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**Globalisation and Pluri-scalar Orchestrations
in Higher Education:**

**Locating The University of Auckland's Student Learning
Centre Historically and Globally.**

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ABSTRACT

Globalisation is a dominant theme in today's discourse of educational and social politics, but its dimensions and forces are not well understood. Generally, globalisation suggests that in meeting international pressures a nation state is less able to act. With diminished state control, the devolution and privatisation of the public sector are seen as solutions for states to operate in a global market. This thesis suggests that changes in New Zealand educational policy since 1984 show that far from weakening the authority of the state, its position has been strengthened through neoliberal policies creating quasi-markets and new forms of public management in the state sector.

This thesis takes neoliberalism as the current manifestation of a world-system of capitalism in crisis, and synthesises historical socio-political approaches to globalisation and economic wave theory into a theoretical framework from which educational policies at the multiple levels of authority (transnational, national and institutional) are examined. Apart from a focus on the structural attributes impinging on reform, the thesis also argues that the global discourses of the knowledge economy and of building a nation's human capital through increased private investment, as well as the state's continued capacity to 'mediate' the expansion of capitalism constitute the driving forces for the reshaping of the tertiary educational system in New Zealand under the fourth Labour Government and the National-led governments that followed.

The impact of global dictates and the tertiary education reforms (1984-2000) in New Zealand on the mandate, delivery, and form of governance of university education is illustrated through the transformations the University of Auckland and its Student Learning Centre have experienced. However, this thesis contends that path-dependency, such as university traditions and culture, affects the way global dictates and state policies are accepted, contested, or translated in a manner consonant with institutional objectives. Yet, it is also suggested that the external pressure of reduced public funding and state regulations promoting a quasi-market environment in higher education pose perhaps the greatest threat to traditional notions of academic autonomy and collegiality built on cooperation and sharing of ideas.

It is further shown that the climate of efficiency and rationality advanced during the period 1984-2000 has limited the scope of what is taught, how it is taught and why it is taught. Even though the thesis indicates that the number of programmes and subjects have increased as more students continue their education, the function of universities has narrowed: providing consumer choice and instrumental value for building the 'elusive' knowledge economy. The thesis expresses concern that if this trend continues the community role of universities will be impeded and teaching will become more pragmatic and technocratic.

DEDICATION

To my family: Leo, the Heijligers and Flohrs.

PREFACE

Life compositions are harmonic orchestrations of moving contradictions.¹

At the heart of this study is an analysis of how a small academic department like the Student Learning Centre (SLC) at the University of Auckland has grown and become a successful player, or at least contributor, in the global drive to develop ‘skilled knowledge workers for the new knowledge-based economy’, an ideology popularised during the 1990s. The SLC’s strength in providing flexible services that are on the one hand student-driven and on the other hand institution-led is an example of how to survive the challenges of today’s world where state policy and consumer demand are dictated by discourses of globalisation, the knowledge economy and lifelong learning and steered by forms of governmentality that epitomise acts of self responsabilisation. On the surface, the SLC’s function in this configuration of education is unreflective. Yet, this need not be so. The diversity of the Centre in its staff’s background, programmes and teaching styles makes critical reflection unavoidable. This investigation is part of the continuous engagement in a dialectic process of review.

This study is also an expression of my concern that in the future the education sector, in particular that of higher education, may increasingly be captured by market forces and become implicated in the promotion of a global capitalism that fundamentally lacks in visions of the social. This concern stems very much from my own history. Born in the Asia-Pacific region (Irian Jaya, now Indonesia) but raised in Europe, from Indonesian colonial – Dutch colonist background, with Jewish sprinkled in the mix, and immigrating in my early twenties to New Zealand I probably was pre-programmed to see the world through multi-coloured glasses. I am, however, also indebted to the ‘free’ and critical education I have been privileged to receive, starting with my primary school head master who taught us children of the predominantly Shell proletariat, I grew up under the smoke of Shell refineries in Rotterdam, songs by Bob Dylan (maybe a form of American imperialism, but fortunately encouraging social awareness). I vividly remember, whilst looking at the polluted sky, the line “the answer, my friend, is blowing in the wind” and how intrigued I was by this metaphor as a young 12 year old.

¹ Personal reflection on the thesis process.

My secondary schooling was equally ‘enlightening’. Having to read as a teenager text by Camus, Thomas Mann, the Flemish surrealist writers and the ‘angry young men’ of English literature (yes, women seem to have been absent from my high school curriculum), I as a child from a working class neighbourhood (but whose grand-family had been in middle class, mediating or professional positions in colonial Dutch Indonesia whilst their children (my parents) received restricted education because of Japanese internment during World War II) was able to taste the alienation of Western (industrial/capitalist) life, reinforced by school visits to important Dutch museums showing the country’s Golden Age and Industrial Age through Rembrandt’s and Expressionist and Cubist paintings, as well as theatre performances such as Brecht’s “Chinese Oranges” and concerts by the likes of George Moustaki organised by my school’s language teachers. These happenings also took place during the last phase of the Vietnam War and opposition to Apartheid in South Africa. So as I teenager I was surrounded by a climate of social protest. Moreover, my class presentations in history allowed me to study actions of resistance, and I recall my investigating the struggle for justice in Uruguay by the Tupamaros, explaining to the class their underground operations and disappearance of members much like the incidents of the “Lost Children” in Argentina. The irony of my being free to talk and express my beliefs whilst others were held prisoners was the first realisation of feeling ambiguous towards freedom in a privileged Dutch, then welfare, state contrasted against dictatorships supported by free capitalist states in response to the former USSR. This ambiguity led me to wanting to become a lawyer in the hope of advancing the goals of a ‘just society’. Alas, family circumstances and growing pains intervened preventing my original path to university education in the Netherlands, and instead I set my ambition on becoming a teacher.

I received my teacher education in the Netherlands during a time of increased immigration of families from the West-Indies and migrant workers from the North African region and Turkey. At that time, the welfare state ideology was central to my education as a Health Education teacher involving equal rights, student advocacy, a feeling of being privileged to be working, strong support for the unemployed, and commitment to the state (I never planned to emigrate forever!) as at that time it subsidised all levels of education. My class assignments based on interviewing disadvantaged youth, and practical experience in community centres, old people’s

homes and home help made me even more sensitive to the plight of the ‘unimportant’. But indicators that the tide was turning were already there. The 1980s signalled a time of economic downturns as well as yuppies – educated and attributing increasingly advancement to personal effort, not social embeddedness. Already, my education as a teacher of English as a Foreign Language had been more conservative, but had given me the opportunity to read, in fulfilment of my 40 books list of English literature, the Bronte sisters, George Elliot, Virginia Wolf, Kate Chopin, Sylvia Plath, Iris Murdoch, Doris Lessing, Lisa Alther, George Orwell, Bernard Malamud, James Baldwin, Kurt Vonnegut and other writers who widened my horizon (finally female perspectives but ‘indigenous’ and post-colonial writing still did not feature in the syllabus). My experience as an immigrant to New Zealand further challenged my comfort zone, and I understood how my family must have felt when leaving their place of birth for colder climates. To me, however, coming into a country of reverse migration in the early to mid 1980s, the colonist as immigrant rather than the colonised as the case in the Netherlands, felt literally like a world upside down. My advocacy of bilingualism in my first academic assignments as a student in the then Education department was not always fully comprehended at that time. However, the support of those who empathised with the stance of an ‘arrogant’ outsider made a lasting impression and I returned to this now Faculty to do my Doctorate in Education more than a decade later.

As the above background shows, I may not present an ‘objective’ eye to the issues explored in this study; in addition, my prior research training in postmodern and qualitative notions of scholarship let me question to what extent this (modernist) objectivity is feasible or should be aspired. However, I do believe in comprehensiveness, a preference to see the whole elephant rather than a part and aim to explore the phenomena under study from a critical theory perspective, based on critical reflections of suppositions, uncovering my own blind spots whilst also finding the sources of power in issues of policy formation and figurations so as to unmask that which lay hidden. In addition, I hope this preface informs the reader about the ground I stand on and hence to be able to detect any ‘biased’ deductions and conclusions on my part.

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It has been a long and winding road writing this thesis and on the way I was helped by many a friend and colleague. Without them I would have struggled bringing this work to an end.

First of all my inmost thanks goes to Leo van Rij, my husband, who has walked this road with me, missing days we could be out sailing and making me breakfast and dinner so I could keep on writing. His wisdom and insight has been a lifelong inspiration to me. I am truly grateful for his love, support and ‘anchorage’. Life would not be as interesting and thought-provoking without him. I would certainly have missed out on exploring and visiting the many harbours and countries around the world and would not have arrived on these shores to write a doctoral thesis.

I am also deeply indebted to my employer, the University of Auckland, and department, the Student Learning Centre (SLC), for encouraging staff to continue their studies and pursue their research interests. In particular I like to thank Professor Raewyn Dalziel and Dr Emmanuel Manalo for approving my leave in the first semester of 2004 and granting research time for the whole of my thesis journey.

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My colleagues have been equally wondrous, and I am extremely thankful to them for allowing me to finish this thesis by taking over some of my teaching and administrative duties, editing my work and generally being so supportive. My sincere gratitude goes

especially to Mona O’Shea for her warm friendship and support, seeing to it that I did not have to worry about SLC Tamaki as she coordinated the work in my absence. My heartfelt thanks also go to Matt Tarawa for being so flexible, teaching some of my classes and generally giving encouragement. I am further very grateful to Dr Susan Carter, Jenny Buxton and Julie Trafford for taking the time to read and edit my work and to Andrew Lavery for helping me to come to grips with the finer details of formatting the thesis.

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Last but not least I thank my family for being my family. Even though they are on the other side of the world, they are my tūrangawaewae (place to stand). This thesis is dedicated to them and written in loving memory of the important women in my life who passed away while I was writing and researching far away from them. They are my grandmother, Josephine Davidsz-Noll, my mother, Joan Davidsz, my auntie, Liz Koot-Davidsz, and my sister-in-law, Adriana Oostra-van Rij. This thesis is also for my father, Gerrit Heijligers, who promised when I left the Netherlands in 1994 to come and see me graduate. It was not to be as in the same year he passed away. He left me with a funny legacy though, misspelling my surname as Heyligers at the birth registration office. This one is for you dad.

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AAU	Academic Audit Unit
ABC	Australian Broadcasting Corporation
ACE	Auckland College of Education
AIDS	Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome
AL	Assistant Lecturer
APEC	Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation
APRU	Association of Pacific Rim Universities
ARP	Academic Resource Plan
ASEAN	Association of Southeast Asian Nations
ATI	Auckland Technical Institute
AUS	Association of University Staff
AUT	Auckland University of Technology
BCE	Before Common Era
CBD	Central Business District
CCE	Centre for Continuing Education
CE	Common Era
CEO	Chief Executive Officer
CERI	Centre for Educational Research and Innovation
CPD	Centre for Professional Development
CRI	Crown Research Institute
CUAP	Committee for University Academic Programmes
CUAT	Canadian Association of University Teachers
DoE	Department of Education
EAL	English as an Additional Language
EEO	Equal Employment Opportunity
EEEdO	Equal Education Opportunity
EFTS	Equivalent Full-time Students
ELA	English Language Acquisition programme
ELC	English Language Centre
ER	Employment Relations
ERO	Educational Review Office

ESL	English as a Second Language
EU	European Union
FDI	Foreign Direct Investment
FLC	Flexible Learning Centre
FP	Fale Pasifika
FTE	Fulltime Equivalent
GATS	General Agreements on Trade in Services
GATT	General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GNP	Gross National Products
HC	Human Capital
HCI	Human Capital Investment
HCT	Human Capital Theory
HE	Higher Education
HEI	Higher Education Institution
HERO	Higher Education Research Office
HoD	Head of Department
IALS	International Adult Literacy Survey
IGO	International Governmental Organisation
IMF	International Monetary Fund
INGO	International Non-Governmental Organisation
ISI	Import Substituting Industrialisation
IT	Information Technology
JIT	Just In Time
LEX	Language Exchange
MAPAS	Māori and Pacific Admission Scheme
MERT	Ministry of External Relation & Trade
MFN	Most Favoured Nation
MHR	Member of the House of Representatives
MOE	Ministry of Education
MOPAS	Māori and Other Pacific Admission Scheme
NAFTA	North American Free Trade Agreement
NEQA	National Educational Qualifications Authority

NEQB	National Educational Qualifications Board
NIC	Newly Industrialising Countries
NIE	New Institutional Economics
NPM	New Public Management
NQF	National Qualifications Framework
NZBRT	New Zealand Business Round Table
NZQA	New Zealand Qualifications Authority
NZVCC	New Zealand Vice-Chancellors Committee
ODA	Overseas Developing Aid
OECD	Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development
OEEC	Organisation for European Economic Co-ordination
PAC	Primary Activity Centre
PAT	Principal-Agency Theory
PCET	Post Compulsory Education and Training
PCT	Public Choice Theory
PISA	Programmes for International Student Assessment
PTE	Private Tertiary Education
QGWHG	Quick Guide to the World History of Globalization
RAA	Review and Audit Agency
R & D	Research and Development
RUME	Research Unit in Māori Education
SAP	Structural Adjustment Program
SLC	Student Learning Centre
SLU	Student Learning Unit
SOE	State Owned Enterprise
SSC	State Services Commission
TA	Teaching Assistant
TCC	Transnational Capitalist Class
TCT	Transaction Cost Theory
TEAC	Tertiary Education Advisory Commission
TEI	Tertiary Educational Institution
TER	Tertiary Education Review
The UK	The United Kingdom

The US	The United States of America
The USSR	The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
TINA	There Is No Alternative
TNC	Transnational Corporation
TPW	Te Puni Wānanga
TQM	Total Quality Management
TRIPS	Trade Related Intellectual Property Services
UE	University Entrance
UGC	University Grants Committee
UN	United Nations
UNESCO	United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation
UNSW	University of New South Wales
UoA	University of Auckland
UoNZ	University of New Zealand
VC	Vice-Chancellor
VU	Victoria University
WB	World Bank
WC	Washington Consensus
WDR	World Developments Report
WTO	World Trade Organisation

Chapter 1

Prologue

1.1 Overture to the Study

This thesis arose from events that I observed in my work as an academic study skills advisor at the Student Learning Centre (SLC) of the University of Auckland and from my decision to enrol for a Doctorate of Education (EdD) in the late 1990s. As a foundation tutor of the SLC, established in 1985, I had witnessed and experienced notable changes in the composition of work, student clientele, teaching content and approaches, and the Centre's administrative structure and conditions. As these changes became more pronounced in the 1990s with a greater number of students from different cultural backgrounds enrolling and a shifting educational climate transpiring, my initial intention was to focus on how newly arrived migrant or international students who have English as an Additional Language (EAL) experienced the transition to university. This interest can be traced to my own experience of transition a decade earlier and my previous research in cultural issues related to psychology and education.

However, the doctoral papers in the sociology and philosophy of education I undertook in the first two years of the programme made me realise that individual experiences are intertwined with the larger socio-political and economic context, factors generally played down in the discipline of psychology. Yet, this realisation was not new. During my Master years, Bronfenbrenner's analysis of child development at the macro-, meso-, and micro-level had been influential as had been Sue and Sue's cross-cultural model of counselling. What was new this time was the 'discourse' of globalisation, which became a buzzword in the 1990s. My earlier explorations of the word on library databases and Internet search engines like Google, for example, produced a plethora of 'globalisation' resources in fields as wide as sociology, economics, history, policy science, and education as well as narrow as resource management and trade negotiations. However, as Peter Roberts (2000, p.435) noted, the concept had seldom been explored, described or defined in detail, albeit many assumptions transpired, with the most dominant being globalisation is "an inevitable and unquestionably valuable process".

In contrast, globalisation was not an issue when I studied psychology and education in the mid 1980s. Neither could it be searched on the Internet, a tool of the 1990s. The critical readings of that time indicated a shift from dominant discourses to ones that allowed the explorations of ‘différence’. The post-modern condition started to feature prominently as manifested in the developments of grounded research and discourse analysis, the incorporation of culture outside of the domain of anthropology, and the emergence of Māori, Pacific and Women Studies as independent disciplines, all probing the modernist notion of universal truth. However, as soon as post-modern discourses gained ground, a discordant economic and socio-political ideology of neoliberalism surfaced. This unitary ideology was accompanied by theoretical frameworks of globalisation and the new capitalism, based on the further expansion of markets and the need for highly skilled workers in a knowledge-based society.

In my EdD papers, globalisation was linked to changes in the role of states as public service providers and to Foucault’s notion of governmentality. In particular, the neoliberal reform agenda of the fourth Labour Government, 1984-1990, illustrated the shift from a ‘paternal’, inward looking state, responsible for the well-being of its citizens through the provision of health and education; to a ‘competitive’ or ‘enabling’, outward looking state, devolving responsibility for the creation of health and wealth to its public institutions and citizens through market mechanisms. Neoliberalism as a form of Foucaultian governmentality further helped to explain, to a degree, how notions of responsibilisation could be internalised at the institutional and individual level through a process of somatisation. Foucault set my mind back to the work of Norbert Elias. During my ‘psychology’ years, my encounter with a German visiting scholar had prompted an interest in Elias’s oeuvre. Elias adopted a socio-historical approach to the increased rationalisation of human behaviour. For example, he explained forms of ‘civilisation’ as increased refinement of processes of self-restraint, mediated by the internalisation of society’s rule, akin to Freud’s explanation of super-ego. However, Elias saw these processes from a ‘longue durée’, rather than a psychoanalytic, perspective where history intersected with the social and the individual. The shift from external coercion to self-restraint, Elias argued, emerged from complex webs of human interdependence instigating the need for “a more continuous, stable, and even regulation

of drives and affects in all areas of conduct, in all sectors of life” (Elias, 1994, p.452).² Although Elias’ work is only modestly referred to in this study, his reference to the pivotal role of history in sociological analysis remained a lingering thought from which the conceptual framework of the thesis took shape.

1.2 Composing a Theoretical Foundation

Elias’ view of human transformations over time as configurations not of their making but emerging from an interplay between structure and human agency (not necessarily embodied in the individual) was the starting point of this thesis. Elias’ configurations reminded me of musical compositions which allow the conductor and musicians to create different tempos and timbres but require them to remain within the structure set, else a new composition materialises. Moreover, I see the writing of a symphony or opera in many ways as an articulation of completeness, yet as a product these compositions are never finished. They receive critical reviews, and allow for alternative interpretations from performers and audiences. Theory building and the writing process share in these features. Although, as suggested in the preface, the writer as composer aims for comprehensiveness, the work is by no means complete. Leitmotifs may get buried under detail, and links remain unexplored. The resultant gaps invite the reader as audience to be interpreter and critic. The structural title and headings chosen for this thesis hence reflect the process of theory creation, be it for a thesis or a policy, as never-ending compositions.

Content-wise, the investigation was largely guided by a process of inquiry related to changes in the university environment. Questions arose from the concept of globalisation emerging in the 1990s and the ‘New Zealand experiment’ that grew in scope to include the education sector. The literature consulted in the early stages of the thesis had indicated that developed nations had begun institutional reforms towards governance under pressures of globalisation. However, as Roberts suggested, little attempt had been made to define globalisation; instead it was inferred that in an increasingly complex and competitive world the state’s central authority needed reform.

² Complexity is in how relationships of interdependence are formed, not necessarily according to western concepts of civilisation and modernity, as intricate webs of human relations occur in societies considered pre-modern.

For one, the state with its traditional bureaucratic and hierarchical control was no longer seen as being able to meet the growing plurality of demands (Kooiman, 1993). In addition, welfare states faced a crisis of legitimacy as social demands proliferated and public funds diminished. The solutions offered, and transmitted by global institutions such as the OECD and the World Bank, were for the state to retrench, regulate, contract out, follow market principles and share power with outside agents (Merrien, 1998)³.

In New Zealand, the fourth Labour Government had introduced neoliberal principles and management models of the business world in its state sector. Correspondingly, universities were confronted with governmental policies promoting institutional efficiency. They also faced higher rates of student participation whilst public expenditure for the sector was significantly reduced and opened up to private providers. The shift of education being less a social good and more an economic utility started to take effect. The restructuring of higher education would inevitably bring about changes in university mandates, capacity and governance (Dale, 1989, 1997), with the call for universities to be more responsive to ‘the market’. Such a call would entail a push to create more links with industry and commerce, attract a higher number of private (foreign) students, emphasise ‘useful’ and ‘applicable’ knowledge (OECD, 1996b), increase student fees (to be offset by making available student loans), do more for less, and be more accountable so to justify public funding and need for private investment in education.

As the overture to the study indicates, I took the view that the social phenomena observed in the present were likely to have antecedent components. Moreover, from my Masters research in social psychology, I assumed that social influence does not necessarily follow in a top-down fashion. From these positions the following queries developed:

³ The development could be linked to Elias’ theory, which generalises individual behaviour to state behaviour, and hence more stable forms of regulating ‘drives and affect’ would be needed. Depending on the scope of interdependence, this stability would require national and transnational regulations, shaping code of conducts between states, and between state and institutions as well as individuals, through processes of self-restraint rather than surveillance.

- What is globalisation: is it something old or new, is it a theory or reality, who are its composers, how is it being employed and to whose benefit, and how can it be channelled and framed?
- Under ‘globalisation’, what are some of the precursors at the global, national, institutional levels that help shape, conduct, reproduce or discontinue certain dominant themes and practices in higher education?
- In what way(s) do agents at the supranational level, such as International Governmental Organisations (IGOs), orchestrate higher education policies at the national level; who do they serve and how does the New Zealand government respond to the supranational formation of higher education directives; does it act, react or contribute?
- What have been the significant policy changes at the national level for higher education in the period from 1984 to 2000.
- How have these changes impacted university education with respect to who gets educated, what gets educated, how one gets educated and why, and who ultimately benefits.
- How have these changes shaped and advanced the Student Learning Centre from its initiation in 1985 up until 2000.
- More specifically, how have these changes contributed or hindered the development of an inclusive curricula and pedagogy in the context of New Zealand’s biculturalism and the internationalisation of university education.

These questions meant that the scope of the study would be extensive, incorporating a socio-historical analysis of the precursors that influenced policy making at the different levels of influence: global/transnational, national and institutional. One precursor was the issue of globalisation, which proved to have a history spanning 500-2000 years depending on whether the ‘story’ started with the western expansion of markets or the spreading of people and religion. For the purpose of this thesis, the precursor was set at the development of a world-system of capitalism that had the West as its main driver. From this demarcation and the queries stated above the following arrangement of the thesis emerged.

1.3 Arrangement of the Thesis

The thesis is arranged as follows. There are three main levels of analyses to examine the pluri-scalar shifts in policy from a public-oriented to a market-oriented provision of higher education: global/transnational, national and institutional. Each level recognises how the process of globalisation and policy formation may have stimulated the neoliberalisation of social life and the transformation of higher education towards quasi-markets.

Chapters 2, 3 and 4 represent the transnational level of analysis. Chapter 2 discusses the nature of globalisation. It reviews the different perspectives taken in the literature to locate the origin of globalisation as a process and the dimensionality of globalisation as a concept. The chapter first discusses whether globalisation is a recent occurrence or an age-old process in the making. The different periodisations that historians, and world-system and transformational theorists employ are explored. Hopkins' (2002) classification of archaic, proto, modern and post-colonial globalisation is presented to explain the relevant features of each period. This is followed by Held and colleagues' model (1999) of thin and thick processes of globalisation according to extensity, intensity, velocity and impact. Particular consideration is given to viewing globalisation as an expression of western expansion, as argued by world-system theorists like Wallerstein, for it precipitated the formation of New Zealand as a state. The chapter then focuses on globalisation as a recent discourse centred around the ideology of neoliberalism. It raises the issue of how globalisation 'gets within' (Larner & Walters, 2002) and how the interplay of history, structure and agency may influence the process of acceptance and contestation of 'shared' beliefs.

Chapter 3 continues the thread of globalisation as a manifestation of advanced capitalism, with neoliberalism viewed as its latest expression. It briefly discusses the role of modernisation in this process, and introduces economic wave-theory as a framework from which to examine the widespread thrust towards neoliberalisation and the role of the state in the 'organic' life of capitalism. Neoliberalism as global leitmotif is then advanced and the theories of New Institutional Economics (NIE) and New Public Management (NPM) underpinning this discourse are presented as 'state apparatus' that mediates institutional and individual compliance to market objectives in

the public sector and that allows states ‘to steer from a distance’. In addition, the Washington Consensus and Human Capital Theory are presented as contingent developments of neoliberalism.

The role of International Government Organisations (IGOs) in the spread and support of neoliberal policies in higher education is examined in Chapter 4. The chapter critically assesses the World Trade Organisation’s (WTO) move towards General Agreements on Trade in Services (GATS), opening the way to international market policies in higher education; the World Bank’s (WB) objective to be a knowledge bank, promoting knowledge as economic development and human and social capital in support of open markets, with post-primary education and training becoming increasingly a private investment; and the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development’s (OECD) agenda for advancing the knowledge economy and lifelong learning in support of global capitalism as well as policy templates and designs for benchmarking the human and social capital of a nation. The chapter concludes that these International Government Organisations (IGOs) advance the neoliberal account of globalisation, placing economic concerns above communitarian and environmental concerns. In so doing, they largely advance education as building human capital that individuals, industry and government invest in order to be competitive in the global market place.

Chapters 5 and 6 embody the national stage. Chapter 5 first examines the national precursors that led up to New Zealand’s ‘experimentation’ with neoliberalism: penetration of Western capitalism in the first half of the 19th century, nation building under modern globalisation from the mid 1800s, state protection of the domestic market after the depression of the 1930s, and the shift to a more open and transnational economy as a response to the financial crises of the 1970s. The chapter then discusses the role of education in harmonising European settlers’ interests and Māori tino rangatiratanga (self-determination) largely in favour of the former as to uphold a capitalistic system of production. Lastly, the role of government in the promotion of neoliberalism is reviewed, followed by a brief overview of state implementation of market mechanisms in the New Zealand public sector.

Whereas Chapter 5 overviews the developments in the New Zealand economy and socio-political environment from a historical and wave-theory perspective, Chapter 6

focuses more narrowly on the changes in tertiary policies as advanced between 1984 and 2000 by the fourth Labour Government and the National-led governments that followed. The role of Treasury as a Transnational Capitalist Class (TCC) (Sklair, 1999) is discussed and the tertiary reviews closely examined. The chapter argues that the Hawke and Life Long Learning reports under Labour mirror many of the WB and OECD's objectives in higher education. These reports set up frameworks for NIE/NPM in the tertiary sector and the streamlining of the sector under notions of degree portability and credit transfer. National is shown to advance what Labour had started as represented in their introduction of student loan schemes and a proposal for a New Zealand Qualifications Authority (NZQA). In addition, the marketisation of the sector is illustrated through a discussion of the Government's Green Papers, advocating NPM objectives, such as devolution of responsibility; market-oriented courses and research; closer links between education and enterprise; and education for competition in the global knowledge economy. The chapter proceeds by outlining other policies in support of placing the New Zealand tertiary education in a world market, and then discusses the likely consequences of the reforms for the mandate, capacity and governance of university education. The chapter ends by placing the national tertiary reforms in a global context.

The institutional changes are discussed in Chapters 7 and 8, with the University of Auckland presented as a case in Chapter 7 and its Student Learning Centre (SLC) in Chapter 8. Chapter 7 lays out the historical pathways of the University, accumulating in three, at times conflicting, tenets: open entry, excellence and academic freedom. The University's relation with Māori scholarship is then reviewed in short, indicating that only small steps towards partnership under Treaty obligations have been taken since the 1970s, but that these obligations have likely produced a trickle down effect on state and institutional policies for students from under-represented communities under the philosophy of lifelong learning as advanced by the WB and OECD. Next, the chapter moves to discussing the arrangements in university governance, mandate and capacity before and after 1984. It is argued that university capacity to fulfil its traditional role of comprehensive education has been weakened by less state funding and that increased diversification and specification in the University's curriculum reflect the growing technocratic role of universities under pressures of serving the dictates of a knowledge economy and a larger and more diverse student population under market conditions.

Contrary to developments pushing for the globalisation of university education, the chapter also shows, however, that the University has been more cautious in its approach. The accord and discord between market objectives of higher education and the University's mission and visions are then discussed, and who benefits from these arrangements and who experiences their impact negatively is assessed.

Chapter 8 represents the 'heart' of the thesis as it discusses the transformations I witnessed at work between 1985-2000, a period that overlaps with the neoliberal state reforms. The chapter first examines the principal external and institutional factors that initiated the founding of an academic learning centre at the University of Auckland in 1985. It then presents the changes the SLC underwent according to two eight-year cycles: from 1985 to 1992 under the directorship of David Simpson, and from 1993 to 2000 under that of Dr Emmanuel Manalo. The first cycle indicates that the insecure funding base, the non-tenured, flexible yet equal work conditions created a committed, largely female, teaching staff characterised by cooperation and collegiality. All shared a similar view of working *with* and *for* the students, and had a high degree of autonomy in interpreting the vision and mission of the Centre. This autonomy was continued in the second cycle, although the chapter indicates that the direction of learning support changed: from at risk remediation to professional student development. Further, it is argued that the new forms of managerialism, changing accountability measures and line of reporting, affected the Centre's work conditions. Throughout this chapter the development of market-led policies mixed with equity objectives that received targeted government funding is emphasised as this apparent paradox has largely assisted in the growth of the Centre, albeit under non-tenured conditions. Next, a case is made that the establishment of the Māori unit, Te Puni Wānanga, and the Pacific unit, Fale Pasifika, within the Centre in 1990 and 1991 respectively and the 'mainstreaming' of its tutors allowed for a working environment from which a bi-/multi-cultural way of interacting and teaching emerged. This diversity contributed greatly to the student-friendly and collegial atmosphere that has largely typified the SLC for most of its existence. The chapter ends by showing how measures of accountability have been integrated in the Centre's operation, showcasing that the SLC has consistently outperformed the outcome-oriented measures required by the institution and the state. Nevertheless, it is concluded that the future of the Centre is not at all certain when the pursuit of

technocratic objectives shift the mode of instruction from teacher-based to computer-based learning support.

The final chapters bring together the many aspects this thesis has touched on and briefly reviews state policy developments and institutional changes post-2000. Chapter 9 provides a discussion and summary of the thesis observations and findings and relates these to the wider literature. The chapter proposes that Bührs' (2000) taxonomy of policy diffusion may provide a workable framework to conceptualise the pluri-scalar influences examined in this thesis, and concludes that globalisation as the expansion of markets and market discourse do affect the educational objectives at the transnational, national and institutional levels. As this thesis brings its 'story' to an end in the year 2000, Chapter 10 provides a short epilogue of events and trends emerging in the 21st Millennium. It comments on the fifth Labour Government's steering towards a 'third way' in educational policy, highlights the University's growing pressure to internationalise its student market, and queries the Student Learning Centre's long-term capability to continue serving the learning needs of the students from a community rather than market perspective. Lastly, a coda as final word is provided to point to the likely consequences of an education system constrained by objectives for increased technocratic rationality, efficiency and accountability demanded from both its staff and students.

Chapter 2

Globalisation as Crescendo: Old or New Reality, Myth or Ethos?

2.1 Prelude

The more the concept of globalisation is historicised the more globalism recedes into the depths of history and reveals itself as nothing new under the sun, whereas the more it succumbs to modernisation theory the easier yet more problematic the claim to novelty becomes.⁴

Globalisation is nothing new. As the “isation” implies, the phenomenon relates to a process which, as Anna Dimitrova (2002) observed, is much older than the concept. In its current use globalisation “has increasingly come since the 1970s to mean all things to all men – from the 24-hour global financial market and a new, apparent greater power of money to the democratisation of information through the development of the World Wide Web” (Cottrell, 2001, p.2). Most academics agree that globalisation indeed signifies a process involving “a widening, a deepening, and an acceleration of world-wide connections” (ibid) but disagree about the historical trajectory and causality of its present manifestations. Generally, the focus of liberal economists has been on recent developments, with some viewing globalisation as a phenomenon without a past (Rothschild, 1999). In contrast, world historians and world-system theorists like Immanuel Wallerstein (1974) date globalisation back several centuries, some even millennia (Frank & Gills, 1993); see the dispersion of early human migration, religion, trade and control of empires as antecedents of the current situation; and view globalisation in phases or periods that are either distinct or overlapping. For example, the historian Anthony Hopkins (2002) talks about archaic, proto, modern and post-colonial globalisation, occurring prior to 1600, between 1600 and 1800, 1800 and 1950, and after the 1950s, respectively. The work of political scientists, Held, McGrew, Goldblatt and Perraton (1999) take a similar historical periodisation: the pre-modern, western expansion during early modern, modern industrial and contemporary after 1945. They further distinguish between thin, expansive, diffused and thick globalisation

⁴ Paul Harrison (2002, p.2).

according to the extensity of global networks, the intensity and impact propensity of global interconnectedness, and the velocity or speed of global flows.

Perceiving globalisation as historical cycles ‘crescending’ over time may overcome the limitations of much research in the social sciences. As the sociologist Norbert Elias (1994) once observed, sociology tends to be short of history and history short of theory, whilst Roland Robertson (2000, p.3) remarked that “a study of globalization is fundamentally *historical analysis*”, else we materialise a phenomenon without understanding the ongoing transformation of social relations and human agency behind it.

This chapter presents a ‘brief’ review of the historical precursors⁵ to explore whether today’s globalisation constitutes a ‘set of transitory events’ or signals ‘a new conjuncture’ (see Cottrell, 2001). It frames and synthesises the discourses of the phenomenon, and illustrates the extent of the current stage of globalisation. It is assumed that knowledge of its scope will help construct the context in which the policy orchestration of higher education at different levels of authority has to be located, and formulate the theoretical framework through which it will be viewed. The chapter starts out to examine globalisation as a process in order to name and unveil its critical ‘markers’ but later shifts the focus to globalisation as a discursive concept used to shape, structure and organise world space by raising issues of history, agency and structure that the concept of globalisation subsumes.

2.2 A Composition of Globalisation: Legato or Staccatto?

As the title and prelude to this chapter suggest, globalisation raises the issues of whether it is a recent phenomenon or an age-old process in the making; or whether it is a popular but unsubstantiated concept; else constitutes a global set of notions and moral beliefs.

To answer these queries, it is key to note that globalisation is a complex process not to be defined in a single capsule (Dale, 2001), rather involving the dual meanings of

⁵ Brief in the sense that periodisation of major events even when detailed does not tell the whole story. The occurrence of slavery, ‘forced’ migration, and colonisation as expressions of globalisation, for example, has a long history and had a marked impact on the global division of labour and the social relations and networks of today.

process and discourse (Dale & Robertson, 2002). As a process, globalisation links up with analytic *modus operandi*, and as discourse with “advocacy”, both for and against globalisation (ibid, p.11). Tension can arise between these approaches, for while the theorist/analyst makes globalisation more complex, it “should be simplified, or reduced, to make it a more valuable discursive and instrumental resource” (Dale, 2001, p.495) to the practitioner. In both approaches there lies a danger though: where simplification perhaps leads to generalised (causal) relationships, and in the process tends to hide the subject, render it invisible; complexity leads to puzzlement or “not [being] able to suggest any questions to which globalisation would be the answer” (Dale, ibid). The preference of an exploratory thesis like the current study is for complexity; Dale’s advice “to identify the subjects of globalisation, as a precondition of being able to discuss it effectively” (ibid) is acknowledged and informs this thesis throughout. The objective of the next sections is to interweave both analytic and discursive aspects of globalisation by providing a comprehensive examination of the concept, starting by placing it in a historical context to frame it as a process.

2.2.1 Globalisation as Early Spread of Human Migration, World Religions and Pre-modern Empires

Arguably, a historical perspective shows people have travelled and exchanged, or imported, cultural and material goods for centuries. Open a book on European history and chances are it will tell about the impact of ancient Greek philosophy and science (the cradle of Western civilisation and modernisation) on Europe and the Arab world⁶. It will also point out the extent of the Roman Empire and the mass migration of people driven from the east to the west by the Huns⁷. Predating this migration, a tribal and nomadic people from the Eurasian hostile steppe, the Aryans, began to move southwards to India and Persia as far back as the first centuries of the second millennium BCE⁸ (Hooker, 1996).

⁶ The works of Aristotle and other Greeks were known to and studied by Arab philosophers, mathematicians, and scientists - the leading thinkers of the Middle Ages, whilst from the European Renaissance onwards, Greek literature and history became widely read (Encarta, 2000).

⁷ This migration started in late 300 CE with the Huns, a nomadic tribe from Mongolia, who invaded Europe, initiating a migration of people westward (De Kleine Winkler Prins (DKWP), 1952).

⁸ BCE is a less Eurocentric abbreviation of ‘before common era’, with CE meaning ‘common era’. If no BCE or CE is indicated, ‘common era’ is meant.

Besides territorial expansion and migration, the globalisation of religion has had a long history. One of the oldest pan-religions, the subcontinent's Hinduism was brought by Indian traders to the Kingdoms of present Indonesia around 200 BCE⁹; Indian Buddhism reached China and subsequently Japan and Korea at least as early as 400 CE¹⁰; Christianity spread from the Middle East to Northern Europe also in 400 CE; and Islam¹¹ had already been disseminated to the far-eastern corners of the Malaysian and Indonesian Archipelagos by Arabic traders in 1100 CE, well before the first European explorations into the Far East and the 'New World' took place in 1500 CE. Asian empires also left their mark. The Sung Dynasty in China (960-1270 CE) provided the economic, financial and technological output for the 'medieval' world economy that linked Europe and China by land and sea; the rise of Genghis Khan (1100 CE) integrated much of Eurasia through military might; and with its kingdoms in Central Asia and India the Ottoman Empire (1300 CE) connected South-East Europe, North Africa and the Middle East (A Quick Guide to the World History of Globalization (QGWHG), n.d.) well into the 19th century. As Hopkins (2002) observed, by 1350 these early networks of warring tribes and pre-modern empires, religious pilgrims and mercantile itinerants ran over land from Europe to Central Asia via the Silk Road¹², and over sea to the China coast, via the Indian Ocean and the Straits of Malacca. However, they did not extend to the Americas or Oceania. Hopkins refers to the pre-1600 era as 'archaic'¹³ globalisation, as noted above, during which boundaries were more fluid and ideas spread more easily than goods as the basic means of transport in those times allowed mainly 'high value to weight' trading; thus, ideas could dissipate more easily

⁹ Indian scholars wrote about the Jawa Dwipa Hindu kingdom in Java and Sumatra around 200 BCE. Buddhism reached the area around 425 CE (see History of Indonesia, 2000, at http://www.campusprogram.com/reference/en/wikipedia/h/hi/history_of_indonesia.html).

¹⁰ 'The Diamond Sutra' was translated into Chinese from the Sankrit in the fifth century by an Indian-Turkish scholar, Kumarajiva, who lived in China (Sen, 2002), and became widely distributed when movable print setting was discovered in China in the ninth century. But the original teaching (Hinayana) had already spread to regions in South Asia around 250 BCE, whereas the later teachings (Mahayana) took roots in Central and East Asia probably in the first century CE (DKWP, 1952).

¹¹ Between 650-850 CE, Islam expanded from the Western Mediterranean to India (A Quick Guide to the World History of Globalization, n.d.), and spread to Southeast Asia after the ninth century when Arab trade hegemony included the East Indies, replacing that of India and China.

¹² The Road stretched from China's old capital, now Xi'an, across the Eurasian Steppe to Alexandria. From 100 CE it enabled cultural links for the Han dynasty with India and trade links with the Roman Empire (Encarta, 2000). Under Mongol rule, it was an important route to control their vast territories.

¹³ In a doctoral discussion group held at the School of Education, University of Auckland (1 November 2002), archaic was seen as derogatory. Maybe, a more neutral term would be 'early' globalisation.

than heavy produce. Also, because of the widespread importance of Islam, the lingua franca was Arabic and expansion realised by coordination rather than assimilation¹⁴.

David Held and colleagues (1999) would classify these occurrences as ‘thin’ globalisation as, in spite of the extent being high, the intensity, speed and impact of these ‘globalising’ forces could have been considered low for the transport and communication of that time would have been slow¹⁵, and the effect, such as the degree of assimilation or convergence, limited (see Table 2.1). Gunpowder, for example, was known in China in the late 11th century but first reached Europe 200 years later, and printing was already established in China around the ninth century but was only applied in Europe in the 15th century¹⁶. World-system theorists like Immanuel Wallerstein¹⁷ and Samir Amin¹⁸ would further see globalisation before 1500 as a world empire system based on the conquest and exploit of important neighbouring states through coercive power. This world-system is considered structurally different, indicating a discontinuity, from the modern hegemonic system arising after 1500 in Europe with respect to military/political power largely being concentrated in a single state and a tributary mode of economy, that is, the ‘empire’ enforcing ‘tribute’ from the subjugated states in ‘exchange’ for peace and nominal independence (Chase-Dunn & Grimes, 1995).

¹⁴ Yet pre-modern empires may have imposed assimilation policies on ‘the other’ by enforcing a common language, religion, and political structure, examples of globalisation as co-existence exist. Still, the Aryans, despite being conquerors, gradually mixed with, rather than coerced, the local cultures they invaded (Hooker, 1996), and the countries under Mongol control kept their own culture, language, and system of rule that in turn influenced their Mongol rulers.

¹⁵ This is debatable, as the impact of world religions cannot be considered low, for example the extent of Islam and the recurrence of Buddhism in China. To be fair, Held et al. (1999) do see Islam as the first globalised religion having high impact during this period of thin globalisation.

¹⁶ *Hour Asia: Ancient Chinese Inventions*, on the Discovery Channel, showed that Chinese discoveries before the tenth century helped made possible the expansion of Europe. For example, Chinese seafarers already used a compass, had junks with watertight bulkheads to prevent sinking and sails that allowed a ship to sail close into the wind. The Chinese also had designed the first canons, missiles and fire bombs that made it possible for them to wage advanced wars, and developed a printing technology that enabled the dissemination of ideas among a wider audience. All these inventions took a few eras before reaching Europe via Arab traders and Jesuits.

¹⁷ According to Wallerstein (1974), there are three possible systems: world empires, such as the past Eurasian empires; world-economies, such as the present world-system integrated by a single capitalist economy; and world-socialism, which as yet remains unrealised.

¹⁸ Amin (2000) sees Wallerstein’s world-empire system as ancient or old globalisation lasting from 500 BCE to 1500 CE and involving the three centres of China, India and the Middle East. This system was not polarising like the current capitalist world system, as developmental gaps were moderate - at most at a ratio of 2:1.

Table 2.1
Model of Globalisation (adapted from Held, et al., 1999)

Spatio-temporal Dimensions of Globalisation					
Type of Globalisation	<i>Extensity</i>	<i>Intensity</i>	<i>Velocity</i>	<i>Impact</i>	Periodisation of Globalisation¹⁹
<i>Thin</i>	HIGH	LOW	LOW	LOW	Premodern
<i>Expansive</i>	HIGH	LOW	LOW	HIGH	Early modern European expansion
<i>Diffused</i>	HIGH	HIGH	HIGH	LOW	No historical equivalent ²⁰
<i>Thick</i>	HIGH	HIGH	HIGH	HIGH	Contemporary

2.2.2 *Globalisation as European Expansion*

Clearly, long before 1492, the year Christopher Columbus sailed west to the Americas, and 1496, the year Vasco da Gama sailed east around Africa to the Indies, different cultures and places were linked into networks of communication, trading and migration. However, for many social scientists the European explorations of the 16th century signal a new era with the global spread of Christianity and Western trading, and “the narrow horizons of the so-called Middle Ages Europe [widening to] encompass the whole world” (Kloos, 1998, p.1). These explorations mark the Eurocentric trajectory of globalisation, or ‘rise of Europe’. ‘Newly’ discovered sea routes in the 15th century, with most East African to Far East routes already known by Arab and Asian traders, became militarised under increased competition for route and port access among the Portuguese and Spanish followed a century later by the French, Dutch and British.

¹⁹ Applying a fixed periodisation of globalisation may not be possible; as the authors stated, their model is “a simple typology of globalisation that has no necessarily fixed form” (p.21).

²⁰ Arguably, the global diffusion of some ideas, such as the protection and sustainability of the environment, is high today but corresponding political impact relatively low, and thus fit this category.

World-system theorists who view globalisation as the worldwide completion of the modern capitalist world-system mark this period of ‘discovery’ as the start of such a system (Amin, 2000; Wallerstein, 2000a) which intensified in the mid-1600s when feudalism broke down²¹, motivating the search for new markets and resources. Market institutions replaced feudalism by means of technological innovations (that had finally reached Europe from the East). European expansion drift linked Europe with regions in Asia and the Americas that ‘supported’ the drive for the accumulation of wealth (Lechner, 2000). This expansion, and push for globalisation, was further paralleled by the development of a world polity system rooted in European Christian tradition. In particular, the spread of the Protestant Ethic (Weber’s theory of modernisation) and revival of Greek philosophy, for example Aristotle and Plato, enabled the development of an individualistic culture and rational organisation of human life, and enlightenment principles in science and philosophy (like those of Descartes and Kant). Reason became its own master; no longer subjected to the authority of a church or ‘divine’ ruler, with the result, Amin (2000, p.585) observed, “Moneytheism replaces monotheism”. Giddens (1999) stated that this development in Western culture rooted in Enlightenment principles was to shape modern global culture, making society more rational on the premise human life will be more predictable if nature can be controlled, whilst Lechner (2000, p.155) indicated that “More than just the aggregate result of individual profit-seeking or political competition, international life acquired a cultural structure.” Moreover, this structure, propagating the scientification and modernisation of life (see Section 3.2.1.), became the basis for justifying European economic expansion accomplished by colonisation.

As Wallerstein (1974) pointed out, the capitalist world-system instigated unequal, hierarchical development between the European core, and the ‘Rest’, the periphery, with some regions in the semi-periphery functioning as a buffer. The arrangement still operates to this day. The core represents militarily strong states, with higher-skill, capital-intensive production leading to appropriating much of the world’s resources and economic surplus; the periphery constitutes the core-dependent, weak states with low-skilled, labour-intensive production and resourcing of raw materials; and the semi-

²¹ Amin (2000) refers to this period as mercantilist transition where the logic of tributary power as expressed by the absolute (feudal) monarchies in Europe was replaced by that of capitalism through the successful ‘bourgeois’ revolutions in the Netherlands, England and France.

periphery consists of the less dependent states with more diversified economies. Unlike the world empire system, in this capitalist system no single political centre exists. Thus, no single colonial power could truly dominate as the core has within its borders “a multiplicity of political systems” (ibid, p.39). But at any time a state could have hegemonic influence through military and technological leadership. As Robinson (2004, p.11) remarked: “The world-system approach to hegemony focuses on successive *state hegemons*. Looking backward, the baton was passed from the Italian city states to Holland, Great Britain, and then the United States”.

Contrary to Wallerstein, Jonathan Friedman (n.d.) proposes the growth of the Mediterranean and then Flanders was only possible when the Arab world experienced a ‘terminal economic crisis’ that led to the decline of the Middle East in the later Middle Ages. Consistent with world-system theory, Friedman explains the rise of Europe as a shift of wealth accumulation from one world hegemon to another, but this hegemony involved regions outside Europe. Likewise, the economist-sociologist-historian, Andre Gunder Frank (2002)²² stressed that such hegemonic shifts occurred within the same world system (without hyphen), linking Asia, Africa and Europe. Frank considers the ever-increasing triangles of trade and complex webs of monopoly positions as forerunners of today’s globalisation and states “there was a single global world economy with a world wide division of labour and multilateral trade from 1500 onward” (Frank, 1998, p.52). He criticises, however, the Euro ‘tunnel’ history that singles out the European trade route ‘discoveries’ of the 1500s as a disjuncture from previous development. This tunnel vision makes Europe somehow different, progressive by highlighting the shift from a tributary mode of production to a capitalist one, which provided the engine for Europe’s ‘modernisation’, as well as by particularising rationality²³ to Europe²⁴. Frank and Barry Gills (1993) argue that, originating from the Near East, a single world system based on extensive and recurring trade links, political as well as hegemony/rivalry relations, sharing economic, political and to some extent

²² Christopher Chase-Dunn and Peter Grimes’s (1995) excellent review of world-system theory observed that Frank and Gills (1993) postulated on the basis of their analyses that for thousands of years the Eurasian world system had capitalism, that is “accumulation of economic surplus by means of the production and sale of commodities” (p.393), as a core feature.

²³ As Frank (1998, p.9) says: “[C]ivilizational’ or ‘cultural’ variables are not so much determinant or independent, as they are themselves derivative from and dependent on the world-wide economic structure and process.”

²⁴ For a critical analysis of Eurocentrism in the work of Marx, Weber, Wallerstein and other renowned social theorists, see Frank’s website: <http://csf.edu/agfrank>

cultural cycles can be dated back five thousand years ago. From world *economies* in one world system, it developed into a world *economy* in which, prior to the 1750s, West-Asia and India had a trade surplus with Europe, the periphery, and China, the core, with every other state because of its unsurpassed production efficiency and export of goods such as porcelain and silk. The authors concluded that since Europe had been part of a 5000 years old Afro-Eurasian, capital-imperialist world system, it did not experience a shift from feudalism to capitalism in 1500.

In support of Friedman's observations, Cottrell (2001) argued that within Europe hegemonic change was marked by shifts in financial centres, first concentrating in the south, probably linked with Arab trade, and then moving north. Consistent with Robinson's observation (2004), Cottrell stated that by the 15th century the centre of merchant banking was the North Italian city-states. As the network became more 'formalised', the centre moved north to Bruges then Antwerp, and in the late 1500s, to Amsterdam, which by then linked Europe financially with the East Indies. London became the financial centre more than a century later and provided the capital for the first industrial revolution²⁵. It expanded commercial links with the Americas, thereby setting up the trade triangle Europe, America and Asia. Friedman (n.d.) further pointed out that in between Holland and England as financial centres Spain and Portugal were hegemonic powers, and that each concentration of power was followed by capital export or globalisation, and a shift in control, during which increased competition and conflict took place. Examples from history are the Spanish-Dutch 80-year war 1568-1648 with a truce in the 1620s that enabled Dutch cities to channel finances to its expansion of trade, and the Battle of Trafalgar 1805, in which the British fleet defeated the Spanish and established maritime and trade hegemony.

By 'going global'²⁶, often under the banner of spreading Christianity and civilisation, seafaring countries in Europe were able to extend their domestic markets by extracting raw or precious materials from other spaces, processing or refining and trading them on the domestic as well as foreign markets for large profits, creating economic surpluses. Citing Hall and Chase-Dunn (1993), Chase-Dunn and Grimes (1995, p.394) stated that,

²⁵ The first industrial revolution was led by the British from the mid 17th century, the second by the Americans towards the end of the 19th century.

²⁶ This term first occurred in the English language in the 16th century (Kloos, 1998).

in agreement with Wallerstein, Europe was the first region within the larger world-system “to experience a predominantly capitalist regional system”, although China had come close in the 10th century. The Golden Age of the Lowlands in the 17th century, and the rising power of the British Isles somewhat later illustrate that their wealth accumulation was a direct consequence of their expansion of trade in, and subsequent colonisation of, new territories. By 1800, the west and east routes of sea trading were consolidated through currency and commodity flows, and companies controlled or contracted by European states. Nevertheless, the trading networks over land of the Ottoman (Turkey), Safavid (Persia), Mughal (India) and Ch’ing (Manchuria) empires were also more expansive than previously, with European interest in this area only becoming prominent in the 19th century (Frank & Gills, 1993; Frank, 1998). According to Frank (1993), with these empires weakened – between 1750 and 1850 – European attempts for hegemony finally succeeded after 300 years (temporarily, he emphasises²⁷), and a multipolar world economy became increasingly unipolar. Despite their ‘success’, Frank highlighted that European participation in the world system would have remained limited if their trade with Asia had not been supported by the silver and gold ‘taken’ from the Americas²⁸. Similarly, Braudel (1982, p.387) posed: “Is not America ... perhaps the true explanation of Europe’s greatness?”

As aforementioned, Hopkins’ (2002) identifies the period between 1600 and 1800 as ‘proto’ globalisation, characterised by two parallel developments: growth of finance, services and pre-industrial manufacturing, and Christian as well as Muslim states strengthening links between territory, taxation and sovereignty. Particularly in the 1760s, Europe intensified its commercial and colonial expansion to the west and east, and used to its advantage the budding knowledge revolution, leading to improved efficiency in the transaction sector. These developments enabled an increased flow of goods, money and people, as well as multilateral trade, and stimulated consumer convergence²⁹ (Hopkins, *ibid*, p.5). Held et al (1999, p.22) would consider this globalisation as

²⁷ Most world-systems theorists share the idea, akin to Marxist ideology, that the capitalist world economy will lead to a crisis and the current globalisation is the ‘swan song’ of such a system (e.g. Wallerstein, 1998).

²⁸ What was taken from Africa should also be noted; as Tabb (1997) said, in reference to Robert Blackburn’s book: ‘The making of New World Slavery’, in 1770 profits from slavery made up a third of British capital formation, and the new international division of labour was made up of slaves, who produced rice, coffee, sugar and other commodities crucial to the living standards and personal riches of many Europeans.

²⁹ The proliferation of core, periphery and semi-periphery would contest such a notion.

‘expansive’ as they remarked: “the early modern period of Western expansion ... comes closest to this type”.

2.2.3 Globalisation as Paradox: Rise of the Nation State and Spread of Industrial Capitalism

Hopkins (2002) refers to the period from 1800 to 1950 as ‘modern’ globalisation, a period dominated by modernising ‘empires’ and characterised by a deepening of national consciousness and identity. ‘Archaic’ and ‘proto’ globalisation became “corralled, domesticated and harnessed to new national interests” (p.6). According to him, two key events mark the period after 1800: the rise of the nation state and industrial capitalism. Amin (2000, p.617-618) calls this ‘modern globalisation’ the second phase of capitalism, where exploitation of human and material resources was no longer based on predominantly “the control of natural means of production (basically land)”, but on the control “of equipment (machines and buildings)”. The transformation eventually led to conflict between capitalist owners and workers, in particular when deskilling took root in the 1920s with the introduction of Taylorism when “skills were transferred to an external body, that of technicians, engineers and organizers of production”. As production expanded under “the bourgeois system of political power”, capitalist mode of production became inconceivable “outside politics and the state”. Similarly, Paul Hirst (in *Open Democracy*, 2002, p.4) stressed that even though globalisation and the nation state seem paradoxical, “territorially exclusive government and world trade grew together”, as illustrated by the Westphalian state system (1648)³⁰ and western expansion consolidating in unison. In other words, “state societies have never been local. From Holland to Spain, they were global from birth” (ibid). The nation state became the basis for modernisation through ensuring internal cohesion and control of own territory as well as expansion of national interests overseas. As Chase-Dunn and Grimes (1995, p.402) noted, state expansion consisted of “a geographical expansion of the power of the central government ever farther away from the capital city, combined with a deepening of its power over the daily life of its citizens”.

³⁰ This marked the beginning of the modern state system, where the state became the only political authority.

The accelerated rise of capital and capitalists during industrialisation further brought about the reorganisation of domestic and foreign territory of European states³¹ as well as that of the American colonies which had obtained their independence in the late 18th century from Britain. As raw materials produced outside Europe, the periphery, became crucial to the core industrial centres of Europe, land conversions became the source of sovereignty (Hopkins, 2002). Also, state bureaucracy and instruments of state (such as land surveys, government statistics and the legal system) developed to control the ‘organizational technologies of modernity’ (QGWHG, n.d.). Moreover, the expansion of European nations became ‘nationalised’ by their exportation of their constitution, religion and overflow of population³². Independence from Britain set in motion the expansion drift of the United States into South America³³ and the shift of European expansion into the Asian Pacific region and Africa (ibid). Capital accumulation was controlled by two main means: ‘assimilation and association’³⁴, and a global order was created by ‘persuasion’ - ‘free’ trade, and ‘command’ - the empire (Hopkins, 2002, p.6). The most successful of the European powers was the British Empire, whose strategies ranged from the formation of, for example, New Zealand as a British territory, by signing of the Treaty of Waitangi in 1840 (see Section 5.2.1), to waging war with China, the Opium Wars in the 1870s, so to uphold British rights of trade into China’s hinterland.

Thus, the role of the state may be seen as a logical outcome of capitalist expansion and hence global integration. For Wallerstein, the European expansion of capital and means of production transformed the system of trading over 400 years into a modern capitalist world-economy, with states being important “to stabilize capitalism by absorbing costs

³¹ For example, Flanders joined Wallonia rather than the Protestant dominated Netherlands to form Belgium, predominantly Roman Catholic, and borders between France, Germany, Austria and neighbouring regions also shifted.

³² Overseas out-migration from Europe effectively extended Europe’s borders (Frank, 2002).

³³ In this context, whilst Americanisation is often seen as a globalising force now, Keohane and Nye (2000, p.7) noted: “the United States itself is a product of seventeenth and eighteenth century globalization”.

³⁴ The British preferred assimilation and the Dutch association, according to Hopkins (2002). The history of colonisation indicates that both strategies were used by European powers, depending on the type of colonisation that took place. For example, in colonies of settlement where citizens of the colonising power migrated to in large numbers and soon exercised control, such as the United States, Canada, Australia and New Zealand, assimilation of the host culture took place as settlers began to outnumber the indigenous people through violence and/or disease exposure. In contrast, in colonies of exploitation, such as Malaysia, Indonesia, Nigeria and Ghana, the indigenous people were numerous and relatively few Europeans settled permanently. Thus, colonising powers had to establish political control by association and military power; they did not displace the native inhabitants nor, on the whole, destroyed their cultures (Encarta 2000), although through education and religion made attempts to ‘civilise’ (or ‘docile’) them.

and managing the social problems it creates” (cited in Waters, 1995, p.24). The importance of states signifies that material exchanges reach a limit where they cannot spread beyond their locality if not transformed into political exchanges. This transformation started towards the end of the 19th century with increased colonial expansion of European states, treaties³⁵, world wars and superpower dealings. With states having a crucial role as economic units, the three types of states could emerge over time: the triangle/triad EU-USA-Japan developed as core; the South, the weak, ‘indigenous’ and invaded states as periphery; and the Middle East, North-East Asia and Eastern Europe as semi-periphery.

Kevin O’Rourke and Jeffrey Williamson (2000), economic historians, consider this period of ‘modern’ globalisation as being the true beginning of globalisation. They define globalisation in specific economic terms: ‘the integration of international commodity markets’, which condition is met by “falling transport costs or trade barriers [that] lead to falling import prices, rising export prices, commodity price convergence, and an increase in trade volumes” (p.3). The authors argue that events before 1800 did not meet the criteria of globalisation; in contrast, the 19th century contained “a very big globalization bang” (abstract) and witnessed “the dismantling of mercantilism³⁶, the establishment of the Pax Britannica³⁷, and a more dramatic transport revolution” (p.20). These events enabled the breakdown of monopolies, intensification of intercontinental open trade and trade in bulk rather than luxury goods, thereby fulfilling the conditions that made market globalisation possible.

However, Frank (2002), in reviewing the authors’ assumptions, found that price convergence was mainly due to the factor mobility of labour (70%), foremost through

³⁵ For example, in 1871, the year that a telegraph cable was laid from Java - Indonesia’s main island - to Australia, the British and Dutch signed the Treaty of Sumatra in which the Dutch gave the Gold Coast to the British in exchange for the Dutch having a free hand in Sumatra, which is now part of Indonesia, where they had discovered oil. However, this was preceded by another treaty between the British and Dutch; in 1824, they signed the Treaty of London, dividing the East Indies between them. The Dutch claimed Sumatra, Java, Maluku, Irian Jaya and other territories of present Indonesia. The British claimed Malaya and Singapore, and retained an interest in North Borneo, now part of Malaysia (The History of Indonesia, 2000, http://www.campusprogram.com/reference/en/wikipedia/h/hi/history_of_indonesia.html).

³⁶ This dismantling is consistent with world-system theory, e.g. Amin’s notion that a merchantilist transformation started in the mid 1600s.

³⁷ As Gilpin (cited in Waters, 1995, p.32) would argue, for a global market economy to develop fully, it needs a liberal hegemon, such as Britain in the 19th century and the USA in the 20th century. If there is no such hegemonic power to enforce conditions for freedom and perfection of the market to develop, than nationalistic and mercantilist competition arises with states seeking control of supply and demand.

intercontinental migration. In addition, convergence did not occur everywhere nor did it at all times of openness. As Keohane and Nye (2000) observed, convergence such as that between Britain and the US (which also shared structural similarity of world culture/polity) was significant, but in others was not important. Moreover, O'Rourke and Williamson's own data indicate that world capital flows in the late 1800s led to divergence rather than convergence. Frank (2002) cites privileged position in location, technology, commerce, production and legislature, rather than convergence and openness of markets, as having characterised global economic integration, and argues (1971, cited in Waters, 1995, p.21) that as monopoly-capitalist colonialism was based not on export-capitalism but on colonial commodities being imported at low prices, while manufactured goods exported at high prices, it provided a surplus to investors of the colonising powers. Hence, it led to trade and payments imbalances and perpetuated underdevelopment in colonies of exploitation that still divides the world today in developed and 'developed to be underdeveloped' nations³⁸. From a world system approach without a hyphen, Frank (2002) refers to the triangles connecting Britain first to the triangular Atlantic trade and payments imbalances before 1800, then to those involving China and India in the 19th century, later to be complemented by the trade with the United States and China. These triangles were joined by other triangles and merged into complex multilateral trade systems that led to convergence in the North and set up de-convergence in the so-called Third World.

2.2.4 Globalisation as a Recent Phenomenon: Retraction of the Nation State

In contrast to the above periodisations of the continuation of globalisation, neo-liberals and some Marxist-leaning radicals - both referred to as '(hyper) globalists' (Held et al, 1999), place globalisation in a contemporary time frame. Today's world history is one of globalisation that differs from earlier periods in "sheer magnitude, complexity, and speed" (Held et al., 1999, p.235). Globalists consider globalisation not as a conjuncture

³⁸ Chase-Dunn and Grimes (1995) also pointed out that it is the whole system that develops and that the developing, peripheral countries cannot mimic the path taken by core countries previously as they are through unequal exchange "structurally constrained to experience developmental processes that reproduce their subordinate status" (p.389). However, the changes are better for the semi-periphery as they contain features similar to the core, for example the United States becoming core in the 1880s and hegemonic in 1945. This may also explain the position of some East-Asian countries, especially since they used to be core countries in the preceding non-European centred world system. However, as Chase-Dunn (1999) stated, Japan's and Korea's shift from semi-peripheral towards the core after the Second World War was in part made possible by US support as a 'geopolitical' response to the Chinese Communist Revolution.

of previous internationalisation processes but as a new epochal transformation of capitalism, and a logical progression towards a 'borderless world' (Ohmae, 1990) nurtured by transactional organisation such as the International Monetary Fund, World Bank and World Trade Organisation (Held & McGrew, n.d.). This triggers a basic evolution between market power and state authority with the outcome that nation states no longer constitute 'natural' forms of organising society. In other words, globalisation is seen as primarily an economic phenomenon that is characterised by the irreversible processes of denationalisation and diffusion of economies through transnational networks of production, trade and finance³⁹. Corporate capital and global finance now mostly determine the organisation, location and distribution of economic power and wealth (Held & McGrew, n.d.). With traditional states' sovereignty and autonomy weakened and challenged by the increasing importance of global and regional governance - such as the World Bank (WB) and the European Union (EU) respectively, globalisation produces "a shift from public to private regulation and from territorial to trans-territorial forms of authority" (Higgott & Reich, 1998, p.4). Hence, states are losing their capacity to control or resist the process of globalisation and merely function as 'transmission belts' for global capital and intermediaries for local, regional and global governance (Held et al, 1999).

Neo-liberals and radicals both focus on economic globalisation but differ in their assessment of its impact. Neo-liberals view globalisation as a *positive* progressive force that will increase employment opportunities and thus living standards (Hopkins, 2002). These 'goods' will be achieved by the free flow of means of production and commodities at a transnational level – that is the global free market – and a 'trickle down' effect from wealth accumulation of the rich to the poor. In addition, globalisation makes possible the first 'truly' global civilisation, based on Western concepts of rationality, human rights and democracy (strengthening the existing world polity), through transnational organisations like the United Nations. Although the ideal state of global market and governance may not have been fully realised yet, neo-liberals consider the path set to a convergence of laws, rights and obligations across nations and, as Schrader (n.d., p.2) remarked, "the emergence of supra-national spaces with a common policy in economic and non-economic spheres". In contrast, and similar to

³⁹ This diffusion refers to the four 'I's flowing freely across borders: Industry, Investments, Individuals, and Information.

Frank and Friedman, radicals and neo-Marxists see today's globalisation as "the triumph of an oppressive global capitalism" (Held et al., 1999, p.4), and a *negative* destructive force as the gap between winners and losers widens not only across core and peripheral regions but also within national boundaries. For neo-Marxists the global capitalist structure constrains the behaviour of key actors, composed of states, classes, international business and transnational corporations (Newman, 1998). Some individual organisations may act in the interest of nation states but do so to sustain the expansion and accumulation of global capital. Although they share with neo-liberalists the view that international organisations are crucial in the process of globalisation, they view, similar to world-system theorists, these as hierarchical with the global economy ruled by a dominance-dependency relationship rather than a decentralised, network system that liberal philosophy would espouse. As their explanation of 'negative' globalisation is similar to that of world-system theorists and sceptics⁴⁰, it is discussed in the next section.

2.2.5 Globalisation as 'Nothing New': Cyclic Pattern of Globalisation

The so-called sceptics, (neo-) realists or traditionalist, such as Paul Hirst and Graham Thompson, accept that there is an intensification of international interdependence but view globalisation as 'not new at all' and, premised on the economic notion that globalisation represents a "perfectly integrated global market" (Held et al., 1999, p.5), argue that the process itself is overstated. Hirst and Thompson (1996) even postulate that globalisation is a necessary myth created in the 1970s, a period which signalled the end of full employment and economic growth as marked by the oil crisis, to set up conditions that would allow for free market policies and stimulate competitiveness as an answer to increasingly uncontrollable market forces. And as the 1980s and 1990s saw the collapse of Keynesian monetary policies and the demise of socialism in Eastern Europe, globalisation "is a myth suitable for a world without illusions, but it is also one that robs us of hope" (p.6). The myth dispels the fact that the economy is determined by

⁴⁰ As Newman (1998) noted, Marxism is a modernisation theory that views the economy as the driving force behind globalisation. As the economy determines the structure of nation states as well as the interstate system, it assumes the harmonisation of nation state and transnational capital interests. However, conflict will occur between different groups in society, eventually leading to the end of capitalism. These Marxist notions have been incorporated in the work of world-system theorists like Wallerstein and Frank as the previous writing illustrated.

transnational agents and corporations that have no fixed location and move there where they gain competitive advantages in the global market place.

Further, sceptics do not see contemporary globalisation as global market integration but more as regionalisation for it mainly involves the rich OECD members: Western Europe, Japan⁴¹ and North America - the Global Triangle or Triad, which are the architects of a liberal global economy (Held & McGrew, n.d.). Also, according to economic measures of economic convergence and migration flows, today's markets may not be as globally integrated as between 1870-1914, referred to as the Belle Epoque. As Hirst (2001, p.8) said:

In 1914, Britain, France and Germany had attained trade to GDP ratios comparable to those of today, levels of capital export to GDP not exceeded today, and levels of mass migration that dwarf those of today. Between 1800 and 1930 40 million Europeans migrated permanently overseas. The world created by commercial liberalism was unlike the world of today, which is controlled by borders, passports and visas that in the nineteenth century were regarded as devices of barbarous regimes like the Tsars.

In view of the above, sceptics concur with world system theorists like Jonathan Friedman. Friedman (n.d., p.1) asserted that globalisation should be considered as distinct phases of internationalisation rather than a new era as historically the rise of centres of wealth accumulation has been followed by “decentring via decentralization of the accumulation process itself”. For example, globalisation between 1880 and World War I was followed by deglobalisation and regionalisation worldwide. This trend was reversed after the 1950s and increased the pace of globalisation from the 1970s onwards. Interestingly, Friedman argues that the regionalisation along three major zones: APEC (Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation), NAFTA (North American Free Trade Agreement) and EU (European Union), is again the emerging trend⁴². Compared to the old triangle, however, the difference is that the process has increased in extent. Even so, the patterns

⁴¹ Interestingly, according to Keohane and Nye (2000), Japan imported German law a century ago.

⁴² Friedman's argument resembles Gilpin's, who argued that twentieth century American liberal hegemony has declined due to increased competition from Europe and Asia. This decline was deliberate on America's part to open up the global market to “a triangular mercantilist dogfight” like those of the 17th and 18th century in which states compete to succeed through tax competitiveness, investment and export/import protection and migration restrictions. The only difference now is that the ‘fight’ involves regional state alliances such as EU, ASEAN, APEC and NAFTA (in Waters, 1995, p.32-33). Thus, present day globalisation could be seen as mercantilisation through regional states.

of development indicate that world trends are cyclic⁴³, rather than irreversible, and consist of a “series of pulsations, expansions and contractions” (Friedman, *ibid*). Frank and Gills (1993) would agree, as they also argue that expansion and contraction begin at the core and then disperse to other parts of the world system. In 3000 BCE the core was West Asia, after which it spread to Central Asia and then South Asia. Today, it begins in the United States and subsequently diffuses from there.

Like the ‘negative’ Marxist-leaning globalists and world-system theorists, sceptics further question the beneficial impacts of globalisation, seeing it likewise as deepening differentiations, making the rich richer and the poor poorer, and continuing the disparity between North-South. According to Hirst (2001), most of the major companies are based in the developed nations and, whilst trading about 2/3rds of their products, keep the majority of their assets in their country of origin⁴⁴. Also, capital markets obtain 90% of investment locally in the advanced countries, and migration is tighter “to keep economic migrants out of welfare states” (Hirst, p.9). In these developments, the nation states of the ‘core’ are neither passive victims nor somehow ‘outside’ the process of globalisation. Through the interstate system that has operated since the 17th century and intensified in the 19th century these states have promoted economic activities across borders, and created the legal framework and necessary conditions by which a global market system can be sustained.

As Friedman (n.d.) pointed out, nation states still exist. Under conditions of globalisation, states – especially the major core ones - can stimulate competitive advantages, with the degree to which capital investment concentrates in a region, that is the North, remaining the same. More than this, however, the advanced nation states have become active agents in the development of globalisation. They have willingly

⁴³ On the Discovery Channel, a programme presented by Terry Jones on how the ‘average’ Pompeii citizens may have lived mentioned archaeological findings that indicated Pompeii had been a more equal society before the invasion of Rome. As Mellor (Encarta, 2000) stated, Pax Romana brought about extreme wealth and poverty. Military dominance and slavery meant that small agricultural units gave way to large plantations controlled by the Roman elite, causing landless peasants to move to Rome and other cities. This resembles the effect of decentralised capitalism, and Friedman may thus be correct in saying that world trends are in essence cyclic. However, using Held et al’s model of globalisation, it could be argued that these cycles may have widened and deepened throughout history.

⁴⁴ Tabb (1997) reported, for example, that 75% of US foreign investment and production is in Western Europe, Canada and other high wage countries. Also, 85% of industrial output is produced domestically and 15% by multinationals. This indicates that the free flow of capital on the global market is an oversimplification.

ceded some elements of sovereignty and discretion to supranational organisations in order to maintain more effectively their own position of dominance in the system. For example, Friedman observed that whereas the US had 42 of the top 50 corporations in 1956, this decreased to 17 in 1983, but increased in Europe, which now has the largest number of top firms - 21 in the top 50. In addition, Taiwan, Korea and China have increased their rankings among industrial export countries⁴⁵ with the US and UK losing some ground. It is thus argued that the proportional shift in the US-Europe-N.E Asia triangle has been guided by state policies and incentives to improve manufacturing, infra structure and human resources. From this perspective, globalisation can be seen as national, or even regional, coordination of world markets rather than market unification or integration on a global scale, which is the globalists' contention.

As Hirst (2001, p.8) remarked: "What most people mean by 'globalization' is the continued development of the international system of commercial liberalism. This system remains *inter-national*, not truly global, because it involves high levels of trade and investment between distinct national economies centred on major states". Although Hirst's comment is valid in so far that the developed nations have long been in competition with each other in a (world) system of capitalism, this competition provides much of the drive behind globalisation. It can thus be queried whether the global institutions they have created are truly international. For example, the World Trade Organisation does not advance *bi-lateral* but *multi-lateral* trade relations, which can be seen as a shift from international relations to transnational relations with the ultimate aim to set global rules.

⁴⁵ Hirst (in Open Democracy, 2002) cited that Taiwan and South Korea had an industrious peasantry who had benefited from their land under land reforms and subsequently saved the surplus. Therefore, these economies did not have to rely on capital inflows, rather "built on high rates of local saving, and industrialisation behind tariff barriers." This will not happen for Brazil or other similar societies, he continued as: "Nobody is going to let developing countries have a favour through a differential trade regime, while the sort of peasantries that can save are dissolving" (interview). Thus, weak and poor states are less likely to develop a competitive advantage and catch up with 'the North' or developed countries.

2.3 Globalisation Framed

As Snow and Benford (1992, pp.136-137) described, frames provide:

An interpretative schemata ... that simplifies and condenses the 'world out there' by selectively punctuating and encoding objects, situations, events, experiences, and sequences of action within one's present or past environments.

Most of the abovementioned theories offer three frames of situating, identifying, and classifying globalisation: globalisation is historically as old as human existence but has intensified progressively and accelerated recently; it has developed parallel with western modernisation and lately gathered speed; and it is a recent phenomenon arising from post-industrialisation, post-modernisation and the deterritorialisation of capital (Waters, 1995). The historian Felipe Fernandez-Armesto (Australian Broadcasting Corporation (ABC), n.d., p.2) formulates it as follows: "[G]lobalisation is as old as history itself. It's not a very old phenomenon if by globalisation you mean something purely economic or if you mean westernisation."

When globalisation is taken as a 'recent' phenomenon, it tends to play down, however, other global developments that influence today's policy and practice at both a state and institutional level, such as those related to culture, technology, and demography (space and time). Hopkins (2002), for example, refers to today's globalisation (beginning after 1950) as post-colonial globalisation, which marks the end of 'modern' empires and the emergence of supra-territorial organisations and regional integration, as predicted by many of the abovementioned theories. In addition, geographical ties are weakened whilst links between the core, advanced countries strengthened. However, Hopkins also noted that although the agents of modern Western polity may have extended their influence, they have not obtained full control as competing world 'empires', such as Pan Islam and strong ethnic identification among Chinese⁴⁶, survived, even when weakened in economic and political power. In today's world, he emphasises that borders are

⁴⁶ Fernandez-Armesto (ABC, n.d.) noted that China has been successful as empire to assimilate its people and 'turn them into Chinese' whilst western empires "crumbled away and haven't succeeded in creating any sense of common identity ... strong enough to keep the empires together" (p.5). He reasons that there is a relative decline in the West because of the more rapid rise of China to the extent that China is likely "to resume its traditional place as the most powerful, most influential, most dominant society, country and civilisation in the world" (p.10).

increasingly defined by ideology and religion as well as by ethnicity, migration, trade and financial flows, and famine and disease (as AIDS from the mid 1980s and SARS more recently sadly illustrate⁴⁷). Hopkins concluded that globalisation in the ‘post-colonial’ age is one of transition, where “boundaries of the ‘global village’ are fluid; its inhabitants are highly mobile. Each street has its own problems, but each problem impinges increasingly on the population as a whole” (p. 8). It can indeed be argued that globalisation is not a unidimensional but a dialectic, multidimensional process, a notion propounded in many of the transformational theories of globalisation, including those of Held and colleagues.

To complete a theoretical framework from which the impact of globalisation on state policy and university education can be described and explored, the remaining sections of the chapter discuss globalisation as multi-dimensional transformation, in particular in reference to Held and colleagues. Nevertheless, to highlight the importance of the economic-political dimension on changes in society, the work of Leslie Sklair on transnational capitalism is also presented. Ulrich Beck’s theory of globalism, and globality and globalisation functions as ‘shift markers’ between globalisation as a multi-dimensional process and discursive concept, since Beck delineates globalisation as prevailing discourse, global outcome and process of interconnectedness. Finally, globalisation as ‘ethos’ as represented by critical theorists and postmodern writers is reviewed to conceptualise how globalisation ‘gets within’ and is mutated, negotiated and put into force.

2.3.1 Globalisation as Multi-Dimensional Transformation

Acknowledging globalisation has its precedents transformationists, similarly to Hopkins, see the current ‘thick’ globalisation as not only expansive, but also speedier, more intense and impacting all levels of world society. Globalisation is “the central driving force behind the rapid political, economic and cultural changes that are reshaping the world today” (Held et al, 1999, p.42). The direction of these changes is uncertain as globalisation pushes and pulls societies in opposite directions. It is uneven in its impacts

⁴⁷ However, the global spread of disease is not a new phenomenon as the Black Plague and later the killing of indigenous population (because of flue epidemics) during the European age of expansion highlight.

on regions and nation states and is thus not a force leading to convergence and homogenisation of policies and human life. Rather globalisation represents a world dividing, distancing and disembedding as well as integrating and shrinking (Held & McGrew, n.d.). Globalisation is therefore more seen as an open-ended, even “incomplete process with multiple actors and contingent outcomes” (Hopkins, cited in Harrison, 2002, p.10), rather than a linear process towards an end state.

As globalisation embraces multidimensional transformations, it cannot be reduced to the economic logic of global markets. “The local still matters but is being re-contextualised in a more complex world of economics, politics, culture and migration” (Held, cited in Open Democracy, 2002, interview). As Held et al’s model of thin and thick globalisation (1999) indicates, globalisation is not new but its present form has unique attributes, such as Internet, which quicken and deepen the process. Held and McGrew (n.d.) stressed that, similar to Marx’ notion of conflict, the economic and political dimension of globalisation represents a historically contested process that leads to the politicisation of social life. In reframing states and markets there have been unprecedented transformations in inter-regional trade, with national and local economies being integrated in global and regional markets. Not unlike the world-system/sceptics’ notion of the semi-periphery, this gives rise to a global division of labour with developing countries being repositioned according to winners and losers. For the capitalist elites economic globalisation means that their world becomes more unified, but as the global workforce becomes fragmented it divides nations *and* communities. Moreover, global economic activity is increasingly out of reach of the regulatory power of nation states, as multilateral institutions gain in importance. And notwithstanding transnational organisations such as the WTO becoming sites contested by weaker states, they largely mediate control for the powerful nations and sectors.

Historically globalisation may have given rise to modern nation states, but more recently it has led to breaking the link between territory and political power through expanding networks of multi-layered global and regional governance, as globalists described. For example, Held and McGrew (1999) mentioned that the number of IGOs rose from 37 in the early 1900s to around 300 by the end of it. In that same period the number of INGOs rose from 371 to 25000. This development has created an infrastructure of global polity through which globalisation can be regulated, promoted

and protested⁴⁸. The authors disagree, however, with the globalists' view that the state is in decline. Rather they attribute more agency to states, as states, especially the developed ones, can be simultaneously weakened as well as be expanding their power. This means that globalisation is experienced differently, mediated by a nation's standing in the global polity and economy, its form of government and institutions, and strategies for making and unmaking globalising 'imperatives'.

2.3.2 Globalisation as Transnational/global Capitalism

A more refined globalist is Leslie Sklair (1999, 2001), who concurs that globalisation is a recent phenomenon and the result of post-1960s capitalism. Although he rejects the neo-liberal end-of-state contention, he also strongly challenges the state-centrist approach of sceptics and world-system theorists such as Friedman and Wallerstein. According to Sklair (2001), many contemporary problems cannot be analysed from each nation state and its *inter*-national relations. Instead the basic unit of analysis should be at the transnational and global level – which he uses interchangeably – as some state agents are influential in the global system. In agreement with Wallerstein, Sklair argues that capitalism largely configures the global system of transnational practices (in Waters, 1995). However, in his analysis of globalisation, Sklair (1999) focuses on transnational practices that originate with non-state actors and cross state borders. For example, transnational corporations (TNC) facilitate the global flow of capital and production and have assets and annual sales that exceed the Gross National Products (GNP) of most countries. Although Sklair acknowledges that many of these TNCs are based in the Golden Triangle, he questions (maybe naively⁴⁹) whether they express national interests, contends that they increasingly use global strategies and emphasises the emergence of Newly Industrialising Countries (NIC).

⁴⁸ John Boli and others (2001) noted that Europeans participate in more INGOs than other regions, with the island countries from the Pacific region participating least, and that individuals/groups from the richest 25% participate more than those of the poorest. Also, the countries with a long history of independence, the core, have broader memberships, as do Christian groups, than those from the periphery. This seems to support World-system theory in that the core establishes international organisations to advance their interest, control the periphery and the world economy. However, they also observe that growth of membership in INGOs by the poorer countries, other religions and recently independent countries is 'inversely related to absolute levels of participation', indicating a spread of world polity participation.

⁴⁹ Most of the stakeholders reside in developed countries.

Moreover, global diffusion in control of a few media conglomerates is having an increasing globalising effect in developing countries. Transnational practices are thus not solely economic; they also constitute, as world polity theorists would argue, the political and cultural-ideological. Sklair proposed that each of the three practices is represented by a major institution. As indicated, TNC represents the economic transnational practices; the Transnational Capitalist Class (TCC), consisting of globalising bureaucrats and politicians, represents the political; and the culture-ideology of consumerism, made up by the consumerist elites like the media, represents the cultural-ideological transnational practices. It is the TCC that forms the ‘global ruling class’, with many of its members educated or influenced by the Chicago School (see Chapter 4). They oppose anti-capitalism and capitalists that are anti-globalists (Sklair, 2001).

According to Malcolm Waters (1995, p.26), Sklair admits that as a nation state the United States have the agents, institutions and classes that are hegemonic in all the three transnational practices, and that hegemonic states, Britain in the 19th century and the US from the 20th century onwards, “promote capitalism as the global system”. However, a central issue in these hegemons’ pursuit of global capitalism is “the extent to which economic and environmental constraints in the private accumulation of capital challenge the global capitalist project in general and its culture-ideology of consumerism in particular” (Sklair, 1999, p.158). Thus, like transformation theorists, Sklair agrees that globalisation can be contested. And although Sklair notes that his approach to globalisation may be one-sided as it prioritises the global capitalism system, he justifiably raises the question: “how important is that “one side”?” (p.159).

2.3.3 Globalisation as Unitary Ideology, and Multidimensional Connectivity and Process

In search of a more comprehensive explanation of globalisation, the sociologist Ulrich Beck (1997) made the distinction between globalism, on the one hand, and globality and globalisation, on the other. As Beck (1995) explained, globalism refers to the ideology of neoliberalism, the ruling of the global market. Beck (1997) considered this ‘ism’, besides being a dominant Anglosaxon discourse of the globalisation process, as a mono-

causal, linear explanation of the global free market⁵⁰, and highlights that it is on purpose a one-dimensional, false, paradigm to exclude the ecological, cultural and political dimension of globalisation⁵¹. As a result, Beck (1995) argues, the model of national modernity organised within “a particular cultural identity [...], a territory and a state” (p.100) is depoliticised by the model of global markets, which supported by New Public Management (NPM) ideology envisages the role of government to be akin to a business enterprise⁵². In other words, globalism is linked to the deterritorialisation of the nation state by transnational global capitalism. In the process, it engulfs the politics of the nation state and that of organised labour as today’s technological innovation enables the replacement of the workforce (Kenway, Bullen & Robb, 2003). Hence, Beck (1997) also embraced the ideology of negative globalism that he compares to the sceptics’ notion of no ‘real’ globalisation exists, but like ‘hyperglobalists’, explains globalism predominantly from an economic point of view.

On the other hand, Beck’s concepts of globality and globalisation referred to a multidimensional system of belief and relate to globalisation theories of transformation. Beck stresses the irreversibility of globality, a globality that stands for the untenability of the concept of ‘closed spaces’; no nation, group or individual can be closed off from the global. As Beck (1995, p.101) observes, “we have been living for a long time in a world society”, in which “the totality of social relationship [...] is not integrated into or determined [...] by national-state politics.” Similar to Hopkins’ conclusion, Beck stresses that aspects of our every day life and conduct are more linked to ever closer networks extending across borders. This globality is characterised by increased uprootedness of ‘gemeinschaft’ (community), labour, and capital; global risk awareness;

⁵⁰ Beck’s (1997) article is written in German, and thus references to this work are my translated paraphrase from the German.

⁵¹ This is similar to Keohane and Nye’s argument (2000, p.3) that globalisation is a multidimensional phenomenon, but which is often “defined in strictly economic terms ... But other forms of globalisation are equally important”, with environmental globalisation being the oldest, migration the most long-standing, and biological one of the most expansive. For example, the Black Death from Asia killed more than a quarter of the European population between 1346 and 1352, the European invasion into the “New World” killed 95 percent of the indigenous population, and AIDS affects increasing numbers of people especially in the developing countries.

⁵² New Public Management is considered a theoretical tool for implementing free market theories at the public service level. Theories supporting neoliberal policies will be discussed in Chapter 3.

consciousness of ‘the other’ in one’s life⁵³; circulation of global culture industries; and power of transnational actors, institutions and agreements.

In particular, Beck (1995) referred to the global risk society: an event in one place is not confined to that locality. Beck (1997) highlighted that ecological risks no longer are (nor have they ever been since industrialisation and the weapon race have enlarged the ecological footprints of expansive nations⁵⁴) the risk of one territory. Deforestation in Brazil and Indonesia, for example, has worldwide ecological consequences, as do the pollution and consumer levels of the developed countries, dumping their industrial and hazardous waste in developing nations for it to return to the earth’s atmosphere to affect people globally. These risks, intensified by global industrialisation, are themselves globalising as they can only be contained through agreements at the supranational level⁵⁵. In addition, social reflexivity of these risks, that is the social awareness and construction of threat, has increased in scale. As a result, Beck (1992, p.44) argues “ [t]he multiplication of risks causes the world society to contract into a community of danger”.

Beck (1995, p.101) proposed that the intensified awareness (or reflexivity) of globality has spurred “multiplicity without unity”, with ‘world society’⁵⁶ meaning difference and ‘society’, unlike the concept of the nation state, non-integration. This multiplicity includes “social circles, communication networks, market relations and lifestyles, none of them specific to any particular locality” (Beck 2000, p. 4). In this differentiation and opening of spaces, globalisation encompasses the processes through which state sovereignty (a closed space) is intertwined and weakened by transnational agents that

⁵³ Clearly, as the historical narrative indicates, this is not a recent phenomenon. Rothschild (1999) rightly observes that by the end of the 19th century new developments in transport and communication had resulted in people “in all modern societies [having] economic, political, and moral relationships with other individuals whom they do not know” (p. 4) and who are strangers, distant and different.

⁵⁴ As the German economist, Adam Muller wrote in 1809: “society expands and intensifies. By a letter, by a bill of exchange, by a bar of silver, the London merchant reaches out his hand across oceans to his correspondent in Madras, and helps him to wage the great war against earth” (cited in Rothschild, 1999, p.3).

