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Queer Assemblage Thinking:
Governing Sexual Others in Contemporary Turkey

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A thesis submitted in fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Politics and International Relations at the University of Auckland, 2017.
Abstract

In this thesis, I argue that queer identity is an assemblage. I demonstrate that heterogeneous actors, institutions, and productions are responsible for making queers knowable, tangible, and governable. Yet these processes are uneven, affecting different queers differently, are resisted, and change all the time. It is not simply that institutions (for example, the state) control queer lives and that they resist. Rather, everyday life, public encounters, banal objects, and subjective and physical experiences result in unique power relationships between queers and institutions. I support these claims by developing lines of governmentality theory, assemblage thinking, and queer theory. I apply these ideas to the case study of queer and trans people in contemporary Turkey. I draw upon archival and interview data to explore the ways the queers are materialized and the political consequences of these constructions. The first part of the thesis explores the genealogy of heteropatriarchal state-making, historically situating the embeddedness of the disavowal of queer others across Turkish institutions. The next two chapters explore the processes and components which give rise to the idea of queer and trans bodies, focusing on how institutions interact to define and marginalize queer others. I consider how the family, the state, Turkish Islam, and media establish negative understandings of queer bodies. I also explore how queer resistance emerges from this assembled experience of marginalization. This is demonstrated in my final chapter, wherein I consider the Gezi Park uprisings of 2013 as a kind of “queer common,” or a renegotiation of the queer assemblage. The queer common exemplifies the possibilities for resistance created alongside institutional acts of power. As an assemblage itself, this thesis foregrounds the fluctuating relationships between queer others and local, national, and global processes.
Dedication

This thesis is dedicated to Linda Kramer, Wendy Shifrin, Colette van Kerckvoorde, Sarmila Bose, Anita Lacey, Katherine Smits, Katherine Jennings, and Pia McKay. I could not have come this far without these divas.
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Introduction

Cynthia Enloe’s assertion that “the personal is international” complicates traditional conceptualizations of International Relations: to only study powerful elites or states confirms the status of those actors, obscuring the complex marginalizations that brought them their privilege. Queer approaches derive from this call to greater reflexivity in International Relations. Queer IR as a subdiscipline legitimizes the study of the governance of sexuality as it occurs from the local to the global (within militaries, in global development aid planning, as a U.N. human rights norm) – and interrogates what it means to discursively refer to something as “queer.” Yet Queer IR can also reveal our own ontological positions as researchers, wherein we recognize that the way we talk about the marginal or the powerful is itself an act that creates these realities. And so one of the greatest strengths of Queer IR as a critical, reflexive approach is its latitude to denaturalize assumptions in pursuit of social change. While Queer IR nominally is concerned with the identification and analysis of sexual assumptions in global discourse and power relations, it further recognizes how sex and gender norms inform conceptions of sovereignty, human rights, terrorism, development, and other traditional foci of International Relations research. Queer approaches therefore do not need to be explicitly about the study of LGBTQ persons or rights, but instead problematize given assumptions, discourses, and understandings of power and the production of sexuality more broadly. As Peterson argues: “[Queer theory] offers not only the most telling and informed critique of heteronormativity and its political effects, but

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also, potentially, *the most transformative analysis of power inequalities*–across individual, interpersonal, group, national, and global levels [emphasis mine].” Yet how we go about researching the personal within the international –especially in terms of non-normative sexualities –has eluded me until this research project. Where does one start seeing linkages between global queer bodies? What claims could emerge from such an analysis that are not totalizing, imperialist?

In reading through the diverse literatures that would eventually form the backbone of my thesis, in interviewing my participants, and in living my queer life, it has become apparent to me that queerness has no singular meaning, yet it is referred to and constituted by endless, far-flung social processes: academic research, clubs and bars, popular culture, religious officials, government and U.N. policymaking, and social media like Tinder all contribute to how different people understand queers. Foucault tells us that these acts of discursively explaining the queer body are necessarily political, whereby the formation of knowledge about bodies facilitates the governance of those bodies. This thesis seeks to understand queer identity and its political ramifications by emphasizing the messiness of this process. It is not only that institutions (like psychology or the state) control bodies and bodies resist. Rather, everyday life, public encounters, banal objects, international economic trends, and subjective and physical experiences figure into diverse understandings of queer lives and must be accounted for when thinking about the governance of queer others. I support this claim by developing current lines of thought in “assemblage thinking” by arguing that the figure of the queer is itself a kind of assemblage.7

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Assemblage thinking is an analytical approach to exposing social entities (the state, the city, the queer) as composite constructs. As Sassen argues, assemblage thinking is an “analytic tactic to deal with the abstract and the unseen,” allowing for the empirical scrutiny of transcendental categories, like queer identity. It demonstrates that these entities have origins – queer others are a historical construct –destabilizing what is more often accepted as natural or common-sense. It shows that assemblages are comprised of many fluctuating parts: queers are not just the summation of their internal world, but queerness is constantly being redefined and produced in interaction with outside entities. Assemblage thinking seeks to understand how these specific parts, these component forces, interoperate and are brought together under transcendent categories. In focusing on these heterogeneous components, assemblage thinking shows that contingency, resistance, and fluctuation are central to what we would normally consider as coherent. The political goal in understanding something as an assemblage is that we develop a more robust basis to understand and critique these seemingly stable formations. What’s more, to study something as an assemblage is necessarily reflexive: “To make assemblage thinking relevant, we need to start with an acknowledgement of vulnerability, fragility and contingency –of the material world we exist in, of ourselves as researchers within that world, and of the multiple self/world interactions that arise.” Lisle contends that assemblage thinking’s distance from established research methods makes us vulnerable, but such

11 Ibid., 2.
12 Ibid., 8.
13 Ibid., 10.
14 Ibid., 9–10.
vulnerability permits the exercise of self-reflection and the following of paths unknown, which, I think, complements queer sensibility quite well.

In trying to figure out what queers are, how they are governed, and how they relate to the international, assemblage thinking recognizes the queer is complicated, not only produced by interlocking governmentalities, but constantly resisting and pushing back. Having chosen the case of Turkish queer identity, I have found that local discursive acts (of Turkish gay slang called *labunca*, but also of the mainstream media’s hate speech), trans-national queer material culture (including the dating-app Grindr, sex tourism, or even travel for gender confirmation surgery), and fluctuating relationships (with the E.U., with the family) all are part of the assemblage that is the Turkish queer – a knowledge formation which I also contribute to as a queer researcher. The idea of the assemblage therefore demonstrates that the notion of the queer depends upon definition from outside sources as much as the internality of the queer person herself; queer identity is a product of the state, media, and family, but, being lived, queer identity constantly dissents from these outside suppositions. To return to Enloe’s assertion that the personal is international, my notion of the queer as an assemblage produces queerness as a legitimate point of inquiry in International Relations, demonstrating that the queer is a formation of local, national, and international political relationships. This assemblage is constituted by those dominant processes of governance, which name and marginalize queer others, as well as the ways queers choose, instead, to resist and live queerly.

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I depend upon a Foucauldian governmentality framework to situate the Turkish queer assemblage. As I explore in the next chapter, governmentality is useful for exploring how subjects are subject to power relations between the self and the state. In my interviewing, I found that I needed a way to account for the very complicated ways queer people are imagined, disciplined, and compelled to act not just by the state, but by their families, the media, nationalist discourses, other queers, the military, and other actors and processes. Through the governmentality approach expressed by Mitchell Dean, I am able to account for the governance as a diffuse negotiation between all of these institutions, bodies, and processes. In his framework, governance can be understood as the production of knowledge, the deployment of techniques of governing, the making of things visible and invisible, and the defining of populations. Queer identity constitutes, I argue, one of these techniques of governing, a means by which the state and other institutions exerts power over an imagined population. If Turkish governmentality is the dominant summation of governance in Turkey, queer identity is a technology, or, assemblage that facilitates that governance over a specific group of people. I explore the idea of non-conforming sexual identity in Turkey as a fluctuating assemblage, wherein queerness is used to marginalize others by an array of top-down institutional forces. However, queers also manage to use this identity, which is so often used to oppress them, as a source of resistance and political change.

The empirical project of this thesis begins by showing how, in Turkey, ideas of the queer as other are produced in the discourse and actions of the state, the family, religious authority, the military, (global) neoliberal economic policymaking, and mainstream media. I refer to this as

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“Turkish governmentality,” which produces the queer as other in order to buttress the strength of these individual institutions.\(^{20}\) In many ways, this governmentality is the glue that unites disparate understandings of the queer (as undesirable). Yet queerness is also lived. Queer people do not passively accept these designations and acts of disciplining: “…materialization is never quite complete…bodies never quite comply with the norms by which their materialization is impelled.”\(^{21}\) Instead, queers dissent, mis- and re-interpret top-down discourses, form complicities with other marginal groups, use sex for political subversion, and form their own institutions (in addition to those who seemingly act against their own interests). Examining the queer as an assemblage within this context disaggregates it as a definite entity, demonstrating how dominant forces name and govern identity, while paying attention to the ways people resist and change in a non-linear fashion.\(^{22}\)

I turn now to explore the route I took in writing this thesis. In many ways, my thesis is a response to a number of current texts within International Relations and queer theory. I start by exploring some of these texts and consider some of the questions they provoked me to consider in my own research. I then describe how I developed my theoretical positions, chose a case study, and formulated the analytical chapters of my thesis. Finally, I provide a brief overview of these chapters and suggest some of the overarching themes within my thesis.

My supervisors likely did not expect to be proofreading elaborate theoretical treatises about assemblages and queers when I first applied to this program. My initial proposal actually asked questions about ethno-nationalist violence in the South Pacific, which to me sounded like a

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serious, PhD-worthy topic that one might build an academic career upon. I think that we all recognized that it did not really suit me – both in terms of my own prior education (which was not even in politics) as well as my personal interests. My academic focus might better be executed, we agreed, in thinking critically about my own interests in identity, which would draw from my liberal arts background more broadly in addition to a desire to understand how sexuality shapes the politics of our daily lives – being a queer person, this is something I have always “felt,” but have never really been able to articulate. I therefore chose to study the problem of sexuality in International Relations. At the time, I was unsure about whether this would be an intelligent move, professionally speaking. There existed a relatively small number of texts about Queer International Relations in the top ranking journals, including the work of Cynthia Weber, and I could not find anything but tangential works in course syllabi.23 Yet that my supervisors did not bat an eye at the idea of working with queer theory and exploring the politics of sexuality went far in encouraging me to develop my interests, read comprehensively and across disciplines, and assert the legitimacy of what I was attempting. My encounter with several particular texts, as explored below, helped me formulate an inquiry that was not only interesting personally, but of seemingly serious, real-life concern.

LITERATURE

One of the most influential texts for me in the writing of this thesis was a recent book by David Halperin titled How to Be Gay.24 Halperin’s book was titled after a class he taught by the


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same name at the University of Michigan. The class was met with an uproar in the conservative media – apparent proof that the left was using education in the supposed “culture wars” to literally turn students gay.25 It thus made me believe it was probably worth investigating. The premise of the book was to demonstrate that gay identity politics has sanitized a wide breadth of cultural practices to make homosexuality more palatable to the mainstream.26 For Halperin, gays are forced to play down their differences, their queerness in order to promote tolerance and acceptance.27 His political project, then, is to interrogate and explore queerness beyond its current liberal identity formation: what are the affects, the cultural practices, the sensibilities and acts that characterize queer subjectivity before this sanitization?28 While many other queer theoretical texts approach the study of sexuality from a critical perspective, I appreciated Halperin’s refreshingly normative commitments. Halperin does not shy away from claiming that there is something gay, for example, about some musicals in their excessive sentimentality and explosion of heterosexual realities.29 This claim was immediately met with concerns from queer and gay people themselves, who argued that Halperin was calling for the furthering of gay stereotypes which have been normalized as negative.30 Instead, Halperin sees in effeminacy, sarcasm, queer affects, and dramatic musicals a wellspring of social and political potential in imagining alternatives to the present order.31 Halperin leans into these supposed stereotypes,

26 Halperin, How to Be Gay, 71.
27 Ibid., 73.
28 Ibid., 76.
29 Ibid., 106.
31 Halperin, How to Be Gay, 104.
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analyzes what he believes makes them so gay, and proposes that gay sensibility is something that can be a source of power for our community.\textsuperscript{32}

Halperin’s was one of only a handful of texts which made me feel empowered to be a queer person, providing me and many others with tangible ways to develop and participate in queer culture beyond the confines of gay identity politics.\textsuperscript{33} Although the problem of queer versus LGBT is conceptualized differently by different authors, I understand the role of “queering” as a frame of understanding identity formation, after Butler: that queering is both 1) an inquiry into the formation of deviant sexualities and 2) a “deformative and misappropriative” critique that exposes dominant power relations –or, in other words, the interruption of norms.\textsuperscript{34} I draw upon this approach in my own understanding of queer identity in this thesis. To call attention to queer communities and queer identity formation is to signify both how sexuality is politicized and changes over time as well as underlining how pre-given sexual identity categories are constantly challenged.\textsuperscript{35} Queer identity, I argue, refers to a category of person with a range of pre-given assumptions from outside, which originate in historical and evolving ideas about what deviant sexuality means. However, queer also calls into question the stability of that category, as people are constantly undermining these assumptions in the daily ways they “perform,” claim and define their sexual identity.\textsuperscript{36}

My understanding of queer identity is further informed by the work of Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick, whose work expands Butler’s. Asking the question, “what’s queer?,” Sedgwick offers the definition of “the open mesh of possibilities…when the constituent elements of anyone’s

\textsuperscript{32} Ibid., 91–95.
\textsuperscript{35} Ibid., 19–22.
\textsuperscript{36} Ibid., 22.
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sexuality aren’t made (or can’t be made) to signify monolithically.”  

She writes at length about the many different notions that sexual identity are meant to signify, which, she argues, can actually be much more diverse and contradictory than common sense thinking allows. For example, sexual identity encapsulates: your chromosomal sex as male or female; your self-perceived gender assignment; the degree to which your appearance and mannerisms are feminine or masculine; your procreative choice; your partner’s self-perceptions as gay or straight and masculine or feminine; your preferred sexual acts and fantasies; your source of emotional support; your cultural practices and sense of community; among other factors. To say that one is lesbian or straight amasses assumptions about these factors which, instead, are often much more fluid in practice. For Sedgwick, to expose our assumptions about sexual identity and allow for a more “open mesh of possibilities” is what queer identity is all about. But there are other notions of queer identity as well; it often simply refers to same-sex sexual object choice, and some authors (like Anzaldúa or Johnson) use the notion of queer identity to disrupt identity categories beyond gender and sexuality, calling into question how sex intersects with prefigured ideas about race, indigeneity, and postcoloniality. In my thesis, I use queer as an open term to refer to a group that is marginalized by their deviant sexual practices, but that their queer identity itself can be a source of power and renegotiation.

There exists some tension in explaining the political projects of queer theory beyond criticism: “…antinormativity appears in all itineraries of current queer critical practice, from scholarly monographs to blogs, journal essays, conference themes, curricula, and program

38 Ibid., 8.
39 Ibid.
mission statements.” I think that queer criticism is important to exposing the constraints of common-sense thinking and LGBT identity politics, but have been consistently frustrated by critical approaches which provide no alternatives. However, I believe that this can be rectified by a more substantive commitment to the first part of Butler’s definition as an inquiry into the formation of sexuality, particular in terms of sexuality as something which produces and informs culture, society, and political economy. This is notably explored in Halperin’s work; Halperin’s observations about queer sensibilities (against LGBT politics) explore particular American artifacts (the movie *Mildred Pierce*, for example) and defines the broader exclusionary state governmentality of the Cold War during the time of HIV/AIDS as creating a very specific modern American queer milieu. Yet I think Halperin’s ideas about the disjuncture between queerness and LGBT politics are readable within International Relations: what are queer sensibilities in other societies and where do they come from? Are they like those in the U.S.? What is the relationship between queerness and identity politics in other countries as LGBT rights increasingly becomes internationally normative? How do we construct non-competing, non-imperialist queer cultures? When using the term “queer,” I aim to highlight these tensions, pointing to both the breadth of non-normative sexual identities and practices beyond the norm as well as queerness as a political act of criticism.

In contrast to Halperin’s text, Joseph Massad’s *Desiring Arabs* provides a negative conceptualization of the idea of gay culture and identity as a global phenomenon and argues that it is imposed by the West onto unsuspecting others. I had come across several references to his text in conducting my literature review, namely in the writings of Tom Boellstorff and Arno

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42 Halperin, *How to Be Gay*, 100; 141-147.
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Schmitt. Massad’s work depends upon Edward Said’s premises of understanding the impact of Western representations established in *Orientalism* by exploring the ways homosexual identifications are imagined by Westerners and projected upon Eastern subjects. He draws links between the colonialist sexualized-imaginings of the Middle Eastern other with the contemporary LGBTQ rights movement in the Middle East, with a specific focus on the advocacy efforts of organizations like the International Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Trans and Intersex Association (ILGA). He argues that the Gay International – a confluence of activist, NGO, and governmental bodies – is guided by an imperialist impulse to “save” Middle Eastern gays, demonstrating that such organizations benefit from inciting Islamist, anti-gay discourse. The effect of this has been to marginalize older non-normative sexual practices, forcing people into the heterosexual/homosexual binary—which he terms a *heterosexualizing* move in its anti-liberatory effects on communities. It has also enabled Middle Eastern governments to identify and prosecute gay people in order to demonstrate their non-Western-ness: Massad provides the example of the Egyptian Queen boat raid in 2001, where 50 men were charged with violating public morality laws. For Massad, the episode represents the negative side of the globalization of gay rights and adoption of normative gay identities, wherein the outcry from the Gay International incited the Egyptian government and media into a polarizing campaign against Western “deviance” and entailed the intensification of LGBTQ repression. A congruent claim is made in the work of Rahul Rao, who coins the term “global homocapitalism” to describe the

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46 Ibid., 161–67.
47 Ibid., 175.
48 Ibid., 188.
49 Ibid., 181.
50 Ibid., 184.
neoliberal techniques that have incorporated some queer people into markets while excluding the world’s unproductive queers.\textsuperscript{51} Further, Momin Rahman argues against the West vs Islam binary by exploring the intersectionality of queer Muslims living in Western contexts.\textsuperscript{52} Rahman, Rao, and Massad’s work helped me appreciate the complexity of LGBTQ rights within postcolonial settings.

In somewhat the same spirit of Massad’s work, Jasbir Puar’s \textit{Terrorist Assemblages} has been widely cited in queer theory since its publication in 2007.\textsuperscript{53} Her study problematizes the means by which western liberal democracies form complicities with LGBTQ activism and culture, to the effect of empowering destructive formations of nationalism and marginalizing racial others.\textsuperscript{54} Puar’s work has helped cement the problematic of “homonationalism” in Western LGBTQ rights-based politics.\textsuperscript{55} In her case studies, she explores how Western states’ incorporation of LGBTQ rights (like gay marriage) normalizes a sanitized image of queerness other racialized queer subjects, notably in enacting discursive juxtapositions of a liberal narrative of social progress against a barbarous, oppositional, deviant Islamic bloc.\textsuperscript{56} She pursues several paths in exploring homonationalism, for instance considering how the LGBTQ tourism industry allows queers to purchase legitimacy and national belonging, especially after 9/11, when the state and tourism industry offered travel as a means of refuting terrorism itself: “Encouragement of patriotic consumption allows participation in the national grieving psyche and allows for queer subjects to embrace as well as be embraced by the nation.”\textsuperscript{57} The surge of “queer touristic exceptionalism” permits gay and lesbian travelers to purchase American patriotism, but these

\textsuperscript{53} Puar, \textit{Terrorist Assemblages: Homonationalism in Queer Times}.
\textsuperscript{54} Ibid., xii–xv.
\textsuperscript{55} Ibid., 1–23.
\textsuperscript{56} Ibid., 20–22.
\textsuperscript{57} Ibid., 64–65.
purchases necessarily exclude the poor and obscure the (sometimes violent) surveillance faced by brown bodies in post 9/11 travel.  

I appreciated the materiality of Puar’s research, which highlighted the embodiment of practices of queer governance, for example in her account of the material and sexual practices of disciplining queer bodies at Guantanamo Bay.  

I was further struck by Puar’s usage of the concept of the “assemblage,” which she applies to explain the blurred-ness of the body as more than just the physical thing we inhabit, notably visible in her exploration of the turban and its multiple indications of religious piety, terrorist, racial otherness, and queerness.  

To explain the idea of the assemblage, she provides a passage from Deleuze and Guattari, which captured my attention:

On a first, horizontal, axis, an assemblage comprises two segments, one of content, the other of expression. On the one hand it is a machinic assemblage of bodies, of actions and passions, an intermingling of bodies reacting to one another; on the other hand it is a collective assemblage of enunciation, of acts and statements, of incorporeal transformations attributed to bodies. Then on a vertical axis, the assemblage has both territorial sides, or reterritorialized sides, which stabilize it, and cutting edges of deterritorialization, which carry it away.

Puar herself does not develop the Deleuze and Guattari quote or define assemblage as methodological approach, instead sticking close to her own engagement with queer terrorist

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58 Ibid., 64–67.
59 “Incarcerated detainees at Guantánamo Bay undergo a full (intrusive) medical examination (for some, purportedly the first ever), are assessed for mental illness and depression, and gain an average of thirteen pounds within the first three months of arriving. They are given individual copies of the Koran in Arabic and English (on which guards have been accused of urinating) and are able to pray five times a day next to arrows inscribed with the number of kilometers of distance between Camp X-Ray and Mecca. These bodies are not only being commanded to the restoration of the properly visible. (The name of the detention site, Camp X-Ray, suggests in itself a profound yearning for the transparency of these bodies, the capacity to see through them and render them known, taciturn, disembodied.) It is the reterritorialization of the body that must be performed through the ritual of cutting and shaving hair.” Ibid., 158.
60 “It is this assemblage of visuality, affect, feminized position, and bodily disruption of organic-nonorganic divides, the not-fully-organic not-fully nonorganic body, which accounts for the queer figuration of the turban in the calculation of a hate crime.” Ibid., 148.
61 Quoted in Ibid., 193.
bodies in the post-9/11 West. However, at the end of her study, she provides some footing for further application of queer assemblage:

Querness as an assemblage moves away from excavation work, deprivileges a binary opposition between queer and not queer subjects, and, instead of retaining queerness exclusively as dissenting, resistant, and alternative (all of which queerness importantly is and does), it underscores contingency and complicity with dominant formations. This foregrounding of assemblage enables attention to ontology in tandem with epistemology, affect in conjunction with representational economies, within which bodies interpenetrate, swirl together, and transmit affects and effects to each other.62

I appreciated this approach to the study of queer subjects and the emphasis on contingency in the formation of queer subjecthood, which gives weight to both local knowledge-formations and embodied experience. I wondered if this might help identify queer cultural productions that challenged heteropatriarchal society, enabling queer lives and social relationships beyond an assimilationist LGBT platform. I also was interested in inquiring how assemblage might help move the debate beyond whether or not LGBTQ rights organizing constitutes a form of colonialism, as argued by Massad, as I suspected that there could be more said about the production of queer lives in the East beyond the role of foreign non-profit organizations. I was finally interested in exploring whether assemblage might be a way to allow my work to be more reflexive, accounting for my own subject position and unique experiences as part of the assemblage I was exploring.

This led me to the original Deleuze and Guattari texts, especially A Thousand Plateaus as well as allied readings on assemblage within International Relations, to get to the heart of what assemblage thinking might enable.63 My foremost engagement with assemblage thinking in International Relations comes from a volume edited by Michele Acuto and Simon Curtis.64 In

62 Ibid., 205.
64 Acuto and Curtis, Reassembling International Theory.
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Positing my own take on their work on “assemblage thinking” in International Relations, I am offering the notion of “queer assemblage thinking.” Three basic premises underline the authors’ conceptions of assemblage: 1) that they are both material and the social, 2) that they problematize dominant ways of thinking, transcendental categories, and reified entities, and 3) that assemblages are spatio-temporally contingent, historical constructions. I develop these ideas further in relation to queer theory in my theoretical section.

I was spending a lot of time reading queer theory, much of which is produced within the discipline of English literature. It was therefore becoming quite clear to me that although much of the queer theory out there is necessarily political, it would be essential for me to understand how it fits in with the discipline of International Relations. My initial academic background being in the humanities, I had up to this point little engagement with the mainstream debates in the field of International Relations. For the professors at my undergraduate institution, many tenets of realism, Marxism, and psychoanalysis were already established as too conservative to be productive in social research. I therefore did not doubt that queer theory had a place within International Relations—but soon found that most other ‘mainstream’ International Relations academics, journals, and conference attendees in the field were skeptical (at best). For example, in their 2011 Survey of U.S. International Relations programs, researchers at the College of William and Mary found that 90% of publications in the top 12 ranking journals were positivist (up from 58% in 1980, that scholars perceive realism, liberalism, and constructivism to constitute 28%, 26%, and 17% of the literature, and that the three most influential scholars, Robert

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Keohane, Kenneth Waltz, and Alexander Wendt, built their careers by advocating for one of the three major paradigms (realist, liberal, constructivist) in International Relations.\textsuperscript{67} I did not realize the entrenchment of “common-sense thinking” within International Relations departments and journals across the world.\textsuperscript{68} Although the disciplinary confines never seemed particularly important to me, the disinterest from other PhD students, the sanitizing of my writing for publication, and being stuck in filler panels at various conferences was wearing at my confidence. It is for that reason that Cynthia Weber’s “Why is there no Queer International Theory?” was very important for me.\textsuperscript{69} In this text, Weber argues that mainstream research agendas within International Relations work to actively keep out queer theory.\textsuperscript{70} She demonstrates that queer theory is perceived as too inconsistent, whereas “real” International Relations always refers back to the ways the state navigates the state-system.\textsuperscript{71} Weber’s recent work on queer IR has made my own work much easier because she has contended with the most conservative scholarship in the field, because she has spent so much effort blurring the lines of what is and is not acceptable in IR, and because she has been so unabashedly queer in the process. I appreciate being able to work on problems of global politics using queer frameworks without having to discuss the intellectual history of IR in order to make myself seem legitimate. Although published after much of my thesis investigation, Weber has further developed her thought in her recent book, \textit{Queer International Relations}, which provides several approaches toward seeing sexuality within international statecraft.\textsuperscript{72} For example, she replaces “either/or”


\textsuperscript{70} Ibid., 29.

\textsuperscript{71} Ibid., 34.

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binaries with “both/and” (after Barthes) using queer figurations within the international order – notably contesting figurations of drag queen Eurovision winner Conchita Wurst to demonstrate the potential for pluralistic understandings of European values.73

Weber’s voice has perhaps been the most vocal in naming Queer International Relations as a subdiscipline, and a number of other scholars contribute to its emerging canon. Some particular works of note deserve mention here, given their relevance to my project on studying the governance of queer others in Turkey. The first is V. Spike Peterson’s Sexing Political Identities/Nationalism as Heterosexism.74 In this text, Peterson develops the feminist critique of the state as a gendered construction (represented, for example, in the work of Jill Vickers75) to move into a critique of how the state is both gendered as patriarchal and sexualized as heterosexual.76 She argues that states depend upon both biological and social reproductions visible across a range of processes, from pro-natalist state policies to sex as a weapon of war.77 I appreciate how she accounts for sexuality as seemingly invisible within International Relations, but is able to show particular empirical examples of the conflation of heterosexuality with nationalism in the West.78 Peterson provides further specifics on how states depend upon heteronormative reproductions (of marriage, property, and nationalism) for continuity.79 Yet she argues that this is being destabilized by transnational processes – namely, “global householding” demonstrates how migrants queer these heteropatriarchal state orders through “…changes in sexual relations and gender roles, altered demographics and living arrangements, new

73 Ibid., 143–91.
76 Peterson, “Sexing Political Identities/Nationalism as Heterosexism,” 39.
77 Ibid., 44–54.
78 Ibid., 56.
reproductive technologies and eldercare options, and the complex unfolding of these in dynamic, increasingly global contexts." It is increasingly important, therefore, to understand the transnational implications of family, intimacy, and sexuality, as migration disturbs given patterns of kinship relations, gender roles, inheritance, and urbanization. I depend upon Peterson’s work to establish the genealogy of the Turkish state-building process as a necessarily heteronormative one, providing examples of how a certain nationalist governmentality developed to equate belonging with heteronormative reproductions.

Another key thinker in Queer International Relations is Lauren Wilcox. Wilcox proposes some baseline propositions for what it means to do Queer IR. I appreciate that Wilcox considers the queering of IR to indicate more than just the ways sexuality becomes an object of global governance, focusing as well on “identifications rather than identities as shifting, fluid, and sometimes contradictory.” She argues that queerness can describe other kinds of performative events in IR, drawing upon examples from the works of Cynthia Weber and Aaron Belkin, by identifying and formations of ambiguity in global violence, or destabilizing binaries (which Weber refers to as the “both/and” in contrast to the “either/or”). She also understands queering IR as a move toward greater sensitivity to the unstable, fluctuating processes of affect and identification which shape global politics, rather than queer simply meaning “freedom from norms.” For example, she highlights the work of Agathangelou et al. (2008) in demonstrating the ambiguity of queer politics, showing how the escalation of racialized neoliberal incarceration

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80 Ibid., 606.
81 Ibid., 607.
83 Ibid., 613.
depends upon a dense network of desires and affects (beyond straightforward sexual identity categories).  

Of key importance to my own thesis is Wilcox’s writings on the body in IR. Her central project in this work is to challenge traditional conceptions of the body in IR as more than just an essentialized object that needs to be protected (particularly in realist and liberal IR thinking). Instead of thinking about the body as a sovereign, pre-existing fact, she asks us to think about how bodies both produce and are produced by the political. Although her work on embodiment in IR does not only focus on queer bodies, she provides a number of empirical examples linking queer bodies to international processes. For example, she discusses how practices of surveillance and disciplining at airports seek to clarify trans and gender queer people into the gender binary, reflecting a broader state governmentality that depends upon maintaining gender boundaries. Biosecurity practices produce these queer bodies as a threat, demanding they “pass,” publicly outing and humiliating them, strip-searching them, and ensuring they conform to immutable passport designations of male or female. In my own work, I demonstrate the ways queer bodies are produced by certain heteronormative governmentalities, focusing on linking the materialities of queer lives to particular exercises of power.

It was within the context of this merging together of queer theory and International Relations that I began reading about governmentality. Before this project, I already had an extensive background in reading Foucault. The Foucault I thought I knew was a hero to queer theory, who provided the means by which we would analyze all manner of cultural detritus in

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88 Ibid., 17–22.
89 Ibid., 23–26.
90 Ibid., 116.
order to make claims about the networked disciplining of bodies, the normalization of certain sexual practices, and the marginalization of queer people.91 I read Foucault in the context of art history, socio-economic justice, and even dance studies.92 Now I saw that Foucault’s canonical place within poststructural IR was not in regards to sexuality at all, but about the so-called “conduct of conduct,” or, as he defines in his later lectures on governmentality, an analytics of governance that focuses on the deployment of practices that shape our actions beyond coercive violence.93 In coming to Auckland for my studies, I was attracted to my Ph.D. supervisor’s work on governmentality in development practices, which shaped my initial foray into governmentality scholarship.94 I spent months on these first-hand lectures in an attempt to comprehend the minutiae of this concept. I also explored how these were being adapted by IR scholars. Of the many studies utilizing governmentality, I appreciated William Walters’ text, Governmentality: Critical Encounters, the most.95 What I liked was its clearly articulated tool-kit approach, which relies heavily on the relationships between governmentality and genealogy to provide a flexible theoretical and methodological approach to doing IR in this poststructural way.96 I appreciated that this research orientation offers a way to think about the distanced manipulations of governance, which come from a wide variety of actors, incorporates emerging

96 As I explore in my theoretical and methodological approach, governmentality refers to the stabilization of “regimes of truth,” which shape our actions. Genealogy helps us observe that these are historically contingent, social constructs. See: Ibid., 17.
Several themes connect the above literatures I have explored in mapping my thesis. While authors like Massad and Puar made me question the role of rights-based activism in disciplining other queers, these left me wondering about which practices were worth supporting. Yet Halperin, Weber, Rahman, and the Deleuzian commitments of Puar’s work led me to believe that there were indeed ways of thinking about the possible constructions of queer culture, identity which could be enabling. While Walters’ focus on governmentality provides the space for considering the networked forms of power relations that shape people’s lives in the contemporary era, Weber’s work demonstrating the centrality of sexual governance and its ambiguities demonstrates that these kinds of inquiries into queer lives are legitimate. Many of these texts refer in some way to the social construction of queerness or the ways that governance happens at the level of life itself, like Wilcox’s work which directly asserts the role of the body in the production of the global. These recurring themes left me with a number of unresolved questions. Can queer cultures be produced outside of a Western context? If so, can they be positive or are they necessarily incorporated into nefarious, state-based, or colonialist projects? How does the queer become socially constructed and what is the role of “material” factors? If queerness is to be taken seriously as an International Relations concern, how do we go about evidencing that? I decided upon a case study that would provide me with a complicated portrait


98 Wilcox, “Queer Theory and the ‘Proper Objects’ of International Relations.”
of queer lives, which are not only governed by disparate actors between the local and the international, but also produce politics in unique ways.

**Turkey**

I knew I wanted to go somewhere outside of what is traditionally considered the West for my study. After reading postcolonial queer theory from Massad, Halperin, Rahman, and Rao, I wanted to explore a different context to test these authors’ arguments. My initial attraction to Turkey is in part because of the many stereotypes I have heard about it over the years. Having studied in Germany during my undergraduate degree for a year, I was familiar with many of these tropes in popular politics and culture – that Turkey embodies a struggle between East and West, secular and religious, developed and underdeveloped, European and Middle Eastern, Turkish and Kurdish, or authoritarian and democratic. I was also interested in Turkey as a state that is not technically postcolonial, having never been occupied in the way, for example, South Asia was occupied. Rather, the Ottoman Empire was itself an imperial force until its decline and transformation into the modern Turkish Republic, which modelled its legal system and many institutions on Western forms. Further complicating Turkey’s identity, the country has been a member of NATO for over 50 years, an EU Customs Union member since 1995, and has pursued Western-styled neoliberal economic reform (by means of World Bank and IMF

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intervention in the early 1980s). Yet media, public opinion, and European government officials (including MEPs in the European Parliament) have argued against Turkey’s inclusion in the EU because of a fear of Turkish migrants as diluting a supposedly culturally homogenous Europe. 

I thought that one way of getting out of these binaries of West versus East might be to focus on the politics of sexuality. After Rahman’s appeal to the way queerness complicates intersectional categories and Weber’s appeal to the “both/and,” I hypothesized that sexuality would cut across the notion of Turkey as stuck in an identity crisis of secular versus religious, or Western versus Eastern, and provide new insights on the genealogy of the Turkish state and how it governs, the governance of queer lives and their own circulations of governance.

A number of key texts have been written about Turkish queers and their governance. These texts helped me formulate my own position, providing me with some ideas about what is distinct about the Turkish queer experience. Mehmet Sinan Birdal’s work on the Turkish LGBTQ movement helped me contextualize queer organizing within a global context. In his work, Birdal argues that LGBTQ rights are represented by the ruling AKP government (and other consenting actors) as a threat to the nation, resulting in the production of a homophobic public culture producing a broader Turkish conservative democratic identity. Birdal points to a

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104 Rahman, “Queer as Intersectionality: Theorizing Gay Muslim Identities,” 949; Weber, Queer International Relations, 40–45.


106 Birdal, “Queering Conservative Democracy.”

107 Ibid., 124.
number of popular discourses to demonstrate his claim, like the work of popular theologian and columnist Hayrettin Karaman, who espouses limited contact with homosexuals and the need for protecting public morality at the expense of human rights. There is also Zaman columnist Ali Buluç, who argues homosexuals are more prone to violence and murder. Birdal demonstrates the significant difficulties faced by LGBTQ rights activists in an environment where they are routinely misrecognized by a dominant coalition of conservative-nationalist actors. Birdal follows this theme in a later essay on the role of LGBTQ activists in the 2013 Gezi Park protests, where he argues that the inclusion of LGBTQ actors at Gezi Park is more than just a call for Western-style rights (he specifically refutes Joseph Massad’s notion of a totalizing Gay International). Rather, LGBTQ activists in Turkey also deploy local idioms of protest, especially in their coalition building with other progressive elements in society, moving them beyond a straightforward demand for recognition into a broad coalition building movement. In my own work, I build upon these claims about LGBTQs operating “between the universal and the particular” at Gezi Park, demonstrating some of the unique forms and outcomes of queer organizing at Gezi and subsequent activism since then.

Emrah Yıldız’s work also explores the distinctive practices of queer organizing seen at Gezi Park. Yıldız is concerned with demonstrating the primary role of LGBTQ activists in the Gezi Park events, as opposed to his perception of media reporting at the time, which excludes or de-emphasizes the queer element. He demonstrates a rich tradition of queer identity categorizations indigenous to the Ottoman period and beyond, arguing that a closer, empirical

\[108\] Ibid., 126.
\[109\] Ibid., 129.
\[110\] Birdal, “Between the Universal and the Particular: The Politics of Recognition of LGBT Rights in Turkey."
\[111\] Ibid., 2–5.
\[112\] Ibid., 16–17.
\[113\] Birdal, “Between the Universal and the Particular: The Politics of Recognition of LGBT Rights in Turkey."
\[114\] Yıldız, “Cruising Politics: Sexuality, Solidarity and Modularity after Gezi."
\[115\] Ibid., 105.
exploration of queer lives destabilizes any straightforward Western vs Eastern argument about the imposition or pre-existence of LGBTQ identities.\textsuperscript{116} He asks us to question our ontological assumptions about queer activism in global contexts: “Once the queer subalterns speak, do they always speak in line with a liberal democratic agenda…?”\textsuperscript{117} Yıldız cautions against simply labelling such movements as “Western” or “homonationalist,” demonstrating that these concepts may prove damaging in accounting for the political accomplishments of these movements.\textsuperscript{118} He evidences ways that LGBTQ activism has discursively challenged deep-seated assumptions about the family as well as the foundation of the Kurdish queer group “Hevi” to show that preconceived conceptual frameworks fail when they do not account for the complicated local, national, and transnational processes that govern queer lives in Turkey.\textsuperscript{119} For this reason, Yıldız’s work has positively informed my own theoretical approach, which furthers the idea of the assemblage as an anti-transcendental, contingent construction informed by heterogeneous actors and empirical realities.

A number of other interdisciplinary texts further broach the subject of queer lives in contemporary Turkey. A 2014 sociological study by Bakacak and Öktem provides a broad overview of attitudes toward queer people and the methods Turkish queers employ in resisting homophobia.\textsuperscript{120} They explore a 2005 survey of 393 homosexual and bisexual persons in Turkey conducted by a local LGBTQ rights organization, which found that 56% of the participants had a negative view of their sexuality, 83% hid their sexuality from some or all of their family members, 40% were reluctantly in heterosexual relationships, and that 62% of males who had applied for a military exemption were forced to undergo an anal examination to receive their so-
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called “rotten report.” The authors argue that every LGBTQ person in Turkey employs strategies for managing these instances of homophobia, such as how some males will adopt an overly aggressive male person to overcompensate for perceived effeminacy, or how many will face compounding levels of stress as they construct lies about their sex life to their families. I found these findings significant, because they helped me identify the role of non-state actors in the governance of sexuality: the family is crucial to reproducing homophobia in Turkey, which is a significant issue when the loss of familial support and security can ruin lives.

Of special relevance to my research are feminist approaches to the relationship between gender and the state in contemporary Turkey. Complementing the emerging work on Turkish LGBTQ lives, feminist scholarship has much to say about the ways sexuality is produced in Turkish society. I explore the link between gender and sexuality in my first chapter, which demonstrates the genealogical development of a Turkish governmentality dependent upon the regulation of heterosexual lives. Deniz Kandiyoti, notably, explores the Kemalist reformation of the modern Turkish state to ask: “To what extent were discourses that were ostensibly about “reforming” women…also about reshaping gender by establishing new models of masculinity and femininity to better institutionalize the monogamous, heterosexual, nuclear family?” Kandiyoti provides numerous examples of the ways the production of proper, modern, Turkish citizenship became linked to the maintenance of heterosexual reproduction at the exclusion of queerer practices, visible in the writings of the famous sociologist Ziya Gökalp and “scientific” expertise in daily news media regulating proper marriage practices. Pınar İlkkaracan continues

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121 Ibid., 820–21.
122 Ibid., 822–34.
123 Ibid., 822.
125 Ibid., 305.
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these themes, showing how the reform of the Turkish Penal Code in 2004 made significant changes to the governance of sexualities in Turkey for both queers and heterosexuals. The reform movement, as she shows, was instigated by a coalition of women’s rights and LGBTQ rights organizations, as both found that early Kemalist discourses (which tied public morality to national belonging) continue to deny rights to both straight women and queer people. Collectively, feminist writings on Turkey have helped me see that the production of gender in Turkey is closely tied to the production of sexuality and that much can be said about the relationship between queerness and heteronormativity by looking at state, Islamist, and familial discourses on women and gender.

Thesis Structure

The first chapter of my thesis explains my methodological approach to data collection and analysis in greater detail. I also explore the Foucauldian notion genealogy as a methodological tool. Genealogy, I demonstrate, helps reveal how certain norms about the governance of bodies become standardized over time. Such a research orientation, therefore, makes common-sense practices as constructed visible. It also enables the study of alternative modes of governing by demonstrating that our contemporary understandings of the queer are not inevitable, and alternatives are being suppressed all the time. In this section, I also briefly consider some of the ethical dilemmas which shaped my research.

My next section establishes a theoretical framework for my thesis. Here, I explore three concepts which inform my approach to my data: governmentality, assemblage, and materialization. I have already hinted at some of the broad ways I understand these ideas in this

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introduction. In my theoretical framework, I explore each of these in turn and define how they are both related and distinctive approaches to understanding power dynamics as they concern queer lives. Governmentality, I show, describes a specific enactment of governance over a population, with attention given to an adherent rationality and concomitant networked control techniques beyond the state (though the state remains a primary actor).

Assemblage is a lens that can be used to look very particularly at a taken-for-granted social entity in order to denaturalize it, explain its contingent genesis, demonstrate the heterogeneous parts that constitute it, and explore the power dynamics that produce it. I call the queer body such an assemblage, which is in part produced in a relationship to a wider Turkish governmentality. This follows Foucault, who used the idea of the apparatus to spotlight how certain structures enhanced governance in special circumstances; Foucault gives name to many such structures in his reappraisal of how they inform governance – including sexuality, anatomy, and capital punishment.\textsuperscript{128} For Foucault, the sexuality apparatus represented a system of relations between various “truth-telling” discourses and acts of power which define and discipline queer others; queer identity, is, in a way, a method of controlling sexual others.\textsuperscript{129} I explore how Deleuze furthered Foucault’s idea of the apparatus into the assemblage, opening new ways of approaching the idea of the apparatus/assemblage as a technology of control that perpetuates dominance of queers, but also allows room for understanding how they resist this dominance.\textsuperscript{130}

While the queer assemblage is shaped by the Turkish governmentality in a number of ways, queer identity is also lived, complicated, and resistant. I use assemblage thinking to


\textsuperscript{129} Foucault, “The Confession of the Flesh,” 194.

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highlight the interplay between knowledge-making about queers and embodied experience, showing how queers are made abject, how populations are defined and come to be seen as human (or, which bodies “matter”), and the fluctuating messiness of these processes. In using these concepts, I hope to show that they provide overlapping ways into seeing the complicated power relations formed by the problem of the queer in its relationship to the state, the global, and everyday life.

Chapter one provides a genealogical approach to understanding the contemporary Turkish governmentality, which depends upon the state and concomitant institutions in demanding heteronormative belonging from its citizens. My goal in this background chapter is to locate the construction of a heteropatriarchal-nationalist governmentality in Turkey. This dominant governmentality, I argue, represents a confluence of state-led institutional relationships, which work together to normalize certain bodies and marginalize queer ones – queer including not only sexually but racially othered minorities. I provide a genealogy of this governmentality since the conception of the Turkish state in 1923 to the modern day. This demonstrates that this governmentality was not inevitable, but a factor of contingent events. I show that the governmentality has been constructed over time to police a nationalistic, racialized, heteronormative society. This entails tightening control over women’s reproductive health, militarized notions of masculinity and citizenship, the normalization of conservative roles for the family, and the making-invisible of others by producing a broad range of queer bodies outside these imaginaries.

In chapter two, I arrive at contemporary queer Turkish identity and how it affects and is affected by the heteropatriarchal-nationalist governmentality. Here, I depend upon my interview data from my fieldwork in Istanbul to explore how queer people see themselves as being

Butler, Bodies That Matter: On the Discursive Limits of “Sex,” 16.
governed in Turkish society. I use this interview material to demonstrate that the queer is something that is imagined through varied outside actors and is dependent on queers’ discursive and material encounters. These include things like the military and one’s need to prove one’s homosexuality to get out of service, the banning of LGBTQ friendly websites and preponderance of hate-speech in the media, and the physical violence experienced by others in banal public settings. However, I also show that there are many ways in which queers push back, organizing their capacity to resist and change Turkish party politics, local civil society, and their representations in a number of tangible ways.

The third chapter focuses on trans people as a particular somatic assemblage within Istanbul. Here, I argue that trans people have become a significant cause of concern for the institutions of the heteropatriarchal-nationalist governmentality. Trans people in particular are imagined as inhuman, terrorist, and othered by an array of social practices. I begin this chapter by exploring the case of pop-star Bülent Ersoy in particular, who was and continues to be Turkey’s most famous trans person. In the 1980s, the trans singer had great difficulty in gaining legal recognition of her gender, yet in the present day, she denounces the LGBTQ rights movement. Recently, LGBTQ activists criticized her for dining with conservative President Erdoğan after the Istanbul police violently broke up the 2016 trans rights parade.132 I explore the disjuncture between Ersoy’s privileged position and other trans people by turning to my interview material with activists and everyday people as well as an analysis of trans discourses in the media. This marks my point of departure for investigating some of the ways trans others are made knowable, governed, and violated. I also look in detail at the Kurdish trans rights group, Hevi, and their intersectional activism.

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The final chapter considers the events of the Gezi Park protests. I argue that the protests constitute a renegotiation of the queer assemblage from below. While queer identity is persistently used as a mechanism for oppression in Turkey, Gezi Park represented an opening of the assemblage for radical experiments in queer politics which are normally denied by the heteropatriarchal-nationalist government. The Gezi Park protests represent a long-standing inability for Turkish governance to completely control queer others. I make a case for the ways these protests have empirically redefined some of the institutions invested in the delineation of proper and improper bodies. I refer to the Gezi Park assemblage as a kind of “common,” which has three particular traits. These are: 1) that the common forces us to think about the ways taken-for-granted society manipulates others, 2) the common enables radical new experiments in representation and organizing, and 3) that the common entails lasting political ramifications beyond the spatial-temporal moment of protest.

In the conclusion, I pull together some of the major themes running throughout the thesis. I do so by relating these points to some of my ethnographic fieldwork in Turkey. The purpose of this chapter is to do more than simply summarize the content of my thesis. Rather, my conclusion depends upon my anecdotal experiences in Turkey to demonstrate the blurred relationships between theory and “real life.” In my conclusion, I demonstrate some of the ways my thesis was successful in thinking about queers in Turkey as an assemblage. I also offer some of the research directions yet to be explored by this approach, both within Turkey and in other cases of International Relations.

**CONCLUSION**

One of my primary aims in writing this thesis is to describe the complexity of queer life. In conducting my fieldwork, I found that power was talked about in terms of embodiment,
feelings, and experiences: it was the “rotten report” provided by the military, parents pressuring their children to marry and produce sons, the cruising for sex at pre-protest Gezi Park, and the tear-gas used to break up the yearly pride march. These things assemble queer lives in Turkey and form focal points for my argument. I realized that queer identity is something that is constantly defined by diverse actors in negative terms, yet that these were tangible practices that could be empirically pointed at. It is for this reason I needed to develop a theoretical approach, which needed to account for so many different kinds of power dynamics as they appeared on the surface of queer bodies – the direct, sovereign acts of violence by the police and the state; the distanced economic impacts of neoliberal development in an urban setting; the medical and religious knowledge echoed by family members; the social welfare institutions queers themselves founded – all of these parts contributed to the production of a constantly-rearranging queer identity. Further, how does one explain queer bodies when there is no internal consensus amongst this population? I found that some queers look back upon their participation in the military positively, some vote for the conservative AKP government, others are self-declared socialists or conscientious objectors, some are Kurds and others think Kurds are all terrorists. My thesis proposes to allow these contradictions, demonstrating that queer bodies are quite possibly queerer than we ever imagined.
Chapter One
Governmentality, Assemblage Thinking, and Queer Others

In this chapter, I develop an understanding of the governance of queer others by using key concepts from Foucault and Deleuze. This chapter establishes a framework for analyzing queers as heterogeneous, non-unified, and imbricated in complex power relations. I look in particular at governmentality and assemblage thinking to understand sexual identity in terms of fluid patterns and processes, rather than as static, universal, or coherent forms.

I explore how these three concepts complement each other in what I call “queer assemblage thinking.” I argue that queer assemblage thinking asks us to consider how queer identity forms and functions as an apparent coherent whole, yet that it is constantly entering into new relations, changing over time, and tending toward incoherence. Queer assemblage thinking reveals how subjects of control are complex groupings of heterogeneous parts – discourses, material bodies, utterances, affects, and relations to others. Assemblage thinking also demonstrates that queers are not simply a surface upon which power is projected, but that the assemblage of queers entails many contradictions and opportunities for resistance. While many social entities could be thought of as an assemblage, to think specifically of the queer in this way escalates queer identity as a site of power contestations, complexity, and historical contingency.

In this section, I explore two interrelated concepts to form a framework for understanding how queers govern, are governed, and resist governance. These concepts have different emphases in how they approach the problem of governance. Taken together, they form a flexible framework for identifying a range of power relations and productions concerned with the regulation of bodies. Governmentality, I will show, is useful for understanding the state and

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concomitant institutions’ rationalities and practices in identifying and manipulating queer lives. Assemblage thinking, I demonstrate, demystifies abstract social entities: beneath the category of the queer exist a range of heterogeneous components united by complex power relationships, which give rise to the idea of a coherent form, queer identity. As Tania Li argues: “Examining practices of assemblage enables an expansion of the analytic of governmentality without loss of focus.” While governmentality demonstrates the broad, top-down institutional discourses and acts involved in governing Turkish society, assemblage shows that there is no one particular force that controls queer lives.

**Governmentality**

Governmentality refers to a regime of practices shaped by knowledge and expertise. A governmentality framework provides a method of analyzing the genesis of these regimes of practice – how they come into being and how they change over time. Governmentality further shows that governance not only occurs through direct action, but also from a site of removed manipulation by depending upon subjects’ own agency, habits and activities to govern. Governmentality is a concept introduced by Foucault and later developed into a theoretical tool for contemporary analyses of dispersed power relations. An analysis of Turkish governmentality promotes an understanding of complex power relations, rationalities, styles, and practices of governance that are missed by those mainstream political and International Relations theories.

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4 Ibid.
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which are more focused on problems of the state-system. It enables a focus on how particular actors engender control below and beyond the state. Through a governmentality framework, one traces the direct and indirect techniques that actors (especially the state) use to control populations via the manipulations of habits, self-conduct, and actions, wherein subjects are compelled to self-regulate. Minute deployments of discourse, policy, utterance, and institution-building are seen to have far-reaching, yet intentional repercussions on populations as these disparate processes are drawn into the orbit of the state. Dean argues that this pre-supposes the freedom of the governed to act: governance entails shaping the broader field in which actors act, but actors nonetheless are free to make choices within that field, compelling us to self-regulate but also opening possibilities for resistance. A governmentality framework therefore re-conceptualizes some of the taken-for-granted ways people act in their everyday lives as effects of governance from a distance.

Foucault used governmentality to describe a range of different phenomena, leading to divergences in how later theorists have developed the term: some see governmentality as specifically used to understand the development of liberal democracy. Others, like Mitchell Dean, have broadened governmentality to encompass a more general approach to analyzing rationalities of government. Dean provides four components of a governmentality analysis, which support an inquiry into how governing works, whether in liberal democracy, authoritarian

10 Dean, Governmentality: Power and Rule in Modern Society, 21–24.
13 Dean, Governmentality: Power and Rule in Modern Society, 30.
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contexts, or other regimes of practices: 1) visibility, 2) technologies, 3), mentalities, 4) and population formation. I will explore these in turn to foreground the application of these concepts in my thesis. In this thesis, I examine Turkish governmentality as a heteropatriarchal construction, broadly, before looking at how queer identity emerges from that as a technology of governance (or, assemblage), constituting various mechanisms of defining and controlling queer others.

First, Dean argues that a governmentality framework must define the ways governance is visibly discernable: “…by what kind of light it illuminates and defines certain objects and with what shadows and darkness it obscures and hides others.” This depends upon both literal maps, schematics, and diagrams demarcating what is to be governed as well as more abstract methods of “picturing” governance. Dean provides examples of how certain regimes of practices are tied to the notion of visibility. Imprisonment, he argues, depends upon both the constant surveillance of the prisoner on one hand, but also the banishment of the prisoner from the rest of society (and thus their invisibility) on the other.

