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National Identity and Nuclear Disarmament Advocacy by Canada and New Zealand

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A thesis submitted in fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Politics and International Relations.

The University of Auckland, New Zealand.
September 2016
Abstract

Nuclear disarmament dynamics are under-studied and under-theorised. Constructivists hold that identities determine interests and thus, policy preferences, but there has been virtually no investigation of national identity as a driver for nuclear disarmament policy. This thesis investigates the drivers of nuclear disarmament advocacy by Canada and New Zealand, focusing on the activation of anti-nuclear weapon national identities as a key explanatory factor. The thesis presents four comparative case studies—two each from Canada and New Zealand. Each case examines the dominant nuclear weapon-related national identity tropes of three constituencies—senior government ministers, bureaucrats and the public—and traces the processes through which various actors seek to have these identities expressed in policy. Since identities inform preferences but do not necessarily determine policy, the case studies also consider how contextual factors—alliance commitments, normative context, civil society activity and great power relations—affect the expression of anti-nuclear weapon identities.

Canada’s decision not to acquire nuclear weapons, despite being able to, is a touchstone for a popular, pro-disarmament ‘peacemaker’ identity. However, security policymakers almost always prioritise the identity of Canada as a strong US ally and thus, supporter of nuclear deterrence. The Canadian cases represent attempts by two prominent norm entrepreneurs to break this pattern—the first, during a Cold War crisis in superpower relations, and the second, during the post-Cold War superpower rapprochement. In both cases, a ‘disarmament/deterrence conundrum’ was evident; that is, the activation of anti-nuclear weapon identities produced nuclear disarmament advocacy, but it was significantly constrained by conflicting, alliance-based identities and the related norms of solidarity and nuclear deterrence.

In New Zealand, public and political norm entrepreneurship generated early nuclear disarmament advocacy, but again, this was bounded by alliance-based nuclear deterrence norms. During political upheaval in the 1980s, an identity crisis and civil society activism created an internalised ‘New Zealand nuclear taboo’ in the public, which was institutionalised in law. This delegitimised acquiescence to nuclear deterrence, including for alliance imperatives. Activation of internalised public anti-nuclear sentiment produced comprehensive nuclear disarmament advocacy from the government—initially for instrumental reasons, but later, due to bureaucratic socialisation towards anti-nuclear identities. The New Zealand cases support the hypothesis that norm institutionalisation facilitates identity transformation in officials through the iterative practice of norms.
Acknowledgements

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I also want to sincerely thank the many colleagues and friends who have read and commented on various draft chapters and sketches along the way. Thank you Kate Dewes, Tanya Ogilvie-White, Rob Green, Treasa Dunworth, Laura Stanley, Benoit Pelopidas, Togzhan Kassenova, Rod Alley, Nicholas Ross Smith, Mark Boyd, Jacqui True and Felicity Hill. I know there have been so many more people that have helped, so I apologise to anyone that I have missed.

Warm thanks also to my supervisors, Anita Lacey, Chris Wilson and Maria Rublee, for their support, wise council and patience with my many meanderings.

Finally, thanks to all my friends and family for their support and encouragement in the research process. And especially, thank you Sal, for showing me the patience of an angel and making this whole thing a lot easier.
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# Glossary

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<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ASEAN</td>
<td>Association of Southeast Asian Nations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCD</td>
<td>Conference of the Committee on Disarmament</td>
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<tr>
<td>CD</td>
<td>Conference on Disarmament</td>
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<tr>
<td>CTBT</td>
<td>Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty</td>
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<tr>
<td>DFAIT</td>
<td>Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (Canada)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DFAT</td>
<td>Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (Australia)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DSC</td>
<td>Disarmament &amp; Security Centre (New Zealand)</td>
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<tr>
<td>EEC</td>
<td>European Economic Community</td>
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<tr>
<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>ICAN</td>
<td>International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons</td>
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<td>ICC</td>
<td>International Criminal Court</td>
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<td>ICJ</td>
<td>International Court of Justice</td>
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<tr>
<td>IR</td>
<td>International Relations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MFAT</td>
<td>Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade (New Zealand)</td>
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<td>MP</td>
<td>Member of Parliament</td>
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<td>MPI</td>
<td>Middle Powers Initiative</td>
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<td>NAC</td>
<td>New Agenda Coalition</td>
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<td>NAM</td>
<td>Non-Aligned Movement</td>
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<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>NCCD</td>
<td>National Consultative Committee on Disarmament (New Zealand)</td>
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<tr>
<td>NORAD</td>
<td>North American Aerospace Defense Command</td>
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<tr>
<td>NWFZ</td>
<td>Nuclear weapon free zone</td>
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<tr>
<td>NZ</td>
<td>New Zealand</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NZHR</td>
<td>New Zealand House of Representatives</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NZIIA</td>
<td>New Zealand Institute for International Affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NZPD</td>
<td>New Zealand Parliamentary Debates (Hansard)</td>
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<tr>
<td>OIA</td>
<td>Official Information Act (New Zealand)</td>
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<tr>
<td>PACDAC</td>
<td>Public Advisory Committee on Disarmament and Arms Control (New Zealand)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PTBT</td>
<td>Partial Test Ban Treaty</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SCFAIT</td>
<td>Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade (Canadian Parliament)</td>
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<tr>
<td>SEATO</td>
<td>Southeast Asia Treaty Organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNDC</td>
<td>United Nations Disarmament Commission</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNGA</td>
<td>United Nations General Assembly</td>
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<td>UNSSOD</td>
<td>United Nations Special Session on Disarmament</td>
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<td>WCP</td>
<td>World Court Project</td>
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What causes nuclear disarmament advocacy?

What I hoped to do, not by offering answers for others but by describing what New Zealand had done, was to make the point that alternatives were possible. What we needed was the political will to look for them.

~ Former New Zealand prime minister, David Lange

I was not so naive as to think we could decisively, or even importantly, influence the policies of the Great Powers, but I hoped that we could influence the environment in which they were pursued.

~ Former Canadian prime minister, Lester Pearson

Introduction

The political dynamics of nuclear disarmament are under-studied and under-theorised. In particular, there is little theoretically-informed analysis of the policies, perspectives or role of non-nuclear weapon states regarding nuclear disarmament. In policy terms, this is a significant omission since non-nuclear weapon states will necessarily play an important role in making any disarmament agreement possible, as the West’s fixation with the Iranian nuclear programme attests. This thesis addresses the lack of scholarly engagement with the nuclear disarmament-related experiences of non-nuclear weapon states by examining one specific type of behaviour: nuclear disarmament.

advocacy. The core research question of the thesis is *what causes nuclear disarmament advocacy by democratic, non-nuclear weapon states?*

To answer this question, the thesis presents four theoretically-informed, comparative case studies—two each from Canada and New Zealand—that draw on the insights of International Relations (IR) constructivism. A key characteristic of constructivist scholarship is its focus on how interactions between material factors and non-material factors, such as actors’ beliefs and identities, and the related norms of appropriate behaviour, drive policy outcomes. This research adopts a commonly-cited definition of a norm, that being ‘a standard of appropriate behaviour for actors with a given identity.’ As this definition makes clear, constructivists see an important link between norms and identities: norms only apply to actors if they identify with a group which is committed to the prescribed standard of behaviour. In this sense, norms and identities are interdependent and mutually constitutive. Both are also socially constructed, historically contingent and often, contested.

The notion that national identities shape national interests and therefore, policy preferences, is fundamental to constructivist IR theories. Given the centrality of this causal chain to constructivist thinking, it is striking that the constructivist literature most relevant to nuclear disarmament has largely ignored the issue of identity. This thesis is one of only a handful of works, in fact, to examine

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6 Wendt, “Anarchy Is What States Make of It,” 399.
8 See, for example, Jutta Weldes, *Constructing National Interests: The United States and the Cuban Missile Crisis* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1999).
9 For examples of this trend, see, Erika Simpson, *NATO and the Bomb: Canadian Defenders Confront Critics* (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2001); Marianne Hanson, “Advancing Disarmament in the Face of Great Power Reluctance: The Canadian Contribution” (Vancouver: Institute of International Relations, University of British Columbia, June 2001); Marianne Hanson, “Australia and Nuclear Arms
the relationship between national identity and nuclear disarmament policy. As such, the thesis makes a significant contribution to the security studies literature in theoretical terms. Given the lack of theorisation regarding nuclear disarmament dynamics in general, and in particular, regarding the experiences of non-nuclear weapon states in this field, the thesis adopts an exploratory, hypothesis-generating approach regarding when and how national identity influences nuclear disarmament policy.

In this introductory section, a brief note about key terminology is necessary. The political dynamics relating to nuclear energy are deeply intertwined with those relating to nuclear weapons. This is evident, for example, in the fact that the most widely adhered-to international nuclear agreement—the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (‘the Non-Proliferation Treaty,’ or NPT)—addresses both nuclear weapons and energy. Due to space restrictions, however, this thesis deals almost exclusively with the theorisation of the political dynamics of nuclear weapons, and in particular, nuclear disarmament, as opposed to nuclear energy. For this reason, the use of the word ‘nuclear’ in this thesis refers only to nuclear weapons, unless explicitly stated otherwise. In a similar vein, unless otherwise stated, the term ‘disarmament’ is used here to refer to nuclear disarmament in particular, as opposed to general disarmament or the disarmament of other weapon types.

Returning the core research question, an important first observation is that a country’s status as a non-nuclear armed state is not, in itself, a useful explanatory factor for nuclear disarmament advocacy. There are many non-nuclear weapon states that do not actively advocate nuclear disarmament, and several that do. Norway, Canada and Australia, for example, despite their claim to shelter under the US ‘nuclear umbrella,’ have put much more effort into nuclear disarmament initiatives than many other non-nuclear weapon states. In this sense, a country’s non-nuclear

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10 For the other one, see, Mariana Budjeryn, “NPT and National Identity: The Politics of Nuclear Disarmament in Ukraine (1990-1994),” paper presented to the conference The Making of Nuclear Order (Zurich: Center for Strategic Studies, 1-2 March 2014). Maria Rublee highlights the relationship between identity and policy in her theorisation of nuclear nonproliferation dynamics. She recommends exploration of this relationship in the context of nuclear disarmament, but does not explore the point herself. (The importance of distinguishing theoretically between disarmament and nonproliferation is discussed further below.) Maria Rublee, “Scholarly Research on Nuclear Exits: The Role of Civil Society,” Medicine, Conflict and Survival 30, no. Sup.1 (July 29, 2014): s43–s44.

armed status is a historically-contingent fact, but has no meaning or explanatory power until human agents—that is, policymakers—interpret it and incorporate this interpretation into the policy process. Constructivist scholars generally examine policy advocacy through the frame of norm entrepreneurs—actors that ‘seize windows of opportunity’ to ‘alter the prevalent normative structure.’ In this frame, the current research examines the causes of nuclear disarmament norm entrepreneurship by non-nuclear weapon states.

In keeping with the core constructivist principle that identities determine interests and therefore, policy preferences, this thesis takes as its starting point the assumption that a key driver for nuclear disarmament advocacy is the activation of an ‘anti-nuclear weapon’ identity—one which sees nuclear weapons as reducing security. From a constructivist perspective, activation of an anti-nuclear weapon identity is a necessary condition for nuclear disarmament advocacy to occur. In other words, it offers an explanation for why democratic non-nuclear weapon states have a preference for pursuing nuclear disarmament in a given situation. This preference results from the fact that a politically-influential actor or group of actors—be they the voting public, officials or elected politicians—see the pursuit of nuclear disarmament as increasing security. Since non-nuclear weapon states cannot themselves undertake disarmament, they may instead express their disarmament preference through political advocacy.

While this thesis treats the activation of an anti-nuclear weapon identity as the core driver for disarmament advocacy, the thesis does not claim that activation of such an identity causes nuclear disarmament advocacy in any automatic or deterministic way. Competing identity claims—and contextual factors, as outlined further below—may reduce the likelihood of anti-nuclear weapon sentiment being expressed as disarmament advocacy. Pro-alliance identities, for example, might constrain the expression of anti-nuclear weapon sentiment—especially if the relevant alliance

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14 The fact that nuclear disarmament advocacy may be pursued for instrumental reasons—as opposed to the genuine belief of government leaders—does not alter this causal explanation. Even if leaders pursue disarmament advocacy for instrumental reasons, for example, they must have a specific audience in mind which does hold an anti-nuclear weapon identity, to which they seek to appeal through their advocacy. This point is discussed further in the following chapter.
includes a nuclear weapon state—by contesting pro-disarmament policy claims. Identification with such alliances implies, at a minimum, acquiescence to pro-nuclear weapon norms. As will be seen in subsequent chapters, such acquiescence may also lead to entrenchment of pro-nuclear norms in foreign policy institutions, and potentially, in the national identity beliefs of the individuals that populate those institutions.

Identity contestation affects the policy process through human agency. That is, different actors may invoke competing visions of national identity and thus seek to advance their preferred policy outcomes. These visions may be purely personal, or may be representative of broader, institutional affiliations. To account for this observation, the thesis separates each country’s population into three parts: senior government politicians; foreign policy officials; and the public. This segmentation allows the analysis to identify the dominant beliefs about national identity held by each segment of the population, and to assess how the resulting foreign policy preferences compete or complement each other in the democratic policymaking process.

Various contextual factors—both domestic and international—may also increase or decrease the likelihood of a government expressing anti-nuclear weapon identities as nuclear disarmament advocacy. Each case study accounts for the potential influence of four key contextual factors: alliance relationships, normative context, civil society activity and great power relations. A process-tracing method is applied to within-case analysis, to assess whether and how contextual factors have either affected actors’ identities and thus, preferences, or have intervened in the policy process to affect the expression of those preferences. This method makes it possible to identify the unique set of agents, structures and interactions—including the sequence in which events occurred—that led to the specific policy outcomes in each case. Chapter three provides further discussion of this, and other methodological choices.

As the core research question makes clear, the thesis does not explore, or claim to demonstrate, the influence of non-nuclear weapon states on the nuclear disarmament behaviour of nuclear

15 This segmentation distinguishes the thesis from other related constructivist work on nuclear policymaking. Rublee, for example, focuses specifically on ‘state elites and policymakers’, defining elites as ‘those with decision making authority or substantial influence over decision making.’ This, of course, implies that public opinion cannot wield substantial influence on nuclear weapons policy. The case study in chapter seven, below, demonstrates that this cannot be taken for granted. Maria Rublee, Nonproliferation Norms: Why States Choose Nuclear Restraint (Athens, GA: University of Georgia Press, 2009), 2.

weapon states. That is an enormously complex issue that is beyond the scope of this research. Rather, given the increasing international focus on nuclear disarmament as a credible potential response to the existential threat that nuclear weapons pose to humanity,\(^\text{17}\) this thesis seeks to contribute to the development of scholarly debate around nuclear disarmament that is both empirically-grounded and theoretically rigorous. As the late UK nuclear expert, Michael Quinlan, notes, ‘the theme of abolishing nuclear weapons is one on which there is broad and serious analytical work to be done.’\(^\text{18}\)

The focus here on nuclear disarmament advocacy speaks to significant puzzles in both policy and IR theory. On the first point, this thesis addresses a fascinating policy problem—the enormous gap between rhetoric and reality on multilateral nuclear disarmament. The international community has repeatedly, and often unanimously, highlighted the urgent need to achieve complete nuclear disarmament.\(^\text{19}\) The first ever resolution of the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) in 1946, passed unanimously, sought the elimination of nuclear weapons.\(^\text{20}\) Article VI of the NPT, a treaty commonly referred to as a ‘cornerstone’ of the international nuclear regime, obliges both nuclear armed and non-nuclear armed members to bring about complete nuclear disarmament.\(^\text{21}\) At the first UN Special Session on Disarmament (UNSSOD) in 1978, UN member states unanimously concluded that, ‘Mankind is confronted with a choice: we must halt the arms race and proceed to

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disarmament or face annihilation.\textsuperscript{22} In 2010, NPT members—representing 97 percent of UN members (188 of 193)\textsuperscript{23}—unanimously expressed deep concern at the catastrophic humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons use, and reaffirmed that ‘the total elimination of nuclear weapons is the only absolute guarantee against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.’\textsuperscript{24} Moreover, critics can no longer claim that disarmament advocates are all naive idealists. In recent years, a raft of influential international military and political experts—including many who helped develop or implement nuclear deterrence theory—have advocated urgent, practical steps toward the elimination nuclear weapons.\textsuperscript{25}

### Nuclear deterrence in theory and practice

In contrast to and despite the widespread disarmament aspirations noted above, nuclear deterrence theory—which holds that the threat of nuclear war contributes to international peace and security\textsuperscript{26}—is institutionalised in the core national security strategies of eight, possibly nine, nuclear armed states,\textsuperscript{27} as well as those of dozens of their allies.\textsuperscript{28} The institutions of nuclear

\textsuperscript{23} India, Israel and Pakistan have nuclear weapons and have never joined the NPT. North Korea withdrew from the Treaty in 2003 and subsequently tested nuclear weapons using technology developed while it was an NPT member, leading to disagreement over the status of its NPT membership and obligations. The UN’s youngest member state, South Sudan, is embroiled in a civil war and has not yet joined the NPT. See, UNODA, “Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons [Status of the Treaty],” December 2014, https://web.archive.org/web/20141020001245/http://disarmament.un.org/treaties/t/npt.
\textsuperscript{26} See, for example, the British view regarding the stabilising role that nuclear deterrence plays internationally, in Nick Ritchie, “Valuing and Devaluing Nuclear Weapons,” Contemporary Security Policy 34, no. 1 (2013): 157.
deterrence—that is, the collective identities, interests, norms and rules associated with the practice, but also the physical and human infrastructure that supports and maintains them—are thus a core determinant of the nuclear weapons policies of many of the richest and most influential countries in the world. To make sense of how this fact impacts on nuclear disarmament advocacy by democratic, non-nuclear weapon states, it is necessary to briefly examine the core elements of nuclear deterrence theory, and to review its application in the context of US and NATO defence strategies in particular.

The central role ascribed to nuclear weapons under deterrence theory is to deter aggression by potential adversaries. The theory holds that no rational leader would risk starting an armed conflict with a nuclear power, because to do so would be to risk a catastrophic, and likely, omnicidal nuclear war, and thus would be pathologically irrational. The precise nature of the purported deterrent effect of nuclear weapons has evolved over time, as demonstrated by a review of NATO nuclear strategy. NATO’s early strategy of ‘massive retaliation’—officially adopted in April 1957, but proclaimed by the United States throughout most of the 1950s under the leadership of President Eisenhower in particular—called for ‘massive [nuclear] retaliation against nearly any provocation and relegated conventional defences to the sidelines.’ Technological developments gradually undermined the credibility of this strategy, however. As awareness of Soviet missile technology evolved following the launch of Sputnik in October 1957, it became apparent that in the event of a nuclear first strike on the Soviet Union, the Soviets would likely be able to strike back at the US homeland using nuclear armed, intercontinental ballistic missiles. This threat greatly dampened US

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29 Wendt defines an institution as, ‘a relatively stable set or “structure” of identities and interests...often codified in formal rules and norms...Institutions are fundamentally cognitive entities that do not exist apart from actors’ ideas about how the world works.’ Wendt, “Anarchy Is What States Make of It,” 399.

30 In contrast to Canada’s bilateral and multilateral alliance ties, the Australia-New Zealand-United States (ANZUS) alliance has never explicitly been premised on a nuclear defence of the Pacific allies, as discussed in chapter four, below. It is nevertheless clear that nuclear deterrence norms have strongly influenced ANZUS dynamics, as a result of the centrality of nuclear deterrence to US global security strategy.


enthusiasm for the massive retaliation concept. Throughout the late 1950s and early 1960s, many US and European analysts argued that it was not credible that the United States would risk an all-out nuclear war to respond to a conventional Soviet provocation in Europe.\(^{33}\)

In the early 1960s, the United States led calls for a revision of NATO strategy, sparking an extended debate within the alliance.\(^{34}\) The US preference for a more graduated response to aggression met strong opposition from the leaders of many European allies, including France, which withdrew from the integrated NATO military command in 1966 and maintained a massive response doctrine until at least the end of the Cold War.\(^{35}\) Within NATO, however, the US perspective eventually won out and the alliance adopted a new ‘flexible response’ strategy in 1967.\(^{36}\) This new strategy placed greater emphasis on conventional responses to armed aggression, providing decisionmakers with more flexibility in trying to manage the speed of military escalation.\(^{37}\)

The concept of flexible response has remained the basis of NATO strategy since its adoption in 1967, albeit with several revisions over time. Under flexible response, the idea that NATO might be the first to use nuclear weapons in a conflict was far less prominent than under the massive retaliation strategy, which held that the explicit threat of a devastating first use was a primary requirement of credible deterrence. Nevertheless, the willingness to be the first to use nuclear weapons has been an option under flexible response since the earliest promotion of the strategy within NATO in the 1960s.\(^{38}\) This does not mean NATO implies that it will use nuclear weapons first, merely that the Alliance is prepared to do so if it believes the strategic situation warrants it. In 1991, for example, NATO adopted a new Strategic Concept which aimed ‘to reflect a reduced reliance on nuclear


\(^{34}\) Nevertheless, while allowing for greater flexibility in response options, the US national nuclear strategy adopted in 1962—SIOP 63—also maintained the option of massive retaliation. Sagan, *Moving Targets*, 29–30.


\(^{38}\) Ibid., 37, 39.
The 1991 Concept still asserted, however, that ‘the Alliance’s conventional forces alone cannot ensure the prevention of war. Nuclear weapons make a unique contribution in rendering the risks of any aggression incalculable and unacceptable. Thus, they remain essential to preserve peace.’ This deliberately ambiguous phrasing implied that an adversary could not be certain NATO would not respond to conventional aggression by using nuclear weapons. In other words, the 1991 Concept maintained the implied threat of first use if NATO believed it was necessary ‘to protect peace and to prevent war or any kind of coercion.’ This wording demonstrated the ongoing belief among many NATO strategists and leaders that credible deterrence requires the Alliance to imply its willingness to use nuclear weapons first. This explains why the idea of NATO adopting a ‘no first use’ policy—that is, an explicit commitment not to be the first to use nuclear weapons in any conflict—has been so contentious within the Alliance, as will be seen in chapter eight. NATO produced further updates to its Strategic Concept in 1999 and 2010. The former is of direct relevance to the case study in chapter eight, and so is discussed in more detail there. Like its predecessors, the 2010 update did not explicitly affirm a policy of first use, but did not rule out the option.

The evolution in NATO strategy from massive retaliation to flexible response highlights a key concept which is central to nuclear deterrence theory, as with deterrence theory more generally:

40 Ibid., para. 38. Emphasis added.
41 Ibid.
42 In contrast, China adopted an explicit no first use policy immediately after its first nuclear test in 1964. Similarly, the Soviet Union adopted the policy in 1982, though Russia renounced no first use after the end of Cold War. A group of eminent former US policymakers—including a key author of flexible response, Robert McNamara—had also promoted the concept for NATO in 1982, but it had never seriously been considered by the Alliance. McGeorge Bundy et al., “Nuclear Weapons and the Atlantic Alliance,” Foreign Affairs 60, no. 4 (1982): 753–68. For broad discussion of the concept of no first use and its incarnations in the strategies of various nuclear weapon states, see, Harold A. Feiveson and Ernst Jan Hogendoorn, “No First Use of Nuclear Weapons,” The Nonproliferation Review 10, no. 2 (2003): 90–98.
threat credibility. To create an effective deterrent, the threat of punishment must be credible.\textsuperscript{44} That is, 'The deterree...needs to be convinced that the deterrer is both (physically) capable of executing [the threat] and (psychologically) committed to doing so, despite the cost of possible retaliation.'\textsuperscript{45} Given that the primary purpose of nuclear weapons is to deter armed aggression, deterrence theory sees the ‘credibility’ of threats to use nuclear weapons as essential to preventing war and by extension, preventing escalation to nuclear war. Deterrence theory thus implies that for nuclear deterrence to work in practice, potential aggressors must believe that their nuclear adversaries \textit{will} actually respond to aggression by using nuclear weapons if sufficiently provoked. In deterrence relationships between two nuclear armed states, this means that the leaders of each state must believe that their nuclear adversary is willing to risk a catastrophic nuclear war that would in all probability destroy their own state, in order to keep that state ‘secure.’

The requirement that leaders believe in their adversaries’ willingness to risk starting a nuclear war, however, is one half of a fundamental contradiction in the logic of nuclear deterrence theory. As noted at the start of this section, a core tenet of the theory is that no rational decisionmaker would ever risk instigating a nuclear conflict due to the likelihood of nuclear retaliation by their adversary, and the potentially catastrophic global consequences of such events. In sum, for nuclear deterrence to work, policymakers must believe that they and their adversaries are rational actors who will \textit{never} use nuclear weapons,\textsuperscript{46} while also believing that they and their adversaries are pathologically irrational actors who \textit{are} willing to use nuclear weapons and thus, risk a nuclear war. The contradictory nature of these beliefs presents an inescapable challenge to the credibility of NATO’s core security strategy.\textsuperscript{47} There are further significant flaws in nuclear deterrence theory, including, for example, that it is devoid of real-world reference data,\textsuperscript{48} and is informed by a ‘myriad of

\textsuperscript{44}Robert Green, \textit{Security without Nuclear Deterrence} (Christchurch, NZ: The Disarmament & Security Centre, 2010), 92.

\textsuperscript{45}Frühling, “Fuzzy Limits,” 19.

\textsuperscript{46}On the issue of proponents treating nuclear deterrence as a \textit{permanent} stabilising force in international relations, see, Benoît Pelopidas, “A Bet Portrayed as a Certainty: Reassessing the Added Deterrent Value of Nuclear Weapons,” in \textit{The War That Must Never Be Fought: Dilemmas of Nuclear Deterrence} (Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press, 2015), 6.

\textsuperscript{47}On this point, for example, see, Heuser, “The Development of NATO’s Nuclear Strategy,” 48.

unverifiable assumptions’ about human responses to annihilation threats.49 In sum, nuclear deterrence is ‘a bet portrayed as a certainty.’50

A core argument in this thesis is that the conceptual incoherence of nuclear deterrence theory—the focus here being particularly on the lack of threat credibility—creates a significant psychological and policy conundrum for the leaders of NATO states, who purport to believe that nuclear deterrence provides the ‘supreme guarantee’ of allied security.51 It is psychologically destabilising, for example, to publicly assert that one’s existential security is based on a theory which is deeply flawed and which, if it fails, will likely destroy humanity. This thesis frames discussion of this issue in terms of the ‘disarmament/deterrence conundrum,’ based on the observation that decisionmakers in nuclear and umbrella states are often deeply conflicted about their policy options. They know that their nuclear weapons create a significant risk of a humanitarian catastrophe that would likely render the ideas of national and international security meaningless.52 This knowledge creates a strong desire to advance nuclear disarmament in principle. At the political level, however, the desire to advance disarmament is often stymied by nuclear deterrence theory, which is deeply entrenched in their shared institutions and norms. As will be seen below, that theory necessarily views progress towards nuclear disarmament as irrational and potentially, also catastrophically dangerous—hence, the disarmament/deterrence conundrum.

The case studies in this thesis offer a detailed examination of the precise identity-related and policymaking processes through which this conundrum plays out. Collectively, the case studies suggest that the ideational competition between deterrence and disarmament has been a defining factor in debates over national, Western alliance and international security in the nuclear age. The norms and beliefs of nuclear deterrence theory are thus the primary competitors for those related

49 Anne Harrington de Santana, “Nuclear Weapons as the Currency of Power: Deconstructing the Fetishism of Force,” The Nonproliferation Review 16, no. 3 (2009): 333–334; Ward Wilson, “The Myth of Nuclear Deterrence,” The Nonproliferation Review 15, no. 3 (2008): 422–430. The specifics of these various flaws are not central to the core arguments presented in this thesis and at any rate, have been covered in detail by other analysts. As such, they are not examined further here. For detailed critiques of nuclear deterrence theory, see, Pelopidas, “A Bet Portrayed as a Certainty”; Green, Security without Nuclear Deterrence.

50 Pelopidas, “A Bet Portrayed as a Certainty.”


52 See, for example, Austria, “Vienna Conference on the Humanitarian Impact of Nuclear Weapons 8-9 December 2014: Conference Report,” 2014. While the nuclear weapon states did not attend this conference, it should be noted that at the 2015 NPT Review Conference, they consistently argued that no new information arose as a result of the three humanitarian impact conferences, and that the catastrophic consequences of nuclear weapons use is precisely why nuclear deterrence works.
to nuclear disarmament; the two are largely mutually exclusive. This observation helps to inform the definition of nuclear disarmament advocacy adopted here, as discussed in more detail below.

Defining nuclear disarmament advocacy

Defining nuclear disarmament advocacy inevitably depends on one’s definition of nuclear disarmament. A simplified definition of disarmament in the broader context is that it seeks to eliminate entire weapons classes; in contrast, for example, arms control seeks to place limits on the development or deployment of weapons, as a way of managing what arms controllers assume to be inherently conflictual relations between states. In an abstract sense, this definition is sufficient to understand the overall objective of nuclear disarmament efforts. In an international security environment dominated by the theory and practice of nuclear deterrence, however, such a binary, all-or-nothing definition of disarmament is inadequate to deal with the subtle, multifaceted challenges and motivations that characterise nuclear weapons policymaking.

Given the focus here on state-based—as opposed to civil society—advocacy, this thesis defines nuclear disarmament advocacy as being any promotion of policies by government officials or ministers at the international level, which aims to advance the goal of complete nuclear disarmament. This includes explicit advocacy of the prohibition or elimination of nuclear weapons, but also includes advocacy which focuses on limited disarmament measures—as long as that advocacy is framed in terms of supporting complete nuclear disarmament. Such advocacy might include, for example, promoting an end to all nuclear testing; proposing a reduced role for nuclear weapons in security policies; working to delegitimise the possession and/or use of nuclear weapons; or questioning the security value of nuclear deterrence—for example, by confronting the inherent challenges to nuclear threat credibility outlined above. This definition has strong precedents in

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54 This definition does not treat domestic policy discussions and recommendations as nuclear disarmament advocacy; rather, the thesis focuses on international acts of advocacy by government agents mandated to speak on behalf of their country.
both the policy and academic fields. The 1996 Canberra Commission report, for example, asserts that ‘nuclear weapon elimination should be conducted as a series of phased, verified reductions that allow states to satisfy themselves, at each stage of the process, that further movement toward elimination can be made safely and securely.’\(^{55}\) Similarly, scholars and policymakers often cite the promotion of an end to nuclear testing as an example of nuclear disarmament advocacy.\(^{56}\) Despite these precedents, the controversial nature of the subject matter means that any discussion of how to define nuclear disarmament is likely to be controversial. As such, further explanation is warranted of the rationale behind the definition adopted here.

As noted previously, the political, military and social institutions of nuclear deterrence are deeply entrenched in many of the richest and most influential countries on earth. This observation has important implications that inform the above definition of nuclear disarmament advocacy. Since nuclear deterrence is the primary ideational competitor and institutional barrier to nuclear disarmament, actions which seek to undermine nuclear deterrence theory can reasonably be treated as a form of nuclear disarmament advocacy, as long as they are pursued in the context of the explicit desire to advance complete disarmament. Austria’s Ambassador for Disarmament Alexander Kmentt, for example, argues, ‘Nuclear disarmament and a world without nuclear weapons will never be achieved unless this vicious cycle [of arms racing that results from nuclear deterrence theory] is broken.’\(^{57}\) Similarly, Nick Ritchie demonstrates that the ‘deep’ devaluing of nuclear weapons, which necessarily means undermining the security value ascribed to nuclear deterrence, is a necessary condition for nuclear disarmament.\(^{58}\) In sum, to achieve disarmament it will be necessary, among other things, to unpick the threads of nuclear deterrence that are woven into the intellectual and political fabric of national and international security. As such, advocating a reduced role for nuclear deterrence in national and international security, or questioning the


credibility of nuclear deterrent threats, if such policies are explicitly pursued in the context of a desire to support disarmament, are treated here as nuclear disarmament advocacy.

Some disarmament advocates may criticise the definition of nuclear disarmament advocacy adopted here by suggesting that advocacy by umbrella states of limited disarmament steps—such as a comprehensive test ban treaty (CTBT) or fissile material treaty to restrict access to nuclear weapon fuel\textsuperscript{59}—is not sincere, but rather, is a cynical attempt to distract attention from existing nuclear arsenals and thus, to prevent disarmament progress. The International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons (ICAN), for example, argues that to demonstrate the sincerity of their stated desire for disarmament, nuclear weapon states and their allies must support immediate negotiations for a comprehensive treaty to prohibit nuclear weapons.\textsuperscript{60} For several reasons, this assumption is not an appropriate starting point for defining nuclear disarmament advocacy in the context of this thesis.

First, as discussed above and as further demonstrated at several points in this thesis, the dominance of nuclear deterrence institutions creates major political and psychological barriers to anything that would undermine nuclear threat credibility—such as a prohibition on nuclear weapons—regardless of the preferences of government representatives. This observation does not, however, provide proof as to the sincerity or otherwise of a stated desire for disarmament. Such a determination requires detailed, context-specific analysis of characters and events, such as provided in the case studies that follow. This analysis includes consideration of additional factors that might offer clues as to the sincerity of policy statements, such as previous actions and policies congruent with support for disarmament, or a consistent willingness over time to assume the potentially significant personal, political and diplomatic costs of nuclear disarmament advocacy.

\textsuperscript{59} The fissile material treaty has commonly been known as a fissile material cut-off treaty, as the nuclear powers did not wish to see the treaty address the issue of existing stocks, but rather, to prevent the production of new material. In recent times, however, the United States has indicated a willingness to include in this treaty consideration of existing stockpiles. Daryl G Kimball, “U.S. Floats New Fissile Talks Formula,” \textit{Arms Control Today} (Arms Control Association, March 3, 2016), https://web.archive.org/web/20160325065535/http://www.armscontrol.org/ACT/2016_03/News/US-Floats-New-Fissile-Talks-Formula.

Second, the fact that a particular policy goal—for example, a limited nuclear disarmament measure such as entry into force of the CTBT—is stated publicly but not achieved does not prove that the initial statement was insincere. Sincerely held beliefs might still be subordinated to policy preferences deriving from competing identities and their related norms. Again, however, this does not prove that the subordinate objective was insincere. In this regard, it is important to remember that while civil society disarmament advocates tend to focus on a narrow set of policy objectives at any one time, policymakers grapple with an enormous range of interconnected and overlapping issues and interests on a daily basis. Indeed, their democratic mandate demands that they do so. In other policy areas such as economic and trade relations, cooperation with great powers may be seen as essential to advance national interests. As history shows, such relations can be damaged by even limited challenges to existing nuclear weapons policies; the case of New Zealand in the 1980s is a good example. The country did not advocate for other states to adopt its ‘nuclear free’ policy at the time; rather, the government pursued what it saw as New Zealand’s national interest in not being defended by nuclear weapons.61 As then-Prime Minister David Lange notes, New Zealand foreign policy officials sought to assure Western allies that the nuclear free policy was ‘not for export,’62 and went out of their way not to challenge other states’ nuclear deterrence strategies directly.63 And yet, New Zealand was diplomatically isolated by almost all Western allies, and the United States suspended its ANZUS alliance commitments to New Zealand, along with curtailing access to military equipment and processed intelligence.64 In conclusion, many bureaucrats adopt a cautious approach to nuclear weapons issues—and advise senior government ministers to do the same—so as to avoid ‘poisoning the atmosphere’ in relations with great powers on other policy issues.65

61 NZHR, New Zealand Nuclear Free Zone, Disarmament and Arms Control Act (Wellington, 1987).
62 Lange, Nuclear Free, 117–118. Likewise, Kennedy Graham, a New Zealand diplomat based in the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva at the time, states that in late 1987 he received explicit instructions from superiors in Wellington to stop promoting New Zealand’s nuclear free policy. Kennedy Graham, “Private Interview” (Wellington, November 7, 2013).
In the current context, a final problem with the assumption that umbrella states’ advocacy of limited disarmament measures is insincere is that this assumption treats the state as a unitary actor with a single, cohesive vision of the national interest. Such an assumption is not appropriate here because it obscures the possibility that different domestic actors may perceive and pursue quite different interests in a given policy scenario. As explained in detail in chapter three, this thesis takes a nuanced approach to defining national identities and consequently, national interests. The thesis examines the dominant beliefs about national interest across three segments of society—senior government ministers, officials, and the public. The analysis then traces the process through which these beliefs interact with each other, and with additional contextual factors, to produce disarmament policy outcomes in a democracy. From a scholarly perspective, therefore, the interesting questions are, which national identities and interests dominate policy discussions and outcomes, and when and why do they do so? These are precisely the types of questions that this thesis seeks to answer.

The puzzle of nuclear disarmament advocacy

Non-nuclear weapon states are themselves unable to disarm, but have nonetheless used a variety of mechanisms to advance nuclear disarmament. Among other things, non-nuclear weapon states have enacted domestic policies or laws banning nuclear weapons; created regional nuclear weapon free zones (NWFZs), in which the testing and permanent deployment of nuclear weapons

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66 At the domestic level, Palau and the Philippines, New Zealand, Mongolia and Austria have created laws restricting in various ways or prohibiting nuclear weapons entirely. From 1981-1994, Palau was governed under a nuclear-weapons-free constitution, which was annulled when Palau entered into a Compact of Free Association with the United States. The Compact was the result of extensive political pressure and economic inducements from the nuclear superpower, and was completed only after multiple failed national referenda organised by a powerful and well-funded pro-US lobby that favoured the Compact. In 1987, the Philippines ‘consistent with the national interest’, adopted ‘a policy of freedom from nuclear weapons in its territory’ under Article II, Section 8 of its Constitution. In 1992, Mongolia declared itself a nuclear weapon free zone (NWFZ) and in 2000, the country’s Parliament passed a law institutionalising the weapon ban. In 1999, Austria adopted a federal constitutional act to ban nuclear weapons. Several other states have enacted policy bans, but have not institutionalised these in legislation. In 1982 Vanuatu prohibited nuclear weapons from its territory and territorial waters. In 1983, the Solomon Islands and Papua New Guinea followed suit. Unlike the laws noted above, these policy bans can be revoked through a simple policy change by the ruling government.
are banned;\textsuperscript{67} helped develop and roll out verification technologies required to create confidence in disarmament-related activities;\textsuperscript{68} and more recently, contributed to research designed to facilitate the participation—as part of a future disarmament treaty—of non-nuclear weapon states in the process of verifying nuclear warhead dismantlement.\textsuperscript{69} In addition to such initiatives, a range of non-nuclear weapon states, individually and in groups, have invested significant energy into nuclear disarmament advocacy, which is the focus of this thesis.

Despite the potentially significant costs associated with nuclear disarmament advocacy, non-nuclear weapon states can and have played important roles historically as disarmament advocates.\textsuperscript{70} NPT Article VI, for example, is the only legally-binding nuclear disarmament provision in a multilateral agreement, and it exists entirely because of advocacy by non-nuclear weapon states.\textsuperscript{71} Yet there has

\textsuperscript{67} At time of writing, 115 countries are located in regions recognised under international law as NWFZ, including Latin America and the Caribbean (1967); the South Pacific (1985); South East Asia (1995); Africa (1996); and Central Asia (2006). Three additional multilateral treaties have created NWFZ cover areas that are largely uninhabited, including Antarctica (1959); Outer Space (1967); and the Seabed (1971). See, Cecil Helsetveit and Daniel Mekonnen, “Nuclear Weapon-Free Zones: The Political Context,” in \textit{Nuclear Weapons under International Law}, ed. Gro Nystuen, Stuart Casey-Maslen, and Annie Golden Bersagel (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 347–73.

\textsuperscript{68} In the Canadian context, see for example, Michael Pearson, Gregor Mackinnon, and Christopher Sapardanis, “‘The World Is Entitled to Ask Questions’: The Trudeau Peace Initiative Reconsidered,” \textit{International Journal} 41, no. 1 (1985): 130–131.


\textsuperscript{70} See, for example, Marianne Hanson, “The Advocacy States: Their Normative Role Before and After the U.S. Call for Nuclear Zero,” \textit{The Nonproliferation Review} 17, no. 1 (2010): 71–93.

been almost no attempt by IR scholars to explain in theoretical terms why these particular states believed nuclear disarmament was an important foreign policy objective, and thus, what caused them to take on this advocacy role. In the absence of theoretically informed analysis, the world's only multilateral nuclear disarmament obligation thus appears to be a historical fluke. Since all political change begins with human agency—generally in the form of some type of advocacy—determining the causes of nuclear disarmament advocacy should be of considerable interest to policymakers seeking to narrow the gap between disarmament rhetoric and reality. This brings the discussion to the theoretical puzzle that this thesis addresses, which results from the inability of neorealism—which dominates IR nuclear weapons scholarship—to account for nuclear disarmament advocacy by non-nuclear weapon states.

Early writings dismissed nuclear disarmament efforts as a ‘maze of unrealism’ dominated by ‘fictional utopias.’ The concept of arms control demonstrates this point well. Advocates of arms control developed the concept explicitly to distance themselves from what they saw as the unrealistic idea of nuclear disarmament. Relatedly, the neorealist theories that dominate IR nuclear weapons scholarship portray nuclear disarmament as neither feasible nor desirable. Neorealism, also known as structural realism, is underpinned by three common assumptions which typify ‘materialist’ IR theories—those that explain outcomes primarily with reference to material factors. First, structural realism treats states as rational, often monolithic actors primarily seeking...

72 Many studies look at the notion of ‘middle power’ states as disarmament advocates, a notion that has potential identity-related aspects, as discussed further below. However, the middle power concept is so amorphous that its operationalization as a causal factor is highly problematic in theoretical terms. For a recent attempt to grapple with this issue, see, Allan Patience, “Imagining Middle Powers,” *Australian Journal of International Affairs* 68, no. 2 (October 31, 2013): 210–24.


survival in an anarchic international system, defined by the absence of a global authority capable of ensuring peace. In this view, states necessarily pursue self-interested, power-maximising behaviour to ensure their survival. Second, structural realists assume that this state of affairs creates inherently conflictual relations among countries. And third, the relative distribution of material capabilities is seen a central determinant of state behaviour under anarchy. In this materialist view, national interests are thus a function of system-level structure; they are largely predetermined, static and uniform across all states. Some realist scholars, such as those drawing on neoclassical realism, open space to consider national-level drivers of policy, including a peripheral role for ideational factors; such theories nonetheless maintain the assumption of materially-derived, fixed state interests.

The dominance of neorealist theories in IR nuclear weapons scholarship manifests in two ways in particular. First, the IR nuclear weapons research agenda focuses overwhelmingly on the experiences of states that either have nuclear weapons or are suspected of seeking them, rather than states that have given up nuclear weapons or related programmes, or states that never sought such weapons. Second, materialist assumptions have created an empirically questionable ‘proliferation paradigm’ that treats the spread of nuclear weapons as natural and/or inevitable. This also creates a conceptual ‘straightjacket’ that frames the achievement of national security as a binary choice between acquisition of nuclear weapons or membership in a nuclear alliance.

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In sum, nuclear disarmament advocacy by non-nuclear weapon states appears quite futile in neorealist terms. From this perspective, it can most accurately be described as an attempt by non-powerful countries to convince the most powerful countries in history to voluntarily give up a central source of their power. Since it is likely to incur significant diplomatic, political and/or individual costs, as discussed above, it also appears quite irrational from a neorealist perspective. Coming from nuclear umbrella states, disarmament advocacy is triply puzzling: it appears futile, irrational and dangerous. If such advocacy undermines nuclear deterrence norms, for example, it is assumed to reduce the security of allies, destabilise the international system, and thus, reduce the security of all states. This is because the internal logic of deterrence theory suggests that reducing nuclear deterrent threats increases the likelihood that adversaries will be willing to engage in acts of aggression. This increases the risk of both parties being drawn into armed conflict, with the potential for escalation to nuclear war. As the pioneer of neorealism, Kenneth Waltz, argues, ‘Those who like peace should love nuclear weapons.’

Despite the dominance of such perspectives in the IR nuclear weapons literature, a growing body of IR and historical research shows that the assumptions underpinning those perspectives are based on selective or wholly erroneous readings of the empirical record. There is a large gap, for example, between the number of countries that are capable of acquiring nuclear weapons, and the number that have actually done so—in stark contrast to the assumption of an inherent interest in material power maximisation. And as of 2007, ‘more countries have given up nuclear weapons or weapons...

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85 Sagan and Waltz, “Is Nuclear Zero the Best Option?,” 93.


programs in the past 15 years than have started them.’ 88 Meanwhile, ‘the number of states that started nuclear weapons activities but reversed course is more than double the number of those who still conduct them.’ 89

South Africa is the preeminent case of nuclear disarmament, as the only country thus far to follow what might be called an ‘indigenous disarmament’ trajectory of decision to acquire—acquisition—decision to disarm—disarmament. 90 Between November 1989 and July 1990, South Africa dismantled its working arsenal of six nuclear weapons, joining the NPT as a non-nuclear weapon state in July 1991. 91 The so-called ‘born nuclear’ states of Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine inherited administrative control of thousands of nuclear warheads and delivery vehicles when the Soviet Union dissolved, but chose to return them to Russia. 92 Granted, these states did not produce their own nuclear weapons, 93 and it appears most likely that they did not have the ability to target or fire them. 94 Nevertheless, the decision to surrender control of enormous nuclear arsenals has important symbolic value, affirming that these governments saw their national interests as being best served by getting rid of nuclear weapons—a point that NPT members unanimously acknowledged in 2000. 95

91 Ibid., 87; UNODA, “Treaties Database: NPT.”
92 Budjeryn, “NPT and National Identity.”
The need for nuclear disarmament theorisation

Despite the evidence above regarding the possibility of disarmament, the political dynamics of nuclear disarmament are under-studied in the IR literature, and where they are studied, they are generally under-theorised. This thesis starts from the premise that if we are to contribute to the advancement of nuclear disarmament, IR scholars need to develop a more cohesive theoretical programme dedicated to the issue. Certainly, there has been a spike in the attention paid to nuclear disarmament and the surrounding political dynamics in recent years. Starting in 2007, for example, a series of influential articles by former US cold warriors ‘stimulated public interest in disarmament as a serious response to nuclear weapons threats’ and triggered ‘a cascade of disarmament proposals.’ US President Barack Obama has also provided significant rhetorical leadership on nuclear disarmament issues, although his commitment to extensive modernisation and life-extension programmes for the US arsenal has been criticised as undermining disarmament efforts. Responding to the renewed political interest in nuclear disarmament, a few path-finding academic studies have begun to address the associated theoretical challenges. Given the magnitude of the stakes, however, and the overwhelming preponderance of proliferation and nonproliferation research in the nuclear literature, much remains to be done.

98 On this note, see, Lawrence Freedman, “Nuclear Disarmament: The Need for a New Theory” (Sydney, Australia: Lowy Institute for International Policy, 2009).
Two interrelated patterns in the existing academic literature are indicative of the need for more coherent theorisation of nuclear disarmament. First, IR scholars have used a wide range of terms to refer to states’ decisions not to acquire nuclear weapons, or to get rid of them—often without providing clear or explicit definitions of the terms being used. These terms include, for example, restraint,\textsuperscript{103} forbearance,\textsuperscript{104} rollback,\textsuperscript{105} denuclearisation,\textsuperscript{106} nonproliferation,\textsuperscript{107} and more recently, deproliferation.\textsuperscript{108} The cases examined in the literature cited above differ enormously in their historical detail, comprising variously: deliberate decisions not to seek to acquire nuclear weapons; decisions to renounce an established nuclear weapons programme not yet come to fruition; the reduction or complete dismantlement of an indigenously-developed, functional nuclear arsenal; or the surrender of nuclear weapons inherited from other countries. The lack of consistency and sometimes, clarity about the definitions applied to the analytical terms above, combined with the application of those terms to cases which vary so greatly in their historical detail, make comparisons across case studies highly problematic. This makes it difficult, on the basis of much of the existing literature, to draw broad theoretical conclusions about the dynamics of nuclear disarmament.

The second problem hampering coherent theorisation of nuclear disarmament dynamics is that several key contributors to the theoretical literature on nuclear weapons seem to have implied at various points that the drivers of nuclear disarmament and nuclear nonproliferation can be treated similarly in analytical terms. In her analysis of nuclear ‘fence-sitters’, for example, Etel Solingen uses the term ‘denuclearisation’ to refer to the experiences of Argentina, Brazil, Egypt, South Africa, South Korea and Taiwan.\textsuperscript{109} As discussed above, South Africa was the archetypal example of nuclear disarmament. In contrast, however, the other countries Solingen discusses never possessed nuclear weapons, and developed to greatly varying degrees the technological capacity needed to build them. Analysing South Africa’s experience of disarmament through the same theoretical lens as the

\textsuperscript{103} Sagan, ‘Why Do States Build Nuclear Weapons?’: 60-61; \textit{passim}.
\textsuperscript{107} Rublee, \textit{Nonproliferation Norms}, 7.
\textsuperscript{108} Müller and Schmidt, “The Little-Known Story of Deproliferation.”
\textsuperscript{109} Solingen, “The Political Economy of Nuclear Restraint,” 129.
experiences of countries which chose not to develop nuclear weapons is arguably of limited value in advancing our understanding of nuclear disarmament dynamics. As Maria Rublee points out,

One cannot assume that motivations for nonproliferation will also explain motivations for disarmament. Acquiring nuclear weapons irreversibly changes a state, from the public prestige (or scorn) that accrues to the domestic bureaucracy that forms to manage and maintain the weapons program. Reversing that type of decision will involve a different set of processes than the processes involved in nuclear restraint.110

Other prominent IR theorists have made similar analytical choices. Rublee’s own earlier work does not appear to have distinguished strongly in theoretical terms between disarmament and nonproliferation. In her 2009 book, *Nonproliferation Norms*, for example, Rublee brackets South Africa with Argentina, Belarus, Brazil, Kazakhstan, Libya and Ukraine, concluding, ‘On balance, the end of the bipolarity has led to more nonproliferation than proliferation.’111 In another prominent work on the drivers of nuclear nonproliferation, Tanya Ogilvie-White describes South Africa’s choice to dismantle its nuclear weapons, and Ukraine’s agreement to surrender the weapons it inherited at the dissolution of the Soviet Union, as nonproliferation decisions.112 Finally, in one of the most commonly cited articles on the theorisation of nuclear weapons decision making, Scott Sagan discusses the experiences of Belarus, Kazakhstan, Ukraine and South Africa under the rubric of nuclear ‘restraint’; however, he also includes in this analytical category the experiences of Brazil and Argentina—countries which never had nuclear weapons.113

While there has been a move towards more dedicated analysis of nuclear disarmament dynamics in recent years, the lack of consistency in distinguishing analytically between cases of nuclear nonproliferation on one hand and nuclear disarmament on the other is problematic. It prevents the development of plausible policy prescriptions precisely because it is not credible to apply the theoretical assumptions developed in the realm of nuclear nonproliferation to the problem of nuclear disarmament. The policy challenges to ensuring international norm compliance in the two different spheres demonstrate this point well.

112 Ogilvie-White, “Is There a Theory of Nuclear Proliferation?,” 49.
In contrast to nuclear nonproliferation, in which coercive pressure can play a significant role in ensuring norm compliance,\textsuperscript{114} it is probably not possible to achieve multilateral nuclear disarmament through coercion or enforcement.\textsuperscript{115} Multilateral attempts to use economic coercion to bring about nuclear disarmament will fall flat at the hurdle of the Security Council veto. Alternatively, attempts to use militarily threats or force to coerce nuclear states to disarm are likely to result in war, and potentially, nuclear war—the very outcome the international community is seeking to prevent by moving toward nuclear disarmament. This thesis argues, therefore, that achieving nuclear disarmament will necessarily require ‘getting to persuasion.’ In other words, disarmament will require broad international ‘internalisation’ of anti-nuclear weapon norms, such that it becomes widely assumed that nuclear weapons undermine, rather than bolster, international security.\textsuperscript{116} With this in mind, a significant contribution that this thesis makes to the security studies literature is in deepening our understanding of the dynamics of normative persuasion—that is, the social-psychological processes through which individuals and states internalise and act on collective belief systems—in the context of nuclear weapons policy. This contribution assists in the development of a theoretically-coherent literature capable of producing credible prescriptions for policymakers seeking to advance disarmament. The following section examines the existing literature on nuclear disarmament advocacy most relevant to the current thesis, and demonstrates how the thesis further contributes to the literature in theoretical and empirical terms.

**Existing literature / theoretical contribution**

The existing literature on non-nuclear weapon states as nuclear disarmament advocates has largely ignored the question of how unique national identity beliefs relate to policy outcomes. Johan


\textsuperscript{116} Internalisation constitutes a state in which a norm’s prescriptions are so deeply embedded in an identity that they are no longer debated; rather, compliance with those prescriptions is taken for granted as a policy preference. Further discussion of this point follows in chapter two. See, Finnemore and Sikkink, “International Norm Dynamics,” 904–905.
Bergenäs, for example, details Sweden’s nuclear disarmament and nonproliferation advocacy, but does not engage in any detail with the question of what caused this advocacy.\textsuperscript{117} Marianne Hanson examines Canadian and Australian attempts to advance nuclear disarmament and/or arms control.\textsuperscript{118} She also looks more broadly at the role in nuclear disarmament processes of what she calls ‘advocacy states’: a group of ‘often small- or middle-sized nations’ which have done ‘many years of hard work and norm-building’ and ‘have also been instrumental in stimulating a strong civil society sector...supportive of the elimination of nuclear weapons.’\textsuperscript{119} Hanson’s work in this regard focuses mainly on the effect of advocacy states’ actions on the international normative environment, and does not engage with the notion of identity as a policy driver, nor with the relationship between identities and norms. Naoki Kamimura looks at the nuclear disarmament advocacy of Australia and New Zealand, but limits his explanation of why this advocacy came about to the observation that it was triggered when France began testing in the South Pacific.\textsuperscript{120}

Erika Simpson looks at the role of elite beliefs in shaping Canadian nuclear weapons policies, but does not engage with the constructivist literature on the subject.\textsuperscript{121} Gabriel Stern focuses on Canadian identity in the field of conventional arms control, but his work focuses on elite identities only, rules out public influence on arms control dynamics, and highlights the importance of Canadian material contributions, as opposed to the advocacy focus in the current thesis.\textsuperscript{122} As will be seen in both the Canadian and New Zealand case studies here, however, public sentiment can influence nuclear disarmament policy in significant ways.

Douglas Shaw examines Canada’s advocacy of nuclear nonproliferation norms.\textsuperscript{123} He highlights Canada’s status as a ‘peace-loving nation’ with an ‘apparent satisfaction with “middle power” status,’ as important domestic factors influencing policy. These characteristics clearly relate to

\textsuperscript{117} Bergenäs, “The Rise of a White Knight.”

\textsuperscript{118} Hanson, “Advancing Disarmament”; Hanson, “Australia and Nuclear Arms Control.”


\textsuperscript{121} Simpson, NATO and the Bomb.


national identity, but Shaw makes no attempt to explain how they came to be constructed or why Canada, in particular, should be thought of as peace-loving.124 Natasha Barnes also explores ‘middle power’ nuclear disarmament advocacy, taking a structural approach to defining this notoriously flexible term; that is, material ‘asymmetry forms the core motivation for these states to actively seek and support the development of international norms that can constrain the great powers and ensure a more constructive and equitable international environment.’125 Again, this leaves aside the issue of unique national experiences and histories that are formative aspects of national identity. Carl Ungerer examines the role of the ‘middle power’ New Agenda Coalition (the ‘NAC’—a group of six states that includes New Zealand, whose designation as a middle power demonstrates the extreme flexibility of the term) in helping set the international nuclear agenda.126 Ungerer makes no mention, however, of national identity and does not attempt to explain why the issue of nuclear disarmament is important to the NAC countries in particular.

The current thesis offers the most detailed examination to date of the precise mechanisms and processes through which nuclear weapons-related national identities inform nuclear disarmament policy in Canada and New Zealand. This constitutes a unique contribution to the small literature on nuclear disarmament advocacy by non-nuclear weapon states, but also contributes to constructivist studies more broadly, which have almost entirely neglected the relationship between national identity and nuclear disarmament policy.

Key findings

Due to the complex, historically-contingent dynamics that characterise nuclear disarmament advocacy, it is not possible for a constructivist analysis to produce ironclad rules about when or how non-nuclear weapon states will undertake such advocacy.127 However, the findings in this thesis

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124 Ibid., 46–47.
125 Natasha Barnes, “Middle Powers as Norm Entrepreneurs: Comparative Diplomatic Strategies for the Promotion of the Norm of Nuclear Disarmament”, MA Thesis (Christchurch: University of Canterbury, 2010), 20.
strongly support the key causal hypothesis that the activation of an anti-nuclear weapon identity is a necessary condition, and active driver, for nuclear disarmament advocacy. The case studies also point to several overarching conclusions about when and how the activation of an anti-nuclear weapon identity is likely to result in nuclear disarmament advocacy.

First, the presence of supportive international norms and especially, international legal norms, makes nuclear disarmament advocacy more likely. The metanorm of sovereignty, for example, played an important role in activating opposition to nuclear testing in New Zealand in the 1960s and 1970s, as described in chapters four and five. In its disarmament advocacy, the New Zealand government invoked international legal norms in the form of anti-nuclear testing treaties and provisions, and argued that by causing radioactive fallout in the Pacific, French testing breached New Zealand’s sovereign rights. Likewise, chapters seven and eight show that the 1996 ICJ Advisory Opinion on the legal status of nuclear weapons not only informed the content of Canadian and New Zealand advocacy in the late 1990s, but was actually the catalyst for a reconsideration of Canadian nuclear policy.\textsuperscript{128}

Second, though the number of cases is small, detailed within-case analysis strongly supports the hypotheses that the presence of a nuclear alliance commitment makes broad-scope nuclear disarmament advocacy less likely,\textsuperscript{129} and that this causal relationship is driven by dynamics at the elite level. In the 1970s, New Zealand’s advocacy was limited to opposition to nuclear testing due to internalised pro-alliance norms that for the most part, ruled out consideration of broader challenges to nuclear weapons or related strategies. Similarly, both Canadian cases show how activation of alliance-related identities significantly constrains the scope of nuclear disarmament advocacy, even if governmental elites hold strongly pro-disarmament identities. Due to the transnational nature of alliance institutions, the constraining, pro-alliance identities may be activated by domestic or external actors. Meanwhile, chapter seven reinforces this conclusion by demonstrating how the opposite situation leads to the opposite outcome; that is, the absence of alliance commitments, combined with an internalised public anti-nuclear weapon identity, can

\textsuperscript{128} ICJ, “Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons.”

