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Interpreting References to the Subject in Philosophical Writings

David Nickless

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Abstract

In this thesis I will develop and test an interpretive framework for the Subject based on the understanding that an entity can be identified as a Subject if it is the necessary referent for an attribution. This understanding provides a template for approaching different Subjects, for considering the validity of their being identified as Subjects, and for reorienting the general discourse of the Subject away from an investigation of particular entities to one concerned with the contexts which support such identifications.
Thought about thought, an entire tradition wider than philosophy, has taught us that thought leads us to the deepest interiority. Speech about speech leads us, by way of literature as well as perhaps by other paths, to the outside in which the speaking subject disappears.

Preface

Towards a Philosophy of the Subject

In this Thesis I will present a treatment of the concept of the Subject. While references to the idea of a Subject appear in many forms in every period of the Western philosophical tradition, from the metaphysical theories of the ancient Greeks to the modern Continental discourse, few of them address the general understanding of what it means for an entity to be a Subject. Most of the discussions in the Western tradition refer, rather, to specific forms of the Subject. Writing in the 1991 collection *Who Comes after the Subject?*, Vincent Descombes asserts that the debate in modern Continental philosophy regarding the existence of a Subject properly refers to the theory of a human Subject originating in the works of René Descartes and refined by Immanuel Kant. Faced with this, he observes that the general critique of the Subject, which the Continental debate purports to be, “… remains as yet entirely undone, at least in philosophy of the French language.”

As the first step towards a general theory of the Subject, my project in this Thesis will be to develop and test an interpretive framework capable of addressing different characterisations of the Subject within a single theoretical structure. At the heart of this framework lies an understanding of what it means for an entity to be identified as a Subject. In the opening chapter, based on a reading of Aristotle’s logical works, I will characterise this understanding in terms of the basic condition that an entity can be identified as a Subject if and only if it is the necessary referent of an attribution. In practical terms, the exact nature of a Subject will reflect the form of the instantiation of this condition in which it is encountered.

In the remainder of the Thesis I will test the framework developed in the opening chapter by demonstrating its applicability to cases in which different entities have been identified as Subjects and by considering its implications for the general discourse of the Subject. To accomplish the former demonstration, I will, in the next four chapters, consider examples drawn from the writings of French philosophers from the 1930s until the 1970s to show that, despite differing in form and context, each example supports the identification of a particular entity as being a Subject on the basis of its participation in an instantiation of the aforementioned condition.
examples I have chosen consist of Jean-Paul Sartre’s phenomenological writings of
the 1930s and 1940s culminating in *L'être et le néant: Essai d'ontologie
phénoménologique* (Being and Nothingness: An Essay on Phenomenological
Ontology), Claude Lévi-Strauss’s ethnological theories as they are expressed in his
mature writings from the early 1940s to the 1970s, Jacques Derrida’s deconstructive
investigations from the late 1950s to the early 1970s, and Jean-François Lyotard’s *La
condition postmoderne: rapport sur le savoir* (The Postmodern Condition: A Report
on Knowledge).5 In the sixth and final chapter I will consider the implications that the
interpretive framework has for the general discourse of the Subject. As part of this
last discussion I will briefly consider a possible reorientation of the critique of the
Subject as it appears in Twentieth-century French philosophy. While my results will
not in themselves establish the proposed framework as a general theory of the Subject,
they will open the way for others to consider its wider validity.

As with any work of this nature, this presentation is the product of many
influences. To that end, I would like to acknowledge those at the University of
Auckland through whose teaching I first encountered the idea of the Subject. I would
also like to thank those who have read and commented on earlier drafts of this Thesis,
in particular Associate Professor Robert Wicks of the Department of Philosophy and
the examiners assigned by the University. Without their observations this would have
been a lesser work.
A Note on References

In this Thesis I will adopt the following conventions with respect to references in text:

- All references – either explicit or implicit – will be accompanied by a note providing the appropriate publication details of each source.

- When explicitly introducing a source in the text I will provide the title of the work and, when that title is in a language other than English, a translation of the title. I will also provide details, where possible, of the published translation in the accompanying note.

- When referring to a non-English source in text, I will provide the details of the location in both the original language version and in the existing translation in the accompanying note.

- When a passage originating in a language other than English is explicitly presented in the text, the translation will be my own unless otherwise stated in the accompanying note.
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Introduction

Identifying Entities as Subjects

As a prelude to the development of a framework capable of interpreting the identification of different entities as being Subjects, it is useful to consider examples of such identifications both in ordinary language and philosophy.

0.1 The Subject in Ordinary Language

The definition of the noun “Subject” presented in the second edition of the *Oxford English Dictionary* indicates that it is possible to identify eighteen different applications of the term divided between four categories: the category defined by those cases in which “Subject” refers to a substance, the category in which it refers to the reference of a larger process, the category in which “Subject” designates those entities which are foci for acts of power, and the category defined by those cases where the term “Subject” is used to grammatically qualify the labels of entities which might otherwise have been called “Subjects” in the preceding senses.1

The first category of usage for the term “Subject” reflects its derivation from the Latin *subiectus* and, through that, from Aristotle’s treatment of the concept of *hupokeimenon*.2 In his treatment, Aristotle uses the term “*hupokeimenon*” – which carries a literal sense of something positioned beneath – to refer to the necessary underpinning of the manifestation of properties. Reflecting this, Subjects of the first category of modern ordinary language usage embody the idea of being such underpinnings. In particular, further mirroring Aristotle’s treatment, they are typically identified as being a substance. The *Oxford English Dictionary* notes that the identification of the Subject with human consciousness – a common practice in philosophy – represents an example of this category of usage deriving from the observation that consciousness provides the substance of a human being’s knowledge of the world.

The second category of usage of the term “Subject” indicated by the *Oxford English Dictionary* is perhaps the most general. In this case a Subject is an entity which acts as the basis for a reference. This reference can take many forms. It is possible, for example, to find Subjects of this category which are acted upon, studied,
or which are represented: a doctor, for example, performs a medical procedure upon a Subject, an academic specialty focuses upon a Subject, and a work of art refers, in its representation, to a Subject.

The third category indicated by the *Oxford English Dictionary* corresponds to one of the oldest English usages of the term “Subject.” Since approximately the middle of the fourteenth century, the term “Subject” has been used to refer to those entities that exist under the authority of or in obligation to another. Examples of such Subjects include those entities who are Subjects of the authority – or “majesty” – of a monarch and those who owe fealty to a feudal lord. The authority exercised upon this form of the Subject does not have to originate in a person. It is also possible to identify the source of authority with social structures such as the system of laws which govern a society. In the modern usage of the term, the idea of authority is replaced by the more general concept of power.

Before considering examples of the different characterisations of the Subject encountered in philosophy, it is worth noting that second and third categories indicated by definition of the term “Subject” in the *Oxford English Dictionary* display a degree of congruity with the first. In the case of the second category, the Subject clearly represents an underpinning in the Aristotelian sense due to the fact that any reference requires a Subject to refer to. The Subject, as such, lies beneath the reference. Subjects of the third category – the Subjects which exist under authority or obligation – can similarly be interpreted as being the underpinning of the exercise of that authority or the realisation of the obligation by providing something for the instantiation of power to act upon.

### 0.2 The Subject in Western Philosophy

Turning to the different characterisations of the Subject identified in Western philosophical theories, it is possible to divide these characterisations into categories paralleling the divisions discussed in the previous section.

The first category of philosophical Subjects consists of those entities which act as a substance. Beyond the basic logical sense in which a Subject is the substance of a predicate, this mode is most often associated, as it was in the corresponding ordinary language category, with human beings. A human Subject provides the substance for the conduct of his or her life. While it is possible to characterise human life, and
hence the Subject which provides its substance, in many different ways, one of the forms most often encountered in philosophical discussions presents that life in terms of the realisation of knowledge. The paradigmatic example of this form, according to Descombes, appears in Descartes’s *Meditationes de prima philosophia* (*Meditations on First Philosophy*).\(^4\) Descartes argues that the Subject represents the substance of its knowledge and corresponds to the human mind existing in the human body.\(^5\)

While philosophical treatments of knowledge and the requirements for its realisation have become more complex between Descartes in the Seventeenth century and the modern age, the tradition of identifying a human being with the substance of his or her knowledge has persisted. An important feature of this tradition is that it has given rise to many of the most influential thinkers of the Western philosophical tradition including not only Descartes, but also Kant, British empiricists such as John Locke and David Hume, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel and his intellectual descendants, Henri Bergson, and Jean-Paul Sartre. Partly as a corollary of this, it has become common practice to refer to a human being as a Subject even when it is not immediately associated with the realisation of knowledge. As Gérard Granel notes, this association – while possibly incorrect – validates questions such as “Who Comes after the Subject?”\(^6\)

A second category of Subject encountered in philosophy consists, in a manner analogous to the ordinary usage of the term, of the entities which exist as the focus of a reference. One category of reference of particular interest to philosophers consists of those associated with representations. A representation entails one form or structure standing in place of – or representing – another. In philosophical treatments of representation it is possible to encounter the Subject characterised in two ways, namely, as the Subject who creates the representation and as the Subject which is represented. Both of these examples appear in considerations of languages and language-like systems. Languages are typically presented as consisting of structures known as linguistic signs, each of which consists of an apprehendable aspect referred to as the “signifier” of the sign and a meaning-bearing aspect referred to as the sign’s “signified.” With respect to signs, a language-user is a Subject of the first form who creates a sign to, typically, express his or her intention through its signified aspect. The second form of Subject then takes the form of the signified aspect of a sign, the meaning that is conveyed by the sign and which is represented by the apprehendable aspect. In the late Nineteenth and Twentieth centuries new approaches to language
have arisen in which the role of the first Subject, the language-user responsible for the constitution of a linguistic sign, is less clear. The most extreme case of this appears in the theories of Ferdinand de Saussure who dispenses with the language-user altogether.

The final class of Subject I will consider here are those associated with the exercise of power. While there are many conceptions of power, each typically entails the application of force for the purpose of affecting the nature of the entities – the Subjects of the power – to whom the force is applied. The paradigmatic treatments of such Subjects appear in the philosophy of Michel Foucault. Writing two years before his death in 1984, Foucault characterised his entire project as an investigation of the processes by which human beings are constituted as Subjects through the application of force.7 His 1975 work, Surveiller et punir: naissance de la prison (Discipline and punish: The birth of the prison), for example, considers the subjectification resulting from the application of power within a carceral framework.8 In the case of the later volumes of the L’histoire de sexualité (The History of Sexuality), L’usage des plaisirs (The Use of Pleasure) and Le souci de soi (The Care of the Self), the forces in question originate in the Subject itself and are embodied in the practices by which a human being turns itself into a sexual Subject.9

0.3 Encounters with the Subject in Philosophy
Beyond the different categories discussed in the last section, it is also possible to consider characterisations of the philosophical Subject in terms of how they are treated in philosophical writings. As with the characterisations themselves, it is also possible to divide these treatments into categories, the two most prominent of which consist of investigations in which only one characterisation of Subject is referred to in the course of the investigation and of investigations which make mention more than one.

Considering the first of these categories – the category consisting of investigations referring to only one characterisation of Subject – further subdivisions are possible based upon the role that the characterisation of the Subject plays in each investigation. On the one hand, and most obviously, it is possible to identify investigations in which the characterisation is the primary focus of the investigation. In System der Wissenschaft. Erster Theil, die Phänomenologie des Geistes (Phenomenology of
Spirit), for example, Hegel characterises the human Subject in terms of its progression – through the attainment of different forms of knowledge – towards a state of fully integrated social consciousness. In contrast to such cases, it is also possible to find investigations where the characterisation is referred to only insofar as it relates to the investigations true focus. An example of such an inquiry appears in Kant’s *Kritik der reinen Vernunft* (*Critique of Pure Reason*). In this work Kant’s principle concern is with the forms of human knowledge of objects in the world. Given this, the Subject is addressed to the extent it is capable of realising that knowledge.

In contrast to those investigations which refer to only one characterisation of the Subject, investigations which refer to two or more characterisations typically occur at that point in a philosophical discourse when one theoretical framework is being replaced by another. At such points an older characterisation of the Subject is presented in opposition to the one that will replace it. In the history of Western philosophy after the Renaissance and prior to the twentieth century these replacements proceeded at a slow pace from Descartes, through the British empiricists, to Kant and Hegel. In the twentieth-century continental-philosophical discourse, however, the pace of change sped up significantly. In French philosophy from the 1920s to the 1970s, in particular, it is possible to find several different characterisations – often resonating with those of the earlier, slower, period – referred to by philosophers. To provide a contextualisation of the examples that I will consider in the later chapters, I will spend the remainder of this section discussing the procession of characterisations of the Subject in the French milieu.

In the earlier part of the century, French philosophers generally approached the Subject as an autonomous human being who acts as the substance of his or her knowledge. Although this treatment derives from the works of Descartes, it is more often associated with the theories of Hegel and Marx. The exact source of French philosophy’s relationship with Hegel has been a matter of some debate. The popular explanation of this relationship – noted, for example, by Judith Butler – credits Alexandre Kojève’s Marxist reading delivered in a lecture series at the *L’École pratique des hautes études* between 1933 and 1939, as a major source of Hegel’s influence. Bruce Baugh, by contrast, explains French Hegelianism in terms of Jean Wahl’s earlier work, *Le Malheur de la conscience dans la philosophie de Hegel* (*The Unhappy Consciousness in the Philosophy of Hegel*).
By the 1960s, the attitude of philosophers had shifted to one in which, if it appeared in their theories at all, a Subject did not take the form of a human being acting as a substance. This theme had appeared almost two centuries earlier in the works of Immanuel Kant, amongst others. In the *Kritik der reinen Vernunft*, for example, Kant argues that the Subject is not the substance of the knowledge he is attempting to explain. Rather, it is the structure responsible for the generation of the components of that knowledge. This argument is reflected in, amongst other places, the assertion “I think” which accompanies all representations. A different approach to the idea of a non-substantial Subject appears in the works of Martin Heidegger. Heidegger – whose theories are often used to characterise this period – argues that a human being’s knowledge of the world does not refer to that being as its substance, but to the relation between the human being and the world.

Another approach associated with this treatment of the Subject is structuralism. Following the linguistic models of Saussure, structuralists present an understanding of various phenomena as being the representations of social structures. By treating these representations as analogues of linguistic signs, Saussure’s theories provide structuralists with a way to explain their observations without reference to the entity traditionally identified as being the Subject in such cases – the entity who creates the phenomena and who acts as its substance. Because of the connection between the idea of a Subject and an idea of the human being arising out of the earlier tradition, approaches such as the structuralists are often associated with the “Death of Man.” This characterisation derives from Michel Foucault’s 1966 work, *Les mots et les choses, une archéologie des sciences humaines* (*The Order of Things: An Archaeology of the Human Sciences*), which argues that the concept of a human being as the Subject capable of generating representations has been replaced in the modern *episteme* by a human being as an object of study.

The fact that many of the phenomena examined by the structuralists are social phenomena, and hence involve human beings in some form or another, motivated a third phase of the debate regarding the Subject. In the theories originating in this third period, a human being is treated as a Subject, but not, as it was in the first phase of the debate, due to it serving as a substance. This approach gained prominence in theories which treat the human Subject as the focus for the execution of power in a social framework. Such theories represent examples of a theme which Jacques Derrida
characterises as a restoration of the Subject, while others as a return of the Subject from those systems in which the Subject plays no part.20

While it is not the aim of this Thesis to consider the nuances of this debate, I will return to the above presentation in the final chapter. There I will argue that the debate can be re-characterised in light of the interpretive framework which I will now develop. In the new approach, the debate will be presented not in terms of different characterisations of the Subject, but in terms of the different situations in which those characterisations are encountered.
1.

Developing an Interpretive Framework for Subjects

In this chapter I will develop an interpretive framework capable of addressing different characterisations of the Subject based on a consideration of the question of what it means for an entity to be identified as a Subject. Recalling the congruity between the categories of the ordinary language usage of the term “Subject” associated with references and power and the category arising from Aristotle’s treatment of the concept of *hupokeimenon* – which, following contemporary practice, I will refer to as Subject – it is to that treatment that I will now turn.

1.1 An Aristotelian Template of the Subject

For the last hundred years, Aristotelian scholarship has been dominated by two attitudes: a developmental attitude and a conceptual one. For the first two thirds of the century the developmentalists argued, based on the success of the same approach in the study of Plato, that each of Aristotle’s theories should be considered in terms of the chronological order of its appearance within his corpus. The problem with this approach lies in its contingency upon the correct determination of that chronology. As time passed and archaeological evidence grew, it became apparent that the chronology of Aristotle’s works could not be determined to the accuracy required by the developmentalists. In particular, they realised that the surviving records of Aristotle’s thought do not represent a definitive account of his intellectual development. Rather, they constitute an indirect picture of his teaching at the Lyceum – teaching which was structured as much by Aristotle’s pedagogical concerns as it was by its immediate content. In the face of this, scholars turned away from the developmentalist approach to one more consistent with that pedagogy. To that end, modern Aristotelian scholarship generally focuses upon the order in which concepts need to be acquired to support a student’s accessing the more complicated aspects of Aristotle’s thought.

At the heart of the conceptualist understanding of Aristotelian thought is the field of logic. Aristotle viewed logic as the discipline which enables the assessment of any argument or inference and, given that such assessments play a key role in many other
fields, should be the basis of all intellectual activity.³ To that end, through a number of works posthumously collected as the Organon, he developed an extensive framework to address various aspects of arguments. In the following discussions I will restrict my attention to the two logical works in which the concept of the Subject is most readily apparent: the Prior Analytics which presents a theory of inference and the Categories which considers the ontological basis for that theory.

In the Prior Analytics Aristotle approaches the question of inference through the structure of the syllogism. A syllogism consists of the presentation of a set of assertions together with the derivation, or inference, of a new assertion as their necessary consequence.⁴ Each assertion in this structure shares the common form of a statement referring to an entity’s existence in a particular state of being. These states can be simple, such as is the case when an entity exists as a human being, or more complex, as when an entity exists as a short human male.⁵ Within this framework Aristotle characterises the statement of the assertion in terms of a state of being being “said of,” or predicating, the entity which he identifies as the Subject.⁶

Aristotle explores the nature of a Subject in the assertive framework further in the Categories where he focuses on its ability to have states of being said of it.⁷ Central to this ability is a primary state of being defined as the state upon which all other secondary states are contingent in the sense that they exist only as states of being for the primary state. In the assertive framework this means that all other states of being are either said of this primary state or are identical with it.⁸ Aristotle refers to this state of being as a “primary substance.”⁹ An implication of this characterisation of a primary substance is that it is not said of a Subject. Were this not the case, there would exist another state of being – the state of being, for example, in which the Subject exists – which is more fundamental than the primary substance.¹⁰ Based on this, Aristotle identifies a primary substance as a state of being which is the Subject to all other states of being.¹¹

While he would consider the exact nature of primary substance in more detail in his later works – such as in the Physics and De generatione et corruptione (Generation and Corruption) where he considers the implications of change and motion, and in the Metaphysics where he addresses the ontological nature of substance – Aristotle’s project in the Categories and the Prior Analytics requires only that he characterise it to a degree sufficient to explain its role in an assertion.¹² To that end, he identifies a primary substance with the individual entities about which
states of being are said. The primary substance at the heart of the assertion that Socrates is human is the individual entity referred to as “Socrates.”

If a primary substance is a state of being, it is not the only one explicitly considered by Aristotle. In his logical works he goes on to identify several subclasses, or categories, of states of being which, singularly or in combination, constitute the states of being of a Subject. The fullest list of these categories occurs in the *Categories* and includes the state of being a substance, a quantity or quality, a relation to other entities, an indication of location in space or time, a reflection of posture or possession, or a mark of action or inaction. Shorter versions of the list which appear elsewhere typically omit properties of posture and possession.

One of Aristotle’s concerns in his treatment of states of being in the *Categories* is the extent to which they specify a Subject. The most general states of being – those which provide the least degree of specificity – constitute the genera of the Subjects which exist in them. Considering the case of a Subject who exists as a human animal, it is the state associated with being an animal that constitutes the Subject’s genus since it identifies the Subject with the general class of entities who are animals. The less general states – those which provide a greater level of specificity – determine the species of the Subject. In the preceding example, the species of the human animal is a reflection of the Subject’s existence as a human being. Aristotle notes that in an assertion, it is often the species which is said first of a Subject to specify its most immediate state of being, while a particular genus applies secondarily to place its Subject within a general class defined by Subjects which share same state of existence.

Beyond species and genera, Aristotle identifies a third class of states of being which he refers to as “differentiae.” Unlike the other states of being, differentiae do not apply directly to a Subject, but to the states of being associated with its species and genus to specify them with respect to other species and genera. By way of an example, the differentiae of the species embodying the state of being human might include references to the bipedal aspect of human nature to delineate it from the quadrupedal aspect of the species of horse. Similarly the differentiae of the genus embodying the state of being an animal could refer to the nature of an animal’s cell walls to delineate it existence as a plant.

Aristotle draws attention to the different degrees of connection to the Subject shown by the species, genera, and differentiae by characterising the states of being of
the first two as secondary substances. Just as a primary substance forms the basis of all subsequent predication, the secondary substances of the species and genera can also have states of being – in the form of differentiae – said of them. Differentiae, by contrast, cannot be so qualified. The appellation “secondary” is included to reflect the fact that, as with all states of being barring one, the states of being of species and genera adhere to the requirement that they too refer to primary substance.

The elements of Aristotle’s theory of logic presented here provide me with sufficient material to characterise the conditions for identifying an entity as a Subject. While Aristotle presents a primary substance, in the *Prior Analytics* and the *Categories*, as the Subject to which other states of being are attributed in the framework of an assertion, much of this structure is an artefact of Aristotle’s treatment of assertions. This suggests that the identification of primary substance as a Subject is a reflection of its consistency with a more general understanding of what it means for an entity to be recognised as a Subject. Given this, I will model the more general understanding by the form of its particular instantiation in primary substance. Based on the preceding presentation it is possible to characterise this form in terms of a primary substance acting as the referent for the attribution of other states of being. Generalising this, in the following discussions I will adopt the formulation in which a Subject is equivalent to an entity which participates in an instantiation of a template in which it acts as the necessary referent for an attribution. While this attribution, in Aristotle’s logical framework, is of the states of being in which the Subject exists, there is nothing in the template to preclude a wide variety of attributions ranging from appropriately construed properties and universals to other entities. Henceforth I will refer to this formulation as the Aristotelian template for the Subject – the template whose instantiation supports the identification of different entities as being Subjects if and only if they are the referents of attributions.

1.2 The Genera and Species of the Subject

Armed with the Aristotelian template in which a Subject is the necessary referent of an attribution, I will turn my attention to the question of how this is possible. That is: how can an entity exist as the referent of a particular attribution? Answering this question enables the characterisation of a Subject along two axes: in terms of the form of its existence as a referent, and in terms of those qualities necessary for it to be the
referent of a particular attribution. Adopting the Aristotelian terminology, these axes correspond to the genus and the species of the entity identified as a Subject.

1.2.1 The Genera of Subjects in Instantiations of the Aristotelian Template.
Even before its instantiation, it is possible to identify three ways for an entity to exist as the referent of an attribution and hence to be a Subject within the Aristotelian template: by being what is attributed, by actively creating what is attributed, and by being the source of the form or structure of what is attributed. When realised in an instantiation of the Aristotelian template, these ways form the basis for characterising the general class, or genus, of the Subject in the instantiation.

The paradigmatic example of the first genus of Subjects occurs when the Aristotelian template instantiates as the tautologous observation that if a Subject exists then it exists. In this observation the Subject is attributed to itself. The painting of a bowl of flowers, for example, is its own Subject in the sense that it is itself. In the following discussion I will refer to Subjects of this genus as “Tautologous Subjects.”

The second way in which a Subject can be the necessary referent of an attribution occurs in those instantiations of the Aristotelian template where what is attributed to the Subject is the creation of that Subject. In the case of the painting of a bowl of flowers it is possible to identify the artist as a Subject of the painting because it is the artist who is responsible for its creation. As with Tautologous Subjects, Subjects in such instantiations are also members of a genus of Subject defined, in this case, by their ability to create what is attributed. I will henceforth refer to Subjects of this genus as being “Creative Subjects.”

The third way in which a Subject can act as a referent occurs in those instantiations of the Aristotelian template where the Subject is the origin of the form or structure of what is attributed. In the case of the painting of the bowl of flowers, it is the bowl of flowers which is the Subject of the painting in the sense that it is the bowl of flowers which is the source of the form of the painting’s representation. This example also raises the possibility of two different instantiations of the Aristotelian template sharing the same physical conditions in that the painting also supports the identification of a Creative Subject in the form of the artist. Returning to the question at hand, as with the Tautologous and Creative genera of Subjects, the Subjects which
act as referents by providing structure or form to what is attributed are also members of a genus of Subject. I will refer to Subjects of this genus as “Structuring Subjects.”

1.2.2 Speciating the Genus of a Subject

Beyond the genus of a Subject, it is also possible to characterise the Subject in terms of those qualities which allow it to act as the referent of a particular attribution within an instantiation of the Aristotelian template. Considering the instantiation of the template in which a painting of a bowl of flowers is attributed to an artist as his or her creation, for example, the identification of the artist as a Subject of the Creative genus requires the characterisation of the artist in terms of his or her ability to paint. Noting that this characterisation is contingent upon the nature of the attribution within a particular instantiation of the Aristotelian template and observing the potentially infinite variety of such attributions leads to the conclusion that the resulting qualities serve to specify a Subject to a greater extent than the genera discussed previously. Following the Aristotelian terminology, these qualities then correspond to the species of the Subject.

While an exact characterisation of every species of Subject consistent with the Aristotelian template is impractical, it is possible to identify some general categories of Subject whose speciation derives from attributions of the same basic type. Mirroring the philosophical usages of the term “Subject”, the three examples of particular interest to philosophers are the category associated with the attribution of knowledge, the category associated with the attribution of a representation, and the category associated with the attribution of power.

In considering the category of Subjects of the species defined by the attribution of knowledge, it is worth noting that there are extensive debates both in philosophy and in neuroscience as to the exact nature of knowledge. In the latter case, such debates typically focus upon establishing the empirical makeup of the processes associated with the attainment and holding of knowledge. In the former, the response is more theoretical with philosophers proposing models ranging from those in which knowledge corresponds to a suitably justified belief to models in which knowledge is the product of a natural occurrence. Despite this variety, it is possible to make some general observations regarding the speciation of both the Creative and the Structuring genera of Subjects resulting from the attribution of knowledge.
Attributing knowledge to a Subject of the Creative genus leads to the identification of a Subject which is responsible for the creation of that knowledge. This points a general constitution, or speciation, of the Subject in terms of the abilities necessary to realise that creation. The Subject in Descartes’s Meditationes, for example, is the entity to whom knowledge is attributed as his or her creation implying that it is a Subject of the Creative genus. Recognising that Descartes defines the attributed knowledge in terms of experience and reflection then enables the identification of the speciation of the Subject in terms of his or her possession of those faculties. While the rectitude of generalising Descartes’s arguments in the Meditationes to all humanity is questionable, this characterisation does play a key role in his determination that he is principally a thing that thinks.

An important feature of the examples of a Creative Subject to which knowledge is attributed is that the faculties in question are typically defined in terms of intentionality. An intentional faculty is directed towards, or intends, an object. In the case of Descartes, for example, experience is intentional in the sense that it is directed towards objects in the world, while reflection is intentional in that it is directed towards artefacts of the mind such as the products of the faculties of experience. In the next chapter I will examine the philosophical theories of Jean-Paul Sartre and Edmund Husserl which refer to the intentional faculty of experience.

Returning to the question of speciation, when the Subject to which knowledge is attributed is of the Structuring genus, it provides form or structure to the attributed knowledge. This indicates that a Structuring Subject can be speciated by its possession of a knowable form. Examples of this species of Subject are typically identified with what the knowledge is knowledge of and are referred to either explicitly as the Subject of the knowledge or, synonymously, as its object.

While knowledge is the focus of its own field of philosophical inquiry, in the form of epistemology, representations appear in many philosophical disciplines. Following the ordinary language usage, the central idea of a representation is that of something – commonly referred to as the representation – standing for something else. A paradigmatic example of a representation is a work of art where the work represents an object. Beyond this, one can also find representations in the fields of politics and law where the interests of one individual are represented by another. It is even possible to encounter representations in epistemological inquiries where knowledge can be viewed as a representation of the object of that knowledge. Foucault’s Les
mots et les choses, mentioned earlier, considers the representation of human beings in scientific knowledge in the Seventeenth century. This example suggests that, in certain circumstances, such as when attributed to a Structuring Subject, knowledge can be viewed as a subclass of representation. I have chosen to present knowledge here as a separate category on the grounds that the existence of a separate discourse regarding the nature of knowledge implies a common philosophical disposition towards treating the category of knowledge as being distinct from the corresponding category of representation.

The speciation of the Creative and Structuring genera of Subjects formed by the attribution of a representation follows a similar course to the speciation which results from the attribution of knowledge. In the case of a Creative Subject, the attribution of a representation points to a Subject which creates the representation and is, therefore, speciated by the faculties necessary for it to do so. In the case of a representation originating in a democratic political framework, for example, the speciating faculties support the Creative Subject’s participation in that framework. Turning to the case of a Subject of the Structuring genus, the attribution of a representation within the framework of an instantiation of the Aristotelian template points to a Subject which is speciated by the structure it provides to the representation: the bowl of flowers presented in the previous section is speciated by the structure it provides to its representation in the painting.

Before considering the final class of philosophically interesting speciations it is worth noting that the Creative and the Structuring Subjects are not the only Subjects identified by philosophers as being associated with representation. Foucault’s discussion of Diego Velázquez’s painting Las Meninas in the opening chapter of Les mots et les choses, suggests that there exists a third class of Subject with respect to the representation in the painting. This is the Subject for whom the representation is intended. In the framework being developed here, however, this third Subject is not a Subject with respect to the attribution of a representation, but a Creative Subject with respect to the attribution of knowledge of the representation: through perceiving the painting, the third Subject attains knowledge of its contents. A corollary of this is that, so interpreted, the painting ceases to be a representation with respect to this third Subject and becomes, instead, the Structuring Subject of his or her knowledge.

The final category of philosophically interesting speciations that I will consider derives from the attribution of power. The basic idea of power entails the application
of force to bring about a certain end. As with representation, power occurs in a wide array of philosophical discussions ranging from political treatments to questions of self-identity and, as with knowledge, there are a number of theories which seek to explain the exact nature of power. Social theorists, for example, consider power as it is applied by and to agents while normative theorists treat power in terms of its ability to control.

For the purposes of my discussion I will adopt a conception of power suggested by Michel Foucault’s 1976 book, *Historie de la sexualité I: La volonté de savoir* (The Will to Knowledge: The History of Sexuality Volume 1) and repeated in his 1977-1978 lectures at the Collège de France – posthumously published as *Sécurité, Territoire, Population: Cours au Collège de France: 1977-1978* (Security, Territory, Population). Foucault argues that power is not a property to be possessed by an entity nor is it a mechanism of generation. Power, rather, is the combination of the application of force to achieve a particular end and the resistive force that such applications necessarily provoke from the entities to which the first force is applied. So understood, the existence of power defines the relationship between the generator and the focus of the applied force while at the same time being a property of neither. Foucault identifies several power relationships based on different forms of force, ranging from the application of classifications such as sexuality, to the interactions present within family and political units. There is a certain resonance between Foucault’s characterisation of power and the idea of power that appears in the physical sciences. In both cases power is not a quality or a mechanism, but a measure of the application of force and of the resistance to that force. In mechanics, for example, this resistance occurs in a manner consistent with Newton’s third law of motion and equilibrium which observes that to every action there is always opposed an equal reaction.