⁵⁵ O’Neill (cited in Waters, 1995, p.107) referred to these global risks as globalising panics, both products of and contributors to globalisation, undermining states’ authority to solve problems, hence disempowering them. However, recent acts by the Bush administration in not signing the Kyoto agreement and advocating instead the interest of US companies tend to indicate that powerful national governments still have a high degree of authority.

⁵⁶ Beck (1995) emphasised that globalisation does not present a world state but world society without a world state or world government; this situation gives rise to disorganised global capitalism having multiple ‘logics’.

vary in their degree of situated power and influence (see also Held et al., 1999), and commitment to identities and networks. Although as said Beck (1997, p.102) agrees with the sceptics that “nothing really important is new”, their conception of globalisation is, he thinks, historically, empirically and theoretically flawed. For the growth in number and power of transnational actors, institutions and agreements; the heightened degree of economic concentration; and the massive circulation of the global culture industries have instigated a disjunctive change. For Beck then, globalisation is clearly not a one-way process. Rather it involves a dialectic process that not only creates “transnational social links and spaces” but also “revalues local cultures, and promotes third cultures” (ibid, p.102), that is, hybrid forms⁵⁷. This dialectic nature of globalisation entails both a deterritorialisation as well as a relocalisation. The extent of this process can be measured according to “extension of space, stability over time, and social density of the transnational networks, relationships and image-flows” (Beck, 1995, p.102), and is comparable to Held et al’s (1999) notion of the extent, intensity, velocity and impact of change. Fundamentally, what tends to distinguish today’s globalisation from previous forms is that space-time is ever more compressed, bringing diverse cultures in contact and collision, and concepts like homogeneity and global discourse in doubt.

Beck’s concept of globalisation bears resemblance with the work of Roland Robertson and Anthony Giddens (see Waters, 1995), highlighting the social/cultural dimension of the process. Roland Robertson’s notion of ‘glocalisation’⁵⁸, for example, involves the universalisation of the particular and the particularisation of the universal. Globalisation does not necessarily lead to the universalisation of particular ideas and movements, but rather it makes them problematic, as the particular is not subsumed within a single

⁵⁷ This is similar to David Held’s observation that our world does not merely consist of national cultures but of multicultures and “increasing cultural hybridity” (1995, p.9). Jonathan Friedman (n.d.) cautioned, however, that discourses of hybridity and transnationalism in supporting the political objectives of multicultural states would be to the detriment of indigenous peoples. He reported on an Australian scholar promoting unity out of diversity to an audience of Aboriginal intellectuals and artists, indicating their mixed heritage and criticising cultural essentialism, to which an older man responded: “I’m an essentialist mate, and if you don’t like it you can bugger off!” (p.8).

⁵⁸ As Robertson (1997) stated, the term glocalisation is derived from the Japanese word *dochakuka*, which is used in Japanese business practice to refer to the selling or making of products for particular markets. Interestingly, Roland Robertson (2003) noted that the Japanese themselves had never made the link between the two concepts and ‘imported’ glocalisation as a new term in their discourse, which is an example of the particular becoming universalised, but unknown to its originator, and returning to the place of origin as a universal becoming particularised!!

global narrative of Western modernity⁵⁹. Instead, a “relativisation of narratives” is more likely to occur (Robertson, 1992, p. 141). Similarly, Giddens (1990) suggests that globalisation may well have spread Western institutions on a global scale, yet this expansion likewise impels a local identity and autonomy to reassert itself. As Richard Edwards and Robin Usher (1997, p.256) pointed out, “this entails drawing a distinction between internationalisation and globalisation, the former concerned with the spread of ‘Western’ institutions, culture and practices, the latter with the paradoxes of the global-local nexus”. That is, the parallel movement of the globalisation of predominantly Anglo-American ideas, culture and products (as signified by neoliberalism, Hollywood and McDonalds, for example) and the assertion of difference by local, regional and ethnic identities (ibid) result in globality reshaping rather than supplanting diversity⁶⁰.

2.3.4 Globalisation Theory: Global Imagery, Embodiment and Governmentality

In the dominant discourses, it appears that globalisation is principally seen as a force impacting human life from the outside. But how does the global get within? Or as Colin Hay and Ben Rosamond (2001, p.1) queried “how [do] ideational structures become institutionalised and normalised and thereby socially construct conceptions of ‘the possible’ amongst political actors”.

Roland Robertson (1992, p.8), who defined globalisation as “the compression of the world and the intensification of consciousness of the world as a whole”, argued that the global started to get within more than 500 years ago. Similar to transformationists and world system theorists like Wallerstein, he dates the *impetus* of globalisation to the

⁵⁹ Note however, that western modernity already represents a duality of meanings as it contains the rationalisation of life through science and the fragmentation of the (irrational) ‘herd’ into rational individuals on the one hand and the promise of equality, social justice and human emancipation on the other hand. Only, when economic malaise requires a focus on instrumental rationalisation, see Chapter 3, the emancipative transformation modernity promises is doomed to be a failed project, with the nation state stifling the rights of those it was envisaged to protect (Santos, 1995). Hence, modernity can be seen as analogous to globalisation but also provides a counter narrative to its advancement. Or as Jürgen Schriewer (2003, p.281) put it: “globalisation ... is both the consequence and the correlative of modernity”, but with ‘multiple programs of modernity’ now being realised in different parts of the world.

⁶⁰ However, it does not mean that the global-local ‘puzzle’ is a phenomenon of the modern era, as the spreading of the world’s great religions also involved a long process of glocalisation (Robertson, 2003, p.4).

‘expansion’ of Europe⁶¹, and associates the initiation of global consciousness – individual experience addressed to the world rather than to a locality or nation (Waters, 1995) – with European modernisation in what he calls the germinal phase from 1400 to 1750⁶². This onset of modernity is characterised, besides global expeditions and colonialism, by the first generalisation about humanity, the first global map, and the first universal calendar. Intensification of global consciousness occurred along four globalising reference points in the ‘take-off’ phase between 1875 and 1925, characterised by the first world-war, mass migration, and an international society of nation states joined by more non-Europeans. The first reference point here is individualisation, the redefinition of the individual as a complete person – first as part of a rural community, then as a national citizen and finally as a citizen of the world. The second refers to societalisation, in which nation states not only secure their citizens economic goods but also democratic rights and, as they are embedded in an international system of states, universal human rights. The third refers to internationalisation, the proliferation of inter-state dependencies, in which states contract their claims of sovereignty, with international systems setting norms for human behaviour. The last point of global reference initiated in the take-off stage is humanisation, in which humanity can no longer be differentiated according to categories such as class, gender and race but defined according to a single (masculine) humanity of individual rights (Waters, 1995) sanctioned and enforced by the system of states. These four processes, Robertson (1992) points out, happen independently of the internal forces at the national level. The current stage makes up the ‘uncertainty’ phase where all barriers to globalisation, and hence global consciousness and imagination, have given way, leading to ‘the universalisation of the particular and the particularisation of the universal’, as aforementioned in Section 2.3.3.

In contrast, Lerner and Walters (2002) propose that instead of capturing the essence of global transformation along spatial-temporal dimensions, viewing it as governmentality, a term made popular by Micheal Foucault⁶³, might prove to be more fruitful in

⁶¹ Like Frank and Gills, however, Robertson (1992) considered globalisation as a process predating modernity and the rise of capitalism.

⁶² In his theory of globalisation there are five phases but only three of significance are mentioned here.

⁶³ Governmentality is “the ensemble formed by the institutions, procedures, analyses and reflections, the calculations and tactics that allow the exercise of this very specific, albeit complex form of power, which has as its target population, as its principle form of knowledge political economy, and as its essential technical means apparatuses of security” (Foucault, 1991, p.102).

answering the question of how the global gets within. Larner and Walters (ibid, p.2) argue that as a concept governmentality helps to focus on problematisations; on states, markets and citizens not as producers but as products of the “will to govern”⁶⁴; and on the ‘how’ rather than the ‘why’ of power. For example, they raise the following questions: “How is the global imagined? Through which forms of knowledge and expertise? How are problems to be addressed and by whom? What spatialities and subjectivities are assumed?” (Ibid.) Perceiving globalisation in this way makes it possible, they argue, to trace the power and expert networks that propagate globalisation through the notion of ‘dispositif’⁶⁵, which regulates visibility whilst making transparent that what globalisation ‘invisibilizes’, that is other realities⁶⁶.

In this context, globalisation is viewed as an “event, mutation within a much wider, historical field of geopolitical” that highlights “the multiplicity of world order” and thus “the diverse ways in which [globalisation] has been imagined and practiced” (Larner & Walters, ibid, p.5). Such a ‘substantialized account’, they suggest, allows attention to be directed to the ‘surfaces, practices and routines’ of globalisation, and helps to map the ‘dividing, coding and territorialisation’ of the world through, for example, performative acts like benchmarking. For that reason, to look at discourses used to map, organise and order world space is more productive than to look at historical events as antecedents or necessary stages to present-day globalisation⁶⁷. In fact, globalisation may not be so much a historical epoch, rather more the ‘ethos’ of governmentality itself. As Miller and Rose (1990) argued, governmentality operates by way of loosely aligned networks that generate a dominant centre. In its progression “language ... plays a key role in

⁶⁴Miller and Rose (1990, p.3) explicate this point in relation to the state. When the state is perceived as a product of governmentality, not its producer, traditional dualisms of public-private and state-civil society tend to cease. Rather government is deemed to operate in multiple social sites, not just in state bureaus. Hence, “to speak of the ‘power’ of a Government ... is to substantialize that which arises from an assemblage of forces by which particular objectives and injunctions can shape the actions and calculations of others” (Rose & Miller, 1992, p.184).

⁶⁵ Foucault (1980, p.194) defines a dispositif, in English ‘apparatus’, as “Discourses, institutions, architectural arrangements, regulations, laws, administrative measures, scientific statements, philosophic propositions, morality, philanthropy, etc.”. But as Tim Dant (Personal Communication, 11/10/2004) explained, a dispositif is essentially a statement of summary or concluding judgment. In the process what is visible, that is what is knowable, becomes linked to the expressible given that it makes possible ‘énoncés’ (statements). For Foucault (1972, p.109) the analysis of statements is a historical analysis. However, it refrains from any interpretation, rather “it questions them as to their mode of existence, what it means for them to have appeared when and where they did – and no others”.

⁶⁶ Note that the focus on how entails that within a framework of governmentality the focus is on processes and hence is congruent with the more analytic approach to understanding globalisation.

⁶⁷ Larner and Walters (2002) postulate that such a historical account of globalisation focuses on the transformation of social and political form that makes the present too continuous with the past.

establishing these ... networks and in enabling rule to be brought about in an indirect manner. It is, in part, through adopting shared vocabularies, theories and explanations, that loose and flexible associations may be established between agents across time and space... whilst each remains, to a greater or lesser extent, constitutionally distinct and formally independent” (p.10). To illustrate, Larner and Walters (2002, p.6) noted, global expansion was conceptualised as civilisation in the 19th century and as development and modernisation in the twentieth century. And as civilisation can be viewed as the site of power relations between colonisers and colonised, globalisation can be imagined as “commitment to the global economy as a measure of a state’s fitness, its citizenship within the world community”, with both universalising concepts embodying the promise of progress⁶⁸. What is more, in the process other narratives have become silenced, captured or curbed, especially the less positive/ist, deconstructing discourses of the post-modern decade preceding globalisation talk. As Waters (1995, p.1) remarked, globalisation is “far less controversial” than “postmodernism”.

Arguably, Larner and Walters’ focus on imagination signifies that, as the authors themselves suggest, globalisation needs to be situated at the level of epistemology rather than ontology⁶⁹; that is, how globalisation represents a certain way of knowing and how discourses and practices produce globalisation effects. Accordingly, unlike historical narratives, the point of departure becomes when globalisation figured dominantly in expert and public discourse⁷⁰ as to constitute a force shaping social, political and economic relations. This gives rise to questions like: “How did it become possible to think in terms of the global?⁷¹ What techniques were required? How are these ideas and techniques transferred in and between organizations? Embodied in what forms of expertise?” (Larner & Walters, 2002, p.10). The authors see the unfolding of globalisation not just as a top-down thrust promoted by the global class of technocrats, as Sklair claims, nor merely as political assimilation or hegemony, but as an ideology promoted by academics and the social sciences as a progressive force. This force is clustered under “interconnection, interdependence, time-space compression” rather than

⁶⁸ Hence, they also imply the centrality of the history of western modernisation in their account.

⁶⁹ As Antje Wiener (2001) summarised, issues of ontology concern what things are made of, whereas issues of epistemology refer to what questions should be asked.

⁷⁰ Hay and Rosamond (2001) commented that it is far more important whether globalisation is *deemed* true by those that are using it rather than *is* true, as what is believed to be true can bring about outcomes consistent with the conviction – akin to the self-fulfilling prophecy.

⁷¹ The imagination of the global clearly predates that of globalisation for as discourse it became used in the 16th century.

“ways of dividing, segregating, disciplining and allocating territories and population” (ibid, p.8). The authors’ contention raises the issue of the role of universities in contributing to the global impact of a Western dominated world polity.

Moreover, the ‘macro-subjects’ at the level of industry, state, region and networks that globalisation presupposes are not only encouraged “to pursue international competitiveness through notions such as export orientation, self-management, good governance and policy dialogue” and “re-create themselves in very specific forms with particular capacities” (Larner & Walters, ibid, p.18) as to be responsive to the challenges globalisation poses; these subjects’ “embeddedness in the global order is sought voluntarily”⁷², leading to the global being “a specific configuration that itself circulates through networks” (ibid, p.14). Through these networks, ‘immutable mobiles’⁷³, such as information, are transported with some keeping “their shape as they move, others flow in different configurations in different locations” (ibid, p.15). As Hay and Rosamond (2001, p.3) put it:

Discourse matters in at least two respects. The way in which actors behave is not merely a reflection of the degree of accuracy and completeness of the information they possess: it is also a reflection of the normative orientation towards their environment and potential future scenarios. Thus the constraints and/or opportunities which globalisation is held to imply might be understood (or misunderstood) in very similar ways in different (national) contexts. Yet such understanding are [sic] likely to provoke divergent responses from political actors with different normative orientations and diverse institutional contexts.

⁷² This remark can be contended or needs to be refined as weaker macro subjects, such as Third World nations, do not always act voluntarily to the ‘encouragement’ given by those transnational ‘subjects’ that have the power to enforce these states to pursue the imposed policies, often to the detriment of their development and capacity to respond. Nor do individuals necessarily act voluntarily to, for example, the imposition of (lifelong) learning as a prerequisite to market participation in a globalised world. They may well react. Thus, any discourse of agency should be deconstructed in itself. As Pearce (n.d., p.1) cited: “The discourse is an expression of power by the elite over the weak. It results in governments and businesses adopting policies to the detriment of many, and the benefit of capital. It demoralises the losers of globalisation, in particular, workers.” Thus, in agreement with Larner and Walters, alternative imaginations, as well as realities, should also be kept in mind.

⁷³ Immutable mobiles have been defined by Latour as “text, graphic or figure which transcends spatio temporal distance in networks” (in Ball & Hodgson, 2001, p.28).

Hence, according to these authors, globalisation is not ‘out there’, it is ‘situated’ as it materialises in the discourse, processes and practices of institutions, and as it differentiates in different places – or as Robertson (1992) would say as the ‘universal’ is particularised.

2.4 Globalisation Reframed

In theorising globalisation, two issues were raised: 1) is it an old or new (unitary) phenomenon; 2) is it a myth, ethos or reality? Answers to these questions partly originate from how we define globalisation. Martin Shaw (1997, p.497) may come closest to depicting globalisation.

Globalisation ... is not simply or mainly either an economic or a recent historical phenomenon, indeed not a single process at all. It can be defined as a complex set of distinct but related processes – economic, cultural, social, and also political and military – through which social relations have developed towards a global scale and with a global reach, over a long historical period. Globalisation has been developing for some centuries, in the sense that ... the ‘multi-power actor civilization’ of the West⁷⁴, originating in Europe, has come to dominate more or less the entire world. Globalisation in this sense includes the development of regional and transnational as well as global forms.

Although this definition ignores the cultural influences of the non-Western civilisations, it prevents the often myopic view espoused by economic, in particular neoliberal, globalists that globalisation has no historical precedent and marks a rupture from previous developments. Clearly, this is not the case. Moreover, transformationists like Held and Beck make a point when they observe today’s process of globalisation contain continuities as well as disjunctures or qualitative differences due to material developments in communication and technology (pointing to ongoing process of wealth accumulation and ‘creative destructions’ that set in motion the discontinuity of certain

⁷⁴ This term implies a world-system approach where in the tribute world-system power was centred in one empire whereas in the modern capitalist world-system no single centre of power exists.

practices and configurations of social life⁷⁵). Hence, globalisation can best be seen from long term social processes.

The second issue of globalisation as a myth, ethos or reality is more complex and relates to structure-agency supposition. As Antje Wiener (2001) noted, in the field of international relations the frames contested are whether the ‘world out there’ is itself constructed or whether social reality exists beyond the meaning constructed by symbolic interaction. It could be argued that the same applies to frames and theories of globalisation: is it a (historical) material or normative reality existing outside the discursive practices of everyday life, and providing the structure within which we materialise our reality, or is globalisation materialised through present discourse, processes and practices of individuals, institutions and states, as is the position taken by Larner and Walters. These questions are of importance as they impinge on the way research is done. A hypothetical, explanatory approach focussing on ontology and the role of ideas, beliefs and norms in society and world politics that guide (and constrain) action, as well as constitute the identity of actors, is advocated when social reality exists ‘out there’. On the other hand, a discourse, interpretive approach stressing epistemology and the role of language constituting meaning in specific social contexts is preferred when that reality is itself constructed. Here agency is often – but not necessarily – assumed, for systems are reproduced and transformed through actions of actors.

However, globalisation has highlighted the issues of governance beyond the nation state, foregrounding questions of ‘intersubjectivity, norms and behavior’ (Wiener, 2001). It entails that a purely structural as well as agency approach may not suffice. Between the structural, top-down and agency, bottom-up dimensions are intermediate positions. Wiener (ibid) outlines a merging of these dimensions by highlighting the dual quality of norms: one active, regulative and constitutive (norms as elements of structure and material conditions); the other passive, flexible and constructed. In the context of globalisation, the first can be translated as isomorphic trends on a global scale, constraining individual, institutional and state agents’ behaviour (such as hyperglobalists), and global ‘norm-setters’ imposing their strategically created rules and standards on ‘norm-followers’ (for example, Sklair and world-polity theorists). The

⁷⁵ Creative destruction is a term introduced by Joseph Schumpeter, which is further discussed under K-wave theory in Chapter 3.

second would imply scope not only for idiosyncratic trends in norm and policy formation and implementation but also for contestation as well as creation of globalisation as a dominant speech act (for example, Larner and Walters). However, Wiener acknowledges that the merging of structure and agency leaves certain questions unexplored, such as the role of historical contingency and the impact of path dependencies on norm (and policy) consistency and change, and the degree of success some groups have in norm setting where others may fail.

Social theorists, like Anthony Giddens⁷⁶ and Norbert Elias in particular, proposed a synthesis to bridge the issues of history, structure and agency. As Robert van Krieken (2002) summarised, Elias' social theory involves five propositions. The first is that society consists of individuals and groups whose actions are intentional (agency), but when combined lead to unplanned and unintended outcomes that through 'structured interweaving' over time (history) result in specific forms of culture and identity, and capitalism and modernity (structure). The second is that individuals are not free, autonomous 'closed' but 'open personalities', interdependent of each other as part of networks – figurations. Like a dance, a figuration is "relatively independent of the specific individuals forming it in the here and now, but not of individuals as such"; that is, there is no structure outside the individual (van Krieken, 1998, p.58). At the same time, as social beings we only come into being through our social relations by which we develop a socially constructed, 'second nature, habitus'⁷⁷. The third is that social life is dynamic, relational rather than static. Thus, power relations should be seen as ever changing shifts in power 'ratios'. The fourth is a logical following from the third in that societies do not represent lasting states but long-term processes of development and transformation. This implies that the focus of research should be on globalisation rather than globality, on (post)modernisation rather than (post) modernity, and thus also on structuration rather than structure.

⁷⁶ Giddens' structuration theory is mainly an attempt to overcome the duality between structure and agency, that is macro-level and micro-level activity respectively. In essence his theory entails that "Society only has form, and that form only has effects on people, in so far as structure is produced and reproduced in what people do" (Giddens & Pierson, 1998, p.77)

⁷⁷ Basically, habitus refers to socialisation within the family, peer group and educational system that leads to an ingrained pattern to act, think and feel in a certain way. But as the individual also experiences idiosyncratic patterns of development, each habitus is a complex combination of national, cultural, group, gender, familial, and individual processes. It does not refer to character or socialisation as such, rather to socially acquired deep structural dispositions that are expressed by, for example, opinions, attitudes and body language.

The last proposition refers to the roles of researchers. Theorising and exploring social processes, such as globalisation, involves both involvement and detachment. Social researchers as interdependent human beings are part of the (knowledge) process; at the same time, too much subjectivity may hinder the understanding of social phenomena. It is therefore vital, Elias believed, that social theorists engage in deconstructing myths. Elias' propositions are worthy of consideration although his concept of unintended consequences could be questioned as it may disregard the success of powerful groups (e.g. the norm setters) in setting or guiding the agenda of social change. Nevertheless, in the context of globalisation his theory of figuration and habitus allows for human agency⁷⁸ (rather than personal autonomy) that incorporates cultural variation and historical specificity as well as for the resilience of social forms, such as capitalism and western culture.

Andre Spicer and Peter Fleming (2001) provide another conceptualisation of the issue of history, agency and structure. Though not aimed at a synthesis, certain aspects of their theory match, albeit not perfectly, Elias' notion of unintended outcomes, interdependent subjectivity, and shifting power relations. Their starting point, however, is to elucidate the difference between interpretive and critical approaches to discourse. They point out that the first focuses on individual speech acts that constitute reality and accentuate agency (Larner and Walters' work partly falls in this category); the second views discourse as constituting identity and power relations and thus tends to over-emphasise structure (Foucaultian informed discourse analysis). They argue that in attempting to synthesise structure and agency may be under-examined. Hence, Spicer and Fleming propose a "theoretical antagonism between social structure, discourse, and contestation that do not necessarily have to be resolved" (ibid, p.11). Their approach to structure entails that globalisation is not based on a "well understood set of social trends which are the same regardless of the specific research site" (p.10). Rather social structure is understood as an 'organising principal' relatively stable and "spatially and historically situated", which impinges on the organisation of social life and activity, and includes a set of concepts embracing "capitalism, context, the state, patriarchy, and the material" (p.6). These structures – external to the subject/individual – overlap and

⁷⁸ Elias (1991, p.13) stressed that despite having and acting with 'agency', we are not necessarily 'agents' or 'creators' of social life, which has a "hidden order, not directly perceptible to the senses".

interlace. In the case of globalisation the relevant organising principals consist of, for example, post-industrial capitalism, neo-liberal state polity and multinational financial markets. Moreover, structures of (neo-) colonialism persist in core-peripheral relations and the moral justification of the West (as represented by the US) to protect economic interests and wage war against 'rouge states'. The concept of contestation, on the other hand, includes "agency, tactics, performativity, negotiation and resistance" (ibid, p.6). Resembling Elias' notion of unintended consequences, Spicer and Fleming point out that discourse not merely construct identity (reality), but at times is resisted and put into question, hence leading to changes neither planned nor intended. In addition, this contestation does not embody an autonomous agent. Instead, citing Newman, contestation involves an "active playing with discourse" (ibid, p.7). Accordingly, dominant discourses must be repeatedly renewed and articulated; they are open to challenge and transformation and even make possible other 'articulations' not reinforcing existing power relations. But to articulate differently does not mean "instant transformation":

Rather there are some structural aspects that are not wholly reducible to discourse, but are interlinked with it. ... speaking in a different fashion may, through struggle, and in time lead to changing attitudes of ourselves and others (subjective), the way we interact (inter-subjective), and the way various which provide the boundaries for this interaction (structural) (p. 14).

Discourse and structure are therefore best understood as 'over-determined', meaning that social structures (organising principals) determine discourse, and vice versa. Arguably, it may take time, and at times be impossible, for 'rearticulated' discourse to transform structures although it may have already made an impact on both subjectivity and inter-subjectivity. The authors conclude that in studying social phenomena the focus should be simultaneously on social structure, discourse and contestation. This advice applied to issues of globalisation implies the exploration of how the social world is repeatedly constructed by language (e.g. globalisation discourse), in the context of social structures (e.g. capitalism, western culture) that frame speech acts, and how the use of dominant discourse does not always converge with what happens in reality (through negotiation and contestation).

2.5 Closing Note

The theories on globalisation framed and reframed are consonant with Cox's observation (1996, p.33) that "no absolute distinction between actors and structures", and subjectivity and objectivity exists. Akin to Elias, he pointed out that historical structures are "formed by collective human activity over time". The resultant configurations do "not determine actions in any direct mechanical way but imposes pressures and constraints. Individuals and groups may move with the pressures or resist and oppose them, but they cannot ignore them". Dale and Robertson (2002, p.11) came to a similar conclusion: globalisation signifies "a complex, overlapping set of forces, operating differently at different levels, each of which was set in motion intentionally, though their collective outcomes were *not uniform, intended, or predicted*". [Italics my emphasis].

Nevertheless, when one asks what these pressures and constraints are this question principally leads to the conclusion that today's globalisation is a key expression of a capitalist system and world polity that sustains it. As signifiers of the supranational 'state' apparatus, they set (indirect) limits to individual and collective action, resulting in configurations of the possible and impossible, with the latter an unlikely option unless taken place outside (or at the margin of) the system of capitalism. As Dale (1999b) argued, globalisation is neither an economic nor a political phenomenon, rather a political economic one, whose position Cox (1996, p.32) explained as follows:

Political economy ... is concerned with the historically constituted frameworks ... within which political and economic activity takes place. It stands back from the apparent fixity of the present to ask how the existing structures came into being and how they may be changing, or how they may be induced to change. In this sense, political economy is critical theory.

In this context, the political economic approach to globalisation offers perhaps the most relevant interpretive framework from which to 'identify the subject' and explore policy developments and arrangements at multiple levels of analysis over a length of time. In view of that, the next chapter revisits and builds on some of the issues presented here to shape the meta-conceptual stage from which to examine the supranational influences

and instruments of discourse that configure state policy and the higher education sector in New Zealand.

Chapter 3

The Supranational Stage: Modernisation and the Neoliberal Rhapsody of the Globalisation K-Wave

3.1 Prelude

Chapter 2 exemplified that globalisation is a phenomenon of the present even though the world's history shows that the global has long been part of people's imagination through religion, empire, discovery, trade and voyage taking humans beyond the borders of their birthplace, and in the process has created hybrid spaces that became local cultures over time. Indeed, the "West" would not be the "West" without its early contact with the "East", and likewise, neither would the "East" have a separate identity. All 'isms' – *Judaism*, *Hinduism*, *Buddhism*, *Catholicism*, *Islam*, *Protestantism*, (Neo-) *Liberalism*, *Socialism*, *Communism* and lately *Consumerism* are in essence globalising forces that have influenced the socio-political climate of many local and national communities in past and present time. Both religion and philosophy have spread from their various centres to places North, South, East and West. Their spread shows that historically the word (ideology) has been more powerful than the sword (instrument) in exercising widespread authority, albeit that the latter has in many cases supported the endeavour of the former.

World-system theory further strengthens the case that before 1500 CE power was evenly balanced in the different regions of the world, but that of late this balance is lopsidedly distributed to the 'West' having hegemonic control over the 'Rest'. Nevertheless, recent debate in the social sciences has stressed the importance of distinguishing between globalisation, modernisation, Westernisation and colonisation in an attempt to avoid reductionist or deterministic explanations (Scott, 1997). Similarly, theories like Marxism and Neoliberalism have often been criticised for making the cultural and political subordinate to the 'logic of capitalism' (ibid, p.3). Yet, contemporary globalisation that represents the growth of capital on a global scale, supported by a neoliberal discourse mediated by a transnational capitalist class (Sklair,

1999) and in ‘crucial’ cases military hegemony of the US⁷⁹, cannot easily be disaffiliated from the former globalising processes that were in strength and intent largely the same: the expansion of Western markets and culture. The reality is that economic globalisation plays an important role in the orchestration of social life and likewise affects policies for higher education. As some Neo-Marxist analysts have suggested, the logic of capitalism, is “always mediated through political and social forms” (Scott, 1997, p.4). As it is mediated through socio-political channels, there is, in theory, also room to challenge today’s logic of the market as being a natural, inexorable state. Alan Scott (ibid) and Roger Dale (1997, p.277) both referred to Karl Polanyi’s historical analysis of capitalist production, with the first author highlighting that supposedly ‘free’ markets are ‘planned’, and the latter pointing out that markets are not natural as they are “always shaped by patterns of state regulations”. In essence, as markets tend to break down social relations, their disruptive nature spurs states into action to restrict their ‘free’ operation mainly through regulatory and juridical means but also through policy discourse⁸⁰.

The previous chapter also suggested that in the last few centuries social life has increasingly been subordinated to a capitalist economy in support of its excesses, resulting in widening the gap between rich and poor countries, and in privileging certain cultural practices, leading to the universalisation of the particular (Robertson, 1992) and the deculturalisation of others even as the universal is particularised. These processes bring in doubt the possibility of a sustainable existence for all. To illustrate, where once were multiple traditions and languages, biodiversity and different ways of sustaining human life, there now stand high rise buildings, motorways, CNN, and McDonalds.

⁷⁹ It should be noted, however, this hegemony needs to be morally supported by interstate alliances. As the most recent Iraq war illustrated, the US action only received some credibility through finding partners in the war effort ‘against terrorism’: The UK, Australia, Japan and some nations from the EU such as Poland and Spain. Nevertheless, the lack of overall support, in particular from the UN and ‘Old Europe’, meant that the US has to justify itself for actions taken through media propaganda channels like CNN, but this justification can also be seen as a reduction in US power and increased shift to multi-state hegemony (see Boswell, 1995).

⁸⁰ Polanyi’s analysis of capitalism in the 1800s and 1900s demonstrated a dialectical process, whereby the push to split the economy from state to let it function unrestricted led to failure as the state took action to bring the market economy again under its social and political control (Cox, 1996). As world-system theorists Chase-Dunn and colleagues surmised: “This Polanyian ‘double-movement’ of commodification and the reassertion of political regulation over market forces is an old phenomenon that reinvents itself in unique ways every time it comes around, depending on the exact nature of the problems that need to be solved and the actions of the agents who mobilize to solve them. An important component of this elaborate dance is the recurrent phenomenon of “rise and fall,” the centralization and decentralization of political/military and economic power that is a characteristic of all hierarchical world-systems” (2002, p.4).

Alternatively, the ‘other’ places now hold depleted seashores, carved-up land, landfill sites for waste of the developed or urbanised, and deserts of nothingness. On a global scale, questions should be raised on what or who guides today’s globalisation process, how is it perpetuated, and who are the likely beneficiaries in the process.

As signalled in Section 2.5, this chapter identifies globalisation as the spread of capitalism, taking modernisation, economic long-waves and neoliberalism as ‘organising principals’⁸¹ of the process. It puts forward that these principals contextualise, frame and compose policies in higher education at the supranational level, and to various degrees also constitute the systemic drivers of ‘glocal’ (state and institutional) arrangements in public life, including education. The chapter posits, in particular, that the concept of economic waves provides the meta-conceptual framework through which discourses of modernisation and neoliberalisation can be seen to materialise. It further presents the instruments of economic rationality that breathes life into the neoliberalisation of higher education. Inquiries in these areas may help to make transparent the transformations witnessed in universities, and anticipate the likely configurations of their future developments.

3.2 Modernisation, Economic Long-waves and Neoliberalism as ‘Organising Principals’ of the Supranational Stage

Modern Western political culture is rooted in a political, economic, philosophical and methodological individualism. ‘Globalization’ is its ultimate expression.⁸²

Robert Cox (1996) points to the importance of individualism in underpinning much of the political culture by which ‘the West’ organised its expansion. Moreover, the individualisation of social, political and economic life finds its expression in the western modernisation project, which as “one key modality through which capitalism

⁸¹ When ‘organising principal’ is used in this thesis, it refers to Spicer & Fleming’s notion of social structure that is relatively stable and spatially and historically situated (see Section 2.4). Principal further refers to the musical term for instrumental section leader, a function the organising principal fulfils in this thesis.

⁸² Robert, W. Cox (1996, p.44).

develops”⁸³ has culminated into today’s neoliberal concept of homo economicus, whose roots, however, can be retraced to the utilitarian utopia of Adam Smith (1723-1790). This section focuses on the modernisation project that underpins the globalisation of a capitalist world-system through investigation of two key points: Kondratieff’s long-waves to explain the systemic nature of economic, political and social events, and neoliberalism that represents a ‘recycled’ leitmotif for organising human life according to economic rationales.

3.2.1 The Modernisation Project

As Chapter 2 indicated, the ascendancy of market globalisation is advanced at a transnational level to influence economic and social policies of nation states in support of a global economy that in its scope and scale is in danger of supplanting alternative modes of production and organisation of life. Yet, today’s globalisation is not new. Other forces advancing Western values and capital have preceded it. In his review of major sociologists’ explanations of globalisation a century ago, Waters (1995, pp.5-7) summarised that the dominant force pushing Western values outwards was industrialisation, which, according to Saint-Simon, led to common practices across the different cultures of Europe, later transplanted to European colonies; and which, according to Durkheim, fragmented collective consciousness and hence made possible the breaking down of barriers within and between societies. Rather than industrialisation per se, for Weber rationalisation, born out of the Reformation separating church and state or secularising the state, caused societies to become similar in the depersonalisation of social relations, rational control of life, work and technology, and importance attributed to expertise. And for Marx, the burgeoning bourgeoisie, free trade, world markets and uniform modes of production would gradually allow national differences and animosities to disappear, with united action of the working class accelerating the process (cited in Waters, *ibid*). More recently, Serge Latouche (1996, p.xii) made similar observations and formulated “three principal vectors of Western steamroller”: mimetic industrialisation, arising from transnational economies; urbanisation, breaking up farming communities; and “nationalitarianism”, giving rise to “rootless, mimetic states” whose economies can be managed.

⁸³ Roger Dale, personal communication, 16/4/ 2004.

Much of the above scholarship suggests the importance of the global economy organising the social fabric of life. But the economic thrust in globalisation, in turn, is driven by socio-cultural and geo-political forces (as the work of social and economic historians and transformational theorists in Chapter 2 likewise suggested). Weber proposed that the Western cultural emphasis on reason provided the framework in which industrialisation could take shape. Marx highlighted the fact that the European class structure would enable a homogeneous, capitalist economy to expand even though, as history suggests, this expansion needed no united proletariat to do so. And Latouche touches upon geopolitical factors influencing the spread of Western values and systems of economic production.

Irrespective of which comes first or whether or not it is viable to see causality in this process, these drivers for global homogeneity have, as the preceding chapter explicated, their early development in Europe and form an intricate part to the ‘previous’ colonisation of other cultures, interpellating them in a capitalist system. The project of modernism assumes democracy as a rational state formation and science and technology as rational instruments to provide solutions to all societal problems. Based on the supposed neutrality of the project, the drivers of globalisation present pressures on (and provide ‘solutions’ to) state, community and institutions to standardise⁸⁴ desired practices. In particular, this ‘world polity’⁸⁵, or globalisation as the expansion and enactment of (Western) modernism, is what Meyer, Boli and Thomas (1987, p.27) highlighted, for it represents the broad claims about “progress, justice and the natural

⁸⁴ Dale (2000) rightly pointed out naming words like standardisation, homology, convergence, isomorphism, homogeneity, commonality all mean something different. Yet to me they basically convey a sense of ‘sameness’, depending on the surrounding text, with some focussing more on process like convergence, others more on state like homogeneity. Accordingly, when these words occur in my writing they are used as synonyms: there is no intent to fragment them or make them specific.

⁸⁵ World polity theory as developed by John Meyer, John Boli and colleagues attributes much agency to International Non-Governmental Organisations (INGOs) and scientists for standardising practices across borders (see Boli & Thomas, 1997). As Boli (1999) stated: “the global milieu as a ‘world culture’ [...] is embodied first and foremost in INGOs, secondarily in IGOs” (p.3). These organisations help in the ‘cognitively construction’ of definitions and principles based on such values as universalism, egalitarian individualism, and world citizenship. The tenet of this chapter, however, is that much of this ‘cognitive constructing’ on a global scale is done by International Governmental Organisations (IGOs), arising from powerful states like the US, rather than INGOs even though those engaged in economic matters add to the economic and technological rationalisation advanced on a global scale. I do think, however, that ‘core’ scientists contribute significantly to the process of world polity formation. For example, Charles Darwin’s evolution theory justified colonisation for civilisation so as to prevent extinction of the ‘weak, uncivilised’, and the Chicago School of neo-classical economics of the 1960s helped spread and popularise neoliberal discourse in the 1980s. It is also science that makes the ‘imagined’, such as freemarket, plausible and ‘rational’ and hence contributes to the ‘global imagination’ being pursuit.

order” which sanction economic, political as well as educational actions (see also Dale, 2000).

As Latouche (1996, p.49) observes, the appropriation and assimilation of science and technology by the West reflect Westernisation anchored in “the linear and cumulative concept of time, belief in the possible mastery of nature, and the conviction that this was humanity’s sacred mission”. This mission has also been used to alienate those states and individuals not engaged in the process of modernisation. In framing technology, for example, Lelia Green (1994, p.168) cleverly illustrated the division between core and periphery through the concepts of ‘homo informaticus’ and ‘homo incommunicatus’. The first refers to one who is “urban, civilised, rational, Christian, astute, innovative, rich and generous” and associated with the core; the latter represents one who is “rural, wild, emotional, nonbeliever [non-Christian would be more exact], gullible, traditional, poor and needy” and signifies the periphery⁸⁶ or marginalised. Such dichotomies continue the modernisation project of the West and are likely to have a sustained impact on states, institutions and education systems forcing them to ‘comply’ and shape their policy agendas and curricula to these universalistic ideals, which in essence sustain market globalisation with Western polity as core⁸⁷. As Ken Kempner (1998) stated, modernist notions of development have compelled developing countries to become ‘modern’; yet, not all social classes or countries have benefited. Those who are ‘failures’, however, help “to provide cheap export goods for consumers of the industrialized world” (p.448), and hence perpetuate the inequality needed to sustain an open capitalist system.

⁸⁶ Green (1994, p.173) uses this core/margin duality to explain its limitation in a post-modern world of a networked society that makes an integrated periphery and fragmented core possible expressions. Hence, she argues, core-periphery belongs to an industrial society and modernity, and instead for today’s situation she suggests the ‘fragmentation of homogeneity’ through the recognition of individuality. If this suggestion is deconstructed, however, it may indicate the continuous impact of Western norms as this fragmentation is an ideal platform for building a society of consumers and hence the perpetuation of a global market based on individual needs, wants and choice.

⁸⁷ Meyer, Boli and Thomas (1987, p.29) argue that political and educational variations found across national settings are limited and remain within the parameters set by the dominant cultural frame; that is, the form and content that arise in particular settings are shaped and adjusted to fit “very general rules that often have worldwide meaning and power”. An example would be that most children get to read, write and do sums despite any variation in teaching style, pedagogy and national ideology. Even dual thinking remains a shared feature of Western education, something I realised when talking to one of my colleagues who informed me that dualism is not a feature of Māori pedagogy, and hence an often painful (limiting) aspect of mainstream New Zealand education (personal communication, 14/04/04).

3.2.2 *Economic Waves as ‘Principal Organisers’*

Modernisation represents progression. Yet, what often goes unnoticed is that the globalisation of capitalism it upholds is not linear, but rather comes in waves as it expands and contracts (see Section 2.2.5). Hence, as situations change, so may dominant theory and practices.

The rise of neoliberal discourse in the 1980s along with the push for market globalisation, rather than being linear and inexorable, seems consistent with the cyclic nature of the world economy and can be explained according to Kondratieff-wave, or K-wave, theory named after the Russian economist Nicolai Kondratieff (1892-1938), who introduced the notion of upswings and downswings in expanding economic cycles (see Trebilcock, 2002). In Kondratieff’s model (which synthesises notions of world-system, transformational and hyperglobalist theory⁸⁸), each swing takes 20-30 years and hence each K-wave, which Clive Trebilcock refers to as the Big Dipper⁸⁹, is thought to last 50 to 60 years. ‘Attendant conditions’ occur with these swings: technological transformation following major innovations, wars and social unrest, and new economies added to the pool of industrialised nations (for example, through colonisation or interpellation into an inter-state system). Trebilcock included the discovery of gold but reasoned, that this may no longer be an important force as nations’ reserves have been decoupled from the gold standard. However, the three other conditions have been found to be concomitant in a regular fashion.

As David McMinn (n.d) explained, technological innovations tend to occur during a downswing, predating an upswing by two decades. As innovations are bundled, they

⁸⁸ Kondratieff’s model features aspects of transformational and neoliberal conceptions of globalisation as it assumes the process is irreversible and in an upward direction, yet it also contains oscillations which move from ‘limits of opportunity’ to ‘limits of growth’ impinging on each cycle (Von Baranov, 2004), hence showing similarity with world-system theory. The model implies that a capitalist economy is self-correcting, progressive and sustainable, and was thus a problematic proposal in communist Russia. Indeed, his theory was considered contrary, even sacrilegious, to Marxist ideology of capitalism as self-destructive, and hence in 1930 Kondratieff was imprisoned by the Stalinist government and banished to Siberia where he died. Despite this theoretical support for today’s neoliberal globalists, his work on the cyclic nature of capitalism has also received backing from world-system theorists (see The Journal of World-System Theory, in particular the article by Terry Boswell (1995): “Hegemony and Bifurcation Points in World History”, available from: http://jwsr.ucr.edu/archive/vol1/v1_nf.php).

⁸⁹ The Big Dipper, or Big Bear, is a group of seven bright stars that can only be observed from the Northern hemisphere. As such, it symbolises the world system radiating from the North, ‘holding its candle’, and, as dipper indicates, refers to wave-motion that necessarily has dips or down swings.

gather force, attract capital, are implemented and change the process of manufacture. At the start of the rising wave, a conservative socio-political climate exists as a remnant from the previous downswing. But economic expansion soon leads to profits and wage increases. Recessions are few in numbers and if they occur of short duration. Because developed economies need materials as well as new markets for their increased output, 'lagging' economies are interpellated into the system of capital. The mood is further optimistic, the climate less conservative and affirmative action more widespread (ibid)⁹⁰. However, the ability to meet expectations weakens as inflation sets in. Hence, in the second decade of the upswing, social unrest and conflict, making war increasingly likely⁹¹. These developments signal the limits to growth. Yet, before the downswing begins, a plateau stage sets in. The economy becomes consumption orientated, hence producing more debt (Von Baranov, 2004). In this climate entrepreneurial behaviour is valued (McMinn, n.d.), and corresponding speculation and high commodity prices lead to a financial crisis. The outcome is that the economy contracts, deflation occurs and a long depression or adjustment period sets in, with prices stabilising and political conservatism returning. Yet, as McMinn (ibid) observed, many of the freedoms achieved during the upswing are upheld.

Kondratieff's contemporary, Joseph Schumpeter (1883-1950), refined the K-wave theory, adding shorter business cycles intersecting K-waves. Nevertheless, key discoveries, which he labelled creative destruction, demarcate major K-waves. Schumpeter started each wave during an economic expansion: the Industrial Revolution Kondratieff from 1787 to 1842, involving textiles, iron, and steam power; the Bourgeois Kondratieff from 1842 to 1897, involving railroads and steel; and the Neo-Mercantilist Kondratieff from 1897 to "?" – Schumpeter did not indicate the end of the third cycle, involving electricity, internal-combustion engine and chemical industries, nor did he live long enough to see the start of a new wave. Freeman and Soete (1997) have since added two more cycles: Age of Mass Production (1940s-1990s) and of Microelectronics and Computer Networks (1990s-?). Others have identified new K-waves during

⁹⁰ Coinciding with periods of upswings is the abolition of serfdom and slavery in the 1860s, the first suffrage association in Britain in 1865 and women given the right to vote in the territory of Wyoming in 1869; women given voting rights in for example Russia and The Netherlands in 1917, Britain 1918, and the US in 1919 (New Zealand being the exception by preceding these events by more than a decade, 1893); and Women's Liberation and Civil Rights Movements of the 1960s.

⁹¹ Examples from history that fits this premise are the Napoleon Wars (1799-1815), the Crimean War (1853-56), and the First World War (1914-18).

economic stagnation. For example, Henry Liu (1999) referred to a Globalisation Kondratieff, beginning in the 1970s. Terry Boswell (1995) applied a similar demarcation. Using the model designed by world-system theorists Modelski and Thompson (1996), Boswell extended the K-waves to the 1990s (see Table 3.1), highlighted the rise and decline of hegemonic power occurring during certain cycles, inserted the major (bundling of) innovations as well as economic/political upheavals and listed the resultant world forums of each.

Table 3.1 indicates that each K-wave builds on conditions shaped by previous innovations. Each condition gives rise to problems that 'new' discoveries need to resolve. Hence, K-waves can be considered path dependent, yet each new phase is qualitatively different due to developments in technology and communication brought about by innovation. Boswell places, however, a question mark after 1990; economic expansion can be seen in the growing commitments nations have shown to regional and global free trade agreements, but whether this also has led to an upswing in the economy is up for debate⁹². Also, the last cycle has experienced more creations of IGOs. The increase in IGOs might indicate that globalisation, in transformational terms, has an impact on the orderly patterns of economic cycles in a capitalist world system and that a discontinuity is transpiring; alternatively, it may mean that patterns remain the same but the velocity, intensity and extensity by which they occur change (see Held, et al., 1999).

Although Boswell (as well as Modelski and Thompson) sees global war as the most likely event of the latest K-wave, consistent with the rise of IGOs, he highlights the possibility of increased multi-state hegemony, a shared world polity and the push for a democratic world order as impacting on systemic regularity (which in fact would be an extension of the modernisation project). Similarly, Modelski and Thompson (1996) put faith in the unpredictability and human reflectivity for averting major destructive acts. They also pointed out that the diffusion of democracy may form a buffer, and that the growth in the size of IGOs allows for better handling of conflict.

⁹² See for debate Jim Dator (n.d.) (<http://www.futures.hawaii.edu/dator/futures/tsu2longwvs.html>).

Table 3.1

K-Waves: Global Hegemony, Wars, Innovations and World Forums

Cycle	Hegemon ⁹³	Global Wars, Innovations	Forums (IGOs & INGOs)
1762-S 1790-E	The UK – A	Seven Years' War (1755-1763) Textiles, Steam Engine (UK) Revolutionary Wars/ Napoleonic (1792-1815) Industrialisation (UK, France)	
1814-S 1848-E	The UK – V The UK – M	Railroads (UK) Wage/Factory System (UK)	Concert of Europe, 1815
1872-S 1893-E	The UK – D The US – A	Steel (US/UK); Chemicals (US) Mass Production (US, Ger)	
1917-S 1940-E	The US – V	World War I (1914-1918) Car, Air; Electronics (US) World War II (1939-1945) Multi-Corporation (US)	League of Nations, 1918
1945	The US – M		WB/IMF, 1943 NATO/UN, 1945
1968-S		Information Industries Flexible Specialisation	EC & ASEAN, 1967
1974 1990s-E?	US – D	(Japan/US?) Transnational-Corporation ⁹⁴	AFTA, 1992; EU, 1993; NAFTA & WTO, 1994; INGOs?
Key:	E = period of economic expansion S = period of economic stagnation A = hegemonic ascent V = hegemonic victory M = hegemonic maturity D = hegemonic decline		

Source: Adapted from Boswell, 1995 (with TNC category and additional IGOs included and cycles predating 1762 omitted).

⁹³ Boswell's cycle of hegemony is grounded in Modelski and Thompson's notion (1996) that it takes two K-waves to see a shift in political power; a nation's hegemony diminishes as the second K-wave nears its end (see Table 3.1), marking changes in agenda setting and building of alliances. But while the latter authors explain the new hegemon from a world system perspective of shifting core and periphery relations, that is the new hegemon being one of the existing economic powers, strong in military capability, relatively open to allow for innovations and global leadership, and taking on global problems; the former states: "American hegemony is breaking down, and is being replaced by a world polity of international organizations and shared norms of liberal individualism" (p.38). Writing in 1995, Boswell predicted that a new hegemon would be another 50 years away, with the EU having the greatest potential of leading the world to another transition (envisaged as global democracy similar to the notion of cosmopolitanism as espoused by transformational theorists such as Held).

⁹⁴ The Robinson-Rojas Archive (available from <http://www.rojasdatabank.org/toc5.htm>) reported that there were only 7,000 transnational corporations in 1970, compared to 37,000 parent TNCs in 1995.

Accordingly, wave theory lends itself to predicting a future, but one that is open. Or as Nelly Stromquist (2002, p.15) concluded in relation to globalisation, today's technological innovations and market liberalisation represent a conjunction of unpredictable and predictable events respectively, making "globalization an evolving journey into the future".

Unlike the linear concept of globalisation, as espoused by the neoliberal hyperglobalists, the wave theory synthesised above shares features with globalisation as multi-dimensional transformation (see Section 2.3.1). It provides a meta-conceptual framework for the co-occurrence of economic, social and political phenomena (arguably all organised around the western notion of modernisation) that are systemic to a capitalist world order⁹⁵. Wave theory incorporates many aspects of the theories on globalisation discussed in Chapter 2, in particular world-system and transformational perspectives. Its notion of economic expansion and contraction entails a dialectic process that mirrors Polanyi's double movement, suggesting a loosening as well as reassessment of the role of the state in the 'organic' life of capitalism. Accordingly, today's push of globalisation can be seen as part of 'power cycles' (Modelski & Thompson, 1996), 'hegemonic sequences' (Chase-Dunn, 1998), and/or 'systemic cycles of capitalist accumulation' with each cycle containing qualitative differences or discontinuities (Arrighi, 1994) as well as continuities (Wallerstein, 1974)⁹⁶. Hence, wave theory forms the thesis' overall conceptual stage on which contemporary configurations of ideology and policy at different levels (supranational, national, institutional and departmental) are acted out. One such ideology is the 'reemergence' of market philosophies under the nom de plume of neoliberalism, which is discussed next.

⁹⁵ Interestingly, Takis Fotopoulos (n.d.) made the point that neoliberalists and central-left 'social-liberals' like Anthony Giddens adopt a systemic position regarding globalisation as they see it as inevitable and irreversible; in contrast, he assigns the 'reformist' Left, including world-system theorists like Wallerstein, the label of non-systemic as globalisation is the result of exogenous changes in economic policy, and hence is reversible. Much of my writing aligns with the 'reformist Left', but I disagree with Fotopoulos as my point is that economic policy is systemic and not external to the system of capitalism; any change in policy orientation to the 'left' is possible but remains endogenous to the system.

⁹⁶ Wallerstein (2000b) has more recently commented, however, that "the modern world system is in structural crisis and has entered into a period of chaotic behavior which will cause a systemic bifurcation and a transition to a new structure whose nature is as yet undetermined and, in principle, impossible to predetermine, but one that is open to human intervention and creativity" (p.251).

3.2.3 *Principal Modus Operandi: Neoliberalism as Leitmotif*

[N]eoliberal discourse is not just one discourse among many. Rather, it is a “strong discourse” – the way psychiatric discourse is in an asylum...”⁹⁷

The above K-waves suggest economic/political events and innovations in production are co-determinant; hence, the downswing in the global market since the 1970s gives an account as to why neoliberalism moved from the background to the fore to become the new globalism, as Beck would say. Elizabeth Martinez and Arnolando Garcia (2000, p.1) in defining neoliberalism observed (in world-system fashion) that “the capitalist crisis over the last 25 years, with its shrinking profit rates, inspired the corporate elite to revive the economic liberalism. That’s what makes it “neo” or new.” Neoliberalism thus appears to be a discursive instrument for crisis management, adopted by parties on both the right and the left of the political spectrum to maintain a public sector, whose “goal is no longer to protect society from the market’s demands”, as under the Keynesian welfare state, “but to protect the market from society’s demands” (Cohn, 1997, p.586).

In a way, this ‘streamlining’ of ideas signals a discontinuity from past practices, as it can be said that previously a wider diversity existed in politics, especially in the western democratic nations: progressives were red, conservatives blue, and now under capitalistic imperatives the scope narrowed to purple-blue. Alternatively, the ‘globalisation’ K-wave represents the process that started in the first K-wave, when Europe asserted its hegemony, with other empires waning, and set in motion the ‘unipolarisation’ of economic systems (see Frank, 1993, Section 2.2.2) as well as a political composition, which accumulated in a world polity of western modernisation. Today’s neoliberalism represents a continuation of this process, aided by new innovations. These innovations, such as enhanced communication and technology, sustain the global free market of capitalism, thereby weakening alternative models to economic and social organisation. The demise of the Soviet Union, ending the bi-polar world shaped by the Cold War, and the crisis of capitalism under Keynesian economics have only assisted in the process. As Adam Tickel & Jamie Peck (2003, p.1) asserted, both globalisation and neoliberalisation are “creatures of the latter third of the twentieth century” and stand for the expansion of a ‘borderless’ market, with neoliberalism being

⁹⁷ Pierre Bourdieu (1998, p.1).

the political project to envisage this utopia, since “the downsizing of nation-states enlarges space for private accumulation, individual liberties, and market forces”.

Neoliberalism undoubtedly represents the economic rationalisation⁹⁸ for rolling back the Keynesian welfare state, which according to Friedrich von Hayek (1899-1992)⁹⁹ “fettered the free market, consumed wealth and infringed on the rights of the individual” (Peters, n.d., p.1). It promotes the idea that the traditional functions of the state are best left to the market, which is presumed to more efficiently distribute scarce public resources, and hence neoliberalism is the ‘right’ discourse during a contraction in the global economy. Rooted in modernist notions of universality, rationality and individualisation, neoliberalism holds up market expansion as “a morally superior form of political economy” (ibid, p.4), for as von Hayek would proclaim “[t]he market is equal, and democratic, as everyone can enter into it, and it is free because no one is obliged to buy or sell” (Devine, n.d., p.3). Markets enable the individual freedom to choose – a freedom that takes precedence over equality ‘enforced’ by state-led income redistribution. In accordance, neoliberalism is foremost linked with policies of marketisation and privatisation aimed at shrinking the state sector, reducing accrued public debt, and stimulating Foreign Direct Investments (FDI), objectives realized through reductions in state subsidy, state provision and state regulation on the one hand and through the proliferation of transnational free trade agreements on the other.

Yet, neoliberalism as an ideology is unlikely to bring to fruition a global free market. The Foucaultian dilemma of how market discourse gets ‘within’ (see Section 2.3.5) has as much to do with governance of economic, political and educational systems at the micro-level as with ‘cognitive persuasion’ and the internalisation of dominant discourse at *all* levels (see Meyer, et al., 1987). In this context Robertson and Dale’s (2003a)

⁹⁸ Patrick Fitzsimons (1995, p.74) cites Barry who defines neoliberalism as “the science of economics applied to social and political questions”.

⁹⁹ Friedrich von Hayek (1899-1992) is generally seen as the ‘founding father’ of neoliberalism and one of its most influential institutions, the Mt Pelerin Society. He established the neoliberal tradition in the US when in 1950 he moved to the University of Chicago, which through its ‘Chicago School’ nurtured scholars like Milton Friedman, Pat Buchanan and Gary Becker who advanced monetarism, Public Choice Theory and Human Capital Theory respectively. Hayek was also of influence in Britain through his links with the Institute of Economic Affairs in London. In fairness, Hayek deviated in many points from neoliberalism (he considers himself a ‘classical liberal’: see Peters, n.d.; Devine, n.d.). As Devine observed, he would not have agreed to Human Capital Theory as he believed in the good of a liberal arts education rather than the narrow skill specialisation based on industry requirements, which he probably would have seen as state interventionism, and hence socialist and oppressive.

observation that the mobilisation of today's neoliberal globalism basically takes two forms, disciplinary and constitutional, is pertinent. The disciplinary aspect of neoliberalism can be seen as a form of social control/persuasion – either through instruments of governance or subjective processes of internalisation. The constitutional aspect refers to Gill's notion that neoliberalism is being “institutionalised in the quasi-legal structure of state and international political forms” (as cited by Robertson & Dale, *ibid*, p.7). For education the neoliberal shift implies that the global scale of market liberalisation repositions national education systems into a supranational network of governance, organised around the ‘constitutionalisation of neo-liberalism’ (Gill, 2000) through multilateral trade agreements such as GATS (see Chapter 4). Indeed, it can be argued that the transnational project of neoliberalism increasingly becoming constitutionalised is the foremost impact on the configuration of higher education systems at the national level. At the same time, the ‘transnational’ discourse of education in neoliberal terms cannot be ignored as a convergent force promoting the structural change of higher education on a global scale by ‘disciplining’ the institutional and individual subject. Similarly, the neoliberal project gives states the rationale to seemingly withdraw from public provision, whilst remaining in the ‘driving seat’.

The following section discusses the disciplining aspects of neoliberal ‘instruments’ (and the accompanying discourse) that help realise both the expansion of the market in the latest cycle of capitalism and cause the ‘rolling-back’ of the state in the provision of public goods and services.

3.3 Neoliberalising the Public Stage

Daniel Cohn (1997, p.593) explained that the ‘neoliberal’ policies of market fundamentalism as advanced by *market libertarians* Margaret Thatcher and Ronald Reagan throughout the 1980s signalled a problem. Their policies involved the withdrawal of the state and large tax cuts to stimulate the market. However, tax cuts did not lead to more growth nor to less spending by the state, hence large public deficits accrued. Accordingly, the state could not simply be assigned the role of “night watchman”. Instead of the state withdrawing from the public sector, a ‘new’ consensus emerged: it could operate more like a private business by promoting structural competitiveness best mediated by neoliberal notions of governance as pursued by

market liberals.¹⁰⁰ As Thompson stated: “The job of government is neither to suppress markets nor to surrender to them but to equip people [and] companies to succeed within them” (cited by Cohn, p.595).

Public Choice Theory (PCT), Principal-Agency Theory (PAT), Transaction Cost Theory (TCT), and New Public Management (NPM) are the neoliberal theories that act as motives and instruments for implementing the above objectives, in order to let market economies function efficiently, be competitive and hence grow, and disciplining subjects at the state, institutional and individual level to perform and achieve these aims.

However, Roger Dale pointed out that neoliberalism is not reducible to these configurations, rather “contingently associated with it in particular conjunctures”¹⁰¹. One such conjuncture is the career of the Washington Consensus, driving macro-economic policies of trade liberalisation; another is the advance of Human Capital Theory, framing the role of education in predominantly economic terms and equipping individuals, companies and the state to succeed in the market. Together they constitute the forces of enterprise economics, which signifies a commitment to “upgrading the human and capital resources common to all economic activities” and “expanding world trade and world growth” (Shapiro & Ross, 1993, p.2).

The following discusses the instruments of neoliberalism and the co-occurrence of the Washington Consensus and Human Capital Theory in the latest cycle of capitalism.

3.3.1 Instruments of Neoliberalism

As aforementioned, today’s push for neoliberalism is intended to provide the means by which markets can expand in a contracting economy and states can privatise or corporatise their public sector, devolving responsibilities of the enactment of public services to providers (agents) while keeping ‘control’ from a distance.

¹⁰⁰ Market libertarians and market liberals are terms coined by James (1992) to distinguish between the neoconservative policies, aimed at ‘starving the state’, espoused by Thatcher and Reagan; and the neoliberal policies, aimed at the state operating like a private enterprise, advanced by governments in New Zealand and Australia since the mid 1980s.

¹⁰¹ Personal communication, 16/4/2004

Table 3.2 shows that PCT provides the *raison d'être* for the retrenchment of the public sector based on the notion that each individual, including political/public actors, is a rational utility maximiser guided by self-interest when making choices. This is an excellent attitude to have in the free market but has adverse effects for society as a whole when applied to the public arena, for bureaucrats' self-interest will result in them maximizing their department's resources, since more funding translates in more "power, prestige, perks, and higher salaries" (Howlett & Ramesh, 1995, p.20). As public goods and services are not set by market mechanisms and protected from competition, and are further poorly monitored as elected officials frequently lack the expertise, bureaucrats are in a good position to maximise their interest – as witnessed by increased state provision to the public. John Codd (1999) observed that PCT assumes that public service provisions produce 'provider capture' and subsequent resource waste because in their monopoly position devoid of accountability, public agents are not motivated to economise. To curb this process that serves the interest of particular individuals to the detriment of society at large, "government intervention in the affairs of society should be limited to supplementing the market by enforcing and creating property rights where these are weak or non-existent so that market forces can operate, and allocate resources in a manner beneficial to the whole society" (Howlett & Ramesh, *ibid*, p.21). The market is considered to offer more transparency and guarantee competitive conditions and attendant opportunities for 'consumers' to make rational choices and hence achieve greater efficiency and responsiveness to their demands. As PCT tends to reduce all social phenomena to individual behaviour, it suggests there exists no such thing as the public good (Codd, *ibid*).

Table 3.2.
Theories Underpinning Neoliberalism

	Main Assumptions	Problem Formulation	Solution	Expression	Major Weaknesses
Public Choice	<p>Social phenomena reducible to individual behaviour.</p> <p>Individual as rational utility maximiser motivated by self-interest: good for market, problematic for public sector.</p>	<p>Public sector overextended as a result of bureaucrats' self interest, leading to maximisation of departmental budgets, institutional rigidity, and inefficient use of public resources.</p>	<p>Prevent 'provider capture' by relegating state services to the market that is open to competition.</p> <p>Limit government intervention to enabling the market to operate through upholding/extending property rights.</p>	<p>Minimal state. Selling state commercial assets.</p> <p>Restraining functions of state agencies.</p> <p>Contestability of public services.</p>	<p>Exclusion of human motivation based on social concerns and of institutional constraints on individual behaviour.</p> <p>Public interest and good not included in analysis, rather seen as legitimising interests of sectoral groups.</p>
Principal Agent	<p>Social/political life understood as series of contracts between principal and agent.</p> <p>Individual also seen as rational utility maximiser causing principals and agents to be opportunistic.</p>	<p>Adverse selection of agent as a result of imperfect/asymmetrical information prior to contract.</p> <p>Moral hazard due to imperceptibility of agent's behaviour after contract.</p>	<p>Prevent opportunism of agent by contract maximalisation via:</p> <p>Incentives/sactions aligning agent to principal's objective; Monitoring agent's behaviour; Bonding arrangements, assuring service delivery or compensation.</p>	<p>State delegation of responsibility to agents (providers).</p> <p>Division of service suppliers (agents) into competitive units.</p>	<p>Power relations and problem of principal's opportunism ignored.</p> <p>Too simple a model to explain complex social interactions and constitutional relationships.</p>

	Main Assumptions	Problem Formulation	Solution	Expression	Major Weaknesses
Transaction –Cost	<p>Principals and agents as opportunistic.</p> <p>Opportune behaviour influenced by uncertainty, bounded rationality, asset specificity and small numbers bargaining.</p>	<p>Unreliability of partners in contract, culminating into rent seeking behaviour.</p> <p>‘Satisficing’ rather than optimal performance due to limited information/ knowledge and cognitive processing capability.</p>	<p>Select governance structures that minimise transaction costs and avoid high cognitive demands.</p>	<p>Contracting out when services are highly contestable (low asset specificity and many potential suppliers), and transaction costs low (e.g. high degree of certainty).</p> <p>In-house provision under opposite conditions.</p>	<p>Little attention given to social, cultural and moral constraints impinging on human relations.</p>
New Public Management	<p>Management as generic, instrumental activity applicable to both the public and private sector.</p> <p>Private sector management seen as techniques superior to those in public sector.</p>	<p>Crisis of the modern state, with its bureaucratic processes causing inefficiency, and inflexibility in employment and wage/reward structures.</p>	<p>Devolve management control, and improve reporting, monitoring and accountability mechanisms. Accentuate efficiency.</p> <p>Shift from process accountability to that of results, and from relational to classical modes of contracting.</p>	<p>Private sector management practices: short-term contracts, contracting out, mission statements, strategic and corporate plans, performance accords/indicators/ rewards, bench marks, quantifiable outcome measures, corporate imaging, best practice.</p> <p>Flexible work force.</p>	<p>Equating public sector with private sector, whilst function and context may differ; hence inattentive to diverse organisation cultures and political constraints.</p>

Source: Adapted mainly from Boston, Martin, Pallot & Walsh (1996). Additional points from Howlett & Ramesh (1995) and Cohn (1997).

PAT and TCT represent the instruments of New Institutional Economics (NIE). PAT is premised on the assertion that all relationships, including those in the public sector, are essentially contractual and, consonant with PCT, are inevitably influenced by participants' self-interest. Hence conflicts are likely to arise as agents indulge in self-serving actions that can be contrary to the interest of the principal. As Table 3.2 illustrates, agents' interest can be controlled by contract maximalisation through the principal (in the public sector the state) instituting service delivery criteria, monitoring devices like performance indicators and auditing, and bonding arrangements (penalties and rewards) to guarantee that the service will be provided according to the criteria set. Applied to the public sector, PAT allows the state to withdraw from direct service delivery in areas traditionally associated with its governance – infrastructure, health, social welfare and education, yet still control these services 'at a distance'.

Similarly, TCT is based on the notion that if contractual obligations were to be provided by an agent, there would be the strong incentive to make necessary changes in order to minimize costs and maximize profits. TCT helps governments decide in theory which activities, goods and services to contract out on the market (with price as regulator) and which to keep in-house (with bureaucracy as regulator) in order to minimise transaction costs, and hence obtain maximum efficiency. Table 3.2 indicates that contracting out is preferred when services are highly contestable and transaction costs low. For the public sector, market delegation is generally considered to maximise results; as Sylvester van Koten (n.d., p. 24) stated, "Governance structures that have to use administrative controls, to compensate for a low incentive intensity, are ... more expensive than governance structures that can do without extensive administrative controls". That is to say, incentive intensity is low for agents when their behaviour is of little consequence for their own welfare or interest, for example in the case of providers on fixed salaries. Here, agents do not bear the full costs nor receive the full rewards for their activity; hence they only produce what is required under administrative supervision and monitoring. As incentives are not optimum under such control, there is efficiency loss (van Koten, *ibid*). In contrast, when there is a written framework of rules, enabling solid contracts, agents are free to determine how to undertake the required activities to their best advantage, whilst also being held responsible should they fail to fulfill the contract. Clearly, both PAT and TCT envisage the breaking down of expensive bureaucratic controls – a logic that supports the state's withdrawal from supplying 'public' goods

and services and relocating them to the market or delivering them under market conditions.

NPM or ‘new managerialism’ refers to the application of ‘rational’ economic theory to public management, and as Table 3.2 indicates incorporates elements of public choice theory, principal agency theory and transaction costs analysis (Boston, 1991). It surfaced in the early 1980s in the UK and US but became known as a concept in the early 1990s to describe the public sector reforms taken up by New Zealand in particular (see Chapter 6) as well as other Anglophone countries like Canada and Australia. As a conceptual instrument, NPM supplies the framework, meta-narrative (see Fitzsimons, n.d.) or policy expression (Dale, 1997) for nurturing a business culture in a devolved public sector in order to achieve government’s objectives of efficiency, flexibility, consumer culture and ‘best practice’¹⁰². As Cohn (1997, p.596) pointed out, NPM “reduces the public sector’s traditional reliance on process accountability and enhances the role of results accountability”. As a meta-narrative, NPM represents a marriage between theories of NIE and “managerialism” as derived from the private sector; that is, it fuses contractual attributes, “making managers manage”, with management-by-objectives/results, “letting managers manage” (Yamamoto, 2003, p.6;). This approach has especially been promoted by International Government Organisations (IGOs) such as the OECD and World Bank (see Chapter 4).

Like PCT, PAT and TCT, NPM is the answer to bureaucratic inefficiencies, rule-based operations, and top-down delegation that distance public service providers from their customers. Hence, the shift in emphasis from administration and policy to management is seen as a way for governments to introduce performance-based units and promote business principles. These principles centre on: 1) hands-on management skills to encourage “active, visible and discretionary control in organizations”; 2) transparent performance standards and measures; 3) output controls – rather than input controls and formal procedures – as measured by performance indicators; 4) decentralisation or separation of units in the public sector; 5) greater competition between public sector organisations and private and public sector to increase efficiency and reduce costs; 6) private sector style approach in the management of human resources, such as shorter

¹⁰² Hood (1995) pointed out that there are different forms of NPM, and hence the concept functions as an umbrella incorporating these streams. NPM here constitutes therefore just one expression.

employment contracts, corporate plans, performance agreements and mission statements; 7) efficient and cost-cutting resource use: “doing more with less” (Hood, 1991, pp.4-5; 1995, p.94); and 8) a client orientation to encourage responsive services. As Christopher Hood (1991) noted, in the process public managers are locked in a relational chain determined by market mechanism where the public value of legal equality is primary and other values such as reliability and fairness feature second.

As an instrument for public sector reform, NPM primarily denotes a form of Foucaultian governmentality, disciplining the subject to the conditions and operations of the free market. In the process, services can be contested and state sectors like education “marketised and privatised” (Fitzsimons, n.d.). In this context, NPM is a powerful approach for reconfiguring university education, and as Yamamoto (*ibid*) suggested has been of specific significance to state sector reforms in New Zealand. The influence of NPM on higher education reform will be further discussed in later chapters.

Overall, as Table 3.2 summarised, the deployment of neoliberal reforms is premised on the fiscally centred notions of governance. Hence, these theories have major weaknesses. The services of the public sector are equated with those of the private sector. Yet, as Schick (1996) pointed out the responsibilities of the state are broad. The implementation of NPM (and hence NIE) would narrow these responsibilities and thus undermine collective values and interests. Or as Cohn (1997, p.611) observed, the more NPM is used as a blame-avoidance strategy, relieving politicians and senior bureaucrats from responsibility and blaming underperformance to agencies, the more the “anticipated benefits for society disappear”. In addition, the NPM focus on outputs and discretionary management instead of the traditional rule-based and open procedures and processes of public systems tends to erode the principles of equity, equality and integrity (*ibid*). One reason is that under the efficiency regime management has more say on job tasks and the hiring and firing of employees, so that the sharing of leadership and the autonomy for staff members are weakened. Moreover, the neoliberal view of humanity as homo economicus equates people as users, or clients and customers, of public services. This model may apply to the private sector, but in the public sector overlooks people as citizens and subjects. In the process, their role as participants is only meaningful as measured by ‘customer satisfaction’, which, as Yamamoto (*ibid*) observed, is rather passive.

3.3.2 *The Washington Consensus*

The Washington Consensus (WC) was first coined by John Williamson at an Institute for International Economics conference in 1989 to refer to a policy agenda radiating from Washington-based organisations, such as “the ‘political’ Washington of the US Congress, the Administration [US Treasury] and the ‘technocratic’ Washington of the IMF, World Bank, and the think tanks” (Naim, 1999, p.2). In contrast to the above-discussed neoliberal instruments, this 10-rule consensus represents a macro-economic policy heuristic that denotes an “intellectual convergence” emerging in the 1980s from monetary policy, and gathering force as the communist system in East Europe collapsed (Williamson, 2000). Since then, Williamson (ibid) argues, the WC has impacted rather than “imposed” wide-ranging neoliberal reforms (p.251)¹⁰³. Williamson (ibid, p.252-253; 2002, p.1) summarised these reforms as follows:

1. Fiscal discipline.
2. Redirection of public expenditure priorities from indiscriminate subsidies to basic health and education as well as infrastructure that were to provide high economic returns.
3. Tax reform to broaden the tax base in combination with lower marginal tax rates.
4. Interest rate liberalisation, which Williamson admitted should have been formulated broader as financial liberalisation (ibid, 2002).
5. A competitive exchange rate.
6. Trade liberalisation.
7. Liberalisation of inward foreign direct investment (FDI).
8. Privatisation.
9. Deregulation so to ease barriers to entry and exit.
10. Safeguarding of property rights.

Williamson (ibid) admitted that although there was general agreement on the first three measures, the others produced some controversy, in particular exchange rate liberalisation, as some nations that had achieved economic growth, such as those in East

¹⁰³ In his 2000 article, Williamson concluded that there is no “universal model that can or should be imposed on the world” (p.261). But he also suggested that the WC was a result of the collapse of communism since “socialism does not work except in a simple economy” (p.262).

Asia, had done so with policies at odds with the WC. The securing of property rights was further contested by some, but as Williamson remarked the people to whom it was offensive were “extinct in Washington by 1989” (p.254). In addition, the privatisation agenda received a few criticisms but also much support, and was put on the international agenda in 1985 by the then secretary of the U.S. Treasury, James Baker. What is more, the IMF and World Bank made loans conditional on WC-modelled reform (see Section 4.3).

Throughout its career, the WC has generally been considered as pro-market and anti-state (see Fine, 2001). Williamson (2000), however, envisaged the programme as being potentially “pro-poor”(p.258), and accordingly a helpful reform manifesto for the World Bank. For example, he reasoned that inflation caused by poor fiscal discipline hampers income distribution; redirection of public expenditure to education and health builds human capital for the poor; tax redistribution can be neutral or progressive; competitive exchange rates supports export-led growth; trade liberalisation particularly in the poorer, under-resourced countries increases the demand for unskilled labour and hence helps the poor; FDIs assists in economic development and the spread of technology; privatisation if well-conducted (a concept Williamson fails to explain) can raise efficiency, hence improving public finances that benefits all, so also the poor; deregulation dismantles barriers that protect the privileged; and private property rights defend the right to property of both the rich and poor.

In this light, Williamson (ibid) lamented that his WC formulation has frequently been misinterpreted as market fundamentalism, offering little hope and support to the poor¹⁰⁴. One could argue that the naïvity of his assumptions¹⁰⁵, as well as the model’s simplicity, is a contributing factor to such a ‘misunderstanding’. A more in-depth analysis of the WC further indicates that politically, this shorthand represents the global consensus of neoliberalism, the weak state, liberal democracy and the supremacy of the legal system (Santos, 2002). However, the first two elements are problematic. As Boaventura de Sousa Santos observed, “deregulation implies intense state regulatory activity in order

¹⁰⁴ Williamson (2000) considered the Reagan-Thatcher period as market fundamentalism. In contrast, he stressed that the WC did not represent the mere reduction of government spending to restore fiscal discipline, nor did it demand overall tax cuts, or ‘firmly fixed’ or ‘freely floating’ exchange rates.

¹⁰⁵ These ‘fallacies’ will be discussed in more depth under the World Bank (see Section 3. 4.2) as its policies reflect the WC and Williamson’s suppositions.

to end former state regulation and to create the standards and institutions which will preside over the new model of social regulation”. Hence, deregulation needs “a relatively strong state” as “only a strong state can efficiently create its own weakness” (Santos, *ibid*, p.11). Also, the consensus of a liberal democracy represents a “monolithic model” inapplicable to the diversity of societies, localities and circumstances. In addition, the democracies of core countries “are, if not caricatures, ... abbreviated versions of this model of liberal democracy” (*ibid*).

As could be expected, the WC rules as stated remained uncontested for only a short time after its formulation (Naim, 1999), with objection further fuelled by the fact that in reforming countries the WC dictates did not always produce the predicted results, rather the opposite (as world-system theorists and sceptics envisaged, see Sections 2.2.3 and 2.2.5). Yet, to remain true to this policy heuristic these ‘failures’ have commonly been attributed to the countries’ internal characteristics, such as low domestic savings in the case of Mexico, and crony capitalism in the case of high domestic saving countries like South Korea and Thailand (*ibid*). Nevertheless, to make the WC consistent with reality, a ‘new’ consensus, frequently referred to as the post-Washington Consensus, arose. It focuses on the third consensus, which Santos considers an essential element of linking political globalisation to economic globalisation, and entails “institutional strengthening” to complement the macroeconomic reforms of privatisation (cited in Naim, *ibid*, p.10). Hence, the principal role of the state in order for the market to function is to create the right conditions and legal framework, build on universal systems of understanding that generate “standard expectations and resolve litigation” (*ibid*, p.12). This development of the WC embodies the enterprise economics previously mentioned, but also signals a shift from a trade perspective to a development perspective (Rodrik, 2001)¹⁰⁶. The new consensus is discussed in Chapter 4 as it is reflected in the evolution of the IGOs presented, in particular that of the World Bank.

3.3.3 *Human Capital Theory*

¹⁰⁶ Dani Rodrik (2001, p.34) argued that a development perspective embodies the goals of both developed and developing countries, with WTO managing the interface between different national systems rather than the harmonization and reduction of national institutional differences.

Accompanying the push for neoliberal policies at both the macro- and micro level has been the career of Human Capital Theory (HCT). Like NPM, it is of particular relevance to higher education policy and discourse as it predominantly focuses on the contribution of education to economic growth, and in its latest version is linked to the formation of the knowledge-based economy/society¹⁰⁷ that characterises post-industrial societies. As Patrick Fitzsimons (1999) commented, HCT has been the leading economic theory of Western education as it enabled the reframing of education as foremost an economic tool.

That knowledge and skills possess economic value is not a novel idea, however. Economists as early as Adam Smith have acknowledged that education and health contribute to productivity, wages and other economic measures. Yet, as Pedro Nuno Teixeira (2004) observed, economists before the Second World War considered any benefits from education predominantly from a political and moral point of view: improving human reason and self-discipline. In their view education contributed to making future workers better citizens, which objective is in line with the nation-building rhetoric under modern globalisation (see Hopkins, 2002), and the trend of making education compulsory for the good of civic society¹⁰⁸. As Teixeira (ibid) argued, analysing the value of human life for its “productive potential” discredited the wide-ranging and societal purposes of education, “reducing it to a mechanistic approach” (p.5). The subsequent neoliberal development of HCT is referred to by Ian Baptiste (2001, p.184) as a “malignant force”.

The role of education started to shift to predominantly economic objectives in the 1960s. This shift can be typified by three major developments: HCT1 promoting state investment in human capital in general; HCT2 focussing on manpower planning; and HCT3 highlighting individual investment in personal human capital.¹⁰⁹ Simon

¹⁰⁷ The knowledge-based economy is associated with globalisation, or the latest K-wave. Gregerson and Johnson even remarked that the post-Fordist era of the fifth Kondratieff long wave brought the new knowledge economy into being (in Peters, 2004). This economy is characterised by the annihilation of distance, the deterritorialisation of the state, economics of abundance (Lyotard’s notion of infinite knowledge production), the importance of local knowledge and HCI (Peters, ibid).

¹⁰⁸ Baptiste (2001) gave three main reasons for HCT not being advanced before the 1960s: different opinions among early theorists from humanism, Marxism and economic rationalism, with the latter’s concept of humans as capital considered offensive; Keynesian dominance of seeing education as pure consumption and not investment; and the industrial economies not needing many highly skilled workers.

¹⁰⁹ Roger Dale, personal communication, 23/10/2004.

Marginson offers a comparable three-phase appraisal of governments' utilisation of HCT to educational policy:

The first phase, in the 1960s, was one of public investment in human capital, dominated by claims about a link between education and economic growth. The second phase was a period of eclipse, in which the earlier policy assumptions were abandoned and the rates of return equations were confined to a modest place with the body of neo-classical theory. The third phase (not completed) saw renewed policy commitment to investment in human capital. But in the free market climate now prevailing, the emphasis is on private rather than public investment. (Marginson, 1993, p.40)¹¹⁰.

Central to the early HCT formation, originating from neo-classical economics, is the work by theorists such as Theodore Schultz, Jacob Mincer and Gary Becker in the 1960s. These authors shared the conviction that human capital (HC) determines economic growth. Schultz (1961), a Nobel Prize laureate associated with the Chicago School of Economics, asserted: "knowledge and skill are in great part the product of investment [not consumption] and, combined with other human investment, predominantly account for the productive superiority of the technically advanced countries" (p.3). He reasoned that under-investment in HC would slow down the economy, forming a major obstacle to achieving economies of scale endogenous to the industrialisation of developing countries. Moreover, Schultz argued that the return on investment in higher education would be significantly higher than the rate of return to physical capital. Gary Becker (1964) extended Schultz's macro-economic approach to HCI, labour productivity and earnings. Becker, like Schultz a Nobel Prize laureate and Chicago School associate, developed a HCT cost-benefit model, the equations of which later formed the micro-economics of HCT (Marginson, 1997b) as it measures the direct costs (such as fees and materials) and indirect costs (delay of income) of higher education against its likely benefits (expected higher income). According to Becker, education is a property of personal investment in HC; if the benefits better the costs, the

¹¹⁰ In Marginson's later work (1997a) this second phase constitutes the indirect link between education and economic growth as mediated by technology (see later writings in this section).

investment should be made. Unlike Schultz, Becker (building on the work by Mincer¹¹¹) differentiated between general and specific education/training: the first building up skills and knowledge that are transferable or portable, the second improving productivity specific to the firm or industry in which it is learned. Like Schultz, however, Becker also proclaimed that educational investment increases productivity and social mobility (Baptiste, 2001).

As the consensus was that a sizeable investment in education, particularly higher and further education, would maintain an acceptable rate of growth, HCT became an approach for governments to achieve their goal of economic development¹¹². Moreover, public HCI was expected to produce “responsible rather than anti-social citizens” (Coombs, cited in Marginson, 1997a, p.106) and generate greater income equality and modernisation in production through technological and organisational change (Kjell Rubenson, 2004, citing OECD, 1961)¹¹³. Hence, it was thought at the time that public investment in education would produce many economic as well as social spin-offs. This was a valid assumption in the 1960s; however, empirical anomalies occurred when a contracting economy transpired in the 1970s: the link between learning and earning did not materialise in the developed countries like the US, nor did it for many developing countries; poverty persisted despite educational and training programmes aimed at the poor; education for women and minority groups also resulted in weaker associations between educational investment and higher earnings (Irvin Sobel, 1982). In addition, underemployment of the highly educated became a social issue (Livingstone, 1997). It thus transpired that “there were limits to the capacity of the labour markets to absorb growth in educated labour” (Marginson, 1997a, p. 109); as expected governments’ faith in the macro-claims about investment in education waned (Marginson, 1995), and neo-classical HCT became temporarily eclipsed by alternative theories like screening and

¹¹¹ Mincer developed a model to investigate income inequalities, using education and years of work experience to measure the impact of formal and informal training. He found that jobs requiring high levels of education provided higher earnings, and as more skill and experience were needed over time income rose, only to level off when in later years aging affected productivity, though the latter effect was lower for the highly skilled (see Sweetland, 1996).

¹¹² HCT was also congruent with the political rationale of many Western governments to increase their educational spending to counteract the technical (military and space) innovations of the then Soviet Union (Marginson, 1997b).

¹¹³ As Sobel (1982) noted, HCT was appealing to both conservative and radical elements in developed and developing nations. The first were primarily interested in economic growth and the latter in educational expansion, which would result in the equalisation of status, power and income. Marginson (1997a) made a similar claim, saying that the HCT formulations of the 1960s were flexible, fitting any claim, be it economic, social or political, about the benefits of education.

institutional economics, which incorporated a more economic-sociological view of HC (see Sobel, *ibid*; Baptiste, 2001)¹¹⁴.

The above developments indicate that in a downswing economy HCT in its original form needed ‘retooling’ (Livingstone, n.d.). This retooling initiated the second phase of HCT, which grew out of agricultural economics (Marginson, 1997a). Here, it is assumed that the link between education and production is not direct, rather mediated by technological innovations and transformations, which set off systemic changes in the production process resulting in changes in the demand for certain types of skills and training. The role of education is that an individual becomes more skilled in obtaining and interpreting new information, and better able to deal with external shocks and uncertainties. It follows that the more complex and dynamic the technological change or environment, the greater the educational contribution as schooling is seen to develop a person’s creativity, flexibility and efficiency – hence bringing about higher productivity. This new formulation of HCT gained strength in the 1980s, and shifted the focus from undifferentiated public funding in education at the macro level to selective investment in advanced technology and management subjects as well as generic skills in areas such as communication and knowledge of technologies at the micro level (Marginson, *ibid*).

The second phase of HCT further gave rise to market liberal HCT in the 1980s and 1990s. This ‘third’ phase represents in perhaps their purest form the neoliberal policies as proposed by Chicago school academics such as Friedman and Becker. Friedman in his book *Capitalism and Freedom* (1962) had already asserted that an individual profited most from education in monetary terms. Basic and general education did produce some social externalities, like shared literacy, knowledge and values strengthening society, but it should not demand government funding if parents could afford it. Also, even though general education and vocational training were difficult to separate definitively, the latter (as did most of higher education) resulted in *all* benefits

¹¹⁴ Screeners consider schools as screening devices that sort out individuals according to those attributes employers consider as evidence for trainability, such as ability and motivation, for which they are prepared to pay more. Credentials basically form a proxy for trainability and adaptability and a substitute for perceived productivity (Sobel, 1982), with the requisite skills acquired on the job. As institutional theorists pointed out: “once screened, employees move up the institutionally prescribed job ladders”, the latter representing continuous screening devices within firms (*ibid*, p.263). These explanations do not exclude the impact of race and gender ceilings as neoclassical/neoliberal HCTs would, nor in its more radical form ignore the difference between core and periphery, which institutionalists refer to as primary and secondary labour markets.

going to the individual. Hence, Friedman believed that no state subsidies were needed. The ideal education system would be founded on private investment within competitive markets (see Marginson, 1997a and 1997b).

Becker's work, which allowed for private investment in post-secondary education in particular, was pivotal to developing the market idea of HCT. Although his cost-benefit analysis was mainly worked out at the national level in the 1960s, when Keynesian macro-economic policies still reigned, its individualised calculus provided the seed from which the concept of private HCI, as formulated by IGOs like the WB and OECD (see Chapter 4), emerged in the 1980s and 1990s. As Marginson (1997a, p.99) stated, Becker "systematised the econometrics of human capital" to individual decision-making behaviour, based on three neoliberal pillars: utility maximalisation, reflecting rational choice theory of humans engaging in behaviour that maximises outcome; market equilibrium, premised on perfectly competitive, free markets; and stable preference, assuming individuals' persistent desire for health, status and pleasure (see Baptiste, 2001). He also linked HCT to the new technology; with "[t]he most successful companies and the most successful countries ... those that manage human capital in the most effective and efficient fashion—investing in their workers, encouraging workers to invest in themselves" (in interview with Brook Manville, 2001). The latter statement in addition to Becker's individualised HCT account comprises the prospect of marketising education as a private on-going investment, endorsing policies to reduce state contribution in education. Hence, whereas these neoliberal ideas were dormant in the 1960s and 1970s, they became fully active in the 1980s. As Marginson (1997a, pp. 114-115) remarked:

In the new markets and quasi-markets in schools, training and higher education, human capital theory supplied individual investors not only with the idea of investment in the self, but also with the technical means of calculating returns on that investment... Everyone could be the entrepreneur of themselves, even though many were likely to be disappointed with the result.

