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POLITICAL PARTICIPATION OF “ASIAN” NEW ZEALANDERS: A CASE STUDY OF ETHNIC CHINESE AND KOREAN NEW ZEALANDERS

SHEE-JEONG PARK

A thesis submitted in fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Political Studies

The University of Auckland
October 2006
Politics is a numbers game. Having sufficient numbers is a prerequisite for any ethnic minority group to have political influence in a host country. But numbers are only a prerequisite – numbers do not automatically increase the group’s political power. Individual members of the group need to have sufficient resources, interest, knowledge, and the confidence to participate in politics in order for the group to transform its numbers into political power. Having strong ethnic communities and political parties that actively seek out minority voters can also facilitate this process by encouraging ethnic minority groups to participate in politics. But even with the right combination of these individual and community factors, without a liberal institutional structure which facilitates political participation, it would be difficult for any minority group to have adequate political representation in a host country. A study on the political participation of Asian New Zealanders proves that understanding ethnic minority groups’ political participation is a complex yet interesting issue, which challenges various aspects of traditional theories on political participation.

This thesis is a first in many ways. The thesis introduces Asians for the first time into the literature that seeks to explain what factors influence the political participation of people living in New Zealand. The thesis also introduces Asian New Zealanders for the first time into the international literature that seeks to explain what factors influence the political participation of Asian immigrants in Western democratic countries. The findings of the survey conducted as a part of the thesis indicate that Asian New Zealanders, as the newest and most rapidly growing segment of New Zealand society, provide an important and unique insight into our understanding of political participation, and that Asian New Zealanders are set to emerge as even more important players in New Zealand politics in the coming decade.
I would like to thank my supervisors, Dr Raymond Miller and Prof Jack Vowles, whose advice and assistance have been extremely valuable in completing this thesis. Thanks also to the Department of Political Studies, the International Education and Diversity Committee of the University of Auckland, and the Asia New Zealand Foundation for providing the funding for the survey. I would also like to thank Anna Tse, Nola Yao, Brendan Tu, and Amber Chang for translating the questionnaire and responses written in Chinese. Special thanks go to Dr Rebecca Foley and Rob Moore-Jones who have kindly proof-read my thesis. Most of all, thanks to the Asian respondents of the survey, without whose participation this thesis could not have been completed. The high level of interest and goodwill expressed by the respondents made what could have been a daunting experience a very humbling one.

I cannot list all the people whose encouragement and moral support have pushed me through the last four years: Associate Professor Manying Ip and Dr Peter Aimer for their support and advice; Rosalind Henshaw, Kevin Chung, Hyang-sook Oh, and Adrian Tan for their assistance in administering the survey; Pro-Vice Chancellor Chris Tremewan for his assistance in obtaining the funding for the survey; the Electoral Commission for awarding me the Wallace Scholarship; and my colleagues and former colleagues at Russell McVeagh, Wilson Harle, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, and the New Zealand Embassy in Seoul for their understanding and offers of help. Above all, I cannot thank enough members of my family who have shown me incredible love and patience even at times when I was close to losing my sanity. I am blessed to have the most supportive family, to whom this thesis is dedicated.
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1. INTRODUCTION

Until very recently, the political participation of Asian immigrants in New Zealand and other Western immigrant nations of the US, Canada and Australia has been understudied and largely ignored. In the case of the US, scholars have developed a substantial volume of literature on political participation of African Americans, and increasingly on Latino Americans, but it was not until 2001 that a nation-wide survey was conducted on political participation of Asian Americans. Similarly in New Zealand, literature on ethnic minority groups’ political participation has focused mainly on Maori people, whereas non-Maori ethnic minorities such as Asian New Zealanders have been scarcely studied. Studies on political participation of Asian immigrants in Canada and Australia are equally few and far between. There has been, however, a recent surge of interest in political participation of Asian immigrants, as the number of Asian immigrants in Western countries has increased significantly in the second half of the 20th century. For example, Asian immigrants came to New Zealand in large numbers in the 1990s, and the US, Canada and

1 For the definition of “Asian”, see chapter 1.6.
2 The US, Canada, Australia and New Zealand are the only four countries in the world that have had significant number of immigrants year after year, have accepted immigrants for permanent settlement, and have selected immigrants under a diversity of categories and from a very wide range of countries; Lloyd P., “The Political Economy of Immigration” in Jupp J. and Kabala M. (eds) The Politics of Australian Immigration (1994) Australian Government Publishing Services, Canberra, pp59-82 at p59.
4 A survey conducted by Dr Pei-te Lien of the University of Utah among 1,218 Asian Americans of various ethnic backgrounds. See chapter 1.3 for more details. Although there is now a considerable volume of literature on political participation of Asian Americans, most of the research has been carried out fairly recently. Examples of regional surveys on political participation of Asian Americans include a 1984 study in San Francisco (Din G., An Analysis of Asian/Pacific American Registration and Voting Patterns (1984) Masters thesis, Claremont Graduate School, Los Angeles), a 1986 study in Los Angeles county (Nakanishi D.T., The UCLA Asian Pacific American Voter Registration Study (1986) Report sponsored by the Asian Pacific American Legal Centre of Los Angeles, UCLA Graduate School of Education), and a 1984 survey in California (Uhlaner C., Cain B.E. and Kiewiet D.R., “Political Participation of Ethnic Minorities in the 1980s” (1989) 3(11) Political Behaviour 195).
Australia have also experienced a major influx of Asian immigrants in the 1970s-1980s. For this reason, the political behaviour of Asian immigrants, which previously had been deemed insignificant for the politics of the host country\(^8\), has begun to attract more attention in recent years.

The emergence of ethnic nationalism following the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1989, and the increasing focus on concepts such as “cultural rights” and “ethnic equity” in the late 20th century, has also increased the level of interest in the issue of political participation of Asian immigrants. These recent developments suggest that the challenges posed by ethnocultural diversity within or between nation-states may be one of the biggest political issues of the 21st century\(^9\). With some 5,000 to 8,000 ethnocultural groups and only around 200 nation-states in the world, most states will inevitably become multi-ethnic and multi-cultural societies in this increasingly globalised world. For this reason, the method of integrating people from diverse ethnic backgrounds into a common political system, while accommodating their ethnic diversity, has become the subject of extensive political debate in recent years\(^10\). Most of the political debate on this issue has concluded that respecting minority rights, including the right to participate in politics, is the best way for minority groups to come to identify with the larger political community of the host country\(^11\). As a consequence, studies on political participation of ethnic minority groups have gained greater importance, especially in countries which are becoming increasingly diverse. New Zealand is no exception to this global phenomenon of ethnocultural diversity. As a predominantly “White” nation which is becoming increasingly heterogeneous\(^12\), New Zealand faces a challenge in recognising and respecting different groups’ interests without endangering national unity. A

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8 Because it is not possible for a parliament to be an exact replica of the society, only groups that are deemed important will reflect the political culture of the country; Catt H., “Representation” in Miller R. (ed) *New Zealand Politics in Transition* (1997) Oxford University Press, Auckland, pp397-407 at p402.


12 The New Zealand Census 2001 found that between 1991 to 2001, the proportion of Europeans in New Zealand declined from 83.2% to 80%, whereas Maori increased from 13% to 14.7%, Pacific Islanders from 5% to 6.5%, Asians from 3% to 6.6% and “other” ethnic minorities from 0.2% to 0.7%.
study on the political participation of Asian New Zealanders\textsuperscript{13} is therefore a timely effort to address, in the New Zealand context, some of the questions that have recently attracted significant international attention.

\section*{1.1 NEW ZEALAND AND ASIA}

New Zealand is a nation of immigrants, but until fairly recently the source of immigrants had largely been homogeneous and consisted mainly of the British and other European settlers (with the exceptions of the indigenous Maori people and later the Pacific Island immigrants of the 1970s). It was not until after the abolition of the discriminatory immigration policy (introduced in pursuit of a "White New Zealand" doctrine) in 1986 that people from Asian countries were able to migrate to New Zealand in large numbers. Similarly, other Western immigrant countries of the US, Canada and Australia had initially adopted a form of "Whites only" immigration policies which, together with Asian countries' internal policies to control the movements of their citizens\textsuperscript{14}, limited the number of Asian immigrants to Western countries.

The abandonment of the "Whites only" immigration policies was the result of a combination of factors, including the inability of Western countries to meet their labour needs through European immigration, the impact of globalisation (most noticeably the development of international transportation and telecommunication systems), and the rapidly developing economies of Asian countries. In addition, the civil rights and other movements for equality in the 1960s and 1970s (which focused on the rights of ethnic minorities, women, homosexuals and other minority groups) led countries with racist policies to face growing criticism from within, as well as from outside. These developments taken together not only made it necessary for Western countries to open their doors to Asian immigrants, but also made it increasingly difficult for Asian countries to control the movement of their people. For many Asians, the negative consequences of unprecedented rapid economic growth in their home countries (such as pollution and social unrest) and political uncertainty (such as the transfer of Hong Kong from Britain to China in 1997) provided incentives for them to leave their home countries. The combined result was a growing number of affluent and well-educated Asian people migrating to Western countries in pursuit of a

\textsuperscript{13} In this thesis, the term "Asian New Zealanders" will be used interchangeably with "Asian immigrants", "Asian people", and "Asians", unless a further distinction is necessary.

\textsuperscript{14} For example, Korean people were not allowed to travel overseas freely until after the 1988 Seoul Olympics; \textit{South Korea country paper}, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, August 2004. For more information on historical Chinese policy on immigration, see Godley M.R., "China's policy towards migrants, 1842-1949" in Inglis C., Gunasekaran S., Sullivan G. and Wu C.T. (eds) \textit{Asians in Australia – The Dynamics of Migration and Settlement} (1992) Allen & Unwin, New South Wales, pp1-22.
better lifestyle\textsuperscript{15}, unlike previous Asian immigrants of the 19\textsuperscript{th} century who left their home countries out of economic or political necessity.

In the case of New Zealand, the changing external economic environment and the demand for highly skilled workers were the key reasons behind the opening of doors to Asian immigrants. When Britain (which had been the single most important market for New Zealand exports) joined the European Common Market in 1973, there was an urgent need for New Zealand to explore new international markets, and the rapidly growing economies of Asian countries presented a much-needed alternative trade opportunity for New Zealand. At the same time, concerns over under-population and a lagging economy in the late 1980s justified the opening of New Zealand’s doors to immigrants from non-traditional sources\textsuperscript{16}, in the hope that they would bring the new skills and capital. Against this background, New Zealand’s perceptions of Asia changed from “political and economic threat” in the 1940s-1960s to “economic partners” in the 1970s-1980s, and even to the notion of “New Zealand as an Asian nation” in the 1990s\textsuperscript{17}. When New Zealand formally opened its doors to Asian immigrants\textsuperscript{18}, it became one of the favoured destinations for many Asian immigrants with its images of “Godzone” and “the last paradise on earth”.

New Zealand’s economic relationship with Asia has subsequently developed significantly, to the extent that its economy has become very much dependent upon Asian markets. In addition to the domestic economic benefits brought by affluent Asian immigrants\textsuperscript{19}, Asian countries became important trading partners for New Zealand, with Japan, South Korea, China, Taiwan, Hong Kong

\textsuperscript{15} It is important to note, however, that not all recent Asian immigrants are affluent. Many are refugees or illegal immigrants who moved to Western countries out of necessity, including many Asian immigrants to the US in the 1960s and 1970s. But large proportions of the Asian immigrants of the 1990s are relatively affluent and are described as a “trans-national public”; Freeman A., \textit{Political Participation and Ethnic Minority: Chinese Overseas in Malaysia, Indonesia and the United States of America} (2000) Routledge, New York. See also Ip M. (ed) \textit{Re-examining Chinese Transnationalism in Australia-New Zealand} (2001) Centre for the Study of the Southern Chinese Diaspora, Australia National University.


\textsuperscript{17} Hartdegen S., “Perceiving Asia 1945-1998; Shifts and Changes as seen in Official Speeches” in Zhang Y. (ed) \textit{New Zealand and Asia: Perceptions, Identity and Engagement} (1999) Publishing Press Ltd, Auckland, pp5-30. It should be noted however that the change in New Zealand government’s perception towards Asia did not necessarily reflect that of the general New Zealand population.


\textsuperscript{19} In 1995 alone, Asian immigrants under the Business and Investment category brought $383 million, although much of these were passive investment, such as investment in real estate; Trlin A.D., “For the Promotion of Economic Growth and Prosperity; New Zealand’s Immigration Policy 1991-1995” in Trlin A.D. and Spoonley P. (eds) \textit{New Zealand and International Migration: A Digest and Bibliography} (1997) Department of Sociology, Massey University, Palmerston North, as cited in Fleras and Spoonley (1999) p169.
and Malaysia becoming the top 10 international trading partners for New Zealand in 2002\textsuperscript{20}. Over the past 10 years, a large number of tourists and overseas students also came to New Zealand from Asian countries, contributing over $1 billion and $1.3 billion respectively to the New Zealand economy in 2002 alone\textsuperscript{21}. The impact of Asian immigrants on New Zealand’s demographic composition was also significant, as Asian New Zealanders became the fastest growing ethnic group in New Zealand in the 1990s\textsuperscript{22}. The number of Asian New Zealanders more than tripled in the 10 years between 1986 and 1996, and as at the last census in 2001, Asian New Zealanders comprised 6.6% of the total New Zealand population and 12.5% of the Auckland population\textsuperscript{23}. As Asian countries became increasingly important to New Zealand’s future, there was a growing need to dispel concerns that New Zealand was only interested in Asia for economic reasons, and a growing appreciation that New Zealand’s attempt to befriend Asian countries on the basis of financial and economic interests alone was unlikely to be received positively by Asian countries\textsuperscript{24}. This was reflected in a speech by Don McKinnon, the then Minister of Foreign Affairs and Trade: “You cannot just trade with Asia and live off the spoils of trade. You’ve got to actually involve yourself and engage yourself in the region, and that means trade flows, cultural exchanges, sister-city exchanges, sporting exchanges, the lot”\textsuperscript{25}. One way of showing New Zealand’s “genuineness” was to ensure that Asian immigrants settled well into every aspect of New Zealand society. This again contributed to growing interest in the political participation of Asian New Zealanders.

### 1.2 KEY QUESTIONS

So how visible and influential are Asian New Zealanders in New Zealand politics? To date, little effort has been made to answer this question. There have only been a limited number of studies conducted to assess the political participation of Asian New Zealanders\textsuperscript{26}. This may be due to

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{20} New Zealand’s economic relationship with Asia (2002) Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade. The data used in this thesis is based on the 2002 New Zealand General Election and the 2001 Census, and does not include most recent data post-2004 such as the 2005 General Election.
  \item \textsuperscript{21} Ibid. About 500,000 visitors came from Asian countries in the year ending June 2002. Income from overseas students attending New Zealand’s primary and secondary schools, tertiary institutions and language schools has increased from $540 million in 1999 to $1.4 billion in 2001; Gamble W. and Reid G., “Lessons in foreign exchange”, Weekend Herald, 18-19 May 2002, pB1.
  \item \textsuperscript{22} Koreans were the fastest growing ethnic group in New Zealand, up from 930 in 1991 to 19,026 in 2000; New Zealand Census 2001.
  \item \textsuperscript{23} Hartdegen in Zhang (1999) p22. It should be noted however that New Zealand’s relationship with Asia was not based solely on economic reasons, as the New Zealand governments had been providing aid to the “less developed countries” of Asia; Crisp T., New Zealand and Asia: Newspaper representations of the relationship 1991-1995 (2000) MA thesis, University of Auckland, p17.
  \item \textsuperscript{25} Sedgwick in The politics of survival: A social history of the Chinese New Zealand (1982) Unpublished PhD dissertation, Sociology Department, University of Canterbury, noted how little literature existed on New
the fact that the history of mass Asian immigration is relatively short in New Zealand, but with the increasing number of Asian New Zealanders, there is now a growing need to understand their political participation.

This thesis is an attempt to explore the following questions relating to the political participation of Asian New Zealanders: How politically active are Asian New Zealanders? If they are politically inactive, what are the main reasons for their political inactivity? Is it because Asian New Zealanders are only interested in economic prosperity? Or is it because New Zealand’s political system and environment are hostile to Asian New Zealanders? What role does Asian New Zealanders’ newness play in their political participation? Can we look at Asian cultural characteristics to find out the reasons for their political behaviour? If Asian New Zealanders are interested but not visible in New Zealand politics, what are the main barriers preventing them from participating in politics? When or under what conditions do Asian New Zealanders become politically active? Do they have a similar pattern of political activity as Asian immigrants in other Western countries of the US, Canada and Australia, or do they face unique challenges and opportunities in New Zealand? How different are their patterns of political participation compared to that of the general New Zealand population? Can we predict the political participation of Asian New Zealanders by looking at the traditional theories on political participation? Is it in fact important to encourage the political participation of Asian New Zealanders, and if so, what can be done to encourage this participation? These are some of the key questions that this thesis seeks to address.

It became clear that answering these questions would require not only research and analysis of the existing literature on political participation, but also a fact-gathering exercise to obtain basic data on the political participation of Asian New Zealanders. The fact-gathering exercise was also needed to substantiate and/or challenge many of the arguments made in the available literature, most of which appeared to be based largely on the authors’ personal observations and analysis of historic, social and economic circumstances surrounding Asian New Zealanders. The lack of primary and secondary information on Asian New Zealanders’ political participation meant that Zealand Chinese, although the literature base has since been expanded, mainly due to the work of Manying Ip and James Ng; Yee B., *Enhancing Security: A Grounded Theory of Chinese Survival in New Zealand* (2001) PhD dissertation, Education Department, University of Canterbury at [www.bevenyee.com](http://www.bevenyee.com). Materials on the topic of political participation of Asian New Zealanders include Zhang Y. and Ip M. (eds) *Proceedings of the symposium on learning and practicing democracy: The Chinese Community and New Zealand Politics*, 26 August 1996, held at the University of Auckland; Beal T., “Out of the shadows: Emerging Political and Civil Participation of the Chinese in New Zealand” in *Civic Participation of Global Chinese Communities’ International Conference*, 17 July 2002. See also Ip M., “Chinese political participation in New Zealand – the role of Taiwanese immigrants”, and articles by Young S.: “Politics and Culture” (Young 1), “Chinese participation in civil society in New Zealand” (Young 2), and “MMP and Chinese New Zealanders” (Young 3), all of which can be found at [www.steveyoung.co.nz/chinesevoice](http://www.steveyoung.co.nz/chinesevoice). See also McMillan K.A., *Citizenship Under Neo-Liberalism: Immigrant Minorities in New Zealand 1990-1999* (2001) PhD Thesis, Political Studies, University of Auckland, chapter 6.
the fact-gathering exercise had to be targeted at the general Asian population in New Zealand (rather than selected key personnel) and that it had to cover a wide range of topics. After considering a number of fact-gathering methods, a decision was made to conduct a mail survey among 2,000 Asian New Zealanders of Korean and Chinese origins.

1.3 THE SURVEY

Survey administration

The survey on the political participation of Asian New Zealanders was conducted from 8 August 2003 to 19 September 2003 by sending out survey questionnaires to 1,000 Korean New Zealanders and 1,000 Chinese New Zealanders from all over New Zealand\(^{27}\). A mail survey was chosen as the best way to conduct the survey within the time and resources available (after considering a number of survey methodologies such as telephone survey and face-to-face interviews\(^{28}\)), especially since it was the methodology used for the New Zealand Election Survey ("NZES")\(^{29}\). The survey questionnaire incorporated questions from three main sources: the NZES, a similar survey conducted on Asian Americans in 2001 ("2001 survey")\(^{30}\), and questions designed specifically for this thesis. The questionnaire incorporated Korean or Chinese translations underneath the English text to encourage respondents with insufficient English language skills to participate in the survey. The survey questionnaire contained 58 questions, including questions on political participation, political partisanship, political interest and knowledge, various policy-related issues, and personal information. Copies of the questionnaire (with translations) and Participant Information Sheets are annexed in Appendix I. The questionnaire and translations used in the survey were approved by the University of Auckland Ethics Committee on 10 April 2002 (Reference No 2002/Q/010), a copy of which is annexed in Appendix II.

\(^{27}\) The terms “Korean New Zealander”, “Korean immigrant” and “Korean” will be used interchangeably, so will the terms “Chinese New Zealander”, “Chinese immigrant” and “Chinese”. The term “Korea” will refer to South Korea unless a distinction is necessary between South and North Korea.

\(^{28}\) For advantages and disadvantages of other survey methodologies, see Dillon W.R., Madden T.J. and Firtle N.H., *Marketing Research in a Marketing Environment* (1990) Richard D Irwin Inc., Homeward, Illinois. See also Appendix III.

\(^{29}\) NZES is a nationwide survey conducted since the 1990 election to assess the political behaviour of New Zealanders. See [www.nzes.org](http://www.nzes.org) for more information. Vowles and Aimer described sample surveys used in the NZES as “the most widely used way of pursuing the question of “who voted for what party and why?””, as they are able to reveal more of the dynamics of the electoral process as well as to explore the reasons behind it; Vowles J. and Aimer P., “Introduction: Asking the people” in Vowles and Aimer (1993) pp1-8 at p4.

\(^{30}\) The 2001 survey was the first survey to be conducted on Asian Americans at a national level, covering Chicago, Honolulu, Los Angeles, New York and San Francisco. The survey was conducted by telephoning households in the five cities using a dual-frame approach consisted of random-digit dialling at targeted Asian zipcode densities and listed surname frames. Respondents were interviewed in English, Mandarin, Cantonese, Korean or Vietnamese, according to their preferences. Overall, 1,218 Asian Americans participated in the 2001 survey, including 308 Chinese, 168 Korean, 198 Japanese, 266 Filipinos and 141 Asian Indian or Pakistani Americans.
Various aspects of the Total Design Method ("TDM") were used to increase the survey response rate, such as enclosing freepost return envelopes and using the University of Auckland letterheads\(^{31}\). Overall, 915 respondents participated in the survey, including 417 Koreans and 482 Chinese from the People’s Republic of China ("mainland China"), Hong Kong, Taiwan and Malaysia. The response rate of 48% (45% for Koreans and 52% for Chinese) was surprisingly high. This could be attributed to the unexpectedly high level of political interest on the part of Asian respondents, and also to the two follow-up mailings of reminder postcards and the second mail out of questionnaires, the effect of which will be discussed further in Appendix III\(^{32}\).

Selection of survey participants

Because it was practically impossible to conduct a survey that is large enough to produce statistically significant results for all Asian ethnic groups, the survey focused on two groups of Asian New Zealanders – Korean and Chinese New Zealanders. The survey respondents were randomly selected based on their surnames\(^{33}\) from the Parliamentary Electoral Data ("PED")\(^{34}\). This random selection provided an equal opportunity for all registered Asian New Zealanders to be selected as the respondents. However, the survey result cannot be regarded as statistically projectable to the entire Asian New Zealand population, as it is inevitably limited to registered Asian New Zealanders from particular ethnic groups who were more inclined to respond to survey-type research than non-respondents. In other words, the survey respondents were limited to those who have taken steps to register themselves, and can therefore be regarded as more interested in politics. Because of these limitations, the demographic, socio-economic, and other personal components of the survey respondents will be different from those who participated in the 2001 Census, details of which will be set out later. The survey also had the effect of over-sampling Koreans, as the Chinese respondents included people from four different countries of origin. Despite the limitations, the survey provided a valuable insight into the participatory patterns of an important segment of Asian New Zealanders.

Korean New Zealanders were chosen as one of the two ethnic respondent groups primarily because of the author’s familiarity with the Korean culture. From personal experience of being a recent immigrant Korean New Zealander, the author was able to contribute in-depth views on

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\(^{32}\) Dillman claimed that without pre- and post-mailing follow-ups, typically no more than 10% of the questionnaires would be returned; Dillman (1978) p182. See Appendix III for more information on the follow-up mailings.

\(^{33}\) See Appendix III for a list of common Asian surnames used and details of the sample selection process.

\(^{34}\) The PED records a list of registered voters in New Zealand.
Korean immigrants’ perspectives on, and experience of, New Zealand politics. Korean New Zealanders are also the third largest Asian ethnic group after Chinese and Indians, but no previous study has been conducted on the political participation of Korean New Zealanders. There was therefore a gap in understanding Korean New Zealanders, most of whom represent the “recent affluent immigrants” of the 1990s who came to New Zealand under immigration policies which focused on skills and wealth. Korean New Zealanders are also unique in that their pre-migration social background is more homogeneous than most other Asian groups. This means that Koreans may exhibit more solidarity in their community structure in New Zealand. In addition, Korea is the country most influenced by Confucianism in East Asia, and at the same time, it is one of “Four Asian Tigers” which experienced rapid economic development and social transition in recent years. A study of Korean New Zealanders therefore provides a good illustration of the impact of traditional Asian culture, as well as the experience of modernisation/democratisation, on Asian immigrants’ political participation in the host country.

Chinese New Zealanders were chosen because they are the largest Asian group in New Zealand, comprising 44% of the total Asian population. Chinese New Zealanders also represent immigrants who have a long history of immigration in New Zealand, and include many second-, third- or fourth-generation Chinese born and raised in New Zealand. As such, they provide examples of acculturated Asian New Zealanders, as well as potentially providing an insight into the possible effect that the host country’s historical discriminatory policies have had on the political participation Asian New Zealanders. Chinese New Zealanders are also a very diverse group of people, who speak different dialects of Chinese language, have different socio-economic backgrounds, and were exposed to different sets of political environments in their home countries. For this reason, a study on Chinese New Zealanders may help illustrate the consequences of imposing a collective identity on a diverse group of people, as well as how members of such a diverse group learn to identify themselves as an homogeneous minority group. Chinese New Zealanders also provide a useful comparative aspect to the current study, as they have been the subject of academic studies both in New Zealand and overseas in the context of political participation.

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35 The author acknowledges that in so doing, the author’s own biases from personal experience in Auckland, involvement in various political activities, and the privilege of having high education and professional occupation would inevitably be reflected.

36 Korea is one of the most homogeneous countries in the world. With the exception of some 20,000 Chinese, almost all of the Korean population is of Korean ethnicity; CIA World Fact Book, www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/ks.html#people.

37 The “Asia culture” survey conducted in China, Japan and Korea in 1995 found that Korea is the most Confucian nation in East Asia. For example, 90% of Korean people favoured the rule of Confucianism in the 21st century, compared to 22% of Chinese and 63% of Japanese people; Kim K.I., The Death of Confucianism (1999) Bada Publication, Seoul, p85 (Korean text).
1.4 DEFINITION OF “POLITICAL PARTICIPATION”

In *Modern Political Analysis*[^38], Robert A Dahl defined a political system as “any persistent pattern of human relationships that involves, to a significant extent, power, rule or authority”. This includes not only formal government, but also the pattern of human relationships that affect the decisions of that government[^39]. Adopting this definition, Verba and Nie defined political participation as “activities by private citizens that are more or less directly aimed at influencing the selection of governmental personnel and the actions they take”[^40]. A similar definition was adopted by Mishler and Clarke who defined political participation as “those voluntary activities by citizens that are intended to influence the selection of government leaders or the decisions they make”[^41].

Political participation has several dimensions[^42]. For example, political participation may be individual or collective, organised or spontaneous, sustained or sporadic, peaceful or violent, legal or illegal, and effective or ineffective. A person may respond to an inner or general environmental stimulus, such as awareness that a campaign is in progress, or to solicitation. Some political actions can only take place at specific times, such as voting, whereas others can be taken at any time. Understanding these different sub-dimensional characteristics of political participation is important because certain characteristics may make the prospect of taking a political action attractive or unattractive to a potential participant. For the purpose of this thesis, the term “political participation” will refer mainly to “active” forms of political participation, although a person can participate in politics “passively”, for example by obeying laws, paying taxes, and paying attention to what is happening in politics[^43]. The focus of the thesis will be wider than the simple act of voting, and will include different forms of political activities which take place between elections and through which citizens seek to exercise influence over government decisions.

[^40]: Verba S. and Nie N.H., *Participation in America – Political Democracy and Social Equality* (1972) Harper and Row Publisher, New York, p2. It should be noted, however, that the definition and the generalisations made under this definition apply only to Western democracies. For example, the communist Chinese style of political participation stresses execution of party policies and contact downward from cadre to mass for the purpose of supporting the supreme, unified national interest as defined solely by the communist party; Townsend J., *Political Participation in Communist China* (1967) University of California Press, Los Angeles, as cited in Verba and Nie (1972) p2 at fn1.
[^42]: See Milbrath (1965) p10.
Focusing on wider political activities is especially important because compulsory enrolment in New Zealand makes the act of voting a lesser indicator of “voluntary” participation, and also because voting is a unique form of political activity. The thesis will look at various dimensions of political activities such as communal activities (working with others to solve a problem, taking part in protests), campaign activities (being nominated as a political candidate, assisting in a political campaign) and particularised contacts (writing to government officials or media) to understand the full scope of the political participation of Asian New Zealanders. These different forms of political activities will further be divided into high-intensity political participation (political activities that take a lot of time and effort on the part of those who are involved) and low-intensity political participation, firstly to see whether the same factors influence the political participation of Asian New Zealanders in both forms of political activities, and secondly to see how these factors differ from the factors that influence Asian voter turnout.

1.5 IMPORTANCE OF POLITICAL PARTICIPATION

Before assessing the current status of political participation of Asian New Zealanders, it is important to address why it is important for Asian New Zealanders to participate in New Zealand politics. Does political participation matter? After all, the turnout in New Zealand, as well as in other Western democratic countries of the US, Canada, and Australia, has been steadily declining, despite the fact that voting is by far the most common form of political participation.

For example, the voter turnout in New Zealand has decreased from 88.2% in 1996 to 84.8% in 1997. Voting itself is not compulsory in New Zealand, and non-registration rarely leads to enforcement.


Putnam R.D., Bowling Alone: The collapse and revival of American community (2000) Simon and Schuster, New York, p35. In the US, the rate of the most common form of political participation (persuading others how to vote) was below 40%; Conway (2000) p10, Table I-2. For Canadians, the most common political activity apart from voting was signing a petition at 27.5%; General Social Survey 2003, Statistics Canada, www.statcan.ca. Working with others was the most common form of political activity among Australians at 29%, followed by persuading others at election (22%) and contacting state officials (18%); McAllister and Makkai (1992) p286, table 6.
1999, and again to 77% in 2002. The decline in voter participation in the US is such that it is regarded as “the most important, most familiar, most analysed, and most conjectured trend in recent American history.” The reason for the decline in turnout has been explained in terms of the weakening of traditional voter mobilizer groups, breakdown of social networks, decline in party identification, decline in both the demand and supply side of participation, professionalism and commercialisation of political contacts, and evolved channels of political participation, to name a few. In the circumstances, why do we care about political participation, especially that of Asian New Zealanders?

Some political analysts have downplayed the importance of political participation by arguing that the low participation rate is not of a great concern because the preference of non-voters is likely to be much the same as the preference of voters. Some have also argued that a degree of inaction or apathy may be useful for the stable continuity of a political system, as extensive participation could readily lead to increased social conflict, disruption and fanaticism. Such

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54 Scarrow argued that the demand-side of participation has declined because electronically-oriented parties have become more professional and media-dependent so they no longer need the kind of services once provided by party volunteers. At the same time, the supply-side of participation has declined because of shifts in citizens’ lifestyles and political preferences such as post-materialism, new leisure opportunities, and declining party attachments; Scarrow S.E., “Parties without members? Party organization in a changing electoral environment” in Dalton R.J. and Wattenberg M.P. (eds) Parties without partisans – Political change in advanced industrial democracies (2000) Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp79-101 at p83.


56 Various studies have found that while voter turnout has been decreasing, certain other forms of political participation (such as donation) have been increasing. They argued that the Western public has not become politically disengaged but that channels of political participation have been evolving; these developments are regarded as the “reinvention of civic activism”; see Norris P., Democratic Phoenix: reinventing political activism (2002) Cambridge University Press, Cambridge (2002); Putnam (2000); Inglehart (1997); Verba, Schlozman and Brady (1995). Some have also argued that the decline in turnout has been exaggerated, or that the decline was due to the calculation method of using the voting-age population which includes ineligible population such as non-citizens and felons; McDonald M.P. and Popkin, S.L., “The Myth of Vanishing Voter” (2001) 95(4) American Political Science Review 963-974.


analysis goes against the widespread agreement amongst democratic theorists that mass participation is essential for representative democracy, and that democratic self-government requires an actively engaged citizenry. They also ignore the danger of political inactivity by members of a particular minority group by assuming that non-participants would be evenly spread among different ethnic groups. Some analysts have even argued that the low level of political participation is a symptom of “politics of happiness” – that people’s apathy towards politics is an indication that they are fairly content with the way things are. This analysis ignores the possibility that people’s apathy may have been caused by feelings of discontent and alienation, which could result in violent outbursts if the resentment behind the apathy is not adequately addressed. Studies have also found that non-voters are in general more dissatisfied than uninformed or indifferent, and that non-participation in electoral politics is an indication of political discontent, a form of negative response to the political frustration they have experienced. Even assuming that claims downplaying the importance of political participation are valid and equally applicable to ethnic minority groups in New Zealand, there are various reasons which dictate that political participation of Asian New Zealanders does actually matter.

Firstly, Asian New Zealanders’ political participation is an essential aspect of democracy in New Zealand. “Democracy” is a complex term which not only refers to a type of government but also to a type of power distribution. Although New Zealand has a democratic political system in that its government is chosen by the people, the extent to which a minority group is represented in government and involved in the political decision-making process is an important indicator of how democratic New Zealand truly is. This is because unequal participation spells unequal influence - those who are excluded from politics are unable to protect themselves against

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receiving unequal and less favourable treatment from the government. The political participation of Asian New Zealanders would increase the likelihood of Asian New Zealanders' interests being accommodated by the New Zealand government, as politicians respond more readily to groups who participate actively in politics than those who do not. To deny Asian New Zealanders the right and opportunity to participate in New Zealand politics would therefore be contrary to fundamental democratic principles.

Secondly, political participation of Asian New Zealanders is necessary for the effective functioning of the political system. The system's legitimacy and stability is established by creating a link between public opinion and public policy. Through a process of political participation, citizens can communicate their needs to the government, and this flow of communication allows the government to create and implement policies which are more closely attuned to citizens' needs. Various researchers have found that citizens' level of responsiveness to, and compliance with, governmental policies is much higher in communities with greater rates of political participation. The extent of citizens' political participation can therefore be seen as an important indicator of the public's overall satisfaction and support for governmental policies. In this sense, a lack of political participation among Asian New Zealanders could lead to a danger that, if consistently under-represented, Asian New Zealanders may reject the institutions that do not allow for the accommodation of their interests. In such circumstances, Asian New Zealanders may display less respect for the laws which were enacted without their direct input, and regard political and community engagement as futile. The political participation of Asian New Zealanders is

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67 Verba and Nie (1972) p336. Politicians are more likely to contact those who are predisposed to vote, as they are easier to get to the voting booth and more likely to convince their friends to vote; Banducci and Karp in Vowles et al. (2004) pp111 and 112; Goldstein and Ridout (2002).


69 Mansbridge in Kymlicka and Norman (2000) p106. Verba and Nie stated that adopting the needs of the citizens may not be adequate in setting up social policies because the citizens may not know what is in their own interests and may not have the skills to calculate the consequences of their acts. However, even “selfish” requests of citizens are regarded as more helpful than non-participation, as the government is at least informed of these interests and is pressured to respond to such requests; Verba and Nie (1972) p5.


therefore important in ensuring that New Zealand's political system is supported and respected by its newest members.

Thirdly, the level of immigrants’ incorporation into the political life of their adopted country is an important indicator of how well a society copes with its diversity\textsuperscript{74}. New Zealand takes pride in its diversity and has shown increasing willingness to accept its transformation into a multi-cultural society. “Multicultural integration” by definition is to recognise and accommodate ethnocultural identities and interests within common social and political institutions\textsuperscript{75}. The political participation of Asian New Zealanders helps ensure that they have an opportunity to represent their own interests, have a say in New Zealand’s political decision-making process, and counter any disadvantages that they may face as a minority group\textsuperscript{76}. Providing this opportunity to represent their interests through political participation is especially important for Asian New Zealanders who do not necessarily share the same preference as members of the dominant group due to their physical, cultural, and social differences\textsuperscript{77}.

Fourthly, Asian New Zealanders who participate in politics are likely to feel a greater sense of belonging and equal worth with other members of the host country. Members of ethnic minority immigrant groups often feel that they are second- or third-class citizens. Being a “citizen” is different from being a “subject” in that the former actively participates in the rituals of democracy, whereas the latter passively allows the government to initiate and carry out public policy\textsuperscript{78}. Political participation in this sense is important for Asian New Zealanders to learn the civic virtues required for responsible citizenship\textsuperscript{79}. Engaging in political discussions and activities with their

\textsuperscript{74} Freeman (2000) p21.
\textsuperscript{75} Kymlicka and Norman in Kymlicka and Norman (2000) p14.
\textsuperscript{76} Mansbridge in Kymlicka and Norman (2000) pp102-104.
\textsuperscript{77} However, insisting that only Asian representatives can represent Asian New Zealanders’ interests is dangerous as it implies that Asian New Zealanders cannot adequately represent others, and further that any Asian representative could represent interests of all of Asian New Zealanders, regardless of their political belief, class, ethnic origin or other differences; Young I.M., “Polity and Group Difference: A Critique of the Ideal of Universal Citizenship” (1989) 99 Ethics 250-274 at p261.
\textsuperscript{79} Political virtues learnt through political participation, such as the capacity to discern and respect the rights of others, willingness to demand only what can be paid for, ability to evaluate the performance of those in office, willingness to engage in public discourse, and giving reasons for their political demands, are regarded as one of four civic virtues of responsible citizenship. The other three civic virtues are: (1) general virtues such as courage, law-abidingness, loyalty; (2) social virtues such as independence, open-mindedness; and (3) economic virtues such as work, ethic, capacity to delay self-gratification, adaptability to economic and technological change; see Galston W., Liberal Purposes: Goods, Virtues and Duties in the Liberal State (1991) Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, pp221-224, as cited by Kymlicka and Norman in Kymlicka and Norman (2000) p7. See also Watanabe P.Y., “Building on the indigenous base” in Chang G.H. (ed)
fellow citizens could also make Asian New Zealanders more aware of others’ needs and recognise the interests they share in common, thereby making them more community-oriented. The participation of Asian New Zealanders in different aspects of political activities (not only in voting but also in other processes of deliberation and opinion-formulating that precede voting which place importance on “public reasonableness”) is therefore necessary for Asian New Zealanders to become good democratic citizens of New Zealand.

Lastly, ensuring participation of Asian New Zealanders in various aspects of New Zealand society may help to improve the nation’s international relationships and reputation. Given that Asian New Zealanders usually have cultural and linguistic skills that can be deployed to liaise between their countries of origin and New Zealand, greater Asian involvement is likely to facilitate economic and political links between New Zealand and Asian countries. In the case of the US, for example, Asian Americans have gradually increased their influence on foreign policy decisions of the government through various forms of political participation. Promoting political participation of Asian New Zealanders could therefore improve New Zealand’s political, economic and cultural relationships with Asian countries, which are becoming increasingly important to New Zealand. At the same time, New Zealand has legal obligations to ensure equal participation of Asian New Zealanders under a number of international conventions that it has ratified, such as the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (“ICCPR”) and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (“ICESCR”). Under these conventions, New Zealand has obligations to guarantee, inter alia, every citizen’s right and opportunity to take part in the conduct of public affairs, to vote and to be elected, and to have access to public services. New Zealand ratified both covenants on 28 December 1978. These two covenants, together with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 1948, enjoy a status of customary law; Steinier H.J. and Alston P., International Human Rights in Context: Laws, Politics, Morals (1996) Clarendon Press, Oxford, p119. Examples of other relevant international treaties ratified by New Zealand are Convention (1960) and Protocol (1973) Relating to the Status of Refugees, and International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (1975); New Zealand’s Consolidated Treaty List (1996) Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Wellington.

80 For a critical assessment of this argument, see Mulgan (1989) pp169-176.
81 “Public reasonableness” is described as “one that seeks to separate public reasons, on the one hand, from religious beliefs and cultural traditions, on the other”; Kymlicka and Norman in Kymlicka and Norman (2000) p9.
84 Articles 25(a)(b) and (c) of the ICCPR. Full text of the ICCPR can be found at www.unhchr.ch/html/intlinst.htm.
has also incorporated its international legal obligations into domestic laws, examples of which include s.12 of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 (provision for citizen’s electoral rights) and s.170 of the Electoral Act 1993 (provision for electors with insufficient familiarity with the English language to vote with the necessary assistance). In this sense, promoting the political participation of Asian New Zealanders is necessary for New Zealand to fulfil its international obligations and improve its international relationships.

1.6 DEFINITION OF “ASIAN NEW ZEALANDER”

So what does it mean by “Asian New Zealander”? It is important to clarify at the outset the meaning of the term “Asian”, because it is a term which covers a wide range of people with different ethnic backgrounds whose origins could include the Far East, Southeast Asia, or the Indian subcontinent\(^\text{85}\). The New Zealand Census 2001 categorised “Asian” to include Chinese, Korean, Japanese, Taiwanese (East Asian), Filipino, Cambodian, Thai, Vietnamese, Indonesian, Malay, Laotian (South East Asian), Indian, Sri Lankan, Indo-Fijian, Bangladesh, and Pakistani (South Asian). Setting aside this broad official definition, the public’s understanding of what “Asian” means differs from country to country depending on the particular country’s social composition. For example, “Asian” in New Zealand mainly refers to people from East Asian countries, whereas in the UK, “Asian” refers mainly to people from Pakistan, India, Sri Lanka and South Asia\(^\text{86}\). This thesis will focus on “Asian” as it is commonly understood in New Zealand, with particular reference to two Asian ethnic groups of Chinese (including people from mainland China, Taiwan, Hong Kong, Singapore, Malaysia and other Chinese diasporas) and Korean New Zealanders\(^\text{87}\).

The term “Asian New Zealander” includes not only those who have migrated from Asian countries to New Zealand and their descendants, but also people of Asian origin who were born and grew up in New Zealand, and even those of Asian origin who have migrated from other European countries to New Zealand. This is because all of them are regarded as “Asians” by the New Zealand society based on their physical appearance, regardless of their background and self-identification. If a distinction is necessary, Asians who were born in New Zealand or arrived in the


\(^{86}\) Yee (2001) p4. This view was also expressed by Peter Harris, the then Executive Director of the Asia 2000 Foundation; “For many New Zealanders, Asia means primarily Northeast Asia”; Editorial, Asia 2000 Foundation of New Zealand Newsletter, No 3, April-May 1995, p1. See also Vasil R. and Yoon H-K., New Zealanders of Asian Origin (1996) The Printing Press, Wellington, at p11. For the classification in the UK, see Layton-Henry and Studlar who defined “British Asians” to include Indians, Pakistanis, Bangladeshis and Asians from East Africa; (1984) p2.

\(^{87}\) Although it does not include people from Southeast Asia or South Asia, East Asians such as Chinese (44%), Korean (8%) and Japanese (4%) comprise the majority of “Asian New Zealanders” under the broad definition used by the New Zealand Census. Other significant Asian groups in New Zealand include Indian (26%), Filipino (5%), Sri Lankan (3%), Cambodian (2%) and Thai (2%); New Zealand Census 2001.
early 20th century will be referred to as “local” Asians, and those who came after the 1987 immigration policy change will be referred to as “recent immigrant” Asians. For the purpose of this thesis, “Asian immigrants” refers to people who legitimately arrived in New Zealand, and excludes illegal immigrants who are difficult to capture by the survey method used in this thesis.

Even with the limited definition of “Asian New Zealanders”, there is much diversity among Asian New Zealanders in terms of their ethnic background, experience in their home countries, socio-economic status, language, religion, and time spent in New Zealand. Given the multi-levelled diversity, it is important to assess whether research on Asian New Zealanders as a group is in fact viable. A minority group can be defined as “one whose members, because of physical or cultural characteristics, are disadvantaged and are subject to unequal treatment by the dominant group, and who regard themselves as objects of collective discrimination”. Under this definition, Asian New Zealanders can be regarded as a “minority group” for the following reasons. Firstly, Asian New Zealanders have imposed on them a collective identity, often with a certain negative stigma, due to one highly distinctive and identifiable physical characteristic – their skin colour. There are also (arguably) certain shared cultural characteristics among Asian New Zealanders, derived mainly from the teachings of Confucianism. Perhaps more importantly, they have a shared history of discrimination in New Zealand (although to varying degrees) which creates a common experience.

Secondly, regardless of individual Asian New Zealander’s nationality, ethnicity, or self-identification, they are classified collectively as “Asian New Zealanders” by the host country based on their distinctive physical characteristics. Even those so-called “bananas” – local Asians who are yellow on the outside but white on the inside - are merged into a broad category of “Asian New Zealanders”, especially with the influx of the recent Asian immigrants. This categorisation of “Asian New Zealanders” involves ignoring sub-group boundaries and lumping together a diverse group of people into a single, expanded “racial” framework. For this reason,

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90 Confucianism has a broad influence on most East Asian countries, although the influence of Confucianism would be less significant for “local” Asians, and those from South East Asia or South Asia.

91 For example, people often ask the author where the author came from. Such a question implies that because of a different skin colour, the author must be from another country and not from New Zealand. This is a common experience shared by many Asian people living in Western countries, even those who are second- or third-generation Asians.

92 Gudykunst W.B., Asian American Ethnicity and Communication (2001) Sage Publications, London, p102. According to the definition used by the New Zealand Census 2001, an “ethnic group” is a social group whose members have a shared sense of common origin, history and destiny, possess collective cultural
individual Asian New Zealanders who may have nothing in common with each other (except the categorisation that is used to distinguish them) are forced to identify themselves as members of a minority group\textsuperscript{93}. Anybody who falls under the definition of “Asian New Zealander” is therefore concerned with the allocation of resources and values that impact on their status in relation to the majority group or other minority groups\textsuperscript{94}. This in turn creates additional distinctive interests among Asian New Zealanders, which renders the initial definition of social category more distinctive, and strengthens a sense of common identity among Asian New Zealanders\textsuperscript{95}; hence the viability of a study on Asian New Zealanders as a group.

Although any study on Asian New Zealanders as a group inevitably involves overemphasising commonness and downplaying divisions within the group, it does not necessarily require working under the pretence that Asians are a homogeneous group. Rather, it can be seen as a study of a “politically meaningful category”\textsuperscript{96} in a similar way studies are conducted on Pakeha\textsuperscript{97}, Maori and Pacific Islanders. To a large extent, “Asian New Zealander” is a historically, socially and culturally constructed category, which was initially imposed by New Zealand society and subsequently adopted by Asian New Zealanders themselves. Adopting this approach, Asian New Zealanders can be regarded as a group which has a common political identity worthy of research, without necessarily ignoring or downplaying the differences that exist between various Asian ethnic groups.

individuality, and feel a sense of unique collective solidarity. Because “ethnicity” is self-perceived, people can identify with an ethnicity even though they may not have descended from ancestors with that ethnicity, and vice versa. On the other hand, “race” is a concept that “signifies and symbolises socio-political conflicts and interests in reference to different types of human bodies”, and is an immutable determinant of social distance and hierarchy which is imposed regardless of individual self-perception; Hirabayashi L.R., “Back to the future: Re-framing community-based research” (1995) 21(1&2) Amerasia Journal 103 at p103, fn28 and 29.

\textsuperscript{93} This is an experience shared by other ethnic minority groups. For example, Samoans, Tongans, and Cook Islanders are often lumped together as one group: “Pacific Islanders”.

\textsuperscript{94} Freeman (2000) p5. Given that politics involves allocation of resources, the categorisation of “Asian New Zealanders” has a profound effect on the political position of those who fall under the definition of Asian New Zealanders, especially in their efforts to organise and distribute resources along ethnic lines; Hirabayashi (1995) p112. Similarly, Watanabe argued that if Asians were regarded differently and often to their detriment, they must develop correspondingly different political responses; Watanabe in Chang (2001) p371.


\textsuperscript{97} The term “Pakeha” can be defined as New Zealanders of European background, whose cultural values and behaviours have been primarily formed from the experience of being a member of the dominant group in New Zealand; Fleras and Spoonley (1999)p83. The term “Pakeha” will be used interchangeably with “White New Zealander”, “European New Zealander”, and “White”, and may also be used interchangeably with “dominant group”, “majority” and “mainstream” in New Zealand.
1.7 CONCLUSION AND OUTLINE OF THE THESIS

What happens when people migrate from one society to another in terms of their political participation? This is an issue that is becoming increasingly important, given the extent of international immigration today. One of the most prominent characteristics of current international immigration is the movement of Asian peoples to Western societies. This is a relatively new phenomenon fuelled by a number of factors identified earlier in this chapter. Because the cultural differences between sending and receiving countries are extremely wide, a study on the political participation of Asian immigrants in Western countries raises interesting questions relevant to the understanding of political participation. New Zealand, as one of four main Western immigrant nations which has experienced a recent influx of Asian immigrants, provides a good basis upon which to explore this issue.

This chapter looked at the definition of key concepts such as “political participation” and “Asian New Zealanders” to determine the scope of the thesis. The thesis adopted a broad definition of “political participation” to include not only voting but also other forms of political activities. This is important because a study on the act of voting, a unique form of political participation, would be inadequate to explain the reasons for Asian New Zealanders’ participation (or non-participation) in other forms of political activities, which are becoming increasingly important with the general decline in overall voter turnout. In contrast, a limited definition of “Asian New Zealanders” was used to minimise the danger of masking differences between diverse groups of Asian New Zealanders. The introductory chapter also looked at why it is important to study the political participation of Asian New Zealanders, and concluded that it is important for New Zealand’s democracy, stability, and international reputation. The introductory chapter also set out how the lack of existing literature on the political participation of Asian New Zealanders made it necessary to conduct a survey. The information obtained from the survey will be used to assess the current participation rate of Asian New Zealanders, as well as to challenge or reaffirm the traditional theories on political participation, details of which will be set out in the next chapter.

As well as looking at traditional theories on political participation, chapter two of the thesis will set out the theories developed to explain the political participation of Asian immigrants in Western democratic countries. Chapter two will also look at the background political history of Asian countries and that of Asian Americans, to provide the basis upon which to understand and predict participatory patterns of Asian New Zealanders. The third chapter will look at the survey analysis methodology used in this thesis, and set out the survey results on Asian New Zealanders’ turnout and participation rates in other forms of political activities. These findings will form the basis upon which to identify and analyse the factors that influence the political participation of Asian New
Zealanders. The survey results will then be compared with that of the general New Zealand population, as obtained by the NZES 2002. The effect of ethnic (inter-Asian) and demographic (gender and age) factors will also be looked at, as these are basic factors that need to be controlled for more accurate analysis of other explanatory factors.

In chapters 4-6 of the thesis, the following nine factors will be analysed to understand the political participation of Asian New Zealanders. They are: socio-economic status, cultural values, and the level of acculturation (individual variables); relative size of the Asian population, ethnic community organisations, and pan-ethnic identity (community variables); political structure of the host country, prejudice/discrimination against Asians, and the inter-group relationships (institutional variables). Theories relating to each factor will be substantiated by the case of Asian Americans, as most of the studies on the political participation of Asian immigrants in the last 20 years have been conducted in the US. Reference to studies conducted on the political participation of Asian immigrants in Canada and Australia will also be made wherever possible. The survey data will be analysed, through cross-tabulation and regression, to assess the influence of these factors on the political participation of Asian New Zealanders. In doing so, various theories on political participation will be reaffirmed or challenged in the New Zealand context. At the same time, the information obtained from the survey will be used to understand the current political, social, and cultural situation of Asian New Zealanders, as only limited information on Asian New Zealanders is currently available. This will help substantiate and/or challenge many stereotypes and perceptions that people have about Asian New Zealanders. To conclude, the key questions raised in this introductory chapter will be revisited to see whether the questions have been sufficiently addressed in the thesis.
2. OVERVIEW OF ASIAN POLITICAL PARTICIPATION

There is no single explanation for the political participation, or lack of participation, of Asian immigrants in New Zealand and other Western immigrant countries. The level, mode and effectiveness of the political participation of Asian immigrants depends upon various factors – ranging from factors that can be regarded as individual variables (such as socio-economic status), to factors that are outside an individual’s control (such as the institutional structure of the host country). In addition, factors influencing the political participation of Asian immigrants are somewhat different from those influencing the political participation of the dominant group (which are already complex and multi-dimensional). This is because Asian immigrants are exposed to different sets of political, economic and social forces in the host country. Nevertheless, studies on political participation of the dominant group provide a valuable basis upon which to identify and understand factors that influence the political participation of Asian immigrants. Although most studies on political participation focus on voting rather than other forms of political participation, the rationale behind many of the theories may also be used to explain other forms of political participation. This chapter will begin by looking at various theories on political participation.

2.1 THEORIES ON POLITICAL PARTICIPATION

Traditional theories

One of the most well-known and widely applied theories on political participation, advanced by Verba and Nie\(^1\), focuses on resources. Also known as the socio-economic theory, it argues that the more free time, money and civic skills one has, the more likely one is to participate in politics. This theory has been used to explain differences in voting rates between different ethnic groups (that is, ethnic minority groups participate in politics at a lesser rate because they have lower socio-economic status than the dominant group), as well as differences among members of the dominant group (for example, wealthy and well-educated people are more likely to vote). Linked to the socio-economic theory is the attitudinal or social psychology theory, which argues that individual attitudes, such as political efficacy, interest, trust, and a sense of civic duty, determine whether or not one might participate in politics\(^2\). The two theories are linked because social psychology theorists argue that people with high socio-economic status tend to have attitudes that are conducive to political participation due to expectations of society and social

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\(^1\) Verba and Nie (1972).

circumstances surrounding them\textsuperscript{3}.

The resource-based theories are not, however, without limitations. The declining turnout in most Western democratic countries, despite the fact that the average income and education levels have gone up, poses a serious challenge to the socio-economic theory. These theories have also been challenged for focusing exclusively on the “supply” side of participation\textsuperscript{4}. If there is no “demand” to participate – eg. if the electoral system of the country makes it difficult for individuals to register as voters, or if political parties make no effort to mobilize voters - even those with the necessary resources may have little incentive to participate in politics. Partly for this reason, theories have been developed to look also at the “demand” side of the equation. A theory which focuses on the idea of civic literacy\textsuperscript{5} is one example which looks at both the “supply” side (individuals’ knowledge, ability and capacity to engage in political discourse) and the “demand” side (institutional contribution to the accessibility and intelligibility of political information) of political participation. In so doing, the civic literacy theorists argue the importance of political knowledge – both at individual and aggregate level – on individuals’ political participation.

The demographic theory, on the other hand, assumes that those who are younger, unmarried, and less integrated into society have less experience and commitment to society in general, and therefore are less likely to participate in politics\textsuperscript{6}. The demographic theory has recently been challenged by the generational theory, which argues that it is not necessarily age per se that influences an individual’s political participation, but rather the “habit” of voting that an individual has gained in their first few years as a voter\textsuperscript{7}. The generational theorists argue that significant changes in turnout occur only when there is a change in generation, and that older people may show a lower level of participation if they have developed a habit of non-voting when they were young. Whether or not this theory applies to people who have moved to a new country, or those who grew up in a non-democratic country without the opportunity to develop the “habit” of voting, is not yet clear, as the generational theory was developed by looking solely at the official polling data in established democracies (which does not distinguish between immigrants and non-immigrants, and is likely to exclude immigrants who are not eligible to vote). These theories which focus mainly on “micro” conditions will be used to analyse the impact of the “individual variables” on the political participation of Asian New Zealanders.

\textsuperscript{3} Verba and Nie (1972) p13 and 19.  
The mobilization theory, advanced by Rosenstone and Hansen\(^8\), argues that studies on political participation which focus on individual factors tell only half the story. Defining participation as “the product of strategic interaction of citizens and leaders”, they argue that strategic mobilization by political parties, interest groups and government elites constitutes the other half - that individuals participate in politics in response to the political opportunities and stimuli in their environment\(^9\). Membership in community organisations is also regarded as encouraging political participation: by exposing individuals to networks which provide the opportunity to participate, and by building up the “stock of social capital” which underpins civic engagement\(^10\). In other words, mobilization theorists and social capital theorists argue that people participate in politics because of social pressure to behave as members of a group rather than as isolated individuals, and because the opportunities to participate in politics are greater for those who have wider social networks. The social capital theory is also linked to the socio-economic theory, because individuals with high socio-economic status are more likely to have the time, willingness, and opportunity to join organizations that stimulate participation\(^11\). These theories, however, have also been subject to a number of criticisms. The main criticisms include questions over why people might change their behaviour in response to the efforts of strangers\(^12\), and why some organizations do not have the expected positive effect on political participation of their members. The mobilization theory, social capital theory, and other theories that focus on “intermediary” conditions (between individuals and the institutional structure) will be used to assess the impact of the “community variables” on Asian New Zealanders’ political participation.

The institutional theory, advanced by Powell\(^13\) and Jackman\(^14\), argues that the political system of a country, such as the electoral system, registration and franchise requirements, frequency and closeness of elections and population size, are the main factors that influence individuals’ political participation. The institutional theorists argue that because turnout varies much more from country to country than it does between different types of individuals, the institutional factors can be regarded as more important than individual or community factors\(^15\). In addition to the political system, the impact of indirect structural factors such as broad societal values and political opportunity are also regarded as relevant. For example, if there is a general societal acceptance of the value of “cultural diversity”, the host country may be more willing to provide opportunities

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\(^10\) See for example, Putnam (2000).


\(^12\) See for example, Whiteley and Seyd (2002) p51.


for ethnic minority groups to participate in politics and other aspects of society. On the other hand, if there exist political, economic or social restrictions against those who deviate from the norm, being involved in politics tends to be the privilege of only those who belong to the dominant group. The institutional factors are also interlinked with the individual and community factors in that the institutional factors may promote, for example, civic literacy of citizens and mobilization efforts by political parties. These “macro” conditions, things that are beyond the control of individuals or their community, will be analysed to assess the impact of “institutional variables” on the political participation of Asian New Zealanders.

In addition to the theories set out above, the thesis will also focus on the rational choice model (“RCM”) developed initially by Downs\textsuperscript{16}. The RCM looks at the “calculus of voting” and argues that citizens participate in politics when the “benefits” of participation outweigh the “costs”. Although the RCM is not without limitations\textsuperscript{17}, it provides a useful reference point as most of the other participation theories are compatible with the cost and benefit analysis of the RCM. For example, wealth and educational qualification can be seen as increasing the “benefit” of participation, as those with higher socio-economic status are likely to have more at stake in society. Similarly, mobilisation efforts by political parties can reduce the “cost” of participation by passing on relevant information to citizens. Institutional factors may also reduce (or increase) the “cost” of participation, for example, by easing registration requirements and holding elections in the weekends (or vice versa). In addition, factors that are uniquely relevant to Asian immigrants and which cannot be explained by the traditional theories of political participation (such as language skills and pan-ethnic identity), may be explained by RCM’s cost and benefit analysis.

In addition to the RCM, which focuses on “individual” incentives (in that RCM assesses individuals’ rationality based on their pursuit of own self-interest), the general incentives model advocated by Whiteley and Seyd focuses on “collective” incentives, and is better equipped to deal with high-intensity political participation other than voting\textsuperscript{18}. This is because the RCM cannot explain why people participate in high-intensity activities given their high cost and relative low benefit to the individual participants. Linked to both the RCM and social psychology theory, the general incentives theory argues that individuals think of the group welfare, as well as their own welfare, in their calculus of cost and benefit. In other words, the general incentives theory assumes that individuals act as members of a collective, and not only as individuals serving their own self-interest, when deciding whether or not to participate in politics. For example, the


\textsuperscript{17} One of the biggest limitations of the RCM is that in terms of cost and benefit calculation, it would be rational for citizens not to vote, yet large numbers of citizens make an irrational decision to turn out to vote. See Blais A., \textit{To vote or not to vote? The merits and limits of rational choice theory} (2000) University of Pittsburgh Press, Pittsburgh, for other examples of RCM’s limitations.

“benefit” of having a sense of political efficacy and civic duty for individual voters would be difficult to estimate\(^\text{19}\), whereas they can be regarded as key incentives to participate in politics for those who are concerned with the group welfare of sustaining a democratic political system. By introducing the concept of “collective benefit” to the calculus of participation, the general incentives theory attempts to deal with certain shortcomings of the RCM. These theories of political participation will be incorporated wherever possible in the following chapters to understand and predict the political participation of Asian New Zealanders.

**Theories on Asian immigrant political participation**

In addition to the traditional theories on political participation, there are a number of theories developed to explain patterns of participation amongst Asian immigrants. One of the most prominent theories focuses on immigrants’ level of acculturation. It argues that any new group of immigrants need to acquire the necessary language, knowledge, confidence, and qualifications to enter the political arena of the host country, and that the new group’s participatory behaviours develop in stages. This theory has been applied by almost all studies on the political participation of Asian immigrants to explain their low level of participation, with language difficulty, in particular, being identified as one of the main barriers to participation\(^\text{20}\). However, the acculturation theory has been challenged by the finding that even the most acculturated Asian immigrants often find it difficult to participate in politics of the host country\(^\text{21}\).

The cultural theorists, on the other hand, assume that particular traits of a group (such as culturally defined perceptions towards authority) provide the key to understanding the immigrant group’s participation in politics, and that their traditional culture continues to shape the political perception of immigrants in the host country\(^\text{22}\). They also argue that immigrant groups’ prior political experience and practice in their home countries lay the foundation of those groups’ participation in the host country, either by providing opportunities to learn democratic norms, or by discouraging people from being involved in politics\(^\text{23}\). The cultural theory has been challenged by those who argue that immigrants’ mode of participation is developed from the socialization

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\(^{19}\) Cf Riker and Ordeshook (1968) which attempted to explain the “general incentive” as additional factor of “D” in the RCM.


\(^{21}\) See for example, Freeman (2000) p25. See chapter 4.7 for more information.


process in the host country, primarily in response to the host country’s treatment towards them\textsuperscript{24}. In so doing, the critics have shifted the focus away from the traditional cultural traits to immigrants’ common experience in the host country. For example, the existence and the extent of discrimination against an immigrant group is regarded as a more important determinant of how an immigrant group becomes politically active or inactive, rather than the perceived Asian cultural trait of “obedience to authority”. This approach regards immigrants’ participatory patterns as largely reactive to how the host country treats them, without necessarily ignoring the impact of traditional cultural traits and prior political experiences may have on Asian immigrants’ political participation.

The nature of ethnic community organizations, which play a significant role in immigrants’ socialization process in the host country, are also regarded as an important variable. Immigrants’ tendency to socialize mainly with members of their own ethnic group is used to support this theory. The strength of group identification and political awareness of their minority status are also regarded as important, because the heightened group consciousness may provide the basis upon which to mobilize a diverse group of immigrants for a political cause\textsuperscript{25}. As most of these theories on political participation of Asian immigrants were developed through studies on the political participation of Asian Americans, a brief background history of Asian Americans and Asian New Zealanders will be set out for comparative purposes. Before doing so, the contemporary political history of key Asian countries will be looked at to understand the political environment from which many Asian immigrants originated.

2.2 CONTEMPORARY POLITICAL HISTORY OF ASIAN COUNTRIES

Some cultural theorists argue that Asian immigrants’ attitude towards political participation in the host country is influenced by their prior political experience in their country of origin – that Asian immigrants’ low level of political participation can be seen as deriving from the political environment of their home countries. This is because being involved in politics or criticising the government in some Asian countries could lead to severe disadvantages or even punishment not only for the individuals involved but also for their whole family. Asian immigrants from countries where politics has been a dangerous past-time are therefore likely to feel constrained, and restrain their children, from being involved in politics, even in the host country. In addition, Asian immigrants from countries which have a non-democratic political environment would have had little opportunity to learn about democratic political norms, thereby making it difficult for them to participate in host country politics\textsuperscript{26}. This is especially so given that the first few elections that

\textsuperscript{24} Examples include Ireland (1994) and Barth (1969), as cited in Freeman (2000) p35.
\textsuperscript{25} See for example, Uhlaner et al. (1989).
\textsuperscript{26} Tam (1995) p237.
people are exposed to as voting-age adults are regarded as crucial for the development of the habit of voting (or non-voting), and that once individuals become habitual voters (or non-voters), they are less likely to respond to other stimuli encouraging (or discouraging) political participation. Interestingly, however, in their study of six overseas-born immigrant groups, McAllister and Makkai found that immigrants from countries lacking established democratic traditions were more likely to exhibit greater democratic commitment and trust in the host countries’ political system. This was explained in terms of Asians from non-democratic countries showing greater appreciation for the democratic norms, whereas others take them for granted. This finding makes it difficult to predict the influence of home countries’ political environment on the political participation of Asian immigrants. This chapter will set out a brief contemporary political history of the five Asian countries of Korea, China, Taiwan, Hong Kong and Malaysia, where most of the survey respondents originated from. Whether and how these different political environments affect the political participation of Asians living in New Zealand will also be analysed in the following chapters, when the survey data on voting and other participation rates will be analysed for inter-ethnic comparison between Asians from these five countries.

