GOVERNING FREE CHOICE:

A FOUCAULDIAN CRITIQUE OF REFORMS IN NEW ZEALAND EDUCATION SINCE 1987

KAREN VAUGHAN

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ABSTRACT

The education sector in New Zealand has undergone an immense reform since 1987. Much of this has been underpinned by neo-liberal notions about government intervention as counter to freedom of choice. I argue that while the reforms purport to be liberating through a restoral of rights and a provision of choices, they instead lead us to constitute ourselves as "governable" rather than as free individuals. Using the work of French philosopher Michel Foucault, this thesis provides an alternative reading of the reforms and shows that what we come to know as freedom is a significantly regulated version of it.

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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION

> Never, I think, in the history of human societies... has there been such a tricky combination in the same political structures of individualisation techniques and totalisation procedures.
> (Foucault 1982a:213).

The education system in New Zealand, and indeed many other sectors of the New Zealand economy and society, have undergone immense transformation in the last decade. Of all that I have read about these changes, it is Foucault's comment about modern Western power relations that has intrigued me persistently, for somehow, the reforms seemed to embody that "tricky combination" of techniques. Arguably, the most salient feature of the education reforms is that of recognising every one of us as freely choosing, self-managing individuals. Neo-liberalism, identified as underpinning the reforms (Grace 1989, Kelsey 1993, Peters and Marshall 1988b and 1990b, Apple 1991, Boston et al 1991, Bates 1990) promotes mechanisms which supposedly secure, for each individual, freedom of choice. The reforms institute measures designed to promote the principles of flexibility and choice through a lessening of State mediation. In the light of these measures it becomes appears difficult to sustain critiques on the grounds of the State increasing its domination over individuals. Yet how is it, that the practices of the reforms subject us to more ordering and standardisation, further control and authority? This led me to ask: What kinds of choices are we making? How, within education today, do we come to understand ourselves as free individualsIt is here that I wish to use the work of Michel Foucault, "one of the most powerful philosophers of this century" (Eribon 1991). Although Foucault never wrote about education particularly, I would argue that current reforms in education exemplify Foucault's concept of "governmentality". Foucault understands governance as an activity which shapes and directs the activity of others through techniques which address the minute particulars of every individual's life. It becomes a form of power which is both individualising and totalising (Foucault 1982a). Following this, I argue that the reforms operate under a subterfuge of restoring rights and providing choices; while they purport to be liberating, they instead make us into "governable" rather than free individuals. Many of the academic critics of the education reforms concentrate on the huge shift occurring in how we conceive of education. While this is valid at one level, I wish to argue that the shift does not necessarily represent a new configuration of power relations. Instead, I would argue that we are seeing an relocation and intensification of existing power relations - which Foucault has described as "disciplinary" and "subjectifying" - so that they emerge as "governmental".

Education Reforms Since 1987

A staggering number of reports and policies generated by the government and various advisory bodies have impacted upon all sectors of education. Reports pertaining to the early childhood sector include *Education to be More (the Meade Report, 1988d)*, and *Before Five (1988b)*. The primary and secondary sectors have been targeted by *Administering for Excellence (the Picot Report, 1988a)*, *Tommorrow's Schools (1988f)*, *Today's Schools (the Lough Report, 1990)*, *The New Zealand Curriculum Framework (1991)* and *The National Curriculum of New Zealand (1993)*. The tertiary sector has also been investigated through the *Report of the Working Group on Post-Compulsory Education and Training (the Hawke Report 1988e)*, the Business Roundtable document *Reforming Tertiary Education in New Zealand (1988)*, *Learning for Life (1988c)*, *The Tertiary Reviews (1994)*, and the *Report of the Ministerial Consultative Group (the Todd Report 1994)*. Increasingly, the education system has been taken as a whole and integrated into a new economic order. Reports taking this approach include *Bulk Funding: Wage Bargaining in the Education Sector (1991)*, The New Zealand Qualifications Authority's *Designing the Framework (1991)*, *Education for the 21st Century (1993)*, and the OECD *Economic Surveys 1992-1993*.

No less staggering than the sheer number of reports are the changes instituted as a result of these reports - changes in both how various educational institutions operate and in what education has come to mean to us as a society. For the first time in New Zealand history, the possibility of education being a government investment subject to market conditions has been debated, centering upon questions about increasing equality and efficiency through choice and competition. The 1989 Education Act, the 1990 Education Amendment Act and the 1991 Education Amendment Act (4) abolished the Department of Education (and its regional offices, associated Boards) and installed a Ministry of Education. Boards of Governors and School Committees were replaced with Boards of Trustees (BOTs) whose new responsibilities included staff employment, management of the institution's property and the design and implementation of a Charter (based on a contract). The Education Review Office and the New Zealand Qualifications Authority were established. The Acts also initiated bulk funding for both school operations and teaching salaries (including the transference of funds between categories), revoked compulsory registration for teachers, and abolished zoning for schools. In 1991, the Labour government introduced a user-pays system of student fees into tertiary education, culminating in the National government's current Study Right scheme and means testing for allowances.

A Brief Review of Reform Critiques

The education reforms have been the subject of vociferous debate from many quarters, including academic institutions, schools, teacher unions, and the media and general public. Many of the changes have been resisted within schools themselves (see Carpenter 1992 for a discussion of teacher union responses to bulk-funding) and at the academic/theoretical level. I do not propose to deal with the academic critiques in great detail. I would, however, like to outline their concerns in order to signal the difference between their various approaches and a Foucauldian one.

Peters, Marshall and Massey (1994) argue that there has been a shift from egalitarian ideals within a liberal humanist framework in education (see Marshall 1988 for a exposition on this) to ideals of a market-oriented education system. They demonstrate this through their discussion on curriculum, arguing that the ideas underpinning *The Curriculum Review (1987)* and *The New Zealand Curriculum Framework (1993)* shifted from a concern with equality of opportunity to a concern with technical notions of efficiency and consumer choice (1994:260). Gordon (1992c) argues a similar line in that restructuring was at first justified in terms of empowering school communities, but later shifted to a justification in terms of competition. Carpenter (1992) makes the same point in relation to the release of the 1991 Porter Project, *Upgrading New Zealand's Competitive Advantage*. Gordon (1992c) points to *Today's School's (1990)* continual references to "management" over a bare mention of "education", and the revoking of mandatory equity clauses in school charters under the 1991 Education Amendment Act.

According to one set of academic critiques, the changes to education were signalled as early as 1984 with the advent of "Rogernomics" and the Fourth Labour Government. What followed in terms of radical changes to social policy (including education) was seen as the result of an increasing involvement by Treasury in government policy and decision-making areas (Peters and Marshall 1988, 1990, Codd 1990, Bates 1990, Grace 1989). These critics have pointed to Treasury's adherence to a conservative strain of liberal thought, which is thought to motivate their agenda. Treasury (1984, 1987, 1990) have referred to the "crisis" situation of the New Zealand economy, identifying education as one of the areas of culpability and as a key area of recovery. Apple (1988) refuses to accept the idea of "education in crisis", saying that it is a crisis of the economic world that has been exported into schools. This argument ties in with those of Peters and Marshall (1988b), Grace (1990), Marshall and Peters (1990), Gordon (1992c), and Peters (1993) that education is different from economics and should not be treated as part of that sphere.

Other critics have argued that the role of the State Services Commission during restructuring has been overlooked, and in fact, constitutes the principal driving force behind educational policy changes. Dale

and Jesson (1992) argue that the government seeks to reform education as part of its overall reform of public administration, making education simply a branch of this and as such not afforded any special treatment (Dale and Jesson 1992). Thus, this critique and those which focus on Treasury's involvement revolve around being able to identify the architects (whoever they may be) of reform, in order that we might then understand their intent and impending policy drives.

Other critics have focused explicitly upon the role of the State. They try to explain education restructuring in terms of a state legitimation crisis (Gordon 1992c, Codd 1990), implying that new policies are a government's response chosen from a finite group of possibilites, within a model of a legitimate State. What these critics do is to base their critiques on a foundation that recognises the State as the paramount site of power. The fact that schools and educational agencies are required more and more to report to the government (in order to receive funding or accommodate performance assessment), is for these critics, an issue of power and control - directly related to State involvement.

This has some critics accusing the State of eschewing its responsibility. Where a similar process of reforming education has been effected in Great Britain, critics there (see Hall 1983, Johnson 1983) and also here in New Zealand (Kelsey 1993) have referred to the "rolling back" of the State. They attempt to explain why this process is occurring. The legitimacy of this process is debated by Maori critics who point to State obligations under the Treaty of Waitangi (Smith 1991, Johnston 1991). As the State is seen to have created and enshrined existing inequalities, it is therefore the State's place to accept responsibility and to "correct" the situation through continued involvement. Smith (1991) claims that by placing the school in a role accountable to a community, without checks and balances that guarantee Maori interests, the result is "an abdication by the State" (1991:1).

Gordon (1992c) cites Jessop, whose argument is that the Thatcher government in Great Britain has tried to create new systems of management and objectives so that its intervention is not direct (such as through legislation or central planning) but through indirect means and at a distance.

> The process that Jessop describes would shift power from the state to civil society, but in such a way that the new "social practices" of civil society would mirror those that would otherwise have to be undertaken by the state through processes of consent and coercion (Gordon 1992c:190).

Following this, Gordon (1992c), Bates (1990), Codd (1990), Smith (1991), and Kelsey (1993) argue that the government's catch-cry of "devolution" is a devolution of responsibility solely, rather than of power (in the sense of control). Their claims refer to an absolution of responsibility on the part of the government through its attack on welfare state agencies.

Shifting the Terrain: The Constitution of Free and Self-Managing Subjects

In this thesis, I want to take the argument of a devolution of responsibility further. I do not want to examine the duties of the State in the sense that the abovementioned critics refer to, but rather, to examine how a devolution of responsibility leads us to constitute ourselves as people who are willing to take on that responsibility. For Foucault, to understand power as situated within or owned by a particular institution or group would be to grasp only one aspect of power - its repressive aspect. Foucault understands power as productive, in that it actually creates certain qualities of relationship, discourse, and consciousness. The responsibility to manage our schools can be understood as reflection of a responsibility to improve and manage our lives; self-knowledge and the continual betterment of ourselves being tied to our liberation (from repression and authority).

In the following chapter I will discuss Foucault's approach to analysing power and differentiate it from those of the current educational critiques in more depth. This enables me to show the limitations of some

of the current critiques which, I argue, share with the reforms (and neo-liberal explanations for them), a repressive concept of power which acts to mask the productive quality of power that Foucault wants to stress.

Through this analysis I will attempt to argue for the usefulness of Foucault's concept of governmentality as a more sophisticated and accurate way to understand what is happening in education. I will set out the foundational ideas of Foucault's thought, tracing through his earlier work to his later work on the relations between truth, power and the self, and also governmentality, which is the focus of this thesis. Foucault takes a nominalistic position with regard to power, seeing it as existing only in its exercise. In the case of an analysis of the education reforms, this means that we must suspend questions of "who has power?" and "whose interests are served?" and instead ask questions about how power is exercised.

I note that a few educationalists, such as James Marshall and Michael Peters in New Zealand, Jane Kenway in Australia, and Stephen Ball in England, have also taken up theoretical positions based on the thought of Foucault or theorists such as Deleuze, Donzelot, Lyotard, and Lacan, who are associated with the "post-modern" or "post-structural" school of thought (Marshall 1994a, Peters and Fitzsimmons 1994, Kenway 1990, Ball 1990, 1994). These educationalists do attempt to "use" Foucault in varying degrees. However this thesis will not engage with this work as my concern is specifically with a Foucauldian project on governmentality. That is, I wish to "do" a Foucauldian analysis of governmentality in relation to specific reforms in New Zealand education. In chapter three then, I will take the ideas discussed in chapter two and explain how I will utilise Foucault's thought to understand specific practices within the education reforms, setting out my approach to the remainder of the thesis.

Foucault suggests that we think of governmentality as a "contact point" (1982c) between two technologies. The first, technologies of domination, link practices of surveillance, correction, and improvement to an obedience that is maintained through self-policing. Following this, the subject of chapter four is how the practices of the reforms, in particular those of the Education Review Office and the New Zealand Qualifications Authority, exemplify technologies of domination, making visible those who are to be "made docile" and "normalised" (Foucault 1977a).

However, it is not just a question of things being done to us. If anything, the education reforms encourage us to do things to ourselves. Technologies of the self then, are about the ways in which we enact techniques upon ourselves so as to transform ourselves. These link self-knowledge and identity to self-management and liberation. Chapter five explores how policy objectives of "flexibility" and "enterprise" associated with New Zealand's economic recovery manifest themselves educationally through "training culture" (ETSA and NZQA 1994:3) and encourage us to transform ourselves in line with these objectives.

Under the reforms, I would argue that our individual objectives of free choice are shaped to correspond to those objectives of the economy. At this point, technologies of domination (chapter four) and technologies of the self (chapter five) come together as "political technologies". This is the subject of chapter six where I will explore how we recognise and constitute ourselves as a particular society within the political rationality of liberalism. Liberalism increasingly rationalises itself through a dispersal of rule. That is, it equips itself with instruments so that it can "govern without governing" (Rose 1993), becoming rational to the extent that individual aspirations can conform to those of government. In education then, our choices are constituted in relation to the market and regulated through various instruments such as the family. It is through instruments such as the family that the "at risk" (truant or underskilled) student emerges, to be "normalised" in relation to the market, so that they choose to improve and manage themselves. The premise that New Zealand's economic recovery can be determined by greater efficiency through choice (and competition) thereby make individual freedom of choice both a condition for and a result of the education reforms. In this way, the reforms take hold at

the level of identity and become a means through which we constitute and come to understand ourselves as free subjects.

CHAPTER TWO: FOUCAULT AND POWER

This chapter seeks to introduce the theoretical framework of the rest of this thesis. The critiques in the previous chapter can be loosely grouped together as critiques from the Left - encompassing liberal humanist and Marxist standpoints, with the majority being grounded in or developed from the Critical Theory school. They form one kind of analysis of the education reforms in New Zealand. What I want to introduce is a different kind of analysis based on what Foucault called "an analytics of power" (1982a), and will be developed in the following chapter. The earlier Critical Theory critiques tend to rest on a particular conception of how power operates; a conception that Foucault calls "sovereign power" and which he challenges as involving an inadequate conception of power for analysing how power operates.

Foucault's own hypothesis about the workings of power is called "power/knowledge". I would argue that a Foucauldian approach has much to offer in that it bypasses "traditional" sociological questions about power relations in our society, allowing us to evaluate the education reforms from a different perspective than that which the earlier critiques have offered. Hence, this chapter will also establish the distinction between a Critical Theory project and a Foucauldian one on the approach to power. However, this is not to say that we are analysing power per se, because, as we shall see, this was not Foucault's project. He says clearly, in the article where he spells out the elements of an analytics of power, that the goal of his work:

> ...has not been to analyse the phenomena of power, nor to elaborate the foundations of such an analysis. My objective, instead, has been to create a history of the different modes by which, in our culture, human beings are made subjects (1982a:208).

Like Hacking (1981), I think it is important to trace through Foucault's early work, called "archaeology", to his later work, called "genealogy". Doing this will help us appreciate the significance of the power/knowledge hypothesis. Although this thesis will be concentrating on Foucault's later work, I see his earlier work as still being relevant as it was not so much abandoned as extended. Critics differ as to the connection between Foucault's earlier work and his later work. Lecourt (1975) argues that Foucault abandoned archaeology in favour of genealogy. While Dreyfus and Rabinow (1982) refer to inconsistencies within the framework of archaeology, they, like Marshall (1990) and Donnelly (1982) understand genealogy as building upon and extending archaeology, although some of the tenets of archaeology can be seen as no longer directly relevant. Given that Foucault was fairly candid about not having written definitive accounts or histories (Foucault 1977b, Foucault 1982a, Eribon 1991), it would be more accurate to say that Foucault was continually refining his areas of concern.

Archaeology and Education Reform Critiques

As we have seen, some critics (Codd 1990, Gordon 1992c, Peters and Marshall 1988, 1990, Liz Gordon 1991, Carpenter 1992) have looked at whether or not the government's policies actually have achieved, or logically will achieve the objectives stated. At the conceptual level, they dispute government policy at the level of the terms the government itself uses - "efficiency", "accountability", "devolution", "greater quality" and "choice". They attempt to show that in practice the effects of such policies will result in ineffectiveness, a spurious variant of accountability, and policies that cannot achieve any real sense of devolution, but rather a form of in which decentralisation responsibility, rather than control, for specified processes is "downloaded".

At the centre of these challenges are the terms and definitions. Critics such as Apple (1988, 1991) and Hall (1983), Peters and Marshall (1988, 1990), Grace (1989), claim the issues to be ones of language and argue that if we first understand the "ideological manoeuvre" (Grace 1989:211) that has been undertaken, we will better be able to determine the direction and significance of impending policy drives.

This type of analysis appears to be very similar to Foucault's method of archaeology. While Foucault has, throughout his work, looked to practices and techniques in order to study the human subject in relation to power, in *Madness and Civilisation (1961)*, *TheBirth of the Clinic (1965)* and *The Archaeology of Knowledge (1969)*, he sought to explain the discursive rules beneath what we say that made it possible for us to speak about certain things in certain ways. Foucault was interested in uncovering savoir (depth knowledge) that permitted the emergence of connaissance (surface knowledge), and in identifying changes in savoir that produce and legitimate certain discourses. He says in a later interview, that he meant the word "archaeology" to represent an analysis which was "out-of- phase, not in terms of time but by virtue of the level at which it was situated. Studying the history of ideas, as they evolve, is not my problem so much as trying to discern beneath them how one or another object could take shape as a possible object of knowledge." (Foucault 1983:31).

In this sense, Foucault, like the critics, would be interested in redefinitions. Following this line, he too would have asked: what is it that makes it possible for us to talk about education in this way: as a commodity?; as no different from the private sector?; as a profitmaking agency?; as the responsibility of a community rather than the State?. More than redefinitions, which is the term many critics use, Foucault would want to talk about the constitution of education as a particular type of object. What is now thought about as good education, what is now considered to be the role of a school within society, is not an experience or an idea that we, today more than ever before, are better able to capture and explain in our speech. Rather, these ideas about education, the fact that we can make education a particular object (connaissance), are constituted through our talking about it in particular ways (savoir).

Some of these critics of education reforms would call their work "discourse analysis" but Foucault was not analysing discourse or ideology itself. Unlike many of these critics, Foucault never saw himself as "a practitioner of the human sciences" (Rabinow 1984:12) such as psychology and of course education, and was therefore not interested in the truth or the falsity of claims made from within that paradigm because he wished to suspend notions of truth and falsity in the area of connaissance. He is wary of the notion of ideology on two important grounds at least Firstly, that "it always stands in virtual opposition to something else which is supposed to count as truth" (1977b:118) and secondly, that it makes necessary reference to a subject. Since what Foucault's work did, among other things, was to show that there could be no one truth especially where the human sciences were concerned, pitting the discovery and assertion of truth against repression, the concept of ideology (as masking the real truth) becomes somewhat redundant, if not irrelevant. So Foucault and the critics are similar insofar as they ask questions about what it is possible to talk about in education and in what ways we approach it; they agree on a set of problematic questions, but Foucault is not interested in whether or not we should talk about it in the way that critical theorists, and liberal humanist theorists, wish to talk about education.

What Foucault was doing through archaeology was isolating discursive practices through which human beings were objectified. It was through the emergence of the human sciences that we first became "objectified subjects". Rabinow (1984) indexes three ways in which this is done. The first is through "dividing practices" which divide and categorise us (see the difference between the mad and the sane in *Madness and Civilisation (1961)*. The second was through "scientific classification" of ourselves (see human beings as objects to be studied in *The Archaeology of Knowledge (1969)*. This method proved limited. While Dreyfus and Rabinow (1982) refer to "the failure of archaeology", they also acknowledge that it was not abandoned but refined to become a tool of the genealogical method, rather than an end in itself. The "failure" they refer to occurs because "...all such theories of human beings must fail because the attempt to grasp the total picture requires such theories to objectify the conditions which make

objectification possible." (Dreyfus and Rabinow 1982:99). The idea that the archaeologist could stand outside of discourse and its related cultural practices became untenable for Foucault.

The Move to Genealogy and Power/Knowledge

So Foucault expanded his area of concern from discursive practices to include other cultural practices. Foucault wanted to analyse the cultural practices that allow us to objectify ourselves. Hence, the third way we become "objectified subjects", which Rabinow (1984) claims is Foucault's most original contribution, is "subjectification". Here, we can be seen to be the active agents in forming ourselves. Foucault moved into a methodology called "genealogy" so that he could better analyse subjectification. At this point, Foucault wanted to know: what made the human sciences possible? The answer lies in our being both the object upon which the human sciences are based and the subject which is constituted through them. So the answers to these questions were to be historically grounded.

