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THE CROWN IN AUSTRALIA:

AN ANTHROPOLOGICAL STUDY OF A CONSTITUTIONAL SYMBOL

Sally Raudon

A thesis submitted in fulfilment of the requirement for the degree of
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Abstract
The Crown in Australia: An anthropological study of a constitutional symbol

The Crown is the foundation of Australia's constitutional order, and its representations are common throughout society, yet it is also curiously unrecognised and taken for granted. Even within the elite community of Australians whose work brings them into direct contact with the Crown – who are responsible for curating or representing it, or enacting its agency – many argue that it is insignificant, 'merely symbolic', or ornamental to actual political power. Its efficacy is minimised, and its presence unremarked. Over the past twenty years, however, the Crown has become embroiled in Australia's vigorous, sometimes bitter, debate over constitutional reform, even while it evades direct interrogation.

Based on multi-sited fieldwork in Australia, including interviews and participant observation, I set out to explore how Australians view the Crown and its constitutional role. I found that people typically think of it in terms of the Queen, rather than the offices of government or state. This leads me to ask: How is the Crown represented in Australia? Is it a unifying entity? To what extent has the Crown been indigenised, and in what ways does it still signal colonialism? How does the Crown interact with other symbols of national identity and conflict? If the Crown is a façade, what does it conceal? How is it used by actors in the constitutional reform debate? With that deliberation already well advanced, will the inevitable death of the popular Queen mean a constitutional reordering in Australia?

To analyse the Crown's diverse meanings I draw on theories of symbolism, power and ritual. Using Kantorowicz's thesis of the king's two bodies, I also draw out the significance of the distinction between the Crown as a person (Elizabeth Windsor) and the Crown as a set of institutions, or body politic (the Crown in right of the Commonwealth of Australia). The figures of the Crown-as-person and the Crown-as-office come together and pull apart in different situations and contexts in Australian life.

I argue that, while the office of the Crown is concerned with relatively narrow legal issues around land, it remains primarily associated with Queen Elizabeth II and the British monarchy rather than with its institutional meanings. This places a delicate constitutional equilibrium at risk. I make my case by examining how the Crown conflates notions of symbolism, affect, mystique, charisma, kinship, and transcendence with issues of political power, authority, legitimacy, sovereignty, and nationalism. These political abstractions, like constitutional monarchy itself, must be symbolised so that people can imagine, and be moved to love – or hate – them.

Keywords:
Political symbol, Crown, Australia, constitutional reform, elites, constitutional monarchy, royalty, charisma, king's two bodies, political anthropology, ethnography

For my mother, Patricia Margaret Grant

1942–2001

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To Jai Patel, the ideal colleague and comrade.

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Several chapters benefitted from discussion at conferences: the Australian Anthropological Society's Moral Horizons conference (panel on moral politics and the modern state), the Association of Social Anthropologists of Aotearoa/New Zealand Conference, ANU's Public Law Weekend on Constitutional Deliberations, and Death, Dying and Disposal 12.

I thank again those Australians who generously gave up their valuable time to answer my questions.

Finally, to Allan, whose 'satiable curiosity accompanied me from the very first discussion through to the final full stop.

Context

This study represents the Australian arm of a broader project, entitled *The Crown: Perspectives on a Contested Symbol and its Constitutional Significance in New Zealand and the Commonwealth,* funded by the Royal Society of New Zealand's Marsden Fund (13-UoA-205). Drawing on both anthropology and legal history, the project investigates the Crown as a cultural entity and a social and political institution, within the context of constitutional reform in New Zealand, Australia, Canada, and other Commonwealth post-colonial settler societies, with the ultimate goal of helping inform ongoing constitutional debates about republicanism in New Zealand. It aims to answer a raft of questions. How is the Crown represented in public life in these nations, and how does it represent itself? For whom is it useful, and how? How do lobbyists and political actors use the Crown as a strategic and symbolic resource? Is the Crown, as a symbol of monarchy and colonialism, an obstacle to current constitutional reform? The Principal Investigators are Professors Cris Shore (Anthropology) and David Williams (Law) at the University of Auckland.

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Abbreviations

Australians for Constitutional Monarchy: ACM

Australian Monarchist League: the League, or AML

Australian Republican Movement: the Republicans, or ARM

Selected interlocutors

Baskerville, Bruce: Historian

Benwell, Philip: Australian Monarchist League founder and chair

Chaney, Fred: Former Federal Liberal deputy leader

Connors, Jane: Historian, broadcaster and scholar of Australian royal tours

FitzSimons, Peter: Incoming Republican chair, writer and columnist

Flint, David: National Convenor of Australians for Constitutional Monarchy

Flood, Phillip: Retired diplomat

Foley, Gary: Indigenous activist and historian

Freeman, Damien: Writer, philosopher and lawyer, associated with Australians for Constitutional Monarchy and the Liberal Party

Godden, Lee: Legal academic, Australian Law Reform Commissioner

Hazell, Malcolm: retired public servant, served two Governors-General as official secretary

Leeming, Mark: Judge of the Supreme Court of New South Wales, judge of appeal

Leeser, Julian: Lobbyist and lawyer, associated with Australians for Constitutional Monarchy and the Liberal Party

McKenna, Mark: Academic historian and republican advocate

Nelson, Brendon: Director of the Australian War Memorial, former Federal Opposition and Liberal Party leader, former ambassador

Rees, Peter: Journalist, non-fiction and television writer

Salt, Bernard: Demographer, futurist, and social commentator

Tink, Andrew: Writer, commissioner, former New South Wales shadow Attorney-General

Twomey, Anne: Legal academic, with a particular interest in the Crown

Walsh, Kerry-Anne: Veteran political journalist

Warhurst, John: Former Republican chair political scientist, columnist and Republican chair,

Warnock, Diane: Retired State politician, journalist, lecturer, and women’s rights activist

Williams, George: Legal academic

Woods, Asmi: Legal academic of Torres Strait Islander and Aboriginal descent

… What is this metaphor, called a *crown*? … is it a *thing*, or is it a *name*, or is it a *fraud*? … is it a thing *necessary* to a nation? If it is, in what does that necessity consist? What *services* does it perform? … Doth the virtue consist in the *metaphor*, or in the man? Doth the goldsmith that makes the crown make the *virtue* also?

Thomas Paine, *Rights of Man,* 1791 (original emphasis)

Chapter One
Perspectives on the significance of a contested symbol

On 29 April 1770, 20 years before Thomas Paine wrote the republican challenge at the frontispiece of this thesis, Captain James Cook claimed the land of Australia for the British Crown. He achieved this through an act of magic, by flag, cannons, and ritual utterance. The first convict-settlers, guarded then employed by the King's soldiers, arrived in 1788 to serve their sentences in a penal colony. Their convict settlements expanded into a collection of colonies under British governors. In 1901, federation of the colonies established the Commonwealth of Australia as a dominion of the British Empire. With the Statute of Westminster (1931), Australia achieved independence as a democratic constitutional monarchy, although the individual States[1] remained British colonies until the Australia Acts of 1986. In 1975, the Queen's representative, Governor-General Sir John Kerr, dismissed Prime Minister Gough Whitlam and appointed the opposition leader, Malcolm Fraser, as caretaker Prime Minister. Throughout, and to this day, Australia's sovereign has been the British monarch, crowned at Westminster Abbey.

In Australia, the cultural meaning of the Crown is awash with apparent puzzles and inconsistencies. Prince Charles, set to become king of Australia on his mother's death, has supportively acknowledged the republican movement (The Prince of Wales 1994). The immediate past Governor-General, Quentin Bryce, accepted a damehood and revealed her republican sympathies (Bryce 2013). I met republicans who revel in royal gossip, monarchists who proclaim Australia a "crowned republic", and a republican with a crown tattooed on her body. The Crown breeds apparent paradoxes and defies easy categorisation. It

[1] Throughout, I capitalise State to indicate the States of Australia (New South Wales, Queensland, South Australia, Tasmania, Victoria, and Western Australia).

is an enigma, one which remains entrenched and operational within a modern constitutional democracy. It is frequently seen, and just as often unrecognised, yet it carries out a number of politically, legally, and culturally important functions. I examine how the Crown performs this symbolic work, seemingly in taken-for-granted and paradoxical ways. It represents and circulates authority, unites its cultural and constitutional dimensions, and helps legitimise sovereignty and the constitutional order – as it has done in Australia for over 200 years, though not without contestation.

Republican sentiment, marginal but never far from the surface in Australian politics, gained renewed momentum in the 1990s. Republicans protested that the Crown was divorced from contemporary Australian values and that "only colonies continue to borrow the monarchies of other lands" (Turnbull 1993: 4). Monarchists campaigned to "justify keeping the Crown in the Australian system of Government without relying on any appeal to 'British-ness'" (Abbott 1995: 6). Eventually the proposal for republican reform was taken to the Australian people and voted down. Queen Elizabeth[1] remains Queen of Australia.

Universal suffrage, the secret ballot, more equitable representation, and other democratic measures have altered constitutional monarchy significantly since Paine wrote his defence of the French Revolution, in which he argued for republicanism and justified popular rebellion.[2] But his queries remain as relevant today as when he penned them. He questioned the Crown's purpose and its function, work, and value, and scoped the distance between the material thing and the ideas people held about it. He noted the tension between thing and idea, between metaphor – a linguistic fraud – and fraud, a deceit used to appropriate property or rights. He asked about its honour, and the source thereof. He effectively asked, on what

[1] I refer to each individual royal by their simplest title, in order to avoid the confusion that full royal titles can provoke.

[2] For this Paine was tried in absentia for seditious libel against the Crown and sentenced to capital punishment, which he evaded by exile.

basis is the Crown the fount of all honour, the entity which carries sovereignty and has the authority to award honour to others? While his purpose was polemical and his questions rhetorical, they nonetheless represent matters which deserve serious consideration by scholars concerned with Australia's political power structures.

So what is the Crown? It is the head of state of the 16 Commonwealth realms, including Australia. It acts as a key symbol (Ortner 1973) of Westminster constitutional monarchy because it summarises common social and cultural concepts which shape aspects of life in those cultures,[1] and captures or inspires sentiment which people associate with those ideas. In Australia it is the absolute source of authority, including radical title, for it retains ownership of land, property and resources. It forms the basis of the protections of Australian citizenship and has the power to rescind those rights. It interacts with each of the separated government powers of executive, legislature, and judiciary: it assents legislation, orders elections, appoints judges, ministers and ambassadors, prosecutes, and administers justice and punishment. It holds significant reserve constitutional powers, and bestows honours. These are the Crown's real powers which have very real effects. But what *is* the Crown?

The Crown is a metonym, the fictional entity which formally and historically underpins Australia's political and legal institutions. The Oxford English Dictionary has 35 definitions for the word "crown", which itself is instructive of the term's breadth and variation. The salient one for this study is 3: "*Fig*. the sovereignty, authority or dominion of which a crown is the symbol; the rule, position of empire of a monarch. Chiefly in phrases in which the sense, originally literal, has *ceased to be analysed*" (Oxford English Dictionary 1989a: 70, my emphasis). This is certainly true for Australia because, despite its political and social importance and the wide range of views surrounding this, the Crown in Australia has

[1] Some interlocutors described the Crown as representing "Westminster values". Otherwise known as responsible government, these include democratic election, cabinet responsibility, impartial public service, rule of law, independent judiciary and public service, and monarchy above government.

not been studied as a socio-political institution and cultural entity. This thesis is my effort to begin addressing this gap.

A political paradox

The Crown is a paradox: simultaneously an object, an institution, and a person. It is visually common but rarely recognised, axiomatic and divisive, impartial yet political, sacred and banal, immortal and fragile, redolent with invented traditions, modern yet colonial, beloved and loathed, and the head of state in what many monarchists describe as a de facto republic. Its taken-for-granted status is challenged by insistent pressure from republicans. If the republican movement has been somewhat wary since its defeat in 1999, this changed in 2015 when former republican leader Malcolm Turnbull became Prime Minister, and a revitalised republican leadership – bolstered by political errors by Turnbull's predecessor, monarchist Tony Abbott – brought the issue back to the political and public agenda. Arguments from republicans attempt to denaturalise the Crown, rendering it visible and problematic and destabilising the constitutional monarchy's authority. But do they? Are republicans and monarchists talking about the same thing when they talk about the Crown? Why is the Crown widely considered unimportant, even by some of its champions, while it retains the propensity to polarise? What is the significance of this lingering divisive power?

I analyse the porous boundaries between the Crown's symbolic and constitutional aspects, including the relationship between the Crown as the Queen and the Crown in its institutional form. I examine the nature of the Crown's persistent but mostly subterranean efficacy, including how royalty realises and deploys its symbolic mystique, how the monarchy maintains an enduring fascination and popularity in the national imagination, and how people can use the Crown to claim political authority. My aim is to understand the constitutional enigma of the Crown, the metaphor at the heart of Australia's political order, by interrogating the meanings of that which has ceased to be analysed. Like all potent

symbols it combines condensation, ambiguity, multivocality, and agency. It is efficacious in and of itself, but it can also be used to enormous political advantage when deployed by conscious and astute handlers because of its taken-for-granted presence. Further, its efficacy is enhanced because the symbol is episodically brought to life by very special, breathing incarnations – royalty – who can be moved about Australia and strategically displayed. My hypothesis is that the Crown in Australia is an exemplary political symbol, one which does exactly what certain political symbols are supposed to do: it renders comprehensible a complex abstraction.

To test this hypothesis and its implications, I follow instances of the Crown in use. I ask those people who represent or handle it about what it means to them, and why they think it matters, or does not, to others. How and where does it feature in Australian life? What does it symbolise for those who represent it to the public, protect and curate it, or work to legitimate or undermine its status? In short, what meanings does constitutional monarchy carry in Australia today?

On methodology and interlocutors

In 2013, Cris Shore and David Williams were awarded a grant from the Royal Society of New Zealand Marsden Fund to study the Crown as a socio-cultural entity in several Commonwealth countries, with the goal of supporting informed debate about constitutional reform (see Context). My investigation contributes to the Australian part of this larger project and was designed as a study of the Crown as constituted and debated among Australia's political elite.

Political anthropologists have undertaken a wide range of studies of elites since Nader (1972; cf. Gusterson 1997) famously issued a call for this approach. As I pursued the spaces in Australian life where the Crown was most visible, and sought to study its operations and

meanings for those to whom it matters most or who most regularly engage with it, my interlocutors emerged as an epistemic community. The Crown is above all a symbol of political power and authority, and those most interested in it are often elites. Understanding this community matters because their interests and ideas are influential and hegemonic within Australia.

My initial research into potential interlocutors focused on people who influence the Crown as its custodians, commentators, advocates, and critics. I practised snowball sampling, such that the sample grew as interlocutors recommended others I should approach. Almost all were professionals in positions of influence and comparative privilege: vice-regal representatives, Federal and State politicians (serving and retired), members of the judiciary, senior public servants, Crown officers, lawyers, academics, lobbyists, journalists and writers. The majority were European males, of middle-age or older. They were highly educated, often holding post-graduate degrees, and professionally accomplished. Some were well-known nationally, with eminent reputations. Some had received national honours for service to Australia or to humanity. A few had been present at significant moments in Australian history. For instance, Sir David Smith, as Governor-General Sir John Kerr's official secretary, had read Kerr's proclamation dissolving parliament on the steps of Old Parliament House to Prime Minister Gough Whitlam in 1975, the apex of the constitutional crisis; Peter Rees was there as a political correspondent. Philip Flood was Australia's High Commissioner in the United Kingdom (UK) during the republican referendum in 1999, and personally conveyed its result to Queen Elizabeth. Some had retired but remained engaged in writing, consulting or humanitarian work. A small number met me in their homes, usually comfortable and well-appointed rather than overtly wealthy, filled with books, art, and career and travel mementos which indicated certain forms of cultural capital (Bourdieu 1984). Monarchists often displayed portraits of the Queen. They knew each other, or if not, knew *of*

each other: they had read each other's books and media interviews, or appeared together on television and radio discussion panels, and followed each other's careers. This loose network comprised an epistemic community. This concept from the international relations literature (Adler and Haas 1992) describes a network of professionals who share common frameworks of understanding, values, beliefs, and recognised expertise in a particular domain and who can make authoritative claims to relevant knowledge in that domain.

I quickly realised that while I was guided by my research focus on the concept of the Crown, this concern often did not resonate with those I approached. The common domain for this community is an interest in Australia's constitutional arrangements, in which they often include the Crown in some form. This network of epistemically linked actors extends into Federal and State governments, universities, the public service, diplomacy, the judiciary and the law, influential media, and lobby groups. Within this community, there are vigorous disagreements over the preferred future of Australia's constitutional structures. For some republicans and monarchists, this has been the great cause, even passion, of their public lives. Others professed no interest in challenging or protecting the status quo but are linked to the community by their professional obligation to enact the Crown within the current arrangements. What distinguishes these people as a community is that, as individuals and in groups, they have accrued the social and cultural power to act as catalysts, set policy agendas, frame debates, identify issues, and propose solutions regarding Australia's constitutional future. Most of my interlocutors positioned themselves during interviews as either republicans or monarchists, usually without prompting: such positioning often seems part of the *habitus* of elite identity politics in Australia. Generally, I identify this affiliation if they hold office in a lobby group or regularly speak on behalf of one; otherwise I let people speak for themselves.

The views of Indigenous Australian[1] leaders are underrepresented, despite the efforts I made in light of the importance of the Crown in native title[2] and the raging national debate about Recognition.[3] When I approached Indigenous Australians as potential interlocutors they were more likely than others to decline, saying they did not have the time to meet me. This was borne out when I arranged for a third time to meet with one who again had to demur due to other more urgent demands. I take these many refusals as reflecting their need to prioritise the demands made of them, in which the issues of political symbolism and potential constitutional reform did not seem urgent.

Many people I approached doubted they could help. I collected a long list of people who declined to be interviewed, some with high public profiles. Others said that to discuss the Crown would inevitably lead to talk of constitutional reform, so they felt compelled to decline because of the potential contentiousness of the topic. It is difficult to overstate how divisive constitutional reform remains for some Australians. Others participated but requested anonymity; they appear in the text unattributed or with their identity protected. Some of these are senior public servants who were circumspect generally. Also, I was asked more than once about my neutrality, on the suspicion that the funding body, The Royal Society of New Zealand, is a political organisation. It is not (at least, it is impartial on constitutional matters, which is what my interlocutors meant).

The fact that I was dealing with elites was emphasised in that I often negotiated with assistants or agents whose job it was to control access to the person. Sometimes I was urged to read relevant speeches the interlocutor had delivered or books they had authored before

[1] By Indigenous Australians I mean peoples of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander descent. Those I met used the terms Aboriginal and Indigenous interchangeably, and so do I.
[2] Native title refers to the rights and interests in land or waters founded on the traditional laws and customs of Indigenous Australians, which were first recognised by Mabo v. Queensland (No 2) 1992.

[3] "Recognition" refers to a government proposal to hold a referendum about altering the constitution to recognise Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islanders as Australia's first inhabitants and remove racial discrimination from the document (see Davis and Williams 2015 for a concise history and discussion).

meeting with them. Sometimes I needed to go through security checks or present identification before the interview. Occasionally, a minder attended the meeting as a silent observer. Many interlocutors appeared regularly in news media. Each of these marks status within Australian society.

That I was dealing with a community became clear when I realised that people sometimes asked around about me. It was not uncommon for interlocutors to consent to see me only after they had found someone they trusted to vouch for me, and several interlocutors already knew, without my saying, about others with whom I had met. Some people also connected me with individuals who were hard to access, such as by giving me a private phone number or email address and saying "Use my name" to indicate that they would sponsor the introduction. Of course, this kind of gatekeeping and social filtering is culturally common from small-scale traditional communities to contemporary capitalist societies, and can be used to display status.

Because I was engaging with elites, interviews formed the backbone of my fieldwork. Elites often sequester themselves professionally and privately, which makes interviews an appropriate fieldwork technique but participant observation problematic if not impossible (Gusterson 1997). Moreover, elite habitus means they are comfortable with interviews, which makes interviewing a respectful mode of methodology: interlocutors recognised interviews as meaningful encounters and a justifiable way to spend time. Being short of time is another marker of power within contemporary Australian society. Some people offered 20-minute slots to speak to me. My shortest interview was 11 minutes. Most lasted about 90 minutes, and I had repeated contact with some interlocutors.

An interview is "conversation with a purpose" and "nonroutine conversation" (Rapport 2012: 55). The interview is "a *part* of participant observation and not *apart from* participant observation" (Skinner 2012: 35, original emphasis). Echoing Ingold's proposal

that anthropology is not ethnography (Ingold 2008), Hockey and Forsey argue that "ethnography is not participant observation" (2012: 69). Strathern concludes that "the interview should be considered a form of participatory research. As such, as for all that the term *ethnography* covers, it can yield ethnographic knowledge" (2012: 266). These arguments insist that the interview is no more, and no less, problematic or objective than other fieldwork methods. By recognising that ethnographic knowledge can be sourced and negotiated in immensely variable encounters, including interviews, these views open up spaces for techniques of participant *engagement* rather than observation (Hockey and Forsey 2012). Certainly, my interactions with interlocutors leading up to and after interviews were often ethnographically valuable.

Wanting to ensure that the data reflected views outside Canberra, the home of the country's Federal government, but also from beyond the influential south-eastern cities of Sydney and Melbourne, my research involved fieldwork in the Australian capital Canberra (Australia Capital Territory), as well as State capitals Sydney (New South Wales), Perth (Western Australia), Melbourne (Victoria), and Brisbane (Queensland). I spent almost three months in Australia, conducting 60 interviews and attending some 20 events as a participant observer. Multi-sited research is well-established as a useful ethnographic approach, particularly when tracing a concept or behaviour within urbanised cultures (Marcus 2009).

I supplemented interview data with other fieldwork, including participant observation. I joined the Australian Republican Movement (the Republicans), the Australian Monarchist League (the League), and Australians for Constitutional Monarchy (ACM) and met with each organisation's leaders. I received their newsletters and articles, and observed group members interacting on social media, such as Facebook. I reviewed texts from these organisations' websites and was invited to formal and informal events, some of which I attended. I was a delegate at the Conference on the Crown, a gathering of constitutional monarchy experts

(many of whom were also monarchists) from Australia, New Zealand, and Canada. I also attended the annual conference of the Australian Monarchist League. At each conference I interviewed several senior delegates. I joined in Anzac[1] celebrations in Sydney, a State Supreme Court in session, sittings of Federal and State parliaments, and twelve Last Post ceremonies at the Australian War Memorial in Canberra. I monitored local newspapers, television, and radio for mentions of the Crown and related issues. Finally, I recorded visual data on the Crown from heraldry on local, State, and Federal government buildings, courts and hospitals, public monuments and sculptures, coinage, architecture, crockery, and the uniforms and vehicles of police and the armed services, as well as at events such as Anzac Day parades. From such apparently disparate ethnographic sources as virtual networks, material culture and formal state ceremonies, I could observe something of the complex social life of the Australian Crown, and build up a progressively deeper understanding of the beliefs and practices surrounding it.

Only once during my fieldwork was I asked to give my own views on constitutional reform.[2] An interviewee looked over her glasses and asked, "So, are you a republican?" Despite the readiness with which most of my interlocutors gave their own position – often before I had even raised the topic – I was unprepared to be asked my own view. I answered weakly that I believed impartiality was an important principle which allowed me to conduct the investigation (in fact, I often found myself temporarily persuaded by the views of those I had most recently interviewed), and also that the issue carried different meanings in New Zealand, where I live. I might have hoped to articulate this more coherently, but at its root it

1 Anzac refers to veterans' commemorations in Australia and New Zealand. The word comes from the Australian and New Zealand Army Corps (ANZAC), which first fought at Gallipoli against the Ottoman Empire during World War I. The Gallipoli landing and campaign is the focus of substantial nationalistic identity formation and origin myths for both countries, and Anzac remembrances are quasi-national days in each. For a fuller comparative account see McAllister (2012).

2 Aside from the misunderstandings prompted by this research being funded by the Royal Society.

remains the answer I would have given. Anthropological methodology and theory offer me no tools for evaluating truth or falsity; I did not set out to evaluate the merits of either side and have no wish to pass judgement. That I strove to maintain a sufficiently neutral position was generally evident in that my more ardent interlocutors attempted to convert me, assuming that their arguments held irresistible logic. What I hope I have done is taken the positions of my interlocutors seriously as I sought to understand the enculturated expressions of the Crown in Australia, how it affects people's experience of the world, and how people use it to negotiate what it means to be Australian – as something to cherish, ignore, or fight to overthrow.

Themes of recognition and contention

Two central themes emerged early in my fieldwork, and I introduce them briefly here. The first is that the Crown is often an unrecognised symbol. The second is that while the Crown is rarely a feature of everyday discourse, constitutional reform is an enduring preoccupation for some Australians, and it is in this context that the Crown is most frequently discussed.

The Crown is not part of everyday conversation; it seems to be a largely invisible symbolic aspect of Australian life. Many interlocutors were initially unsure what I was talking about when I asked them about the Crown, and some said they had never given it much thought. My attempts to explain to acquaintances what I was doing in Australia were often met with confusion. Australian colleagues wondered whether I was perhaps researching a brand of beer.[1] This elusiveness is itself instructive: social "invisibility" can often be an indicator of symbolic efficacy, in which a particular reality can be revealed by "the care it takes to remain hidden" (Lévi-Strauss 2011 [1955]: 57; cf. Sapir 1934; Berger and Luckmann 1991 [1867]). In some ways this study was an example of that timeless ethnographic

[1] Crown Lager, a local beer.

encounter: a researcher asks the locals what they are doing with the symbolic object, and they answer in variations of “I don’t actually know”, “You’d have to ask the ritual specialist”, and “I’ve never really thought about it”. Indeed, constitutional legal scholar and interlocutor Anne Twomey (2006), whose research focuses on the Crown, described it as a chameleon, deliberately protected by disguise within its environment unless there is some advantage in revelation. Because the Crown is not much mentioned outside of highly specialised arenas, its presence is often regarded as unremarkable and insignificant, its meanings taken for granted and its efficacy trivialised. By this, I mean both that the Crown is underappreciated due to overfamiliarity, and that its existence, significance, and potency are assumed to be unquestioned truths that can be relied on uncritically. In Bourdieu’s terms, the Crown “goes without saying because it came without saying” (1977: 167), such that it sits below the radar of critical consciousness.

Everyone I interviewed agreed that the Crown once meant more than it does today. Although this may have its own symbolic valency, as a form of nostalgia, it is true that like those of all cultural artefacts, the Crown’s meanings have shifted over time. Many of my interlocutors described how the Crown was more visible for earlier generations, when portraits of the Queen were common in public spaces, “God Save the Queen” was sung at school assemblies and at the cinema, letters from government departments were headed “On Her Majesty’s Service”, and the Crown and the sovereign’s initials adorned public post boxes.

Yet the Crown remains part of Australian public life. It retains a visual presence through Federal and State coats of arms, charitable and cultural patronage, nomenclature such as that of royal societies and commissions, armed services’ uniforms, memorials and banners, and the uniforms of police and customs officers. The Queen’s image remains on some coins, paper currency, and postage stamps. References to royalty occur in the names and symbols of

some hospitals, schools, racetracks, agricultural societies, sailing clubs, professional associations, law courts, golf courses, and other organisations. The Crown features on fleet vehicles of the Governor-General and State Governors, and on the badges of the Returned and Services League of Australia (RSL). Federal and State parliaments and courtrooms continue to identify the Crown as the source of authority. I heard "God save the Queen!" bellowed by a courtroom clerk as part of opening a court session, and I joined the crowd in singing "God Save the Queen" before the Australian and New Zealand national anthems at the Anzac Day Dawn Service in downtown Sydney. However, most of my interlocutors said they did not take much notice of these symbols and regarded them as unimportant because they are mostly peripheral to actual political power.

Constitutional reform was the second major theme which emerged, and it powerfully frames ideas about the Crown that pull in opposite directions. One proclaims the magic of monarchy, and the precious inheritance of political traditions honed over centuries. The other sees the Crown as a kind of vestigial constitutional organ, a residual category that belonged to the British Empire and has no relevance to Australia's contemporary independent identity. The historian and republican Mark McKenna (2008; 2010) argues that the Crown has faded into irrelevance for most Australians.

Yet support for the monarchy ebbs and flows; some two-thirds of Australians have expressed in-principle support for a local head of state (Boyce 2007; Kullmann 2008; Bean 1993), but monarchy's popularity has increased steadily since the failed 1999 republican referendum (Mansillo 2016). Media regularly poll the public's appetite for republicanism, and report its fluctuations (ABC 2013). Republican support reportedly slumped following the 2014 Australian tour of the Duke and Duchess of Cambridge and their infant, Prince George (Kenny 2014; Mansillo 2016), suggesting that the embodied presence of the Crown, in the form of circulating royal bodies, can shore up support for the Crown as an institution.

However, although some Australians see republicanism as inevitable, there is no clear programme for changing Australia's constitutional arrangements, nor are there formal plans to consider reform. Many in monarchist and republican organisations classify reform as symbolic since in many functional ways Australia already operates as a republic. These attitudes – that the Crown is insignificant but at the same time highly politically charged – reveal the central conundrum which informs my study.

Crowned with many crowns

Australia is a political hybrid, having "melded the royal prerogative with American beliefs about federalism" (Rhodes, Wanna and Weller 2009: 55). The 1901 Constitution of the Commonwealth of Australia has been seen as allowing a Cromwellian space for a republic (Sawer 1988; Aroney 2009).[1] The Australian nickname for this mingling of American state federalism with British Westminster cabinet government is the "Washminster" system (Rhodes, Wanna and Weller 2009; Ford and Rowse 2012; Cox 1998); one consequence of this blended system is that Australian politics exhibits a constant undercurrent of disputation between Federal rights and powers and those of the States. Following the Westminster tradition, Australian citizens vote for members of parliament, from which a cabinet government is formed, and it is this body which governs, with the monarch as head of state. Some people consider these practices as essentially republican and so perceive Australia to be functionally a republic, though symbolically a monarchy. This pervasive idea influences both sides of the constitutional reform debate.

[1] The term "Commonwealth" has two main meanings in Australia. The first and most important is the Commonwealth of Australia, the single state of the federated States and territories, also referred to as the Federation, or the Federal government. The second refers to the Commonwealth of Nations, the intergovernmental organisation of 53 states, most of which previously formed the British Empire. The Queen is monarch of 16 of these countries, including Australia.

Some of the muddle over meanings is doubtless due to the Crown's "divisibility". This term is shorthand for the Crown's ability to reign in 16 Commonwealth realms, though each retains independent sovereign status and there can be only one monarch at any one time. In Australia, the Crown's divisibility is further complicated because the Australian Crown is further divisible: the Commonwealth and the six States are each separate body politics, each of which has its own Crown. Each State has an executive government which is also known as "the Crown". Whether the six States have separate Crowns or fall under the Federal Crown remains disputed (Twomey 2006, 2008), but States' Governors are directly appointed by the Queen and States' Premiers communicate directly with her, suggesting independence. The Northern Territory, the Australian Capital Territory and Norfolk Island, while not States, are also each separate body politics.[1] Consequently, there are arguably some 10 Crowns in Australia. Each of these has its own history and nuances, but they also jointly represent a united identity as well as divisibility. Some interlocutors see this divisibility as the reason why the Crown is not an everyday term in Australia, rationalising that the constant need to clarify which Crown one is referring to makes the term prohibitively cumbersome; for instance, the Crown in right of the Commonwealth of Australia, the Crown in right of Queensland, and so on. It is to this untidy collective of Crowns that I refer when I discuss the Crown in Australia.

Some central concepts

I discuss my theoretical engagements in Chapter Two, examining how issues of symbolism, character, and charisma relate to monarchy. Here I offer some working definitions for

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[1] Australia has six States and 10 territories, of which the two mainland territories are the Northern Territory and the Australian Capital Territory (ACT); the others are islands or island groups. Only the Northern Territory, the ACT and Norfolk Island have local parliaments. The other territories are governed directly by Commonwealth law, and so for this discussion fall under the Federal Crown.

conceptual terms I use frequently, namely the related concepts of power, legitimacy, and sovereignty, and also one way in which these abstractions are manifested, embodiment.