\textsuperscript{129} This is consistent with the Nic Maclellan’s finding, based on primary archival sources, that Australian leadership of the development of a South Pacific nuclear free zone in the 1980s was caused in part by the government’s desire to ensure that the zone did not ban port visits of nuclear armed warships in the region, out of fear that this would disturb Australia’s alliance relationship with the United States. Nic Macellam, “Delaying the Nuclear-Free Zone in the Pacific,” Inside Story, August 27, 2013, https://web.archive.org/web/20140725050807/http://inside.org.au/delaying-the-nuclear-free-zone-in-the-pacific/.
cause universalistic nuclear disarmament advocacy, despite a lack of genuine persuasion about such advocacy, or even opposition to it, from senior officials and politicians.\textsuperscript{130} Overall, the conflictual dynamics between alliance membership and disarmament advocacy are symptomatic of the disarmament/deterrence conundrum. In other words, since the conceptual logics behind the two approaches to security are largely mutually exclusive, it creates a significant policy conundrum for individuals with personal anti-nuclear weapon beliefs operating in pro-nuclear weapon institutions.

Third, the methodology developed here allows the thesis to isolate the important role that the bureaucratic, and particularly, legal institutionalisation of \textit{domestic} anti-nuclear weapon norms plays in increasing the likelihood of consistent nuclear disarmament advocacy in the long-term. This is of theoretical significance in several ways. Kees van Kersbergen and Bertjan Verbeek suggest that since actors may comply with norms for instrumental reasons or out of genuine normative persuasion, specifying ‘the conditions under which these various factors are likely to carry more weight’ in policymaking is an important task.\textsuperscript{131} All four case studies speak to this issue by isolating the various domestic and external policy pressures in the causal chain to gauge whether and how they affect nuclear disarmament policy. Chapter seven, however, is of particular interest in this regard; it demonstrates that legal institutionalisation of anti-nuclear weapon norms affects long-term policy trajectories in two ways. First, it helps to delegitimise arguments in favour of supporting, or acquiescing to nuclear deterrence, thus removing a primary normative competitor for nuclear disarmament. And second, officials that undertake disarmament advocacy for instrumental reasons (due to social conformity) may become genuinely persuaded about the national security value of those norms in the long term—that is, across several years. This reflects a social-psychological view which sees collective learning leading to changed state preferences and thus, policies. In this view, the iterative implementation of new norms leads to a self-perception

\textsuperscript{130} The term ‘universalistic’ is used here to refer to international disarmament advocacy which claims that the norms and policies promoted should be universal and thus, should apply to all countries. This term is deliberately used instead of the word ‘universal’, because the latter could be construed to mean that the entirety of a particular constituency, be it a national government or population, or the collective membership of the United Nations, was promoting the relevant norm or policy.

change in the individuals tasked with that implementation, who come to identify themselves with their regular practices.132

Checkel writes that analysts often present such arguments as heuristic claims that are ‘are intuitively or empirically plausible but elaborated insufficiently to allow for empirical testing and generalizing to other contexts. Thus, they avoid the tough issues of operationalization (how would I know persuasion when I saw it?)’133 More recent works have similarly called for greater specification of constructivist causal chains; Rublee, for example, highlights the need for an evolution in constructivist theory that would have great policymaking value—clarifying precisely ‘through what processes and under what conditions’ ideational factors affect policy.134 The methodology developed in this thesis addresses this challenge, and is one example of how analysts can identify normative persuasion and its effects on policy: first, segment the population to isolate domestic policy pressures and dynamics; and second, identify correlations between active identities and policy outcomes, and trace hypothesised causal pathways from the former to the latter, while taking into account alternative explanations based on external contextual pressures. The case study in chapter seven provides empirical support for Rublee’s suggestion that one pathway to state internalisation of a norm is through its institutionalisation in bureaucratic structures.135

Fourth, the thesis finds that the persuasion dynamic described above does not function with the same efficacy at the political level as it does at the bureaucratic level. Thus, if politicians are unconvinced about the value of a dominant policy norm, but comply with it for instrumental reasons related to, for example, electoral pressure, those politicians are much less likely to become normatively persuaded than are officials. It is hypothesised that this is because politicians tend to focus on specific policy areas less intensively than officials and, due to electoral cycles, for shorter periods of time. Conversely, however, where a specific politician is publicly associated with the promotion of a norm on multiple occasions, the persuasion dynamic is more likely to hold true due to psychological consistency effects, discussed in more detail in the following chapter.

134 Rublee, Nonproliferation Norms, 3.
135 Ibid., 46, note 46.
Finally, three out of the four cases highlighted the importance of individual norm entrepreneurs in generating nuclear disarmament advocacy. This finding reflects broader trends in the constructivist literature—including in relation to nuclear weapons—regarding the central role of human agency in creating normative change.\textsuperscript{136} In the fourth case, that of New Zealand in the 1990s, individual political norm entrepreneurship was less apparent, though not totally absent. In that case, internalised anti-nuclear weapon sentiment in the New Zealand public combined with the rhetorical entrapment of unpersuaded political leaders to produce strong nuclear disarmament advocacy. Later, increasing persuasion among officials and the prime minister, along with positive reinforcement from international peer groups, drove consistently strong advocacy.

**Thesis outline**

This introductory chapter has outlined the basis for the current research and its relevance in policy and theoretical terms. Three further chapters establish the conceptual foundations of the thesis, on which the individual case studies are built. First, chapter two provides more detail about the constructivist principles and concepts that underpin the research. This includes the nature of national identity and its close relationship with norms; the functional mechanisms through which identities and their related norms affect policy; the social and psychological mechanisms through which norms and identities evolve; and the role of human agency in all of these processes. The theory chapter also looks more closely at the contextual factors that may intervene in the policy process and thus, affect actors’ willingness or ability to express anti-nuclear weapon sentiment as nuclear disarmament advocacy.

Chapter three describes the methodological choices guiding the research design and the operationalisation of key concepts. In sum, the methodology revolves around two choices: first, to conduct comparative case studies in order to maximise external validity of findings; and second, to apply a process tracing method to within-case analysis in order to increase the internal validity of findings. The methodology chapter also looks at the case selection criteria and process, and outlines the sources and analytical treatment of case study data.

\textsuperscript{136} Müller, “Agency Is Central.”
Given the hypothesised role of anti-nuclear weapon identities as the active driver for nuclear disarmament advocacy, it is necessary to establish a baseline of national identity content on which the case studies can draw. Chapter four does this, and thus provides a bridge between the theoretical and methodological frameworks, and the analysis in the case study chapters. Chapter four surveys the history of Canadian and New Zealand experiences regarding nuclear weapons, and demonstrates how these experiences have shaped the prevailing national identities in different segments of the population.

Chapters five to eight present the four case studies. Each of these chapters begins by identifying the dominant national identity tropes in the three societal segments during the period in question, then traces the process through which these identities interacted or competed with each other and with contextual factors to produce the scope, intensity and longevity of nuclear disarmament advocacy observed. Finally, chapter nine reviews the findings of the case study chapters, offers more detailed observations about the patterns that characterise the drivers of nuclear disarmament advocacy, and suggests areas in which future research could usefully build on the research presented here.
2

Constructivism:
The power of ideas, not the idea of power

Peace cannot be kept by force, it can only be achieved by understanding.

~ Albert Einstein

Constructivism and nuclear weapons

IR constructivism is not a specific theory, but rather, a diverse set of approaches for thinking about how non-material or ‘ideational’ factors influence relations among nations. Constructivists ‘elevate socially constructed variables—commonly held philosophic principles, identities, norms of behavior, or shared terms of discourse—to the status of basic causal variables that shape preferences, actors, and outcomes.’ Two key concepts do much of the explanatory work in constructivist literature: first, national identity as a determinant of national interest and thus, of policy preferences; and second, norms as international social structures that both guide behaviour, and help constitute actors and actor identities over time. Constructivists see the relationship between (ideational) structures and agents as mutually constitutive; that is, state behaviour affects international normative structures, and those structures in turn affect the actions and identities of states. Since the foundational constructivist works were published in the 1980s and early 1990s, IR scholars have demonstrated

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1 For a formative article that laid the conceptual groundwork for much of the constructivist literature that followed, see, Ruggie, “International Regimes.”
4 See, for example, Wendt, “Anarchy Is What States Make of It”; Ruggie, “International Regimes.”
the significant influence of ideational factors on foreign policy choices. This includes studies even in so-called ‘hard cases’ where traditional IR theories see little prospect for such influence, such as in national and international security issues. As Jeffrey Checkel notes, ‘the once controversial statement that norms matter is accepted by all except the most diehard neorealists.’

Constructivists do not dispute the realist definition of international anarchy—the absence of a global sovereign capable of ensuring international peace and security—but they take an entirely different view of its nature and implications. For constructivists, the mutual constitution of agents and structures suggests that both anarchy itself, and the interests assumed to arise from it, are social constructs, not static or inevitable ‘realities.’ In this sense, constructivists hold that anarchy does not define national interests in any automatic way; rather, a state’s interests are historically contingent and dependent on its self-conception, or identity.

Despite their ideational focus, constructivists do not deny the important influence of material factors on international affairs. They argue, however, that the influence of material factors is historically contingent, not arbitrary or predetermined. Jutta Weldes, for example, describes material facts as ‘reality constraints’—a set of objective realities, such as geography, or the existence of large stockpiles of nuclear weapons, that states must account for in determining their interests.

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in a given situation. The influence on policy of such reality constraints is determined by the interpretations and meanings that actors give to them. These meanings are necessarily subjective, based on culturally and historically contingent national experiences and identities, as opposed to being derived from any inherent quality of physical objects themselves: ‘People act towards objects, including other actors, on the basis of the meanings that objects have for them.’

A good example of how identities affect responses to material objects comes from US perceptions of Russian versus British nuclear weapons. In material terms, the design, range and material effect of many Russian and British nuclear missiles are very similar. Yet British nuclear weapons have never been seen as a threat to US security, while Soviet (and later, Russian) nuclear weapons are seen as a very significant threat. The difference lies not in the weapons, but in the national identities of Russia, the United Kingdom and the United States, which are historically contingent, ideational, and interpreted by human agents.

In sum, constructivists see international life as made up of ‘intersubjective understandings, subjective knowledge, and material objects.’ The strength of a constructivist approach lies in its ability to account for the influence of both material and non-material factors, such as identities, norms and social structures, on policy outcomes. Given the constructivist view of the world as a complex social structure characterised by the mutual constitution of agents and structures, feedback loops, and cyclical norm change, this thesis is careful to account for the possible feedback effects created by the events in each case study. In other words, the identities and norms discussed as policy influences in the first case study may not be the same as those discussed in later cases. The following section offers more detail about the specific constructivist principles and concepts most relevant to the current study.

11 Ibid., 396–397.
National identity

The previous chapter introduced the argument that national identity plays a central, though not exclusive, explanatory role for policy outcomes in this thesis. To say that identity is an important driver for policy does not mean that national interests do not matter. It is a false dichotomy to contrast realist and constructivist explanations of policy outcomes along the lines of interests versus identities. Constructivists agree that interests drive policy, but believe that identity will strongly determine how an actor interprets its interests in any situation. In other words, for constructivists, national identity is a key determinant of national interest.

In an important sense, there is a close, interdependent link between national identity and norms. The common constructivist definition of a norm adopted here—‘a standard of appropriate behaviour for actors with a given identity’—implies that one’s national identity determines which norms are seen as applying to any given situation. On this basis, national identity is defined here as a national population’s beliefs about its nature as a social unit, in terms of its appropriate relationship to other international actors and social structures, such as allies or international law respectively. Thus, norms are embedded in and help to define national identities, with the latter being in part a collection of beliefs about which foreign policy behaviours are appropriate in particular situations. When constructivists talk of norms being ‘internalised’, for example—a concept discussed in more detail below—it is implicit that the norms are internalised in an identity.

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A second key factor which, along with norms, helps to define national identity is the practice of telling stories—in the media, in schools, or in the speeches of public figures, among other places—related to heroes and events that invoke national pride. It is for this reason, for example, that the name of David Lange, New Zealand’s prime minister from 1984-89, is invoked so often when New Zealanders discuss nuclear issues. Lange is revered by many New Zealanders as an anti-nuclear hero. Similarly, Lester Pearson’s name invokes for many Canadians their country’s pursuit of peace, due to his role as a formative champion of the concept of international peacekeeping during the 1956 Suez Crisis, for which he won the Nobel Peace Prize the following year. A monument to Canadian peacekeepers stands prominently in the centre of Ottawa, with an inscription from Pearson: ‘We need action not only to end the fighting, but to make the peace...My own Government would be glad to recommend Canadian participation in such a United Nations force, a truly international force for peace.’ An image of the memorial was stamped on the Canadian $1 coins produced in 1995. These national heroes and stories that they embody help to refine and reinforce dominant notions of national identity across time, embedding them in the popular imagination.

Three clarifications are necessary regarding the treatment of identity in this thesis. First, national identity is a multifaceted concept. Citizens’ beliefs about national characteristics are informed by a diverse range of cultural, economic and security issues, among other things. In some foreign policy debates, all three of these aspects of national identity may be highlighted or ‘activated’ by different actors, while at other times, only one might be activated. Human agency determines which

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25 A point of clarification is necessary regarding the treatment of Canada and New Zealand as countries with a coherent ‘national identity’ in a given context. Both countries actually have national communities other than the dominant Anglo-Saxon ones, such as the various First Nations and French Canadian settler communities in Canada, and Māori and Moriori peoples in New Zealand. In the cases examined here, however, identities relating to these communities do not arise in any significant way as competing narratives striving to influence foreign policy decision-making. As such, this thesis does not distinguish between ‘national’ and ‘state’ identities. In contrast, the distinction between nation and state is highly relevant in the Middle East, for example, where a myriad of ethnic, national and religious sub-state and transnational identity markers compete with the Western conception of the sovereign state as a primary point of allegiance. See, Telhami and Barnett, “Introduction,” 8–10.
identity tropes are activated in a given situation. This makes agency an important consideration in assessing ideational influences on foreign policy, a point discussed in more detail below. Since nuclear weapons are widely regarded as relating to defence and security, the term ‘national identity’ is used as shorthand here to refer specifically to actors’ security-related beliefs about national identity, rather than to the broader set of beliefs and norms that citizens associate with their country. Nuclear weapons-related questions that inform beliefs about national identity include, are nuclear weapons seen as enhancing or degrading the security of a particular country? Are the weapons seen as morally abhorrent, or simply as a weapon needed to fulfil a national defence requirement? Or perhaps both? Identifying how different actors answer such questions enables the researcher to point to the dominant security-related beliefs about national identity in different portions of the population.

Secondly, different beliefs about national identity may compete for prominence in policy processes, as various actors invoke their preferred vision of identity in order to advance the likelihood of their preferred policy outcome. That vision may be a purely personal one, or it may be representative of an institutional or organisational position. To respond to these observations, this thesis separates each country’s population into three analytical segments: first, senior government ministers; second, key foreign affairs and potentially, defence officials;28 and third, the public.29 This allows for consideration of how the dominant national identities held by these portions of the population either compete or complement each other in the democratic policy process of deciding nuclear policy. In this regard, it is worth considering the dynamics typical of policymaking processes in representative democracies such as Canada and New Zealand.

In Westminster–style democracies, the cabinet, led by the prime minister, has collective responsibility for deciding foreign and defence policy.30 All cabinet ministers are elected

28 In terms of bureaucratic division of policy tasks, nuclear disarmament is largely the domain of foreign affairs, as opposed to defence, bureaucrats. The institutional leaning of defence establishments is generally in favour of closer defence ties with great powers, and hence, tends to act as an inhibitor of proactive nuclear disarmament advocacy. Since this thesis focuses on the expression of anti-nuclear weapon identities, discussion here mainly addresses the work of foreign affairs bureaucracies.

29 This segmentation distinguishes the thesis from other related constructivist work on nuclear policymaking. Due to her focus on psychology, for example, Rublee focuses specifically on ‘state elites and policymakers’, defining elites as ‘those with decision making authority or substantial influence over decision making.’ Rublee, *Nonproliferation Norms*, 2.

30 On the Westminster system and its governing institutions, see, Raymond Miller, *Democracy in New Zealand* (Auckland: Auckland University Press, 2015), 26–36. Although New Zealand was once considered a ‘near perfect example of the Westminster model’, Miller (pp. 26–27) questions whether the label is
representatives and constitutionally speaking, govern in the name of the people, but they nevertheless come into office with their own beliefs about national identity and nuclear weapons, and consequent policy preferences. The central role of senior ministers in the foreign policy process means that their views can affect the options available for consideration by cabinet. When the policy preferences of key ministers do not match those of the public on a particular issue, public opinion may influence outcomes if there is enough active public interest to create electoral pressure. If this is the case, and politicians’ public behaviour thus conflicts with their genuinely-held preferences, individual actors may experience a form of cognitive dissonance—defined in the psychological literature as a ‘psychological discomfort.’ The natural human response is to take measures to reduce this discomfort, namely through a reconsideration of policy, or alternatively, by reframing the relevant norms in relation to national identity. As explained in more detail below, the potential for cognitive dissonance to influence policy outcomes is arguably strongest in terms of politicians, as they are required to represent and defend their policy decisions in public.

The constitutional role of officials is to advise cabinet. The bureaucracy holds institutional memory about policy across time and as such, foreign policy officials will often have more detailed policy knowledge and experience than their ministers. Officials are not directly responsible to the public in the way that politicians are, but since they are required to implement political directives, their policy behaviours may be influenced indirectly by public opinion. On a psychological level, a significant influence on officials comes from the personal relationships they form and norms of behaviour that they learn over long periods through regular, potentially daily, cooperation with representatives of friendly or allied countries. In his foundational constructivist essay, for example, Alexander Wendt writes, ‘institutionalization is a process of internalizing new identities and interests, not something occurring outside them and affecting only behavior; socialization is a cognitive process, not just a behavioral one.’ In this view, iterative processes of security policy

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31 In the nuclear weapons field particularly, see, Jacques E C Hymans, *The Psychology of Nuclear Proliferation: Identity, Emotions, and Foreign Policy* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006); Simpson, *NATO and the Bomb*.
34 Weldes, *Constructing National Interests*.
collaboration necessarily influence officials’ personal beliefs about national identity. Again, although these identities are held by individuals, they are national to the extent that the officials concerned identify their actions with serving a broader, national interest, and participate in collective practices on that basis.

If alliance norms include nuclear deterrence, the beliefs underpinning nuclear deterrence theory are likely to become embedded in the national identities of officials, acting as a constraint on nuclear disarmament advocacy. Norms that are indirectly related to nuclear deterrence may also constrain such advocacy. NATO’s strategic concept, for example, argues that both military strength and alliance solidarity are necessary to ensure a ‘credible’ deterrent. Expressing a dissenting opinion about the value of nuclear weapons may be seen as undermining alliance solidarity, and thus, as increasing the likelihood of external, potentially nuclear, aggression. In this sense, certain types of nuclear disarmament advocacy constitute a psychologically-destabilising, potentially existential threat to nuclear deterrence adherents. The constraining role that this dynamic plays on nuclear disarmament advocacy is revisited at various points throughout the thesis.

For the general public, who for the most part do not actually practice foreign policy norms, national identity is made up mainly of beliefs about principles the country stands for, generally represented in stories of past foreign policy ‘successes’ that feature national icons, heroes and foster national pride. As will be seen below, the role of sovereignty as an international ‘metanorm’—the norm at the zenith of the international normative hierarchy, from which most other norms governing international relations derive—means that public beliefs about national identity also revolve around stories that affirm a country’s sovereign independence. If particular stories or heroes dominate the public discourse for a prolonged period, or play a significant role in affirming ideas about national sovereignty, the related norms are likely to become deeply entrenched in the dominant public view about national identity. Where those stories relate to anti-nuclear weapons norms, this increases the likelihood of nuclear disarmament advocacy as a policy outcome.

In addition to the influence on nuclear disarmament policy of the psychological and institutional dynamics described above, it is important to recall that actors may invoke a particular national identity on the basis of genuine, personally-held beliefs, or for instrumental or strategic reasons.37

36 NATO, “The Alliance’s New Strategic Concept”, para. 30. See also paras 17, 36 and 55 of the Concept.
However, instrumental use of identity does not negate the relevance of the concept as a source of political influence:

...if language is used strategically it will only be effective if at least some important portion of the population has internalized the identity cues and responds to their use. That is, the instrumentality and authenticity of identity are two sides of the same coin.  

In other words, an identity must exist in at least one politically-relevant constituency for its invocation to be of strategic or instrumental value. Whether an identity is invoked out of genuine commitment or for instrumental reasons, the act of invoking an identity increases the likelihood that the related norms will inform policy outcomes.

Treaty-based international legal norms have important practical implications in terms of helping embed norms in national identities. Treaties codify norms and for countries that join the treaty, establish their explicit sovereign consent to be bound by the relevant norms. Parties are often obliged take specific measures at the domestic level to ratify and implement treaties, requiring the creation of domestic institutions and constituencies responsible for related tasks. Since their jobs derive from defending treaty-based norms, these constituents have a personal, utilitarian interest in the maintenance and strengthening of those norms, though that interest may also correspond to genuinely-held normative commitments. If the commitment is utilitarian at first, over time, it may come to be internalised in personal identity structures due to the iterative, daily practice of the norms and as a result of the psychological consistency effect—a concept outlined in the following section.

Thirdly, in relation to how national identity is defined here, identity is not static; it can change in significant ways over time, and challenges to dominant identities are common. While acknowledging the dynamic nature of identity, this thesis treats identity as a social object that can be defined as a discrete causal factor, in order to assess its influence on an observed policy outcome. Thus, the thesis defines national identity as it existed at the time of the events examined in each case study, offering an assessment of the dominant identities held by the three constituencies discussed: senior ministers, officials and the public. The process and data sources

39 Legro, “The Plasticity of Identity under Anarchy.”
41 Leading international scholars have advocated such an approach. See, Abdelal et al., “Identity as a Variable,” 700.
used to define national identities in each case are outlined in the methodology chapter which follows.

As the various dynamics described above suggest, national identities tend to evolve slowly and incrementally. This is because dramatic shifts in belief systems can be psychologically destabilising, and because institutional structures accumulate over time at the national level which reflect and reinforce dominant identity traits, habituating officials to the defence of those traits.\(^{42}\) Wendt, for example, describes an institution as ‘a relatively stable set or “structure” of identities and interests...often codified in formal rules and norms.’\(^{43}\) As will be seen in chapter four, however, rapid transformations in national identity are possible when an external trigger event challenges existing identities; this is similar, for example, to the way that sudden, unexpected events may shift international norms.\(^{44}\) Such events create a window of opportunity for norm entrepreneurs—actors who advocate new norms,\(^{45}\) or who seek to activate and link existing norms to new policy objectives,\(^{46}\) as discussed further below—to promote a new vision of what a country stands for.

**Norm internalisation**

The nineteenth century German Chancellor Otto von Bismarck famously called politics ‘the art of the possible.’\(^{47}\) The constructivist notion of norm internalisation is a modern theoretical tool for analysing precisely what is possible—or conversely, not possible—in a given political context.\(^{48}\) Internalisation refers to a state in which a norm’s prescriptions regarding appropriate behaviour are

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\(^{42}\) Discussion of the ‘consistency’ effect that results from this dynamic follows further below.  
\(^{43}\) Wendt, “Anarchy Is What States Make of It,” 399.  
\(^{44}\) Wunderlich, “Theoretical Approaches in Norm Dynamics,” 20.  
\(^{45}\) Ibid., 24.  
\(^{46}\) Rublee, *Nonproliferation Norms*, 45, n.42.  
\(^{48}\) On norm internalisation, see, Finnemore and Sikkink, “International Norm Dynamics,” 904–905; Checkel, “Why Comply?,” 556–558. From a more sociological perspective, Pierre Bourdieu’s notion of *habitus* closely resembles norm internalisation. Among others, Vincent Pouliot and Frédéric Mérant apply Bourdieu’s concept in their IR ‘practice’ theory, but focus on implicit learning among elites as opposed to the effects of explicit norm advocacy. Since the core focus here is on explicit advocacy of nuclear disarmament, the internalisation/*habitus* link is not pursued further. Vincent Pouliot and Frédéric Mérant, “Bourdieu’s Concepts: Political Sociology in International Relations,” in *Bourdieu in International Relations: Rethinking Key Concepts in IR*, ed. Rebecca Adler-Nissen (New York: Routledge, 2012), 29–32.
embedded so deeply in a collective identity that the impulse to comply with them is widely taken for granted.⁴⁹ In policy debates, internalised norms thus determine the boundaries of the possible from the outset; they rule out certain options as unthinkable to most people, and make other options appear natural or inevitable.⁵⁰ As a result, internalised norms contribute significantly to the influence of national identities on policy outcomes. In addressing the core research question of this thesis, it is therefore important to consider what nuclear weapons-related norms are internalised in Canadian and New Zealand national identities at various historical moments. The analysis returns to this question, as and where appropriate, throughout the thesis.

When norms are embedded in a national identity but not internalised, the democratic policymaking process may include explicit reflection and debate over the related policy prescriptions. In contrast, when a norm is internalised, debate over the relevant policy issues ceases, because actors do not need to consider what the policy preferences should be in a given situation, they are obvious.⁵¹ Internalised norms thus have the potential to constrain policy before any explicit policy debate begins, by defining certain options as ‘natural’ or inevitable, and making others appear unthinkable.⁵²

To be clear, the discussion of various internalised identities in this thesis is not intended to imply total unanimity on a particular identity trait. Rather, it implies that the overwhelming portion of a societal segment is committed to a particular vision of national identity. Such widespread internalisation of a norm within a portion of the population may attenuate not just debate, but even attention to an issue. In this situation, the absence of debate or public attention does not reflect a lack of genuine commitment to the relevant norm. On the contrary, the lack of debate means that the norm and its prescriptions are so deeply embedded in an identity that, unless an external trigger forces a reconsideration of beliefs, actors see no need to consciously examine policy alternatives. If this dynamic develops within state institutions responsible for managing policy, the resulting policy practices may become very difficult to shift.

⁴⁹ Regarding the notion that norms are internalised in an identity, see, Abdelal et al., “Identity as a Variable,” 697.
⁵¹ Ibid., 697–698.
In international affairs, the most obvious example of the internalisation dynamic is what is defined here as the ‘metanorm’ of national sovereignty. Another ways of saying this is that sovereignty sits at the zenith of the normative hierarchy governing international relations, and thus provides the rationale and legitimacy for many subsidiary norms that govern daily inter- and intra-state relations. The core norms that constitute the modern concept of sovereignty—self-determination and non-interference within territorially-defined national boundaries, and the right to self-defence—have been practised relatively consistently since the 1648 Peace of Westphalia. These norms are therefore deeply entrenched, and arguably, internalised, in the national identities of people all over the world. They are, for the most part, an unquestioned feature of international life.

The relevance of this observation to the discussion of how internalised norms affect nuclear disarmament policy is that foreign policy claims that can credibly be linked to core sovereignty norms are likely to be compelling and politically influential. Chapter four demonstrates, for example, that in New Zealand, one aspect of the political dynamic that helped shift public opinion towards internalisation of an anti-nuclear weapon norm was the belief—fostered by nuclear disarmament advocates and assisted by external events—that opposing nuclear weapons was central to defending New Zealand’s sovereign independence.

Socialisation mechanisms

Political psychology proposes three socialisation mechanisms through which norms, when highlighted or activated, may influence social outcomes—social conformity, persuasion and identification. Social conformity means complying with a norm’s prescriptions for instrumental reasons, in contrast to personal preferences. When a person is persuaded, they pursue norm-consistent behaviour out of a genuine belief in the appropriateness of that behaviour. Identification describes a situation in which a person complies with a norm in order to emulate or develop affect with an important other. This section outlines some of the ways in which these socialisation mechanisms either affect policy or come to be embedded in dominant national

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identities. The impact of these socialisation mechanisms may vary across the three segments of society.

In a democracy, widespread public internalisation of a norm produces strong incentives for politicians to comply with that norm or express pro-norm attitudes in public, even if they are not genuinely convinced about the norm’s prescriptions. Such electorally-motivated statements can lead to rhetorical entrapment; that is, if public sentiment on the issue is strong, leaders will feel compelled to pursue behaviours that are consistent with previous pro-norm commitments made in public, increasing the likelihood of future policy that is consistent with past rhetoric.\textsuperscript{54} In terms of genuine preference changes, chapter seven will demonstrate that particular politicians who for instrumental reasons become closely identified with defence of anti-nuclear weapon norms may experience persuasion effects over time; or alternatively, generational change or natural attrition among MPs may alter the balance of identities within a party across time.

A concept related to social conformity and persuasion dynamics, and one which also informs the analysis here of the drivers for nuclear disarmament advocacy, is the notion of psychological consistency. This refers to an individual’s need to appear consistent, either for the stability of their own identity and thus, their psychological wellbeing, or for electoral or political purposes.\textsuperscript{55} Consistency effects in policymaking have been explored in the realm of nuclear nonproliferation,\textsuperscript{56} but not previously in regard to nuclear disarmament, though Rublee calls for such an undertaking.\textsuperscript{57}

For officials, the institutionalisation of norms in bureaucratic structures and practices is an important mechanism of socialisation. Officials may support the policies they are instructed to implement, or may simply implement them for utilitarian reasons in that their livelihood depends on it. Alternatively, they may oppose government policy, and seek to undermine it. Either way, the iterative daily practice of norms habituates officials to those norms, and over time, can lead to norm persuasion. In personal psychological terms, the consistency effect suggests that ‘performance of the initially requested action causes a self-perception change; that is, individuals come to see

\textsuperscript{54} Verbeek, “Does Might Still Make Right?,” 211–212.
\textsuperscript{56} Rublee, \textit{Nonproliferation Norms}, 46.
\textsuperscript{57} Rublee, “Scholarly Research on Nuclear Exits,” s44.
themselves as possessing certain behaviour-related traits.\textsuperscript{58} Cialdini describes this process as commitments ‘growing their own legs.’\textsuperscript{59}

In this sense, consistency effects may drive future norm-consistent behaviour not only due to the rhetorical entrapment of political leaders, but potentially, due to the progressive persuasion of officials. This persuasion dynamic is more likely to occur if the individuals in question are undecided to start with; a key finding in chapter seven, however, is that even in the realm of nuclear weapons, persuasion can shift officials’ perspectives from opposition to the advocacy of nuclear disarmament norms to strong support. If the persuasion dynamic continues for a long enough period, it may result in the internalisation of nuclear disarmament norms.

The persuasion/internalisation process may be augmented or diminished depending on whether officials receive external recognition—for example, from international peers—whose figurative ‘back patting’ or shaming may produce a sense of pride or shame regarding the policies enacted. The degree to which such external feedback affects individuals’ beliefs depends on the perceived legitimacy of the actor providing the feedback:

...the strength of backpatting and opprobrium depends on two related factors: the nature of the actor’s self-categorization, and which other actors, by virtue of this self-identification, become important, legitimate observers of behavior. Changes in identities mean that different audiences matter differently.\textsuperscript{60}

As with the political leadership, natural attrition may help to introduce alter the balance of national identity beliefs within the bureaucracy, though if the beliefs of incoming officials conflict with established norms, they will still have to compete for recognition.

**Norm dynamics**

In very simplified terms, there are two related, but distinct dynamics that might interest norm scholars: how norms affect actors’ behaviour, and how actors’ behaviour affects norms.\textsuperscript{61} The main

\textsuperscript{58} Rublee, *Nonproliferation Norms*, 46.
\textsuperscript{59} Cialdini, *Influence*, 84.
\textsuperscript{60} Johnston, “Treating International Institutions,” 501.
\textsuperscript{61} On the question of how state behaviour affects international nuclear weapons-related norms, see Shaw, “Lessons of Restraint.”
contribution of norm dynamics to this thesis comes from the former. That is, the thesis examines how existing norms—either congruent with, or embedded in anti-nuclear weapon identities, and activated by human agency—affect the likelihood of nuclear disarmament advocacy.

The interplay between agents and structures means that norms are constantly evolving over time in a cyclical manner, with actors ‘linking rules to actions to arguments, which in turn reshape the rules.’ It is the ‘intersubjective’ or shared nature of beliefs about appropriate behaviour that gives norms validity and contributes to their influence on policy. In this sense, the legitimacy of state actions at the international level is derived in part from adherence to relevant norms in a given situation, and states may invoke particular norms to justify and validate their behaviour. Norms are generally seen as existing on a continuum, rather than as being dichotomous. The constructivist literature tends to focus on a few common assumptions about norm functioning. First, norms have a value-laden prescriptive character that distinguishes them from other kinds of rules. For example, James Fearon distinguishes between a rule and a norm as follows: rules stipulate ‘do X to get Y’, whereas norms stipulate ‘good people do X’. In the context of nuclear deterrence, however, this distinction is somewhat blurred.

Few people affirm the moral value of making annihilation threats of the type inherent in nuclear deterrence postures. The theoretical structures around which the practice of nuclear deterrence is built, however, suggest that weakening nuclear deterrence practices—for example, by undermining alliance solidarity, as discussed above—increases the likelihood of war and potentially, nuclear war. As such, the normative value of making credible nuclear annihilation threats comes, somewhat perversely, from the belief that the alternative is worse. For this reason, the use of the terms pro-nuclear/pro-nuclear weapon in this thesis is not intended to impute to the relevant actors a

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63 Adler, “The Emergence of Cooperation.”
66 Wunderlich, “Theoretical Approaches in Norm Dynamics,” 22.
moral commitment to the threat or use of nuclear weapons. Rather, these terms refer to practices and beliefs that favour the retention of nuclear weapons.

A second defining feature of norms is that they can be both constitutive and regulative; they ‘establish expectations about who the actors will be in a particular environment and about how these particular actors will behave.’\(^6^8\) A key example of this in the nuclear field comes from the NPT. Ten years after the Treaty entered into force, 73 percent of UN members (112 of 154) had joined;\(^6^9\) at time of writing in 2015, the figure is 97 percent, as noted above. In other words, the NPT is a central normative structure that determines multilateral discourse around nuclear weapons. The NPT explicitly creates the identity categories of ‘non-nuclear weapon state’ and ‘nuclear weapon state’—the latter being those that exploded a nuclear device prior to 1 January 1967.\(^7^0\) Though these categories officially apply only to NPT members, the near-universal nature of NPT membership means that the Treaty’s norms and identity categories often structure relations between NPT members and non-members. Many NPT members, for example, show great reluctance to acknowledge the four non-members as being nuclear armed, for fear of undermining the NPT.\(^7^1\) Similarly, opposition to the US-India nuclear deal in the mid-2000s was based on concerns that the deal would undermine the existing international nuclear regime, which centres on the NPT.\(^7^2\)

In terms of defining member-states’ behaviours, the NPT affirms that non-nuclear weapon states agree not to acquire nuclear weapons by any means. In exchange, the nuclear weapon states—China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom and the United States—agree not to assist any non-nuclear armed state to acquire nuclear weapons, and agree to disarm under Article VI.\(^7^3\) Given this ‘grand bargain’ in which all Treaty members agree to work to eliminate nuclear weapons, this thesis

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\(^7^0\) UNODA, “Treaties Database: NPT”, article IX(3).
\(^7^1\) See, for example, SCFAIT, “Canada and the Nuclear Challenge: Reducing the Political Value of Nuclear Weapons for the Twenty-First Century” (Ottawa, December 1998), recommendation 14.
\(^7^3\) China and France did not join the NPT until the early 1990s, but fit the definition of nuclear weapon states included in the Treaty—that being, states which tested nuclear weapons prior to 1 January 1967. See, UNODA, “Treaties Database: NPT”, Article IX(3).
argues that although the NPT does not outlaw nuclear weapons, it codifies an ‘anti-nuclear weapon norm.’ In other words, the grand bargain codifies ‘the mutually agreed-upon assumption that the world is better off without nuclear weapons than with them.’ This anti-nuclear weapon norm is defined here as a metanorm that incorporates both nuclear disarmament and nonproliferation norms.

A third common assumption about norms is that they help to shape identities incrementally, through the iterative repetition of norm-compliant behaviour. For example, nuclear weapons acquisition was previously seen as increasing international status and marking a state as a modern or great power. However, as countries have consistently pursued policies, and established bureaucracies that reflect and institutionalise the anti-nuclear weapon norm of the NPT, these processes have helped to invert the normative value of—that is, the shared beliefs about what constitutes appropriate behaviour in relation to—the weapons over time. Acquiring nuclear weapons is now widely viewed as the illegitimate action of a renegade state. Quantitative analysis shows that this transformation of international norms corresponds to an increased likelihood over time that states will renounce nuclear weapons activities.

A final observation in this section is that it is important to consider how the creation and activation of domestic or international anti-nuclear weapon norms—and in particular, legal norms—affect nuclear disarmament advocacy. In politics, ‘those who determine what is legitimate have social power.’ Invoking law is one means of increasing the perceived legitimacy of one’s policy preferences or prescriptions. It is for this reason that political actors sometimes use law to attempt to ‘magnify their influence.’

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74 This might equally be termed an emergent ‘nuclear disarmament norm.’ Barnes, “Middle Powers as Norm Entrepreneurs,” 4–5. The term anti-nuclear weapon norm is used here for compatibility with the notion of anti-nuclear weapon identities.
75 Rublee, Nonproliferation Norms, 39.
76 Sagan, “Why Do States Build Nuclear Weapons?,” 76; Rublee, “Taking Stock,” 430. Even some realist scholars have acknowledged the normative basis for this trend: see, Gavin, “Nuclear Proliferation and Non-Proliferation during the Cold War,” 415.
The role of agency

The construction, activation and interpretation of ideational structures such as norms and identities are inherently social processes. Human agency is therefore an essential aspect of any explanation for how identities and their related norms affect policy, and vice versa. This section outlines how agency is incorporated into the core arguments made in this thesis about the role of anti-nuclear weapon identities as drivers for nuclear disarmament policy.

Much of the constructivist literature adopts the frame of ‘norm entrepreneurs’ to describe actors that advocate novel policies or normative positions. Norm entrepreneurs are actors that try to convince a critical mass of states to adopt norms. They ‘seize windows of opportunity’ to ‘alter the prevalent normative structure.’ A common understanding of norm entrepreneurs as purveyors of new ideas led to the assumption in early constructivist literature that such entrepreneurs are most active during the emergence phase of new norms. However, this model needs refinement. Normative contestation is constant and evolutionary, so norm entrepreneurs should not be understood merely as actors who encourage the adoption of new ideas. Norm entrepreneurs also seek to activate and link existing identities and related norms to new policy objectives, and use consistency effects to ensure that policy outcomes reflect prior normative commitments.

Early constructivist works largely examine the role of individuals as norm entrepreneurs, though a growing body of literature has begun to focus on states and international organisations in this role.

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80 Peter Howard and Reina Neufeldt, “Canada’s Constructivist Foreign Policy: Building Norms for Peace,” Canadian Foreign Policy Journal 8, no. 1 (2000): 14; Müller, “Agency Is Central.”
82 Finnemore and Sikkink, “International Norm Dynamics,” 895.
83 Wunderlich, “Theoretical Approaches in Norm Dynamics,” 20.
85 Rublee, Nonproliferation Norms, 45, n.42.
The outcome of interest in this thesis is state-based nuclear disarmament norm entrepreneurship, with the theoretical focus on why states pursue such activity. In contrast to scholars’ earlier focus on the altruistic, principled motivations of norm advocates,87 Wunderlich notes that state-based norm entrepreneurship may be driven by a complex mix of self-interest and normative commitment—a finding also reflected in the case studies presented here.88

The precise influence of norms on nuclear policymaking depends on how key actors responsible for making decisions process the norms they are either confronted with externally, or with which they already identify. From a social psychological perspective, three mechanisms affect such norm processing: linking, activation and consistency. Linking a proposed policy to well-established norms or values strengthens the perceived legitimacy of the policy. Activation of a norm means emphasising and promoting one particular norm over others. A third norm processing mechanism, consistency, has already been discussed. The empirical chapters return to these three concepts—linking, activation and consistency—to build the causal arguments about the relationship between national identities and nuclear disarmament policy.

To the extent that norm entrepreneurs can credibly frame new policy objectives as congruent with existing norms with which the target audience identifies—that is, to ‘link’ the two, normative precedence may be influential as a policy driver. In the NPT context, for example, it is common to use consensus language from the final documents of previous review conferences as the basis for future negotiations. This practice means that the specific language in such documents often represents consensus developed across a decade or more of negotiations between dozens of countries.89 Invoking previous consensus NPT agreements allows countries to claim greater legitimacy for current disarmament proposals if the two can credibly be linked.90 The relevance of

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88 Wunderlich, “Theoretical Approaches in Norm Dynamics,” 32.


90 The author observed the regular use of this linking technique in negotiations at the 2015 NPT Review Conference, as states sought to have their preferred disarmament language included in the draft outcome document.
this observation to the question of what causes non-nuclear weapon states’ advocacy of nuclear disarmament is that policymakers who doubt the chances of success for a diplomatic initiative related to disarmament are unlikely to proceed. Normative precedents that legitimate their policy preferences, however, mean that related initiatives are more likely to succeed, thus increasing the likelihood of nuclear disarmament advocacy.

In domestic policy-making processes, the existence of codified anti-nuclear weapon norms—whether in domestic law or policy, or international treaties—provides precedents, and thus legitimacy and political leverage, for actors seeking to pursue pro-disarmament policies. Several cases point to this effect. In Ukraine’s decision to get rid of its inherited nuclear weapons, for example, ‘the NPT subtly disciplined nuclear negotiations...by limiting legitimate options available’ due to the identity categories defined in the Treaty.\(^{91}\) South Africa’s decision to disarm seems to have been driven in large part by a desire to rejoin the international community in the post-apartheid era, including for economic reasons.\(^{92}\) However, without the NPT’s widely-endorsed anti-nuclear weapon norms, achieving these goals would not have been assisted by getting rid of nuclear weapons, making disarmament a less likely outcome.\(^{93}\)

Similarly, while economic and other forms of coercion have played an important role in minimising the spread of nuclear weapons,\(^{94}\) such coercion would have no legitimate basis in the eyes of much of the world were it not for the NPT. Political authority is ‘a fusion of power with legitimate social purpose,’\(^{95}\) whereas ‘force without legitimacy is tyranny.’\(^ {96}\) Coercive great power nonproliferation strategies in the absence of collective anti-nuclear weapon norms would be seen as a breach of states’ right to self-defence—a core norm of sovereignty—and would thus be condemned internationally, and arguably, would be less likely to succeed. The case study chapters return to the normative dynamics discussed in this section as they are relevant to each historical episode. Each case offers detailed empirical examination of whether and how the activation of anti-nuclear

\(^{91}\) Budjeryn, “NPT and National Identity,” 34.
\(^{92}\) Long and Grillot, “Ideas, Beliefs, and Nuclear Policies,” 32.
\(^{95}\) Ruggie, “International Regimes,” 382.
weapon norms—some embedded in national identities, some derived from international agreements or legal norms—have made nuclear disarmament advocacy more likely.

**Contextual factors**

According to constructivist logic, a significant change in identity should lead—all things staying the same—to a related change in policy. Of course, things never stay exactly the same in the political world. The complexity of social interactions that define international life mean that constructivists cannot make deterministic claims such as, ‘the more X, the more Y.’ The external material, ideational and agentic factors that intervene between identity and policy are classed here as contextual factors. To the extent that the analysis can account for or discount contextual policy influences, it is possible to draw credible conclusions about the role of identity as a policy driver.

On the basis of existing scholarship, this thesis examines a range of contextual factors that are of key interest to IR constructivism. These include: a) the military alignment of the country; b) the status of norms relating to nuclear weapons, and the way those norms are processed by decision makers and officials; c) civil society activity, particularly regarding the activation/highlighting/linking of norms, and d) the state of great power relations, which may affect policy calculations in a variety of ways. Depending on the details of the case, each of these contextual factors may complement or counteract the preference to pursue nuclear disarmament advocacy. The influence of normative context on policy was discussed in detail in the preceding section due to its close relationship with identity structures. The current section therefore focuses only on military alignment, civil society activity and great power relations. It should be noted that these contextual factors do not exist in isolation from the process of identity and preference formation discussed above. Rather, they interact regularly with national identities and thus may exert pressure in a range of ways—for example, by reshaping national identities in the

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97 Lupovici, “Constructivist Methods,” 211.
98 In their definition of process tracing—a methodological tool applied in this thesis, as discussed in the following chapter—Bennett and Checkel discuss ‘complementary’ variables as those that display additive/subtractive qualities in relation to the key causal variable. This thesis takes a similar approach, but does not employ the positivist language of ‘variables’. Bennett and Checkel, “Process Tracing,” 7–8.
99 In the context of nuclear nonproliferation, for example, see, Rublee, “Scholarly Research on Nuclear Exits,” s39–s40.
mutually-constitutive manner emphasised by constructivist principles, or by activating particular norms during policy debates.

Finally by way of introduction to the contextual variables, this thesis acknowledges the important role that geography plays as a reality constraint with which all countries must grapple in determining their policy preferences. However, as emphasised above, the impact of such reality constraints on policy is determined by human agency. As such, the influence of geography on the national identities and nuclear disarmament policies of Canada and New Zealand is operationalised in the empirical chapters that follow via the identity-related and contextual factors outlined in this chapter.

Military alignment

Defence planning is an important, long-term policy issue for governments in logistical, political and legal terms. Military alliances complicate defence planning by requiring its coordination with foreign as well as domestic constituencies. Membership in military alliances with nuclear weapon states can generate countervailing pressures to the expression of anti-nuclear weapon identities through a variety mechanisms. Such alliances create domestic and transnational constituencies that have personal and institutional interests in affirming the value of nuclear weapons, including from a financial perspective. Over time, the socialisation dynamics outlined above may create or strengthen pro-nuclear weapon identities in these constituencies. In some cases, pro-nuclear norms may even become internalised.

Both Canada and New Zealand have participated in alliances in which nuclear weapons play a significant role. Canada is still a member of two such alliances: the 28-member (at time of writing)


101 It is worth noting that neorealist theories regarding alliance dynamics, such as those in Glenn Snyder’s early work on alliance dilemmas, do not apply here for several reasons. Snyder’s focus on international structure leads him to exclude domestic politics from consideration, as well as alliance relations outside Europe. He also fails to consider that nuclear disarmament—as opposed to arms control—might be a policy objective for alliance members. Glenn H Snyder, “The Security Dilemma in Alliance Politics,” World Politics 36, no. 4 (1984): 466, 484, 485.
North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), formed in 1949, and the Canada-US North American Air Defence agreement (NORAD), which began operations in 1957 and was formalised in 1958. For more than 35 years, from 1951–1986, New Zealand was an official ally of the United States under the trilateral Australia-New Zealand-United States Treaty (ANZUS). The empirical chapters examine how the publics, bureaucracies and senior ministers in each case study understood and acted on their alliance commitments. This includes consideration of the degree to which alliance commitments and the practice of their associated norms informed national identities and decision-making processes.

In this regard, it is important to note that from a constructivist perspective, the Canadian commitment to NATO cannot be understood merely in terms of security or state ‘survival’ in the realist sense. Post World War II, the territorial threat to North America was distant, while the United States—and to a lesser, but still significant degree, Canada—had overwhelming military and economic superiority to those countries whose territories had been devastated by the war. From a structural realist perspective, Canadian and US commitments to NATO—with their potential for entrapment in messy European conflicts—is therefore anomalous.

From an ideational perspective, the establishment of NATO resulted from the affinity between Western, liberal democracies who saw the ‘Sovietisation’ of Europe as a threat to ‘the liberal collective identity and its views of what constituted a “just” domestic and international order.’ The Alliance was established to address that threat. This point is explicitly reflected in NATO documents. For example, the 1991 NATO strategic concept states, ‘the security of all Allies is indivisible: an attack on one is an attack on all.’ In material terms, this is a very difficult proposition to defend, considering the Atlantic Ocean that divides Canada and the United States from Europe.

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103 Buckley notes, for example, that Canada ‘emerged from World War II as a major military power in its own right’ with an economy ‘richer, stronger, and more sophisticated than it had been in 1939.’ Brian Buckley, Canada’s Early Nuclear Policy: Fate, Chance, and Character (Montreal; Ithaca, N.Y: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2000), 7–8.


106 Ibid., 378.

107 NATO, “The Alliance’s New Strategic Concept”, para. 36.
In this regard, Canada’s commitment to NATO, and the tensions between alliance solidarity and opposition to nuclear weapons—one of the central themes explored in this thesis—must be understood not just in terms of material security concerns, but as a broader normative imperative.

**Civil society activity**

Civil society actors can apply a range of tactics in attempting to influence policy processes. In the nuclear realm specifically, civil society individuals and organisations have engaged actively on nuclear weapons policy issues since the start of the nuclear age, and have become an increasingly prominent aspect of international nuclear policy debates. In this vein, Lawrence Wittner writes, ‘omitting this [civil society] nuclear disarmament campaign from explanations of nuclear restraint makes about as much sense as omitting the U.S. civil rights movement from explanations for the collapse of racial segregation and discrimination.’

Through political lobbying or public awareness campaigns, civil society may help to activate particular norms at important turning points in policy processes, thus affecting political calculations for decision-makers. This activity can be domestic or transnational, and may focus on either domestic or international norms. In the modern, globalised and digitally connected world, civil society actors have their own transnational networks, which may include foreign civil society or...

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governmental actors. Domestic civil society actors may thus be able to use these networks to put pressure on their ministers and/or officials both ‘from above’ (at the international level) and ‘from below’ (at the domestic level).\textsuperscript{110}

Alternatively, civil society activity at the domestic level may help to shape national identity over time, potentially helping to shape the range of policy options deemed legitimate by all sectors of society. In addition to potentially influencing the population’s views through public campaigning, for example, civil society influence at the government level is made possible by the fact that official government consultations with civil society have been taking place since the late 1970s in both Canada and New Zealand. These consultations were established in the lead up to the First UN Special Session on Disarmament in 1978 in order to elicit public input into disarmament policy; though their frequency has waxed and waned since that time, they have remained a feature of the policy landscape.\textsuperscript{111}

By examining the content, timing and intensity of civil society interventions in policy debates, this thesis assesses how these interventions influenced government decisions about whether and how to pursue nuclear disarmament advocacy. This might include, for example, activating or influencing anti-nuclear weapons identities across the different segments of society, or influencing factors used by policymakers in their cost-benefit analyses of policy options.

**Great power relations**

The most prominent focus of nuclear weapons scholarship has traditionally been the relationships between great powers, and during the Cold War, between the two superpowers. Given their significantly larger access to material resources over other states, the great powers have an increased breadth and depth of capacity to engage in international relations. The tone and content of great power relations are therefore often major influences on international outcomes, including the policies that other states choose to pursue. In the disarmament realm, the nuclear weapon states have often emphasised the view that disarmament is facilitated by reduced international

\textsuperscript{110} Risse and Sikkink, “Socialization of International Human Rights Norms.”

\textsuperscript{111} Ernie Regehr, “Private Interview” (Ottawa, May 29, 2012).
tensions, not the other way around,\textsuperscript{112} though experts are divided on the point.\textsuperscript{113} Similarly, commentators have suggested the Russian annexation of the Crimea in 2014 greatly reduced the prospects for further Russia-US disarmament progress.\textsuperscript{114} This perspective sees deteriorating relations as a causal factor that blocks disarmament progress. The influence of such a dynamic on nuclear disarmament advocacy by non-nuclear weapon states, however, cannot be taken for granted. In some cases, retrenchment into antagonistic ‘bloc’ mentalities may lead great powers to put pressure on others not to break solidarity with their bloc; arguably, this would lessen the likelihood of disarmament advocacy. Alternatively, total retrenchment into bloc mentalities can increase the perceived risk of nuclear war, creating a powerful motivator for anti-nuclear advocacy. Chapters six and eight demonstrate these two dynamics respectively, albeit with specific nuances.

While extreme antagonism between great powers may spur nuclear disarmament advocacy by non-nuclear weapon states, disarmament cooperation between great powers can also increase the likelihood of such advocacy. Immediately following the signing of the Russia-US New START agreement on nuclear reductions,\textsuperscript{115} for example, the 2010 NPT Review Conference negotiated a comprehensive ‘action plan’ on nuclear disarmament and nonproliferation, including ‘concrete steps for the total elimination of nuclear weapons.’\textsuperscript{116} This plan included an explicit reference to humanitarian concerns, which has spurred a new wave of disarmament advocacy, commonly known as the ‘Humanitarian Initiative’.\textsuperscript{117}

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{112} See, for example, the French statement to the CD, in which it states that ‘progress on nuclear disarmament cannot be achieved independently of the overall strategic context.’ CD, “Final Record of the One Thousand Two Hundred and Sixty-Seventh Plenary Meeting (CD/PV.1267)” (Geneva, 2012), 11–12. For detailed analysis of the point, see, Hedley Bull, “Disarmament and the International System,” \textit{Australian Journal of Politics and History} 5, no. 1 (1959): 41–50.
  \item \textsuperscript{113} For example, see the contrasting positions of Hedley Bull and Philip Noel-Baker, as summarised in Ibid.
  \item \textsuperscript{114} See, for example, Mark Fitzpatrick, “The Ukraine Crisis and Nuclear Order,” \textit{Survival} 56, no. 4 (July 4, 2014): 81, 86–87. For a partial chronology of the negative spiral of events leading to this annexation, see, Anders Åslund and Andrew Kuchins, “Pressing the ‘Reset Button’ on US-Russia Relations” (Washington DC: Peterson Institute for International Economics, March 2009), 2–3.
  \item \textsuperscript{115} For details, see, Tom Z Collina, “Senate Approves New START,” \textit{Arms Control Today} (Arms Control Association, January 10, 2011).
  \item \textsuperscript{116} “NPT/CONF.2010/50 (Vol. I),” 19–24, quotation at 19.
\end{itemize}
Summary of causal chain

This section briefly summarises the core causal arguments presented in this thesis, as represented visually in Figure 1, below.

In line with foundational constructivist principles, this thesis argues that the active driver for nuclear disarmament advocacy by non-nuclear weapon states is the activation of anti-nuclear weapon identities. Such identities determine pro-disarmament national interests, and thus, foreign policy preferences. In drastically simplified terms, if the production of foreign policy were a closed system (which it is not, even in the realm of nuclear weapons policies), a pro-disarmament preference would then be expressed as nuclear disarmament advocacy. Due to the mutually-constitutive relationship between agents and structures, this disarmament advocacy would create a self-reinforcing feedback loop, via which advocacy would reaffirm domestic policymaking norms,
institutionalising them in bureaucratic structures and simultaneously, reinforcing a dominant, pro-disarmament identity.

Several factors complicate this simplified model. For a start, national identity is often contested, so any pro-disarmament impulse arising from an anti-nuclear weapon identity will likely have to compete with conflicting visions of the national interest, which may seek to constrain disarmament advocacy. This identity-based competition may come from domestic actors; this is accounted for by identifying the dominant security-related beliefs about national identity among the public, foreign affairs officials and senior government MPs, and assessing how these compete or complement each other. Alternatively, identity competition may be invoked by external actors, such as allies highlighting nuclear deterrence or solidarity norms. A further alternative is that external actors may intervene to create pro-disarmament pressure in the policy chain—for example, by civil society actors highlighting disarmament norms that resonate with domestic anti-nuclear weapon identities. Furthermore, even if a pro-disarmament impulse prevails in domestic policy debates, intervening factors may affect the expression of that impulse at later stages of the policy cycle. Each of the micro-processes described above is animated by human agency—at least at present\(^\text{118}\) so accounting for the activation or highlighting of different norms or identities requires the analysis to pay close attention to the policy process leading to the final outcome, a point discussed in more detail in the methodology chapter that follows. Finally, whatever the policy outcome, it creates a precedent that may be invoked as a legitimising precedent in future iterations of disarmament policymaking.

**Conclusion**

This chapter has outlined a constructivist view of politics that sees outcomes as being driven by a mix of mutually-constitutive interactions between human and (ideational) structural factors. In this view of the world, national identity determines interests and thus, policy preferences. Identities themselves are dynamic social constructions, evolving gradually over time in a cyclical process of informing, and being informed by, policy choices and other factors such as material ‘reality

\(^{118}\) IR scholarship will inevitably have to grapple with the impact of artificial intelligence on policy processes as non-human actors are created with ever greater levels of autonomy—including in the military sphere, if the present trend continues.
constraints’; domestic and international norms; and the role of human agency in activating and linking these ideational factors, or assessing them for consistency. The following chapter outlines the methodology applied in each of the case studies to produce the policy analysis described above.
3

Methodology:
Tracing the policy process

Introduction

Responding to the dearth of theoretical literature on nuclear disarmament in general, and on the disarmament-related experiences of non-nuclear weapon states in particular, this thesis adopts an exploratory, hypothesis-generating approach. A key methodological choice here is the use of process tracing to create detailed, within-case studies. The strong contextual analysis inherent in this approach allows for the exclusion of alternative explanations, increasing the ‘internal validity’ of causal arguments.¹ By comparing cases across time and national boundaries, it becomes possible to arrive at contingent generalisations about the causes of nuclear disarmament advocacy by non-nuclear weapon states more broadly.² This allows the research to produce credible conclusions about the drivers of nuclear disarmament advocacy. This chapter begins by outlining the overall research design. This includes the choice to conduct case studies and to apply a process tracing method to within-case analysis. The chapter then discusses the criteria for case selection and introduces the four case studies selected. Finally, the chapter closes with discussion of the data generation and analysis methods used here.