In contrast to the speciations resulting from the attribution of either knowledge or representation to an entity within an instantiation of the Aristotelian template, the attribution of power does not speciate the genera of the Creative and Structuring Subjects in isolation. Reflecting the relational nature of this conception of power, the resulting speciation of one genus will refer to the speciation of the other. Considering a Subject of the Creative genus, the attribution of power suggests a speciation of the Subject by the faculties necessary for the generation of force. But the nature of power ensures that this force is matched by a resistive response from the entity to which it is
applied, a response which can be interpreted as gaining form or structure from the speciation associated with the original force. This implies that the Creative Subject is also a Structuring Subject for the resistive aspect of the attributed power. A similar argument applies to the case of the entity to which the force is applied. In this case the entity is a Creative Subject with respect to the attribution of the resistive response to the original force. But, since this response is matched to the original force, this suggests that it provides a structure to that force. In effect, the entity to which force is applied is also a Structuring Subject. Reflecting this I will henceforward refer to the Subject speciated by an attribution of power as a Creative-Structuring Subject.

The Subject in Foucauldean systems of power is not the only example of a Creative-Structuring Subject. It is also possible to construe the Subject with respect to the attribution of self-knowledge as a Creative-Structuring Subject in the sense that it both realises knowledge of itself and structures that knowledge. Similarly the Subject in an appropriately construed political framework might also be a Creative-Structuring Subject of representation in the sense that it both generates its representation and is represented by it. Noting that these examples are not the only forms that a Subject associated with the attribution of knowledge or representation can take, I will simply note them as special cases of the respective categories discussed earlier. In the case of power, at least in this Foucauldean conception, the Subject in any instance will always be Creative-Structuring in the sense discussed here.

1.3 Differentia of Subjects and Domains of Manifestation

Beyond the general observations presented in the previous section, it is also possible to consider the specific nature of the entity identified as a Subject within an instantiation of the Aristotelian template. This nature is characterised in terms of the differentiae of the Subject. Returning briefly to the logical framework of the Prior Analytics and the Categories, recall that genera and species serve to specify the Subjects to which they apply while the differentiae specify a genus or species with respect to other possible genera or species.
1.3.1 Differentiae of a Subject

In the context of the genera of the Subject identified in the preceding discussions, the differentiae at play can be identified as the qualities which enable the delineation of the Tautologous, Creative, and Structuring genera. In the case of the speciation of the Subject, the situation is both more complicated and philosophically more interesting.

In the previous section I argued that the speciation of a Subject of a particular genus originates in what is attributed to the Subject in the framework of an instantiation of the Aristotelian template. This suggests that there are potentially as many species of Subject as there are possible attributions. Even within the philosophically interesting categories of Subject arising from the attribution of knowledge, representation, and power, it is possible to identify different species deriving from the specific forms of the knowledge, representation, or power being attributed. Following the Aristotelian analogy, the differences between species of Subject can be attributed to differentiae. Given this, the question is, can one identify the differentiae of the species of a Subject in a general sense or is it necessary to treat each instantiation of the Aristotelian template separately?

1.3.2 Characterising the Differentiae

While, technically, it is necessary to consider the differentiae of the species of a Subject for each species in isolation, it is possible to identify certain differentia which can appear in more than one form of Subject. This possibility arises from the nature of the domain in which instantiations of the Aristotelian template are encountered. In the corpus of philosophy, the domain of instantiation for any concept consists of the discursive framework of a philosophical argument. Such frameworks can be thought of as spaces defined by the different themes and disciplines on which the argument is based together with a modulating structure imposed by the argument itself. The combination of themes, disciplines, and argument then influences the way in which different elements instantiate within the space. A corollary of this is that the nature of an instantiation of the Aristotelian template for the Subject reflects the nature of discursive space in which it appears. This suggests that the identification of the instantiation is as much a matter of placing it within its discursive space as it is of the form of the instantiation itself.
Although the range of philosophical arguments is as varied as the opinions of the philosophers who create them, a number of common themes and disciplines appear in the formation of philosophical discursive spaces in the Western philosophical tradition. The first category of such themes takes the form of the traditionally identified areas of philosophical inquiry. As well as the epistemological inquiries discussed previously, a philosophical investigation might be undertaken within the general category of metaphysics to address some aspect of the “real” nature of things. In such cases, the instantiation of the Aristotelian template is typically cast in metaphysical terms resulting in a parallel metaphysical identification of the species of its Subject. An example of such a Subject appears in Hegel’s *Phänomenologie des Geistes*. Hegel’s treatment of the evolving human Subject can be interpreted as an instantiation of the Aristotelian template in a metaphysical framework in which knowledge is attributed to a human Creative Subject in such a way as to facilitate his or her Hegelian evolution.

A subclass of metaphysical inquiries consists of those ontological investigations which consider the nature of reality in terms of being. Within this framework, one typically finds an instantiation of the Aristotelian template entailing a relationship between the being of what is attributed and the being of the Subject. In such cases, the Subject’s participation in the instantiation leads to its characterisation in terms of its relationship to being. An example of this case might be Kant’s *Kritik der reinen Vernunft* in which the Subject is considered in relation to the forms of human knowledge of objects in the world and is defined by its ontological relationship with those objects.

Beyond the basic philosophical inquiries it is possible to identify a number of more general themes which regularly contribute to the discursive spaces of philosophy. One of the most common of these themes is humanism. While humanism appears in a wide variety of discursive spaces each is defined by its orientation towards questions of human nature. This orientation manifests either directly, in investigations of that nature, or indirectly, in inquiries which approach their objects in terms of the relationship of those objects to human beings. Within the humanist framework one generally encounters instantiations of the Aristotelian template in which the Subject is identified with a human being. This then leads to characterisations of the human Subject deriving from the nature of what is attributed. In those cases where the Subject is not human, a humanist orientation considers the Subject in relation to a
human being: the bowl of flowers as the Structuring Subject of the painting might be defined, in a humanist treatment, by its relationship with the human artist.

One field of inquiry often treated with a humanist orientation is the field of linguistics. Beginning with the assumption that language entails the use of symbols to convey meaning and typically instantiates in human communication through the use of written or spoken symbols, philosophers of language address a wide range of questions ranging from the relationship between a given symbol and the meaning it conveys and the connection between this relationship and the intentions of the language-user. In the modern discourse, the connection between a symbol and its conveyed meaning forms the basis of a linguistic sign where the former corresponds to the signifier of the sign while the latter corresponds to its signified.

As a tradition of inquiry, the question of language has occupied philosophers since antiquity. Aristotle, for example, considered the instantiation of language as speech to be the immediate representation of the experiences of the mind. In modern philosophy, inquiries into language fall into two general categories: attempts to rigorously formalise language tracing to the works of Gottlob Frege, Bertrand Russell and the earlier theories of Ludwig Wittgenstein; and attempts to explain language through a consideration of its everyday usage tracing to the works of G.E. Moore, John Austin and the later works of Wittgenstein.

Within the linguistic framework, the Aristotelian template most often instantiates in a form where what is attributed to a Subject is a linguistic sign. In such inquiries it is possible to encounter not one Subject, but two: a Subject of the Creative genus who creates signs through the exercise of its faculties, and a Subject of the Structuring genus which provides the sign with meaning. To these, humanism typically adds an orientation which manifests either in the identification of the Creative Subject as a human language-user, or the orientation of the Structuring Subject towards the language-user as the meaning conveyed by the attributed sign.

Although not generally recognised as modes of philosophy, the last category of inquiries that I will discuss here consists of those fields which regularly generate results equivalent to their philosophical counterparts. Rather than refer to theorisation, however, these inquiries reach their results primarily through an analysis of empirical observation. Given this, I will refer to them as “observationist philosophies.” An example of an observationist philosophy is the discipline of sociology. Sociology aims to understand the social aspects of human nature through
the observation of that nature. Through such considerations, the sociologist reaches conclusions regarding the form and functioning of those aspects on a par with those reached by philosophers such as Hegel and Marx. This reliance on observation does not mean that theoretical concerns cannot play a role in informing the interpretation of observations – Marxism, for example, often informs sociological results – only that it is not the primary source of the results of such inquiries.

Within the observationist framework, an instantiation of the Aristotelian template and of the Subject it entails generally reflects the focus of the observations in question. In the case of sociology, for example, one might encounter an attributed entity in the form of some social structure or artefact with the consequence that the Subject is defined by the features necessary for it to be the referent of the attribution of that artefact. In the third chapter I will examine an observationist philosophy – in the form of Lévi-Strauss’s ethnology – which considers social phenomena as an avenue to identifying human nature as the Structuring Subject represented in them.

1.4 Interpreting Subjects

In the preceding discussions I have developed an understanding of what it means for an entity to be identified as a Subject. At the heart of this understanding is the assertion that an entity is a Subject if it is a participant in an instantiation of the Aristotelian template through which it acts as the necessary referent for an attribution.

Beyond the basic instantiation, the exact form of the Subject reflects the nature of the instantiation of the template in which it appears. It is possible, for example, to identify three genera of Subjects based upon how the Subject entity acts as a referent in the instantiation of the template: if the instantiation results in the Subject being attributed to itself, it is of the Tautologous genus; if what is attributed is the creation of the Subject, the Subject is of the Creative genus; and if the Subject is the source of the form or structure of what is attributed to it, then it is of the Structuring genus. A Subject can, furthermore, be characterised in terms of the speciation deriving from the nature of what is attributed in the instantiation of the Aristotelian template. While identifying the speciation of the Subject entailed by a particular instantiation of the template will depend upon the nature of the discursive space – defined by a selection of influences modulated by an argument – in which the instantiation occurs, it is nonetheless possible to identify general categories of species of Subject resulting
from the particular attributions. Three such categories of particular interest to philosophers are those associated with the attribution of knowledge, the attribution of a representation, and the attribution of power.

In the following chapters I deploy this understanding to consider examples of different characterisations of the Subject. The framework of this deployment – the interpretive framework of this chapter’s title – proceeds through three stages: the characterisation of the discursive space, the identification of the instantiation of the Aristotelian template for the Subject within that space; and the determination of the nature of the genus and species of the Subject within that instantiation. The purpose of the first stage, the characterisation of the discursive space, is to identify the various influences that affect the nature of what is attributed in the form of the inquiries, themes and structuring arguments which define the space. This characterisation will inform the identification of the instantiation of the template for the Subject which will, in turn, embody the actual form of the Subject. In each of the examples I consider I will show that the entities identified as being Subjects in their theories exist within instantiations of the Aristotelian template.

As an aside, this interpretive framework is not the only application of the understanding of the Subject developed here. It is also possible to apply the understanding in a normative manner to identify the processes through which an entity becomes a Subject by becoming, in the first instance, the referent of an attribution. Understanding this process is useful for both prescribing the future of an entity and identifying how Subjects in the past came into being. While these are interesting inquiries in themselves, they presume the validity of the Aristotelian template, an accuracy which has yet to be established.
2.

Sartre’s Phenomenological Subject

In this chapter I will consider references to the Subject made in Jean-Paul Sartre’s phenomenological writings of the 1930s and early 1940s to show how they imply an entity which exists within an instantiation of the Aristotelian template developed in the previous chapter. At the core of this instantiation is the assertion that the Subject is a human being who acts as the referent for the attribution of knowledge.

In as much as such a delineation is possible, Sartre’s pure phenomenological period occupies the thirteen-year span from 1933, when he first became aware of the philosophical potential of the theories of Husserl, to 1946, when he delivered the lecture subsequently published as *L’existentialisme est un humanisme (Existentialism and Humanism).* During this period Sartre produced many of the philosophical works for which he is most remembered such as *L'imagination (Imagination: A Psychological Critique)* and its thematic sequel, *L'imaginaire :, psychologie phénoménologique de l'imagination (The Psychology of the Imagination),* the article subsequently published as *La transcendance de l'ego: esquisse d'une description phénoménologique (The Transcendence of the Ego),* the brief inquiry *Esquisse d'une théorie des émotions (Sketch for a Theory of the Emotions),* and the analysis for which these works count as predecessors, *L'être et le néant.*

During the same period Sartre also devoted time to writing fiction; realising, in the process, his childhood ambition of becoming a novelist. Talking with his partner Simone de Beauvoir in the 1970s, Sartre characterised the literary desires of his youth: “… I wanted to write a novel which would be like *Notre-dame-de-Paris* or *Les Misérables,* a work that would be recognized in other ages, an absolute that nothing could modify …,” and noted that he would much rather be recognised as a great writer than a philosopher. In the 1930s he achieved this non-philosophical recognition through short stories, plays, and through the novel, *La nausée (Nausea).* This last, published in 1938, presents a fictionalised account of a problem Sartre had been considering since his time at *L’École normale supérieur* in middle of the 1920s: the problem of contingency.
2.1 The Problem of Contingency

Although he had alluded to the issue earlier, Sartre’s first real attempt to formalise his thoughts on the problem of contingency came in 1931 when he began the subsequently unpublished *Factum sur la contingence* (*Factum on Contingency*). From its first draft, the *Factum* consisted of a fictional first person account of the experiences of Antoine Roquentin living in the town of Bouville. After extensive modifications suggested by his study of phenomenology and the critical feedback provided by Beauvoir, Sartre transformed the *Factum* into *La nausée* which, in its final form, addressed Roquentin’s growing realisation of, and response to, the contingency of existence.

2.1.1 Contingency

Sartre’s concern with the problem of contingency grew out of his treatment of the relationship between a human being and the world. At the heart of this treatment lies the assumption of realism. In the early 1930s Sartre thought of himself as a realist and, as a result, believed that “… the objects I perceived were real …” To better understand this reality, Sartre introduces the correlate idea of existence. Existence, he argues, embodies reality in the sense that every object which is real exists: it is there, it appears, and it is encountered. Roquentin, for example, addresses the existence of the sea and of the seagull flying above it.

Although his later theoretical developments go further – ultimately to the ontological concept of being – Sartre’s early discussions imply a belief that each real object has its own independent existence defined by factors ranging from its physical nature to its spatio-temporal location: the existence of the gull is distinct and independent from the existence of the sea. A corollary of this implies that every part of existence is different from every other. Even when two existents are spatio-temporally coincident, their different physical constitutions will ensure this independence: when the gull is diving for fish, its existence is still distinct from that of the sea in which it swims. As Sartre describes it, existence is “… never limited by anything but its existence.”

While the objects of Sartre’s perception may be real, his investigations of contingency begin with the observation that any relationship that he has with an object must be mediated, in the first instance, by the knowledge he realises for himself of
that object: when Roquentin talks of the green sea or the flying gull in La nausée, he speaks only of his knowledge of their respective existences. Given this, it is possible to characterise the reality of an object for a human being – that aspect of the object to which a human being responds – not as the object itself, but as his or her knowledge of that object. This is even true of the basic state of existence. In La nausée, Sartre, through Roquentin, identifies a human being’s knowledge of this basic state by the verb “to be.”

Later in his phenomenological writings, Sartre attempts to extend this framework to explain the reality that another human being has for an individual. In this case, Sartre argues that this reality is again constituted by the individual’s knowledge of that other. Recognising this, I will not deal with this aspect of Sartre’s theory in my discussion here beyond noting that he later expressed some dissatisfaction with his own analysis. The problem is, if the reality of others is defined by one’s knowledge of them, what is there to differentiate that reality from the reality of objects. In L’être et le néant, for example, Sartre criticises Husserl, Hegel, and Heidegger for failing to make this distinction. His own solution is to propose that knowledge of others – and of his own body – derives from a special form of perception which he refers to as the “look.”

With respect to the Subject in Sartre’s phenomenological writings, the characterisation of the mediation of a human being’s relationship with objects in the world by his or her knowledge of them entails the first instantiation of the Aristotelian template. In this case, the Subject in question is the human being who can be so identified on the basis of the attribution of knowledge he or she realises of objects in the world. This implies that a human being in Sartre’s discussions is a Subject of the Creative genus. Although Sartre does not identify a human being as a Subject until later, for convenience I will refer to the entity which occupies this position in his theories as the Subject. As I will argue shortly, when he does introduce the term, a refined understanding of the realisation of knowledge allows Sartre to identify the nature of the Subject with the aspect of human nature explicitly responsible for that realisation. This aspect is defined by the faculties which collectively characterise human consciousness.

Sartre’s treatment of the relationship between a human Subject and existence contrasts with the one which appears in the works of Martin Heidegger. Heidegger argues in Sein und Zeit (Being and Time) – written approximately ten years before the
publication of *La nausée* – that the relationship between a human being and existence is ontological and not, as it is for Sartre, epistemic.\(^\text{16}\) Beginning with the concept of Being as the meaning of all existents, Heidegger asserts that the defining feature of a human being is its existence as *Dasein* where *Dasein* is an instantiation of Being whose being is of issue to it.\(^\text{17}\) The reality of other objects to *Dasein* – the aspect of those objects to which *Dasein* responds – is then a reflection of the orientation which exists between it and other existents.

The possibility of different existents plays an important part in Sartre’s treatment of movement. Intuitively, it might seem reasonable to assume that the reality of an object for a Subject will embody the motion of that object: if Roquentin observes a tree being shaken by the wind, then his knowledge of the tree will entail knowledge of that shaking. In light of the previous observations, however, this intuition is problematic.

Assuming that the intuition is correct, Sartre, through his mouthpiece Roquentin, asserts that if a moving object has reality for a Subject knowledge of that object – the knowledge which forms the basis of that reality – can be partitioned into three interconnected components: knowledge of the object at the commencement of the motion, knowledge of the motion itself, and knowledge of the point towards which the motion of the object is directed.\(^\text{18}\) Given that the object in motion has existence, the components of its reality for the Subject will correspond to aspects of that existence, aspects that will have their own distinct existences. As Roquentin notes of a moving tree, “… a movement was something other than a tree. But it was all the same an absolute. A thing.”\(^\text{19}\)

The problem with the structure of a Subject’s knowledge of an object in motion is that the previously asserted independence of different existents implies that while the knowledge of each stage of an object in motion may be connected, the existents which underpin that knowledge are not: the existence of the tree at the end of its motion, is independent from the existence of the tree at the beginning, and both are independent of the mediating motion. In effect, while the components of a Subject’s knowledge of an object in motion are connected together, there is nothing in the existents underpinning those components to support that connection. These observations lead Sartre to conclude that motion exists only in the reality of moving objects for a Subject.\(^\text{20}\)
A similar argument can be constructed with regards to the concept of causality. As it is traditionally understood, causality instantiates in causal systems where it connects given antecedents with particular consequents. On the basis of his or her knowledge of such a system, a Subject can legitimately expect the latter to result whenever they encounter the former. The problem arises when one considers the basis of that knowledge. As with knowledge of movement, a Subject’s knowledge of a causal system can be broken down into three interconnected components: knowledge of the antecedent, knowledge of the causal connection, and knowledge of the consequent. But when one considers the basis of these components in existence, one finds – again as with movement – that they correspond to distinct and independent existents. In effect, the connection of the components of a causal system exists only in the reality of the system for a Subject.

Sartre’s treatments of movement and causality resonate with the arguments of the British Empiricist, David Hume. 21 In the first book of *A Treatise of Human Nature*, Hume asserts that the idea of causality is a “fiction” constructed by a human Subject to satisfy his or her belief that objects which are perceived to be spatio-temporally contiguous are necessarily connected.22 Upon reflection, however, he notes that there is nothing in the content of experience which supports the connection of those events in anything other than their contiguity23 In contrast to Sartre, who – due, perhaps, to his realist disposition – argues that a Subject’s knowledge of the causal connection rests on a distinct existent, Hume takes this conclusion to indicate that there is nothing in existence which serves the role of the causal connection. Elsewhere in the *Treatise*, Hume identifies other fictions which play a similar role in a Subject’s knowledge. Space and time, for example, are fictions introduced to satisfy a Subject’s belief that something lies between two events while substance explains the connection of perceived properties originating in a single spatial location.24 Even knowledge of the self is a fiction created to explain the collection of personal experiences.25 Based on these and other fictions, Hume calls for a Subject to manifest a general scepticism towards his or her ideas of the world.

While Sartre is aware of Hume, he proceeds in a different direction. In particular, he uses his conclusions regarding causality not as the basis for a normative assertion regarding the advisability of scepticism, but as an indication of the contingency of existence. Assuming that something is necessary only if it has a cause, the fact that
causal systems exist solely in a Subject’s knowledge of the world implies that the world itself cannot be necessary. This leads to the conclusion that it must contingent.

Sartre, through Roquentin, takes this contingency to indicate that human existence lacks meaning – in the sense of necessary existence to which it refers – and is, as such, absurd.26 Another way to describe the absurdity of human existence is to observe that there is no existent connection between a human Subject and any other existent. For each object, however, the lack of a connection serves to establish a relationship between the object and the Subject. In L'être et le néant, Sartre refers to the totality of these relationships – which ultimately reflect the disconnection of the Subject from every part of the world of objects – as the facticity of the Subject.27

This facticity – and hence the absurdity of the Subject’s existence – is not unknowable. In the course of reflecting upon his or her knowledge of objects, a Subject determines that he or she is not connected to those objects. In La nausée, following a pattern which he would use both in Esquisse d'une théorie des émotions and L'être et le néant, Sartre identifies this knowledge as the feeling of nausea. Since nausea – as a Subject’s knowledge of their facticity – is revealed in the Subject’s reflection upon any and all of his or her knowledge of objects, it is ever-present in the Subject’s existence, although, as Sartre later argues in L'être et le néant, it is possible for a Subject to give his or her life meaning – and hence transcend the absurdity of that life – by working towards a state of self-realisation. I will return to this structure later in the chapter in my discussion of the ontology of the Subject.

2.1.2 Sartre’s Philosophical Problem

Although the preceding presentation draws heavily from Sartre’s later characterisations of the problem of contingency – in particular from the published version of La nausée – the basic components of his approach to the problem were detectable in his thought from his first attempts to compile them in the Factum. In particular he was acutely aware of the observation that a human being’s relationship with an existent object is mediated by his or her knowledge of that object. Sartre’s problem in the early 1930s – the problem which hampered his transformation of the Factum into La nausée for almost eight years – was his belief that he lacked the tools to explain that relationship. For this he would require a philosophical theory which
would allow him “… to have both an idea of the world and an idea of consciousness [as the mechanism by which knowledge of the world is realised]…”

2.1.3 Sartre’s Introduction to Phenomenology

In the end, Sartre found the philosophical tools he was looking for in the field of phenomenology, to whose possibilities he was introduced in 1933. According to Beauvoir, whose commonly accepted account of this introduction appears in the second volume of her autobiography, La force de l’âge (The Prime of Life), this occurred through a conversation between her, Sartre, and their friend and colleague Raymond Aron.

Sartre’s moment of revelation occurred when Aron pointed out that the theories of Husserl – which he had studied during the previous year at the French Institute in Berlin – could provide a solution to Sartre’s desire to explain the relationship between a human Subject and the existent world. As Beauvoir reports, Aron asserted that if Sartre were a phenomenologist he could “… talk about this cocktail and make philosophy out of it …” Excited by the possibilities of this observation, Sartre turned first to Emmanuel Levinas’ Théorie de l’intuition dans la phénoménologie de Husserl (The Theory of Intuition in Husserl's Phenomenology). Finding Levinas’s Heideggerian interpretation of phenomenology unsatisfactory, he went again to Aron who arranged for him to take up Aron’s old position at the French Institute at the end of 1933.

Sartre remained in Berlin until the middle of 1934 studying Husserl’s Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenlogie und phänomenlogischen Philosophie. Erstes Buch: Allgemeine Einführung in die reine Phänomenologie (Ideas: General Introduction to Pure Phenomenology) in detail. At the same time, he also encountered the theories of Heidegger and worked on transforming the Factum sur la Contingence into La nausée. On his return to France he began to treat philosophical problems within a phenomenological framework which drew heavily from his readings of Husserl. Given this, it is to the phenomenological theories of Husserl that I will now turn.

2.2 Husserlian Phenomenology

As a general concept, phenomenology assumes a distinction between a human being who realises knowledge of objects in the world and the intentional content of that
knowledge. This distinction allows phenomenologists to separate questions concerning human nature and knowledge from questions concerning the ontological status of the objects of knowledge. While this structure does not require the explicit identification of human nature with the state of being a Subject, it is not uncommon for it to be so. This is a reflection of the fact that the relationship between a human being and his or her knowledge entails the same instantiation of the Aristotelian template identified in the discussion of Sartre’s treatment of contingency. Specifically a human being is identified as a Subject on the basis of the attribution of the knowledge of objects which he or she creates. In effect, a human being in the phenomenological framework is a Subject of the Creative genus.

Historically, the term “phenomenology” traces to the Eighteenth century, to the correspondence between the physicist, mathematician and philosopher, Johann Heinrich Lambert and Immanuel Kant. It was Lambert who introduced the term to address questions of the relationship between knowledge and experience.34 Perhaps the most famous historical example of phenomenology, however, is Hegel’s _Phänomenologie des Geistes_. The _Phänomenologie des Geistes_ presents a model for the evolution of the human Subject facilitated by the Subject’s knowledge of different objects. In the modern sense, the term “phenomenology” is most often used to describe the theories of Edmund Husserl and his intellectual descendants.

### 2.2.1 Husserl and the Basis of Phenomenology

Although the first fully realised statement of his phenomenological theories would not come until 1901 with the first edition of _Logische Untersuchungen (Logical Investigations)_), Husserl first became concerned with explaining the mechanisms which underpin a human beings knowledge of the world in the late 1880s when he was a student of the German philosopher, Franz Brentano.35 At the time Brentano was concerned with the connection between the mind and the world. In _Psychologie vom empirischen Standpunkt (Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint)_), for example, he argues that psychical phenomena – such as thoughts in the mind – are intentional in the sense that they are directed towards objects: a thought is always a thought of something.36 This represents one of the first modern instances to the concept of intentionality mentioned by scholastic philosophers such as St. Thomas Aquinas.
Just as earlier philosophers had, Brentano also believes that intentionality implies a direct connection between the mind and the objects it intends. For this to be possible, intentional objects must be immanent to their corresponding mental states. Brentano’s philosophical precursors believed that this is necessary, in part, to account for the possibility that the intended object may not be real: the fact that a golden mountain does not exist does not prevent the human mind intending it in thought.\\(^{37}\)

Based on his own studies, Husserl believed that Brentano’s requirement for immanence is problematic in that it opens his teacher’s theories to the charge of psychologism. Psychologism assumes that epistemological problems can be resolved solely through reference to human mental processes.\\(^{38}\) In practical terms, this assumption often leads to inquiries drawing heavily from empirical fields such as psychology. Husserl, however, believes that the psychologistic presentation of human qualities in purely mechanistic terms denies the possibility, generally held by philosophers, that they transcend their physical instantiation.

To avoid the risk of psychologism in explaining a human Subject’s knowledge of the world, Husserl argues that the basic intentional state is not thought, but experience. By its nature, experience is intentional in the sense that every experience is an experience of something. Even when experience malfunctions – such as is the case with dreams and hallucinations – it cannot avoid this while still remaining experience. Based on these observations he asserts that it is experience to which the Subject refers first in the constitution of his or her knowledge.\\(^{39}\) Given this, the problem is now one of determining the processes of this constitution, in particular, as it applies to the realisation of knowledge of objects in the world.

Having identified experience as the basis for a human Subject’s knowledge of objects, Husserl asserts that the first difficulty that the Subject faces in his or her constitution of that knowledge is that he or she cannot directly experience any object as a whole. For any given object, he argues, a Subject can, at best, experience only aspects of the object. These aspects are dependent upon the object and on the relation between it and the Subject: while the side of the cube, when considered as an object, is always square, the aspect of the cube presented to the Subject might exist in a number of different quadrilateral configurations depending on the orientation of the cube with respect to the Subject.\\(^{40}\) This dependence even extends to the temporal axis: the aspect of a tree presented to the Subject in winter differs from that presented in the summer. Husserl refers to the aspects of an object as its *Abschattungen*,

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namely, its shadings, hues or “adumbrations.” In this framework it is the
Abschattungen of an object which are the fundamental intentional objects of a
Subject’s experience.

At this point Husserl encounters another problem in the form of the observation
that there is nothing in the experience of the Abschattungen of an object to necessarily
connect them to that object.\(^{41}\) While one can experience an Abschattung of a tree, for
example, one cannot experience its connection to the tree as a whole. It could, in fact,
not be the Abschattung of a whole tree at all, but of a simulacrum of a tree in the form
of a painting or sculpture. Sean D. Kelly uses the word “façade” to describe those
Abschattungen which realise this possibility.\(^{42}\)

To avoid the incorrect derivation of knowledge from façades, Husserl proposes a
model for a Subject’s derivation of knowledge of an object in the world – the
phenomenon of that object for the Subject – based on the interpretation of his or her
experience of that object. In this model, a Subject reflects on his or her experiences of
the Abschattungen of a single object and, in the process, identifies them as being
experiences of an object and not of the façade of an object. The recognition of their
shared origin serves to connect those experiences together in the phenomenon of their
object. Returning to the example of the tree, a Subject reflects on his or her
experiences of a tree and interprets them as being connected in the phenomenon of the
tree. Husserl regularly notes the parallel between his model and the processes
associated with the assignation of significance in language: in both cases a Subject’s
experience of an appearance, in the form of either the Abschattungen of an object or a
the signifier of a linguistic sign, is assigned a meaning, in terms of the recognised
shared origin of the experiences of an object or of the signified of the sign
respectively. This suggests that in the phenomenological framework, the act of
knowing is an act of meaning.\(^{43}\) In Chapter Four I will return to Husserl’s treatment
of meaning, particularly as it is deconstructed by Derrida.

As I noted earlier, Husserl’s first complete statement of his phenomenological
model appeared in Logische Untersuchungen. Here, he identifies the being of the
human Subject with the combination of the faculties of experience and reflection. In a
practice he repeats in his later works he refers to this combination as
“consciousness.”\(^{44}\) Husserl’s observations do not mean that the rest of the human
being – specifically its body – disappears from phenomenological considerations.
The body provides an immediate context for any other experience: the experience of a
sea-gull, for example, is framed by the fact that it is seen by the eyes which are situated in the head and placed at the top of the neck and so forth.

In terms of the interpretive framework developed in Chapter One, Husserl’s identification of the being of the Subject as consciousness corresponds to a speciation of that Subject within the phenomenological instantiation of the Aristotelian template. In my opening comments of this section, I observed that phenomenology in general entails an instantiation of the template in which a human Subject of the Creative genus acts as a referent for the attribution of the knowledge it creates. Given this, Husserl’s characterisation of knowledge in terms of experience and reflection indicates the speciation of the being of the human Subject by the faculties which support their generation.

In 1901, Husserl’s principal concern was to explain the relationship between the functions collected in consciousness and the human Subject’s realisation of knowledge. To that end, Logische Untersuchungen presents his central argument, in “Prolegomena zur reinen Logik” (“Prolegomena to Pure Logic”), and investigates several of its implications in areas ranging from the constitution of meaningful expressions, in “Ausdruck und Bedeutung” (“Expression and Meaning”), to the nature of consciousness, in “Elemente einer Phänomenologischen Aufklärung der Erkenntnis” (“Elements of a Phenomenological Elucidation of Knowledge”).

For many of those who followed Husserl, especially Sartre and Heidegger, the first edition of the Investigations represents the most compelling version of Husserl’s development. After this, they believed that Husserl undermined his own development through the introduction of a transcendental aspect into his conception of consciousness.