In order to do this, Foucault radically challenged the method of history, going beyond the "new" histories (of social classes, of women) to show up relationships we had not seen before. Foucault did not give us a continuous narrative that allowed us to trace one object across time, or understand people or events from our current knowledge. Had he done so, he would have had to have referred to a transcendental subject - a type of person who was the same in nature across time and history - and this view of ourselves is precisely the thing he wants to call into question.

Foucault's use of the word "subject" quite intentionally reflects the two ways the word may be understood. That is, that we may be <u>subjected to</u> someone or something in various ways, and that we may be <u>a subject</u> in that we are tethered to an identity based on a discovery and knowledge about who we are. Both senses of "subject" are crucial in the analysis of power relations, and help us to understand the circular, perpetuating, and generating nature of forms of knowledge attached to power. We ourselves are not intrinsically worth studying for Foucault, since we have no human nature; that is, we are constructed and constituted in entirety, but <u>how</u> we came to <u>be</u>, through various practices, is his point. Hence, in genealogy, we are to:

> dispense with the constituent subject, to get rid of the subject itself, that's to say, to arrive at an analysis which can account for the constitution of the subject within a historical framework. And this is what I would call genealogy, that is, a form of history which can account for the constitution of knowledges, discourses, domains of objects etc., without having to make reference to a subject which is either transcendental in relation to the field of events or runs in its empty sameness throughout the course of history (Foucault 1977b:117)

Donnelly (1982), in a discussion on *Madness and Civilisation (1963)*, shows that Foucault was targeting histories of madness or psychiatry which legitimated the present circumstances of psychiatry. Although, *Madness and Civilisation (1963)* is regarded as an archaeological work, the seeds of genealogy are clearly there. The standard histories which Foucault was targeting tended to take the object (in this case, madness) for granted and present us with a story of development from the dark ages of misunderstanding of madness to the enlightenment of today's science. What Foucault was doing was disrupting this story and "mystifying" our concept of progress and hence, our concept of human nature. Foucault questioned the concept of madness by studying the circumstances in which it emerged as a category (Donnelly 1982). It is possible here to see that the discipline of psychiatry actually constituted what we know as madness.

What makes this archaeological (and not genealogical) is that Foucault was focusing on what it was possible to <u>say</u> (in terms of conceptualising things) about madness. It was a question of discursive rules and systems - of connaissance made possible by savoir. However, Foucault expanded archaeology into

what became genealogy by moving to analyse non-discursive "regimes" and institutions. In a clear example of this, and his most well known book, *Discipline and Punish (1977a)*, Foucault began to identify the techniques through which we become objectified. He did this by studying the emergence of systems of confinement, in particular the prison, and the emergence of the criminal as object. Again, he disrupted our accepted history of the prison as the result of humanistic sensitivities and progress. Instead he showed how the techniques for identifying and categorising the criminal, and the techniques for punishing and treating the criminal, linked up to form "technologies of domination" which were simply more efficient than previous methods surrounding punishment. These technologies of domination (discussed more thoroughly in chapter four) were also shown to be legitimated by a wide variety of views on governmentality and the human being, and indicative and projected at society at large so that it was not only a question of disciplining the category of criminal but of disciplining all members of society, in the sense of a totality (see both Taylor 1986 and Walzer 1986 for criticisms of Foucault here on the grounds that he appears wrongly to generalise from the case of imprisonment to the predicament of society at large).

Although his genealogies contain a wealth of detailed historical information, he has been criticised on counts of historical inaccuracy and polemical contentions (Megill 1979, Waltzer 1986, Taylor 1986, see also Marshall 1990 and Donnelly 1982 for discussions on this). However, Foucault is providing us with an account of psychiatry or prison, rather than presenting us with a definitive history; the uncritical liberal humanist acceptance of such accounts was precisely what he was problematising. The details he provides are designed to show that there are alternative readings of historical circumstances.

> Instead of reaching outward towards an objective truth, history turns inwards for Foucault, becoming plot, myth and fabrication. It is something to be used in the present and for the future; it is not something that captures `reality', and certainly not a reality of the past (Marshall 1990:18).

Marshall (1990) has described genealogy as distinct from archaeology in that while archaeology was primarily concerned with statements and the systems of truth being produced, genealogy required the idea of power/knowledge. That is, the idea that truth and power are circularly linked - each produces and maintains the other.

> ...power produces knowledge (and not simply by encouraging it because it serves power or by applying it because it is useful); that power and knowledge directly imply one another; that there is no power relation without the correlative constitution of a field of knowledge, nor any knowledge that does not presuppose and constitute at the same time power relations (Foucault 1977b:27).

At this point, it is proper to think of power for Foucault as power relations because he sees it as involving capilliaries and circulation, patterns within which the whole depends on the parts. Thus, we as individuals are "..not only its inert or consenting target;..[we] are always also the elements of its articulation...individuals are the vehicles of power, not its points of application" (Foucault 1977c:98).

Positive Power

This "move" to genealogy signals an important break with the concerns of Critical Theorists. Despite their distinct foci (within similar concerns about education), the Critical Theory or Left critiques centre on who, what and why type questions. That is, who is manipulating or driving policy, who is benefitting, and who is being disadvantaged by it? What does the government intend and what is it actually doing? Why is it being done at all and why in this particular way? The concern that these

critics have is with the erosion of principles surrounding social issues like equity and equality through a restructuring that makes these issues invisible. They are trying to identify and explain how neo-liberal economic theory serves to increase the domination of one social class, ethnic group, and gender, over others. Implicit (though sometimes explicit) in all of these critiques is a recognition of the State as the central agency of power. While Foucault might be interested in an investigation into education reforms, he would consider the kinds of questions being asked in most of the critiques covered in the last chapter to be inadequate for forming a description and understanding of power. The questions asked and issues raised are useful, but they make sense only in the context of a particular understanding about power relations.

Power, as it is understood by these critics is attached to a person or a system, in this case government advisory agencies. The power is owned and possessed, to be wielded as the nature of the social structure dictates. This is the conception termed by Foucault as "sovereign power". A commonly cited example of Foucault's description of sovereign power is the execution of Damien in *Discipline and Punish (1977a)*. Power was exerted by the King over the body of Damiens (who was tortured at length and then executed by rational custom). The death of Damien was very much a spectacle and deliberately so, ensuring that the King's sovereignty and authority was visible and exerted through the visible public space. As the monarchical system collapsed, this violent and public display of power was succeeded by a legal system. While it is often understood that a system of laws and rights constituted the major shift away from sovereign power, Foucault counters that law and sovereignty are in a circular relationship; in order to achieve sovereignty, one must have obedience to certain laws, and sovereignty is constituted by this obedience (Foucault 1977a). In other words, sovereignty/monarchical rule/sovereign power and legal systems and rights are both examples of power which functions through repression.

Foucault talks of our refusal to let go of the idea that power operates in this way. We still commonly understand power in terms of one group holding power structurally within society, and that another group are subjected to the power of the dominant group, and are acted upon. In this instance, the might of the government and legal system, which serves the interests of the dominant group, repress, prohibit, confine, and oppress those below. It is therefore often believed that some people need more power, should somehow get more of the thing that is being used to oppress them, in order to become liberated. For Foucault, power can be far more positive and pervasive than this. There is direct evidence of power having a quality other than that which we are able to talk about, and this is what he attempts to uncover in his work:

> If power were never anything but repressive, if it never did anything but to say no, do you really think one would be brought to obey it? (Foucault 1977b:119).

The fuller property of power identified by Foucault is its creativity and productivity. It actually creates certain qualities of relationship, discourse, and consciousness. This creative aspect of power was particularly stressed by Foucault in his later work. He commented on his earlier work: "When I think back now, I ask myself what else it was that I was talking about, in *Madness and Civilisation* or *The Birth of the Clinic*, but power?" (1977b:115).
Foucault's conception of power is quite distinct from that upon which Critical Theory critiques of education rest. To this end, Foucault would ask quite different types of questions about power relations:

> If, for the time being, I grant a certain privileged position to the question of `how' it is not because I would wish to eliminate the questions of `what' and `why'. Rather it is that I wish to present these questions in a different way; better still, to know if it is legitimate to imagine a power which unites in itself a what, a why, and a how. To put it bluntly, I would say that to begin the analysis with a `how' is to suggest that power as such does not exist. At the very least it is to ask oneself what contents one has in mind when using this all-embracing and reifying term; it is to suspect that an extremely

> complex configuration of realities is allowed to escape when one treads endlessly into the double question: what is power? and Where does power come from?...
>
> (Foucault 1982a:217)

There is no point then, in asking questions about something which does not exist per se. Foucault would go so far as to say we actually misunderstand the concept of power, not in asking "who", "what" or "why" questions, but inasmuch as this legitimates the "fact" of power. This is his objection to Marxist type theories, which sees power firmly rooted in a conception of the State (as serving the ruling classes). For Foucault, power exists only insofar as it is exercised. He is firmly nominalistic here and looks to the actual practices and techniques of power. An institution such as the State is not power in itself, nor is any particular person or agency. Instead of starting an analysis of power relations at this point, Foucault looks to what he calls the "micro-level" not just to identify a manifestation of power, but to understand the means by which power is exercised, what actually happens when it is, and to develop the concept of power from a nominalistic position. Foucault asks "how" not to describe the effects of power (with power as a "thing") but to highlight the creative aspect of power. To understand power as situated within or owned by a particular institution or group would be to grasp only one aspect of power - its repressive aspect.

Bio-Power, the Self, and Governmentality

Foucault's work has been seen as a response to a marxist failure to explain modern society's structures of domination adequately (Balibar 1993, Poster 1993). Foucault has also directly attacked marxism in interviews (Foucault 1977b, Foucault 1983, Eribon 1991). He claimed that he felt "shut in within the boundaries of a horizon demarcated by Marxism, phenomenology, existentialism" and it was this which prompted him to explore attempts to escape identity (Racevskis 1988:28). Foucault would accept marxism as a critique (Smart 1983) which certain historical conditions have made possible, but he would not differentiate it from other liberal humanist traditions (Balibar 1993). Nor would he agree with marxists that economic domination is the only or most fundamental form of domination we experience; his micro-level analyses are designed to refute precisely that conception. Hence an analysis which takes the means of production, the State, and class struggle as its primary focus is missing the point for Foucault. He would not deny that some classes or groups come to dominate others through a convergence of power relations. "Major dominations are the hegemonic effects that are sustained by all these confrontations." (Foucault 1980:94). However, if Foucault were to focus on the state to the degree that many of the critics of the education reforms do, he would be "buying" into the idea that power stems from somewhere, that it is owned and that it comes from the top down to repress those below.

> To pose the problem in terms of the State means to continue posing it in terms of sovereign and sovereignty, that is to say in terms of law. If one describes all these phenomena of power as dependent on the State apparatus, this means grasping them as essentially repressive: the Army as a power of death, police and justice as punitive instances, etc. I don't want to say that the State isn't important; what I want to say is that relations of power, and hence the analysis that must be made of them, necessarily extend beyond the limits of the State (Foucault 1977b:122)

However, Foucault was increasingly criticised for his refusal to spell out the link between micro-practices and macro level effects (Walzer 1986, Taylor 1986, Eribon 1991). Colin Gordon (1991) suggests that criticisms of Foucault were answered to a certain extent with his later work on the notions of bio-power and governmentality.

He first developed the notion of bio-power in *Discipline and Punish (1977a)*, but spelled it out more clearly in *The History of Sexuality volume one (1980)*. As with *Discipline and Punish (1977a)*, he examined disciplinary technologies, but this time he went further and concentrated on their productive

capacity. The idea of bio-power has two poles. The first involves disciplines such as those in *Discipline and Punish (1977a)*, which acted in a deterministic way upon the individual body (though he drops the deterministic thesis later). The second involves the regulation of the social body; the administration and control of biological processes so that bio-power became interested in and controlling of birth, health, and mortality. Like the move from sovereign power to disciplinary power, this was a move from the organisation of power over death to the organisation of power over life.

Thus, sexuality was a concept, and one not necessarily anchored in sex itself. Foucault was asking: how did various techniques, in particular the adoption of the medical model of the confession, constitute us as sexual beings and what was the significance of this politically? How was our status as individual sexual subjects linked with our status as members of a population?

This constitution of ourselves as sexual subjects can be understood as part of Foucault's first exploration into what he would later term "technologies of the self".

> ...which permit individuals to effect by their own means or with the help of others a certain number of operations on their own bodies and souls, thoughts, conduct, and way of being, so as to transform themselves in order to attain a certain state of happiness, purity, wisdom, perfection, or immortality (Foucault 1982b:18)

The History of Sexuality (1980) was about the way in which strategies of population management could be coupled to micro-practices and management of individual sexual activity. It was also about how we actively seek to create a consciousness and identity for ourselves through (sexual) micro-practices we regard as liberating.

The idea of a population which is self-managing later became closely intertwined with Foucault's notion of "governmentality". In his paper "On Governmentality" (1979), he refers to sovereign power as being a "pastoral" model of power where the family, with the father as its head, was used as a model on which to base a model of government (the sovereign over the subjects). Foucault was interested in the shift that saw the family become an instrument through which to normalise and govern subjects. The strength of the state, under sovereign power, was evaluated in terms of the state's territory. With the advent of disciplinary power it became not a question of the disposition of territory, but the disposition of "things". That is, the management of the subjects in their lives. We can see how this follows on from his work in *Discipline and Punish (1977a)* where he shows the shift from punishment being enacted upon the body to punishment being enacted upon the soul. The practices are inscribed directly onto the body, but their intention is not to kill, but to correct and train.

Foucault refers to the State as a "mythical abstraction", claiming that it is little more than the sum of technologies which act on and constitute its subjects in a way that consolidates and increases its own strength. From his nominalistic position he could not do otherwise. So for Foucault, it is not that the State is unimportant, but that it is important only in terms of being able to see how we, as individuals, become "significant elements" for the State (Foucault 1982c). Certainly in our modern society, all forms of power appear to refer to the State, but this is not because they come from it, but because power relations have come more and more under the auspices and control of the State. They have been progressively governmentalised - that is, elaborated, rationalised and centralised in the form of or under state institutions (Foucault 1982a).

> ...I'd like to underline the fact that the state's power (and that's one of the reasons for its strength) is both an individualising and a totalising form of power. Never, I think, in the history of human societies has there been such a tricky combination in the same political structures of individualisation techniques and of totalisation procedures (Foucault 1982a:213).

Hence, the two poles of bio-power; on the one hand we have individual bodies and on the other we have the social body. These represent the two sides of the power relationship - objectification and subjectification - and come together in the notion of governmentality or governance. A Foucauldian conception of power which encompasses objectification and subjectification is quite distinct from a more traditional sociological concept of power as solely repressive. This allows us to better understand how the education reforms operate at the level of self-regulation as well as at the level of state control. Without this conception of power we are unable to account for the complex interplay between individual aspirations and the demands of political government.

In the following chapter I will continue to explore ways in which Foucault's conception of power is useful for analysing current education reforms. I will concretise the ideas I have put forth in this chapter into a analytical framework. More specifically, I will elucidate an "analytics of power" (Foucault 1980) which I will use to demonstrate how some aspects of the current reforms exemplify Foucault's notion of "governmentality".

CHAPTER THREE: FOUCAULT'S ANALYTICS OF POWER

In this chapter I want to introduce the framework I will be using for the remainder of this thesis. I am attempting to do what Foucault, in *The History of Sexuality volume one (1980)*, proposed as an "analytics of power". Foucault described an analytics of power as being both "the definition of the specific domain formed by relations of power" and "the determination of the instruments that will make possible its analysis" (1980:82).

Crucial to an analytics of power is Foucault's conception of power. He insists that we avoid the representation of power he calls the "juridico-discursive", saying that this notion of power is deeply rooted in the history of the West. He argues that the monarchy is commonly presented as being above the law, or concomittant with unlawfulness. Hence, the law was conceived to encompass the injustice and domination that monarchical rule previously exploited. However, Foucault argues that despite the differences between the monarchy and the law, they share a representation of power "whose model is essentially juridical, centred on nothing more than the statement of the law and the operation of taboos" (Foucault 1980:85). It is "sovereign power" that was exercised by the monarchy - "the power to say no" (Foucault 1977b, 1980) or post limits; a power of essentially repressive character. As I explained in the previous chapter, what Foucault wants to point out is that power is no longer repressive but productive. That we do not recognise this and continue to talk in terms of "sovereign power" through political theory based on laws and rights, simply increases the hold of modern power. I will deal with the concept of "sovereign power" and its connection to "discipline" in more depth in the following chapter. Suffice to say that Foucault's argument is that:

> ...power is tolerable only on condition that it mask a substantial part of itself. Its success is proportional to its ability to hide its own mechanisms...Power as a pure limit set on freedom is, at least in our society, the general form of its acceptability (Foucault 1980:86).

Therefore, Foucault argued that the only possible analysis is one that is free from a conception of power as represented through the law or conceived of as having "a central point in the enunciation of the law" (1980:90). Our analysis must not take law as a "model and a code" (1980:90). Nor can we understand power as a theory. In the previous chapter, I argued that we cannot comprehend power solely by looking to who has it or why they have it. We must understand power as Foucault does: not as "a naked fact" (1982a:224), but as an exercise. We must therefore take on Foucault's nominalistic position and look to the practices and techniques of power. Foucault's nominalistic position is underlined by his definition of

power relations as "actions upon actions" (1982a:220) and his stating that a relationship of power exists when one set of actions acts upon another's actions (and this field of actions includes possible subsequent or impending actions). So an analytics of power is set up in opposition to the idea of a theory of power. Theory cannot work because it assumes that we can deduce what happens or will happen from a general set of principles or hypotheses.

At this point it would also be useful to distinguish between an analytics of power and a genealogy because this thesis does not attempt to be the latter. A genealogy is, as we have already seen, a "history" that aims to disrupt our understanding of ourselves as continuous by de-familiarising the things we "know" and calling into question the conditions of our existence. Certainly, I hope to present an alternative understanding of our education reforms, and therefore open up possibilities which are not present in current understandings which are rooted in a conception of "sovereign power". To this extent, some of what I hope to do constitutes a disruption in Foucault's sense. I will be picking out some examples of the education reforms which best illustrates Foucault theses, but I do not claim to be covering every detail, just as Foucault did not claim to be presenting definitive accounts. However, it is not genealogical in the sense of containing the detail and micro-level descriptions/accounts which Foucault provides in his "histories". Nor can it be genealogical in the sense of showing up a break in an epoch. Various education critics in New Zealand have pointed to a shift in the way we think about education, but the power relations involved are not new in the way that Foucault wanted to demonstrate that disciplinary power was new and different from sovereign power. The point I wish to make here is not that the education reforms have introduced a form of disciplinary power into our education system. That has always been there, if we concur with Foucault's account of disciplinary power, where he does in fact include the example of the school (1977a). What the reforms do is exemplify forms of disciplinary power and take it to new heights of efficiency.

Elements of an Analytics of Power

So what this analytics of power does is examine how power operates and what it does. In "The Subject and Power" (1982a), one of his last pieces of work before his death, he suggested that "Concretely the analysis of power relations demands that a certain number of points be established" (Foucault 1982a:223).

1. The system of differentiations
2. The types of objectives
3. The means of bringing power relations into being
4. Forms of institutionalisation
5. The degrees of rationalisation (Foucault 1982a:223).

Foucault did not actually spell out the meaning of these points, nor did he make use of them explicitly in his work. However, since the main focus of this thesis is Foucault's later work on governmentality and techniques of government, I will explain each point in terms of the themes running through the concept of governmentality.

In the previous chapter, I claimed that Foucault's interest in this stemmed from a fascination with a type of power which was both individualising and totalising. Foucault suggests (1982b) that we think of governmentality as a "contact point" between technologies of domination and technologies of the self. As we saw in chapter two, this development can be seen as an attempt to counter the criticism levelled at Foucault over the problem of understanding how his micro-level power relations became operative at the macro-level.

> Perhaps I've insisted too much on the technology of domination and power. I am more and more interested in the interaction between oneself and others and in the technologies of individual domination, the history of how an individual acts upon himself in the technology of the self (Foucault 1982b:19).

Foucault sees governmentality as "the conduct of conduct" (1982a). He refers to a double meaning here. The first meaning is to do with being led or conducted, and the second meaning is to do with the concern with one's own behaviour or conduct. Similarly, he refers to a narrow and a broader meaning of the word "government"; on the one hand there is the governing of the self and on the other there is the integration of this into a practice of governing others. These double meanings reflect on the one hand, the individualising nature of power, and on the other hand, its totalising nature.

The two themes of objectification and subjectification, which run throughout Foucault's work are brought together through governmentality. The objectification side of governmentality is exemplified by technologies of domination (Foucault's earlier work in genealogy, eg: *Discipline and Punish 1977a*). The other side, subjectification, is exemplified by technologies of the self, first established in *The History of Sexuality volume one (1980)* and enlarged upon in *The History of Sexuality volume two (1985)* and *The History of Sexuality volume three (1986)*. The idea of bio-power, in *The History of Sexuality volume one (1980)*, whereby micro-practices of sex corresponded to macro-practices of population, also led into Foucault's interest in governmentality and how we become governable subjects.