In the traditional and universalised conception of political power, politics is about mastery, and power is "the capacity to make decisions by which others are bound" (Geertz 1980: 134), often underscored by a latent threat (Graeber 2011). This conception assumes that political power by its nature involves obvious or implicit domination, exploitation, coercive potential, force, and ultimately legitimised violence. However, the Queen of Australia reigns but does not rule. While the Australian Crown has very real legal powers, many of these are enacted on the Crown's behalf and by its representatives, so that the Crown itself has little to do with the daily administration of governance. While its own reserve powers to act independently in exceptional circumstances are substantial, they are loosely codified, rarely engaged, and underpinned by legal force. In practice, constitutional monarchy's role has been circumscribed to three main rights, as British essayist Walter Bagehot (2001 [1867]) described: the right to be consulted, the right to encourage, and the right to warn. The best well-known example of the reserve powers being engaged in Australia is the 1975 dismissal of Prime Minister Gough Whitlam by Governor-General Sir John Kerr. The actual power of the contemporary Crown is ill-defined, seldom tested, and substantially symbolic. Consequently, when I refer to the Crown's political power, I usually mean its cultural and social authority and influence.

However, power and authority are distinguished by legitimation: power can be unsanctioned, but authority is power that has been legitimated by law, custom, or recognition. Understandings of legitimacy – the legality and acceptability of political authority, how it should be earned, how leadership and decisions can be understood as having virtue – vary cross-culturally. Such power can be endorsed by various practices and methods, ranging from redistributive feastings (Benedict 1934), military power (Price 2005), linguistic oratory rituals

(Bloch 1975), charismatic display (Lindquist 2001; Trnka 2011), and divine authority (Evans-Pritchard 2014 [1948]; Feeley-Harnik 1985) to the democratic elections (Kertzer 1988; McLeod 1999) and dynastic inheritance (Shils and Young 1953) which legitimate constitutional monarchies. Each path to legitimacy comes with particular ideologies, moralities, and problems which must be resolved if authority is to be correctly gained and held.

When I refer to "sovereignty", I mean the supreme powers which the Crown enjoys as head of state. These powers are related to, but distinct from, Australia's authority as a state to govern itself, and from the Foucauldian "ability to kill, punish, and discipline with impunity" (Hansen and Stepputat 2006: 1) that is often evoked in contemporary anthropological discussions of sovereignty. I discuss sovereignty's defining characteristics and the origins of its secular formations in depth in Chapter Two.

By "embodiment", I mean how royal bodies represent the Crown and monarchy in human biological form, in ways which carry social meaning in culturally patterned ways (Csordas 1990). I particularly mean to invoke the sense of the social body in which the Queen's body represents "a natural symbol with which to think about nature, society, and culture" (Scheper-Hughes and Lock 1987: 6; cf. Douglas 2004 [1970]). Queen Elizabeth's personal self embodies the Crown as a relatable breathing symbol infused with cultural meaning, and it can resonate with a citizen's own sense of self as a biological and social being.

The Australian Crown in anthropology

Despite its central importance to Australian politics, the Crown as a cultural concept has been inadequately theorised. Australian constitutional issues, including the Crown and its potential reform, have been much studied, but almost entirely by legal, historical, and political scholars

(Aroney 2009; McKenna 1996, 2004a, 2004b; Twomey 2006, 2008; Rhodes, Wanna and Weller 2006; Warhurst 1988, 1993). The Crown, however, has scarcely been addressed within the social sciences and humanities.

Where the Crown is mentioned in Australian anthropology, it is almost exclusively in the context of important Aboriginal land and justice issues as well as matters of identity, lived experience, and alternative histories (Morris 2003; Langton 2011; Altman 2002). This literature generally assumes that the metaphorical meanings of the Crown are so well understood as to make definition redundant, for instance, where Crown lands stand as a synonym for government lands (cf. Langton 2011). This is instructive in itself because it suggests a narrow and instrumental role for the Crown.

However, I found that a degree of confusion or disinterest about what the Crown meant was normal. The term is not defined or analysed because the Crown's meanings are taken as self-evident, and yet there is some nuanced variation in how it is used, as these three examples show. Marcia Langton (2011), writing about relationships between Aboriginal Australians and anthropologists, refers to "Crown reserves", meaning government-owned land held for particular purposes. Here, the Crown is the metonym in common use for government or the state. Barry Morris, in his discussion of anthropology's culpability in failing to protect Aboriginal Australians' citizenship rights, refers to "unalienated Crown land" (2003), which means government-owned land that is not privately owned or leased. He also refers to a "whole body of law, which granted and protected private ownership and crown land, [which] specifically precludes indigenous people exercising their traditional laws and customs, even if not always designed to do so" (ibid.: 140). Here, again, the Crown is a metonym for government or the state, but Morris also implies that Crown land is both the thing itself and shorthand for a particular form of law shaped by colonial history. In her account of the hearing for the Katherine Area Land Claim (1995), Francesca Merlan writes of

"Vacant Crown Land", which is land available for native title settlements because no party other than the Crown holds an interest in it – much like the unalienated Crown land and Crown reserves discussed above. Merlan carefully describes the inability of local objectors to recognise native title. One man, who had leased local land since he arrived in the Northern Territory in the 1940s, gave evidence rejecting a suggestion that Indigenous Australians had ever owned the land he had leased simply because "[i]t is Crown land" (ibid.: 73). His understanding of the Crown (the government or the state) as the first and only owner of all land reflects a pre-Mabo[1] ideology of Australian property law, which relieves him of complicity in injustice. This example also uses "Crown land" as shorthand for how colonial history has shaped Australian law. While these examples demonstrate the Crown's centrality in articulating complex issues, the authors take the Crown's meanings for granted and do not explore the significance of the Crown, nor do they contextualise it within the framework and meanings of Australia's constitutional monarchy. This is not uncommon, and I suggest it reflects the general perception of the Crown in Australian culture.

The broader anthropological context: An anthropology of monarchy

There is a small but burgeoning anthropology of monarchy. This field seeks to integrate the strengths of anthropological literature on kingship with contemporary theory, as well as address anthropology's inattention to contemporary monarchy as a field (Quigley 1995, 2005; Watson 1997; Billig 2002; Jenkins 2002; Hansen and Stepputat 2006; Ramble 2006; Dotson 2011; B. Turner 2012; Fanselow 2014). Declan Quigley remarked that "[a]nthropologists have had curiously little to say about monarchies in modern democracies" (1995: 3), considering the ubiquitous and enduring popular interest in monarchy, and anthropology's rich heritage in studies of kingship. He observes that monarchies are still a common way of

[1] Mabo v. Queensland (No 2) 1992, which legally recognised native title for the first time.

arranging political power and are found not only in Northern Europe but also in parts of the Pacific, the Caribbean, Asia, and Africa. In his discussion of how Danish royalty simultaneously performs hierarchy and equality, Richard Jenkins reiterated that "[r]oyalty deserves more attention than it receives from social scientists trying to understand modern western European democracies … Something important is being overlooked" (2002: 1). Jenkins adds that the numerous European monarchies play significant social and constitutional roles within their societies, and yet these remain underattended. C. W. Watson (1997) reiterates the point, taking as his example the dearth of anthropological investigation into the phenomenon of mourning for Princess Diana. With its mass spectacle, royal rituals, scapegoat symbolism, and arcane mortuary rites, which many anthropologists personally witnessed and may have even participated in, Watson asks why it received so little attention, when "surely all these are the very stuff of anthropology" (1997: 3).[1] This anthropology of monarchy acknowledges that, while both the kingship literature and political anthropology have pertinent analyses to offer of monarchy, neither has yet taken it seriously as a field – and asserts that doing so may yield rich insights into contemporary studies of political power, within constitutional monarchies and beyond.

Mapping the argument

Following this survey of my general framework, Chapter Two examines theoretical approaches to the Crown, focusing on how monarchy synthesises the embodied metaphor of Elizabeth Windsor together with the immortal office and royal dignity of Queen Elizabeth II. The implications of the Crown's embodiment and of royal bodies involve issues stemming

[1] Scholarship on the Diana phenomenon was led by sociologists (Walter 1999; McGuigan 2000) and cultural theorists (Frazer 2000; Davies 2001).

from monarchy's mystique and charisma. I argue that my interlocutors' habitual conflation of Crown, Queen and monarchy is theoretically grounded.

In Chapter Three I argue that the occasional presence of the Crown's personification in Australia – royal tours – are important rituals for naturalising, and thereby reinforcing, the Crown's legitimacy, by associating charismatic with British royalty with Australian land. I consider why the "magic of monarchy" (Australia Associated Press 2005) continues to fascinate, and some of the constitutional implications of this attraction.

Chapter Four offers a summary history of the Crown in Australia, emphasising its periodic visibility. My focus on the relationship between the Crown and land illustrates how, for various reasons, the Crown has developed a comparatively narrow set of associations in Australia. I consider the implications of this in terms of Australian ways of adapting the idea of the Crown in culture, including how people can use it to claim political legitimacy. In Chapter Five I consider how Australians use the Crown to make history present through the sacred ideals of Anzac, and how the Crown is both ubiquitous and unmarked in rituals old and new.

In Chapter Six I argue that the Crown remains personified and personalised in the form of Queen Elizabeth and her heirs, as shown by ambivalence about whether to wait until the Queen dies to pursue constitutional reform. This vacillation illustrates the tension between whether Queen Elizabeth is considered quasi-kin or a stranger, and reveals the precarious balance between the body personal and body immortal in Australia's constitutional order.

Chapter Seven explores the meanings of the Crown to experts and people on all sides of the constitutional reform debate. Although the Crown's images and embodiments saturate aspects of Australian life, the term seldom features in everyday discourse. I explore the idea that the Crown is "merely symbolic" by examining two ritual uses of the Crown. I argue that

the Crown's position as an unrecognised symbol means it can simultaneously serve multiple political interests by seeming at times axiomatic and at others deeply contentious. The Crown can also, even when unmarked, provoke strong unspoken emotion that engages with the mystique and charisma of monarchy.

In the concluding chapter I argue that the Crown illuminates the tussle over what forms of nationalism, and which versions of history, should be shaped in Australian everyday life, even in its most apparently banal forms (Billig 1995). Whether the Crown is a residual, undesirable category, or the ideal symbol to employ in efforts to sacralise national events, the vigorous jostling over its significance or irrelevance suggests that the Crown remains a potent, provocative and divisive symbol. But I begin with the charismatic symbolism of the bodies of the Queen.

Chapter Two
Power made flesh:
The Crown's charismatic embodiment

... There's such divinity doth hedge a king
That treason can but peep to what it would ...

Hamlet (Act 4, scene 5), Shakespeare

When I asked people in Australia about the Crown, they frequently replied by referencing the Queen rather than the Crown. For instance, the Federal parliamentarian and lawyer Matt Thistlethwaite said, "You're referring to the British monarch and her role within our constitution?" Journalist and non-fiction and television writer Peter Rees said, "We still have this strange situation where we have a British monarch as the Queen of Australia." The new chair of the republicans, the writer and columnist Peter FitzSimons, said, "On the one hand we *glory* in sporting achievements to show we're better than England, and yet … we still have their queen as *our* queen?" This mingling of symbol and its embodiment is, in fact, not a superficial understanding but an established and theoretically sound interpretation. Historically, the Crown has been understood metonymically as both the office and the person, meaning that embodiment through royalty is central to constructing the meanings of the Crown. The person and the office of the Crown converge and diverge at different moments. Understanding the relationship between Crown and Queen is crucial to grasping monarchy's charisma and articulating how this helps legitimate political authority.

To analyse the meanings of the Crown means examining its significance and denotations as well as the sense of social structure, systems of values, and categorical relationships contained within the concept. It also means recognising the Crown as nested within a larger system of political symbols. To this end, this chapter frames some of the

relevant debates and concepts in the literature, including symbols, charisma, the sacred, and the thesis of the king's two bodies.

Anatomising the king's bodies

In *The King's Two Bodies* (1997 [1957])[1] Ernst Kantorowicz took constitutional monarchy as his object of study. He identified the legal fiction of the monarch's two bodies in Tudor England and traced its ritual performance in early modern France, drawing a conceptual chain from the seventeenth century Stuart courts back to the Tudors, the Saxon and Carolingian dynasties, and earlier to the Middle Ages. By tracing the history of European monarchy from divine office to secular institution, he demonstrated that early modern secular constitutional phenomena are modelled on medieval political theology. It is a fertile and foundational theory for conceptualising how aspects of sovereign power are legitimated transcendentally through the metaphor of embodiment.

Much modern statehood, including many constitutional monarchies, is founded on this legal fiction of the monarch's two bodies: the natural body of the individual, and the everlasting body politic. The body natural is a body mortal, subject to all the infirmities of nature and accident. The body politic is immortal, immaterial, and invisible and comprises policy, government and management of the people for the common good. Consequently, "this Body is utterly devoid of Infancy, and old Age, and other natural Defects and Imbecilities, which the Body natural is subject to" (Plowden 1816, cited in ibid.*:* 7). This powerful idea means that that the monarch never dies, and can never be underage: in perfect sempiternity, the queen was, is, and ever shall be. Operationally, it transforms the Crown into a corporation, and means that service to the state, Majesty and Crown are effectively the same.

[1] I often refer to Kantorowicz's thesis of the king's two bodies (1997 [1957]) as the queen's two bodies. This is both to correct the gender bias in the original text and for accuracy, as my chief example is Queen Elizabeth.

Kantorowicz persuasively argued that conceiving of the queen's two bodies demands a form of mystical thinking made possible only by Christian medieval theology, expressed as the Christ as wholly god and wholly human, and especially as the individual body of Christ (*corpus naturale*) and the collective body of the church (*corpus mysticum*; ibid.: 206). This collective body of the church as corporation survives the death of its members, which provides the metaphor for the kingdom continuing after the king's demise. These metaphors help explain sovereignty's perpetuity, because they embed concepts of permanence, unitariness and legitimacy within the institutions and practices of constitutional monarchy.

Kantorowicz argued that secular sovereignty was shaped by distinctively Christian thinking, such as the organic unity of the sacred and secular, in which the king, with a *character angelicus*, was immutable within time. In Europe, for centuries people had borrowed theological notions to define the state, just as they had applied political concepts to the Church (ibid.: 19). These concepts crystallised during the Reformation, a time of acute concern about correctly ordering the primacy of power and will between God, Church, monarch, and government. In European monarchies, the body politic dominates the body natural (Kantorowicz 1997 [1957]; Metcalf and Huntington 1991: 168), so that if the monarch's body and capacity is diminished by immaturity, senility, illness, or disability, this will not threaten the kingdom's welfare. Elizabeth Windsor may die, but Elizabeth II endures, and the monarchy lives on. Kantorowicz took Christian theology in Western Europe as his case, and Christian habits of thought remain pertinent when discussing the British monarchy because Queen Elizabeth reigns in cultures patterned by Christian worldviews, and she is the supreme leader of the Anglican Communion, the official Church of England.

Kantorowicz seemingly implies that these ideas are specific to early-modern Christian Europe, yet these notions are neither wholly Christian nor European. Cross-culturally, the tribe, or a specific lineage, can be considered a body politic which lives beyond the natural

life of its members (Radcliffe-Brown 2013 [1922], 1930; Fortes 1969). The duality of a lasting office with a mortal incumbent is ubiquitous in non-Christian contexts (Frazer 1906–1915; Evans-Pritchard 2014 [1948]; Arens 1984; Schnepel 1995; Graeber 2011), and how societies manage these transitions has been a classical object of anthropological study (Hertz 2004 [1960]; van Gennep 1960 [1909]). The metaphor of the ruler embodying the collective and with a potentially shared fate is, likewise, culturally common.

The figure of the doubled body was the vehicle Kantorowicz used to grasp the emerging "idea of the continuous personality" (Kantorowicz 1997 [1957]: 402) of the monarch, with a "virtual identity of predecessor and successor" (ibid.). Charismatic constructions link the two bodies (Giesen 2005: 114–15). This abstract, transcendental thinking – demanding that kingship's dualities of mortal and immortal, abstraction and corporeal, sacred and banal, *gravitas* and *celeritas* (Sahlins 1985) be simultaneously embodied in one person – remains probably unparalleled in the secular imagination (Kantorowicz 1997 [1957]: 4).

The twinned body metaphor has such fertility that it risks eclipsing Kantorowicz's main project, which was "what may perhaps be termed constitutional semantics" (ibid.: 354). By this he meant unravelling the early modern Western state's conceptual emergence from Christian metaphorical habits of thought, or the secularisation of sovereignty (Jussen 2009: 102). What Kantorowicz identified is how a new polity emerged, with powers which had not existed previously: sole and united, territorial, of common interests, with supreme authority held by a single legitimate entity authorised to advance the collective's welfare. That polity is now called the state, and its signature authority is sovereignty.

The basis for distinction between the two bodies is theological, not sociological (Fukushima 2015): not between the king as office and the king as private person, but between the physical body of the king and the power *embodied* or personified by a king. When Louis

XIV allegedly proclaimed "*L'état, c'est moi*" (the state is me) he was expressing a constitutional truth through a theological one. Kantorowicz noted that the notions of body politic and mystical body are used without great discrimination in his sources (1997 [1957]: 15). The conjunction of these two ideas is also capable of savage disjunction. The English revolutionaries fought the king (Charles Stuart) to defend the King (the Crown of England) (Walzer 2013 [1974]: 13; Kantorowicz 1997 [1957]: 18). After the trial and public execution of Charles I, the political reform was understood as proof that it was possible to kill both the human body and the body politic. Arguably, as it was only seven years later that the monarchy was restored with Charles II, the body politic as institution was not allowed to die completely (ibid.: 23); the counterview is that the body politic was restored but radically remade as, after this, English kings no longer claimed divine power, and were far more circumspect in claims about their power's scope, legitimacy, and practical consequences (Walzer 2013 [1974]). However, the revolution and interregnum proved that the two bodies are inseparable.

Kantorowicz discussed the Crown and its meanings specifically as part of the undying political body's paraphernalia (ibid.: 336-382), along with the phoenix (ibid.: 388-401) and funerary rites and customs (ibid.: 419-437). The Crown was a converging "tangle of intersecting, overlapping, and contradictory strands of political thought" (ibid.: 381). It was not only above its members but divorced from them as a composite body, "an aggregate of the king and those responsible for maintaining the inalienable rights of the Crown and the kingdom" (ibid.: 381). These ideas were increasingly expressed in oaths of and to the monarch (several interlocutors had sworn oaths to Queen Elizabeth, which I discuss in Chapter Six). Sir Francis Bacon described the king and Crown as "inseparable, though distinct" (ibid.: 382), articulating that, while they are cognate, the monarch is not the Crown, though the Crown is individually ever-present through the monarch (ibid.: 382). Kantorowicz

described the Crown's invisible and quasi-corporate formations, such as the fiscal Crown, responsible for administration, tax, and jurisdiction (ibid. 342), and its unifying effects, such as the expression of *universitas* (whole). The Crown is both personal and impersonal, with fundamental rights, duties, and claims of, on, to, and by the country (ibid. 347). The Crown was rarely "personified" but frequently "bodified" (ibid. 382), which describes how the composite body necessarily requires the monarch as head, and for the limbs, other actors as agents.

The twinned bodies in anthropology

The two bodies thesis has been most regularly applied to discussions of divine kings. James Frazer's account of the doubling of the royal body in the Shilluk kingdom is an early example (Frazer 1906–1915; cf. Graeber 2011), and other instances can be found from Africa (Arens 1984; Schnepel 1995), India (Schnepel 1995), and Japan (Fujitani 1996). Julian Pitt-Rivers analysed the twinned beings of sovereignty, encompassing human and divine, nature and grace (1992). Rodney Needham (1970) explored the duality of sovereignty in traditional societies. Peter Metcalf and Richard Huntington (1991: 165) applied it explicitly to E. E. Evans-Pritchard's (2014 [1948]) account of the Shilluk kingdom, describing how the death of the king introduces risk to the kingdom, which is the opposite of how the tension between the bodies is balanced in Kantorowicz's European kingdoms. Adrian Mayer (1985) described the two thrones of Indian kingship, encompassing object and institution. While the two bodies thesis has been less frequently applied outside of the field of divine kingship, Gillian Feeley-Harnik argued that the figure of the two-bodied king should not be considered as part of a developmental "transition from superstition to rational thought" (1985: 300), but remains productive for thinking about the political and moral rituals of European society. Contemporary examples have been identified in the Vatican (Paravicini-Bagliani 2000) and

Soviet and post-socialist Russia (Yurchak 2015). While such examples are rare, the two bodies thesis can be appropriately applied to the Crown in Australia.

The image of the doubled body has perhaps been more extensively used as inspiration than Kantorowicz's thesis of the conceptual emergence of statehood has been interrogated or applied. For example, Michel Foucault explicitly offers a "homage to Kantorowicz" (1977: 29) in his description of the "lesser body of the condemned man" (ibid.). He summarises sovereignty's duality as organised around "an iconography, a political theory of monarchy, legal mechanisms that distinguish between as well as link the person of the king and the demands of the Crown" (ibid.). His account emphasises how the two aspects of body and embodiment reiterate in modern sovereignty, with one side of the coin as the transcendent body politic and the other, separate but inseparable, its transient embodiment in the form of a monarch, leader, or regime.

More recently, an increased focus on the anthropology of the body and embodiment has contributed to greater engagement with the two bodies' thesis. In particular, theorists have used it to analyse sovereignty's sublime and profane dimensions within the individual (Hansen and Stepputat 2006: 301). Foucault (1977) and Giorgio Agamben (1998; 2005) identified the body as contemporary sovereignty's object and performative site. Santner (2011) traced how as the investment in the sovereign's flesh declined in modern liberal democracies, it transferred to the body of "the people", leading to the compulsive management of those bodies through biopolitics (Foucault 1977).

Agamben (1998) credited Kantorowicz with demystifying the political theology at the heart of modern statehood. He argued that Kantorowicz's major contribution is his revelation of perpetuity as sovereignty's defining characteristic (1998: 57–62). Monarchy exists within time, but everlastingly; there was a beginning, based on life, but there can be no end. Sovereignty can be relinquished or extinguished, but these describe changes in custody only.

This concept of the uninterruptible body politic articulates "the cipher of the absolute and inhuman character of sovereignty" (Agamben 1998: 62).[1] If sovereignty is inhuman, it is monstrous; displays of embodiment may help rehumanise sovereignty.

Foucault observed how power over the individual body has transformed, including the monarch's excess of sovereignty and the prisoner's inverse lack of it (1977). Agamben (2005) applied the two bodies concept to all citizens: the body of defined rights as a member of a political community, and the body which can be kept alive but stripped of humanity and reduced to bare life in "states of exception" or exceptional situations. For Agamben the sovereign is the inverse to his concept of the *homo sacer*, the criminal banned from society with all citizenship rights revoked. He can be killed by anyone, but as he lives under conditions where law is suspended but not abrogated, this would not constitute murder. However, because he has no legal standing, he cannot have the privilege of being sacrificed for a greater cause. Where *homo sacer* is defined by the lack of sacred life, the sovereign is defined by its excess. If *homo sacer* is killed, this is a lesser crime than murder, whereas killing a king is a greater crime than murder – it is regicide. So, Agamben's *homo sacer* and the sovereign are symmetrically reversed figures (1998: 62). To the sovereign, all people are potentially *homo sacer*. Agamben's paradox of sovereignty is that the sovereign stands simultaneously within the law, and so can be condemned as a natural person (as Charles I was for treason), and in a legally ambiguous position, since the body politic can suspend laws indefinitely (Walzer 2013 [1992]).

The twinned bodies thesis provides a theoretical foundation for a deeper, more historically informed and analytically sophisticated understanding of the Crown's role in a contemporary constitutional monarchy. It helps reveal the symbolic density of the Crown, the

[1] Agamben also argued that the twinned bodies imagery derives from paganism (1998: 57-62), suggesting that what Kantorowicz identified as a Christian model is in fact syncretic in its European example.

inherent duality and theatrical charisma of royal power, and the Christian origins embedded within its European-derived and purportedly secular Australian model.

The symbolic dress of political power

My interlocutors regularly trivialised the Crown and its rituals as ornamental to actual political power. Yet I also observed examples of the Crown's symbolic potency, its transcendent effects, and its capacity to trigger unexpected emotion. To understand how both can be true means turning to the role of rituals and symbols – such as the Queen's own body – in creating meaning and legitimating authority.

By definition, a symbol is itself and something else. The Oxford English Dictionary describes its etymology as something thrown together: *sym*, together; *ballein*, to throw (1989b: 451). This reveals the dynamic force implicit in symbols. The signifier and the signified do not passively find themselves placed alongside one another, with a corollary transfer of meaning. The notion of a symbol emphasises the act of construction, as much as it does denotation. The symbol's interpretation is not fixed but fluid and can be made fresh, requiring deliberation and energy.

Symbols enable meaning to be shared – and unshared. I take my definition of meaning from Clifford Geertz (1973), Victor Turner (1967, 1969, 1975, 1977) and David Schneider (1968), who broadly described culture as a set of shared public meanings which shape the way people think, experience and act upon their world. Geertz defines symbols as vehicles for meaning; Turner, inspired by Durkheim and notions of society, sees symbols as representing conceptual categories (Ortner 1984). By Turner's definition, the symbol is the smallest unit of ritual knowledge, and rituals manipulate symbols that involve beliefs. A symbol can be an object, word, deed, gesture, relationship, event, or even a space (Turner 1967: 19). It acts as a "storage unit" filled with vast information (Turner 1968: 1–2). Dan

Sperber (1975) emphasised that symbols are polyvalent rather than carrying stable and definite meanings. Consequently, because symbols are not simply parts of an explicit or implicit code, exegesis represents symbolic discourse. Meaning must be continually reiterated and remade; my fieldwork itself represented symbolic discourse which subtly honed the meanings of the Crown within a community.

In Australia, even within the small elite community that curates and tussles over the Crown, knowledge was unevenly distributed and certainly was not agreed. This evokes the important issue of meaning-for-whom, and Pierre Bourdieu (1977) showed how powerful interests organise implicit meanings to serve their own purposes. Keesing (1987, 2012) offered the corrective that cultural meaning is unevenly distributed, circulated, comprehended and preserved; knowledge should not be assumed to be shared, and can be ultimately intractable (1986).

Following Turner's interpretation of ritual, I use the term to mean both ritual's entire theatrical expression and the condensed symbolic building blocks within it, for they are intimately and essentially related. A ritual is a "sequence of activities involving gestures, words, and objects, performed in a sequestered place, and designed to influence preternatural entities or forces on behalf of the actors' goals and interests" (Turner 1977: 183). Rituals contain meaningful symbols, which reveal information understood as authoritative, and often deal with the community's central values, beliefs, and behaviours (Turner 1968: 2).

I suggest that the sensory emotional affect of the Australian Crown has not been as fully acknowledged and explored by scholars as its ideological meanings have. This matters because the Crown comes freighted with both ideological *and* emotional meanings for both sides of the ongoing debate about constitutional reform; indeed, for the ideological meaning to be potent, it must have emotional significance, and vice versa. In his study of Ndembu rituals and symbols, Turner (1967) identified three properties of ritual symbols. Firstly, they

condense meaning, representing complex and perhaps competing ideas in a single form. Secondly, they unify disparate meanings, so that they can be shared. Thirdly, their meaning is distributed on polarised axes. One pole is ideological, the structurally normative articulation of the group's values that helps guide their norms and ethics and emphasises cohesive relationships. The other is sensory, prompting desires and emotion (Ahmed 2014 [2004]; Ortner 1984; Abélès 1988). However, as Michael Walzer (1967) explained, these poles of meaning cannot really be separated: for a symbol's substantially ideological meaning to carry power and resonance, it must prompt emotion. The axes of meaning may be polarised, but they are related, reiterative, and inseparable.

When Walzer observed that "the state is invisible; it must be personified before it can be seen, symbolised before it can be loved, imagined before it can be conceived" (1967: 184), he articulated an anthropological truism. Political and social abstractions and institutions have to be symbolically created in order to have legitimacy and relevance to people's lives and construct political reality (Kertzer 1988). People can be motivated to fight to protect intangible concepts such as freedom, the nation, and "our way of life" (and these terms are symbolic themselves), but these abstractions are inevitably represented through other, more easily recognised abstractions such as emblems, flags, and other symbols (Cohen 1976; Walzer 1967; Kertzer 1988; Billig 1995). As Geertz asserted in *Negara* (1980), this suggests not that political power can only be expressed through symbolic guise (Kertzer 1988: 174), but that political abstraction requires rendering into the knowable and meaningful. The seductive myth that "modern politics is determined by rational action" (Kertzer 1988: 7) ignores the rich evidence of how people choose to act in all contexts of life, where what is perceived as logic is enculturated and emotional. Further, while constitutional monarchy is highly abstract, the Crown is tangible and the Queen and her heirs are relatable, particularly

as the body is a natural and intimate symbol (Douglas 2004 [1970]; Scheper-Hughes and Lock 1987; Walzer 2013 [1974]: 22).

Through rituals, symbols not only display power but construct and sustain it. David Cannadine asserts that “the ‘symbolics of power’ are not mere incidental ephemera, but are central to the structure and working of any society” (1992: 3). The former Republican chair John Warhurst, a political scientist, as well as an interlocutor in this study, recognised that symbolism can be an important source of authority, rather than merely indicative of it (Warhurst 1993: 28). So, to dismiss the Crown as merely symbolic elides the ritual and theatrical construction of political power. There is, of course, a political valency to the notion of symbols as epiphenomenal. Bagehot (2001 [1867]) described this as the genius of constitutional monarchy: it allows for the efficiency of cabinet government while maintaining those aspects of monarchy that satisfy sentiment. Monarchy provides the “hidden wiring” of government, affording it a convenient cloak of invisibility. It leavens dry, complex, rational government with theatre and pageantry. Perhaps it requires less exegesis by citizens than the concept of cabinet government by responsible ministers; indeed, undue exegesis privileges the intellectual over the emotional pole.

Despite regular experience of its commonplace symbols, many people believe that they only rarely directly encounter their government and state. So it is with the Crown in Australia: images of St Edward’s Crown appear regularly in Australian life, but only as an unnoticed backdrop, on mundane objects like epaulets, buildings, and stationery. But the everyday brushing up against taken-for-granted symbols like flags, coats of arms, and anthems can powerfully hone nationalism in prosaic ways, even though their existence is largely unseen or trivialised (Billig 1995). Billig argued that banal nationalism is the most effective kind, because it makes it possible for citizens to believe that their nation has formed

naturally by disguising how its ideology has been shaped by elites, and at the same time unity is promoted through mundane interactions with hegemonic symbols and rituals.

Why and how do rituals and symbols prompt such powerful emotion? Can the Crown act on people even if they do not notice it? Durkheim (1915) suggested that rituals provoke emotion because they remind us of our deep dependence on others in society. Social solidarity is an inescapable motivation and ritual is essential to its creation. Shils and Young's (1953) account of Queen Elizabeth's coronation exemplifies this social solidarity approach, in which rituals help to mould political beliefs by cyclically using a limited range of powerful symbols, "often associated with emotional fervour" (Kertzer 1988: 95). By this reading, symbolic potency occurs through a "cultic chemistry of public avowals and emotional reinforcement" (Bell 1992: 187) where reaction is motivated not by belief, but by participation. The crowds that gather on Anzac Day do not need to explicitly agree on what they believe in order for communitas to take effect. However generated, the ability to create emotional response is crucial to a symbol's ability to support political legitimacy.

This affective potential can seem to give ritual a powerful focus on conservative and consensual conformity (Kertzer 1988): 86), albeit one made palatable by what Durkheim called collective effervescence. Turner also favoured this reading of symbolic ritual as reconciling individuals to society's expectations, because ritual "periodically converts the obligatory into the desirable" (Turner 1967: 30) by "establishing a right relationship between involuntary sentiments and the requirements of social structure. People are induced to do what they must do" (Turner 1974: 56). Rituals and symbols can also be strategically deployed to encourage people to endure hardships or great sacrifice for abstract political ideals.

Yet, symbols do not have uniform effects. They carry powerful potential for reinterpretation and revolution, and so are not inevitably conservative. Abner Cohen and others argue for the ambiguity of symbols (Douglas 1966; Moore 1969; Turner 1975; Sperber

1975; Cohen 1976; Kertzer 1988; Bell 1992; Keesing 2012) because interpretation is fraught with amorphous, inchoate, and somewhat contradictory indicators. By definition, symbols "stand *ambiguously* for a multiplicity of disparate meanings, evoke sentiments and emotions, and impel men to action" (Cohen 1976: ix, original emphasis). Symbolic meanings are unstable, flexible, and unclear. A symbol may evoke different things to different people, and may even be interpreted differently by the same person at different times and circumstances (Cohen 1976: 13, 37, 69–75). That the same symbol can be differently understood is due to its properties of "multivocality, complexity of association, ambiguity, open-endedness, primacy of feeling and willing over thinking in their semantics" (Turner 1975: 155). This imprecision gives symbols their unifying potential.