This individualisation and private orientation in HCT can be considered as a response to stagnation in economic growth, to the rise in unemployment and to the polarisation of

incomes (Jérôme-Forget, 1997¹¹⁵), but it also provided a scheme for damage control, based on the logic that if people find themselves out of work, they can do something about it: upskill or continue their education. If not, they have themselves to blame for the consequences. The responsibility for (negative) societal outcomes hence shifts from macro-economic processes (of neoliberalisation) to the individual (consumer), who in their consumption of knowledge are further assigned the role of entrepreneur, able to self-sell and create opportunities. Moreover, this simple causal heuristic can be applied to all situations where economic progress does not result. Developing countries too can be attributed the same blame as the ‘inefficient’ consumer/entrepreneur. As Gary Becker contends: “One reason that less-developed countries haven’t adapted more advanced technologies is that they do not have the human capital that allows them to effectively utilize the technology” (Manville, 2001)¹¹⁶.

Basically, the second phase of HCT provided the framework for education needing to be tailored to the knowledge economy, with the marketisation of education being further advanced in the third phase. In both scenarios, education becomes increasingly embedded in the production process of capital, leading to the assessment of educational effectiveness in economic terms and hence the promotion of market instruments, such as bench marking, performance indicators and audit reviews. Similar to the WC undergoing changes, however, the market approach to HCT underwent some ‘adjustments’ in the late 1990s as expressed in HCT discourses of social capital. This latest phase in HCT discourse will be discussed in more detail in the coming chapters, in particular in relation to the WB and the OECD (Section 4.3 and 4.4).

3.4 Closing Note

The above elements of neoliberalism fused with the ‘market’ developments of the WC and HCT have all surfaced and increased in relevance in the last three decades and when linked to Kondratieff’s long wave model can be seen as systemic (see Arrighi,

¹¹⁵ Jérôme-Forget also highlights the renewed interest in HCT from new growth theorists, with main authors Romer, Barro and Lucas, and points to a growing consensus of early education being critical to the “formation of intelligent, well-adjusted adults, *a.k.a.* human capital (p.3, author’s italics), which is consistent with the WC rationale for investment in basic education.

¹¹⁶ Ball (1998) made the astute observation that in times of uncertainty, simple theories are seen as the most effective means to deal with complex problems. Social psychologists have similarly pointed out the human need for simple heuristics to deal with chaotic or otherwise uncontrollable events.

1996), although not unstoppable, arrangements to a contracting economy under pressures of new innovations supporting the transnational movement of capital, people and production. Similarly, IGOs through which liberalisation policies are channelled have increased in importance from the late 1970s onwards. And as communism tumbled, neoliberalism as leitmotif of globalisation may not only be in response to a competitive market in a downswing, but also in response to “extending it into areas which were previously protected, or partially protected, from commodification” (Tickel & Peck, 2003, p.10). Despite the discourse and instruments of neoliberalism seemingly being a logical answer to global market events, this chapter has indicated that their premises of rationality contain fallacious lines of reasoning. These will be commented on in the next chapter, which discusses the neoliberal project through an assessment of IGOs with regard to their disciplinary and constitutional involvement in ‘neoliberalising’ higher education among their member states. Undoubtedly, the neoliberal push in public life warrants in-depth discussion. As Franklin D. Roosevelt once said:

The liberty of a democracy is not safe if the people tolerate the growth of private power to a point where it becomes stronger than their democratic State itself. That, in its essence, is Fascism – ownership of government by an individual, by a group or any controlling private power.¹¹⁷

¹¹⁷ Franklin D. Roosevelt, as cited in “Global Solutions”, Adriaan Boiten and Richard Alden Stimson (Eds.), available from <http://www.fixgov.org/globalbook.html>

Chapter 4

International Governmental Organisations: The Market Composers of Higher Education

4.1 Prelude

... problems arise at the transition from the nation state to a continental federation of such states. They arise when super powers put pressure on less powerful states. They arise too when super powers in the name of humankind try to enforce rules to protect the individual against laws of his own state that they regard as inhumane.¹¹⁸

Norbert Elias suggested that the upscaling of national governance to a supranational level is to be expected, but in the process would disadvantage the less powerful nations and peoples, as ‘universals’ would be applied to enforce supranational (hegemonic) interests. The globalisation of neoliberal policies is a case in point. As Larry Summers, former WB executive and Treasury Secretary in the Clinton Administration, asserted, “the laws of economics are like the laws of engineering. There is only one set of laws and they work everywhere” (as cited in Wade, 2004, p.147). As aforementioned, this ‘universalisation’ of the free market has produced a move away from a pluralistic multi-dimensional model of economics prioritising “loyalty, stability and protection against systemic instability” to one that is uni-dimensional favouring “exit, competition and the opportunity to profit from risk as guiding principles” (Wade, *ibid*). When efficiency and the profit principle rules, commodification of knowledge is likely to occur and hence education, in particular higher education, is in danger of becoming a commodity that can be traded within a national, but increasingly also a regional and global market.

Since the movers behind the shift of the marketisation of higher education are largely the supranational organisations, in particular the IGOs, there is “a new geography of power – an emerging functional, institutional and scalar division of the labour of education systems in the global economy” (Robertson & Dale, 2003a, p.3). Today’s educational playing field is increasingly shaped by IGOs and their reformulation of

¹¹⁸ The Norbert Elias Reader, (Goudsblom & Mennel, 1998, p.257).

HCT (see Sections 4.3 and 4.4). And although international organisations have been in existence for several hundred years, IGOs really came into being after the Second World War (see Table 3.1).

IGOs can be seen as conductors for facilitating and enabling the capitalisation of the social aspects of life, including education. However, it is outside the scope of this thesis to discuss all IGOs, but as Howlet and Ramesh (1995, p.70) observed, in the analysis of public policy, “international regimes in the areas of trade and finance are clearly the most important”. Therefore, the transnational government organisations that incorporate these areas in their mission and into which New Zealand is interpellated will be discussed in some detail; they are the WTO, the WB, and OECD, representing, as Ramonet (2002) proclaimed, “l’axe maléfique” (the axes of evil) that continue to impose on the world “la dictature du marché, la pre-eminence du secteur privé, le culte du profit, et de provoquer ... de terrifiants dégâts...”¹¹⁹ (cited in Voldemar Tomusk, 2002, p.336).

The following discussion centres on the extent these IGOs function as reinforcers and regulators of global capitalism and as ‘orchestrators’ of higher education with neoliberalism as leitmotif.

4.2 WTO as Librettist of Free Markets in Higher Education

[W]e are writing the constitution of a single global economy.¹²⁰

Having legitimate power over nation states when they sign a charter, declaration or multilateral agreement, the WTO is one supranational organisation instrumental in promoting the free trade agenda of their more influential members, the Quad– the US, the EU, Japan and Canada. As Robertson and Dale (2003a) described, the 148 members of the WTO are bound to a set of rules and negotiations that have resulted in three agreements of significance to the global trade in ‘knowledge’. They are General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), General Agreement on Trade in Services

¹¹⁹ The dictatorship of the market, the pre-eminence of the private sector, and the cult of profit, which all cause terrifying damage.

¹²⁰ Statement by Renato Ruggiero, the then Director General of the WTO (as cited in Gill, 2000).

(GATS) and Trade Related Intellectual Property Services (TRIPS). The next sections discuss the shift from GATT to WTO/GATS, WTO's logic of the free market, GATS as instrument of a borderless education market, and the potential impact of GATS on state policy and provision of higher education.

4.2.1 From GATT Harmoniser to GATS Enactor

The origins of the WTO can be traced to the 'free world' vision of the Western victors of the Second World War. In response to trade protectionism of the interwar years that had led to policies of deflation and high unemployment (a downswing world economy), cumulating into a total war, GATT was first launched on 30 October 1947 when 23 key capitalist countries, whose combined economies accounted for four-fifths of world trade, signed up to reduce tariffs on roughly a fifth of world's trade. This signing signalled the first step to multilateral trade agreements but was still set amid a climate of 'embedded liberalism' characterised by a desire to expand free trade whilst still keeping a protectionist stand towards domestic markets.¹²¹ Importantly, GATT was launched, as Robert Wade (2004) observed, within the framework of development economics. The latter allowed developing countries not to reciprocate their higher level of access to markets in the developed world with a corresponding reduction in their own tariffs. Prior to 1980 most members shared this vision: GATT's "messy, multi-faceted and uneven rules" were workable and free trade regimes were allowed to develop incrementally whilst at the same time remaining compatible with different interventionist state systems (Mundy & Iga, 2003, p.283). GATT, founded on four principles, has as its main regulation the principle of no trade discrimination, based on the most favoured-nation (MFN) clause; that is, if a state were to reduce tariffs for one GATT signatory it is to do so for all¹²². However, the shared vision of embedded liberalism started to collapse as a result of the oil crises in the 1970s. Domestic

¹²¹ Mundy and Iga (2003) observed that the US participation in multilateral trade has been characterised by a 'duality of purpose'; trade liberalisation within a multilateral system is to the US advantage, but needs to be organised around veiled bilateral trade talks (p.283). In other words, the US "idealises free trade but retains an important commitment to protectionism" (Mundy, cited in Robertson & Dale, 2003b, p.23). Others have drawn the same conclusion, especially worth mentioning is the work of Noam Chomsky (1992) and Stephen Gill (2000).

¹²² The other principles cover no protection apart from that provided by the customs tariff, that is the 'national treatment' principle; customs unions and free trade associations being legitimate means of trade liberalisation, on the condition these arrangements do not discriminate against third countries; and signatories entitled to levy certain charges on imports (Mundy & Iga, 2003).

protection through, for example, state subsidies became further unattainable, producing a shift from Keynesian to neoliberal ideology that linked eminent theorists from the Chicago School and Institute of Economic Affairs in London to politicians like Reagan and Thatcher. As GATT was not constituted officially, signatories were ‘contracting parties’ rather than members, and various clauses allowed them exemption to tariff reductions in cases where domestic producers would be seriously disadvantaged (Glenn Rikowski, 2002a), or when stronger regimes of trade liberalisation were being advocated, principally by the US.

Despite this free market push, GATT remained the most influential charter for cross border trade and international tariffs up to 1995, when it became tied to the WTO. Two of its sessions are worth noting for their particular historical importance in setting the path to closer multilateral trade agreements under the WTO. One is the Kennedy Round (1962-1967), initiated by the US, which was concerned about the growing economic integration of Western Europe under the EC. This Round resulted in tariffs on industrial products being reduced by an average of 35% over a five-year period but the negotiations excluded steel and agricultural products; as ‘embedded liberalism’ was still advocated, parties agreed that these sectors needed domestic protection. The other is the Tokyo Round (1973-1979) that started with the Tokyo Declaration in 1973, concluded in 1979 with the adoption of further tariff reductions to be implemented over an eight-year period.

Thereafter, the United States has been greatly influential in accelerating the pace of free trade agreements. In fact, its crusade that not only goods but also services needed to be included in multilateral trade dealings had started earlier, in the late 1970s, as the US economy enjoyed a comparative advantage in this sector. However, during the Tokyo Round this initiative met great resistance from other member states¹²³. But as traditional tariffs became increasingly less important in international trade, and the Washington Consensus (WC) emerged from the heart of US politics, the US initiated a new set of negotiations in Uruguay in 1986, which resulted in the founding of the WTO during the Uruguay Round in 1994. This event marked an important transformation in trade

¹²³ Both the developing nations and OECD rejected the inclusion of services. Only in 1994 after political dealings in which the US promised developing countries concessions with tropical food and the EC and Japan with agricultural products could the inclusion of services go ahead (see Mundy & Iga, 2003).

policies, from embedded liberalism to disembedded market-oriented ideas and from procedural rules based on power politics to institutionalised legal practices (Ford, 2003).

The following year, GATT became incorporated into the WTO, which as Jane Ford (2003) indicated was given a stronger mandate and legal authority to advance open market policies. Moreover, the inclusion of services under GATS in 1995 and property rights under TRIPS in 1996 marked the beginning of the education sector becoming subject to global free trade, a development likely to influence the quality, operation and provision of public higher education and research. For example, TRIPS encourages the commodification of knowledge and reduces the likelihood of knowledge being a public good to be shared. Under TRIPS, certain knowledges will be increasingly protected through patents and copyrights. This means that knowledge generated by researchers can be withheld from publication and conferences if it represents a ‘product’ capable of generating profits. For basic research TRIPS has huge implications: break-through findings can be stalled, as innovations are often the result of shared information; and research compromised, as TNCs move into funding only those projects that have perceived market value. Moreover, to protect market interests, if the results do not fit these, the private sponsors may compel researchers not to publish or worse ‘adjust’ their data (see Henry Giroux, 2003), and in the process set limits to academic freedom of expression.

4.2.2 WTO and the ‘Logical’ Drum of the Global Free Market

As Ha-Joon Chang (2003) commented, the stepping up of multilateral trade agreements by powerful members of the WTO has largely been backed by the simple logic that developed countries got rich because of their open border approach to trade, so developing countries should follow their path. But as Chang pointed out, an historical analysis would show that when the US was a capital importing country protective measures were taken at the federal and state level preventing foreign investors from having control over the US economy through protective measures. Some of these measures include restrictions in ownerships of important natural resources, higher taxation, and limited legal protection. As the UK, Germany and France were capital exporting countries before the Second World War, they had little need for controlling

their FDIs, but in the post-war years they too used control mechanisms to protect their national interests, such as foreign exchange control, and restrictions on take-overs by TNCs. Also, whilst developing, Japan and Korea depended little on FDI. Taiwan, most open to FDI, scored below the international average for dependency on FDI. All these countries have been “strategic” and “flexible” in their choice to open trade; that is, they have been liberal or restrictive dependent on “changes in the external environment, the country’s stage of development, and the development of the indigenous firms in the industries concerned” (Chang, *ibid*, p.2). The straight-forward belief that open borders attract wealth is thus rather naïve and simplistic, bordering on cargo-cult optimism.

Arguably, the rich nations’ thrust for further liberalisation is made from a position of strength, and wealth flows across open borders from the weak to the strong. Those nations that are already strong and the TNCs ‘based’ in their territory are capital exporting oriented, and increasingly this capital is in knowledge, information transfer and the provision of service. In areas where developing countries may have an advantage, such as through the production of agricultural products, WTO negotiations show that a federal country like the US, a regional community like the EU and a strong regional hegemon like Japan are still protective of their domestic markets, blocking weaker players. Chang emphasises that principles such as ‘national treatment’ look fair in a “level playing field”. But as the players are not comparable, the strong players are set to win. In other words:

... in many sports where weight matters (e.g., boxing, wrestling, judo, weight-lifting), we do not allow players of different weights compete against each other. And history tells us that the policy-makers of successful countries understood this when they designed their policies towards foreign investment (Chang, 2003, p.3).

On the whole, the seemingly rational logic of the WTO supports the hegemonic alliances that world-system theory would predict. Moreover, world-system theorists and sceptics are given credence as the so-called Triad nations have a say in non-trade issues through the “Quad” that meets daily in Geneva, the WTO’s home base. The Transnational Corporations (TNCs) also lobby their cases through the Quad as they sit in key advisory committees that enable them to direct policy and set agendas (Rikowski,

2002b). In reference to Sklair, this suggests that TNCs' economic power is similarly matched by their political influence in the WTO.

4.2.3 GATS as Legal Instrument for Higher Education in a 'Borderless' World

As mentioned earlier, the inclusion of services under GATS in 1995 has widespread implications for the higher education sector in individual member states. However, as the previous section suggested, the effect of GATS is likely to be varied and conditional on the commitments and position of trade strength of each state. The GATS enables strong states to actively pursue the privatisation of their public services; it provides them the justification. Weaker states are often obliged to sell state assets and privatise the public sector to mesh with their stronger partners. To illustrate, in 2000 the whole service sector in the UK generated £67 billion in export earnings (Tibbett, 2001). In the US, the education sector alone generated a revenue of more than US\$ 14 billion in 2000 thereby, making it the fifth largest export service earner in the US (NCITE, as cited in Murdy & Iga, 2003). It is also the third largest export earner in Australia accounting for AU\$ 4.1 billion annually (Way, as cited in Ziguras & Reinke, 2003).¹²⁴ A close assessment of members' commitments to liberalisation of especially their higher education sector under GATS is likely to confirm Ha-Joon Chang's observation that 'developed' states strategically and flexibly manipulate open trade to their economies' advantage. But to understand members' commitments of trade liberalisation in the education sector, the working of GATS needs further clarification.

As Mundy and Iga (2003) explained, a nation's commitments to GATS fall under general and sector-specific obligations, Most Favoured Nation (MFN) treatment (Article II) plus transparency (Article III) and foreign market access (Article XVI) plus national treatment (Article XVII) respectively. The general obligations apply to all WTO members irrespective of their commitment profile, but members are allowed to take MFN exemption, and the US and the EU, as well as 14 other member states, have done so for their education sector. The sector-specific obligations only apply to those

¹²⁴ The growth in international students is mainly seen in the rich OECD countries, with Switzerland ranking first regarding international students enrolled in tertiary institutions (16%), Australia second (12%) and although the US has the largest group, in percentages it only ranks 12th with an international student population of 3.9% which is similar to New Zealand's 3.95% (Heyneman, 2003).

sectors a member makes commitments to, and these can be partial, imposing explicit limitations to Article XVI and XVII on foreign operations, or fully with no limitations attached. In addition, commitments can be made to the four modes of supply (Article I.2): cross border supply (Mode 1), consumption abroad (Mode 2), commercial presence (Mode 3), and presence of natural persons (Mode 4) and to the five levels or sub-sectors: primary, secondary, higher, adult and other (see Knight, 2002). Of the 44 members who have made commitments on trade in education services, most cover secondary, higher and adult education, even though concern has been expressed that the latter lacks clear classification. Also, a high degree of commitment has been given to Mode 2, which already represents the main activity of international trade in education (Mundy & Iga, *ibid*). On paper, all exemptions to commitments once made should not last longer than 10 years, should be under periodic review or renegotiated every five years ‘with a view to achieving a progressively higher level of liberalization’ (Article XIX) so to remove barriers to effective market access.

GATS seems straightforward; however, its rulings are in practice not so clear-cut. One controversial clause highlighted in the literature (Knight, 2002; Mundy & Iga, 2003; Kelsey, 2003) is Article I.3 that protects the supply of services given ‘in exercise of government authority’ (I.3b) from multilateral trade liberalisation. These services should be provided on a non-commercial basis and not be in competition with service suppliers (I.3c). But as Kelsey cautions, in today’s deregulated environment where neoliberal policies govern, not many ‘public services’ fulfil Article I.3 requirements. It follows that, as students in the higher education sector in many member countries pay partial fees or full fees in the case of international students and universities are increasingly urged to fund research in partnership with the private sector, higher education at least is in danger of failing to fulfil Article I.3. Furthermore, most states have private schools (profit and non-profit based on, for example, denomination) co-existing with the public sector, making it problematic to limit access to foreign providers as this would be in violation of I.3c. There is, however, nominal provision to protect government’s purchasing of services. For example, Article XIII safeguards government’s funding and support to domestic economies and institutions. Unfortunately, the terms of agreement are vague: services must be ‘purchased for governmental purposes’ and ‘not with a view to use in the supply of services for commercial sale’. As the user pays component in many countries’ education systems

could be considered commercial resale, Article XIII may not provide much protection (Kelsey, 2003) for governments wanting to improve state education.

Evidently, many areas under the WTO are ambiguous, even deliberately opaque, with GATS “an enormously uneven and under-defined agreement” (Mundy & Iga, 2003, p.286). On the one hand, the absence of clear definitions provides space for contestation. As Mundy and Iga (ibid) indicated, the flexibility in rulemaking results from political concessions made on the part of the US to the developing countries wanting a slower pace of trade liberalisation, and from tension between Japan and the EU preference for managed liberalism and the US duality in purpose: to protect domestic producers from competitive imports and expand their export markets¹²⁵. On the other hand, this flexibility gives powerful members the ability to negotiate agreements mainly to their advantage. For example, Mundy and Iga (ibid) reported that the US has progressively focused attention to Mode 1 as the provision of distance and e-learning have seen a steady growth, whereas the numbers of students studying in the US have declined in recent years, funding for foreign students have diminished and barriers to access are unlikely to be removed¹²⁶. In addition, to stretch the scope of US educational services beyond its borders, Mode 3 is increasingly promoted. Hence, US trade policies are primarily aimed at reducing barriers to open up foreign markets to US services rather than at liberalising domestic markets, clearly illustrating US duality in foreign policy and its strategic use of multilateral trade. Where there is flexibility, there is also the potential for strong partners to gain further advantage over weaker ones.

4.2.4 First and Last ‘Vocalist’ in the GATS’ Education for the Global Market Game

The above observations suggest that the rich, core countries are likely to benefit from GATS, particularly in the provision of educational services. In contrast, the poorer countries may lose the little they have. However, once GATS agreements have been made, they will have far reaching outcomes for all its members. Robertson and Dale

¹²⁵ As the WTO works on the premise one country, one vote political concessions as well as economic ‘threats’ or ‘promises’ are part of the political process to reaching a form of consensus. Yet despite this formal equality, Mike Moore (2000) admitted that some members are more equal than others when it comes to influence.

¹²⁶ This situation is likely to continue after 9/11, the attack on the Twin towers in New York, for fear of foreign students, especially those from Muslim regions, posing a threat to US national security.

(2003a) pointed out that the consequences of liberalising higher education under GATS are basically threefold. First, member states, the poorer ones in particular, cannot easily opt out on agreements. Even though GATS allows a nation to withdraw after three years, it can only do so if it pays organisations for their potential lost earnings on investments, something the developing countries are in no position to do¹²⁷. Second, it changes the mandate of education from a public service to a service tradable in a global economy, thereby strengthening the competitive advantage states like the US, Australia and the UK possess in providing particular educational activities at home for international students' consumption (Mode 2) as well as abroad (Mode 1, 3 and 4). Third, as education loses its social dimension and becomes codified and fragmented (Kelsey, 2003) into units of service that can be traded¹²⁸, the regulatory capacity of a state diminishes, making it possible to reshape some of these units as services supplied by the market rather than the public sector, thereby shifting capacity to large transnational organisations (ibid)¹²⁹.

In the latter case especially, the public provision of education is threatened. Detaching services from their social dimension can be seen, as Kelsey observed (2003), in the first two modes of supply referring to the service supplied and the last two to the supplier of services. In both cases it privileges the service provider, and together with the 'disembodied, neutral' terminology of GATS effectively hides the dominant role transnational corporations and agents play, and the benefits they derive from, the pursuit of multilateral trade liberalisation. In the end, the neoliberal rulemaking of the WTO will not only result in widening the gap between developed and developing member states but also between rich and poor within nations as the commodification of educational services and knowledge predominantly tends to serve the prosperous

¹²⁷ With the introduction of a Dispute Settlement Process under the WTO, conflicting issues are now settled between member states in secret, barring any outside appeals procedure. In a settlement, a losing party is given a set time to comply and must adapt their laws to conform to WTO decrees; if it rejects these rulings, it must pay compensation to the winning party; alternatively, the member state has to face non-negotiated trade sanctions (Rikowski, 2002b).

¹²⁸ Kelsey (2003) illustrates this fragmentation by listing the sub-sectors university activities fall under: 92310 post-secondary technical and vocational education services, 92390 other higher education services, 92400 adult education services, 9641 sporting services, 8510 research and experimental development services on natural sciences and engineering, 8520 on social sciences and humanities, and 8530 interdisciplinary research and experimental development services, libraries and archives.

¹²⁹ Robertson and Dale (2003b) suggested that the provision of educational services will not operate in a niche market rather be most profitable when driven by economies of scale. The extent of the enterprise also forecasts that such economies will push for greater standardisation and homogenisation in the education sector.

economies and rich households. As Robertson and Dale (2003a, p.18) stated in reference to Kachur's conclusion of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) on which the WTO is modelled: "constitutionalising neo-liberalism means making the rules to suit the most powerful, and if the most powerful don't like them (the US) they are also free to break them when it suits"¹³⁰.

Overall, rather than enforcing mandatory trade liberalisation, GATS institutionalises rules which influential states can apply to gain selective access for their economies to certain markets on the basis of non-discrimination (Mundy & Iga, 2003). Even so, because of its constitutional strength, the WTO has the potential of becoming the 'principal organiser' of future free trade policies in higher education across all members' borders.

4.3 The WB as Composer of Knowledge Production as Development

Like the WTO, the WB has promoted a neoliberal agenda through its development regime for the developing nations in particular. As Martin Wolf stated, whereas the WTO is "the only global institution that even the US and the EU are to obey" (as cited in Rikowski, 2002a, p.6), the WB is powerful solely through the structural adjustment programmes (SAPs)¹³¹ 'policed' by its twin partner, the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Nevertheless, the WB has also gained in authority among the richer states mainly from its having become an "intellectual source, its ideas, country studies and seminars [giving] it an expertise and reputation second to none" (Marcus, 2002, p. F119). This status can mostly be attributed to the Bank's publication of the World Developments Reports (WDRs) which, as Robert Wade (1996) observed, provide the 'conceptual framework' and compile the facts and figures that 'rationally' back up the Bank's neoliberal policies and actions, Yet, such data is often highly selective and in violation of objective scholarship, as the ensuing writing will explicate.

¹³⁰ This is in reference to Aileen Kwa-took, who reported that the process of GATS negotiation is controlled by the developed countries, with the developing and least-developed either excluded and "bullied" into signing agreements on the promise of 'aid' or threat of financial repercussions, or not having the finances to monitor negotiations on a permanent presence basis (Robertson & Dale, 2003b, p.26).

¹³¹ SAP policies by the WB and IMF have really 'sapped' the economic viability of many poor countries. Stromquist (2002) remarked that SAPs have been powerful instruments of power to expand neoliberal policies so as to perpetuate an order in which the rich North keeps its economic advantage. As neoliberal economics is a zero-sum tactic, for every winner there will be a loser, much of the South loses out.

The following sections discuss the development of the WB from development bank to WC and HCT promoter, cumulating in its strive in the post-WC era to be not only a financial bank for the poor but also a knowledge bank advancing social capital and knowledge as capital. The development of the WB as promoter shows its attempt to legitimise its imposition of structural adjustment programmes on the poor that in reality privilege the rich.

4.3.1 From Reconstruction Bank to Washington Consensus Concertmaster

The WB was originally created in 1944, together with the IMF, at the Bretton Woods conference¹³² as the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development for the economic rebuilding of Europe (WB, n.d.)¹³³. As Edward Marcus (2002) in his review on the history of the WB observed, the Bank was a late addition to proceedings that were opposed by Keynes but goaded by the US government.¹³⁴ However, the WB was not always a free market campaigner as its major concern in the 1960s and 70s was alleviating poverty. For example, under Robert McNamara, president of the WB from 1968 to 1981, the WB saw itself as a development agency (Rose, 2002). With poverty high on the agenda, McNamara emphasised population control¹³⁵, (which although understandable from a sustainability and Western point of view was not culturally unproblematic) output growth, equity, education and agriculture as cornerstones for development.

¹³² Bretton Woods initiated a liberal monetary system, where national exchange rates are fixed against the US dollar rather than the Gold Standard since the dollar was thought to provide greater predictability in foreign exchange dealings. In 1976, this fixed exchange was replaced with a flexible exchange rate system that allows financial markets to determine the rate according to the supply and demand of a nation's currency. This change has led to volatile and large fluctuations in the value of national currencies (Howlett & Ramesh, 1995).

¹³³ As the WB (n.d.) mentioned, the success of reconstruction and development, not only for Western Europe but also the US, was such that the EU now contributes nearly two-third of the total official development aid. In reviewing the history of US involvement in the WB, Catherine Gwin concluded that the country has benefited greatly from its financial contributions to WB undertakings as recipients use loans or aid on American goods and services (as cited in Marcus, 2002, p. F131).

¹³⁴ Joel Spring (1998, p.178) commented that the WB was to help developing nations so as to stop communist expansion, reduce political unrest and social conflict, and "create markets for US goods".

¹³⁵ Lower birth rate is related to the economic rationale that large families invest less in the education of their children; in this light, the poverty cycle some of these families find themselves in is unlikely to be broken, especially when education is not free, hence stagnating economic growth.

A specific focus in the drive to help the poor, in a period marked by an optimistic economy and HCT focussing on public investment, saw the WB cautiously explore its role in education. During the 1970s, at the start of a contracting economy, the WB increased its emphasis of education as development, and with this vision, expanded and diversified its education budget. For example, the total percentage of lending for education was 3% in the 1963-1969 period, rising to 5.1% in the 1970-1974 period (Rose, 2002). McNamara's views, however, were opposed by many WB top bureaucrats who believed in the 'trickle-down effect' of growth in GDP¹³⁶ via the free market. WB resistance to McNamara's policies signalled the growing influence of neoliberal ideology and a move away from education, specifically higher education, as a social value meriting public investment. Indeed, the 1980s¹³⁷ witnessed the end of Keynesian economics and the rise of 'supply-side' economics (Wade, 1996). The Bank had from the start been dependent on private finance, that is the New York financial market, so the change in economic theory meant that there was more pressure to push for trade liberalisation and market forces as means for stimulating monetary growth. Hence, the period from 1975 to 1989 was marked by a reduction in lending for educational purposes to an average of 4.5% of WB total spending (Rose, 2002).

In such a climate, the poor growth figures of many of the developing countries prompted the Bank to concentrate on economic management, with as a main task the monitoring of policies of borrowing countries. The WB increasingly focussed on two issues in the 1980s: introducing anti-poverty arrangements and privatising the public sector through policies of decentralisation that would encourage development from the bottom up, and absolve government from its function to redistribute income. In fact, indebted governments were obliged to reduce their spending, privatise industry and services, shift their domestic food production to export food production, decrease the cost of labour, open up markets to foreign companies, ease controls on financial flows, to weaken environmental and labour protection laws, and devalue their currencies. These obligations represent WB's policy instruments of SAPs that formed the basis,

¹³⁶ McNamara needed to reorganise WB administration to give his ideas some weight. If not by internal conflict, his policies were also plagued by external barriers such as developing countries' oligarchies or dictatorships, bureaucratic ineptitude and ethnic strife (many taking roots in underdevelopment during colonial policies, as previously indicated), leading to providing funds to assist borrower priorities and policies (Marcus, 2002).

¹³⁷ This was under Clausen (1981-1986), who downgraded the priority given to poverty, and during the shift in global politics to the right - Reaganism in the US and Thatcherism in the UK (Marcus, 2002).

together with the IMF's stabilisation programmes, of the emerging WC (Rose, 2002). The changing attitudes of the Bank resulted in its advocating a global economy "open to movements of good, services, and capital, *if not labour*"; the role of the state as "the provider [but not director] of a regulatory framework for private-sector exchanges" (Wade, 1996, p.5, italics added); and public expenditure geared towards health and primary education. In its neoliberal agenda, the WB contributed to the WC, promoting the idea of New Institutional Economics (NIE) that the state mirrors "inappropriate economic interests, such as rent-seeking, whereas the market is unaffected by such influences"¹³⁸ (Rose, 2002, p.4).

The WDRs of 1987 and 1989 are policy documents advancing the WC agenda. The first titled *Trade and Industrialization* prioritised free trade before industrialisation as the engine of economic growth, including the trade in knowledge. The second titled *Financial Systems and Development* focussed on developing countries needing to deregulate their financial markets. Nevertheless, increased criticism on the negative economic and social effects of SAPs and the positive active role of the state in the economic growth rate of East Asian Newly Industrialised Countries (NICs), as mentioned in Section 3.3.2, started to filter through. These developments contributed to what Stiglitz (1998) referred to as the post-Washington Consensus (post-WC), which envisaged instead of a direct shift from a state to a market approach, a complementary relationship between states and markets. But Rose (2002, p.9) noted, paraphrasing the authors Hildyard and Gore, that "the basic policy instruments continue to be based on neo-liberal principles of free trade and privatisation, with the only change being a reassessment of a role for the state to ensure that they can be implemented effectively and humanely". As Wade (1996) explained, WB policies were not 'laissez faire' but 'market friendly' in that they allowed governments to have an interventionist role where markets were likely to fail, mainly in infrastructure and education, but not to intervene in capital control and industry. Like the WTO, the WB principally contributed to the

¹³⁸ Rent seeking refers to individuals seeking to extract economic rents from others, institutions or society rather than putting efforts into creating new wealth. Hence it negatively affects economic growth rates. Policy regulation and employment in the public sector are considered to promote rent-seeking behaviour, as the incentive for profit-maximalisation through production generally does not exist; in contrast, trade liberalisation which encourages competition is thought to promote growth-enhancing behaviour (Pissarides, 2000).

neoliberal agenda of its leading members¹³⁹ by promoting an ‘enabling’ environment for growth in the private sector. The 1990s marked a period where the Bank began to reemphasise human capital (HC) as key to development; however, the early version of HCT needed retooling, which is highlighted next.

4.3.2 The WB, the Retuned HCT and the Marketisation of Higher Education

As mentioned, the WB’s basic rationale regarding the role of education in development is largely based on the HCT logic that investment in education “helps build up human capital, which is essential for higher incomes and sustained economic growth” (WB, 1995a, p.1). However, in the 1990s WB began to promote investment in HC in line with the WC objective of institutional strengthening; education “helps strengthen civil institutions and build national capacity and good governance-critical elements in the implementation of sound economic and social policies” (WB, *ibid*). As Michael Woolcock (n.d., p.3) of the WB Development Research Group observed, “policymakers, foreign investors, and aid agencies alike finally began to recognize that corruption, far from “greasing the wheels” in weak institutional environments, was in fact imposing serious and measurable net costs”. Hence, if corruption were to be curbed by building strong civil institutions, with education being key, the release from corruption would allow the market to operate. As indicated, WB’s total lending for education decreased to 4% in the 1980s but rose sharply to 8% in the 1990s (Rose, 2002) – 10% in 1996 (Bennell & Segerstorm, 1998), when the WB made education a top priority (Spring, 1998). Consistent with the WC, the WB focus was on pre-primary and primary education, which lending rose from 4% in the 1960s to almost 25% in the mid-1970s and 1980s, further rising to nearly 37% of the total education budget in the 1990s (Rose, 2002). Education was expected to contribute to human capital, and to strengthen economies by transforming corrupt individuals into tax paying citizens.

¹³⁹ Marcus (2002) stated that the richer countries have disproportionate voting rights. In particular the G-7, led by the US, has political influence over the WB and the IMF with the latter providing “political cover for their decisions” (p. F126). Interestingly, Japan, which used to be a receiver of WB loans in the 1960s, became the second largest contributor, but only 2% of WB staff is Japanese; the vast majority are American trained followed by British trained economists generally promoting Anglo-American neoliberalism. Predictably, as Marcus commented, WB research is critical of government-run ventures but in favour of market-led proposals.

The Bank's World Development Report (WDR) of 1995, titled *Priorities and Strategies for Education: A World Bank Review* (WB, 1995b), stressed the important function of basic education for producing economic growth, and based on its sole 'rates of return' rationale promoted a technocratic, neoliberal approach to education reforms in the developing countries. Its advice for change parallels the market-oriented reforms in curricula underway in the US, such as national academic standards, school choice and parental involvement. To reduce poverty, the report also argued that basic education needed to consist of language, science and mathematics as well as communication to form the base for further education, and include "*the development of attitudes necessary for the workplace*" (Spring, 1998, p. 181, italics in original)¹⁴⁰. The report similarly emphasised economically 'useful' education at secondary level: science and vocational education, whilst subjects such as history, literature and the arts in general received no mention. Moreover, WDR 1995 posited that a work-related curriculum would only be optimal if businesses were to take part in its governance, without which vocational education would have a limited impact on economic growth. It further advanced an NPM approach, focussing on outputs and government's role of "setting clear and high performance standards in core subjects" (WB, 1995b, p.182), which orientation reflects HC accounting, where educational quality is "measured by the degree of achievement of national academic standards" (WB, *ibid*).

The WB reform agenda for the self-financing of higher education, however, stood in sharp contrast to the WB's emphasis and growth in funding for elementary education. Unlike the earlier formulations of HCT, the WB started to view investment in higher education as having a lower social return (presumably also in building a civil society) than investment in basic education. Moreover, higher education, it argued, primarily served the social elites in the developing economies. Hence, the WB began to promote a higher education agenda oriented towards the market and premised on NIE, which Bill Graham (1998, p.2)¹⁴¹ summarised as follows:

Higher education, the World Bank argues, is a private – not a public – good whose problems are amenable to market solutions. That is, it is in limited

¹⁴⁰ This is a policy objective the WB borrowed from the OECD changes to measuring HCI (see Section 4.4).

¹⁴¹ Bill Graham, the president of the Canadian Association of University Teachers (CUAT), was an observer at the World Conference on Higher Education held at UNESCO headquarters in Paris October 5 to 9, 1998, where the WB promoted its HE agenda.

supply, not demanded by all, and is available for a price. Also, the consumers (business and industry) are “reasonably well informed” while the providers (administrators and faculty) are “often ill informed – conditions which are ideal for market forces to operate.” Financing the demand side means, in practice, (i) increasing tuition fees; (ii) charging full cost fees for room and board; (iii) means testing for all student loans; (iv) charging full market rates of interest on all loans; (v) improving collection of loans through private companies, and the introduction of a graduate tax; (vi) training faculty in entrepreneurship; (vii) selling research and courses; and (viii) increasing the number of private educational institutions with full cost tuition. The goal is to make higher education completely self-financing.

Clearly, this agenda mirrors PCT and NIE assumptions. In particular, it promotes a budget reform in higher education that is responsive to the needs of the global market¹⁴², advising governments to shift from ‘negotiated’ funding based on traditional factors such as enrolment and reputation to performance-based funding linked to results as measured by outcome indicators determined by consumers. As Graham (ibid) pointed out:

In this way institutional managers will be forced to make the difficult decisions they are now avoiding, i.e. to reallocate resources in response to client and customer needs. And institutions will be forced into differentiation, ending the “isomorphic repetition” of the traditional classical or research university.

Noticeably, the WB takes a neoliberal stance, perceiving public institutions as inefficient bureaucrats, reluctant or unable to change. To increase efficiency, their managers must “be forced to account for their market position, cash flow, product diversification, ... progress in creating corporate partnership... [and] do a better job of personnel management and control” (Graham, ibid). The WB agenda for higher education hence also reflects the policy of provider capture, suggests a flexible, contractual work force, and promotes a shift in control from academics and

¹⁴² The WDR report of 1999 illustrates this ‘need’: “[T]he type of tertiary education matters for economic growth. The proportion of students majoring in mathematics, science, and engineering ... has been positively associated with subsequent growth rates” (WB, 1999, p.43). It further highlights that *what* students are taught might be at least as important as the duration of their education.

departments to managers under the banner of NPM. As Graham stated, the WB is of the opinion that faculty has too much control over the curriculum that does not serve the needs of a global economy, and muscles its authority through collegial decision-making, unionism, academic freedom and tenure. In a nutshell faculty needs to be more ‘entrepreneurial’:

Radical change, or restructuring, of an institution of higher education means either fewer and/or different faculty, professional staff, and support workers. This means lay-offs, forced early retirements, or major retraining and reassignment, as in: the closure of inefficient or ineffective institutions; the merger of quality institutions that merely lack a critical mass of operations to make them cost-effective; and the radical alteration of the mission and production function of an institution – which means radically altering who the faculty are, how they behave, the way they are organized, and the way they work and are compensated. (Graham, *ibid*, p.3, quoting the World Bank’s status report).

The overall result of WB’s position is that in its funding policy for development it started to demand that countries owing reduce their funding of higher education, for both egalitarian and efficiency reasons. Yet, WB conveniently overlooked the paradox that user pays education excludes the less well to do and hence reproduce existing hierarchical structures, even widening the gap between rich and poor. Nevertheless, efficiency was the goal in a climate that considered inefficiency to be caused by free higher education to all who qualify for admission and have the freedom to choose from any course of study (Spring, 1998). Apart from making the higher education sector more businesslike, the ‘new’ HCT rationale was also for students to pay and make ‘wiser’ decisions in view of job opportunities available after graduation¹⁴³. Accordingly, institutions would adjust their curricula to the (market) choices students made, with private providers more swiftly responding to these altered preferences; and subjects such as philosophy, literature, history and other topics considered irrelevant to economic development would receive less funding. In addition, WB used the life long

¹⁴³ Spring (1998) explained that the WB deemed Egypt’s higher education system inefficient as economic investment was high but economic returns low due to graduate unemployment. Hence, the solution deemed necessary was to enforce or increase tuition fees so for students to make better educational choices for future employment, stimulate a private higher education sector and make public institutions more dependent on private funding. The result of course is that fewer students attend higher education programmes, solving the problem of graduate unemployment!

learning principle that “many of the functions of higher education should be carried out through part-time studies and continuing education” (Spring, *ibid*, p.184)¹⁴⁴.

4.3.3 The WB as Knowledge Bank: Human and Social Capital

In the late 1990s, the WB publications reflected a renewed interest in not only the institutional but also social dimensions of economic development (WB, 1997). In WB’s 1999 report *Knowledge for Development*, for example, the HCT notion that knowledge *is* capital is highlighted, but given a social twist; that is, knowledge is advancing “economic and social well-being” (WB, 1999, p. iii). It suggests that education as a form of social policy started to take root. This shift in development orientation is associated, however, with the WC emphasis on strong institutions and based on the notion of a civil society, as the previous section indicated. Accordingly, the discourse of social capital began to circulate, merging the development literature on institutional capacity, social networks, and community participation (Woolcock, n.d.).

The basic premise of social capital¹⁴⁵ is that one’s network of family, friends and associates is a form of capital that can be relied on in times of crisis, or simply enjoyed and/or influenced for material gain. As Woolcock (n.d., p.6) surmised: “the well-connected are more likely to be hired, housed, healthy, and happy. Specifically, they are more likely to be promoted faster, receive higher salaries, be favorably evaluated by peers, miss fewer days of work, live longer, and be more efficient in completing assigned tasks”. Since “the latest equipment and most innovative ideas in the hands or

¹⁴⁴ As Xavier Bonal (2002) concluded, the rates of return approach the WB adopted leading to prioritising basic education entails that the Bank advanced a neoliberal paradigm whilst *appearing* concerned with reducing poverty and creating educational opportunities. In addition, the WB justified user pay in post-basic education and allowed for private sector growth in the supply of education. The result was that for many countries the private costs in secondary and tertiary education rose and enrolments in these sectors fell, increasing educational inequalities.

¹⁴⁵ There are several definitions of social capital. For example, it entails the building of social networks founded on shared norms, values and trust. Putman (1993, 2000) conceptualises social capital as having three elements: bonding, bridging and linking. Bonding represents the relations within communities (strong ties), bridging refers to links across communities (weak ties), and linking reflects bridging across the different socio-economic strata of society, within and across social classes and groups. For Woolcock (n.d.), social capital refers to “the norms and networks that facilitate collective action” (p.10). As such it can be positive as well as negative, as the WB itself points out. Collective action against states, capitalist accumulation or TNCs, for example, could be seen as negative social capital. Hence, the implication of social capital is to produce networks that support a capitalist system and function as a buffer to its excesses. In essence, it implicitly advocates not only structural but also individual and social adjustment to mainstream objectives of economic and social development.

mind of the brightest, fittest person ... will amount to little unless that person also has access to others to inform, correct, improve, and disseminate his/her work” (ibid, p.7), it is evident to the WB that social capital complements human capital¹⁴⁶. Likewise, societies with a rich source of social networks and civic involvement will be better positioned to cope with poverty. For example, Woolcock (ibid, p.23), citing recent findings by Dani Rodrik and William Easterly, concluded:

[P]owerful econometric evidence in support of the idea that economic growth in general, and the ability to manage shocks in particular, is the twin product of coherent public institutions *and* societies able to generate what Easterly calls a “middle class consensus.” Countries with divided societies (along ethnic and economic lines) *and* weak, hostile or corrupt governments are especially prone to a growth collapse.¹⁴⁷ [*Italics in original*].

Hence, social capital involves a dual process, which can be assessed at the individual level according to behaviour (outcome) indicators, such as trust, reciprocity and social skills; and at the societal level according to macro institutional quality measures such as rule of law, contract enforceability, civil liberties and other measures of good governance, producing social trust (Woolcock, n.d.). Christian Bjørnskov (2004), for example, investigated the link between social trust and the growth of schooling between 1960 and 2000. He reported that the poor performance of countries such as Turkey, Venezuela and Costa Rica could be attributed to low trust levels, whilst the strong comparative improvements in schooling in Scandinavia, Canada and New Zealand corresponded with above-average levels of social trust. Interestingly, he found no association between social trust and post-secondary education. Research findings like these, thus tend to validate WB’s concern with basic education as development of not only human but also social capital, and simultaneously provide a rationale for reducing public funding in higher education.

¹⁴⁶ WB (n.d., p.1) sees social capital as the “glue” that holds institutions/society together (see also Putnam, 2000), and hence as a form of social cohesion, which “is critical for societies to prosper economically and for development to be sustainable”.

¹⁴⁷ This observation tends to support the previous point of networks needing to adjust to mainstream goals of wealth accumulation in order to produce positive social capital. Again strong, civic institutions are essential. As Woolcock reported, even if there are networks producing ethnic fragmentations, this is no hinder to economic development as long as it is coupled with strong institutions. According to the WB, this is key to explaining differences in economic performance in Russia and many nations in Africa, on the one hand, and the US and other OECD countries on the other.

Clearly, naming an entity capital, be it human or social, means that it is made subject to as well as product of accumulation. Like the focus on human capital, the incorporation of social capital in WB discourse narrows social relations to instruments of economic growth. Hence, the economic dimension takes first place, and the social second. Throughout the WDR 1999, this hierarchical positioning seems to be the framework for presenting and implicitly ranking priorities. In addition, this report signals WB's emphasis on knowledge as capital in economic growth cycles; the main tenet is that, "economies are built not merely through the accumulation of physical capital and human skill, but on the foundation of information, learning, and adaptation" (WB, 1999, p.iii). It follows that poor countries differ from rich countries not just because of less capital but also because of less knowledge, or a failure to build on the knowledge base that they have. Hong Kong, Korea, Taiwan and Singapore - the Asian Tigers - are used as examples to make the point that knowledge *is* development. These countries saw their living standards sharply improve whilst the former USSR made only little gain despite its highly educated population and better capital accumulation as a share of gross domestic product (GDP) from the 1960s up to the 1980s. Using growth accounting based on the Solow residual¹⁴⁸, the WDR 1999 concluded that the difference in economic growth may have been in the USSR placing strict restrictions on foreign investment, foreign partnership, and innovation, making it impossible for its work force to adapt and change as new information, product and management innovation became available across its borders. As a result, its economy started to decline. Also, after the collapse of communism the relatively weak, "mafia style government" that followed made matters worse, which was reason for the earlier WB 1997 report to reinstate the importance of state regulation (Santos, 2002), as – in the post-WC era – governments have a role, building the right conditions, strong institutions and human/social/knowledge capital, for the market to function.

¹⁴⁸ The Solow residual, as the WDR 1999 explains, is the growth not accounted for by tangible factors such as labour or capital. The growth is "attributed to *growth in their productivity*, that is, using other factors smarter, through knowledge" (WB, 1999, p.19). The residue is named after economist Robert Solow who made technological innovation crucial, based also on the assumption that the multiplier effect for each unit of investment would produce increases in employment. In effect, the residue supports HCT2 assumptions and the rhetoric of the knowledge economy. However, when the rate of economic growth is lower than increases in productivity, it signals that increasingly technological investment displaces labour, and hence there are limits to this theory, like it does not account for the disciplining aspects of education in an economy that 'deprofessionalises' a large number of the workforce through technological innovation such as nurses, teachers, engineers and doctors (unless they are in management functions incorporating NPM policies for maximum efficiency).

Nevertheless, the WDR 1999 continues to promote the benefits of an open economy; it does so without taking into account a historical analysis of different pathways of development, such as some of the poor countries having experienced resource and human capital misuse in the past (as well as present) under colonising conditions by Western powers, leading to artificial geographical boundaries that have made nation building a difficult project, and monocultural farming and industry that have placed these countries economically at risk from the beginning. It should be noted that the East Asian examples used in comparison to the less fortunate countries, for example those in Latin America and Africa, conveniently support WB's neoliberal point of view¹⁴⁹. All these, however, leave factors seemingly unrelated to production proliferation, such as historical networks, state-citizen relationships, guiding philosophy and degree of cultural homogeneity, untouched (although the insertion of social capital suggests some of these). World-system theory would indicate, for example, that Japan, Taiwan, Korea and Hong Kong already had many of the characteristics of modern systems of capitalism, such as administrative bureaucracies, a substantial educated class, large-scale infrastructures¹⁵⁰ and fundamental industrial know-how; hence, a system of production and wealth accumulation could be better facilitated than in regions mainly depending on agriculture founded on a vulnerable supply economy. Furthermore, many of the agricultural states predominantly served the consumer needs of colonial powers (e.g. their desire for tobacco, cotton, tea, coffee beans, and cacao at cheap prices), which under SAPs regimes they were still being obliged to produce for the benefit of the 'developed' countries.

¹⁴⁹ Noam Chomsky (1992) made the point that some comparisons serve propaganda rather than enlightenment. And propaganda means that data not supporting, in this case, free market ideology are ignored, such as state capital controls in these Young Tigers economies. Moreover, Wade and Veneroso (1999) reported that when the Asian economy experienced a crisis in 1997 critics, including the US Treasury, were quick to point out that it was not the free market but over-investment in certain industries, speculation in property, infrastructure and equities, and cronyism that burst these economies' bubble. To blame Asians for the Asian crisis was a deliberate strategy on part of US officials (Wade & Veneroso, *ibid*). In social-psychological terms, they show an ethnocentric bias in intergroup relations, making the ultimate attribution error, whereby negative outcomes/behaviours of the outgroup are attributed to dispositional factors. However, if this were to happen to the ingroup, then external factors are to blame. Interestingly, Fletcher and Ward (1988) found this bias to be more prevalent in Western than non-Western cultures. As research has also indicated gender differences in causal attributions with men showing more bias than women, it suggests that dominant position might be an intervening variable. The need for power maintenance seems to reduce the capacity to think logically as the history of hegemony and fascism obviously shows.

¹⁵⁰ For example, the WDR 1999 illustrates that Japan, Korea and Taiwan use a legal infrastructure from German origin, and Hong Kong from English origin. These systems were not set in place recently; they go back to networks of trade and colonisation more than a hundred years ago.

Because of these oversights, the WB's knowledge motif warrants a more detailed analysis and 'deconstruction'. In particular, despite being short of any direct legitimate force for the developed countries, WB's weight in support of the IMF and the WTO's push for 'constitutionalising' open markets; its influence on funding of projects at the local, national and regional scale (that forces the poorer countries to indeed change their laws); and its policies for higher education ought not to be discarded.

4.3.4 'Decomposition' of WB's Knowledge Tunes

In its WDR 1999 report, the WB advocates two types of knowledge for a nation's economic development: 'knowledge about technology' and 'knowledge about attributes'. The first refers to technical *know how*, and deficiency here leads to 'knowledge gaps'. The second refers to *know what*, for example, about quality of a product, productiveness of employees, and credible reputation of companies. Any deficiency in the knowledge of attributes creates 'information problems' (WB, 1999, p. 1). Accordingly, the poorer nations have less technical knowledge and mechanisms to safeguard and disseminate production standards, quality training, business transactions and transparency of accreditation than the highly developed nations¹⁵¹. Bridging this divide, the report basically reiterates WB's WDR 1995, in that "the value of an open trade regime and of universal basic education", and "scientific and technical training, local research and development, and the critical importance of institutions... facilitate the flow of information essential for effective markets" (WB, 1999, p.2). It simply states that if people are 'given' knowledge they have greater control over their destinies, and gives examples such as that knowledge about better nutrition leads to better health and public information about industrial pollution may produce "cleaner and more healthful environment" (WB, *ibid*).

The above accounts are non-critical, for they ignore that such knowledge and information may not suit the economies of the developed countries. Despite sharing information, if powerful producers want to impose their unhealthy habits on weaker countries, they will proceed to do so. For example, knowledge about GE seeds that are

¹⁵¹ WDR 1999 shows that developing countries like Nigeria, Sri Lanka, Peru, and the Philippines have law enforcement scores less than 4 out of a maximum of ten, whereas those constituting the 'Triad' nations have scores exceeding 9.

infertile does not mean that farmers of the 'Third World' can prevent their introduction, as multinational suppliers (based in these developed economies) will have a vested interest in making farmers dependent on their supply. The difficulty of banning and labelling GE products in many developed countries is already a case in point of economic might outweighing any health or biodiversity concerns. Furthermore, knowledge about pollution need not result in clean ups. The protest in Nigeria about Shell's adverse contribution to the environment may have led to a violent 'uprising' (quickly suppressed by the execution of prominent leaders) but did not lead to a ban on production or to strict environmental policies controlling transnational corporations operating in the poorer countries¹⁵². Hence, in WB talk, knowledge is not foremost to serve social agency or rights to values such as freedom of speech, decent education and conditions of employment and life; rather it is to increase the value of economic production.

The solutions WDR 1999 offers are further interesting in their simplicity, and their contradictions but also in their partly relevant observations to the present situation. With regard to knowledge gaps, the report urges developing countries not to reinvent the wheel, but acquire and adapt the knowledge already available in the developed world (as the USSR should have done), hence implying the universal (and superior) application of western science and technology. With communication costs tumbling, the transfer of knowledge should become cheaper. They ask why this transfer has not happened. They are not reporting that foreign aid to many of these countries has been reduced in the last thirty years and that many of WB's neoliberal policies have also hurt their economies. Instead, the answer lies, WDR 1999 concludes, in the ability of a country to attract trade and foreign investments (FDI) through good governance, with those less successful not being that 'inviting' because of, as the Washington Consensus would point out, insecure property rights, severe restrictions on foreign ownership of businesses, weak infrastructure, and unfavourable macro-economy, such as high inflation (WB, 1999, p.29).

¹⁵² See also Noam Chomsky (1992) in his explanation of US and UK 'diplomacy' in the Middle East in which oil is considered essential to the viability of western economies. It helps to understand why knowledge production should be steered in a way that capitalist economies can be sustained.

Although the WB supports trade liberalisation as a means for building knowledge capacity, the above reinforces a post-WC view; that is, the policies the WDR proposes involve the state. The role of the state is not obsolete in a global market economy rather, as previously indicated, ‘enabling’ to the globalisation of market forces. To minimise the gaps in knowledge and problems in information, states should therefore work on what Stephen Gill (2000) referred to as the three Cs: state *credibility*, *consistency* of policies, and investors’ *confidence*. The WB (1997, p.4-5) defines credibility as “reliability of the institutional framework” and “the predictability of its rules and policies and the consistency with which they are applied”. Within this framework, WB’s WDR 1999 (p.145) highlights that the following can be explored to acquire overseas knowledge and produce it locally:

- “Find new and better ways of producing goods and services through trade”.

Referring to the East Asian growth path, WDR 1999 reasons that this has been made possible by policies in support of trade liberalisation (such as government being a signatory to WTO agreements) and export promotion and diversification.

- “Work with foreign direct investors that are leaders in innovation”.

This also needs an open trade administration to attract investment and thus ‘efficient’ technology and management. The report illustrates that unlike East Asia, Sub-Saharan Africa has been less open with the result that the region has attracted only 1 percent of global FDI, hence establishing the causal link between open borders and FDI that this thesis challenges.

- “Get access to new proprietary technical knowledge through technology licensing”.

The advice is that governments should stimulate the import of technology knowledge by reducing any restrictions to licensing or terms of contracts. They can also create local information centres that will help national firms to obtain foreign know how and negotiate licensing.

- “Stimulate domestic innovation and get access to global knowledge”.

To do so, governments further need to establish laws and institutions to protect intellectual property rights as required by knowledge producers to secure a return on their investment.

- “Attract back home talented people who have studied or worked abroad”.

Because of few opportunities at home (and larger income overseas – WDR 1999 omits to mention), many of the best educated immigrate to countries with growth economies. The report advises that governments should create incentives, as done in Korea and Taiwan, to bring expertise back home. Especially, those that have the knowledge that matches advanced technologies with domestic capabilities should be given tax and trade incentives to return or set up trade and investment links.

- “Promote domestic R & D to make it more responsive to the market”.

Governments can encourage public research in universities directly and private research indirectly through incentives. To match public research with the requirements of the private sector, WDR 1999 advocates reforms that include “restructuring labs so they behave like corporations, capping the government contribution to their budgets to provide incentives for researchers to seek corporate sponsorship, improving the pay and recognition of researchers, and giving firms direct incentives to place research contracts with them” (WB, 1999, p.147).

WDR 1999 further stresses the importance of increasing “people’s capabilities to absorb knowledge” (p.147) and building “the capacity for people to communicate” (p.148). The following measures are hence advocated (p.147-149):

- “Decentralize to give power to those with the most information”.

The report argues that increased spending to reduce class size is not necessary as within current budgets quality and delivery of education can be improved through a “client-driven” approach that ensures teaching performance.

- “Focus public resources on those who need them most.”

WDR 1999 especially highlights the education of girls from poor families who have to care for younger siblings or need to work to supplement the family’s income. It hence recommends that governments provide higher subsidies in poorer areas, direct grants to needy students and student loans for higher education.

- “Support tertiary education, especially in engineering and the sciences”.

The report warns against the practice of many developing countries to provide higher education that trains students for scarce civil service positions. The development of technological know how is considered more important and gearing resources towards the education of engineers and scientists enables the integration of advanced technology.

- “Use new learning technologies to improve the quality of education and to broaden access”.

WDR 1999 promotes distance education and e-learning as it vastly expands access and reduces the costs of adult learning. In addition, the developing countries should use these new technologies not only to ‘upgrade’ their education systems but also to “improve policy formation and execution, and widen the range of new opportunities for businesses” (p.148).

- “Ensure competition, private provision, and regulation” as well as targeted subsidies.

To promote communication capability, privatisation of telecommunication is seen as the solution for reducing prices and thus improving access. However, to ensure gains, government is to prevent private monopolies substituting public ones by encouraging competition among international suppliers. For this to occur, it needs “strong regulatory authorities” (p.148), to monitor, for example, anticompetitive dealings and, if necessary, assist competing companies in reaching agreements.

The above recommendations for closing the knowledge gaps and solving the information problems arguably interpellate governments as subjects into the disciplining of neoliberalism (Gill, 2000). To obtain ‘best practice’ under this regime, governments need to implement structural reform on a national level along the lines of the WC, which includes such policies as “banking reform, corporate restructuring, tax reform and tax administration, establishment of effective legal systems, protection of property rights, and improved governance” (IMF, as cited in Gill, 2000, p.4). In addition, they need to engage in multilateral agreements like GATS and TRIPS to encourage FDI and knowledge transfer. The disciplining process also applies to addressing information problems so to encourage markets; governments can promote neoliberal mechanisms for quality assurance, ensure transparency of public organisations and strengthen accounting systems. In the case of education, this entails accreditation of educational institutions, mandatory for basic education (as in the WB agenda it receives most of the public funding) and voluntary for higher levels.

A critical reading of the WB report would arrive at the conclusion that poor states are in essence assigned internal blame for economic failures, including knowledge gaps and information problems, in the same vein as the ‘punishing’ state makes the poor

internally responsible for their plight. Conversely, developed states or those in the process of becoming developed, such as Korea and Singapore (see Spring, 1998), receive accolades for their successes. Many African and South-American countries are singled out as examples where poor and weak institutions are causes of the poor results of SAPs, suggesting it is not IMF and WB policies that force these countries to poorly perform, but their institutional weakness that have lead to economic stagnation and disaster.

What is missing here is an understanding of Elias's concept of interdependence: how the internal and external are interwoven; that is, the developed countries are as much to 'blame' for the underdevelopment of their poorer counterparts, as the latter should be given credit for the successes of the developed world. Where else to dump waste, obsolete or unwanted products, including educational commodities, than in the Third World/South? Cigarettes are a danger to the health of the well to do but not the poor whom some US documents refer to as the 'unimportant'¹⁵³. Moreover, 'responsibilisation' of the underprivileged is translated into surveillance at the lower level. For example, WDR 1999 advocates governments to create interest groups to aid in "multiple eyes" monitoring and enforcement. It presents the case of microfinancing where individual loans are linked to small groups of people acquainted with the borrower. They know if one individual fails to pay, others in the group will lose out on future loans. Although such policy insures the investor, a loan made to one individual who fails to maintain the debt means that a whole community is no longer eligible. Basically, these policies represent a pan-optican world, and show that WB discourse of neoliberalism taken in uncritically may allow practices harmful to the majority to continue. In the case of higher education, its further marketisation and instrumentalisation of the curricula are advanced.

Despite the above criticisms, this WB report also contains some statements that deserve recommendation. The objectives of giving the 'poor' voice through better education, involving them in the design and implementation that will be of benefit to their life, working through traditional channels of communication and supplying knowledge that they can use are commendable. However, the hidden agenda of capturing all citizens to

¹⁵³ See Noam Chomsky (1992) on American 'cigarette policy' for the Philippines.

a system of wealth accumulation with little respect for long term consequences is not. Even though the report highlights the importance of green policies, all good policies are discussed in the context of market development, and thus lack solid visions of the social. The composition of mainly Anglo-American trained (neoliberal) economists in the WB also points to cultural bias in formulating policy.

4.4 The OECD as Instrumentalist of Human Capital Theory

Knowledge, skills and competences constitute a vital asset in supporting economic growth and reducing social inequality in OECD countries. This asset, which is often referred to as human capital, has been identified as one key factor in combating high and persistent unemployment and the problems of low pay and poverty. As we move into “knowledge-based” economies the importance of human capital becomes even more significant than ever.¹⁵⁴

The above quote indicates that the OECD like the WB uses the HCT heuristic of education leading to economic growth, whose spill-over effects are expected to result in closing the gaps between the rich and poor, hence fulfilling the promise of a just and fair society. However, as the education sector is merely rendered the producer of knowledge and key to solving problems inherent in a capitalist world-system, education is equally made subservient to the economy.

The next sections discuss the OECD’s promotion of education consonant with economic rationales but increasingly inserted with discourses of the social; its shift from HCT1 to HCT for the ‘Knowledge Economy’, entailing the further commodification of education; its function as bench marker, designing HCT indicators; and its role as monitor of countries’ reform and performance in tertiary education. These activities can be seen as the OECD assigning itself the role of global knowledge agency to inform governments about gaps in information and knowledge (see Section 4.4.2). They are intended to help governments design and steer the education policies and reforms purportedly needed to establish/sustain growth in their economies, as the following exemplifies.

¹⁵⁴ Donald Johnston, Secretary-General of the OECD in foreword (OECD, 1998a, p.3).

4.4.1 OECD as Early Scriptwriter of Education as Human Capital

The OECD came into being in 1960 in Paris and developed from the Organisation for European Economic Co-ordination (OEEC) founded under the Marshall Plan (1947-1952) to reconstruct Europe after the Second World War¹⁵⁵. The OECD was established as a ‘think tank’ to advance sustainable economic growth and employment policies among its initial 20 members, consisting of the US, Canada, Turkey, and the non-communist countries of Europe, including the former dictator states: Greece, Spain and Portugal¹⁵⁶. In addition, the organisation’s objective was to contribute to the “expansion of world trade on a multilateral, non-discriminatory basis in accordance with international obligations” by promoting policies among member states that would maintain financial stability (CERI, 1998a, p.2). This is still its main objective. For example, in an overview of the OECD (see www.oecd.org), the organisation highlights that it is composed of a group of like-minded countries committed to the market economy as well as a pluralistic democracy to the stable running of a market economy. Hence, the OECD advocates trade liberalisation and market expansion as well as advances the notion of ‘civic’ society as represented by ‘good governance’, both intricately linked with the system of capitalism. In addition, the OECD focuses not only on providing information to member economies, which are largely run by democratic forms of government, but also on extending its expert analyses and amassed know-how to developing and emerging market economies (thus promoting market ideology and ‘democracy’ to a larger audience, enabling the expansion of world trade). As Skilbeck (2003, p.113) remarked, the OECD’s “overall purpose is to enhance and strengthen democracy, not just in member countries”.

Investment in education featured relatively early on the OECD agenda. Education was seen as integral to OECD aspirations of developing economic growth and living standards among its member states. These states further needed to know what curricula

¹⁵⁵ The Marshall Plan or European Recovery Plan was to build up Europe as a market for the US (much of the aid was spent on goods in the US) and to prevent the spreading of socialist or communist systems to western Europe (see <http://www.loc.gov/exhibits/marshall>).

¹⁵⁶ Japan joined in 1964, Finland in 1969, Australia in 1971, and New Zealand in 1973. Mexico, Korea and the former communist countries: the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland are the new ‘boys’ on the block, joining the OECD in the mid 1990s (OECD, 1998a). Thus at present there are 30 members.

should be taught for future employment considering the education sector was, and still is, largely state-funded. Hence, the first international conference on investment in education, which the OECD sponsored, took place in 1960. HCT formulations of Schultz and Becker received wide attention, although at that time some queried whether human skills and attributes could be seen as capital and if so how one was to measure it (Healy, 2001). In the 1961 OECD conference, the dependence of economic growth on education and scientific research was confirmed (Marginson, 1997b). However, the OECD also took the position that increased public investment in all forms of education, resulting in an undifferentiated expansion of the education sector, on the basis of equality of educational opportunity would result in both economic growth and balance out income structures. In the report that followed, *Economic Growth and Investment in Education* (1961), the OECD advocated market processes would generate a more equal distribution of income (cited in Rubenson, 2004). Hence, from the start the organisation favoured a market approach to economic growth and social issues. Yet, it also acknowledged the traditional role of education as building a nation's identity and developing moral character as foundation of social engagement. These twin goals can be said to form the organisation's 'principal organisers' informing OECD's policy rationales to this day.

As education became increasingly seen as the engine for growth, the Council of the OECD created the Centre for Educational Research and Innovation (CERI) in 1968, responsible for much of its publications on education. From the beginning, these reports have closely matched the HCT developments discussed in Section 3.3.3 and GATT/WTO and WB objectives. (This is not surprising because, as Marginson (1997b) pointed out, there was a close and continued link between the human capital economists and IGOs, in particular the OECD). The reports have also been influential in spreading

the neoliberal philosophy of the OECD¹⁵⁷: stimulate economic growth through cooperation and creation of free markets, so to advance economic integration and interdependence and promote political stability through building “greater opportunity for all people to realize their potential and aspirations” (OECD, 1997, p.12).

In the 1970s and 1980s, as the economic and political situation changed due to the worldwide downturn in the economy, the OECD faced two issues. The first was that education expanded, but did not produce economic growth; hence the simple causation of education leading to a nation’s wealth and income equality no longer held. Secondly, OECD membership grew, with diversity increasing between as well as within member states, so reaching consensus on policies and moral and social goals became more difficult. According to Fred Naylor (2004), this diversity of interests among OECD members mostly affected the education context, and is reflected in the 1975 OECD/CERI publication *Social Influences on Educational Attainment* by Torsten Husen, who voiced that the OECD had shifted its focus from ‘equality of opportunity’ to ‘equality of results’. Unlike OECD’s founding preference for market policies, Husen presented this as a shift from a more liberal to a more radical, somewhat Marxist framework. Naylor even asserted that the Marxist orientation remained the political bias of the OECD. Yet, it can be argued that the report was written in response to the oil crises of the 1970s and ensuing economic malaises that prompted the OECD to acknowledge that the idea of full employment was no longer tenable. The shift to an equality of result agenda can be seen as a temporarily move away from neoclassical HCT, as embodied by the screening hypothesis of HC. However, it can equally be argued that it sustained the OECD preference for market rather than Marxist policies, and was indicative of the shift in political consensus on government expenditure from a

¹⁵⁷ The former Deputy Director for Education in the OECD Directorate for Education, Employment, Labour and Social Affairs, Malcolm Skilbeck (2003) would point out that in viewing the OECD as advancing neoliberal policies, I misconceive OECD’s role and misunderstand its modes of operation. If OECD values are economic then, Skilbeck argues, they are ‘most inclusive’, for its policymaking involves an international community. A critical reading makes his words discomfiting as it ignores whose interests are really served. Democracy serving the interest of capital is unlikely to assist the majority of people. The tendency towards ‘social fascism’ at multiple levels (see Santos, n.d.) in the current Bush administration is a case in point. In addition, Skilbeck presents a neoliberal hyperglobalist TINA attitude when reasoning that if “the OECD has fallen victim to the excesses of globalisation and neo-liberalism ... it is so because these same tendencies prevail in the world of which it is an inextricable part”. It is a ‘joining the band wagon’ assertion clearly lacking the “reflexive, dispassionate, inquiring state of mind” (Skilbeck, *ibid*, p.115) he accuses those who assess the OECD as a neoliberal agency not to have. If Skilbeck proves dispassionate it is in his pragmatism, an understandable but perilous attitude to have as an academic ‘bureaucrat’.

welfare state agenda to a neoliberal agenda in the late 1970s (Richards, cited in Rubenson, 2004).

4.4.2 OECD's 'Retuning' of Human Capital Theory for the Knowledge Economy

In the 1980s, the OECD again focussed on education as the producer of economic growth (Rubenson, 2004). Its report, *Education in Modern Society* (1985, cited in Marginson, 1997b, pp.154-155), highlighted “the alarming scale of current unemployment”, and education was seen as a relief measure. Congruent with the retooling attempts, mentioned in Chapter 3 and the preceding writing on the WB, the report mirrors the second generation of HCT in educational policy whilst also prefiguring the importance of lifelong learning; it states: “a substantial program of preparation for work as part of a widely developed set of opportunities for continuing or recurrent education is essential”. As Marginson (ibid) cited, the report refers to adult and ‘second chance’ education and in particular to education being “directly relevant to work”. Yet it did not advocate labour power planning; rather it stressed, in line with the HCT2 notion that technological innovation needs effective information-processing individuals who can handle complexity and uncertainty (see Section 3.3.3), “the need for flexible, adaptable and self-managing workers”. At the same time the “hidden message” to its member states was to devolve responsibility for employment outcomes to the individual, relieving government from its task of creating (full) employment (ibid).

The OECD 1989 report, *Education and the Economy in a Changing Society* (cited in Marginson, 1997a), follows up on these trends. Like earlier versions of HCT, the report stated that differences in economic performance among nations were the result of differences in the degree of “educational effectiveness and a country’s learning capabilities” (Rubenson, ibid, p.136). Unlike the earlier versions, it postulated: “‘education’ is becoming less clearly distinct from that which is ‘the economy’” (OECD, 1989, p.19). That is, technological development increases the demand for more trained and qualified workers, whose accumulation of skills and knowledge, in turn, encourages technological transformations and brings about productivity gains. However, the OECD argued that this did not necessarily require the general expansion of public education

rather it needed educational reforms aimed at meeting the needs of the labour market. In this context, the OECD urged for the development of a close dialogue between schools, local businesses and employers¹⁵⁸. The OECD now explicitly widened the concept of education to entail not just schooling but also on-going or lifelong education as a means for retraining the unemployed and making workers meet the demands of a flexible workforce (OECD 1989, 1996a). As Marginson (1997b, p.155) observed, “This would require a major expansion of participation, the development of relations between industry and all forms of post-compulsory education and research, and changes to the governance, financing and delivery of education”.

The above shift further provided OECD members with the policy framework of transforming the welfare state into a ‘workfare’ state, where social assistance get tied in with the willingness/responsibility of taking on any job or training programme (Rubenson, 2004), as well as lifelong learning, once associated with transformative objectives of personal development, as a means for promoting employability. This change is most notable in the OECD educational ministers making lifelong learning for all a key educational goal and strategy in 1996 (OECD, 1996a), whilst also adopting the neoliberal goal of a borderless world, based on the notion that the spread of market economies is an answer to promoting global peace (Spring, 1998). Moreover, the OECD publications of the mid 1990s extended the HC discourse for technology to social capital and the knowledge-based economy. As Peters (2002) pointed out, the knowledge discourse is linked to the growing consensus in new growth theory that what drives economic growth are the developments in knowledge and technology with regards to how to transform inputs into outputs in the production process. Within growth theory, however, there are two theoretical positions: the exogenous, such as advanced by Solow, based on technology being available limitlessly across the globe; and the endogenous, as represented by Romer, stating that technology is not a pure public good as it can be partly ‘captured’ (Peters, *ibid*), and hence ideas lose their non-rivalrous nature, by means of the legal system and patents (as advanced by TRIPS). The latter theory underscores the knowledge-economy as a model for a high performing economy. As

¹⁵⁸ This should also be seen in the light of OECD’s economic advice in the 1980s, prioritising the economy over the social and advancing NIE assumptions: cooperation between the public and business sector; devolution of financing services from government to private individual; and transparency, flexibility and accountability in public programmes aimed at cost efficiency (OECD, 1987, cited in Marginson, 1997b, p.85).

technological change is advanced through the deliberate actions of economic agents motivated primarily by financial incentives, there are two implications for HC policy. These, as is also seen in the policies of the WB, are knowledge about technology and levels of information flow that are crucial for economic growth; and differences in their development account for discrepancies in growth patterns among countries (Peters, *ibid*).

Within this context, the OECD developed the notion of knowledge and information gaps. This is similar to WB's delineation of know how and know what respectively (see Section 4.3.4). Like the WB, the OECD also postulated that for developing countries in particular, gaps in both know how and know what hold back growth, whereas policies to enhance technology transfer (through trade liberalisation as the WB also proposed) accelerate it. In the OECD report *The Knowledge-based Economy* (1996b), predating the WB report *Knowledge for Development* by two years, the "information society" and "learning economy" feature prominently, with the first entailing the increasing codification of 'knowledge' and transmission of information via formal as well as informal communication networks like the internet, and the second requiring students/workers to become highly skilled and to continuously update or adapt their skills and knowledge to the requirements of the learning economy. The role of government accordingly is to increase its HC by improving the access to a wide range of skills. Also, as the economy becomes dependent on knowledge production, education as a knowledge intensive service sector, particularly the science system (the HEIs and research institutes), no longer is external to production but, as growth theory would predict, becomes an integral part of its expansion. The report further pointed out that knowledge about know what and know why, constituting factual and scientific knowledge, is 'codifiable' and measurable and hence most closely fits the criteria of being a commodity or economic resource. In contrast, knowledge about know how and know who (implying the importance of social networks) is tacit and so harder to codify and measure, yet as tacit knowledge is "needed to handle codified knowledge [it] is more important than ever in labour markets" (OECD, 1996b, p.13). Hence, the OECD increasingly focussed on establishing indicators that measure not only quantitative aspects of HC, such as length of education, but also HC's qualitative dimensions, as the following discussion shows.

4.4.3 OECD as Benchmark of Human Capital

Since 1992 the OECD has provided indicators on “the human and financial resources invested in education”, “the returns to educational investments”, and the educational performance and evolution of learning systems in OECD countries published in its annual report, *Education at a Glance* (OECD, 1998c, back cover). These indicators encourage the formation of international standards and benchmarks that can be used to measure a country’s HC against global standards. But as the above stated, the OECD has increasingly been incorporating social capital in its discourse as a response to the negative effects of a pure market model (as mirrored in the aforementioned WB discourse, see Section 4.3.3). Its 1998 CERI report *Human Capital Investment* (HCI) illustrates the dual economic and social role of HC in OECD discourse: education to prevent any backlash of a (global) market economy as well as sustain social cohesion to minimise conflict. As the report (OECD, 1998b, p.91) stated: “*There is growing recognition of the key role of human capital in economic growth and social cohesion*”, [italics in the original]. In particular, without HC the young people especially will become “*threats to the social fabric unless they are addressed effectively in good time*” [italics in original] (OECD Communique, as cited in OECD, 1998b, p.8). Hence, the report raised the issue of creating ‘genuine’ HCI indicators, as the current measures were inadequate for they mainly consist of the two indices of educational attainment: qualifications and years of schooling. These indicators do not provide information on “which knowledge and skills to promote, under which condition” (OECD, 1998b, p.10), do not take into account that knowledge can become outdated, and neglect the role of organisations in HCI.

Clearly, HCI needed to take account of lifelong learning, quality education relevant to future employment, and role of enterprises as learning organisations. The report thus stressed the importance of measuring adult skills directly, estimating the market value of HC and assessing “the stock of highly-skilled knowledge producers” (OECD, 1998b, p.29), such as investment in Research & Development (R&D), as other indices of HCI. In this context, the “direct measurement of [relevant skills], competence and aptitudes” is advocated (ibid, p.81) by, for example, examining the “contribution of various types of competence to productivity” (ibid, p.82). As such, the report mentions three

appropriate approaches in upcoming international surveys that would cover the relevant skills for employment area of HCI:

- Student achievement in particular areas of knowledge and competence at different stages of school education.
- Competence of school-age children that cross the boundaries defined by subject curricula.
- Adult skills and competences *relevant to everyday life and work*. (Ibid, p.83) [italics in original].

The first generates data in mathematics and science ability among 9, 13 and 15 year olds to judge school performance across countries concerning basic educational objectives. The second assesses cross-curricular skills such as “problem-solving, communication, teamwork, knowledge of democratic and economic systems, and self-esteem” (ibid, p.83), qualities deemed vital to HC and indicative of the values endorsed by the new capitalism: the need to be a self-confident and independent entrepreneur, yet social and collaborative on the job; and the willingness to continuously up-skill and develop a portfolio of competencies and achievements for an ever-changing marketplace. The third determines how these skills are applied in adult life to gauge their ‘depreciation’ costs and labour market benefits. It may also inform on lifelong learning requirements to renew HC. To fulfil these ambitions, the OECD Programmes for International Student Assessment (PISA) and International Adult Literacy Survey (IALS) constitute the initial steps for assessing the extent to which students close to finishing their compulsory education years have acquired the skills and knowledge deemed important for their full participation in the ‘knowledge-based economy’, and the degree adults have built up work relevant skills.

PISA surveys the knowledge, skills and learning approaches of 15 year olds, mostly within OECD countries. It measures not only literacy in reading, mathematics and science, focussing on know *what*, but also assesses students’ capacity “to use the knowledge and skills to meet real-life challenges” by asking them about “their attitudes and approaches to learning” (OECD, 2001, p.2) as a proxy of know *how* and success at school and later in life. Consonant with the shift of responsibility for work from state to the individual, this measure undoubtedly reflects the importance the OECD places on

the rational behaviour of individuals as a prerequisite for the full participation in life. As the report on the results from PISA 2000 states (ibid, p.3):

[Students] need to regulate the learning process, taking responsibility for reaching particular goals. In the context of school, such learning goals may be set by the teacher, but it is also important, especially beyond school, to be able to formulate one's own goals.

Hence the survey's designers assume that self-regulation of learning, goal-directedness and self-confidence relates to successful achievements¹⁵⁹. However, it also looks at a fourth factor: whether students learn better in cooperative or competitive situations. This is potentially an important measure, yet the report merely mentions that weaker readers despite being weaker in learner characteristics score higher on interest for cooperative learning. The finding in itself is of interest, pointing to the possibility that the individual-oriented approach of achievement that a competitive environment, such as advanced by neoliberal approaches, encourages may be of a disadvantage to students preferring to learn (and achieve) cooperatively, as is likely the case where the social/cultural home environment is more group oriented. This possibility is not explored; rather full attention is given to the fact that *appropriate* learning approaches of *autonomous* learners will be of importance throughout life. Hence, to make students independent, the advice is that teachers "need to help students develop greater confidence in themselves and sufficient motivation to invest in learning" (ibid, p.19). The PISA project raises perhaps more questions than it aims to address, but these deserve their own chapter, and hence is beyond the scope of this thesis. Basically, the survey design and underlying assumptions can be questioned, the findings allow for alternative interpretations as the above example shows, and hence interpretations for less market-guided approaches can be advanced.

The same observation can be made for the IALS project, initiated in the mid 1990s. It measures three domains of literacy: prose, document and quantitative, from which five levels of literacy can be deducted representing varying degrees of complexity with level 1 being the lowest. IALS findings of 1994–95 are stated in the HCI report (OECD, 1998b) and show inadequate literacy competence for 25% to 75% of the adult

¹⁵⁹ This supposition is also of relevance to the development of the Student Learning Centre and will be further discussed in Chapter 8.

population between the ages of 16 and 65 in 12 OECD countries¹⁶⁰, with the US, UK and New Zealand having half, Ireland more than half and Poland above three-quarters of their adults performing at levels 1 and 2. In contrast, Sweden had 75% of its population scoring level 3 or above, followed by the Netherlands on nearly 65%. However, when examining adult literacy according to 16-25 and 46-55 age groups, findings indicated a lower level of literacy for the older cohort (except the US), with differences between these groups more pronounced (15% and above) in Belgium, the Netherlands, Canada, Switzerland, Ireland and Poland. When these results were compared to educational achievement, however, it indicated a correlation but one that needed to be qualified: first, for a considerable proportion of the populations tested literacy performance did not correspond with level of education; second, for people with a similar attainment great variation in level of literacy was found across countries. For example, people with less than upper secondary in Sweden, Germany and the Netherlands scored relatively high, whereas those with tertiary education in Poland and Australia scored relatively low on the IALS. Also, 20% of graduates from the US and German-speaking Switzerland scored at levels 1 and 2. Moreover, upper-secondary graduates from Sweden scored better than those with tertiary qualifications below university level in all six English-speaking countries. The HCI report concluded: “in terms of creating literacy skills for life different education systems perform at very different levels” (OECD, 1998b, p.28).

Like PISA, IALS findings can be insightful as they may indicate that neoliberal policies do not affirm ‘effective’ education policy for post-compulsory education. For example, *Literacy in the information age* (OECD, 2000a) reports a higher participation rate in adult education in the Nordic countries (53%) compared to Anglo-Saxon countries (39%), including New Zealand. In support, the report noted a positive relationship between economic inequality and illiteracy that can be categorised according to three clusters: the socio-democratic (welfare) Nordic countries with low inequality and low illiteracy, the in-between socio-democratic and neoliberal continental European countries (Germany, the Netherlands and Belgium) with slightly higher inequality and corresponding illiteracy, and the ‘neoliberal’ (workfare) Anglo-Saxon countries with the

¹⁶⁰ These countries ranked from low to high literacy performance included Poland, Ireland, New Zealand, the UK, the US, Switzerland (German, then French), Australia, Canada, Germany, Belgium (Flanders), Netherlands and Sweden.

highest inequality and illiteracy of the developed OECD member countries (OECD, 2000) Hence, IALS results suggest that the welfare-oriented nations are more ‘successful’ in developing their ‘human capital’ than their ‘workfare’ oriented counterparts, and that their attempts to minimise inequalities in participation are more effective in raising the educational performance of *all* their citizens (Rubenson, 2004).

In the face of these findings, the OECD (2000) highlights that IALS marks only the beginning and reiterates that *personal* characteristics such as self-discipline, problem solving and other general aspects relevant to HC also need further research to give a more accurate profile of a nation’s HC. Lifelong learning is an important measure but irrespective of length the report highlights that for job-related training for the 24 to 64 age group this has been highest in the UK, New Zealand, the US, and Sweden (above 40% of the employed), whereas lowest in Poland, Belgium and Ireland (below 25%) for the 1994-95 period. Another ‘amendment’ is the number of knowledge producers through research and development (R & D), which, the report stated, is highest for Japan and the US, followed by Norway, Sweden, Australia and Finland (above 60 per 10000 people in the work force in 1997), pointing to the link of research-innovation-wealth creation. The OECD further stated that it intends to follow up IALS with an International Life Skills Survey to measure more accurately HC at “different points of the life-cycle” (OECD, 1998b, p.30). The intention to generate more data on factors implicating the learning-earning-growth connection, however, may effectively produce even more ‘fuzzy’ or contradictory results, although again this fuzziness simultaneously allows for alternative and critical readings of OECD publications to surface. All the same, the above activities of the OECD are in essence advancing global accounting systems and international benchmarking as a tool for managing education at the national as well as regional level. But as long as contradictory results are produced, a global policy template to fit all can in principle be avoided.

4.4.4 OECD and Redefining Higher Education for the Knowledge Economy

As lifelong learning features prominently in the above publications, one report relevant to the developments in the tertiary education sector has been the OECD’s *Redefining Tertiary Education* (OECD, 1998a). Compared to the WB, OECD’s activity as a ‘knowledge bank’ can be classified as being more ‘sophisticated’ with the proviso,

however, that its comparisons frequently cover just the rich core countries. To illustrate, in *Redefining Tertiary Education* four Anglo-phone, three Nordic, and two northern (continental) European countries are sampled, with Japan being the only Asian representative. Hence, it is obvious that these countries function as models of transformation. They also happen to overlap with the four trajectories of modern capitalism Boyer proposed (as cited in Santos, 2002), which are classified as follows: mercantile (The US, the UK, Australia and New Zealand), social democratic (Norway, Sweden, Denmark), state (Germany and Flemish Belgium, in part), and meso-corporative respectively (Japan)¹⁶¹. However, the ‘purer’ forms of state capitalist countries characteristics of the ‘Latin’ European nations are noticeably absent from the report, as are those of upcoming and developing economies.

Redefining Tertiary Education focuses on tertiary education¹⁶² being a key part of lifelong learning and underpinning the knowledge economy. It highlights that tertiary education is therefore no longer the pursuit of an elite group but represents a trend towards universal participation, as was the case with secondary education after the Second World War. As such, more diverse students in terms of background, age and career path enter the sector, which means that students cannot be plugged into courses. Rather that courses need to be adapted to their needs (Alan Wagner, 1998¹⁶³). This student-led agenda, however, does not necessarily uphold the rights of students as citizens. Instead it rather tends to underscore the neoliberal epitome of the consumer

¹⁶¹ The first stands for market as central institution, with labour and market regulated by private law, technological innovation prioritised, the labour market flexible, and great social inequalities tolerated. The second represents tripartite relations between state, employers and workers, characterised by wage negotiations balancing the interest of all parties involved as expressed by guarantees for competitive gains, innovation and productivity, on the one hand, and salary increases and improvements in living standards, on the other; high level of social protection, social justice, and education as response to growing competition and technological change; and minimisation of social inequalities. The third signifies the centrality of state intervention in regulation of the market and social life characterised by public education system for producing the public and private elites, and a high level of social protection. The last typifies the centrality of large corporations, with financial life mediated through banks, characterised by public regulation acting in close coordination with corporate society, careers advanced within the internal market of the large company, high levels of education and ‘stable’ inequalities accepted (Santos, 2002). Note that pure forms are unlikely to exist, but that the relative degree of adherence to certain trajectories aligns a country to one of the four categories.

¹⁶² The report’s use of tertiary indicates it discusses a wider education sector than higher education, as the latter only includes degree-granting institutions (see also Chapter 6).

¹⁶³ Alan Wagner is one of the main compilers of the report, with the other two being Malcolm Skilbeck and Eric Esnault. His comments in the OECD Observer (Wagner, 1998) better reflect the economic rationales of the knowledge-based economy. The report itself can be considered more all-inclusive as it discusses issues from several angles, providing a well thought out and ‘objective’ assessment of the issues confronting the tertiary sector and the solutions possible. However, when analysed more closely it parallels the various forms of ‘mercantile’ capitalism (neo-classicism, neo-liberalism and third way).

society, with knowledge becoming commodified and embedded in economic life as is illustrated by the following quote (OECD, 1998a, p.10):

[P]rovisions needs to be diverse and responsive if it is to be of value to a highly varied clientele of students and meet societal and economic requirements. Provision needs to become more attuned to changing occupational structures and employment realities, not by merely “fitting” students to the job market but through industry-education partnership in curriculum design and delivery, work experience for students and greater emphasis on competences and skills across the curriculum.