What I have done is understand each point in terms of its position within the theme of objectification and technologies of domination and/or subjectification and technologies of the self. I am not proposing that these points are or should be seen as wholly distinct from each other; in fact, to a large extent they tend to overlap. However, for the purposes of this thesis I have separated them out so that we may understand the distinctions between points and their separate importance, and so that we might see what an analytics of power might entail. While I have devoted an entire chapter each to points one, two and five, I understand the points three and four as an infrastructure for the analysis and will therefore not be talking explicitly about them separate to the other points and chapters. I will now discuss what each point means in detail, beginning with the two underlying points, three and four.

3. **The means of bringing power relations into being:** according to whether power is exercised by the threat of arms, by the effects of the word, by means of economic disparities, by more or less complex means of control, by systems of surveillance, with or without archives, according to rules which are or are not explicit, fixed or modifiable, with or without the technological means to put all these things into action (Foucault 1982a:223).

These various "means" tend to correspond to "technologies". That is, as techniques of power spread throughout society and link up, they cross the "technological threshold" (Foucault 1977a:224). The technologies of domination as delineated by Foucault in *Discipline and Punish (1977a)* cover "means...exercised by the threat of arms, by the effects of the word, by means of economic disparities...by systems of surveillance...". It is important to understand that reforms are not only disciplinary in nature; to objectify us is not their sole function. In his later writings, Foucault has stressed that freedom is often the precondition for the exercise of power and that power acts upon our actions (1982a). If we were objects in total we would have little freedom and few or no actions open to us. So while Foucault suggested that power may come into being via the threat of arms, in fact, in the case of current educational practice in New Zealand, quite the opposite is true; power is exercised via a conception of choice which presupposes our being subjects. Thus, the technologies of the self as ways in which we act to transform ourselves (Foucault 1982c) tend to incorporate "means...according to rules which are or are not explicit, fixed or modifiable...".

4. **Forms of institutionalisation:** these may mix traditional predispositions, legal structures, phenomena relating to custom or to fashion (such as one sees in the institution of the family); they can also take the form of an apparatus closed in on itself, with its specific loci, its own regulations, its hierarchical structures which are carefully defined, a relative autonomy in its functioning (such as scholastic or military institutions); they can also form very complex systems endowed with multiple apparatuses, as in the case of the state, whose function is the taking of everything under its wing, the bringing into being of general surveillance, the principle of regulation and, to a certain extent also, the distribution of all power relations in a given social ensemble (Foucault 1982a:223)

Although Foucault appears to have studied various institutions (the prison, the clinic), these are not his target (Dreyfus and Rabinow 1982:113). He is focusing on institutions as a site, a place where technologies of power have taken root and grown. He calls the carefully defined institutions "a privileged point of observation" (1982a:222). The observations made there are about power but more precisely they are about the kinds of relationships and subjects that this power constitutes. Hence, Foucault insists that we study power relations from the standpoint of institutions, rather than the other way around because institutions, while they embody power relations, are not in themselves power relations nor are they equal to them.

The "apparatus closed in on itself" with "its own hierarchical structures...relative autonomy in its functioning" can be understood in this instance to be referring to educational institutions. Interestingly, neo-liberal arguments for reforms are based on a notion of the educational institution not being "closed in on itself". That is, reforms have sanctioned organisational measures which correspond to institutions or agencies not connected with the educational sphere, thereby attempting to make institutions "accountable" to parents, consumers, and communities. What we can learn from studying the "forms of institutionalisation" has to do with how power relations are organised in our society. It is when technologies localise themselves within particular institutions that power can spread. These technologies can then initiate alliances between their various institutional stations, consolidating a network of power relations.

1. **The system of differentiations which permits one to act upon the actions of others:** differentiations determined by the law or by traditions of status and privilege; economic differences in the appropriation of riches and good, shifts in the processes of production, linguistic or cultural differences, differences in know-how and competence, and so forth. Every relationship of power puts into operation differentiations which are at the same time its conditions and its results (Foucault 1982a:223).

This implies firstly, that an analysis of power must include an analysis of differentiations because power demands these as its conditions of exercise. Secondly, it implies that a relationship of power promotes and extends such differentiations. Here we are referring to Foucault's exposition of power relations as being productive and creating certain qualities of relationship.

Madness and Civilisation (1965) and *The Birth of the Clinic (1963)* both identify differentiations between the insane and the sane, and the psychiatrically well and unwell, respectively, and show them to be a key internal condition of power. That is, these categorisations are crucial to the process of normalisation and discipline. In *Discipline and Punish (1977a)*, Foucault showed how differentiation served to establish an expanse of criminal types, so that punishments appropriate to each were administered. That is, with the advent of "modern power" or "power/knowledge" (as opposed to "sovereign power"), we no longer needed to differentiate between acts so much as differentiate between the perpetrators. The concern to know the offenders - who they were, why they did it, what kind of person they were - operated in conjunction with a notion of treatment rather than punishment for the

offender. This is the concept of "normalisation" and being able to study, measure, and rank the individual - in other words, differentiate the individual - is crucial to the process of normalisation.

2. **The types of objectives pursued by those who act upon the actions of others:** the maintenance of privileges, the accumulation of profits, the bringing into operation of statutory authority, the exercise of a function or of a trade (Foucault 1982a:223).

Foucault included objectives in his suggested format for an "analytics of power" because they are a crucial aspect of the practices through which we are fashioned into subjects. The distinction between critical theory and Foucault is important here. It helps us to understand why people's objectives are important for Foucault (in doing an analytics of power) because although critical theorists see people's objectives as being important, they do so for quite different reasons.

We have already distinguished between Foucauldian and Critical Theory notions of objectives in chapter two. The distinction hinges on the two different conceptions of power, with Foucault's power being productive rather than repressive. What this means is that we take people's objectives or aims to be a reflection of who they think they are. This in turn reflects the practices through which they are constituted (and actively constitute themselves). As we have seen, the problem for Foucault with a Critical Theory view of power, and also then, with people's objectives, is that Critical Theory sees power acting directly upon people (one group seizes power and slams it down on another group). Power cannot be a separate entity used in this way; for Foucault, power is a matrix of forces within society. While critical theorists have maintained that power is given meaning through its context, Foucault would add that a context is given meaning by power (relations).

Foucault defines the exercise of power as actions upon actions (1982a). He specifies the study of "the objectives of those who act upon the actions of others" because power is sets of relationships. This is why he insists we study the practices of power; power cannot exist except in its exercise. There is nothing to dig for in the area of hidden "objectives" that people may have - only the practices which both affect and effect people are relevant for Foucault. Hence, he says:

> People know what they do; they frequently know why they do what they do; but what they don't know is what what they do does (Foucault 1982a:187).

A Critical Theory reply to this might be: "no they don't" (know what they do) and this is often attributed to ideology. That is, some Critical Theorists tend to work with the idea of there being one truth (just like there is one self). Therefore, to reverse oppression there must be liberation, and this often occurs through the peeling away of ideology and hegemony. In this view, many people are so oppressed that they do not know they are oppressed (false consciousness as a result of hegemony) or take on a discourse that oppresses them, thereby maintaining it (such as a blaming-the-victim understanding of their own experience). So people, while they think they know, often do not. They need to be liberated by those more enlightened than them. This view misses the point that Foucault makes about all people being involved in power relations. There are, for Foucault too, social classes who dominate or people who oppress but it is not to be taken for granted. Power and a set of interests are not synonymous but power does structure the field of possibilities (1982a). Foucault's premise that freedom be the precondition for the exercise of power (1982a, 1984). In this case, if we understand only those who intend to liberate others as having agency, we construct them as "outside" the discourse and practices, whereas in fact they too are constituted by these things. Rather, when we understand a person's objectives, we are understanding the practices that construct and constitute reality. Hence this point is linked to technologies of the self, through which we actively seek to transform ourselves in various ways and accordingly to various principles.

5. **The degrees of rationalisation:** the bringing into play of power relations as action in a field of possibilities may be more or less elaborate in relation to the effectiveness of the instruments and the certainty of the results (greater or lesser technological refinements employed in the exercise of power) or again in proportion to the possible cost (be it the economic cost of the means brought into operation, or the cost in terms of reaction constituted by the resistance which is encountered) (Foucault 1982a:223).

The aim of this final chapter is an investigation into the link between power relations and rationalisation. Foucault's concern with the rationalisation of society through objectifying and subjectifying practices (often bound up with the human sciences) is understood in terms of governmentality, which Foucault identifies as the modern Western form of power relations. Governmentality, as the "tricky combination" of individualising and totalising techniques (Foucault 1982a) can be seen clearly in the modern political rationality of liberalism. Liberalism, as a rationality, both constitutes certain practices through which we can act, and at the same time legitimates those practices with principles. Liberalism's status as a rationality which is designed to critique state reason means that it requires the State to have a knowledge of its subjects (who also have a knowledge of themselves) in order to consolidate a totalising power for itself. In other words, governing is rational to the extent that individual aspirations and practices can conform to those of political government. Liberalism thus requires a number of instruments through which it can govern and accordingly society is rationalised through these instruments. It is the effectiveness of these instruments and the continual reformulation and refinement of them, in relation to a particular political rationality, that is the concern of this chapter.

The final chapter on "the degrees of rationalisation" will also consolidate the previous two in its discussion of governmentality and the education reforms (the major concern of this thesis) at the broad level of "political technologies" (Foucault 1982c) which induce us to understand ourselves as a particular kind of society. This leads us into the first of the next two chapters - on "differentiation" which is about the objectifying practices which contribute to modern power relations.

CHAPTER FOUR: DISCIPLINING TEACHERS

The technologies of domination, in particular, disciplinary technology, expounded by Foucault in *Discipline and Punish (1977a)* form the basis for the analysis in this chapter. As I previously explained, differentiation is crucial to the establishment of objects (and also, we shall see later, subjects). In this chapter I would like to examine the way various educational (and traditionally non-educational) institutions and agencies perform an essentially disciplinary function in the sphere of education. The various differentiations emerging from both current restructuring discourse and education legislation make visible those who are to be "made docile" and "normalised" (Foucault 1977a). Differentiation allows certain groups of people, such as teachers, to be picked out and divided both from each other (within the group) and divided as a group from other groups. It also means that boundaries between various groups (teachers and non-professional workers) and areas of education such as academic and vocational education can actually be merged. The insertion of a new group of experts in education can occur at these points. Differentiation, then, is part of a form of power that individualises us as objects through a demarcation of boundaries, a detection and selection of people and their roles, while at the same time creates the conditions for homogenising us. These differentiations are critical to our understanding of ourselves as being members of a particular kind of society.

Disciplinary Technology

Foucault suggests that we examine "differentiations determined by the law or by traditions of status and privilege; economic differences in the appropriation of riches and good, shifts in the processes of production, linguistic or cultural differences, differences in know-how and competence, and so forth." (1982:223). However, before we go any further, we need to examine differentiation within the concept of disciplinary power. Disciplinary power was most comprehensively spelled out by Foucault in *Discipline and Punish (1977a)*, where he studied the "birth" of the prison system. He later elaborated upon this conception of power so that it became "power/knowledge". Foucault used the study of this particular form of institution to highlight distinctions between sovereign power and the new disciplinary power.

One of the major distinctions is that while sovereign power aimed to repress, prohibit, or kill those who dissented, disciplinary power is concerned to train, correct, and improve people. Hence sovereign power was expressed through the public execution, while disciplinary power gave rise to a system of confinements. For the former, we needed only to know of the offense itself (and who had committed it); retribution was swift and final, culminating in a violent act upon the body of the offender.

Foucault (1977a) sought to show that while we often think that the advent of imprisonment and related matters such as the trial, the confession, and the study of the offender as being the result of a humanistic progression, this is actually a misunderstanding. For Foucault, it is a question of a shift in a type of power rather than a shift in sentiment. For example, sovereign power had its limits. The punishment endured by Damiens in the opening pages of *Discipline and Punish* demonstrates the absurdity (or so it seems to us now) of mismanaged attempts to carry out the sentence upon Damiens' body and to continue the punishment/torture long after Damiens has ceased to breathe or know what is being done to him. With these limits to sovereign power exposed, a more efficient form of power was needed. Hence, what we have now is a new type of power which has been extended to encompass not only the body but the soul through control of space, time, and movements. Foucault described the advent of (more humane) execution by lethal injection as "an execution that affects life rather than the body" (1977a:12).

What was needed to reinforce and extend this in terms of punishment was a precise and specific knowledge of the criminal (confession, motive) as well as a precise knowledge of the offense itself. Foucault describes a shift in the type of questions asked to ascertain guilt (1977a:19). Differentiation was important here in that we were no longer discriminating between acts so much as discriminating between individuals. Initially, the question of "who committed this act?" related to a concern to identify the offender. The act itself was taken to be self-evident and the punishments exacted would correspond to the severity of that act. However, the question shifted from "what <u>is</u> this act?" to become "to what field of reality does it belong?" (that is, is it fantasy, perversion, or psychosis?). These questions reflected a concern to know what type of person the offender was and therefore what was intended by the act. This focus on the nature of the individual came to determine the type of punishment necessary. The aim of this punishment was in fact a <u>treatment</u> of the offender. The aim of punishment was no longer to crush (to show off the awesome power of the sovereign) but to train, to supervise, and to increase the aptitude of the individual. In short, we <u>normalise</u> the offender.

Herein lie the two meanings of the word "discipline" upon which Foucault plays. Punishment (or discipline) requires a knowledge about the offender which in turn forms part of a knowledge base (a specific discipline) to which we refer in order to punish. A relationship was created that tied the improvement of a person to the increase in their obedience. The crucial link between differentiation and what Foucault calls "normalisation" occurs at this point. It is the norm against which we measure people and this norm is created by measuring people. In order to normalise we compare, differentiate, hierarchise, homogenise and exclude. It is the norm that permits discipline as a blockade or repressive measure to become discipline that is positive (Ewald 1992). The power of the norm "functions within a

system of formal equality, since within a homogeneity that is the rule, the norm introduces...all the shading of individual differences." (Foucault 1977a:184).

Docile Bodies

The norm which permits discipline to be positive rather than repressive can be broken down into a series of procedures and techniques, which make possible the production of what Foucault calls "docile bodies". The docile body is essentially a person who is treated as manipulable, so that the person may be transformed (in particular, improved). Foucault stresses that the advent of the prison did not herald the first time that the body was treated as an object in this way. However it was the first time that the bodies were treated individually, obtaining holds at the level of the mechanism itself (Foucault 1977a).

These techniques involve treating an action in terms of its results, and this treatment is a constant thing; a constant supervision of the process of an act. It effects the partitioning of time, space, and movement, through a set a techniques which distribute individuals and then control their activities. This is done by enclosing them and then dividing them amongst each other. It requires that the individuals be ranked - that the unit in question is not a place per se, but a place occupied in relation to others. The effect here is to make the elements, such as the individuals themselves, interchangeable. The actual activities of the individuals are then controlled by use of timetabling, breaking the act down into its constituent parts, and then promoting exhaustive use of that activity to effect efficiency (Foucault 1977a).

Foucault's illustrations of these techniques were, he said, "a machinery of control that functioned like a microscope of conduct." (1977a:173). The use of the term "microscope" is important; disciplinary power's success lies in its great attention to the to the micro-scale. The isolation and identification of each element within an activity makes it possible for precise control over it to be obtained, making it possible, in turn, for the activity to be made more efficient by standardising it.

Foucault picked out Bentham's prison design - the Panoptican - as representative of this disciplinary power and delineates the workings of the Panoptican in order to highlight the design as a physical manifestation of this power. The Panoptican prison design is an ideal vehicle for the promotion of docile bodies. The entire building is cylindrical in shape and has a central guard tower with prisoners' cells arranged right around it. This means that a continuous surveillance is performed upon those who are to be normalised (in this case, the prisoners). In this the individuals are constantly visible, unlike the sovereign power paradigm, where only the king was visible. More importantly, the people know that they are under surveillance, yet they must not know exactly at what moments this is happening. Though it would probably not be possible, in actuality, for them to be constantly watched, the potential for this affects and effects their behaviour. Previously the surveillance of the sovereign was limited to enforcing laws which had been broken, suddenly (and violently) and the sovereign's presence would be withdrawn once this had been done. However it is much more efficient to have a constant surveillance that, as Foucault showed through the Panoptican, could be administered by anybody (in fact he called it fundamentally "democratic"). So the individuals themselves participate through an internalisation of these relations and this makes the system more efficient.

Though he examined the prison in great detail, it could equally have been another institution such as the school on which Foucault chose to focus. However, Foucault specifically chose the prison in this instance as the best example of disciplinary power at work. It fitted Foucault's genealogical model in terms of the prison's "birth" constituting a major break in what has usually been presented by historians as a progression. The prison, provided an example of disciplinary power having attached itself to an institution - "a privileged point of observation" (Foucault 1982:223). However, by its very nature, disciplinary power was spreading throughout society. It located itself within other institutions such as the school and operated in the same ways as he describes for the prison. He asks, "Is it surprising that prisons resemble factories, schools, barracks, hospitals, which all resemble prisons?" (Foucault

1977a:228). These techniques, upon linking up and spreading throughout society, often locate themselves within and become identified with various institutions, "cross the technological threshold" (Foucault 1977a:224) and become "disciplinary technologies". So the two things I wish to stress about disciplinary technology are firstly, that we treat rather than punish, and secondly, that everyone is treated. That is, what Foucault wanted to say about prisons or systems of confinement was that they represented what was happening to all of us; ordinary citizens are subject to discipline as well as criminals. It is a question of intensity and it is this continuum of discipline that education reforms of late exemplify.

Differentiation and the Law

If disciplinary power constitutes one half of governmentality (Foucault's later concept of power upon which this thesis focuses), and if normalisation constitutes a very large part of what it is that discipline does, then it is differentiation that is most crucial to getting this process underway. This is because before we can do anything else, we must enclose and isolate an object; we must then divide it up and rank its elements, thereby allowing us to homogenise it and make the elements interchangeable. In terms of schooling, the disciplinary function (namely normalisation), has been extended consistent with the "spreadable" nature of disciplinary power. Teachers continue to act in the interests of the child but teachers themselves are now also the target of normalisation. This does not mean that their treatment is the same as that of the children in the classroom. We can compare this situation to the one in *Discipline and Punish*, where it was demonstrated that the guards, though not subject to the same situation as the prisoners, were nonetheless still subject to situations that involved power relations. I have chosen to look specifically at teachers and how they are differentiated in this chapter. They are by no means the only targets of discipline and various technologies (as we shall see in later chapters), but they are one of the best examples of discipline exacted through the education reforms. Teachers are disciplined through legislation at a macro-level, and through institutionalised mechanisms of normalisation at the micro-level. Differentiation here requires that we objectify teachers as well as what they do.

I will be using legislation as evidence of this objectification of teachers. I think it would be useful to further clarify this position, as it may appear to run counter to much of what Foucault had to say about the status of the law in the analysis of power. Now Foucault suggested we examine differentiations which are "determined by the law and by traditions of status and privilege" as well as those determined by "know-how and competence" (Foucault 1982a). One of my points is that the traditions of status and privilege enjoyed (until recently) by teachers has been transformed by the law. This legislation tends, contrary to what Foucault has said explicitly about the law, <u>not</u> to "say no" to various possibilities. Rather, it suggests relations and highlights potential. A crucial aspect of this legislation is its emphasis on opening up possibilities for educators (professional or otherwise), which is consistent with the stated preference for decision-making at the local level. Of course not <u>all</u> possibilities are referred to or opened. The field of possibilities is, as Foucault would say, structured, but the point is that it is the law here that structures it.

It is through recent legislation that differences in status and privilege particularly occur, but also differences in know-how and competence, and the processes of production (in relation to knowledge, curriculum, and credentials that are produced through the education system) have been redefined. Privilege is removed from teachers by limiting their involvement and redefining their role, but what the law does is provide spaces for others to move into the area previously marked off for teachers. One does not have to be "a teacher" in order to do what we have known as teaching. What we have done is "invest" disciplinary power as a set of laws.

Foucault often talked about the law in terms of repression and therefore discarded it as constituting an adequate description of power. Foucault's objection to focusing entirely on the law corresponds to his objection to marxism and its focus on the State and social class. He said, "power is tolerable only on condition that it mask a substantial part of itself." (1980:86). The masking of power is actually fostered

by our often pitting the one system of rule - the law - against another - the monarchy. Foucault, on the other hand, grouped the two together as the same form of power - ie: power that says "no" - and regards the former system to have been borne out of the latter. He argued that law and sovereignty are in a circular relationship since in order to achieve sovereignty, one must have obedience to certain laws, and sovereignty is constituted by this obedience (Foucault 1977a). In terms of disciplinary power, Foucault shows in *Discipline and Punish (1977a)* that it is acts which the law specifies, but whereas individuals which normalisation specifies (and ranks). Foucault sees disciplinary power gaining its hold in the places that the law has "left empty"; disciplinary power addresses behaviours which the law and systems of punishment ignore (1977a).