In discussing the role of political symbols, Marc Abélès (1988) and David Kertzer (1988) extend Cohen's work with the notion that symbols help define political reality by shaping emotion and thought. Kertzer quotes one American observer as saying that "in electing a president, we elect 'the chief symbol-maker of the land'" (1988: 6). The notion of ritual mastery as fundamental to political authority is reiterated in James McLeod's (1999) study of US presidential campaigns and Abélès' ethnographic account of French president François Mitterrand (1988).

Abélès analyses two ritual performances enacted by Mitterrand. The first is the opening of a new railway station, an event that was formulaic, cliché-ridden, and redolent with banal, unrecognised symbols, such as ribbon cutting and a red carpet. The second ritual Mitterrand initiated himself, when he invited media to join him on his annual Pentecost Day pilgrimage to the village where he hid from the Nazis. This dramatic invented personal ritual blends existential, ideological and sacred elements, with cognitive and emotional potential. Mitterrand demonstrates ritual mastery through his charismatic ability to manipulate symbols with popular significance for politically strategic purposes, in ways that may be unnoticed

even by close observers. Abélès' account of how religious imagery resonates in a putatively secular society suggests limited popular understandings of what religion is. Observers of the ritual may be sceptical or cynical and still be moved to a sentimentality that they would ordinarily scorn (Bloch 1988: 399).

Abélès describes how symbolic ritual produces "snares for thought" (ibid.: 393) which work on the observer's unconscious. While this relates to Lévi-Strauss's (1963) notion of a concept being "good to think" because it engages sensibility and cognition, Abélès' phrase emphasises how affect may be unwillingly prompted by ritual. The individual may be entrapped by a sudden ideological surge of emotion, such as a sense of the rightness and apparently natural logic of an idea. Political ritual both "presupposes solidarity" (Abélès 1988: 393), without demanding it, and offers a functional ambiguity, allowing for multiple, even contradictory interpretations.

In the various rituals I encountered involving the Crown, simply describing these practices as traditional implied that they are "old, dating from 'time immemorial'" (Eriksen 2005: 296).The literature of invented traditions (Hobsbawm and Ranger 1983; Cannadine 1983) demonstrates that many practices presumed ancient and inherited are in fact recent and devised, often quite instrumentally and rapidly, to reiterate certain values and norms while appearing timeless. In his classic account of ritual or symbolic political practices, Hobsbawm explains how skilled practitioners can "inculcate certain values and norms of behaviour by repetition, which automatically implies continuity with the past" (1983:1). He distinguishes custom from invented traditions because their "continuity with [documented history] is largely factitious" (ibid.), while customs are apparently older, varied, and malleable. In the same volume, Cannadine (1983) argued that much large-scale royal pageantry that is perceived as unchanged for a thousand years was actually devised for political purposes less than a hundred years before. While this can seem an arbitrary distinction between traditions

of greater or lesser authenticity, what this illustrates is that tradition is not a thing, but a classification of that thing; something becomes traditional when it is called traditional (Handler and Linnekin 1984).

Hidden in plain view

Unrecognised symbols – those which are taken for granted by the people who live with them, regarded as irrelevant, self-evident, or without particular significance – have a long anthropological history. This can mean various things: sometimes the symbol is unseen, sometimes its meanings are unrecognised, and sometimes its symbolic efficacy is unrealised. Edward Sapir examined how political symbols are inherently manipulatable, for the values they represent may be unnoticed in a period of stability but more recognised in periods of instability or crisis:

> … symbolic meanings can often be recognized clearly for the first time when the symbolic value, generally unconscious or conscious only in a marginal sense, drops out of a socialized pattern of behavior and the supposed function … loses its significance and seems to be little more than a paltry rationalization. (1934: 494)

I suggest that the Crown is mostly, though not always, taken for granted. Sapir's commentary echoes the way many of my republican interlocutors describe the Crown: as something they usually do not notice, but when they do, they experience its presence as discordant.

The greatest affective and socially integrative potential belongs to symbols that are prosaically embedded in everyday life because their observation attracts mostly uncritical responses (Berger and Luckmann 1991 [1967]; Billig 1995). Conversely, a symbol's efficacy begins to ebb as its function becomes too easily recognised (Cohen 1976: 8). One interlocutor said he rarely noticed the Crown but was sensitive to the increasing prominence of another political symbol, the Australian flag. In particular, like several other interlocutors, he had noted that the then-Prime Minister Abbott habitually gave media interviews about security and defence in front of the flag:

> I think, certainly, that the trappings of patriotism are abused by current political elites. I have never been interviewed standing in front of a flag and never thought that was appropriate … The political purpose shows you that all of these symbols are now … appropriated in the interests of providing a fig leaf for the lack of respectability of the government. The Prime Minister now stands in front of three flags at times. I mean, ridiculous. They've probably got flag underpants on.

Here, the flag's symbolic function had become overt to the interlocutor, reducing its socially integrative potential. In this instance a symbol remains efficacious even though it is interpreted in ways that do not accord with the presumed intention with which it was so deliberately displayed. Monarchy abounds with symbols which are designed to be seen, such as crowns, thrones, carriages, castles, and the monarchs themselves. So how has anthropology analysed the symbols of monarchy? In the discipline's formative period, they held a genuine fascination for a new generation of thinkers.

The relationship of archetype and the divine with authority

The anthropology of kingship[1] encompasses a significant and rich body of comparative studies in monarchy spanning Asia, Africa, South America and the Pacific. The pioneering works (Frazer 1905; Hocart 1970 [1927]; Malinowski 1938; Evans-Pritchard 2014 [1948]) emerged in the early days of the professional discipline. These remain instructive for examining the Crown in Australia as they grapple with perpetual concerns such as the function of myth and the role of charisma, transcendence, and the sacred in legitimating power and sovereignty.

Anthropologists have tended to categorise kingship as a problem of sacred ritual (Feeley-Harnik 1985; Hansen and Stepputat 2006; Graeber 2011). This approach traces back to James Frazer's *The Golden Bough*, (1906–1915). with its central motif of the ritually

[1] The term "anthropology of kingship" refers to that literature subset which deals with divine kingship, usually in traditional historical societies. This is the commonly used term, and when it was coined, its prioritisation of the masculine, while inappropriate today, accurately referred to the object of study, which rarely included queenship.

sacrificed divine king Despite Frazer's methodological shortcomings, his long-discredited evolutionism, and his unmistakable and intentional Christian imagery (Feeley-Harnik 1985), he continues to inspire through the extraordinary scope of his "imaginative speculations" (Willerslev 2011: 510; cf. Abélès 1981; de Heusch 1997; Quigley 1995, 2005; da Col and Graeber 2011). However, classifying kingship as ritualistic rather than as a political problem itself suggests a tacit evolution, or at least teleological thinking. The Australian Crown's rituals use elements of the sacred to assert political sovereignty, and that the two categories are entwined and reiterative rather than discrete.

What is strikingly present in the kingship literature, and harder to trace in contemporary scholarship, is the role of charisma and the transcendent in legitimating political authority. It is as though kingship, having been associated with magic and superstition, now does not fit the positivist conceptual categories preferred in current analyses of political power (Hansen and Stepputat 2006; Feeley-Harnik 1985). This disjunction between the anthropology of kingship literature and contemporary political power has been extensively noted. Introducing Mass Observation's account of George VI's coronation in 1937, Malinowski (1938) saw great potential in exploring the motifs of divine kingship and symbolic potency, and recommended deeper anthropological engagement to help explain the ritual's significance. In his ethnography of Elizabeth II's 1953 coronation, former Mass Observer Tom Harrisson noted that "[b]elief in the Divine Right of Kings is still far from remote in twentieth century living" (1961: 231). Clifford Geertz diagnosed that "the easy reaction to all this talk of monarchs … has to do with a closed past" (1983: 142), as though scholars believed that the magic of monarchy, and the irrational habits of thought that accompanied it, had died away. These attitudes, traced over the discipline's development, sit within a broader earlier reluctance to theorise contemporary industrial societies.

Frazer (1906–1915) catalogued two core ancient and prevalent mythical beliefs about the king: talisman and scapegoat. As talisman, the monarch's physical well-being merged with the vitality of the empire and cosmos, and therefore the king should be sacrificed, symbolically or literally, before personal corporeal deterioration damaged the people. As scapegoat, the monarch absorbed the collective evil or negativity of the kingdom and cleansed society by serving as the vessel to carry it off (Dotson 2011: 94; Dumézil 1988 [1973]). C. W. Watson (1997) made a contemporary application of the royal as scapegoat in his ethnographic reflection on the death of Princess Diana. Remarks by my interlocutors evoked both notions. People sometimes mentioned that if Queen Elizabeth were to develop dementia, she would need to abdicate, which perhaps suggests the fear of the effects an unwell monarchy might have (but they mentioned only mental rather than physical incapacity). And perhaps scapegoating is suggested by the constant speculation about whether Prince Charles, perceiving his unpopularity and apparent character flaws, will abdicate his kingship. The mirrored functions of talisman and scapegoat both depend on collapsing the personal body of the monarch with the collective body of the people.

Frazer's divine king also speaks to how kingship and kinship are cognate (da Col and Graeber 2011). Kingship, like kinship, is ultimately a unifying idea which makes one out of many, knitted together by complementary reciprocal obligations. Edmund Leach (2011 [1982]) compares the distinctive, almost mystical effects which relatives and kin have on each other to the quasi-affinal relationship between a monarch and their people, which can seem similarly magical. In his study of the Zulu kingdom, Max Gluckman described that in this hierarchical society, the body of the king is identical to the body of the people (the body politic) and so "despite the apparent autocracy of kings and chiefs, ultimately, sovereignty in the State resided in the people" (2015 [1940]: 54). Evans-Pritchard stated that one of kingship's key features is that the monarch must be simultaneously of the people and

radically outside of society (2014 [1948]; cf. Sahlins 1981, 2010). This dyad has implications for how the sovereign's kinship can be measured and by whom, and what is at risk when the tension between kin and foreigner becomes unbalanced. These issues are highly pertinent: my interlocutors sometimes described the Queen's relationship with the Australian people as familial, with Queen Elizabeth a beloved grandmother or elder; others described her as an aristocratic outsider who is not Australian[1] and who no longer enjoys any meaningful ties to Australia. For previous generations the fact that she was English could also have legitimised her outsiderhood – or enhanced their feelings of membership in the "family" of the British Empire.

A. M. Hocart (1970 [1927]; cf. Geertz 1980) argued for kingship's original and essential ritualism, with governance matters subordinate to this (rather than ritual being incidental or secondary to politics). For Hocart, kingship was "an organization to promote life, fertility, prosperity by transferring life from objects which are abounding in it to objects deficient in it" (1970 [1927]: 3), with the primary duty being to provide "the life of the group" (ibid.: 99). The monarch symbolised the ritualisation and transmission of energy, renewal, and reproductive vigour and the vital propulsion of biological life (J. Frazer 1905; Hocart 1970 [1927]; Sahlins 1981, 2010; Bloch 1992). When Hocart stated that "the first kings must have been dead kings" (1954: 27), he encapsulated how transformative rituals, specifically coronation and enthronement, mimic regicide while simultaneously affirming the kingdom's immortality. While Hocart's cognitivism and speculative social evolutionism is no longer credible, his thesis of kingship's metaphor of society's fertility can still be appropriately applied to contemporary interest in the Royal Family (a notion first promulgated in the Victorian era), bolstered by the corollary public preoccupation with royal

[1] The British sovereign is not a citizen of any state, so is technically not a foreigner in Australia or any other nation. However, critics point out that her family all carry British passports, the Queen lives in the United Kingdom, owns property, and pays tax there and so on, all of which indicate domicile and citizenship.

couplings and births. Both republicans and monarchists believed that the comparative popularity of monarchism was related to public interest in the younger and attractive generation of royals and in the family's new children; indeed, the monarchist nickname for the baby Prince George, who toured Australia with his parents in 2014, was "the republican slayer" (Saul 2014). Hocart's (1970 [1927]) thesis, that kingship satisfies the people's appetite for ritual which affirms life, can be appropriately applied here: Australian public interest in the younger royals' virility remains high, and coincides with apparent indifference towards republicanism.

Analysing the intangible sacred centre of power

The purported separation between religion and state offers a partial explanation for why the early kingship scholarship sits "uncomfortably with … recent anthropology on nationalism, power and the state" (Hansen and Stepputat 2006: 300). Part of the problem is that modern politics is generally and officially no longer associated with traditional religious practices (Giesen 2005). In Australia, there are obvious exceptions such as the ritual recitation of the Lord's Prayer which opens Parliament, and the bellowing of "God save the Queen" by courtroom clerks. Bernhard Giesen argued that despite this ostensible secularisation in the West, notions of sacred transcendence remain "latent in everyday politics" (2005: 134). Katherine Verdery (1999) identified a similar theoretical deficiency in her study of how of post-socialist European governments reanimated the dead to help demarcate and sacralise the new world physically and imaginatively, she calls for a politics of enchantment. In this she surely echoes Weber's (1968; cf. Jenkins 2012; Turner 2002), description of modernity's disenchantment, in which the world is bureaucratically managed, rather than rich with magic and mystery.

For Verdery, politics is “a realm of continual struggles over meaning, or signification” (1999: 14)[1] including “feelings, the sacred, ideas of morality, the nonrational – all ingredients of ‘legitimacy’ or regime consolidation (that dry phrase) yet far broader than what analyses employing these terms usually provide” (ibid*.:* 25). Here she reminds political anthropologists to be wary of bounded concepts which overemphasise structures, institutions and bureaucracies, because they may be too flat and narrow to do the symbolic work which people require to make meaning of their worlds. Nationhood is not only about borders, resource competition, statemaking or constructionism, it is also about “kinship, spirits, ancestor worship and the circulation of cultural treasures” and the renovation of space and time (ibid*.* 25). These calls for recognition of the transcendent or enchanted identify a theoretical space in current political anthropology. Such approaches, encompassing transcendence, can be productively applied to the Crown, in spite of – or perhaps because of – Australia’s assumed status as a secular nation in which the irreverent and irreligious is celebrated as an essential national value (Kapferer 2012 [1988]: 170–171). In order to theorise the “magic of monarchy” (Australia Associated Press 2005), we may need to enrich and enlarge symbolic categories to recognise how leaders of contemporary democracies seek legitimacy and sovereignty by demonstrating symbolic potency, evoking transcendence, and making charismatic links to the cosmic.

Edward Shils’ claim (1975) that all political authority has a charismatic core was as true for Frazer (1905) and Hocart (1970 [1927]) as it is in contemporary Australia. Further, this charisma must be externalised through certain culturally codified performances (Geertz 1983). Political authority reiterates ritual competence and charisma in complex ways: mastery in rituals, such as sacrifice and magic, testifies to charisma, which must itself be presented

[1] This echoes Victor Turner’s more general description of culture as “an endless series of negotiations among actors about the assignment of meaning to the acts in which they jointly participate” (1977: 63).

ritualistically (Giesen 2011: 170). Indeed, charisma, correctly demonstrated, accrues authority even in the absence of other signals of power, such as resources or potential for physical force.

The charismatic legitimation of power

The British monarch and her heirs have discreet political influence and act as social leaders internationally and within Australia. As the Crown, Queen Elizabeth holds ultimate authority as Head of State in Australia without the threat of latent force. So how is her political authority legitimated?

Weber's (1986) typology of leadership remains influential to the analysis of political power. Weber classified monarchy as legitimated by traditional authority: like tribalism, monarchy is accepted because it is founded on social custom, and it is that society's historical and habitual form of leadership. This remains true, in part, because monarchy's historical claims and perceived perpetual qualities are key to its naturalisation within a political constitutional order.

However, if traditional authority is subject to challenge, and the monarch does not rule but rather reigns as a ceremonial figurehead, perhaps an individual queen's personal ability to charm and inspire is critical to legitimating monarchical authority. Weber's category of charisma may be applicable here (1968). He argues that a charismatic leader is "set apart from ordinary men and treated as endowed with supernatural, superhuman or at least specifically exceptional powers or qualities" (1968: 48). Charismatic individuals use these exhilarating qualities to reshape their social world by reworking "both the symbolic and cognitive order … and the institutional order in which these orientations become embodied" (Eisenstadt 1968: xl). Charismatic leaders develop fresh demonstrations of charisma but also reinterpret established myths and schemas of leadership, which legitimate their authority by resonating with followers (Willner and Willner 1965). Martin Spencer described how some charismatic leaders seem to act as lightning rods for social desires which they can re-present to followers as values and needs, and so are often more correctly "midwives" than creators of history (1973: 347). Cohen (1976) echoed this by observing that effective political leaders are

able to manipulate symbols that have popular currency. Monarchists frequently mentioned how individual royals "moved with the times" and stressed monarchy's capacity to "reinvent itself". By this they asserted that both the institution and individual royals have enduring social relevance.

My interlocutors frequently praised the Queen's character, intelligence, and charm; conversely, their questions about Prince Charles' suitability to become king often focused on his supposed eccentricities and character flaws. Both suggest that personal charisma can enhance political authority. Hegel argued in his defence of hereditary monarchy as an ideal form that its institutional strength relied significantly on the character of the individual monarch (1991: 323–25). Of course, Prince Charles may acquire gravitas and authority the moment he becomes king, indicating that monarchy's charisma resides with the office rather than the individual, which would not accord with Weber's sense of charisma as located in the person. A royal person's charisma may also relate to the life stages, which suggests that the king still symbolises fertility for society (Hocart 1970 [1927]). Prince Charles was a glamorous and magnetic bachelor (UPI 1973; *People Magazine* 1974), but after his divorce and now his mid-sixties, no longer in the first vigour of his youth, this reputation and corollary attention has passed to his sons (Coughlan 2013). Perhaps some of the ambivalence about Prince Charles' suitability for kingship can be traced to the prejudicial suspicion that with his devotion to watercolour painting and architecture and his commitments to organic farming and other ecological concerns, he is not virile enough. Further, although charismatic authority is typically challenged by age and increased signs of decrepitude, Queen Elizabeth seems to have renewed charisma with the gravitas of her great age. Perhaps it is more accurate to say that charisma, in Weber's sense, can augment a monarch's political authority rather than be its sole source, and the perceived absence of charisma can undermine claims to power.

Geertz (1983) synthesised these arguments about how political charisma operates in culture through kingship. In his study of royal tours he suggests that charismatic leaders delineate the central and sacred preoccupations of that culture: "The ceremonial forms by which kings take symbolic possession of the realm … locate the society's centre and affirm its connection with transcendent things by stamping a territory with ritual signs of dominance" (ibid.: 124). However, he also describes something more metaphysical in the reflection between the sovereign's own characteristics and the qualities of that realm. Representations of political authority require some degree of enchantment or mystery because "the inherent sacredness of central authority" lies in demonstrating "a deep, intimate involvement … in the master fictions by which that order lives" (Geertz 1983: 146). Where and how political charisma is displayed helps make beliefs visible, particularly the sacred and unspoken ideas at a culture's core.

Geertz offered another highly pertinent study which speaks to how political power can be understood and performed. In his study of the organised spectacle of the nineteenth-century Balinese state, the *negara*'s (court's) proper purpose was to establish "a cosmologically based exemplary state" (1980: 37) by accurately and artfully reflecting the divine order of the cosmos in miniature. The Balinese theatre state was not an instructive dramatisation of society, but rather society's main purpose: the intricate court rituals and ceremonies did not symbolise the state, they *were* the state. The negara offers "an alternate conception of what politics is about and what power comes to" (ibid.: 135), which counters the normative assumption about political power being inevitably founded on potential force.

Geertz's quintessential reading of culture as text stands accused of assumptions of homogeneity, and of disconnecting culture from the material and ideological processes of its creation (Roseberry 1982: 1027; Giesen 2011; Keesing 1987). The value of *Negara*, however, lies in its challenge to presumptions about the taken-for-granted category of power.

The habitual classification of the symbolic as an antonym to the real – as aesthetic is to practical, and decorative to substantial – was a dichotomy which did not exist in the structures of thought within the Negara (Geertz 1980: 136). It is a potent reminder, recalling Hocart (1970 [1927]), that dismissing the rituals of public life as merely disguising political power obfuscates their actual operations and potency. This remains highly pertinent to the Crown because monarchy is, by definition, a symbolic system in which political authority indexes symbolic efficacy.

Humanising the Crown

The Crown's embodiment remains pertinent to its political authority. Bagehot (2001 [1867]) described how royals, as the "dignified" aspect of constitutional monarchy, demonstrate monarchy's charismatic mystique, which is another way of saying that royal embodiment renders sovereignty's "inhuman character" (Agamben 1998: 62) comprehensible and relatable. Comparing the Crown's relative invisibility with the Queen's popular recognition suggests how the twinned bodies of sovereignty can reiterate each other. But although the Queen is well recognised, she is also infrequently present. How does this affect the ways her legitimation is expressed and claimed? If the future kings of Australia are seldom found in the country, they immerse themselves in symbols of nationalism when they do appear, helping the British monarchy to cloak itself in Australia's sacred, unspoken centre.

Chapter Three
Sacralising the Australian Crown

Standing at last on Australian ***soil****, on this spot that is the birthplace of the nation, I want to tell you all how happy I am to be amongst you.*

Queen Elizabeth addressing a crowd of one million, Woccanmagully/Farm Cove Sydney, 3 February 1954, Morning Bulletin *(my emphasis)*

It is an ancient trope in European mythology that a rightful ruler – and only a rightful ruler – may source sovereignty from the land to be reigned over. In Norse saga, Sigmund alone can free the mighty sword which Odin has embedded in a tree trunk for him, and possessing it enables him to perform heroic deeds. In the Arthurian romance, Arthur obtains the throne by pulling a sword from a stone. In some versions this sword is Excalibur, the rightful ruler's sacred, magical blade which Arthur uses to unite his people. Drawing a sword from stone also lies at the centre of the Galahad legends, and again is a task which only the true king can accomplish (Frazer 1905; Weston 1920).

In each of these myth cycles, the sword represents a mighty power drawn from the power of nature, which unites the king with the land and releases the land's latent supernatural powers to the mortal king. The sword further signifies the legitimate inheritance of sovereignty. Kingship ignites when the land which desires his rule releases a magical powerful resource to the heir's grasp. The landscape – the stone, the tree – is divinely charged with the agency to anoint and authenticate its true liege. Under the right circumstances, and into the right hands, sovereign power springs directly from the land.

These myth cycles recall Frazer's archetypes of the land reflecting the monarch's fertile body (1905) and Hocart's thesis (1970 [1927]) that the monarch's key purpose is to

demonstrate ritual efficacy through fertility.[1] If it is true that a sovereign ought to embody the land over which they reign, perhaps this is further complicated when that sovereign is perceived as a foreigner who visits only occasionally. How can Australia's head of state, apparently a foreigner who resides on the other side of the world, assert deep connection with the country from which she and her heirs are usually absent? Being seen to draw power from the land may help legitimise these claims, just as across many cultures, leaders legitimate their political power by circulating and displaying themselves as that power's embodiment (Geertz 1983).

These archetypes of the sovereign seeking to embody the land over which she wishes to reign, and to claim the right to do so from the land itself, are useful for examining Australian royal tours as political rituals. This contemporary practice, in which royals actively co-operate, places them in the Australian landscape as a way of assimilating the Crown within the Australian political order. It also demonstrates how royal tours reveal the very thing that symbolic constructions of power are supposed to conceal, that "majesty is made, not born" (Geertz 1983: 124).

Through royal family visits and gap years, the Crown's corporeal presence circulates regularly through the Commonwealth, shoring up claims for its role in the local political order. As Geertz argues, claims for territory are made simply by moving about that territory (1983). Contemporary royal tours by members of royal family have recognisable elements in whichever realm is visited: they meet with state leaders, visit charities, and go on walkabouts to meet common people. Regular royal tours remind Australians of mutual histories, shared genealogies and kinship, a common worldview, and unifying claims on English heritage (Connors 1993, 2015; Spearritt 1988a, 1988b; cf. Verdery 1999). They are also recognisably

[1] These archetypes accord with the extraordinary popularity of royal tours to Australia by young, newly married royals who have recently become parents, including tours by Queen Elizabeth (1954), Prince Charles (1983), and Prince William (2013).

similar to the royal progresses of earlier monarchs – and to contemporary political campaigns (Kertzer 1988; Abélès 1988; McLeod 1999). This suggests that there is a limited array of forms to political tours, so that content becomes more significant than structure.

When Queen Elizabeth first visited Australia, she made her link to its territory clear. She emphasised her sovereignty by her presence on Australian soil, in a specific location, through a particular historicisation, and proclaimed that these links pleased her. Then, as now, it seemed important for visiting royals not only to declare their pleasure at being on Australian soil, but also to be seen standing upon it.

The itineraries of Australian royal tours differ from those of other realms[1] because they often seem to carefully cultivate a relationship between individual royals and the Australian land, specifically soil, by placing the royal body visibly in the rural landscape. Visiting royals go into the outback to visit remote livestock stations and Indigenous settlements, stand on the red earth of Uluru, wrestle crocodiles, and plant trees (*News.com.au* 2014; Walker 2014; BBC 2015c; Alexander 2015; ABC 2015; BBC 2015e; BBC 2003). As one interlocutor remarked, royal visitors are often seen in places quite outside the experience of most Australians but which vividly represent the notion of Australia to Australians.

Fig. 3.1: Prince Harry roping a crocodile (AFP/ Parks and Wildlife Commission NT)

Rituals concerning land may be particularly useful to the Crown because demonstrating cultural competence with land is highly valued in Australia (Merlan 2014).

[1] For instance, in visits to neighbouring New Zealand the royals are seen frequently in cultural contexts such as Māori *marae* visits and at sporting events.

Today, land remains fundamental to issues of sovereignty, including Indigenous Australian recognition and self-recognition, and to the complexities and anxieties of how others can untangle and reconcile claims for legitimacy and authority over Australian soil (Sutton 2004; Altman 2002; Behrendt 2003; Merlan 1995). In some ways, the royal focus on landscape evokes white Australians' efforts to affiliate themselves with Aboriginal ties to land made through Welcome ceremonies and other more overt claims of autochthony.

Taking in the country heir

My fieldwork coincided with the 2015 Australian tour of Prince Harry, Prince Charles' second son. Regarded as a charismatic and popular member of the royal family, he drew crowds wherever he went.[1] He book-ended his four-week military attachment with the Australian Defence Force with typical ceremonial duties. Press releases described how he would travel to the country's corners performing army service in Sydney, Darwin and Perth, participating in "urban training exercises, regional bush patrols, flight simulation and aviation activities, joint fire exercises and Indigenous engagements" (Australian Government Department of Defence 2015). The media covered this predictable schedule, but what stood out to

Fig. 3.2: Prince Harry in the outback, 2015 (©Tim Rooke/Rex Shuttercock)

Fig. 3.3: Prince Harry with Wuggubun residents the Coxes, 2015

[1] Again, recalling Hocart (1970 [1927]), much of the media coverage of these crowds focused on Prince Harry's unmarried status and the suitability of an Australian woman for the role of royal marriage partner.

me was photographs showing Prince Harry in the landscape: in the outback, in the remote 25-strong Aboriginal community of Wuggubun (ABC 2015), wrestling a three-metre crocodile (BBC 2015a). He also visited Digger's Rest[1] cattle station in the remote Kimberley for a private break (ABC 2015). Media remembered too that the Prince spent part of his gap year in Australia (as had his father), working as a jackaroo, or trainee, on the Queensland cattle station, Tooloombilla (BBC 2003). The media reports suggest that this is a royal heir at home on the land over which his family reigns. As I read the coverage of Prince Harry's tour, two themes emerged: militarism, service and sacrifice (see Chapter Five), and connection to the land.

For most of my interlocutors, Harry's tour bore no relation to the concept of the Crown. They saw no real tension between the Crown being relatively unrecognised or unimportant, and the vast media and public attention paid to the visit of someone fifth in line to the throne, because they regard celebrity and constitutional issues as categorically separate. As Andrew Tink, former New South Wales (NSW) shadow Attorney-General, and now biographer, historical author, and government commissioner, said, "Most people are indifferent to the crown in their day-to-day lives, visits by Prince Harry excepted. But to me he excites interest because he's a celebrity really." Perhaps classifying Harry as a celebrity separated him in their perception from certain forms of affect and emotional engagement with monarchy. At the same time, for many there was a conceptual slippage between Crown and monarchy such that the Crown meant Queen Elizabeth and her heirs. So how did this pattern of demonstrating honourable connections to land develop?

Grounding the crown

[1] Digger is a colloquial term for an Australian soldier. It came to prominence in World War I.

From the earliest days of Australia's settlement, some colonists focused on the monarch as the emblem of their home culture and a hierarchical symbol of civilisation in, for them, a new and isolated society (Woollacott 1997, 2001; McGregor 2006). For many settler Australians, Britain remained "home" even for those who would never visit it (White 1981). Settlers regularly interrupted pioneering's hard work and tedium with special events honouring the monarch and her children, reassuring themselves that they remained family members of the British Empire. Even if there could be no possibility of the sovereign taking a personal interest in the difficulties and sacrifices of individual settlers trying to tame this new continent, doing things in her name imbued the colonial mission with value and significance. For example, social historian and journalist Jane Connors recounted the story of Harriet Douglas Daly to me:

> Her family were pioneering graziers in the Northern Territory. There could be no worse outpost on the earth in the 1840s. With no news, the telegraph wasn't there, it would have been years before news came through from England, if ever. And they nearly starved to death. And yet they killed the only bullock they had on the Queen's Birthday. It's recorded in her diary. And the symbolism … we may be starving to death in this godforsaken wasteland but we felt such an emotional, sentimental, visceral connection to the idea … that we are connected. You know, all that sense of kinship.

Alongside this striving for a sense of connection through the monarch to kin and country (Connors 2015) lay a yearning for a higher purpose in the suffering and struggles endured by frontier colonists. To have the monarch recognise the sacrifice, isolation, and hardships caused by life on the Australian land, and to anchor settlers' work and lives within a larger and morally good project of empire, were regular themes in royal Australian tours (Spearritt 1988a, 1988b; Connors 1993).

Of course, this romantic and discursive pioneering narrative of frontier life does not apply to those forcibly transported to Australia as convicts, many of whom were Irish patriots or republicans, or both. Further, free settlers held a variety of views towards the Crown, according to their relationship with the Crown and England before emigration. Many arrived

in Australia carrying long-held hostility towards the Crown and hopes of escaping English rule (Hirst 1983).

The first royal visitor to Australia was Prince Alfred, Queen Victoria's second son, during his world tour of 1867–69 (McKinlay 1970; Comba 2014; Connors 2015). Amid febrile speculation, many people campaigned to have Alfred made King of Australia (Atkinson 1993b). The Prince alternated between mixing with the "Bunyip aristocracy" and attending large outdoor events in which he could be seen to meet ordinary people. At a picnic on the Yarra River held so that the Prince could mingle with Melbourne's poor, the highlight was to be the Prince turning on a tap for a fountain of wine. The guests waited hours for the Prince, who was advised not to attend for security reasons, and the crowd's patience turned to rioting, furniture, barrels, and food were strewn about, and the wine turned the riverbank to mud (Atkinson 1993b: 8–9). Prince Alfred's six-month tour ended abruptly when, rather than wine, his blood was spilt and soaked into the Australian soil when he was shot and wounded in an assassination attempt at a Sydney picnic held in his honour (Lord Belmore 1868). An apologetic citizenry founded a Sydney hospital in his name, but the scandalous crime and the subsequent arrest, trial, and execution made the prospect of proclaiming Prince Alfred as King of Australia untenable for both sides, and the campaign was abandoned.

By the time Edward, Prince of Wales, toured in 1920, placing the royal on land had become a regular feature of Australian royal tours. His programme organisers felt keenly that "the essence of 'real' Australia was found out in the countryside" and the Prince was taken to a shearing shed and a cattle muster in Queensland (Connors 2015: 49). The theme of military service was also prominent, with so many Australian communities still grieving substantial losses from World War I and struggling to reintegrate into civilian life servicemen still suffering physically and mentally. Prince Edward spent hours inspecting returned troops, thanking them for their service, and unveiling mournful memorials in decimated

communities. Thanks to this and his own war service, he earned the nickname the "Digger Prince" (ibid.).

In 1954, Queen Elizabeth became the first monarch to visit Australia. She has toured Australia 16 times since, but no other tour had the impact of the first, when she visited every State and some 69 towns and cities (Atkinson 1993a). Some three-quarters of Australians personally went to see her (Spearritt 1988a; Connors 1993). Many of my interlocutors had strong memories of participating as children during that tour, and some of the most eloquent descriptions came from people who are not monarchists.