Carl Death argues that tracing the visibility of governance demonstrates the inconsistences, gaps, and blind spots in governmental practices, arguing that there are often competing rationalities at play, opening spaces for resistance and alternatives. I am reminded of queer theorist Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick’s notion of the “the closet.” The closet, Sedgwick argues, is the “defining structure for gay oppression,” wherein homosexuals must negotiate on a daily basis whether or not to render visible their sexuality in dealing with their boss, their

14 Ibid., 40–44.
15 Ibid., 41.
16 Ibid.
17 Death, “Governmentality at the Limits of the International,” 774.
18 Sedgwick, Epistemology of the Closet.
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students, the police, medical professionals, insurance salespersons and so on. To remain in the closet demands self-regulation in order to “pass,” yet to come out invites the possibility of violence. The closet represents the impossibility for sexuality to be wholly private or public, visible or invisible, yet rather a double-bind that perpetually disciplines queer subjects. From a governmentality perspective, I argue that Sedgwick demonstrates the closet as a regime of practices imposed upon queer lives which depends upon the negotiation of visibility and invisibility.

Next, Dean argues that an analytics of governance entails an exploration of the technical aspects of governance: “…by what means, mechanisms, procedures, instruments, tactics, techniques, technologies and vocabularies is authority constituted and rule accomplished?” Dean emphasizes that governance is not simply a series of world views or values, but that these are necessarily formed and limited by the implementation of these ideas as they are enacted. In their exploration of neoliberal governmentality and HIV prevention, Rangal and Adam explore technologies of the “responsible management of risk,” where public health actors propagate “know the facts” information campaigns as a primary means of controlling HIV transmission. AIDS service organizations depend upon making at-risk gay men responsible for their own protection –individual responsibility and information delivery being the key technologies, or, practices of governance in this case. In her governmentality analysis of local British politics, Davina Cooper explores a regime of practices of lesbian and gay inclusion and equity

19 Ibid., 68–71.
20 Ibid., 185–212.
21 Dean, Governmentality: Power and Rule in Modern Society, 42.
22 Ibid.
24 Ibid.
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policymaking. She defines the “firewall” as a technology, where local councils nominally supported projects that promoted equity and representation, but made certain that these were desexualized in an effort to cordon off “private” sexuality from a more palatable gay identity. This follows a liberal mentality of tolerance that forecloses a more radical, sexualized citizenship. Foucault deployed the term “biopower” to speak to the ways he saw techniques of governing deployed upon both individual bodies and man-as-species. Achille Mbembe reconceptualizes this idea as “necropolitics,” arguing that contemporary forms of government are interested more in rendering populations disposable than the maintenance of life itself. I return to the idea of the technologies of necropolitics in speaking about trans people in Turkey in particular.

Dean provides forms of knowledge as a third part of a governmentality framework. The “mentality” part of governmentality, this refers to the expertise or knowledge which government depends upon in order to act: “…what forms of thought, knowledge, expertise, strategies, means of calculation, or rationality are employed in practices of governing?” The assumption is that government must reflect upon itself, forming ideas about what is or is not true or legitimate —and that these knowledge formations are visible in discourse and shape aforementioned technologies of governance. For example, Cruikshank argues that welfare reform in the 1960s U.S. represented a particular reflexive set of knowledge about how institutions should operate and

26 Ibid., 925.
27 Ibid., 940–43.
30 Dean, Governmentality: Power and Rule in Modern Society, 42–43.
31 Ibid., 43.
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how citizens should relate.\textsuperscript{32} This mentality contributed to the normalization of the poor as themselves responsible for their own poverty, which reflects a liberal rationality of limited state intervention in favor of self-governance.\textsuperscript{33}

The exploration of liberalism as a governmentality is a common theme in the governmentality literature, as Foucault himself explored the particularities of liberal practices of government.\textsuperscript{34} These emphasize the ways liberal states maintain control over subjects by deferring governance onto the individual, so that poverty, illness, criminality and so forth are made the responsibility of the individual.\textsuperscript{35} This reflects a mentality of governing through the promotion of free activity and conditioning habits of self-regulation.\textsuperscript{36} Beyond liberal mentalities, other authors have investigated a variety of other mentalities of governance, including indigenous, colonial, developmental, and authoritarian.\textsuperscript{37} In pursuing an understanding of government’s mentalities, Walters argues that governmentality frameworks need to be particular about the co-presence of varied, even contradictory mentalities at play, noting that governmentality is susceptible to making government appear overly coherent and totalizing.\textsuperscript{38} He

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{32} Barbara Cruikshank, The Will to Empower: Democratic Citizens and Other Subjects (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1999), 43–66.
\item \textsuperscript{33} Ibid., 67–86.
\item \textsuperscript{34} Foucault, Security, Territory, Population: Lectures at the Collège de France, 1977-78, 451.
\item \textsuperscript{38} “…there is certainly a rather static feel about many studies of governmentality. They think the world in terms of key concepts like rationality, apparatus and diagram that, even if they do build in room to express movement in their design, on the surface at least give the impression of a world populated by immobile constructions. To animate this world we might, as Thrift suggests, look to thinkers like Deleuze who do foreground processes of flux and mutation.” Walters, Governmentality: Critical Encounters, 74.
\end{itemize}
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further argues that expanding upon governmentality by using the idea of the assemblage as a fluctuating, incoherent, contingent set of processes may bring more subtlety to a governmentality analysis—an argument which I pursue below.  

Dean’s final component of an analytics of government is to understand how government produces subjectivities: “…what forms of person, self and identity are presupposed by different practices of government and what sorts of transformation do these practices seek?” Foucault’s work on the production of homosexual as an identity category is informative here. He argues that the categorization of people as “homosexuals” comes from a certain confluence of medical knowledge during the late 19th century. Before, practices of homosexuality were simply criminal acts. More recently, homosexuality became understood as a medical disorder and then an essential characteristic, like race or gender: “Homosexuality appeared as one of the forms of sexuality when it was transposed from the practice of sodomy onto a kind of interior androgyny, a hermaphroditism of the soul. The sodomite had been a temporary aberration; the homosexual was now a species.” Both in Foucault’s genealogy of sexuality and in his later lectures on governmentality, Foucault charts the ways government produces truths about certain kinds of people; for example, the sick, which enables acts of power over them. This tells us that the ways LGBTQ people are constituted as a population, compared to heteronormative standards, and behaviorally disciplined depends upon specific speech acts, whether through juridical,

39 Ibid., 78.
40 Dean, Governmentality: Power and Rule in Modern Society, 43.
42 Ibid., 42–43.
43 Ibid., 36–49.
44 Ibid., 42–43.
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media, or medical discourses.\textsuperscript{46} Dean further argues that identity production is not simply a matter of government producing a subjectivity that subjects simply adopt. Rather, a governmentality framework asks us how subjects come to identify as citizens or members of the gay community.\textsuperscript{47}

While Dean’s framework provides these four realms as a starting point for analyzing governance, I argue that Walters’ linkage of genealogy with governmentality enhances this approach. Walters defines genealogy as a process which reveals how something came about that did not exist previously.\textsuperscript{48} A genealogical method demonstrates how regimes of knowledge and practice emerge to populations over time, arguing that status quo ways of knowing and disciplining are historically situated and susceptible to change.\textsuperscript{49} Rather than seeing social entities as taken-for-granted truths, genealogy demonstrates that things like the state or the LGBTQ community have a demonstrable beginning and are the result of a number of truth-formations.\textsuperscript{50} A genealogical perspective, I argue, provides a methodological approach to Dean’s four analytics showing, for example, where technologies of governance come from, how they relate to speech acts, and particular events that transform identity categories. I develop the notion of a genealogical approach in my methodological section and provide a genealogy to Turkish governmentality as a substantive “context” chapter in the body of my thesis.

ASSEMBLAGE THINKING

In The Confession of the Flesh, Foucault conceptualizes the apparatus as:

\textsuperscript{47} Dean, \textit{Governmentality: Power and Rule in Modern Society}, 44.
\textsuperscript{48} Walters, \textit{Governmentality: Critical Encounters}, 17.
\textsuperscript{49} Ibid., 110–40.
\textsuperscript{50} Ibid., 16–18.
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...a thoroughly heterogeneous ensemble consisting of discourses, institutions, architectural forms, regulatory decisions, laws, administrative measures, scientific statements, philosophical, moral and philanthropic propositions -- in short, the said as much as the unsaid. Such are the elements of the apparatus. The apparatus itself is the system of relations that can be established between these elements.  

What Foucault calls an apparatus, Deleuze calls an assemblage in almost exactly the same language:

But an assemblage is first and foremost what keeps very heterogeneous elements together: e.g. a sound, a gesture, a position, etc., both natural and artificial elements. The problem is one of “consistency” or “coherence,” and it prior to the problem of behavior. How do things take on consistency? How do they cohere? Even among very different things, an intensive continuity can be found.  

Common threads tie together both definitions: a need to understand how discursive and material forces become bound to each other (privileging neither); understanding entities immanently, rather than as generalizable categories; and a disavowal of accepting entities as timeless or essential facts, but rather seeing them as a confluence of moving parts. This idea of assemblage as a technology of control has since been elaborated upon within International Relations, yet there is no agreed-upon approach to understanding this concept or how it figures within an analytics of government. In this section, I develop the notion of the “assemblage” as an extrapolation of Dean’s second point of a governmentality analysis –that of understanding the “technologies” of government, but that it also depends upon the other, interlinked concepts of visibilities, rationalities, and population-formation. For the purpose of my own work, I follow Li’s usage of assemblage as essentially synonymous with the Foucauldian terms dispositif, 

52 Deleuze, Two Regimes of Madness, 176–79.
54 Ibid., 2–3.
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apparatus, and technology of power.\textsuperscript{55} Queer identity, I argue, is foremost an assemblage of control, bringing together disparate knowledges and acts of power to constrain queers’ actions. Even though this is an apparatus of control, however, queer identity has also served as a source of strength, culture, and dissent, which has enabled resistance against dominant governmentalities in many ways, as I emphasize throughout my thesis and focus on in my chapter on Gezi Park. There is therefore a constant tension between the degree to which queer identity is enabling or disabling, which is reflected in the wide variety of opinions I have found in my interviewing about the state, the family, Islam, and the military amongst queers themselves. Authors like Tania Li, William Walters, and Stephen Collier, see assemblage as complimentary to Foucauldian governmentality, wherein each provide different insights into how the “technological” component in particular deserves elaboration.\textsuperscript{56} I start by exploring the ways assemblage can be understood as an extension of a governmentality framework before delving into what I consider the main theoretical insights offered by assemblage: that assemblages are constituted of dynamic parts and must be analyzed specifically, locally, and materially.

Although this is relatively new ground, I have identified three overlapping discussions which provide assemblage as a means of extending governmentality as a complementary concept, providing slightly different insights into the way we understand the deployment of power. First, as argued by Li, “Examining practices of assemblage enables an expansion of the

\textsuperscript{55} Although some authors have provided subtle differences in the usage of these ideas (including William Walters’ understanding that apparatuses are assemblages that have become permanent) my usage of the term is situated within a growing body of literature which has furthered assemblage as a distinct analytic tactic in its own right. Li, “Practices of Assemblage and Community Forest Management,” 264. See also: Walters, Governmentality: Critical Encounters, 76–78; Legg, “Assemblage/Apparatus.”

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analytic of governmentality without loss of focus.” One of her primary points in the usage of assemblage is that governmentality on its own suggests an exploration of diffuse political relationships, yet tends to assert an overly totalizing framework for understanding complex, contingent, and contradictory practices:

Nikolas Rose, for example, writes that government is ‘not a process in which rule extends itself unproblematically across a territory, but a matter of fragile relays, contested locales and fissiparous affiliations’ and hence ‘inherently risky’ (Rose 1999: 51). Yet he does not follow through to ask: if there is contestation, how is it manifested? If relays are fragile, what are the practices that attempt to secure them? If affiliations are fissiparous, how does this fact shape the resulting formations? If there are risks, who apprehends these risks, and how do they factor risks into their calculations? The answers to ‘how’ questions such as these deserve a more central place in studies of government than is currently accorded.

I appreciate Li’s emphasis on asking “how” questions, demonstrating that more understanding is needed in understanding how government pulls together disparate components in an effort to govern. If we assume that things like the state or the queer are contingent constructions, assemblage may be used to interrogate the dynamic processes and empirical circumstances that make these categories knowable forms by asking us how they present as coherent. In other words, assemblage starts with the assumption that a significant effort is expended on bringing things together to make categories knowable – and therefore resistance is a primary factor in making unified identities.

Further, while governmentality provides an analytics of government, Stephen Collier argues that an assemblage approach may help resist the totalizing tendency of this approach. It is not sufficient, Collier argues, to identify certain practices as neoliberal in a given setting and

58 Ibid.
59 Ibid., 264–65.
then ascribe them to a broader neoliberal governmentality.\(^6^1\) This reifies neoliberalism as too coherent, when in actuality neoliberal practices are evolving, recombining, and meeting resistance all the time in different places. Collier therefore argues for a “topological” approach to complement governmentality in the form of assemblage:

Returning to neoliberalism, we can say that the identification of advanced liberalism as a… form of govern-mentality was invaluable in making visible what is general about a new class of governmental forms across a range of cases. A topological analysis is now required to show how styles of analysis, techniques or forms of reasoning associated with ‘advanced liberal’ government are being recombined with other forms, and to diagnose the governmental ensembles that emerge from these recombinations.\(^6^2\)

While governmentality refers to reflective knowledge production and how this structures governance, how governance is actually enacted, the resistances it meets, and the peculiarities of immanent cases challenges any presentation of a singular governmentality informing all power relations within a state.\(^6^3\) Following Foucault’s elaboration upon many different kinds of assemblages (“…military-diplomatic apparatuses, disciplinary apparatuses, apparatuses of polize, apparatuses of security…”), Collier further offers assemblage as a process of challenging the way we commonly think about certain entities, providing new, critical redefinitions of our contemporary reality.\(^6^4\)

Finally, William Walters provides the idea of the assemblage in line with Foucault’s usage of the apparatus, describing the interplay between discourse, knowledge-production, and material circumstances.\(^6^5\) While Walters argues that assemblage enables the scrutinizing of fixed political formations as flexible and comprised of heterogeneous parts, he distinguishes

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\(^6^1\) Collier, “Topologies of Power Foucault’s Analysis of Political Government beyond ‘Governmentality,’” 98.

\(^6^2\) Ibid., 99.

\(^6^3\) “Interview with Stephen J. Collier on Foucault, Assemblages and Topology.”


\(^6^5\) Walters, Governmentality: Critical Encounters, 77.
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apparatuses as more fixed and adaptable entities (like insurance or confession), while assemblages are more ephemeral: “Assemblages either crystallize into apparatuses, or they fragment and disappear.”66 Walters, like Collier and Li, argues that assemblage can help reinforce the dynamism and fluctuation present in acts of governance, foregrounding the many failures and incoherencies that characterize government. This, he notes, is sometimes absent from the approach of governmentality, which can sometimes “…give the impression of a world populated by immobile constructions.”67 However, Walters cautions that assemblage should be maintained as providing insight into these highly elusive, fleeting constructs, lest everything become an assemblage and the concept lose its purpose.68

Assemblage is therefore an analytic I will use to complement a governmentality framework. Its capacity to expose the heterogeneous components of an entity (here, the queer) and place instability at the forefront helps make governmentality less of a totalizing solution to understanding power dynamics. This is visible in the example of the queer body as an assemblage, which is how I apply the concept in my analysis. Whereas governmentality provides an understanding of the field of power relations within Turkish society it is at the site of the queer body itself that we can see the consequences of acts of government and knowledge production. While Turkish governmentality makes the queer knowable in many ways, this often fails: queers resist, consent to some dynamics and not others, and are subject to political manipulations beyond governmental forms. For example, some queers consent to military disciplining, many (but not all) eschew state-based religious authority, and a great deal participate in illicit sexual practices through internet networking. While Turkish governmentality

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66 Ibid., 78.
67 Ibid., 79.
68 Ibid.
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helps us understand many of the knowledge productions and policy decisions that go into marginalizing queer people, assemblage provides a closer topology of queer people’s lives, accounting for assent to some acts of governance but not others in addition to formations of resistance to governance.

HETEROGENEOUS PARTS

Having described why some academics argue for an extension of governmentality into assemblage thinking, I will now explore three key components to an assemblage approach. I have adapted these three components from Acuto and Curtis.69 The first of these is an insistence that entities are formations of complex, heterogeneous parts – both discursive and non-discursive, human and non-human. All of these parts of an assemblage have their own unique capacities and productive roles in constituting the assemblage. All components are equal in that they affect other components and are affected by other components.70 This permits us to think about assemblages that are multi-scalar and containing both expressive and material components: heterosexuality, for example, is an assemblage of bodies, psychiatry, popular culture, social welfare, and speeches given by state officials, and potentially many more objects (or, other assemblages). What is unique about these parts is that something brings them together, producing an effect that is irreducible to any single component.

Both Foucault and Deleuze consider assemblage to refer to the relationship between heterogeneous elements. Foucault, for example, identifies sexuality as an assemblage (*le dispositif de sexualité*), which:

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...must not be thought of as a kind of natural given which power tries to hold in check, or as an obscure domain which knowledge tries gradually to uncover. It is the name that can be given to a historical construct: not a furtive reality that is difficult to grasp, but a great surface network in which the stimulation of bodies, the intensification of pleasures, the incitement to discourse, the formation of special knowledges, the strengthening of controls and resistances, are linked to one another, in accordance with a few major strategies of knowledge and power.71

The assemblage of sexuality, he argues, is not a singular truth to be understood through scientific research. Rather, it is an emerging “great surface network” – an amalgam of different interrelating processes, pulling together bodies, formations of pleasure, and certain attempts of control. The assemblage of sexuality, he continues, is situated within “strategies of knowledge and power,” or, in other words, a broader governmentality.72 This is developed by Judith Butler, who takes us beyond the social discourse/matter binary in her assertion that the material body can never be perceived without processes of signification.73

Such a perspective can be contrasted to other ways of knowing entities. For example, DeLanda is critical of the metaphor of the body (or city or state) as an organism, or as a system, wherein parts blend into a seamless whole and/or parts are dependent upon each other.74 A system, like a car engine, is static, and the parts depend upon each other to function, having no meaning outside of that system. In realist International Relations theory, the sovereign body is inviolable, and this notion of an organic, self-contained body is extrapolated to representations of the state.75 Instead, DeLanda sees bodies in terms of what he calls relations of exteriority: parts interact with each other, but retain unique qualities. Parts come from different places, can be

72 Ibid.
73 Butler, Bodies That Matter: On the Discursive Limits of “Sex,” 38.
75 Wilcox, Bodies of Violence, 18.
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plugged into different assemblages, and activate different capabilities altogether.\textsuperscript{76} Parts of a car engine, for example, have no purpose outside of that system and behave according to a totalizing logic dictating the actions of each particular part.

Bleiker asserts that assemblages, by contrast, show how component parts are both linked and autonomous.\textsuperscript{77} In his own work, Bleiker finds the notion of the assemblage useful in challenging conventional models of causation in Politics and International Relations. For example, he shows that threatening visual representations of refugees in Australia constitute part of the “Australian security assemblage.”\textsuperscript{78} However, it is not possible to produce a causal linkage between images of refugees as racialized others and the creation of specific anti-migrant policies, even though it is evident that these images play a role in framing and enabling an intensifying securitization of the migration process.\textsuperscript{79} Bleiker’s study shows that there is nothing essential about the image of refugees which facilitates the marginalization of refugees, but that the relationship constituted by the media and state’s usage of these images connects with other discourses and acts of policy that co-operate to exclude refugees (rather than see them more compassionately).\textsuperscript{80} This security assemblage can be considered a technology of a broader Australian neoliberal governmentality, which demands the economic productivity of citizens alongside racialized dispossession.\textsuperscript{81}

\textsuperscript{78} Ibid., 80–81.
\textsuperscript{79} Ibid., 81.
\textsuperscript{80} Ibid.
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Foucault makes a similar argument about assemblage, showing how the sexuality assemblage incorporates disparate power-knowledge formations in order to govern subjects through sexuality. Parts include economic and nationalist policymaking ennobling couples’ responsibility to produce healthy citizens; greater medical concerns about women and children’s sexual development; in addition to new psychiatric knowledge and treatment of perversion represent a relationship made between disparate material and social utterances. Foucault describes the purpose of the sexuality assemblage as a need to control sexual deviants:

> There is no question that the appearance in nineteenth-century psychiatry, jurisprudence, and literature of a whole series of discourses on the species and subspecies of homosexuality, inversion, pederasty, and "psychic hermaphrodisms" made possible a strong advance of social controls into this area of "perversity"; but it also made possible the formation of a "reverse" discourse: homosexuality began to speak in its own behalf, to demand that its legitimacy or "naturality" be acknowledged, often in the same vocabulary, using the same categories by which it was medically disqualified. Because heterogeneous parts come together in almost a self-organizing way, there is no overriding logic or one specific subjectivity an assemblage operates upon. In the above example, the sexuality assemblage brings together practices and knowledge of psychiatry, law, and policing, but the non-linear, undirected nature of the assemblage means that queers themselves were able to resist, developing the vocabulary used to discipline them into a new direction (to become known as a homosexual, rather than a sodomite).

Foucault’s examination of the phallic governance of sexuality can be empirically traced to material and expressive components, like the psychiatrists’ production of knowledge about women’s mental health or the survey methods employed to create statistical knowledge of sexual

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83 Ibid., 101.
practices within a population.\textsuperscript{85} In assemblage, these components give rise to a particular social system of regulating desire which, Foucault argues, was created in order to govern the population in terms of racialized purity, shape proper bodies, and control emerging health concerns.\textsuperscript{86} As described above, this governmentality depends upon producing truths about a population and the deployment of techniques of utilizing bureaucracies, the self, and other social relations (beyond from the state) to govern.\textsuperscript{87} Foucault expresses the need to think through the heterogeneous interrelations between thought and practices: "institutions, procedures, analyses and reflections, the calculations and tactics,” or, assemblage, which devises and enacts governance in diffuse ways.\textsuperscript{88}

\textbf{IMMANENCE}

Because there is no sovereign organization in an assemblage, assemblage thinking is anti-structural and anti-identitarian.\textsuperscript{89} Assemblage thinking shows that social entities are comprised of dynamic parts, which must be empirically understood specifically, locally, and materially.\textsuperscript{90} Part of this disdain for the universal stems from the problem that one cannot predict all of a body’s capabilities, interactions, and affects based on their essentialist categories alone, nor do these chart the dramatic changes certain categories undergo over time.\textsuperscript{91} Acuto and Curtis argue that this is one of the key strengths of assemblage thinking: while mainstream conceptualizations of

\begin{footnotesize}
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\item \textsuperscript{85} Foucault, \textit{The History of Sexuality, Volume I: An Introduction}, 63–65.
\item \textsuperscript{86} Ibid., 145–59.
\item \textsuperscript{87} Foucault, \textit{Security, Territory, Population: Lectures at the Collège de France, 1977-78}, 144.
\item \textsuperscript{89} DeLanda, \textit{A New Philosophy of Society}, 26.
\item \textsuperscript{90} Manuel DeLanda, \textit{Deleuze: History and Science} (New York: Atropos Press, 2010), 12.
\item \textsuperscript{91} Moira Gatens, “Feminism as ‘Password’: Re-Thinking the ‘Possible’ with Spinoza and Deleuze,” \textit{Hypatia} 15, no. 2 (2000): 65.
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IR have been state-centric, assemblage requires us to explain abstract entities like the state (or capitalism or, for my study, queers) in terms of empirical component parts.92

Thinking immanently rather than abstractly presents an interesting renegotiation of the normal way we conceive of queer others. It is difficult to pinpoint one transcendental attribute which unites all lesbian women or gay men or trans-people together. Instead, this universal category is an ongoing production, formulated between the body and institutions like the state, medicine, and media.93 Early queer theorist Guy Hocquenghem identified the identity category of homosexuality as a “trap,” which not only places queer people in a negative binary relationship with homosexual people, but also acts to restrict sexual practices to those which are permissible by state, medicine, and religion, edifying governance instead of challenging it.94 We might, for example, think about the construction of “LGBTQ” and the ways that liberal rights-based construction disavows incoherent forms of intimacy (for example, those in non-monogamous relationships, or those with complicated living, child-rearing, and/or property-owning relationships) in favor of heteronormative-styled gay marriage.95 After acknowledging the particular, heterogeneous processes involved in constituting others, we can start to critically examine the power relations over such bodies, demonstrating that queers are a non-unified category, confronted with many different levels of power, and who push back against these identity impositions in interesting ways.

For Deleuze and for Hocquenghem, the prioritization of differences over categories is itself a political project.96 It destabilizes given essentialist assumptions and opens up radical new possibilities for these assemblages, showing that actually there are many incoherences,

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96 Deleuze and Félix Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia, 263.
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inconsistencies, and resistances that are at constant tension with the construction of the assemblage itself. In queer culture, for example, some queers of color have argued that both LGBTQ rights and queer as a subversive category do not go far enough in accounting for the way race intersects with economic and sexual marginalization. Queer assemblage thinking, following Colebrook’s argument, can provide a renegotiation of these broad categories, exposing both the multiple power relationships that construct them and the tensions resisting them:

As long as we are concerned with identity, with the repetition of who we are, we remain within constituted matter and lived time. To think transcendentally we need to think the pure form of time and difference, the pure intensities which each present repeats and actualises both in the present and for all time. For Deleuze, then, the conditions of the queer and the conditions of the new are the same: to counter-actualise the present, to repeat the intensities and encounters that have composed us, but not as they are for us.

Colebrook is arguing that “to queer” is coterminous with destabilizing taken-for-granted identities. While certain authorities attempt to fix subjects within given identity categories, to queer, for Colebrook, allows for routes out of these stable, essential categories. People are not simply “female” or “male,” but are made knowable as such in the constant production and relationship-making of component parts, including the material body, language, the state, scientific knowledge, law, in particular places and times, upon particular bodies. This feeds back into a central tenet of Deleuze and Guattari’s work, which is abandoning the problem of what bodies are in favor of thinking toward what entities potentially can do. Assemblage thinking can potentially signify how abstract entities, like the queer, are actualized in particular

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circumstances; and that to understand that this is a historically emergent process indicates its inherent instability and potentiality for change or resistance.\textsuperscript{100}

**CONTINGENCY**

Foucault uses the idea of the assemblage to demonstrate that certain social entities, like the prison or sexuality, are contingent upon a series of discursive and non-discursive acts, rather than natural or timeless.\textsuperscript{101} He shows that they are assembled in order to address an “urgent need,” and as they emerge to constrain lives this is not a necessary or eternal condition.\textsuperscript{102} He provides the example of the prison, which he argues became established as a result of the urgent need for the state to more efficiently and rationally manage criminality—the assemblage constituted by processes of “…filtering, concentrating, professionalizing, and circumscribing a criminal milieu.”\textsuperscript{103} In naming an entity as an assemblage, Foucault calls attention to its genesis and the confluence of material and social factors that are incorporated into this new technology of power. Because assemblages have a definite genesis, assemblage thinking demonstrates that things can change over time, evolve or devolve, stabilize or destabilize.\textsuperscript{104} Assemblage thinking therefore challenges the given-ness of entities like the prison or sexuality, interrogating how the component parts are brought together to support an image of wholeness. In this section, I use Deleuze’s concept of “affect” to understand why assemblages come together and the political consequences of assembling as a contingent, on-going production.

\textsuperscript{101} Foucault, “The Confession of the Flesh.”
\textsuperscript{102} Ibid., 195.
\textsuperscript{103} Ibid., 195–96.
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Thinking about the queer as a contingent assemblage provides answers to not only what forces construct (and govern) the queer body, but also what the queer body can do:

Deleuze explains, “a body must be defined by the ensemble of relations which compose it, or, what amounts to exactly the same thing, by its power to be affected [pouvoir d’être affecté].” You cannot understand the structure of the body if you do not know all the ways in which it can be affected, the nature of its power to be affected. The problem of affect in a Deleuzian sense (which he develops from Spinoza) deviates from its commonplace denotation and has contributed to a growing corpus of texts under the headline of affect theory. Affect refers to the changes that occur to the component parts when they come into relations (and thus form an assemblage). Affect is both the change that occurs when those bodies are brought together (the power to be affected) and also describes the component’s new capacities to act (the power to affect)—for Deleuze, affect refers to both, simultaneously. Whereas the term “affect” usually is synonymous with “emotion,” affect here extends that definition to mean the pre-personal force that is enacted upon bodies: “…corresponding to the passage from one experiential state of the body to another and implying an augmentation or diminution in that body's capacity to act.” This emphasizes the degree to which sexual identity is produced not in relation to forces outside of the body—as well as the possibility for queer bodies to, in turn, affect these institutional pressures themselves.

Queer identity is therefore an assemblage that integrates disparate parts, stabilizes them, and make them knowable: “These affective flows produce, connect and territorialize bodies, things, social constructs and abstractions within assemblages, and also produce specific

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108 Deleuze and Félix Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia, xvi.
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capacities to act, feel and desire in bodies.” In referring to the ways component parts come together to produce an assemblage, we are therefore always talking about an affective relationship, where components are constantly changing and are changed by other components, giving rise to an overall stable image of the queer other. Guillame argues that assemblage thinking is useful as it refers to the ordering that occurs between events, discourses, and materials, “…the clues of which we can unveil and connect in an ephemeral and contingent moment.” Thus the identity “queer” is not just the governmentally-stigmatized discourses of the other, nor it is queer people’s activism against oppression, nor is it simply the singular body itself. Rather than a singularly defined entity, queer assemblage thinking allows us to look at all of these processes as a kind of “mosaic,” understanding how they co-exist, fit together, and influence each other.

These constant affective flows dissolve any possibility of a totalizing, sovereign dissemination of power over queer people. Although queer identity constrains lives in many different ways, queers have fluctuating and challenging interactions with the state, media, education, religion, and family. These institutions have to constantly negotiate with queer people, making accommodations, changing their tactics, and dealing with their forms of resistance. Thinking of queer identity as an assemblage therefore highlights persistent tensions within the state as queers “…produce further affects within assemblages, producing the capacities of bodies to do, desire and feel, in turn producing subsequent affective flows.”

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109 Fox and Alldred, “The Sexuality-Assemblage.”
111 Ibid., 110–11.
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contingency in assemblages that define us therefore opens up new possibilities for movement beyond seemingly inescapable systems.

There are, therefore, always forces of change within assemblages, which can be stabilized, but sometimes derail the assemblage entirely. Deleuze refers to these inconsistences within assemblages as “lines of flight,” which he equates with the process of deterritorialization or, simply, destabilization. 113 The governmentality deploying the assemblage as a technology of control may be interested in a certain configuration of sexuality which benefits the state, the family, religion, and so forth: this is why Deleuze defines lines of flight as those which dominant power arrangements want to “seal off and tie up,” as they destabilize status quo power relations. 114 An interesting example of this comes from Puar’s work, who demonstrates ways that a neoliberal governmentality can incorporate queer bodies for anti-democratic ends, formulating conceptions of queer identity into one that supports the nation-state. 115 There is therefore no correlation between a restructuring of the assemblage and anti-authoritarianism or liberal progress. In understanding the potential to activate new capacities in relations with others—opening queer identity to new ways of being affected and affecting—assemblage thinking challenges pre-figured understandings of social identities, like the queer, as stable. As Colebrook argues, there is a productive critique in every assemblage: “how do the state, man [sic], capital, or the family enable their own undoing?” 116 By analyzing the contingent relations made between component parts, it is apparent that assemblages change. By looking at the particular ways components affect and are affected by each other, we can see that change is the default operation of an assemblage.

113 Deleuze, Two Regimes of Madness, 127.
114 Ibid.
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In my chapter on Gezi Park, for example, I show that the queer activism there exemplifies a material slippage of institutional attempts to govern queer others. In other words, it is a challenge to the ways Turkish governmentality deploys the queer assemblage; it is a blind spot allowing queer identity to become empowering rather than confining. I refer to this particular “line of flight” as “the queer common.” I borrow this notion of “the common” from Hardt and Negri, referring to the blind spots of institutional governance, wherein queer people are freed from the control of the state, the family, the media, and so forth.117 The queer common refers to autonomously located relationship building and world-making, building upon the work of Maffesoli’s “social define” as elaborated by Lacey.118 I argue that the queer common facilitates alternative institution building and challenges top-down governance of queer lives in unique ways.

CONCLUSION

My theoretical framework depends upon the usage of both governmentality and assemblage in order to understand the complicated ways queer bodies are governed and resist governance. Governmentality offers an exploration of the diffuse, indirect ways power and knowledge is deployed over populations.119 It can demonstrate that our normalization of certain understandings of sexuality and embodiment are produced, rather than natural. It shows that the direction of human conduct depends upon the establishment of truths about the world as a reflective process. This process entails 1) making certain images visible or invisible; 2) government’s reliance on certain forms of knowledge and expertise; 3) concrete acts of policy,

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measurement and knowledge-gathering, discursive moves, security measures, and other technologies of control; 4) and the production of populations or subjectivities, empowering certain groups of people at the expense of others.\(^{120}\) In my thesis, I apply these four approaches toward understanding how Turkish governmentality governs queer others.

Assemblage thinking complements this approach by developing the way we understand the aforementioned techniques/technologies of government. Seeing the idea of the queer as an assemblage – as a technique of governing — is helpful for understanding the empirical ways governmentality enacts the governance of queer bodies. This is especially helpful in illuminating the ways these acts of governance end up being contradictory, incoherent, or resisted entirely.

Assemblage thinking, following the work of Sassen, is a very specific analytical intervention.\(^{121}\) It acts on three levels: 1) it shows that the idea of the queer is produced by a confluence of many constituent processes; 2) it examines the queer as an empirically visible, spatially-temporally immanent phenomenon; 3) it explores how our idea of the queer changes over time as a historical product. Situating assemblage thinking within a governmentality framework enables me to think about the broad ways government establishes knowledge and power over queers, yet realizing these deployments of power are complicated by the queer being a lived, incoherent, contradictory entity. Queer identity is therefore constituted as much by institutions beyond itself as it is by its internal dynamics. This facilitates an understanding of queerness itself as a constraining, governing technique that is complicated, with empirically visible linkages to the ways queers are constrained by the power/knowledge dynamics of the state, family, policing, religion, media, and themselves. Yet it also forefronts their opportunities to resist and use queerness as a means of liberation.


Chapter Two
Genealogy as Method

In this chapter, I explore my research methodology. First, I explore how the process of “genealogy” has enabled my research on Turkish governmentality, exploring a number of key texts in Foucauldian social research along the way. I then explain my fieldwork data-collection methods, including ethical issues, and divergences between predicted outcomes and actual results. In the final section of this chapter, I consider how my theoretical framework will be applied toward understanding the genealogical, interview, and media data I collected in writing my thesis.

Practicing genealogy is the method by which Foucault denaturalized given understandings of the locations of power in modern society. This entailed the tracing of the pathways by which actors (the people, institutions, civil society, etc.) have come to be knowable as entities which occurs, Foucault argues, via the subjugation of other kinds of “truths:”

The project of these disorderly and tattered genealogies is to reactivate local knowledges—Deleuze would no doubt call them "minor"—against the scientific hierarchicahzation of knowledge and its intrinsic power-effects. To put it in a nutshell: Archaeology is the method specific to the analysis of local discursivities, and genealogy is the tactic which, once it has described these local discursivities, brings into play the desubjugated knowledges that have been released from them.¹

Foucault juxtaposes this approach to common-sense thinking, which appreciates entities as universal, static, or timeless.² Here he employs the terminology of “archaeology” as a means of destabilizing truths in particular time periods and refers to “genealogy” as the means of

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² Walters, Governmentality: Critical Encounters, 16.
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explaining the power dynamics that gives rise to these truths at the expense of others.³ Using a genealogical approach, subjects emerge from specific processes, structures, and functions, the identification and analysis of which can unseat the supposed inevitability of our status quos.⁴

Thinking of governmentality as a genealogical mode of inquiry provides a number of methodological tools for developing an analytics of governance. While different academics hold different notions about the degree to which there is an established methodological approach for governmentality, a genealogical approach to governmentality provides some general guidelines for collecting data on the historical production of governance as well as its analysis. Wendy Brown argues that genealogy reveals the “fictive, fragile character” of our current political ontology, providing not so much a desire to understand the origins of a system of governance so much as an appreciation of its accidental, haphazard construction.⁵ Bevir argues that a genealogical focus disaggregates the centrality of the state in governing, asking us to look instead for changing patterns of governance within and beyond the scope of the state. To this end, Bevir notes we might collect information about: 1) elite narratives, or how dominant actors create truths about the world and enact obedience based upon these truths; 2) how technologies of power enable certain actors over others over time; and 3) popular resistance, or how subalterns offer alternative knowledge to the dominant order.⁶ In each of these steps, we are asked to consider the empirical discourses and material factors that organize the governing of a population.

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⁴ Walters, Governmentality: Critical Encounters, 115.
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Walters argues that genealogy is a useful approach to governmentality, which may provide a frame to the destabilization of taken-for-granted discourses and acts of power in contemporary governance. He argues that Foucault’s concept of governmentality is not a self-contained/established theory of power, but a fluid set of tools and concepts that complement other ideas from Foucault’s corpus (as well as other theoretical traditions). Ideas like genealogy and governmentality (alongside assemblage) must be “encountered;” not only do these concepts affect our interpretation of the research problem, but the empirical research situation is itself contingent, modulating the usage of these concepts differently in each project. To this end, Walters defines genealogical inquiry in three ways, as 1) understanding descent; 2) counter-memory; and 3) the retrieval of forgotten/subjugated knowledge. Walters elaborates upon the properties of each of these styles of genealogies, and I combine a number of the elements he provides in my own analysis. This includes exploring how current forms of governance are not natural but produced, that settled understandings of entities can be challenged and re-thought, and that dominant knowledge formations occur at the exclusion of the marginal.

The methodology I follow in this thesis uses genealogy to unsettle accepted positionalities and expose power dynamics that govern queer people. In conjunction with the concepts of assemblage and governmentality, genealogy provides a methodological framework for tracing shifting knowledges about queer people, queer practices, and queer institutions after the establishment of the modern Turkish republic. Genealogy complements a theoretical approach that helps me explore the multiple and competing knowledges employed by both state and non-state actors in the attempt to control queer lives. It also gives room for the lived

7 Walters, Governmentality: Critical Encounters, 114.
8 Ibid., 111.
9 Ibid., 143.
10 Ibid., 117–40.
experience and resistances enacted by queer persons themselves. I also attempt to demonstrate queer identity is a contingent assemblage, both knowable and undefinable, coherent and incoherent, a jumble of discursive and material factors producing a range of different politics. This led me to want to conduct as many interviews as possible, to better understand the variety of queer lives in Turkey. While a historicist account might claim there is a teleological endpoint for gay rights in Turkey, a genealogy can contradict that narrative by illuminating the entangled processes involved in constituting queer bodies as knowable. It could reveal that being “liberated” may be problematic and, even, undesirable for queer people.  

A REVIEW OF THE METHODOLOGICAL LITERATURE

My genealogical data collection depends on historical and archival research. I also triangulate this data from first-hand interviews, ethnographic data, and the study of media. Given that queer populations and their practices are marginal, this qualitative approach is an appropriate method to encounter and analyze unexpected power dynamics. The ethnographic field work portion of my research has also been useful for maintaining a sensitivity to contexts, revealing hidden activities, and reconsidering taken-for-granted relationships. For this study, by “ethnographic,” I mean archival research, observation techniques, and interviewing which, taken together, have contributed to my construction of genealogy of contemporary queer lives.

This methodology finds precedent in a range of cross-disciplinary, ethnography-based research. Anthropologists have employed these ethnographic strategies in exploring a diversity of queer lives around the world. These include studies of sexual practices to better combat the spread of HIV/AIDS, research into far-flung LGBTQ linguistics, and ethnographic inquiries into

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13 Margaret Diane LeCompte, Designing and Conducting Ethnographic Research, ed. Jean J. Schensul (Walnut Creek: AltaMira Press, 1999).
unique cultural lifestyles and their alignment with nationalism. There is notably an edited volume of reflections by academic researchers on conducting LGBTQ fieldwork, including discussions on ethics and inter-subjective dilemmas: for example, to whom and at what point do queer researches need to out themselves during their fieldwork? And how do we talk about others’ sexualities when we see our own as shifting and fluid? William Leap additionally explores the advantages and disadvantages of being a queer person doing queer research, which provides unique forms of access unavailable to heterosexual researchers. For example, queer ethnography brings into question the notion of the researcher’s desire: where early British ethnographies remained silent on the sexual and gendered assumptions underpinning their research, queer ethnography asks us to reflect on our own understandings of sex if we are to understand what it means to others. These texts also compelled me to reflect on my own self-representation as a queer Westerner in a foreign environment, and confirmed that my own encounters with queer people from different cultures would never really provide me with any overarching generalizations about what it was like to live as a queer person in that culture (which would not be desirable anyway).

Apart from the anthropology-based literature, the field of Feminist International Relations provides a methodological grounding for studying how varied global governmentalties

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govern gender and sexuality. For example, Stefanie Woehl uses a governmentality framework to understand how certain truths became normalized at the global level surrounding “gender mainstreaming,” which may be more of a technique of market efficiency rather than the promotion of gender equalities.19 Tami Jacoby’s survey of security and gender along the political spectrum in Israel also supports the utility of collecting narratives in recalibrating the discourses surrounding conflict.20 Suzan Ilcan and Anita Lacey’s employment of ethnographic techniques helped them define global development aid’s conceptualizations of the poor and how these agencies enact governance through aid programs in Namibia and the Solomon Islands.21

Developing lessons from Feminist International Relations, there are now a number of works deploying ethnography as a mode of inquiry in Queer International Relations as well. These include Leticia Sabsay’s study on the nature of citizenship in Buenos Aires for trans sex workers.22 Kelly Kollman has shown the role of transnational networks in normalizing same-sex unions on a global scale, while Eithne Luibhéid’s book on queer migration explores the ways the U.S. border-crossing experience is a process designed to govern the sexualities of LGBTQ immigrants of color.23 These comprise only a few of an increasing number of examples which are expanding the scope of Queer International Relations and developing relevant methodological tools. These feminist and queer texts demonstrate the usefulness of ethnographic accounts, which look for dispersed power relations within first hand and observational data

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collection. I appreciate that these demonstrate the interconnectedness of the local and the global. These works are further rooted in a self-awareness of the intersectional locations of both the researcher and the research subjects, which contributes to an openly emancipatory effort, which I believe to be integral to my own work.

FIELDWORK PLAN

Beyond researching archival and media data at home, I planned an approach for interviewing queers in Turkey over four months of fieldwork in 2014. Although I was prepared to travel to various sites throughout Turkey to explore how queers are governed, I remained in Istanbul after I had arrived. I was ready to travel to the Kurdish part of Turkey–specifically, the city of Diyarbakir, to gain perspective on the dilemmas facing queer Kurdish persons. I also proposed to go to Ankara, where I would explore various government institutions in more depth. Soon after arriving in Istanbul, however, I realized there was enough to be said about sexual governance there without having to leave the city. Just as in any other country in the world, LGBTQ culture is inordinately articulated in the main population centers, especially sprawling Istanbul.24 Furthermore, budgetary, logistical, and linguistic constraints made the prospect of traveling to these other cities seem too large of a project to undertake: travelling around Turkey on a small grant for PhD students was not feasible. I was not able to make contact with LGBTQ organizations in the East beforehand, but I managed to contact some in Istanbul. Further, I was concerned that my limited Turkish language skills would not be sufficient outside of larger cities in the west of the country, where people were more likely to speak English.

Having established that I would be using the ethnographic tools of archival study, observation, and interviewing to construct a genealogy of queer lives in contemporary Istanbul, I

was also obligated to consider the moral dilemmas I might encounter in pursuing such research. It is required for all researchers from the University of Auckland to undergo an ethics review before conducting human-participant research. In accordance with the guidelines specified by the University of Auckland Human Participants Ethics Committee, I set detailed parameters around my recruitment strategies, conduct during the interviews, and the storage of confidential data.\textsuperscript{25} Being queer and conducting field work abroad has already been addressed by several scholars, as noted above. However, there remains a disparity of opinion on what constitutes ethical queer research.\textsuperscript{26} Liz Goodman proposes that the researchers’ own sexuality is irrelevant to the many other issues that affect a researcher in the field.\textsuperscript{27} Ralph Bolton, on the other hand, says that being openly gay and positively using his sexuality during his research allowed him access he would not have otherwise had, even though whether that access is indeed ethical continues to be debated.\textsuperscript{28} I proposed that my own experience would lie somewhere in the middle of these two extremes. Although homosexuality is not illegal in Turkey, I noted that there would be times it would be necessary to be strategic about revealing my own sexuality. This is not different than a queer person’s daily strategies in a Western, supposedly more accepting environment. As Lewin and Leap explore, the phenomenon of non-normative sexualities being perpetually problematic in numerous social and political ways seems to be a cross-border issue.\textsuperscript{29}

\textsuperscript{25} The University of Auckland Human Participants Ethics Committee approved this project (#010559) on December 13, 2013.

\textsuperscript{26} Joseph Carrier, "Reflections on Ethical Problems Encountered in Field Research on Mexican Male Homosexuality: 1968 to Present," \textit{Culture, Health \& Sexuality} 1, no. 3 (1999), 207-221.


FIELDWORK

My fieldwork plan was met with a number of difficulties in its actual execution. This includes issues surrounding queer research as well as logistical issues in attaining a research visa in Turkey. In the following discussion, I will contrast my preconceptions of fieldwork with what I accomplished in engaging my three-pronged ethnographic approach: the study of archives, interviewing, and participant-observation. There would be some discrepancies which, while not having a particularly negative impact, would nonetheless shape the nature of data acquisition during my three months in Turkey.

I collected archival documents throughout the three months I spent in Istanbul. “Archives” here refers to those physical manifestations of discourses which govern queer lives. I initially proposed that the project be temporally bounded by the establishment of the Turkish Republic in 1923, given 1) the significant role the modern nation state maintains in organizing its citizens’ lives and 2) the populist proposal of including LGBTQ persons in the nation state by means of western-styled identity politics. I had planned to undertake archival research in government institutions, which I postulated contained a wealth of information surrounding the governance of sexuality. I furthermore hypothesized that institutions of public health, civil society, Turkish academia, political parties, and public libraries would provide a wealth of written, statistical, expository, and legal accounts of the state’s governing of non-normative sexualities and other discourses by elites about sexuality. Driven by a poststructural framework, I understood that the state and its institutions are not the only bodies which wield power: instead

30 I planned to conduct research in Istanbul, Ankara, and Diyarbakir, a major Kurdish city in the East. However, the police denied my residence registration, despite having the appropriate research visa, and I was limited to spending three months in Istanbul alone. Although my ethnographic work was limited to Istanbul, my archival research and interviews signified a nomadic queer subjecthood in Turkey extending beyond spatial limitations. In what follows, I demonstrate the smooth space between my interview and archival data and global problems of neoliberal development, ethnic exclusion, gendered and sexualized othering, activist networking, migration, media representation, and militarization.
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acts of power flow from a range of actors—to include queer subjects themselves. Therefore my archival research was to extend into non-profit organizations (including queer rights organizations and international development organizations), the media, religious bodies, and local community organizations. Besides the primary goal of excavating physical primary sources, archival research also was to serve as a means of becoming acquainted with relevant populations and contacts to be studied via further ethnographic methods.

I explored documents in the form of: personal documents; official state documents; official private documents; mass-media outputs; and virtual outputs. By personal documents, I considered the possibility of informants’ interviews, auto-biographical information, and even artworks. Official state documents included official ministerial reports, acts of government, and official government press releases. Documents from private sources comprised institutional research from non-governmental organizations, annual reports, mission statements, newsletters, meeting minutes, and internal and external correspondences. Mass-media outputs included newspapers, magazines, television programs, and films. Finally, virtual outputs included websites, internet forums, social media, and other virtual-based content. I concluded that these documents would be illustrative of the circulations that enable the governing of queer bodies—especially in conjunction with the other ethnographic inquiries. These documents represented the physical manifestation of norms, definitions, and images of queer lives.

By the end of my time abroad, I was able to secure a range of documents to analyze. However, the process was at times circuitous and sometimes exasperating. I found that I would not be allowed into certain government libraries without being a citizen or holding the correct residency permit. I had a temporary research permit, instead. Non-profit and international organizations that I had been in contact with before departing fell out of touch after I arrived. My
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pleas to connect with government institutions and public health bodies fell on deaf ears. Finally, my trips to several local university libraries were met with futile attempts to locate relevant literature.

Fortunately, the LGBTQ organizations (Lambda Istanbul, Hevi, Istanbul LGBTI Pride Week, and LGBTI News Turkey) that I did access provided me with access to a wealth of pamphlets, mission statements, articles, campaign posters, reports on LGBTQ issues, and meeting flyers—among other documents. They also hosted mission statements, press releases, news, event information, and social media online for me to explore. And although my ventures into traditional library archives were only moderately successful, local bookshops (Pandora Kitabevi and Mephisto Kitabevi) were useful resources for locating several books and edited volumes on LGBTQ issues. I did not anticipate the wealth of relevant academic and popular journals, newsletters, magazines, chapbooks, political satire cartoons, and zines that would fill these bookstores, and I incorporated a selection of these publications into my data pool; for example, KAOS GL magazine, which is a LGBTQ news outlet out of Ankara.31 Although I initially collected almost every newspaper that might seem even only tangentially relevant, I realized this was not a reasonable academic approach. I therefore limited myself to locating information in newspapers that I could triangulate with my interviewees. The shift from print news to online news simplified this process, as the major Turkish newspapers have accessible digitized archives (even though some newspapers were later blocked by the government).32 I also found a number of historical legal cases concerning LGBTQ individuals in Turkey, published by Lambda Istanbul.

In preparing for my research, I considered the notion that social media would be an important repository of information, but I underestimated the degree to which various platforms would establish and disseminate queer discourses. I met several prominent bloggers whose websites served as primary points of inquiry into up-to-date LGBTQ news in English. I joined a few relevant groups on Facebook, which were created to keep people informed of demonstrations, rallies, spaces to avoid, seminars, and parties in Istanbul. Many groups held no “real life” presence and conducted no “real-world” business, but hosted intense debate within the online queer community. Facebook, Youtube, and Twitter also connected people in far-flung areas of Turkey with like-minded individuals, creating virtual spaces for queers across the political spectrum. They also presented an opportunity to criticize the government with satire, parody, and the dissemination of leaked documents. These ultimately led to the government’s complete blocking of YouTube and Twitter during much of my time there. I also suspected that LGBTQ dating/hookup applications, such as Grindr (for gay men) and Brenda (for lesbians), would be popular tools for connecting with other people in Turkey. While not specifically created for the purpose of political organizing, I found that queers were more than willing to engage in conversation via these platforms about rights and activism without even being prompted.

About half of my archival findings are in English, while half are in Turkish and most of my interviewees were comfortable speaking English. In preparation for my fieldwork, I had been studying Turkish for nearly a year under private tuition. I continued my studies while in Istanbul by enrolling in Turkish-language intensives at a local language institute. By the time I left

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33 LGBTI News Turkey, “About,” LGBTI News Turkey, August 7, 2013, https://lgbtinewsturkey.com/about/.
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Turkey I had attained a conversational-level competency. However, I was less confident in my ability to translate local jargon and academic texts. I have therefore supplemented my language proficiency by enlisting the help of my tutor and friends that I had met in Turkey in ongoing, informal assistance.

In my preparations for the interviewing phase of my data-collection, I anticipated that the majority of my target population would be able to speak English and that my language skills would not be sufficient to conduct them in Turkish. While I could have enlisted the help of a translator, I decided not to for concerns regarding privacy and funding restraints. I created a schedule of open-ended questions, approved by the University of Auckland Human Participants Ethics Committee, designed to prompt my participants to talk about whatever it is they thought was important, rather than me guiding them too far into specific issues. I planned to conduct separate rounds of interviews. In the first round, I would address a broad range of topics. After conducting a number of these more open-ended interviews, I would arrange the responses thematically to understand which issues were most prominent. I would then conduct a second round of interviews to delve deeper into the specifics of these identified themes.

My recruitment process was shaped by my ethical considerations. I created a participant information sheet to make sure participants understood my research and its boundaries. This complemented a confidentiality form, which would act as an agreement that made their rights explicit and outlined my data storage procedure. However, I also developed an oral participant information and confidentiality agreement process in the event that participants were uncomfortable signing paper documents, which is what I ended up depending upon. I believe it placing a participant information sheet and consent form in front of my first two participants disconcerted them, which resulted in their request to not participate. After discussing the issue
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with some people from a non-profit organization, I learned that it was culturally inappropriate to make people sign their signature on consent forms, especially in Turkey’s climate of curbed press freedoms and homosexuality/transsexualism being taboo. I therefore opted to continue using my pre-established oral consent procedure, which ensured participants were aware of the nature of the research, their rights, and how I would be storing data (securely and without identifying information).

The recruitment process itself was more or less the same as predicted. I approached leading volunteers, activists, and academics across organizations and asked them if they would pass on my information to people who might be interested in an interview. After attending several meetings and connecting with various individuals, I also had some people approach me unprompted and request to be interviewed. I hesitate to identify any particular data about the demographics I reached, as I did not specifically ask people to identify their sexual orientation because I thought it would be unnecessarily normative and colored by my own Western preconceptions of sexual identity. However, a number of people I talked to simply self-identified as lesbians, bisexuals, and trans individuals. Perhaps my most significant barrier was in branching outside of the middle class category. I blame my lack of language skills, non-familiarity with the city, limited time, and dependence on activist organizations as my point of departure in not being able to move beyond this socio-economic box. It is likely the case that poorer LGBTQ individuals have more to lose in coming out of the closet –especially in terms of family ties and job stability, which is why it was more challenging to recruit them.

