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# **Facing New Challenges: Adapting The NZDF And ADF To The Post-Cold War Security Environment**

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**A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of  
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## **Abstract**

This thesis examines the development of the Australian and New Zealand Defence Forces during the post-Cold War period. It has been motivated partly by a desire to clear up the confusion that has sometimes developed over recent force structure changes in both countries, as well as a desire to make recommendations for enhanced practise.

The thesis combines analysis of both policy process and content, although it is more focused on content. It begins by examining the post-Cold War strategic environment, comparing it to the situation as it was in the Cold War, and identifying what has changed, and the effect of that on the role of militaries around the world.

It then focuses more closely on the two countries. It examines their defence policy environments, identifying the various participants in the policy process. It then engages in an analysis of major defence policy reviews of the post-Cold War period, as well as a range of other defence policy occurrences. It identifies the overall impact of those defence policy processes on the force structures of the two defence forces, by identifying elements of continuity and change.

The thesis then assesses the capability of the two forces against the requirements of the current strategic environment, and makes recommendations for enhanced practise. Recommendations are focused on both elements of force structure, and the policymaking system itself.

The broad conclusion of the thesis is that neither defence force has evolved markedly in the post-Cold War period. Continuity, rather than change, has been the dominant theme. This has been the result of multiple factors, and while many are common between the two countries, others are markedly different. This continuity has not been particularly beneficial in enhancing the effectiveness of the two forces. Change would be useful.

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## Table of Abbreviations

Acronym	Definition
3RAR	3 Australian Regiment
4RAR	4 Australian Regiment
A21R96	Army In The 21st Century Review 1996
AATW	The Australian Approach To Warfare
ABM	Anti-Ballistic Missile
ACC	Air Component Commander
ACF	Air Combat Force
ACR2001	Air Combat Review 2001
ADF	Australian Defence Force
ADFA	Australian Defence Force Academy
ADO	Australian Defence Organisation (ADOD and ADF)
ADOD	Australian Department Of Defence
AEW&C	Airborne Early Warning and Control
AIM	Abrams Integrated Management
ALP	Australian Labor Party
AMD	Australian Maritime Doctrine
AMRAAM	Advanced Medium Range Air-To-Air Missile
ANZAC	Australia-New Zealand Army Corps
ANZUS	Australia-New Zealand-United States
APC	Armoured Personnel Carrier
APDC	Air Power Development Centre
APFSDS-T	Armour Piercing Fin Stabilised Discarding Sabot - Tracer
APSC	Air Power Studies Centre
ARH	Armed Reconnaissance Helicopters
ASLAV	Australian Light Armoured Vehicle
ASP90	Australian Strategic Planning In The 1990s

ASP97	Australia's Strategic Policy 1997
ASPI	Australian Strategic Policy Institute
ASRAAM	Advanced Short Range Air-To-Air Missile
ASW	Anti-Submarine Warfare
AWD	Air Warfare Destroyer
CA	Chief Of Army
CAF	Chief of Air Force
CAF	Chief Of Air Force
CAS	Chief Of Air Staff
CATDC	Combined Arms Training Development Centre
CCT	Community Consultation Team
CDF	Chief Of Defence Force
CDG	Capability Development Group
CDS	Chief of Defence Staff
CGS	Chief of General Staff
CMF	Commonwealth Monitoring Force
CNS	Chief of Naval Staff
CNS	Chief Of Navy
COMAST	Commander Australian Theatre
CSC	Cabinet Strategy Committee
CSG	Combat Support Group
CSSERD	Cabinet Strategy Subcommittee on External Relations and Defence
DA1903	Defence Act 1903 (Australian)
DAR	Defence Annual Report
DCARR2005	Defence Capability And Resourcing Review 2005
DCoP	Defence Corporate Plan
DCP	Defence Capability Plan
DCR	Defence Capability Review
DCRP	Defence Consolidated Resource Plan
DDG	Guided Missile Destroyer
DepSecS&I	Deputy Secretary Strategy and Intelligence
DER96	Defence Efficiency Review 1996
DFAT	Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade
DLOC	Directed Level Of Capability
DMO	Defence Materiel Organisation
DOA	Defence of Australia
DOA87	Defence of Australia 1987 (White Paper)
DOTLMS	Doctrine, Organisation, Training, Leadership, Materiel, Soldier Systems
DPMC	Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet
DPPU	Defence Policy And Planning Unit
DRP97	Defence Reform Programme 1997
DSI2005	Defence Sustainability Initiative 2005
DU2003	Defence Update 2003
DU2005	Defence Update 2005
DWP94	Defending Australia: Defence White Paper 1994
EAB	External Assessments Bureau
EBO	Effects-Based Operations
EEZ	Exclusive Economic Zone
EMS	Emergency Management System
EOD	Explosive Ordnance Disposal
ESM	Electronic Support Measures

FBW	Fly-By-Wire
FDAD	Force Development and Acquisition Division
FEG	Force Element Group
FFG	Guided Missile Frigate
FPDA	Five Power Defence Arrangements
FPTF2000	From Phantom To Force Report 2000
FSB	Force Support Battalions
FSR91	Force Structure Review 1991
FSV	Fire Support Vehicle
FundamentalsAir	Fundamentals of Australian Aerospace Power
FundamentalsLand	Fundamentals of Land Warfare
FWC	Future Warfighting Concept
FWTF	Fixed Wing Transport Force
GDPF2000	Government Defence Policy Framework 2000
GDS2001	Government Defence Statement 2001
HNA	Hardened And Networked Army, or Hardening And Networking The Army
HQADF	Headquarters Australian Defence Force
HQAST	Headquarters Australian Theatre
HQJFNZ	Headquarters Joint Force New Zealand
HQJOC	Headquarters Joint Operational Command
IEDD/CB	Improvised Explosive Device Disposal and Chemical-Biological
IPV	Inshore Patrol Vessel
IRR	Incident Response Regiment
JOC	Joint Operational Command
JOPC	Joint Offshore Protection Command
JORN	Jindalee Over-The-Horizon Radar Network
JSCFADT	Joint Standing Committee On Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade
JSF	Joint Strike Fighter
LCC	Land Component Commander
LFG	Land Force Group
LFSR2000	Land Forces and Sealift Review 2000
LOV	Light Operational Vehicle
LPA	Landing Platform Amphibious
LST	Landing Ship Tank
LTDP	Long Term Development Plan
MAD	Mutually Assured Destruction
MCC	Maritime Component Commander
MFAT	Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade
MFO	Multinational Force And Observers
MFR2002	Maritime Forces Review 2002
MLOC	Minimum Level Of Capability
MMP	Mixed Member Proportional
MOD	Ministry of Defence
MOLE	Manoeuvre Operations In The Littoral Environment
MPDA	Military Policy Development Adviser
MPF	Maritime Patrol Force
MPR2001	Maritime Patrol Review 2001
MRV	Multi-Role Vessel
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NBC	Nuclear-Biological-Chemical

NCF	Naval Combat Force
NCW	Network Centric Warfare
NCWR	Network Centred Warfare Roadmap
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
NSCC	National Security Committee Of Cabinet
NZDF	New Zealand Defence Force
NZLAV	New Zealand Light Armoured Vehicle
OCDESC	Officials Committee For Domestic And External Security Co-ordination
OLOC	Operational Level Of Capability
OODA	Observation-Orientation-Decision-Action
OOTW	Operations Other Than War
OPV	Offshore Patrol Vessel
PBG	Parachute Battalion Group
PSO	Peace Support Operation
RAAF	Royal Australian Air Force
RAM	Revolution In Attitudes To The Military
RAN	Royal Australian Navy
RCS	Radar Cross Section
RD	Role Demand
RDF	Ready Deployment Force
RFSU	Regional Force Surveillance Units
RFT	Request For Tender
RHIB	Rigid Hull Inflatable Boat
RISTA	Reconnaissance, Intelligence, Surveillance and Target Acquisition
RMA	Revolution In Military Affairs
RMedA	Revolution In Media Affairs
RNZAF	Royal New Zealand Air Force
RNZN	Royal New Zealand Navy
RPG	Rocket-Propelled Grenade
RRRF	Reserve Rapid Response Force
RSL	Returned Services League
SACLOS	Semi-Automatic Command Line Of Sight
SAE	Service Assisted Evacuation
SAM	Surface To Air Missile
SAS	Special Air Service
SCG	Surveillance And Control Group
SDSC	Australian National University Strategic And Defence Studies Centre
SecDef	Secretary of Defence
SIS	Security Intelligence Service
SOC	Special Operations Command
SONZ97	Shape Of New Zealand's Defence 1997 (White Paper)
SOS	Save Our Skyhawks
STV	Single Transferable Vote
TAG	Tactical Assault Group
TCO	Transnational Criminal Organisation
UAV	Unmanned Aerial Vehicle
UN	United Nations
UNCLOS	UN Commission On The Law Of The Sea
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
USN	United States Navy

VCDF	Vice Chief Of Defence Force
VLLAD	Very-Low-Level Air Defence
WMD	Weapons Of Mass Destruction

# Chapter One - Introduction

## Outline of Thesis

It has been more than a dozen years since the Cold War ended, and it has not been a time of peace. In the place of that global bipolar conflict have emerged myriad small, hot wars, and other acts of collective violence: terrorism, genocide, and ethnic cleansing. A new, stable world order has not developed; rather the post-Cold War period has been an era of unconventional threats. These threats pose problems for national militaries, and New Zealand and Australia, as part of the global security system, face them as well.

The major aim of this thesis is to assess the extent of, as well as analyse the rationale for, change in the Australian and New Zealand Defence Forces (ADF and NZDF) in the context of this post-Cold War strategic environment. For much of the 20<sup>th</sup> century the two forces were largely congruent. They served together without fuss in theatres as widely separated as Gallipoli, Tobruk, and Vietnam. Yet in recent years, questions have been asked about the relationship. A belief has arisen that national views on defence have diverged, and that there is no longer a similar “ANZAC attitude” towards defence. If that is true, then it leads into two further questions: what exactly are those differences, and why have they developed?

To answer these questions, this thesis analyses the defence policy process in the two countries, identifying what has changed or stayed the same, and why that has happened. It examines the environment in which policy is made, the content of that policy, and the results of policy. A wide-ranging methodology combines political, financial, institutional and personal factors.

In the latter parts of this work, there is a shift from the descriptive and analytical to the prescriptive and normative. Evaluation is given as to the scope and effectiveness of change in the two militaries. The conclusion includes a list of recommendations for the two militaries, oriented towards enhancing their operational capabilities.

Before moving onto the next section, it is important to emphasise to the reader that this thesis is focused on the operational capabilities of militaries, rather than other related issues such as their sociology. While such issues may be touched upon in the

text, this is only done when they have an identifiable impact on the operational capabilities of a military. To include them otherwise would be to expand the scope of the thesis beyond the achievable, and lose whatever coherence might be hoped for.

## **Author's Background**

In a work of such scope, it is always useful to identify the particulars of the author's background, in order to illuminate potential flaws in both bias and academic skills.

The author's academic grounding is largely in the fields of history, political studies and defence studies. It has included a substantial amount of work in the field of defence, including a thesis on peace support operations.

There are several benefits of such a background. It is interdisciplinary, and not averse to utilising techniques from a variety of academic areas. It lends itself to a belief in the value of context and historicity at all times. Perhaps most importantly, it grants the author technical knowledge of the field of defence, including the terminology.

Along with the benefits of this background are some shortcomings. Most notably, the author has not had the same degree of rigorous methodological training as is often given in various other disciplines.

Bias should also be considered when discussing the author's background. In general, bias stems from the particular motivations of an author – what he or she says often results from why he or she is undertaking a particular work. To help the reader, the author has listed the motivations for this work in the following section.

Any written work contains some bias and distortion, as the mere act of perception is in itself subjective. However, the author has striven as much as possible to avoid any hint of subjectivity or bias. The range of sources consulted and the use of several advisors have been vital in maintaining objectivity.

## **Rationale for Study**

It seems that there is a real opportunity for new research in this field, given the fact that it is such a dynamic issue in global terms, and also the subject of some debate in both Australia and New Zealand.

The first rationale relates to conceptualising the emergent strategic environment. The post-Cold War period has been one that is often characterised as conflict-ridden, and it has been noted that not only has conflict expanded in quantitative terms,<sup>1</sup> but that it has also taken on new (or re-emergent) forms.<sup>2</sup> There has been much debate on the security environment itself<sup>3</sup>, but few attempts have been made to cross the analytical gap and identify how militaries can in turn respond.<sup>4</sup> However, this thesis aims to do that, by analysing the strategic environment and deriving from that a taxonomy of possible military roles.

There seem to be multiple benefits for both Australia and New Zealand from the production of this work. Its particular structure and focus, in being both descriptive and prescriptive, lends it such value. It synthesises the external strategic environment with political realities. It thus steers a path between the ideal and the pragmatic.

One benefit of this thesis is to clarify the issues surrounding recent changes in the NZDF. Public debate has usually been inflammatory and politically-charged,<sup>5</sup> reliant on an overly simplified model of the situation.<sup>6</sup> This thesis will potentially resolve such issues, by providing a more nuanced assessment of the respective capabilities of the two defence forces.

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<sup>1</sup> Klaus Gatzel and Torsten Schwinghammer, *Warfare Since the Second World War*. New Brunswick, Transaction, 2000.

<sup>2</sup> Works that focus on the idea that the post-Cold War period is conflict-ridden are engaged with more closely in Chapter Two. However, a short listing can be given here: John Baylis et al., (eds.), *Strategy in the Contemporary World*. Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2002.; Colin Gray, *Strategy for Chaos*. London, Frank Cass, 2002.; William Schilling, (ed.), *Nontraditional Warfare: Twenty-First-Century Threats and Responses*. Dulles, Brassey's, 2002.; Paul Hirst, *War and Power in the 21st Century*. Cambridge, Polity Press, 2001.

<sup>3</sup> Some of the many works in this area include: Jeremy Black, *War in the New Century*. London, Continuum, 2001; Robert Patman, 'Security in a Post-Cold War Context', in R. Patman (ed.), *Security in a Post-Cold War World*. Basingstoke, Macmillan, 1999; Yahya Sadowski, *The Myth of Global Chaos*. Washington, Brookings Institution, 1998.

<sup>4</sup> Michael Bhatia, *War and Intervention: Issues for Contemporary Peace Operations*. Bloomfield, Kumarian Press, 2003. is one attempt. Another is Douglas MacGregor, *Transformation Under Fire: Revolutionizing How America Fights*. Westport, Praeger, 2003.

<sup>5</sup> Greg Ansley, 'NZ accused of shirking local defence role', *The New Zealand Herald*, 24 February 2000.

<sup>6</sup> Examples include: Max Bradford, 'Stable defence alliances vital for a secure future', *New Zealand Herald*, 12 August 2003; Mark Burton, 'Forces plan couldn't be more explicit', *New Zealand Herald*, 14 August 2003; Nicky Hager, 'In defence it's not size that matters', *New Zealand Herald*, 6 August 2003; Fran O'Sullivan, 'Burton defends policies against air marshal's attack', *New Zealand Herald*, 31 July 2003; Fran O'Sullivan, 'Ex-chief savages defence policy', *New Zealand Herald*, 31 July 2003; Simon Power, 'Serious flaws in armed forces policy', *New Zealand Herald*, 13 August 2003; Unknown Author, 'Editorial: Defence policy an affront to ANZAC spirit', *New Zealand Herald*, 24 April 2003; Unknown Author, 'Editorial: Labour running scared on defence', *New Zealand Herald*, 1 August 2003; Hugh Webb, 'Size does not matter but quality surely does', *New Zealand Herald*, 15 August 2003.

Another potential benefit of this thesis is to improve the understanding of the various organisations involved with defence, such as the Ministry/Department of Defence (MOD and ADOD), granting them a more holistic view of the process. Another benefit may be to increase the general level of public analysis on strategic and defence matters in New Zealand, improving policy advice.

A final rationale for this study is to provide recommendations for the two defence forces that do not come from external analysis. Such might be extremely useful, and allow defence policymakers to see issues in a new light.

The above rationales would be irrelevant if there were another work covering similar issues. However, there is none; rather, there is a distinct gap in the academic research. That is not to say that other works have not served as influences on structure and analysis. The key theme of this thesis is policy adaptation, and so a variety of texts, not necessarily related to defence, have proved of great assistance. The literature review later in this chapter describes them in greater detail.

In general this work steers a new path in the field. Other analyses of defence policy sometimes tend to the solely political, and treat defence as merely an area of politics without real externalities; this work aims to avoid that, as it is felt that defence is qualitatively different to other areas of governmental policy. Few works on defence policy attempt to focus on the operational capabilities of the forces, which are after all, their *raison d'être* and thus most deserving of close academic attention.

It is anticipated that this work will enable an answer to be posited to the question of whether a common ANZAC attitude to defence remains, through careful, indepth and objective analysis of operational capabilities, free of the sometimes inflammatory rhetoric of the public debate. There is a real need for this study, given the seeming daily growth of conflict around the world.

## **Definitions and Methodology**

Several terms require definition before proceeding further. This thesis is entitled “Facing New Challenges: Shaping the ADF and NZDF in the Post-Cold War Strategic Environment”, and it is vital that the specifics of this title be understood.

The NZDF and ADF are defined as per the terms of their respective constitutional documents: the Defence Act 1990<sup>7</sup> in the case of the first, and the Defence Act 1903<sup>8</sup> in the case of the second. The post-Cold War period is defined as encompassing the period from 1991 to date. While this is a somewhat arbitrary selection, some rationale for this is given in Chapter Two. At times it is of course difficult to define an exact date, particularly when synthesising a variety of sources with slightly different chronologies, but care is taken to identify these and deal with them as they occur.

Primarily, this thesis is built on written sources. These have encompassed both primary and secondary sources, including books, periodical articles, policy papers, cabinet minutes, defence force documents, parliamentary records, party political statements and internal bureaucratic documents. Primary materials were obtained from the NZDF, ADF, MOD and ADOD. Secondary sources have included those directly relevant to the changing security environment, such as those on defence technology, and those that have provided other insights, including works on policy theory and politics.

This thesis takes as its primary point of focus, in relation to defence policy, the major defence reviews published in the two countries, whether defined as White Papers or not. This is further explained in Chapter Five.

Interviews and questionnaires have provided another source of information and meant the thesis is not overly reliant on published material. Interviews and questionnaires were given to a variety of people involved with defence, including bureaucrats, practitioners, analysts, academics, and politicians. All interviews were carried out in confidential manner to ensure the subject had the confidence to speak his or her mind.

Research was carried out in both Australia and New Zealand. Time was spent in Wellington, Canberra and Sydney, interviewing current and past defence officials, as well as defence academics, and accessing various library sources.

The methodology of this thesis is best described as eclectic, integrative and comparative. Use has been made of a variety of analytical techniques from a range of disciplines. Emphasis has been placed not on the methodological techniques themselves, but rather on what they could illustrate in regards to the topic; this

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<sup>7</sup> Unknown Author, 'New Zealand Defence Act,' 1990.

<sup>8</sup> Unknown Author, 'Australian Defence Act,' 1903.

avoided methodological purity becoming an end in itself and thus detracting from the real findings of this work. Critical analysis has been made of political rhetoric by comparing it with physical developments.

Two of the methodologies used in this work are deserving of greater attention at this point. In examining policy, a variant of the classical policy cycle was used to illustrate the various phases of the process. This is further examined later on in this chapter. In assessing the capability of a military in contemporary role demands, this thesis uses a taxonomy known as DOTLMS-R (Doctrine, Organisation, Training, Leadership, Materiel, Soldier Systems, and Readiness).<sup>9</sup>

## Theory and Literature

Any public policy in a modern, pluralistic political system, as Anderson has noted, is the outcome of many interrelationships.<sup>10</sup> Defence policy in Australia and New Zealand is no exception. In order to enhance understanding it is therefore helpful to simplify the policymaking process through the application of theory. In this work, theory serves two major functions: first, to arrange issues in a systematic fashion and produce a descriptive model; and, later, to explain the course of policy.

The following sub-sections comprise a selective study of the literature on policymaking in general, and defence policy in particular. The first sub-section surveys broad policymaking theories focused on the process of policymaking, listing various authors and their respective contributions. The second sub-section (and its constituent parts) looks at narrower defence policymaking theories and the hypotheses they suggest. The third sub-section examines the literature on New Zealand defence policy in particular.

However, before proceeding, some points should be noted. The focus of this thesis is on the content and results of policy, rather than the process and structure of its making. Theory is used largely as an aid in describing the process of policy. Only in the latter chapters is it used to explain actual outcomes.

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<sup>9</sup> See TRADOC, 'TRADOC Military History', [accessed 28 October 2004]. Available from [www-tradoc.monroe.army.mil/historian/faqs.htm](http://www-tradoc.monroe.army.mil/historian/faqs.htm).

<sup>10</sup> James Anderson, *Public Policy Making*. London, Praeger, 1975. p.161

## Broad Policymaking Theories

Various models of public policymaking provide insights into the nature of the process. However, no one model is perfect, and thus the best way of using them seems to be to assess a range of methodologies, pick and choose various elements from them, and then synthesise a variant.

A promising model of the policy process is that developed by Dror.<sup>11</sup> It is divided into four parts: (1) the various units involved in policy, (2) the complex network of communication and feedback, (3) the variables that determine how much each unit contributes, and (4) the actual policy that results from such interactions.<sup>12</sup> Dror also mentions the complex interrelation of political desire and economic feasibility.<sup>13</sup> Policy must be understood as something created within real constraints, and as such ideal solutions are rarely achievable. Dror provides us with an elegant descriptive model, although in other parts of his work he also moves into the field of prescription.

Dillon also notes the central importance of political and economic factors, when he states that defence policy “incorporates... the character of the modern state and the operation of politics within it, together with the economic, social and technological dynamics of mass societies.”<sup>14</sup> Policy cannot be analysed merely through an examination of foreign relations – rather, absolutely central to any defence policy decision is a complex domestic political process, rather than just a rational analysis of threat and required countermeasure.<sup>15</sup>

Ham and Hill provide a broad look at the policy process in the modern capitalist state.<sup>16</sup> They note, per Dye, that policy analysis is the “description and explanation of the causes and consequences of government action.” This encompasses both meta-policymaking, which is the study of how the systems and structures within which policy is made are changed, and the policy itself. Ham and Hill note that policy is made by a variety of actors, and it is important to identify whether the state or some other group(s) is(are) the key actor(s) and what roles those groups play.

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<sup>11</sup> Yehezkel Dror, *Public Policymaking Reexamined*. Scranton, Chandler, 1968.

<sup>12</sup> *Ibid.* p.199-200

<sup>13</sup> *Ibid.* p.31

<sup>14</sup> G. Dillon, *Defence Policy Making: A Comparative Analysis*. Leicester, Leicester University Press, 1988. p.8

<sup>15</sup> *Ibid.* p.2

<sup>16</sup> Christopher Ham and Michael Hill, *The Policy Process in the Modern Capitalist State*. Second ed. Hemel Hempstead, Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1993.

An important point they make, in assessing various methodologies, is that the demands of a good descriptive analysis can be in conflict with prescriptive concerns; for example, acknowledging that certain decision processes tend to be influential doesn't mean they should be.

In analysing decisionmaking, Ham and Hill note that both power and rationality are important. The policy process is summarised as being about conflicts between interests, individuals and groups securing positions that are able to make policy, and the study of action constrained by structural forces. Ham and Hill are enamoured of radical organisation theory in explaining how policy is made. Theirs is not a classical, top-down view of policy, and as such its applicability to the state-centred nature of defence policy is possibly limited.

Kingdon's study analyses why certain ideas come to the attention of government.<sup>17</sup> It thus deals with only the very first phase of policy-making, agenda setting, and has little to say on the later parts of the process. It is important to note that his study focuses on the United States system, which is characterised by relatively weak party discipline, a separated executive, and massive disjointed bureaucracies.

Kingdon finds that fixed career civil servants are not as influential in agenda setting as executive branch officials. This is partly related to the fact that most bureaucrats are concerned with administering existent programmes, and do not have the time or will to develop new agenda items. He notes that the importance of interest groups in a particular policy area depends on the partisanship, ideological cast and campaign visibility of issues – an issue that scores low on these counts is likely to have major interest group influence, which at first glance seems counterintuitive. The importance of parties is problematic – they might affect agendas, but the origins of the detailed policies seriously considered by policy makers generally lie elsewhere. However, it is difficult to find exactly where those ideas come from – tracing origins involves infinite regress, and nobody leads anybody else. One cannot be totally sure about the roots of policies, and must be content with simplifications.

Kingdon posits the idea that rather than problems generating solutions, policy entrepreneurs develop solutions and wait for problems to develop to which the solution can be attached – a model akin to a garbage can, where problems, policy and

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<sup>17</sup> John Kingdon, *Agendas, Alternatives and Public Policies*. Boston, Little, Brown and Company, 1984.

politics are “thrown together” simultaneously.<sup>18</sup> A point where problems develop, and which provides an opportunity for particular policy advocates to push their preferred policy, is called a “policy window.” These might be budget crises, or changes in the international environment, or even a period of increased media attention.

The “policy window” theory thus suggests a group of policies are constantly waiting, ready to “spring out” when the “window” is opened. It also suggests that the “window” is only open for a brief period, and if a policy is not put forward during that period, it may be a long time before it can be advocated again. In the New Zealand and Australian environment, the most obvious “policy windows” would appear to be general elections.

Wayne Parsons provides a broad ranging summary of the theory and practice of policy analysis.<sup>19</sup> As such, summarising his work is fraught with problems, as it involves a vast range of conflicting theories and viewpoints. The best method is to simply note the different theories mentioned, without attempt at integration. Parts in which a second author are not noted are representations of Parsons’ own analysis.

Parsons divides policy analysis into four categories: meta-, meso-, decision- and delivery-analysis. He also divides it into analysis of policy, and analysis for policy: the latter is normative. Public policy is described as making choices about what is possible in the context of available resources.

He notes that policy cannot be easily understood in its entirety, and a common simplification is to produce a model or map. However, the map of a policy process is only a representation, and care needs to be taken to distinguish it from reality. Also, the most commonly used map, the policy cycle, is a state-centred, top-down representation and not always applicable.

The conflict between rational and incremental decision-making is noted as having one interesting implication for defence. Rational decisionmaking, such as the PPBS (Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System) utilised in the United States in the 1960s and 1970s, can be flawed when applied to certain, pluralistic areas of policy. But departments with (usually) clear goals and objectives, and relatively small policy-making systems, seem to fit the rational model much better. Defence, in general, possesses those characteristics.

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<sup>18</sup> A slightly alternative view would be that rather than developing solutions without problems, policy entrepreneurs develop solutions for problems that have not yet passed into common perception.

<sup>19</sup> Wayne Parsons, *An introduction to the theory and practice of policy analysis*. Aldershot, Edward Elgar, 1995.

Halls lists three types of viabilities that influence policy (by establishing outer limits): economic, political and administrative.<sup>20</sup> A policy needs to be viable in all three areas to be implemented. This concept could potentially be used to explain the presence, or absence, of innovation in policy.

Sabatier's thinking is useful in determining why a policy is or isn't successfully implemented.<sup>21</sup> Sabatier lists six conditions for effective implementation:

1. Clear and consistent objectives;
2. Adequate causal theory (knowledge of how to bring about change;)
3. Legal implementation structures able to ensure compliance;
4. Committed and skilful implementers;
5. Support of interest groups and sovereigns in legislature/executive;
6. Any changes in socio-economic conditions do not undermine support of groups or sovereignty.

Thus, when assessing the success (or lack thereof) of a particular policy, we can use Sabatier's implementation conditions to hypothesise about causes.

Hofferbert provides a broad funnel model of the general policy process, with descending levels of influence.<sup>22</sup> At the coarsest level are history and geography, then socio-economic conditions, then main political behaviours, then governmental institutions, then elite behaviour. The advantage of this comes from its level of abstraction, which allows it to be used across almost any countries. It also appeals to commonsense. It provides compartments into which almost all of the other theories mentioned can be placed, and provides a clear representation of process; it thus differentiates between different causal levels.<sup>23</sup>

Smith and May note the confusion about descriptive and normative theories also mentioned by Ham and Hill.<sup>24</sup> Both rationalists and incrementalists seem to have muddled the two concepts, which is *a priori* model building and is not actually useful

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<sup>20</sup> Ibid. p.172

<sup>21</sup> Ibid. p.200

<sup>22</sup> Ibid. p.215

<sup>23</sup> Causal levels can be understood through illustration. When asking why, for example, World War Two occurred, we must differentiate between the direct cause – German invasion of Poland – and secondary and tertiary causes, such as German economic problems of the 1930s.

<sup>24</sup> Parsons, *An introduction to the theory and practice of policy analysis*. p.299

in understanding policy. Instead, the analyst must be clear about whether he is describing the process, or prescribing it – and choose his theory and model carefully.

Lindblom's work is perhaps the most illuminating.<sup>25</sup> He notes that policy is made by specialised groups and individuals working in co-operation; thus policymaking must be understood as a system.<sup>26</sup> When analysing policy, we must then ask a variety of questions – who has the power to decide? What are the rules and authority of the policy process? Who are the participants? Are ordinary citizens, interest groups, and political parties involved, and what are their views?<sup>27</sup>

This brief examination of the policy literature indicates that any study of defence policy-making must take into account a wide range of factors. There will be international influences, domestic influences, and a range of influences within the policy-making body itself. But we cannot merely lump them into crude categories without differentiation, for if we do that then the nuances will be lost. For example, it must be remembered that a bureaucracy is not a single, monolithic agency, but rather an environment in which there are often definite hierarchies and jurisdictions whose interplay has effects on the shape of policy.<sup>28</sup> What is needed is a framework that divides the structure into understandable pieces, is not too complex as to become its own *raison d'être*, and is yet not too simplistic as to cast little analytical light onto the matter at hand.

The best approach to describing and explaining the defence policy-making process seems then to be to borrow different elements from the various approaches, depending on their particular usefulness, and combine them to create an analytical framework that seems to fit the defence policymaking process as it appears to the writer. From such a synthesis two taxonomies can be produced: one to describe the policymaking structure, as is done in Chapter Four, and one to describe the policymaking process itself in the various defence reviews, as is done in Chapters Five and Six. Elements will be taken from Dror, Lindblom, Anderson, Hofferbert, Halls and Parson. In taking this approach, one has borrowed from Anderson, who recommends:

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<sup>25</sup> In reference to Lindblom we are referring more to his approach to the policymaking structure, rather than his prescriptive conclusions in relation to incrementalism.

<sup>26</sup> Charles Lindblom, *The Policy-Making Process*. Englewood Cliffs, Prentice-Hall, 1968. p.30-31. Author's italics.

<sup>27</sup> Ibid. p.116-118

<sup>28</sup> Anderson, *Public Policy Making*. p.113-115

(to) not permit oneself to be bound too rigidly or dogmatically to a particular model or theoretical approach... (rather) use those theories on organizing concepts that seem more useful... an explanation of political behaviour, rather than the validation of a given theoretical approach, should be the main purpose of political inquiry and analysis.<sup>29</sup>

The first taxonomy is relatively similar to Hofferbert's funnel model, with some slight differences. This is used to analyse the policymaking structure and provides the framework for Chapter Four.

<b>Modified Funnel Taxonomy – Analysis of Structure</b>
<b>Level One:</b> Foundational Influences (history, geography, demography, economy, externalities.)
<b>Level Two:</b> Influential Bodies (those who influence the shape of policy but do not have legitimate power over policymaking bodies – non-governmental actors, general public, political parties.)
<b>Level Three:</b> Creators and Deciders (those who craft and decide upon policy.)
<b>Level Four:</b> Implementers (those who put decided policy into practice.)

This taxonomy describes the meta-structure of policymaking.<sup>30</sup> It is hoped that this theoretical division is simple yet illustrative, and enhances understanding.

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<sup>29</sup> Ibid. p.25

<sup>30</sup> Ham and Hill, *The Policy Process in the Modern Capitalist State*. p.16

Defence policy making is the product of many influences, and these need to be seen in their entirety.

The combination of creator and decider is done because a separation of the two fails to take into account the very real power of some policy creators, such as elements within the bureaucracy, to also act as decision makers.<sup>31</sup> It will also be noted that this taxonomy, designed to illustrate a (relatively) static structure is derived from a study of process, and is thus developed backwards.

Several issues were engaged with in deciding upon this structure. First, it was asked how relevant classical policy analysis was to defence, given the closed nature of the defence process. Given that many theories, especially those from the United States, engage with interest groups rather than the state itself, it was felt that their applicability was limited.

Yet despite this focus on the state, it was realised that analysis could not focus simply on formal power. Will is just as important, and in some ways concentrated power can both help and hinder change, as noted by Weaver and Rockham. This required some attention being paid to Level One and Level Two influences, but at an earlier stage rather than simultaneously with Level Three.

