable or unwilling to do so. In hindsight, Creative New Zealand’s objective for the New Zealand presence at the 2005 Venice Biennale, that it provide an extraordinary opportunity for cultural diplomacy, should have been discarded.
Daily cultural diplomacy

It should be noted that the cultural diplomacy of New Zealand in the 21st century did not simply comprise a series of standalone initiatives such as the Venice Biennale or the CDIP. At any one time in the annual calendar of international arts activity abroad which received Creative New Zealand support, there were numerous events and performances which were used by the international offices of New Zealand agencies (such as New Zealand embassies and high commissions, and offices of Tourism New Zealand and New Zealand Trade and Enterprise) to advance New Zealand interests. This use of arts activity by New Zealand agencies was often facilitated by the Cultural Diplomacy Coordinating Group, set up in 2000 as an immediate response to the recommendations of the Ministry for Culture and Heritage in its report in that year on New Zealand’s cultural diplomacy. Although there were limits to the effectiveness of the coordinating group’s information dissemination, because of lack of funds and because the information did not reach the right person early enough for something to be made of the artist or group, the coordinating group’s work had its successes.\(^{662}\) New Zealand agencies became over the years adroit at using opportunities provided by visiting artists or groups to advance New Zealand interests, often with very little funding and very little notice. It was quite possible for such an approach to cultural diplomacy to result in a less than satisfactory outcome. A lack of sufficient funding precludes expanding the scope and impact of the cultural diplomacy event and associated publicity, and the audience attending a given cultural event can end up being dominated by members of the New Zealand diaspora.\(^{663}\) But regardless of the use to which visiting New Zealand artists and groups were put, and the audience they attracted, these artists and groups all served to connect with people abroad, and in doing so raised the level of awareness of contemporary New Zealand abroad.

Conclusion

New Zealand has not been alone in incorporating within its cultural diplomacy a wish to present an up-to-date image of itself. As we saw in the examination of Canada’s cultural diplomacy in the previous chapter, both Canada’s federal cultural diplomacy and that of Québec have sought to

\(^{662}\) One such instance was the performance by the New Zealand pianist, Dan Poynton, in Delhi, in 2001, to which New Zealand High Commission contacts were invited, and which attracted a small level of media coverage.

\(^{663}\) The New Zealand High Commission in London noted this in 2004. The ‘big annual wine and food festival, Toast Life New Zealand,’ the high commission said, had ‘consistently attracted a large and predominantly New Zealand audience,’ which was not its target audience. New Zealand High Commission, London, Memorandum to Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, August 9, 2004 (ECO/GAI/11. Part 1. Economic Division).
present their respective contemporary images abroad. The importance attached by the Labour
governments of 1999 and following, on presenting an up-to-date image of New Zealand abroad,
and on ‘branding’ New Zealand abroad, has been reflected in its cultural diplomacy activity. New
Zealand’s cultural diplomacy since 1999, represented by the CDIP, has had the clear objective of
showing an up-to-date image of New Zealand which sits within the new national brand. In
practice, the capacity to implement cultural diplomacy which met the expanded national brand
was circumscribed by the contradictions inherent in the brand. The new focus on image and
brand represented a major shift in New Zealand’s cultural diplomacy from previous years. Prior
to 1999, New Zealand’s cultural diplomacy cared little about image (and as would be expected
given its short life, about branding).

Maori culture has consistently featured in New Zealand’s cultural diplomacy since its
inception. Arguably New Zealand cultural diplomacy’s finest manifestation was the Te Maori
exhibition. New Zealand’s cultural presence at the World Expo in Aichi, Japan, featured Maori
kapa haka performance twice a day every day for six months. The cultural diplomacy of the
Maori art promotion agency, Toi Maori Aotearoa, in San Francisco, used Maori culture to sell
Maori art - and help fill up seats on Air New Zealand’s aircraft, and lure tourists to New Zealand.
And the new cultural diplomacy programme, the CDIP, incorporated Maori aspects. But one
noticeable aspect of the CDIP was its focus more on the modern than on the distinctive. The new
focus on a modern image meant that Maori culture was a part of, but not a core part of, New
Zealand’s cultural diplomacy, at least in the one initiative dedicated exclusively to cultural
diplomacy, the CDIP.

New Zealand’s cultural diplomacy provides an example of a domestic imperative for
cultural diplomacy, in particular by the objectives of the exhibition Te Maori. That exhibition
was supported as a cultural diplomacy project because it would advance New Zealand’s interests
in the United States and because it would advance Maori interests in New Zealand. It would
make Pakeha more aware of the value of Maori culture, through international recognition, and
Maori more proud of their culture and more aware of it, for the same reason. This domestic
objective was not a byproduct of the exhibition’s success. It was a clear, stated, intentional
objective of the government. Te Maori was the clearest instance, in New Zealand’s cultural
diplomacy, of the domestic objectives of cultural diplomacy, but it is not the only such instance.
The Cultural Exchange Programme of the 1970s had the domestic objective (subsequently

\[664\] As shown below, Maori culture was by no means excluded from the CDIP: the CDIP provided funding for a tour
of Korea by the Patea Maori Group and a performance by Te Puia in Hong Kong.
marginalised in practice) of supporting New Zealand’s cultural development, a type of nation-building project. The Asia: New Zealand Foundation sought to advance New Zealand’s interests in Asia in part by bringing Asian culture to New Zealand. This objective was associated with a desire to make non-Asian New Zealanders better understand Asian New Zealanders, especially new Asian immigrants, so as to enhance national social cohesion.

There has also been a sense, hard to prove but discernible nevertheless, that New Zealand’s cultural diplomacy since 1999 has also been undertaken, in an ancillary way, because of a belief that the world deserves to know about New Zealand’s achievements and its vibrant cultural sector. This aspect was also evident in the cultural diplomacy of Canada - the sense that Canadian values were so impressive that they deserved to be exported to the rest of the world. But in a stark contrast with Canada’s cultural diplomacy, New Zealand’s cultural diplomacy has never been undertaken to protect New Zealand’s cultural sovereignty.

New Zealand’s cultural diplomacy also provides insights into the practice of cultural diplomacy in general, in particular its instrumentality and the increased role of culture in the pursuit of national economic interests.

It can be argued that the cultural diplomacy of New Zealand has taken the instrumentality of cultural diplomacy to a new level. Since the establishment of a separate diplomatic service in 1943, cultural diplomacy has been used explicitly to advance its interests, as an instrument to help New Zealand’s diplomacy abroad and help achieve foreign policy goals. The new cultural diplomacy programme, launched in 2004, continued that tradition. It has combined the use of contemporary image with a national brand and has sought to maximise co-ordination in the field amongst a range of government entities. And it has done all this with the clear aim of advancing national interests, particularly economic and trade interests, including those associated with the cultural sector. The government always insisted that the new programme advance New Zealand’s trade and economic interests that have for so long been the primary focus of New Zealand’s diplomacy. The programme was explicitly charged with supporting ‘the growth of creative industries through overseas promotion’ and lifting the profile of ‘other trade initiatives directly aimed at deepening New Zealand linkages offshore.’

The attempt, in the mid 1970s, to use cultural diplomacy in part as a way of enhancing mutual understanding between countries through a two way exchange of culture, was short-lived.

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Why has New Zealand’s cultural diplomacy developed into this model of instrumentality? Cultural diplomacy activism has been undertaken primarily for economic reasons. New Zealand remains a trading nation, miles from its major markets, susceptible to changes in the global economy, operating in a rapidly changing world of highly competitive, and mostly larger, economies. Its diplomacy has continued to place considerable stress on advancing New Zealand’s economic and trade interests, including those with a cultural aspect. A strong focus of the work of MFAT in the late 20th century and the early years of the 21st century has been on trade diplomacy, including negotiating free trade agreements with countries such as China. The cultural diplomacy of the government since 1999 has sought to support this diplomacy by adding to it another element. Speaking in Parliament in 2005, the associate minister for arts, culture and heritage, Judith Tizard, said:

Our Cultural Diplomacy International Programme recognises that it is all very well to take fabulous New Zealand food and wine overseas, but that it is actually wearable art that brands New Zealand and gets people to come and spend their hard-earned dollars here, to make jobs for New Zealanders.\(^{666}\)

New Zealand’s cultural diplomacy since 1999 reflects the trend towards an increased role for culture in the pursuit of national economic interests. The use of New Zealand films to advance New Zealand interests would have once involved putting on a New Zealand film to help develop contacts.\(^{667}\) By the early years of the twenty first century, New Zealand films were used to sell other New Zealand films, to sell New Zealand as place in which to shoot films, and to persuade major international film directors and companies to use the New Zealand film industry when making their films. The same was true of other aspects of New Zealand culture. Contemporary Maori art was showcased abroad in part because there was a growing market for it. New Zealand music became something worth exporting - not a huge money spinner, but nevertheless another commodity that seemed to have a bright future. Even scholarships funded by the government were used to ‘sell’ education. These cultural activities had become the new commodities, a 21st century version of butter and meat. Hence to the ‘standard’ list of New Zealand’s interests could be added those economic interests with a cultural aspect.

In the next chapter, the ‘old fashioned’ cultural diplomacy of India, with its focus on normative objectives, network of cultural centres, and its strong reciprocal characteristic, provides a useful and interesting contrast to New Zealand’s cultural diplomacy.

\(^{666}\) Tizard, *Estimates Debate.*

\(^{667}\) Once New Zealand had films available for diplomacy: the New Zealand film industry was only really up and running in the mid 1980s.
Chapter Five: India’s cultural diplomacy

Introduction

The cultural diplomacy of India undertaken by its cultural diplomacy agency, the Indian Council for Cultural Relations (ICCR), and as manifested in a major programme of festivals abroad, has sought to present abroad an image of India, and has been undertaken in part to achieve domestic objectives. In particular, the festival of India programme of the 1980s and 1990s provides a useful insight into a country which used cultural diplomacy to present abroad an image of itself that sought to counter stereotypical images abroad. The image of India presented though the festivals programme was mostly concerned with showing a once-great India, a country founded on a millenia-old civilisation, which could compare itself favourably with countries from the West which had become imperial in their reach and status. One ancillary reason for the presentation of an image of India as a great country, through the festivals programme, was that of national pride. India’s cultural diplomacy provides a useful contrast to the imperatives which have driven New Zealand’s and Canada’s respective assertions of their contemporary images abroad. The cultural diplomacy of India has not concerned itself with the issue of cultural sovereignty.

India’s cultural diplomacy provides insights as well into more general aspects of the practice, in particular what might be termed ‘old fashioned’ cultural diplomacy. Since its independence in 1947, India’s cultural diplomacy has sought to enhance mutual understanding amongst countries and their peoples. India’s cultural diplomacy was instigated shortly after its independence because India was genuinely committed to rebuilding a post-colonial world on foundations which in its view were significantly different from those which characterised colonialism. This old fashioned-ness has been reinforced by a very noticeable element of reciprocity in India’s cultural diplomacy, especially in the exchange of people and performing arts groups, and the incorporation of elements of India’s civilisational heritage in its cultural diplomacy activities (and other activities which have the feel of a by-gone age, such as, for example, the presentation to other countries of busts of famous Indians such as Mahatma Gandhi). These aspects – its aim of enhancing mutual understanding, a strong emphasis on reciprocity, and the use of its civilisational cultural heritage – provide a fascinating contrast the cultural diplomacy of Canada and New Zealand.
Nehru and Non-alignment

India’s cultural diplomacy is best understood by placing it in the wider context of changes to India’s foreign policy since its independence in 1947. In the four decades following its Independence, India’s non-aligned foreign policy stance was, as C. Raja Mohan notes, ‘the singular feature’ of its foreign policy. The foundation of that stance was fundamentally challenged by the end of the Cold War, however. As a result of this, several core aspects of its foreign policy, and its economic policy, were reconsidered, and in the 1990s underwent significant change. India’s relationships with the United States, China and Russia were reconfigured, as were those with immediate neighbours, including Pakistan. The first steps towards economic liberalisation were taken. Greater emphasis was placed on the pursuit of India’s national interests rather than on Third World solidarity.

India’s non-alignment owed much to Jawaharlal Nehru, India’s first prime minister and foreign minister, and the architect of India’s foreign policy. Nehru was a product of the high idealism of the ‘Indian Renaissance,’ influenced both by his close friendship with Mahatma Gandhi and by his time studying abroad in the UK. Nehru’s approach to foreign policy was outward-looking and idealistic. He was opposed to the international politics of the two major power blocs and supportive of non-alignment. His was a foreign policy that was anti-imperialist and pro-Third World, and was based on India’s struggle for decolonisation. Nehru’s idealism, and his international experience, was also reflected in his approach to independent India’s relations with other countries, relations that should be based on the principles of Panch Sheel. Chandra, Mukherjee and Mukherjee note that

Nehru constantly emphasized that peaceful co-existence of countries with different ideologies, differing systems, was a necessity and believed that nobody had a monopoly on the truth and pluralism was a fact of life. To this end he outlined the five principles of peaceful coexistence, or Panch Sheel, for conducting relations amongst countries. These were mutual respect for each other’s territorial integrity and sovereignty, non-aggression, non-interference in each other’s internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful co-existence. Nehru believed that if these ‘wholesome’ principles were to be adopted ‘in the relations of various countries with one another, a great deal of trouble of the present day world would

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668 Mohan, Crossing the Rubicon, xv.
669 Nehru’s ideas about the world ‘ruled the roost’ in New Delhi despite many different conceptions on India’s relationship with the world and the kind of international order it should strive for. Mohan, Crossing the Rubicon, 38.
671 Bajpai, “Indian Conceptions of Order and Justice,” 239. The five principles are spelt differently by scholars. Bajpai uses the term Panchashila, but Chandra, Mukherjee and Mukherjee use the term Panch Sheel.
672 Chandra, Mukherjee and Mukherjee, India After Independence, 150.
probably disappear.’\textsuperscript{673} For Nehru, cultural linkages and cooperation between nations and people were an important aspect of peaceful co-existence and cooperation between countries. Four aspects of this are pertinent. First, international cultural interaction was crucial to the development of the great Indian civilisation, the ‘noble heritage’ that he admired not merely for its own intrinsic qualities but also because it was a product of Indians’ ‘toleration of other ways than theirs, their capacity to absorb other peoples and their cultural accomplishments, to synthesize them and develop a varied and mixed culture.’\textsuperscript{674} In his speech to the Asian Relations Conference in 1947, Nehru said that:

Streams of culture have come to India from the west and the east and been absorbed in India, producing the rich and variegated culture which is India today. At the same time, streams of culture have flowed from India to distant parts of Asia. If you should know India you have to go to Afghanistan and Western Asia, to Central Asia, to China and Japan and to the countries of South-East Asia.\textsuperscript{675}

Second, Nehru’s vision of the future of Asian cooperation was based on ‘promoting peace and progress all over the world.’\textsuperscript{676} International cultural cooperation was a key element of this process of promotion. Nations and people who knew each other culturally were less likely to go to war and more likely to get on with one another.

Third, Nehru believed that if India were to advance economically, it had to learn from other countries. For Nehru, the West, despite its imperialist domination and its lack of ‘some basic principles to give meaning to life,’ possessed the very thing India lacked at its independence, ‘the dynamic outlook.’\textsuperscript{677} ‘India…must learn from the West for the modern West has much to teach, and the spirit of the age is represented by the West.’\textsuperscript{678} India had to ‘break with much of her past and not allow it to dominate the present,’ to get rid of the ‘dead wood.’\textsuperscript{679} India had the capacity to learn from others because ‘of the recognized freedom of the mind.’\textsuperscript{680} India’s approach to knowledge in the past was a synthetic one but limited to India. India needed to go abroad in search of the present. That search is necessary, for isolation from it means backwardness and decay…old barriers are breaking down, life becomes more international. We have to play our part in this coming internationalism and, for this purpose, to travel, meet others, learn from them and understand them…It was India’s way in the past to welcome and absorb other cultures. That is much more necessary

\textsuperscript{673} Quoted in Krishna, “India and the International Order,” 274.
\textsuperscript{674} Nehru, \textit{The Discovery of India}, 438.
\textsuperscript{675} Nehru, “Asia Finds Herself Again,” 152.
\textsuperscript{676} Nehru, “Asia Finds Herself Again,” 153.
\textsuperscript{677} Nehru, \textit{The Discovery of India}, 435.
\textsuperscript{678} Ibid., 435-436.
\textsuperscript{679} Ibid., 438.
\textsuperscript{680} Ibid., 446.
today, for we march to the one world of tomorrow where national cultures will be intermingled with the international cultural of the human race.\textsuperscript{681}

Finally, Nehru believed that colonialism had deprived India of active contact and intercourse with other countries. The isolation of the countries of Asia from one another was ‘perhaps one of the most notable consequences of the European domination of Asia.’ For Nehru, the breaking down of colonial domination throughout Asia allowed ‘old friends long parted’ to meet again.\textsuperscript{682} International cultural interaction can be seen in this context as a newly independent nation freed from colonial rule asserting its right to interact with its neighbours on equal terms, terms set by itself, rather than by the colonist.

The end of the Cold War in the late 1980s served to place India’s idealistic approach to foreign policy, manifested in its leadership of the international non-aligned movement, under an intense spotlight. Several core aspects of its foreign policy, and its economic policy, were reconsidered, and in the 1990s underwent significant change. These aspects included India’s relationship with great powers, one of which - the Soviet Union – had disintegrated; India’s wider relationship with the West, formerly characterised by antagonism; India’s economic model, which in 1991 had been shown to be dangerously redundant; and the pursuit of its own interests rather than striving for the collective interests of the Third World.

As a result of these deep changes, India’s foreign policy altered markedly in the 1990s. New relationships were forged with the United States, Russia and China, and with India’s smaller neighbours. India’s economic policy was radically changed. The former inward-looking, closed, protected, and inefficient receiver of aid became, almost overnight (a fair metaphor given the length of India’s civilisation), a seeker of foreign direct investment. ‘Trade, not aid’ became the national priority. India was now marketed as the world’s biggest information technology power, and the success of its information technology sector, based in the southern city of Bangalore, acted as a symbol of the ‘new’ India. Above all, India realised that its ‘claim to great power status could no longer be sustained without rapid advances on the economic front.’\textsuperscript{683} And as if these changes were not enough, in the 1990s India also fundamentally reconsidered its place in, and relationship to, the Third World. The idealism of India’s foreign policy of the preceding decades was replaced by pragmatism. In the first few years of the twenty first century, India was

\textsuperscript{681} Ibid., 486.
\textsuperscript{682} Jawaharlal Nehru, “Asia Finds Herself Again,” 151.
\textsuperscript{683} Mohan, Crossing the Rubicon, xix.
invariably viewed by the foreign policy establishments of other countries as one of a handful of future economic and political powerhouses, alongside China and Brazil.

Two aspects of India’s state sponsored cultural diplomacy are significant. First, the work of India’s premier cultural diplomacy agency, the ICCR, will be examined. The ICCR was established in 1950, and has served as the ‘prime, but not exclusive, channel for official activities abroad.’ Aspects of the ICCR examined below include its relationship with the Indian foreign service, the ICCR’s objectives, the framework of cultural agreements within which it has operated, its funding, its programme of activities, and the network of cultural centres that the ICCR has operated abroad. Second, the programme of festivals of India abroad is explored, in particular the early festivals in the UK, United States, France and the erstwhile USSR, which took place during the 1980s and early 1990s. This programme of festivals was arguably the leading example in the post World War Two period of a common manifestation of state cultural diplomacy, the cultural festival.