Although the compilers of the report state that they are foremost *client*-oriented, the report reflects a stakeholder agenda based on the needs of the economy, with societal concerns pertaining to educating students whose skill-base supports a high performing economy, that is the ‘knowledge’ economy. As expected, the report raises concern about students’ attitudes towards education, culture, work and their role in society, stating that commentators in Japan, the UK and the US “are deeply concerned about what they see as the decay of fundamental mores, traditional values and personal conduct” (OECD, 1998a, p.24). The solution tacitly proposed is that schools should prepare students better, giving better career guidance and training in study skills. The underlining, unstated philosophy is obviously the neoliberal view of the individual as a rational, maximising decision maker – a view education should advance. Hence, problems in attitudes can be solved by making students more rational, rather than making the economy/society more sustainable and equitable, although the latter is advanced by the report’s endorsement of mass participation in tertiary education.

The report accordingly draws attention to the challenges countries’ tertiary sectors face as a result of mass participation, particularly of mature and other ‘non-traditional’ students: pressure on resources, often owing to reduced public funding and observed in worsening staff-student ratios; and high student drop-out rates and underachievement. With regard to resources, it highlights space and equipment issues, as countries such as New Zealand, Australia and the UK that have seen previously well-resourced tutorial systems abandoned or diminished, and comments that “ideally, supply should not be rationed nor demand deflected where well-qualified applicants seek entry” (OECD, 1998a, p.27). Stating that heavy state subsidies evident in Europe are especially under

pressure, the report stresses that new sources of finance are needed. Most solutions for resource and ensuing capacity problems are discussed in the context of ‘innovation’, efficient and creative management, and wider stakeholder participation. Better application of modes of distance learning via the innovative use of technology is commented on several times. Issues of devolution and partnerships are positively assessed as effective answers to increased demand, with comments that on top of efficient management, leadership needs to be “insightful, knowledgeable and imaginative” (OECD, 1998a, p.83), and devolution placed within a policy framework that incorporates instruments “to promote informed decisions by the clients, providers and stakeholders ... to enhance the positive messages from the market, in relation to demand, benefits and costs ... and to intervene with both regulation and incentives to ensure that wider public interests are being served in relation to equity, coherence and efficiency” (ibid, pp. 97-98). Partnerships are seen as effective sources of private funding, but equally important for student “exposure to employment opportunities, and experience of the world of work” (ibid, p.51). The report noted, however, that partnerships in the human and social sciences are least developed and thus these disciplines need to learn from their more successful (professional) counterparts so to be more effective in meeting societal demands. In this context, wider stakeholder participation can be seen as “a community-wide approach towards resource provision” (ibid, p.103) underpinning growth in the sector, although government is still seen as remaining the largest provider of funds¹⁶⁴.

With respect to students drop out rate and underachievement, the report acknowledges the initiatives taken in the countries observed. Intermediate qualifications in long-cycle study programmes, such as bachelor’s degrees in countries that formerly only gave out degrees at the master level (which in Europe is known as the Anglo-Americanisation of the continental higher education system) or diploma courses as bridging options are applauded as flexible solutions for students to break and continue studies. Better counselling, establishments of learning centres or one-stop shops combining flexible student services and focusing on improving and making available resources for independent learning are also seen as valuable. However, they are mainly complements

¹⁶⁴ The report sees the first years of post-secondary education as a natural extension of former developments in mass participation in secondary education, and hence it should remain largely publicly funded, whereas thereafter more private funding should come from the individual (through being part-time employed) and the private sector (employer and private research funding).

to today's teaching and learning approaches, whereas more needs to be done. Teaching and learning can be improved by taking full advantage of the information and communication technology advanced. Rather than using technology mechanically, it should be used to "foster a more creative and critical approach to learning" (Wagner, *ibid*, p.4), although these learning qualities remain undefined. Teaching could also be improved by valuing it more highly, with not all staff needing to be engaged in research, hence suggesting a separation of the teaching-research connection for universities. In addition, the report (being client-oriented) emphasised that tertiary education should offer students a wider range of options, including diversity of learning structures, pathways and credit transfer, yet also encourage more initiative and entrepreneurial behaviour, and more zest concerning work and lifelong learning, objectives that undoubtedly mirrors the advice for falling attitudes and mores among students (and OECD's dual role of promoting economic growth and social cohesion).

Like PISA and IALS, *Redefining Tertiary Education* is conceptually a comprehensive report, allowing for different readings of the trends observed in the 'rich' OECD countries. The neoliberal assumptions tend to be more implicit than in the documents published by the WB as economic rationales are counterbalanced with social concerns, indicating that not only economists, like in the WB case, are involved in the analysis. However, they are there and in much need of deconstruction (see also Henry et al, 2001). To illustrate, Sangeeta Kamat (n.d., p.1) observed, with reference to the publications of the WB, that three pillars of an effective education system are presented as follows: access, quality and delivery. She remarked that to "the 'unschooled' eye, [these] principles ... all appear patently obvious and necessary to building an effective education system", yet a closer assessment informs that each relates more to "the development of mechanisms for the provision of education", thus favouring "form over content, or the 'how' over the 'what'. Applied to the OECD, access needs to be broad and flexible, quality translated into effective teaching methods, and delivery to efficient management. Kamat rightly pointed out that the 'what' is never articulated and the 'why' is taken as read, and in case any reference is made to content and reason, they are seen "through the prism of human capital theory", excluding alternative discourses of education and promoting a one-size-fits-all policy. Undoubtedly, the OECD's twin objective of creating policy for a borderless world and social cohesion to counteract its market excesses are pragmatic. Both sustain the world-system of capitalism, and thus

are aimed at adaptation rather than transformation. It follows that in essence the OECD, like the WB and WTO, remains an agent of the commodification of education for the expansion of the market.

4.5 The Neoliberal Symphonies of IGOs and the Globalisation K-wave

The visual image of a vast sea strikes me as apt. The big and inevitable storms through which a liner like the USS United States of America can safely sail will surely swamp even the sturdiest South Pacific canoe.¹⁶⁵

The orchestrated push of the above organisations of a neoliberal agenda suggests that Sklair (see Section 2.3.3) is not incorrect in arguing that there is a Transnational Capitalist Class, consisting of ‘globalising’ bureaucrats and politicians, who advocate a neoliberal discourse shaped by theories emitted from the Chicago School and buttressed by Transnational Corporations (TNCs), mainly Western based business and industries. Like many world-system theorists, Sklair singles out the United States as the current nation state that has the economic, political and cultural agents, institutions and classes that have been hegemonic from the twentieth century onwards in promoting capitalism as the global system, and the US dominant role in the instigation and policy directions of the above described IGOs subscribes to his observation. The push for a borderless world further gives credence to Beck’s notion that globalism today signifies the ideology of neoliberalism – an ‘ism’ that radiates from a predominantly Anglo-American centre (see Section 2.3.4). The above discussion shows that economic ‘rationales’ remain the principal concerns in matters of education and the IGOs’ weight/expertise calls for governments to adopt their stance.¹⁶⁶ As Boaventura de Sousa Santos (n.d.) argued, peripheral and semi-peripheral states are most subject to IGOs’ neoliberal impositions through, as the WB policies showed, measures such as SAPs. Yet core states are also subject to this regime 1) as international agencies monitor their financial situation, prompting them to cut social spending and adopt market mechanisms to reduce public debts; and 2) as GATS becomes the international regulator for global trade. In addition, the WC in its original as well as its post-WC form compels

¹⁶⁵ Former Federal Reserve Chairman Paul Volker, quoted in Wade and Veneroso (1999).

¹⁶⁶ Peters (2003a, p.7) refers to the impact of IGOs on governments by noting that the knowledge economy, as public policy objectives, can be first traced to a series of OECD and Worldbank reports published in the mid 1990s, before “taken up as policy templates by world governments in the late 1990s”.

states in accepting that its heuristic is the “only model compatible with the new global regime of accumulation”, thereby prompting structural adjustments on a global scale (Santos, *ibid*, p.9).

That at the transnational level a neoliberal HCT education agenda is sustained raises the question of why neoliberalism surfaced as leitmotif in the late 1970s and remained the dominant organising ‘principal’ of capitalist society, even if in the mid 1990s its hard edges were toned down. If innovation is the unpredictable factor that needs to be controlled or captured by the dominant economies so not to lose their competitive/comparative advantages, maybe Gee, Hull and Lankshear (1996) are right to single out industrialisation, specifically the change from Fordism to post-Fordism. This shift, first felt on a large scale by the US, can be seen as an important systemic factor in the new mission and vision of higher education as producers of value creation, with knowledge being a potentially infinite value adding and driving the growth in capital for both national and transnational economies. For while the “Old Capitalism” of earlier K-waves was based on mass production, hierarchical organisations serving the desire of the masses in the developed countries for ever more products like televisions and cars (see Table 3.1), the “New Capitalism” of the most recent K-wave is based on the design, production and marketing of high quality “goods and services for saturated markets” driven by increased global competition. This shift in production has led to a growing need for science and knowledge “to innovate, design, efficiently produce, market and transform products and services as symbols of identity and lifestyle in a high risk world” where there is a transfer from material production to services and info-processing activities¹⁶⁷ and where borders are eased (Gee et.al, 1996, pp.27-29). As the latter activities give rise to higher levels of information exchange, they “require more complex consensual domains, language skills and abilities to overcome breakdowns in relations” (Ernesto Tavoletti, 2003, p.12; see also Henry Giroux, 2003), as IGOs’ social capital discourse dictates.

¹⁶⁷ To illustrate, between 1949 and 1959, the GNP for the major industrial countries of Western Europe was derived from services ranged from a quarter to a third, whereas in the US it was the highest at around 40%. In 2002, service contribution to GNP more than doubled, and in some cases nearly tripled, to 70% for the industrialised European countries, and *almost* doubled for the US at 77% (The Economist, 2002, as cited by Tavoletti, 2003, p.11). It further indicates that ‘Europe’ was catching up (see Arrighi, 1994).

In the workplace, a larger diffusion in knowledge is deemed needed to provide flexible tailor-made products and services, leading to vertical organisational structures becoming flattened with middle management made redundant, and 'motivated' workers no longer directly controlled and ordered as they have become 'partners' in the enterprise of JIT and TQM (standing for innovation and efficiency), and as partners need to be "developed, coached, and supported" (Gee et al., 1996, p.30). However, in reality these 'partners' become more and more responsible for their careers since the new institutional measures under neoliberalism, such as PAT and TCT as well as structural changes in trade legislation under WTO and nations' employment acts, enable private companies and public organisations that once provided their employees lifetime employment the options of contract maximalisation for optimal efficiency and accountability. As James Medoff cleverly observed, organisations now say: "[w]e want you to be eager to stay, but ready to leave" (as cited in Gee et al., 1996, p.35), which leads to recruiting split personalities or "an asocial independent entrepreneur contracting out her or his work who must, ironically, be strongly collaborative when on the job" (ibid, p.35). Clearly, the values endorsed in this 'new' capitalism is that today's workers must continuously up-skill themselves, largely at their own expense, and develop a portfolio of skills and achievements for an ever-changing marketplace. But who benefits?

4.6 Neoliberalism at the Transnational Stage: Zero-sum Orchestration?

If the IGOs are to be believed, market liberalisation and constant knowledge-building as competitive advantage in a global market is to benefit all. In reality only certain countries, certain individuals and certain higher education sectors will profit. Philip Brown (1999) made a valid comment when he stated that knowledge and skill as human capital is presented as a positive-sum game: in the improvement of performance or fulfilment gained everyone is a winner, or at least winners gain more than losers lose. What is overlooked, and what Livingstone also argued, is that many jobs do not require high skills. As Stephen Ball (1998, p.120) noted, knowledge-based systems of flexible production are not inclusive; "low-skill, insecure jobs, particularly in the service sector, are the main areas of expansion of work in all... economies". Yet the rhetoric of knowledge as capital has the motivation power to impel people to update constantly their skills and training, even for less challenging jobs that increasingly require higher

qualifications. However, not all people will be able to reap the rewards of ‘investing’ in their human capital. Most likely, education systems as sites of reproducing social capital will remain “screening device[s] to decide who are the winners and losers in the competition for the credentials required to enter the best jobs” (Brown, 1999, p.244).

In a zero-sum game, undoubtedly there are winners. Apart from employers getting more ‘human value’ for their money¹⁶⁸, in a global free market entrepreneurial learning institutions and those having a competitive advantage are likely to profit from ‘consumers’ keen to update their credentials. Already, in the time span of a few decades the provision of higher education has become a billion dollar industry with global public expenditure in education exceeding a trillion dollars in 2000 (Education International, n.d.). It is not surprising that the education sector is seen as a “dream market for future investments” and that public education is under attack (Knight, 2002, p.2). Knight commented that “Public education is increasingly being targeted by predatory and powerful entrepreneurial interest” (ibid, p.3), reinforced by a neoliberal climate of borderless markets and HCT promoting higher education largely as a private investment. Hence IGOs’ templates for public policy, including higher education, are likely to provide the justification for reducing the state funding of public services, in particular for the tertiary education sector. The latter has seen growing interest from TNCs such as MicroSoft, with the probability of the most lucrative of education markets becoming deregulated and privatised.

In support of these trends, WTO as constitutional force combined with the developments in Information Technology (IT) are means to create opportunities across borders promising high returns on investment for some Higher Education Institutions (HEIs), in some countries, as more students can be served and reached whilst staff/student ratios can be substantially reduced, resulting in huge economies of scale and the potential for generating large profits. Already, the 1990s has seen the growth of distance education being provided by so-called open-universities ‘e-mailing’ courses to more than 3 million students, predominately living in the developing regions (Altbach,

¹⁶⁸ The flexible economy with little loyalty to employer or employee sets up conditions where employers are likely to invest less in the education of their workforce, leading to larger private HC investments being made by the state and the individual ‘lifelong’ learner so to become more valuable workers, increasing productivity with little added value to their own circumstances apart from the ‘privilege’ to be employed.

2001), whose national institutions have suffered from SAPs. The open-universities, however, are foremost based in the developed world, resulting in the educational agenda being greatly controlled by the rich, developed nations. Inequalities are thus likely to be strengthened rather than lessened. As Marginson (2001, p.6) observed, “the commercial education of students from the developing countries by ‘first world’ universities – aided by new communications technologies permeated by Americanisms – speeds the global colonisation of local cultural spaces”. Philip Altbach (2001) similarly cautioned that the present push for a global free market may lead to a Neocolonialism¹⁶⁹ that transgresses national boundaries not necessarily for political ends (like during the Cold War) but for commercial gains.¹⁷⁰ In such a world, the Internet becomes a marketing tool for promoting and delivering knowledge ‘goods’, strengthening the position of a global elite and advancing English as the language of science and business communication. The latter gives universities of the English speaking world a competitive advantage, with the University of Chicago, for example, having a business school in Spain, the University of Melbourne satellite campuses in London (the heart of the ‘Empire’) and Florence, the University of New South Wales Master in Commerce courses in China, and many more arrangements where predominantly English speaking providers move into Asian, Latin-American and East European markets not for development but profit.

4.7 Closing Note

In short, the above-discussed IGOs’ promotion of neoliberalisation advances a system of modernisation based on the privatisation and marketisation of the public sphere. The IGOs clearly support the hyperglobalist position that globalisation is inevitable and desirable, with the WTO as the legal arm that makes globalisation as the expansion of

¹⁶⁹ As Noam Chomsky (1992) implied, the Elite of the developing countries being educated in western institutions could result in capturing these countries to the Western project of global capitalism as, in the case of the Middle East, “princes and business school graduates” become “Western businessmen who happen to pray to Allah, while worshipping Mammon” (p.202).

¹⁷⁰ However, as recent events such as the Second Gulf War have shown the political sustains the economical by military means, and vice versa. Interestingly, Chomsky (1992) observed in analysing the First Gulf War that the US having gained in military supremacy but lost in economic hegemony, cannot fund a war on its own without a comparable economic base. It needs the Triad to help out. This could result in the paradoxical situation where war as a political means of safeguarding economic interests becomes a global public good whilst many services that were traditionally in the realm of a nation’s public spending, such as health and education, become a private good to be traded in a global market. Alternatively, US corporate money takes flight in offshore markets, as it did during the Vietnam War, not tied to any nation state (see Giovanni Arrighi, 1996). In both cases, the expansion of free (financial) markets is advocated.

markets across borders possible, and the WB and OECD as diffusers of this global agenda. In advancing the neoliberal account of globalisation, their reports and assessments of societal needs have largely been one-dimensional, one-directional, uncritical and unreflective on purpose. As their proposed mode of change is based on adaptation to the global market economy, the gaps in their reports signify the “layer of silence about the ‘darker side’ of globalisation ... [For] policy documents of this kind ... cannot speak ... about the material and ideological conditions governing their own production” (Roberts, 2000, p.442). Also, their appropriation of the ‘social’ signifies that the social aspects of life are increasingly captured by the market under discourses of human, social and knowledge capital. Peter Roberts (ibid) succinctly surmised that the discourse of social capital is “an additional element in the performativity equation.” In other words, the appeal to social cohesion is not made to “recover a sense of community” but, as this chapter likewise indicated, to prevent social disharmony that can lead to social and industrial disruptions. That is, social disharmony produces inefficient economic outcomes as “they require resources for their resolution and they waste (profit-making) time” (Roberts, ibid). In support of economic rationales, IGO’s HCI rhetoric proposes that citizens as consumers have the task of becoming knowledge and skill resources continuously updating/upgrading their ‘human capital’ to fuel a global market economy. This rhetoric also advances certain curricula that have the potential of homogenising and standardising local practice to global market objectives. Arguably, the pairing of these objectives to the provision of higher education has an impact on state policy for higher education, which in turn transforms the landscape of many institutions with regard to their objectives and relationship to state, institution, staff, students and all who have a stake in higher education.

The extent to which the neoliberal ‘leitmotifs’ of the above-discussed IGOs have been incorporated in education objectives and policies at the national and institutional level as represented by New Zealand governments, the University of Auckland and its Student Learning Centre during the 1984-2000 period will be a central feature of discussion in Chapters 6, 7 and 8.

Chapter 5

The National Stage: From Pioneering Capitalism to Neoliberal Experimentation

5.1 Prelude

As the previous chapters suggested the capitalist mode of expansion has experienced waves characterised by innovations, each wave generally accompanied by different ideologies, but all had the idea of progress, rationality, and individuality as central tenets. The waves of discoveries, wars and market liberalisation have further resulted in an increase in actual and perceived globality between nations to the point that individual countries experience similar phases of transformation in socio-political and economic organisation. For the last two hundred years, a world polity based on modernist European values has intensified with the founding of international organisations establishing rules that have interpellated many individual states or communities into their supranational structures. Since 1945, processes of decolonisation have further resulted in more nations becoming members of global networks that, as Chapter 4 illustrated, to variable degrees impose their policies on domestic affairs. Since the late 1970s, the common ideology espoused by IGOs and powerful states has been neoliberalism as framework or “ideological filters” (Dale, 1999a, p.4) of state policies. Yet, the impact is assumed not to be the same everywhere. Individual states are differently affected and “existing national [or sectoral] peculiarities” are not necessarily supplanted and discarded (ibid, p.5). Thus, total convergence to world polity is questionable as nationally evolved structures and “cultural effects” lead to differences in interpretation and implementation of externally imposed policies (ibid), in particular as these highly idealised models also prove to be internally inconsistent.

Nevertheless, as the preceding chapter showed, world polity or globalism as presented by neoliberalism (see Beck, Section 2.3.3) influences the economical aspects of life as well as the political by advocating “governance without government” and the cultural by advancing “commodification and consumerism” (Dale, 2000, p.16). Moreover, today’s IGOs may substantiate John Meyer and colleagues’ (1987) proposition that the world polity advanced has no single actor; rather it “allocates responsible and

authoritative actorhood to nation-states” (p.169), as seen in the edicts of the (post-) Washington Consensus and IGOs. Nations can justify their authority, and avoid being classified ‘rogue states’, from this world polity that sets up universal models, which legitimate states as actors of policy and define the goals and manner by which they can be pursued. In today’s context of globalisation, neoliberalism represents such a universalising ideology advocating market forces, minimal government involvement in economic and social life prompting radical state reforms. These reforms are based on NIE/NPM mechanisms that enable states to reduce public funding for social services and programmes (see Section 3.3.1). The neoliberal ideology has therefore the potential force to “shape nation-state identities, structures, and behavior via worldwide cultural and associational processes” (ibid, p.173), as demonstrated by the IGOs discussed in Chapter 4.

This chapter sets the national stage from which to examine state policies and reforms in education. It discusses New Zealand’s formation as a manifestation of Western expansion during an era of modern globalisation (see Hopkins, 2002), and sketches the country’s economic and socio precursors, that have prompted the fourth Labour Government’s decision to ‘experiment’ with the neoliberal instruments discussed in the previous chapter. Lastly, the state as agent or respondent of world polity is reviewed and the New Zealand experiment briefly outlined.

5.2 ‘Organising Principals’ of the National Stage

[T]he abstract, sovereign form of the modern state which constitutes its citizens as legal and political equals, is the political embodiment and sanction of the new type of social connectedness characterising capitalism as an historical kind of society: personal independence based on dependence mediated by things.¹⁷¹

Justin Rosenberg cites in a nutshell the process whereby production, based on capital accumulation can be sustained and cross physical or geographical barriers. Personal independence based on private ownership has been instrumental in New Zealand’s

¹⁷¹ Justin Rosenberg, 2000, p.22.

formation as a colony and nation state as well as its configuration of social, political and economic relations. The following subsections illustrate the ‘organising principals’ that interpellate New Zealand in the world system of western capitalism, and help contextualise the changes in New Zealand government policies for the tertiary education sector in the 1984-2000 period.

5.2.1 *British Accords, Māori Discords in Aotearoa*

New Zealand was settled in an *orderly* fashion. There was no Oklahoma land rush. The pioneers did not come to New Zealand to create a new world. They wanted to replicate the best of the rural *old* world.¹⁷²

We have generations of Māori alienated... We have been privatised. We have been put into private homes, in our own private lives, with no accountabilities with limited support. With our private mortgage and private bank accounts and our private individual way of life. We are in our being and thinking privatised.¹⁷³

The above quotes delineate the different perceptions of Western expansion, engulfing Aotearoa. In a historical context, the first is quite naïve but real to a dominant majority whereas the second is the lived experience of many Māori, the indigenous people to this land. Transporting the ‘old’ into the ‘new’, presupposes that there was nothing worthwhile for the early white settlers to learn from Māori. As in other settler colonies, New Zealand was a ‘maiden’ country, empty of culture, a tabula rasa, waiting to be developed. European culture, the signifier for progress, would be her saviour. This saviour was to be a society built around capitalist production.

As a British settlers’ country, New Zealand’s development as a nation state was situated in 19th century economic globalisation characterised by discourses of civilisation in support of economic expansion. New Zealand’s first settlers came in the wake of the Industrial Revolution in Britain in the 19th century. As Evan Te Ahu Poata-Smith (1997)

¹⁷² Mike Moore (1998, p.107), emphasis added.

¹⁷³ Dr Leonie Pihama, source unknown.

and Brian Roper (1997) stated, the early 1800s was marked by social, economic and political unrest. Consistent with economic wave and world-system theory, Europe experienced a cyclic crisis in its capitalist mode of production in the 1830s, leading to deep-rooted inequalities and subsequent discontent among workers. The British ruling class were similarly faced with a working class revolt it was unlikely to restrain, for no immediate hope of an economic recovery was in sight. As Chapter 2 (see Section 2.2.2) also indicated, colonisation in the late 1700s was based on supplying Britain, and other European colonial powers, cheap raw materials and export markets. However, administrating them proved increasingly costly to the state, which might explain Britain's initial preference for non-state agents like explorers, missionaries and traders to advance British interest in New Zealand (Te Ahu Poata-Smith, 1997) – a colonisation that started relatively late.

Emigration of the 'surplus' workforce in Britain to Aotearoa presented itself as a solution, but in an economic recession subsidised emigration was not a realistic option. The annexation of Māori land to the British Crown, however, would enable a return on subsidies by selling the land to new settlers. This prompted policies by an initially reluctant Britain to seek sovereignty over Aotearoa in order to make colonial administration self supporting and even profitable, hence securing the continued funding of British emigration (Te Ahu Poata-Smith, 1997) "at little cost to the British taxpayer" (Maitra, 1997, p.24)¹⁷⁴. The Treaty of Waitangi¹⁷⁵ provided an inexpensive solution to deal with Māori resistance, and signalled the systematic requisition of Māori

¹⁷⁴ This account omits the role of the New Zealand Company founded by Wakefield. He proposed the Systematic Colonisation Theory based on the premise that land should be sold at a 'reasonable' price, so that it would take time before colonial labourers truly owned their land (and "become independent producers"), and funds could accrue to enable prospective settlers free passage to New Zealand (Roper, 1997, p92). He also advocated selective migration to preserve the structure of English society, but the colony itself should be self-governing. However, the Colonial Office, the British Crown representative, did not support Wakefield's plan. Nevertheless, Wakefield's company sent large numbers of British migrants to New Zealand in 1839 upon hearing Britain would take control of Aotearoa. Through the Company's agents, numerous suspect land deals with Māori ensued largely made possible because of different interpretations of the concept of land sales. This difference would re-emerge in the reading of the Treaty of Waitangi, as for Māori there was a clear distinction between the notion of 'hoko whenua' (land sale) and 'tuku whenua' (release of land for a specific purpose) (Mutu, 1992). Only with the large influx of European settlers did Māori realise the private ownership concept attached to land sales, but by then the Treaty believed to protect Māori rights had already been signed. (Also see <http://history-nz.org/colonisation1.html>, retrieved 27 November 2003.)

¹⁷⁵ The Treaty of Waitangi is New Zealand's founding document signed in 1840 between the British Crown and some of the Māori chiefs. This document gave the Crown sovereignty, not ownership, over New Zealand, and guaranteed Māori the right to land, forest and fisheries. Rights that only in the last few decades have been acknowledged through the establishment of the Māori Tribunal Court, putting in place a legal process of weight to settle the many claims of Māori ignored by the State in the past.

land to “offer the material conditions necessary for the rapid accumulation of capital” attractive to settlers (Te Ahu Poata-Smith, 1997, p.171). It also brought Aotearoa into the realm of a capitalist world system, commodifying land into individual property¹⁷⁶. As Te Ahu Poata-Smith (ibid) mentioned, the aggressive drive for greater profits took place between 1840s and 1870s, the period covering the New Zealand Wars- also known as Māori Wars by Pākehā and ‘te riri Pākehā ’ (white man’s anger) by Māori. Although Pākehā did not acquire land by military force, appropriation of Māori land was made possible by state legislation, with the British Empire as constitutional forum, in support of the transfer of Māori land to colonist landowners.¹⁷⁷ Such legislation involved the Suppression of Rebellion Act 1863, the New Zealand Settlements Act 1863, and the Native Reserves Act 1864. Māori ‘rebellion’ during that time gave the colonial state further justification to appropriate Māori land, and under the Native Land Act 1865 individual ownership titles of communal Māori land became a prospect.¹⁷⁸ This process confirmed the commodification of labour in New Zealand, supporting capitalist production based on surplus value derived from an increasing ‘propertyless class of Māori wage labourers’ and a pool of immigrants without means. In doing so, the roots of conflicting and unequal relations between owners of land, finance and production and holders of labour power were established to influence future race and class relations in New Zealand, with education both constitutive of, and constituted by, the process of appropriation.

5.2.2 Patterns of Economic Waves since the Orchestration of the Treaty

¹⁷⁶ British interests in New Zealand coincide with Hopkins’ period of ‘modern globalisation’ (see Chapter 2), characterised by the rise of the nation state and industrial capitalism. Through the nation state, domestic interests could be secured by internal cohesion and sovereignty of own and overseas territories by means of land conversions.

¹⁷⁷ The situation before the 1840s typifies only a few arrivals from Britain and Australia; from the 1790s onwards, these settlers had come predominantly for exploiting the New Zealand coastline for whales and seals. By 1840, there were 2000 European settlers and an estimated 90 000 to 110 000 Māori. This ratio changed dramatically with increasing numbers of white settlement after the signing of the Treaty. Subsidised British emigration, promise of land for British soldiers who fought the New Zealand Wars, hope for a better future than industrialised Britain could offer and the Gold rush in the 1860s saw the non-Māori population escalating from 60 000 to 470 000 between 1860 and 1881. In contrast, Māori numbers dwindled because of European introduced disease and the wars with the result Māori became quickly outnumbered by the newcomers (see <http://www.newzealandwars.co.nz/causes.html>; <http://history-nz.org/wars.html>. All websites retrieved 27 November 2003).

¹⁷⁸ Like previous observations, the history of colonisation in New Zealand suggests that capitalist social formation is enabled by legal and military actions of a state (here the British Empire) having power.

Brian Roper (1997) pointed out that the emerging ruling class of large land and mine owners, city merchants and bankers, and a growing number of industrialists who had made their life in New Zealand (predominantly around Christchurch and Dunedin) directed much of its socio-economical life in the latter part of the 1800s as they dominated the Legislative Council¹⁷⁹. They also exerted indirect power through their interests in the media, with conservative newspapers becoming the main dailies in the urban centres. By effectively transposing capitalism and the Westminster system of governance¹⁸⁰ onto Aotearoa, they succeeded in building a ‘little England’ in the South Pacific, and set up elite secondary schools modelled after the ‘public’ schools of the motherland to ensure class and cultural reproduction¹⁸¹. Whereas Roper argues that in the earlier period of settlement social relations had been more fluid, by the 1870s and 1890s more rigid class structures had emerged: a ruling capitalist class, not all resident in New Zealand; a rural farming and urban middle class, mostly self-employed; and a working class based on rural and urban wage earners.

Modern globalisation (see Hopkins, 2002) had thus come to Aotearoa as the ‘penetration of Western capitalism’ (Maitra, 1997) unfolded. In K-wave style, Priyatosh Maitra argues that the latter half of the nineteenth century up to the Depression of 1930s¹⁸² marks the first of three cycles of the globalisation of capitalism in New Zealand. As the above class stratification indicates, this period is characterised by “the globalisation of capitalist production and trade in commodities”, with New Zealand economic growth largely explained by “the needs of British industrial capitalism” (ibid, p.23), based on cheap raw materials for industry and supply of cheap food for the growing population of city dwellers (see Section 2.2.3). As communal Māori land changed into private ownership, British surplus capital was from then on heavily

¹⁷⁹ The Legislative Council used to be the Upper House of New Zealand Parliament and was abolished in 1950.

¹⁸⁰ The Westminster model is based on the British Parliament. In the Westminster system, legislative power resides in an elected parliament, composed of one or two chambers. The majority party, or a party coalition, agrees to form a government, and its cabinet, headed by a prime minister, premier, or chancellor, exercises executive power.

¹⁸¹ Secondary schooling only became ‘free’ in 1903. Note, however, that whilst the 1903 Act allowed free places to secondary schools, access to the differentiated provision (grammar schools, technical schools and district high schools) was determined by performance in examinations (Proficiency and Competency).

¹⁸² Maitra’s cycles begin and end with stagnation of the economy and coincide with contracting cycles in the world economy (see Table 3.1). This view is supported by Brian Easton’s statement in the *Listener* of December 10, 1977, that New Zealand’s first long depression began in the late 1860s and finished in the 1890s; the second, the inter-war depression, was from 1921 to 1939; and the third began in the mid-1960s, with (as at 1977) still “not in sight”. As the cycles largely match the global waves, it indicates New Zealand’s interpellation into the larger world system of capitalism.

invested in buying up land. As a result, capitalist agriculture needed for achieving economies of scale in production was put into practice so that New Zealand could ‘oblige’ in exporting predominantly meat and dairy products as well as wool and gold¹⁸³ to Britain. These exports soon soared from 40% in 1860s to 70% in the 1880s when refrigerated shipping became a reality, indicating the impact of technical innovation on economic cycles. As Maitra concluded, “[c]apitalist production in agriculture in New Zealand was imposed from the outside; it did not develop from a feudal ownership system as was the case in Britain” (p.24).

Consistent with developments under modern globalisation of the late 1800s (see Section 2.2.3), New Zealand also became an export market for British manufactured products as European settlement grew, and a destination for commodity investment to build the infrastructure needed for the export-import trade, such as telecommunication, railways, roads and ports. And although geographically isolated, New Zealand’s trade with Britain made it part of a global economy with the West as core. During its first cycle of economic globalisation, the role of the state was mainly to facilitate the building of infrastructure¹⁸⁴ but, as Maitra argued, this role was to change in the next cycle. A stronger state emerged, illustrating Hopkins’ assertion: modern globalisation needed the state to build a nation and international relations that would protect capitalist interests.

The second cycle of capitalist globalisation spans the Depression years up to 1984 (Maitra, 1997.). It was centred on import substituting industrialisation (ISI) that in the latter part of the first cycle was market-led¹⁸⁵, but because of worldwide depression in the 1930s became increasingly state-controlled. The first cycle helped established ISI in ‘light consumer goods’ through market mechanisms like foreign direct investment (FDI) mainly from Britain. As finished consumer goods proved sufficiently profitable, a market-oriented ISI and growing service sector developed. This sector needed skilled labour and attracted immigrants from the UK followed by those mainly from Western Europe, and by 1913 more than a million Europeans made up New Zealand’s population (Mitchell & Deane, cited in Maitra, *ibid*, p.26). Although New Zealand

¹⁸³ The discovery of gold prompted the first non-white ‘immigration’ from the HK/Canton region; for the history of these early settlers and their hardship, see the work by Manying Ip.

¹⁸⁴ As Mike Moore (1998, p.107) observed, “The government seemed the best and frequently the only organization capable of building roads, wharves, dams and railways”.

¹⁸⁵ Maitra (1997) explained that market-led ISI is based on the volume of imports of a product indicating the viability of its substitution by local production.

experienced steady economic growth and a relatively high standard of living from 1895 to 1920s, the Depression of the 1930s caused many small farmers and wage labourers to unite. The resultant union put in place the first Labour government that took control of the crisis in capitalism through state intervention and regulation. In comparison to today's neoliberal ideology as TINA (Thatcher's famous acronym for There Is No Alternative), classical economics, promoting the market principle of comparative advantage by which trade was instrumental for economic growth both in the agricultural and industrial sector, was then blamed for the failing economy. A new economic theory, Keynesianism, was needed to buffer the national economy against 'external shocks', such as a sharp decline in export prices (Maitra, *ibid*).

Maitra refers to the second cycle as ISI growth (involving both producer and consumer goods) under economic nationalism. And whereas the first cycle had been led by the international market, the second cycle saw increased protectionism by the state of the national economy, which is consistent with the 'embedded liberalism' dominant in other capitalist states during this period and an emerging industry needing state support. Accordingly, the domestic industry became protected by import controls such as tariffs to secure long-term employment opportunities in industry. This ISI orientation remained in place, particularly in the 1950s and 1960s, to sustain conditions of full employment and increase self-reliance "so that market deficiencies of New Zealand's primary exports in the post-1945 period could be rectified and balance of payments and foreign debt problems solved" (Maitra, p.27). Overall, ISI under economic nationalism helped develop New Zealand's infrastructure and its energy and manufacturing industries.

Like other 'developed' economies, New Zealand's second cycle was further characterised by changes in the composition of the labour force as the service sector expanded, with this sector attracting 30% of all FDI between 1962/63 and 1972/73 (*ibid*). By 1981, employment in the service industry had risen from 46% in 1951 to 55%, whereas it had dropped from 19% to 11% for the agricultural sector in the same period (Statistics New Zealand, cited in Maitra, p.29). At the end of the second cycle, however, ISI could no longer be sustained. Higher wages and less profits, and lower export earnings due to falling demand and growth in the agricultural sector led to rising deficits in New Zealand's trade balance, hence increasing its foreign debts. It left the country vulnerable to the economic oil crisis of 1973 and the formation of economic regional

blocks like the EEC (now EU) which Britain, New Zealand's main export market, joined in 1973. Although ISI policies continued during the Muldoon years (National Government, 1975-1984), they proved costly and unsustainable. Hence, the crisis of capitalism initiated a policy shift and marked the onset of the third cycle, which Maitra refers to as export-led economic growth under economic internationalism. On a global scale, this period is consistent with the renewed push for trade liberalisation in GATT after the Tokyo Round (see Section 4.2.1)

Unlike the state-led solutions of the depression years in the 1930s, the mindset of state officials and business was that the 'new' crisis demanded less state and more market-led initiatives. It reflects that the neoliberal discourse of the Chicago School and the US Treasury had an impact on New Zealand's affairs of state. Monetarist policies¹⁸⁶ gained in popularity during the late 1970s and early 1980s as key to reversing the slow-down in capital accumulation. These policies soon became *the* 'strategy for capital' (Maitra, 1997, p.30) and are discussed later in this chapter.

5.2.3 Educational Harmonising as Building a 'British' Nation in the Pacific

As Linda Smith (1999, p.88) asserted: "There is a direct relationship between the expansion of knowledge, the expansion of trade and the expansion of empire". Likewise, in all these cycles of the globalisation of capital in Aotearoa, education took on an important role in support of progressing Western ideas and sustaining capitalist class relations¹⁸⁷, albeit in watered-down version based on the belief governing a pioneer nation that everybody should have a 'fair-go'. Nevertheless, this egalitarian stance was to be framed within the limits of capitalism and set up inequitable and conflicting relations with Māori.¹⁸⁸ As previously indicated, once an individual ownership system

¹⁸⁶ Monetarist policies are contrary to Keynesian economics. Whereas Keynesians believe that increases in the money supply is likely to result in growth in employment and output, monetarists contend that such an increase affects prices, leading to inflation rather than increases in output. Monetarism is linked to neoliberalism as it involves control of the money supply to curb inflation, lower taxes to stimulate investment, and minimal state intervention in industry to encourage economic growth.

¹⁸⁷ It is outside the scope of this thesis to discuss in detail the role of education in sustaining economic interest of the dominant group in New Zealand, but for a detailed historical analysis of state education "to *organize Maori* and to *protect Pakeha* interests" see Maxine Stephenson (2000, p.154).

¹⁸⁸ Martin Thrupp (2001, p.305) stated that although New Zealand has never been a classless society, a strong "selfconscious egalitarianism" developed especially among Pākehā New Zealanders as a reaction to the rigid British class society many of the settlers came from. Yet Thrupp (ibid) also mentioned in parenthesis, "this egalitarianism rarely extended to the indigenous peoples colonized".

got underway Māori lost in the time span of a few decades their sovereignty, a large source of income, equal partner status in trade, and nearly Te Reo.

In the earlier period of European settlement, the situation had been different. Māori was the dominant language; settlers and missionaries alike had to use Māori in order to trade and convert. During 1815 and 1847, Māori who attended the mission schools were instructed in Te Reo Māori and influenced by a Christianity that embraced a ‘monogenesist’ concept of race; that is, “all human beings were linked to a common origin through their being children of God” (Jenkins & Morris Matthews, 1998, p.86).¹⁸⁹ This changed with the introduction of Governor Grey’s Education Ordinance 1847, guided by a policy of assimilation. The emerging state became involved in the provision of Māori education (legitimising state control), and missionary schools were then required to teach English in order to receive state subsidies (Walker, 1999; Whitmore, 2003).¹⁹⁰ As Ranginui Walker (1999) asserted, the state used the mission schools to replace Māori culture with European ideals. Unlike the church, however, the state viewed race in a ‘polygenesist’ way, premised on the belief that people from different groups have different origins – not all ‘human’ (Jenkins & Morris Matthews, 1998). Influenced by social Darwinism prevalent at the time, Māori were considered educable, ‘noble savages’¹⁹¹. As Kuni Jenkins and Kay Morris Matthews stated, this “meant that Māori were regarded by the Church as being worthy of conversion to Christianity and by the state as capable of being civilized through instruction in the English language via a curriculum of basic industrial skills” (ibid, p.86). Accordingly, education was primarily aimed at making Māori part of the ‘nation’ and the agricultural proletariat needed in a system of capital accumulation (see Stephenson, 2000).

¹⁸⁹ Stephenson (2000,p.150) pointed out that missionaries considered Māori children in most need of education, and hence “church efforts were less concerned with converting the converted”, that is educating settler children.

¹⁹⁰ As Stephenson (2000,p.167) explained, this was partly initiated by Māori wish to be taught English as “the lack of English [was] one of the restrictive features of their earlier educational experiences in missionary schools.”

¹⁹¹ Social Darwinism and its core belief of the survival of the fittest, as Linda Smith (1999, p.62) rightly pointed out, is of course also a justification for bringing “civilisation”, as mentioned earlier, to the “inherently weak” peoples who would eventually die out, implying that Māori should be thankful for the imported European civilisation that showed none such weakness and hence was inherently superior. Indeed in much of New Zealand’s history, the ‘civilising’ process was deemed vital for Māori survival, for as a race they were thought defeated, a people very near to extinction. Anthony Trollope in 1872 painted the following gloomy picture for Māori: “There is scope for poetry in their past history. There is room for philanthropy as to their present condition. But in regard to their future – there is hardly a place for hope”. From <http://travel.yahoo.com/p-travelguide-825053>. Retrieved 27 November 2003.

Progressively, the Anglo-Saxon worldview became entrenched in the New Zealand landscape during the first cycle of the globalisation of New Zealand's economy. This entrenchment was helped by the larger influx of European immigrants, which caused the number of non-Māori to sharply increase between the 1860s and 1880s. Unlike the economy, however, social policy quickly became a matter of the state. With respect to Māori, the Native Schools Act 1858 ensured the subsidies for Māori education in the missionary schools¹⁹², and an uneasy period of dual church/state followed, during which the state gradually extended its authority in the denominational system of Native Schools (Stephenson, 2000). Māori rejection of the schools in response to the New Zealand Wars, however, meant that the majority had been closed by 1865. The Native Schools Act 1867 then enabled the State to withdraw church funding in education; instead the recently established central government would provide secular rural education, by finding a suitable site (mostly given by Māori themselves), building a school, and supplying a teacher, materials and equipment, but only if petitioned by a Māori community (Whitmore, 2003). By 1871 the Māori language was no longer used for teaching in schools. The shift of focus from Church Christianising to State Civilising, “paved the way for education to become the state mechanism for the assimilation of Māori into the dominant Pākehā culture” (Jenkins & Morris Matthews, 1998, p86), “to inculcate in Maori a sense of belonging to the nation state” (Stephenson, 2000, p.165).

In the meantime, the education for settler children had, up to the introduction of the Constitution Act 1852, been a matter for private venture or co-operative self-help. This new Act, however, established provincial councils that began taking responsibility for their schooling. The roles of the provincial education authorities were endorsed as Regional Education Boards after the Education Act 1877, despite the establishment of a central Department of Education and a national system of primary schools. The Native Schools, however, were to operate under the Central Education Department, and centralisation signalled the increasingly assimilative character of New Zealand education. Pope, the organising inspector of Māori schools, gave out a ‘Native Schools Code’ in 1880, detailing a curriculum in four standards, whilst in 1878 six academic standards had been established to which all students in the European schools should aspire. The Native Schools Code also provided teaching criteria and codes of conduct

¹⁹² Up to 1858, Māori had been largely in control of their life, economically and politically, and were a “strong support to the Pākehā community” (Stephenson, 2000, p.159).

for Native School teachers. In line with the ‘civilising’ project, the mission of the schools was “to bring an untutored but intelligent and high-spirited people into line with our civilisation” (cited in, Colin McGeorge, n.d., p.1) The Native School code was to set standards for Māori students, yet “true success” was measured according to English language ability (Stephenson 2000, p.168). Not long after, teaching in the English language was formally made compulsory, and teachers were to obey by the code so to function as role models of ‘European civilisation’.

The project of assimilation was seen to be successful by the beginning of the second cycle of economic globalisation. To illustrate, a school inspector of the 1930s remarked in 1947: “there was practically nothing Māori in the schools except the Māori children” (McGeorge, n.d., p.1). English remained the language of instruction, with students often receiving corporal punishment for speaking Māori on the school premises, a practice persisting up to the 1950s and leading to only one in four Māori students attending primary school being able to speak Te Reo Māori by the 1960s (Walker, 1999). As may be expected in a climate of assimilation, only 50% of Māori attended the Native Schools by the early 1900s, and this figure dwindled to 10% in 1969 when the remaining schools passed from the Department of Education to district education boards. However, it should be stressed that throughout the national formation of the New Zealand education system, the state has acted in response to Māori resilience: “[Māori] struggle to bring schooling into line with their own interests and aspirations” (Stephenson, 2000, p.170).¹⁹³

5.2.4 Liberal Overtures a Principal Organisers of New Zealand Education

In view of the above, if ‘mainstreaming’ occurred it by no means translated into creating ‘equal opportunities’ in education for all. Rather, in a climate of assimilation, it suggested that school curricula became progressively centralised and state-led, a development that is consistent with the nation-building project of states and with states maintaining the interest of their ruling class. Accordingly, state as educational regulator cannot easily be separated from its role as the protector of capital. As John Freeman-

¹⁹³ Citing the Waitangi Tribunal, Cheyne et.al. (1997, p.25) pointed out that hospitals and schools in the 19th century were founded “not for the European poor, but for Māori as carrots in negotiations for land and sovereignty.”

Moir (1997, p.202) stated: “New Zealand education corresponds to the political economy of capitalist society”; control, production and consumption are sustained by an education system that supply the social (labour) force possessing “the relevant skills, attitudes, and appropriate motivations” (ibid). Yet, within a capitalist system there is space for two liberal ideals of education to exist: social democratic and (neo-) liberal notions of education. The former is characterised by an emphasis on the state’s capacity to follow democratic objectives of equal opportunity through free access to publicly funded educational institutions¹⁹⁴, the latter by an emphasis on the efficiency of markets to provide education that prepares students for a competitive world market.

Like Maitra, Freeman-Moir takes a long cycle view as his writings suggest that the ideals kindling New Zealand’s state policies for education have been influenced by the cycles of capital growth and contraction.¹⁹⁵ For example, after the Depression in the 1930s (i.e. Maitra’s second cycle), steady growth in the economy enabled subsequent New Zealand governments to promote a welfare state that aimed to protect citizens against the adverse effects of market forces through compensating the unemployed or those unable to take part in the labour market through disability or domestic responsibilities. Hence, class conflict that materialises from the unequal distribution of capital could be minimised. Education as an open system available to all irrespective of class, gender or ethnicity stood for the promise of a better future under the notion of equal opportunity and became a key feature of educational policies from the first Labour government in 1935 up to the 1970s. As the former Labour minister of education, Peter Fraser (cited in Freeman-Moir, pp.211-212; and Peters, 2003b, p.303), stated in 1939:

The Government’s objective, broadly expressed, is that every person, whatever his level of academic ability, whether he be rich or poor, whether

¹⁹⁴ Social-democratic liberalism entails ‘positive’ rights to education as prerequisite to individual freedom and achievement of personal objectives, which can be hindered under conditions of poverty, illiteracy and unemployment. In contrast, market liberalism refers to the ‘negative’ rights of individuals, defined in terms of absence of coercion of the state, to education (see Peters, 2003b; also, Olssen, 1996).

¹⁹⁵ Freeman-Moir (1997, p.206) explained that changes in state policies before and after 1984 are not discontinuous as “the state displays certain crucial functions that are continuous across long periods of time”. He defines the state as “that set of more or less permanent relationships centred on sustaining the conditions of capitalist production, specifically as these conditions relate to the development and delivery of labour power into the labour market” (p.203). He argues that “[g]overnments lie in the shadow of the state, and the state, in turn, lies in the shadow of capitalist imperative” (ibid). Thus, he reasons that an analysis of government is incomplete as it fails to see the limits imposed by a capitalist state. Hence, like world-system theorists (and Marxist historical materialism) a ‘longue durée’ view is advocated, an approach taken up in this thesis.

he live in town or country, has a right, as a citizen, to a free education of the kind for which he is best fitted and to the fullest extent of his powers.

It can be argued, however, that an open (though limited and selective) education policy led by the state already existed during the first cycle of economic globalisation in New Zealand in support of building a nation, based on shared (Western) culture, norms and beliefs. Michael Peters (2003b, p.302), for example, highlighted that the free, universal, compulsory, and secular primary education system introduced in 1877 reflected the more social democratic liberalism of early politicians. The reasons for this orientation were various:

[C]hildren needed to be protected against the individual self-interest of their parents, especially in a white-settler society; a basic elementary education was deemed to be essential to the development of moral and personal autonomy; [and] education ... should be accessible to all children irrespective of class, race or creed.

This remark suggests settler parents could not be trusted in the education of their children, and that the state took on the responsibility of building a sense of citizenship and of reproducing, through schooling, the democratic functioning of a capital-regulated society.

Nevertheless, education as an open system under the discourse of equal opportunity (a parallel development to the discourses advanced by the OECD, see Section 4.4.1), and extended to post-elementary education, got effectively underway during the second cycle, culminating in increased state funding during the height of welfarism in the 1960s and 1970s. For example, in 1950 education made up 13.6% of total government expenditure; by 1975 this figure had risen to 25% (Freeman-Moir, 1997). That barriers to access under such policies were lowered can be observed from increased student participation rates in *any form* of education; where the total student participation rate in the New Zealand population was 19.3% in 1945, this figure rose to 30.9% in 1968 (Department of Statistics, cited in Freeman-Moir, p.208). Access to education, however, did not translate into a reduction of race inequalities. In absolute terms both Māori and non-Māori obtained Form 5 School Certificate in greater numbers from the early 1960s to the late 1970s. (Mass secondary schooling only became a reality in New Zealand in

the 1950s.¹⁹⁶) However, whereas the gap between the two groups was 26.4% in 1961, it had widened to 38.9% in 1979 (DoE, cited in Freeman-Moir, p.209). Moreover, subject choice according to ethnicity as well as gender remained highly distinctive, as previously indicated, and mirrors ascribed attributes to Māori and women by the dominant class (the ‘parochial’ white male) with respect to notions of the ‘education best fitted’, ‘talent’ and ‘fulfilment of life’¹⁹⁷.

Statistics illustrate the effect of the socially constructed notion of Māori not being suited for commerce (although history tells otherwise) but more fitting for homemaking and building construction (Jenkins & Morris Matthews, p.101). For example, Māori participation in production and labourer positions increased from 37% in 1936 to 50% in 1966. This increase reflects the shift from primary to secondary as the dominant mode of production in New Zealand, and the associated urbanisation of Maori. By the mid 1970s almost 60% were in manual labour, whilst Māori remained under-represented in professional, white ‘collar’ jobs (Te Ahu Poata-Smith, 1997). Similar constructions (designated homemakers, limited leadership potential and scientifically challenged) have long provided ‘glass ceilings’ for women. Obviously, the failure of the educational mission for equal opportunity suggests that even a social-democratic

¹⁹⁶ The final formal barrier to access to secondary education came with the abolition of proficiency in 1936. By 1958 over 90% of children went on to secondary education (Stephenson, personal communication, 24/3/2005).

¹⁹⁷ The shift in commonly used terminology from race to ethnicity in the late 1970s indicates that in academic discourse the focus on differences being socially constructed became prevailing. As Te Ahu Poata-Smith (1997, p.165) remarked, race was a 19th century concept used historically as “the ideological justification for the denial of the equal rights to the indigenous people... and the domination of the ‘new’ world by Western imperialism”.

education remains within the confines of a capitalist system based on social constructions, divisions and exclusions.¹⁹⁸

Still, the ideology of equal opportunity, supported by an equally pervasive ideology of meritocracy¹⁹⁹, did raise the belief that New Zealand was a classless society where social progression in life was possible. The Hunn report in 1961, a policy document reaffirming assimilation through the ideology of integration, commented that it would take only two generations for Māori to become ‘fully integrated’ (cited in Freeman-Moir, 1997, p.210), an ideal of assimilation derived from the concept of westernisation being modernisation and thus progress (see Section 3.2.1). Indeed, educators, parents and officials unreflectively took in and accepted as true the promise of equal opportunity, but ironically for (white) boys mainly. Parents’ comments from the mid 1960s typify this conviction:

‘I can only hope and pray that my son will seize the wonderful opportunities afforded the children of our country’; ‘Any ambitions I have for my son will be guided entirely by his own attainments academically and by the gifts and talents he possesses’ (Vellekoop, 1971; cited in Freeman-Moir, 1997, p.211).

Although girls and Māori children had possibilities too, their aspirations were seen to take a different course from Pākehā boys.

¹⁹⁸ For a more complex and detailed analysis of the problem of educational governance and social inclusion and exclusion, see Popkewitz and Lindblad (2000). They note that Anglo-American discourse concerning this topic makes the individual central and thus relates the problem of inclusion to access, whereas the French as one example relates it to social integration. New Zealand as a nation of predominantly British settlers tends to represent the former, and social-democratic education is therefore tinged with liberal ideology. They also pointed out four dilemmas. One is that inclusion based on ‘universal’ concepts of citizenship, as framed by the dominant group, brings about exclusion through preferences for certain norms and dispositions (an example would be the concept of the ‘hidden curricula’ and monocultural heartland of educational institutions). The second dilemma is that when the social goal of inclusion is universalised, particular groups may not want to participate (the notion of resistance is relevant here) and instead make their values distinct or conversely universal/normative. The third dilemma is rooted in the dual role of education: providing social mobility and access on the one hand, whilst performing social selection on the other (the argument suggested above). All these dilemmas relate to the problem of equity. The final dilemma is related to the problem of knowledge; for example, making social inclusion the key issue may obscure the upsurge in inequality, unemployment, family disintegration and the like that can affect all social classes in greater degrees at certain times (a dilemma particularly relevant under neoliberal policies and cycles of market contractions).

¹⁹⁹ Meritocracy is also expressed in educational meritocracy, which is rooted in the (HCT) assumption that an individual’s socio-economic position is limited by his/her educational investment (be it financial or time) (see Baptiste, 2001).

Social-democratic notions of education held true well into the late 1970s as illustrated by the 1979 statement of the New Zealand Planning Council (cited in Freeman-Moir, p.212):

There is wide acceptance of the concept that good education for all regardless of the financial means of parents is a prerequisite for equality of opportunity. Education is seen as an investment in tomorrow's producers as well as a way of assisting individuals to develop their talents and to find fulfilment in life.

Yet, corresponding with the third cycle of the globalisation of capitalism that signalled its crisis, from the late 1970s onwards resistance intensified, among both Māori and women, to Pākehā notions of 'liberal' education, because of the racial and gender restrictions the system was inflicting. The sharp down turn in the New Zealand economy further accentuated the hard-up conditions Māori were experiencing under supposedly harmonising systems of equal opportunity that showed little consideration for Te Reo Māori and Māori knowledge, teaching and learning. Nonetheless, as Walker (1999, p.188) highlighted, cultural debilitation through "state policies of domination, impoverishment and assimilation" could not erase tribal memory. Hence, this period of concurrent women's emancipation and Māori reassertion of Treaty rights did bring to the fore the issue of unequal gender and race relations, as typified by publication of the New Zealand feminist magazine, *Broadsheet*, the incidences around the 'Springbok Tour' of 1981, and the increasing importance of the Treaty of Waitangi as an organising principal for public policy in this country. One could say that the 'success' of a social-democratic liberal education was that its 'inclusiveness' fostered a critical reflection on the 'one culture' ideology and a vision of the 'postmodern' welfare society²⁰⁰, which led many non-Pākehā and female students to affirm their difference rather than assimilate to the 'liberal straightjacket' of western paternalistic culture.

5.3 Pioneering Capitalism as New Zealand's Historical Leitmotif

²⁰⁰ Here Dale's (1997) reference to de Sousa Santos's distinction between welfare state and welfare society is pertinent: the former relates to universal rights of members in a state whilst the latter to particularistic rights through membership to a cultural or community group.

New Zealand has moved from being a colonial child to a stropky adolescent and is now hopefully a mature adult. As a colonial child we sought comfort from Mother England, big brother Washington and cousin Australia. Then as a cheeky teenager we rebelled and sought more independence, a larger say in our own destiny and rejected others' apron strings... Now as a confident young adult nation we ought to be able to consider the future with maturity, and decide what's right and wrong in terms of our own legitimate self-interest, not with a juvenile anti-American or anti-European post-colonial cringe.²⁰¹

Its colonial history has, as the previous sections indicated, generally portrayed New Zealand as a British appendage in the South Pacific, hence undeniably influenced by the 'motherland' on the other side of the globe. From its birth as a colony, global capitalism, the global movement of people, and the Western capitalist structure of class relations and ideology of civilisation went along to impress on Aotearoa from the outside a blueprint for an 'ideal' society with core, Linda Smith (1999, p.53) observed, the mother country, London, Parliament, Church, Europe and flagpole; and periphery all things Māori. As illustrated, the role of the state was to promote New Zealand as 'one nation' under assimilative policies of 'civilisation' in its first century of national sovereignty. Colin James (1999), however, observed that through this nation building New Zealand did not just become 'little Britain' of the South Pacific but also asserted its own identity as "a tiny country at the bottom of the world, painfully aware of its insignificance but shyly proud nonetheless of what it can offer the world" (ibid, p.1). He points out that New Zealand's striving to be in a sense unique, or to cite Moore: be a 'cheeky teenager', can be traced to its being the first in the world to introduce a form of state socialism.

As James (1999) outlined, New Zealand history of the last hundred years can be distinguished for three pioneering models that have received international fame (as well as infamy): New Zealand's innovative social policy of the 1890s, its formation of a welfare state in the 1930s and 1940s and its experiment with radical neoliberalism in the mid 1980s continued throughout the 1990s (see also Cheyne, O'Brien & Belgrave,

²⁰¹ Mike Moore, 1998, pp.118-119.

1997). These models largely correspond to Maitra's three cycles of the globalisation of capitalism in New Zealand. However, James highlighted that the first innovation already involved a degree of state intervention in economic life through nationalisation, regulation and protection (a fact resounded in state-led social policy in education as described above). The state model in the first cycle of economic globalisation, James argued, had attracted visits from leftist politicians and academics from all over Europe to look for socialism in action. Yet, he also stated that they found instead "practical socialism without a doctrine" (p.2). This practical policy under a Liberal government in the 1890s consisted of the aged receiving a small state pension, land 'reforms' (through nationalising Māori land), state intervention in wage negotiations, factory regulations, and recognition of trade unions, and above all women being the first in the world to receive voting rights. As Mike Moore (1998) also argued, it made New Zealand the first 'true' democracy as in Britain women only got the vote in 1918. However, these social policies were soon to back the key objective of shaping a 'healthy' race, influenced by the pseudo-science of eugenics (see Cheyne et. al., 1997; also Stephenson, 2000).

The second model was shaped by the worldwide economic depression in the 1930s that initiated the second cycle of economic globalisation under economic nationalism during which the New Zealand economy found itself vulnerable to outside influences because of its reliance on agricultural exports. This vulnerability prompted not only economic nationalism such as state protection for industry but also the introduction of the world's first comprehensive welfare system to provide "from the cradle to the grave" security (the then Prime-Minister Michael Joseph Savage, as cited by James, 1999), during a period where other developed European states 'experimented' with more extreme forms of nationalism – fascism and Stalinism. As indicated by Maitra (1997), the ruling Labour government introduced full employment policies such as import quota protection to protect its own fledgling industry; unimpaird access to free compulsory education; comprehensive health care at low or no cost; and financial state support not only in old age but also in need. These innovations showcased New Zealand as an exemplary egalitarian society and lasted until the introduction of the third innovation: radical neoliberalism.

As the depression and unrest among citizens had brought about welfare state policies in the 1930s, the collapse of Bretton Woods (fixed rate exchange) in the early 1970s, the

oil crisis in 1973 and subsequent overregulation in the form of controls on wages, prices, interest rates and rents under the Muldoon government, led to the Labour government in 1984 embracing neoliberal policies as a way out of the escalating financial crisis. In its seven years of ruling ‘the heirs to welfarism’ set up a deluge of deregulations unprecedented in New Zealand history as a state, and turned New Zealand economic policy framework from one of the most regulated to one of the most deregulated in the OECD (James, 1999). The question is though, why did the Labour Government adopt a neoliberal paradigm that was a marked departure from the earlier welfare state policies it initiated? Was this from choice or necessity? In other words, was the neoliberalisation of New Zealand society a top-down given, or a bottom-up formation? These queries are next examined.

5.4 The State’s Neoliberal Arrangement: A Case of Pluri-scalar Governance?

Small nations like New Zealand don’t have power, but they can have influence.²⁰²

The above quote by Mike Moore suggests that a small state can assert itself on a world stage, as the above stated innovations by New Zealand governments illustrate. Moore, himself, can be seen as an important agent of the TCC as he functioned as Minister of Overseas Trade and Marketing (1984-1990), Minister of Foreign Affairs (1990), and Deputy Minister of Finance (1988-1990) in the fourth Labour Government and as Prime-Minister for eight weeks in 1990, before being appointed as Director-General of the WTO from 1999 to 2002. In *A Brief History of the Future*, Moore (1998) cites Terence O’Brien, the then director of the Centre for Strategic Studies at Victoria University in Wellington, to point out New Zealand’s advantageous position as facilitator in negotiations at the supranational level. The main quality this country has, O’Brien argues, is that it “has no grand strategic design or hidden external agenda”, but adds that New Zealand has not taken the opportunity to advance its case as “[s]uccessive New Zealand governments have proved diffident... about employing or applying such assets in ways like, say Norway” (as cited by Moore, 1998, p.127). In his book Moore suggests, however, that the fourth Labour Government had not been so diffident and had taken a much more outward looking attitude not only to foreign but

²⁰² Mike Moore (1998, p.46)

also economic policy, as it started to promote market liberalisation when it was chosen to office in 1984. The following explains New Zealand's position in the advance of neoliberalism as an expression of globalism and provides a brief account of the implementation of what became known as the New Zealand experiment.

5.4.1 The 'Crisis' of the New Zealand State: Market Globalisation, IGOs and the Neoliberal Tenor

When the New Zealand economy worsened in the late 1970s, the Welfare State provided a crisis for the State. Hence, the fourth Labour Government perhaps initiated an open market policy in New Zealand as a form of crisis management after policies of economic nationalism by successive National Governments from 1975 to 1984 proved untenable; the country's foreign debt had risen sharply whilst its economy contracted (see Section 5.2.2). But the timing of this change coincided with developments taking shape on the global stage. Prior to the 1980s, embedded liberalism was still the *modus operandi* of many developed countries (see Section 4.2). Only after the Tokyo Rounds of the GATT was more pressure put on members to promote trade liberalisation. During earlier periods of modernisation, (see Section 2.2.3), global trade was mainly promoted by education as nation building (see Section 5.2.4), interstate alliances and territorial control, hence through internationalisation. The economic intensification and technological developments of the most recent globalisation phase, however, may have pressed for national economies to become more outward looking, setting in motion the proliferation of multi- and supranational trade agreements (see Section 3.2.2).

For New Zealand the international outlook might have been especially pertinent; the country has at all times been vulnerable to developments in the global economy, as its small economy makes it a 'price taker' rather than 'price maker' (Dale & Robertson, 1997). Whereas some states have the means and strength to protect their interest (and traditions), such an option is thought doubtful for New Zealand. Dale and Robertson (2002, p.17) cite Charles Oman to explain such a country's predicament in a transnational economy:

Globalisation and regionalisation constitute a dual challenge for firms and governments in developing countries. Both phenomena are creating opportunities for strengthening North-South integration, and for enhancing

productivity growth, competitiveness, and developing standards in developing countries. *But*, for many countries they also raise the spectre of involuntary exclusion from the merging tri-polar world. [Italics in original].

Using a similar argument to that put forward by world-system theorist Friedman, by drawing attention to the strengthening of the Triad as core, Dale and Robertson suggested that to be excluded from that core became a reality for New Zealand once Britain joined the European Community in 1973. This directly led to a slump in New Zealand's exports to the former 'motherland' (as discussed in Section 5.2.2). Hence, they explain that much of the change in New Zealand policy stemmed from the fear of exclusion in an environment of rapid globalisation and regionalisation. Accordingly, New Zealand state 'action' for drastic neoliberal 'experiments' can be held as a direct impact of the global economy and the state's apprehension of losing New Zealand's economic standing in the world (above all as monitored by the OECD). Becoming 'backwards' could necessitate the 'active' repositioning of a state in a world where globalisation continues to 'thicken'.

For Dale and Robertson (1997) the shift from an international economy to a transnational economy thus constitutes a key factor in the policy changes witnessed in the post-Muldoon era. They explain that this shift represents "a system of economic activities for which states and territories and state frontiers are not the basic framework" (ibid, p.3). That is, nations are increasingly interpellated into supranational and regional governmental organisations – functioning as the political and social dimension through which the intensification of economic globalisation is mediated (see Chapter 2). The authors extend Hobsbawn's three indicators of a transnational economy, namely a sharp increase in transnational or multinational enterprises, a new international division of labour, and an upsurge in offshore finance, to include a fourth: Robert Cox's concept of 'transnational consensus' as represented by neoliberalism as a dominant, organising ideology. As Chapter 4 illustrates, this transnational consensus, as espoused by IGOs and transnational business and media (see Sklair, 1999, 2001; Stormquist, 2002), is based on neoliberal tenets promoting the expansion of free markets and the efficient use of a (global) work force.

All these factors denote that states may lose their *raison d'être* as an organising structure of economic activities. However, as periods of economic downturns have illustrated, and Dale and Robertson (2002) have suggested, a global economy does not operate in isolation of nation states; states can facilitate the sustainability of a market economy. Only the potentially unlimited movement of transnational capital makes it increasingly possible for TNCs to escape the constraints of a nation state, hence posing dilemmas in terms of the tax and legal concessions states can make. If these are too lax a state may indeed lose its authority to govern. The solution to this problem is the IGOs' concept of 'the enabling state', as embodied in the (post-) Washington Consensus (see Section 3.3.2), that facilitates cross-border trading, with the 'market' being part of the neoliberal arsenal a state can employ to *enable* the system of accumulation to continue. Yet, the global economy can affect countries differently, either directly or indirectly impacting on a country's capacity to govern (Dale, 1997). Developing countries are immediately affected through loan conditions based on SAPs (see Section 4.3), whilst the advanced countries are more indirectly affected since they lose some of their capacity to sustain similar levels of social security and welfare developed under Keynesian policies prior to the mid 1970s. In both these cases, however, it is assumed that states 'hollow out' and move some of their activities and responsibilities upwards.

Despite these upward movements of authority, IGOs do not make policy in isolation. As John Meyer (2001, p.2) explained, there is no world state with "the authority or competence to act", only weak collective leadership, with the US "rather dominant, but ... *formally* only the first among equals" [italics added]. Arguably, world polity works through associational processes that are pluri-scalar; accordingly, IGOs are also 'actively' influenced by states (from the bottom up) through lobbying a nation's position and policy or through a nation setting an example. Chapter 4 illustrated that foremost the powerful states, like the US²⁰³, facilitate such 'bottom-up' movements, but

²⁰³ The influence of a state hegemon (see world-system theorists, Chapter 2; and Section 3.2.2) works not only through IGOs but also other states. As Dale (1997) remarked, Labour's departure from its roots signalled a move towards regulations of state activities the American way. That is, in comparison to the European tradition, which involves the "whole realm of legislation, governance, and social control" – hence implying direct state intervention, which also represents New Zealand's earlier stance under economic nationalism and state ISI (see Maitra, Section 5.2.2), the US model represents "control over activities by specific regulatory agencies", based on the belief that the market works well and should only be interfered with in case of market failure (Dale, 1997, pp.277-278). This shift in New Zealand policy orientation can thus be seen as the US, helped by its Treasury and Chicago School economists, mounting its political influence on the world stage, as reflected by its role in the WTO and WB (see Sections 4.2 and 4.3) and the emerging 'world polity' of the Washington Consensus.

even united powerless nations have been able to guide policy in different directions. For example, the protests of developing countries during deliberations at WTO forums have moderated and at times led to concessions in the conditions to open trade, such as occurred when the plan for Multilateral Agreements for Investment (MAI) did not eventuate.

In New Zealand's case, its neoliberal policies were drastic and generally predate the full impact of IGOs' market and structural adjustment policies in other OECD member states. As Jane Kelsey (1997a) noted, in this respect New Zealand acted like many developing countries, the critical difference being that the latter *had to* because of the structural policies of the WB and IMF, whilst New Zealand governments after 1984, *chose to*, on the basis of "short-term pain would produce massive gain" (Conway, *ibid*, p.3). Or, as Maitra (1997) stated, the state *voluntarily* limited the scope of its authority and promoted globalisation nationally, through removing barriers to international competitiveness and allowing the market to expand with the expectation that the rate of production in the New Zealand economy would increase. At the same time, the Labour government promoted globalisation internationally to set an example, thereby continuing its tradition of 'social' experimentation, becoming an influential agent of neoliberalism in the process, as Mike Moore suggested. New Zealand's third 'innovation' indeed was commonly quoted by IGOs like the WB, IMF and OECD as "*the* example of successful reform ... from a regulated to an open economy" (Peters, 2003b, p.303, italics in original), and *the* leading reformer according to "economic freedom ratings" (*ibid*, p.304). These 'accolades' signify that New Zealand took the IGOs' ideologies the furthest, earning the country the international fame of being the model to follow in state reform.

The above illustration raises the issue of structure and agency involved in globalisation (see Section 2.4). As with the notions advanced by Ulrich Beck and Roland Robertson (in Section 2.3.3), Dale (2001) pointed out a dialectic process in the 'global' career of the New Zealand experiment. On the one hand, the experiment is a case of 'globalised localism' (a term coined by Santos, 2002); on the other hand, the local interpretation of neoliberalism being subsequently endorsed as *the* model of open market reform by

IGOs like the WTO, WB and OECD²⁰⁴ represents ‘localised globalism’. Still, the international reference to the New Zealand model would hardly have come about if it had been discordant with the four dimensions of the global consensus Boaventura de Sousa Santos (2002) outlined: neoliberalism, the weak state, liberal democracy and the supremacy of the legal system (see Section 3.3.2.),²⁰⁵ or as Dale (2001, p.498) noted: “its very close compatibility with the dominant economic discourse of the major international agencies, and its demonstrated practicability, all of which underlay its status as a model for the world”²⁰⁶. In other words, “globalisation operates selectively” (Dale, *ibid*, p.499). As previously indicated (see Section 5.1), governments have a degree of ‘agency’ but are also constrained by the world-system of capitalism in which they are embedded.

5.4.2 The New Zealand Model of Neoliberal Reform

New Zealand’s market reform agenda is not unique, but clearly its scope and range are. As Mulgan (1997, p.265) argued, “[t]he neoliberal agenda of reform was international but New Zealand was able to carry it further than almost any other country”. That is, the reform embraced the full arsenal of neoliberal instruments discussed in Chapter 3 and covered the whole state sector. The extent and especially the speed by which radical experimentation took place were remarkable. In fact, New Zealand was the only OECD member state that made systematic and sustained efforts to redefine and set limits to the state’s role, and render public agencies and their operations more effective, transparent, and accountable, as is briefly illustrated next.

When the fourth Labour Government took office in 1984, they made an immediate start, through powerful lobbying from Treasury – influenced greatly by principal-agent theory, to popularise neoliberal philosophy and implement the New Public Management (NPM) agenda (see Section 3.3.1). The Government accepted the rising consensus that

²⁰⁴ As indicated by high power appointments of, for example, Chief Executive of the New Zealand Ministry of Education, Maris O’Rourke, to Director of the Education Sector of the World Bank in 1995 (Dale, 2001; Perris 1998) and Mike Moore as Director-General of the WTO (see Section 6.1).

²⁰⁵ In world polity terms, the New Zealand experiment does not deviate from, rather reinforces, the world model that has as goals collective progress, individual rights, equality (as we are all equal to the market), and justice, reinforced by the belief in science to solve problems, and the rationalised individual, society and state “to act sensibly and intelligently” (Meyer, 2001, p.7).

²⁰⁶ Dale (2001) further suggested that the actual implementation of the model and New Zealand’s non-threatening status of being a small ally of the western world aided to the model’s popularity.

neoliberal policies provided the *rational* solution to limiting government involvement in the market whilst at the same time ensuring that it did not lose control, but instead steered from a distance. The Government achieved this by first corporatising its state sector and later privatising some of the State Owned Enterprises (SOEs)²⁰⁷ deemed not to be the state's business (such as banking, transport and telecommunication). These strategies were introduced to improve the efficiency and accountability of state trading departments, later to be extended to state service departments. Corporatisation enabled SOEs to be run like private enterprises through the introduction of user charges to consumers, and payment of dividends and taxes by the SOEs. In the process, ministers became shareholders, and senior public servants chief executive officers (CEOs) "given the freedom to manage without political interference [but needing to] provide a 'statement of corporate intent' and annual reports" (Peters, 2003b, p.307). Further privatisation of some state assets between 1988 and June 1990 occurred to "address efficiency shortfalls of the SOEs, help reduce the public debt, continue the process of 'load-shedding', and aid capital accumulation in the private sector" (Peters, *ibid*). In addition, the State Sector Act 1988 and the Public Finance Act 1989, based on the Treasury's "NPM manifesto" (Hood, 1992) – *Government Management*, consisting of two volumes (Treasury, 1987a & 1987b), reformed the non-SOE public service sector into business-like organisations, with their 'CEOs' encouraged to run 'public' services as profitable business enterprises. Both Acts provided the legal framework for implementing an NPM agenda in the administration of education, with the aim to increase the sector's efficiency and accountability.

After 1989, the National and Coalition governments that followed endorsed the process initiated by Labour, indicating that the neoliberal ideology gripped party policy on both sides of the political spectrum as increased unipolarisation of the economic system under late capitalism would predict (see Section 3.2.3)²⁰⁸. However, National's reform in 1991 took the ideology further as its Government cut social welfare spending by \$1.3 billion, and introduced the Employment Contracts Act 1991 to discourage collective

²⁰⁷ The State Owned Enterprises Act 1986 transformed public sector trading departments into SOEs "regulated by company law, to be run to make a profit and to be as efficient as their private counterparts" (Peters, 2003b, p.307). Hence, it forms the basis for the corporatisation of the public sector, as it entails the administration of state activities being run along similar line to commercial enterprises (Codd, 1995).

²⁰⁸ This argument is reinforced by Freeman-Moir's contention that governments lie in the shadow of the state, which in turn lies in the shadow of a global capitalist system.

bargaining so as to promote an ‘efficient’, flexible labour market (Conway, 2002)²⁰⁹. Undoubtedly, the new government welcomed the market culture in all aspects of public policy in order to dismantle the welfare state²¹⁰ that had created a so-called ‘culture of dependency’. As Michael Apple (1989, pp.35) suggested, neoliberal market forms enabled states to revoke “the gains made by women and men in employment, health and safety, welfare programs, affirmative action, legal rights, and education ... under the guise that ‘they are too expensive’ both economically and ideologically”. In New Zealand, both Labour and National-led governments in the 1984-99 period built “the platform of market liberalism” (Roberts & Peters, 1998, p.1). This configuration was to have a significant impact on the funding, running and mandate of university education in New Zealand, as is explored in the next chapter.

5.5 Closing Note

In its building of a nation, New Zealand followed the path of European state formation, by instituting the Westminster system. In so doing, it had to nationalise Māori land and ‘appease’ and ‘civilise’ Māori to the nation’s ideal of civilisation. In the process, it broke up a tribal-regulated society and instituted in its place a system of organization based on individual ownership and property-rich and means-poor class relations.

On the surface, as a settler community nurturing the spirit of ‘fair-go’, New Zealand society can be broadly characterised by the major tenets of social innovation, state welfarism and neoliberal radicalism. These can be seen as nationally distinct, but when linked to a system of global capitalism marked boundaries tend to fade as many of the limits and possibilities were and are shaped by the aforementioned cycles of a global market system, and in New Zealand’s case through its relationship with Britain. Even its rebellion as a ‘cheeky teenager’ is related to New Zealand being a ‘family member’ of the ‘West’. To some extent it had to grow up as a consequence of the ‘mother country’

²⁰⁹ This Act had a major impact on employment relations; based on the assumption that market-based, flexible wages would result in higher productivity growth, it nearly destroyed collective bargaining, and caused union representation in vulnerable sectors to collapse. By 1996, the number of employees covered by union contracts fell 42%, and multi-employer contracts fell from 77% to 20%. One major impact was that it brought down the wages of the unskilled and drove up wage dispersion. Whilst productivity did not significantly increase, profits did (Schwartz, 2000).

²¹⁰ Peters (1996) also argued that the new market discourse is a response to the prior emphasis on cultural and social objectives that placed insufficient importance on economic goals in education systems; in contrast, new policies must now meet the needs of business and industry.

severing economic ties, and new formations taking place at the supranational stage. In reference to Norbert Elias's metaphor of the dance, it seems that a state has a hand in the arrangements of its citizens' economic and social life, as illustrated by state policies for education. However, the state does so within the structure of a capitalist system that is not only cyclic but also intensifying in globality and hence making relations at the regional and supranational level more pronounced. New Zealand society arguably is a product of Western global expansion, and in the process has also become its agent.

What makes New Zealand somewhat distinctive though is its 'radicalism' in structural change as its experimentation with neoliberalism illustrates. Also, the Treaty of Waitangi as a founding document to negotiate Pākehā and Māori relations is a special feature of New Zealand's founding history. These characteristics are likely to be reflected in how a state and its institutions translate IGOs' and other global dictates into national policy. The translation of the supranational rhapsody at the national level and its effect on New Zealand's tertiary education sector are topics of discussion in Chapter 6, which I turn to next.

Chapter 6

The National Arrangements: 1984-2000 The Neoliberal Orchestration of Tertiary Education²¹¹

6.1 Prelude

Inevitably, economic crisis leads to educational crisis, to a demand of cutbacks, for a return to basics and vocational relevance. What had been declared the right of all was now argued to be the right of those who could pay for it. Social crisis undermines confidence in existing relationships and social institutions, including education.²¹²

As with its restructuring of the economy, the New Zealand state has also engaged in the transformation of tertiary education swiftly and frequently, a process helped by New Zealand's parliamentary system of unicameral representation²¹³. But as the economic crisis was wide spread (see Section 5.2.2), it is no surprise that New Zealand was not alone in the reconstruction of its education sector. Butterworth and Tarling (1994) observed that Britain, the United States and Australia also took on the idea that their education needed to be reformed. For example, programmes of privatisation in education and measures for competition between schools were introduced in Britain under the Thatcher government (1979-1990) earlier than in New Zealand. This administration 'loaded' government intervention. In the States, the Reagan government (1980-1988), blaming the educational reforms of the 1960s and 1970s for the downturn in its domestic economy and receding position in the international market, similarly

²¹¹ Tertiary education, the preferred term used in official documents on New Zealand education (Catherwood, 1998), encompasses a wider term of reference to education provided after secondary education: universities, polytechnics, colleges of education, wānanga, and private training establishments. When higher education is used in this chapter it refers to university or degree-bearing institutions only (see OECD, 1998). As some of the discussion involves a wider sector of post-secondary education, the use of tertiary education is mostly employed in this chapter.

²¹² John Freeman-Moir, 1997, p.216.

²¹³ As Michael Peters (2003b, p.324) stated, New Zealand is a small country with a 'thin' democracy based on "one house and a strong executive". This system lends itself to decisive actions, as it only needs a few dedicated politicians asserting a particular policy vision to gain control of cabinet and be confident that their policies will get through Parliament (see also Mulgan, 1997). It also relates to New Zealand being "a laboratory whose isolation, size, and recency is an advantage, [and] in which grand themes of world history are often played out more rapidly, more separately, and therefore more discernibly, than elsewhere" (James Belich, 1996, p.7), as the three 'innovations' Colin James listed illustrated (see Section 5.3).

extended the free-market ideology to the education sector through the rhetoric of individual choice and excellence, and promoting links between the sector and business (Apple, 1989). They argued that schools had failed in their role of building Human Capital “to prepare adequately its young citizenry to be capable of reinvigorating corporate and industrial America” (Giroux & McLaren, 1989, p.xv). Both these governments withdrew from the notion of education as a social good, “which included education as social engineering, as the transmission belt of values and as potent engine of the consensus-seeking state” – reflecting nation-building ideology. Instead, state’s role and public spending on education became “a matter of economic advantage”, and citizens partaking in education were no longer participants “in the common weal” but “individualised consumer of an investment good” (Butterworth & Tarling, *ibid*, p.63).

The above events undoubtedly illustrate the dialectic process between globalisation and states that Dale (2001) referred to: neoliberalism, the Washington Consensus and HCT as compositions of an emerging globalism in the 1980s (as discussed in Chapters 3 and 4) are promoted by, in this case powerful, local sites that in turn strengthen the process, and hence become instrumental in advancing market philosophies in the state sector at other locations²¹⁴. As Peters (2003b, p.305) argued, “the commitment by the Thatcher and Reagan administrations to monetarism and supply-side economics ... provided a global context for structural reform in New Zealand”, and Conway (2002) noted that *no* reforms after 1984 would have been an unlikely option for New Zealand, since other OECD countries started to introduce market-oriented policies. Nevertheless, the dialectic process also allows for local idiosyncrasies as the politics of Thatcher and Reagan represented more the classical roots of liberalism (see Section 3.3), aiming to remove the state from much of the provision of education, The New Zealand model, however, mirrored more closely, or even preceded, the emerging neoliberal consensus at the supranational level that the state should still be its provider but distribute and govern it according to market rules – that is, a quasi-market (see Olssen, 2000 and

²¹⁴ This dialectic process of the career of neoliberalism as globalism, however, has to be seen within the limits of a capital world-system as argued in Chapter 3.

2002)²¹⁵. As Martin Thrupp (2001, p.304) observed, “the neo-conservative dimensions of England’s reforms were not paralleled in New Zealand”.²¹⁶

This chapter focuses on the neoliberal compositions of reform in tertiary education under Labour (1984-1989) and National-led (1990-1999) governments. It investigates what these policies and reports signify, and how they initiated quasi-market arrangements in the provision of university education in New Zealand. It further discusses the impacts of these reforms on universities’ mandate, capacity and governance structure and reviews the role of government in bringing about changes in the tertiary sector as well as points out universities’ resistance and acceptance to reform.

6.2 Neoliberalisation of the Tertiary Sector under a Labour Government

Although the neoliberal reform ‘Rogernomics’ named after the then Minister of Finance, Roger Douglas, under the fourth Labour Government, was speedy, its first phase left the education system largely untouched (Berg & Roche, 1997)²¹⁷. When Labour returned for a second term (1987-1990), however, reform also spread to the education sector, with Treasury especially setting out to make neoliberal ideology applicable to this sector and the State Services Commission largely supporting it. The following sections show the impact of Treasury’s working ideology on New Zealand’s tertiary reform and the Labour and National governments’ reviews and reports that guided the process.

6.2.1 *State Agents as Conductors of Neoliberal Leitmotifs in Tertiary Education*

²¹⁵ Olssen (1996 & 2002, p.59) also posits that classical liberalism represents a negative view of state power from which the individual needed to be freed, whereas neoliberalism represents a positive view of the state with respect to its role as providing the market the “conditions, laws and institutions necessary for its operation”. Despite the differences in orientation, Olssen (2000, p.497) also points out that they share “ontological and metaphysical assumptions”. “Deregulated choice”, for example, reasserts the classical liberal belief in the primacy of the market and individual choice.

²¹⁶ Thrupp (2001) refers to English rather than British reforms, as for example the Scottish educational sector does not necessarily follow the English system of reform.

²¹⁷ As Butterworth and Tarling (1994, p.75) observed, the Labour government had merely made traditional commitments, such as reviewing “all aspects of continuing tertiary education”, including the role of polytechnics, establishment of a grants committee, staff:student ratio (which had worsened since the mid 1970s) and student allowances. Marshall, the Labour minister of education before 1987, was more traditional regarding the role of universities and was against user pays, but came under increased pressure to economise the sector.

Treasury, composed of a small group of ‘new breed’ economic reformers responsive to the neo-liberal tenets of the Chicago School²¹⁸, played a vital part in the dissemination of the growing international consensus: “increasing levels of [state] intervention ... rob economic liberalism of its vitality” (Peters, 2003b, p.309) at the national level – hence representing and acting in the like capacity of the TCC (see Sklair, Section 2.3.2). In Treasury’s briefing to the incoming Labour Government, *Government Management, Volume 2* (Treasury, 1987b), a policy was advocated of linking education, and particularly tertiary education, directly to the market. For example, Treasury had criticised the findings of the Watts’ review, initiated by the New Zealand Vice-Chancellors Committee (NZVCC) in 1986 to discuss developments in the university sector. This review had recommended a planned increase of the university participation rate, targeted at the 18-24 age group and Māori and Pacific students; high quality education; unit of resource funding; and expansion of graduate studies (Butterworth & Tarling, 1994) – all pointing to the need of more funding for the sector. In contrast, Treasury’s briefing adopted the New Institutional Economics (NIE) rhetoric of the public sector performing “poorly because they were constrained by the institutional environment and lacked the same incentives as the private sector” (Peters, *ibid*, p.306).

Predictably, Treasury argued that education shared features with other tradable goods on the market, and needed to be more responsive to business interests and the needs of the economy. In addition, it criticised, like governments in the UK and US, the current system for performing poorly, even with more public money allocated, and for having weak accountability measures as well as educators and institutions following their own self-interests. As Peter Roberts and Michael Peters (1998, p.2) cited:

[The] shift to ‘the market’ as the model on which to base all human activity has been premised on a neoliberal philosophy, at the centre of which is the rational, utility-maximising, consuming, choosing, competitive individual. Older notions of community and cooperation, developed in a country once regarded as the ‘welfare laboratory of the world’, have all but disappeared from the policy making process.

²¹⁸ Citing Jesson and Easton, Bührs (2000, p.11) pointed out the principal neoliberal agents were from within Treasury and the Reserve Bank, of which a number of high ranking officials had either visited US universities that had advanced neo-liberal economics (Chicago, Harvard, Duke) or the World Bank, returning “as converts to the Chicago cause”. Within Treasury, neoliberal thinking became established in the early 1980s, “facilitated by staff turnover and the associated loss of institutional memory” (*ibid*).

Their quote illustrates that Treasury's view of education was a marked departure from the previous organising 'principals' in education policies: nation building and advancing the social democratic goals of equal opportunity (see Section 5.2.4). In the tertiary sector these principals were represented by differential systems: those vocational (polytechnics and colleges of education) falling directly under the Department of Education, and universities given autonomy when made independent of the University of New Zealand in 1961, with funding allocated via the University Grants Commission (see Chapter 7). In addition, fees for attending tertiary institutions were kept low, with students also briefly receiving living allowances. In contrast, Treasury advocated a radical change towards a competitive market-based system. In line with the HCT retooling of education as increasingly a private investment linked to the knowledge economy (see Chapter 3 & 4), Treasury argued that knowledge was best seen as a commodity, with institutions functioning as "profit centres" (Treasury, 1987b, p.193), "producing knowledge as a private good for individual consumption" (Berg & Roche, 1997, p.154). Peter Roberts (1998, p.32) pointed out that "this logic [was] particularly pervasive in discussions of tertiary education" in New Zealand.