The production of a taxonomy was regarded as a necessary step in simplifying the policy process, but such mapping is fraught with danger. It must be remembered that this is only a representation, and care needs to be taken to distinguish it from the reality that it describes. This is also the case with the second taxonomy, that used for the defence reviews, and described below.

This second taxonomy is designed to deal with a fluid process, specifically the production of major defence policy reviews. Its form is as follows:

<b>Modified Policy Cycle – Analysis of Process</b>
<b>Stage One</b> – International Context of Review (Broad Context)
<b>Stage Two</b> – Domestic Political Context of Review (Local Context)

<sup>31</sup> Larry Gerson, *Public Policy Making: Processes and Principles*. New York, M.E.Sharpe, 2004. p.99

<b>Stage Three</b> – Defence Issues and Actors (Specific Context, Agenda Setting, Meta-Policymaking)
<b>Stage Four</b> – Process of Review (Agenda Setting, Selection, Bargaining, Deciding)
<b>Stage Five</b> – Result and Implementation (Deciding, Implementing, Evaluating, Communicating)

It can be seen immediately that there are similarities between this taxonomy and the modified funnel structure used earlier. This is deliberate. The cycle begins with broad contextual issues, the international and domestic political contexts, then narrows down, firstly into involved persons, and secondly onto the actual writing of the review above. It should be noted that the stages do not correspond with the levels of the modified funnel structure precisely. For example, during Stage Four issues from Levels One, Two and Three will likely be involved.

Thus, the range of theories surveyed above can be used to develop a descriptive framework with which to understand the policy process. However, a second use of theory is to explain the outcome of policy. Here, the abovementioned literature is less useful. A great deal of it is United States-centred, and ill-suited to the description of policy in a parliamentary system such as New Zealand and Australia. Also, it is usually developed from fields separated from defence by some analytical space, and thus not specifically relevant. Thus, we must set the greater part of it aside, for explanatory purposes at least, but still keep in mind some of the concepts. However, the following section, which describes the specific defence policy literature, does provide us with some particular hypotheses that retain utility in the restricted field of this thesis.

## Narrow Defence Policy Theories

### *Sub-section One – General Process / Actors / Budgeting / Legislature*

Schilling's study analyses the factors that went into the creation of the United States defence budget for a single year.<sup>32</sup> He notes the budget was as much about power and interest as information and reason. Only within a certain "climate of opinions", a prevailing image of the area of choice, could a process of conflict and accommodation take place; not all areas were open for discussion. The policy process was leaderless, lacking a central point of coordination due to diffusion of power and responsibility amongst decision-making elites. Opportunities for rationality were limited by the complex and contingent nature of problems; even the fact of fixing a budget limit impinged on policy choices. While, in outline, the process seemed relatively rational, it was in fact a product of guesses and the differential power of various actors. Little attention was paid to higher level policy, best exemplified by the tendency for the examining Congress to concentrate on minutiae rather than strategy, a tendency termed "penny-wise policy-foolish" by the author.

Bobrow categorises defence actors into four groups.<sup>33</sup> In the first he places defence professionals, including military and civilian personnel, and private citizens whose career is directly linked to defence. In the second he includes members of government with an influence on defence. In the third he places defence advisors, and in the fourth the general public – those who must accept policy for it to work. His study provides more a taxonomy than an explanatory theory, but is mentioned here due to its scope.

Cohen studies the influence of the United States Congress on policy. He notes its critical role is to provide oversight, and to act as either a critic or supporter of executive policy.<sup>34</sup> Dexter's study is similar to Cohen's.<sup>35</sup> He notes that Congressmen often display a large degree of respect to the advice of military professionals. It is

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<sup>32</sup> Warner Schilling, 'The Politics of National Defence: Fiscal 1950', in Warner Schilling, Paul Hammond, and Glenn Snyder (eds.), *Strategy, Politics and Defence Budgets*. New York, Columbia University Press, 1966.

<sup>33</sup> Davis Bobrow, 'Components of Defence Policy', in Davis Bobrow (ed.), *Components of Defence Policy*. Chicago, Rand McNally & Co, 1965.

<sup>34</sup> William Cohen, 'The US Senate and the Presidency', in Robert Pfaltzgraff Jnr and Uri Ra'anan (eds.), *National Security Policy: The Decision-Making Process*. Hamden, Archon Books, 1984.

<sup>35</sup> Lewis Dexter, 'Congressmen and the Making of Military Policy', in Davis Bobrow (ed.), *Components of Defence Policy*. Chicago, Rand McNally & Co, 1965.

interesting to consider whether the same situation occurs in New Zealand and Australia, or whether parliamentarians in the two countries are more doubtful of the expertise of servicemen.

Heginbotham provides another critique of the Congressional role.<sup>36</sup> He notes that the Congressional budget process deliberately avoids full blown debate on the strategic level aspects of defence policy, due to the desire to avoid further conflict. Instead, focus is on the micro-level aspects of project funding, and Congressmen take strategy almost for granted.

Huntington provides a general criticism of United States defence policy, largely founded on the belief that it is government by committee.<sup>37</sup> He notes that defence programmes are the products of controversy, negotiations and bargaining between different groups. Logrolling prevails, overall objectives get lost in the mechanism, and the premium is agreement, not decision. It is a legislative process at the executive level, and public involvement is not desired due to the need to protect the already existent policy equilibrium

Kolodziej's study focuses on nuclear weapon policy across presidential, parliamentary and mixed systems.<sup>38</sup> Perhaps Kolodziej's most important claims revolve around the concept of previous choices. He notes that prior commitments to certain defence capabilities can banalise and bureaucratise subsequent decisions in those areas, removing freedom of choice. Military systems, once they have entered service, disappear from the policy space and are thus generally free of political considerations. This seems to differ markedly from other fields of policy. In comparing systems, Kolodziej also notes that a British-style parliament tends to polarise party differences on defence issues more than a presidential system.

Lyons discusses the United States system again, and notes that it is a relatively common belief that civil service employees within the American Department of Defence (DOD) have more influence than any other group within that organisation.<sup>39</sup>

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<sup>36</sup> Stanley Heginbotham, 'Congress and Defence Policy Making: Towards Realistic Expectations in a System of Countervailing Parochialisms', in Robert Pfaltzgraff Jr and Uri Ra'anana (eds.), *National Security Policy: The Decision-Making Process*. Hamden, Archon Books, 1984.

<sup>37</sup> Samuel Huntington, 'Strategic Planning and the Political Process', in Davis Bobrow (ed.), *Components of Defence Policy*. Chicago, Rand McNally & Co, 1965.

<sup>38</sup> Edward Kolodziej, 'Nuclear Weapons and Policy Stability', in R.Kent Weaver and Bert Rockman (eds.), *Do Institutions Matter? Government Capabilities in the United States and Abroad*. Washington, The Brookings Institution, 1993.

<sup>39</sup> Gene Lyons, 'The New Civil-Military Relations', in Davis Bobrow (ed.), *Components of Defence Policy*. Chicago, Rand McNally & Co, 1965.

This implies a dictatorship of the bureaucracy, due largely to their control of the channels of information.

### *Sub-section Two – Acquisition and Procurement*

White in his study of procurement points out that rationality must sometimes take a second place to political considerations; a major aspect, in the United States system at least, is whether the defence contractor is located in an influential politician's constituency.<sup>40</sup>

Spinney studies the way stated policy seldom meshes with reality.<sup>41</sup> He notes that acquisition within the United States is dominated by narrow interest groups within defence, devoid of a high level view, who believe that continual budget growth will solve all defence problems. The system is anarchical, due to financial instability, and the need to prepare for three years at once. In order to retain some stability, satisficing is a common strategy, and while it has positive effects for day-to-day running it leaves the long-term outlook untouched. Defence policy, in the field of acquisition at least, is thus a classic Lindblomian incrementalist system.

Fox notes the incremental, micromanaged nature of the acquisition process in the United States.<sup>42</sup> This is partly due to the way budgets are built from the ground up, and partly due to attempts by Congress to micromanage. He notes that the services, rather than civilians, continue to dominate acquisition, and that the process is flawed. The defence bureaucracy can and has subverted attempts by senior officials to reform the process. Turf protection, and the sheer volume of day-to-day work, which makes any major change untenable, means the acquisition process is highly conservative in structure, and this in turn leads to major inefficiencies.

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<sup>40</sup> Richard White, 'Congressional Limitations and Oversight of Executive Decision-making Power: The Influence of the Members and the Staff', in Robert Pfaltzgraff Jr and Uri Ra'anan (eds.), *National Security Policy: The Decision-Making Process*. Hamden, Archon Books, 1984.

<sup>41</sup> Franklin Spinney, *Defence Facts of Life: The Plan/Reality Mismatch*. Edited by James Clay Thompson. Boulder, Westview Press, 1985.

<sup>42</sup> J.Ronald Fox and James Field, *The Defence Management Challenge: Weapons Acquisition*. Boston, Harvard University Press, 1988.

### *Sub-section Three - Doctrinal Innovation*

Pierce looks at change in militaries, studying what he terms “disruptive innovations”, and focusing largely on the twentieth century.<sup>43</sup> Disruptive innovations are changes in one of the primary combat arms of a service in the way it fights, or alternatively, the creation of a new combat arm. He notes the theories of Posen, Rosen, Cote and Kier but posits his own synthetic explanation for disruptive innovation. This is a two step intellectual-political process based around small groups who develop and nurture innovation. It includes external factors, such as culture, but also internal factors within the armed forces. He notes that civilian intervention does not of itself create disruptive innovations within militaries, but is crucial to their later sustainment within the armed forces once created. Civilians in times of change are more likely to ask their militaries to examine and counter new threats than they are during times of stability. Pierce’s thesis is largely limited to warfighting practice but has some relevance, as its central core is understanding how and why change occurs in the way militaries carry out vital tasks.

Posen studies the source of military doctrine between the World Wars.<sup>44</sup> He notes that there is often a disconnect between military doctrine and political grand strategy. He notes that organisational theory posits three causal forces for change, namely purpose, people and environment. He also notes that bureaucracies should place a premium on predictability, sustainability and avoiding uncertainty. In comparing the influence of the international system, versus the state itself, on determining doctrine, he makes certain points. He notes that organisational theory is largely vindicated by the long periods of doctrinal continuity, and few periods of change. He notes that civilian involvement is necessary if innovation is to occur, and such intervention is often motivated by changes in the international system; thus there is almost a conflict between internal factors, which promote stability, and external factors, which may necessitate change. Even this brief summary seems to indicate the applicability of Posen to this thesis.

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<sup>43</sup> Terry Pierce, *Warfighting and Disruptive Technologies: Disguising Innovation*. London, Frank Cass, 2004. Pierce notes that innovation theory suggests that militaries should not innovate regularly due to their bureaucratic nature.

<sup>44</sup> Barry Posen, *The Sources of Military Doctrine: France, Britain and Germany Between the World Wars*. New York, Cornell University Press, 1984.

Kier also studies the way that military doctrine develops.<sup>45</sup> She claims that doctrinal developments are best understood from a cultural perspective. Civilian interaction is causal, and civilian beliefs about the role of the military are vital. However, culture provides means, not ends, a way of organising action, not doctrine in itself. Specifically, “a military’s culture shapes its choice between an offensive and a defensive military doctrine but does not provide a recipe for changing a military’s culture.” The same culture may result in widely different results if the external situation changes, exemplified by the development of French doctrine between the world wars.

Rosen deals with the process of organisational change and innovation within militaries.<sup>46</sup> He notes that control over the promotion of officers in the service is the source of power, and that any attempt to innovate requires control of promotion pathways if the innovation is to be bedded in. In his theory, military planners are driven to consider the need for innovation by broad structural changes in the security environment, and the possibility of problems that cannot be handled by routine operations. Intraservice competition is vital, as various arms compete for new roles. Civilian intervention is not the primary cause of innovation, and in fact civilian leaders have a relatively minor role in change. What is striking is that innovation seems to be as common in times of resource constraint as in times of largesse. Peacetime innovation is a slow process, however, taking at least a decade.

Snyder’s study analyses a major shift in the strategic goals of US defence policy, the “New Look” of 1953.<sup>47</sup> He notes that this shift may have been partly motivated by a political desire by the incoming administration to be seen to be innovative. While financial matters were vital, the military decision-makers stayed firm to their strategic viewpoints; there was no budgetary cart before the policy horse. However, the services were very wilful, and opposed to the central defence administration. At times the role boundaries between the various actors blurred and it was unclear what each was aiming to achieve.

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<sup>45</sup> Elizabeth Kier, *Imagining War: French and British Military Doctrine Between the Wars*. Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1997.

<sup>46</sup> Stephen Rosen, *Winning the Next War: Innovation and the Modern Military*. Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 1991.

<sup>47</sup> Glenn Snyder, 'The "New Look" of 1953', in Warner Schilling, Paul Hammond, and Glenn Snyder (eds.), *Strategy, Politics and Defence Budgets*. New York, Columbia University Press, 1966.

### *The Utility of Narrow Theories*

In a study of military change, these narrow theories have greater applicability in some ways than do the broader policymaking theories mentioned earlier. However, many are still restricted because of their focus on the United States. They do not necessarily mesh well with parliamentary systems such as are found in Australia and New Zealand. Chapter Four shows that the Australian and New Zealand defence bureaucracies are markedly centralised, a major point of difference with their overseas counterparts. It also shows that, in New Zealand at least, defence is regarded as a relatively unimportant issue, compared to the situation in the United States. Thus these theories should still be noted, but cannot be used in their entirety as accurate explanatory tools.

Kolodziej's study has more validity, given its cross-system perspective. However, perhaps the most useful theories are those that have focused on doctrinal development, such as those of Posen, Rosen, Kier and Pierce. This is because they deal with causal factors that are largely independent of the political system, such as culture and intraservice competition. These theories provide useful perspectives on the nature of military change, and thus by extension the reasons for military continuity.

Most importantly, these theories give us a set of abstract hypotheses to consider, concepts to sharpen thinking, rather than neat solutions. Firstly, has change or continuity been the case in the two defence forces? Secondly, what has been the cause of that change, or continuity? Can it be traced to culture, or intraservice bargaining, or interservice rivalry, or the intervention of civilian actors? In latter chapters, the above theories will be revisited to consider what relevance they have to the findings of this thesis.

### **Specific Works**

Several works have been produced in the United States relating to how militaries have adapted, or should adapt, to post-Cold War demands, and each of them has proven useful, both in developing analytical frameworks and also in

understanding particular concepts.<sup>48</sup> One is Richards Lacquement's book, *Shaping American Capabilities After the Cold War*.

This thesis borrows heavily from Lacquement's structure. His work first defines the extent of change in the United States military between approximately 1990 and 2002. He then analyses the major defence reviews of the period, identifying the actors and processes involved, and the eventual results. His hypothesis is that stagnation in the structure of the United States military has been caused by a variety of factors, ranging from bureaucratic conservatism to service intransigence. In the latter chapters of this work, his theories on stagnation and innovation will also be assessed in relation to the situation in Australia and New Zealand.

Other studies have been published in recent years on New Zealand and Australian defence policy.<sup>49</sup> While their focus is somewhat different than that of this thesis, they have still proven useful inputs and are built on by this work.

## Structure of Thesis

This work has been arranged in ten chapters. They are as follows.

Chapter One is the introduction. It includes a summary of the rationale for the study, a discussion of the methodology used, a literature review, an evaluation of potentially useful theories, and an outline of the rest of the thesis.

Chapter Two examines the global security environment. It begins with a brief summary of the Cold War era and the roles militaries were expected to undertake during that era. The chapter then shifts to the post-Cold War era, identifying various influences that have shaped the contemporary security environment. From a synthesis of these the chapter identifies ten roles for militaries relevant to post-Cold War security demands. Each role demand is defined and expanded upon, and the way militaries can best adapt to them is assessed. From these ten role demands a methodological framework to identify capability is derived, and its usage briefly explained.

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<sup>48</sup> John Alexander, *Winning the War: Advanced Weapons, Strategies and Concepts for the Post 9/11 World*. New York, St Martin's Press, 2003; Richard Lacquement Jnr, *Shaping American Capabilities After the Cold War*. Westport, Praeger, 2003; MacGregor, *Transformation Under Fire: Revolutionizing How America Fights*.

<sup>49</sup> A selection of them includes: James Rolfe, *The Armed Forces of New Zealand*. St Leonards, Allen & Unwin, 1999; James Rolfe, *Defending New Zealand: A Study of Structures, Processes and Relationships*. Wellington, Institute of Policy Studies, 1993. See also Desmond Ball and Cathy Downes, (eds.), *Security and Defence: Pacific and global perspectives*. Sydney, Allen & Unwin, 1990.

Chapter Three assesses the two defence forces at the beginning of the period of analysis, in 1991. It begins with some general observations about size and equipment, and concludes with a summary of the two forces and an assessment of whether or not they were similarly oriented at the time.

Chapter Four describes the way in which defence policy is made in Australia and New Zealand. It is structured around the modified funnel taxonomy described in Chapter One. It begins with a broad analysis of the two countries, examining historical, demographic, and economic factors, and then moves on to focus on more narrow political and institutional factors. The mechanisms of defence policy making are identified and compared. Changes in the policymaking systems throughout the post-Cold War period are also noted and assessed.

Chapter Five and Chapter Six show how policymakers in New Zealand and Australia, respectively, have responded to the post-Cold War security environment. This is done largely through an analysis of the major defence policy reviews of the period, using the modified policy cycle taxonomy developed in this chapter. There is also some mention of acquisitions, upgrades and other major policy decisions.

Chapter Seven shows the results of those policy processes by examining force structure continuity and change in the two nations. It identifies what has changed, and what has stayed the same. Various elements of force structure and doctrine are examined, and placed in one of three categories: restructuring, reduction, or continuity. It makes a conclusion as to the overall extent of post-Cold War change in the two defence forces.

Chapter Eight sums up and combines the analyses of Chapters Five, Six and Seven. It explains why continuity or change has occurred, and develops a range of hypotheses and explanations using the evidence of Chapters Five and Six and the theories identified in Chapter One.

Chapter Nine assesses the effectiveness and value of identified changes. It evaluates the capability of the two defence forces to meet policy goals, given the character of the evolving strategic environment. It then makes a series of recommendations for both defence forces to better meet the requirements of the contemporary and future security situation.

Chapter Ten concludes the thesis by summarising the major themes of the thesis, making a final judgement on the state of the two defence forces, and answering the question as to whether they have converged or diverged during the post-Cold War

period. It makes some predictions about the future state of the two defence forces. Finally, it ends with a list of suggestions for possible future research, building on the findings of this work.

# **Chapter Two – The Post-Cold War Security Environment: An Era Of Evolving Challenges**

## **Introduction**

The role of this chapter is to examine the post-Cold War security environment, and, from this, extrapolate a list of military role demands relevant to the contemporary period. It thus provides the broader context for later analysis of Australian and New Zealand defence policy during this period. It is divided into two sections.

The first section of the chapter looks at background conditions and major trends in the global security environment. These include factors that cause conflict and factors that shape responses to such conflict. It begins by discussing the security environment of the Cold War, identifying the defining themes of that period, and briefly analysing how those themes affected the structures and orientation of military forces during that period. Once that background has been established, this section moves forward in time. It examines various issues that have shaped and altered the post-Cold War security environment. The dissolution of the Soviet Union, the resultant rise of multilateralism and globalisation, and resource and environmental pressures are touched upon. The section then focuses on several more specific threats to global security: the rise in ethnic conflict, the increase in terrorism, and the proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMDs). Another important issue, the growing importance of technology in warfare and the nascent or existent Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA), is also examined, and its impact on the security environment assessed.

This section ends with a summary of these trends, and an attempt to synthesise an accurate and coherent view of the character of both conflict and military operations in the contemporary world. It also includes some predictions about the nature of conflict in the near future.

The second section of this chapter extrapolates a set of military role demands from this changing security environment. These are the types of operations that militaries around the world face, or potentially face, today and in the near future.

Some ten role demands are listed. Each is defined and identified, although there are some overlaps between them. Their importance is explained, and the requirements they impose on militaries assessed; this includes a brief analysis of why Cold War-style militaries are not necessarily well suited to these post-Cold War demands.

The chapter concludes with the production of a framework with which to measure the capability of a military to meet the aforementioned role demands.

## **Part One – The Changing Environment**

### **The Cold War – A Time Of Little Change**

The essential starting point of any examination of post-Cold War change is of course to examine the prior roles of militaries during the Cold War. In this work, the Cold War is regarded as encompassing the period from 1946 to 1991. That latter date seems fitting as it was not until the end of 1991 that the dynamics of the Cold War finally ran their course.<sup>1</sup>

During the Cold War, the United States (US) and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) were the pre-eminent global powers, and carried out their ideological rivalry across the globe.<sup>2</sup> States were forced into either supporting one of the two blocs or choosing non-alignment.<sup>3</sup> While there were phases of détente, and “thaws” in the Cold War, the general atmosphere was one of distrust and fear between the superpowers.<sup>4</sup>

As a result of this distrust, both superpowers acquired an immense arsenal of nuclear weapons, easily sufficient to destroy the other. A global nuclear war was felt to be a distinct possibility.<sup>5</sup> Instead of developing defences against nuclear weapons,<sup>6</sup> the superpowers relied on the concept of Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD).<sup>7</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Lawrence Freedman, *The Cold War: A Military History*. London, Cassell, 2001. p.201

<sup>2</sup> Samuel Payne Jnr, *The Conduct of War: An Introduction to Modern Warfare*. Oxford, Blackwell, 1988. p.269

<sup>3</sup> Paul Hirst, *War and Power in the 21st Century*. Cambridge, Polity Press, 2001. p.72-73

<sup>4</sup> Payne Jnr, *The Conduct of War: An Introduction to Modern Warfare*. p.69-72

<sup>5</sup> Ibid. p.39

<sup>6</sup> Matthew Mowthorpe, *The Militarization and Weaponization of Space*. London, Lexington Books, 2004. p.44-45

<sup>7</sup> Freedman, *The Cold War: A Military History*. p.85

Other nations, both middle powers such as Great Britain, China and France, and smaller powers such as South Africa, Libya, Israel and India, also developed or attempted to develop their own nuclear weapons. Due to the sheer size and power of the nuclear arsenals held around the globe, other WMD were largely regarded as being of lesser importance.<sup>8</sup>

Apart from nuclear war, the other major threat to global security, especially as perceived by the US and its Western-bloc allies, was a massive Soviet conventional invasion of Western Europe. Less attention was given to smaller, regional wars, even though these were actually the most common types of conflict during the Cold War period.<sup>9</sup> By and large, strategic analysis focused on states rather than non-state actors.<sup>10</sup>

The organisation of First and Second World militaries reflected the bipolar confrontation.<sup>11</sup> They focused on large-scale conventional war,<sup>12</sup> involving armoured armies and massive losses.<sup>13</sup> There was generally an emphasis on attritional styles of conventional warfare, rather than manoeuvre.<sup>14</sup> To supply such immense forces, consuming a vast quantity of ammunition at higher rates than anything experienced before, required a large logistical tail, as well as a great deal of pre-planning and stockpiling. This reduced the flexibility and deployability of forces to unexpected contingencies.

Amongst Western and Eastern bloc nations non-conventional operations, such as peacekeeping, were regarded as being of lesser importance. Such operations were

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<sup>8</sup> J. Perry Robinson, 'What can Britain do to prevent the spread of chemical and biological weapons', in John Gittings and Ian Davis (eds.), *Rethinking defence and foreign policy*. Nottingham, Spokesman, 1996. p.67

<sup>9</sup> Martin van Creveld, 'The Future of War', in Robert Patman (ed.), *Security in a Post-Cold War World*. Basingstoke, Macmillan, 1999. p.28-34 and Benjamin Miller, 'Hot War, Cold Peace: An International-Regional Synthesis', in Zeev Maoz and Azar Gat (eds.), *War in a Changing World*. Michigan, University of Michigan Press, 2001. See also Klaus Gatzel and Torsten Schwinghammer, *Warfare Since the Second World War*. New Brunswick, Transaction, 2000.

<sup>10</sup> Martin Shubik, 'Terrorism, Technology, and the Socioeconomics of Death', *Comparative Strategy*, vol. 16, no. 4, October/December 1997. p.407

<sup>11</sup> The following description applies broadly to almost all NATO and Warsaw Pact militaries.

<sup>12</sup> Timothy Thomas, 'Information Warfare in the Second (1999-) Chechen War: Motivator for Military Reform?' in Anne Aldis and Roger McDermott (eds.), *Russian Military Reform 1992-2002*. London, Frank Cass, 2003. p.230

<sup>13</sup> Stuart Johnson, Martin Libicki, and Gregory Treverton, 'Introduction', in Stuart Johnson, Martin Libicki, and Gregory Treverton (eds.), *New Challenges and New Tools for Defense Decisionmaking*. Santa Monica, RAND, 2003. p.1

<sup>14</sup> Freedman, *The Cold War: A Military History*. p.142-143. This is of course a simplification. Soviet doctrine, and especially the concept of the Operational Manoeuvre Group, was manoeuvrist to some extent. US doctrine pre-AirLandBattle, however, was not. However the sheer size of the militaries, and their expected narrow theatre of operations (Northern Europe), gave even the most manoeuvrist concepts a strong attritional flavour.

often seen as a distraction from the primary task of warfighting, and little effort was expended in adapting militaries to their requirements.<sup>15</sup> The same was true with counter-insurgency. In Vietnam, US practice was seldom well suited to the specific demands of that war, relying on search and destroy rather than hearts and minds.<sup>16</sup> Nor did it appear that the Soviet Union was any better suited to low-intensity operations, as their Afghanistan experience indicated.<sup>17</sup> Generally, when Cold War-oriented armies engaged in non-conventional operations they were not particularly proficient.<sup>18</sup>

The primary reason that so little effort was expended in adapting conventionally oriented forces to proficiency in these non-core operational roles was that the stakes were simply too high to afford any wasted effort. Inter-bloc war, if it erupted, would require all the military resources of the combatant nations.

Yet, two thirds of wars during the Cold War were internal conflicts.<sup>19</sup> Many occurred in Third World countries and were proxy conflicts supported by the superpowers.<sup>20</sup> This is something that must be kept in mind when we study the post-Cold War period; the major change has not been an increase in ethnic conflict and intra-state war but rather the end of bipolar confrontation, which has in turn freed governmental attention to focus on other issues.

Thus, the roles and structures of militaries during the Cold War were constrained by the overarching demands of that bipolar structure. Focus remained firmly on nuclear and conventional war.<sup>21</sup> Little or no effort was used to adapt forces to non-conventional operations, except in a few places, such as South and Central America. The Cold War froze the structures of militaries in a form designed to fight major wars.

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<sup>15</sup> Zhivan Alach, 'Peace Support Operations: International Evolution and New Zealand Adaptation', MA, University of Auckland, 2002. Chapter Two; and J. Bowyer Bell, *Dragonwars*. New Brunswick, Transaction, 1999.

<sup>16</sup> Freedman, *The Cold War: A Military History*. p.90-104

<sup>17</sup> Ibid. p.179

<sup>18</sup> Alach, 'Peace Support Operations: International Evolution and New Zealand Adaptation'. Chapter Two describes many of the problems that Cold War militaries experienced in adjusting to the demands of peace support operations.

<sup>19</sup> The following section is based largely on Gautzel and Schwinghammer, *Warfare Since the Second World War*. especially pages 76-106

<sup>20</sup> Michael Klare, 'An avalanche of guns: light weapons traffickers and armed conflict in the post-Cold War world', in Mary Kaldor and Basker Vashee (eds.), *Restructuring the Global Military Sector: New Wars*. London, Pinter, 1997. p.57

<sup>21</sup> Payne Jnr, *The Conduct of War: An Introduction to Modern Warfare*. p.159 has some interesting points to note on the nature of nuclear-conventional war

## The Post-Cold War Security Environment

The Cold War ended, against all predictions, during the last years of the 1980s and first years of the 1990s. This work will not discuss the causes of this thaw in superpower relations, but suffice it to say that by the end of the process, confrontation between the Eastern and Western blocs had largely ended, and the US was unrivalled as the world's premier superpower. In contrast, the USSR dissolved into several successor states, each economically weak and posing little or no challenge to potential US hegemony. A working relationship, tending later to friendship, developed swiftly between the two blocs, after a half century of antagonism and conflict. As relations improved, the possibility of global nuclear war receded, with a drawdown in the size of their nuclear arsenals, followed by the end of the practice of directly targeting each other's cities with strategic weapons. The process of nuclear weapons reduction continues today, with the positive end result that global nuclear war is now but a faint possibility, tending almost to the impossible.<sup>22</sup>

Along with nuclear weapons, conventional forces were also downsized in the early 1990s, especially in Europe. Both sides reduced their military establishments, given that the primary need for such large organisations – massive global war – had largely disappeared.<sup>23</sup> Also, due to economic constraints, and the need for reduced spending, the USSR (and its primary successor state, Russia) began to withdraw from political and military involvement around the globe.

This reduction in bipolar confrontation led initially to a widespread feeling of optimism in regard to global security. The period around 1991 was a time of hope; some commentators and analysts believed that a new era of peace was about to emerge around the world, stemming from the spread of representative democracy into nations formerly controlled by Communist ideologies.<sup>24</sup> At first glance this seemed a very real possibility. The United Nations (UN), the pre-eminent institution to promote global peace and security, was freed up after almost a half century of superpower

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<sup>22</sup> J. Simpson, 'Achieving Nuclear Weapons Non-Proliferation and Non-Possession: Problems and Prospects', in Robert Patman (ed.), *Security in a Post-Cold War World*. Basingstoke, Macmillan, 1999. p.145-147

<sup>23</sup> Richard Lacquement Jnr, *Shaping American Capabilities After the Cold War*. Westport, Praeger, 2003. p.60-94; Anne Aldis and Roger McDermott, (eds.), *Russian Military Reform 1992-2002*. London, Frank Cass, 2003.

<sup>24</sup> Francis Fukuyama, "The End of History," *The National Interest*, Summer, 1989

constraint.<sup>25</sup> The end of bipolar rivalry portended a reduction in the number of proxy conflicts around the globe.<sup>26</sup>

Such optimistic predictions have not come to pass. The post-Cold War period has been unstable and full of violence. Not one corner of the globe has been untouched: terrorists have attacked the US, there has been vicious ethnic conflict in Central Europe, mass slaughter in Africa, and civil disturbance even in the South Pacific, a region once noted for its sleepy, peaceful nature.

In responding to these new threats, Western militaries have been busier since the end of the Cold War than they were during it. Militaries have been almost continually involved in operations ranging from peacekeeping through to high speed, manoeuvrist conventional war - operations usually very different to those for which they had been organised and oriented for some fifty years.<sup>27</sup>

The post-Cold War period has not been an amorphous morass of conflict. There are several specific issues and trends that have both caused wars and shaped the responses of Western nations. To understand this period, it is necessary to isolate, identify and assess those issues.

## **Globalisation and the New World Order**

Globalisation, and linked issues of multilateralism, sovereignty and the media, have played important roles in shaping the post-Cold War security environment. Globalisation is a multi-faceted concept, but might be defined as the way that the world has become increasingly unified. Technology has “shrunk” the world, allowing information and capital to flow between nations in a way that was largely impossible during the Cold War for both technical and political reasons.<sup>28</sup>

It has been suggested that globalisation in particular is at the root of so-called “global chaos” and thus has been the primary factor in the rise of conflict in the post-Cold War world. This view has been disputed strongly by Sadowski,<sup>29</sup> yet it should

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<sup>25</sup> Alach, 'Peace Support Operations: International Evolution and New Zealand Adaptation'. Chapter Two

<sup>26</sup> Miller, 'Hot War, Cold Peace: An International-Regional Synthesis'. p.104-122 has an interesting analysis of the causes and courses of such conflicts.

<sup>27</sup> Charles Moskos, John Williams, and David Segal, (eds.), *The Postmodern Military: Armed Forces after the Cold War*. New York, Oxford University Press, 2000. Appendix p.279-282

<sup>28</sup> Globalisation has existed for centuries but has intensified in the post-Cold War period.