The ICCR

The ICCR has had the primary responsibility for India’s cultural diplomacy since the organisation’s establishment in 1950. It was one of a number of national cultural and educational institutions established as part of a post Independence programme of nation-building that owed much to Jawaharlal Nehru and his fellow nationalist leader, Maulana Abul Kalam Azad. Nehru was not only the key figure in India’s post Independence foreign policy, but also played the primary role in India’s nation-building from 1947 onwards. The nature and extent of his involvement in the domestic aspects of this nation-building project ranged from substantive issues such as famine, and crises in Kashmir, to the minutiae of matters such as the tune of the national anthem and the atmosphere in, and look of, Indian embassies. His views on the desire for Indian embassies to look Indian (but not for Indian diplomats to have to ‘squat on the floor’) was a precursor to subsequent debates on public diplomacy in which national embassies came to be viewed as shop-fronts to national identity.

Whilst Nehru’s leadership and vision set the framework for the establishment of the ICCR, Maulana Abul Kalam Azad, Nehru’s close nationalist confidante and nation-builder, can

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685 See Nehru’s extensive writings as set out in Nehru, *Selected Works*, particularly volume 11.
rightly be described as the father of the ICCR. Nehru, when giving the first Maulana Azad lecture in 1959, one year after Azad’s death, noted that the ICCR lost in Azad ‘not only its Founder President but one who also inspired its activities from the outset.’ Azad was renowned for his progressive thinking. Douglas notes that ‘Azad’s religious and cultural broad-mindedness extended to international relations as well as to relations amongst religious communities within India…independence made possible a mutual acceptance between East and West.’ Azad believed that India was a product of international cultural interaction: India’s ‘shared life of a thousand years’ had ‘forged a common nationality. Such moulds cannot be artificially constructed.’ Azad believed that ‘India had been at its best when the doors were wide open to all who came from abroad. She partook of whatever lessons the world had to teach and equally freely gave the world her best.’ And, like Nehru, Azad believed that international cultural cooperation advanced the cause of international peace:

Cultural co-operation was imperative from an international point of view. Should we succeed to set up and build large blocs on the basis of goodwill and friendship, the causes of doubt and estrangement amongst peoples will be removed and then we will be in a position to promote international understanding and strengthen the cause of world peace.

Azad’s commitment to international cultural interaction was in part driven by a desire to enhance the recognition abroad of India’s Islamic heritage, especially in West Asia (in Douglas’s view, Azad’s ‘pet project’), and the ICCR’s activities were a perfect vehicle for this.

The ICCR’s relationship to the Ministry of External Affairs

When the ICCR was established in 1950, it was located administratively within the Department of Culture, a location which well suited Azad’s ideas on the role that culture had played in the making of India, and on the importance of cultural cooperation for world peace. However, in

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687 Azad was twice president of the Indian National Congress and India’s first Minister of Education. Singh notes that ‘the founding of the ICCR and Academies of Art, Letters, Dance, Drama and Music…bear testimony to Azad’s notable contribution in the field of education and culture.’ Mahavir Singh, “Introduction,” 14. The ICCR’s headquarters and the Indian cultural centre in Cairo are named after Azad.
688 Nehru, India Today and Tomorrow, ii.
691 Venkataraman, Maulana Azad and the Unity of India, 2.
692 Bhattacharyya, “Maulana Abul Kalam Azad.”
693 Quoted in Kabir, Maulana Abul Kalam Azad, 23.
694 Douglas, Abul Kalam Azad, 246.
695 Much of the information concerning the ICCR has drawn on reports of the Parliament of India’s external affairs committee, which serve to make up for a dearth of writing about the ICCR, other than ICCR publications and brochures. In addition, the author has discussed aspects of the ICCR with a number of commentators in India, interviewed the ICCR’s director, and the head of the ICCR’s cultural centre in London.
1960, the administrative location of the ICCR was transferred to India’s Ministry of External Affairs (MEA).\textsuperscript{696} In Jain’s view, this move represented a ‘shift of ideology’: because the organisation’s new link to the MEA ensured the strong backing of Indian embassies for its work, the focus of the ICCR became much more closely aligned to the pursuit of diplomacy.\textsuperscript{697}

Since 1960, the ICCR has essentially been a division of the foreign ministry – and indeed the ICCR’s director-general, always an Indian diplomat, has been designated as ex officio head of MEA’s cultural division.\textsuperscript{698} The ICCR’s two deputy director-generals have also always been drawn from the foreign ministry, the ICCR’s funding has been provided through the MEA, and the ICCR’s governing body has always included the foreign secretary (ex officio) and the MEA’s financial advisor, as well as the director-general. The Parliament of India’s Standing Committee on External Affairs, reporting in 1997, was not convinced by the MEA’s assertion, made to the Committee, that the ICCR was ‘functionally autonomous.’ The Committee cited the designation of the ICCR’s director-general as ex officio head of the MEA’s cultural division, and also noted that the ICCR did not present its own report to the Parliament of India: this was done on the ICCR’s behalf by the MEA.

At the same time as the Committee pushed for ‘real functional autonomy’ for the ICCR, the Committee also pushed for the continued linkage of the ICCR’s work to India’s foreign policy. In the Committee’s view, the activities of the ICCR were planned to meet the objectives of India’s foreign policy through cultural diplomacy,\textsuperscript{699} and noted that the ICCR had a ‘very important role’ in the furtherance of India’s foreign policy objectives.\textsuperscript{700} The Committee noted that similar organisations abroad, such as the British Council, Japan Foundation and Alliance Francaise, were ‘closely linked with and funded by their respective Foreign Offices,’ and this only underscored the link between a state’s foreign policy objectives and the role of cultural diplomacy.\textsuperscript{701} However, autonomy for the ICCR would benefit the organisation in a number of ways. It would give the ICCR more flexibility, would counter claims that the ICCR was nothing more than a propaganda instrument of the government of India, and hence would confer on it

\textsuperscript{696} Rana notes that Nehru and Azad created the ICCR (in 1951, not 1950 as cited by the ICCR itself) ‘shortly after Independence, to act as the promoter of cultural diplomacy. It functioned initially under the Ministry of Education, but after efforts initiated in 1957, it was placed squarely under the Ministry of External Affairs in 1960.’ Rana, Inside Diplomacy, 149.
\textsuperscript{697} Jyotindra Jain, interview by the author, May 3, 2004, Delhi.
\textsuperscript{698} Standing Committee on External Affairs, Second Report, 2.
\textsuperscript{699} Ibid., 37.
\textsuperscript{700} Ibid., 38.
\textsuperscript{701} Ibid.
greater credibility without being ‘branded as propagandist.’\footnote{702}{Ibid., 39.} With its autonomous status, the ICCR would be able to ‘deal with, for instance, a large number of individuals/institutions who would otherwise shy away from being involved directly with a Government Ministry/Department.’\footnote{703}{Ibid., 3.} The model adopted in developed countries was cited by the Committee, which noted that ‘cultural interaction with foreign countries’ was taking place more and more through ‘autonomous institutional linkages.’\footnote{704}{Ibid.}

It can also be assumed that the Committee’s view on the need for the ICCR to be independent of the MEA was in part driven by the Committee’s low opinion of the MEA’s management of the ICCR, and of the ICCR’s work. Reports of the Parliament of India’s external affairs standing committees over the period 1997 to 2005 became more and more exasperated with the MEA’s management of the ICCR, and with the ICCR’s lack of dynamism, planning, innovation and flexibility. In 2004, the Committee deemed the MEA’s handling of the setting up of a new Indian cultural centre in Washington as ‘inept,’ noting that delays over the matter were due to ‘the extremely bureaucratic, rigid and cumbersome procedures’ of the Ministry.\footnote{705}{Standing Committee on External Affairs, \textit{Third Report}.} The following year, in another report, the Committee called the MEA ‘lackadaisical’ over its management of the Washington cultural centre issue.\footnote{706}{Standing Committee on External Affairs, \textit{Seventh Report}.} (This issue, above all others, most frequently drew the ire of the Committee). The Committee noted that the ICCR’s approach to cultural diplomacy was ‘conventional and unprofessional and as such, the ICCR was not able to go beyond propagating the stereotyped image’ of India.\footnote{707}{Standing Committee on External Affairs, \textit{Third Report}.} The Committee criticised the ICCR for its engagement with the Indian diaspora, noting that ‘whatever little initiatives have been taken by the ICCR to engage Indian diaspora in its activities,’ these were ‘not up to the desired level.’\footnote{708}{Ibid.} The Committee also criticised the ICCR for its poor record in securing sponsorship, the casual treatment with which the MEA treated the post of the director-general of the ICCR (as shown by the fact that most were unable to ‘do full justice to their assignments because of inadequate tenures’\footnote{709}{Standing Committee on External Affairs, \textit{Second Report}, 47.}), its handling of establishing chairs in Indian studies abroad, and its lack
of promotion of contemporary art.\footnote{Standing Committee on External Affairs, \textit{Third Report}.} Several of these aspects of the ICCR’s work, which drew the wrath of the Committee, are discussed in greater depth below.

\textit{The ICCR’s objectives}

Despite the ICCR’s close relationship with the MEA, the ICCR’s objectives as set out in its Memorandum of Understanding (hereafter referred to as the MOU objectives) make no mention of diplomacy, or of the role which the ICCR should play in advancing India’s national interests. The MOU objectives have remained unchanged since the organisation’s inception in 1950.\footnote{The \textit{Extraordinary \& Plenipotentiary Diplomatist} notes that ‘the first blueprint of the ICCR emerged after the historic Asian relations conference organised in Delhi in 1946, resolved to set up a body for furthering India’s cultural relations with other countries. After Independence, it was felt that cultural co-operation needed to be revived. The political leadership…came up with the idea of setting up a council independent of government control. They envisaged the council to assume an active and vibrant role to foster India’s cultural heritage by acting as a catalyst for cultural exchange.’ ‘ICCR at 50,’ \textit{Extraordinary \& Plenipotentiary Diplomatist}, May 2001. However, the magazine provides no citations.}

The four objectives set for the organisation in 1950 were first, to participate in the formulation and implementation of policies and programmes relating to India’s external cultural relations; second, to promote cultural exchange with other countries and peoples; third to promote and strengthen cultural relations and mutual understanding between India and other countries; and fourth to establish and develop relations with national and international organisations in the field of culture. The MOU objectives, along with the ICCR’s programme of activities, jointly reflect the idealistic elements of Nehru’s and Azad’s world views and attitudes to international cultural relations, and India’s foreign policy approach at the time of Independence. There has remained a strong connectivity between these four, unchanged, MOU objectives and the major part of the ICCR’s activities. The organisation has certainly played a role in the ‘formulation and implementation of policies and programmes relating to India’s external cultural relations,’ and has, through its support of scholarships (one of its most funded activities), delegations, seminars, exhibitions and cultural performances, continued to ‘promote cultural exchange with other countries and peoples.’\footnote{Indian Council for Cultural Relations, \textit{50+ Years of ICCR}.} The director-general of the ICCR, Rakesh Kumar, commenting in 2004, was of the view that the organisation’s objectives were still valid.\footnote{Rajesh Kumar interview by the author, 2004, Delhi.}

But the unchanged MOU objectives have not continued to reflect accurately the aims and objectives of the organisation. Three diplomacy and foreign policy objectives of the ICCR which were not set out in the organisation’s MOU objectives warrant examination. First, the ICCR has
worked to enhance links with the Indian diaspora in order to advance India’s interests abroad, and to achieve domestic objectives. This has been a strong focus of its work, through its network of cultural centres abroad. Second, the ICCR’s programme has, to a lesser extent, sought to present India’s image abroad. Third, since the economic reforms of 1991, the ICCR has made some very tentative steps towards using cultural diplomacy to advance India’s economic interests. These three objectives will now be discussed in turn.

The ICCR and the Indian diaspora

The ICCR’s MOU objectives, in place since 1950, make no mention of the organisation’s activities that have been focused on connecting with members of the substantial Indian diaspora.\footnote{Estimates of the size of the Indian diaspora vary. The Economist estimates it to number around 20 million. “Didn’t They Do Well,” The Economist, January 25, 2003. Kishan Rana thinks more like 15 million. Rana, Inside Diplomacy, 398.} This work has been carried out primarily through the ICCR’s network of cultural centres abroad. These cultural centres abroad are under the administrative control of the respective Indian diplomacy missions in which the centres are located. The centres have been the ‘coal face’ of India’s cultural diplomacy. At the end of 2005, centres were located in Mauritius (Port Louis), Guyana (Georgetown), Suriname (Paramaribo), Indonesia (Jakarta), Trinidad and Tobago (Port of Spain), South Africa (Johannesberg and Durban), Sri Lanka (Colombo), the UK (London), Germany (Berlin), Russia (Moscow), Egypt (Cairo), Tajikistan (Dushanbe), Kazakhstan (Almaty), Uzbekistan (Tashkent), Malaysia (Kuala Lumpur), and Fiji (Suva, and a sub-centre in Lautoka).\footnote{Standing Committee on External Affairs, Eighth Report.} The locations of the centres fell into four categories. These were first, those where there was a ‘strong ethnic link’,\footnote{Rana, Inside Diplomacy, 157.} i.e. a sizeable Indian community (Mauritius, Guyana, Suriname, Indonesia, Trinidad and Tobago, South Africa (Johannesberg and Durban), Sri Lanka, Malaysia and Fiji); second, those in major European capitals (Moscow, London and Berlin); third, those in newly independent republics of the erstwhile Soviet Union (Tajikistan, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan); and fourth, the cultural centre in Egypt (Cairo).

The cultural wing of the Indian high commission in London, the Nehru Centre, may initially have been established in 1992 because of the overall importance of and growth in Indo-UK ties (facilitated in part by the impact of the festival of India in the UK in 1982), but its location came serendipitously to coincide with the substantial development in size, wealth and visibility of the UK’s Indian population. The location of a centre in Berlin reflected the long
historic links between Germany and India that involved, *inter alia*, Goethe, Max Muller and Herman Hesse, and the centre in Moscow remains a testament to the strong and wide-ranging links (political, defence, cultural, and economic) between India and the Soviet Union since India’s independence. Indian cultural centers have not been set up in the Gulf states, despite substantial Indian communities and Indian diplomatic missions in each state, nor in Paris; nor in any of India’s neighbours bar Sri Lanka. However, the ICCR had plans to open cultural centres in Washington, Tokyo, Beijing, Tehran and Kathmandu.

In the ICCR’s 2001 annual report, it noted that the activities of the centres could broadly be divided into two categories: those activities in centres set up in countries with a sizeable Indian population reflected the ‘need of the local Indian population to keep in touch with Indian traditions’; and those activities of other centres such as those in London, Berlin and Moscow, which focused ‘more on intellectual activities such as…lectures, talks, panel discussions and seminars on subjects on contemporary and cultural interest,’ and which ‘mainly aimed at increasing an understanding of India through mutual interaction.’

The absence of a reference to the Indian diaspora in the MOU objectives, drafted as they were in the late 1940s, was perhaps not particularly surprising given ‘the indifference of the Nehruvian state to the plight of Indians living abroad, despite the general enthusiasm with which the latter had greeted the arrival of independence.’ Until recently, the attitude of some in India towards non–resident Indians (NRIs) was evident in the ironic interpretation of the acronym as meaning ‘Not Required Indians.’ Only in the late 1990s and early years of the 21st century was greater recognition given in India, particularly in political circles, to the contribution which its sizeable diaspora was able to make to the advancement of India’s interests in the countries in which the diaspora was domiciled, particularly in those countries in which those of Indian ancestry were well placed politically or economically. This was due in part to the increasingly outward focus of India’s foreign policy, but it was also in part domestically driven.

The increased interest by Indian politicians, and diplomats, in India’s diaspora was in part due to the considerable wealth many had accumulated, particularly Indians living in the United States (most notably in Silicon Valley, the information technology centre of the United States)

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717 MEA noted that in its view, the cultural centre in Nepal which the standing committee on external affairs referred to in its 1996/97 report was not really a centre at all, but ‘basically…a library in a rented building.’ Standing Committee on External Affairs, *Second Report*, 48.


719 Parekh, Singh and Vertovec, *Culture and Economy in the Indian Diaspora*, 5.
and the UK. Wealthy Indians became sources of funds for foreign direct investment into India, and for political parties. In January 2003, at the first annual conference for members of India’s international diaspora, India’s external affairs minister, Yashwant Sinha, was quoted as saying that ‘people of Indian origin are extremely important sources of support for the Indian government in the execution of its policies through the influence and respect they command in the countries in which they live.’ In an address to a joint session of the Parliament of India in 2004, the President of India said

Indians abroad have not only been successful in many walks of life, but have also been a source of inspiration for their brethren back home. The new Ministry of Non-Resident Indians Affairs, which reflects our recognition of their values, will tap their potential for contributing to our economic growth.

However, Sinha’s views were not shared by Lord Parekh, a Gujarat-born professor at the London School of Economics, who was reported as saying that ‘the overseas Indian matters to the mother country only as a cow that can be milked matters to its owner.’

**Presenting India abroad**

In addition to excluding reference to the Indian diaspora, the ICCR’s MOU objectives also exclude the presentation abroad of an image of India. However, this activity has been undertaken in practice by the organisation, although implicitly rather than explicitly. In a passage that seems to connote image projection, the organisation’s annual report noted, in 1999, that it was tasked to ‘promote greater awareness of India’s composite cultural heritage abroad.’ This objective was supported by the Standing Committee on External Relations, the same Committee which has been so critical of the ICCR over a number of years. In the view of the Committee, the image of India abroad needed to undergo a radical transformation. If India’s image was to be transformed, the report noted, there would be an increase in the receptivity to India and Indian things:

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724 Indian Council for Cultural Relations, Annual Report April 1998-March 1999, 7. The ICCR’s website expressed this objective in a slightly different way: the presentation of India to other countries ‘to articulate and demonstrate the diversity and richness of the cultures of India.’ The website also noted that the ICCR will continue ‘to symbolise India’s great cultural and educational efflorescence in the years to come.’ Indian Council for Cultural Relations, “About Us.”

The ICCR should function as a nodal agency to enable it to project more effectively an integrated and unified image of India’s personality, perceptions and concerns abroad…[it] must gradually de-emphasise some of the very general cultural programmes which have generated over the years little else beyond passing goodwill.  

The committee saw the ICCR at the crossroads. It demanded that the ICCR’s role and its programmes ‘be reoriented and restructured.’ The ICCR should not only ‘project a holistic image of a vibrant, dynamic India…to assist in the better perception of India among a large cross-section of people in the world’ but, should also ‘correct concerted attempts at image distortion by certain vested interests and countries.’  

No ‘vested interests and countries’ were named, but it would be reasonable to assume, given the history of relations between India and Pakistan from the time of Partition (a history which has included three wars) that the Committee had in mind Pakistan. The Committee suggested that MEA identify countries and regions where ‘orchestrated negative portrayals’ of India had received widespread publicity. Key people who had been influenced by this negative campaigning, and ‘even bitter critics’ should be identified in this regard.