People remembered being bought smart new clothes for the occasion, being coached about how to perform in the crowd, receiving accessories such as flags or, less explicably to them, New Testaments, and waiting outdoors for what seemed like hours on a hot summer's day for the Queen to arrive. Writer Peter Rees had waited as a five year old in the hot sun for the opportunity to wave his flag when Queen Elizabeth was driven along Sydney's Oxford Street in her black car. Laughing, Peter recalled that when the moment came, the Queen had looked the other way. He recalled the heady atmosphere of this time:

> That tour was … it was like something from the gods … she was something from the heavens. Stepping ashore the first time, her feet, her words, on Australian *land* … the absolute awe that surrounded that.

One republican, who requested anonymity, was a teenager in 1954. Between accompanying his committedly monarchist parents and undertaking his Boy Scout duties, which included standing in a guard of honour at Melbourne's Government House, he saw the Queen six times. He also began subscribing to *Women's Weekly*, from which he carefully clipped photographs and articles for his concertina folder about the tour. Several others I spoke to kept scrapbooks as a way of capturing the memorable excitement. His mementoes of the tour had become an easy, self-deprecating joke about his youth that he used to cheerfully

demonstrate the fullness of his conversion, after which he had donated his scrapbook to a museum. Several interlocutors said they still had theirs.

People whom Jane Connors interviewed about the tour said they remembered it with more clarity and emotion than any other public occasion of their lives (1993: 367). Many realised that social attitudes to monarchy had changed, so they keep these excited, happy memories to themselves in case they are scorned, which tinges "their recollections with guilt" (ibid.: 382). While Connors wrote this analysis during a surge of popular interest in republicanism, it conforms to attitudes I encountered. Their stories about royal mementoes, such as working together with family members on tour scrapbooks or being given the Queen's portrait as a special childhood present, were private memories, shyly shared.

Imagining the great southern land

The outback makes up the overwhelming share of Australia's geography, though it is not where most Australians live (Gill 2005). Because the enormous central desert pushes most habitation towards the coastline, Australians imagine the outback rather than live in it. Yet the empty outback dominates how people imagine the Australian landscape (McGrath 1991; Gill 2005; Haynes 1998; Prout and Howitt 2009; Whitlock and Carter 1992). Notions of the outback and the bush are "critical to the ideological self-representation of Australians" (Kapferer 2012 [1988]: 141). Such mythical notions are "frequently invoked in attempts to unify Australians and smooth over differences" (Gill 2005: 1), including nation-building projects. The Australian Government declared 2002 the Year of the Outback, with a year-long programme of events celebrating the outback's "quintessential spirit" (anon., cited in Gill 2005: 1). Exactly what this spirit signified is hard to pin down, because the concepts and authority of Australian outback mythology are perceived as self-evident and palpable (Whitlock and Carter 1992; Kapferer 1990; McGrath 1991; Rose 1997; Rose and Davis

2005). Despite the unifying drive of outback mythology, these notions are often exclusionary, frequently appropriating or eliding Indigenous Australian relationships with land, as well as excluding other non-rural dwellers (Prout and Howitt 2009) who in reality comprise most Australians.

The figure of the settler stands as a counterpoint to the outback in white Australian imagination. Australian popular culture celebrates narratives of settler heroes who are attuned to the land in which they live (Fiske, Hodge and Turner 1987; McGrath 1991; Haynes 1998) and have often acquired this mystical knowledge through proximity to Indigenous Australians (Marcus 1997: 31). Julie Marcus describes how Indigenous Australians lost their identification with their country while “settler Australians have legitimated their own claims to Aboriginal land” (1997: 29). She describes a discursive surge in popular culture celebrating “authentic Australian outback values” at the end of the twentieth century (ibid.), that idealised how living close to the land “like Aboriginal Australians” can sometimes be perceived as granting the mystical “power that such closeness to the land brings” (ibid.: 31), recalling romanticising ideas about “primitive” peoples living closely with nature (cf. Ingold 2000). The idea that a “true Australian” was at home in the outback and the bush was a well-established trope (McGrath 1991; Haynes 1998; Whitlock and Carter 1992), but what was new was the assertion that white Australians could be “like Aboriginals” in their relationship with land.

These all refer to a landscape that is a stereotypical and idealised vision of Australia of the type promoted and gently mocked in tourism campaigns (Fiske, Hodge and Turner 1987). It does not reflect the diversity of Australian lifeworlds or landscape. Yet the audience for these images of royals in the Australian landscape does not include the full spectrum of its citizenry, nor the marginalised or dispossessed, but those white Australians for whom such images resonate. For instance, Marcus argues that Uluru (Ayers Rock) emerged as the

"sacred centre" of white Australian "settler cosmology" in the late twentieth century, anchoring a kind of "primordial origin myth" of authentic Australianess that celebrates what Turner (1986) described as "the anti-structural, universalising unifying values of society" (cited in Marcus 1997: 34). Are the royals more or less out of place than white Australians at Uluru? For royals to be seen recognising, celebrating, and appropriating the outback's "authentic Australianness" may mean they, like white Australians, might claim access to the sacred centre of settler cosmology.

Going the distance

Ideas about the Australian landscape are also infused with notions of great space, including the time it takes to travel across the vast island from one coastal location to another (Gill 2005). Consequently, visiting royals are committed to demonstrating that they traverse the vast expanses that Australians confront, just as Australians imagine themselves doing – or demonstrating that visiting royals tackle these distances on behalf of Australians. Visiting royals place themselves in the country by seeing the outback for themselves, and by engaging with organisations which respond to the significant social problems of outback life, such as the Royal Flying Doctor Service (the Flying Doctor) and the School of the Air (Connors 2015).[1] These two organisations are closely associated and understood by Australians as emblematic of their determination to meet the challenges of outback life. Jane Connors described to me the phenomenon of royal interest in these services as a demonstration of support for outback life:

> And *distance*. You [the royals] actually have to physically cover the distances that we feel we personally cover, even though I personally don't go west of Parramatta if I can help it. So the Royal Flying Doctor Service, they never *don't* see it, you know. And they do the School of the Air, they go to Alice Springs and they speak to people across the vast wasteland …

[1] The former delivers emergency and primary aeromedical services to outback residents; the latter is the generic term for correspondence schooling for outback children.

During her 1954 tour, Queen Elizabeth visited Broken Hill, NSW, to talk on the Flying Doctor radio network with Mrs Hazel Mitchell on Muloorina station on the shores of Lake Eyre, South Australia, some 750 kilometres away. Media reported the two young mothers sharing their common humanity by discussing family life amid the outback isolation. Reporters also found poignant romance in the Queen's cultivated English accent floating across "half a million miles of saltbush, sage and near desert" to the radios of "sheep and cattle station families, boundary riders, well sinkers, drovers and people in outback hospitals and mission stations. Every one of them hung onto the clear words which brought the Queen into their lonely world" (ABC News, 18 March 1954, 4pm bulletin, cited in Connors 2015: 61). She praised their "courage and tenacity" in "sticking it out" in the face of "hardships and misfortunes" (ibid.). The colonial project of taming the outback was again endorsed.

Recognising the loneliness of bush life was a recurring theme of touring royals. The knowledge that the Queen knew where her subjects were and had travelled all the way to see them was a comfort and consolation in the face of the physical and mental isolation of outback life. During the 1954 tour, rural people often thanked the Queen for visiting them in their remoteness – though, as Connors describes (2015: 105), it was not always clear whether the connection to a wider world craved by outback residents was to metropolitan Australia or to Mother England, as represented by the Queen.

During her 1963 visit, the Queen again addressed people in remote communities over the Flying Doctor network, this time in Alice Springs (Connors 2015: 161):

Fig. 3.0.1: Prince Charles meeting Flying Doctors, Alice Springs, 2 March 2005

> Having a family myself, I fully understand what this mantle of safety must mean to wives and mothers and the encouragement it gives to new families to move out to develop these lonely areas.

In 1983, the Prince and Princess of Wales conducted a question-and-answer session on the School of the Air radio network. More recently Prince Charles visited Flying Doctors staff in 2005 (BBC 2005b) and 2009, and the Duke and Duchess of Cambridge christened a new Flying Doctors aircraft in 2013.

Republicans often remarked that royal tours had been extremely carefully managed since the referendum, with the goal of showing the royals in the best possible light. Many people believed that Prince Charles does not visit Australia frequently because of his comparative unpopularity. This is not entirely fair, though royal visits certainly dwindled during the 1990s as the campaign for constitutional reform gained momentum.

At 17, Charles spent six months at Timbertop, an outback annex of a private boarding school near the Victorian Alps.[1] Timbertop provides outdoor education for pupils, including activities such as hiking, skiing, canoeing, rafting, navigating and camping. Decades later Charles detailed these "gruelling" outback experiences, including 70-mile-a-day hikes, bleeding shoulders from his pack, sunburn, shivering nights, and being hit on the head by his

[1] His younger son Prince Harry likewise spent six months in rural Australia as a teenager working on a farm.

own boomerang (BBC 2005a). The demands of the outback "sorted me out", he said. He later concluded, "If you want to develop character, go to Australia" (The Prince of Wales 2011). The future king had submitted himself to the trials of outback life, and the land had acted upon him. He claims that the outback transformed, even formed, him.

This narrative helps Charles claim a deep intimacy and familiarity with Australia's land – its sacred centre (Geertz 1983: 146). It also conforms to the mythical archetype: nature's power unites the heir with the land and releases its power to him, because knowing the land is a marker of sovereignty. Prince Charles made his fifteenth visit to Australia in November 2015 and consistently claims strong personal ties to Australia, and to its land. He had even expressed interest in becoming Australia's Governor-General (Atkinson 1993a: 89–93).[1]

Counter-views: The lie of the land

Historian, republican and interlocutor Mark McKenna believes that the effort to connect the royals with Australian soil is ultimately counterproductive:

> When they're out there, standing on the red earth, what they show … is that they're completely *out* of place, not connected to the soil. They are parachuted in, like dolls. Their disconnectedness becomes more visible … Diana walks behind Charles in this awkward safari suit and they just look totally out of context. They *are* out of context.

[1] This proposal became untenable after the 1975 constitutional crisis because of the perception that the Crown, through Kerr, had intervened directly in Australian affairs: Whitlam described his dismissal as a "manipulation of the monarchy" (Atkinson 1993a: 91); as Peter Rees described it to me, "in a sense the Crown was used to blindside the prime minister".

Fig. 3.6: Prince Charles and Princess Diana, Ayers Rock, 1981

Fig. 3.7: Prince William and Catherine, Duchess of Cambridge, Uluru, 2014

For McKenna, efforts to stage-manage royal appearances in the outback merely serve to mark their illegitimacy. But perhaps such visible difference was not always understood as a sign of alienation from the land. In earlier times it endorsed royalty's special qualities. In 1954, commentators frequently remarked on the Queen's porcelain skin, unspoilt by the harsh Australian climate, as clear evidence that she was from another environment. Connors commented, "In '54 there was so much of that, that the Queen had a beautiful English complexion and we were so weather-beaten, we'd been so damaged by the sun". In 1954 the importance of unspoilt skin as visible differentiator meant that considerable insecticide was sprayed in some towns the day before the Queen's arrival, to avoid Australians having to risk the ignominy of having a mosquito bite the royal membrane (Connors 2015: 104).

Such differences in perspective about whether the royals fit in or are out of place in the landscape elide the point. Whether the symbolic acts are recognised as successful or unsuccessful, the discussion is focused on the symbolic connection between royalty and the land. It is salient to consider whether such themes emerged at the time of the event or whether they are possibly reflections imbued with today's values. In 1983, when Prince Charles and

Princess Diana visited Uluru, then called Ayers Rock – “the natural symbolic edifice of the nation” (Kapferer 2012 [1988]: 143) – media focused on this being Princess Diana’s first royal tour and that the couple had brought baby Prince William with them because, historically, royal children were left at home when their parents went on tour (Connors 2015: 176–78). Specifically, media covered the efforts to secure the royal family appropriate outback lodging. The intended accommodation at Alice Springs’ newly renovated luxury hotel casino became inaccessible after a monsoon, so they were relocated to the Gap Motor Hotel, which had no outdoor furniture and where guests’ horses were tied at the fence (*People Magazine* 1983: 42; *The Sun-Herald* 1983: 1). Diana’s “peaches and cream” complexion had turned red in the heat, but there was no popular discussion of the royals being out of place in Australia. Instead, the theme that prevailed was of royals experiencing first-hand the privations of outback life (*The Sun-Herald* 1983: 1), and in so doing, experiencing the “real” Australia.

Cultivating the Crown in the country?

As the photographs of Prince Harry in Wuggubun illustrated, the royals regularly engage with Indigenous Australian communities. Several monarchists emphasised the good relationships between royals and Aboriginal Australians (a point not always supported by other interlocutors) and stressed that royal visits always included some time in an Indigenous Australian community, often in a remote area. One source confided what he described as an open secret behind these visits: that royals often take time to visit an Aboriginal mob in the Northern Territory because Prince Philip is said to have fathered an illegitimate child in that community during an earlier tour. This narrative explains that the younger royals visit this community to meet with their Aboriginal extended family. Irrespective of its accuracy, what is significant is the story’s apparent circulation. If British royals regularly visit with outback

kin, this makes particular claims about kinship ties and familial obligations between the Queen and her heirs and Indigenous Australians. The Queen is then not only the head of the Church of England and a respected elder, but also a familial elder through her husband. This complicates the relationship of the royal family – they are the apex of the foreign colonising society which stole land and resources, causing incalculable suffering to Aboriginal peoples; but they are also kin, and as kin, they can access the life force offered by the land.

The charisma of royal bodies

If Australian land is sacred, its character is occasionally complemented by the charisma of royal bodies. The queen's two bodies reveals the metaphysical and transcendent aspects of personified monarchy. The monarch's abundantly sacred life means she and her heirs are exceptions to ordinary existence and their presence offers access beyond the normal range of human experience. When former Australian Prime Minister, Tony Abbott, referred to the crowd gathered to see Prince Frederik and Princess Mary of Denmark as evidence of the "magic of monarchy" (Australia Associated Press 2005), he alluded to the sense of the monarch's ability to fascinate by transcendence. This notion of magic evokes charisma and enchantment (Weber 1968; Geertz 1983; Verdery 1999), but also recalls a Durkheimian sense of the sacred (1915) as that which is set apart from the profane of everyday life, that which requires special rites or reverence. These two categories are continually reiterated and refreshed by interaction with one another (ibid*.:* 41–42). Monarchy's sacredness is consequently reinforced by occasional interactions with it, by imperfect disclosures about its secret nature, and by the encoded ways that citizens can interact with it.

Distinguishing between the Crown's official interests and the private preferences of individual travelling royals is difficult to assess, but these interests are not mutually exclusive. A gap year for a young prince in comparative isolation in the physically

demanding outback may serve the purposes of both the Crown-as-institution and the royal individual. However, the first task is to examine the phenomenon and some of its effects. What I wish to observe is that when royals come to Australia, their symbolic association with the land facilitates impressions of particular relationships of intimacy with Australia because of the land's central place in the Australian imaginary. Such a close association with Australian land helps the Crown subvert potential challenges to legitimacy, such as the point, much canvassed by republicans, that the Queen is not Australian. Whether intentional or not, articulating such links serves the Crown's purposes. This was as true historically as it is today.

Following Geertz (1983), I have argued that the Crown shores up its moral authority and political power by establishing visceral, sacred connections between visiting royals and Australian land – a central and charismatic idea within Australian culture. The master fiction anchoring the ritual of royal tours is that the Crown is at home in Australia's transcendent centre, and that it belongs there. Royal bodies circulating through the Australian landscape supports the institutional Crown's executive and judicial-led processes, helps naturalise, domesticate, and reconcile a perceived foreign head of state as the natural order, and seeks to sacralise the Crown's sovereignty. Land's solidity and permanence echoes sovereignty's own perpetuity (Agamben 1998), as if monarchy, like Uluru, is a material fact and a continuity which can be safely assumed.

Perhaps because the Queen reigns, but does not rule, the Crown's claim to Australia remains circumspect and evocative when made through personal embodiment. However, its institutional claims of dominance over Australian territory are legally assertive. Historically and currently, these claims are problematic. Does the Crown-as-institution also have a distinctive relationship with Australian land? If land sits at the centre of an Australian settler

cosmology, how did it come to be so, and what was the Crown's part in this? The answers to these questions reveal how the British Crown became Australian.

Chapter Four
Making the Crown Australian

Contemporary Australia inherited its Crowns through colonial processes, as did the other 14 states of the Commonwealth of Nations that remain under the Crown. The Crown is recognisable from one realm to another – in both institutional and corporeal forms – but in each state it evolved according to the cultural, political, and historical conditions upon which it was imposed and how people adapted it over time. What, then, are the distinctively Australian aspects of the Australian Crown? How and why did those characteristics develop?

To address these questions I here focus on the Crown as an institution – rather than its personified, embodied form – and examine instances where the Crown is familiar as an actor. Recognising that the Crown has real legal powers in Australia with tangible effects, I firstly review the instability of its definition within legal discourses to uncover how the Crown is framed as an institution in Australian legal thought. Then I draw a selective biography of the Crown in Australia. I trace its history in a colonial settler society, and how its links with land were formed. I examine the significance of the Australian Crown's special relationship with land, and analyse some particularly Australian conceptions and anxieties about land. I then discuss the "honour of the Crown" in terms of its obligations towards Indigenous Australians' claims, made through land, for recognition and resources. Throughout this discussion, I am concerned with examining how legal and political histories shaped the Crown's cultural meaning and social role, rather than providing a precise legal argument.

The Crown's conceptual opacity in law

Legal constructs both reflect and produce the social. To take an anthropological approach to the law means analysing it in contexts of social relations and institutional knowledge

practices (Riles 2011; Latour 2010; Merry 2010; Supiot 2007; Strathern 2005; Pottage and Mundy 2004; Luhmann 2004; Moore 1969). The legal production of the person and office of the Crown and the legal framing of its role in Australia are themselves ethnographic phenomena. Here I focus on how lawyers and judiciary have sought to define the Crown or, rather, how its positive definition has evaded them, and what this might imply.

Walter Bagehot (2001 [1867]) was acutely sensitive to the paradoxes of British constitutional monarchy during the era when it was being intensively distributed around the empire. He described constitutional monarchy as having two compartments: the dignified aspect, which is largely symbolic and of which the Crown is the chief part, and the efficient aspect, which is the actual work of cabinet government.[1] The Crown was the "fountain of honour" (ibid.: 9), "the head of our morality" (ibid. 46) and "of our society" but "of no party" (ibid.: 41). Although "commonly hidden like a mystery, and sometimes paraded like a pageant" as a "visible symbol of unity", it "does more than it seems" (ibid. 50). Bagehot suggested that the Crown made the efficiency of cabinet government more solemn and immediate by way of ceremony and spectacle because these allowed the Crown to maintain the aspects of monarchy that satisfied sentiment.

Those in the Commonwealth settler states of Australia and New Zealand grappling with their respective Crowns found them less coherent and less benign. The Crown's ambiguity gave rise to various ploys, tricks, and ruses bordering on deceit (Cobbett 1904: 1). It was "a convenient cover for ignorance: it saves us from asking difficult questions" (Maitland 1965 [1908]: 418; cf. Maitland 1901). Ben Chifley, Australian Prime Minister during World War II, called it "a handy constitutional fiction" (Bongiorno 2000: 42). Missteps in interpreting the Crown were even more troubling, provoking the "ghost of the heresy of Crown schizophrenia" (Minister for Works for Western Australia v. Gulson 1944:

[1] Here Bagehot means efficiency in its original sense of effective or accomplished.

69), implying that dissent from orthodox understandings of the Crown's divisibility, whatever these were, would result in dire uncertainty and confusion.

Contemporary legal authorities echo Bagehot's understanding of the Crown's dignifying work, but often imply that the Crown can disguise aspects of government or conceal accountabilities that ought to be exposed to scrutiny. The former Labour speaker of the New Zealand parliament, Margaret Wilson, describes it as "a useful fiction that enables government to distance themselves from direct responsibility for obligations" (Wilson 2011:1). Others see the Crown as "slippery" (Brazier 1999: 337), and as a shapeshifting symbol (Cox 2008; McHugh and Ford 2012) with almost incoherent meanings (Loughlin 1999: 37). They characterise it as extremely vague and intensely disconcerting (Seddon 2000: 28), and like a compendious cloak which reconciles modern government with archaic procedures, rituals, and significance (McLean 2004, 2008). Anne Twomey argues that it is as "fallacious" to equate it with government as with a coin worth five shillings (2008: 9) because it is "used to encompass a range of distinct meanings", which makes "a single meaning impossible to devise" and leads to "arguments at cross-purposes" (ibid.*:* 6). This muddle can be politically and legally advantageous because the Crown's various meanings can skirt the need for precise definition and evade difficult questions (ibid.). The High Court of Australia identified five separate meanings of the Crown in common use: the sovereign's regalia (i.e. the material object of the Crown), the body politic, the international personality of a body politic, the government or executive, and the sovereign's powers and capacity to act (Sue v. Hill 1999).[1] As all of this suggests, the Crown ultimately "has different meanings according to context" (Attorney-General v. Mervyn Chapman 2010).

[1] The Sue v. Hill ruling was the first court decision to state authoritatively that Great Britain is a foreign power to Australia.

The definitional vagueness of the Crown is certainly a defining aspect of the Australian Crown's character, though it may not be a uniquely Australian aspect. Such a conclusion sits uneasily with legal epistemology because law as a discipline is concerned with quests of precision (Latour 2010; Luhmann 2004). However, as Mark Leeming, a judge of the Supreme Court of NSW and judge of appeal, noted in our conversation, conceptual vagueness is "not particularly unusual … words like law, justice, especially things like right" are no better defined than the Crown. Here Leeming suggests that the law deals with many symbolically significant and ambiguous concepts, despite its habitual compulsion to attempt translation of the indefinable into more familiar forms.

Being inadequately defined in law has not prevented the Crown from playing its central symbolic role in Australia's constitution, politics, or law. This legal definitional unease shares something with the inherent ambiguity of cultural and political symbols. Perhaps where the Crown's role is ambiguous, it draws upon this ambiguity to perform symbolic work in ways which it cannot do when more narrowly defined.

From British Crown to Australian Crowns

Canvassing some major points in the Crown's intricate history in Australia involves complex and contested legalisms and histories. What is particularly salient here is how the Crown's meanings and roles became prominent in some arenas as the Crown developed an Australian identity. This process involves shifting knowledge practices and evolving conditions of possibility for how the Crown is understood.

The Crown weaves in and out of visibility in Australian history. The Australian Crown is a chameleon, in Twomey's view (2006), by which she means that it is only recognised at certain times and for certain purposes. These include Cook's landing (1770), Federation (1901), Whitlam's dismissal (1975), the Australia Acts (1986), Mabo No. 2

(1992), and the republican referendum (1999). However, like that chameleon, mostly the Crown sits disguised in plain sight in Australia's broader political landscapes.

Australia first encountered the Crown when mariner Lieutenant James Cook landed on the continent's east coast in 1770, claiming the territory in the name of George III. In this discovery myth, with which I opened this thesis, possession changed hands through mystical ritual: a decorated cloth is displayed, an incantation read, the king's name uttered (McKenna 2004a: 71), and then the Crown owns the land.[1] Aboriginals wandered the land and inhabited it but did not occupy or possess it in ways recognised by the British Imperial Crown, a fine distinction which led to massive land confiscations. Settlement began in New South Wales in 1788 by predominantly Irish and English British subjects who had received the benefit of the Crown's mercy, having had their capital punishments commuted to transportation to the penal colonies for between seven years and life (Hirst 1983). From 1788 until the mid-1800s, colonial Governors represented the Crown. In this way the British Crown developed local expression in the colonies' first decades in the form of paternalistic autocrats (Kercher 1995; Hirst 1983).

The Crown owned all land and only the Crown could sell it (Kercher 1995: 119). As Crown representatives, Governors had at first granted land free to settlers, selling it to them from 1820, and this remained the process until the Mabo ruling (Mabo v. Queensland (No. 2) 1992), which recognised native title for the first time. As the Crown's representatives, Governors had final authority in land disputes. However, the British Imperial Government could still disallow Australian colonial legislation, a right it retained and occasionally exercised until the Statute of Westminster in 1931 (Kercher 1995; Twomey 2006, 2008).

[1] The same ritual was performed by Cook in Tahiti and was of incredible significance for those involved (Dening 1986).

Government responsibility arrived early in some Australian States. For instance, in 1853 South Australia enabled legal action against the government rather than the individual Governor, which meant that the Crown was no longer immune from action (Hirst 1983, 2002). In 1885, the British Privy Council acknowledged colonial parliaments as sovereign, rather than agents of the Imperial Parliament as they had been, though some restrictions remained. With Federation (1901), the Australian Commonwealth government gained the right to make local laws, but the Privy Council remained the supreme judicial authority for Federal matters until options to appeal to it were substantially curtailed in 1968 and abolished in 1975 (though States continued to make appeals until 1986). Each of these steps marks a milestone in the transfer of power from the British to the Australian Crown (Kercher 1995; Twomey 2006, 2008, 2010; Hirst 2002, 2009). The process highlights the Crown's role in identity formation as a unifying symbol for both the imagined community of the British Empire and the emerging imagined community of an increasingly independent white Australia (Anderson 2006 [1983]; Hage 1998). However, Australian independence remained a halting process that did not suddenly and unambiguously occur on a definitive date (Hirst 2002: 249).

The UK Statute of Westminster (1931) made all the former colonies of the British Empire sovereign independent nations with a common allegiance to the Crown. When ratified by Australia in 1942 (backdated to 1939), it abolished the British government's right of supervision over Australian affairs, and Governors-General ceased to represent the British Government diplomatically (Hirst 2002). This presented a conundrum, because either to mediate the States' Governors' relationships with the monarch, George VI, through the Governor-General (which would have removed Governors' direct communication with the Crown) or to allow States' ministers to advise the Queen directly about States' issues would have altered the power balance between States and the Federal government (Twomey 2010).

The resolution only stipulated that the Federal government would gain independent sovereignty: the British Government would continue to have responsibility for the six States. Despite most States' having had responsible government and vice-regal representation since the 1850s, they remained colonial dependencies of the British Crown after the Statute of Westminster, even as they formed parts of an independent sovereign nation (Twomey 2010). For most of the twentieth century, British ministers advised the Queen, as Crown of the United Kingdom, on State matters, and Federal ministers offered her advice as the Crown of Australia about Federal matters. Awkwardly, Elizabeth, as Queen of Australia, occasionally received advice contradictory to that which she received as Queen of the United Kingdom with responsibility for the Australian States (Twomey 2006, 2008, 2010). The diverse Crowns of Australia were defined in a particularly ambiguous manner and remained deeply involved in governance and political matters.

This arrangement worked in practice for decades, but eventually conflicting understandings between the parties came to a head. In Australia, beliefs developed that British ministers were merely a communication conduit between the States and the Queen, and that it would therefore breach intention and established practice for British ministers to take into account British political views, together with, or over, States' advice (Stokes 1998; Twomey 2006, 2008). British ministers and officials did not share this view, believing that constitutional authority for the States, as colonial dependencies, resided solely and ultimately with British ministers, and therefore, States' views were recommendations only.

These divergent understandings crystallised in 1972, when Tasmania tried to petition Elizabeth as Queen of Tasmania in a dispute over whether the Commonwealth or the States owned the Australian seabed (Twomey 2008: 11). The Queen received contradictory advice and – owing at least partly to her personal unease at effectively having to write herself letters while wearing her different Crowns (Twomey 2006) – sought expert legal advice and

encouraged negotiations to clarify exactly how divisible the Crown was within the Australian federation.

The Australia Acts (1986) resolved the situation by ending the States' status as colonial dependencies and removing British ministers' powers to interfere in Australian law and institutions. Limited direct communication remained between the States and the Queen because, on the advice of each State's Premier (and without Fderal involvement), the Queen appoints and removes State Governors, who are directly accountable to her. State Governors continue to offer what Buckingham Palace describes as "advice with a small 'a'" – informal advice – about local political matters and honours, but formal advice may only come from responsible ministers (Twomey 2008: 17).

Responding to changes in constitutional law – which in turn reflect Australian adaptations such as the "Washminster" system, the role of State Governors, federation, and the uncertain development of Australian independence – the Australian Crown has moved in and out of historical focus as constitutional relationships evolved between the monarch, her Australian realm, and the British government. Just as Australian law grew as an unruly child (Kercher 1995), so the Crown in Australia is part imperial inheritance and part local stratagem, as the result of Australians adapting the Crown to suit their needs and purposes. The Crown developed distinctive local roles and meanings, but it remained embedded as the ultimate political authority. Nowhere is this more evident than in issues of land.

"What stole our land"

The Crown's significance intertwines with land. Struggles over who has rights to it and who may draw on its material and spiritual resources play out constantly in the public arena (Sutton 2004, 2009; Altman 2002; Rose and Davis 2005; Altman and Hickson 2010; McHugh and Ford 2012; Ford and Rowse 2012; Lea 2012; Merlan 2014). The Crown's role

regarding land and native title is symbolic and agentive, and here it acts in far more defined ways than the earlier discussion about the Crown's vague legal definitions might suggest.

Most interlocutors agreed that one arena in which the Crown was obvious and agentive was Crown land. For instance, historian and republican Mark McKenna said to me, "Crown land is probably the biggest presence of the Crown outside of the walls of Parliament". Demographer Bernard Salt said, "In terms of common-day parlance I would say 'Crown land' is the only thing". These are representative of others' comments that also link the Crown prominently and categorically with land. Interlocutors generally offered this observation then moved on to other topics without elaborating. Indeed, several interlocutors began their interview by asserting that the Crown was not very evident or relevant in Australian life outside the context of Crown land.

Land is inevitably crucial in the colonising processes of settler societies, but perhaps especially so for Australia, because Aboriginal epistemology begins with land. Relationships with, connections to, and understandings of, land permeate Aboriginal experiences and interpretations of life (Myers 1986; Strang 2004, 2005; McKenna and Hudson 2003; McKenna 2004b). The Land – a broad conceptual category which includes water, flora and fauna, geographical features, the entire natural world – directly sustains and is sustained by Indigenous Australians through traditional knowledge of time, space, and relationships associated with particular places, including between individuals and groups in any given area, and between peoples and landscape (Milton 2003, 2013). The land offers people resources for sustenance and social being and anchors spirituality as the focus of origin myths and ancestral relations. Quite simply, "there is no aspect of traditional Aboriginal life that does not contain the land as a central medium" (Strang 2005: 47). This helps explain the fundamentally incompatible worldviews between Indigenous Australians and the Crown as the office of the settler state. Anthropologists have struggled to articulate and analyse this cosmology since

the beginnings of the discipline (Myers 1986; Spencer and Gillen 1899; Roheim 1945; Stanner 1956; Munn 1973; Wolfe 1991), yet – as Lea (2012) notes – they have not been especially effective at unravelling or reconciling these contradictory worldviews (she cites as exceptions Povinelli, Rose, and most especially Altman).

The relationship between Aboriginal peoples and Crown began over land, and land continues as a critical focus. When I asked Asmi Wood, a legal academic of Torres Strait Islander and Aboriginal descent, about the Crown, he said simply that the Crown was "what stole our land. The root at the oppression of our people … The Crown took away what belonged to us." Historian and Aboriginal activist Gary Foley said that each point in Australia's political history was about creating Australia for whites. He said of federation, "When Australia became Australian in 1901, that was really all about preserving this land for white people."

In its most recognised institutional role, in matters of land and native title, the Crown is heavily implicated in issues of structural violence (Farmer 2004), by which I mean how an individual's suffering can be embedded in large-scale economic and social structures as social exclusion, inequality, and injustice (Sutton 2004, 2009; Altman 2002; Altman and Hickson 2010; Behrendt 2003; McKenna 2004a). To understand why this should be so, it is instructive to consider the Crown as a conceptual object of colonial force.

From terra nullius to Mabo: the honour of the Crown

Land is decisive in Australia's colonial history (Hirst 1983, 2009; Bashford and Macintyre 2013; Attwood 1996, 2005; Wolfe 1999, 2006; Maddock 1983). In 1788, Australia's colonisation was legally justified on the principle known as *terra nullius*, meaning that the

territory belonged to no-one because no-one proclaimed ownership of it (Wolfe 1999, 2006).[1] This reasoning is considered outrageously wrong now, but then, within the contemporary conditions of possibility of imagination, it was prevalent (Trouillot 1995). Agents of the British Imperial Crown perceived that it faced no legal or moral obstacle to acquiring land and asserting rights over it. Territory secured by the British Imperial Crown, and then by Colony governments, became Crown land.