<sup>29</sup> Yahya Sadowski, *The Myth of Global Chaos*. Washington, Brookings Institution, 1998. While one can accept his thesis that ethnic and other conflicts have not exploded post-Cold War in absolute terms,

still be kept in mind as a major influence on the structure of the security environment, even if it is not quite as simple as some “global chaos” theorists might suggest.<sup>30</sup>

Globalisation allows new cultural values, usually Western, to reach more traditional societies, which can in turn create tension relating to culture clash.<sup>31</sup> Globalisation can also serve to exacerbate social divisions between the “haves” and the “have-nots,” which causes societal stress and potentially conflict.<sup>32</sup> Also, globalisation can result in tension between rural and urban societies.<sup>33</sup> There is a belief that one backlash by some groups against modernist values introduced by globalisation is a return to traditional ethos such as fundamentalist Islam.<sup>34</sup> Tied to globalisation is increasing urbanisation, as previously agricultural populations flock to cities.<sup>35</sup>

Globalisation has also weakened inter-state barriers. Borders are now far more open, leading to enhanced trade and the freer flow of people. However, this also means that threats can often not be confined to a single state, but spread easily around the globe.<sup>36</sup> Transnational Criminal Organisations (TCOs), for example, find it much easier to move around than they did during the Cold War.<sup>37</sup>

Multilateralism has also become newly important in the post-Cold War period. Regional groups, free of the constraints of the Cold War, have become increasingly

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it is obvious that they have done so in relative terms; their importance is far higher now that the Cold War struggle is gone. Also, while his argument seems to defeat a monocausal explanation of global chaos, my argument is that globalisation, multilateralism and the rising role of the media are but one factor in the changing global political-military environment, and not necessarily a causative factor of conflict at that

<sup>30</sup> Peter Schoettle, 'Key Geostrategic Trends: A Cloudy Crystal Ball', *Naval War College Review*, vol. 48, no. 1, Winter 1995. p.68-69

<sup>31</sup> Douglas MacGregor, *Transformation Under Fire: Revolutionizing How America Fights*. Westport, Praeger, 2003. p.48

<sup>32</sup> M. Renner, 'Fighting for Survival: Environmental Decline, Social Conflict, and the New Age of Insecurity', in Robert Patman (ed.), *Security in a Post-Cold War World*. Basingstoke, Macmillan, 1999. p.87

<sup>33</sup> Ronald Palmer, 'Terrorism in Southeast Asia: Malaysia, Singapore, the Philippines and Indonesia', in John Davis (ed.), *The Global War on Terrorism: Assessing the American Response*. New York, Nova Science, 2004. p.132-133

<sup>34</sup> *Ibid.* p.132-133

<sup>35</sup> Terry McGee, 'Globalisation, Urbanisation and the Emergence of Sub-Global Regions: A Case Study of the Asia-Pacific Region', in Terry McGee and R.F. Watters (eds.), *Asia-Pacific: New Geography of the Pacific Rim*. Wellington, Victoria University Press, 1997. p.29

<sup>36</sup> Robert Patman, 'Security in a Post-Cold War Context', in R. Patman (ed.), *Security in a Post-Cold War World*. Basingstoke, Macmillan, 1999. p.4 and Bernhard Fleckenstein, 'Germany: Forerunner of a Postnational Military?' in Charles Moskos, John Williams, and David Segal (eds.), *The Postmodern Military: Armed Forces after the Cold War*. New York, Oxford University Press, 2000. p.82

<sup>37</sup> Terry Terriff et al., *Security Studies Today*. Cambridge, Polity Press, 1999. p.149-155

assertive.<sup>38</sup> This new assertiveness is also a reflection of the fact, as mentioned above, that many security problems cannot be satisfactorily dealt with by individual states, but require an international response.

Some multilateral groups, such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) were founded for strictly Cold War-era tasks, and have found it necessary to either reinvent themselves for a new environment, or disappear. NATO has chosen the former, and thus has involved itself in a variety of operations different to those it was designed for, such as the air attacks on Yugoslavia in 1999. It has also expanded into former Soviet-bloc nations.<sup>39</sup>

The concept of state sovereignty also appears to have lost some of its weight in the post-Cold War period;<sup>40</sup> at least one commentator believes that sovereignty is weaker in the post-Cold War period than at any other time since the Treaty of Westphalia.<sup>41</sup> This decline has come about through the interventionist actions of states,<sup>42</sup> rather than the actions of corporations or non-governmental organisations (NGOs).<sup>43</sup> There has been a developing trend towards interventionism, as seen in Yugoslavia in 1999 and Iraq in 2003.<sup>44</sup> It appears that this trend is here to stay, and that in the near future at least states will be relatively willing to interfere in the sovereign affairs of others, citing human rights or other rationales.

The media has also played a role in shaping the post-Cold War security environment. Firstly, the media, and especially the globalised media, can itself become a cause of conflict, as seen in Rwanda.<sup>45</sup> Secondly the media can shape how security decision-makers perceive and respond to security issues. The media can bring attention to festering problems, such as ethnic conflicts, and act as a powerful

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<sup>38</sup> Alach, 'Peace Support Operations: International Evolution and New Zealand Adaptation'. Chapter Two also see McGee, 'Globalisation, Urbanisation and the Emergence of Sub-Global Regions: A Case Study of the Asia-Pacific Region'. p.29

<sup>39</sup> P. Shearman, 'NATO Expansion and the Russian Question', in Robert Patman (ed.), *Security in a Post-Cold War World*. Basingstoke, Macmillan, 1999. p.161-163

<sup>40</sup> Robert O'Neill, 'The right to use force after the Cold War', in Carl Bridge (ed.), *Pacific Prospects: Australia, New Zealand and Future Conflicts*. London, Menzies Centre for Australian Studies, 2002. should be read.

<sup>41</sup> John Richardson, 'Strategic Thinking in an Era of Intervention: Thinking Out of a Box with No Sides', *Comparative Strategy*, no. 18, 1999. p.32-33

<sup>42</sup> *Ibid.* p.46

<sup>43</sup> It is correct, however, to assume that such organisations have had some effect on the perceptions and opinions of governmental decisionmakers.

<sup>44</sup> Lawrence Freedman, 'The Changing Forms of Military Conflict', *Survival*, vol. 40, no. 4, Winter 1998-1999. p.53

<sup>45</sup> Inflammatory statements were read over the radio, stimulating tribal mobs to attack their ethnic rivals.

influence for intervention, as in Somalia.<sup>46</sup> Yet, at the same time, the media also imposes demands on militaries, in regards to both casualties and conduct.<sup>47</sup> Media coverage of operations has become incessant.<sup>48</sup> Messy, unprofessional and inhumane acts can be swiftly carried home to attentive audiences.<sup>49</sup> The media might even be conceptualised as a “third side” in any conflict, especially as the quality of their reporting can be poor and sensationalistic, affecting the conduct of operations.<sup>50</sup> A “Revolution in Media Affairs” has reduced the depth of perception and analysis of press reporting of military operations.<sup>51</sup> At the extreme end, the media can even be the primary factor for withdrawal from a military operation, as seen in Somalia.

## Resource and Environmental Pressures

During the Cold War, resource and environmental pressures were not generally considered a major security issue by governments. They were relegated to secondary status, as a lack of water paled in comparison to the prospect of thermonuclear war. However, it has proven difficult to ignore resource pressures in the post-Cold War era. There are two facets to this. Firstly, in the absence of bipolar confrontation, other security threats increase in proportional importance. Secondly, resource and environmental issues have risen in intensity and thus political salience.

There has been a growing public awareness of the environment through the 1980s and 1990s. Populations have continued to grow, consuming an ever-increasing amount of non-renewable resources each year. There are already water shortages in the Middle East. Some are border issues, notably between Israel and Syria, and Iran and Iraq, adding yet more tension to an already unstable region.

Utigawa has identified a relationship between resource and environmental pressures, and resultant conflict.<sup>52</sup> Other analysts also believe that resource shortages

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<sup>46</sup> Theo Farrell, 'Humanitarian Intervention and Peace Operations', in John Baylis, et al. (eds.), *Strategy in the Contemporary World*. Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2002. p.297

<sup>47</sup> Ibid. p.301-303

<sup>48</sup> Freedman, 'The Changing Forms of Military Conflict'. p.53

<sup>49</sup> One need only think of the influence that media coverage of the US occupation of Iraq has had on the conduct of that war.

<sup>50</sup> John Alexander, *Winning the War: Advanced Weapons, Strategies and Concepts for the Post 9/11 World*. New York, St Martin's Press, 2003. p.190-194

<sup>51</sup> Prakash Mirchandrai, 'The Army and the Media', *Australian Army Journal (Land Warfare Studies Centre)*, vol. 1, no. 1, June 2003. p.60-61

<sup>52</sup> R. Utigawa, 'Unconventional Security Threats: An Economist's View', in Trevor Taylor and Seizaburo Sato (eds.), *Future Sources of Global Conflict*. London, Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1995. p.28-29

can lead directly to crises.<sup>53</sup> Conflict can result either from issues of control and access to resources, or as a result of the societal impact of environmental decline, for example where strip mining destroys traditional ways of life.<sup>54</sup> Also, if a state attempts to reduce resource consumption, and thus avoid problems in the future, it might instead stimulate acts of collective violence at home in opposition to that policy.<sup>55</sup> A mild form of such civil disobedience has been seen in areas where water usage is controlled, and protests erupt at what is seen as an infringement of liberty.

The post-Cold War period has already seen resource-related conflict, notably in the civil war in Bougainville.<sup>56</sup> Seabed resources, such as oil and natural gas, have been at the root of tension in areas as diverse as the South China Sea and Northern Europe.<sup>57</sup>

Environmental issues can cause conflict, but they can also shape responses and inflict constraints on the operations of military forces. As environmental awareness has increased amongst the public and policymakers, restrictions have been imposed on militaries. Their freedom of operation, especially in training, has been reduced as they are required to conserve biodiversity and ecological niches.<sup>58</sup> Environmental considerations also factor into targeting, and NATO air strikes on Kosovo were designed to avoid environmental damage.

Given the non-renewable nature of most resources, and the fact that global population growth continues relatively unabated, it is likely that resource issues will become only more important in the course of time. The 20<sup>th</sup> century may have been the “Century of Oil,” whereas the 21<sup>st</sup> might be the “Century of Water.” Resource issues thus represent a major potential source of conflict and one that could trigger both state-on-state and intra-state warfare.<sup>59</sup>

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<sup>53</sup> P. Rogers, 'What are the threats to Britain's security?' in John Gittings and Ian Davis (eds.), *Rethinking defence and foreign policy*. Nottingham, Spokesman, 1996. p.20

<sup>54</sup> Terriff et al., *Security Studies Today*. p.120

<sup>55</sup> Jeremy Black, *War in the New Century*. London, Continuum, 2001. p.39-40

<sup>56</sup> Renner, 'Fighting for Survival: Environmental Decline, Social Conflict, and the New Age of Insecurity'. p.97

<sup>57</sup> There is also a theory that US attacks on Iraq in 2003 were primarily motivated by resource, specifically oil, concerns.

<sup>58</sup> Terriff et al., *Security Studies Today*. p.129

<sup>59</sup> Hirst, *War and Power in the 21st Century*. p.102-108

## The Rise of Ethnic Conflict

Ethnic conflict has been an important feature of the post-Cold War world. It is convenient to first define the concept. There are broad and narrow definitions of ethnic conflict – the broader framework includes religious and other factors missing from the narrow definition. Anthony Smith classifies an ethnic group as a human population possessing the following six characteristics: a collective name, a myth of descent, a shared history, a shared culture, belonging to a fixed area, and a sense of solidarity.<sup>60</sup> Many ethnic conflicts involve the aspiration for sovereignty of a particular ethnic group.

The general causes of ethnic conflict are complex.<sup>61</sup> Primordialists believe that biological and cultural differences are the paramount factor in ethnic conflict. Instrumentalists (also known as rationalists) believe the relative socio-economic and political positions of the groups are more important. Stack regards primordialism and rationalism as being inclusive rather than mutually exclusive, and believes both need to be considered together – a consistent and a variable factor.<sup>62</sup> Some see ethnic conflicts as a grab for power for its own sake, and ethnicity as merely a flag of convenience.<sup>63</sup>

During the Cold War, ethnic conflict occurred, but by and large it was kept in check by superpower influence.<sup>64</sup> Sometimes ethnic conflicts were not even perceived as such, but rather interpreted through a Cold War lens as ideological struggles between left and right.

There is some debate as to whether or not ethnic conflicts have actually been increasingly frequent and severe in the post-Cold War world.<sup>65</sup> Sadowski challenges the commonly held assumption that the post-Cold War world has been one of ethnic

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<sup>60</sup> Anthony Smith, *The Ethnic Origin of Nations*. Oxford, Blackwell, 1987; Anthony Smith, *The Ethnic Revival*. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1981; Anthony Smith and John Hutchinson, (eds.), *Ethnicity*. New York, Oxford University Press, 1996.

<sup>61</sup> David Carment and Patrick James, 'International Ethnopolitics: Theory, Peacekeeping, and Policy', in J. Stack Jnr and L. Hebron (eds.), *The Ethnic Entanglement: Conflict and Intervention in World Politics*. Westport, Praeger, 1999. p.19-27

<sup>62</sup> John Stack Jnr and Lui Hebron, 'World Politics and the Internationalization of Ethnicity: The Challenge of Primordial and Structural Perspectives', in John Stack Jnr and Lui Hebron (eds.), *The Ethnic Entanglement: Conflict and Intervention in World Politics*. Westport, Praeger, 1999. p.43-45

<sup>63</sup> Michael Bhatia, *War and Intervention: Issues for Contemporary Peace Operations*. Bloomfield, Kumarian Press, 2003. p.32

<sup>64</sup> Miller, 'Hot War, Cold Peace: An International-Regional Synthesis'. discusses the role of superpowers in regulating conflict in admirable theoretical depth

<sup>65</sup> Jack Levy, Thomas Walker, and Martin Edwards, 'Continuity and Change in the Evolution of Warfare', in Zeev Maoz and Azar Gat (eds.), *War in a Changing World*. Michigan, University of Michigan Press, 2001. p.22 and Gautzel and Schwinghammer, *Warfare Since the Second World War*.

chaos.<sup>66</sup> What is not debated is that, in the absence of the bipolar confrontation, ethnic conflicts have become proportionally more important to global security.

There does indeed seem to be an intuitive link between the end of the Cold War and the rise of ethnic conflict.<sup>67</sup> A tenuous theory as to the reasons for this can be offered here. It is multi-faceted. The withdrawal of superpower influence in many cases caused a power vacuum, into which other ideologies such as nationalism and ethnic hatred could re-emerge, unchecked. Many central governments, bereft of the massive military and economic assistance rendered to them during the Cold War were unable to control their outer territories; in some cases, ethnic warlords occupied such spaces instead. The large stockpiles of weapons given as aid by the two superpowers during the Cold War allowed groups to engage in armed conflict.<sup>68</sup>

The post-Cold War switch from Communist economies to free market economies in many nations was often painful, and caused financial difficulties. This in turn affected the socio-economic positions of various ethnic groups, giving them new grievances, often directed against other ethnic groups seen as luckier, or more privileged.<sup>69</sup> As countries became newly democratic there was a substantial increase in free speech. Often, this freedom of expression was used to express highly inflammatory views, and thus served as a catalyst for conflict. Also, the endorsement of the many new nations that emerged in Eastern Europe in the aftermath of the Cold War seemed to indicate that secession was viable, thus stimulating ethnic groups to seek independence.<sup>70</sup> When governments refused, conflict ensued.

Empirical studies have indicated that ethnic assertiveness has increased in parallel with modernisation.<sup>71</sup> Partly, this may be a result of globalisation, and the resultant global division of labour, by which manufacturing has shifted to the third

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<sup>66</sup> Sadowski, *The Myth of Global Chaos*.

<sup>67</sup> James Corum and Wray Johnson, *Airpower in Small Wars: Fighting Insurgents and Terrorists*. Lawrence, University Press of Kansas, 2003. p.424 presents the commonly held and simplistic view.

<sup>68</sup> Mary Kaldor, 'Introduction', in Mary Kaldor and Basker Vashee (eds.), *Restructuring the Global Military Sector: New Wars*. London, Pinter, 1997. p.8

<sup>69</sup> Alach, 'Peace Support Operations: International Evolution and New Zealand Adaptation'. Chapter Two and Sheila Croucher, 'Constructing the Ethnic Spectacle: Identity Politics in a Postmodern World', in John Stack Jnr and Lui Hebron (eds.), *The Ethnic Entanglement: Conflict and Intervention in World Politics*. Westport, Praeger, 1999. p.133-134

<sup>70</sup> John Stack Jnr and Lui Hebron, 'The Internationalization of Ethnicity: The Crisis of Legitimacy and Authority in World Politics', in John Stack Jnr and Lui Hebron (eds.), *The Ethnic Entanglement: Conflict and Intervention in World Politics*. Westport, Praeger, 1999. p.5-6

<sup>71</sup> *Ibid.* p.5

world, while capital and decision-making has remained in the first.<sup>72</sup> This has resulted in perceptions of economic inequality, resulting in grievances.

The communications revolution is also a casual agent in emergent ethnic conflict, as it allows the co-ordination of disparate groups towards a common goal,<sup>73</sup> as well as the creation of “cyber-diaspora”.<sup>74</sup> Communications technology can also be used to create ethnic identity through the use of language and symbolic manipulation.<sup>75</sup> This may serve to awaken nascent primordial instincts in individuals who have not previously identified themselves on a strong ethnic basis, and thus develop the foundation for later ethnic conflict.

Ethnic conflicts possess several distinctive characteristics. Often, they are perceived as being exceedingly savage, although there is some dispute over this.<sup>76</sup> In many cases they have resulted in massacres of civilians more reminiscent of the Middle Ages than modern war, and the use of weapons such as mass rape. Combat is often highly fluid, with no certain front line. Cities are often the battlefield.<sup>77</sup>

The combatant sides seldom possess high technology weapons, or even clear distinction from civilians, such as uniforms.<sup>78</sup> The various groups involved are often involved in shifting alliances, and some groups may operate independently.<sup>79</sup> Armies are not hierarchical and disciplined, but composed of horizontal coalitions of local militias, paramilitary groups, and even elements of organised crime.<sup>80</sup>

Ethnic wars are often notably difficult to resolve, especially when compared to classical inter-state conflicts. The sides in an ethnic conflict are often unwilling to compromise on material issues, and can feel that their entire existence relies on success in war. The war in Bosnia exemplified the difficulties that can be encountered in ending ethnic conflicts. Throughout the post-Cold War period Western and other governments, often motivated by media attention, have proven relatively willing to intervene in such conflicts.

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<sup>72</sup> Croucher, 'Constructing the Ethnic Spectacle: Identity Politics in a Postmodern World'. p.125

<sup>73</sup> Ibid. p.135

<sup>74</sup> Stack Jnr and Hebron, 'The Internationalization of Ethnicity: The Crisis of Legitimacy and Authority in World Politics'. p.5-6

<sup>75</sup> Croucher, 'Constructing the Ethnic Spectacle: Identity Politics in a Postmodern World'. p.139

<sup>76</sup> Sadowski, *The Myth of Global Chaos*. However, van Creveld, 'The Future of War'. p.28 points out that low-intensity conflicts (into which category ethnic conflicts fit) have been bloodier than other types.

<sup>77</sup> William Rosenau, 'Every Room is a Battle: The Lessons of Modern Urban Warfare', *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism*, vol. 20, no. 4, October/December 1997.

<sup>78</sup> Bhatia, *War and Intervention: Issues for Contemporary Peace Operations*. p.38-49

<sup>79</sup> Ibid. p.38-49

<sup>80</sup> Kaldor, 'Introduction'. p.16

It appears that ethnic conflict will remain a part of the security environment in the future.<sup>81</sup> Whether one holds that primordial instincts or socio-economic positions are the causal factor, it is clear that both causes remain today. Around the world, the socio-economic gaps between rich and poor ethnic groups are only widening. Nor has there been any decline in hate speech related to race. The situation in the Sudan, recent attacks in Rwanda, and the rise of anti-semitism in Europe are all very powerful illustrations of the continued existence of ethnic prejudice. And, given the proliferation of WMDs, it seems impossible for major actors to ignore ethnic conflicts, as the possibility of escalation and use of such weapons is present.<sup>82</sup>

### **The Rise of Terrorism**

Another sinister trend in the post-Cold War world has been a rise in the severity of terrorism. Before we can discuss terrorism, however, we need to define it. The term itself is exceedingly vulnerable to abuse, and the too-wide definitions often used mean that “terrorism” can often be used to refer to almost any act of violence.<sup>83</sup> Its meaning has shifted as people attempt to fit it into the wider pattern of non-state conflict.<sup>84</sup> For this work, terrorism will be defined per Hoffman as the “deliberate creation and exploitation of fear through violence or the threat of violence in the pursuit of political change.”<sup>85</sup>

Terrorists do not carry out their struggle openly as combatant forces. Terrorists can be defined negatively: they do not attempt to hold territory, avoid engaging enemy militaries, and seldom exercise territorial sovereignty.<sup>86</sup> A force that does such

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<sup>81</sup> Stack Jnr and Hebron, 'The Internationalization of Ethnicity: The Crisis of Legitimacy and Authority in World Politics'. p.4

<sup>82</sup> Ibid. p.11-12

<sup>83</sup> The clearest example of this is the way the term “terrorist” was used to refer to insurgents fighting against the US invasion of Iraq in 2003, or the way Germany used the term “bandit” to refer to partisans fighting against their invasion of the USSR in 1941-1944.

<sup>84</sup> Bruce Hoffman, 'Defining Terrorism', in Russell Howard and Reid Sawyer (eds.), *Terrorism and Counterterrorism: Understanding the New Security Environment*. Guilford, McGraw-Hill/Dushkin, 2004. p.13

<sup>85</sup> Ibid. p.23. Key to this definition is its psychological goal (which may lead to a physical goal) rather than its direct physical goal. Terrorist attacks are not launched to destroy installations (although they may destroy installations) but rather to affect the minds of the perceived enemy (or its allies.)

<sup>86</sup> Eric Larson and John Peters, *Preparing the US Army for Homeland Security: Concepts, Issues and Options*. Santa Monica, RAND, 2001. p.21-22

things is more likely to be an insurgency than a terrorist group,<sup>87</sup> although the dividing lines can be blurred almost to invisibility, especially in some South American conflicts. Terrorist groups often have a fluid organisational structure. Their main strength is their ability to hide and thus avoid retaliation from the state against whom they have struck.

Terrorism existed during the Cold War, and its results were highly visible. Usually terrorist attacks were undertaken for strict, often Marxist, ideological reasons.<sup>88</sup> Terrorist attacks during this period seldom resulted in a large number of casualties. Cold War terrorists were usually more concerned with media exposure for their cause than the number of people slain.

Post-Cold War and contemporary terrorism, in contrast, has often been exceedingly deadly,<sup>89</sup> as bombings have replaced sieges.<sup>90</sup> The average number of deaths per terrorist event climbed steadily through the 1990s, with Africa in particular suffering a series of destructive attacks,<sup>91</sup> eventually peaking with the 9/11 attacks in late 2001. Since then a new era of fear and doubt about terrorism has emerged, and there have been further attacks in Bali, Moscow, Madrid and London. Often these attacks have presented difficulties beyond the capabilities of traditional law enforcement agencies.<sup>92</sup>

There are several reasons for this higher lethality. Many of the older heads of Cold War terrorist groups, who were more focused on exposure of the cause than the killing of civilians, have disappeared, either through death or other means, and their

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<sup>87</sup> William Schilling and Terry Sayers, 'Guerilla Operations in Nontraditional Warfare', in William Schilling (ed.), *Nontraditional Warfare: Twenty-First-Century Threats and Responses*. Dulles, Brasseys, 2002. p.82

<sup>88</sup> Magnus Ranstorp, 'Terrorism in the Name of Religion', in Russell Howard and Reid Sawyer (eds.), *Terrorism and Counterterrorism: Understanding the New Security Environment*. Guilford, McGraw-Hill/Dushkin, 2004; Shubik, 'Terrorism, Technology, and the Socioeconomics of Death'. discuss Cold War-era terrorism. Other points about the changing motivation of terrorism can be found in Hoffman, 'Defining Terrorism'. and Bruce Hoffman, 'Intelligence and Terrorism: Emerging Threats and New Security Challenges in the Post-Cold War Era', *Intelligence and National Security*, vol. 11, no. 7, April 1996.

<sup>89</sup> Larson and Peters, *Preparing the US Army for Homeland Security: Concepts, Issues and Options*. p.1-3

<sup>90</sup> Alan Thompson, *Management of Australia's Counter-Terrorism Program*, Working Paper No. 28, Canberra: Australian Defence Studies Centre, September 1994. p.2

<sup>91</sup> Ted Dagne, 'Africa and the War on Terrorism', in John Davis (ed.), *The Global War on Terrorism: Assessing the American Response*. New York, Nova Science, 2004. p.7

<sup>92</sup> William Schilling and David Bongard, 'Terrorist Operations in Nontraditional Warfare', in William Schilling (ed.), *Nontraditional Warfare: Twenty-First-Century Threats and Responses*. Dulles, Brasseys, 2002. p.54

younger replacements are often highly militant.<sup>93</sup> A more important factor is the changing ideology of terrorism. Religion has largely replaced Marxism as the primary motivator; by 1995 approximately half the terrorist groups on the RAND-St Andrews lists were religious groups.<sup>94</sup>

Religious terrorism has been described as one of the most dangerous issues of the post-Cold War world.<sup>95</sup> Religious terrorists are less concerned with the public reaction that surrounds mass-casualty actions.<sup>96</sup> They are thus often willing to kill a large quantity of people. The attack on the World Trade Center on 11 September 2001 was of such a scope that it seemed to overwhelm the usual conventions of war and terrorism.<sup>97</sup> Some have even seen in these new mass-casualty terrorist events the prospect of a new kind of military force designed for asymmetrical warfare.<sup>98</sup> Religious terrorism is also dangerous because it can cloak itself behind other radical religious groups.<sup>99</sup> Also, these religious organisations have larger strategic goals than did Cold War organisations, and their cellular structures are less vulnerable to penetration.<sup>100</sup>

There seems to be a link between this type of terrorism and the end of the bipolar US-USSR struggle. Some have believed that “the single most important factor in the rise of religious terrorism has been the end of the Cold War, which signified the utter historical failure of Communist ideologies.”<sup>101</sup> The Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan, related to the ending of the Cold War, freed up a large quantity of religiously active *mujahedin*, who often turned to other ways to carry out their

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<sup>93</sup> Ranstorp, 'Terrorism in the Name of Religion'. p.131

<sup>94</sup> Adam Dolnik, 'All God's Poisons: Re-evaluating the Threat of Religious Terrorism with Respect to Non-Conventional Weapons', in Russell Howard and Reid Sawyer (eds.), *Terrorism and Counterterrorism: Understanding the New Security Environment*. Guilford, McGraw-Hill/Dushkin, 2004. p.161. The RAND-St Andrews list is a database of terrorist attacks. See also Hoffman, 'Intelligence and Terrorism: Emerging Threats and New Security Challenges in the Post-Cold War Era'. p.210

<sup>95</sup> Ranstorp, 'Terrorism in the Name of Religion'. p.125

<sup>96</sup> James Kiras, 'Terrorism and Irregular Warfare', in John Baylis, et al. (eds.), *Strategy in the Contemporary World*. Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2002. p.226

<sup>97</sup> Teri McConville, 'The War on Terrorism: A New Classic in Groupthink', in Teri McConville and Richard Holmes (eds.), *Defence Management in Uncertain Times*. London, Frank Cass, 2003. p.46

<sup>98</sup> Bruce Berkowitz, *The New Face Of War*. New York, Free Press, 2003. p.15

<sup>99</sup> Bilveer Singh, *ASEAN, Australia and the Management of the Jemaah Islamiyah Threat*, Canberra Papers in Strategy and Defence 152, Canberra: ANU Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, 2003. p.47

<sup>100</sup> Australian Government, *Australia's National Security - A Defence Update 2003*, Canberra, 2003. p.11 and Singh, *ASEAN, Australia and the Management of the Jemaah Islamiyah Threat*. p.22-25

<sup>101</sup> Dolnik, 'All God's Poisons: Re-evaluating the Threat of Religious Terrorism with Respect to Non-Conventional Weapons'. p.168

*jihad*.<sup>102</sup> Importantly, though, religious terrorism is not solely a post-Cold War phenomenon; rather it has become newly important as traditional social and cultural links have deteriorated in an environment of political repression and economic inequality.<sup>103</sup>

Technology has also been a factor in the increased lethality of terrorism, although this factor is less important than changing motivation. It should not be forgotten that the most lethal terrorist attacks of all time were carried out by agents equipped with boxcutter blades. The post-Cold War liberalisation of the global arms bazaar has allowed terrorists to access weapons that might have been out of reach during the Cold War, such as Surface-to-Air-Missiles (SAMs).<sup>104</sup> More important is the use of widely available commercial technology such as cellphones and the internet, which allows them to communicate swiftly and efficiently, and plan attacks with greater precision.<sup>105</sup> Terrorist groups have taken quickly to advanced communications, seeing in them an effective force multiplier.<sup>106</sup>

While almost all post-Cold War terrorist attacks have been carried out with conventional weapons, there is one exceedingly worrying prospect. That is that terrorists will, in the future, secure and use Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMDs).<sup>107</sup> This prospect is discussed in greater detail in the following section.

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<sup>102</sup> Ranstorp, 'Terrorism in the Name of Religion'. p.132

<sup>103</sup> Ibid. p.127 and Singh, *ASEAN, Australia and the Management of the Jemaah Islamiyah Threat*. p.4-5

<sup>104</sup> Larson and Peters, *Preparing the US Army for Homeland Security: Concepts, Issues and Options*. p.224

<sup>105</sup> Maura Conway, 'Terrorism and IT: Cyberterrorism and Terrorist Organisations Online', in Russell Howard and Reid Sawyer (eds.), *Terrorism and Counterterrorism: Understanding the New Security Environment*. Guilford, 2004. and Larson and Peters, *Preparing the US Army for Homeland Security: Concepts, Issues and Options*. p.1-3

<sup>106</sup> Kevin Soo Hoo, Seymour Goodman, and Lawrence Greenberg, 'Information Technology and the Terrorist Threat', *Survival*, vol. 39, no. 3, Autumn 1997. p.138-139

<sup>107</sup> Wyn Bowen, 'Deterring Mass-Casualty Terrorism', in Russell Howard and Reid Sawyer (eds.), *Terrorism and Counterterrorism: Understanding the New Security Environment*. Guilford, McGraw-Hill/Dushkin, 2004; Christopher Chyba, 'Toward Biological Security', in Russell Howard and Reid Sawyer (eds.), *Terrorism and Counterterrorism: Understanding the New Security Environment*. Guilford, McGraw-Hill/Dushkin, 2004; Dolnik, 'All God's Poisons: Re-evaluating the Threat of Religious Terrorism with Respect to Non-Conventional Weapons'; John Ellis, 'Terrorism in the Genomic Age', in Russell Howard and Reid Sawyer (eds.), *Terrorism and Counterterrorism: Understanding the New Security Environment*. Guilford, McGraw-Hill/Dushkin, 2004; Richard Pilch, 'The Bioterrorist Threat in the United States', in Russell Howard and Reid Sawyer (eds.), *Terrorism and Counterterrorism: Understanding the New Security Environment*. Guilford, McGraw-Hill/Dushkin, 2004; Jessica Stern, 'Getting and Using the Weapons', in Russell Howard and Reid Sawyer (eds.), *Terrorism and Counterterrorism: Understanding the New Security Environment*. Guilford, 2004. These all provide a good survey of the material on this matter

## The Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD)

During the Cold War, most WMDs (nuclear, biological and chemical) were under the control of “status quo” states, whose only use of such weapons would have been in a major war. That situation has changed, and the proliferation of WMDs is now a major issue of global security.

Some analysts even believe we have entered, or are entering, a second nuclear age.<sup>108</sup> Many more states now possess nuclear weapons, including such potential “rogue states” as North Korea. In the mid-1990s, there were also fears that Russian nuclear weapons, especially small tactical devices, had been lost and may have fallen into the possession of non-state or “rogue state” actors.

Perhaps more important than such nuclear concerns is the fact that chemical and biological weapons have also proliferated beyond the possession of a few states.<sup>109</sup> Both chemical and biological weapons have been used, albeit on a small scale, by terrorist groups in the post-Cold War period.<sup>110</sup>

The danger of WMDs comes, as might be supposed from their name, from their sheer lethality. Weight for weight, WMDs are far deadlier than conventional weapons (although history shows that conventional weapons have caused many more casualties.) Nuclear weapons are unrivalled in their destructive power, and the smaller tactical devices are easily concealed and transported. Chemical weapons are relatively easily made, and are highly lethal in small doses. Biological weapons are even more lethal, and are by nature self-perpetuating.<sup>111</sup> Introducing a small quantity of biological agent into a vulnerable population can cause casualties out of all proportion to the quantity of agent used. Genetic engineering of biological agents, as carried out by the USSR during the Cold War, can make them yet more dangerous.<sup>112</sup>

WMDs in the hands of terrorist groups would allow them to respond to Western technical dominance in an asymmetrical fashion, for example by planting a

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<sup>108</sup> Malcolm Davis and Colin Gray, 'Weapons of Mass Destruction', in John Baylis, et al. (eds.), *Strategy in the Contemporary World*. Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2002. p.263

<sup>109</sup> Perry Robinson, 'What can Britain do to prevent the spread of chemical and biological weapons'. p.67

<sup>110</sup> Dolnik, 'All God's Poisons: Re-evaluating the Threat of Religious Terrorism with Respect to Non-Conventional Weapons'; Stern, 'Getting and Using the Weapons'.