Foucault argued that the only appropriate analysis is one that is free from a conception of power as represented through the law or conceived of as having "a central point in the enunciation of the law." (1980:90). Our analysis must not take law as a "model and a code" (1980:90). However, Foucault rephrased his work to say that the State was not unimportant, and explained that technologies lodged themselves within institutions, the State being the largest and most complex of these institutions. However, Foucault also maintained that "...in the case of government it's not a matter of imposing laws on men (sic), but rather of disposing things, that is to say to employ tactics rather than laws, and if need be to use the laws themselves as tactics" (1979:13). What happened was that matters became "governmentalised" under the auspices of the State (Foucault 1982a). This is the sense in which I am thinking of education legislation. I am therefore not meaning to present the legislation around education in New Zealand as purely repressive (of teachers or anybody else). What I am trying to do through talking about legislation is show up the establishment of another set of relations between people; to show how the law contributes to forming "governable" individuals. The whole point of analysing power at a micro-level of practices is to avoid a totalising understanding of power.

One of the major attacks on the status and privilege of teachers has occurred through legislation spawned by the Picot Report (1988) and the resultant policy, Tomorrow's Schools (1988). The security of a teaching position is threatened by repealing clause 65(3) of the 1989 Education Act, where it was stated that no Board of Trustees may appoint anyone not holding a current practising certificate to a teaching position. The Education Amendment Act 1991 (s.3[1]) now permits employment of unregistered persons as teachers. The security threatened here is not only that of job security for those in the teaching profession, but also security in terms of being something that is known as a professional. If Foucault is correct in his analysis of the relationship between power and knowledge within the human sciences, then teaching, like the fields of other experts who inserted themselves into the law (Foucault 1973, 1978), came out of disciplinary power and the need for a knowledge of those to be trained or corrected. This has now been turned on teachers. The status and privilege of teachers is now being replaced by the degrees of normality it sought to impose over others. Foucault showed up the perpetual movement of the pupil, whose performance and behaviour is continually tested, within the context of the classroom (Foucault 1977a). The same can now be seen with teachers.

> Discipline is an art of rank, a technique for the transformation of arrangements. It individualises bodies by a location that does not give them a fixed position, but distributes them and circulates them in a network of relations (Foucault 1977a:146).

There are no penalties allocated to teachers for offenses but there are rewards, punishments, and a sentence of discipline for not reaching certain standards. Their training and correction is now constant.

The 1989 Education Act (and subsequent amendments) have provided the space for a split to occur within what was a cohesive staff structure in schools. Quite new roles for school staff have been created from out of this. The 1989 Education Act designated the school principal's role as being primarily a Chief Executive Officer, responsible for the school's control and management (clause 76), subject to compliance with the Board of Trustees, with scope to manage however s/he sees fit.

> Many of the comments made above about the Board's style of governance on staff can equally be applied to the principal's management style. In fact, because of the principal's closer contact with staff, teaching and non-teaching, that impact is considerably more immediate (A Guide to Personnel Management 1990:5).

For the principal, membership on the Board of Trustees is limited to being CEO in respect of day-to-day running of the school(s) and does not include the possibility of being chairperson. A 1991 Amendment now provides that on any one combined Board, there may only be one principal, representative of all the schools on the Board. Principals used to be teachers first, and organisers second. Now, principals are claiming that they have no time to teach and it is not actually necessary to be skilled or experienced in this area.

> Principals who formerly had time for direct classroom support of teachers and their students, and were involved in demonstration teaching, special programmes or coaching now found the demands of restructuring had shifted the emphases of their actions, time and commitment. They felt that a management emphasis had taken over from instructional leadership.
> (Monitoring Today's Schools Research Project, Report No.4 1991:24).

Teaching staff are permitted to be on a Board of Trustees, but their participation is also restricted in that only one representative is allowed. In fact, this representative may be a non-teaching member of the staff for the Act does not refer specifically to teachers but to "staff" and this includes persons in a solely administrative role. Regulations governing other membership numbers stand in stark contrast to the restrictions placed on those directly involved in teaching: there may be six parent representatives (five on a lone board), and five co-opted representatives (four on a lone board). There is also provision for one student representative (as a full Board member). The 1991 Education Amendment Act now provides that on any one combined Board, there may now only be one principal, representative of all the schools on that Board. The same Act also makes it possible for the Board to co-opt any number of trustees to the Board (which further extends their position over that of teaching staff). Changes to the Act also make it possible for businesspeople who are not parents to be Board members. Parents (who may be teachers also) are no longer eligible for membership.

Legislation is just one of the areas which helps to create new relations. The other occurs at the micro-level of the classroom through the various institutions or agencies which have been set up by the Ministry of Education.

ERO and NZQA: The Panoptican Effect

Two institutions - Education Review Office (ERO) and New Zealand Qualifications Authority (NZQA) - act as Panopticans in respect of surveillance that is continuous without requiring an actual continuous physical presence. The practices of these two institutions/agencies act to normalise their objects of inquiry as well as recasting educational knowledge as technological. While each follow an evaluative model of quality assurance and appear to be concerned with the outcomes of education, they also act to focus on the micro-practices involved in creating certain outcomes, making their practices disciplinary in that they are designed for maximum efficiency.

ERO was created in 1989 to provide quality assurance to the Crown as investor/owner/regulator of education through the Board of Trustees who has a contract with the Crown and provides specific services to consumers, which includes the student as consumer (Penetito, Group Manager, Analytical Services 1992). Such relations between providers, consumers, owners and investors are consistently highlighted by the Ministry of Education and referred to as "lines of accountability". In a Foucauldian

sense we can see that these lines of accountability form a machinery of relations; a relation which means knowledge is tied to power, creating an efficiency which renders people more docile.

Quality assurance through the lines of accountability is done through ERO's Effectiveness Review and Assurance Audit, to which all state schools are subject. They are evaluated in terms of Board of Trustee expectations and National Education Guidelines (ie: what students are expected to achieve). Overall, the effectiveness of a school's performance is judged against their charter objectives, and their delivery of the National and Local Curricula. The Board must provide information to ERO which answers the question, "How can you show the difference you have made to students achievement?" (ERO 1993:6).

This information can be in:

> ...descriptive and/or statistical form. It can include school-based information, standardised test information, results of awards and examinations and narrative descriptions of the quality of student progress. Schools need to analyse information to demonstrate the difference made for groups of students....achievement information needs to meet some general standards of reliability which provide an adequate and valid base to enable the review team to use that information (ERO 1993:6).

The Board of Trustees is advised of ERO procedure two to three months in advance of a visit and is in turn required to send information to the ERO district office. The information required initially is as follows:

1. Achievement statement.
2. Information on the achievement statement and the difference the Board has made.
3. A statement about factors the Board of Trustees controls that contributes to achievement.
4. Locally developed components of the Charter.
5. School development plan.
6. Self-review reports and latest annual return.
7. Policies about school-management and curriculum delivery.
8. Course information, structures and pre-requisites.
9. Staff list, including responsibilities and functions.
10. Annual budget.
11. Timetables.

In addition, ERO may require at the time of the visit:

1. MOE March and July returns (latest)
2. Assessment and evaluation info on student achievement not previously provided
3. Staff development programme
4. Student records including reports to parents
5. BOT's meeting minutes (since ERO last report)
6. Records of student suspensions
7. Attendance registers
8. Newsletters (school and board)
9. Planning/teacher/syndicate/department/term overviews
10. Staff handbook/administration manual
11. School prospectus - latest
12. Documentation on management systems , curriculum delivery and policies
13. Cumulative records of student work

14. Teachers records not previously sighted
15. Any other relevant info

In some cases, up to 40 different records are to be made available to visiting ERO inspectors prior to an actual visit by the Office (Monitoring Todays's Schools no. 11 1992:53). During the visit the review team coordinator explains the review and its purpose to the Board, and within four weeks after the visit, sends a report to the Board. This report may include recommendations for improvements or changes. The Board has 20 days to state what changes are being made to incorporate the report's recommendations. ERO considers this response and if it deems the response unsatisfactory, will arrange an Assurance Audit within the next 12-18 months.

Certainly, schools have always been inspected and I am not trying to argue that this is new nor that it should not happen. What is new is the constant function of surveillance is now carried out at the micro-level by the teachers themselves. Teachers have always kept records and reported on the progress of students. However, they are now required to keep up-to-date records and reports of all their activities (their activities including the activities of their pupils), which includes lesson plans. The principal, as CEO, functions here through knowing staff members and their activities that the principal of any school can now be recognised as important in terms of surveillance and control of teachers. At first ERO was to make two-yearly inspections. However, the Lough Report's (1990) recommendation that inspections be three-yearly was implemented. This could be seen as a sensible solution to organisational problems in achieving two-yearly inspections (eg: lack of personnel, which were halved after Lough's recommendation). It can also be seen as a pulling-back of the external body as the objects of discipline take on the job of their own surveillance; it is unnecessary for them to be checked so regularly, though the "threat" of inspection is still ever-present, and documentation must be kept up-to-date. As Foucault says in a discussion of the school as disciplinary similar to the prison, the examination:

> ...combines the techniques of an observing hierarchy and those of a normalising judgement...At the heart of the procedures of discipline, it manifests the subjection of those who are perceived as objects and the objectification of those who are subjected (Foucault 1977a:184).

Despite their apparent wish to focus on outcomes, a check of ERO's practices actually points to a focus on the process. This process is what they monitor - hence, the requirement that teachers provide records as to how they deliver on the curricula and how they have students achieve objectives. Yet, the Ministry of Education continues to insist that its interest is in outcomes. In March 1991 the Minister of Education announced a new requirement that ERO emphasise learning outcomes, though without abandoning their examination of the school charter (in particular the objectives within it). In June 1993 Judith Aitken, Chief Review Officer, announced that ERO reviews would first analyse documentation provided by a school before visiting them. This documentation was to include an achievement statement. This statement was to focus on the achievements of students rather than the board of trustees, and should outline what understandings, skills, and knowledge each student is expected to achieve at the school.

There is no model achievement statement, but ERO does have some general criteria: The statement should be about students' achievements, not those of the Board; it should refer to the Board and the National Curriculum expectations; and it should set out skills, knowledge and understandings to be obtained by students (ERO 1993:5). Most significantly, it must be possible for the results of the achievements to be demonstrated (Education Gazette, June 1993 and ERO 1993:5). There is a possibility here that ERO are only interested in the things that can easily be measured.

Interestingly enough, ERO's own process (of inspection), "A Manual of Standard Procedures: Assurance Audits 1993" is not available to the public (including teachers) except in "special" circumstances. Unlike the teachers, ERO staff are accountable only in terms of their outcomes (their reports which

include corrective and improvement suggestions). The actions of the teachers are treated in terms of their results but monitoring occurs at the level of the mechanism itself rather than at the level of the result. So ERO claim to be interested in monitoring the results, but their practices indicate a preoccupation with the mechanisms.

NZQA and Standardisation

Similar to the normalising role of ERO and legislative changes is the role of New Zealand Qualifications Authority. Again, it is differentiation, in this case differentiation according to know-how and competence, which makes it possible for processes and practices of teaching and learning to be surveyed, individualised, homogenised and normalised. The role of NZQA can be seen as constituting another attack on teachers "status and privilege" and "knowhow and competence", particularly if we view it in conjunction with other criticisms of teachers' competence (for discussions on the role of teachers and changing conditions of work under the reforms, see Capper and Munro 1990, and Gordon 1992a). However, in the case of NZQA, there are also "shifts in the processes of production" (Foucault 1982a:223) of knowledge and qualifications, important to differentiation. The role of NZQA is to develop a system of credentials which is "flexible and responsive" and an accurate measure of "units of learning" (Designing the Framework: A Discussion Document about Restructuring National Qualifications). NZQA's focus is on "standards-based assessment" and "modular learning" with the latter being necessary to the former. On the surface, it may look as if NZQA are tending towards an outcome-centred system of measurements. However, if we look at what is actually involved, we can see that it concentrates on dividing things into easily measurable units, with the prospect of knowledge being measurable in this way increasingly determining what that knowledge should be. It also establishes a surveillance that is constant.

NZQA's "unit standards" are the building blocks of the framework and each standard "clearly defines what people should know and be able to do in a particular area of skill or knowledge." (NZQA March 1994). Unit standards are designed both by industries and by National Standard Bodies which are made up of representatives from the industries concerned. Unit standards can be transferred across and between industries. Each unit standard is made up of a credit (the time needed for the average learner to complete the unit standard but it is not a time limit), a sub-field (which identifies the subject area to which the unit standard), a purpose (to establish what the unit standard is useful for), elements (which are the sub-outcomes of a unit standard, each element having performance criteria against which a person can be measured). Thus, learners within any educational institution will know exactly what is expected of them in terms of tasks and skills. Similarly, every provider of a course of training or education will have that course broken into easily identifiable and measurable units. Although what is provided for learners (an input from somewhere) is specified, the focus is on outputs and outcomes (both of the learner and of the provider in terms of expected delivery). The determining factor of what constitutes a package of unit standards is explained simply by NZQA: "What people learn will be what employers offering jobs need." (NZQA March 1994). NZQA plan to have specified every job, from window cleaning to teaching, in unit standards by 1997 (most recently, 36 units of learning for the formal qualification of cleaners have been registered on the National Qualifications Framework, see The Dominion 11 October 1994).

The new National Curriculum similarly places its emphasis on standardised outcomes and breaks down areas of knowledge into "essential learning areas" and "essential skills". Marshall (1992) and Carr (1993) see serious problems with a system that implicitly assumes its appropriateness to all forms of knowledge. They argue that this ignores knowledge that involves judgement as opposed to mere competency. Skills are presented as generic and transferable across contexts or disciplines and it is argued by Marshall (1992) that in doing so, NZQA dangerously privilege "knowing how" over "knowing that". His argument can be related to Ryle's (1949) account, "Knowing How and Knowing That". Ryle argues this through a distinction between "habits" as built up through drill and "intelligent capacities" as

developed through training. When we are drilled to perform certain practices when receiving certain stimuli, we "know how" to do something. It requires exercises in relation to rules or applications of criteria and does not necessarily require an understanding of what we are doing at the level of theory which is then put into practice. To "know that" something is true or the case is propositional knowledge and would involve us making judgements about the appropriateness of peforming exercises in various situations; it would entail having an understanding of the principles involved. In the case of the curriculum then, learning skills is one thing, but being able to apply them appropriately is another. Schofield (1972) gives the example of learning how to ride a bicycle, arguing that this is useless without understanding that the bicycle is to be ridden somewhere. The "essential skills" and "essential learning areas" may be like the skills of say, pedalling and balancing needed for riding a bicycle, without any clear notion of what it means to be able to ride that bicycle. That NZQA have failed to make these kinds of distinction or put forward any notion of what knowledge might be is for Marshall (1992) evidence of an absence of understanding that activities require purposes which in turn require thought and decision.

Carr (1993), in her discussion of units standards for teachers as training providers, argues that the very language of unit standards precludes the "packaging" of knowledge which underlies a number of activities and links up to form themes across a number of courses or even across time. The interconnectedness of knowledge is not recognised by NZQA, so although providers can theoretically design their courses and standards, the construction of a programme is considerably constrained by the fragmentation of knowledge. In terms of teacher training, Carr (1993) argues that this means knowledge becomes a set of outcomes rather than judgements which are traditionally associated with professional informed opinion.

Carr (1993) does argue that under NZQA's vision of fragmented knowledge, competency is pitted against processes of learning. At one level this is true. However while NZQA, like ERO, do talk of outcomes and standards (product-centred), they do act to control the "processes of production". It is these processes which are most interesting to us in terms of disciplinary power. A current debate between the universities and NZQA about the distinction between quality control and quality assurance is a good example of these disciplinary processes. NZQA asserts that quality control, the old method of evaluation, is inefficient and inaccurate. To assess a production line in terms of intermittently checking the product off gives us information about the product but does not accurately reflect the state of the production line, nor whether or not it is really doing the job right. Quality assurance, on the other hand, is a constant measure of both the product and the production line. Checks are instituted all along the line - the micro-level, dividing into units - and reports issued about each element. Interestingly enough, Barker (1993) of the NZQA says that they are not interested in the details of what happens, but rather in concentrating on policy and systems (how to determine what should happen). He advocates a continuous and comprehensive focus. So NZQA are to establish the criteria for the approval and accreditation of courses at university (it should be noted that this may occur in conjunction with an Academic Programmes Committee but this is as yet undetermined). NZQA claims not to want to be involved in monitoring the courses themselves. Nevertheless, monitoring is to be done, but done at the micro-level by the educators themselves. Clear standards and outcomes are to be installed to make these courses "monitorable".

One of the universities' major concerns is that research, a role they claim is unique to them as an educational institution, will be reduced to problem-solving. That is, that knowledge will be fragmented. Following this is a concern that qualifications are being fragmented, becoming "learning outcomes" (Elley 1993). Certainly quality control, as opposed to quality assurance, has often been criticised by educationalists who point out the inaccuracy of exams in testing what they purport to test. However the dispute is over whether or not NZQA understands the universities' role enough to play a significant part in determining what its outcomes should be, and in being able to say how to measure them (Marshall 1993, Elley 1993). In addition to this, as NZQA relate quality to what the consumer wants (or thinks constitutes quality), the universities raise questions about whether or not the consumer's view should be

paramount here (Marshall 1993). NZQA is perceived as repressive here; the issue is one of academic freedom. The issue in terms of Foucault is one of governance and the increasingly detailed specifications of knowledge and the individuals who teach or perform it.

Capture and Normalisation

The argument used against university concerns here is the same as the one used to support the legislative changes to teacher status and privilege. The government's attack on those who have "captured" education is discussed by Peters and Marshall (1988). They cite Bertram's (1988) discussion of three forms of capture highlighted by the government in their policies - consumer, provider, and administrative. Provider capture refers specifically to teachers and educationalists and administrative capture to bureaucrats and people involved in (now-defunct) bodies such as the Department of Education. The government's concern is that bureaucrats have stifled people's talents and capabilities, and that education service providers have gradually allowed a system that secures their own working futures to become self-serving. Provider capture is also shown by Liz Gordon (1991) to be a major concern for the government. She contextualises the restructuring of education within the restructuring of the labour market, claiming that the whole idea of the "reforms" has been to turn the school system into a private profit-making business with a workforce driven to accept lower rate of pay and poorer conditions of work (1991:55).

The implication in identifying "capture" is that ordinary people are excluded from the education system. Ordinary people, come to be defined as those who are <u>not</u> teachers or educationalists, and those who are not formally involved in the education system, but those who have a stake in it either as consumer (ie: parents), or providers (ie: government-established institutions). This "capture" argument gains a foothold at the point where the education system has been criticised on the one hand for not doing its job in terms of providing the economy with appropriately skilled workers, and on the other hand in terms of not extending access to, providing qualifications for, and meeting the needs of all groups across society. That the system has apparently failed here leads to a view that the ordinary (non-educational) people need a chance to participate in the system in terms of attendance and maximisation of what the system has to offer, and in terms of having a say in what the system should do for people and how it should operate. In other words, it is the consumer, rather than the provider, who ultimately supervises and regulates the providers of education.

We might ask though whether these categories, which designate the "who" of involvement, will actually propagate even more categories. In fact, the rationale for devolution and self-management (elimination of capture, community involvement, greater accountability, and a more efficient education system) is justified with the very thing (another capture by a different set of people, another ideology) that it purports to be avoiding. So capture, per se, despite the government implying that it is inherently a bad thing, is obviously not so much the problem, but rather, <u>who</u> captures education. The government are attempting to structure the way we view interest groups so that only direct economic interests count (for instance, teachers and education service providers in terms of their salaries) as interests. It can then be argued that a rational policy decision may best be made by those who do not fit this category (Liz Gordon 1991) and it is into this "uninterested/impartial party" category that the government, its agencies, and its advisory associates place themselves.

The reason for the propagation of categories here is not just a question of replacing one group of "capturers" with another. Even more important is the way in which we come to understand the roles of the people involved in technological terms. Efficiency becomes the sole criteria against which teachers' work is understood (particularly by teachers themselves). The shift in position of the principal means that the solution to the problems that principals are experiencing can now be actioned in terms of administrative support (for the new role) and acquisition of further managerial skills, such as computer skills. The shift in the role of the principle is not in itself questioned; rather individual ability to fulfil the

role is at issue. For example, Liz Gordon (1991) cites Cathie Wylie's (1991) study of primary and intermediate schools which found that while bulk funding was opposed (79%) for both political and administrative reasons, the administrative concerns were most pressing and ranked highest. Criticism of the new education administration pitched at this level tends to remain within a paradigm that accepts the currently defined conditions for this administration. That principals may not be able to carry out their new duties may simply be used to justify more central surveillance and control structures to be located within the Ministry of Education.

