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MAKING BOTH ENDS MEET:  
A CRITICAL PERSPECTIVE ON  
BECOMING AN ARTIST IN THE  
NEW CULTURAL ECONOMY

MEGAN WILLIAMS

A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for  
the degree of Masters in Education (Music) University of  
Auckland, 2005.
Artists dwell in a negotiated space between art and commerce. To survive as an artist in the new cultural economy, various aptitudes, skills and capital are required. Diversification, collaboration, self-subsidization, and aptitude towards risk are necessary, alongside the accepted norms of technical artistic ability and original material. Pierre Bourdieu’s model of the two-sub fields (autonomous and heteronomous) of cultural production sustained by habitus and forms of capital provide a way to understand the complexities of cultural production. In this thesis, New Zealand contemporary artist’s work and the limits of this polarized model to take into account transformations in the field of cultural production such as post-market institutions and interaction between the two sub-fields are considered. The artistic habitus that emerged in Bohemian times, still informs attitudes to commerce in autonomous universes of production, which means the sacrifices the artist has ‘made to their art’ serve only to make the work even more unique and culturally valuable. However, modifications have occurred in the habitus of the artist. The artist’s position in society as ‘cultural entrepreneur’ requires large amounts of self-reliance, commitment and dedication to work that is ‘self-work.’ The artist inadvertently becomes the ‘pin-up’ for the discourse of enterprise culture. Such are the complexities of the economies of the arts. Research is presented from a collection of critical voices from a cultural studies and sociological perspective, as well as cultural economics, to debate what has come to be termed the cultural economy or creative industries. Following a critical tradition in music education, I explore the effect of this thinking on the education of the artist/musician in contemporary society.
DEDICATION

This thesis is dedicated to Vaughan James Williams, our dearly loved brother, builder and musician.
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2 BOURDIEU, CULTURAL PRODUCTION AND ARTISTS

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1 INTRODUCTION

Yeah. It’s kind of depressing. Your pride gets chewed up by poverty. You try and make ends meet and if they don’t meet then you just stretch it as far as you can. Make it touch (Milan Borich lead singer in band Pluto, cited in Zanda, 2005).

Aims of the thesis

‘Making both ends meet’ the title of this thesis is an extension of the New Zealand colloquial expression, ‘to make ends meet’. This matter came to my attention as I observed friends and colleagues who, as artists and musicians, were struggling to do just that. The quote above illustrates how the working lives of New Zealand artists can be characterized by this struggle. By inserting the word ‘both’ I am attempting to describe the essence of this thesis problem, how artists juggle sometimes conflicting needs, that of producing art, and that of making money. I propose that art must meet commerce, and to do this, the term artist has moved closer to ‘creative entrepreneur.’ However, despite awareness of the business side of music, a New Zealand musicians work is closer to what can be termed a ‘practice’ and their level of awareness of protecting the ‘practice’ elements of their work and negotiation of this is relatively high.
i) Moving beyond binary opposites

I was aware from the outset of this research problem of a tendency amongst some in the artistic community and educational community to approach art and economics as binary opposites. Cultural economist Hans Klamer states:

Many in the artistic community appear to distrust the operation of money, markets, and the commercial in their world...The value of art is to be found in its aesthetics, in the meaning that it generates. At least those appear to be the dominant beliefs in the world of the arts (1996, p. 7).

I wanted to explore where and when this philosophical separation of art and commerce may have come about and why. Further to this, Marxist perspectives in education tend to criticize and even negate the commodity form, or the marketplace as a distributor of cultural goods. For example, arts educator Janet Mansfield discusses the forces of commodification and describes the “roaming marketeers” and “cultural packaging” which “co-opt” sites of creativity (2005, p. 134-135). She also states in an earlier article that art in its limited autonomy and unpredictability will be brought under the “domination of rationalized capitalism” (2003, p. 66). These statements reflect a high degree of suspicion about the interaction of the market sphere and the arts sphere.

At the other extreme, there is some belief within neoliberal politics that all artistic activities can be adequately provided by the market. As Henry Giroux explains, neoliberalism is wed to the belief that the market should be the “organizing principle” for all of life’s decisions (political, social and economic). Under neo-liberalism, everything is “either for sale or plundered for profit” (2004, p. 495).
In New Zealand under Labour and National administrations the State is a third player in the relationship between art and commerce. Trends show that where appropriate and beneficial, State, commerce and artists are working together in arrangements of State intervention and entrepreneurship in the arts, to make the art more commercially attractive and viable to the market. The intermarriage and fluidity between art, commerce, and State represents what has been described as a ‘third way’ in cultural policy. Massey University economist Anne De Bruin, who has studied the screen industry in New Zealand describes the kind of relationship between art, commerce and State as ‘state entrepreneurship’, or the ‘strategic state’ (2005, p. 6).

Economist Tim Hazeldine thinks that thinking about art as a primarily social and cultural but not economic activity is “old thinking” (2002, p. 32-33). Treating the arts sector as a ‘cost centre’ or a ‘subsidized realm’ at the expense of taxpayers and ratepayers is old thinking as well (p. 32-33). He would like us to think of creative sector workers as people who move increasingly between commercial and non-commercial applications. He also believes that the governments should play a role in facilitating arts development. Hazeldine considers there is not a clear public/private split in the arts sector but rather movement, contact, fluidity and linkages between them (p. 32-33).

Given these various standpoints, I felt that theoretical content in arts education would need to provide a way to articulate the contemporary problem of the relationship between art and economics, so that students and educators could negotiate both the commercial sphere, and the aesthetic
sphere with an equivalent amount of practical skill, knowledge, and critical awareness. My aim was to try to find a critical view, while being aware of the extremes of Marxism and neo-liberalism, and the middle ground policies of the entrepreneurial state model. Moreover, the term ‘creative industries’ was a stimulant for me to consider how art and economics might be constituted differently in our current milieu.

**ii) Theorising the cultural industries**

The cultural industries, or creative industries (these terms are often use interchangeably), left un-theorized is to the detriment of students of the arts who may come to be involved in making art/musical works in many different ways such as in the arts industry, or in government arts, film, or advertising industries, or as a hobbyist. Without a way to negotiate, articulate, or theorise their position within the cultural economy, it seemed artists would have limited opportunities for any kind of transformative action, regeneration or contribution to social imagination. Critical awareness, analysis and understanding by arts educators about the current milieu of cultural economy, and the government agenda for the creative industries in terms of economic development and growth is necessary so that arts educators can continue to evaluate how they can work ethically and artistically with students in different artistic communities.

In order for the thesis to offer a valuable critical viewpoint, it required a questioning and analytical approach so that I could arrive at a more inclusive, thorough theoretical position. As this Master’s thesis has been researched it has evolved over a two-year period. I chose to explore this
topic by means of an inductive philosophical inquiry. That is, by looking at the data, concepts, autobiographical and biographical material, and criticism available in its various forms, I have theorized about art and economy. This data was text based and obtained through library and Internet research of secondary material from a range of sources in academic fields, related to art and economics to establish a body of theoretical work on this topic.

Through the academic reading I identified two key theorists who were the most relevant and useful to this approach and topic. These were Pierre Bourdieu and Michel Foucault. Their writings offered the most in terms of theoretical concepts that could underpin and enlighten my topic. Bourdieu’s relevant concepts, such as habitus, cultural capital, field, and Foucault’s concepts of power, discourse, genealogy and governmentality were then used to structure a critical approach to the discussion of art and economics, and to develop a theorization of this topic. Chapters emerged from the research as I began to find key ideas and uncover relevant research in these areas. By theorizing about the data I have uncovered, I have aimed to draw conclusions about the implications these findings might have for music education and arts education more generally. It can then be used as a layer of theoretical thinking for further studies that may develop in this area or arise out of the questions posed by this thesis. Throughout the first four chapters I refer to artists and arts education in a general sense and in the fifth chapter I relate pedagogy to the formation of contemporary musicians as a ‘subset’ of artists.
iii) Educational aims

Artists The first group in which the educational aims of this thesis are directed towards are artists, including musicians, and arts students. My most important educational aim for this group was to find a relevant pathway of thinking and cultural analysis to help artists to articulate and theorize their position in the contemporary cultural field. Once they were able to articulate and theorize their position, they could then learn how to negotiate and resist where appropriate power relations exist, and I felt have more agency in the way in which they choose to work in the field of cultural production.

My second educational aim for artists was for them to become aware of the possibility of exploitation, including self-exploitation that may threaten their artistic flourishing and interaction with their communities. I wanted artists to learn how to distinguish biological effects from structural effects, that is what traits they are born with and have developed themselves, and what traits about being an artist are part of the objective structure and discourse around them that are shaping their subjectivity. I wanted this thesis to encourage artists to think about these structural effects, to provide a basis for problematisation and redress, which could then have emancipatory effects on the way an artistic life, practice, or career path might be structured. For example, the consideration of new models of economic development that fit with practice and the characteristics of the field of cultural production. Given the high profile of the creative industries at the moment, this is an opportunity through analytical and critical thought to lead onto new possibilities in not only the work artists create, but also how artists
organize the production of this work, both in relation to each other and their community.

*Arts/Music Educators* The second group that I have aimed my research at is arts/music educators. This is in order to inform arts/music education theory and practice. The particular areas that are revealed through this research and are important to this group is the value that ethical negotiation and resistance plays in the lives of artists; secondly, that the commercial and artistic sphere of music requires equivalent practical knowledges; and thirdly, to precipitate an awareness of the government agenda for economic growth through the creative industries, and how this discourse may impact on arts education. Peters, Lankshear & Olssen state that the working lives of critical theorists have been “seal [ed] off” from the “lived forms of oppression as they are experienced…” (2003, p. 11). My hope is that my question that has come from a real, lived experience will feed back into wider teaching fraternity, not just academic circles.

Further to these aims has been to uphold the educator’s ethical and professional call to validate the many ways in which the arts are used and appreciated in life, and to become critical of how the “instrumentalisation of the expressive” (Hartley, 2003) may limit the practice of arts education. That this research can be used to inform teaching practice and course design, so that it has a greater critical and practical orientation towards the economic and cultural conditions of arts production, the political economies of the arts, and the ethical decision-making of artists, is included. By doing so, the production of arts, in particular music is addressed in a broader sense, and practical knowledges and realities about becoming and being an artist are
taught not just within a narrowly technical, mechanistic framework, but also within the consideration of sociological, economic and cultural conditions of the arts.

iv) Inspiring further research

The last aim of my research is that it would inspire further research, both quantitative and qualitative, to be carried out in the contentious area of issues of art and economics, particularly to develop an understanding of daily working practices in the lives of artists, and analysis of the threats to cultural commons that new self-disciplining and ‘network sociality’ (Dijk, 2000; Castells, 2004) might engender. Another aim is to provide a catalyst in cultural research for analysis of the local enabling conditions for art making, and consider how to ensure these are protected. My hope is that by introducing these ideas to the philosophical sphere of inquiry in music education, the realities, rather than the rhetoric of the creative economy may continue to grow, and researchers will not be afraid to be critical in their approach, so that practice is improved.

v) Research Questions

I began my inductive research inquiry with the following questions:

How can I present a critical discussion of how art and economics interact in the contemporary cultural field that would be emancipatory for artists and educators?
How has the myth of the Bohemian artist contributed to the habitus of the artist today, particularly in the artist’s relationship to producing artworks for the market?

What does the term ‘Creative Industries’ signal for artists and educators in the contemporary cultural field?

How are we as educators to understand and promote the process of becoming an artist in an educational context given the highly individualized, valourised and entrepreneurial nature of this career path?

What should our professional praxis be in relation to the new cultural economy, and the creative industries, and what configuration of values, awareness and promotion of resistance should we be committed to as arts educators?

**Why I chose the topic**

*i) Poverty of artists*

The first motivation for choosing this topic was the lived reality of the poverty of artists. This is a generally known and discussed phenomenon in artistic circles, and in media interviews with aspiring and practicing artists, and documented in artist biographies and autobiographies. In December 2003, a study by Creative New Zealand was published called *Portrait of an Artist- Te whakaahua o te tangata pukenga*. This study compiled a database
of more than nine thousand artists and from these a sample of professional practicing artists was identified. In 1999/2000, face to face interviews were conducted with approximately nine hundred practicing artists from different artistic fields to find out their economic status, motivations, materials, resourcing and business skills (Creative New Zealand, 2003, p. 5-6). Here artists were defined as: writers, visual artists, performing artists, musicians and other (which included arts educators, arts administrators and arts managers). The findings of this study were not surprising for those familiar with the creative fields.

The study showed that the average income of artists was approximately the same as someone on a social welfare benefit, around ten thousand to fifteen thousand New Zealand dollars per annum. Musicians were the best off financially reaching up to thirty thousand New Zealand dollars per annum income on average. The gestation period for an artist was approximately five years. This broad study confirmed statistically the kinds of questions I already had about the commitment and risk-taking required by an individual to pursue artwork and the self-subsidization that goes on.

At the same time schools of applied, practical or fine arts were being replaced with the terms creative industries and creative technologies. From what I knew of artists and musicians, the term ‘poor, struggling artist’ still held weight. A good example of this is the formation of a charitable fund by emerging artist in Auckland with a rather tongue in cheek name the ‘Starving Artists Fund’. However, the rhetoric of the creative industries made it sound like there were no longer any hard boundaries separating art and commerce. It appeared that creativity and industry were interacting more
than ever before. It even signaled that it might be financially profitable to be creative. If there was a greater merging between art and commerce, and if this was more and more acceptable and encouraged, even valourised in our society, and if there was the possibility of earning a better income in the arts, then perhaps this meant that the philosophical separation of these two ideas (art and commerce) was over.

Since the Creative New Zealand study *Portrait of an Artist*, artists have become drawn into a wider classification of professions called the ‘creative industries’, or ‘creative entrepreneurs’. Richard Florida’s bestselling book, *The Rise of the Creative Class* identified artists as being within a “creative core” made up of other occupations including academic, scientific and artistic thinkers and leaders (2002, p. 69). This book has gained wide traction within town planning circles, because of the correlation it makes between creative activity and economic growth in urban centres. Those who have written specifically about the creative or cultural industries include Caves (2000), Florida (2002), Hartley (2005), Hesmondhalgh (2002), Howkins (2002), and Power & Scott (2004), and this literature is growing. A brand new New Zealand magazine published by AUT media called ‘Idealog’ has grown up around this idea of the creative economy.

**ii) Cultural analysis of the creative industries**

To be real about the idea of growing a creative economy, and allowing artists/musicians to grapple with what this means is an important aim of this research and an important motivation for choosing this topic. There are a number of research programmes and activities emerging around the creative
industries in New Zealand. These tend to be commissioned by central and local government agencies and are focused on quantitative and qualitative aspects of these industries. For example: studies into professional practicing artists (Creative New Zealand, 2003); how the creative industries are contributing to GDP (New Zealand Institute of Economic Research, 2002; Duncan, 2005); counting those employed in cultural work (Statistics New Zealand, 2005); evaluating the worth of the Screen Industry in New Zealand, (Duncan, 2005); and analysing the contribution of the creative economy within urban centres such as Auckland City (Starkwhite, 2002; Auckland City Council, 2005). The trend is that the numbers of studies in the creative industries are increasing.

While these are useful for developing plans and government initiatives around growing and supporting these areas, such as the recent taskforce for New Zealand Music Export Development (Music Industry Export Development Group, 2004), they do not allow for a the kind of critical work that is possible within a more autonomous academic environment. This kind of critical analysis of cultural discourse pertaining to art and economics can then lead us to better educational practice. As arts educationalist Desna Jury notes, there is a danger with thinking of education as “fuel for the economy” as it means there is a lack of advocacy for a more liberally based education (Auckland City Council, 2005, p. 78). She goes on to say that strong thinkers, leaders and entrepreneurs are more likely to come out of a “…demanding analytical education rather than a highly technical and mechanistic approach” (p. 78).
Musicians should be aware of how they might be being exploited as ‘pin-ups’ for the new creative economy, because of the high profile nature of their work, yet the economic benefits of this same creative economy may not reach them. For example, the recent Snapshot report commissioned by Auckland City Council, showed that the creative sector in Auckland is predominantly made up of design\(^1\), screen production, and radio\(^2\) and publishing.\(^3\) Together these three creative spheres make up eighty five percent of employment in the creative industries in Auckland City. By comparison, music made up just 252 full time equivalent (FTE) jobs in Auckland City.\(^4\) I mention this figure, not to decry the music industries contribution to the creative economy, and expected economic growth, but to put it into perspective and to see how industries like this can be used by the Government for wider economic agendas.

Musicians need to realize that if they aren’t personally enjoying the benefits of the rhetoric and pronouncements of the creative economy, perhaps it is because they are being used as part of a national marketing campaign for New Zealand, rather than because it is a business that is truly viable for real economic growth. As kiwi musician Greg Johnson said in a

\(^1\) Contributing 5400 jobs in advertising, architecture and graphic design.
\(^2\) Contributing 3480 jobs in film, television, video and radio.
\(^3\) Contributing 2785 jobs in newspaper, book and periodical publishing.
\(^4\) This does not represent the actual number of people involved part-time, or who have day-jobs in other sectors and work as musicians as well, as it is counting the number of full-time equivalent jobs.
The New Zealand Herald interview with Kara, in comparing the LA music industry to New Zealand: “It’s a business, it’s not a cottage industry like it is here. That’s not meant to be derogatory, it’s just, let’s face it, that’s what it is” (Kara, 2005a).

The statement by Johnson, as well as what is implied in the Snapshot report (Auckland City Council, 2005, p. 90) is that the music industry has been chosen, not primarily for its real potential for economic growth (not to belittle the dedication, commitment, quality and originality of those involved in New Zealand music, nor its potential for export), but because it can ‘sell’ New Zealand overseas and therefore increase tourism. In the words of the Music Industry Export Development group: “…leverage music as a key resource in promoting our country to the world⁵…” (2004, p. 24).

The nature of the global music industry, and the four large multinational record labels (BMG/Sony, Warner Music, Universal and EMI) that control eighty five percent of the world’s music industry production means that there would need to be an aggressive strategy by many different parties, independent and large-scale for a globally competitive music industry based in a city such as Auckland. Studies of the music industry in Stockholm,

⁵ The four sectors identified by the government as key growth sectors are screen, design, biotech and ICT. The report states that it is being used as a “…high profile cultural activity…” which “…can attract favourable and potentially useful attention to a country…” (Auckland City Council, 2005, p. 90).
Sweden, a city roughly the same size as Auckland with one and a half million people, shows it can be possible to build a popular/contemporary music making centre outside of the UK or the US, but there are key enabling conditions to do this (Power & Hallencreutz, 2004). The interaction between ‘indie’ music labels and ‘major’ record labels in New Zealand, and the recent sale of Festival Mushroom label to Warners Music throws up some interesting questions worthy of cultural analysis about ways in which this is possible.

**Theoretical basis**

The theoretical basis for this thesis is derived from several academic disciplines. These are: i) critical theory; ii) sociology of art and culture; iii) cultural economics; and vi) post-structuralism.

1) *Critical theory and the arts*

Critically reflexive teachers “…seek to engage in research as a springboard for change and improvement… [They] use research to help them…look for discourses that will be influencing these practices…” (Allen, 2004, p. 22).

Critical theory emerged in Germany in the 1920s, and was initially conceived as a revised Marxist critique of capitalist society by the Frankfurt Institute of Social Research (Peters, et al., 2003, p. 2). As Peters et al. explain the driving force of critical theory is practical, and linked to the improvement of the human condition.

Over the last decade, both the origins and application of critical theory and post-structuralism, to pedagogy and education has been introduced into the New Zealand context by several educational philosophers (Peters, 1996;
More recently this critical perspective has been applied to arts education in New Zealand (Mansfield, 1995; Grierson & Mansfield, 2003). According to Grierson & Mansfield, there is a “history of neglect” of a critical perspective within arts education in New Zealand (p. 33). The application of critical theory to music education has also informed the Mayday group, an international collective of music educators formed in 1993. This group has made an express goal to “apply critical theory and critical thinking to the purposes and practices of music education” (Mayday group webpage, 2005).

Critical academic research in music and arts education in New Zealand is a growing research area. Recent studies have included a critique of the Arts Curriculum from policy to practice (Mansfield, 2000), the politics of knowledge in tertiary visual arts education (Grierson, 2000), music education as cultural work (Lines, 2004), the musical subject (Locke, 2004), and technicist teaching (Locke, 2005). A collection of critical research in New Zealand arts education was brought together into the 2003 publication Critical Perspectives in Arts Education in New Zealand.

At its extreme left, critical theory underpins counter-cultural political activism, attacking globalization, neo-liberal economics, and examines how market driven policies have impacted on the public sphere, and undermined public values of democracy, collective power, public space and ownership. Naomi Klein’s book No Logo (2000) is a modern-day textbook on this kind of political awareness and activism, and summarizes how a modern-day resistance to global capitalism can be played out around the globe. In fact, critical theory can promote a range of creative and imaginative responses to
the world, when we allow ourselves to view the world in this way. The positive aspect of critical theory is that it believes people can change reality, through reason and analysis of the prevailing social ways of acting, and imagining a different way.

Critical theory or at least contemporary manifestations of critical theory allows us to look not just at economy, but political economy and it also takes in multidisciplinary perspectives.

This project represents a collective, supradisciplinary synthesis of philosophy, the sciences, politics…” (Kellner, 1989, p. 7 cited in Peters, et al., 2003, p. 4-5).

As critical theory is collective in its approach, it promotes various disciplines working together with the goal of generating radical socio-political transformation. Grierson and Mansfield note how the new Arts Curriculum in New Zealand has “asserted disciplinary divisions” and present these as discrete fields of practice that is music, dance, drama and visual arts. They say that this goes against current trends in education for multi-disciplinarity (p. 33). Many of the other creative areas of practice such as media and screen arts, spatial and graphic design, fashion and textiles seem to be, in their words “overlooked or subsumed” (p. 34) by these four arts. I chose a research paradigm that embraced interdisciplinarity because I found that the arts were grouped together in many of the texts I read since they shared similar economic attributes. I certainly do not restrict my version of art practice to music, dance, drama and visual arts. Indeed over the centuries of Western thought, there have been different groupings of the arts. I felt the
interconnectedness and similarities of arts was more important to my topic, than the differences between them.

In relation to the field of music education, the guiding ideals of the Mayday group confirm the usefulness of a critical theory, multi-disciplinary paradigm. The Mayday group expressly support a “radical broadening” that goes beyond “narrow paradigms and limitations traditionally accepted” in music education research. (Mayday group webpage, Guiding Ideal #6). In addition, the group stresses the effectiveness of maintaining “contact with ideas and people from other disciplines” (Mayday group webpage, Guiding Ideal #5). The sociological, economic and cultural contexts that have informed my research, is also supported by the May Day group’s ideals which sees music as “intimately tied to social and cultural contexts and conditions” (Mayday group webpage, Guiding Ideal #2). While my study does not adhere explicitly to all of the assumptions laid down by founding critical theorists such as Adorno and Horkheimer, the aspects of critical theory that have influenced my study relate to the improvement of practice through critical research; an interdisciplinary approach; examination of political economy, mindfulness of the collective commons and the concept of agency.

ii) Sociology of art and culture

The second theoretical influence for this thesis is the sociology of art (including music) and of culture. A sociological definition of art is something that is defined through social consensus by small or large groups (Zolberg, 1990, p. 80). Art is also something that is created not by one
person, but a variety of actors, within an ‘artworld’ (Becker, 1982). It is the concern of sociologists to analyse the social institutions and processes that determine the social structure of societies, such as art and music institutions and social processes. As Raymond Williams states:

…the primary concern of sociology as an academic discipline is the analysis of social structure - of the institutions and social processes characteristic of advanced industrial societies” (1981, p. 7).

Music educators such as Christopher Small (1998) and John Blacking (1973) have laid much of the groundwork that affirms the ‘sociality’ of music as it has been applied to music education (Regelski, 1998, p. 13). Understanding the cultural context of music has widened the view of music from individual reception, and intrinsic values of music, to the wider social context. These ideas represent a move away from a universalist aesthetic theory of music education, which had been the dominant mode of thinking in Western music education through most of the twentieth century. Aesthetic theory tends to treat musical meaning and value as something that “transcends time, place, context and human purpose and usefulness” (Mayday group webpage, Guiding Ideal #2). Philosophies of music education that offer a different way of valuing music, other than that of aesthetic theory, is the theme of many current music education philosophy texts and articles (Small, 1998; Elliot, 1995). These texts emphasize people in the process of music making, and how music serves people, in improving the quality of their lives, and enhancing social bonds and meanings found in the context of social structure.
In order to examine economics at work in the actual lived realities of artists I examined literature in sociology of the arts and cultural studies which could situate the artist both historically and socially as worker, and participant in the economy. This literature helped me to develop an understanding of the macro view of the artist, that he or she is an economic and cultural construction, rather than focusing on the psychological perspective of an artist as a unique individual. By focusing on the musician as a worker, I could look at similarities and differences between a musician's work and other realms of work. In this sense we normalize what can often be seen as a ‘special’ type of work, and outside of normal economic categories. This kind of work is affirmed by British cultural studies author Williams:

A sociology of culture must concern itself with the institutions and formations of cultural production…with specific artistic forms, and …with the processes of social and cultural reproduction (1981, p. 30-32).

Williams, according to Peters helped “initiate and delineate cultural studies as a field of legitimate academic interest” (1996, p. 49), and enabled us to speak of cultures in the plural. He identified the way in which archeology and cultural anthropology refer to the material production of culture, whereas history and cultural studies refer to the signifying or symbolic systems (Peters, 1996, p. 49). Culture, by Williams’ definition, is the signifying system through which a social order is communicated, reproduced, experienced and explored (1981, p. 13).

French sociologist Pierre Bourdieu’s contribution to the sociology and economics of art is both insightful and valuable also. He has taken terms from economics, such as capital, and extended them to include more aspects
of the social structure including social, symbolic and cultural capital. His terms ‘habitus’ and ‘field’ help explain artistic behaviour beyond the category of social class. As a philosopher and sociologist Bourdieu has been influential in terms of his “explanatory power” (Grenfell, 2004, p. 99) in describing artistic production. At the same time his use of the “sociological scalpel” () can for some people diminish the pleasure and enjoyment of cultural works at face value.

Distinction sets out to establish that cultural consumption…is less a means of personal development or enlightenment…and better understood as a medium of social differentiation and, much as education, reproduction (Grenfell, 2004, p. 99).

According to commentator Michael Grenfell, Bourdieu’s understanding is that art has a very non-arbitrary social and ultimately economic function to perform (2004, p. 104). Bourdieu seeks to ‘unmask’ both the characteristics of artistic production, as well as what might be motivating us in our cultural consumption. He can be described as “iconoclastic” (p. 99) in destroying our traditional and religious beliefs about the sacredness of art and culture, seeing them as mediums of social differentiation, and homologous to the social space we are involved in. Bourdieu’s sociological scalpel strikes at some deeply held beliefs about art and culture. However, these are important concepts for educators to consider. Webb et al. highlight Bourdieu’s sociological interest in art and cultural products:

…Bourdieu’s main concern is not with aesthetics- which is, at its simplest, the question of beauty- but with principles behind people’s tastes; why do some people spend their time and energy in making cultural products? Why do some
people buy (for instance) paintings or theatre tickets? How does it help them to organize the world? What meanings are attached to these sorts of practices? (Webb, et al., 2001, p. 146).