It can be argued this objective of using cultural diplomacy to project a positive image of India abroad was entirely in keeping with the concept of mutual understanding: for other countries to know India, India must present itself to them. But the manner in which this objective was set out by the ICCR and its officers and by Parliament implied that the objective was less to do with enhancing mutual understanding as it was to enhance other countries’ understanding of India: India was assumed to be a great culture that other countries should know about, and presumably admire and even follow, without any overt direction from the Indian government’s agencies. As we shall see when discussing the series of festivals of India, this imperative drove the considerable investment by the state of India which the festivals represented. Certainly, young diplomats such as the head of the Nehru Centre in London, Parvan Varma, recognised the importance of presenting India’s uniqueness abroad. India was the world’s largest democracy, had attained Independence ‘through a certain kind of freedom movement that was in many ways unique,’ was an emerging economic power, and had ‘evolved in a cultural crucible for two

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727 Ibid., 45.
728 Ibid., 51. The Standing Committee on External Affairs in 2002 noted that the ICCR’s activities should be expanded considerably to ‘create a favourable atmosphere in the international arena for a better understanding of India’s viewpoint.’ The committee saw the ICCR’s basic objective as ‘projecting [a] multi-cultural, multi-ethnic and multi-lingual heritage of the country.’ Standing Committee on External Affairs, *Ministry of External Affairs. Demands for Grants* (2002-2003).
Advancing trade and economic interests

The third diplomacy and foreign policy objective of the ICCR which was not set out in the organisation’s MOU objectives concerns the advancement of India’s economic and trade objectives. The focus on this objective has been minimal, but discernible, particularly following the economic reforms implemented by Rajiv Gandhi in the 1980s, and the more radical, World Bank-IMF sponsored structural adjustments to the Indian economy of 1991. Prior to these reforms, India’s ‘insular economic policies of the first four decades’ (from Independence to the late 1980s and the early 1990s), had ensured that the Indian economy was inwardly focused, bureaucratic, controlled and planned. The private sector operated under a ‘strict license-control regime’ directed by the government. There was substantial central government involvement in all facets of the economy and significant levels of protection. Das Gupta notes that ‘protection from foreign predators took a number of forms - import controls by way of very high tariffs, or quotas. There was complete prohibition of imports in some cases…Self reliance became the aim.’ Economic activity with other countries was insubstantial given India’s economic size and population. Until these reforms, there remained rigid controls on foreign exchange flows to and from India, inward investment and foreign ownership of India companies. Mohan notes that India’s ‘renewed engagement with [its] surrounding regions’ in the 1990s ‘had to be within a new framework that emphasized economic relations and energy diplomacy rather than the traditional notion of Third World solidarity.’

Following the fundamental economic reforms of 1991, India’s foreign policy and diplomacy had an increasingly significant focus on economic and trade links, particularly those

730 Mohan, Crossing the Rubicon, xvi.
731 Gupta, "India’s Adjustment Experience 1991-1999," 181. The control regime of pre-1991 India is now commonly referred to as the ‘License Raj’ period.
732 Ibid., 178.
733 The extent of the control of India’s economy is exemplified by the comment by Kindel that the Indian business community’s reluctance to support financially the Festival of India in the United States was probably caused by Mrs Gandhi’s delay in pushing the Reserve Bank of India to free up foreign exchange so that Indian companies or their American counterparts could back various parts of the festival. Stephen Kindel, "How (Not) to Sell a Country " Forbes, October 22, 1984. A report in India Today, June 15, 1985, noted that a number of India’s largest corporations were eventually permitted by the government to remit up to ‘50 lakh each in foreign exchange to fund the massive show on Indian art…at the Metropolitan Museum in New York.’
734 Mohan, Crossing the Rubicon, xvi.
with its immediate neighbours and Asia. The Look East Policy launched by prime minister Narasimha Rao in 1994 was as much to do with renewing India’s commercial contacts with the increasingly successful economies of south-east and north Asia, and Australasia, as it had to do with renewing political contact. As Mohan notes, ‘As India launched itself on the course of globalization in 1991, East and South-East Asia began to loom large in its national economic strategy.’\textsuperscript{735} Rana notes that before the reforms of 1991, ideas that the ICCR’s work could be used for economic or trade purposes ‘were ahead of their times,’\textsuperscript{736} although Jain saw evidence of such an approach (the use of cultural diplomacy for the pursuit of national economic interests) as early as the Festivals of India in the 1980s and 1990s. In Jain’s view, the festivals programme (discussed at length below) heralded a new focus of cultural diplomacy on achieving economic objectives. The woman appointed by prime minister Indira Gandhi to manage the festivals, Pupul Jayakar, was in Jain’s view strongly in support of using the Festivals of India for economic gain for India: ‘her famous sentence was that culture should be used as an arm of diplomacy.’\textsuperscript{737}

Regardless of the timing of a change in attitude within the ICCR to the use of cultural diplomacy for economic purposes, for much of the life of the ICCR, the prevailing attitude was that of a separation between cultural diplomacy and economics. This attitude can partly be attributed to the prevailing ethos of the higher echelons of the Indian Foreign Service (IFS), the diplomatic stream of the Indian Administrative Service (IAS), which to this day provides policy personnel for India’s diplomatic service (i.e. diplomats). Those who have been appointed as either a director-general or deputy director-general of the ICCR have always been, since the ICCR’s move to the MEA’s administrative jurisdiction, IFS officers. Many IFS officers, like their IAS counterparts, would consistently have mirrored the upper-caste ethos of the Indian bureaucracy. Within such a dominating ethos, culture took its rightful place above trade, just as the highest caste, the Brahmin, was situated above the all other castes, including those associated with trade and commerce. Within this schema, culture and trade remain separate activities, the former not to be polluted by the latter.

Following the reforms of 1991, the ICCR began to place more emphasis on working to enhance the achievement of national economic interests such as increased trade and tourism. That was certainly the view of the director-general of the ICCR, in 2004.\textsuperscript{738} But the ICCR nevertheless

\textsuperscript{735} Ibid., 211.
\textsuperscript{736} Rana, \textit{Inside Diplomacy}, 163.
\textsuperscript{737} Jyotindra Jain, interview by the author, May 3, 2004, Delhi.
\textsuperscript{738} Rajesh Kumar, director-general of the ICCR, interview by the author, November 2003, Delhi.
lagged well behind other sectors of the Indian polity in the extent to which it embraced the outward looking, internationally engaged ethos that characterised India in the first years of the 21st century. The Indian Ministry of Tourism, for instance, in 2004 launched an award-winning advertising campaign - *Incredible India* - to take advantage of India’s extraordinary tourism potential. And as noted below, even a fledging brand programme was initiated. Although some in the ICCR adapted well to the new environment, in general the record of take-up of an economic agenda by the ICCR was fairly described as patchy. Commenting in 2004, Jennifer King of New Zealand’s Asia 2000 Foundation, who had considerable dealings with the ICCR (and India’s high commission in New Zealand) over a number of years, could not recall any occasion in which the ICCR, or the MEA, took advantage of ICCR activities in New Zealand to advance India’s economic and trade interests in New Zealand.  

However, the appointment of bright, young, up-and-coming diplomats such as Parvan Varma to posts such as the director of the Nehru Centre in London indicated that in the early years of the 21st century, some in MEA, and in the ICCR, had become aware of the role that cultural diplomacy could play in the diplomacy of the new India. Varma, a best-selling author as well as a rising star in the MEA, was very much aware of the success of the *Incredible India!* tourism campaign, of India’s rapidly growing economic confidence and power, and of the benefits cultural diplomacy could provide to Indian diplomacy in the UK. These benefits included using the attraction of India’s culture (including the largest film industry in the world, centered in the Indian city of Mumbai, and known colloquially as Bollywood) to help connect with those in the UK who might be persuaded to invest in the country, including that group of well-off Britons who were already well disposed towards India - the members of the huge UK-based Indian diaspora. In Varma’s view, the Nehru Centre’s programme should present a contemporary image of India as ‘an economic power above all and as a technology giant in the making.’ He saw the Indian diaspora as playing a major role in the growing economic and trade relationship between India and the UK. The Centre’s clientele included the Indian diaspora, which was ‘vibrant, affluent, upwardly mobile and a significant percentage of the population in the UK.’ The Nehru Centre was able to connect into a network of organisations ‘in every major city in the UK’ which had been set up by the Indian diaspora.

In 2004 the Centre, in conjunction with the Indian Ministry of Tourism, launched a series of tourism-related seminars focused around the *Incredible India* campaign. In addition to the

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Centre’s links with the Ministry of Tourism, its 2004 programme included the launch of a book on India’s highly successful IT sector, attended by two hundred British ‘techies.’ At the same time as the ICCR, through the efforts of people such as Parvan Varma, was moving its focus more actively to the pursuit of economic objectives, there were indications that in future more effort would be made by the government of India and by states of India to use culture for diplomacy. In 2003, the government of India became serious about using a national brand for India, and in the same period the state of Gujarat - one of the wealthiest in India and the most active seeker of foreign direct investment - began using aspects of its culture to help attract investment and investors.

Because India’s national brand programme was so new, it was to be expected that the ICCR’s cultural diplomacy lacked a connection to such a brand. Although the India Brand Equity Fund (IBEF) of Rs5 billion was established under India’s commerce ministry in 1996 (in Rana’s estimation, this sum was equivalent to US$130 million in 1996 dollars\textsuperscript{741}), it was not until 2003 that the initiative gained much traction. In that year, the IBEF was revamped. A private sector national body, the Confederation of Indian Industry (CII) was appointed responsible for the fund’s operational management. The Ministry of Commerce remained responsible for the IBEF’s oversight. The new IBEF was set the objective of building ‘positive economic perceptions of India globally.’ The then Minister of Commerce and Industry, Arun Jaitley,\textsuperscript{742} writing about the launch of the new IBEF, noted that it was not an easy task building positive economic perceptions of India abroad because ‘perceptions are tough to change…as India opens to the world, we realise that a strong image and perception of an erstwhile India lingers on.’ But because of the ‘positive emergent reality of India’ it was worth the effort of trying to ‘break stereotypes’ internationally.\textsuperscript{743} The first steps of the revamped entity were to ‘undertake intensive research and dialogue within India to determine its approach and strategy,’ and to launch the IBEF’s website. The website’s focus was on providing good news stories about India’s economic performance and potential. The IBEF’s catch phrase was ‘India: fastest growing free market democracy.’ The ‘good news’ stories set out on the IBEF website included aspects of culture, with a clear focus on the earnings of the most successful Indian films screened abroad, along with some mention of the growth in popularity internationally of aspects of Indian culture, including

\textsuperscript{741} Rana, Inside Diplomacy, 148.
\textsuperscript{742} Mr Jaitley did not remain a minister following the defeat of the NDA government in India’s 2004 elections.
\textsuperscript{743} Jaitley, “The Metamorphosis That Is India.”
its cuisine, music and art. But despite this cultural aspect of the IBEF, there has not been any linkage between India’s cultural diplomacy and its brand.

The international promotion by the state of Gujarat to attract international investors, marketed under the slogan ‘Vibrant Gujarat’ used, in 2003, Gujarat’s Navarati dance festival, as part of the marketing campaign. The summit was timed to coincide with the festival in order to ‘showcase the culture, tradition and entertainment prevalent in Gujarat by blending them with culture, trade and enterprise.’\footnote{Government of Gujarat, \textit{Vibrant Gujarat}. The 2005 summit was timed to coincide with the Gujarat’s kite festival.} The website noted that there could not have been a better time to experience the hospitality of Gujarat than during the festival. There was an extraordinary disjunction between the positive image presented through this campaign fronted by the chief minister of Gujarat, Narendra Modi, and the role that Modi’s government played in the communal carnage that occurred in Gujarat in 2002. Over a three month period more than 2,000 Gujarat Muslims were murdered, many in appalling circumstances (such as killed by mobs or burnt alive), and many Muslim women were raped. An Amnesty International press release of 9 July 2003 noted that ‘the state government, administration and police took insufficient action to protect civilians and widespread reports at the time implicated police officers and members of Hindu nationalist groups, including the ruling BJP, in violence against Muslims.’\footnote{Amnesty International notes in its press release that ‘Following an attack on a train in Godhra, Gujarat, on 27 February 2002 in which 59 Hindus were killed, violence of unprecedented brutality targeting the Muslim community spread in the state and continued in the next three months, leaving more than 2000 people dead…In many cases of post Godhra violence police have recorded complaints in a highly defective manner, witnesses’ statements as well as corroborative evidence have not been thoroughly collected and responsibilities of eminent suspects have not been investigated by police. The Best Bakery case was seen by human rights organisations in India as a test case given the strong evidence against the accused.’ Amnesty International, “India: Best Bakery case.”} In addition to its role in the carnage, the Modi government’s record in bringing Hindu criminals to justice was so poor that India’s Supreme Court directed that a new trial be held (in neighbouring Maharashtra state) of those allegedly responsible for the infamous ‘Best Bakery’ massacre.\footnote{\textit{The Guardian} noted that ‘Modi instructed his government to do nothing.’ See “He is blamed for the death of 2,000 Muslims in India. So why is Narendra Modi in Wembley?,” \textit{The Guardian}, August 18, 2003. The Supreme Court of India judgments on the Best Bakery case provide very good background on the case.}

\textit{The ICCR, cultural agreements and the Department of Culture}

These then are three examples of how the ICCR has in practice, to varying degrees, undertaken activities that have helped achieve diplomatic and foreign policy objectives, despite the absence of such objectives in the organisation’s MOU objectives. I now turn to a closer examination of the ICCR’s cultural activities. These activities have been carried out, in the main, within a
framework of cultural agreements which Rana has noted ‘usually provide the bilateral framework under which official cultural activities are carried out…They are often combined with agreements on education, and sometimes with science and technology as well.’ The absence of such a bilateral agreement has not, however, prevented cultural exchanges from having taken place: the absence of a cultural agreement with the US, for instance, did not stop a festival of India in the United States being staged over the period 1985-1986. Cultural agreements have been negotiated by the Department of Culture. In 2002, according to the department’s annual report, India had a total of 109 cultural agreements with countries. The first, with Turkey, was signed in 1951, the last in 1999. The department listed three ‘other’ agreements. A report of the external affairs committee of the Indian Parliament noted, in 2002, that the MEA regarded the Department of Culture as having ‘the overall responsibility for chalking out plans for cultural exchanges with other countries through concluding agreements on Cultural Cooperation and Cultural Exchange Programmes.’ In the Committee’s view, the ICCR was ‘essentially concerned with implementation of relevant provisions of these agreements and exchange programmes.’ For its part, the Department of Culture declared that, as part of its overall responsibility to ‘preserve, promote and disseminate all forms of art and culture’ in India, its activities included ‘entering into and implementation of cultural agreements with foreign countries,’ and ‘promoting cultural exchanges at an international level.’ The department said that it co-ordinates all matters relating to international cultural relations. It acts as the nodal agency for executing cultural agreements and cultural exchange programmes with different countries, organizing incoming and outgoing exhibitions and undertaking programmes envisaged in the UNESCO programmes in the field of art and culture.

Several of the national cultural institutions that fell under the department’s remit were involved in cultural exchanges. These included the National Museum, the National Gallery of Modern Art, the Lalit Kala Akademi, the Indira Gandhi National Centre for the Arts and the Maulana Abul Kalam Azad Institute of Asian Studies. The remit of the Department of Culture also included the management of India’s programme of international festivals held abroad and reciprocal festivals held in India.

This situation - one department negotiating the agreements, another (the MEA, through the ICCR) carrying out cultural diplomacy under the agreements - has remained a source of irritation between the two for many years. In the 1996-1997 report of the Standing Committee on

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747 Rana, Inside Diplomacy, 148.
750 Ibid., 25.
External Affairs, the Committee said that it had considered the question of whether the ICCR, rather than the Department of Culture, should be the ‘nodal agency’ for all international cultural exchanges. The MEA noted that there would be some advantages in having the ICCR made the nodal agency in order to ensure ‘better coordination and implementation.’ The Department of Culture said that the ICCR should be attached to the department, as there could not be ‘one Department to formulate a national cultural policy and another agency under another Ministry to take care of International Cultural Relations Committee.’ The Committee rejected the idea, because the ICCR should stay out of the whole issue of cultural agreements: it was a ‘programme implementing agency with the specific aim of establishing, reviewing and strengthening cultural relations and mutual understanding between India and other countries.’ But the Committee also made it clear that if the ICCR were to remain under the authority of a ministry or department (rather than become genuinely independent as the Committee wished), then the best location for the ICCR would be in the MEA, because the ICCR must ‘work in tandem with the MEA within the overall parameters of India’s foreign policy objectives, both short and long term.’

The ICCR’s funding and activities
In 2006 the annual budget for the ICCR totaled 60.5 crores rupee, or approximately US$13.3 million. Of this, almost two-thirds was spent on the two major components of the ICCR’s work: international students studying in India, and the cultural centre network. Other activities included a programme of visits of distinguished scholars, intellectuals, academics and artists to and from India; delegations traveling to and from India; operating the organisation’s network of offices in India; a reciprocal programme of cultural group performances, artist performances and exhibitions to and from India; a programme of performances by Indian up-and-coming artists in India; seminars and conferences; and establishing and maintaining professorships and chairs for Indian studies in universities abroad. The ICCR’s annual report of 2000/2001 lists nineteen such professorial positions: thirteen teaching Hindi, two teaching Sanskrit, one teaching Tamil, two teaching modern Indian history/South Asian affairs and civilisation, and one teaching international relations, diplomacy and international law. ICCR activities also included the presentation of books and musical instruments to visiting dignitaries and to Indian missions.

751 Standing Committee on External Affairs, Second Report, 39.
752 Ibid, 38.
753 Ibid.
754 Ibid.
abroad for presentation; an annual essay award; an annual lecture; supporting the propagation of Hindi abroad through the Central Hindi Institute; and commissioning of busts, statues and portraits of Indian leaders for installation abroad, such as Mahatma Gandhi and Rabindranath Tagore. The ICCR has operated a library at its headquarters in Delhi for many years, and has also published journals and annual special issues, and produced DVDs and CDs on Indian dance and music. Its management of activities on behalf of other departments and organisations included the operation of nine of the thirteen British Council libraries in India (those outside the four metropolitan cities); the management, on behalf of and in conjunction with the Department of Culture, of festivals of India abroad and festivals of other countries in India (in 2000-2001, for instance, festivals from Turkmen and Germany held in India); the management of scholarships under the Colombo Plan on behalf of the Ministry of Finance; and, for the MEA, in addition to management of the ICCR’s cultural centres, organising a programme of visitors, delegations and scholarships, and an annual UN day, and PLO day.

**Educational scholarships and distinguished scholars**

The ICCR’s scholarships programme has always been a significant part of its work. It has focused on students from developing countries, particularly neighbouring countries. The ICCR in its annual report of 2000-2001 noted that a total of about 1,800 international students from over seventy five countries were studying in India under various schemes of the Council. The ICCR also saw itself as having a role in ensuring that students were well looked after in India, and to this end carried out associated activities such as providing information booklets, organising student camps, distributing a newsletter and hosting an international students’ day (featuring performances by international students studying in India). In Rana’s view, this aspect of the ICCR’s work was one of its foundations, and was unique, given it encompassed a welfare aspect. The Parliamentary report on the ICCR of 1996/1997 noted that the ICCR’s programme of providing scholarships to foreign students was ‘most important,’ as it had generated ‘considerable goodwill for India.’ The Committee saw the Council’s foreign students’

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755 Although this latter activity was not a common aspect of other countries’ cultural diplomacy, the recent naming of a road in New Delhi after the New Zealand explorer Sir Edmund Hillary was not that far removed from the installation of busts. Hillary was extremely well known in India, partly because of his ascent of Everest in 1953, but also because of his journey up the Ganges in a group of New Zealand-designed jet boats, and his work in India as New Zealand high commissioner to India in the 1980s. The road naming, involving diplomats of both countries, can be regarded as an activity of both New Zealand and Indian cultural diplomacy.