We have seen that disciplinary power has the overt aim of treating or correcting abnormalities (such as criminal behaviour) while covertly ensuring their proliferation (through systems of confinement). Foucault demonstrated this reproduction of abnormality by highlighting the relationship between power and knowledge. He was not saying they were the same because as he says, "If they were identical, I would not have to study them and I would be spared a lot of fatigue as a result. The very fact that I pose the questions of their relation proves clearly that I do not identify them" (Foucault 1983:43). For Foucault, power and knowledge are in a circular relationship; the expansion of one requires the other. With prison more knowledge about the offender was required in order to normalise the offender. At the same time as the offender was identified and dealt with, more knowledge was gained about him/her. It is now possible in education, to a greater degree than ever before, to create and experience everything as potentially correctable through technological means.

> By definition, there ought to be a way of solving any technical problem...any other standards could be shown to be abnormal or to present merely technical problems (Dreyfus and Rabinow 1982:196).

In the case of teachers, the reforms aim to gain knowledge about what constitutes effective teaching, for example through the Achievement Initiative. In doing so, ERO does not compile an existing or natural knowledge about teachers so much as produce a knowledge through which the practices of teachers can be differentiated. These techniques of surveillance produce a certain reality for teachers, one which presupposes the "naturalness" both of what is monitored (learning outcomes) and that it can be monitored (through standardised test information). This induces teachers to put their own practices under surveillance by fragmenting them and making them more easily measurable.

This chapter has demonstrated that there is a system of normalisation intensifying throughout the education system whereby the consumers (parents) and investors (the government) of education are able to normalise the providers (teachers) of education, while at the same time the consumers have their own desires and demands normalised. It is the intensification of this normalisation to the point where we actively police our behaviour (in fact, constitute our selves) that I wish to explore in more detail in the following chapter.

CHAPTER FIVE: ENTERPRISE CULTURE AND THE FLEXIBLE INDIVIDUAL

The previous chapter sought to focus on one half of governmentality - the objectification of ourselves through technologies of domination, specifically disciplinary technologies. I took "differentiation", from Foucault's "analytics of power", as crucial to disciplinary technology and the establishment of ourselves as objectified and normalised. In this chapter I want to present "the other side" - the subjectification of ourselves through technologies of the self. These technologies are not reducible to each other (Burchell 1993) although they are often both present and one may presuppose the other. Technologies of the self can also be understood as building upon technologies of domination, particularly in terms of the theme of self-policing. Foucault defines technologies of the self as being those:

> ...which permit individuals to effect by their own means or with the help of others a certain number of operations on their own bodies and souls, thoughts, conduct, and way of being, so as to transform themselves in order to attain a certain state of happiness, purity, wisdom, perfection, or immortality (Foucault 1982b:18).

The History of Sexuality: Sex and Identity

It is useful at this point to look at what Foucault did in the *The History of Sexuality volume one (1980)* in order to gain an understanding of technologies of the self and bio-power and how they may be useful in understanding the practices of the education reforms and the type of freedom they promote. *The History of Sexuality volume one (1980)* can be seen as a development of *Discipline and Punish (1977a)* in terms of unfolding further ideas about techniques of self-policing which relied on self-management. It is also perhaps Foucault's initial study of what he came to later call "technologies of the self".

Foucault demonstrated a number of important points in *The History of Sexuality volume one (1980)* which are relevant to an analysis of the education reforms. Firstly, Foucault highlighted the linking of practices employed at the micro-level to practices across a population. Secondly, he advanced the idea that truth and power's intertwining are obscured by our clinging to an understanding of power rooted in sovereignty or a repressive conception of power. Lastly, and perhaps most importantly for us in this analysis, Foucault showed that forms of domination are linked to identity, making them much harder to recognise.

Foucault focussed on a "history of sexuality" not because he was interested in sex per se, but because he was interested in notions of sex and the construction of sexuality, and how knowledge about sexuality gave us each access to our own identities. The scientification of sex meant we could have access to a certain understanding of our behaviour and how we should manage it. Sex was not just a function but an instinct to be understood, contained and controlled. The monitoring of one's own sexuality became the monitoring of one's health, which in turn became the monitoring and management of the population. This is the idea of "bio-power" which Foucault had already begun to develop in *Discipline and Punish (1977a)*. Like the move from sovereign power to disciplinary power, this was a move from the organisation of power over (the threat of) <u>death</u> - where the sovereign could take life or let live, to the organisation of power over <u>life</u> - where we make life.

Bio-power advanced under the guise of the "repressive hypothesis" (Foucault 1980) or the "juridico-discursive" model of power (see chapter two). This entails our pitting truth against power, so that the more we come to know about our sexuality, the more we come to know about ourselves and who we are. Finally, this knowledge and the fact that we could talk about it, could be taken as advancement toward freedom. Technologies of the self suppose that it is possible to know the truth about ourselves and who we are, and that we can know this through scientification.

Foucault created the term "scientia sexualis" to indicate our scientification and medicalisation of sex (creation of knowledge). We studied sex in terms of analysing our own desires, rather than focussing on pleasure itself; an approach Foucault called "ars erotica". Foucault identified a number of methods through which the scientification of sex occurred. These methods included the idea that sex had a causality attached to it so that we could trace everything back to this instinct. Freud, for example, based his work on this (see Hutton 1988). Another "scientia sexualis" idea was that sexuality was by nature quite elusive and its meaning was therefore hidden from us. In order to gain access to the meaning of sex and therefore truth about ourselves, we needed to know about our desires. This was done through the "confession" which was then validated by an expert, such as a therapist, who interpreted and integrated the information.

In *The History of Sexuality volume one (1980)*, Foucault attacked the idea that what we need to do to be liberated and free is to talk about sex, gain more knowledge about sex, and understand ourselves through this. He thought this a false sense of liberation, based on the misconception that power is essentially repressive. Of course what Foucault demonstrated throughout his work on the human sciences was that truth and power (and knowledge) were bound up together. He saw truth as being produced and sustained by power, and power being effected and induced by truth, with power in turn extending truth (Foucault 1977b). He said:

> ...truth isn't outside power, or lacking in power: contrary to a myth...truth isn't the reward of free spirits, the child of protracted solitude, nor the privilege of those who have succeeded in liberating themselves (Foucault 1977b:131).

The medicalisation and scientification of sex, the industry of therapy and the "talking cure" that built up around it were the things that we constructed around an identity that was at the same time constituted through these things. For Foucault, there is no truth to be learned about ourselves in this way; we are constructed and constituted in entirety. The idea that freedom can be obtained through self-knowledge and self-management is therefore quite mistaken.

We now come to the next point Foucault suggested we establish in our analytics of power:

> The objectives pursued by those who act upon the actions of others: the maintenance of privileges, the accumulation of profits, the bringing into operation of statutory authority, the exercise of a function or of a trade (Foucault 1982a:223).

I understand "the objectives pursued..." through current education reforms to be a technology of the self because the reforms encourage us to act upon and transform ourselves. As I explained in chapter four, Foucault included "objectives" in his suggested format for an "analytics of power" because understanding people's objectives are crucial to understanding the practices through which people's identities are constituted. When we look at people's objectives, we learn about who people understand themselves to be; what they aim to do or be is a reflection of, or a projection of an identity. However, not only do our objectives reflect who we are, but who we are is actually constituted <u>through</u> our objectives.

Industry, Enterprise and the Self

Our objectives, according to the education reforms, should be to act upon ourselves in order to transform ourselves into highly skilled, flexible, and enterprising individuals. Not only do these objectives correspond to New Zealand's needs in terms of an economic recovery but, also, they lead to greater individual freedom. One of the most salient features of the education reforms to date is their emphasis on recognising and maintaining each and every one of us as people who act - specifically, people who freely choose. One of the justifications for reforms that has remained throughout policy documents and advisory reports is that of instituting measures that will allow for expression of freedom and choice.

Unlike technologies of domination which specify a range of techniques that are done <u>to</u> us and construct us in various ways, technologies of the self are about how we enact these techniques upon ourselves quite knowingly. Thus, Foucault's later contention that freedom be the precondition for power (1982a, 1984) is of particular relevance here. He says that:

> ...a power relationship can only be articulated on the basis of two elements...that the `other' (the one over whom power is exercised) be thoroughly recognised and maintained to the very end as a person who acts; and that, faced with a relationship of power, a whole field of responses, reactions, results and possible inventions opens up (Foucault 1982a:220).

The education reforms, like reforms of other sectors such as the labour market, have been presented quite explicitly as a response to a "culture of dependency". This "culture of dependency" has been identified as the cause of our poor economic showing worldwide (Treasury 1984, 1987, 1990), and the blame for this was laid at the feet of welfarism for two reasons. The first reason pertained to the capture of welfare. That is, welfare was often not reaching those it was designed to help and had been captured and used by those who did not need it. The second reason pertained to the generation of a welfare dependency. That is, that for those it was designed to help, the welfare "safety net" had become an attitude and way of life, paradoxically creating more need for welfare. In response, reforms across all sectors, but particularly education, have been presented as promoting a "culture of enterprise". Both New Zealand's economic recovery and the success of the reforms depend upon us as individuals taking up positions for ourselves where we can exercise a freedom which is unavailable to us within a heavily bureaucratised welfare state.

I want to argue that the general policy objectives of "flexibility" and "enterprise" associated with New Zealand's economic recovery manifest themselves educationally through the "training culture" (ETSA and NZQA 1994:3) of Skill New Zealand and are to be pursued by each and every individual. In this way, the education reforms take hold at the level of identity and the notion of "training culture" becomes a means through which we constitute ourselves as free subjects. I will argue that the kind of freedom we practice under the education reforms requires that we ourselves become the enterprise in the "culture of enterprise".

That we are deemed to be individually responsible for the economic recovery can be seen through the double meaning of the word "enterprise". The first meaning is to do with encouraging partnership between school and enterprises or industries (see Sutherland, 1993, Education for Enterprise Conference 1992, Hirsch 1992, McQueen 1992, Ministry of Education 1993b, NZ Education-Business Partnership Trust 1993). There is even a sense, related to this, that schools themselves can be seen as enterprises in that effective management is paramount (Peters 1994).

The second meaning of enterprise, which is of particular interest in this chapter, is to do with promoting ways in which we ourselves can become "enterprising" in our attitudes to education and work. Increasingly, it is this meaning of the word enterprise on which the reforms in New Zealand's economic recovery hinge (for an analysis of "enterprise culture" in Britain, see Keat and Abercrombie 1991, and Burrows 1991). That is, New Zealand's international economic competitiveness is increased through individual development of enterprising attitudes to learning and business (Crocombe 1991, Partnership and Enterprise 1991, Ministry of Education 1993a, New Zealand Business Roundtable 1993, ETSA and NZQA 1994, Building Better Skills 1994).

There are also examples of the use of both meanings of "enterprise" within the same documents. In July 1993, the Business Roundtable published a collection of papers, among them "Schooling for the 21st Century". In this paper, Douglas Myers claims that we need to foster the school/business relationship for the sake of our children who are currently ill-prepared by school for employment, and indeed, for society and "life". He stressed the value of industry (or enterprise) being involved in schools through sponsorship or curriculum, with benefits accruing to the industry, the school, the individual student, and the economy generally. However, he also stressed attitudinal changes that were needed at an individual level. He asked that schools take a lead here because, "Employers often end up having to turn around negative attitudes acquired at school to ones that are positive about commerce" (1993:115).

Labour Market Deregulation

The conditions necessary for reconstruction of New Zealand's economy, the forging of school-enterprise partnerships, and changes in individual attitudes were established at first through labour market reform. These conditions were necessary not only for the economy generally, but also for the individuals who

function within it. Criticism of the labour market as it had been operating prior to 1987, was based on its apparent inflexibility in that disputes were far too common and resolution both slow and often costly (and therefore unsatisfactory). It was claimed that prevailing labour laws and practices were simply too rigid to allow innovative and flexible responses to a myriad of work situations. The Labour Relations Act 1987 attempted to deal with industrial strains and predicaments that the Arbitration Court had been unable to deal with effectively. The new Act kept compulsory unionism (though registered unions had to now have a minimum membership of 1000 members) but abolished compulsory arbitration. It aimed to rationalise union activity (Kelsey 1993) and according to Walsh (1989), it was essentially a compromise between the Ministers who supported Rogernomics and traditional Labour party factions. In response to these changes, the Combined Trade Unions was formed that same year.

The 1991 Employment Contracts Act was certainly the most radical implementation of the deregulated market principles, and the following statement is perhaps a telling example of the philosophy supporting it: "Laws which require the payment of minimum wages protect the pay and conditions of those in employment at the expense of reduced job opportunities for the unemployed" (Treasury 1987:7). In other words, Treasury were arguing that secure job conditions mitigate against a competitive marketplace which, in the end, actually disadvantages us all. The Employment Contracts Act abolished national wage awards and compulsory unionism. The unions themselves, accustomed to tax exemption and what had come to be seen as "special treatment" no longer had a monopoly over worker representation. Workers could hire other agents (not necessarily unions) to negotiate on their behalf. Although a nominated agent, negotiating on a worker's or workers' behalf could enter workplace premises, they could only do so for the actual negotiations. So agents, including unions, who sought authority to represent people could not actually gain access to do so, nor could they gain entrance in order to inspect work premises. Any one worker (or a worker's agent) had no right to know what another worker had negotiated in their contract. Strikes were now only legal in relation to the actual negotiations for a collective contract, and only after the existing contract or contracts had expired (Kelsey 1993). All of these changes occurred in line with ideals of deregulation, open competition, and greater enterprise and output; all with the goal of greater flexibility in general.

The Flexible Individual

Fitzsimons and Peters (1994) see labour market reforms as being legitimated by human capital theory; this theory being grounded in neo-classical liberal thought, and sharing two main assumptions with that thought. The first assumption is that we are economically self-interested individuals who are able to operate freely within the marketplace to maximise our own interests. The second assumption is that the economy is a separate sphere from the rest of society, operating with its own dynamics.

However, the economy can also be understood as a redefinition which includes in its dynamics, rather than excludes, other spheres traditionally regarded as separate. Social interests are understood solely in terms of economic activity. For example, Treasury describes itself in its Briefs (1984, 1987) as not purely an advisor of economic matters, but also an advisor on social issues. They even suggest that government intervention may undermine equity goals (1987:30). Here, Treasury follow the thought of Hayek, one of the founding members of the Chicago School of Economics (see Peters and Marshall 1988b and 1990b), who argues that social justice cannot be provided through a state-interventionist system. Treasury argue then that the most important issues are ones of "voluntary choice versus state direction" (1987:17), saying, "No matter how effective social policies are, securing objectives like dignity, security and opportunity is intimately linked to economic performance" (Treasury 1990:96).

Colin Gordon explains neo-liberal thought here as relying on:

> ...a progressive enlargement of the territory of the theory by a series of redefinitions of its object, starting out from the neo-classical formula that economics concerns the study

> of all behaviours involving the allocation of scarce resources to alternative ends...economics becomes an approach capable of explaining all human behaviour... (Colin Gordon 1991:43)

At the same time as a flexible labour market was required, flexible individuals were required to act within it. To take the idea of our "flexible being" and our identity as freely choosing even further, I think the distinction that Burchell (1993) and Colin Gordon (1991) make between earlier classical liberalism and current neo-(classical) liberalism is useful. Burchell (1993) and Colin Gordon (1991) explain that where classical liberalism took the individual as its object and worked to protect and enhance the natural market through as little intervention as possible, neo-liberal government needs to work for the market by providing the conditions (laws, institutions) necessary for its operation. The individual is taken as an accomplice in this activity. The individual in classical liberalism has a human nature and is required to practice freedom in accordance with this. Governmental activity is rational only to the extent that it can ensure this. Neo-liberalism, on the other hand, seeks to create an individual that is an enterprising competitive entrepreneur and will exercise his/her freedom accordingly.

I want to highlight a shift in subject positions here. The shift is from "homo economicus" or "economic man" who naturally behaved out of self-interest and was free when allowed to act in this way, to "manipulable man" who is created as and encouraged to be "perpetually responsive" so that we each make "a continual enterprise of ourselves" (Colin Gordon 1991). Our individual responsiveness and flexibility can be rationalised through the neo-liberal theory of human capital. Fitzsimons and Peters (1994) quote an OECD (1993) report which identifies human-capital development as a crucial issue in New Zealand's economic recovery. Human capital is understood as "the sum of the skills embodied in its people, with the value of that capital dependent on the opportunities people have to use those skills" (1994:11). Thus, the flexible deregulated labour market provides some of the opportunities for us to utilise our skills. There must also be other opportunities for us to develop our skills, to transform ourselves into skilled and flexible individuals who manage our lives and make choices which we perceive as "free".

The NQF and Skill New Zealand: Constituting the Transparent Subject

Officially named and launched in 1990, Skill New Zealand is the umbrella over these agencies through which we can become enterprising, flexible and improve ourselves. Skill New Zealand links education and the workplace under the banner of "skills" and "training" and provides for "lifelong education and training" (ETSA and NZQA 1994). It operates in conjunction with the Seamless Education System which is designed to consolidate all areas of education and training - early childhood education, compulsory primary and secondary schooling, post-compulsory schooling and tertiary education, on- and off-job training - into one coherent system.

Coherence is brought to Skill New Zealand and the Seamless Education System through the National Qualifications Framework (NQF) "under which it no longer matters which institution or educational programme students are working in: they will all lead to the same nationally recognised qualifications" (Ministry of Education 1993a:20). The Framework is based on notions of flexibility and transparency, providing "clear pathways" for people to gain desired qualifications (NZQA 1993a).

The notion of transparency, in relation to institutions and providers, is referred to explicitly by Treasury (1994) in their brief to the Todd Taskforce. One of Treasury's major criticisms of the current tertiary education system is "the lack of transparency and simplicity in the way the current system works" (1994:11). They cite examples of a confusing array of entitlements and assistance programmes available to students and are highly critical of the flat fee measures preserved by some universities. "By not charging fees that reflect resource costs Auckland, Victoria and Canterbury are distorting information relevant to students making choices" (Treasury 1994:15). Hence, the transparency of educational

institutions and training providers is crucial to the individual's expression of choice in relation to courses and providers. The consumer must have access to information that allows for an informed decision about market or industry-led skill requirements, course costs and benefits. It is therefore recommended that centralised budgeting and the government-controlled Equivalent Full-Time Student (EFTS) funding formula (which inappropriately privileges State providers) be changed.

> The benefits of greater competitive pressure on providers can be illustrated by the fact that within the EFTS system, it is the institutions most exposed to consumer mobility or choice that are being forced to adopt sensible fee structures, or fee setting systems that reflect resource costs (Treasury 1994:15).

The transparency issue cuts both ways. The transparency requirement of providers can be seen as an acceptable condition of operation within a free market. However, there is also a transparency requirement of the consumers of education and training. In order for each individual to make the "right choices" (Treasury 1994:16) in terms of their education, we must locate ourselves on the National Qualifications Framework, which is administered by NZQA. The Framework is designed to make our ranking and improvement easily identifiable and measurable. Each individual can know exactly where they are in terms of skills and qualifications. No matter who the individual is, it is possible for them to locate themselves somewhere along the eight-level scale of the framework. Levels one to three correspond to secondary school training, culminating in a National Certificate at level four. National Diplomas correspond to levels five to seven. Level eight refers to degrees or higher certificates and diplomas. Currently held qualifications can be reassessed and fitted into the framework. Existing experience and skills gained in the workplace can be recognised on the framework under Recognition of Prior Learning (RPL). Credits towards unit standards, the "building blocks" of the Framework (NZQA 1993b), build into qualifications and are listed on each individual's own Record of Learning. All Records of Learning are held on a national data base.

Assessment is an important part of flexibility and transparency. The learner should know precisely what their achievements are and where they rank in the overall process.
Standards-based systems of assessment are promoted over norm-referenced systems because the latter do not provide for this.

> Such systems [of norm-referencing] not only pre-determine a large proportion of students to low levels of achievement, they also frequently hide the real levels of achievement of the top scholars in our schools (NZQA undated brochure).

This is an example of the kind of disciplinary power discussed in the previous chapter. The Framework performs a Panoptican-like function of continuous surveillance, in that each individual is made visible, potentially all of the time. As learning is broken down into modules, skills into "units of learning", and people into collections of skills who occupy rankings on a scale, people are normalised. As Foucault showed in *Discipline and Punish (1977a)*, the production of docile bodies is made possible by a series of techniques which treat the person as manipulable. In this case we are "improvable" just like the prisoners Foucault described, who were no longer killed, but re-trained. The place occupied by the individual on the Framework is not fixed; the re-training, correction or improvement is continuous. This idea is stressed in "Education for the 21st Century":

> New Zealanders must realise that the days of education being completed at a certain age are gone forever. They must be prepared to upskill and re-skill throughout their lives (Ministry of Education 1993a:16).