¹ Lupovici, “Constructivist Methods,” 203–204.
Research design

The overall structure of this research revolves around two factors: a comparative case study method, and the use of process tracing within each case study chapter. The use of detailed case studies is a common methodological option for qualitative researchers. Such studies allow the researcher to generate contingent hypotheses about the causal mechanisms that produce outcomes of interest.3 The aim is to present detailed, theoretically-informed analysis of each instance of Canadian or New Zealand nuclear disarmament advocacy, and thus, to identify the drivers for such advocacy.4

While the thesis argues, in line with constructivist expectations, that the primary driver for nuclear disarmament advocacy is the activation of anti-nuclear weapon national identities, the aim of the case studies is not to determine the precise amount of influence that national identity has on a given outcome. That task is better suited to large-n statistical analyses, which infer ‘causation through constant conjunction and correlation.’5 Rather, based on comparisons across detailed, context-rich historical episodes, the case study method allows for the development of contingent generalisations about the circumstances in which the activation of anti-nuclear weapon identities is likely to produce nuclear disarmament advocacy. As scholars investigate further cases of such advocacy, the theoretical conclusions offered here can be refined—a process known as mid-range or ‘typological’ theorising.6 For qualitative scholars, typological theorising offers a means of examining complex empirical phenomena that are not amenable to quantitative methods.7

The second key methodological choice relates to the use of process tracing, which can be defined as ‘the analysis of evidence on processes, sequences, and conjunctures of events within a case for the purposes of either developing or testing hypotheses about causal mechanisms that might causally explain the case.’8 Process tracing requires detailed analysis of the temporal and spatial

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5 Ibid., 457–458.
6 Alexander L George and Andrew Bennett, Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2005), ch. 11.
7 Ibid., 7–8.
relationships that link actors, structures and events within a case. This analysis can be conducted using sources common to qualitative studies, such as ‘histories, archival documents, [and] interview transcripts.’ By offering detailed analysis of chains of actions and events within each case, process tracing strengthens the credibility or ‘internal validity’ of causal claims. Process tracing is particularly useful when dealing with complex scenarios characterised by multiple interaction effects, as in the field of international nuclear diplomacy. Process tracing is distinguished from historical explanation in various aspects, including by its attention to micro-processes, and its commitment to making explicit the theoretical assumptions that underpin causal claims.

In order to apply the process tracing method, each case study chapter begins by identifying the dominant, security-related national identities in the different population segments: government leaders, officials and the public. This includes detailing the location, nature and strength of any anti-nuclear weapon sentiment. Having thus identified where there is an active preference for nuclear disarmament, each case study traces the processes and mechanisms through which the relevant actors seek to have this identity expressed in policy. This analysis includes detailed consideration of how and when contextual factors intervene to either augment or attenuate the likelihood of nuclear disarmament advocacy as a policy outcome. Finally, each empirical chapter concludes with a summary of the theoretical implications arising from the case.

**Case selection method**

Three types of logic may apply in the case selection process: *purposive*, *pragmatic* and *random*. Often, a combination of the three is present. Purposive logic describes situations where research objectives drive case selection. Pragmatic case selection factors, such as the availability of resources

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10 George and Bennett, *Case Studies and Theory Development*, 6.
12 Hall, quoted in ibid., 206.
or data, always affect research to a degree and must therefore be acknowledged, but they cannot provide methodological justification for the cases chosen.15 Finally, random case selection is often used to create representative samples of large populations, generating data that automatically demonstrate useful variation on the variables of interest.16 Given the small number of cases examined here, random sampling is likely to cause serious bias in the data so this is not a suitable case selection method;17 a mix of pragmatic and purposive case selection strategies have thus been applied.

In purposive terms, a key consideration is the hypothesis-generating objective of this research.18 The relative novelty of the research in both theoretical and empirical terms means it is necessary to focus primarily on cases where proactive nuclear disarmament advocacy did occur. This represents selecting on the outcome or ‘dependent variable’, which from a positivist perspective is methodologically problematic. Checkel warns, for example, that small-n studies may overstate the influence of a presumed cause if they ignore the case of the ‘dog that didn’t bark.’19 That is, if all cases display both the presumed cause and the expected outcome, the researcher may be ignoring cases where the presumed cause failed to produce the expected result.20

For several reasons, this criticism is not valid in the current context. First, this study draws causal conclusions from close contextual analysis, rather than from correlational patterns among variables, which mitigates Checkel’s concern.21 Secondly, the study does not assume a direct X—Y causal relationship that characterises most positivist studies.22 The question here is not the degree to which the activation of anti-nuclear weapon identities cause nuclear disarmament advocacy—but when and why they do. And thirdly, the cases selected necessarily demonstrate variation on the outcome,

15 Ibid., 295.
17 Ibid., 125–126; Seawright and Gerring, “Case Selection Techniques,” 295.
18 The ‘hypothesis generating’ approach is one of four purposive case selection techniques in Jack Levy’s typology. Levy, “Case Studies,” 3. For an alternative typology of purposive case selection strategies, see, Seawright and Gerring, “Case Selection Techniques,” 296–306. Under Seawright and Gerring’s typology, the current study represents a ‘typical’ case, in which the aim is to deepen core constructivist understandings by applying them to new empirical material, and to articulate the causal mechanism operating within each case (pp. 303-304).
21 Bennett and Elman, ‘Qualitative Research’: 458.
22 On this point, see, Lupovici, “Constructivist Methods,” 211.
since disarmament advocacy is always unique in the combination of its strength, scope and duration. The cases examined here, for example, include nuclear disarmament advocacy that is limited to opposing nuclear testing (chapter five); high profile, intensive, but short lived nuclear disarmament advocacy which included challenging nuclear deterrence theory (chapter six); prolonged, consistent and universalistic nuclear disarmament advocacy that rejected any legitimacy for nuclear weapons (chapter seven); and advocacy of a revision of NATO nuclear strategy but which stopped short of calling for specific policy changes (chapter eight).23

In pragmatic terms, the scope and nature of research activities required to produce detailed, within-case analysis means that the research has had to focus on a maximum of two countries, whose official languages are either French or English—those in which the author is proficient. Foreign languages create problems of cost and credibility for the current study; hiring interpreters and translators is not feasible financially due to the potential need for many context-specific, expert translations of nuclear weapons-related texts.24

In purposive case selection terms, it has been necessary to choose from countries that have engaged in multiple historical instances of nuclear disarmament advocacy, to allow for variation in outcomes of the type described above. Among non-nuclear weapon states whose official languages include English and French, a number can be classed as relatively consistent and proactively ‘advocacy states’; among them, Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and Ireland most prominently.25 Various members of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), and the NAM as a whole at times, have also been strong advocates of nuclear disarmament, though Marianne Hanson suggests such advocacy has been less active over recent years.26 Since 1998, the New Agenda Coalition (NAC), which includes English-speaking South Africa as well as New Zealand, has been prominent in nuclear disarmament debates. Other groupings that have been excluded from consideration includes the now-defunct 7 Nation Initiative (7NI), which was established in 2005 and disbanded by 2012 and was led and funded in large part by just one country—Norway; and the Non-Proliferation and Disarmament

23 As noted in the previous chapter, however, the protagonists in each of these cases framed their advocacy in terms of supporting the broader goal of complete nuclear disarmament.
Initiative (NPDI), which was formed in 2010, too recently to permit sufficient access during the main data generation phase of this research. Overall, the resulting set of possible case study countries includes Australia, Canada, Ireland, New Zealand and South Africa.

Case study countries

The pair of countries that offer the most potential theoretical interest from the list above are Canada and New Zealand. In terms of similarities, both countries are Western, liberal, Westminster-style democracies with a reputation for constructive international engagement. Each is highly developed, and regularly rates among the world’s least corrupt and most peaceful countries. Both Canada and New Zealand have strong records of engagement in nuclear disarmament affairs. Additionally, civil society has been an active participant in foreign policy decision making in both Canada and New Zealand at various points.

Conversely, two key points distinguish Canada from New Zealand in the present context. The first is the divergence in the countries’ contemporary alliance memberships and relatedly, their perspectives on nuclear deterrence. Secondly, the role of geography in perceptions of national identity and national interest contrasts strongly between the two countries. New Zealand is uniquely

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situated, surrounded on all sides by what former Foreign Minister Don McKinnon has called ‘the largest moat in the world’—1500 kilometres of ocean separating it from its nearest neighbours.\(^{30}\)

Aside from European colonisation in the mid-19th century, no military force has ever invaded New Zealand territory. This is not to say that the country has never faced external aggression, but in comparison to most countries, such aggression has been rather low profile.\(^{31}\) Either way, New Zealand’s isolation has led to a consistently very low, bipartisan national threat perception.\(^{32}\) This perception is gradually changing as national security is increasingly understood in terms of terrorist risks, as opposed to traditional military threats.

In contrast to New Zealand, Canada for most of the nuclear age has been surrounded by oceans on three sides and a great power ally on the fourth. Though this led to a low threat perception in the pre-nuclear age,\(^{33}\) the country’s unique geography produced a very different threat perception during the Cold War, since Canadian airspace represents the fastest flight path between Russia and the United States. Canadian elites thus had to contend with the knowledge that if the Cold War turned hot, nuclear war would most likely begin over Canadian territory.\(^{34}\) This meant a significantly


\(^{34}\) Shaw, “Lessons of Restraint,” 50.
higher threat perception than has been the case in geostrategically-isolated New Zealand. Finally, it must be acknowledged that there is a long tradition of practitioners and scholars framing Canadian foreign policy through a ‘middle power’ lens, and nuclear policy is no exception in this regard. Occasionally, the frame has also been applied to New Zealand. Nevertheless, the inherent ambiguities in the term render it highly problematic when discussing national identity. As a result, the frame of middle powers is not adopted here.

In conclusion, studying the combination of Canada and New Zealand effectively meets both purposive and practical case selection criteria outlined above. The similarities and differences between the two countries provide credible bases on which to conduct cross-national comparisons of the roles of ideational structures, domestic processes, and material and/or systemic reality constraints as drivers for nuclear disarmament advocacy.

The following section briefly introduces the specific historical cases examined. As will be seen, the utility of cross country comparisons is maximised by selecting one New Zealand case that predates, and one case that post-dates, the splintering of ANZUS. These cases can usefully be compared and contrasted to the Canadian cases, in which the NATO and NORAD alliance commitments remained

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constant. These considerations provide a sound basis for developing contingent generalisations about the drivers of nuclear disarmament advocacy by democratic, non-nuclear weapon states.

 Specific cases selected

The first Canadian case examines long-serving Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau’s ‘peace initiative’ of 1983-1984. Prime Minister Trudeau (1968-79, 1980-84) took several important nuclear disarmament initiatives. He led the decision to progressively remove US nuclear weapons from Canadian military service and promoted a ‘suffocation’ strategy to end the nuclear arms race. His high-profile, international ‘peace initiative’ promoted East-West dialogue and specific nuclear disarmament proposals to facilitate a reduction in severe Cold War tensions. Meanwhile, he affirmed that the ultimate goal of all such efforts must remain the elimination of nuclear weapons.

The second case examines Canadian attempts in the late 1990s to have NATO review its strategic concept, seeking to move the Alliance towards a reduced emphasis on nuclear weapons in its strategic doctrine. This diplomacy was driven strongly by Foreign Minister Lloyd Axworthy (1996-2000), a prominent advocate of nuclear disarmament. Axworthy instigated a comprehensive review of Canadian nuclear weapons policies, resulting in the most explicit description ever of Canada’s interests and objectives regarding nuclear disarmament. In addition to promoting a revision of

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39 As there were no significant cases of Canadian nuclear disarmament advocacy prior to its joining NATO in 1949, it is not possible to select for such variance in Canadian cases.
44 SCFAIT, “Canada and the Nuclear Challenge.”

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NATO nuclear policy, Axworthy explicitly emphasised the need for NATO to promote and pursue nuclear disarmament more vigorously.45

The first New Zealand case examines the country’s promotion of an end to nuclear testing from 1971–1974. This case focuses most prominently on New Zealand's efforts to end French atmospheric testing in the South Pacific. Throughout the early 1970s, however, both conservative and liberal New Zealand governments repeatedly stated that ending all forms of nuclear testing, including that of allies, was essential to consolidate and advance progress towards complete nuclear disarmament.46 While this was a bipartisan position, the nuclear disarmament norm entrepreneurship of Prime Minister Norman Kirk (1972-74) was especially prominent during this period. His government significantly expanded the range and visibility of New Zealand’s efforts to oppose nuclear testing.47

The second New Zealand case relates to the country's nuclear disarmament advocacy from 1994 to early 2000, including through its membership in the NAC. In this period, New Zealand moved progressively towards refuting the legitimacy of nuclear defence for any country, and sought to entrench global commitments to the elimination of nuclear weapons.48 This case provides a unique look at the down-stream effects that result from the widespread internalisation of anti-nuclear weapon sentiment in the public national identity.

In addition to variation in the nature and scope of nuclear disarmament advocacy, these specific cases provide useful variation in their surrounding contextual factors. This allows for consideration of alternative causal dynamics, in addition to the core claims regarding the influence of anti-nuclear weapon identities on nuclear disarmament policy. The cases include, for example, one per country from the Cold War period and one from the post-Cold War period. The choice of cases also facilitates

45 See, for example, his speech to the meeting of NATO foreign ministers: Lloyd Axworthy, “Address by the Honourable Lloyd Axworthy Minister of Foreign Affairs to the North Atlantic Council Meeting” (Brussels, 8 December 1998), http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/1998/s981208i.htm.
useful comparison and contrast of alliance dynamics. In the first New Zealand case and the two Canadian cases, nuclear alliance norms and dynamics played important implicit and explicit roles in influencing national identities and related security norms. In contrast, in the New Zealand case from the 1990s, the country was no longer a US ally. As such, external pressure to maintain alliance security norms was removed as an explicit policy consideration. Finally, the cases selected occurred during periods which vary in terms of the status of great power relations. They include periods of relative superpower détente, such as in the early 1970s and mid-1990s, and periods of superpower crisis or tension, such as in 1983-1984 and in the late 1990s, respectively. Overall, these contextual variations contribute to the external validity of hypotheses presented in the thesis about the causes of nuclear disarmament advocacy by democratic, non-nuclear weapon states.

Data generation and analysis

Two methods of data generation are employed in this thesis. The first is analysis of primary and secondary documents, collected from libraries and archives in both New Zealand and Canada. This is complemented by the second method—interviews with governmental, civil society and academic issue experts in both countries. Documentary analysis and the interview process were undertaken concurrently. As such, the two processes were mutually informing as the research proceeded.

In the Canadian context, the majority of sources were collected during three months of field research from April to June 2012. Most primary material was gathered in Ottawa at Library and Archives Canada and the archives of the Department of National Defence. Most secondary material was accessed through libraries at the University of British Columbia (Vancouver) and McGill University (Montreal). Interviews were conducted in both cities. In the New Zealand context, the author was able to spread interviews with New Zealand experts across several years. Similarly, New Zealand primary documents were gathered through multiple trips to the national archives and national library in Wellington.

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49 New Zealanders nevertheless continued to see their country as a member of the Western world, and vestigial nuclear alliance identities continued to influence key governmental actors, as demonstrated in chapters four and seven.
The thesis takes an approach to written documents common to qualitative researchers: ‘By reading and rereading their empirical materials, they try to pin down their key themes and, thereby, to draw a picture of the presuppositions and meanings that constitute the cultural world of which the textual material is a specimen.’ 50 Textual analysis here is thus characterised by an informal, rather than a highly-structured analytical protocol. In this sense, primary source texts are treated as markers that point to social objects, such as norms and identities, rather than as objects to be examined themselves. 51 This is appropriate when such texts are not themselves the core of the research design, but play a subsidiary or complementary role, as is the case here. 52

The research remains sensitive, however, to the ‘historicality’ of documents. In other words, no document represents a complete or impartial account of an event or situation. Texts are indicative of the subjective positions of their authors, and furthermore, may have been generated after the fact, introducing the potential for conscious or unconscious omission or ‘spin’ of issues. Additionally, national security-related documents are likely to be vetted by a range of actors prior to being archived, introducing further avenues for possible bias. The thesis therefore approaches historical texts from a critical perspective: who wrote the document? When did they write it? Who did they write it for? Such questions help the researcher maintain a critical distance from source material. 53 A further corrective for bias in written texts is to triangulate among sources and data types, thus adding to the credibility of conclusions. This includes, for example, large-n public opinion polls; personal biographies; primary documents; secondary analyses; and private interviews. 54

Interviewees were selected based on the researcher’s pre-existing networks in the government, civil society and academic sectors, and through direct, written approaches to relevant governmental officials and elected representatives. Permission was granted for the participant interviews by the University of Auckland Human Participants Ethics Committee (consent number 7118). Participants included current and ex-politicians from Canada and New Zealand; officials from the Canadian and

51 In this sense, the research diverges from a more sociological approach, which would treat the texts as inseparable from the practice of agents. Ibid., 872.
52 Ibid., 870.
53 This discussion draws on expert presentations at the Tenth Annual Summer Institute on Conducting Archival Research hosted by the Eliot School of International Affairs at the George Washington University, Washington DC, 21–25 June 2012, which the author attended.
New Zealand foreign and defence ministries; and academic and civil society disarmament experts. Interviewees were offered the opportunity to participate on a non-attributable basis, an option chosen by two Canadian interviewees, one governmental and one from civil society. One particular challenge was access to key interviewees in Canada. Former Canadian Foreign Minister Axworthy, for example, and a key former staff member of his, did not respond to repeated interview requests.

Expert interviews present researchers with both advantages and challenges. On a positive note, interviews are ‘particularly apt at reconstructing the practitioners’ point of view’ and ‘provide researchers with an efficient means to penetrate more or less alien life-worlds.’ Both quantitative and qualitative researchers have implicitly endorsed the notion that ‘the results [of interviews] are trustworthy and accurate and that the relation of the interviewer to the respondent that evolves during the interview process has not unduly biased the account.’

However, interviews remove the interviewee from their ‘natural’ surroundings; interviews with diplomats, for example, are not a true representation of how they actually ‘practice’ international relations. From a sociological point of view, ‘Interviews are not pickaxes to mine the truth, but social relations in which a world is performed into being. Diplomats, for instance, know very well the “script” of an academic interview and they practice it accordingly.’ Additionally, ‘response effects’ resulting from the actions of the interviewer or the respondent may bias results. For example, an interviewee may deliberately try to please the researcher by embellishing or giving ‘socially desirable’ responses; or, they may hide information for personal or institutional reasons, or recall events incorrectly. For these reasons, trends in qualitative research have increasingly moved towards an ethnographic perspective on interviewing that recognises the interviewer as a participant in the construction of the data created in interviews. While acknowledging this point, there is value in gathering personal reflections from interviewees as one tool among many, in seeking to reconstruct shared ideational constructs.

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55 A complete list of interviewees who consented to on-the-record interviews appears at the end of the thesis.
57 Fontana and Frey, “The Interview,” 698.
58 Pouliot, “Methodology,” 51.
59 Ibid., 49.
60 Fontana and Frey, “The Interview,” 702.
61 Ibid., 696, 698, 716.
The interview method adopted in this research can be described as semi-structured. It replicates several of the protocols of ‘rational’ interview methods; for example, the interviewer seeks to establish a ‘balanced rapport’ that is casual and friendly, yet directive and impersonal; presents an attitude of ‘interested listening’ to encourage participant cooperation; and projects a neutral attitude, refraining from offering opinions on answers provided. Each interview began with a set of common, open ended questions. Taking into account the expertise or experience of interviewees, questions then became progressively more specific and focused. The interviews closed with an open invitation for the respondent to reflect on aspects of the research they felt relevant.

Overall, the objective of data analysis is to contribute to a ‘qualitative contextualization’ of data generated by the various means outlined above, in order to ‘reconstruct the intersubjective context of some social phenomenon—in our case, a collective identity—in order to account for an empirical outcome.’ In the present study, this task of reconstructing ideational phenomena in their social context is accomplished through close, critical reading of written texts and interview transcripts, and through data triangulation.

Conclusion

This thesis is an exploratory, hypothesis-generating study into the causes of nuclear disarmament advocacy by democratic, non-nuclear weapon states. Two key methodological choices inform the process used to determine the drivers of such nuclear disarmament advocacy. First, a comparative case study method is adopted, with the thesis presenting four case studies of nuclear disarmament advocacy, two each from Canada and New Zealand, spread between the early 1970s and the early 2000s. These cases demonstrate a range of outcomes in terms of the nature, duration and visibility of advocacy undertaken, allowing for comparison of the different causal dynamics that lead to these different outcomes. By conducting comparisons across national boundaries and across time, the thesis develops contingent generalisations about the drivers for nuclear disarmament advocacy by democratic, non-nuclear weapon states. The second key methodological choice is to use a process tracing method to produce detailed, within-case analyses. Process tracing allows for identification

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62 Ibid., 702.
63 Abdelal et al., “Identity as a Variable,” 702.
of the precise chain of events and interactions that led to the policy outcome in each case, increasing the internal validity of findings.

The case study chapters each follow a standard structure. They begin by reviewing the dominant security-related national identities across the three segments of society—including the nature, strength and location of anti-nuclear weapon sentiment. The chapters then trace the process through which different actors seek to have their preferences expressed in policy, taking into account the potential for competing pro- and anti-nuclear weapon identities to produce conflicting policy claims. In parallel, the analysis examines contextual factors that may intervene to affect whether and how anti-nuclear weapon identities are reflected in policy. Since anti-nuclear weapon identities are the hypothesised driver of nuclear disarmament advocacy here, it is necessary to establish a basis for the claims about dominant national identities made in the case study chapters. The following chapter therefore provides a broad survey of the role that nuclear weapons have played historically in the Canadian and New Zealand security imaginations.
Nuclear Weapons in Canadian and New Zealand History

Living next to [the United States] is like sleeping with an elephant. No matter how friendly or even-tempered is the beast, if I can call it that, one is affected by every twitch and grunt.

~Former Canadian prime minister, Pierre Trudeau¹

It makes no sense for a country to surround its waters or to invite into its ports or country nuclear weapons, when there is no balance to be achieved. The balance is there now, there are none. And we don’t propose to deter enemies which do not yet exist.

~Former New Zealand prime minister, David Lange²

Introduction

This chapter surveys key historical developments relevant to nuclear weapons policy in Canada and New Zealand. The chapter explores the two countries’ perceptions of reality constraints such as geography and the physical presence of nuclear weapons in their respective regions, as well as the influence of the contextual factors defined previously—alliance dynamics, normative context, civil society activity, and great power relations. These historical surveys of the two countries’ national

security-related experiences provide the context necessary to make credible claims about the role of national identity as a policy driver in the case studies that follow in chapters five to eight.

**Canada in the world**

Canada is a Western liberal democracy. In foreign policy terms, this identifier provides ‘the baseline discourse on contemporary Canadian identity.’ The liberal world view is traditionally associated with the rule of law as a means of protecting norms of individual and civil liberties and human rights. In international affairs, Canadians have often projected these values outward through promotion of multilateralism and ‘good international citizenship’, working for international peace and security by advancing the rule of law and human rights. Writing in the Canadian Military Journal, for example, Lane Anker argues, “Peacekeeping” represents a defining aspect of Canadian identity, reflecting fundamental values, beliefs and interests...Public support for a strong Canadian role internationally is largely rooted in our proud history of peacekeeping. Conversely, Canada’s tradition of respect for international law is touted as a symbol of the country’s position as a principled member of the international community. Proponents of this law-abiding/peace-making vision of Canada also commonly cite the country’s active and effective record in disarmament and arms control, both nuclear and conventional. However, Canada’s relationship to nuclear weapons has often been

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ambivalent, if not contradictory. The conundrum at the heart of this conflicted dynamic is the challenging, often countervailing, pressures deriving from Canada’s alliance commitments on one hand, and its multilateralist, good international citizenship on the other.

Geography and alliance dynamics

Geography is an important reality constraint for Canada. In particular, it is hard to overstate the influence on Canadian decision making of the immediate proximity of the United States; militarily, economically and culturally, the Western superpower looms large as Canadians look out on the world. Sharing the world’s longest contiguous land border with a global superpower inescapably impacts on Canadian decision-makers’ approach to foreign and security policy issues. At times, the dominance of US influence on Canada—which can be seen as a challenge to established notions of sovereign independence—can lead to a nationalist, almost anti-US sentiment in the Canadian public. Regardless, as former Canadian Prime Minister Trudeau stated, ‘the ponderous presence of the United States’ has been ‘the single most important consideration in the design of successive Canadian foreign policies.’ This point is particularly important in the current context, given that the United States was the first country to build nuclear weapons; has so far been the only country to use them in war; and has played a central role in shaping global politics in the nuclear age. In particular, Canadian governments have had to contend with the powerful, pro-nuclear pressures emanating from membership in US-led nuclear alliances since 1949.

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9 See the opening section of chapter two for discussion of this term.
In the period between World Wars I and II, Canadian security policy was marked by isolationist tendencies. This was a result of factors such as a generally low external threat perception; war weariness due to the massive loss of Canadian lives in World War I; and the threat to national unity triggered by the conscription crisis of 1917, which had sharply divided the English- and French-speaking populations of the country.\textsuperscript{15} Low threat perception led the Canadian representative to the League of Nations to assert that Canada was a ‘fireproof house, far from inflammable materials.’\textsuperscript{16} By the time World War II broke out, however, this perception was in sharp decline. As in the previous World War, Canada participated strongly in World War II, providing Allied forces with significant human, and vast material and financial support.\textsuperscript{17} During World War II, Canada also began intelligence sharing with Australia, New Zealand, the United Kingdom and the United States, in what has become one of the world’s most comprehensive multilateral intelligence gathering operations—the so-called ‘five eyes’ network.\textsuperscript{18}

Canada was a significant, active participant in the development of nuclear weapons. The country has enormous uranium deposits, which provided the fuel for the world’s first nuclear weapons, including those dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki; Canada continued selling fissile material to the US nuclear weapons programme until 1965.\textsuperscript{19} A significant number of Canadian researchers participated in the US-led Manhattan project that developed the first bombs, giving the Canadian scientific community advanced knowledge of nuclear physics.\textsuperscript{20} In the immediate post-World War II era, Canada thus had both the means and the know-how to develop nuclear weapons.\textsuperscript{21} Despite this capability, Canada never developed its own nuclear arsenal. In fact, there is near-unanimous


\textsuperscript{17} Buckley, \textit{Canada’s Early Nuclear Policy}, 7–8.


\textsuperscript{20} Duane Bratt, \textit{The Politics of CANDU Exports} (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2006), 8–11.

\textsuperscript{21} Buckley, \textit{Canada’s Early Nuclear Policy}, 8.
agreement among analysts and government figures that Canada never seriously considered developing nuclear weapons.\textsuperscript{22} Former Canadian Foreign Minister Lloyd Axworthy writes that in the parliamentary and cabinet records, and in the media, ‘There is no evidence that this was ever the subject of major debate...It just seemed to be an assumption that developing nuclear weapons wasn’t something we in Canada would do.’\textsuperscript{23}

Some analysts put this down to the personal beliefs and convictions of key politicians and officials.\textsuperscript{24} Trudeau and his former senior advisor, Ivan Head, suggest the weight of public support for non-acquisition was important,\textsuperscript{25} as does former Canadian ambassador for disarmament, Christopher Westdal.\textsuperscript{26} Both explanations have important implications for national identity: whether it was elites’ personal beliefs or their perceptions of public opinion that informed Canadian policy, the absence of any serious consideration of nuclear acquisition implies the presence of a national identity that unquestioningly saw Canadian security interests being served by not acquiring nuclear weapons.\textsuperscript{27} Similarly, the numerous subsequent statements in which senior officials and politicians have highlighted Canada’s choice not to acquire its own nuclear weapons suggests Canadians are proud of the decision.\textsuperscript{28}

The advent of the nuclear era radically transformed the geo-strategic environment and with it, Canadian defence perspectives. Canada was still largely insulated from external invasion, but far from fireproof. As Canadians grappled with the prospect that a nuclear war might be fought in the


\textsuperscript{23} Axworthy, \textit{Navigating a New World}, 359.

\textsuperscript{24} Trudgen, “Buckets”; Simpson, \textit{NATO and the Bomb}.

\textsuperscript{25} Head and Trudeau, \textit{The Canadian Way}, 70.

\textsuperscript{26} Westdal, “Private Interview.”

\textsuperscript{27} Buckley, \textit{Canada’s Early Nuclear Policy}, 131, 134; Westdal, “Private Interview.” Westdal and Clearwater also point out that the enormous cost of building nuclear weapons, combined with the fact that the United States—a Canadian ally—was developing its own arsenal, would have facilitated this lack of consideration of the option. John Clearwater, “Private Interview” (Ottawa, June 29, 2012); Westdal, “Private Interview.”

first instance over Canada, preventing such a war quickly became a key foreign policy objective.\textsuperscript{29}

Geography also played an important role in the anti-nuclear weapon identity of the secretary of state for external affairs, Howard Green (1959-1963). Green became a resolute opponent of nuclear weapons after learning of the unique threat nuclear testing posed to Canada due to atmospheric fallout patterns.\textsuperscript{30}

Canada was also a founding member of NATO in 1949, a multilateral agreement that tied Canada to the United States and to the defence of Western Europe.\textsuperscript{31} Acceptance of a Canadian role in NATO to help ensure European security marked a sharp departure from the inter-war perceptions of Canadian security interests, marked by isolationism.\textsuperscript{32} As discussed in chapter two (‘Military alignment’), the decision to join NATO owed much to the notion of defending a ‘just’, liberal world order.\textsuperscript{33}

The intersection between Canadian geography and the country’s alliance commitments has created very strong pro-nuclear policy drivers at the institutional level. The deep cultural, political and military integration between Canada and the United States means that any pro-nuclear sentiment within the US government apparatus is felt keenly in Canada. NATO, for example, has explicitly affirmed a prominent role for nuclear weapons in its defence strategy from the outset.\textsuperscript{34} The institutionalisation of domestic and transnational bureaucracies related to NATO creates powerful pro-nuclear pressures for Canadian policymakers, through the progressive entrenchment of alliance nuclear deterrence norms and related identities. From 1957 onward, Canada also developed extensive bilateral political and military ties with the United States via NORAD, a ‘unified, bi-national air defence system with an integrated command structure’ for the defence of the North American continent, which also has a strong nuclear component.\textsuperscript{35}

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item Head and Trudeau, \textit{The Canadian Way}, x, 13.
\item Heidt, “‘I Think That Would Be the End of Canada.’”
\item Risse-Kappen, “Collective Identity,” 378.
\item Pedlow, \textit{The Evolution of NATO Strategy 1949-69}, xi.
\item Brian Bow, \textit{The Politics of Linkage: Power, Interdependence, and Ideas in Canada-US Relations} (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2009), 47. Since 1940, Canada has also participated in bilateral military planning with the United States for the defence of North America, through the Permanent Joint Board on Defence. However, this is a military advisory body as opposed to a defence treaty. Department of National
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
In the early 1960s, peace movement organisations such as Canadian Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament (CND) and Voice of Women were very active and prominent on nuclear weapons issues, with participation, for example, from the wives of some of Canada’s most senior politicians.36 Spurred on in part by the excesses of US military force in South East Asia, a young generation of academics—among them, future Foreign Minister Lloyd Axworthy—were also attacking Canada’s involvement in both NATO and NORAD.37 Nevertheless, historical data and developments suggest the public and government elites identified more closely with maintaining a solid US alliance than with opposing nuclear weapons. In late 1962, for example, a national poll conducted by the Canadian Peace Research Institute found 58 percent support for increasing armaments to ensure Western military superiority as the best way to prevent war; this would almost certainly have meant increasing nuclear armaments.38 A further development that reflects this public sentiment was the issue of Canadian operation of US nuclear warheads. The decision for Canada to undertake this operational nuclear weapons role is an example of the pro-nuclear dynamics arising from its alliance structures, and reveals important insights about Canadian national identity early in the nuclear age. It is therefore useful to examine the details of the decision that led to this outcome.39

Since the late 1950s, the conservative Canadian government led by John Diefenbaker had spent almost CDN$700 million equipping and training Canadian forces with ‘dual-use’ weapons systems—those capable of delivering either conventional or nuclear warheads—on the understanding that they needed to be nuclear armed to serve as effective deterrents.40 In the early 1960s, however, the

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Canadian government, and Prime Minister Diefenbaker in particular, vacillated on actually receiving the warheads. Secretary of State Green strongly opposed receiving the warheads, and ‘frequently argued that Canadian acquisition of atomic weapons would cripple its influence and prestige at international disarmament negotiations.’ Meanwhile, different portions of the Canadian public had taken different lessons from the Cuban Missile Crisis of October 1962. Unsurprisingly, peace movement organisations such as CND and Voice of Women, among others, were actively lobbying against receipt of the weapons. In 1963, Prime Minister Diefenbaker reported that his mail ‘was running nine to one against nuclear arms for Canada.’ Numerous analysts have explained the government’s hesitancy on this issue by pointing to Diefenbaker’s nationalistic concerns about subservience to US demands; that is, he did not want the United States to determine, or to be seen to be determining, Canadian defence policy. Outside of the peace movement, however, public anger at Canada’s perceived failure to provide full support for the United States during the Cuban Crisis appears to have increased broader support for Canada accepting US nuclear warheads. The delays in accepting deployment of the nuclear warheads led to significant tension with the US leadership, however, and to criticism at home for failing to fulfil alliance commitments.

The opposition Liberal Party leader at the time was Lester Pearson, whose legacy, as discussed in chapter two, is an important touchstone for national pride. In particular, Pearson’s time as secretary of state for external affairs from 1948-1957 has almost mythical status in the popular memory as a golden age of Canadian diplomacy. The ‘Pearsonian’ tradition is often invoked as shorthand for Canada’s commitment to multilateralism and international peace. In the early 1960s, however, Pearson recognised an electoral opportunity in the growing public support for Canadian receipt of

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41 Heidt, “‘I Think That Would Be the End of Canada,’” 361.
43 Wittner, Confronting the Bomb, 101.
45 Lennox, At Home and Abroad, 62.
46 Ibid., 62–64; Simpson, NATO and the Bomb, 119.
47 On popular understandings of Canada’s place in the word, see, Steven K Holloway, Canadian Foreign Policy: Defining the National Interest (Peterborough, Ontario: Broadview Press, 2006), 1. On the ‘golden age’ under Pearson, see Dhanapala, “Canada’s Role,” 322.
48 Regehr, “Private Interview.”
US nuclear warheads in order to maintain strong alliance relations. 49 Despite earlier ‘leading the fight in Parliament against nuclear weapons in Canada,’ Pearson promised that if elected, a Liberal Government would accept the US warheads. 50 The Diefenbaker Government fell in a parliamentary vote of no-confidence, largely over the warheads issue, and the Liberal Party, having promised to accept the warheads, was elected to govern in 1963. 51 In sum, a conservative government spent a fortune preparing to accept nuclear weapons, but hesitated to do so due to nationalistic fears around excessive American influence on Canadian foreign policy. Conversely, an iconic ‘peacemaker’ Liberal Party leader was elected after promising to bring nuclear weapons to Canada—specifically to repair US alliance relations.

Between 1964 and 1984, US nuclear warheads were deployed for use by Canadian troops on four Canadian-owned delivery platforms. 52 In Canada, the Royal Canadian Air Force operated BOMARC surface-to-air guided nuclear missiles from 1964-1972, 53 as well as Genie air-to-air, unguided nuclear rockets on long-range CF-101 Voodoo interceptor jets from 1965-1984. 54 In Germany, the Canadian Army fielded Honest John short-range nuclear artillery rockets from 1964-1970, 55 while the Air Force deployed three different nuclear gravity bombs from 1965-1971, aboard CF-104 Starfighter strike/reconnaissance jets. 56 Under Prime Minister Pearson in the late 1960s, Canadian Starfighters provided 20 percent of NATO’s Europe-based, all-weather nuclear strike force. 57 As per nuclear weapons-sharing arrangements with other NATO allies, Canadian troops operated these

49 Brian Bow writes that the Liberals officially opposed receipt of US nuclear weapons prior to this point, but that opinion polls showed the public increasingly inclined to receive the weapons. Bow, The Politics of Linkage: Power, Interdependence, and Ideas in Canada-US Relations, 48, 51–54. In contrast, Lenten states that Liberal Party policy was previously ambiguous on this point, but widely assumed to be opposed to nuclear weapons operation by Canadian troops. Howard H Lentner, “Foreign Policy Decision Making: The Case of Canada and Nuclear Weapons,” World Politics 29, no. 1 (1976): 33–34.


51 Simpson, NATO and the Bomb, 18–19. Regarding the importance of Canadian concern for alliance relations more generally, see, Simpson, NATO and the Bomb, ch. 3.

52 To be precise, John Clearwater states that Canada first received US nuclear warheads on 31 December 1963. Though some have claimed otherwise, he argues convincingly that the Canadian Navy never operated nuclear weapons. John Clearwater, Canadian Nuclear Weapons: The Untold Story of Canada’s Cold War Arsenal (Toronto: Dundurn Press, 1998), 18–21, 238.

53 Ibid., 21, 88.

54 Ibid., 178.

55 Ibid., 152.

56 More precisely, the final nuclear warheads were removed from Canadian deployment in Germany in the first few days of 1972. Ibid., 91, 152.

57 Ibid., 108–110.
weapons in cooperation with their US counterparts under a ‘dual-key’ launch system. That is, US troops were deployed with each nuclear unit and the warheads remained in US custody until released to Canadian operators for potential use in times of crisis.58

**Anti-nuclear weapon perspectives**

In 1968, the newly-elected Liberal Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau declared that a recently-completed review of Canadian foreign and defence policies was inadequate, and demanded a comprehensive re-examination of the core assumptions underpinning these policies.59 In doing so, Trudeau specifically called into question both NATO strategy and Canada’s nuclear weapons policies.60 Trudeau was strongly personally opposed to nuclear weapons, as numerous analysts, former officials and historians have noted.61 He heavily influenced the terms and outcome of the new review, asserting that foreign policy should determine defence policy, not the other way

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around as he claimed was currently the case. The idea of reducing Canada’s NATO deployments in Europe was enormously controversial both at home and abroad. Senior Canadian bureaucrats vehemently opposed the idea, as did several senior government ministers and prominent NATO allies—including the United States—in the wake of the 1968 Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia.

Following a heated internal debate, the Trudeau Cabinet announced in 1969 a ‘planned and phased reduction’ of Canada’s NATO forces in Europe. This included halving the number of Canadian troops in Europe, and a three year phase-out of Canada’s European nuclear role. At the first UN Special Session on Disarmament in 1978, Trudeau made the first public declaration of the intention to end to Canada’s remaining nuclear weapons role on home soil. While it took until 1984 to complete the task, the Trudeau government’s decision nevertheless made Canada the first NATO ally to return the US-owned nuclear weapons it was operating to the United States.

Canada was unique among non-nuclear armed states in the post-World War II period in that it was present at almost every formal multilateral negotiation on nuclear disarmament and arms control. For example, Canada was the only non-permanent member of the UN Security Council to be appointed to the Atomic Energy Commission in 1946. This participation was due in large part to Canada’s collaboration in the Manhattan project, and prominent role in the development of nuclear technology in its aftermath. Since Canada did not itself have nuclear weapons, its role in multilateral forums was limited to ‘attempting to persuade others to enter meaningful negotiations’ for

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63 Granatstein and Bothwell, Pirouette, 24–25; Simpson, NATO and the Bomb, 20. Regarding the challenges it posed to existing Canadian and alliance policy, see Thordarson, Trudeau and Foreign Policy, 143; Halloran, “A Planned and Phased Reduction,” 133.
64 Granatstein and Bothwell, Pirouette, 25.
65 Halloran, “A Planned and Phased Reduction,” 140; Simpson, NATO and the Bomb, 60; Granatstein and Bothwell, Pirouette, 25, 28–29.
66 For the Trudeau announcement, see, UNGA, “A/S-10/PV.6,” 93, para. 3. See also, Clearwater, Canadian Nuclear Weapons, 178; Tucker, “Canada and Arms Control,” 646.
67 Clearwater, Canadian Nuclear Weapons, 15.
68 Shaw, “Lessons of Restraint,” 46. For methodological reasons, the Canadian decision to phase out its nuclear deployments is not assessed as a case study in this thesis, as it has greater similarities to an actual case of nuclear disarmament than to a case of nuclear disarmament advocacy.
70 For discussion and further examples, see Tucker, “Canada and Arms Control,” 639.
The depth of Canadian nuclear expertise and capacity meant that one way Canada could do this was to help develop verification technologies to support and facilitate disarmament and nonproliferation agreements. Canada made pioneering contributions in this field and by championing such technology, and had significant effects on the negotiation of a range of international agreements, including the CTBT.\footnote{Rauf, "Non-Nuclear Policies," 233.}


\begin{thebibliography}{99}
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\bibitem{Holloway} Holloway, Canadian Foreign Policy, 87. Trevor Findlay argues that although Canada’s decision to operate US nuclear weapons ‘risked tarnishing [Canada’s] non-nuclear credentials...it is not clear that the outside world much noticed, with the exception of the puzzled Americans who were frustrated [in the early 1960s] by Canadian delay in accepting the nuclear warheads.’ Trevor Findlay, “Canada and the Nuclear Club,” in Canada Among Nations 2007: What Room for Manoeuvre?, ed. Jean Daudelin and Daniel Schwanen (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2007), 204–205.
\bibitem{Rauf1} Rauf, “Non-Nuclear Policies,” 233.
\bibitem{NPT} “NPT/CONF.2000/28 (Parts I and II),” 17–18; p. 27, para. 14.
\end{thebibliography}
Ambassador to the CD at the time—regarding future negotiations on a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty.  

Canada’s presence in these multilateral disarmament forums, however, is subject to the same conflicting impulses that result from the presence of both anti-nuclear weapon and pro-US alliance identities. A statement on the foreign affairs department’s website epitomises the challenge that Canada faces: ‘Canada has a policy objective of non-proliferation, reduction and elimination of nuclear weapons. We pursue this aim persistently and energetically, consistent with our membership in NATO and NORAD and in a manner sensitive to the broader international security context.’ In other words, since NATO’s defence strategy explicitly treats nuclear deterrence as the ‘supreme guarantee’ of allied security, Canada’s ‘persistent and energetic’ pursuit of nuclear disarmament must always be ‘consistent with’ an alliance strategy that affirms the supreme importance of maintaining a nuclear deterrent.

Due to Canadians’ strong identification with the US and NATO alliances as inherent aspects of their national security, the alliance dynamics described above can place significant restrictions on the scope for independent Canadian policy initiatives. This was particularly true during the Cold War, when taking any position that did not maintain strict adherence to alliance unity might be seen by other Western policymakers as strengthening the USSR and consequently, weakening the Western allies. On occasion, this prevented Canadian policymakers from taking a stance against nuclear weapons for fear of upsetting NATO allies—particularly the United States. Head and Trudeau, for example, bemoan the restrictions that alliance dynamics placed on possible reductions in Canadian NATO nuclear deployments in 1969: ‘Canada’s instincts for responsible innovations were suffocated

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78 “Report of Ambassador Gerald E. Shannon of Canada on Consultations on the Most Appropriate Arrangement to Negotiate a Treaty Banning the Production of Fissile Material for Nuclear Weapons or Other Nuclear Explosive Devices (CD/1299)” (Conference on Disarmament, March 24, 1995).
81 Paul Meyer, “Private Interview” (Vancouver, April 24, 2012); Dhanapala, “Canada’s Role,” 321, 328; Regehr, “Private Interview.”
83 Westdal, “Private Interview.”
by the professional establishments’ desire for team acceptance.” The case study chapters return to these pro-alliance and pro-disarmament identity dynamics, examining in detail the differing policy preferences they generate, and how these preferences play out in the process of deciding nuclear disarmament policy.

**New Zealand in the world**

The modern New Zealand state is relatively young; European settlement officially began with the signing of the Treaty of Waitangi in 1840. Like Canada, New Zealand is a Western, liberal democracy. Its people see themselves as progressive and egalitarian, with a strong affinity for the natural environment. In part, these identity traits derive from domestic histories. In 1893, New Zealand became the first country in the world to grant women the vote. The country was also, along with Canada, among the pioneers of the modern ‘welfare state’ in the mid-1930s. And since 1975, successive governments have supported a national reconciliation programme via the Waitangi Tribunal, to acknowledge, apologise for, and pay reparation for widespread colonial injustices perpetrated on the indigenous Māori peoples.

Looking out on the world, New Zealanders identify themselves with efforts to create a peaceful, rules-based international order in much the same way as Canadians do. This is reflected in stories of ‘independent’ foreign policies that defend international law, multilateralism and humanitarian missions, and the rights of small states. As with Canada, geography and US alliance issues have dominated debates in New Zealand around national security in the nuclear age, as has—to a greater degree than in Canada—the issue of nuclear testing.

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Geography and alliance dynamics

New Zealand’s unique geography has impacted strongly on notions of national security. Located in the South West Pacific, New Zealand is among the most physically isolated countries in the world, surrounded on all sides by at least 1500 km of ocean. The country’s colonial settlers viewed their physical isolation as a source of vulnerability due to the separation from the ‘motherland’, though isolation also led to a low fear of direct invasion. Perceived vulnerability and colonial heritage led to a strong tendency to follow the British lead on all international security matters, including disarmament, on which New Zealand was ‘mostly treated as, and mostly acted as, part of the British Empire.’ During World War I, New Zealand strengthened existing colonial ties with Australia through shared military service and sacrifice, forming the Australia-New Zealand Army Corps (ANZAC) bond that is fundamental to contemporary national identity.

In per-capita terms, New Zealand also contributed significantly to the Allied effort in World War II, and began what has become extensive intelligence collaboration with Australia, Canada, the United Kingdom and the United States in the ‘five eyes’ intelligence network. US troops were also based in New Zealand as part of the US Pacific campaign during the war. Following the war, colonial ties remained strong, but Britain’s wartime inability to defend the Pacific led to a rethinking of New Zealand security. Whereas New Zealand military support for and reliance on the United Kingdom had previously been automatic and unquestioned—an internalised aspect of national identity—

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90 Trevor Findlay, “Disarming Cooperation: The Role of Australia and New Zealand in Disarmament and Arms Control” (Canberra: Peace Research Centre, Australian National University, 1992), 5.
94 “PM Declares NZ's Support for Britain: 5 September 1939,” *New Zealand History* (Ministry for Culture and Heritage, October 14, 2014),
this support was gradually replaced by a more mature consideration of interest based on an evolving national identity.

A handful of New Zealand scientists participated in the Manhattan Project, although making a much more limited contribution than their Canadian colleagues. Also in contrast to Canada, New Zealanders never operated nuclear weapons. In the immediate post-war years, however, New Zealand’s leaders accepted the strategic and nuclear doctrines of the Western Powers almost unquestioningly. In this period, physical isolation contributed to fears in New Zealand of a proverbial ‘domino effect,’ in which Communism would spread rapidly through Southeast Asia and the South Pacific. New Zealand elites thus saw great power alliance—and specifically, nuclear alliance—as vital to New Zealand defence. In practice, this led to an increasing focus on US assistance, military contributions to the Korean and Vietnam Wars, and to participation in the Colombo Plan, designed to thwart the development of Communist tendencies in South East Asia.

In the 1950s, the perceived imperative to maintain great power alliances still outweighed any concern over nuclear risks, though New Zealand showed increasing willingness to define and pursue independent security policy objectives. At Australian and New Zealand urging—in large part driven by fears over US plans to rearm Japan—the Australia-New Zealand-United States Treaty

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98 See, for example, the statement of Prime Minister Keith Holyoake in NZHR, “Nuclear Weapons - Society of Friends,” *NZPD* 314 (October 9, 1957): 2923.


100 Priestley, *Mad on Radium*, 65.
(ANZUS) was signed in 1951.\textsuperscript{101} Unlike NATO, ANZUS contains no collective defence guarantee. ANZUS allies agree to consult and respond in accordance with each party’s constitutional arrangements when ‘the territorial integrity, political independence or security of any of the Parties is threatened in the Pacific.’\textsuperscript{102} Also in contrast to NATO, collective ANZUS documents do not mention nuclear defence. Nevertheless, support for nuclear deterrence norms was an implicit expectation of ANZUS membership and played a significant role in alliance dynamics, as New Zealand’s experiences in the 1980s attest.\textsuperscript{103}

By the late 1950s, despite official support for nuclear defence strategies, domestic and international developments began to generate a significant split in public perceptions of the appropriateness of nuclear defence for New Zealand. Internationally, there were disarmament discussions from 1957 onward in various UN forums, including consideration of a nuclear test ban.\textsuperscript{104} Domestically, an anti-nuclear protest movement first gained significant traction in the 1950s, and public opposition to nuclear weapons was growing. This anti-nuclear sentiment was spurred particularly by allied nuclear testing in the South Pacific.\textsuperscript{105} In this regard, New Zealand’s unique geography was an important factor that anti-nuclear activists used to frame their advocacy, in terms of the need to maintain the status quo in the region, which was the absence of permanently-stationed nuclear weapons. Years later, for example, Prime Minister Helen Clark suggested, ‘Perhaps as a small nation without enemies, in a benign strategic environment, we have had a greater freedom to raise these issues.’\textsuperscript{106}

In August 1957, the possibility of New Zealand hosting UK nuclear weapons emerged during a visit to New Zealand of the UK Defence Minister, Duncan Sandys.\textsuperscript{107} On 4 September, however, Deputy

\begin{footnotes}
\textsuperscript{101} Jim Rolfe, “New Zealand’s Security: Alliances and Other Military Relationships” (Wellington: Centre for Strategic Studies, 1997), 7–8.


\textsuperscript{104} Legault and Fortmann, A Diplomacy of Hope, 338.


\textsuperscript{106} Clark, “Address to the State of the World Forum."

\textsuperscript{107} Templeton, Standing Upright Here, 82, n. 80.
\end{footnotes}
Prime Minister Keith Holyoake quashed such thinking by announcing—apparently without consulting the prime minister, who retired two weeks later due to illness—that ‘New Zealand’s own defence planning did not contemplate the acquisition of nuclear weapons nor would she become a storage base for them under her other defence arrangements.’ Templeton argues that this showed Holyoake’s personal opposition to nuclear testing, but also his ‘instinctive understanding of public sentiment in this country,’ which was increasingly fearful that the presence of nuclear weapons would make New Zealand a nuclear target. Regardless, the government saw such concerns as secondary to alliance commitments. The same month that he announced New Zealand would not acquire or host nuclear weapons, for example, Holyoake stated that regardless of the health risks from nuclear testing, ‘the greater risk to New Zealand would be for her to part company with her principal allies.’

This sentiment was bi-partisan; in 1957–1958, for example, the Labour government sent Navy and Air Force equipment and personnel to assist British nuclear testing at Christmas Island (now Kiritimati, a part of Kiribati) in order to fulfil alliance commitments made by its predecessor, and despite the personal anti-nuclear convictions of Prime Minister Nash (1957-1960). Even so, general awareness of growing nuclear risks was raising concern among officials. The 1958 Review of Defence, for example, recognised increasing threats to New Zealand from radioactive fallout and rapid enhancements in nuclear propulsion and missile technology.

In February 1962, French plans to conduct nuclear tests in the South Pacific became public in New Zealand; actual testing began in 1966. From 1962 onward, public protests against French testing

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110 Clements, Back from the Brink, 40–41.
111 See Holyoake, 9 October, in NZHR, “Nuclear Weapons - Society of Friends,” 2923.. From 20 September to 12 December 1957, Holyoake was caretaker Prime Minister, after Sydney Holland (1949-1957) stepped down. National lost the general election that year.
112 Priestley, Mad on Radium, ch. 3; Templeton, Standing Upright Here, ch. 3; Gerry Wright, We Were There: Operation Grapple: The Story of New Zealand’s Involvement in the British Nuclear Weapons Tests at Christmas Island 1957-58 (Auckland: Self-published, 2007). Clements, Back from the Brink, 41–42.
grew consistently. Similarly, the government protested consistently from 1963 onward against planned, and later, actual French nuclear testing. Regardless, the New Zealand government viewed membership in a nuclear alliance as vital to the country’s defence interests, and responded to public anti-nuclear weapon petitions by emphasising the importance of alliance over all other security considerations.

Public concerns were exacerbated in 1963 by rapidly rising levels of Caesium-137 and Strontium-90. The rises were largely due to delayed fallout from high-altitude US and USSR nuclear testing, but French testing in the South Pacific was closer to home and more immediately in people’s minds.

In 1963, New Zealand CND presented a petition to parliament calling for New Zealand promotion of a Southern Hemisphere nuclear weapon free zone (NWFZ), using the slogan ‘No Bombs South of the Line.’ The petition was signed by 80,238 New Zealanders—more than any petition in four decades. Foreign affairs officials privately opposed the idea but would not say so in public. As it had in the past, parliament’s petitions committee recommended the petition be considered secondary to New Zealand’s alliance commitments, implying that disarmament was the domain of global powers. In sum, until at least the early 1970s, New Zealand leaders saw their support for nuclear disarmament as secondary to the maintenance of alliance solidarity and with it, allied

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120 Wittner, *Confronting the Bomb*, 100.

121 See the statement of John George, 21 August, in NZHR, “Nuclear Weapons - Southern Hemisphere,” 1307.
nuclear deterrence. Key political parties and bureaucracies generally left the issue of nuclear strategy and disarmament to the great powers.

**Internalisation of an anti-nuclear identity**

While government support for nuclear alliance remained constant, public support was waning. Over time, a broad-based domestic peace movement had developed, made up of unions, churches, women’s groups, community groups, marae (Māori tribal community centres), professionals, business leaders, local-area peace groups, and sympathetic politicians—particularly from the left in its early days. The Vietnam War was a key focus of the movement from the mid-1960s onward. During the early 1970s, strong protests from the New Zealand government against French nuclear testing in the South Pacific also significantly reinforced public anti-nuclear weapon sentiment and linked it to national identity. These developments are covered in detail in the following chapter and so are not addressed further here.

The end of the Vietnam War in 1975 coincided with the election of a conservative government led by Prime Minister Robert Muldoon (1975-1984). This confluence of events brought the domestic peace movement to focus much more on nuclear issues. Muldoon was strongly pro-alliance; his government supported allied nuclear ship visits to New Zealand as an important aspect of its commitment to ANZUS. From 1976—1984, nine nuclear powered ships visited New Zealand. These ships were potentially also nuclear armed, but it is not possible to confirm this point due to

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122 Alley, “New Zealand and Disarmament,” 92. On this point, see also Stanley and Burford, “Australia, New Zealand and the Cuban Missile Crisis.”


the US neither confirm nor deny policy. Anti-nuclear activists responded to these ship visits with dramatic protest campaigns; a high-profile and very successful example was the ‘Peace Squadron.’ Modelled on Quaker protests against US government arms exports and led by a priest, Rev. George Armstrong, the Peace Squadron involved activists using small, privately-owned vessels to blockade New Zealand harbours, swarming around incoming nuclear warships to try to prevent them entering.\textsuperscript{128} This produced a frenzy of media coverage—much of it sympathetic—and made for iconic, David-vs-Goliath style images and footage of tiny, civil society protest vessels swarming around enormous US nuclear warships. The Peace Squadron was an excellent example of the type of iconic story that evokes notions of sovereignty and pride, and thus, can inform public ideas around national identity. As Clements notes, ‘a good deal of the Peace Squadron’s 1976 manifesto was implemented in general terms when the 1984 Labour government [sic] initiated its nuclear-armed ship ban.’\textsuperscript{129}

The peace movement also rolled-out a nationwide NWFZs campaign, which saw individuals, churches, marae, businesses, community centres and sports clubs, among others, declare their properties nuclear weapon free zones.\textsuperscript{130} As the proportion of adherents grew, local authorities declared first suburbs, then boroughs and entire cities NWFZ by democratic mandate; this was a powerful symbol of anti-nuclear sentiment with electoral implications. Over time, the peace movement successfully reversed the dominant public understanding of New Zealand’s physical isolation and its involvement in a nuclear alliance.\textsuperscript{131} These understandings highlighted the dangers of nuclear testing and war, and framed the presence of nuclear weapons in the otherwise peaceful South Pacific region as a target and a threat.\textsuperscript{132}

This fundamental recrafting of the dominant security-related national identity in the public was a remarkable achievement, and happened relatively rapidly in historical terms. It is important to consider, therefore, the contextual factors that made this possible. In the mid-1970s, what it meant to be a New Zealander in the world was very much a live debate. Decolonisation, the civil rights


\textsuperscript{129} Clements, \textit{Back from the Brink}, 111.

\textsuperscript{130} This was launched in the late 1970s by the Home Base Pacific Pilgrimage group. It was quickly picked up by the Christchurch Peace Collective and then developed nationally by the Christchurch-based New Zealand Nuclear Free Zone Committee, run by Larry Ross.


\textsuperscript{132} Dewes and Ware, “Nuclear Ally to Pacific Peacemaker.”
movement in the United States, and a Māori cultural renaissance at home had ‘forced many [white] New Zealanders to confront the racist assumptions in their past.’

In 1976, the conservative government sent the New Zealand All Blacks rugby team to tour apartheid South Africa, when the majority of the world was boycotting the country. In response, many African states boycotted the Olympic Games that year in protest at New Zealand’s participation.

In rugby-mad New Zealand, this international condemnation of the country on the basis of its rugby ties with a racist regime had caused an identity crisis, and led to much soul-searching in New Zealand about what the country stood for. When the same conservative government invited the South African rugby team to tour New Zealand in 1981, it created the largest domestic civil unrest in three decades. The mood was ripe for change, and anti-nuclear advocates had a powerful story to tell: opposition to nuclear weapons was framed as brave, principled and independent-minded. Regular media coverage of anti-nuclear protests, such as the Peace Squadron actions and the land-based marches that accompanied them, constantly fuelled this vision. This powerful combination of factors helped bind anti-nuclear sentiment tightly to notions of national independence. As described in chapters one and two, rhetorically or symbolically linking new normative claims to stories that evoke national pride is an important means of socialising populations to new norms. This is precisely what nuclear disarmament advocates did in New Zealand in the late 1970s and early 1980s.