756 The Colombo Plan, an international development programme set up in 1950 by members of the then British Commonwealth, has focused since its inception on human development in developing countries.

programme as principally responsible for the realisation of the vision of fostering fraternal relations amongst nations, and noted that former students were now heads of state and of government. These students had become good friends of India, ‘having lived and studied [in India] for at least three years’ and having gained ‘first hand experience of India’s cultural, economic, political and social ethos.’

*Cultural group performances, artist performances and exhibitions*

In addition to the ICCR’s scholarships programme, the organisation has since its inception included cultural performances and exhibitions (both those of other countries in India, and those of India abroad), as well as seminars and conferences. The seminars and symposia have covered a range of issues and included one-off lectures. Whilst the cultural component of the organisation’s programme accounted for a small part of the overall annual funding, it was in some respects this aspect of the ICCR’s work for which the Council became best known in India, and abroad. It is in this area of its operation - cultural group performances, artist performances and exhibitions - that the ICCR most closely interacted with the Department of Culture, as the ICCR was usually entrusted by the Department with managing the performing arts component of Festivals of other countries held in India and Indian festivals abroad.

Cultural group performances, artist performances and exhibitions funded and organised by the ICCR have been the subject of criticism from a number of sources, and have also generated much of the controversy that occasionally engulfed the ICCR. The causes of these controversies (which were often made by spurned artists, scholars or institutions) have included criticism that the programme failed to reflect contemporary India, that the ICCR was pandering to political influence, and that there was a perceived lack of regional balance.

A general criticism of the ICCR’s programme has failed to reflect the contemporary dynamism of India, and that it is in essence, boring. The Standing Committee on External Affairs, a frequent critic of the MEA’s management of the ICCR and of India’s cultural diplomacy, noted in a 2004 report that given ‘ever-changing circumstances,’ the ICCR needed to ‘further increase the scope and intensity of its activities with innovative policies and programmes’ which would have to be ‘specific, pointed and purposeful.’ The Committee criticised the ICCR’s lack of focus on contemporary art, and its failure to take advantage of the popularity of Indian films. The Committee said that steps taken by the ICCR to promote contemporary Indian art were ‘not

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sufficient’ or up to the desired level. The Committee noted that ‘whatever recognition’ Indian contemporary art had achieved was due more to the efforts of private galleries ‘or otherwise’ than through the efforts of the Council. This criticism seems a little harsh, and arguably reflects the impatience of the Committee with almost all aspects of the performance of the ICCR. It was unrealistic to expect that any cultural diplomacy agency could, or should, be the principal driver of recognition for a state’s contemporary art. Recognition accorded to national contemporary art is seldom due to the efforts of a national cultural diplomacy agency, and is far more likely to be due to the efforts of private galleries and indeed artists.759 But the Committee has not been alone in commenting unfavourably about the style and content of the ICCR’s programme, and there are grounds to support this criticism. The ICCR has presented the culture of India as either that of a great civilisation (particularly as we shall see through the great festivals of India), or that of a country with a great number of folk traditions. Rana notes that the focus of the ICCR has been on sending performing artists, dancers and musicians abroad, and that the ‘preferred idiom’ has been classical dance and music, with folk music also represented.760

There has been a relative absence of contemporary art representations in the ICCR’s programme abroad, despite the growth of a increasingly internationally reputable contemporary art practice, particularly in the visual arts, a practice that has frequently drawn on the large number of significant political issues that have occurred in India since Independence. Jain believes that the relative absence of contemporary art representations, and the greater focus on the traditional and on traditions, has been because ‘tradition cannot be questioned, particularly if it is no longer ‘alive.’ It can be constructed as you wish. Contemporary issues by contrast can be contested.’ Jain also notes that presenting India’s culture abroad, through the ICCR, has been a ‘kind of parade on another level. What are we parading? We are parading tableaux and diorama. It is a tableaux of a tradition frozen like a people wearing a certain kind of costume …imaginary costumes.’761

Notwithstanding such criticisms, the ICCR sees itself as being in unison with contemporary India:

We have seen in India the consolidation of Indian democracy, the establishment of an equitable social order, the rapid development of Indian (sic) economy, the empowerment of Indian women, creation of a vibrant infrastructure of world-class educational institutions, and the powerful revitalization of scientific traditions. There has also been a revival, reiteration and renewal of the five-millennia old Indian culture, exemplified by

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759 Standing Committee on External Affairs, Third Report.
760 Rana, Inside Diplomacy, 154.
Despite this rosy view of India’s progress since Independence (by any test, describing the India of the early 21st century as comprising ‘an equitable social order’ is arguable), the director–general of the ICCR, Rakesh Kumar, acknowledged in 2004 that the ICCR was not nearly in unison with contemporary India as the organisation would like, and noted his intention, and that of the ICCR’s council, to make the ICCR more contemporary, and more focused on youth rather than the ‘over 55s.’

Until recently, the ICCR’s programme, including the programmes of its cultural centres, did not include one of India’s most internationally recognisably popular culture products, the Bollywood film. In a 2004 report, the Standing Committee was of the view that the impression created by Indian films was tremendous, and unique, and it recommended that the ICCR take advantage of the opportunity that such films offered to Indian cultural diplomacy. In what might be regarded as a typical response, the ICCR missed the Committee’s point (presumably intentionally, and disingenuously), noting that the cost of producing films was prohibitive. The Committee had not suggested that the ICCR make films, merely that the ICCR should use Indian films in its work, by for instance securing the rights to show films abroad and to add subtitles to those requiring them. As the recent cultural diplomacy of New Zealand has shown, film festivals can be a very effective, and cost-effective cultural diplomacy undertaking, particularly for those countries such as India and New Zealand with a strong, or fashionable, film genre on which to draw.

Not all observers of the ICCR’s programme have been quite so critical. The Indian art critic Bharati Chaturvedi, whilst noting that certain forms of culture presented by the ICCR had been ‘perfectly unimaginative,’ nevertheless placed the ICCR’s work in a wider context. In her view,

diplomacy can at best appear to be balanced to a person who doesn’t really know what else is available…the idea of culture for diplomacy is part of the whole diplomatic project of reassuring people about confidence in your country. There is no way you can put up a sort of weird installation made of plastics. I don’t see why one needs to disseminate

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762 Indian Council for Cultural Relations, About Us.
763 Rajesh Kumar interview by the author, 2004, Delhi.
764 Standing Committee on External Affairs, Third Report. The ICCR did point out that it had recently commissioned ‘the production of films from within its meager resources,’ including one titled ‘New Delhi the Book Capital of the World.’
popular culture abroad…Popular culture is rooted in a particular location. Why would we want someone in Holland to know that we do some stuff the way we do here?\textsuperscript{765}

Despite the ICCR’s focus on classical culture, change seemed to be taking place, however gradually. In 2004, the Nehru Centre in London, arguably the most progressive centre of all, included in its programme a performance by the India Shyam Brass Band from Jabalpur. India’s brass bands cannot be described in any way as high culture: they are boisterous, popular, what might be termed working class (or in India, lower caste) and had their origins in colonial India, rather than being derived from India’s pre-colonial civilisation. Only a few years earlier, the idea that a brass band from India would perform at the Nehru Centre in London would have been dismissed as implausible. The move towards greater emphasis on popular culture in the ICCR’s programme was however patchy: a request by the Asia: New Zealand Foundation to the ICCR seeking a brass band for performances in New Zealand was turned down as being inappropriate.\textsuperscript{766}

There was also anecdotal evidence that the conservatism of the ICCR’s programme in the first years of the 21\textsuperscript{st} century was due in part to political interference by the right-wing, pro-Hindutva National Democratic Alliance (NDA) of the government of prime minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee. Jain

\begin{quote}
\textit{had heard that the embassies when they took major cultural events abroad during the NDA rule, they were telling that you were not allowed to use certain words like Hindu extremism, or eunuch or things like that… I had heard that in meetings it was mentioned that these words were not allowed to be used. I do not remember if it was the word Hindu nationalism or Hindu fanaticism or Hindu extremism or one of those words or also the word [ ] or eunuch. Not only the word but nothing around using the word eunuch.} \textsuperscript{767}
\end{quote}

In addition to criticisms about the conservatism of the ICCR’s programme of cultural group performances, artist performances and exhibitions, these activities have also given rise to criticisms about those artists or groups which have been included, or not included, in the ICCR’s programme. The cause of such a criticism has frequently related to either the issue of a spurned artist (one good enough to be included, but left out) or to lack of regional balance (too few artists from one give state or region). Rana notes, with regard to the issue of spurned artists, that over the years, the ICCR’s selection of artists or groups ‘has been a source of much controversy,’ because of ‘subjective factors’ intruding into the selection process – ‘favouritism, in a word.’ He believes that the ICCR has been sensitive to these charges, and has sought to make the process of

\textsuperscript{765} Bharati Chaturvedi interview by the author, May 15, 2004, Delhi.
\textsuperscript{766} Jennifer King, Asia: New Zealand Foundation, interview by the author, September 10, 2004, Wellington
\textsuperscript{767} Jyotindra Jain, interview by the author, May 3, 2004, Delhi.
selection transparent, through the use of panels comprising artists and eminent people, and through the use of rotation of panelists. Spurned artists and cultural groups can fairly be described as expected in the world of cultural diplomacy.

It was not that surprising that the ICCR was criticised for a supposed lack of regional balance, as it would be a most unusual state of affairs if all of India’s twenty six states were happy with the level of funding allocated to their artists and cultural groups by the ICCR. The ICCR argues that it seeks to maintain a regional balance to its programme. In response to criticism in 1997 by the Standing Committee on External Affairs, that the ICCR failed to represent adequately West Bengal and north-east states, the ICCR retorted that ‘all efforts are made to see that the cultural presentations of India abroad reflects India’s composite culture and due care is taken to include different parts of India.’ In 2004, the Standing Committee reiterated its concerns about the imbalance of the ICCR’s network of regional offices noting that ‘key regions’ of the country like Bihar and Jammu and Kashmir, which ‘had contributed significantly to the country’s culture, ‘had been ignored.’ The Committee chastised the MEA for the slowness of the ICCR in setting up new regional centres, not only in Bihar and Jammu and Kashmir, but elsewhere. The MEA retorted that the opening of new regional centres was being ‘pursued earnestly,’ and that the ICCR had received positives responses from relevant state governments concerning the opening of regional centres in the states of the north-east of India, and in Rajasthan. Five months later, the MEA had changed its tune: in a subsequent report of the Committee, the MEA said it had opened a new regional centre in Jaipur but because of the ‘present staff strength of the Council’ it was not possible to set up new regional offices. In the meantime, the MEA noted, the ICCR was still making all efforts to present a composite cultural image of the country through its activities. It is worth noting that members of Parliament (other than those members of the Standing Committee on External Affairs) would be certain to have kept a close eye on the ICCR’s programmes to ensure that their respective states were fairly represented in the ICCR’s programme.

The reports of the Standing Committee over the period 1996-2005 paint a picture of a Committee that saw great value in the benefit of cultural diplomacy to India. It declared,

Rana, Inside Diplomacy, 154.

In the author’s experience of the cultural sector in New Zealand since the early 1980s, satisfied artists and arts companies have been a rare commodity.

Standing Committee on External Affairs, Third Report.

Ibid.

Standing Committee on External Affairs, Seventh Report.

Standing Committee on External Affairs, Second Report, 26-27.
unequivocally, that ‘cultural diplomacy is a powerful tool for furthering diplomacy interests in [the] commercial, political and strategic fields.’ But it is also clear that the Committee was not convinced that the MEA, or the ICCR, were doing all that could be done to make use of this powerful tool. Allowing for the sometimes obvious pedantry of the Committee, and the sense that the Committee wished at times to flex its Parliamentary muscle, there can little doubt that five years into the 21st century, the ICCR’s version of cultural diplomacy represented a lost opportunity, a view shared by other observers of the organisation. It had failed to take advantage of a world-wide resurgence in interest in the culture of India, in all its manifestations. It was as if the ICCR remained caught in a time-warp. Change was evident, but slow.

The festivals of India

Some evidence of this change can be discerned in the programme of festivals of India abroad, and the support India provided towards festivals of other countries in India, beginning in 1982. The focus of this examination will be on four major festivals which took place abroad: in the UK, United States, France and the USSR.

There are a number of reasons why these festivals warrant detailed examination. First, and most obviously, an examination of India’s cultural diplomacy would be incomplete were it to focus only on the work of the ICCR, as pertinent as that organisation’s work has been. The programme of festivals was of such a size that it constitutes arguably the largest manifestation by any state of a standard cultural diplomacy event, the cultural festival. Hence the festivals represent a significant element of India’s cultural diplomacy. Second, because of the nature of the festivals abroad, they provide, as we shall see, an insight into the motivations for the presentation abroad of a particular image of a state. Why would a country that had, in the 1980s when the first festival took place, a strongly insular foreign policy, a closed economy, and one might argue, a strongly self-sufficient culture, decide to spend a substantial sum of money on presenting itself in all its glory to a number of great western powers? Indeed one of these powers – the UK – was the former colonial master of India, and another – the United States – represented for many in India a great power that acted against the interests of India and other developing countries. What image was constructed, and why? How might answering these questions serve to enhance understanding of India’s cultural diplomacy in particular, and cultural diplomacy in general?

774 Standing Committee on External Affairs, Third Report.

The first festival was described as the ‘biggest nation-to-nation festival in history,’ and was reported as occupying ‘virtually all exhibition and performing spaces’ in London. The festival in the United States ran for eighteen months, involved five hundred events in ninety cities in thirty six states, cost ten million rupees (of which a quarter was paid by the Indian government and the remainder by various American entities), and aimed to reach one hundred and fifty million Americans. It was widely reported in the media in the United States.

The festival in the USSR was described as ‘gigantic’ and the ‘largest ever Indian manifestation in any country of the world.’ That festival included twenty exhibitions and eighty feature films, involved seventeen hundred performing artists, and took place in ninety cities. Each festival following that in the USSR was, unsurprisingly, smaller.

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776 Pupual Jaykar is quoted as saying that ‘I’ve always thought that if India has to project itself, it should project big or not at all.’ *India Today*, April 15, 1982.

777 Quoted in *India Today*, April 15, 1982.


779 William A. Henry III, “Shining legacy from the East; across the U.S., the ‘Festival of India’ brings a potpourri of culture,” *Time*, September 30, 1985. Rajiv Sethi believed the festival took place in 118 cities in the United States. The discrepancy may be due to Sethi’s inclusion of those events organised by locally-based Indian communities.

780 Rajiv Sethi, curator of the exhibitions *Aditi*, *The Golden Eye* and *Mela!* estimated that the US festival was responsible for generating about US$2billion dollars (in 2004 dollars) of media coverage in the US. Rajiv Sethi interview by the author, 25 May, 2004, Delhi. The coverage of the festivals in India is discussed later in the chapter. The festival in France, run at the same time as that in the United States, was similarly grand in scale: see *India Today*, June 15, 1985.


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The festivals of India abroad sought to achieve two main objectives. First, the festivals abroad were to present an updated image of India as a contemporary, scientifically advanced country with a great and broad cultural heritage. This aim was especially directed at countries of economic, political and strategic importance to India. Second, the festivals sought to act as a catalyst for encouraging greater investment and collaboration in the fields of technology, commerce and industry, and also stimulating the growth of tourism. In addition, two exhibitions shown in the festivals in the UK and United States: *Aditi – A Celebration of Life* (*Aditi*) and *Mela!* aimed to bring about change within India of attitudes towards and treatment of Indian folk artists.

**Objective one: presenting a modern image of India**

Prime minister Indira Gandhi was responsible for ensuring that the first festival in the UK and subsequent festival in the United States had a much expanded scope than that initially articulated in 1978. Gandhi was an ardent nationalist, as might be expected of the daughter and granddaughter of two presidents of the Indian National Congress (her father Jawaharlal Nehru and his father Motilal Gandhi). She was intensely proud of India as one of a very small number of countries founded on an ancient civilisation. She was proud of and knowledgeable about India’s cultural heritage, performers and achievements. She was personally interested in culture. She had studied at Tagore’s Santiniketan school in rural Bengal (and at Somerville College, Oxford) and had once made the comment that had she not been a politician she would have been a dancer. She saw a need for a ‘new atmosphere ‘that would create bridges of understanding and friendship amongst ordinary citizens,’ and believed that the festivals of India abroad should focus on India ‘project[ing] its contemporary, scientifically advanced image’ as well as on India’s great cultural heritage. This view was shared by her son Rajiv Gandhi, who succeeded...
his mother as prime minister following her assassination in October 1984. He believed that the festival of India in the United States ‘provided an opportunity to obtain a balanced appreciation of India’ because it brought together ‘so many facets of Indian culture.’ He wished that the festival would make more intimate the long dialogue between the United States and India.

Pupul Jayakar, whom Indira Gandhi appointed to head the programme of festivals, saw the festival of India in the United States as an opportunity to communicate to Americans ‘a vital sense of India’s heritage, her values, her ways of life, her problems, the energy of her thrust into the modern age,’ its ‘immense adventure in democracy,’ and to demonstrate ‘our ancient culture exploding with contemporary advancements in science and technology.’ For Jayakar, India and the United States had, since India’s independence in 1947, grown apart, and the men and women of the United States had been ‘divided from the Indian experience.’

For centuries India was perceived as the land of fabulous riches, of wisdom, of magic and fantasy. In recent times, the image has blurred, and India has come to be regarded as a land of teeming populations, backward poor. Statistics prove that vast developments have taken place since the independence of India; they also reveal pockets of poverty, ignorance and overpopulation.

For the first time, India could face the west in ‘complete equality.’ She believed that ‘if you can make a mark on the people of the country, ultimately it must have an impact,’ and regarded the festivals as having made a ‘fantastic change’ at the people-to-people level.

For the ICCR, the programme of festivals of India abroad was ‘conceived as the most comprehensive and ambitious manifestation of India’s past and present undertaken anywhere since Independence.’ Festivals were undertaken in those countries which were important to India, economically, politically or strategically. Government ministries and departments involved in overseeing, funding and implementing the festivals programme also saw a key

in London in 1947-48, which led to the establishment of India’s national museum. Kapila Vatsyayan, ‘Indian Exposition in Britain.’

USIS American Centre. “Canvas of Indian Culture.”


Jayakar, Festival of India, 14.


Jayakar, Festival of India. B. P. Singh, former head of India’s Department of Culture, believes the objective of the programme of festivals abroad was to ‘remove a public perception, particularly among foreigners, which generally depicted a stereotype of India as a “fossilized monolith”, a romantic and exotic land of maharajas, tigers, snake-charmers, the Taj Mahal, and, of course, grinding poverty…[the] Festivals tried to depict…the theme of continuity and change in the culture of India as a living continuum of creativity over the past 5000 years.’ Singh, India’s Culture. The State, the Arts and Beyond, 57-58.