Korea

A divided country since the Korean War of 1950-1953, South Korea has come a long way from military dictatorship to the noisy democracy it currently is. In light of the continuous threat from communist North Korea, South Korea’s domestic politics was dominated by the military and authoritarian regimes from 1961 to 1987. During this period, basic individual rights were severely limited in the name of national security, and political opponents were often persecuted as communists or traitors. Despite the restrictions, civil society groups and students led the pro-democracy movement through years of strong protests against authoritarian rule, and in 1987, Korea held its first democratic election. In 1993, the country’s first civilian President was elected, and a further political milestone was achieved in 1997 when the leader of the opposition was elected to the Presidency for the first time. These democratic developments are reflected in the Freedom House scores, which rate the state of a country’s political rights and civil liberties on a scale of 1-7 (1.0-2.5 being “free”, 3.0-5.0 being “partly free”, and 5.5 and 7.0 being “not free”). Korea’s ratings improved from 4-6 during the period of 1973-1987 to 2-3 during the period of

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27 See Franklin (2004).
30 See chapter 3.1 for composition of the survey respondents.
31 www.freedomhouse.org
1988-1993. From 1993 onwards, Korea scored 2 for both political rights and civil liberties, making it among the most democratic countries in Asia.

Korea has adopted a Presidential style democracy similar to that of the US where executive power is in the hands of the President who serves a single five year term. A separate legislature, a unicameral National Assembly, is elected every four years. Korea has a first-past-the-post (“FPP”) system which elects 243 seats in the National Assembly. A further 56 seats are elected on a proportional representation (“PR”) basis. The International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (“IDEA”) database\(^{32}\) shows that Korea’s turnout for the parliamentary election remained in the 70% region throughout the 1960s-1980s, but that the turnout declined to 64% for the 1996 election and to 57% for the 2002 election. However, Presidential elections recorded a higher turnout of 85% in 1992 and 92% in 1997.

**China**

China is a one-party totalitarian state ruled by the Chinese Communist Party (“CCP”). In theory, the National Party Congress is the highest organ of the party, but the real power lies in the Political Bureau of the CCP Central Committee. Within representative and executive bodies, minorities must abide by decisions of the majority, and lower bodies must obey the orders of higher level organs. Political and civil rights in the form of public expression and freedom of association remain tightly regulated, and the state keeps control of the media. China is yet to ratify the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

While there remains little prospect of China moving towards a pluralist political system, there has been recognition of a need to provide for a greater degree of political choice, especially at grass roots level. At the village and street committee level, elections are now held on the basis of universal suffrage and a choice of candidates. In 2002, about 20 cities, including Beijing and Guangzhou, introduced direct elections at district committee level. Having said that, the Chinese government is preoccupied with the age-old Chinese dynastic concerns about social unrest and chaos, and is willing to adopt drastic measures, such as those against the 1989 Tiananmen Square pro-democracy demonstrators, to suppress demonstration and organized opposition. Not surprisingly, the Freedom House scores for China remain at 6-7 to this date, the worst score among the five Asian countries discussed here.

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\(^{32}\) www.idea.int
Taiwan

Following the defeat of a civil war fought on mainland China between Chiang Kai-shek’s Kuomingtang (“KMT”) and the Chinese communist party, Taiwan’s politics was effectively controlled by the KMT under a state of martial law. The Emergency Decree, imposed in 1949, restricted the formation of new political parties, allowing the KMT government to maintain authoritarian one-party rule. Taiwan began its transformation to democracy in 1987, when the then President lifted the Emergency Decree and allowed the formation of opposition parties. With the mandatory retirement of the “indefinite” members of the first National Assembly (who held the seats since 1949), the majority of the 325 members of the second National Assembly were directly elected in 1991. Members of the main law-making body, the Legislative Yuan, have also been elected since 1992 for a three year term (with 100 chosen from party slates in proportion to the popular vote). In March 1996, Taiwan held its first popular election of the President, and the opposition leader’s victory in the 2000 Presidential election saw the transfer of power from the KMT for the first time. With the rapid transformation to democracy, Taiwan’s Freedom House scores improved from 5-6 throughout the 1970s-1980s to 3-4 in the first half of the 1990s. After 1996, the scores have remained steady at 1-2.

Taiwan has a representative democracy that has combined elements of both the cabinet and Presidential system of government - it has the Presidency, the National Assembly, and five government branches (Yuan): Executive, Legislative, Judicial, Control and Examination. Taiwan has a semi-proportional voting system which combines multi-member districts with the FPP system of vote counting. The voting rate for the parliamentary election has been around 70%, although the 1996 election saw 75% of the population turning out to vote. The Presidential elections of 1996 and 2002 recorded the turnout of some 77% according to the IDEA database.

Hong Kong

On 1 July 1997, after 155 years as a British colony, Hong Kong reverted to Chinese sovereignty as a Special Administrative Region (“SAR”) of mainland China in accordance with the 1984 Sino-British Joint Declaration on the future of Hong Kong. Since the handover, progressive steps have been taken towards full democracy, but Hong Kong is yet to achieve universal suffrage for electing the Chief Executive. Britain did not introduce democratic reforms to Hong Kong until the 1980s. In the absence of an electoral franchise, and the sensitivity surrounding the presence of both communist and non-communist Chinese during the height of the Cold War, politics was widely seen as potentially dangerous to society and as the exclusive domain of left-wing activists and radicals. As a result, people avoided talking about politics, let alone participating in it, and
the government promoted a “culture of depoliticization” to maintain social order\textsuperscript{33}.

Against this background, members of a District Board were elected by citizens for the first time in 1981, and the election component was introduced to the Legislative Council in 1985 (although more than half of the 60 seats in the Legislative Council are still elected by functional constituencies and the Election Committee). The voting rates were low at around 30-40\% for the District Board elections, although they were slightly higher for the Legislative Council elections, with the highest turnout of 53\% being recorded for the 1998 election\textsuperscript{34}. Despite a more participatory political environment in the 1980s-1990s, Hong Kong people participated relatively little in almost all forms of political activities, due to the continuous influence of the “culture of depoliticization”. Nevertheless, their increasing political activism was reflected by mass demonstrations in 2003 and 2004 which called for more democracy\textsuperscript{35}. The Freedom House database (which does not have the historical scores on Hong Kong prior to 1998) gave Hong Kong good scores of 2-3 for civil liberties but 5-6 for political rights, partly because of the Chinese government’s plans to introduce national security laws which could restrict basic political rights.

**Malaysia**

Malaysian Chinese are an ethnic minority group in Malaysia, constituting approximately 25\% of the total population. Ethnic tension between the Chinese and majority Malay population has been a feature of the country’s post-war history, the main examples of which include the bloody race riot of 1969 and subsequent imposition of a State of Emergency. It has meant that the Chinese community has had to curtail and restrict its own political aspirations and activities to avoid the sort of backlash which occurred in the late 1960s and early 1970s. It has also led to a political and economic system which deliberately and heavily favoured the Malays at the expense of Chinese and other ethnic minorities.

In practical terms, both the Chinese and Indian communities have chosen to work in coalition with the dominant political party, the United Malay National Organisation (“UMNO”). This coalition, broadened under the “Barisan Nasional” (“BN”) banner in 1973, has held power continuously

\textsuperscript{33} For more information on the “culture of depoliticization”, see Wai-man L., *Understanding the political culture of Hong Kong: The paradox of activism and depoliticization* (2004) M.E.Sharpe, New York.

\textsuperscript{34} No information was available on the IDEA database, given that the database only included elections held in independent nation-states. The figures were obtained from Wai-man (2004) p235.

\textsuperscript{35} On 1 July 2003, half a million people marched to protest against the government’s proposal for national security legislation, leading to the withdrawal of the government’s bill. On 1 January 2004, a further demonstration of 100,000 people called for direct election of the Chief Executive and the Legislative Council by 2007 and 2008 respectively.
since independence. But the coalition has been dominated by UMNO and its autocratic leader Mahathir, who adopted a number of repressive measures to suppress critics of his regime, until he stepped down in 2003 after 22 years in power. These measures were reflected in the Freedom House scores, where Malaysia’s scores of 2-3 in the early 1970s increased to 3-4 in the latter half of the 1970s, and again to 3-5 in the 1980s when Mahathir took power. The scores further increased to 4-5 during the height of the Mahathir regime in the late 1980s-early 1990s, and from 1998 onwards, its scores have been at an all time high of 5-5.

Malaysia has a federal parliamentary democracy with a constitutional monarchy, but it is often described as an “authoritarian populist system”, because of the dominance of a single party and the exclusion of ethnic minority groups from the main political arena. Malaysia’s bicameral parliament consists of the Senate and the House of Representatives. Among 70 Senate members, 26 are elected by the 13 state assemblies, and 44 are appointed by the King. The 219 members of the House of Representatives are elected from single-member districts. The turnout among Malaysians during the parliamentary elections was around 60% in the 1980s-1990s according to the IDEA, although the 1999 election showed a significantly lower turnout of 50%.

2.3 ASIAN AMERICANS – BACKGROUND HISTORY

As briefly mentioned before, most of the theories on the political participation of Asian immigrants were developed through studies on Asian Americans. For this reason, it is important to look at the brief background history of Asian Americans for comparative purposes to help understand the political participation of Asian New Zealanders. The history of Asian immigration to the US goes back to the 1840s and 1850s when the discovery of gold in California and the need for cheap labour in the rapidly developing Western US attracted a significant number of Chinese labourers. Domestic instabilities in China around that time, caused by the Opium War (1839), the disintegration of Qing government (which led to famine, internal rebellions and banditry), and the Tai Ping Rebellion (1850-1964), also prompted Chinese in Southern parts of China to leave their homeland. For this reason, similar patterns of Chinese movement were recorded in other Western immigrant countries, where small yet significant numbers of Chinese immigrants began to arrive in the 1850s-1870s.

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36 The political dominance of the BN has been explained in many ways, including the observation that a number of political constituencies and boundaries have been redrawn after every election, generally to the advantage of BN and UMNO, and that elections were only held if BN dominance was likely to be retained; Freeman (2000) pp64-65.
As the number of Chinese immigrants grew, and as their willingness to work longer hours for less pay posed an economic threat to the other labourers, hostilities against this “visible” group began to spread in the US, as well as in Canada, Australia and New Zealand. The Chinese were not the only immigrant group which faced discrimination in the host country (as there were reports of discrimination against German, English and Scottish immigrants), but they faced more severe and long-lasting discrimination because of their physical distinctiveness, wide cultural differences, unwillingness to assimilate\(^{38}\), and the gaining popularity of Darwinian racial theories\(^{39}\). Various anti-Chinese, anti-Asian laws were also enacted in the US and other Western immigrant countries. For example, the Chinese Exclusion Act 1882 barred the entrance of Chinese immigrants to the US until 1943\(^{40}\), and the Geary Act 1892 required Chinese Americans to be registered for identification, non-compliance of which resulted in imprisonment and deportation\(^{41}\). The Chinese Exclusion Act remains as the only federal legislation that singled out a particular nationality for exclusion from entering the country. These exclusionary policies made it difficult for Asian immigrants to undertake collective political actions or to seek redress through political means\(^{42}\). Imposition of anti-Asian legislation also meant that the Asian population in Western countries did not increase in any significant numbers until the abolition of the “Whites Only” immigration policies in the latter part of the 20\(^{th}\) Century\(^{43}\).

The recent opening up of Western borders led to a dramatic increase in the Asian population in the US, Canada, Australia and New Zealand, where Asians became a major, if not the largest, source of immigrants. For example, Asians were the largest group of immigrants to Australia in the 1980s (comprising 36% of total migrants in 1982-1983)\(^{44}\), and 42% of Canada’s intake since the mid-1970s has been from Asia (compared with 9% from the British Isles, 11% from Eastern Europe, and 7% from elsewhere in Europe)\(^{45}\). In the case of the US, Asian Americans were the

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\(^{38}\) This was due to the fact that most Chinese immigrants at that time were sojourners who sent all their earnings back to China and who planned to go back to China eventually.


\(^{40}\) The ban was initially for 10 years, but was extended for an additional 10 years in 1892, and again indefinitely in 1902; Fong (1994) p120.


\(^{44}\) Castles S., "The "new" migration and Australian immigration policy" in Inglis et al. (1992) 45-72 at p57.

fastest growing ethnic group which increased at a rate of 43% in the 1990s, mainly through immigration, and as at 2001, 12.5 million Asian Americans comprised 4.4% of the total American population. With the increasing number of Asian Americans, their visibility in US politics and the chances of Asian candidates being elected to the public office also increased. As of mid-2000, there were two Asian American Senators (who became cabinet appointees in the first Bush administration), five federal representatives, two governors, 29 state representatives, 89 city council members, 26 city mayors, and 210 judges of Asian origin. In addition, the fact that Asian Americans have a clear preference for a particular party, and their tendency to live in specific geographic locations, made them an even more significant political force, as it raised the possibility of Asians bloc-voting and creating political coalitions with other ethnic minority groups. For example, the 2001 survey found that 36% of the respondents identified themselves as Democrats (compared to 14% identifying as Republicans), and that such a pattern was consistent with the political partisanship of other ethnic minority groups in the US (such as African Americans and Latino Americans). Similarly in Canada, the growing number of politically eligible Asian Canadians contributed to the success of the Conservative Party and the election of a record number of Asian politicians (two Chinese and nine Indo-Canadians politicians) at the latest 2004 Federal election.

Despite the growing visibility of Asians in US politics, various studies on the political participation of Asian Americans have consistently found their level of political participation to be lower than that of other ethnic groups. For example, only 44% of the Asian American respondents who participated in the 2001 survey reportedly turned out to vote at the 2000 Presidential election,


49 A full list of Asian American Federal, State and Municipal elected officials is set out in (2001-2002) 10 National Asian Pacific American Political Almanac, pp152-304. Most of the elected Asian representatives in the US were US-born citizens, Democrats, and represented states with a high proportion of Asian peoples; see for example, Coleman in Lee (2002)(Coleman 2) p41. See also chapter 5.1.

50 See chapter 5.1 for more information.

51 Having said that, there is a danger of the Republican party neglecting Asian Americans based on the assumption that their mobilisation efforts could energise the opponent supporters; Goldstein and Ridout (2002) p22.

52 See for example, Coleman K., “Asian Pacific American political participation and representation in elective office” in Lee (2002) 43-50 at p48, tables 3 and 4 (Coleman 3), which illustrated that African and Latino Americans have historically supported the Democratic party. See also Tam (1995) p233, table 3.

which was a lower turnout than White Americans\textsuperscript{54} (61\%) and other ethnic minority groups (56.8\% for African Americans\textsuperscript{55} and 45.1\% for Latino Americans)\textsuperscript{56}. In addition, only a small segment of the 2001 survey respondents participated in other forms of political activities; the most common forms of which included “working with others in the community to solve a problem” (21\%) and “signing a petition for a political cause” (16\%). Studies on Chinese Canadians have also found that the turnout among Asians was the lowest of all ethnic groups in Canada\textsuperscript{57}. Similarly, Asian Australians' level of participation in other forms of political activities was found to be lower than the general Australian population (although other ethnic minority groups, not just Asian Australians, also showed a lower level of political participation than White Australians)\textsuperscript{58}. This, together with the fact that Asians are still under-represented in the politics of the host country, highlights the need to understand the factors that influence the political participation of Asian immigrants in Western countries.

2.4 ASIAN NEW ZEALANDERS – BACKGROUND HISTORY

The early history of Asian immigration to New Zealand is quite similar to that of the US. Like Asian Americans, Chinese immigrants first came to New Zealand in the 1860s to work in the Otago goldmines, and the increasing number of Chinese workers in the 1870s and 1880s created a similar fear of job competition among other workers. In addition, there was a prevalent anti-Chinese feeling even before a single Chinese person arrived in New Zealand, based on the reputation they had earned overseas that they are “naturally inferior, weak, unclean and prone to carry infectious disease”\textsuperscript{59}. Partly due to this reputation earned overseas, an Anti-Chinese

\textsuperscript{54} For the purpose of this thesis, the term “White American” will be used interchangeably with “White” or “Anglo American”. They may also be referred to as the “dominant group”, “majority” or “mainstream” in the US.

\textsuperscript{55} The term “African American” will be used interchangeably with “Black American” or “Black” for the purpose of this thesis.

\textsuperscript{56} The 2001 survey did not conduct a comparative study between Asian Americans and White/Black Americans, but the information was available through the US Bureau of Census. The Census recorded the turnout of Asian Americans as 43.3\%, which was quite similar to the 2001 survey result of 44\%. A similar pattern of inter-ethnic turnout rate was found by Uhlaner et al’s California survey, where 76\% of Whites, 80\% of Blacks, 44\% of Latinos and 47\% of Asians were found to have voted in the 1984 election; Uhlaner et al. (1989). See also Freeman (2000) p130 table 5.1; and Coleman K., “Asian Americans and electoral politics” in Lee (2002) 19-42 at p46, table 2 (Coleman 2).

\textsuperscript{57} Lapp M., “Ethnic group leaders and the mobilization of voter turnout: Evidence from five Montreal communities’ (1993) 31(2) Canadian Ethnic Studies Journal 17 at pp23-25. Lapp explained this as Chinese Canadians’ lack of interest in, and understanding of, the Canadian political system, their preoccupation with other affairs, and poorly organised community media.

\textsuperscript{58} McAllister and Makkai (1992) p286, table 6. An Australian survey conducted in 1988 also found that immigrants from non-English speaking countries were less likely than White Australians to have contacted politicians or government officials; Office of Multicultural Affairs, Issues in Multicultural Australia (1988) Canberra, as cited in Zappala (1999) p7.

Committee was formed in New Zealand as early as in 1857 to fight the “Mongolian Filth”\textsuperscript{60}. This anti-Chinese sentiment led to a number of Acts being passed in the late 19\textsuperscript{th} and early 20\textsuperscript{th} centuries\textsuperscript{61}, to restrict the number of Chinese and other Asians entering New Zealand.

For example, the infamous “Poll Tax” legislation (the Chinese Immigration Restriction Act 1881) required each Chinese immigrant to pay 10 pounds tax on entry (subsequently increased to 100 pounds), and limited the number of Chinese immigrants to one Chinese person per every 100 tonnes of cargo (subsequently changed to one in 200 tonnes of cargo)\textsuperscript{62}. These restrictions, which were imposed in 1881, were not repealed until 1944. English language tests were also introduced in 1899 and again in 1907 to effectively deter Chinese and other Asian immigrants\textsuperscript{63}. In addition, the Immigration Restriction Act 1908 revoked the right of naturalization for all Chinese people in New Zealand (including those who were born in New Zealand) for the next 44 years, thereby severely restricting Asian New Zealanders’ political and legal rights. New Zealand’s door was officially closed for Asians and other “undesirable aliens” by the introduction of the Immigration Restriction Amendment Act of 1920, which gave the Minister of Customs the sole discretion to grant or refuse immigrants’ entry into New Zealand without any explanation, as well as giving privileged entry to British and Irish descendants. This Act, introduced in pursuit of a “White New Zealand” doctrine, lasted 67 years until it was replaced by the Immigration Act of 1987\textsuperscript{64}, making New Zealand the last immigrant country to discard discriminatory immigration provisions.

The introduction of non-discriminatory immigration policies which focused on the skills and financial capacity of immigrants led to the influx of relatively wealthy Asian immigrants in the 1990s. Most Asian immigrants have settled in the main cities of Auckland, Wellington,

\textsuperscript{60} Fong N.G., \textit{The Chinese in New Zealand: A Study in Assimilation} (1959) Hong Kong University Press, Hong Kong.
\textsuperscript{62} The Poll Tax was an enormous sum of money for Chinese immigrants at that time, most of whom earned half a pound to one pound a week; Young 2, p3. Somewhat surprisingly, these restrictions were limited to Chinese and not to other Asians such as Japanese and Indian, reflecting the weakness of China at that time; Ip in Greif (1995) p172.
\textsuperscript{63} Yee 2, p4.
\textsuperscript{64} The doctrine was adopted to create a “Britain of the South Pacific”. Even with the 1987 Act, Ip argued that no one envisaged the new immigration policy would bring a sizeable influx of ethnic Chinese people. The then Minister of Immigration in fact admitted that he did not see that Asian people would be interested in coming to New Zealand when the 1987 legislation was introduced; Ip in \url{www.stevenyoung.co.nz/chinesevoice}, p3.
Christchurch and Dunedin, and in each city, most have settled in places where there are already established Asian ethnic communities. In Auckland, for example, the number of Asian immigrants in affluent suburbs of Remuera, Epsom, North Shore and Howick-Pakuranga increased rapidly in the last few years, with the Howick area gaining the nickname “Chowick”. This development brought positive responses from New Zealand businesspeople and politicians who saw the potential benefits that these immigrants could bring, but more prevalent were negative responses from some parts of the New Zealand public who feared an “Asian invasion”. Despite the public backlash against Asian New Zealanders in the mid-1990s (and the consequential toughening of immigration policies\textsuperscript{65}), the influence of Asian New Zealanders in the political landscape of New Zealand became more visible. The election of Pansy Wong (a Hong Kong Chinese immigrant) to Parliament as a National party list Member of Parliament ("MP") in 1996 was a clear example of Asians’ growing political influence. Considering that the mass Asian immigration was a phenomenon of the 1990s, the election of the first Asian MP as early as in 1996 can be regarded as a significant political achievement for Asian New Zealanders.

One of the most compelling reasons for the relatively early Asian political representation was the change of the electoral system from the FPP to Mixed Member Proportional ("MMP"), which coincided with the timing of the mass Asian immigration\textsuperscript{66}. Asians immigrants were able to enjoy greater political influence under the MMP system, which allowed minorities’ party votes to play a more decisive role. As such, a number of Asian candidates have been nominated as political candidates in recent elections\textsuperscript{67}, and New Zealand saw a second Asian MP (under the definition of “Asian” used in this thesis) entering Parliament in 2004\textsuperscript{68}. There were also 11 local politicians\textsuperscript{69}, two district court judges\textsuperscript{70}, and 174 lawyers\textsuperscript{71} of Asian origin in New Zealand as of mid-2004, evidencing the expanding political influence of Asian New Zealanders.

\textsuperscript{65} New Zealand toughened the immigration policy by introducing a language test and a $20,000 bond in 1995, which greatly reduced the number of immigrants from Asia. For example, immigrants from Taiwan reduced from 23% in 1995 to 12% in 1996; Immigration Fact Pact (1997) New Zealand Immigration Service, p4. Further changes were recently made to the immigration policy, which required higher English skills (20 November 2002) and a job-offer (2 July 2003).

\textsuperscript{66} Other possible reasons include the existence of highly qualified Asian candidates, Asian New Zealanders’ high socio-economic status, and New Zealand’s relatively uncomplicated and inexpensive recruitment procedure, where money and party experience do not play crucial roles in legislative recruitment; see Norris P. (ed) Passage to Power: Legislative Recruitment in Advanced Democracies (1997) Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.

\textsuperscript{67} See Beal (2002) for a list of Asian candidates.

\textsuperscript{68} Kenneth Wang of the Act party.

\textsuperscript{69} There is no centralized registry of elected local politicians: information on local politics are scattered around 86 territorial authorities and regional councils. For this reason, the figure is an estimate based on the common Asian surnames extracted from the list of candidates elected in 2004. The list was provided by the Department of Internal Affairs.

\textsuperscript{70} The information was provided by the Chief Judges’ Chamber. There is no Asian Justice in the High Court, the Court of Appeal, or the Supreme Court.

\textsuperscript{71} Information received from the Law Society of New Zealand. The figure is from 7,476 lawyers who have answered the question on ethnicity, excluding Indians.
However, this does not mean that Asian New Zealanders are as visible as they ought to be in New Zealand politics. The proportion of Asian MPs per population is worse than that of other ethnic minority groups in New Zealand, where 19 Maori MPs and three Polynesian MPs represent 14.7% of Maori population and 6.5% of Polynesian population in New Zealand\footnote{The proportion of Maori MPs (15.8%) is higher than the proportion of the Maori population (14.7%).}. In terms of descriptive representation, there ought to be seven Asian MPs to proportionately represent Asian New Zealanders\footnote{Descriptive representation can be defined as representatives with visible characteristics, such as skin colour, gender, or shared experiences with members of a certain group. However, descriptive representation is not necessarily the best form of representation, as “no one should argue that morons should be represented by morons”; see Mansbridge in Kimlicka and Norman (2000) p101. Substantial representation, where the interests of Asian immigrants are represented by members who are not necessarily Asian, is also important for Asian immigrants who do not often have numerical significance in a region; Takeda O., “The Representation of Asian Americans in the US Political System” in Menifield C.E. (ed) Representation of Minorities in the American Political System: Implications for the 21st Century (2001) University Press of America, Lanham, MD, p93.}. Having said that, it would be unrealistic to expect Asian immigrants with a relatively short period of immigration to have a proportionate number of political representatives, given that factors such as local knowledge, political experience, and the length of time spent in the district are important qualities for New Zealand political representatives\footnote{Catt H., “New Zealand” in Norris (ed) (1997) pp137-157.}.

The growing visibility of Asians in New Zealand politics, however, has not attracted a lot of academic interest. Before the current survey on Asian New Zealanders, there was only one other survey conducted to assess the level of political participation of Asian New Zealanders. That survey, conducted in 1995 by the Chinese Express (a local Chinese newspaper) among 292 Chinese New Zealanders (“CEX poll”), found a number of interesting facts\footnote{Zhang Y., “The Chinese community and political parties: What can a poll tell us” in Zhang and Ip (1996).}. Firstly, it found that the respondents regarded it necessary for Chinese New Zealanders to participate in New Zealand politics – in fact, none of the respondents thought otherwise. Secondly, it found that although 86% of the respondents were aware of the fact that they had the right to vote, only 41.4% had actually registered to vote. Thirdly, more than half of the respondents said that they would support a party with a Chinese candidate, and 56% said that they would vote for National (which at that time was in government and had a Chinese candidate) in the next election in 1996. The support for other parties included 13% for Labour, 3.4% for Alliance, 2.4% for Act, 0.5% for New Zealand First, Right of Centre, and Future of New Zealand, and 8.6% for other parties. About 16% of the respondents said that they would not vote in the next election. Zhang interpreted the Chinese support for National at that time as a combined result of National being a ruling party (therefore better known), Chinese being very much establishment-oriented, and National’s economic policies being more in line with Chinese views\footnote{Asian immigrants have been regarded as potential National Party supporters because of their middle-class background, comparative affluence, and business interest; Ip M., “Clark’s apology to Chinese only a first step in amends”, New Zealand Herald, 13 February 2002, pA15.}. The CEX poll, although limited in scope and a little outdated, provided a useful basis upon which to compare and contrast...
the changing political patterns and preferences of Asian New Zealanders in the past eight years.

2.5 CONCLUSION

Understanding political participation is never an easy task. None of the traditional theories on political participation, developed in the last several decades based on numerous official polling data, can fully explain the precise factors that influence political participation. Understanding the political participation of Asian immigrants is an even harder task, because Asian immigrants are influenced by additional factors and circumstances that have not been considered by traditional theories on political participation. The theories identified earlier in this chapter are therefore expected to explain only certain aspects of the political participation of Asian New Zealanders. In addition, there are only a small number of studies which focus on the political participation of Asian immigrants. In this sense, the survey conducted as a part of this thesis on the political participation of Asian New Zealanders could provide a useful basis upon which to develop our understanding of the political participation of Asian immigrants.

After looking at the brief background history of Asian Americans and Asian New Zealanders, the following similarities and differences between New Zealand and the US can be summarised. The main similarities include a liberal democratic political system, a free market economy, a large White majority population, and a dominant culture with a common English root. Both countries share a long history of racism and anti-Asian hostilities, a history of race relations focusing mainly on one particular ethnic minority group (Black-White discourse for the US and Maori-Pakeha for New Zealand), and a rapidly growing Asian population with increasing political significance. At the same time, significant differences exist between the two countries. Asian New Zealanders have a shorter immigration history but arguably a stronger socio-economic background than Asian Americans. The status of the biggest ethnic minority group in relation to the majority group is also quite different - Maori people have a special status in New Zealand as the indigenous people of the land, whereas African Americans do not have any special status in the US (apart from their history of slavery and its legacy)\textsuperscript{77}. There are also a number of differences in the two countries’ political systems, such as the federalism (US) and non-federalism (New Zealand), and winner-take-all plurality election system (US) and the PR election system (New Zealand)\textsuperscript{78}. In addition, the size of the registered voters in New Zealand (2.6 million) is considerably smaller than that of the US (156 million), so as to give more weight to individual votes in New Zealand. Because of these similarities and differences, the case of Asian Americans could provide a potentially interesting comparative perspective on the political participation of Asian New Zealanders.

\textsuperscript{77} See chapter 6.7 for more details.
\textsuperscript{78} See chapter 6.1 for more details.
As briefly mentioned before, factors that are found to be relevant to the political participation of Asian immigrants will be divided into three groups – individual, community, and institutional variables. This grouping of factors is intended to help not only in assessing which variable has the most influence on the political participation of Asian immigrants, but also in identifying the most effective way of improving the level of political participation of Asian immigrants. For example, if the main cause of political inactivity of Asian immigrants is found to be individual variables, programmes could be developed to assist individual Asian immigrants to overcome such barriers. On the other hand, if institutional variables are proven to be the main barrier preventing political participation of Asian immigrants, the government could take extra steps to ensure that Asian immigrants are able to exercise their full political rights. In chapters 4-6, various theories on political participation introduced at the beginning of this chapter and the comparative case of Asian Americans will be used to understand and predict how each group of factors influences the political participation of Asian New Zealanders. Before doing so, the survey findings on the participation rates of Asian New Zealanders in voting and other forms of political activities will be set out in the next chapter to understand their current participatory patterns.
3. PARTICIPATION RATES AND PARTISANSHIP

3.1 METHODOLOGY OF SURVEY ANALYSIS

In this thesis, two sets of data will be used to analyse the factors that influence the political participation of Asian New Zealanders. The first set of data is the survey conducted as a part of this thesis among 915 Asian respondents. Of those 915 respondents, 389 were Koreans, 234 mainland Chinese, 103 Hong Kong Chinese, 65 Taiwanese, 27 Malaysian Chinese, 3 Singaporean Chinese, 11 came from other countries (including Japan, Cambodia, Philippines, Lao, Macao and the UK), and 82 did not specify their country of origin (see table 3.1). Responses from Singaporean Chinese and “other countries” will not be included in the inter-group comparisons because of their statistical insignificance.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 3.1 Ethnic composition of the survey respondents</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Korean Mainland HK Taiwanese Malaysian Singaporean Others Did not</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chinese Chinese Chinese Chinese Chinese Chinese</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number 389 234 103 65 27 3 11 82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% 46.8 28.1 12.4 7.8 3.2 0.4 1.3 9.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The second set of data is from part of the NZES 2002 conducted among 1533 Pakeha and Maori New Zealanders. Of the 1533 respondents, 1111 were Pakeha and 422 were Maori. This part of the data excludes Pacific Islanders, Asians, and other ethnic minorities who participated in the NZES, so that the NZES data only represents the views of Pakeha and Maori. The NZES data to be used in this thesis is reported unweighted, for accurate comparison with the Asian survey data. The published NZES results were weighted by the actual results of the election, whereas there was no official data for Asians voting at the 2002 election which can be used to weight the Asian survey data. The unweighted NZES 2002 data will be merged with the data on Asian New Zealanders to conduct a comparative analysis.\textsuperscript{79}

The analysis of the data will proceed in the following manner. Firstly, the survey results on questions relating to the political participation of ethnic Chinese and Korean New Zealanders (hereinafter referred to as “Asian New Zealanders”) will be set out at the outset to assess the current level of Asian participation in various aspects of New Zealand politics. Then the survey results on questions relating to the existence and strength of various factors expected to influence the political participation of Asian New Zealanders will be set out under the relevant sub-headings.

\textsuperscript{79} The sampling methodology and questions used in the Asian-only survey and the NZES were identical. However, given that a number of questions in the Asian-only survey were not included in the NZES (eg questions relating to the experience of discrimination), it was not possible to conduct the comparative analysis of all the questions in the Asian-only survey.
(eg. “level of wealth” and “education” under the sub-heading “socio-economic status”). Thirdly, the survey results will be analysed through cross-tabulation to assess the relevance of these factors to Asian New Zealanders’ political participation, with the voter turnout and participation rates in different forms of political activities as dependent variables. Differences between the five Asian ethnic groups will also be set out to the extent that they are relevant to the assessment of the impact of each factor on the political participation of Asian New Zealanders. The Asian survey data will be compared with the NZES data wherever possible through cross-tabulation of the merged data with “ethnicity” as the dependent variable, to assess whether and how the factors affecting the political participation of Asian New Zealanders differ from those affecting Pakeha or Maori. The survey result will also be compared with the US data obtained from the 2001 survey, although it was not possible to merge the US data with the Asian survey data for direct comparison.

The factors under each sub-heading (the explanatory variables) will then be used to analyze their effect on voting and other participation rates of Asian New Zealanders (the dependent variables) through logistic regression, a statistical method for handling dichotomous dependent variables. The effect of the explanatory variables on Asian participation will be tested by decomposing the probability of Asian participation with the addition of those variables to the models. Both the Asian survey data and the NZES-Asia merged data will be analysed through regression to identify what factors in particular are relevant to Asian New Zealanders’ political participation when other seemingly important factors are controlled, and how they differ from those factors that influence the political participation of Pakeha and Maori. The regression of the merged data will also seek to assess whether any or all of the factors can explain differences in participation rates between Asians, Pakeha and Maori. Because some of the questions asked in the Asian survey were not covered by the NZES 2002 (including questions on acculturation, pan-ethnicity, and discrimination, which relate solely to Asian New Zealanders), it will not be possible to test every single factor against the ethnicity dummy variables.

As discussed earlier, factors affecting the political participation of Asian New Zealanders will be divided into three main variables - individual, community, and institutional variables. In order to capture the effect of factors under each variable independently from that of the other two variables, the effect of the factors under each of the nine sub-headings (three subheadings under each variable, each variable constituting one chapter) will be assessed through regression. It will then be followed by regression of all the relevant factors under each variable (together with the two additional demographic factors of age and gender) at the conclusion of each chapter. Because of the large number of factors under each variable, only those factors which show statistically significant relevance to Asians’ participation rates will be included in the overall
regression. Some factors which are known to play an important role, but show little statistical significance, will also be included in the overall regression to see whether these factors become statistically relevant to Asians’ participation rates once all the important factors are controlled.

The analysis of the NZES-Asia merged data will proceed in a similar manner, with the two additional ethnic variables of “Asian” and “Maori”. This will allow direct comparison between Asian and Pakeha participation, as well as between Maori and Pakeha participation. Most importantly, it will show the effect of “Asian” ethnicity on political participation, and whether the significance of the “ethnicity” variable disappears when certain factors are controlled. In other words, regression of the merged data will show whether the differences between Asian and Pakeha participation rates disappear if, for example, there is no difference in socio-economic status between the two groups. To conclude, relevant factors in all three variables will be included in the final regression to see which factor has the most significant effect on the political participation of Asian New Zealanders. This in turn could help identify what can be done to encourage the political participation of Asian New Zealanders.

3.2 ASIAN PARTICIPATION RATES

In the survey undertaken in support of this thesis, various questions were asked to assess Asian New Zealanders’ level of political participation. The respondents were asked whether they had voted in the last election (2002 election), and if not, what were the main reasons for not voting. The respondents were also asked to indicate whether they had participated in other forms of political activities, such as assisting in political campaigns, contacting government officials, making donations, attending political rallies, signing petitions, and working in the community to solve a problem. The survey found that similar to overseas studies on political participation of Asian immigrants, the participation rate of Asian New Zealanders was lower than that of the general New Zealand population. Of particular concern was the extremely low level of Asian participation in political activities other than voting, possible reasons for which will be analysed in the following chapters.

Voting rate

The survey found that 75.6% of Asian New Zealanders who participated in the survey voted at the last election. At first glance, the turnout of 75.6% appeared exceptionally high, especially considering that the actual turnout among the general New Zealand population at the last election was 77.0%. It should be noted, however, that the Asian respondents who participated in the survey are more likely to vote and participate in politics than those who did not participate in the
survey. This is because the respondents are those who have a sufficient level of interest in politics to have registered to vote, and to have participated in the survey. For example, it was found that 92.8% of the NZES respondents voted at the last election, which is 15.8% higher than the actual turnout of the general New Zealand population. This indicated that the actual turnout of Asian New Zealanders would be some 15-20% lower than that of the general New Zealand population at around 60%. However, because we could not weight the Asian survey data against the actual election outcome, the unweighted NZES data will be used in this thesis for accurate comparative analysis.

Cross-tabulation of the NZES data showed that the turnout of Pakeha (94.8%) was higher than that of Maori (87.4%), and that Asian New Zealanders recorded the lowest turnout (75.6%) among the three ethnic groups (see graph 3.1). Analysis of the NZES-Asia merged data showed that Asian New Zealanders were 19.1% less likely to vote than Pakeha when no other factors were controlled, and that Maori were 7.4% less likely to vote than Pakeha (see table 3.2). This was consistent with various overseas studies which found that the turnout of ethnic minority groups is generally lower than that of the dominant group, and that the turnout of Asian immigrants is even lower than other ethnic minority groups. Factors contributing to Asians’ low turnout vis-a-vis the general New Zealand population will be assessed in detail in the following chapters.

Graph 3.1 Turnout of three different ethnic groups at the 2002 election

- Chi-square .000
- Phi and Cramer’s V .253

*Source of Pakeha and Maori data: NZES 2002
Somewhat surprisingly, Asian New Zealanders’ turnout was even lower than the turnout of eligible Asian American voters of 82%\textsuperscript{80}. This was despite the fact that New Zealand’s electoral system is more favourable than that of the US (e.g., MMP/PR system, permanent residents with right to vote\textsuperscript{81}), and that Asian New Zealanders are believed to have comparatively higher socio-economic status than Asian Americans. One possible explanation for this unexpected outcome is that Asian Americans who are eligible to vote would be more politically active than the eligible Asian New Zealanders. This is because Asian Americans would have had to take a number of political steps to make themselves eligible (such as applying for a citizenship and going through a complicated registration process), whereas Asian New Zealanders would have automatically become eligible to vote after residing 12 months in New Zealand\textsuperscript{82}. It may also be that Asians register as voters in New Zealand at a faster rate than in the US, without necessarily having developed sufficient political knowledge and confidence to vote\textsuperscript{83}. In this sense, although institutional barriers could be blamed for the low voting rate among Asian Americans, they could also assist in making Asian American voters more politically active than Asian voters in New Zealand. The fact that Asian New Zealanders have a shorter history of immigration and a correspondingly lower level of acculturation than Asian Americans (the effect of which will be analyzed in chapter 4.8) could also be seen as another reason for Asian New Zealanders’ comparatively lower turnout.

Cross-tabulation of the turnout and five Asian ethnic groups found that Hong Kong Chinese had the highest turnout of 89.1%. This was despite the fact that Hong Kong Chinese, known for their

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ethnicity</th>
<th>% Probability Change</th>
<th>b</th>
<th>s.e</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Asian</td>
<td>-19.1</td>
<td>-1.76**</td>
<td>0.16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maori</td>
<td>-7.4</td>
<td>-0.96**</td>
<td>0.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>94.8</td>
<td>2.90**</td>
<td>0.14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Concordant</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cox &amp; Snell R²</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>.063</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\textsuperscript{80} The 2001 survey found that although the turnout of the total Asian American respondents was 44%, the turnout among the eligible Asian American voters was quite high at 82%.

\textsuperscript{81} See chapter 6.1. Interestingly, when asked to indicate whether they are New Zealand citizens or permanent residents (a trick question, given that everybody on the electorate roll are either citizens or permanent residents) 32 respondents answered that they were not permanent residents or citizens, indicating that not all of the respondents were aware of their own political status in New Zealand.

\textsuperscript{82} See chapter 6.1 for more details.

\textsuperscript{83} Because the current survey was conducted among eligible Asian voters in New Zealand, it was not possible to find out the turnout among the general Asian population. Asian New Zealanders’ participation rate could be higher than that of Asian Americans if New Zealand defined eligibility as they do in the US (e.g., those who are citizens).
“culture of depolitization”, have a notoriously low turnout of 30-40% in Hong Kong\textsuperscript{84}. Their relatively high levels of English language skills and interaction with other ethnic groups\textsuperscript{85}, as well as familiarity with the British political system, may have contributed to this high turnout. Also surprising was the finding that the lowest turnout was recorded amongst Koreans of 66.6%; Korea being the most democratic country among the five countries with the highest turnout rate at home. The other ethnic groups’ voting rates were 85.2% for Malaysian Chinese, 84.4% for Taiwanese, and 80.1% for mainland Chinese (see graph 3.2). Overall, the average voting rate for all four Chinese groups was 82.3\%.\textsuperscript{86} Koreans’ low voting rate, despite them having the highest socio-economic status\textsuperscript{87}, may be explained in part by the fact that the largest proportion of Koreans have lived in New Zealand for less than 10 years\textsuperscript{88} and that they were more likely than other groups to have experienced discrimination\textsuperscript{89}. Other possible explanations include there being no Korean MP and the associated feeling of disempowerment\textsuperscript{90} (cf. Hong Kong Chinese who have a MP from their own ethnic group). Koreans also showed lower levels of interest and knowledge in New Zealand politics than Chinese\textsuperscript{91}. Although the effect of these factors on the political participation of Asian New Zealanders will be closely assessed in the following chapters, these findings suggested that the political environment at home has only limited effect on the political participation of Asians in New Zealand, and that the circumstances in New Zealand may have greater influence on Asian New Zealanders’ political participation\textsuperscript{92}.

The finding that mainland Chinese (who have had no opportunity to develop a habit of voting in their home country) voted at a higher rate than Korean New Zealanders (who have had the experience of democratic elections at home) exposed possible shortcomings in the generational theory which attempts to understand turnout as an habitual activity. The generational theory

\textsuperscript{84} Wai-man (2004).
\textsuperscript{85} Hong Kong Chinese showed the second highest levels of English language skills and interaction after Malaysian Chinese; see chapter 4.8 for more details.
\textsuperscript{86} Turnout between different Chinese groups varied between 80-89\%, but the differences were not statistically significant (Chi-square .229, Phi and Cramer’s V .115).
\textsuperscript{87} Cross-tabulation of the socio-economic factors showed that Koreans have the highest level of property ownership at 68.1\%, followed by 67.2\% of Taiwanese, 60.8\% of Hong Kong Chinese, 59.4\% of mainland Chinese, and 40.7\% of Malaysian Chinese. Koreans also had the highest education qualification with 75.2\% of the respondents having a university degree or higher (compared to 62.6\% of Taiwanese, 56.0\% of mainland Chinese, 55.6\% of Malaysian Chinese and 36.3\% of Hong Kong Chinese); see chapter 4.2 for more information.
\textsuperscript{88} 80.3\% of Koreans and 67.7\% of mainland Chinese have been living in New Zealand for less than 10 years, followed by Taiwanese (55.7\%), Malaysian Chinese (51.8\%), and Hong Kong Chinese (47.1\%); see chapter 4.8 for more information.
\textsuperscript{89} Koreans were most likely to have experienced “a great deal” (5.4\%) or “fair amount” (12.9\%) of discrimination than Chinese; see chapter 6.5 for more information.
\textsuperscript{90} Koreans were least likely to feel that Asian interests were well represented in New Zealand. Nearly 80\% of Koreans indicated that Asian interests were “somewhat inadequately represented” or “not represented at all”; see chapter 5.2 for more information.
\textsuperscript{91} Only 30.8\% of Koreans indicated that they were either “very” or “fairly” interested in New Zealand politics, compared to 56.8\% of Chinese. Koreans also showed the lowest level of knowledge in three out of four questions on New Zealand politics; see chapters 4.5 and 4.8 for more information.
\textsuperscript{92} See chapters 2.2 and 4.4.
failed to consider what would happen to the habit of voting once people move to a different country – do they carry their old habits with them or do they develop new habits in the new environment? If the latter, would people with the previous habit of voting be more susceptible to political stimuli in the host country or vice versa? Although no data is currently available to address this question (as we have no information on the previous voting patterns of the Asian respondents), the survey findings raised an interesting question on the adequacy of the generational theory in explaining the political participation of Asian immigrants in the host country. The findings also challenged the cultural theory that immigrant groups’ previous political experience in their home countries would be the main determinant of Asian immigrants’ political participation in the host country, although (as will be discussed below), their level of participation in activities other than voting appeared to reflect Asian immigrants’ previous experience at home.

**Graph 3.2 Turnout of Asians from different countries of origin**

- Chi-square .000
- Phi and Cramer’s V .203

**Reasons for not voting**

The survey asked those who did not vote at the last election to identify the main reasons for not voting. “Not knowing enough about New Zealand politics” was cited as the most common reason for not voting at 43.4% (see graph 3.3). The result was not surprising, given that most Asian New Zealanders were recent immigrants with limited political knowledge. Asian New Zealanders’ lack of political knowledge was also reflected by the fact that only 29.5% of the respondents were aware of the fact that the party vote is more important than the electorate vote in determining the number of seats under the MMP system; compared to 49.5% of the general New Zealand
“Being too busy working or studying” was the second most common reason for not voting at 28.0%, possibly reflecting the preoccupation of new immigrants, followed by “not being interested in politics” (14.7%) and “language difficulties” (8.4%). This was somewhat different from studies on Asian Americans which found language difficulties to be one of the biggest reasons for Asian immigrants’ non-participation.

Graph 3.3 Asians’ reasons for not voting

For those who specified “other” reasons for not voting, not being eligible to vote (because they have not lived in New Zealand for a year, have not registered to vote, or were underage at the time of the election) and not being in New Zealand at the time of the election were cited as the main reasons for not voting. Other cited reasons included not having confidence in any of the political parties, indecisiveness as to which party to vote for, and the need to express neutrality (possibly referring to the “liability of newness” syndrome that Asians as new immigrants should not be interfering with the politics of the host country). In contrast, the most commonly cited reasons for non-voting among Asian Americans were ineligibility to vote (almost 60%) and non-registration (25%), followed by being too busy working/studying (3%) and lack of interest in politics or elections (3%). This indicated that the franchise and registration regulations are the main barriers preventing Asian Americans from participating in politics. As the New Zealand

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93 Having said that, Asian New Zealanders in general exhibited a reasonable level of knowledge on other political issues; see chapter 4.8 for more details.
94 See chapter 4.7.
95 See chapter 4.7 for more information on “liability of newness” syndrome.
96 The registration rate among Asian Americans was 46%, considerably lower than 69% of White Americans and 53% of Latino Americans; US Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, as cited in Freeman (2000) p130. Similarly, Uhlener’s survey found the registration rate of Asian Americans to be 55%, compared to 82% of Whites, 87% of Blacks and 53% of Latinos; Uhlener et al. (1989) p199, table 1.
survey did not include those who have not registered to vote, it was not possible to assess what proportion of Asian New Zealanders were prevented from voting due to non-eligibility and non-registration. However, the proportion is expected to be lower than that of Asian Americans, given New Zealand’s favourable franchise regulations and compulsory enrolment.

**Participation rates in other forms of political activities**

In other forms of political activities (other than voting), a very low participation rate of less than 10% was recorded among Asian New Zealanders in all but one form of political activity. The highest participation rate was recorded for the activity of “signing petitions” at 13.3%. The participation rates for other forms of political activities were 8.6% for “working in the community to solve a problem”, 5.8% for “assisting in a political campaign”, 5.4% for “writing or phoning government officials, newspaper, or TV station”, 3.8% for “taking part in a protest or demonstration”, 2.4% for “making donation to a political party”, 2.0% for “joining a political party”, and 1.5% for “being nominated as a political candidate”. Asian New Zealanders’ participation rates were considerably lower than those of Asian Americans as recorded by the 2001 survey, where 21% had the experience of being involved in community activities, 16% in signing petitions and 14% in attending a public meeting, political rally, or fundraising. Possible reasons for this will be set out later in chapters 4.8 and 5.5.

In some forms of political activities, there was a significant disparity in participation rates between Asian New Zealanders and the general New Zealand population as recorded by the NZES 2002 (see graph 3.4). For example, the NZES 2002 found that 74.4% of New Zealanders had the experience of signing petitions, 27.9% working in the community to solve a problem, 21.3% taking part in a protest or demonstration, 9.3% writing or phoning government officials, newspaper, or TV station, 6.3% donating money to a political party or candidate and 4.6% joining a political party. The disparity was especially noteworthy because there was only a small difference in participation rates between Pakeha and Maori, with Maori showing higher participation rates than Pakeha in political activities such as working in the community, writing or phoning government or media and attending a protest or demonstration. The low participation rate of Asian New Zealanders may be explained by the fact that other forms of political activities usually require more “active” forms of participation than the act of voting, and that Asian New Zealanders lack the language skills, time, knowledge, and confidence to participate in more demanding forms of participation.
political activities. It may also be that the nature of these political activities are different from that of voting, and that the factors affecting individual's participation in other forms of political activities (which may be lacking among Asian New Zealanders) are accordingly different from the factors that affect the turnout. Whether and how they differ from the factors affecting the turnout of Asian New Zealanders will be assessed in the next chapters.

Graph 3.4 Participation rates of three different ethnic groups in other forms of political activities

Cross-tabulation of participation rates and Asian ethnic groups showed that Taiwanese were the most active participants in political activities of "assisting in a political campaign" (9.2%), "donating money" (2.6%), "joining a political party" (1.9%), and "being nominated as a political candidate" (4.6%). Malaysian Chinese were the least active participants in the above four activities, recording 0% participation rate except for one person who donated money. Interestingly, however, Malaysian Chinese were the most active participants in the political activities of "writing or phoning government officials or media" (14.8%), "being involved in a

98 Perhaps for similar reasons, White Americans' participation rates in other political activities were found to be higher than that of Asian Americans. Examples include contacting officials (47% of White Americans vs 26% of Asian Americans), working with others in the community (33% of White Americans vs 24% of Asian Americans) and attending a political rally (15% of White Americans vs 8% of Asian Americans); See Uhlaner et al., p199, table 1.


100 Although some of the activities did not show statistically significant differences, activities such as making a donation (Chi-square .039, Phi and Cramer's V .118), attending a protest or demonstration (Chi-square .012, Phi and Cramer's V .133), signing petitions (Chi-square .005, Phi and Cramer's V .143), and working in the community (Chi-square .000, Phi and Cramer's V .220) showed statistically significant differences between the five Asian ethnic groups.
protest or demonstration” (7.4%) and “signing petitions” (13.2%). The results indicated that Asian New Zealanders’ political experience in their home countries may have an influence on their patterns of political participation in New Zealand. For example, most Taiwanese immigrants would have experienced Taiwan’s recent transition to democracy, and some may have played active roles in that transformation. Their high level of participation in political activities relating to election campaigns and party politics suggested that they had the opportunity to experience the benefit of direct political representation in their home country, and that they are willing and confident enough to participate in similar forms of political activities in New Zealand. Similarly, Malaysian Chinese’s experience at home as an ethnic minority group whose political influence is severely constrained may well have shaped their preference for indirect forms of political activities in New Zealand.

The political environment of the home country also appeared to have influenced the political behaviours of mainland Chinese, who showed the highest participation rate for “working in the community to solve a problem” (17.1%), but the lowest participation rate for “protest or demonstration” (3.7%), which would have been illegal in communist China. However, the same cannot be said of Koreans, who showed low participation rates in almost all political activities. Despite the fact that many Koreans would have played active roles in their home country’s transformation to democracy in recent years, they were the least active participants in the political activities of “donating money” (1.3%), “phoning or writing to government officials or media” (4.6%), “signing petitions” (10.0%) or “working in the community” (2.8%). The case of Koreans demonstrated that there are factors other than prior political experiences at home that affect the level and mode of the political participation of Asians in New Zealand. In so doing, it highlighted the difficulty in explaining the political participation of Asian New Zealanders by looking solely at the cultural theory.

Because of Asian New Zealanders’ extremely low participation rates, only the two most popular political activities of “signing petitions” and “working in the community” will be included in the regression. The two activities could also be seen as representing a high-intensity political activity (working in the community) and a low-intensity political activity (signing petitions)\(^\text{101}\) – they could therefore demonstrate whether and how factors affecting one form of political activity differ from the other. Initial analysis showed that Asian New Zealanders were 63.2% less likely to sign petitions than Pakeha New Zealanders when no other factors were controlled, whereas Maori were 7.9% less likely to sign petitions then Pakeha (see table 3.3). It also found that Asian New Zealanders were 16.9% less likely to work in the community than Pakeha, whereas Maori were 8.7% more likely than Pakeha to have worked in the community when no other factors were

\(^{101}\) See chapter 1.4 and Whiteley and Seyd (2002) for the definition of high- and low-intensity political participation.
controlled. Through regression of the explanatory variables, the remainder of the thesis will attempt to identify factors that could reduce the huge disparity in participation rates between Asian New Zealanders and the general New Zealand population.

Table 3.3 Effect of ethnicity on participation rates in other forms of political activities – Merged data

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Signed petition</th>
<th></th>
<th>Worked in community</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>% change</td>
<td>b</td>
<td>s.e</td>
<td>% change</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asian</td>
<td>-63.2</td>
<td>-3.05**</td>
<td>0.12</td>
<td>-16.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maori</td>
<td>-7.9</td>
<td>-0.40**</td>
<td>0.13</td>
<td>8.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>76.5</td>
<td>1.18**</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>25.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% concordant</td>
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<td></td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>79.4</td>
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<tr>
<td>Cox &amp; Snell $R^2$</td>
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<td></td>
<td>.062</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**significant at <.01  *significant at <.05

### 3.3 DEMOGRAPHIC FACTORS

Demographic factors of gender and age are one of the most basic factors that apply to all voters, regardless of their ethnicity. As such, they could dilute the effect of ethnicity on political participation if not controlled. The demographic factors will therefore be included in the overall regression as additional explanatory variables, to allow for more accurate analysis of the factors that influence the political participation of Asian New Zealanders. Analysis of the demographic factors will test the applicability of the demographic theory on the political participation of Asian New Zealanders, as well as that of the generational theory.

**Gender**

Both the Asian survey and the NZES found that among survey participants, the proportion of women (54.4% for the Asian survey and 54.9% for the NZES) was higher than men (45.6% for the Asian survey and 45.1% for the NZES). However, having more female respondents did not appear to have much effect on the overall turnout of Asian New Zealanders, as about the same proportion of men (75.9%) and women (75.5%) were found to have voted at the last election (see graph 3.5). For the general New Zealand population, women (53.9%) were more likely than men (46.1%) to have voted at the 2002 election. Gender again did not show any statistically significant relevance to Asian New Zealanders’ participation rate in other forms of political activities, except the activity of “writing or phoning government or media” which showed slightly higher participation rates amongst men than women.

\[102\] Chi-square .061, Phi and Cramer’s V .043.
\[103\] 6.5% of men and 4.2% of women (Chi-square .085, Phi and Cramer’s V .128)
Graph 3.5 Differences in turnout between Asian men and women

- Chi-square .476
- Phi and Cramer’s V .005

Age

Another important demographic factor is respondents’ age. Of the 888 Asian respondents who disclosed their age, the largest proportion of the respondents (30.9%) were aged between 40-49. The next biggest group was aged between 50-59 (20.8%), followed by 30-39 (19.4%), 18-29 (18.7%), 60-69 (7.7%), and 70-79 (2.3%) age groups. Among the NZES respondents, the 50-59 age group showed the highest response rate (20.6%), followed by age groups of 30-39 (18.0%), 40-49 (19.3%), 60-69 (15.2%), 18-29 (13.6%), and 70-85 (13.3%). The survey also found that Asian New Zealanders are a relatively youthful population - only 10.0% of the Asian respondents were over 60 years of age, compared to 28.5% of the NZES respondents.

As noted earlier in chapter 2.1, the demographic theory argued that younger people are less likely to participate in politics because they have less experience in and commitment to society compared with older people. Analysis of the survey data reaffirmed this theory by finding a clear correlation between turnout and age. For example, Asians in the 50-59 age group showed the highest turnout of 83.8%, whereas people in the 18-29 age group showed the lowest turnout of 67.5% (see graph 3.6). The second highest voting rate was recorded amongst the 40-49 age group (77.7%), followed by 70-85 (77.3%), 60-69 (77.1%), and 30-39 (69.9%) age groups. The finding was contrary to the case of Asian Americans whose propensity to participate declined

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104 Similar voting patterns were noticed among the general New Zealand population, where the youngest voters (18-39 age group) showed the lowest turnout of 85.5%. The turnout of 40-49 age group was 93.2%, 50-59 age group 96.4%, 60-69 age group 96.3%, and 70-85 age group showing the highest turnout at 98.4% (Chi-square .000, Phi and Cramer’s V .193).
with older age, although this may be because most younger generation Asian Americans are native-born and do not face the extra cost of participation associated with older foreign-born Asian Americans (such as language barriers)\(^{105}\). A similar survey will be needed in 10-15 years time (when there are a sufficient number of New Zealand-born Asians) to see whether younger native-born Asians also participate in politics at a higher rate than older immigrant New Zealanders - if so, this would indicate that the acculturation theory has greater influence on the political participation of Asian immigrants than the demographic theory. In terms of other forms of political activities, only the activities of “assisting in a political campaign” and “working in the community” showed statistically significant relevance to age, with older people showing higher participation rates in both activities\(^{106}\).

While reaffirming the demographic theory, the survey findings highlighted possible shortcomings of the generational theory, which argued that people who develop a habit of voting in their first few elections as young voters were more likely to vote than others. Does this mean that people who did not, or could not, develop a habit of voting would be less likely to vote? The survey found that older Asian New Zealanders, many of whom had no or limited opportunity to develop the habit of voting, nevertheless showed a higher voting rate than the younger generation. It may be that a distinction is necessary to explain voting patterns of those who had the opportunity to vote but chose not to do so, and those who had no opportunity to develop a habit of voting, if the generational theory were to have wider application to include Asian immigrants living in established democracies.

Graph 3.6 Turnout of Asians in different age groups

\[\text{Graph 3.6 Turnout of Asians in different age groups}\]

- Chi-square .009
- Phi and Cramer’s V .136

\(^{105}\) Tam Cho (1999) p1152.

\(^{106}\) Chi-square .013, Phi and Cramer’s V .128 for the activity of assisting in a political campaign; Chi-square .048, Phi and Cramer’s V .112 for the activity of working in the community.
Regression of demographic factors

Regression of the Asian data showed that the likelihood of voting increased by 0.4% with every extra year of the respondent’s age (see table 3.4). The results indicated that the fact that Asian New Zealanders were a relatively youthful population may have contributed to their low voting rate, and that voting rates would likely increase as the proportion of the older Asian population increases in the future. Gender, on the other hand, did not show statistically significant relevance to turnout. In other forms of political activities, demographic factors did not appear to have any statistically significant effect.

| Table 3.4 Effect of demographic factors on participation rate – Asian data |
|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|
|                 | Voting          | Signing petition | Working in community |
|                 | % b s.e         | % b s.e         | % b s.e         |
| Male            | -0.3 -0.02 0.16 | 2.3 0.20 0.20  | 0.9 0.12 0.24  |
| Age             | 0.4 0.02** 0.01 | -0.1 -0.01 0.01 | 0.0 0.01 0.01  |
| Constant        | 59.4 0.25 0.28  | 18.3 -1.45** 0.34 | 6.0 -2.70** 0.42 |
| % concordant    | 75.5            | 86.6            | 91.5            |
| Cox & Snell R²  | .014            | .004            | .001            |

**significant at <.01  *significant at <.05

Analysis of the NZES-Asia merged data showed that Asians were 16.7% less likely to vote, 63.7% less likely to sign petitions, and 16.3% less likely to work in the community than Pakeha when demographic factors were controlled (see table 3.5). This means that demographic factors reduced the likelihood of Asian non-participation vis-à-vis Pakeha in the activities of voting and working in the community by 2.8% and 0.6% from when no other factors were controlled; whereas they increased the likelihood of Asian non-participation by 0.5% in the activity of signing petitions. In other words, demographic factors accounted for 2.8% of the disparity in turnout between Asian and Pakeha New Zealanders. Maori were 5.2% less likely to vote and 7.7% less likely to sign petitions than Pakeha (which is a decrease of 2.2% and 0.2% respectively) but 10.2% more likely to work in the community than Pakeha (an increase of 1.5%) when demographic factors were controlled. For the general New Zealand population, the likelihood of voting increased by 0.3% as the respondents’ age increased by one year, and men were found to be 3.4% less likely to work in the community than women when demographic factors were controlled.
Table 3.5 Effect of demographic factors on participation rate – Merged data

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Voting</th>
<th>Signing petition</th>
<th>Working in community</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>% b s.e</td>
<td>% b s.e</td>
<td>% b s.e</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asian</td>
<td>-16.7 -1.56** 0.16</td>
<td>-63.7 -3.09** 0.13</td>
<td>-16.3 -1.26** 0.14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maori</td>
<td>-5.2 -0.75** 0.21</td>
<td>-7.7 -0.40** 0.14</td>
<td>10.2 0.49** 0.13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>0.7 0.07 0.13</td>
<td>-1.5 -0.09 0.10</td>
<td>-3.4 -0.22* 0.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>0.3 0.03** 0.01</td>
<td>-0.1 -0.00 0.00</td>
<td>0.1 0.01 0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>79.8 1.37** 0.25</td>
<td>80.7 1.43** 0.19</td>
<td>22.6 -1.25** 0.19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% concordant</td>
<td>86.5</td>
<td>79.2</td>
<td>79.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cox &amp; Snell R²</td>
<td>.082</td>
<td>.322</td>
<td>.067</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**significant at <.01  *significant at <.05

3.4 POLITICAL PARTISANSHIP

Survey results on the political partisanship of Asian New Zealanders are likely to draw a high level of interest not only from academics (given that there has been little, if any, statistical data on this issue), but also from political parties wishing to attract Asian votes. The fact that Asian Americans showed a clear preference for one political party, and their ability to provide a significant support base for their preferred party, suggested the possibility that Asian New Zealanders could provide a similar, if not more significant, support-base for their preferred party in New Zealand. For this reason, this part of the thesis will look at the political partisanship of Asian New Zealanders as found by the survey, although it does not have direct relevance to the participation rates of Asian New Zealanders.

Partisanship

In order to assess the political partisanship of Asian New Zealanders, the survey asked the respondents whether they think of themselves as generally supporting a political party. Only 44.3% of the Asian respondents responded that they do, indicating that Asian New Zealanders’ partisanship rate is lower than that of Pakeha or Maori, 55.6% and 52.2% of whom respectively indicated that they usually identify themselves with a political party. Nevertheless, the partisanship rate of Asian respondents (most of whom are recent immigrants) was higher than

107 For the purpose of this thesis, the term “political partisanship” will be understood as an expression of support for a political party, rather than as a party membership. The survey found that only 2% of Asian respondents belonged to a political party.
108 It should be noted that slightly different questions were asked in the Asian survey and the NZES. For Asian New Zealanders, the survey asked the respondents whether they usually think of themselves as supporting a political party in New Zealand, whereas the NZES asked the respondents whether they think of themselves as National, Labour, or another political party.
109 The survey found that nearly 95% of the respondents arrived in New Zealand in the last 15 years. See chapter 4.8 for more details.
expected, considering that partisanship is a sign of integration into the host country\textsuperscript{110}. Asians’ high socio-economic status, their tendency to support the status quo, and efforts made by political parties to mobilise Asian voters\textsuperscript{111} could be seen as contributing to this relatively high level of partisanship, although full analysis of the factors that encourage recent immigrants to develop a sense of political partisanship is beyond the scope of this thesis.