I planned recruitment simply by networking through contacts, but I was surprised at how useful it was meeting people through LBGTQ social/dating applications for smartphones, including Grindr and its clones (as Grindr itself is banned in Turkey). I predicted it would give
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me insight into how queers negotiated virtual space, including the imagery and discourses they tapped into to navigate their sexualities (as queer people do in many other places in the world). Given their wide adoption by a range of queer people (Grindr alone had over 125,000 active monthly users at the time it was banned in 2013), it seemed almost essential that I explore them as another kind of institution produced by and for queers, with particular ramifications for understanding queer bodies. While initially I had planned to use these dating apps for informal observation, a number of people took interest in my profiles and were keen on expressing their stories to an outside researcher. I credit recruitment through dating applications for providing me with a more diverse body of participants than I otherwise would have enrolled. Utilizing dating applications, I met with Kurds, students, people who worked in retail and banks, conservatives, and people inhabiting a complexity of other categories.

This being my first time conducting interviews for academic research, I planned about 7 questions to ask each participant. These were broad, open-ended questions like “What are the major issues facing Turkish queer people?” and “What do you think of religion?” However, some of my initial participants seemed uncomfortable about the impersonal approach of asking a question, receiving an answer, and moving on to the next subject. I therefore tried to strike a better balance by being more conversational. Instead of cycling through a list of questions, I listened intently to the participants’ answers and tried to shape the interview around what the participants wanted to discuss. I therefore collected a somewhat motley set of interviews of different length on distinct subjects, but in exchange, I received detailed insight into discourses that otherwise would have been concealed and a diversity of opinions.

Accomplishing a number of successful interviews could be contrasted with the lack of data I gathered through participant observation. I planned to remain faithful to the participant-observation techniques defined in a number of anthropological textbooks.\textsuperscript{36} These ethnographic research textbooks proposed similar approaches to data collection, organized primarily around the relaying of objective and subjective thoughts into written field-notes. Following the structure established by LeCompte and Schensul, I planned on observing along the lines of four separate categories: settings, events, numeration, and difference.\textsuperscript{37} By “settings,” I would describe physical spaces where queer persons met and how they negotiated those spaces. “Events,” would entail explaining LGBTQ workshops or social events, were to be observed in terms of who attended, where events take place, and the purpose of the event. Observation would also demand consistent number-taking, identifying ages, genders, ethnicities, and other demographic information and numeration. Finally, “difference” between individuals would be a consistent point of observation, wherein divergences in dress, performativity, leisure activities, language, residence, and materiality were to be noted.

Before I left for fieldwork, I confirmed an internship placement at an LGBTQ-media organization in Istanbul. We agreed that I would use the organization as my preliminary point of inquiry for my participant-observation in exchange for some editing of their English-language media. I was unfortunately not able to connect with the media organization when I arrived in Istanbul. As they failed to respond to my emails, I instead decided to invest more time into my own independent networking. The benefit of being forced to locate contacts on my own was that I didn’t depend on one single group of people for my sample. But when it came to reviewing the


\textsuperscript{37} Margaret D. LeCompte and Jean J. Schensul, \textit{Designing and Conducting Ethnographic Research} (Walnut Creek, Calif: AltaMira Press, 1999), 97–115.
daily observational remarks I would transcribe into my notebook, I decided remarking upon people’s clothing styles, hair colors, and bodily postures was not producing the kind of political data that made sense for my theoretical framework. While I also anticipated photography might be a useful and interesting tool for building an ethnography, I could not produce any justification for taking photographs of people. The effort put into meticulously collecting observational data did not align with the desired outcome, so I devoted more time to the archival and interview elements instead.

Beyond my declared research methods, other dilemmas and urgencies arose in the field that would shape my data collection and, ultimately, thesis. Some were simply logistical challenges: finding an apartment, the labyrinthine process of opening a bank account, adjusting to the foreignness of Turkish culture, my electricity and internet randomly blacking out, health concerns, and so forth. However, others constituted more serious issues. First, my fieldwork took place in a post-Gezi Park atmosphere: protests and demonstrations of different sorts occurred with regularity across Istanbul through the eve of local elections in 2014. Although I received almost daily email notices from my embassy warning me away from public spaces, it was impossible to avoid massive crowds and the resulting tear gas on several occasions. While I took all possible measures to minimize any personal risks, the protesting had a significant impact on my data acquisition and the nature of what activists were concerned about—everyone I spoke to focused in part on Gezi and the upcoming elections. I believe it also made it a somewhat more challenging environment to recruit participants; at least one LGBTQ organization had declared itself on hiatus because all of its members were busy with election-oriented activism. It also

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meant interviews would sometimes be impromptu or simply cancelled, as protests, rallies, and activist events sprung up at a moment’s notice.

Coupled with an intense police presence and the blockading of various public spaces, participating in an interview to discuss the government and social taboos may have been an unattractive proposition; I believe this is why a small number of people failed to turn up to scheduled interviews. In conjunction with the restrictions placed on protest in the urban environment came government mandated censorship of certain blogs, websites, and social media—including YouTube and Twitter.\(^{39}\) This occurred after a number of phone recordings were leaked on YouTube implicating the Prime Minister and his circle in a widespread corruption scandal.\(^{40}\) In terms of how this affected my research, my participants were all too willing to show me how to circumvent the censorship using VPN and proxy-servers. Once I circumvented the virtual blockade, I found the illicit circulations to be a primary site of discursive exchange amongst my population of inquiry. Many queer people depend on their connections online to compensate for their marginalization in daily life.\(^{41}\) The increased censorship of internet outlets contributed to mounting outrage within the queer community contributed to bustling online fora concerning the nature of Turkish democracy, freedom of speech, and general criticism of the government.\(^{42}\) The opposite is also true: hate groups also found their own echo-chambers within

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\(^{39}\) Scott, “Turkey’s YouTube and Twitter Bans Show a Government in Serious Trouble.”


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nationalistic and religiously inspired Facebook groups and the comment sections of state-owned news media.43

My inability to acquire a residence permit would be the final dilemma that shaped my research experience. Although I had the appropriate research visa, my status as a visiting researcher was not well-received by the police bureaucrats who were charged with granting residence permits. Without one of these permits, I would only be able to remain in Turkey for three months, which is three months less than I originally planned. After numerous trips to various police stations and the enlisting of various individuals’ assistance, I eventually decided to forego the effort of it all and instead focus on gathering the data that I could in the amount of time left. This meant I would not have the time to travel to the eastern side of Turkey to conduct interviews there. However, it allowed me to focus on Istanbul in more depth, the primary locus of LGBTQ politics in Turkey. I still managed to collect archival sources on the internet regarding LGBTQ life in the Kurdish areas by interviewing Istanbul-based Kurds.

Genealogy, Governmentality, and Assemblage Thinking

My time in Istanbul bore the fruit of a dataset including some twenty interviews with unique individuals, hundreds of snippets from blogs and social media, academic literature, news items, magazines, and (limited) observational remarks. In reviewing the data and structuring my thesis, I decided to group my data for analysis thematically in terms of the assemblage referred to again and again by my informants. I started by looking at the construction of sexuality genealogically to understand where norms and common-sense thinking about sexuality comes from in Turkey. I then thought more specifically about queer identity in the present day as an assemblage of heterogeneous parts. I found that the participants were also eager to discuss the

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problem of trans rights and the Gezi Park protests in particular, which were and continue to be pressing queer issues shaping local and global understandings of sexuality.

My theoretical and methodological approaches are, as Walters argues, a combination of evolving analytical concepts and research tools emphasizing experimentation rather than adherence to a closed theoretical system.\(^{44}\) Instead, the theory I have developed emerges from my data, and the data is informed by the theory. In trying to understand the governmentality of the contemporary Turkish state, I begin with a genealogical investigation into the discourses and acts of sexual identity construction from the founding of Turkey. In applying governmentality thinking to history-writing, I show how today’s homophobic state descends from a conflictual genealogy, where hegemonic masculinity and heteronormativities are consolidated over time. In this and later chapters, the archival and interview data I have amassed helps me understand how today’s Turkish governmentality functions. I depend upon Dean’s four components of an analytics of government here: how does my data show Turkish governmentality’s 1) ways of seeing; 2) truth-production; 3) technical apparatuses and definite assemblages; and 4) definitions of the people it governs?\(^{45}\) How do turning points in the past show breaks or consolidations within these four categories, destabilizing essential ideas about the state’s power? After establishing a genealogy of Turkish governmentality, I show how it operates today in the technical assemblage of queer identity in the next chapter. Foucault used the idea of the apparatus, or, assemblage, to emphasize a relationship between disparate elements because of an urgent politicized need, like the prison apparatus.\(^{46}\) how does the data I have explain queers as 1) heterogeneous constructs, 2) immanently unique, and 3) (genealogically) contingent? I consider the ways my interviewees see themselves as defined by the state, the family, the military, as well

\(^{44}\) Walters, *Governmentality: Critical Encounters*, 111.
\(^{45}\) Dean, *Governmentality: Power and Rule in Modern Society*, 33.
\(^{46}\) Foucault, “The Confession of the Flesh,” 194–228.
as their own relationships and political actions. Being queer is also somehow simultaneously a lived, material, resistant, changing, contradictory, and undefinable thing. I attempt to explore how trans is also a kind of unique assemblage in this regard in the following chapter. Then, in my last substantive chapter on the participation of queer activists at Gezi Park, I explore how the queer-as-assemblage is constructed by many top-down political manipulations, but that these processes governing queers are untenable, producing resistance as much as they produce marginal subjects. Finally, I conclude the thesis with a brief autoethnographic exploration of my fieldwork in an attempt to further understand governmentality and assemblage thinking.
Chapter Three

Turkish Governmentality: A Genealogy of Heteropatriarchal-Nationalism

In this chapter, I explore the genealogy of Turkish governmentality. I explore a genealogy that continuously produces a heteronormative, nationalist identity that disciplines unfitting subjects. I explore the formation of this governmentality in the context of the birth and development of the Turkish nation state. Turkish governmentality, I will show, can be scrutinized along the lines of Dean’s analytics of government (understanding how governance depends upon visibilities, technologies, populations, and knowledge-productions). I argue that this governmentality in its current manifestation is heteropatriarchal, enforcing compulsory heterosexuality in contrast to a distinctive concept of an “other,” queer identity. There is not an essential body that precedes relations with the state and other socialities. Rather, bodies are unknowable outside of these processes. Such a hierarchal organization of the heterosexual/queer binary may correlate to other academic work in Queer International Relations, which seeks to understand how states, local, and transnational entities work together to materialize heterosexuality as normal in empirically visible acts and discourses.

By looking backwards in time at specific key moments of the creation of Turkish governmentality, we can see that this is not an inevitable state of affairs. In witnessing the genealogical evolution of the heteropatriarchal-national governmentality of the Turkish state, and

1 Dean, Governmentality: Power and Rule in Modern Society, 33.
4 Wilcox, Bodies of Violence, 26; Berlant and Warner, “Sex in Public,” 553.
by highlighting specific points of change, resistance, and fluctuation, I show that these encounters between social entities, institutions, and Turkish citizens normalize a certain kind of heteronormativity, but that this governmentality is contingent and historical demonstrates that what is taken for granted is not the only possibility for sexual belonging.

In this chapter, I present a genealogy of how heteronormativity became an organizing principal in the establishment of Turkey, its institutions, international relations, and cultural milieu. I locate the roots of this governmentality in the context of the founding of the Republic of Turkey in 1923. From there, I demonstrate how particular events, productions, and relationships through to the current day have normalized heteropatriarchal discourses, visibilities, knowledges, and technologies within Turkish institutions. It is key to understand that the state is not the sole institution involved in producing heteronormative citizenship. While the genealogy of heteronormativity is tied to the state’s nation-building project, I argue that media, family, religion, education, medicine, law, people, places, things, and other institutions come together in specific productions, material and discursive, which exclude non-normative sexual identities.

I start by establishing the queer theoretical framework for this discussion as defined by V. Spike Peterson’s treatise on national identity-making.\(^5\) Peterson defines ways the governmentality of a state rests upon certain patriarchal and heterosexual productions. I locate these productions in key events throughout Turkish history, using the genealogical approach developed by Foucault and formalized by William Walters.\(^6\) I have divided the chapter into understanding the First Republic, Second Republic, and Third Republic. These divisions are convenient because they signal the adoption of new constitutions and new conceptions of Turkish sovereignty. However they also represent changing institutional relationships between

\(^5\) Peterson, “Sexing Political Identities/Nationalism as Heterosexism.”
state and other institutions, bodies, and objects. The heteropatriarchal-nationalist governmentality operates by deploying techniques of governance meant to shape citizens as both heterosexual and nationalistic, as well as establishing a large space for dissidents to be made invisible or disciplined as queer others. By analyzing the transformation of this governmentality over time, I demonstrate that this entails different forms of policing bodies and truth-telling, yet that these also generate resistance to the preferred modalities of sexual citizenship.

**APPROACH**

I will be using Peterson’s analysis of the sexual dynamics of nationalism and state-making to argue that Turkish governmentality has refined its power to exclude queer lives. Peterson argues that heteronormativity defines modern nationalism and state-building processes in five overlapping ways: women’s roles as biological reproducers are defined; states become concerned with “correct” social reproduction in the familial unit; nations are symbolically gendered as well as sexualized; women are equated with the nation and are pressured to behave in conformity with national ideals; the fusing of nationalism, militarism, and heterosexual masculinism; and the denial of homosexual bonding. In the genealogy that follows, I attempt to identify some of these processes in the formation of the Turkish state and its institutions, focusing on how these heteronormative nation-building processes have become essential to a governmentality that marginalizes queer subjects.

Many of Peterson’s analyses of sex-making and state-making processes all take as their point of departure certain normative expectations for women in particular. However, the control of women’s sexuality necessarily entails norm-making about the sexuality of men as well,

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8 Peterson, “Sexing Political Identities/Nationalism as Heterosexism,” 44.
coalescing heterosexual standards which demand conformities affecting all of us.⁹ Therefore, by looking at the control of women’s sexuality, much can be said about how the state tolerates queer others. Peterson refers to these oppressive normative acts as “heteropatriarchy,” which refers “…to sex/gender systems that naturalize masculinist domination and institutionalize/normalize heterosexual family forms and corollary heterosexist identities and practices.”¹⁰ Angela Harris’ elaboration on this definition is useful as well.¹¹ She identifies five interlinked notions expressed in the idea of heteropatriarchy: 1) the assumption that all are born and remain male or female; 2) that sex determines gender and behavior; 3) that men and women are well-defined in appearance, character, interest, and innate ability; 4) that it is natural that sex occurs between men and women and reproduction; and 5) that masculine characteristics are superior to feminine ones. Heteropatriarchy therefore refers to heterosexual male dominance of both women and the subjugation of femininity more broadly defined to include the identification and oppression of femininity in men (queer or otherwise), trans, intersex, and non-binary persons. As Gayle Rubin writes, “The suppression of the homosexual component of human sexuality, and by corollary, the oppression of homosexuals, is…a product of the same system whose rules and relations oppress women.”¹² In understanding state-making as inherently patriarchal, we can look for the ways that heteronormativity contributes to producing in-group citizenship (that privileges heterosexual men).¹³ We can also identify how the state produces adversarial others in discourses of masculinist dominance.

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⁹ Ibid., 43–44.
¹⁰ Ibid., 57.
¹³ Peterson, “The Intended and Unintended Queering of States/Nations,” 64.
The first way of state making is “sex making,” Peterson argues, is through the propagation of discourses of biological reproduction.\textsuperscript{14} This entails the formalization of knowledge and employment of practices which regulate women as child-bearers. Nationalism is tied to procreation and the disavowal of non-reproductive sex. Women-as-mothers are spotlighted, while other familial formations are occluded from the nation building project. I am reminded of a similar critique of the political obsession with biological reproduction in the work of queer theorist Lee Edelman.\textsuperscript{15} He argues for a queer destabilization of "reproductive futurism," defined as the dependence of the political on the pure image of the next generation.\textsuperscript{16} As he argues, “That figural Child alone embodies the citizen as an ideal, entitled to claim full rights to its future share in the nation’s good, though always at the cost of limiting the rights ‘real’ citizens are allowed.”\textsuperscript{17} Biological reproduction, he argues, is an attempt to secure an idealized identity in the whole image of the child-to-come, yet the queer, fragmented and anti-identitarian disavows the “fascisms” permitted in order to secure this future.\textsuperscript{18}

Second for Peterson is social reproduction, which refers to the maintenance of acceptable citizenship via legislative means, sexual norms, and enforcing religious dogma.\textsuperscript{19} Legislation regarding the family, including marriage, child custody, property, immigration rights, and domestic violence, all maintain the heteropatriarchal-nationalist citizen. This includes the ways women are stereotyped as guardians of culture in a society and tasked with child-rearing and other forms of gendered labor that devalue women’s work. The ties between social reproduction and nation also entail producing certain forms of acceptable public homosocialities amongst men.

\textsuperscript{14} Peterson, “Sexing Political Identities/Nationalism as Heterosexism,” 44.
\textsuperscript{16} Ibid., 2–3.
\textsuperscript{17} Ibid., 11.
\textsuperscript{18} Ibid., 1–32.
\textsuperscript{19} Peterson, “Sexing Political Identities/Nationalism as Heterosexism,” 45.
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(here, in the state and military) in contrast to unacceptable homosexualities in private.\textsuperscript{20} Parallels can be drawn between Peterson’s accounts of the way nation-building leans on women’s social reproductions and Sedgwick’s identification of the heterosexual family as a site of overlapping social meanings bound up in state and capitalist ideologies.\textsuperscript{21} For Sedgwick, the family is an expansive social space, entailing not only “a surname” but also

\ldots a legal unit based on state-regulated marriage\ldots an economic unit of earning and taxation\ldots the prime site of cultural consumption\ldots a mechanism to produce, care for, and acculturate children\ldots a mechanism for accumulating material goods over several generations\ldots a site of patriotic formation\ldots

Sedgwick’s disaggregation of heteronormative sociality is useful here, showing us some of the ways that heterosexuality is a social production that is maintained by our relationships to the state.\textsuperscript{23}

Third, women become symbolic of the nation, including, “Shared images, symbols, rituals, myths, and a ‘mother tongue’…”\textsuperscript{24} This is central to figurations of women/nation needing protection from outsiders. These metaphors are therefore sexualized, entailing discourses about national purity and foreign penetration. Such a sexual symbolic order normalizes the disavowal of women as political agents, and empowers male-made agendas. Peterson provides the example of rape as a metaphor for state humiliation: “To engender support for its war on Iraq, the United States made frequent reference to the ‘rape of Kuwait.’”\textsuperscript{25} This kind of knowledge-production compels men to perform a certain role as protectors of women and women to perform a role as victims. As Weber argues, the construction of queerness and/or effeminacies is part of modern

\textsuperscript{20} Ibid., 43.
\textsuperscript{22} Ibid., 7.
\textsuperscript{23} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{24} Peterson, “Sexing Political Identities/Nationalism as Heterosexism,” 48.
\textsuperscript{25} Ibid.
statecraft. Discourses of sexualized perversion materialize the body of the other in juxtaposition to the production of rationality, modernity, and security of the paternalistic state.26

Fourth, women are also agents of heteropatriarchal productions and events.27 As Peterson says, women are rarely only ever victims, especially in participating in military action in supporting roles. Women also appear in the public sphere, but contribute to the reproduction of hierarchies as the price of entry.28 Relatedly, men comply with homophobic institutions like the military in order to guarantee a more socially permissible manhood. This develops into Peterson’s final point, which shows how people who are disadvantaged in one group may contribute to the production of heteronormative nationalism that marginalizes other groups: “…allegiance to particular causes may complement, coexist with, or contradict allegiance to other group objectives. How and to what extent feminist and nationalist projects converge depends on contextual specifics.”29 The ways that women and queer people maintain hierarchies that disadvantage other women and queer people (especially those of other class and racial groups) reflects an ongoing discussion in queer theory, which not only refers to the term “homonormativity” to describe the elision of state and LGBTQ goals, but also the lack of attention to racialized queer bodies within the discipline.30

Genealogy is the methodology by which I come to understand how the hetero-patriarchal-nationalist governmentality has become a stabilized, observable entity, which produces certain kinds of bodies while expelling others. The strength of genealogy lies in its capacity to root out problematic assumptions about the seemingly naturalness of these social relations. For example,

27 Peterson, “Sexing Political Identities/Nationalism as Heterosexism,” 50.
28 Ibid., 51.
29 Ibid., 53.
30 Johnson, “‘Quare’ studies, or (Almost) Everything I Know about Queer Studies I Learned from My Grandmother.”
Kancı and Altınay argue that nationalist myths of Turkey as an inherently militaristic nation comes from the public education curriculum in the late 1920s and early 1930s, wherein textbooks argue that Turks are the best soldiers because of the their culture, or that Turkey was a “soldier nation by birth.”\footnote{Tuba Kancı and Ayse Gül Altınay, “Educating Little Soldiers and Little Ayşes: Militarised and Gendered Citizenship in Turkish Textbooks,” in Education in Multicultural Societies--Swedish and Turkish Perspectives, ed. Marie Carlson, Annika Rabo, and Fatma Gök (London: I.B. Tauris, 2007), 54–55.} This is but one part of the modernist social engineering processes which would be referred to as “Kemalism” under Atatürk.\footnote{Soner Çağaptay, “Reconfiguring the Turkish Nation in the 1930s,” Nationalism and Ethnic Politics 8, no. 2 (2002): 67–82.} Turkish nationalist historiography (including the history-writing of Atatürk himself) during the early Republican era envisioned the state as ethnically homogenous, lauded the role of secular elites in creating the new state, and “…emblemish history by selectively employing only those historical events that portrayed the excluded minorities in a negative light, thereby impregnating them with vice.”\footnote{Fatma Muge Gocek, “Defining the Parameters of a Post-Nationalist Turkish Historiography through the Case of the Anatolian Armenians ,” in Turkey Beyond Nationalism: Towards Post-Nationalist Identities, ed. Hans-Lukas Kieser (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), 85-103.; Ayşe Gül Altınay, The Myth of the Military Nation: Militarism, Gender, and Education in Turkey (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), 13-32.} We can see how this informs the present, for example, as President Erdoğan continuously refers to a “black Turks” against “white Turks” divide in his country, wherein the former are the supposedly pious, common people defending themselves against a secular, decadent, Western elite.\footnote{Michael Ferguson, “White Turks, Black Turks and Negroes,” in The Making of a Protest Movement in Turkey: #occupygezi, ed. Umut Ozkirimli (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014).} The effect of this kind of Kemalist nationalist myth-making offers a masculinist, militarized version of citizenship that would privilege heteropatriarchal action and discourse.

In this chapter, the emergence of a heteropatriarchal-nationalist governmentality will be shown to be not simply the natural progression of history or an essential cultural aspect of Turkey. Rather, genealogy will be employed to show how these productions emerged against competing historical narratives to become the self-evident conventions that they appear to be
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today. My reading of Turkish history brings together history-writing, Peterson’s points about state making as state making, and Dean’s analytics of governance. Together, I present a genealogy of Turkish governmentality that depends upon the marginalization of sexuality in the consolidation of the state.

The First Republic: 1923-1960

The establishment of the Republic of Turkey engendered something of an identity crisis in the new state – how was it to be distinguished from the Ottoman Empire that came before? And how would ordinary people negotiate this transformation? The elite leadership of the new Turkey envisioned the country as a modern nation-state, with entirely different territorial borders, modern institutions, secular democratic governance, and a transformed demographic make-up of a Muslim majority.

For the nationalist movement’s leaders to be successful in creating a new nation out of the old, they had to engage in a processes of collective forgetting of the multicultural Ottoman Empire and succeed in creating a homogenous Turkish identity. Renan argues that nationalism is a “daily plebiscite,” or a constant performance, which entails as much forgetting of the past as it does imagining of a common identity. The emerging Turkish governmentality produced the identity of the state and its citizens by means of heteronormative violence against others.

Early Turkish governmentality adopted a program of what Kemalist writer and advisor Munis Tekinalp called “t urkificaiton” (türkleştirme), deploying techniques and knowledge-

36 Hale Yilmaz, Becoming Turkish (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 2013), 1–2.
productions which would both create a new Turkish citizen-identity, while also making minority identities equivalent to dissent.\textsuperscript{39} The problem of “who is a Turk?” would be resolved by bridging together disparate bodies of the state, the citizen, familial custom, developments in media, international relations discourses, economic and scientific knowledge about modernity, and military capabilities, which, in filiation, produced an ideal formation of citizenship. The ideal Turkish citizen, I argue, is not only a socially and materially mediated hodgepodge of racial, religious, nationalistic, and gender norms, but also depends upon the intersection of these categories with heteronormative ideals.

The Republic of Turkey has its formative roots in a military-rooted nationalist movement, which sought to resist the Allies’ partitioning of the Ottoman Empire after its defeat in World War I.\textsuperscript{40} The Ottoman Empire had already suffered significant destabilization in the form of losses of territory and population during the Italian-Ottoman conflict in Libya (1911), the Balkan Wars (1912-1913), and its unsuccessful WWI offensive against Russia (prompting a declaration of war from its allies) in 1914.\textsuperscript{41} Significant demographic changes resulted from these conflicts; beyond the loss of North Africa, the Balkans, and its Arab holdings, three to four million lost their lives in Anatolia in fighting these conflicts.\textsuperscript{42} This is in addition to the 1915 Armenian Genocide, which saw some one million Armenian systematically murdered because Ottoman authorities feared a collaboration between Anatolian Armenians and the Russians would destroy the remnants of the empire.\textsuperscript{43}


After occupying Constantinople (now, Istanbul) in 1918, France and the U.K. further began partitioning the Arab world from the Empire under the terms of the Treaty of Sèvres of 1920. The treaty demanded even more land be ceded to Italy, Greece, and Armenia, but this process was halted by the fight for independence. Unable to depend upon the non-functioning or Ally-complicit political and bureaucratic institutions within the country, the resistance movement against the allies was located squarely within what remained of the armed forces. Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, a military officer in World War I, led the resistance movement through the Turkish War of Independence (1919-1923). At the time, Atatürk was immensely popular for his wartime leadership during Gallipoli and in Eastern Anatolia. Defecting from the Ottoman army in 1919, Atatürk managed to unify army commands and civilian groups throughout the East, gaining the support of top military officials. His movement was further supported by sympathetic bureaucrats in major Western cities, as well as developments in newspaper circulations and grassroots civilian rallies. By December of 1919, Atatürk presided over a budding rival government in Ankara. The next year, the new parliament proclaimed the autonomy of “Turkey” for the first time, and welcomed exiled elites and ministers from Entente-occupied Istanbul to create the Grand National Assembly, which elected Atatürk as president. In response, the Ottoman sultanate attempted to foster dissent by appealing to those segments of society that would be challenged by the project of Turkish modernism, including Circassian

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45 Ibid., 536.
46 Ibid., 540–42.
47 Findley, Turkey, Islam, Nationalism, and Modernity, 222.
48 Ibid., 223.
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migrants and certain Kurdish tribes, yet was unsuccessful in mounting any significant opposition to Ankara.⁴⁹

Atatürk was not only an effective military leader, but also an apt politician. Weary of further conflict, Atatürk successfully brokered various agreements with individual Entente forces to the effect of only having to fight against the Greeks and Armenians rather than the all of the Allies combined.⁵⁰ The Turks defeated the Armenians in 1920 and began winning victories against the Greeks in early 1921. In late 1922, Atatürk himself led a crucial military campaign to retake Izmir, resulting in the burning of the Greek and Armenian quarters and the displacement of over two-hundred thousand people from the city.⁵¹ For his victory, the Grand National Assembly gave him the title “Halaskar Gazi,” or “Deliverer and Defender of the Faith.” By this time, Atatürk was famous throughout the Islamic world for resisting Western imperialism and winning a battle to establish a modern Islamic state.⁵² By 1923, the Grand National Assembly was recognized as the government of the new Republic of Turkey at the signing of the Treaty of Lausanne in 1923. Atatürk and his followers (called “Kemalists,” after the leader of the movement) would govern the attenuated nation under a single-party dictatorship from 1923 through 1950. The highly militaristic transition from empire to republic dominated the politics of the First Republic, especially in regards to the establishment of new norms of belonging and citizenship.⁵³

A primary concern for the founders of the new nation would be figuring out exactly what it meant to be a member of it. During the single-party period, the republican slogan “one

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⁵¹ Findley, Turkey, Islam, Nationalism, and Modernity, 223.
⁵² Hânioğlu, Atatürk, 89.
language, one culture, one ideal” typified embeddedness of nationalistic discourses and policymaking within the state’s agenda.\(^5^4\) Part of the reason for this was because of the significant demographic and territorial exchanges that occurred with the loss of the Ottoman Empire. Until 1912, the Ottoman Empire was an expansive multicultural society, including Muslims of varied ethnic backgrounds and a Christian population of almost 20\%.\(^5^5\) By 1927, after the genocide of the Armenian population and expulsion of Greeks, that number plummeted to 2\%. At the same time, population transfers between the Balkans, the Caucasus, and the Anatolian Heartland saw an enormous influx of multi-ethnic Muslims. The nationalist movement decided to employ the idea of the Turk, previously a pejorative term for Anatolian peasants, as an umbrella term to describe all people living within the boundaries of the new republic to disparate political interests, ethnic groups, sectarian divisions, class divides, and tribes. In practice, the state’s governmentality distinguished a hierarchy of proper Turkishness, which privileged Muslim ethnic Turks over non-Turkish Muslims and actively segregated non-Muslims.\(^5^6\)

The Atatürk government can be described using the analytic tools provided by Dean: they sought to establish “Turkish” as a unifying identity (rather than, for example, Islam); they used policymaking, discourse, and education as techniques of; they created truths about Turkey and its people based on Western “scientism;”\(^5^7\) and they continued a process begun during the independence struggle of making marginal populations (like the Jews and Armenians) even more marginal. An early challenge to Atatürk’s state-making project came from religious scholars, like the Islamist journalist and lawyer Eşref Edip, who argued for a government beholden to a


\(^{56}\) İnce, Citizenship and Identity in Turkey, 40.

\(^{57}\) Hanoğlu, Atatürk, 89.
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supreme caliph (at the time, Abdülmeid II remained responsible for all religious and legislative affairs (which he considered inseparable).\(^{58}\) Atatürk pronounced that the assembly was beholden only to “the nation,” but he also employed Justice Minister Çelebizade Mehmed Seyyid, who used classical jurisprudence to deny the authority of the caliphate and recommended its abolition. Soon after, local newspapers reported a critical letter written to the Turkish Prime Minister, wherein the Aga Khan III and other religious leaders proclaimed the need for the caliph – spiritual leader of the Sunni world – to remain as powerful as the Catholic Pope. In response, Prime Minister İnönü called the religious leaders agents of British imperialism, the editors of the newspapers who published the letter were arrested, and Atatürk began the process of abolishing the caliphate. Atatürk again instructed Seyyid to defend the move from a position of Islamic jurisprudence. By March of 1924, the assembly voted to abolish the caliph and established the Directorate of Religious Affairs, an institution that would allow the state the final say in all interpretations of Islam, Quaranic education, religious appointments, and weekly sermons, and it is still the only lawful steward of Sunni Islam in Turkey today.\(^{59}\) At the time, the Kemalists viewed Islam as a kind of necessary evil confined to the private sphere, rather than a vehicle for furthering Turkish government control.\(^{60}\) This reflected a governmentality of making as invisible as possible any threats to the state’s nationalist, rationalist truth-telling, officially calling this technique of governance “laiklik,” or, laicism.\(^{61}\) The move to abolish the caliph not only helped removed what could potentially have been a source of international interference in Turkish

\(^{58}\) Ibid., 99.

\(^{59}\) Ibid., 100.


affairs; it ended the Indian khalifat movement, which was a series of massive non-cooperation protests designed to pressure the British government to protect the caliphate.\textsuperscript{62}

Atatürk’s speech (called the “Nutuk” in Turkish) at the 1927 Republican People’s Party Congress would be one of the first public proclamations in the Republic that served to consolidate the character of the nation and its citizens. This, and Atatürk’s other similarly-themed speeches across the country, established a precedent for the state’s use of public discourse to produce an image of proper citizenship. Atatürk’s 36 hour speech took 6 days for him to orate.\textsuperscript{63} It contained his understanding of the history of the founding of Turkey, starting with the national resistance struggle in the final years of the Ottoman Period to the creation of the one-party state and its future. One of the first points of his speech was to legitimize his war, proclaiming the highest duty of protecting the homeland. This discourse of “Independence or Death!” and that the entire nation was “united” is part of the Kemalist rationality (or, mentality) of constructing truths about the Turkish people.\textsuperscript{64} This mentality obscures the genocide, population transfers, and the marginalization of dissenters, like Armenians, Jews, and Islamists in order to construct a more homogenous Turkish citizen identity.

This discourse also fashions Turkey as a military nation, urging the audience to “forever protect and defend Turkish independence.”\textsuperscript{65} Atatürk’s censorship laws made it difficult for any political opponent to challenge the history Atatürk presented, especially from competing military officers from the old Ottoman regime, which he discursively represented as consisting of “depraved creatures” and “cowards” as well as advocates of maintaining the caliphate.\textsuperscript{66} The

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\textsuperscript{63} Zurcher, \textit{Turkey: A Modern History}, 175.
\textsuperscript{65} Ibid., 494.
\textsuperscript{66} Ibid., 496–502.
\end{flushleft}
speech and the censor laws meant to protect Atatürk’s image also constitute techniques of
governing that vindicate his and his People’s Party purging of the opposition Progressive
Republican Party, who were also popular leaders within the independence war.\(^{67}\) Such unfit
leaders are contrasted to the image Atatürk presents of himself as a leader and patriot,
contributing to his elevation as a “father” figure in the Turkish imaginary: “[After defecting] I
continued to do my duty according to the dictates of my conscience…trusting solely to the
benevolence and magnanimity of the nation itself, from whom I drew strength, energy
and inspiration as from an inexhaustible spring.”\(^{68}\) As a speech act, the Nutuk established a
series of truths that would serve to legitimize the state’s many dramatically new technologies of
modernization to come.

The speech itself would shape the entirety of Turkish history-writing until the 1970s,
when academia started to liberalize and historians began to critique the notion of politicians
writing their own histories.\(^{69}\) Until then, the speech was reproduced in textbooks, adapted into
children-friendly versions, and quoted by later politicians and in popular culture.\(^{70}\) In other
words, the government was effective in propagating its nationalist, militaristic mentality as a
uniting force for its new citizenry. Historians would later criticize the considerable license
Atatürk employed in his interpretation of the events leading to the founding of the republic.
These included overstating his role in the resistance movement (it was already six months old by
the time he had arrived in Anatolia).\(^{71}\) More egregious was his assertion that the struggle itself
was all along an attempt to create a new nation. It is rather more likely that militants understood

\(^{67}\) Erik J. Zurcher, *The Young Turk Legacy and Nation Building from the Ottoman Empire to Atatürk’s Turkey*

\(^{68}\) Morin and Lee, “Constitutive Discourse of Turkish Nationalism,” 494.

\(^{69}\) Zurcher, *The Young Turk Legacy and Nation Building from the Ottoman Empire to Atatürk’s Turkey*, 11.

\(^{70}\) Ibid., 10.

\(^{71}\) Ibid., 12.
that they were defending the Ottoman Empire instead of fighting for a new nation: up until and including the year 1921; soldiers were still decorated with Ottoman medals and the Sultan’s birthday was officially celebrated until 1922; and the motivation to free an occupied Ottoman Empire is more likely to have been the motivation for most participants in the independence struggle. Atatürk and his followers chose to fashion a Turkish state, rather than an Ottoman state, to create distance between themselves and the military and political failures faced by the Empire in its final decades, pivoting instead to a rationalist program of “catching-up” to Western modernity under a secularist nation-state. However, Atatürk’s nation state would be paternalistically determined by his one-party rule, wherein political opponents and dissonant identity categories would be regularly oppressed. The governmental rationality of “Turkification” underpinned this new understanding of the nation, entailing myth-making about Turkish history, culture, the further defining of the Turkish people, and the surveillance and disciplining of non-conforming bodies.

The problem of language was of significant import to the Kemalist modernization project. Atatürk was persuaded by a handful of esoteric academic texts that Turkish was the source of all other languages and set upon a process of expanding upon this notion as truth in order to integrate it as a pillar of national pride. In 1932, Atatürk established the Society for Examining the Turkish Language, and held a Congress, which was broadcast live to crowds summoned to town centers. The Congress decided upon a course of action to standardize Turkish, replacing Arabic and Persian loan words with “pure Turkish words,” and debated

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72 Zurcher, The Young Turk Legacy and Nation Building from the Ottoman Empire to Atatürk’s Turkey, 12–14.
73 Ibid., 231–232.
75 Hanioğlu, Atatürk, 113.
76 Ibid., 113–14.
whether it was possible that all languages evolved from Turkish.\textsuperscript{77} In 1935, Atatürk commissioned obscure Viennese scholar Hermann F. Kvergić to publish a text on the so-called “Sun Language Theory,” which receives its name from the notion that the Turks first gave name to the sun and that all language in use today devolves from this first utterance.\textsuperscript{78} This complemented the Turkish Historical Thesis, which proposed that the ancient peoples of Anatolia were highly cultured, becoming less so only after migration into Asia and Europe as they “spread among the less enlightened people.”\textsuperscript{79} These theses would be reproduced alongside Atatürk’s historical account of Turkish independence in school textbooks as part of the new national curriculum.\textsuperscript{80} The government therefore used the Turkish language itself as a technology of control, using it to consolidate ideas about Turkish supremacy and the reality of a timeless Turkish ethno-linguistic group.

Turkification also entailed a government-sponsored program of disciplining those who spoke languages other than Turkish in public (for example, Greek or Ladino).\textsuperscript{81} The 1927 census reported that around two million of Turkey’s fourteen million people spoke a language other than Turkish as their primary language.\textsuperscript{82} The so-called “Citizen, Speak Turkish!” campaign was a government-funded campaign that began in 1928 by students at Istanbul University and entailed erecting signage in public places to compel non-Muslims to speak Turkish only. Using Dean’s language, this constitutes a technology of control that reflects a broader mentality of

\textsuperscript{77} “Those Central Asian worshippers, who wanted to salute the omnipotence of the sun and its life-giving qualities, had done so by transforming their meaningless blabbering into a coherent set of ritual utterings. The sun connection paved the way for the Sun-Language ideologues to imagine and ‘prove’ relationships between Turks and any other ethnic group, which worshipped the sun at some point in history.” İlker Aytürk, “Turkish Linguists Against the West: The Origins of Linguistic Nationalism in Atatürk’s Turkey,” \textit{Middle Eastern Studies} 40, no. 6 (2004): 17.


\textsuperscript{79} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{80} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{81} Senem Aslan, “‘Citizen, Speak Turkish!’: A Nation in the Making,” \textit{Nationalism and Ethnic Politics} 13, no. 2 (May 17, 2007): 245.

\textsuperscript{82} Ibid.
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Turkification by the Turkish government. It is significant that the government did not directly discipline non-Turkish speakers, but that the movement was enacted by law students and activists, who threatened foreigners with violence and are reported to have raided local Jewish businesses. This is part of a shaping of the government’s shaping of the conduct of others, compelling professionals and students to participate in the nation-building project. Media reported a spate of violence and harassment against Jews, Armenians, and foreigners at the time.

Newspapers like the Vakit further contributed to the language policing, arguing in one editorial that young Turks should not allow anyone to speak foreign languages to defend the honor of the soldiers who died during the war for independence. Some participants in the campaign brought lawsuits against religious and ethnic minorities, citing penal code Article 159, which vaguely criminalizes “insulting Turkishness.”

The quest to define Turkish national identity depended upon the formation of new ideas of race and linguistic grouping, which also depended upon the suppression of aforementioned competing cultural subjectivities. Over time, the state’s governmentality would increasingly assert Turkish nationality rather than mere Turkish citizenship: the 1924 constitution referred to the rights of “Turks” rather than citizens; voting during the single-party period was restricted to Muslims; and minorities were marginalized in military roles.

Further, the Law on Settlement restricted immigration and refugee entry of those who did not belong to Turkish culture, and

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84 Aslan, “‘Citizen, Speak Turkish!’” 253–54.
85 Ibid., 254.
87 İnce, Citizenship and Identity in Turkey, 46.
population exchanges throughout the country operated to homogenize Turkey into a Turkish-speaking, Muslim population.\textsuperscript{88}

Beyond myth-making and compelling citizens to conform to Turkish identity, this early Turkish governmentality deployed other kinds of pressures upon minority populations to assimilate into its new identity category or face exclusion. For example, Jewish businessman turned political thinker Munis Tekinalp (who had changed his name from Moiz Kohen) argued that all minorities (especially Jews) must take steps to integrate if they want to receive the benefits of the new constitution.\textsuperscript{89} His “commandments” to the Jewish people reflected republican sentiment about the need to “Turkify,” as an attempt to fill in the blanks where forced assimilation in policy was missing. These included, “Turkify your names,” “Send your children to state schools,” and “Eliminate the [Jewish] community spirit.”\textsuperscript{90} The Jewish people of the early Turkish state felt increased social pressures to assimilate or emigrate through the era of the First Republic as influential writers and publications began launching increasingly anti-Semitic attacks against them—for example in the publication \textit{Ak Baba} (Vulture), which stereotyped Jews as caricatured dissidents and ridiculed Jewish German refugees in the early 1940s.\textsuperscript{91} This reflects a governmentality of a state interested in creating truths about Jews as not-fully-Turkish others. Jews, like Kurds and Armenians, were expelled en-masse from employment in certain industries to make room for Muslims, subject to an arbitrary “Wealth Tax,” and forced to resettle in far-flung regions of Anatolia.\textsuperscript{92} Attacks on Jewish businesses and homes in Thrace, which had at least some local political support and was ignored by the state, saw some 10,000 Jews flee to

\textsuperscript{88} Ibid., 54.
\textsuperscript{89} Bali, “The Politics of Turkification During the Single Party Period,” 44.
\textsuperscript{90} Ibid.
Istanbul and Palestine.\textsuperscript{93} Shaping conduct of local leaders and influential writers to incite violence against others became a technology of governing proper citizens in the early Turkish state.

Central to consolidating the legitimacy of the new nation was the question of women’s place in it. Ziya Gökalp was a sociologist, known for his scholarship on political reform during the final years of the Ottoman Empire. He argued that the nationalist movement could be strengthened by modernization, not in terms of the West, but of a mythical pre-Islamic Turkic past, which was supposedly democratic, egalitarian, and feminist.\textsuperscript{94} His thought found purchase in the Committee of Union and Progress/Young Turk reform movement, where he became a leading ideologue, and influenced Atatürk himself.\textsuperscript{95} Gökalp wrote that ancient Turks were in fact “feminists,” using that term specifically to argue that women held a sacred position in ancient Turkish shamanism, and in that society men and women enjoyed equality under the law: “The ancient Turks were not only the world’s most democratic ethnic group but also its most feminist.”\textsuperscript{96} Gökalp also emphasized that women did not veil themselves, that women and men were equally responsible for the rearing of children, and that there was no polygamy.\textsuperscript{97} Yet his letters offered contradictory notions of such an equality, wherein he also praises a traditional role for women in the raising of children: “[women are] a pillar… founder of this sacred nest…the one who first raised the flag of civilization…”\textsuperscript{98} In his poetry, he also makes clear the necessity of women to function as proper housewives in service to the nation: “It is my duty to defend my

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\textsuperscript{95} Andrew Mango, \textit{Ataturk: The Biography of the Founder of Modern Turkey} (Woodstock, N.Y.: The Overlook Press, 2002), 95–96.
\textsuperscript{97} Doğramacı, “Ziya Gokalp and Women’s Rights,” 214.
\textsuperscript{98} Ibid., 216.
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country/Whenever it is under threat./That done, however,/My duty is to be a housewife.”

To apply Peterson’s thinking here, the instrumental use of women to symbolize the nation “marks the boundaries of (insider) group identity,” wherein modern women represent a modern nation and are susceptible to violence by encroaching other men, justifying the violence of resettlement, for example, in the name of Turkish modernization.

An example comes from Soner Cagaptay’s account on Armenians in Turkey in the 1920s. He recounts an excerpt from a British diplomatic cable about the status of Armenian women in Turkey in 1929:

It is true that there exists a large numbers of Armenian women in Turkish houses in the capacity of servants and concubines, but their Armenian children (who are brought up as Moslems) have become absorbed in the Turkish population, and their existence is not officially admitted. I doubt whether in the whole of Turkey outside of Constantinople there are even 10,000 Armenians living as such.

Many Armenian women were kidnapped and made servants in the aftermath of the Armenian Genocide and the transition to the Turkish Republic. While Turkish women were being given a new kind of modern secular identity, other women were being kept as servants and sex slaves. Suciyan notes that the kidnapping of Armenian girls became such an issue in the Turkish provinces that many could not go to school, spurring Armenians to move to the city or abroad in the decades after independence. The government’s support of the resettlement of minority populations and inability to protect minorities demonstrates a commitment to a certain vision of heterosexual reproduction –Turkish social and biological continuity –at the cost of the expenditure of others.

99 Ibid., 218.
The contradictions embedded within Gökalp’s thought would translate into ambiguities about the proper role for Turkish women in modern Turkish society. Women in the workplace and education for women were, for Gökalp, key to reforming the Ottoman Empire into a successful Turkish state, yet he also praises women’s familial roles as the keystone for Turkish society—and expresses admiration for the chastity of ancient Turkic women. For him, women-in-public symbolizes a return to the greatness of a lost Turkish civilization. Yet women must also perform the contradictory burden of biologically reproducing the nation: “The basic element of this nation, this state, is the family. So long as the woman is imperfect, this life will remain incomplete...” The new nation, therefore demands a new woman: public, unveiled, educated, and in the workplace. At the same time, she must perform heterosexuality and maintain the family as the cornerstone of the Turkish nation.

Atatürk himself repeatedly proclaimed Gökalp’s contradictory location for women as both symbols of modern civilization and reproducers of biological and symbolic Turkishness: “The duty of the Turkish woman is to rear generations that will conserve and safeguard the Turk’s intelligence, strength, and determination. As the source of the nation and the essence of social life, woman is capable of discharging this duty only insofar as she is virtuous.” Informed by a utopian Turkic past and future, Atatürk and his Republican People’s Party (CHP) enacted a series of technologies designed to manage women’s biological and social reproductive roles corresponding to series of social reforms between the late 1920s and early 1930s.

107 Zurcher, Turkey: A Modern History, 189.
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The reforms themselves went far in codifying heteronormative standards of biological and social reproduction at a national level. The reforms included laws prohibiting traditional dress in public, prohibiting polygamy, instituting civil marriage, suffrage for women, the ability for women to be parliamentary representatives, the mandatory surname law, the end of sharia law, universal education for girls, the closure of religious schools, and the language reform and new Latin alphabet. These social reforms contributed to the truth-telling program of a Turkish governmentality invested in producing a modern, secular nation-state, making invisible practices associated with the Ottoman past that were deemed superstitious or backward. For the Kemalist leadership, eliminating all Islamic restrictions from women’s visibility in public eradicated all differences between the West and the Turkish state. Now women and the nation could be considered saved from the superstition of Islam, which was viewed as being partially responsible for the decline of the Ottoman Empire. These reforms complemented the idea of a new, public woman, and public heteronormative expression was endorsed by the state and expected of elites: holding hands, dancing, exercising, going to school, dressing in western clothing, and even participating in beauty pageants were all part of a new series of social pressures placed on women. A piece about the changing place of women in the “Arts and Leisure” section of the New York Times from 1930 demonstrates the widespread nature of this idea of a visible, modern Turkish woman:

The path of Turkish women is checkered with the lights and shades of European experiment... There are for her diversion playgrounds on the way. And there are dance halls and beauty contests to keep up her spirit. There are also cafes where she may tarry to survey the masculine world or to be surveyed

108 Ibid., 173.
109 Ibid., 60.
by it while she sips her drink and smokes her cigarette. The girl who once read Pierre Loti in the secrecy of the harem now reads Bernard Shaw and Bertrand Russell on a park bench in Taksim. She is willing to stand dressed in European fashions before the judges of a beauty contest while the editor of a Turkish review publishes her photograph with the nonchalance of a theatrical manager. The Turkish government was successful, therefore, in creating a milieu that made veiled women visible, tying women’s public participation to national modernization by producing knowledge about egalitarianism in Turkish society.

The new civil code (adopted almost wholly from the Swiss) only went so far in the furthering of women’s rights: men were still lawfully the head of the household and women found their employment and earnings subject to their husbands’ discretion. Significant divisions in socio-economic status in rural Anatolia meant many of these transformations were unenforced; in the countryside, polygamy and restrictions on women’s participation in public persisted. In a *Los Angeles Times* piece, a reporter on “the new woman in Turkey” is told by a former health minister that the harem and polygamy had fallen out of practice in Turkey; the reporter asserts that this is “ridiculous” and that harems and polygamy will likely persist in the provinces so long as women are a labor asset to their husbands. As Kandiyoti argues, the state was invested in the publicness of women’s rights, but in private this amounted to very little; in other words, women’s sexuality and domestic roles continued to be strictly regulated.

With the relegation of Islam to the private sphere, the state-led desire to see more women in public life exposed women to new kinds of scrutiny: “Since poverty and rural origin hindered

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women from ‘obeying’ the injunction to leave their homes, become educated, and contribute to the Republic's professional life, social class and urban/rural differences were, from the beginning, implicit in the differentiation of the Republican woman from the ‘reactionary’ woman.” In other words, non-elite women were unable to participate in these new public spaces and felt new kinds of pressure for being unable to do so. State-based feminism and social pressures did not renegotiate women’s roles in the domestic sphere. Kandiyoti points to the fact that women had little say in marriage at the time – a 1967 survey showed nearly 70% of Turkish marriages were arranged – and that “Parents, siblings, near and distant relatives, and even neighbors closely monitor the movements of the postpubescent girl, firmly imprinting the notion that her sexuality is not hers to give or withhold.” She further argues that top-down social change as experienced during the Kemalist reforms, strengthened contradictions about women’s place and sexuality, for example as lower class women were expected to both labor and maintain the household, while upper class women hired lower class women to fulfill household duties.

Women had to publicly exemplify the modernity of the nation, but also maintain chastity, honor, and familial duties in ways which did not apply to men. While this typifies patriarchal nation-building, the degree to which Atatürk himself constructed and articulated both public and domestic roles for women is notable. In a 1923 speech, Atatürk called for women to both “take their places in the general economic division of labour” and, in contradiction, that “a woman's highest duty is motherhood.” While some urban, upwardly mobile women were able to afford

117 White, “State Feminism, Modernization, and the Turkish Republican Woman,” 146.
119 Kandiyoti, “Emancipated but Unliberated?,” 325.
120 Ibid., 333.
121 Hilal Onur İnce, Aysun Yarali, and Doğancan Özsel, “Customary Killings in Turkey and Turkish Modernization,” Middle Eastern Studies 45, no. 4 (July 1, 2009): 541.
122 Quoted in White, “State Feminism, Modernization, and the Turkish Republican Woman,” 153.
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Western dress, education, and social engagement by alleviating their domestic burdens with servants, most women—especially in rural Anatolia—could not.\textsuperscript{123}

Certain archetypes dominated the possibilities of being a modern women in Turkey during the one-party period: the mother of the Turkish soldier, the daughter of the Turkish nation, or the teacher of Turkish children and these manifest primarily through Turkish governmental discourse by state officials.\textsuperscript{124} These categories served to rationalize heteronormative familial roles outside of the domestic space and within broader society. As explored above, the public performance of women in becoming educated or performing heteronormative relations at the theater were a means of strengthening the private familial space.\textsuperscript{125} Public officials also performed heteronormativity. In some of his speeches, for example, Atatürk praised motherhood as the most important role in the nation and supported education for women insofar as they may pass that education onto their children:\textsuperscript{126}

The highest duty of woman is motherhood. If one realizes fully that education of both boys and girls starts in infancy, the importance of motherhood becomes evident. Our people are resolved to become a powerful nation. One of the major needs is to secure enlightenment for women in every field. ... We have been educated by our mothers and they have done the best they could. But our present standards are not adequate for our present days needs. We need men with different attitudes and a deeper understanding, and the mothers of the future shall educate these men.\textsuperscript{127}

The role of the biological mother and social teacher-as-mother is underlined as the most important roles for women here. While the national curriculum educated boys to revere the

\textsuperscript{123} Ibid., 150–54.
\textsuperscript{124} Göle, The Forbidden Modern: Civilization and Veiling, 77-80.
\textsuperscript{125} White, “State Feminism, Modernization, and the Turkish Republican Woman,” 153–55.
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Turkish military, their ideal educators were women. The Turkish government therefore only permitted public roles to women insofar as they mirrored familial roles, allowing women to only be visible when it presented no challenge to the state. As for men, boys were inculcated in an equating of soldiering with Turkishness from a young age. Kancı and Altınay show how boys were pressured into scouts to prepare for military service, soldiering games were common part of school curriculum from grade two, and themes of death and sacrifice reoccur in textbooks in order to normalize the ideal of fighting for the nation against the other. As Peterson shows, men were expected to bond socially (and not sexually), under the banner of Turkish citizen, by identifying with militarized us-versus-them discourses of protecting the homeland.