### 2.2.2 The Transcendental Aspect and Husserl’s Phenomenological Project

Husserl’s “transcendental turn” arose from a growing concern that his focus upon the faculties of reflection and experience in the first edition Logische Untersuchungen effectively ties a Subject’s realisation of knowledge to the natural processes of the human body. To his thinking, this was exactly the psychologism that he hoped to avoid when he began his project. Husserl’s answer was to introduce a transcendental aspect to his model, first in the 1907 lecture series – subsequently published as Die
While Husserl’s mature formulation of phenomenology retains the basic contention that phenomena are the products of the faculties of experience and reflection, it also develops a deeper understanding of the nature of the Subject responsible for their realisation. The first stage of this development is the argument that the intentional nature of acts of consciousness of a Subject – of the Subject’s experience and reflection – indicates that they originate in and are anchored to a single point. A corollary of this is that, since this point serves equally for all of the Subject’s acts of consciousness, it must transcend each of those acts.

In Ideen and elsewhere, Husserl interprets the transcendence of the originating point as meaning that its effects are the same in all of a Subject’s acts. Considering the nature of an individual act, these effects can be identified as the aspects of the act which correspond to the processes associated with the acts generation. The other parts of the act are then shaped by the intentional object of the act and, as such, vary between acts. In a Subject’s experience of a tree, for example, the invariant portion of the experience – the portion which manifests the effects of the originating point – consists of the process of experience while the variable portion – the aspects which are shaped by the intentional object of the tree – are those associated with the branches and leaves of the tree. Based on these observations the being of the originating point can be characterised as the combination of the processes responsible for the generation of acts of consciousness. Reflecting its transcendence with respect to the acts it generates, Husserl identifies this combination as “pure consciousness.” The entity defined by the combined processes – the originating point itself – is then the “pure” or “transcendent” ego whose being is pure consciousness. In terms of an instantiation of the Aristotelian template, it is the transcendent ego which acts as a Subject with respect to the attribution of knowledge and which is speciated by the characterisation of its being as pure consciousness.

In Ideen, Husserl formalises the processes embodied in pure consciousness using the concept of noesis. Noesis entails the correlation of the products of experience with a set of transcendent forms – or noema. Noema originate in pure consciousness in the act of experiencing and serve two functions. In the first instance, they represent templates for recognising the phenomenal nature of experiences: pure consciousness measures its experiences through the process of reflection and against the structure
provided in individual noemata. This implies that the noema correspond to the meanings that pure consciousness, in its role as the being of the Subject, assigns to its experiences. In the second instance, the total set of noema generated by pure consciousness represent a limit to the possible constitution of its phenomena: if a set of experiences does not possess a form corresponding to any of the noemata generated by pure consciousness, then it cannot be connected together in a phenomenon and hence count as knowledge of their object. These observations imply that the noema effectively govern the form of experience originating in pure consciousness. As such, they represent “… the proper foundations, or conditions of the possibility, of all our intentional experiences, including those that lead into objective knowledge of things in the surrounding world.”

Husserl’s characterisation of pure consciousness also suggests a method for the identification of some of its components through further reflecting on the phenomena it generates. This reflection – the basis of the phenomenological reduction – reveals those parts of the phenomenal constitution which are not connected to the object intended by the component experiences and which, as a result, correspond to the processes of pure consciousness. In practical terms, the aspect which is most immediately revealed is the meaning of the phenomena considered. This meaning corresponds to the noema underlying acts of pure consciousness. The revelation of noema through phenomenological reduction forms the basis of the project of Husserl’s later transcendental phenomenology.

In the interpretive framework for the Subject, Husserl’s project can be read as the practical identification of the speciation arising from the attribution of knowledge to the transcendent ego in an instantiation of the Aristotelian template: the attribution of knowledge implies that the pure consciousness as the being of that ego possesses the noematic forms identifiable in its knowledge. This reading suggests that transcendent ego is also a Subject of the Structuring genus in the sense that it is the source of the form of knowledge. Since Sartre rejects this aspect of Husserl’s theories, as I will argue shortly, I will not explore this possibility further. In Chapter Five I will examine an example of a Subject which is also both Creative and Structuring in the form of the Subject identified in Lyotard’s La condition postmoderne.

Paraphrasing Husserl, phenomenology is the science of the essence of the consciousness. One of Husserl’s clearest statements of this science appeared in a lectures delivered at the Sorbonne in 1929 and later published as Cartesianische
**2.3 Sartre’s Phenomenological Subject**

Utilising the formulation which already appeared in his considerations of contingency, Sartre begins with the assertion that a Subject is a Subject with respect to the attribution of the knowledge which he or she creates of objects in the world. This Subject is consistent with the Aristotelian template developed in the first Chapter. Armed with this structure, Sartre then turns to the theories of Husserl to explain the nature of this knowledge.

**2.3.1 Phenomenality and the Subject**

As Husserl did before him, Sartre begins with the assertion that phenomenological knowledge derives from a Subject’s interpretation of his or her experiences made possible through the application of reflection. As it stands, Sartre takes this to mean that set of objects which can be known by a Subject is limited to those which can be experienced. This is problematic for it suggests that the forms of knowledge, conceived in terms of the transcendental noematic structures proposed by Husserl, should ultimately be unknowable. Since observations of human existence indicate that human beings are capable of recognising the form of the knowledge derived from their experiences, Sartre’s challenge is to provide an explanation of that form which avoids Husserl’s transcendent noema and refers only to experience.

Sartre’s solution to the problem of form is to return to the idea that a Subject’s knowledge of an object constitutes the phenomenon of that object. For this to be possible, he believes that a phenomenon must account for every possible Abschattung of its object. Based on this, Sartre argues that the form of a phenomenon is the form which binds a Subject’s experiences of those Abschattungen together. This form corresponds to that part of each experience which is not specific to a given Abschattung, and which, as such, reflects the origin of each experience in the same object.
Given this characterisation of the form of a phenomenon, the next question Sartre must address is how a Subject can identify it in his or her experiences. Such identifications are not without problems. In particular, Sartre notes that it is impossible for a human Subject to access every *Abschattung* of an object simultaneously. Due to spatial orientation, for example, it is impossible for an observer on the surface of the Earth to directly observe the dark-side of the Moon; and due to his or her placement in time they cannot observe it a week into the future.\(^{59}\) This suggests that while the form of a phenomenon refers to the experiences of every *Abschattung* of an object, it cannot, in practice, be accessed by a Subject.

To circumvent this problem, Sartre turns to a Subject’s experiences of the finite subset of *Abschattungen* of an object which he or she can access. On encountering this subset, a Subject begins by reflecting on his or her experiences of its constituent *Abschattungen* to identify the common elements shared by each experience.\(^{60}\) Being part of an experience, these elements, when taken together, also constitute an experience – an experience which is independent of those parts of the experience of each *Abschattung* which are specific to that *Abschattung*. This constituted experience then reflects the shared origin of each of the experiences from which it derives in the finite subset of an object’s *Abschattungen* which are accessible to a Subject.

The next stage in a Subject’s recognition of the form of a phenomenon is based on the concept of transphenomenality. Transphenomenality embodies the potential of the common elements identified in each of the experiences of the finite subset of *Abschattungen* to transcend that finitude and define the common elements of the Subject’s potential experiences of the infinite set of *Abschattungen* of the same object.\(^{61}\) By recognising the transphenomenality in the constituted experience – as the combination of the transphenomenal elements derived from the experiences of the finite set of *Abschattungen* – the Subject is able to identify that experience as the form of the phenomenon of the object called, variously, its essence or transphenomenal being. The necessity of the Subject’s involvement in this process leads Sartre to observe in *L'être et le néant* that it “… suffices to multiply the *Abschattung* under consideration to infinity.”\(^{62}\)
2.3.2 The Subject and the Realisation of Knowledge

Having established the form of a phenomenon, Sartre can now consider the mechanisms which enable its realisation. Based on the preceding discussions, the realisation of knowledge of an object depends on the faculties experience, through which a Subject accesses the *Abschattungen* of that object, and refection, through which he or she identifies the form of the phenomenon entailed by his or her experiences.\(^63\) Taken together, reflection and experience are insufficient mechanisms to explain a Subject’s realisation of knowledge. Before a Subject can reflect on his or her experiences to reveal their shared phenomenality, Sartre argues that he or she must first be aware of them as experiences: if one was unaware of having experienced a tree one could not constitute the phenomenon of the tree.\(^64\) To achieve this revelation, Sartre introduces a third faculty to mediate between experience and reflection. This faculty, a revealing intuition, works to reveal the experiences as having been experienced, although not what the experiences are experiences of. Because of this limitation, Sartre asserts that the revelation of experience through intuition does not result in knowledge of those experiences.\(^65\)

Since the revealing intuition is necessary for the realisation of knowledge, Sartre observes that:

That which one can properly call Subjectivity is consciousness (of) consciousness, but it is necessary that this consciousness (of being) consciousness qualifies itself in some fashion and it can only be qualified as revealing intuition, otherwise it is nothing.\(^66\)

Taken together, these functions imply that a Subject’s realisation of knowledge occurs through three stages. In the first stage, the Subject experiences an object through a finite set of its *Abschattungen*: a Subject, for example, encounters a tree on a sunny day, observes its branches and feels the texture of its bark. The second stage entails the Subject gaining awareness of those experiences through the revealing intuition: awareness, for example, of having experienced a tree, although not of the intentional connection of those experiences to the tree. The final stage in the realisation of knowledge entails the Subject’s reflecting upon his or her experiences to reveal the common aspects which form the basis for the corresponding phenomenon.
for the Subject: reflecting on his or her experiences of the tree’s branches and trunk reveals their common aspects such as, for example, their intentional origin in the object of the tree. This leads to the conclusion that the realisation of knowledge rests on the faculties of experience, revealing intuition, and reflection. The exercise of these faculties then constitutes a Subject’s consciousness of an object – a term that Sartre uses synonymously with knowledge – while their combination forms the being of the Subject in referred to, as it was for Husserl, as human consciousness. Returning to my interpretive framework, this identification supports a richer identification of the speciation of the Subject. Recall from the discussions of contingency and elsewhere, that a human Subject, in Sartre’s theories, exists as the referent for the attribution of the knowledge that he or she realises of objects in the world. Now, having characterised knowledge as the product of the faculties of experience, revealing intuition, and reflection, it is possible to identify the being of a Subject as consciousness defined by those faculties.

Perhaps the most important aspect of Sartre’s conception of consciousness is the fact that it is neither transcendent in itself nor does it make any reference to transcendence in its functioning: experience occurs through the senses, while reflection – as Sartre describes it – is a self-contained function of the human mind. This lack of transcendence reflects the argument in Sartre’s earlier work, La transcendance de l’ego.

2.3.3 Sartre’s Rejection of the Transcendent Subject

In La transcendance de l’ego, Sartre considers some of the corollaries entailed by the functioning of experience and reflection in the realisation of knowledge. In particular, he notes that since a Subject can reflect upon his or her experiences revealed, in the formulation of L’être et le néant, through intuition, those revealed experiences must possess a solidity, or opacity, within itself. At the same time, since a Subject is capable of discerning elements within itself through reflection, that is to say its revealed experiences, it cannot share that opacity. Were this not the case – were a Subject opaque to self-reflection – it could not discern anything in itself beyond itself as an indissoluble whole. Sartre describes this in terms of a Subject being translucent to reflection.
Sartre’s contention in *La transcendance de l’ego* is that the existence of any form of transcendent ego is inconsistent with the required translucency of a Subject to reflection. His argument for this proceeds from the location of that ego. In the Husserlian framework, the transcendent ego serves as the generator and anchor of the acts of experience and reflection. Furthermore, the fact that it is possible to determine the nature of the transcendent ego – construed in terms of its *noematic* structure present in pure consciousness as its being – through reflecting on phenomena it generates, indicates that those phenomena must be opaque to reflection. But this implies that at least some portion of each of the phenomena realised by a Subject must be opaque within that Subject. This opacity contradicts the practical requirement of translucency identified earlier. As Sartre observes, if the transcendental ego exists: “… it would snatch consciousness from itself, it would divide it, it would slide into each consciousness like an opaque blade …” In the interpretive framework, the rejection of transcendence forms another aspect of the speciation resulting from the form of knowledge. Specifically, the fact that the products of experience must be capable of being reflected upon implies that they must be opaque within a translucent Subject.

### 2.4 The Ontology of the Subject

As I noted in the first section, Sartre’s motivation in turning to phenomenology was his search for a philosophical theory capable of explaining the relationship between a human Subject and objects in the world accounting for the fact that that relationship is mediated, in the first instance, by the Subject’s knowledge of those objects. As I have shown, phenomenology satisfied Sartre’s needs by explaining that knowledge in terms of the actions of the faculties which define consciousness: the Subject accesses the object through experience, brings those experiences to consciousness through the revealing intuition, and constitutes those experiences as knowledge through reflection. Armed with these concepts Sartre turns, principally in *L'être et le néant*, to the provision of the aforementioned explanation. He does so through the construction of an ontological structure based upon the being associated with objects and the being associated with Subjects. This ontology forms the basis for Sartre’s treatment of the human Subject in terms of the concepts of desire and action. In the following discussion, however, I will restrict my attention to the basis of that structure together
with a brief mention of two of the more important concepts arising from its form: nihilation and nothingness.

2.4.1 Being-in-itself as the Being of Phenomena

The first being that Sartre considers is the being associated with objects. With respect to a Subject, the most germane characterisation of this being, the being of the object to which the Subject responds, is not the being of the existence of objects. Rather it is the being of the Subject’s knowledge, or phenomena, of those objects.

If the form of a phenomenon consists of the transphenomenal extension of an experience built from the common aspects of the Subject’s experiences of a finite set of an object’s Abschattungen, the being of phenomena must be the being of that constituted experience. Sartre considers two possible candidates for this being: a being which is experienced and a being which isn’t. The first possibility, he argues, can be rejected on the grounds of its experiential nature. If a Subject could experience the being of phenomena then he or she could use that experience as the basis of another phenomenon – the phenomenon of being. But the phenomenon of being would also possess being and would, in turn, refer to another phenomenal explanation. In other words, the first candidate for the being of phenomena leads to an infinite regress.

To avoid the possibility of regress, Sartre concludes that a phenomenon “… does not possess being [as something experienced], and its existence is not a participation in being or in any other relation …” This leads him to consider the possibility that the being of phenomena is a being which is not experienced. Seeking an aspect of phenomena which is part of experience, but which is not an experience itself, Sartre turns to the observation that a Subject can only experience those Abschattungen of an object which have been revealed to it. This indicates that behind each such Abschattung is an act of revelation whose existence may be inferred but which cannot be experienced directly. More importantly, unlike specific qualities – such as shape or colour – the act of revelation occurs in every Abschattung that reveals itself to a Subject’s experience. These two properties lead Sartre to conclude that the act of revelation constitutes the being of all phenomena: “… it is being for revealing and not revealed being …”
Sartre’s characterisation of the being of phenomena resonates with Heidegger’s development in *Sein und Zeit*. In the introduction to *Sein und Zeit*, Heidegger considers the nature of phenomenology. In particular, he argues that a phenomenon is that which shows itself by virtue of its nature and that phenomenology is thus the presentation – or *logos* – of what is revealed in that showing. While Sartre studied Heidegger only superficially during his time in Berlin, by the late 1930s this had changed to the extent that he considered himself a Heideggerian partisan. Heidegger, however, did not share the same opinion of Sartre. In his response to Sartre’s arguments in *L'existentialisme est un humanisme* – subsequently published as “Brief über den Humanismus” (“Letter on Humanism”) – Heidegger asserts that Sartre had deployed a questionable conception of the Subject since it is defined by physical characteristics rather than ontological ones. Because of this, he argues, Sartre falls in to the trap of considering only the mechanics of a particular being rather than the more general question of Being.

Having identified the being of phenomena with the condition of its revelation, Sartre proceeds to identify three qualities of this being: firstly, since every phenomenon derives from a Subject’s experience of revealed objects, every phenomenon possesses this being; secondly, since the revelation of an object to a Subject’s experience supports the constitution of a phenomenon, every instance of this being supports phenomena; and finally, since every object which a Subject experiences is contingent upon its revelation to the Subject, this implies that there is nothing in the constitution of the being of phenomena beyond the ability of their intentional objects to appear to a Subject. These three points indicate that the being of phenomena is complete in itself and leads Sartre to identify it as being-in-itself.

### 2.4.2 Being-for-itself as the Being of the Subject

Turning now to the being of the Subject, the preceding discussions indicate that this being corresponds to human consciousness and is defined by the faculties of revealing intuition, reflection, and experience. Referring to the nature of these faculties, Sartre argues that because experience is intentional – that is it is directed towards an object – it carries with it the implication that its origin is not the same as its intent. This means that, in the actions of its constituent faculties through being conscious, consciousness is not the same as the objects of its consciousness. A corollary of this is that the
Subject, in the exercise of its being as consciousness effectively distinguishes its own being from the being of objects. Sartre goes on to argue that consciousness is not, however, immediately aware of this distinction. This awareness only comes through its reflection upon its experiences. Through this reflection, the Subject becomes aware that the phenomena constituted from its experiences refer to objects which are not itself and, as a result, that the being of phenomena cannot be its own being.79

An important corollary of the Subject’s realisation that its being is not being-in-itself is that it only comes to this realisation through the act of being consciousness – through experience and reflection on experience. This implies that the Subject only recognises the distinct existence of its own being when it is being conscious. In effect, its consciousness is self-revealing.80 Sartre uses this self-revelation as the basis for calling the being of consciousness – and hence of the human Subject – being-for-itself.

The identification of being-for-itself can also be interpreted as the addition of a further degree of speciation to the Subject within the framework of an instantiation of the Aristotelian template. In the previous discussions I have presented this instantiation in terms of the Subject whose being is consciousness being the referent for the attribution of the knowledge which it creates. This implies, in the first instance, that Sartre’s formulation of consciousness acts as a Subject of the Creative genus. Further more, the nature of that knowledge supports the identification of the speciation of the being of the Subject in terms of the faculties of experience, revealing intuition and reflection necessary for the realisation of the attributed knowledge. The discussions here expand upon this characterisation introducing the ontological aspect of that knowledge and, through that, the speciation of the Subject as being-for-itself.

2.4.3. After the in-itself and the for-itself: Nihilation and Nothingness.
It is worth noting that the system defined by being-for-itself and being-in-itself constitutes a formalisation of the conclusions arising from Sartre’s considerations of contingency. Recall from the presentation in the first section of this chapter, that the identification of the contingency of the world of objects – in the sense that it lacks anything within its confines that could serve as the basis for knowledge of a causal system – leads to the conclusion that human existence is absurd. This absurdity is
revealed in nausea, which is a Subject’s knowledge of their facticity as the measure of his or her separation form the world of objects.

Based on the discussion in this section we can now see that the separation indicated in the earlier discussion is encapsulated in the distinction between being-for-itself and being-in-itself engendered by the functioning of consciousness as being-for-itself. In the course of his presentation in *L'être et le néant*, Sartre characterises the process of distinction in terms of the concept of *nihilation*. Nihilation occurs when the Subject, through being conscious – and, as such, being being-for-itself – separates him or herself from the world of objects. There are several interpretive consequences of this separation. In the first instance, since the Subject is no longer part of the world of objects, it cannot be being-in-itself. Sartre interprets this in terms of the Subject removing, or nihilating, any aspect of being-in-itself in itself. This contrasts with the state of bad faith which results when the Subject fails to establish itself through being conscious and hence does not remove itself from objective existence.

The nihilation of being-in-itself from being-for-itself plays another important role in the subsequent development in *L'être et le néant* for it allows Sartre to introduce the concept of nothingness to characterise being-for-itself. This nothingness is not nothingness in the sense of a complete lack of being, since being-for-itself continues to exist as a being. The nothingness resulting from nihilation, rather, is a nothingness with respect to being-in-itself. In being nothingness, being-for-itself lacks “…for meaning, for content, for anything substantive at all.” Perceiving this lack of meaning provides a motivation for the Subject to move towards the aforementioned state of self-realisation.

With this presentation I have now reached the end of my discussion of the Subject in Sartre’s phenomenological writings. While the process of the Subject towards self-realisation provides the basis for much of *L'être et le néant* it only addresses the actions of the Subject defined as being-for-itself in response to being-in-itself.

### 2.5 Interpreting Sartre’s Phenomenological Subject

In the preceding discussions I have considered the Subject identified in Sartre’s phenomenological writings from the 1930s and 1940s and have argued that this Subject exists in an instantiation of the Aristotelian template developed in Chapter One. This existence is apparent in Sartre’s thought even before his adoption of
phenomenology as an analytical tool in his consideration of the problem of contingency. The problem of contingency rests on the observation that many features typically associated with the real world are not part of that world at all. Rather they are artefacts of a human being’s relationship with the world: a relationship mediated by their knowledge of objects. An example of this occurs in the idea of causality. Sartre argues that causality is simply a human invention posited to explain repeated sequential observations. Consequently, if causality is absent from the real world then no aspect of that world can be thought of as being necessary. In effect, every part of the world – including a human being’s own existence – is contingent. Apropos considerations of Subjects, Sartre’s observations here indicate the presence of an instantiation of the Aristotelian template in which a human being acts as the referent for the attribution of knowledge by being, in the first instance, the entity responsible for the creation of that knowledge. This implies that a human being is a Subject of the Creative genus.

In his early discussions, Sartre makes little effort to identify what can be interpreted as the species of the Subject – except, perhaps, for the observation that the attributed knowledge is human knowledge implying that the Subject is a human being. In his later works, as part of an effort to understand the relationship between a human being and his or her knowledge, he turns to phenomenology which provides him with a deeper understanding of knowledge and its creation by a human being. Specifically he argues that knowledge is the product of the realisation of the faculties of experience, revealing intuition, and reflection. Taken together these faculties define human consciousness which Sartre identifies as the being of the Subject in his theory. Although he does not approach the Subject in such terms, this identification directly parallels the identification of the species of the Subject in the interpretive framework: the conception of knowledge as the realisation of faculties implies that the Subject in the instantiation of the Aristotelian template is defined by the possession of those faculties, a possession which speciates the Subject’s being.

The final stage of Sartre’s presentation of the Subject – to the extent that I have discussed it here – addresses the ontological implications of what his understanding of knowledge and its relation to consciousness. This leads Sartre to identify the being of the Subject’s knowledge as being-in-itself defined by the condition of the appearance of the object of that knowledge. This, combined with the nature of knowledge and its realisation, leads him to identify consciousness with being-for-itself defined as not
being being-in-itself. Again this provides an indication of an additional aspect of the speciation of consciousness within the instantiation of the Aristotelian template. In this case the identification of the attributed knowledge with being-in-itself leads to the corresponding identification of the being of the Subject in terms of not being that being.

Based on these observations it seems reasonable to conclude that the interpretive framework developed in Chapter One supports the identification of consciousness, as it is presented in Sartre’s phenomenological writings of the 1930s and 1940s, as the being of the Subject. Given this, the question can be asked whether the same consistency will recur when the framework is applied to the reading of a different Subject, a Subject which is not, as Sartre’s is, a Subject of the Creative genus occurring within a discursive space defined by phenomenology and ontology. In the next chapter I will consider the Subject in Claude Lévi-Strauss’s ethnological writings and argue that it can be read as a Subject of the Structuring genus instantiating in a space defined primarily by ethnology and linguistics. In later chapters I will turn my attention to more complex configurations both of the Subject and of the discursive spaces in which it is identified.
Lévi-Strauss and the Subject of Cultural Phenomena

Although Lévi-Strauss does not explicitly identify a particular entity as a Subject until his later works, the framework on which that identification is based permeates his mature writings. In this chapter I will characterise this framework as a form of ethnology – understood in the Continental sense as the comparative study of human societies in terms of their social structures – modified by Lévi-Strauss’s appropriation of various structural-linguistic techniques. This framework supports the identification of the Subject as the part of human nature which, through its representation in communal actions, underpins cultural phenomena. Turning to the interpretive framework for the Subject, I will argue that this is an instantiation of the Aristotelian template for the Subject in which a human being defined by that represented nature is the referent for the attribution of his or her communal actions and of the phenomena to which they contribute.

In contrast to the singular focus of Sartre’s phenomenological writings, Lévi-Strauss’s ethnological investigations examine phenomena ranging from kinship structures in Les structures élémentaires de la parenté (The Elementary Structures of Kinship), through the social behaviours of the members of so-called primitive cultures in La pensée sauvage (The Savage Mind) and Le totémisme aujourd’hui (Totemism), to the analysis of myths in the paper, “The Structural Study of Myth,” and in the four volume study Mythologiques (Mythologies). Despite this variety, Lévi-Strauss proceeds from the assumption that each phenomenon considered is a representation of the nature of the citizens of the culture in which it appears. The path to this assumption begins not in Lévi-Strauss’s desire to pursue an ethnological career, but in his study of philosophy.

3.1 Lévi-Strauss, Philosophy and Ethnology

Although ethnological research was an intellectual activity ideally suited to his personal disposition, Lévi-Strauss did not realise this until the late 1930s. That he did so at all, was a result of his growing disillusionment with the study of philosophy which he had pursued since before his agrégation.
3.1.1 Lévi-Strauss and Philosophy

At the beginning of his studies, Lévi-Strauss thought of philosophy as little more than an acceptable alternative to those subjects for which, in his own words, he felt a “… genuine repugnance …”\(^2\) Even then, as he notes in the autobiographical *Tristes tropiques* (*Tristes Tropiques*), he originally intended pursuing his *licence* in philosophy – a qualification based on three years of university study – only as a secondary interest while he focused on preparing for a career in law.

As time passed, however, Lévi-Strauss came to find the study of the law unappealing. Not only was he bored by the constant memorisation of pre-existing material at the expense of new thought, but he also found his fellow students to be unpleasantly extroverted, aggressively self-assertive, and politically right-wing. In contrast to students of law and, more generally, to students of any subject oriented towards a profession, Lévi-Strauss found students of the arts and sciences to be introverted, discrete, and politically left-leaning. In *Tristes tropiques* he explains these observations in terms of the appeal that such subjects had for those who sought to avoid the responsibilities associated with a professional career by becoming teachers and remaining in the academic environment indefinitely.\(^3\) Although Lévi-Strauss did not explicitly identify himself as being academically-oriented, the appeal of the refuge offered by academia eventually led him to focus entirely on philosophy to the point of attaining his *agrégation* in 1932.

3.1.2 The Failure of Philosophy for Lévi-Strauss

While philosophy did provide Lévi-Strauss with a refuge from the requirements of a professional career, it did so only temporarily. During his studies, he came to suspect that philosophy, as it was taught at the time, could be as intellectually unsatisfying as the law had been. In *Tristes tropiques* he attributes this to the practice of teaching students to approach a diverse range of philosophical problems within the framework of a single dialectical method of problem solving.

There [at the Sorbonne] I began to understand that all problems, serious or trivial, could be settled by the application of an always identical method which consists of opposing two traditional views of the question; the first is
introduced by the common sense justifications, then these justifications are destroyed by means of the second [view]; finally they [both views] are revealed to be equally incomplete thanks to a third, reduced by verbal artifice to be complementary aspects of the same reality, form and foundation, container and contained, being and appearance, continuous and discontinuous, essence and existence etc. …

Lévi-Strauss identifies several undesirable consequences of adopting the dialectical approach to problem solving. Amongst other things, there is nothing in the approach to necessitate its application exclusively to the problems of philosophy. The dialectical approach is equally applicable to the resolution of any problematic situation. As Lévi-Strauss observes, he was confident that he “… could put together an hour’s lecture with a solid dialectical framework on the respective superiority of busses and trams …”

On a theoretical level, Lévi-Strauss found the unrestricted applicability of the dialectical method particularly disturbing. One of the important philosophical themes prevalent in France in the 1920s and 1930s entailed a rejection of metaphysical explanations of the world and particularly of human nature. Taking an approach similar to Sartre’s realism, Lévi-Strauss appropriated this theme through the assumption that knowledge of the world must have an objective basis. The dialectical method, however, is capable of providing knowledge – in the form of the resolution of the problematic situations to which it is applied – based on something which transcends an objective basis to apply to all situations. In effect, the dialectical method derives knowledge from the unknowable. This is analogous to the problem of causality being investigated at the same time by Sartre: since there is no objective basis for causality one cannot “know” the connection between cause and effect.

A further problem with the dialectical framework became apparent when Lévi-Strauss attempted to apply his qualifications in the teaching of philosophy. After two years of employment as a teacher, he concluded that the dialectical framework had permeated academic philosophy to such an extent that all he was required to do was ensure that his students could apply it correctly: there was no need in the practice of philosophy for any form of insight or originality. This, combined with his observations regarding the applicability of the dialectical method led him to conclude
that philosophy, both in pedagogy and in practice, lacked the intellectual stimulation he was coming to desire from a profession.

One may ask why Lévi-Strauss did not turn to some of the newer philosophical developments of the 1930s – such as the phenomenological theories of Sartre – to address his concerns. The answer to this lies in his perceptions of their inadequacy with respect to what he believed to be the principal goal of philosophy. Writing in 1955 – seven years before his explicit critique of Sartre in *La pensée sauvage* – Lévi-Strauss identifies the aim of philosophy as being: “… until science is strong enough to replace it, to understand being by its relationship to itself and not me [the individual] …” While it is possible that some phenomenological theories – such as those put forward in the later works of Heidegger – may achieve this, it is also true that many do not. In particular, the phenomenological template proposed by Sartre in his attempts to resolve issues arising from his understanding of contingency rests on a relationship between the being of the Subject and the being of the knowledge attributed to him or her. Lévi-Strauss believes that by espousing this type of model, Sartre and his followers stop short of achieving the primary goal of philosophy and trap themselves in the formulation of second-rate Subject-oriented models. In *Tristes tropiques*, Lévi-Strauss famously characterises such lesser models as “… a sort of shop-girl metaphysics …”

### 3.1.3 Turning to Ethnology

Lévi-Strauss’s unhappiness with traditional philosophy and its contemporary alternatives in the early 1930s left him increasingly amenable to the possibility of shifting his profession to one which would provide him with the intellectual stimulation that philosophy and law could not. The profession that he eventually settled on was ethnology. One of the most intellectually appealing aspects of ethnology for Lévi-Strauss is that, in its study of human cultures, it has a potential for intellectual diversity and challenge limited only by the sum total of those cultures.

While Lévi-Strauss had shown an interest in the artefacts of other societies in his youth, he did not recognise the potential of the field until 1933 when he read Robert H. Lowie’s 1920 work, *Primitive Society* – a broad investigation addressing the phenomena of kinship, justice, property and government. With this he found his thoughts escaping “… from bath-house atmosphere to which philosophical reflection
had been reduced …”11 The chance to complete his escape from philosophy came in 1935 when Célestin Bouglé, a sympathetic acquaintance and head of the L’École normale supérieure at the time, drew his attention to a position at the University of São Paulo in Brazil which would allow him to undertake ethnological research.

Moving to Brazil, Lévi-Strauss taught at the university from 1935 until 1938, made several small expeditions into the centre of the country, mounted the first exhibition based upon his explorations, and published his first ethnological article. Following his resignation from the university in 1938, Lévi-Strauss used the opportunity to undertake a major expedition into central Brazil. Although this was the only significant fieldwork of his career, it served as the basis for Tristes tropiques and for several papers based on his investigations of the Nabikwara and Tupi-Kawahib Indians. By 1939, when he returned to France to organise his research and re-enter French academic life, Lévi-Strauss had transformed himself from a disinterested teacher of philosophy to a practicing ethnologist. In the latter field, he found a profession with the objectivity, variety, and stimulation that he thought was lacking in the former. Lévi-Strauss did not, however, completely forsake philosophy. The most important aspect of philosophy he retained, in his opinion at least, was the ethnological project itself: the project of characterising human nature.

3.2 The Project of Ethnology

By the middle of the 1940s, Lévi-Strauss’s understanding of the basic requirements of ethnological research had reached a form which persisted throughout his later writings. Central to this understanding is the belief that ethnology focuses upon the question of human nature.