These questions remind us that Bourdieu’s perspective is materialist or Marxist in its underlying approach, seeing culture as an indication of social status. To Bourdieu, cultural products are “…among the means by which a society- including its way of life and its set of values- is objectified” (Webb, et al., 2001, p. 150-151). If education and art exist to reproduce the social system, then arts educators can use Bourdieu’s analytical tools and reflexivity to tackle these inequities. Bourdieu’s theoretical tools are useful in this respect. He recognized that artists (and I would argue arts educators) needed to have a critical analysis of the art world and the very conditions of artistic production. He praised those who could draw attention to the processes of the artistic field, what he calls reflexivity, and furthermore, to incorporate knowledge of the conditions of cultural production into the work itself (Grenfell, 2004, p. 106-107).

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6 Bourdieu examines the role of education in reproducing the social system in *The State Nobility*

7 Bourdieu examines the role of taste and culture in reproducing the social system in *Distinction*
iii) Cultural economics

Some economists wish to view economics as neutral and objective. However, words such as ‘value’, ‘prosperity’, ‘exchange’, and ‘trade’ are highly subjective within a culture, and are evidence of the values of each cultural or class group. For example, in pre-capitalist societies, economic systems based on communal ownership and reciprocity, good-will relationships, and use value are preferred. Capitalist economies are mostly based on concepts such as commodities, labour and land that are alienable. In advanced capitalist societies ideas and knowledge are commodities, which is why the creative field is counted as an industry now, with intellectual properties rights in the form of patents, trademarks and copyright being wealth-creating commodities that can be bought and sold. However, these are cultural and socially determined concepts.

Cultural economics or the economics of the arts attempts to deal with how economics work specifically within the cultural and artistic field. It is a relatively new subject area. In 1966 William Baumol, with William Bowen, published *Performing Arts-The Economic Dilemma*. This book virtually created the field of the economics of the arts (or cultural economics as it has come to be called) (Baumol, 1997: xiii). Baumol was himself a sculptor and painter as well as economist. Since Baumol and Bowen’s 1966 publication, several cultural economics commentators have contributed their own ideas, terms and models to explain the behaviour of artists and the arts sector, as well as the creative industries. Well-published and cited cultural economists are Australian economist Throsby (2001), American economist Caves (2000), English economists Blaug (1976), Towse (1993, 2003) and Howkin...

Those working in the field of cultural economics tend to critique and reexamine traditional or orthodox economic models. This is because many characteristics of the arts do not fit with a traditional model of economics, for example intrinsic motivation is much higher among artists than other workers. Economists in the cultural field are influenced by sociologists to explain some of the ways in which artists as economic actors behave differently in the cultural field. Cultural economist Abbing (2002) explains how Bourdieu’s terms cultural and social capital has influenced cultural economists:

> Sociologists introduced the concepts of cultural capital and social capital. Recently, an increasing number of economists have started to use these terms as well (p. 65).

The inclusion of an economic analysis into my methodology is supported by Thomas McCarthy in Peters, et al. (2003) about the future of critical theory. McCarthy explains that it is in the understanding of economics in a new tradition of internal political economy that the future of critical theory lies. He says the emphasis of critical theory has had too much of a cultural focus. Markets and state administrations are here to stay. By understanding the political economy, McCarthy believes we can make better sense of the emerging social and economic patterns of inequality (p. 10).
iv) Poststructuralism

Peters explains how during the late twentieth century, a philosophy that held that universal history could progress towards liberation and progress became replaced by an emphasis on historical discontinuity, the accidental, and historical arbitrariness. At the same time, French theorists such as Foucault and Lyotard focused on the contingent, local and particular nature of phenomena rather than the universal. In their writings throughout the 1960s and 1970s, these theoretical perspectives and others aligned with them became later known as poststructuralism. In poststructuralist thought, the idealized concept of progress toward a better state of the world is finally abandoned (Peters, et al., 2003, p. 9). Poststructuralism is a movement of thought that emerged in response to more formalist structuralist views of society evident in the first half of the twentieth century.

Michel Foucault’s ideas have been useful critical thought tools within the complex field of cultural economy. Foucault helps us by encouraging intellectuals to do historical work, what he calls ‘archeological analysis’ and ‘genealogy’, to uncover the ‘truth games’ of how rules are formed within discourses, or ‘discursive systems.’ Allen (2004) explains how this is useful in improving educational practice:

The purpose of discourse analysis is to encourage us to be more reflexive as teachers, to identify the rules and regulations in which we participate. It is also to note that some of these practices may be dominating or has negative effects and that they are often imposed in support of the status quo. Discourse analysis then can help us to examine practices that limit and marginalize students and teachers with the intent of alternative practices (p. 21).
The structures Foucault detects are not universal, trans-historical regularities, but are embedded in history and change within the context of history. Foucault helps us to be attentive towards rules of discursive systems, how they account for what is considered true and what is considered false, what can be assented or dissented, and what data and arguments are deemed to be relevant and legitimate. This is particularly useful as there are many different discourses that we encounter in the field of education, and the field of arts, such as efficient schools, creative economy, and art for art’s sake. Episteme is the word Foucault uses to explain how all of the set of relations are united in discursive practices in a given period. Episteme defines the conditions of possibility of all theoretical knowledge, but are not ‘origins or foundations’ but rather a practice to be encountered.

Foucault also helps us to examine the subject. The subject is analysed by how it is produced by discourses, institutions and relations of power, and how our lives thoughts and activities are often ‘scripted’ by social forces (Danaher, et al., 2000, p. 116-117). Foucault offers a way through this by describing how individuals can become active in crafting or negotiating their identity through ‘technologies of the self’ (Foucault, 1988, p. 18). Through Foucault’s ideas we learn to give up trying to find ‘the’ answer, or utopian ideas about education or economy, but realize that our practice should focus on the relativistic and temporary nature of the locale we are involved in (Peters, et al., 2003, p. 8). We can learn to admit that no one method can provide insight into truth or absolute certainty, or as to how social change can be effected, but is contingent on our unique situation (p. 9). We can also sense our force of agency and how we can practice negotiation.
v) Bourdieu and Foucault

I have outlined the theoretical influence of Bourdieu and Foucault for this thesis. Bourdieu and Foucault were contemporaries, and neighbours in social space. Bourdieu made comment of this in his book *Homo academicus* (1988, p.276). Parallels within Bourdieu and Foucault’s conceptual work can be found in the way in which they treat the subject as influenced by social structure and discourse, but is able through problematisation or reflexivity to demonstrate agency; the way in which discourse and habitus show up in the body; how the past influences human action, in terms of their concepts of genealogy and habitus; and their attention to the peculiar historical experience rather than transhistorical and universalist notions. Lemke notes Derrida, Foucault and Bourdieu “…followed similar academic and social trajectories” and are “critical keys to reading one another” (Lemke, 2005, Para.). Therefore it is appropriate that both Bourdieu and Foucault are drawn upon throughout this thesis, and concepts that are complimentary are used to mirror and shed light on each other.

**Summary of chapters**

The chapters of this thesis move from a macro level, in regards to the contemporary cultural field, to a mezzo level, looking at the historical period of the Bohemian artist’s activities in relation to art and economics, to the macro/micro level, thinking about how individual subjectivity is shaped by forces of enterprise culture and the doctrine of creativity, and finally to the micro level, how an ethical and critical orientation can enable educators and
artists to work more effectively to develop their subject position in relation to art and economics. I now summarise the sequence and content of chapters.

Chapter two discusses Bourdieu’s contribution to understanding the field of cultural production, particularly his model of two-sub fields of small-scale autonomous production and large-scale heteronomous production. Bourdieu’s concepts of habitus, field, and capital are defined. Abbing’s terms of aesthetic and market value, Russell Keat’s concept of market boundaries and cultural meta-goods, and Gisele Sapiro’s discussion of the development of the autonomisation of the literary field, also complement the discussion. Realizing the dynamic relationship between subsidized spheres of cultural production, and commercial spheres of cultural production, and how they are reliant and interact with one another, means arts educators will have to consider both of these spheres and help students take up positions in relation to the autonomous or subsidized sphere of production and the larger scale market sphere of production, so that their involvement in cultural production is aligned with the artist’s own aims, and in order to protect artistic quality, innovation and variety.

Chapter three explores the question: ‘How has the Bohemian artist contributed to the habitus of the artist today, particularly in the artist’s relationship to producing artworks for the market?’ The focus for this chapter is the Parisian movement of ‘Bohemia’, which also became predominant in other urban areas in Germany, USA and England during the period of the nineteenth and early twentieth century. The discussion is predominantly about how artists supported themselves financially and what the relationship was between art and capitalism at the time when capitalism
became the predominant economic system. Historical studies by Nicholson, (2002); Wilson, (2000); Siegel, (1986); Brooker, (2004); and Gluck, (2004) are drawn on to discuss the topic. Foucault’s notion of genealogy influences the chapter with his attention to investigating the particular historical practice at the time and how this relates to the problem of art and economics in the present. Bourdieu’s idea of heterodoxy is explored in the later part of the chapter to understand how this break from the orthodoxy within Bohemianism has remained part of the habitus of the artist today.

Chapter four examines how individual subjectivity is shaped by ‘disciplinary powers’ using Foucault’s concepts of ‘governmentality’, and ‘discourse’ The ‘mentalities of rule’ of enterprise culture and the instrumentalisation of creativity are identified as exerting influence on the constitution of the subject within our current episteme.

Chapter five details how enterprise culture and the instrumentalisation of creativity come together in the subject form of the ‘creative entrepreneur.’ Positive and negative outcomes for the artist with this new subject form are outlined.

Chapter six relates to how individual artists and educators may offer agency and resistance to some of these forces of governmentality and to certain subject formations. I draw upon Foucault concept of ‘aesthetics of existence’ and MacIntyre’s ‘practice’ approach, to further develop Bourdieu’s concept of habitus into the ethical constitution of the self. I develop how a critical pedagogy should prepare students to understand how musicians in New Zealand develop their own capacity for resistance and
negotiation within the field of cultural production and take up different subject positions. I note that musicians work resembles something closer to a practice model than a business model, which is one way in which artists can work with the institution of the market yet continue to meet artistic goals.

Chapter seven returns to the guiding questions of this thesis and considers what answers this inductive research has been able to contribute to our understanding of making both ends meet, becoming an artist in the new cultural economy, and what new questions the thesis raises for music education research.
2 BOURDIEU, CULTURAL PRODUCTION AND ARTISTS

Introduction

In the first part of this chapter I outline Bourdieu’s meta-theoretical concepts of *habitus*, *field* and *capital* and how they relate to this thesis topic. In the second part of the chapter, I expand on Bourdieu’s model of two sub-fields of cultural production, the field of restricted production (FRP) and the field of large-scale production (FLP). I outline the characteristics of the field of restricted production in more depth because this was the field on which Bourdieu’s work concentrated. In the final part of the chapter I draw on other scholars such as Adorno, Williams, Hesmondhalgh and Abbing to expand on Bourdieu’s model of the two sub-fields of cultural production. This is done to show how the field of cultural production has undergone transformations since Bourdieu’s model. I give examples of how the FRP and the FLP work in conjunction with each other in New Zealand and I discuss the role of the ‘strategic state’ as a post-market institution and actor in the field of cultural production in New Zealand further extends Bourdieu’s model.

Habitus, field, capital

Bourdieu’s work on the characteristics of the field of cultural production developed most significantly in various essays published between 1968 and 1985 and later in the *The Field of Cultural Production* (1993). *The Rules of Art* (1996a) offers the arts educator a valuable theoretical vocabulary to understand the logic of the cultural field of production. Bourdieu’s theoretical abstractions of the social space, into a “relational conceptual matrix” (Lipstadt, 2003, p. 390) of field, with its overlapping concepts of habitus and
capital help us to “make sense of a whole series of everyday actions and discourse in the making of symbolic goods” (Hesmondhalgh, 2005, p. 7). The following quote observation by Grenfell demonstrates how inter-related these three concepts are in Bourdieu’s modeling:

For Bourdieu, the principal basis of habitus, that main determinant of social practice, was capital, specifically symbolic capital. The latter was operative and operating as the social and cultural medium for fields (Grenfell, 2004, p. 113).

i) Habitus

Habitus is a philosophical notion originating in Aristotle’s concept of ‘hexis’ and referred to by medieval scholar Thomas Aquinas. It was retrieved and reworked by Bourdieu in the 1960s (Wacquant, 2005, p. 315-319). Habitus is defined by Bourdieu as the “active presence of past experiences” (1990, p. 54) embodied in us, in varying proportions, through what he calls “yesterday’s man” (Bourdieu, 1977, p. 78-79). We are quite unconscious of this “man of the past”, because he is “inveterate in us” that is “deep-rooted, ingrained, through our habits or practice” (p. 78-79). This “presence of past experience” helps form our perception, thought, and actions, and enables us to identify what is the “correctness of practices”, more reliably than “formal rules and explicit norms” (Bourdieu, 1990, p. 54). Habitus is what gives people a “practical sense, a feel for the game” within particular fields (Abbing, 2002, p. 91). For example, in the literary and artistic fields the notion of disinterestedness towards money has become part of the artist’s habitus, which can be traced back to literary society in the 1830’s when cultural production developed as an autonomous field (Bourdieu, 1985, p. 17). Bourdieu summarises the usefulness of habitus as a way to explain how one
might adjust one’s general behaviour to the characteristics of a particular field:

…being the product of a particular class of objective regularities, the habitus tends to generate all the reasonable, common-sense, behaviours (and only these) which are possible within the limits of these regularities, and which are likely to be positively sanctioned because they are objectively adjusted to the logic characteristic of a particular field… (Bourdieu, 1990, p56).

Bourdieu’s concept of habitus is an attempt to bring together both subjectivism and objectivism, these two ideas being a central paradox of Western philosophy’s thinking about human subjectivity and freedom. Subjectivism can be defined simply as a belief that we have a large degree of autonomy over our actions. It asserts that “…society appears as the emergent product of the decisions, actions, and cognitions of conscious, alert individuals…” (Wacquant, 1992d, p. 9 cited in Webb, Schirato, and Danaher, 2002, p. 32) or “… that we are assumed to be capable of choosing actions that are ‘right’ according to a final and unchanging standard-that is, reason” (Danaher, Schirato & Webb, 2000, p. 121). In contrast, objectivist theory “…start[s] from the premise that people more or less reproduce the objective structures of the society, culture or community they live in…” (Webb, et. al, p. 33) or “…what we are and do is based on inevitability (divine will, pre-destination, or just being born a particular type of person) (Danaher, et al., ).

Bourdieu says that it is only in our “imaginary experience” or in “folk tale” that our sense of social reality is “neutralized” and our social world takes the form of a “universe of possibles equally possible for any possible subject” (Bourdieu, 1990, p. 64). Bourdieu dismantles the notion that ‘anything is possible, to anyone.’ He describes how “agents shape their aspirations according to concrete indices of the accessible and the inaccessible,” of what “is and is not ‘for us’” (p. 64). The concept of habitus articulated by Bourdieu
emphasizes a limited sense of agency and ‘improvisation’ by the individual, as this improvisation is always contextualized within an organized, and continually reproduced social world. In Bourdieu’s concept of habitus our freedom is limited.

ii) Fields

‘Fields’ (champs) is Bourdieu’s term for the social microcosms that together make up social space. Different fields operate relatively autonomously, while at the same time are in relationship to each other, (Lipstadt, 2003, p. 398) and are “structurally homologous” (Brubaker, 2004, p. 32). The structure of fields and their manifestations of power are determined by the “distribution of different kinds of resources or capital” (Thompson, 1991, p. 14 cited in Hesmondhalgh, 2005, p. 2). Bourdieu’s work on cultural production was the place where his theory of fields was most systematically laid out (Bourdieu, 2000, p. 96 cited in Hesmondhalgh, 2005, p. 18). He regards the literary and artistic fields as having an economic logic that is the inverse of the larger economy of society placing more importance on cultural capital than economic capital (Bourdieu, 1993, p. 311). Bourdieu places the cultural field in relation to, and subordinate to, what he terms the ‘field of power’ which is a composite of economic and political fields characterized by high levels of economic capital and low levels of cultural capital (Hesmondhalgh, 2005, p. 3). His work on fields also covers the educational field, the intellectual field, the scientific field, and the religious field (Hesmondhalgh, 2005, p. 2).

iii) Forms of capital

Capital is the currency of fields. The logic of capital is also specific to a particular field. Bourdieu in his paper *Forms of Capital* (2005) extends the
word capital, (meaning chief, principal sum and which is the basis for wealth within the economic system of capitalism) to encompass social and cultural capital, as well as financial/economic capital. Bourdieu’s theoretical hypothesis of cultural capital was derived from studying school children’s scholastic achievements from different social classes. Throughout this study he debunked the idea that academic achievement was through natural aptitude and instead was able to show that “ability and talent is itself the product of an investment of time and cultural capital” (Becker, 1964a, p. 63-66 cited in Bourdieu, 2005). Bourdieu felt the educational system sanctions the hereditary transmission of cultural capital (Bourdieu, 1996b).

Cultural capital can exist in three forms: the embodied state, (long-lasting dispositions of the mind and body, invested in personally through time and physical and mental aptitudes and knowledge); the objectified state in the form of cultural goods (pictures, books, dictionaries, instruments, machines); and the institutionalized state (in the form of educational qualifications). Social capital is “the aggregate of the actual or potential resources” through membership of a group, through acquaintance and recognition, which give members access to collectively-owned capital. Material and symbolic exchanges help to maintain these relationships. Economic capital is according to Bourdieu “at the root of all the other types of capital” but cultural and social capital act to disguise and conceal forms of economic capital, allowing transmission of economic capital from one generation to another (Bourdieu, n.d., p. 252).

Bourdieu’s terminology for the logic and functioning of cultural production is useful, although it has been subject to criticism. One criticism is that Bourdieu demonstrates narrow economism, reducing all of social and human interactions to exchanges of capital and modeling the whole social universe as a “struggle and competition among agents for status, domination,
profit and accumulation…” (Lemke, 1993, Para. 18). Another criticism notes that his view of social reality where the “know-what and know-who” compete with the “have-bucks” (Para. 23) for power in every social practice is a view of social reality biased by his life as a “successful academic and intellectual” (Para. 23). Despite these points, however, in my reading about cultural production, Bourdieu’s conceptual innovations have surfaced often as useful thinking tools to inform and describe the logic of cultural fields.

Bourdieu’s study and understanding of the interaction between art and economy does not divorce the two from each other. The work of Bourdieu, and subsequently other scholars who advance his work, help the artist and arts educator to consider relations of power that exist in the social world of art, and how an artist’s effectiveness or capital (social, economic, or cultural) within a particular art field results from the degree of asymmetry or conflict between the field and their habitus. His concept of fields helps artists reflect on how a different logic functions in different spheres, such as business, science, art, and education. The concept of habitus helps artists to explore how attitudes about art and commerce are passed down through generations to form the basis of fields, and that these persist through the artists’ bodies, gestures and habits.

Bourdieu also calls for a “more reflexive account of one’s location and habitus” and for “sustained engagement with ideas and social issues as practical problems” (Kenway & McLeod, 2004, p. 525). It is in this sense that Bourdieu is both practical and emancipatory as a sociologist. This work should be considered by those involved in cultural production. Bourdieu’s emphasis on practical social realities, and how these can be theorized, makes him a philosopher useful for arts students, artists and arts educators wanting to explore the social and economic mechanics of culture and art.
Bourdieu’s notion of cultural goods as two-faced realities

Symbolic goods are a two-faced reality, a commodity and a symbolic object: Their specifically cultural value and their commercial value remain relatively independent although the economic sanction may come to reinforce their cultural consecration (Bourdieu, 1985, p. 16).

In the above quote, Bourdieu states that a cultural object acts as both a symbolic good and a commodity with commercial value. Bourdieu’s ideas about cultural goods acting as both economic and symbolic goods have become widespread in writing about the cultural economy. For example:

Economic and symbolic processes are more than ever interlaced and interarticulated… Thus the boundaries between the two become more and more blurred and the economy and culture no longer function in regard to one another as system and environment (Lash and Urry, 1994, p. 64 cited in du Gay and Pryke, 2002, p. 6).

For Bourdieu the reception of cultural goods is dependent on cultural capital embodied or available by proxy in buyers of cultural goods. Bourdieu explains in the quote below how cultural goods are objectified forms of cultural capital, and therefore require both economic and cultural capital in the form of knowledge and ability to be fully appropriated.

Thus cultural goods can be appropriated materially—which presupposes economic capital—and symbolically—which presupposes cultural capital….To possess the machines, he only needs economic capital; to appropriate them and use them in accordance with their specific purpose…he must have access to embodied cultural capital, either in person or by proxy (Bourdieu, 2005).

Keat borrows this idea when he describes how consumer goods require cultural and social knowledge to be appropriated. He notes that consumer goods and ‘equipment goods’ (the examples he gives include pianos, yachts, hiking boots, food stuffs to cook a meal, paint to decorate) all require both an understanding of the social practices with which to employ these goods, and
specific knowledges and skills to ensure these ‘intermediate’ goods add up to the consumer’s final good which is enhanced well-being (Keat, 2000, p. 153). Keat’s summarises his position in this statement: “So the potential value of goods provided through the market itself depends on the existence of non-market spheres of social life” (p. 161).

Keat believes that cultural goods provide a way to evaluate the benefit of consumer goods. He explains that in order to be able to make “judgements both about the value of particular activities and about how these contribute to the overall value of one’s life” (p. 156) we can use cultural goods, such as novels, films, plays, television drama and many other cultural products. These goods address and explore the nature and possibilities of human well-being itself, of what kind of life is worth living and for what reasons” (Keat, 2000, p. 156). They allow us “vicariously to extend our range of experiences” and so allow ourselves “critical distance” (p. 156) to evaluate the nature of other human goods and their potential contribution to human well being. Where they help us make strong evaluations of our desires and preferences, they could be called ‘transformative’.

However, because of the transformative value of cultural goods and the way they may act upon our decisions in the market, as well as the role they play in maintaining the health of democracy, they may end up being under-produced by the market. Keat says that we might expect the market to instead “over-produce non-credible cultural goods” and to “underproduce credible ones” (Keat, 2000, p. 160). He says that these kind of cultural ‘meta-goods’ of the transformative kind can actually enhance the effectiveness of the market in meeting consumer well-being, because it provides consumers with the information to better able to decide what they need for their well-being. However, we cannot expect the market by itself to provide these kinds of goods. This is because the basis of the market is not consumer well-being but
the ongoing creation of consumer desire. Instead, Keat suggests we need to recognize the limits of the market in this respect as a source of well-being, and “the need to sustain relationships and activities characterized by the absence of market institutions and market meanings” (p. 161).

Abbing also expands on Bourdieu’s ideas of the cultural economy. Abbing says that traditionally one view in relation to art and commerce is that within the sphere of art, market (economic) value and aesthetic value belong to different spheres. Abbing claims that the common artist’s perception, (and he generalizes here) about this traditional view is that these spheres (market values/aesthetic values) are hostile towards each other, operate independently of each other, hold non-reciprocal values, and that in fact market value reduces aesthetic value. Abbing’s contrasting perspective is that market value corresponds with aesthetic value, and that they depend on each. Market value is determined by buyers, who have purchasing power (economic power); either ‘deep-pocket’ ones (those who are well-off and can afford expensive high-ticket cultural items) or ‘mass markets’ (those who are less well off, but can afford smaller lesser-ticket items such as CDs and books) other (Abbing, 2002, p. 54-58).

Aesthetic value is to a large degree determined by experts, with their power of words (reviewers) and cultural knowledge and status (cultural capital). A well-known and respected expert in a field is capable of producing belief in the value of a cultural item, based on the known rules and established practice of that particular artworld. An example would be a review by a leading newspaper music journalist in *The New Zealand Herald*, or a review by leading trade journal, *New Zealand Musician*. The critic can belong to tiny, niche artworlds, such as ‘fringe sound art’ or represent larger audience groups such as ‘popular music.’ What matters is the critic’s degree of cultural and social capital within the field. Abbing states, “Reputations symbolize the
possession of social and cultural capital” (Abbing, 2002, p. 65). Here Abbing uses Bourdieu’s concepts of ‘cultural capital’ which he defines as “incorporated abilities and dispositions” (Abbing, 2002, p. 65). With their cultural capital, experts influence aesthetic value, and in turn can influence market value.

**Bourdieu’s model of two sub-fields of cultural production**

We now turn to Bourdieu’s model for how cultural goods are produced, both those that Keat may describe as ‘telling the truth’ or transformative, as well as those which may provide less ‘truth’ content. According to Bourdieu, the way in which the field of cultural production organizes itself to produce differentiated cultural products is bifurcated: separated into the field of restricted production (FRP) or autonomous sphere; and the field of large-scale cultural production (FLP) or heteronomous sphere (Bourdieu, 1985, p. 13). The development of the FRP was the result of historical circumstances, which I will describe further in Chapter Three with regard to the development of literary and artistic autonomy through the Bohemian/Romantic era in Paris.

**Properties of cultural production in the FRP**

There are several general properties that can describe the habitus, forms of capital and field effects that operate in the FRP. These are: i) relative autonomy; ii) disinterestedness towards money (‘pure’ artistic product); iii) small-scale production with inverse levels of capital; and iv) a focus on internal dialogue, reception and recognition.

1. **Relative autonomy**

   The importance of relative autonomy from the field of power in Bourdieu’s sociology of cultural production cannot be overstated. It is central to Bourdieu’s account of the development of modern culture-making
An understanding of the way fields and capital operate is essential to understanding the idea of relative autonomy. Fields operate by their own specific logic and rules, and these arise through historical circumstances. Although Bourdieu was keen to argue that the idea of the autonomous art-producer was a historical construction, something actively produced in the nineteenth century, he also considered this “autonomization to be a considerable achievement, with potentially positive results” (Hesmondhalgh, 2005, p. 4). Through his life Bourdieu defended with substantial energy and outspokenness the autonomy of the universes of cultural production. I now consider how autonomization, that is the separation into a distinct sphere of life, came about.

Gisele Sapiro, one of Bourdieu’s former students explains how autonomization in the literary field came about as the result of two factors: economic liberalism and political liberalism. I will use her example of the literary field to show how the market, and the State and their potential encroachment on the content of cultural production have influenced artists to develop an autonomous sphere of production (Sapiro, 2003, p. 442).

Where there is State/Church control of cultural products economic exchanges in cultural products are controlled through institutional centralization. The State (or Church/Monarchy) determines the supply of cultural goods through its own ideological demand for propaganda. The instruments for ideological control used by the State/Church/Monarchy are usually censorship and repression, and only allowing artists to practice who belong to the sanctioned professional organization. Some artists have employed strategies to resist these forces, and escape political constraints. The main strategies within the literary field to resist State control of cultural production have been thwarting censorship by using a metaphorical code and secret publishing (Sapiro, 2003, p. 446).
Sapiro traces how in the face of different forms of censorship and repression, truth-telling as an artistic value became very important. She says the principle of ‘art for art’s sake’ was devised to defend writers who were being charged with offence to high morals (2003, p. 449). It could be said that professional ‘deontology’ that is “the writer’s probity, his sincerity, and his concern with ‘truth’ when he paints or describes reality” (p. 449) became something artists defended as part of their habitus. This struggle against political control of cultural production has contributed to the foundation upon which their relative autonomy rests (p. 449).

Economic liberalism has allowed for a market, governed by free competition determined by consumers. Countries that allow development of a trade in cultural products have usually helped to free cultural activity from the supervision of the State. However, freeing cultural activity has also allowed writers to be more like entrepreneurs, and opened up what Sapiro describes as “mercenary writers” that is, those who are ready to “sell his pen for any price” (p. 450). Those writers who cared for truth telling or the deontology of the artist, have withdrawn into what Bourdieu calls a pole of restricted production. Rather than write to please the large (and generally considered profane) public, and according to the law of the market, they have sought the judgement of peers in their work. Sapiro describes the next phase in the process like this:

Whereas the market had helped the literary field to free itself from State control, in the liberal-democratic regime, the State has developed a cultural policy in order to support the pole of restricted production (Sapiro, 2003, p. 460).