By the mid-1980s many New Zealanders had come to see the country’s physical isolation as a source of increased security in the nuclear age. In 1984, 61% of New Zealanders lived in locally-declared NWFZs, and three out of four main parties contested the general election that year with anti-

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135 For a detailed account of the events, see, Geoff Chapple, 1981: The Tour (Wellington: Reed, 1984).
136 McKinnon, Independence and Foreign Policy, 279.
nuclear platforms. The 1984 general election recorded the highest turnout in New Zealand history at 93.7 percent. Nuclear concerns were not the central issue of the election, but the Labour Party clearly promised, if elected, ‘a more independent stance within the ANZUS alliance’; to ‘actively work for nuclear disarmament’; to pass a law banning nuclear armed and propelled vessels; and to actively promote a South Pacific NWFZ. Labour won the 1984 election comfortably and implemented the promised nuclear free policy.

Despite its strict anti-nuclear policy, the Labour Party leadership favoured maintaining the ANZUS alliance. Equally, opinion polling showed strong public support for both maintaining a US alliance and for maintaining New Zealand’s nuclear freedom. In early 1985, following months of private negotiations by officials—about which Prime Minister Lange did not inform cabinet—the United States formally requested New Zealand port access for a visit of the conventionally-powered USS Buchanan. The request was rejected on the basis that the Buchanan was nuclear-capable, greatly angering US officials who felt the New Zealand government had misled them. From this point on, New Zealand-US relations deteriorated consistently. Lange and other senior government politicians argued New Zealand’s isolation was a boon in the nuclear age, and framed the nuclear free policy in terms of the sovereign right to self-determination. Lange highlighted sovereignty norms, for example, in the famous, televised Oxford Union debate in 1985, where he successfully defended the moot that ‘nuclear weapons are morally indefensible’:

...to compel an ally to accept nuclear weapons against the wishes of that ally is to take the moral position of totalitarianism, which allows for no self-determination, and which is exactly the evil that we are supposed to be fighting against.

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141 New Zealand Labour Party, “1984 Policy Document,” 1984, 10, 50. There was also considerable support within the Labour Party membership for withdrawal from ANZUS, though this was not shared by the leadership. Clements, Back from the Brink, 117.

142 Palmer, Reform: A Memoir, 474.


144 Palmer, Reform: A Memoir, 469–472; Hensley, Friendly Fire, ch. 4, 5.


146 Lange, “Nuclear Weapons Are Morally Indefensible.”
Lange returned to New Zealand a hero of the anti-nuclear movement.\textsuperscript{147} External events led many New Zealanders who were initially ambivalent about the nuclear free policy to support it. The public reacted angrily to the perceived ‘megaphone diplomacy’ of the United States, for example, which Lange likened to a great power bullying a small, allied state.\textsuperscript{148} In July 1985, this sentiment was radically exacerbated when the French government bombed the flagship Greenpeace vessel \textit{Rainbow Warrior} in Auckland harbour; a crew member, Fernando Pereira, died in the attack.\textsuperscript{149} The ship was preparing to take non-violent civil society protesters to French Polynesia, to protest French nuclear testing. As New Zealand government historians note, although the ship attacked belonged to Greenpeace, most New Zealanders saw it as an attack on their country and the incident caused public outrage.\textsuperscript{150} The French attack fits both the US and UNGA definitions of terrorism,\textsuperscript{151} and Lange and his deputy prime minister, Geoffrey Palmer—both lawyers by trade—publicly denounced the bombing as an act of state-sponsored terrorism.\textsuperscript{152} The outraged New Zealand public was further incensed that there was virtually no condemnation of the incident from allies.\textsuperscript{153}

Finally, the Chernobyl disaster in Ukraine, USSR occurred in April 1986. Though this related to nuclear energy, it came in the midst of a heated debate about sovereignty, national security, and the safety of nuclear-powered ships, and was easily linked by anti-nuclear advocates to anti-nuclear

\textsuperscript{147} Newnham, \textit{Peace Squadron: The Sharp End of Nuclear Protest in New Zealand}, 57.
\textsuperscript{148} Clements, \textit{Back from the Brink}, 138–139; Clements, “New Zealand’s Role,” 400.
\textsuperscript{151} US law, for example, defines terrorism as act `violent acts or acts dangerous to human life that violate federal or state law’ and `Appear to be intended (i) to intimidate or coerce a civilian population; [or] (ii) to influence the policy of a government by intimidation or coercion.’ Meanwhile, a UNGA resolution implies that terrorism includes acts of violence `including those in which States are directly or indirectly involved, which endanger or take innocent lives.’ UNGA, “Measures to Eliminate International Terrorism (A/RES/49/60)” (New York, December 9, 1994), 2, Annex, preamb. para. 3; Federal Bureau of Investigation, “Definitions of Terrorism in the U.S. Code,” August 15, 2015, https://web.archive.org/web/20150815210529/https://www.fbi.gov/about-us/investigate/terrorism/terrorism-definition/.
A few months later, the United States declared the US-New Zealand leg of the ANZUS alliance ‘inoperative,’ citing the incompatibility between New Zealand’s nuclear free policy and the US neither confirm nor deny policy.\textsuperscript{155} The United States suspended high-level political ties, cut New Zealand’s access to processed intelligence (the provision of raw data was maintained, though largely in secret), and threatened to spy on its former ally.\textsuperscript{156} New Zealand was also excluded from US military procurement processes and exercises, though it continued to deploy personnel in UN-mandated missions with US troops, such as the first Iraq war in 1990-1991.\textsuperscript{157} The Reagan Administration made clear, however, that it would not pursue economic or trade retaliation;\textsuperscript{158} in fact, New Zealand exports to the United States almost doubled between 1984 and 1991.\textsuperscript{159} Despite the suspension of New Zealand-US alliance ties, Australia and New Zealand maintained all high-level political and military links.\textsuperscript{160} For its part, New Zealand placed increased emphasis on the Australian defence relationship.\textsuperscript{161}

The loss of New Zealand’s major ally necessitated a comprehensive rethinking of security policy. A major, government-commissioned opinion poll published in July 1986 showed overwhelming anti-nuclear weapon sentiment in the public. 92-95 percent of those polled opposed the stationing of the various types of WMD in New Zealand; 92 percent favoured New Zealand promoting nuclear

\textsuperscript{154} Many New Zealanders, for example, mistakenly believe that the 1987 law bans land-based nuclear power; it does not.


\textsuperscript{157} McCraw, “New Zealand’s Foreign Policy,” 9–10.


\textsuperscript{160} McKinnon, \textit{Independence and Foreign Policy}, 283–284.

\textsuperscript{161} Peter Greener, \textit{Timing Is Everything: The Politics and Processes of New Zealand Defence Acquisition Decision Making} (Canberra: ANU, 2009), 26, 42–43.
disarmament at the United Nations; and 88 percent supported New Zealand promotion of NWFZs.¹⁶²

In effect, anti-nuclear weapon sentiment had become mainstream.¹⁶³ Nevertheless, the same government poll also showed a strong public preference for US alliance, and a population divided on the relative importance of US alliance versus nuclear freedom—with a small majority in favour of retaining the alliance if both options were not possible.¹⁶⁴ The norm that was most consistently highlighted in public at the time, however—by both the Labour Party and civil society activists, was nuclear freedom. The peace movement, for example, was at its zenith in the mid-1980s, with 350 active, local peace groups around the country.¹⁶⁵

On 8 June 1987, the New Zealand Nuclear Free Zone Act became law.¹⁶⁶ The Act is arguably the most stringent anti-nuclear weapon legislation in the world; it bans nuclear weapons and propulsion from New Zealand’s land, airspace and sea out to the country’s 12-mile sovereign territorial limits.¹⁶⁷ Moreover, the law creates extraterritorial anti-nuclear weapon legal norms for agents of the New Zealand government. In other words, the law stipulates that any government agents—including the armed forces—who provide material support anywhere in the world for nuclear weapons development, maintenance or operation may be imprisoned for up to 10 years upon return or extradition to New Zealand (assuming the necessary extradition protocols).¹⁶⁸

The 1987 Nuclear Free Zone Act institutionalised disarmament norms in New Zealand policy processes, in particular by establishing a cabinet-level minister for disarmament and arms control. This created a dedicated, senior political and bureaucratic constituency with a mandate to promote disarmament norms at home and abroad. The nuclear free law also created a Public Advisory Committee for Disarmament and Arms Control (PACDAC), with an explicit mandate ‘to advise the

¹⁶⁴ Defence Committee of Enquiry, “What New Zealanders Want,” 43–44. This aspect of the poll had a large margin of error, as one of the poll’s authors subsequently noted. Clements, Back from the Brink, 161.
¹⁶⁵ For a list, see, Wendy Harrex and Diane Quin, “Peace is More than the Absence of War” (Auckland: New Women’s Press, 1986), 110–115.
¹⁶⁷ NZHR, New Zealand Nuclear Free Zone Act, Sections 5-7, 9-11.
¹⁶⁸ Ibid., section 14(2).
Minister of Foreign Affairs on such aspects of disarmament and arms control matters as it thinks fit,’ and ‘to advise the Prime Minister on the implementation of Act.’

At the New Zealand general election in August 1987, five out of six key political parties campaigned on nuclear free policies, and the Labour Party was re-elected comfortably. By October 1987, 72 percent of the New Zealand population was living in self-declared NWFZs. In March 1990—seven months before a general election and facing overwhelming public support for the nuclear free law—the National Party announced a complete policy reversal; it would now maintain the law as written. Wellington’s daily morning paper, The Dominion, reported that only 12 of National’s 40 MPs opposed the reversal, but it was nonetheless very controversial within the party. The party’s deputy leader and defence spokesperson, Don McKinnon, resigned his defence portfolio in protest, but acknowledged the democratic basis of the decision. Party leader Jim Bolger defended the policy shift by stating that the changing international environment required a fundamental policy rethink, though the party’s attempts to undermine the nuclear free policy and law after being elected in 1990—discussed in chapter seven—call this point into question. Regardless, by the early 1990s, the New Zealand Nuclear Free Act had become ‘virtually sacrosanct,’ among the public.

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169 Ibid., Section 17(1)(a,b).
174 The figure of 12 assumes that the Dominion did not include Muldoon in its count of 11 MPs opposed, since for health reasons, Muldoon was absent from the Caucus meeting where the policy reversal was decided. See, Richard Long, “National Copies No-Nukes Policy,” The Dominion, March 9, 1990; NZPA, “Muldoon ‘Ashamed’ to Be in the Caucus,” The Dominion, March 9, 1990. For reactions from senior National Party members, see, “What the Nats Said...,” Peacelink 80, no. April (April 1990): 3.
175 McKinnon, ABC Radio, as cited in ibid.
with experts commonly referring to nuclear freedom as a core national identity trait and/or national interest.\textsuperscript{178} This identity can be thought of as a ‘New Zealand nuclear taboo.’\textsuperscript{179}

In theoretical terms, this state of affairs represents a widely-internalised anti-nuclear weapon identity in the New Zealand public. Due to the widespread consensus on opposition to nuclear weapons and the institutionalisation of that norm in legislation, it appears that the idea that New Zealand will pursue pro-disarmament policy preferences became taken for granted by the public in the late 1980s and early 1990s. As predicted by the literature on norm internalisation, the establishment of the New Zealand nuclear taboo led to a sharp diminution in public attention to nuclear weapons policy.\textsuperscript{180} Aside from moments when the taboo is challenged, a pattern of very low public engagement has been the norm since the early 1990s, as discussed further in chapter seven.

**Conclusion**

This chapter has surveyed the dominant, nuclear-weapons-related national identities in Canada and New Zealand, and the actors and stories that have constituted them. In the case study chapters that follow, the analysis demonstrates how the various identities highlighted in this chapter influence the two countries’ nuclear disarmament-related policies.

Canada has a strong tradition of US alliance, including participation in the development and operation of nuclear weapons and nuclear deterrence policies. Conversely, the country chooses not


\textsuperscript{179} The term ‘nuclear taboo’ comes from Tannenwald. As discussed in chapter seven, however, the New Zealand nuclear taboo differs from hers in that the New Zealand taboo delegitimises nuclear weapons entirely, whereas the taboo Tannenwald describes delegitimises the use of nuclear weapons. Tannenwald, *The Nuclear Taboo*.

\textsuperscript{180} International developments undoubtedly contributed to this diminishing focus on the threat from nuclear weapons in the post-Cold War world. On this point, see the Chairman’s preface to the WMD Commission Report: “Weapons of Terror: Freeing the World of Nuclear, Biological and Chemical Weapons” (Stockholm: Weapons of Mass Destruction Commission, 2006), 13. On norm internalisation, see, Finnemore and Sikkink, “International Norm Dynamics,” 904.
to develop its own nuclear weapons despite having the capacity to do so—a point of pride for many Canadians—and has used political, financial and technical means to promote nuclear disarmament in a variety of international contexts. These observations reveal competing anti-nuclear and pro-nuclear weapon norms which are embedded to different degrees in different parts of the Canadian population. Across all three segments of society, a dominant, pro-US alliance norm trumps all others. For officials, the daily practice of alliance-based nuclear deterrence norms has established a strong, arguably internalised pro-nuclear identity in addition to the pro-alliance one. The public has been ambivalent historically about the role of nuclear weapons in Canadian defence. The presence of widespread, but generally dormant, anti-nuclear weapon sentiment in the public has enabled pro-disarmament politicians to legitimate their proposals for Canadian nuclear disarmament advocacy by activating that public sentiment, and on occasion, have been driven by civil society activation of that identity.

New Zealand supported the early development of allied nuclear weapons, and the related nuclear defence strategies explicitly or implicitly for almost four decades. Official protests from the 1960s onward were limited in scope to opposing nuclear testing. From the 1950s onward, several decades of anti-nuclear norm entrepreneurship from civil society and sympathetic politicians succeeded in crafting a new dominant national identity in the New Zealand public. This new identity was informed by geography, and framed nuclear weapons as antithetical to national security and values, as well as to sovereign independence. During a period of political upheaval in the late 1970s and early 1980s, this view became mainstream, and ongoing norm entrepreneurship led to public internalisation of an anti-nuclear weapon identity by the early 1990s—a New Zealand nuclear taboo.
Opposing nuclear testing, 1972-74

We are opposed to the development, refinement, and stock-piling of nuclear weapons. We want to see an international agreement to bring about the abandonment of these weapons and to see the world freed from the tensions and risks of nuclear war which they engender...You cannot build a wall without picking up the bricks. And I believe that a Government policy must not only declare what it wants to achieve but it has to be activist in its character.

~ Former New Zealand prime minister, Norman Kirk

Introduction

Between 1971 and 1974, the New Zealand government took several high-profile nuclear disarmament initiatives. The most prominent of these focused on opposing French atmospheric nuclear testing in the South Pacific, though New Zealand also condemned all nuclear testing in all environments, including that of allies. As per the definition of nuclear disarmament advocacy adopted in this thesis, New Zealand's activity in this case was explicitly based on the premise that nuclear testing was a barrier to nuclear disarmament more broadly, including via the achievement of a CTBT. The key New Zealand initiatives examined here include urging international opposition to all nuclear testing in multilateral forums, while explicitly framing this activity as a means of consolidating and advancing nuclear disarmament more broadly; using the ICJ to challenge the

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1 Norman Kirk, “Prime Minister’s Address to the Returned Services Association,” New Zealand Foreign Affairs Review 23, no. 6 (June 12, 1973): 10.
4 See, for example, UNGA, “Resolution 2934A (XXVII)”, preamb. para. 2; op. para. II(1).
legality of French atmospheric nuclear testing; the prime minister personally writing to the heads of state of all UN members to urge their condemnation of French testing; and sending two New Zealand Navy frigates to protest at Mururoa Atoll, the French nuclear test site in Polynesia. This chapter demonstrates that as per the expectations outlined in chapters one and two, the nature and strength of New Zealand's nuclear disarmament advocacy in this period can credibly be accounted for in reference to the activation of anti-nuclear weapon national identities. While these identities constituted the active drivers of disarmament advocacy, New Zealand policy was also partially shaped by intervening contextual factors—in particular, the international normative environment and civil society activity.

From the mid-1960s onward, French nuclear testing in the South Pacific—a region to which New Zealand has close historical, cultural and ethnic connections—activated anti-nuclear weapon sentiment to varying degrees among New Zealanders from all three societal segments. The widespread, internalised preference for maintenance of US alliance ties, however, meant that support for—or at least acquiescence to—nuclear deterrence strategies set the implicit boundaries for nuclear disarmament advocacy. Within this framework, the variations in the strength of disarmament advocacy can be understood particularly in terms of the different national identities of key political leaders. The strong, moralistic anti-nuclear weapon beliefs of Labour Prime Minister Norman Kirk drove New Zealand’s most strident nuclear disarmament advocacy. Although Kirk’s predecessors, and most officials, saw nuclear testing as a threat to national and international security, they prioritised protection of New Zealand's economic interests over the expression of moral concerns and thus, pursued more restrained forms of protest. Civil society activity played an important role in shaping government protests, by establishing precedents that strongly informed Labour Party policy. Meanwhile, international normative precedents, and pressure from the Australian government, helped shift preferences among officials and Labour ministers for pursuing the ICJ case.
National identities

Political elite

By the early 1970s, there was bi-partisan consensus in New Zealand that nuclear testing in general, and atmospheric testing in particular, posed a threat to national and international security.\(^5\) This consensus was driven by concerns about health and environmental risks, and concerns that testing undermined the prospects for a CTBT and nuclear disarmament more broadly.\(^6\) At the same time, the dominant, bipartisan preference was for maintaining great power alliances, which necessarily meant accepting the nuclear defence strategies of great power allies.\(^7\) In effect, the dominant national identity across all three segments of society was more strongly defined by alliance as a security provider than by nuclear weapons as a security detractor.

Despite bipartisan consensus on the priority of alliance membership, significant divergences existed between the leadership of the two main parties with regard to nuclear weapons policy. The National Party is a conservative party, the traditional constituency of which is found in the agricultural and business sectors, and is ‘interested in promoting free enterprise and individual freedom.’\(^8\) National has therefore generally focused on ‘traditional’ foreign policy concerns such as military security defined in terms of armaments and economic security defined in terms of trade. In contrast, the Labour Party was established by trade unions to fight for economic and social justice. These roots have led successive generations of Labour Party members to focus on liberal ideals such as international justice and humanitarianism. In the long term, New Zealand’s international promotion of moral and legal norms has been ‘associated much more with Labour governments than with National ones.’\(^9\)

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\(^6\) Ministry of Foreign Affairs, French Nuclear Testing, 28; Clements, Back from the Brink, 55, n.24; Kirk, “New Zealand: A New Foreign Policy,” 4.


\(^8\) McCraw, “New Zealand’s Foreign Policy,” 8.

\(^9\) Ibid., 20.
Labour Prime Minister Norman Kirk (1972–1974) is the person most commonly associated with the expression of anti-nuclear weapon sentiment in New Zealand in the early 1970s. Kirk fits the traditional model of a norm entrepreneur, in that his disarmament advocacy was driven largely by normative convictions. He believed strongly in the importance of morality in foreign policy, and placed much greater emphasis on national independence than his conservative counterparts. Significantly, Kirk also questioned the security value of US extended nuclear deterrence, as demonstrated by his comments both in private and in public. Frank Corner, New Zealand’s secretary for foreign affairs and head of the prime minister’s department from 1973 to 1980, told Australian officials that Kirk ‘would prefer New Zealand not to be defended at all than to be defended by nuclear weapons.’ Kirk explicitly linked his high-profile protest against French nuclear testing in the Pacific to the broader aim of advancing disarmament and international peace.

**Officials**

Two aspects of national identity that were prominent in New Zealand’s foreign affairs bureaucracy predisposed officials to oppose nuclear testing: a desire for greater foreign policy independence—within the boundaries of great power alliance—and personal anti-nuclear weapon sentiment. In the early 1970s, senior officials believed it was necessary to reassess New Zealand’s place in the world, including the management of alliance commitments. These dynamics were strengthened by external events such as US conduct in South East Asia and the emergence of the ‘Nixon Doctrine,’ which declared that allies would now be expected to play a greater role in ensuring their own security. George Laking, Corner’s predecessor as secretary for foreign affairs and head of the prime minister’s department from 1967–1972, told a Wellington audience in 1970,

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10 Kirk died in August 1974, with 15 months remaining of his three-year term.
11 For example, regarding the ICJ case, see Templeton, *Standing Upright Here*, 206.
12 Wunderlich, “Theoretical Approaches in Norm Dynamics,” 31–32.
15 Templeton, *Standing Upright Here*, 190.
16 See, for example, “Kirk Speaking at Farewell to HMNZS Otago.”
17 Hugh Templeton, “‘New Era’ for ‘the Happy Isles’: The First Six Months of Labour Government Foreign Policy in New Zealand,” *Australian Outlook* 27, no. 2 (1973): 155; Kirk, “Prime Minister’s Address to the Returned Services Association,” 20; Keith Jackson, “New Zealand’s International Interests and the Search
...we need, in the context of our future relationship with the United States, to disenthrall ourselves from the dogmas of the recent unquiet past. We shall be dealing shortly with a generation to which Vietnam is no more than an incident in history. They will be infinitely more concerned with racism and the pollution of the environment.\textsuperscript{18}

Corner also held progressive views about the need for greater foreign policy independence. This was evident, for example, in his ‘pathbreaking work on the decolonisation of small states’ during his time as New Zealand’s Permanent Representative to the United Nations from 1962–1967.\textsuperscript{19} Ian McGibbon, who edited a volume of correspondence between senior officials, describes Corner as ‘idealistic in nature,’ but a ‘visionary and strategic thinker.’\textsuperscript{20} Corner was strongly personally opposed to nuclear testing. In 1963, he had suggested to Laking the idea of sending New Zealand frigates to protest French testing: ‘No gentle thing through diplomatic channels—let's do it in a big way: the way the General would do it himself. Let's get the most mileage out of it.’\textsuperscript{21}

Public

Assessing the New Zealand public’s views in the early 1970s is a challenging task, as national polling did not begin until 1971, and even then, foreign affairs-related data was sparse.\textsuperscript{22} The majority of polls prior to that time were based on samples of only one or two electorates in a region, and generally focused on domestic political issues.\textsuperscript{23} It is possible, however, to credibly gauge public

\textsuperscript{20} McGibbon, \textit{Unofficial Channels}, 39.
\textsuperscript{21} Ibid., 297–298. ‘The General’ is a reference to then-French President, General de Gaulle.
perspectives on nuclear issues from the actions and experiences of civil society protesters, and the beliefs and responses of both politicians and officials about public sentiment.

From 1956 onward, there were repeated public petitions to Parliament from groups such as CND, calling for the New Zealand government to take strong action to oppose nuclear weapons and nuclear testing.\textsuperscript{24} Between 1957 and 1972,

An increasingly robust public platform emerged, one that later supported diplomatic protests and legal moves against French nuclear testing...A solid core of opposition to nuclear weaponry, if at times muted, was maintained. And deepening local opposition to nuclear weaponry began to penetrate other agendas.\textsuperscript{25}

Malcolm Templeton, a senior official who worked closely on nuclear policy in the early 1970s, writes that then-Deputy Prime Minister Holyoake’s 1957 announcement that New Zealand would not acquire or host nuclear weapons showed his ‘instinctive understanding of [New Zealand] public sentiment.’\textsuperscript{26} Other researchers agree with this assessment.\textsuperscript{27} Corner’s 1963 reflections on whether to speak in the opening session of the UNGA that year demonstrated the strength of public opposition to nuclear testing at even that early stage; Corner notes, ‘with the election coming up I guess that the occasion to say something about nuclear tests—and French tests—cannot be neglected...the Govt. [sic] would be vulnerable if it were accused of passing up the opportunity of the General Debate.’\textsuperscript{28} In the context of consistent civil society protest against French testing in particular, public anti-nuclear sentiment continued to grow. By the early 1970s, ‘the government felt under pressure to raise the issue in every available international forum.’\textsuperscript{29}

Prime Minister Kirk wrote to the French government in late 1972, stating that New Zealand public opposition to nuclear testing was so widespread that his government was bound by democratic


\textsuperscript{25} Alley, “New Zealand and Disarmament,” 65.

\textsuperscript{26} Templeton, \textit{Standing Upright Here}, 511.

\textsuperscript{27} White, \textit{Nuclear Free New Zealand: 1984}, 6–7; Clements, \textit{Back from the Brink}, 40–41.

\textsuperscript{28} McGibbon, \textit{Unofficial Channels}, 302–303.

\textsuperscript{29} Templeton, \textit{Standing Upright Here}, 160.
principle to pursue the issue vigorously.\textsuperscript{30} Similarly, the New Zealand government told the ICJ in 1973 that over the preceding two years, domestic opposition to nuclear testing had become, 

\begin{quote}
...a dominating political issue, requiring constant and extensive coverage in the daily press and in other news media. There has been intense activity by private individuals and groups to impress upon the New Zealand government their anxiety about the tests.\textsuperscript{31}
\end{quote}

The government noted that this sentiment was being expressed by churches, local bodies, community organisations, trade unions, student and youth organisations, and ‘virtually every other grouping of public opinion.’\textsuperscript{32} In 1972, for example, Greenpeace and CND raised NZ $1300—the 2015 equivalent of NZ $16,400—in ten days to outfit the vessel \textit{Greenpeace III} for a protest voyage to the test site at Mururoa Atoll, French Polynesia.\textsuperscript{33} For a pre-internet, pre-cell phone age in which crowd-funded public activism was largely unheard of, this was a striking achievement, indicative of strong public support.

Having demonstrated the various strands of anti-nuclear weapon identity across the three segments of New Zealand society, the following section traces the processes and mechanisms through which these identities found expression in policy, and the role of contextual factors in stimulating or stifling nuclear disarmament advocacy.

\section*{Nuclear disarmament advocacy}

The New Zealand government’s first high-profile nuclear disarmament advocacy began in 1971. In fact, New Zealand had protested French plans to test nuclear weapons in the South Pacific from March 1963 onward,\textsuperscript{34} as had many civil society activists.\textsuperscript{35} But in this early period, the conservative government of Prime Minister Keith Holyoake (1957, 1960-1972) generally pursued low-profile

\textsuperscript{31} Ibid., 57.
\textsuperscript{32} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{33} Locke, \textit{Peace People}, 291.
\textsuperscript{34} Ministry of Foreign Affairs, \textit{French Nuclear Testing}, 19–45.
\textsuperscript{35} Locke, \textit{Peace People}, ch. 29, 30.
protests in the form of private diplomatic notes to France, even after testing began in 1966. The government deliberately excluded actions that might jeopardise New Zealand’s trading interests, giving the protests a somewhat ‘collusive and constructive’ tone.

In this context, the conservative government resisted high-profile direct protest actions or multilateral initiatives that civil society and the opposition Labour Party were advocating, such as promoting a Southern Hemisphere NWFZ or calling a regional foreign ministers’ meeting to address the issue of Pacific nuclear testing. Despite active civil society engagement in this early period, political pressure on the government to strongly oppose nuclear testing was somewhat attenuated by the predominant focus of the public and most peace activists on the Vietnam War. Regardless, from its earliest protests onward, the conservative New Zealand government highlighted the need to cease nuclear testing as a means of supporting disarmament more broadly. On 22 May 1963, for example, New Zealand wrote to the French Foreign Ministry,

It is the Government’s earnest desire to see the cessation of all nuclear tests by means of an effective international agreement which it regards as a valuable means of creating a climate in which progress towards substantive measures of disarmament would be encouraged.

Four months later, New Zealand repeated this point in another note to France. In 1966, after the French had begun testing in the Pacific, the New Zealand prime minister stated that a second French test was ‘all the more regrettable in the light of the unfavourable world reaction to the first test’ and reiterated ‘our opposition to any nuclear testing in the atmosphere, particularly in the South Pacific, and express the profound hope that progress will be made towards the cessation of all testing and the settlement of other disarmament problems.’

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36 Ministry of Foreign Affairs, *French Nuclear Testing*, 19–46. An exception was New Zealand speaking out at the United Nations against planned French tests in 1965; compared with later activity, however, this was still relatively low-key protest. See, Clements, *Back from the Brink*, 55, n. 25.

37 Ibid., 54. New Zealand also opposed Chinese nuclear testing from its inception in 1964. Ibid., 24, 55, including n. 24; Dalby, “The ‘Kiwi Disease,’” 443.


41 Ibid., 25.

the French government that it was ‘deeply concerned’ because ‘such an action can only hinder the attainment of further disarmament measures which are universally considered essential for the attainment of future international security.’ In sum, the New Zealand government repeatedly affirmed that it sought an end to all nuclear testing as part of its support for disarmament more broadly.

International normative developments in the 1960s and early 1970s supported the pursuit of nuclear disarmament advocacy. The Partial Test Ban Treaty (PTBT) entered into force in 1963, codifying a legal norm against nuclear testing in the earth’s atmosphere, underwater and in outer space, and affirming the broader aim of stopping all nuclear testing and proceeding to disarmament. The three nuclear armed states at the time—the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and the United States—ratified the PTBT in 1963, as did New Zealand, which strongly supported the Treaty. The entry into force of the NPT in 1970—again, ratified by the three nuclear powers—was another major normative advancement. New Zealand signed the NPT the day it was opened for signature in 1968 and ratified the Treaty the following year. France never signed the PTBT, and did not accede to the NPT until 1992, so in legal terms, the treaties’ obligations did not officially apply to it in the early 1970s. Regardless, the treaties created international legal precedents to which anti-nuclear weapon policy objectives could be linked, increasing the perceived legitimacy of those objectives. As will be seen below, this made it easier for New Zealand actors who were predisposed to pursue nuclear disarmament advocacy to express those preferences in policy.

In June 1971, key negotiations over the conditions of UK entry to the European Economic Community (EEC—the forerunner to the European Union) were completed. Leveraging New Zealand’s colonial heritage, British and New Zealand negotiators secured import quotas for key New Zealand products to the EEC during a transitional period. This was a significant economic consideration for the geographically-isolated, export-dependent New Zealand. A French threat

43 Ibid., 34.
45 Clements, Back from the Brink, 48.
47 “VCLT”, Articles 34, 35.
48 France blocked the first two British applications to join the EEC, but the United Kingdom succeeded with its third application in 1971. Barry Gustafson, “Marshall, John Ross,” The Dictionary of New Zealand
earlier in the year to veto New Zealand imports was thus nullified, though the threat would later resurface in response to civil society anti-nuclear protests in New Zealand.49

This EEC deal marked a turning point in the intensity of New Zealand’s nuclear disarmament advocacy under the Holyoake Government. Latent anti-nuclear weapon sentiment that the government had previously set aside due to economic concerns now found stronger expression. On 7 August 1971, New Zealand hosted the inaugural South Pacific Forum (now the Pacific Islands Forum), a group whose membership was deliberately restricted to independent countries located in the South Pacific, thus excluding France. Unlike the Forum’s predecessor, the South Pacific Commission, which was dominated by colonial powers and had a remit that excluded sensitive ‘political’ issues, the South Pacific Forum explicitly sought to address nuclear testing and decolonization.50 The inaugural Forum issued a communiqué expressing ‘deep regret’ at France’s nuclear tests and concern over related health, safety and environmental risks; calling for the current test series to be the last; and asking New Zealand to convey South Pacific protests to France.51

New Zealand took further multilateral action later the same year. At the 1971 UNGA, New Zealand inserted into a resolution amendments calling for all states to cease nuclear testing in environments banned by the PTBT; although neither China nor France had signed the Treaty, this was an implicit rebuke of their atmospheric testing programmes, which contravened PTBT norms.52 On the domestic front, the Opposition Labour Party also highlighted the PTBT’s norms in calling for more robust protest from the government.53 Once elected to govern, Labour continued to highlight the

PTBT, NPT and other international legal norms in its opposition to French testing.\textsuperscript{54} This demonstrates how the existence of codified, anti-nuclear weapon norms generates legitimacy for concordant policy options in the eyes of policymakers, thus making the further expression of related anti-nuclear identities more likely.

1972 was an election year in New Zealand. In February, Keith Holyoake resigned his leadership of the National Party and his deputy, Jack Marshall, became New Zealand prime minister. In the lead up to the election, the National and Labour Parties sought to differentiate themselves from each other. Labour campaigned on the slogan \textit{Time for Change}. Hugh Templeton, a National Member of Parliament (MP) who lost his parliamentary seat in the election, writes that the slogan ‘struck a deeply responsive chord in the electorate.’\textsuperscript{55} Domestically, National had been in power for 12 years, while internationally, major structural changes such as the recognition of Communist China, the Nixon doctrine and superpower détente were disrupting traditional New Zealand perceptions of the world.\textsuperscript{56} In this context, Labour’s foreign policies ‘cut furrows in ground more than ready for change.’\textsuperscript{57}

France had announced a new set of tests to be conducted from 1 July to 7 August 1972; this, combined with widespread public opposition to nuclear testing, ensured that nuclear issues were a significant theme in election-year policy debates. Labour highlighted its strong anti-nuclear policy and accused National of being too cautious and ‘more interested in a few francs than the future of New Zealanders.’\textsuperscript{58} The National-led Government countered by highlighting its advocacy of a CTBT, and accusing Labour of pursuing nuclear disarmament advocacy that was ‘irresponsible, confrontational, immature, and provocative,’ and of focusing on nuclear issues to the detriment of broader foreign policy goals.\textsuperscript{59}

Under pressure from growing anti-nuclear sentiment in the public, and less constrained by concerns over New Zealand exports, the conservative government responded more strongly to the planned

\textsuperscript{54} Ministry of Foreign Affairs, \textit{French Nuclear Testing}, 56–57.
\textsuperscript{55} Templeton, “New Era,” 155.
\textsuperscript{56} Kennaway, “Foreign Policy,” 165.
\textsuperscript{59} Clements, \textit{Back from the Brink}, 63. See, for example, Prime Minister Marshall, in NZHR, “Address in Reply,” \textit{NZPD} 378 (June 14, 1972): 123–124.
French tests than it had previously.\textsuperscript{60} At the UN Conference on the Human Environment in Stockholm in June 1972, New Zealand led its largest multilateral protest initiative to date. This action was strongly influenced by civil society protest and opposition political activity at home. The Federation of Labour had called for a union boycott of French ships and aircraft during the test series. At the same time, Kirk was promoting the idea of a meeting of regional foreign ministers dedicated specifically to opposing French testing. The government had opposed the union boycott out of fear of French trade retaliation in Europe, but was now concerned that for electoral purposes, it needed to take an anti-nuclear initiative of its own. According to Malcolm Templeton, the government saw the Stockholm conference as a chance to do that: ‘the need to be seen to be active [in opposing nuclear testing], the delegation was told, could not be overemphasised.’\textsuperscript{61}

At the Stockholm meeting, New Zealand convinced eight countries—Canada, Chile, Ecuador, Fiji, Japan, Malaysia, Peru and the Philippines—to co-sponsor a statement condemning nuclear tests that might contaminate the environment. New Zealand and Peru then tabled a resolution on this basis, which the Conference adopted by 109 to four, with nine abstentions.\textsuperscript{62} The resolution singled out ‘especially those [tests] carried out in the atmosphere,’ and called on ‘those States intending to carry out nuclear weapons tests to abandon their plans to carry out such tests since they may lead to further contamination of the environment.’\textsuperscript{63} New Zealand’s Minister for the Environment singled out France in his speech—the first time New Zealand had done this in an international forum.\textsuperscript{64}

Further New Zealand protests in multilateral forums followed throughout 1972. Later in June, the New Zealand and Australian prime ministers sent a joint statement to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament (CCD—the predecessor to the CD), jointly protesting plans for further atmospheric tests in the South Pacific. The statement called for the CCD ‘to continue to accord high priority to the question of the urgent need for suspension of such tests and the formulation of a comprehensive test ban treaty.’\textsuperscript{65} At the end of June, the ANZUS Council expressed ‘hope’ for the

\textsuperscript{60} Marshall had been New Zealand’s lead negotiator with the British on the issue of New Zealand trade access to the EEC, and so knew the issue well. Gustafson, “Marshall, John Ross.”
\textsuperscript{61} Templeton, \textit{Standing Upright Here}, 156.
\textsuperscript{64} Clements, \textit{Back from the Brink}, 63.
\textsuperscript{65} Ministry of Foreign Affairs, \textit{French Nuclear Testing}, 93.
universal adherence to the PTBT and noted the Australia-New Zealand statement to the CCD.\textsuperscript{66} At the same time, the New Zealand foreign minister sought to have SEATO issue a declaration protesting the French tests; unsurprisingly given French, British and US membership in SEATO, the attempt was unsuccessful.\textsuperscript{67} In August, New Zealand presented a resolution opposing all nuclear tests to a UN Seabed Committee meeting.\textsuperscript{68} Then, at the second South Pacific Forum in September 1972, New Zealand inserted a paragraph into the final communiqué noting member countries’ common objective of ending ‘all nuclear weapons tests in all environments by any country.’\textsuperscript{69} The New Zealand prime minister and the Australian foreign minister also briefed the assembled leaders about action they could take to support New Zealand and Australia in advancing that objective at the upcoming session of the UNGA.\textsuperscript{70}

Finally, New Zealand took high-profile action at the 1972 UNGA, including condemning nuclear testing on behalf of South Pacific Forum countries.\textsuperscript{71} New Zealand also introduced a resolution on behalf of itself and 13 countries, calling for an end to all nuclear testing.\textsuperscript{72} The resolution stressed the urgency of stopping all atmospheric nuclear tests ‘in the Pacific or anywhere else in the world’; called on all states that had not yet done so to adhere to the PTBT; and called upon ‘all nuclear-weapon States to suspend nuclear weapon tests in all environments.’\textsuperscript{73} The New Zealand resolution again affirmed that the government saw the cessation of nuclear testing as a means of pursuing nuclear disarmament more broadly; it recalled that the UNGA had declared the 1970s as a ‘Disarmament Decade,’ and declared that ‘a treaty banning all nuclear weapon tests is an important element in the consolidation of the progress towards disarmament and arms control made thus far

\textsuperscript{66} Ibid., 94.
\textsuperscript{70} South Pacific Forum, “Final Press Communiqué,” 3.
\textsuperscript{71} Clements, Back from the Brink, 62–63.
\textsuperscript{73} UNGA, “Resolution 2934A (XXVII).”
and that it would greatly facilitate future progress in these fields. The UNGA resolution passed with 106 votes in favour to four against, with eight abstentions.

**Divergent identities**

An important point of divergence between the two main New Zealand political parties was their views on the legitimacy of direct, civil society anti-nuclear protest. This divergence had significant implications for the parties’ respective nuclear weapons policies in this case study. The conservative government in office from 1960–1972 was largely suspicious of public anti-nuclear protesters, who were ‘often seen as a source of subversion.’ The conservative government generally opposed civil society initiatives, including, for example, the idea of sending a protest fleet to Mururoa. When CND and Greenpeace were preparing in April 1972 to send the *Greenpeace III* to protest at Mururoa, they experienced ‘every possible kind of harassment from several government agencies—police, customs, marine department, and broadcasting.’ Regardless, with strong financial support from the public as noted previously, the *Greenpeace III* sailed as planned.

The voyage of the *Greenpeace III* received significant international attention, especially after the vessel was rammed by the French Navy. The voyage reinvigorated CND NZ; with the support of Radio Hauraki, CND collected 81,475 signatures for a new petition urging stronger protest action from the New Zealand government, including taking a case against France to the ICJ. The conservative government, however, continued to resist such efforts. This dynamic was also partly influenced by the legal-normative context, however; in 1966, following protests against its nuclear testing in the Algerian Sahara, France had issued a reservation to its acceptance of the Court’s compulsory jurisdiction in ‘disputes concerning activities relating to national defense.’ Thus, in addition to being unconvinced as to whether France’s actions constituted a breach of international

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74 See specifically, Ibid., preamb. para. 2; op. para. II(1 & 2).
75 Locke, *Peace People*, 297.
77 Locke, *Peace People*, 291.
78 Ibid., 292.
80 See, Templeton, *Standing Upright Here*, 159–160.
law, lawyers in the New Zealand foreign ministry were not confident that the ICJ would agree to proceed with a case, and advised against the government pursuing the matter.\(^82\) For its part, the government refused public or media access to the petition hearing, and the September, 1972 report of the petitions committee recommended simply that the government ‘consider’ the petition.\(^83\) Under parliamentary protocol, the fact of having received a recommendation from the committee allowed the government to avoid parliamentary debate of the issue.\(^84\)

In contrast to the suspicion and resistance of the conservative National Party, civil society directly influenced Labour Party nuclear policies as a result of the close, personal links between the two groups.\(^85\) Richard Northey, for example, was chair of Auckland CND in 1972 and helped coordinate the protest voyage of the *Greenpeace III* that year;\(^86\) he later become a three-term Labour MP (1984-1990, 1993-1996). Similarly, Peace Media was established in May 1971 by prominent anti-nuclear activists and rank-and-file Labour Party members. The group sought to activate anti-nuclear sentiment internationally, including in France, by sending a flotilla of protest vessels into the French-declared exclusion zone at Mururoa, forcing the French either to postpone the tests or risk poisoning the protesters.\(^87\) When Labour MP Matiu Rata joined the crew of a Peace Media vessel,\(^88\) Labour leader Kirk told parliament that he was ‘immensely proud’ of Rata.\(^89\) Kirk went further, promising, ‘if we were the Government we would not send a yacht. The country has four expensive frigates. Let them run up the New Zealand flag. Let us be proud of them. Let us take a frigate up there.’\(^90\)

The high-profile actions of groups such as Peace Media, Greenpeace and CND, including the petition supported by tens of thousands of New Zealanders, were reinforced by calls from mainstream unions for more active anti-nuclear weapon advocacy from the government.\(^91\) All this activity

\(^{82}\) Templeton, *Standing Upright Here*, 150–151.
\(^{85}\) Clements, *Back from the Brink*, 64. See also Locke, *Peace People*, 290–91.
\(^{86}\) Ibid., 291.
\(^{87}\) Clements, *Back from the Brink*, 64; Locke, *Peace People*, 300.
\(^{90}\) Ibid.
\(^{91}\) Templeton, *Standing Upright Here*, 155–156.
complemented and emboldened Labour’s calls for protest. In the end, the National government did a poor job of promoting awareness at home of the international protest activities that it had taken. This left the impression that the government was doing little, and gave Labour a lot of material with which it could challenge the conservative government’s anti-nuclear credentials.

A new government

Labour’s strong anti-nuclear stance and assertion of the need for a more independent foreign policy did not decide the November 1972 election, but they assisted in Labour’s victory. The significant degree to which morality, sovereign independence and anti-nuclear sentiment informed national identity for the incoming Labour government created a strong preference for nuclear disarmament advocacy. The result was that over roughly the following 18 months, New Zealand took a range of unilateral, bilateral and multilateral actions seeking to end French nuclear testing which were of a significantly higher profile than previous advocacy. Like the previous conservative government, the Kirk government clearly stated that its opposition to nuclear testing was seen as a means of advancing nuclear disarmament more broadly, and further, of preventing nuclear war. Kirk affirmed, for example, that New Zealand’s opposition to Pacific nuclear testing,

...rests on a much broader basis of international concern. It proceeds in part from a widely shared belief that world peace and security depend on whether nuclear weapons can be limited and, eventually, eliminated, and that the continued development and proliferation of these weapons increase tension and the risk of nuclear war... For these reasons, New Zealand opposes all nuclear weapons testing in all environments.

Immediately on taking office, Prime Minister Kirk wrote to the French government regarding nuclear issues. He stated that he was obliged by democratic mandate to represent strong New Zealand public opposition to nuclear testing, and that stopping nuclear testing was now a central New

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92 Locke, Peace People, 293.
93 Clements, Back from the Brink, 61, 63–64; Templeton, Standing Upright Here, 159, 164–165.
94 Clements, Back from the Brink, 63–64, 66–67; Priestley, Mad on Radium, 217.
95 Kirk, “New Zealand: A New Foreign Policy,” 3–7. This dynamic of independence being closely linked to anti-nuclear weapon sentiment was also evident in later parliamentary debates around New Zealand nuclear weapons policy. See, Catalinac, “Why New Zealand Took Itself out of ANZUS.”
New Zealand foreign policy objective. He advised that his government was ‘committed to working through all possible means to bring the tests to an end, and we shall not hesitate to use the channels available to us in concert as appropriate with like-minded countries.’

The Labour government’s predisposition was reinforced by a contextual factor: strong, consistent and often, transnationally-coordinated civil society protest, which served to further activate New Zealand public anti-nuclear sentiment. As the Kirk Government took office in December 1972, for example, the UN Association of New Zealand, together with the Federations of Labour in both Australia and New Zealand, the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions, the Soroptimists, and CND all urged strong protest action from the Australasian governments. The following month, the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions—with 52 million members worldwide—announced a boycott of Air France; the Australian Council of Trade Unions boycotted all French goods and services; and the New Zealand Federation of Labour announced it would coordinate domestic trade union action against France.

In 1973, Peace Media sent two more protest vessels to Mururoa, and the Greenpeace III made the voyage again. French military personnel beat the male crew of the Greenpeace III with truncheons, as photographs smuggled out by a female crew member later revealed to the world. The Peace Media vessel the Fri was joined by four French campaigners, including a former French Army general who, on returning to France, returned his Legion of Honour medal to the French government in protest. In France in the early 1970s, the liberal media had also started to report widely on international anti-nuclear protest activity.

French MPs highlighted the protests in French Polynesia and abroad, including Australia and New Zealand.

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98 Ibid., 40. Emphasis added.
99 Clements, Back from the Brink, 70.
100 Ibid., 70, 76.
Legal and martial protests

The idea of challenging French nuclear testing at the ICJ had strong public support, as demonstrated by the 81,000 people that signed the 1972 CND petition calling for such action. At the time, however, foreign ministry legal experts in New Zealand advised against taking a case on technical legal grounds, and the conservative government took that advice.\(^{105}\) Evolving government and bureaucratic perspectives about the chances of successfully instituting legal proceedings in late 1972 and early 1973, however, demonstrate how the complex, interdependent relationship between contextual factors (here, alliance dynamics and international legal norms) and human agency affects policy outcomes.

In late 1972, Australian officials alerted colleagues in New Zealand to a legal analysis from D. P. O’Connell, an expatriate New Zealander and Professor of International Law at Oxford.\(^{106}\) O’Connell highlighted the possibility of applying for an interim injunction from the ICJ, calling on France to halt nuclear testing while the issue of the Court’s jurisdiction was decided.\(^{107}\) The application would be based primarily on Article 17 of the 1928 General Act for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes (the ‘General Act of Arbitration’), which Australia, France and New Zealand had all signed.\(^{108}\) It was not until 13 October that officials briefed Prime Minister Marshall (and his predecessor, Holyoake) on this point, stating that the analysis seemed ‘well-based’; it is unclear how the politicians responded.\(^{109}\)

Two points are noteworthy in theoretical terms. First, after his November 1972 election victory, Prime Minister Kirk was himself hesitant about taking an ICJ case.\(^{110}\) Kirk was an intelligent man but one with no formal education. He saw the world in moral, not legal terms and his preference was for sending a frigate to Moruroa,\(^{111}\) a dramatic protest action that would ‘stir public opinion...a bit

\(^{105}\) Templeton, Standing Upright Here, 150–151.
\(^{106}\) Ibid., 165, n. 245.
\(^{107}\) For detailed analysis of the New Zealand government’s case, based on primary sources and including the advice given to government by officials, see, Templeton, Standing Upright Here, ch. 6.
\(^{109}\) Templeton, Standing Upright Here, 165, n. 245.
\(^{110}\) Ibid., 168–169, 200.
\(^{111}\) Ibid., 200.
like the mouse that roared.'\textsuperscript{112} Secondly, Kirk's personal uncertainty was initially mirrored among officials, who were still considering jurisdiction and substantive issues related to an ICJ case. Over the coming months, however, officials and key politicians became increasingly convinced of the merits of taking a case against France.\textsuperscript{113}

The newly-elected Australian Labor government—led by a lawyer, Gough Whitlam—decided in January 1973 that it would take a case against France to the ICJ.\textsuperscript{114} Australian officials and politicians began to put pressure on New Zealand to do the same, arguing that their legal case would be weakened if New Zealand—which was closer to the French test sites and legally responsible for territories that were closer still—did not also participate.\textsuperscript{115} Templeton, who worked closely on the ICJ case, writes that during a trip to Canberra to discuss the idea in February 1973, New Zealand's attorney-general, Martyn Finlay, became convinced of the merits of taking a case.\textsuperscript{116}

Meanwhile, Kirk had made clear at his first post-election press conference that he still intended to send a frigate to protest at Mururoa if necessary, but the reality was that this would require logistical support to be possible at all.\textsuperscript{117} The frigate would require refuelling for the return journey, and New Zealand had no such at-sea capacity. Historical ties and convergent interests made Australia the obvious place to turn to for help, but Whitlam and his officials initially opposed the idea;\textsuperscript{118} Lance Barnard, Whitlam's deputy prime minister and defence minister, called it a 'ridiculous waste of time.'\textsuperscript{119} However, 51 Australian Labor MPs, including twelve cabinet ministers, called on the prime minister to support New Zealand's initiative. Kirk 'brought moral pressure to bear and cornered [Barnard] into promising [to send] the tanker \textit{HMAS Supply}.'\textsuperscript{120} Thus, there was trans-Tasman pressure in both directions to support each other's preferred protest actions.

By late February 1973, Whitlam believed a bargain had been struck: New Zealand would support Australia by agreeing to take a case to the ICJ,\textsuperscript{121} and Australia would provide logistical support for

\begin{footnotesize}
\textsuperscript{112} Kirk, comments to a press conference on 24 January 1973, cited in Ibid., 174.
\textsuperscript{114} Templeton, \textit{Standing Upright Here}, 202.
\textsuperscript{115} Ibid., 169, 205.
\textsuperscript{116} Ibid., 203.
\textsuperscript{117} Ibid., 168.
\textsuperscript{118} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{119} Clements, \textit{Back from the Brink}, 73–74.
\textsuperscript{120} See, Ibid., 69, 73–74.
\textsuperscript{121} Kirk's nationalism and personally competitive relationship with Whitlam led him to favour an individual New Zealand case, rather than joining the Australian one. Templeton, \textit{Standing Upright Here}, 200; Clements, \textit{Back from the Brink}, 69, 74.
\end{footnotesize}
New Zealand’s frigate initiative. In early March 1973, Kirk advised France that the New Zealand government saw French testing in the South Pacific as ‘unacceptable and in violation of New Zealand’s rights under international law, including its rights in respect of areas over which it has sovereignty.’ On 1 May, New Zealand gave notice that it would take the issue to the ICJ, also acting for the Cook Islands, Niue and Tokelau. Both New Zealand and Australia lodged their respective cases on 9 May. New Zealand argued that French atmospheric testing breached New Zealand’s sovereign rights and that further, the case was being brought to protect ‘the rights of all members of the international community, including New Zealand, that no nuclear tests that give rise to radioactive fall-out be conducted.’

The following week, New Zealand presented a request for the Court to support ‘interim measures of protection’ on the basis of the General Act of Arbitration, including mandating a halt to French testing while the case was heard. As on many previous occasions, New Zealand highlighted ‘worldwide opposition to nuclear weapons development and especially to atmospheric testing’; in effect, New Zealand asserted that the development of international anti-nuclear weapon norms was evidence that France must cease testing that might cause radioactive fallout. In this regard, New Zealand cited the PTBT, the NPT and the Latin American NWFZ Treaty; numerous UNGA resolutions calling for an end to nuclear testing that were overwhelmingly-supported by UN members; and protests from countries in the South Pacific, both individually and collectively, through the South Pacific Forum.

On 16 May 1973, France gave notice that it considered the ICJ ‘manifestly incompetent’ to hear the case and would not participate. Regardless, on 22 June, the ICJ granted New Zealand’s interim request, and a parallel one in the Australian case. The Court stated that ‘in particular, the French government should avoid nuclear tests causing the deposit of radioactive fall-out on the territory of

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122 Templeton, Standing Upright Here, 206–207.
124 See, Letter from New Zealand Prime Minister to the French President, 1 May 1973, in Ibid., 45–46.
125 According to Roberts, Marshall, now leader of the opposition, ‘indicated that a National Government would probably have gone to the International Court of Justice in 1973 as well.’ Roberts, “New Zealand Review,” 86. Whether or not this is accurate cannot be proven, of course, as Templeton points out.
126 Ministry of Foreign Affairs, French Nuclear Testing, 9–15, quotation at 15.
127 Ibid., 53–64.
128 Ibid., 14, 55–61, quotation at 55.
129 Ibid., 56–57.
New Zealand, the Cook Islands, Niue or the Tokelau Islands.’ Given France’s rejection of the Court’s jurisdiction, New Zealand immediately took two further high-profile actions.

First, from 23–25 June, the prime minister personally wrote to the heads of government of every UN member and observer state, seeking support for the ICJ interim injunction. These messages affirmed the need to support international law, especially to protect the rights of small states. Kirk received a range of supportive national responses to this letter, which he reported publicly, and other countries took international action to pressure France as a result.

Secondly, fulfilling its election promise, the government sent a New Zealand Navy frigate, *HMNZS Otago*, to protest at the testing zone at Mururoa. Speaking at the farewell for the departing *Otago* on 28 June 1973, Kirk linked New Zealand’s opposition to nuclear testing to the country’s support for international justice and morality:

> We are a small nation but we will not abjectly surrender to injustice...Today the Otago leaves on an honourable mission. She leaves not in anger but as a silent accusing witness with the power to bring alive the conscience of the world.

A photograph of Kirk waving farewell to the *Otago* is an iconic national image for many New Zealanders. Combined with Kirk’s often-cited statement about fighting injustice and awakening the global conscience, the image clearly evokes notions of national sovereignty and pride in pursuing principled foreign policies. In other words, this is precisely the type of image that helps define popular notions of national identity, as described in chapters one and two.

To emphasise the priority it attached to the frigate protest, the Labour government sent a cabinet minister with the *Otago*. Since all 20 cabinet members wanted the job, the candidate was chosen

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135 Clements, *Back from the Brink*, 69, 73–74.
by lottery, with the Minister of Immigration and Mines, Fraser Colman, winning the draw. The government sought to maximise media attention for the frigate’s voyage, to mobilise international public opinion to pressure France into complying with the ICJ order. Colman spent 46 days on the Otago and on a second frigate sent to relieve her, HMNZS Canterbury, talking with reporters from around the world.

The National Party strongly opposed the frigate deployment. Marshall contrasted the ‘responsible’ protest actions his government had pursued with the ‘flamboyant publicity stunts’ of Labour, saying, ‘this new Government is going to extremes in its protests, which could well turn out to be more harmful to New Zealand and less effective in their objective.’ Marshall warned that the protests would ‘irritate and annoy’ the French, thus endangering trade negotiations, and stressed that ‘renegotiation of the EEC agreement in 1975 should always be regarded as a significant New Zealand interest in our relations with France.’ This again demonstrates how competing national identities within political elites affected what was perceived as being in the national interest. For Marshall, anti-nuclear protest was appropriate, but should be pursued as a secondary priority to trade interests.

At the 1973 Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting (CHOGM) in Ottawa from 2-10 August, Kirk sought to elicit a collective condemnation of French testing. British Prime Minister Edward Heath fiercely opposed this initiative. Heath had presided over the United Kingdom’s third and ultimately, successful application to join the EEC (France had vetoed the first two attempts during the 1960s). Heath was concerned not to embitter the French, with whom the United Kingdom would have to negotiate in future—including renegotiation of New Zealand’s EEC import quotas

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142 Marshall, 11 July 1973, in Ibid., 2189.

143 Gustafson, “Marshall, John Ross.”
after their initial five-year term. French trade threats against New Zealand had resurfaced in mid-1972, and the New Zealand Press Association reported later that year that faced with further high-profile New Zealand protest, France ‘would almost certainly pursue retaliatory action.’

Kirk and his officials persisted despite these economic threats and the concerns of the British prime minister; they convinced the CHOGM to make an unprecedented, mid-conference declaration condemning nuclear testing in generic terms, though not France specifically. New Zealand was supported especially by African leaders, whom Kirk supported in debates about African independence struggles. The CHOGM anti-nuclear declaration was deliberately issued on 5 August to mark the 10th anniversary of the signing of the PTBT. This timing was admittedly a minor concern compared to the goal of securing the collective statement. Nevertheless, it again demonstrates how actors link their policy objectives back to existing normative structures as a means of increasing the political pressure on norm violators to change their behaviour—in this case, by highlighting France’s non-compliance with a widely-endorsed international legal norm. An Ottawa newspaper ran the headline, ‘Tiny New Zealand speaks for mankind.’ While the multilateral statement focused on stopping nuclear testing, Kirk framed it as a contribution to the objective of nuclear disarmament.

On 10 January 1974, six months after the ICJ issued its injunction calling for a temporary halt to French testing, the French government withdrew its recognition of the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court. By this stage, however, France ‘was being widely condemned, both within and outside

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France. As the year rolled on and international public opposition to the atmospheric tests continued to grow, France became ‘increasingly desperate for a way out of a situation that had become diplomatically awkward and politically costly.’ The head of the French air force stated in early May 1974 that ‘long and delicate works are necessary’ before France could move to underground testing. Just one month later, the new French government of Valéry Giscard d’Estaing announced that the current series of tests would be the last. The point was repeated in several statements by French officials in subsequent months, including in bilateral communications with New Zealand. Thus, before the ICJ delivered a final judgment in the Australian or New Zealand cases, France had publicly undertaken to stop the disputed behaviour. The Court ruled that this rendered the cases moot, and chose not to deliver a final decision—though New Zealand and Australia could revisit the issue if France resumed atmospheric testing.