In his 1949 paper, “Histoire et Ethnologie” (“History and Anthropology”) – subsequently included as the introduction to Anthropologie Structurale (Structural Anthropology) – Lévi-Strauss lays out the basic principles of ethnology including an endorsement of the characterisation of the field presented by the Nineteenth century British sociologist Sir Edward Burnett Tylor.12 According to Tylor, the principal aim of ethnology is to examine the phenomena of a human society or culture to determine the nature of its citizens.13 This conception contrasts with the practices of others at the time, such as Sir James Frazer and Bronislaw Malinowski, who believed that the study of cultural phenomena ranging from religious to kinship practices should focus
on explaining their structure and evolution rather than their relationship to human nature.¹⁴

Lévi-Strauss’s adoption of Tylor’s conception of the ethnological project is based on two assumptions: that the phenomena of a society are representations of aspects of human nature shared by all of the society’s members; and that those aspects are identifiable in their representations. To support the first assumption, Lévi-Strauss draws on the results of the ethnologist Franz Boas who wrote extensively in the first half of the Twentieth century. Central to those results is the assertion that the phenomena of one culture are the products of capacities shared by the members of all cultures regardless of either the culture’s complexity or the racial makeup of its citizens. The instantiation of this assertion in Boas’s works contrasts with the accepted ethnological wisdom of the early part of the Twentieth century which viewed the primitiveness of a culture as being indicative of the racial inferiority of its citizens.¹⁵

Lévi-Strauss approaches Boas’s central assertion through the latter’s investigation of language. Within the Boasian framework, the cultural phenomenon of a language reflects a capacity to use language shared by the members of all human cultures. This suggests that any one language can be thought of as a representation of that capacity in the objectively observable framework of the culture in which it occurs. Generalising these observations, Lévi-Strauss argues that all cultural phenomena can be similarly approached as being representations of capacities shared by all human beings independently of their cultures.¹⁶ This independence implies that the underlying capacities are part of the basic nature of all human beings.¹⁷

This argument represents one of the first explicit appearances in Lévi-Strauss’s mature writings of an instantiation of the Aristotelian template. In this case, a human being whose nature is defined by his or her capacities is the entity who acts as the referent for the cultural phenomena which are attributed to it as the representations of those capacities. Recognising this, the problem then becomes one of identifying the genus of species of the human Subject. To do so, it is necessary to turn to Lévi-Strauss’s conception of representation posited to support the second assumption.

While the possibility of identifying the aspect of human nature represented in a cultural phenomenon stems from the observation that, in general, a representation reflects the nature of what is represented, the second assumption requires a formalisation of the idea or representation to explain how this identification might
occur. For Lévi-Strauss this formalisation derives from three examples of representation which he presents in *Tristes tropiques*.18

Lévi-Strauss’s first example of representation originates from his interest in geology. Citing a fondly remembered trip to Languedoc – a region in Southern France bordered by the Mediterranean to the South, the Pyrenees to the West and the Rhône River to the East – he observed that the appearance of a geological phenomenon is a representation of the structure of the influences which are realised in its form. The appearance of a stratified rock face, for example, represents the structure of its periodic submersions beneath the ocean. This implies that, by recognising the connection between geological appearance and causal influence, a geologist can access the later through the study of the former. The same pattern is repeated in the second of Lévi-Strauss’s examples: the sociological phenomena which form the basis for the theories of Karl Marx. Following Rousseau, Marx approaches such phenomena as being the representations of a structure of influences arising from factors such as the inequalities present in the mechanisms of production within an economy. Through the study of those phenomena, Marx sought to identify the structure of influences at work and to incorporate it into his economic and political theories. The case of Freudian psychoanalysis – the third of Lévi-Strauss’s examples – is similar to that of Marxism and geology. Freud’s concern was the recognition and treatment of aberrant conscious behaviours. These behaviours, he argued, are the representations of the influences of the unconscious. Psychoanalysis then focuses on the identification of those influences as a precursor to their rectification through a program of therapy.

The examples of geology, Marx, and Freud suggest an understanding of representation in which the structure which shapes what is represented is accessible through the study of the form or appearance of the representation itself: the structure of realised geological influences is accessible in the appearance of the resulting geological formations, the structure of social and economic influences captured by Marx’s models are accessible in the phenomena to which those models refer, and the structure of the aberrant portions of the unconscious are accessible, through Freudian psychoanalysis, in the aberrant conscious behaviours of the human mind. For the purposes of my discussion I will refer to this representation as being a-historical in the sense that the form of what is represented is present in its representation as a super-rationality, a deeper level of structure or rationality which is not merely in a
representation, but also in its cause. This ahistorical representation contrasts with historical representation where the cause precedes, but is excluded from the effect.

Applying the concept of ahistorical representation to the study of cultural phenomena leads to an understanding in which the appearance of a phenomenon contains and represents the structure of the human capacity responsible for its form. Given this, it will be possible to determine the structure of the latter through the study of the former. This understanding also enables the identification of the genus and species of the human Subject in the instantiation of the Aristotelian template entailed by Lévi-Strauss’s writings. In the case of the former, the genus of the Subject derives from the observation that a cultural phenomenon embodies the form of the human capacity it represents. This means that in the terminology of the framework, a human being is a Subject of the Structuring genus with respect to the phenomena attributed to it. Turning to the speciation, the fact that the form of the capacity represented in a phenomenon is present in that phenomenon implies that the human Structuring Subject is speciated by the forms of the phenomena in which his or her capacities are represented.

This interpretation of Lévi-Strauss’s second assumption resonates with an aspect of Sartre’s phenomenology. As I noted in the previous chapter, Sartre argues that the form of a phenomenon is a part of the experiences on which it is based. Lévi-Strauss’s treatment of representation, however, allows him to avoid some of his difficulties with phenomenology. Since the form of the human capacity is contained in its representation in a cultural phenomenon, it is unnecessary for an ethnologist to consider anything other than the representation itself in his determination of the nature of which that capacity is a part. He does not, as Sartre did, need to consider the relationship between the representation and some external Subject.

3.3 Cultural Phenomena as the Representations of Human Nature

Armed with an understanding of the relationship between human nature and cultural phenomena, Lévi-Strauss goes on to consider its practical implications using a model of those phenomena deriving from the works of Émile Durkheim and Marcel Mauss. This consideration leads to a richer understanding of human nature – an understanding which is, again, reflected in the instantiation of the Aristotelian template in Lévi-Strauss’s ethnological theories.
3.3.1 Lévi-Strauss, Durkheim and Mauss

Émile Durkheim’s principal contribution to modern ethnological practice is his assertion that an ethnologist must approach cultural phenomena with the same rigour that a scientist would use in approaching their physical counterparts.20 This attitude, whose clearest statement occurs in Durkheim’s 1895 work, *Les règles de la méthode sociologique* (*The Rules of the Sociological Method*), contrasts with the view commonly held by social researchers in the late Nineteenth century that such phenomena are the instantiations of ideal structures of human behaviour.

If the study of cultural phenomena is like a science, it is not, in Durkheim’s formulation, identical to one. For Durkheim, the basic process through which a scientist interacts with physical phenomena entails objective measurement, followed by interpretation, followed finally by theorisation. In the study of cultural phenomena, by contrast, such objectivity is practically impossible since the observation of any cultural phenomenon must necessarily refer to the general understanding of such phenomena held by the observer: a European researcher might approach the question of marriage, for example, from the point of view of the Judaeo-Christian tradition which dominates his or her background.

A potential problem with the long-term significance of Durkheim’s assertions lies in the observations that developments in the theory and practice of science in the twentieth century have undermined the accuracy of his characterisation of scientific practice. In his 1962 work, *The Structures of Scientific Revolutions*, Thomas Kuhn, for example, proposes a model of paradigms.21 In contrast to Durkheim, the paradigm model asserts that there exists a theoretical framework, or paradigm, which precedes any observation of the world. This is apparent in the contemporary practices of both theoretical cosmology and quantum physics where observations are typically taken to confirm the theoretical results. Some of these theories even argue for the impossibility of objective measurement altogether. This is particularly true in the latter case where, according to the Copenhagen Interpretation – originating in the works of Niels Bohr in the 1920s – the act of measurement plays a determinant role in quantum systems. Noting that such sciences – together with the theories which support them – appeared some decades after *Les règles de la méthode sociologique*, it is likely that Durkheim’s view was, at the time, an accurate one.
Whatever its accuracy, what is important in a consideration of Durkheim is that he takes science as a paradigm against which ethnological research is to be measured. To achieve the scientific standards he desires, and to avoid the subjectivity of individual observations, he proposes that ethnological investigations should focus not on a single observation of a cultural phenomenon, but on the “social fact” of the phenomenon. Such facts are constructed from as many observations of the phenomenon as possible. As the number of observations increases, the social fact will approach a structure free of the sentiment, judgement and perspective generated by any one observer and become – in a manner resonant with Nietzsche’s observations in *Zur Genealogie der Moral (On the Genealogy of Morals)* that the idea of an object only approaches objectivity when one accounts for as many contextual perspectives as possible – a true “scientific” basis for ethnological study.\(^{22}\) An important practical corollary of this approach is that the constitution of a social fact does not require an explicit contribution of observations made by the investigating ethnologist. It is possible for an ethnologist to undertake research without having any direct contact with the studied culture at all. This corollary manifests in the works of a number of subsequent ethnologists. Lévi-Strauss’s fieldwork, for example, is described by commentators as being both limited and of only moderate quality.\(^{23}\)

Beyond the characterisation of the social fact, Durkheim’s sociological project is concerned with the identification of the significance of such facts to the members of the culture in which the phenomenon that serves as the basis for the fact occurs. To that end, he observes that the social facts of cultural phenomena possess two aspects: on the one hand, the communal nature of social facts – reflected in their instantiation within the framework of a culture – implies that they must exist on a scale which transcends the individual concerns of a culture’s members; while on the other, the fact that social facts manifest in individual behaviours indicates that there must remain an aspect of social facts which is a part of the individual lives of those members.\(^{24}\)

To explain both the individual and the transcendent aspect of social facts, Durkheim posits the *conscience collective*. It is possible to translate *conscience collective* as either collective conscience or collective consciousness. Both translations are consistent with Durkheim’s intent. In his formulation, the *conscience collective* represents a set of sanctions which, taken together, govern the common behaviour, attitudes, and practices of the members of a society. This means that the *conscience collective* governs both the actions of the members of a society in much
the same way the conscience governs the actions of an individual, and it governs their awareness in a manner similar to an individual’s consciousness. Recognising this duality I will retain the French terminology in the following discussions.

The duality between consciousness and conscience is not the only one present in the conscience collective. As required, the conscience collective exists on the individual level where it is realised in the behaviours of a culture’s members, and on the collective from where it imposes its sanctions. Given this, Durkheim takes the conscience collective to represent the meaning of each of the social facts of a given culture and, through them, of the culture in its entirety.25 This implies that at a practical level, Durkheim’s project entails the identification of the sanctions embodied by the collective conscience as it manifests in the social facts of a society or culture.

While Lévi-Strauss also characterises his project as the identification of a structure which gives rise to cultural phenomena, he diverges from Durkheim in two important areas. At a practical level, Lévi-Strauss’s analogue of Durkheim’s social fact draws from the idea of the “total social fact” which appears in the work of Durkheim’s nephew, protégé, and intellectual successor, Marcel Mauss. Based on his investigations of the phenomenon of gift-giving in societies ranging from Melanesia to ancient Rome and tribal Germany – published as “Essai sur le don. Forme et raison de l’échange dans les sociétés archaïques” (The Gift: the form and reason for exchange in archaic societies) – Mauss concludes that the paradigm of the giving of gifts is far more inclusive than the traditional economic view of exchange.26 Such gifts, which range from the simple exchange of goods to the arrangement of marriages and the provision of military assistance, reflect not only the immediate intentions of the participants in the gift-giving, but also the sources for those intentions in the structures, religious traditions, cultural practices, and historical circumstances of the society.27 Given this, Mauss argues that to account for the cultural phenomenon of the gift, it is ultimately necessary to account for its place within the framework of phenomena capturing those influences.28 In theory this framework could encompass every phenomenon of the society, but in practical terms it is typically limited to those immediately impacting upon the original gift. Accounting for these immediate connections leads to the identification of the total social fact of the gift.

For Lévi-Strauss, the idea of the total social fact provides a basis for contextualising individual cultural phenomena within their societies. His first application of this approach occurs in his 1949 work, Les structures élémentaires,
where he considers the exchange of female family members as an instance of gift giving and addresses the place of such exchanges in the larger structure of a society. In the process he identifies the rules which implicitly govern such exchanges. In his later works Lévi-Strauss generalises this idea to address the total social facts of other cultural phenomena such as those associated with myths.

The second point of divergence between Lévi-Strauss and Durkheim relates to the role of the conscience collective as the significance of social facts. For Lévi-Strauss cultural phenomena are explained by the individual human capacities which, through their representation in common behaviours, form their basis. Since such capacities are, furthermore, directly reflected in the structure of those behaviours, this implies that unlike Durkheim’s conscience collective, the causes of cultural phenomena are observable. In effect, mirroring the philosophical theme mentioned earlier, there is no need for the ethnologist to resort to a transcendent structure to explain his or her observations of cultural phenomena. It is most likely a suspicion of this result which caused Lévi-Strauss to characterise himself when he arrived in Brazil – contrary to the common attitude of the staff at the University of São Paulo – as not being a Durkheimian.29

Lévi-Strauss’s appropriations from the theories of Durkheim and Mauss can also be treated within the interpretive framework of the Subject. In the previous section I noted that Lévi-Strauss’s conceptualisation of cultural phenomena and of their relationship to human nature is an example of an instantiation the Aristotelian template of the Subject in which the human being defined by that nature is the referent for the attribution of the cultural phenomena which are his or her representations. Turning to the concept of the total social fact provides an elaboration of the speciation of that human being required within the framework of this instantiation. Recall that Lévi-Strauss adopts Mauss’s model of the total social fact to account for the observation that cultural phenomena exist within a larger contextualisation defined by all the phenomena which influence their form. Since each of these phenomena is itself a representation of its own capacity, each then reflects the structure of that capacity. This implies that paralleling the total social fact is a framework of interconnected capacities. In effect, the capacities which define human being in the framework of the instantiation are connected together. Although Lévi-Strauss does not draw out this connection in his discussion of the total social fact, it will become apparent in his explicit identification of the Subject.

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3.3.2 Lévi-Strauss and the Subject of Cultural Phenomena

As I noted previously, Lévi-Strauss does not immediately treat the connection between a cultural phenomenon – now embodied in the contextual framework of the total social fact – and a human being in terms of the concept of a Subject. It is nonetheless possible to demonstrate that the characterisation of the Subject provided in his later works is consistent with such a treatment. Lévi-Strauss’s reference to the idea of the Subject rests on an understanding of the human individual as consisting of a conscious manifestation and an unconscious form.

While terminologically congruent, neither the conscious manifestation nor the unconscious, as Lévi-Strauss understands them, correspond to the psychoanalytical senses of “consciousness” and “unconscious.”30 In psychoanalysis, particularly in the variety proposed by Freud and his followers, a conscious process is defined by the human mind’s immediate awareness of that process: a conscious thought, for example, is a thought which the mind is aware of, while a conscious action is an action that the mind is aware of causing. In contrast to this, unconscious processes are processes which proceed without the mind’s immediate awareness. Psychoanalysis argues that while there is some identifiable contact between consciousness and the unconscious, such as when the latter influences the former’s behaviours through psychoses, there need not be a direct correspondence between the two: there are things of which the mind can be conscious without that consciousness corresponding to an unconscious awareness, such as the immediate physical conditions of the body; and there are things of which the mind is unconsciously aware without that awareness impacting upon the consciousness. In contrast to the Freudian case, the correspondence between the conscious manifestation of an individual and his or her unconscious is, for Lévi-Strauss, a direct one taking the form of an ahistorical representation. That is to say, conscious manifestation of the individual is an ahistorical representation of his or her unconscious.

Lévi-Strauss elaborates the structure of the individual in his 1971 work, *L’homme nu* (*The Naked Man*), partly in response to his critics’ accusation that his theory – as it appears in his earlier works – lacks a place for a human Subject. To answer this, he begins by defining the idea of the Subject with respect to a particular conscious manifestation of an individual in the form of his or her thoughts. In this context he
argues that the Subject is the “…place offered to anonymous thought so that it can deploy itself, stand back from itself, find and fulfil its true dispositions and organise itself to have consideration of the constraints inherent in its very nature …” Since the conscious thoughts of an individual are ahistorical representations of his or her unconscious, this implies that the space of thought referred to in this passage can be identified with the unconscious represented in those thoughts: if it is a conscious thought then, by definition, it is a representation of the unconscious and if the unconscious is detectable at all it is detectable only through its representation in conscious thought. Based on these points, it is possible to identify the relationship between the unconscious and consciousness in an individual as an instantiation of the Aristotelian template in which the former is the referent for the attribution of the latter. This means that, the unconscious is effectively the Subject of conscious thought. Furthermore, since this attribution is one of ahistorical representation, it is possible to identify the unconscious as a Subject of the Structuring genus.

Lévi-Strauss goes further to connect this model of the Subject with those actions of the individual which form the basis of cultural phenomena. Actions, in this framework, are the ahistorical representations of conscious thoughts in the objectively observable domain of the individual’s body. This implies that an action contains within it the form of the conscious thought it represents, and through that of its ultimate unconscious foundation. Consequently, just as the attribution of conscious thought to the unconscious is an instantiation of the Aristotelian template, so too is the connection of action to conscious thought. In this case, it is the conscious thought which acts as the entity to which action is attributed. This implies that conscious thought is a Structuring Subject of action, a Subject which provides form to those actions. But since the unconscious can similarly be treated as a Subject of conscious thought, this implies that action can similarly be attributed to the unconscious. In effect the unconscious is also a Structuring Subject of action.

Turning to cultural phenomena, since such phenomena consist of behaviours shared by all members of a society, the preceding arguments imply that each member possesses identical aspects in their respective unconsciouses whose representation through conscious thought takes the form of such actions. In terms of the project of ethnology, the structure of these aspects is then identifiable in the appearance of those actions.
It is also possible for the unconscious structures which form the basis for cultural phenomena to underpin individual actions. An important example of this occurs in the framework of myths. Myths, Lévi-Strauss argues, are cultural phenomena and thus rest on an unconscious aspect which is shared by all members of a society. This same aspect, however, can also provide the structure for an individual’s action, such as when that action involves the enunciation of a myth in spoken or written form. Following such an enunciation, the audience of the enunciation recognise it as being a representation of an aspect of their respective unconsciouses. This recognition causes the enunciation to transcend its individual origin to become shared, while losing “… in the course of this transcendence, the essential factors owed to the probability which infused it at the start and which one could attribute to the talent, the imagination and to the personal experiences of the its author …”\textsuperscript{32}

At this point it is worth noting that Lévi-Strauss’s formulation of the Subject in terms of consciousness and the unconscious is simply a reformulation of the structure presented in “Histoire et Ethnologie.” In the first instance, both treat cultural phenomena as representations of an aspect of human nature: in the case of the earlier formulation this aspect takes the form of a human capacity while in the later presentation it appears as an aspect of the unconscious. In both cases, furthermore, the representation is an ahistorical one in the sense that its structure corresponds to what it represents. It is even possible to interpret the aspect of the unconscious represented in action as a capacity in the sense that its presence both enables and is realised in action. To establish that the two structures are ultimately compatible, it is also necessary to reconcile the differences between the frameworks in which the capacities appear, in particular, the fact that the capacity of the initial instantiation exists in isolation while the capacity as an aspect of an individual’s unconscious exists within the structure of that unconscious.

The resolution to this problem lies in the observations made earlier regarding the total social fact. Recall that the framework of a total social fact entails a parallel framework defined by the interconnected structures of the capacities represented in the component phenomena of the fact. A corollary of this is that the forms of those capacities will embody their connections to the other capacities. In effect, Lévi-Strauss’s treatment of the total social fact implies that a human capacity which forms the basis of the initial instantiation of the Aristotelian template does not, as it initially appears, exist in isolation, but as part of a structure of interconnected capacities.
Given this and the other parallels noted earlier, it is possible to identify the framework of capacities entailed by the original formulation with the collection of capacities embodied in the unconscious.

3.4 Lévi-Strauss and Structural Linguistics

Given his understanding of cultural phenomena as ahistorical representations of aspects of the human unconscious, the problem facing Lévi-Strauss is now one of identifying the structure of cultural phenomena in order to access those aspects. He approaches this identification through modelling that structure using a structural linguistic framework.

3.4.1 Structural Linguistics of the Prague School

While Lévi-Strauss, as I will note shortly, refers principally to the structural linguistic theories deriving from the works of the Prague School, the basic concept of those theories derives from Ferdinand de Saussure’s *Cours de linguistique générale* (*Course in General Linguistics*). While I will explore the nuances of Saussure’s presentation in greater detail in the next chapter, the most important aspect of his theory is his treatment of language. Rather than construe a language as being the product of language-users, Saussure proposes a model in which language refers only to itself. It does so by consisting of a structure of linguistic entities. In Saussure’s case these entities are linguistic signs understood as the inseparable combinations of the signifiers through which signs are encountered and what is signified by the signs in that encounter. Saussure argues that the connection between the signifier and the signified of a sign is determined by its relationship with every other sign in the language. Taken together, the structure defined by these relationships constitutes the language in which the signs are encountered.

Inspired by Saussure, the linguists of the Prague School in the late 1930s also treat language as a structure defined by the relationships between linguistic entities. According to them, the exact nature of any language reflects the interaction of a number of requirements addressing the formation of linguistic signs, the connection between signifier and signified in a sign, the relationship between signs necessary to construct sentences, and the connection between sounds, or phonemes, necessary to enunciate linguistic signs in speech. These areas correspond to the study of
morphology, semantics, syntax, and phonology. Of these, it is the last which saw the Prague School’s greatest contributions to the field of linguistics.

Beginning from the assumption that the principal instantiation of a language occurs in the form of speech, the project of a phonologist is to examine the spoken signifiers of the signs of the language for the purposes of characterising each in terms of their component sounds, or phonemes. These characterisations, will, in turn, reveal the rules which govern the interaction of phonemes in the creation of well formed signifiers. An example of such a rule might capture the tradition in English that ensures that the sounds associated with the phonemes /nt/ and /dm/ can appear within or at the end of signifiers such as in “rent” and “admit,” but not at the beginning. While phonologists of the time argued that phonemes constitute the foundational elements of the signifiers of a language, Nikolay Trubetskoy – a leading member of the School in the 1930s – took a different view. Phonemes, he argued, can be thought of as the simultaneous combinations of the distinctive features that serve to distinguish one phoneme from others. The distinctive elements which define the phoneme /p/, for example, contrast with those which define the phoneme /q/. The recognition of this construction enables a reorientation of Saussure’s conception of language away from one based on the relationships between signs defined in terms of the connection between the signifier and what it signifies, to one based on the nature of the phonemic makeup of those signifiers only.

One corollary of Trubetskoy’s approach is that it provides a framework for explaining variations within languages over time in terms of recognisable alterations in the phonemic constitution of the signifiers of a language. This allows linguists to consider classes of language defined by their connection to a root language through a series of phonemic alterations. Examples of analyses based on the identification of the series of phonemic alterations which connect particular languages appear in the works of Trubetskoy’s protégé, Roman Jakobson, who considered both the Indo-European class of languages and the evolution of the Russian language within the Slavic language group. It is through Jakobson that Lévi-Strauss first encountered and saw the value in the concepts of structural linguistics. This encounter occurred not in France but in New York.
3.4.2 Lévi-Strauss’s Encounter with Structural Linguistics

Realising that he could no longer live safely in Vichy France following the Franco-German armistice of 1941, Lévi-Strauss had moved to New York at the end of that year to take up a position at the New School of Social Research. While he was there, he had the opportunity to meet many prominent ethnologists of the period including Franz Boas, Ruth Benedict, and Margaret Mead. At the same time he also taught more advanced courses at the École libre des hautes études de New York.

Unlike his responsibilities to the New School, the École libre – established in 1941 as a de facto French university in exile – allowed Lévi-Strauss to explore a wider range of ethnological topics. It was at the École libre in 1942, that Lévi-Strauss was introduced to Roman Jakobson who had come to New York deliver a series of lectures on structural linguistics and the developments of the Prague School.

Writing three years later, when he had a chance to further study the Prague School’s project as it was conceived of by Trubetskoy, Lévi-Strauss listed several parallels between structural linguistics and ethnology. Both disciplines, for example, consider forms of representation: for the former the studied representations are the signifiers of linguistic signs; for the latter the representations are the cultural phenomena. Furthermore, according to Lévi-Strauss, studies in each discipline aim to identify the bases of the representations which they consider: as the rules which govern the interaction of phonemes and as structures of cultural phenomena reflecting the aspects of human nature which those phenomena represent. Finally, these bases exist in structures: in the structure of oppositions between phonemes and distinctive features; and in the larger structures of total social facts. Added to these observations, Lévi-Strauss noted that structural linguistics represented the only branch of the social sciences that could, in his opinion, claim to truly be a science and which had “… achieved both the formulation of an empirical method and an understanding of the nature of the data submitted to its analysis …” Based on these observations, Lévi-Strauss quickly turned his attention to adapting linguistic techniques, particularly those of the Prague School, to the consideration of cultural phenomena. This adaptation forms the basis of the discipline commonly referred to as “structural anthropology.”
3.4.3 An Application of Structural Anthropology to Mythic Forms

While the adaptation of linguistic techniques to the analysis of social phenomena varies from situation to situation, Lévi-Strauss’s comments regarding the benefits of linguistics in ethnology in papers such as “Linguistics and Anthropology,” together with his discussions of the application of that adaptation to the analysis of myths in “The Structural Study of Myth” provide a useful outline of its basic form.

The first step in the adaptation of linguistic techniques to ethnological analyses is to treat the total social fact of a cultural phenomenon as an analogue of the signifier of a sign in the linguistic framework. Turning to the conclusions of Trubetskoy and Jakobson, this analogy suggests that the total social fact is constituted by a structure of phonemic analogues which serves to define the total social fact with respect to other facts. This structure, in turn, embodies the representation of the conscious manifestation of the human unconscious. In terms of the ethnological project, this means that identifying the aspect of human unconscious manifesting in cultural phenomena can be accomplished through the study of the “phonemic” structure of the corresponding total social facts.

An important corollary of this approach is that allows Lévi-Strauss to consider forms of total social fact which, while differing in their immediate appearance, are nonetheless representations of the same aspect of the unconscious. In the case of the phonological theories at the basis of the analogy, variations of a language are not a matter of changes in reference, but of shifts in the phonemic constitution of its signifiers. This means that it is possible to identify apparently different languages as being instantiations of the same form through the determination of the series of phonemic alterations which connect the signifiers of the different languages. In the ethnological case, this raises the possibility of identifying superficially different social facts as being representations of the same unconscious aspects based on the connections between their respective phonemic structures.

Lévi-Strauss’s most significant analysis within the framework deriving from the analogy between the total social fact and a linguistic signifier applies to the class of myths. In “The Structural Study of Myth,” Lévi-Strauss presents a methodology for considering myths as cultural phenomena together with an outline of its application to the Oedipus Myth originating in Ancient Greece.
The first problem addressed by this methodology is that of the identification of the form of the myth. Within Greek writings of classical period, for example, it is possible to find versions of the Oedipus myth in which aspects present in one version are omitted from others. Through the analogy between the total social fact and the linguistic signifier, however, it is possible to construe these different versions as being phonemic variants of the same myth. Given this, Lévi-Strauss proposes that the analysis of a myth should begin with the identification of the phonemic core of the myth, the myth whose elements have been transformed by various mechanisms in the constitution of the encountered forms. In practical terms this form incorporates the elements of all the myth’s variants.

The second, purely practical, stage of the analysis of the total social fact of a myth entails the identification of each of the elements of the fact. Lévi-Strauss suggests that this proceeds through a simple sequential analysis of the fact of the core myth in which each new element is recorded as it appears. In the final stage of his method for the analysis of myths, Lévi-Strauss proposes that the different elements identified in the second stage should be thematically grouped in terms of common elements and relationships. It is these elements which form the phonemic analogues sought by an ethnological analysis of a myth. Returning to the Oedipus myth for the final time, Lévi-Strauss determines that there are four principal phonemic analogues at play in the total social fact of the myth: the overvaluing of blood relationships; the undervaluing of those same relationships; transcending the idea of the mortality of man; and the assertion of that mortality. These forms, in turn, correspond to structures in the human unconscious represented in the myth which are common to all myth-users.

I will conclude this discussion of the influence of structural linguistics upon the discursive space of Lévi-Strauss’s ethnology by considering its effect upon the speciation of the Subject instantiating therein. As already established, this Subject corresponds to the shared aspects of the human unconscious represented in cultural phenomena. In the language of my interpretive framework, this means that the Subject is a Subject of the Structuring genus speciated by the form of the phenomena in which it is represented. To this understanding, Lévi-Strauss’s adoption of structural linguistics provides a more explicit characterisation of those phenomena by characterising their appearance in terms of a collection of phonemic analogues. Through the nature of Lévi-Strauss’s understanding of representation, this implies that
an equivalent structure appears in the human unconscious as the Subject of the phenomenon. In the framework the Aristotelian template in which the unconscious is the entity to which conscious actions are attributed as its representation, the characterisation of the structure of the latter using the linguistic model corresponds to the identification of a set of requirements which leads, through the attribution, to the speciation of the former on the basis of that structure.

3.5 Interpreting the Lévi-Strauss’s Ethnological Subject

Just as I did in the previous chapter’s considerations of Jean-Paul Sartre’s characterisation of a phenomenological Subject, I have shown here that the example of the Subject referred to in Claude Lévi-Strauss’s mature ethnological writings occurs within an instantiation of the Aristotelian template developed in Chapter One. In both cases this occurrence reflects each author’s adoption of a structure as the theoretical core of his theories. For Lévi-Strauss this structure takes the form of an understanding of ethnology as the study of cultural phenomena to determine an aspect of human nature. This understanding entails an instantiation of the Aristotelian template in which a human being defined by that nature acts as the referent for the attribution of cultural phenomena. Lévi-Strauss identifies this attribution as a form of representation in which the human being provides the form of the attributed phenomena. This implies, in the interpretive framework, that the human being is a Subject of the Structuring genus.

Lévi-Strauss then goes on to consider the nature of cultural phenomena in more detail, arguing, in the process, that such phenomena are not the representations of a human being as a whole but of aspects of human nature corresponding to individual capacities. Through the interpretive framework, this implies that the human being as a Structuring Subject is then defined by the appropriate capacities represented in the attributed phenomena. These capacities do not, however, exist in isolation. Turning to the works of Durkheim and Mauss, Lévi-Strauss develops an understanding of cultural phenomena in which a phenomenon is grounded within a larger contextual framework consisting of all the cultural phenomena which impact upon its form. This framework constitutes the total social fact of the original phenomenon. Noting that each phenomenon in this framework is the representation of a human capacity, this suggests that each capacity is connected to every other capacity realised in the fact.
This collection of capacities then corresponds to the structure which Lévi-Strauss identifies as the human unconscious. In the interpretive framework of the Subject, this identification supports the definition of human nature in terms of a framework of capacities realised in the total social fact. The final aspect of the speciation that I considered here derives from Lévi-Strauss’s adoption of structural linguistics. Based on an analogy between cultural phenomena and linguistic signifiers, Lévi-Strauss argues that the structure of total social facts consists of phonemic analogues and that such analogues are accessible to empirical analysis. In terms of the instantiation of the Aristotelian template, this implies that the human being is further speciated by a structure which is representable in the structure of phonemic analogues.