Among Asian respondents who indicated that they generally support a political party, 46.4% supported Labour, 39.2% National, 6.6% Act, 3.5% United Future, 2.9% Green, 1.0% “other” parties and 0.4% NZ First. The findings were quite different from that of the CEX poll conducted in 1995\textsuperscript{112}, which found that 56% of Asians supported National. The difference may be explained by the fact that National was in government when the CEX poll was conducted (and therefore was better known and more appealing to those who supported the status quo), whereas National had been out of government for five years when the current survey was conducted. Also interesting was the finding that there is a noticeable difference in political partisanship between different Asian ethnic groups. For example, Koreans and mainland Chinese preferred Labour (47.8% and 51.6% respectively) over National (36.2% and 32.3% respectively), whereas Hong Kong Chinese, Taiwanese and Malaysian Chinese showed greater support for National (54.2%, 54.0%, 54.5% respectively) than Labour (36.1%, 26.0%, 36.4% respectively)\textsuperscript{113}. Possible reasons for this difference will be analysed later in this chapter. A significant number of Asian respondents also showed support for Act (10.8% of mainland Chinese, 10.0% of Taiwanese, 4.5% of Malaysian Chinese, 4.4% of Koreans, and 3.6% of Hong Kong Chinese) and United Future (4.8% of Koreans and 4.0% of Taiwanese). Asian New Zealanders’ political partisanship was closer to that of Pakeha, whereas Maori showed overwhelming support for Labour at 77.6% (see graph 3.7).

\textsuperscript{110} Gordon (1964); Finifter and Finifter (1989). See chapter 4.8 for more information on the relationship between partisanship rate and the level of acculturation. The recent immigrants were less likely than immigrants with a longer period of residency to express partisanship, although the difference was not statistically significant (Chi-square .406, Phi and Cramer’s V .080).

\textsuperscript{111} For example, 58.7% of Asians with a postgraduate degree indicated that they support a political party, compared to 44.4% who have less than high school education (Chi-square .005, Phi and Cramer’s V .130). Similarly, property owners (46.9%) were more likely than non-property owners (39.9%) to express partisanship (Chi-square .025, Phi and Cramer’s V .068). Those who have been contacted by political parties (44.8%) were also more likely than those who have not been contacted (32.9%) to express partisanship (Chi-square .005, Phi and Cramer’s V -.094).

\textsuperscript{112} See chapter 2.4.

\textsuperscript{113} Different ethnic groups showed statistically significant difference in terms of partisanship (Chi-square .000, Phi and Cramer’s V .370).
Questions on the 2002 election \(^{114}\) revealed that neither of the two main parties received overwhelming support from Asian New Zealanders, as Labour gained more votes for the party vote and National for the electorate vote. For the party vote, 51.1% of Asian respondents voted for the Labour party, whereas 35.2% voted for the National party. Asian New Zealanders’ voting patterns were more akin to the voting patterns of Pakeha New Zealanders than that of Maori, although Asian New Zealanders showed greater support for the two main parties than Pakeha (see graph 3.8). For smaller parties, Act gained 6.9% of Asians’ party vote, United Future 3.5%, Green 1.0%, and “other parties” 2.3%. Not surprisingly, not a single Asian respondent voted for NZ First for the party vote, which ran anti-immigration/anti-Asian campaigns during the last few elections. In comparison, NZ First was the most popular minor party among the general New Zealand population (10.5%), especially among Maori (15.6%), followed by Green (8.2%) and United Future (7.0%).

\(^{114}\) Questions on elections, which are typically difficult to obtain responses, drew a low response rate. For example, only 636 respondents (69.6%) answered the questions asking which party and candidate they have voted for at the last election. A number of respondents refused to answer the question either because they believed that this was “confidential” information or because they felt that there was “no right to ask these questions”.
Mainland Chinese and Koreans were again the only groups to show greater support for Labour than National for the party vote. The survey found that 59.8% of mainland Chinese and 54.1% of Koreans voted for Labour for the party vote, whereas 51.7% of Hong Kong Chinese, 47.8% of Malaysian Chinese, and 45.5% of Taiwanese voted for National for the party vote. Among smaller parties, Act gained a significant proportion of party votes from Taiwanese (12.7%) and mainland Chinese (11.5%), as well as from Malaysian Chinese (8.7%) and Hong Kong Chinese (6.7%). United Future was the most popular minor party amongst Koreans at 5.3%, and it also gained some support from Taiwanese (5.5%) and Hong Kong Chinese (2.2%).

Electorate vote

Contrary to the voting patterns of the general New Zealand population (48.4% of whom voted for Labour and 26.1% for National for the electorate vote), more Asian New Zealanders voted for National (43.3%) than Labour (38.3%) in the electorate vote. Maori again showed overwhelming support for Labour for the electorate vote at 63.7%, and also for “other parties” at 17.1% (see graph 3.9). For smaller parties, Act gained the most electorate vote from Asian New Zealanders at 7.1%, followed by United Future (4.3%), Green (2.9%) and NZ First (0.3%). This was again quite different from the voting patterns of the general New Zealand population, 6.0% of whom voted for Green for the electorate vote, 4.8% for NZ First and 4.4% for United Future. “Other”

\[115\] Again, the differences between different ethnic groups were statistically significant (Chi-square .000, Phi and Cramer’s V .394).
political parties also gained 7.8% of the electorate vote from the general New Zealand population, compared to 3.8% of Asian New Zealanders who voted for “other parties”. A small number of the Asian respondents reported that they could not remember which party/candidate they voted for in the last election (0.9% for the party vote and 2.4% for the electorate vote).

Support for National among the three Chinese ethnic groups was even stronger for the electorate vote, with 66.0% of Taiwanese, 51.2% of Hong Kong Chinese and 43.5% of Malaysian Chinese voting for National\textsuperscript{116}. An equal percentage of Koreans voted for National and Labour (38.8% each) for the electorate vote, leaving mainland Chinese as the only ethnic group which showed greater support for Labour (42.9%) than National (39.6%) for the electorate vote. Even among mainland Chinese, the gap between Labour and National for the electorate vote (3.3%) was significantly less than that of the party vote (33.9%). Act was again the most popular small party among Chinese - it gained 12.3% of the electorate vote from mainland Chinese, 8.7% from Malaysian Chinese, 7.1% from Hong Kong Chinese, 5.7% from Taiwanese, and 4.7% from Koreans. Green and United Future were the two most popular parties among Koreans, 6.9% of whom have voted for Green and 6.5% for United Future. United Future also gained some support from Hong Kong Chinese (4.8%), Malaysian Chinese (4.3%) and Taiwanese (3.8%).

\textsuperscript{116} The differences between different ethnic groups were statistically significant (Chi-square .001, Phi and Cramer’s V .400).
Support patterns of Asian New Zealanders

As the factors influencing Asian New Zealanders’ turnout will be assessed in the following chapters, the remainder of this chapter will focus on identifying the main support patterns of Asian New Zealanders. The main findings can be summarised as follows:

- Contrary to the predictions and the CEX poll result, Asian New Zealanders showed greater overall support for Labour than National. However, further analysis showed that mainland Chinese and Koreans were the only groups which favoured Labour. Because Korean respondents comprised nearly half of the respondents, the overall results disguised the fact that Taiwanese, Hong Kong Chinese, and Malaysian Chinese all showed greater support for National. Asian New Zealanders’ support patterns were somewhat different from that of Asian Americans, who have consistently shown support for a centre-left party (Democrats).

- There was a high level of split-voting - Labour received more party votes from Asian New Zealanders at the 2002 election, whereas National received more electorate votes. This was contrary to the voting patterns of the general New Zealand population, where Labour gained more votes for both the party vote and the electorate vote. Taiwanese, Hong Kong Chinese, and Malaysian Chinese voted more for National than Labour in both the party vote and the electorate vote. For the electorate vote, mainland Chinese were the only group that voted more for Labour, as an equal number of Koreans voted for National and Labour.

- At the 2002 election, Act was the most popular minor party amongst Chinese New Zealanders, whereas United Future was the most popular choice for Korean New Zealanders. Again, this was quite different from the voting patterns of the general New Zealand population, which favoured NZ First and Green over Act and United Future. Asian New Zealanders were more likely to vote for the two main parties than the general New Zealand population.

Perhaps the most interesting outcome of the survey is the high level of split-voting (eg. Asians voting Labour for the party vote and National for the electorate vote). For example, only 63.1% of those who voted Labour for the party vote also voted Labour for the electorate vote, although the figure was slightly higher for National at 77.9%. One of the possible reasons for this high level of split-voting is Asian New Zealanders’ lack of knowledge of the different impact the two votes have on the election outcome. This possibility is supported by the finding that almost half of the Asian
respondents had no or an incorrect understanding of the fact that under the MMP system, the party vote is more important in determining the number of seats in Parliament\textsuperscript{117}. Other tentative explanations include that Asians tend to live in relatively wealthy areas (either because they can afford to do so or because of their desire to send their children to well-known, high-performing schools), which are more likely to have incumbent National MPs. For this reason, Asians may be more familiar with, and may have been contacted by, National MPs during the last election campaign. This, together with Asians’ tendency to support the status quo, could explain why more Asians voted for Labour (the incumbent government) for the party vote and National (the likely incumbent MP) for the electorate vote.

The other interesting outcome is the finding that Asian New Zealanders in general showed support for the National party (with the exception of mainland Chinese and, to a lesser extent, Koreans), which was contrary to the election result of 2002 where National did not fair well. A number of factors could explain this outcome. Firstly, because a comparatively large proportion of Asian New Zealanders are economically well-off and run their own business\textsuperscript{118}, they may be more likely to support National for its business-friendly policies (eg. taxation). The fact that a large proportion of Asians are members of religious groups\textsuperscript{119} (and are likely to be influenced by conservative religious values) could also explain Asians’ support for National and other centre-right parties such as Act and United Future\textsuperscript{120}. Secondly, the survey found that Asian New Zealanders regarded the “economy” as the most important issue (24.7%), followed by “law and order” (11.7%) and “unemployment” (8.6%)\textsuperscript{121}. As these are issues that are more closely associated with the centre-right parties, this could also explain Asians’ support for National. Asian New Zealanders also showed support for Republicanism (45.9% compared to 16.0% opposing), reintroduction of the death penalty (61.7% compared to 25.0% opposing), and an increase in the number of immigrants (51.2% compared to 26.7% opposing), all of which reflect more closely the views of centre-right parties\textsuperscript{122}. In addition, the fact that the first Asian MP in New Zealand belonged to the National party, and that National had another Chinese candidate

\textsuperscript{117} See chapter 3.2.

\textsuperscript{118} It was found that people who run their own business and who are religious tend to support National; Vowles and Aimer in Vowles (2004), p29. The survey found however that the property ownership did not account for statistically significant differences in Asian New Zealanders’ partisanship. See chapter 4.2 for the survey results on Asian New Zealanders’ socio-economic status.

\textsuperscript{119} Ibid. The survey found that Asian membership in organisations was highest in ethnic religious groups (more than 30%) and New Zealand religious groups (13%). See chapter 5.5 for more details.

\textsuperscript{120} The survey found that National gained more party votes and electorate votes from those who belonged to ethnic religious groups. Although the influence of church membership on Asians’ partisanship needs further work, if there is a link between religious belief and conservative values, National and other centre-right parties would be in a better position to exploit that link.

\textsuperscript{121} Other listed issues included health (7.7%), tax (7.6%), education (6.6%), race relations (6.0%), and environment (0.6%). About 28% of the respondents chose more than one issue.

\textsuperscript{122} Asian New Zealanders’ view on these issues were more centre-right than those of the general New Zealand population, 32.9% of whom supported New Zealand becoming a Republic (52.6% opposing), 18.3% supported increased number of immigrants (77.4% opposing), and 56.9% supported reintroduction of the death penalty (33.2% opposing).
high on its party list (Eric Liu at number 34), could have provided additional incentives for Asian New Zealanders to support the National party. Equally, it could be that Asian immigrants of the early 1990s have become “habitual supporters” of the National party, which was in government from 1990-1999, enough time for the early Asian immigrants to become immune to the appeals of other parties.\textsuperscript{123}

That leaves the question of why mainland Chinese and Korean New Zealanders showed greater support for Labour over National. One possible explanation is that Asian people in general support whoever is in government at the time of their arrival in New Zealand. Such a tendency would be especially strong amongst mainland Chinese, who came from a political environment where political participation equated to supporting the government. The fact that more Koreans and mainland Chinese came to New Zealand while Labour was in government\textsuperscript{124} further supports this view. For mainland Chinese, who came from a communist country, the political ideology of the home country may have made it more natural for them to support the Labour party, although the same cannot be said of Koreans. Perhaps the fact that Koreans had the highest educational level could explain their support for Labour, as people with high educational qualifications tend to support Labour. For example, among the Asian respondents who have a postgraduate degree, 49.3% showed support for Labour, compared to 34.2% for National. This was consistent with the patterns of the general New Zealand population, where people with a postgraduate degree (60.5%) or less than high school education (64.0%) showed a higher level of support for Labour than the average (53.9%). Labour’s traditional focus on equality for ethnic minorities and social justice\textsuperscript{125} could have also contributed to Koreans’ support for the Labour party.

The Act party’s effort to attract Chinese voters, such as providing a Chinese website, sending out letters in Asian languages, and nominating a Chinese candidate at a relatively high rank of 10 (who subsequently became New Zealand’s second Asian MP), appeared to have been successful in attracting a significant level of support from Asian New Zealanders. The political philosophy of Act, a right-wing party with a focus on entrepreneurship, could have also played a role in attracting votes from the conservative Asians. On the other hand, the Progressive Coalition party failed to attract Asian votes despite the nomination of two Asian candidates (Meng Ly at number 8 and Nong Li at number 15), indicating that the nomination of Asian candidates

\textsuperscript{123} Butler and Stokes found that anyone who had voted the same way three times could become “immunized” against change; Butler D. and Stokes D., Political Change in Britain (1974) Macmillan, London, as cited in Franklin (2004) p21. Also supporting this possibility is the fact that Taiwanese, Hong Kong Chinese, and Malaysian Chinese are more likely than mainland Chinese or Koreans to have lived in New Zealand for more than 10 years.

\textsuperscript{124} 80.3% of Korean and 67.7% of mainland Chinese came to New Zealand in the last 10 years, compared to 47.1% of Hong Kong Chinese, 55.7% of Taiwanese, and 51.8% of Malaysian Chinese.

\textsuperscript{125} The NZES 2002 found that Labour voters are disproportionately represented among non-European, low-income groups, and women; Miller R., “Labour” in Miller (2003) pp235-250 at p248. For similar reasons, the “local” Chinese have also been Labour’s staunch supporters; Ip (2002).
cannot on its own attract Asian votes. The success of United Future with Korean voters can be attributed to its Christian-focus (given that 55.4% of Koreans belonged to ethnic religious organizations), emphasis on family values, support for multiculturalism, and the recent merger with a former Asian ethnic party\textsuperscript{126}. Overall, a smaller proportion of Asian New Zealanders supported minor parties than the general New Zealand population. This outcome was perhaps not surprising, given that most recent Asian immigrants would not have had enough opportunity to become familiar with all the minor parties. Nevertheless, the success of the Act party illustrated that a targeted approach by minority parties can attract a significant proportion of Asian votes.

3.5 CONCLUSION

This chapter looked at the participation rates of Asian New Zealanders in voting and other forms of political activities. Voting was found to be the most popular form of political activity amongst Asian New Zealanders, especially since almost all other political activities showed participation rates of less than 10%. For this reason, the analysis of Asians' participation rates other than voting focused only on the two most popular political activities of “signing petitions” and “working in the community”. In addition to the statistical reasons for focusing on these two activities, they represented a low-intensity and a high-intensity political activity, thereby allowing comparative analysis of factors that affect Asians’ participation in different forms of political activities. As predicted, the survey found that Asian New Zealanders participate at a lesser rate than Pakeha or Maori New Zealanders in all three political activities of voting, signing petitions, and working in the community. Identifying the factors that can explain the disparity in participation rates between different ethnic groups will be one of the main focuses of this thesis.

Cross-tabulation of the participation rates and different Asian ethnic groups revealed that Asians from more advanced democracies did not necessarily vote at a higher rate than those from non-democratic countries. This finding challenged the cultural theory that Asian immigrants’ low level of political participation derived mainly from previous political experience in their home countries; although their mode of participation appeared to reflect certain aspects of their home countries’ political environment. This, together with the finding that older Asians participate more in politics than younger ones, revealed possible shortcomings of the generational theory in explaining the turnout of those who have migrated to established democracies. What happens to the habit of (non)voting if one moves to a different country? Do they carry their “habit” to the new country or would the habit be broken because of the new environment? If one did not have any opportunity to experience voting in their home country, are they less likely to develop a habit of voting in the

\textsuperscript{126} James in Boston (2003) pp55 and 57.
host country than those who have already had the experience of democratic elections, or are they more susceptible to new political stimuli? These are some of the questions that need to be addressed if the generational theory were to have a wider application.

Analysis of the demographic factors indicated that different factors are expected to influence Asian New Zealanders’ participation rates in different forms of political activities. This is because demographic factors, which accounted for 2.8% of disparity in turnout between Asians and the general New Zealand population, showed nil effect on Asians’ participation rates in other forms of political activities. Further analysis of the data revealed that the effect of demographic factors on the political participation of Asian New Zealanders can be different from the effect they have on Pakeha or Maori New Zealanders. These patterns are expected to be repeated in future analysis of other explanatory variables.

The survey findings on political partisanship revealed that Asian New Zealanders’ support patterns are unique in that they differ from the support patterns of Asian Americans and the general New Zealand population. There was also a significant disparity in partisanship among different Asian ethnic groups. In general, Asian New Zealanders showed a surprisingly high level of political partisanship, considering that most have recently arrived in New Zealand. Factors such as Asians’ tendency to support the status quo, conservative values of Asians coupled with their religious beliefs, Asians’ relatively high socio-economic status, the existence of Asian MPs and candidates, and mobilisation efforts by political parties have been used to explain this phenomenon. Although full analysis of these factors would be beyond the scope of this thesis, it would be an interesting area of future research to assess which factors have the biggest influence on the political partisanship of Asian New Zealanders, and how (if any) Asians’ support patterns might change over a period of time. Similarly, the effect of party membership on the political participation of Asian New Zealanders deserves further attention, although the proportion of party membership among Asian New Zealanders was found to be too low (2%) to conduct in-depth statistical analysis in this thesis.
In this chapter, three factors that can be regarded as "individual variables" – socio-economic status, cultural values, and the level of acculturation – will be studied to predict their influence on the political participation of ethnic Chinese and Korean New Zealanders (hereinafter referred to as "Asian New Zealanders"). The effect of these individual variables on Asian New Zealanders' participation rates will be assessed in three political activities of voting, signing petitions and working in the community, with the latter two representing low-intensity and high-intensity political activities respectively. In so doing, this chapter will test the applicability of the socio-economic theory, cultural theory, social psychology theory, acculturation theory, and the RCM on the political participation of Asian New Zealanders.
PART A – SOCIO-ECONOMIC STATUS

Socio-economic factors such as the level of income, educational qualifications, and occupation are regarded as amongst the most important variables affecting individual political participation. Almost 50 years of the American National Election Study and other polling data have repeatedly demonstrated that people with higher education and income participate more in politics than people with lower socio-economic status\(^1\), because they have adequate resources (such as information, time, and money) which makes it easier and less costly for them to participate in politics. Education in particular is regarded as one of the factors that most strongly encourages political participation, as education increases cognitive skills that help people to learn about politics, overcome the bureaucratic obstacles involved in learning processes, and receive gratification from electoral participation\(^2\). In terms of the RCM, higher socio-economic status represents a greater “stake” in society - a greater benefit to be received from being involved in politics\(^3\). In this part of the thesis, questions on Asian New Zealanders’ level of wealth, education, and occupational status will be asked to assess their socio-economic status and its relevance to their political participation. In so doing, the study seeks to test the applicability of the socio-economic theory on the political participation of Asian New Zealanders.

4.1 COMPARATIVE CONTEXT

The socio-economic theorists have used the generally lower socio-economic status of ethnic minority groups vis-à-vis that of the dominant group to explain the low participation rates of ethnic minority groups in Western countries\(^4\). This was supported by the finding that the rate of African American political participation was same as, or higher than, White Americans, once income and education levels were controlled\(^5\). Similarly, the difference in participation rates between White Americans and Latino Americans diminished once socio-economic factors were controlled\(^6\). But the same cannot be said of Asian Americans, making them the only group to whom the socio-economic theory does not appear to apply. Asian Americans in general have a higher socio-economic status than most other ethnic groups in the US (to the extent that they are regarded as

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\(^1\) See Verba and Nie (1972); Verba, Schlozman and Brady (1995).
the “model minority”\textsuperscript{7}, yet their level of political participation is found to be lower than other groups.

Asian Americans’ socio-economic success has been well documented - for example, Asian Americans’ median household income in 1999 was the highest amongst all ethnic groups at $45,249\textsuperscript{8}, and they also had the greatest proportion of college graduates of any racial or ethnic groups at 42% (compared to 25% for White Americans, 13% for African Americans and 10% for Latino Americans)\textsuperscript{9}. In addition, a high percentage of Asian students were found to be at top universities such as Harvard (14%), MIT (20%), and the University of California at Berkeley (25%), at a time when Asian Americans constituted only 2.9% of the population\textsuperscript{10}. The 2001 survey also found that 38% of Asian American men and 32% of Asian American women worked in managerial and professional specialty occupations, such as engineers, dentists, teachers, lawyers and reporters\textsuperscript{11}. Despite this exceptional socio-economic success, the 2001 survey and various other studies on the political participation of Asian Americans have consistently shown that Asian Americans have the lowest voter turnout rate amongst all ethnic groups in the US. Studies on the political participation of Asian immigrants therefore pose a serious challenge to the socio-economic theory.

To understand this puzzle - that socio-economic factors do not appear to have the expected positive influence on the political participation of Asian Americans as a group - various studies have come up with a number of possible explanations. One of the explanations is that it is not education per se that increases the likelihood of one’s voting but rather the socialisation process that is provided through education, and that Asian immigrants who were educated overseas may not have been exposed to the socialisation process that promotes political participation\textsuperscript{12}. Asian Americans’ relative political inactivity has also been explained as a logical consequence of

\textsuperscript{7} It should be noted that the perception of “model minority” only reflects a portion of Asian Americans. For example, the 2001 survey found that although the most common categories of annual income for Koreans and Southern Asians were “between $40,000 - $59,999” and “over $80,000”, the most common category for Chinese and Vietnamese was “between $10,000-$19,999”. See also Takeda in Menifield (2001) p81.

\textsuperscript{8} US Census 1999. However, because Asian Pacific American households were on average larger than White American households (3.17 people versus 2.58 people), their estimated income per household member was in fact lower than White Americans ($18,569 compared with $20,093). The Census only had a category for “Asian Pacific Americans”, and there appeared to be no separate category/data for “Asian Americans”; See \url{http://www.census.gov/press-release/ct98-177.html} as cited in US Census Bureau’s Public Information Office, “Facts about Asian Pacific Americans” in (2000-2001) National Asian Pacific American Political Almanac 52 at 52.

\textsuperscript{9} Hing (1993) p11.

\textsuperscript{10} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{11} A similar result was found in a 1988 survey, where 63% of native-born Korean Americans, 76% of native-born Chinese Americans and 59% of native-born Japanese Americans were found to be in “white-colour” occupations, compared to 50% of White Americans; Harrision L.E., \textit{Who prospers? How cultural values shape economic and political success} (1992) Basic Books, New York, p165, table 5-1.

contentment with their material success, on the basis that minority groups’ interest in gaining political power stems from economic deprivation\textsuperscript{13}. However, some studies have found that among Asian Americans, people with higher socio-economic status participate more in politics than people with lower socio-economic status\textsuperscript{14}. The case of Asian Americans therefore suggests that although socio-economic factors do encourage political participation of Asian immigrants, there may be other factors that discourage even those with high socio-economic status from participating in the host country’s politics.

**Asian New Zealanders**

There is a widely held belief in New Zealand that Asian New Zealanders in general have a high socio-economic status. This is because a large proportion of the recent Asian immigrants, who now comprise approximately 60\% of the total Asian population in New Zealand, came to New Zealand under the Business Immigration Scheme (where potential immigrants were assessed on their economic contribution to New Zealand) or the points system (where points were granted on the basis of the applicants’ wealth, educational qualifications, work experience, and other factors)\textsuperscript{15}. This was quite different from the case of Asian Americans, many of whom came to the US under the “family category” for the purposes of family re-unification\textsuperscript{16}, and who had to work up the ladder and educate their children to raise the community’s socio-economic status. In contrast, most recent Asian New Zealanders arrived in New Zealand with relatively high levels of wealth and educational qualifications. Various media reports on Asians driving expensive cars and settling in affluent suburbs have further strengthened this perception of “rich Asians”\textsuperscript{17}. This perception may have contributed to the growing interest in the political participation of Asian New Zealanders\textsuperscript{18}, despite overseas studies on Asian immigrants which found that Asians’ high socio-economic status did not necessarily result in the group displaying higher participation rates than


\textsuperscript{15} It should be noted that despite the hype, business immigrants who brought between $500,000-$750,000 have accounted for only about 3-4\% of the total number of immigrants since 1992; Ip M., “Asian Migrants – the Myth and the Reality”, New Zealand Herald, 29 October 1997. For more information on New Zealand’s immigration policies of the 1990s, see Papanidis J.L., Chequebook Immigration? The Development of New Zealand’s Business Immigration Policies 1978-1993 (1999) MA thesis in Political Studies, University of Auckland; Trlin in Trlin and Spoonley (1997).


\textsuperscript{17} See chapter 6.4 for examples of these media reports.

\textsuperscript{18} For example, the recent Asian immigrants have been regarded as “ones who mostly write letters to editors and call up radio talk-back programs, attempting to defend themselves and speaking on behalf of their fellow immigrants”; Vasil and Yoon (1996) p26. See also Ip in www.stevenyoung.co.nz/chinesevoice; Beal (2002).
other groups.

Whether or not Asian New Zealanders are in fact wealthy is, however, questionable. The Census 2001, for example, found the median personal annual income of Asian people to be $10,400, which was considerably lower than the national median income of $18,600\(^\text{19}\). This surprising result was explained by the Census 2001 as reflecting the fact that Asian New Zealanders are a relatively youthful population, many of whom are still studying\(^\text{20}\), and that a large proportion of Asian New Zealanders are recent immigrants who have not yet found a job\(^\text{21}\). Or it could simply mean that not all Asian New Zealanders are wealthy, and that it would be dangerous to assume that they are. Reports showing Asian immigrants having the lowest full-time employment rates of all recent immigrants\(^\text{22}\), and a number of highly qualified Asian immigrants working as taxi-drivers, cleaners and other manual workers\(^\text{23}\), further support this view. Having said that, it could be a case of Asian New Zealanders’ reported level of annual income not accurately reflecting their actual level of wealth - Asian New Zealanders who have substantial assets either in New Zealand or overseas may no longer be required to work for additional income in New Zealand. There is evidence supporting this possibility, such as the fact that Asian immigrants brought $1.8 billion in investment to New Zealand between 1992-1997\(^\text{24}\), and that more Asian New Zealanders have access to internet, fax machines and telephones than the general New Zealand population\(^\text{25}\). For this reason, the survey asked the respondents whether they own residential, investment, or other

\(^{19}\) It was in fact the lowest of all ethnic groups. The median income for other groups were $19,800 for European, $14,800 for Maori and Pacific Islanders, and $11,400 for "other" ethnic groups, such as Arabs, Iranians, Somalis and Latin Americans. The only group of Asians who had a higher median income than the average were local Chinese at $22,000.

\(^{20}\) According to the Census 2001, 21% of Asians were in the 15-24 age group, compared to 14% of the total New Zealand population. 60% of Asians in the 15-24 age group were found to be studying, compared to 44% of the general New Zealand population in the same age group.

\(^{21}\) The Census 2001 found that only 57% of Asian New Zealanders were in the labour force (i.e. in full-time or part-time paid employment or actively seeking work), compared to 68% of European and 67.7% of Maori. The unemployment rate for Asians was also high at 13%, compared to 7% of the total New Zealand population. However, among those who were in the labour force, a slightly higher proportion of the employed Asians (43%) were in white collar occupations (professional, legislators, administrators and managers, technicians and associated professionals) than the general population (40%).


\(^{25}\) The Census 2001 found that Asian New Zealanders were more likely to have access to internet (61.5%) and a fax machine (38.9%) than the general New Zealand population, and that 98% of Asians had access to a telephone.
properties in New Zealand or overseas, instead of questions on annual income\textsuperscript{26}.

In terms of educational qualifications, the Census 2001 found that a high proportion of Asian adults held a formal qualification (86\% compared to 70\% of the general New Zealand population), including a bachelors degree or higher qualification (23\% compared to 12\% of the general New Zealand population). The fact that a large proportion of Asian youth were currently studying at universities and other tertiary institutions\textsuperscript{27} also indicated that the proportion of Asian New Zealanders with high educational qualifications is likely to increase in the future. It is interesting to note, however, that 35\% of Asian people with high educational qualifications obtained their qualifications from overseas universities, suggesting they may not have been exposed to the socialisation process which helps promote political participation in New Zealand.

4.2 SURVEY RESULTS AND ANALYSIS

Questions on wealth, education, and occupational status were asked in the survey to assess Asian New Zealanders’ socio-economic status and its relevance to their political participation. As predicted, the survey revealed that a high proportion of Asian New Zealanders were financially well-off and highly educated, but their high socio-economic status did not necessarily translate into a high level of political participation. The difficulties Asians face in obtaining suitable jobs in New Zealand appeared to have discouraged the political participation of Asian New Zealanders, as those in certain types of occupations were less likely to participate in politics than others. This suggested that it is not money or education per se that encourages individuals’ political participation but rather the socialization process of acquiring wealth and educational qualifications. This finding challenged the applicability of the socio-economic theory on the political participation of Asian New Zealanders.

Property ownership

The question on property ownership\textsuperscript{28} revealed that a large proportion (63.7\%) of Asian respondents own property, and that property owners (78.4\%) were more likely than those who do

\textsuperscript{26} In addition, questions on the level of income do not usually attract a good response rate. For example, in a 1996 study conducted on 375 recent Asian immigrants, over 200 respondents reportedly failed to fill in their current income levels; Friesen and Ip (1997) p10.

\textsuperscript{27} The Ministry of Education found that university students of Asian ethnicity reached 12.8\% in 2001, compared to 8.5\% of Maori and 3.5\% of Pacific Islands students. In the case of the University of Auckland, the number of Asian students reached 34.3\% in 2002, compared to 5.8\% of Maori and 6.6\% of Pacific Islands students: Report of the University of Auckland International and Immigrant Student Survey (2002) Office of the Pro Vice-Chancellor (International), University of Auckland, at pp9 and 11. See also Walsh R., “Asians push up varsity numbers”, New Zealand Herald, 22 August 2000, pA3.

\textsuperscript{28} The question on property ownership yielded a high response rate of 98.2\%, contrary to questions on annual income which usually yield a low response rate; see Friesen and Ip (1997) p10.
not own property (71.1%) to have voted at the last election (see graph 4.1). Similarly, analysis of the NZES data showed that New Zealanders who own property voted at a higher rate than non-property owners\textsuperscript{29}, thereby reaffirming the socio-economic theory. Asian New Zealanders who own property were also more likely to participate in certain political activities such as making donations\textsuperscript{30}. Further analysis of the data showed that the proportion of property owners among Asians was higher than that of Maori (51.0%), but that Asians participated in politics at a lower rate than Maori. This finding challenged the applicability of the socio-economic theory on the political participation of Asian New Zealanders as it relates to other ethnic groups.

![Graph 4.1 Turnout of Asians who own property](image)

- Chi-square .012
- Phi and Cramer's V .081

**Employment status**

The question on current employment status revealed that the most common form of employment among Asian New Zealanders was working full-time for pay (22.9%), followed by running own business (19.8%), studying (16.0%), doing unpaid work at home (10.3%), and being retired (9.5%)\textsuperscript{31}. For the general New Zealand population, the most common form of employment was working full-time for pay (35.4%), followed by running own business (16.9%), and being retired (16.3%). Cross-tabulation of the current employment status and voter turnout showed that

\textsuperscript{29} 94.7% for property owners and 87.2% for non-property owners (Chi-square .000, Phi and Cramer's V .126).

\textsuperscript{30} Although property owners were more likely to participate in political activities such as joining a political party, assisting in a political campaign, and writing or phoning government or media, the differences were not statistically significant.

\textsuperscript{31} The survey recorded a surprisingly low rate of unemployment (4.8%), although it appeared that unemployed respondents may have chosen a different description of their current situation, such as studying or doing unpaid work.
Asians who were studying (61.7%), doing unpaid work at home (72.9%) or running their own business (73.9%) were less likely than others to have voted at the last election (see graph 4.2). In this sense, the fact that a larger proportion of Asian New Zealanders were currently studying (16.0% compared to 4.8% of the general New Zealand population) or doing unpaid work at home (10.3% compared to 7.5% of the general New Zealand population) may account for their low level of participation. Given that Asians who cannot find suitable employment tend to start their own business (usually ethnic-related) or re-train in New Zealand, Asians’ difficulty in finding suitable jobs in New Zealand may be interpreted as limiting their opportunities to participate in politics. Another interesting finding was the exceptionally high proportion (9.5%) of Asians who have retired, and their relatively high turnout (81.4%), considering that Asian New Zealanders are youthful population with only 10% of the respondents being older than 60 years of age. This means that a large proportion of retired Asians are relatively young and (possibly) wealthy compared to their New Zealand counterparts, and therefore have sufficient time, money, and stake in society to participate in politics.

Graph 4.2 Turnout of Asians in different occupations

Chi-square .000
Phi and Cramer’ V .195

Among the Asian respondents who described themselves as retired, 40% were under the age of 60. In comparison, only 4% of the NZES respondents who were under the age of 60 described themselves as retired.
Education

The survey revealed that more than 75% of Asian respondents have completed some form of tertiary education - 14.0% postgraduate degree, 47.3% university degree, and 15.3% university or polytechnic diploma or certificate. As predicted, Asians’ educational qualifications were considerably higher than those of the NZES respondents, only 41.4% of whom received some form of tertiary education. However, as was the case with Asian Americans, Asian New Zealanders with higher educational qualifications did not necessarily vote in higher numbers than those with lower educational qualifications (see graph 4.3). The fact that almost all of the respondents (95.6%) came to New Zealand in the last 15 years, and therefore were likely to have received their educational qualifications overseas, may explain why their level of education does not correlate with their participation rates in New Zealand.

Graph 4.3 Turnout of Asians with different educational qualifications

-Chi-square .167
-Phi and Cramer’s V .088

33 The figures obtained in the survey were considerably higher than those obtained from the Census, where only 23% of the Asian population was found to have bachelor’s degree or higher. This indicated that people who have high educational qualifications were more likely to participate in the survey. The same can be said of the general New Zealand population - compared to the Census finding that only 12% of New Zealanders received university degree or higher, the NZES 2002 found that 5.6% of the respondents received a postgraduate degree, 10.4% a university degree, and 25.4% a university or polytech certificate or diploma.

34 See Leighley and Nagler in Tam Cho (1994) p1142, which argued that it is not education per se that promotes participation but rather the socialization process that is provided through education. Interestingly, however, there appeared to be little correlation between education level and voting rate even among the general New Zealand population (Chi-square .457, Phi and Cramer’s V .050).
Another interesting finding – that those with less than high school education showed the highest turnout of 85.4% - could be explained by the fact that most Asians with low educational qualifications are elderly people who may not have had the opportunity to receive a proper education, because of historical circumstances such as poverty, the Korean War, and China’s Cultural Revolution\textsuperscript{35}. This means that they would exhibit different characteristics from New Zealanders with low educational qualifications who had the opportunity, but chose not, to receive education. It could also mean that the demographic factor of age has greater influence on the political participation of Asian New Zealanders than the socio-economic factor of educational qualification. In so finding, the current study on Asian New Zealanders highlighted possible shortcomings of the socio-economic theory in predicting the political participation of Asian New Zealanders.

Regression of the socio-economic factors

Regression of the factors relating to socio-economic status revealed that one’s occupation type has the greatest relevance to the political participation of Asian New Zealanders. For example, people who were studying were 13.8% less likely to vote when all other socio-economic factors were controlled; whereas people in full-time employment were 8.3% more likely to vote (see table 4.1). The level of wealth and educational qualification, on the other hand, did not appear to have any statistically significant relevance to Asian New Zealanders’ participation rates. The type of occupation again had the greatest effect on Asian New Zealanders’ participation in other forms of political activities, as people in full-time employment and those who run their own business were 15.7% and 6.1% more likely to sign petitions. Interestingly, people who run their own business were 5.9% less likely to work in the community, indicating that the same factor can have the opposite effect on high- and low-intensity participation.

\textsuperscript{35} For example, more than 60% of the Asian respondents who received less than high school education were aged 50 years or older. New Zealand’s recent immigration policies which focused on, inter alia, educational qualifications, also meant that those with less than high school education would not qualify unless as parents of the applicant.
Table 4.1 Effect of socio-economic factors on participation rate – Asian data

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Voting</th>
<th>Signing petition</th>
<th>Working in community</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>%</td>
<td>b</td>
<td>s.e</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wealth</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>0.28</td>
<td>0.19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High education</td>
<td>-0.8</td>
<td>-0.05</td>
<td>0.18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fulltime</td>
<td>8.3</td>
<td>0.55*</td>
<td>0.26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Own business</td>
<td>-3.0</td>
<td>-0.16</td>
<td>0.24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployed</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>0.11</td>
<td>0.43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Studying</td>
<td>-13.8</td>
<td>-0.65**</td>
<td>0.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>74.0</td>
<td>1.05**</td>
<td>0.21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% concordant</td>
<td>76.1</td>
<td>86.1</td>
<td>91.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cox &amp; Snell R²</td>
<td>.034</td>
<td>.028</td>
<td>.015</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**significant at <.01  *significant at <.05

Regression of the NZES-Asia merged data showed that socio-economic factors played an important role in encouraging the political participation of the general New Zealand population. For example, New Zealanders who own property were 5.6% more likely to vote, 4.9% more likely to sign petitions, and 5.6% more likely to work in the community than non-property owners when all other socio-economic factors were controlled (see table 4.2). Having high educational qualifications also increased the likelihood of New Zealanders signing petitions and working in the community by 6.2% and 11.4% respectively. The type of occupation also appeared to have a statistically significant effect on New Zealanders' political participation, as those who were studying were 9.7% less likely to vote, and those in full-time employment were 11.1% more likely to sign petitions.

Because Asians rate relatively high on socio-economic variables, the controls on socio-economic factors did little to reduce the disparity between Asians and other ethnic groups. For example, although the likelihood of Asian non-voting vis-à-vis Pakeha reduced by 2.1% to 17.0% when socio-economic factors were controlled, Asians were still 63.9% less likely to sign petitions and 21.3% less likely to work in the community than Pakeha (an increase of 0.7% and 4.4% from when no other factors were controlled). In sharp contrast to the case of Asian New Zealanders, the likelihood of Maori non-participation in the activity of signing petitions ceased to have statistically significant relevance once all the socio-economic factors were controlled. The likelihood of Maori non-voting also reduced by 0.8% to 6.6%, indicating that improving Maori’s socio-economic status could reduce the differences in participation rates between Pakeha and Maori.

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36 “High education” is defined as people with university degree or postgraduate degree.
Table 4.2 Effect of socio-economic factors on participation rate – Merged data

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Voting</th>
<th></th>
<th>Signing petition</th>
<th></th>
<th>Working in community</th>
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<td>b</td>
<td>s.e</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>b</td>
<td>s.e</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asian</td>
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<td>-1.63**</td>
<td>0.18</td>
<td>-63.9</td>
<td>-3.23**</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wealth</td>
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<td>0.15</td>
<td>4.9</td>
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<td>High education</td>
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<td>0.07</td>
<td>0.15</td>
<td>6.2</td>
<td>0.49**</td>
<td>0.15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fulltime</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>0.13</td>
<td>0.18</td>
<td>11.1</td>
<td>0.68**</td>
<td>0.13</td>
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<td>Own business</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>-0.20</td>
<td>0.20</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>0.17</td>
<td>0.15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployed</td>
<td>1.9</td>
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<td>0.34</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>0.28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Studying</td>
<td>-9.7</td>
<td>-0.56**</td>
<td>0.21</td>
<td>-1.5</td>
<td>-0.18</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
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<td>2.57**</td>
<td>0.20</td>
<td>67.7</td>
<td>0.65**</td>
<td>0.14</td>
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<tr>
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<td></td>
<td>0.338</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.081</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**significant at <.01  *significant at <.05

4.3 SUMMARY

Analysis of the survey findings indicated that neither the level of wealth nor the level of education could be an accurate predictor of Asian New Zealanders' level of political participation, whereas both factors showed a strong correlation to the political participation of the general New Zealand population. The findings were consistent with studies on Asian immigrants in other Western countries where socio-economic factors were not found to have a significant effect on the political participation of Asian immigrants. Yet, there was a correlation between the turnout of Asian New Zealanders and their type of occupation, even when levels of education and wealth were controlled. This indicated that it was the socialization process of acquiring wealth and educational qualifications, rather than the levels of wealth and education, that affected the political participation of Asian New Zealanders. For example, people in full-time employment did not necessarily have more money or higher educational qualifications than those who run their own business, yet they were more likely to participate in politics than business-owners, possibly due to the social networks and workplace environment that reflect their socio-economic status. In other words, the socio-economic theory would apply to Asian New Zealanders only to the extent that their socio-economic status was an accurate indicator of their socialization process. In this sense, the participation rates of New Zealand-born Asians (who would have been exposed to

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37 Such as Uhlaner et al. (1989), Lien (1996), and Tam Cho (1999).
38 For more information on the effect of social networking on Asian New Zealanders' political participation, see chapter 5.5.
the same socialization process as the general New Zealand population) are expected to respond more closely to their socio-economic status\textsuperscript{39}.

\textsuperscript{39} The current survey did not find statistically significant relevance between socio-economic status and the turnout among New Zealand-born Asians. However, because only 3\% of the respondents were New Zealand-born, it would take another decade or two to test such a hypothesis on a substantial number of Asian New Zealanders.
PART B – CULTURAL VALUES

Many studies have found that political activism is shaped by one’s cultural attitudes and values, such as a sense of civic duty, democratic commitment, political efficacy, and political interest that individuals learn from their surroundings and personal experiences. Further to this theory, the low level of political participation of Asian immigrants has often been explained in cultural terms – that Asians are “apathetic” towards politics in their host countries because of Asian cultural characteristics that are inimical to political participation. In order to test the cultural theory, the survey incorporated questions on Asians’ level of interest in politics, their views on various government policies, and their level of democratic commitment. These questions will help assess the influence of cultural and attitudinal factors on the political participation of Asian New Zealanders. If Asian culture per se discourages Asian immigrants from participating in politics, respondents who exhibit strong Asian values would be less likely to participate in politics.

4.4 COMPARATIVE CONTEXT

Although it is hard to identify cultural characteristics that are shared by all Asian immigrants, age-old ideologies and religions such as Confucianism, Buddhism and Taoism have generally been regarded as representing the “Asian culture”. The cultural theorists have used certain characteristics of the “Asian culture”, such as respect for hierarchy, obedience to authority, emotional docility, politeness, and a focus on self-help, to explain Asian immigrants’ political inactivity. For example, Asian people tend not to seek redress for personal grievances through political means but by working harder to overcome personal difficulties, and this tendency has been interpreted as Asian cultural values discouraging Asian immigrants from participating in politics. Confucius’ teaching that not everyone is entitled to speak in all situations has also been used to explain the reluctance of Asian immigrants to speak out in their adopted countries –

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41 The influence of Confucianism is stronger in North Asian countries such as Korea, Japan and China, and in other countries consisted mainly of Chinese (such as Singapore and Vietnam), but not in the Philippines or other Southeast Asian countries; Gudykunst (2001) p48.
42 The term “culture” can be defined as “the system of socially created and learned standards for perceiving and acting, shared by members of an identity group”, which shapes the standards and criteria used to define fairness, justice and efficiency; Donahue W.A and Bresnahan M.I., “Communication Issues in Mediating Cultural Conflict” in Foler J.P. and Jones T.S. (eds) New Directions in Mediation (1994) Sage Publication, Thousand Oaks, pp135-158 at p146.
44 See Lien (1997) which supports the view that most Asian Americans do not link grievances in their personal life with the group position in the socio-political system, nor seek redress through voting; p41.
as immigrants, they are not “entitled” to interfere with the host country’s politics. In addition, Asian immigrants’ desire to conform to the “norm” rather than to voice their differences, in a belief that any additional distinction would be intolerable, has been regarded as another “cultural reason” for Asians’ reluctance to participate in politics.\textsuperscript{46}

The cultural theory, however, can be misleading - it contains the danger of being manipulated by the political elites of the host country to nurture the idea that the lack of political participation by Asian immigrants is a natural phenomenon, thereby denying the existence of other factors which prevent political participation of Asian immigrants (such as systematic disenfranchisement, ostracism, and institutionalised discrimination against Asian immigrants)\textsuperscript{47}. The cultural theory is also based on the flawed assumption that culture is static, and that people of certain ethnic origins are always to be defined and behaviourally determined by it.\textsuperscript{48} In reality, culture is capable of being constantly changed and enriched by forces inside and outside its domain, as that is the only way for culture to maintain its relevance in a rapidly changing society.\textsuperscript{49} The cultural theory also fails to explain the fact that Asian Americans have fought every piece of discriminatory legislation since the 19\textsuperscript{th} century,\textsuperscript{50} and that many recent Asian immigrants have fought for democracy in their home countries through active political participation. In addition, more than 60\% of the respondents in the 2001 survey indicated that they were either “very” or “somewhat” interested in the US politics, thereby challenging the claim that Asians are not interested in politics for cultural reasons.

For Asian immigrants, the cultural values that they learn from their shared experience in the host country may have a greater influence on their political participation than traditional cultural values.\textsuperscript{51} For this reason, many have argued that the inhibited and compliant attitudes of Asian immigrants derived not from their traditional culture, but from the fear, uncertainty, and constant


\textsuperscript{51} Freeman (2000) p35.
pressure for conformity that they have experienced in the host country\textsuperscript{52}. Having said that, the influence of traditional culture on the political participation of Asian immigrants should not be ignored, as people absorb and retain certain values from the political culture within which they have been socialised\textsuperscript{53}. Studies on the political participation of Asian immigrants therefore raise interesting questions in respect to the cultural theory of participation.

Asian New Zealanders

Although the political behaviours of Asian New Zealanders cannot be wholly explained in cultural terms, the influence of Asian cultural values that have been preserved by Asian New Zealanders and passed on to the next generation should not be underestimated. Asian people believe that their miraculous economic growth derived not only from the adoption of Western ideas and institutions but also from their cultural heritage and social underpinnings\textsuperscript{54} - as such, they tend to retain certain cultural traditions in the host country\textsuperscript{55}. For this reason, there may be a number of Asian cultural characteristics that continue to influence Asian immigrants' views on various policy issues. This would be especially so for Asian New Zealanders, most of whom were recent immigrants, as the influence of cultural characteristics would inevitably diminish over time as Asian immigrants gradually adopt the host country's values and practices\textsuperscript{56}. For this reason, it is expected that Asian New Zealanders would not, in general, support policies involving governmental assistance, given the Asian cultural value of "self-help". What is not clear, however, is whether those who exhibit strong Asian cultural values would be less likely to participate in politics, as argued by cultural theorists.

As discussed earlier in chapter 2.2, most Asian New Zealanders (with the possible exceptions of mainland Chinese and early Asian immigrants) are familiar with democratic concepts, and have


\textsuperscript{53} McAllister and Makkai (1992) p270.


\textsuperscript{55} It should be noted that Asian people have been more reluctant to accept Western cultural values compared with economic values. This reluctance is represented by the phrase \textit{ti-yong} (Chinese learning for the fundamental principles, Western learning for practical use), and \textit{woken-yosei} (Japanese spirit, Western technique) articulated by Chinese and Japanese reformers a century ago; Huntington S.P., "The West: Unique, not Universal" (1996) 75(6) Foreign Affairs 28 at 35.

\textsuperscript{56} For the early Asian immigrants to New Zealand, who were forced to adopt tactics of "absorbing racism" - using English names, wearing Western clothes, and not using one's native language in public to conform to the "norm" – the Asian cultural influence would be significantly less evident than the recent immigrants; Wong (2002) p6. Wong also talked about how primary loyalty to New Zealand and renunciation of Chinese nationality/way of life were requirements for naturalisation in 1951. See also Ip in Greif (1995) p183.
had some experience of democratic political participation in their home countries. It was also found in chapter 3.2 that Asian immigrants who had democratic political experience in their home countries did not necessarily participate in politics at a higher rate than those with no such prior experience. This may well be because Asians with prior experience of democratic political activities (although more familiar with democratic concepts and values) are less appreciative of their political rights in the host country than Asian immigrants from non-democratic countries. The survey will look at whether this is in fact the case, by comparing the level of democratic commitment of respondents from different countries of origin. In accordance with the social psychology theory, it is hypothesized that Asian New Zealanders with a higher level of political interest, trust, and democratic commitment would be more likely than others to participate in politics.

4.5 SURVEY RESULTS AND ANALYSIS

The survey challenged the cultural theory that Asians are not interested in politics for cultural reasons by finding that Asian New Zealanders exhibited a high level of political interest and democratic commitment. In addition, the survey found that although a significant proportion of Asian New Zealanders continued to display certain Asian cultural characteristics, those who exhibit Asian cultural traits did not necessarily participate in politics at a lower rate. At the same time, the survey reaffirmed the applicability of the social psychology theory on the political participation of Asian New Zealanders, as those who showed a high level of democratic commitment and political interest were more likely to participate in politics.

Political interest

The survey results refuted the myth that Asians are not interested in politics for cultural reasons by finding that Asian New Zealanders were in general interested in both the politics of New Zealand and of their home countries. When asked how much interest they usually have in what is going on in politics of their home countries, 45.6% of the respondents indicated that they were either “very” (12.9%) or “fairly” (32.8%) interested. The largest proportion (37.8%) of the respondents replied that they were “somewhat” interested, whereas 16.6% responded that they were “not at all” interested in politics of their home countries. A similar level of interest was recorded in New Zealand politics among Asian respondents, 44.7% of whom replied that they were either “very” (9.4%) or “fairly” (35.2%) interested in politics of New Zealand. Again, the

57 However, it should be noted that the expression of interest in politics, a subjective assertion, may change depending on the wording and ordering of a questionnaire; Schwarz N. and Schuman H., “Political knowledge, attribution, and inferred interest in politics: The operation of buffer items” (1997) 2 International Journal of Public Opinion Research 191-195, as cited in Milner (2002) p39.
largest proportion (44.6%) of the respondents was found to be “somewhat” interested in New Zealand politics. Only 10.8% of the respondents indicated that they were “not at all” interested in the politics of New Zealand, which was less than the 16.6% who responded that they were not interested in the politics of their home countries. Although Asian New Zealanders' interest level in New Zealand politics was lower than that of the general New Zealand population (66.9% of whom have indicated that they were either very (19.9%) or fairly (47.0%) interested in New Zealand politics), the interest level was high enough to challenge the perception that Asians were not interested in politics for cultural reasons. As predicted, and further to the social psychology theory, Asians who showed interest in New Zealand politics were more likely than others to vote and to participate in different forms of political activities\(^{58}\) (see graph 4.4).

Graph 4.4 Turnout of Asians with different levels of interest in New Zealand politics

![Graph showing turnout of Asians with different levels of interest in New Zealand politics]

- Chi-square .000
- Phi and Cramer’s V .229

Influence of cultural values

Although it was difficult to measure the influence of “Asian cultural characteristics”, the survey revealed that Asian values of self-help and a focus on socio-economic advancement continued to influence Asian New Zealanders’ perspectives on a number of issues. For example, when asked what would be the most effective way of representing Asians’ interests in New Zealand, more than one third of the respondents chose “advancement of socio-economic status” (34.7%) over

\(^{58}\) Asians who expressed interest in politics were more likely to assist in political campaigns (Chi-square .000, Phi and Cramer’s V .145), make donations (Chi-square .008, Phi and Cramer’s V .115), write or phone government officials or media (Chi-square .000, Phi and Cramer’s V .142), attend a protest or demonstration (Chi-square .014, Phi and Cramer’s V .108), sign petitions (Chi-square .000, Phi and Cramer’s V .198), and work in the community (Chi-square .000, Phi and Cramer’s V .145).
other choices such as “having more Asian representatives in government” (28.0%), “creating coalitions with other Asian communities” (16.4%) and “creating strong ethnic communities” (8.2%)\(^{59}\). Interestingly, none of the Malaysian Chinese chose “advancement of socio-economic status” as the most effective way of representing Asian interests in New Zealand, perhaps drawing from their experience at home where high socio-economic status did not necessarily lead to better political representation of their interests. The cultural influence was also evident in a question asking where they would turn for help if faced with problems in the host country. The largest proportion of the respondents indicated that they would seek help from “friends and families” (32.0%) or “try to deal with them on my own” (24.0%), followed by seeking help from “government and other New Zealand authorities” (17.1%), and “ethnic community or religious group” (11.9%). The results again reflected the ongoing influence of Asian cultural values of self-help and strong family ties on Asian New Zealanders\(^{60}\). Somewhat surprisingly, the period of residency in New Zealand did not appear to affect the influence of Asian cultural values, as little difference was recorded between earlier and more recent Asian immigrants on these two issues.

Contrary to the cultural theory that Asian cultural traits discourage the political participation of Asian immigrants, cross-tabulation showed little difference in voting rates between those who exhibited strong Asian cultural traits (such as people who chose “advancing socio-economic status” as the best way of representing Asian interests) and those who chose other ways of furthering Asian interests (such as “having more Asian representatives”) (see graph 4.5). Similarly, those who indicated that they would deal with problems “on their own” did not necessarily show a lower participation rate than those who did not exhibit strong Asian cultural traits (see graph 4.6). The results indicated that Asian cultural characteristics cannot, on their own, account for Asian New Zealanders’ low level of political participation.

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\(^{59}\) Some of the “other” responses included Asian people’s integration into the New Zealand society, elimination of racial distinction, equal treatment of everybody, improved character, personality and calibre of Asian students and immigrants, and more education, advertisement and campaigns on Asia and Asian ethics.

\(^{60}\) Although there was no comparative data for Pakeha/Maori respondents, Asian people’s focus on self-help and reliance on family and friends was also reflected in a survey conducted by the author in 1999 among 120 Koreans and European students at the University of Auckland. In the 1999 survey, the respondents were asked what they would do if they become involved in a conflict. More than 80% of Korean students said that they would ask their family or friends to be a mediator, whereas the most popular choices for European students were to hire an independent mediator (45%) and going to a court (30%). Survey results are on file with the author.
Graph 4.5 Turnout of Asians with different views on the best way to represent Asian interests

- Chi-square .947
- Phi and Cramer’s V .032

Graph 4.6 Turnout of Asians with different approach to problem solving

- Chi-square .160
- Phi and Cramer’s V .086

Views on policies

The Asian cultural influence was also evident in Asian New Zealanders’ views on various policies that might be implemented to assist them. The respondents were asked whether they support: (1) job training and educational assistance for Asian New Zealanders; (2) race-based preferential (quota) systems for Asians; and (3) provision of bilingual services. The respondents showed overwhelming support for provision of training (95.5%) and bilingual services (92.9%), but as
predicted, a smaller proportion of the respondents (61.1%) supported a quota system for Asians. The five Asian ethnic groups showed general consistency in their views on these three issues, although an overwhelming proportion of Malaysian Chinese (77.0%) opposed the idea of a quota system, possibly due to their experience at home where they had been disadvantaged by various quota systems designed to benefit the Malays.

The respondents were also asked whether they thought that the government should provide or ensure: (1) a job for everyone who wants one; (2) a decent living standard for elders; (3) a decent living standard for the unemployed; (4) free healthcare; and (5) free education from pre-school to university. Contrary to expectation that Asians would be reluctant to receive government assistance, the respondents in general showed a high level of support for all five policies, some even higher than the NZES respondents. The support was strongest for provisions relating to elders (93.9%), reflecting the Asian cultural value of respect for elders, followed by provision of jobs (79.7%), free healthcare (74.3%), free education (61.8%), and assistance for the unemployed (53.1%). There were few differences in terms of voting rates between those who supported government assistance (for both Asian-specific policies and five other categories) and those who did not support such policies, consistent with the earlier findings that Asian cultural characteristics do not have much effect on the political participation of Asian New Zealanders.

Democratic commitment

Questions asked to assess Asian New Zealanders’ sense of civic duty revealed that Asians in general had a strong sense of democratic commitment. For example, when asked whether they agreed with a statement that there was a need for Asians to participate in New Zealand politics, 94.5% of the respondents either “strongly agreed” (43.0%) or “agreed” (51.4%) with the statement. Similarly, more than 90% of the respondents agreed with a statement that it was a citizen’s duty to vote (39.3% “strongly agreed” and 52.8% “agreed”). Asian New Zealanders’ democratic commitment was as strong as that of the general New Zealand population, 91.2% of whom agreed with the statement that it was a citizen’s duty to vote. Further analysis revealed that the largest proportion of mainland Chinese (96.6% and 95.7%) and Malaysian Chinese (96.3% and 96.3%) agreed with the two statements, China and Malaysia being the countries which had the lowest Freedom House score for their state of democracy. This finding suggested

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61 94.3% of New Zealanders showed support for a decent living standard for elders, 69.1% for free education, 64.3% for free healthcare, 62.1% for providing jobs for everyone who wants one, and 61.1% for a decent living standard for the unemployed. It should be noted however that the response rate would have been different if tax implications of any such policy had been included in the questionnaire.

62 Compared to Koreans (94.5% and 90.9%), Taiwanese (93.6% and 90.8%), and Hong Kong Chinese (91.0% and 93.0%). The differences were statistically significant for the statement that Asians need to participate in politics (Chi-square .006, Phi and Cramer’s V .218), but not for the statement that it was a citizen’s duty to vote (Chi-square .360, Phi and Cramer’s V .162).
that Asians from non-democratic countries may be more appreciative of democratic values than those from more advanced democracies.

**Graph 4.7 Turnout of Asians who believe that Asians need to participate in NZ politics**

- Chi-square .893
- Phi and Cramer’s V .036

**Graph 4.8 Turnout of Asians who believe that it is a citizen’s duty to vote**

- Chi-square .000
- Phi and Cramer’s V .166

As predicted, and further to the social psychology theory, Asians who displayed a strong democratic commitment were more likely to participate in politics. For example, only 50% of those who disagreed with the statement that Asians needed to participate in politics voted, and
the voting rate for those who strongly disagreed with the statement that it was a citizen’s duty to vote was equally low at 33.3% (see graphs 4.7 and 4.8 above). At the same time, the survey results challenged certain aspects of the RCM by finding that Asian New Zealanders also thought of group welfare and the preservation of democracy, and not only of their own self-interest, in their calculation of whether or not to vote.

Regression of the cultural factors

Regression of the cultural factors reaffirmed the social psychology theory by finding that Asians who showed interest in New Zealand politics and those who agreed with the statement that it was a citizen’s duty to vote were 19.3% and 21.3% more likely to vote when all other cultural factors were controlled (see table 4.3). In other forms of political activities, apart from having political interest which increased the likelihood of signing petitions by 9.3%, factors that did not show much effect on turnout showed statistically significant relevance to Asian New Zealanders’ participation rates. For example (and somewhat surprisingly), people who felt that there was a need for Asians to participate in politics were 16.0% less likely to work in the community, and those who supported Asian-specific policies were 10.3% less likely to sign petitions. The analysis also revealed that Asians who supported government assistance policies were 4.5% more likely to work in the community.

Table 4.3 Effect of cultural factors on participation rate – Asian data

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Voting</th>
<th>Signing petition</th>
<th>Working in community</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>%</td>
<td>b</td>
<td>s.e</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political interest</td>
<td>19.3</td>
<td>0.91**</td>
<td>0.27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rep Asian interest</td>
<td>-1.8</td>
<td>-0.10</td>
<td>0.19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Need to participate</td>
<td>4.7</td>
<td>0.24</td>
<td>0.65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Duty to vote</td>
<td>21.3</td>
<td>1.01**</td>
<td>0.35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asian policies**</td>
<td>-2.6</td>
<td>-0.15</td>
<td>0.22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Govt assistance**</td>
<td>-6.0</td>
<td>-0.34</td>
<td>0.19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>38.6</td>
<td>-0.55</td>
<td>0.75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% concordant</td>
<td>75.4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cox &amp; Snell R²</td>
<td>.034</td>
<td>.028</td>
<td>.012</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**significant at <.01  *significant at <.05

63 The three questions on Asian-specific policies were merged into one question, with the alpha statistics of .687.
64 The five questions on government assistance were merged into one question, with the alpha statistics of .057.
Regression of the NZES-Asia merged data showed that a sense of civic duty and political interest also had a positive effect on the turnout of the general New Zealand population: those who showed an interest in New Zealand politics were 15.5% more likely to vote, and those with a sense of civic duty were 23.2% more likely to vote (see table 4.4). In other forms of political activities, New Zealanders who showed an interest in politics were 15.5% more likely to sign petitions and 6.8% more likely to work in the community, and those who supported government assistance policies were 3.5% more likely to work in the community. Although the cultural factors accounted for 0.3% of disparity in turnout between Asians and the general New Zealand population, they appeared to have greater influence on Pakeha than on Asians in other forms of political activities – for example, Asians were 63.9% less likely to sign petitions than Pakeha (an increase of 0.7% from when no other factors were controlled), and 17.8% less likely to work in the community (an increase of 0.9%) when the cultural factors were controlled. In contrast, cultural and attitudinal factors reduced the likelihood of Maori non-participation vis-à-vis Pakeha in voting and signing petitions by 3.2% and 0.9%.

Table 4.4 Effect of cultural factors on participation rate – Merged data

<table>
<thead>
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<th></th>
<th>Voting</th>
<th>Signing petition</th>
<th>Working in community</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>%</td>
<td>b</td>
<td>s.e</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asian</td>
<td>-18.8</td>
<td>-2.07**</td>
<td>0.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maori</td>
<td>-4.2</td>
<td>-0.85**</td>
<td>0.27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political interest</td>
<td>15.5</td>
<td>0.96**</td>
<td>0.22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Duty to vote</td>
<td>23.2</td>
<td>1.66**</td>
<td>0.22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Govt assistance</td>
<td>-2.3</td>
<td>-0.26</td>
<td>0.14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>60.0</td>
<td>0.96**</td>
<td>0.32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% concordant</td>
<td>87.1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cox &amp; Snell R²</td>
<td>.113</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**significant at <.01  *significant at <.05

4.6 SUMMARY

Contrary to the cultural theory that Asian people’s “apathy” is the main reason for their low level of political participation, and that such indifference to politics derives from Asian cultural traits, the survey found that Asian New Zealanders in general were interested in the politics of New Zealand and of their home countries. The survey also found that although Asian cultural characteristics and their previous political experience at home continued to influence Asian New Zealanders’ views on a number of policy-related matters, they did not necessarily discourage Asians from participating in New Zealand politics. On the other hand, the survey reaffirmed many aspects of the social psychology theory by finding that Asians with a high level of political interest and a sense of civic duty were more likely than others to participate in various forms of political
activities. At the same time, the finding that having a democratic commitment encourages political participation highlighted one of main shortfalls of the RCM, which struggles to include the psychological gratification of voting into its cost and benefit equation\(^\text{65}\).