**Theoretical implications**

The defence strategies of nuclear allies set the boundaries of New Zealand's nuclear disarmament advocacy in the early 1970s, under both conservative and liberal governments. In this sense, this case shows immediately the influence of contextual factors on national identity. Alliance ties constrained New Zealand policy in this period precisely because the dominant, arguably internalised, national identity in all three societal segments saw maintenance of great power alliance as a primary security guarantor. As will be seen in chapter seven, the 1970s consensus on alliance as a core national security interest was a historical fact, but not an inevitability.

The result of this internalised, pro-alliance identity across all three societal segments was that the focus of New Zealand's nuclear disarmament advocacy was mainly limited to a specific, limited disarmament objective—ending nuclear testing. The focus was most strongly placed on ending nuclear testing in the Pacific, due to New Zealand's physical proximity and strong identity ties with

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153 Ibid., 735–36.
155 ICJ, “Nuclear Tests (New Zealand v. France),” 469, para. 35.
156 Ibid., 471, para. 39.
the region. The country’s protest activity, however, condemned all nuclear testing in all environments, including that of allies. Throughout the case study period, both the conservative government and its liberal successor explicitly affirmed that they sought an end to all nuclear testing as a means of advancing nuclear disarmament.

Setting aside the pro-alliance consensus, different strands of national identity competed for primacy among political elites, and this competition was reflected in nuclear disarmament policy. In particular, these differences related to the priority given to independence, and the relative importance attached to morality and economic concerns as key national interests. For conservative politicians (and officials, for that matter), economic interests were prioritised over the pursuit of anti-nuclear principles. Kirk, on the other hand, openly questioned the credibility of nuclear deterrence, saw foreign policy in strongly moral terms, and ignored economic threats as he railed against what he saw as the injustice of French nuclear policies.

The Australian influence on New Zealand nuclear disarmament advocacy did not relate to the activation of alliance norms, since the main alliance tie for both countries was ANZUS, with its implicit support for nuclear deterrence. Rather, it was historical and geographical links that led Australian and New Zealand interests to converge, facilitating further nuclear disarmament advocacy from the New Zealand government. Both countries’ increasingly regional security outlook supported a desire for greater foreign policy independence, and favoured anti-nuclear weapon advocacy focused particularly on the South Pacific. Australian groundwork and advocacy on the ICJ idea led to New Zealand’s participation in that forum, while the trade-off was Australian cooperation on the frigate protest.

In terms of the normative environment, New Zealand’s ICJ case against France exemplifies the dynamics described in chapter two regarding the relationship between norms, agency and foreign policy. The decision to take the ICJ case was triggered by a legal expert highlighting a specific legal norm in the 1928 General Act of Arbitration. Over time, activation of this precedent changed the cost-benefit calculations among officials and politicians in both Australia and New Zealand.

Meanwhile, the content of New Zealand’s argument to the ICJ demonstrates the relationship between constructivist notions of normative development and influence and international legal theory regarding customary international law; this is a theoretical convergence that deserves much greater attention. Under the legal principle of free consent, treaty-based legal norms only bind
states if they give their sovereign consent to be bound by the treaty.\textsuperscript{158} In some circumstances, however, a treaty provision may attain customary international law status, in which case it becomes binding on all states, including non-treaty members. For this to happen, two factors must be present: uniform state practice; and \textit{opinio juris sive necessitatis}.\textsuperscript{159} \textit{Opinio juris} denotes an actor’s belief that a particular behaviour is legally required. Thus, customary international law exists where states enact a practice broadly and consistently, and do so because they believe this is required by law. From a constructivist perspective, this is of great interest, since ‘customary international law exists only where there is a norm.’\textsuperscript{160}

New Zealand’s case to the ICJ exists at the fuzzy edge of the distinction between these two concepts. New Zealand explicitly linked its protest activity to legal anti-nuclear weapon norms in the PTBT, the NPT, and the Latin American NWFZ treaty—even though France was not party to those treaties—as a means of adding credibility and legitimacy to its anti-nuclear advocacy. New Zealand also cited numerous international resolutions and declarations, and argued the Court should not rule purely on scientific grounds; rather, ‘The Court should be urged to accept as its standard the values of the world community, as reflected in the decisions of United Nations bodies.’\textsuperscript{161}

New Zealand was effectively invoking the belief that the international norm against atmospheric nuclear testing had achieved customary international law status. Attorney General Trevor Finlay summarised this point pithily in parliament, saying that in international relations, ‘when enough people say it, it is the law. We say enough people and enough nations have [condemned nuclear testing] to make it the law.’\textsuperscript{162} While this point is debateable—as international law inevitably is—its relevance here is that New Zealand’s most progressive legal advocacy in favour of nuclear disarmament was made possible in part by the existing normative context, and by the protocols of customary international law.

The comments above show how normative structures make certain behaviours appear legitimate and credible, and thus, inform agency. Conversely, a further point arising from the New Zealand and Australian ICJ cases shows how agency informs structure, and how all states can incrementally

\textsuperscript{158} “VCLT”, Articles 34, 35.
\textsuperscript{159} Benedetto Conforti and Angelo Labella, “International Law-Making,” in \textit{An Introduction to International Law} (Leiden, the Netherlands: Martinus Nijhoff, 2012), 31.
\textsuperscript{160} Finnemore, \textit{National Interests}, 139.
\textsuperscript{161} Templeton, \textit{Standing Upright Here}, 204.
contribute to the development of international legal structures governing relations between states. In order to conclude that the New Zealand and Australian cases were legally moot, the ICJ argued that French proclamations that it intended to stop atmospheric testing were ‘undertaking[s] possessing legal effect.’

This finding meant that in future, depending on the context, unilateral oral statements by senior government representatives could be deemed to be legally binding. W. Michael Reisman, Professor of International Law at Yale Law School, calls this finding ‘revolutionary.’

The impact of civil society activity on policy in this case differs slightly from the dynamics that constructivist norm scholars have observed in other policy fields. The ‘boomerang’ model, for example, sees civil society putting pressure on governments both ‘from below’ (domestically), and ‘from above’, by activating foreign civil society or governmental networks to pressure the home government to comply with a norm. In this case, New Zealand civil society actors sought to pressure the government to take great action not to comply with anti-nuclear weapon norms, but to actively promote them, as well as to pressure France into compliance. Peace movement activists presented regular petitions to parliament prior to and during the case study period, some supported by tens of thousands of people. Local trade unions, which at the time had significant political and electoral influence, implemented boycotts against France in collaboration with international partners, and called on the government to take stronger protest action. Civil society also strongly influenced Labour Party policy through the direct, personal links between disarmament activists and party members. The frigate protest was an example of Labour policy emulating civil society protest, and struck a strong chord with the public; it ‘stimulated considerable national pride within New Zealand: at last New Zealand was standing up for its rights.’

Clements suggests that the strong anti-nuclear protest of the Labour government from December 1972 onward may, ironically, actually have tempered civil society activity, due to the government co-opting most of the peace movement’s concerns.

For the public, national identity is built and maintained in large part by invoking stories of national heroes, struggles and triumphs that foster national pride. The New Zealand government framed its

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165 Risse and Sikkink, “Socialization of International Human Rights Norms.”
166 Clements, Back from the Brink, 81.
ICJ case and frigate protest in terms of justice and sovereignty, and Kirk explicitly linked the frigate’s voyage to a primary marker of national identity—the New Zealand flag. When France announced it would move its testing programme underground, many New Zealanders saw the announcement as a diplomatic victory over a powerful state. The act of standing up to a nuclear power and taking direct protest action that garnered international attention thus elevated Kirk to the status of a national hero for many New Zealanders. The stories of his government’s anti-nuclear protests resonate as markers of national pride, casting New Zealand as an anti-nuclear champion that successfully pursued a principled, independent foreign policy. The high-profile nuclear disarmament advocacy of the Labour government in particular in this period ‘legitimated the objectives of the peace movement and provided it with considerable respectability.'

As chapter four demonstrated, the downstream effects on New Zealand national identity of the events described here, along with ongoing civil society activism, were significant. Helen Clark, for example, a lead proponent and author of the 1987 New Zealand Nuclear Free Zone Act and New Zealand prime minister from 1999-2008, writes that Kirk’s principled opposition to nuclear weapons, apartheid, and the Vietnam War inspired her decision to join the Labour Party. It was not just left-leaning New Zealanders who were affected; the government’s protests brought anti-nuclear sentiment and activism much closer to the public mainstream. Over time, such sentiment has become a dominant aspect of national identity in the public, as well as among many officials and politicians.

170 On the respect that Kirk generated both at home and abroad for his management of New Zealand foreign policy, see, Roberts, “New Zealand Review,” 77.
171 Templeton, Standing Upright Here, 513–514.
The Trudeau peace initiative, 1983-84

In view of the madness inherent in the threat to use atomic weapons, to kill the hopes for disarmament would truly be to risk killing life on earth.

~ Former Canadian prime minister, Pierre Trudeau

Introduction

From October 1983 to February 1984, Canadian Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau (1968-1979, 1980-84) undertook a high-profile international campaign that became known as the Trudeau peace initiative. Over five months, Trudeau dedicated the majority of his time and energy to the initiative, touring 15 world capitals and meeting 58 world leaders for detailed discussions on the security challenges of the nuclear age. This was a clear case of nuclear disarmament advocacy as per the definition outlined in introduction chapter. Trudeau aimed to reduce East-West tensions and put an end to ‘megaphone diplomacy’; to increase scope for dialogue among the nuclear armed states; to stop the spread of nuclear weapons; and to reinvigorate nuclear disarmament negotiations. In many of his meetings, Trudeau promoted a set of specific nuclear disarmament-related proposals, produced by a dedicated Canadian taskforce established for the purpose. The proposals reflected the Trudeau Government’s approach to international security in the nuclear age—namely, as one commentator put it, that ‘control of the application of new technology to weapons development

1 UNGA, “Provisional Verbatim Record of the Eighteenth Meeting (A/S-12/PV.18)” (New York, June 18, 1982), 36.
must be part and parcel of any process aimed at securing actual nuclear disarmament. The prime minister himself promoted complete nuclear disarmament during this period, including in what was arguably the most important meeting of the initiative—his meeting with US President Ronald Reagan. In 1984, Trudeau won the Albert Einstein Peace Prize for his peace initiative.

In terms of identity dynamics, Trudeau was personally committed to a vision of Canada as an international peacemaker. This vision included strong opposition to nuclear weapons and support for nuclear disarmament, as his high-profile statements and nuclear disarmament advocacy both before and after entering politics attested. At the same time, the senior government leadership, including Trudeau, had an internalised belief in the centrality of US alliance as a national security interest for Canada. As discussed previously, this meant that key alliance norms of maintaining deterrent credibility and relatedly, solidarity, were also deeply entrenched in Canadian political thinking. Likewise, the majority of officials had internalised pro-alliance and arguably, pro-nuclear national identities, due to the existence of long-standing bureaucratic institutions dedicated to the defence of alliance-related norms.

National identity in the Canadian public in the early 1980s included a strong, latent anti-nuclear weapon strand, but as with the political class, the majority of the public saw this as a secondary concern to maintaining US alliance guarantees. During the superpower crisis in mid-1983, however, this hierarchy of security norms appears to have been inverted. The government’s decision to permit US testing of nuclear-capable cruise missiles in Canada in the name of alliance solidarity thus activated very strong anti-nuclear public sentiment and mobilised civil society. The majority of Canadians opposed the cruise decision, which triggered the largest peace/anti-nuclear protests in the country’s history.

The protesters singled out Trudeau for condemnation, highlighting the contradictions between Canada’s support for cruise missile testing and the anti-nuclear vision for Canada that the prime minister had personally championed previously. Widespread public condemnation triggered

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5 “Remarks of the President and Prime Minister.”

cognitive dissonance in the prime minister, stimulating a deep sense of personal responsibility to help mitigate global nuclear risks. Officials were hesitant about the sudden, high-profile peace initiative that was an uncharacteristic departure from traditional Canadian foreign policy practice. Seeking to reduce the psychological discomfort generated by the public’s condemnation, however, Trudeau asserted his prerogative as prime minister and side-lined officials’ concerns by developing and delivering the initiative outside of normal policymaking channels. In sum, the activation of public anti-nuclear weapon sentiment, and its resonance with Trudeau, was the catalyst for the peace initiative. This chapter thus shines a spotlight on the inherent contradictions in two core visions of Canadian identity and the conflicting impulses they create—Canada the pro-disarmament peacemaker, and Canada the solid US ally and supporter of nuclear deterrence.

National identities

Political elite

Numerous historians, former officials and analysts have noted Pierre Trudeau’s deep-rooted personal aversion to nuclear weapons.\(^7\) Two prominent biographers, for example, write that Trudeau’s ‘horror of nuclear weapons’ was ‘genuine and longstanding.’\(^8\) In 1963, Trudeau fiercely attacked the Liberal Party leader, Lester Pearson, for supporting the receipt of US nuclear warheads for operation by Canadian troops; in protest, Trudeau refused to stand as a Liberal Party candidate in the upcoming general election.\(^9\) During Trudeau’s premiership, decisions were made to end all of Canada’s nuclear weapons roles, as discussed in chapter four.\(^10\)

\(^7\) Axworthy, “Revisiting the Hiroshima Declaration,” 3; Legault and Fortmann, A Diplomacy of Hope, 202; Trudgen, “Buckets,” 52; Tucker, “Canada and Arms Control,” 645.

\(^8\) Granatstein and Bothwell, Pirouette, 7.


Trudeau’s beliefs were informed by his experiences as an academic and leading public intellectual before entering politics. These experiences produced a leadership style that included an inclination to ask difficult questions, to encourage debate and challenge the status quo, and to highlight inconsistencies in Canadian foreign policy.11 The lead historian at Canada’s foreign affairs department, Greg Donaghy, writes that in general, Trudeau ‘was skeptical of Canadian foreign policy since 1945, which too often seemed defined by a network of US-led military alliances. Always prepared to strike out on his own, he sought policies more closely attuned to Canadian values and interests.’12 Although Trudeau believed in the concept of nuclear deterrence, he thought that the manner in which the superpower nuclear arsenals were being managed created enormous risks of accidental or miscalculated war.13 While Trudeau’s focus on nuclear issues was sporadic,14 it is important to note that during his premiership, a powerful Quebecois separatist movement presented ‘the most serious challenge that has ever confronted the Canadian federal system.’15 The separatist movement led Trudeau to focus mainly on domestic events, despite his personal views on disarmament.16

In the early 1980s, many senior Liberal MPs were also concerned about the severe security risk created by nuclear weapons, and were willing to push for greater foreign policy independence in strategic affairs. In April 1982, for example, the House of Commons Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence (SCEAND) proposed in a report on ‘Security and Disarmament’ that Canada take a ‘Twin Pillars’ approach to improving international security. First, Canada should make a strong call for ‘urgent negotiations on strategic armaments limitation and reduction as soon as possible.’17 And second, Canada should pursue ‘rapid progress towards improvement in world


\[16\] von Riekhoff, “The Impact of Prime Minister Trudeau,” 267. Similarly, see the comments of Trudeau’s Secretary of State for External Affairs, Mark MacGuigan, in MacGuigan, An Inside Look at External Affairs During the Trudeau Years: The Memoirs of Mark MacGuigan, 6–7.

\[17\] Cited in Barrett, “Canada’s Arms Control and Disarmament Policy,” 81–82.
political conditions; establishment of confidence building measures and crisis management systems; and further multilateral disarmament negotiations.\textsuperscript{18} Such initiatives were to be pursued, however, within the bounds of nuclear alliance norms.

**Officials**

A strong narrative in the literature on the peace initiative revolves around the significant concern it caused among Canadian officials.\textsuperscript{19} The daily responsibility of managing alliance relations had entrenched pro-nuclear weapon norms in the national identities of the senior bureaucrats, who were less inclined to question the status quo than their political masters. In addition, Canadian and US officials have deep and wide collaborative relationship, of which nuclear disarmament and arms control is only a very minor part. In general terms, officials are thus concerned not to pursue disarmament policies that would upset relations and potentially have spill-over effects on other aspects of the Canada-US relationship.\textsuperscript{20} Foreign affairs officials were suspicious of Trudeau from the start of his premiership, due to his cabinet’s rejection of the recommendation to maintain existing troop commitments to NATO in Europe in the late 1960s, and its demand that officials repeat their review from the ground up.\textsuperscript{21} Trudeau later suggested he could get more useful information by reading the New York Times than foreign ministry dispatches.\textsuperscript{22}

The early 1980s were a time of superpower political crisis, as described further below. In this context, the alliance norm of solidarity, internalised in the majority of officials, were of heightened importance. NATO nuclear deterrence strategy is premised on the need to maintain credible nuclear threats, said to derive from military capacity and alliance solidarity.\textsuperscript{23} Canada questioning the credibility of NATO’s nuclear threats thus constituted a fundamental challenge to the dominant norms practised by officials at home and abroad. Trudeau’s key foreign affairs advisor warned the

\textsuperscript{18} Cited in Ibid.

\textsuperscript{19} See, for example, Thompson, “Pierre Elliott Trudeau’s Peace Initiative,” 1125.

\textsuperscript{20} Rauf, “Private Interview.”


prime minister that his peace initiative would ‘run against and across a number of bureaucratic currents.’ Nevertheless, this scepticism did not turn into open resistance: ‘most [officials] proved “co-optable” and were swayed by the prime minister’s “enthusiasm and sense of mission.”’

**Public**

The late 1970s and early 1980s marked the resurgence in Canada of sustained public concern with nuclear weapons. The previously ‘small and marginalised’ Canadian peace movement rapidly gained momentum as the collapse of détente and the intensifying Cold War stimulated fears of nuclear war. Between 1981 and 1983, for example, the annual budget of Project Ploughshares—a key civil society organisation with expertise in disarmament issues—jumped from CDN $11,000 to CDN $273,000. Another prominent nuclear disarmament advocacy group, Operation Dismantle, was founded in 1977 and quickly developed an active membership base of 10,000.

By the early 1980s, Canadian public perceptions of Cold War defence strategies had continued the anti-armament trend noted in chapter four. A 1982 survey within the Canadian Institute of International Affairs—‘a middle-of-the-road segment of the Canadian attentive public’ on foreign policy issues—found 74 percent support for reducing all countries’ armament levels as the best way to increase Canadian security. In July the same year, Gallup asked respondents how they would vote ‘as a Canadian’ if there were a global referendum on nuclear disarmament—an objective being promoted by Operation Dismantle. 68 percent supported total nuclear disarmament. Between 1962 and 1982, ‘the percentage of Canadians believing that “the West should take all steps to defeat Communism, even if it means risking nuclear war,” plummeted from 42 to 6 percent.’

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25 Ibid., 43.
26 Ibid., 40–41.
27 Ibid., 40.
Several analysts have noted the overwhelmingly positive response of the Canadian public to the peace initiative, which ‘struck at the heart of Canadian fears about the dangers of continuing the pace of the current arms race.’\textsuperscript{32} A survey conducted in 1984 registered 85% support for Trudeau’s efforts.\textsuperscript{33} The peace initiative resonated with two particular aspects national identity for the Canadian public: first, the strong anti-nuclear weapon strand, which constituted part of the popular vision of Canada as an active advocate of international peace;\textsuperscript{34} and second, a desire to express greater foreign policy independence. Donaghy, for example, writes that the peace initiative ‘delighted most Canadians, reinforcing their scepticism about American claims to exclusive leadership of the western alliance.’\textsuperscript{35}

**Nuclear disarmament advocacy**

Two different aspects of the Trudeau peace initiative have theoretical significance, and are therefore examined in detail here: first, the question of what caused the peace initiative, and second, the question of why the initiative took the specific form that it did.

**The impetus to act**

Superpower relations were at an historic low in 1983, with general East-West tensions at a height not seen since the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis. The international atmosphere was marked, as Trudeau put it, by an ‘ominous rhythm of crisis.’\textsuperscript{36} Following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, it became clear that the US Senate would not ratify the SALT II nuclear arms control agreement.\textsuperscript{37} East-


\textsuperscript{33} Sigler and von Riekhoff, “The Trudeau Peace Initiative,” 59. The report that Sigler and Von Reikhoff cite is dated May 1984. Thus, it is not clear whether or not the opinion poll it refers to was conducted prior to the end of the peace initiative in mid-February that year.

\textsuperscript{34} Donaghy, “The Ghost of Peace,” 52.

\textsuperscript{35} Ibid., 39.

\textsuperscript{36} In addition to the Guelph speech, for example, see, Pierre E Trudeau, “A Peace Initiative from Canada,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 40, no. 1 (January 1984): 15.

\textsuperscript{37} Barrett, “Canada’s Arms Control and Disarmament Policy,” 77. See also, “U.S.-Soviet/Russian Nuclear Arms Control” (Arms Control Association, June 2002).
West relations continued to deteriorate over the next few years. In January 1981, Ronald Reagan became US president (1981–1989), initially espousing a bellicose, anti-Soviet, good-versus-evil religious rhetoric. Reagan announced that a perceived decline in US power would be addressed via a massive nuclear and conventional military build-up. UK Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher (1979—1990) took an equally hard line regarding the Soviet Union, and was championing the modernisation of UK and NATO nuclear forces. In March 1983, Reagan condemned the Soviet Union as an ‘evil empire,’ and two weeks later, announced plans for a space-based missile defence system—the Strategic Defense Initiative, or ‘Star Wars.’ The latter undermined the decades-old consensus—enshrined in the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty—that mutual superpower vulnerability made nuclear war less likely, and that missile defences should therefore not be developed.

The Canadian Parliament unanimously condemned Star Wars as an escalation of the arms race, and Trudeau personally warned Reagan that it increased the risk of nuclear war. In September 1983, a Soviet fighter pilot shot down a South Korean civilian airliner that had strayed into Soviet airspace, killing 269 people. In this context, disarmament negotiations had all but ceased; as Tom Axworthy, a senior Trudeau advisor at the time, puts it, ‘the policy had virtually ended, and rhetoric had taken over.’ Trudeau was concerned that the superpowers were letting ideological battles obscure the vital goal of preventing nuclear war. Recently declassified primary sources reveal that in November 1983—that is, in the middle of the Trudeau peace initiative—NATO nuclear war

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38 Barrett, “Canada’s Arms Control and Disarmament Policy,” 80.
43 Ibid., 116–117.
44 Thomas S Axworthy, “Private Interview” (Toronto, May 14, 2015).
exercises led the Soviet leadership to believe that the West was preparing for a massive nuclear strike on the Soviet Union.\textsuperscript{46}

By 1983, Trudeau had been Canadian prime minister for over 15 years. A senior Western statesman, he had extensive international contacts and a significant degree of personal political capital. He was also highly charismatic and enjoyed close, direct personal engagement with his peers.\textsuperscript{47} Given these personal traits, Trudeau’s strong personal aversion to nuclear weapons, and the steadily growing risk of nuclear war, Trudeau felt a personal responsibility to try to ameliorate global tensions.\textsuperscript{48} This sense of responsibility was linked in Trudeau’s mind to a belief in Canada’s natural role as an international mediator and advocate for peace. Despite Trudeau leaning early in life toward foreign policy isolationism, this internationalist ‘peacemaker’ view of Canadian national identity was a long-standing theme of his public statements and diplomatic efforts, including in the two years prior to the peace initiative.\textsuperscript{49}

In the context of this thesis, it is important to note that his efforts to ameliorate international tensions were closely linked to the promotion of nuclear disarmament. As East-West relations deteriorated and the risk of war increased in the eighteen months preceding the peace initiative, for example, Trudeau’s efforts to advance peace included explicit nuclear disarmament advocacy. In May 1982, Trudeau gave the commencement (graduation) address at the ivy-league Notre Dame University in the United States. His choice to deliver a strong, pro-disarmament speech in this high-profile setting was both deliberate and significant. President Reagan had delivered the Notre Dame commencement address the year before, and had said of communism that the West ‘won’t bother to dismiss or denounce it, it will dismiss it as some bizarre chapter in human history whose last pages are even now being written.’\textsuperscript{50} During his own Notre Dame speech the following year, Trudeau directly contradicted Reagan’s statement, calling for dialogue with the Soviet Union:

\textsuperscript{47} Sigler and von Riekhoff, “The Trudeau Peace Initiative,” 52.
\textsuperscript{50} Ronald Reagan, “Address at Commencement Exercises at the University of Notre Dame” (Ronald Reagan Library Archives, 1981),
...we must recognize that they are a super-power; that they have strategic interests and that they have the power to protect those interests. Only then will we be able to come to a mutual understanding about the desirability of arms reduction.\textsuperscript{51}

Trudeau went on immediately to say that ‘although we may agree that a balance of forces is a necessary objective, it is but one step in the right direction...’ and that, rather than seeking military build-up as a means of reducing Soviet influence, ‘the West should negotiate arms control and disarmament with single-minded determination. The Soviets threaten us militarily; not culturally, not politically and certainly not economically. We should not seek to link or couple non-military objectives with disarmament.’\textsuperscript{52}

Later that same year at the second UNSSOD, Trudeau highlighted his belief in the importance of ameliorating political tensions as a means of advancing nuclear disarmament.

Looking at the work of this second special session, we must remember that disarmament is not simply a technical problem. It is also a political problem, and it is impossible to deal with it while disregarding the world context.\textsuperscript{53}

In sum, Trudeau saw political activity to ameliorate East-West tensions as a fundamental necessity if disarmament were to be advanced. This task of reducing Cold War tensions became a key focus of the his peace initiative the following year, and as noted previously, he explicitly linked the task to the broader objective of advancing nuclear disarmament,\textsuperscript{54} as well as promoting a set of specific, limited disarmament measures on which progress might be made.\textsuperscript{55}

There was an inherent tension, however, between Trudeau’s view of Canada as a disarmament advocate and mediating force for peace, and the view of Canada as a solidarist US ally, which was deeply entrenched among political and bureaucratic elites. The conflicting policy imperatives created by these two visions of national identity came to the fore in mid-1983, just months before the peace initiative, over the issue of cruise missile testing. In mid-1980, the US government had privately petitioned its Canadian counterpart for permission to test new air-launched, nuclear capable cruise missiles over Canadian territory.\textsuperscript{56} Foreign, defence and economic bureaucracies

\textsuperscript{51}Trudeau, “Commencement Address,” 482.
\textsuperscript{52}Ibid.
\textsuperscript{53}UNGA, “A/S-12/PV.18,” 23–25.
\textsuperscript{54}“Remarks of the President and Prime Minister.”
\textsuperscript{55}See, Thompson, “Pierre Elliott Trudeau’s Peace Initiative,” 1123–1124.
\textsuperscript{56}Clearwater, \textit{Just Dummies}, 3–4.
were enthusiastic about the idea, seeing it as serving multiple objectives. First, it would help to rebuild Canada-US military ties, which had been strained since the early 1960s when the Diefenbaker Government refused to receive US nuclear warheads for Canadian operation, and had suffered further in the wake of Canada’s European NATO drawdown at the start of Trudeau’s premiership. Second, cruise testing would support the development of Canadian defence industries. And third, officials saw cruise testing as a means of helping to repair relations with other NATO allies, which had likewise suffered during the European drawdown.

Trudeau was also keen to improve Canada-US relations, and saw cruise missile testing as a possible means of doing that. In contrast to the bureaucracy, however, he was initially hesitant about the cruise testing. Given Trudeau’s previous, high-profile nuclear disarmament advocacy, this was unsurprising. At both UN special sessions on disarmament in 1978 and 1982, Trudeau personally championed a ‘suffocation’ strategy to end the arms race. A central premise of the strategy was that states could help to facilitate nuclear disarmament by opposing the testing of new delivery systems for nuclear weapons.

The Canadian government also assumed that nuclear missile testing in Canada would be deeply unpopular with the public, and thus tried to keep the cruise missile negotiations secret. In March 1982, however, an unplanned comment from a US military officer responding to a different issue alerted the public to the negotiations. When critics pointed out that allowing cruise missile testing in Canada appeared to contradict both the spirit and letter of Trudeau’s suffocation strategy, Trudeau replied that suffocation ‘was never intended to mean that any country could or should

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57 Ibid., 13.
unilaterally pursue this strategy." In February 1983, a generic agreement was signed for the testing of US weapons systems in Canada, and formal approval for nuclear-capable cruise missile testing was granted in July the same year.

Donaghy argues that deteriorating East-West relations, characterised by the collapse of détente and the Soviet deployment of SS-20s to Europe, meant ‘it had become impossible for Trudeau to maintain his steadfast opposition to nuclear weapons.’ However, such conclusions about policy influences immediately invoke identity structures. That is, the events described affect Canadian nuclear weapons policy only if a politically-salient constituency views national security primarily in terms of alliance structures and in this case, in terms of the resulting nuclear deterrence strategies. In terms of the theoretical arguments advanced in this thesis, these norms were indeed internalised in large portions of the Canadian bureaucratic and political elite, and came to the fore in the cruise decision.

The government’s concern about public anti-nuclear weapon sentiment, however, was well founded. In July and December 1983 respectively, Gallup Canada reported 47.6 and 47.1 percent of respondents opposed cruise testing (against 44.5 and 44.3 percent in favour); Regehr and Rosenbaum report 1983 polls showing 52 percent of Canadians opposed. Seeking to appease public opinion, Trudeau tried to link cruise testing in Canada to alliance commitments under the 1979 NATO dual-track decision. This decision had mandated deployment of new intermediate-range nuclear forces in Europe as a response to Soviet deployment in Europe of SS-20

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65 Trudeau, “Commencement Address,” 481.
66 Clearwater, Just Dummies, 36–37.
67 Ibid., 53–54.
69 Clearwater, Just Dummies, 13.
missiles to replace ageing predecessors.\(^7\) NATO’s dual track strategy was to use new Western nuclear deployments as a bargaining chip to push for negotiations on nuclear arms reductions.\(^7\) In fact, the link between cruise testing in Canada and the dual track decision was highly tenuous, as critics and opposition MPs pointed out.\(^7\) The 1979 dual-track decision related to European deployment of ground-launched cruise missiles and Pershing II ballistic missiles. In contrast, the air-launched cruise missiles of the type tested in Canada first entered service with the US Air Force in December 1982 and were deployed on US soil.\(^7\) In other words, the Canadian tests related to different class of weapon deployed on a different continent, and which had no direct relationship to disarmament negotiations. They certainly related to the overall US deterrence strategy, but appear to have had a much greater resemblance to the logic of arms racing than to the dual track strategy. Arguably, this accounts for why Trudeau was initially hesitant about cruise testing.\(^7\) Moreover, it was somewhat incongruous for Trudeau to invoke the dual track decision at this point given that he appeared to criticise the dual-track logic in a major speech in the United States in May 1982, and to imply that both East and West were responsible for the arms race.\(^7\) Given the latent anti-US sentiment in the Canadian public, however, the multilateral NATO alliance was more popular among the public than the bilateral, Canada-US NORAD agreement. This was particularly relevant given Reagan’s massive nuclear weapons build-up in the early 1980s and his bellicose attacks on the Soviet Union, perceived as increasing the risk of nuclear war. In theoretical terms, then, Trudeau invoking the dual-track precedent can thus be seen as an attempt to link the new policy direction—support for cruise testing in Canada—to established foreign policy norms. This linking attempt was a clear failure.

Anti-nuclear sentiment was already high around the world; as Tannenwald notes, ‘In 1981 and 1982, the largest antinuclear movement in history arose in the United States and Europe to protest the Ronald Reagan administration’s seeming repudiation of arms control and pursuit of war-fighting strategies of deterrence.’\(^7\) The cruise testing issue ‘galvanised [Canada’s] nascent peace


\(^7\) Clearwater, *Just Dummies*, 22.

\(^7\) Ibid., 68.

\(^7\) Donaghy, “The Ghost of Peace,” 40.

\(^7\) Trudeau, “Commencement Address,” 481–483.

\(^7\) Tannenwald, “Stigmatizing the Bomb,” 32.
movement,’ which mobilised a large public constituency and formed a nation-wide anti-cruise testing coalition. Moreover, it was not just the peace movement that mobilised; major unions such as the United Auto Workers, the Canadian Union of Postal Workers, the Canadian Union of Public Employees, and the million-member Canadian Labour Congress all condemned the cruise decision and promised to fight it. The result was a mass, public outpouring of anti-nuclear weapon sentiment on a scale never before seen in Canada. The anti-cruise rallies were the largest peace protests in Canadian history, and featured ‘Trudeau’s effigy, perched atop a cardboard cruise missile...hoisted before jeering protesters.’ In April 1983, the Vancouver City Council helped organise a peace and anti-nuclear rally attended by at least 65,000 people. According to Donaghy, 100,000 protesters took to the city’s streets that month.

Other high-profile civil society activities increased pressure on the government. Operation Dismantle, for example, lodged an (ultimately unsuccessful) legal challenge against cruise testing. The national Farmers Union, the United Church of Canada, and the New Democratic Party all endorsed a campaign run by Project Ploughshares and Operation Dismantle to establish Canada as a NWFZ; the local authorities of 75 towns and cities—including Toronto and Vancouver in 1983—declared their municipalities nuclear free zones. In sum, cruise testing was a policy that clashed with a strong anti-nuclear weapon national identity in the general public. However, civil society norm entrepreneurs played an important role in activating that identity, putting pressure on Trudeau by highlighting the inconsistency between his past public statements and current policies. The result was that six months before Trudeau launched the peace initiative, ‘his reputation as an opponent of nuclear weapons [was] in tatters.’

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83 Wyler, “Vancouver Loves Peace.”
86 Wittner, Confronting the Bomb, 157; Clearwater, Just Dummies, 32; Wyler, “Vancouver Loves Peace.”
This chapter argues that as a result of the dynamics described above, Trudeau experienced significant cognitive dissonance and a heightened sense of personal responsibility to help reduce international tensions. The core elements in this mix were Trudeau’s longstanding personal opposition to nuclear weapons; his international championing of a suffocation strategy to end the nuclear arms race and facilitate disarmament; and the Canadian public’s passionate condemnation of cruise testing in general, and Trudeau in particular, for having betrayed that anti-nuclear vision. Cognitive dissonance generated a profound ‘psychological discomfort’ in Trudeau, creating the impetus for action.88 His main immediate aim, as one of his senior advisors at the time states, was to reduce international tensions and re-establish dialogue between East and West, in the hope that this would reduce the likelihood of nuclear war.89 In this context, the existence of enormous superpower nuclear arsenals constituted a key reality constraint.90 Since East-West security relations were structured primarily in relation to nuclear weapons, any attempt to reduce tensions necessarily had to engage with these weapons. Trudeau’s efforts to restore political dialogue therefore had to be framed in terms of movement towards nuclear disarmament. The theoretical discussion at the end of the chapter addresses this point in more detail.

Trudeau’s inclination to act was reinforced by his close personal advisors, such as Thomas Axworthy and Robert Fowler.91 In 1983, the anti-nuclear film If You Love This Planet won the Oscar for best documentary short. The film, which stars prominent Australian anti-nuclear advocate, Helen Caldicott, highlights the risks and terrible consequences of nuclear war. Trudeau’s girlfriend at the time, Margot Kidder, was a passionate member of the peace movement and urged him to see the film, as did Axworthy and Fowler, who arranged for him to do so.92 Trudeau was clearly impressed, and Kidder urged him to meet with Caldicott; Trudeau invited the latter to Ottawa and discussed Cold War dynamics with her.93 In August 1983, Caldicott gave the keynote speech at a Liberal Party conference focused on reviewing Canadian foreign policy.94

In mid-1983, Axworthy and Fowler also arranged for Trudeau to meet ex-US Secretary of Defense, Robert McNamara.95 Along with several senior ex-US officials, McNamara had begun to question

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88 Elliot and Devine, “Motivational Nature of Cognitive Dissonance.”
89 Axworthy, “Private Interview.”
90 Weldes, Constructing National Interests, 102.
93 English, Just Watch Me, ch. 17, unpaginated.
95 Ibid.
the concept of a ‘limited nuclear war’ as envisaged by NATO strategy, and as noted in chapter one, was advocating for NATO to adopt a no first use policy.\textsuperscript{96} Trudeau and McNamara discussed possible Canadian contributions to nuclear weapons-related matters. McNamara urged Trudeau to use his station to speak out personally about the risks of nuclear war before he left office, unlike so many other world leaders, who spoke out only after retiring.\textsuperscript{97} Trudeau’s personal interactions with prominent individuals such as McNamara and Caldicott appealed to his sense of style and leadership, and appear to have contributed to his decision to take action.\textsuperscript{98}

By the end of August 1983, Trudeau had decided to take some kind of initiative.\textsuperscript{99} The following section turns to the second key question highlighted above—namely, what caused the nuclear disarmament advocacy that Trudeau pursued to take the particular form that it did. As will be seen, competing identity dynamics informed by alliance and disarmament objectives again feature prominently.

**Developing the initiative**

On 21 September 1983, Trudeau met for the first time on the concept of a Canadian initiative with Alan MacEachen and Jean-Jacques Blais, the secretary of state for external affairs and minister of national defence respectively.\textsuperscript{100} This was just five weeks before the peace initiative was launched; for a major foreign policy initiative, such a timeframe was unprecedented. A dedicated, eight-member task force was established to develop practical ideas, the makeup and functioning of which deviated significantly from standard bureaucratic practice. The group consisted mainly of mid-level, rather than senior, officials. Moreover, the ad-hoc taskforce was made up predominantly of international security and arms control specialists—an unusual choice for any high-profile Canadian initiative, given that this field constitutes only a small fraction of the overall Canadian foreign policy

\textsuperscript{96} Bundy et al., “Nuclear Weapons and the Atlantic Alliance.”
\textsuperscript{97} Donaghy, “The Ghost of Peace,” 41–42.
\textsuperscript{98} Sigler and von Riekhoff, “The Trudeau Peace Initiative,” 52.
\textsuperscript{99} Donaghy, “The Ghost of Peace,” 42.
\textsuperscript{100} Sigler and von Riekhoff, “The Trudeau Peace Initiative,” 56.
agenda. In a further break from tradition, the group reported directly to the prime minister’s office.\textsuperscript{101}

This disregard for traditional foreign policy channels stirred pre-existing concerns among senior Canadian bureaucrats, who worried about the potential impact of the initiative on broader Canada-US and NATO relations.\textsuperscript{102} Indeed, the peace initiative turned out to be a unilateral Canadian initiative with almost no prior consultation with allies; in this regard, it marked a ‘sharp and public shift in Canadian security and disarmament policy.’\textsuperscript{103} According to Trudeau biographer, John English, NATO’s Secretary General told MacEachen in June 1984 that ‘Pierre’s peace initiative drove Margaret [Thatcher] crazy.’\textsuperscript{104} Officials in the Reagan administration, while publicly offering support in principle for the peace initiative, in private complained loudly about the lack of consultation,\textsuperscript{105} and even insulted Trudeau.\textsuperscript{106} The head of the working group, Louis Delvoie, likened his role of coordinating between the foreign ministry and the prime minister as ‘frequently a job of riding roman circus horses.’\textsuperscript{107}

Following an intensive burst of 18-hour days, the task force produced a set of disarmament and arms control-related proposals, of which Trudeau eventually agreed to four.\textsuperscript{108} These included a call for a five-power nuclear conference within a year; strengthening the NPT to include current non-signatories; developing new initiatives to boost the languishing negotiations on Multilateral Balanced Force Reductions; and introducing new initiatives to suffocate the arms race—for example, by banning the testing and deployment of high-altitude, anti-satellite weapons and restricting the mobility of ICBMs.\textsuperscript{109}

A final issue that Trudeau himself promoted was the idea of reviewing NATO security strategy—which necessarily meant alliance nuclear deterrence doctrines. In this, he was opposed by almost all of his senior officials and colleagues, including Secretary of State MacEachen and Minister of

\textsuperscript{101} Donaghy, “The Ghost of Peace,” 43–44. A parallel steering committee of more senior staff was also established, but had little impact on the content of policy proposals. Sigler and von Riekhoff, “The Trudeau Peace Initiative,” 57.

\textsuperscript{102} For examples of this discontent, see, Thompson, “Pierre Elliott Trudeau’s Peace Initiative,” 1126–1127.


\textsuperscript{104} Thompson, “Pierre Elliott Trudeau’s Peace Initiative,” 1129–1130.


\textsuperscript{106} English, Just Watch Me, ch. 17, unpaginated.

\textsuperscript{107} Thompson, “Pierre Elliott Trudeau’s Peace Initiative,” 1125.

\textsuperscript{108} Donaghy, “The Ghost of Peace,” 43.

\textsuperscript{109} Barrett, “Canada’s Arms Control and Disarmament Policy,” 88–89.
National Defence Blais, who feared it ‘might be seen as a lack of faith or a breaking away from NATO’; the head of the ad-hoc taskforce, Louis Delvoie; and the Canadian ambassador to Washington, Allan Gotlieb, who was concerned Trudeau’s earlier criticisms of Western nuclear strategy may have offended US officials and policymakers, who ‘don’t like the notion that they and the Soviets are equally responsible for world tensions.’ Despite this widespread opposition from senior colleagues and officials, Trudeau returned to the issue of NATO nuclear strategy on several occasions during the peace initiative.

**Launching the initiative**

In launching the peace initiative, Trudeau explicitly linked it to broader multilateral disarmament efforts. The Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe was due to begin its work in Stockholm in January 1984, intended to pursue ‘effective and concrete actions designed to make progress in strengthening confidence and security and in achieving disarmament.’ Trudeau launched the peace initiative on 27 October 1983, with a speech at a conference on *Strategies for Peace and Security in the Nuclear Age* at the University of Guelph, Ontario. In this first speech of the initiative, he argued that Canada was seeking to support the forthcoming disarmament negotiations, by working to stabilise and improve East-West relations:

> We have high hopes for the Conference on Disarmament in Europe...due to open in Stockholm next January. Canada will do its utmost to make that conference productive...These negotiations must be grounded in a structure of stable East-West understanding: reciprocal acknowledgement of legitimate security needs, regular high-level dialogue, and a determined approach to crisis management. Here, again, we require that jolt of political energy which I have described as the third rail.

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111 Granatstein, “Gouzenko to Gorbachev,” 50.
Turning to the issue of great power disarmament negotiations, Trudeau returned to his vision of Canada as a positive political force that could mediate East-West tensions:

Canada is not at the [disarmament negotiating] table, and we have no wish to insert ourselves into this vital and delicate process. It is my hope, however, that we might help to influence the atmosphere in which these negotiations are being conducted, and thereby enhance the prospects of early agreement.114

Trudeau expressed firm support for NATO’s dual-track, armament–for–disarmament strategy, but also criticised the solidarity norms which tend to suppress political debate within NATO:

It is almost as though the diversity, pluralism, and freedom of expression which we are determined to preserve through the Alliance, are not seen as appropriate within the Alliance...institutions cannot grow to meet new challenges if their level of debate—their intellectual universe of discourse—does not expand to meet the changing realities of our environment.115

Roughly two weeks later, Trudeau set off along his metaphorical ‘third rail.’ He travelled across Europe from 8-11 November advocating dialogue, reinvigorated disarmament negotiations, and the need to bridge the East-West divide. He met the British Queen, the pope, and the heads of government of Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, and the Netherlands.116 He did not initially seek a meeting with Thatcher, with whom he had had ‘a lengthy and acrimonious confrontation’ at the G-7 summit in May that year, over his attempt to moderate anti-Soviet rhetoric in the summit communiqué.117 At the end of Trudeau’s European tour, however, Thatcher ‘summoned’ him to London and ‘castigated him for jeopardizing NATO solidarity and placing any trust in the Soviets.’118

Thatcher aside, there was broad support in principle for his initiative due to the dire state of East-West relations.119

Returning home, Trudeau made a second public speech on the peace initiative, this time at a Liberal Party fundraiser in Montreal—against the advice of officials, who thought the setting added an unhelpful partisan flavour to the initiative. In Montreal, Trudeau laid out more details on his

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114 Ibid. He returned to this theme at the end of the peace initiative. See, Trudeau, “Speech from the Throne,” 1212.
117 Ibid., 41. For a further example of this antagonism, see, Thompson, “Pierre Elliott Trudeau’s Peace Initiative,” 1121.
proposals for the five-power nuclear conference, for strengthening the NPT regime, and for the ban on high-altitude anti-satellite weapons.\textsuperscript{120} Still in November, Trudeau travelled to New Delhi for the 1983 CHOGM, though perhaps because his audience was less enmeshed in East-West nuclear dynamics, he shied away from pushing disarmament issues strongly in his main speech. The same month, he met with the Japanese prime minister in Tokyo, and with Chinese Premier Zhao Zi-yang and the paramount leader of China, Deng Xiao-ping. In each case, Trudeau raised his concerns about deteriorating East-West relations, and asserted the need to take immediate action to reduce the immense risks related to nuclear conflict.\textsuperscript{121}

In early December 1983, MacEachen attended a meeting of NATO foreign ministers. Against MacEachen’s personal wishes, Trudeau instructed him to gauge the willingness of allies to support Canada in urging a fundamental review of NATO strategy.\textsuperscript{122} The minister did as Trudeau instructed, but US Secretary of State George Shultz ‘made it clear to MacEachen that the US was not remotely interested in discussing NATO’s doctrine of flexible response.’\textsuperscript{123}

On 15 December, Trudeau met President Reagan in Washington in what was arguably the most important meeting of the initiative. To the great surprise of many observers, including officials from both countries, Trudeau and Reagan got along well.\textsuperscript{124} Ambassador Gotlieb had urged Trudeau to avoid policy specifics and instead encourage the president to further highlight his own recent calls for peace, such as those the president had made the previous month in a speech to the Japanese parliament.\textsuperscript{125} The Japan speech had been a mixture of tough-talking anti-Soviet rhetoric—‘we would never coldbloodedly shoot a defenseless airliner out of the sky’—and conciliatory calls for compromise and negotiation—‘a nuclear war can never be won and must never be fought...our dream is to see the day when nuclear weapons will be banished from the face of the Earth,’\textsuperscript{126} For the most part, Trudeau followed Gotlieb’s advice and the two leaders did not discuss specific disarmament measures. Trudeau instead highlighted Reagan’s more conciliatory recent remarks about disarmament, suggesting that they had not been sufficiently acknowledged internationally,

\textsuperscript{120} Ibid., 45–46.
\textsuperscript{121} See, Trudeau, “Speech from the Throne,” 1212.
\textsuperscript{122} Donaghy, “The Ghost of Peace,” 47.
\textsuperscript{123} Ibid., 48.
\textsuperscript{125} Donaghy, “The Ghost of Peace,” 44, 47, 49–50.
and urging Reagan to take a proactive stance in support of détente. Despite this ‘restrained and non-confrontational’ tone, Trudeau raised the issue of NATO strategy, though it is not clear what precisely was said on this issue.\(^{127}\) Trudeau also highlighted the fact that he saw his peace initiative as part of a broader task of advancing disarmament, as President Reagan attested at the post-meeting press conference:

Prime Minister Trudeau briefed me on his recent discussions with leaders in Europe and Asia, on his concerns for world peace and disarmament and improving the East-West dialog. We fully share the concerns for peace which the Prime Minister has expressed... Godspeed in your efforts to help build a durable peace.\(^ {128}\)

During his own remarks to the assembled media, Trudeau asserted,

...the President agrees that we shouldn't seek military superiority in NATO, we should seek a balance; that we do not think that a nuclear war can be won; that we think that the ideal would be to see an end to all nuclear arms.\(^ {129}\)

In theoretical terms, it is interesting that Trudeau’s notes from this time demonstrate the way that individuals use consistency effects, such as the practice of naming and shaming inconsistent behaviour, to advance policy objectives.\(^ {130}\) Shortly after his meeting with Reagan, Trudeau wrote,

My tactic was essentially to nail Reagan down publicly to the newer and more positive aspects of his [Japanese parliamentary] statement, and—even more important—to commit him publicly & personally to the progressive statement made by NATO in Brussels. If he should flinch in pursuit of this new course, he can be held to account.\(^ {131}\)

Trudeau had not given up on the issue of NATO nuclear strategy. Frustrated by his failure to initiate any serious discussion of the matter, he publicly questioned the logic of extended nuclear deterrence. He twice challenged the French prime minister, Raymond Barre, on the notion that the United States would risk nuclear war in Europe in order to repel a Soviet conventional attack on the continent. This attracted media criticism at home, in the United States and in Europe, and caused significant concern in the Reagan administration.\(^ {132}\) Trudeau also insisted that his ad-hoc taskforce


\(^{128}\) “Remarks of the President and Prime Minister.”

\(^{129}\) Ibid.

\(^{130}\) Rublee, *Nonproliferation Norms*, 46–47.


'include a critical examination of NATO’s strategy’ in the speech it was drafting to mark the conclusion of the peace initiative, though the Reagan administration urged him not to raise the issue in the speech.\textsuperscript{133}

Trudeau had hoped to meet the Soviet leader, Yuri Andropov, prior to Reagan, so as to be able to present the latter with a credible proposal for East-West engagement. However, Andropov’s terminal illness ruled out this possibility. Instead, Trudeau travelled in January 1984 to the capitals of three Eastern bloc countries: Czechoslovakia, East Germany and Romania. This was against the advice of MacEachen, and ‘brought into the open the rumoured differences between Trudeau and his senior foreign policy officials over the peace mission.’\textsuperscript{134} In his last speech of the peace initiative given in the Canadian parliament, Trudeau appears to have been influenced by the strong opposition from Canadian and allied bureaucrats and politicians to any discussion of NATO strategy, and refrained from discussing the issue.\textsuperscript{135}

**Theoretical implications**

As with the empirical discussion above, this theoretical section engages both with the question of what catalysed the Trudeau peace initiative, and the question of why the initiative took the specific form that it did. On the first question, it is important to note that the peace initiative was highly unusual compared with Canada’s tradition of quiet nuclear weapons diplomacy coordinated in advance with allies.\textsuperscript{136} The fact that East-West relations were bleak in the early 1980s and that Trudeau was an elder Western leader who felt a responsibility to help mitigate the risk of nuclear war is insufficient, then, to explain why Canada should suddenly take a high-profile, unilateral nuclear disarmament initiative. A compelling means of explaining this outcome, however, is that Trudeau’s sense of responsibility was dramatically heightened by his profound cognitive dissonance.

\textsuperscript{133} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{134} Ibid. In the end, Trudeau met the new Soviet premier, Konstantin Chernenko, on 15 February 1984 while in Moscow for Andropov’s funeral—a week after the parliamentary speech that marked the end of the peace initiative—though many Western leaders were also in attendance and met with Chernenko. Ibid., 52.

\textsuperscript{135} Trudeau, “Speech from the Throne”, especially 1214.

triggered by the public’s strong activation of an anti-nuclear identity that Trudeau shared, and by their personal condemnation of Trudeau for having betrayed it.

The majority of the Canadian public interpreted the cruise testing decision as strongly conflicting with their vision of Canada as a pro-disarmament peacemaker, as demonstrated by the fact that the cruise decision triggered the largest anti-nuclear protests in Canadian history. The protesters condemned Trudeau personally because he had publicly championed a vision of Canada as a pro-disarmament peacemaker for many years. The need for people to appear consistent in their actions, either for the psychological stability of their own identity, or for electoral or political purposes, is a powerful behavioural driver. If an initial policy commitment is made out of genuine normative preference, a subsequent policy that conflicts with that preference causes cognitive dissonance or ‘psychological discomfort.’ With 100,000 Canadians marching in the street, touting Trudeau’s effigy atop a mock nuclear missile, protesting his betrayal of anti-nuclear principles he claimed to hold dear, Trudeau cannot have escaped a profound sense of cognitive dissonance. Indeed, several commentators note that he was deeply disturbed at the mass protests triggered by the cruise missile decision. The observation that Trudeau appears to have aimed specifically to engage the public on nuclear policy issues during the peace initiative further supports this notion. This does not suggest, however, that Trudeau undertook the peace initiative merely for instrumental or electoral reasons; the fact that he announced his retirement just weeks after the formal end of the initiative undermines that idea. Rather, the public activation and expression of an anti-nuclear weapon identity was a trigger that activated the same identity in Trudeau, and it was an identity to which he was strongly attached.

Strong cognitive dissonance leads the sufferer to take action to reduce their discomfort; in political terms, this means either a reconsideration of policy, or a reframing of identity. Psychologists frame the latter option as ‘attitude change...in the service of reducing the psychological Discomfort...’

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137 Rublee, Nonproliferation Norms, 43–47. See also, Rublee, “Taking Stock,” 427–428.
138 Rublee, Nonproliferation Norms, 48; Elliot and Devine, “Motivational Nature of Cognitive Dissonance.”
142 Rublee, Nonproliferation Norms, 48.
[sic] generated by counterattitudinal behavior.\textsuperscript{143} In the case of cruise missile testing, the idea of reversing course was never seriously considered; senior politicians and officials—including Trudeau—overwhelmingly saw a strong Canada-US alliance as a primary security interest, and reversing the cruise decision would have been immensely damaging to US relations. Trudeau therefore tried to reframe cruise testing in relation to the 1979 NATO dual track decision. As a multilateral alliance, NATO had strong support among the public despite its nuclear component. The public, however, either rejected this link, or rejected the notion that increasing Western nuclear armaments was in the national interest because it would facilitate disarmament. Unwilling to change the cruise testing policy, and unable to reframe it in identity terms that the public would accept, Trudeau’s sense of cognitive dissonance persisted, as did the protests. Keenly aware of the inconsistency between Canadian policy and his personal anti-nuclear beliefs, Trudeau sought to resolve the resulting psychological discomfort by reaffirming his vision of Canada as a supporter of peace through nuclear disarmament. Viewed in such terms, the peace initiative makes sense as a policy outcome.

Turning to the second question of why the peace initiative took the specific form that it did, four theoretical observations are noteworthy, relating to the international structuring effect of nuclear weapons; to the role of identity; to the importance of agency; and to the international normative context. On the first point, the peace initiative demonstrates the fundamental degree to which nuclear weapons structure great power relations. They are a reality constraint or ‘brute observational facts’ that cannot be ignored when trying to engage in issues of great power politics.\textsuperscript{144} As such, the credibility of any effort to reduce international tensions required engagement with nuclear weapons. In this sense, the nuclear disarmament proposals were a ‘conversation piece, an icebreaker,’\textsuperscript{145} serving as a carte de visite, ‘entitling the bearer to raise the broader political issues of peace and international security.’\textsuperscript{146} Relatedly, the peace initiative was noteworthy for demonstrating that policymakers may pursue nuclear disarmament advocacy as a means of reducing international tension and thus, preventing nuclear war. Though some might think this is self-evident, in fact, the idea that nuclear disarmament—which aims at the elimination of

\textsuperscript{143} Elliot and Devine, “Motivational Nature of Cognitive Dissonance,” 390.


\textsuperscript{145} Thompson, “Pierre Elliott Trudeau’s Peace Initiative,” 1124.

\textsuperscript{146} Sigler and Von Riekhoff, p. 56 On this theme, see also, Pearson, Mackinnon, and Sapardanis, “The World Is Entitled to Ask Questions,” 142–43.
nuclear weapons, as per the definition in chapter one—is a means of addressing nuclear threats clashes with a foundational assumption of nuclear deterrence theory—namely, that nuclear war is best avoided by maintaining a strong, credible nuclear deterrent. These clashing notions, and the purported commitment of Canadian policymakers to both, brings the discussion back to the key identity-based drivers that shaped the content of the peace initiative.

Secondly then, in terms of identity, this case clearly demonstrates the conflicting identity-based policy impulses between Canada the pro-disarmament advocate, and Canada the solidarist ally of the United States, inescapably entrapped by—or alternatively, depending on the identity trope, committed to—the structuring role that nuclear weapons play in US global strategies. The majority of the Canadian public were committed to the former, while in general, officials and political elites were committed to the latter; Trudeau, meanwhile, gave public expression to both identities. He made explicit the conflicting imperatives that arise from the mutually exclusive security logics of disarmament and deterrence, and acknowledged the policy conundrum they create:

I understand full well the people’s anguish and confusion. The nuclear debate is difficult and seems to pursue an inverse logic. It deals with power that, by common consent, is unusable. It argues for more nuclear weapons in order that, in the end, there may be fewer.\footnote{147}

His desire to tackle the challenges of disarmament in public arose from his academic’s passion for critical analysis, and his personal abhorrence of nuclear weapons. Trudeau believed in the inherent rational and moral imperatives to pursue disarmament, as his final remarks to the UNSSOD in 1982 clearly attest:

The most unpardonable sin that this Assembly could commit would be to fail to act and thus kill the hopes nourished by mankind today. For in view of the madness inherent in the threat to use atomic weapons, to kill the hopes for disarmament would truly be to risk killing life on earth.\footnote{148}

But he was also logically committed to collective security and to the nuclear deterrence strategy of NATO as a means of preventing Soviet aggression. Trapped in the disarmament/deterrence conundrum, Trudeau sought ways to understand and justify deterrence which made sense in the context of the imperative to pursue disarmament. In defending cruise missile testing in Canada, for example, he quoted the Pope’s message to the UNSSOD the previous year, noting that the Pope had

\footnote{147} UNGA, “A/S-12/PV.18,” 28.\footnote{148} Ibid., 36.
said that, ‘In current conditions...deterrence based on balance, certainly not as an end in itself, but as a step toward a progressive disarmament, may still be judged morally acceptable.’

Trudeau’s comment regarding a ‘power that, by common consent, is unusable’ points to a second contradiction that nuclear allies such as Canada are required to deal with, or more commonly, simply ignore. NATO nuclear deterrence strategy is premised on an explicit willingness to use nuclear weapons, and NATO claims that this willingness increases allied and international security. In this context, a key immediate objective of the peace initiative—preventing nuclear war—ran directly counter to the logic embedded in alliance norms to which Trudeau’s officials and political colleagues, both at home and abroad, necessarily subscribed. Of course, no one actually wanted a nuclear war. As highlighted in the introduction chapter, however, this creates inevitable doubts about nuclear threat credibility: ‘NATO was trying to threaten a nuclear war which NATO itself had to fear as much as the Soviet Union; how, then, could NATO credibly threaten to resort to nuclear use?'