State policy towards artistic producers has begun to develop in order to aid literary creation at the pole of restricted production. Sapiro in her conclusion observes that literary activity has evolved from having ideological
constraints from the State to having greater mercantile constraints, from which the State now tries to protect artists (Sapiro, 2003, p. 460). She writes:

In ultra-liberal configurations, it is the competitions between publishers for the largest public that conditions the supply. This configuration threatens the autonomy of the literary field by encouraging the production of standardized best-sellers and by limiting the chances of more innovative and difficult works being published… (Sapiro, 2003, p. 460).

Bourdieu began to see autonomous universes of cultural production, not only in literary publishing, but in film also, being threatened by the imposition of commercial values (Bourdieu, 1998, Para. 14). This leads one to consider, perhaps autonomous universes of cultural production, as Bourdieu had known them, have changed. The later part of this chapter explores this possibility.

ii) Disinterest in money

Even when they give every appearance of disinterestedness because they escape the logic of ‘economic’ interest (in the narrow sense) and are orientated towards non-material stakes that are not easily quantified, as in …the cultural sphere of capitalist societies, practices never cease to comply with an economic logic (Bourdieu, 1990, p. 122).

The second characteristic of the autonomous sphere of production I wish to examine is what Bourdieu terms ‘disinterestedness.’ Brubaker (2004) suggests that Bourdieu is working in a tradition known as ‘the sociology of interest’, that is, a mode of thought where everyone (even those who appear disinterested) undertakes practices that are directed towards the maximizing of material and symbolic profit. Bourdieu observed that artists within the sphere of autonomous production would devote a lot of energy to disguising the truth of economic acts (Bourdieu, 1990, p. 114). But to Bourdieu, no act
was outside of economy, and all artists complied with an economic logic, albeit often being more interested in symbolic profits.

Bourdieu’s concept of *symbolic capital* extends the economic to all sorts of costs and profits, material and symbolic, that are rare and worthy of being sought after or avoided. They may be “fair words or smiles, handshakes or shrugs, compliments or attention, challenges or insults, honor or honours, powers or pleasures…” (Brubaker, 2004, p. 40). The premise of capitalism laid out in Adam Smith’s *Wealth of Nations* is that to trade, one needs to have a regard for one’s own interest. It is “…not from the benevolence of the butcher, the brewer, or the baker, that we expect our dinner, but from their regard for their own interest” (Smith, 1910). Cultural economist Hans Abbing describes this seeking of symbolic capital as a form of seeking one’s interest even if the ‘income’ is non-monetary.

It appears that artists have a stronger inclination to go for non-monetary income, like recognition by peers and private satisfaction, than average professionals have. They sooner forsake money, or, more precisely, they have a stronger inclination to exchange money income for non-monetary income (Abbing, 2004).

Forsaking money can be seen as a virtuous quality of artists, as it is a rare quality in modern society. It is not that artists are selfless, but they are often more inclined to seek ‘intrinsic’ or symbolic rewards. This is similar to MacIntyre’s (1981) concept of the internal goods of practice, which I develop further in relation to ethics in Chapter Five. Abbing says that the relative importance of recognition by peers and the unimportance of money has become part of the habitus of the artist (Abbing, 2004). One way of understanding how artists might come to be involved in a sphere in which less monetary rewards are offered and fortunes are sacrificed, is Bourdieu’s concept of illusio and collusion. The illusio means a ‘belief in the game’ and
is possessed by a player who is invested, in both an economic and psychoanalytic sense, in a commitment to the stakes of the game. Illusio goes hand in hand with “unconscious, invisible, collective, collusion” (Lipstadt, 2003, p. 399). Collusion is to be taken into the game, to adhere to the belief in the game, and valuing of its stakes. In this case the ‘game’ is the field of cultural production.

Cultural economist Arjo Klamer has called the arts economy a gift economy (2003, p. 243). This implies reciprocity, and more of an emphasis on the maintenance of social capital- that is relationships, friendships, and collectivity through gift exchanges. Jim Shorthose and Gerard Strange write that orthodox economics, with its “narrow focus on the motivations of ‘economic man’” is “ill-equipped to analyse culturally-embedded economies” (Shorthose and Strange, 2004, p. 44). However, Bourdieu’s concept of social capital explains the importance of exchange as an investment strategy, either consciously or unconsciously, to establish and reproduce social relationships that can then be “directly usable in the short or long term” describing them as an “alchemy of consecration” (Bourdieu, 2005).

The gift exchange as alchemy better describes how the cultural field can appear magical, as it disguises the play of economic interest and calculation. Bourdieu’s understanding is that art has a “very non-arbitrary social and ultimately, economic function to perform” (Grenfell, 2004, p. 104), but that “good-faith” economies disguise the “play of (narrowly) ‘economic’ interest and calculation…” (Bourdieu, 1990, p. 115). According to Webb, et al.,

…artists make their work, and position it and themselves, according to what they see as possible and as being in their best interests at a given moment (2002, p. 171).

The placement or positioning of an artist on the continuum of cultural production, either in close proximity and dependence on the market
(heteronomous pole) or at a distance from and insulated from the market (autonomous pole) depends on their best interests at the time, that is, the forms of capital most important to gaining standing in their field.

**iii) Small-scale with inverse levels of capital**

The subfield of small-scale production…involves very low levels of economic capital, and very high levels of field-specific symbolic capital (Hesmondhalgh, 2005, p. 4)

Considering this quote, one may think that artists, rich in cultural capital, would look for investors, (such as the government’s creative fund, or private companies, or individual patrons) rich in economic capital to fund their projects. However, in a recent study done in the United Kingdom (Wilson, 2001), the main sources of start-up capital for small-to-medium size music businesses were personal savings, overdraft, and loans from banks, family or friends. Outside investors were not ordinarily sought. This may be due to the fact that once outside funders are involved, the work becomes progressively heteronomous, as these various funders will require different degrees of artistic and intellectual control over the artwork produced. In order to remain more autonomous from these organizations, artists will look to self-subsidize their work, in order to develop it without the help of these organizations, or they will look for ‘no strings attached’ funding options so that their art is kept separate from the funders’ interest in the kind of art they make. Of course no art could ever be without influence from another field, but artists at this end of cultural production seek ample creative freedom, at the expense of economic capital.

The field of small-scale production is further divided into two poles. These are the consecrated and the Bohemian avant-garde. The consecrated pole has especially high levels of symbolic capital such as prizes,
memberships of academies and so on, and various forms of recognition. The consecrated end of the autonomous sphere is where I would place cultural producers such as the New Zealand Symphony Orchestra (NZSO), those who hold academic posts in literature, classical music, and operate almost completely outside of the market, usually wholly funded by the State. Of course, these are cultural producers in danger of being ideologically controlled by the State, so are still in a partially heteronomous relationship with the field of power. However, the New Zealand Symphony Orchestra (NZSO) is protected by an act of Parliament, which allows them autonomy.

The Bohemian avant-garde tends to shun even the obtainment of symbolic rewards (Hesmondhalgh, 2005, p. 5), yet they often have a product that is of interest to a niche market. One example of an artist operating within the habitus of a Bohemian avant-garde artistic producer is Taika Waititi, an independent Wellington film-maker. His attitude towards maintaining a high degree of resolved independence, and rejection of forms of recognition, both monetary and industry awards, indicate the habitus of a Bohemian avant-garde autonomous producer. The following is an extract from an interview with Waititi in *North & South* magazine:

N&S: “With the success you’ve had many people would’ve thought you’d go to America as others have-Roger Donaldson, Geoff Murphy, Lee Tamahori. Have you had approaches?

Waititi: Yep, a couple. But I read some scripts and they were awful and I’m working on my own projects. Another reason I totally respect Mr Jackson is he’s creating his own work.

N&S: “Why not go there for a few years, make some films, make some money, then come back here to do what you want.”

Waititi: “…I’m still flatting in Mount Cook and struggling to pay my rent. I’m not complaining because I actually like my existence where I don’t have to go and work for other people…” (White, 2005).
Waititi’s resolved independence to work on his own projects and be successful in the way he perceives success to be -(art for art’s sake’ and ‘truth-telling’) -is a good example of the habitus of artists found at the autonomous pole of production. It is important to remember that he is still serving his own interests in terms of increasing his cultural capital and position in his field by retaining ownership of his own projects. As the sociology of interest would indicate “…artists may well serve their own interests by rejecting economic rewards or other commercial markers of success” (Webb, et al., 2001, p. 160).

This helps us to understand why artists may turn down a particular cultural project, as it may present an opportunity for making money (economic capital) but may not be imbued with the right mix of cultural and social (symbolic capital). And artists are often seeking as much symbolic capital as possible, as they know intuitively (through the habitus of the artist) that by looking for projects that are not necessarily going to reward them economically early on in their career, they benefit their interest in acquiring symbolic capital. By holding onto these artistic and symbolic values, artists can be set apart from the rest, thus imbuing their work with greater symbolic capital.

By rejecting overtly commercial projects through the early part of their career, they establish a name for themselves as expert artistic producers, with a high degree of innovation and creativity. This stands them in good stead for later in their career being rewarded with a project they have always wanted to do, that meets possibly both their aesthetic sensibilities and has commercial benefits. For example, Peter Jackson’s earlier independent films were a progression towards larger scale commercial projects. Of course, other artists may reverse this logic, and be involved in commercial work first, the heteronomous end of production, in order to subsidise, and persuade or
influence their publisher/investor to have faith in them to manage, a riskier, more innovative project later.

Other examples of relatively autonomous production are independent record labels in New Zealand. Ben Howe, member of indie bands Fang and Superette, and owner of Arch Hill Recordings, explains the positioning of ‘indie’ labels and in general illustrates the philosophy of Bourdieu’s bifurcated poles of production:

Our philosophy is that we care about good music, we like the idea of a community of musically like-minded individuals and after that, we try to figure out how to generate some money for musicians and their label. In general this is a philosophy more aligned with musicians as it values creativity over and above profits… (Shute, 2005, p. 125).

The placement of economic capital as second to cultural capital, in autonomous spheres of production is reflected in Howe’s statement. Hesmondhalgh makes the same observation that even the word ‘alternative’ seems in effect to be a vernacular term for what Bourdieu calls small-scale or restricted production and that “small-scale popular music production constantly defined itself against a pop mainstream” (2005, p. 7).

iv) Focus on internal dialogue, reception and recognition

This characteristic of autonomous production is that market success is not the only measure for whether a product is successful. In fact, in the habitus of the artist at the consecrated end, market success may indicate the work has been a miserable failure, showing compromise towards the mass populace and perhaps catering to the lowest common denominator. The traditional orientation in this sphere is towards what peers, experts, and those within the art world may consider to be successful. The focus is internal, in both reception and recognition. Reviews and dialogue about the artwork may
circulate within a closed circle of aestheticians and artists. And artists may be satisfied with this form of success. However, it should be noted that lately, as the division of high art and popular art is broken down, market value may even be regarded as acceptable and not the opposite of aesthetic value.

**Properties of cultural production in the FLP**

The heteronomous pole (or FLP) in Bourdieu’s model of two sub-fields of production is that “part of the field bound up in relations with other fields and expressing their values” (Webb, et al., 2001, xiii). For example, commercial art is art that is bound up with commercial imperatives, and the art produced near to that pole is usually almost completely subordinate to business goals and values. The properties of cultural production in this sphere are: i) heteronomous production; ii) motivated towards money (although influenced by the consecrated sphere); iii) corporatisation (large-scale with higher levels of economic capital available (but dependent on cultural capital) and; iv) focus on wider public reception (although critical reviews are important).

Critical theorist and German philosopher of the Frankfurt school, Adorno coined the term the “culture industry” in his 1947 book with Max Horkheimer entitled *Dialectic of enlightenment: Philosophical Fragments*. Adorno’s concept of ‘culture industry’ has affinities with Bourdieu’s concept of FLP. In Adorno’s argument the teaming of the words ‘culture’ and ‘industry’ was a pejorative one. Rather than culture as something that originates spontaneously from people, Adorno recognized that culture was being increasingly mediated to us via commerce, with increasing levels of sophistication in terms of production, administration, control and technology. He subsequently wrote a number of essays criticizing the culture industry, especially the film industry. His main concerns with the cultural industries were their potential for mass
deception, their fettering of consciousness, and their “impeding of the development of autonomous, independent individuals who judge and decide consciously for themselves” (1990, p. 92).

Adorno was also concerned that in order for artworks to integrate into the organization, they would become neutralized, independent and external, and removed from any “possible relation to praxis” (1990, p. 101). Here the term praxis could be described as craft or the ‘live’ elements of production. As the artwork gets removed from praxis, it becomes a “lubricant for the system,” (p. 101) something which exists for something else, into goods of the culture industry calculated for the consumer. Artworks become fungible, that is, they become moveable, perishable goods of a sort that may be numbered or weighed. He claims that through this process, “festivity,” “individual arbitrariness” and “autonomy, spontaneity and criticism” are diminished (p. 101). He expands on Marxist terms such as ‘commodity fetishism’, ‘use value’ and ‘exchange value’ to reveal how cultural products have become fungible and are valued for exchange rather than for use.

Adorno’s very negative view of the cultural industries further confirms the reasons for the autonomization of cultural production. However, Adorno could also see that the extent to which artworks were produced for the cultural industries means that to survive outside of this system is near impossible, and ultimately a deprivation to the artist in his or her interface with an audience and with their ability to earn a living. Obviously to make a good living within cultural production, producers would ordinarily need to have some involvement with the cultural industries or FLP. They cannot survive by withdrawing completely from them, unless they can wholly subsidize their creative work through another means. However, Adorno recognized the contradiction between the administration required by official institutions to foster, produce and present art, and the way art has become oppositional and
critical of everything institutional and official. This is problematic and difficult for the artist to reconcile:

The appeal to the creators of culture to withdraw from this process of administration and keep distant from it has a hollow ring. Not only would this deprive them of the possibility of earning a living, but also of every effect, every contact between work of art and society (Adorno, 1990, p. 103).

Adorno accurately predicted the aestheticization of social reality and the push by marketers of ‘life-styles’ which results in people’s cultural worth being almost totally measured by their spending power. Adorno gives an example: “…he has not ‘made’ it by liking the concert but rather by buying the ticket” (Adorno, 1990, p. 34). He foretold the closing gap between the cultural industry and everyday life, describing this collapse into consumer culture as the “degradation of culture.” Adorno’s critique and dislike of popular cultural forms means he could not conceive how authenticity or reality could be mediated through popular artforms. Adorno ultimately believed, however, that the “real interests of individuals are still strong enough to resist, within certain limits, total inclusion” and “…that a society whose inherent contradictions persist…cannot be totally integrated” (Adorno, 1990, p. 170).

Bourdieu’s critique of neo-liberalism and cultural forms like television, have a similar basis to Adorno in a critical theory/ Marxist perspective on the ‘degradation of culture.’ Bourdieu attacked media presenters for delivering “cultural fast food” (Bourdieu 1998a cited in Formosa, 2005, Para). He also stressed the duty of the intellectual to confront the oppressive features of globalization (Formosa, 2005).

Hesmondhalgh, while being struck by the potential of Bourdieu’s model of the two sub-fields of mass and restricted production, to “make sense of a
whole series of everyday actions and discourse in the making of symbolic goods” (Hesmondhalgh, 2005, p. 7) finds it astonishing how little Bourdieu has to say about large-scale, ‘heteronomous’ commercial cultural production, such as television, given its enormous importance in the contemporary world. He thinks that the dualist structure that Bourdieu developed to describe the ‘market for symbolic goods’ in the 1970s and 1980s (Bourdieu, 1985) “ignores profound transformations in the field of cultural production in the twentieth century” (Hesmondhalgh, 2005, p. 8).

What has arisen in the twentieth century is the domination of cultural production by multinational entertainment corporations across all cultural industries. The process of corporatisation began in the 1920s, with the rise of large enterprises such as RCA, NBC, EMI, and CBS and intensified in the 1950s and 1960s. Now in the last two decades, in the era of telecommunications and broadcasting, these corporations have become a cutting edge sector of international business (Hesmondhalgh, 2005, p. 9). Bourdieu warned of new alliances between economic enterprises and cultural producers but did not take this further to theorise the interaction between partially autonomous producers and multi-national producers, nor the government’s role in this. The degree of polarization which Bourdieu outlined between autonomy and heteronomy is not an accurate assessment of the field of cultural production today. I will now examine some transformations in the field of cultural production within the New Zealand context that show how the field has changed.

Transformations in the field of cultural production

The two aspects of cultural production that Hesmondhalgh highlights as being worthy of Bourdieu’s consideration are corporatisation and the presence of alternative cultural production (Hesmondhalgh, 2005, p7-9). I now
examine two examples from New Zealand contemporary music production and the local film industry to show how Bourdieu’s model of two sub-fields of autonomy and heteronomy may be considerably more complex in our current milieu.

i) ‘Indie’ music labels working with ‘major’ labels

The music industry is, most often, a highly localized cultural product industry that draws on local creative milieus and cultural forms and one that has a tendency to agglomerate in urban areas… However the business of producing, selling and consuming music is globally dominated by an increasingly concentrated manufacturing and distribution system dominated by a shrinking number of global media “majors (Power & Hallencreutz, 2004, p. 224).

Power & Hallencreutz describe in the above quote, how there are two elements to the music industry that work together- the local product, which comes out of local ‘creative milieus’ and the global business of selling that product which is dominated by ‘majors’. Beverley Best, a popular music theorist, notes that all cultural texts need to negotiate in some way with mass or micro media or the culture industry in order to reach an audience. For example, ‘indie’ record labels cannot remain “pure and uncontaminated by commercial industry” but must “negotiate its survival” (Best, 1997, p18). Best draws on Foucault’s notion of power and agency to show how this negotiation may happen, so that a popular cultural text can still possess politically resistant qualities.

The world music market is dominated by four major record labels: Sony/BMG; Universal; Warner’s and EMI. These four companies control around eighty-five percent of the world music market (Wikipedia, 2005). However, major film studios and television channels as well as major recording labels now sign production deals with independent production
companies, or they sign distribution, licensing and financing deals with ‘independent’ record companies. The division between large-scale and restricted production makes sense as an overall organizing principle, but in many fields, such as popular music, there is a “proliferation of subfields of restricted production, alongside the growth of large-scale production, as the field of cultural production as a whole grows larger and more complex” (Hesmondhalgh, 2005, p. 11). Work is taking place at the boundaries of all of these sub-fields, and in a sense restricted production has been introduced into the field of mass production in more inventive ways.

A local example of this is the recent takeover of medium-sized Australasian music label Festival Mushroom (FMR) by Warners Music, one of the world ‘majors’. FMR was the distributor of Dirty Records, a New Zealand indie label founded by hip-hop producer ‘P Money’, and the label to which the hip-hop artist ‘Scribe’ is signed. Warners bought FMR because of “the strength of the label’s New Zealand acts” the FMR general manager Darryl Parker told Scott Kara in The New Zealand Herald (2005a). What this shows is how an independent New Zealand label can operate in conjunction with a major label. P-Money says that as a small, independent label, it can do “much of the work involved with making and releasing an album by itself”, therefore retaining creative freedom, but it has the added benefit of being “plugged into a global network, and that’s one of the big things big acts will benefit from -a big company like Warners has more muscle.” Campbell Smith, chief executive of the Recording Industry Association of New Zealand (RIANZ) goes on to say:

There’s not a situation in NZ where majors are trying to hoard everything to themselves - they are working in conjunction with the smaller labels (Kara, 2005a).
This comment by Smith shows just how much interaction between small and large spheres of cultural production is happening in New Zealand. He says the merging of the big companies like BMG/Sony, and Warners has seen “independent record labels flourish” (Kara, 2005a).

Much thought and ingenuity goes into how New Zealand musicians will retain creative ownership and profits of their music, and still have accessibility to the global networks of a major label. For example, Shelton Woolright the lead singer of band Blindspott says:

We basically didn’t want to sign our songs over to some major and have them own us for the rest of the world. We thought, why can’t we licence this music to whatever label we choose in each country?…We thought, we’ll only sign for each individual territory (Shute, 2005, p. 130).

Many New Zealand musicians have sought to retain independent ownership of their recordings, and yet have become well-known in New Zealand as well as developing international audiences for their work. Some of the many examples are Pluto, Nesian Mystik, Trinity Roots, Phoenix Foundation, Mareko, Scribe, P-Money, Te Vaka, Pitch Black, the Brunettes, Katchafire, John Psathas, SJD, International Observer, One Million Dollars, Shapeshifter, Lucid 3, Concord Dawn. Fat Freddy’s Drop, The Black Seeds, Savage, Mark de Clive Lowe and Goldenhorse (Indies, 2005). Many have negotiated licensing deals with major labels that take care of marketing and distribution but others use New Zealand based independent marketing and distribution firms as well such as Border, Rhythmmethod, Shock and Amplifier.

This has led to an increased diversity and quality of music in New Zealand, supported by a home base of New Zealand music fans. This has also led to the timely establishment of an Independent Music organization (IMNZ), which aims to assist and guide the development of the independent recording sector and to advocate the values and interests of the independent
sector (IMNZ, 2005). With well over seventy independent music labels in New Zealand, this move to form an independent alliance is a very positive and important political move. It indicates the kind of collective action which is vital for this pole of autonomous production to remain viable, given the strength of multi-nationals such as Warner music who have recently moved strongly into the region.

This ability for musicians to create music independently from major labels has been enabled by several conditions. The most important is firstly the accessibility of home-recording equipment, and secondly the ease of marketing and distribution both overseas and in New Zealand in an internet environment. Shayne Carter, from the bands Dimmer and Straightjacket Fits describes how recording technology has enabled local, independent music production:

Even ten years ago, if people wanted to record in a studio they had to spend tens of thousands of dollars… Whereas now, people can spend a year recording at home and it just means they give their records the care and attention they deserve and the result is better sounding records” (Shute, 2005, p. 101).

The recent success of Wellington based ‘Fat Freddy’s Drop’ (FFD) further demonstrates how New Zealand musicians are increasingly inventive in maintaining autonomy and managing to make a living from their music. FFD are part of the trend in New Zealand music production, for independent recording labels. Artists are running more parts of their own music business, so that they directly benefit from the financial profits of the music, as well as retain ownership of the creative direction of their music. This is evident in the business decisions of FFD, who have turned down recording contracts to manage almost all aspects of their music themselves. Their discussion of this approach indicates a blend of skill at both the autonomous and business end of cultural production, and perhaps a new way for artists to negotiate the new
cultural economy. They certainly do not show ‘disinterest’ in the commercial part of their music, but at the same time, they understand what it takes to produce ‘authentic’ music.

The decision to remain independent in the face of significant offers is also with an eye to the long term. ‘We wanted musical freedom, but it also made better maths in regards to finances,’ … ‘We are all into being business owners and directors. We want to learn how to run a business’ (Chait, 2005, p. 61).

Using Bourdieu’s theory of the cultural economy, I would describe FFD’s approach as negotiated autonomy. The group is independent so as to secure ‘musical freedom’ but commercial in that they rely on various commercial revenue streams to make a living. Their philosophy is a blend of business philosophy, and aesthetic philosophy, such as knowing they need to have a consistently available, quality product, yet having that key aesthetic ingredient ‘authenticity.’ They describe this as “hold [ing] onto your integrity” and “keep[ing] it real”(p. 61). This quality indicates the deontology of the artist as the ‘truth-teller’ which goes back to the habitus of the artist in the FRP. By associating themselves with the words ‘real’, ‘integrity’, ‘musical freedom’ and ‘independent’, they assure the music fan that they are ‘all about the music’ and associated with the autonomous or consecrated pole.

At the same time Fat Freddy’s Drop are upfront about the commercial realities of their financial livelihood, they show a determined ‘DIY’ and entrepreneurial attitude, essential to the commercial side of their business. The business savvy required building up their reputation independently from a record company, and exporting themselves and their music to overseas markets, requires a lot of business sense and risk-taking behaviour.

FFD believe that music is not diminished by interaction with market, and their retention of control over the business side of their music indicates their inventiveness and the many possibilities for negotiation with the institution of
the market if artists have developed a unique, quality product. To succeed at this requires a whole host of abilities. Musical talent, original material, ability to collaborate, self-subsidisation, commitment, innovation, and cultural and symbolic capital are required, as well as economic capital, commercial acumen and knowledge of the music industry.

ii) State intervention and entrepreneurship

The state’s role in cultural production in New Zealand has in the past been largely to support the autonomous sphere of production. Due to New Zealand’s size and geographic location the large-scale cultural industries present in countries like Australia, the United Kingdom, Japan or the United States are not present here. International corporations involved in newspaper, advertising, film, television, book, design, internet, music, software corporations may have some presence here through New Zealand based subsidiaries or offices of multi-national companies, but generally there are no large-scale New Zealand owned cultural industries. The recent exception would be Peter Jackson’s configuration of film production companies in Wellington, however this configuration would still be regarded as quite independent compared to some of the large-scale production houses in the United States. One would not expect the government to get involved with this larger-scale end of the market for cultural goods.

New Zealand cultural policy has traditionally been focused on strategic direction and funding for publicly owned cultural institutions, such as Te Papa, Radio New Zealand, National Library, TVNZ, Maori Television, NZSO etc. In addition to this, the government provides funds to other funding bodies, which are administered separately from the Ministry of Culture and Heritage, such as New Zealand on Air, the Film Commission, and Creative
New Zealand. These bodies then distribute funds on merit of application to producers, organizations and individual creators on a project basis.

There is an unusual anomaly in this type of subsidy in that commercial cultural producers can apply for these government grants also. For example, a major record label can apply for NZ on Air new recording funding, or a NZ on Air television production can be screened on TV3 or C4, which are owned by CamWest media, a private broadcaster. On the other hand, commercial radio has opted for a voluntary quota to play New Zealand music, so the subsidized sphere and the commercial sphere are inter-related and relatively fluid. An example is the inter-relationship between the more commercial advertising industry, and the local film industry. As the Snapshot report states:

The impact of public investment is felt throughout the industries, even in areas where there is no apparent direct subsidy. The advertising industry is a case in point, with its highly commercial and profitable ethos that is driven off a context of subsidized television… Conversely, without the ongoing income provided by directors and technical crews by the advertising industry (making advertisements for television) there would be no film industry (Auckland City Council, 2005, p. 77).

What this quote is recognizing is that the subsidized sphere of cultural production and the commercial sphere of cultural production interact regularly and are of mutual benefit to each other. As Tim Hazeldine writes, “At any time the creative city will be a network of relationships between sectors and activities” (Starkwhite, 2002, p. 33).

Alongside the government’s roles as a funder in the public arts and culture, and investor and subsidiser of arts activities at the autonomous pole of production, (and some commercial production to stimulate demand) the government has been increasingly moving towards a strategic role within the
‘industry’ side of creative activity, attempting to aid larger scale commercial cultural industry development in New Zealand (De Bruin, 2005, p. 6). For music, this has involved a new fund to help musicians export their music internationally. For film, this has meant helping the film industry to attract international funding partners to make New Zealand films, such as Whale Rider, and In My Father’s Den (p. 6). The state is seeking to be an entrepreneurial actor within the creative industries, by encouraging small and large creative enterprises. De Bruin observes that there is multi-level entrepreneurial activity operating here, and a “dynamic interaction and symbiotic interdependence at the various levels of entrepreneurship” (p. 16). By working as a capital investor and promotional entrepreneur to intervene in spheres of cultural production, and aid partnerships between State, market and artistic producer the State’s role in the field of cultural production has extended further than what Bourdieu initially conceived.