Treasury's education discourse circled around catchphrases such as 'falling standards', 'provider capture' and 'rising mediocrity' to push for efficiency, choice and competition in the New Zealand education sector²¹⁹, and advanced principles for shifting the focus from administration to New Public Management (NPM) ideology of the private sector: "goal clarity, transparency, contestability, avoidance of capture, congruence of bureaucratic incentive structures with stated government goals, the enhancement of accountability and the cost-effective use of information" (Fitzsimons & Peters, 1994, p.248). Principally, Treasury advocated the neoliberal measures of decentralising educational administration, less state provision as well as control so that "the 'natural' free-market contract" between seller and buyer would not be disrupted. This resulted in providers responding flexibly and efficiently to consumer demand (Olssen, 1996, p.3).

²¹⁹ Peters (2003b) summarised Treasury's neoliberal arguments for educational change as follows: Education cannot be analysed successfully as a public good; higher educational expenditure does not necessarily lead to improved educational standards and equality of opportunity nor to higher economic growth rather it has had opposite results; providers' interest has caused irresponsiveness to consumers' needs and overall poor performance of the education sector; the sector lacks effective accountability systems; and government intervention has led to bureaucratic inflexibility, credential inflation and ultimately to educational inequality.

Undoubtedly, Treasury showed the change in educational relations from pedagogical to contractual (Codd, 1995), paving the way, as Roberts and Peters (1998) observed, for students as consumers to pay fees in exchange for the provision of an educational product (the sum total of knowledge gained from scarce and specialist know-how) or service (the delivery or teaching of course content), with students as rational utility-maximisers making “self-interested choices about the “market value” of specific programmes” (ibid, p.4)²²⁰. As aforementioned, Treasury was particularly influential in the legislative formulation of the State Sector Act 1988²²¹ and the Public Finance Act 1989²²² “which transformed personnel and financial management practices and initiated ‘decoupling’ strategies which separated policy from delivery through the creation of new delivery organisations” (Olssen, 2002, p.62).

Treasury’s views found their way in the Picot Report (Department of Education (DoE), 1988a), the outcome of the Picot Task Force set up to advise government on the administration of primary and secondary education. The report signalled five major weaknesses: over-centralisation of decision making leading to a culture of dependence, complexity and duplication of services, lack of information and choice, lack of efficient management practices, and feelings of powerlessness among parents (Perris, 1998, p.9). Accordingly, the report advised for devolution, (meaning delegation²²³, and accountability) advocating a simple administrative structure which system is “open to scrutiny”, promotes “responsiveness to client demands”, and in which decision making is close to those who are in the position of executing the decisions, coordinating the available resources and being held responsible for the outcomes (DoE, 1988b, pp.4-5).

²²⁰ As Lawrence Berg and Michael Roche (1997) asserted, the market metaphor of education became gendered around the concept of ‘rational man’, homo economicus, and accordingly presented as a universal truth. This ‘objective’ gendering can be seen as a state’s attempt to make market policies palatable and ready-made for ‘consumption’.

²²¹ Under the State Sector Act 1988, CEOs were contracted for up to five years, renewable on the basis of performance and incentives coupled to specific outputs and budgetary targets. Peter Conway (2002) reported that two-thirds of departments were headed by new CEOs eighteen months after the Act was passed, with many brought in from the private sector, with little experience in the core business.

²²² The Public Finance Act 1989 meant that state accounts operate more like a private business involving the funding of outputs, not inputs, and charging departments for the cost of operations. As Conway (2002) reported this Act was aimed at enhancing quality of service and responsiveness as well as efficiency and accountability in the use of resources.

²²³ As Peters (2003b, p.316) explained, devolution as delegation means that a contract relationship exists between individuals which “is controlled through monitored performance and applying incentives and sanctions to encourage managers to meet agreed objectives rather than to follow their own goals”.

Dale and Jesson (1992) argued, however, that the *State Services Commission's* (SSC) focus of managerial efficiency was of more influence than Treasury's 'market' push for choice and competition. They pointed out that SSC set the terms of reference of the Picot report and administration reform. For example, the report did not advocate an educational voucher system (promoting choice and competition), nor did it advise that the state should retract from providing for education. As Dale and Jesson (ibid, p.8) surmised: "At the core of the SSC's agenda are managerial accountability and organisational efficiency: at the core of Treasury's agenda is the creation of conditions where choice and competition can flourish ... one is driven by the model of the efficient firm, the other by the logic of the market." Yet, SSC, like Treasury, highlighted 'provider capture' in its reports to Government, and the Treasury briefings to the incoming Labour government indicated that Treasury likewise emphasised managerial efficiency, as evidenced in their advice being called an NPM manifesto. In any case, the public was given eight weeks to respond to the Picot Report, and as Perris (1998) commented, the resulting white paper *Tomorrow's Schools* received overwhelming support from the community²²⁴.

6.2.2 Hawke as Librettist of New Public Management in the Tertiary Sector

Both SCC's and Treasury's objectives were subsequently reinforced by the recommendations of the Working Group on Post Compulsory Education and Training (PCET), or Hawke Report (Department of Education, 1988b), culminating in two government's reports *Learning for Life* (February 1989) and *Learning for Life II* (August 1989) (DoE, 1989a & 1989b), in which "the neo-liberal agendas were systematically stated" (Olssen, 2002, p.63).

Chaired by Professor Gary Hawke, the former director of the Institute of Policy Studies at Victoria University, the Working Group's instructions were to compile and

²²⁴ Lyall Perris (1998, p.7), former Acting Secretary for Education, stated that education reforms were basically not education reforms, rather public sector management reforms. In this context, the aim of devolution received sectoral and public support, which assisted in the acceptance of the reforms. Treasury's aim for financial savings and separation of policy advice and service delivery, government's objective to apply public sector reforms to education, and educational leaders' wish for greater authority and autonomy plus parents' aspiration for more input came together in the goal to reduce the size and power of education bureaucracies.

synthesise earlier sectoral reports so as to recommend a comprehensive overhaul in the tertiary education sector, but as Butterworth and Tarling (1994, p.140) observed “Hawke was doing more than ‘reviewing the reviews’”. The Hawke review, representing a defining moment in New Zealand tertiary education as it involved a wider range of issues than the Picot report, identified weaknesses in the tertiary sector concerning inefficiencies and lack of accountability, and provided neoliberal solutions to the problems signalled. Already, Hawke’s questions to the then chairperson of the NZVCC, Dr Malcolm, indicate the neoliberal tenets by which the report would be framed: whether universities needed a buffer, such as the University Grants Committee (UGC); would not “charters or corporate plans and explicit monitoring devices” as used by SOEs be equally effective for universities; and how were universities to be made more accountable? He also queried the binary system and the universities’ distinctiveness, and raised the issue of cross-accreditation between universities and polytechnics (Butterworth & Tarling, 1994, p.126).

The report’s solutions for making the sector more efficient reflect the NPM philosophy (see Section 3.3.1); the emerging lifelong learning rationale in the mid 1980s to deal with rising unemployment, as advanced by IGOs like the OECD; and the general shift in orientation from full employment to full participation in education, with (the right) education seen as the producer of economic growth (see Section 4.4.2). Maureen McLaughlin (2003, p.17) summarised the Hawke recommendations as follows:

- Increase participation rate in tertiary education
- Put emphasis on private benefits of tertiary education, but government to remain principal financier
- Raise tuition fees but allow institutions to set own fees levels
- Base funding on Equivalent Full-time Students (EFTS)²²⁵
- Treat the provision of comparable education at public tertiary institutions similarly
- Support student loan plans, making repayments contingent on income
- Assist disadvantaged students by paying fees rather than using loans.

²²⁵ Funding of tertiary education is based on the EFTS formula where a full-time student year generally consists of 1200 hours of teacher-directed activity (Fitzsimons, 1995).

Some of these suggestions reflect a social agenda, but generally advance (Treasury's) market policies in the tertiary education sector through increased competition²²⁶, creation of user charges and emphasis on private benefits. Also, the NPM rationale of devolution stated in the Picot Report is found back in the report. As Hawke (cited in Butterworth & Tarling, 1994, p.131) argued, the Picot analysis "required 'only modification and qualification to be applied to PCET'".

The devolution the report recommended is that those in charge of Tertiary Educational Institutions (TEIs) be given greater discretion in making decisions about expenditure, whilst the funding arrangements need to provide greater incentives for providers to use resources effectively and rely less on state financing (reflecting NIE assumptions). Under the EFTS scheme, for example, capital works would become an aspect of the operational budget of TEIs. In contrast, new buildings under the UGC funding scheme had fallen under establishment grants, considered 'costless' and a means of propping up operating grants. By devolving capital work decisions to the TEIs themselves, however, it meant they had to weigh up the comparative value of new buildings against expenditure on other inputs. As the TEIs' councils were to become responsible for property management, its members also needed to "recognise their obligations to the state" (Butterworth & Tarling, 1994, p.136). However, Hawke was critical of the existing governance systems of TEIs, with the councils not exercising effective control. He therefore suggested that the Government should be able to dismiss the chairperson of Council, yet Council should appoint the institution's chief executive, who, in turn, would be responsible for management based on "appropriate job designations, descriptions, and accountabilities" rather than "outmoded divisions of responsibilities and ill-defined duties" (ibid).

For increased accountability, however, the Hawke Report recommended "a central structure... which provides for a coherent approach to policy formation and implementation" across the whole education and training sector (Butterworth & Tarling, 1994, p.134), with national standards specified and proposed courses assessed by a National Educational Qualifications Board (NEQB). In such 'across-the-portfolio'

²²⁶ Competition was introduced by making different providers in the tertiary education sector (universities, polytechnics etc.) traditionally operating under different rule systems operated on a "level playing field" by granting all TEIs the possibility to confer degrees and so attract students (Olssen, 2002, p.65).

system, there would be no place for a UGC; instead the universities should negotiate funding directly with the Minister of Education, an action likely to result in policy advice being “bureaucratic and not open to public scrutiny” (ibid, pp.142-143). The accountability mechanisms the report subsequently advanced, based on Picot Taskforce proposals, reflect the NIE/NPM rationales: contractual relationships between the government and the Chief Executive Officers (CEOs) of the Ministry of Education (MOE) and other educational agencies, such as a Review and Audit Agency (RAA), later the Educational Review Office (ERO), and between councils and boards (which should be smaller) and their CEOs (appointed on fixed-contracts); charters as agreements between government and TEIs’ councils specifying the institutions’ intended outcomes and performance appraisals (as represented in their corporate plan and measured by audit procedures); and external monitoring through RAA and National Educational Qualifications Authority (NEQA), the soon-to-be established New Zealand Qualifications Authority (NZQA). Although the report further mentioned self, peer and internal reviews, these traditional procedures of professional accountability were given little recognition (Peters, 2003b, pp. 320-321; Olssen, 2002, p.64).

The Learning for Life publications spelled out the NPM tenets of the Hawke Report. In *Learning for Life*, Phil Goff – the then Minister of Education – presented in the preface the Government’s dilemma of the need for lifelong learning and high student participation versus limited state resources. Lack of coordination in the PCET sector is emphasised and some of the deficiencies of the current system outlined (indicating the neoliberal shift of blame and responsibilisation to providers). The report stressed that the Ministry makes policy decisions and the Government remains the principal financier of the TEIs (albeit the expansion of private funding is advocated), whereas institutions make operational decisions in order to “improve responsiveness to industry, the community, and the other clients of post-school education and training” (DoE, 1989a, p.iv). *Learning for Life* further reiterated the need for a charter and corporate plans, a Council appointed CEO, bulk EFTS funding (on a rolling three-year basis), contestable funding for capital purposes and equity objectives, and regular audit reviews (by the Controller and Auditor-General) on the use of state funds and achievement of set objectives. In addition, the report advanced the goal of increased participation in tertiary education by making institutions accountable for the removal of needless barriers to student progress and the implementation of Equal Employment and Equal Education

Opportunity (EEO and EEdO) programmes especially aimed at increasing the participation of under-represented groups (see Butterworth & Tarling, 1994). Hawke's 'across-the-portfolio' approach, however, was slightly toned down by protecting the university title to institutions engaged in advancing knowledge and teaching and research, acknowledging the importance of academic freedom to universities, and assigning the polytechnics the predominant role of vocational education, whilst not rejecting them the degree option if the programme meet the NEQA criteria. Nevertheless, the NEQA was to be applied to both the universities and polytechnics and other post-compulsory institutions, as developed in *Learning for Life II*.

The outcome of the Hawke and the *Learning for Life* reports was that the fourth Labour Government introduced a standard student fee of \$1250 in 1990 (about 10% of total estimated course costs), to be increased to \$1300 for the 1991 tuition year, whilst also giving TEIs the autonomy to set fees. Labour further adopted the advice to supply a means-tested fee subsidy for low-income students, to introduce EFTS-based funding (based on 85% of total course costs), and to abolish the University Grants Committee²²⁷ in order to initiate a direct funding relationship between TEIs and the to-be-established Ministry of Education (under the Education Amendment Act 1990). It further increased the 'contractual' responsabilisation of TEIs as well as put pressure on these institutions to make up for any financial shortfalls. Pressure was also put on institutions to fulfil their equity obligations to under-represented groups, as EEdO and EEO became performance indicators inscribed in institutional charters and corporate plans.

Overall, the path was set for the establishment of a quasi-market regime in the tertiary sector, introducing NPM mechanisms, 'contestable' state funding, increased competition between providers, and a user-pay regime in line with the HCT objective of individual investment in own human capital (see Sections 3.3.1 & 3.3.3).

6.2.3 Porter as Transnational Vocalist of the Knowledge Motif

²²⁷ This was to change university funding from quinquennial grants to numbers of students based on yearly assessments of EFTS, "proportional to the EFTS in each course-cost category" (Olssen, 2002, p.65).

In addition to the above reports, the Labour government further chose to seek advice from high profile academics supporting its market metaphor and ‘shake-up’ of the tertiary sector. A clear example is the policy endorsement obtained from the Porter Project funded by the government to the sum of \$1.75 million (Peters, 1995) with the brief to assess the causes of New Zealand’s poor economic performance, and come with recommendations for improving it (Codd, 1995)²²⁸. This Project was led by Michael Porter, a leading professor at Harvard’s Business School in the area of international competitiveness, and consisted of a team of economists and business consultants, who were briefed to analyse causes for New Zealand’s weak economic performance. Their report, titled *Upgrading New Zealand’s Competitive Advantage* (Crocombe, Enright, & Porter, 1991, p.99), stated that New Zealand had not adequately invested in “creating the pools of human-resource skills needed to be internationally competitive”, and assessed that only one in five New Zealanders was likely to contribute towards building the country’s economic base. It also suggested that New Zealanders generally lacked the motivation and skills to be competitive, attributing this to a deficiency in the education system which gave priority to those skills required for economy growth. It thus advised that in order to be economically competitive, New Zealand needed “sustained and systemic change” to its current education system, “attitudes towards competition, and prevailing management philosophies” (Crocombe et al., *ibid*, p.156).

The Porter Project undoubtedly reflects the edicts of the WB and OECD: A nation does not inherit national prosperity but creates it (a stance that can be disputed as the history of capital accumulation and WB policy failures suggest both agency and structural preconditions in advancing economic development). The way to create national competitiveness lies not in cheap land and labour (as in the industrial age), but in knowledge intensive industries, to which a nation’s education system contributes and is embedded in. As Peters (1995) highlighted, the Project prescribed that New Zealand should become more ‘innovation-driven’, not factor-driven or investment-driven as the period of national economy demanded (see also Maitra, 1997). The Porter Project thus added to the ‘state’ consensus of knowledge being an important commodity congruent with the ‘new’ discourses of HCT at the supranational level, as discussed in Chapters 3 and 4.

²²⁸ In fact it was funded by the Trade Development Board, and supported by Treasury and the Reserve Bank (Codd, 1995).

Despite criticism about the report's methodology and generalisability to the New Zealand situation²²⁹, the Porter 'findings' were used, including by the National-led governments that followed, to validate Labour's educational experiment in neoliberal politics, and may even have been of more influence to New Zealand's change in educational policies in the 1990s than the precepts coming from IGOs. As Fitzsimons (1995, p.177) observed, the OECD, in its economic survey report of 1993, started to stress HCT in support of its claim that governments needed to "address the 'underqualification' problem through education and training"²³⁰. Conversely, Labour-initiated tertiary reviews and the former Department of Education had already signalled a problem of low levels of education in New Zealand prior to 1990, which the Porter Report 'substantiated' in 1991, and which led to the introduction of the NZQA as an instrument for measuring the rate of learning as an expression of growth value of HC.

Whatever the influence, the upshot has been that in contrast to education in New Zealand having largely been a public matter, (see Section 5.2.4), from the late 1980s onwards it became possible to envisage education as a private good with its core value of equality of opportunity being increasingly replaced by efficiency, choice and competition (Olssen, 1996). In particular, the 'user-pays' system of student fees marked a distinct departure of earlier state provisions, based on universal entitlement, in the tertiary sector. Thus, neoliberal policies in education may have started later than in the other public sectors, but once ignited they were similarly swift.

Apart from its unicameral parliament, Michael Peters (1995) observed that the rate of change in the New Zealand education sector was allowed to be so speedy for two principal reasons: the neoliberal ideology had already been tried out on the earlier

²²⁹ Brian Easton (*Listener*, June 3, 1991) made a priceless comment on the value of the Porter report: "... New Zealand's Porter Project spent about \$1.5 million (of taxpayers' money) on a report which is, largely a recycling of conventional wisdom and material published elsewhere. Even if there were more and deeper case studies, the return on the money expended would still be low. Particularly galling is the book's claim that we should improve the efficiency of government spending. The funding of this report would have been a good place to start. It must be a candidate for the lowest productivity research publication ever funded by government". (Article is available from the Brian Easton website: www.Eastonbh.ac.nz).

²³⁰ HCT based on the neo-classical deliberations that "wealth is obtained through the rate of growth in national economic productivity" rather than capital accumulation (Fitzsimons, 1995, p178) is a viewpoint that gathered support on the supra-national level in the mid to late 1980s. Hence, it is debatable whether New Zealand's development preceded the OECD direction or was in dialectic relationship with it, as earlier suggested.

transformation of public organisation such as post and rail; and swiftness was a deliberate policy of the fourth Labour Government as expressed by the then Minister of Finance, Roger Douglas. At the famous Mt Pelerin Society, established by Friedrich von Hayek and known for its contribution to advancing neoliberal ideas, Douglas presented ten principals for successful reform of which three represent the following strategies: (1) move in ‘quantum leaps’ as incremental change allows the rally of vested interests; (2) speed is critical as any delays will minimise success; and (3) never allow the momentum once in motion to stop (Peters, *ibid*). These strategies meant that it was important for government to set its own timetable and to consult only a small policy elite to improve on implementation details once the decisions were made. Any wider public participation or consultation would have slowed down the process and thus obstructed the goals set. As Peters stated, the process was basically undemocratic despite the rhetoric of participatory democracy and community empowerment that government employed in its rationale for ‘devolution’. Likewise, Butterworth & Tarling (1994, p.115) observed that a feature of Labour’s second term in office (1987-1990) was the “growing tendency to bureaucratisation, secrecy and arbitrariness” that typified the processes of tertiary sector reviews the Labour government had instigated in that period.

6.3 The Re-orchestration of Tertiary Education under National

Successive National-led governments between 1990 and 1999 built on the recommendations of the Labour initiated reports, but “embarked on the most significant changes to the welfare state” (Peters, 2003b, p.309), of which one consequence was the substantial cuts in social benefits through stricter eligibility criteria and methods of targeting. The same cuts in the tertiary sector resulted in students needing to contribute not 10% but 20% of total estimated course costs in 1991 (Olssen, 2002). It also introduced the Employment Contract Act 1991, which, closer in line with market libertarianism, represents National’s anti-collectivist and trade union stance. This Act shifted employment relations (ER) to individual negotiations²³¹, and impacted employment relations in the tertiary sector, as it set up conditions for contractual and

²³¹ Peters (1995) pointed out that the educational reforms under Labour had been largely complete, and new structures and accountability measures set in place. What was left was legislation changing employment relations so to make the workforce flexible and stimulate innovation and competitiveness.

flexible employment, clearly advancing an NPM agenda (see Section 3.3.1). As McLaughlin (2003) observed, policy decisions under National-led governments were less ‘incremental’ than under the fourth Labour Government and caused major transformations in educational provision and management. The latter is well illustrated in Lockwood Smith’s speech, the then Minister of Education under the fourth National Government, of 1992 (cited by Freeman-Moir, 1997, p.216):

We have reduced substantially the protection of our domestic economy, we have deregulated our labour market, reducing union power, and allowed individuals and enterprises to negotiate employment arrangements that suit them best. We aim to build a highly skilled, highly innovative and highly adaptive workforce through a reformed education system.

6.3.1 National’s Tertiary Reviews as Neoliberal Crescendos

Adopting the IGOs discourse of the knowledge economy, National was not finished with the reforms in the tertiary sector initiated by Labour. During its administration, the National Government put in place three major reviews of the tertiary sector: The National Government’s Tertiary Review 1991, the Todd Task Force 1994, and the Coalition Government’s Review 1997-1998.

The first tertiary review advised government to set public funding at 80% and private contribution at 20%, but, like Hawke, recommended that institutions were to be allowed to determine their own fees. Unlike Hawke, it proposed that student allowances should be based on student income, and for students under 25 on parental income. This proposal indicated a clear break from universal to targeted entitlements in tertiary education (see also Boston, 1999). The review hence initiated a user-pays system in the tertiary sector, made possible under the Education Amendment Act of 1991, with institutions setting their own fees whilst EFTS-based funding (at a reduced proportion of total course costs) continued. In addition, means-tested fees were abolished, allowances targeted, and interest-bearing student loan schemes put in place.

The second review, named after Jeff Todd, senior partner of Price Waterhouse, was in line with the IGOs emerging consensus of HCT to perceive tertiary education as

potentially a private investment (Olssen, 2002) and as life long learning, for the review emphasised that all New Zealanders needed further education and training in a knowledge-based economy. Increased participation in tertiary education could be funded by the existing policies, with recommendation for private contributions split in raising it to 25% and keeping the loan scheme (option A), or to 50% to fund resources needed to boost enrolments of Māori and low-income students and make the loan scheme income contingent (option B). In addition, the Task Force recommended that Private Tertiary Education (PTE) should be expanded in a managed way to allow students more choice. The government adopted option A and increased public funding to PTEs.

The last review, initiated by the National Coalition Government, consisted of the Green Paper, published in September 1997 (MOE, 1997b), and the White Paper, published in 1998. They addressed concerns raised in Treasury's briefing to the incoming Coalition Government²³² in 1996. These concerns, which are in essence a continuation of previous policy advice, Mark Olssen (2002, p.67) listed as follows:

[T]he need for increased monitoring and managing of tertiary funding; a greater role for student choice; a more even treatment of private and public providers; increased provider competition; a greater alignment of funding across the tertiary sector; and more reliance on student-centred funding models and targeted assistance.

The 'leaked' Green Paper of July 1997 (MOE, 1997a) showed the government's plan to continue the policy direction for tertiary education initiated in 1988. However, it was most radical in its appeal to abolish the EFTS bulk-funded funding system, as Treasury had advised, and to replace it with a voucher system of funding to students, based on non-transferable entitlements (Olssen, 2002). This fully marketised funding proposal, which also introduced the 'corporatisation' of TEIs, caused a widespread stir and student protest (Cohen, 1997). The 'official' Green Paper, which the Coalition Government presented in September 1997 as a 96-page discussion paper to 'encourage' public discussion on the future direction of tertiary education, represented a 'toned-

²³² It was the first Coalition government in New Zealand, based on a change in the voting system from 'first-past-the-post' representation, setting up solid majority governments and hence autonomy for the party in office, to 'mixed member proportional' (MMP) representation, which resulted in coalition governments, calling for more negotiated multi-party agreements.

down' policy document, making no mention of vouchers or corporatisation. The paper did emphasise the need for courses and research that are market oriented, and for universities to fully embrace information technology (IT) and be responsible for generating their own endowments. Prior to these publications the government also published in June 1997 the Green Paper for a National Qualifications Framework (NQF), which raised issues of accountability, capacity building and governance of the tertiary sector, and introduced the plan for NQF (MOE, 1997c). The final White Paper in 1998 confirmed the need for lifelong learning, participation of under-represented groups, diverse programme offerings to be responsive to student demand, and funding of all students for all programmes meeting quality standards, including those offered by PTEs (McLaughlin, 2003).

Besides these reviews, the National-led government also advanced, like Labour, the innovation rhetoric as put forward by the Porter Report in 1991. Under National the Porter Report's advice of developing a culture of enterprise and competition (a concept borrowed from the Thatcher government in Britain and advanced by the OECD – see Section 4.4) was heeded. The then Prime-Minister, Jim Bolger, set up an Enterprise Unit and Enterprise Council, and his government organised an Education for Enterprise Conference in February 1992 that was aimed at bringing enterprise and education together to build a vision of how these two sectors could cooperate to advance New Zealand's economic competitiveness (Peters, 1995). The conference was designed to discuss questions like how to improve institutional responsiveness of the education sector to the demand of enterprise and best prepare young people for future employment; what the role of government could be in encouraging closer links between education and enterprise; and how to improve the quality of training provided by the business sector. As Peters surmised, the three themes that arose from the submissions highlighted the need for:

1. Processes to enable businesses to provide more input into the development and implementation of national as well as local education policy
2. Procedures to promote and coordinate partnership between the business and education sector both nationally as well as locally
3. Means for the business sector to identify the medium and long term skills requirements for education and training purposes

These submissions illustrate that the Government was keen to make education more responsive to market needs, and allow the private sector to have a say in the design and implementation of TEIs' programmes. Education for innovation and competition became recurrent themes as a Ministry of Education document (MOE, 1993, p.7-8) shows. The document highlighted that “[t]he tertiary sector must be the driving force of research, discovery and innovation”, and “[t]he workplace must also be integrated into the educational system to ensure that we have the population skilled enough, adaptable enough, and innovative enough to be successful in international competition”. The document stressed the competitive aspect of education for the economy even further by stating that “we live in a global community and a global marketplace. If we seek to improve our economic standing relative to that of our competitors, our commitment to education and training must be greater than that of other countries”.

It is no revelation that a major consequence of the market orchestration of tertiary education in the 1990s under National was the proliferation of tertiary courses (see University of Auckland, Chapter 7), and science, education and technology becoming more commercialised and commodified in the name of increasing national competitive advantage” (Peters, 1996a, p.16; see also Gee, Hull and Lankshear, 1996). As this neoliberal development for tertiary education (Treasury’s objective) and NPM regovernmentalisation with the aim of introducing efficient management structures (SSC’s objective) are reflected in the role of the NZQA and government proposals documented in the Tertiary Education Review (TER) or Green Papers, they warrant further analysis. Hence they are discussed in more detail in the next section.

6.3.2 National’s NPM Compositions for the New Zealand Tertiary Sector: NZQA and the 1997 Green Papers.

The *NZQA* is an independent statutory body established under the Education Amendment Act 1990²³³ to provide uniformity in recognising academic and vocational courses under a NQF in order to promote degree portability; and “ensure the quality of

²³³ As Fitzsimons (1995, p.185) explained, this Act provides for the establishment and disestablishment of TEIs, and has as objective to grant these institutions “as much freedom to make academic, operational and management decisions as is consistent with the nature of the services they provide, the efficient use of resources, the national interest and the demands of accountability”, hence representing the devolution by delegation (see Peters, 2003b), which is a form of governmentality with the state steering function expanded rather than reduced.

delivery of ... standards on the Framework” (Codd, 1995, p.2). Under a National government, the NZQA advanced the Hawke report recommendation that no distinction should be made between academic and vocational education, and that all qualifications be made up of transferable units of learning, called unit standards, with each representing “a statement of the learning outcome” (Codd, *ibid*, p.3). This position grew out of a state perceived need to provide a seamless post-secondary education system so to increase accessibility, choice, flexibility and credit transfer for the purpose of stimulating student participation in tertiary education²³⁴. The well-established role of universities as exclusive providers of degrees, however, was here clearly seen as a barrier to opening up tertiary education to competition (Ami Sundar, 1998). Not surprisingly this plan received great resistance from the universities through the NZVCC. As Codd (1995, p.3) explained, unit standards stand for the “fragmentation of knowledge”, preferring measurable behaviours (a product-orientation) to developing creative and meta-cognitive skills (a process-orientation), and are thus in direct opposition to academic notions of excellence, and disruptive to “the coherence and integrity of university degrees”²³⁵.

In addition, as Patrick Fitzsimons (1995, p.176) pointed out, the advocated policies of the NZQA represent the New Zealand state expanding its steering function whilst seemingly minimising its direct control and pool of public employees. Fitzsimons proposed that through the NZQA, seven practices of the state (as formulated by Gamble, cited in Fitzsimons, *ibid*) can be observed by which the expansion of government can be gauged. These practices consist of state involvement in:

1. Encouraging the need for reform by using selected comparisons with other industrial countries, such as those reported by the OECD
2. Constructing what is ‘quality’ in education
3. Measuring the rate of a student’s learning in tertiary institutions and evaluating this rate with funding efficiency
4. Building metaphors for what constitute a nation’s wealth

²³⁴ This policy recommendation may well be modelled on the OECD assertion in *Education in Modern Society* (1985, cited in Marginson, 1997b, p.174) that the distinction between academic-general and vocational education was ‘false’ or ‘obsolete’, as the former now incorporates technology and the latter requires “an extended general education” (Papadopoulos, cited in Marginson, *ibid*).

²³⁵ In emphasising the outcome (ends) of learning, the process (means) of education is discounted and hence understanding and ‘required’ knowledge cannot be truly assessed by NZQA’s unit standards (see Fitzsimons, 1995).

5. Redesigning what education means without consulting educators
6. Increasing (paradoxically) costs to the state
7. On-going reforms in its own reform agenda

The NZQA embodies many of these practices, indicating the expansion rather than contraction of the state. To illustrate, the NZQA is consonant with the transnational economic metaphors of HCT and rate of economic growth. As Fitzsimons (1995, p.180) observed, the state is “implicated in constructing metaphors for measuring national wealth” as promoted by the OECD: to raise participation rates in the tertiary sector as means for increasing the value of HC (see also Section 4.4.2). He explained that (the National) government adopted the ‘metaphor’ that New Zealand’s HC “is the sum of the skills embodied in people” (ibid), connoting that more (NZQA) certificates equal more national wealth. Hence, NZQA functions as an instrument of ‘performance’ documentation, with performance measured according to credit accumulation, not necessarily skill or knowledge formation, and a means of tying the funding of TEIs with the rate of (individual) learning. The NZQA’s unit standard further contains a credit value as a measure of the value of learning, with each unit making up certain credits related to teacher-directed activity in hours estimated. The credit value is therefore linked to the time required (by an average student) to complete a unit standard. With the value of education linked to the rate of credit accumulation, competition within the tertiary sector based on which institution can offer the fastest credit accumulation (for the least costs) is advanced²³⁶. This link is to resolve one paradox of the modern state, which is to increase student participation rate (HC metaphor) without like increases in expenditure (efficiency metaphor). Under the NZQA those TEIs that can “produce students who accumulate credits faster than other providers would be deemed more efficient” (Fitzsimons, ibid, p.179).

Moreover, the government’s advocacy for a unit standards approach requires a “separation between the setting of educational standards and the development of a curriculum” (Codd, 1995, p.3), devolving responsibility for outcome to provider institutions. Basically, the NZQA’s focus on outcome as a measure of ‘quality’ means a

²³⁶ As academic skills development is here implicated to assist in the credit accumulation rate, this metaphor is of importance to the growth of academic units like the Student Learning Centre, as discussed in Chapter 8.

shift from inputs to outputs in the education sector, with the state becoming “both *owner* of its agencies and *purchaser* of their outputs” (Codd, 1995, p.4) [italics in original]. As a purchaser of outputs (products or services supplied), state as ‘buyer’ can assess the efficiency or effectiveness of a learning programme or institution by matching objectives with outcomes (ibid). The mechanism pushing this agenda is of course the market metaphor, as previously discussed. An education market functions like any other market: the consumer – as represented by the state²³⁷ - sets the (unit) standards, whilst institutions deliver the ‘goods’. If the latter does not meet the consumer’s need or demand, the former will shop elsewhere; hence funding efficiency is ensured. Accountability for services is devolved to providers, whilst the state does not lose power of control. Basically, it can ‘redesign’ curricula without consulting the educators.

The *NQF Green Paper* (MOE, 1997c) extends the NZQA rationales to a policy plan for a National Qualifications Framework to register the credit value of tertiary educational programmes. In this paper, Wyatt Creech, the then minister of education, foregrounds the monitoring and evaluating practice of the state, by highlighting the following: measuring skills and knowledge that students and employers have *invested* in and assuring that the qualifications they *invest in* are of *value* and *match employers’ and labour market requirements* as closely as possible. In line with the OECD and the Porter Project’s emphasis on raising the pool of human resource skills to be internationally competitive, the NQF Green paper likewise suggests that people need to have the *capability* to drive New Zealand’s overall *competitiveness* and *economic and social success* in a *global economy and marketplace*, that qualifications should meet or exceed a *quality benchmark*, of which one is the endorsement by *employers* and *other interested parties*; and that students and employers should be given a *common currency* – *quality, outcomes, level and credit value* [italics, my emphasis]. The rationale for a NQF is undoubtedly based on the market metaphor of competition, and indicates state anxiety of losing the battle against international competition as similarly cautioned by the Porter Report (and, as aforementioned, Maitra (1997) and Dale & Robertson (1997)). This rationale is stated as follows:

²³⁷ As Codd (1995) outlined, the direct consumer is the student purchasing the service, the indirect consumer is the state purchasing on behalf of society, and the employer as end user of qualifications can be a direct as well as indirect consumer. The state can be said to represent them all through (still) being the largest financial contributor of education.

If New Zealand is to prosper, we must be internationally competitive. We must produce goods and services which not only measure up against imports, but which achieve their share of world markets. With limited economic power and physical resources, we must look to the skills and knowledge of our people to feed innovation and improvements in productivity. In a world marked by rapid technological change, intellectual skills will increasingly command a premium over manual ones. (MOE, 1997b, p.15).

The above regovernmentalisation of state control under pressures of economic globalisation is a continued theme in the official Green Paper (MOE, 1997b). In particular, this paper exemplifies the PCT and PAT assumptions for the devolution of state power; TEIs needed to become more accountable to both the state, being the representative of the taxpayers, and the consumers so to prevent inferior courses, high fees, and the costs associated with financial failure (MOE, *ibid*, Section 6.1). Peters (1997b, p.7) pointed out that delegating power to agents of the state who have the expertise is an important form of indirect state control because they “do not assume an overt repression or coercion”. In its push for expertise, the Green Paper advanced the maximisation of contractual relations enabling indirect state control; that is, it proposed that governance was to be given to single-tiered governing bodies, appointed (largely) by the Minister of Education, with membership based on expertise rather than representativeness of interested parties. This arrangement meant “[c]lear accountability relationships” that “provide greater assurance that, in meeting its educational objectives, each institution is operated in a financially viable manner” (MOE, *ibid*, Section 6.4)²³⁸. The Green Paper portrayed that the then government was wary of any form of governance based on majority appointment because it may not necessarily lead to making the ‘right’ decision as self-interest is involved.²³⁹ Also, “[w]ith a majority-appointed governing body, the responsible Minister would have an accountability relationship with part of the governing body only, be unable to dismiss elected members, and probably require more direct interventions to maintain assurance of financial

²³⁸ Olssen (2002) pointed out, however, that in the White paper (MOE, 1998, Section 3.5) government proposed that all TEIs be placed on the 6th rather than 5th schedule of the Public Finance Act 1989, which would have meant the responsible Minister would have been given greater power of intervention and control, and would thus have weakened institutional autonomy.

²³⁹ The Green Paper states that the risk of failure is considerably reduced when skills and competency rather than representation predominate, and when members of governing bodies would not be there to represent or promote the views of a particular group (see MOE, 1997b, Section 6.3).

viability” (MOE, *ibid*). In accentuating “systems of expertise”, Peters (1997b, p.7) commented, the state “discursively shape[s] society into an object of government”. Furthermore, by doing so ‘providers capture’²⁴⁰ is effectively exercised.

The *Green Paper* (1997b) conveyed that its proposals were to solve the existing ‘inferior’ ownership arrangements, such as having insufficient mechanisms to influence governance decision-making, weak performance monitoring, diffuse accountabilities, and inadequate efficiency measures as indicated earlier by Treasury and the SSC. And although the paper’s authors did not provide, reminiscent of the Porter Project, ‘hard’ facts to support their statements, it follows from their beliefs that high significance was to be given to performativity, with an emphasis on efficiency. Here, the notion of incentive gains in importance: “Governing bodies need incentives that stimulate ownership performance and include both rewards and sanctions for actual performance at both personal and organisational levels” (MOE, *ibid*, Section 6.4). The report proposed that individual incentives were to be based on “mainly personal reputation and liability, in the event of financial failure or mismanagement” (MOE, *ibid*). This individualisation of responsibility through managerial form²⁴¹, as Dale and Robertson (1997) also highlighted, indeed entitles a state to exercise control, while appearing not to do so. However, an “increased concern among members of the governing body for its *collective performance* in acting on behalf of the Responsible Minister” (MOE, *ibid*) [*italics added*] was also considered a crucial aspect of personal incentives. In reality, this criterion further applied to institutional incentives would result in governing bodies, under market ideology, effectively becoming agents of the state, and accountable to a minister for the tertiary sector (a position that was created in 1999), thereby restricting any democratic processes that could lead to a state’s perceived ‘ungovernmentality’.

As Peters (1997a, p.26) reiterates, behind the principles of the 1990s educational reform under the National government had been “a deep suspicion of the processes of democracy”, and instead “Government has been entrusted to a public elite, to ministers

²⁴⁰ Butterworth and Tarling explained that in New Zealand discourse ‘capture’ took three forms, that of the consumer, the provider and the administration. Citing Geoff Bertram, the authors pointed out that “[p]rovider capture was said to occur ‘where those who supply state-provided services pursue their own interests *at the expense of the interests of consumers*’” (1994, p.68).

²⁴¹ As Peters observes (1997a, p.37), the Crown in being displeased with the existing governance arrangement negated the advantages of the representative model for preserving democratic interests, encouraging diversity, and being a suitable framework for achieving multiple goals.

and their expert advisers, who do not allow themselves to be influenced or captured by political considerations represented by the vested interests of the wider public” (ibid). Clearly, National had taken note both of Roger Douglas’s advice of how to conduct policies of reform and of Treasury and SSC’s recommendations of efficient administration in the public sector.

Joseph Stiglitz (1999, p.2), former Senior Vice President of the WB, once remarked that, “... government does have a role – a role in education, in encouraging the kind of creativity and risk taking that the scientific entrepreneurship requires, in creating the institutions that facilitate ideas being brought into fruition, and a regulatory and tax environment that rewards this kind of activity”. Undoubtedly, the discourse used in the Green Paper (1997b) under a National coalition government indicated that the world as described by neoliberal hyperglobalist (see Chapter 2) was given credence. It underlines the philosophy of the knowledge economy as promoted by the OECD and Worldbank (see Chapter 4); a state operates in a post-industrial, info-tech society, in which “knowledge becomes an informational commodity indispensable to the economy and the future basis of international competitive advantage” (Peters, 1997a, p.16). It further represents the HCT ideology of the IGOs: knowledge is not necessarily a public good, but central for capital accumulation and market efficiency. As “knowledge based on a finite set of phonemes has the capacity to generate unlimited combination” (Peters, ibid, p.33, citing Derrida), in matching the rule of efficiency, it becomes the essence of the new economy.

6.4 Counterpoints in State Policies for Tertiary Education: Outlook Global, Regional and/or Local?

As Dale and Robertson (1997) stated, in the context of globalisation and regionalisation a nation state seeks to site itself in a region. For New Zealand this has meant a redefinition of identity from the ‘adolescent dependency’ on traditional cultural and political ties with Britain to an ‘adult independence’ (Mike Moore, 1998) measured by economic success such as indicated by OECD country rankings, and a shift from placing itself predominantly in the realms of its own boundaries (national embeddedness) to locating itself in the ‘world’ (international embeddedness) (see Section 5.2.2). This

reorientation in outlook was helped by the neoliberal policies successive New Zealand governments have adopted since 1984 opening up the domestic economy and reshaping the New Zealand state from a welfare state to a competition state²⁴². In the process, the long-standing dilemma of accumulation and legitimation was solved, as accumulation *became* legitimation (Dale & Robertson, 1997). That is, rather than taken up a legitimation responsibility for social outcomes such as health, employment and education, the neoliberal policies implemented took pressure off the state by transferring responsibility for economic and social welfare to agencies (as providers) and individual citizens (as consumers).

‘Resiting’ can also be observed in the state promoting the internationalisation of its education sector, especially incorporating the Asia-Pacific region. Government-initiated policies other than those stated above similarly had an impact on the New Zealand tertiary sector. Policies for immigration of the late 1980s, for example, opened up New Zealand borders to non-traditional immigration flows from Asia, mainly so as to stimulate New Zealand’s waning economy. As a result, TEIs witnessed massive increases in student enrolments and the diversity of their student population (see for example Chapter 7). The open global market of education was further stimulated by legislative reform. That is, the 1989 Education Act made it possible to fully recoup the cost of education incurred by international students, shifting the focus from educational aid to educational trade (Oettli, n.d.; Alvey, Birks & Buurman, n.d.). Prior to 1989, international students were either private students, whose tuition fees were ‘subsidised’ as they paid equivalent fees to domestic students, or government and Commonwealth funded students, who on top of tuition fee subsidies also received scholarships (Oettli, *ibid*). However, strict quotas applied to restrict overseas enrolments (Alvey, et al., *ibid*). After 1989, only scholarships such as the Overseas Developing Aid (ODA) grants for students from developing countries were retained. Moreover, the quota restrictions were lifted²⁴³, and in 1998 (the year of the Asian Crisis) visa restrictions for overseas students from China were relaxed, with quotas increased from 1000 to 4000 students,

²⁴² This is a term Philip Cerny introduced to refer to the change in decommodification of certain economic activities out of the market as under the welfare regime to their recommodification under the competition state as characterised by shifts from macroeconomic to microeconomic intervention, from comparative to competitive advantage, and from welfare maximisation to the promotion of innovation and profitability on both private and public spheres, and a control on inflation (see Dale, 1999b).

²⁴³ This lifting already took place under the Muldoon government in 1979 with a fee introduced for overseas students (see Chapter 7).

which according to David Cohen (1998) was a direct result of Australian TEIs attracting a greater pool of the international student market than New Zealand TEIs had managed to do (9.6% versus 4.9% of the student population, respectively). These developments suggest that the ‘globalisation’ of the New Zealand tertiary education sector was significantly driven by economic incentives.

Matching the market restructuring of its tertiary sector, New Zealand’s commitment to the GATS has also been one of the most liberalised²⁴⁴. As, Christopher Ziguras (2003) pointed out, the fourth National Government’s signing of the agreement in 1995 covered both market access and national treatment for private tertiary education in cross-border supply and commercial presence, as well as made cross-industry commitments on movements of ‘natural people’, meaning managers and specialists of foreign institutions are allowed to work in New Zealand for specified periods (see Section 4.2.3), a category John Hilary (2001) argues is generally of interest to developing countries and one receiving the least commitments from WTO members. And although New Zealand’s commitments have not led to marked increases in the numbers of PTIs operating in New Zealand since 1995²⁴⁵, they do reinforce the state’s resolve to open up the New Zealand education system to the world. As de Wit and Knight noted, higher education in the 20th century was more parochial to serve the nation-states, particularly in the development of national identity. Towards the turn of the 21st century, however, it “has again become more international” (de Wit & Knight, 1999, p. 1). But a distinction can be made between the internationalisation and globalisation of higher education. Namely, internationalisation is more characterised by students and staff attending higher education in other countries; an increase of understanding of each other’s culture; the transfer of skills and knowledge through shared study; the transfer of understanding of methodologies of science and scholarship; and the profit motive being of less importance. In contrast, globalisation represents the formation of a single dominant paradigm; the franchising of this paradigm; the

²⁴⁴ Of the 44 out of 148 WTO members who have made commitments for the education sector, only 21 of these have done so for higher education and only 4 (the US, New Zealand, Australia and Japan) have submitted a negotiating proposal stating interest and issues in the education sector (UNESCO, n.d.).

²⁴⁵ Most of the increases in PTIs happened from 1990 to 1994 with the Education Act 1989 and the Education Amendment Acts of 1990 and 1991 being the main motivators for the proliferation in PTIs (see Section 6.5).

suppression of alternative cultural approaches (unless marketable); and the profit motive becoming dominant (Andrew Hamnett, n.d.)²⁴⁶.

Arguably, any signing of the multilateral GATS signals a preference for globalisation over internationalisation, with the likely impact being the commodification of a country's higher education sector, the homogenisation of courses, and the decoupling of teaching from research²⁴⁷. In the New Zealand case, as aforementioned, state pressure for the commodification of its tertiary sector has made the sector part of the economic objective to achieve global market competitiveness. Advocating GATS and granting more student visas are clear signs of the state perceiving its education sector to have a competitive advantage, as like most English speaking countries who have signed the GATS, New Zealand is part of a dominant cultural and linguistic paradigm and (under mode 2) can offer international students a stable, open and attractive environment. Indeed, with English the preferred language for the transfer of technology and skills, New Zealand TEIs are 'resited' in an advantageous position as knowledge providers to a global audience, and thus unlike its economic position as 'price taker' has the potential to be a 'knowledge maker' in the global market of education. Hence, the global and regional outlook in state policies for TEIs has mainly been based on market principles of generating funding for education from private sources other than domestic students' fees. As Robertson and Dale (2003b, p.25) assessed: "for exporting countries like New Zealand, there have been large profits to be made from establishing an industry in this [education] sector ... and indeed, the revenues from this industry have augmented declining state funding. It is notable here that in the case of New Zealand, this is a 'state for profit' model".

How has the 'resiting' affected the local, domestic role of TEIs? The 'resiting' effort at the national level to international embeddedness and the perceived need of the country

²⁴⁶ Hans de Wit and Jane Knight (1999) have designed a taxonomy of reasons why institutions chose to internationalise. They are in brief political, as an extension of foreign policy; academic, to enrich teaching and learning; cultural/ideological, to foster respect for diversity and promote international understanding; and economic/financial, to improve a nation's competitiveness or generate revenue for the institution. The first three reasons fit the internationalisation objective, whereas the last characterises 'pressures' for globalisation. It is not to say globalisation excludes internationalisation, but from a neoliberal stakeholder perspective the economic/financial rationale is likely to be advanced, but 'sold' under internationalisation objectives.

²⁴⁷ As Kelsey (1997, p.85) observed, the funding formula adopted by a market model "separates teaching, research and entrepot functions, making the first two contestable, and leaving the third to dwindle or disappear."

to train knowledge workers well-prepared for the global knowledge economy entail that TEIs increasingly need to focus on ‘adding value’ to the local economic objectives as well as develop their international strengths to remain competitive both locally and overseas. Here, Richard Yelland’s (2000, p.302) conclusion for universities in general is perhaps also relevant for New Zealand’s tertiary sector: “being international is increasingly being viewed as a key factor in being attractive locally. However, the driving force is primarily student recruitment, and the underlying causes are economic globalization, not internationalism”.

6.5 Policy Expression: Changes in Mandate, Capacity and Governance of the University Sector

On a national scale the New Zealand reforms of the tertiary sector, as indicated above, have been one of the most dramatic in the OECD countries, with the OECD report in 1997 referring to the New Zealand education ‘experiment’ as a process of “Reforming Again and Yet Again”, stating that “Within the OECD membership, it is difficult to identify a country, unless it be the United Kingdom, which has during the past decade embarked upon such a sustained and radical reform agenda as New Zealand” (as cited in McLaughlin, 2003, p.13). The state tertiary reforms of 1987-2000 clearly reflected the contradictory situation of minimising state funding in education (and other public services) in a downturn economy whilst expanding the tertiary sector to stimulate the (knowledge) economy as well as provide places to the growing numbers of students enrolling in post-secondary education. Under these conditions, as the paradox of the modern state suggests (see Section 6.4), the state advanced two neoliberal principles (McLaughlin, 2003):

- There are limits to public funding government is able (or willing) to spend on tertiary education (privatisation concept)
- Furthering education brings about not only social but also economic benefits to both the society but above all the individual (IGOs’ HCI concept)

The tertiary reform policies of the fourth Labour and National governments embraced these principles. The focus on private benefits based on the HCI assumption that those educated, irrespective of background, have more chances of employment and receive a

higher income not only provided the rationalisation for increasing students' private contributions but also for fulfilling equity obligations: granting open access whilst not preventing 'at-risk' groups from participating through the student loan schemes. At the same time, a competitive consumer climate was created. One noted outcome of the Education Amendment Act 1990 was the increased eligibility of private training establishments (PTEs) to tender for public funding in order to increase student choice. In addition, the universities lost their monopoly over degree courses²⁴⁸. After that, the enrolments in the tertiary sector in 1985 changed from close to half of the total tertiary student population enrolled in university education and the other half in polytechnics, with only 2% in colleges of education to 44%, 31% and 4% respectively, with the newcomers wānanga 4% and PTEs a substantial 18% in 2001 (McLaughlin, *ibid*). As Belinda Yourn (2002, p.753) summed up: "Tertiary education in New Zealand has since the 1990s been based on consumer choice with little regard to the resulting fragmentation".

Undoubtedly, the New Zealand university sector from the late 1980s onwards experienced significant transformations, which Dale (1999b) referred to as changes in *mandate*, related to what is considered desirable for universities to achieve; *capacity*, related to what is considered feasible for them to achieve; and *governance*, related to how those objectives are reached.

As Dale (*ibid*) explained, the mandate is related to the three core functions of the education sector: as supporter of the capital accumulation process, as 'instrument' for ensuring a level of social order, and as legitimisation of the system. Dale argues that for a competition state (see Section 6.4), the focus is increasingly on capital accumulation as legitimisation, a shift congruent with the IGOs' and HCI discourses mentioned earlier. As the state reduced state funding in education, it increasingly came to face a legitimisation problem, but has translated legitimisation into placing efficient delivery on the shoulders of its institutions, making them more market-like, whilst managing equality of access to

²⁴⁸ From the late 1980s to the early 1990s I was part-time employed as a Lecturer of Psychology in the School of Physiotherapy, the then Auckland Institute of Technology (AIT). It was one of the first polytechnic courses that applied for degree status, and I remember the tight objectives and outcomes of papers we had to write and the strong push for lecturers who did not have Masters degrees to obtain postgraduate degrees. The School's degree course was approved, and later the Institute was the only polytechnic that gained university status, before a Labour Government returned in 2000 preventing other polytechnics from becoming universities.

these ‘markets’ by targeting benefits and individualising responsibility for ‘human capital’ development and making the right choices to the ‘consumer’. In particular, the devolution of outcomes to TEIs and the promotion of a demand-led, consumer-oriented approach to delivery have changed the university mandate from broader desirable objectives such as personal development, building a nation of ‘shared’ (inclusive) culture as well as contributing to the economic welfare of the nation (see Section 5.2.) to narrower economic objectives of innovation and market-specific skill development.

The shift in mandate has certainly produced a like effect on universities’ capacity. As Dale (ibid) pointed out, in the 30 years after the Second World War questions about what is feasible to expect from education were more directed to the education sector’s contribution to the extension of social justice, as in the New Zealand case represented by the more social-democratic objectives prior to the mid 1980s (see Section 5.2.4). Only the reduction in funding and introduction of market approaches altered this capacity to narrower goals and a more limited range of pedagogic and curricular options. As Bowles-Gintis’ learning-choosing dichotomy (1989, p.26) would anticipate, the danger of market-oriented reforms is that certain academic subjects become ‘casualised’. Bowles and Gintis (ibid) explained, for example, that the ‘soft’ subjects – like the arts – deal with ‘learners’, and that the ‘hard’ subjects reflecting rational ideology – like the sciences, commerce and technology – deal with ‘choosers’.

Accordingly, the push for linking education to the knowledge economy and rational consumer choice promoting a demand-led education sector has threatened the existence of many Arts subjects, not on the basis of their performance quality but their redundant role, little surplus value, in a (post-Fordist) society of ‘utility maximisers’. In particular, as managerialism and corporatism quicken their pace, instrumental reasons, directed towards predetermined goals, are likely to ‘squeeze out’ alternative views needed for a healthy society and economy (Quartly, *Campus Review*, 30 April 1997). With a reduced capacity to fund these ‘alternatives’, they become less economically viable, and hence disappear from the curricula. As Luke (1997, p.61) remarked: “... universities such as mine are becoming much less ideological enactments of race/gender/class outsider revolutions, and much more experimental simulations of new organisational theories

from management seminars in business school”²⁴⁹. In such a context, management training becomes “*de rigueur* for anyone who aspires to high office” (Ball, 1990b, p.153). Instead of diversity, university education becomes standardised and homogenised to enable and provide, as the OECD ‘s HC approach also advanced, “more ‘career-orientated courses of study’; greater emphasis on ‘applied research and development’; planning for ‘effective technology transfer and knowledge diffusion’; the development of a ‘continuum of functions which cut across and break down the categorical distinctions of the past’; ‘greater government involvement and ... more responsiveness and accountability by universities’; increased ‘efficiency and productivity’ (OECD, 1987; cited in Peters, 1997a, p.223). Clearly, the objectives of what is desirable and feasible have changed and are further discussed in Chapter 7.

The governance of how these new objectives are achieved has also undergone change by the ‘competition’ state’s apparent steering from a distance, as typified by the tertiary education reviews. The use of market ideology and development of forms such as state devolution by delegation (of responsibility), managerial expertise, performance standards and the like may be unequalled answers to problems of state ideology and control. Steven Ball (1994, p.10) stated:

The use of performativity and target-related funding as a form of control, linked to the localized, productive and capillary power of ‘the manager’, presents a solution to the problems of ‘ungovernability’; that is, government overload, which allows the state to retain considerable ‘steerage’ over the goals and processes of the education system (while appearing not to do so).

However, the introduction of managerialism in New Zealand’s universities has raised issues concerning changes in power relations, decision-making mechanisms, institutional culture and academic freedom. All these matters affect the way objectives are formulated and achieved as the university becomes “a surrogate commercial business whose product is sold to customers ... at the competitive market price” (Kelsey, 2000, p.238). Peters (1990), for example, commented that the focus on accountability for efficient performance of the tertiary education sector tends to damage institutional

²⁴⁹ Luke’s observation is in reference to Australian universities, which underwent similar corporatisation measures, with their sector becoming seamless, a process also advanced by the National government under NZQA but which did not eventuate.

‘culture’, thereby creating more problems than solutions. Likewise, Ball (1990b, p.153) warned that such a policy in education would shift institutional governance “from professional/collegial in style to managerial /bureaucratic”, in which staff would become “increasingly subject to systems of administrative rationality that exclude them from an effective say in the kind of substantive decision-making that could equally well be determined collectively”.

A study which surveyed two-thirds of academic staff at Lincoln University (see Matheson, in *Educational Review*, February 1997) indicated support for the above stated observations as it showed that management changes since 1990 had not only increased staff’s administration workload, leaving them little time for research, but also had lowered staff morale. Resentment was reported regarding the increase in accountability that had resulted in the close monitoring of staff’s individual performance. This had created a performance ethos based on assessment of lecturers rather than helping them improve. From a previous supportive, collegial environment, staff surveyed thought that these changes had created a ‘them/us’ culture, where there was little trust. “In effect the university had violated the psychological contracts of some of its staff by changing its expectations of them, without their being really aware of it and giving consent to it” (Matheson, *ibid*). As Kelsey (2000, p.238) noted: “academics became increasingly marginalised from important decisions which had serious academic impacts”, as is discussed in the next chapter.

6.6 State as Conductor or Transnational Instrumentalist of Tertiary

Reforms?

To place the New Zealand tertiary reforms in a global context, it must be noted that the above ‘rearrangements’ are not unique to New Zealand as illustrated by reforms in other OECD countries. For example, the Green Papers have frequently been compared to the Dearing report in the UK and the West report in Australia that similarly provided advice incorporating (or commenting on) the two neoliberal principles of reduced state funding

and HC as private investment, mediated by managerial efficiency²⁵⁰. Ted Nunan and colleagues (2000) indicated that the paradigm shift to a consumption or post-Fordist society has required a reworking of universities from input to output, teaching to learning, local to global and semi-elite to semi-mass.

As Marginson (1997a, p.222) observed, in most OECD countries higher education reforms used the M-form structure, representing a combination of central and decentralised authority through quasi-market controls. Autonomous local sites were made responsible for outcomes and coordination was by competition, with the centre (that is, state) determining “the rules of the game” and “the forms and limits of what could be achieved, so that the system-institutions could be steered ... by remote control”. The comparable effects of these overseas reforms are illustrated by a survey distributed to nearly 800 Australian academic managers to elicit their responses to the condition of Higher Education (HE) management. The findings indicated that deans and heads of departments also thought that management demands now took precedent over collegial decision-making²⁵¹. One departmental head formulated the change as a shift to a culture of distrust in which endless assessment and accreditation had become the norm. In addition, a 1994 survey by the Association of University Staff (as cited by Baxter, 1996, p.3) found that the new situation had led to “... stress factors in the university environment ... identified by both overseas and New Zealand researchers, [concerning] overall workload levels, lack of funding, salary levels, level of infrastructure report, lack of recognition for work, and conflict between teaching and researching roles”.

Arguably, these paradigm shifts and market trends in the provision and organisation of university education are experienced on a wider scale and reaffirm that a nation and its education sector are increasingly interwoven into patterns of transnational policy making, which outlook is the global (knowledge) economy. As the historical analysis of

²⁵⁰ Peter McClenaghan (1998, p.4) reported that the West Review 1998 “was dominated by an agenda, which focussed on managerial, corporate, market driven issues”, but it was preceded by the Dawkins’ Green Paper (1987) and White Paper (1988) that produced the most significant changes as the existing binary system was collapsed and the number of TEIs reduced, resulting in a huge increase of managerial responsibility. The Dearing report, however, is extensive and much more ‘sophisticated’ than the West and New Zealand Green and White papers as it discusses in depth the benefits of the humanities and makes reference to the importance of tradition (Roberts, 1999). As Peters (1998, p.1) surmised “the Dearing report still acknowledges the British university as a site for the development, preservation and transmission of national culture, albeit in its commodified, tradeable and exportable forms”.

²⁵¹ This was in contrast to views expressed by the institutions’ executive officers - the managerial elite (Vice-Chancellor, Pro-VC, and registrar) (Meek & Wood, *Campus Review*, 16 April 1997).

capitalism suggests, nation states throughout the different cycles of capital accumulation have been in need to realign themselves with the ‘vagaries’ of an economic system that is inherently expansionary and international. Consonant with the K-wave theory introduced in Chapter 3, Habermas (cited in Peters, 1997a, p.212) observed that the market policies in university education likely reflect an economic or business cycle as:

... what the neo-conservatives today view as a ‘realistic reorientation’ of educational policy can also be seen as a recession phenomenon in the realm of educational planning, largely explainable in purely economic and political terms.

6.7 Closing Notes

On the whole, the neoliberal reforms in the New Zealand tertiary education sector suggest that New Zealand governments between 1984 and 2000 faced the paradox of state control and the globalisation of market forces that made policies based on the national embeddedness of the economy increasingly unlikely. The reforms under Labour and National governments represented the situation of state power being minimised, whilst simultaneously strengthened in persuasiveness with regard to the restructuring of the public sector (Fitzsimons, 1995). It can be argued that they both followed and preceded the neoliberal templates advanced at the IGO level. Yet, the policy proposals and legislative changes leading to reforms in the tertiary education (and public) sector through policies based on NIE/NPM did not just reflect neoliberal ideology per se but also the Foucaultian form of governmentality (Fitzsimons, *ibid*). As Ball (1990b) noted, this form of governance can be both totalising as well as individualising: totalising in that all are subjected to this system, and individualising in that any problem or resistance is located ‘in’ the person rather than the system. What this means is that New Zealand governments from 1984 onwards have been able to shift responsibility to the individual institution, as service provider responsible for outcomes that meet the demand of its stakeholders, and the individual consumer to invest in their HC and make the right choices.

Arguably, the neoliberal instruments applied to the New Zealand tertiary education sector had the individual and his or her rational action founded on self-interest as core value. However, the form of governmentality that followed also denotes that techniques

of (state/authoritative) power and techniques of self (as applicable to institutions as well as individuals) interact at a certain point. Yet, techniques of state and self “are not necessarily harmonious or mutually reinforcing” (Fitzsimons, 1995, p.175), but presupposes in modern democratic states “both the activity and agency or freedom of those whom they are exercised power” (Foucault, cited in Fitzsimons, 1995, p.175). Thus, conflict as well as consensus (or capture) is possible. In reality, the universities²⁵² persistently contested the neoliberal tenets in government reviews that threatened processes of proper consultation; institutional autonomy, academic freedom and the universities’ role as social critic; the introduction of separate funding for teaching and research; and the homogenisation of the tertiary sector (see Butterworth & Tarling, 1994).

As a result of institutional contestation the neoliberal policy of bulk funding of educational institutions, resulting in vouchers was ultimately abandoned. The plan of NZQA monitoring the criteria of unit standards for both vocational and academic tertiary education, which received strong criticism from the NZVCC, led to university courses not being accountable to NZQA assessments. Instead, it prompted the NZVCC to set up ‘voluntarily’ the Committee for University Academic Programmes (CUAP) in 1989 and the Academic Audit Unit (AAU). Likewise a seamless tertiary education sector did not materialise, although similar state funding of the sectors did. In addition, the 1998 White paper, which resulted from the Green papers, was shelved. Moreover, even though public choice theory (as promoted by Treasury) formed the basic rationale for educational reform, advocating the privatisation and contracting out of educational services as full public provision would be more expensive and less innovative, throughout the period of neoliberal reforms the New Zealand government remained the major financier of education (Peters, cited in Fitzsimons, *ibid*), even embracing private institutions in their funding allocation. As Kelsey (2000, p.229) stated: “To the frustration of Treasury and its fellow travellers, tertiary policy failed to follow the neoliberal textbook. Constructing the new hegemony was not a simple linear process”. It illustrates that departure from state-led policy formation through bottom-up contestation

²⁵² Auckland and Canterbury took their protest the furthest with legal actions against government plans to implement the Hawke report’s NEQA recommendation. They withdrew their actions after some concessions had been made (see Butterworth & Tarling, 1994).

is possible although the result does not necessarily mean a marked departure from the set course.

University accord and discord from the path set by state policies and regulations are examined in Chapters 7 and 8, which discuss the institutional and sectional transformations, as represented by the University of Auckland and its Student Learning Centre respectively.

Chapter 7

Institutional Arrangements: The University of Auckland

7.1 Prelude

The future of the University of Auckland is contained in the university of the present, but it is also contained in the university of the past, and not merely the past 30 years.²⁵³

The previous chapters have indicated that globalisation is acted out on multiple levels ranging from the global to the local. In the last two centuries, technological innovations have further resulted in globalisation becoming ‘thicker’, transforming life, schooling, work and all players in these social networks. Globalisation in its latest manifestation has been translated in the ‘ethos’ of neoliberalism, expressing a form of governmentality that provides states the means to steer public policies whilst appearing not to do so. At this juncture, similar to nation states, institutions may act not only as objects (recipients) but also as agents (promoters as well as contesters) of structural change at both the disciplinary and constitutional level, with their current configurations being manifestations of the interplay between complex external, internal and historical forces. At the supranational level IGOs have promoted higher education increasingly as a private good tradable on the global free market. This promotion has been reinforced at the national level by New Zealand governments between 1984-2000, the composers of the neoliberal experiment. As Tilly (n.d.) highlighted, from an extreme liberal point of view free-market economies – wherever situated – act alike. They dispel barriers from previous governments to free market operations and structurally reform society in similar ‘irreversible’ ways. From an extreme institutional point of view, however, economic reform is path dependent, and economic arrangements of market capitalism are constrained by historically developed social organisations and culture.

Consistent with Boyers’ four trajectories of modern capitalism (see Section 4.4.4), the neoliberal ideology in countries with histories of strong nationalist and/or centralised governments policy changes are likely to have been more incremental in nature. In

²⁵³ Nicholas Tarling (1999, p.i).

contrast for New Zealand, with a unicameral political system and a trajectory that shares features with other Anglophone countries, the neoliberal approach was more radically applied to the public sector in a relatively short time span. However, New Zealand universities, albeit young in history, are also part of a long university tradition, dating back 800 years, which values academic freedom and autonomy in teaching and research. Also, in a centenary university like the University of Auckland (UoA) established values are possibly harder to change even if a market approach is advanced. Institutional and cultural peculiarities could thus have spurred a different approach to ‘radical’ neoliberalisation than what state measures and policy would anticipate.

In line with the previous chapters that emphasised the dialectic pluriscalar nature of political-economic and social processes, the aim of this chapter is to trace the significant ‘traditions’ the University of Auckland has built on since its creation as a College of the University of New Zealand (UoNZ) in 1883, and to explore in what ways government policies from the mid 1980s up to 2000 have impacted on these traditions as well as instigated changes in the university’s governance, mandate, and capacity. In addition, how the UoA might have advanced, incorporated as well as resisted the push for neoliberal reform in their policies, actions and curricula is also examined.

7.2 ‘Organising Principals’ of the University of Auckland

We give degrees in moderate fees
In a democratic way;
If others deride and put on side
Then this is the thing we say:
We take no pains with first class brains
We’ve always managed without ‘em,
We owe our positions to local conditions
So why should we grumble about ‘em²⁵⁴.

²⁵⁴ The mathematician, Henry G. Forder, as cited in Sinclair (1983, p.181). Forder, appointed to the College in 1934, was the son of a blacksmith in Norfolk and through scholarships studied at Cambridge where he was awarded BA, first class honours. He wrote many a light verse, and the above is written in jest to the defenders of the New Zealand education system. To illustrate, Forder complained about the MA syllabus being no different from what was taught in English secondary schools.

New Zealand started its ‘post-Waitangi’ history as a British settler colony, whose colonists mirrored many of the institutions they established on those from the ‘mother’ land (see Section 5.2.2). In so doing, the University of Auckland shares in the university heritage of Europe, whose first university was the University of Bologna in Italy, established in the early 12th century CE, soon followed by the University of Paris, and in the 13th century CE by the University of Oxford and that of Cambridge. The ‘births’ of these universities coincided with Europe experiencing a shift from thin to expansive globalisation (see Held et al., 1999) in which ‘hemispheric’ interactions had deepened as a result of Europe ‘awakening’ and looking beyond its borders. In this awakening and expansion drift, the early European universities played a supportive role. They became the conservatories for planting the seeds of the 15th century Renaissance from which came the search for ‘objective’ truth, a secular legal system and the rationalisation of societal life.

In their pursuit of scientific knowledge, the universities also became the engines of industrialisation. In addition, the ‘rational’ theories and ideologies they developed assisted many of the European nations, and their former colonies, to consolidate as well as expand their borders on the basis of ‘higher’ civilisation and modernisation. Readings (1996) classified the roles that universities have fulfilled throughout the ages as follows: the role of reason to enable the shift from a religious, divine ruling to a secular, ‘rational’ society; and that of culture to strengthen the emerging nation states, hence universities also incorporated a nation building function. Their latest role, he argues, is that of excellence, a techno-bureaucratic notion, as manifested in the recent push at the IGO and national level for managerialism and teaching, learning and research excellence for building a knowledge economy²⁵⁵.

According to Peters (1997a) however, New Zealand universities were not built on the notions of Kantian reason or the Humboltian concept of national culture. As the above quote suggests, university education in New Zealand was not so much to be aimed at cultivating ‘first class brains’ in the Oxbridge tradition. Rather, they were to be

²⁵⁵ Note that excellence is seldom defined. However, John Covaleskie (1994) pointed out that excellence is often equated with competitiveness, being number one as measured by such functionalities as high test scores and high ranking on ivy-league scales. Hence the focus is on measurable outcomes rather than the process of education, with students (and staff) encouraged to compete rather than to excel (that is, be the best one can be). The techno-bureaucratic reading of excellence seems to advance excellence as competition.

provincial universities with “a thoroughly practical character suited to the needs of a colony” (Morrell, as cited by Peters, *ibid*, p.19). As a result, Peters (*ibid*) argues, the early university system prior to 1961 only featured elements of excellence of Readings’ triad of reason-culture-excellence, centred around the recurring worry about standards by Senate, the examination body, and academics, mainly from Britain. However, one issue that has featured consistently in the debates on university education in New Zealand has been the importance of academic freedom (see Crozier, 2000). This issue tends to tie in more with the traditional values of an open and liberal university education, of which the university as the critic and conscience of society is a major attribute, than with the pragmatic traditions of a settler colony advancing the practical merits of education. The ‘traditional’ values of the UoA may therefore ‘resist’ the neoliberal policy objectives of the State and those of the three IGOs discussed earlier, all foregrounding the functional contribution universities can make to a nation’s competitive advantage in a global knowledge economy.

Tensions between universities and ruling parties are not new though; they are part of all universities’ histories, especially as universities since the 1930s have been increasingly dependent on the state for their funding bringing them “ever more intimately into the political world” (see Butterworth & Tarling, 1994, p.23). As universities are woven into the global web of state and institutional relations, the aim of the following sections is to examine the organising principals of the University of Auckland from which to explore the consonant and dissonant ‘tenors’ at the institutional level to the neoliberal policies advanced at the transnational and national stage.

7.2.1 The University of Auckland in its College Years

Keith Sinclair (1983) observed in his book *A History of the University of Auckland 1883-1983* that the last three decades of the 19th century saw many universities established in English-speaking countries. As the University of Auckland was founded in 1883, Sinclair argues that its birth cannot be considered a local incidence. The previous chapters also indicated that New Zealand was a British creation in a period of modern globalisation; its institutions are therefore not autonomous from other events happening in an interstate system that for New Zealand had Britain as the ‘motherland’.

As said, British immigrants wanted to model their institutions after what they had known in their country of origin, but in the process of imitation the New Zealand soil was the ‘stage’ from which new figurations were to emerge, albeit not always applauded as the irony of the abovementioned quote reveals.

The idea of a university in the young colony was first raised in 1854 by Hugh Carleton, Member of the House of Representatives (MHR) for the Bay of Islands, in support of getting “more educated men into the House” (ibid, p.2). He envisaged secular non-teaching universities in each province entitled to examine and grant degrees, whilst each church denomination could start its own college for teaching purposes. This vision was modelled after the University of London, and largely reflected the “down-to-earth” view of the colonists: professional training mainly done part time, open to ‘all’ and with each college mirroring city rivalry. These early seeds set the tone for the development of the university sector in New Zealand (Tarling 1999, p.2).

In 1869 ‘Scottish’ Otago was the first to show the will and means to founding a university, which they intended to make ‘colonial’, meaning national (Sinclair, 1983). Parliament introduced The University of New Zealand Act of 1870, which allowed the establishment of a Senate or Council authorised to confer degrees in arts, law, music and medicine – fields of study that largely reflected the liberal arts curriculum of the Parisian-Oxbridge model²⁵⁶. It was to receive £3000 and amalgamate with Otago University, which henceforth would become a national university, but Otago was challenged in its pursuit by the Canterbury English, who preferred the London model where “the colleges teach, the university regulates” (Sinclair, p.5). For Aucklanders, a university in Dunedin was, however, of no use in terms of access, and Maurice O’Rorke (MHR for Onehunga) proposed to move the UoNZ to Auckland, a move which was rejected by the Legislative Council, the Upper House. As Sinclair (ibid, p.4) aptly remarked: “University politics began before there were universities”. In the end, the Canterbury proposal won and its College was established in 1873.

²⁵⁶ The Paris-Oxbridge model is based on giving the university an independent status from the ruling parties: either the Church or State. In this model, the university is organised around four faculties (arts, law, theology and medicine), each run by a Dean, and whose lecturing staff constitutes the guild.

It took Auckland another decade to establish a College for reasons as diverse as having no ‘intellectual’ nucleus, lack of capital, and losing its status as the country’s capital. Yet the city had early UoNZ connections. Auckland Grammar’s application to be affiliated was accepted in the early 1870s followed by Wellesley College, St. Johns College and Church of England Grammar School in the mid to late 1870s. Nonetheless, the number of students that matriculated was minimal, and the standard of instruction in Latin and Greek reported as poor in 1873 (Sinclair, 1983). Despite the absence of a proper college, Auckland can at least lay claim to the first female college graduate, Kate Edger, who obtained a B.A. through Auckland Grammar’s ‘college’ in 1877.

The founding of a university in Auckland was further hampered by the depression that lasted from 1879 to 1895. Hence, university education was not a priority of the emerging state. Also, as the centre of commerce, Auckland already represented the conflicting mandates of higher education: general or vocational. The controversy shows the clash between ‘universal’ ideals of independent learned endeavour (Oxbridge) and vocational needs of commerce and industry (Scottish models). When The Auckland University College was eventually founded in 1883 with persistent effort from O’Rorke, the then Governor Jervois expressed the New Zealand egalitarian approach to university education in his opening speech: “The true function of modern university I take to be, to give to all – men and women alike – who wish to avail themselves of it every facility for higher education in whatever branch they choose for themselves” (as cited in Tarling, 1999, p.2).

7.2.2 ‘Principal Organisers’: Open Entry, Raising Standards and Academic Freedom

Unlike Otago and Canterbury, The University of Auckland was from its beginnings a state institution dependent on central government funding, and the state money it received barely covered the relatively high salaries of the four professors²⁵⁷, recruited in and from Britain, in the field of Mathematics and Mathematical Physics, Classics and English, Experimental Physics, and Natural Science and the registrar. Because of minimal state funding for accommodation for the College and the absence of

²⁵⁷ They received £700, which must have been a considerable sum as Sinclair’s historical account of the university’s centenary indicates that the level remained the same for a few decades.

endowments, it was housed poorly, and in 1883 staff had to teach 95 students in a disused courthouse and jail. Some other premises, scattered around the CBD and Mount Eden, were soon added, with student numbers rising to 156 in 1901. These early beginnings provided the blueprint for today's physical layout²⁵⁸ and ongoing struggle for more facilities.

In its role as a teaching university, the College was 'open' and part time, attracting mainly students already working and attending university to become certified teachers, law clerks or accountants. Still, students needed to have the means to pay the fee of 15 shillings per course (reduced to 10 shillings during the worst depression year of 1888) (Sinclair, 1983)²⁵⁹. Nevertheless, the open access philosophy became a typifying feature, reinforced from the start by community access to lectures given to the public and interest groups, such as engineers, and the College's annual open day, an event still observed today.

The dual view in the community concerning the role of the university also existed among the founding professors in the different disciplines, with Tucker the classicist stressing the cultivation of the mind and an educated citizen being "all the better able to exercise his vote, all the better able to escape imposition and prejudice" (cited in Sinclair, p.39), and the scientists Brown and Thomas highlighting the practical value of their field. Yet, all were well versed in a number of subjects, showing the influence of the Oxbridge model in their education. For many of its early years the College curriculum with Latin being compulsory in the Arts further reflected the influence of the medieval universities based on the Parisian-Oxbridge model as well as the 'Grammar'

²⁵⁸ The first permanent building specifically built for the College was the Clock Tower, which opened in 1926. The Old Choral Hall was redesigned to become the science building in 1919. Prior to that, Sinclair (1983) reported that there had been many 'site rows' to get the College established around Princes Street where it is now, because of community backlash (some from influential, wealthy citizens living in the Albert Park area) against building on such a prime site and the suggestion that Old Government House may become becoming part of the College. Only after the First World War did the row subside and the College got its prime 'Met' site, but not yet the House.

²⁵⁹ As Sinclair (1983) remarked, the College when it was founded was open to all students whether they had matriculated or not, as the pool of matriculated students was too small to make the College viable. For example, of the 156 students enrolled in 1901, 101 were without 'matric'. This situation was also a result of not many children advancing to secondary school, which was expensive and only made free of fees in 1903, as aforementioned. Open access was 'officially' discussed, however, in the post-World War I years, with ex-service men the first to be given to the university entrance without any need of an examination; this soon included all over the age of 30 and then 21 (Butterworth & Tarling, 1994).

schools²⁶⁰. Therefore, despite most students being employed, the community often accused the College of being a “class institution” as the “study of dead languages, the research into ancient history, and the unapplied theories of science... [were considered to be] of little value to industry and commerce” (cited in Sinclair, p.105).²⁶¹

Well into the 1950s, the leading British professoriate made further attempts to import the English standards of university education, leading to tensions with respect to the relative egalitarian, ‘fair-go’ values of a settler community (see Chapter 5) and the elitist notions of the university characteristic of a class-stratified British society. Sinclair (ibid, p.178) observed that in the 1930s and 40s the College was still “a colonial institution”, New Zealand a Dominion and academic life “dominated by men from Oxbridge and Edinburgh”. For example, in 1939 the leadership was mainly English, with nine of the 15 professors British and three from New Zealand but partly educated in Britain, and twelve Brits and nine British educated New Zealanders making up the academic staff. Hence, there was little input from other university traditions, such as from Germany and the US that promoted a focus on research²⁶².

As expected, many aspects of the New Zealand education system were criticised, in particular its part-time nature and evening classes (ibid). But despite frequent complaints about the quality of students, ‘to raise academic standards’ became a real “crusade” in 1934 of the four newly appointed professorial staff: Forder, Sewell,

²⁶⁰ The early universities ‘north of the Alps’ were the equivalent of Grammar schools as they offered a curriculum based on the seven liberal arts: the trivium - grammar, rhetoric and logic - and quaddrivium – arithmetic, geometry, astronomy and music. This programme entailed that a student, often starting his (there were no female students at that time) studies at the age of 12-15, learned the basic liberal arts, progressed to higher studies in philosophy, mathematics and natural science, and finally underwent more specialised training.

²⁶¹ As Sinclair noted, it took the College longer than the southern campuses to establish professional schools since Senate was to approve the new degrees. Canterbury had majority representation in Senate followed by Dunedin, and as Canterbury already had Engineering and Dunedin Medicine, there was resistance for getting these Schools established in Auckland. The first officially recognised was the School of Architecture in 1915 as it posed no threat to the South, but years of disputes with Senate followed to get Auckland’s Engineering course approved (the first two years of study was finally approved in 1927 by a reformed Senate, renamed Council) and the School of Medicine established.

²⁶² Little research was instigated in the early years of the College, although some students engaged in it, with Chemistry being the most notable (see University History, <http://www.auckland.ac.nz>).

Rutherford, and Cooper.²⁶³ In particular, Rutherford wrote a report on the lack of literacy among his students as in one term test only 44 out of the 147 students had passed. Moreover in 1946, 50% of students failed Stage I, and 35% of students Stage II. The solution coming from the Auckland professors was to raise the standards of the university entrance (UE) examination. Under the first Labour Government (1935-49), the proficiency examination for secondary education had been abolished in 1936 to get more children into secondary schools. One result was that UE became a school-leaving certificate for students who sought immediate employment, not university education. Hence, there was pressure to soften standards whilst keeping the UE geared syllabus. In addition, the principle of accrediting became a Labour policy and was strongly advocated by C.E Beeby, Director of Education in 1940. The Senate of the University of New Zealand approved in principle the concept of accreditation; the Auckland Professorial Board rejected it²⁶⁴, whilst the President of Council, Hollis Crocker, firmly supported it. In the end the views of the Auckland professors were disregarded, accrediting was approved by Senate in 1940 and officially introduced in 1944. The New Zealand ideal of open entry to university for its citizens had persevered over the British (and Continental) more elitist university tradition of limited access and high entry requirements. Nevertheless, the ‘raising academic standards’ theme remained part of the College culture and represents an important ‘organising principal’ influencing university discourse and policies up to this day²⁶⁵.

Although the link with Britain remained strong in the Professorial Board, it was in many ways counteracted by the Council of ‘lay’ men, often prominent community figures like the politician O’Rorke and the lawyer Crocker, both of whom were Chairman (later

²⁶³ Forder, professor of Mathematics, aimed to bring up the level of Stage III mathematics to English secondary school level; Sewell, professor of English, complained about the inferior standard of literary work in particular and the presence of part-time students who lowered the standards even further; Rutherford, professor of History, went as far to state: “the present discrepancy of standards is due entirely to inferior mental equipment of the average New Zealand student” (as cited in Sinclair, 1983, p.179; and Cooper, professor of Classics, reported in 1935 about the suspicion that lingered around the Honours degree and hence wanted to raise the work to the standard of British provincial universities.

²⁶⁴ Sinclair (ibid, p.182) may have a point when he stated that the Auckland professors acted in the interest of New Zealand but contributed little to the evolution of New Zealand education through a lack of interest “in adapting tertiary or secondary education to specifically local needs”.

²⁶⁵ In having been an elected member of the UoA’s Education Committee during the academic years of 2002 and 2003, I have seen the issue of pre-university qualifications featured on the agenda more than once, with the issue raised either in relation to Special Admission or English as an Additional Language (EAL) students. The status quo has generally been decided on due to equity and legal issues, as well as financial reasons such as a reduction in student numbers. Also, as some papers and degrees are restricted some prerequisites or conditions can be built into those papers without removing the special admission criteria or increasing the general entry requirements.

renamed President and today similar to Chancellor) and influential. That is, as a state institution the College fell under parliamentary legislative control, but authority had been devolved to Council. The 1879 Royal Commission had recommended that four professors would be appointed to Council, but this recommendation was ignored in the 1882 Act. Since professors were paid employees, politicians considered them “servants of the University” and hence “subordinate to the administration of Council” (Sinclair, 1983, p.42). Moreover, they were not accountable to the public for their activities; Council was. As the College had no academic head until the appointment of Kenneth Maidment in 1950 as Principal (equivalent to today’s Vice-Chancellor)²⁶⁶, the Chairman effectively ran the institution, a situation that is not dissimilar to the managerialism advanced under neoliberal policies during the 1980s and 90s, with the Vice-Chancellor not necessarily being a professional academic but ‘corporate manager’.

Nevertheless, despite their frequent clashes, the dividing line was not always across Council and the Professorial Board. The ‘freedom of speech’ principle is such an example. During the depression years government put some pressure on the colleges to discipline staff and students who made ‘radical’ comments, again not a situation unlike those faced by academics under market conditions. In Auckland, the commercial city, the effect seemed to have been most intense. Known as the ‘Anschutz affair’ and ‘Beaglehole affair’²⁶⁷, academic freedom became questioned and led to what Sinclair (ibid, p.155) named “the most famous message ever sent out in the College” written by its President, Sir George Fowlds, and which ended with:

The staff has a right to expect the full assistance and protection of the College authorities – and the authorities for their part are entitled to demand that members of staff will not by their utterances place the College authorities in an untenable position when defending to the uttermost the rights and privileges of Universities. I regard recognition, by members of the staff, of the responsibilities referred to in this memorandum as a matter of vital importance, and as being intimately related to the question of fitness for tenure of a University post. (Ibid, p.154.)

²⁶⁶ The Act of 1923 made it possible for Council to appoint a Principal either from the Professorial Board or someone external. The Board first approved of such an idea but then in 1927 decided against it. Sinclair assumed this position was the result of infighting among Board members.

²⁶⁷ Anschutz had written a foreword for a book that was pro-Russian, and Beaglehole, together with Richmond, had signed a letter stating that the communists were not responsible for the riots that erupted in Auckland during the depression (Sinclair, 1983).

The Professorial Board accepted it uncritically; however, Beaglehole (and Richmond) pointed out the danger of the latter remark in a letter to Fowlds, whilst Anschutz commented in the Press that restrictions to free speech included ‘slander, libel and sedition’ but that it now had even more limitations. As Beaglehole’s position in the College was not secure, Council pushed for not renewing his employment, hence losing one of New Zealand’s influential historians. The affairs produced schisms within Council and Board according to conservative and ‘radical’ leanings of its members and academics. The Fowlds’ memorandum was only annulled with new Council members like Crocker, who later became President and was an advocate of free speech, and with new professorial staff who in 1935 produced a shift to the liberal left in the largely conservative Board²⁶⁸. Thus, an age-old university tradition was upheld, and academic freedom became another ‘organising principal’ for the College worthy of defending where it was threatened.

7.2.3 The University and Māori Partnership

The issue of partnership with Māori is noticeably absent from the centennial accounts of the University, a situation consonant with the general post-Waitangi history of New Zealand (see Chapter 5). In the early years of university education not many Māori attended, since the New Zealand education system did not affirm Māori values, making the whole school experience a “cultural battlefield” where, up to 1950, some students were still given corporal punishment for speaking Māori (Walker, 1999, pp.189-190). As Ranginui Walker (1999) commented, Sir Apirana Ngata, one of Māori’s leading academics, had started out in academia with the belief that knowing the European culture through the medium of English would enable Māori to gain access to Pākehā culture and professions. However, he also realised the damaging effect of assimilation on Māori culture and language, and started to emphasise the importance of being bicultural and bilingual. In the early 1920s he put forth the request for government to support research into Māori culture and for the University of New Zealand to include the Māori language in the Arts programme. The Māori Ethnological Research Board

²⁶⁸ This shift should also be viewed in the larger political context of the 1930s, a decade that saw a Labour government emerge. Hence, the country’s political spectrum moved to the liberal left.

was the result of the former, but the Senate of the New Zealand University rejected the latter on the basis of there being not enough literature to fill a teaching programme. Sir Ngata proved otherwise, but it took another 25 years to make Māori a degree subject (Walker, *ibid*).

In Auckland, it was not until 1949 that a Māori tutor, Maharaiia Winiata, was appointed in the Department of University Extension, predecessor of the Centre for Continuing Education (CCE), followed by Matiu Te Hau's appointment in 1952. These were outreach positions but "at least ... a baseline on which other incremental gains could be made" (Walker, 1999, p.191)²⁶⁹. From their activities came the *hui* – Māori assembly – that improved the "mana of the university among Māori people" (*ibid*) and established the Māori Education Advancement Committees. However, after 1963 the University withdrew from providing Māori outreach programmes, formalising the work of the Māori tutors in the now CCE programme that aligned itself with the on-campus courses in languages and culture. More Pākehā students attended the Māori courses, with only 6% of Māori attending, which resulted in 'mainstreaming' the courses and making "the emancipatory project of the Māori" more peripheral (Walker, *ibid*, p.192).