Trudeau’s willingness to address these questions in public was, in the midst of a controversial initiative, the thing that caused the greatest controversy among Canadian and allied officials and leaders. It is argued here that the resistance of NATO allies to discussing the disarmament/deterrence conundrum publicly is based on two factors. The first of these is the institutionalisation of nuclear deterrence norms in bureaucratic and political structures. This institutionalisation has a strong socialising effect on the individuals operating within those structures, potentially leading through iterative practice to the internalisation of nuclear deterrence norms. Secondly, governing elites do not want to address the disarmament/deterrence conundrum because it generates intense psychological discomfort. In this regard, the Trudeau peace initiative epitomises the human-level psychological challenge confronting policymakers as they grapple with a conundrum that has characterised international politics in the nuclear age.

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150 The 1991 Strategic Concept, for example, notes that allied nuclear weapons ‘will continue to fulfil an essential role by ensuring uncertainty in the mind of any aggressor about the nature of the Allies’ response to military aggression.’ NATO, “The Alliance’s New Strategic Concept”, para. 54.
153 For a deterrence-based perspective on the destabilising nature of ‘devaluation’ of nuclear weapons, see, Schulte, “The Strategic Risks of Devaluing Nuclear Weapons.” For a counterpoint, see, Ken Berry et al.,
A third point of theoretical interest here relates to the notions of human agency, and in particular, its importance in the causal chain.\textsuperscript{154} Canadian politicians have always had to contend with the contradicting policy demands of the disarmament/deterrence conundrum. The number of instances in which this conundrum has openly been addressed, however, are few. The fact that Trudeau was willing to question the logic of nuclear deterrence speaks to his personal status as a former intellectual with a sharp analytical and questioning mind. Arguably, it also speaks to the level of personal psychological stress he was already experiencing, as described above. In theoretical terms, Trudeau was a norm entrepreneur who sought to alter the prevailing norms of practice, but ran into strong opposition due to institutionalised pro-nuclear norms. In terms of predicting when and why such norm entrepreneurs may arise, these questions would move constructivist theory towards broader sociological questions about the conditions under which individuals come to hold the specific views they do, and come to attain positions of authority. While much theorisation remains to be done in this regard, it lies outside the scope of this thesis.\textsuperscript{155}

Instead, what this thesis does is to point to psychological mechanisms through which institutionalised norms affect views of national identity in the bureaucracy and public in particular.\textsuperscript{156} For officials, the norms that constitute national identity are practised daily, and the institutionalised, iterative practice of security-related norms informs officials’ views of national identity over time. Conversely, for the public, stories of national struggles and heroes are important, as the content and practice of these stories, by retelling and reaffirming them, is the social fabric that is woven into the cloth of national identity. The latter dynamic may actually affect all three segments of society, but is arguably most relevant in relation to the public.

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\textit{Delegitimizing Nuclear Weapons: Examining the Validity of Nuclear Deterrence} (Monterey: Center for Nonproliferation Studies, 2010), 11–12.

\textsuperscript{154} Müller, “Agency Is Central.”

\textsuperscript{155} Vincent Pouliot’s ‘practice theory’ provides a convincing explanation for policy continuity or incremental change on the basis of elite actors’ implicit ‘know-how’ about how best to advance the national interest. However, it is not clear how this theory would cope with the opposite: embedded knowledge being openly challenged by rival knowledge claims, as is the case with Trudeau and NATO nuclear strategy. As will be seen in chapter seven, practice theory also does not reflect the experience of New Zealand policymakers and officials who were forced to change their behaviour in response to the demands of norm entrepreneurs promoting a different vision for New Zealand national identity and security policy. See, Vincent Pouliot, \textit{International Security in Practice: The Politics of NATO-Russia Diplomacy} (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2010), ch. 2.

\textsuperscript{156} As will be seen in the following chapter, the persuasion mechanisms that function at the bureaucratic level do not seem to hold true to the same degree for political elites.
In this latter regard, the Trudeau peace initiative has significance in terms of its high-profile reinforcement of a view of national identity that is popular among the Canadian public—that of Canada the independent-minded, pro-disarmament peacemaker. 85 percent of Canadians supported the initiative, and Donaghy writes, ‘in acting for peace against long odds, Trudeau both reflected and reinforced the highest aspirations of Canadians for their foreign policy.’ In parallel to this strong public support, the opposition political parties publicly endorsed the peace initiative:

All political parties joined in supporting the central objective of the peace initiative, thereby giving it an essentially nonpartisan basis. The two opposition parties shared Trudeau’s aim to promote a more stable international security environment. Given the broad public endorsement, the Progressive Conservatives and the New Democratic Party (NDP) would have courted dissent from within their own ranks if they had adopted a hostile stand towards the initiative.

Public pride regarding the peace initiative would arguably have been increased by the awarding of the Einstein Peace Prize to Trudeau in 1984 for his effort. As will be seen in chapter eight, public support for a peace-making, pro-disarmament Canadian identity was again highlighted by a key norm entrepreneur in the 1990s, to legitimate further disarmament advocacy.

Finally in terms of the key analytical concepts that inform the causal arguments in this thesis, the international normative environment had a very limited influence on the peace initiative. Trudeau writes that he grew concerned as the 1970s progressed that the international community was failing to build on the precedents set by the PTBT and NPT. In this regard, it is noteworthy that the international normative context provided no legal precedent to which Trudeau could link his advocacy of a change to NATO policy. Although the NPT contains a multilateral nuclear disarmament obligation, neither in customary nor treaty law is there any explicit, comprehensive prohibition on the threat or use of nuclear weapons—a point highlighted subsequently by the ICJ in its 1996 Advisory Opinion on the legal status of nuclear weapons. In the absence of an explicit legal prohibition on the threat or use of nuclear weapons, nuclear deterrence remains the dominant descriptive norm, or international practice, related to nuclear weapons.

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160 Head and Trudeau, The Canadian Way, 294.
162 On the different types of norms, see, Rublee, Nonproliferation Norms, 40–43.
This final observation points to a counterfactual that serves as a hypothesis arising from this case. Officials and colleagues opposed Trudeau’s desire to review NATO strategy; from a constructivist perspective, this was due to these people’s habituation to nuclear deterrence norms which were entrenched in practice and codified in writing. Arguably, the presence of an international legal norm condemning the threat or use of nuclear weapons would have strengthened Trudeau’s willingness to more persistently pursue the issue of NATO strategy. In this regard, for example, the previous chapter demonstrated that the existence of international anti-nuclear weapon norms in the form of the NPT, the PTBT, and regional NWFZ which also banned nuclear testing increased the willingness of New Zealand politicians to strongly advocate an end to nuclear testing. The political dynamics of these two situations are, of course, quite distinct, but the underlying principle is the same, and constitutes a hypothesis worthy of further consideration.
The obligation to eliminate nuclear weapons,
1995-2000

Even if it may not yet be possible to say that, in every circumstance, international law proscribes the threat or use of nuclear weapons, there can be little doubt that the law has been moving in that direction. In New Zealand’s view, the sooner that point is reached, through the progressive development of international law, including the negotiating process, the more secure the international community will be.

— New Zealand statement to the ICJ, 1995

Introduction

Between 1994 and 2000, New Zealand pursued several high-profile nuclear disarmament initiatives, often strongly opposed by its former allies and other nuclear weapon states. In 1994, New Zealand was the only Western-aligned country to vote in favour of a UNGA resolution brought about by a civil society campaign—the World Court Project (WCP)—requesting an advisory opinion from the ICJ on the legal status of nuclear weapons. In the resulting ICJ hearings, New Zealand argued in favour of outlawing nuclear deterrence and stated that international law was moving in that direction. Among other things, the Court found unanimously that there is a legal obligation to achieve complete nuclear disarmament. New Zealand then linked this normative precedent to more progressive disarmament objectives, advocating strongly for the elimination of nuclear

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weapons. In 1995, New Zealand also undertook a range of high-profile unilateral and multilateral protests to oppose renewed French nuclear testing in the South Pacific. In the late 1990s, initially by itself and later, in collaboration with its New Agenda Coalition (NAC) partners, New Zealand sought and elicited ‘an unequivocal undertaking by the nuclear-weapon States to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals.’ Strikingly, most of this nuclear disarmament advocacy occurred under a government led by the conservative National Party, which until a few years prior had been a strong critic of the country’s nuclear free policy and law.

This chapter demonstrates that a central driver for New Zealand’s nuclear disarmament advocacy in the 1990s was an internalised anti-nuclear weapon identity in the New Zealand public—termed here a ‘New Zealand nuclear taboo.’ The activation of this identity by norm entrepreneurs, who linked it to new disarmament objectives, drove proactive nuclear disarmament advocacy by the New Zealand government. Initially, this advocacy was caused by largely instrumental dynamics. Later in the decade, however, the increasing levels of persuasion about anti-nuclear weapon norms among officials and arguably, the prime minister, led to strong, universalistic advocacy based on genuine commitment to the national security value of pursuing nuclear disarmament.

National identities

Political elites

The National Party adopted a nuclear free policy in 1990 due to overwhelming public support for the policy, and won the general election the same year. Senior National MPs, however, such as the Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Don McKinnon, still strongly supported a return to US alliance, including by amending or repealing the nuclear free law if necessary. Generational change was altering the dynamics within the party caucus, however. There had been a large influx of young National Party MPs in the 1990 election, many of whom had become politically active during the

4 For details around the policy reversal, see chapter four, ‘Internalisation of an anti-nuclear identity.’
1980s and thus either genuinely supported the nuclear free policy, or did not share the views of the party leadership about US alliance as an essential security guarantor.6

In late September and early October 1991 respectively, President George H. W. Bush and the Soviet leader, Mikhail Gorbachev, announced significant unilateral reductions in the numbers and deployments of their countries’ strategic and tactical nuclear arsenals.7 Most importantly from the perspective of the New Zealand government, President Bush announced that all tactical nuclear weapons would be removed from surface vessels ‘under normal circumstances.’8 Senior New Zealand government members now saw the country’s ban on nuclear propulsion as the only obstacle to the resumption of ANZUS ties.9 The government established a Special Committee on Nuclear Propulsion in early 1992 to study the issue, and National’s hopes were further buoyed when Bush stated in July that removal of nuclear weapons from surface ships seemed to ‘clear the way for resolutions of differences we’ve had with some countries, but that’s up to them to decide… I’m thinking of New Zealand.’10 In fact, this was not a credible position. The US neither confirm nor deny policy remained in place, and is incompatible with the legal obligation of the New Zealand prime minister to affirm in writing his belief that any visiting warship is not carrying nuclear weapons.11 Moreover, President Bush’s ‘under normal circumstances’ caveat provided no guarantee that nuclear weapons would not be redeployed on vessels during times of heightened international tension. In December 1992, the Special Committee on Nuclear Propulsion reported that the radiation risk to New Zealand from US or UK nuclear powered naval vessels was ‘so remote that it cannot give rise to any rational apprehension.’12 Despite this conclusion and the public overture from President Bush, the National government shelved the Committee’s report and did not seek to

6 NZPA, “Muldoon ‘Ashamed’ to Be in the Caucus”; Don McKinnon, “Private Interview” (Auckland, August 12, 2015).
11 NZHR, New Zealand Nuclear Free Zone Act, section 9(2).
12 Special Committee on Nuclear Propulsion, “The Safety of Nuclear Powered Ships,” vi.
change the nuclear free law. McKinnon acknowledges that overwhelming public support for nuclear freedom made such an option impossible.

In addition, the international reputational benefits of nuclear freedom, and recognition that the policy had not caused economic problems, contributed to the decision not to try to change the law. In late 1992, New Zealand was elected by secret ballot to the UN Security Council for the 1993-1994 term. This was in large part thanks to voting support from non-aligned countries, who admired the stance New Zealand had taken with its nuclear free policy, seeing it as principled and independent.

Meanwhile, the Reagan Administration had made clear that it would not retaliate to the nuclear free policy economically, and New Zealand exports to the United States almost doubled between 1984 and 1991. Patman and Hall argue that the conservative government concluded in 1993 that ‘the political disadvantages of amending New Zealand's non-nuclear legislation for the sake of improving relations with the US outweighed problems associated with retention of the status quo.’

In other words, it was an instrumental decision, not an expression of genuine commitment to anti-nuclear weapon norms.

Officials

An important piece of background regarding the dominant national identity among officials in the mid-1990s comes from the immediately preceding period. In the late 1980s, an internalised identity among most officials unquestioningly saw great power alliance as a primary national security interest. As Lange noted, some senior officials believed the country’s nuclear free policy was the worst ever foreign policy mistake the country had made, due to the severance of the US alliance.

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14 McKinnon, “Private Interview.”
16 Statistics New Zealand, “NZ Trade Data.”
17 Patman and Hall, “New Zealand-US Relations in a Globalising World: Moving Together or Moving Apart?,” 120.
At the UNGA, officials continued to vote along Cold War alliance lines, rather than supporting resolutions calling for specific disarmament-related measures such as no first use. Dewes [then Boanas-Dewes] writes that New Zealand officials were concerned not to question nuclear deterrence theory directly; they told members of PACDAC—the public advisory committee created by the Nuclear Free Zone Act—that for New Zealand to support particular resolutions, ‘the wording needs changing so as not to directly confront the policies of our Western allies.’ Lange later confirmed that despite PACDAC’s legal mandate to advise the prime minister on such matters, officials had never passed on to him PACDAC briefing papers and recommendations regarding changing New Zealand’s UN voting behaviour. Similarly, foreign affairs officials repeatedly included positive references to nuclear deterrence in speeches written for Foreign Minister Russell Marshall. At the CD in 1988, for example, Marshall read a speech provided by officials which affirmed an important role for nuclear deterrence in ensuring international security, much to the frustration of the prime minister, who forced him to recant publicly.

In the early 1990s, this perspective was still very much the mainstream among officials. McKinnon reports that when he became foreign minister in 1990, a strong majority of foreign affairs officials working on international security issues were either somewhat or very antagonistic to the policy. Over the course of the 1990s, however, bipartisan political support for nuclear freedom—even if instrumentally-driven in the National Party—introduced new institutional dynamics that forced officials to reconsider their positions. These dynamics are described in the main section of the

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20 Boanas-Dewes, “Participatory Democracy,” 83.

21 Ibid. The practice of alliance-based voting was halted by 1989, as a result of civil society monitoring and lobbying from such groups as the New Zealand branches of Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom; the United Nations Association; the National Consultative Committee on Disarmament; International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War; and PACDAC. Kate Dewes, “Peace and Disarmament Activism,” in *Public Participation in Foreign Policy*, ed. James Headley, Joe Burton, and Andrew Butcher (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012), 113; Wilkes, “How Good, or How Bad,” 12.

22 Dewes, “The World Court Project,” 158.


24 Lange, *Nuclear Free*, 183–188.

25 McKinnon, “Private Interview.”
chapter, and appear to have resulted by the late 1990s in an increasingly genuine commitment among foreign affairs officials to nuclear disarmament norms and identities. In this later period, officials developed much closer working relationships with civil society disarmament experts, and showed a much greater willingness to oppose nuclear weapons in principle, regardless of the reaction from New Zealand’s traditional allies.

Public

By the late 1980s, the dominant national identity in the New Zealand public was defined by opposition to nuclear weapons. A broad-based, anti-nuclear public constituency was made up of ordinary New Zealanders who ‘had had enough of Reaganite/Brezhnevite Cold War strategies and attitudes.’ A national opinion poll taken in September 1987—three months after the passage of the nuclear free zone law, and more than a year after the US alliance had been severed as a result of the nuclear free policy—found 76% support for the ban on nuclear weapons.

Over several decades, the peace movement had consistently framed New Zealand’s opposition to nuclear testing in the Pacific not just as a strategic choice, but also as one that exemplified a moral strand to the nation’s policies. This story contained both national heroes, such as Prime Minister Kirk and the civil society activists that sailed to Mururoa to protest, and what was proudly perceived as a foreign policy victory: the end of French atmospheric nuclear testing. Chapter four demonstrated that when political upheaval created space for a fundamental reconsideration of national identity, a new mainstream of public opinion was formed, in which New Zealand could contribute to international peace and lessen the likelihood of nuclear war by rejecting nuclear weapons.

By the early 1990s, the Nuclear Free Zone Act had become ‘virtually sacrosanct’ for the majority of the New Zealand public, and since then, ‘antipathy to all things nuclear has become deeply

26 Norrish, “Merwyn Norrish,” 141. See also, Newnham, Peace Squadron: The Sharp End of Nuclear Protest in New Zealand, 55.
29 Clements, “New Zealand’s Role,” 399–400. See also chapter 5 of Clements, Back from the Brink.
embedded in [the New Zealand public’s] collective psyche.” In his dealings with US representatives, for example, Foreign Minister McKinnon (1990–1999) often compared the passion of the New Zealand public for nuclear freedom to the attachment of some US citizens to their constitutional right to bear arms. New Zealand’s ambassador for disarmament, Clive Pearson, told the UNGA First Committee in October 1999, ‘New Zealanders care deeply about the need for nuclear disarmament and the imperative of pushing the agenda forward.’ In effect, an anti-nuclear weapon norm had been internalised in the public; as discussed in chapter two, this does not imply unanimity of support for the related vision of national identity. However, the support was sufficiently uniform that it created an overwhelmingly clear political mandate for particular policy options supportive of nuclear disarmament. This point was reflected in public opinion polling published in 1995, which showed 76 percent support for New Zealand endorsing the World Court Project—a civil society action that aimed to challenge the legality of nuclear weapons, discussed in more detail below—and 80 percent support in general terms for the New Zealand government actively promoting nuclear disarmament. As per constructivist expectations, anti-nuclear norm internalisation led public attention and debate over nuclear issues to drop away quickly in the early 1990s, as pro-disarmament policy preferences became taken for granted. This diminishing attention to nuclear issues was also facilitated by contextual factors such as the end of the Cold War and a range of new collaborative security initiatives between the superpowers, which reduced nuclear threat perceptions.

31 Templeton, *Standing Upright Here*, 511; Young, “Lange Offered to Quit over ANZUS.”
32 McKinnon, “Private Interview.”
35 On norm internalisation, see, Finnemore and Sikkink, “International Norm Dynamics,” 904.
Nuclear disarmament advocacy

Advocating the illegality of nuclear weapons

Domestic nuclear weapons-related civil society activity was waning in New Zealand by the early 1990s, for reasons already discussed. One initiative, however, maintained a relatively high profile and was able to activate internalised public anti-nuclear sentiment and consequently, to influence New Zealand policy significantly in this period. The WCP was initiated in New Zealand in 1986 by a retired district court judge, Harold Evans, and led to a significant extent by New Zealanders; it aimed to have an authorised international body request an ICJ advisory opinion on the legal status of nuclear weapons. The Project had its international launch in 1992, supported by three main co-sponsoring organisations: the International Association of Lawyers against Nuclear Arms, International Peace Bureau and International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War—the latter two being Nobel Peace Prize laureates. In December 1994, the WCP realised its first major objective when the UNGA adopted resolution 49/75K, calling for the ICJ to give an advisory opinion on the question, Is the threat or use of nuclear weapons in any circumstance permitted under international law? New Zealand was the only Western-aligned country to vote in favour of the resolution.

At the UNGA the previous year, the Western nuclear weapon states—that is, New Zealand’s traditional allies—had prevented a vote on a similar resolution by threatening trade and aid

39 For detailed histories of the Project, see, Dewes and Green, “The World Court Project”; Dewes, “The World Court Project.”
40 UNGA, “Request for an Advisory Opinion from the International Court of Justice on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons (A/RES/49/75K)” (New York, December 15, 1994). The WCP also elicited a World Health Organisation request for such an advisory opinion, but the ICJ declined to respond on technical legal grounds. See, Dewes, “The World Court Project”, ch. 9 and pp. 330-334.
relationships with NAM states. The Canadian disarmament ambassador described the behaviour of the Western nuclear powers as ‘hysterical’, while the Swedish disarmament ambassador stated, ‘During my 20 years’ experience as a UN delegate, I have never seen such supreme power politics openly being used as during the Fall of 1993.’ The Western powers again fiercely opposed resolution 49/75K in 1994, as did all European Union (EU) members apart from Ireland. In other words, there was no external pressure for New Zealand to support the WCP resolution based on violation of international norms, and the significant ‘others’ who had traditionally shaped New Zealand thinking on nuclear issues were deeply opposed to the initiative.

New Zealand’s support for resolution 49/75K came despite earlier hesitancy from both major parties to support the WCP. In early 1994, the National government was still uncommitted to the idea. However, intense pressure from the peace movement, public opinion, and sympathetic National and Labour MPs appears to have shifted the government’s position. In March 1994, for example, eight National MPs issued a joint statement declaring their support for the WCP. Similarly, 32,000 New Zealanders signed ‘Declarations of Public Conscience’ condemning nuclear weapons in support of the WCP in the early 1990s. Dewes argues that strong public support, along with ‘the untiring efforts of a few individuals who devoted much of their time to this initiative for nearly a decade’ led to New Zealand’s vote in support of resolution 49/75K. The government’s statement to the ICJ lends credibility to this argument, with the New Zealand attorney-general explicitly acknowledging the hard work and ‘major role’ that civil society, especially from New Zealand, played in bringing the issue to the Court.

42 See, for example, the comments of the Swedish and Canadian Ambassadors for Disarmament about the extreme nature of coercion used, in Dewes and Green, “The World Court Project,” 66; Mark Schapiro, “Mutiny on the Nuclear Bounty,” The Nation 257, no. 22 (December 27, 1993): 798. For detailed discussion, see Dewes, “The World Court Project” Chapter 11.


44 Dewes, “The World Court Project”, ch. 8 and 11. For more on EU states’ positions, see the French and German statements in UNGA, “A/49/PV.90,” 25–27.

45 Dewes and Green, “The World Court Project,” 63; Dewes, “The World Court Project”, ch. 7.


47 Dewes and Green, “The World Court Project,” 67.

48 Ibid. See also, Leadbeater, Peace, Power & Politics, 260.

49 Dewes and Green, “The World Court Project,” 67. For more detail, see, Dewes, “The World Court Project,” 261–262.

50 Ibid., 105.

Don McKinnon, the National MP who had most staunchly opposed the party’s adoption of the nuclear free policy due to its impact on ANZUS, was now New Zealand foreign minister and deputy prime minister. After National’s leadership conceded in 1993 that it would be impossible to change the nuclear free law, McKinnon actively tried to shift focus away from nuclear issues. Nevertheless, he was regularly asked in public for confirmation that the nuclear free policy would not be changed; moreover, since National had adopted a policy that rejected nuclear deterrence, he felt an obligation to represent the policy as a matter of political credibility.

These observations have strong echoes of a consistency effect, facilitated by domestic nuclear disarmament advocates. That is, having adopted a nuclear free policy for instrumental reasons while framing the decision as a genuine response to a changed international situation, the government became rhetorically entrapped. The strength of the New Zealand nuclear taboo made it possible for civil society and political norm entrepreneurs to generate significant political pressure by highlighting the government’s prior normative commitments and linking them to support for the WCP. It was on this basis that the government became the only official Western supporter of a civil society initiative designed to challenge the legality of nuclear deterrence.

In the ICJ hearings following the passage of resolution 49/75K, WCP activists worked hard to ensure as many countries as possible made strong arguments to the Court in favour of the illegality of nuclear weapons. This included, for example, consulting with and advising many of the governmental legal teams; delivering almost four million ‘Declarations of Public Conscience’ to the Court from individual citizens around the world asserting the inhumane, illegal nature of nuclear weapons; and successfully advocating for the first time ever for the Court to hear evidence from ‘citizen witnesses’ who had personally suffered the effects of nuclear weapons.

In its submission to the ICJ, New Zealand stopped short of declaring nuclear deterrence illegal, but argued that the legal/normative trend was moving in that direction. It stated that nuclear weapons reduce international security and concluded unambiguously, ‘the answer to the question put to the Court should be no; the threat or use of nuclear weapons should no longer be permitted under

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52 McKinnon, “Private Interview.”
53 Ibid.
54 On the creation and significance of these public declarations, as well as their influence in the New Zealand context, see, New Zealand, “Note Verbale,” 15, para. 65; Dewes, “The World Court Project,” 246–248, 260–263, 381.
55 For a summary analysis of the World Court Project, see Dewes and Green, “The World Court Project.”
international law. New Zealand also argued that the laws of war, known as international humanitarian law, apply to the threat or use of nuclear weapons, just as to any weapon.

On 8 July 1996, the ICJ delivered its Advisory Opinion, *Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons*. The most significant aspect of the Opinion—in terms of understanding subsequent nuclear disarmament advocacy by both New Zealand and Canada—was the Court’s unanimous conclusion that ‘there exists an obligation to pursue in good faith and bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective international control.’ The normative significance of this affirmation lies in its assertion of an obligation to achieve, as opposed to merely pursue, multilateral nuclear disarmament. In a second key aspect of the Opinion that would later inform Canadian and New Zealand policy, the Court found unanimously that any threat or use of nuclear weapons must respect international humanitarian law, and in a split vote, that ‘a threat or use of nuclear weapons would generally be contrary to the rules of international law applicable in armed conflict, and in particular the principles and rules of humanitarian law.’

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56 New Zealand, “Note Verbale,” 23–24, paras 100-101; ICJ, “CR 95/28,” 19. Australian Foreign Minister Gareth Evans went even further, declaring that the use, threat of use, acquisition, development, testing and possession of nuclear weapons are illegal, since ‘nuclear weapons are by their nature illegal under customary international law.’ He also argued that ‘all States are under an obligation to take positive action to eliminate completely nuclear weapons.’ See, ICJ, “Public Sitting (CR 95/22),” October 30, 1995, 36, https://web.archive.org/web/20150729052345/http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/95/5925.pdf.


58 ICJ, “Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons.”

59 Ibid., 267, para. 105 (2)(F).


61 ICJ, “Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons,” 266, para. 105 (2)(E). One judge died immediately prior to the hearings, leaving an even number of judges. Voting on the incompatibility of the threat or use of nuclear weapons with international humanitarian law was split 7-7, with the President’s vote deciding the matter. However, it is worth noting that three out of the seven judges who opposed the finding that the threat or use of nuclear weapons is ‘generally’ illegal did so not because they felt that this finding went too far in legal terms, but rather, because it didn’t go far enough. These three judges believed the threat or use of nuclear weapons is illegal in *any and all* circumstances. Thus, on this point, the Court was effectively split 10-4 in favour of illegality. ICJ, “Dissenting Opinion of Judge Shahabuddeen,” 1996, 376, 378, 426–427; ICJ, “Dissenting Opinion of Judge Weeramantry,” 1996, 433; ICJ, “Dissenting Opinion of Judge Koroma,” 1996, 556.
began linking these findings to their policy claims.\textsuperscript{62} This demonstrates how such international legal/normative precedents increase the perceived legitimacy of related policy preferences, increasing the likelihood of nuclear disarmament advocacy by the New Zealand government, as will be seen below.

**Opposing French nuclear testing**

Concurrently with these WCP/ICJ developments, several nuclear weapons-related events were unfolding internationally. In mid-May 1995, NPT members unanimously agreed to the indefinite extension of the Treaty\textsuperscript{63}—an option that New Zealand supported. NPT extension was predicated in part on the basis of a consensus decision that ‘Pending the entry into force of a Comprehensive Test-Ban Treaty, the nuclear-weapon States should exercise utmost restraint’ with regard to nuclear testing.\textsuperscript{64} Three days after the close of the Review and Extension Conference, China began a new series of underground nuclear tests. Many governments around the world, including New Zealand, condemned this action.\textsuperscript{65}

French President Jacques Chirac then announced on 13 June 1995 that France would also conduct a new series of underground tests in the South Pacific.\textsuperscript{66} Unlike China, which had been conducting tests until six months prior to the NPT extension, France had halted nuclear testing several years before; its announcement of new tests thus provoked ‘an immediate barrage of protest across the world,’\textsuperscript{67} including in New Zealand.\textsuperscript{68} In fact, this was the only nuclear issue other than the WCP that

\textsuperscript{62} See, for example, Alyn Ware, “Clarification of Nuclear Law Hugely Significant,” *The New Zealand Herald*, September 4, 1996.


attracted significant New Zealand public attention in the 1990s. All New Zealand political parties united in condemning the French plans.\textsuperscript{69} Greenpeace collected seven million signatures globally calling for an end to nuclear testing.\textsuperscript{70}

In protest at the French decision, the New Zealand government cut New Zealand–France military links, excluding emergency and humanitarian cooperation.\textsuperscript{71} Officials, however, advised the government to avoid actions that would aggravate relations with France, fearing that France might impose trade sanctions against New Zealand, as had happened when two French spies were prosecuted in New Zealand for their involvement in the bombing of the \textit{Rainbow Warrior}.\textsuperscript{72} The government followed this advice; it avoided the ‘more drastic measures’ advocated by opposition MPs and protesters, such as boycotting French goods or suspending diplomatic relations with France.\textsuperscript{73} In late June, Foreign Minister McKinnon defended the actions that the government had taken to date and suggested that there were no plans for further unilateral New Zealand initiatives.\textsuperscript{74}

In identity terms, this demonstrates the degree to which both officials and the conservative government were pursuing anti-nuclear policies for instrumental reasons. That is, nuclear weapons policy was debated and weighed against other perceived interests, and in this case, economic interests trumped the desire among the wider public for strong nuclear disarmament advocacy.

Protesters and opposition MPs, however, were demanding greater action from the government. A poll in early July 1995—a month after France’s announcement—showed 81 percent support for stronger protest action and 86 percent support for direct protest action by the government.\textsuperscript{75} A broad-based public campaign produced public demonstrations, letters to the editor and opinion

\textsuperscript{72} Stephen Hoadley, \textit{New Zealand and France: Politics, Diplomacy and Dispute Management} (Wellington: New Zealand Institute of International Affairs, 2005), 108.
\textsuperscript{73} Ibid., 109.
pieces in newspapers; the media was also often supportive of anti-testing sentiment. Further protest activities included the Council of Trade Unions calling for a consumer boycott of France; major retail chains suspending trade in French goods; a delegation of 38 local body politicians, educators and activists travelling to France to coordinate protest with French anti-nuclear groups in September 1995; and a petition calling for an end to nuclear testing supported by 60,000 signatures, mainly collected in rural, conservative-voting constituencies. Several analysts have noted that this significant public advocacy forced a much stronger policy response from the government; Henderson, for example, notes that the government changed its position several times in less than two months.

Two points of theoretical interest deserve mention, and are elaborated on below. First, the timing of policy changes in 1995 suggests that one particular event with strong national identity resonance played a significant role in shifting government policy—the violent storming by French commandos of the Greenpeace ship *Rainbow Warrior II*. Secondly, the government’s expanded response to French testing in 1995 directly emulated several precedents set by the anti-nuclear protests of the Kirk government in the 1970s.

The Greenpeace ship *Rainbow Warrior II* had sailed to Mururoa to protest in 1995, with two New Zealanders on board. On 10 July—ten years to the day that the French government bombed the original *Rainbow Warrior* in Auckland Harbour—French commandos rammed the *Rainbow Warrior II*, lobbed tear gas into the ship’s bridge, and assaulted Greenpeace crew members with batons. Media coverage of the event inflamed already-high public anti-nuclear sentiment in New Zealand. Initially, Prime Minister Bolger resisted taking further action, saying on 11 July that there was ‘little more’ the government could do. Pressure continued to mount from public and political protests, however. Responding to public outrage, Bolger wrote an open letter to President Chirac on 14 July—

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81 Dewes and Green, “The World Court Project,” 69.
France’s national day. Bolger affirmed New Zealand’s ‘deep concern’ about the testing decision, which ‘runs directly counter to the world-wide trend away from the development and use of nuclear weapons’ and which he said risked undermining post-Cold War disarmament progress and disrupting CTBT negotiations.\(^83\) Bolger gave notice that he had also—as Kirk had in 1973—written to heads of government around the world that day, ‘to underline our concerns on this important issue.’\(^84\)

Both the prime minister and foreign minister had earlier resisted the idea—promoted by civil society and opposition MPs, who invoked the memory of the Kirk government’s action in June 1973—of sending a Navy vessel to Mururoa to protest.\(^85\) Shortly after the storming of the Rainbow Warrior II, however, the government changed tack. Bolger told Parliament on 18 July that the government was consulting with officials and civil society about which vessel would be most appropriate. He noted, for example, that Greenpeace preferred that the vessel be unarmed. At this point, Bolger stated that the Navy vessel would sail to Mururoa solely to ensure the safety of ‘individual New Zealanders who want to express their abhorrence at the thought of a return to nuclear testing in the Pacific.’\(^86\)

Over the coming weeks, however, the government’s justification for the dispatch of the Navy vessel also changed. On 2 August, Bolger told parliament that the cabinet had decided an unarmed Navy research vessel, HMNZS Tui, would sail to Mururoa ‘for the primary purpose of demonstrating that the New Zealand government—meaning both Parliament and the Executive—formally and unequivocally oppose the proposed nuclear test by France.’\(^87\) He noted the Tui would also offer emergency aid to civil society protest boats, 14 of which sailed from New Zealand in 1995.\(^88\) When the Tui departed on 10 August, the National and Labour parties each sent an MP with the ship,


\(^84\) A full copy of this letter to other heads of state was not found. Hoadley writes that it used ‘notably circumspect’ phrasing, ‘perhaps reflecting the advice of caution tendered by his officials.’ Hoadley, New Zealand and France, 112.


\(^86\) NZHR, “Questions for Oral Answer: Nuclear Testing - Protest.”


\(^88\) Leadbeater, Peace, Power & Politics, 267.
symbolising the bipartisan support for this direct protest, in contrast to 1973 when National had strongly opposed the government’s frigate protest and only Labour sent an MP with the *Otago*.99

On 8 August, the government also decided to revisit the ICJ *Nuclear Tests* case that New Zealand had taken against France in 1973–197490—the third initiative that emulated the Kirk government’s 1973 actions. The 1974 ICJ ruling held that New Zealand’s case was rendered moot by France’s public commitment to move testing underground, but that ‘if the basis of this Judgment were to be affected, the ‘Applicant could request an examination of the situation.’91 In 1995, the foreign ministry advised the New Zealand government against revisiting the case ‘on grounds of costs, likelihood of success, and time involved since no verdict could be expected before the tests ceased.’92 The prime minister and attorney-general both publicly acknowledged they had received legal advice against pursuing an ICJ case; both also reported that the two core considerations in deciding to return to the ICJ were lobbying from Greenpeace, and ministerial consultations with opposition parties.93 The significance of these specific points is discussed further in the theoretical implications section, below.

In terms of content, New Zealand’s 1995 ICJ case was based on new developments in environmental law and governance, and on new scientific evidence that pointed to the potential for dangerous radioactive contamination from underground nuclear testing; it was on these grounds that the New Zealand government believed the basis of the 1974 ruling had been affected, despite the fact that France had not renewed atmospheric testing.94 In the end, however, the ICJ refused New Zealand’s application on narrow technical grounds, without considering substantive arguments. The Court

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93 Thakur, “The Last Bang before a Total Ban: French Nuclear Testing in the Pacific,” 483. See also, East, “New Zealand’s Attempts to End Nuclear Testing at Mururoa Atoll through the World Court”, para. 11a.


ruled that the basis of its 1974 judgment was France’s commitment to end atmospheric testing and that only a resumption of such testing would justify revisiting the case.\(^95\)

In the second half of 1995, New Zealand also took several multilateral initiatives of the kind the country had pursued for many years under both Labour and National Party governments. This included drafting a UNGA resolution calling for an immediate end to French testing; sponsoring an anti-nuclear testing resolution at the October 1995 meeting of the Inter Parliamentary Union; cooperating with Australia to convince the ASEAN Regional Forum to issue a statement calling for an immediate end to testing;\(^96\) and attaching a protest note to the final communique of the 1995 CHOGM, hosted in Auckland.\(^97\)

In June 1996, New Zealand was invited to become a full member of the Conference on Disarmament (CD). New Zealand had participated on an ad-hoc basis in the work of the CD since at least 1983, and had formally requested full membership in 1988, under the Lange Labour government.\(^98\) Upon being granted CD membership, the government established the new post of ambassador for disarmament,\(^99\) with the inaugural ambassador, career diplomat Clive Pearson, serving in the role from 1997 to 2002.\(^100\) The ICJ Advisory Opinion was delivered a month after New Zealand gained CD membership; as with civil society advocates,\(^101\) the New Zealand government immediately began incorporating the content of the Advisory Opinion into its nuclear disarmament advocacy.

In early August 1996, for example, Prime Minister Bolger and South African President Nelson Mandela signed a Memorandum of Cooperation on Disarmament and Arms Control.\(^102\) South Africa


\(^{96}\) “Chairman’s Statement: The Second ASEAN Regional Forum” (Bandar Seri Begawan, Brunei Darussalam, August 1, 1995), 11, para. 11.4.

\(^{97}\) Hoadley, *New Zealand and France*, 112.


\(^{101}\) Ware, “Clarification of Nuclear Law Hugely Significant.”

\(^{102}\) New Zealand and South Africa, “Memorandum of Cooperation on Disarmament and Arms Control,” 1996.
had recently become the first country to disarm an indigenously developed nuclear arsenal.\textsuperscript{103} The New Zealand-South Africa Memorandum affirmed that the NPT created an obligation to eliminate nuclear weapons, and explicitly highlighted the findings of the ICJ Advisory Opinion in that regard. Speaking in Cape Town following the signing of the Memorandum, Bolger called on the nuclear weapon states to ‘unmistakably commit themselves to total nuclear disarmament.’\textsuperscript{104} A few days later, the Australian government-sponsored Canberra Commission on the Elimination of Nuclear Weapons—a panel of eminent international nuclear experts—released its Report.\textsuperscript{105} The Canberra Commission Report called on the NPT nuclear weapon states ‘to give the lead by committing themselves, unequivocally, to the elimination of all nuclear weapons’ and affirmed that the ICJ’s finding of an obligation to achieve total nuclear disarmament ‘is precisely the obligation that the Commission wishes to see implemented.’\textsuperscript{106} At the UNGA in 1996, New Zealand voted for a Costa Rican resolution following up on the ICJ Opinion, which called for negotiations to begin the following year to implement the obligation to disarm.\textsuperscript{107}

In April 1997, a New Zealand working paper to the NPT Preparatory Committee repeated language reminiscent of Bolger’s Cape Town speech and the Canberra Commission’s report. The working paper called for the NPT nuclear weapon states to ‘declare unequivocally their commitment to the elimination of nuclear weapons and agree to start immediately on the practical first steps and negotiations required for its achievement.’\textsuperscript{108} Both New Zealand and South African diplomats, along

\textsuperscript{103} Burgess and Kassenova, “The Rollback States.”


\textsuperscript{105} Commissioners included, for example, a former French prime minister, US secretary of defence and Brazilian foreign minister, and former disarmament ambassadors from Australia, Japan and Sweden, as well as high-ranking former military nuclear specialists. Canberra Commission, Report, 110–114.

\textsuperscript{106} Ibid., 17, 15. With a change of leadership in Canberra, however, the new Australian government—formed by the Liberal Party, which is actually more akin to a conservative party in traditional terms—preferred not to promote disarmament policies that might alienate its nuclear allies. Ramesh Thakur, “Defence by Other Means: Australia’s Arms Control and Disarmament Policy,” in Handbook of Global International Policy (New York: Marcel Dekker, 2000), 159–160.


\textsuperscript{108} New Zealand, “Proposed Elements for Inclusion in the Report of the Preparatory Committee on Its First Session (NPT/CONF.2000/PC.I/3),” paper presented to the NPT Preparatory Committee (New York, 10 April 1997), 1–2, para. 4(c), http://disarmament.un.org/wmd/npt/2000-PCI-docs/npt-conf2000-pci-3.pdf. Since New Zealand was proposing this language for inclusion in an NPT document, this call did not include the nuclear armed states which are not members of the NPT—India, Israel and Pakistan.
with colleagues from Ireland, were involved in the preliminary discussions that led to the creation of the NAC the following year.\textsuperscript{109} As will be seen below, a primary objective for the NAC in the late 1990s was to elicit from the nuclear weapon states precisely the unequivocal commitment to the elimination of nuclear weapons that New Zealand called for in its 1997 NPT working paper. From 1997 onward, New Zealand also supported an annual UNGA resolution calling for all states to immediately commence negotiations for a comprehensive nuclear weapons convention to prohibit and eliminate nuclear weapons.\textsuperscript{110}

**A new agenda for the elimination of nuclear weapons**

The NAC is a group of like-minded countries established on an Irish initiative and designed ‘to inject fresh momentum and thinking into the nuclear disarmament process.’\textsuperscript{111} It was launched in Dublin in June 1998, with a joint foreign ministers’ declaration entitled, ‘Towards a nuclear-weapon-free world: the need for a new agenda.’\textsuperscript{112} Planning for the NAC began prior to the ‘disarray’ at the 1998 NPT Preparatory Committee and the Indian and Pakistani nuclear tests, but these factors added further urgency to calls for disarmament.\textsuperscript{113} Foreign Minister McKinnon called the Indian and Pakistani tests a ‘gross insult’ and recalled the New Zealand high commissioner from New Delhi.\textsuperscript{114} At the 1998 UNGA, Australia, Canada and New Zealand co-sponsored a resolution condemning the tests and calling for India and Pakistan to join the CTBT.\textsuperscript{115}

The NAC was conceived as a bridge-building group, aiming to facilitate consensus across the deep ideological and political divides defined by groups such as the NAM, NATO, and the Western

\textsuperscript{111} Phil Goff, “Address to the UNESCO Culture of Peace Network,” New Zealand Foreign Affairs and Trade Record 8, no. 9 (2000): 6–7. See also, NAC, “A/53/138,” 2; Hanson, “The Advocacy States,” 73.
\textsuperscript{112} NAC, “A/53/138.”
\textsuperscript{114} Don McKinnon, “Government Recalls New Zealand High Commissioner to India,” New Zealand Foreign Affairs and Trade Record 6, no. 11 (1998): 28.
European and Others.\textsuperscript{116} The Coalition therefore deliberately brought together a set of countries broadly representative of the world in terms of geography, political alignment and developmental status, and with a history of strong disarmament advocacy; the European Parliament acknowledged the value of this approach in November 1998.\textsuperscript{117} Initially, the NAC comprised Brazil, Egypt, Ireland, Mexico, New Zealand, Slovenia, South Africa and Sweden, though Slovenia and Sweden withdrew in 1998 and 2013 respectively. Given the discussion in the preceding chapter of the disarmament/deterrence conundrum facing nuclear alliance members, it is worth noting that these decisions to leave the NAC—and thus, to end the association with the group’s nuclear disarmament advocacy—were driven by the Slovenian government’s desire to join NATO, and a new Swedish government’s desire to improve political and security ties with the Alliance.\textsuperscript{118}

The 1998 NAC ministerial declaration explicitly drew normative precedence in legal terms from the ICJ Advisory Opinion, and in political terms from the Canberra Commission Report.\textsuperscript{119} The declaration highlighted, for example, the ICJ finding of an obligation to achieve complete nuclear disarmament and the Canberra Commission’s statement that ‘The only complete defence is the elimination of nuclear weapons and assurance that they will never be produced again.’\textsuperscript{120} The declaration also called on the governments of all eight nuclear armed states to commit themselves ‘unequivocally to the elimination of their respective nuclear weapons and nuclear weapons capability and to agree to start work immediately on the practical steps and negotiations required for its achievement.’\textsuperscript{121} The significance of this objective was that, despite aspirational rhetoric in this direction, the nuclear states had never explicitly committed themselves to the elimination of nuclear weapons.

\textsuperscript{116} Barnes, “Middle Powers as Norm Entrepreneurs,” 24.


\textsuperscript{119} Another nuclear disarmament-related international initiative in this period was the Japanese Government’s Tokyo Forum, established in August 1998, and reporting in August 1999. However, this did not affect the genesis of the NAC or its diplomatic initiatives. See, Hanson, “Advocating the Elimination of Nuclear Weapons,” 60–61.

\textsuperscript{120} NAC, “A/53/138,” 2; Canberra Commission, Report, 7.

\textsuperscript{121} NAC, “A/53/138,” 2.
The NAC immediately received strong civil society support. The Middle Powers Initiative (MPI), for example, was a civil society project that aimed to facilitate cooperation between civil society nuclear disarmament experts and like-minded governments.\(^{122}\) MPI incorporated organisations and individuals that had led the WCP, including several New Zealand experts, thus benefitting from existing civil society ties with pro-disarmament governments.\(^{123}\) Between July 1998 and November 2000, MPI delegations made 24 visits to the capitals or UN Missions of Western aligned or NATO states, promoting NAC policies among politicians, officials and the public.\(^{124}\) The credibility and high public profile of the initiative were assisted by the participation of North American political and military experts, such as former Canadian Senator and Ambassador for Disarmament Doug Roche; ex-US President Jimmy Carter; ex-US Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara; former head of US Strategic (nuclear) Command General Lee Butler; and UN Ambassador for Peace Michael Douglas.

Beginning in late 1998, the NAC sponsored a series of annual UNGA resolutions that received strong support, with co-sponsors growing in number from 34 in 1998 to 60 in 1999, and 65 in 2000.\(^{125}\) The 1998 resolution repeated the call for an unequivocal commitment from the nuclear weapon states to eliminate nuclear weapons and reaffirmed the obligation arising from NPT Article VI to achieve complete nuclear disarmament.\(^{126}\) The Western nuclear armed states—especially France and the United States—lobbied intensively for all countries, but particularly NATO allies, to oppose the 1998 NAC resolution.\(^{127}\) In contrast, the European Parliament passed a resolution in November 1998 calling for all EU states—the majority of which are also NATO members—to vote for the NAC resolution, and calling for states that opposed the resolution to explain why.\(^{128}\) Despite intense pressure from their nuclear armed allies, non-nuclear NATO members for the first time ever refused


\(^{123}\) Burford, “Principled Pragmatism [Article],” 70–71.


\(^{128}\) European Parliament, “Resolution on the New Agenda Coalition on Nuclear Disarmament”, op. paras 1, 6.
en masse to toe the alliance line; 12 out of 13 of them abstained on the 1998 NAC resolution rather than opposing it. US allies Australia and Japan also abstained.129 The NAC’s 1999 UNGA resolution repeated the same central points as the 1998 one.130 14 out of the now 16 non-nuclear NATO allies abstained on the resolution, including Turkey, which had opposed it the previous year.131

In November 1999, a new Labour government was elected in New Zealand led by Prime Minister Helen Clark (1999–2008), who had been a key advocate of the country’s nuclear free policy and law. In this context, it is unsurprising that New Zealand nuclear disarmament advocacy remained strong. Four weeks after the election, Clark issued a statement affirming that ‘New Zealand will increase its efforts to lobby other countries for the elimination of nuclear weapons…New Zealand has a proud record in the vanguard of the nuclear disarmament movement.’132 On 23 February 2000, the New Zealand Parliament unanimously adopted a motion recalling the ICI Advisory Opinion and calling on UN member states, ‘especially the nuclear weapons states, to join with New Zealand in fulfilling the obligation’ to achieve complete nuclear disarmament.133 Symbolising the strong government collaboration with civil society in this period, this parliamentary motion was a verbatim reproduction of a text sent by Harold Evans, the initiator of the WCP, to all New Zealand MPs in 1998.134 The chief parliamentary backer of the motion acknowledged its civil society roots.135

At the 2000 NPT Review Conference, New Zealand saw further international reputational benefits from the country’s consistent nuclear disarmament advocacy. Ambassador for Disarmament Pearson was elected to chair the subsidiary body tasked with negotiating disarmament agreements at the Conference.136 Minister for Disarmament Matt Robson reported to the New Zealand cabinet that the Conference president and a NAM representative approached him personally to request

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131 Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland joined NATO in March 1999. For the voting record on the 1999 resolution, see, UNGA, “69th Plenary Meeting (A/54/PV.69)” (New York, December 1, 1999), 14.
135 See Peter Dunne, 23 February 2000, in NZHR, “Motion-Nuclear Disarmament.”
that New Zealand chair these disarmament negotiations. Robson noted the ‘real leverage’ that New Zealand gained from its association with the NAC, reporting considerable media interest in the NAC and in New Zealand’s position, with CNN, BBC World, and members of the UN press gallery seeking interviews with him. Robson was strongly personally supportive of nuclear disarmament, and had made clear his intention to push the issue strongly as minister. However, given that New Zealand rarely makes international news, such attention constitutes strong external reinforcement of the value of the relevant policies.

The widespread support for NAC diplomacy in the preceding years, along with the invitation for New Zealand to chair the disarmament negotiations at the 2000 Review Conference, meant that those negotiations revolved around key language from NAC texts. When the negotiations became bogged down due to disagreements between nuclear and non-nuclear states, the United States reached out to the NAC in particular to negotiate on behalf of non-nuclear weapon states, demonstrating that the Coalition was seen as the most coherent, credible negotiating block among the non-nuclear states. In the end, NPT parties agreed to 13 ‘practical steps’ for disarmament reflecting several key NAC objectives, including most importantly in normative terms the Coalition’s central demand—an unequivocal undertaking by the nuclear-weapon States to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals leading to nuclear disarmament, to which all States parties are committed under article VI.

This commitment was a significant normative advance since, as noted above, the nuclear weapon states had never previously committed collectively to the elimination of nuclear weapons. However, this agreement also had legal interpretive significance as a unanimous ‘subsequent agreement’ between NPT parties that NPT Article VI creates a legally-binding obligation not just to pursue nuclear disarmament, but to achieve the elimination of nuclear weapons.

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138 Ibid., para. 26
139 Editorial Staff, “New Zealand Government Vows.”
141 “NPT/CONF.2000/28 (Parts I and II),” 14, para. 15; quotation at para. 15(6).
Disarmament advocates saw the Review Conference outcome as a great success.\textsuperscript{143} Harald Müller, a German nuclear expert who has attended numerous NPT meetings as an advisor to his government’s delegation, writes that the 2000 Conference ‘was the most successful NPT ever.’\textsuperscript{144} Ambassador Pearson reported to Wellington that the 13 steps were ‘a huge advance both in scope and in substance’ over disarmament language in the Treaty itself and the decisions made at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference; he had ‘never envisaged...that such a comprehensive package of undertakings could ever be obtained...the profile, cohesion and support of the New Agenda was a critical factor, it having assumed the intellectual and political lead in the nuclear debate.’\textsuperscript{145}

**Theoretical implications**

The case study presented in this chapter adds to a small, but growing literature debunking the myth that nuclear weapons policy is immune to public influence.\textsuperscript{146} James Headley and Andreas Reitzig, for example, argue that the development of New Zealand’s nuclear free policy is a key example of grass roots influence on the country’s foreign policy.\textsuperscript{147} Similarly, Richard Devetak and Jacqui True write, ‘the non-nuclear issue in New Zealand illustrates the power of a norm embedded in national culture to shape state identity through foreign policy regardless of the geopolitical and political (and potentially economic) costs associated with it.’\textsuperscript{148}

\textsuperscript{143} Johnson, “The 2000 NPT Review Conference.”
\textsuperscript{145} Clive Pearson, ‘NPT: Nuclear Disarmament’, cable to MFAT, Wellington, 20 May 2000, provided by MFAT under the OIA.
\textsuperscript{146} See also in this vein, for example, Lawrence S Wittner, The Struggle against the Bomb, Stanford Nuclear Age Series, vol. 1–3 (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1993); Evangelista, Unarmed Forces; Tannenwald, The Nuclear Taboo; Knopf, “Domestic Sources of Preferences.”
\textsuperscript{148} Devetak and True, “Diplomatic Divergence in the Antipodes,” 254.
By the early 1990s, an anti-nuclear weapon national identity was internalised in an overwhelming majority of New Zealanders. In effect, the public’s preference for strong nuclear disarmament advocacy had achieved a taken-for-granted status. This fact, along with international contextual developments, led to significantly reduced public attention to nuclear issues, as expected in constructivist terms. This internalised public anti-nuclear weapon norm, which can be thought of as a ‘New Zealand nuclear taboo,’ strongly influenced New Zealand nuclear disarmament policy in the 1990s. The content of the New Zealand taboo differs from Nina Tannenwald’s famous ‘nuclear taboo,’ which relates to the delegitimisation of the first use of nuclear weapons by the United States. The New Zealand nuclear taboo rejects not just the use of nuclear weapons, but also their development or possession. A unique theoretical contribution of the current chapter, therefore, is to map the processes and psychological mechanisms through which the public nuclear taboo has both constrained the expression of pro-nuclear preferences among policymakers, and actively motivated nuclear disarmament advocacy by the New Zealand government.

In theoretical terms, this distinguishes New Zealand’s vote in favour of the WCP resolution from the dynamics described by the ‘spiral’ and ‘boomerang’ models of normative change, both of which account for policy influence by referring to norm entrepreneurs who activate international norms. In contrast, the New Zealand government experienced significant external pressure not to support the WCP resolution, and pressure from within New Zealand to vote in favour of the resolution on the basis of consistency effects. That is, domestic advocates linked this new nuclear disarmament objective to previous normative commitments from the government.

Individuals and groups may comply with norms for reasons related to genuine persuasion, social conformity, or due to identifying with an important other. The events described in this chapter were driven by the first two of these mechanisms in particular. The analysis below highlights how, if officials practice norms due to social conformity for long enough, the practice of those norms can lead to normative persuasion—even if the issues at stake relate to nuclear weapons policies with existential implications. This shows that nuclear disarmament policy is not immune to the social

152 Tannenwald, The Nuclear Taboo.
154 Rublee, Nonproliferation Norms, 18–20.
mechanisms that function in other areas of political life. This point has policy relevance for those seeking to advance nuclear disarmament, in terms of contributing to understandings of how the international community might, as discussed in the introduction chapter, ‘get to persuasion’ about the value of disarmament.

The effect of the New Zealand nuclear taboo on the country’s nuclear policies can be thought of as occurring in three stages. The first stage in the early 1990s was characterised by social conformity, as the New Zealand nuclear taboo constrained government policy by ruling out the conservative government’s preference, shared by most officials, for resumption of a US alliance. The removal of alliance norms from policy discourse constituted a significant change to a key contextual factor. As seen in chapter five, for example, the overarching priority of maintaining strong US relations had set implicit boundaries on the scope of New Zealand’s nuclear disarmament advocacy in the past. In the 1970s, New Zealand had focused on the limited objective of stopping nuclear testing and for the most part, avoided the broader questions of nuclear deterrence and nuclear defence in general.155

In contrast, in the early 1990s, the strength of the New Zealand nuclear taboo meant that politicians were forced for electoral reasons to refrain from making any arguments in public that implied even the possibility of acquiescence to nuclear deterrence. This meant that there was no competitor for anti-nuclear weapon norms in policy debates, making their active expression easier for disarmament advocates to achieve.

The second stage of public influence occurred in the mid-1990s, as civil society and political norm entrepreneurs exploited the circumstances described above to pursue new, more progressive disarmament-related objectives. During this phase, the strength of the New Zealand nuclear taboo, combined with rhetorical entrapment, offer a credible explanation for the government’s actions. Bolger had effectively argued in 1990 that the National Party’s adoption of a nuclear free policy was due to changing New Zealand interests in a rapidly changing international environment.156 Having publicly defended the policy reversal in these terms, it became difficult to oppose domestic calls for further disarmament advocacy. Facing fierce opposition from its former great power allies, for example, and without any support from other Western countries, New Zealand voted for the 1994 WCP/UNGA resolution designed to challenge the legitimacy of nuclear deterrence. New Zealand then argued in Court that outlawing nuclear deterrence was a normative priority and would increase

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155 Kirk’s occasional critiques of nuclear deterrence were an exception to this point, which can be accounted for by his personal abhorrence of nuclear weapons.

156 Clifton, “McKinnon Quits.”
international security. McKinnon acknowledges that instrumental dynamics were driving New Zealand policy in this period.\footnote{McKinnon, “Private Interview.”}

Similar dynamics account credibly for the government’s responses to renewed French nuclear testing in 1995. The government was immediately inclined to protest, as governments from both left and right had done for decades. However, protest was initially tempered by concerns—reinforced by advice from the foreign ministry—not to disrupt economic relations with France. Thus, both senior ministers and officials viewed expression of anti-nuclear weapon sentiment as secondary to economic interests. An external trigger with significant national identity implications, however, shifted the government’s priorities. The French bombing of the \textit{Rainbow Warrior} in Auckland in 1985 had been strongly linked with the development of the New Zealand nuclear taboo. A decade later, the French storming of the \textit{Rainbow Warrior II} as it protested at Mururoa resonated powerfully with the New Zealand public, further heightening already strong anti-nuclear sentiment. The government again felt obliged to provide material support for protesters, and to pursue more robust nuclear disarmament advocacy.

Two aspects of the conservative government’s heightened response at this point—the ICJ case, and the dispatch of the ship \textit{Tui} to Mururoa—reinforce a point raised in the theoretical discussion in chapter five. That is, direct anti-nuclear weapon activism had become more acceptable, mainstream behaviour in New Zealand by the mid-1990s, in part due to the precedents set by the Kirk government in 1973-1974. In 1972, for example, the violent French assault on Greenpeace activists at Mururoa triggered an 81,000-strong CND petition calling for New Zealand to take an ICJ case against France. The foreign ministry advised against the idea, however, and the conservative government barred public and media from the petition’s hearing, then ushered the petition through parliament without debate. In stark contrast, the conservative government in 1995 applied to revisit the ICJ \textit{Nuclear Tests} case \textit{against} the advice of the foreign ministry, and stated publicly that its decision was the result of consultations with prominent anti-nuclear activists and opposition MPs.\footnote{East, “New Zealand’s Attempts to End Nuclear Testing at Mururoa Atoll through the World Court”, para. 11.}

however, Bolger eventually stated that *HMNZS Tui*—with National and Labour MPs on board—travelled to Mururoa to protest on behalf of the entire New Zealand Parliament, and to support civil society protesters. In effect, the conservative government was actively engaging in, and supporting civil society to engage in, direct anti-nuclear activism. These developments can be accounted for in part by the observations above about rhetorical entrapment. However, as the discussion below makes clear, it is also likely that persuasion dynamics were influencing Prime Minister Bolger’s beliefs, and those of many officials, with regard to the legitimacy of public engagement in national security policymaking.