Scholarship on education at the time also explores novels produced by the Republican intelligentsia. These idealize the image of the female teacher, who loses any sense of individuality or sexuality in her service to the nation. Instead, she represents the government, producing modern citizens within a rationalist curriculum and thus is connected to the broader nationalist civilizing mission. And yet, she is professional to the degree of lacking any sexual characteristics. Women’s citizenship, therefore, depended upon paternalistic distributions of identity along heterosexual lines, usually formulated in terms of chaste motherhood. These

130 Peterson, “The Intended and Unintended Queering of States/Nations,” 62.
131 Altan-Olcay explores Resat Nuri Guntekin’s famous novel Çalıkuşu (The Wren). Guntekin was one of the most prolific writers of this period. He was also a teacher, a Ministry of Education inspector, Member of Parliament and cultural attaché. The book follows the fate of a female teacher during the early Republic, wherein she battles bigotry and degeneracy through teaching, reflecting the national mentality’s prescription for woman as re-educators of the nation. The book is still taught in high school curricula and was recently adapted into a popular television series. See: Altan-Olcay, Gendered Projects of National Identity Formation: The Case of Turkey, 173-174.
132 Göle refers specifically to Halide Edip’s Yeni Turan, a female author and activist who describes the ideal Turkish woman as “…a mother, governess of her children, and of her nation.” See: Göle, The Forbidden Modern: Civilization and Veiling, 80.
identity-confines served to rear and reproduce certain notions of citizenship, belonging, and modernity in forms that mirror biological/familial reproduction.

In the formative years of the Republic, government at the time forged discursive and practical relations between Atatürk-as-father; an upwardly mobile and visible republican elite; media and literature representations of women; and discourses and practices of modernity-against-religion. This rationality of governance linked modernity and nationalism to heteronormative standards of the body and social relations beyond the family. As Kandiyoti argues, the supposed modernization that saw the banning of the veil entailed new forms of sexual confinement: it became increasingly important for modern women to be seen as chaste mothers or daughters of the nation.133

While Turkish technologies of control produced and incorporated certain kinds of Turkish women, others needed to be expelled. As Peterson argues, women at the intersections of certain ethnic and classes benefitted from the heteropatriarchal productions of nationalism, while others were marginalized in new ways.134 For example, prominent academic and activist Halide Edip Adviar was also influenced by Gokalp, but criticized Atatürk and the Kemalist regime for their anti-religious, anti-minority views.135 She notably defended women’s activities in Islamic society, which, she argued afforded women status and belonging. At one point, she condemned Atatürk as a dictator, instead arguing for a pluralist, democratic society akin to the old Ottoman system.136 In her memoirs, she depicts a radically different history of the Turkish independence struggle by attributing its success to the generals with whom Atatürk surrounded himself, as well

133 Kandiyoti, “End of Empire: Islam, Nationalism and Women in Turkey.”
135 Ibid., 43.
136 Ibid., 45-48.
as depicting Atatürk as an amoral narcissist. In her account of the independence struggle called *The Turkish Ideal*, for example, she reflects upon her fear that Atatürk’s cult of personality might damage the populist movement, quoting him as saying to her in private conversation, “I don’t want any consideration, criticism, or advice. I will have only my own way. All shall do as I command.” Her falling out with Atatürk, who named her a “traitor” in his six-day speech, pressured her into exile.

The seemingly pro-women discourse of the heteropatriarchal-nationalist government emboldened the formation of gender-based community organizing. Activist and author Nezihe Muhiddin established the Women’s People’s Party in 1923, the first party established in the Republic of Turkey (as Atatürk’s Republican People’s Party had not yet been formally founded, but ruled de facto). Muhiddin was influenced by Halide Edip Adivar’s writings on gender and a more democratic Turkish society. However, the Women’s People’s Party was banned on the grounds that women still did not have the right to vote. The group re-formed into an association instead – the Turkish Women’s Association, which the government pressured to disband after 1934, when women received suffrage. The government likely closed the Women’s People’s Party because it posed a threat to the government’s vision of female citizenship. National Turkish identity, in the minds of many elites, already entailed all the benefits of a women’s movement. They were also concerned that a women’s movement would provoke...

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142 Özsu, *‘Receiving’ the Swiss Civil Code: Translating Authority in Early Republican Turkey*, 70.
further dissent in the already unstable provinces. Instead, women’s emancipation would be guided by the Kemalists’ vision of modernization, which neither questioned the supposed benefits of secular-modernity, nor the effect such rapid social change would have on a society with significant class-based, ethnic, linguistic, and other divisions.

While the state made visible (to use Dean’s terminology) a more heteronormative modernity, it also prohibited improper forms of social and biological reproduction. The event of the Dersim Massacre demonstrated the expendability of lives which could not enable the nationalist project. The massacre entailed the supposed rebellion of Zaza Kurds in eastern Turkey between 1937 and 1938, where tens of thousands of people were killed and removed from the region by the Turkish army in repeated acts of bombing and ethnic cleansing. The Dersim Massacre, I will show, represents one of the first failures of the government to racially and sexually integrate others into its formulation of Turkish citizenship. The roots of the ethnic disjunction between Turk and other are traceable to the humiliating loss of the Balkans and WWI more broadly—in addition to the massive destabilization following the transfer of Muslims from the Balkans into Turkey. The rapid transformations in demography likely contributed to a need for a stable, unified citizenry which, as described above, would be answered by the idea of the Turk as a certain linguistic, ethnic, and religious (Sunni Muslim) group.

In 1934 the Turkish assembly (under Atatürk) passed the Law of Resettlement, which promoted homogenous “Turkishness” by moving minorities to other parts of the country. The law stipulated that particular “spheres” made up Turkey—one where the population shared

\[143\] Ibid.
\[144\] Ibrahim Efe and Bernhard Forchtner, “‘Saying Sorry’ in Turkey: The Dersim Massacre of the 1930s in 2011,” *Journal of Language and Politics* 14, no. 2 (January 1, 2015): 240.
\[146\] Soner Çağaptay, "Reconfiguring the Turkish Nation in the 1930s," *Nationalism and Ethnic Politics* 8, no. 2 (2002), 67-82.
Turkish culture and one where populations needed to be resettled and homogenized into Turkish culture. In the remote Dersim district, the government identified the Kurdish Alevi inhabitants as resistant to “Turkification:” many did not speak Turkish (but Zaza), even though it was illegal to speak anything else (even in private). The government would not refer to ethnic minorities here as Kurds, but rather as “nomads,” proposing that they needed to be resettled for assimilation. This explicit othering of the Kurds was not new. The official mouthpiece of the government, Cumhuriyet, published an article decrying the Kurds’ incivility: “…they allow their emotions and brains to be led by simple instincts like ordinary animals and therefore can only think crudely and foolishly… there is absolutely no difference between African barbarians and cannibals and these creatures who mix raw meat with cracked wheat and eat it just like that.”

The implementation of racial purification through the 1934 Law of Resettlement would expose the wanton violence the state was willing to perpetrate in order to homogenize its public.

It is not clear what initiated the Dersim violence, but official records note a bridge was burned and telephone lines were cut in the Dersim district at the same time as Kurdish insurgent events in other parts of country. Who burned the bridge and cut the telephone lines is unknown, but it was likely to be about inter-tribal conflict. However, the Republican military interpreted these acts as evidence of rebellion, resolving to make-invisible this dissident, queer community. From 1937-1938, the Turkish military systematically murdered Dersim’s inhabitants. The number of dead ranged from 13,000 (according to Turkish sources) to 40,000 (according to U.S.)

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147 Ibid., 72.
148 Ibid., 71.
and 80,000 (according to Kurdish sources). A first-hand account describes the violence in terms that suggest ethnocide.\footnote{Ibid., 6.}

…women and children of these tribes were locked into haysheds and burnt alive. Men and women of the Pilvank and Aşağı Abbas tribes, that had always remained loyal to the government, were lined up in the In and Inciga valleys and shot. The women and girls in Irgan village were rounded up, sprinkled with kerosene and set alight…The inhabitants of Hozat town and the Karaca tribe, men, women and children, were brought near the military camp outside Hozat and killed by machine gun…Thousands of women and girls threw themselves into the Munzur river…The entire area was covered by a thick mist caused by the artillery fire and air bombardments with poisonous gas…Even young men from Dersim who were doing their military service in the Turkish army were taken from their regiments and shot.\footnote{Quoted from the book, \textit{Kürdistan Tarihinde Dersim} (1952), written by Nursi Dersimi, a local activist in Ibid., 147.}

Cases of rape and sexual abuse during the massacre have also come to light.\footnote{Suad Joseph, \textit{Encyclopedia of Women and Islamic Cultures: Family, Law and Politics} (Brill, 2003), 361.} Peterson shows that the weaponization of rape is a form of heterosexism, which necessarily depends upon the sexual objectification of women.\footnote{Peterson, “Sexing Political Identities/Nationalism as Heterosexism,” 40–41.} Women are expected to perform Turkish heteronormativity (as mothers, soldier-bearers, and cultural custodians) and are seen as needing the protection of men; men are encouraged to sexually violate others in order to maintain the nationalist hierarchy.\footnote{Ibid., 45.}

Women also participated in the destruction of other women at Dersim. One of the bomber pilots for the Turkish military was Sabiha Gokcen, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk’s adopted daughter mentioned above. A special concession allowed her to become the first female combat pilot in the offensive against Dersim.\footnote{Altınay, \textit{The Myth of the Military Nation: Militarism, Gender, and Education in Turkey}, 37.} For her participation in the bombing campaign, she was honoured as a war hero. Prime Minister Inonu congratulated her, saying, “You are like the Turkish women who carried ammunition to us throughout the [Independence] war…” She earned

\footnote{Ibid., 6.}

\footnote{Quoted from the book, \textit{Kürdistan Tarihinde Dersim} (1952), written by Nursi Dersimi, a local activist in Ibid., 147.}

\footnote{Suad Joseph, \textit{Encyclopedia of Women and Islamic Cultures: Family, Law and Politics} (Brill, 2003), 361.}

\footnote{Peterson, “Sexing Political Identities/Nationalism as Heterosexism,” 40–41.}

\footnote{Ibid., 45.}

\footnote{Altınay, \textit{The Myth of the Military Nation: Militarism, Gender, and Education in Turkey}, 37.}
Atatürk’s praise as well: “You should be proud of yourself for showing to the whole world, once again, what our young girls can do...We are a military-nation. From ages seven to seventy, women and men alike, we have been created as soldiers.”\textsuperscript{157} A daily newspaper praised Gokcen for dropping “the final bomb that would eradicate Feudalism,” while others condemned the locals of Dersim for their degeneracy.\textsuperscript{158} The idealization of Gokcen and the maligning of Kurdish women are part of the same nationalist productions. In analyzing how women are complicit in the destruction of other women, as Enloe shows, we witness that militarism functions both by violating some women and the incorporation of others.\textsuperscript{159}

Sabiha Gokcen’s actions at Dersim represent the ideal role for women in the reproduction of the heteropatriarchal nation. Gokcen represented the right kind of civilized woman: as dutiful to her (and the nation’s) father, a fighter for the nation, and hostile to the nation’s enemies. She acted in opposition to the wrong kinds of women, who needed to be discarded or re-educated into assimilation. Most of the girls who lost their families in the massacre were sent by the state to the Sıdıka Avar Boarding School in the province of Elazığ, which was established to teach Turkish language, culture, and history.\textsuperscript{160} About 500 orphaned girls who graduated from the school were either employed as servants in the homes of military officers or made to marry low-ranking military officers.\textsuperscript{161} The massacre of the Alevis and the re-education of the orphaned girls are part of a certain rationality of Turkish government that enables “correct” reproductions (modernity, daughter, nationalist) and oppresses “incorrect” ones (backwardness, vagrants, feudalism). By reproducing the racialized hierarchies of the nation-state, Gokcen’s violence

\textsuperscript{157} Ibid., 40.
\textsuperscript{158} Quoted from \textit{Tan}, 15 June 1937 in Ibid., 41.
against Kurdish Alevi women reflected knowledge-productions of others inhospitable to those outside of a narrowly-defined conception of citizen. Like Gokcen, the re-educated girls, who were re-inserted into society as literal servants to the military leadership, would symbolize correct citizenship; the case of these “stolen” girls is explored in the 2010 documentary İki Tutam Saç: Dersim’in Kayıp Kızları (Two Locks of Hair: The Missing Girls of Dersim).162

The heteropatriarchal-nationalist governmentality of Turkey’s First Republic was comprised of numerous actors, who depended upon the materialization of heteronormative bodies in order to produce the new nation. Governance depended upon the making-visible of the “Turk” and the usage of military as a technique of controlling those who did not or could not perform Turkish identity. It depended upon the telling of truths about the history of a glorified independence conflict, a worthy paternalistic leadership, a glorious Turkic past, and a utopian modern future. This governmentality also redefined its female population. It reshaped the familial structure by excluding public roles for women that upset the patriarchal balance, yet depended on women to demonstrate the nation’s modernity. The governmentality depended upon new roles for women in biologically and socially reproducing the nation and men as leaders of these processes as techniques of governing a modernizing nation. This, at times, also entailed the incorporation of women to marginalize incorrect ethnic reproductions. The government therefore began to establish a precedent of using heteronormative familial relations as a metaphor for maintaining a nationalist imperative, which would continuously demand the oppression of resistance.

Turkish Governmentality

**The Second Republic: 1960-1980**

In this section, I explore the coup that ended the First Republic and Turkish governmentality in the Second Republic. The single party period ended with Turkey’s first military junta in 1960 and the passing of a new constitution. During the Second Republic, the army staged three coups (in 1960, 1971, and 1980), the economy faltered due to rapid urbanization and global financial crises, and global patterns of radical political violence would find an unforeseen intensity in both terrorism and martial suppression in Turkey’s urban areas.

These crises exacerbated and transformed the problem of belonging within the First Republic, wherein the government erected strict parameters around nation building and who would be included and excluded within the new nation. Identity continues to be a concern in the second republic; the Turkish government enacts new techniques of control and knowledge-production dependent upon the premise of normalizing a certain heterosexual identity for Turkish citizens.

The first coup in the Turkish republic took place in 1960, during a time of heightened tensions between the Turkish government and the opposition. After the opening of the one-party system in 1945, and in 1950, the Democratic Party won by a landslide on a platform comprised of reducing the state’s restrictions around Islam, which was still popular, despite three decades of secularist Republican leadership. Appealing to regional religious elites suppressed during the CHP single party rule, the Democratic Party began to loosen some of the toughest Atatürk-era rules dealing with religion. It allowed thousands of mosques to reopen, legalized the call to prayer in Arabic (instead of Turkish), and opened religious schools.

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164 In addition to the 1997 “post-modern” or “soft” coup, which saw the resignation of Necmettin Erbakan after the publication of a memorandum drafted by the military leadership. See: Ahmet T. Kuru, "The Rise and Fall of Military Tutelage in Turkey: Fears of Islamism, Kurdisism, and Communism," *Insight Turkey* 14, no. 2 (2012), 37-39.
the Kemalist elite accused the government of politicizing Islam and eroding the secular foundations of the Turkish state. The army stepped in and toppled the government: the president, prime minister, cabinet members, and around 450 others were arrested and tried for treason and other offences at Yassiada, an island off the coast of Istanbul where political prisoners were historically sent to stand trial. Although the move was well received by Kemalist urban elites, the rural population, who supported Prime Minister Menderes, was dismayed; the provinces had overwhelmingly supported the liberalization of religion under Menderes. His government was replaced by the military tutelage of General Cemal Gursel, who led the interim National Unity Committee (NUC).

As president, prime minister, minister of defense, and NUC head, Gursel wielded more influence over the state than Atatürk ever did. The military leadership that led the 1960 intervention desired to prevent Islam from supposedly corrupting the country’s trajectory toward civilization, no matter if the popular mandate of the people supported the government’s actions. This would not be the first time the state – referring to the military, the bureaucracy, and the judiciary – would act upon the notion that they were protecting the nation from itself.

In the state’s othering of the government, key elites would continuously assert a “common-sense” rationality of their position as the rightful progenitors of Atatürk’s vision against Islam, Kurds, communists or other minorities.

170 Noted for being a “fatherly figure,” who was well liked in the military. In actuality it was Colonel Türkeş was the most influential member of the junta. Türkeş would later lead the far-right Nationalist Movement Party. Ibid., 242.
171 Ibid., 241-243.
173 Ibid.
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Nominally the military arrested and tried the Menderes government for a range of offenses, including inciting violence against the opposition. Yet to legitimize its coup, the state’s criminal proceedings against the Menderes regime asserted the heterosexual depravities of his government. For example, Menderes was charged with attempting to kill the illegitimate baby he supposedly fathered with an opera singer, as well as sending cash to his “women friends.” Menderes was forced to defend himself against allegations that his mistress also had two abortions by him. This was likely done to nullify his support with religious Turks. When a doctor attempted to testify to his defense, the prosecution reportedly interrupted to introduce evidence in the form of a pair of nylon stockings found amongst Menderes’ secret documents: “What did we find? We found this!,” [the prosecutor] shouted, holding the panties aloft. Although the defense argued they were inadmissible, the Judge ordered that the prosecutor “Keep them. They might be useful in another trial.” When Menderes stated he had not seen the woman since 1955, the judge responded, “Maybe this was because you developed another acquaintance?” and accused her of lying to protect him in her testimony. These constituted attempts by the government to depict Menderes as morally bankrupt in his non-familial sexual proclivities.

The effort to make a spectacle of Menderes’ sexual proclivities extended to his ministers as well. The former Finance Minister was tried for misappropriating funds to bring in a German nurse, who was asserted to be his mistress (“a 24-year-old German beauty”). The former Minister of Agriculture was accused of using a state-owned bank to buy a parcel of land, which

178 Ibid.
was owned by his wife, above value.\textsuperscript{181} The incarceration also helped the military government present these men as physically and emotionally weak – a mentality that supports the military’s intervention by allowing the media to chronicle a number of high-profile deaths and suicide attempts at the prison.\textsuperscript{182} This includes at least two suicides in addition to the reportedly unsuccessful suicide attempt of Menderes.\textsuperscript{183} Menderes was reported to have collapsed during the trial, falling into a coma, and by Turkish law was too unwell to stand for trial.\textsuperscript{184} The media circulated images of a sick Menderes in a hospital bed, reporting that doctors were forced to pump his stomach after he had overdosed on sleeping pills.\textsuperscript{185} A report from the \textit{New York Times} describes his weak appearance: “Mr. Menderes showed far more severe effects of his confinement. Never a heavy man, he had obviously lost considerable weight. His face was pale and drawn, his step feeble.”\textsuperscript{186} Such discourse reflects government techniques to cast the leader as effete in addition to being morally suspect, traits which conflict with the notion of a strong paternalistic leader.

While hundreds received various lesser punishments, former Prime Minister Menderes was ultimately executed in 1961 for “violating the constitution.”\textsuperscript{187} By accusing Menderes of sexual misconduct and allowing newspapers to publish pictures of him after his suicide attempt, the military assumed a patriarchal role in casting the government as morally degenerate and physically effete. General Gursel and his interim ruling committee argued that they were

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\textsuperscript{181} Ibid., 457.
\textsuperscript{184} “Follows Aides to Gallows: Suicide Bid Fails, Menderes Hangs,” \textit{The Globe and Mail}, September 18, 1961.
\textsuperscript{185} Mustafa Armağan, “Adnan Menderes Intihar Mi Etti Yoksa Zehirlediler Mi?,” \textit{Yakın Tarihimiz}, September 12, 2010, http://yakintarihkimiz.org/adnan-menderes-intihar-mi-etti-yoksa-zehirlediler-mi.html. (Originally printed in now defunct \textit{Zaman}, which was shuttered by the AKP government in 2016, the article questions how he would have received these pills.)
\textsuperscript{186} “Follows Aides to Gallows.”
\textsuperscript{187} Zurcher, \textit{Turkey: A Modern History}, 248.
\end{flushright}
enforcing the moral standards necessary to ensure the future of Turkish democracy. The military government reasserted heteropatriarchal norms of strength and honor by producing discursive truths about the improper sexualities of the government. They further used the disciplinary apparatus of the trial as a technology of control to assert the legitimacy of these truths and make extreme forms of punishment justifiable.

Yassıada, the island prison where the military trials and executions were held, exemplifies the Turkish military government’s techniques of control at the time. The military ascribed the weakness of democratic government to both the will of the people and their faith in Islam and used the location of a the island prison to make a statement about how no one, including the government itself, is above the Kemalist-nationalist doctrine of secularism. The military consolidated a heteropatriarchal-nationalist governmentality, which needed new technologies of control to combat the resistance generated by Islamic populism. Those who detracted from the state were sent to the liminal space of the island prison, where their effeminacy and moral degradation was constructed by accusations of sexual depravity, treasonous behavior, and physical and mental weakness. In moving these officials to the island prison, the military government exchanged their visibility as governors, instead redefining them as prisoners. The reassertion of masculinist forms of domination and the queering of others to “fix” the government became a recurring governmental technology, as the military intervened again in 1971, 1980, and 1997.

The knowledge-production that propel the military as guardians of the Turkish nation were themselves rooted in heteropatriarchal processes initiated in the independence struggle. After the coup and increasingly throughout the Second Republic, the military would hold a privileged position in its autonomy from government control, wherein the government was

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The military further established the National Security Council in the wake of the 1960 coup as another layer of control over the government. The Council officially advised the government on matters of security, broadly defined, but gradually would expand its power to overrule the cabinet as the center of decision-making in the executive.\(^{190}\) What is heteropatriarchal about the military’s ascendency was its paternalistic role in disciplining the government and its supporters in the absence of Atatürk’s one-party rule. As expert on Turkish military Ayşe Gül Altınay shows,

...the citizen-army...creates a sense of equality between (heterosexual) men with an accompanying sense of superiority over all women. In the family context, the men are guaranteed the position of the commander over their wives. Outside the family, they are invited to identify themselves with the state and are given the authority to exercise control over women’s bodies and sexuality, through such concepts as honor.\(^{191}\)

The military blockade over democracy symbolically produces a kind of truth or mentality about who counts in Turkish politics. Namely, men (and only heterosexual men) who could defend the nation against degeneracy, the threat of Islam, and threats to the military could relate to the political process and were the ideal citizens. This echoed traditional understandings of women’s honor and place in the family, conflating the defense of the nation with the defense of the nation’s women. As Peterson shows, (heterosexual) men benefit from the organization of a military government, which depends upon male soldiers to defend and male bureaucrats for its administration while keeping out women and effeminate men.\(^{192}\) Rather, it is women’s place to be protected as socio-biological and symbolic reproducers of the nation, rather than leaders in


\(^{190}\) Zurcher, \textit{Turkey: A Modern History}, 245.


\(^{192}\) Peterson, “The Intended and Unintended Queering of States/Nations,” 62.
either the family or the nation-building process.\textsuperscript{193} The ascendancy of the military makes homosocial bonding visible as soldiers only, and other formations of sexuality are disallowed.\textsuperscript{194} While men are able to relate to the men they seen in public office and military governance, women are not allowed these formations of homosociality. Rather, women are to access the state through their husbands/fathers and are expected to bond with the men of their family units.\textsuperscript{195}

The Era of the Second Republic was not only beset by military juntas but increasingly extreme daily political violence. Weak coalition governments, rapid urbanization, a faltering economy, and the separatist war in the Kurdish Southeast marked this period as one of ideological, sectarian, and ethnic conflict.\textsuperscript{196} From 1976-1980, the violence between Turkish right-wing ultra-nationalist groups and left-wing groups inflicted some 5,000 casualties.\textsuperscript{197} As I will explore below, the rise of military actors, fragile democratic governance, and systematic disempowerment of women and minorities continued to escalate an image of ideal men as violent soldiers, women as sexually controllable, and emasculated men as queer others.

The rise of terrorism during the Second Republic coincided with the extreme urbanization of Turkey’s cities. Between 1950 and 1975, Turkey’s population doubled, wherein the urban share of the total population grew from 18% to 41% and Istanbul’s population grew from 800 thousand to 7 million.\textsuperscript{198} The \textit{gecekondu} squat communities became the new home for millions in pursuit of new economic opportunities.\textsuperscript{199} The term \textit{gecekondu} means “night-built:” a response to the lack of infrastructure to support the influx of people, these shantytowns

\begin{thebibliography}{99}
\bibitem{193} Peterson, “Sexing Political Identities/Nationalism as Heterosexism,” 50–52.
\bibitem{194} Ibid., 52.
\bibitem{195} Peterson, “The Intended and Unintended Queering of States/Nations,” 63.
\bibitem{197} Sabri Sayari and Bruce Hoffman, “Urbanization and Insurgency: The Turkish Case 1976-1980” (Santa Monica: RAND, 1991), v.
\bibitem{198} Ibid., 3.
\bibitem{199} Zurcher, \textit{Turkey: A Modern History}, 269.
\end{thebibliography}
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comprised of hastily-built structures on both public and private land that they did not own.\textsuperscript{200} The government overlooked their illegality, likely because of the political competition for the votes of the inhabitants of these expansive communities.\textsuperscript{201} Former communal politics gave way to the material demands of living in the slums, so that political parties would pander to the infrastructural and social needs of their inhabitants in order to secure votes.\textsuperscript{202}

The gecekondu became a site of urban unrest, as it was the location of a confluence of social issues, including overcrowding, high unemployment, dependence on informal labor, poor infrastructure, and the recurrent financial crises that struck the Turkish economy.\textsuperscript{203} These social ills coupled with the squatters’ exposure to new modern institutions —especially the university and party politics—provided one of the conditions for the growth of extremism.\textsuperscript{204} Gecekondu were not only vast recruitment pools for terrorist networks, but would also become the site of turf battles, where competing movements would proclaim sovereign control over their territories.\textsuperscript{205} The gecekondu were therefore a kind of technique of control, bringing disaffected others into the fold of competing actors. Membership in terrorist groups offered

\textsuperscript{200} The term itself may refer to an Ottoman-era law, wherein an occupied building could not be lawfully demolished —therefore, migrants would build their houses in the middle of the night and come daytime the law would be powerless to sanction them. See: James Feron, “Some Ankara Housing an Overnight Thing,” \textit{New York Times}, 1969.
\textsuperscript{201} Sayari and Hoffman, “Urbanization and Insurgency: The Turkish Case 1976-1980,” 5. Sayari 5
\textsuperscript{202} For example, in the 60s the Justice Party gained favor with various Istanbul gecekondu by promising amenities such as water and electricity in exchange for votes. As these former villagers used to vote for the Republican People’s Party, the change in party preferences after moving to the city reflects a move away from voting based on traditional loyalties to voting for individual preferences. See: Kemal H. Karpat, \textit{The Gecekondu: Rural Migration and Urbanization}, Book, Whole (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976), 220.
\textsuperscript{203} From 1979-1980, the inflation rate was 120\%, making life especially challenging for migrants to the city. See: Sayari and Hoffman, “Urbanization and Insurgency: The Turkish Case 1976-1980,” 6–7.
\textsuperscript{204} Ibid., 8.
\textsuperscript{205} For example, see the case of the Umraliye gecekondu public (a district of Istanbul), which declared itself a liberated zone in affiliating with the extremist left Dev-Sol movement: “The town [officials] maintain is an area of lawlessness and revolution, where violence stalks at night and the government’s writ, when it can be imposed, is carried at the point of a bayonet. The citizens of Umraliye scoff at this image, though they do not hide their independence or their Marxist leanings.” Loren Jenkins, “Turkish Town Seeks Security as a ‘Liberated Zone,’” \textit{The Washington Post}, 1980.
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lucrative benefits through illegal means, whether bank robberies, arms trade, or narcotics trafficking—opportunities that did not exist within the formal economy.206

In the early 1970s, a handful of radical leftist groups were primarily responsible for the (at this point limited) violence. But after the 1971 coup, with the expansion of the military’s crackdown on leftist organizing and its more explicit support for the radical right, terrorist violence reached unprecedented levels until another coup in 1980:

By 1979, law and order had practically disappeared in many parts of the country; extremist forces had provoked bloody incidents of communal violence and indiscriminate destruction between the Sunnis and the Alevis in several Anatolian towns, and rival terrorist groups had made considerable progress in establishing “liberated zones” in major cities.207 Whether a gecekondu became affiliated with the right or left depended upon the unique local history of the migrants’ experiences with the city.208 Ineffective coalition governments and factionalism within the police force escalated the violence.209 The gecekondu, therefore, produced the ideal circumstances necessary for radical antagonisms to a degree that Turkish society had never seen and could not sustain.

I argue that the gecekondu became a kind of technology of the government, allowing it to mobilize certain extremist actors against its opponents, but also that this technology of developing violent arenas for suppressing others led to the government’s destabilization. The inability for the government to maintain control; the daily presence of violence and implication of growing swaths of the population; and the disintegration of traditional family networks by urbanization all contributed to an ongoing crisis of national identity.210 The military government preferred violent masculinist demonstrations of force to other modes of governing. Disparate

207 Ibid., 11.
radical groups adopted the same technique of governance for themselves in their attempt to control the socio-economic conditions of within the faltering nation. The gecekondu permitted disaffected men to form homosocial bonds, as in the military model, uniting them, and allowing them to express their political voice—but in familiar forms of marginalizing discourses and acts of violent exclusion. Turkishness had failed to become embodied by all citizens as envisioned in the writings and speeches of Gokalp and Atatürk. The heteropatriarchal-nationalist governmentality depends upon the erection of hierarchies based on the familial form, wherein deference is given to the male head and the women are made symbols of the private. The gecekondu exacerbated these models of exclusion, until violence and terrorism became uncontrollable.

The rise of the paramilitary “Grey Wolves”—the armed wing of the far-right National Action Party—demonstrates how the gecekondu exacerbated heteropatriarchal violence. Led by Alparslan Turkes (spokesman for the military of the 1960 coup), the National Action Party established some 150 military-styled camps across the country to train young “commandos” to be “readied for the day feared by communists.”

Young men were trained in various combat tactics alongside a political ideology that was staunchly anti-communist and advanced a racist “Pan-Turian” agenda, which envisioned the (forced) uniting of all Turkish-speaking peoples across Asia within a single state. Although the Grey Wolves repeatedly attacked universities (seen as the breeding-ground of communism), the gecekondu became a primary site of recruitment, mafia-like criminal behavior, and terrorism. In their imitation of the military’s

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213 “…the urban poor…are often seduced by promises of offered by the estimated 60 factions of the extreme right and left. Those who were not seduced were intimidated. The extremists…often moved into new neighborhoods with pistols and established their territory by daubing their names and party symbols on the walls of houses, much as the urban gangs in the United States mark out their turf with spray paint. Then…they demanded cash contributions from the slum dwellers within their ‘liberated zones.’” McManus, “Coup in Turkey Brings Relief to Slum Battlefields.”
structure and violence, the gecekondu became a primary locus of othering, wherein competing groups demanded correct forms of heterosocial bonding and heterosexual reproductions in order to establish their respective visions for an ideal state. As Peterson has shown, this pattern of violence depends upon fraternal bonding, wherein men form allegiances in the name of protecting their own women and violate the enemy’s men and women.\textsuperscript{214} The Grey Wolves’ pogroms against left-wing Alevi (Turkish Shi’ites) activists in the city of Kahramanmarâş in December 1978 left over approximately one hundred dead, constituting the most deadly single act of violence during the period.\textsuperscript{215} Alongside the killing of women, children, and men and the destruction of property, there are allegations that the Grey Wolves raped Alevi women, although there are no official records on this.\textsuperscript{216}

Militarism encourages men to bond in acceptable public ways in protection of their “privates”—the family, women, and their cultural norms. To dominate the other, therefore, entails the domination of not only competing public political discourses, but also the violation of the enemy’s women.\textsuperscript{217} Further, while the Kemalist leadership expected women to reproduce nationalism during the First Republic, they would experience the authoritarianism and violence of the Second Republic with more restrictions from participation. Ultra-right propaganda such as Turkes’ “Night Lights” doctrine, which would inform the National Action Party and Grey Wolves’ ideology, does not address women—only vaguely asserting the need for morality,

\textsuperscript{214}Peterson, “The Intended and Unintended Queering of States/Nations,” 62–63.
\textsuperscript{215}Zurcher, \textit{Turkey: A Modern History}, 263.
\textsuperscript{217}Peterson, “Sexing Political Identities/Nationalism as Heterosexism,” 43.
nationalism, and other populist tenets. It was only in its 1993 program that the party would explicitly condemn feminism and promote women’s traditional familial roles.

Women were also absent from party politics and the Grey Wolves militia. Despite the lack of information surrounding how women related to the Grey Wolves, women’s explicit absence from rightist terrorism is itself informative. Feminist scholarship tells us that women often suffer disproportionately in prolonged conflict situations. They are forced to internalize the necessity of violence even if they are uninvolved in the processes that instigate it. I argue that although little is known about women’s relationship to terrorism in Turkey’s Second Republic, gecekondu only permitted participation in political life if citizens were willing to commit the violent enforcement of either leftist or rightist heteronormative mentalities. As women generally were kept out of military training and paramilitary organizing, they were left with few options: participation in leftist communist organizing (although it lacked explicit feminist commitments) or by supporting rightist masculinist violence in indirect ways. Commitment to either of these supported a heteropatriarchal desire for dominance, the othering of outsiders, and the recreation/reproduction of a nation led by a male homosocial elite.

Some general themes emerge in comparing the government of the Second Republic to the First Republic. In the First, the monopolization of governance by the paternalistic one-party Kemalist leadership produced a narrow national identity, which could not tolerate dissent. The leadership reformed women’s rights and employed women like Sabiha Gokcen to demonstrate

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220 Enloe, “Does Khaki Become You?”
Turkey’s modernity. In the Second Republic, the government lost its monopoly over the state. Instead the state, guided by the army, escalated the paternalistic hierarchies established in the first republic. The new military government othered the democratic government by asserting a return to Kemalist ideals and defense of the nation. The government’s displacement permitted other competing groups to assert their dominance in the urbanizing, yet non-democratic, nation. The militarization was reflected within the polarized militant groups, which stepped in to fulfill the social functions and political organizing denied by the weak government. While the encounter between Atatürk’s government and women arguably gave women expanded opportunities to participate in the development of the nation (as well as subjecting them to new forms of scrutiny), women in the Second Republic were made more invisible. The rapid proliferation of authoritarianism from competing groups meant more opportunities for men to assert their political grievances and bond homosocially at the expense of women. In both periods, women were expected to have an antagonistic relationship with othered populations. Yet the invisibility of women in both discourse and leadership combined with the escalation of violence during the Second Republic engendered a culture of fear that othered all citizens. As gecekondu were claimed by one group or another, the lack of one single dominant ideology—but instead the presence of various forms of militarized communist or nationalist ideologies—meant that no single group was recognized as embodying the Turkish ideal identity beyond the military. The military supported itself alone, the far-right asserted a racially homogenous Pan-Turian agenda, and the communist left organized on behalf of a pro-Moscow or pro-Beijing ideology.

**The Third Republic: 1980-present**

With the 1980 coup, Turkey would ratify its 3rd and current constitution. Within a year of the coup, the number of terrorist attacks dwindled, as many of the extremists on both sides were
prosecuted en masse. By the middle of 1981, more than 20,000 suspected terrorists awaited prosecution in jail.\textsuperscript{222} The coup coincided with the implementation of far-reaching economic reforms, which helped dissolve some of the instability within Turkish society. The 1980 coup also represented a turning point in the nature of the Turkish state. Before, the fragmentation of democracy and the prevalence of violence restricted the possibilities for women and men’s place in Turkish society. Only through embodying heteronormativities (for example women needing to reproduce biologically and socially for the nation; men needing to protect the nation through soldiering), could citizens find a place within the nation; at the same time, biological and social others were marginalized. Several factors continued the transformation of the ways Turkish government would manipulate visibilities, produce knowledge, deploy techniques of power, and define populations within the Third Republic. These productions complement the rise of civil society as challenge to the government and military-state. We also see the undermining of the traditional left, the rise of identity politics, and the strengthening of religious-based organizing as explored below.\textsuperscript{223}

The solidification of heterosexuality as natural continued to be one of the truths the Turkish government told about its citizens and also factored into its techniques of control over society. This is visible in the governmental rationalities promoted by Turkey’s first female Prime Minister, Tansu Çiller, who came to power in 1993 as the leader of the True Path Party, a conservative, secularist party. In her first electoral campaign, Çiller appealed directly to secular women, claiming that their rights were being threatened by the opposition Refah Party, which was Islamist.\textsuperscript{224} She depended upon heteronormative tropes, positioning herself as the “mother”

\textsuperscript{223} Ömer Çaha, Women and Civil Society in Turkey: Women’s Movements in a Muslim Society (Farnham, Surrey: Ashgate, 2013), 64.
\textsuperscript{224} Maureen Freely, “Ex-PM’s Coalition Has Women up in Arms,” Toronto Star, July 28, 1996.
of the nation: “I embrace you with a mother's love” was her trademark catchphrase. In her victory speech, she asserted that she would be “a mother and a sister for the nation” and referred to President Demirel as “father.” However, Çiller’s party formed a coalition government with the Refah Party in 1996, which resulted in an outcry by secular women’s groups: The Federation of Women’s Associations filed two lawsuits against her for breaking her campaign promises.

In an interview with her former academic colleagues, she was called a “male clone” and that “When she told the nation she was its mother, all she was doing was aping the many generations of male politicians who had claimed to be its father.” Çiller oversaw the escalation of armed conflict between the military and the Kurdish separatist PKK, enacting numerous reforms to bolster national defense, like the controversial “Castle Plan.” This entailed using the resources of paramilitary organizations, as well as police and army units to assassinate PKK members and supporters as well as Armenian nationalists. Once again, the Turkish government depends upon the defining of proper citizenship by means of making unfit others disappear. Çiller was later accused of illegally siphoning money for unspecified “security expenses” from the budget to fund these activities. While Çiller’s speech and imagery attempted to present an image of a warm, family-friendly “soul sister” of Turkey, the government was simultaneously waging a brutal war on Kurds and profiting from sophisticated corruption schemes (including improperly interfering in the privatization of certain corporations for personal gain).

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226 Freely, “Ex-PM’s Coalition Has Women up in Arms.”
227 Freely, “Ex-PM’s Coalition Has Women up in Arms.”
228 Ibid.
229 Dean, *Governmentality: Power and Rule in Modern Society*, 32.
An infamous car crash in late 1996 proved the government’s participation in a range of criminal activities. In 1996, a sabotaged car crashed in Susurluk resulting in the deaths of four individuals travelling together. In the car were Abdullah Çatlı, a former ultra-rightist militant wanted by both Interpol (for international drug trafficking and escape from a Swiss prison) and Turkish police for multiple murders; Huseyin Kocadağ, a senior Istanbul police official; and beauty queen Gonca Us—all of whom were killed. Sedat Bucak, an MP for Tansu Çiller’s party, was the only survivor. The car itself contained a cache of weapons, which were found to be the property of the Turkish Ministry of Interior. It came to light that the car was returning from a seaside resort, where Çiller’s interior minister and former chief of Istanbul police Mehmet Ağar was residing. Although the Turkish parliament conducted a sweeping inquiry, there were no high level arrests. Ağar, said to be Çiller’s proxy in her “dirty war,” went on to successfully contest parliamentary elections in Elazığ.

The event brought to light some disturbing complicities between the police, the armed forces, organized crime, and Çiller’s government. Although Çiller’s public-facing government relied upon neoliberal reform and the end of Kurdish violence to win support, the Susurluk event demonstrated that such reform was only possible through violence, mafia dealings, drug trafficking, and corruption across numerous public entities. The Susurluk case offers a glimpse into the entrenchment of paternalistic mentalities of Turkish nationalism. After decades of citizens being invisible in the democratic process, particular bodies within the government (the police, the military, and violent criminal groups) benefit at the expense of social welfare. The government’s embrace of violent, illicit methods of control complements its unquestioned

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assumptions –distinctly masculinist ways of thinking –about the relationship between the government and its citizens, wherein some citizens face serious violence as elites drain resources from society.235

The exposure of unsavory complicities within the heteronormative government coincided with other events that would loosen its hold over society. Here I explore the rise of feminist activism in Turkey, which would challenge military influence over the nation-state. Groups like *YAZKO* mounted a range of demands, including better rights as well as more radical and socialist feminist organizing.236 The women’s movement was successful for a number of reasons. First, the globalization of Western-styled “second-wave” feminism influenced the possibilities of women’s activism (and human rights activism more broadly) worldwide.237 After the 1980 coup, the military tried thousands of leftist sympathizers and banned all prior political parties, which provided a space for women’s movements to flourish.238 In the Second Republic, women’s rights were more often included within a broader platform of leftist organizing.239 However, the eradication of the old left allowed women’s rights activists to recruit heavily from its remains. Further, the military did not understand women’s organizing as a threat. It understood that women already were liberated and had no further specific political needs after the establishment of the Turkish state.240 One of the first organizations was *YAZKO* (the Cooperation of Writers and Translators) in 1981, which was a series of symposia on the inequality of women in Turkey and as a primary activity translated Western feminist texts (including de Beauvoir) into

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237 Ibid., 64.
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Turkish. In 1982, the organization began publishing a weekly magazine, Somut, which provided a platform for a range of feminist approaches to be both contemplated and criticized; the editor, Şule Torun, wrote that the magazine allowed for women to rethink the roles traditionally given to them in society, that of the “good wife,” “good mother,” or “ideal sex object,” which are enforced by the myth-making of the Turkish state. While women’s rights activism was itself heterogeneous, with radical, socialist, Islamist and other theoretical approaches informing the actions of different groups, they were linked by common demands for bodily autonomy, participation in civic society, and protest against domestic violence. Through their rapid organization, protesting, and activism, the new publicness of women’s status in Turkey forced the government to take them, and their votes, seriously. All parties in the 1991 had women on their party programs, especially in reference to the problem of domestic violence. The women’s movement had therefore begun to encroach upon the images of women and men created through the discourses and forms of governance employed by the state of good wives/sisters/mothers and paternalistic soldiers.

The military coup of 1980 not only swept away the traditional left, but in doing so it also empowered a resurgence of the Islamist right. This led to a revival of wearing traditional dress in public, leading to a universal ban of the headscarf at universities. Women were also penalized for wearing the headscarf in other public locations, such as the courthouse and public

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241 Çaha, Women and Civil Society in Turkey, 73.
242 Ibid.
of offices.\textsuperscript{247} Once again, women would find themselves at the heart of the problem of public citizenship in Turkey. Yet women’s wearing of the headscarf was not simply a matter of religious expression—it was also a symbolic protest against the conservative nature of republican modernity throughout the history of the Turkish state.\textsuperscript{248} Whereas in the First Republic the Kemalists used women’s issues to marginalize Islamism, the headscarf issue of the Third Republic demonstrated the inability for the government to maintain control over women’s bodies for nationalist ends. In the Third Republic, Muslim women wore the headscarf (especially in universities) to protest the deep disjuncture between ideal nationalist femininity and the diverse identities of Turkey’s citizens.\textsuperscript{249}

The debate points to a liberalization of the feminist movement in Turkey, with at least three kinds of feminist organizing: Kemalist feminists who protested any concessions to Islam; liberal feminists, who did not consider Islam a threat to the nation; and Islamist feminists, who viewed the militarized, secular state with disdain and regarded Westernized feminist movements as elitist.\textsuperscript{250} The diversification of the feminist movement in Turkey permitted the LGBTQ movement to develop. Bereket and Adam argue that the vernacular developed by feminists in the 1980s—and their techniques of institution building and mass protests—provided LGBTQs with not only the language, but also the methods of protest and activism necessary to organize for human rights.\textsuperscript{251} Urbanization had set the scene for queer people to meet beyond the scrutiny of their families; at the same time, police routinely raided gay and transgender entertainment venues

\textsuperscript{248} Ibid., 249.
\textsuperscript{249} Arat, “From Emancipation To Liberation.”
\textsuperscript{250} Arat, “Toward a Democratic Society: The Women’s Movement in Turkey in the 1980s,” 245.
\textsuperscript{251} Tarik Bereket and Barry D. Adam, “The Emergence of Gay Identities in Contemporary Turkey,” \textit{Sexualities} 9, no. 2 (April 1, 2006): 134–35.
in 1980s Istanbul, arresting them and placing them on trains out of the city.\textsuperscript{252} LGBTQ organizing was likely a response to the perceived injustices faced at the hands of the police. The first major LGBTQ organization in Istanbul was Lambda Istanbul in 1993 and KAOS GL was founded in Ankara in 1994.\textsuperscript{253} There are now a proliferation of LGBTQ organizations across Turkey dedicated to violence reduction, trans-rights, HIV/AIDS prevention, military reform, and general visibility. These include the social research organization, SPoD, the organizers of the yearly pride and trans-pride parades, and the major queer media outlet, Kaos GL.\textsuperscript{254}

Yet a surge in identity politics has not been complemented by a similarly progressive government. The conservative Justice and Development Party (AKP) government has gained the mandate of the people, winning dramatic victories in all elections since 2002.\textsuperscript{255} The AKP government has not only restructured the military to remove Kemalist detractors from leadership;\textsuperscript{256} it has also enacted social reforms, such as censorship provisions and economic liberalization, which some scholars describe as neoconservative.\textsuperscript{257} While the LGBTQ movement emerged during the Third Republic, it emerged into a hostile environment, wherein the AKP

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{252} Marvine Howe, “Turkey Begins Campaign Against Homosexuality,” \textit{New York Times}, May 7, 1981.
\end{itemize}
leadership has buttressed its conservative support by speaking out against LGBTQ influence in Turkish society.\textsuperscript{258}

Turkish government in the Third Republic is different than in prior periods, foremost because of the disintegration of the military and the consolidation of the Islamist AKP over the government, media, and education. The emergence of civil society has entailed new ways of thinking about the place of women, LGBTQs, and other minorities within Turkey. Minorities and progressive activists benefit from the expansion of civil society and welfare, which developed because Kemalist and militaristic norms about national belonging were displaced by weak governance. For example, this is visible in the feminist movement, which identified gaps in society left by the government, including the Women’s Library and Information Centre (1990), which was established with the goal of making visible women’s rights efforts in Turkish history.\textsuperscript{259} The library challenges the way the Turkish state traditionally has made women’s contributions to the state invisible or permissible only when it furthers state interests. Similarly, environmentalists benefitted from the development of civil society; while participation in politics was seen as a foreclosed route to change, organizations like the Doğa Derneği and The TEMA Foundation helped established new sites of scientific knowledge-creation about environmental degradation and have successfully used this knowledge to lobby the government for environmental protections.\textsuperscript{260} However, the government has also taken to new forms of governing lives. The AKP’s popular neoconservative policy-making, Sunni Islamist-nationalism, and increasing consolidation of power over Turkey’s military, education, and media shape news


\textsuperscript{259} Diane James, “Women’s Memory Symposium: Women’s Library and Information Center, Istanbul,” \textit{Journal of Middle East Women’s Studies} 5, no. 3 (August 5, 2009): 175–82.

\textsuperscript{260} Hande Paker et al., “Environmental Organisations in Turkey: Engaging the State and Capital,” \textit{Environmental Politics} 22, no. 5 (September 1, 2013): 760–78.
ideas about what kinds of citizenship and belonging are preferred in Turkey. The shape of the competition between this and queer organizing has increased hate speech, violence against and murder of LGBTQ individuals, and new forms of scrutinizing queer bodies.

CONCLUSION

Each period within the Turkish Republic’s history presents unique strategies and actors within the heteropatriarchal-nationalist government, yet it’s imperative to govern sexed bodies remains consistent. In the founding and maintenance of the First Republic, the Kemalist leadership adhered to traditional mentalities about family and women’s’ roles as reproductive agents because of an anxiety over the longevity of the nation. It also depended on the usage of the military as a technology of governing correct socio-biological reproductions against those that could not figure into an ideal Turkishness, making sure that ethnic minority groups, for example, were resettled and, sometimes, exterminated in order to produce an ideal population. As Peterson argues, “potentially reproductive women will be encouraged (pressured?) to bear children ‘for the nation’ while non-reproductive sexual activities will be discouraged (punished?) for undermining national objectives.” Heteronormative reproduction constituted technique of control with the recurrent military coups of the Second Republic, wherein democracy and popular governments themselves become paternalistically othered in the military’s pervasive control apparatuses. The militarized heteropatriarchal-nationalist government of this era is reproduced at all levels, including the hyperpartisan turf battles between the far right and left in local communities as well as in traditional familial relations.

The Second Republic saw the militarization of Turkish society, which ultimately sought to silence the position of women in public. In the atmosphere of violence and fear that pervaded daily life, men alone were permitted to engage in the only political voice available—violence against the other. The military itself demonstrated its paternalistic approach to democracy by marginalizing the government itself. This model was reproduced by terrorist groups, who benefitted from the military’s dismemberment of democratic process. As explored above, the government’s incorporation of militarism is necessarily a concern about the governance of sexuality because the identity of the soldier becomes a model identity for men. This model, I have shown, supposes dominance over the other, the disavowal of effeminacy, and the sequester of women to the private sphere.

Within the Third Republic, the military would finally lose its monopoly over the government, allowing a more neoconservative governmentality to take its place. The vacuum that the demise of the military left In the Third Republic allowed for the production of competing ideas about proper belonging, but without the violence mandated by the military governmentality. While the neoconservative AKP party dominates the techniques of heteropatriarchal-nationalist governance, identity and citizenship in Turkey is not simply monopolized by the state. Civil society has produced a basis for challenging constraints on heteronormative governance, which sometimes competes with other sectors within civil society. The rise of competing identity movements into the contemporary period created new forms of surveillance and securitization for those who would affiliate with non-heteronormative organizing, including widespread censorship of queer media and the denial of queer assembly. These topics will be explored in depth in the rest of the thesis.
Chapter Four
Assembling Turkish Queers

In this chapter, I argue that the queer is an assemblage produced in relations with a variety of institutions, objects, and processes. In the previous chapter, I demonstrated how the heteropatriarchal-nationalist government of the Turkish Republic has changed over time in the way that it institutes hierarchal relationships of heteronormative, nationalistic, racialized belonging over bodies. In the contemporary period, explicitly LGBTQ actors, new forms of globalization, and a changing media landscape have challenged the state’s control over queers. While I argue that queer identity is itself a special apparatus of control in part created by the state, now queers find themselves subject to other kinds of scrutiny and control by non-state actors and discourses. As Dean argues, assemblages can be thought of as a “regime of practices,” emphasizing their heterogeneous composition, particular historical trajectories, and polymorphous relations.\(^1\) Queerness is therefore an assemblage, constituted by ideas and material circumstances located between the state, the military, non-profit organizations, progressive and conservative media, and so forth and is utilized to shape different kinds of individuals’ actions. Yet queers also live, resisting and transforming understandings of queer identity as they define their relationship to these institutions. By thinking of the queer as an assemblage, I hope to demonstrate the confluence of power relationships bound up in managing sexuality in Turkey; sexuality was and is highly regulated by the state, but continues to be so in concordance and conflict with a range of other actors—including queers themselves.

I will use interview data to explore the assemblage of institutions, actors, and processes that produces queers. I also look to the ways queers have in turn shaped these institutions,

\(^1\) Dean, *Governmentality: Power and Rule in Modern Society*, 40.
demonstrating that resistance is constantly managed in the production of queer subjects. I proceed by exploring the institutions referred to by my informants, who identify a range of concerns, social pressures, and political events that contribute to the construction of their identity. These are the parts of the assemblage that— in conjunction with the body itself—materialize and govern queer others. I therefore focus my discussion on the linkages made between the institution and the queer in the pursuit of governance.

The institutions that my informants alluded to in our discussions about Turkish politics and queer life are diverse. They include traditional notions of institutions, like the military, as well as LGBTQ non-profit organizations, which my participants see as having more of an empowering influence within their lives. My informants also emphasized the significance of less tangible institutions, like Islam and the family. Other institutions hold more ambiguous positions in the production of sexuality— like the media, which ranges from state-owned and conservative-oriented television to more democratically accessible social media. The governance of queer bodies is not reducible to any single one of these institutions, but results from their interactions and the interactions of individuals with them. By framing the relationship between institutions and queer bodies in terms of my assemblage approach, I aim to demonstrate how bodies and institutions are affected by each other and that there is no primary locus for queer identity.

Further, I show how queer assemblage thinking utilizes interview and ethnographic data to examine the control of immanent queer bodies in a particular, contingent setting.

The following institutions appear throughout the interviews and comprise my subsequent discussion of the role of the institution in forming the public and what that means for the governance of queer individuals: Islam, the media, the family, corruption, NGOs, and the military and the police. As I explore these institutions in more detail, I am primarily concerned
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with drawing out the ways in which they affect and are affected by queers. I will therefore be focusing on: “truth-telling” by these institutions, their material limitations and attributes, their spaces, and how these all fit together with other institutions in Turkey. It is important to recognize that these institutions are situated within a certain space, time, and culture, materializing queer bodies in contingent circumstances. This contribution also demonstrates some of the particularities as well as the global convergences of how the queer other is materialized as a coherent, knowable entity by both queers themselves as well as other actors. It also looks to the incoherences in the image of the queer, which permits queer identity to become a site of active resistance.