\(^{65}\) Although Riker and Ordeshook (1968) added the “D” term in their participation model \((R=PB-C+D)\) to capture the incalculated beliefs about voting and democratic process, the debate on the appropriateness of including the “D” factor into the calculus of voting continues; see for example Blais (2000).
PART C – LEVEL OF ACCULTURATION

Almost all of the studies on Asian immigrants’ political participation found the level of acculturation to be one of the most important individual variables affecting the political participation of Asian immigrants. In particular, language deficiency and the “liability of newness” syndrome are regarded as two biggest barriers limiting Asian immigrants’ ability to participate in the politics of the host country. By “acculturation”, it means the adoption by immigrants of the language, cultural practices and behavioural traits of the host country – an acquisition of a second culture. The level of acculturation also influences the political participation of other immigrants who are new to the host country, and is not confined to the case of Asian immigrants. In RCM terms, language difficulties, liability of newness syndrome, and the need to obtain the necessary qualifications to vote could be seen as adding extra “cost” to participation for Asian immigrants. Asian New Zealanders’ level of acculturation will be assessed in the survey by asking questions on their period of residency, language skills and usage, level of interaction with other ethnic groups, political knowledge, and political partisanship. It is hypothesized that Asian New Zealanders with a high level of acculturation (ie. those who have lived in New Zealand for a longer period of time, have sufficient English skills and political knowledge, interact with other ethnic groups, and identify with a political party) would, in general, participate more in politics than those with a low level of acculturation.

4.7 COMPARATIVE CONTEXT

Asian immigrants’ low level of political participation has often been explained in terms of their low level of acculturation, as most Asian immigrants (especially recent immigrants from non-English speaking countries) lack the necessary information, language, confidence, and eligibility to participate in the politics of the host country. In particular, the problems associated with language difficulties have been illustrated in various studies on the political participation of Asian Americans. The 2001 survey found that the largest proportion of Asian Americans identified “language barriers” (22%) as the most significant problem facing the Asian community, and that 48% of the

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66 See for example, Freeman (2000); Rich (1996); Chang (2001); Lien (1994); Tam Cho (1999); and Uhlaner et al. (1989).
68 Gordon M., Assimilation in American Life: The Role of Race, Religion, and National Origin (1964) Oxford University Press, New York. Gordon differentiated acculturation from assimilation - he saw acculturation as the first stage of assimilation, where a minority group’s cultural and behavioural traits become more in line with that of the dominant group. Gordon identified assimilation as large-scale entrance into cliques, clubs, and institutions of the host society, whereas acculturation was something that can occur without a further process of assimilation taking place. See also Teske R. and Nelson B., “Acculturation and assimilation” (1974) 76 American Anthropologist 351-367, as cited in Gudykunst (2001) p173.
respondents were still living in linguistically isolated households. Another survey found that 46% of Asian Pacific American voters had problems reading English, and that 54% would be more likely to vote if they had received bilingual assistance. As political participation usually requires an understanding of political issues and the expression of political opinions, it would be extremely difficult for anybody to become active in politics until they acquire sufficient language skills. The language problem is exacerbated by the fact that Asian immigrants tend to socialise mainly with their own ethnic groups, and that they are often too busy adjusting to the new environment to learn English.

Political partisanship is another indicator of immigrants' level of acculturation, because it is an important part of one's sense of national identity and integration. The fact that only 38% of the respondents expressed politically partisan views in the 2001 survey can therefore be seen as reflecting the low level of acculturation of Asian Americans. Given that political partisanship is often the single most important determinant of whether or not one might participate in politics, Asian Americans' low level of partisanship may be one of the reasons why their turnout is lower than that of the dominant group. In addition, the fact that a large proportion of Asian Americans do not hold US citizenship can be seen as another reason for the low level of turnout among Asian Americans, as only citizens are eligible to vote in the US. For example, the 2001 survey found that 76% of Asian American respondents were foreign-born, and that 32% were non-citizens who were not eligible to vote.

As illustrated, the cost of participation is higher for Asian immigrants with a low level of acculturation, as they have to incur the extra “cost” of acquiring citizenship, obtaining the necessary information (unless such information is provided in their native language), and

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70 In business transactions, however, 71% of the respondents said that they mainly use English. The 2001 survey also found that 24% of the respondents used both English and their native language at home, and 26% used English only.
71 “The 2000 Asian Pacific American Exit Polls, conducted in 1998: Los Angeles, New York City, and San Francisco Bay Area; National and California” (2001-2002) National Asian Pacific American Political Almanac 36 at 38. Asian Pacific American voters were more likely than any other racial or ethnic group to express a need for bilingual assistance.
75 When only citizens were considered, the difference in turnout between Asian immigrants and other ethnic groups diminished significantly. Among citizens, 80% of Whites, 81% of Blacks, 60% of Latinos, and 69% of Asians voted in the 1984 election; see Uhlaner et al. (1989).
76 The participation rate could be improved by the government of the host country introducing programs to assist Asian immigrants with language difficulties to obtain the necessary rights and information, although such provision would only be a short-term measure for those who have not yet acculturated into the host
actively exposing themselves to political stimuli. It is therefore not surprising that many studies have found a direct link between Asian immigrants' level of acculturation and their level of political participation. Studies have also found that Asian Americans born in the US participate more in politics than those born overseas, indicating that Asian Americans' level of political participation is likely to increase in the future as the number of second- and third-generation Asian Americans grows. It should be noted, however, that even the most acculturated second- or third-generation Asian Americans who vote on party lines rather than on ethnic lines, cannot escape political discrimination.

Asian New Zealanders

Given that the main influx of Asian immigration took place after the 1987 policy change, a large proportion of the respondents are expected to be recent immigrants who came to New Zealand in the last 10-15 years. The New Zealand Census 2001 found that only 22% of Asians were born in New Zealand, and that among those born overseas, nearly three quarters (125,085) had been in New Zealand for less than 10 years. As Asian immigrants' period of residency is likely to correlate with their language proficiency, it was not surprising that the Census 2001 also found that 14.2% of Asian New Zealanders spoke no English. In addition to the short history of immigration, the low level of English proficiency among Asian New Zealanders may be due to the immigration policies of the early 1990s which placed little emphasis on immigrants' language ability (in a belief that migrants who satisfy other criteria would quickly acquire a working knowledge of English). Similarly, a survey conducted by the author in 1998 among 131 Korean students at the University of Auckland found that 51% of students regarded language deficiency as one of the biggest problems facing Korean students. Asian New Zealanders' tendency to
conduct business within their own ethnic groups\textsuperscript{85}, and to socialise mainly with members of the same ethnic group\textsuperscript{86}, may have also slowed the process of acculturation. In general, the respondents’ period of residency in New Zealand is expected to show a clear correlation with their level of political participation, as recent Asian immigrants are likely to lack the knowledge and resources necessary to participate in politics.

However, there are a number of factors that indicate that despite Asian New Zealanders’ comparatively short history of immigration, their political participation rates may be higher than that of Asian Americans. Firstly, because permanent residency holders are eligible to vote in New Zealand, Asian New Zealanders’ cost of participation would be less than that of Asian Americans (who are required to take the extra step of applying for citizenship in order to vote). Secondly, this extended right to vote for permanent residents would have made Asian New Zealanders an instantly valuable political constituency. This means that political parties would find it desirable to attract Asian voters (for example, by providing information in Asian languages and campaigning in Asian neighbourhoods), which in turn could help Asian New Zealanders overcome their “liability of newness syndrome.” This is because Asian immigrants who have been contacted by political parties are likely to feel that they are being recognised and respected by the host society, and that they are entitled to participate in the host country’s politics\textsuperscript{87}. Thirdly, Asian New Zealanders may find it easier to move into mainstream New Zealand society because of the small size of the New Zealand population and the absence of segregated Asian districts. For example, there is no “Chinatown” or “Koreatown” in Auckland\textsuperscript{88}, and instead, Asian shops and restaurants are spread throughout the central Auckland city and other main suburban areas\textsuperscript{89}. This means that Asian New Zealanders are more likely to interact with other ethnic groups, which in turn would help the process of acculturation into New Zealand society. These factors indicate that the speed of acculturation may be faster for Asian New Zealanders than Asian immigrants in other Western countries, and that the cost associated with the low level of acculturation may be

\textsuperscript{85} For example, the majority of Korean businesses appear to be restaurants, Korean food shops, overseas students and immigration related firms, travel agents, and real estate agents targeting mainly Korean New Zealanders; “Ten years of immigration history in New Zealand – Part Two”, Korea Times, 28 January 2003, p112 (Korean text).

\textsuperscript{86} According to a survey conducted in 1996 among 80 New Zealanders, the most frequently cited negative characteristic of Asian immigrants was that they do not mix with natives; Zavareh M.G., Investigating Public Attitude Towards Asian and European Immigrant Groups: The Dynamics of Prejudice (1997) Thesis in MA, Psychology, University of Auckland.

\textsuperscript{87} See chapter 5.2 for more information on the effect of mobilisation efforts by politicians.

\textsuperscript{88} Therefore the stereotypes that are usually associated with Chinatown, such as dirtiness and a sense that the place is out of order, do not exist in New Zealand.

\textsuperscript{89} The extent of Asian penetration into the city centre was such that one reader of the New Zealand Herald wrote during the height of the Maori claim to the seabed and foreshore in August 2003 that “I don’t know about Maori claiming the seabed and foreshore, but I would like to see kiwis claiming back Auckland’s Queen Street”; G.B. of Browns Bay, “Letters to the Editor”, New Zealand Herald, 23-24 October 2003, pA22.
lower for Asian New Zealanders.

4.8 SURVEY RESULTS AND ANALYSIS

A number of questions were incorporated to assess the level of acculturation of Asian New Zealanders and its relevance to their political participation. As predicted, the survey found that most Asian respondents were recent immigrants who faced varying degrees of language difficulties. Many also lived in linguistically isolated households, and continued to have a close association with their home countries. Their lack of political knowledge and interaction with other ethnic groups also appeared to have a negative effect on their participation rates. The survey findings indicated that Asian New Zealanders’ “newness” may be one of the reasons why Asians participate in politics at a lesser rate than other ethnic groups, as various factors relating to the level of acculturation showed a clear correlation with Asian New Zealanders’ participation rates in all three forms of political activities.

Period of residency

The survey found that more than 95% of Asian respondents were “recent” immigrants who came to New Zealand after the introduction of the new immigration policy in 1987. Only 3% of the respondents were New Zealand-born, and of those who were born overseas, 13.2% had been living in New Zealand for less than 5 years, 55.7% between 6 to 10 years, and 26.6% between 11 to 15 years. Only 4.4% of the respondents had been living in New Zealand for more than 16 years. In comparison, only 12.9% of the NZES respondents were born overseas, of whom 73.3% had been living in New Zealand for more than 16 years. Asians who were born in New Zealand showed a slightly higher voting rate (80.8%) than those born overseas (75.5%), but the difference was not statistically significant. For the general New Zealand population, people who were born in New Zealand in fact showed a lower voting rate (92.2%) than those born overseas (96.3%).

As expected, there was a clear correlation between the voting rate and the period of residency in New Zealand, with the most recent immigrants, who had lived in New Zealand for less than five years, showing the lowest voting rate of 38.7% (see graph 4.9). Similarly, the NZES respondents

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90 This was significantly lower than the Census 2001 data which found 25% of Chinese and 5% of Koreans to be born in New Zealand. This indicated that a large proportion of New Zealand-born Asians were either not registered to vote, or chose not to participate in the survey.
91 Not surprisingly, almost all (99.3%) of the Maori respondents were born in New Zealand.
92 Chi-square .363 Phi and Cramer’s V .021. It should be noted that the proportion of New Zealand-born Asians may be too small to have statistical accuracy.
93 Chi-square .023, Phi and Cramer’s V -.053.
who had lived in New Zealand for less than five years showed the lowest voting rate of 75.0%\textsuperscript{94}. This finding indicated that the turnout among Asian New Zealanders will increase over time, especially since 86.1% of the respondents indicated that they plan to live in New Zealand for the next 10 years. However, the period of residency did not appear to have much effect on Asian New Zealanders’ participation rates in other forms of political activities\textsuperscript{95}.

**Graph 4.9 Turnout of Asians with different periods of residency in New Zealand**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period of residency</th>
<th>Voted last election Yes</th>
<th>Voted last election No</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1-5 years</td>
<td>61.3%</td>
<td>38.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6-10 years</td>
<td>77.5%</td>
<td>22.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11-15 years</td>
<td>86.1%</td>
<td>11.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16-20 years</td>
<td>92.9%</td>
<td>7.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21-25 years</td>
<td>85.7%</td>
<td>14.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26-80 years</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- Chi-square .000
- Phi and Cramer’s V .341

**English language skills and usage**

Language difficulty is often regarded as the single most important barrier preventing Asian immigrants from participating in the politics of the host country. To test this theory, the respondents were asked to assess their English reading and speaking skills on a scale of 0 to 5 (0 being no English and 5 being very fluent). Somewhat surprisingly, and despite the fact that nearly half (48%) of the respondents chose language difficulty as the biggest problem facing Asian New Zealanders, Asian respondents recorded a relatively high level of English language skills\textsuperscript{96}. For example, 48.6% of the respondents said that they either have level 5 (18.8%) or

\textsuperscript{94} Voting rate for others included 94.4% for New Zealanders who had lived in New Zealand for 6-10 years, 100% for 11-15 years, 83.3% for 16-20 years, 100% for 21-25 years, and 98.7% for more than 26 years (Chi-square .024, Phi and Cramer’s V .331).

\textsuperscript{95} Although recent immigrants showed higher participation rates in certain forms of political activities, such as joining a political party, assisting in a political campaign, and working in the community, the differences were not statistically significant (Chi-square .871, .440, .720, Phi and Cramer’s V .048, .077, .060).

\textsuperscript{96} This may be because self-assessment of English language skills is often inaccurate in that people tend to overestimate their language skills, or because the survey respondents were registered voters who had been living in New Zealand for at least a year.
level 4 (29.8%) English reading fluency, and 38.6% chose level 5 (15.7%) or level 4 (22.9%) fluency in English speaking skills. At the other end of the spectrum, only 3.7% and 2.7% of the respondents indicated that they could not read or speak English at all (level 0). Further analysis revealed that language skills have a clear correlation with age (with younger people having better English skills than older people), and period of residency in New Zealand (with the recent immigrants showing lesser fluency), indicating that Asian New Zealander's English language skills are likely to improve in the future. Perhaps more interesting was the finding that almost 75% of respondents were living in linguistically isolated households, although a greater proportion of the respondents (28.7%) indicated that they spoke mostly English outside home.

Contrary to predictions and overseas studies on Asian immigrants, language fluency did not show statistically significant relevance to Asians' voting rate. For example, 72.7% of those who could not speak English (level 0) voted at the last election, compared to 79.1% of those who spoke fluent English (level 5). The difference was even less significant for the English reading skills, as 77.4% of those who could not read English (level 0) voted, compared to 77.9% of those who had level 5 fluency. Neither speaking nor reading skills showed much correlation with participation rates in other forms of political activities. Instead, those who spoke mostly English outside the home showed a higher turnout than those who spoke mostly Korean/Chinese (see graph 4.10), although the correlation was not as significant for the language usage at home.

The findings indicated that the frequency of English usage has greater effect on Asians' political participation than the (self-assessed) level of their English language skills.

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97 As expected, Malaysian Chinese showed the highest English language skills (given that most of them spoke English in their home country), with 63.0% (reading) and 55.6% (speaking) choosing level 5 and none choosing below level 3.
98 The largest proportion of mainland Chinese chose levels 0-2 for both reading and speaking skills (38.4% and 40.0% respectively), whereas few differences were shown between Koreans, Hong Kong Chinese and Taiwanese.
99 Chi-square .000, Phi and Cramer's V .547 (for reading skills), Chi-square .000, Phi and Cramer's V .574 (for speaking skills).
100 Chi-square .000, Phi and Cramer's V .285 (for reading skills), Chi-square .000, Phi and Cramer's V .342 (for speaking skills).
101 Only 6.6% of the respondents replied that they spoke mostly English at home, 3.1% more English than Korean or Chinese, and another 3.6% spoke equal mix of English and their native languages.
102 About 20% of the respondents indicated that they spoke more English than their native language outside home, and 13% an equal mix of English and their native language.
103 Chi-square .065, Phi and Cramer's V .112.
104 Chi-square .568, Phi and Cramer's V .068.
105 The turnout of those who spoke different languages at home were, in the order of the highest turnout; those who spoke more English than Korean/Chinese (84.0%), more Korean/Chinese than English (83.0%), mostly English (80.4%), equal mix (78.6%), and mostly Korean/Chinese (73.5%); Chi-square .184, Phi and Cramer's V .086.
Level of interaction

To test Asian New Zealanders’ level of acculturation, the respondents were asked to assess their levels of interaction with Pakeha, Maori, Pacific Islanders and other Asians on a scale of 0-5 (0 being no interaction and 5 being lots of interaction). Contrary to popular perception that Asian immigrants socialize mainly with members of their own ethnic group, the survey results revealed that 66.4% of the respondents had level 3 or higher interaction with Pakeha New Zealanders (18.8% level 5, 21.0% level 4, 26.6% level 3). The level of interaction with “other Asians” was also high, with 64.9% of the respondents having more than level 3 interaction (19.3% level 5, 21.6% level 4, 24.0% level 3). However, the respondents’ levels of interaction with Maori and Pacific Islanders were significantly lower, with only about 20% of the respondents having level 3 or higher interaction with Maori (20.8%) and Pacific Islanders (19.6%). Whereas less than 5% of the respondents had no interaction with Pakeha (4.4%) and other Asians (5.0%), more than 35% had no interaction with Maori (35.2%) and Pacific Islanders (38.3%).

Analysis of the survey data revealed that Asians who interacted with other ethnic groups were more likely to vote than those with no or little interaction. For example, the voting rate of those who had no interaction with Pakeha was 48.5%, whereas 83.4% of those who had a lot of interaction with Pakeha voted at the last election\(^{106}\) (see graph 4.11). They were also more likely
to participate in other forms of political activities, such as attending a protest or demonstration, signing petitions, and working in the community\textsuperscript{107}. The results indicated that Asians’ integration into New Zealand society (as reflected by the level of interaction with other ethnic groups) had a greater effect on their political participation than Asians’ English language skills. Such interaction could also reduce the cost of participation by helping Asian New Zealanders obtain political information and stimuli through their contacts. Indeed, people who have a high level of interaction with other ethnic groups were also found to have greater knowledge of and interest in New Zealand politics\textsuperscript{108}.

Graph 4.11 Turnout of Asians with different levels of interaction with Pakeha

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Interaction with Pakeha</th>
<th>Voted last election Yes</th>
<th>Voted last election No</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No Interaction</td>
<td>48.6%</td>
<td>51.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Little Interaction</td>
<td>70.6%</td>
<td>29.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Some Interaction</td>
<td>73.7%</td>
<td>26.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reasonable Interaction</td>
<td>75.5%</td>
<td>24.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Significant Interaction</td>
<td>79.4%</td>
<td>20.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lots of Interaction</td>
<td>83.4%</td>
<td>16.6%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

-Chi-square .000
-Phi and Cramer’s V .164

Political knowledge

In chapter 3.2, it was found that Asian respondents identified “not knowing enough about New Zealand politics” as the biggest reason for not voting at the 2002 election. Interestingly, however, Asian New Zealanders in general showed fairly good knowledge of New Zealand politics (apart from the question on MMP as set out earlier in chapter 3.2). For example, 99.1% of the

Islanders and other Asians showed lower voting rates (68.2% and 58.5%) than those with a lot of interaction (90.0% and 76.1%) (Chi-square .005, Phi and Cramer’s V .149 for Pacific Islanders, Chi-square .032, Phi and Cramer’s V .123 for other Asians).

\textsuperscript{107} Although other forms of political activities with extremely low participation rates did not show statistically significant differences, activities such as attending a protest or demonstration (Chi-square .003, Phi and Cramer’s V .144), signing petitions (Chi-square .000, Phi and Cramer’s V .212), and working in the community (Chi-square .048, Phi and Cramer’s V .112) showed statistically significant differences.

\textsuperscript{108} Chi-square .000, Phi and Cramer’s V .233 for interaction (with Pakeha) and political interest, and Chi-square .004, Phi and Cramer’s V .172 for interaction and political knowledge (on coalition with NZ First).
respondents were aware of the fact that Helen Clark was the Prime Minister of New Zealand. 79.8% were aware that enrolling as a voter in New Zealand was compulsory, which was higher than the 70.2% recorded in the NZES 2002 among the general New Zealand population. 56.0% of respondents knew that NZ First was not in coalition with Labour, and 46.2% were aware that Cabinet Ministers must be MPs. However, only 31.9% of the respondents were aware that the term of New Zealand Parliament was not four years, compared to 77.4% of the general New Zealand population, possibly due to the fact that it is common for most countries (including many Asian countries) to have a four-year parliamentary term.

Further analysis showed that people with greater knowledge of New Zealand politics were more likely than others to vote and participate in other forms of political activities\textsuperscript{109} (see graph 4.12). In so finding, the survey reaffirmed the civic literacy theory that the level of knowledge is an important factor in explaining individual political participation\textsuperscript{110}. In RCM terms, having sufficient political knowledge can be seen as reducing the cost of participation. The level of knowledge also showed a clear correlation with the respondents’ period of residency and age, with those who had lived in New Zealand for a longer period of time and those who were older showing a greater level of political knowledge than younger more recent immigrants\textsuperscript{111}. These findings indicated that Asian New Zealanders’ turnout is likely to increase in the future as they become more familiar with the New Zealand political system. Somewhat surprisingly, Asian New Zealanders’ level of political knowledge showed little correlation with their educational qualifications, possibly due to the fact that a large proportion of Asian New Zealanders received their education overseas.

\textsuperscript{109} The percentage of those who had correct answers were: 99.5% of voters and 98.1% of non-voters for the question on the PM (Chi-square .123, Phi and Cramer’s V .070); 64.5% of voters and 6.5% of non-voters for the question on the NZ First coalition (Chi-square .000, Phi and Cramer’s V .259); 53.1% of voters and 31.8% of non-voters for the question on enrolment (Chi-square .000, Phi and Cramer’s V .165); and 83.7% of voters and 70.1% of non-voters for the question on cabinet ministers (Chi-square .000, Phi and Cramer’s V .207).

\textsuperscript{110} Milner (2002).

\textsuperscript{111} For example, only 17.1% of those who had lived in New Zealand for 1-5 years knew the correct answer to the question on parliamentary terms, compared to 42.9% of those who had lived in New Zealand for more than 26 years (Chi-square .005, Phi and Cramer’s V .179). Similarly, only 24.5% of those in the 18-29 age group knew that the parliamentary term was not 4 years, compared to 39.1% of 70-85 age groups (Chi-square .005, Phi and Cramer’s V .170).
Graph 4.12 Turnout of Asians with different levels of political knowledge

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>True</th>
<th>False</th>
<th>Don't know</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>78.2%</td>
<td>21.80%</td>
<td>16.80%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>83.2%</td>
<td>16.80%</td>
<td>40.00%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60.0%</td>
<td>40.00%</td>
<td>60.00%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- Chi-square .000
- Phi and Cramer's V .207

Contact back home

Maintaining close contact with home countries can be seen as a sign of low acculturation, although studies have shown that immigrants can adopt the host country’s cultural patterns in the public domain while maintaining a distinct subculture in the private domain\(^\text{112}\). Questions designed to assess the strength of Asian New Zealanders’ ties back home revealed that most Asian New Zealanders maintained close links with their home countries, but that the strength of these ties had little effect on turnout. When asked whether and how often they contacted their friends and families back home and followed news at home, 45.6% of respondents responded that they contacted their friends and families at least once a week, and 67.3% that they followed news at home at least once a week. Only 3.7% of respondents replied that they never contacted their friends and families back home. Despite the strong ties Asian New Zealanders maintained with their home countries, there were few differences in voting rates between those who frequently contacted their friends back home or followed news at home and those who never did so or not as frequently\(^\text{113}\).


\(^{113}\) The turnout of those who contacted friends back home was: once a week 71.6%, once a month 79.0%, once a year 83.0%, and never 72.3% (Chi-square .083, Phi and Cramer’s V .099). The turnout of those who followed news at home was: once a week 74.5%, once a month 81.0%, once a year 80.0%, and never 71.4% (Chi-square .417, Phi and Cramer’s V .068).
**Partisanship**

Political partisanship requires sufficient language skills, political knowledge and confidence that one has the right to be involved in New Zealand politics. As such, it was not surprising to find, as mentioned earlier in chapter 3.4, that Asian New Zealanders’ partisanship rate (44.3%) was lower than that of the general New Zealand population (55.6%). Analysis of the survey data revealed that Asian New Zealanders who indicated that they generally supported a political party were more likely to vote (84.9%) than those who did not usually support a political party (15.1%) (see graph 4.13). Similarly, the NZES respondents who identified with a political party were more likely to vote than others\textsuperscript{114}, supporting the theory that the recent decline in voter turnout may have been caused by decline in party identification\textsuperscript{115}. The result also indicated that the level of Asian turnout is likely to increase in the future as Asians develop a stronger sense of political partisanship.

**Graph 4.13 Turnout of Asians who support a political party**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Voted last election</td>
<td>84.9%</td>
<td>15.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support a political party</td>
<td>88.2%</td>
<td>31.8%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

-Chi square .000  
-Phi and Cramer’s V .194

**Regression of the acculturation factors**

Regression of the Asian data reaffirmed the acculturation theory by showing that all of the factors relating to the level of acculturation had statistically significant relevance to the turnout of Asian New Zealanders (see table 4.5). For example, Asian New Zealanders’ likelihood of voting

\textsuperscript{114} Turnout of 96.4% was recorded for those who supported a political party compared to 87.9% for those who did not support a political party (Chi-square .000. Phi and Cramer’s V .161).

\textsuperscript{115} Aimer P. and Vowles J., “What happened at the 2002 election?” in Vowles et al. (2004) pp16-32 at p26, Figure 2.2.
increased by 1.6% with every extra year of residency in New Zealand, and those who identified with a political party were 17.3% more likely to vote. Asians who spoke English outside home were 9.4% more likely to vote, and having a good knowledge of New Zealand politics also increased the likelihood of Asians voting by 9.0%. On the other hand, people who had little interaction with other ethnic groups were 8.8% less likely to vote. Somewhat surprisingly, people who spoke little English were 10.5% more likely to vote when all other acculturation factors were controlled. This may be because those who spoke little English tended to be older Asians\textsuperscript{116}, who usually had more time, resources, and a greater stake in society. It could also be that efforts made by political parties and ethnic community organizations to mobilize Asian voters in their native languages\textsuperscript{117} have eliminated the extra cost associated with language barriers. Whatever the actual reason may be, the survey results challenged the applicability of overseas studies that found language barriers to be one of the main deterrents to participation in the case of Asian New Zealanders. Another interesting finding was that maintaining contact with home countries showed the biggest effect on Asian turnout of 28.8%. This indicated that people who were interested in the affairs of their home countries were also likely to be interested in the affairs of the host country, and that keeping close ties with their home countries was neither an indication of non-acculturation nor a barrier to participation.

Factors relating to the level of acculturation appeared to have limited effect on other forms of political activities, although political partisanship and English usage increased the likelihood of Asians signing petitions by 6.7% and 6.1% respectively. Having little interaction with other ethnic groups also decreased the likelihood of Asians working in the community by 6.4%, whereas those who used English outside the home were 4.9% more likely to work in the community. It was worth noting that those with insufficient English language skills were 5.7% more likely to work in the community than those who spoke English fluently, contrary to overseas studies which found the opposite correlation between English language skills and participation rates. This surprising result may be explained by the fact that people who did not have sufficient English skills (usually older recent immigrants) tended to be active in ethnic community organizations\textsuperscript{118}. The survey findings revealed that it was not necessarily the period of residency per se that increased Asians' participation rates in political activities other than voting, but rather the efforts made by Asian New Zealanders to interact with other ethnic groups, use English, and identify with a political party.

\textsuperscript{116} About 80% of those who indicated that they cannot read or speak English were older than 50 years of age.
\textsuperscript{117} See chapters 5.1 and 5.4.
\textsuperscript{118} For example, 25% of those who could not speak English belonged to ethnic community organizations, compared to 15% of those who spoke fluent English, although the difference was not statistically significant (Chi-square .625, Phi and Cramer's V .062).
Table 4.5 Effect of acculturation factors on participation rate – Asian data

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Voting</th>
<th>Signing petition</th>
<th>Working in community</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>%</td>
<td>b</td>
<td>s.e</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Residency</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>0.19**</td>
<td>0.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partisanship</td>
<td>17.3</td>
<td>1.07**</td>
<td>0.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Little English</td>
<td>10.5</td>
<td>0.60*</td>
<td>0.27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Use English</td>
<td>9.4</td>
<td>0.51*</td>
<td>0.22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contact home</td>
<td>28.8</td>
<td>1.50**</td>
<td>0.58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Little interaction</td>
<td>-8.8</td>
<td>-0.52*</td>
<td>0.24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Knowledge</td>
<td>9.0</td>
<td>0.56**</td>
<td>0.21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>17.3</td>
<td>-2.51**</td>
<td>0.66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% concordant</td>
<td>77.4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cox &amp; Snell R²</td>
<td>0.155</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**significant at <.01  *significant at <.05

As questions relating to the level of acculturation were not asked in the NZES, regression of the merged data only included the variables of partisanship, period of residency, political knowledge, and whether one was born in New Zealand\textsuperscript{121}. It was also necessary to include the variable of age to estimate the length of residency for those born overseas\textsuperscript{122}. Analysis of the data revealed that New Zealanders who identified with a political party were 10.0% more likely to vote, and that the likelihood of voting increased by 0.1% with every extra year of residency in New Zealand for those born overseas (see table 4.6). In terms of other forms of political activities, having a sense of political partisanship was the only factor that showed statistically significant relevance, which increased the likelihood of signing petitions by 5.6% and working in the community by 4.6%.

The analysis revealed that acculturation factors accounted for 5.5% of the disparity in turnout between Asian New Zealanders and the general New Zealand population. Yet Asian New Zealanders were still 13.6% less likely to vote than Pakeha, indicating that factors that were not included in this analysis (such as the level of interaction with other ethnic groups and the frequency of English language usage) may account for the remaining disparity between the two groups. The acculturation factors also reduced the likelihood of Maori non-voting vis-à-vis

\textsuperscript{119} People with level 2 English skills or below were defined as “little English”. The two questions on English skills have been merged into one question, with the alpha statistics of .913.

\textsuperscript{120} “Little interaction” is defined as level 2 interaction or below. The four questions on the level of interaction with other groups have been merged into one question, with the alpha statistics of .755.

\textsuperscript{121} The “New Zealand-born” factor was not included in the regression of the Asian data because of its statistical insignificance, which showed adverse effect on other factors as well.

\textsuperscript{122} Because the NZES survey used a different format on the period of residency question, the merged data showed the year of arrival in New Zealand (eg. 1988) instead of the year of residency in New Zealand (eg. 17 years), and required the age factor to distinguish those who were born overseas. The “residency” in the merged data therefore measured the recency of immigration – the more recent the immigrants, the higher the figure.
Pakeha by 2.2%. In terms of other forms of political activities, controlling the acculturation factors decreased the likelihood of Asian non-participation vis-à-vis Pakeha in the activity of signing petitions by 2.1% to 61.0%, although it increased the likelihood of Asian non-participation in the activity of working in the community by 1.7% to 18.6%. This indicated that being a recent immigrant does not have as big an impact on Asian New Zealanders’ participation rates in other forms of political activities. Maori were 6.8% less likely to sign petitions when the acculturation factors were controlled (which is a decrease of 0.9% from when no other factors were controlled), and 11.8% more likely to work in the community than Pakeha (an increase of 3.1%).

Table 4.6 Effect of acculturation factors on participation rate – Merged data

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Voting</th>
<th></th>
<th>Signing petition</th>
<th></th>
<th>Working in community</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>%</td>
<td>b</td>
<td>s.e</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>b</td>
<td>s.e</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asian</td>
<td>-13.6</td>
<td>-1.23**</td>
<td>0.33</td>
<td>-61.0</td>
<td>-2.91**</td>
<td>0.22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maori</td>
<td>-5.2</td>
<td>-0.68**</td>
<td>0.22</td>
<td>-6.8</td>
<td>-0.36*</td>
<td>0.14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partisanship</td>
<td>10.0</td>
<td>0.97**</td>
<td>0.14</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>0.35**</td>
<td>0.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NZ Born</td>
<td>-1.6</td>
<td>-0.67</td>
<td>0.36</td>
<td>-0.4</td>
<td>-0.04</td>
<td>0.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.02**</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>-0.1</td>
<td>-0.01</td>
<td>0.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Residency</td>
<td>-0.1</td>
<td>-0.03**</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>-0.1</td>
<td>-0.01</td>
<td>0.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Knowledge</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>0.17</td>
<td>0.15</td>
<td>-2.5</td>
<td>-0.16</td>
<td>0.14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>316.7</td>
<td>59.75**</td>
<td>15.14</td>
<td>188.4</td>
<td>10.76</td>
<td>11.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% concordant</td>
<td>86.4</td>
<td></td>
<td>79.3</td>
<td></td>
<td>79.4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cox &amp; Snell R²</td>
<td>.111</td>
<td></td>
<td>.325</td>
<td></td>
<td>.069</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**significant at <.01  *significant at <.05

4.9 SUMMARY

The survey results reaffirmed the acculturation theory that Asian New Zealanders’ newness is a major barrier to their participation in New Zealand politics. All of the factors relating to the level of acculturation - period of residency in New Zealand, level of interaction with other ethnic groups, language usage, political knowledge, and political partisanship - showed statistically significant relevance to Asians’ turnout. In RCM terms, these can be seen as factors that increase the cost of participation for recent Asian immigrants. At the same time, the survey revealed that Asian New Zealanders were faced with a unique set of costs and opportunities in New Zealand: having a low level of English skills did not necessarily discourage Asian New Zealanders’ political participation, contrary to overseas studies which found otherwise. In any event, Asian New Zealanders’ relatively low level of acculturation can be seen as one of the reasons why their turnout was lower than that of Asian Americans. The survey results indicated that Asian New Zealanders’ participation rates are likely to increase in the future as they become more acculturated into the New Zealand society, but that efforts are needed both on the part of Asian
New Zealanders and the wider New Zealand society to interact with each other, use English, and learn more about New Zealand politics.
PART D – CONCLUSION TO CHAPTER FOUR

4.10 REGRESSION OF THE ASIAN DATA

In order to assess which individual variables had the most significant effect on the political participation of Asian New Zealanders, factors that were found to have a significance of .050 or less were put into the overall regression, together with a number of important yet statistically insignificant factors (such as wealth and education). Regression of these factors showed that political interest, sense of civic duty, period of residency, political partisanship, English usage, interaction with other ethnic groups, and the level of political knowledge were the best predictors of Asian New Zealanders’ turnout (see table 4.7). Among individual variables, one’s sense of civic duty had the biggest influence on the Asian turnout, as people who believed that it was their duty to vote were 22.7% more likely to vote. Political partisanship and English usage also increased Asian turnout by 11.2% and 11.1% respectively. Those who showed interest in New Zealand politics were 12.7% more likely to vote when all other individual variables were controlled. The significance of interaction with other ethnic groups on Asian New Zealanders’ turnout was also evident by the fact that Asians who had little interaction with other ethnic groups were 11.7% less likely to vote. The likelihood of voting also increased by 1.5% as the respondents’ period of residency in New Zealand increased by one year, and those who had a good knowledge of New Zealand politics were 7.2% more likely to vote. Of interest was that none of the socio-economic factors showed statistically significant relevance to the turnout once all other individual variables were controlled. The findings were consistent with overseas studies on the political participation of Asian immigrants, which revealed the limitations of the socio-economic theory in explaining the political participation of those who have been exposed to different socialization processes.

Occupation type appeared to have the most significant effect on Asian New Zealanders’ participation rates in other forms of political activities. Those in full-time employment were 10.6% more likely to sign petitions, and those who run their own business were 6.7% less likely to work in the community. The socio-economic factors, in this sense, appeared to have greater influence on Asian participation in other forms of political activities. In addition, Asians with a sense of political partisanship were 7.1% more likely to sign petitions, whereas those who supported Asian-specific policies were 8.8% less likely to do so. In the activity of working in the community, Asians who used English outside home were 5.0% more likely to work in the community, and those who had little interaction with other ethnic groups were 8.0% less likely to do so when all other individual variables were controlled. The findings indicated that factors that encourage Asian turnout are somewhat different from factors that encourage Asian participation in other forms of political activities. The survey results further indicated that Asian New Zealanders’
participation rates in other forms of political activities would not necessarily increase over time, as factors relating to the level of acculturation did not show as significant an effect on other political activities as they did on voting.

Table 4.7 Effect of individual variables on participation rate – Asian data

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Voting</th>
<th>Signing petition</th>
<th>Working in community</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>%</td>
<td>b</td>
<td>s.e</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>-0.7</td>
<td>-0.07</td>
<td>0.23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wealth</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>0.26</td>
<td>0.24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High education</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>0.20</td>
<td>0.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fulltime</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>0.52</td>
<td>0.35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Own business</td>
<td>-5.8</td>
<td>-0.37</td>
<td>0.30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Studying</td>
<td>-7.3</td>
<td>-0.22</td>
<td>0.36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political interest</td>
<td>12.7</td>
<td>0.68*</td>
<td>0.33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Need to participate</td>
<td>-4.6</td>
<td>-0.11</td>
<td>0.92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Duty to vote</td>
<td>22.7</td>
<td>1.21**</td>
<td>0.42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asian policies</td>
<td>-1.7</td>
<td>-0.20</td>
<td>0.27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Govt assistance</td>
<td>-4.4</td>
<td>-0.21</td>
<td>0.23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Residency</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>0.17**</td>
<td>0.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partisanship</td>
<td>11.2</td>
<td>0.75**</td>
<td>0.23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Little English</td>
<td>12.6</td>
<td>0.62</td>
<td>0.34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Use English</td>
<td>11.1</td>
<td>0.65**</td>
<td>0.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contact home</td>
<td>23.2</td>
<td>1.04</td>
<td>0.70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Little interaction</td>
<td>-11.7</td>
<td>-0.71*</td>
<td>0.28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Knowledge</td>
<td>7.2</td>
<td>0.48*</td>
<td>0.24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-11.8</td>
<td>-4.30**</td>
<td>1.28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% concordant</td>
<td>77.5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cox &amp; Snell R²</td>
<td>.193</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**significant at <.01  *significant at <.05**

4.11 REGRESSION OF THE MERGED DATA

Regression of the NZES-Asia merged data showed that when the individual variables were controlled, the likelihood of Asians non-voting vis-à-vis Pakeha reduced by 6.8% to 12.3% from when no other factors were controlled (see table 4.8). The likelihood of Maori non-voting vis-à-vis Pakeha also reduced by 4.0% to 3.4% when individual variables were controlled. Similar to the case of Asian New Zealanders, factors such as political interest, a sense of civic duty, period of residency, and political partisanship showed statistically significant relevance to the turnout of the
general New Zealand population. A sense of civic duty again had the biggest effect on turnout of 22.7%, followed by political interest (13.2%), political partisanship (7.6%), and the period of residency (0.1% with every extra year in New Zealand). When all the individual variables were controlled, socio-economic factors ceased to have statistically significant relevance even on the turnout of the general New Zealand population.

Table 4.8 Effect of individual variables on participation rate – Merged data

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Voting</th>
<th>Signing petition</th>
<th>Working in community</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>%</td>
<td>b</td>
<td>s.e</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asian</td>
<td>-12.3</td>
<td>-1.27**</td>
<td>0.41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maori</td>
<td>-3.4</td>
<td>-0.69*</td>
<td>0.29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>0.10</td>
<td>0.17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wealth</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High education</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>0.14</td>
<td>0.18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fulltime</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>0.36</td>
<td>0.23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Own business</td>
<td>-0.5</td>
<td>-0.10</td>
<td>0.24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployed</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>0.42</td>
<td>0.41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Studying</td>
<td>-5.9</td>
<td>-0.16</td>
<td>0.28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political interest</td>
<td>13.2</td>
<td>0.69**</td>
<td>0.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Duty to vote</td>
<td>22.7</td>
<td>1.63**</td>
<td>0.24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Govt assistance</td>
<td>-2.5</td>
<td>-0.27</td>
<td>0.16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partisanship</td>
<td>7.6</td>
<td>0.86**</td>
<td>0.17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NZ Born</td>
<td>-0.1</td>
<td>-0.44</td>
<td>0.45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Residency</td>
<td>-0.1</td>
<td>-0.03**</td>
<td>0.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Knowledge</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>0.16</td>
<td>0.18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>293.3</td>
<td>63.08</td>
<td>18.16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% concordant</td>
<td>88.0</td>
<td>81.5</td>
<td>79.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cox &amp; Snell R²</td>
<td>.151</td>
<td>.376</td>
<td>.096</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**significant at <.01  *significant at <.05

Individual variables appeared to have a bigger influence on New Zealanders’ participation rates in other forms of political activities, to the extent that the significance of Maori non-participation in the activity of signing petitions disappeared once all the individual variables were controlled. In particular, socio-economic factors appeared to play an important role, as having a higher education increased the likelihood of the general New Zealand population signing petitions and working in the community by 5.1% and 11.0% respectively. Property owners were found to be 4.4% more likely to sign petitions than non-property owners, and being in full-time employment also increased the likelihood of Asians signing petitions by 11.0%. The findings reaffirmed the
applicability of the socio-economic theory on the political participation of the general New Zealand population, whose resources were more accurate indicators of their socialization process than that of Asian New Zealanders. Interestingly however, male respondents were 4.4% less likely to sign petitions and 5.0% less likely to work in the community than women, suggesting that political activities other than voting may respond to skills or attributes that women have in greater abundance than men. New Zealanders who showed political interest and political partisanship were also 12.7% and 4.3% more likely to sign petitions, although the same did not have any effect on the activity of working in the community. Perhaps because the individual variables had greater effect on the general New Zealand population, Asian New Zealanders were 64.0% less likely to sign petitions (which is an increase of 0.8% from when no other factors were controlled) and 22.9% less likely to work in the community (an increase of 6.0%) than Pakeha when individual variables were controlled.

4.12 CONCLUSION – INDIVIDUAL VARIABLES

Analysis of the individual variables revealed the limitations of a number of traditional participation theories in explaining the political participation of Asian New Zealanders. Firstly, the survey challenged the socio-economic theory by finding that Asian New Zealanders’ relatively high level of wealth and educational qualifications did not necessarily show a positive correlation to their turnout, especially compared to other ethnic groups. This finding was consistent with other overseas studies on the political participation of Asian immigrants, which found that Asians’ socio-economic status did not necessarily correspond to their participation rates. Having said that, the survey findings cannot be seen as proving the socio-economic theory wrong – it provided an accurate prediction of the participation rates among the general New Zealand population. Rather, the findings suggested that greater emphasis needs to be given to the socialization process than socio-economic status per se: the socio-economic theory appeared to apply to Asian New Zealanders only to the extent that their socio-economic status was an accurate reflection of their socialization process.

Secondly, the survey revealed that Asian New Zealanders had a strong sense of democratic commitment and a high level of political interest, contrary to the cultural theory that Asians’ political inactivity is culturally derived and is based on a sense of political apathy. The cultural theory was further challenged by the finding that Asians who exhibited strong Asian cultural traits did not necessarily participate in politics at a lesser rate. Nevertheless, Asian immigrants’ previous political experience in their home countries and certain Asian cultural traits appeared to influence their views on a number of policy-related matters, thereby partly reaffirming the cultural theory. The survey also reaffirmed the social psychology theory by finding that Asians with a
strong democratic commitment were more likely to participate in politics. At the same time, it posed a challenge to the RCM which struggles to include "psychological gratification" in its calculus of voting.

Thirdly, language difficulties, often regarded as the main barrier to political participation for Asian immigrants, did not show the expected negative effect on the political participation of Asian New Zealanders, thereby questioning the applicability of overseas studies to the case of Asian New Zealanders. Having said that, other factors relating to the level of acculturation, such as the period of residency in New Zealand, political knowledge, political partisanship, level of interaction with other ethnic groups, and the frequency of English language usage showed statistically significant relevance to Asians' turnout, consistent with the acculturation theory. The results indicated that the participation rates of Asian New Zealanders are likely to increase over time, provided that both Asian New Zealanders and New Zealand society strive to eliminate the barriers to participation which relate to Asian New Zealanders' level of acculturation. It should be noted, however, that Asians were still participating at a lower rate than the general New Zealand population when all the relevant individual variables were controlled, indicating that the issue of Asian New Zealanders' political participation cannot be understood solely by looking at the individual variables.
In this chapter, factors relating to the Asian community – relative size of the Asian population, ethnic community organizations and pan-ethnic identity – will be analyzed to assess their impact on the political participation of ethnic Chinese and Korean New Zealanders (hereinafter referred to as “Asian New Zealanders”). The impact of these factors on Asian New Zealanders’ political participation will again be analyzed, through cross-tabulation and regression, against the three political activities of voting, signing petitions, and working in the community. Various aspects of the mobilization theory and social capital theory will be tested in this chapter.
PART A – RELATIVE SIZE OF THE ASIAN POPULATION

Size matters: in a democratic country where every citizen has one vote of equal value, the size of the ethnic minority population inevitably influences the political strength of that minority group. For this reason, unless and until an ethnic minority group becomes numerically significant, it may be difficult for such a group to exercise political influence. This applies not only to Asian immigrants, but also to other visible minority groups such as Latinos in the US and Pacific Islanders in New Zealand. In the case of Asian Americans, it was not until the Asian American population increased significantly in a number of key electoral districts that mainstream society began to take notice of their political presence. The comparatively small size of the New Zealand population meant that the growing number of Asian New Zealanders could potentially have a greater impact on New Zealand politics than in the US, and as such, New Zealand politicians could not ignore this increasingly important and geographically concentrated constituency. This part of the thesis will look at whether efforts have been made by political parties to mobilize Asian voters, and how these mobilization efforts are influencing the political participation of Asian New Zealanders. In so doing, the thesis seeks to test the applicability of the mobilization theory on the political participation of Asian New Zealanders.

5.1 COMPARATIVE CONTEXT

According to the US Census 2001, there were approximately 12.5 million Asians in the US, comprising 4.4% of the total population. This was up from less than 1% in 1970 and 2.9% in 1990. About 33% of the growth in the Asian population came from immigration, making Asian Americans one of the fastest growing ethnic groups in the US. As such, Asian Americans became the third biggest ethnic minority group after African Americans (12.1%) and Hispanic Americans (9%). The increase in the size of the Asian population had a number of desirable effects on the political participation of Asian immigrants. Firstly, it increased the chance of Asians being nominated as political candidates and Asian candidates securing electoral seats. This

\[1\] It should be noted that the size of the ethnic minority population may not necessarily represent the size of the eligible voters, as there will be a proportion of illegal immigrants, those who are too young to vote, and who have not registered to vote.

\[2\] Having said that, certain ethnic minority groups, such as Jewish Americans, have successfully converted their financial power into political power without necessarily having numerical significance; Wang in Rich (1996) p139. It should also be noted that the case of indigenous minorities may be different from that of migrant minorities: see chapter 6.7 for more details.

\[3\] The Chinese Americans, in particular, experienced a 104% increase in population in recent years (from 606,027 in 1980 to 1,647,472 in 1990).


\[5\] Alozie found that as the proportion of a city’s population that is Asian increased, the likelihood of Asians securing a seat in the local council improved; Alozie (1992) p95. Bullock and MacManus have even argued that a minority group’s substantial presence in the population is a pre-requisite for that group’s council presence; Bullock C. and MacManus S., “Staggered Terms and Black Representation” (1987) 49 Journal of Politics 543-552, as cited in Alozie (1992) p92.
was especially so because Asians generally concentrated in certain electoral districts, where they
could become a significant political constituency\(^6\). For example, almost all Asian Americans
(95%) have settled in metropolitan areas\(^7\) (a pattern repeated in Canada, Australia and New
Zealand), and most of the Asian members of Congress were elected from districts which have a
high proportion of the Asian American population\(^8\), such as Hawaii (where Asians comprise
47.2% of the population) and California (where Asians comprise 10.9% of the population\(^9\)).
Similarly, a steady increase in the Chinese and South Asian populations in Canada, who now
comprise half of Canada’s four million minorities, enabled Asian voters and candidates to have
greater visibility at the 2004 federal election\(^10\). The province of British Columbia with a large
proportion of Canada’s Asian population nominated at least 20 Chinese and South Asian
candidates for the 2004 election\(^11\).

Secondly, having Asian politicians and candidates had the added advantage of encouraging the
political participation of Asian immigrants, because of their tendency (especially among recent
immigrants) to support candidates of the same ethnicity. For example, Tam's study on Asian
Americans found that Chinese (and, to a lesser extent, other Asians) had consistently supported
March Fong Eu, a Chinese politician, and that another Chinese politician, Matt Fong, drew 15% of
the first time Asian American voters in his run for the 1998 US Senate race\(^12\). This tendency
appeared to be based on the belief that Asian people’s concerns and needs would be more
adequately represented by Asian politicians than politicians of other ethnicities\(^13\). As illustrated,
having a sizeable Asian population can have a positive impact both on Asians’ political
representation and their political participation.

---

Pacific American Political Almanac 1 at 1.

\(^7\) Nearly 40% of the total Asian American population now resides in California. New York and Hawaii have
the second and third largest Asian American populations; US Census Bureau 2000, “The Asian population:

\(^8\) For example, two Asian American senators were representing Hawaii, and three out of six Asian American
House of Representatives were from California and Hawaii; Freeman (2000) pp134-135. In 1994, of the
eight Asian American members of congress, three were from Hawaii and three were from California. The
other two were from American Samoa and Guam; Coleman in Lee (Coleman 2) p41.


\(^11\) In provinces such as Vancouver South and Vancouver Kingsway, where ethnic minorities make up 69.9%
and 67.2% of the population, both the incumbent MPs and candidates were members of ethnic minority
groups; McMartin W., “Canada votes – Analysis and commentary”, 8 June 2004, in
www.cbc.cacanadavotes.

\(^12\) Although Fong lost the general election to Senator Boxer, he managed to receive nearly four million votes
and raise $13 million; Tam (1995) p242. It should be noted, however, that not all Asian immigrants vote
along the ethnic lines. See also Vowles J. and Aimer P., “Political Leadership, Representation and Trust” in

Elected Officials” (2001) 3 Political Science and Politics 611 at 612.
Thirdly, a sizeable Asian population could increase the likelihood of politicians of the host country making special efforts to reach out to Asian immigrants, campaign in Asian neighbourhoods, and address issues that are important to Asians. In the case of Asian Americans, the probability of a representative signing resolutions favourable to Asian Americans was found to have increased as the proportion of Asian Americans living in the representative’s district increased. Similarly in Canada, the increase in the Asian population led political parties to produce political advertisements in Mandarin and Cantonese on national TV and in daily newspapers for the first time at the 2004 federal election.

These mobilisation efforts by political parties are regarded as one of the most important determinants of Asian immigrants’ political participation, because contact by political parties could help Asian immigrants overcome the “liability of newness” syndrome by enhancing their feeling of community identification and sense of political legitimacy. Asian immigrants who have been contacted by political parties may also feel almost obliged to participate in politics, because Confucian norms teach individuals to see themselves in webs of reciprocal obligation. It may also give them an impression that their goals can be achieved through political participation, thereby providing a greater incentive for Asians to participate in politics. Increasing political participation on the part of Asian immigrants could also increase the chance of them being contacted by political parties, as a person’s previous voting patterns are often the key variable that political parties use in choosing whom to contact. The size of the Asian population therefore has a number of political consequences that might encourage the political participation of Asian immigrants.

Asian New Zealanders

As discussed earlier in chapters 1.1 and 2.4, the total Asian population in New Zealand increased

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rapidly in the 1990s. The number of Asian New Zealanders more than tripled in 10 years between 1986 and 1996 (from 53,541 to 173,502), and the latest Census in 2001 showed 237,459 Asians comprising 6.6% of the total New Zealand population. As a result, Asians have become the second biggest ethnic minority group in New Zealand, after the Maori population of 14.7%. Like Asian Americans, Asian New Zealanders displayed a tendency to live in concentrated areas, with 94% of Asian New Zealanders living in the main urban areas (areas with population greater than 30,000). The Census 2001 found that almost two-thirds of Asians (149,121) were living in Auckland, with the majority (107,802) residing in central and Southern Auckland. Asians now comprise 18.5% of the Auckland city population (within the Auckland region), second only to Europeans (65%), and larger than Maori (8.5%) and Pacific Islanders (13%). The growing number of Asian New Zealanders could potentially have a greater impact on the New Zealand political scene than that of the US, because of the comparatively small size of the New Zealand population and the MMP electoral system which minimises the "waste votes" of ethnic minority groups. It is therefore not surprising that the increase in the number of Asian immigrants and their geographic concentration have made New Zealand political parties take notice of this increasingly important constituency in recent elections.

The 2002 national election saw political parties making various efforts to mobilise Asian voters. For example, the two main parties and two minor parties nominated six Chinese candidates to attract Asians’ party votes, although only Pansy Wong was listed high enough in the National Party’s party list to get a seat in Parliament. One Korean candidate, Jonathan Ko, was also nominated as a candidate by the Christian Heritage Party for the electorate seat in the Pakuranga

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20 With the introduction of discriminatory immigration legislation in the late 19th Century, the Chinese population was reduced from a high of over 5,000 in 1882 to just about 2,000 in 1916; Ip in www.stevenyoung.co.nz/chinesevoice p2. The Chinese population increased to 83,320 in 1996 and again to 104,583 in 2001 with the introduction of non-discriminatory immigration policies. The number of Korean immigrants, who first came to New Zealand in the late 1970s, was also insignificant; from 1982 to 1987, less than 100 Korean immigrants came to New Zealand. No accurate data is available on the number of Korean immigrants prior to 1982; “Ten years of immigration history in New Zealand – Part One”, Korea Times, 14 January 2003, p112 (Korean text).

21 Pacific Islanders comprised a slightly smaller population (6.5%) than Asian New Zealanders at the time of the 2001 Census.

22 Census 2001. Vasil and Yoon noted how immigrants normally establish themselves in places where there is already an established concentration of members of their own ethnic group, and that their dispersal elsewhere in the host country tends to occur later after they know the country better; (1996) pp23-24.


24 Under the FPP, all the votes casted for candidates other than the winner are “wasted” in that they are not reflected in any way, whereas under the MMP, the party votes of even the smallest group of people would still be reflected in the number of seats allocated to the party they voted for.

25 Two in National, one in Labour, one in Act and two in the Progressive Coalition Party. For a list of candidates and their rankings, see Beal (2002) p48. Asian candidates did better in local government elections, with the election of seven Chinese local council members and ward members in 1999; Ip in www.stevenyoung.co.nz/chinesevoice p11.

26 Later, Act's 10th ranking candidate Kenneth Wang entered the Parliament, replacing the disgraced Act MP Donna Awaere Huata, to become the second Chinese MP in New Zealand.
area, which has a dense Asian population\textsuperscript{27}. In addition to nominating Asian candidates, a number of political candidates also published their campaign articles and advertisements in Asian languages in local Chinese and Korean newspapers\textsuperscript{28}. In particular, the Act party produced a bilingual website and billboards written both in English and Chinese, and sent out over 30,000 letters in Chinese and 3,000 letters in Korean during the 2002 election campaign to attract Asian voters\textsuperscript{29}. The high level of interest New Zealand politicians had in Asian voters was also reflected in the fact that both National and Labour sent their top politicians to a Chinese pre-election seminar\textsuperscript{30}, and that they both proposed creating a new portfolio to address Asian interests\textsuperscript{31}. Further to the mobilization theory, these mobilization efforts by political parties are expected to have encouraged the political participation of Asian New Zealanders.

5.2 SURVEY RESULTS AND ANALYSIS

The growing size and corresponding influence of the Asian population in New Zealand politics was evident in the survey. The survey found that extensive efforts have been made by political parties to mobilize Asian voters. The survey also found that these mobilization efforts have helped Asian immigrants overcome their feeling of political disempowerment, thereby encouraging their political participation. In so finding, the survey reaffirmed the applicability of the mobilization theory on the political participation of Asian New Zealanders.

Contact by politicians

When asked whether they had been contacted by political parties during the 2002 election campaign, nearly 85% of the Asian respondents replied that they had. This was a surprising outcome, especially since only 21% of New Zealanders (20.6% of Pakeha and 22.1% of Maori) who participated in the NZES 2002 had been contacted by political parties\textsuperscript{32}. The reasons why Asian New Zealanders were almost four times more likely than the general New Zealand population to be contacted by political parties can be explained as follows. Firstly, as a small yet geographically concentrated group with distinctive surnames, Asians would have been an easy

\textsuperscript{27} In the previous election in 1999, Woon-Dae Kim became the first Korean to be nominated as a political candidate in New Zealand. He was nominated as a 6\textsuperscript{th} ranking list MP for United Future.

\textsuperscript{28} For example, four political parties (Labour, National, Alliance and Act) have used the local Korean media for the 2002 election to inform Korean New Zealanders of their policies; See \textit{Koreatown}, 16 July 2002, No 210, pp59-72 (Korean text).


\textsuperscript{30} Ip in \url{www.stevenyoung.co.nz/chinesevoice} p9

\textsuperscript{31} For example, Labour went on to create the Office of Ethnic Affairs.

\textsuperscript{32} The most common form of contacting Asian voters was sending letters or pamphlets, as 71.2% of the respondents received letters or pamphlets. Only 1.0% of the respondents received phone calls and 0.3% emails. More than 10% of the Asian respondents indicated that they had been contacted in more than one way.
target for political campaigners to identify and mobilize (similar to the way the author selected the survey respondents). The fact that most Asians are recent immigrants who may not yet have developed a strong political preference also provided an extra incentive for political parties to make the effort to mobilize Asian voters. In addition, there are a number of characteristics associated with Asians (rightly or wrongly), such as the perception that they are all wealthy and business-oriented, which could have led certain centre-right parties to believe that Asian voters could easily be recruited. The Act party’s effort to send out 30,000 letters in Chinese and 3,000 letters in Korean to contact approximately 50,000 Chinese and 10,000 Korean registered voters could partly explain the high percentage of Asians who had been contacted. In contrast, New Zealanders who were contacted by political parties would have been carefully selected based on a number of factors such as their previous voting history and support patterns, as it would not have been feasible to randomly contact a large proportion of Pakeha or Maori voters.

The survey reaffirmed the mobilization theory by finding that efforts by political parties to mobilize Asian voters had a positive impact on Asian New Zealanders’ turnout. Of particular interest was the finding that respondents who had been contacted in more than one way showed a significantly higher voting rate (89.9%) than those who were not contacted (55.2%) or had been contacted in only one way (66.7%-78.3%) (see graph 5.1). This indicated that the frequency of contact correspondingly increased the likelihood of Asians participating in politics. The survey also supported the civic literacy theory by highlighting the importance of political structure that encourages political actors to pass on political information to voters, which in turn could encourage the voter turnout. Among the general New Zealand population, although those who had been contacted were more likely to vote (96.2%) than those who had not been contacted (94.4%), the difference was not statistically significant. In other forms of political activities, Asian respondents who had been contacted by political parties showed higher levels of participation, but the differences were not statistically significant except for the activity of signing

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33 The figure is an estimate ascertained from the author’s random selection of Asian registered voters from the Parliamentary Electoral Data, which came up with 26,294 Chinese surnames and 6,878 Korean surnames (excluding certain common Asian surnames, details of which will be set out in Appendix III).

34 See Rosenstone and Hansen (1993) and Goldstein and Ridout (2002) who argued that political parties increasingly target only those who are most likely to vote, for example, by looking at a person’s previous voting patterns, in order to maximize the benefit of mobilization efforts. In New Zealand, the Act party sent out 700,000 targeted mails to the “Act audience”, which is about 20% of the approximately 2.7 million registered voters. The “Act audience” was defined as those who either (a) already intended to vote Act; (b) intended to vote for another party but considered Act their second preference; or (3) would consider voting Act; Nicolle B. and Kriha T., Act III: Changing the landscape: A retrospective of Act’s 2002 campaign, sent by the Act headquarters. In comparison, Labour did not appear to have used the electoral roll to target Asian voters - it instead used a mixture of general approach and targeted approach through its sector groups. The Labour campaign manager advised the author that it did not discriminate based on voter party identification.


36 Chi-square .174, Phi and Cramer's V .034.
This was perhaps not surprising, given that mobilization efforts were directed at voting rather than other forms of political activities.

Graph 5.1 Turnout of Asians who have been contacted by political parties

Political empowerment

Despite the recent growth in the Asian population and mobilization efforts by political parties, the survey found that a feeling of “political helplessness” was still prevalent among Asian New Zealanders. For example, when asked whether they felt that Asian interests were well represented in New Zealand, less than 25% of respondents replied that their interests were either “very well” (1.8%) or “somewhat” (22.9%) represented. Meanwhile, almost 65% of respondents “strongly agreed” (17.5%) or “agreed” (45.9%) with the statement that it is harder for Asians to participate in New Zealand politics because of their ethnicity. Similarly, only 13% of the respondents felt that they could have “a lot of influence” (2.9%) or “some influence” (10.4%) over New Zealand government policies, compared to 35.4% of the NZES respondents who felt the same way (2.1% and 33.3% respectively). Having said that, Asians who had been contacted by political parties were less likely to feel political helplessness than those who had not been contacted, indicating that consistent efforts by political parties to mobilize Asian voters could help Asian New Zealanders overcome their feelings of political helplessness. Within different Asian ethnic groups, Korean respondents were more likely to display feelings of political

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37 Chi-square .018, Phi an Cramer’s V .076.
38 For example, 57.1% of those who had been contacted believed that they could have some level of influence over government policies, compared to 42.4% of those who had not been contacted (Chi-square .001, Phi and Cramer’s V .116).
helplessness than Chinese respondents\textsuperscript{39}, possibly reflecting the smaller size of the Korean population (and therefore a lesser chance of having their interests represented than Chinese), as well as the fact that there has been no Korean MP in New Zealand.

Further analysis of the data revealed that people who felt that Asian interests were “not at all represented” showed a lower voting rate (67.6%) than those who felt that their interests were well represented (80.8%), although the overall difference was not statistically significant (see graph 5.2). In contrast, people who believed that they could not have much influence over New Zealand government policies, or that it was harder for Asians to participate in politics, did not necessarily show lower voting and other participation rates than those who expressed more confidence\textsuperscript{40} (see graphs 5.3 and 5.4). This indicated that although the feeling of political helplessness was prevalent among Asian New Zealanders, such feelings did not necessarily discourage Asian New Zealanders from participating in New Zealand politics.

![Graph 5.2 Turnout of Asians who feel that Asian interests are well represented](image)

-Chi-square .265
-Phi and Cramer’s V .069

\textsuperscript{39} More Koreans (11.7%) than Chinese (4.9%) felt that Asian interests were “not at all” represented in New Zealand (Chi-square .000, Phi and Cramer’s V .154). Similarly, more Chinese (16.3%) than Koreans (8.8%) felt that they could either have “a lot of influence” or “some influence” over New Zealand government policies (Chi-square .003, Phi and Cramer’s V .125). This was despite the fact that a greater proportion of Koreans (88.2%) than Chinese (78.7%) had been contacted by political parties.

\textsuperscript{40} None of the factors relating to the feeling of political disempowerment showed statistically significant relevance to Asian New Zealanders’ participation rates in other forms of political activities. Similarly, cross-tabulation of the NZES data showed that there was little difference in turnout between New Zealanders who felt that they could have a “a lot of influence” (91.3%) and those who felt that they could have “no influence at all” (91.0%) over government policies.
Graph 5.3 Turnout of Asians who feel that it is harder for Asians to participate in NZ politics

- Chi-square .833
- Phi and Cramer’s V .042

Graph 5.4 Turnout of Asians who feel that they could have influence over NZ government’s policies

- Chi-square .000
- Phi and Cramer’s V .159

Commitment to New Zealand

Given the number of positive effects a sizeable Asian population could have on the political participation of Asian New Zealanders, questions relating to Asians’ commitment to New Zealand
were also incorporated to assess the likelihood of the Asian population decreasing in the near future. The survey found that more than 85% of the Asian respondents planned to live in New Zealand in the next 10 years, indicating that the Asian population is unlikely to diminish significantly in the near future (even with restrictive immigration policies). Asian New Zealanders’ level of commitment to their adopted country was slightly higher than that of Asian Americans, 78% of whom indicated that they planned to live in the US for the next 15 years. Asians who displayed a long-term commitment to New Zealand showed a higher voting rate (77.4%) than those who did not (60.9%), possibly because the benefit of participation is greater for those who plan to live in New Zealand (see graph 5.5).