These results, together with those established in the preceding chapter, imply two things regarding the interpretive framework developed in Chapter One: (1) that it supports the identification of references to the Subject where those references entail Subjects of different genera, and (2) that it is capable of being applied within different discursive spaces. These implications raise the possibility that the interpretive framework can be applied in a more general consideration of the Subject. Before realising this possibility, it should be noted that the theories of Sartre and Lévi-Strauss each entail a single genus of Subject occurring within a well-defined discursive space. To apply the interpretive framework more generally, it will also be necessary to consider more complicated configurations of Subject. As an example such a configuration, I will turn my attention in the next chapter to the deconstructive works of Jacques Derrida.
In this chapter I will consider the Subject as it is referred to, both explicitly and implicitly, in Derrida's writings collected in six works published in 1968 and 1972. Derrida’s principle concern during this period was with the form and functioning of systems of representation – systems in which an appearance represents something which it is not. While Derrida discusses several examples of such systems – ranging from the system defined by a linguistic sign in which the sign’s appearance represents its meaning, to philosophical theories where the theory itself represents a set of metaphysical presumptions – each example displays the same relationship to the entity or structure which is identifiable as its Subject. Specifically, the appearance of the system is the responsibility of its Subject. In order to consider a wider range of systems and possibly to avoid the presuppositions associated with the term “Subject, Derrida adopts the more general term “logos” to refer to the entity or structure occupying the place of the Subject in the relationship. For my purposes it is possible to interpret the relationship between the logos and the appearance of a system of representation as the central instantiation of the Aristotelian template in Derrida’s writings in which the logos is the referent for the attribution of that appearance.

Derrida’s understanding of systems of representation in terms of appearances and logos plays an important role in his analysis of different systems. Derrida approaches such systems in two ways: in terms of their original presentation and through a reinterpretation based on a reading of Saussure. These two approaches come together in the method of deconstruction. Much of Derrida’s writing of this period consists of an application of this method to compare and contrast these two approaches in the context of particular systems of representation encountered in philosophy or works of literature. These applications regularly led him to conclude that the systems he considered are more accurately explained by the reinterpretation of the representation than their original presentation.

Based on these observations, I will begin my discussion by characterising the deconstructive methodology. I will follow this with a discussion of the new conceptualisation of representation and of examples of the Subjects which it supports.
Finally, I will address Derrida’s deconstruction of two traditional examples which make explicit reference to the idea of a Subject: Husserl’s theory of communication and the nature of the linguistic sign.

### 4.1 Deconstruction

While commentators disagree over its form and application, most accept the impact of deconstruction on the intellectual discourse of the latter half of the Twentieth century. Madan Sarup, for example, notes:

> Deconstruction, which has attained widespread recognition as one of the most important avant-garde intellectual movements in France and America, is essentially post-phenomenological and post-structuralist. In the history of contemporary deconstruction the leading figure is Jacques Derrida …

While Christina Howells observes:

> It is not possible today to be a well educated intellectual without knowing at least something about Derrida and the way of reading most closely associated with him: deconstruction. Indeed the vogue for deconstruction has spread from France to England and the United States and far beyond …

David Novitz similarly states:

> The claim that philosophy is a kind of literature takes especial strength from the deconstructionist writings of Jacques Derrida. His many works, although lengthy and difficult, have inspired a new fashion in thought: a fashion which, in academic circles at least, has become a rage.

Despite these assessments of deconstruction’s importance, the derivation of a characterisation of the methodology from Derrida’s writings presents several challenges. On a practical level, while he sometimes refers explicitly to a particular analysis as a deconstruction – such as in his deconstruction of Husserl’s phenomenological treatment of communication in the 1967 work, *Le voix et la*
phénomène (Speech and Phenomena and other essays on Husserl’s theory of Signs) – Derrida does not do so uniformly. In many of his writings a reader can find analyses which, while being almost identical in form to those which are explicitly referred to as deconstructions, are not referred to as such. Even when he discusses his methods directly, such as in “Signature événement contexte” (“Signature Event Context”), it is not to address the basis of his various deconstructions, but to draw attention to the strategic framework he employs in a particular case. In the face of these observations it is useful to begin by considering the areas to which the methods of deconstruction are applied.

4.1.1 Concerns of Deconstruction: Representations and Logoi

Derrida’s concern in the undertaking of deconstructions is, in the first instance, with systems of representation. A system of representation is a system in which something that appears represents something which is responsible for that appearance. The represented thing – the logos of the system – can take many forms. It can, for example, be the entity who determines the structure of the representation either through being represented directly or by constituting the representation in question. Two important examples of entity logos appear in the systems of representation entailed by linguistic signs as either the language-user who is responsible for the sign or the entity who is signified by the sign.

The category of systems of representation in which the logos of each system is an entity is a subset of a more general category of systems whose logos take the form of sets of logical or metaphysical assumptions which govern the forms of the systems’ appearances. This class can include not only those systems where the logos corresponds to an entity who can be thought of as the embodiment of a particular set of assumptions, but also those systems entailed by philosophical theories where the logos is the system of assumptions which underpin the theory in question. This last example is particularly important to the interpretation of Derrida’s writings, for it opens the way for the deconstruction of the theories originating in the Western metaphysical tradition.

Before considering Derrida’s observations regarding the logos of systems of representation it is worth noting a logos exists in an instantiation of the Aristotelian template in which it is the referent for the attribution of the appearance of its system.
This implies that the logos of a system of representation can be identified as its Subject. While Derrida does not explicitly treat the idea of a Subject in these terms, his references to particular Subjects are consistent with this implication. In the paper “Edmond Jabès et la question du livre” (“Edmond Jabès and the Question of the Book”), Derrida observes, apropos Jabès’s presentation, that the poet “… is thus properly the subject [Derrida’s italics] of the book, its substance and its master, its servant and its theme.”9 This passage entails a correspondence between the poet’s existence as a Subject [my capitalisation] and its functioning as the substance, master, servant and theme of the book. But these functions are the functions which the logos of the appearance of the book must embody in order for it to be responsible for the form of that appearance. This implies that in being its Subject, the poet is the logos of the book.

Beyond its existence as the referent of the attribution the genus and species of the logos-Subject depends upon its fulfilment of its responsibilities for the appearance of the representation. In the case of the linguistic sign, for example, identifying the logos with the language-user responsible for the creation of the sign implies that the language-user is a Subject of the creative genus.

4.1.2 Logocentrism, Metaphysics of Presence, and Dichotomies

Derrida’s concern with the logoi of systems of representation stems from the observation that most of the systems of representation encountered in domains ranging from philosophy to literature rest on the explicit prioritisation of one logos at the expense of others. He explains this prioritisation in terms of the interlocking assumptions of logocentrism, reflecting the central role of one logos over others; of a metaphysics of presence, embodying a logos’s presence in its representation; and of the dichotomies engendered by the contrast between that which is endowed with presence and that which is not.

Logocentrism embodies the basic prioritisation of a logos. In his opening comments in De la grammatologie (Of Grammatology), Derrida cites the example of logocentrism occurring in traditional understandings of language. Such understandings, he argues, typically take the logos of the appearance of a language to be a reflection of the logos defined by the intentions of a language-user. The appearance of language in speech, for example, is formed by the intentions of the
The problem with this is that, in accepting one logos, investigators tend to ignore the possibility that others might define the appearance of the system in question more accurately. In *De la grammaïologie*, and elsewhere, Derrida observes that identifying the logos of a language with the intentions of a language-user ignores the fact that linguistic representations can function communicatively, independently of any one such entity. A reader, for example, might read a book in the absence of an author and a speaker might, through the use of recording devices, speak independently of an audience. Based on these observations, Derrida argues that the appearance of a language is more accurately explained by a logos which draws from features commonly associated with writing. These features form the basis of a general conception of representation which Derrida calls “archi-écriture.” I will return to archi-écriture in the next section and the speech-writing distinction in the fourth.

Based on the example of speech and writing and its analogues in philosophical theories, Derrida’s writings often associate logocentrism with a metaphysics of presence. A system of representation rests on a metaphysics of presence when its logos is a presence with respect to its representation in the system. In the case of speech and phonetic writing for example, the intentions of the language-user constitute a presence with respect to speech. Another example appears in Derrida’s examination of Husserl’s understanding of communication as it is presented in *Logische Untersuchungen*. In *La voix et le phénomène*, Derrida examines Husserl’s theory and concludes that it is grounded on a metaphysics of presence embodying a framework in which pure consciousness, as the being of the communicating Subject, serves as the logos of the system and, as such, is present in the communicative act. I will return to Derrida’s analysis of Husserl in the third section. Again, as with the general conception of logocentrism, the acceptance of a present logos is often accompanied by the rejection of alternative, possibly more accurate, logoi.

A metaphysics of presence often manifests in some form of prioritisation based on the presence of the logos. In the case of speech and writing, for example, the assumed presence of the intentions of the language-user in speech leads traditional theorists to argue that it is a truer form of language than writing which refers to those intentions only through its representation of speech. Similar prioritisations also appear in many of the theories of Western metaphysics. Truth, for example, is regularly prioritised due to its proximity to the state of the world. Even those theories which criticise metaphysics often rely on metaphysical prioritisations. Heidegger – whose
works Derrida examines in “Ousia et grammè: note sur une note de Sein und Zeit” (“Ousia and Grammè: Note on a Note from Being and Time”) and “Les fins de l’homme” (“The Ends of Man”) – critiques metaphysics while retaining the metaphysical prioritisation of Being.17

The prioritisation of one concept over another due to the presence of the logos forms the basis of the third concept, that of a dichotomy. Within a dichotomy it is possible to correlate the entity which refers to the present logos with one that does not. In the case of speech and phonetic writing, for example, the presence of the intentions of the speaker in the speech act opposes such acts to their representations in phonetic writing. Gary Gutting argues that Derrida’s discussions imply a logic to these dichotomies, a logic which would itself be the logos of the idea of dichotomy as a whole.18 As well as the immediate pairing of elements, he observes that a dichotomy also embodies the idea of logical exclusion which supports the assertion that the two elements are distinct. More than that, each pairing entails the valorisation of one element with respect to the other. This valorisation is typically associated with some form of presence associated with one element and not the other, such as the linguistic intention of the speaker of the speech act. In the paper “La différance” (“Différance”), Derrida argues that Western philosophy is built upon such differences.19 Examples of dichotomies include the conjunctions of speech and writing, the opposition between a paradigm and its instance, the connection between a form and its substance, and the relationship between the intelligible and the sensible.20

To this point I have only considered the concern of deconstruction and not its results. In particular I have argued that Derrida addresses deconstruction to systems of representation in which things which appear represent things which do not. I have also indicated that Derrida finds that many of the systems he considers display the interacting phenomena of logocentrism, metaphysics of presence and dichotomies. Given these observations, the problem now becomes one of determining how Derrida engages with such systems: that is how does Derrida carry out his deconstructions?

4.1.3 Strategies of Deconstruction
As noted, one of the problems faced in the general characterisation of deconstruction is that Derrida does not provide such a characterisation himself. What he does do, however, is describe the specific analyses undertaken in papers such as “Les fins de
Based on references within these descriptions it is possible to use them as the basis for deriving a general template for the method of deconstruction. Deconstruction, according to this template, consists of three phases which I will refer to as “the reduction of meaning,” “the semantic destabilisation,” and “the contrast.”

A reduction of meaning entails the identification of the basic assertions which support the appearance of the system of representation being deconstructed. Generally, such assertions take the form of a set of metaphysical assumptions about what obtains within the system and what, by extension, does not. Taken together, these constitute the purest form of the system which is, as Derrida puts it, free of those aspects which fall back “… into cultural or journalistic gossip …” In the language of the preceding discussions regarding the concerns of deconstruction, the reduction of meaning of a system effectively reveals the *logos* of the system.

In the paper “*La structure, le signe et le jeu dans le discours des sciences humaines*” (“Structure, Sign and Play in the Human Sciences”), Derrida presents a deconstruction of structuralism as it appears in the human sciences in the 1950s and 1960s. He begins his investigation by reducing the meaning of those sciences to reveal an understanding of structure which refers to the idea of a centre. This centre functions by fixing the components of a system in position and orienting them towards each other. While Derrida uses the term “structure” from the start of the paper, it quickly becomes clear that what he has in mind, at least as far as the traditional understanding is concerned, is something which corresponds to the *logos* of the structuralist human sciences.

Having reduced a system of representation, Derrida goes on to destabilise the reduction by demonstrating that the revealed metaphysical assumptions are inadequate to explain the appearance of the system. Derrida identifies two ways through which this might occur. In the first instance, the reduction is confronted by an alternative *logos* derived from the same system of representation. In practical terms, this takes the form of a demonstration that there is an inconsistency inherent within the system. The presence of such inconsistencies indicates that the appearance of the system represents contradictory metaphysical assumptions. The second mode of destabilisation takes the form of a challenge posed against the system from without through the presentation of an alternative set of metaphysical assumptions consistent with the original representation. Derrida notes that this “change of terrain” typified a style of analysis common in French philosophy in the early 1970s.
Returning to Derrida’s analysis in “La structure, le signe et le jeu,” the destabilisation of the traditional understanding of structure rests on his observations of what might be described as a meta-discourse of structure. Referring to examples provided by the metaphysical critiques of Nietzsche and Heidegger, Derrida argues that any investigation of a structure generally occurs within the framework of another structure. In the case of Nietzsche and Heidegger, this appears in the fact that their respective critiques of metaphysics are presented in terms which derive from metaphysics itself. This phenomenon also occurs in Lévi-Strauss’s ethnology where the structures of cultural phenomena are analysed within a framework provided by a structural understanding of language. Derrida deduces from this that the traditional understanding of structure, presented in terms of the *logos* of the centre, is open to the possibility of circularity. To avoid this, he argues that it is necessary to turn to an alternative *logos* of structure. This alternative is realised in the third strategic phase of deconstruction.

The final stage of deconstruction is the contrast. In the contrast the implications of the destabilisation are explored to determine if an alternative *logos* might support the system of representation. In practical terms this alternative often derives from attempts to rectify the inadequacies revealed in the destabilisation.

In “La structure, le signe et le jeu,” in response to the potential for circularity revealed in the second phase, Derrida turns to the concept of *bricolage* introduced by Lévi-Strauss in *La pensée sauvage*. *Bricolage* represents a model for the derivation of a Subject’s knowledge of the world in which that knowledge – in the form of myths – is constructed from pre-existing elements. The mythopoetical activity of *bricolage* contrasts with the engineering model in which original knowledge is constituted by a Subject to explain those elements. In *La pensée sauvage*, Lévi-Strauss uses these concepts to explain the distinction between knowledge in primitive cultures, which generally takes the form of myths, and knowledge in their more advanced counterparts. Derrida argues that a discourse based on *bricolage* rests on an understanding of structure which diverges from the traditional forms identified earlier. In *bricolage* the structure at work is not the product of a centre or origin, but of the relationship between the various ideas or forms that combine in the structure. Derrida associates the relational concept of structure entailed by *bricolage* with the concept of play. Unlike the centre, the play of a structure is a feature inherent in the relationships between the structure’s elements. I will return to the concepts of a
relational model of structure and of play in the next section where I will address Derrida’s development of *archi-écriture*.

Before considering the contributions of these phases to a general understanding of deconstruction, it is worth noting that they are not the only way to characterise the deconstructive methodology. Depending upon the particular reading of Derrida adopted, it is possible to define deconstruction with respect to the logocentrism of a system of representation, to its reference to a metaphysics of presence, or to its supporting dichotomies. Such definitions do not lack support in Derrida’s writings. In an interview conducted in 1971 and collected as the third eponymous section of *Positions* (*Positions*), Derrida discusses deconstruction in terms of the overturning of classical philosophical oppositions.30 This leads to a consideration of the strategies of deconstruction in terms of that overturning. Using his own characterisation of dichotomies, for example, Gary Gutting argues that deconstruction functions through demonstrating that the principles of logical exclusion and priority entailed by dichotomies of a system of representation are overthrown by that system itself.31 In the language of my discussion, this would occur through the destabilisation of the original reduction. Reflecting Derrida’s focus in *La voix et le phénomène*, John Coker orients his discussion of deconstruction towards the revelation and confrontation of logocentrism.32 Again, this is consistent with the discussion here which places this revelation in the first, reductive, phase. As a final example, Christina Howells, noting Derrida’s identification of the division between speech and writing, identifies it with the principle focus of deconstruction.33

### 4.1.4 A Statement of Deconstruction

Summarising the preceding discussions, the phases of deconstruction serve to reveal the *logos* of a system of representation through the reduction of its meaning, reveal the possibility of alternative *logoi* through its destabilisation, and consider the relationship between those alternatives in the contrast. Taken together these stages suggest that a deconstruction is a demonstration that the *logos* of a given system of representation is not a necessary feature of that system: through the phases of destabilisation and contrast it is possible to identify an alternative *logos* capable of explaining the same representation.
So characterised, the results of deconstruction are most immediately relevant to challenging logocentric systems. If the *logos* of a system of representation is not necessary, this implies that the assertion to the contrary which establishes the systems logocentricity is essentially flawed. Much of the wider intellectual impact of deconstruction arises from the challenge mounted through its application to theories originating in the Western metaphysical tradition. These theories are fundamentally logocentric in the sense that the rest on the assertion of a single *logos* at the expense of others. Heidegger’s theories in *Sein und Zeit*, for example, rest on a *logos* of Being. Through the application of the deconstructive methodology, Derrida demonstrates that such assertions are incorrect. Based on this, observers regularly take deconstruction to be a fundamental challenge to the validity of those theories “… a dismantling of the traditional organising concepts of Western ontology and metaphysics …”.

It is possible that this last assessment is based on an inaccurate reading of deconstruction. While the second phase of a deconstructive analysis might question the prioritisation of a particular *logos* through the revelation of its inadequacies, it does so only to open the deconstructed system to the possibility of new *logoi* suggested by the contrast of the third phase. Derrida recognises this in the paper “*Signature événement contexte*” (“Signature, Event, Context”), for example, when he observes that deconstruction does not function by removing the possibility of all *logoi*, but by deforming them to new systems – by extension based on new *logoi* – and later in the same passage, that deconstruction serves to overturn the existing conceptual order. This is the basis for the occasional observation that deconstruction rests on a double reading: the reading of neutralisation and the reading of replacement. In the third interview of *Positions*, Derrida emphasises that while the processes identified with the second phase of deconstruction are important, if a deconstructive analysis were to end with them, it would remain “… within the deconstructed system.” It is necessary to move on to a new system, to a *logos* which “… cannot be part of the previous regime.” These observations suggest that deconstruction might be viewed as being simply an extension of the ancient philosophical tradition of deriving new theories from the critical interpretation and analysis of the old.

Before considering the implications of deconstruction for the Subjects associated with a system of representation, it is worth noting a potential objection to
deconstructive framework. Based on common approaches observable in Derrida’s writings, I have presented deconstruction as a methodology which Derrida applies in his consideration of systems of representation. It is possible, however, to approach this methodology as the manifestation of a general theory of deconstruction, a theory entailing features such as the belief that systems of representation are underpinned by *logoi* and that these *logoi* are not fixed but contingent. Accepting this interpretation, it is then possible to apply the deconstructive methodology reflexively to itself to identify a *logos* of deconstruction, the potential contingency of this *logos*, and the possibility for interpreting the representation embodied in the theory as being the representation of a new *logos*. While this may undermine a theory of deconstruction – a fact which possibly contributes to Derrida’s reluctance to provide such a theory – if one restricts his or her attention to the method of deconstruction then one can avoid this possibility. When approached as a method the question of the validity does not apply to the theoretical basis of deconstruction but to the accuracy of each of its stages: is, for example, Derrida’s identification of the *logos* of the system of representation being deconstructed the correct one?

**4.1.5 Implications of Deconstruction for Subjects**

As I argued previously, the *logos* of a system of representation exists in an instantiation of the Aristotelian template in which it serves as the referent for the attribution of the appearance of its system. This implies that it is possible to identify the *logos* as the Subject of its system. Given this, it is possible to encounter two Subjects within the discursive space defined by the deconstruction of a system of representation. The first of these Subjects is the *logos* indicated by the original, or traditional, formulation of the system. Through the course of deconstruction, the possibility is raised that this *logos* is not the only, nor even the best explanation of the appearance of its system, thereby opening the way for the introduction of an alternative *logos* for the system. As with the original *logos*, the new *logos* exists in an instantiation of the Aristotelian template defined by its relationship with the appearance of the system. This implies that the new *logos* can also be identified as the Subject of the system of representation being deconstructed, albeit one that differs in form from its predecessor. In effect, the deconstruction of a system of representation leads to the replacement of one Subject with another. In the next
section I will consider the basis for many of the alternative *logoi* encountered in Derrida’s writings in the form of *archi-écriture*.

### 4.2 Archi-écriture and the Subjects it Entails

Thus far I have argued that the deconstructive methodology is capable of challenging logocentricity through its revelation of the possibility of alternative *logoi* in logocentric systems. In this section I will argue that it is also capable of dealing with the related phenomena of the metaphysics of presence and of dichotomies. It does so by considering alternative *logoi* modelled on *archi-écriture*. Before considering Derrida’s development of *archi-écriture*, however, a brief diversion through the theories of Ferdinand de Saussure will be useful. As I noted in my presentation of Lévi-Strauss’s ethnological Subject, Saussure’s principal contribution to the field of linguistics takes the form of an understanding of language in which a language is determined by the relationships between its signs and not by the participation of a language-user. While Lévi-Strauss drew on this idea through the theories of the Prague School, Derrida’s consideration of representation returns to the original source.

#### 4.2.1 Saussure and Language

Saussure’s structural treatment of language arises out of his observations regarding the nature of a linguistic sign. Signs, he argues, constitute the basic element of a language. In contrast to the traditional use of the term “sign” which refers only to something which is immediately apprehendable, Saussure argues that a sign consists of a signifier and a signified element – which he refers to as the “signal” and the “signification” respectively – which are inseparable within the framework of the sign.\(^{39}\) Beyond this constitution, Saussure observes that there is nothing in the structure of either a sign or its language to require the connection of a given signifier to a particular signified element.\(^{40}\) It is possible to find examples across different languages where signs with different signifiers refer to the same signified element: the signified component of the French sign “*soeur*” is the same as the English sign “sister.” Similarly, one can find examples in the same language of signs in which the same signifier refers to different signified elements: in English, the signifier “factory” refers, on the one hand, to a station where factors conduct their business affairs and on
the other, to a place where manufacturing occurs.\footnote{Saussure takes the absence of a necessary connection between a signifier and a signified element within a sign as an indication of the arbitrariness of all signs.} The arbitrariness of linguistic signs does not mean the nature of the reference that a signifier of a sign makes to its signified element is indeterminate. To explain the nature of the referential relationship in a linguistic sign, Saussure proposes that the form of that relationship for a given sign within a particular language draws from its connection to other signs in the language. In the manner of the missing piece in a jigsaw, the reference that a signifier makes to the signified element in the framework of a particular sign is the opposite of the references of all the other signs in the language: the referential relationship embodied by the sign with the English signifier “red” is, for instance, not the one entailed by the signs with the signifiers “blue” or “green”, and so on. Given this, the project of the linguist is to consider the entire body of the studied language in terms of the structure defined by these oppositional relationships between signs. This implies that linguistic analysis is holistic in the sense that the linguist must consider every sign of a language, and internalistic in the sense that the network must be analysed in terms the relationships between those signs.

\subsection*{4.2.2 Archi-écriture}

The feature of Saussure’s theories most of interest to Derrida is the structural determination of linguistic signs. If signs are determined in the structure of the language of which they are a part, then the linguistic nature of those signs – the nature which allows them to fulfil their linguistic function in communication – lies not in the signs themselves, but in the differences between signs. Although it is possible that Saussure would not emphasise the same feature of a language, Derrida cites a passage from the \textit{Cours} as exemplifying this conclusion:

\begin{quote}
In the language itself there are only differences. Even more important than this is the fact that, although in general a difference presupposes positive terms between which the difference holds, in a language there are only differences and no positive terms.\footnote{In the language itself there are only differences. Even more important than this is the fact that, although in general a difference presupposes positive terms between which the difference holds, in a language there are only differences and no positive terms.} 
\end{quote}
The most important implication of this passage for Derrida is that the structure defined by these differences represents the *logos* of the language in which it instantiates: it is this structure which is responsible for the form of the language through its provision of the relationships which establish the references of the language’s signs. This means that this understanding of language constitutes a system of representation in which the appearance of a language, approached in terms of its signs, represents the *logos* defined by its structure. Through my interpretive framework, this implies that the structure of the language can be thought of as being the Subject of its appearance.

Generalising this structural understanding of language, *archi-écriture* is a model for a class of systems of representation in which the *logos* of each system in the class takes the form of a structure defined only by differences. Beyond this, there is no restriction on the appearance of the system. As well as languages, it is also possible for the representations in this class of system to take the form of philosophical theories or works of art.43

4.2.3 Différance

This characterisation of *archi-écriture* is not without its problems. In particular, given that the typical definition of “difference” refers to two differing entities, how can Derrida define the *logos* of *archi-écriture* in terms of differences independent of positive terms? Or, more fundamentally: what does difference mean in the absence of those things which are different? Derrida’s answer to this question leads him to posit *différance*.

**4.2.3 Différance**

*Différance* is the meaning of difference, not in the sense of the meaning which the signified element lends to the signifier of a sign, but in a sense commonly used by the structuralists. For structuralists, meaning represents the ordering, or structuring, present in the observable details of social phenomena. From the discussions of Lévi-Strauss’s theories in the preceding chapter, for example, the structural meaning of a cultural phenomenon is the human unconscious represented in its form. Derrida recognises the possibility that *différance* may be an origin in the Structuralist sense rather than the more traditional linguistic view, albeit tangentially, in the paper “*La différance*” where he notes that *différance* is incompatible with the traditional sense of the word “origin.”44 When understood as a meaning in the structuralist sense, the
relationship between *différance* and differences forms an instantiation of the Aristotelian template for the Subject in which the former is the referent for the attribution of the latter. In effect *différance* is the Subject of difference. Noting that difference forms the basis for the *logos* of *archi-écriture* this means that *différance* can also be treated as the ultimate Subject of *archi-écriture*. I will return to this connection shortly.

In his development of *différance*, Derrida puts forward a brief etymological consideration of the French word for difference: “*différence*.45 *Différence* derives from the Latin word *differre* which possess an intransitive and a transitive sense corresponding to the words differ and defer, respectively, in English, and to the single verb *différer* in French. Both of these senses play a role in the difference relationship between a pair of non-identical entities. In any such a pairing, the intransitive sense in either language applies to the act of differentiating those aspects of each entity which form the basis of the entities’ differences, while the transitive sense refers to the metaphorical act of deferring one of the entities from the other on the basis of those differences. From this, Derrida concludes that the meaning of a difference independent of positive entities entails the synthesis of the actions of differentiation and deferral. This synthesis, in turn, serves to characterise *différance*.46

It is important to note that despite their synthesis in *différance*, neither differentiation nor deferral lose their active qualities; if they did, the difference structured by *différance* would collapse. In a particular instantiation, the cessation of deferral would result in the metaphorical coalescence of the different entities while the removal of differentiation would result in their equation. Consequently, as their combination, *différance* can be treated as an activity. One way to approach this is by thinking of *différance* as a differentiating force acting to differ and defer, just as magma does as it wells up between continental plates. A corollary of this interpretation is that it implies that a difference is ultimately unstable: as *différance* acts to differentiate and differ it effectively deforms the original difference into something new.

Reading *différance* as a form of differentiating force allows the earlier question to be answered. Specifically, it is possible to consider a difference independent of differing entities when one notes that the difference itself is the realisation of the differentiating force of *différance*. This interpretation also means that, since *différance* is akin to a force, it – like Foucault’s power – is not the feature of a
presence. Rather it exists between presences. In effect, différance allows the
treatment of difference independently of either the differing entities which difference
mediates or a presence to which it refers.

4.2.4 Archi-écriture, Différance and Deconstruction

Derrida’s characterisation of différance has two important implications for the nature
of archi-écriture. In the first instance, the fact that différance is not associated with
presence implies that the logos of archi-écriture, which ultimately refers to différance
through its component differences, is similarly detached from presence. This
implication is important for the application of the deconstructive methodology. In
particular, it suggests that treating the deconstructed system of representation in terms
of a logos based upon archi-écriture – that is one based on a structure of differences –
will allow it to avoid any of the potential problems that it might have if rests on a
metaphysics of presence.

The second implication of this characterisation of différance is that, in being akin
to a force, it implies that the systems of differences that refer to différance and which
form the logos of archi-écriture are unstable. As différance acts to differentiate and
defer, it constantly deforms the original system of differences into new configurations.
This means that the form of the representation of that logos is similarly unstable. This
situation is often encountered in the idea of semantic instability in language. A
semantically unstable language is one in which the referential relationships embodied
in the language’s signs are constantly changing. If one adopts an understanding in
which the language is the representation of a system based on archi-écriture, then that
change can be understood in terms of in the shifting structure of differences which
establish the referential relationships. While I have avoided talking about a theory of
deconstruction for the reasons mentioned earlier, it can be argued that such a theory
might refer to this semantic instability.

While Derrida formalised the ideas of différance and archi-écriture in the late
1960s, he recognised the possibility of identifying a structure in terms of force as
early as the 1963 paper, “Force et signification.” In this paper – subsequently
collected in L’écriture et la différence – Derrida argues that in accounting for any
structure it is necessary to address not simply the physical structure, but also the
forces which supported the creation of the structure and those which drive its
development towards the future. Taken together these three factors suffice to characterise the ultrastructure. This suggests that Derrida’s understanding of archi-écriture might be called an ultrastructuralist understanding of representation.

4.2.5 Subjects in Archi-écriture

As I noted previously, archi-écriture provides a model for proposing alternative logoi in the framework of the deconstruction of a system of representation. As with the general discussions earlier, the relationship between these logoi and their representations constitute instantiations of the Aristotelian template for the Subject in which each new logos is the referent for the attribution of its representation. In effect, each new logos is a Subject for its representation.

It is possible to identify many examples of logoi based on archi-écriture in Derrida’s deconstructive writings. In “La structure, le signe et le jeu,” for example, bricolage forms an alternative logos for the concept of structure which that concept is not based on any centre or origin, but on the relationships between the elements of the structure. Derrida’s discussion of bricolage also entails the idea of dynamism in the form of play. In effect, mirroring archi-écriture, bricolage entails a dynamic structure of relationships.

While Derrida’s consideration of bricolage does not explicitly identify the new logos as being a Subject, it is also possible to consider the impact of archi-écriture upon those logoi associated with the entities credited with the responsibility for the creation of representations. In traditional models of representation, such as those associated with language, these logoi are embodied in Subjects who bring about representations through the exercise of their faculties. In my interpretive framework these Subjects are then Subjects of the Creative genus. In a logos based on archi-écriture this creation is not attributed to a specific entity but to the structure of the system of representation, itself suggesting that it is this structure which exists as the Subject of the system of representation.

One of the clearest examples of the identification of a logos both as a Subject and as the structure underpinning the creation of a representation occurs in the paper “Freud et la scène de l’écriture” (“Freud and the Scene of Writing”). In this paper, Derrida considers Freud’s modelling of the functions of the mind by the concept of the mystic pad. A mystic pad is a child’s toy consisting of layered surfaces on which
one can inscribe and subsequently erase symbols. An important feature of this process is that even when the inscriptions are erased from the surface layers there remains a record, or trace, of the inscription on their lower counterparts. In a similar manner, the conscious mind represents a surface which registers the effects of the world while the unconscious represents a medium which stores those effects even when they are no longer consciously remembered. In his discussions of this system, Derrida notes that:

The subject of writing does not exist if by it one means by that some sovereign solitude of the author. The subject of writing is a system of relationships between the layers: the mystic pad, the psyche, the society, the world. In this scene, the punctual simplicity of the classical subject is not to be found.48

In effect, in contrast to the traditional logoi associated with models of writing in which an author is responsible for the generation of an inscription, the inscriptions on the pad are the product of a system consisting of each layer of the pad and of the effects which are inscribed upon it. The structure of the pad, as one might expect, also exists in an instantiation of the Aristotelian template as the referent for the “writing” inscribed upon its layers.