In 1992 the Australian High Court rejected the doctrine of terra nullius and recognised Indigenous Australian native title rights to land for the first time in a decision commonly known as Mabo (Mabo v. Queensland [No. 2] 1992). Native title can be defined as the rights and interests in land or waters that proceed from the traditional laws and customs of Indigenous Australians. When people referred to "Mabo" during my fieldwork they frequently seemed to be using it as shorthand for both the increased justice purportedly established by the original court case and the politically compromised Native Title Act (1993) that followed, as well as the subsequent shift in social attitudes. Mabo ruled that the Crown had acquired sovereignty, which gave the Crown radical rather than absolute title to lands. Crucially, Mabo recognised that Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islanders' pre-existing rights and interests in land survived the Crown's assertion of sovereignty. It recognised traditional law and custom as an additional source of Australian law, one which does not originate from the Crown, although it does not impact the Crown's sovereignty (Brennan, Gunn and Williams 2004: 325). Essentially, this means that both Indigenous Australians and the Crown possess sovereignty over Australian land.

Following Mabo, the native title claims process became a forum for examining "the way in which two radically different social and legal systems intersect" (ibid.). While Mabo

[1] Again, I am summarising a vast and contested legal and historical issue which formed the base of Australia's bitter "history wars" (for fuller accounts see Bashford and Macintyre 2013; Lowe 2005; Macintyre 2004; Attwood 1996, 2005; Kercher 1995; Hirst 1983, 2009). Many similar issues underpin the current controversy over Recognition, suggesting that certain citizenship issues remain deeply divisive within Australian society.

fundamentally increased the perception of formal justice in Australian law, critics observe that its effects have been negligible in terms of measurably improving living conditions for Aboriginal communities (Sutton 2004, 2009; Lea 2012; Lea and Pholeros 2010), and maintain that the slow, paternalistic process of redressing historical injustices directly contributes to these systemic problems (Altman and Hickson 2010; Behrendt 2003; McKenna 2004a; Povinelli 2002).

Australia's history here is not unusual. In every Commonwealth settler state, indigenous land rights are both quintessentially inalienable and especially vulnerable to cancelation (Secher 2014). Within the Commonwealth of Nations (formerly the British Commonwealth), including Canada and New Zealand, the other post-colonial settler states included in the wider study of which this study forms one part, there was significant historical variation in attitudes and legal processes involving indigenous land. This is because while each then-colony was founded on the appropriation of native peoples' land and rights, each took different judicial approaches to extinguishing native sovereignty in favour of the Crown. Still, in Canada and New Zealand, imperial and then colonial governments agreed to treaties and signed promissory documents such as the Treaty of Waitangi in New Zealand (1840), and the Royal Proclamation (1763) and many other treaties in Canada. These agreements did little to protect indigenous peoples against dispossession and were grievously breached in both countries. In each, corollary indigenous claims for rights and redress are dealt with within the legal frameworks employed in the original dispossession; in Australia, this means within a Western-centric epistemology which considers land as commoditised property rather than a life force (Lea 2012: 191). Notwithstanding their violation, these laws and treaties formed the legal and moral basis for formal compensation and reconciliation processes, albeit problematically and with contestation.

Out of these processes, the Crowns of Canada and New Zealand accept legal and moral obligations to honour indigenous peoples and have broad roles in the social worlds of those states (Gover 2012, 2013; McLean 2008, 2015; Tan 1995; Hughes 1993; Slattery 2005; Behrendt 2000, 2002; Valverde 2014; D. Turner 2001).[1] The "honour of the Crown" is shorthand for these processes, which are some of the most visible and characteristic of the Crown's roles in Canada and New Zealand (Saunders 2014). The notion that the Crown accepts moral burdens is evident in Bagehot's description of the Crown as the "fountain of honour" (2001 [1867]: 9). While this phrase now generally connotes the Crown's ability to bestow privileges such as peerages, its original meaning included notions of justice and fairness.

When Governor Phillip arrived at Sydney Cove in 1788, he brought with him instructions from George III: "You are to endeavour, by every means possible, to open an intercourse with the natives, and conciliate their affections, enjoining our subjects to live in amity and kindness with them." Phillip was enjoined to punish transgressors. The reality fell short of these noble aspirations and the Crown made no formal treaties with Indigenous Australians. Today, the Crown does not perform these kinds of informal or formal moral duties, but this illustrates that from the colony's first days, the Crown's representatives were acutely aware of their honourable obligations. Some legal scholars refer to this as Australian "exceptionalism" (Rowse 2009; Ford 2008; Gover 2012, 2013), evoking comparisons with other Crowns, with the honour of the Crown not being a defining characteristic of the Australian Crown.

Lee Godden described to me her reading of the Crown's distinctive character, and its implicit relationship with land. She is uniquely positioned to observe this, because in addition

[1] Less generously, perhaps, as Wilson said (2011: 1), the Crown has provided a useful fiction which governments might use to shield themselves from unpalatable obligations and tasks.

to her academic work, she is an Australian Law Reform Commissioner, and led the inquiry into the Native Title Act 1993 (Australian Law Reform Commission 2015), the contemporary basis for negotiating relationships between Indigenous Australians, land and the Crown. Godden reflected deeply on the Crown's distinguishing aspects:

> People use the Crown in a very instrumental way in Australia, so you talk about Crown land, you talk about the Crown in right of State … But we don't generally … pick up the notion of a Crown in a personified way as having obligations and responsibilities … for example in relation to the Honour of the Crown in Canada or the way the Crown [in New Zealand] is understood to have particular obligations under the Treaty of Waitangi. So it's a very narrow way in which the Crown is understood here in Australia by comparison I think to other Commonwealth countries. And yes, I think it's bureaucratic in its orientation, as opposed to having moral dimensions.

Here, Godden describes the Crown's primary institutional role as bureaucratic and instrumental, by which she means that it is concerned with procedures as means of pursuing certain objectives, and as means to ends, rather than with participating in broad reciprocal obligations. These themes unfold over the Crown's institutional history, in which it is recognised as active and agentive. She suggests that the Crown's codification is tacitly connected to its constricted ability to undertake broader and more significant, roles in Australian life, which she compares with the broader role played by the Crowns of other Commonwealth settler states. Godden expresses, in legal terms, an appreciation that where a symbol's operation becomes too easily recognised, it cannot undertake broader symbolic work.

The Australian Crown is especially visible in native title claims because it plays multiple and sometimes conflicting roles (Sutton 2004). The Crown is the gatekeeper for the native title claims process. It is the primary respondent to the claim – which is to say, it is the defendant – although the onus of proof remains with the claimants, as the Crown's radical title to land and its ultimate sovereignty is unchallenged. It also acts as defence counsel, as

Crown solicitors[1] prepare reports and arguments which defend the State's position. The Crown finances the claim process through the Attorney-General's office, by funding expert evidence through the Native Title Representative Bodies and the Native Title Officer Funding Scheme for Indigenous claimants, and by funding the Native Title Respondent Funding Scheme for third parties such as farmers who wish for representation in the process. The Crown is also the ultimate adjudicator as the judicial authority which will rule on the claim. Finally, the Crown is also implicated in the asset being claimed, as Crown land is the only land which can be subject to native title determination or offered in settlement. These observations apply equally to Canada and New Zealand (Gover 2013).

Welcome to Country?

Several anthropologists have analysed how the Crown acts as gatekeeper in native title claims. Indigenous Australians and the Australian States are in broad agreement that land relationships are fundamental to Indigenous self-recognition; the conflict comes from this also being fundamental to others' ability to recognise or ignore Indigenous entitlement. Elizabeth Povinelli (2002; cf. Comaroff and Comaroff 2009) argues that Indigenous Australians are made to represent themselves in certain ways before their claims can proceed. Potential claimants must demonstrate certain highly defined forms of cultural authenticity, including ties judged authentic and traditional to land, and specific regions and locations, before they can be recognised by government as entitled to make land claims (Povinelli 2002; Merlan 1995; Cowlishaw 2011). Further, this bar, virtually impossible to reach, has been central to Australian indigenous affairs policy for decades. As Gillian Cowlishaw argues,

[1] Crown solicitors (State solicitors) are colloquially referred to as "Crownies". Eminent lawyers may be awarded the senior status of "Queen's Counsel". In the early 1990s States and Federal governments began replacing this nomenclature with the term "Senior Counsel", but most States have since reverted to Queen's Counsel or offer appointees both options. Several of the lawyers I interviewed felt that Senior Counsel was anodyne and meaningless, but Queen's Counsel had symbolic weight, although, added one firmly, "For me, getting QC had nothing *whatsoever* to do with the Queen."

government expectations of what counts as authentic Aboriginal culture creates ideal types which are "neither instigated nor controlled" by the people they purportedly represent (2011: 170).

One response to this new desirability of demonstrating cultural affinity with land is the rise in rites of acknowledgement and recognition, such as Welcome to Country or Acknowledgement of Country ceremonies.[1] These short, sometimes dramatic post-colonial rituals are intended to demonstrate the custodial and spiritual ties, which transcend state-led sovereignty, between specific Aboriginal groups and the land where the event occurs. They were first enacted as opening ceremonies for native title hearings, further emphasising their connection with land matters (Merlan 2014). Welcome to Country ceremonies, performed by Aboriginal or Torres Strait elders of the traditional custodial tribe of the area, welcome visitors onto local lands. Depending on the practices of that tribal group, the ceremony may include speeches, singing, marking with sweat or saliva, and smoking rituals. Acknowledgement of Country is a simpler ceremonial declaration which can be made formally or informally by an Indigenous Australian or a non-Indigenous person at the start of an event. It acknowledges that the event takes place on land traditionally own by Aboriginal Australians

Fig. 4.1: Acknowledgement to Aboriginal land owners in office window, Canberra, 2015

[1] The Indigenous Australian term "Country" indicates a continuous entity of land and nature saturated with the generative activities of the ancestral forces from the long Dreamtime (Myers 1986: 60).

and recognises the participants as visitors. It often follows the form, “I acknowledge that this meeting is being held on the traditional lands of the [local tribe] people, and I pay respect to these people and their elders past and present” (Victoria State Government 2016). I heard this ritual numerous times in Australia but only once, to my knowledge, was an Indigenous citizen present; speakers and audience were of settler stock. I also saw signs in an energy retailer’s office windows proclaiming the Acknowledgment (Fig. 4. 1).

Francesca Merlan (2014) charts the normalisation of these rites through regular enactment within government, the public sector, and academia (organisations funded by or representing the state). When Prime Minister Kevin Rudd performed the public ritual of apology to Indigenous Australians, he preceded it with a Welcome ceremony – the first time Federal parliament had opened with these rites (Rudd 2008; National Archives of Australia 2016). These rites have been criticised as additional white demands for Indigenous Australian performances of identity and antiquity (Cowlishaw 2011; Morton 2003); as seeking redemption for whites through platitudinous recognition for Indigenous Australians (Batty 2006; Povinelli 2002); as efforts to tacitly manage sovereignty over land and other rights (Morton 2003); as a cynical “crowning gesture of a ‘reconciliation’ process” (Moses 2011: 146); and as part of a wider practice of objectifying indigenous patterns of thought and feeling only when they reflect existing neo-liberal habits of thought (Povinelli 2002). Merlan reads them more generously, as deliberate, if clumsy, efforts to signal support for Indigenous Australians’ citizenship rights and entitlements by ritually valorising the notion of Country and Aboriginal rights and connections to it (2014). What is instructive here is how important connections to land are for demonstrating belonging, and how efforts have emerged within certain parts of white Australian society to correctly perform these connections to the land they inhabit as a result of colonial processes.

The Crown's capacity for honour

Today monarchists champion the Crown as above politics; as Bagehot stated, the Crown is "of no party" (2001 [1867]: 41). Perhaps the monarchists mean, like Bagehot, that the Crown is impartial in party-political terms. Yet in reality, it has always been deeply implicated in political issues, especially debates over nationalism and property. Today, the Crown-as-institution does not play a prominent broad role in Australian politics or public life outside land and native title. However, its roles assign it a prominent profile and deeply politicised position.

Due to particular histories and enculturation, the Australian Crown has developed distinctive characteristics, including an unusually direct and formal relationship with land. This history has left the Crown's honour questionable. Issues of the Crown's honour imply deep conceptual hurdles, for judgements like Mabo and the subsequent native title claims processes explicitly suggest that the Australian Crown may have measurably different moral and legal obligations toward Indigenous Australians than toward other citizens or the public generally (Gover 2013; McKenna 2004a; Behrendt 2000, 2002), and further, that Indigenous Australians may have separate legal and moral rights to land and resources compared to those of other citizens (Behrendt 2000, 2002). While most of my interlocutors recognised the link between the Crown and land, only some articulated the Crown's deeply political position in this arena and its far-reaching implications.

Some interlocutors not only recognised the Crown's exceptionalism but also articulated a pathway to its rectification. A philosopher, writer, and lawyer, Damien Freeman is a monarchist associated with the ACM and the Liberal Party. He would like to see the Crown assert moral leadership by admitting that it has not fulfilled the moral obligations to ensure the fair treatment of Indigenous Australians which it expressed when it arrived in Australia because "successive generations of the crown's representatives and advisers in

Australia failed to treat these communities fairly" (Freeman 2014: 20). This would help the Crown practically address these grievances and then enter into new relationships with Indigenous Australian communities. Freeman was encouraged by how Māori have forged new relationships with the New Zealand Crown through the Waitangi Tribunal process, because "what the New Zealand experience shows us is that this is only possible if the crown first acknowledges [its] specific failures" (ibid.). This imagines the Crown as a quasi-state body with the authority and scope to assume legal and moral responsibilities. It can be seen as building on Kevin Rudd's (Rudd 2008) apology to Indigenous Australians, yet Freeman's vision diverges by distinguishing the Crown from the government and charging the Crown with practical and relational responsibilities for the past and the future – making positive use of Chifley's "handy constitutional fiction" (Bongiorno 2000). Julian Leeser, Freeman's friend and colleague, articulated a similar ethical imperative when he described the Crown to me as a motivating idea which can stimulate people to strive for higher ideals and virtuous instincts. In doing so, both Freeman and Leeser tacitly regard the Crown as conceptually flexible, symbolically potent, and related to, but separate from – indeed superior to – both the state and its government.

The Crown's historical and contemporary associations with land help reveal how the British Crown became an Australian Crown. Regarding land, the Crown-as-institution is visible and its role is codified. This contrasts with its general opacity, articulated with such frustration, for legal scholars. Their views suggest that the Crown can be known only through the essential difficulties of defining it. They also imply that symbolic significance, like social relationships, moral obligations, and other intangibles, is difficult to codify. I now turn to one way thatAustralians establish continuity between the past and the present and consolidate collective identity – but one which reveals the Crown and its royal embodiment as at its centre.

Chapter Five
"Anzacery"

Turner noted that reanimating a symbol's meaning requires energy – recalling that a symbol is "thrown together" – and this energy often comes from invoking well-known conflicts (Turner 1967: 38). Military conflicts are almost invariably about place – they take their names from places and are defined as the struggle to capture or retain a territory or geographic feature. There is a well-known conflict which holds a singular place in the Australian imagination: the Anzac landing at Gallipoli Cove, Turkey, in 1915. The rituals and taboos around Anzac commemorations yield rich clues about the Crown's significance in Australian life (McAllister 2012). People who told me that the Crown was relatively unimportant sometimes also explained that Anzac Day was very important. Others respected what they perceived as Anzac Day's ideals but felt ambivalent or uncomfortable with the nationalistic fervour that it attracts. People sometimes referred to what they perceived as jingoistic distortions to Anzac practices as "Anzacery".

Here, I examine how the Crown is symbolically implicated in ceremonies which commemorate citizens sacrificed in conflicts. Focusing on the Australian War Memorial and its Last Post services, I consider how the Crown and Anzac memorialisation are periodically united. I then analyse the Crown's role in contemporary political myth-making and in re-forming Anzac rituals for a new generation. But first I review how service and sacrifice converge with power in the nexus between military service and the Crown.

Approaching Anzac

Social memory relies less on fact than on narrative which re-presents and reconstructs events in ways that rely on contemporary practice rather than historical exactness (Connerton 1989).

In this way, it remains malleable and open to various interpretations and reinterpretations. Originally Anzac ceremonies commemorated a catastrophic defeat in a war Australia fought as a loyal British colony. In the 1960s and 1970s, attendances at Anzac ceremonies dwindled and the commemoration was expected to fade away. However, the meanings of Anzac have since evolved in ways which now seem to contradict those early associations; today, Anzac signifies an independent and egalitarian Australian identity, patriotism, and militarism, articulated as the "spirit of Anzac" (Kapferer 2012 [1988]). Participating in Anzac ceremonies essentially hones collective memories (Halbwachs 1992; Connerton 1989). A society's members assume shared memories. People use them to accommodate and shape collective experience, practices, and norms (Connerton 1989: 3; Halbwachs 1992). These public rituals help people imagine a common community which includes themselves and the Anzacs by allowing a sense of shared experience and simultaneously fostering a "continuous communal history" (Connerton 1989:17). Contemporary Anzac ceremonies are primarily a commemoratively dense occasion for articulating collective emotion, both solemn and jubilant. They are widely celebrated, accessible, and potentially unifying for all Australians, as much as they can antagonise.

Sara Ahmed (2014 [2004]) argues that all emotions are politicised and relate to safeguarding social hierarchies, and that free-floating emotion starts to "stick" to particular social objects as they gain a kind of cultural density through circulation. She states that emotions work by contouring the surfaces of people and groups, so that when material and social cultures converge, they rub up against the way feelings are embodied and performed, so that free-floating emotion starts to attach itself to certain ideas. This shapes how affect circulates but also how it gets absorbed as belonging to "ours" or "mine". The "affective economy of emotion" (ibid.) can also differentiate between those considered part of a nation and those considered to fall outside it. Anzac's repetitive and ritual practices, and emotional

stickiness, demonstrate how sensations, thoughts and feelings develop together out of people's orientations toward their material and social world. The cultural density of Anzac is now so heavy that it has developed sacred characteristics. Interlocutors often mentioned two recent events as specific examples of how Anzac ideals have been perverted, demonstrating how the emotional and the ideological converge in the "spirit of Anzac". The first was then-Prime Minister Tony Abbott urging Australians, after an apparent terror threat, to attend Anzac celebrations in a spirit of "defiance" and as a means of supporting "our country, our values and our armed forces" (Ireland 2015). In the second, a journalist who made pacifist statements on social media on Anzac Day lost his job and was publicly condemned by senior politicians including the future Prime Minister Malcolm Turnbull (Meade 2015). As these examples suggest, the "spirit of Anzac" can be overtly militaristic and nationalistic; to critique it represents the countermanding of a taboo and risks strong social opprobrium.

Royals and active service

The highly gendered ritual and symbolic links between political power, monarchy, and the military remain salient in Australia, in both military service by royal family members and their vice-regal representatives and the prominence of the Crown in military rituals and insignia. For instance, British royalty are military leaders by default. Queen Elizabeth is the ceremonial Colonel-in-Chief of the Commonwealth armies. Photographs of Prince Harry often show him in his soldier's uniform, and his brother Prince William currently serves in the military. Their father, Prince Charles, uncle, Prince Andrew, and grandfather, Prince Philip, served in the military – as did many other male relatives – and still hold senior ceremonial military ranks.

Further, Australian vice-regents were traditionally drawn from the military. The Governor-General is Commander in Chief of the Australian Defence Force. Current

Governor-General Peter Cosgrove was previously the Chief of the Australian Army, and NSW Governor David Hurley was previously the Chief of the Australian Defence Force. Both are heavily decorated retired generals, who lead Anzac Day ceremonies in their governorship capacities. They wear their service medals, and the Governor-General may wear his uniform as Commander-in-Chief to Anzac Day services and parades. Several senior officials told me that Cosgrove and Hurley had consulted together and agreed not to wear their uniforms on the Anzac Day centenary in 2015, in an effort to downplay their military service in their vice-regal roles that day, and emphasise that Anzac Day is for all Australians, and is not restricted to the Armed Forces.[1]

Some military trainees had a different perspective on their uniform's symbolic significance. John Warhurst said that he spoke several times about republicanism at Canberra's Royal Military College in Duntroon. He said that trainees were often concerned about what would replace the Crown on the collar badges, epaulets, and other uniform insignia if Australia became a republic. This suggests that even amongst people who claimed not to recognise the Crown, there was a sense of its symbolic potency, and a worry that if the Crown were not there, its absence would require careful replacement by a symbol of equivalent valence.

Australia's Anzac cathedral and its daily Last Post

Philip Flood told me that "You cannot understand Australia if you haven't been to the War Memorial or understood the purpose of the War Memorial." Damien Freeman described it as Australia's national cathedral. Bruce Kapferer described it as the headquarters of Australian Anzac nationalism, that "holy, cosmologically regenerative sacrifice" (2012 [1988]: 135).

[1] Their offices also consulted with New Zealand's Governor-General Sir Jerry Mateparae, who also served as his nation's Chief of Defence; he also agreed would not to appear in military uniform that day.

Canberra's Australian War Memorial is a heterotopic space. It is simultaneously a museum, memorial to the fallen, art gallery, reliquary, archive, education facility, café, library, community centre, sculpture park, and, as visitors must exit through the gift shop, retail enterprise. It is one of Australia's most visited tourist attractions. In its galleries, the name of every Australian who has died in war service is permanently and publicly displayed. These galleries are anchored thematically towards Anzac and its significance.

Honouring Anzac ideals is a daily ritual at the Australian War Memorial. At 4.45pm every day, apart from Christmas Day, visitors are invited to assemble in the gallery of remembrance for the Last Post ceremony. Each lasts about 20 minutes and features a bagpiper, a bugler, sentries, and personnel from Duntroon Military College. Here the Crown circulates on every armed service uniform, and sometimes there is a pronounced military presence. At each ceremony, the host tells the story of an Australian who died in service, usually someone relatively unknown. The narratives focus on the serviceman's – or, less frequently, servicewoman's – life history, such as their birth, home, schooling, occupation, marriage and family, motivation for joining the military, and circumstances of death. Surviving relatives and descendants are invited to attend and participate, and the ritual's most dramatic moment is when the family lays a wreath for their fallen relative. There is no cost to lay a wreath, and Memorial staff permanently archive all notes from the tributes.

Fig. 5.1: Crowd gathering for Last Post ceremony, War Memorial, Canberra, 16 May 2015

I attended twelve of these ceremonies. These included ceremonies for well-known soldiers such as Corporal Cameron Baird (Victoria Cross), whose ceremony was attended by the Governor-General, Prime Minister, opposition leader, Chief of Defence Force, and numerous senior political, military, and diplomatic dignitaries. Another was for revered Anzac hero John Simpson Kirkpatrick ("Simpson"), famous for carrying wounded Gallipoli to medical care on his donkey. After the ceremony people walked silently through the sculpture garden to the statue of Simpson and his donkey, his bridle and reins garlanded with synthetic poppies. We stood still in the rainy dusk as the military piper played a special hymn for them. Even when commemorating relatively unknown soldiers, there were never fewer than about 300 people at the Last Post ceremony, and sometimes well over 500, standing outdoors in the chill and drizzle of an early Canberra winter evening.

Before the ceremony begins people mill about to select the best view and watch the raucous cockatoos overhead, swooping home to Mt Ainslie for the night. They often chat to those around them, as they settle into viewing positions. Sometimes I met people related to the person being honoured that day. I also met suburban locals who were regular attendees. One resident brought his golden retriever each night as part of his evening walk; the dog would lie down, politely bored. Most nights included high-school groups visiting the capital; many students I spoke to described this as a highlight of their trip. But many people seemed to be visitors to Canberra. "We're here for a funeral," one man told me, "but it's not till tomorrow so we thought we'd come to this."

I interviewed the director of the Australian War Memorial, Brendan Nelson, who was appointed in 2012. Formerly the Federal Opposition and Liberal Party leader, after retiring from parliament Nelson became ambassador to the European Union and NATO, based in Belgium. Whenever in Ypres he would attend the Last Post service at Menin Gate, an Allied war memorial, where some 6,200 Australian soldiers' names are recorded. The Last Post has

been a daily ritual at the Gate – a pilgrimage site for Australians – since 1928 (except during the World War II occupation). Nelson's attendance at 73 Menin Gate services inspired him:

> I used to stand under the Gate and I'd look up at all of those names, there's nearly 55,000, and I thought, why don't they tell us something about one of these people? And so when I got to the (War) Memorial on my second day, I stood in the commemorative area, and I was looking up at the cloisters and I thought, we could run a Last Post ceremony here. Plus I've got historians … who can research and write stories about these people. We should tell these stories … It's very tempting … to let the past be a distant stranger and through neglectful indifference to forget the individual sacrifices that've been made in our name … Initially there was a bit of resistance …

One well-placed public servant confirmed this, saying that when it started, senior military "had reservations. 'Bloody Nelson, being nerdy, just what you'd expect from a politician'. But it's fantastic! Anyone can lay a wreath so it's really democratic. It's a damn good idea and the public are *loving* it." This person believed that the ceremony cleverly responded to community appetite for "Anzac Day nationalism". Nelson feels vindicated that national media mention the Australian War Memorial ceremony when the person to be celebrated is well known, such as Simpson, and he knows that the Governor-General recommends the ceremony to foreign dignitaries.

Nelson told me that the daily Last Post ceremonies are an attempt to do something that can "unify the country". I asked him why he thought the ceremonies were so popular.

> The intellectual, educated classes tend not to think this way, but the average everyday Australian, in particular, likes ritual. They like ceremony … as a lot of the other institutions in our country have kind of broken down in terms of formality, they actually like that sense of ceremony, and particularly when it engages loss and memory.

He said that the appeal of the War Memorial and its rituals transcended Australia's constitutional divide because "the people who embrace this, some will be devout republicans, some will be devout monarchists and some couldn't care less."

Throughout the Memorial's galleries, the Crown is visually present, particularly in medals and uniform insignia. In the sculpture park around the buildings, units of every Australian theatre of war commemorated dead comrades in memorial plaques in the paths which run through the grounds, and each features the Crown. Upon leaving the galleries a salient link with royalty is revealed: the hall corridor to the exit through the gift shop has a wall devoted to photographs of royal visitors. It shows them attending services, laying wreaths, and planting trees; the photograph commemorating Prince Harry's visit was hung almost before he left Australia. In Fig. 5.3, Catherine, Duchess of Cambridge plants an Aleppo pine on the grounds of the Australian War Memorial on Anzac Day 2014. The tree had grown from a seed gathered after the Battle of Lone Pine at Gallipoli, providing a living connection to Anzac soil and evoking the suggestion that Australia's most sacred soil lies in Turkey (Kapferer 2012 [1988]). The Australian War Memorial gives royal visitors the opportunity to participate in events rich with notions of sacrifice, such as military ceremonies and memorials, which commemorate conflicts understood to have secured Australia's lands from

Fig. 5.2: Royal photograph gallery at the Australian War Memorial, 2015

Fig. 5.3: Catherine, Duchess of Cambridge, at the Australian War Memorial, 2014

her enemies. The tree-planting suggests the royals putting down roots in Australia, with the tree they plant standing as a live proxy for royal bodies.

The photograph gallery reveals the Crown's privileged position in the nation's Anzac cathedral. That the Memorial proudly celebrates its links to royalty recalls how monarchist settlers sought the sovereign's attention for their difficulties and sacrifices, as a way of giving their suffering purpose and value. I asked Nelson about the relationship between the Memorial and the gallery of royal photographs. He said that royal visits are extremely popular, especially with younger Australians, and that people seem to find royal tours comforting:

> We're almost in a situation where if you said anything critical or derogatory about the royals, you'd probably have somebody get into you. Whereas some years ago, it was fashionable to do so.

Nelson made it clear that although he is not a royalist, he would vote to retain constitutional monarchy, but "if Australia became a republic it wouldn't worry me".

This wall, celebrating the connection between royals and the Australian War Memorial, also features one photograph of the sculpture installation "Blood Swept Lands and Seas of Red." This temporary sculpture, in commemoration of the outbreak of World War I, was constructed out of almost 900,000 red ceramic poppies arranged to flow as blood from the Tower of London's "Weeping Window" to its moat. Each poppy represented the life of a British or colonial serviceman who died. The site for this sculpture also places the Crown at the centre of the sacred memories and was not selected by accident: the actual Crown is kept, along with the rest of the monarch's regalia, in the Tower's Jewel House. This centenary commemoration focused on fostering old memories at the emotional and political home of the then-empire. In Australia the same symbols were used to mark the occasion, but with quite different approaches.

New ways to remember: Behind the sandbags at Camp Gallipoli

Camp Gallipoli is an annual nationwide event launched in 2015 to help people "commemorate ANZAC Day as participants, rather than spectators" (Camp Gallipoli Foundation 2014). It was held the night before and on Anzac Day in most States' capital cities.[1] It was founded by South Australian businessman Chris Fox, now its CEO. [2] Although privately developed and operated, it is endorsed by the RSL and Legacy, Australia's influential veterans' associations, which benefit from any profits Camp Gallipoli generates. According to the private citizens behind the Camp Gallipoli Foundation, they were motivated to develop the event to "help preserve and foster the unique spirit of ANZAC" (Camp Gallipoli Foundation 2015a) because the "'spirit of ANZAC' is in the DNA of every Aussie" (Camp Gallipoli Foundation 2015b). These statements suggest that the special values of Anzac are carried within the Australian people and can be accessed through the phenomenological experience of Camp Gallipoli.

I attended the inaugural Camp Gallipoli in Sydney (April 24–25, 2015). The event offered elements of the experience of a military camp in an atmosphere of commemorative density on an Anzac theme. People bought tickets to sleep in swags (low single-person tents) on a field and rise in the dark for the Anzac Day Dawn Service, a religious remembrance ceremony of Anzac hymns, music, and requiem.

Following a powerful storm, Camp Gallipoli Sydney had been relocated from Centennial Park to the drier grounds of the show-ring at Moore Park's Entertainment Quarter, a retail precinct near Fox Studios. People entered the camp stadium past a well-stocked and patronised stand of "commemorative merchandise" including apparel, swags, and accessories such as scarves, hats, and dog tags. At the entrance was the flame of Camp Gallipoli, which

[1] Camp Gallipoli also launched New Zealand but the 2015 event was cancelled because of lack of interest. It relaunched in 2016.

2 For other details of its board and constitution see its website (Camp Gallipoli Foundation 2015b).

burned throughout the event, echoing the Eternal Flame which burns perpetually at the Australian War Memorial to represent the nation's perpetual gratitude for the Anzac heroism of Australia's war dead (Kapferer 2012 [1988]).

Fig. 5.4: Flame at Camp Gallipoli, Sydney, 24 April 2015

Enormous screens projected images of servicemen in reflective profile, in their distinctive lemon-squeezer hats. To get to the swag ground of approximately 5,000 campers, I passed through a sandbag "bunker" near a "mess tent". To receive "rations" at the "mess", people presented "ID". People were displaced from ordinary experience by the theatrical displays of soldiers through still images, projections, logos, documentaries, and feature films which decorated the theatrical set buildings of sandbag bunkers and mess tents, amongst which we moved wearing dog tags. All of this served to normalise a sense of militarism.

The crowd was predominantly white, mostly families with children and young adults in small groups. Teens gathered in the auditorium, waiting for the band to start. Families solemnly watched live and recorded interviews with war heroes and celebrities, then sang along cheerily with school brass bands and choirs performing Australian standards such as "Waltzing Matilda" and "I Still Call Australia Home". Later, a small crowd danced and chanted with the rock band's chorus line, "Never forget! Never forget!" Young adults – those I met were mostly early-career professionals – took photos of themselves in the bunker, posing in front of huge documentary photographs of soldiers in trenches. Smaller children raced about playing tag or tracing the air with glow-sticks. On the field, couples worked together to pitch their swags, and some decorated them with flags and other emblems. From their swags people could watch on a huge outdoor screen, *The Water Diviner*, a historical

drama set just after World War I. Men retreated to the edges of the arena to watch sports on their phones.

During the band's intermission, the Master of Ceremonies interviewed a well-known rugby league player who was "going to take the spirit of Anzac on to the field" in an Anzac Day match. The player said solemnly, "We are going into battle tomorrow. It's not exactly like what the Anzacs went through, but we want to do them proud." The militaristic language is deliberate: league players are icons of Australian manhood and nationhood, especially in the eastern states, and the player articulated the tacit fusion of sports with Anzac heroism that is celebrated in hard-fought matches. Later that day I watched part of a game on television, and the nexus between sports and militarism was made all the more visceral as serving soldiers in light armoured vehicles at the edge of the field fired their guns whenever a team scored. The ability to align one's purpose with the Anzacs, and to express the pleasures of virtuous nostalgia, is highly valued.