<sup>111</sup> James Valdes, 'Vulnerability to Biological Weapons in Nontraditional Warfare', in William Schilling (ed.), *Nontraditional Warfare: Twenty-First-Century Threats and Responses*. Dulles, Brassey's, 2002.

<sup>112</sup> Davis and Gray, 'Weapons of Mass Destruction'. p.278

suitcase-sized nuclear weapon in a city.<sup>113</sup> A chemical or biological attack by terrorists (or rogue states) might occur with little or no warning, cause mass casualties, and leave few clues as to the perpetrator.<sup>114</sup> The small size and lethality of WMDs makes countermeasures difficult. There are no practical reliable solutions or any “silver bullet” to counteract their effects.<sup>115</sup> Prevention is the only real cure and total prevention is difficult to achieve.

There are major technical difficulties related to the use of WMDs, especially in the hands of terrorists. Nuclear weapons are especially difficult to fabricate, given global restrictions on their raw materials. Chemical and biological weapons are more easily created, but storage and especially dispersal present major problems. The admittedly thin evidence of the post-Cold War era indicates that the possibility of their use by terrorists in mass casualty actions is not as likely as sometimes feared.<sup>116</sup>

Yet even if the worst fears have not been realised, WMD proliferation is still an important threat to global security. As the number of users of such weapons has grown, attempts to control them have become more difficult. Technology continues to advance, making production and usage easier.

### **Technological Advance and the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA)**

A final major issue in the post-Cold War strategic environment, and one which affects all of the themes mentioned above, is the development of military technology and especially what is known as the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA). The RMA means different things to different people, so this section summarises some of the various thoughts on the matter.

Military revolutions might be defined as major discontinuities of military affairs, brought about by changes in technologies, concepts and methods of organisation.<sup>117</sup> They are abrupt, and they transform the conduct of war by making possible order-of-magnitude or greater gains in military effectiveness. Researchers have identified several previous RMAs in the past 700 years, including the move to

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<sup>113</sup> Ibid. p.265

<sup>114</sup> Ibid. p.277-278

<sup>115</sup> B. Bennett, 'Responding to Assymmetric Threats', in S. Johnson, M. Libicki, and G. Treverton (eds.), *New Challenges and New Tools for Defense Decisionmaking*. Santa Monica, RAND, 2003. p.50-55 and Davis and Gray, 'Weapons of Mass Destruction'. p.281

<sup>116</sup> Stern, 'Getting and Using the Weapons'.

<sup>117</sup> Colin Gray, *Strategy for Chaos*. London, Frank Cass, 2002. p.55-56

gunpowder and the development of column fighting.<sup>118</sup> One might conceptualise them in the following way:<sup>119</sup>

**Stimulus:** Idea on concepts, or sudden technological advance;

**Initial response:** Partial Transformation – introduction of doctrine, technology, organisations into force;

**Initial result:** Success or failure in war;

**Secondary response:** Further Transformation - Enhanced conceptualisation and improved technology. Borrowing of concepts by other forces.

The idea that the world was undergoing another RMA recently was first propounded in the late 1980s by the Soviet military analyst Ogarkov,<sup>120</sup> who saw in growing US capabilities of precision strike a major threat to the Soviet war machine, one that did not attempt to merely match force against force but rather used skill, flexibility and manoeuvre to achieve success.<sup>121</sup> The proof of his thesis seemed to come with the Gulf War of 1991. There, US forces, operating in a co-ordinated fashion known as AirLandBattle, and using precision-guided weapons, emphasising manoeuvre and communication, destroyed a sizeable foe quickly and without major losses. The Iraqi forces, although possessing some advanced technology, lacked communications and fought statically. This success seemed to validate the AirLandBattle model, and analysts were quick to suggest that the Gulf War indicated the obsolescence of previous concepts of warfare, and the arrival of a new era in which technology would be the preponderant determinant of success: a Revolution in

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<sup>118</sup> MacGregor Knox and Williamson Murray, (eds.), *The Dynamics of Military Revolution 1300-2050*. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2001.

<sup>119</sup> For reasons of space a more comprehensive analytical model of the RMA cannot be given.

<sup>120</sup> Ogarkov referred to it as a “military-technical revolution”.

<sup>121</sup> Stephen Rosen, *Winning the Next War: Innovation and the Modern Military*. Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 1991. p.258

Military Affairs.<sup>122</sup> The US military in particular decided to focus its efforts on this new paradigm of operations.<sup>123</sup>

The framework above provides some insight into this development. The stimulus for this RMA was American perception of Soviet material superiority, as well as new technology. Their initial response was the development of AirLandBattle concepts including new precision weapons. The initial result was the success of their forces, and the secondary response was the sudden attention given to these concepts by military theorists around the globe.

Freedman has summed up the common view of the RMA as “the efficient application of power to the most vulnerable parts of the enemy’s military machine” via precision guided weapons and information technology.<sup>124</sup> Ideas of precision strike, network operations<sup>125</sup> and dominant manoeuvre would be the key facets of such a revolution. Linear warfare and the concept of “the front” were held to be obsolescent.<sup>126</sup>

It is important to note that the RMA as usually conceptualised is less about weapons systems themselves and more about sensors, communications, and the integratory framework.<sup>127</sup> The central core is to collect, process and communicate information and thus speed up the Observation-Oriented-Decision-Action (OODA) loop.<sup>128</sup> The ability to win the information war is held to be the most important principle of the RMA.<sup>129</sup> Warfare in the RMA-model can be either decentralised,

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<sup>122</sup> MacGregor Knox and Williamson Murray, 'The future behind us', in MacGregor Knox and Williamson Murray (eds.), *The Dynamics of Military Revolution 1300-2050*. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2001. p.190 and Gray, *Strategy for Chaos*. p.1

<sup>123</sup> Freedman, 'The Changing Forms of Military Conflict'. p.45

<sup>124</sup> Freedman, *The Cold War: A Military History*. p.209-210

<sup>125</sup> The term “network warfare” is often used to describe the method by which a “transformed force” would fight. See Andrus Viilu, 'Enablers of Land Force Modernization for NTFW Operations', in William Schilling (ed.), *Nontraditional Warfare: Twenty-First-Century Threats and Responses*. Dulles, Brasseys, 2002. and Berkowitz, *The New Face Of War*; Richard Bitzinger, *Defense Transformation and the Asia Pacific: Implications for Regional Militaries*, Vol 3 Number 7: Asia-Pacific Center for Strategic Studies, 2004; Peter Cosgrove, 'Racing Towards the Future: Reflections on Iraq, the Art of Command and Network-Centric Warfare', *Australian Army Journal (Land Warfare Studies Centre)*, vol. 1, no. 2, December 2003; Hirst, *War and Power in the 21st Century*; Andrew Stackpool, 'Warfare map is out soon', *Air Force*, vol. 46, no. 18, 7 October 2004; Unknown Author, 'Network warfare guidance', *Air Force*, vol. 46, no. 04, 25 March 2004; J. York, 'The Quest for Certainty; Coping with Uncertainty', in Teri McConville and Richard Holmes (eds.), *Defence Management in Uncertain Times*. London, Frank Cass, 2003.

<sup>126</sup> Berkowitz, *The New Face Of War*. p.3

<sup>127</sup> Bitzinger, *Defense Transformation and the Asia Pacific: Implications for Regional Militaries*. This work notes the way technology needs to be integrated with organisational and operational change to achieve defence transformation.

<sup>128</sup> York, 'The Quest for Certainty; Coping with Uncertainty'. p.20-21

<sup>129</sup> Berkowitz, *The New Face Of War*. p.21

whereby agent-based plans such as “swarming” are employed, or centralised, allowing a single commander to take advantage of constant links to all combat units.<sup>130</sup> Synergy of these elements, bound together by information architecture, might allow quantum gains in combat effectiveness. Units would be able to operate in highly dispersed fashion, reliant on communications linkages, and would be able to draw on firepower from other units.<sup>131</sup>

Some of the more extreme proponents saw in the RMA a chance to finally eliminate the “fog of war” that has characterised warfare since time immemorial, through the intense use of interlinked sensors to create a holistic picture of the entire battlespace.<sup>132</sup> The term “transformation” has been used to refer to the process of changing militaries to better fit the demands of RMA warfare.<sup>133</sup>

Belief in the effectiveness of the RMA peaked around the middle of the 1990s.<sup>134</sup> Since then it has declined as a topic of analytical debate, as the evidence seems to suggest that high-technology systems of systems are not necessarily the holistic answer to conflict or a true revolution in military affairs. There are several reasons for this.

Firstly, the high-tech nature of the RMA-paradigm produces new vulnerabilities in turn that were absent from other military structures.<sup>135</sup> The Achilles heel of any transformed force is its communication networks.<sup>136</sup> Such networks are exceedingly vulnerable in WMD environments, and can often be disrupted by relatively small amounts of force.<sup>137</sup> Secondly, if the various proponents of the RMA

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<sup>130</sup> York, 'The Quest for Certainty; Coping with Uncertainty'. p.18-19 and p.22-23

<sup>131</sup> Richard Cousens, 'Whither the close battle - British Army Operations: 2015 and beyond', in Michael Evans, Alan Ryan, and Russell Parkin (eds.), *Future Armies, Future Challengers: Land warfare in the information age*. Crows Nest, Allen & Unwin, 2004. p.163-164 and Alan Ryan, *Putting Your Young Men in the Mud: Change, Continuity and the Australian Infantry Battalion*, Working Paper 124, Canberra: Land Warfare Study Centre, 2003. p.46-47

<sup>132</sup> R. Franck Jnr, 'Lifting the Fog of War', *Armed Forces and Society*, vol. 28, no. 1, Fall 2001; National Defense Panel, *Transforming Defense: National Security in the 21st Century*, December 1997.

<sup>133</sup> Bitzinger, *Defense Transformation and the Asia Pacific: Implications for Regional Militaries*.

<sup>134</sup> Gray, *Strategy for Chaos*. p.19

<sup>135</sup> Colin Gray, 'The Changing Nature of Warfare?' *Naval War College Review*, vol. 49, no. 2, Spring 1996. p.14-15

<sup>136</sup> Hirst, *War and Power in the 21st Century*. p.92

<sup>137</sup> Robert Bent, 'Military Forces Survivability in a Weapons of Mass Destruction Environment', in William Schilling (ed.), *Nontraditional Warfare: Twenty-First-Century Threats and Responses*. Dulles, Brassey's, 2002. p.22-23 and Michael McDonnell, 'Impact of Electromagnetic Pulses on Future Warfare Operations', in William Schilling (ed.), *Nontraditional Warfare: Twenty-First-Century Threats and Responses*. Dulles, Brassey's, 2002; Michael McDonnell, 'Information Technology Applications to Counter Nontraditional Warfare Threats', in William Schilling (ed.), *Nontraditional Warfare: Twenty-First-Century Threats and Responses*. Dulles, Brassey's, 2002; Michael McDonnell and Terry Sayers,

are correct, then warfare is undergoing a revolutionary process. Those forces that do not adapt will be destroyed if they ever fight an RMA-equipped force. Yet in operations such as Allied Force, which pitted a highly-technical and massive force against a small, low-tech defender, the results were far from ideal for the attacker.<sup>138</sup> This then leads to questions about the applicability of the RMA-paradigm to various types of military activity. It is seen as being eminently unsuited to low-intensity warfare and occupation operations, because the man-machine ratio is low.<sup>139</sup> The question must then be asked as to whether it can be a revolution if it only touches on a small proportion of military operations.

Colin Gray believes the RMA is less a revolution than an evolution. He feels that the RMA will never achieve the full potential ascribed to it by various thinkers, because the non-linearity of strategy makes any neat answer to war logically indeterminate.<sup>140</sup> Instead, there will be steady gains in combat efficiency due to technological progress, but no radical change.<sup>141</sup>

Another important issue is the cost of the RMA. High technology equipment, the infrastructure required to connect it, the increased training demands imposed by it, and the need to generate new doctrine are all very expensive.<sup>142</sup> Given the fact that defence dollars are limited, embracing the RMA means foregoing other possible force structures. If operations other than high intensity conventional warfare are the most common type of operations, then adjusting to the RMA may actually be counterproductive. There is also a view that belief in the RMA has as much to do with Western society as it has to do with the real contribution of technology to military effectiveness.<sup>143</sup>

Regardless of whether they are evolutionary or revolutionary, the RMA and technological change are important factors in the post-Cold War security environment. New concepts, new weapons and new structures all make possible

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'Information Systems Survivability in Nontraditional Warfare Operations', in William Schilling (ed.), *Nontraditional Warfare: Twenty-First-Century Threats and Responses*. Dulles, Brasseys, 2002.

<sup>138</sup> Bhatia, *War and Intervention: Issues for Contemporary Peace Operations*. p.77

<sup>139</sup> Black, *War in the New Century*. p.111 and Gray, *Strategy for Chaos*. p.72

<sup>140</sup> Gray, *Strategy for Chaos*. p.8

<sup>141</sup> Gray, 'The Changing Nature of Warfare?' p.16-17

<sup>142</sup> Martin Libicki, 'Incorporating Information Architecture in Defense Policy', in Stuart Johnson, Martin Libicki, and Gregory Treverton (eds.), *New Challenges and New Tools for Defense Decisionmaking*. Santa Monica, RAND, 2003. p.114 does point out one possibility of certain aspects of the RMA actually being cheaper, due to the usage of commercial-specification systems rather than military-specified items.

<sup>143</sup> Black, *War in the New Century*. p.97

major gains in combat effectiveness, at least in conventional warfare. This was seen in the US invasion of Iraq in 2003. However, the occupation since has indicated just as clearly the shortcomings of small, RMA-paradigm militaries.<sup>144</sup>

## **A Complex Security Environment and a New Era of Conflict**

The previous sections have illustrated how the relative simplicity of the Cold War security environment has changed significantly. Change has been driven by political, social and strategic factors.<sup>145</sup> New threats have emerged, and the character of conflict has changed.<sup>146</sup> Cold War thinking that “only a state or an entity similar to a state can wage war”<sup>147</sup> has altered in the face of a flurry of small-scale ethnic conflicts and terrorist attacks that resemble “fourth-generation” warfare.<sup>148</sup> Complexity has increased; “the face of war has assumed bewildering expressions.”<sup>149</sup> The changes of the period have made “new kinds of wars possible.”<sup>150</sup> In the post-Cold War world, conflicts escalate swiftly; we are in the midst of a “new season of bellicosity.”<sup>151</sup>

This sub-section describes the post-Cold War period, analyses the contemporary situation, and makes some predictions for the future. This is not an easy task. Many theories about the nature of contemporary and future war have been developed, and few agree with each other.<sup>152</sup> The various themes noted above are

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<sup>144</sup> George Friedman, 'Email - Geopolitical Intelligence Report: Force Structure', 19 October 2004, [accessed 28 October 2004].

<sup>145</sup> Colin Gray, 'How Has War Changed Since the End of the Cold War?' *Parameters*, Spring 2005. p.15

<sup>146</sup> The difference between the character and nature of war is essential and the reader is referred to: David Lonsdale, *The Nature of War in the Information Age: Clausewitzian Future*. London, Frank Cass, 2004. and Gray, 'How Has War Changed Since the End of the Cold War?'

<sup>147</sup> Payne Jnr, *The Conduct of War: An Introduction to Modern Warfare*. p.43-44. Shubik, 'Terrorism, Technology, and the Socioeconomics of Death'. p.403 also notes the emphasis on states in Cold War strategic studies

<sup>148</sup> Richard Shultz and Andreas Vogt, 'The Real Intelligence Failure on 9/11 and the Case for a Doctrine of Striking First', in Russell Howard and Reid Sawyer (eds.), *Terrorism and Counterterrorism: Understanding the New Security Environment*. Guilford, McGraw-Hill/Dushkin, 2004. p.408-420

<sup>149</sup> Michael Evans, 'Clausewitz's chameleon: military theory and practice in the early 21st century', in Michael Evans, Alan Ryan, and Russell Parkin (eds.), *Future Armies, Future Challengers: Land warfare in the information age*. Crows Nest, Allen & Unwin, 2004. p.26

<sup>150</sup> Hirst, *War and Power in the 21st Century*. p.79

<sup>151</sup> Edward Luttwak, 'Blood and Computers: The Crisis of Classic Military Power in Advanced Postindustrial Societies and the Scope of Technological Remedies', in Zeev Maoz and Azar Gat (eds.), *War in a Changing World*. Michigan, University of Michigan Press, 2001. p.68

<sup>152</sup> Evans, 'Clausewitz's chameleon: military theory and practice in the early 21st century'. p.33

interrelated in complex fashion. It would be impossible to identify every linkage, but a few can be mentioned.

The breakdown of the USSR, which was both a trigger for and consequence of the end of the Cold War, resulted in the rapid spread of democracy in successor states, which was in turn a factor in the subsequent rise of ethnic conflict in those places. In turn, ethnic conflicts have often proven to be breeding grounds for terrorist groups, or at least provided places where such groups can survive.

The proliferation of WMDs, and the simultaneous increase in the quantity and intensity of terrorism, portend a very dangerous threat to global security. The possibility that a terrorist group may obtain WMDs is growing each day as such weapons proliferate. And, given the messianic ideology of some of these groups, usage will not be a problem – these groups are often unconcerned with casualties and view sacrifice of life as a necessity.

Another important interaction is that between technical and political issues. The RMA has a potential influence over almost all aspects of future military operations. Advanced technology might allow First World nations to defeat lesser foes with ease. On the other hand, certain aspects of the RMA, such as advanced communications and network operations, are well within the reach of non-state actors. There is a real question as to whether the RMA widens or narrows the technological gap between First World and Third World militaries (or even non-state actors.) Thus, the RMA has the potential to upset balances of power in a relatively short amount of time, with unpredictable political effects.

Internal political and social factors also impact on the security environment. There has been a “Revolution in Attitudes to the Military” (RAM), especially amongst Western democracies.<sup>153</sup> Populations are less willing to serve in the military, demand greater civilian control over defence matters, and are far less willing to embrace casualties on the scale of the World Wars.<sup>154</sup> This has led to, or at least is linked with, a drawdown in military funding in the post-Cold War world, as part of an expected “peace dividend.” This “Revolution” has an especial influence on how democracies shape their responses to security threats.

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<sup>153</sup> Black, *War in the New Century*. p.9 and Moskos, Williams, and Segal, (eds.), *The Postmodern Military: Armed Forces after the Cold War*.

<sup>154</sup> Black, *War in the New Century*. p.11 and Gil Meom, 'Forecasting the Future of War: Foundations for an Algorithm', in Zeev Maoz and Azar Gat (eds.), *War in a Changing World*. Michigan, University of Michigan Press, 2001. p.217 and Luttwak, 'Blood and Computers: The Crisis of Classic Military Power in Advanced Postindustrial Societies and the Scope of Technological Remedies'.

It is vitally important to reiterate that many of the issues mentioned above – terrorism and ethnic conflict especially – were present during the Cold War. However, they were proportionally less important aspects of global security. When a misstep in superpower relations could result in a global nuclear war, it was understandable that almost all military attention was paid to the bipolar standoff. However, as that threat has almost disappeared, other issues have become increasingly important, and will remain so in the future.

The question might be asked whether or not we are still in a single post-Cold War security environment. Some believe that the terrorist attacks on the US in 2001 heralded a new age, one radically different to that which went before.<sup>155</sup> Colin Gray has described the period from the end of the Cold War to the World Trade Centre bombings as an “interwar” period; the conclusion to be drawn from that is that we have returned to a time of war, albeit against terrorism.<sup>156</sup>

Only time will tell, but at this stage it appears to be more an evolution than a sea-change;<sup>157</sup> the change in the global security environment instigated by 9/11 has been less than that triggered by the fall of the Berlin Wall. There has been an increase in interventionism by large powers, but this was a trend already apparent in the pre-9/11 period, as operations in Kosovo and the Sudan illustrated. Militaries around the world have generally received increased funding and many have increased their operational tempo due to the War on Terror. Yet in general terms the attacks of 9/11 can be seen as merely an acceleration of the instability of the post-Cold War period, rather than a change in direction.

Thus, some generalisations about the character of post-Cold War conflict can be made. Of course, these are simplifications, but they illustrate several important facets of the new nature of warfare and conflict in general. By and large they apply equally to the period to date and the contemporary period, and also have validity for the near future.

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<sup>155</sup> MacGregor, *Transformation Under Fire: Revolutionizing How America Fights*. p.120, 190 and Teri McConville and Richard Holmes, 'Introduction', in Teri McConville and Richard Holmes (eds.), *Defence Management in Uncertain Times*. London, Frank Cass, 2003. p.xii-xiii and Michael Evans, 'Appointment in Samarra: Western strategic thought and the culture of risk', in Michael Evans, Alan Ryan, and Russell Parkin (eds.), *Future Armies, Future Challengers: Land warfare in the information age*. Crows Nest, Allen & Unwin, 2004. p.2

<sup>156</sup> Gray, 'How Has War Changed Since the End of the Cold War?' p.14

<sup>157</sup> Aldo Borgu and et al, *Australia's Defence after September 11: A Quick Guide to the Issues*, Barton: Australian Strategic Policy Institute, July 2002. p.7 calls it a clearer illustration of the post-Cold War world.

Firstly, conventional warfare has not disappeared, but it has become extremely rare.<sup>158</sup> Pressures still exist between states, and in a potentially anarchic international system these pressures may still lead to war. When conventional warfare has occurred in the post-Cold War period, it has often been asymmetric, as exemplified by the Iraq war of 2003.

Secondly, the vast majority of wars and conflicts have been fought between non-state actors.<sup>159</sup> In such conflicts sides are difficult to distinguish, and political manoeuvring is as important as battlefield manoeuvre. Often these have been ethnic conflicts, but not always. Cities rather than the countryside have often been the preferred battlefield.<sup>160</sup> Such urban warfare in turn imposes its own particular demands on fighting forces.<sup>161</sup> It is likely, but not definite, that intrastate warfare will be the dominant type of warfare in the near future.<sup>162</sup>

Thirdly, the scale of conflict has remained low. There have been few large wars, and instead many raids, strikes and counter-terrorist operations. This means that in general, casualties have been limited. Because of the generally low-level nature of military operations, the line between military and civil authority has blurred, for example in relation to terrorist and criminal activities.

Fourthly, land forces have been the dominant force in the majority of post-Cold War conflicts, either through the limitations of the actors or the nature of the conflict. Thus in both the Gulf War of 1991 and the peacekeeping operation in

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<sup>158</sup> Various, 'Is Major War Obsolete? An Exchange', *Survival*, vol. 41, no. 2, Summer 1999.

<sup>159</sup> Of course, as stated earlier, this is not necessarily a new trend, but rather one suspended by the bipolar confrontation of the Cold War. See Ian MacFarling, 'Assymmetric warfare: myth or reality', in Michael Evans, Alan Ryan, and Russell Parkin (eds.), *Future Armies, Future Challengers: Land warfare in the information age*. Crows Nest, Allen & Unwin, 2004. p.156

<sup>160</sup> Rosenau, 'Every Room is a Battle: The Lessons of Modern Urban Warfare'.

<sup>161</sup> William Schilling and David Bongard, 'Urban Operations in Nontraditional Warfare', in William Schilling (ed.), *Nontraditional Warfare: Twenty-First-Century Threats and Responses*. Dulles, Brassey's, 2002; Roger Spiller, 'Sharp corners: combat operations in urban areas', in Michael Evans, Alan Ryan, and Russell Parkin (eds.), *Future Armies, Future Challengers: Land warfare in the information age*. Crows Nest, Allen & Unwin, 2004.

<sup>162</sup> Gray, 'How Has War Changed Since the End of the Cold War?' p.19 disagrees with this, but the evidence seems to be against him; while inter-state warfare may be the most violent it is hardly likely to be the most common. And given the casualties suffered by the US against non-state guerrillas in Iraq, compared to those suffered against the Iraqi government, it is questionable whether state-on-state warfare is more violent.

Kosovo in 1999, land forces were most important.<sup>163</sup> Land forces are particularly flexible, and generally well suited to low intensity operations.<sup>164</sup>

Fifthly, domestic demands on the behaviour of military units have increased. Misbehaviour, such as incidents in Somalia by members of the Canadian Armed Forces, often has major repercussions.<sup>165</sup> There is less willingness to let militaries operate autonomously.

Finally, the international community has been keener to intervene in conflict than was once the case. Throughout the 1990s, Western militaries have been increasingly involved in a wide variety of non-traditional operations, including peace support, counterinsurgencies, humanitarian and disaster relief. They have been seen as “an integral part of the liberal democracies’ struggle to win the peace.”<sup>166</sup> Coalitions have been the most common type of military operation, and are likely to remain so in the near future.<sup>167</sup> There has been increasing integration between politics, diplomacy and military activity, rather than strict separation between them.<sup>168</sup> Political meddling has reached overwhelming proportions in some operations.<sup>169</sup>

In the words of Black, “there will be no one type of war” in the future;<sup>170</sup> indeed, there has been no one type of war in the post-Cold War world. Future war may involve an odd juxtaposition of primordial, ethnic forces equipped with lightweight, high-technology weapons.<sup>171</sup>

The complexity noted above makes it difficult for defence managers to know how to respond.<sup>172</sup> Lord Robertson, once NATO Secretary General, has stated that since the end of the Cold War:

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<sup>163</sup> See Alach, 'Peace Support Operations: International Evolution and New Zealand Adaptation'.

<sup>164</sup> Alan Ryan, 'Early 21st-century armies and the challenge of unrestricted warfare', in Michael Evans, Alan Ryan, and Russell Parkin (eds.), *Future Armies, Future Challengers: Land warfare in the information age*. Crows Nest, Allen & Unwin, 2004. p.306

<sup>165</sup> Bhatia, *War and Intervention: Issues for Contemporary Peace Operations*. p.98. This resulted in the disbandment of the Parachute Regiment

<sup>166</sup> Ryan, 'Early 21st-century armies and the challenge of unrestricted warfare'. p.294

<sup>167</sup> Alan Ryan, 'Land forces in 21st century coalition operations: implications for the Asia-Pacific', in Michael Evans, Alan Ryan, and Russell Parkin (eds.), *Future Armies, Future Challengers: Land warfare in the information age*. Crows Nest, Allen & Unwin, 2004. p.103

<sup>168</sup> Evans, 'Clausewitz's chameleon: military theory and practice in the early 21st century'. p.40

<sup>169</sup> D.S. Hartley III, *Operations Other Than War: Requirements for Analysis Tools Research Report*. Center for Modeling, Simulation and Gaming, 1998. p.22

<sup>170</sup> Black, *War in the New Century*. p.82

<sup>171</sup> Alexander, *Winning the War: Advanced Weapons, Strategies and Concepts for the Post 9/11 World*. p.87

<sup>172</sup> James Wirtz, 'A New Agenda for Security and Strategy', in John Baylis, et al. (eds.), *Strategy in the Contemporary World*. Oxford, 2002. p.311. See also Jacob Kipp, 'War Scare in the Caucasus:

The threat of a massive war in Europe has faded and, with it, the need for Cold War forces. Today we face different challenges and different missions - regional or civil wars, humanitarian emergencies, peacekeeping operations, and responding to terrorism and the use of weapons of mass destruction.<sup>173</sup>

The first step in resolving this complexity is, given the shape of the strategic environment, to identify the spectrum of potential military roles. That is done in the second part of this chapter.

## Part Two: Evolving Roles

### Defining Needs: Military Role Demands

While other analysts have attempted to develop taxonomies of such roles,<sup>174</sup> for this thesis an independently developed framework is used. Ten role demands relevant for both the post-Cold War period and the near future can be identified.<sup>175</sup> These are:

1. Conventional Warfare
2. van Creveld Operations
3. Raids and Strikes
4. Counter-Terrorist Operations

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Redefining the Threat and the War on Terrorism', in Anne Aldis and Roger McDermott (eds.), *Russian Military Reform 1992-2002*. London, Frank Cass, 2003. p.237-238

<sup>173</sup> Istvan Gyarmati and Theodor Winkler, (eds.), *Post-Cold War Defense Reform: Lessons Learned in Europe and the United States*. Washington, Brassey's, 2002. p.vii

<sup>174</sup> R.A. Estilow, *US Military Force and Operations Other Than War: Necessary Questions to Avoid Strategic Failure*, Maxwell Paper No 3: Air War College, 1996; Hartley III, *Operations Other Than War: Requirements for Analysis Tools Research Report*; The Centre for Advanced Command Concepts and Technology (National Defense University), 'Operations Other Than War (OOTW): The Technological Dimension', 1995, [accessed 28 October 2004]. Available from [www.ndu.edu/inss/](http://www.ndu.edu/inss/).

<sup>175</sup> One role demand that is absent is anti-ballistic missile defence. This is deliberate. It might be conceptualised as either a subset of other role demands, or as a role demand in its own right. This work prefers to regard it as a subset of other role demands, specifically conventional warfare, but not to focus on it to any great depth.

5. Cyberwarfare
6. Peace Support Operations
7. Humanitarian Intervention
8. Exclusion Operations
9. Aid to the Civil Power
10. Quarantine Operations

A role demand is a particular operational task. It is not the same as a force adaptation. For example, one World War Two role demand was breakthrough operations against fortified lines. The resultant force adaptation might have been the introduction of heavy tanks, or perhaps the organisation of specialised shock battalions.<sup>176</sup> Role demands are broad, theoretical constructs, “outputs” in management speak.

While the following ten role demands are separate and specific, it should be noted that there are overlaps, and one major operation may involve a variety of role demands – the recent Iraqi war has involved (if one is to include earlier air raids) the role demands of: raids and strikes; conventional war; van Creveld operations; and peace support operations.

There are some common characteristics between all role demands. One is the fact that generally they require a swift response, as today’s conflicts give little advance warning.<sup>177</sup> This imposes a clear requirement on the structure of standing forces.<sup>178</sup> Another is, given the focus of this work on Western militaries, the need to avoid casualties and retain public support.

It might be asked why militaries, rather than other agencies, may be used to respond to this range of security issues.<sup>179</sup> There are three reasons.<sup>180</sup> Firstly, they may

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<sup>176</sup> For studies of military innovation to new demands see: Elizabeth Kier, *Imagining War: French and British Military Doctrine Between the Wars*. Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1997; Terry Pierce, *Warfighting and Disruptive Technologies: Disguising Innovation*. London, Frank Cass, 2004; Barry Posen, *The Sources of Military Doctrine: France, Britain and Germany Between the World Wars*. New York, Cornell University Press, 1984; Rosen, *Winning the Next War: Innovation and the Modern Military*.

<sup>177</sup> Bennett, 'Responding to Assymmetric Threats'. p.46

<sup>178</sup> Estilow, *US Military Force and Operations Other Than War: Necessary Questions to Avoid Strategic Failure*. p.6

<sup>179</sup> John Baylis et al., (eds.), *Strategy in the Contemporary World*. Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2002., Robert Patman, (ed.), *Security in a Post-Cold War World*. Basingstoke, Macmillan, 1999., John Gittings and Ian Davis, (eds.), *Britain in the 21st century: Rethinking defence and foreign policy*. Nottingham, Spokesman, 1996. all contain some discussion on the roles of militaries vis a vis other agencies in dealing with security threats

be the best suited organisation to meet a particular security need – such as conventional warfare. Secondly, the military may not be sufficient in and of itself to meet an entire security need, but may be well suited to a particular facet – such as counter-terrorism. And, finally, the military may not be particularly well suited to an operation, but may be forced to do so by the failure or absence of other organisations – such as disaster relief.

In order to fulfil these new tasks well, militaries themselves must change.<sup>181</sup> Nor are changing roles the only evolutionary impetus; military technology has advanced as well.

The following sections list these ten role demands, identify their specific characteristics, illustrate why Cold War military structures are not well-suited to them, and then indicate what type of forces would be better suited. Many of these role demands were present during the Cold War (indeed, the majority), yet have changed in the post-Cold War period and thus need to be assessed by the terms of that period. Others are theoretical projections, because there is yet to be such a military operation. Prediction that they will be required in the future can be justified by looking at current trends, however. Each section describes what is needed to perform a role demand well; no assertion is made, however, that a military need perform that particular role demand.<sup>182</sup>

The ten role demands have been further grouped into three operational categories.<sup>183</sup> They are: conflict operations, protection operations, and peace operations; these categories are further explained in the following sections.