“Passage to the West,” India Today, June 15, 1985.


Standing Committee on External Affairs, Second Report, 53.
objective of the festivals as presenting an updated image of India. The MEA noted in its annual report of 1981-1982 that the main objective of the festival of India in the UK was ‘to bring into focus, the richness and variety of the cultural heritage of India and the progress India has made in the fields of science, industry and technology, since independence.’

The objectives for the festivals of the Ministry of Human Development, within which sat the Department of Culture (the government agency responsible for organising the festivals of India), mirrored MEA’s objectives for the festivals. For the Ministry, the festivals in France and the United States presented ‘a new image of [India’s] ancient splendour and contemporary dynamism.’ The image of the ‘richness and variety of the cultural heritage of India’ would be expanded to include an understanding of ‘the progress and development which India had made in the fields of science, industry and technology.’ The Ministry noted in relation to the festivals in France and the United States that ‘programmes at universities and wide T.V. coverage would further ensure the projection of India’s image among as wide an audience as possible.’

**Objective two: a catalyst for greater investment**

The programme of festivals of India also had a quite clear commercial objective. By focusing attention on contemporary developments in India, the festivals would ‘act as a catalyst for encouraging greater investment and collaboration in the fields of technology, commerce and industry, while stimulating the growth of tourism.’ Jain believes that Pupul Jayakar, chair of India’s Handloom and Handicraft Export Corporation at the time she was appointed to chair the festivals advisory committee, played a key role in ensuring this commercial focus for the festivals. He notes that:

> Things became different when [the] festivals of India were sent. Very openly objectives were set and claims were made for...using culture for economic gain. This was Mrs Pupul Jayakar’s idea. She always said the Festivals of India should be [used] for economic gain for India.

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800 Ibid., 51.
801 Other objectives of the UK festival, according to the London correspondent for the Indian weekly journal *India Today*, ‘vary from bettering the dithering race relations, to instilling knowledge about India in the average British person.’ Bonny Mukherjee, “Passage to England,” *India Today*, March 31, 1982.
Jayakar is quoted as saying that she believed ‘these things have two sides to them…There is the aspect of culture, and there is the aspect of commerce. Many people will call me a Philistine for saying that, but what I am trying to do is take culture to the marketplace.’ In the United States, Ted Tanen, who worked very closely with Pupul Jayakar on the festival, concurred. He hoped the festival would hasten the arrival of ‘a tremendous increase in tourism and in certain kinds of trade, and possibly…collaboration in various fields of technology and industry.’ The director–general of the festival of India secretariat set up under the auspices of the Department of Culture, S. K. Mishra, noted that the immediate, concrete benefits for India from the festival in the United States would be ‘in the areas of tourism, books, movies, investment and trade.’ For India Today, the festival of India in the United States was a ‘cultural Trojan Horse carrying within its belly the armies of trade and diplomacy.’

Festival activities and the image they presented

Key individuals and ministries involved in the formulation and implementation of the programme of festivals of India, when setting out the festivals’ objectives on the presentation of an image of India, placed equal importance on presenting an image that conveyed both the greatness and breadth of India’s cultural heritage and its dynamic, contemporary, scientifically-advanced image. But despite this focus on both the new and the old, the cultural events of the festivals of India had a marked emphasis on the greatness and breadth of India’s cultural heritage. Whilst the festival in the United States, for instance, included several exhibitions which presented aspects of contemporary, scientifically-advanced India, and several exhibitions which covered both historical and contemporary periods, by far the majority of the thirty two exhibitions in the festival (about two thirds) dealt with the exposition of aspects of India’s

808 These included India, a Festival of Science, Golden Eye, and Forms From Mother Earth: Contemporary Indian Terracotta.
809 Such as Vistara: The Architecture of India and From Indian Earth. 4000 Years of Terracotta Art.
810 The festival in the United States was dominated by exhibitions. Of the thirty eight events set out in the ‘official’ catalogue, thirty two were exhibitions. The remaining events set out in that catalogue comprised theatre, music, a fair and a rock garden.
historical cultural heritage, particularly ancient civilisation and the Mughal period.\textsuperscript{811} Other events in the festival of India in the United States, such as seminars and symposia, focused more on contemporary India, including the Smithsonian’s symposium ‘The Canvas of Culture: Rediscovery of the Past as Adaptation for the Future,’\textsuperscript{812} a touring festival of Indian film, a seminar attended by Indian and American women scholars which looked at the impact of industrialisation and urbanisation on the lives of women in both countries, a seminar on India in the year 2000, and a seminar on economic problems. Whilst the events outlined in the official catalogue clearly did not represent the full festival programme, those included in the official catalogue did nevertheless provide an indication of those events deemed significant by the festival organisers, as measured by the reputation of the hosting institution, the collection from which the exhibition was derived, or the investment in and scope of the exhibition itself. The overwhelming image of India presented by the official catalogue was that of India as a great civilisation.

The focus of the festival of India in France presented a contemporary image of India as well as aspects of the breadth and civilisational depth of India’s cultural heritage. In addition to folk art forms ‘never exhibited outside [India] before…Naga dances and songs, Pandavani, Chhau and Thangta, folk songs of the Bauls, Chakri & Bhaka,’\textsuperscript{813} and ‘the best talent in classical music and dance,’ the programme in France included exhibitions on contemporary Indian art, contemporary Indian textiles (which included the work of Japanese fashion designer Issey Miyake working with Indian textiles), a three month season of Indian cinema at the Pompidou Centre, and an exhibition of the photographs taken in India by Henri Cartier-Bresson.

Similarly, the programme of the festival of India in the USSR included aspects of India’s civilisation, India’s folk traditions and contemporary India. The programme included a large number of ‘folk’ events such as performances by folk dancers, singers and theatre. Contemporary India was presented through a number of exhibitions. As anticipated by Indira Gandhi’s wish for the presentation of modern scientific India, the science and technology exhibition in Leningrad, Moscow and Tashkent, organised by India’s department of science and technology, focused on a ‘modern India with a strong industrial base and varied range of skills,’

\textsuperscript{811} For example, The Sculpture of India 3000 B.C. – 1300 A.D., Kushan Sculpture Images from Early India, Monumental Islamic Calligraphy from India and Akbar’s India Art from the Mughal City.
\textsuperscript{812} This was described in a USIS press release as the ‘scholarly centerpiece of the 18 month Festival of India,’ exploring ‘many of India’s most important scientific, religious, cultural and social science disciplines.” USIS American Centre, “News From America. Festival of India.” USIS American Centre, New Delhi, 26 June 1985.
\textsuperscript{813} Ministry of Human Development, Annual Report 1984-1985, 60.
which were essential for the building of a ‘basic infrastructure to move forward into the 21st century.’\textsuperscript{814} The exhibition incorporated aspects of Indo-Soviet collaboration in steel, heavy industry, engineering and space. Contemporary exhibitions included three curated by India’s National Gallery of Modern Art; exhibitions on contemporary textiles with a fashion show; popular art in India; a large number of symposia (almost all of which dealt with modern India); exchanges in ‘modern’ sports; a major touring film festival (which included films from both the ‘popular mass-based cinema’ and from ‘the intense and socially committed world of the relatively lesser-known ‘serious’ cinema’\textsuperscript{815}); contemporary theatre productions; and the exhibition \textit{My Land My People} aimed ‘at bringing together the children and youth of India and the USSR’ using a personalised idiom so as ‘to ensure that children are not overwhelmed and needlessly confused by the glamour of an exotic India.’\textsuperscript{816}

\textit{Commercial aspects of the festivals}

The commercial objective of the programme of festivals of India abroad was primarily to be achieved through the impact of the overall programme rather than through specific ‘commercial’ events. The increased profile of India as a modern, scientifically and technologically advanced country with substantial business opportunities and unique tourist experiences was to result in more economic activity and more tourists. Malik believes the spurt in the number of British tourists traveling to India in the 1980s was mainly ‘due to interest created…by the year long Festival of India.’\textsuperscript{817} The Indian tourist office in Frankfurt ‘reported a 20 percent rise in tourist traffic’ and this was ‘expected to go up even further’ as a result of the festival of India in Germany in 1992.\textsuperscript{818} The festivals of India abroad also included exhibitions with an intentionally commercial focus, and commercial events organised by commercial entities. \textit{Aditi, Mela!} and \textit{Golden Eye} were all conceived by Rajeev Sethi, who believed that the \textit{raison d’être} of the festival was to ‘create something permanent, to reinforce the spirit of commerce.’\textsuperscript{819} All three exhibitions reflected this ethos. \textit{Aditi} and \textit{Mela!} both provided opportunities for the sale of Indian artifacts – indeed \textit{Mela!} was, as the meaning of the word in Hindi suggests, a fair, selling Indian artifacts.

\textsuperscript{814} Festival of India Secretariat, “Festival of India in USSR 1987-88. Science and Technology.”
\textsuperscript{815} Festival of India Secretariat, “Festival of India in USSR 1987-88. Festival of Indian Films.”
\textsuperscript{816} Festival of India Secretariat, “Festival of India in USSR 1987-88. My Land My People.”
\textsuperscript{817} Malik, \textit{India and the United Kingdom}, 244. He notes that the number of travel agents and tour operators offering tours to India increased from 24 to 72 in just two years over the period 1982-1984. He also notes that films such as the \textit{Jewel in the Crown, Far Pavilions} and \textit{Gandhi} played a part as well.
\textsuperscript{818} \textit{Indian Express}, August 14, 1992.
\textsuperscript{819} \textit{India Today}, “Passage to the West,” June 15, 1985.
food and handicrafts. The exhibition *Golden Eye*, a collaboration between international designers and Indian artisans, involved international designers and architects visiting India to ‘discover craft traditions that could be used to realise their work.’

Purely commercial events organised by commercial entities included a six month ‘See India’ promotion at the UK department store Selfridges organised by the Indian Tourism Ministry, and an Indian Handicrafts Emporium boutique at the same department store. Other commercial events included sales of Indian objects by the Smithsonian, and an exhibition organised by the auction house Sotheby’s in New York drawn from the Clive collection at Powis Castle, in order to raise funds for the establishment of an Indian museum at the Castle. Hundreds of thousands of dollars of Indian artifacts and products were sold through festival events and outlets of venues at which these events took place. Kurin notes that ‘high-volume sales of Indian crafts though the Smithsonian convinced Indian government corporations of the viability of such items on the international market.’ The Indian Tourism Development Corporation’s food stall associated with *Mela!* in Washington grossed over US$200,000 in ten days, which was twice the expected amount, and the stalls of the Handicrafts and Handlooms Corporation of India, also associated with *Mela!*, sold goods to the value of Rs.700,000 in its first three days. Notwithstanding the festivals’ clear commercial objective, in the view of Rana the festivals represented a wasted opportunity:

These Festivals were not exploited to give better exposure to modern India. With a more integrated effort, the Festivals could even have become a backdrop to an investment promotion drive, for example, but such ideas were ahead of their times, before the 1991 launch of the Indian Economic Reforms….To be fair, there were some events that focused on the contemporary face of India, especially the splendid science exhibition in Boston, during the Festival in the United States. But India did miss the bus.

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823 The Smithsonian catalogue for summer 1985 featured a range of Indian objects.

824 The Clive collection was begun by Clive of India, whose career as an East India Company merchant and soldier enabled him, less than thirty years after arriving in India as the ‘eldest son of an impoverished country squire’, to own five houses, art collections and twenty thousand acres of land. Clive’s exploits paved the way for ‘Britain’s eventual domination of the Indian subcontinent.’ Jayakar, *Festival of India*, 117.


Media coverage in India of the festivals

It is useful to examine briefly some aspects of the media coverage in India of festivals in the UK, United States, France and the USSR, in order to help determine the extent to which the media may have served to magnify the impact of the festivals in India, especially through what might best be termed the ‘feel-good’ factor. This factor posits that cultural diplomacy activities of the scale of the festivals of India provide an additional aspect to the menu of subjects reported throughout India through its media, and in so doing contribute to the sense that Indians have of being members of the same, united community called India, despite their very considerable ethnic, linguistic, social, educational and economic differences.

The four festivals in the UK, United States, France and the USSR were covered in India through newspapers, weekly magazines such as India Today, on state television and on state radio. For the festival in the United States, a daily dispatch from Washington on the festival was broadcast on All India Radio over a five day period. In addition, All India Radio broadcast live a White House function attended by prime minister Rajiv Gandhi, his address to the United States Congress, and his address at a Press Club function. For the festival in France, the inaugural event, opened by prime minister Gandhi and the president of France, was broadcast on India’s national TV channel Doordarshan for one hour. A running commentary was provided in Hindi and English for four hours on All India Radio. The festivals were covered in the major English-language newspapers (The Times of India, Hindustan Times, The Hindu, Patriot, The Statesman, Indian Express and Herald Tribune), especially in the period leading up to and during the opening ceremonies of the festivals. The coverage of this period - the lead-up to a festival opening – was, for the media, a logical time to cover such an event, but the coverage was made all the more appealing for the media because of the attendance by Indira Gandhi at the opening of the UK festival in London in 1982, and the attendance by Rajiv Gandhi at the openings of the festivals in France in 1985, the United States in 1985, and the USSR in 1987. This high-level attendance meant that newspaper reporting of the four festivals covered both the festival and the prime ministerial visits. For example, the Times of India, reported under the heading ‘PM will

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829 France’s second TV channel, Atene 2, covered the opening event of the festival of India in France.
830 This newspaper coverage (the term incorporates news magazines such as India Today) included, of the UK festival, stories in the Times of India (over the period 16 March to 31 March 1982, of fourteen stories, five appeared on the front page) and India Today; of the United States festival, stories in the Hindustan Times (over the period 13 – 18 June 1985, of the eleven stories, six appeared on the front page and two as editorials), The Hindu (‘India comes alive in the United States,’ 11 June 1985), Patriot, The Statesman, Indian Express and Evening News; of the festival in France coverage in the Times of India, Hindustan Times, The Hindu, Patriot, The Statesman, Indian Express and India Today; and of the festival in the USSR stories in the National Herald, Indian Express, Hindustan Times, Times of India and India Today.
brighten festival of India,’ that ‘New Delhi’s biggest image refurbishing exercise in recent times in this part of the world will begin when Mrs Indira Gandhi arrives here on Sunday evening to see the Festival of India off to a good start.’

Indian media coverage of the festivals of India abroad was celebratory of India and its leaders. There were, as might be expected, stories about India’s place in the world (‘Soviets laud India’s role,’ ‘India, America allies in freedom and peace’), and on the response to the festival by leaders and audiences (‘three giants of the musical world...performed before a captivated audience,’ and ‘India, Indira great: Muscovites’). Some stories emphasised the scale and nature of the festival: the Hindustan Times, for example, reported that ‘the world’s largest cultural explosion got off to a grand start,’ and the same newspaper reported on the opening of the festival of India in the USSR under the headline ‘Kremlin witnesses Indian splendour.’ The Times of India reported that the festival of India in the UK would present the ‘rich and fabulous panorama of the arts of India as well as the scientific and technological achievements of the country.’ The same newspaper said that ‘Commentators agree that...the scope and variety of the event are staggering and their impact on the British public is bound to be immense.’ Some stories reported on the success of the festival (‘A Spectacular Success’), and others on those attending the festival opening. For example, the Times of India, under the headline ‘Galaxy of VIPs for Festival’ reported that the opening gala concert presented by ‘India’s celebrated artistes’ would be attended by Prince Charles, Mrs Gandhi and Mrs Thatcher.

Stories in the India media also reported on the volume and quality of coverage by media of the countries in which the festivals took place. An eleven page cover story on the festival of India in the United States by the weekly magazine India Today, for example, detailed at length the extent of the coverage of the festival in the United States in the Washington Post, USA Today, Vanity Fair and Town and Country (as well as ‘the leading magazine for coin collectors, Coin World,’ which India Today reported ‘had declared 1985 ‘The Year of India’’). And one of the Times of

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831 Times of India, March 20, 1982.
833 Hindustan Times, June 14, 1985.
834 Times of India, March 24, 1982.
836 Hindustan Times, June 14, 1985.
842 “Passage to the West,” India Today, June 15, 1985.
India stories on the USSR festival reported on the response to Rajiv Gandhi’s visit to Moscow in *Pravda* and other major national dailies.\(^{843}\)

The Indian media also reported on the reception abroad to India’s prime ministers: not merely how well the prime minister had been received (‘Red Carpet Welcome in Paris,’\(^{844}\) the ‘rare gesture’ of the British prime minister meeting Indira Gandhi at the airport,\(^{845}\) ‘Warm White House welcome to Rajiv,’\(^{846}\) ), or on the success of the visit (‘Shultz: Visit a great success’\(^{847}\) ), but also on aspects of the prime ministers’ character and appearance. The *Times of India*, in a story under the headline ‘PM will brighten festival of India,’ described Indira Gandhi as a ‘politician of...standing and eminence.’\(^{848}\) The same newspaper reported that Mrs Gandhi would be the ‘star’ at the Festival of India when it opened, and reported that the *Observer* newspaper had run a lengthy profile (under the ‘somewhat mischievous headline ‘The Last Empress of India’’) in which it suggested that both Prince Charles and Mrs Thatcher would ‘find themselves cast into shadow by the overpowering presence of India’s own prime minister.’\(^{849}\) The characterisation of Rajiv Gandhi emphasised his youth and vigour. The *Hindustan Times*, under a headline ‘A Vibrant India Projected,’ said that ‘even hardened United States newsmen wondered how the Prime Minister managed to remain so unruffled and fresh in spite of the grueling pace.’\(^{850}\) *India Today* reported that ‘one commentator described Rajiv as the ‘computer boy who had the grace of a young rajah who had abandoned his turban and his jewels.’\(^{851}\) The same magazine reported as well on Rajiv Gandhi’s Italian-born wife, Sonia and their children: ‘the prime minister and Sonia Gandhi appeared to have charmed both the media and the public. Newspapers eulogised the “handsome and dignified couple” and their well-behaved children.’\(^{852}\)

**Conclusion**

India’s cultural diplomacy, particularly the festivals programme, presents abroad an image of India as a great country, a member of a small, privileged club of countries whose cultural and historical foundations were civilisations, and a contemporary, scientifically advanced country

\(^{844}\) *Hindustan Times*, June 7, 1985.
\(^{847}\) *Hindustan Times*, June 16, 1985.
\(^{848}\) *Times of India*, March 20, 1982.
\(^{850}\) *Hindustan Times*, June 16, 1985.
(although this aspect has in practice given less emphasis). This image of India has not been tied to a national brand. The presentation of India’s image abroad has sought to advance India’s interests, and has also been undertaken to achieve domestic objectives.

In recent years, the cultural diplomacy of the ICCR has placed greater emphasis on trade and economic diplomacy, and there have been signs of greater emphasis being placed by the ICCR on showing the more dynamic and modern face of contemporary India, its position as an economic power and a technology giant in the making.

In contrast to the cultural diplomacy of Canada, India’s cultural diplomacy has not been used to protect India’s cultural identity against threats from foreign cultural influences. India’s strong sense of itself, its ‘Indian-ness,’ has remained remarkably undiluted since it became independent. This was true even after India’s increased engagement with other countries since the 1990s. If anything, the increased international engagement since that period provided India with greater opportunities to show its own cultural uniqueness, such as the films of Bollywood and its cuisine, to other countries.