Camp Gallipoli is a new Anzac ritual, invented to give people alternative ways to concretise their engagement with the nation's origin myths.[1] It drew people together physically, cognitively and emotionally. The crowd, props and role-play, special food, opportunities to purchase memorabilia, and movie screenings, music, and other performances gave the event a festival-like atmosphere, in which time and place were temporarily disrupted (Leach 1961). People could experience the collective effervescence of ritual communitas through collectively giving up their individual autonomy for a period, such as having to queue for rations at the right time at the mess tent with the right proof of entitlement, or waking at 4:00am for the Dawn Service. Through rhetoric, ritual, and symbolic objects,

[1] Camp Gallipoli is a private event which people can only participate in by purchasing tickets, with any profits going to veterans' associations; in this way it is significantly different from Anzac Day rituals, which are public and free for all citizens.

people were to understand that the purpose was to recall the Anzac narrative and the values that Camp Gallipoli promotes as the “spirit of Anzac”.

Many people clearly found Camp Gallipoli deeply purposeful and emotionally moving, as well as entertaining. National holidays “are often a pastiche of solemn feelings, moral ideals, personal fun, and recreation” (Schwarz 2008: 103). I chatted with people as we queued, or when people asked me to take their photographs for them (so these conversations were short and casual). When I asked people why they had come, it revealed my outsider status. Several found my question bewildering because, to them, the answer was self-evident. They said things like, “It’s so special to be here”; “Just all these people coming together”; “I’m just thinking about what the diggers went through”; “My granddad served, so …”; and “It’s important to teach the kids”. One woman told me, “It’s a small thing to do, after what the diggers did for us”. The spirit of Anzac is so naturalised that it evades perception, making its meanings and effects difficult to recognise.

People also articulated their participation as an act of reciprocity that fulfilled obligations to ancestors (personal or national), in statements such as, “I came because of what the diggers did for us”. The temporary and modest inconveniences of camping in swags gave participants a way to form imagined experiential connections with the diggers. By spending a night in swags, the participants believed themselves to be offering a small sacrifice which honoured that much greater sacrifice of soldiers a century ago and affirming the heroic Anzac values of egalitarianism and practicality (Kapferer 2012 [1988]). Narratives of hardship, heroism, fear, and great suffering were reiterated through the night in documentaries and murals. Indexing individual participation at Camp Gallipoli against these narratives is an important part of the ritual. Campers reiterated ties to venerated individual or collective ancestors. Having aligned participation at Camp Gallipoli with the sacrifice and fortitude of World War I soldiers, campers also contextualised their experiences as not equivalent. More

than once that night I heard parents admonishing children's complaints or requests with, "This is nothing compared to what the diggers went through!" By creating a corporeal experience of social conditions based on related but not equivalent sacrifice, Camp Gallipoli imprints collective memory on individual bodies, and links this experience to something ineffable and transcendent.

Hidden in plain sight

All of this might be an aside were it not for Camp Gallipoli's logo. This featured on every piece of documentation or promotion related to it, on paper and online. It was also on every item of merchandise, and was prominently displayed throughout the event. The logo is a graphical crown with a red poppy on the top left and two rosemary sprigs on the top right. Red poppies and rosemary are symbols of remembrance for Allied veterans, and they grow abundantly in places particularly associated with their deaths; rosemary on the cliffs of Gallipoli in Turkey; and red poppies in the fields of northern France and Belgium. Rosemary sprigs and imitation poppies are often worn on and around the date of Anzac Day to signify remembrance. The lettering is in a serif font, which again suggests an appreciation of tradition: sans-serif fonts were not prevalent at the time of World War I. Below the name "Camp Gallipoli" appears the phrase "Spirit of Anzac", indicating that Camp Gallipoli promises an emotional, transcendent experience for the soul or the psyche. Each of the logo's visual elements would have been recognisable to Australians at any time over the last century. The logo, while a recent invention, was carefully designed to suggest the authority of heritage.

Fig. 5.5: Logo of Camp Gallipoli, 2015, featuring a Tudor Crown

When I asked people at Camp Gallipoli about the crown in the logo – which many were wearing – they said things like, “I don’t know”, “I hadn’t really noticed it”, “It’ll just be for RSLor Legacy I reckon” or “Yeah there is a crown, I didn’t see it! There’s the poppy though, and rosemary, that’s about the veterans.” It seemed as though the image of the Crown evaded perception. At Camp Gallipoli, the Crown was more than unrecognised, it seemed somehow invisible.

Fig. 5.6: Camp Gallipoli tee shirt and dog tag, 2015

I wrote to the general manager of Camp Gallipoli, David Watson, about the inclusion of the crown in the Camp Gallipoli logo (pers. comm. 4, 10 August 2015). He said that this crown is a graphical representation of George V’s crown, rather than an exact representation, and this crown was selected because George V was Australia’s monarch during World War I.[1] He added that this type of image is often used by organisations like the RSL. For David, it did not appear to mean anything else. So it seemed that the decision to use an image of the Crown was predicated on associating Camp Gallipoli with the heritage, respect and significance of the veterans’ associations.The logo, with its prominent use of a crown, formed a central element of the advertisement used to promote Camp Gallipoli. The promotion was based on one widely used design (Fig. 5.7). The crown and logo sit above the female figure, a young European woman. She is foregrounded and draped in a large Australian flag, as though wrapping herself in it for protection. Her pale blonde hair is straggly and windblown, suggesting authenticity: she is outdoors in the elements, not in a studio. She has pulled the flag high around her neck so that it is also across her left cheek. All that can be seen of the

[1] In fact, this is not George V’s crown but the Tudor Crown, also known as the King’s or Imperial Crown. From 1902 to 1953 it was used to visually represent the monarch personally as well as the government’s authority, but the image was not modeled on an actual crown. This image is often used on Commonwealth military badges and medals.

flag is the Union Jack.[1] This seems deliberate, because the Union Jack – which is the British flag – makes up only the upper-left quarter of the Australian flag with the remaining three-quarters blue with the stars of the Southern Cross and the federation star. The Union Jack's prominence emphasises Australia's historical and enduring links to Britain; arguably, by displaying only the Union Jack portion of the flag, the image orients the viewer towards a historicism and worldview which prioritises Australia's relationship with Britain over other ties. The red of the heraldic crosses of St George and St Patrick in the Union Jack echoes the red poppy in the logo. The young woman appears otherwise warmly dressed against the night, wearing a knitted hat. The hat's red colour again matches the poppy and the Union Jack. Its coarsely ribbed knitting suggests traditional handicrafts and practicality. The dome shape of her hat follows that of the crown directly above her.



Fig. 5.7: Camp Gallipoli advertisement 2015

The photograph is lit from the viewer's left, making the woman seem unusually pale and accentuating her blonde hair and the whites of her very wide eyes. It washes over the many bodies in the darkness. The woman's gaze is directed upwards. She seems watchful and expectant, perhaps contemplative, rather than alarmed or fearful. Her left eyebrow is raised,

[1] Wearing the flag as a cloak has become a recognised nationalistic practise for Australian youth. Several interlocutors focused on it as representing the jingoistic excesses of "Anzacery". One public servant described "the most appalling aspects of Anzac" as "young people patriotically shrouding themselves in flags, they have the stylised Union Jack painted on their faces …it's a new, completely loathsome aspect of Anzac Day".

indicating that her attention has been captured, but the viewer cannot see what she is looking at.

In the background is a featureless mass of people, supine and shrouded in sleeping bags. While they are represented as gathered together camping outdoors overnight in brightly coloured sleeping bags, their prostrate positioning and stillness evokes the dead of a battlefield. The crowd's presence implies that the Camp Gallipoli ritual demands physical and cognitive participation, and will incorporate social memory into the bodies of those gathered together (Connerton 1989).

Camp Gallipoli's focus is made clear in the text included in the design: "1915–2015, Camp Gallipoli, Commemorating 100 years of Anzac Spirit." The event's stated intention is to honour and venerate the ineffable, transcendent essence of Anzac. It has an additional symbolical significance because this spirit has now reached a very special anniversary – its centenary. Whatever the woman is focused on, she must look up to it. The goal of honouring a spirit resonates with her upward gaze: united with the people, protected by British ties, standing underneath the perpetual Crown and the veteran ancestors, she can focus on higher concerns. At Camp Gallipoli, the mystery of Anzac may come within one's grasp. Exactly what the "Anzac spirit" *is* is strategically ambiguous so that, like the event participants, viewers of the design remain free to infer the diverse and inarguable interpretations of Anzac that community solidarity seems to require.

A second design, Figure 5.8, I saw comparatively infrequently. The subject is another white female, this time a young girl with darker hair carefully braided into plaits. The logo of the Crown with poppy and rosemary floats beside the girl, and again the Crown echoes the shape and size of her head. She wears a large red poppy over one ear, approximately the same size and in the same position as the poppy above the Crown. This is a mid-shot of her upper body, in comparison with the woman's head-and-shoulders photograph. Like the woman in

Fig. 5.7, she has the Australian flag drawn tightly around her, but this time the two identities of the flag are given equal exposure, with her left side showing the Union Jack and her right the federation star. Again, this presentation overemphasises the relative prominence of the Union Jack. The child is slightly hunched forward as she pulls the flag tightly about her, as if being huddled in the flag offers her the protection of a strong nation.



Fig. 5.8: Camp Gallipoli advertisement

Most importantly, the young girl's expression is far from celebratory. Her gaze is again directed upwards with wide eyes, but her face is slightly downcast. Her slight hesitant smile with raised eyebrows and a worried brow gives an impression of anxiety and discomfort, suggesting a need to be vigilant against threats. In contrast with the woman's alert awe in Fig. 5.7, the child's sad face and young age suggests innocence and vulnerability, in a way which conjures up photographs of child refugees.

Three rays of light focus on the child's right side, illuminating her pale skin and the Union Jack. Unlike in Fig. 5.7, where the woman is foregrounded against a community of bodies, the child is alone in a gently sloping pasture with a few small rocks on it. It is not an iconic image of Australian bush or outback, but neither does it represent the rugged cliffs of Gallipoli. Nor is the stony ground suitable for pitching the officially branded swag to her right, part of Camp Gallipoli's official merchandise, which participants were encouraged to purchase (A$199 for a single, A$299 for a double). The swag is printed in a sans-serif font rather than the serif font used in the rest of the design, suggesting that the swags are modern interpretations rather than historically accurate (what cannot be seen here is that the Camp

Gallipoli logo with the Crown was also printed on the swags). The sky above the horizon shows no sign of atmosphere apart from the rays of light (unlike the hazy night sky behind the woman in Fig. 5.7), but instead is a curious ombré which becomes lightly darker brown at the top of the image. It gives the image a studio-styled and digitally manipulated sterility that the first image does not have.

While the lettering uses the same serif font as Fig. 5.7, the text of Fig. 5.8 is subtly different, from "Commemorating 100 years of the Anzac spirit" to "Celebrating the birth of the Anzac spirit". Commemoration implies sobriety, but celebration entails joy – a sentiment undermined by the girl's sad expression and diffident posture. Describing Gallipoli as the birth of "the Anzac spirit" also evokes the rite of passage that new life suggests; possibly a reference to the child's age. Further, a trademark symbol has been added next to the words "Camp Gallipoli", indicating its commercial status as intellectual property. Finally, New Zealand is mentioned, indicating that Camp Gallipoli is a trans-Tasman operation. However, the Australian flag, the rosemary sprigs, and the swag all risk appearing to New Zealanders as symbols of Australia, and these are not balanced out by specifically New Zealand symbolism. The visual symbols of the brand of Camp Gallipoli, and indeed the entire design, ultimately undermine the stated effort to include New Zealanders in the project.

Examining these designs' common elements allows me to infer how the organisers' wished to represent Camp Gallipoli and what they believed would have popular appeal. Both feature young white females, alone, eyes gazing upwards, protectively wrapped in an Australian flag which prioritises the Union Jack, each wearing a red object on her head. Both are presided over by a Crown, rosemary sprigs, and a poppy. That both figures are evidently European is instructive. Ghassan Hage has argued (1998: 121) that, in Australia, the dominant European majority incontrovertibly exists as an unmarked national collective while others, including Indigenous Australians and migrants, exist in comparison to, and usually

below, this norm. The dominant group "imagines the nation as 'theirs'" (ibid.: 85), and therefore their belonging can be assumed. The girl and woman from the advertisements belong to Australia, and the nation belongs to them – though this version of Australianness makes particular claims on British heritage. Indeed, the participants at Camp Gallipoli Sydney were mostly white, suggesting that Camp Gallipoli's version of belonging resonates especially with white Australia.

The choice of female figures for the designs is also deliberate and significant; every advertisement I saw, whether online, in social media, or in posters, used female figures.[1] Are the figures supposed to tacitly represent the women and children on whose behalf the diggers allegedly fought? The experience of Anzac soldiering was an overwhelmingly male one, both in fact and in myth. The semantic domain of these images reveals a call for citizens to be faithful to nationalistic Anzac myths of Australianness (especially the gendered values of mateship and egalitarianism), racial hegemony, patriotism, and militarism (Kapferer 2012 [1988]). Both the monarchist and republican groups have been analysed as gendered, with republican symbolism often perceived as determinedly, independently, self-sufficiently masculine, while monarchist imagery often asserts the "feminine" comforts of powerful protection (Lake 1994; Bulbeck 1996). The Camp Gallipoli imagery of the lone young female conforms to this apparent monarchist trope. The designs, and the event they represent, promote unquestioningly that the Anzac campaign was a heroic nationalist revelation, and assert a direct relationship with the protections afforded to Australia by the transcendent promises of "the Anzac spirit", and the shelter mediated by its relationship with the British Crown.

[1] Camp Gallipoli uses both men and women as Camp Gallipoli "ambassadors" in its advertising, but I did not see any images of men or boys in the promotional materials.

Under the ubiquitous but apparently undetected Crown, Camp Gallipoli gave people the opportunity to renew symbolic meanings by remembering an old conflict. As a form of ancestor veneration, it engaged notions of personal loss and endurance, subordinating the individual to the collective. It prioritises, even sacralises, a particular version of history, which positions the Gallipoli campaign as the crucial moment in defining national identity. Camp Gallipoli overtly sets out one view of how the Anzac legend should be performed in everyday Australian life, even in apparently banal forms (Billig 1995). I suggest that this view is that Anzac is a sacred concept, one that stands for heroic values, and that understanding, appreciating, and promoting Anzac values is a central element of Australian citizenship.

Refreshed memories and reanimated meanings

To "remember is to make the past actual" (Connerton 1989:45). With both Camp Gallipoli and the Australian War Memorial Last Post ceremony, sharing particular Anzac narratives enables participants to imagine individual and collective links to heroic Anzac soldiers and other war dead, because one of the defining features of such events is "the explicit claim to be commemorating such a continuity" (Connerton 1989: 48). Memorialisation helps amalgamate the community and consolidates Australians' collective identity as descendants of the Anzacs.

Both the Australian War Memorial Last Post ceremony and Camp Gallipoli are newly invented rituals. Though the Last Post ceremony is recognisably similar to any Australasian Anzac service, its frequency, location and popularity mark it as a distinctive new form of these commemorations. Both emphasise the Anzac value of egalitarian unity (Kapferer 2012 [1988]) (though attendance at Camp Gallipoli is limited to those who purchase tickets and have special camping equipment, and it exists in a mock-hierarchical pseudo-military

environment). Camp Gallipoli's festive environment is temporary, so differs from the permanent dedicated heritage environment of the Australian War Memorial. However, they are linked by their mutual evocation of sustained connections to, and celebrations of, militarism, monarchy, and place.

Camp Gallipoli was saturated with Crown imagery on posters, clothing, signage and merchandise, giving the Crown a greater visual and vernacular prominence than any other event or place I saw. Yet people did not seem to notice or acknowledge the Crown at Camp Gallipoli any more than they noted it at the Last Post ceremony where it was on every serviceman's collar badge, sleeve, and medal or every battalion plaque. Unmarked within the richly emotive ideology of these events, the Crown helps assert particular forms of nationalism, and particular, though contested, versions of history.

The notion and image of the Crown was central to the Anzacs' Gallipoli campaign in 1915, and remarkably, one hundred years later it has again become the central symbol of the rituals which commemorate it. It could be considered paradoxical that royal heirs inevitably engage in Anzac rituals when in Australia given that these celebrate independence from the old ties of Empire, with British betrayal still a central motif in Anzac mythmaking (McAllister 2012). It is more easily approached by recalling the nexus between militarism and royalty and the archetypal ways that sovereignty can be sourced from the land. Just as the Crown was strategically deployed to persuade people to reconcile themselves to the suffering and bereavements of war, today it can be skilfully deployed as an unseen symbol to potently stand for deeply hegemonic Australian ideals and implied links between a cosmic order and the prosaic plane of human experience (Cannadine 1992: 17).

That touring royals and Anzac memorialisation are periodically united helps legitimise the Crown in reiterative ways. As the Crown gains political legitimation and moral authority from its associations with Australian lands and with the sacrifices Australians made

for it, so its presence sacralises national occasions such as Anzac Day, and helps transform potentially bewildering death on foreign soil into the productive defence of Australian soil. As the Crown and monarchy cultivates authority via emblems of nationalism, so it bestows its transcendence on them.

While the Crown does not much feature in Australian discourse, the Queen and her family do. What is less articulated, though culturally very common, is popular interest in, and even affection for, royalty. One of the Crown's specific meanings is Queen Elizabeth and her family, but dissonant examples occasionally reveal the limits of this metaphor.

Chapter Six
The queen’s two bodies

Constitutional order, following Kantorowicz, depends on maintaining a delicate tension between the body personal and the body immortal. If Australians primarily associate the Crown with Queen Elizabeth and her heirs, then this may throw this tension out of balance and place the constitutional order at risk. The Crown’s personalised and personified form has political implications for the debate about constitutional reform, particularly in terms of the speculation, anxiety, and ambivalence about the significance of the Queen’s death. To analyse this I begin by reviewing some evidence for the Crown’s personification, including Prince Philip’s knighthood, and two instances involving the Australian Monarchist League.

Evidence of a conceptual slippage

When I talked with Australians about the Crown, they often answered with ideas about the Queen, because the Crown is commonly understood as signified and embodied by Queen Elizabeth herself. Australian Monarchist League founder and chair Philip Benwell said, “The Crown symbolises the fundamental basis of Westminster democracy. Of course the Queen as the wearer of the crown unites the symbolic crown … with herself, a living person. The human entity of the crown is the symbol of our democracy.” Malcolm Hazell, who served two Governors-General as official secretary and now advocates for constitutional education, said, “We are not a republic yet. Last time I looked at the Constitution the Queen was there!” Former Federal Liberal deputy leader Fred Chaney said, “I am a patriot, I love this country, I adore it, I think it is the most wonderful country in the world … I’m prepared to die for Australia but I’m not prepared to die for the bloody Queen.” For each man, despite their different constitutional positions, the Queen represents the Crown in Australia.

In one sense, this is not surprising. The Queen's image has been part of the milieu of Australians' lives. Many interlocutors remembered singing "God Save the Queen"[1] and having portraits of the Queen displayed at school, and some had seen her on her 1954 tour. Queen Elizabeth may not be as prominent a part of Australian public life as she was, but Australians still observe an annual holiday to celebrate the Queen's birthday (though not on the actual date, and Western Australia has no fixed date for this holiday). The Queen's image is on coinage and paper currency. Further, every Governor-General, State parliamentarian, member of the judiciary, and member of the armed services must swear an Oath or Affirmation of Allegiance to Her Majesty and her heirs and successors.[2] These examples demonstrate how the notion of Crown-as-Queen is built into numerous aspects of Australian life in prosaic ways. It might seem a naïve glossing of a complex term, but synthesising and condensing abstract complexity is by definition what symbols always do. The Crown's capacity for personification (making it a symbol of a symbol) is one of its most integral and necessary aspects, both theoretically and operationally (Kantorowicz 1997 [1957]).

To bear true allegiance

Oaths of allegiance, which are required for people entering certain public offices, conform to Durkheim's maxim that ritual requires unity of action rather than belief (1915). Although the Queen is personally highly unlikely to witness these pledges, some are made before her local representatives; for instance, parliamentary oaths are sworn before the Governor-General. Because these oaths explicitly make Queen Elizabeth their focus, I asked several interlocutors

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[1] This was replaced as the national anthem by "Advance Australia Fair" in 1984.

[2] Prime ministers Kevin Rudd and Julia Gillard chose not to swear allegiance to the Queen but rather to Australia. In 2013 prime minister Tony Abbott restored this oath, which was also taken by Malcolm Turnbull, illustrating that this remains disputed symbolic territory (McKeown 2013).

who had taken them what this had meant to them personally.[1] Generally, for these interlocutors, the swearing had been a significant and meaningful ritual but the Queen was far from mind. For Justice Mark Leeming the most important decision was whether to take an oath or an affirmation:

> … The fact that the words happen to be "to the Queen" is … much subsidiary … The question is, what is the most solemn thing I can do to tell the world I'm really serious about this? … What is going to be seen to bind me more powerfully than anything else? But to whom – allegiance to Her Majesty and heirs and successors according to law or whatever it is – that was not something I particularly focused upon. But there's no choice, you have to do that [make an oath or affirmation] otherwise you don't take the job, and frankly it wasn't part of my decision-making process.

Others offered similar accounts. One passionate republican was clear that he had no choice but to swear to the Queen when he became a Queen's Counsel (at that time in his State, affirmation was not available), but the words held no meaning for him. Another said that the oath had mattered because he was promising to do the job as well as he possibly could in front of his family and colleagues. In these examples the ritual retains a functional ambiguity, despite focusing intently on the Queen, who stands amidst the ritual as an unmarked symbol. Perhaps there is some deliberate obfuscation in these examples, in order to render the ritual functionally ambiguous.

Ascribing the Crown with humanity

The Crown is both the material object itself and the person who has worn it (Kantorowicz 1997 [1957]: 270), which means that personification and personalisation are embedded in its symbolism. However, these are not equivalent concepts. By personification of the Crown I mean the representation of this abstract concept in human form, in which I include the Queen, her heirs, and her vice-regal appointments. By personalisation of the Crown I mean a

[1] For instance, the parliamentary Oath of Allegiance is "I, [name], do swear that I will be faithful and bear true allegiance to Her Majesty Elizabeth the Second, Her heirs and successors according to law. So help me God!" (McKeown 2013).

personification that is particularly tied to the form and personality of one individual, in this case Queen Elizabeth.

My interlocutors did not agree about whether local representatives of the Queen, or members of the royal family not in the immediate line to the throne, or the Queen herself, signify the Crown in the same way. Monarchist Philip Benwell said, "Everything the Governor-General is, is as the representative of the Queen. When Prince Harry and Prince William come over here, to perform official duties, they represent the Queen … and the Queen embodies the crown." Although the glossing of Crown-as-Queen was common, it was not ubiquitous, and lawyers often kept the categories separate. As law professor Lee Godden said, "I don't think the Queen embodies the Crown. I think the idea of the monarchy and the Crown are held in tension and together but held separately." One Governor, who wished to remain unidentified, saw it differently again: "I represent the Crown in a formal sense, but I don't think anyone looks at me and thinks of the crown, no, any more than they think of the Queen when they see me." This Governor distinguishes between his official status and how his role may be publicly perceived.

Whether Governors, or indeed, someone fifth in line to the throne, should really be considered a metaphor for the Crown is a reasonable question. However, the Governor-General and State Governors are appointed by the monarch to represent the Crown, and conduct its business on behalf. When in Australia on an official visit, the heirs represent the monarch, are accepted as such by the Australian Government, and are accommodated at Yarralumla (Government House Canberra, the Governor-General's official residence) or other Government Houses. By definition, an heir is one whom circumstances may require to wear the Crown. Further, to accept the heirs as personifying the Crown allows that, as Queen Elizabeth ages, she will travel considerably less and will delegate appearances and other physical responsibilities. Consequently, I classify the heirs and the vice-regents as substitutes

for the Queen in this argument about the Crown's personification; although I note the distinction between appointment and blood inheritance, including the temporary nature of a governor's term.

The Australians of Norfolk Island offered another perspective on the personification of the Crown. Many protested on Anzac Day 2015 by drowning out the official singing of "Advance Australia Fair" with their own rendition of "God Save the Queen". In Mitchell Low's (2012) ethnography of Norfolkers' quest for identity and legitimacy, some indicated that when they think about the Queen, they have Victoria in mind rather than Elizabeth. They claim recognition from Queen Elizabeth as indigenous Norfolkers on the grounds that her ancestor Victoria gave Norfolk Island to their ancestors (Low 2012). The object of the Crown remains critically important for Norfolkers, but the identity of the personifier has remained stable in its first manifestation. However, on the mainland of Australia, a far more discordant personification had occurred.

"The old swish on the shoulder from Tony …"

On 26 January 2015, Australia Day, Australians woke to the news that Tony Abbott, then-Prime Minister and celebrated monarchist, had awarded two new knighthoods. This was controversial in itself, as knighthoods had been abolished in 1986 but reinstated in 2014 by Abbott (Patrick 2016). As only Queen Elizabeth can appoint knights and dames on the Prime Minister's recommendation, the reinstatement was perceived as reasserting monarchism in Australian political life. Most startlingly, Abbott had awarded one of the knighthoods to the Queen's husband, Prince Philip, for service to Australia and to the Crown (Levy and Cox 2015). The news was greeted with disbelief and then scorned as ridiculous, even by members of Abbott's own Cabinet; indeed, it reportedly almost cost him his prime ministership (BBC 2015a). Months later, Abbott described his decision as "injudicious" (BBC 2015b). After

Abbott had been replaced as Prime Minister by Malcolm Turnbull, media reported rumours (neither substantiated nor denied, that I saw) that the Queen herself had requested her husband's knighthood (Sheridan 2015), which did nothing to assuage public resentment towards its conferral.

At times all fieldwork resembles the Rashomon effect, in which a single circumstance will be recounted in multiple, maddeningly contradictory but plausible ways (Heider 1988). However, the issue of Prince Philip's knighthood distinguished itself as a beacon of uncannily united perspective. One senior republican described the public response as, "Are you kidding? Seriously, are you fucking kidding me?" Peter FitzSimons shook his head in disbelief and said, "There's nothing better for the republican movement than that. Completely ludicrous. Prince Philip, what has he done for Australia?" Demographer, futurist, and social commentator Bernard Salt said, "It seems twee, it seems medieval, it seems sycophantic, it just seems ridiculous … all that crap, no, that's English, that's not us. We will define our relationship with the Queen in our way." Veteran journalist Kerry-Anne Walsh saw it as deeply damaging for Abbott, publicly, within his party and within his cabinet: "[Prince Philip] goes and gets the old swish on the shoulder from Tony – you have got to be kidding! I think he really, *really* screwed up with The Greek."[1] One senior public servant, who had made discretion a hallmark of a distinguished career, was stopped short: "I … [pause]. That was a dumb decision." Even the loyal monarchist Philip Benwell could not be entirely supportive, although he certainly blamed "the biased media" in part:

> Of course the Duke of Edinburgh is eminently qualified, the service that he's given [to Australia] … Mind you I think it would have been preferable if there had been a lead up to the announcement and if he [Abbott] had made it in September when the Queen becomes the longest serving monarch. Not on Australia Day, it's become a nationalistic day for Australians.[2]

[1] A common Australian nickname for Prince Philip, which refers to the Prince's Greek paternal parentage.

[2] Later, Benwell wished to clarify that Prince Philip is "Admiral of the Fleet in the Royal Australian Navy, Field Marshal in the Australian Army, and Marshal of the Royal Australian Air Force. Furthermore, there are very few institutions which have influenced Australians as much as the Duke of Edinburgh's Award which has

Why did this grate so badly with Australians? I suggest that it symbolised a dissonant personification of the Crown, one which revealed the Crown's workings too starkly for many. Most media, like these interlocutors, described Prince Philip's knighthood as incongruous with Australian nationalistic values such as egalitarianism and fairness (Levy and Cox 2015; ABC/AFP 2015) because people suspected that he had received the award because of who he was rather than what he had done, and particularly, rather than any particular service to Australia. Arguably, it also emphasised that although Queen Elizabeth has been styled Queen of Australia since 1973,[1] many Australians continue to perceive monarchy as a British institution, even as many experience quasi-kinship bonds with the Queen. But the relationship remains one of tension: at times the Queen is a stranger, and at others she is like family. If symbols accumulate cultural resonance while simultaneously concealing other associations (Ahmed 2014 [2004]; Ahmed 2004), what happens when these disguised associations are revealed and made unavoidable? I suggest that Prince Philip's knighthood powerfully recalled less palatable meanings of constitutional monarchy for many Australians, including, for instance, its colonial history, inherited privilege, and Prince Philip's own troubling chauvinism (Fairfax Media 2015). The knighthood disrupted the fiction that the meanings of the institutional and personal Crown are stable and mutually understood.

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supported the development of hundreds of thousands of young Australians in this country for more than 50 years. More importantly, he has been the loyal and supportive Consort of the Queen for the entirety of her reign."

[1] This refers to the Royal Style and Titles Act (1973), which officially described Elizabeth as "Queen of Australia".

The Australian Monarchist League: Her Majesty's devoted servants

Philip Benwell has devoted much of his life to the monarchy. When he founded the Australian Monarchist League in the early 1990s he decided to model it on what he saw as one of Australia's most successful lobby groups, the environmentalist movement. Benwell said, "We're very much like, say, Greenpeace. We lobby, we educate, we inform. And whenever any newspaper or politician or company attacks the Queen or the constitution, we attack them." The League promotes itself as both a monarchist organisation and a royalist one. Much of the League's work and many of its rituals revolve around the Queen and other royals. For instance, it actively rallies crowds to cheer visiting royals and supplies flags to the crowd.

Since its inception, the League has jealously guarded the Queen's personal reputation in Australia. In 1998, when tensions about constitutional reform were high after the republican convention, Toyota ran an attack advertisement against Range Rover, with text reading, "Don't worry Your Majesty, you're not the only British export that's had its day", playing on republican sentiment that the Queen had become irrelevant in Australia. International media covered Benwell's complaint about this "grave insult". He publicly released a thundering letter to the Japanese ambassador: "How dare your companies disparage the Sovereign of Australia" (Watson-Smyth 1998). Publicity, driven by the League, forced Toyota to withdraw the advertisement and apologise. The victory continues to be a source of pride for AML members 17 years later, and they regard this as a personal service rendered to the Queen herself. Benwell reminded me that there have been many such instances.



Fig. 6.1: Saatchi and Saatchi advertisement for Toyota, 1998

I attended the League's 2015 Annual Conference, where the Queen was honoured as if personally present. We sang "God Save the Queen", prayed for Her Majesty, toasted her reign and health, and discussed sending a locally crafted heraldic greeting to the Queen when she became the longest-serving monarch later that year. Members vigorously supported a new campaign to restore portraits and photographs of Queen Elizabeth throughout Parliament House and States' Government Houses, bolstered by the news that portraits of the Queen had been reinstated to the walls of then-Prime Minister Tony Abbot's parliamentary office as part of his personal monarchism (presumably later removed by his republican successor, Malcolm Turnbull). To invigorate the delegates, the conference was presided over by a larger-than-life photograph of Queen Elizabeth in full regalia, beside which delegates posed for photographs. The importance of a proxy of the Queen's physical presence illustrates that bodies – real or proxies – are useful for all kinds of ritual work because they are at the same time material objects that can "be moved around, displayed, and strategically located in specific places" and remain powerful symbols that transcend time, making the past immediately present (Verdery 1999: 27).

The age range of the delegates at the conference starkly illustrated the life stages of the League's membership. Many were older or elderly, and some had problems with mobility or hearing. However, the room's energy came from a small group of delegates in their early to mid-20s. The two age groups interacted cheerfully: the younger people stopped to chat with older ones, fetch tea, refreshments, and walking canes for the immobile, and offer arms to lean on; the older ones seemed buoyed by the youthful liveliness and enthusiasm. These younger members busily managed the arrival of delegates, confirmed that speakers were prepared, and checked audio-visual equipment, and several acted as hosts and gave presentations.

There were very few middle-aged people, and they were either office-holders from other States or guest speakers. Both monarchist organisations told me that their cause was increasingly popular with young people, and both ensured I met their younger representatives. The League has deliberately built a new constituency and is active on the internet and in social media. Several of these younger League members hold official roles and have been given specialist media training and regularly speak to journalists, post on social media, or make public presentations on the League's behalf. Benwell has planned carefully to ensure his organisation endures beyond him.