Conclusion

In my observations, artists tend to locate themselves somewhere along Bourdieu’s continuum, or within this multidimensional field of cultural production according to their habitus, and amount and forms of capital they have available to them at a given time, and the amount and forms of capital (social, cultural and economic) that are most important to build. Many artists utilize the bases for production at both ends of Bourdieu’s continuum, and the two spheres interact with each other. The consecrated sphere influences the symbolic value of all artwork, and the commercial sphere influences the market value of all artwork. Abbing calls this a continuum of aesthetic value and market value which can in many cases converge, (popular success and critical acclaim) or be at different ends depending on its taste audience (2002).
Instead of expecting that every artist should become a ‘cultural entrepreneur’ at the heteronomous end of production, maximizing art for profit, we can expect that artists will experiment with alternative bases and formations for cultural production, and some will choose the small-scale form of cultural production, working in increasingly inventive ways to negotiate their involvement with large-scale production. The inter-relationships between heteronomous and autonomous poles of production, described by Bourdieu, and further developed by Hesmondhalgh help cultural producers reflect on their position within the field of cultural production. This reflection and articulation of the complexities of the field of cultural production is of benefit to arts education, so that the political ‘mechanics’ of production are more widely understood.
3 THE ALTERNATIVE WORLD OF BOHEMIA

From 1830 literary society isolated itself in an aura of indifference and rejection towards the buying and reading public, i.e. towards the ‘bourgeois’. By an effect of circular causality, separation and isolation engender further separation and isolation, and cultural production develops a dynamic autonomy (Bourdieu, 1985, p. 17).

Introduction

This chapter begins by describing the emergence of the Bohemian artist, particularly the movement’s humble and ironic beginnings in Murger’s play La Vie Boheme and the circumstances of unemployment and industrialisation in Paris of 1830. The second part then moves on to discuss the historical changes in cultural institutions and formations for artists, from guilded artisan to market professional, to contextualize the disjuncture between art and economics upon which Bohemia arose. The final part of the chapter revisits Bourdieu’s concept of the field of restricted production (outlined in Chapter Two) forged during the Bohemian era, and describes how this liberated artists into several new freedoms in art and social life.

Importance of Bohemia to the thesis topic

The reason I have chosen the Bohemian period to examine within this thesis is that the cultural phenomenon of Bohemianism is a richly illustrative example of the complex relationship between art and economics in Western society, forged during a time of economic and social upheaval in Europe. Part of what has informed the habitus of the Western European artist today, is the
historical and mythological figure of the Bohemian artist, which arose in response to economic change in the late eighteenth century and early nineteenth century. Bohemia is based on the artist residing in a cityscape, and arising within a context of social, political and economic upheaval. This serves to illustrate the tension, dynamics and economic uncertainty of the artistic ‘calling’ within a Western capitalist economy. This has application to the political economy of the artist today that is also situated within post-industrial capitalism, and within new discourses such as the ‘knowledge economy’ and the ‘creative industries.’

This chapter draws on Bourdieu’s notion of habitus to draw out the influence of this period on contemporary society’s discourse about art and economy. This chapter is not primarily concerned with the aesthetic achievements of the artists of this period, or a critique of the work and sub-movements itself produced in this period, as interesting and important as they are. What are of primary importance are the notable changes to the habitus of the artist, instituted during this period.

The chapter also briefly touches on Michel Foucault’s theoretical approach to historical analysis, that of genealogy. Genealogy is a way to approach the analysis of historical grounds for a given system of thought. This can help us to leave behind our ‘infatuations’ and ‘lofty’ ideals about how something may have come about. Foucault describes historical beginnings as “lowly: not in the sense of modest…but derisive and ironic, capable of undoing every infatuation” (Prado, 2000, p. 35). A Foucauldian approach to historical work is not to find all of the answers, so to speak, about why we are the way we are now, but to find out where there are errors and false appraisals, faulty calculations that have given us what we have today. This approach to history means we are not looking for a golden era, but a mix of power-plays, language games and false assumptions (Rabinow, 1984, p.
To refer genealogically to an historical problem is also to refer to the discourse, at least in Foucault’s understanding of genealogy, to a problem in the present (Heraud, 2005, p. 1). I wanted to see how the present attitudes about money and commerce might have a historical reference in Bohemia.

Although musicians or composers do not feature as personalities described in the literature of this period (the emphasis tends to be on writers and visual artists) this does not discount this period as an area of study for arts education. I am convinced this period is fruitful to look at because of the influence this period has had on the ways in which artists approach art production for the market. Because Bohemians were the first group of artists to negotiate producing art within industrial capitalism, the basis with which musicians as a subset of artists may approach their economic survival has a genealogy that goes back to some of the ideals and heterodoxy emergent in the Bohemian subculture.

Bohemia continues to be somewhat of a mythological country. To quote Roland Barthes, I am seeking to find the complexities, the dialectics, the contradictions of history, that make something less ‘mythological’ and more ‘historical’ (Barthes, 1993, p. 143). Like Bourdieu, Foucault claims that our subjectivity is historical, but takes on different forms in different historical periods…” (Danaher, et al., 2000, p. 118). Wilson suggests Bohemianism, as a cultural identity to society today, is one like an old-fashioned frock, hanging in the back of the wardrobe. It has a certain “musty charm” but she thinks it might well be relegated to the “museum of ideas” (2000, p. 246).

In her opinion art and the social and cultural space that art arises from have fundamentally changed and are no longer a “single continuum”, or “two hostile camps of high and low”, but a “multidimensional” space (p. 246).
The emergence of the Bohemian artist

Bohemia is the name for the alternative world within Western society created by nineteenth and twentieth-century artists, writers, intellectuals and radicals (Wilson, 2000, p. 2). The word Bohemian comes to us through French, in which language the word (bohémien) has long been applied to Romani people, who were thought to have entered France from Bohemia, in the Czech Republic. It is thought that at this time in Paris there had been a safe haven for this ethnic group. The word shifted in usage in the nineteenth century, from “somebody who was a vagabond, or a person of irregular life and habits” (the disparaging view of ‘Romani’ ethnicity at the time) to be “applied with special reference to an artist, writer or actor who despised conventionality” (Worldwidewords, 2005).

The emergence of the Bohemian artist was dependent on specific social, economic and geographic circumstances. The Bohemian artist arose first and foremost in mid-nineteenth-century Paris. Elizabeth Wilson notes that Paris was the only metropolis in the mid-nineteenth century that had the concentration and centralization of political, intellectual and cultural life to sustain an artistic counterculture (2000 p. 28). Later in the nineteenth century Bohemian districts were well established in a number of large European and American cities and all shared similar characteristics. For example, in Germany’s, Munich, Schwabing, and Berlin, in America’s, San Francisco, Chicago and New York (Greenwich Village and Soho) and in London’s Soho district.

Within the period generally spanning 1830 – 1930 (Siegel, 1986) and sometimes called the Early Modernist period (Brooker, 2004) there are too many artists involved to name or count, but by way of an introduction I will mention some of the more well-known artists here. During 1910 -1930, Bohemian Paris’s heyday, the Montparnasse district of Paris alone housed
thirty-nine well known artists. Painters and writers such as Joan Miro, Max Weber, Marc Chagall, Diego Rivera, Paul Gaugin, Henri Rousseau, Marcel Duchamp, and Pablo Picasso all lived in this area.

i) La vie boheme

The first writer to popularise the notion of the Bohemian artist was Parisian Henri Murger, who wrote a series of short narrative sketches, *Scenes de la Vie Boheme* (1845-49), for the literary magazine *Corsaire*. It told the story of four young men living together in an attic in the Latin Quarter of Paris in 1830. The male characters were Rodolfo, a poet, Marcello, a painter, Schaunard, a musician, and Colline, a philosopher. Mimi, a grisette (working-class seamstress) and Musetta, an artist’s model, were the female characters in the sketches. The setting is predominantly the café life in the Latin Quarter of Paris at the time (Murger, 1908). Murger then, together with a playwright, turned the character sketches into a stage play, entitled *La Vie de Boheme*, which premiered in Paris in 1849. The play was later made into the well-known Puccini opera *La Boheme*, which is still popular today.

The act of writing and talking about Bohemianism by writers and artists caused this subculture to become part of being an artist, frequently revisited and affirmed so that it becomes deep rooted within an artistic habitus. These themes of Bohemianism are re-iterated in numerous artworks such as plays, biographical films, songs, documentaries and novels that tell the story of the ‘tragic artist’ or ‘poor artist’ figure. This is an example of the political consciousness of artists within the habitus of the artist which continues to affirm Bohemian values.

In examining the emergence of Bohemia, it is important to note that it only came into existence as writers began to describe it and painters depicted it. So from the start this was a discourse shared in and created by writers and
artists themselves. This fits with Foucault’s conception of discourse, which comes about through a field “speaking” of itself (Danaher, et al., 2000, p. 33).

The act of writing and talking about Bohemianism by writers and artists caused this state to become perhaps more fixed in the habitus of the artist about how an artist ought to live. As Webb et al. commenting on Bourdieu’s concept of habitus state: “[the]… values and dispositions gained from our cultural history…generally stay with us across contexts (they are durable and transposable)” (2002, p. 36-37).

**ii) Ironic beginnings**

An irony with Murger’s work is that he spoke of Bohemia being a transitory phase, and one whence he ultimately wanted to escape. After the resulting fame and wealth of *La Vie de Boheme*, the stage play, Murger continued to write works about his Bohemian friends, but only from the comfort of his country cottage on the outskirts of the city. A website devoted to Bohemianism notes that in Murger’s opinion, people who were unable to see beyond it and move into the next stage of life would destroy themselves (Mytholoke, 2005).

This story of Murger’s retreat into the country after reaching moderate fame and fortune as a Bohemian playwright is an example of the kind of ironic beginnings that Foucault explores in genealogical work. In the light of Foucault’s theory of genealogy, I have been more attentive to how the birth of Bohemia may in fact be fraught with irony, accidents and deviations and its enduring power may be because of power-plays and even false assumptions.

Another example of ironic beginnings is that you might expect that because of the difficulties with producing cultural goods for the market, ‘would-be’ artists have been deterred from entering the market. In fact the opposite occurred. This is an example of a delightfully human faulty
calculation that resulted in a unique art movement. Siegel suggests that becoming an artist became a very magnetic concept, even “emblematic of the emancipation and fulfillment the new society promised to all who conscientiously developed their personal abilities” (1986, p. 15). Siegel describes how there was a noticeable increase in people wanting to become artists, as well as an increasing number of stories and plays about artists during this time. Siegel describes this phenomenon as “artistism” (p. 25).

In the case of Paris, there were three groups of young Parisians that due to their economic status made them ‘risk preferent’ and therefore fed the supply of cultural producers and the artworlds surrounding these. Towse says that professions in which risk preference dominates, often result in overcrowding, as all entrants “overestimate their chance of success” (1993, p. 178). The risk preferent groups of Bohemia can be identified as i) young unemployed middle-class men, ii) single, working-class women from rural areas and iii) remittance men.

The first group that fed Bohemian Paris was young, unemployed, middle class men. This was the result of a growing birth rate which meant there was, (in the mid-eighteenth century), an all time high of youth aged fifteen through thirty years. This growth put economic pressures on society as the population was expanding faster than industry. There was a great deal of competition for jobs, especially professional positions. Siegel says that it is likely that many of these unlucky, middle-class, unemployed youth fed the population of Bohemia (1986, p. 20). In fact, Wilson says: “…few Bohemians came from working-class or proletarian backgrounds” (2000, p. 22).

The second group who were involved in the artworld and had a preference for risk, were single, working-class women. They, by association with artists from the middle-classes, were offered a chance to more easily climb the social ladder. They were known as grisettes and were young,
working-class women, usually in their twenties, who left their home and families in the countryside to find work in Paris in the cloth trade. Grisettes lived on their own, away from their families, and supported themselves, and sometimes their families, with their work. Failure to achieve some sort of security through marriage often resulted in prostitution or death. The severity of a working-class woman’s life if she did not marry well is the opposite of the ‘care-free’ image we know of Bohemianism. On the other hand, middle-class women had a harder time leaving their old lives for a Bohemian one, because they were more hampered by ideas of respectability and feared the loss of social standing. In economic terms they were risk adverse.

Seigel describes how grisettes were figures of “romantic fantasy” for the men of Bohemia. They were young, available, unfettered by “bourgeois morality” (1986, p. 40). As mistresses they satisfied the physical needs of the pleasure-seeking Bohemians. Grisettes provided a valuable audience for Bohemians; they accompanied them to the cafes, joined their conversations, listened to poems and examined art work inspired by and completed for them. Through the unique social situation, of a group of relatively unsupervised young women, without family, and without anything to lose in terms of status (in fact fearing prostitution or death), Bohemian men were able to pursue their ideals of ‘freedom’ in regards to sexuality, and reject the bourgeois norms of traditional family values that they despised.

The third group with resilience to risk was those known as remittance men, who were rebels from the upper middle class who were able to pursue an “artistic calling by virtue of an independent income. They “lived on large or meager allowances from their families” and “remained familiar figures in Bohemia” (Wilson, 2000, p. 22).
Historical changes in artistic institutions and formations

Bourdieu’s paper, *The Market of Symbolic Goods* (1985), traces the way in which artists legitimation and authority have developed historically. Raymond Williams (1981) also examines the institutions, formations and means of production historically influencing cultural production. Williams’ categories of institutions (institutional, patrons, markets [with the sub-categories of artisanal, post-artisanal, market professional, corporate professional], post-markets), formations (guilds, academies, professional societies, movements, factions, dissidents and rebels) and means of production (dance, song, speech, writing, reproduction, new media, group production, ownership) comprehensively expand the sociology of cultural production in greater detail than Bourdieu, while also complementing Bourdieu’s work.

I have concentrated on the institutions and formations of cultural production prior to Bohemianism, which I term the i) *guilded artisan* phase and the ii) *transitional* artist phase, and then locate Bohemianism within what I call the iii) *market* phase. I will examine in more depth the market phase within which the Bohemian subculture was situated.

i) *Guilded artisan*

Intellectual and artistic life was dominated by external sources of legitimacy throughout the Middle Ages (Bourdieu, 1985, p. 14).

The guilded artisanal phase of cultural production through the Middle Ages was characterized by the artist being bound closely to the world in which he worked, as servant of society, rather than its critic (Wilson, 2000, p. 2). Artisans came from the artisan classes, and had higher status than workers or peasants. They belonged to the petit-bourgeois class. Not everyone could become an artisan due to restrictions on entry to apprenticeships. The artisan’s
livelihood was based on external sources of legitimacy in that he served the Roman Catholic Church and the royal courts.

Around the 14th century, artisans formed guilds. Guilds specified conditions of work and pay, defined members’ place in urban society, provided a voice in government, acted as a focus for social action and offered aid for its sick and elderly members. Guilds reduced competition by limiting the numbers of apprentices a master could train. This controlled the numbers of professional artisans in any one locality. To be a member of a guild you normally had to be a citizen of that town. However, some towns hired foreign and visitor artisans and made exceptions to this rule. Those who took up an artisan practice outside of the accepted apprentice model were regarded with suspicion and very often not allowed to receive the Roman Catholic sacrament of Holy Communion.

Cathedrals such as Westminster Abbey in London and the Notre Dame in Paris were built during this time, illustrating the huge investment in architecture, sculpture, painting, masonry and music that the church made during this period. The universities also supported music through their inclusion of music theory in the liberal arts. (Other arts were excluded as they were regarded as mechanical rather than intellectual). The royal courts were, fortunately for artisans, favourable towards the arts also, and used them in displays of wealth to their political advantage. The wealth and extravagance of these two political and religious power bases, and their dedication to the arts to glorify and worship God, meant artisans were a fully integrated part of medieval society.
ii) Transitional

For part of the Renaissance and, in the case of French court-life, throughout the classical age, intellectual and artistic life has progressively freed itself from aristocratic and ecclesiastical tutelage (Bourdieu, 1985, p. 14).

Patronage during the Renaissance period continued to be from the church and royal courts. However, humanist ideologies and significant technological developments saw artists progressively freeing themselves from the auspices of church and rulers. This is a transitional period where artists sought to elevate their position in society, to establish the right to legislate their own sphere, and free themselves from subordination to religious and political interests. Due to technological developments, there were also new opportunities for artists to interact with a growing base of consumers of culture as a result of the expansion of primary education. Despite this, aristocratic and ecclesiastical patronage still formed the major part of an artist’s legitimation.

Humanism, that is the revival of Greek and Roman classical texts and thought, had the effect of diluting church teaching, and signaled the rise of secular education. Secular humanism glorified the importance of the individual in human achievement and self will, as distinct from the power and will of God. This thinking had a significant impact later on how the artist perceived themselves, as individuals with an important creative vision, and also in the whole of society during the eighteenth century, moving away from corporate reception of God to individual reception.

Visual artists in Italy during this period revolted against the guilds, and fought for social recognition of their art as an intellectual rather than a manual occupation. This is an example of a group of artists attempting to improve their own standing and capital within a field. By using humanist thought, they were able to give their art a theoretical foundation, elevating themselves
above the craftsman. They emphasized their pursuit of art as coming from “love and noblemindedness” instead of from “poverty and necessity” (Cennini cited in Wittkower, 1963, p. 23). This was an important theoretical shift, which served to free artists from restraints by guilds, and patrons who were dictating the content, style, production and payment of their work.

This revolt from the guilds brought about significant changes to the way artists worked and were paid, resulting in the ability to amass wealth in an unprecedented way. Individual reputation became increasingly important for Italian visual artists. For example, painters such as Michelangelo and Leonardo da Vinci became known as intellectual as well as artistic geniuses. In a sense, this was an important change in the habitus of artists. It could be argued these artists helped facilitate a new habitus for all artists, one based on freedom from structure and communal obligations (Mukerji, 1979, p. 247-248).

Rudolf and Margot Wittkower, in their book Born Under Saturn (1963) describe how this change in the economic and social status of visual artists actually changed artists’ known temperament. Artists were once associated with the planet Mercury, cheerful men of action. Later, with the economic and social changes, they were associated with the planet Saturn, that of the melancholic genius. They attribute this to the greater free time and isolation that artists experienced, removed from guild regulations and corporate responsibilities.

The Catholic Church also suffered an irreparable blow to its stability and power in this phase, through the Reformation, and the spread of Protestantism in the form of Lutheranism (Germany, Netherlands), Calvinism (France) and Anglicanism (England). Fortunately for musicians and composers, music remained part of the worship of Protestantism, and new forms of music were composed for these different styles of worship, such as hymns for
congregational singing. Lutheranism was more devastating for other artistic forms that lost patronage due to Lutheran beliefs about visual representation, and a more puritanical approach to decoration and ceremony.

The major technological development in this era was the invention of the printing press which made compositions, literature and artworks available to the wider public and literacy grew as a result. This was the first form of mechanical reproduction of art for mass consumption. Partially feeding the growth in musical publishing was a new group of amateur musicians who wanted songs and compositions to play or sing. Bourdieu suggests that as the public grew into a more diverse and educated populace, a competing principle of legitimacy for artists began to emerge, that of the market for symbolic goods (1985, p.14).

iii) Market

They [artists] are increasingly in a position to liberate their products from all social servitude, whether the moral censure and aesthetic programmes of a proselytizing church, or the academic controls and directives of political power...(Bourdieu, 1985, p. 15).

This emancipation from guilds by visual artists as well as the rise of mercantilism and later capitalism, led to the weakening of guild power to the point where guilds were eventually banned in Europe by 1830, being seen as a remnant of the past order, and limiting of individual and artistic freedom. In effect, over several centuries, a musician or composer had moved from being a guilded artisan, with regulated hours and integration into the petit-bourgeois class of society, to an emancipated creative genius.

The uniqueness of the artist/individual, the isolated and alienated artist, and the artist as misunderstood genius became indicators of the artist during the Romantic era. The eccentricities and tragedies of artist’s lives were
viewed as by nature, and their ‘outsider’ status was what made them creative individuals. Philosophers such as Nietzsche (1999) remarked in 1872 that the arts reflected the Dionysian forces, the unconscious collective, and science and reason as Apollonian conscious forces. Science and art were perceived as antithetical. There was disillusionment amongst artists about the notion of economic growth, progress and industrial expansion. A shift was happening in which the artist was moving from being integrated into society, as a servant, to an outsider and critic.

The changes that occurred in France and more gradually in Britain, and in other Western European countries during the late eighteenth century and early nineteenth century, that of the industrial revolution and the establishment of a capitalist economy, as well as in some cases political revolution, shifted political and economic power from the aristocratic ruling class to the middle-classes or, as they are known in French, the bourgeoisie. These classes now made up government, and their interests were largely being served in government policy. These changes had the most detrimental effect on traditional art patronage.

At the same time that traditional sources of patronage were shrinking, a commercial cultural realm of a different sort was growing. Expanding literacy, urban growth and increasing middle class wealth had enlarged the market for cultural products. Wealthy homes required furnishings and decoration that exhibited this wealth. This group also required cultural activities for their entertainment and education. There was a boom in journalism and new publishing houses, theatres, concert halls, libraries and museums opened.

Art was becoming just another commodity, to be produced speculatively in the hope that it would sell. The artist not only had to prostitute his art to the logic of
profit, but was expected to entertain an audience, which (or so at least he felt) lacked discrimination (Wilson, 2000, p. 17).

The demand for cultural goods was coming from a new kind of audience, the middle class. This was a large-scale shift in the way an artist worked who previously was used to being looked after by a court, civic or church patron. Economic risk for producing the artwork was now placed firmly on the artist’s shoulders, or shared with new cultural intermediaries, such as publishing companies. Remuneration and protections that once existed for artists had been dismantled and dissolved by political and social changes. The artist had to negotiate a new commercial reality, one of public patronage and the anonymous individual bourgeoisie consumer of art.

**Emergence of the field of restricted production (FRP)**

…the gulf between the hierarchy of producers dependent on ‘public success’ (measured by volume of sales or fame outside the body of producers) and the hierarchy dependent upon recognition within the peer competitor group undoubtedly constitutes the best indicator of the autonomy of the field of restricted production” (Bourdieu, 1985, p. 18).

The variety of philosophical responses to cultural production for the market place had led to many popular culture movements and a diverse range of art formations and institutions. Bourdieu suggests that a gulf emerged between producers for “public success” and producers for “peer recognition” resulting in a field of restricted production (Bourdieu, 1985, p. 18). These two poles or sub-fields of cultural production are characterized by heteronomy, that is, orientation towards the market for symbolic goods, and autonomy, that is, disfavour and disassociation towards the market for symbolic goods. This has allowed for considerable variety in the ways artists can organize the base of cultural production, both large and small-scale.
Producing cultural goods for the market brought a mixed reaction from artists. Some artists welcomed the new market relations, sensing the opportunity available to them through economic liberalism and the lack of ideological restraints. Those that believed in unrestricted access to artistic activities felt that with this change, all activities were, in principle open to all people. A society had been created that encouraged all that could develop their talents, the freedom to do so, as members of a free community. Contrast this to the guilded artisan phase when in order to practice as a musician or other kind of artist, you had to be apprenticed to a master. This was often determined by your class (whether you were from an artisan class), and in late medieval times as the guilds became less democratic, by your family connections.

Those in favour of the market believed the artist was at liberty now, as the artist could speak, cry and sing for all. Artists could draw their inspiration from all aspects of society, the desires and sufferings of everyone, and their work did not need to be sanctioned by their patron. They also noted that the artist was no longer a dependent or servant on a family of rank, but one who was paid directly for the “free products of his genius,” which they felt was a more direct relationship with the world (Siegel, 1986, p. 15). Those in favour of this change felt these factors would all aid the progress of art, leading art into new and exciting directions.

Whilst the market offered many new possibilities for art, many artists viewed the change to producing goods for the market as a negative one. They felt that culture could only be debased by entry into the marketplace. Some of the reasons for this were that the world of commerce would be “too narrow for the broad spaces of imagination”, too “utilitarian” in value, too “earthbound,” and there would never be the large-scale works commissioned as they had been in the past, as people would prefer something that fits in
their “salon or boudoir” (Siegel, 1986, p. 14). Artists would have to make works that responded to the “whims” and “caprices of fashion” of the buyer that of the bourgeois, whose tastes was an unknown quantity. Suddenly, their livelihood was open to the fluctuations of the market. Some feared they would be deprived of the leisure time necessary to develop their talent, because they would be too busy “earning their bread” (Siegel, 1986, p. 14).

The negative reaction to producing art for industrial capitalism is summarized by Williams (1981, p. 72). He explains that alternative and oppositional groups in the eighteenth and nineteenth century came out of the idea that “… the practice and values of art are neglected by, or have to be distinguished from, or are superior or hostile to the dominant values of ‘modern’ society” (p.72). Two social bases for these ideas are i) the crisis of the transition from patronage to market, and ii) the crisis of the transition from handwork to machine production (among others). In general, the practices and values of a ‘commercial’ and ‘mechanical’ civilization were something from which the practice and values of the arts could be distinguished (p.72). These ideas became prominent in the eighteenth century, and resulted in alternative and oppositional formations in the late nineteenth century, for example William Morris’s Arts & Craft movement and the Bloomsbury group of writers.

This calculation that art must come first and the market second is also what Bourdieu calls ‘art for art’s sake.’ Bourdieu suggests that the “ideology of free, disinterested ‘creation’ founded on the spontaneity of innate inspiration was a reaction to the pressure of an anonymous market” (1985, p. 16). By acting ‘disinterested’ in the market, artists gave the appearance of being above and removed from areas of economic and social interest, claiming to be concerned with higher aesthetic values (Webb, et al., 2001, ix and xi). This actually served to increase the cultural value of what they were
producing, as it became associated with a sacred or consecrated sphere, similar to religion, or other spheres where monetary exchange is less important, such as inalienable land, family or friendships. Culture as thus defined came to have a semi-religious function and value, even virtually to replace religion. This was possible because, in spite of being produced as a commodity at the FRP, it remained to some extent distanced from capitalist values (Wilson, 2000, p. 20-21).

These artists knew that the only possible way that they were left with to produce these cultural goods was by negotiation with the market. However, they felt this function needed to be concealed, downplayed, and secondary to the art. Devotion to art should come first, and the money would follow. They also believed that this new audience was vulgar and lacked taste. It followed that to be successful in winning their affections was to surrender to them. Conversely, failure to please the bourgeoisie was proof of the artist’s originality and genius. In a sense this is the ‘faulty calculation’ which, as Foucault says, many movements or ideas are based on. It also illustrates the power-play that was going on at the time, between industrialization and commercialisation and art production.

Abbing proposes that this denial of the economy has served to elevate the status of the arts to a sacred sphere, outside of commerce, and kept the cultural status of art high. Abbing describes this as an asymmetrical, two-faced value system. “[In art] Many transactions are guided by a normal, but veiled orientation to market values” (Abbing, 2002, p. 48). Artists appear to be primarily motivated by psychic rewards that are the joy and satisfaction of doing expressive work.

Wilson describes this reaction by some artists to reject and downplay money and commerce as an “imaginary solution” (2000, p.3) to producing art within industrial capitalism. It has the artist operating both inside and outside
commerce and consumption, straddling the “economic uncertainty of the artistic calling” with “ideas of the artist’s genius and superiority” (p. 5). Wilson goes on to say that Bohemia is a “cultural myth…that seeks to reconcile Art in industrial capitalism…” (p.3).