NON-PROFIT ORGANIZATIONS

LGBTQ rights were placed on the agenda by a few, small, radical left parties in the late 1980s. This political mobilization was met by the establishment of LGBTQ non-profit organizations in the 1990s, which, as explored in the previous chapter, was an era when queer organizers were borrowing styles of resistance from feminist activists and EU integration was providing international pressure on the reform of rights. Most of these organizations are located in the urban West –especially in Istanbul and Ankara. However, smaller organizations are increasingly common within middle to large sized cities across the country. This includes organizations in Kurdish-majority cities, like the Hebun LGBT Association in Diyarbakir. LGBTQ organizations in Turkey were established for and enact a range of different functions, including university clubs (e.g. LuBUnya at Boğaziçi University), promoting positive media and

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3 Other examples include the Malatya Youth Initiative Against Homophobia and Transphobia in Eastern Anatolia, the Kocaeli LGBT Initiative, and ZeugMadi Gaziantep LGBT in the South-East. See: LGBTTI News Turkey, “LGBTTI Organizations in Turkey,” *LGBTTI News Turkey*, December 5, 2013, https://lgbtinewsturkey.com/list-of-lgbtti-organizations-in-turkey/.
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government representation (e.g. LGBTI News Turkey), networking for sexual/personal interests (e.g. Istanbul Bears), sex-worker advocacy (e.g. Red Umbrella), lobbying, activism, research (e.g. SPoD), and social welfare (e.g. Pink Life). One of the largest, most active advocacy/activist organizations in Turkey is Lambda Istanbul. Lambda Istanbul was founded in 1993 and has maintained a permanent office since 2002. The organization lacks any formal hierarchical structure: there is no chairperson and no salaried staff. The people who maintain the organization and create its programming are volunteers. The organization’s goal is to work against heterosexism in society broadly, and has undertaken many different forms of activism throughout its history. The organization hosts discussion hours on current events and topics pertinent to queer life, film screenings, informal drop-in/networking sessions, and maintains a library of LGBTQ related literature and historical documents in both English and Turkish. Lambda Istanbul also collaborates with academics and policymakers in researcher and the drafting of policy documents.

The organization registered as a nonprofit institution in 2006, but in 2007 the Istanbul Governor’s Office filed a complaint to close down the organization on the grounds that its objectives were “against the law and morality” and was in breach of article 56 of the Turkish Civil Code (banning organizations against morality) and article 41 of the Constitution (stating that the family is the cornerstone of Turkish society). The Beyoğlu 3rd Civil Court of First Instance ruled in favor of the Governor’s office, but the organization was accused of technical

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5 Lambdaistanbul, “Lambdaistanbul LGBTI Solidarity Association.”
errors in its statutes rather than for moral reasons (although these were never delineated by the court). Ten days before the court case, twelve policemen in plain clothes raided the Lambda Istanbul office, warning that the organization “facilitates prostitution, acts as a go-between [and] provides a place for [prostitution],” as criminalized under Article 227 of Turkey’s Penal Code. The state had previously targeted other LGBTQ organizations: in 2005 and 2006, the Ankara Governor’s Office attempted to close the activist and media organization KAOS-GL and the trans advocacy Pembe Hayat (Pink Life), claiming that these groups were actively destroying “morality and family structure.” While the Ankara cases were dropped, Lambda Istanbul was ordered to dissolve in 2008 –a verdict later overturned by the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court ruled that the organization had the right to exist, but threatened that they did not have the right to “spread” homosexuality. Yilmaz and Birdal argue that this vague judgement may yet expose the organization and others like it to risk in the future.

Although the institutions exist on precarious grounds, Lambda Istanbul continues to operate out of its Istanbul office. It has enjoyed significant growth since the Gezi Park protests. As an official at Lambda said:

I think [Gezi] has already brought a lot of new allies. So right now the LGBT movement has a larger support base in Turkey. A lot of people support it just as politically correct thing, they might not necessarily be LGBT friendly themselves, but they think it’s the right thing to do and that’s why they support it. People who are against the government, they support the LGBT movement because they see that we are also being prosecuted by the government as well.

12 Yilmaz and Birdal, “LGBT Rights in Turkey.”
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I will explore the role of LGBTQs in the Gezi Park Protests in a later chapter. However, it is significant that activists as Lambda Istanbul and Hevi saw themselves as leaders within that movement because of their prior experiences with activist organizing and police violence.\(^{14}\) One participant argued that trans people’s regular interactions with the police in particular has prepared them to lead others against political oppression.\(^{15}\) Lambda Istanbul’s experiences in organizing at Gezi, supporting sympathetic politicians, and ongoing social welfare efforts have garnered support for their movement across other social causes (like the conscientious objection movement and the anti-animal cruelty movement).\(^{16}\) Their increased visibility and coalition-building with other progressive causes means more mainstream political entities now take them seriously; because of the significant in-roads queer activists have made with other oppressed groups, mainstream parties like the CHP and HDP have both put forward LGBTQ activists to stand for local elections.\(^{17}\)

Another key Istanbul-based LGBTQ nonprofit organization is SPoD: Sosyal Politikalar, Cinsiyet Kimliği, ve Cinsel Yönelim Çalışmaları Derneği, which translates to the Social Policy, Gender Identity and Sexual Orientation Studies Association. In its official documentation, SPoD claims to support academic and policy-oriented research for the LGBTQ community in six dimensions: 1) economic and social rights, 2) legal issues, 3) political participation, 4) knowledge production, 5) media, and 6) international solidarity.\(^{18}\) It was founded in 2011 as a

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\(^{14}\) Interviewee O, interview by author, Istanbul, 2014.

\(^{15}\) Sedef Çakmak, interview by author, Istanbul, 2014.

\(^{16}\) “The HDP led its campaign for the 2015 parliamentary elections under the motto “We into the Parliament” (Biz’ler Meclise). Its platform centred on topics such as social and union rights, political freedoms, conscientious objection to military service, women, youth, the Kurdish question and the peace process with the PKK, as well as the reform of the judiciary. It promised to safeguard the rights of LGBTI persons to equality and a dignified life.” Zülfükar Çetin, “The Dynamics of the Queer Movement in Turkey,” Heinrich Böll Stiftung, September 30, 2015, 28, https://eu.boell.org/en/2015/09/30/dynamics-queer-movement-turkey.

\(^{17}\) Ibid.

\(^{18}\) SPoD, “About Us.”
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think-tank for LGBTQ issues. There is a clearly defined hierarchal structure, they produce academic research, and they are interested in policymaking and government processes rather than direct social welfare provision and activism:

[We do more] Social policy, for example. If you look at Lambda’s calendar, they’re more working on coming out. Or helping LGBT [sic] migrants. Or helping with LGBT imprisonment. Or organizing some event for newcomers, new students as LGBT to Istanbul. To host them, to help them. These kind of things. This is very important, I really like what they do and they organize pride—you know LGBT pride in Istanbul. I’m also on the organization committee, but the thing is there are huge problems about the constitution. SPoD also works for constitution. We have many psychiatric health clinical projects. We care about academia, but it’s not the only thing we do. We also do political representation.

The activists at SPoD emphasized the need for various approaches to activism for LGBTQ rights in Turkey. While they appreciate Lambda’s social networking and welfare services, SPoD provides a complementary role in producing policy documents to lobby government and international organizations for support. Some of SPoD’s key projects include compiling a Turkey-wide resource for trans people across the country that explains what it means to be trans, including their particular health and wellness concerns, and also lists trans-friendly doctors, lawyers, and social workers. Another project is an attempt to get parliamentarians to sign a pledge that promises they will commit themselves to furthering LGBTQ-friendly policies during their period in government. There is some crossover of people, knowledge, and resources between these organizations. For example, I met individuals during meetings at Lambda who worked for SPoD. Students who meet in Bogazici University’s LGBTQ group (called Lubunya) informed me that they not only participate in the protest events executed by SPoD and Lambda, but also volunteer and intern at both these organizations.

19 Ibid.
Lambda Istanbul and SPoD are pertinent cases for understanding the relationships between queers and nonprofit institutions, as they demonstrate how queer NGOs fill gaps left by mainstream society. For example, Lambda Istanbul translates individual experiences of LGBTQs for policymaking, academia, and community. It does this in a number of material ways. First, the organizations are physically located within Istanbul’s Beyoğlu neighborhood, contributing to a perception of the neighborhood as a kind of progressive oasis in the city. They host LGBTQ movie screenings, conduct safe-sex seminars and monthly HIV testing, and present guest speakers (recently including, a series of talks on violence against women). This provides opportunities for queer people to encounter other queer people in noncommercial settings.

I attended an English-language weekly meeting during my fieldwork there. I noticed that many of the meetings entailed an amount of venting of frustration about family, state, President Erdoğan, the military, and religion – the voicing of which can be dangerous in other spheres. Whereas religious or familial encounters can be anxiety-laden for queers, queer nonprofit institutions help facilitate discussion, social networking, and political organizing in a sex-positive space. These are spaces for the sharing of vital information regarding healthcare, queer-friendly legal advice, and dealing with the military. A 2013 internal evaluation at Lambda Istanbul confirms these findings. When asked to rate Lambda’s strengths, the most-responded answers by volunteers include: “Events,” “horizontal organization,” “love connections,” and its “place in Takism,” a central, historically diverse neighborhood in Istanbul. Queer NGOs therefore provide flexible opportunities for the empowerment of queer bodies, which are marginalized by a range of other institutions.

Although Turkey is nominally a secular society, its culture is informed by a distinct form of Islam, informing faith, personal life, rituals, and social norms. For many people, religion translates into daily practices and custom regarding marriage, funeral rites, conceptions of purity and dress, the spaces of mosques, and local elite leadership, some of which I explore here. A 2006 survey of nearly 50,000 people across Turkey provides a number of indicative findings about the country’s religious demographics: 99% of Turkey’s population of 75 million identify as Muslim. Of those, 82% are Hanafi Sunnis, 9% are Shafii Sunnis, and 5.73% are Alevi. The vast majority of Turkey’s population self-identifies as Muslim. Yavuz argues that this originates in Islam as an identity that brought together various disparate ethnic and linguistic groups during the independence war. The nature of state control over Islam in Turkey is officially referred to as “laicism,” wherein a state ministry differentiates between acceptable Sunni Islam and unlawful practices (entailing esoteric local customs, Alevi Islam, and Sufi orders).

The Kemalist state established the Presidency for Religious Affairs (referred to simply as the “Diyanet”) to replace the Ottoman caliphate in 1924. Diyanet’s directives have historically included appointing all imams and regional religious leaders (religious personnel are officially

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27 The report notes that Hanafi and Shafiis are generally united by adhering to Sunni Islam, whereas a greater division in practice is found between Sunnis and Alevi. Alevi are not recognized by the state as a minority religion, received no anti-discrimination protections, and receive no tax-breaks for mosques or educational institutions. See: Mark Hallam, “Turkey Discriminates against Alevi Faith, ECHR Rules,” Deutsche Welle, April 26, 2016, http://www.dw.com/en/turkey-discriminates-against-alevi-faith-echr-rules/a-19214883.
28 Yavuz, “Is There a Turkish Islam?,” 221.
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civil servants in Turkey), as well as teachers of religion in schools and universities. It is also responsible for creating and disseminating the weekly sermon to over 86,000 mosques in Turkey and 2,000 mosques abroad. While Diyanet always held a role in regulating the nature of Islam in Turkey, Öztürk argues that the AKP government transformed the Diyanet to more explicitly function as a mouthpiece for the state. In 2010, the AKP quadrupled Diyanet’s budget to over $2 billion and increased its staffing to over 120,000 people. It now recruits only pious Muslims (instead of secular civil servants), issues halal certifications for food, began a TV station in 2012, a telephone hotline in 2012, and opened the first religious kindergarten in 2016.

It has also begun enforcing a certain Turkish mentality toward queer others. In 2009, Diyanet published a proclamation denouncing the “unacceptable” spread of homosexuality, referring to it as “sexual behavior disorder.” Although Diyanet policies are not legal proclamations, it is difficult to quantify the impact such a decree will have given its enormous audience and influence on Turkish politics. As Keyman argues, the project of Turkish state secularism has actually led to a rise in religion as a mainstay of social cohesion and identity, as secularism has failed to adequately represent any given subset of Turkish society.

Although the Diyanet maintains significant control over religious practices in Turkey, Turkish (Sunni) Islam is still shaped by older Sufi customs, which have persisted despite

34 Ibid., 10.
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attempts at suppression by the state.\textsuperscript{37} For this reason, Sufi orders, like the Nakşibendi, maintain dense civil society networks, “…opening private high schools, hospitals, radio stations, local television stations, commercial companies, printing houses, and summer camps…,” blurring the boundaries between religious, business, and political association.\textsuperscript{38} There are more than 20 Nakşibendi orders in Istanbul alone and many past politicians can be linked to the Nakşibendi – including current President Tayyip Erdoğan.\textsuperscript{39} Mardin argues that Islamic organizations like the Nakşibendi are inseparable from thinking about Turkish politics: “All of the successful elements of modern Turkish Islamic politics have originated in later branchings of that group.”\textsuperscript{40} The most influential Islamist parties in Turkey have been and continue to be supported by Nakşibendi leaders.\textsuperscript{41} There are many different kinds of these religious networks in Turkey. Another influential example is MÜSİAD, which is an organization of small to medium businesses dedicated to furthering Islamic moral values in actualizing free-market capitalist development.\textsuperscript{42}

One interviewee argued that the Gülen movement – a Sufi network like the Nakşibendi — operates primarily by developing schools, universities, and dormitories for students. The interviewee told me that the Gülenists would provide these services for free or little cost, but then request service when these people found jobs afterward. He attended one of the Gülen preparatory courses for a year and described the social pressure they place on participants to conform to Islamic ethics: “…you go there, they give you food, they entertain, and you watch movies together… Then, for example, in the Ramadan month they come to you, ‘oh it’s time to fast.

\textsuperscript{37} Yavuz, “Is There a Turkish Islam?,” 219.
\textsuperscript{40} Şerif Mardin, “Turkish Islamic Exceptionalism Yesterday and Today: Continuity, Rupture and Reconstruction in Operational Codes,” \textit{Turkish Studies} 6, no. 2 (2005): 152.
\textsuperscript{42} Yavuz, \textit{Islamic Political Identity in Turkey}, 94.
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You don’t have to, but everybody’s doing it.” When I asked him if they ever conveyed any specific thoughts on homosexuality, he noted that they would gloss over “dangerous questions,” in an attempt to avoid confrontation and promote conformity. A different interviewee notes that Gülenist dormitories in urban settings are popular: “…when [rural transplants] can’t deal with modernity’s issues and they’re coming from a religious or conservative family, the Gülenists are the one that hold their hands and then they indoctrinate them.” Another participant recounted his negative experience at a Gülen dormitory: “You’re an abomination if you’re a homosexual. It’s a huge sin. If you’re not going to kill yourself, you have to sink yourself in religion, some meditation, you have to force yourself to be like us. And always deny that part.”

Almost all of my participants referred to Islam directly in our interviews. Some asserted that religion, or Islam, is incompatible with homosexuality: “Turkey has so many homophobic people and I think it’s about religion.” However, the same person confessed to having a belief in Allah. In one group discussion, one respondent vehemently asserted that any interpretation that allows for homosexuals is not Islam. This person specifically referred to the story of Lot in the Quran as evidence that Islam is not tolerant of queer people. In the same vein, one respondent claimed that LGBTQ people will never have rights in Turkey because of the influence of religion, but that kind of marginalization can be circumvented if one has access to enough money or influence. The same interviewee claims that the situation is worse in Arab countries, where they have to be more secretive. Further, while many LGBTQs have found

47 Ibid.
49 Ibid.
51 Ibid.
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ways to reconcile Islam with their sexuality, others have turned to other personal spiritual practices or become atheistic.\textsuperscript{52}

To complicate things further, some Turks interviewed do not regard themselves as queer or LGBTQ, yet both engage in what we in the west would refer to as queer sexual practices and are deeply religious.\textsuperscript{53} Although some of my respondents were very concerned with the influence of religion on the government and the family, one claimed most Turks are only culturally Muslim.\textsuperscript{54} Another interviewee asserted the need to remember intersectional categories when discussing Islam and sexuality, especially when the state uses ethnicity and religion to exclude Kurdish Alevi: “…they are part of the Islam, but they are not like ‘pure’ Islam.”\textsuperscript{55} Another respondent argues that the AKP government supports one kind of (Sunni) religious identity in order to group together all manner of “queer” identities: “…this divisive rhetoric is helping the government, the prime minister a lot because he’s putting his own voter base against these ‘radicals, vandals, Alevi, homosexuals, terrorists,’ – [all these] people together.”\textsuperscript{56}

A trend in these conceptions of Islam is that participants often referred to Islam as a monolith, like the state, which has an impact on their lives, whether by conditioning other people’s perceptions of queers negatively or, for a few, by providing them with spirituality. I argue that we can think about Islam in Turkey as another institution that creates knowledge about queer lives, contributing to how both queer and non-queer people understand what it means to be queer. Queer identity comes not just from Islam or from the state; it would be impossible to determine where exactly queer identity comes from. In exploring the role of religion in Turkey, its embeddedness in Turkish culture and politics, and the ways that queer people perceive of

\textsuperscript{52} Interviewee B, interview.
\textsuperscript{53} Interviewee G, interview.
\textsuperscript{54} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{55} Interviewee E, interview by author, Istanbul, 2014.
\textsuperscript{56} Interviewee O, interview.
religion, we can say that religion does shape queer lives to some degree. What’s more we can think about how Islam specifically relates to other institutions in defining (assembling) queer lives.

For example, when talking about his experience in receiving a military exemption for being homosexual, one participant reflected upon the integration of Islam and the state:

[I had to take a] character test. There are 500 questions…’Do you believe in God,’ and then yes or no –always a yes or no question. 30 questions after there is a question, ‘I know there is a God.’ Number 40 question, again, ‘God is my lord,’ something like that and you always say no…They ask you, ‘why are you here,’ you say, ‘well I’m a homosexual,’ he asks you what’s your [sexual] role, do you believe in God, do you believe in something, do you want to change your test?57

Although Turkey is officially a secular country, queer people must contend with religion on a daily basis in their familial relations, in consuming media, in education, and in having to deal with the military. Another interviewee talked about how one of their trans friends could not get medical help from a doctor because the doctor rejected her on religious grounds.58 One participant argued that Islam forces otherwise queer people to marry and establish traditional families.59 As I will continue exploring, Islam works with many of the other institutions named here to inform what it means to be a queer person; indeed, it is difficult at times to distinguish where Islam ends and the state begins, or how to distinguish concepts rooted in familial knowledge versus religious custom.

**THE MILITARY**

As prefaced in the previous chapter, the Turkish military historically plays a significant role in Turkish politics, deposing four governments seen as antithetical to the secularist,
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Kemalist state in 1960, 1971, 1980, and in 1997, in addition to a failed 2016 coup against
President Erdoğan’s AKP government. The military’s execution of repeated coups against
Governments reflects an imperative to protect the state against governments deemed too
Islamist. A number of factors signify the military as an autonomous, powerful institution in
Turkey. Its military is one of NATO’s largest armies, with over 500,000 active and 300,000
reserve personnel and expenditures of over $13.7 billion USD. While the military assisted in
NATO deployments in Afghanistan and the Balkans, its most protracted engagement continues
within the south-east of Turkey itself in what is referred to as the Kurdish-Turkish conflict
(against the Kurdistan Worker’s Party, or, PKK). Tens of thousands have died on both sides of
the conflict, which began in the early 1970s. Kerem Öktem argues that the AKP government is
transforming the region into a “state of exception” by escalating the military presence there,
broadening the prosecution of “terrorists” to include Kurdish journalists and politicians amongst
other human rights abuses. Still, the military enjoys an exceptional level of popularity among
the Turkish people (in comparison to other national military forces). However, the military’s
governance of queer bodies is similar to that of other institutions discussed here. It is referred to
as a coherent entity, yet actually elicits a range of perspectives in conversation with queer
people. An exploration of the Turkish military’s interactions with the queer body demonstrates

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63 Ibid., 147–48.


66 In the 1999-2000 World Values Survey, 61% of Turkish respondents have a “great deal of confidence” in their military, compared to 33% in the United States. See: Zeki Sarigil, “Deconstructing the Turkish Military’s Popularity,” Armed Forces & Society 35, no. 4 (July 1, 2009): 709–12.
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that rather than being autonomous or monolithic, the military develops its governance of sexuality in association with other institutions, like Islam and the family.

While all queer men must negotiate how they will handle compulsory conscription at some point in their lives (starting from the age of 21), it is still unlawful to be a homosexual in the military.67 As explored above, however, the construction of Turkish citizenship depends upon the correct performance of patriarchal clichés and military duties, wherein homosexual failure to participate in the military and perform masculinist stereotypical behaviors are associated with disloyalty.68 I asked my participants to consider their experience with the military, and found many expressed fear, distrust, and anger toward the institution. Many of my participants conveyed their sentiments about the military not in terms of their participation, but in terms of how they were avoiding service. One participant argued that while some can stay closeted, not all queer people can “…hide it, they might be afraid that they will be treated badly there…You cannot really survive 15 months as an out gay man there…”69 Another claimed that the military depends upon dated pathologies of homosexuality, which inform a negative culture within the military itself:

The Turkish armed forces uses DSM 3 from 1968, which considers homosexuality a psycho-sexual disorder. This has been updated how many times? Let’s say you’re a guy and you’re in the military and then all of a sudden you hear about what gay people have to do to get out of the military – that your only outlet of information. You’re going to think they’re sick.70

The notion of homosexuality as a kind of disease is a military mentality that is buttressed by techniques of controlling unfit bodies. In a recent BBC interview, a Turkish army general agreed

67 Yılmaz and Birdal, “LGBT Rights in Turkey.”
68 Funda Gençoğlu Onbaş, “Paid Military Service at the Intersection of Militarism, Nationalism, Capitalism, and (Hetero)patriarchy: Escaping without Leaving ‘manhood,’” Citizenship Studies 20, no. 6–7 (October 2, 2016): 886.
69 Interviewee O, interview.
that queer men are unfit for the military, as they would require separate living facilities. The article also argues that the army has placed pressure on medical doctors to determine whether or not a person is homosexual, which is an unstandardized and ambiguous process.

There are a number of ways people circumvent military service. Service can be postponed if one is studying in a degree program and university graduates can have their service reduced to six months. Turkish nationals who were over the age of 27 at the end of 2014 are exempt if they pay a 6,000 Euro fee and Turks who have been living outside of the country for more than three years can pay a reduced 1,000 Euro fee. Some of the people I talked to went through with their service, some used ailments to avoid service, and some have depended upon study and overseas experiences to defer their service. The ones that have attempted to reduce or defer their service did so by moving abroad for long periods of time, extending their studies, paying the fees to become exempt, or faking illnesses that would disqualify them.

The reason many do not come forward about their homosexuality, which would release them from service, is because the process of receiving a so-called “rotten report” is humiliating. This includes being forced to undergo a psychiatric evaluation, which scrutinizes the individual for established stereotypes about homosexuality, childhood experiences, and history of sexual encounters in order to establish whether or not they are truly homosexual. In some cases people are sent for rectal exams, wherein a surgeon checks for anal deformations as evidence of one’s

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72 Ibid.
75 Interviewee O, interview; Interviewee B, interview; Interviewee K, interview.
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homosexuality.\(^77\) The draftees are called in front of a panel in order to discuss each case individually, which entails more questioning and observation for supposedly effeminate characteristics.\(^78\) These committees have also notoriously demanded photographic evidence of men being sexually penetrated—in addition to a clear view of both participating men’s faces.\(^79\) Other accounts of this process include men being asked to provide photographs of themselves in women’s clothing, the examination of men’s mannerisms and voice, and questions about one’s childhood toys and whether they enjoy sports.\(^80\) One respondent argued that the military is so invasive in the rotten report process supposedly in order to deter straight men, who might try to avoid service by claiming to be homosexual.\(^81\) In some cases (especially in smaller towns) this information is not kept securely, leading to the outing of queer people.

It is common practice to ask for evidence of completed military service in applying for jobs in Turkey.\(^82\) The rotten report can not only disqualify job applicants from positions (especially in any kind of government or public service), but, in a culture where military service is seen as a rite of passage, this effectively “outs” applicants and can lead to further marginalization within communities.\(^83\) An example of this is the 2009 case of Halil İbrahim Dinçdağ, who lost his job of fourteen years as a soccer referee after it was revealed he had been expelled from the military for a “psychosexual disorder.”\(^84\) This expulsion depends upon complicities between the military, pseudo-scientific knowledge, and nationalist-popular

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\(^77\) Ibid., 570.
\(^78\) Ibid., 570–72.
\(^79\) Interviewee K, interview.
\(^80\) Azizlerli, “Proving You’re Gay to the Turkish Army.”
\(^81\) Interviewee B, interview.
\(^82\) Basaran, “‘You Are Like a Virus,’” 568.
\(^83\) Ibid.
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stereotypes, which materialize Dinçdağ’s body (and other queer bodies) as pathologically
dangerous, amoral, and anti-nationalistic.

One of my participants reported that they were forthright about their sexuality to the
military and endured invasive testing to ensure their dismissal. They did not have to provide
any kind of photographic evidence, but were still subject to extensive interrogation. They
claimed that scathing press in the EU had pressured the military into halting the need for visual
confirmation. The Turkish military reclassified homosexuality as a chosen behavioral disorder
instead of an illness in 2013. However, men continue to be subject to bodily scrutiny, wherein
their physicality and mannerisms are evaluated for supposedly effeminate traits.

There are few women in the Turkish military (some 1,350 officers as of 2014) although
the military has initiated efforts to recruit more. Only certain routes to military service are open
to women and they mostly occupy administrative, medical, and non-combatant roles. I
therefore could not find any women to interview about queer experience in the military. The lack
of integration of women confirms Kancı and Altınay’s argument, that Turkish citizenship is
foremost a heterosexual male experience, wherein male soldiers protect the nation and its
women.

The interview accounts primarily focus on how having to demonstrate one’s
homosexuality is an emotionally disturbing and humiliating process. It is also a means by which

85 Interviewee D, interview.
86 Ibid.
90 Kancı and Altınay, “Educating Little Soldiers and Little Ayışes: Militarised and Gendered Citizenship in Turkish Textbooks,” 57–58.
queers are made knowable in Turkey, wherein medical experts, military personnel, and state officials are constantly making decisions about individual queer bodies. Homosexuality is seldom acknowledged by the state and is absent in law. But conscription is a central event in men’s lives in Turkey, where men’s bodies become a site of contestation, scrutiny, and control in their encounter with the military. If men follow through with the conscription and remain silent about their sexuality, a number of benefits are bestowed upon them. These include the participation in the military as a familial rite-of-passage, and the upholding of honor, correct citizenship, and masculinity.91 As an interviewee who went through with his service said,

I had a right to not go and tell them, ‘hey I’m gay,’ but I knew that they’re going to ask me those weird photos of intercourses and lots of inhumane approach on the people, individuals. So I said, ‘I’d rather go.’ And I can also use this as a shield for my future career, because that’s the only way I can survive…My family invested in me, I invested in myself, so I need to utilize this career somehow in Turkey…92

Therefore, for those that can remain silent about their sexuality, or those who cannot afford another way out, military service can bestow a “shield” of normalcy. However to fail the conscription process results in public humiliation, outing as a homosexual, familial repercussions, and potential inability to secure employment.

When I describe the military as a part of the way queer identity is formed, I refer to how queer individuals are scrutinized psychologically and physically in order to confirm certain stereotypes of queers as week and a threat to soldiers’ homosocial comradery. As Judith Butler argues, it is the scrutiny of the body by means of discourse and expertise which materializes gender differences.93 In the conscription process, the identification of queer people is bodily: military personnel and doctors depend upon and reproduce knowledge about queer bodies, which

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93 Butler, Bodies That Matter: On the Discursive Limits of “Sex.”
enables them to look for supposed signs of homosexuality. These seem arbitrary, including the wearing of women’s clothing/make-up/perfume; being clean-shaven; one’s mannerisms and build; and, notably, the visual evidence of being penetrated by another man. In turn, its defining of queer bodies allow the military to distance itself from effeminacy to create an ideal model of citizenship based on tropes of strength and violence. Taken as part of the queer assemblage, these stereotypes about queers are produced in other institutions as well. As I have noted above in discussing Islam, one of my respondent’s psychological tests repeatedly questioned the draftee’s faith in God. As I discuss below, negative stereotypes about homosexuals are assembled across institutions, which together depict queers as weak, immoral, and perverse. This is seen in the AKP’s official rhetoric; the invisibility of positive representations of queer people in the media; the preponderance of hate speech in the media; and familial and religious values regarding heteronormative relationships.94

THE GOVERNMENT

Most of the participants talked about the state in overwhelmingly negative terms, but many also asserted that the state could also offer opportunities for change through electoral politics. Here I generally am referring to Turkey’s AKP government under President Erdoğan. Although same-sex practices have never been illegal in Turkey, queer people face many different kinds of marginalization by the Turkish government—particularly in terms of how it represents or silences queer voices as well as the making of queer bodies visible or invisible via morality laws. For example, the AKP has thwarted attempts to pass anti-discrimination laws of any kind. Queer people are not allowed to serve in the military, adopt, marry, or donate blood. There is no hate

94 See the notable gay “honor killing” or Ahmet Yildiz, which some local activists responded to as a problem rooted in entrenched familial and religious norms. LGBTI News Turkey, “The Case of Ahmet Yildiz: Violation of the Right to Life,” LGBTI News Turkey, September 17, 2013, https://lgbtinewsturkey.com/2013/09/17/ahmet-yildiz-murder/.
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crime legislation, and anti-queer honor killings go unprosecuted. Queer media is censored, while anti-queer hate speech goes uncensored. In this section, I explore some of the more important facets of the government’s intervention into queer lives, with a focus on the role of the state in governing and materializing the queer other.

According to my interviewees, the government is antagonistic to other elements of society which do not adhere to an idealized model of Turkish citizenship: “The basic principle for government is ‘if you are not one of us, you are one of them.’” My informants view the AKP with skepticism, asserting that lawmakers, politicians, and the enforcement of their laws through the police represent a homophobic regime. They express concern about their inability to fit into the norms they see being produced by a government increasingly aligned with conservative religious and familial values. They argue that this translates into day-to-day violence for themselves and for others who cannot fit within a heteropatriarchal-nationalist ideal. The state produces similar tropes about homosexuality expressed within family, Islam, media, and military discourses; when analyzing these declarations, the lines between these institutions become unclear. For example, in the aftermath of the 2016 massacre at a gay nightclub in Orlando, Florida, the pro-Erdoğan news outlet Yeni Akit celebrated the incident, claiming that only “perverts” and “deviants” died. Whereas critical news outlets have been shut down by the AKP (the government prosecuted dozens of journalists for “terrorism” in 2015 alone), the lack of scrutiny of publications like Yeni Akit’s is understood as de facto support of its views. In 2011, the government used its communications directorate to ban the usage of the word

95 Ibid.
97 Interviewee G, interview.
98 Focus Group Interview at Lambda Istanbul, interview.
“gay” in domain names and websites. Before the 2015 elections, Erdoğan derided openly gay People’s Democratic Party candidate Baris Sulu, proclaiming that his party “…won’t appoint a homosexual candidate from Eskisehir.” At the same time, the Minister of Family and Social Policy, Ayşenur İslam, announced that the state housing agency would no longer subsidize one bedroom apartments as they do not “protect the integrity of the family,” effectively foreclosing queer peoples’ ability to live in low-income housing in addition to discriminating against straight people without children, which reflects a very particular mentality enabling heteronormative reproduction.

By reproducing norms about the primacy of the heterosexual family and Islam in Turkish society, the state defines proper citizenship against queer bodies. In what follows, I chart these discursive interrelationships by exploring my interviewees’ comments on the government. This shows how the AKP government (amongst other institutions) plays a significant role in both other peoples’ conceptions of queer identity and their own conceptions of self.

Many of my participants understand the state in terms of President Erdoğan alone, who was Prime Minister at the time of writing. Some of my informants consider him to be the locus of power within the Turkish state: a cult-like leader, a manipulator, and excessively chauvinistic. “We don’t have press freedoms…Everything is getting through approval of PM right now. He is the one man.” One notable way he demonstrates heteronormative values at the expense of queer bodies is in the assertion of women’s reproductive roles: “…Because of Erdoğan’s behavior and trying to restrict people, he even wanted to get in their beds: ‘you should bear 3

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103 Interviewee K, interview.
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children…’ He was also against birth control and abortion.” Erdoğan is known for his repeated public calls for women to have 3 children; in 2016, he went so far as to state that “Rejecting motherhood means giving up on humanity.” Identifying women’s “humanity” insofar as they reproduce denies queer women’s possibility of belonging in society.

Some participants conflate Erdoğan’s paternalistic speech, his control over the media, the electoral system, the police, and the military. For example, two expressed fear that he was stealing the 2014 elections. Another noted his ability to control and manipulate the media and popularity among the police. They understand Erdoğan’s increasing consolidation of power as confirmation that the AKP government maintains significant control over all of these state institutions. In some of my informal conversations, Erdoğan’s tyranny was confirmed by his recreation of the role of the presidency (where once it was more ceremonial), after he became president in 2014. Now, in 2016, his presidential powers are heightened even further, prompting further anxiety by queer people about his influence over the institutions that direct their daily lives.

Several participants also pointed to Turkish law as a site of state-based discrimination against LGBTQs. Article 29, for example, contains references to “provocation” as grounds for lesser punishment for murder, a defense used to lower the sentences for the murders of queer people. This happened in the cases of Abdülباقي Koşar, a gay journalist, in 2006 and Yelda

104 Interviewee G, interview.
106 Interviewee O, interview.
107 Interviewee B, interview; Interviewee E, interview.
108 Interviewee G, interview.
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Yıldırım, a lesbian murdered by her girlfriend’s husband in 2004. The problem of queer hate crimes continues to be a concern for many queer activists in Turkey — 12 people were murdered in 2012 alone for being queer.

Now we don’t even have hate-crime laws, that’s why we have to fight for it. Many of our friends have been killed, have been kidnapped or teased, bullied by their family or by their friends and we cannot protect them. So we really need the law, especially [for those] under 18…since AKP government…everything got worse...

The above participant argues that anti-discrimination legislation, including the establishment of hate-crime laws, would be a significant step for the advancement of queer rights in Turkey.

The problem of the lack of anti-discrimination laws is complemented by wide-scale censorship of queer representation in media. Courts have used Article 28 of the Constitution, which regulates the freedom of expression and asserts the need to censor “immoral” media and publications. Law 5651 on the internet gives wide license for the Turkish Telecommunications Directorate to ban access to websites that offend “Turkishness,” denigrate Atatürk, or contain content inciting “suicide, pedophilia, drug abuse, obscenity, or prostitution.” The state uses these pieces of legislation to shut down thousands of websites, ban books, and keep LGBTQ-themed movies and TV shows from airing in the country. Notably, the gay dating app “Grindr” was banned in 2013. Also banned was Transsick-O, an online repository of information for trans men in Turkey, in addition to thousands of other websites that feature “high-risk terms,” like “gay” or “anal.” In 2014, over 60,000 websites (gay-themed and otherwise) were blocked,

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111 Ibid., 5.
113 Interviewee E, interview.
115 Clones of Grindr have proliferated in its place — especially “Hornet,” which I used during my field work (see methodology chapter).
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22,645 without court approval during that year. During my fieldwork in March, before the local elections, all of twitter was blocked for two weeks and YouTube was blocked for two months.

Beyond censorship on grounds of morality, there is censorship of criticism of the state. The highly controversial Article 301 of the Turkish Penal Code, for example, prescribes a prison sentence between six months to two years for those found guilty of denigrating “the Turkish nation,” which also entailed offenses aimed at the Republic, the Assembly, the military and police, and the judiciary. The government has prosecuted hundreds of dissidents using Article 301, notoriously shutting down YouTube in 2007 after Greek users claimed Atatürk was a homosexual.

The 1991 Law on the Fight Against Terror has been used to censor and imprison reporters for exploring leftist, Kurdish, and LGBTQ issues. Finally, there are multiple instances where the slandering of government officials – especially Prime Minister Erdoğan – has resulted in significant penalties. A notable example is from 2013, when Erdoğan prosecuted an LGBTQ activist, Pişkin, for supposedly calling him a “fag [ibne],” which is ironic, as these homophobic epithets are never subject to prosecution when used against anyone else. After Pişkin was tried and fined for slander, he was brought back to trial by Erdoğan’s lawyers because

118 Scott, “Turkey’s YouTube and Twitter Bans Show a Government in Serious Trouble.”
122 LGBTI News Turkey, “Levent Pişkin: ‘It Was Not Me; It Was the State of Being a Fag* That Was Judged,’” LGBTI News Turkey, May 29, 2014, https://lgbtinewsturkey.com/2014/05/29/levent-piskin-it-was-not-me-it-was-the-state-of-being-a-fag-that-was-judged/.
he did not find the punishment punitive enough. Pişkin was then ordered to pay 10 thousand liras on top of his original 1500 lira fine.\textsuperscript{123}

Based on Articles 56 of the Civil Code, which forbids organizations deemed against morality, and 41 of the Constitution, which provides that the “...family is the foundation of Turkish society,”\textsuperscript{124} LGBTQ organizations in Turkey have faced an uphill battle in their freedom of assembly. In 2013, Istanbul’s yearly pride parade attracted some 100,000 participants—in part because it occurred alongside the Gezi Park protests — and was met with the use of water cannons by police.\textsuperscript{125} One participant said that it was a peaceful protest, but that the police used excessive force in routing them.\textsuperscript{126} However, the governor of Istanbul attempted to ban the LGBTQ pride parade in 2015 (on the day of the parade), which also resulted in violent confrontations with police.\textsuperscript{127} Again in 2016, the government banned the pride march, citing “security concerns,” yet again relying heavily on police, water cannons, and tear gas to disperse the movement.\textsuperscript{128}

Beyond their attempts to isolate protests, the police marginalize queer people in a variety of other ways. Istanbul police routinely provide arbitrary fines to trans people for violating public morality. Several respondents reported that trans people’s absence from the law leaves them especially vulnerable to violence, because, for example, punishments are lessened against trans people and sex workers.\textsuperscript{129} The police raided a local bath house in 2014, taking 60 men into

\textsuperscript{123} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{125} Çetin, “The Dynamics of the Queer Movement in Turkey.”
\textsuperscript{126} Interviewee M, interview by author, Istanbul, 2014.
\textsuperscript{129} Interviewee B, interview.
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custody. One participant argues that police tend to side with heterosexual assailants in cases of anti-queer violence. One activist involved explains that it should be a top priority for LGBTQ-friendly politicians to make the police undergo training in diversity, noting that their discrimination against LGBTQ people belies Turkey’s status as a signatory to the European Convention on Human Rights.

Activists and those within LGBTQ nonprofit institutions express concern about these and other challenges by the government to criminalize non-normative bodies. However, some of them differentiated the government from the state, and express a need to defeat the AKP government while gaining more legitimacy within state apparatuses. One of my interviewees, who represented the new Kurdish LGBTQ group, Hevi, believes in government as something to be reformed: “We believe there must be an organization to work towards protecting the rights of LGBTs by working closely with the government to make sure that basic human rights for LGBTs are protected by law in Turkey.” Bringing queer people into the scope of government is a strategy that I believe is informed by the Kurdish experience of being historically excluded by the state –especially in terms of recognition and representation. She explores the problem of a lack of intersectional recognition for Kurdish queer people within Turkey: “…if you do not mention your identity or ethnicity, you are automatically considered as Turkish, that’s why we want to emphasize our being Kurdish and LGBT.” I explore Hevi in more depth in the following chapter, which focuses more particularly on trans experience in Turkey.

131 Interviewee B, interview.
132 Interviewee Q, interview.
135 Asya Elmas and Hevi Members, interview.
Another instructive interview was with self-identified lesbian activist Sedef Çakmak, who ran as a CHP candidate for the Beşiktaş Municipality Assembly in 2014 and lost by a slim margin.\footnote{Çakmak, interview.} Sedef also sits on the board of SPoD and works with Lambda Istanbul. Her experiences lobbying local government, running for local assembly, and her activism make her a privileged source of information regarding the relations between the state and LGBTQs. Sedef campaigned on a platform that asserted the state has for too long neglected LGBTQ issues. For example, she is explicit about the invisibility of women in politics in general and lesbians in particular: “Politicians’ statements on women, ranging from their clothes to how they should behave, are increasing every day. The mentality ignoring the woman’s intellect and will constitutes significant pressure on us.”\footnote{LGBTI News Turkey, “Lesbian Municipal Assembly Member Sedef Çakmak and Mayor Murat Hazinedar on LGBTI Rights and Politics,” \textit{LGBTI News Turkey}, March 13, 2015, https://lgbtinewsturkey.com/2015/03/13/lesbian-municipal-assembly-member-sedef-cakmak-and-mayor-murat-hazinedar-on-lgbti-rights-and-politics/.} By contesting party politics, she sees herself as helping provide greater representation to queer women by helping counteract the negative discourses produced by misogynistic politicians. In our conversation, she argued that it should not be the responsibility of LGBTQ NGOs to provide welfare, social services and representation to queer people, but that should be the state’s job: “I’m so angry at our irresponsible state, I’m just reminding them of their responsibilities.”\footnote{Çakmak, interview.} She wanted to establish a government-funded hotline for LGBTQ people that would connect the population to LGBTQ-friendly social welfare practitioners. She also proposed the opening of a shelter for LGBTQ individuals, which is a model she and others within SPoD have been studying from Canada. Sedef also wants LGBTQ sensitivity trainings for all local government officials. Finally, she showed concern about the nature of urban development in greater Istanbul and in one particular neighborhood in her municipality that has traditionally
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been the home of trans, Roma, and other minority groups. Although Sedef believes that her country’s government’s treatment of LGBTQ people is akin to the prosecution of LGBTQs in Russia, she does believe that at least in her own party and in her own district that tangible changes are possible. After entering a substitute assembly position in 2014, she became a full assembly member in 2015.  

One of SPoD’s greatest victories was the establishment of a charter in 2014, which listed a number of guidelines that political candidates should adhere to if they wished to be queer-friendly. Officially the LGBTİ Dostu Belediyecilik Protokol (LGBTI Friendly Municipality Protocol), SPoD managed to have over 30 mayoral candidates sign the document, which reads:

I, the undersigned candidate for…, declare my commitment:

To take concrete steps to bring forth an egalitarian, libertarian, transparent and participatory local administration mentality and will work to protect and improve LGBTI people’s rights and freedoms,

To actualize policies that will allow LGBTI people to equally benefit from access to public services, the right to health care, the right to housing, the right to employment, and the right to transportation,

To consider these policies in budget preparations,

To cooperate with LGBTI associations and initiatives to ensure that city services are encompassing,

To draft regulations of non-discrimination based on sexual orientation and gender identity within the municipality,

To provide training to municipality employees on LGBTI rights and discrimination,

To be an LGBTI-friendly mayor.

Four candidates who signed the document won their respective elections, including one mayoral candidate in Mersin and three within Istanbul. In the 2015 parliamentary elections, SPoD

139 LGBTI News Turkey, “LGBTI Activist Sedef Çakmak Is Now a Municipal Assembly Member,” LGBTI News Turkey, March 2, 2015, https://lgbtinewsturkey.com/2015/03/02/lgbti-activist-sedef-cakmak-is-now-a-municipal-assembly-member/.
140 LGBTI News Turkey, “SPoD’s LGBTI-Friendly Municipality Protocol.”
amended the protocol into a pledge to develop LGBTQ rights within the Grand National Assembly. Out of 64 candidates who signed the pledge, 22 signatories are now MPs in Turkey’s 25th parliament. These MPs constitute both the HDP, which crossed the 10% electoral voting threshold for the first time in 2015, as well as the established CHP.

SPoD’s successes are at least partially credited to their 2015 “Politics School” campaign. SPoD hosted a series of seminars on a range of issues from lobbying workshops, LGBTQ history, law, and organizing practices to pressure candidates into being outspoken about their stances on LGBTQ rights. Perhaps their greatest victory is visible in their emerging relationship with the HDP. Before the presidential elections at the end of 2014, HDP co-chairman Selahattin Demirtaş’ expressed support for LGBTQ rights – the first time a presidential candidate has done so: “The LGBT movement, which has adopted the motto that the salvation of homosexuals will also free heterosexuals, is also making efforts to develop comradery with all of the oppressed.” This prompted 12 LGBTQ associations from across the country to release a statement supporting the HDP unconditionally: “We are making public that we support the candidate of the people and change in the presidential elections, Selahattin Demirtaş, who has made a call for a new life based on freedom, equality, fraternity and peace and who has defended human rights without making exceptions.” Local pressure from groups like SPoD as well as international pressure from the European Union accession process have

143 SPoD, “LGBTİ Dostu Belediyecilik Protokolü İmzaçıları.”
146 Ibid.
much to do with the opening of government and party politics to engagement with LGBTQs in earnest.\footnote{Yılmaz and Birdal, “LGBT Rights in Turkey.”} Finally, another group that deserves mention is the LGBTQ supporters of the AKP. Every person I spoke with either condemned or felt apathetic toward the AKP administration. However, during the 2014 local elections, a Facebook group that advertised itself as the AK Parti LGBT Bireyleri (AK Party for LGBT Individuals) was formed. When I brought this group up at a Lambda Istanbul meeting, a few members expressed outraged: “That doesn’t make any sense. The LGBT AKP group? They’re two opposite things.” Another said, “‘They’re some confused people.’\footnote{Focus Group Interview at Lambda Istanbul, interview.} When I asked the group why some LGBTQs might mobilize for the AKP, I received a number of responses. One claimed that these people benefitted from the economic policymaking of the AKP.\footnote{Ibid.} Another argued it was pressure from their families and religious commitments.\footnote{Ibid.} Finally, another participant argued that a disdain for non-Turkish minorities is common; many perceive Kurds in particular as destabilizing the country: “…so AKP these are very nationalist so they’re against this political claiming of ethnic identities, even though they might be Kurdish or something they say ‘No we are all Turkish citizens.’…And the one unifying thing for them is religion –everybody is Muslim for them.”\footnote{Ibid.} I was not able to interview a member of the AKP LGBTQ group, but I think that the responses from the group meeting explain some of the key reasons why LGBTQs would vote for the AKP. Namely, they may be concerned about the disintegration of Turkish identity due to the rising Kurdish presence in politics, who were once and continue to be associated with terrorism and destabilization in

\footnote{Ibid.}
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Turkey.\(^{152}\) Their Twitter account, for example, continuously condemns the HDP as terrorists, uses the PKK and HDP as interchangeable acronyms, and attacks all the other LGBTQ activist movements as supporting terrorism by supporting the HDP.\(^{153}\)

Further, the electoral successes of the AKP were at least partially due to the stabilization and growth of the economy during its reign, something that may have won over many LGBTQ individuals. These include various deregulations in terms of tax law and banking reforms which benefitted many small to mid-size businesses.\(^{154}\) One of my participants did originally support the AKP when they first came to power in 2002, arguing that Erdoğan was crucial to the stabilization of the country:

…If Tayyip didn’t modernize the country in the beginning of the 2000s, with European laws and everything, if he didn’t put the army away from politics and back into the barracks, we would have never had an idea of protest because the army would have come and just kill all of us like they did in the 80s…He saved us from the military. You have no idea –military generals were like the dog owners and the political leaders were dogs.\(^{155}\)

This participant asserts that the AKP has restructured the government to be independent from the military and reinvigorated the economy with popular success.\(^{156}\) Their neoliberal politics have won them many hearts and minds, and thus the other parties have not been able to mount an effective critique.\(^{157}\) There is also a parallel between the patriarchal discourse and imagery of Atatürk as founder of the nation state and Erdoğan as savior from the military that cannot be
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ignored as an important symbol in the capture of the nation’s votes. Finally, one participant argued that the nature of the AKP’s discrimination against queer minorities is often indirect, depending upon concerns of public morality, the silencing of queer voices, and complicity with hate-speech in media rather than outright discrimination.

THE FAMILY

In this section, I explore some of the ways the institution of the Turkish family governs queer identity. I begin by considering some recent sociological literature on Turkish families. A trend throughout these works is how familial norms cross-pollinate in the media, government, and religious truth-telling. I then turn to explore how my participants understood family. Several of them connect the Turkish family with heteronormative values, yet the impact of this is different for different queers. A common theme emerges regarding familial expectations about heterosexual marriage and reproduction, while some also talked about the gendered division of labor. In Turkey, many men prevent their wives from working, or only allow them to work where they will not encounter other men. These notions of proper relationships, child-rearing, and gendered labor impact stereotypes about masculinity and femininity – individuals who do not perform these gender roles properly are subject to familial scrutiny. My participants also approach the idea of the family by discussing “the closet,” effeminacy; the contrast between

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158 Erdoğan’s comments sought to depict his predecessors as an alien elite whose European affectations marked them as indifferent to the needs and culture of the masses. Ataturk worked to paint the late Ottoman dynasty in the same light, saying the Sultans who presided over the Empire’s dissolution were “foreign usurpers,” “madmen and spendthrifts,” whose depravity endangered the Turkish nation. Nick Danforth, “Why Erdoğan Is like Ataturk,” Politico, December 28, 2015, http://www.politico.eu/article/president-erdogan-like-ataturk-turkey-democracy-nationalism/.

159 Focus Group Interview at Lambda Istanbul, interview.

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Western-styled LGBTQ identities and older queer sexual practices; and the mirroring of these familial values across other Turkish institutions, especially in the AKP government.

The Turkish family can be characterized by both processes of broadly termed Westernization as well as the continuity of local values.\footnote{Serap Kavas and Arland Thornton, “Adjustment and Hybridity in Turkish Family Change: Perspectives from Developmental Idealism,” \textit{Journal of Family History} 38, no. 2 (April 1, 2013): 223–24.} The EU accession process facilitated significant changes to family law: changes to the Turkish civil code in 2002 and 2004 guarantee the equality of men and women within the family, wherein women no longer have to ask their husbands for permission to be employed and marital rape is criminalized.\footnote{Ibid., 230.} However, Westernization does not fully shape the nature of Turkish families. A number of different indicators from the Turkish Statistical Institute (a government agency) are informative here. For example, in 2015, 66.9\% of households were comprised of a nuclear family, including two heterosexual parents and at least one child.\footnote{“Statistics on Family 2015,” \textit{Turkish Statistical Institute}, May 11, 2016, http://www.turkstat.gov.tr/PreHaberBultenleri.do?id=21523.} In 2016, 59.9\% of first marriages were arranged by the family, with 12.1\% of those occurring without the opinion of the person being wed.\footnote{“Family Structure Survey 2016,” \textit{Turkish Statistical Institute}, January 18, 2016, http://www.turkstat.gov.tr/HbPrint.do?id=21869.} 28.2\% of women married in 2016 were under 18, yet this number was only 5.6\% for men. While the majority of people undergo arranged marriages, LGBTQs cannot be legally married in a LGBTQ relationship, and therefore may feel familial pressure to remain closeted. Further, more than a quarter of all women married are underage; this reflects Rich’s argument, wherein the forced marriage of underage women constitute ways of controlling women’s sexuality and enforcing compulsory heteronormativity.\footnote{Rich, “Compulsory Heterosexuality and Lesbian Existence,” 638–39.} Scalco argues the “surveillance of marriage” in Turkey begins well before the actual age of marriageability, wherein families strictly monitor the home space to

\begin{thebibliography}{99}
\item Ibid., 230.
\end{thebibliography}
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to ensure girls maintain their virginity until marriage, the only permissible locus of sex. For example, she shows that women are less likely to purchase condoms because of an anxiety of being seen buying them or having them at home, preferring the “withdrawal” method instead.

Familial norms further encapsulate expectations surrounding reproduction. 31.4% of the population said the ideal number of children is 3 (reflecting Erdoğan’s claim). 37.6% of the population expressed a preference for elderly family members to live with their children. The taken-for-granted understanding that one’s children will reproduce establishes the inability to do so as a significant social failing. Further, parents often dictate their children’s education and career choices, steering boys toward traditionally masculine careers and girls towards feminine careers.

97.1% of all marriage ceremonies were both religious and civil. Weddings are traditionally extravagant affairs; usually 3 day ceremonies, including the groom’s family members’ visit to the bride’s house to ask her father for permission for the marriage. Through these customs, the families perform and normalize heterosexuality. Finally, women continue to be made responsible for housework; while men are still considered the “head” of the household, women’s earnings are considered “additional.” These gendered ideas about the division of labor imply the need to belong to a heterosexual family unit in order to attain economic success. This notion is reflected in the aforementioned military norms about men and women’s roles in

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167 Ibid., 332–33.
170 “Family Structure Survey 2016.”
172 Ibid., 235.
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protecting the nation; military service in Turkey is a “fundamental right of hegemonic masculinity,” whereas women are expected to assist their husbands in supporting roles.\footnote{Mahiye Seçil Dağtaş, “The Personal in the Collective: Rethinking the Secular Subject in Relation to the Military, Wifehood, and Islam in Turkey,” Feminist Studies 42, no. 1 (2016): 79.}

Familial practices surrounding marriage, reproduction, and the persistence of segregated, heteropatriarchal roles for men and women can be situated within the pro-family policymaking of the AKP government. Yazici argues that the conservative mentality of the AKP government depends upon mentalities and truth-telling which spotlights the centrality of the nuclear family to Turkish society, obscuring unfitting familial formations, like those of single mothers and queers.\footnote{Berna Yazıcı, “The Return to the Family: Welfare, State, and Politics of the Family in Turkey,” Anthropological Quarterly 85, no. 1 (February 25, 2012): 103–40.} She explores the AKP’s “Return to the Family” policy, a technique of governance aiming to discipline non-heterosexual relations by returning all children from public institutional care back to familial homes.\footnote{Ibid., 126.} She recounts one case where a young mother went to Family and Child Services because she was suffering domestic abuse and her parents kicked her and her child out of their home. The social worker refused the woman financial assistance or institutional lodging, claiming that she needed her father’s support (even though he threatened to rape her) and that she needed to find a job to take care of her child.\footnote{Ibid., 126–40.} It is therefore government policy to depend upon the (heterosexual) family unit for social welfare, even though many families cannot or will not carry out these functions. Other techniques of control by the AKP further shore up the family as a site of social cohesion and national belonging, including attempts to criminalize divorce, new constraints on alcohol consumption, and renewed efforts to ban abortions.\footnote{Scalco, “The Politics of Chastity,” 326–27.}

Few of my participants were “out” or had proclaimed themselves LGBTQ to their families. This is because there are not only significant pressures to enter into heteronormative

\footnote{Ibid., 126–40.}
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relationships, but also the threat of stigma, ostracism, and violence from the family if they cannot perform these roles: “Many of our friends have been killed, have been kidnapped or teased, bullied by their family or by their friends and we cannot protect them.” A few reference the cases of Ahmet Yıldız and Roşin Çiček, two young men murdered by their families for being homosexual in 2008 and 2013, respectively. Some of my participants managed their family’s expectations by claiming that marriage was simply not right for them. One claimed to be living “two separate lives.” Another is planning to leave the country because of familial pressure: “They’re already overwhelming. Every time my mom phones me, she always says, ‘if only I had a grandchild, I would do this I would do that.’ Come on mom...” Another was pressured into therapy after coming out to his mother, with the intention that therapy would cure his homosexuality. Others claimed that they maintained a kind of “silent agreement” with their father or that they were only able to confide in their siblings, not their parents. For many trans people in particular, the idea of maintaining any familial relations can be difficult, with many being ostracized from their families. The constant invocation of high profile LGBTQ honor killings and the violence faced by trans people is notable. These events, which happen to other LGBTQs across the country, impact their perception of their own families and the institution of the family in general.