The festivals of India were used by Indira Gandhi (continued by her son) to ‘put the record straight.’ They showed a country fiercely aware and proud of its former greatness; adverse to national slights; able to draw on a wealth of civilisational cultural heritage when undertaking cultural diplomacy; which had few anxieties about the strength of its cultural identity; an independent and rapidly modernising country which, since its Independence, had been through a period of extraordinary domestic conflict, including assassinations, wars, famines, communal riots and terrorism, all of which had been widely reported abroad, often in a simplistic or clichéd manner. As Henry noted, ‘when India has broken through the legacy of its storybook history, it has emerged in Western consciousness as the land of assassination and religious riots, of chemical disaster in Bhopal and the nuclear arms race with Pakistan. Or, more trivially, as the land of tandoori chicken and the Nehru jacket.’853 This was a view shared by India Today:

In the French media, interpretation of Indian events often comes in a bizarre mix. The rare special supplement on the Indian economy – usually a slapdash affair, essentially designed to generate advertising revenue – is interspersed with the outlandish idiosyncratic profiles of a Phoolan Devi or an Amitabh Bachchan. What does receive regular coverage is the mayhem in Punjab or carnage in Assam, intrigues in Kashmir or fostering of the Tamil guerilla movement in southern India. ‘Consider the resultant mix,’

says a retired French diplomat, ‘you have all this bloodletting along with all those freak, weird stories. Is it any wonder an average Frenchman doesn’t have a clue about India.’

In this respect, it is pertinent to draw on the observation by the New Zealand historian, James Belich, who notes that ‘cultures under siege retreat to their citadels.’ The state of India, in the 1980s and 1990s, through the festivals, retreated to its citadel, the greatness of its civilisation. This focus can also be seen as a way of appealing to pre-existing concepts of culture and image, of attracting audiences through aspects of India about which they may already have some knowledge, which is likely to be easily accessible (lacking the challenge of aspects contemporary India’s politics and society), which is impressive by any standards, impressive to a wide range of audiences, and is in accordance with the image which India wishes others to have of it.

It can also be argued that India’s presentation of an image of itself abroad, through its cultural diplomacy, contributed to its sense of national unity through the ‘feel good factor.’ This was particularly true of the impact of the programme of festivals of India held abroad: whilst the ongoing work of the ICCR had this same impact, its activities by their very nature were less able to be used to (and were less likely to) attract media attention. Robyn Jeffrey’s study of the newspaper revolution in India showed that that revolution, which saw an extraordinary increase in the number of newspapers, languages used by them, their coverage throughout India, and number and type of readers, did not result in the undermining of the unity of the Indian state. It had the opposite impact. The small number of owners of the largest newspapers in Indian languages knew that their continuing power, profitability, and above all, respect, depended on big national and multi-national advertisers. Jeffrey notes that:

> the owners…acted as hinges, linking their regions and the Indian states in a variety of conscious and unconscious ways…the overall thrust of their news-gathering and dissemination was to propagate subliminal ideas about the existence and legitimacy of an Indian state and an Indian nation…The daily consumption of a newspaper seemed to affirm the existence of other people of the same nationality who, newspapers reminded readers every day, were also reading their newspapers…[which] used Indian news agencies to report Indian weather, Indian cricket, Indian stockmarket prices and Indian politics and to remind us editorially every so often that we were Indians.

To this list might be added ‘Indian triumphs abroad.’ The positive coverage of a great India, with a great leader such as Indira Gandhi (or in Rajiv Gandhi’s case, a handsome leader with a beautiful wife) had the same effect in India as reportage on the success of Indian cricket teams, or

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855 Belich, Paradise Reforged, 540.
856 This point is made with regard to China by Bound, Briggs, Holden and Jones, Cultural Diplomacy, 59.
857 Jeffrey, India’s Newspaper Revolution, 8-9.
of Indian armed forces against Pakistan. All contributed to a sense of being Indian and of being a citizen of a state called India.

With regard to general insights into cultural diplomacy provided by this examination of India’s cultural diplomacy, three stand out.

First, India’s cultural diplomacy has sought both to enhance mutual understanding and advance India’s interests.

The objectives and the practice of the ICCR’s programme since its establishment in 1950 have had a strong emphasis on the enhancement of mutual understanding through the reciprocal exchange of people. India’s scholarships programme, for instance, focused on students from developing countries, particularly those from countries contiguous or near to India, and has been undertaken in part because of an old-fashioned and genuine commitment to supporting beneficially mutual relationships between India and other countries. The ongoing work of the ICCR and the programme of festivals of India abroad advanced India’s interests by facilitating smoother political and economic relations with other countries. The ICCR provided opportunities for interaction between political leaders, members of elites, and for people-to-people contact in a wide range of situations (from passive viewing of performances to significant personal interaction). It provided young, bright students from the Third World with opportunities to study and travel. A number of these students eventually took up very important positions in their own countries, and were, given the invariably positive experience they had had when students in India, well placed to help with the pursuit of Indian diplomacy.

By the first years of the 21st century, India’s cultural diplomacy was becoming more associated with advancing India’s economic and trade interests, at a time when both were becoming more important. The ICCR’s network of cultural centres provided an increasingly more effective method of using the huge and wealthy Indian diaspora to advance India’s interests abroad.

Second, whilst India’s cultural diplomacy has moved towards a greater recognition of the country’s modernism, its economic and scientific progress (not just its rich civilisational heritage), one must nevertheless wonder about the capacity of the ICCR to completely reflect India’s dynamism through its activities. In the first years of the 21st century the ICCR indeed recognised that its activities should better reflect the presentation abroad of India’s cultural and economic dynamism. Not even an organisation as conservative as the ICCR was able to resist the impact of the new India. India at the start of the 21st century was not only increasingly integrated
into the global economy and into global political issues, but was gaining more confidence in its ability to perform on the international stage as the great power it believed itself to be.\textsuperscript{858} The reasons for this growing confidence included, \textit{inter alia}, India’s well-performing economy (indicators included high annual growth rates, reserves in excess of US$100 billion, and an IT sector that was an international role model); the international success and profile of its film industry; the success of its diaspora; and increased recognition by and involvement with significant powers, particularly the United States, in regional security issues. All these reasons were underpinned by an abiding belief amongst political, bureaucratic and business elites, and the Indian population at large, of India’s significant place in the world, and that India’s time had come.

But in the author’s view, based on his interaction with members of the ICCR over a period of three years, and on discussions with those in India and abroad who had dealt with the ICCR, the reputation of the ICCR was deservedly low, and the successive criticisms of the ICCR and its management by the Parliament of India, and by the MEA, were fully justified. One need only visit the ICCR’s headquarters in Delhi to conclude that the organisation was moribund and was in need of a major overhaul. The ICCR continuously failed to take advantage of the extraordinary opportunities which were available to it in the pursuit of cultural diplomacy. These included a willingness of politicians to support with funds an expansion of the ICCR’s activities; the extraordinary range of cultural forms and expressions in India (an almost unmatched combination of civilisational heritage, popular cultural manifestations such as film, and a range of world class contemporary art practices); and the willingness of the Indian diaspora to make all this happen. Furthermore, the management and work of the ICCR has remained a very low priority for the MEA. Consequently the unimaginative cultural diplomacy of the ICCR has made possibly the most fascinating and dynamic county in the world look staid and dull.

Third, as alluded to above, the focus of much of the ICCR’s activities (those which comprise a substantial part of its overall work and budget) has been on countries in the developing world. All but three of the sixteen cultural centres have been established in less developed countries, and as noted above, the ICCR’s scholarships programme has overwhelmingly had a focus on students from less developed countries.

\textsuperscript{858} India’s decision, in January 2005, not to accept international aid to assist with the aftermath of the tsunami of 26 December 2005 can be seen as part of this process of growing confidence in its place in the world. Not only did India refuse aid, it provided aid to both Sri Lanka and the Maldives.
India’s cultural diplomacy has not only put the record straight and contributed to national unity through the ‘feel good’ factor, but has also enabled Indian artists of varying ethnic and religious backgrounds to interact with one another, and has increased awareness of the importance to India of its culture, of the preservation of cultural artifacts and of its artists. The programme of festivals abroad acted as an impetus to the staging, in 1986 in Delhi, of the festival of India held in India (titled Apna Ustav), which the Times of India noted was a ‘carefully planned and executed effort to promote a new, modern idea of Indian-ness and indeed a novel idea of modern India’ which was ‘not elitist or parochial: it seeks to transcend all those frontiers of caste, religion, class and language.’ The festivals abroad also led to the establishment of the seven cultural zones, and to the establishment of a new national organisation, the Indian National Trust for Art and Cultural Heritage.

In the following concluding chapter, the insights, explications, contrasts and comparisons of the case studies related to the three themes with which this thesis has been concerned and to cultural diplomacy in general will be set out, along with a number of aspects of the subject which warrant further research, and implications that these findings may have on policy relating to cultural diplomacy and diplomacy.

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859 Kurin notes that Banku Patua, one of the Indian artisans participating in the Festival of India in the United States, composed a story of people of many religions eating together. See Kurin, “Cultural Conservation through Representation, 338.
861 For a discussion of the zones, see Singh, India’s Culture, 56. Rajev Sethi credits Rajiv Gandhi with the idea of the seven zones. Rajiv Sethi, interview by the author, May 25, 2004, Delhi.
862 INTACH as it is known in India. Krishna Menon, interview by the author, 2004, Delhi.
Chapter Six: Conclusion

In this thesis, I have been concerned with exploring, through case studies of the cultural diplomacy of Canada, New Zealand and India, three aspects of the practice of cultural diplomacy. These are: 1) cultural diplomacy’s role in presenting abroad a national image, potentially as part of a national brand; 2) the role that cultural diplomacy, defined as that part of diplomacy which seeks to advance national cultural interests, plays in the protection of cultural sovereignty; and 3) the role of cultural diplomacy in advancing national domestic objectives, and the domestic impacts of cultural diplomacy. I have also sought to explicate from the case studies greater insight into general aspects of the subject, including the practice’s instrumentality (its use as an instrument of diplomacy), its objectives, and the range and type of cultural activities used by practitioners.

In this concluding chapter, I begin by drawing on the understanding gained from the case studies to develop the three themes. I then set out a number of general insights, comparisons and contrasts about cultural diplomacy which have been highlighted by the case studies. I conclude by examining the policy implications of these findings and suggesting a number of aspects of the subject which warrant further research.

Theme one - cultural diplomacy’s role in presenting abroad a national image, potentially as part of a national brand

The cultural diplomacy of all three countries examined in these case studies has been concerned with presentation of a national image. The cultural diplomacy of both the Canadian federal government and of Québec has emphasised their respective images. In the case of Canada’s federal government, the image presented abroad has emphasised that Canada was not simply a nation of forests and lakes (‘mountains, moose and Mounties’), but also a multicultural, modern, creative, innovative, technologically advanced and ‘cutting-edge’ nation. Québec has sought to show itself as distinctive: the only French speaking polity of the American continent.

In New Zealand, the move towards an emphasis on national image in its cultural diplomacy occurred in the later part of the 1990s, and early years of the 21st century. Prior to that, image was irrelevant in New Zealand’s cultural diplomacy. The recent emphasis on image has been aimed at showing New Zealand to be ‘unique, creative, innovative and “moving ahead”;’ and to be more than a country of pristine scenery. This focus has, in the newest discrete cultural diplomacy programme, tended to emphasise the innovative side of modern New Zealand, rather

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than its distinctiveness, particularly the distinct culture of New Zealand’s indigenous people, the Maori. In India, the cultural diplomacy of the festivals sought to show India as a great civilisation and a contemporary, scientifically advanced country, although in practice India’s great civilisation received greater emphasis. Some of the recent activities of the ICCR have sought to convey a contemporary image of India as an economic power and as a technology giant in the making. It is possible to say that the cultural diplomacy represented by these three case studies (or four if Québec is considered a separate case) indicates not simply that each state presents an image of itself in its cultural diplomacy, but that there has been an increase, in recent years, on the focus which their cultural diplomacy has placed on presenting a national image, and a shift from an emphasis on the traditional to the modern.

The link between cultural diplomacy’s presentation of a national image and national brand (a strategic, thought-out approach to using the articulation of a national identity to achieve national objectives, often using a brand slogan) has been shown to be much less clear. India’s national brand was only resurrected in 2003. Canada has undertaken a number of national branding exercises, and each has targeted a different group or sector abroad, and has emphasised different messages. These efforts have revealed the limitations of a national brand. In Canada’s case, efforts have had to cope with inter-agency turf battles, competition from provinces, and, in one instance, problems interpreting what was meant by one of several slogans used for a brand. In the world of branding, the trend has been towards more rather than fewer brands, and the more brands there are, the greater the chance that the messages of those brands will run counter to one another. Québec’s cultural diplomacy can be viewed as simultaneously having both the strongest and weakest link to a national brand: on the one hand, Québec has no national brand, on the other, the province is its own brand.

The clearest link between image and brand has been that of the cultural diplomacy of New Zealand. Its most recent manifestation, the Cultural Diplomacy International Programme, had a clear objective of linking cultural activity to New Zealand’s national brand ‘proposition.’ Programme messages of the initiative were not to be inconsistent with the national brand position of clean, green, innovative, creative and technologically advanced. This was despite the contradiction inherent in two important components of New Zealand’s branding, that of the brand used by Tourism New Zealand, which has focussed on a clean and green New Zealand seemingly devoid of cities or economic advancement, and that of the brand used by New Zealand Trade and
Enterprise, which has focussed on the modern New Zealand economy, so as to show that New Zealand was much more than simply clean and green.

A range of outcomes has been sought by the use of a national image in the cultural diplomacy of Canada, New Zealand and India. They have all used the presentation of a modern image of themselves to help advance their respective economic interests, to make themselves more attractive in order to attract foreign direct investment, students, tourists, filmmakers and so on. But India’s presentation of its image abroad, in the festivals programme, was not simply about advancing national interests - it sought also to counter stereotypical perceptions of India, as a matter of pride. A country with a great history and future prospects, and an elite which was fiercely proud of India, wished to be duly recognised for its former great achievements and recent progress.

The federal government of Canada has sought, through the presentation of a modern image of Canada which has stressed its multiculturalism, to assert its right to speak for Canada abroad. The stress has not been biculturalism, on English-speaking and French-speaking Canada, but rather on an aspect of modern Canada which served to diminish the distinctive position that Québec has in the federation. The emphasis on multiculturalism has been entirely constructed: the emphasis could quite easily have been on Canada’s first nations as on its large number of ethnic and linguistic groups, of which Québec is simply one of many. And indeed the emphasis could just have easily been on Québec’s uniqueness. The Canadian federal government’s emphasis on multiculturalism has been tied up with the federal government’s goal of undermining the efforts of Québec to assert more forcefully its position in the Canadian federation, and had its foundations in former prime minister Pierre Trudeau’s agenda to counter Québécois’ claims to sovereignty. Trudeau sought to negate Québec’s claims to special-ness by subsuming that special-ness in a national identity based on bilingualism and multiculturalism.

Why has there been a renewed emphasis on national image in the practice of cultural diplomacy? This partly has been due to the practice of cultural diplomacy adapting to changes in diplomacy in general, and to public diplomacy. Image has become important for countries: for example, the UK wishes to be ‘recognised internationally as a world-class knowledge economy,’ the Australian government aims to project an image of Australia as a ‘stable, sophisticated, tolerant nation with a rich and diverse culture,’ and Singapore wishes to be seen

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865 Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada. *Cultural Program*. 
as a ‘multi-cultural, cosmopolitan and vibrant city-state.’ Image has become important for countries because in the economic world of globalisation, countries must compete (or at least feel as though they must) for foreign direct investment, skilled migrants, high-worth individuals, tourists, students and others, and countries have come to believe that their chances of competing successfully would be enhanced by showing their national image to those investing, or moving, or studying. The broad practice of diplomacy has more frequently focussed on national image, often, as we have seen, through public diplomacy. The same forces which have brought about changes to the practice of diplomacy in general, with its increased emphasis on public diplomacy, and on national image, have also brought about changes to the emphases of cultural diplomacy. This was to be expected. A government which was of the view that its diplomacy must keep pace with changes in the international environment, had dedicated greater resources to the practice of public diplomacy (and hence to the presentation of national image), and had possibly come to conceptualise cultural diplomacy as a component of public diplomacy, would wish also to ensure that its cultural diplomacy also adapted to change. A practice that formerly may have had little to do with national image (but everything to do with advancing national interests), which in most cases was viewed by governments as a tool of diplomacy, was bound to have been adapted to show a modern national image in the new competitive world of globalisation.

The renewed emphasis on national image in the practice of cultural diplomacy also concerns the nature of the practice itself – the ‘cultural’ part of cultural diplomacy. Culture can show a state’s personality in a way that connects with people: the culture of cultural diplomacy can show the ‘true’ nature of a state and its people in a world of the ‘virtual,’ the constructed, the doubted, and the fleeting. The national image presented abroad through cultural diplomacy has not simply been a set of facts and figures, or postcards, or sound-bites, or a tourist promotion slogan. And cultural diplomacy can go to the very heart of a state’s identity. In the Cold War, for instance, cultural diplomacy was a powerful method of showing what a state stood for - its values, and ideas. It showed as well the power of the freedom of speech: the United States was able to exert a powerful influence on people in the USSR because some of the culture used in its cultural diplomacy seemed genuinely to be that of a state which did not proscribe such a freedom. This revelation served to highlight the contrast between the two political systems represented by the Cold War’s main protagonists. In peace time, issues of national identity and national pride, and which group has the right to speak on behalf of a state, can become very important in those

866 Ibid.
states in which there are disputes about the role, or legitimacy, or status of parts of the state, for example racial minorities such as Maori, religious groups such as Muslims, and linguistic groups such as those who speak French. Cultural diplomacy is a practice of diplomacy which has the strongest connection to the practitioner of that diplomacy, to the state showing itself to the world. Cultural diplomacy can be seen as that aspect of diplomacy which most strongly conveys, but also reinforces, the character, values and culture of a state.

**Theme two - cultural diplomacy’s role in protecting cultural sovereignty**

The second theme of this thesis concerns the role which cultural diplomacy may play in protecting a state’s cultural sovereignty. It can be argued that any cultural diplomacy, from the purely instrumental (that used solely as a tool of diplomacy rather than seeking to advance mutual understanding) to the purely domestically focussed, contributes to a state’s cultural sovereignty, but the focus here has been on those instances of the practice that have been undertaken within a framework of activity that has served explicitly to enable a state to strengthen its own cultural ‘voice,’ in order to resist a perceived cultural threat from another state.

Cultural diplomacy has been shown most clearly to have played a role in protecting the cultural sovereignty of Canada, and of Québec.