There are a number of support agencies available to advise people on their ongoing training, as well as a system of private- and government-run training schemes (PTEs and GTEs). Quest Rapuara (QR)

essentially provides a vocational guidance service to both schools and industries in the interests of encouraging "partnerships" between them. The Education and Training Support Agency (ETSA) administers government programmes such as Training Opportunities Programmes (TOPs) designed to eventually subsume Access and MAccess training schemes.

Industry Training Organisations (ITOs), under the Industry Training Act (1992), are developed to manage the training and setting of skill standards in whichever industry a particular ITO represents. In other words, these Organisations identify skill areas within an industry and then register the skill standards against the NQF. They then arrange for the delivery of training both on and off the job as well as actually monitoring the training and assessing the trainees (Education and Training Support Agency, July 1992). ITOs are designed to take over administration of existing apprenticeship and cadetship schemes and there is government funding available to assist with the take-over. However, the suitability of an ITO is determined by ETSA in consultation with NZQA, and depends on a number of factors, not least of which is the ability to be self-funding, although the government are currently funding them. Membership is voluntary and training is ongoing.

However, what I want to stress in this chapter is that the Skill New Zealand strategy is not just done to us as passive objects, but that we actively participate in our re-training and up-skilling. In the *History of Sexuality volume one (1980)*, Foucault showed that the idea of knowing the truth of who we are became possible through the scientification of sex. In the case of the Framework, knowing where we are translates into knowing who we are; we become transparent in that we become a highly skilled person or a person training towards certain skills and qualifications. Everybody is at some level and not having any existing qualifications, experience or skills simply means having further to move up the scale. The Dominion recently reported the development of unit standards for cleaners (11 October 1994) from which 36 units of learning have been registered on the Framework. A pass in the floor cleaning unit would prove that trainees could select and use cleaning agents and equipment as well as demonstrate correct methods for cleaning floors. The report includes an interview with the chairperson of the cleaning advisory group who maintains that this demonstrates the importance of cleaners and in turn, makes them feel important in having certifiable skills. What the Framework allows us to do is experience ourselves as a process of becoming something, in this case, of becoming skilled. Like the idea of bio-power in *The History of Sexuality volume one (1980)*, where sex became a health issue right across the population in general, the Framework advertises itself as healthy in the sense of creating a junction between the fit individual body and the fit (economically recovered) social body. The Framework provides for a:

> Sharp Mind because it's clearly focused on the standards you need to achieve...Better Grasp of the skills and qualifications you'll need to make your career happen...Huge Heart because your skills and knowledge will be nationally recognised, encouraging you to keep on learning...Hands On practical experience could count towards a national qualification...Powerful Feet as your learning takes you into local businesses for on-site experience (NZQA and Skill New Zealand, undated brochure).

NZQA literature also emphasizes the transparency of the individual by featuring young people enjoying the process of learning and the feeling of "going somewhere" and "becoming someone". They quote them:

> It's a buzz - it's great! For the first time in my life I feel like I'm doing something worthwhile - I'm achieving something (NZQA 1992:16).

and

> National Certificate will help me a lot. I'll be able to start learning now for what I'm going to do in the future (NZQA 1992:11).

The National Curriculum is also involved here in promoting the correct attitudes to self-improvement. Subject areas are called "essential learning areas" and the skills which are to be transferable between areas are called "essential skills". Perhaps the most emphatic of these is "Self-Management and Competitive Skills" - which include setting, evaluating and achieving personal goals; being able to show enterprise, initiative and commitment; adaptation to new ideas and situations; constructive approaches to change and competition; self-discipline and responsibility; and self-esteem. Personal attitude is most critical here and the assumption is that our attitude will be one that favours a process of learning over actual knowledge of things (Marshall 1994b).

The transparency of training providers and their courses means that knowledge both of ourselves through the Framework and our place on it, and through what programmes and qualifications are available, is accessible to each and all. Once, we recognise ourselves as transparent and the structures of improvement as transparent also, Skill New Zealand provides for continuous self-improvement with a raft of agencies/structures through which we can gain the self-knowledge necessary for enacting the improvements in the appropriate areas. For this to work, we must understand ourselves (as opposed to someone or something making us that way) as inherently flexible, malleable, and able to practice our own individual freedom so that it coincides with that of the economy.

Being Subject to the Market

Foucault showed how sex and identity could be linked so that greater investigation of our sexuality became a way for us to know ourselves and make possible the self-management of our lives. There are implications for how we practice freedom in that self-management, based on self-knowledge, signifies our freedom (from repression). What Foucault was saying in *The History of Sexuality volume one (1980)* was that power is most effective when humans are subject to it in the name of their "being". The paradox which Foucault showed up is that our "being" is little but an effect of various discourses and practices; it is these things which act to "naturalise our situation as individuals in the universe or in history" (Racevskis 1988:23).

In this case we can see that our objectives, to train and improve ourselves, occur in direct relation to the requirements of the market. However, at the same time, it is the market that constitutes our desires and interests, and therefore, our sense of who we are. The emphasis on the development of individual attributes and qualities increases so that exercising freedom of choice in line with economic competitiveness becomes a virtual responsibility. The strategies in "Education for the 21st Century" (MOE 1993) detail education strategies designed, in conjunction with the Industry Training Strategy, to link improvement of the individual to improvement of the economy. This is of course very similar to bio-power in that capitalism requires a controlled insertion of docile bodies into the machinery of production, as well as an adjustment of the population to economic processes. Bio-power also requires the growth of methods of power which are capable of optimising aptitudes and life but without making people harder to govern. There had to be explicit calculation with regard to each and every life.

Marshall (1994a, 1994b) argues that bio-power has developed further into "busno-power" in line with a "busnocratic rationality", whereby the productive economic power of the individual is maximised so as to increase the productive economic power of the State. Bio-power referred specifically to notions of good health practice for each individual which becomes good health practice in terms of population management. There is a scientific or biological base to this. Busno-power, on the other hand, does not have this base, but relies instead upon a particular view of human nature. Colin Gordon (1991) explains that neo-liberalism actually posits "a human faculty of choice" (1991:43) through its principle of economics explaining all rational conduct. Marshall (1994a, 1994b) argues further that the exercising of

choice is in fact taken to be or created as our human nature so that not to exercise it is to be less than human.

Countering the idea that we are freed through training is Keat (1991, 1994) who suggests that the idea of the "sovereign consumer" is actually a fiction in that our desires as consumers are not actually separate from the demands and ideas of the producers. Keat (1994) argues that the conception of autonomy invoked here is dubious because it reduces people's ideas about their own well-being and what is good generally to "unjustifiable, arbitrary preferences" (1994:38). So when we talk about flexibility and choices, and the freedom this apparently leads to, the choices can be:

> understood as more akin to "forced choices", since the subject's positioning within particular discourses makes the "chosen" line of action the only possible action, not because there are no other lines of action but because one has been subjectively constituted through one's placement within that discourse to want that line of action (Davies 1991:46).

Accordingly, the form of power which is brought into play through the double meaning of "enterprise" corresponds to the double meaning of "subject". We are subject to the market in the sense of being controlled, and we are subjects in that we are tethered to an identity based on a discovery and knowledge about who we are. Not only are our desires (or objectives) constituted, but our identity (as free individuals) is as well. Paradoxically, "enterprise culture" may not actually be very enterprising; essentially it remains within a set of conservative parameters which carefully defined by and driven by the market. Despite the rhetoric encouraging creative and enterprising business ideas, it may be that we end up being less enterprising individuals because, to a certain extent, we are to render ourselves adaptive to market demands rather than be truly creative or enterprising within it.

CHAPTER SIX: THE DEGREES OF RATIONALISATION

> **The degrees of rationalisation:**
> The bringing into play of power relations as action in a field of possibilities may be more or less elaborate in relation to the effectiveness of the instruments and the certainty of the results (greater or lesser technological refinements employed in the exercise of power) or again in proportion to the possible cost (be it economic cost of the means brought into operation, or cost in terms of the reaction constituted by the resistance which is encountered) (Foucault 1982a:223).

A useful way to explain what is meant by "rationalisation" is to make a comparison with Weber's work here. Smart (1983) explains that Weber considers rationalisation a process entailing a constant refinement and development of means by which specific goals can be realised. Significantly, this process does not entail a rational inquiry into the goals themselves. Weber claims that an expanding scientific mastery over and regulation of life is not evidence of progress, but of a "disenchantment" (Dreyfus and Rabinow 1982:165) with the world. Foucault too has advanced the idea that increasing scientification, psychiatrisation, and medicalisation (1965, 1977a, 1978, and 1980) have not led to progress or the realisation of an emancipatory humanist project. Rather, categories of madness, criminality, and sexual deviance or normality are produced through the various treatments for and sanctions of them. The practices of humanism are bound up with and depend upon these (see Fraser 1985).

Although both Weber and Foucault are similarly concerned with the effects of increasing rationalisation of society, they differ as to their methods for analysis and also the conclusions they draw (Dreyfus and

Rabinow 1982, Smart 1983). While Weber sees the process of rationalisation as being a global historical one, Foucault argues for an investigation into forms of rationalisation. Foucault warns against invoking or assuming the progress of rationalisation (1982a) as we may be inclined to generalise all kinds of relationships or actions across different fields. Assumptions here may mean we return to juridico-political discourse and ignore practices which comprise the productive nature of power. What Foucault wants to do is analyse very specific rationalities which are inscribed with varying practices. His argument is that we need to understand how a particular rationality constitutes practices by which we can do certain things at the same time as it legitimates those practices with principles.

The particular rationality at issue here is liberalism. In the following sections of this chapter, I am going to argue that liberalism has developed from out of a number of other doctrines of rule as a critique of state reason, and was designed to check their propensity to impinge upon citizens. Since liberalism emerged in this way, it is not so much a cohesive ideology, but it is rather a political rationality concerned with the "art of government" (Foucault 1979) or the actual techniques required for rule. It must therefore also check itself, and as Rose argues, "Political rule was given the task of shaping and nurturing those domains that were to provide its counterweight and limit" (Rose 1993:290). I want to argue that these "domains" of "counterweight" are the "instruments" which Foucault refers to in the quote at the beginning of this chapter. In fact, the instruments of family, welfare, and school, make liberal rule possible; we are governed through these instruments which are, today, reformulated in relation to the market and constituted in market terms.

In some of his last work before his death in 1984, Foucault (1982a) talked about the power relations of modern Western society as "a tricky combination in the same political structures of individualisation techniques, and of totalisation procedures" (1982a:213). It is this character of power that Foucault calls "governmentality" and is understood by Foucault in terms of the broad meaning it had during the sixteenth century. Governmentality is the "conduct of conduct" (Foucault 1979); a concern with directing (conducting) the activity (conduct) of individuals or groups. To govern, in this sense, is to structure the field of possible actions of others (Foucault 1982a). I would argue that Foucault's notion of governmentality provides a more precise account of the interaction of these aspects of our political and historical condition than that put forward in the reform literature (and some of the critiques of it). The "tricky combination" of individualising and totalising techniques in governmental power can be seen clearly in liberalism which requires that the State have a knowledge of its subjects (who also have a knowledge of themselves) in order to consolidate a totalising power for itself. Governing then, is rational to the extent that individual aspirations and practices can conform to those of political government.

The Development of Liberalism

In order to understand how liberalism works, and how liberal techniques of governing have developed, it is necessary to discuss the development of liberalism as Foucault understands it - as springing up in the eighteenth century to check the various "reason of state" and "police" doctrines that had been developing since the sixteenth century.

Foucault (1979, 1982a, 1982c) discusses the political rationalities prior to the emergence of liberalism and identifies the breaks between them. The first rationality that Foucault discusses is based on Christian principles of governing people according to "natural laws" and by following a model of divine ordination. The next rationality to emerge is exemplified through the writing of Machiavelli. Machiavelli's advice to the Prince centred on questions of how the sovereign could retain control over and possession of his state. This entailed making the Prince's subjects into objects; the Prince was concerned with the consolidation of his power and not with the freedom or lives of the citizens. Where the Christian doctrine was concerned to understand the entity of the state and how to emulate a higher

order, Machiavelli's doctrine was concerned to understand the relationships between the Prince, his citizens, and his territory (Foucault 1982c).

However, it is not the difference between these two that Foucault is concerned to highlight. It is the political rationality of *raison d'etat* which, for Foucault, provides us with a sharp break from the earlier two ways of thinking about governing. Like Machiavelli's idea, it involved the conception of a strong state. The break occurs where the strength of that state would be identified through its population. The state was thus required to foster the lives of its subjects. It did this through what Foucault calls "pastoral power" (1982a), the nature of which is to care for each and every individual by knowing their consciences (the truth of which is produced) and linking the practices of "knowing" to political ones.

Foucault argues that we have not so much abandoned this rationality as "integrated [it] in a new political shape" (1982a:213). It is the aspect of pastoral power in the shape of the ecclesiastical institution which has declined rather than its function, which, Foucault claims, has spread beyond the institution (Foucault 1982a). This *raison d'etat* or idea of police (Foucault 1982c) focused on both a territory and a people living there who would be transparent to knowledge (Rose 1993). The conduct of the people was overseen, monitored, and restricted by various ordinances and controls. This is the type of power and mentality of rule that Foucault referred to as "governmentality".

The explosion of interest in knowledge about ourselves occurred at this time also - notably, the emergence and the development of the human sciences. "The Enlightenment, which discovered the liberties, also invented the disciplines" (Foucault 1977a:222). That is, Foucault argues throughout his work that the human sciences (and liberties associated with them) are legitimated by values which are fictions. The practices of the human sciences serve to increase rather than decrease our subjection through an increased attention given over to the advancement of our individuality. The new disciplines (the studies centred around the human sciences) brought with them a system of discipline - a micro-physics of power operating upon the body. Hence Foucault regards the disciplines as "the dark side" of liberal government, but nevertheless, as becoming indispensable to its functioning. It was a question of knowing about the thing that was to be governed - the state in terms of its environment, its population, its resources and its problems (Dreyfus and Rabinow 1982:137). Here we can see the connection with bio-power, particularly as evidenced in *The History of Sexuality volume one (1980)*, where the micro-level practices in the bedrooms of parents and children were tied to macro-level practices of population management.

This idea of the totalising will and firm administrative grip of the sovereign over territory and subjects became refined to a government of eighteenth century liberalism. That is, liberalism emerged to limit a state which required a knowledge of itself through a knowledge of its subjects (a need to know what is to be governed). Liberalism furnished citizens with rights (such as equality and freedom to choose) which must not be interfered with by government (Colin Gordon 1991). What Foucault would stress here is that the liberal state, in its requirement for a detailed knowledge of what it is governing (so it can govern and guarantee rights and freedoms) is in a position to grow out of all proportion and paradoxically impinge on those rights. As the strength of liberal rule depends upon its population, it must somehow not be seen to impinge upon the rights of the population, by providing some form of guarantee (ie: through rights and laws).

Liberalism as a Rationality

Reforms in education and indeed across all sectors in New Zealand can be seen as political responses to liberalism's tension between governing too little or too much (Rose 1993). However, as I have argued, the justification for reforms of conferring greater freedom upon the subjects (see Treasury 1984, 1987, 1990) is rooted in a repressive conception of power, regarding freedom, on the one hand as a matter for the removal of constraints and, on the other hand, as a particular "culture" to be instilled in the individual. What I want to argue is that while a liberal explanation for reforms does account for the increasing individualisation of our society, it does so on a spurious basis of freedom, and fails to account for the rationalisation of society and its tendency to become totalising in its effects.

Liberalism is a political rationality concerned with the "art of government" (Foucault 1979). That is, liberalism is more than a philosophy, ideology or theory of rule; it is a "rationality of rule" (Rose 1993) because it also specifies actual techniques for governing. A number of critics linked the education reforms with a form of liberal ideology (Grace 1990, Bates 1990, McCulloch 1988, Peters and Marshall 1990b, Apple 1988) and it would appear that they risk falling into the trap which Foucault warns us of: implying a masked flipside - the truth - to an ideology. Foucault was not saying that there was nothing that was true or no truth at all, just that there could not be one truth in an absolute sense. In spite of Foucault's objection to ideology (see chapter two), the sense in which many of these critics use the concept of ideology is close to Foucault's idea of "discursive formations or truth effects (Foucault 1977b). In other words, there is a recognition of ideology as productive, as being a set of practices or structures which make meaning (McLaren 1989). What these critics have tried to do is describe a shift as ideological because they assess it as deliberate and studied - an "ideological manoeuvre" (Grace 1989). However, they go further than identifying it as deliberate; they attribute responsibility or culpability for it to an entity or to a nexus of power - Treasury, the government, the "new right", or the neo-liberal State. It should be noted however, that while Marshall (1992) does talk about government policy being "driven by" Treasury, he does not mean that Treasury's use of neo-liberal ideas generated actual policy in the sense of ideas causing events.

Certainly Foucault would agree that there is something deliberate and calculated about the reforms. However, he would not point to a specific perpetrator in the same way as these critics imply. It is more accurate in Foucauldian terms, to talk of various techniques and apparatuses linking up in their effects. To point to a specific perpetrator would be to imply that there was a cohesive force or philosophy being carried through. The reforms are cohesive to the extent that current policies can be shown (Peters and Marshall 1990b) to hark back to or take their cues from earlier forms of liberalism. However, Foucault would want to emphasise that liberalism itself is not cohesive at all. Liberalism is a way of thinking about the nature of the practice of government. It is an "intellectual machinery or apparatus for rendering reality thinkable in such a way that it is amenable to political deliberations" (Rose 1993:289). However, liberalism does not necessarily set out what particular government policies should be. It is for these reasons that liberalism cannot be considered an ideology in the classical sense, although it can be considered an "organic ideology" in the Gramscian sense (see Hall 1986).

Instruments of Liberal Rule: Family, Welfare, and School

Liberalism marked out, as separate from the public domain of the state, an unassailable private domain of civil society in order not to impinge upon its citizens. Foucault (1983) contends that while the civil society/state opposition may have quite rightly been used by economists in eighteenth century liberalism, it is an opposition that may not be operational now. What he means is that this opposition tends to present the state pejoratively, with civil society idealised "as a good, living, warm whole" (1983:168), mobilising a repressive understanding of power relations. That is, that the authoritarian state is inclined to repress or control civil society.

Alternatively, Colin Gordon (1991) proposes we not understand civil society to be what repels and contests the will of government; rather, civil society should be understood as "an instrument or correlate of a technology of government" (1991:23). That is, liberalism attempts to ensure that the conduct of individuals within civil society conforms to the conducting of the public domain. The technique that liberal rule requires to rationalise itself -that of dispersing power relations - involves the use of particular instruments which spread and link up in their functions throughout the social nexus. It is these instruments to which I shall now turn the discussion.

Foucault (1979) makes the important point that for governmentality, or more specifically that for liberalism to emerge it was necessary for the family to become not so much a model for governing (as in pastoral power or the Christian doctrine), but an instrument through which to govern. However, government does not occur through the family on its own; family has also linked up with welfare and with schooling, so that the operation of power became intensified through its continual dispersal and thorough coverage of every corner of our lives.

The former model of a sovereign family meant that the security of the state relied upon the family head being accountable for its members; an exchange of state protection for the head guaranteeing members' faithfulness to the public order (Donzelot 1979). However, with the advent of industrialisation, added pressures were brought to bear upon the family unit. With the shift of workplace from family to factory, and the growth of poverty and begging, the family was increasingly unable to contain its members to the family order and ensure their socialisation to the public order. A welfare system was set up, designed to contain these people, now constructed as a risk to the security of public order of society. Donzelot (1979) documents the philanthropy movement which sought to couple an "assistance pole" and a "medical-hygenist pole". At first, this took the form of almshouses and hospitals which sheltered those who had come to be known as beggars and vagrants. One of the major problems with the system of welfare during the eighteenth century was its propensity to produce, through creating dependency and rewarding laziness (Donzelot 1979), more of the problem it sought to correct. Increasingly the almhouses and hospitals became sites which bred a discontent and a further dependence upon the state, constituting an even greater risk to society.

What was needed was a way to make welfare provision contingent upon demonstration of potential rehabilitation into the family or some form of socialisation and containment. To this end, certain strategies such as savings schemes (Donzelot 1979) were implemented, whereby people were required to deposit a portion of their earnings into savings accounts; assistance became tied to the ability to help oneself to a certain extent. It was also tied to the "autonomisation" (Donzelot 1979) of the family; a system in which the family was "set up as both the cause of each of their problems and the privileged site of their resolution" (Bell 1993:392). In other words, the family could be held responsible for the lack of control over its members and at the same time gain an autonomy and freedom from state interference by normalising its own members.

> In one sense, the family became, through saving, a point of support for reabsorbing individuals for whom it had been inclined to relinquish responsibility, calling upon the state instead as the agency politically responsible for their subsistence and well-being. In another sense, through a consideration of the complaints of individuals against its arbitrariness, the family became a target; by taking account of their complaints, they could be made agents for conveying the norms of the state into the private sphere
> (Donzelot 1979:58).