One participant claimed that being “out” implies a binary Western construct of “the closet” which does not exist in the same way in Turkey. Instead, many queer people do not

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178 Interviewee E, interview.
179 Interviewee P, interview; Interviewee Q, interview.
180 Interviewee P, interview.
181 Çavuşoğlu, interview.
182 Interviewee K, interview.
183 Interviewee M, interview.
184 Interviewee B, interview.; Interviewee E, interview.; Interviewee M, interview.
185 Interviewee J, interview.
186 Interviewee O, interview.
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identify as LGBTQ. Traditionally, Turkish men who had sex with other men only distinguished between “active” and “passive” roles for homosexual men, wherein aktif men retain their heterosexual identity.\textsuperscript{187} Another term for an “active” sex partner in Turkish queer slang is laço, which means “real man” and asserts both one’s masculinity and preference for sex with effeminate men.\textsuperscript{188} It was challenging to locate information about how queer women might have traditionally had same sex relations. However, a leader at Lambda Istanbul claimed that the traditional, gendered division of labor actually facilitated same-sex relationships among some women: “Traditionally, Turkish men go out to work and the woman stays at home, so in a building there are many women who are staying at home and they would get together for tea and stuff…”\textsuperscript{189} It is likely that many people of both genders simply get married and perform heteronormative roles for their families, although a more the more Western styled gay identity is now challenging the necessity of marrying members of the opposite sex.\textsuperscript{190} I asked the leader at Lambda Istanbul if traditional forms of queer sex and hooking up were at risk of being erased by the modern LGBTQ identity movement, but they were confident both would continue existing side-by-side, with varying degrees over overlap.\textsuperscript{191} Online networking, for example, is something they saw as still only affecting a very small, upwardly-mobile segment of queer society.\textsuperscript{192} Queer people of all identifications still cruise for same-sex encounters in public parks and other known cruising areas, covertly visit queer bars/clubs in major cities, go to hamams, and meet others online.\textsuperscript{193}

\textsuperscript{187} Bereket and Adam, “The Emergence of Gay Identities in Contemporary Turkey,” 131–32.
\textsuperscript{188} Ibid., 137.
\textsuperscript{189} Interviewee O, interview.
\textsuperscript{190} Bereket and Adam, “The Emergence of Gay Identities in Contemporary Turkey,” 146–47.
\textsuperscript{191} Interviewee O, interview.
\textsuperscript{192} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{193} Interviewee M, interview; Çavuşoğlu, interview.
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Having heard similar stories about how queers relate to their families, I asked two interviewees what they in particular would do about improving the relationship between LGBTQs and their families. One of them argues that the problem is education, especially in the east, which is seen as the more rural, underdeveloped, Kurdish part of Turkey:

The educational level is lower than the Western side...[and] there are some awful laws still applied in Turkey in the rural areas. Like they are selling their daughters. 13, 14 years old –have you heard about it?...They call it custom. They call it culture. They call it tradition. ...Also there is another tradition that if the person does something which affects the family name bad—for example stealing or raping or being gay, that person is executed among the family.\textsuperscript{194}

What I found interesting about this account was the respondent’s strong insistence on juxtaposing the Eastern, Kurdish parts of Turkey against the Western, less traditional parts of Turkey. The challenge that LGBTQs might pose to the family is portrayed as an Eastern issue. This aligns with normative state-derived mentalities of the Kurdish East as overly traditional, backward, and the site of conflict (as evidenced in the above participant’s narrative).\textsuperscript{195} For example, the Turkish judiciary routinely denies Kurds’ separate existence and portrays their culture as backward.\textsuperscript{196} The Constitutional Court refuses to recognize Kurdish ethnicity as distinct from Turks entitled to the protection of their differences, notably denying that their language has an origin, that they have claims to any particular territory or region, or that there are scientifically provable ethnic differences in a series of judgements in the 1990s.\textsuperscript{197} Further, it is interesting they insist upon cultural difference, rather than Islam, as driving violence and shaming against LGBTQs.

\textsuperscript{194} Çavuşoğlu, interview.
\textsuperscript{196} Derya Bayır, “Representation of the Kurds by the Turkish Judiciary,” Human Rights Quarterly 35, no. 1 (February 8, 2013): 120.
\textsuperscript{197} Ibid., 132–34.
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A different interviewee expresses an opposing stance toward educating the family. This respondent argues that education alone lacked the necessary dynamism to carry out such a task: “I hate people who say everything will be solved by education, because it’s a lot of work. They don’t educate you to find yourself they educate you to put you in a box.”¹⁹⁸ I believe they consider the idea of education within the government sanctioned school to be too confining and that the school system propagates norms about nationalism and civic duty which are possibly harmful to LGBTQs in other ways. Instead, they believe the problem of families and their relationships with their LGBTQ members is less of an issue of education than visibility and exposure: “And then if I talk more freely with my cousins and if their babies turn out gay it will normalize [homosexuality].”¹⁹⁹

Some of my participants made close connections between the mentalities and techniques of control between the family, Islam, and the AKP government. One respondent’s understanding of these institutions is particularly indicative of the relationships between the state, policing, and the family in the production of queer others:

If you’re gay and the police beats you up …you have no protection, you have nothing. If I got in a fight in Istanbul and end up in the police station and they call my family and they say “your son is gay and they tried to punch him and fight him,” my family wouldn’t protect me. My father would probably kill me…I decided to go boarding school at high school, because I figured I can’t be with my family, it’s too much pressure on me.²⁰⁰

There is therefore a tacit disciplining of queers that is assembled by all of these institutions, wherein queer identity signifies moral failing as it is conceived of as anti-familial, anti-nationalist, and anti-social. Negotiating these interlocking techniques of disciplining is difficult: even though my participants felt anxieties because of their families, the strategy of remaining

¹⁹⁸ Interviewee J, interview.
¹⁹⁹ Ibid.
²⁰⁰ Interviewee K, interview.
silent about one’s sexuality is preferred over the proclamation of a queer identity and its consequences. In cases where individuals came out to their family members, it appears to be a long road to acceptance: “I know [my mother] still [isn’t] loving the idea, but at least she came to accept it.”

Between family, government, military, and religion in Turkey, certain discourses about queer people become confirmed. The family acts as a continuous mechanism of surveillance and governance of queer lives, exerting pressure on queer people to marry, have children, and perform clear masculine or feminine sex roles. These rationalities of governance synchronize with the knowledge-production rationalities of other institutions: the government’s call to reproduce for the nation and limitation of social welfare for nuclear families, religious discourse about the fall of Lot and boarding-school conformity, the military’s scientific knowledge about anuses and the place of women in assisting men as they defend the nation –all of these “assemble” what it means to be a queer other in Turkey.

MEDIA

In this section, I explore the role of the Turkish media in shaping queer lives. Like other Turkish institutions, the media maintains strong ties to the Turkish government and produces “truths” about queer people. This includes not only television and newspapers, but also the growth of social media. I will also explore how LGBTQ efforts to make queer people visible using social media challenges traditional media outlets. Instead, it is a contingent, ongoing apparatus that is constantly being renegotiated and resisted by queers. I begin with a brief overview of Turkish media and then explore how my participants see themselves interacting with it.

201 Interviewee M, interview.
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Turkish media is expansive, including “…40 national and 2,000 local newspapers, dozens of news magazines, at least 10 national news channels, 250 local TV channels, 2,000 radio outlets, and hundreds of news websites.”\(^{202}\) However, media is becoming less plural due to the government’s techniques of control, which includes interventions in media and increased partisanship in editorial decision-making.\(^ {203}\) Since 2013, Freedom House has ranked the Turkish press “Not Free,” citing the AKP government’s ongoing use of antiterrorism law and the penal code to prosecute critical media outlets.\(^ {204}\) According to Reporter’s Without Border’s Media Ownership Monitor project, owners of 7 out of 10 of the largest daily newspapers and 7 out of 10 TV stations have connections to the government.\(^ {205}\) The largest media group is Doğan Holding, whose holdings include Hürriyet, the most circulated daily newspaper as well as TV channels Kanal D and CCN Turk (and many other channels, radio stations, online platforms and magazines); Doğan controls over 50% of print, audio-visual, and new media in Turkey.\(^ {206}\) Its political leanings are nationalist, expressing praise for the AKP’s economic development and political stability.\(^ {207}\)

Many media outlets are self-censoring and fire dissident journalists in order to avoid punishment in the form of “crippling tax fines.”\(^ {208}\) Another recent example of the government’s strategies for silencing press came in October 2016, when the government closed Cumhuriyet.


\(^{204}\) Freedom House, “Turkey: Country Report.”


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Turkey’s oldest secular paper, alongside 15 other media outlets critical of the government.\textsuperscript{209} Further, a report by the Committee to Protect Journalists notes that Turkey jailed at least 81 journalists in December 2016, the highest number of any country at any time according to their records.\textsuperscript{210} Finally, the government is also intent on curtailing social media freedoms.\textsuperscript{211} The government attempted to ban Twitter and YouTube in 2014, but, after international outcry and the proliferation of attempts to circumvent the ban, it was quickly lifted.\textsuperscript{212} Instead, the government reportedly coordinates and pays for social media “trolls” to respond to negative government perceptions online.\textsuperscript{213} The Turkish government therefore demonstrates a diverse set of techniques for making dissent invisible in media.

LGBTQs, especially those involved with activist and non-profit organizations, have a negative perception of the Turkish media. They see two co-constitutive hurdles toward having a more positive representation in the media. First, anti-LGBTQ hate speech is regularly found in widely circulated print and online media, some of which is state-sponsored.\textsuperscript{214} Second, queer media is routinely censored by the state, and LGBTQs argue that there is a lack of visibility across news media through popular culture.\textsuperscript{215} I interviewed the founder of LGBTI News Turkey, which is a volunteer run news outlet, whose mission is to aggregate queer news across the country. The organization exists to give visibility to queer political issues as well as respond to censorship and hate speech –much like the similar KaosGL magazine out of Ankara. The

\textsuperscript{211} Şik, “Journalism Under Siege,” 20.
\textsuperscript{213} Şik, “Journalism Under Siege,” 20.
\textsuperscript{214} “Turkish LGBT Group Releases Annual Monitoring Report on Hate Crimes.”
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LGBTI News Network also translates all its content into English. The leadership believes that being able to advocate on behalf of Turkish queers in English is essential to international support, hence there is a particular emphasis on volunteer-mediated translation of news items into English alongside original content.\(^\text{216}\) I was told that this has been a successful endeavor for the organization: the leadership was invited to participate in the International Gay and Lesbian Human Rights Commission’s lobbying efforts at the UN. They are also a primary source of information regarding Turkish queer issues for CNN. They name queer activist organizations across Turkey and worldwide as their partners.\(^\text{217}\)

Queers are also subject to different standards of scrutiny in the press, wherein their sexual identity becomes a key factor in making violence against them more acceptable. Hate speech within the media has been difficult for the LGBTQ rights organizations to combat. That hate speech goes unpunished by the government, yet government critiques are routinely silenced makes the media a difficult space to combat negative representations of queers. The unevenness of censoring pro-LGBTQ media makes queer lives especially vulnerable to hate-based messaging:

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\ldots\text{Vakit, this newspaper that is extremely homophobic. We cannot really say anything because whenever LGBT organizations take this organization to court they say it’s \text{“freedom of speech” or “freedom of the press actually,”} and you know Turkey has like hundreds of journalists in prison but, you know, \text{“freedom of the press.”}^\text{218}\n\]

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\ldots\text{they talked about...a murder in Diyarbakir and normally in the newspaper you don’t give the names, you just write the initials. But they write the full names and they put the pictures, saying it’s about gay people killing someone –}
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\(^{216}\) Interviewee Q, interview.
\(^{217}\) For example, see their submission to the UN’s Universal Periodic Review on Turkey in 2015: Kaos GL, LGBTI News Turkey, and ILGHRC, “Human Rights Violations of LGBT Individuals in Turkey: Submission to the United Nations Universal Periodic Review.”
\(^{218}\) Focus Group Interview at Lambda Istanbul, interview.
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instead of saying it’s just a murder, one person got killed. It didn’t have anything to do with their being gay…both of them were gay.\textsuperscript{219} These accounts suggest that when LGBTQ people and issues are covered in government-affiliated, nationalist news media, the coverage is often negative.

There is also a heightened sensationalism in the case of LGBTQ murders, wherein the sexuality of the victims makes them seemingly less human and more of a target of moralistic supremacy. This is visible in Yeni Akit’s recent accounts of the Orlando massacre in 2016, which praised the shooter and condemned the dead as “perverted homosexuals.”\textsuperscript{220} Various online and traditional newspapers use language that is moralistic, like “perverts” and “fags,” or draws special attention to sexual deviance to sensationalize an event—especially during pride week.\textsuperscript{221} For example, the NGO KaosGL recently held an education workshop in the eastern city of Batman, which was referred to as a “meeting of perverts” by a local newspaper.\textsuperscript{222} LGBTI News Turkey has gone to significant lengths to document hate speech across media and government itself, as well as using their platform to explore the linkages between hate speech and how it may result in tangible acts of violence:

\textit{Does hate speech lead to hate crimes?}

…We’ve heard many instances of families trying to seek bogus treatments for their children because a minister has pronounced homosexuality a disease. This is a situation that creates horrible traumas for individuals. On top of intensifying hate speech, it feeds into the prejudices in society.\textsuperscript{223} This again reflects a Turkish technique of control that gives full citizenship to a certain population while making others vulnerable. The censorship of queer voices has recently become consolidated by the government and media. This is one key imperative of the Telekomünikasyon

\textsuperscript{219} Interviewee G, interview.
\textsuperscript{220} “‘50 Perverts Killed in Bar.'”
\textsuperscript{221} Focus Group Interview at Lambda Istanbul, interview.
\textsuperscript{222} Interviewee Q, interview.
\textsuperscript{223} LGBTI News Turkey, “LGBTI Municipal Member Sedef Çakmak on Hate Speech in the Media.”
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İletişim Başkanlığı (TIB, or, The Presidency of Telecommunication and Communication), which, in early 2014, was empowered to both 1) block any website without judicial review and 2) demand all internet providers to store all data on users’ web activities for two years.\textsuperscript{224} As Freedom House reports, internet usage in Turkey is “partly free,” in part because LGBTQ-related websites are blocked by the TIB for containing supposedly immoral content or pornography.\textsuperscript{225} This also includes social media sites like Twitter and YouTube, both of which were blocked before the 2014 local elections—as well as LGBTQ networking applications like Grindr, which has been blocked since 2013.\textsuperscript{226} The LGBTI News Network itself has been blocked on the grounds of “sex education.”\textsuperscript{227} In my discussion with a head editor at LGBTI News Turkey, I was informed that the trans-male information portal “Trans Sick-O” has been arbitrarily blocked for random periods of time without notification.\textsuperscript{228} The site provides diverse information on trans-male healthcare, rights and access to justice and welfare, and how to resist mandatory sterilization during the sex-change process.\textsuperscript{229} The Presidency of Communication blocked the site on the grounds of an administrative measure that censors all websites which promote child abuse, facilitate drug usage, are outlets for prostitution, or are obscene.\textsuperscript{230} In solidarity with the blog owner, a number of LGBTQ rights organizations in and outside of Turkey (including Amnesty International, Hevi Istanbul, the Red Umbrella Association and Lambda Istanbul) penned a letter protesting the decision to block the website, arguing that prohibitions on


\textsuperscript{225} Freedom House, “Turkey: Country Report.”


\textsuperscript{227} Interviewee Q, interview.

\textsuperscript{228} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{229} LGBTI News Turkey, “Trans Men’s Right to Information Censored by the Presidency of Telecommunication.”

\textsuperscript{230} Ibid.
reporting about LGBTQ sexual health and wellness means that they are exposed to unnecessary risks, as they are often lacking social and health resources.  

From the perspective of my participants, the widespread banning of over 40,000 websites by April 2014 impacts upon the LGBTQ community in a number of ways. First, the internet is increasingly the means by which LGBTQ people organize, both politically and in terms of private relationships. To ban the means for establishing relationships is therefore one way the media and the state converge to marginalize queer individuals. Gorkemli reports that LGBTQs have been using the internet in Turkey to organize and network since its inception in 1993. He explores the Lezbiyen ve Gey Topluluğu (LEGATO), which was an organization of LGBTQ student groups at different universities across Turkey founded in the late 1990s. Its primary mode of communication was through Yahoo! Groups. The Yahoo! Group email lists promoted queer student societies across Turkey and linked them to the advocacy efforts of larger urban queer organizations like Lambda Istanbul. By the end of 2003, one mailing list had 857 members at eighty-three colleges and universities across Turkey. Students on the mailing list write about and explore their struggles as queer individuals in Turkish society in a forum that exists beyond the gaze of the state. This trend continues alongside the emerging popularity of Facebook and YouTube: as of January 2017, the Lambda Istanbul Facebook group has nearly 10,000 followers and a search for “Lambda Istanbul” in YouTube returns 160 videos.

The utilization of social media by queer NGOs could be considered a kind of counter-governmentality deployed by queer people themselves. Here, queer people depend upon the

231 Ibid.
233 Serkan Gorkemli, “‘Coming Out of the Internet’: Lesbian and Gay Activism and the Internet as a ‘Digital Closet’ in Turkey,” Journal of Middle East Women’s Studies 8, no. 3 (2012): 63.
234 Ibid., 77.
235 Ibid., 77–78.
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marginal spaces they have been pushed into by mainstream society— their NGOs and social media – to recast queer identity as something more positive, providing them with visibility and a platform for voicing their demands for rights and recognition. I have argued that queer identity is a kind of assemblage of control, a disciplinary apparatus which enables the state and other institutions to govern certain lives to empower heteropatriachal citizenship. Mainstream institutions like the state, family, and mainstream media push queers out of these institutions by marginalizing them or making them invisible. As some of my informants have shown, queers therefore need to rely on alternative social media and NGOs for recognition, social support, and welfare. In turn, we see such occurrences as the state taking measures to censor and block non-conforming social media. All of these relationships are fundamentally related, or, assembled by the very notion of queer identity. In speaking of queer identity as an assemblage, we can see how it is in constant flux, it is produced all the time by competing actors as well as individual queers themselves, and enables dissent as much as it enables marginality.

It follows Turkish governmentality that there would be a kind of moratorium on representing LGBTQ lives in positive ways which threaten the patriarchal, militarized citizenship characterizing the government’s ideal population. The suppression of knowledge means that those gaps are filled in by other means, including hate speech or harmful stereotypes. One of my contacts informed me that local adaptations of Western TV shows have the gay and lesbian characters routinely replaced by heterosexuals or are represented in stereotypes. For example, the gay characters in the Turkish remake of the British series “Shameless,” were made heterosexual. In 2010, a presenter was fired from Turkish Radio and Television for Children

237 Interviewee Q, interview; Asya Elmas and Hevi Members, interview; Çakmak, interview.
238 Interviewee K, interview.
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for portraying a gay man in a soap opera on a private network. Without the normalization of queer people through popular culture and online, queer people have few role models and can feel alienated.

At least one interviewee, however, believes there may be some advantage to keeping invisible within the media, at least in the current socio-cultural milieu:

I agree that there is not enough media attention, but maybe it is better that there is no attention from the media, because no matter how much we try to give some trainings to media, reporters—they still want to make bad news of people dying or people infecting each other. They look from the wrong side.

The above respondent, who works for one of Turkey’s only HIV/AIDS welfare non-profit organizations, believes that HIV/AIDS has had a significant impact on the queer population in Turkey. However, it is something rarely discussed in the other activist organizations or even amongst LGBTQs in private. They argue the lack of conversation surrounding HIV/AIDS and LGBTQs has prevented the media from attaching an HIV/AIDS stigma to queer individuals as it has in Western societies. Another interviewee confirmed this line of thinking. Although the HIV/AIDS epidemic and LGBTQ bodies have been historically closely linked in the West, almost none of my participants felt any particular connection to the HIV/AIDS crisis. I argue that the divergence is because of the different trajectory of media representations of non-normative sexualities in both cases. In Turkey, HIV/AIDS is stereotyped as a problem that originates in foreign-born sex workers, according to my source at the HIV/AIDS organization. A statement by the Turkish Security Directorate’s Vice Bureau about sex work confirms this

241 Ibid.
242 Ibid.
243 Interviewee E, interview.
245 Interviewee R, interview.
bias: “A major cause for the rise in AIDS cases in Turkey is claimed to be Turkish men catching the disease from HIV-infected prostitutes and then passing it onto their wives.”

Although I explore social media and activism in depth in the following chapter on the Gezi Park protests, it should be considered here as well, as it is widely depended upon by the LGBTQ community. A social media expert at SPoD asserted that the anonymity of social media provided protection for voices that were otherwise marginalized or at risk. However, they also acknowledge that social media is still restricted to only a small audience: “A local coffee house in Bacilar, a poor neighborhood in Istanbul, they do not even know what Facebook and Twitter is. They know everything, they learn everything from the press, from newspapers, from TV, and they believe in that.”

The significance of social media for LGBTQ organizing became visible during the Gezi Park protests. At this time, when the government censored traditional media from reporting on the activism, social media became the main news source for both local activists and international news outlets:

For example during Gezi the only reliable source I was using was Lambda Istanbul’s twitter account. I know that they were there and that they were reliable. And I think a lot of people – non-LGBT people, saw that as well, and became allies.

Queer utilization of social media during the Gezi Park protests helped situate the LGBTQ rights movement as a primary player in the anti-government actions. This is demonstrated by the vast increase in participants in the Pride Parades before and after the protest, but was also reiterated across many of my interviews. I explore the Gezi Park protests in detail in a following chapter.

Beyond the Gezi Park activism, many LGBTQs have expressed that they use social media daily

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247 Focus Group Interview at Lambda Istanbul, interview.
248 Interviewee Q, interview.
249 Asya Elmas and Hevi Members, interview; Interviewee P, interview; Çakmak, interview.
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to both connect with others in the community and read and comment upon emerging news items.\(^{250}\)

**CONCLUSION**

I have explored the numerous ways queerness is governed by and across different institutions in Turkey. My goal is to demonstrate that there is no single factor in the materialization and governance of queers. Instead, this is an assembled relationship between different institutions and the queer individual, wherein “truths” about queers are constructed across various institutions. While it would be difficult to identify the causal process by which these ideas disseminate or inspire action, assemblage thinking shows that – as a fluctuating whole – these parts echo and build upon each other to produce notions about queer identity. Further, queers resist oppressive identifications, and shape the very institutions which govern them, especially in forcing them to respond to their demands. I turn to draw out some of these themes in conclusion. I look in particular at the way the queer as an assemblage is comprised of heterogeneous parts, can be immanently understood, and is contingent.

Earlier I explored the idea of an assemblage as a relationship among heterogeneous parts. In this chapter, I have defined the queer assemblage as an interrelationship between institutions and queer individuals. These institutions make queers knowable, yet queer bodies are lived and they resist and augment this knowledge in interesting ways. There is therefore significant resistance always present in the construction of queer identity. A number of key themes across my conversations emerge in this regard. First is the notion that the queer is both pathologically and morally different. When one participant claimed that “…people look at you like you’re a third kind of thing,” they are referring to a truth that is told across institutions which identifies

\(^{250}\) Çavuşoğlu, interview; Interviewee C, interview by author, Istanbul, 2014; Focus Group Interview at Lambda Istanbul, interview; Interviewee L, interview by author, Istanbul, 2014; Asya Elmas and Hevi Members, interview.
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queer bodies as both pathologically and morally other. This is evidenced in the military screening for sexuality. The military depend upon medical expertise to materialize queer bodies in terms of illness: “My illness is homosexuality.” Yet the same medical scrutiny depends upon a questionnaire which interrogates an individuals’ religious propensity. In this way, the problem of physical difference is confirmed by moral degradation. In the case of the military, it is the rotten report, which haunts queer people beyond the military conscription process as a lasting mark of shame. Within Islam, religious texts are used to help legitimize queerness as other: for example, in regards to the allegory about Lot: “In Koran is a character called Lot. And that’s how they see gays. So they don’t really like – they don’t really accept us. They think it’s sin so there’s no accepting.” Yet religion is a site of empowerment for others. In the family, religion informs marriage and the production of children. It is also the law about public morality and the blocking of internet sites and representation of gay people which is not allowed on TV. The bridging of secular scientific scrutiny and religious moralism at the site of the queer other is itself noteworthy. This is further visible within LGBTQ hate-speech in the media, which refers to queer activist events as perverts amongst (non-pervert) Muslims. This discursive slippage between ideas of queer, perversion, and amorality is also present in the state; a notable example being when the former AKP Minister of Family and Social Policy, Aliye Kavaf, claimed that homosexuality was a disease and that love scenes on TV were against Turkish family values.

However, the queer assemblage is not simply produced by the state, but it is constantly being elaborated upon by varied institutional discourses and actions, which affect each other in

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251 Interviewee B, interview.
252 Interviewee D, interview.
253 Ibid.
254 Focus Group Interview at Lambda Istanbul, interview.
256 Focus Group Interview at Lambda Istanbul, interview.
unforeseen ways and are resisted and augmented by queer people themselves. As queers themselves are a component of this assemblage, who have varied interests, different conceptions of such as the military and the family, with some participating fully and others refusing the truths constructed upon them by institutional knowledge. This is evident, for example, in the priorities of the LGBTQ activist movement. While institutions of the assemblage find ways to push queers out of public life, this has created openings for NGOs and activism to take a greater role in providing queers with social welfare, positive representation, and community. As I have explored, Turkish governmentality depends upon the assemblage that is queer identity to marginalize queer others in order to support its heteropatriarchal citizen ideals. The progress made by queer activists is a positive development in renegotiating the queer assemblage, countering negative ideas about queer identity and acts of marginalization with more positive representations of queer visibility and acts of welfare and community organizing. For example, alternative organizations like SPoD have given name to the particular injustices being done to queer people, collaborating with human rights institutions abroad to pressure the government from the international level.257 This facilitates protest, legal action, academic scholarship, and community networking against such as the state, the military, and the media:

And I don’t know if you have heard about this, but gay marriage, the term ‘gay marriages,’ has an allergy to the LGBT activists here. They hate that term.

Why is that?

Because people are getting killed.258

Many of my participants spoke with urgency against the threat of violence against queer people.259 LGBTQ activists are responding to the violence committed against their bodies by


258 Çakmak, interview.
making the problem of murder and police brutality central to their activism. This impacts institutions across the board: social media and new media outlets like LGBTI New Turkey works to represent the death tolls of queer people in Turkey and expose everyday hate-speech. These discourses become part of the queer assemblage, making queer people knowable as a prosecuted group.

Organizations like Lambda Istanbul are able to appeal to foreign international human rights bodies—including the UN— with this knowledge-production, pressuring Turkey into passing anti-discrimination protections into law for LGBTQs. In 2015, Kaos GL, LGBTI News Turkey, Pembe Hayat, Lambda Istanbul, SPoD, and IGLHRC drafted a submission to the UN’s Universal Periodic Review for Turkey. Among other issues, the report focuses on the prevalence of hate crimes, legal discrimination, and violations of speech against LGBTQ individuals since 2010. It also provides specific examples wherein AKP ministers have decreed that queers were “…a disease…,” “…inhuman…,” and “…outside the bounds of normality.” It further condemns discrimination against queer people in the military and police. The review resulted in recommendations made by a number of states regarding anti-discrimination against queer people, including recommendations to publish crime statistics against queer people, a recommendation ensuring freedom of association, and one demanding hate-crime legislation to protect queers. These recommendations were complimented by a statement by the office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, which condemned

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259 Interviewee E, interview; Interviewee G, interview; Focus Group Interview at Lambda Istanbul, interview; Interviewee J, interview; Interviewee Q, interview.


262 Ibid., 1–3.

263 Ibid., 4–5.

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incitement to violence against queers in Turkey.\(^{265}\) Turkey will be forced to follow up on these recommendations and undergo further review in 2018 to evaluate its progress on LGBTQ rights. Although the state enables significant oppression against queer people, queers resist this oppression by appealing to institutions above the state (the UN) and below the state (non-profits), incorporating these more positive agents into the queer assemblage.

Queer organizing also fills in the gaps of social welfare left by the state, family, and religious networks. This is exemplified by the establishment of a sex-worker and queer-friendly medical clinic in Istanbul.\(^{266}\) Queer activism is also reclaiming cultural production with Pride Week, which creates spaces for the screening of queer documentaries, networking, and the visibility of queer bodies in public spaces.\(^{267}\) Queer people are also beginning to stand for parliamentary positions. So while a variety of institutions involve themselves in assembling queer identity in a confluence of negative ways, this involvement also exposes those institutions to being changed by the queer identity in return.

By illustrating that queers are made knowable through heterogeneous parts (including their own selves), we can see how the notions of immanence and contingency matter as well. To focus on immanence means looking at the particular institutions that shape queer Turkish identity. Here, I have attempted to identify what makes the queer assemblage in Turkey unique, focusing on the expansive role of the state in the family and media; an influential military, which all queer people must interact with; the problem of cultural Islamic belonging tied to citizenship; and the role of family and media truth-telling about queer lives. At the same time, the meaning of “queer” fluctuates. It is particularly contingent upon the ways queer people themselves resist and

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\(^{266}\) Çetin, “The Dynamics of the Queer Movement in Turkey.”

organize against the institutional relationships they find themselves bound up in. Now, for example, the state finds itself having to defend its lack of discrimination protections for LGBTQs at a supra-national level. As Lisle argues, the importance of assemblage thinking is in its ability to not only in its focus on marginalized actors (rather than overemphasizing the sovereign nation state), but that it explores how the logic of marginality is constituted by “multiple materialities and forces,” or, as I have named here, a Turkish governmentality that brings together many difference kinds of discourses and actions in constituting queer others.268 In Turkey, queer people are a complicated assemblage of truths, truths which are confirmed in institutional acts and relationships-making with queer individuals themselves.

There is a diversity of ways queers relate to the state, ranging from outright marginalization to empowerment. Some queer activists imagine the state as something that can be worked with, lobbied against, and that they can enter into through political organizing.269 These leaders have a positive understanding of the democratic structure, if not the current AKP government. They are strongly invested in increasing LGBTQ visibility in order to counter the Turkish governmentality which renders them dehumanized and invisible.270 Some of my interviewees –especially those who were not involved in activism –saw the state as a series of laws and restrictions that have had profound effects on their lives. They view the developing relationship between the state, Islam, and family with disdain, as all three of these seem to compound upon the violence they face in their daily lives.271 By supporting heteronormative reproduction and turning a blind-eye to negative and missing representation of queer people, the state actively imposes its mentality of a hierarchy of citizenship, wherein queers are clearly

268 Lisle, “Energizing the International,” 72.
269 Çakmak, interview; Asya Elmas and Hevi Members, interview; Interviewee O, interview.
270 Interviewee Q, interview.
271 Interviewee G, interview; Interviewee K, interview; Interviewee M, interview; Interviewee N, interview; Interviewee Q, interview.
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outliers in their inability to biologically/socially reproduce the nation as well as in their inability to defend it as masculine soldiers. Some equate the state with President and former Prime Minister Erdoğan himself, conveying dismay at the corruption, religious values, and chauvinism that they envision characterizes his mentality of governance. These informants express concern about the heteronormative discourses espoused by Erdoğan, as well as his performance of hegemonic masculinity in his strong-arm approach to dissent, which includes techniques of silencing and policing oppositional media. Finally, some queers regard the state as compatible with their identities, given that they have benefitted from the AKP regime’s policymaking. It should not be considered surprising that not all queer people are affected the same by the government, but that queer identity in Turkey assembles disparate, daily productions involved in the governing of queer lives.

272 Interviewee J, interview; Interviewee O, interview; Asya Elmas and Hevi Members, interview.
273 Focus Group Interview at Lambda Istanbul, interview.
Chapter Five
Assembling Trans Bodies

In this chapter, I explore trans identity as an assemblage in the context of contemporary Turkey. I argue that trans identity overlaps with the queer identity explored above, however there are some particular ways trans people are suspect to different forms of Turkish governmentality. Like queers generally, trans identity is constructed between the individual and outside social institutions; it is an assemblage that enables the governance of a certain population. In line with Dean’s governmentality analysis, considering trans identity as an assemblage asks questions about how Turkish governmentality shapes the conduct of its citizens, how status is allotted to some over others, and how rights are enforced.¹ Further, this is a reciprocal process, rather than a top-down one, wherein trans people affect these institutional bodies and broader politics in Turkey as well. In my interviewing and media research, I have found a variety of conceptualizations of trans identity that are mobilized for certain political ends. To situate this discussion, I consider the 1980s media frenzy surrounding Bülent Ersoy, arguably the most famous trans person in Turkey.² I then turn to my own data to explore issues surrounding trans identity, which contrasts with the Ersoy case. I focus in particular on how trans personhood is understood via mentalities of othering and marginalization, which enables violence against them. However, I also consider trans organizing and activism to demonstrate that trans people are not a passively constructed assemblage, but resist the popular discourses, practices, and omissions which characterize the idea of trans.³

¹ Dean, Governmentality: Power and Rule in Modern Society, 43.
³ Interviewee C, interview; Interviewee K, interview; Interviewee O, interview.
BÜLENT ERSOY

Bülent Ersoy, born in 1952, was a popular singer of Ottoman classical music who later transitioned (and kept the male name “Bülent”) and became increasingly popular for her music and television appearances.4 In 1980, a week before Turkey’s third military coup, Ersoy was arrested for exposing her breasts at a concert venue; she was then jailed for 45 days for doing so.5 A brief notice in the LA Times documents the military government’s attitude toward Ersoy at the time: “Military authorities in Turkey, who have sworn to eradicate public immorality, have ordered the nation’s leading transvestite singer to stop wearing women’s clothing. Bülent Ersoy, 26, who was born male but now has a hormone-induced bust, is said to be Turkey’s most expensive singer…”6 The Turkish government at the time practiced a governmentality of making public deviance invisible, using a common-sense language of “public immorality” to justify its intolerance of sexual others.

Ersoy undertook sex-reassignment surgery (SRS) in London in 1981. Since her transition, Bülent Ersoy continued to feature within the Turkish public, and has been seized upon by various actors to espouse certain notions of citizenship, purity, and familial honor. She was banned from performing, struggled to have her gender recognized by the state, and was ridiculed in the media.7 Upon her return, Ersoy would continue to feature in the media for over a decade as she contested two simultaneous court cases: one was her effort to gain legal definition as a woman.8

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7 Altinay, “Reconstructing the Transgendered Self as a Muslim, Nationalist, Upper-Class Woman,” 213–16.
Assembling Trans Bodies

The other case entailed her attempt to overturn the ban on performances by homosexuals and cross-dressers by General Evren’s military regime.9

The Istanbul Security Department forced Bülent Ersoy to sign a statement “…declar[ing] that I would wear normal clothes while performing my art and from now on would not indulge in acts and manners which are not good for the eye.”10 This reflects a mentality (after Dean) that enforces strict gender norms, which the government sees as part of maintaining public order. Further, Dean’s analysis of governmental concerns of visibility are particularly applicable here, wherein Turkish governmentality depends upon practices of concealing trans others from view in order to govern.11 Performance being her livelihood, Ersoy entered into two lengthy court battles to change her national identification records in order to be permitted to perform, claiming that she was simply a woman rather than a homosexual or deviant.12 Ersoy was banned from performing in all major Turkish cities, on the radio, or on TV on the basis of articles 11 and 12 of the Police Duties and Authorities Act. Article 11 criminalizes behaving “…in ways that run counter to propriety and decency…” and Article 12 prohibits women from working in entertainment establishes without official permission from the state. 13 Together, these laws enabled the police to deny trans people their livelihoods, constituting a technique of defining proper citizenship against trans personhood. Ersoy appealed to the Council of State that she was indeed a woman, and thus could not be seen to corrupt public morals (under Article 11).14 The court agreed, and compelled her to seek out permission of the governor of Istanbul to perform (as

10 Howe, “Turkey Begins Campaign Against Homosexuality.”
11 Dean, Governmentality: Power and Rule in Modern Society, 41.
14 Ibid.
required by article 12). The governor at the time, Nevzat Ayaz, had already dismissed her by claiming she had been a homosexual before she was a woman.\(^\text{15}\) By binding Ersoy in this legal catch-22, the government used the unintelligibility of Ersoy’s trans personhood to make trans people invisible and reaffirm the centrality of the traditional gender divide in Turkish society.

Alongside the performance ban, Ersoy’s attempt to change her legal gender demonstrates the significant degree to which trans bodies are confined by the state. In 1981, she first approached a local court with notarized documents from her sex reassignment surgery (SRS) in London, and the judge approved her petition after sending her to local doctors to be examined.\(^\text{16}\) Yet a public prosecutor appealed the decision and the case went back to court; this pattern of being bounced from court to court continued for Ersoy until 1988.\(^\text{17}\) It was at this time that a revision of the Turkish Civil Code allowed people who underwent SRS to officially change their gender.\(^\text{18}\) The 1982 local court ruling against granting Ersoy the ability to correct her identity records is indicative of the Turkish government’s usage of the judiciary as a technology of enforcing gender norms:

A person cannot arbitrarily change one’s sex by one’s own volition. If we accept the opposite, the matter will not be limited to personal rights, but will pave the way for unlawful deceit. For instance, a person who cannot divorce his or her spouse can find a way to dissolve the wedlock by changing his or her sex, and relying on the rule that two same-sex individuals may not be married. Similarly, individuals may receive unfair advantages like avoiding military service (which is mandatory for men) or getting the right to an early retirement (which women are entitled to). We do not think anyone would react positively to these examples.\(^\text{19}\)


\(^{16}\) Ertür and Lebow, “Coup de Genre,” 15.


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The judgement depends upon judicial expertise to condemn the very notion of trans identity, dismissing such a decision as arbitrary. The ruling finds that what is truly at stake is people such as Ersoy’s desire to swindle the state and the Turkish citizen by conning their way out of marriage, unlawfully avoiding military service, and claiming benefits that she should not be entitled to, like early retirement. This notion of deception is asserted in the first section of the ruling: “…the plaintiff cannot be fully regarded as a woman because it was found that he lacks ovaries and a womb…,” here invoking supposed medical knowledge about what makes one a woman.20 This, again, is part of the creation of government knowledge utilizing certain gendered scientific parameters for social and biological reproduction.21 Further, the ruling confirms the centrality of nationalism to Turkish citizenship, interrogating the lengths one would go to avoid military service. Given that Turkey was under military rule at the time, to accuse one of avoiding military service brands one a dissident.22

The discourse of “deception” is part of the double bind that trans people consistently find themselves a part of: either one reveals they are trans and is labeled a deceiver, or attempts to pass as a woman and is at risk of being revealed to be a liar.23 Bettcher provides a framework for understanding the deleterious effects of either of these paths.24 “Make-believers,” or those that do disclose themselves as trans, are subject to their lives being constructed as fictions, condescension, and subjection to violence. “Deceivers,” or those who refuse to disclose their identity and attempt to “pass” as women or men: live in constant fear of exposure and violence; exposure as a liar and the threat of forced genital exposure; being the subject of extreme violence

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20 Ibid., 21.
21 Peterson, “Sexing Political Identities/Nationalism as Heterosexism,” 44.
22 Altinay, “Reconstructing the Transgendered Self as a Muslim, Nationalist, Upper-Class Woman,” 213.
24 Ibid., 58–65.
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and murder; and being held responsible for this violence. While this is not an all-or-nothing binary for trans people, Ersoy’s body in particular became a primary target of institutional scrutiny, which strengthened public perceptions of trans people as “make-believers.” The government mapped politicized truths onto Ersoy’s body – that one cannot manipulate one’s own gender, that medical knowledge supports nationalist understandings of gender, and that trans is a farce meant to swindle the state and degrade moral society.

The public discourse surrounding Ersoy is potentially Turkish citizens’ first and only encounter with the notion of trans personhood. Significantly dictated by the state, this mainstream notion of trans would differ significantly than the experience of non-celebrity transpersons in many ways. For example, as I explore below, many trans people who were forcibly removed from Istanbul during the early 1980s could not afford to live abroad like Ersoy did, nor could they afford the legal expertise necessary to contest their gender on their state documents.26 In 1981, some 50 trans sex workers were deported by train from Istanbul.27 Trans sex workers were also engaging in small scale-protests outside employment offices and collecting signatures to legitimize sex-change.28 This disjuncture widened after Ersoy gained the consent of the state after the end of the military junta, as I explore now. As the government began to incorporate Ersoy, rather than exclude her, the notion of what constituted proper trans life changed. I argue that this governmentality made invisible those who could not afford to follow her (and the state’s) paradigm.

25 Ibid., 50.
Bülent Ersoy was never a spokesperson for the LGBTQ community in Turkey. Rather, she maintained conservative views on identity issues. In an interview with Günaydin in 1981, Ersoy stated, “The people whom I find most disgusting are homosexuals. I am so glad that I am not one.”

Instead of using her publicness to address identity issues, she presented herself as a “conservative, Muslim, nationalist, upper-class woman.” Ersoy performed this new identity in a number of ways. She dressed more conservatively in performances. She married a younger man in 1998, and the public discussion surrounding the marriage was of the age gap rather than her being transgendered. She began to incorporate more religious imagery in her songs, notably singing the Islamic call to prayer in a 1995 album, Alaturka. She also increasingly deployed Ottoman language vocabulary and Ottoman songs in an attempt to construct herself as a remnant of an element of the past, rather than a symbol of a more decadent, Western modernity.

Being nick-named “older-sister” (abla) and, later, “the Diva of Turkey” by the media would further cement the widespread acceptation of her female gender, but in terms that were palatable to the dominant norms of Turkish society: that of an upper-class, moneyed, non-sexual, conservative. Turkish governmentality would therefore tolerate Ersoy as a trans-woman and a performer but only insofar as she conformed to the heteronormative mentalities of the state, media, and family. As an assemblage of control, it is apparent that these institutions foster an ideal image of trans that benefits both the individual institutions and Ersoy herself. The challenges of dissident gender identity and non-reproductive sexuality to the state, media, and family are obscured by

29. Altinay, “Reconstructing the Transgendered Self as a Muslim, Nationalist, Upper-Class Woman,” 214.
30. Altinay, “Reconstructing the Transgendered Self as a Muslim, Nationalist, Upper-Class Woman.”
31. Ibid.
32. Trash, “Bülent Ersoy: The Remarkable Untold Story of a Turkish Icon, Transgender Diva and Unintentional Revolutionary.”
33. Altinay, “Reconstructing the Transgendered Self as a Muslim, Nationalist, Upper-Class Woman.”
Ersoy’s performance of traditional familial gender roles, endorsement of Turkish nationalism, and rejection of homosexuals.

There is little overlap between this public perception of trans identity as pious and nationalist and the daily experience of normal trans persons in Turkey. Ersoy continues to host her own TV show (the Bülent Ersoy Show) and guest-star on other reality TV shows (including “Arkadaşım Hoşgeldin,” “Popstar Alaturka,” and “Bu Tarz Benim”). However, other representations of LGBTQs in media – including health information – are systematically censored by the government’s Presidency of Telecommunication. Activists within the trans community have denounced Ersoy; in an interview in Radikal, one Kurdish trans activist once stated, “Bülent Ersoy is as transsexual as Michael Jackson is black.” This condemnation of Ersoy’s distance from a perceived “real” trans experience in Turkey shows that the trans assemblage is technique of control which encapsulates competing rationalities of regulating trans personhood.

I found this perception of Ersoy in my own research. One interviewee called Ersoy a “conservative.” A respondent who does not affiliate with any LGBTQ organizing said, “We have some examples [of LGBTQ in the media], for example Bülent Ersoy is a transsexual. Because of her, we have seen from our childhood, we see her and we think, ‘ah if you are gay you have to look like this weird clown.’” Further, many of those I interviewed simply said there were no positive representations of LGBTQ people in Turkish media, Ersoy included. The perception of Ersoy as a clown and as a traitor indicate different types of resentment towards her

36 LGBTI News Turkey, “Trans Men’s Right to Information Censored by the Presidency of Telecommunication.”
38 Interviewee K, interview.
39 Interviewee C, interview.
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and the government. On the one hand, the image of Ersoy as a “clown” as the only acceptable mode of gender-deviance has left other LGBTQs wanting for a broadened representation of what is permissible in Turkish society. I would argue that there is great pressure upon LGBTQs to adhere to traditional gender norms because of a fear of being compared to Ersoy. Gay men in particular often expressed resentment at others who appear too feminine or wear make-up or wear women’s clothing in my informal conversations with them.

Beyond the popular account of Bülent Ersoy are the experiences of other trans people, who do not figure into the materialization of trans personhood in Turkey. For example, in Turkey, there have been 38 recorded trans murders between 2008 and 2015.40 This amounts to 40% of all trans murders in all of Europe.41 In what follows, I depend upon interviews, non-profit reports, and media analysis to explore how “regular” trans identity is assembled in Turkey. My participants discuss the problem of violence against trans people at length, remarking also upon other forms of social and economic precariousness resulting from government oppression. As one of the trans activists I interviewed argued, “It is very difficult to be a trans person in Turkey.”42 Given the many burdens on trans people’s lives economically, socially, and politically, I identify a range of ways knowledge is created about trans people, how different institutions work together to constrain trans lives, and how these processes have opened spaces of resistance for trans people. I group these into three overlapping, interacting formations of knowledge that are specific about trans people: the discourse about trans people needing to “pass,” the linkages between trans people and the sex work economy, and trans people as agents

40 This is almost certainly lower than actual murders, as there are no government statistics tracking hate crime against trans people and data must be anecdotally gathered from media outlets and LGBTQ rights institutions.


42 Çavuşoğlu, interview; Asya Elmas and Hevi Members, interview; Interviewee B, interview; Interviewee D, interview; Interviewee E, interview; Çakmak, interview; Interviewee G, interview; Focus Group Interview at Lambda Istanbul, interview; Interviewee J, interview; Interviewee N, interview; Interviewee Q, interview.
Assembling Trans Bodies

of truth-telling in their own right. These identifications of trans people figure into the trans assemblage –what it means to be trans and how that disciplines one’s life. This assemblage, I show, benefits Turkish governmentality, but is increasingly being utilized as a platform for positive change in the trans community.

PASSABLE BODIES

Asya is a trans Kurdish sex worker, activist, and politician who lives in Istanbul. Her account radically departs from Ersoy’s constructed public persona as a conservative, self-made woman of the Ottoman Golden Era. In this section, I juxtapose Asya’s account with that of Ersoy’s to demonstrate the variety of ways trans bodies are constructed, governed, and resist governance in Turkey. In contrast to the perhaps more visible Ersoy, Asya represents a community of trans people who are actively erased from society because of their inability to conform to the limited possibility of existing as a Turkish citizen. In her words, they “…are discriminated just because they are trans.”\footnote{Asya Elmas and Hevi Members, interview.} Asya’s proclamation here asserts that trans is an issue that deserves scrutiny as a particular identity category, both in broader society as well as within the LGBTQ movement. She goes on to argue that the “…majority of the population lead their lives by Turkish society’s norms and values in which trans have little place…”\footnote{Ibid.} Heteronormativity is so inextricable from the institutions of the state, family, religion, and media, that cis-gender, heterosexual people often do not notice the comforts afforded to them: billboards, displays of intimacy, music, concerned glances in public, representation in the media, and pro-family politics all materialize heterosexual relations as the normative point of departure for the social.\footnote{Ahmed, The Cultural Politics of Emotions, 184.}
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Asya’s account explores the broad, persistent ways that she and others in the trans community are made to feel othered by oppressive understandings of trans personhood on a daily basis as their identity “…poses a serious threat to the very core values of the patriarchal society in Istanbul.46 As I have argued, mainstream conceptualizations of trans identity come from a certain alignment of institutions, like the media, family, and the state, which maintain heteronormativity to expand their own interests. This, I argue, is in concordance with trans theorist Sandy Stone’s argument that, “Bodies are screens on which we see projected the momentary settlements that emerge from ongoing struggles over beliefs and practices…”47 Institutions like the government construct certain populations as viable citizens while obscuring the possibility of living otherwise. For trans people, the ease of fitting in that heterosexuals encounter in everyday society is transformed into constant antagonism, where “passing” as “normal” is constantly on one’s mind. This is true regardless of one’s own conceptualization of one’s own body, affecting those trans people who do not want to fully adopt a set of gender norms as well as those who fully identify as either male or female. Turkish governmentality (in particular, everyday interactions with the state, with the family, media, and other institutions) forces trans people to constantly evaluate whether or not they are passing in everyday situations and decide to whom to disclose their gender identity and when, not knowing what the consequences will be for failing to pass as sufficiently male or female.48 This is a central means by which trans people’s conduct is shaped by the trans assemblage, as trans people are forced to constantly self-monitor their gender presentation in public.49

46 Asya Elmas and Hevi Members, interview.
49 Dean, Governmentality: Power and Rule in Modern Society, 43.
Assembling Trans Bodies

Asya goes on to argue that, “Everyday life becomes unbearable for a trans as you get discriminated, ostracized, criticized for your sexual inclination or sexual identity.”\(^{50}\) I am interested here in the way that Asya herself constructs knowledge that challenges dominant Turkish rationalities about trans identity. She refrains from defining trans except in terms of those who have disturbed social norms by disavowing their given gender identity, rather than those which pass and have been accepted as a “natural” member of their gender.\(^{51}\) By continuously referring to marginalized trans persons, her focus is on those people who do not pass and are discriminated against for failing to correctly embody biopolitical knowledge concerning what constitutes normal bodies. As Foucault argues, normalcy is a measure by which deviants are identified and disciplined.\(^{52}\) For trans people, like Asya, normalcy is not only prohibitively expensive, but a performative regime of disciplining that occurs in everyday encounters, especially encounters with the state, family, and other heteropatriarchal institutions. Stone argues that trans personhood can exist as an alternative to the disciplinary regime of passing (to trouble the gender binary); Asya’s activism demonstrates a practical example of how non-passing trans people call for rights.\(^{53}\) Asya explains that being on a bus or going into a hospital can become fraught with the policing of her gender identity: “This discrimination exists and is part of everyday life in Istanbul- you can feel it when you are on a bus, when you walk in the streets, when you visit a hospital or go to school, basically it is everywhere.”\(^{54}\) Stories about trans people being attacked make many people fearful on a constant basis. It is never certain whether trans people will “pass,” or whether they will be responded to harshly for banal acts like trying to buy a ticket on a bus, asking a police officer for help, ordering food at a restaurant, or

\(^{50}\) Asya Elmas and Hevi Members, interview.  
\(^{51}\) Stone, “The Empire Strikes Back,” 166.  
\(^{52}\) Foucault, *Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison*, 184.  
\(^{54}\) Asya Elmas and Hevi Members, interview.
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being admitted to a hospital. As Sara Ahmed argues, compulsory heterosexuality necessarily operates most powerfully in banal encounters such as riding the bus or walking down the street.\(^{55}\) It is in these circumstances wherein trans people are constantly forced to decide whether they are in danger if they are exposed, whether they can pass unnoticed, or whether one need to reveal their queerness.\(^{56}\) Particular to the trans body, however, is that even if one does “pass” as a woman or man, they are still subject to various forms of misogyny and paternalism on a daily basis. However, passing is often a matter of resources. As one of my respondents argued, “In Turkey, if you have money, you can live however you want. So if you have money, you can be a transsexual or anyone. If you don’t have, you don’t get that...”\(^{57}\) Trans people who cannot afford or do not want to have surgery, hormone replacement therapy, the “right” clothing/makeup/styling, and bodily comportment corroborate an image of the trans body as embodying incorrect citizenship, non-familial reproduction, and impropriety.\(^{58}\)

Although not a trans person, another one of my informants recounted his own gay-bashing on a bus in Istanbul that is salient to the problem of the policing of heteronormativity in public:

They would first attract your attention and then you start responding to they would react homophobically. “Are you hitting on me?” or “why are you looking at me?” That’s what happened here, “Why are you looking at me?” and I said “I’m not looking at you” and then he just stood up and punched me in the face on the bus. And nobody on the bus defended me at the time.\(^{59}\)

\(^{56}\) Ibid., 165.
\(^{57}\) Interviewee D, interview.
\(^{58}\) An example from an American study: “…financial barriers to transition were exacerbated by their difficulty in finding work, while, at the same time, their need for physical procedures (e.g. facial feminization surgery) made it more difficult for these participants to be hired, binding them into a vicious cycle. One female-identified participant discussed how she was constantly self-conscious about her appearance and frustrated by her lack of financial resources for surgery…Because she had little control over many aspects of her situation (e.g. physique, job discrimination), she struggled to maintain constant control of her physical appearance (e.g., hair, makeup, clothing) and mannerisms in order to protect herself,” in Heidi M. Levitt and Maria R. Ippolito, “Being Transgender: The Experience of Transgender Identity Development,” *Journal of Homosexuality* 61, no. 12 (December 2, 2014): 1745.
\(^{59}\) Focus Group Interview at Lambda Istanbul, interview.
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The informant goes on to argue that the government tacitly endorses hate crimes such as these, because there is no anti-discrimination protection. Moreover, on the rare occasion that assailants are charged with assault or murder, judges will dismiss the case or provide reduced sentences by using a so-called “gay panic” defense or claim they were “duped” because they thought they were dating a “real woman.” For example, in 2013, a man beat a trans woman to death in Istanbul. The prosecutor asked the judge for a life sentence, but the judge reduced it to 15 years on account of the possibility of “unjust provocation” – the verdict citing the victim’s “being a transvestite” as permitting a reduced sentence. Another murder case in 2014 also resulted in a reduced sentence for the defendant because of “unjust provocation.”