The third phase of influence deriving from the New Zealand nuclear taboo came in the mid-to-late 1990s. During this period, the cumulative psychological effects of the anti-nuclear weapon norms that had been institutionalised in New Zealand’s bureaucratic structures and political practices appears to have altered the national identities of officials and arguably, of Prime Minister Bolger. Additionally, the normative context changed significantly in 1996, as the ICJ Advisory Opinion established a strong, pro-disarmament international legal norm to which disarmament advocates could link more progressive policy objectives. Advisory opinions do not create direct legal obligations in the way that the Court’s judgments bind the parties to contentious cases, but coming from the world’s ‘premier arbiter of international law,’ advisory opinions have broad legal interpretive value.  

At the individual, psychological level, Bolger’s experience offers insight into the mechanisms through which politicians experience socialisation effects. As National Party leader, Bolger was the public face of the party’s decision to reverse its policy and thus, to reject nuclear defence as a national security strategy. Shortly thereafter, election to the UN Security Council brought prestige to his government, largely thanks to the nuclear free policy. In July 1995, it was Bolger who announced the decision to send the Navy vessel *Tui* to Mururoa, and who affirmed publicly that the *Tui*’s protest voyage was on behalf of the entire New Zealand Parliament. The same month, New Zealand challenged the legitimacy of nuclear deterrence in its ICJ statement.  

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leadership, New Zealand was granted full CD membership, a further international reputational boost, and appointed an ambassador for disarmament. It was Bolger who co-signed the Memorandum of Cooperation with Mandela, when the latter was at the height of his political fame and prestige. These were all developments that strengthened Bolger’s public connection to expression of anti-nuclear weapon sentiment, increased New Zealand’s profile on issues central to international security, and brought with them personal links to influential international figures. In sum, it is hypothesised here that Bolger’s personal expression of support for nuclear disarmament norms was initially motivated by instrumental logic, but over time, the consistency with which he was publicly associated with pro-disarmament policies, and the prestige it brought his government and him personally, led to a significantly increased personal commitment to those norms. This finding is supported by Bolger’s continued engagement, following his retirement from politics, with the Asia-Pacific Leadership Network for Nuclear Nonproliferation and Disarmament. As discussed in the concluding chapter, however, this dynamic appears to have been unique to Bolger; his colleagues and predecessors do not appear to share his heightened identification with anti-nuclear weapon sentiment.

Human-level persuasion dynamics also appear to have affected New Zealand officials in this period. Since officials practice policy norms on a daily basis, collective learning processes are likely to lead to norms ‘growing their own legs.’ In the New Zealand context, the 1987 nuclear free law created bureaucratic structures such as a ministerial disarmament portfolio and a public advisory committee with a mandate to advise the government. These institutional factors helped to shift officials’ outward behaviour away from support for nuclear deterrence in the late 1980s. Across the 1990s, a cyclical socialisation process developed among officials, as New Zealand’s expression of anti-nuclear sentiment—most commonly through the agency of foreign ministry officials—was rewarded with backpatting by international peers, increased international prestige, and further access to and establishment of institutional platforms where expression of anti-nuclear sentiment was appropriate or indeed, expected. These dynamics were evident, for example, in New Zealand’s election to the UN Security Council, membership in the CD, establishment of an ambassador for disarmament, and invitations to join the NAC and to chair the disarmament negotiations at the 2000 NPT Review Conference. At the human, psychological level, this cycle of positive feedback and

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163 Cialdini, Influence, 84.
164 Rublee, Nonproliferation Norms, 17–18.
increasing institutionalisation of related norms increases the likelihood of individuals becoming personally persuaded about the normative value of nuclear disarmament, by linking increased personal and national prestige with high-profile condemnation of nuclear weapons. In this context, a psychological consistency effect comes into play as a medium-term policy driver. The increasing regularity and intensity of interaction between New Zealand officials and civil society disarmament advocates in the mid-to-late 1990s, through initiatives such as the WCP and later, MPI, also reinforced the dynamic of persuasion to anti-nuclear weapon norms.

Several further pieces of evidence provide support for this persuasion hypothesis. The first relates to the process that led to the formation of the NAC, which produced New Zealand’s most strident nuclear disarmament advocacy in the 1990s. It was foreign ministry officials, and not New Zealand government ministers, who helped develop the NAC concept in concert with Irish and South African officials. But after the initial discussions between these officials, it was the Irish government, not the New Zealand one, which gave impetus to the plan at the inter-governmental level. A second piece of evidence in this regard comes from considering the changing electoral pressures in New Zealand in the second half of the 1990s. As a result of the public nuclear taboo and the lack of external triggers to activate anti-nuclear sentiment, New Zealand public attention to nuclear issues was very low in this period. In this context, rhetorical entrapment cannot readily explain the country’s strong nuclear disarmament advocacy in the latter part of the decade.

A final piece of evidence for the conclusion that a new, pro-disarmament identity had established its dominance among officials comes from examining developments within the National-led government during this period. Don McKinnon became New Zealand disarmament minister in 1996, adding the portfolio to his existing role as foreign minister. Of the senior National Party MPs, it was McKinnon who had most strongly opposed the party’s adoption of the nuclear free policy in 1990. As foreign minister in the early 1990s, he had actively sought to side-line nuclear issues in order to repair New Zealand-US relations. In 1997, moreover, a leadership coup within the National Party removed from power the government’s most prominent nuclear disarmament advocate—Prime

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165 Ibid., 216.
167 Mukhatzhanova and Potter, “Coalitions to Watch.”
168 McKinnon, “Private Interview.”
Minister Bolger. In conclusion, Bolger’s departure, McKinnon’s assumption of the disarmament portfolio, and the absence of public attention to nuclear issues created political space for officials—if they were so inclined—to reduce the emphasis they placed on nuclear disarmament advocacy. In fact, the opposite occurred; New Zealand’s nuclear disarmament advocacy in the late 1990s became increasingly strident, characterised by universalistic, anti-nuclear weapon normative claims that went beyond any the country had previously promoted.

Harald Müller and Andreas Schmidt have shown that ‘the probability of nuclear renunciation declines with the duration of nuclear weapons activities and the accompanied institutionalization and bureaucratization of such activities.’ The findings in the current chapter support the hypothesis that the dynamic holds true in reverse. That is, the institutionalisation of anti-nuclear weapon norms increases the likelihood of consistent nuclear disarmament advocacy across time, even if officials are not initially persuaded about the disarmament policies that they are promoting at the government’s behest. As the discussion here has shown, moreover, the consistency of this nuclear disarmament advocacy may come to be driven by genuine normative persuasion, as officials come to internalise anti-nuclear weapon norms as a result of their constant practice.

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170 This observation supports Rublee’s suggestion that internalisation of norms in elite constituencies may take place through ‘the creation of bureaucratic apparatus, complete with budgets and personnel to protect and defend the commitments the state has made.’ Rublee, Nonproliferation Norms, 46, note 46.
Challenging NATO nuclear strategy, 1997-99

The key elements of Canada’s policy are, first, a forceful, responsible advocacy of nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation, based on [the] NPT and its associated instruments; secondly, a direct and clear opposition to any move by the nuclear weapons states to validate their nuclear weapons.

Canadian Foreign Minister Lloyd Axworthy, May 1998

The presence of United States conventional and nuclear forces in Europe remains vital to the security of Europe, which is inseparably linked to that of North America... Nuclear weapons make a unique contribution in rendering the risks of aggression against the Alliance incalculable and unacceptable. Thus, they remain essential to preserve peace.

NATO Strategic Concept, April 1999

Introduction

In the late 1990s, in parallel with several other NATO members, Canada promoted revision of NATO’s ‘strategic concept’—the central document that defines NATO’s approach to allied and global security, including the role of nuclear weapons. Canada’s advocacy included promoting a reduced...

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role for nuclear weapons in NATO strategy and highlighting the legal obligation to work for complete disarmament. A key norm entrepreneur in this case was Canadian Foreign Minister Lloyd Axworthy (1996-2000); Axworthy is strongly committed to anti-nuclear weapon norms and sees Canada’s promotion of disarmament as a natural reflection of the country’s identity. Canadian nuclear disarmament advocacy in this period was catalysed by an international normative development, the 1996 ICJ Advisory Opinion, which also heavily influenced the policy development process in Canada.

As in other areas of Canadian disarmament policy at this time, such as the campaign to ban anti-personnel landmines, the foreign minister collaborated closely with civil society on nuclear weapons issues. Referring implicitly to international humanitarian law—which had been invoked in the ICJ Advisory Opinion—Axworthy publicly questioned the legitimacy of using nuclear weapons. This point conflicted sharply with NATO’s explicitly-stated willingness to use nuclear weapons—which included a deliberately ambiguous but nonetheless implicit threat to use nuclear weapons to defend against conventional attack, if Allies deemed it necessary ‘to protect peace and to prevent war or any kind of coercion.’ The Canadian initiative was thus, in part, an attempt to deconstruct the primary normative barrier to nuclear disarmament: nuclear deterrence theory. As discussed in detail in the introduction chapter, this is an important means of pursuing nuclear disarmament advocacy from within institutions dominated by the practice of nuclear deterrence.

An evolution in national identities among left-leaning political elites in the decade prior to this case study, including in the governing Liberal Party, meant that there was strong support in principle for revision of NATO policy. Axworthy led efforts in this regard, portraying NATO’s nuclear deterrence policies as legally questionable, as well as outdated and dangerous in the rapidly transforming post-Cold War world. Despite strong anti-nuclear weapon identities among politicians and overwhelming public support for Canadian leadership on nuclear disarmament, however, most government ministers and officials still saw a strong US alliance relationship as a primary security interest. As a result, strong push-back from nuclear allies triggered alliance solidarity norms—particularly as NATO began bombing Serbia in April 1999 without a UN mandate. This curbed the enthusiasm of Canadian politicians for the promotion of specific changes to NATO strategy—such as adoption of a no first use policy—which Canadian civil society and Axworthy himself preferred.

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4 As Hanson points out, however, that the nuclear policy initiative was actually a forerunner to the major Canadian government focus on landmines. Hanson, “Advancing Disarmament,” 20.

5 NATO’s strategic doctrine stated at the time, ‘Nuclear weapons make a unique contribution in rendering the risks of any aggression incalculable and unacceptable.’ NATO, “The Alliance’s New Strategic Concept,” para. 38. Emphasis added.
This case shows one mechanism through which nuclear disarmament advocacy can be constrained by pro-US alliance identities, even when government elites and the public hold strong anti-nuclear weapons preferences. The case provides further evidence of the contradictory identities that compete to determine Canadian nuclear weapons policies, the mechanism through which they are expressed, and the contradictory or anomalous policy outcomes that result.6

National identities

Political elite

The dominant national identity among governing Liberal Party MPs in the 1990s had shifted significantly from the position in the early 1980s, described in chapter six. In fact, the majority opinion among all left-leaning MPs was strongly in favour of challenging the nuclear status quo. This preference was reflected in a 1998 report from the parliamentary foreign affairs committee, the central recommendation of which was that the Canadian government should ‘work consistently to reduce the political legitimacy and value of nuclear weapons in order to contribute to the goal of their progressive reduction and eventual elimination.’7 Reducing the political legitimacy and value of nuclear weapons necessarily implied challenging central aspects of NATO’s nuclear deterrence strategy, which was premised at the time on the idea that alliance nuclear forces needed ‘to be perceived as a credible and effective element’ of NATO strategy.8

Axworthy’s foreign policy agenda explicitly aimed to develop international norms that he saw as reflecting ‘Canadian values.’9 Like Trudeau, Axworthy was an academic before entering politics.10 As

9 Howard and Neufeldt, “Canada’s Constructivist Foreign Policy: Building Norms for Peace,” 12.
foreign minister, he invoked Lester Pearson’s internationalist legacy, stating that it ‘contributes to a uniquely Canadian identity and a sense of Canada’s place in the world.’

This vision of Canadian internationalism (as opposed to thinking primarily in bilateral, Canada-US terms) was also reflected in the views of Prime Minister Jean Chrétien (1993–2003), who ‘came to office determined to distinguish himself from his predecessor whom he accused of having far too close a relationship with the Americans.’ This created considerable domestic political leeway for Axworthy to pursue progressive nuclear weapons policies.

Canada’s decision not to acquire an indigenous nuclear arsenal in the 1940s also informed Axworthy’s beliefs about the country’s national identity. He saw the lack of domestic debate over this decision as a natural reflection of Canadian identity, setting the country apart and giving it a ‘special vocation’ in nuclear issues. Axworthy was also suspicious of the way that alliances locked the country into the web of US global strategy. Axworthy was ‘no fan of NATO—at least a nuclear NATO.’ In the early 1980s, for example, he vehemently opposed cruise missile testing in cabinet debates and in public.

A countervailing identity dynamic derived from the widespread, arguably internalised belief in the Liberal Party that US alliance was the primary guarantor of Canadian security. As will be seen below, this was an important determinant of the limited scope of nuclear disarmament advocacy pursued by the Canadian government, despite the widespread and strong anti-nuclear weapon sentiment among Liberal and other left MPs, and strongly held views of the foreign minister.

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13 Axworthy, Navigating a New World, 358–359.
14 Donaghy, Tolerant Allies, 113–114.
15 Hampson, “The Axworthy Years.”
16 English, Just Watch Me, ch. 17, unpaginated.
Officials

The United States dominates Canadian foreign policy thinking, as noted previously, and since the 1970s, there had been a rapid increase in the integration between Canadian and US bureaucratic networks, ‘generating an increasing array of ‘transgovernmental’ communications between various components of the American and Canadian governmental systems.’ The result of this interaction was the further entrenchment of a constituency and institutional structures in Canada that viewed the national interest in all foreign policy—of which nuclear issues play only a very small part—in terms of protecting Canada-US ties. Officials’ policy preferences regarding nuclear disarmament are thus affected not just by the alliance dynamics discussed previously, but also by Canadian economic concerns, which generally command more interest from cabinet than do security matters. At the turn of the millennium, for example, 80 percent of Canadian trade was with the United States. In this context, nuclear policy is rarely a top priority for Canadian officials in their dealings with US counterparts.

In addition to this broader context, the daily practice of international security officials in Canada is strongly guided by the beliefs and concepts surrounding the practice of nuclear deterrence, a perennial touchstone for Canada-US security relations. Unless individuals come into the foreign affairs department with particularly strong personal beliefs about nuclear weapons or deterrence, those individuals quickly become acculturated to the daily ‘practice’ of deterrence. In the late 1990s, this had been the case for several decades; the result was a strongly entrenched, pro-nuclear identity in the bureaucracy.

In the late 1990s, the radical transformations in relations across the former East-West divide led to occasional calls for similarly radical action regarding Canadian security alliances. A former Canadian Ambassador to Russia, for example, called in 1997 for Canada to leave NATO, on the basis that the planned expansion of the organisation would do more harm than good, and would not bring stability.

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to Eastern Europe. On the whole, however, the broader concerns described above relating to US relations dominated official thinking in this period.

Public

The competing strands of national identity among the Canadian public in the late 1990s are strikingly similar to those seen in New Zealand in the late 1980s (see chapter four, ‘Internalisation of an anti-nuclear identity’). That is, a strong majority of Canadians viewed the country’s security as tied to its relationship with the United States, but at the same time, an overwhelming majority also held strong anti-nuclear weapon identities. Though just outside the timeframe of the current case study, a 2002 poll by the Centre for Research and Information on Canada showed that 75 percent of Canadians were either satisfied with current levels, or preferred greater military collaboration, with the United States. This necessarily meant maintaining support for nuclear deterrence, a central aspect of US global security strategy. Meanwhile, the public were ‘more or less evenly divided on whether or not Canada should take a more independent approach to its partnership with the US in matters of security or diplomacy.’ Conversely, a 1998 poll conducted by Angus Reid showed 93 percent support among Canadians for the elimination of nuclear weapons and 92 percent support for the Canadian government ‘to take a leadership role in promoting an international ban on nuclear weapons.’

Despite this very strong anti-nuclear public preference, it is important to note that active public engagement on arms control issues has often been low historically, albeit it has been a flashpoint for debate on specific policy issues, as demonstrated in chapters four and six. The public experience in the late 1990s was characterised by this lack of active engagement on nuclear weapons issues. Between 1995 and 2000, for example, of 63 Gallup national opinion polls that surveyed issues of

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22 “Canada and the United States: An Evolving Partnership” (Centre for Research and Information on Canada, August 2003), 11.

23 Ibid.


contemporary political debate, none address nuclear weapons. An occasional question in these polls which arguably was the most salient to the current research asked respondents to name the biggest problem facing Canada. The proportion of respondents answering ‘world peace / war’ ranged between 0.1 and 1.2 percent.

The most significant conclusion to be drawn from these reflections is that public national identity was not a significant political driver that might push Canadian nuclear disarmament policy strongly in one direction or another. Nevertheless, the idea of Canada as a force for good in the world that balances against the excesses of US dominance is one that resonates with the Canadian electorate. As will be seen below, Axworthy’s own beliefs resonated strongly with that vision, and on that basis, he sought—and received—a public mandate on which to base his nuclear disarmament advocacy.

Nuclear disarmament advocacy

From January 1996 to October 2000, Canadian foreign policy adopted an ‘activist’ flavour under Axworthy’s leadership. This included promoting nuclear disarmament by advocating a change to Canadian nuclear weapons policy; promoting the delegitimisation of nuclear weapons; calling for a fundamental rethink of NATO nuclear deterrence strategy; and affirming the international legal obligation to eliminate nuclear weapons. While Canada’s efforts to reform NATO nuclear strategy were attenuated due to the external pressure from allies, there is overwhelming evidence to suggest that these efforts were intended to advance the cause of complete nuclear disarmament.

27 See the respective codebooks for the months listed above at, Ibid.
30 In the first half of 1996, Canada was also engaged in CTBT negotiations in the CD. Since the focus of this case study is on the broader Canadian nuclear disarmament advocacy in this period, the CD negotiations are not considered further. Rauf, “Non-Nuclear Policies,” 233.
A range of observations demonstrate this point. Canada was among several non-nuclear NATO allies, for example, which were promoting consideration of NATO adopting a no first use policy during this period;³¹ the Canadian disarmament ambassador framed it explicitly as a disarmament measure.³² On the basis of the ICJ Advisory Opinion, the Canadian foreign minister sought input from the public on appropriate Canadian policies to pursue complete nuclear disarmament, as discussed in more detail below.³³ In his advocacy within NATO, Axworthy highlighted that ‘93 percent of Canadians expect Canada and its Allies to take the lead in working to eliminate nuclear weapons.’³⁴ He instigated a study by the Canadian parliamentary Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade (SCFAIT). This led to the 1998 SCFAIT report—the conclusions of which were endorsed by four out of five parliamentary parties on SCFAIT³⁵—which called for Canada to take a leading role in advancing the cause of eliminating nuclear weapons.³⁶ Speaking to the Committee, Axworthy stated that the NPT obliges the elimination of nuclear weapons: ‘That’s the bargain that was struck.’³⁷ He also told the Committee that he saw Canada’s national interest in reforming NATO nuclear strategy as part of an overall plan to advance complete disarmament, arguing for example:

We need to resist any movement to validate nuclear weapons as an acceptable currency in international politics...The key elements of Canada’s policy are, first, a forceful, responsible advocacy of nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation, based on NPT [sic.] and its

³¹ Steven Pearlstein, “Canadian Seeks Shift in NATO Nuclear Policy,” The Washington Post, October 24, 1998, A26. As noted in chapter six, a group of eminent former US policymakers had promoted the concept for NATO in 1982, and Tom Axworthy, brother of Lloyd, had arranged for Prime Minister Trudeau to meet with one of them, Robert McNamara, for this reason. For the US officials’ advocacy, see, Bundy et al., “Nuclear Weapons and the Atlantic Alliance.”
³² See, for example, Peggy Mason, “The NATO Alliance, No First Use, and Nuclear Non-Proliferation,” Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law 31, no. 2/3 (April 1999): 633.
³⁴ Axworthy, “Address [to the North Atlantic Council Meeting].” It is not clear whether Axworthy was slightly mis-representing a recent Angus Reid poll, which said that 92 percent of Canadians wanted Canada to take a lead in promoting an international ban on nuclear weapons, or whether he was referring to a different survey. See, Angus Reid Group, “Canadians’ Views on a Global Ban on Nuclear Weapons” (Ipsos, March 26, 1998), https://web.archive.org/web/20150902221618/http://www.ipsos-na.com/news-polls/pressrelease.aspx?id=832.
³⁵ See the Chair’s foreword, in SCFAIT, “Canada and the Nuclear Challenge.”
³⁶ Ibid., Recommendations 1.
³⁷ Axworthy, “Address to the Standing Committee.”
associated instruments; secondly, a direct and clear opposition to any move by the nuclear weapons states to validate their nuclear weapons.\textsuperscript{38}

Further evidence of the intention to advance complete nuclear disarmament came at the UNGA in 1996. That year, NAM member Malaysia introduced a resolution highlighting the ICJ Advisory Opinion, and calling for the commencement in 1997 of multilateral negotiations for ‘a nuclear-weapons convention prohibiting the development, production, testing, deployment, stockpiling, transfer, threat or use of nuclear weapons and providing for their elimination.’\textsuperscript{39} Such negotiations would constitute a direct challenge to the theory and practice of nuclear deterrence. Caught in the disarmament/deterrence conundrum, Canada supported alliance norms and voted against the resolution as a whole. However, Canada also requested a separate vote on, and supported, operative paragraph three of the resolution, which underlined the Court’s unanimous conclusion that there is a legal obligation to achieve complete nuclear disarmament.\textsuperscript{40}

Axworthy’s international security initiatives sometimes angered policymakers in the United States.\textsuperscript{41} The tacit support of Prime Minister Chrétien, however, along with broad parliamentary support for Canadian leadership on nuclear disarmament, meant that the foreign minister had some leeway to act. Meanwhile, despite widespread public support in principle for Canadian leadership on nuclear disarmament, the public’s anti-nuclear weapon identity was not strongly activated, and so did not appear to influence the policy outcome. In the late 1990s, contextual factors such as great power relations, the international normative context and civil society activity facilitated expression of the anti-nuclear weapon sentiment that was widespread in the political leadership. Conversely, entrenched beliefs about the importance of US alliance ties among political elites and officials had a strong, constraining effect on Canadian nuclear disarmament advocacy.

The post-Cold War optimism regarding great power cooperation ‘had already run aground in Somalia and Bosnia’ in 1996,\textsuperscript{42} though when Axworthy first launched his nuclear policy initiatives,

\textsuperscript{38} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{39} UNGA, “Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons (A/RES/51/45M),” op. para. 4.
\textsuperscript{42} Axworthy, Navigating a New World, 2.
there was still hope for arms control and disarmament issues. As the 1990s wore on, however, great power relations were steadily deteriorating, due in part to Russian concerns about the development of US ballistic missile defences, and to tensions surrounding NATO expansion and activity. In other words, great power relations were shifting away from the post-Cold War détente towards increased mistrust and tension. The 1998 Indian and Pakistani nuclear tests added to a sense of malaise. Increasing international frictions caused concern among disarmament advocates that a post-Cold War window of opportunity for great power cooperation was being missed.

A vital and influential piece of normative context in this case was again the 1996 ICJ Advisory Opinion, released six months after Axworthy took office. Of particular interest were the Court’s findings that ‘A threat or use of nuclear weapons should also be compatible with the requirements of the international law applicable in armed conflict, particularly those of the principles and rules of international humanitarian law,’ and that therefore, ‘the threat or use of nuclear weapons would generally be contrary to the rules of international law applicable in armed conflict, and in particular the principles and rules of humanitarian law.’ Given that NATO nuclear strategy is based on a constant, implicit threat to use nuclear weapons, the Advisory Opinion raised serious questions about the legality of NATO and Canadian policies—a point that Canada raised with its NATO allies, as discussed further below. In sum, as the Canadian government later wrote, that Advisory Opinion added ‘new ideas and impetus to the [nuclear weapons] debate,’ and catalysed Canada’s nuclear disarmament advocacy. Other international normative developments contributed to what has been

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43 Hanson, “Advancing Disarmament,” 20–21.
44 Reuben Steff, Strategic Thinking, Deterrence and the US Ballistic Missile Defense Project from Truman to Obama (Farnham, Surrey: Ashgate, 2013), 117–118.
46 Axworthy, Navigating a New World, 363.
described as an ‘abolitionist upsurge’ in this period,\textsuperscript{50} thus supporting Canadian expression of anti-nuclear weapon sentiment. In August 1996, the Canberra Commission released its final report, which called for the elimination of nuclear weapons as the only complete defence against the threat from nuclear weapons.\textsuperscript{51} For Canada, this was an important political development, given Australia’s similar status as a US ally and purported nuclear umbrella state.\textsuperscript{52} The adoption of the CTBT text by the UNGA in September 1996 also advanced nuclear disarmament norms in this early period of Axworthy’s tenure.

Domestic civil society activity also provided support for the Canadian government’s pursuit of nuclear disarmament. As in the New Zealand context in the 1990s, peace movement activity in Canada declined across much of the decade,\textsuperscript{53} after its strong presence in the 1980s.\textsuperscript{54} Nevertheless, groups of nongovernmental disarmament experts continued to monitor nuclear developments and to engage with their own and other like-minded governments. Project Ploughshares, for example, saw a window of opportunity for nuclear disarmament arising from recent developments, such as the ICJ Advisory Opinion; the Canberra Commission Report; the CTBT completion; and the formation of the Abolition 2000 alliance, an international civil society network aiming to generate political will to complete negotiations by the year 2000 on a treaty to eliminate nuclear weapons.\textsuperscript{55} Ploughshares planned a series of public meetings in 18 cities across ten of the 13 Canadian provinces. These were chaired by Douglas Roche, a former conservative MP and Canadian ambassador for disarmament, and aimed to elicit public feedback on how Canadian nuclear weapons policies should respond to recent international developments. In September 1996, as the meetings were about to begin, the foreign minister posted on his ministry’s website a series of related questions aimed at the Canadian

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\item \textsuperscript{50} Lennox, At Home and Abroad, 67. Another report in this vein, the Japanese Government’s Tokyo Forum Report was released in August 1999, following the events discussed in this chapter. As such, it is not discussed here.
\item \textsuperscript{51} NAC, “A/53/138,” 2; Canberra Commission, Report, 7.
\item \textsuperscript{52} Though official Australian government documents have repeatedly sought to frame the US security guarantee to Australia in nuclear terms, the United States has never explicitly affirmed that it provides a nuclear security guarantee to Australia. For examples of the Australian statements, see, Australia, “Defence White Paper 2013: Defending Australia and Its National Interests” (Canberra: Department of Defence, 2013), 29; Australia, “Defending Australia in the Asia-Pacific Century: Force 2030 (Defence White Paper)” (Canberra: Department of Defence, 2009), 50.
\item \textsuperscript{54} Dewes, “The World Court Project,” 81.
\item \textsuperscript{55} Roche, “Canada and the Abolition of Nuclear Weapons”, “Background” section.
\end{itemize}
public, seeking feedback on the ICJ Advisory Opinion specifically, and on Canadian nuclear nonproliferation and disarmament policies and initiatives more broadly.56

Roche’s report, *Canada and the Abolition of Nuclear Weapons*, concluded that ‘a broad cross-section of Canadian society would enthusiastically welcome and rally behind clear leadership by the Canadian government in working immediately—not in the distant future—to secure an international nuclear weapons abolition program.’57 According to Roche, the roundtable discussions emphasised that Canada ‘should put its commitment to international law ahead of allegiance to NATO’,58 and that ‘Canada’s obligation to follow the admonition of the World Court supersedes the outmoded alliance solidarity of NATO, which has prevented Canada from expressing the humanitarian values of Canadians against the continued possession of nuclear weapons.’59 In theoretical terms, the Ploughshares report, along with the developments noted above, created strong normative precedents to which Axworthy could link his nuclear disarmament policy preferences, generating greater legitimacy for them.

In November 1996, citing the ICJ Opinion and the Canberra Commission and Project Ploughshares reports, Axworthy requested the parliamentary Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade (SCFAIT) to review Canadian nuclear weapons policies.60 He called for SCFAIT to examine fundamental issues such as whether Canada should maintain its reliance on US nuclear weapons for Canadian defence, and offered a somewhat unenthusiastic endorsement of NATO, saying that ‘at the moment we are committed to NATO.’61 Axworthy then ‘worked closely behind the scenes to ensure that the [SCFAIT] Report...contained recommendations calling for substantive moves toward eventual disarmament, the de-alerting of all nuclear forces, and an open debate on NATO’s nuclear policy.’62

Despite Axworthy invoking Pearson’s memory, the policy-making process in the Axworthy years was a significant departure from Canadian diplomatic tradition, in terms of the degree of influence that he sought to ensure for civil society and the style of initiatives that he took.63 Government
consultations with civil society had begun in the lead up to the first UN special session on disarmament in 1978, and had waxed and waned over the years. According to Regehr, these consultations reached their zenith under Axworthy, who made a semi-formal commitment for the government to consult with civil society. Roche calls the late 1990s the ‘high-water mark for productive interaction between civil society and the federal government’ on disarmament issues. Axworthy stated in 1997,

One can no longer relegate NGOs to simple advisory or advocacy roles in this process. They are now part of the way decisions have to be made. They have been the voice saying that government belongs to the people, and must respond to the people's hopes, demands and ideals.

Axworthy’s diplomatic style was often politically-focused as opposed to technical, and when seized of an issue, he would engage in direct and forceful public advocacy. In contrast to these observations, the vision of Pearsonian internationalism that shaped traditional Canadian foreign policy thinking was elite-driven and had little time for engagement with civil society; it emphasised alliance solidarity above all, and favoured quiet consultation with and coordination among allies.

While Axworthy’s NATO policy preferences were controversial, however, they did not come out of the blue; in fact, they had some relatively significant domestic policy precedents. Canadian policy towards NATO began to shift as the Cold War came to an end. In 1992, the conservative government withdrew the last Canadian troops from NATO deployment in Europe, and ‘emphasized the United Nations as the more appropriate vehicle for Canada's pursuit of its international interests.’ Similarly, in the Liberal Government’s foreign and defence policy reviews in 1994 and 1995, ‘NATO was clearly given a lower priority than the UN as a multilateral instrument for the

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64 Regehr, “Private Interview.”
65 Douglas Roche, How We Stopped Loving the Bomb: An Insider’s Account of the World on the Brink of Banning Nuclear Arms (Toronto: James Lorimer, 2011), 80–81.
pursuit of Canada’s international security objectives.” Moreover, Axworthy’s personal views on nuclear weapons policy were legitimated in democratic terms by public opinion. A March 1998 Angus Reid poll showed overwhelming anti-nuclear weapon sentiment in the public: ‘93% of Canadians support the abolition of nuclear weapons; 92% of Canadians want the Government of Canada to take a leadership role in promoting an international ban on nuclear weapons; [and] 75% of Canadians believe that nuclear weapons pose a threat to world security.’

By the late 1990s, other non-nuclear weapon states—including NATO allies—were also starting to question the nuclear status quo. NATO was due to issue an updated strategic concept at a heads-of-state summit in April 1999, which marked the 50th anniversary of the Alliance. In 1998, the so-called ‘NATO-5’—Belgium, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, and Norway—began collectively presenting progressive disarmament proposals to the CD, and later, to NPT meetings. The NAC called in its June 1998 ministerial declaration for a legally-binding no first use agreement regarding nuclear weapons. On 20 October 1998, a new German coalition government uniting the Social Democrats and the Green Party included in its official policy manifesto the promotion of a no first use policy for NATO, and reductions in the alert status of nuclear weapons. In sum, Axworthy’s nuclear disarmament initiatives had strong policy precedents and public support domestically (although public anti-nuclear weapon sentiment was not strongly activated), and strong normative precedents internationally.

On 24 October 1998, the Washington Post reported that Axworthy was promoting revision of NATO nuclear strategy, including calling for a no first use policy. Tom Keating appears to imply, though it is not clear, that civil society was responsible for spurring the Canadian discussion of no first use as a possible policy platform for NATO. Given the strong government-civil society relations at the time, this is certainly possible; the MPI, for example, which was established in November 1997 and then launched internationally in March 1998, was promoting no first use. It has not been possible

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71 Delvoie, “Curious Ambiguities,” 40.
75 Mendelsohn, “NATO’s Nuclear Weapons: The Rationale for ‘No First Use.’”
77 Tom Keating, Canada and World Order: The Multilateralist Tradition in Canadian Foreign Policy, 2nd ed. (Ontario, Canada: Oxford University Press, 2002), 222.
78 Burford, “Principled Pragmatism [Article],” 70.
79 Robert Green, “Re-Thinking NATO’s Nuclear Policy: A Position Paper by The Middle Powers Initiative” (Cambridge, Massachusetts: MPI, June 2000),
to confirm this specific point, however. The no first use concept had strong support from the Bloc Quebecois (the third largest parliamentary party at the time) and the New Democratic Party; it was opposed by the official Opposition Reform Party, and by the Progressive Conservatives, who believed ‘Canada should approach any changes to NATO’s nuclear strategy with great caution.’

In late October, the first draft of the NAC’s 1998 UNGA resolution called for exploration of no first use options. Under pressure due to strong opposition from the Western nuclear weapon states—as will be seen below—this language was watered down in subsequent negotiations. The version adopted by the UNGA First Committee on 13 November instead called for the nuclear weapon states to explore ‘measures to enhance strategic stability and accordingly to review strategic doctrines.’

Despite pressure from the Western nuclear weapon states to oppose the NAC resolution, 15 out of 16 non-nuclear NATO members and US allies instead chose to abstain. This response to the NAC initiative was evidence of the frustration among EU and NATO non-nuclear allies at the lack of progress on multilateral nuclear disarmament.

In late November 1998, the German foreign minister was still pursuing a no first use policy, and on 3 December, just days before a NATO foreign ministers’ meeting, the Dutch Parliament passed a resolution calling on the alliance to consider a no first use stance. The following day, the UNGA plenary adopted the NAC resolution, with the vast majority of NATO allies again abstaining, as they had on the First Committee draft. Tannenwald argues that following this, ‘the political debates in many countries over the UN [NAC] resolution prompted non-nuclear states Germany and Canada to push harder for a reexamination of NATO strategies, in particular the policy of first use of nuclear weapons.’

At this point, however, the Canadian government was experiencing strong pressure from its nuclear armed allies not to promote no first use. AxDorthy writes that this issue in particular created strong
opposition and lobbying from the UK and US representatives in Ottawa, who feared that if Canada were to adopt such a policy, others in NATO would do the same.\(^8^9\) UK and US diplomats lobbied SCFAIT members intensively, making—in Axworthy’s words, ‘not so veiled warnings of consequences, not unlike those issued by Ambassador Cellucci that our non-participation in the Iraq war could affect border issues.’\(^9^0\) Axworthy concludes,

If I had ever believed that policy-making in Canada is a simple exercise, or that solely domestic forces dictate the result, this experience dispelled such notions. The scrutiny and pressure from outside and the full court press being executed by the nuclear states, especially the Americans, had an effect...several of my colleagues, to say nothing of certain officials in DFAIT [the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade] and DND [the Department of National Defence], were discovering serious reservations to the nuclear review strategy.\(^9^1\)

In theoretical terms, the reservations that officials and political leaders were experiencing highlight the identity-related arguments advanced in this thesis. That is, the presence of strong anti-nuclear weapon sentiment creates a preference for actively pursuing nuclear disarmament—in this case, by reviewing NATO strategy to minimise reliance on nuclear weapons and, as will be seen below, by exhorting NATO to take further measures to advance nuclear disarmament. However, the dominant nuclear norms practised within NATO run directly counter to these preferences. When this inconsistency is highlighted by external actors, it threatens the stability of the dominant security-related identity in Canada, and this threat is resolved by reaffirming alliance structures; nuclear disarmament preferences are put aside.

At the NATO foreign ministers’ meeting on 8-9 December 1998, the German foreign minister raised the issue of no first use, but the UK and US representatives strongly opposed revision of NATO strategy.\(^9^2\) Axworthy did not call for a no first use policy, though he did promote a comprehensive review of NATO nuclear weapons strategy, saying the updated strategic concept ‘should underline that as a consequence of a changed security environment, nuclear weapons are far less important

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\(^8^9\) Axworthy, *Navigating a New World*, 362.
\(^9^0\) Ibid.
\(^9^1\) Ibid., 362–363.
to Alliance strategy than they were in the 1980s and early 1990s.\textsuperscript{93} He also noted that 92 percent of Canadians supported their government taking a lead in working for the elimination of nuclear weapons.\textsuperscript{94} Axworthy argued that a revised NATO Strategic Concept should take into account ‘international law, humanitarian imperatives and political realities,’ and commit to pursuing greater progress in nuclear disarmament:

\begin{quote}
[It] should underline the very significant progress made in disarmament since 1991 and make a commitment to doing more. Special attention should be paid to recording reductions made in strategic weapons and the elimination of whole classes of weapons from Europe. At the same time, we must affirm our intention to reinforce the nuclear non-proliferation regime, especially to respond to the specific threats I have referred to, and to develop further arms control and disarmament measures.\textsuperscript{95}
\end{quote}

Finally, and significantly, Axworthy challenged the legitimacy of nuclear deterrence, by stating that ‘using Alliance nuclear capabilities—even in retaliation—raises very difficult questions of means, proportionality and effectiveness that cause us significant concerns.’\textsuperscript{96}

This last point needs to be unpacked. Invoking concerns about means and proportionality relating to nuclear weapons implies that the use of such weapons is unlikely to comply with international humanitarian law, of which these two concepts collectively form a key aspect. This implication derives from the massively disproportionate effects of nuclear weapons compared to most conceivable military threat or objective. Since NATO deterrence policy is based on a willingness to use nuclear weapons, Axworthy’s statement constituted a challenge to the legitimacy of NATO strategy. Once again, this reflects the influence of the ICJ Advisory Opinion, which found that ‘the threat or use of nuclear weapons would generally be contrary to the rules of international law applicable in armed conflict, and in particular the principles and rules of humanitarian law.’\textsuperscript{97}

On 10 December 1998, the day after the NATO foreign ministers’ meeting and six days after the UNGA had adopted the NAC resolution, the SCFAIT report that Axworthy requested, \textit{Canada and the Nuclear Challenge}, was tabled in parliament.\textsuperscript{98} This was the result of ‘two years of extensive...

\begin{footnotes}
\item[93] Axworthy, “Address [to the North Atlantic Council Meeting].”
\item[95] Axworthy, “Address [to the North Atlantic Council Meeting].”
\item[96] Ibid.
\item[97] ICJ, “Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons,” 266, para. 105(2)(E).
\item[98] SCFAIT, “Canada and the Nuclear Challenge.”
\end{footnotes}
research, public hearings, and expert testimonies,⁹⁹ which considered in detail the question of Canadian national interests in the post-Cold War world, and created a strong, clear mandate for future policy. The report called for the Canadian government to adopt an activist-type role on nuclear disarmament, and to argue forcefully for NATO to review its nuclear strategy.¹⁰⁰ SCFAIT labelled the civil society–government collaboration on the successful campaign to ban anti-personnel landmines a ‘Canadian approach’ to disarmament,¹⁰¹ and recommended that the government seek to replicate the landmines success in the nuclear realm. It argued Canada should do this by focusing on humanitarian, rather than military/technical issues; by engaging civil society; and by working with like-minded states outside traditional groupings if necessary—including the NAC.¹⁰² The primary SCFAIT recommendation was that a guiding principle for all nuclear policy should be ‘That Canada work consistently to reduce the political legitimacy and value of nuclear weapons in order to contribute to the goal of their progressive reduction and eventual elimination.’¹⁰³ The report also included recommendations on a range of specific measures and initiatives Canada should take to advance nuclear disarmament.¹⁰⁴ The Canadian government publicly endorsed these central SCFAIT recommendations.¹⁰⁵

The SCFAIT report did not call for Canada to promote a no-first use policy for NATO, though the Canadian ambassador for disarmament, Peggy Mason, was still promoting the idea in early April 1999, just weeks before the Washington summit to mark NATO’s 50th Anniversary.¹⁰⁶ Mason questioned the legality of NATO nuclear weapons policy, saying, ‘current NATO nuclear policy is seriously at odds with the majority opinion in the ICJ ruling, which, while not binding, is considered an “authoritative” statement of international law.’¹⁰⁷ Her main argument, however, was that NATO’s refusal to revise its nuclear policy was hypocritical, and was thus undermining the whole regime built around the NPT. She stated that NATO’s intransigence meant betraying the commitment, made in 1995 in order to secure the indefinite extension of the NPT, to the ‘determined pursuit by the nuclear-weapon States of systematic and progressive efforts to reduce

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⁹⁹ Lennox, At Home and Abroad, 67.
¹⁰¹ Ibid., “Pursuing a Canadian Approach” section.
¹⁰² Ibid., ch. 4, recommendation 15, and ch. 5 respectively. On the NAC, see, Ibid., ch. 1, recommendation 3.
¹⁰³ Ibid., Recommendation 1.
¹⁰⁴ Ibid., Recommendation 3.
¹⁰⁶ Mason, “The NATO Alliance,” 634.
¹⁰⁷ Ibid., 635.
nuclear weapons globally.”\(^{108}\) This sentiment was later reflected in a private report commissioned by DFAIT, which highlighted the importance of changing NATO policy for nuclear disarmament:

> Because it is centrally important to any of these efforts to delegitimise nuclear weapons as instruments of security, NATO’s strategy takes on particular importance...While NATO operationally considers nuclear weapons essential to providing security against any form of attack, it is in no position to suggest that such weapons are not equally important to any others.\(^{109}\)

On 19 April, five days before the NATO 50\(^{th}\) anniversary summit, the Canadian government responded to the recommendations in the SCFAIT report, as it is required by law to do. The government endorsed 14 out of 15 of the Committee’s specific recommendations,\(^{110}\) including the main recommendation, regarding working to reduce the political legitimacy and value of nuclear weapons, and asserted that ‘the NPT is the central instrument in which Canada’s nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament policy is rooted.’\(^{111}\) This, of course, is highly questionable. In fact, the analysis here suggests that the central instrument guiding Canadian nonproliferation and disarmament policy in practice is the North Atlantic Treaty, along with its associated norms.

NATO held its 50\(^{th}\) anniversary summit in Washington, from 24-26 April 1999. The Alliance had not long previously begun its controversial bombing campaign in Serbia, without a mandate from the UN Security Council.\(^{112}\) The vehement opposition from Russia and China to this campaign resulted in a focus at the NATO summit on reaffirming alliance solidarity; media were given little opportunity to interact directly with government leaders, and ‘nuclear policy was kept deliberately low key, with careful avoidance of the questions raised in late 1998 by Germany, Canada and others about retaining first-use doctrine [sic] and tactical nuclear weapons in Europe.’\(^{113}\) The Canadian prime minister made no mention of nuclear issues, and stated ‘the only true guarantee of long term

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109 DFAIT commissioned and published the report, but noted that it did not necessarily reflect the views of DFAIT or the government. See, Mutimer, “Confidence-Building,” iv.
110 The only recommendation the government did not endorse was the idea of not burning mixed oxide (MOX) fuels in Canadian nuclear reactors as a means of disposing of plutonium removed from nuclear weapons. Canada, “Government Response,” 12.
111 Ibid., 1.
112 For detailed discussion of this issue, including Canadian perspectives, see, Keating, Canada and World Order, 216–219.
security is collective security’ and therefore, ‘the need for NATO is as great as ever.’ The updated NATO strategic concept presented at the summit stated that nuclear weapons ‘make a unique contribution’ to deterrence and thus ‘remain essential to preserve peace.’

The summit did agree that NATO would ‘consider options for confidence and security building measures, verification, non-proliferation and arms control and disarmament.’ On this basis, Axworthy continued to promote what was essentially a no first use policy: ‘one where nuclear weapons would be used only in clear response to a nuclear attack, not in response to conventional or biological or chemical attack.’ However, the response to this campaign demonstrates the institutional barriers to nuclear disarmament advocacy that this thesis has highlighted throughout. In Axworthy’s words:

...these ideas were not met with much enthusiasm. One big problem was the inertia, if not opposition, within the bureaucracy of NATO and the permanent representatives to the council. They are basically averse to rocking the boat, and there is still a dominant military culture amongst NATO decision makers.

After hitting the twin ‘brick walls’ of the election of George W. Bush, and then the terrorist attacks of 9/11, ‘the idea of a serious review was shelved’ in NATO. When Axworthy retired from politics in October 2000, Canada’s high profile advocacy of a change to NATO policy came to an end.

Theoretical implications

The dynamics described in this chapter again highlight the tension between two competing and often, largely contradictory visions of Canadian national identity. In effect, the debate between the supporters and critics of Axworthy’s policies ‘underscores Canadians’ longstanding ambivalence about what our role or mission on the international stage should be.’ Should Canadian security be understood in terms of US defence alliances—in which case, policymakers should prioritise maintenance of solidarity with the United States, including through NATO—or should Canadian

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115 NATO, “The Alliance’s Strategic Concept”, para. 46.
116 Axworthy, Navigating a New World, 364.
117 Ibid., 364–365.
118 Ibid., 365.
119 Hampson, “The Axworthy Years.”
security be understood in terms of international solidarity, symbolised by the pursuit of international law and principled objectives such as disarmament?

Applying the theoretical framework of this thesis, the conflict between these two visions in the current case study can be summarised as follows: on one hand, a strong anti-nuclear weapon identity was held by an influential constituency of political actors such as Axworthy and many other Liberal and left-leaning MPs, supported by civil society (and tacitly, but overwhelmingly, supported by public opinion). The preferences of these groups constituted the active driver for nuclear disarmament advocacy. On the other hand, many in the political and bureaucratic constituencies experienced a conflict between this preference, and the activation of their primary security-related national identities, regarding solidarity with the United States and NATO. This conflict was triggered by external activation of alliance norms by great power allies, and the result was a diminution of the scope that Canadian government elites were willing to afford to nuclear disarmament advocacy. As Axworthy noted, for example, bureaucratic inertia created a strong constraint to the pursuit of a change to NATO policy, with transnational NATO elites ‘basically averse to rocking the boat.’

A broader diplomatic concern was also constraining the expression of anti-nuclear weapon sentiment: fear of damaging Canada-US relations in other policy areas, such as trade or border cooperation. Axworthy suggests that this fear was not merely perceived by Canadian officials and MPs in the late 1990s, it was deliberately invoked by veiled threats from UK and US diplomats.

The competition between competing visions of Canadian identity—that is, pro-disarmament versus pro-alliance and thus, pro-nuclear deterrence—was evident in two nuclear policy statements that the Canadian government made in April 1999. These statements demonstrate a fundamental conceptual conflict in Canadian nuclear weapons policy. First, Canada endorsed the SCFAIT recommendations to ‘work consistently to reduce the political legitimacy and value of nuclear weapons in order to contribute to the goal of their progressive reduction and eventual elimination’ and, in intensifying its efforts for nuclear disarmament, to ‘inform the public on the exorbitant humanitarian, environmental and economic costs of nuclear weapons as well as their impact on international peace and security.’ But just days later, Canada endorsed the collective NATO

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121 Ibid., 362.
assertion that ‘nuclear weapons make a unique contribution’ to allied security on the basis of their deterrent effect, and thus ‘remain essential to preserve peace.’

Opinion polling in the late 1990s showed that this conceptual conflict is equally entrenched in public sentiment. Canadians overwhelmingly supported the elimination of nuclear weapons and Canadian leadership towards that objective, but also strongly supported either maintaining or increasing military integration with the United States, which necessarily meant endorsing and supporting nuclear deterrence norms. Reflecting on his many years of personal experience interacting with the Canadian public, Roche writes, ‘Many Canadians want their government to take a more active role in disarmament, but they are ambivalent about where Canada’s duty, in the interests of security, lies.’ In this vein, Gabriel Stern points out that despite strong support in principle for nuclear disarmament, ‘in policy terms, such a sentiment is too general to represent any sort of significant consensus.’ In the current case, this meant there was no consistent electoral pressure on politicians to pursue particular policies, such as no first use.

This Canadian identity conflict also points to a broader conceptual problem facing disarmament advocates. Chapter six introduced the notion of the disarmament/deterrence conundrum, in which nuclear disarmament advocates are hampered in their pursuit of pro-disarmament policies by the fact that the idea of advancing disarmament creates in deterrence adherents significant psychological disturbance. This occurs because proponents of nuclear deterrence see progress toward disarmament as creating an existential threat. The highly dismissive language used in NATO circles to describe Canadian policy in the late 1990s, for example, is suggestive of this heightened psychological tension. Critics used gendered language to try to undermine the country’s policies, labelling Canada a ‘nuclear nag.’ A US diplomat who served in the Ottawa Embassy from 1992-

123 NATO, “The Alliance’s Strategic Concept,” para. 46.
1996 subsequently called Canada’s nuclear policies under Chrétien/Axworthy ‘breathtakingly arrogant in their ignorance.’

In the theoretical terms of this thesis, the extreme nature of the responses to Canadian policy results from the fact that those policies explicitly attempted to address the disarmament/deterrence conundrum. The policy process that Axworthy activated on the basis of the ICJ Opinion, for example, led to significant domestic debate about issues such as ‘whether nuclear weapons are illegal/illegitimate and should be totally eliminated; whether nuclear deterrence is an obsolete concept; and whether NATO should adopt a policy of “no first use” of nuclear weapons.’ In response to a question about the potential for Canadian advocacy of a no first use policy, Axworthy stated, ‘I think it gets into a fairly long discussion about deterrence theory and where it’s going.’

In logical terms, the introduction of a no first use policy would have increased the predictability of NATO’s nuclear intentions in a crisis. However, existing NATO strategy in 1998 insisted that nuclear weapons ‘fulfil an essential role by ensuring uncertainty in the mind of any aggressor about the nature of the Allies’ response to military aggression.’ In other words, the implied willingness to use nuclear weapons first in a conflict, and the lack of predictability about whether or not NATO would choose to do so, were seen crucial factors in making nuclear weapons ‘useful’ deterrents to aggression. According to NATO’s own logic, it follows that a no first use policy would make the Alliance’s nuclear deterrence strategy less effective, increasing the risk of aggression, and potentially, escalation to nuclear war. Indeed, senior US leaders such as then-Secretary of Defence William Cohen saw the policy changes advocated by Axworthy as undermining NATO’s nuclear deterrent. The concluding chapter of this thesis returns to the topic of the disarmament/deterrence conundrum, offering some broader observations about its implications for nuclear disarmament scholarship and practice.

Turning to the question of how contextual factors influenced Canadian policy in the present case, with the exception of alliance-based norms and identities discussed above, contextual factors both supported and stimulated Canadian nuclear disarmament advocacy in the late 1990s. The ICJ

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130 Delvoie, “Curious Ambiguities,” 40.
131 Axworthy, “Address to the Standing Committee.”
Advisory Opinion gave Canadian politicians and officials a legally-significant, if not legally binding, document on which to base policy, providing a legitimising basis for expression of anti-nuclear weapon identities. The Opinion both catalysed and served as a constant touchstone for Canada’s disarmament advocacy in this period. In political/normative terms, the Canberra Commission was a further legitimating factor for disarmament advocacy, coming as it did from a like-minded US ally. Meanwhile, the NAC enabled non-nuclear NATO members to express discontent about NATO nuclear policy in a forum where the Western nuclear powers had less ability to constrain the expression of anti-nuclear weapon sentiment. Civil society activity had an enabling effect for Canadian nuclear disarmament advocacy, in the sense that without the WCP, there would have been no ICJ Advisory Opinion. Civil society also provided constant reinforcement of Axworthy’s personal inclination to pursue disarmament, and some specific policy objectives such as no first use.

Finally in terms of contextual influences, the end of the Cold War transformed great power relations. The social, political and security structures of the international system were rapidly being challenged or dismantled—including the bipolar, East-West divide. Axworthy and other senior politicians saw in this context an opportunity to advance nuclear disarmament.134 Nuclear deterrence, however, was still a mainstay of NATO and therefore, Canadian security strategy. Thus, despite the radical change in great power relations, Canada remained locked in the disarmament/deterrence conundrum. In order to bring about a dramatic shift in the country’s disarmament policy, a significant shift in Canada’s security-related identity hierarchy would have been necessary. Arguably, one reason that this did not occur is, despite improved great power relations opening space to consider new Canadian identities, there was no significant challenge to, or condemnation of, existing ones. In contrast, for example, chapter four showed that the shift in New Zealand national identity in the 1980s was assisted by a significant challenge to the country’s national identity, triggered by international condemnation of its rugby ties with apartheid South Africa. In the final analysis, the contextual change brought about by improved great power relations was a much less prominent influence on Canadian nuclear disarmament policy in the late 1990s than institutionalised identity structures.

134 Axworthy’s 2004 book, for example, was entitled, *Navigating a New World: Canada’s Global Future*. The implication is that the international system was experiencing dramatic changes, and Canadian foreign policy must account for these.
The causes of nuclear disarmament advocacy

Introduction

This thesis addresses the research question: what causes nuclear disarmament advocacy by democratic, non-nuclear weapon states? Based on the core IR constructivist notion that identities determine interests and thus, preferences, the thesis begins with the premise that the primary driver for nuclear disarmament advocacy is the activation of anti-nuclear weapon identities—that is, identities that see nuclear weapons as reducing security. From a constructivist perspective, activation of an anti-nuclear weapon identity is a necessary condition for nuclear disarmament advocacy to occur; it therefore explains the why of nuclear disarmament advocacy by democratic non-nuclear weapon states. The core focus of the thesis, however, is on the more complex theoretical questions of precisely when and how anti-nuclear weapon identities are likely to produce nuclear disarmament advocacy. In a qualitative research context, addressing these questions requires the researcher to define the content of national identities, and to specify the psychological mechanisms through which those identities and their related norms influence nuclear disarmament policy. To date, however, the identity dynamics that inform nuclear disarmament policymaking have not been made explicit in the relevant constructivist literature. By presenting one model for defining the content of national identities, and by making explicit the mechanisms through which identities inform nuclear disarmament policy, the current research makes a unique contribution to the development of constructivist methodologies. In addition, the thesis contributes more broadly to IR security studies by providing detailed case studies of nuclear disarmament policymaking in democratic non-nuclear weapon states.¹

¹ On the need to refine constructivist methodologies, see, Lupovici, “Constructivist Methods.”
The thesis operationalises the concept of national identity by analytically segmenting each case study population into three parts: elected senior ministers; bureaucratic officials; and the general public. This segmentation acknowledges that the content of national identity is often contested in the policymaking process. The empirical chapters begin by identifying the dominant, security-related identity beliefs in each societal segment at the time of the case study, focusing particularly on beliefs about how nuclear weapons affect national security. The data for this analysis comes from public opinion polling, primary historical sources such as internal government and political party documents, the public speeches and biographies of senior ministers and party leaders, semi-structured interviews with political, bureaucratic and civil society experts in the field, and a wide-ranging review of secondary sources. Having defined the dominant identities present, the case studies then apply a process tracing method to produce fine-grained analyses of how national identity beliefs inform policy preferences, and how contextual factors either augment or attenuate the expression of anti-nuclear weapon identities. The close attention paid to policy detail, chronology and human agency in these analyses increases the internal validity of causal arguments.

The thesis presents four case studies of nuclear disarmament policymaking, two each from Canada and New Zealand, across three decades from the early 1970s to the early 2000s. The cases show useful variation in terms of both the identity narratives competing for policy influence, and the surrounding contextual factors in each case. Additionally, while all four cases meet the definition of nuclear disarmament advocacy outlined in the introductory chapter, they vary in terms of the scope of advocacy, and in terms of the level of profile and priority afforded to it by the government in question. In three of the cases, advocacy focuses on limited disarmament measures, while in the fourth, disarmament advocacy focuses in large part on the broader objective of eliminating nuclear weapons. By identifying the conjunctions of identity dynamics, contextual factors and processes which produce these specific outcomes, the thesis offers hypotheses about when and how nuclear disarmament advocacy is likely to occur. As ideational scholars investigate further cases of disarmament advocacy in future, these hypotheses can be tested and refined. The current analysis

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2 To recap, the thesis treats nuclear disarmament advocacy as being any promotion of policies by mandated government officials or ministers at the international level, which aims to advance the goal of complete nuclear disarmament. This includes explicit advocacy of the elimination of nuclear weapons, but also includes advocacy focused primarily on limited disarmament measures which many believe will be necessary to achieve elimination, as long as those measures are framed in terms of supporting complete nuclear disarmament.
thus represents one starting point for mid-range or ‘typological’ theorising regarding nuclear disarmament policymaking in democratic non-nuclear weapon states.\(^3\)

This final chapter of the thesis compares and contrasts the findings of the four case studies, highlighting key patterns of theoretical interest that emerge in order to generate hypotheses about the overall causes of nuclear disarmament advocacy by democratic, non-nuclear weapon states. To aid in this task, the chapter disaggregates the complex causal patterns observed in individual case studies, separating policy influences into two categories: those relating to identity dynamics, and those relating to contextual factors.\(^4\) The nature of the comparisons presented here—that is, across national, temporal, and contextual lines—increases the generalisability or ‘external validity’ of the conclusions. Having presented the overall findings of the thesis, the chapter then presents suggestions for how future research might build on these findings. Finally, the thesis closes with some observations and reflections about how the findings relate to contemporary international dynamics relating to multilateral nuclear disarmament.

**The influence of identity on nuclear disarmament advocacy**

**Moral and instrumental norm entrepreneurship**

Human agency plays a vital role in determining political outcomes, as veteran norm scholar Harald Müller points out.\(^5\) Constructivist scholars often frame their analysis of human agency in terms of norm entrepreneurship. The cases examined here contribute not only to the extensive literature on the norm entrepreneurship of individuals and civil society organisations, but also to a growing literature on the role of states as norm entrepreneurs.\(^6\) In the latter context, the findings in this

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\(^3\) On typological theorising, see, George and Bennett, *Case Studies and Theory Development*, ch. 11.