**Graph 5.5 Turnout of Asians who plan to live in New Zealand in the next ten years**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Plan to live in NZ next 10 years</th>
<th>Voted last election Yes</th>
<th>Voted last election No</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>77.4%</td>
<td>60.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>32.6%</td>
<td>39.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don’t know</td>
<td>17.6%</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

-Chi-square .002  
-Phi and Cramer’s V .123

**Regression of the population factors**

Analysis of the survey findings indicated that mobilization efforts by political parties were an important predictor of Asian New Zealanders’ turnout, as Asians who had been contacted by political parties were 20.8% more likely to vote than those not contacted (see table 5.1). The finding was consistent with many overseas studies on Asian immigrants’ political participation (as well as that of the dominant group), which found that mobilization efforts by political parties encouraged individuals’ political participation. A long-term commitment to New Zealand also showed statistically significant relevance to Asian turnout, as those who planned to live in New Zealand in the next 10 years were 16.9% more likely to vote. In contrast, factors relating to the feeling of political helplessness did not appear to have much relevance to the Asian turnout. In
other forms of political activities, none of the factors included in this analysis showed statistically significant relevance to Asian New Zealanders’ participation rates.

Table 5.1 Effect of the size of the population on participation rate – Asian data

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Voting</th>
<th></th>
<th>Signing petition</th>
<th></th>
<th>Working in community</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>%</td>
<td>b</td>
<td>s.e</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>b</td>
<td>s.e</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contact by politician</td>
<td>20.8</td>
<td>0.98**</td>
<td>0.23</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>0.55</td>
<td>0.36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Well represented</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>0.29</td>
<td>0.23</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>0.28</td>
<td>0.26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Harder to participate</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>0.20</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>0.44</td>
<td>0.27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Plan to live 10 yrs</td>
<td>16.9</td>
<td>0.80**</td>
<td>0.26</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>0.36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>39.3</td>
<td>-0.56</td>
<td>0.35</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>-2.86**</td>
<td>0.51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% concordant</td>
<td>73.9</td>
<td>87.4</td>
<td>91.6</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cox &amp; Snell R²</td>
<td>.045</td>
<td>.009</td>
<td>.010</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**significant at <.01  *significant at <.05

As other questions relating to the size of the population were not included in the NZES 2002, only one variable of “contact by politicians” was included in this analysis of the NZES-Asia merged data, together with the ethnicity variables. Regression of the merged data showed that New Zealanders who had been contacted by politicians were 9.0% more likely to vote, 6.6% more likely to sign petitions and 5.7% more likely to work in the community than those who had not been contacted (see table 5.2), thereby reaffirming the mobilization theory. However, controlling the mobilization factor did not reduce the disparity between Asians and Pakeha, as Asians were 24.6% less likely to vote (which is an increase of 5.5% from when no other factors were controlled), 67.4% less likely to sign petitions (an increase of 4.2%) and 20.5% less likely to work in the community (an increase of 3.6%) than Pakeha when the mobilization factor was controlled. A possible reason for these results, despite the positive effect the mobilization factor had on Asian New Zealanders’ turnout, may be that different criteria were used to select Pakeha and Asian targets. For example, New Zealanders who were contacted by political parties would have been selected based on their past history of political participation (therefore more prone to vote), whereas Asian New Zealanders would have been selected (most likely based on their surnames) regardless of their tendency to vote. This, together with the fact that a high proportion of Asian New Zealanders had been contacted by political parties, may explain why the controls did little to reduce the disparity between the two groups.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Voting</th>
<th>Signing petition</th>
<th>Working in community</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>%</td>
<td>b</td>
<td>s.e</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asian</td>
<td>-24.6</td>
<td>-2.34**</td>
<td>0.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-67.4</td>
<td>-3.35**</td>
<td>0.16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-20.5</td>
<td>-1.50**</td>
<td>0.16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maori</td>
<td>-7.3</td>
<td>-0.96**</td>
<td>0.21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-8.4</td>
<td>-0.43**</td>
<td>0.13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>8.5</td>
<td>0.41**</td>
<td>0.13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contact by politician</td>
<td>9.0</td>
<td>0.89**</td>
<td>0.17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>6.6</td>
<td>0.44**</td>
<td>0.14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5.7</td>
<td>0.35**</td>
<td>0.13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>92.8</td>
<td>2.75**</td>
<td>0.14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>75.3</td>
<td>1.11**</td>
<td>0.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>24.5</td>
<td>-1.14**</td>
<td>0.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% concordant</td>
<td>86.5</td>
<td></td>
<td>79.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cox &amp; Snell R²</td>
<td>0.074</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.324</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.065</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**significant at <.01 *significant at <.05

5.3 SUMMARY

In advocating the mobilization theory, Rosenstone and Hansen argued that people “want to be accepted, valued, and linked”, and that they accept being mobilized by others in order to be well esteemed41. This argument has been questioned by many who found it “hard to imagine anyone being able to command the blind allegiance of followers to the point where they would vote just because they were encouraged to do so”42. The survey found that this “desire to be accepted, valued, and linked” may be greater for Asian New Zealanders, many of whom displayed a feeling of “political helplessness”. By finding that mobilization efforts by political parties diminished the feeling of disempowerment, as well as encouraging Asian turnout, the survey reaffirmed the applicability of the mobilization theory in the case of Asian New Zealanders. The survey also demonstrated that the size of the Asian population is unlikely to diminish in the near future, indicating that political parties’ mobilization efforts to attract Asian voters are likely to continue. Despite the positive impact mobilization efforts have on Asian New Zealanders’ political participation, direct contact between political parties and individual Asian voters may have contributed to the weakening of the Asian community’s role, details of which will be discussed in the next part of the thesis.

PART B – ETHNIC COMMUNITY ORGANISATIONS

Many studies have found that membership in community organizations contributes to building social capital that in turn encourages citizens to become more engaged in politics. This is because community organizations play an important “educative” role in teaching citizens democratic norms including how to interact socially and politically, as well as personal skills and resources that give individuals increased abilities and incentives to act in the political arena. Studies have also found that people who are active in community affairs are more likely to be active in politics, because the experience of receiving collective rewards helps people overcome the “rational ignorance” that accompanies non-participation. This part of the thesis seeks to find out whether community organisations, especially ethnic organisations, have the same positive effect on the political participation of Asian New Zealanders. If so, facilitating community activities among Asian New Zealanders would be an effective way of encouraging the political participation of Asian New Zealanders.

5.4 COMPARATIVE CONTEXT

The importance of ethnic community organisations in promoting the political participation of Asian immigrants has been well recognised in various studies, to the extent that ethnic organisations are regarded as “probably the best avenue for bringing [Asian immigrants] into the political system as participants.” Ethnic organisations give Asians a chance to participate in community affairs, help them to overcome feelings of disempowerment, and enhance their group consciousness and political awareness. In addition, because Asian immigrants are exposed to different forces of socialization in the host country (such as different media channels, entertainment outlets, religious and community associations), and because they tend to exhibit dense networks among themselves in the host country, ethnic community organisations could

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47 See Bobo and Gilliam (1990) as cited in Freeman (2000) p31, which found that group consciousness stimulates heightened Black participation. Kibria also argued that those who were exposed to Asian American organisations were far more likely to attach an explicit political agenda to the shared racial status of Asian Americans; Kibria N., “The construction of ‘Asian American’: reflections on intermarriage and ethnic identity among second-generation Chinese and Korean Americans” (1997) 20(3) Ethnic and Racial Studies 523-544 at pp526, 531.
have a significant political influence over Asian immigrants. This would be especially so for Asian immigrants with limited English proficiency, as they would rely almost totally on ethnic organizations and ethnic media to obtain political information and guidance.

Ethnic organizations could also raise the visibility of Asian immigrants in the host country’s political landscape by providing a point of contact for politicians and political parties who wish to reach out to Asian immigrants. They could provide a forum for policy discussions between political parties and the Asian community over policies that could affect Asian immigrants, as well as an internal forum to develop effective political strategies for Asian immigrants. For this reason, Asian immigrants are likely to turn to members of the ethnic community group first for assistance and advice when faced with difficulties in the host country. This would be especially so for those who have had the experience of marginalisation in the host country, as such an experience would have resulted in an inadequate foundation of trust and flow of communication between Asian immigrants and political representatives who belong to the dominant group.

In the case of Asian Americans, there are a number of national ethnic organisations which have been established to raise the political consciousness of Asian Americans and to mobilise them for political causes. These include the Committee of 100 which was successful in launching a 80-20 initiative (aimed at organising an Asian American voting bloc at the 2000 Presidential election), the Organisation of Chinese Americans (“OCA”) which focuses on educating Chinese Americans on legislative issues that might impact on the community, and the Asian Pacific American Legal Centre (“APALC”) which provides multilingual and culturally sensitive

other ethnic immigrant groups, as it helps to maintain culture, improve life chances, and protect members from racism; Zappala (1999) p6.

For a list of studies on the unique socialization process of foreign-born immigrants with limited English proficiency, see Tam Cho (1999) p1144.

However, it is worth noting the danger of abuse of power by self-appointed ethnic community leaders, such as them demanding or maintaining special treatment; Kymlicka and Norman in Kymlicka and Norman (2000) p36.

As a way of example, a survey conducted by the author in May 1999 among 60 Korean New Zealanders and 60 Pakehas revealed that 48% of Korean New Zealanders would turn to friends and family to act as a mediator when a conflict arises, compared to only 2% of Pakeha. In contrast, 45% of Pakeha replied that they would turn to an independent mediator, compared to only 10% of Korean respondents. A copy of the survey results is on file with the author.


For a list of national, state and local Asian Pacific American bar associations, civil rights groups and political party organisations, see (2000-2001) National Asian Pacific American Political Almanac, pp60-69.

The main aim of the Committee of 100 is to educate and advise political leaders, interest groups and the corporate sector on matters of concern to the Chinese Community; See www.committee100.org


The OCA is a nonpartisan organisation (thus has limited influence on the political process), but makes policy recommendations and suggestions to Congress and executive agencies; for more information, see www.ocanati.org.
legal services and education to the Asian community. In addition, there are ethnic research organisations that provide political resources and references for people who are interested in the political affairs of Asian Americans, such as the UCLA Asian American Studies Centre, the Leadership Education for Asian Pacific, and the Asian Pacific American Public Policy Institute in South California.

In terms of political mobilisation, in addition to the well-publicised launch of the 80-20 initiative, Asian community organizations were also successful in mobilising the Asian American community through a campaign against Proposition 187. Proposition 187 sought to impose requirements for Californian public organisations to verify the immigrant status of persons who are “reasonably suspected” of being in violation of federal immigration law (ie. people with distinctive physical features such as Latino and Asian Americans). The campaign against Proposition 187 provoked an unprecedented amount of interest among Asian Americans in terms of voter registration and voter education, although these efforts were unsuccessful in bringing about the desired outcome. Despite the shortfalls, these examples illustrated that ethnic community organisations can play a major role in shaping the level and mode of political participation of Asian immigrants.

Asian New Zealanders

Like Asian Americans, many Asian New Zealanders are exposed to ethnic media, socialise in ethnic entertainment outlets, and use services provided by members of their own ethnic group. For this reason, New Zealand also witnessed the creation of a growing number of ethnic community organisations that have the potential to influence the political participation of Asian New Zealanders. For example, with the increasing number of Korean immigrants in the 1990s, Korean Societies were established in every major city of New Zealand. Similarly, there are no fewer than 62 Chinese associations of recent Chinese immigrants in Auckland alone. Ethnic

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58 See [www.apalc.org](http://www.apalc.org)
59 See [www.sscnet.ucla.edu/aasc](http://www.sscnet.ucla.edu/aasc). The UCLA Asian American Studies Centre publishes the National Asian Pacific American Political Almanac, which provides the most up-to-date and comprehensive information and empirical research on the political participation of Asian Americans.
60 See [www.leap.org](http://www.leap.org)
61 Reasons for the failure included: (1) an inability to form a pan-ethnic coalition; (2) a widely held view that Proposition 187 does not affect Asian Americans and only affects Latino Americans; and (3) lack of numbers in that even if all Asian Americans voted against Proposition 187, it would still have passed; Bau I., “Immigrant Rights: A Challenge to Asian Pacific American Political Influence” (1995) V Asian American Policy Review 7, at pp17, 19, 21.
62 Vasil and Yoon (1996) p14. See also Gregory A., “‘Ghettos’ of migrants forming around the city”, New Zealand Herald, 16 August 2003, pA7. Examples of professional services provided by Korean people include lawyers, accountants, doctors, dentists, architects, insurance brokers, pharmacists, travel agents, real estate agents, bankers, and many more. Examples of ethnic entertainment outlets include cafes, restaurants, bars, karaoke, pool places, and sports clubs.
religious organisations also play a pivotal role in the Asian community, not only by providing religious services and a venue for social interaction, but also by organizing language schools for young Asians, educative seminars, and coordinated church services with Pakeha, Maori and Pacific Island churches\textsuperscript{64}. As such, many recent Asian immigrants (Christian or not) go to church for help and advice on housing, education, banking and other issues\textsuperscript{65}. Although there exists a degree of rivalry and generational/cultural gaps within ethnic organisations\textsuperscript{66}, they can be seen to encourage the political participation of Asian New Zealanders by raising the profile of the Asian community in New Zealand, passing on political information, and providing the opportunity to participate in community affairs. Asian New Zealanders who belong to community organisations are therefore expected to be more active in politics than non-members.

The role of ethnic media which passes on relevant political information to Asian New Zealanders in their native languages should also be noted. In the case of Korean New Zealanders, there are currently four ethnic magazines and newspapers which mainly cover the news of New Zealand and Korean New Zealanders, two ethnic newspapers which mainly cover the news of Korea, five Korean radio stations, and one Korean TV channel. In the case of the Chinese community, there are at least nine local Chinese language newspapers, as well as a couple of Chinese language radio stations and TV stations. A 1996 survey on Chinese New Zealanders found that 58% and 28% of the respondents frequently used the local Chinese newspaper and the Chinese language radio station\textsuperscript{67}. The ethnic media also plays a role in educating Asian New Zealanders about the importance of political participation. The local Korean media, for example, put considerable effort into educating the Korean community about the New Zealand political system and the importance of political participation. During the 2002 election, the main Korean magazines and newspapers, together with the Korean radio station, ran a joint campaign encouraging Korean New Zealanders to exercise their right to vote\textsuperscript{68}.


\textsuperscript{64} In a survey conducted in 1996, it was found that 31% of the Chinese respondents belonged to a Chinese society and 34% to a Chinese church; Friesen and Ip (1997) p14.


\textsuperscript{66} Lack of cohesion within the Asian community has often been cited as one of the main problems facing Asian New Zealanders. For example, some established local Chinese New Zealanders were among the opponents of the new Asian immigrants; they feared that their Century-old efforts to fit in quietly with the mainstream could be undermined by more visible and outspoken recent immigrants; Chen E., “A new ‘Yellow Peril’ for New Zealand?”, \textit{Sinorama}, October 1996, p11 (Chinese text).


\textsuperscript{68} One of the Korean magazines also issued an election special to provide information on voting, such as how to register as voters, who is eligible to vote, how to vote, and how the MMP system works; \textit{Koreatown}, 16 July 2002, No 210, pp52-87.
There have been a number of notable mobilization efforts by Asian community organisations in New Zealand, with varying degrees of success. The most successful example to date has been a political initiative by the New Zealand Chinese Association ("NZCA") to seek redress for the historical imposition of the Poll Tax on early Chinese immigrants\textsuperscript{69}. This initiative eventually led to the Labour government’s apology and its subsequent decision to set up a $5 million trust (to raise awareness of early Chinese history, language and culture). The NZCA set the groundwork for this apology by commissioning research into the full history of the Poll Tax, and formed an advisory group under the Office of Ethnic Affairs to advise the government on an appropriate form of reconciliation. The number of written submissions received in relation to the Poll Tax issue was such that it surprised not only the government but also Chinese New Zealanders who regarded themselves as a “quiet minority”\textsuperscript{70}. The Epsom Normal Primary School’s “English Rule” incident of 1996 was another good example of a successful Chinese political mobilisation. A school rule requiring children to pass an English test before starting the school prompted the Chinese parents to join the school board (which had not previously included any Chinese), apply to the Ministry of Education for a subsidy, and raise money to subsidize English classes\textsuperscript{71}. These efforts by the Chinese parents were successful in making the school board abandon the “English Rule”, which was adopted primarily to deter Chinese and other Asian students from enrolling at the school.

The “Inv-Asia” article written by Pat Booth in 1993\textsuperscript{72}, which claimed that New Zealand had been invaded by an alien race, also had the effect of mobilising the Asian community. Various letters were written by Chinese New Zealanders to rebut the claims made in the “Inv-Asia” article, and the Pakuranga-Howick Chinese Parents’ Association made a formal complaint to the Race Relations Conciliator about the article. Although the complaint fell outside the scope of the Race Relations Act, these efforts by the Chinese community resulted in an apology from the suburban newspaper which published the article\textsuperscript{73}. Another example of Asian political mobilisation was the Korean community’s effort to fight off prejudicial media coverage. An article describing Koreans’ favourite foods as “dogs, snakes, octopus, seahorses”\textsuperscript{74} prompted Korean New Zealanders to make numerous telephone calls and written complaints to the \textit{New Zealand Herald}. The Korean

\textsuperscript{69} See chapter 2.4 for more information on the Poll Tax.
\textsuperscript{70} Young 1, pp3-4.
\textsuperscript{71} Chen E., “Chinese get involved in Kiwi Politics”, \textit{Sinorama}, October 1996 (Chinese text) (Chen 2).
\textsuperscript{72} Booth P. and Martin Y., “Inv-Asia”, \textit{Eastern Courier}, 16 April 1993, p7. See chapter 6.4 for more information on this article. A similar debate was sparked in Australia by Professor Blainey’s 1984 book which set out the dangers posed by the rapid increase in Asian immigration; Blainey G., \textit{All for Australia} (1984) North Ryde, Methuen Haynes.
\textsuperscript{73} \textit{Auckland City Harbour News}, 15 May 1993, p1. The New Zealand Chinese Public Issues Group, which was formed to challenge the Asian-Invasion controversy, was also effective in forcing a racially demeaning TV advertisement sponsored by the New Zealand Olympics and Commonwealth Games Association off air; Young 1, p4.
\textsuperscript{74} “Korea at a glance”, \textit{New Zealand Herald}, 24 June 2002.
community also formed a group called “Kyo-Dae-Mo”\textsuperscript{75}, with the aim of obtaining a formal apology, ensuring better media coverage in the future and, if necessary, issuing a defamation proceeding against the \textit{New Zealand Herald}. Kyo-Dae-Mo was led mainly by Korean professionals, including lawyers, architects, and local media representatives in New Zealand. The initiative was widely publicised in the local Korean media, and Kyo-Dae-Mo managed to collect NZ$27,376.75 in 10 weeks from the Korean community. The initiative eventually led the chief editor of the \textit{New Zealand Herald} to send a formal letter to the Korean community expressing regret for the mistake, and promising better coverage on Korea and Korean New Zealanders in the future\textsuperscript{76}. These examples illustrated that Asian community organisations are willing and capable to mobilize Asian New Zealanders for political causes, and in doing so, provide opportunities for Asian New Zealanders to participate in politics.

5.5 SURVEY RESULTS AND ANALYSIS

The survey found that Asian New Zealanders who belonged to community organizations were in general more active in politics than non-members, but that their membership rates in various ethnic organizations were surprisingly low (with one exception of ethnic religious groups). The survey also highlighted the shortcomings of the social capital theory by finding that membership in religious organizations did not show the expected positive effect on Asian New Zealanders’ political participation. The ethnic media was also found to play an important role in passing on political information to Asian New Zealanders.

Membership

The survey asked the respondents whether they belonged to various organizations in New Zealand. Contrary to the prediction that a large number of Asian New Zealanders would be active members of ethnic organizations, less than 15% of the respondents indicated that they belonged to ethnic community organizations. In addition, only about 3% of the respondents indicated that they belonged to ethnic sports groups (2.7%) and ethnic business groups (3.1%). Only ethnic religious groups showed a relatively high membership rate of 30.6%. Membership

\textsuperscript{75} This is an abbreviation in Korean for “a group formed to recover the pride of the Korean community in relation to the degrading articles by the \textit{New Zealand Herald}.

\textsuperscript{76} Whether the \textit{New Zealand Herald} coverage on Korea in fact improved is questionable. Part of the deal between Kyo-Dae-Mo and the \textit{New Zealand Herald} was that they would send a reporter to Korea for more and better coverage on Korea. However, the reporter who was sent to Korea published another negative article entitled “Korea teaching ‘scam’”, which again enraged the Korean community and resulted in many Kiwis in Korea writing in defence of the English teaching programmes in Korea; see letters written by Georgina Guscott, Donna Vitasovich and Peter M.J. Auckram, all from Seoul, to the \textit{New Zealand Herald} on 31 October 2002.
rate of ethnic religious groups was especially high amongst Koreans at 56.0%. The relative newness of these ethnic organizations, conflict within and between various organizations, and lack of strong leadership could all be regarded as contributing towards this low membership rate, as will be discussed further below. The ability of political parties to identify and directly contact individual Asian voters may have further weakened the role of ethnic community organizations, which traditionally acted as intermediaries between the Asian community and political parties.

Asian New Zealanders’ membership rates in New Zealand organisations (ie. not ethnically based) were even lower than that of ethnic organizations. The highest proportion of Asian New Zealanders were found to be members of religious groups (12.8%), followed by business groups (10.2%), sports groups (7.1%), community groups (6.7%), and trade unions (1.9%). Asian New Zealanders’ membership rate in political parties was also low at 2.0%, compared to 4.6% of New Zealanders who identified themselves as political party members. Interestingly, more Asians belonged to New Zealand business groups (10.2%) than the general population (4.2%), whereas Asians’ membership rate in trade unions (1.9%) was considerably lower than that of the general population (11.8%). The findings could be seen as providing yet another reason why Asian New Zealanders showed more support for centre-right parties than centre-left parties.

As predicted by the social capital theory, Asian New Zealanders who belonged to ethnic or New Zealand organizations were more likely to vote than those who did not belong to any organizations. The voting rates for those who belonged to various organizations were, in the order of highest voting rate, trade unions (94.1%), New Zealand community organizations (90.7%), New Zealand business organizations (86.5%), New Zealand sports organizations (84.7%), ethnic business organizations (84.0%), ethnic community organizations (83.7%), New Zealand religious organizations (82.6%), ethnic sports organizations (75.0%), and ethnic religious organizations (71.4%). Asians who belonged to New Zealand organizations showed higher voting rates than those who belonged to ethnic organizations, possibly because the former have a higher level of interaction with other ethnic groups, use English more, and are exposed to greater political stimuli through wider social networking. Somewhat surprisingly, membership in ethnic religious organizations showed a negative correlation to Asian New Zealanders’ turnout, as only 71.4% of the respondents who belonged to ethnic religious groups voted at the 2002 election (see graph 5.6). Membership in organizations also had a positive effect on Asian New

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77 Similarly, a study in the US found that over 75% of Korean Americans were affiliated with one of the Korean immigrant churches, and that ethnic religious groups played a major role in stimulating social interaction and preserving Korean culture; Min P. (ed) Asian Americans (1995) Sage Publishers, Thousand Oaks, CA.

78 Similarly, New Zealanders who belonged to trade unions or business organizations showed higher voting rates than non-members. 97.2% of those who belonged to trade unions voted, compared to 92.1% of non-members (Chi-square .006, Phi and Cramer’s V -.063). 98.4% of business organization members voted, compared to 92.5% of non-members (Chi-square .055, Phi and Cramer’s V -.045).
Zealanders’ participation rates in other forms of political activities, with the exception of ethnic religious organizations and New Zealand religious organizations.\(^{79}\)

**Graph 5.6 Turnout of Asians who belong to ethnic religious groups**

- Chi-square .036
- Phi and Cramer’s V .065

This leaves the question of why religious organizations did not have the same positive effect on the political participation of Asian New Zealanders – after all, religious organizations provide the same opportunity for Asians to participate in community affairs and learn civic virtues. A similar puzzle was raised in an earlier study by Donovan et al.\(^{80}\), which found that contrary to US studies that church group membership increased individual’s participation rate\(^{81}\), membership in church groups did not have any effect on the general New Zealand population. The reason for this may be that the nature of religious organizations in New Zealand differs from that of the US\(^{82}\), or that New Zealand religious organizations discourage their members from taking part in other forms of civic engagement\(^{83}\). Whatever the actual reason may be, the survey findings questioned the universal applicability of the theory that membership in organizations has a positive effect on individuals’ political participation.

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\(^{79}\) Whereas most respondents who belonged to ethnic or New Zealand organisations showed higher participation rates in most political activities, those who belonged to ethnic and New Zealand religious organizations were less likely than non-members to have participated in political activities such as donating money and writing to government or media, although the differences were not statistically significant.


\(^{82}\) Donovan, Bowler, Hanneman and Karp (2004) p417. This was explained in terms of New Zealand having a unique religious context, such as having a significant proportion of Anglicans (24%) and non-religious affiliated people (25%), compared to the US where 62% were protestant and 9% claimed no affiliation.

Satisfaction rate

In addition to having a low membership rate, ethnic community organizations in New Zealand did not appear to have earned much respect from Asian New Zealanders for their role in representing the community’s interests and solving the community’s problems. Only 4.0% of the respondents regarded ethnic organizations as “very effective” in representing the community’s interests, although 30.5% regarded them as “somewhat effective” in doing so. Ethnic community organizations also received a low approval rate for their role in solving the community’s problems, with only 26.6% regarding the organizations as “very effective” (3.3%) or “somewhat effective” (23.3%). Nearly a quarter of the respondents displayed their lack of awareness of and interest in the affairs of ethnic organizations by choosing “don’t know” as the answer. This ignorance may be one of the reasons for Asian New Zealanders’ low level of satisfaction with organizations’ performance, as the satisfaction rate among those who belonged to ethnic community organizations was higher than non-members. As briefly mentioned above, factors such as the newness of the organizations, conflict between older and younger generations, non-accountability of self-appointed organizational leaders, and the diminished role of the ethnic community organizations could all have contributed to this low level of satisfaction.

Cross-tabulation revealed that people who were satisfied with ethnic organizations’ performances were more likely than those who were not as satisfied to have voted at the last election, but the differences were not statistically significant (see graphs 5.7 and 5.8). In other forms of political activities, the satisfaction rate with ethnic organizations’ performance did not show much correlation to Asians’ participation rates.

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84 23.8% for the question on representation, 26.6% for the question on solving problems. The largest proportion of Koreans and Taiwanese (both approximately 84%) expressed their views on these two questions (whether positive or negative), reflecting their high level of interest in the affairs of ethnic community organizations.

85 45.1% of the members believed that ethnic organizations were “very” or “somewhat” effective in representing the community’s interests, and 41.2% believed that the organizations were effective in solving the community’s problems.
Graph 5.7 Turnout of Asians who believe that ethnic community organizations are effective in representing the community's interests

- Chi-square .234
- Phi Cramer's V .082

Graph 5.8 Turnout of Asians who believe that ethnic community organizations are effective in solving the community's problems

- Chi-square .076
- Phi Cramer's V .101

Source of political information

The influence of the ethnic community was also evident in the finding that Asian New Zealanders rely more heavily on the ethnic media than the New Zealand media to obtain political information.
When asked to identify their main sources of political information, more than 60% of the respondents indicated that they obtained such information from TV news\footnote{Unfortunately, the questionnaire did not distinguish between New Zealand TV and ethnic TV (World TV), although the latter was cited by a number of respondents. Most respondents chose more than one answer.}, followed by Korean or Chinese newspapers (54.8%), New Zealand newspapers (35.7%), the internet (34.9%), Korean or Chinese radio (25.8%), friends and families (22.2%), and New Zealand radio (18.8%). The findings indicated that the ethnic media played an important role in shaping Asian New Zealanders’ political perceptions, especially at a time when community organizations appeared to be losing their relevance. Asian New Zealanders’ reliance on the ethnic media, which provide information in their native languages, could also explain why language difficulties were not a major barrier to participation for Asian New Zealanders\footnote{See chapter 4.8.}. The voting rates for Asians who used different media channels, in the order of highest voting rates, were: New Zealand radio (84.8%), New Zealand newspapers (81.0%), ethnic radio (79.4%), friends and families (79.3%), TV news (79.0%), ethnic newspapers (76.3%), and the internet (74.1%). Perhaps not surprisingly, Asian New Zealanders who obtained political information from the New Zealand media showed higher voting rates than those who obtained information from the ethnic media (as the former would have been more acculturated into New Zealand society).

Regression of the factors relating to community organisations

Because of Asian New Zealanders’ extremely low membership rates in a number of organizations, regression of the Asian data included only those organizations which had a higher than 3% membership rate. It revealed that although membership in organizations had a positive correlation to the Asian turnout (with the exception of membership in ethnic religious organizations), only membership in ethnic community organizations showed a statistically significant relevance of 10.9% when all other factors were controlled (see table 5.3). Membership in organizations appeared to play a greater role in other forms of political activities, as Asians who belonged to New Zealand business organizations were 14.9% more likely to sign petitions and 7.3% more likely to work in the community. Those who belonged to ethnic community organizations were also 11.3% more likely to sign petitions and 14.2% more likely to work in the community when the factors included in this analysis were controlled. In addition, Asians who belonged to New Zealand religious organizations were 11.7% more likely to sign petitions, and membership in New Zealand community organizations increased the likelihood of Asians working in the community by 20.7%. In so finding, the survey reaffirmed the social capital theory that people who belong to voluntary organizations are more likely to be political active, especially in political activities other than voting. In contrast, Asian New Zealanders’ view on the effectiveness
some textual content

of ethnic organizations did not show much relevance to their turnout or participation rates in other forms of political activities.

Table 5.3 Effect of ethnic community organizations on participation rate – Asian data

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Voting</th>
<th></th>
<th>Signing petition</th>
<th></th>
<th>Working in community</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>%</td>
<td>b</td>
<td>s.e</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>b</td>
<td>s.e</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic community</td>
<td>10.9</td>
<td>0.75*</td>
<td>0.30</td>
<td>11.3</td>
<td>0.82**</td>
<td>0.26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic religious</td>
<td>-5.1</td>
<td>-0.28</td>
<td>0.21</td>
<td>-3.5</td>
<td>-0.35</td>
<td>0.28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NZ community</td>
<td>8.5</td>
<td>0.70</td>
<td>0.49</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>0.11</td>
<td>0.38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NZ religious</td>
<td>6.7</td>
<td>0.38</td>
<td>0.33</td>
<td>11.7</td>
<td>0.94**</td>
<td>0.35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NZ sport</td>
<td>7.4</td>
<td>0.55</td>
<td>0.43</td>
<td>7.3</td>
<td>0.48</td>
<td>0.36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NZ business</td>
<td>8.8</td>
<td>0.63</td>
<td>0.36</td>
<td>14.9</td>
<td>0.99**</td>
<td>0.29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Effectiveness**</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>0.10</td>
<td>0.20</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td>0.23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>73.6</td>
<td>1.01**</td>
<td>0.16</td>
<td>9.5</td>
<td>-2.22**</td>
<td>0.20</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**% concordant | 77.0 | 85.7 | 90.8
Cox & Snell R² | .032 | .045 | .073

**significant at <.01  *significant at <.05

Regression of the NZES-Asia merged data also reaffirmed the social capital theory by showing that membership in trade unions and New Zealand business organizations increased New Zealanders’ likelihood of voting by 6.3% and 9.3% respectively (see table 5.4). Having said that, the likelihood of Asian or Maori non-voting vis-à-vis Pakeha did not show any improvement when the organisational factors were controlled; Asians were 19.2% less likely to vote (which is an increase of 0.1% from when no other factors were controlled), and Maori were 7.7% less likely to vote (an increase of 0.3%) than Pakeha. In other forms of political activities, New Zealanders who belonged to business organizations were 13.3% more likely to sign petitions and 12.3% more likely to work in the community, and those who belonged to trade unions were 12.3% more likely to sign petitions and 20.8% more likely to work in the community. Unlike the effect on the act of voting, the likelihood of Asian non-participation vis-à-vis Pakeha was reduced by 0.3% to 62.9% for the act of signing petitions, and by 1.2% to 15.7% for the act of working in the community. The findings suggested that organizational membership was a better predictor of Asian New Zealanders’ participation in political activities other than voting.

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88 The two questions were merged into one, with the alpha statistics of .901.
Table 5.4 Effect of ethnic community organizations on participation rate – Merged data

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Voting</th>
<th>Signing petition</th>
<th>Working in community</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>%</td>
<td>b</td>
<td>s.e</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asian</td>
<td>-19.2</td>
<td>-1.74**</td>
<td>0.16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maori</td>
<td>-7.7</td>
<td>-0.99**</td>
<td>0.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trade Union</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>1.21**</td>
<td>0.43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NZ business</td>
<td>9.3</td>
<td>0.86**</td>
<td>0.30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>93.7</td>
<td>2.79**</td>
<td>0.14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% concordant</td>
<td>86.5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cox &amp; Snell R²</td>
<td>.072</td>
<td>.329</td>
<td>.082</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**significant at <.01  *significant at <.05

5.6 SUMMARY

Most of the studies on the political participation of Asian immigrants have emphasized the important roles ethnic community organizations play in encouraging their political participation. Although the survey reaffirmed the social capital theory by finding that Asians who belonged to voluntary organizations had higher participation rates, it appeared that the ethnic community organizations were no longer playing as important a role as they used to. Whether this was due to the favourable electoral system of New Zealand (which allows direct interaction between individual Asians and political parties, thereby reducing the role of the "middleman")89, or because of the different nature of ethnic organisations in New Zealand, remains to be seen. Also interesting was the finding that ethnic religious organizations, which had by far the highest membership rate, had a negative effect on the political participation of Asian New Zealanders. Although possible reasons for this result have been investigated, questions remain as to why certain organizations in certain countries do not have the expected positive effect on individuals' political participation. Addressing this would be an interesting topic for future research. Nevertheless, Asians who belonged to community organizations were more likely than non-members to participate in politics, especially in political activities other than voting, thereby indicating that Asian New Zealanders' low level of participation may have been exacerbated by their unwillingness or inability to join community organizations. The findings also suggested that different factors affect individuals' participation in different forms of political activities (as membership in organisations showed greater effect on political activities other than voting), and that strategies to encourage political participation should accordingly reflect these differences.

89 See chapter 6.1 for more information on New Zealand’s institutional structure.
PART C – PAN-ETHNICITY

Another community variable relevant to the political participation of Asian immigrants is the presence and strength of a pan-ethnic identity among Asian immigrants. As briefly mentioned earlier, Asian immigrants are often portrayed as a homogeneous group, and individual actions of Asian immigrants are accounted for and judged collectively\(^0\). In doing so, the host country is putting pressure on Asian immigrants to think of themselves as “Asian” rather than as “Chinese” or “Korean”. Such development is common for all immigrant groups - for example, immigrants who previously understood themselves in local, regional terms (eg. Sicilians, Neapolitans, Florentines) often begin to see themselves in national terms (Italian) in the host country\(^1\). Responding to this pressure, and to a certain extent voluntarily adopting this dominant group’s categorisation of them, Asian immigrants in Western countries began to institutionalise a “pan-ethnic identity” as their primary political identity. Overseas studies have found that a pan-ethnic identity may strengthen Asian immigrants’ involvement in most political activities, as those who identify themselves in pan-ethnic terms are more likely to be aware of the community’s needs and attach a political agenda to Asian issues\(^2\). This part of the thesis will assess whether or not a pan-ethnic identity has developed among Asian New Zealanders, and whether having a pan-ethnic identity in fact encouraged the political participation of Asian New Zealanders.

5.7 COMPARATIVE CONTEXT

In the case of Asian Americans, the term “Asian American” was a political label chosen by Asian immigrants themselves in the 1960s to form a united ethnic identity (unlike the labels of “Indian Americans” and “Hispanic Americans”, which were imposed by mainstream Americans)\(^3\). The adoption and development of a pan-ethnic Asian identity had two primarily political objectives: to mobilise a diverse group of people, and to force others to be more responsive to their grievances\(^4\). A sense of shared culture and destiny among Asian Americans, based on their shared experience as immigrants with distinctive racial features in a pre-dominantly Caucasian society, also helped them to develop this pan-ethnic identity\(^5\). The 2001 survey revealed that although the respondents were more likely to identify themselves along ethnic lines (with 34%...
choosing to identify as ethnic Americans and 30% by ethnic origin only), more than half the respondents who identified with ethnic-specific identities also thought of themselves as “Asian Americans”. This indicated that a pan-ethnic identity does not necessarily involve denial of their original ethnic identity; it is a highly situational and fluctuating identity in that depending on the circumstances at hand, national identity may be emphasized over pan-ethnic identity and vice versa.

Asian Americans’ general preference for Asian political candidates (regardless of candidates’ ethnic origin) is another indicator of the developing pan-ethnic identity among Asian Americans. About 60% of the respondents in the 2001 survey showed support for an Asian American candidate over another candidate, all else being equal between the two candidates. As a way of example, the presence of prominent Chinese American candidates has attracted a large number of first time voters from a wider Asian American community, including Japanese and Koreans. The elected Asian American politicians in turn tend to serve the broad interests of the Asian American community rather than ethnic-specific interests, as evidenced by David Wu’s resolution condemning stereotypes against all Asian Americans. There have also been impressive accounts of pan-Asian organisational efforts, particularly over issues that can unite Asian Americans as a whole, such as anti-Asian violence, inter-minority group tension, bilingualism, and other community-based criticisms.

The development of a pan-ethnic identity is political coalition-building, a process of creating a working relationship between different ethnic groups to maximize their political interests. However, it can also be a limiting trap for the expression of diverse ethnic cultures and the individual immigrants’ full integration into the host society. Internally, coalition partners may marginalise minority groups’ views within the coalition in an effort to raise a unified voice, or a dominant group may attempt to control the coalition, as groups inevitably have different amounts of political resources and internal solidarity. For Asian American politicians, focusing too much

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96 Hing characterised this process as “situational political mobility”; (1993) pp181-182.
97 Tam (1995) pp242, 244.
98 See also chapter 5.1.
99 Wu’s resolution in the 106th Congress (1999-2000) succeeded in having a concurrent resolution approved by the House, although it failed to pass the Senate. For more information on the resolution, see Takeda in Menifield (2001).
on issues that are relevant solely to Asian Americans contains the danger of being marginalized in mainstream US politics, or overlooking important issues that are relevant only to certain ethnic Asian groups\textsuperscript{104}. This may compel some Asian American political leaders to deny their ethnicity in order to gain political support and acceptance from mainstream society; especially as Asian American candidates are most likely among all ethnic minority candidates to be elected by members of the dominant group\textsuperscript{105}. The existence of a multi-levelled diversity among Asian Americans also makes it difficult for them to raise their voices in unity, not only in the area of foreign policy (where opinions of Asian Americans are inevitably divided along ethnic lines\textsuperscript{106}), but also in domestic policy\textsuperscript{107}.

Despite the difficulties and possible adverse effects of developing pan-ethnic political coalitions, there appeared to be a growing willingness on the part of Asian Americans to form such coalitions. This suggested that Asian Americans are gradually learning to speak the “language of politics”, given that coalition building is central in US politics\textsuperscript{108}. A political coalition of Asian immigrants would also allow new groups to learn from the more visible groups, so that their scarce skills and resources can be maximised in obtaining the desired political outcome. The strength of a pan-ethnic identity and the groups’ willingness to cooperate could determine the success of a political coalition of Asian immigrants\textsuperscript{109}, which in turn could strengthen the group’s political power in the host country.

\section*{Asian New Zealanders}

Vasil and Yoon in their book “New Zealanders of Asian Origin” stated that almost no Asian immigrants possessed even a notional sense of pan-ethnic Asian identity and instead had a

\begin{itemize}
\item Wang in Rich (1996) p141.
\item Because Asian Americans’ sense of ethnic distinctiveness is often reinforced in the foreign policy area, Asian American political unity on foreign policy is regarded as impossible; Desai (1997) p56. See also Watanabe P.Y., “Global Forces, Foreign Policy, and Asian Pacific Americans” (2001) \textit{Political Science and Politics} 639 at 640 (Watanabe 2).
\item For example, Chinese identified language barriers as the main problem whereas Koreans identified a lack of cohesion within the community and Vietnamese an increasing crime rate as the main problems in the 2001 survey. The generation gap is also evident; the leadership of Asian Americans with a longer history in the US is regarded as impotent and ineffective, whereas the new leadership, led mostly by second-generation professional Asian Americans, is regarded as focusing too narrowly on their professional interests instead of broad community issues; Wang in Rich (1996) p136. See also Hing (1993) p172.
\item In order to create a successful coalition, the groups need to communicate their political intentions, actions, and expected outcomes to their coalition partners, so that they can coordinate actions with each other. They also need a strategy, a reward structure, and a mechanism to resolve disagreement, as well as shared political issues and goals that are strong enough to overcome differences among the coalition partners; Rich in Rich (1996) p6; Kim (1997) p75; Espiritu (1992) pp164-168.
\end{itemize}
strong sense of ethnic identity. They also noted that although many Asian immigrants made special efforts to establish contact with the larger New Zealand society, little attempt had been made to intermingle with migrants from elsewhere in Asia or to form pan-Asian organisations. That may have been the case then (1996), but it appears that a pan-ethnic identity has been developing among Asian New Zealanders in recent years. Because most New Zealanders cannot distinguish one ethnic Asian group from the other, Asians living in New Zealand are often categorised in a pan-ethnic term of “Asian New Zealanders”. As such, other things that used to distinguish one from the other (such as which region of China or Korea they came from) have become less important to Asians living in New Zealand.

As this external categorisation is internalised by Asian New Zealanders, an increasing number of Asian New Zealanders appeared to have begun to see themselves in pan-ethnic terms. For example, following a car accident in which a young Chinese driver killed a four-year-old New Zealand girl, a Chinese reader of the New Zealand Herald apologised “on behalf of all Asians” for the awful accident. In doing so, he demonstrated a sense of pan-ethnic identity as an “Asian New Zealander”, as well as the willingness to take collective responsibility for the action of an individual Asian driver. Similarly, many Asian people writing to the New Zealand Herald have expressed how “we Asians” were frustrated by the continuous attack on “us Asians”. These examples indicate that Asian New Zealanders may have developed a sense of pan-ethnic identity. Pansy Wong, the first Asian MP in New Zealand, also acknowledged in her maiden speech that she was to represent all ethnic Asian groups in New Zealand who have supported her. She has since worked together with different Asian ethnic groups to represent pan-ethnic Asian interests in and outside Parliament. As such, it is hypothesized that Asian New Zealanders would support Asian MPs over MPs of other ethnic backgrounds.

In addition, there have been movements within the Asian community to create various pan-ethnic Asian groups and events. The Asian Network Steering Committee, which was established after the successful Asian Network Forum of 2000, provides a good example. The Committee has been annually organising an “Asian Forum” since 2001 to facilitate networking and to discuss key issues facing the Asian community, including the issue of political participation. However, not
all attempts to create a pan-Asian ethnic organisation have been successful, as evidenced by the failure of the New Zealand Pan Asian Congress, which had the grand aim of “countering prejudice, responding to anti-Asian messages, promoting wider awareness of Asian contribution, and providing a political voice for Asian New Zealanders”\(^\text{117}\). Despite the extensive media attention the group received, it failed to produce any concrete outcomes, and was subsequently dissolved. Factors such as differences between local and recent Asian immigrants, difficulties in gathering support from various ethnic community leaders, and the lack of experience of key personnel were regarded as the key reasons for its failure\(^\text{118}\). Nevertheless, the initiative can be seen as an example of growing pan-ethnic identity among Asian New Zealanders, and the positive influence the pan-ethnic identity could have on the political participation of Asian New Zealanders.

5.8 SURVEY RESULTS AND ANALYSIS

A number of questions were asked in the survey to assess the strength of a pan-Asian identity among Asian New Zealanders. The survey revealed that although Asian New Zealanders have begun to develop a pan-ethnic identity, such an identity did not necessarily encourage their political participation. This was contrary to overseas studies which found that a pan-ethnic identity strengthened Asian immigrants’ involvement in political activities. The findings indicated that the political participation of Asian New Zealanders cannot be understood solely by looking at overseas studies on Asian immigrants. The survey also found that although the respondents in general supported the idea of having more Asian political representatives, little support was recorded for pan-ethnic political mobilization. In so finding, the survey illustrated the difficulties in mobilizing a diverse group of Asians for political causes.

Self-identification

When asked to choose the best description of their identity, nearly 80% of Asian New Zealanders chose an ethnic identity of “Korean/Chinese New Zealander” (51.2%) or “Korean/Chinese” (28.4%) (compared to 64% of Asian Americans who chose an ethnic identity). Only 14.1% of the respondents chose a pan-ethnic identity of “Asian New Zealander” (9.0%) or “Asian” (5.1%), and...
an additional 5.4% chose “New Zealander” as the best description of their identity. Given that the history of Asian immigration in New Zealand is shorter than that of the US, this was perhaps not surprising - people’s common experience as members of an ethnic minority group being one of the reasons for Asian immigrants to identify themselves in pan-ethnic terms. As such, the pan-ethnic identification of “Asian New Zealander” or “New Zealander” was more prevalent among respondents who had lived in New Zealand for a longer period of time\textsuperscript{119}. Further analysis revealed that people who identified themselves in pan-ethnic terms of “Asian New Zealander” or “New Zealander” voted at a higher rate (84.0% and 81.6%) than people who identified themselves in ethnic terms of “Korean/Chinese” or “Korean/Chinese New Zealander” (66.2% and 78.5%) (see graph 5.9). Somewhat surprisingly, people who identified themselves as “Asian”, a pan-ethnic term, showed the second lowest voting rate of 69.8%, possibly reflecting their lack of identification as “New Zealander”. No statistically significant difference was recorded for political activities other than voting.

![Graph 5.9 Turnout of Asians with different description of identity](image)

-Chi-square .002
-Phi and Cramer’s V .145

Common destiny

The development of a pan-Asian identity among Asian New Zealanders was more strongly felt when the respondents were not forced to choose a pan-Asian identity over an ethnic identity, but were asked to consider whether they believe what happens generally to other “Asian” or

\textsuperscript{119} For example, 82.1% of those who had lived in New Zealand for 1-5 years identified themselves in ethnic terms, whereas 53.8% of those who had lived in New Zealand for more than 26 years identified themselves in ethnic terms (Chi-square .000, Phi and Cramer’s V .311).
“Korean/Chinese” in New Zealand would also happen to them\(^{120}\). These questions were asked to assess whether Asian New Zealanders regard themselves as having a common destiny with other Asians in New Zealand. The survey result showed that 76% of respondents believed what happens generally to other Asians in New Zealand would also happen to them, and 78.2% believed what happens generally to other members of the same ethnic group would also happen to them. This was significantly higher than the sense of shared destiny as expressed by Asian Americans, less than 50% of whom believed what happens to other Asians would also happen to them. In contrast, only 53.8% of respondents regarded different Asian groups in New Zealand as culturally similar. This indicated that Asian New Zealanders in general have developed a sense of common destiny with other Asians, despite cultural differences among different Asian ethnic groups. Contrary to expectations however, respondents with a strong sense of shared destiny showed lower voting rates than those who did not have a sense of common destiny, although the differences were not statistically significant (see graphs 5.10-5.12).

Graph 5.10 Turnout of Asians who have a sense of shared destiny with other Asians

![Graph](image)

- Chi-square .555
- Phi Cramer's V .060

\(^{120}\) The responses may vary as they were not given the definition of, or asked to define, what “Asians” meant in the survey. “Asia” is, after all, a European construct, and the respondents will use the term “Asian” to mean “what they choose it to mean, and to exclude whomever and whatever they choose to exclude”; Trood R. and McNamara D. (eds) *The Asia-Australia Survey 1994* (1994) MacMillan Education Australian Pty Ltd, South Melbourne, p61.
Graph 5.11 Turnout of Asians who have a sense of shared destiny with other Korean/Chinese

- Chi-square .550
- Phi Cramer’s V .060

Graph 5.12 Turnout of Asians who feel that Asian cultures are similar

- Chi-square .671
- Phi Cramer’s V .053

Pan-ethnic political mobilization

One of the reasons why the development of a pan-ethnic identity attracts interest is the belief that such an identity might provide the basis upon which to mobilize a diverse group of Asians for political causes. In order to assess the likelihood of successful pan-ethnic political mobilization of Asian New Zealanders (similar to the 80-20 initiative in the US), the respondents were asked...
whether they would follow community leaders’ recommendation to vote for a particular political party which was most likely to serve Asian community’s interests. The survey revealed that less than 25% of respondents would follow such a recommendation, although an additional 56.7% indicated that they would vote according to their own decision with some regard to the recommendation. Around 18% of respondents indicated they would vote according to their own decision without any regard to the recommendation, and 0.9% that they would oppose such a recommendation.

Somewhat surprisingly, people who indicated that they would follow the recommendation had lower voting rates (68.4%) than those who indicated that they would vote without any regard to the recommendation (83.2%) (see graph 5.13). In addition, people who identified themselves in pan-ethnic terms showed a lower level of support for the recommendation than those who identified themselves in ethnic terms. These findings indicated that the development of a pan-ethnic identity among Asian New Zealanders would not necessarily lead to successful political mobilization. Whether a pan-ethnic identity could provide the basis of a pan-ethnic political mobilization if there was a pressing need to do so (such as the imposition of discriminatory regulations on racial lines similar to California’s Proposition 187) remains to be seen.

Graph 5.13 Turnout of Asians who would follow the recommendation to vote

-Chi-square .005
-Phi and Cramer’s V .125

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For example, 13% of those who identified themselves in pan-ethnic terms indicated that they would follow the recommendation, compared to 25.8% of those who identified themselves in ethnic terms (Chi-square .000, Phi and Cramer’s V .271).
Views on Asian MPs

A number of questions were asked to assess Asian New Zealanders' views on Asian MPs. Firstly, the respondents were asked whether they considered that Asian politicians (not necessarily of their own ethnic group) would represent their interests better than Pakeha or Maori politicians. More than 60% of the respondents replied in the affirmative, compared with 18.6% who said no, and 19.9% who replied don’t know. In contrast, Asian New Zealanders showed a lower level of support for the idea of a separate Asian political party, with 38.3% supporting, 43.8% opposing, and 17.9% expressing no opinion. This was consistent with the results of the 1996 election where the two Asian parties received an extremely low level of support (less than 1%)\(^{122}\). The findings indicated that although Asian New Zealanders felt that their interests would be better represented by Asian MPs, they preferred to work within the existing system rather than to create a political party of their own.

Secondly, the respondents were asked whether there should be more Asian MPs, to which 59.0% said yes, 1.1% no, and 35.4% said it depended on the candidates\(^{123}\). Interestingly, Hong Kong Chinese (who have a MP from their own ethnic group) were most likely to reply that having more Asian MPs should depend on the candidates, whereas Taiwanese and Koreans were most supportive of the idea of having more Asian MPs (66.2% and 64.1% compared to 40.2% of Hong Kong Chinese)\(^{124}\). The findings denoted that once Asians have a MP from their own ethnic group, they would be more likely to focus on the quality, rather than on quantity, of Asian candidates. Contrary to expectations, however, people who showed support for more Asian MPs did not necessarily vote at a higher rate (see graphs 5.14 and 5.15).

In contrast to the overwhelming support for Asian MPs, a large proportion of the respondents indicated that the existence of Asian MPs would not make any difference to their political partisanship. For example, 63.5% of respondents indicated that it made no difference to their partisanship whether a party had an Asian MP or not, whereas 19.9% indicated that they preferred one party over the other because it had an Asian MP, 7.5% that they would change their political preference if another party had an Asian MP, and 5.3% that they did not like parties which did not have Asian MPs. This apparently contradictory view, that Asian MPs would be better in representing Asian interests and there should be more Asian MPs but the existence of

\(^{122}\) See chapter 6.1 for more information.
\(^{123}\) Contrary to the high level of support for having more Asian MPs, only 9.6% of the respondents believed that there should be more Maori MPs and 9.1% supported having more Pacific Island MPs; although nearly 60% indicated that whether or not to have more Maori/Pacific Island MPs should depend on the candidates. Less than a quarter of the respondents (22.6%) showed support for having more women MPs.
\(^{124}\) This may be because Taiwanese and Koreans are least likely to see themselves as “Chinese”, or feel they are being adequately represented by a Chinese MP.
Asian MPs would not affect their political partisanship, represents one of many difficulties that the Asian community faces in order to create a successful political coalition based on pan-ethnic identity.

Graph 5.14 Turnout of Asians who believe that Asian MPs are better in representing Asian interests

Graph 5.15 Turnout of Asians who support having more Asian MPs

- Chi-square .313
- Phi and Cramer’s V .052

- Chi-square .615
- Phi and Cramer’s V .047
Regression of pan-ethnic factors

Analysis of the factors relating to pan-ethnic identity found that none of the factors appeared to have statistically significant relevance to Asian turnout or participation rates in other forms of political activities (see table 5.5). The NZES 2002 did not include any questions relating to pan-ethnic identity; therefore it was not possible to run regression on the merged data.

Table 5.5 Effect of the pan-ethnic identity on participation rate – Asian data

|                | Voting | | | Signing petition | | | Working in community | | |
|----------------|--------|--------|--------|------------------|--------|--------|---------------------|--------|
|                | %      | b      | s.e    | %               | b      | s.e    | %               | b      | s.e    |
| Self-identification | 1.8    | 0.11   | 0.25   | 3.6             | 0.26   | 0.27   | 2.3             | 0.26   | 0.34   |
| Common destiny   | -4.9   | -0.27  | 0.21   | -0.4            | -0.03  | 0.24   | 1.8             | 0.22   | 0.30   |
| Recommendation   | -5.4   | -0.33  | 0.27   | -2.6            | -0.19  | 0.28   | -0.2            | -0.03  | 0.37   |
| Asian party      | -0.4   | -0.02  | 0.21   | -1.2            | -0.09  | 0.24   | 0.9             | 0.11   | 0.30   |
| Asian MP better  | -1.0   | -0.06  | 0.25   | 4.1             | 0.32   | 0.29   | -1.1            | -0.13  | 0.34   |
| Constant         | 83.7   | 1.62** | 0.31   | 14.6            | -1.79**| 0.34   | 8.4             | -2.40**| 0.42   |
| % concordant     | 76.3   |        |        | 76.3            |        |        | 90.7            |        |        |
| Cox & Snell R²   | .009   |        |        | .004            |        |        | .002            |        |        |

**significant at <.01  *significant at <.05

5.9 SUMMARY

Contrary to expectations and studies on Asian Americans, a pan-ethnic Asian identity appeared to have limited effect on the political participation of Asian New Zealanders. Although the respondents who identified themselves in pan-ethnic terms showed higher voting rates than those who chose an ethnic identity, having a sense of shared destiny appeared to have discouraged Asian New Zealanders’ turnout. Similarly, although there was general support for more Asian representatives, not much support was recorded for the ideas of Asian bloc voting or an Asian political party. The results indicated that although there appeared to be a growing pan-ethnic Asian identity, this did not necessarily mean that it would make it easier to politically mobilize Asian New Zealanders. The circumstances of the development of a pan-ethnic identity – whether developed in response to a collective threat from the host country or simply because of weakening ethnic ties – may influence whether or not a pan-ethnic identity encourages the political participation of Asian immigrants. Given the successful examples of Asian political mobilization in New Zealand, Asian New Zealanders may still be able to transform their pan-ethnic identity into a political force if a need arises. The context is important.
PART D – CONCLUSION TO CHAPTER FIVE

5.10 REGRESSION OF THE ASIAN DATA

Similar to the overall regression conducted in chapters 4.10-4.12, factors that are found to have significance of .050 or less, together with a number of important yet statistically insignificant factors (such as membership in ethnic religious organizations and pan-ethnic identity), have been put into regression to see which one of the community variables had the most significant effect on the political participation of Asian New Zealanders. Regression of these factors revealed that age, contact by politicians, commitment to New Zealand, membership in ethnic religious organizations and New Zealand business organizations had statistically significant relevance to the turnout of Asian New Zealanders (see table 5.6). Contact by politicians, in particular, increased the likelihood of Asians voting by 23.5%, evidencing the applicability of the mobilization theory on Asian New Zealanders’ turnout. Those who showed a long-term commitment to New Zealand were also 12.1% more likely to vote when the community variables were controlled, and the likelihood of voting increased by 0.4% with every extra year of age. Membership in organizations had two opposite effects; those who belonged to New Zealand business organizations were 13.7% more likely to vote, whereas membership in ethnic religious organizations reduced the likelihood of Asians voting by 7.9%. Further research on how membership in ethnic religious organizations differs from other organizations, and how the effect of religious organizations in New Zealand differs from the effect of religious organizations in the US on individual political participation, would be needed to fully understand the reasons behind this interesting outcome.

In other forms of political activities, membership in organizations was the only factor which showed statistically significant relevance to Asians’ participation rates when the community variables were controlled. Membership in ethnic community organizations, New Zealand religious organizations, and New Zealand business organizations all increased the likelihood of Asians signing petitions by 10.2%, 10.9%, and 15.2%. Similarly, membership in ethnic community organizations, New Zealand community organizations, and New Zealand business organizations increased the likelihood of Asians working in the community by 14.8%, 18.3%, and 9.0%. None of the other important factors, including contact by politicians, showed statistically significant relevance to the other forms of political activities. The findings indicated that encouraging Asian New Zealanders to join various organizations may be one of the most effective ways of increasing their participation rates in activities other than voting.
## 5.11 REGRESSION OF THE MERGED DATA

Regression of the NZES-Asia merged data revealed that factors such as age, contact by politicians, and membership in organizations showed statistically significant relevance to the turnout of the general New Zealand population when all the community variables were controlled (see table 5.7). Contact by politicians again had the biggest effect on the turnout of the general New Zealand population; those who had been contacted were 9.4% more likely to vote than those who had not been contacted. New Zealanders who belonged to business organizations and trade unions were 8.8% and 7.9% more likely to vote than non-members, and the likelihood of voting also increased by 0.3% with every extra year of age. Overall, the combined effect of the community variables appeared to be greater on the turnout of New Zealanders than that of Asian New Zealanders; Asians were 22.1% less likely to vote than Pakeha (which is an increase of 3.0% from when no other factors were controlled), whereas the likelihood of Maori non-voting vis-à-vis Pakeha decreased by 1.9% to 5.5% when the community variables were controlled.

In other forms of political activities, New Zealanders who had been contacted by political parties were 6.6% more likely to sign petitions and 5.9% more likely to work in the community. Membership in business organizations and trade unions also increased the likelihood of New Zealanders signing petitions by 14.2% and 12.7%, and working in the community by 21.7% and 11.5%. As was the case with individual variables, men were 3.8% less likely to work in the

### Table 5.6 Effect of community variables on participation rate – Asian data

<table>
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<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Voting</th>
<th></th>
<th>Signing petition</th>
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<td>s.e</td>
<td>%</td>
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**significant at <.01  *significant at <.05
community than women when the community variables were controlled. The controls did little to reduce the disparity between Pakeha and Asian, as Asian New Zealanders were still 67.3% less likely to sign petitions (which is an increase of 4.1% from when no other factors were controlled), and 18.7% less likely to work in the community than Pakeha (an increase of 1.8%). Maori were also 8.8% less likely to sign petitions than Pakeha (an increase of 0.9%), whereas they were 9.2% more likely to work in the community (an increase of 0.5%) when the community variables were controlled.

Table 5.7 Effect of community variables on participation rate – Merged data

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**significant at <.01  *significant at <.05

5.12 CONCLUSION – COMMUNITY VARIABLES

Arguably the most interesting finding of this chapter on community variables is the extensive efforts made by political parties to attract Asian voters. The finding indicated that Asian New Zealanders, whose number has been increasing rapidly in the last 15 years, are already regarded as an important constituency by the New Zealand political parties (although the effect of the MMP electoral system in encouraging political parties to target Asian New Zealanders should not be underestimated). At the same time, the study reaffirmed the relevance of the mobilization theory in understanding the political participation of Asian New Zealanders; the mobilization efforts by political parties showed a strong correlation to Asian New Zealanders’ turnout, and they also mitigated the feeling of political helplessness which was found to be prevalent among Asian New Zealanders.

At the same time, analysis of the community variables indicated that the effort by political parties to contact individual Asian voters may have weakened the strength of ethnic community
organizations, which recorded low membership rates and low approval rates for their performances. This was contrary to many overseas studies on the political participation of Asian immigrants, which consistently found the intermediary role that ethnic organizations played in promoting Asians’ political participation to be important. Having said that, the survey reaffirmed the positive effect organizational membership had on the political participation of Asian New Zealanders, although the reason why membership in ethnic religious organizations had the opposite effect on Asian New Zealanders’ political participation requires further research. The survey indicated that promoting organisational membership among Asian New Zealanders may be one of the most effective ways of encouraging their political participation, especially in political activities other than voting. At the same time, it indicated that different strategies may need to be adopted to encourage the participation of Asian New Zealanders in different forms of political activities, as factors that encourage Asian New Zealanders’ voting rates differed from factors that encourage their participation rates in other forms of political activities.

A pan-ethnic identity, although developing among Asian New Zealanders, did not show the expected positive effect on the political participation of Asian New Zealanders. In addition, the survey found that the existence of a pan-ethnic identity would not necessarily make it easier to mobilize Asian New Zealanders for political causes, as those who identified themselves in pan-ethnic terms did not appear to see themselves as a political force. It is not clear whether that was because there was no triggering incident that could mobilize Asian New Zealanders at the time of the survey, or because the circumstances and context in which a pan-ethnic identity may develop were simply different for Asian New Zealanders. What was clear from the survey results were that some of the theories developed to understand the political participation of Asian immigrants in other Western countries – such as the role of ethnic community organizations and pan-ethnic identity – are not necessarily applicable to Asian New Zealanders. The different nature of the institutional structure may have affected the role of the community variables in the political participation of Asian New Zealanders, details of which will be assessed in the following chapter.
This chapter will look at the influence of the institutional variables - political structure, prejudice/discrimination, and inter-group relationships. Consistent with previous two chapters, the effect of these three institutional factors on the political participation of ethnic Chinese and Korean New Zealanders (hereinafter referred to as “Asian New Zealanders”) will be assessed against the political activities of voting, signing petitions and working in the community. To conclude, the overall regression of the survey data will attempt to address the questions of what additional factors influence the political participation of Asian New Zealanders, which one of the factors has the paramount effect on their participation, and what can be done to encourage the political participation of Asian New Zealanders.
PART A – POLITICAL STRUCTURE

The effect of the political structure on voter turnout has been well documented, from the early studies of Gosnell and Tingsten\(^1\), to recent works by Powell (1986), Jackman (1987) and Franklin (1996), to name a few. These studies have found that the political structure such as the electoral system, qualifications for citizenship and franchise, efficiency of registration and balloting procedures, use of compulsory voting laws, and frequency and closeness of electoral contests are the main factors that influence individuals’ political participation. However, because the institutional theory is better equipped to deal with inter-country and inter-election differences, in the absence of comparative overseas data or data from other New Zealand elections which can be used for direct comparison, the current study can only provide a limited analysis of the applicability of this theory in the New Zealand context. This part of the thesis will therefore focus mainly on the way Asian New Zealanders feel about the New Zealand political and electoral systems and their roles within them. This will test the applicability of aspects of the institutional theory – that people who are satisfied with the host country’s political structure show higher participation rates – on the political participation of Asian New Zealanders.

6.1 COMPARATIVE CONTEXT

Because turnout varies much more between countries than it does between different types of individuals\(^2\), institutional factors are often seen as the main remedies for non-voting\(^3\). The institutional approach is especially useful in comparative studies between countries and elections, as it helps to explain why the turnout varies from country to country and from election to election. For example, studies have found that turnout tends to be higher in countries with a PR electoral system than in countries with the FPP system\(^4\), and that the adoption of the PR system can boost turnout by 9-12%\(^5\). Similarly, if the immigration and citizenship laws of the country make it difficult for immigrants to become eligible voters, this could increase their cost of participation and discourage their participation. The institutional approach can also provide practical tips on ways to improve the political participation of ethnic minority groups (as well as the dominant group) by identifying and rectifying institutional barriers to participation - for example, introducing

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compulsory voting or providing bilingual services would be easier than trying to change education levels or political attitudes of ethnic minority groups. The openness and responsiveness of the political structure to ethnic minority groups’ needs and interests are therefore regarded as “crucial factors” which could determine the nature and effectiveness of ethnic minority groups’ political participation in the host country\(^6\).