Beyond physical and psychological violence, discourses of medical knowledge define trans bodies. In my interview with the people from SPoD, one of the trans activists needed to see a gynecologist on a monthly basis after having a sex change operation. At one of these appointments, she saw a cis-female doctor who refused to treat her on moral grounds. This account resonates with Voltrans Transmen Initiative founder Ali Arıkan’s account of his stay in the hospital when battling cancer. He reported that he was repeatedly misgendered by all level of staff, because of supposed discrepancies in his medical files. He also wrote about his trans-male companion who came to visit, and how one of the nurses implored him to get married: “You have to get married. You are young now. But what about when you get old, when you get

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62 LGBTI News Turkey, “Defendant Accused of Murdering Trans Woman Çağla Joker Gets a Sentence Reduction because of His Age, Then a Reduction for Having Been ‘Unjustly Provoked.”
63 Focus Group Interview at Lambda Istanbul, interview.
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sick, who will take care of you?”65 It is such daily performances of heteronormativity in all spheres of life that keep trans people out of public engagement. Only by being part of a heteronormatively defined family unit and having the right colored identification card (and thus enough money) can one engage with the public and not be actively erased by its processes. Cotton argues that passing with the “right” genitalia often makes the difference between life and death for trans people, preventing trans people from being incarcerated in a prison at odds with their identity or allowing them access to social/medical services, including bathrooms.66 Yet that sex reassignment is a requirement for state recognition problematically marginalizes trans people who cannot or do not want to undergo surgery. If trans bodies can potentially point to a life lived outside of patriarchal demands of the state and family, then the legitimacy of these institutions are called into question. Instead, trans is assembled as a necropolitical production, policed by everyone, everywhere, all the time.67

Necrosexual Bodies

In my interviews, I found a number of linkages between trans people and sex work. Because of the lack of discrimination protections and social marginality, many trans people work in the sex industry as one of few options available to them.68 In this section, I explore how various institutions materialize the trans sex worker’s body to speak to issues of public morality and gentrification in Turkey. While the media has documented the case of Bülent Ersoy since the 1980s, the problems that other trans people face in their daily lives remain hidden. Amnesty

65 Ibid.
68 “As a result of denial of access to employment, for the vast majority of transgender women the only option is to engage in unlicensed and dangerous sex work, the risks of which are indicated by the number of transgender women sex workers who have been killed or report suffering constant violence by customers...” in Amnesty International, “Turkey: ‘Not an Illness Nor a Crime’: Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual and Transgender People in Turkey Demand Equality” (London, UK: Amnesty International, June 21, 2011), 23–24, https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/EUR44/001/2011/en/.
International and Transgender Europe have conducted survey research within trans communities in major Turkish cities to better understand how regular trans people live. These studies demonstrate how trans people are disproportionately pushed into sex work in order to survive. They also find that being trans, sex workers, poor, and sometimes ethnically other has created intersectional forms of marginalization for trans sex workers that are not experienced by other populations. In this section, I corroborate these studies by exploring news media and my own interviews with the queer community in Istanbul. I argue that the idea of the trans body has become coherent in connection to sex work.

Sex work is legal in Turkey within certain parameters: sex workers have to work within a brothel and have the appropriate-gendered identity card (thus they must have both medical and juridical consent). However, many trans people experience financial and social roadblocks in attaining the legal recognition of their gender and therefore do sex work illegally. Several of my participants flagged trans sex workers as a particularly vulnerable population in Turkey because of the multiple ways they fall through the legal code and are targeted by violence: “The transgender individuals, because they can’t get decent employment from the society – including government – they are forced to work on the streets. At night. That kind of job is very risky job.”

69 Ibid., 23.; Ördek, “Transrespect versus Transphobia: The Social Experiences of Trans and Gender-Diverse People in Colombia, India, the Philippines, Serbia, Thailand, Tonga, Turkey, and Venezuela.”
70 Amnesty International, “Turkey: ‘Not an Illness Nor a Crime’: Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual and Transgender People in Turkey Demand Equality”; Ördek, “Transrespect versus Transphobia: The Social Experiences of Trans and Gender-Diverse People in Colombia, India, the Philippines, Serbia, Thailand, Tonga, Turkey, and Venezuela.”
71 Ördek, “Transrespect versus Transphobia: The Social Experiences of Trans and Gender-Diverse People in Colombia, India, the Philippines, Serbia, Thailand, Tonga, Turkey, and Venezuela,” 65.
73 Çavuşoğlu, interview.
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There are a number of reasons why trans people become sex workers in Turkey. First, they are often forced out of their homes, especially when they come from small towns, and come to large cities with limited resources or social connections. They also are discriminated against in school and education; for example, some have reported being barred from university campuses for not having identification corresponding to their gender. This means it can be difficult to attain the necessary qualifications to work. However, even those that do have qualifications find themselves discriminated against in hiring and those that are found out to be trans are fired. As there is no anti-discrimination law in Turkey to protect trans people from these practices, job insecurity is something that trans people have to contend with in ways that cisgender people do not. In a survey of 101 trans respondents, 34% said they were refused a job for being trans. 87% of trans women surveyed were engaged in the sex industry. In the Lambda survey, of 90 trans women who left their employment, 42% said they left because they believed they were going to be fired, 29% said they were denied promotions, and 24% said they were forced to resign.

The relationship between trans bodies and sex work speaks to the assembled nature of trans identity as a mechanism of control. Turkish governmentality shapes the possibilities for trans life in a number of ways: a lack of anti-discrimination and hate-crime legislation of the state; common-sense familial gender ideals about marriage and child-bearing; and unregulated...

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74 Ördek, “Transrespect versus Transphobia: The Social Experiences of Trans and Gender-Diverse People in Colombia, India, the Philippines, Serbia, Thailand, Tonga, Turkey, and Venezuela.”
76 Ibid., 24.
77 Ördek, “Transrespect versus Transphobia: The Social Experiences of Trans and Gender-Diverse People in Colombia, India, the Philippines, Serbia, Thailand, Tonga, Turkey, and Venezuela,” 64.
79 Ördek, “Transrespect versus Transphobia: The Social Experiences of Trans and Gender-Diverse People in Colombia, India, the Philippines, Serbia, Thailand, Tonga, Turkey, and Venezuela.”
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Police violence against trans people constitute this technique of governing. Trans identity is, here, an assemblage that denies this population the possibility of work in other occupations—and exacerbates violence against them in sex work, which is one of the few trades available to them. In one survey of trans persons (of both gender, including sex workers and non-sex workers), 99% of 109 respondents have faced insults and/or threats of violence, 87% said they have experienced physical aggression, and 78% said they experienced sexual violence at least once.\(^\text{81}\) In another study of 233 trans women sex workers, 74% reported that they had experienced physical violence, 54% had experienced sexual violence, and 68% had experienced psychological violence, including verbal abuse and blackmail.\(^\text{82}\) These attacks against trans sex workers continue unabated. In January 2015, a client strangled a trans woman to death.\(^\text{83}\) In May 2015, four trans sex workers were attacked in three different provinces on the same day. In August 2015, a man stabbed a trans sex worker in Afyon.\(^\text{84}\) The regularity by which trans sex workers are exposed to violence reflects a Turkish governmentality that only recognizes reproductive sex and traditional family configurations as legitimate.

As Leticia Sabsay argues,\(^\text{85}\) the daily violence faced by trans sex workers constitutes a public buttressing of proper forms of citizenship: neighbors and families versus improper citizens, sex workers. In other words, there is a performance of violence against trans sex workers in order to cleanse the public of improper bodies. Sex work, which entails the selling of the body, non-reproductive sex, and anti-binary genders, is positioned in opposition to the

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\(^{81}\) Ördek, “Transrespect versus Transphobia: The Social Experiences of Trans and Gender-Diverse People in Colombia, India, the Philippines, Serbia, Thailand, Tonga, Turkey, and Venezuela.”

\(^{82}\) Ibid., 68.


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neoconservative state, which privileges traditional gendered divisions of labor and demands heteronormative reproduction. The state is in alignment with the family here, which privileges honor norms based on “proper” exchanges of women into marriage. It is through this networked enforcement of proper reproductions and the conservation of honor that the disciplinary governance of trans people to violence becomes legitimate. Therefore, the Turkish trans body is assembled by the filiations between state, media, and family. This assemblage both defines trans sex workers as other and disciplines them as a technology of control. At the same time, these institutions are amenable to the figure of Bülent Ersoy as a conservative rich woman. For these dominant institutions in organizing the public, trans people are permissible insofar they confirm the interests of the state, family, and media.

Police violence against (and the absence of police protection of) trans sex workers is a common means by which the state makes everyday life a cis-gendered sphere. Through certain laws, and their absence, and discursive acts, the state has enabled police violence against trans people without expressly demanding the erasure of trans people. Police harassment and violence against trans sex workers is a common experience: according to one survey, 61% of trans people said they have often been harassed by the police and a further 14% said they were sometimes harassed by the police. This harassment takes a number of forms. 42% said they were often fined by the police and another 29% said they had been fined once or twice. 46% said they are often arrested by the police and a further 25% said they have been arrested once or twice. The reasons police give for fines and arrests are “prostitution, cross dressing, and public nuisance.”

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86 The survey counts all trans people—the author notes that these percentages would likely be higher if only counting trans women, given that 87% of the trans women surveyed do sex work. Ördek, “Transrespect versus Transphobia: The Social Experiences of Trans and Gender-Diverse People in Colombia, India, the Philippines, Serbia, Thailand, Tonga, Turkey, and Venezuela.”

87 Ibid.
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There are a number of legal instruments that facilitate the policing of trans sex workers. Notably, the Law on Public Disgrace or Misdemeanors Law of March 2005 “aims to protect public order, general morality, general health, the environment, and economic order.” Further, Article 29 of the TPC establishes sentence reductions for those who were “provoked” into violence, giving perpetrators impunity in many of these cases:

There’s no way of proving it. And that’s what happens a lot of the time. And that’s why I’m saying it’s the government’s systemic way of condoning hate crime is when, especially with trans women or sometimes gay men are murdered, the murderers say in the court—for trans women what they is ‘When I picked her up I didn’t know she was trans I thought she was a real woman’...And the bad thing is the judges actually take this as a fair reasonable “self-defense.”

So-called “gay-panic” laws are not the only way trans peoples’ lives are made difficult in regards to their sex work. Ordinances criminalize the “promotion” of prostitution, the use of unsanctioned spaced for sex work, and require an identity card and registration to be a sex worker. In turn, attaining an identity card and registration requires the individual undergo SRS and the necessary bureaucratic legal proceedings to recognize their gender. The police are given great leeway to enforce these laws in the form of arbitrary fines, closing brothels, house raids, and arresting sex workers. This entails demanding identification on the street, searching sex workers’ cars, and other attempts at intimidation.

Targeting by the law does not explain the totality of violent behavior that often accompanies the policing of trans sex workers. I believe that police violence has become a

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89 Focus Group Interview at Lambda Istanbul, interview.
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necessary part of suppressing positive images of trans personhood. This violence takes many forms. In the Red Umbrella study, out of the 233 trans women sex workers surveyed, 49.7% reported that the police exercised violence against them. 31.2% had been sexually assaulted by the police. The fining is itself a form of violence, wherein trans sex workers already are economically disadvantaged through housing discrimination, healthcare costs, and the necessary legal proceeding to change gender. One of my participants considered the ways trans sex workers are both brutalized and patronized by the police on a regular basis:

…many of the transgender sex workers are lovers of policemen or having sexual intercourse with policemen, or have some other kind of agreements with policemen – so it is not just violence. It’s not valid for my straight best friends, whenever she sees a policeman she would just change her direction, she wouldn’t get into interaction with him at all. But for a transgender sex worker working on the streets it’s impossible to avoid the policemen. So what they do in order to survive, they get into interaction with them. They talk with them. They make bargains with them.

There are therefore multiple ways police marginalize trans lives. However, that trans people sometimes engage in sex work with the police (as the above informant explains), makes these other forms of marginalization particularly unethical. One trans activist reports, “…I had to sleep with the mafia for free from time to time. And the police too… Some policemen would just flip their dicks out, telling me ‘come on suck it.’ It is not so easy being a prostitute.” There are further reports of police extorting “protection money” from trans people.

There are a number of indicative cases of police harassment in recent history and there are likely many more cases which are undocumented. These demonstrate the extreme lengths the

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92 Özgenç, “Half of Transgender Sex Workers Subjected to Police Violence.”
93 Ördek, “Transrespect versus Transphobia: The Social Experiences of Trans and Gender-Diverse People in Colombia, India, the Philippines, Serbia, Thailand, Tonga, Turkey, and Venezuela.”
94 Çakmak, interview.
95 Ibid.
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state is willing to go to delegitimize any notion of accepting Turkish trans personhood. In winter 2014, police detained trans sex workers in the Fındıkzade and Haseki neighborhoods of Istanbul and took them to a local venereal disease clinic, where they were forced to have blood tests taken. Foucault speaks at length about the relationship between scientific discourses, which make diseased bodies knowable, and the policing needed to enact medical knowledge by controlling the spread of diseased bodies.98 Trans identity is, here, an assemblage made knowable by medical expertise, which produces certain bodies as a public health risk, which provides police with the imperative for the invasive surveillance of a person by forcing them to undergo blood tests. The police further conducted raids on trans women’s homes after finding their phone numbers and addresses on social media, sealing several of the residences presumably under the guise of unlawfully operating a brothel.99 In Mersin in July 2014, police beat a group of trans women and used pepper spray against them after claiming they were “disturbing people in the vicinity.”100 In an interview with a victim of police harassment in the newspaper Birgün, a victim of police harassment tells her story:

A few days ago, when I was working, three police vehicles approached. Undercover policemen got out of them, beat us up with bats that had iron inside, and swore at us. We were not taken to the police station after we were beaten up because then a report would be required from the hospital. They beat us up in the middle of the street and then leave us. Besides, we are afraid of getting hurt through assault because we have plastic surgery.101

98 “A medicine of epidemics could exist only if supplemented by a police: to supervise the location of mines and cemeteries, to get as many corpses as possible cremated instead of buried, to control the sale of bread, wine, and meat, to supervise the running of abattoirs and dye works, and to prohibit unhealthy housing; after a detailed study of the whole country, a set of health regulations would have to be drawn up that would be read ‘at service or mass, every Sunday and holy day’, and which would explain how one should feed and dress oneself, how to avoid illness, and how to prevent or cure prevailing diseases: These precepts would become like prayers that even the most ignorant, even children, would learn to recite.”
99 LGBTI News Turkey, “Police Harassment, House Raids and Detainment in Istanbul.”
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In October 2011, as trans sex worker Sehap Gunesar was being murdered in Antalya, witnesses claimed that the police pepper sprayed the sex workers that came to her aid. Another case shows that the harassment of trans people continues after they are taken into custody: Emir Çoban, a member of the Malatya Youth Initiative against Homophobia and Transphobia, says the police applied psychological abuse and insulted the apprehended women, repeating such slurs as, “Do you get your ass fucked? Are you a fag? Are you queer?” In another interview, a trans sex worker named Caesar exclaimed, “The police are the problem, they fine us every day — 179 lira,” she says. “I get 50 lira per client.” Many trans sex workers readily point to the police as the source of marginalization in their lives. For example, a trans sex worker named Beren blamed the Istanbul Chief of Police for the violence: "During the six years that Celalettin Cerrah has been Istanbul Chief of Police, the violence against transvestites and transsexuals has risen very noticeably. His time in office has been a turning point for the worse.

The respondents in my own interviews also expressed anger, disdain, and frustration with the relationship between state violence and trans sex workers in Turkey. When I asked what the most pressing issue for LGBTQs in Turkey was today, a few of them answered that the discrimination that trans sex workers faced was the most pressing. Some also offered anecdotal evidence of trans peoples’ fraught relationships with the police:

I came across a transvestite along the way screaming loudly and she went to police and asked for help in front of me, I was like 60 or 70 meters away from them, and she said there are people chasing her and she’s afraid they could kill her or beat her very badly. You know what the police said? ‘We don’t care.

104 Johnson, “Transgender Killings Rise in Turkey.”
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You are prostitute you should come with us to the police station.’ They didn’t care about the people trying to murder or beat her.\textsuperscript{106} Another explored the lack of social welfare provided for trans people, wherein many lack the economic and social support provided by family or government services to deal with emergencies and healthcare.\textsuperscript{107}

Much of the policing of trans bodies is linked to sex work. This has become a reason to “clean up” neighborhoods that is justified by a government rationality (or, the production of truths and knowledge, after Dean) that permits acts of violence in the name of economic development and family-neighborly salubriousness.\textsuperscript{108} Gentrification’s impact on trans lives must be contextualized within the recent milieu of public-private urban development commenced by the state. Since the 2000s, public-private partnerships have propelled a spate of large-scale infrastructural projects in Istanbul, including a new airport (to be the largest in the world), a second bridge across the Bosporus, large shopping centers, and property-led renewal initiatives in historically poorer neighborhoods.\textsuperscript{109} At the June 2014 groundbreaking of the new airport project, Prime Minister Erdoğan said, “We’re building not just an airport, but actually a monument of victory today,” reflecting a mentality wherein the government sees itself as battling against vaguely-defined others in order to bring about their vision of a more modern, economically-developed Turkey.\textsuperscript{110} Programs of urban renewal are based on the ruling AKP-run

\textsuperscript{106} Interviewee G, interview.

\textsuperscript{107} Interviewee J, interview.

\textsuperscript{108} Dean, \textit{Governmentality: Power and Rule in Modern Society}, 33.


\textsuperscript{110} After calling on all Turkish citizens to be proud of the project, Erdoğan lashed out at the Gezi Park protesters by calling them "Gezi-minded" (Gezizekalı), an apparent pun on the word for "idiot" (gerizekalı). “Turkish PM Slams Gezi Protesters as Turkey Breaks Ground on ‘World’s Largest Airport’,” \textit{Hurriyet Daily News}, June 7, 2014,
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municipality’s mentality of development as not only a widely-popular policy directive but also a codification of the government’s modern, neoliberal-oriented vision for Turkey. Yeseren Elicin argues that “unjust rent transfer, displacement, and social exclusion” comprise a few of the techniques used by the government in order to bring about investment-friendly gentrification.111 Here, I explore these processes of gentrification in relation the exclusion of trans people from the city, which constitutes part of the assemblage of what it means to be a trans person in contemporary Turkey.

Beyond these large projects, the government’s efforts to obscure trans people in order to increase land value is demonstrated in neighborhood property redevelopment. These local projects generally entail the identification of “risk zones,” wherein buildings lack proper permits or are deemed unsuitable for living and overriding any other historical preservation or protection provisions.112 The Housing Development Administration of Istanbul (TOKI) identifies these sites and grants contracts to developers to take control of the redevelopment.113 In neighborhoods like Tarlabasi, existing owners are forced to demolish buildings themselves or allow developers to demolish them for compensation.114 Existing renters are given the option to be relocated to state housing in far-flung neighborhoods like Tашoluk, 30 kilometers away from Tarlabasi.115 Relevant to this essay, Tarlabasi hosts many trans residents because of its (formerly) affordable rent and nearby access to busy brothels.116


113 Letsch, “Istanbul Sees History Razed in the Name of Regeneration.”
115 “Tarlabasi hosts a sizable transvestite population as well, along with Romans who have long worked in the entertainment sector of Beyoglu nightlife. Poverty may be the only common factor that brings together such a
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Pro-government media garners support for these projects by calling certain districts “ghettos,” “shanties,” and “slums.” After decrying these neighborhoods as bastions of unrest – even going so far to assert that they are the cause of terrorism – the media praise urban renewal projects as a key part in a more secure, homogenous city. Several of my respondents pointed to gentrification as a problem for trans sex workers in particular. They argue that areas like Tarlabası, which were once home to sex workers as well as where sex workers conducted business, are now being “cleaned up” to create a city more in line with the neoliberal ideals that propel urban gentrification. One of my interviewees explained that this is phenomenon is linked to a global politics of neoliberal development:

...Cihangir used to be all trans. It used to be a safe place for trans – Tarlabası as well. But what do you do if you want to be cleaning a neighborhood? First get rid of trans people. And then Kurds, Gypsies. So in 1994 there was serious, brutal police violence toward trans women. It’s called Ülker St. Historically, trans women have been the first ones to get kicked out. They were put on trains and shipped to Eskişehir. Insane – now there’s the urban renewal of Tarlabası. Trans people got kicked out first. And then you no longer have affordable housing, so you move to Avriller. And then what happens in Avriller? There’s lynching. So the residents of this housing complex lynched transwomen. One person died and the case is still going on-this happened last year. So OK, now transwomen are scared to live in Avriller. If your only source of employment is sex work – because no one else employs you, and you’re more distant from the city, and considering the fact that brothels are closing down or not taking in new women, you have to work on the street. What street are you going to work on? Then you have to work on the highway. And that’s fucking dangerous, right? First we’ll get rid of your house, obviously no employment opportunities – it is social isolation.

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119 Interviewee G, interview; Interviewee Q, interview.

120 Çakmak, interview.

121 Interviewee Q, interview.
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The respondent’s narrative is informative because it portrays the multiple ways the assemblage constitutes and marginalizes trans bodies, including the global institution of the UN and local policing. In the above conversation, the interviewee is specifically referring to the “cleaning up” of Istanbul before UN Habitat II, a conference held in Istanbul in 1994, which was designed to formulate the UN’s program of sustainable and equitable urbanization policy. The globalized image of urban renewal depended upon the clean up a certain neighborhood, leading to police violence and mob-style lynching. Amnesty International produced a report confirming that transgender women were beaten and forced from their homes ahead of the conference and that this is just one example of trans people being forcibly removed from their homes. We can speculate how this violent displacement compounds upon the difficulties faced by a person unable to find formal employment and, in addition, without housing. Many trans sex workers find themselves impacted by the correlated problems of housing loss, lack of economic opportunities, lack of access to education, and social discrimination.

The violent marginalization of trans bodies is one means by which trans bodies are assembled as expendable, non-human, non-citizen, diseased, and so forth. Trans people, because of their bodies and their sex work, are seen as undeserving of the protections of the state, but deserving of violence. That public engagement with trans bodies tends toward violent encounters is corroborated by the available data regarding violence against trans people, including 79% of trans sex workers having faced police violence. The murder of trans people and trans sex workers in particular further demonstrates the precariousness of trans life in Turkey as an

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124 Ibid., 20–25.
outcome of a hostile public. I have compiled a list of trans murders in Turkey since 2008 using data from the Trans Murder Monitoring project, LGBTI News Turkey, and other sources (see: Appendix A). This list is likely to be incomplete, as trans murders are not specifically quantified by the state and tend to be underreported by the media. As there are no hate-crime protections in Turkey, response to trans violence is not considered an option to some, often undocumented on the part of police and medical personnel, and some trans people simply conceal their gender identities, so they are not known to the authorities to be trans.126

In looking at the 39 trans people murdered, certain themes emerge regarding the brutality of violence directed toward trans bodies (see: Appendix A). First, of those whose age is known, only 4 are 40 or above – the vast majority are young people. Most of the murdered are from Istanbul or other large urban centers. 11 were shot to death and 19 were stabbed to death. The level of brutality involved in these murders is significant: some of the trans people stabbed or shot to death were done so multiple times – one trans woman was stabbed 40 times, while one was shot 8 times. Others had their genitals mutilated, body parts dismembered, or their bodies left in squalid conditions – naked or on the side of a highway, for example. 10 were found dead in their own car or home. The majority were known sex workers. In the cases where the perpetrator was found, some received reduced sentences for being “unjustly provoked.” The violence faced by these victims demonstrates the expendability of trans bodies, which is linked to the way the government defines heteronormative Turkish citizens against others.

**TRANS BODIES**

Although institutions in Turkey assemble a certain negative existence for trans bodies, there are collaborations between institutions and trans people which seek to renegotiate trans

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identity. I argue that this is especially apparent in the circulations between trans activist organizing and new media. These institutions are using trans sex workers to promote a more positive perception of trans people as human and deserving of human rights. As I will show, positive understandings of trans personhood challenge the dominant ways trans personhood is materialized in Turkey. Here I focus on two “reterritorializations” of trans identity in particular. The first is the rise of visual media as trans activism. The second is in regards to trans inroads within electoral politics.

I interviewed a group of leaders (including Asya Elmas) at Hevi, which is Istanbul’s Kurdish LGBTQ organization. I learned about three values that Hevi oriented their programming around to change public perceptions of sex work and bring about trans sex worker-friendly policies:

We try to convey the message that working in the sex industry is not bad, and sex workers should not be stigmatized as subhuman or sinners. What they do is to work and support themselves financially like everyone else. We also would like to see a sex workers’ union set up so that their problems, concerns and demands are listened to and resolved. Sex workers’ working conditions should be improved and regulated. Brothels should be in compliance with health and safety regulations, and should be checked on a regular basis to ensure that sex workers and their clientele are in a safe and healthy environment. Sex workers in Europe are not discriminated and this should be achieved in Turkey as well.

This first point characterizes their messaging as a direct rebuttal of negative images of sex workers, specifically formulated around showing that they are not subhuman or sinners. The organization is therefore interested in countering the religious, familial, state, and media narratives which produces these popular understandings of trans people. Tied to realizing these goals is a demand to improve working conditions for sex workers, which would legitimize their

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127 Ördek, “Transrespect versus Transphobia: The Social Experiences of Trans and Gender-Diverse People in Colombia, India, the Philippines, Serbia, Thailand, Tonga, Turkey, and Venezuela.”
128 Asya Elmas and Hevi Members, interview.
129 Ibid.
means of subsistence and, thus, their lives.

Working in the sex industry is seen as selling your meat or hiring your body for money. Actually, we provide our services to sexual pleasure seekers. We sell pleasure and it is a service as well. This should be seen like that. We also try to promote this view through social media. Prostitution is one of the oldest professions and we want prostitution seen as professional. Having sex is a need and it is a fact that people have sex, you cannot stop people sleeping with prostitions and we are saying is that this should be regulated and LGBTs should be given safe working environment. Their right to work in the sex industry should be acknowledged and regulated like any other worker.\textsuperscript{130}

This second value further responds to the prevailing governmentality of the state, which would rather see sex only in terms of familial reproduction and proper, Turkish citizenship.\textsuperscript{131} To challenge the predominance of these heteronormative discourses is to offer pleasure as something outside of those institutions. The existence of trans sex workers constitutes a radical challenge to these popular, long-standing institutions’ norms surrounding sex and pleasure. By promoting the notion that sex for the sake of pleasure is “normal,” they are attempting to unseat these discourses and legitimize styles of living that are not inherently reproductive (including the lives of most LGBTQ people).

I think no one should be forced to work in sex industry. I know a lot of people who do it because they love what they do like any professional. Trans prefer to work in the sex industry as there are not many options for them to work in different sectors because of the fact that they look different and they get dressed differently.\textsuperscript{132}

Finally, one of the participants raised the point that trans sex workers should have the option whether to be a sex worker or not. The mainstream perception of trans sex workers does not explore the multiple forms of discrimination faced by trans people (including employment discrimination and ostracism from the family) which pushes them into sex work. This

\textsuperscript{130} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{132} Asya Elmas and Hevi Members, interview.
reconditioning of the image of trans bodies must champion protections for trans sex workers, but
also reform public opinion to make sex work something that people are not forced to do.

An emerging means by which organizations like Hevi are attempting to take greater
control over their identity (and over the trans assemblage) is via social media. For example,
Amnesty International collaborated with artist Gabrielle Le Roux to produce a documentary
series about trans individuals, which seeks to provide them with a platform to express their daily
struggles in a transphobic society.\footnote{Uluslararası Af Örgütü, \textit{AI Turkey - How Would You Describe the State of Trans People in Turkey?}, accessed December 15, 2015, \url{https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=neWKmJql-6k&feature=youtu.be&list=PL499CF01A74184C63}.} In the videos, trans activists from a range of organizations
explain not just the ways they feel violence and marginalization, but also the ways that they are
regular people. One woman talks at length about her life before she was trans, how she went to
school and became a teacher, but then was forced out of her job and turned to sex work in order
to survive.\footnote{Uluslararası Af Örgütü, \textit{AI Turkey - What Is Your Occupation?}, accessed February 3, 2017, \url{https://www.youtube.com/watch?time_continue=884&v=WlFh2Q1euo0}.} One trans man explains that he wanted to be a cook, but could not because the
“…system prevents us from using our talents.”\footnote{Ibid.} A genre of videos now available across social
media seeks to expose the public to the reality of trans sex workers’ lives.

One video from Red Umbrella features a trans sex worker, Destina, talking about her
profession and the struggles she faces on a daily basis.\footnote{Kırmızı Şemsiye, “Biz Kimiz?,” \textit{Kırmızı Şemsiye}, March 22, 2017, \url{http://www.kirmizisemsiye.org/}.} Destina argues that people’s behavior
toward trans sex workers in public is contradictory: while people harass trans sex workers, they
do so by proclaiming their commitment to morality.\footnote{Kırmızı Şemsiye, \textit{Kırmızı Şemsiye - 17 Aralık Dünya Seks İşçilerine Yönelik Şiddetle Mücadele Günü}, accessed December 15, 2015, \url{https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=23JUtZxePVA&feature=youtu.be}.} She says, “If these are your morals, then
down with your morals!” This is an example of one public process which is challenging the
governmentality of mainstream society by problematizing neoconservative moralizing by
Appealing to a different, yet palatable set of values: “Don’t intervene in our bodies, identities, or professions!” offers a return to personal liberty, harkening back to the laicism upon with the Turkish state was predicated. Whereas conservative governance expresses transphobia and misogyny in terms of the deviance of the trans sex workers’ physicality, in these videos, the audience is confronted with shocking anecdotes of violence and inhumanity. When Destina says, “Maybe now, when my client comes, he will attack me and then you will say that a trans is murdered,” her resigned indifference is palpable, suggesting that this is a fear she is well-acquainted with. She steadily applies mascara while explaining that their homes have been raided and they are arbitrarily fined by the police. Finally, she proclaims that “Violence against sex workers is violence against society itself,” a mentality upon which the trans activist movement predicates its forms of leadership and governance.\(^{138}\)

The video makes use of the power of new media to transform marginal voices into public ones.\(^{139}\) The video enables hearing the discourses that enable violence against trans sex workers, and seeing a trans sex worker, and feeling horror at the disjuncture between the violent words she says and the resignation in her tone and body language. Videos such as these call into question grand narratives about “normal” gender relations, making visible individual peoples’ lived experiences of oppression, which challenges the ways trans personhood has been assembled by the state, media, family, and religion as less-than-human.

When I asked my interviewees about positive representations of LGBTQ identity in popular culture, most of them stated there are none. However, a handful offered the movie *Benim*...
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cocugum, a 2013 documentary about queer people coming out to their parents in Turkey.\textsuperscript{140} The film notably contains the perspectives of parents of trans people coming to terms with their children’s gender identities. Organizations like Lambda Istanbul have conducted screenings of the film as part of their community outreach, which entails an active support group for parents of LGBTQs.\textsuperscript{141} By screening the film, they are attempting to normalize LGBTQs for heterosexual parents, whose disapproval can be a source of extreme stress or even result in violence for queer children. The movie screenings help show other families of LGBTQs that their struggles with understanding their children’s sexual orientation/gender identity are not uncommon.

I then found other kinds of visual media that further attempts to specifically normalize trans people in Turkish society. The Proudly Trans in Turkey series by South African artist Gabrielle Le Roux was funded by Amnesty International Turkey and the Consulate General of the Netherlands. Premiered in 2012, the Proudly Trans series was originally part of a travelling exhibition that combined a range of narrative projects – from portraiture to interviews and videos.\textsuperscript{142} The 18 part video series is now available on YouTube and many of the videos have tens of thousands of views. The videos feature trans activists of varied genders from the age of 24 to 57 from five cities in Turkey. Each of the films explores a different question, from “How old are you?” to “How do hate crimes affect you?” to “How would you describe the state of trans people in Turkey?”\textsuperscript{143} Besides these videos, a 2014 documentary called TransXIstanbul by Maria Binder follows a trans woman through Istanbul as she grapples with the murder of her friends.

\textsuperscript{140} Interviewee J, interview.
\textsuperscript{141} Interviewee B, interview.
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and the destabilization of trans lives because of gentrification in the city.\textsuperscript{144} Both the series and the documentary are in Turkish but subtitled in English. They have premiered at film festivals in Turkey and abroad, including Germany, Pakistan, and the UK.

Exposure to seeing trans bodies that do not “pass” as male or female in a conventional way is crucial to the reduction of everyday discrimination of trans people. With more positive representations of a breadth of different trans bodies, citizens are confronted with alternative discourses to those located in the state, family, Islam, and media, with their limited conditions for existence of a trans person. This assemblage, I argue, is unique to Turkey, if only in the dramatic rise in violence against trans people in Turkey, which has the highest trans murder rate in Europe.\textsuperscript{145} To counter this extreme violence, Turkish activism takes the form of producing visibility of trans bodies and the expression of fraught life narratives provides a counter to the narratives of deviance. Being seen not only as a nonconforming body but also as a human who suffers is helping make trans people gain ground in the public. These new representations use the public to counter negative or missing discourses, instead demonstrating that trans people can belong to families and communities, that they can be Muslim, and that they have a right to be treated as equal citizens within the Turkish state.

These values and images of the new trans body are not only making inroads in popular culture and social media, but they are also challenging electoral politics. Another destabilization is occurring in the formal political participation in electoral politics by trans activists and recognition of trans rights by major political parties and figureheads. Aforementioned Asya Elmas also stood as a People’s Democratic Party (HDP) candidate for city council in Istanbul’s

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Kadiköy neighborhood in 2014. I asked her what compelled her to run for local government. She said,

It is really hard to eat out in a restaurant, café, or any other public places as you get to hear nasty comments, abusive language, and get treated really badly. We think we should start somewhere to change these negative feelings towards LGBTs. I liken our plan to a pyramid – we need to start from the bottom and go all the way up to make a difference to the lives of LGBTs in this part of the world. I believe unless Trans have their rights, LGBTs would not have better living conditions. Unless women’s living conditions are not improved, society would not be a better place to live in.146

Asya’s reasoning for her activism is instructive, as she argues that all of society will benefit from the expansion of trans rights – just as society benefits from gender parity between men and women. She directly incorporates her negative experiences of the public as primary reasons as to why she decided to get involved in party politics. Using the resources available to her, Asya attempted a reclaiming of trans personhood by using one of the state’s technologies of public engagement (the elections) to do so.

Asya’s physicality is present throughout her engagement with party politics. Her campaign made use of highly-viewed videos on Facebook, which feature interviews with Asya, photos of her participating in the Gezi Park protests, and speeches wherein she contends with questions like “is society ready for a trans candidate?”147 Further, in her interviews and policy ideas, she draws upon her experience as a sex worker – which she had paused during the campaign, but has since returned doing.148 Finally, she never “passed” like Ersoy (“I grew my hair. I got rid of my beard. I had plastic surgery, but it doesn’t really camouflage me.”149), nor did she hide her history of being a sex worker or the abuse that has been visited upon her body.

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146 Asya Elmas and Hevi Members, interview.
148 “After the elections, I went back to my normal life – working as a sex worker for 4 days a week and being an activist for LGBT rights for 3 days a week.” Asya Elmas and Hevi Members, interview.
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Instead, she reframed her body and her life narrative as a platform to change the way trans people are talked about in public.\(^{150}\)

Although Elmas did not ultimately win, that she and 9 other openly LGBTQs were included on ballots in local elections in 2014 constituted a first in Turkish history.\(^{151}\) Reporting on the LGBTQ candidates, a Hürriyet journalist argued that a decade ago “…it was a completely ignored issue…by definition everyone thought that everyone else was straight. Now we are talking about the existence of LGBT people in society.”\(^{152}\) The changing public notions of trans personhood are further visible in the late 2014 presidential elections, when LGBTQ activist institutions came out in support of Selahattin Demirtaş’ HDP, which advocated for a “sexually free society.”\(^{153}\) Perhaps more importantly, four LGBTQ candidates were nominated as candidates for the 2015 general elections, including trans candidate Deva Özenen.\(^{154}\) It was during this election that the HDP – the party that the LGBTQ activist organizations endorsed – managed to cross the 10% election threshold for the first time in Turkish history, stymying the AKP’s attempt to win a simple majority in parliament (until a hung parliament led to a snap election later in the year, wherein the AKP regained their majority).\(^{155}\) Nonetheless, the increased visibility of trans activists in party politics constitutes a reterritorialization of the idea of trans personhood. This amounts to a significant challenge to Turkish governmentality: attempts to

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\(^{150}\) In one interview, Elmas said, “You are kind of forced [into sex work], and then they call you a whore. And what can I do? What can I do in this situation? You won’t give me a job, allow me to launch my own business, you don’t even allow me to walk on the street freely, to live as a normal human being and now you call me a whore. I think this is very hypocritical,” from “Taksim Square,” Istanbul Stories, accessed December 15, 2015, http://2013.istanbulstories.net/taksim/.

\(^{151}\) Krajeski, “Loud and Proud.”

\(^{152}\) Ibid.

\(^{153}\) “LGBT Associations Announce Support for HDP Candidate Demirtaş.”


control trans bodies through othering discourses are being challenged by trans activism in social media as well as diverse party politics. The trans assemblage as a technique of surveillance and confinement must now content with representations of trans people as Turkish citizens deserving of human rights as well as political leaders in their own right.

**Conclusion**

As the government identifies trans lives by means of the trans body as deceptive, abject, and effete, it simultaneously solidifies an understanding of the nation as masculine, pious, and family-oriented. Yet an emerging “reterritorialization” (to use the Deleuzian term) or transformation of this assemblage uses the exposure of trans bodies to show that they too can convey positive values (of inclusion and personal liberty, for example) that benefit Turkish society. New trans activist organizations, trans-friendly media campaigning, and the standing of trans and trans-friendly candidates signals new confrontations with those negative conceptions of trans personhood.

As trans identity becomes a more frequently circulated issue within the public – both positively and negatively – all sides stand to gain by solidifying notions of the trans body and ensuring that their conceptions of trans personhood are dominant. The question of trans rights is now being responded to by the government and pro-government media, affording them more opportunities to double down on their familial and religious values by appealing to a disgust of deviant bodies; for example, officials name the opposition as parties sponsoring “homosexuals” and “sedition.” However, trans activism is finding partnership with party politics, like the

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156 Umut Güner, “AKP Politician Unconcerned with Constitutional Equality for Gays,” Bianet - Bagimsiz Iletisim Agi, February 26, 2009, http://www.bianet.org/english/minorities/112795-akp-politician-unconcerned-with-constitutional-equality-for-gays.; Idiz, “Turkey’s LGBT Fight Uphill but Not Hopeless Battle - Al-Monitor.”; “Our Kurdish brothers are religious people. For God’s sake, look at these candidates that the HDP put forth. I can’t even bring myself to say it. They have put forth candidates that our citizen [sic] cannot accept. I mean let me say this,
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HDP, which seek to counter these discourses by appealing to the secular, multicultural, liberal principals the Turkish state was founded upon.\textsuperscript{157} The HDP has become a significant force in Turkish politics in part due to its ability to unite minorities – especially Kurds, LGBTs, Armenians – and those disaffected with the old Kemalist left as well as the neoconservative AKP. By making trans bodies visible, the HDP contributes to the materialization of the trans body, yet the opposite is also true: the trans body has affected the course of party politics itself, making government accountable for how it imagines trans bodies. The mutability of trans has become a source of political change.

Chapter Six

The Queer Common

This struggle is not something you can do on your own. There is a huge world out there just waiting to humiliate you, kill you—you need to be together to face all these threats.¹

In this chapter, I argue that queer participation in the Gezi Park protests constitutes a “line of flight” – a rupture in the assemblage of control that is queer identity, which I refer to as the queer common.² A queer common, I argue, is an injunction against the state’s governance of queer bodies taking the form of diffuse, horizontal protest. Where the heteropatriarchal-nationalist state, religion, family, and media marginalize others, the events of Gezi Park not only exposed this logic, but create an opening for change. I depend upon interviews and media surrounding the queer activism surrounding the Gezi Park protests to demonstrate resistance to oppressive Turkish institutions. I show how the state and concomitant institutions (including the family, Islam, and the media) have narrowed the scope of what constitutes good citizenship. This entails constrictions of freedoms of speech, assembly, and association for some. Yet the queer common represents an interruption into the governance of bodies as per usual, enabling queers to assert their own demands to govern. Within the queer common, queer affects, language, and relationships create an ontological disturbance that alters party politics, identity categories, and the public perception of queer and trans individuals.

I begin by establishing the context for the Gezi Park protests. I define Turkish governance of queer bodies as reflecting a particular national identity, which compelled many to organize against it. I reflect upon some of the particularities of how the government works with other institutions to normalize the exclusion of queer bodies. From there, I explore how Gezi

¹ Çakmak, interview.
² Deleuze and Félix Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia, 8–10.
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Park emerged as a rebuke to this tightening of sexual governance. I focus in particular on the queer movement at Gezi: I demonstrate the relationship between Gezi Park and the pride protests of 2013, consider that they descend from a global genealogy of protest, albeit rooted in local idioms, and explore how queers used Gezi to leverage their own movement. Here, I introduce the queer common as a lens for understanding the topology of Gezi. This assemblage, I show, fundamentally changed the state’s ability to normalize images of heteropatriarchal-nationalist identity.

GEZI PARK

Gezi started in late May 2013 as an environmentalist protest against the razing of a small park adjacent to Istanbul’s central Taksim Square. With no public deliberation about the redevelopment, bulldozers arrived to clear out the trees in order to pave the way for the construction of a replica of Ottoman military barracks. These were designed to house a shopping center, condos, and possibly a mosque.3 While only around 50 demonstrators initially occupied the park, photos of the municipal police using tear gas and violence against the protesters elicited a national outcry. Within three weeks, more than 3.5 million people (out of Turkey’s 80 million total) participated in around 5,000 demonstrations across Turkey.4

Not only was the size of the protest notable, but the heterogeneity of protestors made the activism particularly difficult to define by the state and the media. 78.9% of participants at Gezi claimed no affiliation with a party or non-profit organization, 93.6% claimed they were not

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affiliated with any particular group, and 44.4% claimed to have never protested before.\textsuperscript{5} Gezi was rather a diverse protest of football fans, Muslims, Kurds, communists, environmentalists, and queers. These protestors established a camp within the park, set up tents, staged performances and workshops, and provided free food, medical care, and water to others.\textsuperscript{6} This support was echoed online with around 6 million combined mentions of the #direngeziparkı and #occupygezi on Twitter within the first five days alone.\textsuperscript{7} Police deployed tear gas and water cannons to clear the encampment in June.\textsuperscript{8} However, protests connected to Gezi Park continued well after it was cleared.\textsuperscript{9} Related activism includes the Berkin Elvan protests in 2014, the deployment of over 10,000 police to contain May Day protests every year since 2013, and the brutal crackdown on the Pride march of 2015. In 2016, hundreds of protestors once again took to the streets after the murder of trans activist Hande Kader, who was known in the community for sitting in front of police water cannons during the 2015 protests.\textsuperscript{10} These movements continue to revolve around Taksim Square, engender viral attention on social media, and bring together different segments of the population to protest against the state.\textsuperscript{11}

The Gezi Park protests and the inclusion of queer activism can be situated within the context of other global, contemporary queer, anti-neoliberal, and anti-authoritarian protests. The influences of these globalizing protest movements are visible in protestors’ actions and

discourses during Gezi—both at the park and online. Notably, images and speech-acts directly referring to the Stonewall Riots of 1969, and social justice protests since the early 2000s are evident in the protestors’ actions. All of these events contributed certain discourses and practices to the queer activist movement at Gezi and beyond. In using both international and local discourses and styles of protest, queer activism created new experimentations with democratic governance and brought to light the way queer others are marginalized in Turkey. This challenge to the governance of queer lives resulted in lasting implications for perceptions of acceptable citizenship and demonstrates a slippage in the state’s dominance over the representation of and governance over queer others.

Although Gezi was officially dismantled by the police on June 15th of 2013, protests continued in the Taksim-Gezi area up through Pride on June 30th, 2013. Since the early 2000s, pride includes a traditional protest march. It also entails a week of film screenings, workshops, performances, parties, and other events. The pride march itself spans Istiklal Avenue terminating in Taksim Square and Gezi Park. LGBTQ groups report that the 2012 march had 20,000 supporters, while the 2013 march swelled to nearly 100,000 because its enmeshment with the Gezi Park movement. Pride was also programmatically fused with Gezi. The theme of 2013 Pride Week was ‘Resistance,’ and the language used in the official program employs a vocabulary of resistance made popular within Gezi. Over a dozen workshops, performances, and panels focused on a queer perspective on discourses being explored at Gezi. Finally, hashtags on Instagram, Twitter, and Facebook like #gezi and #diren (resist) were frequently

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15 Istanbul Pride Week, “21. LGBT Onur Haftası 2013 İstanbul.”
accompanied by #lgbtonur (lgbtpride) and #stonewall by LGBTQ protestors and their supporters before, during, and after Pride Week.\(^{16}\)

Stonewall is invoked in Turkey during Pride Week through discourses, events, and particular acts of protest. Organizers of these events see these protests as descendant from the 1969 New York Riot, directly naming Istanbul Pride as a protest in honor of “…our trans, bisexual, lesbian, and gay friends at the Stonewall Inn in New York, who collectively opposed injustices against them.”\(^{17}\) Academic and independent scholar Kevyne Baar reports on screening a documentary on Stonewall to her Turkish students in the midst of the protests, wherein they discussed overlaps between the lack of media exposure in both cases.\(^{18}\) The Pride events are timed to occur during the anniversary of Stonewall. Lambda Istanbul hosts panels and film screenings to “re-think Stonewall” during pride each year, linking the Stonewall Riot to the contemporary struggle for LGBTQ rights in Turkey.\(^{19}\)

While LGBTQs in Turkey relate Stonewall to Gezi and the Pride protests, there was an academic and media debate which considered the degree to which Gezi was situated within the context of a wave of global justice protests since the 2007 Global Financial Crisis.\(^{20}\) I refer here to protests against the neoliberal austerity measures and banking bail-outs that swept North America, Iceland, Spain, and Greece in particular.\(^{21}\) Kivanc Atak argues that the Gezi protests

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\(^{16}\) See #Lgbtonur, #direnayol, and other relevant hashtags on Twitter, especially as used by @LGBTBLOK, @istanbulpride, and @lambda_istabul: Twitter, “#LgbtOnur Hashtag on Twitter,” 2016, https://twitter.com/hashtag/LgbtOnur?src=hash.

\(^{17}\) The press release from the 2015 Pride Week, for example, explains (in Turkish) how Stonewall was a multi-day riot against police violence, which engendered the modern global struggle that is symbolized by Pride Week Pride Istanbul, “Press.”


\(^{19}\) Lambdaistanbul, “Lambdaistanbul LGBTI Solidarity Association.”


\(^{21}\) Christina Flesher Fominaya, Social Movements and Globalization (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014), 150.
emulate the Arab Spring and Occupy Wall St., as they occurred within the same time period and shared similar strategies of resistance, occupation, and the use of new media within a global discourse of pro-democratic protest. However, the Gezi protests were predicated on local urban tensions distinct to the Turkish situation.  

Although differences of regime type and histories of colonization may problematize these comparisons, there are some linkages to be considered here. The protestors consisted of a heterogeneous range of actors with no single emergent voice. Protestors brandished anti-neoliberal, pro-democracy discourses and slogans. They adopted consensus-building, anti-capitalist, prefigurative utopian social organization. They also occupied both physical space as well as virtual space.

Linkages between Gezi and recent global justice protests were articulated by both protesters themselves. Protesters employed organizational techniques used at Indignados (in Spain, 2011), Occupy (USA, 2011) and Syntagma (in Greece, 2010-2012) such as assemblies, workshops, and hand-signals. The protestors actively crafted relationships between these global protests online. On Twitter, for example, #Occupygezi was mentioned over 160,000 times on May 31st, ballooning to nearly 2 million by the middle of June. Both Occupy and Gezi protesters shared information on the popular internet forum Reddit, including medical tips and instructions for people abroad who want to order food for Gezi protestors.

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23 Fominaya, Social Movements and Globalization, 154–60.
25 Fominaya, Social Movements and Globalization, 183.
26 Ibid.
27 Ibid., 183–85.
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Citizen-driven media also became a crucial platform for news reporting and organizing during the protests. Mainstream organizations kept away from reporting on the protest events (evident in the notorious case of CNN International’s broadcasting from the park while CNN Turk aired a documentary about penguins.”31 Tufekci asserts a linkage between the usage of protestors’ own media as a reliable source of news to the same phenomenon at other protests, including the WTO protest at Seattle in 1999, the Arab Spring, Euromaidan in the Ukraine, and so forth.32

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Gezi Park, both as a queer cruising space before the protests and as the protests themselves, represents a rupture in Turkish governmentality and its attempts to confine queer identity. In this section, I argue that Gezi Park is a kind of queer common, representing a space of radical dissent within a confining queer assemblage. An historical understanding of the common refers to natural resources (such as Gezi Park’s green space) which, theoretically, do not belong to anybody.33 However, Hardt and Negri extend this classic European idea to include social productions and encounters: information, language, and affects, which do not belong to anybody, unless they are made private or incorporated within the government-owned public.34 I apply this concept to the protest events, demonstrating the disjuncture between how the park space appears to its users as open, natural, and non-sexual (as far as its straight patrons know),

Food to the Protestors at Gezi Park • /r/Turkey,” Reddit, 2013, https://www.reddit.com/r/Turkey/comments/1fvmtn/how_to_send_food_to_the_protestors_at_gezi_park/.
32 Ibid.
34 Hardt and Negri, Commonwealth, viii.
yet the park is in actuality controlled by institutional regulations and social norms. The queer common shows us what life is like without these regulations.

Thinking about the queer common is useful, I argue, for three reasons. First, it acts as a heuristic device to show us the degree to which the heteropatriarchal-nationalist government is involved in the governing of both normal and queer bodies. It foregrounds the possibility of genealogical inquiries into how the co-opting of the body in these ways are not necessarily given, but contingent. The second aspect of my conceptualization of the queer common is that it provides the space for alternative ways of existence. The Gezi resistance shows us possible alternative ways of thinking of queer identity and of the relationship between individual and public. Here, minority groups –including LGBTQs — realize radical identity practices and experiments in democratic governance, which are normally regulated by the government and other social institutions. My third point is that the common is queering. By queering, I mean not only that the queer common provides for a radical decentering of heteronormativity as it is produced in everyday life, but that experiments of the common ultimately have a queering impact on everyday society, changing, for example, the role of queers in “normal” party politics. In other words, the queer common affects the social beyond the apparent spatial-temporal moment of protest.

**The Common as Heuristic**

Certain sites are often seen as public or autonomous –for instance, the public park. Yet our knowledge of these sites are moderated by the state, media, and other institutions. Gezi Park is one of the few remaining green spaces in Istanbul and was originally occupied by environmentalists to protest the felling of the park’s trees and transformation of the space into a
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mall.35 One activist describes their actions at Gezi as one of “protection” of the park from the state, optimistic about the swelling of support to “save our city.”36 Ownership of the park is therefore a kind of construct; Butler argues that it is only in the “performance” of occupation itself that the park becomes an open, political forum.37 The official platform that grew out of the movement, Taksim Solidary, provided a list of demands to the government, the first being that Gezi remain a park, the fourth being the lifting of restrictions on freedoms of assembly in Turkey. In these discourses of protection and rights, the activists assert a perception that the park is a space they — not the government — are entitled to.38 Historian Çağlar Keyder argues that while the Ottoman state “owned” Turkey’s public spaces, this was more of a form of trusteeship.39 The current government’s interest in transforming public land into private development more aggressively attempts to reduce political debate on the nature of park space to a question of economic growth.