4.3 Deconstructing Husserl

In this and the following section I will consider some of Derrida’s more important deconstructions to show how they display the general features identified here. I will begin with Derrida’s treatment of Husserl’s theory of communication in La voix et le phénomène. As with most theories of communication, Husserl identifies the basic element of communication with a sign: a sign is communicative on the basis of its representation of the meaning – the signified of the sign – which it is the sign for. Going further he asserts that the realisation of signs, and hence of communication, is the responsibility of the same acts of consciousness associated with the realisation of knowledge in the phenomenological framework. In this case, the meaning of a sign is the knowledge which a Subject realises based on his or her experience of its signifier. Turning to my interpretive framework for the Subject, this structure is consistent with an instantiation of the Aristotelian template of the Subject in which consciousness
forms the being of the entity which acts as the referent for the attribution of the communication it creates.

4.3.1 Reducing the Meaning of Husserl

Derrida’s reading of Husserl begins with the latter’s identification of two different categories of significance referred to, in the terminology of Husserl’s later writings, as meaning and sense.\(^4^9\) This terminology does not, in fact, originate with Husserl, but with the works of the German logician, Gottlob Frege, who introduced the distinction in his 1892 paper, “Über Sinn und Bedeutung” (“On Sense and Meaning”), to explain the different meanings encountered in logical structures.\(^5^0\) Husserl was aware of Frege’s works particularly through their shared interest, in the latter part of the 1890s, with the logical basis of arithmetic.

For Husserl, a meaning designates something which exists solely in the world: the meaning of a flag, for example, is the nation to which the flag refers.\(^5^1\) Sense, by contrast, refers to something which originates solely through a Subject’s acts of consciousness: the sense of a flag is the feelings of nationhood that it engenders for the Subject who experiences it. Husserl identifies senses with the thoughts of a Subject which are revealed to itself in the process of self-reflection.\(^5^2\) This suggests that a sense is a measure of Subject’s presence to itself and not of its connection to the world.\(^5^3\)

The delineation of sense and meaning is reflected in the parallel distinction between the expressions and indications, respectively, by which they are conveyed. Expressions express only senses and not meanings and, because of this, are most often encountered in the framework of the internal monologues through which a Subject expresses the senses which originate in itself. Interpreting Husserl’s arguments, Derrida asserts that such monologues cannot be communicative: since the expressed senses are already part of the expressing Subject, their expression conveys nothing of which the Subject is not already aware.\(^5^4\) This suggests that, like a sense, an expression is also a manifestation of a Subject’s self-presence: to be aware of the expression, the Subject reflects upon itself. Husserl takes this to indicate that the realisation of expressions is a feature of the imagination.

Although Husserl does not use the concept in “Ausdruck und Bedeutung” – not least because he did not introduce it until later – Derrida’s presentation suggests that
one way of understanding the expression of a sense is through the concept of the
noema.\textsuperscript{55} In the framework of knowledge and phenomena presented in Husserl’s later
writings, the noema represent a set of transcendent structures generated in pure
consciousness which direct its acts of consciousness and guide their interpretation.
Extending this to the expression, the noematic interpretation suggests that an
expression is a noematic form and, as such, is an ideal structure which transcends
experience. Furthermore, this implies that the expressive Subject in Husserl’s theory
– the Subject which, in my interpretive framework, is a Subject of the Creative genus
to whom expressions are attributed – is more accurately identified with the
transcendent ego whose being is pure consciousness.

An important implication of the ideality of expression is that it supports the
repeatability necessary for communication: if an expression is unique, then it cannot
be used for communication since it could not be recognised as expressing the same
sense in different circumstances.\textsuperscript{56} Through being ideal, an expression is separated
from the influences which might compromise its repeatability; as Derrida notes: “…
absolute ideality is a correlate of indefinite repetition.”\textsuperscript{57} Despite this, the ideality of
expression also problematic: if expressions are ideal then they are inaccessible outside
of the Subject who generates them in their acts of consciousness.\textsuperscript{58} This means that
the mechanism for communicating the intentions of the Subject cannot communicate
to other Subjects. Recognising this, Husserl proposes that communication requires a
second form of sign which exists outside of the Subject – a form he identifies as an
indication.\textsuperscript{59}

Unlike the ideal expression, an indication consists of a set of empirical conditions
which represent an equally empirical meaning to the acts of consciousness of a
Subject. Through these acts the Subject then realises that representation and
recognises that meaning through his or her intentional experience of those conditions:
the experience of the flag allows a Subject to recognise its meaning as the nation.\textsuperscript{60}
Through this process an indication indicates its meaning to a Subject. One
implication of this definition of indications is that they cannot indicate the ideal senses
represented by expressions. What it can do – and what in the process enables
communication – is indicate a set of empirical conditions which will allow a Subject
to realise the noema of an expression as knowledge. This implies that communication
in Husserl’s phenomenology requires an indication indicating the conditions of an
expression which, in turn, expresses a sense. It is also possible for an indication to
indicate things which do not correspond to expressions: in the case of a flag indicating a nation, for example, it is possible for the nation not to correspond to an expression of the nationalist spirit the flag can induce in a citizen.\textsuperscript{61}

From this brief summary it is possible to identify the key aspects of Husserl’s understanding of communication. Communication consists of the combination of an expression in the form of a \textit{noema} originating in pure consciousness, and an intention which provides the physical conditions, the experience of which supports the realisation of that \textit{noema} by a Subject: without the latter, the former could not be accessed by any but the originating Subject and without the former the latter could not convey the intentions of the Subject. In my interpretive framework these features allow for the identification of the instantiation of the Aristotelian template in which a Subject, whose being is pure consciousness speciated by the \textit{noematic} structures necessary for the realisation of communication, is the referent for the attribution of that communication. This implies that the \textit{logos} of Husserl’s theory takes the form of pure consciousness which is responsible for the form of the communicative act. While I will return to the problematic aspects of requiring two forms of sign in communication – the indication which indicates an expression – I will now consider Derrida’s destabilisation of this theory.

\subsection*{4.3.2 Destabilisation}

Derrida destabilises Husserl’s model of communication through a consideration of the repeatability of expressions. If an expression is ideal then it is, as is the sense it expresses, the manifestation of a Subject’s self-presence: the Subject recognises it through reflecting upon itself. This is problematic when one approaches the question of repeatability for it suggests that this self-presence is invariant over time.\textsuperscript{62} Derrida observes that even within Husserl’s own writings that this is not the case.\textsuperscript{63}

In \textit{Zur Phänomenologie des inneren Zeitbewusstseins} (1893-1917) (\textit{On the Phenomenology of the Consciousness of Internal Time}), Husserl attempts to extend his phenomenological framework to account for a Subject’s knowledge of objects which have temporal duration.\textsuperscript{64} An example of such an object is a musical melody. A melody, as it is generally understood, consists of several notes or chords played in some determinate sequence. Despite the fact that it is only possible to experience – and hence know in a phenomenological sense – one note of the melody at a time, it is
nonetheless possible to speak of having knowledge of the melody as a whole. In this case a Subject simultaneously has knowledge not only of the present note, but also of the notes which preceded it and the notes which are to come.

One way to understand such knowledge is to argue, as Husserl’s mentor Brentano does, that the aspects of the object associated with the past and the future are presented to the Subject in the present through the functioning of the imagination: having encountered the present note of a melody, the Subject then imagines the notes that preceded it and those which will follow. Husserl, however, rejects this approach on the basis that it misconstrues the nature of the Subject’s relationship with the aspects of an object associated with timeframes other than the present. When knowing an object in its temporality, he argues, the aspects of the object in the past are known as objects and not as the products of the imagination. Inspired by the American pragmatist William James, whose works had a great – if rarely acknowledged – influence upon his thought, Husserl argues that a Subject’s knowledge of an object is always accompanied by a halo or “fringe” of other knowledge corresponding to knowledge of what is just past and knowledge of what has yet to come. In the case of the former, this knowledge is the memory, or “retention,” of the past, while for the latter, the knowledge is the anticipation, or “protention,” of the future.

In his consideration of Husserl, Derrida interprets the model of protention and retention as implying that both are accessible to the Subject in the present in much the same way that the products of his or her faculties are. As such, they are available for the Subject to reflect upon and, through this, determine that they satisfy the noematic structures corresponding to his or her knowledge of the temporal object. The problem with this is that, for it to be possible, it means that both retentions and protentions represent noema of the same basic type as the Subject’s experience in the present. By Husserl’s own argument, this cannot be the case: retentions are only the memories of experience while protentions are only their anticipation. In effect, within the larger framework of Husserl’s phenomenological theory the reading of expression as the ideal mode of communicating the intentions of a Subject is inconsistent with his understanding of a Subject’s temporal awareness.
4.3.3 Confrontation: Communication and the Trace

This temporal inconsistency provides a point of departure for identifying an alternative logos of communication. To retain the invariance necessary for communication, a communicative sign must be realised outside of the framework of the phenomenologically conceived Subject. That is, it must not reflect the nature of a retained past and a protended future mediated by a intending present. Derrida’s solution is to turn to the idea of the trace. The trace is ultimately a mark for something which it is not. While it is possible for the trace to occur in the framework of a sign – where the trace represents signifier of the sign, it is not limited to this role. In particular, as will be seen in the final section, it can exist in relation to other traces within the play – to use the terminology of “La structure, le signe et le jeu” – of a structure. An implication of this is that while:

... it may be possible to speak of a literary text for example as being composed and indeed made possible by the gathering of a multitude of traces, this is not to suggest that the traces are simply sources or signifiers pointing to some hidden meaning to be unearthed.  

Turning to the trace, Derrida argues that the repeatability of an expression – as the sense bearing aspect of communication – is a matter of the present expression being shaped by the trace of past expressions. There are several implications of this worth noting. In the first instance, Derrida’s model suggests that pure consciousness as the embodiment of the noema exists in the present with a form which reflects noema of past expressions. This implies that pure consciousness in the present is effectively constituted by its reference to something outside of itself. This does not mean that an expression lacks a framework for determination. This framework is now provided by the network of other expressions whose traces impact upon it.

Although Derrida does not present them in such terms, these observations point to a conception of the trace is consistent with the model of archi-écriture given in the previous section. In the first instance, the expressions which form the basis of communication exist within a structure of expressions defined by the influences of their traces. Furthermore, pure consciousness – which can consistently be identified as the being of the Subject of the system or representation entailed by this approach to
communication – embodies the noema of past expressions. I will return to this structure again in the next section. In my interpretive framework this implies that the speciation of the Subject – embodied in the structure of its being of pure consciousness – reflects the structure of past noema whose traces define its form.

With these observations I come to the end of Derrida’s deconstructions of Husserl’s theory of communication: first by showing that it contains an inconsistency in its treatment of the repeatability of communication and then by providing an alternative logos consistent with the model of archi-écriture discussed in the previous section. In the next section I will consider a selection of Derrida’s deconstructions associated with the nature of the linguistic sign.

4.4 Deconstructing the Linguistic sign
Derrida deconstructs several different treatments of the concept linguistic sign in his writings of the 1960s and early 1970s. In the first instance, building on his deconstruction of Husserl, Derrida considers the relationship between the expressive sign and its indicative counterpart. This deconstruction is mirrored in the larger consideration of the distinction between speech and writing signalled in the discussion of deconstruction in the second section. Ultimately the results of both these deconstructions are mirrored in the deconstruction of the traditional conception of the sign in terms of a signifier and a presence.

4.4.1 Husserl and the Sign
Recall from the discussion in the previous section that a communicative act, according to Derrida’s reading of Husserl, entails the combination of an ideal expression of a sense and an empirical indication of a meaning. In particular an indication indicates the empirical conditions which enable a subject to recognise a sense. This means that, with respect to the communicative act, it is possible to identify the sense as the basic logos; the form ultimately responsible for the structure of the act. These relationships – between the indication and the expression and between the expression and its sense – manifest the Derridean idea of the supplement. In his discussions of Rousseau in De la grammatologie, Derrida introduces the supplement to capture the idea of a possibly deleterious replacement. In this context, the expression supplements its sense with the effect of deferring the sense’s ideality beneath its own. The
expression, in turn, is supplemented by the indication with the effect of further deferring that ideality.73

The problem with identifying the sense as the ultimate *logos* of the communicative act is, according to Derrida and despite Husserl’s protestations to the contrary, that the ideality to which the supplemental chain refers, both in expression and in sense, cannot be sustained in the face of observations of actual linguistic communication.74

Consider, for example, the recognised possibility of linguistic shifts. A linguistic shift entails a change in the senses communicated by the signs of a language. Such shifts occur for a variety of socio-historic reasons ranging from the slow evolution of a language, as was the case with hieroglyphic script, to the sudden non-conventional use of term which captures a prevailing social mood as was the case with the term “gay.” Such shifts, however, are difficult to explain within the Husserlian framework.

If an indication conveys a sense through indicating the conditions of the sense’s expression, the change in that conveyance means that the indicated conditions no longer correspond to those required for the satisfaction of that expression. This, in turn, implies that the expression of the sense may have varied over time. But, as the previous section argues, one of the features of communication is that its signs should be invariant over time: the expression of “gay” should not succumb to the influence of the sudden non-conventional usage of the term. In effect, the possibility of linguistic shifts implies a contradiction.

Derrida’s solution to this, already mentioned, is to propose a *logos* of communication based around the idea of the trace. This *logos* supports an understanding of expressions which are effectively connected to expressions outside of themselves through registering the effect of the traces of those external expressions. But this external reference implies that an expression does not exist in the ideality in which it was originally presented, but as part of a network.

4.4.2 Speech and Writing

Husserl’s treatment of indications and expressions can be interpreted as an instantiating the same dichotomy which underpins the relationship between phonetic writing and speech discussed in *De la grammatologie*: in both cases the former is a supplement of the latter while the latter is a supplement of some ideal meaning or intention. Recognising the importance of the instantiations of this dichotomy, Derrida
spends some time in *De la grammatologie* considering the possibilities of its deconstruction.

At its heart, the speech-writing dichotomy rests on an understanding of language in which speech is a direct reflection of the intentions of the speaker. These intentions then form the *logos* of speech. Derrida identifies this as the prevailing approach to language throughout Western metaphysics. To make his point he cites directly from Aristotle: “…‘the sounds emitted by the voice (*ta en té phonē*) are the symbols of mental experience and (*pathēmata tes psychēs*) and written words are the symbols of spoken words’ (Int. 1 16a 3) …”\(^75\) Traditional theorists further support their prioritisation of speech by noting the potentially negative aspects of writing. Writing, for example, de-emphasises the place of the language-user either as the author or reader of a written text in the sense that without this connection there is nothing in a given text which requires that either party take account of the intentions of the other.\(^76\)

Considering the nature of speech in more detail, however, reveals that its prioritisation apropos its representation in writing is not as clear-cut as traditional metaphysics might assert. While writing displays several of the properties which are necessary for the functioning of speech as communication, such as its use of repeatable meaning-bearing signs, both speech and writing possess several properties which are not shared by the other. The intonation and accent which are essential to the functioning of spoken language, for example, play no part in its representation in writing, while punctuation and the spaces between words which enable written language do not feature in speech. The diversity of these properties suggests that writing cannot be, as the traditional view asserts, a direct representation of speech.\(^77\)

The conclusion that writing is not a direct representation of speech does not necessarily imply a reversal of the dichotomy.\(^78\) In contrast to the traditional understanding Derrida proposes an alternative *logos* of language based on a model of representation in the form *archi-écriture*. In the new framework the communicative act does not refer to the intentions of a language-user, but to the structure of differences which define its *logos*.

Two important features of Derrida’s new *logos* are worth noting: generality and absence. Beginning with the understanding of writing as a system of meaningful inscription, Derrida argues that such inscriptions need not be limited to the phonetic alphabet typically associated with writing. One can, for example, encounter such inscriptions in fields ranging from cinematography to choreography, as well as in
pictures and music. In each of these cases, an appropriately identified inscription refers to a meaning. This suggests that each of these examples represents a form of writing and that, as a result, writing is a more general concept than the traditionalists would attest. The more important aspect of Derrida’s new logos is that of absence. Returning to the criticism of writing made by the traditionalists that it marginalises both the author and an “… empirically determinable set of addressees [the readers of ‘written communication’] …” This suggests that writing can function in the face of a two-fold absence of either its author or its reader. This absence then defines a space of possibility for writing. The identification of this space is consistent with the absence of a language-user from the role of what, in my interpretive framework, could be described as the Creative subject of language. One final point worth noting is that this absence entails the absence of the intentions that might have been recorded in a written sign: the author may have intentions in the original inscription of a linguistic statement, but they are inaccessible to the reader in the author’s absence. The same is true of the interpretation of such a statement by a reader: the interpretation is inaccessible to the author in the reader’s absence.

4.4.3 The Sign and Presence

One of Derrida’s most famous deconstructions is his deconstruction of the traditional model of the linguistic sign in which a signifier refers necessarily to a signified element which is itself present in the sign. This presence – the logos of the sign – is then the reference of the sign. The simplest example of this is when a given sign is the immediate appearance of a presence. In such cases the presence effectively signifies itself. It is also possible for the traditional approach to signs to underpin more complicated forms such as when a sign makes a necessary reference to an external presence: one calls a spade a “spade”, for example, because the sign “spade” necessarily refers to the object that is traditionally identified as a “spade.” At first, such referential models seem to reflect a commonsensical interpretation of the state of real languages where any sign appears to refer unambiguously to a unique presence – if they did not, how would communication by linguistic signs be possible? In the early Twentieth century, however, linguistic theorists such as Saussure were coming to question the necessity of the connection between a sign and its reference.
Recall from the presentation of Saussure’s theories that one of the features of a linguistic sign is that the connection between a signifier and its signified element is an arbitrary one. Derrida takes this to be a reflection of the fact that, in practical terms, a sign cannot be the presence it refers to and as such, is free to refer to something else: the road-sign indicating trucks crossing is clearly not the trucks it indicates, nor are the words on a page the same as the concepts to which they refer. Generalising these examples leads to an understanding of signs in which the sign stands for a presence which is not present; which has been – in Derrida’s words – deferred by the sign.82 This conclusion is, again, a reflection of the consistency between the new logos and the general understanding of representation in the form of archi-écriture discussed earlier. In archi-écriture the ultimate reference of a language is différence which shapes its structure and which is not a presence. This result also is mirrors the earlier result established in the deconstruction of Husserl where the trace-based understandings of expressions – as the communicative sign – did not refer to a presence but only to other expressions.

4.4.4 Implications for the Subjects of the Sign
Possibly reflecting an awareness of the humanist tradition in the philosophy of language, Derrida typically does not discuss the nature of the Subject in the context of his deconstructions of a linguistic sign, preferring to leave the term to refer to the Creative Subject encountered in theories of communication such as Husserl’s. Despite this, it is nonetheless possible to interpret each of the deconstructions here as entailing two Subjects, one corresponding to the Subject as it appears in the original system of representation and the other from the reinterpretation of the system derived in its deconstruction. In both cases, however, the Subject can be read as instantiating the central form of the Aristotelian template in Derrida’s deconstructive framework in which it acts as the logos to which is attributed the appearance of the system with which it is associated.

In the case of Husserl’s theory of signs, the first instantiation of the template is one in which a sense acts as the referent for an expression which, in turn, acts as the referent of an indication. In each case the referent, the sense and the expression, form Structuring Subjects of what is attributed to them. This instantiation is then replaced by a restricted one in which the sense alone is the referent of the attribution of an
expression. In the new instantiation, furthermore, the nature of an expression is presented as the product of a network of expressions suggesting that the sense, as the Subject of the expression, is speciated to reflect this network.

A similar pattern obtains in the deconstruction of the speech-writing dichotomy. In this case, the intentions of speaker are the referent of the attribution of speech and speech, in turn, is the referent for the attribution of writing. This is then contrasted with one in which both speech and writing are determined within the framework based on *archi-écriture*.

In the final deconstruction, the deconstruction of the connection between a sign and a presence, the contrasting Subjects are, perhaps, the easiest to identify: in the first case, the Subject is the presence which is the referent for the attribution of a sign, whereas in the latter, it is now absence which acts as the referent.

### 4.5 Concluding Remarks apropos the Subject in Derrida

The results in the preceding two sections regarding examples of Subjects in Derrida’s writings from the 1950s to the early 1970s confirm the general observations made in the first and the second regarding the place of the Subject in the deconstructive framework. Deconstruction applies, in the first instance, to systems where an apparent aspect represents the *logos* responsible for its form of structure. The relationship between the aspect and the *logos* forms the central instantiation of the Aristotelian template in Derrida’s deconstructive writings. In this case the *logos* is the referent for the attribution of the apparent aspect and is, as a result, the Subject of the system of representation.

Beyond the central instantiation of the Aristotelian template, the observable differences between the forms of Subject encountered in Derrida’s writings are simply reflections of the different nature of the specific representation being considered. In the case of Husserl’s theory of the communication, for example, the identification of pure consciousness as the being of the referent for the attribution of communication derives from Husserl’s phenomenological presentation. Deconstruction, however, does not leave this instantiation untouched. In response to problems arising out of the initial *logoi* in the deconstructed systems, the deconstructive methodology allows for the identification of new *logoi*, sometimes based on the model of *archi-écriture*, to explain the appearance of the representation. As did the old *logoi* each of the new
logoi exists in an instantiation of the Aristotelian template as the referent for the apparent aspects of their systems.

With respect to my larger project of testing the interpretive framework developed in Chapter One, the analysis in this chapter provides an example which can be read using the framework but which, in contrast to the examples in the previous chapters, does not entail a single Subject instantiating in a single discursive space. Derrida’s writings, rather, contain a variety of Subjects instantiating in their own discursive spaces. These discursive spaces, however, are connected together by two shared features: each entails a system of representation and each is the focus for a deconstruction. Through the former, each Subject is typically construed in terms of its relation to representation, and through the latter, each Subject is effectively bifurcated between the Subjects as they appear in the original system of representation prior to deconstruction and the Subject which results from the reinterpretation of that system in the deconstructive framework. In the next chapter I will consider an example of a discursive space which, while unified in itself, supports two instantiations of the Aristotelian template.
In the preceding chapters I have considered examples where philosophers have identified different forms of entity as being Subjects. Two of these, the phenomenological Subject of Sartre’s writings of the 1930s and 1940s and Lévi-Strauss’s ethnological Subject, are singular forms referred to within a coherent argument, albeit ones whose various aspects are spread over multiple works. The different forms of Subject referred to in Derrida’s deconstructive writings, by contrast, exist as Subjects due to their participation in the same central instantiation of the Aristotelian template. In the following discussion I will consider the Subject identified in Jean-François Lyotard’s *La condition postmoderne*. This Subject, I will argue, is a participant in not one, but two instantiations of the Aristotelian template of the Subject: one in which it is the referent for the attribution of the manifestation of scientific knowledge through the framework of a language game – which Lyotard adopts from the works of Ludwig Wittgenstein; and one in which it is the referent for the attribution of the power which those language games entail.

Although Lyotard would later expand some of the theoretical structures introduced in its analysis, *La condition postmoderne* is not immediately part of a sustained philosophical project: it is not, as is *L’être et le néant*, the culmination of a program of phenomenological research; nor is it an expression of a single analytical approach as are Lévi-Strauss’s mature ethnological presentations; finally it is not a demonstrative example such as are found throughout Derrida’s deconstructive writings.

*La condition postmoderne* began life as a report commissioned by the *Conseil des Universités* of the government of Quebec to provide a framework for understanding the influence of technology upon the notion of knowledge. Although it shares some thematic similarities with Lyotard’s earlier works, in particular in its concern with the social implications of its focus, it diverges from them in its overall treatment of technology and knowledge. Based on this divergence, Lyotard later expressed regret that the work has come to be treated as his most important intellectual contribution.

The relative conceptual isolation of *La condition postmoderne* with respect to Lyotard’s corpus does not mean that the work exists in philosophical isolation. As I
have already mentioned, Lyotard’s presentation makes use of the Wittgensteinian concept of the language game. Before addressing Lyotard’s appropriation of Wittgenstein, however, I will consider another influence upon *La condition postmoderne* in the form of the phenomenological theories of Maurice Merleau-Ponty. Although these theories – which Lyotard encountered through his study of phenomenology and in his first major philosophical work: *La phénoménologie. Que sais-je?* (*Phenomenology*) – do not immediately affect Lyotard’s arguments, they nonetheless serve as part of their foundation. In particular they introduced Lyotard to a particular conception of the Subject which would reappear in *La condition postmoderne.*

5.1 Merleau-Ponty’s Embodied Subject
In this section I will consider Merleau-Ponty’s identification of the Subject with the human body, particularly as it appears in his 1945 work *Phénoménologie de la perception* (*Phenomenology of Perception*). As with Sartre, whose *L'être et le néant* appeared two years earlier, Merleau-Ponty’s project in the *Phénoménologie* is to consider the relationship between a human being and objects in the world. To accomplish this, Merleau-Ponty turns to the concept of “perception.”

As do other phenomenologists, Merleau-Ponty assumes that a human being’s access to objects in the real world begins with his or her experience of a finite number of those objects’ *Abschattungen.* Furthermore, just as Sartre does, Merleau-Ponty also assumes that experience is not in itself sufficient to support a human being’s knowledge of objects; it is also necessary for experience to be revealed through a form of internal awareness identified by Merleau-Ponty as an “incomplete” form of reflection. It is these revealed experiences which then form a human being’s perceptions of objects. Because of this, Merleau-Ponty characterises a human being as a Subject of perception – the entity responsible for the realisation of perception. This characterisation is an example of an instantiation of the Aristotelian template in which a human being acts as the referent for the attribution of the perceptions they are responsible for realising. This implies, in the first instance, that the human being is a Subject of the Creative genus. I will return to the question of speciation through which the nature of a human being in Merleau-Ponty’s theory is defined shortly.
An important distinction between Sartre and Merleau-Ponty is that, while the former goes on to assert that a Subject’s reality derives from his or her interpretation of the revealed experiences of objects realised in the process of knowing, or being conscious of those objects, Merleau-Ponty asserts that revealed experiences, in the form of perceptions, are sufficient to constitute the basis of that reality. They do so, either through subsequently contributing to the Subject’s knowledge of objects by serving as the focus of full reflection, or by providing a Subject with pre-reflective access to objects in the world. A possible explanation for differences between each approach lies in each theorist’s assumptions regarding the nature of a Subject’s reality. Sartre’s treatment implicitly assumes that that reality consists of elements which correspond to whole objects. For that to be the case, it is then necessary for the Subject to account for the entirety of an object in the constitution of his or her knowledge of them. Merleau-Ponty’s approach, by contrast, rests on the implicit assumption that the elements of a Subject’s reality do not correspond to whole objects but only to those aspects, or Abschattungen, of the objects of which he or she has experience.

Given the place of perception in the constitution of the reality of a Subject, Merleau-Ponty’s inquiry then turns to identifying the nature of a human being which supports his or her existence as the Subject of perception. Merleau-Ponty approaches this identification through results furnished by the Gestalt psychological movement. In particular, he refers to the situation of the World War One veteran named Schneider. Through injuries incurred during the war, Schneider was left unable to process his perceptions through conscious reflection: he could not, for example, name where on his body he was being touched by an object, nor could he describe the shape of that object. This did not mean, however, that he was incapable of perceiving objects. Schneider repeatedly demonstrated his perceptive abilities when he performed pre-reflective activities ranging from simple bodily functions such as walking, to actions such as striking a match or taking a handkerchief to wipe his nose.

Merleau-Ponty interprets Schneider’s case as demonstrating that the mechanisms of perception – the experiential apparatus and the incomplete reflection by which experiences are revealed – exist prior to reflection as part of the functions of the body. In effect, it is the human body that realises perception. Based on this, it is not uncommon to encounter the human body referred to as the “body-Subject” in the secondary literature. This body-Subject is not, however, the body which is
perceived. This perceived body is the body which follows those perceptions based on experiences of parts of the body at rest or in action. The body-Subject is the body which comes first; it is the body which acts and which is acted upon. This leads Merleau-Ponty to characterise the body-Subject in terms of ontological being.

In terms of my interpretive framework, the identification of the body-Subject supports the identification of the speciation of the human Subject. Specifically, the case of Schneider provides an empirical indication of the nature of perception in the form of the observation that perception is possible in the absence of those mechanisms associated with reflection. This implies that a human being, as the Creative Subject of perception, consists of the pre-conscious aspects that define the human body.

Having developed the concept of perception, Merleau-Ponty goes on to consider its place in mediating a subject’s relationship with objects in the world. He begins with the observation that a perception rests on the body-Subject’s experiences of a finite number of the aspects of the perceived object. This finitude is the result of the orientation of body-Subject towards that object: if one is facing the near side of the moon, for example, one cannot experience its farther face. In effect, the perception of an object refers to the relationship between beings: between the pre-perceptual body-Subject and the object itself. This implies that, as it is in Heidegger’s theories, the relationship between the body-Subject and his or her perceptions reflects the ontological relationship between the body-Subject and the objects of perception. This argument does not mean that the Subject cannot have knowledge of things which are not immediately perceived: the interpretation of perceptions of the near side of the moon, for example, can lead to the surmising of its far side.

Based on this understanding of perception, Merleau-Ponty goes on to elaborate the structure of the body-Subject and its relationship to objects in the world. In particular, in a manner akin to both Husserl and Sartre, he argues that the determination of perception by the orientation of the body-Subject equates to the assignation of a meaning which reflects how the object of experience is perceived. This implies that the ontological existence of the body-Subject embodies the application of meaning. Merleau-Ponty treats this assignation of meaning in terms of human qualities, in this case emotional gestures such as anger and love. These gestures, he argues, are the embodiment of the orientation of the Subject, a fact of his or her existence. Since gestures refer to the orientation of the body-Subject to the world, they then govern the way in which the world is perceived. Merleau-Ponty captures this by identifying
gestures with expressions of the meaning that form the basis of the body-Subject’s interactions of with the world. In effect, the body-Subject perceives the world in the assignation of meaning through expressive gestures. While this resonates with earlier phenomenological theories – Husserl, for example, argues that the constitution of phenomena corresponds to the assignation of meaning to experience – Merleau-Ponty’s approach places the assignation not at the level of consciousness – understood not in the phenomenological sense but the psychoanalytic – but in the pre-conscious body. In effect, meaning has already been assigned to experience prior to the Subject’s realisation of any conscious awareness.

Merleau-Ponty analyses this structure of expression and gesture in terms of language. Language, he argues, begins with thought. This thought is not the thought which is revealed to the body-Subject through reflection. Rather it is pre-reflective thought. This pre-reflective thought embodies the orientation of the body-Subject to the world. As such, it equates with the gestures as expressions. Based on this, Merleau-Ponty labels expressions as “speech.” This does not mean that speech is immediately communicative in the traditional sense. To explain how communication occurs between different body-Subjects, Merleau-Ponty partitions speech between two subclasses: internal speech, which is the immediate expression as thought; and external speech, which entails the repetition of previously perceived expressions. While the first of these subclasses embodies those expressions associated with the body-Subject’s perception of objects, the second is more interesting. In the second subclass, the expressions being repeated are the external manifestations of other body-Subject’s perceptions of the world. This means that the external speech consists, in the first instance, of a body-Subject’s response to their perceptions of others. As with the perceptions of objects, this implies that external speech is based on the orientation of the body-Subject towards other Subjects. In effect, external speech is based on the ontological relationship between body-Subjects.