In breaks during the conference I chatted with the young monarchists. They were white, a mix of genders, and mostly middle-class. They were studying for graduate degrees or working as political aides, in public service, or sometimes in business. They were all confident, well-dressed, articulate, professional, energetic, and passionate about monarchy. They seemed to enjoy each other's company. When I asked how they each joined the League, several laughingly revealed a complex interrelated dating history. Some talked about being politically active in conservative politics.[1] When I asked why they chose monarchy as their cause, they talked idealistically about the strengths of constitutional monarchy, the value of Australia's ties to Britain, and their admiration for the younger princes as role models for public service. They were confident that republicanism was an elitist generational blip, but one they had to guard against. They liked the League because they believed it was more assertive about its values than other similar organisations (such as the ACM), and they liked its explicit focus on the royals as people: "The Queen's the strongest thing we've got – why wouldn't we talk about her?" said one. "Well, apart from Prince George the republican slayer!" laughed another. One young woman smiled and said:

[1] High-profile participation in constitutional lobby groups is seen as helpful to political careers; Prime Minister Malcolm Turnbull and former Prime Minister Tony Abbott are both examples.

> All that stuff's true for me too. But … I'm a nice girl from a nice middle-class family. I went to a nice private girls' school. My parents have nice progressive values. If I'd come home with a tattoo or whatever, or got passionate about traditional student protests, they'd be supportive. But coming home and announcing I was a young monarchist, that really got their attention.

While the young monarchists had various explanations for their commitment, they identified themselves as part of what they saw as renewed generational interest in the younger royal family, and they perceived the fascination with royalty as beneficial to their cause.

In contrast to the League's royalism, members of Australians for Constitutional Monarchy (ACM) often described themselves as motivated by the philosophical principles of constitutional monarchy rather than the celebrity culture which they perceive preoccupies "diamonds and pearls" monarchists, as some describe League members. While this distinction is broadly true, my experience was that ACM members almost inevitably talked about the virtuous character of royal family members. Some shyly offered anecdotes about meeting or working with the Queen or other royals. These stories frequently highlighted notions of service and sacrifice, as well as the intelligence and good nature of the Queen herself. At public ceremonies or even private events, members also toasted the Queen (by raising a glass of champagne or port, with the host saying "To our Queen's good health", to which guests responded with raised glasses, "The Queen!"). What was striking about this verbalisation is how people claimed the Queen as their own, though it was unclear whether this referred to her status as Queen of Australia or to a more personal connection.

The Queen will die. Long live the King?

When the Australian Labor Party (Labor) voted to pursue republican reform at its national conference in July 2015 it was not fresh policy (Chan 2015; BBC 2015d). Labor, with its strong Irish Catholic roots, had historically supported republicanism (Warhurst 1993). What was new was the insistence that reform need not wait for the conclusion of Queen Elizabeth's

reign by death or abdication, a view that had prevailed since the failed referendum of 1999 amongst republican politicians, including previous Prime Minister Julia Gillard (BBC 2010), and in Green Party policy (The Greens 2016). Prime Minister and republican Malcolm Turnbull has repeatedly stated that successful republican reform will only follow the Queen's death (Knott 2016). What these positions recognise – and what Labor's vote discounts – is that many Australians believe the Queen sits at the heart of the Australian constitution, and some feel a form of affective quasi-kinship ties to her.

When interlocutors mentioned the Queen, I frequently asked them to speculate about what might happen when this very popular sovereign dies. Some republicans hoped that it would prompt Australians to reflect on other constitutional options. However, most responded, "Nothing. Charles will become king." Some monarchists reverently predicted mass mourning rituals followed by soaring public support for the monarchy – and mirthfully anticipated the resulting republican dismay. Benwell believes Australians will experience it as like family bereavement: "There will be an intense period of grief, like losing one's favourite grandmother. By the time people stop grieving, Charles will be there, and then the coronation will be coming". Retired judge and academic Michael Kirby was old enough to remember the previous change of monarch:

> The death of the present Queen will not alter Australia's constitutional arrangements in the slightest. Because of her long reign, most Australians have not witnessed a change in the monarch. I did, as a schoolboy in 1952, when King George VI died. There was genuine mourning, great pageantry, and the sense of renewal on a new reign. I would expect that the same things would follow.

Anne Twomey echoed this when she said that it was hard to predict because, as for so many Australians, "the Queen has been Queen my entire life." She continued:

> People may have a personal attachment to Queen Elizabeth but not to Charles, and so that's obviously an issue in terms of, are they attached to the notion of hereditary monarchy, or are they attached to a particular person?

Kerry-Anne Walsh was convinced that although change was not politically palatable now, it may become so once the quasi-kinship bonds had ended.

> She has reigned for a long time so people cannot imagine being without her as a wallpaper to life. I think that the affection for her is such that we don't want to offend Granny, and also because the offending Granny thing would carry over into any vote. So you are not going to do it. Once she is gone, then … even John Howard eventually recognised that!

The exuberant and opinionated FitzSimons said, "I don't hope the Queen dies, obviously. But if the Queen dies and Prince Charles takes over, it's on." This contrasts with the view of a previous Republican chair, John Warhurst, who said, "That is using a British marker for an Australian event, which seems strange to me." Constitutional lawyer George Williams bluntly described using the Queen's death as a marker as "a bogus delaying tactic … a convenient excuse to put things off" because "if you want to become a republic then you do it independently of the state of the monarchy, [otherwise] it sort of emphasises our connection to Britain … and you'd have to be ready to do it beforehand."

People with whom I discussed the Queen's eventual death and constitutional reform recognised it as a little spurious to promise reform without committing to action, yet some felt that doing so provided a convenient and courteous placeholder. It reassures the electorate that republicanism remains official policy while appeasing those with conflicted loyalties towards the current monarch. Delaying any decisions until after the Queen's death recognises that many Australians both feel ideologically and emotionally attracted by republicanism, and experience the pull of affective bonds towards Queen Elizabeth as a familiar and familial presence. This delaying is also perceived as a personal courtesy to the Queen, which suggests that these affective bonds for her can take on relational, personalised dimensions: abstractions do not receive courtesies, but persons with whom we have social relationships do. This makes possible a thread of republican discourse that contemplates allowing the old regime to die with Elizabeth: "The Queen is dead. Leave it so." Again and again Australia's potential

constitutional reform was articulated as a choice between retaining this Queen *personally* or dispensing with her.

In addition to the social barriers to reform which the Queen's death might present, there are also significant legal hurdles. Fundamentally, the law makes no provision for anything else to happen apart from Prince Charles' ascension. Anne Twomey described how in NSW law, if someone did a global search on the law statutes and substituted "State government" for "Crown" the result would be legally viable in only about 80 percent of the instances. Some NSW legislation is significantly older than that of other sSates, and in the remaining 20 percent it was not clear what the original drafters meant by references to the Crown. In these instances, said Twomey, "you would have actually had to have gone back … even to medieval times to draw out exactly what was meant". Consequently, Twomey suggested to me that it would take between three and five years of legal work to update State and Federal legislation to reflect any constitutional change, making reform at the time of Queen Elizabeth's death impractical, unless, as Williams suggested above, the reforms are already prepared. Twomey believes that careless interpretations might create significant problems lasting decades into the future:

> … it became apparent … that the word "Crown", or other references to royal, majesty, king, queen, cloaked a range of different meanings, and it was a convenient word to do that, so that people didn't have to think what it meant.

What matters in the speculation about the constitutional implications of the Queen's death is the energy and consideration devoted to something entirely imaginary. There is, currently at least, no alternative to Prince Charles becoming King of Australia, and no practical preparations to make an alternative possible. So why does vacillation about the significance of the Queen's death continue to play such a role in discourse about constitutional reform? I suggest that this reveals the centrality of the Queen, and people's affective bonds to her, in understandings of constitutional monarchy in Australia. Further, all sides of the debate

instinctively recognised the ritual dangers of the liminal period following the Queen's death, with its inevitably coterminous rituals of funeral and coronation.

The risk to symbolic order posed by a ruler's death is a classical anthropological concern (Turner 1969; Douglas 1966; Bloch and Parry 1982; Hertz 2004 [1960]; Lienhardt 1967). The ruler's death will initially be marked by rites of rupture, cessation, and cutting (van Gennep 1960 [1909]). After a suitable time, the disorder of communal grief will then ordinarily be resolved by rites of reaggregation, which reaffirm the social structure. Of course, reaggregation may mean reformation. Republicans discussed the need to make respectful preparations. League members fervently hope that King Charles' investiture might be re-enacted in several Commonwealth countries, including Australia.

Noel Cox (1998) suggests that the way the person of the monarch has emerged as a separate entity from the body politic is a particularly Australian permutation. Certainly, what is distinctive about the Australian discourse of Crown-as-Queen is the way popular appetite for constitutional change is so often constructed as imagining the death of the queen *as* the death of constitutional monarchy. This echoes the historical connection between the revolutionary killing of monarchs as symbolically killing the monarchy. It capsises the traditional understanding of the two bodies (Metcalf and Huntington 1991: 168): instead of the death of a body physical affirming the perpetuity of the body politic, the citizenry has imagined limiting the body politic to the life cycle of the present sovereign.

Perhaps the Queen's death is constructed as a lever for constitutional reform because death itself is such a compelling marker. To effect constitutional change in Australia demands compulsion. The double majority needed to amend the Constitution is seldom reached, which Quick and Garran's Annotated Constitution justified like this: "to prevent change being made in haste or by stealth, to encourage public discussion and to delay change until there is strong evidence that it is desirable, irresistible, and inevitable" (1901: 988). The Constitution cannot

be adapted piecemeal, by interpretation, or by haphazard drift. The Queen's life might be framed by republicans as a mock impediment to reform, when in fact they are looking to her death as an undeniable end point for monarchy. Paradoxically, this leaves the Queen politically potent in death, as she was in life. Verdery (1999) insisted that the dead inevitably work for the living and described how dead bodies can be deployed as political actors. Here we have a dead-body-to-be as political-actor-to-be, available to work for – or against – political interests.

Royal watching

Another prominent way that the Queen and monarchy feature in Australian life is that popular interest in the royal family remains high. During my fieldwork, media covered local celebrations of Princess Charlotte's birth and Prince Harry's tour. One newspaper heralded the birth of Princess Charlotte with a full front page dedicated to "Our little princess" (*Herald Sun* 2015); another described Princess Charlotte as "A darling new jewel in the Crown" (Benns 2015). Discourse about these events helps naturalise interest in the royal family, including an avid interest in royal virility and fertility. Both Anderson (2006 [1983]) and Billig (1995) link media discourse to nationhood and national identity. The media discourse stresses the monarchy's endurance by associating the Queen with her potential heirs. It also normalises and shapes emotional responses to these events through repetition and ritual expression, because emotions gain a kind of cultural density through circulation (Ahmed 2004). Most monarchists and republicans described affection for the Queen (including deference for her great age), the glamour of the younger royals, and, most topically, the excitement of the new royal babies as critical factors in the public's apparently low appetite for constitutional reform. Further, the notion promoted in the newspapers that Princess Charlotte is "ours", that she is familial, and someone whose birth should be acknowledged as

part of this community, evokes the culturally organised performative aspects of emotional experience (ibid.). Most monarchists attributed the surge of republicanism in the 1990s partly to the royal family's private problems and the subsequent public censure, which again illustrates the link between the Crown's standing and affection for those individuals which embody it.

Many interlocutors dismissed popular interest in the Queen and her family as succumbing to the power of celebrity. However, the monarch's body itself holds symbolic significance. I suggest that this dismissal is a misreading of how the monarchy animates and sacralises politics for some, and given the ubiquity of popular interest in the royal family, it ought not be trivialised. As one example, historian Bruce Baskerville thought he would go and see for himself when the Duke and Duchess of Cambridge were due to visit the lookout in his small Blue Mountains community.

> It's a small town, so I thought I'd be there in plenty of time. But the way to the promontory was stacked deep with people and they'd been there for hours. People had taken the day off work, and taken their kids out of school for the day. When Wills and Kate came through, it should only have been a quick stop. But people at the back were passing their babies through the crowd so that the royals could touch them! So what's going on with that?

The nexus between kingship and charity, whether for victims of witchcraft or bushfires, is an old idea. It is also not without Australian precedent. During Prince Edward's 1920 tour, the quest to touch the prince became such a mania that there was genuine risk to people being crushed in the crowds. At one Melbourne reception, some 20,000 people filed past the Prince in two hours, and over 100 reportedly fainted (Connors 2015: 49). This echoes the persistent folk historical belief in England and France of the potential of the royal touch as a spectacular cure, most notably for scrofula (Bloch 1973). This practice reflected traditional beliefs about monarchy's divinity and ability to effect miracles – and about the potential for this embodied power to be viscerally transmitted by touch. As writer Peter Rees speculated to me, affection for the royals taps into "that magical thinking which is not far beneath the surface of a very

large part of the community." With this in mind, when interlocutors trivialised affection for the Queen or heirs as celebrity, I would probe further. Would people hold out babies to be touched by a sports star or celebrity musician? For other political leaders? Why did these people behave differently towards the royals – in a way which suggests religious leadership and the granting of blessing? Borrowing from Trouillot (2001), something happened on that promontory of that small country town that was, I think, more than celebrity. The question is what.

This raises the issue of what exactly celebrity is. In what ways are celebrity and charisma alike as concepts and in what ways do they differ? Where are celebrity's conceptual limits, and where is its symbolic value? While charisma is an enduring anthropological concern, celebrity has received comparatively little attention. Schoug (1997) examined Swedish sporting celebrities, and Hughes-Freeland (2007) applied Weber's concept of charisma to contemporary Indonesian politics, asking if celebrity is a new form of charisma. Chris Rojek defined it as "the attribution of glamour or notorious status to an individual within the public sphere" (2001: 10) and classified the British royal family as dynastic celebrities. Rojek argues that celebrity does not displace religion but has become "the milieu in which religious recognition and belonging are now enacted" (ibid.: 97). Accordingly, the Queen and her heirs are charismatic leaders and celebrities operating not as religious substitutes but in a quasi-religious arena.[1] This incomplete analysis certainly leaves scope for the transcendent and sacred as part of political, but does not entirely explain how and why people held out their babies to be touched by royalty. However, it is instructive to recall Geertz's corrective that charisma was originally a Christian theological term indicating a "God-given capacity to perform miracles" (1983: 14), an understanding with a genealogy and

[1] The British monarch is also a religious leader as Defender of the Faith in the Anglican Church. Only two of my interlocutors mentioned this, from which I assume that it is not greatly significant to this community. It also recalls Kapferer's assertion that being irreligious is a typical Australian characteristic (2012 [1988]).

political edge that he hoped to restore in his own analysis of a term now used as a synonym for glamour or popularity.

Most of my interlocutors emphasised that they themselves had no interest in the personal lives of royalty, which they classified as gossip, and many expressed impatience with media coverage of royalty. They often attributed monarchy's popularity, especially amongst youth, to the women's magazines which commercialise them, as illustrated in comments such as Anne Twomey's observation: "My suspicion is that a lot of it is just interest in celebrity as opposed to actual attachment to the concept of Crown and a constitutional monarchy … it's superficial and peer-influenced." Fred Chaney said he reads women's magazines and classifies royals along with other celebrities, adding "They're like the Kardashians, they're just famous for being famous." Kerry-Anne Walsh said, "Look at the crowds that turned out for Harry, they're the same young girls who go to watch One Direction. 'Marry me Harry' and all that sort of thing. I find it hard to understand." These attitudes insist that the office of monarchy should be distinguished properly from the persons which inhabit it. Further, these comments classifying popular interest in royalty as retrograde again describe gender and class distinctions (Bourdieu 1984).

Many monarchists emphasised aspects of the Queen's character that they thought made her personally suitable for the role of sovereign. People who had once briefly met the Queen would use the encounter as evidence of her impressive human qualities, often elaborating knowledge of the Queen of which they had no direct experience (Nairn 1988). Twomey said that the Crown's visibility "rises and falls depending upon circumstances, depending upon the monarch of the day. And things may well be considerably different when Prince Charles is around, if he becomes king." Twomey's qualified phrasing suggests that the possibility that he will not remains open for her. The equivocation about whether the Queen's

death will trigger constitutional reform carries an undercurrent of suspicion about Prince Charles' suitability for the role.

However, loyalties and classifications were not always as clear as first declarations might suggest. Monarchists who insisted they had no interest in the royals as people also expressed enthusiasm for them or personal knowledge of them. Jai Martinkovits, the young executive director of the ACM, asserted that, "It's not just that the young princes are handsome men and … eligible" but also that all Australians recognise the royal family's "sense of service and magnificent dedication to the needs of others. Prince Charles alone raises more money than any other individual in the United Kingdom for charitable causes!" Republican Philip Flood had spent significant time with Queen Elizabeth as High Commissioner to the United Kingdom, and warmly regarded her intelligence and sharp humour. He said affectionately, "She is immense fun." Some mentioned not only characteristics such as virtue, intelligence, and charm, but also the Queen's physical beauty, with a noble and memorable face that expresses good character. Some expressed their affection for her as "love". Some described enthusiasm for royalty as a bond they shared with their mother. (Each of the examples I have in mind are men.) Some displayed the Queen's portrait in their homes or kept memorabilia such as scrapbooks about royal tours or weddings. Public servants of strict professional neutrality would later confess to a profound personal devotion to the Queen since childhood, and republicans proclaimed cheerfully about their own interest in royalty, or their intention to take seriously that of others.

Others found it difficult to take these affective bonds seriously, dismissing them as anachronistic, and certainly would not admit how such emotion could justify retaining constitutional monarchy. Yet Connors cautioned that such sentiments were commonplace within living memory (1993). In her social history of Australians' experience of royal tours, some women stated they now felt disenclined to share their joyful memories of the Queen's

1954 tour. Out of concern that their social group no longer held a common vocabulary for discussing these special memories, even as nostalgia, they held them privately, believing that they could not be shared without risking incomprehension or ridicule. Connors observes that contemporary royal-watching is categorised as a female domain and is often marginalised as women's social history (Connors 1993, 2015), but for most of Australia's history, royal watching was very popular with both genders, and interest in the royals personally was understood as part of support for monarchy as institution. In 1954 many men "scrambled for invitations" to meet the Queen (Connors 1993: 381), although male attention to royalty was often framed as interest in defence and militarism.

One interlocutor who had reconciled her apparently paradoxical interests in royal-watching and republicanism was Diana Warnock, who has been a journalist, lecturer, State politician, and women's rights activist. Now retired, she devotes her considerable energy to causes which matter to her, including republicanism, arts and feminism. To maintain her fluency in written French, she reads an hour a day from French magazines like *Hello*, in which stories about royalty are staples. Warnock said, "This is a constant joke among my friends who are also republicans … for a republican, I know more about the monarchy than most people you could possibly imagine!" For Warnock, the pleasures of consuming royalty are categorically different from wanting monarchy as a constitutional system. Though she appreciates the charismatic fairytale elements of a prince marrying a commoner and the enchantment of a new baby, she becomes most animated talking about the romance of the Eureka story and its flag, and her impatience for Australia to become a republic.

Another exception, journalist Jane Connors, holds a doctorate in the social history of royal tours to Australia and recently published a popular book on the topic (2015). She voted for the republic and says she would do so again, and recognises that this apparent inconsistency bewilders monarchists and republicans alike. She recalled being in a radio quiz

about royalty with a prominent monarchist who, although she was winning, dismissed her as a republican. “It became necessary to get him off balance … [so I] flashed him because *I* have a tattoo … And he really was very shocked. He recoiled!” Laughing mischievously, she showed me the small crown tattooed on her left breast, in imperial red and purple, which she had done to mark her successful thesis submission. That a republican would have the symbol of monarchy inscribed on her body would seem paradoxical, but like Warnock’s pleasure in royal gossip magazines, Connors holds these ideas simultaneously.

Of course, that these two examples are of women is not coincidental. Scholars have examined the particular pleasures which following the royals apparently offers women, who can consume the royal family as a melodrama, treat the royals as archetypes for exploring the constraints, pressures, and pleasures of domesticity, mothering and family (Nairn 1988: 170; Brett 1996), and consider what it means to be a good or proper woman (Coward 1985). Royal-watching gives women, in particular, access to the entertaining pleasures of pageantry, ceremonies, and fashion (Billig 2002: 172–201). From Connors’ perspective, monarchists and republicans marginalise popular interest in monarchy as gendered because it means they can frame their positon on constitutional reform as properly intellectual without admitting the affective dimension:

> What really struck me was the contempt for the popular interest in the Crown … it’s a great *blaming* of women who are probably too stupid to understand the Constitution anyway, and so focused on what was trivial, less meaningful, less important. And annoyingly, for the monarchists, kept the institution alive for the wrong reasons.

She also observed that republicans promoted their own rationalisation by minimising the emotional and relational connections people felt for the Queen. They developed a reputation for dry intellectualism, which ultimately undermined their position, because they were perceived as denying the affective elements of nationalism by privileging:

> … joylessness and dourness and the idea that you can cut through these emotions with what you see as a hard rational argument … I mean they were scuppered by the Prime Minister [Howard] but their great failing was they achieved no emotional connection.[1]

Certainly, both monarchists and republicans trivialised royal-watching to me (even those monarchists who also disclosed affection for the royal family), and generally my fieldwork supports the idea that republicans usually feel that their position is more logical. Connors was acutely sensitive to the gendered nature of how affection for royalty can be expressed in Australia, and how this might motivate people in ways difficult to articulate or even recognise within Australian political discourse. Yet the work of symbolism in nation-making is predicated on having the public accept these proffered embodied symbols, and so the very people who disdained popular interest in monarchy were often involved in promoting it.

Competing visions of imagined communities

Anthropology has an extensive literature on nations as "imagined political communities [that are] imagined as both inherently limited and sovereign" (Anderson 2006 [1983]: 6; cf. Gellner 1983; Hobsbawm 1983). More recently, anthropologists have focused on exactly how and by whom these national communities are imagined, and whose interests they serve (Hage 1998; Kelly and Kaplan 2001; Eriksen 2002; Trouillot 2001). I suggest that each side of Australia's constitutional reform debate employs the Crown, the Queen, and other symbols to help imagine their ideal national community.

To discuss the imagined communities contested by republicans and monarchists, I distinguish between republicanism as a political ideology and republicanism as an Australian value. Republicans I met usually framed their republicanism in nationalistic terms, as a constitutional form specifically suited to Australian culture. They criticised constitutional

[1] Here Connors articulates a common republican view that Prime Minister Howardmanipulated the referendum through the choice of questions.

monarchy as dissonant: monarchy is not Australian, but republicanism can be. John Warhurst even describes himself as a "nationalist republican" (1993: 199). A republic, they say, would better reflect Australian values such as egalitarianism and fairness which constitutional monarchy, predicated on dynastic inheritance, does not. Another common rationalisation is that Australia should have a head of state who is an Australian citizen and who, like other Australians, lives in Australia, because "only colonies continue to borrow the monarchies of other lands" (Turnbull 1993: 4). This quest sees republicanism as exerting an ultimately irresistible teleological and nationalist force, one that reflects the maturity and independence of Australia's political development. Rarely did republicans articulate their position as one of political philosophy, for instance that republicanism is a good system for any society. They seldom discussed republics in other countries.

In comparison, monarchists often described their advocacy in terms of political philosophy, emphatically advocating for constitutional monarchy as the ideal form of state formation and almost always superior to a republic. Some cited studies and media articles identifying constitutional monarchy as the causative factor in a citizen's expectations for peace, security, democracy, political stability, transparency, and other measures of public good. They also frequently made comparative arguments for constitutional monarchy by discussing republics which they saw as instructively poor examples, most usually the United States of America. However, these principled arguments were also usually followed by remarks about the personal virtues of the Queen and her heirs, and the historical and personal relationship and reciprocal obligations they share with Australians. That people's advocacy on both sides was motivated by complex and emotive positions recalls Anderson's comparison of "the 'political' power of such nationalisms vs. their philosophical poverty and even incoherence" (2006 [1983]: 5).

Further, monarchists and republicans often emphasised different forms of nationalism in their vision for Australian society. For instance, monarchists were generally more comfortable with what republicans often saw as patriotic excesses, such as some aspects of Anzac commemorations or jingoistic displays of the Australian flag. They related these to ideas about Australians being "united under the Crown". Republicans were more likely than monarchists to support ideas about Indigenous Recognition (although there were diverse views amongst monarchists on this).

These nationalistic ideas can be explicitly related to broader notions of kinship and family. Throughout this study I have traced a tension between the Queen's status as quasi-kin to her "Australian family" and that of a stranger or foreigner to Australians. In his study of royal watching amongst the British, Billig argued that talk about royalty is a kind double speak which say as much about 'us' as about 'them' (2002: 87–88). People used the royal family as a proxy to discuss issues such as bloodlines, purity, nationalism, ethnicity, and identity (ibid.: 105) – to discuss who belongs in the family and who does not. Popular interest in royalty is usually expressed as interest in the royals as a family group (Billig 2002): the royal family stands as an exemplary nuclear family, and as a metaphor for forms of familial nationalism, such as the national family of Great Britain, the family of the Commonwealth or, historically, the family of Empire. Family is also important to how royal watching is performed. Billig found that it was often a focus of sociality within families (2002); this was echoed by my interlocutors who described royal watching as a bond with their mothers, or something they did "as a family".

I suggest that the competing nationalist imaginaries of republicans and monarchists can be contextualised within larger public discourses about what it means to be a true Australian. This includes struggles about the status and rights of Indigenous Australians, about gay rights, about migrants seeking citizenship and refugees seeking protection, and

about how the responsibilities of citizenship can be foreclosed and the rights of citizenship abrogated by "un-Australian" attitudes or acts. All of these were prominent in national political and media discourse during my fieldwork. Whether the Queen is no longer included in Australia's independent national community or is in fact at the heart of the Australian family forms part of this larger debate.

Imagining the Queen's death

Will Australia stand at a political and constitutional crossroads when Queen Elizabeth dies, and why has it been considered taboo to canvas constitutional reform while the Queen remains alive? The motion was already vigorously, even bitterly, voted on in 1999. It is as if to discuss the abolition of the Crown, while no longer treasonous, would cause offence or discomfort to the feelings of the person in which it is currently embodied. Has the pendulum swung so far towards monarchism that such imaginings constitute an act of *lèse-majesté*? Or is there an expectation that the future King Charles will be a lesser model, less sacred and thus less deserving of fealty? Perhaps Charles is perceived as having completely separated himself from the office already, as he has stated that he is personally comfortable with an Australian republic (The Prince of Wales 1994). Anxieties about whether to explore constitutional reform during the Queen's lifetime demonstrate that the concept of Crown-as-Queen remains significant and deeply pleasurable for many Australians, even for some who are committed to republicanism. At the same time, the prospect of a republic means a profound and distressing sorrow for my monarchist interlocutors, disrupting the sempiternity of the Crown, compounding their grief at the death of a beloved queen, and the severing of a quasi-kin relationship as well.

Though Queen Elizabeth has been styled Queen of Australia since 1973, many Australians continue to understand the Crown as a distinctively British institution. For the

most part this meaning is acceptably disguised in a kind of mutual pretence, but when it becomes undeniable, as it was with Prince Philip's knighthood, the tension between Queen Elizabeth's status as kin and as stranger to Australians becomes untenable. Whether the personalised, personified body of Elizabeth has come to overshadow the immortal body of the Queen and her Crown offices is less clear. However, the habitual dismissal of affection for the royals as attraction to celebrity leaves unexamined their charismatic powers. Monarchy appears to retain the power to sacralise space and anoint the profane, and the contact between these spheres reinforces the symbolic power of the royal bodily presence and makes the past present through ritual gesture.

Chapter Seven
Perceptions of the Australian Crown

> *Whereas the people of New South Wales, Victoria, South Australia, Queensland, and Tasmania, humbly relying on the blessing of Almighty God, have agreed to unite in one indissoluble Federal Commonwealth under the Crown of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland ...*
>
> *Preamble, Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act 1900 (Sawer 1988)*

These opening words of the Australian Constitution place the Crown at the Commonwealth's head, with the States federated under it. Indeed, across the Commonwealth's constitutional monarchies, the Crown is the master metonym for the complexities and vagaries of constitutional monarchy. It serves as a key symbol (Ortner 1973) in these Westminster democracies because it summarises certain ideas and emotions that they provoke. Constitutional monarchy is fundamentally a symbolic system, and its symbol is the Crown. Yet, what is the Crown? And what do Australians mean when they talk about the Crown?

Here I explore how some Australians perceive and understand the Crown, while watching how they behave towards it. In what ways is it recognised, and what symbolic values are ascribed to it? I analyse how people who grapple professionally with the concept, including lawyers, members of the judiciary, and parliamentarians, articulate its meanings, and compare this with how monarchists and republicans describe the Crown. In particular I consider the implications behind the phrase "the crowned republic". Then I scrutinise two examples of the Crown's use in political rituals, and contrast these with the descriptions and understandings offered by interlocutors to reveal aspects of the Australian Crown's role and effects as a political symbol. But I begin with my interlocutors' descriptions.

Perceptions of the Crown in Australia

Throughout my fieldwork, there was little common ground among experts in terms of what the Crown is in Australia, but most agreed that "the Crown" is not a term Australians find useful for daily life. People often said they had not ever thought much about it. Unsurprisingly, constitutional legal scholars could articulate the problem, even though they themselves recognised the complexity of the abstraction they were trying to define. "I have a cynical view that trying to explain the Crown in plain language … is difficult, so that's one reason people don't refer to the Crown," said Lee Godden. Anne Twomey, another legal scholar, said,

> It's not exactly really obvious, it's actually really difficult … It means a number of different things. It means the executive government, often. Sometimes it means the personification of the state. Sometimes it means the relationship with the United Kingdom, so the role of the monarch and her relationship with Australia. It can mean the polity of the relevant state, or even sometimes less than states.

This unusually well-considered description focuses on the Crown's role in Australia's constitutional order. However, the Crown carries meanings beyond the constitution. People described the Crown to me as Queen Elizabeth herself and her heirs, the systems of constitutional monarchy, the head of state, the vice-regents, the reserve powers, or a loose collection of what they consider Westminster values. Mark Leeming described it as "invisibility plus respectability plus historical continuity". Leeming had sworn an oath of allegiance to the Queen when joining the judiciary. However, for him the sovereignty of the state has come unfastened from the Crown and the monarchy. Referring to the tipstaff[1] that some NSW judges use to assert their authority, he said:

> It's not clear to me that having a staff member who wields that unfortunately unwieldy tipstaff [gestures to it behind me] means that you're embodying the Crown and representing the Crown. I think of [being a judge] as embodying the judicial power of the state, and to release people from jail and send people to jail, which is

> about as visceral as you get to judicial power. But I do think of it as the judicial power of the state, I don't think of it as some emanation of the Crown.

Lobbyists had more definitive views. Benwell sees the Crown as "the very foundation of our constitution". The National Convenor of the ACM, David Flint, said emphatically that the Crown is "the non-political part of the state". Peter FitzSimons simply rejects the Crown as "ludicrous". Others were more equivocal, and speculated about the Crown's broader significance. For Mark McKenna, the Crown is a "largely irrelevant" residual category. Fred Chaney said, "It's an unspeaking symbol, isn't it?" Constitutional lawyer George Williams described it as:

> a term of legal art that is not commonly used … it's there in a subterranean sense … I think, for many Australians, the Crown is a bit of a mystery. It's not used in common parlance, it is rarely spoken of in the media or public debate … I can give you a good lawyer's answer, but I don't think there's any common community conception … it's a mysterious, largely invisible concept.

Legal scholar and Indigenous Australian Asmi Woods said that as well as the Crown being, "what stole our land," it was also "the legal personality within the constitution, central to criminal prosecution, land, radical title. It is central to everything, in law anyway", and he added, "but I don't think about it much". Peter Rees reflected and said simply, "The term 'Crown' is not an Australian term of use." Kerry-Anne Walsh said that it is important to her that monarchy's place in Australia is reformed, but she suspects that many people see the Crown as "just symbolic". This range of opinions demonstrates that understandings about the Crown are ambiguous, varied, uncertain, and sometimes paradoxical. Even among experts, the term itself is not much used. People who deal with the Crown as a legal object offered technical and cognitive descriptions, while lobbyists offer criticism or praise coloured by ideology and emotion. Many interlocutors understood questions about the Crown as an invitation to discuss constitutional reform, demonstrating that while the Crown itself is not part of national discourse, constitutional reform is, and interlocutors would quickly move to discussing the Queen's constitutional role in Australia.

People frequently described the Crown as “merely symbolic” or “just a symbol”. While this response would be predictable from republicans wanting to minimise the Crown’s relevance, in fact it was widely used by those who described themselves as impartial and by all but the most royalist of monarchists. Julian Leeser is a conservative, lobbyist and lawyer, associated with Australians for Constitutional Monarchy and the Liberal Party. At 19, he served as a local body councillor, the youngest in Australian history, and at 21 he was appointed to the government’s 10-member “No” Case Committee for the Republican Referendum. When I asked him about the Crown, he immediately parried with, “As a symbolic matter or a practical matter?” What did he mean by this reflexive distinction?