This ‘liberation’ from social servitude and reliance on the market had the appearance of increasing artists’ liberty. However, Bourdieu goes on to say that this liberty is “purely formal” as artists were now subject to the “laws of the market of symbolic goods” (Bourdieu, 1985, p. ) and this pressure exerted itself in new ways, such as sales figures, publishers, theatre managers, art-dealers.

**New freedoms**

…while on the one hand the artist saw himself as a romantic genius elevated above the common run, on the other his fascination with the everyday, the obscure, the forbidden and the sordid contributed to the perception of the Bohemian artist, as one who deliberately went ‘slumming’…” (Wilson, 2000, p. 24)

Given the freedom to explore new subject matter, the heroism of everyday life, the unexpected beauty of the simplest and lowest elements of society, captured the interest of artists. This was essentially a form of exoticism. Artists began to explore the obscure, banal, traditionally unpoetical and shocking aspects of modern existence. This was also fuelled by the fact that artists were living in working-class areas of town due to their poverty. As artists were denied regular conventions and obligations, they moved into new spaces and new possibilities.

Art became a way of finding out just where these boundaries of the new ‘free subjectivity’ stood and where they could be pushed. In doing so, artists and intellectuals opened up new spaces of liberation. The artist’s role in
society became one that would meditate on ugliness as well as beauty, alienation as well as solidarity, to reflect back on society their values, so as to challenge their morality, and to offer society a unique vision. Wilson suggests artists were becoming shamanistic (Wilson, 2000, p. 25). In this way, art was moving from adornment and a purely aesthetic dimension to a confrontational aspect. Artists became concerned with the ‘truth’. As Sapiro says, they developed a professional “deontology” which included probity, sincerity, concern with truth and reality (2004, p. 449).

The Bohemian principles of erotic and alcoholic excess, love and opium create a culture of transgression, further sustained by songs, linguistic puns and jokes (Bourdieu, 1992, p. 88 cited in Fowler, 1997, p. 51). The artistic habitus most characteristic of modernity is shaped by knowledge of this oppositional history and the lived experience of heterodoxy (Fowler, 1997, p. 51).

Bourdieu notes that Bohemia shaped an oppositional history or heterodoxy in the habitus of the artist. Heterodoxy is a “set of beliefs and values that challenge the status quo and received wisdom- or common sense- within a particular field” (Webb, et al., xiii). Bourdieu refers to artists as heterodoxical because of the freedom they claimed from social norms. In my reading, Bohemianism is one of the first examples of heterodoxy, or a ‘reversed world’ or a ‘society within a society’ founded on a fundamental rupture with the ethos of the market and the dominant class (Fowler, 1997, p. 51). The dominant class in this case was always imagined as the bourgeoisie, the ruling class.

Cultural historian, Sarah Maza writes about the “myth of the French bourgeoisie” as a “group imagined as the incarnation of privacy, selfishness, and spiritual deficiency” (2003, p. 192). Maza points out that “hardly anyone in France has claimed to be bourgeois; the word invariably applied to someone else” (dustcover). Maza’s argument is that the bourgeois is the
“scapegoat…in the Gallix social imaginary, the embodiment of centrifugal materialism and self-interest” (p. 199) similar to the Jew (in the nineteenth century) and the American (in the twentieth century). She thinks that the bourgeoisie “define negatively France’s deepest social, cultural and political ideals” (p. 5). She goes on to say:

Contempt for the bourgeois appears to have been a source of cohesion to the denizens of coteries known as cenacles, and in the mid-1840s a series of newspaper articles gave the modern literary world one of its most powerful founding myths: Bohemia (p. 182).

Bohemia was a form of transgression, opposition and heterodoxy, and a source of cohesion ‘against’ bourgeois values. As Wilson says “…It was the ‘other’ of bourgeois society, that is to say it expressed everything that the bourgeois order buried and suppressed (2000, p. 240). Williams offers the notion of class fraction to describe the alternative movement of Bohemia (1981, p. 74). For example, Bohemian artists explored liberation in sexuality, work hours, aesthetic appearance, political ideas, social and ethnic marginalities, and the value of money.

As artists were now independent producers for the market, they could easily have become geographically dispersed, which could have made them potentially invisible and de-politicised. However, this was not the case. Artists were visible in the collective spaces of cafés, clubs and street life and often shared accommodation in the same working-class parts of the city. According to Wilson, café culture was the social institution whereby the lonely artist became a Bohemian (Wilson, 2000, p. 34). For example, Siegel describes Murger’s informal group of friends known as the ‘Water Drinkers’ who inspired his writing and provided mutual support (Siegel, 1986, p. 34). Because artists’ working hours were irregular, cafés provided a place to go outside of the home, day or night.
Café life gave artists a visual presence in society, and created a meeting, learning, and political space for their growth and development. This informal clustering or ‘formation’ in Williams’ sense was an important part of cultural production. Before telephones, faxes and email, the café served the function of bringing together various players in the art world, both artists and intermediaries such as journalists, editors, painters, models, actors and directors. Cafes were also used as studies and libraries for individual work. Paper to draw or write on was often provided for free by the café. And most important was conversation, the café acting in a sense as a university. Learning to debate, to perceive, to think as well as the educational function of newspapers and magazines, made the café atmosphere one conducive to learning. Smoking also allowed those who had long finished their coffee to linger, to “orchestrate time” as part of the performance of café life (Wilson, 2000, p. 38). Through this desire to be visible, and operate to some degree collectively, artists brought an artistic sensibility to bear on all those aspects of life that were once thought peripheral to art, such as dress, surroundings and relationships.

**Conclusion**

This response of Bohemia by artists in the late eighteenth and nineteenth century to the practices and values of a ‘commercial’ and ‘mechanical’ civilization has meant the opening up of many possibilities in popular culture and equally importantly has meant artists possess a voice of challenge, criticism and opposition to the dominant hegemony or discourse. The counter space that Bohemianism opened up for artists has meant artists also had a tradition and habitus of negotiation and sometimes contradiction of the commercial and technological sphere of life. In this sense, it has enabled artists to make a contribution to society as extremely valuable pioneers and
experimenters in cultural movements and ideas, outside of normal ‘economic’ or conservative models.

What Bohemia has shown is that power-plays exist within industrial capitalism and evidence of this are the boundaries where class fractions such as the Bohemians emerge. The crisis of transition from patronage to market for symbolic goods introduced threats to the way in which art was appreciated and valued in society. Bohemian artists worked around this by forming an alternative world, where inverse forms of capital became important. This resulted in the market, or economic capital, not becoming the dominant form of capital in the field of restricted production. Bourdieu believes the establishment of a restricted pole of production is of great advantage to Western society, in terms of critical thought and the pursuit of collective ideals and should be protected. In the light of Keat’s philosophical discussion of market boundaries, Bohemia and movements like it help capitalist societies appreciate non-market spheres of life.

The development of a dynamic autonomy is something to be valued as providing an opportunity for critique. Today’s artist has inherited in part this from the Bohemians, who were the first group of artists who were faced with negotiating the production of cultural and artistic goods for a capitalist, free-market economy. The Bohemian impulse to reinvent daily life, to question the status quo, to experiment, to move towards community and festivity over and above individualism and conservative values, has provided today’s artist and arts educator with an opportunity in the habitus of the artist to continue to explore alternative ideas, a heterodoxy and explore new ways of being, even within post-industrial capitalism. We can expect modifications in the habitus of the artists to adjust to the field of cultural production through time, but the legacy of Bohemianism, and other subsequent social and political movements in art, means that part of the habitus which has the ability to question, to be
oppositional and critique the circumstances of its own being looks set to remain inveterate in the artist’s habitus. And this space of criticality is essential for ‘becoming an artist.’
4 ENTERPRISE CULTURE AND CREATIVITY

Introduction

To become familiar with the discourses exerting disciplinary power over today’s artist in the ways in which they will ‘become’ an artist, I draw upon Foucault’s concepts of discourse and governmentality. In this chapter, these concepts help to facilitate a discussion of two powerful political and strategic discourses that have emerged in Britain and New Zealand during the 1980s and continue to exert power over the process of becoming an artist and arts education agendas. They are ‘the enterprising self’ and the ‘instrumentalisation of creativity.’ These concepts offer positive opportunities for those with resilience, cultural and social capital, ambition, resourcefulness and preference for risk to become a ‘creative entrepreneur.’

In this chapter, I lay out the characteristics of the discourses of ‘enterprise culture’ and the ‘instrumentalisation of creativity’ separately. I propose that these cultural and economic forces place limits on the artistic subject, both of who one can be and the kinds of relations that are possible with oneself, with others and with one’s being in the world. Identifying these forces of governmentality is important educational work. As Mansfield explains, teachers, as cultural workers, need to be aware of political and strategic conceptions of musical knowledge and how political discourses may be “enframing” their work (2005, p.133).
Disciplinary power

Foucault was of the opinion that “…the subject is not natural, but takes on different forms in different historical periods…” (Danaher, et al., 2000, p. 118). The subject can be defined as the individual or self, constituted by a blend of internal and external forces. Foucault saw the subject as primarily produced and limited by social forces such as discourses, institutions and relations of power, rather than being a free agent (p. 116-117). Essentially this meant people have their lives, thoughts and activities ‘scripted’ for them by social forces, such as schools, the media and advertising (p. 116-117). Power-knowledge, contexts and discourse place limits on the subject both of who we can be, and the kinds of relations that are possible with ourselves and with others (p. 151).

Discourse is the means through which a field ‘speaks’ of itself. Discourse can extend further beyond one field to span various fields. For example, cultural theorist Giroux claims the discourse of neo-liberalism has become the most pervasive ideology of the twenty-first century, redefining not only the global economy but also the “very nature of politics and sociality” (2004, p. 495). Discourse is evident in the language or ‘truth-games’ that a field generates. Foucault in his historical work looked for discourse in a variety of sites, such as government records, books, a person’s private correspondence and oral memory (Danaher et. al, 2000, p. 3). Discourse can also be evident in the cultural field in official speeches, publications, conversation, cultural exhibitions, and media (internet, television, newspaper and magazine copy and advertising). Episteme is the whole set of relations that unite discursive practices at a given period. It can be used to describe the general background attitude, or belief within a given period. Episteme is similar to the Deleuzian term ‘milieu’. Milieu is the set of conditions that allows a particular cultural
phenomenon to emerge. Episteme is not the origins or foundations of a given period, but rather a practice to be encountered.

Foucault’s notion of governmentality relates to both the control of one’s self and the control of populations. Governmentality is thus defined as the set of practices and strategies that individuals in their freedom use to control or govern themselves and others (Peters, 2005, p. 129). Governmentality has come about in societies where there are de-centred and supposedly de-volved power to society’s members, so that members play an active role in their self-governance (Wikipedia, 2005). Peters states that Foucault used the term ‘governmentality’ to “…signal the emergence of a distinctive mentality of rule that, he alleged, became the basis for modern liberal politics” (2005, p. 126).

Central to Foucault’s work on disciplinary power, is how this power make people “behave” in terms of their bodies, and how patterns emerge which “write” (Danaher, et.al, xiii) or “inscribe” on the body certain attributes and certain status (Prado, 2000, p. 80). Prado says bodies manifest the effects of regulating discourses in their “habits and gestures” and “postures and speech” (p. 36). For Foucault, this is how an individual “internalizes” power (Prado, 2000, p. 80). McRobbie, a feminist cultural commentator gives an example of the way that regulating discourses are manifest in and through the body. She describes the way in which women are now defined in wage-earning rather than child-bearing capacity. She notes this is a dramatic shift in the way women and their bodies show up new forms of subjectivity (2002a, p. 99).

Educational philosophers Marshall, Peters and Olssen draw on Foucauldian notions of disciplinary power to critique the view that education helps individuals achieve personal autonomy. Olssen thinks the notion of individual autonomy understates the “…degree of interconnectedness and
interdependence that characterizes relations in societies” while exaggerating “the extent to which people are independent and self-legislating” (Olssen, 2005, p. 374). Olssen notes how during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries “morality and conduct…conceived in terms of obedience” became “increasingly contested” and replaced with emerging conceptions of morality and life as an exercise in “self-governance” (p. 379). Olssen identifies four sources for the “newly emerging individualism” as the protestant reformation; the scientific revolution, political and economic liberalism and the industrial revolution (p. 379). Today personal autonomy that is the self-reliant and individualistic conception of the person is “avidly promoted through its popular forms of entertainment and media” (p. 374).

Marshall says that while education promotes personal autonomy it denies the social construction of individuals, and masks the fact that we are constituted by political acts (Marshall, 1996a, p. 113 cited in Olssen, 2005, p. 366). Our conception of ourselves as “free agents” (p.366) is in fact an illusion. Instead, modern bio-power, through “technologies of domination” and the “technologies of the self” have produced governable individuals (p. 366). We are far more the products of normalization and socialization than we believe or claim. Olssen, Marshall and Peters focus on how notions of ‘choice’, ‘quality’, ‘freedom’ and ‘autonomy’ have made it seem that the choices, or needs or interests that one has, are one’s own, yet we are being subtly governed to make these choices. I now use the above concepts to show how notions of enterprise culture, instrumentalised creativity are discourses that are governing the artist subject in our current episteme.
The enterprising self

…individuals are to become, as it were, entrepreneurs of themselves, shaping their own lives through the choices they make among the forms of life available to them (Rose, 1997, p. 87 cited in McRobbie, 2004, p. 138)

Keat, co-author of Enterprise Culture (1991) first summarized how enterprise culture and the entrepreneurial self, what he calls the “enterprise form” was a “central motif” in the Britain’s Thatcher administration. This began firstly in economic reform, in terms of market efficiency, individual choice and the non-interventionist state, and then in ‘cultural’ reform, that is the attitudes, values, and forms of self-understanding embedded in both individual and institutional activities (p. 1).

Peters extends this idea of ‘enterprise culture’ to show how it is also the central motif in the Blair administration in Britain (2001, p. 58). Peters states that enterprise culture is a “new metanarrative” for our postindustrial, information economy (p. 65). This metanarrative is based on neo-liberal governance, which reduces State control of the market and transfers choice, responsibility and risk onto the individual. Peters goes on to say:

The duty to the self - its simultaneous responsibilisation as a moral agent and its construction as a calculative rational choice actor – becomes the basis for a series of investment decisions concerning one’s health, education, security, employability, and retirement (p. 61).

Individuals have been governed through the discourse of enterprise culture to operate, above all, with a duty to self and to act from a utilitarian morality. This means calculating their ‘investment decisions’ regarding health, education, and employability on whether they are a rational choice and would personally ‘pay off’ in the long term. This thinking is ingrained in our current education system that it is difficult to consider life operating any other way. Peters says education and training have become increasingly important
in this equation, being a “passport” for one to transition from a dependent, passive welfare consumer to an entrepreneurial self” (p. 60). Peters describes this move towards enterprise culture as both a “radical withdrawal of government” (2005, p. 130-131) coupled with an “intensification of [individual] moral regulation” which he terms “responsibilisation” (2001, p. 59). A closer relation between government and self-government has resulted (p. 68). Heelas further comments:

Thus profit is the main yardstick of success as a human being; and success depends on the person functioning as a ‘business’, treating psychological life-

‘Personal’ activities become increasingly based upon a ‘commercial’ model of running one’s life as a small business (Keat, 1991, p. 3). Enterprising qualities are necessary such as initiative, energy, independence, boldness, self-reliance, willingness to take risks and to accept responsibility for one’s actions and so on. Keat debunks the idea of enterprising individuals as being the key to economic growth stating, “...the conditions of modern capitalist production has been the dominance of large-scale globally organized companies” (p. 7). Therefore, the idea that free market economies will depend primarily on the activities of enterprising individuals is in his opinion an absurdity.

One of the major influences on enterprise culture is neoliberalism. Neoliberalism’s transformation of society has been significant, redefining and reorganizing life along market lines. Giroux says neo-liberalism, which could be thought of as the overarching discourse that has produced enterprise culture “is wed to the belief that the market should be the ‘organizing principle’” for all of life’s decisions (political, social and economic). Under
neo-liberalism, everything is “either for sale or plundered for profit” (2004, p. 495). He writes:

Free-market fundamentalism rather than democratic idealism is now the driving force of economics and politics in most of the world… neo-liberalism wages an incessant attack on democracy, public goods, the welfare state, and non-commodified values (p. 495).

As individuals move closer to the enterprising self, and away from dependency and weakness associated with welfare institutions, or bureaucratic or collective institutions, a more enterprising and it is hoped wealthier society is created. Neoliberalism has essentially been a form of social engineering, or governmentality of individuals to reduce ‘interference’ by the government and collective organisations in spheres of life, and increase individual responsibility and consumer choice. This is characterized by a leaner state (more economical and efficient government spending, and fewer public servants), privatization of state owned enterprises, and where possible within the state owned sphere, individuals and organisations operating closer to competitive market rules. Despite the emphasis on ‘the individual’ and personal choice, there is paradoxically a tightening of state control which has as its aim, the control of the individual. The subject becomes more visible, whilst the constituting factors become more invisible. Political control not freedom has been the aim.

Another aspect of enterprise culture is the importance placed on paid work, or citizens being included in the market economy. McRobbie states:

Getting people into work as a strategy of government becomes also a definition of government. It requires that people become more entrepreneurial, irrespective of education, skills, or expertise (2002b, p. 100).

McRobbie explains how under New Labour and a Blair government in the United Kingdom, work has become increasingly valourised. This is partly
because Labour’s politics could not tolerate the high levels of unemployment that Thatcher’s move to free market values had produced. McRobbie further elaborates that Labour’s approach to unemployment was to place more importance on people getting into work, or wanting to “develop their own capacities to create their own jobs and, it is hoped, employ others” (p.100). According to McRobbie, Labour made work not just a strategy of government, but a *definition* of government. Increasingly under the Blair administration people have been encouraged and channeled into any and every possible form of ‘work’ and self-employment. A similar policy has been advocated in New Zealand through the Clark -Labour government, following Blair’s Third way in political management (Kelsey, 2002, p. 54-55).

Although social inclusion through paid employment has obvious advantages such as the opportunity to develop personal capabilities, earning potential sense of purpose, and low unemployment is a sign of a healthy economy there is a definite social cost. Family time, leisure time and community time are severely curtailed and marginalized in favour of time that can be directly correlated to economic profit. By valorising paid labour as well as entrepreneurship of the self and increasing the visibility of consumption and lifestyles well beyond the reach of the average household, non-market spheres of life are depleted of importance and appeal, while the market sphere of which paid work is one component, becomes life’s organizing principle.

The more entrepreneurial the form of work takes, the more it is an embodiment of the attitudes, values and forms of self-responsibility that the government is interested in fostering, and which in turn reinforces an enterprise culture. Artists are inculcated in this ideology also. Artists are unwitting exemplars of the enterprise culture, and even more powerful are
those artists from disadvantaged backgrounds, who are proof that anyone can pick themselves up by the shoe-strings and ‘make it.’ Commercially successful artists from underprivileged backgrounds are the ultimate pin-up for enterprise culture, making the exception of success appear the norm (McRobbie, 2002b, p. 100).

Alongside social inclusion through work is meritocracy. British Prime Minister, Tony Blair’s recent use of the term ‘meritocracy’ in his speeches as a social system which allows people to achieve success proportionate to their talents and abilities, as opposed to one in which social class or wealth is the determining factor prompted McRobbie to criticize the use of the term (p. 107). McRobbie identifies the way in which the term meritocracy denies the neo-liberal motivation behind it which is, as she sees it, is to keep work as individualized and de-politicised as possible. McRobbie further elaborates:

Giving the appearance of egalitarianism by virtue of its seeming openness, and its commitment to social inclusion through work…it is an unambivalently neo-liberal strategy and a wholly individualized image of work…[it] has no time for anything other than resilience, self-help and motivation (McRobbie, 2002b, p. 107).

In a meritocracy, talent, education and competence are stressed, as they are believed to be ‘neutral criteria’. However, this ‘neutral criteria’ actually favours the children of those who possess appropriate forms of capital.8 As Olssen states: “It is rather that their privileged capabilities depend on a whole network of complex structures and support” (2005, p. 374).

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8 See Bourdieu’s book State nobility: Elite schools in the field of power which illustrates how the future leaders and power brokers in society are raised in elite schools.
Heelas (1991) describes four character formations or ‘selves’ evident in Thatcher’s 1980’s government in Britain. These four subject positions of the self are: i) enterprising self (displaying initiative and responsibility in economic production); ii) the sovereign consumer (exercising freedom to satisfy his or her wishes); iii) active citizen (concerned to contribute to the wellbeing of the community); iv) the conservative self (bearer of traditional or Victorian values). Heelas identifies the way in which there are considerable tensions, between these four subject positions. He goes as far as to call these tensions “moral chaos” (p. 76).

Heelas suggests that these four subject positions are informed by two distinct kinds of morality, that of utilitarian individualism and authoritative ethical morality. The utilitarian ethic is based on “an agent seeking to satisfy his own wants or interests” which are deemed to be self evident, such as happiness, pleasure, self-preservation (Tipton, 1982, p. 7 cited in Heelas, 1991, p. 76-77). The authoritative moral ethic is able to support values of a more relational or collective nature, as it is orientated towards an authoritative moral source (God or Marx, for example) (p.76-77). Heelas suggests that the morality of the ‘enterprising self’ and the ‘sovereign consumer’ are broadly based on the utilitarian individual kind (Heelas, 1991, p. 84).

By the state encouraging individuals to make decisions based on a utilitarian morality, that is becoming ‘rational choice’ actors, judging the rightness of actions based on how they affects personal wants and pleasures, the state has governed it’s subjects to the attitudes, values and forms of self-understanding closer to the enterprise self and the sovereign consumer. As conservative morality defined by a belief in citizenship, family, commitment to community values, charity, and embodiment of the Protestant work ethic wanes, it is possible that the ‘wrong’ sort of enterprise culture develops. Due to the desire-stimulating effects of advertising, and the narrow form of self-
interest promoted to the ‘sovereign consumer’ and the comparatively little value placed on thrift and economizing, capitalism in the form of neo-liberalism and enterprise culture attacks the public sphere. Neo-liberal capitalism also threatens democracy, collective goods and the protection of the weak and vulnerable, and the kinds of conservative and communal values that underpin them. Becoming the wrong kind of enterprising selves (simply utilitarian) and the wrong kind of undisciplined consumers, (running credit at record high levels and neglecting to save), creates a new destructive form of capitalism. Unless enterprise is accompanied by conservative or another form of morality, and active citizenship it can only highlight the contradictions and flaws of post-industrial capitalism.

Not surprisingly there has been a backlash to the dominance of free market enterprise culture and the sovereign consumer subject forms and the utilitarian ethos that underpins them. This has come from many angles. Values and virtues education are becoming increasingly in vogue. Environmental education also promotes a sustainable approach to not only the natural environment but in support of local production, and criticism of consumption for consumption’s sake. This approach helps to establish market boundaries and curb the greed of the ‘sovereign’ individual consumer. Campaigns for ethical consumption, such as billboard advertising warning about products made in sweatshops, are forms of resistance to the neo-liberal discourse that supposes the market has the ability to appropriately regulate all spheres of life. Without a wider sense of a collective morality, beyond the individual, this form of capitalism will implode in turn exploiting the planet and its people. As Bourdieu says:

...in reality what keeps the social order from dissolving into chaos...is the continuity or survival of those very institutions and representatives of the old order that is in the process of being dismantled, and all the work of all of the
categories of social workers, as well as all the forms of social solidarity, familial or otherwise (1998, p. 6).

Bourdieu says that these forces of conservation are all too easily labelled conservative, yet they are the cause for hope, in that these traditional establishments of social solidarity, of which family is one, defend the order from disappearing altogether, and so prevent the reign of one law, the law of the pursuit of egoistic interests. Any collective form is subversive in the light of this (p. 7).

For although the functional, utility-laden design of this mode of identity may appear to exalt the individual, it actually places severe limits on what it is to be human. This is the paradox of ‘freedom’ and occluded control, endemic to neo-liberal forms of governance, or what Foucault terms ‘governmentality’. Those who constitute themselves in terms of their consumer activities (the self defined by its accessories) and their productive endeavours (the self defined by working life) may find dissatisfaction with this limited way of being and thus be prompted to seek other modes of being. In contrast to the central Thatcherite assumption that people essentially seek self-fulfillment and enrichment through materialistic consumption and production, it may increasingly be felt that “life is too rich to be conducted as a business” (Heelas, 1991, p. 87). Artists have the opportunity to become aware of enterprise culture and the sovereign consumer subject forms and base their lives on values and ways of being that surpass this narrow view as well as find ways to resist it’s encroachment on all spheres of life.

**The instrumentalisation of creativity**

Everywhere we look, creativity is increasingly valued. Firms and organizations value it for the results that it can produce and individuals value it as a route to
self-expression and job satisfaction. Bottom line: As creativity becomes more valued, the Creative Class grows (Florida, 2002, p. 71).

i) Creative economy

Literature around the term ‘creative economy’ has been growing. Proponents of the creative economy regard it as the basis and key to economic growth for post-industrial economies, urging cities and nations to move towards an economy based on copyrighted creative ideas and cultural products and experiences. The reason is that it is one of the fastest growing sectors of the economy (Howkins, 2001). Advocates of the creative economy suggest creativity in terms of the traditional advertising, design, arts, films, TV, music, architecture, publishing, digital content has growth potential, but what is even more important is creative thinking applied to a wide range of services and commodities such as agriculture, horticulture, retail, third world, and health. In the creative economy, there are many spheres that creative thinkers touch and can add economic value to. Heeringa in the newly launched business magazine for the ‘creative economy’ Idealog, says, “…the next phase for New Zealand must be about creating ideas and intellectual property that can be applied and sold…” and this could be in “…science, finance, arts, agriculture, manufacturing- anything” (2005, p. 40). Howkins also finds the application of creativity in many areas of human activity:

Surely creativity is found not only in the arts but elsewhere in society.

Doing science and creating a transport network are just as creative as painting a picture and designing a bracelet. They are all creative. They all use creative imagination. This is culture not as aesthetic but as anthropology (Howkins, 2005).

Florida’s bestselling book *The Rise of the Creative Class* (2002) describes a change in the pattern of work in the United States (p. 67). Florida sets out to prove that ‘creative work’ now makes up a large component of
what educated people do for a living in Western post-industrial capitalist societies. According to Florida creative work in its highest form is carried out by “super-creatives” whose job it is to “produc[e] new forms or designs that are readily transferable and widely useful” (p. 69). People in this “creative core” engage in this work regularly, that is, it’s what they are paid to do. Florida includes musicians and artists in this nucleus.

Working beyond this core group, but still within the creative class is what Florida calls “creative professionals” (p.69). He counts those who work in high-tech, financial, legal, health and business management in this group (p.69). The creative classes, according to Florida, are those people who “add economic value through their creativity” and whose work function is to “create meaningful new forms” (p. 68). To Florida, artists are an integrated part of society and economy, even the “norm-setting mainstream of society” (p. 82). In Florida’s distinction this creative class is distinguished from those who work in the service class, agricultural workers and the traditional working-class.

Proponents of the creative economy believe anyone can get involved, because anyone can think, dream, and imagine. Because it does not require capital that is land, or factories to be involved in the creative economy, it is a more open economy. Intellectual property is the currency of the creative economy. This discourse has an influence on arts education. It means creativity is no longer just the domain of the arts. The arts are regarded as an important component of the creative economy, creative thinking is a bankable skill, and creative products are potentially wealth creating. This means that the importance and status of professional artists is potentially elevated.