Read against the interpretive framework for the Subject, these observations suggest that the Subject of perception is also a Subject of communication in the sense that it is the referent for the attribution of expression. In the next sections I will argue that Lyotard embeds this understanding of communication in La condition postmoderne within a framework in which the thoughts that the body-Subject communicates are associated with expression of knowledge claims.
While Lyotard may have been inspired by Merleau-Ponty, he was not a phenomenologist. In *La Phénoménologie*, Lyotard attempts to reconcile phenomenology with a Marxist conception of political history. In the course of doing so he breaks his analysis into two parts addressing, respectively, the theories of Husserl and the intersection between phenomenology and the social sciences through an examination of the works of Merleau-Ponty. Through his analyses, Lyotard concludes that phenomenology does have much to offer the social sciences, particularly through providing a theoretical framework for the analysis of phenomena to determine their essences. One field where this is particularly true is in the Gestalt psychology referred to by Merleau-Ponty. Gestalt psychologists regularly approach human behaviours in phenomenological terms to determine their essential underpinnings in human nature. Overall, however, Lyotard concludes that phenomenology is ultimately an unsuccessful model of social structures. This failure lies principally in the phenomenological focus upon the nature of the Subject rather than on the objects of which he or she has knowledge. In contrast to this, Marxism considers social phenomena in terms of objective structures such as the mechanisms of production present in an economy. As a result, Lyotard argues, Marxist theories make a more valid claim to being representative theories of the world than their phenomenological counterparts.

Lyotard wrote *La Phénoménologie* at the start of a period in his life marked by increasing political involvement. During the next ten years he would be a member of the workers organisation, *Socialisme ou barbarie*, and contribute many articles to organisation’s eponymous journal focusing, in particular, on a Marxist analysis of the worsening situation in Algeria. Even following his abandonment of Marxism in the mid 1960s he would continue in his political activities by playing an organising role in the events of 1968. Lyotard did not return to publishing philosophical works until the early 1970s with works such as *Discours, figure* (*Discourse Figure*) and *Économie libidinale* (*Libidinal Economy*).17

5.2 The Expressions of Knowledge

Lyotard’s concern in *La condition postmoderne* is to explain the changing nature of expressions of knowledge in cultures, particularly those expressions appearing in Western European countries as they enter the post-industrial age.18 Of special interest
are those expressions associated with scientific knowledge. Lyotard observes that scientific advancements in the fifty years prior to his analysis have focused principally upon the arrangement and storage of items of knowledge in preference to the generation of new knowledge. Each of these advances – in fields ranging from theories of language and communication to the technology of information storage and retrieval – embodies the assumption that a valid expression of knowledge is not something to be known, but something which is external to the entity who knows.

The externalisation of knowledge has several implications. Lyotard observes that in being external, knowledge is capable of existing in the same relationship with those who generate or acquire knowledge that a manufactured good does with those who produce or acquire such goods. This similarity supports the commercialisation of knowledge as a commodity to be produced and traded. Lyotard even notes the possibility of external knowledge becoming a determining factor in the conduct of international relationships – being acted upon in much the same way that land or oil are in the contemporary world.

A second implication of the externalisation of knowledge lies in the area of what counts as knowledge. The assumed requirement that a valid expression of knowledge exists as something external to a knower provides a framework for assessing or rejecting knowledge claims with respect to their externality. In this case, Lyotard cites the example of storage mechanisms where the ability to be stored sets a standard which discounts any knowledge claim which cannot be so.

Given these observations Lyotard is faced with several questions, the most important of which – with respect to his considerations in *La condition postmoderne* – addresses the assumption regarding the externality of knowledge. To justify this assumption Lyotard proposes a model of the expression of knowledge based on the establishment of an expression’s validity, or legitimacy, when measured against a particular standard. Armed with this model, he can then consider issues such as why the postmodern standard reflected in the assumption of externality has replaced earlier ones in which the valid expression of knowledge is one in which knowledge is not external to the knower. In the remainder of this chapter I will address this model for it is in it that Lyotard embeds the idea of a Subject in *La condition postmodern*. 
5.2.1 Knowledge and Legitimation

In *La condition postmoderne*, Lyotard models the expression of knowledge with a tripartite structure consisting of the claimant who expresses knowledge in the form of knowledge claims, the claims themselves, and an audience who assesses those claims to verify their legitimacy. Although Lyotard identifies neither of these entities as Subjects until later, this structure directly resonates with Merleau-Ponty’s model. In this case, the claimant is oriented towards his or her audience, he or she expresses thoughts in the knowledge claim, and the audience responds to their perception of that expression by assessing the validity of its claim. The same is true of the audience, the members of which are oriented towards the claimant, perceive his or her expression of the knowledge claim, and respond with their own expressions embodying the result of their assessment of the claim. A corollary is that the audience must possess sufficient competencies to perform the legitimising assessment. In practical terms, these competencies correspond to an ability on the part of the audience to generate equivalent claims of their own. I will return to Lyotard’s identification of the Subject within this form when I have considered the framework arising from the nature of the verification process.

Lyotard argues that the verification of legitimacy occurs through the assessment of knowledge claims against a set of standards appropriate to the community making the assessment: the community of doctors, for example, may measure the legitimacy of a statement regarding a new treatment against measurements of its efficacy, while a society could measure the legitimacy of a statement of morality in the form of a new law by considering the law against the moral authority of the law maker. Given this, the observed transformation of the modern manifestations of knowledge to the postmodern state can be approached in terms of transformations in the standards of legitimacy between those which accept knowledge as being internal to the knower and those which do not. This change forms the basis of Lyotard’s preliminary characterisation of the states of modernity and postmodernity in which the latter is defined as the state that obtains following the replacement of the former. Lyotard attributes this definition to the attitude, common amongst American sociologists, which situates the postmodern replacement as occurring since the end of the Nineteenth century. 24
Lyotard’s interest in legitimacy is not unique in Continental philosophy of the 1970s. Another example, to which he both explicitly and implicitly refers, appears in Jürgen Habermas’s *Legitimationsprobleme im Spätkapitalismus (Legitimation Crisis)* published in 1973.\(^{25}\) Habermas is concerned with a number of issues in and around the legitimacy of governments in late Twentieth-century Western societies. For him, governmental legitimacy is a correlate of the acceptance of the government by those it governs as manifested through the exercise of a type of formal democracy.\(^{26}\) This legitimacy, however, faces regular challenges ranging from persistent social pressures to economic shocks. Habermas treats these challenges through the theoretical framework of the crisis.\(^{27}\) Through considering a number of theories of crisis ranging from the idea of a medical crisis to the social connotations of Marxist theory, he concludes that a crisis, in a general sense, occurs in those situations where the objective possibilities available to an individual or to a system have diminished in number beyond the point necessary for the system’s continued survival.

### 5.2.2 Legitimation and Narratives

Lyotard retains Habermas’s term “crisis” to describe the replacement of modern standards of legitimation with their postmodern counterparts.\(^{28}\) His concern then is to address the nature of the crisis: what factors changed to force the replacement of one set of legitimating standards by another. To do this he provides an explanation of legitimation in terms of narratives. The first function of a narrative is to provide information to its audience. This information can range from simple facts regarding the state of the world or a reporting of historical events, to the standards and conventions which define a particular community. An important subclass of the latter consists of the standards which form a basis for the assessment of knowledge claims.

In the case of the modern approach to expressions of scientific knowledge – the approach which obtained prior to the postmodern “crisis” – the assessment of legitimacy refers to an assessment of what is known. Lyotard argues that the standards which govern that such an assessment fall into two distinct classes, each embodied in its own grand narrative.\(^{29}\) The first of these – embodied in the narrative of the Enlightenment – establishes the legitimacy of expressions of knowledge on the basis of the role of their contents in the emancipation and enlightenment of the population. This standard is reflected in assertions such as, “All people have a right to
science …,” and requires that a society overcomes the suppression enacted “… by priests and tyrants …” 30 The Enlightenment narrative embodying these standards takes tangible form in those philosophies which speak of the advancement of humanity and in educational theories which link the advancement of knowledge to its place in aiding the state towards the ends of improving social conditions.

The second class of modern legitimating narratives for the expression of scientific knowledge rests on the belief that the content of all such expressions forms a holistic structure. Given this, the legitimacy of individual knowledge claims reflects the consistency their content with a conception of that structure. This conception, in turn, forms the basis of a narrative of consistency. Lyotard observes that an example of this form of narrative appears in a report presented by Wilhelm von Humboldt in 1810 discussing the structure of the recently formed University of Berlin. 31 Humboldt argued strongly that the university should focus on the pursuit of knowledge for its own sake and proposed the division of its faculties to facilitate the realisation of that goal.

Identifying the grand narratives of the Enlightenment and consistency forms the basis of a more formal characterisation of a “modern” expression of scientific knowledge. Specifically, a legitimate modern expression of scientific knowledge is one which refers “… explicitly to some grand narrative or other, such as the dialectic of the spirit, the hermeneutic of meaning, the emancipation of the reasoning or working Subject, the development of wealth …” 32 Measured against this standard, a scientific discipline is modern if it is built on knowledge claims which adhere to this definition by having their legitimacy determined by standards defined by the appropriate grand narrative.

Just as a modern understanding of the expression of scientific knowledge is characterisable in terms of the reference that legitimate knowledge claims make to narrative standards, so too can a postmodern expression of scientific knowledge. Since the postmodern understanding of the expression of scientific knowledge derives, in the sociological definition noted earlier, from a transformation of the modern, it necessarily embodies a rejection of the narratives to which the modern understanding refers. This leads Lyotard to characterise a postmodern expression of scientific knowledge by its “… incredulity with regards to metanarratives …” and its general scepticism in the earlier sense towards the extant forms of narrative. 33
5.3 Modelling Legitimation: Lyotard and Wittgenstein

To aid in his analysis of the relationship between modern and postmodern expressions of knowledge, Lyotard provides a formalisation of his model of legitimation based on the idea of the language game deriving from the works of Ludwig Wittgenstein. Lyotard’s adoption of language games stems from the observation that the tripartite structure entailed by the expression of scientific knowledge occurs within a linguistic framework: the claimant enunciates a knowledge claim in language and the audience accesses the claim through language.\(^{34}\) An important corollary of this observation is that it suggests a connection between the roles of a statement, in this case as the assertion of a particular item of knowledge through a knowledge claim, and its linguistic presentation. A statement made in a fictional context, by contrast, such as in a play or novel would not count as a knowledge claim since it is presented without requiring an assessment of its legitimacy. Lyotard’s approach in this differs from the structuralist view of language and language-like structures in which the role of a statement is determined by its significance which is, in turn, a function of its language.

5.3.1 Wittgenstein and Language Games

The association of language and use is a central tenet of ordinary language analysis. Ordinary language analysis argues that the best approach to understanding a language is not through reference to formalised models, but through the study of the nuances of its everyday usage. Lyotard noted his debt to various thinkers in this tradition, particularly to John Austin.\(^{35}\) In works such as *How to Do Things with Words*, published in 1962, Austin proposes that certain linguistic utterances embody the performance of the actions to which they appear to refer.\(^{36}\) Such utterances are described in the literature as being “performatives.” In the case of Lyotard’s treatment of the manifestations of knowledge, the claim can be interpreted as a type of performative in the sense that it demonstrates the claimant’s engagement in the process of knowing. To analyse the manifestations of knowledge Lyotard turns to the concept of the language game developed by Ludwig Wittgenstein.

Wittgenstein – who became, in his later period, the archetypal practitioner of ordinary language analysis – introduces the concept of language games in the *Philosophical Investigations* (posthumously published in 1953) as part of his critique
of the functioning of language. Language featured prominently in Wittgenstein’s intellectual concerns almost from the moment of his abandonment of aeronautical engineering in 1911. His first major philosophical work, *Logisch-philosophische Abhandlung (Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus)* – published in 1921 and commonly known as the *Tractatus* – attempts to explain the representational features of language. One of the most famous aspects of Wittgenstein’s life is the fact that, following the publication of the *Tractatus*, he concluded that he had reached the limits of his ability to make original contributions to philosophy. For the next nine years, he worked variously as a teacher, a gardener and an architect. In 1929, however, he reconsidered his position and concluded that he could, indeed, make new contributions. Consequently, he returned to Cambridge and spent the rest of his life writing prodigiously.

The most prominent philosophical work of Wittgenstein’s second period is the *Philosophical Investigations*. In the *Tractatus*, Wittgenstein presents a view of language as being the representation of the world. By the time of the *Investigations*, he rejected this understanding in favour of one in which the significance of a linguistic utterance is determined by the use to which that utterance is put and not by its objective reference. Wittgenstein argues that, by failing to account for this fact, traditional referential theories of language undermine their own ability to successfully explain the functions of language. Based on the importance of utility in the understanding of language, Wittgenstein describes the utterances through which this utility is realised as tools for the language-user and notes that, as tools, they are focused upon realising a particular end. In effect, like a performative, the production of a linguistic utterance embodies the act of realising a particular end.

Wittgenstein models the function of utterances through the structure of the language game. A language game provides a framework for understanding the generation of linguistic utterances – that is to say the words and their combinations – and their use in communication. Just as general games consist of discrete moves, the moves of a language game are the distinct utterances which taken together result in a particular end. Wittgenstein notes the existence of several different ends for language games: they can focus on the giving and obeying orders, on the description and measurement of objects, on the reporting of events, on the communication of directions, or on the enunciation of speculation. The combination of utterances and ends is not, however, sufficient to fully characterise the nature of a language game.
Turning again to the understanding of general games, it is necessary to characterise each utterance in the language game as a move governed by a set of rules. These rules support the production of utterances and focus them towards the particular end. Taken together, utterances, the rules which govern them, and the ends towards which they are directed suffice to define a language game. This does not mean that all linguistic utterances occur within the framework of such games. Wittgenstein draws attention to the possibility of encountering utterances made without strategic ends by citing the repetition of sounds by a parrot.44

Returning to the paradigm of the general game, an aspect in the game structure worth noting is the implied relationship between the game and its players: players engage in games through making legitimate moves towards strategic ends. In the case of language games, the association of language with communication allows the description of the roles of the players in such games. Typically, one of the players takes the role of a “speaker” who makes utterances for a particular end associated with the response which the statement evokes from the second player of the game.

A special subclass of language games worth noting consists of those associated with the acquisition of language skills.45 In such a game, the player who teaches communicates the conditions which characterise various language games to his or her students. The student manifests the receipt of these conditions in his or her ability to recognise and engage in those games. In effect, language teaching entails communicating the ability to make use of language.

While Wittgenstein does not talk about a Subject with respect to language, these observations suggest that such a Subject could reasonably be identified with the human language-user who is responsible for the realisation of linguistic communication in the language game framework. In the interpretive framework of the Subject, it is this human being who acts as the referent for the attribution of such communication. It is probably because of such an understanding that authors such as Søren Overgaard refer to the human being in their discussions of subjectivity in the Philosophical Investigations.46

Elsewhere in the Philosophical Investigations Wittgenstein makes some observations regarding the nature of the human language-user. The most important of these observations derives from the inseparability of inner sensations from their linguistic expression: my sensation of pain, for example, is inseparable from the assertion “I am in pain.”47 This suggests that the nature of the human being as a
language-user is apparent in the totality of its expressions in linguistic interactions. A corollary is that the human being is apprehensible by others through its expressions. This apprehension forms the basis of language games in the sense that it enables other language-users to respond to the original expressions: the assertion “I am in pain,” for example, elicits a response of belief or disbelief. This is consistent with Merleau-Ponty’s model: Wittgenstein’s human language-user corresponds to Merleau-Ponty’s body-Subject and is oriented, as the body-Subject is, towards other language-users. While the argument presented here is only a sketch, Overgaard notes a possible future research project based on the application of phenomenological theories to aid in the understanding of Wittgenstein’s assertions.

5.3.2 Lyotard and Language Games

In his appropriation of the concept of language games, Lyotard makes three observations regarding their nature. Like Wittgenstein, he accepts that a language game rests on the existence of a body of rules: without rules there can be no game. Lyotard extends this by noting “… that even a small modification of a rule modifies the nature of the game …” Although this extension does not appear explicitly in Wittgenstein’s exposition, it is not inconsistent with its intent. In Wittgenstein’s opinion, the rules of a language game serve to direct utterances towards the ends of the game. Given this, it is reasonable to assume that a change in rules would also entail a change in that direction, and in the game itself.

Lyotard’s next observation also extends Wittgenstein’s presentation to make explicit the connection between the game and its players. In this context, Lyotard notes that the legitimacy of a language game’s rules derives from their acceptance by the players of the game. While Lyotard does not address the possibility directly in La condition postmoderne, in his 1983 work, Le différend (The Differend: Phrases in Dispute), he extends the language-game model to those situations where, by accident or design, the language-users who might have become players in a language-game cannot agree to the rules of that game. I will briefly consider Lyotard’s treatment of différends and their relation to his analysis of the manifestation of knowledge later in this section.

As with Lyotard’s first observation, this assertion does not explicitly appear in the Philosophical Investigations, although it too is consistent with those that do. In
particular, noting the contingency of Wittgenstein’s conception of language games upon the presence of rules and the model of language acquisition based on learning the conditions for recognising a language game, it is reasonable to assert that if a game is in progress then each of its players recognise and accept its rules. This suggests that, within the Wittgensteinian framework, an occurring game is a legitimate game. A possible reason for Wittgenstein’s omission of this observation may be a desire to focus upon the nature of the game rather than of its players.

Lyotard’s recognition of the place of the game’s players reflects his belief that the questions of knowledge to which he applies the concept entail a degree of agonistics. Agonistics – an idea which he identifies in the works of Heracleitus and the Sophists, as well as in Nietzsche – embodies the process by which one entity achieves success at the expense of another. In the case of knowledge, this success entails some form of assent to a knowledge claim. The form of assent derives from, amongst other things, the standards of legitimacy at play. This suggests that a language game can be read as a form of power understood in the Foucauldean manner presented in Chapter One. Recall from that presentation that power exists in the relationships of force between two entities through which one seeks to illicit a response from the other, while the other resists their efforts. In the case of the agonistics inherent in the language game of knowledge, the two entities correspond to the players in the game, and the structures of force in which power resides equates to the demand for legitimation inherent in a statement.

Lyotard’s final observation regarding language games equates moves in a game with utterances. This connection, directly appropriated from Wittgenstein, serves to complete Lyotard’s conception of language games. Like the Wittgensteinian view, this conception entails the use of utterances within a framework of rules directed towards a particular end. Lyotard goes further to connect the legitimacy of the game to a contract between the players who accept the rules of the game in question, and to assert that the game is contingent in form and existence upon the body of its rules. While Wittgenstein does not explicitly refer to either of these properties, they are not incompatible with his development.

To facilitate his analysis of the manifestation of knowledge, Lyotard identifies two important forms of language games. The first of these is the class of denotative language games. Such games involve two players, a speaker and a listener, together with a statement referring in some way to an aspect of the world. In the execution of
the game, the speaker utters the statement to the end of attaining its confirmation by
the listener on the basis of its correspondence to the world. The second form of
language game mentioned by Lyotard is the declarative language game.\textsuperscript{56} The
declarative game is not dissimilar to the denotative variety in that it involves the
assessment of the accuracy of statements by the listener. In the declarative case,
however, this accuracy is not a measure of a statements correspondence with the
world but of the status of the speaker. Success in declarative language games
measures the listener’s recognition of that status. Lyotard makes use of both
denotative and declarative language games in his discussion of knowledge.

5.3.3 Language Game Distortions: A Brief Discussion of the Différend

Before addressing Lyotard’s application of denotative and declarative language games
to explaining the manifestations of knowledge, I will briefly discuss his theory of the
différend which he develops in the work of the same name. A différend, according to
Lyotard, is a phenomenon which is associated with communication using phrases.
Phrases, which typically consist of sentences or groups of sentences, entail the
existence of a number of associated components, or “instances.”\textsuperscript{57} The first of these
instances is the addressor who is responsible for enunciating the phrase. This
enunciation is then directed towards the second instance in the form of the addressee.
Beyond the addressor and the addressee, the third instance is the sense or meaning
which is communicated by the phrase. This sense is principally a linguistic sense
governed by the nature of the language itself. The sense, however, is connected to a
part of the real world corresponding to the referent of the phrase. This referent is then
the final “instant” of the phrase.

Beyond a phrase’s instants, the exact form of its manifestation is governed by a
series of rules and procedures which determine how its instances act and interact:
why, for example, the addressor constructs a phrase with a particular sense and
reference, how he or she does so, how it is to be delivered to the addressee, and how
the addressee responds to that delivery. Lyotard identifies two general categories of
rules: the phrase regimen and the genre of discourse. The phrase regimen serves to
define the structure which a phrase requires to realise a particular functionality.\textsuperscript{58}
Examples of functionalities include orders, questions, recounts, and indications.
By contrast, the genre of discourse of a phrase establishes the requirements that a
phrase must meet in being directed towards a particular end. Examples of ends to which phrases might be applied, include teaching, evaluation, justification, and manipulation.

At this point it should be clear that the model of the phrase is consistent with Lyotard’s earlier formulation of language games. Just as does a language game, a phrase involves the exchange of linguistic utterances; it entails the presence of two entities between which that exchange occurs, and it implies the existence of a set of rules and regulations which govern the form and function of the exchange. A corollary of the phrase model is that, just as it is in the case of language games, if communication is to occur, both the addressor and the addressee must adhere to the same set of rules. What the phrase model does not do, however, is require, that they do so.

Lyotard’s principle concern in *Le différend*, is not with the situations where communication through phrases occurs, but with the situations where it does not. In such situations, while both the addressor and the addressee may adhere to legitimate rules and procedures governing phrase usage, they are different rules for each. As a result of this difference, neither the addressor nor the addressee is able to participate in the exchange of phrases. Lyotard identifies two forms of such difference: on the one hand it is possible that the phrase regimen differs between the addressor and the addressee in which case the well-formed phrases of one party cannot be recognised as such by the other; and on the other it is the genre of discourse which differs with the result that one party is unable to recognise the end to which the other’s phrases are applied. When these differences occur, the system defined by the addressor and the addressee constitutes a *différend*.

Having established the nature of a *différend*, Lyotard goes on to consider several of its connotations focusing, in particular, upon what happens when a set of rules governing phrase usage is forced upon either the addressor or the addressee. Here he identifies three ways that the imposition can occur: if the addressor forces their rules upon the addressee, the latter loses the freedom to respond to the phrase according to the rules they previously held; if, on the other hand, the addressee forces their rules upon the addressor, the later loses the freedom to make claims in accord with the rules they previously held; finally, if some third party attempts to force rules upon both, then both lose the freedom to either enunciate phrases or to respond to them as they might have otherwise.
While Lyotard considers the connotations of such impositions in fields ranging from politics to ethics, I will conclude my summary of *Le différend* here. In the last part of this section I will return to the concept to consider how it applies in the context of knowledge manifestation. It is to this context, and to the role that language games play in that manifestation that I will now turn.

### 5.3.4 Language Games and Knowledge

Two areas of knowledge are particularly relevant to Lyotard’s considerations: scientific and narrative knowledge. In each case, Lyotard characterises the expression of knowledge in terms of a language game in which one player, or language-user, makes a knowledge claim while the other assesses the claim’s legitimacy in accordance with a given set of standards.

The expression of scientific knowledge occurs solely through denotative language games in which knowledge claims are presented in order that their legitimacy be determined by the audience. This legitimacy, in turn, is a reflection of the provability of the claim. Lyotard notes that there are two sub-forms of this game based upon how this provability is to be realised: the research game and the teaching game. In the case of the research game, the audience is required – as part of the game – to either construct their own proof of the knowledge claim, or to assess any proofs for the claim simultaneously presented to them by the claimant. In the case of the teaching game, the provability of a knowledge claim is determined by the audiences’ acceptance of a simultaneously presented proof based, in part, on the authority of the presenter. In this formulation, teaching represents the complement of research in the sense that it provides the claimant in the research game with an audience sufficiently qualified to assess the knowledge claims presented to them.

An important feature of both of the research and the teaching games of scientific knowledge expression is that they refer to standards which are not part of the denotative statements of scientific language games. This is particularly true of the standard of provability: if this standard was established through a scientific game, then it, too, would require to be proven. Given this, it is possible to argue that other standards, such as the standard which establishes the status of the teacher, are similarly un-provable. Taken together, these observations imply that, as a general
class, scientific language games refer to standards which are not established in scientific language games: science is, in effect, not self-legitimating.\textsuperscript{64}

The question then is where the standards associated with the legitimation of scientific knowledge claims originate. To answer this, Lyotard turns to the class of language games associated with the manifestation of narrative knowledge. As with their scientific counterparts, narrative knowledge manifests in a language-game framework in which claims, in this case associated with the establishment of standards, are expressed and those expressions are assessed for their legitimacy. Unlike scientific games, however, the expression of narrative knowledge is not limited to denotative statements. While it can occur through such statements – where a narrative claim is presented for the audience to assess through the comparison of the claim to other standards – it is also possible to encounter narrative games making use of declarative statements which are accepted on the basis of the perceived authority of the speaker.\textsuperscript{65} This authority is also established by a narrative. A final point regarding narratives worth noting is that the fact that the standards which form the basis for the legitimation of narrative games – those against which denotative claims are assessed or those which establish the authority of a claimant – are themselves established through narratives. This implies that, in contrast to scientific language games, the general class of narrative language games refers to itself for legitimation.

A special sub-class of narrative knowledge is social knowledge. In this case the standards which are established by narrative claims delineate those who adhere to them from those who do not. The adhering group then forms a community defined by the social knowledge embodied in the narrative claims. This is important in the consideration of science where the standards by which scientific claims are legitimated serve to define a community of scientists capable performing that legitimation. While Lyotard’s analysis in \textit{La condition postmoderne} deals with those cases where both the claimant and the assessor are members of the same community, his discussions in \textit{Le différend} provide a framework for considering those case where they are not. It is to such cases that I will now turn.

\textbf{5.3.5 A Différend of the Manifestation of Scientific Knowledge}

Noting the similarities between the two theories, it is possible to re-characterise the language game associated with the manifestation of scientific knowledge using the
terminology which Lyotard deploys in his consideration of the phrase. In such terms, the phrase in question conveys a scientific knowledge claim which is made by the claimant as addressor according to a set of rules and procedures. In the ideal situation – the situation examined in *La condition postmoderne* – the addressee adheres to the same rules and procedures and, as such, is capable of accessing and phrase and performing the legitimation desired by the addressor. In the language of the earlier work, the rules and standards which govern the use of phrases are embodied in a narrative which defines, in turn, the community of scientists of which the addressor and the addressee are a part.

If the ideal situation is one in which both the addressor and the addressee in the scientific language game adhere to the same rules and procedures, a *différend* occurs in those situations where they do not. In such cases, the knowledge claim of the addressor cannot be accessed by the addressee and hence cannot be legitimated; in effect, the language-game collapses. Observing that the rules and procedures which govern the generation and assessment of such phrases effectively defines a community, one way of interpreting a scientific *différend* is as a situation which occurs when a member of one scientific community makes a claim to a member of another. An example of this would be when a physicist who adheres to the rules of Newtonian mechanics makes a claim to a physicist who adheres to the precepts of Einsteinian relativity.

Lyotard’s discussions point to three phenomena in *La condition postmoderne* which can be associated with a scientific *différend*: education, propaganda, and terror. In the case of education, such as occurs in the teaching game of scientific knowledge expression, the party who is not a member of the appropriate community is inducted into it through their participation in the appropriate educational language game. In the framework of *La condition postmoderne* this is viewed as acceptable in the sense that it would bring the party to a point where they can be a willing participant in the relevant language game. In Lyotard’s later analysis, however, it is less so. In particular, the imposition of the rules and procedures through education occurs at the expense of the rules and procedures that the educated party previously espoused. This means that, while they may be able to access the phrases generated by or directed towards them, they cannot respond to them in the way they might otherwise have done.
Although Lyotard does not refer to it by that name, propaganda occurs when the rules and procedures governing the use of phrases are manipulated in such a way as to limit, but not totally negate, the options of either the addressor or the addressee associated with a scientific phrase. Such alterations can entail the creation or manipulation of the rules and procedures which govern the legitimation of knowledge claims, or the creation or manipulation of aspects of the rules and procedures which govern the generation of those claims. As Lyotard notes, governments spend much effort making scientific claims more acceptable to the general public either by creating a narrative of progress wherein claims are assessed in terms of their consistency with the standard of progress, or by creating a narrative of “good” science where the generation of claims is only made in accordance with a particular view of what counts as science. It can also be argued that scientists themselves are guilty of the second form of manipulation in the course of ensuring the position of their respective fields.

The final phenomena from *La condition postmoderne* which can be associated with a scientific *différend* is terror. For Lyotard, terror occurs when the rules governing the use of phrases are altered so as to negate the meaningful participation of one or more of the participants in the language game of scientific manifestation. In such cases, the alteration typically entails the creation of a narrative in which results are presented to the population as being legitimate without the option of either generation or assessment. Lyotard argues that this can be a result of technocratic authorities assuming that they occupy the position in society in which they know best. In this case, the scientific discourse is effectively quashed as the technocratic authorities provide all claims.

What I have shown here is that, while Lyotard did not consider the phenomena in such terms in *La condition postmoderne*, his developments in his later works allow him to consider not only the language-game model for the expressions of scientific knowledge, but also distortions to that game. In effect he did not discard the earlier theory; he generalised it to the model of the phrase and the *différend*.

### 5.4 Language Games and the Subject in *La condition postmoderne*

Based on the model for the manifestation of scientific knowledge construed in terms of language games, together with the discussions of Merleau-Ponty and Wittgenstein...
and their treatments – both explicit and implicit – of the Subject, it is now possible to turn to Lyotard’s direct references to the Subject in *La condition postmoderne*. I will begin by separately summarising those references.

### 5.4.1 Lyotard’s Observations of the Subject

In the most explicit presentation of the Subject in *La condition postmoderne*, Lyotard identifies the Subject of scientific knowledge as the “… sender-receiver of denotative statements with truth values, to the exclusion of all other language games.”69 This statement points to a Subject who participates in the language games associated with the expression of scientific knowledge and their connection to the truth values which form the basis of the requirement of provability. As an aside, just as the language game is consistent with the more general structure of the phrase presented in *Le différend*, this Subject is also consistent with that referred to in the later work. In particular, Lyotard argues that the Subject of an uttering – effectively the addressor – is the entity who is capable of generating that uttering.70

While Lyotard does not repeat the explicit characterisation, his comments immediately following the preceding passage indicate that the same idea – of a Subject who participates in the language games associated with the expression of scientific knowledge – is also applicable to the expression of narrative knowledge and, through that, to the expression of social knowledge. In particular he observes that the existence of, in his terms, a Subject of knowledge is bound to the institutions in which he or she is supposed to “… deliberate and decide …” the legitimacy of a knowledge-claim.71 In the first instance, these institutions consist of the set of standards against which such claims are assessed and which are transmitted by the language games of a narrative. This implies that the Subject of scientific knowledge is also a player in narrative language games. Noting that narratives also form the basis for the definition of a society suggests that the Subject of social knowledge is a player in social language games. As a precursor to drawing out the political implications of this of this structure, Lyotard notes that these larger institutions correspond to the institutions of a State. An implication of this correspondence is that the State is intimately connected to the expression of scientific knowledge.72 This observation applies not only to the macro-level of the state, but also to the smaller
communities defined by more specialised sub-narratives: the scientist, for example, is a player in the social language games which define the scientific community.