Yet, as Walker (1999) pointed out, the *hui* or Māori leadership conferences were reintroduced in the 1970s from which Nga Tamatoa emerged, giving leadership in protest actions at Waitangi, and the subsequent Māori Land March of 1975, the occupation of Bastion Point in 1977 and the Hiko Ki Waitangi in 1984. The group also promoted a Māori language day and campaigned for a one-year teaching training course for fluent speakers of Māori, with its conference in 1984 further setting the path of Māori education towards the development of te kohanga reo, kura kaupapa Māori and wānanga. Consistent with K-wave theory (see McMinn, n.d.), these developments overlap with the emancipatory movements against racial and gender discrimination in many of the Western countries and their former settler colonies (such as the US and South Africa) with universities becoming sites of struggle. A major result of the rise of emancipatory groups in New Zealand was the 1985 amendment to the Treaty of Waitangi Act, which gave retrospective power to the Waitangi Tribunal to 1840 and

²⁶⁹ These events coincide with the move of many Māori to the cities in the 1950s, resulting in 70% of the Māori population being urban in the 1970s. However, their numbers in tertiary education were in no proportion to their numbers at large (see Tarling, 1999).

made possible the retelling of New Zealand history from a Māori point of view and the advance of treaty discourse of partnership and tino rangatiratanga. As regards Māori engagement in “the politics of culture and the pedagogy of emancipation”, Walker (ibid, p.193) observed that the protective cloak of academic freedom and the university as the critic and conscience of society played an important role in this engagement (see also Kelsey, 2000).

At the departmental level, the Māori language became a subject paper within the Department of Anthropology with the appointment of Bruce Briggs as lecturer in 1951. Protest came from the professor of French who considered Māori not a language of scholarship because it was an oral language (Walker, 1999). But with the support of some of the Anthropology staff, the faculty (of Arts) passed the motion. Because of ‘liberals’ having the numbers in faculty, the Māori Stage 2 paper was also accepted in 1952 among much protest which reiterated the earlier decision by the UoNZ Senate that not enough written resources existed for the teaching of Māori. These protests, Walker argued, reflected more the state of race relations in the country than the availability of resources. Despite these protests, the University of Auckland was first to introduce the Māori language in the Arts curriculum, with the University of Victoria the second university to do so in 1967, more than 15 years later. Still, Victoria was the first to give Māori independent status from Anthropology with the appointment of Hirini Mead in 1975 (Walker, 1999). Auckland had to wait another 15 years before the Māori Studies department was created.

With respect to Māori students, as part of a quota system being introduced after 1969, the UoA made the first attempt to increase their numbers and rate of success at the faculty level, first with Law in 1969, then Medicine in 1972 (with Commerce a late starter in 1986). Special schemes were introduced to support the entry of Māori students into their professional schools and guide them on the way. In addition, the then Vice-Chancellor (VC) Colin Maiden set up a committee in 1976, with John Hollyman as convener (Tarling, 1999), which resulted in the University’s commitment to increase Māori participation and academic success and to build the university’s marae, which was (after many delays) opened in 1988. Also, the first Māori Liaison Officer,

Taimihanga Potaka, was appointed in 1982²⁷⁰. All these stepping stones contributed to laying the foundation for partnership under the Treaty to be addressed, as well as for other voices on campus to be heard. Nevertheless, Māori participation was increasing at a slow pace for much of the 1980s only to rise substantially in the 1990s, yet remaining under-represented relative to the Māori population in Auckland (Henry, 1992)²⁷¹.

7.3 University Orchestration before 1984

Before the neoliberal shift in IGOs and state discourse and policies for tertiary education, the university landscape in New Zealand was characterised by six universities distributed throughout the country's major centres. It was regional in character, with, except for the professional schools, students mainly “drawn from regional catchments, known as ‘university districts’” (Berg & Roche, 1997, p. 151). Although Peters argued that the New Zealand universities were not so much sites of reason and culture in the Kantian and Humboltian tradition, his assertion can be questioned. As Berg and Roche (1997) observed, university education before the *market* metaphor can best be summed up as a *community* metaphor. Such a metaphor incorporates a nation-building element, in New Zealand's case, the cultural ideal of the harmonious, egalitarian society (see Section 5.2.4). As the authors indicate, and as has been demonstrated in Chapter 5, this community orientation was not always favourable towards Māori, women and other “visible minorities” and often restricted (higher) access along lines of ethnicity (see the previous section) and gender²⁷² as well as age and sexuality. However, the metaphor offered scope to “more inclusive constructions of society” (Berg & Roche, 1997, 152). which, as Codd (1999, p.1) commented, reflected the traditional role of public education as contributor to the “maintenance of social democracy through building communities of literate and informed citizens”. The community metaphor further influenced UoA's arrangements of governance, mandate and capacity, which are discussed next.

²⁷⁰ Shirley, as I got to know her, was an amazing woman, who in the mid 1980s imparted to me the important pedagogical lesson of learning from academia without “losing one's feathers”.

²⁷¹ The Māori student participation rates in 1981 was 3.4% only and was to drop to 2.5% in 1982, hovering around 3% for the next four years. The 1988-1990 period saw a rise to an average of 4.5%, to be followed by a sharp increase of 6.2% in 1991, a rate still lower than the 11% living in the Greater Auckland region (Henry, 1992). As Henry (ibid) observed, although pleasing, the initial increases are likely to have been the result of growing unemployment, no unemployment benefits to the under 18-year olds, and sharp increases in the Māori population in the core participation group of 18-24 year olds

²⁷² The *first* UoA female professor was Marie Clay of Education in 1974.

7.3.1 *Arrangements of Governance*

With regard to governance issues, the community orientation within the university's 'fortress' was generally typified by collegiality based on trust, sharing and participation rather than competition based on distrust, control and retribution (Smyth, as cited by Berg & Roche, 1997). The cornerstone of collegiality is consensus decision-making, the advantage of which is that a majority of members decide. This collegiality can further be expressed at three functional levels (Bessant, 1995, p.62):

1. *autonomy* in teaching and research; that is, freedom to design courses of study and research directions with assessment by and accountability to the 'experts' and colleagues in the field;
2. *voice* in the decision making process on academic issues at both the departmental and institutional level of the university;
3. *academic freedom* to disseminate knowledge and ideas to the world-wide community of scholars without fear or favour.

In addition, Berg and Roche (*ibid*, p.153) stressed that within this framework reference should be made to the idea of equity "as a means of at least partly guarding against the exclusivity of the gendered, racialised and classed collegiality of the 'old boys' networks"²⁷³ that have dominated the university landscape until quite recently (and that continue to be influential).

As the history of the UoA illustrated, the characteristics of collegiality have been variably applied to the running of the university, with autonomy and academic freedom being threatened at times by both the 'lay people' in Council and the academics on the Professorial Board, and with Māori, women and other 'visible minority' staff largely being excluded from the executive process²⁷⁴. In addition, the broader political situation

²⁷³ From a social-psychological point of view consensus decision making can lead to groupthink resistant to alternative or novel viewpoints and exclusion of minority members' input, as in the history of the UoA the limited number of Māori, women, and students from other minorities in powerful academic committees has tended to demonstrate. The account by Kathie Irwin (2000) on how academic freedom is threatened from within for Māori is especially worth reading in this context.

²⁷⁴ In the historical accounts of the University of Auckland from 1883 to 1983 by Keith Sinclair these groups are largely 'invisible' in the decision making process. However, this is not specific to New Zealand as a patriarchal white society typified many Western societies prior to the 1960s.

has often affected this collegiality from the outside. During the depression years, as the Beaglehole affair showed (see Section 7.2.2), the government tried to curb academic freedom by making academics liable for statements that would discredit government (Butterworth & Tarling, 1994). Also as Kelsey (2000, p.227) observed, during the Muldoon years between 1974 and 1984, academic freedom was difficult as Muldoon represented an increasingly authoritarian government in a country that was “relatively conservative, mono-cultural”. The role of ‘critic and conscience of society’ therefore created tension within and outside the university, “as Muldoon counter-attacked those who threatened the world of the ‘ordinary bloke’ whom he purported to represent” (Kelsey, *ibid*).

Yet, despite the University’s ‘dependency’ on state funding, reviews concerning the New Zealand university sector before the introduction of the market metaphor have largely been supportive of academic autonomy, freedom and culture of collegiality. The Reichel-Tate report of 1925, for example, stated: “We believe that the reputation of a degree is best founded upon the reputation of the teachers within the university which confers it ... [with academic freedom being] the very breath of life of a true university” (as cited in Butterworth & Tarling, 1994, p.21)²⁷⁵. The Hughes-Parry report of 1959 expressed similar views, and suggested that university education deserved better support of the New Zealand community. The report also signalled the role of universities in ‘manpower’ planning (within the framework of an expanding *industrial* society). It recommended the introduction of a University Grants Committee (UGC) to function as an independent statutory body; independent status for the colleges, and hence the abolition of the University of New Zealand; better staffing and staff remunerations; support for research; and more fulltime studies made possible by a student grant system. Since the report’s suggestions were largely implemented and funding for universities increased, the 1960s and 1970s can be regarded as the golden days of university autonomy. In particular, the introduction of the UGC meant that funding was secured on a 5-year basis, allowing universities to be “largely self-regulating, with the quality of

²⁷⁵ The report in fact criticised the university administrators for failing to see, implying lack of trust, that excellent teachers represented the success of the university. Not many of its recommendations for change were implemented at that time though. As Section 7.2.2 shows, the influential role of the Chairman lasted until 1950.

teaching and research being maintained by peer review” (Butterworth & Butterworth, 1994)²⁷⁶.

Tarling (1999, pp.128-129) surmised the university context before the neoliberal reforms as follows:

Government’s involvement was indicated both in the founding legislation of the universities, in their funding, and in the presence of appointees on the Councils. A lay interest was demonstrated by membership of the university councils and of the UGC. But New Zealand universities were also run by academics, and the interaction of lay and academic was the subject of careful arrangement and continuous discussion. The chancellor had more than a merely decorative role, but the vice-chancellor was academic and administrative head. At Auckland the Council was bound to consult the Senate on all academic matters, and though it was not bound to accept that advice, convention tended to mean that it did. Many of the most important committees reported to Senate, and academic staff dominated them.

Under the 1961 Act, ‘members’ of the university included academics and students but excluded general staff. The University accordingly established, on the initiative of Senate (the equivalent of the former Professorial Boards), staff-student committees in departments and faculties in 1968. The headship of departments was further no longer held permanently from the 1970s onwards, but assigned on a three- or five-year rotation base. In addition, a committee on university government was set up in 1969, on which members of Council, Senate and sub-professional staff, and students had representation. The committee’s final report “was to set the pattern of university governance into the 1990s” (Tarling, 1999, p.130)²⁷⁷.

²⁷⁶ Although the UGC represented an independent body, there was university distrust that it could function as a “Treasury stooge”. In practice, the UGC proved itself to be a buffer system in defence of the universities against the “extremities of management”, which the polytechnics experienced under the Department of Education that set up impractical funding formulae (Butterworth & Tarling, 1994, p.36).

²⁷⁷ Tarling (1999, p.131) pointed out that the committee supported the basic governance structure of “Council and Committees, Senate, Committees and Faculties, Departments, Registry” but simplified them. It reduced the number of specialist and ad-hoc committees, and increased the number of standing committees, of which the Academic Committee, Deans Committee and Research Committee turned out to be the most important, with their academic chairs later becoming assistant vice-chancellors.

Overall, academic staff had input in the University's operation, although there is no denying that for much of its history the 'boys' network' of the university (see Sinclair's account of the UoA history, 1983) also provided glass ceilings for those 'outside' the network, who, to use WB and OECD lingo, before the reforms enjoyed little social capital²⁷⁸. As Roberts (1999, p.79) well surmised:

It would certainly be a mistake to view the history of the university – as an international institution – through rose-coloured spectacles. Sexism, racism, ageism, Eurocentrism, and homophobia have all been present in different sectors of the university world, and have at times been manifested in course programmes, reading materials, appointments, and promotion decisions.

Nevertheless, “a belief in the value of collegiality and democracy in matters of governance” through discussion, dialogue and peer review has also been a basic characteristic of university life (Roberts, *ibid*).

7.3.2 Arrangements of Mandate and Capacity

Consonant with the community metaphor, university education mostly fulfilled a general purpose, partly as a result of the majority of secondary schools offering a narrow scope of academic subjects (e.g. limited subjects at advanced level; limited syllabus for languages other than English), and partly as a result of the open access policy to higher education. Hence, a comprehensive education has mostly characterised the University of Auckland's undergraduate curriculum in Arts, Science and Commerce, giving students much flexibility in structuring their degree programme. Nevertheless, UoA's broad focus has also been offset by a more vocational orientation, since providing part-time study for those working in the teaching and law professions and commerce made up a large part of the UoA's early mandate. As Tarling (1999) stipulated, universities in New Zealand took on tasks that in other countries would have been fulfilled by institutions like polytechnics. Most of the University's more 'traditional' specialisation, however, originated largely from the old federal university model of providing additional state funding for professional courses (*ibid*) in specific

²⁷⁸ As a personal anecdote, I recall when first working for the university in the mid 1980s the innocent question occasionally asked to which (male) academic I was 'related'.

locations²⁷⁹. As these Schools needed more funding, their locations and number of students were planned according to need and already established facilities.²⁸⁰

According to Tarling (1999), the UoA curricula expanded after World War II, when New Zealand universities in general caught up with their international counterparts and the American university system, based on the German model that, unlike the Oxbridge model, placed a heavy emphasis on scientific research. Out of specialisation grew diversification, a development applicable also to the more general Faculties of Arts, Science and Commerce whose student population had grown the most in the post-war years, partly as restriction of entry had been a feature of the specialised/professional Schools on the basis of national requirements and cost that determined the places available. Table 7.1 provides some examples of the growth in subjects between the periods of 1961²⁸¹ to 1984 within the three ‘general’ faculties.

Table 7.1

New Subjects Introduced at the University of Auckland 1961-1984

Faculty	Diversification	1961-84
ARTS:		
<i>European Languages</i>	Swedish	1965
<i>Asian Languages</i>	Chinese	1965
	Japanese	late 1960s
	Indonesian	late 1960s
<i>Social/Human sciences</i>	Sociology	1968
	Political Studies	
	Art History	late 1960s
COMMERCE:		
	Management Science (MS)	1973
	MBA	1983

²⁷⁹ Butterworth and Tarling (1994) reported that universities were keen to establish ‘professional’ schools since under the University of New Zealand they attracted separate and more generous funding, and were more highly valued by the state and community.

²⁸⁰ As there were quotas for not only the professional schools but also professional programmes (such as Clinical Psychology), open entry applied mainly to the general Schools of Arts, Science and Commerce. With the professionalisation of Commerce, however, increased selection mechanisms were introduced in the 1980s.

²⁸¹ The year that the University of New Zealand was abolished and the University of Auckland became independent. At that time, Biological Studies (foundation subject, split into Zoology and Botany in 1933), Chemistry (established in 1914) and Physics (foundation subject) were already major Science departments. In addition, Classical Studies and English were from the beginning taught in the Arts, with Education being a BA subject taught by the Auckland Training College since 1906. Geography (founded in 1946), Psychology (founded in 1957 as a department in experimental science rather than philosophy where it originated from) and Mathematics (foundation subject) were departments fulfilling a major function in both the faculties of Arts and Science (Tarling, 1999).

SCIENCE:	Cellular & Molecular Science	1962
	Biochemistry	1968
	Geothermal Institute	1978
	Computer Science	1980
	Optometry	1982 ²⁸²

Source: Nicholas Tarling, 1999.

The majority of the above-tabled changes happened in the ‘welfare’ years when, as previously mentioned, universities became independent, received more funding²⁸³, and experienced the first signs of ‘massification’. For example, the UoA had slightly more than 4000 students in 1961 rising to almost 10000 in 1971, when it temporarily levelled off²⁸⁴, only to rise at a lower pace to more than 12000 in 1981 (Tarling, 1999).

Clearly, the university was given the mandate and capacity to extend its programmes as well as research activities, which, as Section 7.2.2 suggested, had not been a major enterprise under the College system²⁸⁵. Tarling (1999, p.3) portrayed the developments as follows:

From the 1960s, the international as well as the national position of New Zealand changed. Hitherto it had been colonial or provincial. Now their expansion and reform began to give them some international significance and endow them with wider ambitions. That fitted in with the trend in university development in other countries, where expansion gave new meaning to the international aspect of the traditional university. It also fitted with the needs and aspirations of New Zealanders themselves. The colonial relationship could not suffice in a changing world. New Zealand, though

²⁸² In 1982 a degree course in Optometry was first offered and prior to that a diploma under the tutelage of the Department of Psychology. It became an independent department in 1987 (Tarling, 1999).

²⁸³ The university reforms of the 1960s, based on the Hughes-Parry report, not only gave the former colleges independent status but also prevented any direct state control and intervention, reflecting the support for academic freedom in those days. What is more, the UGC system allowed the universities to expand in areas they considered significant as funding provided flexibility in the allocation of resources.

²⁸⁴ Tarling (1999) stated that the decline in student enrolments was not only due to rapid economic growth that made working a better alternative than studying, but also to restrictions in university enrolments. These are also the years of Muldoon as Prime Minister, who was not very sympathetic towards the university sector, reducing their funding thereby limiting places. The building of the Marae was further impeded by his administration (ibid).

²⁸⁵ Research interest first grew in the 1930s after changes were made to institutional practice that resulted in greater academic freedom for staff, suggesting that research needs a climate of academic autonomy in order to flourish.

small, must have links, commercial and otherwise, with a great range of countries in Europe, the Americas and Asia²⁸⁶.

The role of research was particularly important to the development of the UoA after it gained independent status. As Tarling (1999, p.53) explained, research constitutes a crucial part of teaching, for it informs the teaching staff “how their discipline works, how its conclusions ... are reached and supported”; also, presenting their research to students, especially seniors, helps refine their skills in research. The expansion in research and teaching meant that the profile of the University and its international standing were raised and consolidated, making a provincial university more ‘cosmopolitan’.

7.4 University Reorchestration after 1984

The steady reduction in state funding from the mid 1980s onwards, further falling sharply in the 1990s²⁸⁷, no doubt provided a major external restraint for the universities’ operations. Moreover, students had to increase their financial contribution, and hence relied more and more on student loans to finance their tertiary education²⁸⁸. Instead of placing monetary barriers on attaining a higher education, the fee charged system and the loan scheme paradoxically increased the numbers of students attending university. In general, the number of students enrolled for tertiary courses more than doubled between 1985 and 2001, from 120,000 to 282,000 respectively (McLaughlin, 2003). The University of Auckland was one of the major beneficiaries with student numbers rising from 18,831 to 28,092 in the years 1991-2000 (UoA, 2002b).

As Chapters 3, 4 and 6 indicated however, this growth coincided with the push for HCI in a changing (global, post-industrial and ‘white-collar’) economy that experienced a world wide economic decline, and in New Zealand’s case caused the unemployment rate to rise to 10 percent in the 1980s (McLaughlin, 2003). This decline has since given

²⁸⁶ Interestingly, Africa is absent from this list. As Chapter 2 suggested, it tends to be the forgotten continent.

²⁸⁷ Although overall public funding for education increased from 5.5% of GDP in 1990 to 6.1% of GDP in 1997, it decreased for the tertiary sector from 1.2% of GDP in 1993 to 1% in 1997 (OECD, 2000b). Of the OECD countries its public spending on tertiary education represented a medium position.

²⁸⁸ For example, domestic students’ tuition fees for a full-time course (14 points) rose from \$1200 in 1992 to \$1848 in 1995 and \$2884 in 1998 on the flat-fee policy the University adopted (UoA, 1998b)

employers the clout to hire selectively, frequently asking for degree qualifications for a relatively simple job²⁸⁹. In particular, the demand of a flexible workforce as employment conditions changed and worsened with the introduction of the Employment Contracts Act in 1990 produced employment insecurity and promoted the HCI discourse of lifelong learning, as initiated by the Hawke report. In New Zealand, not only did the overall student participation rate rise 59% in the period 1990-1999, the percentage of students older than 24 years also increased from 2.7 to 5.2%²⁹⁰. By 1999, the number of special admissions had risen accordingly; at the University of Auckland a third of its students were admitted under the special entry category, and this group comprised more than 30% of female, 50% of Māori and Pacific, and 25% of Asian enrolments (Benseman, 2002). These trends coincided with reduced state funding in the 1990s (see Section 6.5) and a higher institutional reliance on student fees income. Together with the state reforms they had an effect on the University's culture and governance to steer objectives, and changed its mandate and capacity to deliver.

7.4.1 Rearrangements in Governance and Institutional Culture

Universities experienced pressure to change their institutional culture and governance largely because of the reduction in state funding and new accountability procedures required. Cuts in their funding base meant universities needed to find other financial sources and be more efficient in how they were to use their resources. On top of that, governments in the 1990s pushed for performance indicators based on quantifiable measures of output, rather than the traditional quality measures through peer assessment and periodic reviews of departments and faculties by external academics (Savage, 2000). The new situation thus 'motivated' universities to introduce market mechanisms and best practice models from private business, and hence comply to NPM objectives²⁹¹. The rhetoric of the 'knowledge economy' further supported the change, as elements of management theory, for example, lean production, continuous improvement and

²⁸⁹ Les Levidow (2001, p.3) noted that "job specifications have generally not increased the requirements for cognitive capacities", but as the pool of graduate employees widens employers ask for more qualifications beyond those required to do the job, hence leading to qualification inflation.

²⁹⁰ This growth further put New Zealand's net-entry rate into tertiary education well above the average for OECD member countries (Benseman, 2002) in a relatively short time span.

²⁹¹ As Olssen (2002, p.74) observed, state reforms in the tertiary sector had as objective instating "relations of competition as a way of increasing productivity, accountability and control", the EFTS funding regime being the key mechanism to link universities to the market.

benchmarking (Peters, 2001) started to play a significant role. Tarling (1999, p.106) pointed out, for instance, that “‘Visions’, ‘Mission Statements’, ‘Strategic Plans’, ‘Outcomes’ took hold in the language – and of the language. Universities were far from immune”. In particular, as an outcome of the Hawke and *Learning for Life* reports, the 1990 Education Act required universities “to develop a ‘charter’ as well as ‘statement of objectives’”, with the latter activity functioning as a means for seeking state funding on an annual basis (ibid, p.144). As Section 6.5 suggested, under ‘market’ reforms the university culture shifted from a more (albeit not perfect) collegial model based on ‘consensus’ decision making, which allowed (key) tenured academics to have a say in educational and resource matters, to a more competitive model based on an executive style of management, that gave rise to a “new super hierarchy of Executive Deans, Pro-Vice-Chancellors or Deputy [Assistant] Vice-Chancellors” in support of the Vice Chancellor (McClenaghan, 1998, p.6)²⁹², who officially became the employer under the State Sector Act 1988. Olssen (2002, p.77) pointed out that such an apparatus tended to show “loyalty to the centre rather than to disciplines or faculties”.

Tarling indicated (see Section 7.3.1) that the structure of governance proposed by the committee on university government in 1969 was to be retained into the 1990s, during the “Maiden years” (1971-1994). This comment suggests that the tertiary reforms of the National-led government of 1993-1999 had a major influence on the operations of the University, and that prior to that the UoA could follow in many ways its ‘natural’ pathway of development based on “a combination of the democratic spirit that was common in New Zealand society and the collegial approach to corporate existence” (Tarling, 1999, p.132). It was under the first ‘professional’ Vice-Chancellor, Professor Kit Carson (1994-1998),²⁹³ that strategic planning became a formal feature of the University. While, according to Tarling, the new VC remained loyal to the collegial culture of the University under his period in office the UoA changed its budget process and management and organisation structure in 1996-97. The relationship between Council and Senate as well as the composition of their members remained similar, indicating the University resistance to government’s proposals of reducing membership

²⁹² Although McClenaghan made this observation for his Australian university, the same can be said for the UoA.

²⁹³ As Dale (personal communication, 14/2/2005) pointed out, Maiden’s position was halftime, earning him a knighthood for services to business first and education second. In contrast, Carson’s function as CEO was fulltime and hence he was the first ‘manager VC’.

and increasing ministerial influence on these institutional bodies.²⁹⁴ However, Council members were removed from many of the university committees, and the volume of papers they had to read substantially reduced (though on their request). The Academic Audit Panel (UoA, 1998a) reported that as a result members felt less cognisant of the University's operation, but the problem was addressed by initiating "a more extensive requirement on the VC for full reporting to Council meetings" (ibid, section 1.3). The role of Deans and Academic Committee was further taken over by a larger Education Committee, functioning as a mini-Senate, with Senate's role shifting from being a forum "for action and debate" to one for "reporting and monitoring" (Tarling, 1999, p.133).

Arguably, the reduction in staff participation - as committee members were replaced by representatives of *faculty* (mostly the deans) and chaired by *permanent* officers, including two assistant VCs - affected procedures of how objectives were to be set and achieved. Mathew Fitzsimons (2004, p.16) pointed out the potential reduction in influence from the larger university community in this shift of governance:

Executive deans and senior academics now work within a decision making structure that includes key members of the bureaucracy and the strategic apex of the university. These collegial/managerial hybrids behave like the former collegiums when they take decisions. The chairs of these hybrid committees, like the former chair of the collegial committee, are 'first amongst equals'. They capture the consensus of the group, and rarely does any issue go to a vote. Whilst the old collegium acted as a buffer (albeit a conservative force) on university management the hybrid rarely challenges powerful decision making from the strategic apex of the university.

As the state's NPM objectives of efficiency, flexibility and accountability took hold of the University, staff faced increased reporting mechanisms and managerial control. For instance, the separation of policymaking and implementation was advanced by the

²⁹⁴ For example, the University's submission to the Green Paper (UoA, 1997, section 13) shows that it resisted the GP's proposed membership of 6-12 members and appointment of its Chancellor by the Minister of Education (as representative of the Crown's *ownership* of universities), as under the Education Act 1989 12 to 20 members could be appointed to Council. The UoA proposed instead a membership of 6-20 to be negotiated, as was the status quo, and the Chancellor to remain chosen by Council, stressing that "[t]he nature of a university depends on a collegial approach to decision making" (section 13.21). Nevertheless, UoA stated that it recognised the benefits of a smaller Council as it had 17 members on Council, warranting a reduction in size (UoA, 1998d).

development of performance indicators at the departmental level, as a devolved structure of accountability would decree, and by the planning and policy generation being assigned to the central registry (UoA, 1999b). Also, external audits and reviews became a standard feature of university life as did number crunching, with monitoring and evaluating performance, and keeping accurate records of students served (see Chapter 8) becoming increasingly important²⁹⁵ for continued funding. In addition, annual staff reviews were introduced in the mid 1990s, based on staff reports of their activities and achievement, appraised by the HoD with respect to “duties assigned, the expected performance, and the goals set at the previous review” (UoA, 1998a, section 4.2). Yet, most of the executive positions remained in the hands of key academics and collegiality continued to be seen as an important feature in the process, as is also illustrated by the institutional values in UoA’s mission (UoA, 1999a) that states the University is committed to:

[C]reating a diverse and collegial scholarly community in which individuals are valued and respected, academic freedom is exercised with intellectual rigour and high ethical standards, and critical enquiry is encouraged.

Here, however, collegiality ties in more with the traditional concept of the university being a community of scholars engaged in research than with issues of governance. In fact, the increased formalisation of accountability and quality measures, shifting focus to acts of performativity and individual responsibility in achieving objectives that are not necessarily determined by the individual or his or her group of colleagues, can be said to weaken the processes of collegial decision-making. As is stated under principles of accountability (UoA, 1999a):

- Each member of staff has a clearly identified supervisor, understands the rights, responsibilities and obligations associated with their role in the University and participates in a regular process of performance review.
- Managers of academic, administrative and support units work to clear operational goals, targets performance measures and reporting obligations.
- Wherever possible, internal reporting schedules and management information systems are designed to feed into major external accountabilities such as the

²⁹⁵ Not all of these developments are disadvantageous. Quantitative measures can help assess future developments, clarify student and staff needs, and monitor equity objectives. However, they need to be balanced with collegial trust as well as qualitative data and peer input to do justice to the teaching-learning process.

Annual Report, Ministry of Education statistical returns, the Statement of Objectives and the requirement of national and international benchmarking.

More accountability principles are mentioned, but the three highlighted indicate the possible constraints on collegiality through 'imposed' measures.

These principles may have emerged from the observation made in the summary of the Academic Audit Report 1997 (UoA, 1998a)²⁹⁶, that for devolution to be successful, it requires “the development of accountability systems, with feedback loops” so as to reduce variability in quality, and “greater openness and transparency in information-sharing”. The use of accountability measures for consistency in the implementation of policy, procedures, practice and outcomes seems to have been foremost on the agenda as the report states that the University’s *2001 Mission, Goals and Strategies* (M2001) (UoA, 1995) “sets out a broad sweep of activities ... any faculty, department (or individual) is free to select from what it wishes from M2001 for implementation” (UoA, 1998a, section 1.1). This remark highlights that policy setting and implementation constitute two different sets of activities, with the ‘implementers’ selecting objectives congruent with their personal or departmental culture/objectives, and hence increased transparency and accountability measures are needed to prevent inconsistencies (and flexibility) from occurring.

Overall, the above developments reflect that “a new logic of performativity” consisting of “continuous appraisal and review of individuals, departments and programmes” (Roberts, 1999, p.69) had become an established feature of the University’s culture and organisation, even though the UoA submission in response to the Green Paper highlighted that whilst it acknowledged many indicators can be used to measure quantitative aspects of the University’s performance, “many of its core activities, including its public good and critic and conscience of society roles, cannot be expressed in quantitative terms” (UoA, 1997, section 13.39).

²⁹⁶ The UoA was the first New Zealand university to volunteer an audit process. The Audit Panel consisted of academics and education and research executives external to the University, as was required by government.

7.4.2 *Rearrangements in Mandate and Capacity*

The focus on the economic role of university education, as promoted by the OECD and New Zealand tertiary reviews, shifted the function of learning for knowledge sake increasingly to ‘learning for earning’ (Tony Blair’s slogan). This changed the focus of universities’ contribution to social policy and public debate through their role as critic and conscience of society²⁹⁷, which in the past universities might have fulfilled in differing degrees (Kelsey, 1997a), to being provider of ‘useful’ knowledge, with some disciplines gaining in status and others facing difficulties and even demise. Not only did the ‘knowledge economy’ rhetoric put weight on technology and ICT literacy, the competitive education sector that emerged as a result of the tertiary reforms also required ‘adjustments’ to the UoA’s mandate and capacity of what is desirable and feasible to achieve. Combined with the need to generate income as public funding declined, the UoA had to focus increasingly on giving students more choice as well as a ‘valuable’ return on their investment. As Les Levidow (2001, p.3) explained, under market conditions, universities have to raise their own productivity for survival. They need to “package knowledge, deliver flexible education through ICT, provide adequate training for ‘knowledge workers’, and produce more of them at lower unit costs”²⁹⁸.

The University’s role of being a storehouse of knowledge became less relevant as its role as service provider expanded. Accordingly, the UoA needed to add more vocationally orientated programmes to its calendar, leading to a proliferation as well as shortening of courses, when the two-semester system replaced the three-term one in 1997²⁹⁹, and the summer school programme soon followed. These developments stimulated the fragmentation and compartmentalisation of knowledge, and put pressure on staff and students as their workload markedly increased, leaving less time for research and part-time employment to pay off fees and loans, respectively. Moreover, a

²⁹⁷ Even though the TER Green Paper (MOE, 1997b) stated that it recognises academic freedom, particularly with respect to universities, and that its governance and accountability policies include its protection (see MOE, *ibid*, Section 6.3), its basic distrust of democratic, consensus decision processes did not seem to support this.

²⁹⁸ Overlaying this development is the shift from mode 1 to mode 2 knowledge, with the former being in its purest form “academic, institutional, disciplinary, homogenous and hierarchical” and the latter “application-centred, transdisciplinary, heterogeneous, reflexive and transient” (Robertson, 2000, pp. 90-91). Mode 2 can be said to advance cooperation between university departments but in the context of competition can also lead to duplication and hence proliferation of programmes, as happened in the 1990s in the UoA case.

²⁹⁹ Tarling (1999, p.103) stated that he had resisted it as chairman of the Deans Committee, but UoA finally went the ‘fashionable’ way though the old College had already used semesterisation up to 1894.

shift in mandate from ‘general’, offering students a comprehensive university education, to one that was (ideologically) narrower in scope resulted³⁰⁰. As the University’s Curriculum Commission (UoA, 2002b, p. 21) observed:

... the principles underlying the University’s commitment in the past to a broadly based education (on which and alongside which specialist and professional knowledge and skills are built) have become eroded.

The Commission (*ibid*, p.22) cautioned, however, that this technocratic role of the university would be limiting as:

The generic attributes ... are not – at least in a University whose mission is to be a research-led institution – simply ‘skills’, narrowly, vocationally, and technocratically conceived for the immediate needs of the marketplace, but have to do with the value of enquiry-based learning, awareness of the contestable nature of the assumptions and methods on which particular claims to knowledge are based, and the ability to bring critical intelligence to bear on live issues in contemporary society and culture.

As Roberts (1999, p.71) observed, in a competitive environment where academics are no longer seen as the “bearers of intellectual wisdom” but the “sellers of products”, “a strong sense of scholarly disciplinary traditions” is lost and replaced “by a focus on the ‘here and now’, by a desire for the ‘quick fix’ or the ‘packaged solution’”. As a result, “goals such as promoting a love of learning, fostering public debate, and enhancing democratic citizenship disappear from the agenda” (*ibid*, p.80). Yet, not all changes were necessarily market-oriented. The compounding factors that transformed the university environment also comprised, as aforementioned, the emancipation process initiated in the late 1960s; the economic downturn of the mid 1970s, which stimulated a return to or need to ongoing formal studies; and the influx of migrant students from the Asian region in the 1990s – all mirroring the patterns of the ‘globalisation K-wave’ discussed in Chapter 3. As previously indicated, the UoA participation rate of Māori students increased from 2.5% in 1982 to 6.3% in 1992, although on average it remained

³⁰⁰ As the University’s Curriculum Commission (UoA, 2002b, p.22) stated: There are likely to be many reasons for ... a narrowing of students’ learning experiences at university, among them an increasingly vocational view of university education, increasing specialisation in the secondary school curriculum, and an EFTS-focused university funding regime that has tended to turn faculties and departments into silos driven by the need to compete in order to protect and expand enrolments”.

steady at 6.2% in the years 1991-2000 (UoA, 1992 & 2002b). The number of Pacific students rose from 61 in 1977 to 219 students, or 1.8%, in 1981, only to rise further to 1148 students, or 5.7% in 1992 (UoA, 1992 & 2002a), and 6.3% of the total student population in 2000 (UoA, 2002b). Moreover, a quarter of UoA's enrolments was taken up by students older than 21 years by the late 1990s (Tarling, 1999), and more English as an Additional Language (EAL) students from an Asian background enrolled in university studies, constituting 22.9% of the student body in 1996 and 30.3% in 2000 (UoA, 2002b).

Table 7.2

New Subjects Introduced at the University of Auckland 1984-2000

Faculty/School	Diversification	1984-2000
ARTS:		
<i>European Languages</i>	Dutch	1992
<i>Asian Languages</i>	Korean	1989
<i>Pacific Languages</i>	Samoan	1991
	Cook Island Maori	1995
	Tongan	1996
<i>Social/Human Sciences</i> ³⁰¹	Maori Studies	1990
	Women Studies	1993
	Pacific Studies	1987
	Centre for Performing Arts	1996
COMMERCE:		
	Management Studies & Labour Relations; Management Science & Information Systems; and Marketing & International Business	1987/1995 ³⁰²
	Economics	1988 ³⁰³
	Commercial Law	1988 ³⁰⁴
SCIENCE:		
	Audiology	1991
	Health Science	1991
	Public Health	1991
	Sport Science	1994
	Statistics	1994 ³⁰⁵
	Nursing	1999

Source: Tarling, 1999.

³⁰¹ Although papers in these fields were already taught in the discipline of Anthropology or Sociology, the subjects listed became independent departments in the 1990s mainly.

³⁰² With Marketing and International Business becoming separate departments in 1995.

³⁰³ Previously part of the Arts Faculty.

³⁰⁴ Separated from the Department of Accountancy.

³⁰⁵ The year it became an independent department, separated from Mathematics.

Table 7.2 shows examples of the diversification and specialisation of university programmes and departments in the period of 1984-2000, spurred by the changes in student composition. The department for Pacific Studies developed in 1987 within the Faculty of Arts, followed by Māori Studies in 1990 and Women Studies in 1993. Many of the new Arts papers provided critical as well as multiple perspectives on social, political and environmental issues in the context of the ‘post-modern’, ‘post-colonial’ world. In contrast, the Faculties of Science and Commerce introduced more vocational papers and degrees, such as Sports and Health Sciences (linked to the School of Medicine) and Marketing respectively. Even though this table is far from complete, it provides a glimpse of the dual role the University undertook from the mid 1980s onwards: to serve its diverse student population as well as cater for market demands (goals that are not necessarily mutually exclusive³⁰⁶) in an environment of reduced EFTS funding³⁰⁷.

The UoA was further committed to making feasible its equity policies by instituting targeted schemes. One of the first steps was the establishment in 1985 of the Student Learning Unit to help ‘at-risk’ students cope with their studies (see Chapter 8), and the Wellesley programme in 1989 to provide disadvantaged students the foundation to succeed in tertiary studies. With the UGC being abolished in 1990 and contestable equity funding instated, only to be discontinued at the end of 1992, UoA’s capacity to deliver equitable outcomes was impeded. However, the UoA incorporated some of its new initiatives in its budget as a permanent feature (Tarling, 1999). Although UoA’s commitment to Equal Education Opportunities (EEoO) could also have reflected the fact that EEoO became an explicit performance indicator under the new legislation and structures set up in 1989-90 by the fourth Labour Government³⁰⁸, Tarling (ibid) stressed that this commitment was already part of the University’s culture rather than it being

³⁰⁶ The university as ‘supermarket’ diversifies to meet the ‘desires’ of its diverse ‘consumer pool’, hence the introduction of papers such as women in media and film; and to serve the instrumental needs of consumers who in today’s market place want to build up professional credentials to secure an employment future, hence the growth in commerce and health sciences.

³⁰⁷ Note that this role is not new to the UoA as it has for much of its existence struggled with lack of funding, hence making UoA courses largely open to entry and serving the private trade communities.

³⁰⁸ By section 220 of the Education Act 1990, the University is mandated to attract students from lower decile secondary schools, and under-represented groups with specific reference to Māori and Pacific students (UoA, n.d.).

externally imposed by government requirements³⁰⁹. Indeed, the ‘fair go’ and ‘open access’ as ‘organising principals’ of the University provide some support for Tarling’s assertion.

There were additional concerns that the university’s capacity to conduct research would suffer under the new policies, as the combined outcome of the massification of university education and reduction in funding per student since the late 1980s would break down the relationship between teaching and research, with teaching being more cost effective and research receiving no extra funding under the EFTS system. In fact, as Tarling (1999) pointed out, the UoA was able to sustain its research capacity because of economies of size. That is, the “underfunding of postgraduate students and the desire to increase their number, led to further increases in undergraduate student numbers to support postgraduate study” (UoA, 2002b). According to Tarling, large undergraduate classes do not adversely affect any research commitments; rather they support them.³¹⁰ Moreover, he stressed that no direct link existed between the increasing numbers of undergraduates (suggesting a broader focus into the discipline) and the capacity for specialisation (requiring a more specific focus to develop expertise). However, the increased work-load of academic staff as staff-student ratios rose and funding decreased meant that research became a luxury many could ill afford.

Arguably, the neoliberal state policies of the 1990s placed constraints on the traditional mandate of the university, by promoting an environment where students as consumers demand instant currency, from an increasingly dearer education, for which they have to pay off significant loans after graduation. Yet, the ‘vocationalisation’ of university education also expresses the recurrent UoA debate: university education as cultivation

³⁰⁹ Most schemes have been introduced at the faculty level. As indicated, the Faculties of Law and Medicine initiated Māori schemes in 1969 and 1972 respectively. However, in 1989 when EEdO became a performance indicator, the School of Commerce (now the Faculty of Business and Economics), which had placed restrictions on its admissions in the 1980s, also introduced the Māori and Other Pacific Admission Scheme (MOPAS). In the same year, Law advanced the quota system for Māori and Pacific students to realise a more equitable representation of both groups in the faculty. This initiative has been coupled to the Law School Support System, incorporating a comprehensive supplementary tutorial programme. At the institutional level a Pacific Liaison Officer position was established also in 1989. It seems to suggest that when equity becomes part of state legislation and a performance indicator, it prompts faculties and departments to incorporate equity objectives in their mission and vision.

³¹⁰ Tarling had taken this position early on, as already in the 1970s he disagreed with Kenneth Maidment, who after retirement as VC had expressed in the early 1980s that the ideal university should not be larger than 5000 students. Tarling, in contrast, believed that size presented the prospect of growth in numbers as well as quality (partly measured by research output and citations) and took the American relatively open university system rather than the English exclusive one as model of university growth and development.

of the mind or practical value. As Section 7.2.2 indicated, with the University being dependent on state funding from the start, the classicist and pragmatist have co-existed within the institution, but pragmatism has tended to dominate when, as Tim Bowron (2001) suggests, New Zealand capitalism has to compete in the world market. At this juncture, the demand and rhetoric for more and better skilled labour intensifies, prompting universities to reassess what is desirable to teach. In 1959, the Hughes-Parry Report provided much support for universities' autonomy but also advocated that a classical education should be replaced by an education that helps graduates to find "more varied and profitable uses for the expanding output of existing industries... translate the ideas developed through research into the production of saleable goods; and undertake the efficient management of enterprises that will grow in scale and complexity" (cited in Bowron, *ibid*, p.1). This advice was not so pertinent at that time³¹¹, with the polytechnics, an 'invention' of the 1960s, taking on the vocational task³¹², but the global and national situation (as the K-wave theory suggests) proved to be rather different in the 1980s and 90s.

7.5 Internationalisation of the University: A Globalisation Crescendo?

Internationalisation of higher education has been defined as "the process of integrating an international/intercultural dimension into teaching, research and service functions of the institution" (Knight, 1997, p.8). It represents an "openness to the world" as reflected by the students and staff a university attracts and the people "who access its scholarship, research and creativity" (Davis, Olsen & Haworth, 1998, p.1). This definition mirrors the educational and social and cultural notions of internationalisation emphasised by authors like Hamnett and de Wit and Knight (see Section 6.4) rather than the 'globalisation' focus on economic profits. From Tarling's account, however, internationalisation in whatever form has long been a guarded approach in UoA policy.

³¹¹ Although not pertinent, the discourse of HCT emerged in that period (see Section 3.3.3). Also, many politicians, both Labour and National, continued the New Zealand tradition of perceiving universities as ivory towers, being "intellectually remote from the community" with their creativity channelled into projects "of little value to the nation" (the then Minister of Science (in 1960), as cited by Butterworth & Tarling, 1994, p.52).

³¹² UoA's submission to the report demonstrates that the university emphasised that it already fulfilled the dual role of generalists and specialists as it indicated that because the university was state funded it fulfilled the community expectation of being an extension of secondary education, a teaching and examining body for the *formal* instruction of students, and "[it had] given the professions a large say in what was taught, and encouraged in part-time study" (Butterworth & Tarling, 1994, p.26).

Although “[f]oreign students came to the University as a result of the expanded demand for university education in other countries in the postwar period” (Tarling, 1999, p.12-13), their numbers were small and many were government sponsored. In addition Sinclair’s historical account of the University suggests that the UoA environment consisted mainly of a culturally homogeneous group, with international staff predominantly originating from the Anglophone countries. It is only from the 1970s onwards that the University began to welcome Malaysian students, particularly Chinese, as priority was given to indigenous Malaysians in allocating national university places. Under the Colombo plan and other aid plans, students from developing nations, mainly Asia, did not have to pay special fees, although there was a quota of 40% of international student places. In 1979-80, the University further set up exchange programmes with Sophia and Hiroshima universities in Japan (Tarling, 1999).

State policies of internationalisation, however, started to shift to globalisation objectives for the country’s education sector under the Muldoon government, as indicated in Section 6.4, when quotas were abolished but a fee introduced in 1979. In 1982, government officials presented the proposal of full-cost fees for international students outside the South Pacific and Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), thereby first introducing the notion of “earning foreign exchange through using our education system as a commercial asset” (cited in Tarling, 1999, p.13). Although the Labour government later implemented this proposal, removed the ASEAN exemption, and advanced the rising commercialisation of the tertiary sector, the University of Auckland did not immediately embrace this push for ‘globalisation’. Instead, the University “wanted good students from overseas; ... give them a good experience of university education; ... [and not] become too dependent on a continued flow of foreign students” (Tarling, *ibid*).

Rapid growth in domestic student numbers, aided by the high influx of immigrant students from the Asian region in the 1990s, probably assisted in UoA’s cautious approach to internationalisation. As the review team on internationalisation of the University of Auckland (Davis, Olsen & Haworth, 1998) reported, in 1997 3.5% of the UoA student population were international, compared to an average of 4.9% across the seven New Zealand universities. The team pointed out that UoA might underachieve in international student numbers on purpose, as many faculties explicitly expressed

apprehension about the ‘ethnic mix’ of their students. Their concerns were that larger numbers of international students would put pressure on teaching space and student accommodation. In addition, there was uncertainty about their competence in English and school qualifications, which proved difficult to assess. The library further commented that international students were more demanding customers. These concerns should be seen in the context of disproportionate numbers of students from Asian background who were not international attending the University since many Asian families, under state immigration policies that embraced a regional/global outlook, had settled in Auckland rather than in other parts of New Zealand³¹³. Hence, the issue was how to cope with the increasing diversity of its student population, which further included a gradual growth in the numbers of Māori and Pacific students attending university.

The University’s strategic plan Mission 2001 (UoA, 1995) advocated a modest growth, with zero growth not an option in a financially strained environment. As Davis et al. (1998) pointed out, the decrease of 20% in first year students attending UoA, from more than 6000 in 1996 to less than 5000 in 1997, as well as the reduction in EFTS funding in July 1998³¹⁴ and recent (lower) immigration figures may persuade the University to boost its international student numbers in future (which it did, see Chapter 10). The modest growth scenario points towards the UoA not having been an active agent of ‘internationalisation’, rather a pragmatic participant to external developments, which were not so much caused by globalisation per se, but foremost by government policies towards education and immigration. Arguably, UoA’s internationalisation approach was somewhat *reactive* as manifested by its ad hoc organisation structure for internationalisation³¹⁵. Davis et al.’s review (1998, p.3) reported, for example, that international marketing and admissions were separated functions that were “artificial

³¹³ For example, in 1996 of the 25,949 UoA students enrolled 5906 students were from Asian background and the total number of international students was only 864 (cited in Tarling, 1999, p.13).

³¹⁴ As EFTS funding was cut by 3.5%, it cost the University approximately \$5.3 million in revenue that was passed on to students by increasing their fees substantially, hence reducing demand (Davis et al, 1998). The proposed budget for 1999 (UoA, 1998c) further reported that the University had received a \$10 million cut in state funding, with inflation and currency transfers increasing cost by another \$14 million, forcing the UoA to introduce differential tuition fees and pursue other avenues (reduction of staff and streamlining the curriculum).

³¹⁵ The Audit panel of 1997 suggested the University changed too quickly for its institutional structures, practices, attitudes and culture to keep up so that it resulted in ad hoc responses and decisions (UoA, 1998a, 1999b). This situation reflects the competitive tertiary environment that led to both internal and external competition breaking up the University’s culture and structure, as previously indicated.

and untenable”³¹⁶, as they produced fragmentation and territoriality with faculties not fully recognising and respecting “the coordinating responsibilities of the International Office”. On the basis of their findings, the review recommended a single organisational unit to be established under the Pro-VC International, and to obtain modest growth needed to double its international student numbers to 2000 in the year 2000, although this growth would only represent an interim goal³¹⁷. They further advised that the existing ethnic mix of its student population should not be a factor in the University’s decisions, instead stressed that Knight’s (1997) four categories of internationalisation should be advanced:

- Openness to the world (political)
- Value of education as a service export (economical)
- International curriculum as to add value to the quality of the university system (educational), and
- Diversity of the student population to encourage international know-how and know-what (social-cultural).

Nevertheless, in reviewing its internationalisation policies in 1999, the University concluded the following (UoA, n.d., p.2):

Internationalisation is one of the most powerful forces bearing upon the development and internal management of universities. While scholars have always been internationally mobile and knowledge transcends national boundaries, the current process of internationalisation requires adjustment to several factors. These include increasingly pervasive global and regional markets, the managing of global communications technologies and information systems, the international mobility of human resources and the re-engineering of global enterprise.

Like the resiting of the state, this comment signals a shift in University policy towards internationalisation as a competitive advantage. In its revised mission document it has as its goal of internationalisation “To maintain and develop international relationships

³¹⁶ The authors review listed five major factions responsible for internationalisation programmes and policies: the Pro-VC International, the International Committee, the International Students Office within the Academic Registry, the Students Affairs Registry, and the seven Faculties.

³¹⁷ Davis et al. stressed that 2000 on an estimated student population of 27,000 would constitute 7.4% of the total, a percentage significantly lower than the average in Australian universities of 9.6% in 1997.

and activities which position The University of Auckland as a top-ranking international university” (UoA, n.d). Accordingly, the UoA highlighted its international networks, Universitas 21 (member since 1997) and the Association of Pacific Rim Universities (APRU), as indicators of its international reputation, and specifically saw Universitas 21 as a consortium it could benchmark itself against, through which it could promote staff and student exchanges and enhance its international position, and in so doing attract international students. This position became also important as the sharp decrease in public funding of the universities, made the University realise the economic benefits of being a ‘knowledge provider’ to an international audience whose private funding of courses would help bridge the growing financial shortfalls the University experienced from the mid 1990s especially. All in all, to be the only New Zealand university linked to these prestigious networks represented a comparative advantage in an increasingly competitive industry.

7.6 Friction and Harmony between Market Reforms of Education and University Leitmotifs of Open Entry, Equity and Academic Freedom

The above discussions show that in the climate of market reforms the University underwent transformations in its aim, role, culture and operations. However, the question is whether all the global and national drivers for change signify a marked departure from UoA’s path shaped over a century of existence. As Section 7.2 indicated, the issue of ‘excellence’ versus open entry has been a central feature of University debate since worries about standards had been raised from its earliest College days so as to become a recurrent theme and point of friction within the UoA itself (Oxbridge idealists versus pragmatic realists) as well as between the university and the state (institutional elitism and national egalitarianism). In its current manifestation, excellence integrates the technocratic and market objective of being the best, and hence appeals to all ‘stakeholders’ as a university’s excellence can be translated as quality education and value for money. Nonetheless, tensions can still arise. Tarling (1999, p.12) reported, for example, that the former Vice-Chancellor, Dr. Colin Maiden, expressed the wish in 1993 for the University to create “an upmarket image”. Maiden argued that UoA was “in a strong position to distinguish itself by concentrating on postgraduate

teaching and research work”, and could attract graduate students from other universities both in New Zealand and overseas (ibid, p.17).

As Maiden’s vision was worked out in the mid 1990s, discrepancies in implementing its research strategy arose. Attracting graduates from other institutions meant creating new policies of credit transfer and offering attractive scholarships. However, in a climate of reduced state funding, faculties had to earmark some of their earnings for graduate scholarships from undergraduate student revenue and full fee paying students, which some did. As had been suggested by Tarling, strengthening research capacity needed economies of size as represented by large undergraduate classes. Yet, Maiden thought that the university “no longer needed to concentrate on meeting the demand for first-degree places” (cited in Tarling, p.12). Apart from raising the issue of elitism, Tarling warned that this position was “risky”. Nonetheless, Maiden’s view was taken into account and the outcome was a scenario of “modest growth”³¹⁸ (as indicated in Section 7.5). This scenario was obviously at odds with the market dictum of consumerism and the need for mass participation in the university sector based on the requirements of a high performing, knowledge-based economy, as advanced by the OECD (see Section 4.4) and New Zealand governments in the years 1987-2000³¹⁹. To illustrate, the Education Act 1989 assigned to Council the task to encourage the greatest possible participation by the communities the University served (UoA, 1997). In contrast, the modest growth advanced, setting a target of 25% postgraduate students by 2001 in

³¹⁸ Maiden’s view on size seems to align with that of his predecessor, Maidment; however, according to Tarling (1999), Maiden was more pragmatic than Maidment, and the “modest” approach reflects this difference; Maidment, on the other hand, seemed to have been more successful in advancing the debate on size in his favour. For example, Tarling mentioned that his own arguments for size and expansion had been countered by the hierarchy of the University (Deans Committee and Senate) under Maidment’s reign. In the early 1970s, the University adopted a regional approach of containment based on students needing to make a case for transferring from other universities, limiting places in each faculty, and giving priority to students from Auckland and the region north of Auckland. In addition, measures such as limiting overseas enrolments in first-degree courses, tightening requirements for satisfactory progress, and asking students to study continuously were also endorsed. These measures partly caused a drop in enrolments in the early 1970s, and Tarling was thus aware that the consequence of Maiden’s wish in the 1990s would affect the University’s revenue making it more difficult financially to engage in costly research.

³¹⁹ High participation in education can be seen in relation to the changes in economic cycles that had shifted the state’s focus from full-employment under Keynesianism to full-education under neoliberal rationales of open access to markets. The New Zealand tertiary reforms justified the market objectives of the state (enabling the reduction of state funding in higher education) with social objectives such as equity by means of providing access to the university ‘market’ through mechanisms like the loan schemes and the 1990 Education Act under Labour, which lowered provisional admission to universities from 21 to 20 years of age.

Mission 2001 (UoA, 1995)³²⁰, coincided with slower growth rates after the very rapid increases in student numbers of the late 1980s and early 1990s. No surprise that a revision of the 1995 strategic plan was undertaken in the University's Mission, Goals and Strategies of 1999 under vice-chancellorship of Dr. John Hood (1999-2004).

Maiden, however, made clear that modest growth should not set up barriers to access for Māori and Pacific students in particular³²¹. Although in the 1990s Pacific student participation grew, the participation rate of Māori remained stable. Yet, as Maiden's comment indicates, the University has generally shown a commitment to advancing its equity objectives. Its institutional values as stated in Mission 2001 (UoA, 1995) and its revised version (UoA, n.d.), for example, recognise the University's special relationship with Māori under the Treaty of Waitangi³²² and acknowledge the UoA's role in providing equal opportunities to all who have the potential to succeed in a university of high international standing³²³. These values are in agreement with the UoA's own institutional 'organisers' and the Education Act 1989 (s181(c)) that, as abovementioned, assigns Council the duty of encouraging participation by the communities the University serves (with particular emphasis on under-represented groups). However, as there is a high participation rate of students from Asian background, the University's EEO and EEdO policies have not included direct equity strategies and measures addressing these students' needs (see Jiang, 2005).

With regard to the University's acknowledged responsibilities for Māori and Pacific students and staff, the focus has been more on encouraging their participation rate to rise than on emancipatory measures like increasing Māori and Pacific staff input in pedagogical and management issues across the institution, instead of just within their

³²⁰ Note that this plan was realised under VC-ship of Professor Kit Carson, who in contrast to Sir Colin Maiden's preference for strategic thinking preferred, according to Tarling (1999), the more formal approach of strategic plans, as represented by the Mission 2001 document (see Section 7.4.1).

³²¹ This position mirrors the University submission to government in April 1985, expressing concern "at the low overall level of participation in University education ... [believing] that New Zealand should be educating a significant greater proportion of its population at University" (cited in Butterworth & Tarling, 1994, p.83).

³²² Some of the strategies the University has listed in fulfilment of Treaty obligations are recognising that all members of the UoA community are covered by the Treaty with mutual rights and obligations; recognising its obligation to increase and improve the success rates of Māori students; increasing the numbers and improving the qualifications of Māori academic and general staff; acknowledging the community duties of Māori staff; and ensuring Māori participation in key aspects of the management structures and institutional life of the University (UoA, n.d.).

³²³ Italics are my emphasis to indicate possible ambiguity in meaning.

designated programme/department. Although there are noted exceptions, some Pacific academic staff (see UoA, 2002a, p.23), for example, reported of “having been bypassed in decision-making, being token members of committees, being ‘advisors’ with no real impact, made promises that were never kept, given administrative responsibilities way above their remuneration levels,” and lack of structural support³²⁴. Graham Smith (UoA, 1997, Appendix D) likewise put forward that Māori have seldom been consulted; with regard to the Green Report, Smith stated: “policy reform ... is almost always developed outside of the interests of Maori ... exclusively by Pakeha for Maori”, and hence are not “‘liberating’ and or ‘equalising’ [but] ‘colonising’, ‘domesticating’ and subordinating”. The only exceptions, Smith notes, are the educational reforms and initiatives developed by Māori themselves. In addition, EEdO policies in support of Māori and Pacific students are variable across departments and time, with Schools like Law and Medicine showing good practice, initiated (as shown above) well before the Education Act 1989 and the subsequent neoliberal tertiary reforms.

However, the University in its submission to the Green Paper (UoA, 1997) explains its predicament of implementing equity programmes in a climate of financial restraints and systemic impediments leading to “a cycle of educational deprivation” (pt. 6.17) of under-represented groups and a small pool of their members being represented at all levels of institutional decision making. The University notes, for example, that in its obligations to Māori “Too few attend universities”, but those who attend have comparable pass-rates to non-Māori “where appropriate support schemes are in place” (pt. 7.1). It reports that the UoA “seeks to provide distinctive and wide ranging equity programmes”, but indicates that because of little published research to assess the appropriate types of assistance, it had to conduct its own studies which is “a difficult and expensive task” (see pt. 6.2). In addition, the differential base rate funding of 75% and 95% for over 21 and under 22 enrolling for the first time respectively, is no help for the under-represented groups who tend to enrol when they are older (often under Special Admission). Any further cuts in “per capita funding will thus jeopardise the equity programmes” of the University (pt. 6.14). However, as suggested, some UoA departments and or faculties are more dedicated to equity objectives than others, confirming Donald Savage’s observation (2000, p.200) that it is more important to have

³²⁴ Staff also reported that they were more positive about future developments and the Pacific students were generally optimistic with the present and future conditions of university study.

the commitment of the senior administration, the deans and the academic staff to equity programmes than “the formal goals and detailed procedures”.

The threat to academic freedom in a marketised tertiary sector has additionally been a cause of friction. However, the Education Act 1989 provided statutory recognition to academic freedom and university autonomy, and recognised that a core function of universities is the “role as critic and conscience of society” (s162(4)(a)(v)). In contrast, Treasury (1987b, p.178) had argued that this role would eventually disappear as it pointed out that in an information age “the very multiplicity of sources is itself a form of protection”, no longer needing the university as “a key source of free information and discussion on political and other sensitive issues”.

Whereas the fourth Labour Government had protected academic freedom by law, the issue came to a head in the mid 1990s when Treasury’s argument resurfaced. As Kelsey (2000, p.230) noted, the market-driven agenda of the Green and White Papers, the embrace of managerialism by “all university administrations to a greater and lesser degree”, pressures of globalisation and advocates of the market model made it hard for academics to fulfil this role. In its Green Paper submissions, however, the University (UoA, 1997) was adamant that its role as critic and conscience should be maintained for both economic and social reasons. That is, the most immediate benefit is social (pt. 4.12), but the achievement of the country’s economic goals also requires the generation and dissemination of ideas and products that further depend on the monitoring of and commenting on their quality and effectiveness (pt. 4.5). The Acting VC, Alistair MacCormick (in 1998), similarly criticised the White Paper for putting at risk this role with its proposal that the Minister of Education could intervene in the operation of a TEI deemed ‘at risk’ (UoA, 1998d), as Hawke had also suggested (see Section 6.2.2). In addition, the Audit Panel (UoA, 1998a) pointed out that the University’s Council members had informed the panel that they would give their full support to any staff member who spoke or published *in their field of expertise*.³²⁵

³²⁵ My italics to indicate that this can be problematic as it potentially narrows the scope of comment an academic can engage in. Donald Savage (2000) also raised this issue using Noam Chomsky as an example, but Jane Kelsey can be included as she received much criticism from organisations such as the NZBRT to comment as a Law professor on political and economic issues (Dale, personal communication, 14/2/2005). This may thus have prompted the University’s phrasing of the academic freedom clause.

Generally speaking, from reading Savage's (2000) and Kelsey's accounts (2000) on academic freedom in universities, the UoA has compared well in advocating its autonomy and academic freedom relative to some of the other New Zealand universities, with UoA's 'critical' academics being mainly criticised by the outside world of media, private lobby groups such as the New Zealand Business Round Table (NZBRT), and politicians. However, Kelsey also indicated that universities on the whole have not fought hard enough for other communities nor "provided adequate support for those who perform the critic and conscience role", since "many women, Māori and critical scholars have struggled to establish their work as valid 'scholarship'" (Kelsey, 1996, p.4). In particular, Kelsey (2000, p.231) stressed that academic freedom is intrinsically linked with Treaty obligations, but points out that those "who have asserted the validity of Māori knowledge have rarely found a safe space to speak".

Nevertheless, Walker indicated, as aforementioned, that the UoA's principal organiser of academic freedom had provided Māori a protective cloak to advance their case and objectives. Kelsey (ibid) likewise noted that the "small spaces that opened up in the 1980s have been maintained in some universities", although they do experience ongoing external and internal pressures that are financial, as the equity commitments showed, as well as ideological. These pressures also apply to freedom of research; when faced with reduced state funding, academics need to seek private funding. However, the ensuing loyalty to the supplier puts objective research and a critical voice in question, and the market objective of making public research funding contestable advances the functional and pragmatic approach to research and hence places restrictions on academic freedom. Moreover, the shift from tenured positions to contractual ones under the Employment Contracts Act 1991 has put academic freedom even more in danger.

7.7 Institutional Counterpoints: Costs & Benefits

Nicholas Tarling may have a point that economies of size enable universities in an environment of reduced state funding to diversify and specialise as well as increase their profile in quality teaching and research. Nevertheless, there are unmistakably winners and losers in this game of growth. The Curriculum Commission (UoA, 2002) reported that the University experienced a growth in student population from 18,831 to 28,092 in the years 1991-2000, and major changes in student demographics and student academic

choices. The Commission noted that beneficial outcomes of these trends were increased diversity on campus, improvements in efficiency and professionalism of teaching delivery, and growth in the numbers of staff, enabling new and young academics to contribute to the “breadth and scope of teaching and research” (ibid, p.6). However, it also noted that these benefits have brought about costs. The Commission reported that they had received submissions that indicated that growth had harmed the quality of teaching and learning in some areas: increased pressure on staff and infrastructure; more students being ill prepared for university studies; and staff and the courses they offer not responding to changes in student demographics and culture, leading to barriers in studying for some students. Overall, both staff and students reported that the increase in staff to student ratio³²⁶ had impoverished the classroom situation, leading to less supportive learning environments and poorer student engagement with staff and peers.

In addition, some faculties gained a “competitive advantage” in an age of instrumentalism and demand-driven objectives; that is, not all schools and departments increased their student numbers in students’ pursuit of a degree that will guarantee them good job prospects and the ability to pay off their student loans. To illustrate, although the Commission informed that all faculties experienced growth in student enrolments, there were again clear winners and losers. The faculties of Science, and Medical and Health Sciences grew by more than 50% during the 1990s, and the Faculty of Business and Economics by nearly 90%. In contrast, Arts did not experience the same growth figures, leading to some departments like Swedish, Dutch and Indonesian being made redundant³²⁷. These developments are consistent with Bowles-Gintis’ learning-choosing dichotomy (see Section 6.5).

What is more, the Commission highlighted that the new funding system of the National government in the 1990s impelled departments and schools to compete for students. Obviously, interdepartmental collaborations were more difficult to establish under

³²⁶ The university had 799 academic staff in 1986 for 13030 students enrolled, and 1306 in 1996 for 25949 students (Tarling, 1999). This trend reflects an increase of 1:16 to 1:20 respectively in staff/student ratio, which was around 1:11 in the 1970s.

³²⁷ This is quite ironic as I am from Dutch-Indonesian background and enrolled in first year Indonesian papers in the mid 1990s, which I interrupted when choosing to do an Ed.D degree. However, my continuing these papers at an advanced level is no longer an option. Dutch only survived for a few years, being a new paper in 1992. It gave me the opportunity to keep abreast with the new literature and Dutch writers. Unfortunately, all the books have now been withdrawn from the university library.

conditions of competition. The Commission summarized the competitive environment as follows:

[E]ach faculty and, in some cases, departments within faculties attempted to provide service courses for their own students. When a particular field of study became popular with students, a number of departments sought to offer courses within it, claiming in each case that they had a special ‘perspective’ to bring. Majors became more specialised. Majors and specialisations proliferated as departments sought to capture a few more students to increase their numbers and revenue. The under-funding of postgraduate students and the desire to increase their number, led to further increases in undergraduate student numbers to support postgraduate study. (Ibid, p.6).

Moreover, as economic rationales came to impact university practice, the ‘localised’ voices of the ‘other’, as represented by increased student diversity and the introduction of papers in Māori Studies, Women Studies and Pacific Studies in the Arts faculty, were in danger of becoming silenced. In a demand-driven system, the proliferation of courses in these areas indicates the safeguarding of ‘voice’ for diverse student groups if a significant number attend university and opt for such courses. However, this upholding of choice does not necessarily translate into changes to content and practice and can even impede it when the majority of students opt for more pragmatic courses that largely teach them the Western way of doing business, and the European history and or procedures of professions like Architecture and Medicine. The Curriculum Commission’s remark that staff and the courses they offer tend to be irresponsive to changes in student demographics and culture, hence setting up barriers in studying for some students, clearly suggests this lack of diversity in curricula and pedagogy.

As the Commission report implies, departments and staff in the ‘imposed’ quest for utility maximisation were often divided. In particular, this division was helped by the emergent conditions of the flexible work force, non-tenured and individual contracts and specialisation of courses in the 1990s. Neoliberal policies seemed to impact not only those ‘traditionally’ marginalised, rather all who are ‘captured’. It largely confirms Peters’ warning (1990) that the focus on accountability for efficient performance of the

tertiary education sector under NPM would result in neglecting issues of employee welfare and damage institutional ‘culture’.

7.8 Closing Note

As a state institution, the UoA has been very much tied to the social changes New Zealand experienced. The chapter showed that the University has largely been ‘open’ to all, primarily because of the New Zealand ideal of an egalitarian society but also out of pragmatism – to have a sufficient number of students enrolled in their programmes to make a university in Auckland viable, a theme that re-emerged under funding constraints in the 1990s. As a College, it was further “remote and provincial, small and under-funded” and no player in the international rankings (Tarling, 1999, intro) for much of its centennial existence until more funding was forthcoming during the New Zealand welfare years and research activities placed the University on the ‘international’ map. However, the situation of favourable funding was set to change when the fourth Labour Government initiated market reforms in the tertiary sector, which the National Governments continued.

Overall, the outside influences that have affected the University in the 1984-2000 period have involved a reduction in governmental funding, the creation of a demand-driven, competitive tertiary sector, the changes in student population through massification of higher education and immigration from non-traditional sources, and globalisation/internationalisation of university education. Whilst the University’s internal actions reflected many of these pressures, there was generally a continued commitment to open access, equity and academic freedom; a cautious push for internationalisation; and, as a member of an international community of scholars, the promotion of participation in transnational networks, such as Universitas 21 and APRU. All these dynamics have prompted responses trying to combine the traditional role of the University and the new challenges faced in a tertiary sector where the notion of public education has been challenged. Hence, during the reforming years, the University experienced various degrees of shifts in its organisational structure and culture from academic collegiality to (key-academic) managerial control and in its mandate and capacity to deliver. These shifts have produced benefits as well as costs, opportunities as well as risks.

The next chapter investigates how a small academic support department, 'budding' in this period of market reforms, experienced the 'makeovers' of the University during these turbulent times.

Chapter 8

The Student Learning Centre: Orchestration from the Periphery to the Core?

8.1 Prelude

[W]ith the doors of universities now wide open to students of different academic backgrounds and very different levels of academic preparation, subject departments have been losing ground in the battle to provide for consequent student learning needs. With open-entry policies become [sic] even more open, the creation and expansion of a student learning unit is a very constructive and practical approach to overcoming main learning problems of students at risk of academic failure.³²⁸

The above quote by the founder of the UoA's Student Learning Centre (SLC), David Simpson, suggests that the lifeblood of the Centre's existence has been the open access orientation to university education at both the state and institutional level, as Chapters 6 and 7 illustrated. But as open access for those 21 and older is not a new regulation, why did it take the university a hundred years before setting up academic support for those students who entered the college/university under-prepared? The history of the university illustrates that the number of students failing papers or doing poorly has not been a recent phenomenon. What did staff do when 50% of their students failed an exam (see the Rutherford case, Section 7.2.2)? Were classes small enough to give them extra tuition, or did students have to struggle or leave? There is no written history of what happened to students using their right of open access but who then found it difficult to cope with their studies. As university education, for most of its history, was attended by relatively few students, it can be assumed that the numbers needing academic support did not warrant an official learning centre. Also, in times of near full employment, students had the option to make money rather than to extend their university education. And in a settlers' society, comprehensive university education had generally been considered of little practical use for obtaining work.

³²⁸ David Simpson (1989, p.4).

Some things must therefore have changed in the period leading up to the creation of a learning support unit at the University of Auckland in 1985. As the Hawke and *Lifelong Learning* reports had not yet been written, these changes may initially have had little to do with the tertiary reforms of the fourth Labour Government, but more with the ‘globalisation K-wave’ (see Section.3.2.2) that witnessed a contraction in the economy and a shift to a ‘post-Fordist’ society whose needs of flexible specialisation (see Table 3.1 and Section 7.4) initiated an expansion of mass education from secondary to tertiary. As Tarling (1999, p.83) noted:

Relatively full employment tended to reduce the growth in enrolments in the early 1970s. The changes after the late 1970s marked not only a shift in the nature of the economy but also increased insistence on qualifications.

Apart from this shift in economic organisation, the emancipatory and migratory influences of the post-war years instigated a swing from a semi-elite, largely monocultural, university system to a semi-mass system that was more diverse with regard to class, gender and ethnicity (see Section 7.3). As chapter 7 showed, equity issues in university education became increasingly central in the 1970s. Although student protest in New Zealand during that period had been minor compared with those in Europe and the US, Māori voices became more audible (see Section 7.2.3); women and anti-racist movements more prominent; and above all, in the 1980s, the Treaty of Waitangi more central to New Zealand society. Yet these trends do not explain all. Not every country or New Zealand institution promoted the existence of a learning centre. Some learning centres of overseas universities predate the UoA’s learning unit; others only introduced similar support systems much later; and some not at all. In New Zealand, the UoA was the first to show its support for such an initiative. Massey and many of the polytechnics soon followed whereas it took other New Zealand universities much longer, even a decade, to set up learning centres.

This chapter’s objective is threefold: to examine the critical external and institutional factors that prompted the initiation of the UoA’s Student Learning Centre; to consider these factors in the context of globalisation forces, state reform of university education and institutional idiosyncrasies; and to analyse the different configurations the Centre underwent. It divides this analysis into two parts: 1985-1993 under directorship of David Simpson, and 1993-2000 under that of Dr Emmanuel Manalo.

8.2 ‘Organising Principals’ in the Configuration of the Student Learning Centre

The Centre’s foundation and early development under David Simpson, the first Director of the SLC (1985-1993), occurred when the fourth Labour Government was in power, and when massification of university education and public funding for universities steadily became contentious issues. In such an environment, financial support for learning assistance may not have been forthcoming if no need had been perceived. But as Simpson mentioned in his report to the then Deputy-Registrar, Stanley Croker, *Student Learning Assistance at the University of New South Wales* (1991b), the University did establish a centre in 1985, suggesting that the University’s Registry saw a demand and necessity for such a service. However, the need was addressed cautiously: the new Student Learning Unit (SLU) was experimental. The experimental nature also meant that the then Unit came under the UoA Counselling Service, where Simpson was senior counsellor, and was to receive ‘soft’ funding for its operation. The antecedents leading up to the SLU’s inception, Simpson’s vision and the Unit’s experimental nature were to form the founding ‘principals’ and influence future configurations and developments of the later renamed Student Learning Centre (SLC). These ‘organising principals’ are discussed in more detail in the following subsections.

8.2.1 Orchestrations of Learning Support Schemes

As Nicholas Tarling (1999, p.97) contended, “that students should have worthwhile opportunities to learn” is not a recent concern of the University, but it took a long time before the first studies were done on students’ learning needs and motivation. It was only in 1974 that the UoA set up the Higher Education Research Office (HERO), run by Dr John Jones, with the objective to carry out research on issues of higher education as they related to the teaching, learning and research at the University. Although HERO, now the Centre for Professional Development (CPD), increasingly took on the task of academic staff development, it also researched the many aspects of student learning and experience of learning at the UoA. For example, Jones (1978) surveyed 2275 first year students of the 1976 intake and found that 542 of them, nearly 25%, did not return for

the 1977 year. Some of these students left earlier in the academic year, others performed poorly or failed, and another group did well but decided not to re-enrol. Many of the students had been part-time and a large percentage was married. Hence the reasons given for leaving were financial, employment/business and family-related. However, there was also a significant number of the cohort, whether returning or not, who expressed their discontent with the university experience, indicating a lack of support. For example, Jones highlighted comments such as: failing by 2 marks after not having studied for a while is off-putting; needed more preparation; and not enough information provided on the difficulty of the various subjects. Replicating the survey in 1984, Jones (1978) found that the main reasons for withdrawal from the University were financial (21%), lost energy/overcommitment (17%), lost motivation/disappointment with university (16%), and work/career commitment (15%)³²⁹. Jones' surveys thus made the University aware that a significant number of students were in need of more academic guidance and assistance.

David Simpson wrote largely in support of these findings. In his brief 3-page report *Correlates of Personal and Scholastic Failure at Auckland University: the Experience of University Counselling Service 1975-1980*³³⁰, he states that it was known from the 1970 national cohort study that only a quarter of all students finished their basic degree in four years, whilst it took another 25% of students 10 years to complete, with 6% turning out to be 'eternal' students. These figures indicate that many students were part-time, as the history of the University likewise shows. Simpson also suggested that 30 to 35% of any graduating cohort would have consulted the Counselling Service at some time in their "often protracted undergraduate careers". Thus, like Jones, he informed the University that 'student wastage' was a significant occurrence. Simpson provided the following factors as correlates of student failure: personal motivation, adaptive incompetence in social and emotional contexts (in particular, a significant problem among young male students from single-sex schools), scholastic incompetence and inadequate environmental support. From his experience he found scholastic incompetence not to be a critical factor as long as students "maximise their study skills" and "utilised varied environmental support systems" although lack of the latter could also be overcome by high motivation and high adaptive capacity. Hence, Simpson

³²⁹ Internal document, Jones, 14/11/1984.

³³⁰ Internal document, Simpson, no date.

stressed that encouragement to increase student motivation and varied services “to rescue students from social, emotional and scholastic incompetence” could prevent student failure.

Apart from the above reports some departments, notably English and History, experienced academic ‘illiteracy’ among their students as a recurrent problem, and had decided to provide extra tutorial support on how to write a good assignment or essay for their discipline. In addition, the Dean of Engineering had referred in his letter to the Chairman of the Deans Committee³³¹ to the findings of a subcommittee set up 24 November 1982 concerning Engineering students. This committee had highlighted that the standard of students’ writing was so poor that it required remedial attention so that by Year 3 students would be able to write good reports, an essential component of their work as an engineer. The Dean’s proposal was to make discipline-specific literacy part of Engineering’s General Studies curriculum, hence extend the duties of General Studies tutors, and move part of the curriculum from Year 2 to Year 1.

From a different angle, Dr Judith Grant, Romance Languages, and Mr C. Bowley, English, had put in a proposal for an English Language Centre (ELC)³³² that Senate had referred to Academic Committee (2.8.1982) for discussion. The proposal was for ELC to offer English as a Second Language (ESL) papers (preferably for credit), ESL research, and an ESL Teaching Diploma programme, as there were few qualified ESL teachers in the Auckland region. In addition, the Centre was to provide Communication Skills for native English speakers. In the report, several non-UoA people supported this initiative based on the growing numbers of ESL and English as first language students needing literacy help. In addition, the observations of the adviser for overseas students, Brian Lythe, were reported in the proposal. In 1982, the report stated, 520 UoA students had been from overseas, the vast majority from countries around the Pacific, including New Zealand residents and citizens, and also students from other ethnic minorities in New Zealand. Of this group 76 had been aid-sponsored. Lythe expected their numbers to increase. For example, the Malaysian government had started to send students to New Zealand rather than the UK, as it was a cheaper option. Many of these sponsored students went to Wellington before the start of the academic year as Victoria University

³³¹ Internal document, Meyer/Tarling, 13/4/1984.

³³² Internal document, Bowley & Grant, 27/1/1983.

(VUW) ran preparatory language programmes. Also, the then Auckland Technical Institute (ATI), now the Auckland University of Technology (AUT), offered language and communication skills courses, but these were not open to or were too expensive for many overseas students to attend, although some of the ‘overseas’ students from New Zealand did enrol for these courses. The proposal further mentioned the success of the courses offered by History and English in essay composition, rapid reading and note taking in 1982, and stressed that since they were discipline specific other students could not benefit from them and had to go to ATI for communication skills.

Grant and Bowley’s proposal made clear that a language centre would be important and emphasised “Auckland University serves a multicultural society”. It informed the Academic Committee members that communication skills as credit courses were common in the UK and the US. Although contradictory to the ESL paper proposal, the report also stated that British research had found “little correlation between success in English and academic success”, with cultural issues being more influential. Subsequently, the Academic Committee requested David Simpson (and Dr Jones) to respond to the student problems stressed in the ELC proposals³³³, as the Deans Committee (14/3/1984) had felt that “it might be possible to make fuller use of the facilities already in the community”³³⁴, and that information should be collected from “the teaching of skills within the University, e.g. Mr Simpson in Counselling and in Departments like History and English”. Simpson then reported that there were two areas of concern which identified students in need of help: “scholastic incompetence among English speaking students” and “language incompetence among overseas students”³³⁵. He thought, however, that the latter was a far smaller group that could be assisted by Dr Grant and ESL trained or experienced remedial tutors, but concluded:

The written comments of teaching departments, my informal discussions with interested teaching staff and the experience of the Counselling Service indicate a need for an improved service at the Auckland University for students with a variety of learning problems, of which English language incompetence is only one. From my first hand experience of overseas

³³³ Internal document, Metcalfe/Simpson, 5/8/1983.

³³⁴ Internal document, Academic Committee, no date.

³³⁵ Internal document, Simpson/Metcalfe, 22/12/1983. In this memo, Simpson also indicated “the increased competition among students for better grade averages considered necessary in a shrinking graduate job market”, with “more B level students ... coming for help in the hope of raising their grades to A level.”

universities and polytechnics such service has been most commonly and usefully provided in student learning centres constituted for the purpose, rather than in language centres as traditionally conceived.

A similar response to the ELC proposal came from Dr John Jones, who stated in a letter to the Secretary of the Academic Committee³³⁶ that ELC would be of some help but that a scheme for help with “under-development of intellectual skills” was more useful than one for help with knowledge of “English grammar”. He informed the Committee about the need for essay writing assistance and subject literacy, and as an example stated that of the 600 Maths students, a hundred of them needed remedial action. Jones therefore advocated for study skills programmes based in specific subjects/departments as well as for individualised support to take into account the different motives for and preferences of learning. A cost-effective approach to skills assistance would involve four areas: didactic like the HERO video on study skills, study skills as integral part of the curriculum, non-didactic peer support, and a subject-based ‘peer’ tutoring model as employed by the University of Berkeley, California³³⁷.

It is in this context that the proposal for a learning centre took shape and University support emerged, with the committee structure set up in 1969 (see Section 7.3.1) being most influential in the decision process.

8.2.2 The ‘Counselling’ Experiment as Composition of the Student Learning Centre

Simpson had already started proactive measures in providing study skills support in the late 1970s and early 1980s to some of the students who had contacted the Counselling Service for help. In his work as a senior counsellor, Simpson had seen a growth in non-traditional students³³⁸, as Jones’s surveys had also illustrated. As Tarling (1999) pointed out, by the 1980s a quarter of the University’s roll was comprised of provisional

³³⁶ Internal document, Jones/Metcalf, 19/3/1984.

³³⁷ Dr Grant’s ELC was deferred and returned in 1986, with the advice to forward any proposal for an English Language Institute (ELI) until the outcome of the Romance Languages Review and the arrival of ESL staff were known. In the meantime, however, a trial English for Academic Purposes (EAP) summer course could be discussed and considered within Continuing Education. (Internal document, Tarling, 3/7/1986.)

³³⁸ Non-traditional refers to students who are not entering higher education directly from secondary school with entrance qualifications and funding from parents or scholarships, and who are often not full-time (Benseman, 2002).

admission students, older than 20 – an occurrence that coincided with a decline in the New Zealand economy (see Sections 5.2.2 & 7.4). These students did not only need counselling in personal matters but also assistance in learning *how* to learn in order to succeed in their academic work. Simpson stated that his was not a unique experience and that in his research and overseas visits he had often come across faculty reports and staff comments that reflected concern with “the inadequate academic standards shown by many first year students” (1991b, p.6), suggesting that the change in student profile was widespread. He highlighted that the traditional approach had been to offer poorly prepared students special tutorials, problem clinics or basic first year papers to help them gain the necessary subject knowledge. Simpson believed that such assistance could be helpful “[w]here students have only limited conceptual subject difficulty, or limited substantive deficit, ... provided skilled and popular tutors with high motivation for such work have been employed” (ibid). They would be less helpful when students had major conceptual problems or limited knowledge in essential areas. As he stated:

Remedial or compensatory subject tutoring is almost useless where in addition to these problems, students simply do not know how to study ... or where they have developed highly idiosyncratic or defective learning styles which do not meet university requirements. All these problems are compounded where students have manifest learning disabilities such as dyslexia, English language problems in the case of overseas or minority group students, or physical handicap. (Ibid).³³⁹

The use of terms like idiosyncratic and defective is indicative of Simpson’s roots in clinical and educational psychology, and represents the specialist/individual approach to problems of learning, congruent with Jones’s view that individualised support is an important aspect of intervention³⁴⁰. Simpson backed up the need for this approach in memos explaining that he had conducted “study skills activities on a shoe-string budget” since 1976. He had also shown that these activities had been successful. In analysing the interventions with students with regard to essay writing and reading between 1975-1980, Simpson produced good results: assignment grades had improved

³³⁹ First mentioned in Simpson (1989).

³⁴⁰ It is also consonant with the educational theories of the 1970s that largely followed a deficit model with students needing intervention or enrichment (both largely assimilative). This model, however, was soon to be challenged by models of difference. Also, the post-modern and critical theories of learning and power only gained momentum in the second half of the 1980s.

markedly and so had the students' skills for study³⁴¹. In a memo to Tarling³⁴², Simpson mentioned a paper he wrote in 1980 which detailed that "the motive underlying our study skills activity is to lower student wastage caused by scholastic failure among marginal scholars, through the use of well-validated contemporary remedial or compensatory study skills techniques". By 1982, however, these activities demanded two days of his time as counsellor, with the result that the counselling service needed additional personnel to compensate for the hours he spent on study skills activities. In the same memo, Simpson thus requested that Counselling received extra-funding for equipment and a part-time counsellor for one day a week, so he could increase his academic support activities from 2 to 3 days to offer a limited range of study skills workshops, introduce workshops on students request (such as speed reading), provide specialised remedial work, and compile a directory of departmental assistance for students. Approval was given in February 1983, consisting of a non-recurrent grant of \$5000 for equipment and \$3000 for an extra 200 hours of counselling help³⁴³.

These incremental steps in the provision of academic learning support later proved to be influential in obtaining UoA's approval to establish a learning unit (within Counselling), the task of which was to focus on personal remedial help to students in need of learning assistance. In support, Simpson's memo to the Academic Committee in 1983³⁴⁴ underscored that a large number of students needed help in reading, writing and oral skills, time management and other study skills, whilst smaller numbers needed help with English language, basic mathematics and remediation of complex learning disorders. On the invitation of the Academic Committee, Simpson followed up this memo by a proposal a year later. In this proposal³⁴⁵, and based on the rationale that widespread and diverse student learning difficulties existed, he requested the inception of a learning centre staffed by one fulltime educational psychologist to conduct learning assessments and various study skills workshops and tuition; one fulltime tutor at lecturer status, connected to a university department for at least two hours per week, to provide remedial language and learning programmes; one fulltime tutor to deal with student learning problems within science-based programmes; and one full-time

³⁴¹ Internal documents, Simpson, no date.

³⁴² Internal document, Simpson/Tarling, 13/7/1982.

³⁴³ Internal document, memo McLay/Cocker, 8/2/1983.

³⁴⁴ Internal document, Simpson/Academic Committee, 22/12/1983.

³⁴⁵ Internal document, Simpson, 8/6/1984.

secretary/receptionist. As this proposal may have been somewhat ambitious, Simpson toned down this original request some days later, instead proposing that as a transitional step, a student learning unit was to be set up within the Counselling Service; that Simpson's two days on study skills work was to be made official; that one fulltime or several part-time tutors were to be appointed to undertake language learning activities; and that the means and availability of a part-time science tutor was to be investigated³⁴⁶.

Nevertheless, one issue was that the model Simpson envisaged and proposed³⁴⁷ had not yet been proven in New Zealand. His proposal also faced another issue: before the Unit's inception in 1985 some university academics had expressed apprehension about a specific learning unit since it would relieve subject departments from their duty to help their students with learning problems (Simpson, 1991b). Hence, they thought it better to establish these units within departments. Despite these objections, UoA management, in this case the Finance Committee and the Academic Committee, realised the growing need for academic assistance and gave Simpson the green light in 1985 to develop the proposed Student Learning Unit (SLU) within the Counselling Service. As Tarling (1999, pp.99-100, quoting from Simpson's proposal) summed up the situation:

Simpson countered the view held by a minority that it was not the university's business to 'remedy inadequate scholarship', compensate students with learning disorders, or teach English to students with inadequate mastery of it. His view was more 'pragmatic'. Already 'non-trivial student learning problems' were increasing in number, and they could be expected further to increase: 'something practical' had to be done 'to attempt a reduction in such student wastage'.

That there was only a minority (albeit vocal) opposition against a centralised learning unit is reflected in Simpson's prospect about the likely success of his (revised) proposal: "all executive committees endorse the establishment of a learning centre and it awaits funding approval in November 1984". In reality, funding was confirmed on 18 March 1985 under the proviso that the Unit was to be an *experimental* project, and that a report

³⁴⁶ Internal document, (official) proposal, Simpson, 13/6/1984.

³⁴⁷ The model was based on both Simpson's existing study skills work as well as his visits in 1981 to learning centres in the US and UK, in particular U.C. Berkeley Student Learning Centre headed by Dr Kurt Lauridson and the Educational Methods Unit at Oxford Polytechnic where Graham Gibbs conducted student-centred learning research (Simpson, 1989).

“on the success or otherwise of the Centre be forwarded to [the Finance Committee] at the end of the year”³⁴⁸. This decision, however, meant that no permanent positions were initiated until 1989, marginalising to an extent the condition of work and the function and image of the SLU. The right environment was put in place to set up a flexible workforce³⁴⁹ consonant with the state market ideologies for education and employment relations to emerge in the mid 1980s and to intensify under a National government in the 1990s.