As Foucault argued in "The Politics of Health" (1977d) and in *The History of Sexuality (1980)*, the family during the eighteenth century, becomes more than a system of kinship and property organisation; it becomes an environment where child and parent can be continuously monitored and developed in a system of norms. The family becomes the primary unit of socialisation, indispensable to liberal rule.

Formal institutionalised schooling became established in the late eighteenth century and became another pivotal site of rehabilitation. Schooling was linked to the family, performing, on the one hand, a social control function for the working classes, managing both children in danger and children who were in themselves a danger to society (Donzelot 1979). On the other hand, school also used a mechanism of enticement (Donzelot 1979) such as a development of the child for the middle classes; for them social control was linked to tutelage and psychiatry.

Neo-Liberal Autonomisation: Linking Instruments Through the Market

I want to argue now that the education reforms are a good example of the intensification of the use of the same instruments of governance, except that the instruments of family, welfare and school are linked together by and constituted with reference to the market. The market emerges as both an instrument of rule and a model for rule here. Whereas the family's role as a model is succeeded by a role as an instrument, the market is required to fulfil both of these roles. This is because freedom of choice is activated through the market, as well as because the market itself is presented as the best way for us to optimise and realise our life chances. Governing, then, can be rationalised through the concept of the free market (Burchell 1993) and it must be continually reformulated with reference to the market so that people's choices function to benefit the state.

School was, for the middle classes since the eighteenth century, presented to all social classes as educative and a key to social and individual betterment (McCulloch 1990). However, a number of critics have challenged this conventional understanding of schooling on the grounds of schooling serving to increase rationalisation and totalisation of society or simply does not educate (see Freire 1972, Illich 1973 and Harris 1979). Illich (1973) argues that school is symptomatic of an institutionalised society which also employs a host of teachers and therapists to deal with constructed categories of childhood and deviancy. Illich charges that "Everywhere not only education but society as a whole needs `deschooling'" (1973:10). Freire (1972) also challenges the notion of schooling as educative, maintaining that school's version of education through a teacher/student contradiction is little more than "banking education". As such it is "dehumanising" and should be replaced with a liberating system of "dialogue" and "problem-posing education" which recognises the potential of "man" (sic) as human. Yet Freire, a neo-Marxist (as are others such as Harris 1979) with similar criticisms that school does not educate), believes that certain forms of schooling are emancipatory, replacing ideology with truth.

Criticisms which focus on ideology as opposed to truth, or on humanist-based solutions are not Foucault's concern, although he too challenges the notion of schooling as educative. Foucault posits school as an example of the localisation of discipline (1977a). Schooling disciplines in that it is about control, improvment, ranking and normalisation. Foucault says, "Is it any wonder that prisons resemble factories, schools, barracks, hospitals, which all resemble prisons?" (1977a:228). The implication is that while prisons are an obvious site of incarceration, their techniques and practices are spread throughout a society that is becoming in itself more carceral. However, Foucault would argue that the kinds of solutions offered by such critics as Freire constitute a manipulation of the child, based upon notions of human nature which are fictitious. Foucault would want to argue that school, like notions of sexuality, helps to constitute an identity or self which is continuously corrected and developed so that we achieve autonomy. This autonomy is, for Foucault, inherently false insofar as it presupposes a human nature to be developed.

However, there is a continuing "autonomisation" at the heart of arguments for reductions in both education and the provision of welfare sector. Firstly, with regard to welfare, Treasury critiques of welfare (1984, 1987, 1990) argue for what is essentially a further disperal of power relations to the micro-level. The Treasury Brief to the Incoming Government of 1984, *Economic Management*, using comparisons with the economic performance of other OECD countries, listed sectors of the economy that they considered overprotected - certain industries, state monopolies in communications and energy,

public service, education and health systems, and unions. This was indicative of a system which had failed to deliver economic stability and security while also incurring a huge deficit.

> The New Zealand economy continues to display one of the most lacklustre performances among countries in the developed world...A feature of New Zealand's policy is a heavy reliance on particular forms of intervention in the economy, and a tendency to rely on specific controls rather than general policy instruments....interventions are an overhang from past policies and have ceased to promote - or have even come to undermine - the objectives they once had. For whatever the reasons they were instituted, many malfunctioning interventions are difficult to remove because they have attracted those groups who are able to organise their affairs to benefit from those interventions and who have come to see the advantages they derive from them as a right (Treasury 1984:107).

Dramatic and exhaustive reforms were advocated. Treasury stressed the importance of consistency across sectors, the intersecting nature of policies, and pointed to the danger of having some policies hinder or cancel out benefits of others. Thus the 1984 Labour Government undertook a dual grand programme of liberalisation (opening up markets to competition, lifting tariffs and other market restrictions) and commercialisation (using the private sector model to organise other economic relations, particularly in the public sector). Among the sectors to come under scrutiny was that of welfare.

It was not just a question of how welfare provision should be regulated, but a question of the whole system of qualification for benefits and classification of beneficiaries. The entire performance of welfare distribution was challenged; the ideal of equitable distribution was deemed a failure because social inequalities continued to exist and the state of the economy actually appeared to be worsening. There was also the question of "welfare mentality" or the dependence generated by comprehensive and easily obtainable welfare, seen as counter to the competitive, enterprising spirit needed for our economic recovery. To this end the 1990 Social Welfare Reform Bill introduced cuts to the unemployment and domestic purposes benefits, and established stand-down periods. Healthcare charges were introduced in hospitals, prescription charges trebled, and doctors' visit subsidies were cut. Income tests were introduced for national superannuation. There were changes to rules governing eligibility for State Housing as well as the institution of market-value rentals.

Just as accountability and efficiency were lauded across the public service and government agency sector, so too would the individual need to take seriously their responsibility to be self-managing.

In this sense, we can understand welfare as an instrument of government. The practices for rule that liberalism specifies are based on a knowledge of human activity. Welfare organisations are notable in that they provide a site for the gathering of this information (see Foucault 1980, 1982c). There is a case to be made then that welfare is not in "crisis" because it has failed, as some education critiques have suggested (see Treasury 1987, 1990, Easton 1989, Codd 1990, Kelsey 1993). On the contrary, welfare has been very successful in gathering information by specifying our individuation and normalising those it objectified. Where liberalism and capitalism were perceived to be having the unintended effect of social breakdown, welfare emerged to check this and guarantee a collective security (Rose 1993).
The welfare "crisis" has perhaps more to do with the idea that "Political rule was given the task of shaping and nurturing those domains that were to provide its counterweight and limit" (Rose 1993:290). Increasingly though, welfare became too bound up with bureaucracy and government itself; it became totalising. Through the emphasis on freedom of choice which underpins the cutbacks in welfare provision, the State is now seen to be <u>restoring</u> rights to the family and encouraging their autonomy. That welfare is presented as encroaching upon family is still an argument which opposes civil society to the state, and is actually part of the successful operation of disciplinary power.

State reduction of welfare provision is also linked to a reduction of the compulsory aspect of schooling. Schooling was compulsory when first established in order to facilitate access to knowledge or self-improvement and also to provide a form of social control (see Jones et al 1990). It may at first seem curious that policies of education reform in New Zealand are predisposed toward an increase in the actual provision of schooling as the same time as there is a decrease in the enforcement of attendance. On the one hand there is evidence that schooling has been extended out either end of its more traditional boundaries - from Parents as First Teachers at pre-school level to Skill New Zealand and the Seamless Education System at tertiary level and beyond to employment. On the other hand, teachers are not required to be registered (1991 Education Amendment Act (s.3[1]), suggesting that teacher training may be nonessential. There is also an option for groups of parents to start up their own schools (see Tomorrow's Schools 1988), and attendance is no longer monitored nationally by an Education Department and Truancy Officers. Rather than see this as a confusion between policies and effects, we might understand this as indicative of a further autonomisation of the family insofar as the success of these policies requires the combined normalising influence of the family and school.

The link between family, school, and governing is now maintained through the identification of the "at risk" child; this includes the child who truants from school and is thereby under-skilled for work/life. As Foucault showed in *Discipline and Punish (1977a)*, knowledge must be gathered about the offender in order to correct and train the offender. The disciplinary side of governmentality introduced a system of norms; the family ceased to operate in terms of sovereign power and instead operated to normalise its own members. It did this through a reversal of the situation where the more power or privilege one holds, the greater the visibility and individualisation of that person (Foucault 1977a). The establishment of norms means that "the child is more individualised than the adult, the patient more so than the healthy man, the madman and the delinquent more than the normal and the non-delinquent" (1977a:193).

In terms of the "at risk" child or truant, they can be "seen as either deviant or potentially criminal, rather than victims of an inadequate education system" (Gordon 1992b:297). The current emphasis on prevention of further deviancy occurs through an early identification and categorisation of this deviancy. To this end, classification strategies (of behavioural characteristics) with teachers to be at the frontline of monitoring and surveillance are established (see the School Trustees Association 1994 *Taskforce on Truancy, Suspensions and Expulsions draft report)*. The family and also boards of Trustees, the School Trustees Association and the community at large are called upon to normalise offenders through an escalating designation of their individuality.

> If Foucault's insights are valid, liberalism's flaw is not that it has been inefficacious in pressing its agenda on behalf of individuals against modern tendencies that repress individuality and obstruct its potential, but that its rhetoric and its practices are themselves tragically and completely implicated in the burdensome network in which we find ourselves (Gruber 1989:615).

Through this reconstruction of truancy and underskilling as a problem of family breakdown, the government relieves itself of governing insofar as the family is required to discipline its own members according to norms in order to avoid state intervention by way of police, courts, and Children and Young Persons' advocates. In this way, the family becomes "a social machine - both made social and utilised to create sociality..." (Rose 1993:293).

Education programmes such as Parents As First Teachers (see Pihama 1993 for a critique of this programme) also work to maintain and link the instruments of family and school. This works in terms of an extension of the domain of schooling (from Parents as First Teachers through to Skill New Zealand), which must be supported by the family. It also works by way of encouraging parents to fulfill their natural duties through a principle of choice (Bell 1993). Certain choices become established as normal and are regulated in relation to another instrument - the marketplace. An example of this is the

encouragement to save supermarket receipts and pass them on to our local school, as part of a competition for computers (see competitions such as "Apples for the Students" run by Apple MacIntosh). Telecom has run similar campaign since 1992 called "The School Connection Programme" under the arm of the Telecom Education Foundation. This entails individual consumers nominating a school of their choice to receive 5% of what that household spends on toll calls as a donation from Telecom. We are not only acting as consumers of education here, but actively constituting ourselves as free and autonomous, both as individuals and as members of a family unit.

Another good example of choice as a norm is school (de)zoning. McCulloch (1990) examines the history of this in New Zealand. Most interestingly, he points out that zoning has been a contentious issue since it began to be introduced in the 1920s, despite popular opinion seeing it as a recent issue associated with the "New Right" governments of 1987 and 1990. However, it was Treasury's (1987) argument which specifically mentioned parents being unable to choose the best school for their children which led to the move to dezone secondary schools under the 1989 Education Act and the 1990 Education Amendment Act. This argument also included the idea that parents would choose a "good" school for their children, thus the idea of contestability between schools and accountability to the family (and community) was also established.

McCulloch traces through a history that shows arguments both for and against zoning have been based on notions of freedom and equality. His analysis of a Department of Education (1989) survey of secondary school enrolment numbers over four years, combined with figures on enrolments and zones since the 1989 Education Act from schools throughout New Zealand shows a marked decline in numbers for some schools, and a marked increase for others. Paradoxically, some of the more established schools, such as Auckland Boys Grammar, who have historically railed against zoning on the grounds of it inhibiting freedom now have a protected "home zone". This is justified in terms of stemming a tide of "out of zone" applications for the popularly-recognised "good school". Newer schools serving more working class areas are "left to compete for pupils in the open marketplace" (1990:160). Thus, the emphasis on freedom, equality and parental choice, which has been a justification for dezoning, has been extended to include justification in terms of the competitive free market; the market being more efficient because it is competitive and therefore capable of delivering a higher quality of education to the family consumer unit.

With the family and the market, the government ensures that relations between consumers (parents, communities) and providers (teachers, Boards of Trustees) are regulated. It is no longer government, but the notion of consumer choice which mediates between the competing claims of educational experts and institutions.

The "Effectiveness of the Instruments" of Liberal Rule

Prior to this chapter, I examined the link between power relations and rationalisation in terms of the objectification and discipline of providers and consumers of education (chapter four). I have also examined this link in terms of the active transformation of ourselves through "training culture" (ETSA and NZQA 1994) into freely choosing individuals (chapter five). In this chapter I investigated the link between power relations and rationalisation in terms of our recognition and constitution of ourselves as a society through specific governmental practices. That is, what I want to show is how we constitute ourselves as a particular society, or as part of a nation or state through particular "political technologies" (Foucault 1982c). Foucault posed the problem in these terms:

> Which kind of political techniques, which technology of government, has been put to work and used and developed in the general framework of reason of state in order to make of the individual a significant element for the state? What I am looking for...are the techniques, the practices, which give a concrete form to this new political rationality

> and to this new kind of relationship between the social entity and the individual (Foucault 1982c:153).

The assemblage of "political techniques" cross the "technological threshold" (Foucault 1977a:224) as the various disciplinary techniques and subjectifying practices spread and link up throughout society. They become political technologies and are expressed through "the effectiveness of the instruments" (Foucault 1982a:224). Since liberalism's task, more so today than ever, is to "govern without governing" (Rose 1993), a detachment of government from these instruments is crucial to rationalising government.

Liberalism has often been presented as developing in opposition to feudal rule based on ascription (see Hall 1986). The emphasis is on one of its central tenets, that of individualism. Equal rights, regardless of the circumstances (place or parents) of birth were attributed to each and every person the moment they were born. Thus liberalism can be seen as succeeding (and improving upon) a monarchical or feudal system. However Foucault (1980) has argued that both the monarchical system and legal system based on rights are rooted in a sovereign conception of power relations. That is, they take power to be repressive and opposed to truth (and freedom).

Essentially, reforms across all sectors of the economy and society have been premised on the ideas that economic well-being is determined by efficiency through competition and consumer choice. Individual freedom of choice is both a condition for and a spin-off of these measures instituted by governments in New Zealand since 1987. They are presented as economic (efficiency, fiscal imperatives) but are also political (mentality issues). In the light of these measures of autonomy and choice, so integral to reforms, it becomes difficult to sustain critiques on the grounds of an <u>increase</u> in state domination and an actual <u>loss</u> of freedom.

As Colin Gordon puts it:

> The formulae of politics have changed. The phobic representation of a potentially totalitarian state, which is at the same time made the addressee of unlimited social demands, loses its credibility. Government itself assumes the discourse of critique, challenging the rigidities and privileges of a blocked society. Promises of expanded individual autonomy and responsibility become electoral necessities (Colin Gordon 1991:46).

What is significant is that the practices which should realise these promises of expanded autonomy tend to presuppose categories of individuality which must be normalised. What Foucault argues is that this emphasis on laws, rights and resulting freedom actually masks the productive workings on power. As Vikki Bell (1993) argues, "the family is caught in a position whereby it cannot recapture the sovereign power that once opereated there, but neither can its members renounce the `last vestige of identity' to the temptations of a life without it" (1993:392).

The liberal State then, developed as totalising precisely <u>because</u> it was also individualising in its practices of government. It did not develop "above" individuals (Foucault 1982a); individuality was crucial to liberalism but it was to be developed and regulated in certain ways.

> ...there is no necessarily adequate or perfect fit between the <u>form</u> of problematisation characteristic of early liberalism, and the assemblage of governmental techniques and practices which construct the shape eventually taken by a <u>real</u> liberal art of government (Burchell 1993:273).

Foucault understood governing as the structuring of the field of possible actions of others (1982a). Governmentality has a dual purpose - to have us think about ourselves in a particular way, act upon ourselves (and the actions of others), and to have us rendered docile and able to be controlled politically. Here, governmentality or liberal rule is "elaborate" in relation to "the effectiveness of the instruments". Its peculiar disposition "as a form of knowledge calculated to limit power by persuading government of its own incapacity..." (Colin Gordon 1991:46) means that it requires a continual dispersal of its rule. In this case, effectiveness is achieved through a dispersal to the market - as both an instrument of and a principle for governing. It is both a way to rule people and a rationale for ruling them. Thus, governmentality means that liberal society is increasingly rationalised in order to cope with the tension between governing too little and governing too much Rose 1993). This rationalisation becomes "elaborate" to the degree that it is the market which becomes the model for governing. The increasing specification of us as individuals who take responsibility for and police ourselves within the market are not incidental to, but necessary for liberal rule. What liberalism does is economise "on its own costs: a greater effort of technique aimed at accomplishing more through a lesser exertion of force and authority" (Colin Gordon 1991:24). Ultimately, the "effectiveness of the instruments" means that:

> ...individuals may alter their relationship to themselves in their new relationship with government, without it being clear that the outcomes which are supposed to justify this rationality of government are in fact being achieved...[Liberalism] constructs a relationship between government and governed which increasingly depends upon ways in which individuals are required to assume the status of being the subjects in their lives...(Burchell 1993:276).

CHAPTER SEVEN: CONCLUSION

> A critique is not a matter of saying that things are not right as they are. It is a matter of pointing out on what kinds of assumptions, what kinds of familiar, unchallenged, unconsidered modes of thought the practices that we accept rest... (Foucault 1981:154).

In this thesis, I have not been concerned to explain what is right or not right with the reforms in education. That is, I have refrained from engaging in a problem-solving exercise. I have not proposed alternatives to the reforms, but instead have been concerned to re-evaluate understandings of education reforms since 1987 in New Zealand. I argue that a re-evaluation has been necessary because neo-liberal justifications for reform, as well as many critiques of the reforms and their justifications, tend ultimately to remain within a framework which paradoxically reinforces that which it seeks to change. Totalising control depends on producing greater specifications of individuality. For, as I have argued in the previous chapter, the reforms are aimed ostensibly at reducing totalising practices in education via a freeing of the individual. However the individual of the education reforms is a product of certain practices and techniques. While the reforms purport to be freeing the individual by providing choices and self-management, they instead make the individual more governable.

This thesis has operated at the level of critique by problematising the practices of the reforms. This has been a two-tiered process. Initially, I argued that explanations and justifications for the reforms, and critiques of these reforms, fall into what Foucault called the repressive hypothesis or juridico-discursive model of power relations, which mask the productive practices of power. In other words, many of the explanations and critiques position themselves in opposition to power and offer ways of overcoming it that are supposedly free from the effects of power.

To this end, in chapters two and three I differentiated Foucault's thought from that of Critical Theory-based thought. The latter tends to understand power as what Foucault terms sovereign power and which he claims masks the real workings of power in our society. I argued that alternatively, Foucault's conception of power/knowledge and disciplinary power bypasses traditional sociological questions and

allows us to evaluate power in terms of its exercise at the micro-level. I introduced an analytics of power as a way to actually do this type of analysis. This, as Foucault claims, is different from a theory of power in that a theory is a set of assumptions, ideas and claims which can be applied "down" to the micro-level. It derives principles for the analysis of power from an understanding of power as essentially repressive and articulated in the form of rights and laws. From these ideas we deduce micro-level activity. An analytics, on the other hand, starts from the micro-level in terms of what is happening and how it works.

Following this, the second tier of my analysis has provided an account of the particular form of power relations that reforms in education bring into play. In doing so, I have not analysed power per se, but rather, as Foucault (1982a) said of his project, I have analysed some of the education practices through which we are made subjects. Notwithstanding this, my analysis has not necessarily attacked that we are individuals, nor that particular institutions are inherently bad. It has been an attempt to illuminate current practices that laud a particular form of individualism and thereby make us subjects in a way that may well leave us vulnerable to domination. The focus was on a modern Western political form of power which Foucault calls governmentality. This form of power contains within it the two senses of the word "subject" - to be subject to in the sense of being controlled, and to be a subject in the sense of being tethered to an identity through self-knowledge. It can be seen throughout this thesis that we are subjects whose choices are shaped to correspond to economic objectives; subjects who objectify our capacities and aptitudes and actively seek to improve upon them; subjects whose practices tend to contradict the kind of freedom we aspire to.

I separated the concept of governmentality into its themes of objectification and subjectification, regarding it, as Foucault suggested, as a contact point (1982c) between technologies of domination and technologies of the self. In chapter four, I discussed technologies of domination, in particular, disciplinary technology, to talk about differentiation as crucial to the establishment of objects. To do this, I examined the practices of two institutions - the Education Review Office and the New Zealand Qualifications Authority which function as Panopticans. Sited within these institutions are techniques of continuous surveillance, measurement, and standardisation which highlight the activities of teachers, making possible their discipline (in both senses of the term).