Thus far we have Subjects of knowledge who participate in language games of a form appropriate to the mode of knowledge – scientific, narrative, or social – being expressed. The question is now one of determining the nature of the Subject which supports this participation. Fortunately, Lyotard provides an answer to this question in the form of competencies. A competency is what makes the expression of knowledge possible by allowing a Subject to both make and assess knowledge claims within the appropriate language game framework. Lyotard takes this to mean that the Subject, at least as far as knowledge is concerned, consists solely of the competencies associated with its knowledge. Although Lyotard does not address the issue, the possession of a competency by a Subject indicates that the Subject either “knows” the object of its claim, as is indicated by him or her claiming it as knowledge, or it “knows” its opposite thereby allowing it to access and reject the claim.

While Lyotard refers to competencies only briefly to support his subsequent discussions of the language games associated with the manifestations of both scientific knowledge claims and the narratives used in their legitimation, there are several noteworthy implications of his comments. In particular the identification of the constitution of a Subject of knowledge in terms of competencies implies that there is no fixed form either for a single Subject across time or for multiple Subjects compared across space. In the first instance, when a Subject acquires knowledge it effectively modifies its nature through the addition of the appropriate competencies becoming, in the process, a new Subject. In the second instance, the fact that different Subjects may “know” different things implies that their respective constitutions, defined by the competencies necessary to express that knowledge, are different: the Subject who knows only how to speak French differs from the Subject who knows only how to speak English. These two points suggests that the Subject of knowledge as it is presented in La condition postmoderne rests on a twofold contingency: a contingency upon the competencies associated with the individual items of its knowledge, and a contingency upon the makeup of its knowledge as a whole.
5.4.2 The Resonance with Merleau-Ponty

Before considering Lyotard’s Subject in *La condition postmoderne* in terms of my interpretive framework, I will address the resonances between Lyotard’s observations and the body-Subject presented by Merleau-Ponty.

In Merleau-Ponty’s arguments – aspects of which I discussed previously – language is a manifestation of the human body-Subject based on its orientation towards other body-Subjects and towards objects in the world. In practical terms this orientation manifests through the expression of meaning in bodily gestures. This is particularly important when what is perceived are other body-Subjects for it implies that those Subjects are encountered through their own manifestation in expression. This leads Merleau-Ponty to an understanding of external language in which one body-Subject responds in expression to the expressions of others.

Lyotard’s treatment of language games also embodies the manifestation of the Subject and an orientation which, reflecting the treatment of knowledge in *La condition postmoderne*, occurs in the linguistic framework. In the case of the former aspect, the manifestation in question takes the form of the realisation of the Subject’s competency to participate in language games. To see how this parallels Merleau-Ponty’s conception of the body-Subject manifesting its orientation, it is necessary to consider the conditions for this realisation. In order for Lyotard’s Subject to realise their competencies, it must be part of the domain in which that realisation takes place. This domain is the domain of the game itself which, as noted previously, is established by the legitimation of the game by each of its participants, the acceptance of its rules, and the endorsement of its ends. This implies that, just as Merleau-Ponty’s body-Subject manifests in the ontological system defined by its relation to objects, Lyotard’s Subject realises itself in the system defined by its participation in the language game. Furthermore, this realisation also reflects an orientation towards elements in this domain. In contrast to Merleau-Ponty, for whom the elements of the domain correspond to both objects and to other body-Subjects, Lyotard’s treatment – due to its linguistic focus – refers solely to the other language-users with whom the Subject engages in language games.

While these congruencies can be attributed to Lyotard’s early studies of Merleau-Ponty in the 1950s, they should not be read as an indication of identity. Beyond Lyotard’s explicit rejection of phenomenology as a theoretical basis for understanding
human phenomena, his understanding of the constitution of the Subject and its manifestation differs from Merleau-Ponty’s. Following the Gestalt School, Merleau-Ponty argues that the Subject should not be treated solely in terms of its capacities, but as a whole which manifests in certain phenomena. Based on this, Merleau-Ponty would most likely reject Lyotard’s identification of his Subject as the collection of the competencies supporting its participation in the appropriate language games even if the practical realisation of those competencies originates in the Subject as a whole. Given this, one possible explanation for the observations here is that Lyotard’s earlier study of Merleau-Ponty disposed him towards the appropriation of the language game structure of Wittgenstein which rests on the same structure of oriented Subjects.

5.5 Interpreting Lyotard’s Subject: Expressions of Knowledge and Power.

In this, the final section, I will consider the nature of the Subject presented by Lyotard in *La condition postmoderne* in light of the interpretive framework being examined in this Thesis. As I asserted in my opening comments, this Subject is consistent with not one instantiation of the Aristotelian template – as were the examples in the previous chapters – but two. The most obvious of these derives from the observation that Lyotard’s Subject is a Subject with respect to the expression of knowledge. Through his appropriation of Wittgenstein and his resonance with Merleau-Ponty, Lyotard presents the Subject as the human language-user who engages in language games with other users to attain the legitimation of his or her knowledge claims or to assess the legitimacy of the claims of others. In the interpretive framework, just as was the case with the analogous structures in Wittgenstein and Merleau-Ponty, this Subject is a referent for the attribution of those knowledge claims. The nature of those claims, furthermore, implies that the Subject must be capable of generating them in the framework of the game, which implies that he or she is speciated by the appropriate competencies.

A corollary of this first interpretation of the Subject in *La condition postmoderne* is that, through its participation in the language game, it enters into a relationship with the other players in the game on the basis of which it can be characterised as a Subject with respect to a form of Foucauldian power. Recall from my previous presentation that the language-game model of knowledge manifestation entails two applications of
force: in the first instance, the claimant forces a response from the assessor through presenting a claim for their assessment, and in the second, the assessor applies force to the claimant through being able to legitimate or reject their claims. Following the discussion of power in Chapter One this means that each Subject of the first sort, can be treated as being both Creative and Structuring with respect to the attribution of power. Before concluding this chapter, it is worth noting that this power relationship opens the way to some of the distortions and abuses discussed previously: in forcing a response from the assessor, for example, the claimant can force a limiting legitimation narrative upon them through propaganda or they can negate that response completely through terror.

While Lyotard goes on to apply this model of the expression of knowledge to the explanation of the postmodern condition, identifying in the process the reasons for the adoption of narratives involving the externalisation of knowledge, I have now reached the end of my consideration of the Subject in *La condition postmoderne*. While these later applications may vary in the precise nature of the language game in which a Subject is a participant, and hence in the competencies of which the Subject is made up, the nature of the Subject with respect to the realisation of the expression of knowledge or of power does not change due to the fact that the Subject remains defined by the participation in language games. Given this, I conclude that, as was the case in the previous chapters, the Subject identified in *La condition postmoderne* is consistent with my interpretive framework albeit within two potential applications. Based on these results I will now turn my attention, in the final chapter, to consider some of the implications of the interpretive framework for a general philosophy of the Subject.
Concluding Remarks: Implications of the Interpretive Framework for the Consideration of Subjects

In this Thesis I have developed a framework for treating different entities which have each, within the context of their manifestation, been identified as being Subjects. At the core of this framework is the understanding that this identification rests on the entity’s participation in an instantiation of the Aristotelian template of the Subject through which it acts as the necessary referent of an attribution. Through this relationship, it is possible to identify the various features of the entity which allow it to act as a Subject. The first class of features are those which reflect the nature of the Subject’s existence as the referent within the instantiation. These features define the genus of the Subject as being either Tautologous when the Subject is attributed to itself, Creative when the Subject creates what is attributed to it, or Structuring when the Subject provides the structure of what is attributed. Beyond this, the second class of features are those which enable a Subject as the referent of a particular attribution. These features form the basis of the speciation of the Subject and derive from the nature of what is attributed in the instantiation which, in turn, reflects the shape of the discursive space in which the instantiation occurs.

To test this framework I considered its philosophical utility in the first instance, by applying it to the reading of four examples drawn from the corpus of Twentieth-century French philosophy: to Jean-Paul Sartre’s phenomenological writings of the 1930s and 1940s, to Claude Lévi-Strauss’s ethnological theories developed from the middle of the 1940s to the 1970s, to the deconstructive writings of Jacques Derrida presented in a period form the late 1950s to the early 1970s, and to Jean-François Lyotard’s *La condition postmoderne*. In this last chapter I will consider some of the contributions that the framework can make to a general philosophy of the Subject drawn both from these readings and from more general concerns.

6.1 Interpreting Individual Instantiations

The results in the preceding chapters indicate that the interpretive framework developed in Chapter One supports the identification of Subjects in a range of cases.
In the Chapters Two and Three, for example, it enables Subjects of different genera in
different discursive spaces. In his phenomenological writings, Jean-Paul Sartre
identifies the being of the Subject as human consciousness defined as the combination
of the faculties of experience, revealing intuition, and reflection necessary for the
realisation of knowledge of objects in the world. This Subject occurs in an
instantiation of the Aristotelian template in which it acts as the referent for the
attribution of that knowledge by being the creator of knowledge. This implies that
consciousness is a Subject of the Creative genus speciated by the collection of
faculties necessary for the realisation of knowledge.

Turning to Lévi-Strauss, it is also possible to treat the Subject identified in his
ethnological theories using the interpretive framework. Lévi-Strauss identifies the
Subject with the human unconscious, aspects of which are represented in conscious
thought, and through that, in the cultural phenomena studied by ethnologists. As with
the previous example, Lévi-Strauss’s unconscious also occurs in an instantiation of
the Aristotelian template in which the unconscious, as the Subject, is the referent for
the attribution of cultural phenomena. Here, however, the nature of the attribution is
not an active one where the unconscious creates those phenomena, but a passive one
where it is represented in them. This implies, firstly, that the unconscious is a Subject
of the Structuring genus defined as the source of the form present in its representation.

Beyond the case of a Subject of a single genus within a single discursive space, the
interpretive framework can also be used to consider more complicated combinations
of each. In Chapter Four I considered examples of Subjects occurring in the complex
combination of discursive spaces defined by Jacques Derrida’s concern with systems
of representation. The appearances of such systems, he argues, are the representations
of the logoi of the systems. While these logoi are not always identified as being the
Subjects of their systems, each reflects the central instantiation of the Aristotelian
template in Derrida’s writings in which the logos of a system of representation acts as
the referent for the attribution of the appearance of that system. Beyond this basic
instantiation, the genera and speciation of any individual logos is determined by the
relationship between it and its representation. When the logos of a language is
identified as the language-user, for example, that language-user is a Subject of the
Creative genus. Faced with such a system, Derrida’s response is to apply the
deconstructive methodology. This serves, to introduce a new logos within the
discursive space of the deconstruction to explain the representation of the system.
While this new *logos* typically differs from the old, it too exists in an instantiation of the Aristotelian template in much the same way as its predecessor. That is, it acts as the referent for the attribution of the representation.

In Chapter Five I considered the identification of a Subject which exists within two different instantiations of Aristotelian template. In Jean-François Lyotard’s *La condition postmodern*, the Subject appears as the entity capable of bringing about the manifestation of knowledge in the framework of the language game. The most obvious interpretation of this structure is as an instantiation of the Aristotelian template in which the Subject acts as the referent of the attribution of the manifestation of knowledge by being responsible for the creation of that manifestation. In this case the Subject is a Subject of the Creative genus defined by their ability to participate in language games.

Considering the nature of language games reveals the second possible interpretation of the Subject identified by Lyotard. According to Lyotard, who adopts the concept from Wittgenstein, a language game entails the interaction of two players where one makes statements to elicit a response from another. In the case of the expression of knowledge, this response takes the form of the legitimation of the knowledge claims embodied in the initial presentation. Given this, it is possible to approach a language game as an example of a system of power defined in the Foucauldian manner. In this system the first player of the game exerts a type of force to which the second responds. This means that Lyotard’s presentation of the Subject can also be treated as an instantiation of the Aristotelian template in which what is attributed is not knowledge but power. In this instantiation, it is possible to identify Lyotard’s Subject as being both Creative in the sense that it can generate the statements of the language game and Structuring in the sense that they shape the response to those statements.

Taken together, these results imply that the identification of a Subject is equivalent to the positing of an instantiation of the Aristotelian template on which the interpretive framework is based. A practical corollary of this equivalency is that it suggests that the validity of the identification of an entity as a Subject can be confirmed by assessing that entity’s participation in an instantiation of the template. In the preceding examples, the validity of each identification rests on each entity’s existence as the referent for an attribution: for Sartre, the entity whose being is consciousness is a valid Subject because it is the referent for the attribution of
knowledge; for Lévi-Strauss the unconscious is a valid Subject since it is the referent for the attribution of cultural phenomena; in Derrida, each *logos* is a Subject because of their respective existences as referents for the attribution of their representations; and for Lyotard, the player in the language game supporting the manifestation of knowledge is a valid Subject on the grounds of its existence as a referent either for that manifestation or for power. This property of the framework can play an important role in a general philosophy of the Subject for it allows for the correct identification of the instances of the Subject being considered.

Beyond the validation of existing identifications of Subjects, a closely related application of the interpretive framework is to the consideration of situations where a Subject has not been identified but which contain an instantiation of the Aristotelian template which would support doing so. Examples of such a practice occur throughout philosophical writings where entities are identified as Subjects even when the original author does not do so. In the case of Descartes’s *Meditationes*, for example, the fact that the identification of a Subject occurs only tangentially in the replies to the second set of objections does not prevent the identification of the thinking thing as a Subject. Even here in this Thesis I characterised Lévi-Strauss’s presentation of the relationship between human nature and cultural phenomena as an instantiation of the Aristotelian template when his own identification of a Subject did not appear until much later.

Although I did not specifically consider examples of the identification of Subjects not previously specified in my earlier chapters, it is reasonable to assume that the practice of doing so will mirror the results already established. Using the interpretive framework as a guide, it will be possible, for example, to identify entities as Subjects when they act as referents within instantiations of the Aristotelian template, and it should be possible to consider such identifications of different genera of the Subject within different configurations of the discursive space. It should even be possible to identify entities as Subjects when they are consistent with two different instantiations of the template.

6.2 General Concerns and the Twentieth Century Debate

Beyond its applications to individual Subjects discussed in the preceding section, it is also possible to draw out some general implications of the interpretive framework for
the nature of a Subject and the form of a general philosophy of the Subject. The most important of these, again, arises from the equivalence between the identification of an entity as a Subject and the participation of that entity in an instantiation of the Aristotelian template in which it is a referent for an attribution. This implies that the identification of the entity as a Subject is a reflection of the state of its being entailed by its participation in the instantiation. This state of being supports the characterisation of, amongst other things, both the nature of the entity identified as being a Subject – defined here in terms of its genus and species – and the relationship that the Subject has with what is attributed to it. The identification of consciousness as the being of the Subject in Sartre’s phenomenology, for example, reflects its nature – defined in terms of the faculties of experience, revealing intuition, and reflection – and the connection that it has with the knowledge it realises of objects in the world. Similar observations can be made regarding Lévi-Strauss’s ethnological Subject which is connected to the phenomena in which it is represented; the various Subjects in Derrida’s deconstructive writings which are embedded in the relationships with their respective attributions; and, depending upon the interpretation adopted, the Subject in Lyotard’s *La condition postmoderne* that is connected either to knowledge or to power.

A corollary of this observation is that while the entity which is identifiable as a Subject may exist prior to the attribution embodied in instantiation, it is only identifiable as a Subject through that attribution: for Sartre, the entity with the being of consciousness is only a Subject when it realises knowledge, while Lyotard’s Subject is only a Subject when it supports power in the form of a language game. Generalising these results implies that no Subject can be considered in isolation from its context, particularly from that part of its surroundings which is attributed to it in the framework of an instantiation of the Aristotelian template. In effect, the identification of an entity as a Subject is an artefact of its context. This contrasts with those views which treat the Subject as an isolated entity such as the tradition in which the Subject is identified with a human being without any reference being made as to why a human being is a Subject.

The most important implication of this is that it serves to reorient general inquiries into the concept of the Subject. The standard approach to such inquiries, such as that of the debate in Twentieth-century French philosophy, is to conceptualise the Subject as the isolated entity which serves as the focus for questions of form or nature, of
existence and non existence, and of the implications of that entity in larger philosophical discourses. A potential difficulty with this approach is that the valorisation of one form of Subject typically occurs at the expense of others.

Reconsidering Subjects in light of the interpretive framework and the results here, the questions which assume importance are not those relating to a particular form, but those which concern the nature of the instantiation of the Aristotelian template in which the different entities identified as Subjects are found. Such questions may include why, for example, the template instantiates in the way it does, how the instantiation changes over time or how it can be replaced altogether by another instantiation. This latter question can lead to the construction of a genealogy in a manner consistent with that identified by Foucault in the paper “Nietzsche, la généalogie, l’histoire” (“Nietzsche, Genealogy, History”).

To see how this reorientation affects a traditional philosophical treatments of the Subject I will briefly consider the French debate regarding the existence of the Subject. Recall from my discussions in the introduction, that an important phenomenon in French philosophy takes the form of the debate regarding the existence of a human Subject. On one side of the debate are those philosophers, particularly those in the earlier part of the century such as Sartre, who identify the Subject with an autonomous human who provides, in the first instance, the substance for his or her knowledge. Sartre’s Subject, for example, is the basis of its knowledge. On the other side of the debate are those philosophers who, if they consider a human being at all, identify it as something which is shaped within a larger framework. In the latter case, it is common to encounter these frameworks construed in terms in of social networks. While the standard approach to this contrast is to take the second approach as a rejection of the first and, through that, of the existence of the human Subject – as is evidenced by references to phrases such as “the death of the Subject” – it is possible to reorient this debate in light of the interpretive framework developed here. The reoriented debate rests not on the existence or non-existence of a particular mode of Subject but – in a manner closer to Descombes’s observation regarding the status of a general philosophy of the Subject – on changes in the contexts in which the Subject is encountered from one which a human being is identified as a substantial Subject to one in which it does not.

While the complete characterisation of the transformation captured in the debate would require a larger study than the one I have undertaken here, the results
established in the preceding chapters provide, at least, an outline to the processes occurring in the period from which my examples were drawn. In the early part of the period, exemplified by the works of Sartre, the instantiation of the Aristotelian template entails a human Subject to which knowledge is attributed as its creation. Due to perceived inadequacies in this approach, particularly with respect to answering philosophical questions such as the relationship of being to itself, the Sartrean instantiation is replaced by one in which human nature manifests in a larger social framework. Referring to theories of language such as those put forward by Saussure, the trend away from identifying a human being as a Subject on the basis of its existence as a substance continues in works such as the deconstructive writing of Jacques Derrida, where the human being need not play a role in the considered philosophy at all. In this framework, the Subject in Lyotard’s *La condition postmoderne* represents an example of a resolution of the debate where the Subject, while being human, is also firmly embedded in a social framework. This is an example of a trend to reintroduce a human Subject motivated, for example, by concerns of power.

6.3 Contributions of the Framework and Questions to Come

I will conclude my Thesis by summarising the contributions that the interpretive framework developed in Chapter One and tested in the subsequent four can make to considerations of the Subject. In the first instance, the framework treats the idea of being a Subject not in terms of particular being, but in terms of a state of being within which different entities can exist. This state of being, in turn, is defined by the instantiation of the Aristotelian template in which such entities participate by being the referents of different attributions.

In the context of more general considerations of the Subject, the connection between the identification of an entity as a Subject and an instantiation of the Aristotelian template suggests that any Subject should be considered in the framework defined by that template. That is, a Subject is only a Subject in its existence as a referent for an attribution. This provides a framework for reorienting traditional considerations of the Subject away from the valorisation of a single form of Subject, such as the human Subject considered by French philosophers, towards concerns with questions arising from the context of the Subject, particularly as it applies to the
identification of what is attributed. Concerns in the new framework include the correct identification of the instantiation of the Aristotelian template in which the entity identified as a Subject participates and the determination of how different instantiations can transform into each other.

These results demonstrate that the interpretive framework can be useful in considering the phenomena of identifying particular entities as being Subjects both in the form of particular examples and in general considerations. Noting that the conclusions here are based on the application of the interpretive framework to a limited, albeit representative, set of Subjects, this demonstration suggests that further testing of the framework is warranted both in an individual sense and in terms of considering its wider philosophical connotations. As well as considering other examples of Subjects to confirm that the framework is capable of generating consistent readings in each case, other testing strategies might involve a consideration of the metaphysical implications of the framework. Based on these investigations, it will be possible to consider whether the interpretive framework presented here forms the basis of a truly general philosophy of the Subject.
Notes

Preface: Towards a Philosophy of the Subject

1 In my presentation I will capitalise the term “Subject” when referring to the concept which is the focus of my study.


3 Descombes, p. 123.


Introduction: Identifying Entities as Subjects


3 Descombes, p.124.


5 Descartes, AT VII 160-162; CSM II 113-114.


7 Michel Foucault, “The Subject and Power,” Afterword to Dreyfus and Rabinow, Michel Foucault: Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics (New York: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1982), pp. 208-212.


11 I accessed this through Immanuel Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, ed. and trans. Paul Guyer and Allen W. Wood (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1998) based on the 1781 (A) and 1787 (B) editions of *Kritik der reinen Vernunft* and unpublished sources. When citing from this work I will provide the pagination in the A or B edition together with pagination in the Guyer and Wood translation prefaced by GW.


Chapter 1: Developing an Interpretive Framework for Subjects


2 Gill, p. 224.


8 Aristotle, *Cat*. 5 2a 34-2b 6; *Categoriae and De Interpretatione*, p. 6.

9 Aristotle, *Cat*. 5 2a 34; *Categoriae and De Interpretatione*, p. 6.

10 Aristotle, *Cat*. 5 2a 11 13; *Categoriae and De Interpretatione*, p. 5.

11 Aristotle, *Cat*. 5 2b 38-41; *Categoriae and De Interpretatione*, p. 8.

13 Aristotle, *Cat.* 2 1a 20-1b 10; *Categoriae and De Interpretatione*, p. 4.

14 Ross, pp. 22-23, following Aristotle, *Cat.* 4 1b 25-2a 4; *Categoriae and De Interpretatione*, p. 5.

15 Aristotle, *Cat*. 5 2b 7-11; *Categoriae and De Interpretatione*, p. 7.

16 Aristotle, *Cat*. 3 1b 16-24; *Categoriae and De Interpretatione*, pp. 4-5.

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18 Aristotle, *Cat*. 5 2a 14-17; *Categoriae and De Interpretatione*, pp. 5-6.

19 Aristotle, *Cat*. 5; *Categoriae and De Interpretatione*, pp. 5-12.


Chapter 2  Sartre’s Phenomenological Subject


7 Sartre, *La nausée*, p. 185; *Nausea*, p. 188.


9 Sartre, *La nausée*, p. 188; *Nausea*, p. 190.

10 Duncan, p. 103.


17 Heidegger, *Sein und Zeit*, p. 12; *Being and Time*, p. 32.


22 Hume, p. 125.

23 Hume, p. 124.

24 Hume, pp. 75-117, pp. 63-64.


26 Sartre, *La nausée*, pp. 182-183; *Nausea*, pp. 185-186.


33 Hayman, p. 96.


40 Solokowski, p. 19.

41 Solokowski, p. 20.

42 Kelly, p. 119.

43 Moran, p. 30.

45 Mohanty, pp. 53-55.


51 David Woodruff Smith, pp. 80-81.

52 Husserl, *Ideen* §33; *Ideas*, pp. 112-114.

53 Husserl, *Ideen* §33; *Ideas*, pp. 112-114.


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60 Sartre, *L'être et le néant*, p. 13; *Being and Nothingness*, p. xxiii.


63 Sartre, *L'être et le néant*, p. 18; *Being and Nothingness*, p. xxvii.

64 Sartre, *L'être et le néant*, pp. 17-18; *Being and Nothingness*, p. xxxvi.

65 Sartre, *L'être et le néant*, p. 18; *Being and Nothingness*, p. xxxvii.

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67 Sartre, *La Transcendance de l'ego*, p. 24; *The Transcendence of the Ego*, p. 40. This work was originally published as the journal article (“La transcendance de l'ego: esquisse d'une description phénoménologique,” *Recherches Philosophiques* VI (1936-1937): 85-123) and it is to that article that the standard English translation refers. For convenience, however, I will cite from the 1965 publication mentioned above.

68 Sartre, *La Transcendance de l'ego*, pp. 24-25; *The Transcendence of the Ego*, pp. 41-42.


72 Sartre, *L'être et le néant*, p. 15; *Being and Nothingness*, p. xxv.

73 Sartre, *L'être et le néant*, p. 15; *Being and Nothingness*, p. xxv.

74 Sartre, *L'être et le néant*, p. 15; *Being and Nothingness*, p. xxv.

75 Sartre, *L'être et le néant*, p. 15; *Being and Nothingness*, p. xxv.

76 Heidegger, *Sein und Zeit*, pp. 27-31; *Being and Time*, pp. 49-55
Chapter 3 Lévi-Strauss and the Subject of Cultural Phenomena


Lévi-Strauss, *Tristes tropiques*, p. 58; *Tristes Tropiques* (trans.), p. 54.


Clarke, p. 31.


Robert H Lowie, *Primitive Society* (New York: Boni & Liveright, 1920). While a French translation of this work appeared in 1935, Lévi-Strauss indicates (*Tristes tropiques*, p. 64) that he was aware of the work at least two years earlier indicating that it was the English edition to which he refers.


23 Leach, p. 3.

24 Gehlke, pp. 40-41.

25 Moore, p. 53.

27 Moore, p. 128.


34 Saussure, *Cours de linguistique générale*, p. 166; *Course in General Linguistics*, p. 118.


36 Lévi-Strauss and Eribon, *De prés et de loin*, pp. 63-64.


Chapter 4 The Subjects in Derrida’s Deconstructions


8 Sarup, p. 37.

9 Derrida, *L’écriture et la différence*, p. 100; *Writing and Difference*, p. 65.

10 Derrida, *De la grammatologie*, pp. 21-22; *Of Grammatology*, pp. 10-11.


12 Derrida, *De la grammatologie*, pp. 82-83; *Of Grammatology*, pp. 56-57.


14 Derrida, *De la grammatologie*, p. 11; *Of Grammatology*, p. 3.

15 Derrida, *De la grammatologie*, p. 12; *Of Grammatology*, p. 4.


21 Stocker, p. 188.


24 Derrida, *L’écriture et la différence*, p. 409; *Writing and Difference* p 278.


29 Derrida, *L’écriture et la différence*, p. 419; *Writing and Difference*, p. 286.

30 Derrida, *Positions*, pp. 56-57; *Positions* (trans), pp. 41-42. In the following citations I will refer to the translation as *Positions* (trans.).

31 Gutting, p. 294.


33 Howells, p. 3.

34 Howells, p. 2.


36 Derrida, *Positions*, p. 57; *Positions* (trans), pp. 41-42.

37 Derrida, *Positions*, p. 57; *Positions* (trans), pp. 41-42.

38 Gutting, p. 295.


40 Saussure, *Cours de linguistique générale*, pp. 100-103; *Course in General Linguistics*, pp. 67-70.
41 Saussure, *Cours de linguistique générale*, pp. 100-101; *Course in General Linguistics*, pp. 67-69. The example of “sister” is inspired by Saussure while the example of “the factory” is mine.


43 Derrida, *De la grammatologie*, p. 19; *Of Grammatology*, p. 9.


53 Derrida, *La voix et la phénomène*, p. 8; *Speech and Phenomena*, pp. 9-10.

54 Derrida, *La voix et la phénomène*, p. 53; *Speech and Phenomena*, p. 48.

56 Howells, p. 21.

57 Derrida, *La voix et la phénomène*, p. 58; *Speech and Phenomena*, pp. 52.

58 Derrida, *La voix et le phénomène*, pp. 50-52; *Speech and Phenomena*, pp. 46-47.

59 Derrida, *La voix et le phénomène*, p. 18; *Speech and Phenomena*, p. 18.

60 Derrida, *La voix et le phénomène*, pp. 28-29; *Speech and Phenomena*, pp. 27-28.

61 Derrida, *La voix et le phénomène*, pp. 31-33; *Speech and Phenomena*, pp. 29-31.

62 Howells, p. 22.

63 Derrida, *La voix et le phénomène*, p. 68; *Speech and Phenomena*, p. 61.


68 Derrida, *La voix et le phénomène*, pp. 73-74; *Speech and Phenomena*, pp. 65-66.


71 Derrida, *La voix et le phénomène*, pp. 92-94; *Speech and Phenomena*, pp. 82-83. Howells, p. 23.

72 Derrida, *De la grammatologie*, pp. 397-398; *Of Grammatology*, pp. 280-281.


74 Derrida, *La voix et le phénomène*, pp. 61-62; *Speech and Phenomena*, p. 55.

75 Derrida, *De la Grammatologie*, p. 21; *Of Grammatology*, p. 11. I retained Derrida’s transliteration but modified the format of his reference to the original Greek text from the French (*De l’interprétation*, 1, 16a 3) to one consistent with that used to refer to Aristotelian works in the first chapter.


77 Howells, p. 51.

78 Stocker, p. 189.

79 Derrida, *De la grammatologie*, p. 19; *Of Grammatology*, p. 9.


Chapter 5. Lyotard and the Subject in *La condition postmoderne*


5 Merleau-Ponty, *Phénoménologie de la perception*, p. i; *Phenomenology of Perception*, p. vi.


7 Merleau-Ponty, *Phénoménologie de la perception*, p. 239; *Phenomenology of Perception*, p. 239.

8 Merleau-Ponty, *Phénoménologie de la perception*, p. v; *Phenomenology of Perception*, p. xi.

9 Merleau-Ponty, *Phénoménologie de la perception*, pp. 119-120; *Phenomenology of Perception*, p. 118.


12 Vasterling, p. 211.


14 Vasterling, p. 211.

16 Merleau-Ponty *Phénoménologie de la perception*, pp. 206-207; *Phenomenology of Perception*, p. 206.


18 Lyotard, *La condition postmoderne*, p. 11; *The Postmodern Condition*, p. 3.

19 Lyotard, *La condition postmoderne*, pp. 11-17; *The Postmodern Condition*, pp. 3-6.


23 Wicks, pp. 248-249.


26 Habermas, *Legitimation Crisis*, p. 36.


29 Lyotard, *La condition postmoderne*, pp. 54-55; *The Postmodern Condition*, pp. 31-32.
30 Lyotard, *La condition postmoderne*, p. 54; *The Postmodern Condition*, p. 31.

31 Lyotard, *La condition postmoderne*, p. 55; *The Postmodern Condition*, p. 32.


33 Lyotard, *La condition postmoderne*, p. 7; *The Postmodern Condition*, pp. xxiii-xxiv.

34 Lyotard, *La condition postmoderne*, pp. 20-21; *The Postmodern Condition*, p. 9

35 Lyotard, *La condition postmoderne*, p. 21 n28; *The Postmodern Condition*, p. 28 n8.


48 Overgaard, p. 281.


50 Overgaard, p. 283.


54 Lyotard, *La condition postmoderne*, p. 23 n35; *The Postmodern Condition*, p. 10 n35.


59 Lyotard, *Le différend*, p. 10; *The Differend: Phrases in Dispute*, p. xii.


Chapter 6. Implications of the Interpretive Framework

Bibliography

Translations

I have, in general, chosen to list the translations of the works consulted in the preparation of this Thesis in parentheses at the end of the main entry for the work. The two exceptions to this occur where a publication combines translations of two or more works by the same author – such as with Ackrill’s translation of Aristotle’s *Categoriae* and *De Interpretatione* – or when a translation refers to two editions of the same work – such as is the case with Guyer and Wood’s translation of Kant’s *Kritik der reinen Vernunft*. In these cases I have listed the translation separately under the work’s original author.

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