In the case of the federal government of Canada, efforts to protect its cultural sovereignty have involved both protection and promotion, carried out within a national cultural and foreign policy framework which simultaneously seeks to preserve a space for Canadian culture whilst supporting free trade (and incurring the obligations which free trade agreements place on a state) and continued, substantial, foreign cultural imports. These imports, particularly those from the United States, have the strong advantage of drawing on a huge United States domestic market, one of a number of factors which have meant that Canada’s cultural producers have not been a match for foreign cultural producers. Successive Canadian governments have adhered to the notion that closer economic integration with other countries, particularly the United States, demands strong domestic cultures and cultural expression so as to maintain a strong sense of national identity, because culture has been seen as a crucial element of Canada’s national identity. Canadian identity sets Canada apart from other nations, especially the United States (ensuring Canada is not a ‘pale imitation of anyone else’), helps build a cohesive, multicultural society, a sense of community and a sense of pride in Canada, and as is regarded by some as a critical tool in the task of nation building because it represents the values that make Canada

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867 Frulla, “How Culture Defines Who We Are.”
distinct from other nations. The Canadian government’s response to the combined issues of foreign cultural invasion and a deeply held belief in the importance of protecting and supporting Canadian culture has involved a raft of measures (tariffs, taxes, quotas, restrictions on ownership, and restrictions on content) and has been supported by two main cultural diplomacy initiatives: ensuring that international agreements to which Canada was a party allowed Canada to support and protect its cultural sector, and promoting Canadian culture abroad, through the foreign ministry and Canadian Heritage. Federal cultural diplomacy placed considerable emphasis initially on securing a cultural exception within the multilateral free trade framework (the WTO and GATS), and, when this approach failed, on the promulgation of the new UNESCO instrument for the protection of cultural diversity. The latter was regarded as a new method of providing support to and protection of domestic cultural industries without compromising or running counter to Canada’s pro free trade policy. There has been a sense that this instrument has had as much to do with expressing a symbolic stance against the pervasiveness of American cultural exports as it has had to do with giving countries the right to support their cultural industries. This is because the full power of the new instrument has yet to be tested. Rather than overriding trade-related agreements, the new instrument may be subservient to them.\textsuperscript{868}

The federal government’s cultural diplomacy has also incorporated the promotion of Canadian culture though its diplomatic network, including support for international cultural tours, supporting Canadian studies abroad, and supporting the international activities of Canada’s cultural industries.

In the case of Québec, its efforts to protect its cultural sovereignty have included its diplomacy associated with the new UNESCO instrument; the preservation internationally of the French language; the promulgation of a range of international agreements, and in negotiating with the federal government its role within international agreements and fora. Québec also supported artists, arts companies and cultural industries in Québec and abroad (some C$20 million was spent on this alone). I have argued that Québec’s cultural diplomacy can be viewed as having been entirely concerned with the protection of Québec’s cultural sovereignty, not against the threat of cultural ‘invasion’ by another country such as the United States, but against the threat posed by the Canadian federation. Québec’s sovereignty is cultural. As the Gérin-

\textsuperscript{868} It should be noted that cultural diplomacy, even when of an entirely instrumental nature (used as a tool of diplomacy, rather than as a way of advancing mutual understanding, or achieving domestic impacts), frequently helps arts companies and artists achieve an international profile, gain international experience, and increase the size of international audiences, and this contributes to their viability.
Lajoie doctrine states, ‘Québec is more than a simple, federated state among other federated states. It is the political instrument of a cultural group, distinct and unique in all of North America.’

Québec’s cultural diplomacy has sought to support Québec’s continuing cultural distinctiveness, to overcome Québec’s sense of displacement within an Anglo federation, and to protect its power within the federation. The protection of the powers of a state from another state can be regarded as a workable definition of sovereignty. Québec has, since the Quiet Revolution, been engaged in what it has viewed as a battle to keep hold of those rights provided to it under the Canadian constitution, which the province has insisted include the international capability in its domestic fields of jurisdiction, such as culture, education and immigration. In addition, it has been Québec’s view that its identity and interests were becoming more often constrained by restrictive international standards negotiated by international organisations or at international conferences, and that the federal government was negotiating more international agreements which required implementation in part or in whole by the provinces. Both these processes were resulting in an encroachment of Québec’s jurisdiction.

By contrast, the cultural diplomacy of New Zealand has been involved in advancing national cultural interests, and supporting national cultural industries, but this has not been undertaken within a framework of seeking to protect a distinctive New Zealand voice. The same applies to the cultural diplomacy of India.

In the context of the protection of cultural sovereignty, the concept of ‘invisible borders’ advanced by Patricia Goff, is relevant. In Goff’s view, Canada’s significant role in the trade disputes over culture is indicative of a process of ‘reinforcing …conceptual borders held in place by cultural particularity (and)…collective identity.’ Because liberalisation threatens to erase Canada’s borders, the ‘Canadian government has worked to erect invisible borders in an effort to resist the political and cultural integration that can accompany economic integration.’ In this view, cultural diplomacy, to the extent that it contributes to the protection of cultural sovereignty, can be seen as serving to help erect conceptual, cultural, borders.

**Theme three - the role of cultural diplomacy in advancing national domestic objectives, and the domestic impacts of cultural diplomacy**

In chapter one, I drew a distinction between objectives and impacts, noting that a domestic objective implies a conscious decision on the part of the state undertaking cultural diplomacy to

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869 Government of Québec, *Québec’s Positions on Constitutional and Intergovernmental Issues.*
871 Ibid., 549.
use the practice not to advance its national interests abroad, but to achieve benefit ‘at home.’ By contrast, a domestic impact implies that such an impact was not so much intended from the outset but rather a happy by-product of the practice.

The Canadian and New Zealand case studies have provided examples of cultural diplomacy having been undertaken in order to achieve domestic objectives.

In the case of federal Canada, that part of its cultural diplomacy associated with cultural agreements has been implicated in the battle for the right of the federal government to be Canada’s only diplomatic voice, and, at one stage, as an element in the federal government’s agenda to counter Québec’s claims to sovereignty. In the case of Québec, its cultural diplomacy has had the domestic objective of asserting in the Canadian federation the distinctive state called Québec and protecting the constitutional rights of Québec. At one period of time, Québec’s cultural diplomacy was used to bolster the province’s push to political sovereignty.

The exhibition *Te Maori* was supported as a cultural diplomacy project not only because it would advance New Zealand’s interests in the United States, but also because it would advance Maori interests in New Zealand. It would make Pakeha more aware of the value of Maori culture, through international recognition, and Maori more proud of their culture and more aware of it, for the same reason. As I note in chapter four, this domestic objective was not merely a by-product of the exhibition’s success. It was a stated, intentional objective of the government. The examination of New Zealand’s cultural diplomacy also provides other instances of cultural diplomacy having domestic objectives. The Cultural Exchange Programme of the 1970s had the domestic objective of supporting New Zealand’s cultural development, a type of nation-building project, and the Asia: New Zealand Foundation sought to enhance national social cohesion by contributing to a greater acceptance of things Asian in New Zealand, in part by bringing Asian culture to New Zealand.

All three cases studies have highlighted a number of domestic impacts of cultural diplomacy. One such impact I have described as the ‘feel good’ factor, the domestic impact of positive international recognition for a state’s culture and its cultural success which contributes to a state’s sense of itself, its sense of being a distinctive national community of the type suggested by Benedict Anderson in his seminal work *Imagined Communities*. This ‘feel good’ impact can be discerned in Canada and Québec with international reaction to their respective cultural successes. The exhibition *Te Maori* had this impact: following the international success

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872 Anderson, *Imagined Communities*. 

231
of Te Maori, New Zealand had a better sense that it was a country that was unique, and well
defined, an imagined community in which its citizens saw themselves as members of a distinct
community that was in part defined by Maori culture. The same was true with the national
reaction in New Zealand to the success of The Lord of the Rings film trilogy (with which
government-funded cultural diplomacy was associated), and in India with national reaction to the
festivals of India. National reaction to international cultural success (mostly commercial in
nature, sometimes made possible through cultural diplomacy) can be viewed as an addition to the
menu of activity which enables a disparate group of people to become the sort of imagined
community envisaged by Anderson. It is worth noting that the degree of domestic impacts of
national reaction to international cultural success will always be proscribed by the extent of
media coverage.

It might also be argued that the ‘feel good’ factor contributes to a state’s confidence,
which in the case of New Zealand, has become an important component of their national
economic agenda, and nation-building. In recent years the New Zealand government has
consciously sought to use the resources of the state to engender a greater confidence in New
Zealanders, on the basis that a confident New Zealand is better able to meet a range of national
objectives. But the link between this agenda, and the cultural diplomacy of New Zealand, has
been shown to be at best tenuous. In the case of New Zealand’s most recent discrete cultural
diplomacy programme, the Cultural Diplomacy International Programme, the minister with
responsibility for that programme did not support the publicising of the programme in New
Zealand – the focus for publicity was entirely abroad. That reflected the primary impetus for that
programme, which was to advance New Zealand’s economic interests and raise its profile abroad.
But the general principle seems nevertheless to be relevant: that a state’s confidence in itself (in
part its capacity to engage internationally) is likely to be enhanced when the state gains
international recognition, from cultural, sporting, business, diplomatic or any other success.

Several other domestic impacts have been discerned in the cultural diplomacy of the three
countries examined. The festivals of India led to a series of festivals of India in India, helped
change attitudes to the importance of cultural preservation, and changed the perception amongst
Indians (including Rajiv Gandhi) of the value of the achievements of Indian folk artists and of the
marketability of Indian crafts. In a similar vein, New Zealand’s Te Maori exhibition established
new practices in New Zealand museums.
There can also be discerned what might be termed an evangelical motivation for the support for cultural diplomacy by politicians in Canada and New Zealand, a desire to show each state to the world, regardless of whether this would advance national interests, or achieve domestic impacts. A state should show itself to the world because the world deserves to know about the state, because the state has a special-ness that can only be admired. Canada has shown such a motivation in its recent foreign policy. The world needs more Canada because Canada has characteristics (such as its multi-culturalism) which, were they to be replicated internationally, would make for a better world. States, and the political elites that run them, invariably are proud of their achievements, and wish others to know of them. The cultural diplomacy of India, in the programme of festivals, seemed in part to have been supported by Indira Gandhi because it was time to ‘put the record straight,’ to counter stereotypical versions of India held by the citizens, leaders, or media, of other countries.

General insights and contrasts
In addition to providing an opportunity to explore the three themes set out above, the examination of the cultural diplomacy of Canada, New Zealand and India in this thesis has provided a number of insights into and contrasts about cultural diplomacy in general. These include cultural diplomacy’s use as a tool of diplomacy, an increased focus on using cultural diplomacy to advance economic interests that have a cultural aspect, a revitalisation of the importance of the cultural agreement, a lessening of cultural diplomacy’s normative objectives, and the official characteristic of cultural diplomacy.

General insight one: an instrument of diplomacy
The three case studies suggest that cultural diplomacy maintains its utility as an instrument of diplomacy. Cultural diplomacy has been used to develop Canada’s relationship with the United States, cement Québec’s relationship with the international community of French-speaking polities, improve New Zealand’s bilateral relationship with the UK, enhance India’s relationships with countries which have a large Indian population, and enhance India’s relationship with Indian communities in those countries. Cultural diplomacy has been used to send a message to a government that a relationship is important (such as New Zealand’s gift of a sacred white horse to a shrine in Japan) and to show the international community of states the importance that is attached to a particular issue, such as the push to have ratified the new UNESCO instrument. The practice has been used to counter negative impacts of contentious issues: the exhibition Te Maori,
was undertaken in part to counter the impact that its ban on visits to New Zealand by nuclear-powered and armed ships had on New Zealand’s relationship with the United States, the state of Gujarat used an aspect of its culture to attract investors in the wake of the murder of Muslims in the state, and the festivals of India sought to counter negative perceptions of the country. Cultural diplomacy has been used to develop economic and trade relationships – a focus of the cultural diplomacy of all three countries, but particularly of New Zealand and Canada – and to advance the interests of specific groups, such as Maori in New Zealand.

Scholarship on cultural diplomacy, and insights informally proffered by diplomats, suggest that the practice continues to be viewed as a valuable instrument of diplomacy by other countries. As noted in chapter one, a recent Australian ambassador to France regarded cultural diplomacy as the most powerful tool at her disposal because it opened doors to the most important contacts, and was a powerful way of showing Australia’s sophistication in a country which paid attention to culture, and to countries showing their culture in France. The ambassador noted that President Chirac had mentioned to her three times how much he appreciated the Australian contribution to the new Musée du Quai Branly in Paris, a project in which Chirac had taken considerable personal interest. Similarly, the Norwegian ambassador to India regarded cultural diplomacy as a powerful way of attracting media attention, and developing media contacts. And the sheer volume of cultural diplomacy activity in Delhi indicates that many countries continue to regard cultural diplomacy as a powerful instrument.

General insight two: the objectives of cultural diplomacy

The three case studies provide insights into an understanding of the objectives of cultural diplomacy. The range of objectives which Canada, New Zealand and India seek to achieve through their cultural diplomacy has been shown frequently to seek benefits for the practitioner of cultural diplomacy, for example improving the practitioner’s relationship with another state, advancing the practitioner’s various national interests, countering negative impacts of contentious issues, and seeking to achieve domestic objectives of benefit to the state in general, and to specific groups within it. But the cultural diplomacy of India, as represented by the work of the ICCR, has continued also to seek benefit for those countries with which it had cultural relations, reflecting the origins of its establishment. Although the normative objectives of the ICCR failed accurately to reflect a number of non-normative, implicit, and un-stated objectives of the

873 Penny Wensley (Australian ambassador to France), private conversation, Paris, France, August 2006.
874 Truls Hanevold (Norwegian ambassador to India), private conversation, Delhi, India, 2003.
organisation, it has remained the case that the organisation’s activities have always had a strongly normative aspect to them. The ICCR continues to practice two-way cultural diplomacy, not merely to benefit itself, but to benefit other countries. And although the ICCR seems to be moving towards a greater focus on presenting India’s dynamism, and on helping to advance India’s economic and trade interests abroad, there have not been any indications that its commitment, in its objectives and its activities, will any time soon eschew the pursuit of normative objectives, or lessen the practical focus on its two-way cultural diplomacy. There remain in India those who continue strongly to support the ideals of Nehru’s and Azad’s approach to international cultural relations, and those who recognise that in benefiting other countries, especially those of the Third World, India benefits eventually as well. It may well be that for countries such as India – large enough to attract attention in a world of globalisation, and powerful militarily, economically and culturally - the focus of their cultural diplomacy should remain normative. It has less need to use cultural diplomacy as an instrument, to use it to gain international profile. But as I discuss below, the cultural diplomacy of India has remained badly hindered by the heavy hand of officialdom. The instrumental objectives of the type which the recent cultural diplomacy of New Zealand exemplifies may have their place for smaller countries, but may not be suitable or necessary for countries such as India. Perhaps the ideals which Nehru and Azad advanced around the time of India’s Independence can be used to inform the cultural diplomacy of the 21st century for those countries which do not need to use cultural diplomacy as a tool to raise their international profile.

General insight three: the emphases and activities of cultural diplomacy
The three case studies provide several insights concerning the general understanding of the emphases and activities of the practice of cultural diplomacy: greater emphasis on economic interests with a cultural aspect, increased work associated with cultural agreements, and a continuation of the use of ‘standard’ cultural activity.

The case studies indicate a noticeable increase in the role that economic interests with a cultural aspect play in cultural diplomacy. Whilst all three countries have sought to advance their economic and trade interests through their cultural diplomacy, the cultural diplomacy of Canada in particular has sought to advance those economic interests associated with culture, such as cultural industries. In New Zealand, government economic announcements have emphasised the importance of these industries, and the new cultural diplomacy programme has promoted New
Zealand’s leading international cultural industry, the film sector. New Zealand now uses its films to sell other New Zealand films, sell New Zealand as a place in which to shoot films, and persuade major international film directors and companies to use the New Zealand film industry when making their films. The same was true of other expressions of New Zealand culture, the same applied to Canada and to Québec, and it is likely that this will be true of other states. As discussed in chapter one, there has been a significant change in the practice of diplomacy, and one such change has been the growth in emphasis on economic and trade interests. Other developed countries such as Singapore, the UK, Ireland and Australia have come to regard their cultural industries as important growth sectors of their economies. Cultural industries have become significant sectors in national economies, and have experienced faster than average growth. These industries have been perceived as important components of the ‘new’ economy (economies based on innovation and ‘creativity’), and have served also to show a creative and modern national face to the world.

The case studies highlight the renewed importance placed on the negotiation and promulgation through diplomacy of cultural agreements. In earlier years, cultural diplomacy was able to be defined as that aspect of diplomacy which dealt with the signing of cultural agreements, and the implementation of these. In recent years, the nature of the cultural agreements has changed. The old form of cultural agreement has mostly become redundant. Cultural agreements have become much more associated with economics, and mirror the growth in the importance of cultural industries. Cultural agreements have moved from setting out how cultural relations between countries were to be managed to a much greater focus on economics: with either setting out how economic relations with a cultural aspect to them were to be managed (for example film co-production agreements), or dealing with the economic impacts of globalisation, as was the case of the diplomacy associated with the new UNESCO instrument. In the case of Québec, that province’s increased focus in its cultural diplomacy on cultural agreements was concerned not only with Québec’s economic interests (the province has a huge, successful and expanding economy with a growing cultural sector) but with the issue of its constitutional prerogatives. India’s cultural agreements remain of the old fashioned type, providing that state’s framework for its cultural diplomacy.

Despite the increased importance to diplomacy of the Internet, and an increased emphasis on diplomacy’s effectiveness at and role in influencing in a positive way the perceptions of individuals and organisations abroad, the cultural diplomacy represented by the three case studies
indicated continued reliance on what might be termed standard cultural diplomacy activity. In the first years of the 21st century, the cultural diplomacy of Canada, New Zealand and India still involved visual and performing artists and arts companies, authors and playwrights, festivals, cultural groups, academic exchanges and student scholarships, exhibitions of quilts, presentation of busts of famous people, the naming of roads, films and television programmes, and so on. The continued reliance on standard cultural diplomacy activity has not been confined to Canada, New Zealand and India. As noted in chapter four, cultural diplomacy in one recent single week in Shanghai included ballet, orchestral performances, a string ensemble, violin recitals, operas, a photo exhibition, a puppet show, exhibitions of painters, an exhibition of video art, and a bullfight. Whilst this continued use of a standard type of cultural diplomacy activity may indicate either a lack of imagination on the part of cultural diplomacy practitioners, or a paucity of new cultural expressions, it may also serve to emphasise the importance of the cultural part of cultural diplomacy. Although there were new elements discerned in the cultural diplomacy of Canada, New Zealand and India, such as the increased use of DVDs, the overall feel of the activity of the three countries was one of business as usual, rather than bold new cultural forms or ways of doing things.

**General insight four: the official-ness of cultural diplomacy: eschewing the political**

The final insight that the three case studies provide into cultural diplomacy in general concerns the official nature of the practice, and the impact this has on the inclusion into the practice of political content. Canada’s cultural diplomacy, as implemented by DFAIT, displayed bureaucratic characteristics,\(^875\) and the new cultural diplomacy programme of the New Zealand government was encumbered by a bureaucratic structure and approach which has made its development and management cumbersome, and arguably focussed more on the modern than the distinctive. The cultural diplomacy of India, set out in chapter five, highlighted the extraordinary opportunities available to the ICCR in the pursuit of cultural diplomacy. These included political support for the role which cultural diplomacy could play and for the provision of extra funds; an extraordinary range of cultural forms and expressions in India comprising its civilisational heritage, popular culture, and range of world class contemporary art practices; and the willingness of the Indian diaspora to make all this happen. Yet despite these opportunities, the cultural diplomacy of the ICCR made India look staid and dull.