### *Conflict Operations*

Conflict operations are combat operations. They involve the deliberate use of force to impose the will of one actor on another, and often focus on the destruction of the enemy's military forces. They range from high-technology, conventional state-vs-

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<sup>180</sup> My threefold division is partially based on a modified variant of Hartley III, *Operations Other Than War: Requirements for Analysis Tools Research Report*. p.23

<sup>181</sup> Peter Volten, 'Defense Reform in the Netherlands', in Istvan Gyarmati and Theodor Winkler (eds.), *Post-Cold War Defense Reform: Lessons Learned in Europe and the United States*. Washington, Brassey's, 2002. p.421

<sup>182</sup> This is a key point that deserves attention. This list of role demands is exhaustive and aims to create a taxonomy of all possible roles, rather than define what roles a military should perform.

<sup>183</sup> These categories are similar but slightly different from Hartley III, *Operations Other Than War: Requirements for Analysis Tools Research Report*. p.53. Linkages can still be seen. It should be noted my categories were developed before the Hartley III source was consulted.

state war through to counter-terrorist operations. They include Role Demands 1 through 5: Conventional Warfare, van Creveld Operations, Raids and Strikes, Counter-Terrorist Operations, and Cyberwarfare.

## Conventional War

Conventional war is defined as “the sustained use of military force against a conventionally operating enemy state to achieve a political victory.” Such warfare has been the *raison d’etre* for militaries at least since the development of the nation-state. Nor has it disappeared in the post-Cold War era.

Conventional war is characterised by being fought between states, and between forces operating in an open manner.<sup>184</sup> Due to that, it is usually of high intensity, although technology may vary.

Due to its nature, conventional war is the role demand most markedly affected by the rapid advance of military technology in recent years. Intensity has increased due to advances in weaponry, sensors and communications. Because of this, conventional war is the role demand most suited to the RMA paradigm of force structure.<sup>185</sup> Cold War military structures, while oriented towards conventional war, are not well suited to contemporary military operations.<sup>186</sup> Such militaries are heavy and ponderous, reliant on mass and momentum rather than speed and flexibility. They are weapons-focused rather than systems-focused, and often have rigid command structures.

Thus, a force best suited to post-Cold War conventional operations needs to differ from Cold War organisational structures. However, it should also be remembered that while an RMA-paradigm military may well be the best type of force

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<sup>184</sup> At least one anomaly can be identified: the Yugoslav civil war, which in many ways was a conventional war between non-state actors. The key is the openness of conventional war when compared with van Creveld operations.

<sup>185</sup> Authorities who support the thesis that RMA-paradigms are best practice for conventional warfare include: Lonsdale, *The Nature of War in the Information Age: Clausewitzian Future*; Douglas MacGregor, 'Resurrecting transformation for the post-industrial era', in Michael Evans, Alan Ryan, and Russell Parkin (eds.), *Future Armies, Future Challengers: Land warfare in the information age*. Crows Nest, Allen & Unwin, 2004. Elinor Sloan, *The Revolution in Military Affairs: Implications for Canada and NATO*. Montreal, McGill-Queens University, 2002. Gray, *Strategy for Chaos*.

<sup>186</sup> MacGregor, *Transformation Under Fire: Revolutionizing How America Fights*. provides perhaps the best critique of the applicability of Cold War militaries to RMA-paradigm operations. Cold War structures are still capable. However, if they were operating against an RMA-paradigm force, they would find it very difficult to win. Also, if they themselves restructured to the RMA-paradigm, they would perform better.

for contemporary conventional war, traditionally organised armies may still retain substantial capability for such operations.<sup>187</sup>

In order to best meet the demands of high-speed, high-intensity, high-technology conventional warfare, several requirements can be identified. The central key is the possession of a single overarching doctrine and philosophy, so that unity is achieved.<sup>188</sup> This *ethos* should be information focused. Weapons should be regarded as parts of systems rather than individual platforms. Command should be flexible, and decisions made swiftly. The force should be oriented towards manoeuvre and speed through the use of flat rather than vertical organisational structures.<sup>189</sup> The complexity and speed of such operations requires adept practitioners, rather than swiftly trained conscripts.<sup>190</sup> As such emphasis should be on both technology and training.<sup>191</sup> Doctrine should be joint down to the tactical level to realise the synergies of the three main arms operating together.<sup>192</sup>

For conventional war, major weapons systems such as tanks, armoured infantry vehicles, artillery, strike aircraft and attack helicopters are vital. These are the types of units that can take and occupy territory, or deliver massive firepower against defined targets. For best efficiency, they should be equipped with precision weaponry, and be integrated with other platforms and a sensor network; this ensures that any target found can be swiftly destroyed.<sup>193</sup> Emphasis should be less on mass, such as tank divisions suited to Cold War operations, and more on small, responsive units. Because conventional warfare is fought against other states, technology and size advances cannot be taken for granted; a state may need to use manoeuvre and flexibility to succeed, extracting the maximum combat potential from each unit by the use of integration.

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<sup>187</sup> One should reiterate, again, that the emphasis of this thesis is on best practice. A force may operate in a role demand without adapting; however its performance in that role demand will be less than it would have been had it adapted. Thus for each role demand, the force adaptation recommended is regarded as best practice.

<sup>188</sup> MacGregor, *Transformation Under Fire: Revolutionizing How America Fights*. p.86-87 and Bitzinger, *Defense Transformation and the Asia Pacific: Implications for Regional Militaries*.

<sup>189</sup> Paul Dibb, 'The Revolution in Military Affairs and Asian Security', *Survival*, vol. 39, no. 4, Winter 1997-1998. p.112

<sup>190</sup> Knox and Murray, 'The future behind us'. p.176-177 and Steven Biddle, 'Land Warfare: Theory and Practice', in John Baylis, et al. (eds.), *Strategy in the Contemporary World*. Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2002. p.110

<sup>191</sup> Eliot Cohen, 'Technology and Warfare', in John Baylis, et al. (eds.), *Strategy in the Contemporary World*. Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2002. p.244

<sup>192</sup> Les Brownlee and Peter Schoomaker, 'Serving a Nation at War: A Campaign Quality Army with Joint and Expeditionary Capabilities', *Parameters*, Summer 2004. p.11

<sup>193</sup> Berkowitz, *The New Face Of War*. p.77

The utility of forces operating in such a fashion was seen in the two Gulf War offensives in 1991 and 2003. In both, a well-trained force relying on precision and manoeuvre easily defeated a Cold War-model army.<sup>194</sup>

There is also the prospect of even more revolutionary styles of conventional warfighting.<sup>195</sup> The linear front may disappear, replaced by a new multi-dimensionality.<sup>196</sup> If there are no front lines, then training needs to be made more stressful, to reflect this complexity and ambiguity.<sup>197</sup> There will also be a greater need to protect logistical installations and lines of communications, as they will not be safe behind fixed lines.<sup>198</sup>

For most Western militaries, any conventional war will be an expeditionary operation. Because of this, there will be uncertainty about deployment, the probability of an austere operational environment, and the requirement to fight on arrival.<sup>199</sup> Expeditionary operations also impose demands on sustainability, as forces may need to operate for a protracted period.<sup>200</sup>

Fulfilling the requirements of high-technology conventional warfare is extremely expensive, and may perhaps not be the best answer to other requirements. It must be remembered that the above role demand is posited on the hypothesis that the RMA will indeed revolutionise conventional warfare.<sup>201</sup>

## Raids and Strikes

Raids and strikes are defined as “the use of short duration military force against a foreign target to achieve a limited political goal.” They are thus forceful, and

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<sup>194</sup> Sydney Freedberg Jr, 'A Military Stretched Thin', *National Journal*, vol. 36, no. 26, June 26 2004. and Biddle, 'Land Warfare: Theory and Practice'. p.110. The aftermath of the second invasion is not conventional warfare, and thus the above comments have no bearing on the success or lack thereof of the occupation. However, it is obvious that the US advance during the conventional phase was swift, accurate and decisive.

<sup>195</sup> Berkowitz, *The New Face Of War*. p.102

<sup>196</sup> Thomas, 'Information Warfare in the Second (1999-) Chechen War: Motivator for Military Reform?' p.230; Cohen, 'Technology and Warfare'. p.250-251 and Mowthorpe, *The Militarization and Weaponization of Space*. p.202-204

<sup>197</sup> Brownlee and Schoomaker, 'Serving a Nation at War: A Campaign Quality Army with Joint and Expeditionary Capabilities'. p.17-18

<sup>198</sup> Ibid. p.22-23

<sup>199</sup> Ibid. p.9

<sup>200</sup> Ibid. p.11

<sup>201</sup> There have been only two major post-Cold War conventional wars, both in Iraq. Both illustrated the strength of the RMA. The Kosovo intervention was not a conventional war; any shortcomings it illustrated in the usage of technology are not applicable to this section. It is difficult to suggest a conventional war in which a transformed military would not have a major advantage over an army operating in a more traditional fashion.

related to conventional operations; the main difference is duration. Raids and strikes are short. They might be used to secure information or physical objects, destroy a target, or confuse an opponent.<sup>202</sup>

Such operations have become increasingly frequent in the post-Cold War era: the attacks on Iraq during the mid-1990s, the cruise missile attacks on Sudan in 1998, NATO air raids in Bosnia in 1995, and indeed most terrorist attacks can all be categorised as raids and strikes.<sup>203</sup> Their character has evolved during the period, largely due to advances in technology.

The requirements for raids and strikes are simple: long range forces capable of attacking targets in a short amount of time. They provide a useful adjunct to sustained operations; instead of deploying sizeable units, a nation may rely on rapid surgical strikes by air and special forces.<sup>204</sup>

Commando units, long-range bombers and transport aircraft, and missile-firing warships all possess the ability to carry out raids and strikes. Precision is vital. Due to the limited nature of such operations it is important that they strike their specific target.

One particular subset of raids and strikes is service-assisted or service-protected evacuations. The most famous example of such operations was the US withdrawal from Vietnam in the early 1970s.

Sustainability is not a major factor for this role demand. Thus a small nation could maintain a potent raid and strike capacity yet a relatively weak conventional war capacity.

### Van Creveld Operations<sup>205</sup>

Van Creveld operations are defined as “the sustained use of military force against a non-conventionally operating enemy to achieve a political victory.” They are named after the strategist Martin van Creveld, who has predicted a future of low-

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<sup>202</sup> Hartley III, *Operations Other Than War: Requirements for Analysis Tools Research Report*. p.A-4

<sup>203</sup> Moskos, Williams, and Segal, (eds.), *The Postmodern Military: Armed Forces after the Cold War*. p.279-282 lists several others as well.

<sup>204</sup> Azar Gat, 'Isolationism, Appeasement, Containment, and Limited War: Western Strategic Policy from the Modern to the Postmodern', in Zeev Maoz and Azar Gat (eds.), *War in a Changing World*. Michigan, University of Michigan Press, 2001. p.88 and Ryan, *Putting Your Young Men in the Mud: Change, Continuity and the Australian Infantry Battalion*. p.9 and p.46-47

<sup>205</sup> Van Creveld operations: Used deliberately; while others may not use the term in adjective-noun sense, the idea of a "field" of operations analysed by Martin Van Creveld is distinct.

intensity, dirty wars rather than high-technology conflict.<sup>206</sup> Others have termed such operations “mud warfare,” in reference to the often primitive nature of conflict.<sup>207</sup> They are long-term, and low intensity when measured over time, although individual actions may be of high intensity.<sup>208</sup>

During the post-Cold War period, they have been the most common kind of conflict operation – US operations in Afghanistan and Iraq today being the most obvious examples. Given the rising trends of ethnic conflict, terrorism, and interventionism, it is likely they will remain the most common type in the future as well. Again, it must be kept in mind that this thesis approaches such operations from the viewpoint of the intervening state.

Van Creveld operations encompass several sub-types. They include anti-terrorist organisations, which are expeditionary operations against terrorists in their own territories and are thus distinct from counter-terrorist operations. Also included under this term are counter-insurgency operations.

The common defining characteristic in all van Creveld operations is that one side operates in non-conventional fashion; it will avoid pitched battles and open warfare. This enemy will usually be small, flexible and fast moving.<sup>209</sup> Due to the need to operate in non-conventional fashion, this enemy will lack the logistical support to operate heavy weapons, and indeed if it did so it would likely give up its non-conventional status and become a conventional actor.<sup>210</sup> In the post-Cold War era, insurgents may possess some advanced, light weapons such as hand-held missiles, but not always. Often, insurgents will seek to operate from urban areas as this can give them an asymmetrical advantage against conventionally superior foes.<sup>211</sup> It is likely that this trend will continue in the future.<sup>212</sup> Usually, actions are small, and

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<sup>206</sup> Martin van Creveld, *The Art of War: War and Military Thought*. London, Cassell, 2000; van Creveld, 'The Future of War'.

<sup>207</sup> Libicki, 'Incorporating Information Architecture in Defense Policy'. p.118 calls such operations “mud warfare”

<sup>208</sup> David Bongard, 'Factors and Considerations for Addressing Guerilla and Counterinsurgency Warfare', in William Schilling (ed.), *Nontraditional Warfare: Twenty-First-Century Threats and Responses*. Dulles, Brassey's, 2002. p.182

<sup>209</sup> Bowyer Bell, *Dragonwars*. This book in its entirety is a useful – if somewhat incoherent and opaque – analysis of the nature of insurgencies and similar underground movements

<sup>210</sup> Some, limited usage of heavy weaponry can be an aspect of van Creveld operations – but compare Giap's usage of artillery vs Dien Bien Phu in 1954, a conventional operation, to later Viet Cong usage of small numbers of rocket and mortar systems as part of an insurgency.

<sup>211</sup> Rosenau, 'Every Room is a Battle: The Lessons of Modern Urban Warfare'. p.375

<sup>212</sup> Jennifer Taw and Bruce Hoffman, 'The Urbanisation of Insurgency: the Potential Challenge to US Army Operations', *Small Wars and Insurgencies*, vol. 6, no. 1, Spring 1995. p.70

thus a single chance event can have disproportionate effects on the course of battle.<sup>213</sup> All of the above characteristics can be seen in insurgencies from South America to Africa, and in the current fighting in Iraq.

During the Cold War, state militaries proved unsuited to fighting such foes unless they adapted swiftly. Indeed, one Cold War analyst noted that to fight guerillas, a formal military needed to “forget a great deal of its doctrine and organisation for the conduct of other types of wars.”<sup>214</sup> Armies were usually too large and inflexible to deal with fleeting enemies, and their massive firepower advantages could seldom be brought to bear. When success was achieved tactically, such as in Afghanistan and Vietnam, it was through decentralisation and the use of small manoeuvre elements, including special forces. However, even such tactical victories seldom turned into strategic success.

To fully succeed in such operations, a military must be able to achieve strategic victory, not merely tactical military success. This requires deliberate orientation towards the demands of such conflicts; retaining a conventional focus and attempting to succeed in van Creveld operations is fundamentally flawed.<sup>215</sup> In a low-intensity conflict this is achieved through a doctrine that focuses on the central importance of winning “hearts and minds”. The military force must operate in a way that is conducive to good relations with the population. This in turn removes the support that sustains the insurgency or terrorist group, making them vulnerable to the tactical initiatives of the military.<sup>216</sup> This mechanism is often forgotten, with emphasis instead placed on the military-tactical aspects of such operations, but it is the key; tactical successes do not automatically turn into higher-level successes.<sup>217</sup> This emphasis on hearts and minds goes against the outcome-oriented Clausewitzian mindset of most Western militaries.<sup>218</sup> It is especially vital in the RAM-dominated

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<sup>213</sup> Bongard, 'Factors and Considerations for Addressing Guerilla and Counterinsurgency Warfare'. p.182

<sup>214</sup> Payne Jnr, *The Conduct of War: An Introduction to Modern Warfare*. p.241

<sup>215</sup> Rob de Wijk, 'The Limits of Military Power', in Russell Howard and Reid Sawyer (eds.), *Terrorism and Counterterrorism: Understanding the New Security Environment*. Guilford, McGraw-Hill/Dushkin, 2004. p.482

<sup>216</sup> Bowyer Bell, *Dragonwars*. p.96-106

<sup>217</sup> Payne Jnr, *The Conduct of War: An Introduction to Modern Warfare*. p.243

<sup>218</sup> J. Spence, 'Reflections on 11 September 2001', in Teri McConville and Richard Holmes (eds.), *Defence Management in Uncertain Times*. London, Frank Cass, 2003. p.32-33

post-Cold War world, where an aggressive, high-casualty approach to insurgencies is unlikely to meet with domestic approval.<sup>219</sup>

Tactical doctrine should be highly flexible. It should be adapted to respond to irregular demands, as insurgents and terrorists seldom fight in a formalised style.<sup>220</sup> Specific training is useful, given the demands of this role.<sup>221</sup> Intelligence is even more crucial than in a conventional war, due to the fact that the opposition is often hidden or not easily distinguished from the civilian population.<sup>222</sup> Combat units will thus require local experts. There is also the possibility that the need for intelligence may require methods that are not necessarily conducive to enhanced relations with the civilian population, such as torture or bribery.<sup>223</sup> In such cases, great care must be taken that tactical successes are not allowed to hinder longer term strategy in winning “hearts and minds”.

The weapons needed to fight van Creveld operations are not as sophisticated as those for conventional war. Sensors are useful, but cannot take the place of ground agents; the electronic device that can detect the sympathies of a village has not yet been invented.<sup>224</sup> There is a need for special forces and precision weapons that can react quickly and hit fleeting targets.<sup>225</sup> Helicopters are useful, as they can access otherwise impossible terrain. Airpower has utility also, especially in supplying ground forces and in hitting insurgents as they mass in the later stages of a campaign.<sup>226</sup> The logistical demands of such operations are relatively small compared to those of conventional war, as ammunition and fuel expenditure is likely to be light. However, given that most insurgencies are long-term there still must be a solid supply base from which to fight.<sup>227</sup> There may also be a logistical need to supply the local population.

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<sup>219</sup> Witness the current controversies about Iraqi civilians killed during remarkably precise US operations in Fallujah; acceptance of collateral losses has almost disappeared.

<sup>220</sup> See Michael Orr, 'Reform and the Russian Ground Forces 1992-2002', in Anne Aldis and Roger McDermott (eds.), *Russian Military Reform 1992-2002*. London, Frank Cass, 2003. p.132 for a criticism of Russian operations against Chechen insurgents.

<sup>221</sup> Corum and Johnson, *Airpower in Small Wars: Fighting Insurgents and Terrorists*. p.437

<sup>222</sup> Bruce Hoffman, 'A Nasty Business', in Russell Howard and Reid Sawyer (eds.), *Terrorism and Counterterrorism: Understanding the New Security Environment*. Guilford, McGraw-Hill/Dushkin, 2004. p.339-344

<sup>223</sup> Ibid. p.339-344

<sup>224</sup> J. Gentry, 'Doomed to Fail: America's blind faith in military technology', *Parameters*, vol. 32, no. 4, Winter 2002/2003.

<sup>225</sup> Pavel Baev, 'The Challenge of 'Small Wars' for the Russian Military', in A. Aldis and R. McDermott (eds.), *Russian Military Reform 1992-2002*. London, Frank Cass, 2003. p.198-201

<sup>226</sup> Corum and Johnson, *Airpower in Small Wars: Fighting Insurgents and Terrorists*. p.425-426. This is predicated on the insurgents following a gradually intensifying, Maoist strategy.

<sup>227</sup> Ibid. p.436-437

Van Creveld operations are not merely conventional warfare scaled down. They require specific orientation and acceptance of their characteristics if they are to be ably carried out and longer term success achieved. While the character of van Creveld operations has not changed markedly in the post-Cold War era, their frequency, proportional importance and intensity has.

## Counter Terrorist Operations

Counter-terrorist operations are defined as “the use of military force to respond during or immediately before or after a terrorist attack.” They are perhaps the most difficult of all role demands, due to the necessity for perfection. If improperly executed, heavy civilian casualties can result, as seen in attacks on a Moscow theatre in 2003 and a Beslan school in 2004.<sup>228</sup> Given the severity of terrorism in the post-Cold War era, it seems that civilian law enforcement may no longer be a sufficient response to such attacks.<sup>229</sup>

During the Cold War, most militaries possessed specialised counter-terrorist forces, such as the West German GSG-9. The demands on such forces have increased in the post-Cold War period, as terrorists have grown more ruthless and sophisticated, and the potential price of failure has increased.<sup>230</sup>

Counter-terrorism requires speed and precision. Forces should be specifically tasked with the counter-terrorist role, whether as part of a larger special forces group or as a sole-task unit. They must be able to respond to attacks within a very short time period, perhaps a few minutes. Superior training is vital. Because they will be operating in a sensitive environment, surrounded by civilian targets, the forces involved will need extreme professionalism. They must have the skill to avoid civilian

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<sup>228</sup> Alexander, *Winning the War: Advanced Weapons, Strategies and Concepts for the Post 9/11 World*. p.96 mentions the Moscow hostage drama. There is some debate about whether this operation was a failure or success.

<sup>229</sup> Tom Lansford, 'Homeland Security from Clinton to Bush: An Assessment', in John Davis (ed.), *The Global War on Terrorism: Assessing the American Response*. New York, Nova Science, 2004. p.4 and Joseph Douglass Jr, 'International Criminal Operations in Nontraditional Warfare', in William Schilling (ed.), *Nontraditional Warfare: Twenty-First-Century Threats and Responses*. Dulles, Brassey's, 2002. p.100

<sup>230</sup> Larson and Peters, *Preparing the US Army for Homeland Security: Concepts, Issues and Options*; Roger Medd and Frank Goldstein, 'International Terrorism on the Eve of a New Millennium', *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism*, vol. 20, no. 3, July/September 1997; Palmer, 'Terrorism in Southeast Asia: Malaysia, Singapore, the Philippines and Indonesia'; Shubik, 'Terrorism, Technology, and the Socioeconomics of Death'.

casualties and yet defeat and destroy the terrorists involved. Strong and decisive leadership is also vital, especially of the “heroic” type.<sup>231</sup>

Technology can be of great assistance in this role demand.<sup>232</sup> Advanced sensors can allow the counter-terrorist teams to see into buildings and keep terrorists under surveillance. New types of non lethal weapons may allow them to operate with little fear of collateral casualties.<sup>233</sup> Certain types of weapons may allow them to defeat terrorists at a safe range, such as sniper rifles with precision sights. However, technology needs to be proven, as the weapons for the counter-terrorist role must be extremely reliable. The price of equipment failure is likely to be too high to countenance. Counter-terrorist forces will also need integral transport, or the ability to obtain transport quickly.

The prospect that terrorists may operate WMDs makes the counter-terrorist role yet more difficult, and personnel may require nuclear-biological-chemical (NBC) suits for their own protection, and perhaps other equipment to protect civilians.

Another aspect of counter-terrorist operations is dealing with the aftermath. If there is a major casualty event, then counter-terrorist forces must either be trained in medical assistance themselves, or be closely linked with emergency medical units.<sup>234</sup> While counter-terrorist forces are likely to be small in nature, they will be the first on the scene, and may need to do what they can until other actors arrive.

## Cyberwarfare

Cyberwarfare is defined as “the use of information networks to inflict damage upon or obtain intelligence about an enemy.” Questions can be asked about at which point attacks on computer networks become warfare as such. Generally, the issue is whether or not separate physical damage has occurred.<sup>235</sup> If so, then such an attack could be seen as an act of war. The boundaries are very fuzzy, given the fact that both individuals and organisations use information networks to cause damage and obtain

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<sup>231</sup> Charles Moskos, 'Towards a Postmodern Military: The United States as Paradigm', in Charles Moskos, John Williams, and David Segal (eds.), *The Postmodern Military: Armed Forces after the Cold War*. New York, Oxford University Press, 2000. discusses this leadership type

<sup>232</sup> Alexander, *Winning the War: Advanced Weapons, Strategies and Concepts for the Post 9/11 World*. discusses the applicability of advanced technology to such operations in detail.

<sup>233</sup> N. Lewer, 'Non-lethal weapons: operational and policy developments', *The Lancet - Extreme Medicine*, vol. 362, December 2003.

<sup>234</sup> Larson and Peters, *Preparing the US Army for Homeland Security: Concepts, Issues and Options*. p.161-162 discusses these questions in greater detail.

<sup>235</sup> Conway, 'Terrorism and IT: Cyberterrorism and Terrorist Organisations Online'. p.276

sensitive information. Cyberwarfare did not exist during the Cold War, as information networks were too small and separate. Electronic warfare did exist, but as a subset of other role demands, notably conventional war. What separates cyberwarfare is its ability to be stand-alone.

Another question is whether or not cyberwarfare is a demand for the military, rather than civilian organisations. At this point in time no definite answer can be made, but given the potential security implications it can be perceived as a possible military role.

During the 1990s there was some fear that terrorists or other actors might use cyberwarfare against others.<sup>236</sup> It was believed these attacks might bring a country to its knees by destroying connected systems, such as power stations. One commentator called information warfare the “most significant threat to national security since the development of nuclear weapons.”<sup>237</sup>

However, the evidence to date seems to suggest that such fears were an overreaction.<sup>238</sup> The few attacks that have been carried out by organisations have been disruptive rather than destructive. Conventional terrorist attacks are far more likely to do real damage than cyber-attacks.<sup>239</sup> However, this should not breed overconfidence. The world will grow only more interconnected in the future, and thus the potential for successful cyberwarfare will also grow.

This presents militaries with a specific role demand: the ability to conduct defensive and offensive cyberwarfare. Technical demands can be clearly identified. To carry out this role successfully requires a good information architecture, with excellent physical network capabilities, and the ability to accommodate the fluidity of a real-time, high-density and rapidly changing world.<sup>240</sup> Defence is also vital: present military networks are already highly secure, although this may merely force attackers to seek out softer targets such as defence-related companies and other governmental

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<sup>236</sup> Soo Hoo, Goodman, and Greenberg, 'Information Technology and the Terrorist Threat'. and Berkowitz, *The New Face Of War*.

<sup>237</sup> Adam Cobb, *Australia's Vulnerability to Information Attack: Towards a National Information Policy*, Canberra: ANU Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, October 1997. p.4

<sup>238</sup> Berkowitz, *The New Face Of War*. p.140-143

<sup>239</sup> Soo Hoo, Goodman, and Greenberg, 'Information Technology and the Terrorist Threat'. p.146

<sup>240</sup> Martin Libicki, 'What Information Architecture for Defense?' in Stuart Johnson, Martin Libicki, and Gregory Treverton (eds.), *New Challenges and New Tools for Defense Decisionmaking*. Santa Monica, RAND, 2003. p.77-85

organisations.<sup>241</sup> Cyberwarfare may thus emulate the history of strategic bombing, in focusing upon civilian rather than military targets.

Doctrine, organisation and training for this role present a more difficult proposition. It is likely that a devoted organisation would prove best. Doctrine would need to be developed from scratch. Due to the need for expertise, personnel might need to be recruited from the civilian field.<sup>242</sup> Leadership of the managerial type would likely prove best-suited to the requirements of this role demand.<sup>243</sup>

The costs of cyberwarfare might be low, given the great applicability of civilian technology. There is little need for specific military equipment, and a cyberwarfare centre might be set up in almost any city or town.

### *Protection Operations*

Protection operations revolve around the physical protection of a state.<sup>244</sup> They may involve some form of combat, but are primarily focused on the prevention of harm. They include actions against criminal organisations, the protection of exclusion zones and the provision of aid to the civil power.

### *Exclusion Operations*

Exclusion operations are defined as “the use of military force in association with civilian agencies to protect the state against criminal organisations and economic threats.”<sup>245</sup> This role demand involves military action against criminal organisations, the surveillance of borders, as well as the patrolling of economic zones. Such operations have been a military role for many centuries, but the character of the role has changed in the post-Cold War period.

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<sup>241</sup> Berkowitz, *The New Face Of War*. p.160

<sup>242</sup> Cohen, 'Technology and Warfare'. p.249

<sup>243</sup> Moskos, 'Towards a Postmodern Military: The United States as Paradigm'.

<sup>244</sup> The discerning reader should compare my Protection Operation category to National Integrity and Military Contingency operations in Hartley III, *Operations Other Than War: Requirements for Analysis Tools Research Report*. p.38,55,73-75 and Estilow's Low and Medium threat roles in Estilow, *US Military Force and Operations Other Than War: Necessary Questions to Avoid Strategic Failure*. p.10-11

<sup>245</sup> It should be noted that the focus of Exclusion Operations is external, not internal threats. The use of the military for domestic policing is covered by Aid to the Civil Power.

The core role of military policing is internal, regulating the actions of the military. This, however, is not the focus of this role demand, which describes policing as an operational task oriented towards an external target, namely criminals.

During the Cold War, military operations were waged against criminal organisations – notably the US-led “War on Drugs” in Central and South America, but also in other locations such as the Caribbean.<sup>246</sup> This has continued to be the case, only in expanded form.<sup>247</sup>

As noted earlier, globalisation has seen trans-national criminal organisations (TCOs) expand in size and reach. In response to this growth, countries as diverse as the Netherlands and the Ukraine have stated that crime is one of their most important security threats.<sup>248</sup> Also, terrorists have established links with such TCOs, as the relationship is mutually beneficial.<sup>249</sup> In turn, TCOs have often become more like insurgent and terrorist groups than solely criminal organisations, most notably in regards to the use of violence. This has been seen in South America, especially in Colombia.<sup>250</sup> Police forces cannot necessarily deal with such powerful organisations, and require assistance.<sup>251</sup> Due to their size, equipment, and ability to operate over long distances, militaries can play an important role in defeating criminal organisations.

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<sup>246</sup> Terriff et al., *Security Studies Today*. p.154 and Wyn Rees, 'Britain's Contribution to Global Order', in Stuart Croft, et al. (eds.), *Britain and Defence 1945-2000: A Policy Re-evaluation*. Harlow, Longman, 2001. p.42. The War on Drugs in particular has become controversial, with criticism being directed at US-funding of certain governments.

<sup>247</sup> Jakkie Cilliers and Lindy Heinecken, 'South Africa: Emerging from a Time Warp', in Charles Moskos, John Williams, and David Segal (eds.), *The Postmodern Military: Armed Forces after the Cold War*. New York, Oxford University Press, 2000. p.240-245 and Marina Nuciari, 'Italy: A Military for What?' in Charles Moskos, John Williams, and David Segal (eds.), *The Postmodern Military: Armed Forces after the Cold War*. New York, Oxford University Press, 2000. p.151 and John Williams, 'The Postmodern Military Reconsidered', in Charles Moskos, John Williams, and David Segal (eds.), *The Postmodern Military: Armed Forces after the Cold War*. New York, Oxford University Press, 2000. p.266

<sup>248</sup> Jan van der Meulen, 'The Netherlands: The Final Professionalization of the Military', in Charles Moskos, John Williams, and David Segal (eds.), *The Postmodern Military: Armed Forces after the Cold War*. New York, Oxford University Press, 2000. p.103 and Anatoliy Grytsenko, 'Ukraine's Military Reform Efforts: Lessons Learned', in Istvan Gyarmati and Theodor Winkler (eds.), *Post-Cold War Defense Reform: Lessons Learned in Europe and the United States*. Washington, Brassey's, 2002. p.80

<sup>249</sup> Barry McCaffrey and John Basso, 'Narcotics, Terrorism and International Crime: The Convergence Phenomenon', in Russell Howard and Reid Sawyer (eds.), *Terrorism and Counterterrorism: Understanding the New Security Environment*. Guilford, McGraw-Hill/Dushkin, 2004.

<sup>250</sup> Ibid.

<sup>251</sup> Douglass Jr, 'International Criminal Operations in Nontraditional Warfare'. p.100. Bowyer Bell, *Dragonwars*. p.207 discusses this police-military escalation in regards to insurgencies, but it is also applicable to criminal organisations.

The varied tasks of economic zone patrolling, border surveillance, and prevention of illegal immigration might be termed estate management.<sup>252</sup> The importance of estate management has grown in the post-Cold War era. There are multiple reasons for this. Refugee numbers have climbed rapidly in the 1990s, presenting a potential threat to the territorial integrity various states, and illegal migrants have also grown in numbers, leading to resentment from host populations.<sup>253</sup> Resource pressures have made Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs) more important. Such threats may be of such a size that civilian agencies are overwhelmed, and seek assistance from military organisations.

Also, in the post-Cold War world, the protection of borders has become increasingly vital due to the proliferation of WMDs. Due to the very major threat such weapons pose, it is essential that they be kept outside a country's borders; even one failure could have catastrophic consequences.<sup>254</sup>

The requirements for exclusion operations are not particularly extreme. Doctrine should be related to the types of operations required, and should be based on militarised policing with a stress on co-operation.<sup>255</sup> Forces involved need to be highly diplomatic to avoid international incidents, and may well require a firm grounding in various aspects of international law.<sup>256</sup> Given the nature of the environment, language skills may also be essential. Leaders should also understand that they are not operating in a conflict environment. The use of violence will likely be relatively restricted except in extreme cases, and in those cases precision is vital, again due to the likely close involvement of civilian actors. Care must be taken not to undermine the authority of the police and other similar agencies.