The US provides a good example of how the political structure can act as a barrier to political participation, especially for ethnic minority groups such as Asian Americans. The US electoral system is a single-member-district, winner-takes-all plurality model. Under this system, a party that pulls a plurality (not even a majority) wins 100% of a district’s representation with the election of its one candidate, while other parties, regardless of the votes they attracted, receive zero representation\(^7\). This means that political parties are likely to select candidates who can attract the votes of the dominant majority population in all electoral districts. Such a structure makes it difficult for Asian Americans, who constitute a majority of the population in only two House districts in Hawaii\(^8\), to be nominated as political candidates. It also means that minor parties, some of which may disproportionately represent minority groups, would find it difficult to win a seat when competing against major parties. US franchise and citizenship laws, which do not give the right to vote to immigrants with permanent residency status, and the procedural difficulties in registering to vote\(^9\), are other examples of institutional barriers to participation\(^10\). These institutional barriers have been blamed for a low level of turnout among US citizens (in comparison to other Western democracies\(^11\)), as well as among ethnic minority groups such as Asian Americans.

For Asian immigrants, the political structure can also play an important role in determining their levels of satisfaction and trust towards the government of the host country. For example, institutional barriers can be seen as one of the reasons why only 5% of Asian Americans in the 2001 survey felt that government officials would pay “a lot of attention” to their complaints\(^12\), and almost 70% of respondents considered that their opinion would have “little or no influence” over

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\(^8\) These are Honolulu (69.93%) and Hilo (61.27%); Takeda in Menifield (2001) p83, table 5-1.

\(^9\) For example, registration centres are open only during working hours, and their locations are often remote and frequently changed. Registration forms are also unnecessarily complex; Parenti (2002) p207. See also Gosnell (1930) pp203-205; Rosenstone and Hansen (1993) p230.

\(^10\) Blais and Carty (1990). Even for the general population, studies have found that automatic registration could boost the turnout by up to 14%; Powell (1986) p36.


\(^12\) 33% responded that government officials would pay some attention to their complaints and 9% a lot of attention.
US governmental policies. This feeling of “political helplessness”, exacerbated by the hostile political structure, could discourage Asian immigrants from participating in the politics of the host country.

**Asian New Zealanders**

New Zealand has an international reputation as an established democracy, and many aspects of its political structure can be seen as favourable to Asian New Zealanders. For example, unlike many countries that only allow citizens to vote, New Zealand gives undifferentiated voting rights to permanent residents - all that is required for a permanent residency holder to register as a voter is to reside in New Zealand continuously for not less than one year. This, together with the fact that it is compulsory to enrol as a voter (although voting is not compulsory), reduces the cost of participation for Asian New Zealanders. There are also legislative provisions designed to protect the political and other rights of the ethnic minority groups, such as the Electoral Act 1993, the Bill of Rights Act 1991 (“BOR”) and the Human Rights Act 1993 (“HRA”).

New Zealand’s MMP electoral system is another institutional factor that could encourage the political participation of Asian New Zealanders and other ethnic minority groups. Under the old FPP system, winning an electorate seat was the only way for a candidate to be elected to Parliament. It was therefore extremely difficult for members of an ethnic minority group to be nominated as candidates, let alone be elected as MPs. Under the MMP system however, MPs can be elected either by winning electorate seats (through electorate vote), or by being listed as candidates on the party list (through party vote). The latter is a form of PR, where the number of

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13 Only 26% of the respondents replied that they would have some or a lot of influence over government policies. Interestingly, however, 39% of the respondents felt that compared to their home countries, they would have more influence over government policies in the US.

14 The rationale behind this policy is that permanent residents who have been granted permission to live and work in New Zealand can be said to have earned full membership of the community, as they usually make a full contribution to the community and its future; *Towards a Better Democracy* (1986) Report of the Royal Commission on the Electoral System, Wellington, p232.

15 The person has to be over 18 years of age. If a citizen has not been in New Zealand within the last 3 years, or if a permanent resident has not been in New Zealand within the last 1 year, the eligibility is lost. For more information, see [www.elections.org.nz](http://www.elections.org.nz).

16 The Electoral Act 1993 includes provisions allowing individuals with limited language skills to have an interpreter with them in the polling booth, and allowing returning officers to use an interpreter when communicating with non-English speaking voters.

17 The BOR is aimed primarily at protecting negative rights of citizenship against the New Zealand state. Of particular relevance to Asian New Zealanders is section 19(1) of the BOR, which gives everyone “the right to freedom from discrimination on the grounds of colour, race, ethnic or national origin, sex, marital status, or religious or ethical beliefs”.

18 The HRA applies to relationships between individuals and the private sector, and prohibits discrimination based on race, ethnicity, or any other listed grounds. For further information, see [www.hrc.co.nz](http://www.hrc.co.nz).

19 Even if Asians were nominated as political candidates, they were nominated in districts where the chances of the party winning the seat were minimal, such as the case of Ron Waishing of the Labour Party who was nominated in the National stronghold of Franklin in the mid-1960s.
each party’s seats in Parliament (out of 120) are determined by the proportion of party votes each party receives from voters nationwide\textsuperscript{20}. This means that even the minority groups’ votes can have a direct impact on the number of seats each party obtains in Parliament, which in turn makes political parties better appreciate the significance of minority constituencies such as Asian New Zealanders. In doing so, the MMP system provides incentives for political parties to mobilize Asian voters, nominate Asian candidates\textsuperscript{21} and introduce policies designed to serve Asians’ interests, in order to attract their party votes.

As a result, the number of ethnic minority MPs increased from eight in the 1993 election (under the FPP system) to 20 in the first MMP election in 1996, and to a record number of 24 ethnic minority MPs in the 2002 election. Indeed, one of the objectives of introducing the MMP system was to enhance the political representation of ethnic minority groups\textsuperscript{22}, and it was under the MMP system that the first Asian MP was elected through a party list. The MMP system also makes it easier for Asian New Zealanders and other ethnic minority groups to form political parties, as any party which gains 5% of the total party votes can have proportional representation in Parliament. In addition, even if a party does not gain 5% of the total party vote, with the election of one of its candidates through electorate vote, the party can be represented in proportion to the party vote they attracted\textsuperscript{23}. With the proportion of Asian New Zealanders at 6.6% and increasing, the MMP system makes it viable for an Asian political party to be represented in New Zealand parliament. Whether or not Asian New Zealanders want a political party of their own, and whether they are sufficiently united to create a political party, are questions that need to be addressed separately\textsuperscript{24}, but it is certainly easier for Asian New Zealanders to be nominated as a political candidate, get elected to Parliament, and create a political party under the MMP system. It is therefore hypothesized that Asian New Zealanders would have a relatively high level of confidence in New Zealand’s political system and their roles within it.

\textsuperscript{20} For example, if Party A receives 10% of the party vote, Party A gets 12 seats in parliament (10% of 120 seats). If the number of elected candidates from Party A is less than 12, the rest will be filled up by list MPs.

\textsuperscript{21} New Zealand’s legislative recruitment process also makes it relatively easy for Asians to be nominated as political candidates, as the requirement for money and previous party service are not as crucial as in the US or Australia. See Catt in Norris (1997) for details of New Zealand’s recruitment procedure.


\textsuperscript{23} For example, if Party A attracts 2% of the party vote and one successful candidate, Party A will be entitled to 3 seats in total (2 seats being 2% of 120 seats).

\textsuperscript{24} See chapter 5.8. There were in fact two Asian political parties formed at the first MMP election in 1996 (the Ethnic Minority Party and the Asia Pacific United Party), but they did not gain much support from Asian New Zealanders and faded soon after the election. The Ethnic Minority Party gained 0.12% of the national party vote, while the Asia Pacific United Party gained 0.002%; The New Zealand Electoral Compendium (1997) Electoral Commission, Wellington, pp18-19. Interestingly, the formation of a political party for ethnic minority groups was expressly opposed by the New Zealand Federation of Ethnic Councils; see Vasil and Yoon (1996) p19. Perhaps because of this earlier failure, no “Asian party” was registered at the 2002 election.
The fact that New Zealand has a favourable political structure, however, does not necessarily mean that there are no institutional barriers facing Asian New Zealanders. Asian New Zealanders are still seriously under-represented in Parliament, as well as in other political arenas. Both the BOR and HRA have shortfalls in that neither has the status of supreme law, and therefore cannot override other inconsistent pieces of legislation. In addition, education, justice, health, and other systems continue to reflect and reinforce the majority group's values and practices in many ways. Despite the shortfalls, the favourable aspects of New Zealand’s political structure described above are expected to influence Asian New Zealanders’ levels of satisfaction and trust towards the New Zealand government, which in turn could encourage their political participation.

6.2 SURVEY RESULTS AND ANALYSIS

Questions asked to assess the way Asian New Zealanders feel about New Zealand’s political system and their roles within the system revealed that Asian New Zealanders in general were satisfied with, and had trust in, the New Zealand political system, even more so than that of their home countries. The level of confidence Asian New Zealanders had in New Zealand’s political structure also appeared to show a positive correlation to their turnout, consistent with the institutional theory. There was a predominant feeling among Asian New Zealanders that they could not have much influence over New Zealand government’s policies, although Asians in general felt that they would have more influence in New Zealand than in their home countries. The survey revealed that although Asian New Zealanders have yet to develop confidence about their own roles within the system, having confidence in New Zealand’s political system could encourage their political participation.

Satisfaction with New Zealand’s democracy

The survey asked the respondents to express their levels of satisfaction, trust and confidence in New Zealand’s political system, and to compare these with their home countries. When asked whether they were satisfied with the way democracy worked in New Zealand, 66.6% of respondents expressed “great satisfaction” (9.3%) or “satisfaction” (57.3%). An additional 23.9% expressed “some satisfaction”, and only 3.8% replied that they were not satisfied with the way

25 See for example, section 4 of the BOR and section 151 of the HRA. The Human Rights Review Tribunal was subsequently given power to declare that certain legislation is inconsistent with the HRA, although it cannot overturn inconsistent statutes. For more information, see Fact Sheet 15: Changes to Human Rights in New Zealand, www.hrc.co.nz

26 For this reason, notions such as “institutional racism” has been introduced to New Zealand since the 1970s; Spoonley P., “Migration and the Reconstruction of Citizenship in late Twentieth Century Aotearoa” in Castles S. and Spoonley P. (eds) Migration and Citizenship (1997) Asia-Pacific Migration Research Network, p36.
democracy worked in New Zealand. Asian New Zealanders’ satisfaction rates were slightly higher than that of the general New Zealand population, 63.3% of whom expressed “great satisfaction” (7.7%) or “satisfaction” (55.6%)\(^{27}\). The satisfaction rate for New Zealand’s democracy was highest among Koreans, 74.8% of whom expressed “great satisfaction” or “satisfaction”, followed by Taiwanese (69.3%), mainland Chinese (66.3%), Hong Kong Chinese (44.7%), and Malaysian Chinese (41.7%)\(^{28}\). More importantly, Asian New Zealanders appeared to be more satisfied with New Zealand’s democracy than that of their home countries, as only 17.0% of the respondents expressed either “great satisfaction” (1.7%) or “satisfaction” (15.3%) with the way democracy worked in their home countries\(^{29}\). This was considerably lower than the satisfaction rate expressed by Asians living in Asian countries as recorded by the Global Barometer Survey 2001-2002, some 60% of whom expressed “great satisfaction” or “satisfaction” with the way democracy works in their home countries\(^{30}\). This could be because political dissatisfaction in their home countries may be one of the reasons why Asian immigrants decided to leave their home countries in the first place. This could also explain why Asian New Zealanders’ satisfaction rates with New Zealand’s democracy were higher than that of the general New Zealand population, as those who left their home countries out of political dissatisfaction would be more appreciative of New Zealand’s democratic political system.

Contrary to prediction, people who showed a high level of satisfaction with the way democracy worked in New Zealand did not necessarily participate more in politics; although the voting rate of those who expressed some level of satisfaction was higher than those with no satisfaction or who did not express any opinion (see graph 6.1). In contrast, there was a clear correlation between the satisfaction rate and the voting rate among the general New Zealand population; 98.3% of those who were “very satisfied” with the way democracy worked in New Zealand voted, compared to 88.2% of those who were “not satisfied”\(^{31}\). Asians who were “not satisfied at all” with New Zealand’s democracy were more likely to sign petitions (22.9%) than those who were “very

27 The satisfaction rate was especially low among Maori, 8.3% of whom expressed “great satisfaction” and 46.6% “satisfaction” with the way democracy worked in New Zealand.
28 Chi-square .000, Phi and Cramer’s V .281. Taiwanese and Koreans also showed the highest satisfaction rates with the way democracy works in their home countries, with 27.7% and 20.9% respectively expressing “great satisfaction” or “satisfaction”, compared to 11.1% of Malaysian Chinese, 10.0% of mainland Chinese and 7.7% of Hong Kong Chinese; Chi-square .000. Phi and Cramer’s V .371.
29 Although 30.5% of the respondents indicated that they were “somewhat satisfied” with their home countries’ democracy, the largest proportion of the respondents (40.7%) indicated that they were “not satisfied at all”.
30 See www.globalbarometer.org. It showed that 16% of mainland Chinese living in China were “very satisfied” with the way democracy worked in their home countries (despite the fact that China is still not a democratic country), 52% “fairly satisfied”, 14% “not very satisfied”, and 1% “not at all satisfied”. The figures for Koreans living in Korea were 1% “very satisfied”, 60% “fairly satisfied”, 36% “not very satisfied”, and 2% “not at all satisfied”. The figures for Taiwanese were 4% “very satisfied”, 44% “fairly satisfied”, 37% “not very satisfied”, and 4% “not satisfied at all”. The East Asia mean (excluding China and Hong Kong) was 11% “very satisfied”, 50% “fairly satisfied”, 30% “not very satisfied”, and 6% “not at all satisfied”.
31 Voting rates for others were: 94.3% for those who were “satisfied”, 91.3% “somewhat satisfied”, 88.2% “not satisfied”, and 82.4% for those who replied “don’t know” (Chi-square .000, Phi and Cramer’s V .139).
satisfied" (14.0%), although it did not show any statistically significant relevance to the activity of working in the community. These findings indicated that being satisfied with the country’s political system does not necessarily encourage Asian New Zealanders’ political participation. Unfortunately, the survey did not ask the respondents in what areas they thought New Zealand’s democracy could be improved; it would be an interesting area for future research.

**Graph 6.1 Turnout of Asians who were satisfied with New Zealand’s democracy**

-Chi-square .008
-Phi and Cramer’s V .127

**Trust in government officials**

Asian New Zealanders also showed a high level of trust in New Zealand government officials, with almost 95% of respondents indicating that they could trust government officials in New Zealand “almost always” (12.9%), “most of the time” (43.9%), or “sometimes” (32.0%). This was higher than Asian Americans’ level of trust in US government officials as obtained by the 2001 survey, where 81% expressed some level of trust. When asked whether they trust New Zealand officials more than officials in their home countries, 70.0% of the Asian respondents indicated that they did. Analysis of the data showed that people who had trust in New Zealand officials were more likely to vote (79.6%) than those who did not trust officials (66.7%) (see graph

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32 Chi-square .039, Phi and Cramer’s V .105 for signing petitions, Chi-square .679, Phi and Cramer’s V .050 for working in the community.
33 About a quarter of mainland Chinese (26.5%) and Taiwanese (25.0%) indicated that they could trust New Zealand government officials “almost always”, whereas only 11.1% of Malaysian Chinese, 7.8% of Hong Kong Chinese, and 3.1% of Koreans shared the same view (Chi-square .000, Phi and Cramer’s V .394).
34 Only 2.5% of the respondents said that they had less trust in New Zealand government officials and 11.8% replied that they had equal trust.
6.2). The result was contrary to the findings of Rosenstone and Hansen\textsuperscript{35} and Citrin\textsuperscript{36} that having trust in government does not necessarily have a direct link to individual participation rates. It suggested that Asian New Zealanders may be more likely than the dominant group to be influenced by the host country’s political structure when deciding whether or not to vote. There were no equivalent questions asked in the NZES 2002, so this study was unable to conduct a comparative test between Asian New Zealanders and the general New Zealand population. The finding also led to the question of why being satisfied with New Zealand’s democracy did not have the same positive effect on the turnout of Asian New Zealanders. Perhaps one can be satisfied with the host country’s democracy in an abstract term without having had personal experience of it, whereas trust in government officials most likely developed through personal experience and knowledge.

Graph 6.2 Turnout of Asians who trust NZ government officials

\footnotesize{-Chi-square .012
-Phi and Cramer’s V .123

Political confidence

Although Asian New Zealanders displayed high levels of satisfaction and trust in New Zealand’s political system, it was found earlier in chapter 5.2 that only 13\% of the respondents believed that they could have some degree of influence over New Zealand government policies. This indicated that Asian New Zealanders in general have a low level of confidence about their own role within the New Zealand political system. Interestingly however, 30.4\% of the respondents believed that

\textsuperscript{35} Rosenstone and Hansen (1993).
\textsuperscript{36} Citrin J., “Comment: The political relevance of trust in government” (1974) 68 \textit{American Political Science Review} 973-988, as cited in Rosenstone and Hansen (1993) p150.
they could have more influence over government policies in New Zealand than in their home countries, and only 11.1% responded that they would have less influence in New Zealand\textsuperscript{37}. This was despite the fact that Asian New Zealanders would have been the dominant group in their home countries (with the exception of Malaysian Chinese\textsuperscript{38}).

Other findings of the survey indicated that Asian New Zealanders had a comparatively high level of confidence in New Zealand’s political system. For example, almost 90% of Asian New Zealanders agreed with the statement that their votes counted (31.4% “strongly agreed” and 57.8% “agreed”), which was even higher than 83.3% of the general New Zealand population who felt the same way (19.6% “strongly agreed” and 63.7% “agreed”). Not surprisingly, Asian New Zealanders who agreed with the statement that their vote counted were more likely to vote (84.2%) than those who did not agree (40.0%) (see graph 6.3). Similarly, although 56.2% of the Asian respondents agreed with the statement that “sometimes politics seems so complicated that people like me cannot understand what is going on”, this was lower than the proportion among the general population of 60.2%. The extensive effort made by political parties and the ethnic media to mobilise and educate the Asian voters, as well as the nature of the MMP electoral system and New Zealand’s relatively transparent political system, may account for this comparatively high level of confidence in New Zealand’s political system. Further analysis revealed that although those who felt that politics was too complicated showed lower voting rates (71.1%) than those who did not find politics complicated (78.3%), the difference was not statistically significant\textsuperscript{39} (see graph 6.4).

\textsuperscript{37} 15.6% responded that they could have equal influence, and 42.1% indicated that they did not know whether they could have more influence in New Zealand than in their home countries.

\textsuperscript{38} Perhaps because Malaysian Chinese were an ethnic minority group in their home country, the largest proportion of Malaysian Chinese (37.0%) felt that they could have more influence in New Zealand, followed by Koreans (31.9%), mainland Chinese (31.4%), Hong Kong Chinese (23.7%), and Taiwanese (23.4%) (Chi-square .000, Phi and Cramer’s V .291).

\textsuperscript{39} Among the general New Zealand population, there was a stronger correlation between the voting rate and the feeling that politics was too complicated: 86.3% of those who “strongly agreed” with the statement that politics was too complicated voted at the last election, compared to 91.5% who “agreed” with the statement, 96.9% who “disagreed”, 93.6% who “strongly disagreed”, and 85.7% who replied “don’t know” (Chi-square .000, Phi and Cramer’s V .134). This may be because New Zealanders who felt that politics was too complicated possibly lacked political interest or knowledge, whereas for Asian New Zealanders, it was possibly due to their newness.
Graph 6.3 Turnout of Asians who believe that their vote counts

- Chi-square .000
- Phi and Cramer's V .206

Graph 6.4 Turnout of Asians who felt that politics is too complicated

- Chi-square .537
- Phi and Cramer's V .061

Regression of institutional factors

Regression of the Asian data revealed that Asian New Zealanders who agreed with the statement that their vote counted were 17.5% more likely to vote, but none of the other factors relating to the political structure showed statistically significant relevance to the Asian turnout (see table 6.1). Similarly, although Asian New Zealanders who felt that they could have some degree of influence
over New Zealand government policies were 5.1% more likely to work in the community (possibly because the benefit of participation is greater for those people), none of the other factors relating to the political structure showed statistically significant relevance to Asians participating in other forms of political activities. The findings signal that having a fair political system, although important, only lays the basic conditions for Asian New Zealanders to participate in politics, and there are other conditions that need to be met in order for Asian New Zealanders to participate in politics at a higher rate than they currently do.

### Table 6.1 Effect of political structure on participation rate – Asian data

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<td>.017</td>
<td>.009</td>
<td>.012</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**significant at <.01  *significant at <.05**

Regression of the NZES-Asia merged data demonstrated that people who felt that they could influence New Zealand government policies were 5.4% more likely to vote, and people who felt that their vote counted were 10.9% more likely to vote (see table 6.2). In terms of the other forms of political activities, New Zealanders who felt that politics was too complicated were 5.2% less likely to sign petitions and 8.8% less likely to work in the community. New Zealanders who felt that they could have some degree of influence over government policies were 5.5% more likely to sign petitions when the factors relating to the political structure were controlled. Interestingly, people who were satisfied with the way democracy worked in New Zealand were 10.9% less likely to work in the community. Although the exact reason for this is not clear, it may be that those who were satisfied with the New Zealand democracy did not see the need to participate in politics – a rare case of people becoming apathetic out of political satisfaction.

Further analysis revealed that the likelihood of Asians non-voting vis-à-vis Pakeha reduced by 0.4% to 18.7% when the factors relating to the political structure were controlled, and the likelihood of Maori non-voting also reduced by 1.4% to 6.0%. In contrast, and perhaps not surprising given the greater effect these factors have on participation rates of the general New Zealand population in other forms of political activities, Asians were 63.5% less likely to sign petitions (which is an increase of 0.3% from when no other factors were controlled) and 17.4%
less likely to work in the community (an increase of 0.5%) than Pakeha. However, the likelihood of Maori non-participation in the activity of signing petitions ceased to have statistically significant relevance when the factors included in this analysis were controlled, and Maori were 15.9% more likely to work in the community than Pakeha (which is an increase of 7.2% from when no other factors were controlled). These findings were another reminder that factors encouraging Maori participation do not necessarily have the same positive effect on the participation of Asian New Zealanders.

Table 6.2 Effect of political structure on participation rate – Merged data

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Voting</th>
<th>Signing petition</th>
<th>Working in community</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>%</td>
<td>b</td>
<td>s.e</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asian</td>
<td>-18.7</td>
<td>-2.31**</td>
<td>0.29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maori</td>
<td>-6.0</td>
<td>-1.22**</td>
<td>0.37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Satisfaction</td>
<td>-2.4</td>
<td>-0.24</td>
<td>0.41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Influence NZ policies</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>0.38*</td>
<td>0.18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>My vote counts</td>
<td>10.9</td>
<td>1.17**</td>
<td>0.28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Politics complicated</td>
<td>-1.7</td>
<td>-0.20</td>
<td>0.17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>85.9</td>
<td>2.57**</td>
<td>0.51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% concordant</td>
<td>86.6</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cox &amp; Snell R²</td>
<td></td>
<td>.92</td>
<td>.361</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**significant at <.01  *significant at <.05

6.3 SUMMARY

Although only limited aspects of the institutional theory were tested by the survey, the finding that Asian New Zealanders who showed trust and confidence in New Zealand’s political system were more likely to participate in politics reaffirmed the institutional theory that a liberal political structure of the host country could encourage the political participation of Asian immigrants. Various questions asked in this part of the thesis also revealed that Asian New Zealanders were more confident about New Zealand’s political system than that of their home countries. Nevertheless, it should be noted that having confidence in the host country’s political system does not necessarily mean that Asian New Zealanders are confident about their roles within the system, and that there may still be additional barriers to participation for Asian New Zealanders. For better understanding of the applicability of the institutional theory on the political participation of Asian New Zealanders, it would be useful to conduct a similar study on Asian New Zealanders at the next few elections. This should help clarify whether and how factors such as the competitiveness of the election and the importance of the main election issues affect the political participation of Asian New Zealanders.
PART B – PREJUDICE/DISCRIMINATION

The existence of prejudice and discrimination against Asian immigrants is another important factor influencing the political participation of Asian immigrants. Because a minority group’s political actions are in large measure influenced by the majority group’s stance towards them, the extent of prejudice and discrimination against Asian immigrants could very much determine the degree and manner of Asian immigrants’ political participation. In this part of the thesis, questions will be incorporated to assess whether and from whom Asian New Zealanders had experienced discrimination in New Zealand, and whether the media played a role in perpetuating prejudice against Asian New Zealanders. Although a large proportion of Asian New Zealanders are expected to have experienced discrimination, it is not clear whether such an experience would have discouraged Asian New Zealanders from participating in politics, or mobilized them to be more actively involved.

6.4 COMPARATIVE CONTEXT

Defining “prejudice” as “set attitudes involving a negative inter-group orientation” and “discrimination” as an “overt behavioural prejudice which is acted out and institutionalised into public policy and norms,” Lemay regarded both prejudice and discrimination as attempts by the dominant group to preserve the existing social order in the face of social changes. Racial prejudice, in particular, is a sense of group position which arises out of a belief that a particular racial group is inferior, threatening, or praiseworthy. The existence of prejudice against Asian Americans was evident in the 2001 survey, which found that approximately 40% of the respondents had experienced discrimination in the US, based mainly on their ethnicity (92%) and accent (48%).

The experience of discrimination could deter Asian immigrants from being involved in politics, by making them feel that political participation would only bring the group into more conflict with other groups and that they are better off staying removed from the politics of the host country.

41 Lemay (1985) pp1, 8.
43 Among those who have experienced discrimination, most experienced discrimination from strangers in a public place, followed by business or retail establishments, and in getting jobs or promotions.
In this sense, the historical discrimination against Asian Americans could be seen as one of the reasons for their low level of political participation. Racial stereotyping against Asian Americans also forced them to restrict their occupational choices to science, engineering, medicine, and other technological fields; such choices were reportedly made after considering the possibility of success in light of the perceived stereotype that Asian Americans are generally non-aggressive. The restricted career choice by Asian American professionals has lessened their chance of gaining power in the US politics, which is dominated by lawyers and corporate executives. A number of second- and third-generational professional Asian Americans also spoke of a "glass ceiling" and institutional discrimination against them, which prevented even the most acculturated and qualified Asian Americans from obtaining positions of political influence in the US.

The media is a powerful source of perpetuating prejudice and discrimination against Asian immigrants. As individuals' political preferences are formed from a mixture of cultural belief, personal experience and elite debate, and because these factors are often channelled through the mass media, the power of media in formulating one's political opinion cannot be overestimated. The commercial logic of mass media, however, means firstly that Asian immigrants do not often feature in the media, and secondly that the rare coverage of Asian immigrants is often out of context and focuses too much on conflicts and controversy without providing adequate background information or analysis. The US media’s focus on Asian illegal campaign contributions in 1996 and the Chinese espionage case in 1999 provide good discriminatory policies are likely to suffer long-term psychological symptoms such as lack of confidence, low self-esteem, excessive conformity, and alienation; Jo (1984) p597.


Atkinson J., “What capacity do New Zealand’s mass media have for promoting intercultural discourses?” in Zhang and Ip (1996) 25 at p26. McGregor J. and TeAwa J., “Racism and the News Media” in Spoonley P., MacPhearson C. and Pearson D. (eds) Nga Patai Racism and Ethnic Relations in Aotearoa/New Zealand (1996) Dunmore Press, Palmerston North, 235 at 237. In 1996, the media headlined an illegal campaign contribution made by John Huang, an illegal resident and non-citizen, who raised $1.5 million for President Clinton and the Democratic party. Under the US laws, only US citizens or legal residents may donate money to political campaigns. For more information on this incident, see Freeman (2000) pp126-129; Takeda in Menifield (2001) p92. In March 1999, Dr Wen Ho Lee, a Taiwanese American, was accused of passing classified computer files about nuclear weapons testing to China, which would enable China to build and test smaller and more accurate warheads. Although Dr Lee was indicted and arrested on 59 charges, the charges did not include
examples of the media reinforcing the stereotypes of Asian Americans as cunning and untrustworthy, and casting doubt on the genuineness of the political participation of all Asian Americans. The US media’s portrayal of Asian Americans as a “model minority” provides another example of the media creating stereotypes and generating fear among the public of unfair competition from “superbeings”. The “model minority” myth has also been used to weaken the overall justification of affirmative action programmes (by implying that victims of all racial discrimination are actually to blame for their own failure), thus contributing to an outburst of violent behaviour towards Asian Americans. Praise and admiration by the dominant group may also discourage Asian Americans from making political demands, as they sense that it is to their advantage to maintain such a favourable image.

On the other hand, the experience of prejudice and discrimination can trigger the political mobilisation of Asian immigrants, by making them realise the huge cost of not being involved in politics. For example, the murder of a Chinese man Vincent Chin in 1982, which was motivated by a growing resentment towards Japanese industrial competition, made Asian Americans realise how vulnerable they were to racial attacks and how little political power they really had in the US. This in turn motivated Asian Americans to become more involved in the US politics. The Los Angeles Riot of 1992, which involved a major attack by African Americans on Korean businesses in downtown Los Angeles, turned out to be a similar triggering point for Korean Americans. The Korean community found itself victimised and deserted not only by the city and state governments, but also by other Asian American groups. This led to a critical self-assessment by Korean Americans: the Korean community has since put considerable effort into improving its espionage. Nevertheless, the media exaggerated the event as Chinese “espionage”. See Freeman (2000) p126; Takeda in Menfield (2001) p95.

For example, after the extensive coverage on the Chinese espionage case, an increasing number of Chinese American scientists have reported job discrimination and suspicion because of their ethnicity; Freeman (2000) p126.


Gurwitt R., “Have Asian Americans Arrived Politically? Not Quite” (1990) Governing 32. The fact that a Chinese American (Chin) was mistaken as a Japanese prompted the formation of Asian American political groups at the inter-ethnic, rather than ethnic, level; Espiritu (1992) chapter 6.

relationships with other ethnic groups and raising political awareness among Korean Americans.\textsuperscript{61} Perhaps for this reason, one of the surveys found that Asian Americans who had experienced some form of discrimination were more likely to vote than those who had not experienced discrimination.\textsuperscript{62} It would be interesting to see whether the same can be said of Asian New Zealanders.

**Asian New Zealanders**

New Zealand’s long-held prejudice against Asian people, as illustrated by the 19th Century “Yellow Peril” hysteria,\textsuperscript{63} was still evident at the turn of the 21st Century. Because Asians do not share cultural and political affinity with New Zealand compared to New Zealand’s other European immigrants, the government’s push for closer identification with Asia (including the debate on whether New Zealand is an Asian country) resulted in a public backlash against Asian New Zealanders. For example, a survey conducted in 1996 found that New Zealanders were more prejudicial towards Asian immigrants than other immigrants, and that Asian immigrants were associated with many negative characteristics (such as being bad drivers and not mixing with the locals).\textsuperscript{64} More than 50% of the respondents in a 2002 poll also felt that there were too many Asian immigrants in the country, compared to 35% who felt that there were too many Pacific Islanders, 11% too many Australians, and 9% too many British.\textsuperscript{65} The public’s reaction to the influx of Asian immigrants in the 1990s, as portrayed by the New Zealand media, was a mixture of fear (that Asian immigrants are “invading” New Zealand, taking all jobs, buying all the land, and threatening New Zealand’s identity), hatred (for putting more pressure on health, housing, and education systems), envy (of whiz kids and wealthy Asian immigrants who bought huge houses and drove expensive cars), and cultural shock (of different behaviours and languages).

This anti-Asian sentiment was reflected in New Zealand’s national politics, where NZ First’s anti-Asian campaign (which openly attacked Asian immigrants for causing numerous domestic problems\textsuperscript{66}) attracted 13.4% of the vote in the 1996 election and gave the party the balance of power in the first MMP Parliament. The support for NZ First increased from 7% before the party’s...
attack on Asian immigrants to 14% within a month. In subsequent elections held in 1999 and 2002, NZ First again campaigned on the immigration issue, and the level of support the party received from the voters (4.3% and 10.4% of the party vote) indicated continuous anti-Asian sentiment among certain members of the New Zealand population. Many Asian immigrants also felt that New Zealand employers were prejudicial against people who spoke English as a second language. There were also reports of Asian students being bullied at school for speaking their native languages, and Asians becoming a target of “road monitoring” by the Police. Perhaps for these reasons, a survey conducted by the author in 1997 found that more than 80% of the Asian respondents had experienced racial discrimination in New Zealand. A separate survey conducted in February 2003 also found that 70% of New Zealanders regarded Asians as the group most vulnerable to discrimination.

The mainstream media also played a role in perpetuating prejudice and discrimination against Asian New Zealanders. Many reports in the media reinforced the unfounded public fear of an “Asian invasion” and other racial myths, to the extent that a study on New Zealand’s media concluded that there is a need to report on Asian issues more often, with contextual details and broader perspectives. For example, the media often focused on negative and controversial stories relating to Asians such as Asian crimes and social and domestic problems caused by...

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69 Rees J., “Life Sours for Auckland’s Asians”, *New Zealand Herald*, 5 July 2001. Lianne Dalziel, the then Minister of Immigration, conceded that New Zealand employers were unwilling to hire workers from different ethnic or cultural backgrounds; Tunnah H., “Government shuts door on migrants”, *New Zealand Herald*, 2 July 2003, pA3.
71 The prejudicial perception held by members of the Police against Asian New Zealanders was highlighted in a letter written by a Police constable to the *New Zealand Herald*, in which he claimed that he might not be able to respond to calls from the public while patrolling the Auckland city because he would be busy dealing with crime committed by Chinese students; Steven Lamb of Browns Bay, “Letters to the editor”, *New Zealand Herald*, 13 May 2003, pA12.
72 The survey was conducted among 113 Korean students at the University of Auckland, and the survey results were reported in *New Zealand Times*, 25 December 1997, p17 (Korean text). A copy of the survey results is on file with the author.
75 Crisp (2000).
Asians. On the rare occasions that Asians were depicted in a positive light, the focus was mainly on the economic benefits Asian immigrants brought to the country, thus creating an image of Asians as “cash cows”. Similarly, media coverage on Asian “whiz kids”, although written in praise for hardworking Asians, added to the existing fear and envy towards Asian New Zealanders. It is therefore hypothesized that a large proportion of Asian New Zealanders would have experienced discrimination in New Zealand, and that their level of satisfaction towards the media would not be very high.

The public’s perception towards Asian New Zealanders is well illustrated in letters sent to newspaper editors in recent years. Newspapers were found to be a particularly valuable source in capturing the public’s perception of Asian New Zealanders, since they commented on day-to-day interactions between different ethnic groups in New Zealand. The letters, although they cannot be seen as “representative” of all New Zealanders’ views, often expressed fear and hatred towards Asian immigrants; “We have become a dumping ground for people whom other countries do not want and we are giving away our citizenship far too easily to people who in the end will overrun us and destroy all that we like about ourselves and our country”, wrote one reader. A similar fear was expressed by another reader; “I must be a racist because I believe that our country is being rapidly recolonized by foreign aggressors and that if we don’t stop it we will suffer the same fate as Maori have suffered all over again. Call me a racist. I call me a patriot.” These letters with anti-Asian sentiment have frustrated many Asian immigrants, one of whom wrote; “How can [Asian immigrants] integrate if people around just don’t like your accent and don’t feel like treating you as a real friend?” "The Asians are singled out because we stand out", wrote another frustrated Asian immigrant, "It does not matter whether we are new or New Zealand-born Asians, we will always be singled out". Similar frustration was expressed by a young Asian immigrant; “As a young Korean New Zealander, I am sick and tired of being portrayed as an uneducated, uncaring, disease-prone, welfare-bludging parasite who is not

interested in integrating. It should be noted however that despite the existence of prejudice and discrimination, most Asian New Zealanders were found to be satisfied with their lives in New Zealand, thereby making it difficult to predict the effect of anti-Asian sentiment on the political participation of Asian New Zealanders.

6.5 SURVEY RESULTS AND ANALYSIS

As predicted, the survey found that most Asian New Zealanders had experienced discrimination in New Zealand. Interestingly however, such experiences did not necessarily discourage Asian New Zealanders from participating in politics. This was contrary to overseas studies on Asian immigrants, which found the experience of prejudice and discrimination to have a bearing on the mode and level of Asian immigrants’ political participation. On the other hand, Asian New Zealanders’ dissatisfaction with the media coverage on Asia showed a negative correlation to their turnout, indicating that improved media coverage could encourage Asian New Zealanders’ political participation.

Experience of discrimination

When asked whether they had experienced racial discrimination in New Zealand, more than 80% of the respondents replied that they had experienced “a great deal” (5.0%), “a fair amount” (11.5%), or “some amount” (63.7%) of racial discrimination. Only 19.8% of respondents had never experienced discrimination in New Zealand. The rate was similar amongst all groups, although Koreans were more likely than Chinese to have experienced “a great deal” (5.9%) or “a fair amount” (13.2%) of discrimination. Further analysis of the data revealed that contrary to prediction, the experience of discrimination did not have statistically significant relevance to Asian New Zealanders’ turnout (see graph 6.5). Interestingly however, people who had experienced discrimination were more likely than those who had not experienced discrimination, or not as much discrimination, to participate in other forms of political activities. For example, 26.7% of those who had experienced “a great deal” of discrimination signed petitions, whereas participation rates for others were 17.5% for those who had experienced “a fair amount” of discrimination.

86 A survey conducted in 1996 among 212 Asian immigrants revealed that most immigrants have found New Zealanders friendly; Asian Immigrants: Economic and Social Survey (1997) Auckland Institute of Studies. Another study of 157 young foreign students found that 80% of the respondents felt welcomed in New Zealand and that 85% were glad they came to New Zealand; Binning E., “Migrant teens bored but glad”, New Zealand Herald, 6 December 2002.
87 Although the differences were not statistically significant. Among Chinese, 4.2% had experienced “a great deal” of discrimination, and 9.9% “a fair amount” (Chi-square .229, Phi and Cramer’s V .069).
12.6% “some amount”, and 11.2% for those who had “never” experienced discrimination. This indicated that the experience of discrimination could encourage the participation of Asian New Zealanders in certain forms of political activities. At the same time, this could be interpreted as Asians who had experienced discrimination feeling alienated from mainstream politics, and therefore focusing more on political activities other than voting. Further analysis revealed that contrary to overseas studies, the levels of interaction and language skills did not show much correlation to the experience of discrimination. Although the exact reasons for this are not clear, it may be because people who were not fluent in English and socialized mainly with their own ethnic group had little or no opportunity to experience discrimination from the other ethnic groups.

Graph 6.5 Turnout of Asians who have experienced discrimination in New Zealand

Chi-square .293
Phi and Cramer’s V .067

Chi-square .026, Phi and Cramer’s V .101. Asians who had experienced “a great deal” of discrimination also showed the highest participation rates in activities of “assisting in a political campaign” (8.9%), “making a donation” (4.4%), “writing or phoning government or media” (6.7%), “attending a protest or demonstration” (6.7%), and “working in the community” (13.3%), although the differences were not statistically significant.

This is similar to the participatory patterns of those with political cynicism, whose alienation with the political system acts as a catalyst to participate in politics; Citrin and Green (1986). See also chapter 5.4 for examples of discrimination mobilizing Asian New Zealanders.

Lien found that Asian Americans who had experienced discrimination were more likely to participate in political activities other than voting; (1994) pp42-43.

For example, the 2001 survey in the US found that Asian respondents who showed a high level of interracial social networking were less likely than others to have experienced discrimination. For more information on ethnic assimilation and social distance; see also Park R., “The concept of social distance” (1924) 8 Journal of Applied Sociology 339, as cited in Rich in Rich (1996) p3; Borgardus E., A forty-year racial distance study (1967) University of Southern California Press, Los Angeles; and Cummings S. and Lambert T., “Anti-Hispanic and Anti-Asian Sentiments among African Americans” (1997) 78(2) Social Science Quarterly 338-353 at p49.

For example, the proportion of those who had experienced either “a great deal” or “a fair amount” of discrimination were: 21.2% for those who had “no interaction” with Pakeha, 10.5% “little interaction”, 14.5% “reasonable interaction”, 18.9% “significant interaction”, and 21.1% “lots of interaction” (Chi-square .102, Phi and Cramer’s V .159).

45.0% of those who spoke no English reported that they had never experienced discrimination, compared to 29.8% of those with level 1 English language skills, 18.7% of level 2, 19.3% of level 3, 14.1% of level 4, and 19.5% of level 5 English language skills (Chi-square .000, Phi and Cramer’s V .215).
Source of discrimination

In an effort to come up with ways to minimize incidents of discrimination, the survey asked the respondents to identify the sources of discrimination. The largest proportion of respondents (43.9%) replied that they had experienced discrimination from “passers-by in public”. The second largest source of discrimination was “shopkeepers or restaurant workers” (9.8%), followed by “police or other government authorities” (8.8%), “neighbours or school friends” (7.3%), and “workplace” (5.6%). About 25% of the respondents chose more than one source; 5.3% chose “passers-by in public” and “neighbours or school friends”, 4.1% chose “passers-by in public” and “shopkeepers or restaurant workers”, 3.4% chose “passers-by in public” and “police or other governmental authorities”, and 2.6% chose “passers-by in public” and “workplace”. “Other” sources of discrimination included young people/teenagers, school teachers, drivers, hospital staff, and when applying for jobs. The results suggested that public education to facilitate understanding between the general New Zealand population and Asian New Zealanders would be needed to reduce the incidents of discrimination. This is especially so given that most of discrimination appeared to involve random, unprovoked attacks by the public, based on their pre-existing prejudicial views against Asian New Zealanders.

Reporting discrimination

For those who had experienced discrimination, the survey asked whether they had reported the incident to anyone. Only 10.4% of the respondents replied that they had reported the incident, indicating that the reported incidents of discrimination only reflect a small proportion of actual discrimination that Asians experience in New Zealand. Further analysis revealed that those who had reported the incident were more likely to vote (85.1%) than those who did not (74.6%), possibly because reporting the incident could be seen as a form of political participation (see graph 6.6). Of those 89.6% who did not report the incidents of discrimination, 55.2% said that they did not report because they felt that reporting would not make any difference, reflecting Asian New Zealanders’ lack of faith in government institutions to improve the racial situation. This was perhaps not surprising, considering that more than 15% of the respondents (including those who identified more than one source) had experienced discrimination from “police or other government authorities”.

94 Those who had reported the incident were also more likely to sign petitions (18.7%) and work in the community (18.7) than those who did not (13.6% and 7.4% respectively). Chi-square .153, Phi and Cramers’ V .045 for signing petitions; Chi-square .003, Phi and Cramers’ V -.123 for working in the community.

95 It should be noted that this may be due to Asian people’s tendency to interpret unpleasant experiences (such as traffic incidents) as a form of racial discrimination, or the case of some police officers having
could not be bothered, 8.8% because they did not know where to report, and 0.9% because they were afraid of revenge. About 8.8% of the respondents chose “other” reasons for not reporting, the most popular of which included: “discrimination was not serious enough”; “there was no evidence”; “discrimination is so common not interested in reporting”; “there was a feeling of being discriminated against rather than actual discrimination”; and “language problems.” It should also be noted that there were many who commented that “there is no serious discrimination against Asians in New Zealand”.

**Graph 6.6 Turnout of Asians who have reported discrimination**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Report discrimination</th>
<th>Voted last election Yes</th>
<th>Voted last election No</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>85.1%</td>
<td>14.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>74.6%</td>
<td>25.4%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- Chi-square .036
- Phi and Cramer’s V .073

**Media**

The media has often been blamed for creating negative stereotypes against Asian immigrants through inaccurate or overly dramatized coverage of Asia and Asian immigrants. It was therefore important to assess the quality of the New Zealand media’s coverage on Asia from the perspective of Asian New Zealanders. When asked whether they felt that their home countries were fairly portrayed by the New Zealand media, about 20% of the respondents indicated that the media portrayed their home countries fairly “most of the times”. Disturbingly, most respondents replied that the media “sometimes” (41.0%) or “never” (25%) portrayed their home countries fairly.

Difficulties communicating with people who have limited English language abilities, rather than actual incidents of discrimination. Disturbingly, there were many written comments which reflected Asian New Zealanders’ sense of political disempowerment and helplessness, such as “discrimination is a fact of life, deal with it”; “we should not provoke unnecessary conflict”; “better to ignore”; “after all, we are from a foreign country, difficult to have equal status”; “nothing can help”; “police is discriminatory anyway”; “discrimination will exist forever, nothing can change”; and “it’s us who came to ‘their’ country and add onto their burden. We will always be ‘second-class’ citizens.”
Further analysis revealed that the satisfaction rate varied significantly between Korean and Chinese New Zealanders, with the Chinese showing more satisfaction than Koreans with the media coverage of their home countries\textsuperscript{97}. Korean people’s high level of dissatisfaction with the New Zealand media may have been caused by the inaccurate coverage on Korea by the New Zealand Herald in June 2002 and the subsequent collective actions taken by the Korean community to combat the unfair coverage\textsuperscript{98}, which were widely reported in the local Korean media just prior to the survey. This feeling of dissatisfaction with the New Zealand media may have discouraged Korean New Zealanders from participating in New Zealand politics, as people who expressed dissatisfaction with the media were less likely to vote than those who expressed satisfaction (see graph 6.7). The findings suggested that the media has an important role to play, not only in educating the New Zealand public to help reduce anti-Asian sentiment, but also in encouraging the political participation of Asian New Zealanders.

**Graph 6.7 Turnout of Asians who are satisfied with the media coverage of their home countries**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Media fairly portray home country</th>
<th>Voted last election Yes</th>
<th>Voted last election No</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Most of the time</td>
<td>83.1%</td>
<td>16.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sometimes</td>
<td>78.9%</td>
<td>24.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Never</td>
<td>69.4%</td>
<td>36.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don’t know</td>
<td>67.2%</td>
<td>32.8%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- Chi-square .001
- Phi and Cramer’s V .139

**Regression of the factors relating to prejudice/discrimination**

Regression of the factors relating to prejudice/discrimination revealed that Asian New Zealanders’ view on the New Zealand media was the only factor that had statistically significant relevance to the political participation of Asian New Zealanders. Asians who were satisfied with the media coverage of their home countries were 11.4% more likely to vote when all the factors in this

\textsuperscript{97} For example, 28.8% of Chinese replied that their home countries were portrayed fairly by the New Zealand media “most of the time”, compared to only 9.5% of Korean New Zealanders. In addition, 44.9% of Koreans believed that the media “never” portrayed their home country fairly, compared to only 6.5% of Chinese New Zealanders.

\textsuperscript{98} See chapter 5.4 for more information.
analysis were controlled (see table 6.3). Contrary to prediction and overseas studies on Asian immigrants’ political participation, the experience of discrimination did not show statistically significant relevance to the Asian turnout or participation rates in other forms of political activities. No regression was run on the merged data, as the NZES did not include any questions on discrimination.

Table 6.3 Effect of discrimination on participation rate – Asian data

|                        | Voting | | | Signing petition | | | Working in community | | |
|------------------------|--------|---|---|-------------------|---|---|-----------------------|---|
|                        | %      | b  | s.e| %               | b  | s.e| %                    | b  | s.e|
| Discrimination         | 2.7    | 0.16| 0.24| 2.5             | 0.21| 0.28| -0.5                 | -0.06| 0.32|
| Satisfied with media   | 11.4   | 0.61**| 0.19| 3.0             | 0.25| 0.24| 3.7                  | 0.48| 0.30|
| Constant               | 66.9   | 0.68**| 0.26| 10.1            | -2.15**| 0.33| 7.3                  | -2.56**| 0.38|
| % concordant           | 77.2   |     |    | 85.7            |     |    | 90.5                 |     |    |
| Cox & Snell R²         | .015   | .002| .004|                  |     |    |                      |     |    |

**significant at <.01  *significant at <.05

6.6 SUMMARY

Interestingly, the experience of discrimination showed two opposite effects on the political participation of Asian New Zealanders. On the one hand, Asians who had experienced racial discrimination were slightly less likely to vote. On the other hand, the experience of discrimination appeared to have encouraged Asian New Zealanders to participate in other forms of political activities. It appeared that the experience of discrimination made Asian New Zealanders realize the importance of being involved in politics, but at the same time, it made them do so by participating in activities other than voting (possibly because they had little confidence that the racial situation would improve through the activity of voting). Asians' lack of confidence in the New Zealand government was also reflected by the fact that most people who had experienced discrimination did not report the incident, out of belief that reporting would not make any difference. The most interesting outcome, however, was the lack of statistically significant relevance the experience of discrimination had on Asian New Zealanders' participation rates, which was contrary to the findings of many overseas studies. It may be that the negative effect of discrimination on the political participation of Asian New Zealanders was overridden, for example, by extensive mobilization efforts by political parties or other favourable aspects of New Zealand's political structure. It may also be the case that Asians have not faced discrimination serious enough to act as a trigger for political mobilization. Conversely, Asian New Zealanders' satisfaction level with the media coverage on their home countries showed a strong correlation with the voting rate. This could be seen as evidence of the power of media in shaping the public's perception on Asia and in encouraging the political participation of Asian New Zealanders.
PART C – INTER-GROUP RELATIONSHIPS

The status of other ethnic minority groups in the host country and their relationships with the dominant group may also influence the political participation of Asian immigrants. This is because the relationship between the dominant group and the biggest ethnic minority group often affects the relationship that the dominant group has with other ethnic minority groups. In addition, ethnic minority groups often compete with each other for the limited resources and positions vis-à-vis the dominant group\(^99\), which in turn could influence Asian immigrants' level and mode of political participation. In this part of the thesis, questions will be asked to assess Asian New Zealanders' levels of interaction with and understanding of the other ethnic minority groups, and its implications on the political participation of Asian New Zealanders.

6.7 COMPARATIVE CONTEXT

The importance of the biggest ethnic minority group in shaping the political position of Asian immigrants is evident in the case of Asian Americans. In the US, the hegemonic “Black/White” paradigm of race relations has fundamentally shaped how the society thinks about, engages, and politically mobilises around racial issues, including those of Asian Americans\(^100\). For example, the fact that African Americans involuntarily came to the US as slaves, and the implicit policy of assimilation\(^101\), led to the perception that the relationship between White and coloured people should be superior/inferior. The Black/White paradigm was also used to understand conflicts between different racial/ethnic groups in the US. For example, because Asian Americans appear to have relatively less socio-economic problems than African Americans (partly because Asians do not raise their issues through political means like African Americans do), Asian Americans are often left out of the affirmative action debate and other debates involving racial preference issues\(^102\). This illustrates how the Black/White hegemony can diminish the importance attached to the Asian American issues by framing Asian American issues as secondary to those of African Americans\(^103\).


\(^101\) This is reflected in the “melting pot” analogy, a predominant assumption that immigrants will eventually “melt” into the host society based on the concepts of individualism and assimilation; Hirschman A., “America’s melting pot re-considered” (1983) 9 Annual Review of Sociology 397-423.

\(^102\) Omi and Takagi (1996) p158.

How Asian immigrants are perceived by the dominant group is also linked to their relative power over other ethnic minority groups. When one or more minority groups are excluded from equal participation in the society and from a fair share of its values, other minority groups not so excluded are correspondingly elevated in position. This may prevent ethnic minority groups from forming a broader political coalition, which could pose a greater threat to the dominance of White Americans. For this reason, a conscious effort is made by the dominant group to give precedence to one minority group ahead of the others, as groups would be reluctant to sacrifice their ad hoc alliances with the majority group which grant them a “preferred minority” status over other ethnic groups. This not only places ethnic minority groups in competition with each other, but also disguises the system’s unfair treatment of certain ethnic minority groups. For example, Asian Americans’ socio-economic success in becoming the “model minority” has often been used to attack African Americans’ claim for affirmative action. In so doing, it created an artificial sense of superiority among Asian Americans, as well as creating African American resentment towards Asian Americans. At the same time, Asian Americans have been constantly portrayed as immutably foreign and different, unable to become true “Americans”. This process of placing one ethnic group over the other and at the same time ensuring that the other group is ostracized has been described as “racial triangulation”: an attempt by the dominant group to control both groups.

Asian New Zealanders

In New Zealand, the three main ethnic minority groups are Maori, Pacific Islanders and Asian New Zealanders, with Maori shaping the main ethnic relations discourse. The Maori people are not only the biggest ethnic minority group in New Zealand, but they also enjoy special status as the indigenous people of New Zealand, by virtue of certain rights guaranteed under the Treaty of

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105 For example, efforts to create a political coalition between Asian and Latino Americans in Los Angeles for the 1991 election created a more formidable political force for both groups; Freeman (2000) pp97 and 190.
108 Racial triangulation can be defined as processes of (a) “relative valorisation” whereby dominant group A (White Americans) valorise subordinate group B (Asian Americans) relative to subordinate group C (African Americans) on cultural and racial grounds in order to dominate both groups, but especially the latter, and (b) “civic ostracism” whereby dominant group A (White Americans) constructs subordinate group B (Asian Americans) as immutably foreign and unassimilable on cultural and racial grounds in order to ostracize them from the body politic and civic membership; See Kim C.J., “The Racial Triangulation of Asian Americans” in Chang (2001) for more details on the process of “racial triangulation”.
Waitangi ("TOW")\textsuperscript{109}. The TOW is regarded by some as a quasi-constitution of New Zealand\textsuperscript{110}, and the "biculturalism" based on this partnership between the Crown and Maori has assumed the status of a de facto government policy in New Zealand since the late 1980s\textsuperscript{111}. The problem with this notion of "biculturalism", however, is that it focuses only on power-sharing between two groups (Maori and Pakeha\textsuperscript{112}), and leaves little room for Asian and other non-Maori ethnic minority groups. In this sense, New Zealand’s emphasis on biculturalism can be seen as unfavourable to Asian New Zealanders, whose interests would best be served by the adoption of "multiculturalism" (which seeks to remove discriminatory barriers and promote the full and equal participation of all ethnic minority groups).

From the perspective of Asian New Zealanders, it is unfair and unjust to encourage immigration without a corresponding multicultural commitment to accommodate immigrants’ diverse needs, and to treat Asians’ interests as secondary to that of Maori people\textsuperscript{113}. From the Maori people’s perspective, the pursuit of multiculturalism is a political plot to distract or dilute the counter-hegemonic struggle of the Maori people and their claim to special status, as they would simply be deemed yet another minority group with no special rights in a multicultural society\textsuperscript{114}. Some Maori activists have therefore been voicing concerns about Asian immigrants, who were initially perceived as competitors in the labour market, and later as a threat to New Zealand’s biculturalism\textsuperscript{115}. Although New Zealand is arguably becoming more multicultural in practice in that organisations and policies have begun to focus more on inclusion of diverse groups, the pressure and challenges posed by biculturalism and other notions based on Maori rights continue

\textsuperscript{109} The TOW, signed between the English Crown and some 500 North Island Maori chiefs on 6 February 1840, gave the Crown rights to occupancy and governance of New Zealand in exchange for the protection of Maori’s individual and collective rights. The TOW and the Maori rights thereof had long been ignored by the New Zealand government, until greater recognition of cultural politics led to the passing of the Treaty of Waitangi Act 1975; for more information, see Nagata A., \textit{The Treaty of Waitangi: An Explanation} (1963) Maori Purposes Fund Board, Christchurch; and Kawharu I.H. (ed) \textit{Waitangi: Maori and Pakeha Perspectives of the Treaty of Waitangi} (1989) Oxford University Press, Auckland.

\textsuperscript{110} Kelsey J., “From Flagpoles to Pine Trees: Tino Rangatiratanga and Treaty Policy Today” in Spoonley et al. (1996).


\textsuperscript{112} There is, however, a lack of consensus on the term “Pakeha”, a signatory to the TOW. One school of thought asserts that “Pakeha” means fair-skinned European settlers, whereas another school of thought regards it as “all non-Maori”, including Chinese; see Ip (1992) p17, fn19 and 20.

\textsuperscript{113} Greif S.W., “Introduction: The Interweaving of Themes of New Zealand Immigration” in Greif (1995); Nola N., “Ethnic Minority Writing in Multicultural Aotearoa/New Zealand” in Trlin and Spoonley (eds) (1997). Interestingly, Vasil and Yoon noted that many Asian immigrants are willing to acknowledge that they cannot expect to be treated at a level of parity with Maori and Pakeha; (1996) p29.


\textsuperscript{115} See for example, Walker R.J., \textit{The Government’s Economic Mantra of BIP Immigration} (1991) Seminar paper, Maori Studies Department, University of Auckland, p3, where he regarded the acceptance of Asian immigrants as breach of agreement (TOW) that New Zealand would only accept immigration from the countries nominated in the preamble of the treaty, namely Europe, Australia and the UK. This is despite the fact that the Maori version of the TOW (which is widely regarded as the authoritative text) does not mention that “Her Majesty’s subjects” should be from “Europe and Australia”; Ip (1992) p7.
to reinforce the political position of Asian New Zealanders as “secondary” to that of Maori. It is therefore hypothesized that Asian New Zealanders would not, in general, support TOW-related Maori issues.

As the same time, the whole debate around the TOW can be seen as having contributed positively to the public’s recognition of Asians and their right to participate in New Zealand politics, given that the status of the dominant ethnic minority group inevitably influences the public’s perception towards other ethnic minority groups. Pakeha may have learnt the importance of acknowledging and respecting different cultures through their dealings with Maori, which in turn would have made it easier for Asian New Zealanders and other ethnic minorities to gain acceptance from the dominant group. In addition, the complexity of issues associated with the TOW (which is regarded by many members of the dominant group as infringing upon their rights) may lead to greater public support for multiculturalism as an attractive alternative to biculturalism. Another possible influence of the special status enjoyed by the Maori people is that members of the dominant group would be forced to see themselves as “immigrants” when faced with Maori claims of customary rights, and therefore have an opportunity to empathize with Asian and other immigrants.

The immigrants from the Pacific Island countries also play an important role in shaping Asian New Zealanders’ political position. As the first significant non-Maori non-White immigrant group (an increasing number of whom are New Zealand-born citizens), Pacific Islanders strengthen the claim for the adoption of multiculturalism in New Zealand. Their home countries’ close geopolitical links with New Zealand (with Tokelau, the Cook Islands, and Niue having constitutional links with New Zealand) makes it more difficult for the New Zealand government to ignore the interests of non-Maori ethnic minority groups in New Zealand. There is, however, little commonality between Pacific Islanders and Asian New Zealanders in terms of culture, socio-economic status, and immigration experiences in New Zealand. For example, many Pacific Islanders came to New Zealand as semi- or unskilled-labourers in the 1970s, and were treated as

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116 It has been predicted that there would be a shift towards multiculturalism in New Zealand because of the difficulty the bicultural ideology has in accommodating the increasing number of other ethnic groups, but that such a move would need to address Maori’s fear that multiculturalism will be used as a dissembling weapon for the TOW; Durie M.H., “Beyond 1852: Maori, the State, and a New Zealand Constitution” (1995) 30 Sites 31-47, as cited in Fleras and Spoonly (1999) p247.

117 For example, during a public debate over Maori’s claim to the seabed and foreshore ownership, one reader wrote to the New Zealand Herald as follows; “Those who live in this modern society we call New Zealand are not visitors. We do not plan to return anywhere. This society is our home. Trying to create divisions among us by creating classes of citizens – those who belong and those who are mere guests – is destructive and has little to do with Aotearoa as it exists today”; Carey Marsh of Beach Haven, “Letters to the editor”, Weekend Herald, 9-10 August 2003, pA22.

unwelcome overstayers\textsuperscript{119}. Most of them therefore have a different socio-economic background and experience in New Zealand to that of Asian New Zealanders, making it difficult for the two groups to interact closely with each other. At the same time, Pacific Islanders could have made Asian New Zealanders a preferred political partner for White New Zealanders, as Asians’ socio-economic status and work ethics are depicted as more similar to White New Zealanders than Pacific Islanders. The political position of Asian New Zealanders therefore cannot be fully understood without looking at the political and economic status of the other ethnic minority groups in New Zealand.

\textbf{6.8 SURVEY RESULTS AND ANALYSIS}

The relationships that Asian New Zealanders have with the other two main ethnic minority groups of Maori and Pacific Islanders were assessed to see whether they in fact compete with each other for the limited resources and positions vis-à-vis the dominant group. The survey revealed that a degree of rivalry\textsuperscript{120} may exist between the three ethnic groups, and that Asian New Zealanders in general have a low level of knowledge of and support for the TOW and related Maori issues. Having said that, Asian New Zealanders showed a slightly higher level of support for Maori issues than Pakeha. In this context, it would be interesting to incorporate questions on Pakeha’s view towards Asian New Zealanders in the NZES, in order to assess whether those who sympathize with Maori issues are also more likely to be sympathetic to Asian issues. If so, this would reaffirm the theory that Pakeha’s experience with Maori has formed the basis of Asian New Zealanders’ relationship with the dominant group.

\textbf{Relationship with Maori and Pacific Islanders}

As briefly mentioned in chapter 4.8, Asian New Zealanders did not appear to have much interaction with Maori or Pacific Islanders, with less than 3% of the respondents indicating that they had “a lot of interaction” (level 5) with the two groups (see graph 6.8). In addition, when asked to identify sources of discrimination, a number of Asian respondents identified Maori or Pacific Islanders as perpetrators. This indicated that a degree of competition and even hostility may have developed between the three ethnic minority groups in New Zealand. The finding that about a third of Asian respondents supported Republicanism (which could diminish the importance of the TOW by detaching the ties with the English Monarchy with whom the TOW was

\textsuperscript{119} The New Zealand government ran an “overstayers” campaign in the 1970s to prosecute illegal Pacific Island immigrants. These racist policies of the 1970s still have lingering effects on Pacific Islanders, and for this reason, some choose to use the term “Tangata Pasifika” instead of “Pacific Islanders”; see Fleras and Spoonley (1999) pp.191, 197-199.

\textsuperscript{120} Rivalry in a sense that ethnic minority groups must compete amongst themselves for the same limited resources.
entered into) may be seen as one of the reasons for this not-so-friendly relationship between Maori and Asian New Zealanders. For Pacific Islanders, the fact that the two groups inevitably fight for the same limited resources available to non-Maori ethnic minority groups, and their cultural and socio-economic differences, may explain why Pacific Islanders do not have a close relationship with Asian New Zealanders, and vice versa. The media’s portrayal of Asians as “cash cows” and “invaders” may have also contributed to this hostile relationship, by making Asians a subject of fear and envy. Such media coverage could also have created a false sense of superiority among Asian New Zealanders, thereby exacerbating tensions between the three main ethnic minority groups.

Graph 6.8 Asians' levels of interaction with Maori and Pacific Islanders

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Interaction with</th>
<th>Interaction with</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Maori</td>
<td>Pacific Islanders</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>38.3%</td>
<td>35.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27.4%</td>
<td>27.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16.3%</td>
<td>14.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13.8%</td>
<td>13.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.6%</td>
<td>4.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.7%</td>
<td>2.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.5%</td>
<td>10.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No interaction</td>
<td>Little interaction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Some interaction</td>
<td>Reasonable interaction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reasonable interaction</td>
<td>Significant interaction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Some interaction</td>
<td>Reasonable interaction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reasonable interaction</td>
<td>Significant interaction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Significant interaction</td>
<td>Lots of interaction</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Views on Maori issues

One of the criticisms raised by Maori about Asian immigrants is that Asian New Zealanders do not have much knowledge of and respect for the history of Maori-Pakeha relationship, including the TOW and the associated rights of Maori people. To test the validity of this criticism, the survey asked the Asian respondents to express their views on a number of Maori-related issues. Firstly, the respondents were asked whether they believed that Maori deserved special status in New Zealand because of historical background and the TOW. Of the 900 respondents who answered this question, 22.1% replied they did not know, indicating that a significant proportion of Asian New Zealanders did not have sufficient knowledge of New Zealand history and the TOW to answer this question. Of those who expressed their views, only 18.9% replied that Maori people deserved special status, whereas 59.0% opposed the idea of Maori having special status. It

121 No equivalent question was asked in the NZES 2002.
should be noted however that Maori people’s claim to the seabed and foreshore was receiving extensive media attention at the time of the survey, which may have affected the respondents’ view on these issues.\(^{122}\)

Secondly, the respondents were asked whether they believed that there should be special Maori seats in Parliament, to which 22.1% replied yes, 59.0% no, and 18.9% don’t know. A similar level of (non-)support was recorded for questions asking whether there should be more Maori and Pacific Island MPs in New Zealand, which attracted only 9.6% and 9.1% of support from the Asian respondents (although 59.0% and 58.5% of the respondents indicated that whether or not there should be more Maori or Pacific Island MPs depend on the candidates). Thirdly, the respondents were asked whether Maori people should be given more say in government decisions in New Zealand. This question received the lowest support rate of 14.7%, with 58.6% opposing and 26.7% indicating that they did not know. Interestingly, Asians showed a higher level of support for this issue than Pakeha, only 10.3% of whom supported Maori having more say in government decisions.\(^{123}\) This indicated that despite the rivalry, there is a scope for improved relationship between Maori and Asian New Zealanders.\(^{124}\) Whether those Pakeha who showed support for Maori issues are also more likely to show support for Asian issues would be an interesting area for future research.