Conversely, the arts that take on less commercial, commodifiable forms in our culture, such as religious, protest, cultural identity, criticality, educational, community, therapeutic, domestic and family, decorative,
communal, ritual and traditional may be given less emphasis, space, and importance. Art forms in the public domain may also be exploited for their market potential or intellectual property. Debates about how intellectual property should be used, and where it is in the interests of the public domain, to allow cultural knowledge, ideas, skills and products to be available freely will need to be debated in arts education. These new discourses will require arts educators who can critically analyse both the potential for the market of cultural goods, but also the market’s limits. Arts education should ensure the range of arts practices and activities remain diverse, and the arts continue to be available in people’s lives for moral, communal, civic, patriotic, social and spiritual uses as well as financial uses.

ii) Creativity as ‘doctrine’

We live, it seems, in a veritable age of creativity. Those engaged in the creativity industries – experts of various kinds, managers, media workers, designers…marketing gurus, educationalists, sensationalist artists and postmodern philosophers – all variously signal that to be creative is the highest achievable good. An age in which creativity is actually a kind of moral imperative… (Osborne, 2003, p. 507-8).

Thomas Osborne describes creativity as a “…matter of our governmentality…” (2003, p. 508) and a “…combination of doctrine and morality…” (p. 510). He is disquieted by what he calls the “doctrine of creativity” which is espoused now by the “ideologues of creativity” which he cites as psychologists and managers (p. 510). According to Osborne, this “discursive logic” of creativity has become universalized and ordinary, it is “no longer the exclusive prerogative of geniuses or great thinkers, but of all of us” (p. 508). At the academic level, Osborne notes the concern with creativity as something to be celebrated, as an aspect of intelligence, and the “…intrinsic values of creativity as an end in itself” (p. 508).
Osborne links the ordinariness and universalisation of creativity with the kinds of flexible thinking needed for the ‘knowledge society’. He also links this to the notion of the ‘life-long learner’ who can adopt creativity as a way of life. In this environment, creative thinking is an important personal asset and investment aiding one’s employability. Osborne recognizes in business how the “…values of creativity” are given priority over other business-like attributes. All this adds up to what Osborne terms “technologies of creativity.” That creativity is now something you can “manage” so as to produce it (p. 509). There are creativity “techniques” one can learn, to the extent that “…creativity becomes valued as a form of investment in its own right” (Rose 1999a: 114-15 cited in Osborne, 2003, p. 509), and enables you to “invent the future itself” (Howkins, 2001, p. 129 cited in Osborne, 2003, p. 509).

Osborne draws upon Deleuze to analyse this notion of creativity, partly because Deleuze is one of the key thinkers of the “creative turn” (Deleuze, 1992, p. 283 cited in Osborne, 2003, p. 511) but also, at the same time, in his opinion, the best kind of “diagnostician” and “scathing critic” (p. 510). Osborne promotes Deleuze’s understanding of creativity as something that should be restricted to “…certain kinds of intellectual work…” to the arts, sciences and philosophy (Deleuze, 1994). Deleuze was aware how much these fields were burdened and captured by “non-creative forces” and often led to the spread of imitation. Imitation, is to Deleuze, making “…creativity seem like an easy thing to achieve” (Deleuze, 1992 cited in Osborne, 2003, p. 508). To Deleuze, authentic creativity is not easy and is as “…destructive as it is productive…” (p. 508). Osborne describes how to be creative you might have to be a “traitor”, or “destructive” and that it is not something that can be known in advance. It might even by akin to “anti-creativity” and could be improved by taking a “philistine, treacherous approach” (p. 512).
Osborne opposes a morality or doctrine of creativity, and instead provides a provocative version of creativity as “post-heroic” (p. 519) instead of risking turning something into merely “fashion”, or “endless repetition of permanent change under conditions of permanent imitation” or ultimately “a sort of compulsory heterodoxy, with conservative effects” (p. 512). Osborne goes on to say:

Inventiveness in art is no doubt rather the repetition of attempt and elimination of accomplishment. In that sense, it is desire not fulfillment, something which makes it more or less wholly at odds with most versions of the doctrine of creativity today (p. 521).

This is similar to Foucault’s positive notion of error. Foucault says “…life has led to a living being that is never completely in the right place, that is destined to ‘err’ and to be ‘wrong’ (Foucault, 1991, p. 476 cited in Heraud, 2005, p. 4). Osborne suggests creativity should be disassociated with conceptions of inspiration, and re-associated with ‘invention’ and ‘inertia’. Invention shouldn’t be associated with quantity or product, or a high turnover of novelty products. Moreover, inertia is found in unusual places, like those who are preventing creativity, who are holding things up, and resisting change. Osborne states that the true, genuine artists are “…the very last people actually trying to be ‘creative’” (p. 520). He goes back to the Deleuzian concept that inventiveness comes about through repeated attempt and work (p.520).

iii) Universalised creativity

Educator Anna Craft admits it is not “popular to challenge creativity in today’s discourse” (2003, p. 124). She reflects on how creativity is becoming a part of a “universalized discourse” in the Western world, reflecting “globalization of economic activity” which she remarks has led to an “integral
fear of obsolescence” (p. 114). Returning to old things, to the past and reviving and honouring traditions, is an essential part of art making and music making. Arts educator, Engels-Schwarzpaul notes that art traditions that are ornamental are excluded or endangered by the incessant drive for the ‘creative’ in curricular discourse (2003, p. 201).

Recognising that creativity is necessary to economic survival as our need for continual innovation and resourcefulness grows, Craft suggests that creativity may be more “value and culture-specific” than we think, and considers the implications for this universalized discourse on education and pedagogy (p. 113). She writes:

…creativity may be imbued with social class based assumptions such as resilience, self-reliance, persistence and control over one’s environment – also future-orientation, and greater individualism (p. 120-121).

Craft describes the growth of the service sector, e-communication and e-markets, which rely on the intellectual and creative capabilities of workers (p. 114) to feed what she calls “soft-capitalism” (Seltzer and Bentley, 1999 cited in Craft, 2003, p. 114). The basic premise is that our economy demands creativity, and a healthy economy is necessary to a wealthy society. She discusses how creativity has recently taken on a less ‘extraordinary’ status, and is more focused on the ‘ordinary’ person being creative. Her discussion then examines the limits to creativity within education, finding the terminology, policy and curriculum limits the practice of this kind of thinking. However, she suggests that more fundamentally in need of discussion and questioning is the “universality” and “desirability” of creativity (p. 120). She suggests creativity is presented as “universally-applicable” and it’s “strong emphasis on individuality” and valuing thinking that is independent of social norms is actually “culturally specific” (p. 120). Craft further elaborates:
…obsolescence is built in at the design stage of many consumer goods and [where] fashion dictates the need for constant change and updating… (p. 121).

The global influence of Western culture means it could be argued that creativity has reached cultural saturation and has taken on a universal value. Craft poses an interesting question to creativity in education – “how desirable is the norm of innovation that the global economy demands?” (p. 121). Should we as educators be encouraging and sustaining ‘disposable’ culture? The environmental cost in continually updating and innovating is something that needs to be questioned. She suggests how the possibility of ‘make do and mend’ is drowned out in an incessantly new, consumer society. This begs the question, : can we not foster the “old, or the borrowed, the inherited and the unchanging” as well as the new? (p. 123).

Consider for example, the Maori and Polynesian secondary schools cultural festival, which takes place in Auckland every year. These competitions draw on traditional art and music making. A value of creativity above all else would deny the place of ritual, communal ownership, identity and tradition that is integral to these performances. Inertia, or resistance to change would signal dedication to the artform, much more than creativity. A Western concept of intellectual property rights imposed on traditional dance motifs, patternation and songs could destroy this tradition. This is a reality students and arts educators need to negotiate. However, a contemporary music competition for example at the Pasifika festival could be an opportunity for the kind of creativity important to making popular music. The discernment to know when creativity is required, and when a respect of the past and ritual is more relevant is an important ethical and praxial understanding for an arts educator to have.
Proposing that there may be ethical limits to creativity is to reveal creativity’s undoubtedly “darker side” (p. 121). Critical examination of the values inherent in creative ideas and actions should be encouraged. The human imagination, or creative thought is capable of immense destruction as well as constructive possibilities. Craft suggests the “positive associations with creativity mask” the “possibly questionable values” associated with it (p. 122).

The market potential of intellectual property, espoused by proponents of the creative economy, needs to be balanced with what should be made available for the public domain. Critical thought is essential in these areas to understand the powerful drivers and discourse about creativity and its importance in the New Zealand economy, so that teachers can be prepared with a pedagogy that both addresses the skills training of future workers in the new creative economy, but also that is not wholly dominated by a utilitarian rationality.

iv) Managed creativity

Creativity and emotional literacy are being ‘attached’ to an educational practice which remains decidedly performance-driven, standardized and monitored. This creative impulse is said to derive from an increasing awareness that both a successful knowledge economy (one which includes the ‘cultural economy’) and a service-based economy cannot be constructed and sustained unless more of the creative and emotional self can be appropriated for instrumental purposes (Hartley, 2003, p. 17).

Further elaborating on Craft and Osborne’s commentary on the cultural economy, is educator David Hartley. He analyses how the “instrumentalisation of the expressive”(p.6) is translated into an educational setting. He has also observed, in contemporary society, that creativity is both “at a premium”, while also being “universalized” (p. 7). Hartley, however, is
cynical of this move towards the softer values, of emotions and creativity, stating that it is for the benefit of producing better workers and consumers for soft-capitalism, what he calls the “high-tech” and “high-touch” industries (p. 9).

An example of this instrumentalisation is by author Daniel Pink who encourages people in business to emulate artists, in ways such as “practicing empathy” to find out ways to “serve customers better”, and “searching for meaning” as a way to “re-conceive a market” (Pink cited in Heeringa, 2005, p. 40). Encouraging a utilitarian rationality towards ‘artistic behaviours’ of empathy and search for meaning, rather than fostering a genuine, ethical orientation towards these human qualities is a nasty counterfeit, and a disturbing example of the instrumentalisation of the expressive.

However, this example shows that the skills and dispositions that were once the domain of artists are now the skills that are in demand in many workplaces, skills such as network sociality, ideas, and innovation. The world of work has changed, and therefore the needs of post-industrial capitalism require ‘right-brain’ thinking. Flexibility, motivation, risk-taking, openness to change, thinking on your feet, adaptability and acceptance of diversity are skills artists tend to possess and are skills that employers increasingly want. In this sense, soft-capitalism has meant new work opportunities for artists.

Nevertheless, this critique of creativity offered by Osborne, Craft and Hartley expresses anxiety about the way creativity is increasingly managed, universalized and made ordinary. What this discussion helps us see is that creativity, something an arts educator might naturally think is the domain of the arts, has in fact been colonised by a variety of thinkers to fit the needs of a ‘creative economy.’ The way that creativity is defined in these contexts, may not be the same as the traditionally creative thinkers and actors, such as musicians, writers, painters define it.
This means that teachers need to be able to resist these instrumentalised definitions of creativity that would lead students towards merely fashionable ideas, and instead attempt to examine and articulate what is really at play in the act of creativity, including unfashionable concepts such as destruction, inertia, work, repetition, tradition, ornamentation, truth-telling, critique, irony, and the ethical limits to creativity. Arts educators need to take leadership about how creativity is treated and defined in the context of their work. Hopefully this would lead to a more honest description and vocabulary of the work done by artists. By contemplating the post-heroic, anti-creativity values of inertia and invention, critiquing the incessantly new and disposable, and whether creativity is really a universal value, will help us advance our critical pedagogy. To consider these ideas in Foucauldian terms, is to practice refusal, a dis-engagement, and therefore a resistant force to instrumentalised creativity.
5 THE ARTIST AS CREATIVE ENTREPRENEUR

Introduction

In this chapter, I explore how the two discourses of enterprise culture and instrumentalised creativity, discussed in the Chapter five, have united in the subject form of the ‘creative entrepreneur.’ This is a term for the combination of business acumen with creative thinking or a creative product or service. It is more than a ‘buzzword’-this term represents a shift in the subject form or habitus of the artist in our current episteme. There are several points I wish to discuss about this subject form. Firstly, to identify the ways in which this discourse is communicated and articulated, which show it up as a form of governmentality. Secondly, to discuss both the positive outcomes this can have for becoming an artist, in terms of the ability to make a living, and thirdly, to consider the negative outcomes for those lacking in entrepreneurial skill, or ‘market power,’ who may suffer social and economic marginalization.

The great morph

In reality, the rise of the Creative Economy is drawing the spheres of innovation (technological creativity), business (economic creativity) and culture (artistic and cultural creativity) into one another, in more intimate and more powerful combinations than ever (Florida, 2002, p. 201).

Florida is one of the key proponents of the creative entrepreneur subject form. He says in the above quote that in our current time the spheres of artistic and cultural creativity are not separate from business or technology,
but are intimately related. Florida argues that Bohemian and bourgeois values have ‘morphed’ together into a creative ethos that combines values from both discursive systems. He calls this a “resolution of the centuries old tension between these two value systems” (2002, p. 192). In effect, Florida cancels out any tension between art and commerce, claiming that the new creative ethos, forged in the Silicon Valley of San Francisco, has made artists and entrepreneurs ‘one’ (p. 202).

The creative entrepreneur can be defined as one who “uses(s) creativity to unlock the wealth that lies within themselves” (Howkins, 2002, p. 129 cited in De Bruin, 2005, p. 4). Individuals who respond to both business drivers and a personal desire to create, demonstrate the new creative ethos. The creative entrepreneur can be defined as:

…individuals who use creative mindsets in response to two triggers for their entrepreneurial acts: extrinsic, that which is contextual and business driven; and intrinsic, that which involves the internal desire to create something and a personal sense of challenge (Henry, Johnston & Aggestam, 2004 cited in De Bruin, 2005, p. 4).

Economist De Bruin has studied entrepreneurial activity in the film industry and suggests Peter Jackson as writer, producer and director of The Lord of the Rings trilogy is the embodiment of the creative entrepreneur. He was able to use his powers of persuasion to convince New Line Cinemas to back a multi-million dollar project in New Zealand, as well as couple this with the artistic imagination to create Tolkien’s world on film (p. 15). Jackson has been involved in organization and co-ordination roles as well as creative directing, he was director and producer or co-producer in all of his recent projects, King Kong, Lord of the Rings, The Frighteners, and Heavenly Creatures (p. 15). He has been described as a “self-made industry in himself owning a production company (Wingnut Films), an effects company (Weta
Ltd) and a studio (Three Foot Six) in Wellington” (Errigo, 2003, p. 121 cited in De Bruin, 2005, p. 16).

Similarly, on show at the museum and exhibition space, The Dowse Lower Hutt in 2005 were other local examples of creative entrepreneurship. Entitled *The New Cool*, this exhibition showcased the “inspirational stories of 12 young entrepreneurial New Zealand companies called ‘creative businesses’” (Dowse, 2005). The ‘New Cool’, described as a “new generation of street-smart entrepreneurs” (Dowse, 2005) are a mix of film-making, graffiti art, hip-hop, roots music production and street wear clothing companies. Dawn Raid Entertainment; Disruptiv; First Floor Publishing; Huffer Clothing; Illicit Clothing; Inject Design; Insidious Fix; LOOP Aot(ear)oa Recordings; Metia Interactive; Misery; Sidhe Interactive and Sticky Pictures were those businesses represented. The exhibition was funded by the New Zealand Trade and Enterprise under the ‘Enterprise Skills and Culture Activities Fund’ as well as sponsored by Westpac bank and other companies. In addition to information about these companies, young visitors could take away information on how to “take their own creative ideas and begin transforming them into business enterprises” (Dowse, 2005).

These high profile examples of New Zealand creative entrepreneurs show that enterprise culture is a discourse that is being celebrated through our local stories and articulated and promoted by government agencies. These stories of successful creative entrepreneurs are inspiring and motivating to young people, and present the main model currently for establishing an economic livelihood from one’s artwork in New Zealand. From my reading, I ascertain this is being done for several economic reasons. First, because it is believed that New Zealand cultural products demonstrate innovation, and therefore have growth potential for creating jobs and wealth, but as they are small and fledgling, they also require help in terms of state capital, co-ordination and
strategic planning to grow. This relates to the second aim, that New Zealand cultural products have export value which has not been adequately exploited, and that through ex-pat networks around the world, there are many opportunities for export growth. Thirdly, New Zealand cultural producers (musicians, film-makers, writers, dancers, performers, artists, designers) can attract an international profile which is a strategic way of ‘advertising’ New Zealand to attract ex-pat New Zealander’s back here to live, as well as other talented, educated workers from foreign nations who might be able to offer skills, talent, and knowledge to our economy. This also means that New Zealand may become an attractive place to set up business or base a creative project in, having additional economic spin-offs. Lastly, by promoting New Zealand’s cultural products, we can attract tourism to New Zealand, the largest export revenue earner for New Zealand, as foreigners are offered a ‘taste’ of New Zealand abroad through our cultural products- music, film, dance, comedy, visual arts etc.

**Cultural exporters**

Behind all of these aims is a direct benefit to New Zealand cultural producers in making a living from their art. Just as export is important to many New Zealand industries such as dairying, fishing, horticulture and forestry, it is also becoming important to artists. These strategies allow New Zealand cultural producers to exploit more markets for their products, and therefore move from a poor, struggling artist, to the possibility of a sustainable career in the arts. This is a positive outcome for artists. For example, New Zealand musicians who have an international network to promote and sell their music will substantially improve their ability to make ends meet. The national strategy by the government gives this the political profile and capital needed for it to succeed.
Yet while there are many advantages to artists in this kind of government strategy, (and artists have been directly involved with developing these strategies), I am also aware of how this discourse may neglect some important aspects of local art making. While we celebrate the successes, we also need to recognise their fragility, and the creative ecologies and government support that sustain them. We also need to realise that the rewards within the artistic sphere are lottery like, with no guarantee of critical or commercial success. The risk for autonomous artistic producers to attempt to make art, and the projects that fail or never see the light of day, can be seen as casualties, but also forming part of the collective commons or creative ecology (Shorthose & Strange, 2004, p. 43) that enable the celebrated successes to happen.

Marxist commentators Jim Shorthose and Gerry Strange say that independent artists operating within informal creative communities bring to their creative activities “a set of meanings, norms and values—a political subjectivity—which assumes and recognizes the value of autonomy as a basis for authentic forms of production” (2004, p. 54). Shorthose & Strange refer to this as a “politics of autonomy” (p. 54). They note this sub-sector is “at best partial and fragile” (p. 50).

This statement is a development of Bourdieu’s idea of the autonomous pole of production. They say artistic consciousness can tend to be opposed to, resistant, or even subversive towards the “commodified social relations of capitalist society” (p.54). They propose that artists value the “collective resources” held in the “collective commons” which offer some “independence from capital” (p. 54). Shorthose & Strange further postulates that these independent creative communities are vulnerable to the structural processes and imperatives of commodification. This is especially applicable if it the cultural product is culturally successful. The structural processes of
commodification can have the effect of negating the “trust-based reciprocity of ecological relationships” (p. 51).

An example of the kind of fragility that Shorthose & Strange refer to, which can be threatened by the processes of commodification, particularly by export, is McRobbie’s study of the small scale, independent activities of British fashion design in the 1980s. What McRobbie details is how an industry (one which I think has certain synergies to the music industry in New Zealand) was “small scale, independent” and which formed “…the backbone of the success of the British fashion design as an internationally recognized phenomenon from the mid 1980s to the mid 1990s” (2002a, p. 52). She calls the work they were doing “experimental semi-entrepreneurial creative practice” (p. 53). It had a fairly specific context and locality within London. It grew out of a collective spirit brought through from the punk era, and was orientated towards DIY, self-generated economic activity.

McRobbie identifies a number of “enabling conditions” that allowed these “micro-economies” to flourish (p. 54). They were: i) a government support scheme which subsidized housing in run-down blocks; ii) use of street markets; iii) close proximity to machinists and garment makers; iv) a recognition by local authorities that their practice was artistic and cultural and not a conventional business; and v) a location supported with associated cultural intermediaries and creative workers, such as journalists, stylists and photographers. (p. 54). McRobbie states that through a “minimum level of government intervention” fashion design was turned into “viable micro-economies of culture” (p. 62).

McRobbie goes on to that this small-scale industry was virtually obliterated during the 1990s due to the aggressive presence of corporate fashion. She blame this on the policy makers who she says, didn’t like the idea of staying small as it “contradicts the logic of capitalist enterprise” (p.
As a result, the government began to see this activity not as a ‘culture industry’ but an industry per say. They began to withdraw the support of subsidy instead providing help to develop “business plans” (p. 55). The emphasis in government policy shifted, to encourage these designers to adopt more aggressive promotional strategies, that could in turn encourage international sales. The problem with this policy direction was a misunderstanding or miscomprehension about the “under-capitalised” nature of their small-scale business. As these local small-scale fashion designers were pushed to “expand and move out into the global market” they were instead pushed towards bankruptcy (p. 55). McRobbie notes the amount of capital investment required for exporting, and how once a small-scale producer receives a capital loan from an external investor or bank, they are required to give the investor a return. McRobbie reveals that these small-scale producers did not have an effective lobby or association and therefore were subject to these harsh conditions that overtook and demolished their street fashion culture.

Furthermore, art schools were reprimanded for producing “too experimental, over-ambitious graduates” as this was leading to “business failure” (p. 57). As a result market stall fashion was discouraged, and graduates were encouraged to find work in large fashion houses. These stores then co-opted fashion design graduates on a contract, casualised basis to create designer collections within mainstream stores. Alternatively, big labels sent out ‘cool scouts’ to find out what was hip on the street, clubs, and fashion students wardrobes to copy and incorporate into their ranges. McRobbie describes how ideas of “co-operation” became “unglamorous” and “old-fashioned” and began to have no place in the vocabulary of the “talent-led economy” (p. 61-62).
There are several points that I can draw from this about autonomous cultural production. Firstly, we cannot underestimate the undercapitalized nature of these independent activities and what this undercapitalization means for artistic autonomy and also potential bankruptcy. Exporting is costly and investment capital can compromise autonomy. Secondly, independent cultural producers are original because many of them are fiercely autonomous. Artistic producers need to be aware of threats to autonomy and act collectively. Thirdly, the government, through cultural policy, should consider the conditions that are enabling independent sectors to thrive and continue to protect them.

**Inventive independents**

In the light of McRobbie’s study outlined above, New Zealand small-scale cultural producers, under pressure to export artistic output, could also be in danger of eroding the vital ecological relationships that sustain their sector. Some of the pressures and policy directives experienced by the British small-scale fashion industry, are similar to those being promoted here by the New Zealand government, in an effort to expand the ‘creative industries.’

Yet there is reason to take heart. New Zealand contemporary musicians have found some inventive ways to maintain a trust-based, ethical basis to the way in which music is produced, while finding ways to commercialise culturally successful products. This has resulted in the possibility of being ‘true’ to one’s art form and enjoying creative freedom as well as exploiting market opportunities for art-work, and in return financial gain from the art-work. The way this has been done is by setting up as independent, autonomous producers, and working with other independent intermediaries such as distributors, often within trust-based, collaborative relationships,
while at the same time utilizing the muscle and marketing services of major record labels.

As outlined in Chapter two, these New Zealand independent music producers are working increasingly in conjunction with major labels. Deals are struck increasingly between independents and major labels in what is termed a production and distribution agreement (P&D). Fortunately, major labels with offices in New Zealand are staffed by people who are sympathetic towards local producers, and who are willing to work in conjunction with small independent labels for the benefit of the diversity of New Zealand music. These inventive deals have resulted in a better possibility for making a living as a musician, and for the industry to supply a diverse range of New Zealand music to the marketplace.

Media and cultural commentator, Russell Brown’s recent article in Idealog, about the independent music industry supports this view of the micro-sector (independents) surrounded by commercially-orientated corporate activity (majors) which has resulted in a greater ‘breadth’ of music:

Basically independents start because the majors won’t sign artists…That’s the reality. They only sign the ones they can justify the investment in, but if you want to have a diverse culture there has to be a whole breadth of music released (2005, p. 62).

Despite these positive working relationships between independents and major large scale music labels, it would be naïve to think that these local small-scale producers are not under any threat. The establishment of IMNZ, a collective for independent music producers shows that independent musicians and producers are aware of threats to their autonomy. Economic and political power-relations being what they are, the influences of international competition, international capital, international trade and economies of scale do threaten local cultural producers. For example, these local independent
companies could just as easily be sold to larger companies, if offered the right price. An example of this is Flying Nun records. A proudly ‘kiwi’ record label, it was bought out by a Festival Mushroom (FMR) several years ago. Warners Music, one of the four major international labels, has now bought FMR. These are the kinds of patterns that occur in a globalised cultural industry. While these producers trade in symbolic goods, and are recognized and appreciated within the culture as such, they also exist in their double life as economic goods and as commercial enterprises. This shows that independent creative communities are vulnerable to the structural processes and imperatives of commodification. Practicing artists require political savvy to negotiate their way through these commercial worlds.

**Limitations of the creative entrepreneur form**

The model of the artist as creative entrepreneur, expounded by Florida and others, cannot be applied to all artists or art forms and has limitations. The negative aspect is that those artists on their way to becoming a creative entrepreneur, or a creative business or producer, may experience social and economic marginalization. This is due to the risk and isolation required to develop their cultural product for the market. The work in developing these cultural products for the market rely heavily on entrepreneurial skill, as Shorthose & Strange comment: “entrepreneurialism is crucial to the establishment of networks within the sector” (2004, p. 48). They also rely on ‘ecologies’ of interdependence, and intermittent, irregular and informal relationships.

Shorthose & Strange also recognizes the hierarchies of power and how one can be marginalized within the creative industries. They say there are those who have ‘market power’ that is, they possess the skills to offer commercial creative industries well-paid part-time labour, while they use their
other time to make independent art work. These creative workers hold the
most power in the autonomous sector. Secondly, there are artists who are
involved full-time in corporate work, who do not have the market power to
negotiate time to do other projects. Thirdly, there are those who perhaps due
to lack of experience, social networks and confidence cannot find work in the
corporate sector, and who have to find other ways to create independent art
work, perhaps through a government benefit scheme. Certainly, most
independent artists that achieve some form of financially sustainable lifestyle
have made decisions to be involved to some degree with the commercial
large-scale sector.

Despite the positive associations with freedom, pursuing entrepreneurial
artistic work can engender, this kind of work can be examined from a
sociological perspective to find out its potentially negative effects.
McRobbie’s case study of ‘artwork’ undertaken in London by recent art
graduates indicates that there are limits to the creative entrepreneur model,
and that there needs to be greater awareness both of how this subject form can
take its toll on young people, and more research on the kinds of working
practices that emerge in these distinctive creative work cultures (McRobbie,
2004). McRobbie describes artists as “‘new subjects of cultural
individualization’” (p. 141), radically disconnected and dislocated from
130) from the areas they live in. McRobbie observed through her time/space
study of recent visual arts graduates in London is that workers are left to
themselves, without organizational support and representation, and the “pain
of insecurity, precariousness and even failure” makes this “pleasure in work”
and passionate attachment to “my own work” both incredibly rewarding, but
also sometimes torturous. She has termed a shaping characteristic of this work
as “pleasure-pain” (p. 132). There are indistinguishable lines between work
and play, and overworking for self-expressive output is common. She
wonders whether artists will stop to join forces and collectively challenge the
conditions in which they are working:

Will they ever join forces to collectively challenge the conditions which give
rise in the longer term to (well-documented) assorted pains (including mental
and physical illness, sporadic earnings, loss of confidence and so on)? (p. 133).