Training is a key first step. Personnel should be highly professional in their tasks, especially as they may well be exposed to temptations from various actors, including criminal organisations and illegal fishers. Organisational links should be established between the military and civilian actors, so that during operations military personnel are interoperable with their civilian counterparts.

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<sup>252</sup> The term estate management is taken from Sam Tangredi, 'Sea Power: Theory and Practice', in John Baylis, et al. (eds.), *Strategy in the Contemporary World*. Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2002. p.124

<sup>253</sup> Terriff et al., *Security Studies Today*. p.157-162

<sup>254</sup> Larson and Peters, *Preparing the US Army for Homeland Security: Concepts, Issues and Options*. p.139-140

<sup>255</sup> Black, *War in the New Century*. p.63 discusses this idea but not specifically in relation to estate management.

<sup>256</sup> Hartley III, *Operations Other Than War: Requirements for Analysis Tools Research Report*. p.B10-21 notes some issues

Intelligence is crucial, and as most exclusion activities will be carried out along borders or on the open sea, electronic sensors can be just as useful as human sources. Surveillance is absolutely central, as until a threat is identified it cannot be countered.

The types of units needed depend on the nature of the country's geographic environment. If it is maritime, naval vessels able to operate out to the limits of the EEZ at least are required, or, if they are not available, sensor systems that can do that. Maritime patrol aircraft are also vital due to their speed of response.<sup>257</sup> The ability to fight is unlikely to be a crucial requirement, but the forces involved should still carry weapons, although they may justifiably be light. Heavy weaponry will either prove overkill or be unable to be used due to logistical constraints. In some cases there may be a need for specific weapons: South American militaries have used aircraft to strike hideouts and shoot down smuggler aircraft in their "War on Drugs."<sup>258</sup> Non-lethal weapons might also be particularly useful.<sup>259</sup> Endurance is also important due to the extended nature of the role demand.

If the situation is land-based, then requirements can be fulfilled through light arms and perhaps some slightly heavier items for particular tasks, such as man-portable SAMs and anti-tank weaponry. Infantry special forces will have the most utility in this role.

Communication linkages must be secure as well, as forces will likely be operating far from their bases and may need constant advice from higher command, especially in sensitive situations.

The RMA might well have a great impact on this role demand. Space-based sensors have already been used to watch over ports.<sup>260</sup> If an interlocked system of sensors can be developed to watch over the approaches, then any attempted incursions can be met swiftly and efficiently. There is thus a distinct possibility that this role demand, more than any other, might well be technologised to a great extent. However, criminal organisations are likely to be largely immune to technological detection.

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<sup>257</sup> Aircraft are of secondary importance, as they cannot make naval interceptions. See Andrew Forbes, *Protecting the National Interest: Naval Constabulary Operations in Australia's Exclusive Zone*, Working Paper 11: Royal Australian Navy Sea Power Centre, April 2002; Peter Lewis-Young, 'The EEZ Patrol Problem - Australia, New Zealand And The South Pacific Nations', *Asian Defence Journal*, June 1995.

<sup>258</sup> Anil Pustam, 'Air Forces in South America', *Military Technology*, vol. 28, no. 3, March 2004.

<sup>259</sup> Alexander, *Winning the War: Advanced Weapons, Strategies and Concepts for the Post 9/11 World*, p.11-36

<sup>260</sup> Mowthorpe, *The Militarization and Weaponization of Space*. p.202-204

## Aid to Civil Power

Aid to the civil power is defined as “the use of military force to provide support to civil authorities in an emergency situation.” The most obvious example of such operations is disaster relief, but they might also include domestic policing.

Due to their size and equipment, militaries have consistently been used throughout history to assist in the management of disasters. In the post-Cold War period, this has extended to the provision of international assistance, as societies and politicians have wished to see their militaries doing something useful.<sup>261</sup> It is a task likely to become increasingly common in the near future.

The requirements for giving aid to the civil power are varied. Firstly, and perhaps most importantly, there should be a doctrine that sees such operations as a valid role for the military, rather than as a distraction from crucial warfighting tasks. Organisationally, at least some units should be designated for quick response to emergencies. Training should focus on various tasks relating to disaster management, medical support, and co-operation with civil authorities. There are great similarities with the requirement for exclusion operations; the major difference is a domestic focus.

Most standard military equipment has great applicability for such tasks, due to its rugged nature and ability to enter difficult terrain. Helicopters, engineering and firefighting apparatus, and off-road vehicles are likely to be the most important types of equipment. Weaponry is largely unnecessary, although in cases where civil disturbance has followed a disaster, the provision of small arms may well be required. In cases where aid is provided to a third party, long range sea or air transport may be necessary.

The RMA has little applicability here, except in the field of sensors. Advanced equipment might be used to detect survivors from a disaster,<sup>262</sup> but in general the network concepts of the RMA are less useful than a large number of personnel, fit, trained and ready to provide aid to the civil power.

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<sup>261</sup> The response to the Asian tsunami of 2004 is perhaps the best illustration of this.

<sup>262</sup> David Dickens, *The Revolution in Military Affairs: A New Zealand View Part I*, Working Paper 14/99, Wellington: Centre for Strategic Studies, 1999. p.37

## *Peace Operations*

Peace operations have at their central core the maintenance of global security.<sup>263</sup> They are the most politically-motivated of the three types, in that countries choose to carry them out willingly and not because there is a direct threat to their security. Generally such operations do not involve combat, but unlike protection operations it is a distinct possibility of any deployment.

## Peace Support Operations

Peace support is defined as “the use of military force to participate in a peace support operation.” Peace support operations differ from humanitarian interventions (discussed below) slightly. The following is a synthetic definition derived from close analysis of extant operations and other definitions:

An effort, involving external military personnel in an operational fashion, with the primary goal of conflict control and with the operational consent (whether given freely or under duress) of the host nation or at least one of the local belligerents, conducted impartially in an effort to reduce conflict and not for the national interests of the intervening countries.<sup>264</sup>

Peace support operations are “at the forefront of exposure to the evolving dynamics of contemporary warfare.”<sup>265</sup> Indeed, involvement in peace support is the area of greatest growth for post-Cold War militaries.

The number of PSOs in general, as well as their individual size, has grown during the 1990s, as countries have proven more willing to establish and participate in such operations. This increased involvement stems from several motives: support for allies and alliances, distant control of immigration, the withdrawal of superpowers

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<sup>263</sup> See Hartley III, *Operations Other Than War: Requirements for Analysis Tools Research Report*. p.70, which describes peace operations as supporting diplomatic efforts to reach a long-term political settlement.

<sup>264</sup> Alach, 'Peace Support Operations: International Evolution and New Zealand Adaptation'. p.17

<sup>265</sup> Bhatia, *War and Intervention: Issues for Contemporary Peace Operations*. p.29

from areas of influence, and maintaining the balance of power, as well as the more idealist notion of humanitarian assistance.<sup>266</sup>

Cold War militaries regularly involved themselves in PSOs, but seldom modified their structures to meet such demands. Those structures are relatively ill-suited to post-Cold War PSOs. Notably, traditional emphasis on heavy weapons is unnecessary, as is a warfighting doctrine and attitude. Nor is the opposite, a totally neutral and passive attitude that was sometimes seen when Cold War militaries deployed to peacekeeping operations, any better.<sup>267</sup>

Post-Cold War PSOs, in general, possess several common characteristics.<sup>268</sup> Objectives are often ambiguous, if not simply unattainable. Unity of command is seldom achieved, due to the wide variety of contributing nations and their various national interests. National contingents are usually beholden to their state, rather than the operation itself.<sup>269</sup>

Forces are usually dispersed rather than concentrated. Surprise in military operations is often compromised by the need to share information with other participants in the force.<sup>270</sup> And, often, the peace support force is actively opposed by segments of the host population and foreign mercenaries.<sup>271</sup>

It is possible to identify those qualities that would best suit a force to post-Cold War and near-future PSOs.<sup>272</sup> Firstly, doctrine specifically devoted to peace support is vital – such operations have their own defining characteristics, and warfighting doctrine is not well suited. Organisationally, some units should be earmarked for rapid deployment to PSOs, avoiding the need for delay and decision-making over contribution. Also, there is a need for sizeable ground forces within the military organisation, as this is the one arm that can easily undertake the broad range of tasks that may be required in a PSO.<sup>273</sup> Supporting elements, such as medical units,

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<sup>266</sup> Ibid. p.16-18

<sup>267</sup> Alach, 'Peace Support Operations: International Evolution and New Zealand Adaptation'. Chapter Two

<sup>268</sup> Ibid. p.90-97

<sup>269</sup> Duncan Lewis, 'Lessons from East Timor', in Michael Evans, Alan Ryan, and Russell Parkin (eds.), *Future Armies, Future Challengers: Land warfare in the information age*. Crows Nest, Allen & Unwin, 2004. p.268

<sup>270</sup> Farrell, 'Humanitarian Intervention and Peace Operations'. p.299-301

<sup>271</sup> Bhatia, *War and Intervention: Issues for Contemporary Peace Operations*. p.51

<sup>272</sup> This segment builds largely on my thesis: Alach, 'Peace Support Operations: International Evolution and New Zealand Adaptation'.

<sup>273</sup> Luttwak, 'Blood and Computers: The Crisis of Classic Military Power in Advanced Postindustrial Societies and the Scope of Technological Remedies'. p.72

engineering support, military police and civil affairs units are all greatly useful.<sup>274</sup> Training is an area in which special focus should be given. A force oriented towards peace support should train its personnel with relevant skills, such as languages, negotiation techniques and cultural knowledge.<sup>275</sup> Also, there should be a mindshift away from minimising casualties in the peacekeeping force, towards achieving the goals of the operation, even though this may meet with major political and organisational opposition.<sup>276</sup>

Equipment for peace support presents its own requirements. Generally, PSOs are expeditionary operations for the contributing nations, so strategic lift is vital. This may either be through sea- or air-lift, although the latter cannot transport heavy equipment. Such equipment can be either bought or leased.<sup>277</sup>

On the ground, forces need sufficient weaponry, or they may well be unable to carry out operations. The majority of contemporary PSOs are characterised by a level of violence entirely absent from Cold War era operations.<sup>278</sup> Thus units must possess armoured vehicles, especially reinforced against light-weight anti-tank weapons such as rocket-propelled grenades (RPGs). These vehicles can provide an important psychological effect.<sup>279</sup> Forces must be able to outmatch local belligerents if necessary, perhaps through the provision of air support.<sup>280</sup> Still, most PSOs should not pursue warfighting goals as aggression can undermine resolution.<sup>281</sup>

The RMA may also have a lot to offer militaries involved in PSOs. Modern PSOs are characterised by a small number of soldiers operating in an amorphous environment with ill-defined threats. Certain aspects of the RMA would suit this environment well.<sup>282</sup>

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<sup>274</sup> Hartley III, *Operations Other Than War: Requirements for Analysis Tools Research Report*. p.143

<sup>275</sup> Christopher Dandeker, 'The United Kingdom: The Overstretched Military', in Charles Moskos, John Williams, and David Segal (eds.), *The Postmodern Military: Armed Forces after the Cold War*. New York, Oxford University Press, 2000. p.36-37

<sup>276</sup> Kaldor, 'Introduction'. p.26

<sup>277</sup> Ibid. p.27

<sup>278</sup> Individual cases such as Bougainville are exceptions to this rule.

<sup>279</sup> Bhatia, *War and Intervention: Issues for Contemporary Peace Operations*. p.127

<sup>280</sup> Kaldor, 'Introduction'. p.27

<sup>281</sup> Michael Rose, 'Lessons from Bosnia: a British perspective', in Michael Evans, Alan Ryan, and Russell Parkin (eds.), *Future Armies, Future Challengers: Land warfare in the information age*. Crows Nest, Allen & Unwin, 2004. p.262

<sup>282</sup> Alexander, *Winning the War: Advanced Weapons, Strategies and Concepts for the Post 9/11 World*. p.71-74. Also see James Hosek, 'The Soldier of the 21st Century', in Stuart Johnson, Martin Libicki, and Gregory Treverton (eds.), *New Challenges and New Tools for Defense Decisionmaking*. Santa Monica, RAND, 2003.

The most important aspect of participation in PSOs, however, is the attitude of the forces involved. As with van Creveld operations, the crucial consideration is winning the “hearts and minds” of the local population; without this, the central goal of conflict control can never be achieved. Such an outcome is a product of training, doctrine, leadership and even equipment on the part of the peace support force. A belligerent attitude, which may succeed in humanitarian intervention where goals are narrower, cannot succeed in PSOs.

## Humanitarian Relief

Humanitarian relief operations are defined as “the use of military force in an effort to alleviate human suffering.” Unlike peace support operations, their overarching goal is not necessarily the resolution of conflict.<sup>283</sup> They are often undertaken without the consent of the host nation or indeed any of the involved belligerents. Humanitarian intervention is seldom neutral or impartial.

During the Cold War, militaries were seldom involved in such operations. In the post-Cold War world, the situation has changed. Ethnic conflicts have resulted in many humanitarian catastrophes, and the global media has cast a spotlight on them, leading to public demands for involvement. In turn, governments have been more willing to intervene. While civilian agencies have a part to play, in dangerous environments militaries are often the only organisations logistically able to cope.<sup>284</sup>

The tasks of humanitarian interventions include resettling refugees, delivering food, and providing security for humanitarian organisations.<sup>285</sup> The probability of conflict has also increased since the end of the Cold War. Contemporary humanitarian intervention may require the occupation of airfields, the protection of relief convoys, and the avoidance of ambushes by local actors unwilling to allow the humanitarian intervention to continue.<sup>286</sup>

Due to their nature, humanitarian interventions are often conducted in the glare of close media attention. This results in compression of the battlefield; tactical

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<sup>283</sup> Alach, 'Peace Support Operations: International Evolution and New Zealand Adaptation'. p.20

<sup>284</sup> Wirtz, 'A New Agenda for Security and Strategy'. p.311-312

<sup>285</sup> Charles Moskos, John Williams, and David Segal, 'Armed Forces after the Cold War', in Charles Moskos, John Williams, and David Segal (eds.), *The Postmodern Military: Armed Forces after the Cold War*. New York, Oxford University Press, 2000. p.3

<sup>286</sup> Michael O'Hanlon, *Expanding Global Military Capacity for Humanitarian Intervention*. Washington, Brookings Institution Press, 2003. p.105

actions can have strategic consequences if transmitted to politicians and the general public. In turn, there has evolved a heavy emphasis on the protection of the intervening force and the avoidance of casualties. This has resulted in the use of weapons systems that pose little risk to the intervening force, even at the cost of reduced effectiveness, and there has often been fixation on exit strategies to ensure the intervening nation does not become bogged down.<sup>287</sup> Political considerations, especially in regards to casualties, can hamstring missions.<sup>288</sup>

When consideration is placed solely on the efficient conduct of the intervention, several clear requirements can be identified. First and foremost is the provision of a specific doctrine for humanitarian operations, detailing the methods to be used; this might be based on doctrine for counter-insurgency or peace support operations. Personnel should also be trained specifically for such operations. This may include language training or merely cultural awareness to accustom them to the theatre of operations. Leadership is also vital, due to the fact that humanitarian interventions are tactically-focused, and not every decision can be sent back to high command for authorisation.

Traditional military skills are still important in humanitarian interventions. Because emphasis is less on impartiality than is the case in PSOs, a belligerent attitude can be retained. In fact, a reputation as formidable warriors may assist a military involved in such an operation, because local spoilers may be less willing to be obstructive if there is a distinct possibility of retaliation.<sup>289</sup>

The types of equipment needed vary. Sealift is usually vital, and aircraft can provide both strategic and tactical airlift; the latter is often particularly important in primitive environments.<sup>290</sup> Light weapons are important, but heavy weapons may also be essential, especially armoured vehicles due to the need for force protection. There is likely to be little demand for offensive systems such as artillery and long-range rockets. However, the most important type of equipment of any humanitarian intervention is likely to be the standard truck or boat needed to carry humanitarian supplies to where they are needed.

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<sup>287</sup> Farrell, 'Humanitarian Intervention and Peace Operations'. p.301-303

<sup>288</sup> Ibid. p.297

<sup>289</sup> O'Hanlon, *Expanding Global Military Capacity for Humanitarian Intervention*. p.105

<sup>290</sup> Timothy Garden, 'Air Power: Theory and Practice', in John Baylis, et al. (eds.), *Strategy in the Contemporary World*. Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2002. p.154

## Quarantine Operations

Quarantine operations are defined as “the use of military force to maintain an external blockade, sanction or exclusion zone.” Such operations are centuries old, and while their character has not changed markedly in the post-Cold War period, their frequency has, due to the new trends of interventionism and multilateralism. Examples include the long-term patrol in the Persian Gulf directed at Iraq during the 1990s.<sup>291</sup> There is a close linkage between quarantine operations and exclusion operations.

Due to their nature, naval and air forces are the most important types of military unit for this role demand. Naval forces should be long range, capable of extended patrols, while air forces should possess similar characteristics. Doctrine and training will be similar to that for exclusion operations, with additional warfighting emphasis, as there is a possibility of conflict erupting at any time. Thus the forces should be well-armed and alert.

There needs to be a sizeable logistical framework to support such operations, because of their lengthy nature. There should also be sufficient spare capacity to ensure that a constant presence is maintained over time.

The RMA is applicable here largely in the field of sensors and integration. Networked units might be able to maintain a more coherent quarantine than a larger number of non-networked units.

Quarantine operations present a relatively limited role demand, and one in which capabilities are less generalised and more oriented to the specifics of each individual operation.

## Assessing Capability in Role Demands

The above section has isolated and identified ten role demands relevant to the post-Cold War security environment. Many existed during the Cold War, but have changed in the period since in response to factors such as terrorism and the RMA. The lines between the differing role demands are often blurred, and a single operation may encompass several.

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<sup>291</sup> Moskos, Williams, and Segal, (eds.), *The Postmodern Military: Armed Forces after the Cold War*. p.279-282

One problematic issue should be addressed: chronology. The above role demands have been synthesised from a study of the period from 1991 to date; they are primarily contemporarily relevant, and likely to be relevant in the near future. By and large, they also describe the demands of the entire post-Cold War period, but this is not necessarily the case, and arguments might be made about the demands of early-period Cold War PSOs, for example. They are approximations and abstract categories.

These ten role demands provide a framework for assessing the total operational capability of a military today. The methodology chosen relies on a simple two-dimensional grid. The first dimension comprises the ten role demands. The second is divided into Doctrine, Organisation, Training, Leadership, Soldier Systems and Readiness (DOTLMS-R)<sup>292</sup> This DOTLMS-R taxonomy is adapted from that used by the US military, and also by Larson and Peters in their analysis of US homeland security capability,<sup>293</sup> and enables the capability of a military in a particular role to be assessed in some detail. Doctrine encompasses formal doctrine, and institutional experience. Organisation refers to the structure and size of the military. Training refers to the quality of individual and collective training, as well as its emphasis. Leadership refers to the talents and types of leaders. Materiel refers to military equipment, and Soldier Systems refers to the qualities of individual soldiers, including their ethos and basic soldiering skills. Readiness refers to the operational state of the military and the time it would take to deploy. The table below shows a blank Capability Assessment Framework.

Figure 2.1 Example of Capability Assessment Framework

	Doctrine	Organisation	Training	Leadership	Materiel	Soldier Systems	Readiness
RD 1							
RD 2							
RD 3							
RD 4							
RD 5							

<sup>292</sup> TRADOC, 'TRADOC Military History', [accessed 28 October 2004]. Available from [www-tradoc.monroe.army.mil/historian/faqs.htm](http://www-tradoc.monroe.army.mil/historian/faqs.htm).

<sup>293</sup> Larson and Peters, *Preparing the US Army for Homeland Security: Concepts, Issues and Options*.

RD 6								
RD 7								
RD 8								
RD 9								
RD 10								

Each square is assessed both qualitatively and quantitatively. A short paragraph is written on each square, and a grade assigned. There are five grades: Very Low (1), Low (2), Fair (3), High (4), and Very High (5). Also important is the fact that the category Organisation includes size; a small army is unlikely to achieve anything above Low in this. Also, Organisation is double-weighted in the final assessment. The example below shows the assessment of a single role demand.

Figure 2.2 Example of Capability Assessment – United States Military

	Doctrine	Organisation	Training	Leadership	Materiel	Soldier Systems	Readiness	Overall
Conventional War	High (4)	High (4)	Very High (5)	Very High (5)	High (4)	Fair (3)	Fair (3)	High

The major use of this framework is to facilitate a systematic assessment of the current capability of a particular military. In Chapter Nine this Capability Assessment Framework will be used to assess the capabilities of the NZDF and ADF today.

## Conclusion

This chapter has shown the ways in which the post-Cold War strategic environment has developed. A new era of conflict has emerged, and with it new roles for militaries. The simplicities of the Cold War have been replaced, and defence forces around the globe face evolving challenges.

However, militaries do not automatically evolve to meet the demands of new security issues. Decisions on military orientation must be made at the political level.<sup>294</sup> Change requires resourcing, and this causes problems:

<sup>294</sup> In countries where the armed forces are more independent in policy it would be wiser to focus on their high command.

The complexity of military tasking leads to an inevitable tension between politicians and public, who seek to have a military able to take on all tasks, and militaries who point out the difficulty of achieving adequate flexibility with limited resources, necessitating the sophisticated management of resources.<sup>295</sup>

The following chapters will examine this process, by showing how the ADF and NZDF have developed in the context of this dynamic post-Cold War strategic environment. The first step in such a process is to identify the states of the two defence forces at the beginning of the period, in 1991. That is the role of Chapter Three.

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<sup>295</sup> Black, *War in the New Century*. p.120

## **Chapter Three – Setting a Baseline: The NZDF and ADF in 1991**

### **Introduction**

This chapter sets the baseline for an analysis of changes within the NZDF and ADF in the post-Cold War period by describing and assessing the two forces at the beginning of the period. It is divided into two main sections.

The first section examines the NZDF. It analyses policy, higher command and control, and joint doctrine. It then moves through each service, analysing their structures, training, equipment and doctrine. It ends by assessing the military ability of the NZDF as a whole. The second section does the same for the ADF. The chapter ends with a brief comparison of the two defence forces at the beginning of the post-Cold War era.

Following chapters build on this baseline to show how the two forces have changed in the post-Cold War period.

### **The New Zealand Defence Force (NZDF) 1991 – A Capability Analysis<sup>1</sup>**

#### **Overview**

The NZDF in 1991 consisted of 11,300 regular personnel,<sup>2</sup> divided into Headquarters NZDF (HQNZDF) and the three services: the New Zealand Army, the Royal New Zealand Navy (RNZN), and the Royal New Zealand Air Force (RNZAF). While a small force in global terms, the NZDF attempted to retain some, albeit minor, capability in all major areas of military endeavour, including jet strike, armoured warfare, and naval operations.

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<sup>1</sup> The following is not a snapshot at a single date, rather a synthesis and approximation of the size, structure and equipment of the NZDF around the year 1991; any attempt to be more specific as regards a date would be impossible due to limitations of data.

<sup>2</sup> International Institute of Strategic Studies, *The Military Balance*. London, 1991/1992. p.174

## Policy Guidance

Under the Defence Act (1990),<sup>3</sup> authority was granted to the New Zealand government to raise armed forces for the following purposes:

- a) the defence of New Zealand or any area of New Zealand responsibility;
- b) the protection of New Zealand's interests anywhere in the world;
- c) the contribution of forces under treaty;
- d) the contribution of forces to the United Nations;
- e) the provision of aid to the civil party;
- f) the provision of public services.<sup>4</sup>

These broad tasks provided the major defence policy framework for the NZDF in 1991, but due to their lack of specificity did not provide a particularly detailed indication of what the NZDF was supposed to do.

More specific requirements were provided by the Defence White Paper 1991 (DWP91.) This document stated that “there are no direct threats to our (New Zealand's) security... defence planning is therefore less concerned with New Zealand's security needs than with New Zealand's security interests.”<sup>5</sup> As an extension of this attitude, it was stated that the role of the NZDF was “not to fight wars... but to make an effective contribution to achieving New Zealand's external objectives.”<sup>6</sup> The White Paper noted that the end of the Cold War was an important change, but that it was too early to make predictions about the course of the future.<sup>7</sup> The DWP91 identified a variety of strategic variables and strategic constants,<sup>8</sup> and from these extracted a series of Defence Policy Goals.

There were ten of these goals. They were as follows:

- To maintain the sovereignty of New Zealand;
- To preserve the security of New Zealand and its essential interests;

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<sup>3</sup> Unknown Author, 'New Zealand Defence Act,' 1990.

<sup>4</sup> Ibid. Part I Section 5

<sup>5</sup> New Zealand Government, *The Defence of New Zealand 1991: A Policy Paper*, Wellington, 1991. p.7

<sup>6</sup> Ibid. p.7

<sup>7</sup> Ibid. p.16

<sup>8</sup> Ibid. p.17-26

- To maintain the sovereignty and security of the Cook Islands, Niue, and Tokelau;
- To contribute to the security of the South Pacific states with which New Zealand shares historical or other particular interests, and to contribute generally to the security and stability of the South Pacific;
- To develop further the existing defence co-operation with Australia, including combined planning operations, logistics and the industrial base;
- To maintain and develop defence co-operation with ASEAN countries, and to preserve the partnership obligations of the FPDA;
- To work to re-establish an effective defence relationship with New Zealand's other traditional partners especially the US and the UK;
- To support the United Nations by contributing forces for peacekeeping or peacemaking duties;
- To contribute forces to other collective endeavours where New Zealand's national interests are involved;
- To ensure that the general purpose forces implied for these goals are capable of supporting non-military interests.<sup>9</sup>

While these goals were not linked explicitly with the purposes noted in the Defence Act 1990, correlations can be seen. What was interesting, because it signalled a move away from the more operational focus of the preceding Lange White Paper of 1987, was the importance attached to the foreign policy role of the NZDF, and also the mention made of re-establishing ties with the US, partially broken by the ANZUS rift of the 1980s. Also, if the above goals were listed in order of importance,<sup>10</sup> then United Nations operations were ranked above other collective security operations, although admittedly both were near the end of the list.

Given the above goals, the review espoused a strategy of “self-reliance in partnership.” Two geographical areas were listed in which the NZDF might operate: “New Zealand and its immediate neighbourhood”, and “wider collective action.”<sup>11</sup>

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<sup>9</sup> Ibid. p.9

<sup>10</sup> While this is not stated in the document itself, it might be assumed that the ordering of goals was not merely a product of chance.

<sup>11</sup> New Zealand Government, *The Defence of New Zealand 1991: A Policy Paper*. p.52-54

New Zealand and its immediate neighbourhood was seen as the more important geographic area. Potential roles in this area included the maintenance of New Zealand's territorial integrity, which required maritime patrol assets, anti-submarine assets, counter-terrorist capability, and the ability to provide aid to the civil power.<sup>12</sup> The immediate neighbourhood also included the defence relationship with Australia, and exercises and manoeuvres with regional groupings. For such tasks, maritime air patrol capabilities, port visits by surface combatants, the air attack force, and the ability to provide deployable land forces were seen as vital. Also regarded as important was the ability to contribute forces to South Pacific emergencies ranging from terrorist attacks to service assisted evacuations of New Zealand nationals.<sup>13</sup>

The broader grouping of wider collective security was largely identified with peacekeeping. As such it was seen as requiring infantry, communications, transport and logistics elements. No special importance was attached to the role, and it was noted that "we (New Zealand) do not hold units specially configured and equipped for peace-keeping duties."<sup>14</sup> Some mention was also made of higher intensity collective security operations, but little note was made of the capabilities required for such operations.<sup>15</sup>

The review also included a more detailed list of defence tasks. These were:

1. To protect the territorial integrity and sovereignty of New Zealand and dependent territories;
2. To provide defence advice;
3. To provide intelligence;
4. To maintain a force in reserve;
5. To provide ancillary services;
6. To contribute to regional security;
7. To participate in defence alliances;
8. To contribute to collective security.<sup>16</sup>

These tasks thus ranged from the operational, such as numbers 6 and 8, to the

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<sup>12</sup> Ibid. p.59-60

<sup>13</sup> Ibid. p.64-65

<sup>14</sup> Ibid. p.84-85

<sup>15</sup> Ibid. p.67-68. This was likely due to what was seen as the improbability of such operations, or perhaps financial issues.

<sup>16</sup> Ibid. p.58

everyday running of the defence apparatus, such as numbers 2 and 3. They were not particularly specific, although some effort was made to further identify the capabilities required to achieve each task.

To achieve these policy goals, the DWP91 suggested the concept of a “credible minimum defence force,” although what that meant was not clearly defined.<sup>17</sup> This would be a force with a broad range of capabilities; the document stated that “our armed forces should not become limited by over-specialisation”, in answer to earlier criticisms that New Zealand should move towards a niche defence force for economic and moral reasons.<sup>18</sup>

The DWP91 stated that it was the start, rather than the finish, of the defence review process.<sup>19</sup> A series of narrow reviews would follow to determine whether various capabilities actually achieved the “credible minimum.”<sup>20</sup> It was felt that there was a risk to New Zealand’s credibility if an obvious gap existed between force capabilities and the rhetoric of defence goals.<sup>21</sup>

To implement this broad policy, the specific mission of the NZDF, derived from the White Paper, was:

to protect the sovereignty and advance the well-being of New Zealand by maintaining a level of armed forces sufficient to deal with small contingencies affecting New Zealand and its region, and capable of contributing to collective efforts where our wider interests are involved<sup>22</sup>

The NZDF was tasked with four specific outcomes derived from this mission:

1. Ensuring New Zealand’s sovereign integrity;
2. Promoting exclusive national interests;
3. Promoting regional stability;
4. Promoting world peace.<sup>23</sup>

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<sup>17</sup> Ibid. p.8 and James Rolfe, *The Armed Forces of New Zealand*. St Leonards, Allen & Unwin, 1999.

<sup>18</sup> New Zealand Government, *The Defence of New Zealand 1991: A Policy Paper*. p.42

<sup>19</sup> Ibid. p.7

<sup>20</sup> Ibid. p.96. Reviews included Air Combat, Air and Sea Transport, and Maritime Surveillance.

<sup>21</sup> Ibid. p.40

<sup>22</sup> New Zealand Defence Force, *Report of the New Zealand Defence Force for the year ended 30 June 1992*, G4, Wellington, 1992. p.3

<sup>23</sup> Ibid. p.3

Under the accrual accounting system used, the NZDF was then required to produce specific outputs derived from those outcomes. Outputs were measured against levels of capability, the highest being Operational Level of Capability (OLOC) – being constantly available for operations. Due to funding shortfalls, most units were instead maintained at Directed Level of Capability (DLOC), which allowed OLOC to be achieved within a specified period of time.<sup>24</sup> Minimum Level of Capability (MLOC) was largely the same as DLOC, and was determined by the Minister, on the basis of the CDF’s advice, and embodied in a purchase agreement.<sup>25</sup>

Overall, defence policy in 1991 demanded a broad range of capabilities from the NZDF. No single role was identified as being pre-eminent, and so the preferred force structure was broad, with a minimal capability in each area, rather than one focused and particularly capable in a narrower field. Policy avoided the detailed analytical study of required force structures, in direct contrast to the in-depth approach taken to identifying the preferred strategic posture. The DWP91 was very focused on the foreign policy impact of defence force operations, rather than purely operational considerations. It was also somewhat determined by fiscal considerations, especially in regards to the concept of the “credible minimum.”<sup>26</sup>

## Funding

Perhaps the one constant in the history of the NZDF has been the government’s parsimonious attitude towards funding it.<sup>27</sup> Defence funding in the 1990/1991 budget was 1.34 billion NZD,<sup>28</sup> a reduction in 4% from the previous year,<sup>29</sup> and for 1991/1992 only 1.23 billion NZD; budgets were declining steadily from their late 1980s peak.<sup>30</sup> It was planned to continue those cuts for the next few

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<sup>24</sup> The one exception being the SAS squadron, maintained at OLOC.

<sup>25</sup> Warren Cooper, Parliamentary Question 8721, 22 November 1995, Wellington.

<sup>26</sup> H.B. Cockburn, *Defence 2000: Is the NZDF Ready to Meet the 21st Century?*, Whenuapai: RNZAF Command and Staff College, 1993. p.3

<sup>27</sup> James Rolfe, *Defending New Zealand: A Study of Structures, Processes and Relationships*. Wellington, Institute of Policy Studies, 1993. p.3, p.12 and New Zealand Parliamentary Library, *Defence Expenditure: Trends and International Comparisons*, 2005/01, Wellington, 2 March 2005.