The survey indicated that about one-fifth of Asian New Zealanders did not have enough knowledge of TOW and related Maori issues to express an opinion, and those who had enough knowledge to answer these questions were in general against the idea of Maori having special status in New Zealand. This result, although worrisome, may have resulted from the lack of opportunity that Asian New Zealanders have had to learn about Maori issues, as further analysis revealed that Asians who interacted with Maori showed a greater level of support for all three Maori issues. For example, among those who had level 5 interaction with Maori, 40.9% showed support for Maori having special status, 50.0% Maori having special seats in Parliament, and 36.4% Maori having more say in government decisions.\(^{125}\) The support for these issues was considerably lower among those who had no interaction with Maori (16.2%, 18.6% and 11.6% respectively). Asians with a high level of interaction with Maori and Pacific Islanders were also

\(^{122}\) This was also reflected by the fact that a number of respondents chose Maori ownership disputes, especially seabed and foreshore issues, as the most important issue facing New Zealand at the time of the survey.

\(^{123}\) 40.5% of Pakeha New Zealanders were opposed to the idea of Maori having more say, whereas about half (49.2%) expressed a neutral opinion. Not surprisingly, 80.0% of Maori people supported the idea of Maori having more say, 9.1% opposed, and 11.9% expressed a neutral opinion.

\(^{124}\) This is especially so since both groups share a common goal of “racial equality”. For example, even when African Americans expressed extreme hatred towards Chinese Americans in the 1850s-early 1900s, they did not support oppression or restriction against Chinese Americans, in the belief that to do so would eventually be to the disadvantage of African Americans; Shankman (1978) pp4 and 9.

\(^{125}\) Chi-square .012, .161, .035, Phi and Cramer’s V .167, .132, .155.
more likely to show support for having more Maori and Pacific Island MPs. The results indicated that improving the inter-group relationships between different ethnic minority groups may be possible by increasing their levels of interaction with each other. The level of support for Maori issues, however, did not show much correlation with Asian New Zealander's voting or other participation rates (see graphs 6.9-6.11).

Graph 6.9 Turnout of Asians who believe that Maori deserve special status

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>Don't know</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>72.5%</td>
<td>27.5%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>77.6%</td>
<td>22.4%</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>74.4%</td>
<td>25.6%</td>
<td>20%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- Chi-square .374
- Phi and Cramer's V .048

Graph 6.10 Turnout of Asians who support Maori having special seats in Parliament

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>Don't know</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>77.8%</td>
<td>22.2%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>75.6%</td>
<td>24.4%</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>73.4%</td>
<td>26.6%</td>
<td>20%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- Chi-square .638
- Phi and Cramer's V .033

126 28.6% of those who had level 5 interaction with Maori showed support for having more Maori MPs, compared to 7.7% of those who had no interaction with Maori (Chi-square .034, Phi and Cramer's V .257). Similarly, 27.8% of those who had level 5 interaction with Pacific Islanders showed support for having more Pacific Island MPs, compared to 5.9% of those who had no interaction with Pacific Islanders (Chi-square .000, Phi and Cramer's V .361).
-Chi-square .370
-Phi and Cramer’s V .049

Regression of the factors relating to inter-group relationships

Regression of the Asian data revealed that factors relating to inter-group relationships did not show any statistically significant relevance to Asian New Zealanders’ turnout or other forms of political activities (see table 6.4). Regression of the NZES-Asia merged data also showed that factors relating to inter-group relationships had no effect on New Zealanders voting or signing petitions, although New Zealanders who showed support for Maori people having more say in government decisions were 7.8% more likely to work in the community (see table 6.5). Interestingly, when the factors relating to inter-group relationships were controlled, Asian New Zealanders were 18.7% less likely to vote (which is a decrease of 0.4% from when no other factors were controlled), 60.3% less likely to sign petitions (a decrease of 2.9%), and 16.3% less likely to work in the community (a decrease of 0.6%) than Pakeha, despite the fact that these factors did not show statistically significant relevance to the political participation of Asian New Zealanders. The significance of Maori (non)-participation vis-à-vis Pakeha in the activities of signing petitions and working in the community also disappeared when the inter-group factors were controlled.
Table 6.4 Effect of inter-group relationships on participation rate – Asian data

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Voting</th>
<th>Signing petition</th>
<th>Working in community</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>%</td>
<td>b</td>
<td>s.e</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maori support</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>0.17</td>
<td>0.23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>74.9</td>
<td>1.09**</td>
<td>0.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% concordant</td>
<td>75.4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cox &amp; Snell R²</td>
<td>.001</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**significant at <.01  *significant at <.05

Table 6.5 Effect of inter-group relationships on participation rate – Merged data

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Voting</th>
<th>Signing petition</th>
<th>Working in community</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>%</td>
<td>b</td>
<td>s.e</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asian</td>
<td>-18.7</td>
<td>-1.89**</td>
<td>0.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maori</td>
<td>-9.4</td>
<td>-1.25**</td>
<td>0.28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maori support</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td>0.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>95.6</td>
<td>3.08**</td>
<td>0.18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% concordant</td>
<td>87.2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cox &amp; Snell R²</td>
<td>.065</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**significant at <.01  *significant at <.05

6.9 SUMMARY

As predicted, the survey results revealed that Asian New Zealanders did not have close relationships with Maori or Pacific Islanders, reflecting the reality that they have to compete with each other for political power, resources, and cultural recognition. Also as expected, about a quarter of Asian respondents were found not to have enough knowledge to express opinions on the TOW-related Maori issues, and those who expressed opinions were generally not supportive of those issues. However, the finding that Asians with a high level of interaction with Maori were more likely to support Maori issues indicated that facilitating interaction between Maori and Asian New Zealanders could help Asians understand and support the TOW and related Maori issues. Although Asian New Zealanders’ views on Maori issues did not show statistically significant relevance to their participation rates, the finding that controlling the inter-group factors decreased the likelihood of Asian non-participation vis-à-vis Pakeha in all three political activities indicated that the inter-ethnic relationships could influence the political participation of Asian New Zealanders.

127 The three questions on the Maori issue were merged into one question with the alpha statistic of .716.
6.10 REGRESSION OF THE ASIAN DATA

As was the case with individual variables and community variables, factors relating to the institutional variables which showed significance of .050 or less, and other important yet statistically insignificant factors (such as levels of satisfaction and trust and the experience of discrimination), were included in the overall regression. Analysis of the data revealed that age and satisfaction with the media coverage were the only factors which had statistically significant relevance to the Asian turnout (see table 6.6). Asian New Zealanders who were satisfied with the media coverage of their home countries were 11.6% more likely to vote, and the likelihood of voting increased by 0.4% with every extra year of the respondents’ age when the institutional variables were controlled. The result was yet another reminder of the power of the media, as well as the relevance of the demographic theory, on the political participation of Asian New Zealanders. Interestingly however, none of the factors included in this analysis showed statistically significant relevance to Asian New Zealanders’ participation rates in other forms of political activities, contrary to prediction that institutional variables would have the greatest effect on the political participation of Asian New Zealanders.

Table 6.6 Effect of institutional variables on participation rate – Asian data

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Voting</th>
<th>Signing petition</th>
<th>Working in community</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>%</td>
<td>b</td>
<td>s.e</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>-1.2</td>
<td>-0.07</td>
<td>0.21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>0.02**</td>
<td>0.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Satisfaction</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>0.18</td>
<td>0.57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Influence NZ policies</td>
<td>6.9</td>
<td>0.42</td>
<td>0.22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>My vote counts</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>0.17</td>
<td>0.52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Discrimination</td>
<td>8.2</td>
<td>0.49</td>
<td>0.28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Satisfied with media</td>
<td>11.6</td>
<td>0.67**</td>
<td>0.22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maori support</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>0.29</td>
<td>0.29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>36.2</td>
<td>-1.11</td>
<td>0.84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% concordant</td>
<td>78.5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cox &amp; Snell R²</td>
<td>.037</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**significant at <.01  *significant at <.05

6.11 REGRESSION OF THE MERGED DATA

Regression of the NZES-Asia merged data showed that when the institutional variables were controlled, the likelihood of Asian non-voting vis-à-vis Pakeha decreased by 4.1% to 15.0%, and
that the likelihood of Maori non-voting decreased by 1.0% to 6.4% (see table 6.7). The result was somewhat surprising, given that the institutional factors appeared to have a greater effect on the general New Zealand population. For example, New Zealanders who felt that they could have some degree of influence over government policies were 6.8% more likely to vote, and those who believed that their vote counted were 7.5% more likely to vote, whereas neither of the factors showed statistically significant relevance to the Asian turnout. Age continued to show statistically significant relevance by increasing the likelihood of New Zealanders voting by 0.3% per every extra year. The results indicated that although the institutional factors did not have much statistically significant relevance to Asian turnout, they nevertheless played an important role in reducing the disparity in participation rates between Pakeha and Asian New Zealanders.

Table 6.7 Effect of institutional variables on participation rate – Merged data

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Voting</th>
<th>Signing petition</th>
<th>Working in community</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>%</td>
<td>b</td>
<td>s.e</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asian</td>
<td>-15.0</td>
<td>-2.04**</td>
<td>0.35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maori</td>
<td>-6.4</td>
<td>-1.34**</td>
<td>0.46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td>0.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.03**</td>
<td>0.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Satisfaction</td>
<td>-4.3</td>
<td>-0.57</td>
<td>0.47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Influence NZ policies</td>
<td>6.8</td>
<td>0.54**</td>
<td>0.21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>My vote counts</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>0.83*</td>
<td>0.34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Politics complicated</td>
<td>-2.4</td>
<td>-0.25</td>
<td>0.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maori support</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>0.22</td>
<td>0.26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>74.9</td>
<td>1.52*</td>
<td>0.68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% concordant</td>
<td>87.0</td>
<td>81.1</td>
<td>81.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cox &amp; Snell R²</td>
<td>.107</td>
<td>.350</td>
<td>.108</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**significant at <.01  *significant at <.05

In other forms of political activities, New Zealanders who felt that politics was too complicated were 5.1% less likely to sign petitions and 9.8% less likely to work in the community when all the institutional variables were controlled. Those who felt that they could have influence over government policies were 6.2% more likely to sign petitions, indicating that the benefit of participation may be greater for those with confidence in their roles within the system. In the activity of working in the community, men were 5.6% less likely to do so than women, and showing support for Maori issues increased the likelihood of New Zealanders working in the community by 9.0%. These findings again confirmed that the factors that influence individual participation rates in low-intensity political activities are different from the factors that influence high-intensity political activities. Despite the fact that none of the institutional variables showed
statistically significant relevance to Asians’ participation rates in the two activities, the likelihood of Asian non-participation vis-à-vis Pakeha in the activity of signing petitions decreased by 1.3% to 61.9% from when no other factors were controlled, and the likelihood of Asian non-participation in the activity of working in the community decreased by 1.4% to 15.4% when the institutional variables were controlled. The significance of Maori non-participation vis-à-vis Pakeha also disappeared when the institutional variables were controlled, indicating that factors included in this analysis hold the key to improving the participation rates of Maori in these political activities.

6.12 CONCLUSION – INSTITUTIONAL VARIABLES

Although it was not possible to conduct inter-country or inter-election comparisons to assess the applicability of the institutional theory on the political participation of Asian New Zealanders, the level of confidence Asian New Zealanders had in New Zealand’s political structure and its positive relevance to their political participation was evident in the survey. The importance of the political structure was also highlighted in previous chapters, where extensive mobilization efforts by political parties and weak ethnic community organizations were attributed to the favourable political structure of New Zealand. This did not mean, however, that Asian New Zealanders were confident about their roles within the system, although having confidence in New Zealand’s political system appeared to have a positive impact on Asian New Zealanders’ participation rates. The survey indicated that similar studies need to be conducted in future elections in order to fully understand the applicability of the institutional theory on the political participation of Asian New Zealanders.

The susceptibility of Asian New Zealanders to outside forces was evident by the fact that the unfair media coverage of their home countries discouraged Asian New Zealanders from voting, although somewhat surprisingly, the experience of discrimination did not have much effect on the Asian turnout. Whether this could be interpreted as an absence of serious discrimination that could trigger Asian New Zealanders’ political mobilization, or the benefit of a favourable political structure overriding the additional cost of participation associated with the experience of discrimination, is debatable. It may be that the experience of discrimination has forced Asians to focus more on alternative ways of participating in politics, other than through voting, as such an experience appeared to have encouraged Asians’ participation in other forms of political activities. The fact that most Asian New Zealanders have experienced discrimination by passers-by in public, and their general dissatisfaction with the New Zealand media’s coverage, indicated that improving the media coverage on Asia could potentially reduce the incidents of discrimination and encourage the political participation of Asian New Zealanders.
In terms of inter-group relationships, Asian New Zealanders appeared to have an ambivalent relationship with Maori. On the one hand, New Zealand’s general acceptance and recognition of the concept of “cultural diversity”, deriving from Pakeha’s experience in dealing with indigenous Maori issues, may have made it easier for Asian New Zealanders to be involved in New Zealand politics. On the other hand, New Zealand’s pursuit of biculturalism, based on the TOW-related special rights of Maori, contains the danger of ignoring Asian issues as secondary to that of Maori. Perhaps because of this complex relationship, a degree of rivalry and hostility was found between different ethnic minority groups in New Zealand. Nevertheless, there appeared to be scope for improved inter-group relationships, as Asians with a high level of interaction with other ethnic groups showed more support for Maori and Pacific Island issues. Although few factors under the institutional variables showed statistically significant relevance to Asian New Zealanders’ participation rates, the likelihood of Asian non-participation vis-à-vis Pakeha decreased in all three political activities when the institutional variables were controlled. This indicated that the institutional variables could play an important role in reducing the disparity in participation rates between Pakeha and Asian New Zealanders.
PART E – OVERALL REGRESSION

6.13 ASIAN DATA

Overall regression of all the relevant factors (those with a significance of <.050 and important yet statistically insignificant factors) revealed that the period of residency, level of interaction with other ethnic groups, and contact by politicians were the best predictors of Asians’ turnout when the individual, community, and institutional variables were controlled (see table 6.8). Further to the mobilisation theory, mobilisation efforts by political parties had the biggest effect on the Asian turnout, as Asians who have been contacted by politicians were 24.5% more likely to vote. Asian New Zealanders’ likelihood of voting also increased by 1.4% with every extra year of residency in New Zealand; thereby reaffirming the acculturation theory that Asian New Zealanders’ “newness” may have discouraged them from participating in politics of the host country. The acculturation theory was also reaffirmed by the finding that Asian New Zealanders who have little interaction with other ethnic groups were 12.7% less likely to vote. However, other acculturation factors that were found to be relevant, such as political partisanship and language usage, ceased to have statistically significant relevance once all the relevant factors were controlled. Also interesting was the finding that age, which has consistently shown statistically significant relevance to Asians’ turnout, no longer had relevance in the overall analysis, and neither did other significant factors such as a sense of civic duty, political interest, and membership in organizations.

In other forms of political activities, membership in organizations was the only factor which had a statistically significant effect on Asians signing petitions when all other factors were controlled. Overall regression showed that Asians who belonged to New Zealand business organizations and New Zealand religious organizations were 18.7% and 15.4% more likely to sign petitions. Membership in ethnic community organizations also increased the likelihood of Asians signing petitions by 12.2%. Other important factors such as type of occupation and political partisanship ceased to have statistically significant effects once all the relevant factors were controlled. The results indicated that Asian New Zealanders’ extremely low membership rates in various organizations may be the reason why they are significantly less likely to sign petitions than the general New Zealand population. The results also indicated that different strategies would be needed to encourage Asian participation in different forms of political activities, as factors that showed statistically significant effects on voting did not necessarily show the same effects on Asians signing petitions or working in the community.

For the activity of working in the community, factors such as organisational membership, type of occupation, democratic commitment, cultural influence and the level of interaction showed statistically significant relevance when all the relevant factors were controlled. Not surprisingly,
membership in ethnic community organisations and New Zealand community organizations showed the biggest effect by increasing the likelihood of Asians working in the community by 21.6% and 17.2% respectively. Interestingly however, Asian New Zealanders who supported Asian-specific policies were 4.3% more likely to work in the community in the overall regression, despite the fact that this factor did not previously show statistically significant relevance to Asians working in the community. In addition, Asians who agreed with the statement that there was a need for Asians to participate in New Zealand politics were 21.9% less likely to work in the community; suggesting that despite being aware of the need to participate in politics, Asians may have been discouraged from doing so due to additional barriers to participation. Asians who run their own business were also 7.9% less likely to work in the community, possibly because they were too busy to participate in high-intensity political activities. In addition, lack of interaction with other ethnic groups decreased the likelihood of Asians working in the community by 8.2%, further evidencing the importance of the level of acculturation on the political participation of Asian New Zealanders. The results indicated that understanding Asian participation in high-intensity political activities could be more complex than low-intensity political activities, as a mixture of mobilization factors, socio-economic factors, attitudinal factors and acculturation factors showed statistically significant relevance to Asian New Zealanders’ participation in a high-intensity political activity.

Table 6.8 Overall regression – Asian data

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Voting</th>
<th>Signing petition</th>
<th>Working in community</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>%</td>
<td>B</td>
<td>s.e</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>0.19</td>
<td>0.33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wealth</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>0.38</td>
<td>0.37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High education</td>
<td>4.9</td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td>0.37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fulltime</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>0.17</td>
<td>0.49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Own business</td>
<td>-6.9</td>
<td>-0.65</td>
<td>0.45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Studying</td>
<td>-8.9</td>
<td>-0.42</td>
<td>0.55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political interest</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>0.21</td>
<td>0.51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Need to participate</td>
<td>-14.1</td>
<td>-1.12</td>
<td>1.58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Duty to vote</td>
<td>17.1</td>
<td>1.03</td>
<td>0.58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asian policies</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>0.28</td>
<td>0.40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Govt assistance</td>
<td>-2.6</td>
<td>-0.03</td>
<td>0.34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Residency</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>0.25**</td>
<td>0.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partisanship</td>
<td>7.3</td>
<td>0.45</td>
<td>0.33</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

128 For the political activity of working in community, two factors (contact back home and belief that one’s vote counts) were not included in the overall regression, firstly because they did not show any statistically significant relevance (significance of .999) and secondly because they produced unexpectedly high standard of error figures which could have prevented accurate analysis of the other relevant factors.
### Overall regression of the NZES-Asia merged data showed that factors such as age, sense of civic duty, political partisanship, contact by politicians, and confidence in New Zealand political system were the best predictors of New Zealanders’ turnout when all of the variables were controlled. Contact by politicians again showed the biggest effect on the turnout of the general New Zealand population; those contacted by political parties were 12.5% more likely to vote. New Zealanders with a sense of civic duty and political partisanship were 11.3% and 7.5% more likely to vote, thereby reaffirming the attitudinal theory. The likelihood of voting also increased by 0.2% as New Zealanders’ age increased by one year, and those who believed that their vote counted were 7.2% more likely to vote. Factors such as the type of occupation, political interest, and membership in organizations ceased to have statistically significant relevance when all the individual, community, and institutional variables were controlled.

---

**Because of the shorter list of factors in the merged data, all of the factors, including those which did not show statistically significant relevance, were included in the overall regression of the merged data.**
Membership in organizations was again one of the main factors that encouraged New Zealanders to participate in other forms of political activities. For example, those who belonged to trade unions were 12.7% more likely to sign petitions and 18.5% more likely to work in the community when all the variables were controlled. Membership in business organizations also increased the likelihood of New Zealanders signing petitions by 15.6%, indicating that the social capital theory is equally applicable to the case of the general New Zealand population. The analysis showed that men were 5.6% less likely to work in the community than women, and those who felt that politics was too complicated were 5.8% less likely to work in the community. The socio-economic variables appeared to have greater effects on the general New Zealand population; being in a full-time employment increased the likelihood of New Zealanders signing petitions by 7.8%, and having high educational qualifications increased the likelihood of working in the community by 6.9%. New Zealanders who showed support for Maori issues were also 7.2% more likely to work in the community, whereas having a sense of political partisanship increased the likelihood of signing petitions by 7.8%. Other relevant factors, such as age, political interest, and contact by politicians, ceased to have statistically significant effects on New Zealanders’ political participation when all the factors were controlled.

Overall regression of the merged data showed that Asian New Zealanders were still 19.7% less likely to vote than Pakeha when all the relevant factors were controlled, which is an increase of 0.6% from when no other factors were controlled. Similarly, the likelihood of Asian non-participation vis-à-vis Pakeha in signing petitions increased by 2.5% to 65.7%, and Asians’ non-participation in the activity of working in the community also increased by 9.0% to 25.9% from when no other factors were controlled. In contrast, the significance of Maori non-participation vis-à-vis Pakeha in the activities of voting and signing petitions disappeared when all the relevant factors were controlled. Overall regression also showed that Maori were 18.8% more likely to work in the community than Pakeha, which is an increase of 10.1% from when no other factors were controlled.

### Table 6.9 Overall regression – Merged data

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Voting</th>
<th></th>
<th>Signing petition</th>
<th></th>
<th>Working in community</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>%</td>
<td>B</td>
<td>s.e</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>b</td>
<td>s.e</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asian</td>
<td>-19.7</td>
<td>-2.39**</td>
<td>0.67</td>
<td>-65.7</td>
<td>-3.42**</td>
<td>0.42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maori</td>
<td>-4.3</td>
<td>-1.04</td>
<td>0.57</td>
<td>-4.3</td>
<td>-0.26</td>
<td>0.36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>0.19</td>
<td>0.24</td>
<td>-5.3</td>
<td>-0.36</td>
<td>0.19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.03*</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>-0.00</td>
<td>0.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wealth</td>
<td>-2.1</td>
<td>-0.15</td>
<td>0.27</td>
<td>-0.2</td>
<td>-0.02</td>
<td>0.23</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
What is clear from the overall regression is that political participation is a multi-dimensional phenomenon, where different costs and benefits are associated with different types of political activities, and that the political participation of Asian New Zealanders cannot be explained by looking solely at one factor or another. The survey results also revealed that factors that affected Asian New Zealanders’ turnout were different from factors that affected Asian New Zealanders’ participation rates in other forms of political activities. This means that strategies to encourage Asians’ participation in different forms of political activities should reflect these differences accordingly. For the activity of voting, the overall regression indicated that the turnout among Asian New Zealanders is likely to increase over time as Asians’ period of residency in New Zealand increases, but that efforts are needed both on the part of Asian New Zealanders to interact with other ethnic groups, and on political parties to mobilize Asian voters. On the activity of signing petitions, the overall regression suggested that encouraging Asian New Zealanders to
become members of various organizations may be the most effective way of improving their participation rates in low-intensity political activities. Such an effort would also encourage Asian New Zealanders to participate in the activity of working in the community, although a more complex set of factors appeared to affect Asians' participation rates in high-intensity political activities.

The overall regression highlighted the complexity of the political participation of Asian New Zealanders, as none of the factors, or combination of factors, could fully explain why Asians participate in politics at a lesser rate than Pakeha or Maori New Zealanders. This was especially so given that factors included in the overall regression diminished the significance of Maori ethnicity by diminishing the disparity in participation rates between Pakeha and Maori. It may be that Asian-specific factors that were not included in the overall regression of the merged data, such as the level of interaction, pan-ethnicity, discrimination and other factors relating to the level of acculturation, provide the key explanations as to why there exists disparity in participation rates between Pakeha and Asian New Zealanders. In any event, it is of no surprise that the political participation of Asian New Zealanders raises complex issues that cannot be fully addressed in this thesis. Although the survey provides a useful basis upon which to assess the level of Asian political participation and what motivates/inhibits the political participation of Asian New Zealanders, it is only a first step. Further research on various aspects of the political participation of Asian New Zealanders is needed to understand the full implication of the growing Asian presence in New Zealand politics.
7. CONCLUSION

As the number of Asian faces increased in the streets of New Zealand, questions regarding the integration of this newest immigrant group into New Zealand society began to be raised. Of particular interest was the possible impact this new group could have on New Zealand politics. The fact that very little was known about the political behaviour of Asian New Zealanders, and that it was difficult to predict their participatory patterns because of their different cultural, social and political backgrounds, contributed to further speculation. Based on the first nation-wide survey conducted to assess the political participation of various Asian ethnic groups in New Zealand, this thesis established that Asian New Zealanders do participate in New Zealand politics, but that their participatory patterns are unique and cannot be explained solely by looking at traditional theories on political participation. The thesis also concluded that Asians have already become significant players in New Zealand politics, and that they could potentially become more visible and influential political players in the near future. At the same time, the current study found that the New Zealand political environment has an equally important role in shaping the political behaviour of Asian New Zealanders. This study on the political participation of Asian New Zealanders could therefore be seen as a study on the New Zealand political system – how it facilitated or discouraged the political integration of this new, and increasingly important, immigrant group.

At the beginning of the thesis, a number of key questions relating to the political participation of Asian New Zealanders were set out to highlight the outstanding issues that this thesis sought to address. After a close analysis of the data obtained from the survey of Asian New Zealanders, the NZES data, and other overseas studies on the political participation of Asian immigrants, it is important to assess whether the thesis sufficiently addressed these original questions. The main questions posed at the beginning of the thesis can be summarised as follows: (1) Do Asians participate in New Zealand politics, or are they politically inactive?; (2) What are the factors that inhibit or motivate the political participation of Asian New Zealanders and what can be done to encourage their participation?; and (3) Does the pattern of Asian New Zealanders’ political participation differ from that of the general New Zealand population and of Asian immigrants in other Western countries? After addressing these questions, the thesis will conclude by summarizing the key implications of the current study on a number of traditional theories on political participation, as well as by suggesting areas of future research which would facilitate our understanding of the issue of Asian New Zealanders’ political participation.
7.1 POLITICAL (IN)ACTIVITY OF ASIAN NEW ZEALANDERS

How politically active are Asian New Zealanders? There are different ways of addressing this question. On the one hand, the survey found that Asian New Zealanders participated at a lesser rate than Pakeha in all forms of political activities. In the activity of voting, Asian New Zealanders were found to be some 19% less likely to vote than Pakeha. The likelihood of Asian non-participation vis-à-vis Pakeha was even more significant in certain other forms of political activities - for example, Asians were 63% less likely to sign petitions and 17% less likely to work in the community than Pakeha. In addition, the participation rates of Asian New Zealanders in almost all forms of political activities other than voting were found to be below 10%. Based on these findings, one could argue that the survey found Asian New Zealanders to be “politically inactive”.

On the other hand, the survey could be interpreted as demonstrating the political activism of Asian New Zealanders. For example, the turnout of 75.6% among Asian respondents can be seen as an indication that Asian New Zealanders are relatively active in politics (although the actual turnout of Asian New Zealanders is expected to be about 15-20% lower than the turnout of the survey respondents). This is especially so given that more than 95% of the Asian respondents are recent immigrants who have lived in New Zealand for less than 15 years, and therefore lack the knowledge, confidence and resources (eg. time and language) to participate in politics. The survey also found that recent Asian immigrants have already participated in certain forms of political activities at higher rates than those who have lived in New Zealand for a longer period of time. By finding that about 90% of the respondents had some degree of interest in New Zealand politics, and nearly 95% of the respondents saw the need for Asians to participate in New Zealand politics, other aspects of the survey also illustrated that Asian New Zealanders are politically active. Considering this, although the participation rates of Asian New Zealanders in various forms of political activities were found to be lower than that of the general New Zealand population, it would be inaccurate to conclude that Asian New Zealanders are politically inactive.

7.2 FACTORS AFFECTING ASIAN NEW ZEALANDERS’ POLITICAL PARTICIPATION

So what are the factors that inhibit or motivate the political participation of Asian New Zealanders, and what can be done to encourage their participation? Much of the thesis focused on answering these questions, which required analysis of a complex set of factors that relate to individual Asian New Zealanders, their community and the wider institutional structure of New Zealand. Analysis of the individual variables showed that Asian New Zealanders’ “newness”, particularly their short period of residency, lack of knowledge of New Zealand politics, non-partisanship and lack of
interaction with other ethnic groups were the main barriers to participation for Asian New Zealanders. Interestingly, and contrary to most overseas studies on the political participation of Asian immigrants, Asian New Zealanders’ lack of English language skills did not prove to be one of the main barriers to participation. Neither socio-economic status nor Asian cultural values appeared to have much effect on the political participation of Asian New Zealanders. Asian New Zealanders’ previous political experience in their home countries seemed to influence their mode of participation, although it had little effect on their participation rates. What encouraged Asian New Zealanders’ political participation was their having attitudes that were conducive to political participation, such as being interested in politics or having a sense of civic duty. The fact that the Asian population in New Zealand is relatively young could be another reason for their lower level of participation, as younger people were found to be less likely to vote than older people.

The importance of a sizeable ethnic population and the role of ethnic community organisations in encouraging the political participation of Asian New Zealanders were evident in the analysis of the community variables. For example, contact by political parties had a clear positive correlation to the turnout of Asian New Zealanders, indicating that the fact that almost 85% of Asian respondents had been contacted by political parties may be one of the reasons why the turnout among Asian New Zealanders was relatively high. In political activities other than voting, membership in organizations was the key factor which encouraged Asian New Zealanders’ participation rates. In this sense, the finding that only a small proportion (15% or less with the exception of religious organizations) of Asian New Zealanders belonged to community organizations could partly explain their low levels of participation in political activities other than voting. At the same time, the survey found that neither a pan-Asian ethnic identity nor a sense of shared destiny appeared to encourage the political participation of Asian New Zealanders, contrary to overseas studies on the political participation of Asian immigrants.

Analysis of the institutional factors indicated that New Zealand’s favourable political structure may have made it easier for Asian New Zealanders to participate in politics. This was especially so given that studies on Asian Americans have often identified registration and franchise requirements to be the main barriers to participation. The finding that Asian New Zealanders felt more confident about the New Zealand political system than that of their home countries was further evidence that New Zealand’s political structure may have encouraged the political participation of Asian New Zealanders. In the absence of comparative data, however, it was difficult to calculate the exact effect of the political structure on Asian New Zealanders’ political participation. Mainstream society’s stance towards Asian New Zealanders showed a mixed effect on Asians’ political participation – whereas Asians’ dissatisfaction with media coverage on their home countries appeared to discourage their participation, the experience of discrimination had
little effect on their political participation. This was again contrary to overseas studies which found the experience of discrimination to either trigger or discourage the political participation of Asian immigrants. In terms of inter-group relationships, rivalry between Asian and Maori (the dominant minority group) appeared to have played a role in reducing the discrepancy between participation rates of Pakeha and Asian, although further research is needed to fully understand the impact of inter-group competition on Asian New Zealanders’ political participation.

7.3 WAYS TO ENCOURAGE POLITICAL PARTICIPATION

So what can be done to encourage the political participation of Asian New Zealanders? Analysis of the individual, community and institutional variables indicated that the easiest and the least costly way of encouraging the political participation of Asian New Zealanders would be to simply give them time. The period of residency in New Zealand was one of the few factors which showed a clear correlation with Asian turnout when all the relevant factors were controlled, and many barriers which inhibit Asian New Zealanders from participating in politics were found to be associated with their newness. But time will not solve all the problems. To increase their level of political participation, Asians need to make an effort to interact with other ethnic groups, speak English and learn more about New Zealand politics. Efforts are also needed on the part of political parties, to focus more on Asian-related issues, mobilize Asian voters and select more Asian representatives. The government and the media could also encourage the political participation of Asian New Zealanders, by eliminating institutional barriers and reducing the anti-Asian sentiment in New Zealand through public education. Ethnic community organisations also have a role to play, in providing opportunities for Asians to participate in various community activities, mobilizing the Asian community, passing on political information and representing Asian interests. Perhaps most importantly, efforts are needed on the part of New Zealand society to accept Asian New Zealanders as equals, and to realize that encouraging the political participation of Asian New Zealanders is beneficial for all New Zealanders.

In sum, the current study indicated that a dynamic response from individual Asians, the Asian community and New Zealand society are needed to encourage the political participation of Asian New Zealanders; it is only through a combined effort by all these sectors that a measurable difference can be made to Asian New Zealanders’ participation rates. The survey also indicated that strategies to encourage Asian political participation in different forms of political activities need to recognize different motivating factors, as factors that encouraged the Asian turnout were found to be different from factors that encouraged their participation rates in other forms of political activities.
7.4 UNIQUE PATTERNS OF ASIAN NEW ZEALANDERS’ POLITICAL PARTICIPATION

The next important question is whether the patterns of Asian New Zealanders’ political participation differ from that of the general New Zealand population, and also of Asian immigrants in other Western immigrant countries of the US, Canada, and Australia. By finding that many of the traditional political participation theories (which focused mainly on the political participation of the dominant group) failed to explain the participatory patterns of Asian New Zealanders, and through analysis of the Asian-NZES merged data, the survey revealed that Asian New Zealanders’ participatory patterns are different from that of the dominant group. The most obvious example of this is the finding that higher socio-economic status did not necessarily lead to a higher level of political participation on the part of Asian New Zealanders, whereas it showed a positive correlation to the political participation of the general New Zealand population. These findings were perhaps not surprising, given that Asian New Zealanders are faced with different, and often additional, barriers to participation compared to the general New Zealand population. Nevertheless, it should be noted that the current study did not necessarily refute the traditional theories on political participation. Rather, it provided an opportunity to enrich our understanding of political participation, by identifying certain aspects of the participation theories which appeared to focus only on certain segments of society. At the same time, the current study reaffirmed the applicability of a number of traditional theories on the political participation of Asian New Zealanders (such as the mobilization theory and the demographic theory), details of which are discussed below.

The survey also found that even the “additional factors” that were found to be influencing the political participation of Asian immigrants in other Western countries did not necessarily have the same effect on Asian New Zealanders. Examples of this include the level of English language skills, Asian cultural values, experience of discrimination and pan-Asian identity not having the expected influence on the political participation of Asian New Zealanders. In particular, the effect that membership in ethnic religious organizations had on the political participation of Asian New Zealanders was almost contrary to the effect it had on Asian Americans, as it in fact discouraged Asian New Zealanders from participating in politics. These examples illustrate that certain aspects of the political participation of Asian New Zealanders cannot be understood by looking at the case of Asian immigrants in other Western countries; Asian New Zealanders’ participatory patterns are shaped by the unique New Zealand settings. Methodologies to be adopted to encourage the political participation of Asians in New Zealand should accordingly reflect these differences.
7.5 IMPLICATIONS FOR TRADITIONAL THEORIES ON POLITICAL PARTICIPATION

The current study provided a rare opportunity to test the applicability of the traditional participation theories on the newest and rapidly increasing immigrant group in a Western democratic country. By finding that Asian New Zealanders with high levels of wealth and educational qualifications did not necessarily participate more in politics than those with lower socio-economic status, and that the discrepancy in participation rates between Asian and Pakeha could not be explained by controlling the socio-economic factors, the current study challenged various aspects of the socio-economic theory. Instead, the survey found a statistically significant relationship between Asian turnout and the type of occupation. This indicated that it is not education or financial well-being per se that encouraged Asians’ political participation, but rather the social process of acquiring wealth and educational qualifications. For example, people in full time employment would not necessarily have higher educational qualifications or more money than those who run their own businesses, and yet the former showed higher participation rates, which could be attributed to the exposure to social opportunities and networks through the work environment. These findings indicated that the traditional socio-economic theory should be modified to put more emphasis on the socialization process, rather than wealth and education levels, especially in understanding the political participation of immigrants who have been exposed to different sets of socialisation processes. Whether the turnout of New Zealand-born Asians (who would have been exposed to the same kind of socialization process as Pakeha or Maori) would match more closely to their socio-economic status is an interesting area of further research, once there are sufficient numbers of New Zealand-born Asian respondents to test such an hypothesis.

The survey also revealed the limitations of Franklin’s ground-breaking generational theory. Although Franklin stated at the beginning of his book that his findings were intended to apply only to established democracies, the survey found that the question of whether or not the “habit of voting” could be broken and re-created when people decided to leave their home countries needs to be explored further, especially given the increasing international movement of people. By finding that mainland Chinese had a higher turnout than Koreans, despite the former having no opportunity to develop a habit of voting in their home countries, the survey raised interesting questions. Could the high level of turnout among mainland Chinese be explained in the same terms as first time voters in newly democratic countries showing higher turnout? If so, does this mean that immigrants from non-democratic countries would be more likely to develop a habit of voting in the host country than immigrants from more democratic countries, contrary to the cultural theory? More complicated questions arose in relation to Asian immigrants who have had the opportunity to develop a habit of voting in their home countries, such as Korean or Taiwanese New Zealanders. Would they carry their “habit of voting” to the new country, or would the habit be
broken because of the change in the surrounding environment? What would it take to induce a habit of voting for adult immigrants who have already developed a habit of voting or non-voting in their home countries, and how would the inducement differ from those young voters who have yet to develop a habit of voting? These are some of the questions that need to be addressed if the generational theory is to have a wider application to include those who moved to a different country.

The survey also challenged certain aspects of the social capital theory which argued that involvement in voluntary organizations promoted individuals' political participation. Although membership in organisations generally showed a positive correlation to Asians' participation rates, especially in political activities other than voting, Asians who belonged to ethnic religious organizations were found to participate in politics at lesser rates than non-members. This was also the case for the general New Zealand population who belonged to religious organizations, which was contrary to the effect religious organisations had on the political participation of Americans. It may be that the nature of religious organisations in New Zealand differs from those in the US, although exact reasons for this outcome have not yet been investigated. This, together with the effect of religion on the political participation and political partisanship of Asian New Zealanders, would be interesting areas for future research.

It was difficult to test the institutional theory on the political participation of Asian New Zealanders, as there was no comparative Asian data that could be used for direct comparison between different countries or different elections in New Zealand. In any event, the favourable political structure of New Zealand appeared to have contributed to the relatively high level of participation among Asian New Zealanders. For example, the adoption of the MMP system in 1996, which coincided with the increasing number of Asian immigrants in New Zealand, may be one of the reasons why Asian New Zealanders received more political attention than earlier Pacific Island immigrants of the 1970s. The compulsory enrolment system and franchise right for permanent residents are other examples of the New Zealand political system assisting the relatively fast integration of Asian immigrants into the political system. The fact that a disproportionately large number of Asian New Zealanders had been contacted by political parties could also be attributable to the favourable political structure of New Zealand. By finding a clear correlation between the Asian turnout and mobilization efforts by political parties, the survey reaffirmed the applicability of both the institutional theory and mobilization theory on the political participation of Asian New Zealanders.

Having said that, the favourable institutional structure of New Zealand may have weakened the relevance of Asian community organizations to the political participation of Asian New Zealanders.
In a political environment where political parties can identify and directly mobilize individual Asian voters, there is little incentive either for individual Asian New Zealanders or for political parties to use Asian community organizations as an intermediary. This is in sharp contrast to the case of earlier Asian immigrants, where there was a strong reliance on Asian community organisations to raise their concerns and represent their interests, and for political parties to reach out to the Asian community. This favourable institutional structure may also be the reason why a pan-ethnic Asian identity did not show a positive effect on Asian New Zealanders’ political participation, as Asians may have lacked compelling reasons to mobilize politically based on their pan-Asian ethnic identity. Perhaps for similar reasons, the experience of discrimination did not show the expected negative (or positive) effect on the political participation of Asian New Zealanders. Nevertheless, it would be premature to draw a concrete link between the institutional structure and the strength of the Asian community, as both ethnic organizations and pan-ethnic identity require time to develop and mature. Without unnecessarily underestimating the strength and influence of the Asian ethnic community, the survey found that Asian New Zealanders were exposed to a unique set of social and political circumstances in New Zealand, and that the political participation of Asian New Zealanders could not be explained by looking solely at the case of Asian immigrants in other Western democratic countries.

Another interesting finding of the current study, which challenged existing theories on Asian immigrants’ political participation, was that language difficulties were not found to be the paramount barrier to participation for Asian New Zealanders. Although a large proportion of Asian New Zealanders faced varying degrees of English language difficulties, the extra cost of participation for those with limited English ability appeared to have been overridden by other favourable factors, such as extensive mobilization efforts by political parties, and efforts by the ethnic media to provide political information in their native languages. Aside from language, other factors relating to the level of acculturation (such as the period of residency, political partisanship, level of interaction with other ethnic groups and political knowledge) showed statistically significant relevance to Asian New Zealanders’ political participation, especially that of voting, thereby reaffirming the acculturation theory. These findings indicated that Asian New Zealanders are likely to play a greater role in New Zealand politics as they become more acculturated, and that efforts by political parties and the ethnic media could facilitate such a process by reducing the extra cost of participation for recent Asian immigrants.

The thesis also challenged certain aspects of the cultural theory by finding that those who were influenced by Asian cultural characteristics did not necessarily show lower voting and other participation rates. Although many Asian New Zealanders still exhibited certain Asian cultural traits, especially in their views on various policy-related matters, those traits had little or no effect
on Asian New Zealanders’ political participation. The current study also found that the political environment of the immigrants’ home countries continued to affect Asian New Zealanders’ mode of participation, as certain Asian groups appeared to have refrained from participating in political activities which had been disallowed in their home countries. What was interesting, however, was the finding that Asian immigrants who came from countries with relatively advanced democracies did not necessarily show higher voting rates than those who came from non-democratic or less democratic countries. This indicated that it is Asian New Zealanders’ experience in the host country as an ethnic minority group, rather than their previous political experience in the home countries, that has a greater effect on their participation rates in New Zealand. A study on previous participatory patterns of Asian New Zealanders in their home countries would be needed to fully evaluate the extent to which prior political experience influences the political participation of Asians living in New Zealand.

7.6 WHERE TO FROM HERE?

What is clear from the current study based on the first Asian survey in New Zealand is that it is too early to draw many solid conclusions about Asian New Zealanders’ political participation. None of the factors included in this thesis can fully explain the discrepancy in participation rates between Pakeha and Asian New Zealanders. The survey also highlighted many outstanding questions that need to be addressed if we are to have a clear understanding of the participatory patterns of Asian New Zealanders. What the current study did provide was a valuable insight into what influences the political participation of Asian immigrants in an established democracy and what can be done to encourage their participation. One of the problems in conducting a similar study, in addition to the fact that there is not enough existing data on the political participation of Asian New Zealanders that can be used for comparative purposes, is that it will continue to be difficult to fund any such study, as will be explained further in Appendix III.

In light of the recent growth in international movement of people and the growing political influence of immigrants from various cultural backgrounds, it would be a useful initiative to set up a worldwide polling system for Asian immigrants. This is especially so given that the development of traditional theories on political participation was only possible through analysis of decades’ worth of formal polling data, and also because the existing polling data (such as the NZES) may not be able to capture enough Asian responses to test various participation theories on Asian immigrants. Theories developed to understand the political participation of Asian immigrants also need to be tested by studies conducted in other countries and over a long period of time. The results of this study, which showed implications for both the traditional participation theories and overseas studies on Asian immigrants, demonstrated that there would be considerable value in
conducting further research on the participatory patterns of this increasingly important political constituency. Appropriate methodologies to allow more extensive study on this topic should also be developed accordingly.

In addition to possible areas of future research identified above, a study focusing on the political partisanship and party membership of Asian New Zealanders would be interesting topics, not only for academics who wish to find out why and how new immigrants develop political partisanship, but also for political parties wishing to attract Asian voters/members. Asians’ relatively high socio-economic status, high level of religious affiliation, tendency to support the status quo, the continuous influence of Asian cultural values and receptiveness to mobilization efforts by political parties are some of the factors which make the question of Asian political partisanship worthy of further research. The political participatory pattern of New Zealand-born Asians, especially the question of whether they correspond more closely to the participatory patterns of the dominant group, is another area of possible future research. The question of why certain ethnic minority groups gain political influence more quickly than others is also a topic that could attract substantial political interest, although any such study would require comparative data between various ethnic minority groups within a particular country. The current study on Asian New Zealanders also suggested areas of further research for the general New Zealand population, such as the impact of the level of interaction with other ethnic groups on individuals’ participation rates, and the impact of the Pakeha-Maori relationship on the development of the Pakeha-Asian relationship.

That brings us to the fundamental question that underlies any study on political participation. Does participation matter? Do we care if Asian New Zealanders participate in politics or not? The answer is yes, it does matter. It matters because Asian New Zealanders are now a part of New Zealand. New Zealand politics can no longer be defined or understood without reference to the political participation of Asian New Zealanders. It matters because the level of political participation of Asian New Zealanders is a test of how well New Zealand copes with its increasing diversity. With the history of mass Asian immigration still relatively short, the growing political visibility of Asian New Zealanders can be seen as a triumph of New Zealand politics which has transformed itself to accommodate this newest immigrant group, although there are still areas that need to be improved further. In this sense, a study on political participation of Asian New Zealanders could provide a good example to the international community on how best to incorporate new immigrants from different cultural backgrounds into the politics of the host country without compromising national unity and harmony. The thesis also found that there exists enough potential for Asian New Zealanders to translate their numbers into political power – Asians have shown the willingness, capability and growing confidence to participate in various
aspects of New Zealand politics. There exists a number of individual, community, and institutional variables that could increase Asian New Zealanders' participation rates in the near future. Having an Asian community that is active in New Zealand politics would undoubtedly be beneficial for the democracy and stability of New Zealand that is becoming increasingly heterogeneous. After all, we are all New Zealanders who wish to exist harmoniously with each other in this place we call home.
SURVEY ON THE POLITICAL PARTICIPATION OF ASIAN NEW ZEALANDERS
(뉴질랜드 동양인들의 정치참여도에 관한 설문조사)

Dear Sir/Madam,
(안녕하십니까)

My name is Shee-Jeong Park. I am a student at the University of Auckland enrolled for a PhD Degree in the Department of Political Studies. I came to New Zealand from Korea about 12 years ago.
(저는 현재 오클랜드 대학교 정치학과 박사과정을 받고있는 박사과정입니다. 저는 한국 사람이며, 뉴질랜드에는 약 12년전에 왔습니다.)

The number of Asian people in New Zealand has increased significantly in the last 10 years. As a result, there is now a greater need to understand the influence of Asian people on political, economic and social developments in New Zealand. So far, little research has been conducted on political participation of Asian New Zealanders. For this reason, I am conducting this survey to understand political behaviour and attitudes of Chinese and Korean New Zealanders.
(지난 10년간, 뉴질랜드에 사는 동양인의 숫자가 급격히 늘었고, 그로 인해 동양인들이 뉴질랜드 정치, 경제, 사회에 미치는 영향을 이해하는 것이 점점 중요시되고 있습니다. 하지만 동양인들의 정치참여도에 대한 연구는 거의 되어있지 않은 상태입니다. 그럼 이유로 뉴질랜드 동양인들, 특히 중국인들과 한국인들의 정치에 대한 태도와 행동을 이해하기 위해 이 설문조사를 실시하게 되었습니다.)

I have randomly drawn people's name from the electoral rolls which are available to the public. By chance, your name was one of them. Whether you voted or not, and whether or not you are interested in politics, your opinions and ideas are very important to this study.
(귀하의 이름은 공개된 선거대표명단에서 무작위로 선정한 설문조사 대상자 중 한 분이시다. 귀하가 지난번 선거때 투표를 했거나 안 했거나, 또 귀하가 뉴질랜드 정치에 관심이 있거나 없거나 관계없이 귀하의 의견은 이 설문조사의 성공에 중요한 한 부분입니다.)

Participation in the survey is voluntary, but I hope you will assist my research by completing the questionnaire. The survey would take approximately 10-15 minutes. I stress that all your answers will be confidential and that you will never be identified in any way. The methods used in the survey have been approved by the University of Auckland Ethics Committee.
(이 설문조사에서 응답하시는 것은 귀하의 자유입니다, 귀하께서 제 설문조사에 응해주시기를 부탁드립니다. 이 설문조사는 약 10-15 분 정도 걸릴 것입니다. 귀하의 답변은 비밀에 부쳐질 것이며, 귀하의 신원은 어떠한 경우에도 확인되지 않을 것입니다. 이 설문조사 방법은 오클랜드 대학의 윤리위원회의 승인을 받은 것입니다.)

Thank you very much for your time and cooperation in making this study possible. I would be grateful if you could send the completed questionnaire in the enclosed reply-paid envelope and return it to me by 22 August 2003. No stamp is needed.
(제 설문조사에 응해주시셔 감사합니다. 완성된 설문지는 동봉한 편지봉투에 넣어서 2003 년 8월 22일까지 보내주시면 감사하겠습니다. 동봉한 편지봉투에는 우표를 붙일 필요가 없습니다.)
I will be happy to answer any questions about the survey. If you have any queries or wish to know more about the survey, please write to me at the following address:

Department of Political Studies  
The University of Auckland  
Private Bag 92019  
Auckland

My supervisor is:  
Dr Raymond Miller  
Department of Political Studies  
Private Bag 92019  
Auckland  
Tel: 3737 599 extn 88074

The Head of Department is:  
Professor Jack Vowles  
Department of Political Studies  
Private Bag 92019  
Auckland  
Tel: 3737 599 extn 88644

For any queries regarding ethical concerns please contact the following:  
The Chair, The University of Auckland Human Subjects Ethics Committee  
The University of Auckland, Research Office - Office of the Vice Chancellor, Private Bag 92019, Auckland  
Tel: 3737 999 extn 87830

Yours sincerely,

Shee-Jeong Park  
Department of Political Studies  
The University of Auckland

APPROVED BY THE UNIVERSITY OF AUCKLAND HUMAN SUBJECTS ETHICS COMMITTEE on 10 April 2002  
Reference 2002/Q/010
SURVEY ON THE POLITICAL PARTICIPATION OF ASIAN NEW ZEALANDERS

Dear Sir/Madam,

致親愛的先生/女士。

My name is Shee-Jeong Park. I am a student at the University of Auckland enrolled for a PhD Degree in the Department of Political Studies. I came to New Zealand from Korea about 12 years ago.

我的名字叫朴時靜(Shee-Jeong Park)。我現在奧克蘭大學攻讀政治學系的博士學位，近十二年前我從韓國移居到紐西蘭生活。

The number of Asian people in New Zealand has increased significantly in the last 10 years. As a result, there is now a greater need to understand the influence of Asian people on political, economic and social developments in New Zealand. So far, little research has been conducted on political participation of Asian New Zealanders. For this reason, I am conducting this survey to understand political behaviour and attitudes of Chinese and Korean New Zealanders.

過去十年，亞裔人士的數目在紐西蘭不斷飆升。因此，他們對紐西蘭政界、商界以及社會的影響亦逐漸地被各界關注。到現時為止，針對亞裔紐西蘭人參與政治活動的研究爲數很少。因此，我設計了這問卷來考察有關中國人與韓國人對政治的行為及態度。

I have randomly drawn people’s names from the electoral rolls which are available to the public. By chance, your name was one of them. Whether you voted or not, and whether or not you are interested in politics, your opinions and ideas are very important to this study.

我從公眾的選民名單隨機選取了一些姓名。恰巧，您的姓名就是其中一人。無論您有否投票，或您對政治有興趣與否，您的意見和想法對這研究都非常重要。

Participation in the survey is voluntary, but I hope you will assist my research by completing the questionnaire. The survey would take approximately 10-15 minutes. I stress that all your answers will be confidential and that you will never be identified in any way. The methods used in the survey have been approved by the University of Auckland Ethics Committee.

您可選擇參與這項研究與否，但我希望你可完成這份問卷來幫助我的研究。這份問卷需要您用十至十五分鐘去完成。我強調您的所有回答將會保密，還有您的身份絕不會被認出。這研究所採用的方法已被奧克蘭大學的道德委員會所認同。

Thank you very much for your time and cooperation in making this study possible. I would be grateful if you could send the completed questionnaire in the enclosed reply-paid envelope and return it to me by 22 August 2003. No stamp is needed.

非常感謝您的時間，是您的鼎力合作令這份研究得以成全。請您將填完的問卷放進附上的信封內，並於八月二十二日之前寄回給我。郵資已付。
I will be happy to answer any questions about the survey. If you have any queries or wish to know more about the survey, please write to me at the following address:

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The University of Auckland, Research Office - Office of the Vice Chancellor, Private Bag 92019, Auckland
Tel: 3737 599 extn 87830

Yours sincerely

Shee-Jeong Park
Department of Political Studies
The University of Auckland

APPROVED BY THE UNIVERSITY OF AUCKLAND HUMAN SUBJECTS ETHICS COMMITTEE on 10 April 2002
Reference 2002/0/010
SURVEY ON THE POLITICAL PARTICIPATION OF ASIAN NEW ZEALANDERS
(뉴질랜드 동양인들의 정치참여도에 관한 설문조사)

CONFIDENTIAL
(비공개문서)

HOW TO FILL OUT THIS QUESTIONNAIRE
(설문지 작성법)

To answer most of the questions you need only put a TICK (✓) in the box next to the response you choose. Sometimes you are asked to write in an answer in words or numbers. In those cases, simply do so in the space provided.
(대부분의 질문은 휨하가 그르신 답변 옆에 휨표함으로서 답하실 수 있습니다. 어떤 질문은 휨하의 의견을 쓰거나, 또는 글자로 답하시기를 요청합니다. 그러한 질문은 주어진 공간에 숫자 또는 글자로 답해주십시오.)

In most cases, there are no right or wrong answers, and there is nothing wrong with saying that you don’t know or don’t have an opinion on some matters. We just want your own personal opinions.
(대부분의 경우 일관되거나 물리 답이 있는 것이 아닙니다. 그러므로 문제에 대한 답변을 잘 모르겠다거나 문제에 대한 의견이 없으면 그렇다고 솔직히 대답해 주시면 됩니다. 이 설문조사는 휨하의 개인적인 의견을 듣고자 하는 것입니다.)

When you have finished the questionnaire, please place it in the envelope provided and post it.
( 설문조사를 마치신 후에 경성된 설문지를 동봉한 편지봉투에 넣어 지혜에게 보내주십시오.)
No stamp is needed.
(우표를 붙이실 필요가 없습니다.)

We hope you enjoy the questionnaire. And thank you very much for taking part in this study.
(설문조사에 응해주시서 감사합니다.)

Shea-Jeong Park
University of Auckland

This survey is being funded by the University of Auckland’s Department of Political Studies and the International Education and Diversity Committee, together with the Asia 2000 Foundation.
(이 설문조사는 오클랜드 대학교 정치학과, 오클랜드 대학교 국제교육 위원회 및 아시아 2000 재단의 후원으로 준비되었습니다.)
**Political interest/knowledge (정치에 대한 관심)**

1. Generally speaking, how much interest do you usually have in what’s going on in politics? (대략적으로 당신은 정치에 어느 정도 관심이 있습니까?)

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<tr>
<td>Politics of Korea (한국 정치)</td>
<td>NZ politics (뉴질랜드 정치)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2. What is your main source of political information? (정치에 관한 정보를 주로 어디에서 얻으십니까?)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TV news (tv 뉴스)</th>
<th>New Zealand newspapers (뉴질랜드 신문)</th>
<th>New Zealand radio (뉴질랜드 라디오)</th>
<th>Korean newspapers (한국 신문)</th>
<th>Korean radio (한국 라디오)</th>
<th>Internet (인터넷)</th>
<th>Friends and families (가족과 친구들)</th>
<th>Others* (기타*)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

*Please specify where (*기타 정보 제공처를 적어주세요):

3. For each of the following statements, please say whether it is true or false. If you don’t know the answer, put a tick under “don’t know” and try the next one. (뉴질랜드 정치에 관한 다음 문장들이 맞는지 틀림지 표시해 주십시오. 대답을 모르실 경우 “말 모르겠음” 항에 표시해 주십시오)

- Helen Clark is the Prime Minister of New Zealand. (헬렌 클락은 뉴질랜드의 수상이다)
- NZ First is in coalition with Labour. (뉴질랜드 최초당은 노동당과 함께 연합정부를 이루고 있다)
- The term of Parliament is four years. (뉴질랜드 국회의 임기는 4년이다)
- Cabinet Ministers must be MPs. (뉴질랜드 국회의원이 뉴질랜드 장관이 될 수 있다)
- Enrolling as a voter in New Zealand is compulsory. (뉴질랜드로 등록하는 것은 뉴질랜드 국민의 의무)

**Asian problems and issues (뉴질랜드 동양인들에 대한 문제점들과 해결방법)**

4. What do you think is the biggest, and the second biggest problem facing Asian New Zealanders? (뉴질랜드 동양인이 가지고 있는 가장 큰 문제점과 두번째로 큰 문제점이 무엇이라고 생각하십니까?)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Language difficulties (언어문제)</th>
<th>Racial discrimination (인종차별문제)</th>
<th>Lack of job opportunity (취업문제)</th>
<th>Lack of political representation (문화적 동양인 정치적 대변인)</th>
<th>Lack of cohesion within the ethnic community (동양인 공동체 안에서의 불화, 편견)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Losing culture (문화 상실문제)</td>
<td>Generation gap (세대간의 갭)</td>
<td>There is no problem (문제점이 없습니다)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others* (기타*)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*If you ticked "Others", please specify (*문제점도 적어주세요):
5. If you were personally faced with any of the problems identified above, where would you turn for help?
(만약 당신이 위에 나열된 문제점에 직면하다면 어디에서 가장 먼저 도움을 요청하셨습니까?)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Government and other New Zealand authorities (뉴질랜드 정부기관이나 공공기관)</th>
<th>Ethnic community and religious groups (한민공동체나 종교기관)</th>
<th>Friends and family (친구들과 가족들)</th>
<th>Try to deal with them on my own (원자본질로 풀기위해 노력하였습니다)</th>
<th>Others* (기타*)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

*Please specify (*어디인지 적어주세요): 

6. Please indicate whether you support the followings (다음 정책을 지지합니다?):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Jcb training and educational assistance for Asian New Zealander (뉴질랜드 동양인들의 교육과 고용에 도움을 주는 프로그램)</th>
<th>Support strongly (강력히 지지합니다)</th>
<th>Support (지지합니다)</th>
<th>Oppose (반대합니다)</th>
<th>Oppose strongly (강력히 반대합니다)</th>
<th>Don't know (잘 모르겠습니다)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Race-based preferential system (quota system) in school and employment (동양인을 우대하는 교육이나 고용 특별 제도)</th>
<th>Support strongly (강력히 지지합니다)</th>
<th>Support (지지합니다)</th>
<th>Oppose (반대합니다)</th>
<th>Oppose strongly (강력히 반대합니다)</th>
<th>Don't know (잘 모르겠습니다)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Governmental provision of bilingual services and/or information (뉴질랜드 정부가 제공하는 영어와 한국어로 된 정보, 서비스)</th>
<th>Support strongly (강력히 지지합니다)</th>
<th>Support (지지합니다)</th>
<th>Oppose (반대합니다)</th>
<th>Oppose strongly (강력히 반대합니다)</th>
<th>Don't know (잘 모르겠습니다)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

7. Looking at the type of people who are MPs, do you think there should be more who are:
(뉴질랜드에 다음과 같은 국회의원이 더 나와야 한다고 생각하실까요?):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Yes (예)</th>
<th>No (아니오)</th>
<th>Depends on candidate (국회의원 후보의 자질에 따라)</th>
<th>Don't know (잘 모르겠습니다)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

Asians (동양인) 
Maori (마오리) 
Pacific Islanders (남태평양 섬나라인) 
Women (여성) 

8. Do you think there should be a separate party or parties to represent ethnic minorities like Asian people? (뉴질랜드에 소수민족으로 구성된 정당 (예를 들면 동양인으로 구성된 정당)이 생겨야 한다고 생각하실까요?)

Yes (예) ☐ No (아니오) ☐ Don't know (잘 모르겠습니다) ☐

9. Which one of the following statements best describes your view on Asian MPs? (다음 중 동양인 국회의원에 관한 여러분의 생각이 가장 잘 설명하나요?)

I prefer one party above all others because it has an Asian MP. (나는 동양인 국회의원을 가진 정당을 선호합니다) ☐
I do not like parties which do not have Asian MPs. (나는 동양인 국회의원을 가진 정당을 선호하지 않습니다) ☐
If another party had an Asian MP, I would change my preference to that party. (다른 정당이 동양인 국회의원이 있으면 선호하는 정당을 변경할 의향이 있습니다) ☐
It makes no difference to me whether a party has an Asian MP or not. (정당의 선호여부는 동양인 국회의원의 존재여부와 상관없습니다) ☐
10. If you were advised by Asian community leaders to vote for a political party which is most likely to serve Asian community’s interests, what would you do? (만일 동양인 공동체에서 동양인의 이익을 위해 가장 열심히 일할 것 같은 한 정당에게 표를 주자고 제시한다면 어떻게 하시겠습니까?)

I would follow the recommendation. (그 제안을 따线索합니다) □
I would vote according to my decision with some regard to the recommendation. (그 제안을 엄두에 두고 내가 선택하는 정당에게 투표하겠습니다) □
I would vote according to my decision without any regard to the recommendation. (그 제안에 상관없이 내가 선택하는 정당에게 투표하겠습니다) □
I would totally oppose the recommendation. (그 제안을 무조건 반대하겠습니다) □

New Zealand Policies (뉴질랜드 정책)

11. What is the most important issue in New Zealand for you personally at this time? (지금 현재 당신에게 가장 중요한 뉴질랜드 정책은 어떤 것입니까?)

The economy (경제) □
Taxes (세금제도) □
Health (의료제도) □
Education (교육제도) □
Race relations (민종문제) □
Environment (환경문제) □
Unemployment (실업문제) □
Law and order (치안문제) □
Others* (기타*) □

*Please specify (*기타 정책을 적어주세요):

12. Generally, do you think it should be the government’s responsibility to provide or ensure the following? (뉴질랜드 정부가 다음에 나열된 것을 책임지고 제공해야 한다는 주장에 동의합니다?)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Issue</th>
<th>Definitely should (강력히 동의합니다)</th>
<th>Should (동의합니다)</th>
<th>Shouldn’t (반대합니다)</th>
<th>Definitely shouldn’t (강력히 반대합니다)</th>
<th>Don’t know (실로 모르겠습니다)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A job for everyone who wants one (직업을 원하는 모든 사람에게 일자리를 제공)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A decent living standard for all old people (노인들을 위한 적절한 생활준정)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Decent living standards for the unemployed (실업자들을 위한 적절한 생활준정)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Free health care for everyone (전 국민을 위한 무료의료제도)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Free education from pre-school through university levels (유치원부터 대학까지 무료교육)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

13. Do you think Maori people deserve special status in New Zealand because of the historical background and Treaty of Waitangi? (마오리인 조약과 뉴질랜드 역사배경으로 인해 마오리들이 특별 대우를 받아야 한다고 생각하십니까?)

Yes (예) □
No (아니오) □
Don’t know (잘 모르겠습니다) □
14. Do you think there should be special Maori seats in parliament?
(국회내에 지정된 미오프 국회의원석이 있어야 한다고 생각하십니까?)

Yes (예) □  No (아니오) □  Don't know (잘 모르겠습니다) □

15. Do you think New Zealand should give Maori people more say in all government decisions?
(뉴질랜드 정부 정책에 마오리들의 의견이 더 부과되어야 한다고 생각하십니까?)