The park, for instance, has laws (written and unwritten) regulating acceptable usage that are enforced by the police. This includes including less tangible forms of policing, like familial norms about whether same-sex physical contact is acceptable in parks; —not only same-sex kissing, for example, but also public sex.40 In their work on the public, Berlant and Warner argue that the equivalence of sex and privacy in the domestic sphere is a heteronormative construct, both discursively performed and institutionally enforced; queer sex “has almost no institutional matrix for its counterintimacies” and thus depends upon the non-private, open park space and

35 Göle, “Gezi - Anatomy of a Public Square Movement.”
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dating-app hook-ups. The park space exemplifies the precarious space of queer sexual relations. While the park is assumed to be a “non-sexual” space, this is a heteronormative assumption about the division between public and private that is more difficult for queers to realize; queer people live under the scrutiny of their families, cannot get married, face undue violence by the police, and go to significant lengths to remain closeted. That intimacy between same sex persons (let alone sex in public) is considered an affront to public safety, or that it threatens children and families, is a discourse that enables police raids on queer people, yet it is unclear how often queer intimacy occurs in proximity to these families, whose claims to the public are prioritized. In Amsterdam’s Vondelpark, for comparison, sex is legal so long as no one litters, it occurs at night, and happens away from the playground.

That parks’ “ownership” is a contestable norm mirrors what I have explored about bodies: while we often conceive of our bodies as blank slates, wherein our own actions determine the scope of our agency, our bodies are instead incomprehensible without the complex systems of social signification which determines how we perceive ourselves and how our selves are perceived by others. Hardt and Negri argue that the ideas, affects, and material manifestations of our relationships are common – not inherently belonging to anyone, but are constantly privatized. As I have shown in previous chapters, queer sex practices, for example, become the “stuff” of scientific knowledge that enables discrimination against queers in the military. In certain contexts, the public is led to believe that parks are open to everyone, or news productions are purveyors of objective facts, or Facebook is an open forum, or the state is

accountable to people’s concerns, or that our identities are inherent; instead these spaces are laden with laws governing access, non-neutral discourses, and contrived ideological orientations.

That services and goods, like water, medical care, and performances, were provided freely within Gezi Park is an obvious signifier of the creation of a kind of common at Gezi Park. However, the queer common further refers to intangible, shared experiences: the common experience of and feelings associated with police violence, whose priority is oriented toward the protection of urban gentrification rather than the people; the common experience of non-representation in government; discomfort with the policymaking that follows a neoconservative-Islamist pivot in national identity; the alienation felt by the mass-incarceration of academics and journalists. These common feelings, or affects, resonated at the level of the social, propelling shared discourses about police violence at the protests and engendering comradery. For example, Göle credits images of police brutality against the original protestors for the surge in support that transformed the environmental protest into a broader middle-class movement of dissent against the government. Images circulated across social media, reflecting significant revulsion with the government, including an image of a protestor holding a sign that says “Chemical Tayyip” as a shield against a police hose. Takism Solidary made the prohibition of police violence its second demand to the government. Affects, like anger at police brutality and the taking of public land, are productions that are not inherently owned by any institution and are strongly resistant to

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46 Göle, “Gezi -Anatomy of a Public Square Movement.”
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public control.\(^{49}\) And here, they have aligned the interests of people to such a degree that they were compelled to occupy Gezi en masse.

The government attempts to privatize the park space of Gezi impinge upon a common desire for open access to green, non-consumption-based spaces in Turkey. The urban renewal depended upon a mentality that denies democratic discourse and the value of assembly when it conflicts with privatization.\(^{50}\) This disavowal from outsider voices is exemplified by the lack of public consultation in the development plan as well as the dismissal of concerns from the Istanbul Chamber of Commerce, Urban Planners, and Landscape Architects decried the “Taksim pedestrianization project,” calling instead for the park to be made a protected heritage area.\(^{51}\)

Instead, the municipal government provided the redevelopment contract to Kaylon Construction, and the project began in October 2012. The voices of the people who use the park, including gay men and trans sex workers who use the park as a cruising spot, were absent from the consultation plans for the development of Gezi Park. During the protests, the claim that prostitution and group sex were common at Gezi Park became a common media refrain supporting the AKP’s crackdown on the space; one \textit{Haber Vaktim} article claims the entire movement was a pretext for public prostitution and adultery.\(^{52}\) In Turkey, queer cultures of cruising, wherein married and/or non-gay-identifying men meet trans and/or other men for sex, persist alongside the rise of more Western-styled LGBTQ identities and ‘Grindr’-hook-up culture.\(^{53}\) To destroy these sites of common sexual experience and transform them into financially productive condos, malls, and

\(^{49}\) Hardt and Negri, \textit{Commonwealth}, x.
\(^{50}\) Keyder, “Çağlar Keyder.”
\(^{53}\) Interviewee O, interview.
mosques denies queer people a vital resource for intimacy as well as activist assembly. As Butler argues, the performance of sexuality and the performance of assembly are two sides of the same coin: both depend upon bodily actions that signify politicized claims, whether signifying dissident sexuality or public dissidence or, in this case, both.  

“Cleaning-up” queer places in Turkey follows a precedent set by a range of violent actions against queer people in Turkey. In the last chapter, I explored the Ülker St. violence before the UN Habitat II conference in 1996, wherein police rounded up trans people in the neighborhood adjacent to Taksim Square, stripped them naked, beat them, and cut their hair before sending them away on trains out of the city. During the Eryaman attacks in Ankara from 2004-2006, gangs of men would target trans sex workers with rape and beatings. In the Avcılar neighborhood of Istanbul in 2012, a mob moved to lynch trans people, which prompted the police to raid the houses of the affected trans people. Now, trans people from the Tarlabası neighborhood are being driven out as developers expel them from their homes. The local government is forcing home owners to sell their homes to developers and using various techniques to get tenants to leave. These include increasing the rent in houses taken over by the state, forcibly evicting them from the residences, as well as stopping water and other services to the homes.

56 Mallinder, “Trans People Are Risking Their Lives in Istanbul.”
57 “We Need a Law for Liberation:’ Gender, Sexuality, and Human Rights in a Changing Turkey,” 76.
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The idea of the common can be used to show how those things which we perceive as freely accessible, like the park or social media, are actually not free to be used by everybody, but are actually restricted in many ways. For Gezi, the state and its concomitant institutions, moved to shape, divide, and sell-off the park because it never truly belonged to the people to begin with. The occupation of Gezi, therefore, represents a takeover of public spaces by the people, thus liberating this public resource and producing a common one. The logical extension of this, as Judith Butler argues, is the linkage here between Turkish governmentality and the employment of policing to protect and support that economic drive, which makes deviant encounters with the police often violent.61

We might then think about not only the redevelopment of a park in terms of increased restrictions of what is otherwise common, but also about the common emotional and physical experiences of policing, violence, and silencing that are felt by widening segments of the Turkish population. This is why what started as a smaller environmental sit-in swelled into a massive, internationally-supported movement after images of the initial police brutality were released.62 The common affective experience of being violated and of lacking access to democratic process resonated with many different kinds of othered people.

THE COMMON AS SOCIAL DIVINE

Some theorists have conceptualized of the protest moment in terms of a “social divine.” The social divine, as introduced by Maffesoli and developed by Lacey, refers to the space of justice developed within protest movements. This enables experimentation of living in opposition to global and local neoliberalism.63 Looking at the social divine of protest in terms of

63 Lacey, “Spaces of Justice,” 409.
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the queer common contributes an understanding of how the anti-neoliberal protest manifests and, as I show in the next section, how the social divine spills over into normal society. I argue that the Gezi Park movement radically enacted a queer common enabling participants to engage in political actions not afforded to them in everyday society. Here I will focus on sexuality as a social divine realization, wherein queer minorities experimented with highly visible leadership roles during the protests. The effect of these experiments was the rapid consolidation of sexual identity among otherwise disconnected social groups. The queer common also enabled a reconnection to direct democracy, leadership, and representation as denied by the state.

I define the idea of the queer common as a slippage or “line of flight” in the queer assemblage—a departure from how Turkish governmentality uses queer otherness as a way to confine sexual dissidents. The queer common refers to a space created by activists that enables political coalition building, recognition of queer rights, and the promotion of positive understandings of queer identity which are denied by Turkish governmentality. That queer activists were integral players at Gezi is evidenced by the groundswell of support garnered for queer activists during pride week, wherein over 100,000 people joined in the Pride March, and the leadership roles reportedly assumed by queer activists during the encampment.64 At a conference after Gezi in late 2013, a queer activist detailed some of the ways that queers experimented with radical social justice under the LGBT BLOK banner. These include providing a “full-fledged infirmary service” and the distribution of food/beverages “twenty-four hours a day.”65 They argue that these leadership roles and LGBTQ visibility “opened up the ways in

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which new acquaintances became possible.” LGBTQ relationships are often relegated to private spaces, banned online, and shamed in public. The queer common, here, represents an unforeseen opportunity for queer people to perform their identity in otherwise impermissible ways.

These queer activists depict a common moment wherein queer people are not only finally represented politically, but are in control of the governance of their sexual identity. I refer here to queer peoples’ capacity to develop their own culture, and positively represent themselves, and craft queer community, for example in the form of workshops, marches, and film screenings. On the first day of Pride 2013 (June 24th), there was a forum called “Resisting with Media, Resistance to Media,” which brought together press representatives from mainstream and alternative media to discuss problematic clichéd representations of queer people. On June 27th, 2013, Pride Istanbul sponsored a panel about LGBTQ activism and legal rights, a panel on sex work, and a play about the life of a trans woman. On June 28th, 2013, Pride Istanbul staged a forum for queer school students, a panel on LGBTQs and the labor union movement, and an annual satirical awards ceremony, which awards politicians and celebrities with “awards” for their homo- and transphobia. These “common” cultural productions build upon certain common queer affective states. When I asked a local queer politician and community leader and politician why she thinks the LGBTQ community had taken such a prominent position in leading the protests, she argued that it had to do with the common experience of police violence:

Yes because we are used to police violence, that’s why. And it’s not just police violence—it’s that we are too much in interaction with the police…We’re always in contact with the police. I mean every year during LGBT pride parade, we actually bargain with the police. Because they would say that, “do

66 Ibid.
67 Istanbul Pride Week, “21. LGBT Onur Haftası 2013 İstanbul.”
68 Ibid.
69 Ibid.
not chant slogans,” or “put down your flags,” we would bargain with them: “For 200 meters we will walk like this and then we will walk like that.”

LGBTQs in Turkey are used to the experience of police harassment in Turkey in both times of protest as well as daily life. As the above community leader explains, they were the ones who knew how to bargain with the police, as they are forced to do so in their daily lives. Their experiences were recognized by all protestors, who were increasingly willing to listen to queer activists about police brutality after having experienced it at the protests. Many protesters therefore deferred to queer leadership in terms of protest strategy. As one activist claimed, “LGBTs were in the front lines with their flags!”

I asked a leading organizer at Lambda Istanbul, who participated in leadership at the protests, about the role of queer people in supporting the occupation. They agreed that queer people held a unique leadership position hitherto unseen in Turkish society:

Publicly they were with the rainbow flag – they were easily recognized. A lot of newspapers or foreign media would come for interviews, so they did a lot of interviews... also a lot of people were video recording for documentaries, so again they would do interviews. Also opposition groups constantly requested us to send representatives to their different meetings outside of Gezi – for organizing different things. I think it was the first time actually we were taken as a serious group. Instead of us requesting to become a part, they would ask us to become a part.

Some of the documentaries this other community organizer was referring to include Lambda Günlükleri (Lambda Diaries) and Trans X Istanbul, which both consider LGBTQ experiences at Gezi Park. Foreign media ranged from the BBC, The Huffington Post, Vice, and Jadaliyya.
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Other groups that met with queer activists included the HDP and the umbrella platform Taksim Dayanışması (Taskim Solidarity) as well as women’s groups. The community organizer I spoke with argued that this was in direct competition to heteronormative understandings about queers:

…On the right, the general perception of LGBTs is either it’s a psychological disorder or it’s a perversion. In the traditional [Kemalist] left, again, it’s either a psychological disorder or it’s a degeneration of assimilating into western lifestyle. They would consider LGBTs as these apolitical people who do nothing other than partying. So when they saw LGBTs as an organized political group, protesting and defending the rights of other people — not just their own rights — and also going to these barricades and standing there in front of the police officers... of course the other typical stereotype is that these gay people would be sissies, they wouldn’t stand in front of the police officers…

Before the protests, no party in parliament represented the interests of queer people. As argued by a few of my participants, the traditional Kemalist left (represented by the opposition CHP) has historically been in many ways as conservative and determined by heteronormative, neoliberal discourse and policymaking as the neoconservative right, especially in refusing to take up the cause of LGBTQ rights. Only because of the interruption of the queer common, wherein queers were able to demonstrate their potential contributions to the political by means of their affective and practical knowledge, did the incorporation of pro-LGBTQ policy and leadership within the HDP and CHP become noteworthy. In early 2014, for example, a CHP youth organization presented the organization with a report on LGBTQ rights in the party, recommending a slate of inclusive policies to be folded into the party’s bylaws – including a ban

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76 Interviewee O, interview.
77 Ibid.
on hate speech within the party and a quota for supporting at least one LGBTQ candidate at the district level in Turkey’s major western cities.\footnote{LGBTI News Turkey, “The CHP’s LGBT Report Has Been Completed,” \textit{LGBTI News Turkey}, January 17, 2014, https://lgbtinewsturkey.com/2014/01/17/chp-lgbt-report/\textemdash} By early 2015, the CHP had changed its party program, pledging to “…fight all kinds of discrimination based on sexual orientation and gender identity via legislations and law enforcement” and introduced an anti-discrimination bill that included protections for LGBTQ people.\footnote{Mehmet Atif Ergun, “Turkish Popular Opposition Promises to Fight Anti-LGBT Discrimination,” \textit{LGBTI News Turkey}, April 21, 2015, https://lgbtinewsturkey.com/2015/04/21/turkish-popular-opposition-promises-to-fight-anti-lgbt-discrimination/.} I explore more of these lasting impacts of the queer common below.

The queer common as a site of knowledge-sharing and affective camaraderie is further demonstrated linguistically in the issue of homophobic slurs at Gezi Park. During the early days of the protest, ardent fans of rival football clubs came together at Gezi to protest against the state. Some of these were notably reported for commandeering one of the bulldozers meant to raze the parks’ trees to chase after the police and their armored water cannons.\footnote{They named it “the people’s bulldozer.” See: Stephen Starr, “Rival Turkish Football Hooligans Now United in Istanbul Protests,” \textit{The National}, October 10, 2013, http://www.thenational.ae/arts-culture/rival-turkish-football-hooligans-now-united-in-istanbul-protests.} These fans’ participation was controversial beyond their “hooliganism.” They also chanted homophobic and misogynistic slurs about the government, claiming, for example, that Prime Minister Erdoğan was a “faggot.”\footnote{Barçın Yinanç, “Homophobic Prejudices Broken by Gezi Incidents in Turkey.” \textit{Hurriyet Daily News}, June 29, 2013, http://www.hurriyetedailynews.com/homophobic-prejudices-broken-by-gezi-incidents-in-turkey.aspx?pageID=238&nID=51567&NewsCatID=339.} Whereas at the football game, this might have simply gone unchallenged, the space of the common meant otherwise: “…we were going to them and saying, ‘Don’t say ‘faggot’—it hurts us. Don’t say ‘prostitute.’ It hurts sex workers. And they say they learn from Allah this
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machismo and even they are killing each other normally, but here the [football clubs] are alike because they basically are the same.”

Gezi therefore entailed the education of those who are normally seen as oppositional to the causes of women, sex workers, and LGBTQ/minority groups, not only reforming the way people use homophobic language but also demonstrating the benefits of queer coalition building. Because the common is a site of radical horizontality, the barriers to information and affective sharing are removed. Whereas Turkish governmentality depends upon polarization to govern, LGBTQs are empowered in the common to educate and share their lived experiences with heterogeneous groups. This is why LGBTQs were not only successful in getting these groups to change their slogans, but also part of the reason so many non-LGBTQ Gezi supporters marched in the Pride Parade at the tail end of the Gezi Protests in June 2013, including representatives from Turkey’s major opposition parties (like the CHP).

The Common as Queering

The common overflows beyond its spatial-temporal confines to fundamentally alter the organizations that have a stake in materializing queer bodies. In this section, I will argue that Gezi reshaped conceptions of sexual identity, and that certain institutions came to meet the political expectations of queers determined at Gezi. I look in particular at how the queer common engendered entirely new institutions, like Hevi Istanbul, and radically altered old ones, including Turkey’s major opposition parties as well as the media.

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82 Interviewee J, interview.
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This newfound acceptance of queer individuals, first expressed in solidarity during the Pride Parade of 2013, was recognized by politicians as a great source of political power for the new left in Turkey.\(^8^4\) This is why the HDP has adopted a 10% quota for queer and trans candidates. The HDP also has policies like anti-discrimination in employment for LGBTQs and put forth the first ever gay MP, Baris Sulu to stand for parliament in 2015.\(^8^5\) SPoD, a queer activist NGO in Istanbul, gathered signatures of support for LGBTQ rights from over 22 MPs now in Parliament.\(^8^6\) They also hosted a “Politics School,” entailing a series of workshops designed to share information and knowledge about the ways LGBTQs are impacted by government and law.\(^8^7\) These modes of disseminating information and inclusion in party politics are continuations of the common productions seen at Gezi. The HDP’s capacity to engage the LGBTQ community has proven extremely popular with LGBTQ institutions, prompting 12 LBGTQ institutions to sign a letter of support for HDP candidate Selahattin Demirtaş in the 2014 presidential elections. Their support for the HDP must be seen as a contributing factor in HDP having surpassed the high 10% election threshold needed to enter parliament—which they did for the first time in 2014.\(^8^8\)

Beside the linkage between the common and party politics, Gezi became the site where Hevi was founded. Hevi (meaning ‘hope’ in Kurmanji-Kurdish) is Turkey’s first Kurdish LGBTQ organization. The group not only participates in protests, but manages an online social network for Kurdish queers, runs Pride Week in the Kurdish Southeast, manages a

\(^8^6\) LGBTI News Turkey, “22 MPs in Turkey’s New Parliament Will Support LGBTI Rights.”
\(^8^7\) LGBTI News Turkey, “Politics School for LGBTI Begins.”
\(^8^8\) Robins-Early, “Meet The Pro-Gay, Pro-Women Party Shaking Up Turkish Politics.”
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library/archive, and stages a trans beauty pageant.\textsuperscript{89} I spoke with some of the leaders of Hevi before a weekly radio program they broadcast out of the Beyoğlu neighborhood in Istanbul. They explained that Hevi emerged at Gezi because of the unique prejudices and experiences faced by Kurdish LGBTQs in Turkey. According to the activists I spoke with, Gezi helped queer Kurdish activists find each other and identify particular common goals, eventuating in the coming-together of this group.\textsuperscript{90} One of the participants referred specifically to in the 2012 case of the “honor killing” of Kurdish 17 year old gay man Roşin Çiček in the eastern city of Diyarbakir, who was shot by his father and uncles multiple times in the head before they dumped his body on the side of a road.\textsuperscript{91} They argued that no political entity was interested in pursuing justice in this case and that a Kurdish LGBTQ organization is necessary to ensure the protection of human rights. Another participant argued that LGBTQs seem invisible both within the Turkish LGBTQ community as well as in Kurdish society.\textsuperscript{92} Some participants in the conservative AKP LGBT group, for example, see recognition of Kurdish identity as separatist or divisive, and are quick to condemn Kurdish activism within the LGBTQ community.\textsuperscript{93} Yet members of Hevi see themselves as filling a necessary gap in political representation:

\begin{quote}
We support the Kurdish movement in Turkey and fight for their rights. Some of our members lost their loved ones in the Kurdish-Turkish conflict in the region, some of our members’ villages were destroyed, and we want to raise awareness and attract attention to the sufferings of the Kurdish people as well.\textsuperscript{94}
\end{quote}

Kurds have unique cultural practices, relationships, and knowledge that are not considered within other LGBTQ groups. These include providing a forum for the unique ways queer Kurds face

\textsuperscript{90} Asya Elmas and Hevi Members, interview.
\textsuperscript{92} Asya Elmas and Hevi Members, interview.
\textsuperscript{93} Focus Group Interview at Lambda Istanbul, interview.
\textsuperscript{94} Asya Elmas and Hevi Members, interview.
discrimination in Turkish society, the violence perpetrated against their families and kinsmen in the South-East, and the silencing of Kurds within the LGBTQ community itself.95

One participant in the discussion argued that there are problems within Kurdish society itself that demand the intervention of a LGBTQ nonprofit organization like Hevi:

I would like to add that Kurdish people have made a lot of sacrifices for acceptance of the Kurdish identity and people by the Turkish people – the majority of the population. Kurdish people have made little effort to understand their own population, culture and its members which also harbor people like us – I mean, LGBTs. The commonly held view in the Kurdish society is that there are no trans, gays within the Kurdish society or all Kurds are normal people. Kurdish LGBTs did not come into existence just after Gezi protests. Just after Gezi protests we attracted more attention onto Kurdish LGBTs.96

Hevi therefore exists not only to combat exclusion from the state and public in general, but also within both the LGBTQ community and the Kurdish community separately. There is a need, they explain, to develop what it means to be Kurdish and LGBTQ, which they do through their cultural programming and advocacy. By hosting a queer Newruz (an Iranian New Year celebration), for example, “...there were thousands of people who got the chance to know us as an LGBT organisation. In terms of making us known to a larger audience, the Newruz celebration event was a huge success. We met people who had never seen homosexuals before. This gave us hope and also HEVI means hope.”97

This recognition of Kurdish LGBTQ lives at Gezi was not only realized by Kurdish LGBTs, but also by heterosexual people too. Prejudices about the Kurdish separatist movement and the difficulties encountered by Kurdish lives became better understood by those that for the first time experienced the brunt of police brutality and media silencing at Gezi. As one of my interviewees said, “…we found out at the Gezi protests: the media said we are the terrorists. And

95 For example, the AKP LGBT group – not officially affiliated with the conservative party – manages social media which routinely refers to HDP and its supporters as supporters of terrorism. Twitter, “AK LGBTİ (@aklgbti).”
96 Asya Elmas and Hevi Members, interview.
97 Ibid.
then we thought, ‘Oh my god what was happening all those years in the [Kurdish] East?’ The poor treatment of the heterogeneous Gezi protestors is common to the state’s marginalization of Kurds in the Turkish South-East.

What is unique, therefore, about the common, is that it engenders the free-flowing production of information, affect, and knowledge in addition to engendering encounters between different people and ideas that are regulated by the heteropatriarchal-nationalist government. Although the state and media have been effective in defining Kurdish identity as divisive, the sphere of the common facilitated encounters that quickly disintegrated those discourses. Even the negativity of being marginalized by the state, experiencing police violence, or being silenced in the media are made into common productions. Because of the heterogeneity of the protesters, who took on varying leadership roles, or provided food or aid, or assisted by opening their businesses or homes, or made public art or theatrical pieces, many were exposed to radical new ways of thinking and doing social justice that is normally restricted.

**Conclusion**

I have argued that the queer common is an assemblage with its own unique characteristics of: 1) showing us how our bodies are incorporated and governed; 2) enabling experimentation with social justice, democracy, and human relationships; 3) queering the normal order of things. The queer common demonstrated at Gezi helps us understand how the hold of Turkish governmentality over the queer assemblage is not totalizing. Thinking about what is common challenges perceptions of access to space as well as other kinds of social relationships in Turkey, permitting room for challenges to status quo discourses and representations of queer others. It has further disrupted party politics as well as popular understandings of identity.

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98 Ibid.
By understanding the impact of the heteropatriarchal-nationalist government on sexual identity, we can change it. The queer common shows how the seemingly natural, taken-for-granted ideas about identity, the body, and space can be broken down and interrupted. It asks us to think of how these assemblages assert their coherence through acts, which materialize acceptable identities. Yet the queer common demonstrates that this apparent unity is contingent, impressionable, and responsive to organizing from below. Moreover, the queer common provides a model for doing queer theory beyond anti-normative critique. Instead, the queer common maps productive practices of living differently than under the Turkish state. The benefits of redistributing the knowledge, experience, language, and affects of normally marginalized others across the social may be most visible within particular moments of protest. The next step is to continue cultivating these alternatives beyond the protests and shape these “lines of flight,” these ruptures in governance into new, more empowering assemblages.\(^9\)

Conclusion

One of the most frustrating things about researching the governance of queer lives is that queerness itself means something different to everyone. It is hard to demonstrate that “LGBTQ” is a coherent category, especially when you start talking to people and realize that their priorities are entirely contradictory to those with whom you last spoke. To say something resolute about how governance occurs for queers and what is to be done is, I think, difficult. This is why queer assemblage thinking has been so useful. It allowed me an “in” to understanding the governance of queer lives in terms of the institutions that participants identified as being oppressive or enabling. Suddenly, the assembled nature of queer identity in Turkey became very apparent to me: queerness is produced all the time between the interactions of queers and the state, the government, the police, the media, the family, medicine, the internet, and so on. Queer assemblage thinking demonstrates that all of these institutional interactions impact people’s lives, maybe not in indicating quantifiably to what degree for each person but that they shape understandings of queer identity nonetheless.

I believe such an approach confirms what Weber (after Enloe) refers to as “queer intellectual curiosity” as a focus on how sexuality is defined, attached to bodies, and performed in global politics, as opposed to sexuality constituting a kind of “special interest.”¹ As queer assemblage thinking shows, placing sexuality at the front and center of political research underlines the breadth of institutional marginalization upon other bodies. It also demonstrates how strategies of resistance grow in the cracks of a marginalizing governmentality.

As part of the queer assemblage, I found that my own feelings and social encounters shaped my fieldwork and research outcomes. I believe that including these here in the thesis are

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a crucial part of thinking queerly and disturbing some of the disciplinary norms regarding the
conduct of political research. If anything, my experiences during my PhD felt more like an
assemblage of unforeseen, ambiguous, and anxiety-provoking encounters than a straightforward
plan. It is only after the fact that I have formulated these irrationalities into something
meaningfully coherent. Rather than attempting to hide away all of the inconsistencies that
occurred to me, I intend to demonstrate that the strangeness of the body-in-research is something
to be embraced to strengthen my academic positions. In conclusion, I turn to a number of
autoethnographic anecdotes from my thesis, to further understand the idea of the queer
assemblage and the limits of my research.

The Homosexualist

During the later stages of my fieldwork in Istanbul, I was ecstatic to have been invited by
a professor at a local university to give a guest lecture. Not only would this be my first “official
lecture” it was to be delivered at the graduate level to class with the very stately title of “Political
Sociology.” The professor, who was briefly hosting me during my stay, had asked me to lecture
on the topic of “governmentality” and its applications in Middle Eastern politics. By this point, I
spent months pouring over Foucault’s Security, Territory, Population in carefully crafting an
actionable research plan from his foggy historiography. After a series of manic “mind-maps”
differentiating pastoral power from raison d’etat, I could tell you all about how the
securitization of smallpox represented an insidious new iteration of surveillance as distinct from
the management of leprosy. And so to be asked to lecture felt empowering in a way that the PhD
process seldom is. It was a great responsibility, I thought, to be entrusted with delivering my
expertise to a sophisticated audience. It would be a stunning line of text on a robust, yet humble
resume. Yes, I realize now that it’s more likely that the lecturer just wanted a day off. But I spent
Conclusion

three days revising for this lecture. I watched a TED talk on innovative presentation techniques (“…make your presentation a story…”). I drafted a PowerPoint presentation worthy of an Academy Award. I was, in a word, confident. In writing the lecture, I conceived of a straightforward overview of governmentality as a theoretical tool first offered by Foucault and then later academics like Rose, Dean, and Walters. Its language was clear, yet not too approachable, lest anyone think I was offering a short cut through an intellectual labor that had taken me nearly a year to surmount. It offered some tangible deployments of these ideas within the context of contemporary Turkish politics. It felt good to produce something tangible and profound and to be so self-assured (“This is what straight men must feel like all the time!,” I thought). When the time came, I dressed in a flannel shirt and jeans, because being casual is cool. There were no technical hang-ups. The students paid attention. One interjected with an interesting comment about Cyprus and the Turkish state’s indirect forms of control over the island. We explored the tangibility of borders for a while. I was pleased with myself. I now know that this feeling should make one feel immediate concerned.

I accepted a final question from a female student around my age. She asked, “Did you know that Foucault was a homosexualist?” And she continued, her face contorting in realization that something much darker might be afoot: “Are you yourself a homosexualist?” The room was silent enough to hear the judgement racing through the students’ minds. Panic constricted my throat; a feeling, I think many queer people are familiar with when their sexuality is forcibly opened to public scrutiny. And rarely does this scrutiny end well (think more Scarlet Letter, less Glee). I looked down at my notes for guidance, which did not exist. Perhaps I missed that particular lecture by Foucault. Perhaps it had not been translated from the French yet. I felt

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2 Rose, O’Malley, and Valverde, “Governmentality”; Dean, Governmentality: Power and Rule in Modern Society; Walters, Governmentality: Critical Encounters.
Conclusion

confusion, like I had mistakenly arrived at a heteros-only party and the needle on the Bob Dylan record had come to a screeching halt. I looked to see if in my notes I had accidently slipped in some sort of reference to sexuality – but I knew I had not. Actually, I went to great lengths to avoid talking about sexuality in this talk. I even replaced an image of Foucault in the presentation because the turtleneck he wore was a bit much. All along I thought I was analyzing serious processes of governance without the identity stuff. Also: what the fuck is a homosexualist?

Being exposed as a queer person is humiliating, but in this foreign context, with these unknown faces, I feared the possibility of the situation becoming even more unstable. It occurred to me that sexual orientation is a much more delicate performance than I had accounted for. I actually knew very little about the degree to which homosexuality was acceptable in this context; what about my clothes or hair or mannerisms were signifying straightness or queerness; what topics are too taboo to discuss. And that calling myself an expert on these things was dumb. But something I knew I was well-versed in was that art of jumping ship. I smiled to mask my concerns, and exclaimed, (in my best deployment of a monotone, heterosexual male voice) “Sure! Lots of Foucault’s ideas about sexuality relate to his later work on governmentality. Thanks for listening!” This seemed to satisfy the inquisitor. She and the other students clapped as I shook the professor’s hand and left.

On the way home, my bewilderment devolved into anger. When I was better able to parse the experience, I realized I wasn’t angry at the student for her question. I was angry at all the academics who had normalized a conception of Foucault as this patriarch of poststructural International Relations, but sanitized of its queer formulations, of any reference to the tiring ways heterosexuality is compelled by society. I had begun to realize the existence of two
Conclusion

separate Foucaults: the Foucault of serious scholarship, who is highly referenced in leading International Relations journals; and Foucault the homosexualist, who continues to shape queer theory, but mostly outside of the discipline of International Relations, and whose queer life and experience with HIV/AIDS are inseparable from his analyses of the diffusion of power over peoples’ lives. Remember that Foucault notoriously justified his experience in San Francisco’s bathhouses, claiming that sadomasochism, with all its poppers, nipple-clamps, and dungeons, destabilizes norms surrounding heteronormative, genital-focused sex—I was not so confident I could get away with so overtly talking sex as a public intellectual. Yet it seemed, at this moment, that my reticence on sex was neither here nor there: I failed to remain closeted. I knew I would have a difficult time being taken seriously by the journals and the conference-goers, but by some random student? I had not accounted for being outed publicly. I had assumed the people younger than me were on board, had listened to Lady Gaga and watched Glee and were generally “over” the notion that sexuality was a problem. To be taken seriously, I tried appealing to a more sanitized Foucault, but I now was not so sure why I engaged in this self-censorship. Sometimes I wonder if the only real research question anyone wants to interrogate is the one at the heart of OK! Magazine’s research agenda: who is sleeping with whom? I continue to wonder about my place in IR. I wonder to what degree I chose to position myself within the subdiscipline of queer IR, or whether queer IR is something that envelops me regardless.

**Imperial Queen**

I convinced the ethics committee that advertising through the gay dating app “Grindr” was a legitimate means of recruiting participants. I didn’t message people directly, but posted information about myself and my research on my profile. I also used the most middle-of-the-road

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photo of myself I had, sourced from my university directory page. Needless to say, I mostly received dick pics. I was committed, however, to monastic chastity for the duration of my fieldwork. This was a personal judgement more than anything, as it sounded like a smart way to keep things ethical in what was sure to be an exceptionally complicated project. I proved competent at wading through the deluge of phalluses on my phone to find a handful of people interested in participating in a less romantic, but just-as-stimulating interview.

One of these was Adnan. Adnan was a young, educated schoolteacher from a suburb of Istanbul. Adnan and I sat at the cafe at the French embassy on the tourist high street of Istiklal Caddesi, which sat within what is known as a queer area of Istanbul. He had a lot of interesting things to say about Turkish politics, and explained to me in detail the history of the relationship between the ruling parties in the country. He also gave me some useful leads on the issue of trans rights and brought to life some of the queer activism at the Gezi Park protests that I was reading about in the news. It was also quite clear by the end of the conversation that Adnan had expected us to have sex. What started with an un-subtle touch of my knee built up to the nonchalant suggestion that we might “have some fun.” I denied that request. Adnan asked me for my local address, continuing to press the idea that hooking-up would be “not a big deal.” I was uncomfortable. I suggested we stick to being friends, yet this did not dissuade him either. I made a final appeal to “ethical constraints,” and, again, in very plain language, explained that I was as chaste as an early 2000s Jonas brother. When he finally conceded, he became frustrated. His brow furrowed, he yelled that I was an American imperialist and stormed off.

In reflecting upon what went wrong, I was again struck by the absurdity of believing that my research (or any research) can reproduce some kind of objective truth from social research,

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4 Name changed.
which was perhaps not an explicit goal when I began my research, but began haunting me as I engaged with my quantitative-minded peers. It began to feel strange that my methodological framework and visa application and grant proposal and university affiliation were designed to assist me in excavating some kind of objective science from these situations. I also had a difficult time with the ethics of this one, despite having read every single queer account of ethnographic approaches offered at my university library. Would Adnan have provided me with all this valuable information if he knew from the beginning I wouldn’t consent to sex? Was I supposed to discard this data now? (I did not.) It did not feel different from other times in the past when I had rejected men’s advances only for them to respond with resentment. But these questions raised other questions about my supposed distance from my research subjects. Is committing to chastity during fieldwork a kind of paternalism? What would the risk be to this man if we had sex after he had already given me all of this information? Did I think he was from such a different world that to have sex with him would be some kind of ontological disruption of a confined Turkish queer culture? Was something lost in translation? Was I signaling him in some way that I didn’t even realize? But also, as a queer researcher, what is the line between my research self and my actual self? Is that bifurcation of two identities itself not a heteronormative construction? Although plagued by a number of theoretical ethical questions, more than anything, I never actually felt any strong impulse to have sex with anyone I interviewed. It may have been that their testimonies made me think of them as more complicated than what is usually sexy about hooking-up. Or maybe Adnan just wasn’t my type.

IKEA

I think all graduate students have experienced that moment of realization that what they are writing is not the unique, voice-of-a-generation manifesto for a new age of social justice that
Conclusion

we hoped it would be. This was made clear to me after an interview with a leader in queer activism in Turkey, who was making waves in the context of challenging homophobia during the 2014 local elections. At the time, getting this interview was my greatest fieldwork achievement and affirmation that I was not altogether incompetent. I could hardly concentrate during my interview, as I felt like I had struck gold. Not only was this interviewee famous in the community, they were providing me with quotable quote, one after the other, replete with dramatic metaphors and scathing anti-homophobic criticism of the government. It would be the springboard for a very brilliant journal article. The editors of highly ranked IR journals would be dueling over it at my doorstep. And I would turn them down for being too mainstream, instead offering it to an experimental student journal—a benevolent hand-out to raise their impact factor.

A few days later, I found an interview with the very same queer trailblazer of mine in a popular, millennial-focused Western news outlet. If that interview and my own were my students’ essays, I would have referred them for disciplinary action for plagiarism. Not only were the questions similiar (and, I realized now, fairly insipid), the interviewee was using the same metaphors, the same thrilling anecdotes, the same catch phrases. What’s more, anyone would be able to easily find this interview, as it sits within the top ten google search results for their name. My emotive, unearthed life-history was literally yesterday’s news. I did not blame them. They are a politician, after all, and trading in sound-bites is part of their job. Yet I fashioned myself as more than just a campaign billboard—I thought I was getting at the heart of something real.

A week later, a Scandinavian graduate student showed up at the organization I was shadowing for my fieldwork in Turkey. He was not only taller and blonder than I, he was also here to research LGBTQ activism during Gezi Park. I flipped through my rolodex of scowls, but even I lacked a cutting-enough glance to claim ownership over these problems. I realized I
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actually had no ownership over any of this, and that it would have to suffice that mine would be
one perspective out of many on queer Turkish politics. Maybe it was actually a problem that so
many people were showing up to research these people. Which of us would go further in
accurately representing the struggles of these people in attaining representation and legitimacy?
Perhaps the worst part was his incessant friendliness, his constant entreaties to share pertinent
information and share cigarettes. Unable to locate an obvious character flaw, I reluctantly
befriended him. He demonstrated a genuine academic interest in the topic and had a better grasp
of the history of Turkish politics than I did. Eventually I recognized that it was good to have
another outsider to meet with and complain about Turkish bureaucracy to. But the competition to
be the World’s Preeminent Scholar on Deleuzian Approaches to Queer Activism at Gezi Park in
Turkey never really stopped, in my own mind.

A third pin in what was looking to be a deflated, wrinkly balloon of egotism: I was
scheduled to talk to the director of a local queer non-profit organization. I arrived 15 minutes
eyearly, as prior events had engendered a deep fear of getting lost in the city. I walked upstairs to
the NGO’s office, where a large group of college students were seated on the floor in front of the
director. The students, I found out, were from Scandanavia – apparently ethnographic research
on queer society in Turkey is the new ABBA! They were here as part of an exceptionally
progressive-sounding class trip to learn about history and politics in modern Istanbul. I listened
as the director explained the minutiae of how their movement began, their role at Gezi Park, and
the status of LGBTQs in Turkey. I realized how applicable this was to my own research and
fumbled to get my voice recorder working before I missed anything crucial. With my other hand,
I was crossing out the interview questions he was answering and trying to come up with new,
more interesting questions to ask. When it came time for the students to leave and for my own
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interview to begin, it felt embarrassing to ask them, one more time today, to recount the significance of the LGBTQ movement in Istanbul, especially since I bungled the voice recorder the first time. Yet they smiled, assured me it was no big deal, and provided thoughtful responses to my inquiries.

POLICE

I was on the train for the first time, on my way to meet an established academic with a significant track record on feminist political research in Turkey. My phone only worked with Wi-Fi, so I had an elaborate series of screenshots of train and bus timetables saved in order to get me to the right place at the right time. The university itself sat nearly one hour’s drive from central Istanbul, and the train only took you half way. You then needed to board the right bus. But I was prepared. I am a city gay, and I knew that transport was only stressful if you looked like a tourist doing it. This sense of empowerment departed as soon as the train left the station. I realized that the train was operating on a maintenance timetable. It ejected me at a different train station beyond the fog of war. No zooming in and out of my screenshotted maps gave me any indication of where I existed in the world. A local took pity on me and directed me to the conjoining bus station. Yet I could not find a single bus with a number or destination labeled anywhere. I stepped halfway onto the closest bus and asked the driver whether it went to the university. He said, “of course,” which struck me as far too serendipitous to happen to me. Not really convinced, but not having many other options, I got on the bus. The drive took us through neighborhood after neighborhood, generic houses, streets, and trees repeating themselves over and over and I saw nothing that would indicate where I was headed. After 20 minutes of mounting internal tension, the driver pulled over to the side of the road, eyed me through the mirror, and nodded at the door. I got out of my seat, stepped off the bus, and turned back to ask
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him for more guidance. He managed to point in every direction and no direction at all. As the
door closed, I thanked him for leaving me here, at the edge of a forest, but the bus had already
driven off before I remembered the Turkish words for “have a good afternoon.”

I figured that the road he must have been indicating at a narrow road leading up a hill. A
mountain, rather. The road had no sidewalk beyond a worn, dirt shoulder, which quickly plunged
into a ravine. There were no buildings and no signage in sight; just a narrow road snaking up a
mountain, without indication that a university existed up there. Yet there was plenty of evidence
that I had made a serious mistake. It was also pouring rain, of course.

I struggled up this hill. I did not really have any other choice at this point. Or maybe my
brain had finally recused itself in light of all its poor decision making as of late. I felt
increasingly doubtful about this task, and tried not to make this damp, uphill climb to nowhere a
metaphor for my pursuit of an academic career more generally. The dirt on the side of the road
became thick mud. Yet it was unavoidable, as unwieldy trucks dominated the slick black strip of
asphalt. It seemed as if the road was specifically designed to humiliate ignorant foreigners with
inflated senses of possiblity. The trucks obeyed no speed limit –and so I was relieved when I was
only splashed as they hurdled through accumulating puddles (instead of becoming turned into a
puddle myself). When a police car pulled over in front of me, I decided that thinking things
cannot get much worse usually does results in things getting significantly worse.

My first thought in realizing that I was going to have to encounter the police was of my
past encounters with police in my own country, which have been unpleasant at best. I
remembered the disdain in the policeman’s voice as I tried to report being harassed in a park by
homophobes. I remembered being beeped-at by police for holding hands with my boyfriend on
the street, the times my backpack was searched for drugs for no ostensible reason, and that time I
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was arbitrarily held at the airport for so long I missed my flight. I then thought of the interviews I had done thus far. Everyone unanimously painted the police in a negative light. They referred to the police as dogs of the state, condemning their violence against trans people and the tear gas they used against them during the Pride March. I wondered whether I was breaking some kind of law (trespassing? Reckless idiocy?). I wondered how I would respond to being asked for a bribe, or if I was going to be beaten. It would have been easy at that point to cry. I wondered whether that would invoke pity or not—and whether that would be a good or bad thing for me.

There were two cops. The one seated in the passenger’s seat beckoned me over. I got into the back of the car, and the driver asked me where I was headed. “The university,” I replied. “No problem,” he assured me, and started to drive. They picked up on the tenuousness of my Turkish capabilities. The passenger asked me where I was from. “New York,” I said. “Cool,” they both agreed. They dropped me off in front of the university, 5 minutes down the road, and wished me luck. “Thanks,” I said.

I rushed through security to meet with the academic I was scheduled to meet with. I was only about 10 minutes late, which I thought was pretty good all things considered. Between the wet clothes and the exhaustion, I was once again hoping my pitifulness were enough that the professor would excuse my tardiness. Yet walking into her office, I could tell immediately that she would not be buying the friendly-yet-simple foreigner vibe I was selling. She told me she had to leave in a few minutes, and asked that I cut to the chase. I gave her the elevator pitch of my project. I asked if she had any contacts who might be useful to interview. I also asked whether there was any academic literature that might be relevant. This all seemed to concern her. She looked at me like I was some kind of drenched foreigner who was wasting her time with nothing tangible to offer in return. She did not offer academic support. Instead, she asked me
whether I had considered the imperialist and ethical implications of doing such a project. (I had, of course. I explored these issues within the human-participants ethics process at my university. I also had partially established this thesis as a response to the academic debates surrounding the idea of queer theory and queer activism as a global phenomenon. I was not really offering any absolute position beyond the fact that queer people did exist in Turkey and their movement had both unique and global characteristics. However this was not how I responded to her query.) I responded with silence. I was emotionally and physically exhausted. I was soaked from head to toe. I failed the transport-tourist-test and had a baffling police encounter. I was well-convinced that I was an imposter in my academic pursuits. I was defeated. I’m not sure whether she took pity on me or simply needed me to move along, but the professor walked me out of her office and encouraged me to write her an email if I had any more questions. When I asked her about the easiest way to get back to Istanbul, she pointed at a few idling busses and assured me that one of them would go in my direction. I watched her leave. I hailed a cab and paid $60 for a ride back to my apartment.

**POST-PORN**

I struggled to say anything significant about the hammam, the Turkish bathhouse. I stayed in an apartment adjacent to the Firuzağa hammam in the Beyoğlu neighborhood. Only a month after I left Istanbul, this hammam was raided by the police. 60 people were taken into custody for supposed prostitution. Local queer leaders condemned the raid, arguing that sex happened between consenting adults in every hammam, but that hammams for tourists were given a pass while local queer spaces were shrinking in the city.\(^5\) I originally wanted to focus on the hammam to demonstrate the persistence of local cultures of sexuality among forces of

\(^5\) Ergun, “Police Raid on Firuzağa Hammam.”
globalization. Yet I could not really explain how these were different from queer saunas or other spaces for public sex in the West. Not that hammams come from the West, but that this is a phenomenon that seems to have arisen in many cultures across the globe. I suppose I didn’t find it very interesting that men meet in designated places to have sex.

Instead, the sexual practice that challenged me was the post-porno night at the LGBTQ activist organization I was working on. If you are as unaware of this as I was, post-porn is a global movement to reclaim pornography from its many negative practices. Instead, post-port represents women more positively in control of their sexual experiences, rather than perpetuating violence against women. It eschews high production values, poor labor practices, stereotypical/violence scenarios, and harmful body-archetypes. Instead, it attempts to normalize average, fat, and normal bodies. The post-porn event at the organization, then, was a public screening of a series of these post-porn videos. The intent, I believe, was to bring greater awareness to post-porn, rather some kind of mass-masturbation evening. I was not fazed by the idea of watching porn with others. Yet I assumed that it was not going to be particularly relevant to my data-collection. A lot of people watching porn did not seem like a prudent time to bring out the voice recorder. I also thought it would be better to take a night off from furiously accumulating information to, instead, just hang out with some queer people and do queer things.

There were about 40 chairs, lined up in rows, facing a large projection screen. All the chairs were full by the time I arrived, so I stood toward the back. I noticed that there were at least as many women as men, with a handful of visibly trans and gender-fluid people present. The leaders introduced the purpose of the event, which was to reclaim pornography from its hypercapitalist, misogynistic, and body-shaming premises. They dimmed the lights and screened a series of videos. Part-way through the second video, which represented a disabled woman

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having sex with another woman, I realized that this entire situation would have been pushing the limits of what is acceptable on my own, Western, liberal university campus. The film also made me think about the ways gay men are disconnected from the violence towards women implicit in much of heterosexual pornography, and the challenges faced by women and trans people in enjoying positive sexual experiences. I realized I had never thought about the need to represent different kinds of lesbian bodies or queer bodies in pornography before, and how damaging it must be for all of us to only be exposed to sex between white, able-bodied, thin, attractive people on a regular basis. One of the attendees talked about how damaging it is that many people get information about trans lives from porn, wherein they are reduced to sexual fetishization. What are the broader consequences of this? And given how popular pornography is –does it have a place in politics and International Relations?

Queer Others

I recount these stories not because I think they are funny or interesting, but because they speak to the problems I have been investigating all along. My intention in this thesis was to explore the question of how bodies are materialized and governed. I have argued that this occurs in an assembled fashion. These bodies are coherent because of their interactions with different institutional actors, personal relationships, social discourses, and physical objects. But they are also incoherent in the slippages between these and new relations and because of its propensity to change. In my study, I have attempted to capture a small part of these interactions. I have approached this problem from a number of different perspectives in order to show just how diverse the parts that constitute the body are. I also wanted to focus on how important it is to look at the particularities of a specific body.
Conclusion

I explored Turkish queers-as-assemblage for my case study. I focused on how queerness is shaped genealogically by the confluence of heteronormative, patriarchal, and nationalist processes. Following Foucault, I develop the idea of sexuality as an “apparatus” or assemblage as a technology of control, allowing certain actors to define queer others and act to marginalize them. The movement from apparatus to assemblage is intentional – this term foregrounds locality, flux, and resistance. In talking about queerness as an assemblage, I explore how various institutions hold a stake in producing queer bodies, working off of each other’s discourses and acts of marginalization. While it would be impossible to demonstrate cause and effect relationships between a government statement about LGBTQs and a familial act of marginalization, the close proximity of these institutions, the common speech-acts, and similar mentalities toward making queers invisible asserts that these all contribute to the governing of queer lives. This framework provides a number of points of entry for queers, yet is flexible enough to also explore trans-as-assemblage as well. I finally introduced the queer activism integral to the success of the Gezi Park activist movement and saw in this protest the possibility for a change in the nature of the queer assemblage. Here is where the queer assemblage becomes truly queer in the sense of a radical experimentation with democratic governance and the positive portrayal of queer identity.

In the chapter contextualizing my thesis, I explore the construction of a heteropatriarchal-nationalist governmentality in Turkey, constructed as such in different acts of institution-building and the defining of Turkish citizenship and queer others. I argue that this has created ideal, heteronormative citizens at the expense of excluding others. In the creation of a dominant Turkish governmentality, following Dean, we can see that the state is a primary organizing

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7 Foucault, “The Confession of the Flesh.”
Conclusion

principle for a host of other institutions in Turkey that marginalize dissident lives.\(^8\) This
governmentality, following Spike Peterson’s framework, defines its citizenship in terms of
heteropatriarchal norms, especially through “correct” forms of socio-biological reproduction, the
making visible of westernized women as reproducers and militaristic men as soldiers, and the
making invisible of racial, linguistic, and queer others.\(^9\)

The next chapter takes a step further by exploring contemporary institutions and how they materialize queer identity. I wanted to show that there many ways that queers are made knowable; that this is not simply intrinsic, but it is produced in queers’ relationships with various institutions. I also hoped to show some of the ways bodies themselves push back against these institutional efforts, demonstrating that there is no singular authoritarian route to disciplining queer lives. Instead, it is in everyday encounters with the state, the police, the media, Islam, and the family that sexuality matters. Dissent is seemingly everywhere in these encounters and is becoming more institutionalized as queers organize non-profit organizations, in new media, and construct international alliances with global advocacy organizations.

The third chapter was concerned with the production of trans people in particular, with a focus on how trans are assembled through particularly “bodily” discourses. I immediately understood that trans people in Turkey were particularly marginalized in their day-to-day lives and felt it was prudent to dedicate a particular chapter to understanding trans governance. In both my interviewing and media analyses, I saw that trans people experience unprecedented violence in Turkey in a way that was deeply visceral not only to my participants, but to myself. In this chapter, I explored the case of Bülent Ersoy as an early advocate for trans rights, but demonstrate that everyday trans people have a significantly different relationship with the social than Ersoy.

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\(^8\) Dean, *Governmentality: Power and Rule in Modern Society.*

\(^9\) Peterson, “Sexing Political Identities/Nationalism as Heterosexism.”
Conclusion

Beyond violence faced by trans people, I also explore the issue of sex work as a phenomenon faced by trans people in particular. However, I wanted to do more than just portray trans people as victims. Thus I also focused on trans Kurdish activist organizing, which I saw as balancing the rhetoric of violence against trans people with some of the ways trans people are asserting a culture and politics of their own creation.

The final chapter considered the events of Gezi Park, the protest which initially drew my attention to Turkey as a case study. In this chapter, I considered Gezi Park to be indicative of the queer common. The queer common, I argue, represents a space of dissent in the queer assemblage. This queer common opens up a space for experimentation with radical queer politics and alludes to the spatial occupation as a key element of challenging oppressive institutions. I explored how Pride merged with Gezi to become something greater than the sum of its parts, producing a broad and inclusive coalition of protestors wherein queers were leaders. It was if to say, “look what is possible if you heterosexuals would just let us be in charge for a change!” Going forward, academics might utilize the queer common to think about productions and encounters that exist beyond the scope of the public in other situations – particularly outside of physical occupation-based activism. Where, for example, does queer culture manifest outside of its capture of the neoliberal market? And what gives rise to the dispersion of affects across groups that are free from private interests, or outside the confines of state, media, or family control? When do we realize democratic social justice, if even momentarily? Such a political orientation pushes the boundaries of our identity practices outside of the scope of normal governance.

Having finished this research, I am going to continue researching the relationship between sexuality and governance. This work has helped me develop a vocabulary, theoretical
Conclusion

approach, and methods for linking the personal with the political. Yet there is much more to be done here. I will continue to think about how global institutions regulate sexuality, including international organizations dealing with global development and migration, which are some of the most important global issues of our time. I think that it would be interesting to continue focusing on particular bodies and expressions of sexuality as a source of qualitative information. For example, this might entail the thinking of sexual imagery or bodily manipulations or sexual enhancement pharmaceuticals as the material of global governance (in the vein of Paul Preciado). In any case, my research on Turkey confirms for me the importance of thinking about the co-constitutive nature of the social and the material, and thus I hope to incorporate a complex methodological approach in the future. This might entail an exploration of the aesthetic alongside the discursive.

There is still much to be said about the relationship between queer identities, trans bodies and modes of governance. The ways that we might employ queer strategies to exploring problems and understand the complexity of identity is still an issue of intense debate, especially in an era of global nationalisms, wherein out-groups are continuously identified as anathema. However, within these acts of constraint—in any discourse of queer deviance or attempt to make us invisible—there are ways out, opportunities for new allegiances, and openings for the creation of more positive representations. I hope, further, to have queered the boundaries of what is acceptable in International Relations in this thesis, by showing that queer people’s experiences with the institutions that shape their lives are difficult and complicated. But more importantly,

10 Weber, “From Queer to Queer IR.”
11 Puar, Terrorist Assemblages: Homonationalism in Queer Times.
13 Acuto and Curtis, Reassembling International Theory.
queers will always resist, practicing radical organizing that fundamentally undermines any absolute possibility of the governance of queer lives.
## Appendix A

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Age</th>
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<th>City</th>
<th>Cause of Death</th>
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<td>Sisi S. Ö.</td>
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<td>29/12/2008</td>
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Works Cited


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Works Cited


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