\(^4\) It must be acknowledged that this disaggregation of causal factors is an analytical device used to identify patterns of theoretical interest, rather than a reflection of any empirical ‘reality’. In practice, the factors discussed here are often mutually constitutive or have overlapping influences on policy, as discussed in previous chapters.

\(^5\) Müller, “Agency Is Central.”

\(^6\) For discussion and citations regarding both of these literatures, see the section in chapter two entitled, ‘The role of agency.’
thesis reinforce the conclusion that state-based norm entrepreneurship may be driven by a complex mix of self-interest and normative commitment.7

At the individual level, the cases presented here demonstrate that when a senior politician or politicians have strong anti-nuclear weapon identities, it can trigger or augment disarmament advocacy in important ways. Chapter five, for example, showed that the election in late 1972 of New Zealand Prime Minister Norman Kirk—a vocal opponent of nuclear weapons who explicitly framed the national interest in terms of morality in foreign policy—triggered a significant increase in the priority and profile afforded to New Zealand’s nuclear disarmament advocacy. At the same time, the New Zealand government eschewed the concerns of its conservative predecessor regarding potential French economic retaliation, despite ongoing threats in this regard. In sum, the intensity and profile of disarmament advocacy closely reflected personal distinctions in the strength of anti-nuclear weapon sentiment among key decision-makers. Similarly, chapter six demonstrated that the Trudeau peace initiative of late 1983 and early 1984 was so strongly driven and orchestrated by the Canadian prime minister that it is extremely doubtful it would have gone ahead were it not for his personal norm entrepreneurship. In chapter eight, Canada’s advocacy of a change to NATO’s strategic concept in the late 1990s was driven by a desire to reflect progress in and further advance nuclear disarmament. While this advocacy was catalysed by the ICJ Advisory Opinion—as discussed below in the section ‘Normative context’—it was again instigated and driven in large part by individual norm entrepreneurship, this time from the country’s foreign minister, Lloyd Axworthy.

It is noteworthy, however, that while these individuals significantly influenced their government’s policies, strong individual norm entrepreneurship was significantly attenuated by institutionalised norms relating to alliance identities, as discussed in the ‘Military alignment’ section below. It is also noteworthy that in the case in which nuclear disarmament advocacy was most comprehensive—that of New Zealand in the 1990s—several of the high-profile advocacy outcomes occurred despite the absence of what might be called a ‘traditional’ nuclear disarmament norm entrepreneur among the senior political leadership. In other words, despite pursuing strong nuclear disarmament advocacy, the conservative government of the day identified much more strongly with resumption of an official US alliance—including, if necessary, acquiescence to nuclear deterrence—than with a national interest in promoting nuclear disarmament. This observation points to two further patterns of significant theoretical interest which are also discussed below: the potential for strong public

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7 Wunderlich, “Theoretical Approaches in Norm Dynamics,” 32.
influence on nuclear disarmament advocacy, and the crucial influence of institutionalised norms on policy outcomes.

Public influence on nuclear disarmament advocacy

Much of the prominent nuclear weapons literature, including in the constructivist sphere, privileges system-level factors or governmental elites in explanations for security policy. In contrast, a key finding of theoretical significance in the current thesis is the strong influence of public opinion on nuclear disarmament policy in three out of the four cases. In this sense, the thesis adds to the small but growing body of work debunking the idea that nuclear weapons policy is immune to public influence.

In the early 1970s, the strength of public anti-nuclear weapon identity in New Zealand placed pressure on the conservative government to consistently pursue public disarmament advocacy, as private discussions between senior officials attest. In the early 1980s, a majority of the Canadian political and bureaucratic elite believed that allowing cruise missile testing in Canada was a natural expression of the national interest—and therefore, a policy priority—because it reflected US alliance solidarity as well as presenting economic opportunities. The majority of the Canadian public, however, was vehemently opposed to the idea, as evidenced by opinion polling and by the fact that the decision to permit cruise testing triggered the largest anti-nuclear rallies in the country’s history. This rapid, vocal expression of public anti-nuclear sentiment catalysed the nuclear disarmament advocacy of the Trudeau peace initiative.

In New Zealand in the early-to-mid 1990s, a widespread, internalised anti-nuclear weapon identity in the public—a ‘New Zealand nuclear taboo’—delegitimised nuclear deterrence as a defence strategy in the eyes of the vast majority of the population. This taboo had been growing for a long time; it had been nurtured over decades through consistent anti-nuclear weapon norm entrepreneurship by civil society and (mostly) liberal political parties, which linked anti-nuclear

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8 In the constructivist literature, see, for example, Stern, “Forging New Identities,” 377, 386; Rublee, Nonproliferation Norms, 16; Hymans, The Psychology of Nuclear Proliferation, 1.
9 For other work which also debunks this notion, see, for example, Wittner, The Struggle against the Bomb; Evangelista, Unarmed Forces; Tannenwald, The Nuclear Taboo; Knopf, “Domestic Sources of Preferences.”
10 McGibbon, Unofficial Channels, 302–303.
weapons policies to the metanorm of sovereign self-determination, and to the claim that due to the country’s unique geography, nuclear weapons were more of a threat to New Zealand than a security benefit.\textsuperscript{11} Several external trigger events contributed to the creation of the taboo, including an identity crisis caused by international condemnation of New Zealand for its rugby ties with apartheid South Africa; perceived US bullying aimed at changing New Zealand’s nuclear policies; and a French act of state-sponsored terrorism—the bombing of the Rainbow Warrior in an effort to quash anti-nuclear protest. The latter two issues strengthened the arguments of those linking anti-nuclear weapon sentiment to national sovereignty.

The New Zealand nuclear taboo created a very strong instrumental motivation for politicians to avoid publicly advocating acquiescence to nuclear deterrence—even in the name of US alliance ties, which until recently had been seen as a core national interest by all three segments of the New Zealand population.\textsuperscript{12} The removal from public discourse of the key normative competitor for disarmament—namely, nuclear deterrence—in conjunction with the government being persistently prompted by members of the public and opposition parties to reaffirm its anti-nuclear weapon commitments, led the conservative, pro-alliance government to pursue proactive and later, comprehensive nuclear disarmament advocacy. Contextual factors also played a key role in facilitating these dynamics, as discussed further below.

Finally, in the Canadian case in the late 1990s public influence on nuclear disarmament policy appears to have been weak, despite an opinion poll showing that the public overwhelmingly supported Canada playing a leading role in promoting nuclear disarmament.\textsuperscript{13} This lack of influence was possibly due to public sentiment being generalised rather than focused on a specific objective, and to the lack of external triggers to activate anti-nuclear weapon sentiment.

\textsuperscript{11} This was a considerable shift in the interpretation of New Zealand’s geography. For several decades during the nuclear age, for example, the New Zealand government believed that nuclear alliance was essential to the country’s security, due to the country being small, isolated and vulnerable. See, for example, Prime Minister Holyoake’s letter to the UN Secretary-General in 1962, in UNDC, “DC/201/Add.2,” 48.

\textsuperscript{12} See, for example, the comments of Foreign Minister Don McKinnon in Goulter, “NZers Serving in Gulf.”

\textsuperscript{13} Angus Reid Group, “Canadians’ Views on a Global Ban on Nuclear Weapons.”
The mechanisms of identity-based policy influence

This section examines a range of mechanisms through which identities influenced nuclear disarmament policy in the case studies. At times, the activation of an anti-nuclear weapon identity among government leaders was a core driver for nuclear disarmament advocacy. Such advocacy can be thought of as resulting from what is termed here ‘identity compliance’. In other situations, the core policy driver was more instrumental. That is, elite decision making was motivated by the widespread activation of a public anti-nuclear weapon identity. In these cases, government leaders believed that electoral logic required them to take actions consistent with previous public statements in favour of disarmament, even if their personal preferences favoured other priorities; the mechanism driving nuclear disarmament advocacy was thus rhetorical entrapment. A third mechanism through which identity informed policy was cognitive dissonance; this case saw a leader dealing with contradictory policy demands due to competing, personally-held identities which produced conflicting preferences. In some cases, a combination of these mechanisms may have driven nuclear disarmament advocacy.

In the early 1970s, all three segments of the New Zealand population held anti-nuclear weapon identities to varying degrees, and thus, opposed nuclear testing in principle. In terms of policy priorities, however, the conservative government favoured protection of the country’s economic interests over the more robust expressions of anti-nuclear weapon sentiment being demanded by many members of the public, and by civil society activists and the opposition Labour Party. In this context, the impetus for the conservative government to pursue progressively higher-profile nuclear disarmament advocacy appears to have come from electoral dynamics, rather than persuasion about such advocacy as a genuine foreign policy priority. For the conservatives, a combination of identity compliance and instrumental logic thus drove disarmament policy. After the election of the Labour government in late 1972, the prime minister saw nuclear disarmament advocacy as a natural policy priority and expression of national interest. In this sense, identity compliance was far more apparent as a policy driver for the new government.

In Canada in the early 1980s, Prime Minister Trudeau experienced significant, personal psychological conflict when two competing national identities—a pro-alliance identity and an anti-nuclear weapon identity—were activated in him at the same time. The pro-alliance identity was activated by domestic and allied officials and peers, who invoked alliance ties and norms, and in some cases,
Canadian economic interests, in promoting acquiescence to a US request to test nuclear-capable cruise missiles in Canada. Trudeau was initially reluctant to support cruise testing, but was swayed by his colleagues’ pro-alliance arguments. Mass public protests against cruise testing activated his anti-nuclear weapon identity, however. Protesters condemned Trudeau in particular, highlighting the contradiction between his government’s decision to allow cruise testing and his personal promotion of a peace-making, pro-disarmament identity for Canada in the past.

The rapid speed with which the peace initiative was conceived, planned and executed; the central role that Trudeau played in these three aspects of it; and his willingness to suffer criticism from officials and peers at home and abroad due to his public challenges to nuclear deterrence theory, all suggest that a strong, personal psychological motivation drove the initiative. This conclusion is supported by the fact that Trudeau announced his retirement just weeks after the end of the initiative, suggesting it is unlikely he was motivated by electoral logic.  

The thesis concludes that Trudeau’s strong desire to comply with his anti-nuclear weapon identity, combined with the cognitive dissonance that resulted when the public condemned him as having betrayed that identity, drove this instance of nuclear disarmament advocacy.

Chapter seven showed how rhetorical entrapment drove several aspects of New Zealand’s nuclear disarmament advocacy in the mid-1990s. In this case, the conservative government worked throughout the early part of the decade to try to restore the US alliance, which would have required repealing the New Zealand Nuclear Free Zone Act. The government was confronted with regular questions from opposition MPs and members of the public, however, about its commitment to the anti-nuclear weapon norms in the Act. The strength of the New Zealand public nuclear taboo, combined with its regular invocation, created a clear expectation that given the opportunity, the government would express anti-nuclear weapon sentiment on behalf of the country. The result was a decade of relatively strong nuclear disarmament advocacy.

Finally, the Canadian nuclear disarmament advocacy in the late 1990s was driven most prominently by identity compliance in a key norm entrepreneur—Canadian Foreign Minister Lloyd Axworthy. There was strong public anti-nuclear weapon sentiment at this point, but it appears that Axworthy saw this as justifying and legitimising his disarmament advocacy, rather than motivating it. Axworthy’s own anti-nuclear weapon identity was activated by international normative

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14 Even if critics were to claim that Trudeau was thinking of his legacy, this is a reputational and thus largely psychological motivation.

**Nuclear weapons are not immune to persuasion effects**

This thesis further contributes to the constructivist literature by providing a detailed case study of how socialisation dynamics led to the reversal of the dominant, nuclear weapons-related national identity among New Zealand officials over the course of the 1990s. In the 1980s and early 1990s, the dominant norm hierarchy among senior New Zealand politicians and officials saw maintenance of the US alliance as an unquestioned security priority. The preference among these governmental elites was thus to abandon the country’s nuclear free policy and resume US alliance ties. Across the mid-to-late 1990s, however, a significant shift occurred in the dominant national identity among officials, and this was reflected in New Zealand disarmament policy.

In the late 1990s, there was very low New Zealand public attention to nuclear issues, and senior, conservative government ministers continued to see improving ties with the United States as a policy priority. Regardless, New Zealand undertook ever more progressive and assertive nuclear disarmament advocacy in the late 1990s. The implication is that this advocacy appears to have been driven largely by foreign ministry officials—a constituency which had previously strongly supported resumption of US alliance ties. It appears, therefore, that the hierarchy of security-related norms had shifted among officials, with alliance resumption now seen as a secondary interest to the pursuit of nuclear disarmament. The absence of pressure from the public or government ministers to pursue strong nuclear disarmament advocacy suggests that a genuine process of persuasion had occurred among officials about the ‘oughtness’ of nuclear disarmament.

In her book on norm dynamics in the context of nuclear nonproliferation, Rublee asks: ‘do actors who comply based on identification or social conformity experience this internal change, leading ultimately to the influence outcome of persuasion?’ The findings in chapter seven point to the

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15 The New Agenda Coalition, for example, was officially driven at the foreign minister level, but came out of discussions among officials from Ireland, New Zealand and South Africa. It was given its initial political impetus by the Irish government. See, Mukhatzhanova and Potter, “Coalitions to Watch.”


conclusion that this is indeed the case. This thesis argues that the persuasion effect experienced by New Zealand officials regarding nuclear disarmament norms resulted from those officials consistently practising and promoting such norms for more than a decade, due to their institutionalisation in the Nuclear Free Zone Act in 1987. This conclusion, and the empirical data that support it, reflect an observation from Wendt’s formative essay on constructivism: 'institutionalization is a process of internalizing new identities and interests, not something occurring outside them and affecting only behavior; socialization is a cognitive process, not just a behavioral one.'\textsuperscript{18} In effect, due to the domestic institutionalisation of anti-nuclear weapon norms in New Zealand, those norms had begun to ‘grow their own legs.’\textsuperscript{19}

At the same time, it should be noted that international socialisation processes also contributed to this outcome, with New Zealand’s nuclear disarmament advocacy being positively reinforced by back-patting from international peers. This included, for example, developments such as New Zealand winning a Security Council seat for 1993-94, strongly aided by the reputational benefits accruing from the maintenance of the Nuclear Free Zone Act; being granted full membership of the CD in 1996; being invited to join the NAC in 1998; and being invited to chair nuclear disarmament negotiations at the 2000 NPT Review Conference. Nevertheless, in terms of the theoretical findings of this thesis, the more striking observation relates to the increasing persuasion of foreign ministry officials regarding nuclear disarmament norms, and the consequent evolution of the dominant identity in this constituency. The discussion returns to this point further below, examining its relationship to contemporary policy developments, and highlighting further theoretical questions to which it gives rise.

This brings to a close the discussion of key theoretical findings related to the influence of national identity on nuclear disarmament advocacy. Discussion now turns to the key case study findings regarding the influence of contextual factors on policy. In general, the findings suggest that certain contextual factors tend to augment the expression of anti-nuclear weapon identities—thus making nuclear disarmament advocacy more likely—while other factors tend to attenuate or constrain the expression of such identities. The following section summarises the most relevant patterns in this regard.

\textsuperscript{18} Wendt, “Anarchy Is What States Make of It,” 399.
\textsuperscript{19} Cialdini, Influence, 84.
The influence of context on nuclear disarmament advocacy

Normative context

As signposted in chapter two, this thesis has paid particular attention to the role of legal norms, at both the domestic and international levels, in shaping policy debates and outcomes. At both of these levels, the thesis has found a strong correlation between the existence of legal anti-nuclear weapon norms, and the likelihood of nuclear disarmament advocacy.

Arguably the most famous dictum of Prussian military theorist Carl von Clausewitz is that ‘war is the continuation of policy by other means.’ The case studies presented here suggest a similar claim could be made with regard to international law. In other words, at the international level law is the continuation of policy by other means. In several of the cases, for example, Canadian or New Zealand governments used international law as a tool to increase the profile or legitimacy of particular pro-disarmament policies being advocated. The existence of international law thus acts as a facilitating factor, making the expression of anti-nuclear weapon identities more likely.

In the early 1970s, the realisation that France had signed the 1928 General Act of Arbitration was an important factor in convincing the New Zealand government to initiate an ICJ contentious case to try to stop French nuclear testing in the Pacific. In the same period, New Zealand’s disarmament advocacy consistently highlighted the anti-nuclear weapon norms contained in treaties such as the NPT, PTBT and regional NWFZ, in an effort to delegitimise and encourage others to oppose French nuclear testing. And in the late-1990s, the ICJ Advisory Opinion was a central reference point for both Canadian and New Zealand nuclear disarmament advocacy. In Canada, the ICJ Opinion was a key catalyst for the nuclear disarmament advocacy explored in chapter eight, as well as guiding the content of Axworthy’s political advocacy in certain respects. In the New Zealand context, the ICJ Advisory Opinion became a central aspect of all New Zealand nuclear disarmament advocacy from 1996 onward. The Opinion continues to play a central role in New Zealand’s nuclear disarmament

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advocacy to the present day, as the country’s disarmament ambassador, Dell Higgie, emphasised at a public event to mark the 20\textsuperscript{th} anniversary of the Opinion.\textsuperscript{21}

At the domestic level, it appears that the legal institutionalisation of anti-nuclear weapon norms can also play an important facilitating role for nuclear disarmament advocacy; the New Zealand Nuclear Free Zone Act is the key example examined here. As discussed above, the Act played several roles in this regard across the 1990s. Initially, the Act played a constraining role, preventing the conservative, pro-alliance government from reversing New Zealand’s anti-nuclear weapon policies. At the same time, the Act contributed to the rhetorical entrapment of the same politicians due to their previous expressions of support for its anti-nuclear weapon norms, and thus helped to produce proactive nuclear disarmament advocacy. In the longer term, the Act also made disarmament advocacy much more likely by contributing to the persuasion of officials regarding nuclear disarmament as a priority national interest. Arguably, then, without the Nuclear Free Zone Act, New Zealand’s most proactive nuclear disarmament advocacy in the 1990s may not have occurred. This counterfactual hypothesis, strongly backed by the evidence presented in chapter seven, implies a significant role for normative context in helping drive New Zealand’s nuclear disarmament advocacy.

This potentially important causal role for domestic anti-nuclear weapon legislation has been largely overlooked in debates over nuclear disarmament dynamics. The Canberra Commission, for example, lauds the potential role of international law in entrenching global norms, but fails to mention the role of domestic law in this regard.\textsuperscript{22} In fact, the constraining role that the Nuclear Free Zone Act played in in the 1990s reveals an important distinction between domestic and international law. As discussed in the introduction chapter, it is arguably impossible to coercively enforce international nuclear disarmament law. In contrast, due to the universally-internalised norm regarding the right of sovereign nations to use force to ensure the domestic rule of law, anti-nuclear weapon legal norms are enforceable in a domestic context. While disarmament norms are not exactly the same as anti-nuclear weapon norms, the two are inextricably linked. It follows that replicating anti-nuclear weapon legislation in other domestic jurisdictions is likely to be a necessary condition for moving towards the elimination of nuclear weapons, as Richard Tanter suggests: ‘Passage to a nuclear free

\textsuperscript{21} Dell Higie, “Speech to the Symposium Marking the 20th Anniversary of the 8 July 1996 Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice,” (Christchurch, 8 July 2016).

world will require surely more New Zealand’s.  

If the pattern observed in New Zealand holds true in other democratic non-nuclear weapon states, the domestic institutionalisation of anti-nuclear weapon laws would strongly favour the internalisation among officials of pro-disarmament norms, arguably increasing the likelihood of nuclear disarmament advocacy.

Civil society activity

All four case studies showed that civil society can influence state-based nuclear disarmament advocacy in relatively significant ways, whether catalysing or shaping the content of such advocacy. In New Zealand, for example, the activities of the Kirk Labour government in the early 1970s were directly inspired and informed by civil society protests. Most prominently, Kirk explicitly framed his intention to send a New Zealand navy vessel to protest at the French nuclear test site at Mururoa Atoll as a response to the similar actions of civil society activists in preceding years. In Canada in the 1980s, the rapid development of a civil society coalition, coalescing around opposition to cruise testing, led to the mass public protests that catalysed the Trudeau peace initiative. A key contextual factor in the two case studies from the 1990s—the 1996 ICJ Advisory Opinion—was a direct, downstream result of a transnational civil society campaign known as the World Court Project. The ICJ Opinion catalysed much of Canada’s nuclear disarmament advocacy in the late 1990s, and was a key touchstone for the nuclear disarmament norm entrepreneurship of Foreign Minister Axworthy. Meanwhile, the Advisory Opinion’s conclusions have been a core aspect of New Zealand’s nuclear disarmament advocacy since 1996. In effect, civil society activity has directly facilitated and empowered state-based nuclear disarmament advocacy, by assisting in the development of international disarmament law. This points to the counterfactual hypothesis that, were it not for the World Court Project, Canada’s nuclear disarmament advocacy within NATO and New Zealand’s comprehensive nuclear disarmament advocacy may not have occurred, or, in the latter case, may not have been so broad in scope.

Military alignment

Across all four case studies in this thesis, a key dynamic in the policymaking process was the competition between anti-nuclear weapon identities, and identities that affirm great power alliances as a priority and which therefore, since early in the nuclear age, have necessarily required acquiescence to nuclear deterrence norms. As noted in the introduction to this chapter, in three of the four case studies—the two Canadian cases, and the New Zealand case from the early 1970s—the countries’ nuclear disarmament advocacy focused on limited disarmament measures. In contrast, a central focus for New Zealand’s disarmament diplomacy in the second half of the 1990s was the comprehensive objective of eliminating nuclear weapons. The most prominent contextual change which correlates to this pattern of outcomes is New Zealand’s shift from US ally to ‘friend’ in the mid-1980s.

In theoretical terms, this pattern of outcomes again points to the notion of norm internalisation. The fact that New Zealand’s immediate focus in the early 1970s was limited to ending nuclear testing, for example, can be explained by the internalised belief across all three societal segments that membership in the ANZUS alliance was the priority national security interest. It was therefore unthinkable that New Zealand would challenge the overall security strategies of its great power ally—at least in the eyes of most officials and politicians. In the Canadian context, Trudeau’s personal aversion to nuclear weapons had led him to take a range of high-profile, anti-nuclear weapon actions both before and after entering politics. But an internalised pro-alliance identity among the majority of officials and colleagues at home and abroad meant that during his peace initiative in the early 1980s, Trudeau encountered strenuous opposition to his desire to challenge NATO’s nuclear deterrence strategy. In the late 1990s, Axworthy’s strong pro-disarmament preferences received emphatic support from a cross-party Canadian parliamentary report, and were legitimised by evidence of overwhelming public anti-nuclear weapon sentiment. But despite the end of the Cold War, and despite the Canberra Commission Report and ICJ Advisory Opinion, these pro-disarmament preferences were still secondary policy drivers, trumped by Canada’s widely internalised, pro-alliance identity and its related norms of solidarity and nuclear deterrence. Pro-alliance norms thus narrowed the scope of disarmament advocacy, and their internalised nature

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24 Norm entrepreneur Norman Kirk did question the value of extended nuclear deterrence, in public and private. Given that he died with 15 months of his prime ministerial term remaining, how his thinking might have influenced New Zealand policy if Kirk had lived is an interesting hypothetical question.
meant that the promotion of a revision to NATO nuclear policy did not outlive Axworthy’s tenure as foreign minister. In sum, in all three of the above cases, the scope of nuclear disarmament advocacy was attenuated by the primary identification with a widely internalised pro-alliance identity which necessitated, at a minimum, acquiescence to nuclear deterrence norms.

In contrast, several aspects of New Zealand’s nuclear disarmament advocacy in the mid-to-late 1990s focused on the comprehensive goal of complete nuclear disarmament. This correlated with a significant reduction in identification with pro-nuclear alliance norms, and with the increasing dominance of an internalised anti-nuclear weapon identity in the public and later, the bureaucracy. In conclusion, a key finding of this thesis is that membership in a nuclear alliance makes broad-scope nuclear disarmament advocacy much less likely, and suppresses the impulse to challenge the key normative barrier to disarmament: nuclear deterrence theory. The nature and policy impact of the normative competition between disarmament and deterrence is discussed in more detail below, in the section, ‘the disarmament/deterrence conundrum.’

Great power relations

The state of great power relations varied across the cases, with the related variation in findings providing no consistent pattern in the effect of those relations on nuclear disarmament advocacy. The findings suggest, for example, that great power crisis can motivate nuclear disarmament advocacy, but it also tends to narrow the scope of such advocacy by nuclear allies. Meanwhile, the end of the Cold War—resulting in a temporary reduction of great power tensions—was also seen as a motivation to pursue nuclear disarmament advocacy.

The early 1970s is a period commonly associated with superpower détente, but the reduced East-West tensions in this period do not appear either to have attenuated or augmented New Zealand’s expression of anti-nuclear weapon sentiment. Rather, the heightened focus on nuclear weapons and threats was driven by a regional concern—French nuclear testing in the Pacific. During the Trudeau peace initiative in 1983-1984, the crisis in East-West relations played a strong role in augmenting the expression of anti-nuclear weapon identities in Canada and thus, on the initiation of the Trudeau peace initiative. In the content of the initiative, however, the opposite pattern emerged. That is, the crisis caused many NATO members, as well as officials and politicians within
Canada, to emphasise alliance norms of solidarity and nuclear deterrence, and this had a constraining effect on the scope of Canada’s nuclear disarmament advocacy.

Following a period of relative détente between Russia and the United States in the early 1990s, great power relations steadily deteriorated across the decade. This trend was fuelled, among other things, by Russian concerns over the development of US ballistic missile defences, and tensions surrounding NATO expansion and activity. In this context, the state of great power relations did not appear to influence the New Zealand government’s policymaking process significantly, though alternative sources of nuclear threat—for example, the 1998 nuclear weapons tests by India and Pakistan—did add renewed urgency to the country’s nuclear disarmament advocacy. In the Canadian case, Axworthy saw the end of the Cold War as an opportunity to pursue nuclear disarmament objectives, but the reduced tension in Russia-NATO relations early in the decade did not appear to provide a proactive driver for disarmament advocacy. Later in the 1990s, Russia-NATO relations continued to deteriorate, reaching a significant low when NATO began bombing Serbia. In this context, alliance solidarity and deterrence norms had the effect of dampening the expression of anti-nuclear weapon sentiment by the Canadian government.

The disarmament/deterrence conundrum

There are fundamental conceptual and political tensions between the norms of nuclear disarmament and deterrence. These tensions have been a significant characteristic of international security debates since early in the nuclear age, creating what this thesis has termed the disarmament/deterrence conundrum.²⁵ Despite widespread support in principle for disarmament, in practice, nuclear deterrence norms are deeply entrenched in the national identities and foreign policy institutions of many countries around the world. The result has been the creation of powerful constituencies with vested personal, institutional and identity-based interests in maintaining those norms, which have themselves become self-reinforcing. These observations suggest that the relationships between the institutions and practices of nuclear deterrence on one hand, and nuclear

²⁵ The ICJ notes this tension, for example, in ICJ, “Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons”, p. 246, paras 48; p. 254, para. 66, 67; p. 255, para. 73; p. 263, para. 96. See also the Dissenting Opinion of ICJ Vice-President Schwebel, in ICJ, “Dissenting Opinion of Vice-President Schwebel,” ICJ Reports, July 8, 1996, 311.
disarmament on the other, must be a core focus for researchers seeking to understand disarmament dynamics and possibilities.

In case studies stretching across almost three decades, this thesis has shown the psychological and political mechanisms through which the disarmament/deterrence conundrum influences Canadian and New Zealand nuclear disarmament policies. In both countries, identification with deterrence norms attenuated the expression of anti-nuclear weapon identities and thus, constrained and narrowed the scope of nuclear disarmament advocacy. Due to the explicitly nuclear nature of NATO security strategy, the Canadian context highlights most clearly the challenges facing policymakers as they attempt to reconcile the competing demands of pro-alliance and pro-disarmament identities.26

In Canada, the conflictual dynamic between a peace-making disarmer identity, and another which sees the country as a solidarist NATO and US ally, creates a ‘quintessential dilemma’ for policymakers: ‘the diplomatic necessity of supporting NATO military plans and strategies, despite inner doubts among Canadians about their arms control and strategic logic.’27 The case study of Canadian nuclear disarmament policy in the 1990s demonstrates the bizarre contradictions that this disarmament/deterrence conundrum produces in practice. The central policy recommendation in the 1998 SCFAIT report to the Canadian government, for example, was that Canada ‘work consistently to reduce the political legitimacy and value of nuclear weapons in order to contribute to the goal of their progressive reduction and eventual elimination.’28 The Canadian government explicitly endorsed this recommendation. Just days later, however, the government also endorsed a NATO strategy document which states that nuclear deterrence makes ‘a unique contribution’ to allied security, and thus ‘remain essential to preserve peace.’29

If nuclear deterrence works—in other words, if nuclear weapons have political value, as the SCFAIT report put it—then delegitimising those weapons reduces their political value. Since devaluing or delegitimising nuclear weapons also increases the perceived costs of using nuclear weapons,

26 In contrast, New Zealand was never explicitly covered by the so-called US nuclear umbrella. Similarly in the ANZUS context, the United States has never explicitly affirmed that it provides a nuclear security guarantee to Australia, as discussed in chapter eight. Nevertheless, the suspension of New Zealand’s status as a US ally in the 1980s demonstrated the implicit requirement for allies to support US nuclear deterrence norms.

27 Tucker, “Canada and Arms Control,” 644.


29 NATO, “The Alliance’s Strategic Concept,” para. 46.
advancing either process undermines the credibility of threats to use the weapons.\textsuperscript{30} According to the logic that drives nuclear deterrence theory, delegitimising nuclear weapons thus undermines nuclear deterrence. As noted in chapter one, the internal logic of deterrence suggests that reducing nuclear deterrent threats increases the likelihood of suffering aggression and thus, of being drawn into armed conflict, with the potential for escalation to nuclear war. In this context, for example, Nick Ritchie notes that policymakers often think of credible nuclear deterrence in binary terms:

Many nuclear policy practitioners insist that the exclusive value of nuclear weapons is deterrence. It is the only variable in play and it is a value that bifurcates into a yes/ no dichotomy: either one deploys and operates nuclear weapons in a manner that exerts a ‘credible’ nuclear deterrent threat, thereby generating national security value, or one deploys and operates nuclear weapons in a manner that does not, thereby generating zero national security value.\textsuperscript{31}

In this context, saying that one supports both nuclear deterrence and the delegitimisation of nuclear weapons as ways to prevent nuclear war appears conceptually schizophrenic; logically speaking, it is not possible for both statements to be true. The Canadian policy statements above imply that the country’s leaders purport to believe A while working to achieve B, when from the vantage point of A, actually achieving B significantly increases the likelihood of global nuclear catastrophe. Advocating tangible steps towards disarmament thus appears illogical and existentially threatening.\textsuperscript{32}

This observation helps to explain why the expression of anti-nuclear weapon sentiment provoked such extreme responses from deterrence insiders in the various cases examined here. As noted in chapter seven, for example, the Canadian ambassador for disarmament classed as ‘hysterical’ the opposition of US, UK and French diplomats to calls for an ICJ Advisory Opinion on the legal status of nuclear deterrence, while the Swedish disarmament ambassador stated that she had never in 20 years’ experience at the United Nations seen such coercive power politics.\textsuperscript{33} Later in the decade, a former US official called Axworthy’s nuclear disarmament policies ‘breathtakingly arrogant in their

\textsuperscript{30} For a deterrence-based perspective on the destabilising nature of ‘devaluation’ of nuclear weapons, see, Schulte, “The Strategic Risks of Devaluing Nuclear Weapons.” For a counterpoint, see, Berry et al., \textit{Delegitimizing Nuclear Weapons: Examining the Validity of Nuclear Deterrence}, 11–12.

\textsuperscript{31} Ritchie, “Valuing and Devaluing Nuclear Weapons,” 154.

\textsuperscript{32} Bull, “Disarmament and the International System,” 47; Barry Buzan, \textit{An Introduction to Strategic Studies: Military Technology and International Relations} (Basingstoke Macmillan, 1987), 250.

\textsuperscript{33} Schapiro, “Mutiny on the Nuclear Bounty,” 798; Dewes and Green, “The World Court Project,” 66.
ignorance.” This thesis argues that the extreme nature of these and other responses to nuclear disarmament advocacy results from a dual destabilising effect that such advocacy has on those who have been socialised to nuclear deterrence norms. In institutional terms, elite constituencies in NATO and other US allies have been habituated to alliance-based nuclear norms for decades. Any challenge to long-established practices is likely to encounter resistance—not least, for example, for self-interested reasons such as job security or identity stability. However, the extremity of the responses documented here, and the steadfast commitment to nuclear deterrence theory, despite the collapse of the bi-polar international order that strongly informed its development, cannot credibly be explained simply by habituation. Rather, for those who believe nuclear deterrence provides existential security, disarmament advocacy which challenges physical or conceptual deterrence structures poses a deeply psychologically destabilising threat. This is because deterrence theory implies that to make progress towards nuclear disarmament increases the risk of nuclear war. In psychological terms, the logic of nuclear deterrence thus creates in the minds of its adherents a conceptual cul-de-sac from which they see escape as being very difficult. US Secretary of Defence Ash Carter, for example, acknowledges that ‘You never get quite used to how terrible [a failure of nuclear deterrence] would be,’ but, according to his interviewer, also argues, ‘that the dangers of the nuclear world left no other obvious option.’

And yet, the New Zealand example demonstrates that it is possible to escape the disarmament/deterrence conundrum. The country’s prime minister, David Lange, emphasised precisely this point in his book on the topic, as demonstrated by the opening quotation of this thesis: ‘What I hoped to do, not by offering answers for others but by describing what New Zealand had done, was to make the point that alternatives were possible. What we needed was the political will to look for them.’ Certainly, New Zealand is unique in terms of its geography, which undeniably informed its decisions. As this thesis has highlighted at several points, however, the country’s geography, like any ‘reality constraint,’ does not have a pre-determined meaning; its effect on policy has therefore depended significantly on the interpretations placed on geography by human agents. These interpretations have ranged from the belief that New Zealand’s isolation rendered nuclear

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34 Jones, “Canada and the US,” 40.
36 Lange, Nuclear Free, 118.
alliance membership as essential in the nuclear age, to the belief that bringing nuclear weapons to a region in which there were none decreased national and international security. The key to these contrasting conclusions lies in the political, not the geographical landscape. It is to this point specifically that the current thesis responds. The aim here has been to raise awareness of the identity-based and contextual dynamics that inform nuclear disarmament-related political dynamics.

**Future research**

**Additional case studies**

An obvious extension of the research presented here would be to apply the current analytical framework to the nuclear disarmament policies of additional non-nuclear weapon states. The conducting of such case studies would provide further empirical data on which to build typological theories, thus helping to test and refine the findings offered above regarding nuclear disarmament dynamics. In particular, given the centrality of the disarmament/deterrence conundrum to much nuclear policymaking, it would be useful to investigate other countries that subscribe to nuclear deterrence theory. Australia is the most obvious candidate for comparison to Canada and New Zealand in this regard. It is a liberal, parliamentary democracy, and a US ally. In contextual terms, Australia faces an interesting combination of the factors that have influenced Canadian and New Zealand policies. In 1985, for example, while promoting and negotiating the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone, Australia was also grappling with a US request to test nuclear-capable intercontinental ballistic missiles off the southeast Australian coast, and seeking to ensure that the South Pacific Zone did not outlaw passage of nuclear-armed US warships.37 Similar candidates for analysis include other US allies, such as Japan and various NATO states—for example, Belgium, Germany, Italy and the Netherlands—which have also pursued nuclear disarmament advocacy at various points. The

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37 Maclellan, “Delaying the Nuclear-Free Zone in the Pacific.”
variations in the electoral systems of these different countries would need to be accounted for, but in principle, the methodological framework developed here would be applicable.38

Socialisation effects

The empirical material in this thesis related to New Zealand policymaking presents interesting theoretical observations regarding various norm and identity dynamics operating in the three different segments of society. While the observations arise in the context of nuclear disarmament policies, they are relevant to the constructivist literature more broadly. The first observation concerns the difference between the socialisation dynamics that occur at the bureaucratic level and those that occur among elected politicians. The second relates to the long-term policy dynamics that occur as a result of public internalisation of an identity. And the third observation concerns the ongoing role of officials as key drivers of New Zealand's nuclear disarmament advocacy.

On the first issue, a preliminary comparison between the case study of New Zealand’s nuclear disarmament advocacy in the 1990s and the country’s contemporary policy dynamics in this field suggests that the persuasion effects seen in New Zealand officials have not also occurred in conservative politicians. As such, it would appear that the experiences of actors in these two constituencies are characterised by different socialisation dynamics. Certainly, chapter seven argues that Prime Minister Jim Bolger, a member of the conservative National Party, developed a strengthened personal commitment to anti-nuclear weapon norms due to his repeated public association with New Zealand’s nuclear disarmament policies in the 1990s. This dynamic appears to have been unique to Prime Minister Bolger, however, and contemporary developments suggest that senior National Party politicians do not share this strengthened anti-nuclear weapon identity.

In the mid-2000s, for example, the National Party in opposition was again beginning to challenge aspects of the Nuclear Free Zone Act. In 2004, the party’s leader, Don Brash, is alleged to have told

38 Turkey, which also hosts US nuclear weapons and is a NATO ally, might present challenges to the framework however, particularly following the ‘purges’ conducted by the government of President Recep Tayyip Erdogan in 2016 in the wake of an attempted coup, which appears to have undermined many of the country’s democratic institutions. See, for example, Kenan Gurbuz, “Turkish Government Shutters Dozens of Media Organizations - CBS News,” CBS News, July 27, 2016, https://web.archive.org/web/20160728134712/http://www.cbsnews.com/news/turkey-government-shutters-dozens-of-media-organizations/.
US Congress members visiting New Zealand that if the National Party were elected to govern, the nuclear free law would be ‘gone by lunchtime.’ Brash denies making the comment, but the Labour government of the day regularly raised the issue in public and attacked the National Party as untrustworthy on the issue. Brash acknowledges that the public perception that he was willing to challenge the law produced significant, adverse effects on his personal political fortunes, and may have contributed to National’s election loss the following year.

By 2006, the National Party had lost its third national election in a row. In this context, the party’s foreign affairs spokesperson, Murray McCully, convinced the party to reaffirm its unqualified commitment to maintaining the Nuclear Free Zone Act as written. Subsequent events suggest, however, that this decision was driven by instrumental logic rather than genuine persuasion. In 2011, for example, the National Party-led government disestablished the role of minister for disarmament—a role created by the Nuclear Free Zone Act. This reduces the profile of disarmament policy issues at home, as well as reducing New Zealand’s profile and potentially, influence in international meetings. Diplomatic protocol, for example, affords government ministers the right to speak before officials at intergovernmental meetings. If more powerful states send officials to a meeting, which is often the case, less powerful states have an opportunity to influence the agenda and discussion points by sending a minister. In disestablishing the ministerial disarmament portfolio, this opportunity is lost to New Zealand. Presumably, the foreign minister is now responsible for disarmament policy, but neither the idea of a disarmament portfolio nor even the word ‘disarmament’ feature on now-Foreign Minister McCully’s governmental or National Party websites. In campaigning for a seat on the UN Security Council in 2013-2014, the government did not highlight or promote New Zealand’s internationally-lauded anti-nuclear weapon policies. Given the strong identification of many New Zealanders with these policies as a point of national pride, this omission was incongruous, as Robert Ayson, the Director of the Centre for Strategic Studies at

41 Ibid.
42 NZHR, New Zealand Nuclear Free Zone Act, Section 18(1).
Victoria University, Wellington, notes. Similarly, when McCully visited the United Nations in New York during the 2015 NPT Review Conference, he did not address the Conference, nor attend any NPT sessions.

This complete lack of interest in nuclear disarmament issues—and indeed, active eschewal of such issues, as exemplified by the disestablishment of the ministerial portfolio—among senior conservative politicians suggests that while maintenance of the Nuclear Free Zone Act has assisted in persuading officials about the normative value of nuclear disarmament, the same has not happened at the political level. It follows that the socialisation dynamics that operate at the political level differ from those at the bureaucratic level. One possible way of understanding the difference is that specialist officials tend to practice specific norms more regularly than politicians, and thus, the latter are less likely to experience identity shifts due to norms ‘growing their own legs.’

Turning to the second issue flagged at the start of this section, the long-term political dynamics that result from public internalisation of an identity deserve further discussion. A preliminary comparison between New Zealand public engagement with nuclear disarmament policy in the 1990s and that of today reveals that such engagement has been radically reduced. The Nuclear Free Zone Act is still in force at time of writing and, according to conservative Prime Minister John Key, still very popular with the public. In 2014, when questioned on the issue at an event at New Zealand’s embassy in Washington, Key said, ‘We have anti-nuclear legislation and New Zealanders wear it as a badge of honour. There ain't any time in the future of [New Zealand] that we're ever going to nuclear power, nuclear weapons...or nuclear anything; it's just not happening.’ This assertion is supported by the fact that public discussion of amending the Nuclear Free Zone Act elicits rapid and vocal public opposition, as noted in the preceding paragraphs. In her 2012 book _Mad on Radium_, Rebecca Priestley notes that ‘being nuclear free is now hugely important to most

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45 This observation is based on the author’s experience as a member of the New Zealand delegation to the Review Conference.
46 Watkins, “Key Emphasises NZ’s Anti-Nuclear Stance.” In a similar vein, a prominent critic of the nuclear free law bemoaned its ongoing popularity in 2008: ‘Anti-nuclearism may be the closest thing we have to a state religion, with the 1987 Act our sacred text and David Lange as our first saint.’ Smith, “Nuclear Power in New Zealand: Attitudes and Prospects,” 77. With regard to the prime minister’s comments, it should be noted that the legislation actually makes no reference to land-based nuclear energy, though the two issues of nuclear weapons and nuclear energy are often conflated in the public mind.
New Zealanders.\textsuperscript{47} In an article published the same year, James Headley and Andreas Reitzig similarly state that the Nuclear Free Zone Act ‘is now considered a defining feature of New Zealand’s international identity.’\textsuperscript{48}

Despite strong public support for maintaining the Nuclear Free Zone Act, however, it is perhaps necessary in the contemporary context to distinguish between a domestic norm of nuclear freedom, and anti-nuclear weapon sentiment—the latter being the core driver for nuclear disarmament advocacy, as demonstrated throughout this thesis. New Zealand public anti-nuclear weapon sentiment may actually be eroding, as Headley and Reitzig point out: the last significant public opinion poll on the issue, which they commissioned in 2008, found that while ‘over two-thirds believe that nuclear disarmament is important (‘very important’ or ‘quite important’), 30 percent stated that it was not important (‘not very important’ or ‘not at all important’).\textsuperscript{49} Surveys conducted decades apart may vary significantly in focus, methodology and thus, comparability. Nevertheless, these findings appear to represent a significant decline from 1986, when government polling found that 86 percent of New Zealanders believed their government should actively promote nuclear disarmament.\textsuperscript{50} Anecdotally, the most common question that the author encountered from members of the New Zealand public while conducting this research was something to the effect of, do we have a nuclear disarmament policy? Meanwhile, civil society activity in this field appears to be at an all-time low; the 350 active, local area peace and anti-nuclear groups that existed in 1986 have dwindled to a small handful of expert organisations and individuals.\textsuperscript{51} Kevin Clements, for example, the director of the National Centre for Peace and Conflict Studies, presented a paper to the 2015 Otago Foreign Policy School entitled, ‘What happened to the New Zealand peace movement?’\textsuperscript{52} In sum, despite strong public attachment to a domestic nuclear taboo, New Zealand public awareness of international nuclear threats and disarmament issues is now extremely low.

In theoretical terms, the discussion of identity in chapter two highlighted that for the public, national identities are built on heroes and stories that evoke pride. That discussion, however, also emphasised that stories must be retold and celebrated in order for the relevant identity to survive.

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
\item[47] Priestley, \textit{Mad on Radium}, vii.
\item[48] Headley and Reitzig, “Does Foreign Policy Represent the Views of the Pub,” 71.
\item[49] Ibid., 79.
\item[51] For a list of those active in 1986, see, Harrex and Quin, “Peace Is More than the Absence of War,” 110–115.
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
In the New Zealand context, this celebration of stories relating to anti-nuclear heroes and episodes has largely stopped. One reason for this is that—just as predicted by ideational scholars—internalisation of anti-nuclear weapon sentiment has significantly diminished attention to related issues, due to the consensus about preferences in the field. In political terms, this lack of public attention has had two main effects. First, it has removed the electoral pressure on politicians to pursue a leadership role in nuclear disarmament. This has further reduced public exposure to the issue, contributing to a cycle of gradual identity erosion. And second, the lack of public attention has actually created political space for non-persuaded politicians to begin dismantling the institutional structures supporting pro-disarmament norms. In effect, the New Zealand case demonstrates that the unanimity of preferences created by identity internalisation in the short term also opens political space for identity and norm erosion in the long term.

Regarding the final issue highlighted at the start of this section, it is striking to note that despite the lack of active public or governmental interest in nuclear disarmament issues, New Zealand has maintained a high international profile in this field. In fact, the country’s reputation as a leading disarmament advocate is still relatively strong. New Zealand’s strong support for the Humanitarian Initiative is a good example of its recent high profile and comprehensive nuclear disarmament advocacy. For many nuclear disarmament advocates, this Initiative—which seeks to highlight the catastrophic humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons, in order to build political will and momentum for disarmament—represents the most significant development in recent years. The Humanitarian Initiative emerged out of the deep dissatisfaction among non-nuclear weapon states at the total lack of progress on multilateral nuclear disarmament, despite the detailed disarmament plans and objectives agreed at the 2000 and 2010 NPT Review Conferences. New Zealand was among 16 states, coordinated by Switzerland, which presented a joint statement on this issue of humanitarian impact of nuclear weapons to the 2012 NPT Preparatory Committee. In March the

53 See, for example, the commentary from US-based disarmament and nonproliferation experts, in Mukhatzhanova and Potter, “Coalitions to Watch.”
56 Austria et al., “Joint Statement on the Humanitarian Dimension of Nuclear Disarmament,” presented to the NPT Preparatory Committee (Vienna, 2 May 2012),
next year, the Norwegian government hosted an international conference on the issue in Oslo. At the conclusion of the conference, New Zealand announced that it would coordinate the next joint international statement on humanitarian impact of nuclear weapons, thus becoming a key leader and representative for the Initiative.\footnote{See, for example, ICAN, “New Zealand Announces Continuation of the Humanitarian Initiative,” September 16, 2013, https://web.archive.org/web/20160512152027/http://www.icanw.org/campaign-news/new-zealand-announces-continuation-of-the-humanitarian-initiative/.} In conclusion, given the widespread public inattention to nuclear weapons issues, and the government’s dismantlement of the ministerial disarmament portfolio and demonstrable lack of interest in the issue, it follows that officials are the key constituency driving the country’s nuclear disarmament advocacy. The country’s ongoing leadership role as a nuclear disarmament advocate, moreover, suggests that a strong anti-nuclear weapon identity remains dominant among officials.

The three observations above build on the earlier theoretical discussion of the historical case studies in this thesis. By comparing those historical cases with contemporary dynamics, the observations help to further clarify how norms and identities evolve in a democratic society, as well as showing how that evolution corresponds to policy processes and outcomes across time. The observations point to several broad conclusions of theoretical significance. First, even internalised norms and identities suffer from ‘natural’ erosion over time, and require constant maintenance if they are to retain their strength. Second, the mechanisms through which identities emerge, are maintained or erode appear to differ across the three democratic constituencies specified in the current methodology. Finally, any one of those three constituencies can act as a driver for policy in a democracy. These final two conclusions provide further evidence of the utility of the methodology presented here, in terms of analytically segmenting a democratic population when seeking to assess the effects of identity on policy. These conclusions are preliminary and would benefit from further exploration, whether in the form of new case studies such as those proposed earlier, or from comparison with findings in other empirical fields regarding the influence of identity on policy.
The law-norm nexus

Finally in terms further theoretical development, this thesis points to two issues which arise at the intersection of IR constructivism and international legal theory. First, one area in which constructivist scholarship requires development, and in which legal theory offers a possible pathway, is in defining the specific content of norms. At present, despite the core constructivist premise that norms affect behaviour, there is no broad agreement on a method for defining norm content. International legal methodology offers constructivists an interesting point of departure in this regard; Finnemore notes, for example, ‘...international legal scholarship is an interesting object of study for constructivists in that part of its mission is to make new norms. One of the functions of legal scholarship is to articulate and codify norms and rules for states.’\(^5^8\) This interdisciplinary exploration makes sense, given that both IR constructivists and legal theorists often focus on the same empirical material—the negotiation, texts and implementation of international treaties. As some norm scholars have noted, the meaning attributed to international norms is not uniform across domestic jurisdictions: a ‘localisation’ of international norms often occurs as they are implemented at the domestic level.\(^5^9\) In this sense, it must be acknowledged that defining the content of an international norm will always reflect a degree of subjectivity, rather than an objective ‘reality’. Regardless, developing agreement on the use of legal methodology as a starting point for constructivist norm scholarship would enable more rigorous comparison of claims regarding the effects of norms on behaviour, and equally, regarding the effects of behaviour on content of norms.

The 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT) is the authoritative international agreement regarding treaty law.\(^6^0\) VCLT Articles 31-33 codify the rules for interpreting treaty provisions—rules which the ICJ, other international courts and tribunals, and many national-level courts have consistently recognised as reflecting customary international law.\(^6^1\) This customary law status means that VCLT Articles 31–33 apply to all treaties, including those that pre-date the VCLT, and to all states, regardless of whether or not they are VCLT signatories.\(^6^2\) The VCLT rules for treaty

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\(^{58}\) Finnemore, *National Interests*, 140.


\(^{60}\) See “VCLT.”


interpretation thus provide an appropriate methodology for defining the content of treaty-based nuclear disarmament norms, as the Canberra Commission Report pointed out in 1996. In the context of nuclear disarmament, a few scholars have attempted VCLT-based analyses of NPT Article VI. However, these analyses have either been undertaken as a political tool to bolster the claim that the United States is not required to take further nuclear disarmament steps, and/or have been based on a deeply flawed or selective application of the VCLT method. In sum, there is a need for much more rigorous and detailed VCLT-based analysis of NPT Article VI. The current author is working on such an analysis, with the intention of submitting it for peer review shortly.

Secondly in terms of the links between international legal theory and IR constructivism, chapter five highlighted the parallels between the concept of customary international law and constructivist understandings of norm dynamics. Specifically, customary international law exists when there is uniform state practice of a norm, and that practice is guided by opinio juris sive necessitatis—the belief that the behaviour is legally required. In a rough approximation of this concept, for example, New Zealand’s attorney-general stated that in international relations, ‘when enough people say it, it is the law.’ Though customary law is highly contentious and the bar for proving its existence is very high, it follows that the accumulation of prominent actors’ statements about the content of international legal norms can actually affect the content of those norms, and can thus have a downstream effect on other parties’ preferences and potentially, on international outcomes. This suggests the need for further research on the impact of nuclear disarmament advocacy on international norms, and in particular, on customary international law.

A contemporary context in which these theoretical dynamics could be explored is the Marshall Islands’ nuclear disarmament cases against India, Pakistan and the United Kingdom—if the ICJ accepts jurisdiction to rule on the cases. The Marallese argue that these nuclear armed states

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64 Kiernan, “‘Disarmament’ under the NPT”; Ford, “Debating Disarmament”; Joyner, *Interpreting the NPT*.
65 Burford, “Defining the Nuclear Disarmament Norm.”
have failed to fulfil their international nuclear disarmament obligations. In lodging cases against non-NPT members India and Pakistan, the Marshall Islands claims that the nuclear disarmament obligation in NPT Article VI has acquired the status of customary international law, and therefore applies to all countries. This raises the questions of how this claim might be justified legally; how such justifications will be perceived politically; and how the resulting dialogue might affect international nuclear disarmament norms and behaviours—all questions which lie at the nexus of international legal theory and IR constructivism, as outlined above.

Concluding thoughts

This thesis began by outlining two puzzles relating to nuclear disarmament advocacy—one regarding IR theory and the other regarding policy. The theoretical discussion above demonstrates that nuclear disarmament advocacy can usefully be understood through an ideational lens that treats identity as a key driver for policy. This identity-based discussion thus goes some way to explaining the second puzzle introduced at the start of the thesis—the question of why there is such a large gap between aspiration and action on multilateral nuclear disarmament. The theoretical analysis has demonstrated that the widespread adherence to nuclear deterrence theory creates not just political barriers to nuclear disarmament, but deeply entrenched psychological and institutional ones as well. In countering these barriers to disarmament, much work remains to be done.

Despite the nuclear disarmament aspirations of the international community, and despite ever-increasing awareness of the catastrophic consequences of any use of nuclear weapons, a survey of the international strategic landscape reveals a bleak picture. The post-Cold War nuclear arsenal reductions were driven largely by a logic of economic rationalisation which sought to save
money by retiring militarily redundant weapons and delivery systems. The initially-rapid pace of nuclear reductions has slowed dramatically, giving way to active modernisation and/or life extension programmes in all nine nuclear armed states that would see nuclear weapons retained for up to half a century. Collectively, these nine states spend roughly a trillion US dollars each decade on their nuclear arsenals.

Meanwhile, new technologies are exacerbating old nuclear threats and creating new ones. The development of hypersonic missile technology is advancing rapidly, implying that the flight times of future intercontinental nuclear missiles may be radically reduced, raising further concerns among military planners over the potential for nuclear first strikes by adversaries and thus, increasing the risk of nuclear war. As dual-use nuclear technology becomes cheaper, more advanced and more widespread, the risk of non-state actors acquiring and using nuclear weapons is growing. This includes, for example, the challenges posed by the potential to use 3D printing to develop nuclear weapons, and by the development of laser enrichment, which would make the manufacture of fissile material cheaper, faster, and enormously more difficult to detect. As cyber war and/or

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76 “Nuclear Terrorism Fact Sheet” (Cambridge, MA: Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, April 2010).


sabotage becomes ever more prevalent, the threat of terrorists hacking nuclear command and control systems in order to deliberately launch nuclear strikes is another serious concern.

In the post-Cold War world, globalised, non-military threats such as climate change, refugee flows, global pandemics, and economic instability render nuclear deterrence theory meaningless in the vast majority of security contexts.\(^7^9\) Regardless, the nuclear deterrence strategies that created and fed the nuclear arms race have survived the Cold War. This means that a moment-by-moment existential threat to humanity remains, though the global public is largely ignorant of the fact. Away from the public spotlight, nuclear deterrence strategies have exacerbated tensions unnecessarily in the post-Cold War. The maintenance of institutions dedicated to creating annihilation threats has continued to engender severe mistrust between potential nuclear adversaries, for example, despite the absence of any rational interest in initiating a nuclear conflict.\(^8^0\) Russia-US relations, degraded by sharp disagreements over developments in Ukraine and Syria among other areas, and over issues such as expanding NATO membership and Western missile defence programmes,\(^8^1\) are in a dramatic downward spiral. Writing in 2015, Russian nuclear expert Alexei Arbatov warned that the world now faces ‘the most serious and comprehensive crisis in the fifty-year history of nuclear arms control.’\(^8^2\) In a similar vein, former US Secretary of Defense from 1994–1997, William Perry, has stated, ‘Today, the danger of some sort of a nuclear catastrophe is greater than it was during the Cold War and most people are blissfully unaware of this danger.’\(^8^3\)

The multilateral disarmament picture is equally bleak. The CD, the only forum with a standing mandate to negotiate international disarmament agreements, has been completely deadlocked for two decades, leading the last remaining civil society organisation to abandon its monitoring of the


\(^8^0\) Ibid., 91.

\(^8^1\) Ibid., 95–96.


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Conference in 2015.\textsuperscript{84} The CTBT, signed in 1996, has not yet entered into force and there is little to suggest progress in this regard in the foreseeable future. There has been no progress on commencing negotiations on a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty, widely seen as an essential aspect of multilateral nuclear disarmament, despite more than two decades of efforts in this regard. In sum, despite the nuclear disarmament aspirations of the international community, there has been no tangible progress in multilateral nuclear disarmament for 20 years.\textsuperscript{85} As nuclear risks expand, the nuclear status quo is clearly inadequate to ensure true security in the 21st century.

For disarmament advocates, a rare point of policy-relevant hope arising from this thesis is that, as New Zealand’s experience demonstrates, it is possible to abandon the beliefs and norms that characterise nuclear deterrence. There is no simple prescription for replicating anti-nuclear weapon identities or policies; the thesis has been careful to point out the unique historical factors that led to New Zealand’s decision to reject nuclear defence. Nevertheless, the observations presented here regarding the social-psychological dynamics that inform nuclear disarmament policy in Canada and New Zealand suggest various avenues that policymakers seeking to advance disarmament objectives might explore. An important principle that has led to the specific focus here on nuclear disarmament\textit{ advocacy}, is that all political change begins with an act of advocacy. Understanding the causes of that advocacy bring us closer to understanding how change occurs. Most importantly, the thesis shows that nuclear weapons policy is not immune to the socialisation effects that function in other foreign policy fields. The dominance of neorealist theories in the realm of nuclear policy has blinded analysts to a simple, inescapable fact: humans are empathic social beings, not automatons. Psychologically speaking, individuals respond in meaningfully predictable ways to social cues such as condemnation or affirmation from peer groups. If policies and institutions can be designed around this simple notion, there may yet be hope for nuclear disarmament.


List of interviewees

NB: The biographical notes below are necessarily limited. They relate only to interviewees’ experiences which are most relevant to the current thesis. In addition to the interviewees listed below, two experts consented to be interviewed on a non-attributable basis in 2012. One was a prominent Canadian civil society expert; the other was a senior Canadian government official.


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Corner, Lynette. Wife of Frank Corner, New Zealand Permanent Representative to the United Nations, 1962-1967; Ambassador to the United States, 1967-1972; Secretary of Foreign Affairs, 1972-1980. 11 November 2013. [Frank Corner was too ill to be interviewed for this research.]


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