Techniques of differentiation, instituted through norms invested as laws, create new boundaries between teachers as a group. Principles and teachers have previously had separate responsibilities, but now we are also seeing the definition of new roles through which teachers and principles constitute themselves as objects. As the practices insert themselves at the micro-level, teachers take on the job of their own surveillance. The practices of surveillance, measurement and standardisation of the Education Review Office replace the "status and privilege" (Foucault 1982a:223) of teachers with a normality that teachers also seek to impose over others such as students. The New Zealand Qualifications Authority's practices of "standards-based assessment" and "modular learning" act to create discrete units of knowledge. It also collapses boundaries between academic and vocational forms of knowledge, so that the former is subsumed under the latter (see the unit standards for cleaners, which include sweeping streets and cleaning schoolrooms as a good example of this - see The Dominion 11 October 1994). Differentiation, then, is part of a form of power that individualises us as objects through a demarcation of boundaries, a detection and selection of people and their roles, while at the same time it creates the conditions for homogenising us.

In the next chapter I examined our objectives in terms of technologies of the self. I argued that our objectives, according to the education reforms, are to act upon ourselves in order to transform ourselves into highly skilled, flexible, and enterprising individuals. Not only do these objectives correspond to New Zealand's needs in terms of an economic recovery but, also, it is claimed that they lead to greater individual freedom. I claimed that the education reforms shared with reforms of other sectors, a theme of anti-dependency, linked to our poor economic performance. Hence, reforms associated themselves with a form of enterprise culture. Enterprise is also understood as industry and a link between industry and

schools is emphasised by the New Zealand Qualifications Authority and the Education and Training Support Agency through the Skill New Zealand strategy. These two senses of enterprise echo the idea that both New Zealand's economic recovery and the success of the reforms depend upon us as individuals taking up positions for ourselves where we can exercise a freedom which is unavailable to us within a heavily bureaucratised welfare state. Finally, I argued that the kind of freedom we practice under the education reforms requires that we ourselves become the enterprise in the "culture of enterprise".

In the final chapter, I showed how we recognise and constitute ourselves as a society, or as part of a nation or state through "political technologies" (Foucault 1982c); that is, we are able to see ourselves as a society of free individuals through specific governmental practices. The "tricky combination" of individualising and totalising techniques in governmental power can be seen clearly in the political rationality of liberalism, which requires that the State have a knowledge of its subjects (who also have a knowledge of themselves) in order to consolidate a totalising power for itself. I placed this understanding of liberalism in contrast to Treasury (1984, 1987, 1990) claims about conferring greater freedom upon subjects. The argument of Treasury regards freedom, on the one hand as a matter for the removal of constraints and, on the other hand, as a particular "culture" to be instilled in the individual. What we have is in fact a dispersal of power relations which intensify as they disperse, becoming lodged in the places that the law leaves empty (Foucault 1977a). Since liberalism's task, more so today than ever, is to govern without governing (Rose 1993), a detachment of government from these instruments is crucial to rationalising government. I focused on the family, school and the market as instruments which establish norms and constitute the experiences of members in a form concomitant with those norms.

The composition of these chapters has served to give us another basis from which to evaluate the reforms. In this thesis I have not attempted to provide a "way out", but have wanted to show that we only accept certain practices (eg: the necessity for upskilling) because we accept as self-evident the assumptions upon which they are predicated. In the second half of my conclusion then, I wish to address the implications of my arguments by addressing the possible limitations of the form of critique that this thesis has presented.

Removing the Grounds for Political Action? Implications for Social Change

> ...as soon as one can no longer think things as one formerly thought them, transformation becomes both very urgent, very difficult, and quite possible (Foucault 1981:154).

Carrying out a Foucauldian analysis of the reforms has meant that I have not been able to think things as I formerly thought them. All of my former assumptions about how power operated contained within them modes of resistance to power and programmes for emancipatory social change. I found it difficult at first to let go of these assumptions, not seeing how transformation could be possible without notions of resisting power such as within a Critical Theory framework. This difficulty in itself is a reflection of my embeddedness in a mode of thought that pits truth and liberation against power and domination.

Foucault's account has allowed me to argue that, despite their claims to the contrary, the education reforms do not provide or secure the conditions for our freedom. However, the question remains: what forms of freedom are available to us? I would like to address the issue of how Foucault's arguments make it difficult for us to talk about any simple notion of domination and liberation, for I think that at some level these are useful notions. If we discard these notions, as Foucault appears to, how can we recognise the education reforms as a form of domination and how can we successfully resist them?

In other words, I am asking what we can do with Foucault. Where was he taking us? He refused to give us firm answers or political programmes (Smart 1983, Marshall 1990, Hoy 1986, Rabinow 1984).

Instead he referred to the idea of "permanent critique" (1981, 1984d), to "problematisations" (Rabinow 1984) and a notion of freedom through a "care for the self" (Foucault 1984c). He also suggested that an "attitude of philosophical interrogation" could translate into a "labour of diverse inquiries...a patient labour giving form to our impatience for liberty" (Foucault 1984d). What did he mean by these remarks? To a large extent I think the answers to these questions, or at least the directions we might take, depend upon how we understand his rejection of humanism and also the degree to which we can consider him a political theorist.

Foucault was often regarded as annoyingly evasive on the subject of where he stood in terms of politics and social action. While many have tried to categorise him, there is much disagreement about the positions he occupies on the political spectrum (Hoy 1986, Marshall 1990, Rabinow 1984, Smart 1983) and some would argue that he appears to shift his position (Taylor 1986, Habermas 1986). However, Foucault openly enjoyed the difficulty he posed for those who have attempted to categorise him, appearing to consider their difficulty some kind of vindication of his method of critique (1984a).

While Foucault did claim an interest in politics, he never considered himself a political theorist (1981, 1984a, 1984b) and did not regard his work as political per se (1984a). That is, as he explained:

> ...the questions I am trying to ask are not determined by a preestablished political outlook and do not tend toward the realisation of some definite political project (Foucault 1984b:375).

Foucault's reluctance to indicate what we should <u>do</u> with his analyses leaves him open to charges of being "politically irresponsible" (Hoy 1986), particularly given that, as Hoy (1986) argues, it is not at all clear whether genealogy, as the tool of Foucault's critique, can actively advocate social change. That people want to place Foucault somewhere and that his work is taken seriously is not only acknowledged by his supporters but also by a number of his critics. Yet Hoy (1986) acknowledges the significance of Foucault's work. Walzer (1986) admits that although Foucault's account of our everyday politics is "often annoyingly presented and never wholly accurate...", he concedes that Foucault is "right enough to be disturbing" (1986:53). Taylor (1986) also grants that Foucault "is on to something" (1986:83) particularly with regard to his claim that we have been led to place great importance on sexual desire, sexual fulfillment, and the expression of a true nature in our society. Fraser (1985) is sceptical of the potential for success with Foucault's line of criticism, but nonetheless defends Foucault against Habermas' charge that Foucault is a "Young Conservative" who is "politically suspect". Sawicki (1991) seems to come closest to Foucault's intended meaning when she argues that "to the extent to which he [Foucault] develops a politics, it was a politics of uncertainty" (1991:103).

Where Sawicki (1991) is optimistic about possibilities for resisting domination within a "politics of uncertainty", a number of other feminists working within a post-structuralist framework hesistate (see Nicholson 1990, Bordo 1992, Benhabib 1990, Harding 1990). Notwithstanding the significance of Foucault's work, Hartsock (1990) points out that it is significant that a postmodern rejection of humanism is occuring at a time when various minority or disempowered groups are beginning to be heard and use humanist categories in their struggles.

Many feminists have expressed an ambivalence towards Foucault on the grounds that his web-like notion of power makes domination disappear and arguments about unequal power relations difficult to sustain (see Nicholson 1990, Hartsock 1990, Bordo 1992, Benhabib 1990, Harding 1990). If everyone is enmeshed in power relations, then how can women (or <u>any</u> "oppressed" groups) position themselves in relation to a centre from which to make truth claims about their subordination?

Walzer (1986) takes this lack of a centre for power as a misjudgment by Foucault of the significance of the State.

> ...it is the state that establishes the general framework within which all other disciplinary institutions operate. It is the same state that holds open or radically shuts down the possibility of local resistance... Every act of local resistance is an appeal for political or legal intervention fromthe centre (Walzer 1986:66).

In terms of the education reforms, we need to determine the ways in which it is (and is not) useful for us to identify the instigators of and principal movers of policy, and to identify those who are advantaged and those who are disadvantaged by them in various ways.

Notwithstanding Foucault's idea that power is everywhere and that nobody owns it, it does follow that everybody has power or that relations are therefore quite equal. Foucault's point was that we are neither completely dominated nor completely free, but that we are constituted through a complex interplay of techniques. Since power is unowned, we can no longer talk about relationships between government and governed, men and women, Maori and Pakeha as being the same kinds of relationships for all government and all governed. That is, "subordinate" or "oppressed" groups do not experience domination in any homogeneous way and therefore their resistance will be motivated by different factors. As Foucault mentions, anti-authority struggles will tend to criticise the instances of power which are closest to them (Foucault 1982a:211).

For example, in this thesis I have talked about how "we" are not really offered freedom through the reforms. Yet, I have not taken into account how some of "us" might find, within notions of choice proferred by the reforms, a form of empowerment, depending upon the interplay of the various social positions (ie: social class) available to us. We therefore cannot simply rely on unification in order to resist power where it becomes domination.

Foucault's portrayal of power relations as unowned and without a centre came in response to what he saw as marxism's failure to explain modern society's structures of domination adequately (Balibar 1993, Poster 1993). Although Foucault may accept marxism as a form of critique (see Smart 1986), he sees it as rooted in, rather than distinct from, humanist thought. In Fraser's (1985) eyes, Foucault's rejection of humanism was one of his most important contentions:

> Foucault has shown that one does not need humanism in order to criticise prisons, social science, pseudoprograms for sexual liberation, and the like. That humanism is not the last word in critical social and historical writing (Fraser 1985:171).

Nonetheless, Habermas (1981 in Fraser 1985) alleges that Foucault rejects modernity (and humanism) yet presupposes the very categories he rejects in order to make his rejection. That is, Foucault can be understood as rejecting humanist notions of freedom and truth from a standpoint that presupposes some kind of a freedom and a truth, suggesting that Foucault may possibly have some kind of notion of "progress". However, Foucault (1984d) does distinguish between modernity as a period of history and modernity as an attitude or ethos. Foucault suggests we might preserve the attitude or philosophical interrogation of the Enlightenment, if not its humanist projects (1984d). That is, that the Enlightenment did problematise our relationship to the present, our historical mode of being, and the constitution of the self as an autonomous subject (198b:43). Accordingly, Fraser (1985) argues that Foucault may only be rejecting the humanist component of modernity. Certainly, Foucault (1984d) did voice concern over the conflation of the Enlightenment as an event with Enlightenment-related humanism which is tied to value judgements.

Firstly, Fraser (1985) contends that Foucault has targetted and rejected humanism on philosophical or conceptual grounds. That is, humanism would have us believe in a distinction between subject and object, so that we may liberate ourselves by concentrating on our subject side. What Foucault

demonstrates throughout his work is that the two are bound together, generate each other, and that the appearance and development of the subject is part of our domination. In terms of the education reforms, there is a sense in which the reforms require us to see skills strategies as a way to improve not only our life chances but also our sense of self. Through skills strategies we can position ourselves as instigators of our own personal growth and employability rather than subjected to an imposition by educators and employers.

Secondly, and building upon the philosophical rejection, is what Fraser (1985) terms a strategic rejection of humanism. That is, while humanism is supposed to oppose forms of domination in a sovereign regime of power, it replaces these forms of domination with a more insidious form of domination - disciplinary and subjectifying practices. The replacement practices such as those associated with the human sciences (eg: psychiatry) contribute to a new form of domination. These new practices invite us to continue to understand domination as oppressive, creating a need for increased categorisation and treatment, through which we can become liberated. The complicity of practices with the problems it seeks to correct means that the strategy of humanism as an emancipatory force is fundamentally flawed.

Similarly, Foucault's possible rejection of humanism on normative grounds (Fraser 1985) signals that autonomy is inherently unacceptable because autonomy is in itself a form of domination. For example, it has been a basic premise of modern schooling to romote and develop forms of rational and personal autonomy through its pedagogical and curricular practices (see educational philosophers such as Dewey 1938, Freire 1972, Barrow 1975, Peters 1966). Such notions of autonomy presuppose an "autos" (or self) which develops to accept to "nomos" (or universal laws) so that to be a self governing in accordance with universal laws is to be free (Marshall 1994a). This autonomy is part of our human nature and it is therefore imperative that we develop it. Therefore, in the case of schooling, children are encouraged to take part in events or activities (eg: sport, art, writing) for which they are "rewarded" - at first with certificates of merit and the like, later a personal satisfaction or feeling of achievement is reward enough.

However, for Foucault, autonomy is false insofar as we have no human nature and any autos is a construction through which we in turn constitute our desires and acceptance of certain laws. We can see that autonomy is a premise of the current reforms of education, albeit in a slightly different form from that explained above. As I have argued in chapter five, following Burchell (1993) and Colin Gordon (1991), current versions of liberalism (ie: neo-liberalism) rely less on a development of an existing human nature and instead posit the (re)construction of an "autonomous chooser" (Marshall 1994b) that will exercise his/her autonomous nature in accordance with the free market. Foucault's normative rejection of humanism leads us to question the extent to which the education reforms can, through enterprise culture, successfully bring about an individual autonomy which is concomittant with freedom. Foucault's rejection of humanist autonomy provides us with grounds to reject notions of freedom of choice, which are both implied and posited explicitly and throughout education policy documents, as having little to do with freedom and everything to do with becoming governable.

These rejections suggest, as Habermas has, that Foucault may have implicit standards of freedom and truth. That is, for Foucault to argue that humanist autonomy is <u>not</u> freedom suggests that he has some idea of what freedom really is, against which he judges the practices which fail to provide freedom and mask their real workings. Walzer (1986) has similar concerns with Foucault's position because Foucault would have us abandon many of the norms of our society, yet does not tell us what to replace them with, suggesting that he himself presupposes them. Walzer's (1986) attack on Foucault is a stinging one, revolving around a contention that Foucault is "simply incoherent" (1986:65) because of a refusal to distinguish between, for example, carceral society (such as in *Discipline and Punish (1977a)* with disciplinary technologies) and actual incarceration. On this point, Walzer argues, Foucault leaves us in an impossible position.

Like Walzer (1986), Taylor (1986) contends that Foucault is "ultimately incoherent" (1986:83) because he fails to recognise that the disciplines (ie: human sciences) can function not only as structures of domination but also as bases for equal collective action; disciplines can function both for and against despotic control and they can also slide from one to the other over time. These sorts of distinctions need to be made and are, for Walzer and Taylor, critical to what we each require to be able to live in our society, and to know when power is being misused (and therefore, when to resist it). In addition to Walzer (1986) and Habermas (1981 in Fraser 1985), Taylor (1986) argues that within Foucault's notion of "power" are notions of "truth" and "freedom". Taylor (1986) contends that "To speak of power, and to want to deny a place to `liberation' and `truth', as well as the link between them, is to speak incoherently" (Taylor 1986:93).

Fraser (1985) too contends that while Foucault's first two rejections of humanism are sustainable, he may be "unable to account for or justify the sorts of normative political judgements he makes all the time - for example, `discipline' is a bad thing" (1985:172). That is, Foucault cannot tell us why we should oppose a fully panopticised autonomous society. In other words, as Walzer (1986) argues, one cannot resist "with reason unless one inhabits some social setting and adopts, however tentatively and critically, its codes and categories" (1986:67). He and Taylor argue that Foucault gives us no place to stand from which to make these judgements, and does not "give us any way of knowing what `better' might mean" (Walzer 1986:61).

The Work of Permanent Critique

Throughout this thesis, I have taken pains to show the differences between the work of critical theorists and the work of Foucault. However, Smart (1983) identifies a similarity between the critical theorists and Foucault in their commitment to critique as an activity which challenges. In this sense of critique, Foucault is not required to conclude that certain things must be done or to lay out certain programmes for us to undertake. While I do not consider the criticisms of Foucault as discussed above to be without grounds, it is my belief that we should not be focussing our analyses on solving the question of whether or not Foucault "owes" us any specific programmes for action. Given that Foucault did not consider himself a political theorist, and that he had a preference for partial transformations over programmes for new political systems (Foucault 1984d), I would argue that it is not a question of whether or not Foucault can provide the one best theory or answer, but a question of asking: <u>in what ways</u> does Foucault provide us with a useful framework for understanding (and possibly for resisting) the education reforms?

My aim throughout this thesis has been to problematise the education reforms and their justifications in order to highlight that our choices and what we come to know as freedom is a significantly regulated version of it. Following Foucault, I have attempted to show that our freedom is not simply achieved through an apparent reduction of State activity or an increase in individual rights and choices. This nonetheless leaves us in the predicament of wondering what our freedom is to be. Foucault does not tell us explicitly, or as Marshall (1990) has argued, Foucault's concept of freedom is one which he was never to articulate fully. His last work on the care for the self (1984c) was possibly moving toward a fuller explanation, and does give us some indications of what freedom might be and where we might look.

Firstly, within Foucault's conception of power relations is a certain notion of freedom. There can be no society without power relations and no power relations without the pre-existence of freedom. This may not be so far from Taylor's (1986) argument that Foucault presupposes a notion of freedom and a notion of truth within his notion of power. As this thesis has shown, the education reforms are predicated upon a belief that we are freely-choosing, self-managing subjects. In fact, the reforms only work to the degree that we take up these subject positions.

Contrary to a repressive conception of power relations, Foucault is not arguing for a contradiction between freedom and power. Instead, he argues for a "strategic reversibility" of power relations (1982a),

saying that "...if there are relations of power throughout every social field it is because there is freedom everywhere" (Foucault 1984c:13). This means that it is not simply the case that the removal of power relations leads to the realisation of freedom, for society is made up of power relations. This reading allows us to see that Foucault is not, as some commentators (Merquior 1985, Walzer 1986) have claimed, nihilistic or anti-society.

This "strategic reversibility" is related to Foucault's last work on the care for the self (1984c) where he insists upon the practices of liberty over the processes of liberty. For example, an act of emancipation (processes) would not in itself be enough to establish the means (practices) by which a free society could be maintained. This suggests that we must establish practices which are ongoing, rather than look for a final solution or theory. This is consistent with Foucault's idea of critique as a philosophical ethos, characterised by a "limit-attitude" (Foucault 1984d). It is a way of thinking which can transform critique from a search for universal structures or values into "a historical investigation into the events that have led us to constitute ourselves and to recognise ourselves as subjects of what we are doing, thinking, saying" (Foucault 1984d:46). In this sense, Foucault did presuppose a critical subject, capable not of controlling history, but of choosing between discourses and reflecting critically (Sawicki 1991).

The idea of practicing our freedom leads us to a consideration of ways in which we might "re-invent" ourselves. Foucault shows us that the formulation of our identity was bound up with practices that mask themselves with rights and liberties. We have no core identity, but rather are produced through a number of different power relationships. For example, in the case of the education reforms I have shown that discourses of self-management and upskilling make it possible for us to understand enterprise culture as self-evident and therefore to understand ourselves as an enterprise. In order to resist the reforms, we need to recognise how we are made subjects and that we do not exist outside of certain discourses.

A freedom through self-invention (Sawicki 1991, Hacking 1986, Foucault 1984c) depends upon our ability to transform our relationship to history, rather than attempting to control the direction it takes (Sawicki 1991). To uncover what this could mean for us, we would need to undertake more genealogies which would expose more practices through which we constitute and come to understand ourselves (for example, Marshall 1990 suggests the Birth of the School).

Like Sawicki (1991), I do not understand Foucault to be shutting down opportunities for us; Foucault understood his task to be to opening up problems "that are as concrete and general as possible, problems that approach politics from behind and cut across societies on the diagonal, problems that are at once constituents of our history and constituted by that history" (Foucault 1984b:376). This suggests he sees more spaces for forms of resistance than we are currently able to identify. On the subject of what we should or could do then, Foucault is not saying that anything goes and that there can be no truth claims; rather, he is arguing against a universal or absolute truth. This does not mean that Foucault invalidates other kinds of analysis or struggles which do appeal to a centre or locus of power relations. As Sawicki (1991) argues, "appeals to rights, liberties, and justice (and struggles over how to interpret these principles) are not denied to us. These are the only sort of appeals that make sense to us right now" (1991:101). Therefore it may not be useful to completely abandon the critiques of the education reforms, that I have criticised in this thesis, for the terms within which they speak are the ones we must use to participate in the formal discourses of education policy. Nonetheless, Foucault's notion of permanent critique means that we should always be aware of the possibilities and limitations of our forms of critique. Finally, Foucault (1984d) suggests we give up hope of ever finding a complete and definitive knowledge of our historical limits, and understand ourselves as being in the position of always beginning again.

> It is therefore not a question of there being a time for criticism and a time for transformation, nor people who do the criticism and others who do the transforming, those who are enclosed in an inaccessible radicalism and those who are forced to make

> the necessary concessions to reality. In fact I think the work of deep transformation can only be carried out in a free atmosphere, one constantly agitated by a permanent criticism (Foucault 1981:155).

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