8.2.3 Motif of Equal Opportunity: Berkeley’s Learning Centre as Blueprint

The New Zealand position of “providing automatic entry of anyone over 20 years of age” to enter most courses offered by TEIs, illustrating the country’s “egalitarian ethos in education”, has been unique on a worldwide scale (Benseman (2002, p.12). As Chapter 6 indicated, the national ethos of open entry has been one of the organising principals of the University of Auckland. From UoA’s beginnings this has been an ongoing point of discussion in its Committee meetings concerning tightening or not tightening entry criteria with the quantity-quality argument³⁵⁰ often fuelling the debate. Nevertheless, the University’s ‘open entry’ stance is a clear point of departure from the British as well as Continental European class-conscious tradition “that only the “brightest” should enter university and that university education should be a deliberate “trial” aimed to perfect students through adversity” (Simpson, 1991a, p.20). As the opening quote to this chapter indicated, this departure from British tradition was to be important in the realisation of the SLU.

In many ways, the open entry policy of universities in New Zealand reflects more the American idea “that the role of a university is to facilitate learning among a wide range of student ability levels and preferences, rather than organising the university around the

³⁴⁸ Internal document, Cocker/Simpson, 18/3/1985.

³⁴⁹ The flexible workforce model was also helped by the majority of SLU staff being female, and traditionally the female staff of the university has held more non-tenured positions than their male counterparts. When in 1984 Margaret Wilson conducted a staff survey for the then Association of University Teachers (AUT, now AUS) to assess the status of academic women, she found that at UoA 57.3% were tenured, whereas the figure for male academics was 87.9% (Tarling, 1999).

³⁵⁰ Under pressures of marketisation of higher education, this argument has shifted to one that equates *quantity* with the number of students needed to raise the staff-students ratio to make up for the loss in government funding and *quality* with efficiency of the use of resources.

advancement of only the brightest abstract thinkers” (Simpson, 1991a). This vision is also congruent with the perceived requirements of a post-Fordist economy for more skilled workers that first took off in the US, and for a consumption rather than a production-based culture (Nunan et.al., 2000) as advanced in the 1980s (see Section 4.5). As expected, the first learning centres emerged in the US and they predate the New Zealand development of learning centres by a good decade. To illustrate, the Student Learning Center (SLC) of the University of California at Berkeley was established in the early 1970s. This Center materialised from the belief that a specific unit would have a positive impact on the academic achievement of “borderline and failing students” on the basis of the skills training and personal guidance offered (Simpson, 1991b, p.10). As Simpson reported, staff at Berkeley strongly believed that its learning centre could help “overcome legacies of poverty and educational disadvantage that many minority students bring to their first year at university” (ibid, p.10-11).

In fact, UC Berkeley’s SLC has been one of the main models of student support the SLU was fashioned after. Its mission of overcoming disadvantages in education due to minority status in society is congruent with the notion of equality to access from non-traditional and under-represented groups that came to the foreground in New Zealand from, as aforesaid, the 1970s onwards. Simpson clearly envisaged an expected increase in student diversity, and developed the Unit with UC Berkeley’s experience as an example to follow and develop. Once the SLU was established, Simpson (1991a, p.20) was well aware that UoA commitment to open entry would determine the continued feasibility of the fledgling SLU, as he stressed:

The future of our Student Learning Unit is predicated upon a commitment of this University to open its doors to students from the widest possible range of educational and social backgrounds even if such backgrounds produce less impressive academic profiles and even if significant remedial or other help is required.

Open entry as organising principal entailed that the focus of the SLU in its first decade of operation was set on helping non-traditional students at risk of failing. In view of that, the SLU’s modus operandi did not just emerge from the individual intervention anchored in the more clinical orientation of the Counselling Service, but also from the compensatory programmes for disadvantaged students developed in the US. The

ensuing remedial approach remained a lasting objective as well as personal barrier to access for students because of the ‘dumb’ label. The focus was to change gradually from remedial to student professional development in the 1990s, but the image stuck with perception only slow to change from the late 1990s onwards.

8.3 The First Eight Year Cycle: 1985-1992

Expansion of services in response to increasing student numbers entails reform³⁵¹.

The first eight years of the SLU’s existence was largely marked by small increases in funding that was discretionary, non-tenured or relied on contestable equity grants from government, following the Hawke report (see Section 6.2.2), for its expansion of services in the late 1980s and early 1990s. Such a tight and insecure funding base meant that full academic positions were unfeasible, prospect for career advancement absent and research into students’ needs highly unlikely. Despite these conditions, Simpson was optimistic about future developments, emphasising the professional profile of the tutors as an internal strength for growth. In many respects the foundation tutors, and the tutors that followed, endeavoured to reach this standard, not because of the positions they were given but because of their dedication to making the Unit work, assisting students and being acknowledged by the university community. All believed strongly, either politically or educationally or both, in the objective of helping students succeed in an environment that had become increasingly less supportive and engaging because of constraining factors such as the growth in student participation and reduced state funding, which, as staff:student ratios rose (see Section 7.7), had led to large classes and less tutorial assistance (see Section 4.4.4).

The following illustrates that in an educational sector under pressure of massification and market reforms, this dedication formed the basis of the Unit’s development. The Unit’s marginal status, particularly in funding and accommodation, tended to produce, at certain cross roads of the Unit’s existence, friction that impeded collegial

³⁵¹ David Simpson (1991a, p.7).

relationships and affected the Unit's operation every so often; yet the overall commitment of staff to students and the department also stimulated the Unit's growth.

8.3.1 Tuning into Neoliberal Times: Small Resource Base and Flexible Workforce

After the Academic and Finance Committees had given their approval of starting up a learning unit within Counselling, half a tutor post (budget of \$13,100, excluding Simpson's position) was made available in 1985 for the project. From this small funding base, Simpson allocated three teaching positions, varying from five to ten hours per week during the academic year (March-October), to one Education and two Psychology students, who had been involved in a learning assistance project a year earlier as part of their coursework requirements. In addition, two hours were given to a subject tutor from the Maths department as well as to a tutor from the English department. Even though the Unit fell under Counselling, a non-academic student (and staff) welfare service, Simpson had advocated from the start that the SLU should be an academic unit as tutors came from subject departments; learning support needed professional skills from the Unit's staff. In his review of the SLU, Simpson (1989, p.6) stated that he had used the subject departments as model for the SLU's staffing policy in areas such as recruitment, standards and staff development, with tutor posts viewed as "non-tenured training positions, available to students enrolled in higher study who are also expected to maintain hands-on teaching contact in subject departments". Hence, in its first year of operation the SLU was to function as a training ground for subject tutors much like the Teaching Assistant (TA) or Assistant Lecturer (AL) functions within departments, but most staff involved believed in the concept and, like Simpson, expected the Unit to grow in size.

In 1986, the halftime funding was indeed doubled to a fulltime tutorship, despite it being on a non-recurrent basis³⁵². The tutor of the English department took up a part-time advisory position in the Law School's writing programme however, and the remaining four tutors saw their hours and duties markedly increase. Monthly SLU

³⁵² On the endorsement of the Academic Committee, approved by the Finance Committee, internal document, Cocker/Simpson, 9/12/1985.

meetings were initiated, introducing the first written records of the Unit's operation³⁵³. As there was high cooperation rather than competition among the tutors, "it was agreed to waive the graduates' [sic] privilege of being paid at a higher rate", so all tutors would be paid the same hourly rate³⁵⁴. Other subject tutors had approached the Unit for tutoring positions, but the conservative increase in funding was seen as an opportunity to consolidate the positions of the existing staff so that certain areas could be developed, although a few hours were given to a subject tutor in Chemistry³⁵⁵.

Increases in funding in the next years meant that a study skills career within the SLU became a feasible option. From these beginnings, four major areas of expertise emerged and they became formalised in 1988 when funding increased to 2.1 of a tutorship (SLU, 1990) as a halftime tutor position was negotiated by introducing a registration or SLU membership fee of a \$9.90, officially to cover both copier costs and additional tutor posts³⁵⁶. As a result, the contracts of the three 'foundation' tutors changed from hourly rates to halftime tutor contracts spanning the whole year rather than the academic period from March to October. The four areas they covered were remedial writing, essay writing and notetaking; memory, motivation, stress reduction and specific reading disabilities; study organisation, time-management, reading efficiency and ESL; and maths and computer literacy³⁵⁷. In the same year, Simpson also requested the Finance Committee to make some positions tenured³⁵⁸. Approval came for the 1989 year but unfortunately also caused some friction as tenured positions, equivalent of one tutor

³⁵³ However, as the SLU had no designated secretary or electronic databases at that time, many of the minutes of the earlier years have not survived.

³⁵⁴ Internal document, SLU minutes, 11/2/86. This was decided because not all tutors had a Bachelor degree (thus not enrolled for a graduate course), and the funding for 1986 was \$10,000 less than expected). Hence, in *SLU-tutors for 1986*, it was proposed that all tutors be paid the lower rate of \$18/hour (internal document, van Rij-Heyligers/Sisley, n.d.).

³⁵⁵ Arguably, cooperation reflects the collegial cultural tradition of the University, resulting in group cohesion that can exclude others but also solves problems in tight situations and prevents fragmentation and division, an issue to emerge in the more competitive situations the Unit had to face later.

³⁵⁶ Unfortunately, only half the funds from contributions were recovered (later to be funded by contestable equity grants).

³⁵⁷ Internal document, memo Simpson/SLU tutors, 4/3/1988. These skills naturally evolved from the tutors' experience and educational background, although there were many overlaps especially in the study skills and writing support areas. Some of the skills disappeared when tasks became more formalised. For example, in the first few years I had a relative high case load of students needing emotional support as illustrated in a memo, Sisley/SLU tutors (1/10/1985), which stated "If you find yourself engaged in counselling (as opposed to help with learning/academic problems) please contact me to arrange supervision. Most such cases should be taken on by Josta". This role changed when we separated from Counselling in December 1991 (and I took leave of the SLC for two years to come back to a different clientele in 1994).

³⁵⁸ Internal document, memo Simpson/SLU tutors, 11/11/1988.

post, and contractual positions, equivalent of four tutor posts (1.7 funded by the UGC equity grants) (SLU, 1990), changed work conditions³⁵⁹ that impacted existing collegial decision-making which had been nurtured in a climate of equal employment contracts for similar positions. From this point on, decision-making became more managerial (see also Section 8.3.5). Although this shift can be seen as emerging from internal processes, it coincided with the first major reform efforts from the then Labour government on the TEI sector, as documented by the Hawke and *Learning for Life* reports (see Section 6.3.2). These efforts had a paradoxical effect on the Unit, providing more funding for EEdO initiatives with as trade-off reduced collegiality. Competition threatened to make an impact on operations.

Nevertheless, the fact that the resource base was small, was spread among several tutors, and was growing incrementally proved to be an efficient as well as effective strategy for the Unit's future development. As more subject areas could be covered, more students sought assistance, with the result that every year the funding base was raised correspondingly. Hence, during the first 8-year cycle under Simpson, funding – despite growing financial constraints – and activities increased, helped by the many extra (unpaid) hours the tutors put in to meet demand. Simpson commented that this dedication typified the early and ongoing commitment of staff to the objectives of the unit (SLU, 1992)³⁶⁰:

There is no doubt in my mind that the impressive range of help offered to so many students this year in the SLC resulted from highly motivated and very hard-working staff who view their work as an important mission and not just a job ... both teaching and office staff work far too hard.

As a result, the SLU was allocated .5 of a Directorship from academic establishment, plus one tenured tutor post from Welfare levy, three non-tenured tutor posts from the Contestable Equity fund and one tenured secretary/receptionist position in 1990; an additional 2.5 non-tenured tutor posts through the Ministry of External Relation &

³⁵⁹ Non-tenured tutors needed to be enrolled in higher degrees from 1989 onwards and linked to a subject department whereas this was optional for tenured positions, but because of the obvious unfairness of these discriminatory practices these prerequisites of employment were contested and not actively pursued in some cases.

³⁶⁰ This dedication typifies the Unit. Ella Henry (1992, p.11), for example, reported that the Māori peer tutors felt “a sense of responsibility for the programme [which] led to more than one case of ‘burn-out’, as tutors balanced their commitments to whanau, study and work”. This observation can also be applied to all staff involved and at all levels from senior to peer tutors and from teaching to administration.

Trade (MERT), the Contestable Equity fund and SLC membership fees of \$10, as well as an extra .5 receptionist position from Equity grants in 1991; and, when the SLU became the SLC and independent from Counselling, a full Directorship in 1992 (SLU, 1990 & 1992). However, from 1992 the Equity grant no longer provided for the .5 receptionist post, which henceforth came from the teaching funds which by then amounted to eight fulltime equivalent (FTE) posts spread among 33 part and fulltime tutorial staff³⁶¹. In the same period the student base registered with the SLU/SLC nearly doubled: from 581 students in 1990 to 1071 in 1991, to drop to 910 in 1992 (SLU, 1992; SLC, 1993), a time of transition as the renamed SLC moved out of crammed Counselling premises³⁶² into the new library entrance, a space it occupied until 2000, when it temporarily moved to five offices and two seminar rooms in the Old Choral Hall.³⁶³

8.3.2 Tenuto of Mission and Vision: Aiding the Under-prepared to Succeed in Academic Studies

The early mission of the SLU reflects the open entry policies of the UoA and Simpson's clinical psychology background. As Simpson (1989) stated:

The raison d'être of the SLU is, first of all, to provide learning assistance to students at risk of academic failure from whatever cause. Much work focuses on teaching skills at pre-entry level to students lacking appropriate pre-entry academic preparation. Tutorial methods used for both individuals and groups are practical methods grounded in sound uncontroversial teaching practice. The SLU also seeks to improve the learning skills repertoire of the wider student population.³⁶⁴

³⁶¹ Five had been established from University-funded teaching posts and three from Equity sources (Internal document, Simpson, 31/1/1992). It was also agreed to make .5 of a tutor position tenured per 1993 (Memo, Wills/Simpson, 25/8/1992).

³⁶² The three rooms in the Old Choral Hall were temporary accommodation until 1988 when a seminar room in Counselling had been converted into three offices soon to be inadequate to house an SLU staff of more than 10 part-time tutors in 1991. The accommodation problems in many respects follow those of tradition, as the history of UoA indicates.

³⁶³ This 'temporary' move lasted four years before the SLC moved into its official premises, the new Kate Edger building.

³⁶⁴ Simpson reiterated the first objective two years later as he stressed that the mission of learning centres is "aiding and supporting students at high risk of academic failure, in a non-competitive and personally supportive environment" (1991b, p.12).

Although this statement mirrors the pragmatic, as suggested by ‘uncontroversial’, and remedial approach to learning support for the growing ‘few’ at risk, the last statement signalled a more extensive role for the SLU in the future. However, in the first five years of operation the students helped were mainly the non-traditional students, especially mature women but also ‘overseas’ students. In addition, a small but significant number of students seeking assistance had been diagnosed with a learning disability such as dyslexia. These student characteristics contributed to the following SLU pursuits (Simpson, 1989, p.5):

Activity focuses on remedial teaching with both matriculated and open-entry students who present with academic deficits. We provide compensatory assistance for open-entry students who lack particular upper secondary school experience or skills and for students with educational or physical disabilities. We also engage in bridging programmes for students crossing disciplinary or cultural boundaries and attempt to use the concept of enrichment where relevant. [Underlined in the original.]

Simpson’s vision (1991b) clearly emphasised two aspects of activity a learning centre should provide: 1) a wide-scope of pre-entry skills and personal support, and 2) help with first year bridging courses for students not coping in large first year classes during their first half year of study³⁶⁵. The focus on remedial teaching and pre-entry skills points towards a potentially restrictive and culturally insensitive approach to learning support, as the assimilation of students into a dominant university culture tends to become the target. Yet, the political orientation and diverse cultural backgrounds of the tutors meant that objectives of adjustment were frequently counterbalanced by affirmative practices of support³⁶⁶. The SLU science tutors, for example, were actively involved in the support of women in engineering and mathematics. Also, the close link

³⁶⁵ This vision influenced the composition of the first SLU tutors employed: those from Psychology and Education (and later Sociology) for the first aspect in particular but not exclusively, and those from Mathematics and Chemistry (Engineering) for targeted/specific bridging help.

³⁶⁶ Also, variations in mission or policy were encouraged. Simpson stressed the fluidity and experimental nature of the Centre, which made it possible to be eclectic when helping students. As he argued: “We resist dogma and doctrinaire views on how students should be helped to learn, Many of our staff hold distinctively different views about the most basic aspects of our work. But that isn’t a problem” (Internal notes to guide new staff, Simpson, February 1992).

between the Unit and Counselling Service³⁶⁷, under which the SLU was administered up to 1992, gave students a broader support base. This relationship was of particular importance in the early years when most of the students seeking individual assistance requested, in order of importance, assistance in writing, special learning, memory and concentration, and motivation (SLU, 1989)³⁶⁸, and other student support. As Simpson (ibid) observed:

At the University of Auckland many student groups with special needs, such as mature-age students, the very poor, Māori, Pacific Islanders or single parents of very young children, make frequent use of the whole family of student support services. It has proven most useful to have learning centre tutors closely associated with this family of services.

From its beginnings, the SLU has, however, also assisted a noticeable number of ‘overseas’ Pacific and South-East Asian students (Philippines, Malaysia and Indonesia), many of whom had been referred to the Unit for writing and language support by the overseas counsellor, Brian Lythe. In contrast, the SLU often failed to reach Māori and New Zealand-born Pacific students. For example, the report *Bridging and Remedial Assistance to First Year Students* (UoA, 1988, p.2) commented:

Some targeted groups are better able to access the assistance available than others. ‘Mature’ women and overseas students whose first language is not English sometimes have initial difficulties, but are able to secure the help to overcome them. Some Pacific Island-born students also fall into this

³⁶⁷ A good example is my first student, who was a mature-age woman diagnosed with dyslexia. She had failed most of her papers and faced exclusion at the end of 1984. Although her diagnosis was not totally accurate, she found it hard to concentrate for long periods, was easily distracted and had difficulty writing in a logical fashion. Yet she was a good creative writer expressing much wit and perceptiveness in the stories she wrote. With the Unit’s assistance she managed to pass more than half her papers. In the end, she decided to do a creative writing course as UoA study was too restrictive, but she reported she had found the university experience more enriching with the help of SLU and Counselling. Translating this enrichment in today’s environment, and it would be perceived as cost, reflecting how much economic rationalism has come to the fore.

³⁶⁸ I recall that for some of the female students I assisted, emotional vulnerability frequently affected their studies. Much of the study support at that time consisted of a mixture of counselling, personal affirmation, motivation and study skills assistance in general learning and subject related areas. Hence, it was good to be so closely linked with the counsellors who provided advice when asked or who would indicate areas of study SLU tutors should concentrate on with the students they had referred. Alternatively, the close link also provided the possibility to refer students back to the counselling service if needed. As Simpson suggested, the initial student group made regular use of the health and counselling services, with the total approach provided helping many of them cope with their studies in situations of much stress and anxiety.

category. Others find it more difficult, and so do some Māori and New Zealand-born Pacific Island students.

The report (ibid, p.4) specifically stated: “too few Māori and Pacific Island students appear to be aware of the services offered by the SLU ... Recruitment of a Māori or Maoris, if available, would be desirable”. This advice was soon to be advanced and largely made possible by targeted state funding for EEdO under a Labour Government.

8.3.3 Te Roopu Kaiawhina and Fale Pasifika: Arrangements of Equity Resources and Multicultural Practice

As indicated, contestable equity funding proved crucial to the Unit’s expansion of services in the early 1990s. Consistent with the institution’s conservative approach to ‘internationalisation’ (see Section 7.5), the Unit’s mission and funding sources meant the focus was on under-prepared local students, shortly to include the under-represented. Hence, the SLU initiated research in areas of effective academic support for Māori and Pacific students. In 1987-88, for example, the Unit received a VC’s grant to support “an in-house fact finding study ... to search out detailed educational information on the scholastic behaviour of failing and borderline students in two categories of concern to the SLU: ethnic minorities and the economically and socially disadvantaged” (Howie, 1988, p.1).³⁶⁹ Unfortunately, the study had some limitations: it was small-scale, observing only a few incidences of tutor-student interactions in one-to-one and class situations for each SLU tutor; and framed within an ‘enrichment model’ from which all verbal interactions were assessed³⁷⁰. Nevertheless, the interviews with several Māori and Pacific students made some of the student needs concrete as they indicated the importance of participatory class dynamics, a comfortable environment, negotiating the

³⁶⁹ Note, however, that this funding predates the Hawke recommendation but not the Watts report (see Section 6.2.1), initiated by the universities to pre-empt government reviews of the sector. As Butterworth and Tarling (1994) observed, the ideas of the Watts Report (1986) were implemented at the institutional level.

³⁷⁰ Enrichment here tends to be typified by a more indirect method of teaching and individual approach to learning, based on the importance of personal planning, self motivation, self evaluation, learner independence and ability to confront one’s failures and problems (Howie, 1988, p.5). Hence, more direct teaching acts tended to be judged as authoritative and unhelpful, in much the same way as Asian pedagogy is seen as limiting as students cannot explore knowledge autonomously. In fairness, the author also concluded, “my perspective is a limited one” (ibid, p.56) and in her recommendations she stressed the importance of Māori and Pacific staff and student input on the content and method of any enrichment programme offered.

topic for an exercise or assignment, applying knowledge to practice, attending to students' emotional and motivational needs, and providing on-going group support. Above all, the advice of offering students "access to a trained and experienced tutor of a similar cultural/ethnic background, if they so desire this" (Howie, *ibid*, p.28) was one all tutors agreed on.

Apart from the above study, liaison between SLU and Māori and Pacific initiatives took place from 1987 onwards. The SLU was asked to run workshops for MAPAS³⁷¹, and participate in a hui. The SLU briefing on proposals for a summer school in 1989 for Māori and Pacific students informed that it was decided that the objectives for such a programme were "to provide academic preparation and personal adjustment experiences for entering university at first year level [and] to increase academic success and retention". The running of such a programme, however, needed a statement about a Māori and Pacific Island perspective, which raised the issue of whether one perspective existed, and if so what implications would it have on how the course was to be conducted.³⁷² Alongside, the notion of employing Māori subject tutors to assist Māori students in a culturally appropriate environment was further advanced. Barbara Grant, one of the SLU's staff members, made academic skills projects *for* and *by* Māori part of her postgraduate research work in Education. In 1989, she presented a report in which she advocated a bicultural model of operation for the SLU based on Treaty of Waitangi obligations and Dr Howie's enrichment model (Grant, 1989). In this report, she also presented findings from her open-ended interviews with 12 Māori students and four Māori staff. The interviews indicated that factors that place Māori at risk in the University consisted of the following institutional factors:

1. the monocultural view of knowledge and teaching and learning,
2. the invisibility and marginalisation of Māori experience, and
3. the power and authority structure of the university, likely leading to alienation.

In addition, student factors like lack of self-esteem as a result of Māori experience in a monocultural Pākehā school environment, and cultural/social factors such as self-reliance as a disadvantage, whakamā (shyness), cultural commitments, and financial

³⁷¹ MAPAS is the Māori and Pacific Admission Scheme, which encourages Māori and Pacific students who have not met the minimum criteria of entry into the Faculty of Medical and Health Sciences to enrol in the Faculty's programmes.

³⁷² Internal document, memo Manalo/Simpson, 26/10/1988.

pressures place Māori students at-risk at university. Hence, skills to deal with the institution, to link one's knowledge and experience to course material, to cope with study requirements and to access financial resources were reported to be valuable. However, the SLU was not the place, partly because it was not known to one-third of the interviewees, or else could not be located, and partly because of apprehension contacting a place that "catered for inadequate students" or "aimed at the 'best' students" (Grant, *ibid*, p.23). Also, consonant with Howie's findings, the interviews indicated that the SLU programmes were not so inviting, as they did not provide hui-type seminars, contained inappropriate cultural advice, and represented a compartmentalised function based on individual-oriented support.

From the above efforts the Unit initiated in the third term of 1989 the Marae-based Study Skills Programme, funded from a \$5,000 private grant from the Masonic Education Foundation. This enabled the Unit to hire senior Māori students as peer tutors for first year students, and was able to reach around 8% of the Māori student population, representing mainly mature female students enrolled in Arts papers (Henry, 1992). Despite this development, a bicultural model was never formalised as Simpson advocated for a multicultural approach and questioned whether the international foundation of universities and the diverse group of UoA students and staff made the University truly monocultural. As Simpson explained:

The notion of the SLU having a bicultural focus ... does not form part of SLU strategic thinking or our original mission and a change to such a limiting focus is not planned at this time. SLU special services for Māori students, consistent with University policy on Partnership and Treaty, must proceed without neglect of other student groups on campus, especially minorities such as Pacific Islanders. The SLU is committed [sic] to multiculturalism³⁷³.

Hence, the Marae-based programme also involved senior Pacific students, and even though the programme was not specifically designed for Māori and Pacific students, the cultural background of the tutors and the fact it was based in the Marae meant that these students would be attracted (Henry, 1992). However, in support of Howie's and Grant's

³⁷³ Internal document, memo Simpson/SLU tutors, 28/11/1989.

findings, Ella Henry (1992), the first tutor employed for the programme, suggested that a bicultural model was likely to be effective as the Māori students using the programme felt more comfortable sharing issues like racism and family problems with the Marae-based peer tutors, even though their academic problems (a sense of isolation, insufficient family support, lack of confidence to seek departmental assistance, unfamiliarity with time management strategies, little or no experience with academic writing or reading, and financial constraints) overlapped with those of non-Māori. On the basis of the peer tutors' feedback and the availability of Contestable Equity funding³⁷⁴ the programme was extended in 1991 to cover the whole academic year. The programme was renamed Te Roopu Kaiawhina: The Group of Helpers, and two of the peer tutors were given a halftime tutor position, with Henry becoming the first programme coordinator.

Arguably, the above developments were influenced by internal developments but also national and institutional objectives. Increased importance was placed on the Treaty of Waitangi and full participation of under-represented groups in higher education, albeit at reduced rates of state funding, at a governmental level (see Section 7.4) in their (Porter and OECD induced) vision of building a high performing economy. At an institutional level, equity issues became charter objectives of the UoA, as required by the Education Act 1990. As Henry (1992, p.10) noted:

The University of Auckland clearly states that one of its objectives is to 'enhance Māori presence and participation' in the University. That it has enabled Te Roopu Kaiawhina to be set up is testimony to that goal.³⁷⁵

Like the Marae-based programme, however, Te Roopu Kaiawhina did not only target Māori students; it also aimed to assist Pacific students, as did the SLU project at the

³⁷⁴ A letter of the UGC Chairman to the VC of the UoA (14/12/1987) indicated that Government was to set aside funding for initiatives that "increase rates of successful participation by women, Maori, and other groups currently under-represented in university enrolments", with the UGC making \$2 million available to universities for special (bridging) programmes, counselling and tutoring, and outreach initiatives. This changed into the Contestable Equity Fund in 1990 providing the same amount (Letter, Barker/Maiden, 11/12/1989).

³⁷⁵ Regarding the Treaty, one of Te Roopu's tutors indicate, however, "the SLU commitment to Te Roopu Kaiawhina is based on recognition of Maori as an under-represented, at risk group, rather than on recognition of Maori as our equal partners laid down in Te Tiriti o Waitangi" (Internal report, Filipino, n.d.).

Auckland College of Education (ACE)³⁷⁶. Nonetheless, alongside this support the SLU trialed a Centre for Pacific Studies Project in the third term of 1991, focussing on exam preparation. It recruited five peer tutors from different Pacific descent, “which was felt important given the diversity of the Pacific Island student body” (SLU, 1992, p.8). These tutors offered workshops based at the Centre for Pacific Studies. In addition, that year the SLU set up a halftime tutor position for eight months, taken by Melani Anae, at the request of the Education Department that had seen a marked increase in Pacific student enrolments in 1991³⁷⁷. The programme was located in the Education Department to help at-risk Pacific students individually and in groups. All these initiatives meant that whereas in 1990 of the 516 students enrolled with the SLU 6.6% and 7.8% were Māori and Pacific respectively, in 1991 of the 804 students enrolled by mid-term 2 these figures had risen to 9.5% and 10.6% respectively³⁷⁸. As a result of the success of these programmes the Marae-based programme split in 1992, when the SLU became an independent Centre, into Te Roopu and Fale Pasifika, each “to develop along different lines” (Henry, 1992, p.7). At the end of that year, the Contestable Equity Fund ceased to exist, and from then salaries came from the central SLC budget³⁷⁹, which subsequently became dependent on university funding.

The split and loss of equity funding resulted in a smaller budget for Te Roopu, but enabled a focus on Māori initiatives and needs. Likewise, Fale could develop programmes specific to the needs of Pacific students. The funding base of the two programmes was similar, with in 1993 Te Roopu employing one halftime co-ordinating tutor, two part-time tutors and eight peer tutors, and Fale employing one halftime co-ordinating tutor, two part-time tutors and seven peer tutors³⁸⁰. In that year, Te Roopu and Fale relocated to the SLC premises in front of the General library, magnifying the

³⁷⁶ This project was set up in 1991 to assist UoA BEd students from Māori and Pacific backgrounds who were also enrolled at ACE. However, it was discontinued as funding was withdrawn and ACE had established its own learning centre in 1992, hence leading to confusion and duplication/wastage of resources (Letter, McGrath/Simpson, 24/7/1992).

³⁷⁷ The position was responsible to the SLU Director, but the tutor supervised by Alison Jones in the Education Department (Memo Marshall/ Education staff, 25/3/1991).

³⁷⁸ Internal SLC documents.

³⁷⁹ The learning assistance programme is referred to as the SLC from 1992 onwards. If SLU is mentioned hereafter it refers to the 1985-1991 period.

³⁸⁰ Simpson, however, had asked for 1.2 FTE post for Te Roopu and .8 for Fale (Internal document, Simpson, 22/10/1992), but in 1992 spent \$27475 from \$38000 proposed on Te Roopu and \$35863 from \$18263 proposed on Fale due to one resignation and one reduced activity of core tutors in Te Roopu.

existing accommodation problems that took more than a decade to solve³⁸¹. With the flexibility of all SLC staff involved these problems were as best as could be dealt with in-house, yet the lack of privacy set up barriers for students to contact Te Roopu and Fale tutors.

8.3.4 'Market' Consonant Compositions of the First Cycle: Competitive Advantage, First-mover and Students as Point of Reference

Government HE policies as represented by the Hawke report and Learning for Life publications that initiated market-oriented funding changes and institutional rearrangements in mandate and governance largely took an effect on the Centre's development from the 1990s onwards, although the 'soft' funding and flexible tutor base it started out with had laid an ideal foundation to cope with these changes, as Section 8.3.1 indicated. Writing in 1991, a time of diminishing government EFTS funding, Simpson was aware that while the 'massification' of higher education would continue the social aspects of affirmation under open access policies were to shift to more economic rationales under market policies. In reference to special entry students and limited resources, he observed:

Concurrent with the steady enrolment explosion ... is the problem of an effective diminution of public funding of universities, which are increasingly expected to look elsewhere for larger proportions of their operating costs. Again this is a trend which even the most optimistic see as long term if not permanent (Simpson, 1991a, p.7).

This shift was not necessarily disadvantageous to the SLU, as it offered a number of opportunities. Simpson, for example, argued that subject departments had "the apparent advantage... that students may be taught the rhetoric or vocabulary of a subject at the same time as they receive remedial or compensatory teaching in basic learning skills" (1991b, p.7). However, financial constraints on operational costs would mean that they would be less and less able to give their ill-prepared first years "the remedial or compensatory teaching in basic learning skills" needed (Simpson, 1989, p.3). In fact,

³⁸¹ In April 2003, the SLC was finally allocated its own premises with 9 offices, 2 seminar rooms and 1 computer room in the Kate Edger building, designed to house student health and information amenities.

only the better-funded departments were likely to provide such skills, but as the support would be subject related, the wider student body would fail to benefit.

In addition, Simpson (1991a) presented three main reasons for the reduced overall capacity of departments to provide academic assistance to increasingly more students:

1. Questions about the suitability or skills of the subject teacher to provide pre-entry skills, in particular to students from different cultural backgrounds.
2. Staff belief that any remedial work would take away valuable time for research and publication needed for promotion.
3. Growing awareness among staff that students in need of assistance require more than “the basic teaching skills that interested staff may acquire through short in-house seminar courses or workshops in staff training centres”.

Clearly, centralising the provision of learning assistance, as Simpson proposed, would be ‘profitable’ and effective as it provided “a more cost-efficient wide-ranging procedure, to manage the costs of assistance” whilst also serving the needs of students from small departments that could not fund such services from their own budgets. In addition, learning skills tutors would not be pressured by academic staff and under-prepared students to provide just “more of the same subject tuition” (Simpson, 1989, p.3). UoA management agreed, and as indicated, the Unit became an independent Centre with its funding base enlarged and made partly permanent as its services expanded³⁸².

As mentioned, the SLU was the first academic learning centre in the country, resulting in the University being “the market leader in this field in New Zealand”, with the Unit offering after five years in operation “extensive programmes for at risk students” (Simpson, 1991a, p.19-20). Being the first, the model was an innovative concept and became closely studied by other tertiary institutions, giving the Unit credibility as a model of good practice, an important feature to have in a competitive market environment of higher education. During 1989 and 1990, the period signalling a

³⁸² Simpson in fact fought for the Unit’s autonomous status as in 1991 it was proposed that for reporting purposes the SLU was to become part of the proposed School of Education. However, Simpson explained that such a move would be detrimental to helping the entire student body, and proposed other reporting lines, either to the Chairperson of the Dean’s Committee or to the Registrar (Internal memo, Simpson/Thomas, 30/9/1991).

transformation in policies for the New Zealand tertiary education sector, the SLU received steady interest for information on operations and materials from universities in New Zealand and overseas, and was visited by all New Zealand universities, bar Lincoln, and four polytechnics. Massey University, with its origins in distance learning, had already created a learning centre, and Simpson expected the other universities to follow UoA's example, whilst the polytechnics would "become increasingly active in the field" (ibid, p.19), as indeed proved the case. Moreover, Simpson was invited to visit the University of New South Wales (UNWS) in February of 1991 to advise its Registrar of Student Services on how best to establish a learning centre³⁸³.

This heightened interest in the Unit was no real surprise. As indicated in Chapter 6, funding per student reduced markedly in the 1990s. Scott and Scott (2000) calculated that Ministry of Education expenditure per EFTS dropped by 36% and real funding fell at an average 2.3% annually between 1980 and 1999. But whereas the drop in funding was an average 1.5% for the period 1980 to 1990, this figure almost doubled to 2.8% between 1991 and 1999. Together with increased and diversified student participation that translated into more students having lower levels of academic or literacy skills and experiencing difficulties coping with the demands of their university courses³⁸⁴, the need for academic learning support became an urgent matter. Accordingly, learning support to aid student retention, that is reduce wastage, increased in importance in the 1990s since, as the above suggested, it provided the option of delivering learning support services cost-effectively.

Simpson was further aware of the criticism an independent learning unit was to receive from departments, as he stressed that learning centres like that of Berkeley and UoA had proven its early critics wrong: their creation had not decreased but increased initiatives in academic assistance within subject departments. Simpson (1991b, p.9) reasoned:

[L]earning centres become specialised resources for the university and provide centres of energy and ideas and clearing-houses or coordination

³⁸³ Note that some Australian universities had already set up learning centres prior to UoA's SLC in 1985.

³⁸⁴ This situation was likely to confront universities with higher costs. As Benseman (2002, p.10) noted, citing the education committee at ministerial level of the OECD, non-traditional students are more costly than "conventional, fully qualified school-leavers".

centres for program innovation and teaching techniques for remedial teachers who often work in isolation in subject departments.

Although these initiatives were not widespread within UoA, they were significant. In the late 1980s, subject departments within Commerce, such as management and accounting, trialed the possibility of giving specific language and writing tutorials for their growing numbers of students who had English as an additional language (EAL). Education and Law School had further increasingly provided support to Māori and Pacific Islands students through appointing appropriate tutors (from similar backgrounds), and Engineering had started their Women in Engineering support. Some of these departments liaised with the SLU, in particular where SLU tutors were also employed by the respective subject department, to some extent proving that a learning centre could function as a specialised resource for its university.

Apart from being cost-effective and not being a barrier to learning support initiatives within departments, for Simpson the strength of learning centres was, rather than just teaching study skills, they taught these skills “within a context of subject study” (1991b, p.9). Hence, employing tutors who were also subject tutors in their department became a central policy as the formation of the tutor base and the condition of employment illustrated: SLU tutors were to be subject tutors in their department else their contract would not be extended³⁸⁵. In addition, the largely non-permanent work arrangement meant that when a tutor left it allowed the Unit to assess current student needs as well as consider changed university objectives, and rearrange accordingly the knowledge pool of its staff in order to offer flexible academic assistance that was further reinforced by tutors’ new initiatives which when successful received strong SLC backing. Henry (1992, p.4), for example, pointed out that in the case of Te Roopu, they had received the complete support of the director of the SLC and its staff. She mentioned that “It had long been the intention of the Centre to encourage such an initiative to develop in as organic a manner as possible, within the constraints imposed by administrative policy”. This organic development within administrative and budgetary constraints typifies much of the Centre’s operation and together with its staff dedication formed the basis of

³⁸⁵ This selection criterion was first questioned in the latter half of 1991 and up for review as not all tutors could fulfil this ruling. However, the ruling was to stand (Minutes of SLU meeting, 23/9/1991), but as aforementioned not always implemented until Simpson requested a change (memo, Simpson/ Pettit, 15/9/1992), which the Advisory Board approved (Report of Advisory Board, 23/9/1992).

its growth. For example, in 1989 I proposed the setting up of a language exchange (LEX) that was trialed on a limited funding basis in 1990 but quickly expanded as it proved to fulfil a student need, especially when in later years the numbers of EAL students significantly increased and other staff initiatives added a LEX conversation class to the programme's arsenal.

8.3.5 Public-Private Modulation: Governance and Funding

In 1992, the penultimate year of Simpson's being in charge of the renamed SLC³⁸⁶, he took inventory of the Centre's progress and made the following SWOT-analysis for the years ahead:

Opportunities:

- Increasing support to other academic assistance units
- Increased support to subject department tutorial staff
- Continued development of the Te Roopu Marae project
- Piloting a Pacific Islands student assistance resource
- Expanding services for learning disabled students
- Setting up a student testing and assessment service
- Gaining more non-governmental external funding.

Threats:

- Government funding cuts
- Staff morale compromised through new management styles
- Decline in political will for student support initiatives
- Turnover of pivotal SLC staff

Strengths:

- Staff morale and collegiality
- Staff teaching calibre
- Ideologically driven staff
- Visible and accessible new campus location
- Stand-alone academic support unit status

³⁸⁶ The change of Unit to Centre is important. As Simpson pointed out, he had originally called it a unit because it was "small, provisional, and supported by Counselling Service funds". In 1989, he proposed to rename it as Centre as it would signify permanence, independence and separate funding (Memo, Simpson/Nicoll, 7/8/1989).

Established history of successful activities

Full-time manager for the Centre

Weaknesses:

Inability to meet anticipated demand

Inadequate accommodation in present and new locations.

As can be seen, the first cycle of operation proved to have generated more opportunities and strengths than threats and weaknesses. Nevertheless, the threats of funding cuts and new management styles reflect the changes in finance, reporting and accountability measures that were in line with the neoliberal principles of NPM (see Table 3.2) as advanced by the Hawke and the *Learning for Life* reports (see 6.6.2). This development to some extent changed the dynamics of the SLC. The threats are especially noticeable in Simpson's NPM-tinged writings of the 1990s. Simpson (1991a, p.6) argued, for example, that the universal problem of more students and less money signified "Public funding of student services will come under increased scrutiny, with repeated calls for improved operational efficiency". He anticipated that capacity would not be a problem but funding would. As Simpson argued (*ibid*, p.7-8):

In a market economy, expansion will have to be sustained by a certain degree of self-help. A look at the organisation and delivery of student services is of obvious relevance of demands for improved operation.

Overseas student services, Simpson pointed out, were managed by "professional middle-managers, whose work is evaluated according to clearly defined performance indicators" (*ibid*). Yet, he warned that the "cheap solution" of creating Assistant Registrar positions to oversee student services – as done in some British cases – represented no solution, as it would not warrant "change, innovation or service development" (*ibid*).

For the SLU, the major change came in 1992. As Simpson reported, "after seven years of loosely structured and innovative activity ... [the SLU] has come of age"³⁸⁷. No longer part of Counselling and independent of Student Services, the renamed SLC, would now be more formally accountable to the University with the introduction of new reporting structures:

³⁸⁷ Internal document, memo Simpson/SLC staff, 5/2/1992.

- Reporting to an Advisory Board³⁸⁸ on matters of policy.
- The Director being responsible to the Vice-Chancellor via the Assistant to the Registrar for the operation of the SLC. (Formerly, Simpson had been directly responsible to the Vice-Chancellor and Registrar in his position as Director of Welfare).

Even though Simpson had been critical of the function of the Assistant Registrar in his report (1991a), in 1992 he expressed that the impact of the new structure officially introduced in November 1991 would be positive³⁸⁹. That is, the Centre could draw on advice, clarification and direction on University policy from the Board and on day-to-day management from a senior administrator. In practice, the restructuring of reporting lines created new demands and pressures, such as increased accountability. It is therefore no surprise that Simpson announced that as Director he would take full responsibility for the daily management of the SLC, setting of agendas and signing of minutes whereas before these responsibilities were often shared with the founding tutors. Hence from the 1990s onwards the more consensus style of decision-making was formally replaced by a more consultative management style, where tenured tutors were consulted but final decisions were made by the Director. Monitoring functions were made official, as tutors would henceforth report to the Director on activities in meetings preceding the monthly meetings of the Advisory Board. Moreover, the reporting of activities became tighter (see second cycle of the SLC) and the function of coordinators formalised according to the following activities: Science, Writing, Centre for Pacific Studies project, Auckland College of Education, Study Skills, Te Roopu Kaiawhina project, Language Support, The Tamaki satellite service³⁹⁰, Specific Learning

³⁸⁸ This Board, Simpson reported in his memo of 5/2/1992, consisted of senior academic staff representing different sections of the University and reporting to Senate and Council via Academic and Deans Committees. Before the inception of the Board, as above indicated, funding requests went to the Academic Committee and then for approval to the Finance Committee, chaired by Professor Nicholas Tarling and Warrick Nicoll, respectively. The change meant a less direct line of communication to top management, with influential mediating functions taken over by professional managers rather than academics.

³⁸⁹ His optimism may have been somewhat ironic as internal correspondence with the Assistant-Registrar suggests some tension in their working relationship, which seems to have impacted the prioritising of funding requests and likely aided in Simpson's decision to resign in 1993.

³⁹⁰ The Tamaki Campus was established in 1991 to cope with the huge increases in Commerce (now Business) students, although Science and Arts had some representation. The campus provided first-year courses for students who had not fulfilled the Commerce entrance criteria. Many were recent migrant EAL students, many succeeded, but because of the lower entrance criteria the Campus was known colloquially as the 'dumb campus' in its early formative years, until a change of focus towards research took shape especially in 2000.

Disabilities, and SLC Staff Development (the last three responsibilities taken by Simpson himself). These changes would not affect staff salaries, however, as it was declared that “Staff responsible for these areas will not receive a salary supplement, but should take account of their coordination load when planning work with students”³⁹¹. When the funding base became uncertain in 1992, objectives of helping at-risk students were further combined with demands for efficiency: namely, improve SLC cost effectiveness, continue to increase staff competency, and increase external funding, especially non-governmental³⁹². These developments clearly mirror the advancement of neoliberal (NIE/NPM) principles in the provision of educational services.

The resulting threats to governance and funding undoubtedly impinged on the Centre’s operation and at times created limitations and conflict as well as new possibilities. In reference to the SWOT-analysis of the Centre, some of the costs indeed involved staff morale being compromised and pivotal members leaving. The opportunities Simpson outlined were nonetheless advanced in the next cycle with Dr Manalo as Director, although others were recoiled; the weaknesses were to be absorbed by increased staff output and the Centre’s remaining strengths. All in all, the SLC in its first 8-year cycle was able to survive the external funding cuts – helped by UoA’s commitment as well as obligation to equity programmes, and to grow and be gradually integrated in the larger University mission and vision as the next section illustrates.

8.4 The Second Eight Year Cycle: 1993-2000

In 1993, the funding base of the SLC was reduced to 6 FTE tutor posts in addition to the fulltime Director position (SLC, 1993). However, the number of students served increased. The new Director was one of SLU’s foundation tutors, who had left the Centre in 1989 to set up a learning unit at Massey, Palmerston North. He had been one of the staff putting in more hours than required and, as Director, in a climate of financial constraints, was to function as a model of efficiency and hard work for the already committed tutors. In many ways, he continued the tradition of selecting dedicated teaching staff and of creating a multicultural work environment and flexible workforce,

³⁹¹ Internal document, memo Simpson/SLC tutors, 24/2/1992.

³⁹² Internal document, SLC 1992 Plan Summary.

consisting of full and part-time (senior) tutors supported by senior students as teaching assistants.

The next eight years also largely upheld the SLC mission and vision established in the early years. However, there were also clear departures and additions linked to the vision of the new Director, changes in UoA student composition and expansion of postgraduate courses, positions and programmes. Throughout these cycles, however, the focus of the Centre remained on being responsive to students' needs, which contributed to increases in staff workload as the following sections show.

8.4.1 Neoliberal Arrangements Extended: Operational Efficiency and Flexibility

In a climate of budgetary restraint, the increase in official working hours of tutorial staff has been crucial to the next cycle of development as more students enrolled for workshops and sought individual advice. The tutor positions in the first cycle of operation stipulated less tutor contact hours than in the second cycle. Although part of the culture was that tutors tended to do more hours than paid for in any case, the hours they were expected to work and be present officially increased in 1996.³⁹³ The first tutor contracts given in 1988, for example, requested that a fulltime tutor needed to work 28 hours per week of which a maximum of 16 were to be spent on student contact hours (about 700 hours annually); in exchange eight weeks holiday could be taken during the period November-January inclusive.³⁹⁴ However, the new flexible employment conditions, advanced under a National Government that introduced the Employment Act 1991, meant an increase to 38 hours a week, with 50% of the time spent on student contact (about 900 hours annually)³⁹⁵, and holidays reduced to four weeks per annum. This reduction in holiday time was especially crucial when in 1997 the University adopted the semester system and soon after a summer term started in the first week of January, thereby expanding the teaching period.

³⁹³ It was generally allowed to do preparatory work at home, especially during the university holidays, which before semesterisation covered November up to the end of February. However, this tradition was questioned by the Assistant Registrar who stated "I am very wary of any suggestion that SLC tutors should work at home. We are a service organisation and tutors are paid on the basis that they are available to help students" (Memo, Wills/Simpson, 5/2/1992).

³⁹⁴ Internal document, memo Simpson/SLU tutors, 1/3/1988.

³⁹⁵ These hours could be lowered to a minimum of approximately 500 hours if the tutor fulfils a coordinating role and does research.

For the SLC, the official increase in teaching hours under conditions of small incremental increases of tutor posts (from 8 FTE in 1994 to 12 FTE in 2000³⁹⁶) meant the Centre could cope with the new circumstances and significant rise in the number of students using its services as well as being able to expand its programmes. Already, a near doubling of student registration took place in the first cycle of operation. A briefing paper to the Advisory Board³⁹⁷ indicates that the SLU had 300 ‘registered’ users in 1989, 540 in 1990 and 1070 in 1991. This figure dropped to 910 in 1992, only to increase to 1250 in 1993. In its second cycle, the pool of student registration grew from 1577 in 1994 to 2754 in 1997³⁹⁸ and 3729 in 2000 (SLC, 1994; 1997 & 2000a). Workshop activities rose correspondingly, from 305 skills workshops offered in 1994 to 774 in 1997 and 1089 in 2000, totalling an attendance of 3978 students in 1994 and generating 24406 and 57474 student contact hours in 1997 and 2000 respectively (SLC, *ibid*)³⁹⁹. Similarly, the number of students seen individually sharply increased: from 799 in 1993 to 1510 in 1994, but then fluctuated between 1200 and 1500 to climb again to 1679 in 1999 and 1757 in 2000 (SLC, 1993-2000a). As more detailed accounts of student use of the Centre were only kept from 1996 onwards, the SLC’s annual reports from 1996-2000 better illustrate this fluctuation and rise in individual contact hours: 4986, 3262, 2482, 4370 and 5696 for the period from 1996-2000 correspondingly.

The above figures indicate that the focus after 1996 shifted from individual to workshop assistance as outcome measures became emphasised in annual reporting as a result of the University’s emphasis on strategic planning and its first conceptualisation of Mission 2001 (see Section 7.4.1). Simpson, however, had already thought group assistance necessary in 1992 as he pointed out that for the 1992 SLC programmes “Sadly, individual tuition will again be limited, because we find workshops the most cost-efficient way to assist large numbers of students”⁴⁰⁰. Yet, the drop in individual assistance is also likely to have been the result of the number of first year students at the

³⁹⁶ Personal communication, Manalo, 22/3/2005.

³⁹⁷ Briefing paper, Simpson, 14/2/1992.

³⁹⁸ The increase especially came in 1999, as 1997 and 1998 registrations are similar to that of 1996 (SLC, 1996-1999).

³⁹⁹ From 1996 the reporting changed from the number of students attending to student contact hours for workshop. The latter entails that one student attending a two-hour workshop generates two student contact hours.

⁴⁰⁰ Briefing paper for the Advisory Board, Simpson, 14/2/1992.

University falling 9%, from 1996 to 1997⁴⁰¹, as fees kept rising sharply with the EFTS grant cut by 3.5% in 1998 (Davis et. al., 1998; see also Section 7.4) and student debt becoming a national problem⁴⁰². On top, the New Zealand immigration programme of the early 1990s was markedly reduced under a coalition National – New Zealand First government in the mid 1990s (Davis et. al., *ibid*). Moreover, if students did enrol, they had to adjust to the new semester system, which saw their workload increase (see Section 7.4.2), especially as the due dates for assignments, tests and exams significantly shortened, hence limiting their time to seek personal advice⁴⁰³ early enough.

Nevertheless, in 1999 the number of individual consultations and that of students attending workshops soared, leading to heightened pressure on staff as apart from rising contact hours administrative tasks increased⁴⁰⁴. Again, like in the first cycle the dedication of the staff to the Centre's objective of helping students to achieve in their academic work enabled the SLC to cope with the increased demand. In addition, despite no or few tenured positions being made available until 2000, a core staff emerged by the end of the 1990s that were for the most part supportive of and largely enjoyed working with each other to the point that most were prepared to put in the extra hours when needed⁴⁰⁵. It shows that rather than competition, collegiality oils 'the machine' and enables successful results. However, this success also increased the pressure to 'over-perform'. It illustrates how NPM as new governmentality is likely to be internally adopted as output measures provide checks on performance. Clearly, like its University, the SLC had to raise its productivity for survival under quasi-market conditions (see Section 7.4.2) as advanced internationally, nationally and on site.

⁴⁰¹ Approximately 50% of students seen individually are first years (SLC, 1994-1998).

⁴⁰² Tarling (1999) cited the New Zealand Herald (26/7/1996) to point out that four years after the introduction of the student loan scheme in 1992 the tertiary students in Auckland had accumulated a debt of \$292.9 million, with UoA students taking a share of \$158.9 million.

⁴⁰³ Even though 2x4 papers in a semester system were thought to be equivalent in workload to 1x8 papers over three terms, reality was different as many papers increased the number of internal assessments. Hence, it likely required students time to acclimatise to the new conditions.

⁴⁰⁴ For example, my student contact hours have generally been close to 50% of the 1800 hours a FTE teaching position consists of, leaving little time for coordinating tasks and research outside preparation for workshops. I am, however, not an exception; some of my colleagues have even exceeded that number.

⁴⁰⁵ This attitude typifies the SLC up to this day and has made it possible for me and other staff to take some time off when their postgraduate studies require them to do so. It is further helped by the multicultural environment that has encouraged a friendly, cooperative rather than competitive working relationship.

8.4.2 Tenuto of Mission and Visions: From At-risk Remediation to Professional Student Development

As Section 8.3.2 indicated, SLU's main target group consisted of students at risk of failing their papers. Accordingly, the criteria for individual help were for a long time students whose marks did not exceed a B- average, with priority given to those who had failed one or more papers. This directive meant that most of the individual appointments were utilised by undergraduate students. As Simpson indicated (see 1991a, 1991b), mature and minority students were predominantly considered at risk. However, as precise measurements of accountability and performance were not required until the 1990s when outcome measures became firmly established in University's operations, no records were initially kept on students' background apart from age and gender. From the Centre's early annual reports on individual assistance, the assumed 'at risk' group consisted mainly of women older than 25, with female students in general constituting more than 60% of the student registrations (SLU, 1989-1992).

Regarding ethnicity, rough figures on students individually assisted from non-European background first appeared in the 1989 Annual Report (SLU, 1990), when increased focus was given to Māori and Pacific learning support and ethnicity as measure of EEdO and attached funding became progressively more important. Two categories for ethnicity were indicated: Māori and Pacific and Other, leaving open what 'Other' could be. The report mentioned that of the students seen individually 16% were from Māori/Pacific background. This percentage dropped to 7.2% in 1990⁴⁰⁶, after which ethnicity was only indicated for general registration: 8.5% for Māori and 11% for Pacific students in 1991. Hence, most students contacting the SLU were Pākehā/European in this period, although the 'Other' category makes it impossible to provide an accurate figure. No other ethnicity statistics for individual support are supplied until 1993, the second eight-year cycle. It is therefore hard to tell to whom the B- criteria applied, especially as this criterion for receiving individual help was not actively pursued by the tutors.⁴⁰⁷

⁴⁰⁶ Student numbers for workshops are not accurate until 1994, as a student attending two courses would be counted twice instead of once.

⁴⁰⁷ Not all tutors kept to the policy, as B- was not always felt an adequate measure for providing assistance as help could be requested in one-off reading skills or motivation sessions.

In the second cycle of operation, the characteristics of students seen individually underwent a gradual change but the ‘at risk’ category disappeared. This reflected the belief of the new Director, Dr Manalo, that the SLC was to be open to all students, and hence the B- no longer counted as criterion for providing individual help. His position signalled a shift in operation and mandate of the Centre: from at risk to professional student development. Although this policy rearrangement may not have consciously arisen from the change in times, it is consonant with the emerging pluri-scalar consensus about the role of education in a post-Fordist society: students need to become highly skilled and continuously update and or adapt their knowledge to the needs of a learning economy (see Section 4.4.2). Hence, there is an increased focus on skill training and self-regulation of learning, goal-directedness and self-confidence as correlates of successful achievement (see Section 4.4.3) and human capital (HC) development (see Section 3.3.3). The new direction is further in agreement with the institutional goal of excellence, where a comparative advantage is needed in a tertiary sector consisting of many more providers, receiving similar EFTS funding, offering similar degrees (see Section 7.6 & Gould, 1999).

Accordingly, whilst not discarding the need of ‘at-risk’ students, Manalo observed “Learning advisors now play a multitude of roles that range from being ‘remedial’ to providing ‘student professional development’ in nature”⁴⁰⁸. As Manalo (2004, p.83) argued:

The professional development function of the SLC derives from two premises. The first is that achievement of academic potential at university necessitates the development of new skills – including ones that are usually not taught, let alone articulated, by teaching staff in subject departments. The second premise is that most of these new skills will be useful even after university – hence, that they have lifelong value.

The latter observation is not new. Simpson (1989, p.7) likewise contended:

Auckland University graduates are training for a marketplace and a social world that requires them to be conceptually flexible and adaptive beyond the boundaries of any particular discipline. Our students must not merely learn

⁴⁰⁸ Quote available <http://d05.cgpublisher.com/proposals/82/index/html>

to master a discipline, but to master themselves as well as the wider context of the workplace and social life. In the context of a wider preparation, the SLU ... has a personal development role.

Despite this realisation, it was only in the second cycle of operation that the narrow focus of remedial and basic skills teaching and intervention transformed into a broader vision of professional development of students to cope with the demands of their course. As Emmanuel Manalo (2004, p.82) explained: “The instruction provided by academic staff of the SLC deals with generic skills (the ‘how to’) that complement the content instruction (the ‘what’) provided by subject departments [at both the undergraduate and postgraduate level]”. The ‘how to’ is undoubtedly consonant with the knowledge discourse advanced at the IGO level (see WB & OECD, Chapter 4). Accordingly, the Centre has since provided broad and specific topics that are similar to those given in the earlier years (effective learning, time management and writing skills as well as maths and statistics), yet has also extended the scope of its offerings to advanced levels of learning, incorporating research skills and analysis and computer literacy skills (see SLC Annual Reports 1993 & 2000, Appendix A).

The nature of individual learning assistance also changed. Where the majority of students for most of the Centre’s existence were assisted in writing skills (average of 45%) followed by test taking (average of 15%), in 2000 14.7% were seen for computer skills, 14.2% for drafting their assignments, 9% for planning their assignments, 7.2% for statistics, 6.8% for data analysis, 6.4% for reading and note taking and 5.5% for thesis writing (SLC, 2000a). Arguably, the University’s ambition for more postgraduate programmes and research and the general shift in mandate to a more technocratic role (see Section 7.4.2) began to be noticed in the Centre’s operation.

Moreover, with the incorporation of thesis and research support in the SLC’s programmes and support, Manalo believed that the professional development not only applied to students but also to staff. From the start, he has stressed that the academic status of the tutors should be maintained and supported by research activity that showed that the Centre was contributing to the knowledge and skills development literature in the learning area. It would also help in staff becoming more proficient in their ability to help graduate students. And as research was an important performance indicator in the

larger University context, it is not surprising that the SLC annual reports show that the tutors' research output increased in the second cycle (see Appendix A).

8.4.3 *Equity Arrangements and 'Minor' Librettos: Te Puni Wānanga, Fale Pasifika, and the New Migrant Student*

As the demographics of UoA students changed, the SLC, rooted in a philosophy of being student-needs based, also changed. Section 7.4.2 illustrated that Māori participation rose markedly in the 1980s to level off in the 1990s to around 6% of the total student population. This may be partly explained by Wānanga (Māori tertiary institutions) being initiated in the 1990s. Similarly, the number of Pacific students participating at the UoA escalated in the 1980s to gradually increase in the 1990s. This increase in participation was also reflected in the number of Māori and Pacific students seen for individual assistance. In 1995, for example, most of the students consulted on an individual basis were still female (69.7%), although in general they were younger (28.7% under 20, 34.4% between 21-25, and 36.9% over 25). Most were still first years (54.3%), but their ethnic composition had altered: 29.4% Pākehā/European, 25.9% Asian, 23% Pacific, and 18.7% Māori (SLC, 1995).⁴⁰⁹ Similar figures were obtained in 1996 and 1997 for Pākehā/European and Māori students, but a marked decline was noticeable for Pacific students (14.2% and 8.1%, respectively) whilst a corresponding increase in Asian students (38.1% and 47.6%, respectively) (SLC, 1996 & 1997) transpired.⁴¹⁰

By the year 2000, the student composition had changed again with 36.5% Asian, 35.3% Pākehā/European, 11% Māori and 9.6% Pacific (SLC, 2000a). These figures generally mirror the changes in the larger student population (see Section 7.4.2). It showed that immigration increases from the Asian region started to have an effect on the student composition of the University from the mid 1990s onwards, keeping in mind that internationalisation/globalisation was a conservative university policy for most of the 1990s (see Section 7.5). In contrast to institutional policies for Māori and Pacific

⁴⁰⁹ Some of these figures may not accurately reflect the number of Māori and Pacific students seen, as the tutors in Te Roopu/Te Puni and Fale counted all students they saw in their reports, some of whom may not have been from Māori or Pacific backgrounds. (Personal communication, Manalo, 22/3/2005).

⁴¹⁰ In 1991 there was the first mention of Asian student registrations in the SLU annual report (SLU, 1992); 13% of the total student registrations were from Asian background, a figure that coincided with the easing of barriers to entry for immigration flows from the Asian region.

students under EEdO and Treaty obligations being introduced swiftly by the early 1990s, the University was slower to establish special student support services for the huge increase of immigrant students from the Asian region and the more gradual increase of international students, who had English as an Additional Language (EAL). In a way the over-representation in participation of the Asian students in particular pre-empted any need for targeted support within the EEdO framework set up under the Education Act 1990. But it was soon apparent that a significant proportion of new migrant students needed academic learning and language support.

Tentative steps towards EAL support were made in the early 1990s. The SLC had started the Language Exchange (LEX) programme in 1990⁴¹¹, and continued to support EAL students, from first years to thesis writers, on an individual basis. Also, the English Language Acquisition Programme (ELA) of Dr Judith Grant was finally approved in 1990⁴¹², and was first offered as a non-credit two-paper course for enrolled students in 1991. Because of ELA, the SLC was directed not to focus on language support but on the learning needs of all students and hence provide EAL students ‘mainstream’ academic learning assistance of which language barriers were to be just one aspect. As ELA did not provide individual EAL assistance, however, the existing EAL support the SLC provided continued.

Soon after being appointed as the new director of the Centre, Manalo initiated more learning support aimed at the rising numbers of EAL students. For example, Asia Pasifika, an intensive course on writing, learning and critical thinking techniques for students from the Asian region was introduced in February 1994. It predated the observation of the Dean’s Committee that “the issue of the competence of students in written and oral English [had] been discussed many times in recent years but without suitable workable solutions having been found”, and the associated request that the Deputy Academic Registrar look into the problem.⁴¹³ That year, both ELA and the SLC put forward proposals for more support and funding for EAL students. Manalo

⁴¹¹ LEX emerged from Illich’s notion of skills exchange and was prompted by the many Japanese students I saw in the late 1980s (prior to the immigration flow from Taiwan, Hong Kong and Korea) requiring help with English. See for LEX history and development an article by Nisarg Dey (2005), the current SLC coordinator of the LEX programme.

⁴¹² Dr Grant’s proposal for ELA, 1989, was similar to the earlier ELC proposal in 1983, although the Diploma in English Language Teaching was offered by the English Department, which also introduced an English Writing for Academic Purposes in 1994 (Internal document, ELA, 1994).

⁴¹³ Internal document, Dean’s Committee, 13/6/1994.

advanced the notion of targeted learning support based on the model advanced by Te Roopu Kaiwhina, renamed Te Puni Wānanga (TPW) in 1994, and Fale Pasifika (FP) – “provide an environment for learning support and instruction that is culturally relevant and appropriate” (Manalo. 1994, p.1).

Manalo stressed that, due to the Centre’s being pushed for resources, it had included EAL students in its general programmes, but explained that a targeted learning project would better address their needs. Like Simpson, Manalo was aware of the importance of efficiency in an environment of increasing budgetary cuts, as he pointed out that such a project “would be the most successful and cost-effective way of addressing the learning problems that Asian students are experiencing” (Manalo, 1994). Nevertheless, the project was not given the green light by the University hierarchy, perhaps as more credited papers in EAL were being offered by departments, namely English and Applied Linguistics, which attracted EFTS funding - hence university income from government - and student fees. The SLC did receive 0.4 FTE funding⁴¹⁴ to increase its learning support programmes and provide more drop-in hours to cope with the rising numbers of immigrant students using its services. However, this funding never kept abreast of the need for, and activities provided to, students from the Asian region, whose SLC member registrations rose from an estimated 895 in 1996 to 1105 in 2000, and who in large numbers used the individual assistance, in particular for writing support, the SLC provided (from 546 in 1996 to 641 in 2000) (SLC, 1996 & 2000a)⁴¹⁵.

Funding for TPW and FP initiatives also remained stable, with some slight increases in the 1990s, but these increases were not enough to keep the coordinators in Te Puni’s case.⁴¹⁶ Despite the decrease or fluctuation in the percentages of Māori and Pacific students registered as members or seen individually, they consistently exceeded the 6% participation rate for both groups in the total UoA student population. Also, their SLC registration numbers steadily increased, from 178 and 225 in 1996 to 246 and 280 in 2000, respectively (SLC, 1996 & 2000a). Therefore, staff of TPW and FP retained their

⁴¹⁴ Personal communication, Manalo, 23/3/2005.

⁴¹⁵ As previously stated, fewer statistics on students’ demographics were collected before 1996, and hence no information on the use of the Centre by ethnicity could be estimated before that time. Also, ethnicity is only an indicator of EAL students from the Asian region as some of these students are the descendants of the first Asian communities that settled in New Zealand long before the influx of the 1990s.

⁴¹⁶ As Manalo (personal communication, 23/3/2005) pointed out the lack in tenured and full-time positions kept TPW coordinators in the job for no longer than two years as some moved to professional careers or Lecturer positions in and outside the University.

student base⁴¹⁷ whilst also increasingly helping students from other cultural backgrounds. In essence, this practice continues the multicultural approach Simpson established, with the difference being that TPW and FP tutors also began to participate in and initiate programmes outside their targeted group.⁴¹⁸ Yet, their tutor positions have only increased since 2000⁴¹⁹, although prior to that additional funding was sourced from the overall SLC budget.

The upshot of these developments has been that the pedagogy advanced within the SLC has received significant input from tutors of TPW and FP, and hence the sharing of ideas, views and materials have occurred concerning what and how workshops are taught and individual assistance is provided. As Manalo⁴²⁰ pointed out the greater role of TPW and FP tutors in contributing to all aspects of the SLC was an important development for the Centre, especially in the context that many other learning support centres and academic departments worked on the premise that Māori and Pacific staffs are for Māori and Pacific students only. Such a position seems to imply that other staff and students do not benefit or learn from an indigenous national and regional pedagogy, a notion the new director strongly rejected.

The second cycle has additionally witnessed increases in bi-cultural staff with ethnic or relational affiliation to the Asian region, all adding to the ‘mix’ of teaching and support strategies and methods that emerged⁴²¹. In light of the Curriculum Committee’s remark that the staff and courses of the University are not always responsive to the culture and demographics of the UoA’s student population (see Section 7.7), pointing to the need for different teaching and learning strategies from the mainstream Pākehā (Western-

⁴¹⁷ The decline percentage-wise, but not in numbers, can be explained by the changing SLC student dynamics and more equity programmes and services for Māori and Pacific students provided in faculties, such as SPIES (Engineering), PILSA (Law), MOPAS (Commerce), MAPAS (Medicine), and by programmes like Wellesley (now Foundation Programme). The faculty schemes provide learning and specific content support in groups, which are appreciated by many of the Māori and Pacific students for task relevance and group learning. (Personal communication, Tarawa, 10/3/2005; and O’Shea, 11/03/05).

⁴¹⁸ This development started from the day Manalo became director, as he had asked the then Māori coordinator what he thought of the practice of seeing only Māori students. The coordinator reported that he did not know why this should be the case, and from then on TPW and FP tutors were ‘mainstreamed’, to the benefit of all students.

⁴¹⁹ Currently three fulltime senior tutor positions are held by TPW/FP, constituting approximately 20% of all positions.

⁴²⁰ Personal communication, 23/3/2005.

⁴²¹ This is not to say that no friction occurred. Some friction can be attributed to the lack of tenured or fulltime positions made available to the Centre whilst the workload increased; others involved communication problems, but generally these have been resolved amiably as respect for differences in opinions has been nurtured by the culturally diverse work environment.

oriented) model, the SLC amidst administrative constraints has managed to create an environment that is learner friendly. The continuous demand of students for SLC assistance largely testifies to its effectiveness, which did not emerge from market principles like consumer satisfaction, but from staff's ongoing social commitment to helping students succeed and survive in a university environment under pressure of NPM and efficiency measures in teacher:student ratio, teacher output, student retention and budget savings. On the one hand, it sadly illustrates that NPM objectives in an under-funded sector can capture the social base and motivation of human interaction and makes it work for rationales that are basically economic in nature. On the other hand, it demonstrates that in such a climate a degree of individual institutional autonomy is possible (with staff able to exercise an area of discretion over their work) and that cooperation and collegiality can be sustained.⁴²²

8.4.4 Neoliberal Concord and Discord: Transparency, Benchmarking, and Good Practice.

The development of the SLC clearly shows that neoliberalism as a form of governmentality produces paradoxical results. The Centre has shown 'good practice' in economic measures of accountability, efficiency and work output. The transparency of the annual reports in the second cycle of operation can clearly be seen as an NPM expression of improved reporting, monitoring and accountability mechanisms, that accentuate results rather than process, in which quality is assumed (see Table 3.2). As the annual reports of 1993 and 2000 show (see Appendix A), result output shifted from simple/global statistics to precise calculations, presenting actual rather than cumulative student use of the Centre according to gender, age, ethnic affiliation, and number of years at university. The later reports show the number of courses/workshops offered and the student contact hours they generated to assess the actual attendance for each. They also report on new initiatives and overview some of the programmes according to measures such as student evaluation and pass rate. These reports further contain measures relating to the mission and vision statements of the University (see UoA, 1995), such as EEO and EEdO outcomes and output of research activity and community service. Hence, it is

⁴²² The SLC may be an exception as over the years it has developed a specific work culture that is reflected in the responses of new staff and visitors, who mention the friendliness of the place, and express surprise about the staff's willingness to share teaching material, with little feelings of ownership attached to new material created.

not surprising that the annual reports doubled in size and increased the administrative tasks of all staff, but especially those of the director, computer and administrative personnel. However, the transparency of SLC activities also helped in predicting students' needs and in the planning of new courses/programmes. Moreover, unlike the practice established in the first cycle, annual reports were made available in-house to all tutors rather than to a core few, and provided an insight into the marked increases in work output and student effectiveness. Perhaps, the performance indicators created under NPM have worked as a motivator for increasing output. On the downside, however, little time remained for development of new resources, methods and ideas linked to process-oriented objectives of learning.

Consonant with NPM objectives, the Centre also performed a benchmarking exercise in 2000, a period when the University's departments faced a 10% cut in their budget. As aforesaid, 1996 was a year where accountability measures came to the fore, as demonstrated by the changes made in the SLC annual reports. Also, processes of official reporting and budget allocation again changed in that year. From then on, the SLC reported directly to the Deputy VC Academic, although the Assistant Registrar remained an intermediary until 1998. In addition, the budget system became centrally controlled with the SLC becoming a Primary Activity Centre (PAC), receiving a devolved budget and needing to present an annual base case (for existing funding) and plan case (for increases in funding due to proposed new activities). Hence, to justify at least its base-case and not to lose any more funding, Manalo compiled an Academic Resource Plan (ARP) report, *Academic and Resource Plans 2001-2003*, to provide information relevant to the Centre's planning and budgeting for 2001 (SLC, 2000b). This report indicated the dramatic increase of the numbers of students using the Centre; the Centre meeting or surpassing key performance indicators and producing tangible results on improved achievements of students, including EEdO target groups; and it 'being the best of its kind' in comparison to similar centres in New Zealand and overseas. The benchmarking exercise showed that the SLC reached the most students of the universities that had participated, and kept the best performance measures (see Appendix B), suggesting that the Centre had (proactively) used NPM mechanisms to the best of its advantage. The report also showed that the SLC had achieved many of the

University's objectives⁴²³ but needed to retain at least the present budget to keep performing accordingly.

In addition, the report mentioned two risks: insufficient resources to meet student demands and requirements, and, as Simpson had likewise highlighted, the inability to retain high quality staff due to limited tenured positions. It accordingly advocated for an increase of tenured position⁴²⁴, and for an increase from halftime to fulltime for the coordinator of TPW.⁴²⁵ In his plan, Manalo made a strategic move: if funding was to be cut it would be to the detriment of the post graduate services that had seen a sharp increase in 1999, and hence focus on the original SLC mission. This was, however, contrary to the advice from the report of the Committee established to review Foundation Studies. This Committee had recommended, "that the SLC's role be recognised as supporting the professional development of learners", including that of postgraduates (cited in SLC, 2000b, p.1). The benchmarking exercise made the University hierarchy aware of the scope and effectiveness of the SLC's programmes and assistance to students. Hence, it produced some fruitful results, although the Centre had to wait until 2003 when it was allocated two more fulltime tutor positions for postgraduate support.

Apart from the above-mentioned achievements, the SLC has also shown good practice in "productive diversity" (Cope & Kalantziz, cited in Blight, Davis & Olsen, 2000, p.111). In the context of a globalised world where cultures increasingly mix and mingle, the Centre, as the previous section indicates, accentuates the fact that universities "will be most effective when they are as diverse ... as the local and global environments in which they live" (Blight et.al., *ibid*). As Blight and colleagues noted, in such an

⁴²³ The objectives highlighted were "attract and retain staff of the highest quality" in order to gain more tenured positions; "ensure that the University of Auckland is a university of high standard" to which the SLC contributed as it offered the most comprehensive range of programmes of all universities in its benchmarking sample; "foster and disseminate high quality research and creative work" which in comparison to the other learning centres the SLC fulfilled; "acknowledge and embrace the responsibilities and obligations of the University of Auckland under the Treaty of Waitangi" which the Centre supported but needed to be able to give the TPW coordinator a fulltime, tenured position; and "optimise the use of the University's infrastructure and resources" which was shown in the marked increase of students taking part in the SLC workshops rather than individual assistance.

⁴²⁴ The Assistant VC Academic, Professor Raewyn Dalziel, looked immediately into this matter with the result that three full-time positions became tenured in that year, and that some positions received three- instead of one-year contracts. Remarkably, this was also in the first term of the Labour Government, under which the first tenured SLC positions in 1989 had eventuated.

⁴²⁵ This was later granted with the result that the TPW coordinator is still working for the SLC.

environment, the *raison d'être* of student services is no longer to overcome student deficiencies and problems, but to encourage self-efficiency⁴²⁶ and diversity. The environment the Centre has nurtured at heart values staff and students' diversity, contributing to "a richer, more flexible, tolerant, responsive and innovative higher education" (ibid, p.112), as the new projects in the annual reports illustrate (see SLC, 1996-2000). Whilst the 'productivity' in student efficacy (which the SLC's shift from at risk to professional student development suggests) fulfils the need of a knowledge-based economy for a flexible, self-managing work force, the 'productivity' in diversity simultaneously fulfils equity and social objectives. The SLC's dual productivity demonstrates the accord and discord between economic (homogenising) and social/cultural (diversifying) processes under NPM. How the Centre has been able to incorporate both in its mission and vision perhaps indicates the utility and practicality of the New Zealand model of public reform at the micro level: helping to minimise public funding whilst expanding a 'diversity' of services (see Section 5.4.1). However, the Centre has largely been able to do so by incorporating aspects of collegiality with those of administrative rationality, and in so doing has tried to find a hybrid form (see Section 6.5).

8.5 Closing Note

The above writing shows that the SLC developed in a climate where open entry to university education was advanced and equity issues came to the fore. The Centre is therefore perhaps as much a creation of the 'global' emancipation processes of the post-war era as it is of the traditional dual role of New Zealand universities: comprehensive and vocational. The early focus of the Centre arguably represents the influence of deficit theories based on remediation to bridge the transition of the students from 'non-traditional' backgrounds entering the University en masse from the 1970s onwards and who were considered 'at risk'. Initially mostly 'mature' women sought learning skills assistance, followed by the relatively small group of 'overseas' students for whom English was not their first language.

⁴²⁶ As previously mentioned, this 'productivity' also fulfils the need of a flexible knowledge-based economy, as SLC's shift from at risk to professional student development suggests, and once again shows the accord and discord between economic and social/cultural rationales.

As the Treaty of Waitangi became more central to educational policies and objectives of equity in the mid 1980s, initiatives like Te Roopu Kaiwhina and Fale Pasifika materialised with the help of the University management and contestable government funding. With the growth of student numbers from the Asian region, programmes like LEX expanded. The later shift to professional student development mirrored the University's objective of being an international, research-led university attracting (international) students of high ability (UoA, 1995). This broader approach embodies the original concept of helping 'at-risk' students to succeed in a university environment as well as focuses on assisting *all* students to become skilled participants of a high performing knowledge economy. In both cases the neoliberal rationale of efficiency is advanced, as student 'wastage' is potentially reduced through student retention and aiding "efficiency in the students' academic performance" (Manalo, 2004, p.83), and goals of excellence are upheld.

On the surface, both the old and new mission and vision of the SLC seem adaptive in nature, especially at the instrumental skills level. Yet, the Centre's origin indicates that its teaching staff has at all times been given a fair amount of autonomy to advance programmes that incorporate different views and approaches to learning and to adopt a critical stance to consumer oriented education. Hence, there is a persistent commitment to go beyond skills training and be a support for a diversity of students. The multicultural environment has helped in these endeavours, as cultural learning and respect have been integral to the Centre's operation.

Overall, the Centre's shift from remediation to 'excellence' and its consistent high performance and results have helped the SLC to move closer to the core of the University's mission and visions of quality, efficiency and equity. The SWOT analysis Simpson prepared, however, for the most part still holds true. The University as well as state commitment to open access and equity remains the lifeblood of the Centre's existence. On the other hand, as soon as 'elitism' or the information/computer approach to learning, in support of the technocratic role of universities, sets in at the top levels of university management, the future of the Centre is less certain. Also, equity indicators and funding may prompt Faculties and Departments to set up their own learning support units. Undoubtedly, as initiatives such as MAPAS and MOPAS have illustrated, there is scope for content-based learning and language support as the massification of university

education has increased student-teacher ratios, with the quality of interaction being accordingly compromised. However, departmental commitment to student assistance, from basic to advanced, is likely to be variable. Hence, the rationales for a learning centre that Simpson put forward in the 1980s are still pertinent in the 21st millennium.

Chapter 9

Précis & colloquy

The thesis is a comprehensive ‘composition’ of the issue of globalisation and its relation to changes in higher education at the different levels of analysis: global/supranational, national, institutional. Chapter 2 started with the problem of viewing globalisation as a process and discourse, and in trying to cover both aspects adopted a political economic framework consistent with a more complex and long-term view of the phenomena in question. This approach shares affinity with what Boaventura de Sousa Santos (2002) referred to as a *paradigmatic* reading of the world system in transition. Santos explained that a paradigmatic reading is substantive in its treatment of time and space and views crises in the mode of capitalist production and regulation as symptomatic of a deeper crisis that may result in reaching the limit of adjustment, as world-system theorists like Wallerstein similarly envisioned, and hence the system’s destruction. Accordingly, as Santos (*ibid*, p.38) pointed out, paradigmatic arguments appeal more “to collective actors who favour transformatory action, whilst subparadigmatic arguments of capitalism having managed to solve its crises have found more appeal under “collective actors who favour adaptation”. As I proceeded, I similarly argued that (political-economic) globalisation is linked to the system of capitalism, which, with the ‘West’ as its emerging core, dates back 500 years.

Chapter 3 further illustrated the cyclic nature of the system interspersed with ‘creative destructions’ that constitute marked shifts in means of production and initiate social and political change. Thus far, the developed nations especially have managed to adjust their economies to these destructions, albeit with periods of war, by further expanding their markets whilst promoting civil democracy through the different discourses of (neo-) liberalism. However, the growing inequalities that lately have resulted within and between nations under market-led policies have raised the question whether such a system is ultimately sustainable. Following Santos’ paradigmatic path, Chapter 3 suggested that globalisation represents the latest cycle in the system of capitalism, producing a dialectic process between globalisation as the expansion of markets and the emergent knowledge industries. In the process, as subsequent chapters showed, the

traditional role of university education has shifted increasingly from developing ‘reason’ (the search for ‘truth’) and/or ‘culture’ (building a ‘civil’ society), to use Reading’s (1996) classification, to ‘excellence’ (client training for the global market based on technocratic values). These observations are consonant with Edwards and Usher’s (1997, p.259) remark:

Globalisation ... results in and from an increased economic integration within a framework of the market. With this, the emphasis on education transmitting a national culture becomes displaced by a focus on education’s role in servicing the global economy wherein each nation is embraced by the logic of competitiveness. Educational practices therefore come both to service and contribute to the intensifying processes of globalisation.

In this process, the commodification of higher education in particular has been encouraged by the IGOs discussed in Chapter 4: the WTO, the WB and the OECD. Their advocacy for linking the education mandate to concepts of human capital and issues of governance to the various forms of New Institutional Economics and/or New Public Management has led to assumptions about human nature that are in essence one-dimensional. Chapter 3 illustrated that these discursive tools of neoliberalism rest on individuals as utility-maximisers, “incapable of engaging in activities other than those that maximize their benefits”; and on the free market that best coordinates social behaviour through cost-benefit analyses based on stable human preferences of “material happiness and bodily security” (Baptiste, 2001, pp.191-193). As Baptiste observed, these values resemble that of Skinnerian Behaviourism⁴²⁷ that reduces human behaviour to reward and punishment schedules. Indeed, the market discourse excludes other aspects of what makes us human: altruism and social concerns as well as aspects of irrationality and the internalisation of societal norms, values and traditions (Freud’s id-superego dimension).

The New Zealand ‘case study’ further signalled that the uncritical adoption of IGOs’ neoliberal policy templates by ‘agents’ at the national and institutional levels promotes the process of turning the university sector increasingly into a (global) *supermarket*,

⁴²⁷ A historical analysis of the human sciences would indicate that theories of human rationality tend to emanate from Anglo-American centres, whereas less mechanistic theories of human behaviour originate from the European continent and elsewhere.

where products in great demand can be made for measure as well as made ready for (global) mass consumption whilst unprofitable products are to be discontinued. Consonant with Baptiste's observations, Marginson (1997b, p.140) pointed out that under such templates, competition is used in multiple ways "to drive institutional efficiency and responsiveness" as well as to shape student behaviour premised on 'homo economicus': rational, self-regulating, motivated and disciplined, who seeks out quality education and as a result high educational standards would be guaranteed as no rational person would want second-rate education. In a climate of reduced state funding, as eventuated in the 1990s under the National-led governments, competition was encouraged, with, as Chapter 7 illustrated, subjects not 'profitable', such as the 'minor' languages of the world⁴²⁸, no longer part of the UoA's curriculum. Instead, the resultant quasi-market approach contributed to the proliferation of professional and vocation-oriented courses and degrees, altering the University's mandate of education as personal development, seeking truth and nation building, that to variable degrees it may have fulfilled in the past, to narrower economic goals. Accordingly, other departments, schools and faculties, especially those whose curriculum could not readily be linked to market demands, have had to promote their courses to make them more appealing and/or relevant to 'consumers', who are assigned the role of entrepreneur, responsible for creating their own (work) opportunities and hence needing to make the 'right' choices (be utility maximisers). Not surprisingly that the Faculty of Business has turned out to be one of the 'winners', as it experienced massive increases in its student enrolments.

The thesis also indicated that at all levels the axiom of the 'knowledge economy' has been advanced, with the OECD especially developing the policy templates for education, by combining the 'new' economy with technology as a mediating factor and lifelong learning as a capital investment increasingly borne by the individual. As Baptiste (2001, p.190) argued, the utopia of education in such a context is that "educated workers are always technologically savvy" and that this 'savviness' makes them more productive than their less educated counterparts, with private investment defensible as differences in (future) earnings are due to differences in HCI; that is, educational investment benefits foremost the individual. Chapter 4 demonstrated that

⁴²⁸ Minor is used here either in the sense that the language is spoken by relatively few people, such as Swedish, or that it is perceived as having little economic prestige, such as Indonesian.

IGOs' policy templates contain many simple heuristics, which when analysed show many flaws, but as they are simple they are also easily digested by and diffused to other policy agents who employ them to legitimise their actions. As Chapters 5 and 6 indicated, New Zealand governments between 1984-2000 have been radical in their application of IGOs' neoliberal paradigms. Perhaps this radicalism, which history shows is part of New Zealand's 'pioneering' with capitalism, originates from, as Jesson (1989, p.43) observed, New Zealand's vulnerability to ideological neo-colonisation on the basis of the country's weak intellectual tradition; hence, "[l]acking ideas of their own, New Zealanders have imported them wholesale and uncritically from overseas". As Chapter 7 indicated the history of the University may reflect this position, as its development has been based more on the pragmatic needs of a settler community than on advancing the intellectual traditions of universities, although there have been notable exceptions.

Chapter 6 showed that since the late 1980s New Zealand governments have incorporated neoliberal tenets to advance mass participation in its tertiary education whilst, at the same time, justifying to their electorate its reduction in funding of the sector: there are limits to public funding, and continuing education brings about economic benefits especially for the individual (McLaughlin, 2003). The massification of the New Zealand university sector shows the success of this approach, sustained by the student loan schemes introduced in the 1990s, which enabled the private investment in education, and by the acceptance that everyone has to up-skill and continue their learning in order to contribute/participate in the knowledge economy that needs creative and flexible workers. The downside is that student debts have accrued, with these debts likely to affect certain groups in the population most: the less-well-to-do, women and/or minority groups where the link between high investment in learning and high earning is less well established. In neoliberal deliberations, however, social inequalities as a result of social injustices, like exploitation and oppression, power or structural barriers do not exist; rather they are "the natural and inevitable outcomes of a competitive, free market" (Baptiste, 2001, p.195). Hence, the inability to succeed in such a market is ultimately attributed to the individual for not being rational or entrepreneurial enough.

What transpires on a national scale also transpires on a global scale. As Chapters 2 and 4 indicated, historical imbalances of power are likely to continue between the developed

and developing countries with some nations in the semi-periphery perhaps moving closer to the core. In view of that, the thesis suggested that the pluri-scalar orchestration of neoliberal policies based on Western notions of rationalism, individualism and private property remains a powerful influence on sustaining unequal relationships. This orchestration is further reflected in the teaching and research activities that are pushed and/or promoted: words and discourse not to be shared but treated as private property, as advanced by GATS, and, as manifested in TRIPS, applied research preferred above basic research as greater return on investment is expected through ownership of patent rights. As Shiva (as cited in Li, 2003, p.61) indicated:

The global in the dominant discourse is the political space in which a particular dominant local seeks global control, and frees itself of local, national and international constraints. The global does not represent the universal human interest; it represents a particular local and parochial interest which has been globalized through the scope of its reach.

Clearly, Shiva points towards the universalisation of the particular, that is the 'West', as is shown and indicated in most of the preceding chapters, but at the same time is optimistic that this 'global' resides only in the confines of transnational corporations and organisations like the WB and IMF, whereas the local is in all places. Although this thesis has not been so confident, it has raised the issue that counter forces to globalisation and market reform can occur from the local level up, as shown in Chapter 6 by the universities' contestation to aspects of the Green paper proposals. In addition, Chapter 8 illustrated that measures of performance and accountability can be used to advance more support-oriented than economic-oriented activities, and hence there is some 'agency' at the lower levels.

As Beck's 'multiplicity without unity' in Chapter 2 suggests, "the 'Europeanization of the Globe'" does not have to be dominant or lead to creating "a homogenized global civilization" as it has merely produced "patches of Westernized societies" (Chou, 2001, p.1). Nevertheless, the New Zealand case is an example of this 'Europeanisation'. Chapter 5 showed that European culture became dominant and firmly established in New Zealand institutions, of which the University is one. As aforementioned, New Zealand governments have, at crucial points in history, been daring in their experimentation of the different forms of Western liberalism, and the universities have

mainly been mono-cultural in the adaptation of British and later American forms of high learning. Hence, the country and its universities have generally been agents and diffusers of westernisation as a global polity, yet specific forms have occurred and at times mediated this influence. The needs of a settler community contributed to universities not becoming the elite schools, or intellectual powerhouses, as were/are their British and European counterparts. Also, the Treaty of Waitangi, symbolising the bicultural foundation of this nation, has been given more weight since the mid 1980s leading to EEdO and EEO objectives being advanced and made part of the performance indicators promoted under a NPM agenda.