The small-scale independent artist and the non-organised casualised
freelancer have come to represent the dominant units of cultural production.
Inequities, injustices and malpractices are widely recognized, even normative,
but rarely confronted. Workplaces are fluid, flexible and placeless where
inter-personal exchange and bodily presence in clubs, bars and other locations
are important. Network sociality is the dominant form of socializing,
exploiting contacts for what you can gain from them. This is an entirely
different form of sociality than narrative sociality, where your story is told
and retold in an enduring way. There is an absence of permanence or
durability about work and the workplace. There are no “set rules, no
guaranteed pathways” (p. 134).

The paradox is that in McRobbie’s study of artists, even though they
were working in an unstructured work culture, individuals themselves
operated in highly organised structured schedules. This is where McRobbie
suggests that this could be a new form of disciplinarity, all the more opaque
because of the association of notions of ‘freedom’ with artistic labour. She
states:

these ‘inner qualities’ are new forms of disciplining, new regimes of power all
the more effective since they are connected with freedom and self-realisation
(McRobbie, 2000b, p. 104).

McRobbie draws on Foucault’s notion of disciplinarity to examine where
‘technologies of the self’ (Foucault, 1988) become ‘entrepreneurship of the
self’ and become new forms of disciplinary power. She critiques the self-determining entrepreneurial creative labour for its psychological effects on people, it’s potential eroding of the collective commons, the potential for exploitation and self-exploitation, the lack of collective political action, and the lack of workplace protections and equal opportunities within the sector. McRobbie further comments that the role of “affect” in creative labour, “skewers any comparison with more standard work or employment (2004, p. 132). Where one is involved in creative labour, that is one’s ‘own work’, the passionate attachment one has to it, allows one to tolerate high levels of uncertainty and self-exploitation, and even to stay (unprofitably) in the creative sector. McRobbie suggests that the power relations show up in the mechanisms of self-regulation and endless self-invention. Deeply inculcated at a corporeal level, artists self exhort – “to make it, to do better, to talk to the right people, to achieve success” (p. 141).

McRobbie describes how artists are self-reliant, avid multi-taskers, with little time for domesticity. Many artists she interviewed in her time/space study did not have children, or had no time for children. She states these are “real costs in terms of leisure, personal and family life” (p. 140). The artists also rarely commented on the spaces of community or neighbourhood in which they lived and worked. There was evident that there was not a strong commitment to place and involvement in local neighbourhoods, as the city becomes a place of projects and temporary contracts. She notes that the status bestowed on artists in terms of possessing high-cultural capital, partially compensated for the precarious life and the expense of the investment. A key feature amongst all of this activity was uncertainty and risk (Landry, 2001 cited in McRobbie, 2004, p. 141).

What McRobbie’s critical work illustrates is that the working life of an artist is seldom discussed in this context. To be doing the work you ‘love’ is counted as a priviledge and a joy, so to identify these kinds of negative effects
and injustices can seem almost ungrateful. However, as this kind of work becomes economically important, perhaps artists will recognize their conditions of employment are important too. Forms of collective action may become more prevalent as artists consider the effects of this kind of work on their personal and collective lives. The negative effects of the artist as creative entrepreneur show the impacts of enterprise culture and instrumentalised creativity (and its associated discourse of meritocracy and success by talent) upon the process of becoming an artist. The uniqueness of McRobbie’s voice in describing the characteristics of this risky labour within the creative industries resonates with my understanding of the experiences of many artists. However, while McRobbie’s work questions the entrepreneur form, and provides a useful critique of these mentalities of rule upon creative labour, she is unable to offer any alternative solution. Perhaps, that is the point. She urges sociologists to study these aspects of artists lives and write about them, so that alternative models can be developed.

The continuous financial insecurity, lack of career structure, lack of social benefits and lack of trade union organization, as well as the blurring of work and social life, and time pressures show that there are some unique pressures about working in the independent creative industries. The extraordinary wealth that pop megastars such as famous film directors, songwriters, and actors can amass in their lifetime is widely known and publicized; however, this exists alongside the lottery-type rewards for artistic work. Information about the chances of success would be seen as a ‘damper’ on the hopes and dreams of young artists. Equally giving up is seen as immense failure in a meritocratic society. However, the risks at stake with this kind of work are unparalleled by any other industry and need to be understood and theorized by emerging and practicing artists.
Conclusion

Making both ends meet remains a challenge for artists in New Zealand. The independent music scene in New Zealand is, however, an example of artists working through a politics of autonomy, to work out how they might negotiate both the artistic and the commercial sphere. The organization of (IMNZ) in New Zealand offers some hope that local autonomous music producers are acknowledging the collective commons, and that artists can work together to combat the tough nature of entrepreneurial work and the structural processes of commodification.

Being aware of these forms of governmentality and disciplining, such as enterprise culture and creativity, all the more hidden because of the ‘freedom’ associated with creative self-initiated labour, means that arts educators need to encourage students to think about forms of collectivity to combat the isolation and marginalization this kind of work can engender. Feminist and Marxist perspectives help to identity the nature of work in the creative industries and how these can diminish the richness of the cultural commons. They also help us to examine how the intrusion of the market on all spheres of life can diminish artists’ participation in local neighbourhoods, community and family life.

The creative entrepreneur has positive and negative possibilities for artists. I think that being a creative entrepreneur has empowered contemporary musicians, to make a living from their work, without thinking they are ‘selling out.’ I accept that this is part of the reality and habitus of a contemporary artist today, while advocating for examination of where the entrepreneurial form may be a form of marginalization for those who lack market power and the informal networks to bring their work to the market. The daily, lived practices of artists require more research and examination so that artists can become politically aware of how the organization of their
labour, production and work could be improved to reflect their personal and collective goals.
BECOMING AN ARTIST, THE SELF AND ETHICS

Introduction

The notion of becoming an artist invites a philosophical investigation of the self and the ethics involved. In the chapter I begin to formulate an ethos that could underpin and aid one’s becoming as an artist in the new cultural economy, given the issues considered in the thesis thus far. On reflection of Bourdieu’s concept of habitus, and Foucault’s concept of governmentality, concepts which have underpinned the thesis discussion so far, two theoretical positions stand out about the ethical constitution of the self that are useful in consolidating how an educator and artist might respond to Bourdieu and Foucault’s ideas. The first is Foucault’s later notion of an ‘aesthetics of existence’. The second is Alasdair MacIntyre’s ‘tradition constituted rationality’. These concepts extend Bourdieu and Foucault’s ideas further, into the area of personal ethics, and may be helpful to the educator and artist to reflect on how they might personally respond to these notions of instrumentalised creativity, enterprise culture and the habitus of the artist. The discussion in this chapter largely centres around music and music education as a point of focus.

I propose that ethical and artistic engagement with questions of being and personal ethics are an essential part of becoming an artist and this type of reflection and problematisation should be incorporated as a helpful and practical part of music education. Economics is one area in which this could be relevant and empowering for artists. Music education should be involved not only with learning a “unique way of organizing and making sense of sound” as the Arts in the New Curriculum states (Ministry of Education,
2000, p. 52), but the way in which a musical life is lived. By developing critical and political awareness of the problems and circumstances one might expect as an artist in the new cultural economy, and ensuring local stories are told of how artists are negotiating these realities, arts educators are providing important preparation for artists faced with negotiating similar realities.

Foucault proposed for us to approach life- in a way that opposes “deadening, unthinking closure and domination…” and promotes “…the revitalizing creation of new forms of thought and action…” (Falzon, 1998, p. 71). MacIntyre is useful here because he was concerned with finding a practical morality, that is, how “real people made real choices in real situations” (Lutz, 2004, p. 14). This is the manner and intention with which I explore these ideas.

**Critical awareness in arts education pedagogy**

A critique is not a matter of saying that things are not right as they are. It is a matter of pointing out on what kinds of assumptions, what kinds of familiar, unchallenged, unconsidered modes of thought, the practices that we accept rest….Criticism is a matter of flushing out that thought and trying to change it: to show that things are not as self-evident as one believed, to see that what is accepted as self-evident will no longer be accepted as such. Practicing criticism is a matter of making facile gestures difficult (Foucault, 1988i: 154-155 cited in Olssen, 1999, p. 113).

To take seriously the role of education in shaping an artist’s practice in society, a critical pedagogy requires arts educators to go beyond a facile criticism of ‘commodity’ and ask a more vital question, how do artists in society ethically negotiate and engage with economic and aesthetic entities in their work and world? A pedagogy that encompasses the problematisation and negotiation of practical-discursive realities of economy interacting with ‘art-work’ and does so in the manner of working within an artistic practice is an
important aim of this thesis. Critical pedagogy is a teaching approach which helps students question and challenge domination to achieve critical consciousness, and think about ways to respond collectively and individually to improve the conditions of their lives. This is therefore a relevant approach to economics. The student is often a member of the group or process they are studying, for example, a musical student examining the music industry. The teacher works with students to help them question ideologies and practices that may be oppressive.

Grierson urges us in our attempt to develop practical knowledge in the arts, to grapple with the technologies of production, at a wider level than the technological, and to understand our work as essentially political (2003, p. 113-114). Maxine Greene, an American arts educator, also states that educators should be more concerned with “consciousness and vitality” more than just “technical mastery and quantifiable skills” (Greene, 1995, p. 178 cited in Stinson, 1998, p. 223). Greene says that arts education should “offer opportunities for perspective, for perceiving alternate ways of transcending and being in the world, for refusing the automatism that overwhelms choice” (Greene1995, p. 142 cited in Stinson, 1998, p. 223). Arts education should ensure engagement, that is, “arousing persons to wide-awakeness, to courageous and (I would add) resistant life…” (Greene, 1995, p. 224 cited in Stinson, 1998).

Arts educators from many arts disciplines are calling for a more critical pedagogy, rather than a technical, or mechanistic approach to the teaching of the arts. For example, Mansfield argues: “a critical theory of music education would engage in the questioning of global technological processes for their impact upon music educational sites” (2005, p. 135). She also says that we need to be concerned with “how local and regional musical cultures might be
affected by global transnational culture industries” and that these are matters of “importance and interest for educators” (p. 135). She articulates:

It becomes increasingly clear that the music educator’s cultural and curricular knowledge involves a facility with deconstructive practices in respect of the electronically produced musical product or commodity (p. 136).

Mansfield suggests that “…art, drama, dance and music and education in the arts” need to “embrace and be contextualized within educational philosophy, cultural policy studies, sociology and history” (p. 75). Mansfield goes on to say that the way critical analysis is described in the Arts Curriculum to “inform and evaluate a wide range of performance” (Ministry of Education, 2000, p. 69) is too focused on performance, and the work itself, and neglects the “discourse of technology and commodity culture” (2005, p. 134). She thinks that it keeps students “unaware of the politics of musical knowledge” through an absence of critical questions (p. 139). For criticality to work, it needs to involve dialogue which she thinks can’t occur when there is a “universalist consensus” around becoming “‘musically technologically literate’” which is driven by “technological rationality” (p. 139).

Lines says that rather than thinking of music/art as being geared towards ourselves, we should think of this kind of work as “working with” music/art. He regards this as an “ethical disposition”, one that “works with” and “cares for” the artistic process, which is more “musical and resonant with the cultural communities in which [students] reside” (2005, p. 66). Lines goes on to say that music educators need to be attuned to the “fluid forces in a cultural epoch and historical community” and that they need to have an “active disposition…[to] understanding and repositioning of things as they stand in relation to the human condition” (p. 67).
Similarly, Regelski draws our attention to praxis, that is how music is valued according to the purposes and criteria of its use, and therefore musicians need to be able to be guided by a “professional ethic for ‘right results’ and with ethical criteria such as ‘to do no harm’” (2005, p. 19). He goes on to say that the “situatedness and social construction of music meaning” requires that a musician be guided by “social conditions and conventions” that account for how ‘goodness’ is evaluated in each case (p. 18).

From a popular culture theory and popular cultural production perspective, Beverly Best says musical pedagogy need not follow a strict theory/practice dichotomy. There should be productive interbreeding of the work of both parties. Best proposes the idea that musicians and cultural producers who challenge the logic of profitability, and the audiences of their work, can take on the role of organic intellectuals. Those musicians who produce music independently, or those who have achieved commercial success, can use still be involved with critique and cultural analysis of the music industry. Best says:

…that the production of music is a ‘real’, ‘concrete’ activity that is opposed to the ‘abstract’, ‘idealized’ and ‘parasitic’ activity of cultural analysis must be disassembled…It is directly in the commercial interests of the culture industry that musicians believe that theoretical discussions of popular music and cultural politics are a threat to ‘actual’ music production (1997, p. 34).

An example of the outworking of the productive interbreeding between concrete activity and cultural analysis is in the practice of musician, producer, and owner of Arch Hill recordings, Ben Howe. Ben completed a MA thesis (2000) in anthropology on the construction of place, history and identity in independent music, and now in his work has formed an alliance of independent music producers in New Zealand (IMNZ).
Although the abundance of opportunities to ‘be creative’ in the workforce and in entrepreneurial work, has many positive effects in boosting the status of music and arts education in schools and learning institutions, educators need to be critically aware of how economic and ideological forces may influence their educational work in directions opposed to desirable curricular results in arts education. The potentially negative effects are that creativity becomes all important, and the importance of tradition is lost. Alternatively, too much emphasis on tradition, does not allow for the positive possibilities of self-creation, motivated by individual curiosity. Thus educators need to be advocates for political consciousness, alternate ways of being, engagement in questioning, dialogue and deconstructive practices, placing musical practice within the context of history, and acknowledging musical students historical community and social construction.

**Foucault’s ‘aesthetics of existence’**

Foucault designated the relation of oneself and one’s existence as the main area of ethical concern and the most important field where aesthetic values are to be applied. In his aesthetics of existence, he invited the individual to problematise the relationship with the self, and by using ‘self-techniques’ to transform it into a work of art (Huijer, 1999, p. 61).

Foucault’s early writing saw the subject as primarily produced and limited by social forces such as discourses, institutions and relations of power. (Danaher, et al., 2000, p. 116-117). Towards the end of Foucault’s life he revived an aspect of ethics in Ancient Greek society, the ‘aesthetics of existence’ to offer an ethical framework to help subjects experience agency and transformation by “…breaking the limits of the rigid, object-like forms of subjectivity which are given to us by our culture” even those which are “self-imposed” (O’Leary, 2002, p. 133). Through this theory he considerably
extended his earlier ideas about the ephemeral and derivative status of the individual, and proposed the way in which individuals can give shape to their lives. This broke from Kantian notions of aesthetics as ‘taste’ separate from other human activities, and unrelated to principled behaviour. Foucault expands the notion of aesthetics to include how one might shape their whole life into an aesthetic project. Central to Foucault’s notion of the ‘aesthetics of existence’ are Nietzsche’s ideas about becoming (Nietzsche, 1977 cited in O’Leary, 2002, p. 136).

Foucault’s ‘aesthetics of existence’9 is aesthetic not because it calls on us to make ourselves materially beautiful as such, but because it calls on us to relate to ourselves and our lives as to a material that can be formed and transformed (O’Leary, 2002, p. 138). Through this practice of ‘problematisation’ and ‘technologies of the self’ (Cutrofello, 2004, p. 157) we could build up resistance to governmentality. He suggested that ‘technologies of the self’ were the way in which one can craft, or exert influence over one’s bodies, soul10, thoughts, to manage and affect our constitution as subjects, and

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9 Foucault’s notion of ‘life as a work of art’ or the aesthetics of existence, is outlined in Huijer’s (1999) paper as comprised of four dispositions. They are i) problematisation, ii) mode of subjection, iii) working on oneself, and iv) focus on aesthetics of existence.

10 Nietzsche’s thoughts about the origin of man’s ‘soul’ and the emergence of conscience is outlined in Nietzsche’s account On the Genealogy of Morals, which put forward the hypothesis that when humans found themselves subject to political organisation, the ‘old instincts’ were unable to turn outward, so they turned inward, and the capacity for self-
recognize the possible subject positions available. Some of the ways Foucault believed we could do this was through some of the more ancient religious practices he studied such as mediation, journaling, reflection, conversation. According to Foucault’s definition, freedom is something that develops over time, and should be thought of as a “political skill to be exercised” (Olssen, 2005, p. 384).

The result of this work as O’Leary states is “ephemeral”, a “never to be completed work-in-progress” (2002, p. 133). It is work on oneself that accepts “fragmentation, plurality and instability” and the subject as an “ever-changing, substance-less form which is the site of endless conflict” (p. 132).

In summary, Foucault’s notion of ‘aesthetics of existence’ is a self-fashioning without significant reference to any rules or predetermined paths. However, it should be read in relation to his earlier theories about power and governmentality, which places the individual in his or her social context. Rather than effecting major societal change through collective action, such as the kind of meta-narrative Marxism attempted, Foucault works with the way the individual is constituted in Western society, as an autonomous individual, and offers a way for individual’s to impact on external structures through the shaping of themselves.

In considering Foucault’s response to ethics I found it had many possibilities for informing artistic practice in terms of encouraging original

directed action resulted in man developing what is later called a ‘soul’ (Nietzche, 987, p. 84-88 cited in Falzon, 1998, p. 65).
thought, self-reflection, self-invention and striking out at governing forces and breaking from limiting paradigms in an individually original way, however, it did not comprehensively account for the ways in which we act according to habitus, or according to corporate traditions. An approach to ethics which acknowledged historical tradition, and how to respond to the stories and narratives one is born into, is where MacIntyre’s ethical framework is useful and able to offer an additional perspective.

**MacIntyre’s notion of ‘tradition-constituted rationality’**

The three components of MacIntyre’s tradition-constituted rationality outlined in his book *After Virtue* (1981) are i) narrative order ii) moral tradition and iii) practices. I outline these now, and provide greater discussion on practices as an extension of previous ideas discussed by Bourdieu.

MacIntyre upbringing in Glasgow heightened his sense of the importance of tradition, particularly in regards to his own native Gaelic oral culture and also how one needed to locate one’s own life story to communal history and narrative. MacIntyre says that one’s life is embedded in the story of the community one is born into and that humans relate to each other through an “interlocking set of narratives” (1981, p. 203). It is through story that MacIntyre believes we most learn how to act and respond to situations. To engage with the questions that are raised when stories or narratives fail, and to overcome differences in rival moral schemes inherited at birth, is the kind of ethical or self-work that MacIntyre proposes and terms ‘tradition-constitutive’. Being able to understand “who we are and where we stand in relation to our traditions, according to commentator Ballard, is a central, if overlooked virtue” (2000, p. 21). We are all born into a moral starting point, and the debts, inheritances, rightful expectations and obligations that go with this (1981, p. 205). MacIntyre’s approach is that unless we understand our
tradition, we cannot know the best way to act in the future. As he says: “Knowledge of history is necessary for moral understanding and practice” (p. 205). A tradition-constitutive approach to ethics is one that embarks on a respectful engagement with one’s history and traditions, to discover a more coherent and adequate narrative towards one’s life.

With his concept of practices, MacIntyre argues that it is virtues such as justice, courage and honesty, that enable one to achieve in practices, and without these kinds of virtues the internal goods of practices are barred to practitioners. His understanding of virtue is not universal, but that virtue is relative to one’s historical and cultural epoch. MacIntyre says that practices are found in all human cultures and in a sense constitute goals for human desire (Ray, 2005). His definition of practice is:

…any coherent and complex form of socially established co-operative human activity through which goods internal to that form of activity are realised in the course of trying to achieve those standards of excellence which are appropriate to, and partially definitive of, that form of activity, with the result that human powers to achieve excellence, and human conceptions of the ends and goods involved, are systematically extended (MacIntyre, 1981, p. 175).

Examples of practices given by MacIntyre are a full list of what is, and what is not in his estimation considered a practice. He counts music as a practice (p. 175). Within practices, a central concern is with internal goods. These are defined and judged in relation to the practice’s specific standards of excellence, and distinct from external goods such as money, power and status which are the concern of institutions (Keat, 2000, p. 113). An example of an institution is a university or the marketplace. To enter into a practice is to enter into a relationship with both contemporary practitioners, and those who
have preceded us (MacIntyre, 1981, p. 181). Institutions grow up around practices and help to sustain them.

Keat develops MacIntyre’s concept of practice in relation to the supply of goods for the market. He says that a practice approach to ethics means that the practitioners are driven less towards profit maximization, and more towards profit-satisfiers. This is because there are considerable internal rewards by being involved in a practice like excelling, innovation, commitment, community, and personal well-being. Keat thinks that even if practices produce activities for this separate sphere we know as the ‘market’ it does not negate their internal operation as practices. Keat explains how an inverse logic of subordination of economic goods to the goods of practice can exist as a rewarding way of producing cultural goods for the market (2000, p. 116).

This notion of the internal goods of ‘practice’ is similar to the characteristics of Bourdieu’s field of restricted production, outlined in Chapter Two, and his notion of inverse levels of cultural and economic capital. Both Bourdieu’s concept of the field of restricted production and MacIntyre’s concept of practices, are useful to explain many of the seeming contradictions that can be observed between art and commerce in the contemporary cultural field. Instead of thinking of them as contradictions, these theorisations allow us to consider that there are other possibilities for producing goods for the market.

MacIntyre (MacIntyre 1981, cited in Keat, 2000, p. 123) states that participants in practice like production consequently regard their own good as inherently related to that of its other members, and that they form an integral part of a local community. Keat develops this notion to consider how the well-being for the producer and the consumer in the market of practice-created goods is enhanced through the existence and flourishing of practices. This is similar to Small’s concept of ‘musicking’ (1998), where Small
considers both the performer and the listening community to be actively involved in a musical event.

One example in considering this relationship between performer and listener/producer and consumer in practice is ethical consumption. Through the education of New Zealand music listeners (and consumers) to the importance of not pirating New Zealand music (the burn or be burned campaign), APRA educated the audience of New Zealand music to take more ethical care in their practice towards music, and New Zealand musicians, so that New Zealand musicians were better able to earn royalties, and thus a living. This resulted in many more people buying New Zealand music rather than pirating it, and therefore the practice of music and the wellbeing of musical producers in New Zealand were enhanced. In addition the appreciative and ethical skill of consumers of creative products was enhanced.

The strength of Foucault’s notion of aesthetics of existence allows for an experimental, playful and creative approach to the ethical substance of one’s life. Foucault’s concept allows for individual inspiration and motivation, as well as a sovereign attitude and responsibility, and the positive possibilities of self-creation. MacIntyre’s strength is the way in which he acknowledges narrative, and that knowledge of history and traditions is necessary for moral understanding and practice. The free floating liberal self is a fiction, and so is the individual wholly constrained by tradition. In the Western world we are constituted as individual’s and communal beings. Finding a balance between our contribution in both of these contexts is challenging, but important ethical work.

**Considering a dual approach**

Bourdieu’s concept of habitus introduced the idea that one’s actions are informed by one’s historical constitution. MacIntyre’s notions of moral
tradition, practice and narrative order as constructs which order our collective and individual morality, build on this concept, and allow us to consider the application of Bourdieu’s ideas to how one might teach music. Attention to this aspect of a historical community, is of benefit to music education as it is an act of resistance to the undermining of tradition and collective institutions that can occur within the discourse of enterprise culture and creativity. If life is more than running a business, as an enterprise, particularly within the arts, artistic creators work with both elements of tradition and originality. Bearing this in mind, we can treat tradition as an important entity and continue to uphold this within one’s artistic practice, ensuring it has an equal standing to notions of progress, newness and ‘creativity.’

The other aspect is the formation of one’s life, through ‘self-techniques’ as a focus for resistance to the forces of governmentality. Mentalities of rule such as meritocracy, enterprise culture and the sovereign consumer would weaken one’s ability to enact on the world for change. By problematising the forces that come to bear upon one’s life, and realize one’s own ethos towards them is to be involved in the creation of new forms of thought and action.

A two-pronged approach to the ethics of becoming an artist in the new cultural economy, that of being able to make a living through creating a unique cultural product, and reflecting on how one’s own actions can stimulate new forms of thought, while also being adequately grounded in an understanding of one’s cultural epoch, the ‘where’ and ‘when’ of one’s ethical, political, economic and religious constitution is a possible way of advancing our critical pedagogy. History and tradition combined with an awareness of how an experimental approach to life and one’s ethos is the way that these two approaches can be blended to form a resistance towards enterprise culture and instrumentalised creativity.
Working with real life ethical/musical problems

To illustrate these ethical theories of ‘aesthetics of existence’ and ‘practice’, I have gleaned examples from New Zealand contemporary musicians lives particularly from Shute’s (2005) recent compilation of comments on the way in which these musicians approach many different aspects of their lives. Their frankness in relation to the three art/commercial interfaces of advertising, economic capital, and recording contracts is evident, and is chosen to illuminate our discussion with freshly formulated commentary. These examples show that while ‘commercial musicians’ serve and supply musical product to a local or global music market, they are aware of their personal ethos that underpins this work, they are interested in the internal goods of their practice, and the self-stylisation and the negotiation of power relations that contribute to this.

What emerges in Shute’s book described in the foreword as a book to examine the reality of being a local musician is how remarkably strong the critical awareness, and understanding either consciously or unconsciously of the way the music industry functions, and the level of negotiation that contemporary musicians require to define and re-define their field position within the context of the music business. Not only the ability to survive in what Dimmer’s Shayne Carter describes as a “hard-edged” business (Shute, 2005, p. 129) but to devise and formulate a personal set of ethical commitments (ethos) and subject positions that enable them to practice as artists.

Interestingly, all of the musicians interviewed in Shute’s book would be traditionally classified as popular or commercial musicians. However, they do not necessarily see themselves in this way, identifying other spheres such as the ‘ad industry’ or ‘major labels’ as being driven by commercial values and principles of profit and their work as operating on a different basis. New
Zealand musicians would regard their work as cultural, or creative, about ideas and the music (art for art’s sake or internal ‘practice’ goods) first, and the commercial arm of the industry (external goods such as record sales, fame, success) as a necessary second stakeholder in taking their music to their audience and their fans.

i) Advertising

Ordinarily, work done in the advertising industry may cause an ethical problem for some artists. With these examples I show how a different stance or subject position can be taken up, and show there is deliberate engagement with the issues of the effects, advantages and disadvantages of what they perceive to be more commercial aspects of music. They show the use of a personal set of ethics that would forbid in one instance, and sanction for another. Some are working with a more traditional approach to art and economics, based in the habitus of the autonomous Bohemian avant-garde artist, where involvement with an advertising industry is perceived as compromising the artistic quality of their music. Others are working with an ethical position of ‘balance’, being aware of how one might compromise the other, yet seeking the external goods (money) from involvement with it, and the internal goods (friendship) that could enhance their music practice. Others are working more seamlessly between both commercial and independent spheres. Their ability to do so is the result of being able to incorporate this work into a narrative or story that makes sense to their life.

Musician Don McGlashan describes how working in the commercial world of doing music for ads is a different world, and “a different way of looking at art and life” and one in which the “two worldviews quite often don’t mix” and where there is “difficulty jumping from one world to the
other” (Shute, 2005, p. 149). This is the schizophrenia of modern life.

McGlashan’s describes this kind of advertising work as “walk[ing] a pretty fine line” where writing your own songs requires “openness and innocence” which is a different mindset to “think[ing] of a way to sell ice-cream” (p. 149). This ethical perspective is that these different worlds of music are ‘separate mindsets’ and if you get too caught up in them, the more commercial may jeopardize your other practice-like activity.

McGlashan describes the benefits of working within the advertising sphere, as the opportunities for collaboration with “another group of creative people”, and the opportunity to “make new friends” (p. 149). He emphasizes the internal rewards like community important to those engaged in a practice. Knowing how to relate ethically to these kinds of situations is not straightforward, as there are moral traditions to consider as well as differences between commercial activity (heteronomous) and practice based activity. He describes his strategy to negotiate with this as “you’ve got to strike a balance” (Shute, 2005, p. 149). This artistic notion of balance, is perhaps what Foucault would term an aesthetic, in that McGlashan is working out how to live in a way that fits with his narrative of what it is to practice as an artist.