<sup>28</sup> International Institute of Strategic Studies, *The Military Balance*. p.174

<sup>29</sup> Unknown Author, 'PDR Newsletter', *Asia-Pacific Defence Reporter*, vol. XVII, no. 3, September 1990. p.28

<sup>30</sup> Unknown Author, 'Realignment in Defence', *Army News*, no. 19, 7 August 1991. p.1

years.<sup>31</sup> This amount was divided somewhat unevenly amongst the three services, with the RNZN taking the largest share.

The level of funding given the NZDF was the subject of some attention. An external review identified a range of problems with the mechanism of funding, and noted that the affordability of the force, given funding projections, was highly questionable.<sup>32</sup> When compared to other nations, the percentage of New Zealand's GDP allocated to defence was low. This low level of funding stemmed directly from the belief, as stated clearly in DWP91, that there were little need for New Zealand to maintain a highly capable military force ready for high intensity operations

### **Higher Command and Control**

This section describes operational control at the level of the joint NZDF, as distinct from the individual services themselves. The highest level of command and control, in setting policy, is examined in Chapter Four.

The Commander in Chief of all New Zealand armed forces, as per the Defence Act, was the Governor General.<sup>33</sup> However, this was a ceremonial position, and it was not expected that the Governor General would ever exercise any command function. Next in the hierarchy was the Minister of Defence, who retained the power of control over the NZDF,<sup>34</sup> albeit exercised through the Chief of Defence Force (CDF), who held the power of command. The distinction between command and control was important – the CDF was a military officer with legal responsibility for all forces beneath him, whereas the Minister was not. In March 1991 then-CDF John Mace was replaced by Somerford Teagle.<sup>35</sup>

Within HQNZDF, operational planning was the responsibility of Operations Branch, which was commanded by the Deputy Chief of Defence Staff (DCDS), who in turn was junior to the CDF.<sup>36</sup> Operations Branch included three directorates: joint operations and plans (DJOPT); joint command, control, communications and

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<sup>31</sup> Unknown Author, 'Defence Spending Cut', *Royal New Zealand Air Force News*, June/July 1991. p.3

<sup>32</sup> James McLay, *Review of Defence Funding*, Volume Two, Wellington: Ministry of Defence, 1991.

<sup>33</sup> Unknown Author, 'New Zealand Defence Act.'


<sup>34</sup> In the New Zealand political system, there is no need for parliamentary approval for the declaration of war or the deployment of military forces. It can be carried out by the executive..

<sup>35</sup> Unknown Author, 'Chief of Defence Force retires', *Army News*, no. 10, April 4 1991.

<sup>36</sup> New Zealand Defence Force, *Report of the New Zealand Defence Force for the year ended 30 June 1992*. p.74

information systems (DJCIS); and defence, intelligence and security (DDIS).<sup>37</sup> The three service commands were all based in Auckland, and headed by the Chief of General Staff (CGS/Army), Chief of Naval Staff (CNS/Navy), and Chief of Air Staff (CAS/Air Force).

Figure 3.1 NZDF Higher Command Structure



There was no permanent joint operational headquarters, as HQNZDF was not an operational organisation. A Joint Force Command was maintained, subordinate to the CDF, but it was not a permanently manned headquarters.<sup>38</sup> In the case of an overseas deployment, the usual procedure would have been to form a Joint Force Headquarters, utilising the headquarters of the commander chosen to lead the deployment. Thus, a deployment with an Army commander would likely have been commanded via Headquarters Land Force Command.

### NZDF Ethos and Doctrine

The NZDF in 1991 possessed a long history of military endeavour, reaching back to the Boer War. An “ANZAC spirit” of mateship, close camaraderie, and a

<sup>37</sup> Rolfe, *The Armed Forces of New Zealand*. Chapter Three. While written in 1999, much of Rolfe’s book is applicable to the situation in 1991.

<sup>38</sup> New Zealand Defence Force, *Report of the New Zealand Defence Force for the year ended 30 June 1992*. p.74

relatively informal approach to military discipline was maintained. However, there was no real joint ethos, or feeling of belonging to the NZDF as a whole.<sup>39</sup> Instead, loyalty was given to the particular service. A psychologist noted at the time that “there is often rivalry and politicking between the three services and this can cause problems.”<sup>40</sup>

There were some perceptions of a developing morale problem, related to the reduction in funding<sup>41</sup> and various other issues.<sup>42</sup> Recruitment and personnel retention, however, were not major issues; in fact the three services were attempting to lose personnel in order to cope with the reduction in funding.<sup>43</sup>

There was no NZDF-wide doctrine, and, as such, the NZDF in 1991 might be better described as an alliance of three services, rather than a truly joint military.

## Existing Operations

In 1991, the NZDF was involved in a variety of operations around the globe. These ranged from humanitarian assistance through to peace support deployments and collective training exercises.

The NZDF provided only a small contingent of Hercules<sup>44</sup> and medical personnel to the Gulf War,<sup>45</sup> as the government preferred not to send combat elements. In the Sinai, New Zealand provided 25 personnel to the Multinational Force and Observers.<sup>46</sup> A small team of five was maintained in Pakistan to assist Afghans in learning how to demine their villages.<sup>47</sup> Other NZDF personnel operated in Angola and the UN Truce Supervision Organisation.<sup>48</sup> The majority of the NZDF’s overseas

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<sup>39</sup> Cockburn, *Defence 2000: Is the NZDF Ready to Meet the 21st Century?* p.7

<sup>40</sup> C.C.P. Bruhns, *A Description of the New Zealand Defence Force in Comparison with other New Zealand Organisations*, Wellington: New Zealand Defence Force, 1991. p.38

<sup>41</sup> Unknown Author, 'Defence personnel shabbily treated - MP', *Christchurch Press*, 15 January 1990.

<sup>42</sup> Rolfe, *Defending New Zealand: A Study of Structures, Processes and Relationships*. p.100-106

<sup>43</sup> Unknown Author, 'PDR Reporter', *Asia-Pacific Defence Reporter*, vol. XVIII, no. 4, October 1991. p.24

<sup>44</sup> Unknown Author, 'RNZAF Contingent in the Gulf', *Royal New Zealand Air Force News*, January 1991. p.4-5 and Unknown Author, 'Gulf Action', *Royal New Zealand Air Force News*, February/March 1991. p.8

<sup>45</sup> Unknown Author, 'NZers set themselves up in Gulf', *Army News*, no. 6, February 6 1991. p.1

<sup>46</sup> Unknown Author, 'A rewarding posting in an area steeped in history', *Army News*, no. 7, February 20 1991. p.5

<sup>47</sup> Unknown Author, 'Training Afghans to get out of their mines', *Army News*, no. 7, March 6 1991.

<sup>48</sup> Zhivan Alach, 'Peace Support Operations: International Evolution and New Zealand Adaptation', MA, University of Auckland, 2002. Chapter Four and p.138

deployments were composed of individuals or small groups, and the total number of deployed personnel was a very low percentage of the NZDF's total strength.

## **The New Zealand Army**

### **Command, Force Structure and Readiness**

The New Zealand Army was the largest of the three services, with a strength of approximately 5000 regular personnel.<sup>49</sup> It was organised into a Ready Reaction Force, an Infantry Brigade, Force Troops and a Force Maintenance Group. Its main operational bases were Burnham and Linton, and its main command bases Papakura and Wellington.

The Commander of the Army was the Chief of General Staff (CGS), based in Wellington. Under him were Land Force Command and Support Command.<sup>50</sup> The former, based in Papakura, commanded the operational forces (the RRF, Force Troops, and 1<sup>st</sup> Brigade), whereas the latter, based in Trentham, provided the static support structure necessary to maintain those forces.<sup>51</sup> CGS was not an operational commander, but rather was tasked with “training, maintaining and sustaining” the New Zealand Army.

The Army was undergoing a significant restructure, which sought to reduce personnel numbers in order to achieve savings, and yet retain combat capability.<sup>52</sup> Strains from this restructuring were evident within the force.<sup>53</sup>

### **Figure 3.2 New Zealand Army Operational Command Structure**

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
<sup>49</sup> International Institute of Strategic Studies, *The Military Balance*. p.174 and Mark Burton, Parliamentary Question 13191, 19 September 2001, Wellington.

<sup>50</sup> Unknown Author, 'Know thy Army', *Army News*, no. 12, May 1 1991. p.7

<sup>51</sup> Rolfe, *The Armed Forces of New Zealand*. p.113

<sup>52</sup> Unknown Author, 'Aims of the Army's restructure', *Army News*, no. 12, May 1 1991. p.2

<sup>53</sup> Unknown Author, 'Another year of considerable change', *Army News*, no. 28, 11 December 1991. p.2



The primary operational capability of the Army rested with the Ready Reaction force, manned by Regulars, and held at a higher state of readiness than other elements. This consisted of an infantry battalion, comprising three rifle companies, as well as supporting units including a ranger capability and a Force Support Unit.<sup>54</sup> It was designed to serve as the basis for an infantry battalion group of up to 2000 personnel with mortar, artillery, engineer, logistics and armour support.<sup>55</sup> It was oriented to low-level contingencies, and was tasked to have a lightly equipped battalion on seven days notice, and a heavy equipped battalion available on fourteen days notice.<sup>56</sup>

Headquarters RRF was based at Burnham Camp, Christchurch, but was moving north to Linton Camp, near Palmerston North.<sup>57</sup> This meant that the infantry battalion tasked with RRF duties was changing from 2/1RNZIR to 1RNZIR.<sup>58</sup> The Commander of the RRF was Colonel Richard Ottaway, who noted the main challenge for his force was achieving the readiness required by policy.<sup>59</sup> By and large, the

<sup>54</sup> Unknown Author, 'Burnham Camp - its roles, task and history', *Army News*, no. 20, 21 August 1991. p.6-7 and New Zealand Government, *The Defence of New Zealand 1991: A Policy Paper*. p.105

<sup>55</sup> New Zealand Government, *The Defence of New Zealand 1991: A Policy Paper*. p.78

<sup>56</sup> New Zealand Defence Force, *Report of the New Zealand Defence Force for the year ended 30 June 1992*. p.29-33

<sup>57</sup> Unknown Author, 'Realignment in Defence'. p.1

<sup>58</sup> Unknown Author, 'Burnham Camp - its roles, task and history'. p.6-7 and Unknown Author, 'Linton's role and tasks', *Army News*, no. 26, 13 November 1991. p.9

<sup>59</sup> Unknown Author, 'New Commander for RRF', *Army News*, no. 6, February 6 1991. p.3

RRF's capabilities as evaluated at the time were satisfactory, and its readiness quite good.<sup>60</sup>

The Army was also required to provide a full brigade group, 1<sup>st</sup> Brigade, at 90 days notice for conventional operations.<sup>61</sup> This was an integrated Regular and Territorial force designed to carry out operations beyond the abilities of the RRF.<sup>62</sup> It was also tasked with providing, on short notice, counter-terrorist, civil defence, and explosive ordnance demolition personnel.<sup>63</sup> Most of the personnel for 1<sup>st</sup> Brigade were Territorials, and it was expected the six Territorial battalions would combine to produce the three battalions necessary for the full brigade.<sup>64</sup> Questions might be asked as to whether or not the brigade could indeed have been raised in time, considering the fact that the Territorial force, as will be seen, was not particularly effective.<sup>65</sup>

The Force Troops included an SAS group, a force intelligence group and a military police unit. The SAS group was capable of a wide variety of special operations, including counter-terrorism. It was held at a high level of readiness and possessed its own dedicated ground transport.<sup>66</sup> It was based alongside Land Forces Command in Papakura to enhance its readiness.<sup>67</sup>

Heavier weapons were provided by various small units. 1 Armoured Group operated the Army's M113 armoured personnel carriers and Scorpion armoured reconnaissance vehicles.<sup>68</sup> Artillery support was provided by 16 Field Regiment and 32 Field Battery.

For its personnel size, the Army had a relatively large number of units – two regular and six reserve battalions. It managed to maintain light infantry, special forces, parachute troops, artillery and armour, all with 5000 Regulars. However, despite the assertions of the NZDF annual report, it is questionable whether the RRF could actually have been raised, equipped and deployed in time.<sup>69</sup> Due to manning

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<sup>60</sup> New Zealand Defence Force, *Report of the New Zealand Defence Force for the year ended 30 June 1992*. p.29-33 and Unknown Author, 'Ivanhoe achieves aim', *Army News*, no. 9, March 20 1991.

<sup>61</sup> New Zealand Defence Force, *Report of the New Zealand Defence Force for the year ended 30 June 1992*. p.33-36

<sup>62</sup> Unknown Author, 'The role and tasks', *Army News*, no. 14, May 29 1991. p.6

<sup>63</sup> Unknown Author, *Ibid.* p.6

<sup>64</sup> New Zealand Government, *The Defence of New Zealand 1991: A Policy Paper*. p.77

<sup>65</sup> Mark Burton, Parliamentary Question 13858, 27 November 2002, Wellington; Warren Cooper, Parliamentary Question 5859, 5 October 1994, Wellington.

<sup>66</sup> New Zealand Government, *The Defence of New Zealand 1991: A Policy Paper*. p.72-74

<sup>67</sup> Unknown Author, 'Papakura', *Army News*, no. 24, 16 October 1991. p.5-7

<sup>68</sup> Unknown Author, 'Waiouru - its role and tasks', *Army News*, no. 23, 2 October 1991. p.6-7

<sup>69</sup> Peter Jennings, *Exercise Golden Fleece and the New Zealand Military: Lessons and Limitations*, Working Paper 187, Canberra: ANU Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, 1989. p.9-15. While

issues, and the fact that only two regular battalions were maintained, the Army would have struggled to provide even a single battalion at full strength on short notice, and would have found it difficult to maintain a battalion sized deployment for longer than twelve months.<sup>70</sup> Also, each infantry battalion possessed three rather than four rifle companies, making them understrength in any case.

### **Doctrine, Training and Experience**

The New Zealand Army did not possess domestically developed doctrine, instead utilising the doctrine of other ABCA partners, especially the United States. A hint of a developing doctrine, perhaps, might however be seen in the words of the Commander of Land Force Command, who in 1991 stated that he wanted a greater focus on higher level operations rather than the very low level operations that had dominated exercises for the previous few years.<sup>71</sup>

Initial training in the Army was carried out at Waiouru camp, located in the central North Island.<sup>72</sup> Like other boot camps around the world, the harsh climatic conditions of Waiouru assisted in the acclimatisation of new recruits to military life. Also, the tussocky moors around Waiouru loaned themselves to large scale exercises, including those involving armoured vehicles.

Advanced and collective training was often carried out on a multinational basis. For a long period New Zealand had provided contingents to jungle warfare exercises in South East Asia, especially with Malaysia and other FPDA partners. This contributed to a deep institutional knowledge of such operations within the force.<sup>73</sup> One infantry company of each battalion was parachute trained.<sup>74</sup> More than half the Army trained overseas during the year.<sup>75</sup>

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published in 1989, Jennings' criticisms were still entirely valid in 1991 as no work had been done on enlarging the Army during that period; indeed, if anything, his criticisms would be more valid due to the downsizing the Army had experienced by 1991, and the reduction in funding.

<sup>70</sup> Rolfe, *The Armed Forces of New Zealand*. p.118-122

<sup>71</sup> Unknown Author, 'Commanders given specific requirements', *Army News*, no. 22, 18 September 1991. p.2

<sup>72</sup> Rolfe, *The Armed Forces of New Zealand*. p.128

<sup>73</sup> *Ibid.* p.120

<sup>74</sup> New Zealand Government, *The Defence of New Zealand 1991: A Policy Paper*. p.78

<sup>75</sup> Unknown Author, 'More than half Army trained overseas this year, records show', *Army News*, no. 21, 4 September 1991. p.2

Exercises were carried out in a range of locations. Elements of the Army undertook exercises in Northern Europe, Southeast Asia and the South Pacific.<sup>76</sup> In 1989, the Army had participated in Exercise Golden Fleece, a domestic exercise involving 6690 NZDF personnel from all three services.<sup>77</sup> This was designed to test procedures associated with counter-insurgency operations, and indicated both strengths and weaknesses in the New Zealand Army.<sup>78</sup> In 1991, the major domestic Army exercise was Ivanhoe, which was designed to test the RRF's capabilities in low level operations, and was thus similar to Golden Fleece, if much smaller.<sup>79</sup> This exercise indicated some shortcomings in the Army, including tactical skills, logistics capacity and training issues.<sup>80</sup> Another domestic exercise tested skills in internal security against terrorists and very low level security threats.<sup>81</sup> Exercise Tasman Reserve was a large conventional exercise in Australia.<sup>82</sup> Other exercises encompassed logistics, sniping skills, tropical reconnaissance, and artillery training.<sup>83</sup> The SAS was particularly busy, participating in multiple operations, sometimes in groups as large as fifty personnel.<sup>84</sup>

While in general the level of skill amongst Army personnel was high, some concerns were expressed as to whether non-combat personnel participated sufficiently in field exercises to maintain combat skills.<sup>85</sup>

Leadership training in the Army was not as sophisticated as in other armies. An eleven-week staff and tactics course was required for promotion to substantive major.<sup>86</sup> There was no compulsory requirement for university training at the senior officer level. The Army sent some officers to the RNZAF Command and Staff

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<sup>76</sup> New Zealand Defence Force, *Report of the New Zealand Defence Force for the year ended 30 June 1992*. p.27-36

<sup>77</sup> Jennings, *Exercise Golden Fleece and the New Zealand Military: Lessons and Limitations*. p.1

<sup>78</sup> *Ibid.* p.2-9

<sup>79</sup> Unknown Author, 'Up to 1600 Regular Force personnel to participate in exercise', *Army News*, no. 7, February 20 1991. p.1

<sup>80</sup> Unknown Author, 'Ivanhoe achieves aim'. and Unknown Author, 'Keeping ahead of the hit squads', *Army News*, no. 9, March 20 1991. p.8

<sup>81</sup> Unknown Author, 'Securing compound against insurgent threat', *Army News*, no. 28, 11 December 1991. p.10

<sup>82</sup> Unknown Author, 'Trading places with the Aussies', *Army News*, no. 10, April 4 1991.

<sup>83</sup> Unknown Author, 'Upcoming exercises until May', *Army News*, no. 7, February 20 1991. p.7

<sup>84</sup> Warren Cooper, Parliamentary Question 402, 17 November 1992, Wellington.

<sup>85</sup> Unknown Author, 'Soldiers should be in best state of preparedness says SM of A', *Army News*, no. 8, March 6 1991. p.2

<sup>86</sup> Unknown Author, 'Officers attend 11-week staff and tactics course', *Army News*, no. 12, May 1 1991. p.3

College, and others overseas, if their educational requirements could not be met domestically.

There was no core of combat veterans in the Army. While some senior officers had fought in Vietnam, their numbers were limited, and most personnel had only peace support experience at best.

## Equipment

The following sections discuss the equipment of the Army, divided into major and minor categories.

### *Major*

Major equipment in the Army included two types of armoured vehicle, and two main types of indirect artillery.

The Army had 26 Scorpion fire support vehicles in 1 Armoured Group,<sup>87</sup> utilised in both fire support and reconnaissance roles. The Scorpion was lightly armoured but fast, and mounted a 76mm gun, firing high-explosive (HE) and high-explosive squashed head (HESH) ammunition. It lacked sophisticated observation equipment, thus hindering its reconnaissance role,<sup>88</sup> and its lack of firepower and protection hindered its fire support role. However, it might still engage enemy armour if operated skilfully and from behind cover; the 76mm gun was capable of penetrating the flank and rear armour of some main battle tanks. Given the likely environment of any New Zealand deployment, it was likely to be adequate in terms of firepower and protection, at least.<sup>89</sup>

The major shortcomings of the vehicle were mechanical, with an audit finding a high unreliability rate especially linked to transmission and turret problems.<sup>90</sup> The Army disagreed, claiming a high Scorpion availability rate.<sup>91</sup>

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<sup>87</sup> International Institute of Strategic Studies, *The Military Balance*. p.74

<sup>88</sup> New Zealand Government, *The Defence of New Zealand 1991: A Policy Paper*. p.76. This pointed out the lack of night vision gear in general, the lack of which was particularly damaging to the Scorpion's capability.

<sup>89</sup> Office of the Controller and Auditor General, *The Quality and Reliability of Defence Equipment: The Army*, Wellington, 1990. p.13 criticises the Scorpion as being restricted against MBTs; a case of a straw man (cf. the criticism of the Bradley fighting vehicle in the US) as the Scorpion was not intended to fight MBTs.

<sup>90</sup> *Ibid.* p.19

<sup>91</sup> *Ibid.* p.33

Along with the Scorpion, the Army had some 76 M-113 Armoured Personnel Carriers (APCs).<sup>92</sup> Their main armament was a 0.50 calibre machine gun, usually mounted on a simple pintle, but in some cases in a fully enclosed turret. The M-113 was partially amphibious. Its speed and acceleration were low, although it was regarded as being relatively agile. Its main flaws were lack of firepower and protection. It was exceedingly vulnerable to even light weapons due to its thin armour and boxy shape, and lacked any real capability to engage armoured targets. Also, the M-113s operated by the Army were aging, and were experiencing mechanical problems. There were only enough M-113s to lift a single infantry company.<sup>93</sup>

Indirect fire support was provided by 81mm and 105mm systems. The Army had 72 81mm mortars, sufficient for short range support of the infantry battalions. For longer range fire the Army was reliant on 105mm howitzers. These included both 105mm Hamel Light Guns and M-101A1 howitzers. The latter were particularly old, but both types were limited in range and explosive throw-weight. Also, given their lack of mobility and armour, they were vulnerable to enemy counter fire and air attacks.

### *Minor*

The main infantry weapon of the Army was the Steyr rifle, which was just entering service. Problems were experienced with this weapon due to mechanical unreliability. However, when it worked it was a light, accurate weapon, if lacking in stopping power compared to its predecessors.

Light direct fire support was provided by the C-9 7.62mm machinegun. This was an adequate weapon against soft targets, but its effective range was only 1000m at most. No heavier machineguns were operated except those mounted on the M-113s.

Anti-tank firepower was provided by Carl Gustav 84mm recoilless rifles. These were shoulder fired weapons firing an unguided high explosive anti tank (HEAT) warhead out to a maximum effective range of approximately 1000m. Against the rear or flanks of a main battle tank, the Gustav provided an acceptable capability, although its limited range and inaccuracy was restrictive. Against later model

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<sup>92</sup> Military Analysis Network, 'M113A1 Armored Personnel Carrier', [accessed 28 October 2004]. Available from [www.fas.org/man/dod-101/sys/land/m113.htm](http://www.fas.org/man/dod-101/sys/land/m113.htm).

<sup>93</sup> Rolfe, *The Armed Forces of New Zealand*. p.129

armoured targets its penetration was quite limited. The Army possessed 61 Gustavs, a sufficient number to equip each battalion.<sup>94</sup>

A large Landrover fleet provided low-level mobility support. Heavier transport was provided by a fleet of Unimog trucks. These had been purchased in the late 1970s, and while aging, were still reliable.

Perhaps the most important equipment shortcoming involved communications. The Army's tactical communications equipment dated from the Vietnam War or before, and relied on antiquated vacuum tube technology. This meant that in rough terrain its range and reliability was extremely limited.<sup>95</sup>

### **Territorial Forces and Reserves**

The Army maintained six Territorial battalions, scattered around the country. Their expected role was twofold: firstly, to provide sufficient units to round out the brigade group, and secondly, to provide a Force Maintenance Group that would allow the sustainment of the brigade group.<sup>96</sup> There were 5425 Territorial personnel in total.<sup>97</sup> The Army did not attempt to use the Territorial forces to maintain specialised capabilities such as medical and engineering personnel.

The utility of the Territorial units was questionable. Only a small portion of the force was regarded as efficient, that is, they undertook 20 days of training in the year.<sup>98</sup> The Territorial training requirement was very low, and thus substantial time would have been required to work up to operational capability. There were also problems with manning levels and recruitment, partially stemming from the issue of protecting civilian employment. However, despite these problems, some 3000 Territorials managed to combine for Exercise Pacific Shield during the year.<sup>99</sup>

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<sup>94</sup> International Institute of Strategic Studies, *The Military Balance*. p.174

<sup>95</sup> As noted, at a later date, in Piers Reid, 'The Lessons of East Timor', Paper presented at the Conference on Defence Policy After East Timor, Victoria University of Wellington, 2000; Piers Reid, 'NZ troops in Timor would face only embarrassment', *The New Zealand Herald*, 17 May 1999.

<sup>96</sup> New Zealand Government, *The Defence of New Zealand 1991: A Policy Paper*. p.77

<sup>97</sup> Cooper, Parliamentary Question 5859,

<sup>98</sup> Burton, Parliamentary Question 13858; Warren Cooper, Parliamentary Question 5835, 5 October 1994, Wellington; Warren Cooper, Parliamentary Question 5857, 5 October 1994, Wellington. There is a disparity, however. The Burton statement is that some 1756, or 33.8% of the Territorial force, was regarded as efficient. The Cooper statement says only 641, or 11.8% of the force, was effective.

<sup>99</sup> Unknown Author, 'More than 3000 TF troops mass in Waiouru', *Army News*, no. 13, May 15 1991. p.3

Along with the Territorials, there was a separate Army Reserve comprising retired officers and soldiers. However, as there was no system for organising the Army Reserve, its utility was very low.<sup>100</sup>

## **The Army in Summary**

The New Zealand Army consisted of a small, light infantry force based on two understrength battalions, with limited armour, artillery and logistics support. It lacked firepower and sustainability, but was capable of providing a small but rapid response to low intensity conflicts. It could not have operated in a high intensity conflict, and even in a low intensity operation it could only have maintained a battalion through the heavy use of Territorial forces.

Its equipment was not of the highest quality. Major capability gaps existed.<sup>101</sup> Its anti-tank firepower was limited in range and protection, and it had no dedicated air defence equipment. Most direct fire systems had a range of 1km or less. Its armoured vehicle support was restricted in reliability, protection and firepower, making the Army dependent on leg transport. Its problematic communications equipment, and the resultant inability to transmit and process information swiftly and reliably, was a major shortcoming.

There was also some confusion over the Army's role. Without the concept of forward defence in South East Asia, the Army was a force without a clearly defined mission.<sup>102</sup> It was caught between the very low level contingencies of the 1987 White Paper, and the newer, broader roles of the 1991 White Paper. As such, it retained a generalist structure that aimed to do a little bit of everything.

## **The Royal New Zealand Navy**

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<sup>100</sup> Rolfe, *The Armed Forces of New Zealand*. p.124

<sup>101</sup> The commander of the RRF, in the aftermath of Ivanhoe, said the army needed observation helicopters, night vision equipment, and better communications. Unknown Author, 'Commander outlines needs', *Army News*, no. 9, March 20 1991.

<sup>102</sup> New Zealand Government, *The Defence of New Zealand 1991: A Policy Paper*. This does not make it clear exactly what roles the Army needs to fulfil.

## Command and Structure

The RNZN was the smallest of the three services, with only 2605 regular personnel. Its sole operational base was Devonport, which was also the location of Maritime Command. The commander of the RNZN was the Chief of Naval Staff (CNS). As with CGS, his role was not operational command, but rather the provision of naval forces to the NZDF. Auckland Command controlled the operational base, and thus the various operational ships.

The RNZN, as was the Army, was experiencing pressures due to the reduction in defence funding, and had halted its personnel intake.<sup>103</sup> It was also the subject of some external criticism, with one retired Prime Minister publically attacking its force structure.<sup>104</sup>

The RNZN consisted of several functional groupings. These were the Naval Combat Force, Maritime Minewarfare Force, Hydrographic and Oceanographic Force, and various reserve and support units.

## Force Element Groups

### *Naval Combat Force*

The Naval Combat Force (NCF) provided the RNZN's combat capabilities. It comprised four Leander-class frigates: *Canterbury*, *Wellington*, *Waikato* and *Southland*.<sup>105</sup> The NCF was tasked with the provision of surface and sub-surface warfare capabilities, albeit against low levels of threat. It was required to be able to provide one warship continuously on distant operations. It was also required to be able to surge one frigate on 12 hours notice, and another on 47 hours notice.

The NCF was one of the busiest elements of the NZDF. During 1991, frigates undertook a variety of deployments. *Canterbury* undertook a five month cruise to the Mediterranean and back, and engaged in disaster relief exercises.<sup>106</sup> *Wellington* was

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<sup>103</sup> Unknown Author, 'PDR Reporter'. p.24

<sup>104</sup> Unknown Author, 'NZ 'needs' frigates', *Army News*, no. 24, 16 October 1991. p.2

<sup>105</sup> New Zealand Defence Force, *Report of the New Zealand Defence Force for the year ended 30 June 1992*. p.18-21

<sup>106</sup> Unknown Author, 'Canterbury Capers', *New Zealand Navy News*, vol. 17, no. 1, Autumn 1991; Unknown Author, 'Canterbury Capers'.

involved in major naval exercises.<sup>107</sup> *Southland* visited a variety of ports around the region, and *Waikato* carried out its usual training cruises.<sup>108</sup>

The Leanders provided an acceptable, if limited, surface combatant capability. Each was equipped with a 4.5” gun system, Seacat surface-to-air missiles, and torpedo tubes. The Seacat was obsolete, but the 4.5” guns provided useful gunfire support for shore operations as well as a restricted anti-ship capability. The torpedo tubes, while utilising relatively modern Mk 46 torpedoes, were restricted by the shortcomings of the sonars mounted on the frigates.<sup>109</sup> The Leanders operated Wasp helicopters, in service since 1966,<sup>110</sup> for patrol and anti-submarine tasks, again with restricted capabilities. A proposal to replace the Wasps was in the pipeline, but had been delayed.<sup>111</sup>

An audit in 1991 indicated that the operational availability of *Canterbury* was either 70% or 64%, dependent on measurement.<sup>112</sup> If this same availability was reflected across the fleet, then the NCF was capable of providing two, and possibly three frigates in a single surge, although one Leander was engaged on training at all times.

The ability of the NCF to reach MLOC was good, given the number of ships, personnel numbers, and the reliability of the individual vessels.<sup>113</sup> However, while the NCF could provide warships to deployments near or far, it was not a modern, effective surface combatant force. It lacked anti-surface capability, and had a very limited anti-submarine capability. Given their lack of air defence, the Leanders could only operate in a permissive environment.

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<sup>107</sup> Unknown Author, 'Gumboot Gambits', *New Zealand Navy News*, vol. 17, no. 2, Summer 1991.

<sup>108</sup> Unknown Author, 'Southland's Ramblings', *New Zealand Navy News*, vol. 17, no. 2, Summer 1991; Unknown Author, 'Waikato Wanderings', *Navy News*, vol. 18, no. 2, Summer 1992.

<sup>109</sup> New Zealand Government, *The Defence of New Zealand 1991: A Policy Paper*. p.72-74

<sup>110</sup> Unknown Author, 'Navy Wasp Helicopter Clocks 4000 Hours of Flying', *Navy News*, vol. 18, no. 2, Summer 1992. p.65

<sup>111</sup> Unknown Author, 'PDR Newsletter', *Asia-Pacific Defence Reporter*, vol. XVII, no. 8, February 1991. p.24-25

<sup>112</sup> Office of the Controller and Auditor General, *The Quality and Reliability of Defence Equipment: Royal New Zealand Navy*, Wellington, 1991. p.29-30

<sup>113</sup> New Zealand Defence Force, *Report of the New Zealand Defence Force for the year ended 30 June 1992*. p.18-21

### *Maritime Minewarfare Force and Hydrographic and Oceanographic Survey Force*

The Maritime Minewarfare Force and Hydrographic and Oceanographic Survey Forces were both very small force elements.<sup>114</sup> The former comprised a single ship, *Manawanui*, along with diving teams. The latter comprised a single larger ship, *Monowai*, with several smaller supporting vessels, *Takapu*, *Tarapunga* and *Tui*. The Maritime Minewarfare Force lacked a dedicated mine clearing vessel, and as such could only clear limited channels extremely slowly.<sup>115</sup> However, it achieved MLOC satisfactorily.<sup>116</sup>

The vessels operated by the Maritime Minewarfare Force possessed limited combat capabilities, and were largely restricted to peacetime activities. The same applied to the Hydrographic and Oceanographic Survey Force.

### *Support and Reserve Force*

Underway support for the Navy was the responsibility of a single vessel, the fleet oiler *Endeavour*, purchased from South Korea in 1988.<sup>117</sup> This vessel provided a reliable capability, and was a vital enabler for distant deployments of the NCF. It was also very useful for large fleet exercises. Its lack of armament meant that it could only operate in permissive environments.