His response evokes a particularly Australian classification, that of the symbolic as an antonym to the practical – useful, realistic, pragmatic and commonsensical. If symbolic stands against these things, that means it is fanciful, of little consequence, ineffective, perhaps even extraneous. Kapferer argues that practical common sense, like irreverence and egalitarianism, is mythologised and idealised as a heroic Anzac value (2012 [1988]: 170–71). This may help explain what people mean when they describe the Crown as “just a symbol.” In a nation where the practical is prized, to describe something as symbolic indicates that it has little practical effect or value. Leeser continued that, “I think it’s very important. But does it affect people’s everyday lives as they are going about their business, no it doesn’t. It’s a presence.” For Leeser, the Crown is significant, but not in terms of the practical virtues which he believes usually resonate for Australians.

When my interlocutors categorise the Crown as a symbol, they did not typically use the term in the specialised anthropological sense. One who did was John Warhurst, who said, “To me, it’s the cultural power of the Crown in Australia which is much more important than arguing the constitutional niceties … It is all about symbolism.” Here Warhurst recognises the Crown’s ability to realise and personalise constitutional power as one of its most integral

and necessary aspects. For him, its purpose is deeply and richly symbolic of power, rather than ancillary to it. It is because of this symbolic power, and the negative meanings these carry for him, that he has spent most of his adult life advocating republican reform.

By describing it as "just a symbol" people also meant that the Crown is so circumscribed that the position of head of state is effectively neutered, making Australia functionally a republic with a figurehead monarchy. Lobbyists on both sides share the perception that Australia is "only a hair's breadth from a republic", and the ACM, "unique among lobby groups, argues not how great, but how small is the influence of the institution it protects" (Hirst 1994: 1). For many republican minimalists (those who want the least amount of constitutional reform to achieve a republic), the only constitutional gap to plug is that the head of state is not Australian.[1] Remarkably, these opposed groups both use it as evidence for the logic of their own positions. As Mark McKenna observed, "the symbol [of the crown] has become largely irrelevant, but its irrelevance is now used as an argument for its retention, it saves us from having an Australian politician [in the role] as Australian president". Here McKenna describes the monarchist view that the "merely symbolic" head of state proves that constitutional monarchy is functioning correctly, valued because of its perceived ineffectuality, not despite it. If even some monarchists consider the Crown practically, though not symbolically, insignificant, why do they defend it so tenaciously? How can two opposed groups see the same symbol, and ascribe the same meaning to it, but comprehend it as signalling completely different ways of framing the world? These apparently paradoxical understandings reveals one of the Crown's central conundrums: how can it be taken for granted and yet highly politically charged?

[1] A substantial minority of monarchists argue that the Governor-General is Australia's head of state. This argument is made most vigorously by Sir David Smith (2005) and associated with Australians for Constitutional Monarchy.

For republicans, having a “mere symbol” as head of state signals its unimportance, and reassures that nothing substantial would change significantly in a move to a republic. Speaking to me in his parliamentary office, member of parliament Matt Thistlethwaite (also a lawyer), argued that, “If we make this reform, most Australians will not even know that we’ve done it. Because everyday life will not change. Australians will go to work, our legal system will continue to operate in the same manner, our laws will continue to be passed by this parliament.” This minimalist description of reform argues that it entails no threat because it will be largely figurative rather than practical, as constitutional monarchy remains largely invisible in everyday Australian life. Thistlethwaite said that he was committed to reform because becoming a republic “would symbolise maturity for our nation”. To some republicans the Crown and monarchy might be primarily symbolic but they recognise its potency because, like Thistlethwaite, they insist that it is deeply, profoundly symbolically important that the head of state be an Australian.

A common republican saying is that “any Aussie child should be able to be head of state”. This argument refutes English aristocratic inheritance of the role in favour of democratically judged merit, which republicans perceive to better reflect Australian values such as egalitarianism and fairness. Thistlethwaite echoed this oft-repeated saying when he mentioned his two young daughters in Parliament during a reading of the Succession to the Crown Bill 2015, which aimed to synchronise, with other Commonwealth realms, Australia’s repeal of the gender discrimination of monarchical inheritance. He said, “Like every proud Australian father … I despair that they cannot aspire to hold the position of head of state in our nation” (Thistlethwaite 2015). Of course, in arguing against genealogy and heredity, republicans assert their own distinctive local forms of it: eligibility should be determined by citizenship of the “imagined community” (Anderson 2006 [1983]). Out of a sense of

nationalism, they argue against inherited invented traditions while insisting on new invented traditions (Hobsbawm and Ranger 1983).

A crowned republic?

> *… if our slowly-grown*
> *And crowned Republic's crowning common-sense,*
> *That saved her many times, not fail …*
>
> *Idylls of the King* (Tennyson 1897: final stanza)

In the 1990s, political scientists, monarchists, and republicans began describing Australia's constitutional arrangements as a "crowned republic" (Kirby 1992; Republic Advisory Committee 1993: 39; Keating 1995; Hirst 1994; McKenna 1996: 4–5; Brett 1996; Flint 1999). This faintly absurdist phrase has a glib best-of-both-worlds quality: Australia is already both republic and monarchy. For some, it signified an emerging belief that Australia was already a de facto republic, making constitutional reform a formality. For republicans, this meant constitutional reform would be inconsequential and therefore unthreatening. For instance, the Republican Advisory Committee described Australia as "a state in which sovereignty resides in its people, and in which all public offices, except that at the very apex of its system, are filled by persons deriving their authority directly or indirectly from the people … a crowned republic" (1993: 39). For some monarchists, usually those associated with the ACM, it signalled that Australia's unique form of constitutional monarchy had already incorporated the most salient and useful aspects of the republic: a new and distinctively Australian constitutional form. Further, in the Westminster system the sovereign is really a figurehead, with power actually residing in the apparently subservient parliament (Bagehot 2001 [1867]); in the modern era power has accreted in the cabinet and the increasingly presidential persona of the Prime Minister.

In fact, while the term burst into currency in the 1990s as if devised for the Australian constitutional reform debate, it has an older history. Tennyson first used the term in the closing stanza of *Idylls of the King*, his great Arthurian epic narrative (1897). Before this, the notion is evident in Bagehot's description of a "republic disguised … which has insinuated itself beneath the folds of a monarchy" (2001 [1867]: 185), a gloss which was necessary for those who habitually misinterpreted theatrical pomp for actual power. H.G. Wells uses the term 11 times in his *A Short History of the World* (1958 [1922]) to describe the British Empire as a crowned republic of "United British Kingdoms". When Australia's first cardinal, Cardinal Moran, described Australia as a "crown republic," it was this meaning of the British Empire that he evoked (Cochrane 1996: 66). While its contemporary Australian use suggests a new or indigenised expression, the term carries a profoundly English political heritage and colonial worldview.

Today, the term "crowned republic" is identified with and used almost exclusively by the ACM. They operate a website called "The Crowned Republic" (Australians for Constitutional Monarchy 2016a) which champions the idea, stating that because "Australia now enjoys all the desirable features of a republican government and a constitutional monarchy without any disadvantages of either system", republican concerns can be dismissed because "agitation for change is unnecessary, irrelevant, divisive and distracting" (Australians for Constitutional Monarchy 2016b). (Verbally, some members of the Monarchist League referred to ACM members as "those crowned *republicans*", indicating that they consider it a fundamental compromise in principles.) Tennyson used the phrase exultingly, and so do some ACM members: as an irrefutable statement that purportedly neutralises all reasonable objections. This particularly appeals to that subset of monarchists who believe that the Governor-General is the head of state (Smith 2005). If Australia is

already a de facto republic, and the head of state is already an Australian citizen, what grounds remain for the republicans?

What is salient for my argument is how the phrase fuses the two symbols into one, so recognises the symbolic potency of both the Crown and the *res publica*. However, Leeming recognised that there is precedent for a new constitutional order appearing to cling to the symbols of the old, and that charismatic leaders can mould symbolic meanings pragmatically according to their own will:

> … Augustus got rid of the republic but kept the senate because there's a huge value in symbols and there's a huge value in historical continuity – it makes it easy to govern. I'm not surprised that in the de facto republic we have at the moment we still keep those symbols, especially on people's sleeves.

Here Leeming recognised the symbolic potency of the Crown, and pragmatism rather than paradox in the miscegenation of Australia's constitutional modes and symbols. In contrast, the notion of the Crown as "merely symbolic" makes it easier to accommodate the seductive idea that new and meaningful republican symbols could simply take up that conceptual space. As Williams commented:

> If we did become a republic, there would need to be things to fill that gap. But it wouldn't be as big a task as we might think, because these symbols aren't visible anyway at the moment … nobody takes much notice of them … You'd just have a crownless symbol.

When people assume that the Crown is unimportant and that people do not notice it, it evades interrogation. If the Crown is routinely taken for granted, perhaps this enables the Crown's symbolism to persist in underestimated but significant powerful emotional, cognitive and ideological ways.

The Crown has real duties and practical effects. It is, as Asmi Woods describes, central to criminal prosecution, land, and radical title, as well as ordering elections and undertaking a host of other duties with actual consequences. However, recognising that the material and symbolic are not mutually exclusive, I argue that its substantial symbolic

potency of complex sensory, ideological and cognitive meanings lies openly in its taken-for-grantedness as a trivial symbol. In my first example, the Crown is taken for granted but has spectacular ritual power; in my second, a mistaken identity causes angst for a ritual specialist.

The spectacular power of the mace

It was a typically chilly Canberra winter day when I arrived at Australia Parliament House and made my way to the public gallery of the House of Representatives. The previous day had been Budget Day, and there was a frisson amongst staff and media as the crowd swelled. The first Question Time after Budget Day is a theatrical highlight in the calendar of Australia's aggressive House of Representatives. But hours before this ritual began, I observed another, more prosaic ceremony from the public gallery.

The leaders started the day's work in a special location set aside by society for that purpose. The ceremony began when a ritual specialist (the serjeant-at-arms) dressed in a special costume (a morning suit with white gloves) carried a staff into the space. The stick's powers are protected from ritual pollution by strictly enforced social rules about how to behave towards it. Only the serjeant-at-arms may touch it, and there are proper codified ways of handling it, and ways which are forbidden. The chattering leaders, and the staff, media and people in the galleries fall silent and still as they watch. The serjeant-at-arms leads a procession, escorting another, more senior ritual specialist wearing special adornments (the speaker) into the chamber. Both recite specific ceremonial words. People watch intently as the stick is placed into a special holder, which must be turned in the correct direction. The ritual is efficacious, and the magic stick has worked again: the mace's royal authority has activated the House of Representatives, which the serjeant-at-arms declared open for business. The mace is so potent that the serjeant-at-arms must shield or withdraw it from the presence of the personification of those powers, the Governor-General. Versions of this ritual are replicated at the Australian Senate (the upper house) and each of the State parliaments. Unless this ritual has been performed, parliaments are not officially sitting.

In this instance, the meanings of the crowned mace are given structure and order by its ritual purpose; as Kertzer says, ritual is "action wrapped in a web of symbolism" (1988:

9). The ritual's chances of success are boosted by the formality of its performance, which also helps communicate what exactly is being done and what outcomes are expected (Rappaport 1999: 115–16). The mace makes the royal powers available to parliament in the Queen's absence. Royal authority has been transferred to the symbolic object. These rituals situate the mace within a greater symbolic system designed to augment and naturalise parliament's political power (the colours of the debating Chamber modelled on the British House of Commons, the flags, the formal codes of conduct honouring the speaker, and so on), and these elements are also replicated throughout the States' parliaments.

Much like the Ndembu mudyi tree (Turner 1967), the mace condenses a highly complex system of ideas. It synthesises these, standing for them all at once by containing them in one object. The mace acts as a shorthand for a vast array of ideological and sensory meanings. Moral and political norms about power, sovereignty, legitimacy, democracy, perpetuity, and even sempiternity cohere around this object and orientate the members to a particular cosmology. On the sensory pole, the mace might assert the noble aspirations of parliamentary democracy, the comforts and gravitas of tradition, and the communitas of shared purpose. Its presence could sanctify the members' work, and mark a moment of dignity, transcendence, and reverent calm and unity before the verbal combat begins. For several interlocutors, the lustre of the priceless object itself, like the bicameral parliamentary system and the green and red interior design of the parliamentary houses, reiterates Australia's claim to certain heritage artefacts of the English-derived Westminster system.

I discussed this ritual with Andrew Tink, who said:

> The mace is probably the most important physical item in the chamber … and it's got a crown on top of it! Now, am I bothered by that? No. It's a magnificent thing. It's all a bit odd, a bit silly to me, that's all. But historical artefacts are wonderful, I see it from a heritage and history point of view.

Tink's view is particularly informed by his experience-near perception of the Crown as a barrister, as a senior state parliamentarian for 20 years, and now as a commissioner.

However, it reflects the ease with which some of my interlocutors reconciled apparently contradictory views, seeing the mace as simultaneously vital and inconsequential to the administration of political authority, at once arcane and magnificent, foolish and cognitively ridiculous, and emotionally pleasing.

Those with republican views may not recognise or respect these meanings but instead be impatient or offended by the superstitious anachronism, the unexamined mingling of church and state, the shorthand for colonialism, and the redundant customs from another nation imposed on credulous Australians at a solemn ceremonial moment. This, of course, suggests that the mace is also symbolically significant to them, for they, like monarchists, wish to privilege one set of meanings and abandon the others. Australia's vigorous constitutional reform debate can be partially explained in that each side values one systemic view of the Crown's significance and refutes that other perspectives ought be taken seriously.

A Crown on a teacup

Whenever I visited a Government House (an official residence of a State Governor or Governor-General), staff offered me refreshments in formal and elaborate ways, usually tea or coffee served in fine bone china, water in heavy cut-crystal glass, and tiny biscuits or sandwiches, often on silver trays. Glass and silverware was frequently embossed or etched with crowns or other heraldic imagery. On one such occasion, my white teacup had a line drawing of a dark red Crown finely imprinted on its rim. Usually the image of the crown used on these items by the Queen and her representatives is one of St Edward's Crown: the Queen owns the intellectual property rights to it and Buckingham Palace controls its use.[1] The

[1] Used only at a coronation, St Edward's crown is the principal item of regalia of the Crown Jewels and its image may only be used on the monarch's authority (pers. comm. Royal Historic Palace staffers). Most likely, the image on the teacup is of the Tudor Crown.

Crown on the teacup is recognisably a crown, but it is not St Edward's. As I left, the public servant escorting me commented *sotto voce*:

> Every time that china comes out I have to sigh. It's the wrong crown – you saw that didn't you? It's from before the coronation, not the St Edward. We [indicating the previous administration rather than the current household] commissioned the set only a few years ago and didn't notice, [so] we can't get rid of it, the cost … you know? But it grates every time. It's the *wrong* crown.

In one sense the public servant controlled the situation by appropriating the error, demonstrating her awareness, and blaming others; perhaps she was also testing me. In another sense, this illustrates the challenges of being a good custodian of ritual knowledge.

Fig. 7.1: St Edward's Crown

The embossed teacup forms a small part of a whole dense ritual of formality and etiquette: cup and saucer rather than mug, serving staff, fresh handmade food from the Government House kitchen, and so on. These practices embed the Crown within this nest of symbolic meanings and potentially trigger deep-seated affective responses. These form part of a larger symbolic system that includes each State's Government House, all of which are set apart from Australian society as dedicated spaces in which the Crown's local representatives undertake duties on its behalf. Each Government House is entirely devoted to correctly presenting and performing the Crown. Its staff, who are repositories of specialist knowledge about the Crown, generally take extraordinary care with its symbolic evocation.

The Crown acts as complex code for a system of moral and political information, including assertions of hierarchy and authority. It is such a potent symbol that even its caricature, when appropriated by business names or logos (in Australia, most prominently Melbourne's Crown Casino, Carlton and United Breweries' Crown Lager, and Crown Relocations), indicates heritage and quality (Greyser, Balmer and Urde 2006). Yet few would

recognise the distinction, on a teacup, between an image of St Edward's Crown and any other.

Part of the official's exasperation is that the use of "the wrong Crown" shows that even those who work for the Crown cannot be relied on to properly protect its representation. She is embarrassed and wishes it were otherwise, because while other organisations may appropriate inauthentic images of a crown, staff of Government Houses, as the Queen's representatives, should possess ritual mastery over the Crown's use and representation in every context. While the finer points of the Crown's representation may generally fall below the radar of critical consciousness in the public, surely here, at least, it should be properly kept. Yet, with the teacup, they have shown themselves as having no greater expertise than the organisers of Camp Gallipoli, despite being entitled to use the authorised and official image of St Edward's Crown as the Queen's representatives. In this case, the ability to distinguish between a right crown and a wrong one also becomes a boundary marker of a person's cultural and social capital (Bourdieu 1984), akin to how the way the teacup is held or those petite sandwiches from the silver tray devoured reveals a guest's cultural knowledge.

By confiding her annoyance to me, the public servant both compliments me as one who would discern the right Crown from the wrong, and asserts that so is she, because every appearance of that unfortunate china is a small assault on her senses and a slight, for which she was not responsible, to the symbol she cherishes. Her irritation is compounded in that the error is permanently inscribed on valuable material objects, so cannot easily be made right (unlike, for instance, a mistake in behaviour, which can be corrected in subsequent performances). She emphasises this point by offering in mitigation, without conviction, that her administration is a good steward of public monies.

The visual error may rupture symbolic order, and represent an instance of pollution (Douglas 1966) which risks limiting or disrupting the Crown's symbolic efficacy;

alternatively, perhaps the disruption might reinforce order through the example of difference (Lévi-Strauss 2011 [1955]: 57). However, the public servant also tacitly admits that the distinction is by most standards arcane and technical: after all, the staff who commissioned the china did not realise the error. Crucially, the tea cup can still undertake the Crown's symbolic work because a defining feature of symbols is their permeability – they can absorb variable meanings and powerfully signal one unified meaning to those who recognise it as if it were *the* single true meaning. It is this quality which means they can be jostled over and advantageously employed by contesting groups. The incorrect image still represents a crown, even though a Government House teacup is entitled to bear a special and more symbolically significant Crown under the Queen's imprimatur.

In the elite environments of Parliament and Government Houses, the Crown acts as a boundary marker of specialist knowledge. It articulates ideology through symbolic efficacy by lacing together the highest echelons of Australian power with the Crown, and evokes continuity, specialness, and hierarchy. In the instances of the mace and the teacup, ritual experts are specifically tasked with protecting and representing the Crown in arenas and moments dedicated – indeed, honed over many decades – specifically for that purpose. Each ritual implies links between a cosmic order and the prosaic plane of human experience (Cannadine 1992: 17). Such events help constitute the "spirit of Anzac" in action, because it is perfomance that brings the spirit into being, invests it with morality, and re-establishes social commitment to it (Rappaport 1999). In these sequestered and hierarchical settings, people circulate and endorse certain forms of symbolic literacy which recognise, appreciate and enhance the Crown's symbolic potency – as people also do in vernacular environments such as Camp Gallipoli and the Australian War Memorial's Last Post ceremonies. In each instance rituals dramatised, even sacralised, exceptions to everyday time and space (Leach 1961).

How can these examples of intricate and emotionally charged symbolic efficacy be reconciled with the perception of the Crown as "merely symbolic"? Or with the case of the crowned republic, in which a monarchist lobby group seeks to preserve the Crown by insisting on its ineffectuality? Clearly, these instances – including the crowned republic – demonstrate that the Crown can remain a viable political symbol, even when ostensibly unnoticed or incorrectly portrayed. Perhaps the Crown's ritual experts build on the premise that the Crown is an unexamined symbol which is often dismissed as trivial, by which I mean to indicate the shades between intention and awareness which make hegemony what it is. Communication via symbols inevitably elides the consciousness of those most entangled in them. Being habitually underestimated may be crucial to how the Crown retains social significance in a de facto republic, because people are free to invest it with various meanings that can be contested but not falsified – and free to assume that it would be a simple task to replace one symbolic system with another.

Chapter Eight
Merely symbolic?

> … What is this metaphor, called a *crown*? … is it a *thing*, or is it a *name*, or is it a *fraud*? … is it a thing *necessary* to a nation? If it is, in what does that necessity consist? What *services* does it perform? … Doth the virtue consist in the *metaphor*, or in the man? Doth the goldsmith that makes the crown make the *virtue* also?
>
> Thomas Paine, *Rights of Man,* 1791 (original emphasis)

There is, of course, an actual Crown. This is St Edward's crown, a 2.2 kilogram gold diadem which is kept as a tourist attraction in the Tower of London. Recycled from the metals and stones of a previous model, it has endured for centuries in the same form, solid and unyielding to touch, yet ultimately malleable, ornately fashioned by artifice and an excessively heavy a burden to wear. Described like this, the Crown is a metaphor for monarchy itself. It is also an enabling ritual object. It is pressed into service once in each monarch's reign, most recently in 1953 when 26-year-old Elizabeth Windsor was crowned monarch of 16 Commonwealth realms, including Australia. Yet Paine really asked not about the material object, but about the metaphor for which it stands.

Paine's questions – probing, belligerent, and loyally republican – display a stubborn literalism. Paine demands to know on what basis the Crown holds sovereignty. He is purposefully unwilling to accommodate the imprecision of symbols, and his interrogation remains instructive. What exactly is the metaphor of the Crown? What services does it perform? Does its honour come from the institution, or from the polity – or from the individual who has borne the weight of the thing itself? What would happen to the state, and to its citizens, were it to disappear? How would that change their social order, arrangements for political power, and relationships between Australians?

Its presence is often taken for granted, its meanings unclear, and its efficacy trivialised. That its meaning cannot now be agreed on – just as in Paine's time – is the very point. Its power relies on it being approximate and appropriable. I have argued that its power in contemporary Australia derives from its symbolic efficacy. Its imagery and rituals permeate this society in ways so commonplace that people do not recognise them. For the Crown to be generally unnoticed and dismissed as insignificant is in fact crucial to its persistent potency.

Bagehot believed that the Crown provided "a visible symbol of unity to those still so imperfectly educated as to need a symbol" (2001 [1867]: 56). Humanity has not changed as much as Bagehot may have hoped: a century later, Malcolm Turnbull, in statement worthy of Paine, said, "The Queen is a symbol, a symbol without substance" (Turnbull 1993: 127). Yet whether the Queen stands as an impractical or unstable symbol, or whether the Crown is only useful symbolically for those who cannot grasp the intricacies of cabinet government, this elides the point: the substance of symbols is measured by their multivocality. A symbol confers "order, coherence, and significance upon a people, their surroundings, and the workings of their universe" (Basso and Selby 1976: 3). For many Australians, the Crown is part of a particular nest of symbols of royalty and constitutional monarchy which help order social life, for both monarchists, republicans and those who profess indifference. They use it to give form to ways of understanding what it can mean to be Australian, and locate Australia's place in the world, providing a set of classifications and premises that continually shape Australians' experiences and interpretations of their lives. For them, the Crown offers a cosmological blueprint that articulates fundamental categories about how to organise and interpret the world, and infuse it with dignity and significance. This is as true for those for whom the Crown represent a blight on Australian identity, a canker to be excised before

Australians can stand proudly independent in the world, as it is for those who find it a source of security or inspiration.

To emphasise the Crown's symbolic effects is not to marginalise its constitutional role in Australian society. For all that many of my interlocutors saw it as a trivial ceremonial aspect of Australian life, the Crown holds significant reserve constitutional powers, ultimately owns all land, orders elections, bestows honours, assents legislation, appoints judges, ministers, and ambassadors, and, in some states, prosecutes. It is also visually evident on currency, State and Federal coats of arms, hospitals, military uniforms and banners, and in various other examples, such as charitable and cultural patronages. But for the most part, the Crown goes unnoticed, and most Australians do not see it for what it is. While legal scholars have attended to the concept of the Crown, there has been a relative dearth of interest in it as a cultural symbol. This reflects the way it is most commonly framed in Australian life – or rather, as something set apart from everyday Australian life.

Anthropologically, symbols are rarely "mere" because, in fact, they are integral to making abstraction comprehensible – even by means of other abstraction. In particular, they are vital for the imaginative work required to give form to abstract political ideas (Walzer 1967; Kertzer 1988). Political battles are always waged on the field of symbolism. The Crown's symbolism, far from being mere, is the wellspring of its power and social significance. Especially when unrecognised, the Crown's symbolic functions are in fact its central work, and may be foundationally important to the affective citizenship of many Australians.

A distinctively Australian Crown?

It is possible to describe some particular and distinctively Australian characteristics of the Crown. The Crown in Australia is remains associated with the person of Queen Elizabeth II

and her heirs. Its meanings – including responses to Paine's queries about its purpose, uses, necessity and services – are anthropomorphised in these people and personalised through their actions. These associations of the Crown with the Queen overwhelm its more abstract connotations such as popular sovereignty. Consequently, while the Crown is a metonym for constitutional monarchy, it has not become a metonym for the state.

Not only is the Crown personified, which as a human body is a familiar and relatable metaphor, it also appears to many Australians as something other. Although Queen Elizabeth has been styled Queen of Australia since 1973, the Crown is predominantly seen as the British monarchy by many Australians. Tony Abbott argued that the Crown has become as Australian as cricket, meaning that it has shed the elitism, class associations and formality of its origins and has become woven into the national character (Abbott 1997: 95). This is unconvincing: it is disingenuous for monarchists to argue about "keeping the Crown in the Australian system of Government without relying on any appeal to 'British-ness'" (Abbott 1995: 6), because Britishness is part of the Crown's significance in Australia.

Helping the Crown's honour

The Crown is associated with Australian land in two distinctive ways, as institution and as personification. Its association with land is a formal, instrumental, and legal one that occurs when the Crown-as-office deals with title to land, which it does in ways which profoundly shape Australian society. Here, the Crown's narrow role focuses on ensuring that the law has been correctly applied or complied with and remains relatively circumscribed. This unusual and disproportionately formal relationship with land coupled with the want of a founding document, give rise to what can be today described as an absence of honour, an absence that is exceptional in comparison to other settler societies. Arguably, relations between Indigenous Australians and the Crown-as-institution have been relegated to property

litigation (disputes over ownership and management of land, water, and resources) and anti-discrimination rights (Australian Law Reform Commission 2015; Gover 2013; Behrendt 2000, 2002). The Crown does not play an active role in recognising forms of Indigenous Australian agency and sovereignty, or in undertaking to fulfil any wide-ranging moral, rational, and political obligations to Indigenous Australians (Gover 2013: 29). Narrowly defined, it seems to be unable to perform moral and relational duties and aid conceptual work. Without a cloak of ambiguity it cannot undertake the fiduciary duties, nor display the honour, that has now become the province of the Crown in Canada and New Zealand.

The second way that the Crown is associated with land is informal and personal, as the Crown-as-person forges connections to Australian landscape in informal but evocative and potentially deeply affective ways, by ensuring that visiting royals are seen on the land. If the Queen's habitual sequestration from Australia underscores the Britishness of the Crown, her occasional presence in Australia has strategic political effect.[1] Efforts to display royalty are ritualised as royal tours and other visits, during which royals are often seen connecting with Australian lands and soil – and perhaps also with Australian traditions and national ceremonies. However, these rituals fall short of autochthony: this is not an attempt to indigenise the Crown, but rather a sovereign marking of territory according to some "exemplary and mimetic" (Geertz 1983: 134) symbolic order. It demonstrates how charisma must be performed, in ways that resonate within the culture, and this performance must be episodic.

Embodiment means the Crown can strategically appear in very special, highly visible, breathing form to animate constitutional monarchy's more covert symbols. As natural symbols (Douglas 2004 [1970]), bodies can be strategically moved and displayed in specific

[1] Jenkins' (2002) ethnography of Danish royalty argues that the Danish Queen's apparent accessibility, as shown by the pervasive apocryphal sightings of her riding her bicycle or out shopping, celebrates the perceived national values of homogeneity and egalitarianism, and that this enculturated expectation of monarchy does not diminish its charisma and transcendent capacities for Danes.

places – not too often, as charisma ought be occasionally glimpsed rather than lived with – and transcend time. When Prince William tours Australia with his son, he powerfully makes the past present by simultaneously standing on the authority of his grandmother, the Queen, and their shared monarchical genealogy; and he and his son signify the future, because when he himself ends his reign, his son's will begin.

The Crown's transcendence

Like monarchy itself, the Crown in Australia is riddled with paradoxes, at once archaic and contemporary, sacred and banal, tenuous and intractable, concrete and abstract, unifying and divisive, foreign and indigenous. Despite the apparent oscillations, inconsistencies and contradictions which surround the Crown – republicans versed in royal gossip, a former Governor-General revealing republican ambitions, a republican who has inscribed the Crown on her body, monarchists proclaiming a "crowned republic" – it remains deeply embedded in Australia's constitutional and political institutions.

For monarchists and republicans, discussing the Crown was often affecting, suggesting that for them it was emotively "sticky" (Ahmed 2014 [2004]). Even those who are cynical or suspicious towards the Crown can find themselves surprisingly moved by it, including its personifications. Some of my interlocutors found the concept of the Crown an inspiring – even exhilarating and motivating – concept, just as some found it offensive. Likewise, many of the republicans I met found the idea of an Australian republic a magnetic idea, one which has motivated them to make it the great cause of their lives.

Contested meanings

When a republican described constitutional monarchy as incompatible with a nation founded by "my Irish stock", or monarchist David Flint proclaimed that, "if the Crown is an

anachronism, so is parliament, so is the rule of law, so is the English language because all of those came with Governor Phillip!" they were both in effect talking about genealogy, and ancestor veneration, and rights to certain cultural treasures. When monarchists defended Prince Philip's knighthood "for all he's done for Australia", and when republicans demanded to know why the future head of state "barracked for the opposition in the Rugby World Cup," both speak of kinship and its reciprocal obligations. When monarchists condemn republicans for wanting to erase "our own history", or republicans describe the need to "cut the apron strings" which bind them to the Queen and the British monarchy, they are again arguing over competing understandings of kinship, as well as the desirability or otherwise of renovating time and space. These deeply human expressions show how symbols like the Crown become a focus of contest over political meaning or signification (Verdery 1999).

The parliamentary mace, the Crown on the teacup, the War Memorial's Last Post and Camp Gallipoli all align Australia towards a cultural inheritance of Anglo-Saxon origins. In each, the Crown can evoke notions of unity, distinction, perpetuity, tradition, honour, endurance, reciprocity, and even transcendence and links to the cosmic. Further, for some, the Crown may powerfully evoke notions of kinship, worldview, geographic orientation, ancestor veneration, sacrifice, and Australia's claim on certain English cultural treasures (cf. Verdery 1999: 162). Perhaps it is these things that Australians are arguing about when they argue about reforming their constitutional order. Perhaps this is why monarchists regard the prospect of reform with such a profound sense of loss. Weber (cited Turner 2002: 207) argued that "the disenchantment of the world" was the "fate of our times" but also noted that, precisely under these circumstances, people would seek out the sublime and transcendental realms of mystical experience. I suggest that, recognised or not, monarchy represents this for many Australians, as they align themselves on opposing sides of an enduring debate.

Epilogue

Monarchy's charisma – "[t]hat which is mystic in its claims; that which is occult in its mode of action; that which is brilliant to the eye" (Bagehot 2001 [1867]: 64) – can help sacralise the business of parliaments and courts, and adds majesty to commemorations such as Anzac rituals which nourishes social memory. At the same time the Crown periodically wraps itself in Australia's emblematic conflicts and symbolic centres, situating royals on the land in order to domesticate and naturalise its claim of sovereignty. Consistent with Kantorowicz's two bodies (1997 [1957]), the appearance of the natural body of the sovereign or her heirs in Australia can help shore up and validate the institutional body of the Australian monarchy. The Crown is a salient reminder that it is not institutions or administrations that people use to creatively animate and remake meaning in their worlds, but those broader non-rational concepts these can be made to symbolise.

Social historian Jane Connors can pinpoint when she became intellectually curious about royalty's charisma. On 9 May 1988, the Queen was due to celebrate Australia's bicentenary by opening the nation's new Parliament House in Canberra. Jane had joined other republicans protesting to the gathering dignitaries at Capital Hill, joyfully and pointedly chanting that this was an Australian celebration with no need for foreign royals: "But when she came, and this was thing that fascinated me, our noisy chanting fell away and we watched in unexpected silence as she got out of the car and walked inside … I wanted to understand what made it so impossible to bellow slogans at Queen Elizabeth."

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