Undoubtedly, governments' push in the period 1984-2000 to marketise and corporatise the New Zealand tertiary sector mixed with the country's traditional values of open entry and 'fair-go' attitude has produced paradoxical results. Despite the increased privatisation of the New Zealand tertiary sector, Wānanga were created in the 1990s and the centrality of the Treaty of Waitangi advanced at both the national and institutional levels. Hence, Māori education after more than a century-long struggle, as Chapter 5 illustrated, obtained its own place in the system at large as well as in pockets of academia. Chapter 7 showed that Māori Studies, despite the UoA's being somewhat slow in comparison to Victoria, became an independent department in 1990. In addition, the very successful Research Unit in Māori Education (RUME)⁴²⁹ developed within the University's School of Education in the 1990s, and other Māori initiatives at the institutional, faculty and departmental levels also received more support. Although these developments can be seen as an expression of state promotion of mass education in order to be nationally competitive in global markets, they also contain the promise that in future the shaping of a New Zealand university system might well be informed by bicultural values and forms of governance, opening up pedagogical and curricular possibilities that are likely to increase cross-cultural understanding amongst all.

Chapter 8 suggested that the development of a diversity agenda is possible at the institutional/departmental level when EEdO, EEO and other equity measures are upheld and a certain degree of autonomy is given to those who implement the programmes. In this context, a multi-cultural work place like the Student Learning Centre presented the

⁴²⁹ RUME attracted the largest Māori undergraduate enrolment of any department at UoA and the largest Māori postgraduate enrolment of all universities (Tarling, 1999).

prospect that diverse cultures can work together, learn from each other and co-create pedagogies that are not just informed by the ideology of the self-maximising, self-fulfilling and rational individual high in self-control and self advocacy as proxy signs for success and achievement but also by indigenous, Pacific and Asian pedagogies that are perhaps more ‘communitarian’ in character, and accordingly contribute to the building of a university as community rather than tool of technocratic-based excellence. However, to continue this development, a commitment at all levels, as a minimum from national to institutional, is needed to uphold and encourage policies and pedagogies of diversity informed by critical/reflective approaches to the balances of power in order for education to be transformative rather than adaptive. Containing ‘globalisation’ to institutions and patches of westernisation, as Chou advises, may not be a realistic option in New Zealand’s case. Yet, globalisation of ‘westernisation’ under neoliberal precinct can be ‘steered’ in a more collective and humanitarian direction, but it entails putting the ‘decommodification’ of education on the agenda and placing questions about sustainable economic and social development to the fore. As Richard Bagnall (2000, p.32) argued in the context of lifelong learning: “there surely remains the opportunity for a more encompassing construction of individual and social responsibility: one ... that is focused on long-term sustainability, rather than immediate gains, one that is ecocentric, rather than anthropocentric”. The incorporation of the social, albeit as capital, in recent IGOs’ directives, as Chapter 4 indicated, may be a sign that the next K-wave is approaching, making other discourses plausible as some world-system and transformational theorists have likewise suggested.

Nevertheless, the thesis also exemplified that the formation of the Student Learning Centre has been intrinsically linked with the neoliberal practices advanced at the state level intermixed with equity objectives of both the state and the institution, rooted in ‘fair-go’ attitudes, open-access and the Treaty of Waitangi. Its marginal and non-tenured position, however, is a direct result of funding in EEdO and student support being contestable for most of the Centre’s existence, with tenured positions only becoming available (perhaps coincidentally) during Labour governments (1989 and 2000). Institutional support has largely been based on the Centre’s assumed and proven effectiveness in achieving performance objectives concerning operational efficiency, accountability, student achievement and equity, and as such can be seen as a “product of economic determinism within a postmodern cultural context” (Bagnall, 2000, p.21),

where the quality of student learning is assessed according to its contribution to the knowledge-economy and the quality of teaching and learning support to educational outcomes of *all* students, who, in a climate of private investment in their education, expect choice and demand “educational outcomes that are more responsive, of high quality and specifically tailored to particular needs” (Nunan, et al., 2000, p.). The philosophy of the SLC to be student-need based arguably complies with these precepts, and shows that social objectives can be captured by the market metaphor, as Chapter 8 similarly suggested. However, as Nunan and colleagues (*ibid*, p.31) also observed, student-centredness in market-based relationships “is associated more with intensified marketing than a genuine desire to meet students’ academic and vocational needs”. In this respect, Chapter 8 illustrated that the SLC’s focus has throughout its history been on helping students succeed in the university environment starting from an at-risk philosophy that was not actively implemented to a professional student development orientation that has also been informed by staff focus on student advocacy rather than on institutional assimilation (see Manalo & Wong-Toi, 2005), and a diverse cultural working environment mindful of the influence of power relations on learning. Yet, whether such a position can be sustained depends to a great degree on future developments and commitments at the state and institutional levels and on the continued capacity of the SLC to sustain its present culture.

As said in the preface, comprehensiveness guided the thesis process, but in trying to see “the whole elephant” certain relationships may have been left undeveloped or unexplored. For example, the link between institutional autonomy in relation to goal formation and policy implementation has been observed to be positive in the case of the SLC. A comparative analysis with other learning centres may have strengthened this finding. Also, a comparative approach may have demonstrated more robust correlations between policy templates set at the IGO-level and policy formation and implementation at the lower levels. Nevertheless, the level of policy diffusion can be triangulated with findings in the wider literature.

As I shaped the different platforms of pluri-scalar influence, I discovered that many of the processes observed share elements with those observed by Ton Bührs (2000) in the case of New Zealand’s environmental policies. Bührs put forward a model, representing six forms of diffusion, for explaining the policy changes of environmental management

in New Zealand after 1984. These forms triangulate with the influences observed in this thesis. They are cultural colonialism, structural adjustment, policy harmonisation, cultural exchange, institutional innovation, and policy learning. He categorized these forms according to three levels of diffusion (ideological, institutional and policy) and two driving factors (push and pull). Ideological are cultural colonisation (push) and exchange (pull); institutional are structural adjustment (push) and innovation (pull); and policy constitutes policy harmonisation (push) and learning (pull).⁴³⁰

In Bührs' taxonomy, cultural colonisation refers to the imposition of values, beliefs and ideology, such as 'westernisation' and modernisation, spread through the mass media, advertising and educational material, whereas cultural exchange is as old as the trade routes and contributes to socio-cultural diversity (akin to the dialectic process of globalisation) and potentially its appreciation. Structural adjustment refers to the imposition of rules, policies and reforms as conditions for on-going monetary support, such as SAPs by the WB and IMF, as indicated in Chapter 4; in contrast, institutional innovation occurs when countries or jurisdictions collectively or individually borrow and develop new institutional arrangements, for example the NIE/NPM agenda of public sector reform, for directing policy processes and behaviour. As Bührs (ibid, p.9) pointed out, these arrangements are rarely new, rather they build on historical and existing examples, as illustrated by neoliberal reform being conceptualised as a derivative model of classical liberalism and by wave theory in Chapter 3. Also, an important feature in this process is the element of familiarity, such as observed by the Anglophone countries based on shared experiences with Britain, a common language and culture, and political systems anchored in the Westminster system. These countries provide each other the "first port of call" when changes in policies and institutional behaviour are assumed necessary, as this thesis likewise suggested. With regard to policy harmonisation, it signifies the development of like policies across countries or jurisdictions. The process is assumed to be voluntary but experiences strong pressures. An example is a country's trade liberalisation through the WTO and regional free trade agreements that under a globalising economy involves strong push factors for harmonisation. On the other hand, policy learning entails the development of policies,

⁴³⁰ This model shares certain features with that of Roger Dale (1999a). Dale proposed a typology of external influence on national policies, based on eight mechanisms of external effects: borrowing, normal learning, paradigmatic learning, harmonisation, dissemination, standardisation, installing interdependence and imposition.

on a voluntary basis, based on or inspired by those developed in other countries or jurisdictions. This process is again more likely to occur when familiarity features highly, but can also result from issues and problems perceived to be similar to those other governments have already dealt with. Alternatively, these governments are considered leaders or pioneers in the field, as in the case of the Resource Management Act (RMA)⁴³¹ in New Zealand, and to a degree the acceptance by other countries of New Zealand's 'neoliberal experiment' in its public sector.

Akin to the dialectic process of state policy formation (see Chapter 5), Bührs (2000, p.10) suggests that diffusion may be influenced by a combination of factors and interwoven systems; push and pull factors may work concurrently, driven by different agents or proponents, with diffusion following different paths and sequences. Yet Bührs also refers to the ideological level as organiser of diffusion, which is consonant with world polity notions and discussions of modernisation underpinning the globalisation of capitalism, as mentioned in Chapter 3. Bührs (*ibid*) states:

Policy diffusion may be influenced by, or in some cases even depend on, convergence or diffusion at an institutional level, whereas institutional convergence or diffusion is influenced by, and may depend on, such a process at the ideological level. In other words, diffusion at the ideological level prepares the ground for diffusion at the institutional and the policy level.

For New Zealand's environmental policies, Bührs (2000, p.20) concluded that firstly political-cultural familiarity, the sense of belonging to a "family of nations", appears to facilitate "institutional and policy diffusion (learning)"; secondly, internationally active organisations are influential in the dissemination of knowledge and information about the country's innovations; and thirdly, the country's environmental performance and projection of an international image as leader affect the level of outside interest in its reforms. This thesis showed, that a similar observation could be made for the career of the New Zealand model of neoliberal reform in the public sector, including education, that was showcased by the IGOs as a model of good practice. The thesis also demonstrated the model was 'radical' but not unique. The neoliberal notions were first

⁴³¹ RMA can also be seen as at the level of institutional emulation as it provides a legal framework rather than policy to guide policy processes and behaviour.

spread by the Chicago School of Economics, taken up by both the Thatcher and Reagan administration that together with the US initiated institutions, like the WTO, WB and OECD, ‘composed’ neoliberalism as the Anglo-American discourse of globalisation (see Beck, Section 2.3.3). Given that unlike the developing (borrowing) countries New Zealand ‘voluntarily’ adopted this emerging consensus, its diffusion perhaps was at the level of cultural exchange, reform ‘innovation’ and policy learning, especially since the diffusion came from the “family of nations”, as Boyer’s four trajectories of modern capitalism (see Section 4.4.4) similarly reveal. However, Bührs also observed that international and domestic push factors existed based on New Zealand’s weakened economic position: failure of government-led efforts to improve the economy under Muldoon, the perceived need to reposition the country in the global marketplace so to become more attractive to investors and gain increased access to overseas markets for its products and services (see Maitra, Section 5.2.2, and Dale & Robertson, Section 6.2).

Nevertheless, Bührs (2000, p.13) observed that the state chose to reform, whilst domestically “the reforms were imposed rather than chosen”. This thesis similarly demonstrated that the diffusion from state to institution may have involved a stronger push factor as elements of cultural colonisation, structural adjustments and pressure of harmonisation are evident. As Chapters 5 and 6 suggested, Treasury represented an example of “intellectual colonialism” (Jesson, 1989, p.43), assisting Labour and National governments in the promotion and implementation of a neoliberal agenda in the public sector. Moreover, the use of the ‘provider capture’ rationale resulted in the ‘providers’ of education being minimally involved in policy formation. The implementation of tertiary market reforms therefore had a strong push factor, further advanced by changes in the Education Act and Public Sector Act. Arguably, government policies were more imposed than agreed to.

Hence, it can be concluded that educational policies advanced at the state level in the period investigated had a significant impact on university mandate, capacity and governance, as manifested in the University’s push for more professional/vocational programmes, strategic planning, performance indicators and accountability measures in the 1990s and the funding and reporting history of the SLC. Moreover, national policies on immigration and employment also changed the university landscape, with a shift to a more diverse student population and flexible workforce. The history of the SLC

exemplified these transformations, showing that Elias' concept of interdependence transpires at multiple levels of human arrangements.

Chapter 10

Epilogue: Alternatives to Neoliberalism?

We are part of the universe, not separate. We and our environment are one.
We cannot look without something to look at. We cannot breathe without air.
We cannot live without being part of society.⁴³²

Frederick Perls's quote is a reminder that we are not fragmented pieces, reducible to neoliberal notions of the rational individual, self motivated and independent. Studies in social psychology have indicated that we die if we are placed in isolation; we need society and what we gain from it is not totally of our own making as without it we cease to exist. Indeed, extreme individualism promoted by a free market ideology can take away the life force of what we call society as what is given is respected, whilst what is bought is individually owned and mistakenly thought to be from the fruits of one's own toil. To find a balance between societal respect and individual ownership, there has been a shift away from 'pure' neoliberal discourse in recent years. In the New Zealand case, the neoliberal experiment had been a near disaster; the gap between rich and poor was widening, its economy base was not strengthening, students' debts had increased uncontrollably, and hence social discontent rose. People were ready for a change, and in 2000 a Labour government returned. They were not signalling a path of Rogernomics, however. A new discourse emerged, but not only for this Labour Government. As Chapter 4 indicated, the end of the Second Millennium saw a 'Third Way' motif developing that tried to make neoliberalism more palatable, more social. It announced that states did have a role, an important role in the shaping of their economy and social organisation.

In 1999 the then Labour spokesperson (and later associate minister) for tertiary education, Steve Maharey⁴³³, indicated Labour would not homogenise the New Zealand higher education system by giving equal subsidies to public and private providers. He argued that the role of the private sector should be complementary rather than

⁴³² Frederick Perls, 1972, p.35.

⁴³³ Education Review, 10/12/1999.

competitive and hence advocated a differentiated funding system. He also promised to reinstate equivalent full-time student (EFTS) funding and remove interest on loans for full-time and low-income students. Higher education would become more a public good and part of a *national* infrastructure, which would give tertiary institutions a strong platform from which to “serve their regions as well as encourage specialisation” (ibid, p.1). Hence, a research commission would be initiated to come up with a model that would stimulate “centres of excellence” and “foster elite researchers” with a strong link to research and technology (R&T). The latter aims reflected the new OECD discourse that development of R&T was crucial for a knowledge-based economy. Indeed, in this respect Labour continued the policy that National started in the same year with its ‘Bright Future’ policy document⁴³⁴. However, with Labour the discourse changed from knowledge economy to knowledge society. Education was considered to be of national importance, rather than a free market where providers compete for the individual consumer, and business contributes to research to gain potential money making patents. Maharey stressed that duplication of services should be avoided and that mergers and alliances between institutions should be encouraged on the basis of educational and research objectives, not financial gain.

In the few years that followed Labour’s re-election, its Coalition government under Helen Clark has indeed tried to redress the hard edges of a pure neoliberal policy for higher education. The Government established the Tertiary Education Advisory Commission (TEAC), which undertook a Tertiary Education Review between 2000-2001 that accumulated into the policy document, *Tertiary Education Strategy 2002-2007*. In all reports constant reference was made to the knowledge society that was to be built by providing New Zealanders with opportunities for lifelong learning (as the Hawke report previously also had highlighted). The stress was on an *inclusive* knowledge society, and government had a role to ensure that such a society could be achieved by pursuing policies that were open, internationally oriented and engaged; vibrant, diverse, and innovative; fair inclusive and democratic; informed by the Treaty of Waitangi; enriched by New Zealand’s cultural heritage; and sustainably prosperous (TEAC, 2000, p.xiv). The new direction reflected both Anthony Giddens’ Third Way

⁴³⁴ *Bright Future: Making Ideas Work for New Zealand* (MOE, 1999) was a policy document launched by the then Prime Minister, Jenny Shipley, in response to criticism concerning the Government’s lack of direction in economic and educational policy. The report highlighted the importance of partnership between education, research and business for high economic performance.

philosophy and the shift in discourse at the IGO level: nation states are not redundant but need to adjust their policies to the requirements of a new global economic order (Giddens, 2001). The Government also reiterated Michael Potter's vision that it is vital today's society employs advanced technology; promotes an effective tripartite partnership between government, public institutions and the private sector by encouraging cluster formation, which involves firms, related industries and research programmes in universities specialising in the field (Porter, 2001), as Bright Future had similarly done.

The Catching the Knowledge Wave conference held in August 2001 and hosted by the University of Auckland attempted to address some of the issues for building a knowledge society equal to other OECD countries. Both at the institutional and state levels, concern was expressed for New Zealand's standing relative to other OECD members. The then Vice-Chancellor of the UoA highlighted, "New Zealand's economic performance was inadequate to sustain the quality of life, the quality of public services and the social cohesion valued by New Zealanders" (Hood, 2001, p.1). In particular, New Zealand's underperformance internationally – from being placed ninth in 1970 and falling to 20th in 1999 in the OECD in real GDP (New Zealand Herald, August 3, 2001, C1) – was an issue of concern. As Helen Clark put it candidly in her opening speech at the conference: "Our profile develops that of developing countries, not a developed one." (Clark, 2001, p.8). Although the vision was building a knowledge *society*, the economy was again the main driver and what was required was: lifelong learning that inspired innovation, creativity, excellence, and technological expertise; and the ability to retain highly-skilled citizens.

At the institutional level, The University of Auckland embraced this new direction as seen in its plans for Tamaki Campus as one response to the challenge of developing technological expertise. As the University of Auckland (2001, p.5) described its young campus:

In 2001, the Tamaki Campus was relaunched as a campus in pursuit of the New Zealand knowledge economy. It will have a culture with the following characteristics: research-intensive, postgraduate-intensive, interdisciplinary, entrepreneurial and creative. Its future development will be based on six

themes related to international foresight and to export growth areas for New Zealand through to 2010.

The six themes that were thought to create such a culture were Information Technology, Telecommunications and Electronics; Manufacturing and Materials; Food and Biotechnology; Health, Psychology and Sports; Environment, Resources and Energy; and Information Management. All these themes broadly reflect concept borrowing from the OECD, which stresses that technological knowledge forms the main source of economic growth (OECD, 1996c), and successful small nation states like Finland and Ireland, on what constitute a knowledge economy. In addition, clusters of research excellence acting as engines for economic growth (Potter's vision) have actively been sought, with Landcare Research, a Crown Research Institute (CRI) focussing on sustainable management of resources, being the first to locate its research activities at the Tamaki Campus. The integration of Research & Development (R&D) between the University of Auckland and Crown Research Institutes (CRIs) is now seen as pivotal to attracting private industry to the Campus, and to simultaneously addressing the issue of little private funding for research in New Zealand. These developments, in turn, are thought to ensure "the reversal of the net exodus of knowledge workers in strategic fields" (Cooney, cited in The University of Auckland News, August 2001, p. 5).

Research became a main focus for the whole of the University, and the promotion of its graduate programmes also intensified. In addition, the TEAC recommendation to be internationally oriented has been advanced, from extending its international networking with prestigious universities overseas to attracting more overseas students, in particular graduates, as had first been signalled in 1999 (UoA. n.d.). Hence, although Chapter 7 showed that the UoA had initially been conservative in setting its capacity for international students, internationalisation as a competitive advantage came to the fore in the new Millennium. For example, whereas 954 international students were enrolled in UoA programmes in 1999, in 2002 this figure rose to 3682 (UoA, 2003). As a result, the University has seen consistent increases in its student population, including domestic student numbers.

The above changes have also been observed in the Student Learning Centre. In 2000 the SLC took on the full responsibility for the PhD skills development programme (see SLC

Annual Report 2000, Appendix A), with no increase in funding, and post graduate students registered with the SLC rose from 15% in 1997 to peak at 36% in 2001, to level around 20% thereafter (SLC 1997, 2001, 2003 & 2004)⁴³⁵. In 2002, the SLC was finally given a senior tutor post for a Doctoral Student Advisor to cope with the demand. The total number of SLC registered students also increased markedly, from 2754 in 1997, to 4052 in 2001, and 7841 in 2004 (ibid). Student contact hours generated rose correspondingly from 1241 (individual consultations) and 24,406 (workshops) in 1997 to 14,508 (individual consultations) and 38,806 (workshops) in 2004. All these were absorbed with little extra funding, apart from the new doctoral position and a 1.4 tutor post from the School of Business for the SLC Communication Skills Programme for Business students.

As the history of the SLC has indicated, the flexibility of the work force, the friendliness of the work environment and staff dedication to their work have largely made these increases in student hours possible. But as we look to the future, the question becomes whether the current SLC staff levels can absorb any more student hours. The weakness that Simpson pointed out in 1992 (see Chapter 8), inability to meet anticipated demand, may impact on operations. In case the technocratic function of the University is further advanced, the long-term scenario may mean that the job of tutors will evolve into providing student support to self-access teaching materials in learning and research. The pastoral care that is presently part of the learning support may disappear, as it has already in other centres. Ted Nunan and colleagues (2000) painted a rather bleak picture of the developments in the Flexible Learning Centre (FLC) of the University of South Australia. The Centre experienced the shift from teaching to learning to mean new applications of technology in online learning that can deliver customised services onshore and offshore. Here, “learning control of navigation, resource use, and interaction become central issues” (ibid, p.91). However, FLC staff, whose expertise is in professional development, has little experience with such provision, leading to the staff being seen as offering little value by both academic staff and students. In addition, they are taken up in larger university organisations, such as the library, and thereby lose their operational autonomy. The authors reported that the cost of the FLC has been compulsory redundancies, dislocation of personal and

⁴³⁵ This decline can also be a reflection of the many SLC students who did not specify their degree course: 2% in 2001 versus 14% and 36% in 2003 and 2004, respectively.

organisational relationships, more work done by less people, “loss of satisfaction, confidence and self-esteem as competence is challenged by new technologies and new approaches to work” (ibid, p.96).

In the case of the SLC, the loss of autonomy perhaps presents the greatest threat as it will change the culture and with that the flexibility, reflexivity and friendly approach in student support. Technology staff as a unit can deal with, fragmentation of practices and cultures most likely not.

Coda

And all really because of my questions, my impatience, my thirst for knowledge. Did they want to lull me to sleep, to divert me, without violence, almost lovingly, from a path that was false, yet not so completely false that violence was permissible?⁴³⁶

Whilst writing this thesis, I every so often browsed through my small personal library of books, opening pages at random to get inspiration when stuck. That's how one day I came across Kafka's quote. Not knowing directly its significance I wrote it down in my notebook. Somehow it was related to a remark Professor Roger Dale jokingly made in one of our supervision sessions, "nessun dorma" in reference to my opera-inspired thesis structure. Looking back, I now realise that this remark represents the essence of my 'staying power' in this long, and at times tedious but always inspiring process of academia, unveiling paths of truths and untruths whilst trying to stay 'awake'. The further I delved into the subject of globalisation and the transformations that have taken place in higher education, the more I realised that the thirst for knowledge is increasingly compromised by economic objectives of information production and consumption, protected by the hypertrophy of regulations and at times 'violence'. In contrast to 'truth' explorations, the distribution of knowledge as information can be said to function as a sleep-inducing tranquilliser to the 'provoking' activity of critical and reflective engagement, not only in research but also in every day life. The New Zealand state and its universities have thus far enshrined and safeguarded the university role of critic and conscience of society in legal acts and university charters. However, publications by the Association of University Staff (AUS) indicate that this role is contested and questioned both inside as well as outside the university walls. Often it is seen as an 'elitist' enterprise, outdated for today's world where "[t]he academic, the social critic is now a marginalized cultural entity" (Bagnall, 2000, p.32)

⁴³⁶ Franz Kafka (1933, p.97), 'Investigations of a dog' in *Metamorphosis and Other Stories*. London: Penguin.

This thesis was motivated by explorations and discovery and I was perhaps lucky to be in a position not to engage in the project for economic gain. Hence, this thesis could be seen as a product of painful luxury. Yet, what kept me going was to question the vision of staff and students being economic utility maximisers, which is a disturbing one as it influences how we teach/learn, what we teach/learn and why we teach/learn. The metaphor employed by Ian Baptiste (2001) about the encroachment of HCT in to the mandate of education may be a fitting one to end this discovery into the neoliberalisation of social life. Baptiste highlighted that HCT informed teaching leads to educating *lone wolves*, “rugged individual[s] self-sufficient, totally free, shrewd, and industrious” (ibid, p.196). The aim of their enterprise is to secure material and bodily wealth, and they only work in packs to maintain their material status. Accordingly, educating lone wolves would be “apolitical in its orientation [with] [e]ducational objectives and activities ... determined by ‘market analysis’ and by technical considerations ... [that is] ‘needs assessments’” (ibid). Conflicting demands would not exist, as in a utilitarian approach consensus is a priori assumed. Hence, when educational programmes merely appeal to the “needs of learners” and “ignore or discount serious conflicts of interest between learners” (ibid) HCT is applied or assumed. The education of lone wolves also centres on adaptive teaching practices, aimed at changing the behaviour of wolves/students so they can function properly in their settings, rather than on social, political and economic conditions that form impediments to their development. Lastly, their education is individualistic, with learners neither “tied nor indebted to one another” (ibid, p.197). They gather, “not to forge some common good or collective purpose but rather to secure and optimise their private property” (ibid). Let’s hope for the future of university education and learning support that this picture about the mandate of education can be assigned the status of fiction.

At the heart of this thesis has been the conviction that education is more than a rational economic utility forged to interpellate groups and individuals to the needs of the global market as advanced under neoliberal precincts of globalisation that embody the destruction of the collective in favour of private enterprise. As suggested in Chapter 9, New Zealand education is in a position to develop counter-pedagogies informed by indigenous ways of learning that can help build other visions of education. As a final note to draw to a close this thesis that had as its structure a musical/opera theme,

Nicholas Tarling's conception of the university as opera is pertinent as it embodies the spirit of education as creative and inclusive of 'la différence'⁴³⁷. Tarling (1999, p.128) concluded in his assessment of the changes occurring at the University of Auckland the following:

[A]n opera is owned by the librettist and the composer, by the singers and the instrumentalists, by conductor, director and impresario, and indeed by the audience, loyal subscribers or dilettanti; perhaps too, by the next generations as well as the present. Only in recent times, when relationships are so often described in market terms, has the question of involvement been put in terms of 'ownership'. If the question has to be put in respect of universities, the opera seems a more relevant comparison than the commercial firm. The university has many aims, and draws on many different constituencies.

I rest my case.

⁴³⁷ Interestingly, in French la différence is female, and le même as indefinite pronoun is male.

Appendix A

THE UNIVERSITY OF AUCKLAND

Student Learning Centre

Annual Report (January to December 1993)

1 INTRODUCTION

The Student Learning Centre (SLC) provides help to students who have met problems or difficulties relating to their academic work. It also caters for students who would like to improve their generic learning skills, such as those who have been away from formal studies for a while. The Centre offers individual consultations and workshops on a wide range of topics including time management and study organization, writing skills, memory and concentration, reading and notetaking, motivation, test-exam preparation and taking, basic maths skills, and learning disabilities.

In 1993, the Centre was in its ninth year of operation. The Centre's Director since its inception in 1985, David Simpson, resigned at the beginning of 1993 to take up a new post at another institution. A new Director has been appointed, Emmanuel Manalo, who took up the position in August.

In addition to the Director's position, the SLC had an equivalent of six full-time tutor posts in 1993. These were spread over 30 part-time tutors and peer tutors, including those in the Te Roopu Kaiawhina and Fale Pasifika projects which provided targeted assistance to Maori and Pacific Island students. The Centre also received funding, equivalent to 4 hours per week's work, to provide learning support programmes at the Tamaki Campus.

The period of January to December 1993 saw considerable increases in the numbers of students making use of the SLC's services and programmes. The total number of student registrations (N=1250), for example, increased 37% compared to the same period last year (N=910 during January to December 1992). A further 200-plus students made use of the 'drop-in' hours that were offered during term-time in 1993, and another 82 students joined the highly successful Language Exchange programme. The provision of services and programmes was also developed further at the growing Tamaki Campus, where 35 students sought individual assistance and where workshop attendance totalled 269 students.

In total, over 1800 University of Auckland students made use of the wide range of programmes the Centre offered in 1993. In terms of carrying out and maintaining its mission of being totally focused on addressing the needs of students who are underachieving and/or experiencing study problems, the year can certainly be considered as another successful one for the SLC.

2 ACTIVITIES REPORT

2.1 Individual Consultations

From January to December 1993, **799 students sought individual help or advice** from the Student Learning Centre. The following profile was compiled for these 799 students.

Gender	
Female	64.3%
Male	35.7%
Age	
≤ 20 years	24.1%
21-25 years	32.0%
≥ 26 years	43.9%
Year at University	
1	45.2%
2	21.4%
3	15.4%
≥ 4	18.0%
Ethnic Affiliation	
Pakeha/European	47.9%
Maori	21.9%
Pacific Islander	15.3%
Asian	13.4%
Other	1.5%
Main Area in which Help or Advice was Required	
Writing skills	34.4%
Language support	14.3%
Test/exam preparation/taking	10.1%
Basic mathematics and/or statistics	9.8%
Time management	6.3%
Science (including science essays)	6.1%
Motivation	5.0%
Memory and/or concentration	4.9%
Reading and/or notetaking	4.4%
Specific learning disabilities	2.3%
Computer skills	1.0%
Other	1.5%

2.2 Skills Development Courses

During the 1993 academic year, the Student Learning Centre ran **212 workshops**, which had a **total attendance of 2899 students**. There were significant increases in numbers of students attending the workshops offered in 1993, compared to 1992 figures. The most pronounced increase came in Term 3 when the total attendance in workshops amounted to 987 students: the corresponding figure in 1992 was 333 students, which means a 196% increase.

The following tables list the topics covered in the 1993 SLC workshops, the number of workshops conducted in each of those topics, and the number of students who attended the workshops during Terms 1, 2 and 3. Topics covered in workshops were similar to those offered in 1992 but more workshops within each topic were made available. To cater for the diverse needs of students, a wider mastery range was also offered within each topic: for example, essay writing workshops ranged from the very basics right through to advanced levels.

Workshops in Term 1:

Topics covered in workshops	No. of w/shops	No. of students
Basic mathematics and/or statistics	10	184
Essay writing	11	207
Library skills	2	9
Memory and/or concentration skills	6	72
Notetaking	2	47
Postgraduate writing skills	10	194
Reading skills	4	59
Seminar preparation and presentation	5	127
Time management	3	27
University introduction and orientation	3	42
Writing skills in science	2	11
TOTALS	58	979

Workshops in Term 2:

Topics covered in workshops	No. of w/shops	No. of students
Basic mathematics and/or statistics	7	91
Calculator skills	3	23
Computer skills	15	59
Dealing with the workload	3	31
Essay writing	11	98
Memory skills	11	155
Motivation and/or self-management	3	45
Notetaking	2	15
Postgraduate writing skills	8	95
Reading skills	5	48
Seminar preparation and presentation	5	76
Test/exam preparation	8	93
Time management	7	49
Tutorial participation and learning skills	1	12
Various writing skills	4	43
TOTALS	93	933

Workshops in Term 3:

Topics covered in workshops	No. of w/shops	No. of students
Basic mathematics and/or statistics	5	83
Computer skills	3	10
Essay writing	1	9
Essay writing in exams	8	99
Exam preparation (general)	12	327
Exam room techniques	5	47
Memory skills for exams	7	93
Motivation	2	16
Positive thinking for exams	2	30
Postgraduate writing skills	8	142
Stress management	2	36
Time management	4	70
Writing science essays for exams	2	25
TOTALS	61	987

2.3 Drop-in Programme

In 1993, the SLC offered drop-in hours to students from 11 am to 12 noon, Monday to Friday. During these drop-in times, a tutor was available for students to consult briefly without having to make an appointment and without having to register with the Centre. Students, who could consult the tutor available for help or advice on any skills area relating to their academic learning and performance, were seen on a 'first come, first served' basis. The students' problems ranged from assignment writing difficulties and questions about test taking strategies to concerns about loss of motivation and problems about remembering what they study.

A total of 225 students made use of the drop-in times offered. Tutors sometimes had to see as many as five students during a single one-hour drop-in session. The programme proved to be particularly helpful to those students who needed to see somebody on the day because of an urgent problem or difficulty, but did not have an appointment. During busy times of the year, these students might otherwise have had to wait at least a few days to make a proper appointment with a tutor. The drop-in programme was also very effective in helping students who had only quick questions to ask, as well as those who did not want to view their learning problems as 'something big and requiring a proper appointment.' It proved to be extremely useful in providing many students an initial point of contact with SLC tutors, and in conveying to these students that there is a place they can go to on campus should they need further learning assistance, advice and/or support. Due to the drop-in programme's success in 1993, the SLC will extend the number of hours available for drop-in in 1994.

2.4 Te Roopu Kaiawhina

Te Roopu Kaiawhina tutors have the task of providing learning assistance and support programmes for Maori students at the University of Auckland. In 1993 the Te Roopu Kaiawhina project consisted of a co-ordinating tutor (appointed half-time), two part-time tutors, and eight peer tutors.

The Te Roopu Kaiawhina project, which was based at the Marae when it was initially established in 1989, experienced serious accommodation problems in 1993. Due to shortage of space at the Maori Studies Department, the project had to move from the Marae early in 1993 and was re-located at the SLC's offices in the Main Library building. The office space they used during most of 1993, and which they now occupy, is far from adequate in terms of the learning assistance the project tutors try to provide for Maori students. As the project's co-ordinator pointed out, their office was often overcrowded with students seeking help or advice and, as a consequence, many of these students were eventually discouraged from returning for individual consultation.

Despite the accommodation problems, 1993 was a very successful year for the project which was initially set-up in 1989. Te Roopu Kaiawhina tutors were involved in many initiatives and programmes aimed at addressing factors that relate to the success-failure rates of Maori students at the University. Te Roopu Kaiawhina tutors, for example, were instrumental in restructuring the Maori Students Association. Prior to this restructuring, there were many disparate departmental and faculty Maori students associations on campus. The combination of these associations into a single entity (known as Te Kotahitanga o Waipapa) meant, from Centre's point of view, that learning support provision by Te Roopu Kaiawhina tutors was better facilitated: communication among students and tutors improved, and identification and referral of students with study difficulties, and the provision of learning assistance, were more efficiently carried out.

Te Roopu Kaiawhina tutors saw a total of 175 students on an individual basis, and 276 students were assisted in study groups. A total of 183 students also attended the 21 learning skills workshops that the tutors conducted during term time in 1993. A good example of the rewards of their effort is that, in 1993, all first year Maori medical students (a group which received individual and study group support from Te Roopu Kaiawhina) passed all their final exams - which was the first time this had happened in a very long time.

2.5 Fale Pasifika

The Fale Pasifika project provides targetted learning assistance and support to Pacific Island students enrolled at the University. The Fale Pasifika team in 1993 consisted of a co-ordinating tutor (appointed half-time), two part-time tutors, and seven peer tutors. Like the Te Roopu Kaiawhina project, the Fale Pasifika project met with accommodation problems in 1993. The 'tower room' above Counselling, where the Fale Pasifika tutors were based had to be returned to Counselling, and by the end of the year the project had to be temporarily housed in the SLC's seminar room (where it remains at the time of writing this report).

Again, despite the accommodation problems, the project had a very successful and effective second year of operation in 1993 - thanks to the high motivation, dedication

and determination of its team members. The Fale Pasifika tutors offered a total of 29 workshops in Terms 2 and 3, and these had a total attendance of 214 students. A total of 275 students also came for one-to-one and/or small group learning assistance and support, and of these, 45% (125 students) came on a regular or semi-regular basis.

Apart from providing individual assistance and teaching skills development courses, Fale Pasifika tutors also organised and facilitated study groups, provided workshops for Pacific Island students in a number of departments, and offered drop-in hours to students. In their efforts to raise awareness among Pacific Island students of the learning and other assistance programmes available to them on campus, Fale Pasifika tutors also actively networked among various cultural and other groups on campus, liaised with teaching staff in departments, and on several occasions talked on air through the Pacific Island radio programmes.

2.6 Language Exchange Programme

The Language Exchange Programme was in its second year of operation in 1993. By pairing students who are reasonably fluent in one language and learning another with other students who are complementary in their language fluency/learning, the programme's function was to facilitate improvements in language learning among student participants. Apart from pairing the students, SLC tutors working on the programme also provided suggestions on activities that facilitated language learning. They organised meetings and social gatherings with the students, constantly monitored and followed up on the students' progress, and made themselves available for consultation with regard to any problems that came up.

Eighty-two students enrolled in the programme in 1993. Of these, 71 % were successfully paired. Most of those who were not paired sought and received assistance focused on language learning strategies from SLC tutors. Forty-one percent of those who enrolled in the programme had English as their native language, and 51 % were fluent in various Asian languages. Another 3 % spoke European languages other than English, and 2 % spoke Pacific Island (Polynesian) dialects.

Students in the programme showed strong commitment and enthusiasm. Most provided feedback indicating that they found the programme very helpful in their language learning, and many commented about how much they enjoyed the one-to-one conversation practice they got in a relaxed and friendly learning environment.

2.7 Tamaki Campus

The SLC was funded for 4 hours per week's work at the Tamaki Campus in 1993. It was the first time that the SLC received separate funding for its operations at the Tamaki Campus.

Workshops in learning skills and basic mathematics/statistics, as well as opportunities for individual consultation, were offered to students at the Campus. Thirty-five students sought individual help, and total attendance in workshops amounted to 269 students.

SLC tutors also provided advice and tutor training in a peer tutoring project that was initiated at the Campus' Management Science and Information Systems Department.

There is a clear need to establish more comprehensive learning support programmes to cater for the requirements of the increasing numbers of students at the Tamaki Campus. The 1993 experience, when demand far exceeded supply in terms of programmes provided by the SLC, highlighted this need. In 1994 the SLC will endeavour to provide Tamaki Campus students learning support programmes equivalent to those which are offered to City Campus students.

2.8 Students with Specific Learning Disabilities

Eighteen students with specific learning disabilities came to the Student Learning Centre for assistance and/or advice in 1993. The majority of these students were experiencing difficulties in writing/spelling (dysgraphics), reading (dyslexics) and/or basic mathematics (dyscalculics). These students ranged from first year to PhD level, and they came to the SLC for various reasons which included advice on how best to cope with their learning disabilities, direct help with spelling/writing/reading/maths, assessment of their learning problems, and support for obtaining extra time and/or reading/writing assistance in exams. A number of these students required intensive and/or ongoing assistance and, again in 1993, the Auckland Masonic Education Foundation was very generous in providing some funds for the necessary labour-intensive work.

The noticeable increase in the number of students with specific learning disabilities who came to the SLC in 1993 (18 students, compared to 4 in 1992) reflect the growing number of students with disabilities (in general) who are now entering tertiary institutions to re-claim their right to learn. The SLC will continue in its efforts to provide these students the best possible assistance and support to ensure that they are not unfairly disadvantaged in their learning pursuits.

2.9 Other Teaching Activities

In conjunction with other departments, SLC tutors were involved in numerous other learning support programmes during 1993. Tutors provided teaching input into various orientation and introductory programmes such as the First Year Maori Students Orientation (organized by the Maori Liaison Office), the First Year Pacific Island Students Orientation (organized by the Centre for Pacific Studies), the MOPAS Course for first year Commerce students, and the Overseas Students Orientation (organized by the Overseas Students Advisor). A few lectures on academic learning and performance skills were given to Wellesley Programme students, and Fale Pasifika tutors ran a whole-day workshop on study and examination skills for about 35 Pacific Island students at the Law School. A number of study support groups were also effectively established within the Commerce Faculty - a project jointly facilitated by SLC tutors and staff from the University Counselling Service.

3 PUBLICATIONS

MANALO, E. 'Teaching problem-solving skills'. *Performance & Instruction* 32(8), 31-33, 1993.

SORRENSON, J. 'Letters to teacher: A study of students' writing'. *Many Voices* 4(2), 17-19, 1993.

4 CONFERENCE PRESENTATIONS

During 1993, tutors at the Student Learning Centre attended a number of conferences and presented papers. In July, Barbara Grant and David Semp attended the HERDSA Conference in Sydney where they presented papers on ethical issues concerning postgraduate supervision practice, and the establishment and facilitation of study support groups, respectively.

In August, the first national meeting of tertiary learning support centres was held at the Marae of the University of Auckland. Staff of the SLC were instrumental in organizing and co-ordinating this meeting. Rapata Wiri, Rau Hoskins, Glynnis Paraha, Mekita Bell, David Semp, Judith Sorrenson, and Barbara Reilly all made presentations at the meeting.

In October, Barbara Reilly attended the International Commission on Mathematical Instruction Conference on Gender and Mathematics Education in Sweden and presented a paper on participation and achievement in a national calculus examination.

5 SUMMARY & CONCLUSION

The Student Learning Centre has had a very busy ninth year of operation in 1993. Efforts were made to reach more students, especially those who usually fall through the gaps of the university system without being identified, referred and/or given the necessary assistance for the problems they experience in their learning. More workshops were offered with the aim of catering for a wider range of student learning needs. As a consequence of these efforts and initiatives, considerably more students registered with the SLC, sought individual assistance, and attended the various workshops offered than in the previous year.

Various other initiatives within the Centre also met with considerable success in providing learning assistance and support to specific groups of University of Auckland students. The Te Roopu Kaiawhina and Fale Pasifika tutors, who focused on Maori and Pacific Island students respectively, provided more extensive and comprehensive learning support programmes in 1993, and their efforts have been rewarded with some excellent examination results among the individuals and groups they had assisted. The Drop-in and Language Exchange programmes were very well utilized by students.

Workshops and opportunities for individual consultation offered at the Tamaki Campus were also very positively responded to by students at that Campus.

The new year, 1994, presents various new challenges to the SLC. Apart from the urgent need to address the Centre's accommodation problems, there is also the necessity to examine closely some areas that may not have received adequate attention from the Centre in the past. Staff at the Centre are already in the process of mounting new initiatives, such as providing a course and an on-going support programme for students who were unsuccessful in the previous academic year. With the invaluable support given by the University, the Student Learning Centre will continue, and constantly aim to better, the learning assistance and support programmes it provides to University of Auckland students.

Emmanuel Manalo
Director
STUDENT LEARNING CENTRE

THE STUDENT LEARNING CENTRE

Annual Report: January to December 2000

I DEVELOPMENTS IN TEACHING

The Student Learning Centre (SLC) had another busy year in 2000, with the numbers of students using the Centre continuing to increase. A total of 3,729 students registered with the SLC, which is an 11.1% increase over the 1999 total of 3,357 students. 34.8% of these students were postgraduates, up from 24.8% in 1999.

The SLC continued to provide its regular programmes of instruction and support, which include the provision of individual advice and assistance, drop-in hours, and workshops, orientation courses, and intensive courses for specific groups of students. In addition, many new courses were developed, including the following:

New Postgraduate Courses

A total of 23 new postgraduate courses were offered in 2000. These included:

1st Year Masters Orientation

This one-day course was a new initiative aimed at preparing Masters students (from all faculties) in their first year of study. The course covered topics such as expectations, reading, writing longer essays, self-management, effective use of technology and organisation of ideas. A total of 32 students attended the day which received very positive evaluations.

Beating the Mid-Thesis Blues

"Beating the Mid-Thesis Blues" was a one-day course for students having difficulties completing their Masters thesis (in fact many of the students who attended were considering dropping out). As many of the problems students were experiencing concerned self-management, this was the focus of the day. However, writing topics such as "Writing Your Thesis Story" were also covered. A total of 12 students attended the day. At the time of writing this report, all 12 students are still enrolled and most are close to finishing.

Statistics for Data Analysis

This workshop was developed out of a need to provide appropriate support for students required to perform statistical analyses on their data in order to complete their research. Each course was 12 hours (split either 4x3hrs or 2x6 hrs) and a mixture of both statistical theory and practical use of SPSS was covered. Throughout the year, the course was offered a total of 9 times and 76 students attended. Evaluations were consistently high.

Intensive 2-Week Workshop for NESB Thesis Writers

This workshop was offered in late November (20 November–1 December) for students from non-English speaking backgrounds (NESB) planning to do a thesis or dissertation in 2001. The workshop ran from 9 am to 3 pm Monday to Friday during the two weeks and was taught by teams of SLC tutors. Topics covered included: thesis expectations, thesis proposals, writing research reports, interpreting and presenting data, writing literature reviews, summarising and paraphrasing, critical thinking, pre-writing and organising ideas, writing good sentences, editing and proofreading skills, and skills for self-management. A total of 27 students attended the workshop, and high attendance levels were maintained throughout the two weeks. The FFQ (Formative Feedback Questionnaire) was completed by the students at the end of the workshop and excellent evaluation results were obtained. On a scale of 1 to 10 ("very poor" to "very good"), the students gave the following mean ratings: "overall effectiveness of teaching" (8.28), overall quality of the course" (8.75), "overall value for money" (8.91), and "compared to other courses this course is ..." (8.50). Also worth noting were the students' mean ratings for the following

(also on a scale of 1 to 10, from “strongly disagree” to “strongly agree”): “opportunities provided for student participation” (9.06), “Lecturers were responsive to requests for help from students” (9.38), and “provided opportunities for students to ask questions” (9.53).

PhD Day

This was a full-day course offered in early December aimed at PhD students who are at various stages of completion. A series of workshops was offered during the course of the day and students could attend as many of these as they wished. The workshops included: What is a PhD?; Getting Started on Your PhD; Finishing Your PhD; Professional Development; Finding Library Information; Setting Up Writing Groups; and Managing Your PhD. The day proved to be a big success with at least 90 PhD students attending at some point during the day.

New Computer Courses

183 computer skills courses were offered in 2000 (up 37% from the 1999 total of 134 courses), generating 9,202 student contact hours (an increase of 113% on the 1999 total of 4,315 student contact hours). Many new workshops were offered, including ones specifically targeted towards Maori students and others providing instructional support for PhD and other postgraduate students. The new courses also included:

Getting the Most out of Computers

The SLC with the support of the Student Computing Facilities Committee organised two different training programmes for the start of the first semester to try to address some of the computer literacy problems at the University. All enrolled students were sent information about [1] workshops for absolute beginners (held during the first week of semester) and [2] workshops for computer literate students who simply needed to familiarise themselves with the University facilities. Five beginner workshops were offered and were attended by a total of 89 students, while the 5 workshops offered for computer literate students were attended by 49 students. The workshops received very positive feedback. For example, students gave the beginners’ workshop an average rating of 6.1 (standard deviation, sd = 1.31) on a 7-point scale (1=poor, 7= excellent).

Microsoft Office Day

On Saturday 2nd of December, the SLC offered a full day course teaching the Microsoft Office package. The aim was to teach students the capabilities of the package, and how to use it efficiently during their academic studies. A total of 22 students enrolled, and student feedback was very positive. The SLC also offered ongoing support for the students. Postgraduate students found the format of the workshop very helpful as many were unable to attend the individual courses for the Office package throughout the academic year.

New courses offered by Te Puni Wananga and Fale Pasifika

In the second semester, Te Puni Wananga (TPW) and Fale Pasifika (FP) tutors made a concerted effort to attract more Maori and Pacific Islands postgraduate students to attend workshops aimed at assisting them to complete their theses and dissertations more efficiently. Two “study days” and one evening workshop were organised covering topics such as writing a thesis proposal, a literature review, and different sections of a thesis. A total of 29 Maori and Pacific Islands postgraduate students attended these workshops, most of whom subsequently made individual appointments with TPW and FP tutors.

More requests also came from various subject departments for TPW and FP tutors to run workshops for Maori and Pacific Islands students. For example, TPW tutors ran a total of 14 workshops for various departments. The Maori student attendance of these workshops ranged from 5 to 36 students. Tutors from the FP programme were asked to provide workshops on essay writing and examination preparation for students undertaking the Bachelor of Education programme at Manukau Institute of Technology.

II OTHER STUDENT MATTERS

Student usage of the Centre

Total number of students who registered = 3,729

Total number of students who used the drop-in service = 1,650
Total number of students who sought individual consultations (not including drop-ins) = 1,757
Total number of student contact hours generated from individual consultations = 5,696
Total number of individual students who attended workshops = 4,477
Total number of workshops offered = 1,089
Total number of student contact hours generated from workshops conducted = 57,474
Total number of teaching hours = 7,958 hours

Appendix B provides details of the profile of students who registered with the Centre in 2000. Appendix C provides details of the profile of students who consulted tutors at the Centre on an individual basis. Appendix D provides details of the workshops conducted and the student contact hours generated.

Student Pass Rates

As a general comparison, the Liaison Office calculated that in the previous year (1999) the overall pass rate of first year students was 81%.

Commerce Programme

Mean pass rate of students who attended the First Semester Orientation = 92% (n = 285)

Mean pass rate of students who attended the Second Semester Orientation = 93% (n = 15)

These both compare favourably to the mean pass rate of 79% for all first year Bachelor of Commerce students in the previous year.

Engineering Orientation

Mean pass rate of students who attended the three-day Orientation = 94% (n = 40)

Workshop for Special Admission Students

Mean pass rate of Special Admission students who attended the SLC course = 84% (n = 101)

This compares favourably with the average pass rate of 55% for all Special Admission students in 1998.

Study Day for Maori and Pacific Islands Students

Mean pass rate of those who attended this full-day workshop held on 18 April = 85% (n = 28).

Exam Skills Workshops

Mean pass rate of students who attended whole- or half-day exam skills workshops in Semesters 1 and 2 = 89% (n = 39)

Asia Pasifika

Mean pass rate in Semester 2 of students who attended the week-long Asia Pasifika course for Asian and recent migrant students, held during the inter-semester break = 86% (n = 44)

Puawaitanga 2

Mean pass rate in Semester 1, *prior* to attending Puawaitanga 2 = 24% (n = 12)

Mean pass rate in Semester 2, *after* attending Puawaitanga 2 = 59% (n = 12)

III EEO & EEdO

The SLC continued to employ high proportions of EEO target groups. Based on head count (irrespective of whether a staff member is full- or part-time), women staff members comprised 80% of the total staffing of the Centre; Maori, Pacific Island, and other ethnic minorities comprised 60%; part-time staff comprised 83%; staff with children comprised 34%; and general staff comprised 20%.

As in previous years, a significant proportion of the work that the SLC does involved the provision of instruction and support to EEdO target groups of students. Tutors in the Te Puni Wananga programme contributed to the First Year Maori Students Orientation, as well as providing the regular study skills courses and individual support for Maori students at the University. Similarly, tutors in the Fale Pasifika programme contributed to the First Year Pacific Island Students Orientation, and continued to provide study skills courses and individual support for Pacific Islands students at the University. In total, Maori students comprised 6.6% of the students who used the SLC, and Pacific Island students comprised 7.5%. The Centre also conducted many courses that catered particularly for the needs of mature students (e.g., the course for Special Admission students), and new immigrant students and those belonging to ethnic minority groups (e.g., the Asia Pasifika course; the Intensive 2-week Workshop for NESB Thesis Writers). Many courses continued to be offered later in the afternoons or early evenings, and during weekends, to accommodate students who have family commitments and those who are studying part-time only.

IV RESEARCH

One highlight of 2000 was the inclusion of three papers from the SLC in the published refereed proceedings of the third biennial Communication Skills in University Education (CSUE) Conference, an international conference held in Perth, Western Australia in September. Only 25 papers from the 44 submitted were accepted and included in the refereed proceedings. The three papers from the SLC were the only successful papers from New Zealand. (A copy of this book is now held in the General Library.)

(a) Refereed Journal Articles

MANALO, E., BUNNELL, J. K.³, STILLMAN, J. A.³. 'The use of process mnemonics in teaching students with mathematics learning disabilities.' *Learning Disability Quarterly*, 23 (2), 137–156, 2000.

(b) Sections in Books

CHAN, H. 'Pre-teaching technical vocabulary in an introductory Information Systems course: An experiment involving non-native speakers of English.' In: M. Khosrowpour (ed.), *Challenges of Information Technology Management in the 21st Century*. Hershey, PA, Idea Group Publishing, 74–78, 2000.

(d) Papers in Refereed Conference Proceedings

MANALO, E. 'Bringing your PhD back to life.' In: C. Beasley (Ed.), *Making the critical connection: The refereed proceedings of the third biennial Communication Skills in University Education (CSUE) Conference*. Murdoch, WA: Murdoch University, 114–123, 2000.

MANALO, E., MIZUTANI, S.², TRAFFORD, J. 'Using mnemonics to facilitate learning of Japanese characters.' *Australian Journal of Psychology*, 52 (Supplement: Combined abstracts of 2000 Australian psychology conferences), 40, 2000.

TRAFFORD, J. 'Organising your ideas: Implementing techniques for more effective communication of ideas.' In: C. Beasley (Ed.), *Making the critical connection: The refereed proceedings of the third biennial Communication Skills in University Education (CSUE) Conference*. Murdoch, WA: Murdoch University, 215–223, 2000.

VAN RIJ-HEYLIGERS, J., O'SHEA, M. 'Writing your way into postgraduate studies: A student-centred approach to NESB postgraduate writing.' In: C. Beasley (Ed.), *Making the critical connection: The refereed proceedings of the third biennial Communication Skills in University Education (CSUE) Conference*. Murdoch, WA: Murdoch University, 225–233, 2000.

WOLFGRAMM, 'E. 'Providing learning support for Pacific Island students.' In: G. Crosling, T. Moore, and S. Vance (Eds.), *Language and Learning – The learning dimensions of our work: Refereed conference proceedings of the National Language and Academic Skills Conference, Monash University, November 25–26, 1999*. Churchill, Victoria: CeLTS, Monash University, 97–101, 2000.

(k) Other Works

LAVERY, L., LAVERY, A. 'Student learning centres online: How can technology aid our development as a profession?' Paper presented at the *Conference of the Tertiary Learning Centre Association of New Zealand (TLCANZ)*, Christchurch, 19–20 October, 2000.

TARAWA, M., PIRIPIRI, M. 'The SLC approach to retaining Maori students.' Paper presented at the *Te Toi Taura Mo Te Matariki Conference*, Victoria University of Wellington, 27–29 June, 2000.

TRAFFORD, J. 'A multi-faceted evaluation process for ensuring staff professionalism.' Paper presented at the *Conference of the Tertiary Learning Centre Association of New Zealand (TLCANZ)*, Christchurch, 19–20 October, 2000.

VAN RIJ-HEYLIGERS, J., ANDERSON, A., O'SHEA, M. 'Academic learning support in the third millennium.' Paper presented at the *New Zealand Association for Research in Education (NZARE) Conference*, Hamilton, 1–3 December, 2000.

WOLFGRAMM, 'E. 'Academic skills and success of PI students.' *Paper presented at the third biennial Communication Skills in University Education (CSUE) Conference*, Fremantle, WA, 28–29 September, 2000.

V STAFF LEAVE AND CONFERENCES

No SLC staff member took research and study leave during the 2000 academic year.

All staff members who attended conferences presented papers at those conferences, the details of which are given in the previous section.

VI COMMUNITY SERVICES

Dr Emmanuel Manalo, Director of the Centre, continued to be a member of Teaching and Learning Committee, Professional Development Committee, and Student Computing Facilities Committee (a subcommittee of Information Technology Committee). He became a member of the Student Survey Steering Group convened by the Director of Quality, Dr David Tippin. He continued to be a member of the Australasian Society for Experimental Psychology, and the Psychologia Society (based at Kyoto University in Japan). In April, he was asked by the Graduate School of Education of La Trobe University (Bundoora, Victoria, Australia) to be an external examiner for a thesis submitted for the degree of Doctor of Education. In December, he was invited to be a member of the planning committee for the 2001 Association of Tertiary Learning Advisors of Aotearoa/New Zealand (ATLAANZ) conference.

Both Matthew Tarawa, Co-ordinator of Te Puni Wananga, and 'Ema Wolfgramm-Foliaki, Co-ordinator of Fale Pasifika, attended and contributed to meetings of the EO 'Think Tank' Group, organised by Dame Professor Anne Salmond, Pro Vice-Chancellor (EO). Both, together with other tutors and teaching assistants from Te Puni Wananga and Fale Pasifika, contributed to the Maori Students Orientation and the Pacific Islands Students Orientation. Matthew was also a member of the Tautoko Maori Tutors Committee, and the Runanga discussion group. In addition, he and two teaching assistants from Te Puni Wananga (Te Aroha Anderson and Morore Piripiri) were invited to provide a number of workshops and talks relating to learning skills at various Church of Latter-Day Saints youth meetings, conferences, and orientations.

'Ema Wolfgramm-Foliaki continued to be a member of the Tongan Women's Association, to be a member of the Board of Trustees of St Marys Primary School in Ellerslie, and to have an advisory role in the Tongan Pre-School Association. She also undertook an educational advisory role for the Tongan Methodist community in Otara.

Lyn Lavery, Co-ordinator of the SLC's Postgraduate Skills Development programme, organised and taught a free NVivo workshop for Auckland tertiary institutions. The workshop was attended by 30 staff and postgraduate students, including six from the University.

Julie Trafford and Huia Haeata taught academic writing skills to hearing impaired high school students intending to enrol in tertiary studies, as part of a transition course offered by the Disabilities Co-ordinators' Office. Julie Trafford also undertook some voluntary work at Glen Taylor School assisting students who were experiencing difficulties in reading, writing, mathematics, and science.

Jenny Buxton convened a literature study group for the Parnell branch of the University of the Third Age (U3A), a non-profit worldwide organisation which aims to provide informal study courses for older people. Jenny's role included research and design of study materials, and arranging the seminar-type presentations given by members at group meetings.

VII OTHER MATTERS

The SLC continued to evaluate many of its courses, particularly those longer than 1-hour in duration, to obtain feedback on student satisfaction with the courses, appraisal of tutor performance, and views on what they considered the most helpful aspects of the courses as well as the aspects that could be improved. Many tutors also used the CPD administered SEEQ and FFQ to evaluate their courses. Results of student evaluations are included in many of the programme descriptions in Appendix A.

At the end of the year, the SLC also surveys a random sample of students who have registered with the Centre. In 2000, 58 of the undergraduate students returned the survey form. On a scale of 1 to 7 (where 1 = "poor" and 7 = "excellent"), these students gave their "overall experience with the SLC" an average rating of 5.3, with 67% of the students rating their experience at 5 or above. Worth noting are these students' average ratings of "tutors' attitude towards students" (6.2), and "friendliness and helpfulness of tutors" (6.1). All of the postgraduate students who registered with the SLC in 1999 were sent the survey form, and 89 returned it. These students gave their overall experience with the SLC's postgraduate programme an average rating of 5.8, with 90% rating their experience at 5 or above. Also worth noting are these students' average ratings of "tutor friendliness and helpfulness" (6.3), "tutor knowledge of postgraduate concerns" (6.0), and "overall effectiveness of the postgraduate programme" (5.8).

Visitors to the SLC in 2000 included Dr Brian Paltridge (Associate Dean of Academic programmes, Department of Linguistics and Applied Linguistics, University of Melbourne – now Professor of Applied Linguistics, School of Languages, Auckland University of Technology), and Dr Sue Starfield (Director of Learning Centre, University of New South Wales). We also had visits from staff and students of Bay of Plenty Polytechnic, Southern Cross High School, and Panguarua School. They had heard of and were very interested in the learning support provided by Te Puni Wananga in particular, and wanted to encourage their students to make full use of the Centre when they enrol at University.

VIII OVERALL COMMENTS ON WORK AND PROGRESS WITHIN THE DEPARTMENT

The Centre continued to be fortunate in having general staff who are highly responsible, dependable, and committed to providing a high standard of service to students and support to the teaching staff of the Centre. The Administrative Assistant continued to do an excellent job in running and co-ordinating the Centre office. The half-time Receptionist and casual office staff (called in when required) have continued to assist in the efficiency and effectiveness of the Centre office.

Emmanuel Manalo, PhD
Director
Student Learning Centre
9 March 2001

Appendix A SLC Programmes in 2000

This section briefly describes the teaching and learning support programmes offered at the SLC during 2000.

Individual Appointments

A total of 1,757 students made appointments for individual assistance from SLC tutors during the period of January to December 2000, an increase of 4.6% over the same period in 1999 (n = 1,679 students). Please refer to Appendix C for a profile of these students. Of note was the continuing increase in the proportion of postgraduate students making individual appointments to see SLC tutors: 33.7% in 2000, compared to 23.9% in 1999, and 15.8% in 1998.

Drop-In Programme Consultations

The drop-in programme provides immediate assistance to students experiencing urgent problems in their studies. It also caters for students who need 'quick' advice and do not require an appointment with a tutor. Students who are in need of extensive assistance are encouraged to make subsequent appointments with an SLC tutor. The drop-in hours are from 11 am to 2 pm during the weekdays and 10 am to 2 pm on Saturdays during semester time. Shorter drop-in hours are offered during weekdays outside of the semesters. Specific postgraduate drop-in hours are also offered on Wednesdays, 2 to 4 pm. A total of 1,650 students used this programme in 2000, an increase of 54.2% over the 1999 total of 1,077 students.

Skills Development Courses

In 2000 the SLC offered 1,089 courses and workshops (40 more than in 1999), ranging from one-off, one-hour workshops to week-long intensive and ongoing regular workshops. The courses and workshops were attended by a total of 4,477 students (an increase of 10.7% over the 1999 figure of 4,043 students), and they generated a total of 46,395 student contact hours (and increase of 23.9% over the 1999 figure of 46,395 student contact hours). Details of the types of courses and workshops offered at the SLC in 2000 are shown in Appendix D.

Te Puni Wananga

Te Puni Wananga (TPW) is the Maori arm of the Student Learning Centre. The programme's objective is to provide learning support and assistance to students within a kaupapa Maori environment. In 2000, TPW had a part-time co-ordinating tutor, and four teaching assistants (henceforth, also referred to as tutors). These tutors saw a total of 253 students on an individual basis, 95 (37.5%) of whom were Maori. The tutors also planned and taught 185 workshops, with a total attendance of 1,942 students; 94 of these workshops were specifically designed and intended for Maori students.

The new teaching initiatives that TPW tutors were involved in during 2000 have been described in the first section of this report. As in previous years, TPW tutors also participated fully in many other teaching programmes offered by the SLC, including intensive courses such as Commerce Orientation, the Special Admission Students course, and Asia Pasifika. TPW tutors also continued to provide Te Reo Maori language support: 68 tutorial sessions were held during the year and all of the students who regularly attended passed their Maori language papers. In addition, TPW tutors continued to provide a series of workshops to support Maori and Pacific Islands students doing the Certificate in Health at the School of Medicine. They also continued to run workshops for Te Rau Hikitia (the Maori unit) at St Johns College.

Fale Pasifika

Fale Pasifika (FP) provides learning support for Pacific Islands students on campus. It is co-ordinated by a Senior Tutor, who in 2000 was assisted by one part-time tutor and two teaching assistants (also referred to as tutors). Fale Pasifika saw a total of 371 students on an individual basis by appointment, 14% of whom were Pacific Islands students. Many more came to see FP tutors on an informal or drop-in basis (a total of 263 drop-in consultations). FP tutors also taught or contributed in teaching 111 workshops, attended by a total of 1,256 students.

Postgraduate Skills Development Programme

The numbers of students using the postgraduate programme continued to increase dramatically during 2000. In 1998 a total of 586 postgraduate students (19.7% of total) enrolled at the Centre, a figure that rose in 1999 to 833 students (24.8%). In 2000, this figure rose to 1,298 postgraduate students (34.8% of the students registered with the SLC). A wide range of services continued to be offered including one-off workshops, individual consultations, workshop series, and longer, intensive courses. Topics included thesis and dissertation writing, time management, seminar and oral presentation skills, reading skills, data analysis, research skills, and computer skills. All workshops were well attended and received high evaluations. In 2000, the SLC also took on the full responsibility for the PhD skills development programme (previously shared with the Centre for Professional Development). Numerous new courses were developed, a support network that met regularly was set up, and a PhD mailing list was established. In total, 198 PhD students registered to use the Centre in 2000.

Commerce Communication Skills Programme

In 2000 we continued to offer a range of services through the Commerce Communication Skills Programme – general and department-specific workshops, one-to-one consultations, as well as assisting staff within the Faculty. The orientation programmes for students new to the Faculty, which were run prior to the beginning of both semesters, again proved successful. In 2000, there was continued demand for workshops (e.g., report writing, critical thinking, exam preparation) run in conjunction with departments, and for specific papers. More than half of the students who made use of one-to-one appointments were of Asian ethnic affiliation, and the majority sought assistance with academic writing.

SLC Summer School Programme

2000 was the first year that the SLC appointed a Summer School Co-ordinator. In 2000, the SLC's Summer School Programme continued to provide support to students enrolled in Summer School through drop-ins, individual consultations and workshops. In 2000, the programme expanded to include both a greater number and wider range of workshop topics to better meet the needs of Summer School students. 2000 was the first time that an orientation programme was offered for new students enrolled at Summer School, and a full-day intensive study skills workshop for returning students.

Tamaki

In 2000, the Centre's activities at the Tamaki campus consisted mainly of individual support and workshops requested by departments based at Tamaki. The Centre also held a two-day orientation programme for first year Tamaki students in February, and 29 students attended. Apart from study skills and reading and writing workshops, the orientation offered students a chance to get to know the Tamaki campus, its library and student services. Students' feedback indicated that they found the programme helpful in preparing them for the academic year. During the semesters, the Centre conducted workshops on effective study organisation, writing, notetaking and reading, and exam skills. These were not well attended as less Arts and Commerce students attended lectures at Tamaki in 2000. Like the previous year, the workshops requested by departments (e.g., MSIS, SEMS and Theology) attracted many of their students. The Centre further offered more computer workshops at Tamaki. Of these, the "Introduction to Excel" and "Formatting your thesis" were very popular.

Language Exchange Programme (LEX)

The LEX programme had another very successful year in 2000. A total of 546 students (an increase of 47% over the 1999 total of 371 students) were catered for: 54% of these students were paired with an appropriate language exchange partner and the remaining 46% used the programme's Language Conversation Groups (LCG).

The LEX programme facilitates improvement in students' foreign or English language skills by matching students of similar language needs and ability. LEX tutors arrange meetings with the students to suggest activities that would facilitate language learning, answer queries that students may have and to monitor the students' progress. All paired students were asked to fill out an evaluation form a few months after their initial meeting and on a scale of 1 (poor) to 7 (excellent) students gave this component of the programme an overall satisfaction rating of 5.98. The average satisfaction rating for their LEX partner in

terms of compatibility was 6.99. The average satisfaction rating for the programme in assisting them improve their language learning was 5.17.

LEX tutors also held LCGs. A large number of students register with the programme only to attend these conversation groups. Five 2-hour groups operated from the Centre's seminar room every week (one group less than in 1999 due to a continued increase in demand on the seminar room for other SLC courses). These groups also ran through the summer in order to meet the demands of the students. Students gave the conversation classes an average satisfaction rating of 5.56 on a scale of 1 to 7.

Computer Skills Development Programme

As noted previously, this programme offered a total of 183 computer skills courses in 2000 (up 37% from the 1999 total of 134 courses), involving 365 actual teaching hours (up 38% from the 1999 total of 265 hours), and generating 9,202 student contact hours (an increase of 113% on the 1999 total of 4,315 student contact hours). These do not include the computer skills workshops for postgraduate students only, of which there were 21, involving another 139 hours of teaching. In addition, 222 students made a total of over 300 appointments with the computer skills tutors. The tutors of this programme were also frequently requested to conduct workshops for students of various subject departments. As the SLC has no computer lab of its own, the tutors have had to depend on the help and availability of facilities of other departments/ faculties. Staff of ITSS, HSB Computer Lab, the Computer Department of Architecture, Language Multimedia Lab, and the Commerce Labs were all very helpful. Some of the new courses offered through this programme were noted in the first section of this report.

Maths, Statistics & Science Programmes

In 2000, the Mathematics Department, in response to a recommendation made in the review of the School of Mathematics and Information Sciences, took over the role of providing individual consultations and workshops to support students undertaking mathematics courses. The SLC therefore reduced its activities in this area, continuing only in the provision of assistance for generic mathematics and upskilling of students who lack the skills necessary for University mathematics courses. There was therefore a drop in the number of students who used the SLC for mathematics (only 66 students came for a total of 82 appointments, compared to 134 students and over 400 appointments in 1999), and only two sets of workshops were offered during the year.

The Statistics programme remained very busy though with 144 students making over 400 individual appointments during the year. Workshops continued to be provided in co-operation with the Statistics Department. In total, 59 workshops were offered involving 148.5 hours of teaching. These workshops were very popular, with some having more than 50 students attending.

The Science programme was again limited to providing workshops to upskill students with little or no background in Chemistry, but who need to take this subject for their degrees. Over 100 students signed up and attended the workshops offered during both the first and second semesters.

Engineering Orientation

With the School of Engineering, the SLC again conducted an orientation programme for first year Engineering students who have lived in New Zealand for less than five years. The programme was reduced from three to two days and included an introduction to the School, strategic thinking, notetaking skills, group presentation, report writing, academic writing, and test taking skills that were intended to help these students manage better those problems perceived to be common among BE students from overseas backgrounds. A total of 34 students participated in the programme, mostly coming from Chinese, Korean, and Indian/Sri Lankan backgrounds. The students, who gave the programme an average overall satisfaction rating of 5.71 on a scale of 1 to 7 (s.d. = 1.16), reported that they found the sessions well balanced and those on report writing, strategic thinking and notetaking most useful.

Orientation Courses for International Students

The International Students Office and the SLC jointly organised orientation courses to help better prepare international students who were enrolling at the University of Auckland for the first time. The workshops programme held over three half-days (23–25 February) was attended by 170 undergraduate and

postgraduate students, while 110 students attended the orientation courses held during 13-14 July for second semester new intakes. The students who attended both courses were registered with the SLC by the International Students Office, and many attended further workshops and made appointments with Centre tutors during the year.

Puawaitanga 1 and 2

The SLC again conducted the first of the Puawaitanga courses in mid-February (17–19 February). Puawaitanga 1 is an intensive 3-day course designed specifically for students who failed more than half of their papers in the previous academic year. The course is aimed at providing these students with skills that will ensure success in their studies in the new academic year. In 2000, a total of 84 attended this course and on a scale of 1 to 7 they gave the course a satisfaction rating of 6.0, and provided very positive written comments indicating that they found the course useful. Participants were registered with the Centre for the whole year and had unlimited access to the learning assistance provided. Tutors strongly encouraged the participants to keep in contact during the semesters, and followed up on their progress when possible.

Puawaitanga 2 is a one-day intensive course for students who failed more than half of their papers in Semester 1. In 2000, it was held on 22 July and was attended by 12 students. On a scale of 1 to 7 they gave the course an average satisfaction rating of 6.2 (s.d. = 0.67). The average pass rate of these students improved from 24% in the first semester to 59% in the second semester.

Study Skills Workshops for Special Admission Students

Students who enter the University under the Special Admission scheme often encounter difficulties in their studies. On Saturday 25 March, for the sixth time, the SLC taught the annual one-day intensive study skills course for these students. The aim was to provide these students with essential academic learning and performance skills that would assist them with their studies. It was also an opportunity for the students to become aware of the types of assistance they could obtain from the Centre. A total of 102 students (divided into two groups) attended. 101 of these students had results that were accessible and showed that they had an average pass rate of 84% in their exams in 2000. This compares favourably with the usual pass rate of Special Admission students of around 50%.

Asia Pasifika Workshop⁴³⁸

The Asia Pasifika is an intensive one week long course designed specifically for students from Asian and other new immigrant backgrounds who are enrolled for courses at the University of Auckland. The course focuses on writing and other academic skills that would assist students in their studies. In 2000, the course was held for the seventh time during the week of 26–30 June. A total of 48 students attended. These students gave the course an average satisfaction rating of 6.1 (s.d. = 0.85) on a scale of 1 to 7. At the end of the year, 44 of these students had accessible pass rates and their average for the second semester was found to be 86%. This pass rate – which is higher than the usual average for all first year students – is a commendable achievement for these students as many of them attended the course because they were lacking in confidence (being unfamiliar with the academic demands at this University) and/or they experienced difficulties with their courses during the first semester.

⁴³⁸ The Student Learning Centre is grateful to the Auckland Masonic Education Foundation for continuing to provide funding to support this intensive course.

APPENDIX B Profile of the Students who Registered with the Centre in 2000

Total number of students who registered = 3,729

GENDER	PERCENTAGE
Female	63.8
Male	36.1
Unspecified	0.1

AGE GROUP	PERCENTAGE
≤20	32.6
21-25	25.4
≥26	41.9
Unspecified	0.1

ETHNIC AFFILIATION	PERCENTAGE
NZ/European	45.4
Asian	33.7
Pacific Islander	7.5
Maori	6.6
Other	6.7
Unspecified	0.1

YEAR AT UNIVERSITY	PERCENTAGE
1	39.3
2	11.5
3	11.2
4	9.4
5	7.2
≥6	10.4
Unspecified	11.0

COURSE OF STUDY	PERCENTAGE
Undergraduate	64.8
Architecture Property Planning & Fine Arts	2.9
Arts	36.5
Commerce	28.7
Engineering	4.3
Law	3.2
Medicine & Health Sciences	5.4
Science & Technology	17.6
Theology	1.4
Postgraduate	34.8
(from all faculties)	
Postgraduate Certificates	15.9
Postgraduate Diplomas	19.9
Masters	49.0
PhDs and other doctorates	15.3
Others	0.3
Unspecified	0.1

PREVIOUS USE OF THE SLC	PERCENTAGE
Previous user	15.3
New user	80.6
Not answered	4.1

APPENDIX C Profile of Students who Consulted Tutors on an Individual Basis

Total number of students who came to SLC for individual consultation by appointment = 1,757

GENDER	PERCENTAGE
Female	66.0
Male	34.0

AGE GROUP	
≤20	17.6
21-25	32.3
≥26	50.1

YEAR AT UNIVERSITY	
Undergraduates	66.3
1	42.4
2	21.6
3	19.5
≥4	16.6
Postgraduates	33.7

ETHNIC AFFILIATION	
NZer/Pakeha/European	35.3
Maori	11.0
Pacific Islander	9.6
Asian	36.5
Other	7.5

NUMBER OF CONSULTATIONS	
1	58.0
2	17.5
3	7.9
4	4.9
5	4.2
6–10	4.6
11–15	1.9
≥16	1.1

MAIN AREA IN WHICH ADVICE OR ASSISTANCE WAS SOUGHT	
Computer skills	14.7
Essay & assignment writing (Drafting)	14.2
Essay & assignment writing (Pre-drafting)	9.0
Statistics	7.2
Data analysis	6.8
Reading and/or notetaking skills	6.4
Thesis writing	5.5
Mathematics	3.9
Test & exam skills	3.8
Report writing	3.5
Research methodology	2.7
Literature reviews	2.6
Language learning skills	2.4
Time management	2.4
Motivation & goal setting	2.3
Seminar & oral presentation skills	2.2
Memory and/or concentration skills	2.0
General enquiries	1.9
Constructing research proposals	1.8
Subject-specific advice	1.7
Learning disabilities ⁴³⁹	1.3
Other	1.5

⁴³⁹ The Student Learning Centre is grateful to the Auckland Masonic Education Foundation for continuing to provide funding support for the intensive remedial instruction of students with specific learning disabilities.

APPENDIX D Types of Courses/Workshops Offered and the Number of Student Contact Hours Generated

COURSES/WORKSHOPS	NUMBER OFFERED	STUDENT CONTACT HOURS GENERATED
Thesis writing and other postgraduate courses	272	17,940
Language Learning Skills (including Te Reo Maori and LEX groups)	251	11,569
Computer skills	183	9,202
Special intensive courses and weekend workshops	26	8,095
Context based learning skills courses (including workshops requested by departments)	81	5,938
Basic mathematics, statistics, and science workshops	74	3,358
Essay writing and other writing skills	66	404
Test/exam skills	55	317
Reading and/or notetaking	33	258
Memory and/or concentration	14	105
Others	34	288
TOTAL	1,089	57,474

Total Number of Individual Students Who Attended Courses and Workshops = 4,477 students

APPENDIX E Brief Descriptions of Some of the Students Assisted on an Individual Basis

As noted earlier in this report, the SLC provided individual assistance and support to 1,757 students of the University. However, only statistical information has been provided about these students in the other parts of this report. This section briefly describes a number of these students and the progress they made in their studies during 2000. The students' names have been changed to avoid identification, and tutors who helped these students sought their consent to be included in this report.

Lucy, a female Chinese student doing a BSc degree

Lucy was one of the students included in last year's Appendix E case reports. She had passed only 3 of her 13 papers in 1997 and 1998, and because of this was under Exclusion at the start of 1999. Prior to the start of semester one 1999, she was referred to the SLC by one of her lecturers as she was quite distraught about not being allowed to re-enrol. Both the SLC tutor who saw her and the lecturer who referred her wrote letters to Academic Registry to support her appeal to be given another opportunity to re-enrol. She was successful in her appeal, and during 1999 made regular and semi-regular appointments with the tutor at the SLC. The tutor focused on helping Lucy develop a more effective way of learning and remembering the many concepts and processes involved in the papers she was taking, and on improving her ability to communicate in written form what she had learnt – particularly for exams. Lucy went on to pass 5 of her 6 papers during 1999. She continued to consult the SLC tutor during 2000 – although less frequently as she developed greater confidence in her studies. At the end of 2000, Lucy completed her BSc degree. She has gone on to enrol in the Postgraduate Diploma in Health Science at the start of 2001.

Marie, a mature female Maori student in her final year of a BA degree

Marie is a mature Maori woman with two children. In 2000 she was in the final year of her BA, majoring in Maori Studies. She was a hard-working student who did all the required readings and began assignments well in advance. However, her assignment grades and the feedback she received for them did not reflect her hard work, leading Marie to question her own ability. When she made her first appointment in April, Marie was lacking in confidence and feeling like “giving up” on her degree. She sought assistance with her grammar and sentence structure. However, it became apparent to her SLC tutor that Marie's planning and essay structuring skills also needed attention. The tutor also noted that although Marie had underdeveloped writing skills, she had strong oral communication skills and could express herself well when asked the ‘right questions.’ During the appointments that Marie made, the tutor worked with her on various aspects of her writing skills including generating ideas, organising these ideas and constructing writing plans, and improving flow and readability. Marie's confidence and critical thinking skills increased throughout the year. By the end of the year, Marie was confidently asking critical questions of her research texts and of her own writing. She successfully completed her degree and, at the time of writing this report, was considering embarking on postgraduate study.

Amber, a female doing stage 1 Statistics

Amber made an appointment with one of the SLC tutors during the middle of the examination break of the second semester. She was extremely panicked and certain that she would fail the stage 1 Statistics exam. During the first interview, the tutor was quickly able to establish that Amber was an able student who was capable of passing the exam as long as she did not panic or do anything drastically wrong due to nervousness. The tutor worked intensively with her during the week leading up to her exam, focusing on both actual revision and strategies for keeping her panic at bay. The tutor was impressed with Amber's ability to hold herself together in a time of extreme stress and was pleased to later find out that she passed her Statistics exam.

10.1.1.1 John, a male Chinese student doing third year Commerce

John migrated from Hong Kong with his parents and had been doing pretty well with his studies until he failed one of his papers in Accounting. He was referred to the SLC by the lecturer in charge of the paper as John had to repeat that paper. The tutor reported that John experienced some difficulties and lacked sufficient confidence in writing in English – particularly under pressure, such as during exams. The tutor also thought John needed to work on improving the way he approached his preparation for his exams. In total, John made 22 appointments with the tutor who worked with him on various aspects of his writing technique (drafting and expressing his ideas clearly, developing ideas in his written work, checking and

editing his written work), his language learning strategies, and his exam skills. John passed his Accounting paper the second time around and was very pleased. He wrote an e-mail message to the tutor who helped him, which in part read, "I tried the strategies you introduced. They worked so well for me ... I wish I could have known those exam techniques, and how to analyse and structure my essays earlier ..."

10.1.1.1.2 Sarah, a mature female student enrolled in the first year of the BNurs degree

Sarah had undertaken no previous study at the tertiary level and came from a non-English speaking background. She had immigrated to New Zealand with her husband and two young children only a few months before the start of the first semester. She attended the Study Skills Workshop for Special Admission students and, at the conclusion of the workshop, approached one of the tutors to make an individual appointment for assistance with her time management. At Sarah's first appointment it became apparent to the tutor that she was having difficulty finding enough time to care for her young family, study full-time, and work part-time. She also struggled to understand her lecturers, take useful lecture notes, and keep up with the required reading. She had drafted her first assignment but was afraid that she was going to fail. At the tutor's advice, Sarah sought individual assistance on a weekly basis for the following two months, and then on a fortnightly basis after that. Sarah was taught skills to better manage her time, to become a more efficient reader and notetaker, to improve the grammar and structure of her written work, and to effectively prepare for her exams. Sarah successfully completed her first year of study, passing every piece of assessed work and achieving an A-/B+ average. She wrote her tutor: "My first year at University was very difficult for me. I would not have been able to pass my essays and exams without your help and support. Thank you very much."

10.1.1.1.3 Mel, a mature female Pacific Island student doing the first year of a BTheol

Mel's lecturer at St Johns Theological College suggested that she attend some of the courses offered by the SLC. Mel attended the Tamaki Orientation, where she found out about the Fale Pasifika (FP) programme. She then made an appointment during the second week of the first semester with one of the FP tutors. She brought her first assignment, an essay, which she did not know how to approach. It became clear to the tutor that Mel's lack of prior experience in producing written academic work, as well as the fact that English was her second language, were the sources of her difficulties. The tutor set about teaching Mel the process of essay writing, working with her to apply the skills discussed on her first essay. Mel received a C+ for that first essay. She continued to see the FP tutor throughout the year, making appointments and also using the drop-in times offered. The tutor continued to help her in developing her writing skills, as well as teaching her strategies for improving her use of English in her written work and her skills in proofreading and correcting her own work. Towards the end of the semester, Mel was getting Bs and B+s for her essays. She went on to pass all her papers, and later came to see the FP tutor very thankful for the support and assistance she received.

10.1.1.1.4 Lily, a female Taiwanese/Chinese student completing her MA

Lily was completing her MA in English literature. She speaks fluent English (having lived in New Zealand since she was 14 years of age) and consistently obtains high grades, but needed some help with English composition and academic writing style. The tutor she saw at the SLC worked with Lily on various aspects of her writing, including developing a strategy for reducing wordiness and varying her sentence structures. The tutor reported that Lily made rapid progress, both in improving her essay writing and in getting her dissertation under way. Lily also made use of a number of other services provided by the SLC, including attending workshops to learn how to use EndNote for referencing.

Appendix B

Data provided relate to 1999, unless otherwise specified.

Numbers of students that use the learning centre

Institution and student head count	Data/numbers of centre users	Proportion of institution's student population
UNSW (32,792)	476 were registered (only required for individual consultations) Actual numbers of students that attended workshops are difficult to compute from annual report received	1.5% sought individual consultations
Melbourne (approx 35,000)	880 were registered	2.5% were registered
Hong Kong (14,700)	Estimated 600 students use consultation service Estimated 2,000 students use the Language Resource Centre (LRC)	4.1% use consultation service (estimated) 13.6% use the LRC (estimated)
AUT (26, 319)	Only provided total student contact of 7,602 which includes total one-to-one sessions, and attendance of different courses offered (students would have been counted more than once)	Not possible to calculate
Massey (13,000 internal, 18,000 extramural)	Only provided totals that counted students more than once: One-to-one consultancies = 1,253 Workshop attendance = 2,529	Not possible to calculate
Otago (17,000)	Approx 400 students	2.4%
ACE (4,939)	Approx 700 have used the Unit	Approx 14%
Sydney (36,976)	2,371 students taught	6.4%
CUHK (approx 18,000)	585 students (1999–2000, and the ALSS was only established in Nov 1999)	3.3%
UoA (26,985)	3,357 registered 4,043 attended courses offered	12.4% were registered, 15.0% attended courses provided by the centre

Programmes and services provided by learning centres

Institution	One to one consultations	Workshops	Postgraduate courses & support	Computer skills instruction	Indigenous student support	Ethnic minority & new immigrant student support	Special programmes for at-risk students	Language instruction	Credit courses	Pre-entry or foundation courses
UNSW	√	√	√		√				√	√
Melbourne	√	√	√			√				
Hong Kong	√				n/a			√		
AUT	√	√			√	√	√	√		
Massey	√	√								
Otago	√	√								
ACE	√	√								
Sydney	√	√	√			√	√			
CUHK	√	√	√		n/a					
UoA	√	√	√	√	√	√	√			

Measures of effectiveness

The following table outlines the learning centres' responses to the question: What measures have been taken by the centre to establish the effectiveness of programmes and services it provides students?

Institution	Measures taken by the learning centre
UNSW	Nothing specified
Melbourne	Nothing specified
Hong Kong	Verbal feedback from students; standard evaluation forms
AUT	Student feedback mechanism similar to SEEQ; peer and self-appraisal mechanism; a student satisfaction survey conducted by the Research Institute at AUT
Massey	Student evaluation forms
Otago	Workshop evaluations
ACE	Survey of unit users; pigeonhole drop questionnaire
Sydney	Workshop evaluations; survey of students conducted from time to time; university-wide student questionnaire (recent)
CUHK	Participant numbers; participant feedback; self-evaluation
UoA	Course evaluations including SLC evaluation forms, SEEQ, and Fast Feedback; annual satisfaction surveys of undergraduate and postgraduate student users; analyses of pass rates of particular groups of students targeted

Staff teaching hours

Institution	Amount of teaching expected of a FT teaching staff member	Actual teaching hours generated per FTE teaching staff member
UNSW	Approx 8–10 hours per week (equates to approx 400 hours per year)	Not possible to calculate
Melbourne	Not answered	Approx 528 hours
Hong Kong	480 hours annually	416 hours
AUT	Not answered except to say that teaching staff are supposed to make their 34 hours per week available to students, but that in practical terms this is not possible	Not possible to calculate
Massey	Varies a lot	Not possible to calculate
Otago	Not known	Not possible to calculate
ACE	Approx 70% of time to be made available to students	Approx 285 hours
Sydney	400 hours annually	247 hours
CUHK	Could not answer	Not possible to calculate
UoA	Minimum of 450 hours annually	536 hours

Research

Institution	Research activity and/or output
UNSW	Research done on an ad-hoc basis only
Melbourne	9 journal articles published; plus (in 2000) 1 MA thesis passed, 1 EdD thesis submitted, 1 MA in progress, 1 research in progress
Hong Kong	Instructors encouraged to do research in their spare time; publications included in English Centre website
AUT	"Mainly anecdotal and qualitative ... some presentations in conferences, but no publications in refereed journals"
Massey	Contribute to conferences
Otago	None at present (but planned)
ACE	1 internal publication
Sydney	3 journal publications; 1 report; 3 published conference papers; 6 other conference papers presented
CUHK	Several research projects started, but no publications yet
UoA	1 journal publication (1 other accepted for publication and published in 2000); 1 section in book; 2 papers in refereed conference proceedings; 6 other conference papers presented; plus (in 2000) 4 doctoral theses in progress, 5 masters degrees in progress, 2 papers being revised for publication, 1 research project completed and being written up for publication

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