Alternatively, the musician SJD has found to his surprise that work writing music for short films and the “ad industry” is complimentary to his musical ethos, and was surprised at how with a “degree of compromise” it was not personally, or ethically a ‘sell-out’ (p.148). Instead, by doing this, it has enabled him to keep on doing what he loves, which is his music. This is a subject position that finds the advertising industry complimentary to his music practice. He has in MacIntyre’s view, found a way to incorporate this into the narrative of his life that could ethically resolve this kind of work.
Conversely, the band Pluto has maintained that they would not “compromise the music” by “sell[ing] ourselves to a crappy commercial”, even though they admit, “there’s a lot of money in it” (Shute, 2005, p. 148). At the same time, they comment on how they would not judge if a band if they did it, if the band felt it was “right” for them (Shute, 2005, p. 148). Pluto’s subject position shows that for them licensing their music to advertising would be a ‘sell out’ reflecting the internal goods of practice, such as honesty, courage and justice are more important than external goods. Despite their own ethos, they comment that they are prepared to accept other’s decisions, taking a relativist approach.

Musicians are personally involved in ethical decisions about how they negotiate and where they position themselves and their music. These examples shows that musicians arrive at a variety of positions based on a different ethos towards various aspects of cultural production in the cultural economy.

**ii) Economic capital**

Many musicians openly admit the enormous struggle financially in making music in New Zealand, with stories of touring, accommodation and transport taking them into debt. This is problematised, and different subject positions are taken up in regards to the need for economic capital. One subject position towards economic capital is the belief that talent, hard work, commitment, and sacrifice will earn musical and financial dividends. Matt Ruys, of Universal records and HiRuys records expresses this view (Shute, 2005, p. 126). This would be an understanding that by working on oneself, one can affect the outcome of one’s life and that the virtue of commitment and hard work will pay off.
Tina Pihema from the Coolies speaks of how their band made it to a major music festival in the United States on a very small budget. She shows that her subject position towards economic capital is to rely on reciprocal favours and generosity from friends, (social capital or friendships) and to not be overwhelmed or held back by a small budget (Shute, 2005, p. 71). Putting trust in the practice of music, and the virtue of friendship shows Pihema has faith in the community and ‘practice’ elements of music to provide for her and her band’s needs.

Alternatively, King Kapisi and Dawn Raid have both diversified into clothing to subsidize the costs of music-making (Wihongi-Ioane, 2003, p. 13-14). This shows that perhaps the internal goods of practice are not enough, and that their investment in the practice of music needs to be coupled with self-subsidisation in a more commercially driven sense. Their negotiation of these realities show they are willing to invent new ways of living as a musician, employing diversification, and self-styling their lives in a Foucauldian sense.

iii) Recording contracts

Similarly, a relationship with a recording label represents the opportunity for a range of ethical subject positions for artists to take up. Negotiation skills to keep one’s ethos intact are essential. Some artists will be most conscious of protecting creative freedom, and taking time to develop the kind of product they want, and therefore negotiate this into the kind of contract they enter into. New Zealand musicians currently demonstrate a high degree of awareness of power and where they need to negotiate, where they need to allow someone else to negotiate (in the form of lawyers, managers, and booking agents) and what aspects of their work they want to directly control.
themselves. The high numbers of independent musicians show how they have problematised this aspect of their musical/economic lives.

Ben Howe, owner of Arch Hill recordings and musician, describes how there are various subject positions towards signing to a recording label. He says that major labels have “more money” (economic capital/external rewards) which he says can be attractive to musicians, but thinks that because of this, “profits…come first” and “creativity comes second” (Shute, 2005, p. 125). He thinks musicians need to think about their “goals” whether it is important to sell “large numbers of your album and become famous as quickly as possible” or if you are interested in being “creatively driven” and focused on the “long term” then your preference may be suited to an independent label (p. 125). Howe’s comments show how important an ethos towards the kind of music, and the way in which one’s music is disseminated; in relation to recording contracts, is an important ethical problem to consider. Foucault’s ‘aesthetics of existence’ would allow a relative, inventive approach, while MacIntyre’s might allow us to consider moral traditions, narratives and stories in which we might inherit as musicians that would inform our decision.

Another example of a band who has problematised their relationship with a recording label is the band Goldenhorse. They made their album Riverhead without the backing of a recording label, because they didn’t want to be influenced by record-company pressure. The Listener reports that the band borrowed against Morelle's mother's house, even though this was stressful, as it enabled them to record for a full eighteen months (Schmidt, 2003, Para. 7). This unconventional approach resulted in the possibility of greater control over their music, even if it was a risky approach to finances. As Foucault says:
Ethics was also a matter of pleasure, of taking risks, of danger and the intensity of existence” (Foucault, 1983, DE IV; 531 cited in Huijer, 1999, p. 74).

A final example is the approach of music producer P-Money and his business partner, Callum August. The pair started the company Dirty Records, without business training nor by following a traditional business model. They comment on their approach as taking the best from what they saw and moulding it to their own style (Bond, 2005). This is an example of Foucault’s notion of ‘aesthetics of existence’, modeling their behaviour on new models, forms, and habits that could extend thought and practice beyond what is already known.

**Transmitting a critical pedagogy**

Thought and life achieve realization through an attitude of ‘permanent criticism’ whose aim is not an objective of absolute emancipation or absolute enlightenment, but rather limited and partial operations on the world as well as acts of aesthetic self-creation framed within a critical ontology of ourselves and supported by an ethics and aesthetics of existence (Olssen, 1999, p. 113-114).

If the ethical problematisation and aesthetic self-creation that goes on in music is widely practiced, and the adherence to a moral tradition or habitus in practices occurs, as arts educators we need to consider how this kind of critical ontology is culturally transmitted. Are these kinds of ethical problems and subject positions passed on adequately through enculturation and habitus, informal dialogue and engrossment in the field of music itself? Regelski acknowledges that such praxial knowledge can be acquired through “habitual involvement” not just from “studied expertise” (p. 19) noting that amateur performers, audiophiles, listeners and music critics may not have been ‘taught’ music, but can well understand musicking, or the how, why and when of music’s use in society. This is similar to Bourdieu’s notion of habitus, that
these knowledges can be transmitted through participation within a field, and from one generation to another. If this is passed on ‘habitually’, what role might a music educator play in transmitting this critical ontology?

A music educator can play a vital role in the transmitting of a critical ontology by facilitating deliberate dialogue, problematisation and reflexivity... One way to do this is through story. Stories about how artists negotiate their lives should be abundant in music education practice. It is through hearing and telling stories about artists that one learns how practitioners that have gone before have developed their ethos. When a personal or collective narrative fails us, artists need help to know how to critically evaluate their ideas and continue to find a more compelling, intelligible life narrative. Ethical and artistic engagement with questions of financial and artistic considerations are an essential part of becoming an artist, and this type of reflection and problematisation in music education would provide a storehouse of examples that can feed into how one might shape one’s ethical/musical life. These stories of negotiation should be incorporated as a helpful and practical part of music education. There is no one way to think about an ethical position in relation to art and economy, as these above illustrations from musicians show, but being able to problematise a stance, make sense of one’s narratives and the interlocking stories one finds oneself born into, particularly the ethical traditions which inform music practice, and learn a way to continue critically in life is an important part of being and becoming an artist.

Following a Marxist critique of the cultural industries too closely, focusing on the shortcomings of the commodity form, and the negative effects of globalization, pluralism, and technology, as important and useful as this is to help establish ethical limits to creativity, does not offer a way to bridge theory to practice in the way in which today’s musician/artist may need to
negotiate these discursive realities to make a contribution to artworlds and to practice as an artist today. An ethics wide enough to encompass the many aspects of an artist’s ethical/musical reality, such as technology, band members, economic capital, recording, collaboration, exporting should be sought. The aesthetics of existence and practice could be an approach that recognizes the musicians active ethical disposition in relation to all of these parts of music, rather than just working with the ‘object’ of music or technical ‘skills’ of music.

Music education can offer alternative views of the work done by artists that better describe the circumstances surrounding cultural production, and that more accurately articulate the different formations of artistic production. A practice approach within a neo-liberal discourse breaks from the idea that the market is the overall organizing principle to all activities, and accounts for how other ways of being are sustained. An understanding of practice by educators means there is an acknowledgement that life can be organized and operate in different ways than just utilitarian and profit maximizing. It shows up the limits or boundaries of the market to regulate all spheres of life, an important resistance to neo-liberalism’s totalizing discourse. Keat says a practice approach occupies a marginal status in society (2000, p. 112). In the light of this, it is all the more important for arts educators to understand how these dynamics of practice, contribute to a communitarian, participatory approach to music at many different levels. A critical pedagogy that accounts for how artists are concerned with the practice-values of commitment, community, personal well-being, excellence and innovation, as well as how they operate within the market (MacIntyre, 1981 cited in Keat, 2000) is possible with an understanding of practice.

Ignoring the wider conditions of cultural production is not empowering to musical students. Acknowledging the degree to which artists negotiate
cultural production in the widest sense is. Teaching the curriculum strands, as stated in the New Zealand Curriculum as: developing practical knowledge in music, developing ideas in music, communicating and interpreting in music, and understanding music in context, is possible by examining the cultural conditions of production of music, ethical traditions in music, and sharing stories of how artists relate to the ethical substance of their lives. This would provide more ways for students to experience the ‘lifeworld’ of music, rather than a purely technicist and rational analytical approach. Music education would then resonate with students experiences of music in their lives and around them.

**Conclusion**

Musicians development of these political knowledges and understandings of various subject positions, and one’s ethical relationship to them, is important in musicians’ lives and economic livelihood and therefore is equally relevant to the development of technical skills in music. Through ‘ethical problematisation’ and an ‘intermingling’ of theory and practice in pedagogy, younger musicians are better equipped to choose strategically negotiated positions within their industry or field. I suggest that contemporary New Zealand musicians demonstrate a conscious or unconscious practical knowledge of the Foucauldian principles of an ‘aesthetics of existence’, and MacIntyre’s notion of ‘practice’, however, both of these ways of being are threatened by the instrumentalisation of creativity, technical rationality and enterprise culture. Therefore it is all the more important that an ethos is developed towards these elements of a musical life, so that artists can continue to work in both traditional and original ways.
7 CONCLUSION

The concluding chapter returns to the guiding questions of this critical inductive research to reflect what it has unearthed that might contribute to our understanding of the problem of how art and economics interact in the contemporary cultural field. In the final part of the chapter I consider further questions that arise out of this thesis for future music education research and cultural studies research more generally.

Revisiting the aims

We thus return to the primary historical mission of critical thought, which is to serve as a solvent of doxa, to perpetually question the obviousness and the very frames of civic debate so as to give ourselves a chance to think the world, rather than being thought by it, to take apart and understand its mechanisms, and thus reappropriate it intellectually and materially (Wacquant, 2004, p. 101).

Bourdieu’s “metatheoretical approach” (Formosa, 2005, Para. 3) to the question of how art and economics interact, with his concepts of habitus, field and capital have provided a critical pathway for a discussion of art and economics. The work of Bourdieu, and subsequently other scholars who advance his work, help the artist and arts educator to consider the mechanisms of power and capital that exist in the social world of art. This theorisation of how an artist’s effectiveness or capital (social, economic, or cultural) within a particular art field results from the degree of asymmetry or conflict between the field and their habitus is both practical and emancipatory for those engaged in these fields and should be considered by those involved in cultural production. Bourdieu’s theory resist the doxa of Marxism on the one hand,
necessary to question the negative effects of the commodity form, but which may have seen art endangered by economics. On the other hand it resists the doxa of neo-liberalism, which denies the social and collective aspects of economy and markets and which would have seen the market as the overall organizing principle of life. Bourdieu refusal to perceive the two ‘disciplines’ of sociology and economics as antagonistic, but instead as part of a single discipline has illuminated many aspects of cultural production (Bourdieu, 2005, dust jacket). This perspective on art and economics provides a way to sustain a lengthy and open discussion of the field of cultural production, and allows one to consider transformations in the cultural field.

Bourdieu attempts to build theory from the ground up, “reaching conclusions about regularities and social structures on the basis of empirical research” (Calhoun, 2002). Although my study has not involved empirical research, it was initially conceived because of an observed and experienced phenomenon of the poverty of artists, and the discourse of the creative industries, which led me to find ways to understand this practical economic and social problem in the world. In this more limited sense, it follows Bourdieu’s commitment and orientation to find theory for practice.

By observing how the relations between the field of restricted production and the field of large-scale production might work in the contemporary cultural field, I explored how this model of two-subfields might be more complex now. I looked for scholars who have advanced Bourdieu’s theories on the contemporary dynamics of cultural production, namely Williams, Keat and Hesmondhalgh. In addition, MacIntyre’s notion of practice has provided an even fuller understanding and articulation of the formations of cultural production.

The insertion of Foucault’s theories into this thesis was because Foucault was also “…orientated towards the problematisation of our prevailing forms
of life in order to promote resistance and new forms of thinking and acting”…to “question what is self-evident” and “reinterrogate the obvious and assumed “(Falzon, 1998, p. 70). Foucault’s notion of genealogy has provided another theoretical angle to this discussion to describe how a present day disjuncture of art and commerce can be traced historically. In my attempt to follow this kind of critical thought, I have considered how the past can influence the present in our ideas about art and commerce. It was necessary to excavate our own history of ideas in relation to the Bohemian artist. In doing this kind of excavation, Foucault says we may find we have opened up a space for “innovation and creativity” (Foucault, 1981, p. 11-12; 1988e, p. 265 cited in Falzon, 1998, p. 70). Certainly, in regards to the Bohemian artist, one has been able to view this subject as more historical, and less ‘natural’, and consider what our response to producing art in post-industrial capitalism might look like now. Wilson says the Bohemian impulse or desire to create a different and more authentic life will never disappear, and we can expect that it will find new expressions and new forms (2000, p. 247-248).

Bohemia is not an artistic utopia (it is founded in a Foucauldian sense of faulty miscalculations) yet it is one attempt to find a poetic and practical way to respond to making art in industrial capitalism. The Bohemian artist is part myth, but mostly a response to political, technological and economic change in the basis with which an artist’s work was produced. Bourdieu has also significantly contributed to my understanding of the influence of Bohemia in his term ‘habitus’. The Bohemian response has had an enduring impact in the habitus of the artist in several ways. Firstly in terms of creating a critical counter-space within the middle-class, secondly in the ethical orientation or deontology of the artist to ‘tell the truth’ in a society, thirdly in the formation of an inverse universe where cultural and social capital are favoured over economic capital, and fourthly as a collective response by artists to make art
for the new institution of the market. This response of Bohemia in these four aspects was a resistance to the excesses of capitalism. These are still relevant especially as neo-liberal capitalism continues its “programme of the methodical destruction of collectives” (Bourdieu, 1998, Para. 5). Artists are not obliged to go ‘back to Bohemia’ as if it is a pure state, or origins and foundations, but they will continue to find remnants of the attitudes of Bohemia inveterate within the habitus of art production in capitalist society, particularly at the autonomous sphere.

Florida’s argument that the Bohemian and the bourgeoisie have ‘morphed’ in our current milieu into the subject form of the ‘creative entrepreneur’, denies the genealogy of Bohemia and it’s modern incarnation in the existence of an autonomous artistic sphere. The variety and quality of all cultural production is still dependent on activities being carried out in an autonomous sphere and also those carried out in the heteronomous sphere. The two are inter-related. While I agree with Florida that the two are not as ‘antagonistic’ as earlier times, and work in conjunction with each other in many inventive ways, to simply say they have ‘morphed’ into one subject form is to deny the full range of provisional classifications and formations of artistic production today. Without precise analysis and description of the variety and range of cultural formations around the globe, we limit the imagination and possibilities of artistic practice. Arts educators should seek to historise and contextualize movements in art, and explain formations of artistic production so that the contemporary cultural field is shown in the complexity and depth that exists in practice.

Taking into account the strong discourse of enterprise culture and the instrumentalisation of creativity, evident in our current episteme and how these two concepts have come together into the subject form of the ‘creative
entrepreneur’, I have explored how enterprise culture has turned responsibility for one’s future increasingly onto the individual. This has been part of a systematic form of social engineering during the 1980s and 1990s, as part of neoliberalism’s project to responsibilise individuals. Alongside this has been governing of individuals to act as rational choice actors, and the promotion of the subject forms of the ‘entrepreneurial self’ and the ‘sovereign consumer’ based on utilitarian rationality. These reforms have profoundly changed society and impacted on artists and education.

There has also been an emergent discourse of ‘creativity’ as something to be exploited for its commercial potential. The ‘creative industries’ termed by various academics such as Howkins and Florida, and increasingly by governments and educational institutions, to indicate a ‘path to economic prosperity’ highlights that creativity has become the interest of government and business and is no longer the domain of the traditional arts. Those at the ‘creation’ end of products and ideas are increasingly in demand, hence artists, innovators and entrepreneurs are increasingly important to society. This indicates that there may be positive opportunities for artists to make a living from their art in our current milieu, if they are able to exploit the economic benefits of their art making. In addition, it indicates that there may be government backing and support, and possibly venture capital and private investment in these industries to aid artists to exploit local and international opportunities. It also means that it is urgent that these forces are theorised by arts educators. If theory about creativity is left up to those outside of the creative arts, this could mean arts educators may be forced to teach in ways that are not conducive to the breadth and depth of the arts. The breadth and depth of what creativity is, in its destructive and inert capacity, as well as it’s novel and fashionable capacity, is worthy of educational debate and intellectual rigour.
Arts educators need to be aware of the aspects of art that are not about ‘creativity’ in the incessantly new and novel way, such as tradition, ritual, and decoration. Crafts and arts that are unpopular and not ‘commercially’ viable at the time, which feed the richness of art worlds, should not be excluded from arts curricular. Educators need to uphold the importance of art in community contexts which enrich the cultural commons. This would be practicing Foucault’s ideas of emancipation through “recalcitrance, resistance, refusal or renegotiation of power, and the exploration of possibilities of existence that transgress or modify power relationships and identities” (Lloyd & Thacker, 1997, p. 60).

This discourse of the ‘creative entrepreneur’ also indicates that the ‘creative industries’ have the potential to become an important economic and export sector for New Zealand. However, artists and arts educators need to continue to play a strong role in developing this. The ability to make this work, without destroying local creative ecologies, or locally owned creative businesses is important to the welfare of the arts in New Zealand. As long as economic planning and artistic practice planning work together, and collective organizations are maintained, then this could be a sustainable future for New Zealand art and artists. A greater variety of research and models need to be examined to ensure local restricted fields of production co-exist with larger-scale production, and the fertile enabling conditions that exist now for cultural successes like the New Zealand music industry continue to flourish.

Arts education should balance the individualized career path that will be presented as part of ‘enterprise culture’ with discussion of the possibilities of collective formations in art making. Music provides a particularly good example of this, as many aspects of music require collectivity and collaboration. There is also the possibility for arts education to re-define, or self-define what a creative entrepreneur is and might look like. To understand
that copyright and intellectual property is a social construction and that it is
the artist’s right to use these concepts in ways that are compatible with their
values and what they desire to do is a liberating possibility. An awareness of
the discourses of enterprise culture and instrumentalised creativity can help to
draw out responses to these in arts curricular, so that art is experienced in its
many facets.

The entrepreneurial pathway can only be realized through undertaking
risk. As this historical investigation has revealed, risk is an element of artistic
production that goes back to the break-up of the guilds and the removal of art
from patronage. Assessing the self’s relationship to the kinds of risk required
to succeed as an artist, contextualised against the background of one’s own
forms of capital, gender and class, is useful self-reflection. This helps a
potential artist to realize that to be an artist requires greater risk than other
professions, and how they might contend with this in their lives. Awareness
of risk also highlights that the entrepreneurial and interventionist strategies of
state and collective formations are vitally important to offset and minimize
the risk for artistic producers. In conjunction with risk more generally in
artistic production, enterprise culture has proportionately shifted more risk to
the individual specifically (for example, student loans). This has been part of
deliberate policy of government since the 1980s to create individuals that will
be more self-reliant and self-governing.

Bourdieu says social capital needs to be renewed and reproduced. By
simply defending an order, be it family, co-operative, associations, unions,
and the corresponding priviledges, we will be able to resist the challenge to
not just pursue egoistic interests and individual passion for profit, but pursue
the public interest, and continue to invest the public domain and communal
institutions with value and worth. Interestingly, when the NZEIR studied the
Lord of the Rings film project and the potential of the screen industry in New
Zealand they found that the most important economic outcome from the project was the human connections, linkages, capacity, capability and trust (or in Bourdieuan terms, social capital) that was built up during that project. This was found to be worth more than technology, technical skill, locations and so forth (Duncan, 2005).

Critical studies in the politics of power are addressed in some popular music studies, and music education taught at the tertiary level. However the Arts in the New Zealand Curriculum (Ministry of Education, 2000) are found to be silent on the political economies of music. When ‘production’ is prescribed in the curriculum, for example “Students will investigate the production and performance of music in contemporary contexts” (p. 62) the learning examples given are orientated towards the technical production of the piece. This should be more broadly interpreted as the production within the culture industries. Examining all of the parts of ‘production’ in the wide sense that make a piece of music happen is important practical knowledge in music. As Best says an “intermingling of theory and production can result in popular cultural texts that are ‘self-conscious’ of their material environments” (1997, p. 34).

Arts educators cannot ignore the economic imperatives of cultural production, present in an economically liberal society. We live in an environment of economic liberalism, where artists are free to pursue a living (and make a profit if they can) from their art. I suggest arts educators cannot ignore economic processes in arts pedagogy, as art interacts with commerce and has a place in reflecting and creating wealth in society. However, nor can arts education ignore the ‘sociality’ of music and the voice of the ‘other’ that the artist embodies. Part of the habitus of the artist, formed during Bohemia is that creative artists and leaders have a social role to extend the boundaries of life, to enrich life with their ability to be the ‘critic’, the ‘truth teller’ and the
‘shaman.’ This is an important function of art in a politically liberal society. Arts educators, by acknowledging this schism, open themselves up to how they might better understand both the history and sociology of culture and the economic production of culture. Bourdieu’s intellectual thinking tools help us make sense of these apparent contradictions in a complicated contemporary cultural field of production and are a springboard to formulate our own ideas about them.

MacIntyre’s notion of practice (and its subsequent development by Keat) infers that artists as practitioners, focus on the innovative development of their product, demonstrate the ability to weather storms and retain their core commitment to their artform. They will desire to excel, they may seek to earn just enough profits to stay in business, (profit satisfiers) and may hold to their core commitment even when offered more profitable activities. They are sustained through both competition and co-operation with other practitioners, as well as by the sense of community with which they belong. Keat describes practices as having a “marginal position” in society (Keat, 2000, p. 112). The notion of the ‘creative entrepreneur’ is perhaps more aligned to this model than we think, and requires artists and arts educators to consider ways to better articulate and describe the way in which artists do business and bring their cultural products to the market.

Process, movement and change in art and thinking are possible by considering an ‘aesthetics of existence’ with stories and examples from artists lives. This is a way of thinking that goes beyond the right approach based on tradition or use of music, to what is the response the individual or subject may want to take up, given the forces of governmentality. An ‘aesthetics of existence’ allows for improvisation and self-stylisation based on one’s ethical constitution and response to dominant forces as a form of resistance. This may be more useful for a contemporary artist who may be trying to approach
their music and art in new ways. I believe both ‘practice’ and ‘an aesthetics of existence’ tie together into a pedagogical approach and have powerful implications for musicians trying to meet both financial and artistic goals. This is the work of preparing would-be musicians for a future of negotiation as not only a creative artist, but as a critical and musical-ethical subject.

**Further questions**

This leaves us with some further questions about the development of artists in the new cultural economy that may lead on from this study and could be of interest for additional research in cultural studies and education.

*What are the working practices and the logistics of making a living for young musicians and/or other cultural entrepreneurial groups in Auckland?*

What has emerged in McRobbie’s recent study of the small-scale creative sector operating out of artist’s studios near Goldsmith University, London, is how artist’s lives function. She states that artists worked with an “…overwhelmingly organized and highly structured schedule” which “put paid to the chaotic ideal of the Bohemian lifestyle-these were clearly ‘career artists’” (2004, p. 137). The daily working practices and economics of young musicians and other cultural entrepreneurs in Auckland as a parallel study would be an interesting one for cultural analysis. McRobbie remarked that cultural entrepreneurs are looking to test out their practices in the presence of sociologists and cultural theorists (p. 135).

Educational and social science research that undertakes to study the day-to-day working practices could provide understanding about artists’ lives within a wider context, than the usual art historical context. In doing so, artists lives can be improved which is an important aim of critical theory. By seeking to understand the problems that are systemic, and societal, rather than the
personal inadequacies of the subject, could result in a greater awareness of where there is a need for collective action, and where marginalisation may exist.

Artist working practices and the logistics of making a living can be overshadowed by a city’s concerns for the consequences of art in creating a ‘world class city,’ or on increasing the value of real estate in the ‘cultural precincts,’ or experiencing the next economic miracle. The difficulties with the informal nature of creative ecology, and the financial insecurity, lack of career structure, and the blurring of social and work life are all aspects that could be examined so as to be appropriately addressed in policy. This is emancipatory for artists as in the context of macro-theoretical tools, personal failures are shown to be not personal, but societal, and therefore able to be addressed.

*How does the co-existence of ‘indies’ and ‘major’s’ in the New Zealand music industry reflect Bourdieu’s model of the ‘hierarchized relations’ between the autonomous and the heteronomous modes of production?*

Bourdieu says the:

> two modes of production, as opposed as they are, coexist so as to be definable only in terms of their hierarchic and objectively hierarchized relations with each other (Bourdieu, 1985, p. 14).

Examining the fragility and the enabling conditions that help preserve the delicate balance that makes an artistic and lively city, made up of two (or more) modes of production, co-existing in hierarchized relationship, would provide an interesting case study. This phenomenon indicates the likelihood of a sustainable small-scale local music industry in New Zealand, co-existing with the majors in the FLP, from which a more robust music industry could be built in the future.
A facility and knowledge in respect to electronically produced musical product in New Zealand would show that on one hand cheaply available home recording technology and Internet distribution has had a positive effect on the flourishing of independent music in New Zealand (Brown, 2005, p. 68) while on the other hand there may be threats from “roaming musical marketers” who appropriate “creative cultural resources” from “different parts of the world” (Mansfield, 2005, p. 135). Shorthose & Strange (2004) suggest the sphere of autonomy sustained by the cultural commons is at best “partial and fragile” (p. 50). It is a micro sub-sector, surrounded by more commercially-orientated corporate activity. The local nuances in the New Zealand music scene would make an interesting educational case study about political economies of music. Examining models for the music industry in places like Stockholm and Jamaica would make an interesting comparison case study (Power & Hallencreutz, 2004, p. 231).

Understanding how these local economies could be threatened by pressure to commercialise output, low levels of economic capital, exporting, and imports, could lead to better economic and policy planning so that the advantages of having both spheres of cultural production operating in New Zealand are maintained. More research into models of economic development that take into account cultural commons, sustainability and voluntary participation (Shorthose & Strange, 2004, p. 50-51) could help. This research could help artistic development, based in local creative ecologies built on trust, reciprocity, gift and social capital to thrive, and are not be pushed out through the forces of industrialization, globalization and neo-liberalism.
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