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\(^{875}\) One audit of the relevant Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade bureau noted the extraordinary time taken to approve sometimes very small sums of money.
One might ask, so what? The ‘unofficial’ presentation abroad of a state’s cultural activity – that which occurs without any form of government funding or support or involvement - also comes in a range of forms, and can vary in quality. And besides, the cultural diplomacy of Canada, New Zealand and India as represented in the three case studies has included some excellent activities and cultural manifestations, some of which have been far from dull, or staid. Why need we worry that the involvement in cultural diplomacy of an official entity such as a foreign ministry seems on the evidence of the cases studied to have a negative impact on cultural diplomacy?

I believe the answer to this question ultimately concerns the issue of politics. The case studies indicate that officialdom has tended to make cultural diplomacy duller than it need be, and less efficiently managed than desirable. But as I argue below when discussing the policy implications of the findings of the case studies, these matters are not beyond resolution. What is seemingly insoluble about official cultural diplomacy is the issue of politics. By this I mean the extent to which official cultural diplomacy is able to include in its scope content which runs counter to, or is critical of, official government policy. An example serves to emphasise this point. The head of the British Council in the United States was contacted by a member of the British Consulate-General in New York concerning a visual arts exhibition showing in that city which seemed to include material that was against the war in Iraq, a war waged primarily by the United States and the UK against the Iraqi dictator, Saddam Hussein. The exhibition was part-sponsored by the British Council. The official of the Consulate-General complained that the exhibition was not very helpful to the UK’s public diplomacy effort because it was ‘actually quite anti the war.’

In response the head of the British Council noted that the British Council’s cultural diplomacy message was that it supported the ‘propagation of quality in the arts,’ and that was why the exhibition had been sponsored by the Council. His view was that the British Council took no responsibility for any political messages contained within that exhibition.

In fact, if you think about the long term and you think about cultural relations, there are an awful lot of people in this country who don’t necessarily agree with their government’s position. It’s going to be quite important to talk to them as well, once the war is done and dusted. Actually being able to represent the full spectrum is extraordinarily important if you’re talking about true cultural relations, rather than simple public diplomacy.  

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876 National Arts Journalism Program, Arts & Minds.
The case studies of this thesis have shown, I would suggest, that it would be almost unthinkable for the official cultural diplomacy of Canada’s DFAIT, New Zealand’s Ministry for Culture and Heritage (and its MFAT), and India’s ICCR to sponsor in part or in full an exhibition critical of the prevailing government policy. An example for Canada would be an exhibition condemning Canada’s federalism, and its ‘subjugation’ of Québec; in New Zealand, an exhibition that was critical of the government’s recent policy initiatives related to Maori claims to New Zealand’s seabed and foreshore; in India, an exhibition setting out the role of the government of Gujarat in allowing the massacre of over 2,000 Muslims in that state. That is not to say that all cultural diplomacy eschews content which is against government policy. Cultural diplomacy has never been quite that clear-cut. Films, for instance, rarely are made to support a government’s view, and artists participating in cultural diplomacy can usually say what they want to.

The limitation of cultural diplomacy, when compared to cultural relations, has often been expressed as its inability to show a polity ‘warts and all,’ to show the ‘real’ polity rather than an official portrayal of it. I would suggest that what this term ultimately means is that official cultural diplomacy undertaken by a foreign ministry (or a cultural ministry which reports to a prime minister with strong views and an active oversight) cannot criticise the government that pays for it. It is worth recalling the comments made by Mitchell about cultural relations and cultural diplomacy. Mitchell noted that the objectives for cultural diplomacy, and for international cultural relations, differed. Cultural relations did not seek one-sided advantage, but aimed to achieve understanding and cooperation between national societies for their mutual benefit. For Mitchell, the ‘real’ return on the investment by countries in international cultural relations was not short-term advantage, but long-term relationships. These could flourish only if they were ‘not subject to politics.’ And to ensure that this could occur, he recommended that cultural relations should be undertaken by an independent entity. Mitchell was of the view that the cultural relations of a country should present an honest, rather than beautiful, picture of the country, one in which ‘national problems’ were neither ‘concealed nor made a show of’: in his words, previously cited, cultural relations should ‘neither pretend that warts are not there nor…parade them to the repugnance of others.’ By contrast, in Mitchell’s view, cultural diplomacy was closely aligned to official policy and national interest, and the ‘concept of the cultural attaché slavishly scoring points for his political masters’ was the very antithesis of ‘right-minded cultural relations.’

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It seems, from the case studies, that when cultural diplomacy has been managed by an official agency of the government (and this has always been the predominant form of management used by countries), it is almost bound to eschew content which is too political. Given this, should cultural diplomacy be taken out of the hands of foreign or culture ministries, and given to an independent entity to develop and deliver, so as to free the practice from the shackles of bureaucrats and politicians? The answer to this question depends on what a government wishes to achieve with the practice of cultural diplomacy.

To ask that cultural diplomacy show fearless independence, to present cultural activity that sometimes opposes government policy is to misunderstand the practice. Cultural diplomacy of the type practiced by official entities usually reflects official policy. It usually presents an image of a state which meets government policy objectives. Certainly, cultural diplomacy as constructed by an official entity tends to emphasise the positive, the sort of image which politicians, and for that matter, the population at large, like to see shown abroad – a state’s finest cultural achievements, its best orchestras, ballets, and bullfights. As Mitchell’s quotation, cited in chapter one suggests:

No Government and no people wishes to fade into oblivion. Flying the flag is a common manifestation of national identity. Of the colours to be hoisted at the masthead, those that unfurl a nation’s cultural achievements are in many modern situations the most appealing. And it is, of course, part of cultural diplomacy to appeal.\(^{878}\)

Certainly there are activities undertaken within the cultural diplomacy of Canada, New Zealand and India which provide an insight into the politics or society of each state which each respective government may not necessarily welcome or applaud. Each state regularly includes film festivals in its cultural diplomacy. The films in film festivals can show a state to be violent, or depraved, or dysfunctional, or quirky, as well as other possible permutations of national life and character. Documentary films in particular can easily counter or contest government policy. And there will always be limits to cultural diplomacy of whatever type - fully official, fully independent, or something in between – because cultural diplomacy can only ever present part of a state’s culture.

But cultural diplomacy constructed by official entities will almost always avoid content which is critical of, or in opposition to, prevailing government policy, and may well focus on cultural activities which are avowedly supportive of government policy (such as the New Zealand government-funded conference in London in 1990 which sought to show the similarities

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\(^{878}\) Ibid., 5.
between the monetarist, free–market economic and social reforms of the New Zealand Labour government and the UK conservative government). This is entirely to be expected. It is not in the remit of a government entity responsible for cultural diplomacy to develop projects which are critical of the government. And even were an official cultural diplomacy entity to seek approval from politicians for such a political project, it would inevitably be knocked back by them. Politicians of most countries regard cultural diplomacy as a practice of diplomacy, undertaken to help achieve foreign policy objectives (rather than as a practice concerned simply with the presentation of culture abroad), and one which is at its best when showing the positive aspects of a state. The example of New Zealand’s participation in the Venice Biennale of 2005 emphasises this point. On that occasion, the choice of artist and the nature of the art attracted strongly critical comments from politicians, who expected the New Zealand participation to achieve diplomatic objectives more than those to do with culture. Cultural diplomacy of the type delivered by officialdom (by a foreign ministry, or another ministry rather than by an independent entity which has a strong commitment to, and record of, independence) is more about diplomacy than culture. Cultural diplomacy presents an official view of culture, for official purposes.

Policy implications
What are the policy implications of the findings, set out in this thesis, about the practice of cultural diplomacy? Two public policy issues stand out. The first concerns the reasons why cultural diplomacy should be funded by governments, and measures that could be adopted to make the case for cultural diplomacy stronger. The second concerns those ways that the cultural diplomacy of states could, drawing on the insights of this thesis, be made more effective (and simultaneously do the work of diplomacy, and reduce the heavy-hand of bureaucracy).

From a public policy perspective, drawing on the insights of this thesis, there are two reasons why governments should use taxpayers’ money to fund cultural diplomacy. First, unless governments fund cultural diplomacy, it will not happen. Cultural industries, single artists, or arts companies undertaking their activities abroad may sometimes contribute to cultural diplomacy’s work, but on the whole they do not have the motivation, inclination or capability of doing the work of cultural diplomacy (or have not been attached to foreign policy outcomes or to diplomacy). Private commercial entities do not undertake diplomacy for a state. Diplomacy remains a publicly-funded practice. Hence those new aspects of the practice of cultural diplomacy which have been identified in this thesis, such as the promotion abroad of a national
culture to aid diplomacy or help pursue foreign policy goals, and the pursuit of international agreements, need to be undertaken by governments if they are to happen.

This reason alone is of course insufficient to justify government funding for cultural diplomacy. Cultural diplomacy needs also to achieve results. This is the second reason why governments should fund cultural diplomacy, with a major proviso. The case studies have shown that cultural diplomacy does achieve results. The practice seems to provide an effective way of helping diplomacy’s work, and of advancing domestic objectives. In particular, for small and medium sized countries that lack the international presence of large countries such as the United States, UK, France or Germany, cultural diplomacy has continued to be an effective way of raising their international profile, in order to avoid the international anonymity of which both Mitchell and Saul wrote. Cultural diplomacy provides the opportunity to make a coordinated cultural impact abroad, of the sort that privately owned commercial cultural entities, and artists and art companies could not undertake, could not be expected to undertake, and would not undertake (unless funded). Hence the co-ordinated instrumental approach exemplified by Canada’s cultural diplomacy push in Asia, the New Zealand film festival in Japan in 2006, and the Indian festivals of the 1980s and 1990s enabled these respective countries to raise their international profiles. And even very small cultural diplomacy initiatives such as the co-ordination by New Zealand’s Ministry for Culture and Heritage, for New Zealand embassies, of a calendar of New Zealand cultural activity occurring abroad, serves to highlight the public role for cultural diplomacy. Unless the New Zealand government provided this service, which helped its embassies use New Zealand cultural activity for cultural diplomacy, this service would not be provided.

From a public policy standpoint, however, the one glaring omission that continues to undermine support for cultural diplomacy is the absence of effective, and persuasive, measurements of cultural diplomacy’s effectiveness. There have always been methods of measuring the success or otherwise of cultural diplomacy events and activity, such as the number of people who turned up to a concert, media coverage of a road opening, feedback from audiences at a bullfight, and comments by contacts attending a ballet performance. But it has always been extremely hard to determine the precise impact on behaviour of cultural diplomacy. In the New Zealand case study, I suggested that the presumed impacts of the presentation abroad of New Zealand’s image were that the image of New Zealand was outdated, that culture was an effective tool with which to update New Zealand’s image, and that a positive, and new, image
changed the behaviour of people who were the targets of the presentation of that image. Much anecdotal evidence was available to support these assumptions. New Zealand diplomats in embassies were frequently indicating that the New Zealand image was outdated (and sometimes almost non-existent). The same diplomats, along with those from other countries, and other people as well, all agreed that it was most likely that culture was an effective tool with which to update a state’s image. And, ever since cultural diplomacy began, those involved in the practice have strongly assumed that, all things considered, those who have a positive feeling towards another polity are more likely to behave positively towards that polity (to buy its goods, support its policies, negotiate in good faith with it, and so on) than if the opposite were true. But all these are really only assumptions. For many years, the cultural diplomacy of countries seems to have been predicated on an article of faith.

The second policy implication of this thesis concerns those ways that the cultural diplomacy of governments could be made more effective by drawing on the specific insights of the three cases studies and on this thesis’ insights into cultural diplomacy in general. Several aspects have come to light. The cultural diplomacy of countries would benefit from a greater awareness of the distinctions and differences between public diplomacy, cultural diplomacy and international cultural relations. It would benefit from greater clarity of the practice’s objectives. Some objectives have become dated. Those of the ICCR, for instance, should be revised and updated. Some objectives, although pursued in practice, remain un-stated and should be made explicit and transparent. Some have been poorly thought through: the example of the cultural diplomacy of New Zealand’s participation in Venice, in which the objectives of politicians differed from those of bureaucrats and the artist, attests to this. Some objectives are too wide-ranging and all inclusive to be effective. It would be beneficial as well were there to be improved co-ordination amongst government entities involved in cultural diplomacy, both ‘at home’ and in the field, improved clarity about the link in practice between cultural diplomacy and a national brand, and improvements to the way in which target audiences of cultural diplomacy are selected, and how they are reached through cultural diplomacy. If the target audience is the emerging middle classes of China, how can cultural diplomacy reach this audience, which members of the audience are to be connected with, and what type of cultural diplomacy is best suited for the purpose?

In addition, countries would benefit from using the opportunities provided by cultural diplomacy’s domestic impacts. The practice can work towards achieving national domestic goals,
and should be used more effectively for this purpose. If, as the case studies indicate, cultural diplomacy can contribute to improving the esteem of minority groups and enhance national confidence and national social cohesion, then it should be used explicitly for this purpose. In particular, small countries which undertake cultural diplomacy would benefit from a greater awareness of the potential of cultural diplomacy to achieve a wide range of national objectives, domestic and international, in a rapidly changing world in which small countries must use all available tools to improve their national well-being.

New research foci
The findings set out in this thesis indicate that the practice of cultural diplomacy would benefit from a thorough examination of its behavioural impacts. The ability to measure the behavioural effects of cultural diplomacy would provide officials the means to improve their policies, and politicians, bureaucrats and artists with the capacity to argue for greater support for cultural diplomacy. A research project of this type could be carried out with a focus on a single country, or on a number of countries. The aim would be to establish a baseline of information about target groups’ attitudes towards a country, and to then measure changes brought about by cultural diplomacy activity to which the target groups were subjected. This would involve undertaking initial surveys of target groups’ attitudes towards the country or countries whose cultural diplomacy was to be measured prior to any such cultural diplomacy, to then implement cultural diplomacy activity aimed at the target groups, and to continue with that activity over a number of years. The aim of this would be to enable those managing the cultural diplomacy which formed the subject of the research to be able, over time, to assess as clearly as possible the impacts that cultural diplomacy had had on the target groups. It would be then possible to assess if presenting a national image through cultural diplomacy did in fact persuade, for example, a high-worth investor to change his or her behaviour.

The practice of cultural diplomacy would also benefit from further research into two other aspects of the practice. The first aspect concerns the merging of diplomatic objectives, political independence and artistic standards so as to enable the delivery of cultural diplomacy that is of the highest quality, free to present whichever aspect of national culture that will help meet its objectives, and which contributes to diplomacy. This research would seek to examine a range of agencies used to deliver cultural diplomacy, and the impact that each type of agency had on setting and achieving diplomatic objectives, on the level of political content, and on artistic standards. On the basis of its findings, the research would suggest a model of delivery of cultural
diplomacy best able to maximise all of these three objectives. This model might encompass the delivery of cultural diplomacy through an independent entity, so as to ensure political freedom and artistic quality. The research could examine possible forms that an independent entity could assume. Such an entity might be located within a foreign service, but provided with an independent board, answerable not to politicians but to Parliament. A separate fund of the cultural diplomacy entity could be dedicated to funding the cultural diplomacy work of embassies, and another fund dedicated to large cultural diplomacy activity spanning more than one embassy. Or such an entity might be located outside the foreign service, in the style of the British Council, but possibly have closer connections to the objectives of diplomacy as would befit a cultural diplomacy entity, rather than one dedicated to international cultural relations.\textsuperscript{879}

The second aspect of cultural diplomacy that warrants further research concerns cultural diplomacy’s domestic impacts. As noted above, cultural diplomacy can help achieve national domestic goals, and should be used more effectively for this purpose. By way of example, it may well be that New Zealand’s cultural diplomacy could be used to improve the sense of inclusion that Chinese New Zealanders have in New Zealand society, by for instance including in that cultural diplomacy more artists with Chinese ancestry, and providing greater resources to ensure that the success of these artists abroad was more actively publicised in New Zealand, both in mainstream media and in those media aimed at Chinese communities. But would this approach work? Research should be undertaken to improve understanding of the inter-connection between the components involved in this mix: cultural diplomacy’s activities; national media coverage of these activities; the impact of media coverage on national social cohesion, national self-confidence and national identity; and minority groups. This would enable greater understanding of the extent to which international recognition of cultural success abroad aids national cohesion and national identity, and the role of culture and recognition in national confidence and national social cohesion.

Finally, the case studies have suggested a number of future research directions. These include examination of the impact that government entities have on the inclusion in cultural diplomacy of content critical of government, greater research into which specific ethnic or linguistic groups benefit from cultural diplomacy, an examination of those instances of cultural diplomacy events or activity which seem on the face of it to be better described as public diplomacy, and examinations of examples of those practitioners who seek to counter negative

\textsuperscript{879} This is discussed in the Demos report on cultural diplomacy of 2007. See Bound, Briggs, Holden and Jones, \textit{Cultural Diplomacy}, 62-64.
international publicity. Future research could also usefully include comparative examinations of cultural diplomacy in which national innovation is used as a basis of national image, the role which the culture of indigenous groups plays in cultural diplomacy, the role which culture plays in varying national brands (and the connection between these), the political impetus of cultural diplomacy in a number of countries (by in part interviewing politicians to determine their objectives for the practice), and a comparative examination of how the cultural diplomacy of a range of sub-national states, for example special economic zones in China or states of Australia, intersect with the cultural diplomacy of their respective federal or national governments. Finally, research using a cultural diplomacy case study to examine how the concept of New Zealand Inc. works in practice in New Zealand or in any other country would usefully expand knowledge about the practice.

Final word

As this thesis has shown, cultural diplomacy has been an under-studied practice of government. As an official practice, it has not been as well understood, or researched, as it warrants. But this thesis has shown cultural diplomacy to be a significant tool of diplomacy. It is a special tool, because cultural diplomacy intersects with national culture, national values, national identity, and with national pride. In recent years, cultural diplomacy has become more linked to the pursuit of those national economic interests which have a cultural aspect to them, and to the defence of national cultural sovereignty. Cultural diplomacy offers a state the chance to show itself to the world in a unique way, much more powerfully than simple promotion, or advertising, or branding. And cultural diplomacy can connect with people from other cultures and other countries in a manner which benefits both the practitioner of cultural diplomacy and the receiver. Cultural diplomacy also has the potential to be used as a powerful tool of domestic politics. Furthermore, this thesis has set out examples of the deliberate use of cultural diplomacy to achieve domestic outcomes. Of all the types of the practice of diplomacy, cultural diplomacy most strongly connects to a country’s sense of what it is, its national identity, and its national values. And because of this, and the opportunity it provides to help achieve domestic objectives, I would suggest that the practice is likely to become a more valuable tool for states in future, and a more valued and significant component of the practice of public diplomacy. But if that is to happen, two issues must be dealt with. First, politicians, bureaucrats, artists and others will need to more actively act as advocates for the practice. Research that shows cultural diplomacy’s
effectiveness can motivate and empower, and it is hoped that this thesis contributes to this endeavour. And second, efforts will need to be made to use the full potential of the practice by overcoming the sometimes negative impact that officialdom has on cultural diplomacy. Cultural diplomacy may be a sub category of the conventional practice of diplomacy, but it can also be a practice that reflects the excitement, the power, the importance, and the pleasure of culture, enriching all parties that engage in it.
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267
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