Yes (예) □  No (아니오) □  Don't know (잘 모르겠습니다) □

16. Do you agree with the following statements? (다음문장에 동의하십니까?)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Strongly agree (강력히 동의합니다)</th>
<th>Agree (동의합니다)</th>
<th>Disagree (반대합니다)</th>
<th>Strongly disagree (강력히 반대합니다)</th>
<th>Don't know (잘 모르겠습니다)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>There should be a law to further reduce pay differences between women and men (남성과 여성의 봉급차이를 줄이기 위한 법률이 제정되어야 한다)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>It is a citizen's duty to vote (투표하는 것은 국민의 의무입니다)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Zealand should be a republic rather than having the Queen as head of state (뉴질랜드는 공화국이 되어야 한다)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The death penalty for murder should be reintroduced (살인범에 대한 사형제도가 다시 생겨야한다)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The number of immigrants allowed into NZ should be reduced (뉴질랜드 이민자수를 줄여야한다)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Political participation (정치참여도)

17. Generally speaking, do you usually think of yourself as supporting a political party in New Zealand?
(일반적으로 뉴질랜드의 한 정당을 지지하고 있다고 생각하십니까?)

Yes (예) □  No (아니오) □

18. If you usually support a political party, which political party do you support the most?
(만약 한 정당을 지지한다면 다음중 어떤 정당을 가장 지지하십니까?)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Labour (노동당)</th>
<th>National (국민당)</th>
<th>Act (액트당)</th>
<th>Green (녹색당)</th>
<th>NZ First (뉴질랜드 첫당)</th>
<th>United Future (통합미래당)</th>
<th>Others* (기타정당*)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

*Please specify which party (*선호하는 기타정당의 이름을 적어주세요): __________________________

19. Do you have New Zealand Citizenship or Permanent Residency?
(뉴질랜드 시민권이나 영구영주권을 갖고 계십니까?)

Yes (예) □  No (아니오) □

(Go to Q.24)(24번 문제로 가십시오)
20. If you have New Zealand Citizenship or Permanent Residency, did you vote in the last national election?
(만약 뉴질랜드 시민권이나 영구영주권을 갖고 계신다면 지난번 선거에 투표하셨습니까?)

Yes (예) ☐ No (아니오) ☐

21. With MMP New Zealanders now have two votes, one for a party, and one for a candidate in their electorate. Which do you think is the most important in deciding which party will get the largest number of seats in Parliament? (MMP 선거방식에서는 유권자가 정당표와 지역구표 두개의 표를 찍습니다. 두개중 어떤 표가 결정이 국회에서 가장많은 의석을 차지하게 될지를 결정하는데 중요하다고 생각하십니까?)

Party vote most important (정당표가 더 중요합니다)
Both equally important (두표 다 중요합니다)
Electorate vote most important (지역구표가 더 중요합니다)
Don't know (잘 모르겠음)

22. If you voted in the last election, which party and which party’s candidate did you vote for?
(만약 지난번 선거에 투표해서도 다른 방식도 어떤 경향에 투표하셨습니까?)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party vote (정당투표)</th>
<th>Labour (노동당)</th>
<th>National (국민당)</th>
<th>Act (액트당)</th>
<th>Green (녹색당)</th>
<th>NZ First (뉴질랜드 제일당)</th>
<th>United Future (통합미래당)</th>
<th>Others* (기타정당*)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Electorate vote</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Please specify which party (*투표하신 기타정당의 이름을 적어주십시오*):

23. If you did not vote in the last election, what is your main reason for not voting?
(만약 지난번 선거에 투표하지 않았다면 그 이유는 무엇입니까?)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Too busy working and/or studying (일하느라/공부하느라 바쁘서)</th>
<th>Don’t know enough about New Zealand politics (뉴질랜드 정치에 대해 아는 것조차 없어서)</th>
<th>Language difficulties (언어문제 때문에)</th>
<th>Not interested in politics (정치에 관심이 없어서)</th>
<th>Others* (기타*)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

*Please specify the reason (*이유를 적어주십시오*):

24. Please indicate whether you have participated in New Zealand politics in any of the following ways (choose as many as possible) (다음은 뉴질랜드 정치에 참여할수 있는 여러 가지 방식을 나열한 것입니다. 여러 방식으로 참여한 응답자에게 해당되는 항목을 체크하십시오):

- Nominated as a political candidate.
- Joined a political party.
- Assisted in a political campaign.
- Made donation to political parties.
- Written or phoned government officials, newspapers or TV station.
- Taken part in protests and/or demonstrations.
- Signed petitions for political cause.
- Worked in the community to solve a problem.
Pan-ethnicity (다른 동양인들과의 교류)

25. Do you feel that Korean people’s interest would be better represented by Asian politicians (not necessarily Korean) than by Pakeha or Maori politicians? (백인정치인이나 마오리정치인 보다는 동양정치인이 (극. 한국정치인이 아니라도) 뉴질랜드 한국인들의 권익을 더 잘 대변할 것이라고 생각합니까?)
   Yes (예) □ No (아니오) □ Don’t know (잘 모르겠음) □

26. On a scale of 0-5, please indicate your level of interaction with the following groups: (0부터 5단위로 다른 인종의 사람들과 얼마나 교류하며 지내십니까?)
   No interaction (교류가 전혀없음)  High interaction (밀접하게 교류함)
   Pakeha (백인)       □ 1 2 3 □ □
   Maori (마오리)      □ 1 2 3 □ □
   Pacific Islanders (남태평양 섬민인) □ 1 2 3 □ □
   Other Asians (다른 동양인) □ 1 2 3 □ □

27. Do you agree with the following statements? (다음 문장들에 동의하십니까?)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Statement</th>
<th>Strongly agree (강력히 동의합니다)</th>
<th>Agree (동의합니다)</th>
<th>Disagree (반대합니다)</th>
<th>Strongly disagree (강력히 반대합니다)</th>
<th>Don’t know (잘 모르겠음)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>What happens generally to other Asians in NZ will affect what</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>happens in my life (뉴질랜드에서 다른 동양인들에게 일어나는 일들이 내</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>생활에도 영향을 미칠 것입니다)</td>
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<tr>
<td>What happens generally to other Koreans in NZ will affect what</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>happens in my life (뉴질랜드에서 다른 한국인들에게 일어나는 일들이 내</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>생활에도 영향을 미칠 것입니다)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Different Asian groups in NZ are culturally similar (뉴질랜드에 있는 여러</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>동양인들은 문화적으로 비슷하다)</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Empowerment (권한부여)

28. On the whole, are you satisfied with the way democracy works in New Zealand? (뉴질랜드에서 민주주의가 실행되는데 대하여 만족하시니까?)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Satisfaction Level</th>
<th>Very satisfied (평점에서 만족합니다)</th>
<th>Satisfied (만족합니다)</th>
<th>Somewhat satisfied (조금 만족합니다)</th>
<th>Not satisfied at all (전혀 만족하지 않습니다)</th>
<th>Don’t know (잘 모르겠음)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

29. Are you satisfied with the way democracy works in your home country? (한국에서 민주주의가 실행되는데 대하여 만족하십니까?)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Satisfaction Level</th>
<th>Very satisfied (평점에서 만족합니다)</th>
<th>Satisfied (만족합니다)</th>
<th>Somewhat satisfied (조금 만족합니다)</th>
<th>Not satisfied at all (전혀 만족하지 않습니다)</th>
<th>Don’t know (잘 모르겠음)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
30. Do you feel that you can trust government officials in New Zealand? (뉴질랜드 정치인들을 신뢰할 수 있다고 생각하십니까?)

- Almost always (언제나 신뢰할 수 있습니다)
- Most of the times (대부분의 경우에 신뢰할 수 있습니다)
- Sometimes (때때로 신뢰할 수 있습니다)
- No (신뢰할 수 없습니다)
- Don’t know (잘 모르겠습니다)

31. Compared to your home country, do you have more or less trust in New Zealand government and politicians? (한국과 비교했을 때, 뉴질랜드 정부와 정치인들을 더 신뢰하실 수 있다고 생각하시는가 아니면 뉴질랜드 정부와 한국 정치인들을 비슷하게 신뢰하실 수 있다고 생각하시는가?)

- More trust (뉴질랜드 정치인들을 더 신뢰하실 수 있습니다)
- Less trust (한국 정치인들을 더 신뢰하실 수 있습니다)
- Equal trust (뉴질랜드와 한국 정치인들을 비슷하게 신뢰하실 수 있습니다)
- Don’t know (잘 모르겠습니다)

32. How much influence do you think you can have over government policies in New Zealand? (당신의 의견이 뉴질랜드 정부정책에 얼마나 많은 영향을 미친다고 생각하십니까?)

- A lot of influence (큰 영향을 미친다고 생각합니다)
- Some influence (당당한 영향을 미친다고 생각합니다)
- Very little influence (영향을 조금 미친다고 생각합니다)
- No influence at all (영향을 전혀 미치지 못한다고 생각합니다)

33. Compared to your home country, do you feel that you have more or less influence on the government policies in New Zealand? (한국 정부정책과 비교했을 때, 당신의 의견이 뉴질랜드 정부정책에 더 많은 영향을 미친다고 생각하시는가 아니면 뉴질랜드 정부정책에 적은 영향을 미친다고 생각하시는가?)

- More influence (뉴질랜드 정부정책에 더 많은 영향을 미친다고 생각합니다)
- Less influence (한국 정부정책에 더 많은 영향을 미친다고 생각합니다)
- Equal influence (뉴질랜드정부정책에 주목한 영향을 미친다고 생각합니다)
- Don’t know (잘 모르겠습니다)

34. Do you agree with the following statements? (다음 문장들에 동의하십니까?)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Strongly agree (강력히 동의합니다)</th>
<th>Agree (동의합니다)</th>
<th>Disagree (반대합니다)</th>
<th>Strongly disagree (강력히 반대합니다)</th>
<th>Don’t know (잘 모르겠습니다)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>There is a need for Asians to participate in NZ politics (동양인들이 뉴질랜드 정치에 참여할 필요가 있다)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>It is harder for Asians to participate in NZ politics because of their ethnicity (동양인들은 동양인이라기 때문에 뉴질랜드 정치에 참여하기 힘들다)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>My vote really counts (나의 투표는 정말 중요하다)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sometimes politics seems so complicated people like me can’t understand what goes on (가끔 정치문제는 너무 복잡해서 나같은 사람을 이해하기 힘들다)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
35. Do you feel that Asian interests are well represented in the New Zealand government?  
(뉴질랜드 정부에 뉴질랜드 동양인들의 권익이 잘 대변되다고 생각하십니까?)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Very well represented</th>
<th>Somewhat represented</th>
<th>Somewhat inadequately represented</th>
<th>Not represented at all</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(잘 대변받다고 생각합니다)</td>
<td>(정소 대변받다고 생각합니다)</td>
<td>(충분하지 못하게 대변받다고 생각합니다)</td>
<td>(전혀 대변되지 않는다고 생각합니다)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

36. What do you think is the most effective way of representing Asian interest in New Zealand?  
(뉴질랜드 동양인들의 권익을 잘 대변할 수 있는 방법은 무엇이라고 생각하십니까?)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>More Asian representatives in government (증다 많은 동양인 국회의원 선출)</th>
<th>Strong ethnic communities (강력한 한인 공동체 형성)</th>
<th>Coalition with other Asian communities (다른 동양인 공동체와의 협력)</th>
<th>Focus on advancing the socio-economic status of Asian people (동양인들의 경제적 또는 사회적 성공)</th>
<th>Others* (가리*)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

*Please specify (*이외 방법이지 적어주시십시오): ____________________________

37. Please indicate whether you have been directly contacted by politicians and/or political parties during the election campaigns in any of the following ways (선거기간동안 뉴질랜드 정당이나 국회의원 후보로부터 다음과 같은 방법으로 연락을 받아본 적이 있습니까?):

- Received letters/pamphlets (편지, 플래셔트를 받아보았습니다)
- Received telephoned calls (전화를 받아보았습니다)
- Received emails (이메일을 받아보았습니다)
- Have not been contacted (연락을 받지 못했습니다)

38. Do you feel that your ethnic community is effective in the following ways?  
(뉴질랜드 한인 공동체들이 다음과 같은 일들 효과적으로 하고 있다고 생각하십니까?)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Very effective (매우 효과적)</th>
<th>Somewhat effective (조금 효과적)</th>
<th>Somewhat ineffective (조금 비효과적)</th>
<th>Very ineffective (매우 비효과적)</th>
<th>Don't know (모르겠습니다)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

- Representing your community's interests (한인 공동체의 권익 대변)
- Solving your community's problems (한인 공동체의 문제 해결)

General questions (기타질문)

39. Are you (당신의 성별은?) -  
Male (남) ☐  Female (여) ☐

40. In what year were you born? (당신의 출생년도는?)  
19[ ]

41. Were you born in New Zealand? (당신은 뉴질랜드에서 태어나셨습니까?)  
Yes (예) ☐  No (아니오) ☐

(Go to Q. 44) (44번으로 가십시오)
42. If you were not born in New Zealand, what is your country of origin? (만약 뉴질랜드에서 태어나지 않았다면, 당신은 어떤 나라에서 오셨습니까?)

Korea  China  Hong Kong  Taiwan  Malaysia  Singapore  Other*
(한국)  (중국)  (홍콩)  (대만)  (말레이시아)  (싱가포르)  (기타*)

*Please specify which country (*나라 이름을 적어주시오):

43. If you were not born in New Zealand, in what year did you establish residency in New Zealand? (만약 뉴질랜드에서 태어나지 않았다면, 언제부터 뉴질랜드에서 사셨습니까?)

Please write in which year (년도를 적어주시오):

44. Which of the following do you think best describe your identity? (다음 중 당신을 가장 정확하게 표현하는 것을 골라주십시오)

New Zealander  Asian New Zealander  Asian  Korean New Zealander  Korean
(뉴질랜드인)  (뉴질랜드 아시아인)  (아시아인)  (뉴질랜드 한국인)  (한국인)

45. Do you expect to be living in New Zealand in 10 years time? (앞으로 10년간 뉴질랜드에서 살 계획인가요?)

Yes (예)  No (아니오)

46. On a scale of 0-5, how fluent is your English language skill? (0부터 5 단위로 당신의 영어 실력을 어느정도인가요?)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cannot read/speak English (영어를 전혀 할 수 없음)</th>
<th>Very fluent (영어가 유창함)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Reading (읽기)</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Speaking (말하기)</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

47. Which language do you mostly speak? (다음 중 어떤 언어를 자주 쓰십니까?)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>At home (집에서)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Outside home (절벽에서)</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

48. How often do you do the following? ( 얼마나 자주 다음과 같은 일들을 하십니까?)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>At least once a week (일주일에 한번이상)</th>
<th>At least once a month (한달에 한번정도)</th>
<th>At least once a year (일년에 한번 정도)</th>
<th>Never ( 전혀 안한다)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Contact friends/families back home (한국에 있는 사람들과 연락한다)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Follow news at home (한국의 뉴스를 보다)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
49. Which of the following organisations do you belong to? (Choose as many as possible)
(다음동 어느 기관에 소속되어 있습니까?) (해당되는 사항을 전부 체크하시십시오)
- Ethnic community organisation (한인사회단체)
- Ethnic religious organisation (한인종교단체)
- Ethnic sports group (한인 운동단체)
- Ethnic business organisation (한인 사업단체)
- New Zealand community organisation (뉴질랜드 사회단체)
- New Zealand religious organisation (뉴질랜드 종교단체)
- New Zealand sports group (뉴질랜드 운동단체)
- New Zealand business organisation (뉴질랜드 사업단체)
- Trade Union (뉴질랜드 또는 한국 노동조합)

50. What is your highest formal education qualification? (당신의 최고학력은?)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Postgraduate degree (대학 석,박사학위)</th>
<th>University degree (대학 학사학위)</th>
<th>University/Polytech diploma or certificate (전문대 학위)</th>
<th>High School graduate (고등학교 졸업)</th>
<th>Less than High School (고등학교 중퇴이하)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

51. Do you own residential, investment, or other properties in New Zealand or overseas? (뉴질랜드 또는 외국에 집이나 상가, 또는 기타 부동산을 소유하고 계실니까?)
Yes (예) □  No (아니오) □

52. Which of the following best describes your present position? (다음동 당신의 사정을 가장 적절하게 표현하는 것은 무엇인가?)
- Working full time for pay or other income. (32 hours plus a week). (フル타임으로 보수를 받고 일한다 - 주 32시간 이상)
- Working part time for pay or other income. (less than 32 hours a week). (파트타임으로 보수를 받고 일한다 - 주 32시간 이하)
- Runs own business. (개인사업을 한다)
- Unemployed, laid off, looking for work. (랜제 직업이 없으며 일을 찾는 중이다)
- Retired. (경제퇴직/퇴직하였다)
- Temporarily or permanently disabled, unable to work. (공해로 인해 일을 할 수 없다)
- At school, university or other educational institution. (학교에 다니다)
- Unpaid work outside the home. (보수를 받지 않는 일을 한다)
- Unpaid work within the home. (보수를 받지 않는 집안일을 한다)

53. Who do you now work for or, if you are not working now, who did you work for in your last job in paid employment? (지금 어디에서 일하십니까? 만약 지금 일을 하지 않으신다면 가장 최근에 보수를 받고 일하신 곳이 어디일까요?)
- I am/self-employment. (자영업을 한/했었다)
- A private company or business. (개인회사나 기업체)
- A state or public agency or enterprise. (공무원이나 국영기업계)
- A mixed public/private or nonprofit organisation. (공사중합회사나 비영리단체)
- Never in paid employment. (보수를 받고 일을 해본적이 없습니다.)
- Don't know. (잘 모르겠습니다)

54. Have you experienced racial discrimination in New Zealand? (뉴질랜드에서 인종차별을 경험하신 적이 있습니까?)
- Great deal (지주 경험했습니다)
- Fair amount (평 균 경험했습니다)
- Some amount (기금 경험했습니다)
- Never (아니오)
55. Who did you suffer discrimination from?  
(만약 인종차별을 경험했다면 누구에게서 인종차별을 받았습니까?)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Passer-by in public (지나가는 사람에게서)</th>
<th>Neighbour or school friend (이웃 또는 학교친구에게서)</th>
<th>At work (직장에서)</th>
<th>Police or other governmental authority (경찰이나 공공기관에서)</th>
<th>Shopkeeper or restaurant worker (가게 또는 식당에서)</th>
<th>Others* (기타*)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

*Please specify by whom (*누구인지 적어주세요): ____________________________

56. When you experienced racial discrimination, did you report it to anyone? (eg. Police, ethnic community organisation, or other government institution) (인종차별을 경험했을 때 경찰, 인종 공동체, 또는 다른 공공기관에 신고하셨습니까?)

Yes (예) □  
No (아니오) □

57. If your answer to the above question is no, why not? (만약 신고를 안하셨다면 그 이유는 무엇입니까?)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>I could not be bothered (귀찮아서)</th>
<th>I did not know where to report (어디에 신고해야 하는지 몰라서)</th>
<th>I did not think that reporting would make any differences (신고해도 달라질게 없을 것 같아서)</th>
<th>I was afraid of revenge (보복이 두려워서)</th>
<th>Others* (기타*)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

*Please specify why not (*이유를 적어주세요): ____________________________

58. Do you feel that your home country is fairly portrayed by New Zealand media?  
(뉴질랜드 미디어(신문, 텔레비전 뉴스)가 한국을 공평하고 적절하게 묘사한다고 생각하십니까?)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Most of the times (대부분의 경우)</th>
<th>Sometimes (때때로)</th>
<th>Never (아니오)</th>
<th>Don't know (잘 모르겠음)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>□</td>
<td>□</td>
<td>□</td>
<td>□</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
SURVEY ON THE POLITICAL PARTICIPATION OF ASIAN NEW ZEALANDERS
(亞裔紐西蘭人政治參與之調查)

CONFIDENTIAL
(機密文件)

HOW TO FILL OUT THIS QUESTIONNAIRE
(如何填寫這問卷)

To answer most of the questions you need only put a TICK (✓) in the box next to the response you choose. Sometimes you are asked to write in an answer in words or numbers. In those cases, simply do so in the space provided.
(大部分問題只需要您在格子內塗一個勾(✓) 戴寫在您選擇的格內。有些問題則需要您用文字或數字回答。這些問題，您可在適當的空間內作答。)

In most cases, there are no right or wrong answers, and there is nothing wrong with saying that you don’t know or don’t have an opinion on some matters. We just want your own personal opinions.
(在多數的情況下，沒有設定的正確答案。對某些觀點問題您絕對可以選擇‘不知道’或‘沒有意見。我們希望可得到您的個人意見。)

When you have finished the questionnaire, please place it in the envelope provided and post it.
(當您完成填寫問卷時，請將它放進附上的信封內並將它寄出。)
No stamp is needed.
(郵費已付)

We hope you enjoy the questionnaire. And thank you very much for taking part in this study.
(我們希望您能享受這問卷。非常感謝您參與這項研究。)

Shee-Jeong Park
University of Auckland

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Political interest/knowledge (對政治的興趣/瞭解)

1. Generally speaking, how much interest do you usually have in what's going on in politics? (一般來說, 您對政治有多大的興趣?)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Very Interested</th>
<th>Fairly Interested</th>
<th>Somewhat Interested</th>
<th>Not at all Interested</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Politics of China 中國的政治</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NZ politics 紐西蘭的政治</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2. What is your main source of political information? (您對政治的消息都是從哪裡來?)

<p>| | | | | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TV news 電視新聞</td>
<td>New Zealand newspapers 報紙</td>
<td>New Zealand radio 廣播電台</td>
<td>Chinese newspapers 中文報紙</td>
<td>Chinese radio 電語電台</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Internet 網路</td>
<td>Friends and families 親友</td>
<td>Others* 其他*</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Please specify where(請說明是哪裡):

3. For each of the following statements, please say whether it is true or false. If you don't know the answer, put a tick under "don't know" and try the next one. (以下敘述事項為是非題, 如您不知道答案, 請選擇 "不知道" 再回答下一題)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Statement</th>
<th>True (是)</th>
<th>False (否)</th>
<th>Don't know (不知道)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Helen Clark is the Prime Minister of New Zealand. (海倫克拉克是紐西蘭的總理)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NZ First is in coalition with Labour. (紐西蘭第一黨和勞工黨組成聯合政府)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The term of Parliament is four years. (國會任期是四年)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cabinet Ministers must be MPs. (內閣部長必須是國會議員)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enrolling as a voter in New Zealand is compulsory. (紐西蘭選民有義務註冊登記)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Asian problems and issues (亞裔的問題和難題)

4. What do you think is the biggest, and the second biggest problem facing Asian New Zealanders? (您認為什麼是面對亞裔紐西蘭人最大, 和第二大的問題?)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Problem</th>
<th>Biggest (最大)</th>
<th>Second biggest (第二大)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Language difficulties (語言問題)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Racial discrimination (種族歧視)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lack of job opportunity (缺乏工作機會)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lack of political representation (缺乏政治代表)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lack of cohesion within the ethnic community (少數民族社區之間缺乏向心力)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Losing culture (文化遺失)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Generation gap (代溝)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>There is no problem (並沒有問題)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others* (其他*)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*If you ticked "Others", please specify (請說明是什麼問題):
5. If you were personally faced with any of the problems identified above, where would you turn for help?
(如果您本身遇到上述的困難，您會向哪裡尋求協助？)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Government and other New Zealand authorities</th>
<th>Ethnic community and religious groups</th>
<th>Friends and family</th>
<th>Try to deal with them on my own</th>
<th>Others*</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

*Please specify where (*請說明何處):

6. Please indicate whether you support the followings (您支持):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Job training and educational assistance for Asian New Zealanders</th>
<th>Support strongly</th>
<th>Support</th>
<th>Oppose</th>
<th>Oppose strongly</th>
<th>Don't know</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>爲亞裔紐西蘭人所辦的職業訓練和教育協助</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Race-based preferential system (quota system) in school and employment</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>在學校或工作就業上給予少數民族優先名額</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Governmental provision of bilingual services and/or information</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>政府提供雙語的服務和資料諮詢</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Preference for Asian politicians (對亞裔政治人物的偏好)

7. Looking at the type of people who are MPs, do you think there should be more who are:
(就國會議員成員來說，您認為國會應該要有更多的):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Yes (是)</th>
<th>No (否)</th>
<th>Depends on candidate (因選出人而異)</th>
<th>Don't know (不知道)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Asians</td>
<td>□</td>
<td>□</td>
<td>□</td>
<td>□</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maori</td>
<td>□</td>
<td>□</td>
<td>□</td>
<td>□</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pacific Islanders (太平洋島民)</td>
<td>□</td>
<td>□</td>
<td>□</td>
<td>□</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women</td>
<td>□</td>
<td>□</td>
<td>□</td>
<td>□</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

8. Do you think there should be a separate party or parties to represent ethnic minorities like Asian people?
(您認爲我們應該有一個單一的政黨來代表少數民族，例如亞裔人民？)

Yes (是) □     No (否) □     Don't know (不知道) □

9. Which one of the following statements best describes your view on Asian MPs?
(以下哪一個觀點形容您對亞裔國會議員的看法？)

I prefer one party above all others because it has an Asian MP. (我特別支持一個政黨因為它有亞裔的國會議員)
I do not like parties which do not have Asian MPs. (我不喜歡沒有亞裔國會議員的政黨)
If another party had an Asian MP, I would change my preference to that party. (如果另一個政黨有一位亞裔國會議員，我會改變支持那個政黨)
It makes no difference to me whether a party has an Asian MP or not. (一個政黨有沒有亞裔國會議員對我沒有影響)

□
10. If you were advised by Asian community leaders to vote for a political party which is most likely to serve Asian community's interests, what would you do? (如果一位亞洲社會組織的領導者建議您投給某個最有可能為亞裔社會利而服務的政黨, 您會怎麼做?)

I would follow the recommendation. (我會依照建議投票) ☐
I would vote according to my decision with some regard to the recommendation. (我會參考得到的建議再決定) ☐
I would vote according to my decision without any regard to the recommendation. (我會自己本身做決定, 不考慮得到的建議) ☐
I would totally oppose the recommendation. (我會反對我得到的建議) ☐

New Zealand Policies (政策)

11. What is the most important issue in New Zealand for you personally at this time? (現時在紐西蘭，您個人最關心哪一項問題?)

- The economy (經濟) ☐
- Taxes (稅費) ☐
- Health (醫藥) ☐
- Education (教育) ☐
- Race relations (種族關係) ☐
- Environment (環保) ☐
- Unemployment (失業) ☐
- Law and order (治安) ☐
- Others* (其他*) ☐

*Please specify (*請說明):

12. Generally, do you think it should be the government’s responsibility to provide or ensure the following? (一般來說, 您認為以下的事項是否該由政府提供?)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Definitely should</th>
<th>Shouldn't</th>
<th>Definitely shouldn't</th>
<th>Don't know</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A job for everyone who wants one</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A decent living standard for all old people</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Decent living standards for the unemployed</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Free health care for everyone</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Free education from pre-school through university levels</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

13. Do you think Maori people deserve special status in New Zealand because of the historical background and Treaty of Waitangi? (您認爲毛利人民因為 Waitangi 條約應在紐西蘭得到特別的身份地位嗎?)

Yes (是) ☐ No (否) ☐ Don't know (不知道) ☐

14. Do you think there should be special Maori seats in parliament? (您認為毛利人在議會中應有特別席位?)

Yes (是) ☐ No (否) ☐ Don't know (不知道) ☐
15. Do you think New Zealand should give Maori people more say in all government decisions?
(您認爲紐西蘭應該在國會內給與毛利人更多的發言權嗎？)

Yes (是) □  No (否) □  Don't know (不知道) □

16. Do you agree with the following statements? (您贊成下列觀點嗎？)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Statement</th>
<th>Strongly agree</th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
<th>Strongly disagree</th>
<th>Don’t know</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>There should be a law to further reduce pay differences between women and men</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>我們應立法來降低男女之間的薪資差別</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>It is a citizen’s duty to vote</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>公民有義務去投票</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Zealand should be a republic rather than having the Queen as head of state</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>紐西蘭應該是共和國而不應由女皇統領國家</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The death penalty for murder should be reintroduced</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>重新立法謀殺犯應被處以死刑</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The number of immigrants allowed into NZ should be reduced</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>每年紐西蘭收的移民應該减少</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

17. Generally speaking, do you usually think of yourself as supporting a political party in New Zealand?
(一般來說，您會否認为自己是支持某個政黨的支持者？)

Yes (是) □  No (否) □

18. If you usually support a political party, which political party do you support the most?
(如果您通常支持某個政黨，哪一個政黨您會給予最大支持？)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Labour</th>
<th>National</th>
<th>Act</th>
<th>Green</th>
<th>NZ First</th>
<th>United Future</th>
<th>Others*</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>劳工黨</td>
<td>國家黨</td>
<td>行動黨</td>
<td>綠黨</td>
<td>紐第一黨</td>
<td>未來聯合黨</td>
<td>其他</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Please specify which party (*請說明是哪一黨)：

19. Do you have New Zealand Citizenship or Permanent Residency?
(您是否有紐西蘭的公民或是永久居留權？)

Yes (是) □  No (否) □ (Go to Q.24)( 跳去第 24 題)

20. If you have New Zealand Citizenship or Permanent Residency, did you vote in the last national election?
(如果您有紐西蘭的公民或是永久居留權，您在上次國家大選時有投票嗎？)

Yes (是) □  No (否) □
21. With MMP New Zealanders now have two votes, one for a party, and one for a candidate in their electorate. Which do you think is the most important in deciding which party will get the largest number of seats in Parliament? (在MMP的選舉模式下，紐西蘭人現在可享有兩張選票，一張選政黨，另一張選政黨議員。您認為哪一張票對決定政黨在國會中得到更多席位比較重要?)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party vote most important</th>
<th>Both equally important</th>
<th>Electorate vote most important</th>
<th>Don't know</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(政黨票最重要)</td>
<td>(兩者同等重要)</td>
<td>(選區票最重要)</td>
<td>(不知道)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

22. If you voted in the last election, which party and which party's candidate did you vote for?
(如果您在上一次選舉投票，您選了哪一個政黨及政黨議員?)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Labour</th>
<th>National</th>
<th>Act</th>
<th>Green</th>
<th>NZ First</th>
<th>United Future</th>
<th>Others*</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Party vote</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>政黨票</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electorate vote</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>證選票</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Please specify which party (*請說明哪個政黨): ___________________________________________________________________________________

23. If you did not vote in the last election, what is your main reason for not voting?
(如果您上次沒有投票，主要原因為什麼?)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Too busy working and/or studying</th>
<th>Don't know enough about New Zealand politics</th>
<th>Language difficulties</th>
<th>Not interested in politics</th>
<th>Others*</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>工作或學業忙碌</td>
<td>不夠了解紐西蘭的政治</td>
<td>語言問題</td>
<td>對政治沒興趣</td>
<td>其他*</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Please specify the reason (*請說明您的原因): ___________________________________________________________________________________

24. Please indicate whether you have participated in New Zealand politics in any of the following ways (choose as many as possible) (您是否有透過以下的方式參與紐西蘭的政治? 可複選):

- Nominated as a political candidate.
- (提名為政治候選人)
- Joined a political party.
- (參加政黨)
- Assisted in a political campaign.
- (協助政治競選活動)
- Made donation to political parties.
- (捐款給政黨)
- Written or phoned government officials, newspapers or TV station.
- (以書信或電話聯絡政府人員，報章或電視台)
- Taken part in protests and/or demonstrations.
- (參與抗議或遊行)
- Signed petitions for political cause.
- (為政治問題簽署請願)
- Worked in the community to solve a problem.
- (在社區內工作來解決社區問題)
25. Do you feel that Chinese people's interest would be better represented by Asian politicians (not necessarily Chinese) than by Pakeha or Maori politicians? (您認爲亞裔人民的利益由亞裔政治人物(不一定要是中國人)代表會比由白人或毛利政治人物代表好嗎?)

Yes (是) □ No (否) □ Don't know (不知道) □

26. On a scale of 0-5, please indicate your level of interaction with the following groups:
(在0到5的態度上, 請說明您與以下的交流程度?)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>No interaction (沒有交流)</th>
<th>High interaction (高度交流)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakeha (白人)</td>
<td>□</td>
<td>□</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maori (毛利人)</td>
<td>□</td>
<td>□</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pacific Islanders (太平洋島民)</td>
<td>□</td>
<td>□</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Asians (其他亞裔)</td>
<td>□</td>
<td>□</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

27. Do you agree with the following statements? (您贊成下列的觀點嗎?)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Strongly agree</th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
<th>Strongly disagree</th>
<th>Don't know</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>What happens generally to other Asians in NZ will affect what happens in my life 一般對其他在紐西蘭人身上發生的事會影響到我發生的事</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>What happens generally to other Chinese in NZ will affect what happens in my life 一般對其他在紐西蘭中國人所發生的事會影響到我發生的事</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Different Asian groups in NZ are culturally similar 在紐西蘭不同的亞裔民族在文化上是相似的</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Empowerment (給予力量)

28. On the whole, are you satisfied with the way democracy works in New Zealand? (總括來說, 您對紐西蘭的民主政治感到滿意嗎?)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Very satisfied 非常滿意</th>
<th>Satisfied 滿意</th>
<th>Somewhat satisfied 舒適滿意</th>
<th>Not satisfied at all 不滿意</th>
<th>Don't know 不知道</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

29. Are you satisfied with the way democracy works in your home country? (您對祖國的民主政治感到滿意嗎?)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Very satisfied 非常滿意</th>
<th>Satisfied 滿意</th>
<th>Somewhat satisfied 舒適滿意</th>
<th>Not satisfied at all 不滿意</th>
<th>Don't know 不知道</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
30. Do you feel that you can trust government officials in New Zealand? (您感覺您可以相信紐西蘭的政府單位嗎?)
   Almost always (幾乎都可以) □
   Most of the times (大多數時間) □
   Sometimes (有時候) □
   No (不行) □
   Don't know (不知道) □

31. Compared to your home country, do you have more or less trust in New Zealand government and politicians? (跟您祖國相比，您認為您對紐西蘭政府的信任是比較多還是比較少?)
   More trust (比較多信任) □
   Less trust (比較少信任) □
   Equal trust (同樣信任) □
   Don't know (不知道) □

32. How much influence do you think you can have over government policies in New Zealand? (您認為您對紐西蘭政府政策能有多少影響?)
   A lot of influence (很多影響) □
   Some influence (一些影響) □
   Very little influence (一點點影響) □
   No influence at all (完全沒有影響) □

33. Compared to your home country, do you feel that you have more or less influence on the government policies in New Zealand? (跟您祖國相比，您認為您對紐西蘭的政府政策有更多還是更少的影響?)
   More influence (更多影響) □
   Less influence (更少影響) □
   Equal influence (相同影響) □
   Don't know (不知道) □

34. Do you agree with the following statements? (您同意以下的觀點嗎?)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Statement</th>
<th>Strongly agree</th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
<th>Strongly disagree</th>
<th>Don't know</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>There is a need for Asians to participate in NZ politics</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>It is harder for Asians to participate in NZ politics because of their ethnicity</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>My vote really counts</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sometimes politics seems so complicated people like me can’t understand what goes on</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Translated from Chinese to English)
35. Do you feel that Asian interests are well represented in the New Zealand government?
(您認為亞裔的權益在紐西蘭政府內有足夠的代表嗎?)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Very well represented</th>
<th>Somewhat represented</th>
<th>Somewhat inadequately represented</th>
<th>Not represented at all</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>非常足夠的代表</td>
<td>有些代表</td>
<td>不夠足夠的代表</td>
<td>完全沒有代表</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

36. What do you think is the most effective way of representing Asian interest in New Zealand?
(您認為亞裔在紐西蘭有代表最有效的辦法是?)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>More Asian representatives in government</th>
<th>Strong ethnic communities</th>
<th>Coalition with Asian communities</th>
<th>Focus on advancing the socio-economic status of Asian people</th>
<th>Others*</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>在政府內有更多亞裔的代表</td>
<td>強力的少數民族社會組織</td>
<td>與其他亞裔社會組織聯合</td>
<td>專心於加強亞裔的社會和經濟的地位</td>
<td>其他*</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Please specify (*請說明):

37. Please indicate whether you have been directly contacted by politicians and/or political parties during the election campaigns in any of the following ways:
(是否有政治人物或政黨在競選期間透過以下方式跟您聯絡? (可複選)):

- Received letters/pamphlets (郵件/宣傳單)
- Received telephoned calls (電話拜訪)
- Received emails (電子郵件)
- Have not been contacted (未曾被聯絡過)

38. Do you feel that your ethnic community is effective in the following ways?
(您認為您的民族社區組織是否有效的做到以下事項?)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Representing your community's interests</th>
<th>Somewhat effective</th>
<th>Somewhat ineffective</th>
<th>Very ineffective</th>
<th>Don't know</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>代表您的民族社區利益</td>
<td>有點有效</td>
<td>有點沒效</td>
<td>非常沒效</td>
<td>不知道</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Solving your community's problems</th>
<th>Very effective</th>
<th>Somewhat effective</th>
<th>Somewhat ineffective</th>
<th>Very ineffective</th>
<th>Don't know</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>解決您的民族社區問題</td>
<td>非常有效</td>
<td>有點有效</td>
<td>有點沒效</td>
<td>非常沒效</td>
<td>不知道</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

39. Are you (您是)-

- Male (男性) □
- Female (女性) □

40. In what year were you born? (您哪一年出生?)

- 19□□

41. Were you born in New Zealand? (您是否在紐西蘭出生?)

- Yes (是) □
- No (否) □

(Go to Q. 44) (請到第44題)
42. If you were not born in New Zealand, what is your country of origin?
(如果您不是在紐西蘭出生，您從哪裡來?)

Korea  China  Hong Kong  Taiwan  Malaysia  Singapore  Other*
(韓國)  (中國)  (香港)  (台灣)  (馬來西亞)  (新加坡)  (其他*)

*Please specify which country (*請說明您從哪來): ____________________

43. If you were not born in New Zealand, in what year did you establish residency in New Zealand?
(如果您不是在紐西蘭出生，您在哪一年得到居住資格?)

Please write in which year (請寫出年份): ____________________

44. Which of the following do you think best describe your identity?
(您認為以下哪一個對您身份最好的敘述?)

New Zealander  Asian New Zealander  Asian  Chinese New Zealander  Chinese
(紐西蘭人)  (亞裔紐西蘭人)  (亞裔)  (華裔紐西蘭人)  (中國人)

45. Do you expect to be living in New Zealand in 10 years time?
(您認可自己十年後還會住在紐西蘭嗎?)

Yes (是)  No (否)

46. On a scale of 0-5, how fluent is your English language skill?
(在0到5的程度等級，您的英文程度是?)

Cannot read/speak English  Very fluent
(不能讀/說英語)  (非常流利)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Reading (閱讀)</th>
<th>0</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Speaking (說)</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

47. Which language do you mostly speak? (您最常說哪種語言?)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>At home</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Outside home</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

48. How often do you do the following? (您多常做下列之事?)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>At least once a week</th>
<th>At least once a month</th>
<th>At least once a year</th>
<th>Never</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Contact friends/families back home</td>
<td>一週至少一次</td>
<td>一個月至少一次</td>
<td>一年至少一次</td>
<td>從不</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
49. Which of the following organisations do you belong to? (Choose as many as possible) (您屬於哪一機構? (可複選))

- Ethnic community organisation (族裔社區機構)
- Ethnic religious organisation (族裔信仰機構)
- Ethnic sports group (族裔運動組織)
- Ethnic business organisation (族裔商業機構)
- New Zealand community organisation (紐西蘭社區機構)
- New Zealand religious organisation (紐西蘭信仰機構)
- New Zealand sports group (紐西蘭運動組織)
- New Zealand business organisation (紐西蘭商業機構)
- Trade Union (貿易聯合會)

50. What is your highest formal education qualification? (您最高學歷是?)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Postgraduate degree</th>
<th>University degree</th>
<th>University/Polytech diploma or certificate</th>
<th>High graduate</th>
<th>School</th>
<th>Less than High School</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>碩士/博士</td>
<td>大學學歷</td>
<td>大學/專科文憑/證書</td>
<td>高中畢業</td>
<td>學校</td>
<td>低於高中</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

51. Do you own residential, investment, or other properties in New Zealand or overseas? (您在紐西蘭或海外是否擁有住宅的，投資的或其他物業?)

Yes (是) ☐ No (否) ☐

52. Which of the following best describes your present position? (以下哪一個形容您目前的情況?)

- Working full time for pay or other income. (32 hours plus a week). (全職工作: 一週等於或超過32小時)
- Working part time for pay or other income. (less than 32 hours a week). (兼職工作: 一週少於32小時)
- Runs own business. (經營自己的生意)
- Unemployed, laid off, looking for work. (失業, 遭解雇, 正在找工作)
- Retired. (退休)
- Temporarily or permanently disabled, unable to work. (暫時性或永久性殘障, 無法工作)
- At school, university or other educational institution. (就學中)
- Unpaid work outside the home. (在家外兼職的工作)
- Unpaid work within the home. (在家內無薪的工作)

53. Who do you now work for or, if you are not working now, who did you work for in your last job in paid employment? (您現在的僱主是誰，如您現在沒有工作，您最後一份有薪工作的僱主是誰?)

- I am/was self-employed. (我是自僱人士)
- A private company or business. (一間私人公司)
- A state or public agency or enterprise. (政府或公共機構或企業)
- A mixed public/private or nonprofit organisation. (公共/私人混合或非牟利機構)
- Never been in paid employment. (從沒有工作)
- Don't know. (不知道)

54. Have you experienced racial discrimination in New Zealand? (您在紐西蘭有受過種族歧視嗎?)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Great deal (很多)</th>
<th>Fair amount (不少)</th>
<th>Some amount (一些)</th>
<th>Never (從來沒有)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
55. Who did you suffer discrimination from? (您被誰種族歧視?)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Passer-by in public</th>
<th>Neighbour or school friend</th>
<th>At work</th>
<th>Police or other governmental authority</th>
<th>Shopkeeper or restaurant worker</th>
<th>Others*</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>公眾場所行人</td>
<td>鄰居或學校同學</td>
<td>工作時</td>
<td>警察或政府機構</td>
<td>商店或餐館員工</td>
<td>其他</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Please specify by whom (請說明是被誰): ____________________________

56. When you experienced racial discrimination, did you report it to anyone? (e.g. Police, ethnic community organisation, or other government institution) (如果您受到種族歧視, 會通知任何人嗎? 例如, 警察, 種族社區機構或其他政府機構)

Yes (會) □ No (不會) □

57. If your answer to the above question is no, why not? (如果您對上題的回答是“不會”, 為什麼不會?)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>I could not be bothered</th>
<th>I did not know where to report</th>
<th>I did not think that reporting would make any differences</th>
<th>I was afraid of revenge</th>
<th>Others*</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>我沒興趣</td>
<td>我不知道要報案</td>
<td>我不認為報案會有任何幫助</td>
<td>我害怕報案後報復</td>
<td>其他</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Please specify why not (請說明為什麼不會): ____________________________

58. Do you feel that your home country is fairly portrayed by New Zealand media? (您認爲您的祖國被紐西蘭媒體公平報導嗎?)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Most of the times (大多時間)</th>
<th>Sometimes (有時候)</th>
<th>Never (從沒有)</th>
<th>Don’t know (不知道)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>□</td>
<td>□</td>
<td>□</td>
<td>□</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Recently you received in the post a printed questionnaire entitled “Survey on the political participation of Asian New Zealanders”, along with a letter explaining my project.

If you are one of the many people who have already filled out the questionnaire and sent it back to me, thank you very much for your cooperation.

If you have not yet done so, please help my project by completing the questionnaire and posting it back in the reply-paid envelope provided. No stamp is needed. It would help me greatly if I could have your completed questionnaire by 29 August 2003.

Thank you in advance for your cooperation.

Yours sincerely,

Shee-Jeong Park
SURVEY ON THE POLITICAL PARTICIPATION OF ASIAN NEW ZEALANDERS
(뉴질랜드 동양인들의 정치참여도에 관한 설문조사)

You probably remember my recent letter containing a questionnaire, and my request for your help in a major study of the political participation of Asian New Zealanders. As of today, I had not yet received your completed questionnaire. In case you have mislaid it, we enclose another copy.

(귀하께서는 여전히 뉴질랜드 동양인들의 정치참여도에 관한 설문조사지를 받으셨을 것입니다. 그러나 귀하의 응답서 설문지는 아직까지 도착하지 않았습니다. 귀하께서 혹시 설문지를 잃어버리셨을 경우에 대비하여 설문지를 한부로 더 제공합니다.)

This survey is investigating what Asian New Zealanders think about a host of political issues in New Zealand. The results of the study will be written up in various publications, which may be read by students, politicians, and members of the public. Asian New Zealanders as a minority ethnic group have been under-represented in many aspects of the New Zealand society. This survey is an opportunity for you to help put on record what Asian New Zealanders think about New Zealand politics.

(이 설문조사는 뉴질랜드 동양인들이 뉴질랜드 정치에 관한 입맛에 대해 어떤 의견을 갖고 있는지를 연구하기 위해 실시되고 있습니다. 이 설문조사의 결과는 뉴질랜드 학생들, 정치인들 및 뉴질랜드 시민들이 읽을 수 있도록 출판될 것입니다. 소수민족인 뉴질랜드 동양인들의 의견은 뉴질랜드 사회 곳곳에서 잘 대변되지 못하고 있습니다. 그러므로 귀하는 이 설문조사에 응하심으로써 뉴질랜드 동양인들이 뉴질랜드 정치에 대해 어떤 생각을 갖고 있는지를 정식으로 알릴 수 있는 기회를 갖게 됩니다.)

Everything you write will be treated as confidential and anonymous. Your name will not be entered in the computer file when all the answers to the questions are put together for analysis. The questionnaire has a number for mailing purpose, but when you send back the questionnaire, the number is crossed off the mailing list and you will not be sent any further reminders. The survey has been funded by the University of Auckland and the Asia 2000 Foundation.

(귀하의 답변은 비밀에 보관되어 있으며 응답자가 보장될 것입니다. 귀하의 성명은 설문조사결과를 분석하는 컴퓨터 파일에는 입력되지 않을 것입니다. 이 설문조사는 우편 본의상 번호가 매겨져 있으나 응답한 설문지를 받는 편지 번호는 우편발송부에서 제외될 것입니다. 이 설문조사는 오만덜 대학과 아시아 2000 재단의 후원으로 실시되고 있습니다.)

I would very much appreciate it if you could complete the questionnaire and return it as soon as possible in the enclosed reply-paid envelope. No stamp is needed.

(귀하께서 이 설문조사에 응해주시고 응답하신 설문지를 놓고한 편지봉투에 넣어서 되도록 밀리 보내주시면 감사하겠습니다. 놓고한 편지봉투에는 우표를 붙일 필요가 없습니다.)

Thank you for your cooperation.
(귀하의 협조에 감사드립니다.)

Shee-Jeong Park
Department of Political Studies
The University of Auckland
SURVEY ON THE POLITICAL PARTICIPATION OF ASIAN NEW ZEALANDERS

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SURVEY ON THE POLITICAL PARTICIPATION OF ASIAN NEW ZEALanders
(뉴질랜드 동양인들의 정치 참여도에 관한 설문조사)

Dear Sir/Madam,

I am writing to thank you most sincerely for the time you put into filling in the questionnaire. The survey has had a tremendous response. I hope that the survey result could be used to represent Asian New Zealanders' view on New Zealand politics.

(제가 여러분께 보내드린 뉴질랜드 동양인들의 정치참여도에 관한 설문조사를 보내주시서 감사합니다. 이 설문조사는 그동안 설문조사 대상자들로부터 좋은 반응을 받았습니다. 이 설문조사 결과가 뉴질랜드 동양인들의 뉴질랜드 정치에 관한 생각을 대변하는데 조금이라도 보탬이 되었으면 합니다.)

Unfortunately, I have discovered that you have accidentally turned over two pages of the questionnaire booklet together, leaving a big gap in your answers. The pages in the questionnaire booklet have often not been easy to separate. I enclose a copy of the page that appears to have been accidentally overlooked. Could you please help me once again by filling in the page enclosed and sending it back in the reply-paid envelope (no stamp needed) as soon as possible? It will probably take less than 5 minutes.

(공교롭게도 귀하가 설문지를 작성하실 때 실수로 설문지 두장을 한꺼번에 넘기신 것 같습니다. 설문지 두장을 한꺼번에 넘기는 일은 흔히 있는 일이지만, 그로 인해 귀하의 답변에는 공백이 생겼습니다. 귀하께서 답을 하지 않은 설문지를 다시 보내드리오니 평소처럼 내에 답을 써서 동봉한 편지봉투에 넣어 보내주시면 감사하겠습니다. 동봉한 편지봉투에는 우표를 붙이실 필요가 없습니다.)

As before, I remind you that your answers will be treated as confidential. The enclosed page is numbered so that they can be inserted into the questionnaire you have already sent me, but the number will be crossed off once I receive your response.

(전에도 말씀드렸듯이 귀하의 답변은 비밀에 부쳐질 것입니다. 동봉한 설문지에는 귀하가 이미 보내주신 설문조사자에 답할 수 있도록 번호가 매겨져 있으나 귀하의 원성된 설문지를 받는 순간 그 번호는 제명될 것입니다.)

Once again, thank you very much for your cooperation.
(귀하의 협조에 다시 한 번 감사드립니다.)

[Signature]

Shae-Jeong Park
Department of Political Studies
The University of Auckland
SURVEY ON THE POLITICAL PARTICIPATION OF ASIAN NEW ZEALANDERS
(亞裔紐西蘭人政治參與之調查)

Dear Sir/Madam,

我正在寫信感謝你所花的時間來填寫問卷。調查結果希望可用來代表亞裔紐西蘭人對紐西蘭政治的觀點。

Unfortunately, I have discovered that you have accidentally turned over two pages of the questionnaire booklet together, leaving a big gap in your answers. The pages in the questionnaire booklet have often not been easy to separate. I enclose a copy of the page that appears to have been accidentally overlooked. Could you please help me once again by filling in the page enclosed and sending it back in the reply-paid envelope (no stamp needed) as soon as possible? It will probably take less than 5 minutes.

As before, I remind you that your answers will be treated as confidential. The enclosed page is numbered so that they can be inserted into the questionnaire you have already sent me, but the number will be crossed off once I receive your response.

Once again, thank you very much for your cooperation.

Shee-joong Park
Department of Political Studies
The University of Auckland
UNIVERSITY OF AUCKLAND HUMAN SUBJECTS ETHICS COMMITTEE

11 April, 2002
MEMORANDUM
Dr Raymond Miller
Political Studies

Re: Anonymous Questionnaire

I wish to advise you that the Committee met on 10 April 2002 and reviewed the Anonymous Questionnaire titled "Survey on political participation of Asian New Zealanders" (Our Ref. 2002 / Q / 010).

It is suggested that the researcher reconsider the time taken to complete the research, and the time taken to complete the questionnaire.

Ethics approval was given conditional on

1. If the community list is not public knowledge then the researcher may not approach potential subjects directly. This must be done by the owner of the list first.

If the project changes significantly you are required to resubmit your application to the Committee for further consideration.

In order that an up-to-date record can be maintained, it would be appreciated if you could notify the Committee once your project is completed.

Kate O’Connor
Research & Ethics Administrator
University of Auckland Human Subjects Ethics Committee

c.c. Head of Department, Political Studies
    Shee-Jeong Park
    20 Whiting Grove
    West Harbour
    Auckland
SAMPLE SELECTION

The respondents were selected randomly from the Parliamentary Electoral Data ("PED") which listed the names of all New Zealanders who have registered to vote. Two CDs containing the PED of 2,668,234 New Zealanders were sent from the Electoral Enrolment Centre in Wellington on 4 August 2003. In order to handle an extremely large set of data, it was divided into age groups of five years starting from people born between 1 January 1890 - 31 December 1894 to people born between 1 January 1980 – 31 December 1984. The divided data set was then imported into Statistical Package for Social Science ("SPSS") for a random selection of the survey respondents.

The survey respondents were selected based on common Chinese and Korean surnames. The common Korean surnames used in the selection were: Kim, Park, Choi, Ahn, Baek, Han, Hong, Hwang, Jang, Kang, Koh, Lim, Min, Moon, Oh, Roh, Seo, Shin, Sohn, Song, Yang, Yoo and Yoon. The common Chinese surnames used in the selection were: Chan, Chen, Li, Zhang, Wong, Wang, Huang, Ho, He, Au, Ou, Chou, Chow, Zhou, Ng, Hu, Wu, Woo, Ma, Mah, Mak, Mai, Yip, Ye, Yeh, Ip, Yap, Chiu, Chao, Zhao, Zhong, Cheng, Zheng, Tsang, Zeng, Tse, Hsieh, Xie, Hui, Xu, Lok, Lo, Cao, Tsao, Kwok, Guo, Kuo, Kwun, Guan, Kwan, Leung, Liang and Leong. A number of common surnames, such as Lee, Chung, Chang and Cho, were not used in the selection because these surnames are commonly used by both Chinese and Korean people, making it extremely difficult to distinguish Chinese and Korean people simply by looking at their first names. The PED came up with 6,876 people with common Korean surnames (0.3%) and 26,294 people with common Chinese surnames (1%). The proportion of Korean and Chinese people listed in the PED was significantly smaller than the actual Korean and Chinese population as reported in the 2001 Census. This was because there were other, not as commonly used, surnames which were not included in the selection, but it could also be seen as an indication of a low registration rate among Asian New Zealanders.

Even with the initial elimination, there were still surnames that could be used for more than one ethnic group, for example “Park” (common Korean and Pakeha surname) and “Han” (common Korean and Chinese surname). For this reason, 1,500 each from the Korean and Chinese pools were randomly selected for the elimination of those with distinctive Chinese first names from the Korean pool, and vice versa. Those with English first and middle names were also eliminated -

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1 This may have reduced the number of Taiwanese/Hong Kong respondents, as these are surnames commonly used by Taiwanese/Hong Kong people.
although a significant proportion of Asian New Zealanders have adopted English first names, they usually retained their Asian names or initials as their middle names. After this initial elimination process, a further random sampling was conducted to select 1,000 Korean and 1,000 Chinese respondents.

Selecting the sample by looking at the surnames had limitations in that women (and their children) who have adopted non-Asian husbands’ surnames were excluded from the sample. Similar problems existed for the inclusion of non-Asian women who have married, and adopted, their Asian husbands’ surnames. Those who were children of intermarriage, and therefore had English first and middle names, were also excluded. Despite these limitations, it was the only way of randomly selecting Korean and Chinese respondents with the minimum possible bias. Overseas studies on Asian immigrants have also used this method of selecting respondents based on common surnames. Identifying Asian voters would have been simpler if individuals were required to specify ethnicity when they were registered to vote\(^2\), but unfortunately (for privacy and other reasons) no such information was contained in the PED.

**MERITS AND FLAWS OF THE MAIL SURVEY METHODOLOGY**

The mail survey was chosen because it enabled the selection of a nationwide sample of people of different age, gender, occupation and social group. It also excluded those who were visitors or overseas students (some of whom may have participated in, say, a face-to-face survey at a local ethnic church) and who cannot be regarded as “New Zealanders”. The mail survey also allowed the respondents to work through the questionnaire at their own pace, and offered a greater degree of anonymity. Having said that, the mail survey using the PED had its own limitations in that the PED only recorded those who were registered to vote – this meant that the survey excluded those who have not been registered. In addition, the mail survey did not provide the opportunity for the respondents to seek clarification and/or further elaboration of the questions asked, as would have been allowed in face-to-face or telephone surveys. Having considered these various factors, the mail survey was chosen as the most effective method of conducting the survey with the minimum possible bias, within the time and resources available.

**THE QUESTIONNAIRE – TOTAL DESIGN METHOD**

The process of sending a questionnaire to prospective respondents, getting them to complete the questionnaire in an honest manner and return it, can be viewed as a special case of “social

\(^2\) A similar view was expressed by Nakanish in Amerasia (1985) p8.
exchange. The theory of social exchange as developed by Blau, Homans, and Thibaut and Kelley asserted that actions of individuals were motivated by the return these actions were expected to bring. They therefore argued that in order to maximize the survey response rate, the researcher should look at ways to (1) minimise the costs for responding; (2) maximize the rewards for doing so, and (3) establish trust that those rewards will be delivered. In order to maximize the response rate, the questionnaire adopted various aspects of Dillman’s Total Design Method (“TDM”):

- The questionnaire was printed in a booklet form. This gave a professional appearance, minimized the number of pages, and provided the impression that the questionnaire was shorter than it actually was.

- The questionnaire was relatively short. It contained 58 questions on 12 sides (6 pages), including translations and the cover page. Questions were also designed to fit each page to avoid confusion in turning pages in the middle of a question.

- The sequence of the questions followed many recommendations of TDM. For example, the first question on whether the respondent was interested in politics was relatively easy and interesting, and it was something that applied to all respondents. It was also a neutral question and did not require the respondent to express agreement or disagreement. Related questions were also grouped together to ease the mental effort required for constantly switching from one kind of question to another. Demographic questions (ie. questions that elicited personal information such as age, gender and income) were placed at the end of the questionnaire. This was because people’s reluctance to provide personal information could have deterred them from starting the survey. Placing demographic questions towards the end of the questionnaire had the effect of making the respondents feel that unless they answered the personal items, their previous responses may not be counted and their time and effort in filling out the earlier questions may be lost.

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3 Dillman (1978) p12
5 It was found that a questionnaire which is longer than 12 pages or more than 125 items generally showed a lower response rate than a 12 page questionnaire, although little difference was found in the response rate for a questionnaire which is less than 12 pages; Dillman (1978) p55.
6 Dillman (1978) p128.
7 Ibid p124.
8 Ibid p144.
• Most of the questions were closed and multi-choice, which made it faster and easier for the respondents to answer. In addition, some partially closed questions, where answer choices were provided but the respondents also had the option of creating their own responses, were used to attain the best of the open and closed format.

• The questionnaire included a cover page to add a professional flavour. The University of Auckland letterhead was also used to generate trust and legitimacy. The Participation Information Sheets ("PIS"), which accompanied the questionnaire, stressed the importance of the survey, as well as the confidentiality of the responses.

• Freepost envelopes were enclosed, together with the questionnaire and PIS, so that the respondents did not have to incur the cost of buying envelopes and stamps for the completed questionnaire. Translations in Korean or Chinese were also provided underneath the English questions to reduce the mental effort for those with low English proficiency.

• The questionnaire and the questions therein were pre-tested many times prior to being sent out. Pre-testings were useful in identifying a number of construction defects and clarifying translations, as well as amending the ordering and grouping of the questions.

ADMINISTRATION OF THE SURVEY

Dillman argued that without a follow-up mailing, the response rate of any postal survey would be less than half of those normally attained by the TDM, regardless of how interesting the questionnaire or impressive the mail out package was. For this reason, two follow-up methods were used in the survey; reminder postcard and second mail out. The reminder postcards were sent out to all the recipients of the first mail out to thank those who had already returned completed questionnaires, and to remind those who had not yet done so. The postcards were sent out 10 days after the first mail out, to jog their memories before the questionnaire got buried under more recent mail, without giving the impression of being unreasonable. The second mail out enclosing an extra copy of the questionnaire was sent out four weeks after the first mail out, to those who had not responded to date. This was because the questionnaire would likely have been lost, thrown away, or difficult to find after four weeks of the original mail out. The timeline for the survey administration was as follows:

9 Ibid p180.
On 8 August 2003, the first mail out was sent to 1,000 Korean and 1,000 Chinese New Zealanders. The respondents were given until 22 August 2003 to return the completed questionnaire.

On 20 August 2003, 1,952 reminder postcards were sent to all respondents (977 Koreans and 975 Chinese), except those who had moved with no forwarding address or those with wrong addresses. Respondents were given until 29 August 2003 to return the completed questionnaire.

On 3 September 2003, the second mail out was sent to 655 Korean and 597 Chinese New Zealanders who had not replied to date, excluding those with wrong addresses. No due date was given for the return of the completed questionnaire.

While entering the data, it was found that 14 respondents had not completed a page by turning two pages of the questionnaire together. In such cases, the missing page was photocopied and sent back to the respondents concerned, together with an explanatory letter. The missing pages were sent as they were discovered. Of the 14 respondents who were sent a copy of the missing page, nine returned the completed page.

**RESPONSE RATE**

By mid-September, some six weeks after the first mail out, 915 completed questionnaires (490 Chinese and 425 Koreans) were received. Excluding the 107 returned/non-reachable mail (53 for Chinese and 54 for Koreans), the response rate for the survey using the following formula was 48% (52% for Chinese and 45% for Koreans):

\[
\text{Response rate} = \frac{\text{number returned}}{\text{number in sample} - (\text{noneligible} + \text{nonreachable})} \times 100
\]

\[
48\% = \frac{915}{(2,000 - 107)} \times 100
\]

The importance of the follow-up mail was evident. After the first mail out but before the reminder postcards were sent out, only 481 responses (53% of the total response, from 254 Chinese and 227 Koreans) had been received. This meant that almost half of the responses were received largely due to the follow-up mailing. For example, 22% of the total responses, or 204 responses (121 Chinese and 83 Koreans), were received after the reminder postcards but before the second mail out were sent out, and 25% or 230 responses (115 Chinese and 115 Koreans) were received
after the second mail out. The graph below illustrates the positive effect the reminder postcards and the second mail out had on the response rate.

Respondents in general answered most of the questions. Many also provided written comments, even for questions that did not require them to do so. Most of these comments demonstrated the respondents’ high level of interest in political issues, as well as their appreciation that somebody was taking an interest in issues relevant to Asian New Zealanders. For example, a lot of respondents sent a good luck wish and positive feedback with their completed questionnaire. On the other hand, some respondents made suggestions for better translations, and some Taiwanese respondents protested the use of “Chinese” by crossing out all the references to “Chinese” and changing them to “Taiwanese”. Only one respondent refused to complete the questionnaire, on the basis that the cover letter was “too rude”. Overall, the amount of interest and encouragement received from the respondents was such that the author was honoured and humbled to have conducted the survey.

**Number of responses received**

![Graph showing number of responses received over weeks](image)

**FUNDING**

A short note should be made on the difficulties the author encountered in obtaining the necessary funding, as it delayed the administration of the survey significantly. The original plan was to conduct the survey among 2,000 Korean and 2,000 Chinese New Zealanders, bearing in mind
that the response rate for a postal survey among ethnic minority groups is usually extremely low\textsuperscript{10}. The sample size also had to be large enough to allow further breakdown into national origins, as “Chinese New Zealanders” included people from different countries. The estimated costs of conducting the survey on 4,000 Asian New Zealanders were over NZ$20,000. The author, together with the supervisors and the University of Auckland funding advisor, made approximately 40 applications to various organizations and government institutions (including the Office of Ethnic Affairs, Korean Embassy, Hong Kong Shanghai Bank, Sky City, Pan Asian Congress, and the Ministry of Social Development) but no application was successful\textsuperscript{11}. None of the scholarships available were designed to support research on Asian-related political topics.

After a year of unsuccessfully searching for funding, the funding schedule had to be revised to NZ$10,500\textsuperscript{12}, by reducing the survey sample to 1,000 Korean and 1,000 Chinese New Zealanders, relying on friends and families to translate the questionnaires and written responses, and the author personally entering and analysing the data. Even with the revised budget, it was extremely difficult to obtain funding that the author was advised to drop the idea of conducting a survey, after spending more than a year working on the thesis based on a survey. In the end, the Department of Political Studies, the International Education and Diversity Committee of the University of Auckland, and the Asia 2000 Foundation (now Asia New Zealand Foundation) agreed to meet portions of the survey costs, all on an exceptional, one-off basis. The difficulties that the author encountered in finding appropriate funding for the survey indicated that it would be extremely difficult for any future students interested in the affairs of Asian New Zealanders to obtain funding for their studies. There is a serious need for the formation of a research institution with appropriate funding, expertise, and governmental support, if further studies on Asian New Zealanders are to be carried out.

\textsuperscript{10} See for example, Woo (2001-2992) p35 where 30% response rate was recorded for an email survey. Similarly, only 375 out of 2,000 questionnaires distributed to the Chinese New Zealanders for a 1996 survey were received; Friesen and Ip (1997).

\textsuperscript{11} The initial application to the Asia New Zealand Foundation was rejected on the basis that the amount sought was too large.

\textsuperscript{12} Compared to the fact that the NZES 1990 (which was carried out among 3,057 New Zealanders) incurred the cost of some NZ$34,000, the current survey was a cost-effective one.
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