The final element of the RNZN was the Naval Reserve. This had four Moa-class inshore patrol craft. They were very limited vessels. Their seakeeping qualities meant they could not operate offshore, and thus they were instead largely used for training. Their lack of armament and speed also limited their utility, and their usage in a secondary mine countermeasures role was more an indication of shortage of capability elsewhere rather than their ability in the task.

The RNZN did not operate a sealift or amphibious ship, although the need for one had been highlighted in both the 1987 and 1991 White Papers.<sup>118</sup>

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<sup>114</sup> New Zealand Government, *The Defence of New Zealand 1991: A Policy Paper*. p.72-74

<sup>115</sup> Rolfe, *The Armed Forces of New Zealand*. p.102

<sup>116</sup> New Zealand Defence Force, *Report of the New Zealand Defence Force for the year ended 30 June 1992*. p.22-23

<sup>117</sup> Rolfe, *The Armed Forces of New Zealand*. p.106

<sup>118</sup> Warren Cooper, Parliamentary Question 7847, 6 December 1994, Wellington.

## Doctrine, Training and Experience

The RNZN did not possess domestically developed doctrine, and in fact operated without any formal statement of doctrine.

Training for the RNZN took place first at HMNZS Tamaki in Devonport.<sup>119</sup> Once the basic course was completed, training was carried out on board the Moa-class patrol boats and *Kahu*. The latter was a 91.5 ton ship that taught basic seamanship and chart training.<sup>120</sup> As with the Army, the RNZN often utilised overseas support for advanced and warfare training, due to domestic shortcomings.

Prior to the Anzus breakdown, the RNZN had frequently engaged in major multinational exercises. Post-Anzus, the number of exercises was reduced markedly, and the Royal Australian Navy (RAN) became the most important partner. The RNZN also engaged in a large number of tasks for other departments, which while not exercises, enhanced the skills of personnel. It conducted two special surveillance tasks at the request of the Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries, as well as 57 surveillance tasks when vessels were deployed on other tasks.<sup>121</sup> Navy divers conducted four searches for missing persons and materiel.<sup>122</sup>

The number of combat-experienced personnel in the Navy in 1991 was most likely zero, as the RNZN had not engaged in combat operations since the Korean War. Also, due to the RNZN's relatively restricted role in peace support operations, those RNZN personnel with experience in overseas deployment likely functioned as land-based observers rather than onboard ships.

## Naval Reserve

The Naval Reserve was extremely small. It operated the four Moa-class patrol craft, and had a role in training new recruits. Its capabilities were limited, and it could neither function as a coastguard-type force nor as a reinforcement for the larger RNZN.

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<sup>119</sup> Rolfe, *The Armed Forces of New Zealand*. p.108

<sup>120</sup> Unknown Author, 'HMNZS Kahu', *New Zealand Navy News*, vol. 16, no. 2, Spring 1990. p.32

<sup>121</sup> New Zealand Defence Force, *Report of the New Zealand Defence Force for the year ended 30 June 1992*. p.59

<sup>122</sup> *Ibid.* p.61

## **The Navy in Summary**

The RNZN was not a potent force. Its combat capabilities were limited by the age and equipment of its primary surface combatants, and its other force elements were just as restricted. It was largely limited to operations in permissive environments. The readiness of the RNZN was still good, as was its ability to sustain a frigate at a distance. However, the quality of that equipment meant that any contribution would have very restricted utility.

Some notable capability gaps existed. Given that New Zealand is a maritime nation, it is odd that the RNZN did not possess any sealift capacity. Despite the debate about the importance of maritime patrol, the four Moa-class vessels did not provide an adequate capability. They could not police New Zealand's EEZ to its limits.

Public opinion in the 1980s had been firmly in favour of a more limited role for the RNZN, yet governmental decisions in regards to the Anzac frigates showed that the official desire was to retain a capable blue water navy. This, however, was more an aspiration than a reality. And, in relation to this, there were no hints of any restructuring to enhance the RNZN's patrol or littoral performance. As with the Army, the RNZN was a conventionally structured but limited force.

## **The Royal New Zealand Air Force**

### **Command and Structure**

The RNZAF was the middle service in terms of size, with 3900 Regular personnel.<sup>123</sup> It operated two major bases, Ohakea near Bulls, and Whenuapai north of Auckland.

The commanding officer of the RNZAF was the Chief of Air Staff (CAS). Equivalent to the chiefs of the other services, he was responsible for maintenance of forces rather than operational command.<sup>124</sup> Subordinate to him was RNZAF Operations Group, whose commander had control of the operational bases, and their squadrons.<sup>125</sup>


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<sup>123</sup> International Institute of Strategic Studies, *The Military Balance*. p.74

<sup>124</sup> Rolfe, *The Armed Forces of New Zealand*. p.134

<sup>125</sup> New Zealand Government, *The Defence of New Zealand 1991: A Policy Paper*. p.107

Figure 3.3 RNZAF Operational Command Structure



As with the other services, the RNZAF was struggling with budget problems.<sup>126</sup> Large personnel cuts, and reorganisation of infrastructure, were ongoing.<sup>127</sup> Flying hours were also being cut.

The RNZAF had three main roles: air combat, maritime patrol, and transport.<sup>128</sup> It was divided into several force elements reflective of these roles.

## Force Element Groups

### *Offensive Air Support Force*

The Offensive Air Support Force provided the RNZAF's primary combat capability.<sup>129</sup> It operated the RNZAF's fast jets, 16 A-4K and five TA-4K Skyhawks.<sup>130</sup> These were divided into two squadrons, No.75 and No.2.<sup>131</sup> The former

<sup>126</sup> Unknown Author, 'RNZAF Establishment Review results in 490 jobs cut', *RNZAF News*, December/January 1992. p.3

<sup>127</sup> Unknown Author, 'PDR Reporter'. p.24

<sup>128</sup> Royal New Zealand Air Force, *The Royal New Zealand Air Force: Yesterday and Today*. Wellington, 1992. p.11

<sup>129</sup> The term Offensive Air Support Force, rather than Air Attack Force or Air Combat Force is taken from: New Zealand Defence Force, *Report of the New Zealand Defence Force for the year ended 30 June 1992*. p.38

<sup>130</sup> International Institute of Strategic Studies, *The Military Balance*. p.74

was based in Ohakea, but the latter was a small detachment based in Australia to provide training assistance to the ADF.

The Offensive Air Support Force was tasked with a range of roles. It was seen as being vital to the defence of New Zealand's territory and vital interests through maritime strike.<sup>132</sup> It was also seen as a crucial part of New Zealand's contribution to regional security, and a good foreign policy tool, as it was felt to indicate New Zealand's sharing of the South East Asian defence burden.<sup>133</sup>

The Skyhawks were the RNZAF's most potent aircraft, but were an old design. While relatively agile, they were slow and lacked range and a heavy warload. New Zealand's A-4s had been subject to a major upgrade project named Kahu during 1987-1991 to improve their avionics, weapons and navigation equipment.<sup>134</sup> The Kahu upgrade allowed them to carry a variety of weapons, including AIM-9L Sidewinders, AGM-65B/G Mavericks, and laser guided and iron bombs. These weapons were relatively sophisticated, and suited to even high intensity operations. Still, the Skyhawks lacked the ability to lase their own targets, and given the shortcomings of the platform itself, their combat usage was largely limited to permissive environments. They lacked the self-defence systems and physical performance to operate against adequate air defences. Four of the A-4s were equipped to refuel others in flight.<sup>135</sup>

There were some fears in the RNZAF about the future of the Skyhawks, and a review of air combat needs was undertaken during the year,<sup>136</sup> but delayed.<sup>137</sup>

### *Maritime Patrol Force*

The Maritime Patrol Force operated six P-3K Orions. Its primary task was maritime patrol, with a secondary task of keeping watch over New Zealand's EEZ.<sup>138</sup> It was required to have one Orion ready to reach a South Pacific area of operations

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<sup>131</sup> Royal New Zealand Air Force, *The Royal New Zealand Air Force: Yesterday and Today*. p.11

<sup>132</sup> New Zealand Government, *The Defence of New Zealand 1991: A Policy Paper*. p.72-74

<sup>133</sup> Ibid. p.78-81

<sup>134</sup> Royal New Zealand Air Force, *The Royal New Zealand Air Force: Yesterday and Today*. p.11

<sup>135</sup> New Zealand Defence Force, *Report of the New Zealand Defence Force for the year ended 30 June 1992*. p.38-40

<sup>136</sup> Unknown Author, 'The Defence of New Zealand', *Royal New Zealand Air Force News*, April/May 1991. p.3

<sup>137</sup> Unknown Author, 'Air combat needs review delayed', *The Dominion*, 21 October 1991.

<sup>138</sup> Royal New Zealand Air Force, *The Royal New Zealand Air Force: Yesterday and Today*. p.12

within 12 hours.<sup>139</sup> The Friendships operated by the Flying Training Wing were also sometimes tasked with maritime patrol missions.

The Maritime Patrol Force was one of the most heavily worked of all the force elements, as it was required to provide a large number of operational hours (2400) as its output. Given the number of aircraft and New Zealand's large maritime area, it was often stretched to capacity. During the year, the RNZAF conducted 69 surveillance patrols within and adjoining the NZ EEZ, and 12 Orion patrols further out in the Pacific.<sup>140</sup> Thus, the Maritime Patrol Force met all of its governmental requirements, and was regarded as maintaining a satisfactory level of capability.<sup>141</sup>

The six P-3K Orions operated by the Maritime Patrol Force were capable aircraft, with long range and endurance. However, they had some shortcomings. Their equipment fitout was particularly unreliable.<sup>142</sup> The supply of spare parts was also low, further hindering availability, and raising questions about the ability of the Orions to undertake sustained operations.<sup>143</sup> And, even when the equipment worked properly, it was very limited, which meant it was highly unlikely the Orions could ever detect submarines working on their own. Also, the Orions lacked any anti-surface weaponry.

### *Fixed Wing Transport Force*

The Fixed Wing Transport Force operated a range of aircraft.<sup>144</sup> Five C-130H Hercules provided tactical airlift. These aircraft were also occasionally used for search-and-rescue and medical evacuation. They were also the designated equipment for airdropping of SAS units.<sup>145</sup> During the year, the Hercules fleet flew 2493 hours,<sup>146</sup> and was taxed by its deployment to the Gulf.<sup>147</sup>

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<sup>139</sup> New Zealand Defence Force, *Report of the New Zealand Defence Force for the year ended 30 June 1992*. p.38

<sup>140</sup> *Ibid.* p.50

<sup>141</sup> *Ibid.* p.38-40

<sup>142</sup> Office of the Controller and Auditor General, *The Quality and Reliability of Defence Equipment: Royal New Zealand Air Force*, Wellington, 1992. p.18-19 also see New Zealand Government, *The Defence of New Zealand 1991: A Policy Paper*. p.72-74

<sup>143</sup> Office of the Controller and Auditor General, *The Quality and Reliability of Defence Equipment: Royal New Zealand Air Force*. p.25

<sup>144</sup> Royal New Zealand Air Force, *The Royal New Zealand Air Force: Yesterday and Today*. p.15

<sup>145</sup> Rolfe, *The Armed Forces of New Zealand*. p.141

<sup>146</sup> New Zealand Defence Force, *Report of the New Zealand Defence Force for the year ended 30 June 1992*. p.40-42

<sup>147</sup> Unknown Author, 'Gulf Action'. p.8

The C-130H was an extended range version of earlier types, and New Zealand was the first country to operate the variant.<sup>148</sup> It was capable of operations from dirt airfields. It could carry 20,000kg of cargo, or 64 fully-equipped paratroopers, or 92 combat-loaded infantrymen, or a combination. The Hercules were excellent transport aircraft, but lacked self defence equipment or armour. This, as with the case of the Skyhawks, limited their deployment to permissive environments.

Eight Andovers provided short range transport and were also occasionally used as maritime patrol platforms. They had seen good service in Iraq as New Zealand's contribution to the UN peacekeeping operation there.<sup>149</sup> The fleet flew 2622 hours during the year. They lacked any offensive or defensive equipment, and their utility was thus extremely limited. There was talk about removing the Andovers from service as an economising move.

Two Boeing 727s provided the RNZAF's fast jet transport capability, and were tasked with strategic air transport, personnel movement, and VIP transport. They were also hard worked, flying 1004 hours during the year. They undertook long distance transport of personnel, rather than cargo, and provided a niche capability. Their usage, however, was problematic, due to the amount of noise they produced.

The readiness of the transport fleet was satisfactory, and sufficient aircraft were available at required notice.<sup>150</sup>

### *Rotary Wing Transport Force*

The Rotary Wing Transport Force consisted of fourteen UH-1Hs of No.3 squadron, based at Whenuapai in Auckland. One of these was constantly maintained on standby for emergency tasks.<sup>151</sup> Another Iroquois was detached to Wigram and maintained on standby for the same tasks.<sup>152</sup>

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<sup>148</sup> The following technical information is taken from: Military Analysis Network, 'C-130 Hercules', [accessed 28 October 2004]. Available from [www.fas.org/man/dod-101/sys/ac/c-130.htm](http://www.fas.org/man/dod-101/sys/ac/c-130.htm).

<sup>149</sup> Alach, 'Peace Support Operations: International Evolution and New Zealand Adaptation'. Chapter Four

<sup>150</sup> New Zealand Defence Force, *Report of the New Zealand Defence Force for the year ended 30 June 1992*. p.40-42

<sup>151</sup> Royal New Zealand Air Force, *The Royal New Zealand Air Force: Yesterday and Today*. p.19

<sup>152</sup> Unknown Author, 'Iroquois still going strong', *Royal New Zealand Air Force News*, June/July 1991. p.10

The Rotary Wing Transport Force was tasked with battlefield support, aero-assault, combat search-and-rescue, and aeromedical evacuation.<sup>153</sup> Two Iroquois were required to be able to reach any point in New Zealand within six hours. During the year, the fleet flew 4111 hours, or almost 300 hours per airframe. Readiness was satisfactory, and sufficient aircraft and crews were maintained for policy requirements.

The fourteen Iroquois of No.3 Squadron were the only major helicopters operated by the RNZAF, and were old aircraft. Initial versions of the Iroquois had entered service in the 1960s, and many air forces had already retired them by 1991. They were capable of conveying only a few men, and to do so had to remove most of their own firepower. Lacking armour, they were restricted in their deployment. They could only operate safely in permissive or covert operations, and in the latter task their large noise signature rendered them somewhat ineffective. However, the arrival of night vision equipment late in the year meant they were increasingly capable of night-time operations.<sup>154</sup>

### *Training Force*

The RNZAF maintained a training contingent consisting of fourteen BAC-167 Strikemasters for jet training, F-27 Friendships for advanced and multi-engine training, four Airtowers, fifteen CT-4s, and several Bell Sioux helicopters.<sup>155</sup>

The fourteen BAC-167 Strikemasters attached to the Offensive Air Support Force for jet training provided a secondary strike capability utilising bombs, guns and rockets. However, the Strikemasters were extremely fatigued and almost half the fleet was grounded at one time.<sup>156</sup> A replacement programme was underway, and the first new Aermacchi trainers arrived during the year.<sup>157</sup>

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<sup>153</sup> New Zealand Defence Force, *Report of the New Zealand Defence Force for the year ended 30 June 1992*. p.44-46

<sup>154</sup> Unknown Author, 'Night vision goggles arrive for No.3 Squadron', *Royal New Zealand Air Force News*, August/September 1991. p.9

<sup>155</sup> International Institute of Strategic Studies, *The Military Balance*. p.74 and Royal New Zealand Air Force, *The Royal New Zealand Air Force: Yesterday and Today*. p.25-27

<sup>156</sup> Unknown Author, 'Cracks found in Strikemaster', *Royal New Zealand Air Force News*, August/September 1991. p.5

<sup>157</sup> Unknown Author, 'First Aermacchis Arrive in NZ', *Royal New Zealand Air Force News*, February/March 1991. p.3

## Doctrine, Training and Experience

As with the other services, the RNZAF in 1991 had not developed its own domestic doctrine. It was not clear whether the RNZAF's role was to provide independent air power or merely to act as a supporting element for the other services.<sup>158</sup>

Basic training was undertaken on the Airtrainers.<sup>159</sup> Those destined for multi-engined aircraft then undertook training on the F-27 Friendships. Prospective Skyhawk pilots completed a course on the jet trainers: this had involved 85 hours on the Strikemasters, but would involve 110 on the new Macchis.<sup>160</sup> Those wishing to become helicopter pilots undertook a 12-week conversion course on the Bell Sioux.

Training for Skyhawk pilots was intense and difficult. They practised low-level attack training down to 50 feet, and on average Skyhawk pilots flew from 180-200 hours annually, a figure that stood them in good stead even compared to NATO norms.<sup>161</sup> The maximum a Skyhawk pilot could fly a month was fifty hours.<sup>162</sup>

The RNZAF was frequently involved in major training exercises with foreign partners. These involved all of the various force element groups. The Offensive Air Support Force in particular often visited South East Asian countries, deploying for up to seven weeks annually.<sup>163</sup> These exercises enabled the RNZAF to maintain competence in various roles such as anti-submarine warfare, tactical air transport, and maritime strike. They were also held to be an excellent tool of foreign policy, and useful in developing links with South East Asia in particular.<sup>164</sup>

Non-flying training was carried out through Ground Training Wing, based at Woodbourne. This was where the various trades required of ground crew were taught. The RNZAF maintained its own Staff College, to which the other services sent their senior officers. RNZAF personnel also participated in a variety of seminars.<sup>165</sup>

Operational experience in the RNZAF in 1991 was limited. The Andover and Hercules crew had participated in peace support and humanitarian operations during

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<sup>158</sup> New Zealand Government, *The Defence of New Zealand 1991: A Policy Paper*. This does not make this point clear.

<sup>159</sup> Unknown Author, 'RNZAF trials new recruit course', *RNZAF News*, December/January 1992. p.8

<sup>160</sup> Royal New Zealand Air Force, *The Royal New Zealand Air Force: Yesterday and Today*. p.25-27 describes the training loads of the time

<sup>161</sup> Rolfe, *The Armed Forces of New Zealand*. p.137

<sup>162</sup> New Zealand Defence Force, *Report of the New Zealand Defence Force for the year ended 30 June 1992*. p.38-40

<sup>163</sup> Royal New Zealand Air Force, *The Royal New Zealand Air Force: Yesterday and Today*. p.15

<sup>164</sup> New Zealand Government, *The Defence of New Zealand 1991: A Policy Paper*. p.64-67 and 78-81

<sup>165</sup> Unknown Author, 'Australians teach joint warfare', *RNZAF News*, October 1991. p.11

the 1980s and early 1990s, however. There were some concerns, largely stimulated by deployment to the Gulf, that RNZAF personnel were not ready for combat operations.<sup>166</sup>

### **The Air Force in Summary**

The RNZAF was a small force that attempted to maintain a broad range of capabilities, including air combat; tactical, strategic and vertical air transport; maritime air patrol; and basic and advanced air training. It maintained some capability in each area, but at a very restricted level. Only the Skyhawks might have operated in a non-permissive environment, and even then the risks would have been very great. The general level of sophistication across the various types operated by the RNZAF was very low. Most airframes were at least twenty years old, and few had been substantially upgraded since purchase.

Given the necessity for New Zealand to deploy overseas for any military operation, it was perhaps surprising how small the RNZAF's transport fleet was. Five C-130Hs were not sufficient to move a large quantity of men swiftly and safely. The one indication of the importance of New Zealand's geography to force structure was the size of the Orion fleet, which with six aircraft was sufficient for most tasks.

The RNZAF in 1991 was also facing the prospect of block obsolescence within a few years. The Strikemasters were already being replaced, but on the near horizon were other needs, such as upgrades for the Orions and Hercules, and the possible need for replacements for the Skyhawks and Iroquois. There were problems developing, and they related to what the role of the RNZAF was to be: an independent arm, or support for the Army and RNZN.

### **The NZDF in Summary**

The NZDF in 1991 was a general purpose force, with few forces specifically tasked with individual roles. Most of its expected roles were geographically rather than thematically linked. No one role dominated any other. With only 11,600 regular personnel, and a budget of approximately 1.3 billion NZDF, the NZDF attempted to

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<sup>166</sup> Unknown Author, 'Food for thought', *Royal New Zealand Air Force News*, February/March 1991. p.2 and Unknown Author, 'Letters to the Editor', *Royal New Zealand Air Force News*, April/May 1991. p.2

maintain a broad range of capabilities. While jet fighters, surface combatants, armoured vehicles and helicopters were all maintained, they were generally older types. Many were obsolescent, and required replacement.

The combat capability of the NZDF was extremely limited, especially in conventional operations. It did, however, have a slightly higher capability in van Creveld-type operations, where the qualities of its personnel would likely have made up for equipment shortcomings. In peace support operations, the NZDF was hindered by the vulnerability of its forces. The NZDF had a satisfactory capability in estate management-type roles, albeit with some shortcomings in equipment.

Some of the equipment was not as obsolescent as often perceived, such as the Skyhawks, which retained some utility even in high-intensity combat operations, if at a high level of risk. And personnel, training and institutional experience were all good.

Deployability and sustainability was limited.<sup>167</sup> New Zealand's geographic location meant that the ability to deploy for operations was dependent on the provision of sealift, which the NZDF did not maintain of itself. The NZDF lacked the capacity to deploy even a single fully-equipped battalion overseas. It also lacked substantial logistics support, and so sustainability would have required either additional purchases, or the help of coalition allies.

The primary reason for the NZDF's shortcomings was the interaction between funding and policy. Policy, because of its foreign policy orientation, attempted to do everything. However, funding was not particularly generous. This meant money was spread over a wide range of capabilities, which were individually not particularly able. While these capabilities could still be maintained within the 1991/1992 budget, the prospect of lower defence funding in the next few years was a very real one, and threatened to ask serious questions of the force structure.

The NZDF was a servant of diplomacy. This hindered its operational capabilities; what was more important, it seemed, was how foreign governments perceived the NZDF, rather than what it could really do. While, in total, the NZDF was not incapable, declining personnel numbers, growing obsolescence, and doubt

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<sup>167</sup> Peter Cosgrove, *An Essay on the New Zealand Defence Force's Future Involvement in Peace Operations*, Whenuapai: RNZAF Command and Staff College, 1993. This is a good summary of issues around the time.

about the future all threatened to reduce its capabilities below the “credible minimum.”

## **The Australian Defence Force (ADF) 1991 – A Capability Analysis**

### **Overview**

The ADF in 1991 consisted of 68,100 Regular personnel, comprising the corporate ADF, and the three independent services:<sup>168</sup> the Australian Army, the Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF), and the Royal Australian Navy (RAN). In global terms, the ADF was a small force, and overall personnel numbers had declined steadily through the 1990s.<sup>169</sup>

Primarily, ADF bases were located in the south-east, although moves were underway to shift personnel to the north. There were bases in all major cities, especially Sydney. Headquarters ADF (HQADF) was located in Canberra.

### **Policy Guidance**

The foundational legislation governing the usage of the ADF was the Defence Act 1903. This, with later amendments, authorised a defence force comprising the three services and the separate ADF structure.<sup>170</sup> The Defence Act did not specify the roles of the ADF beyond bland generalities.

Two policy documents listed the operational roles of the ADF. The first of these was the 1987 Defence White Paper, *The Defence of Australia* (DOA1987).<sup>171</sup> This noted that Australia’s area of direct military interest encompassed 10% of the world’s surface, and that it was unlikely that Australia’s direct strategic interests

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<sup>168</sup> International Institute of Strategic Studies, *The Military Balance*. p.158

<sup>169</sup> David Horner, *Making the Australian Defence Force*. South Melbourne, Oxford University Press, 2001. p.316 indicates this with a decline in personnel costs.

<sup>170</sup> Unknown Author, 'Australian Defence Act,' 1903. Also important was the Defence Force Reorganisation Act 1975.

<sup>171</sup> Australian Department of Defence, *The Defence of Australia*, Canberra, March 1987. Where the term ‘Defence of Australia’ – so capitalised – is used in this thesis it refers to this specific concept of the continental defence of Australia.

would ever require a significant defence intervention outside that area;<sup>172</sup> thus a close focus was acceptable. The priority for the defence force would be the direct defence of the nation, to “ensure that we would be a difficult country against which to use force”; however the ADF would still retain some capability for regional operations.<sup>173</sup>

DOA1987 assumed that the major threat to Australia’s security would come from small-scale incursions, and thus there was a focus shift from high-intensity to low-intensity warfare and the required forces to deal with such issues.<sup>174</sup>

The concept of “defence in depth” was central to this paper.<sup>175</sup> Maritime forces, capable of preventing enemy attack against the northern maritime approaches, were of fundamental importance.<sup>176</sup> DOA1987 espoused the use of high technology forces, although this reliance on technology was criticised by some.<sup>177</sup>

Building on the strategy of “defence in depth,” DOA1987 listed eight required defence capabilities:

1. Intelligence and surveillance;
2. Maritime warfare;
3. Strike and interdiction;
4. Land warfare;
5. Air warfare;
6. Command, control and communications;
7. Infrastructure and logistics;
8. Nuclear, biological and chemical defences.<sup>178</sup>

It is notable that, despite the timing of the review, little attention was paid to Cold War issues, apart from the mention of nuclear defence.<sup>179</sup> Also, while DOA1987 developed the concept of “defence in depth”, it also retained elements of previous policy, especially the concept of self reliance within alliances.<sup>180</sup>

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<sup>172</sup> Ibid. p.2-8

<sup>173</sup> Ibid. p.112

<sup>174</sup> Albert Palozzo, *The Australian Army: A History of its Organisation 1901-2001*. Melbourne, Oxford University Press, 2001. p.336 and Australian Department of Defence, *The Defence of Australia*. p.23-26

<sup>175</sup> Australian Department of Defence, *The Defence of Australia*. p.31

<sup>176</sup> Ibid. p.21

<sup>177</sup> Gary Smith, Dave Cox, and Scott Burchill, *Australia in the World: An Introduction to Australian Foreign Policy*. Melbourne, Oxford University Press, 1996. p.142

<sup>178</sup> Horner, *Making the Australian Defence Force*. p.86 and Australian Department of Defence, *The Defence of Australia*. p.34-62

While DOA1987 was the primary statement of Australian defence policy in 1991, a follow-up document, *Australian Strategic Planning 1990* (ASP1990) also provided guidance.<sup>181</sup> This was not a major shift from DOA1987, but rather an incremental advance; it itself stated that it “amplif(ied) the strategy of defence in depth set out in *The Defence of Australia 1987*.”<sup>182</sup>

ASP1990 noted that the Cold War had ended, but stated that this would mean no real change to Australia’s security environment, as Australia’s defence orientation was already largely Cold War independent, and the ADF should still focus on low-level conflicts.<sup>183</sup> However, Australia would likely involve itself in tasks other than continental defence, such as peacekeeping and disaster relief.<sup>184</sup>

Nine principal defence roles were listed:

1. Intelligence collection and evaluation;
2. Surveillance in Australia's maritime area of interest;
3. Maritime patrol and response;
4. Air defence of the maritime areas and northern approaches;
5. Protection of shipping, offshore territories, and resources;
6. Protection of important civil and military assets and infrastructure;
7. Detection and defeat of incursions into Australian territory;
8. Strategic strike;
9. Contributing to response to requests for aid by SP countries.<sup>185</sup>

In summary, ASP1990 was oriented on conflict operations, although it saw them as relatively unlikely. The most important task remained the conventional military defence of Australia against low-level threats. There was little attention paid to peacekeeping, fisheries protection, counter-terrorism or other non-traditional roles.

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<sup>179</sup> Horner, *Making the Australian Defence Force*. p.81 and Stewart Woodman, *Australian Security Planning at the Crossroads: The Challenge of the Nineties*, Working Paper 271, Canberra: ANU Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, 1993. p.13

<sup>180</sup> Horner, *Making the Australian Defence Force*. p.79

<sup>181</sup> Australian Department of Defence, *Australia's Strategic Planning in the 1990s*, Canberra, 27 November 1989. One should note this document was only released publically in September 1992.

<sup>182</sup> *Ibid.* p.46

<sup>183</sup> *Ibid.* p.iii-5 and p.22-23

<sup>184</sup> *Ibid.* p.21

<sup>185</sup> Horner, *Making the Australian Defence Force*. p.85 and Australian Department of Defence, *Australia's Strategic Planning in the 1990s*. p.29

Thus, the ADF in 1991 was guided by three major statements of defence policy: the Defence Act 1903, DOA1987, and ASP1990. The first had little impact except at the most basic level, and the latter two both expounded a similar strategy of continental defence. Little attention was paid to expeditionary operations. Both political parties in Australia supported this strategy, with only minor differences.<sup>186</sup>

Both DOA1987 and ASP1990 were rigorous, technical documents, focused firmly on the limited demand of protecting Australia's northern borders. When compared to New Zealand's policy at the time, it is obvious that Australia's policy was more specific, more focused, more rigorous in its analysis, and more oriented towards military rather than foreign policy considerations.

Developed from these policy documents, the stated mission of the ADF in its 1990/1991 annual report was "to protect and promote the security of Australia and its people against armed attack and other military pressure."<sup>187</sup> In the 1991/1992 annual report that changed to a simpler one: "to promote the security of Australia and to protect its people and interests."<sup>188</sup>

## Funding

The 1990/1991 and 1991/1992 defence budgets were both approximately 9-9.5 billion AUD.<sup>189</sup> This was approximately 2.2-2.3% of Australian GDP, and 8.5-8.8% of the Government budget. It was thus constant in raw terms, but due to inflation was a slight decline on previous years.<sup>190</sup>

The ADF did not have the same sophisticated accrual accounting system as the NZDF, and did not produce outputs for the government; an input based system was used instead.<sup>191</sup> The budget was divided somewhat unevenly, with the Australian Army receiving a proportionally smaller amount than the other, higher technology

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<sup>186</sup> Herschel Hurst, 'Opposition plans big bureaucratic cuts in defence', *Asia-Pacific Defence Reporter*, vol. XVIII, no. 5, November 1991. p.22 notes opposition views.

<sup>187</sup> Australian Department of Defence, *Defence Report 1990/1991*, Canberra, October 1991. p.5

<sup>188</sup> Australian Department of Defence, *Report for 1991/1992*, Canberra, November 1992. p.3

<sup>189</sup> Horner, *Making the Australian Defence Force*. p.87; International Institute of Strategic Studies, *The Military Balance*. London, 1990/1991. p.156; International Institute of Strategic Studies, *The Military Balance*. p.158; Herschel Hurst, 'Serious wastage problem in armed forces', *Asia-Pacific Defence Reporter*, vol. XVII, no. 6/7, December/January 1991. which gives a figure of 8.97 billion for 1990/1991!

<sup>190</sup> A.W. Grazebrook, 'The cuts that aren't cuts', *Asia-Pacific Defence Reporter*, vol. XVII, no. 5, November 1990.

<sup>191</sup> Indeed the ADF did not introduce accrual accounting until 1999/2000. Horner, *Making the Australian Defence Force*. p.87

services. This budget division was in accordance with the concepts of DOA1987. Capital equipment procurement took up some 22.6% of the budget, a sizeable percentage, but a figure that had declined slightly from the late 1980s.<sup>192</sup>

Budgetary pressures were evident in the ADF, and there was concern that capabilities could not be maintained within the existing level of funding. DOA1987 committed the ADF to major, expensive purchases in the near term. The percentage allocated to capital expenditure was seen as likely to increase, which would cause pressure on other areas such as personnel and operating costs. In February 1991, the Minister of Defence admitted that the cost of planned defence projects had blown out, and that a funding shortfall of \$3 billion Australian dollars had accumulated.<sup>193</sup> In response, the ADF was attempting to save money by reorganising its internal structure, through, for example, civilianisation.<sup>194</sup>

## Higher Command and Control

The Commander-in-Chief of all Australian armed forces in 1991 was the Governor General, as authorised by the Defence Act 1903.<sup>195</sup> However, as in New Zealand, this was a ceremonial position. The Australian Minister of Defence possessed equivalent powers of control to his New Zealand equivalent, and exercised his authority through the Australian Chief of Defence Staff (CDS).

CDS was based at HQADF, Canberra. This was the force-level command organisation. The offices of the Army, RAN and RAAF were all based in Canberra, collocated with HQADF. The three services also retained their own operational commands: Land (Sydney), Maritime (Sydney) and Air (Glenbrook).

While theoretically subordinate to HQADF, the three services had historically held the preponderance of power in the relationship.<sup>196</sup> In an attempt to remedy this, and enhance jointness, DOA1987 recommended new command and control

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<sup>192</sup> Ibid. p.316

<sup>193</sup> Eric Andrews, *The Department of Defence*. South Melbourne, Oxford University Press, 2001. p.268

<sup>194</sup> Australian Government, *Defence Communications Corporate Plan 1991-2001*, Canberra, May 1991. See also Australian Department of Defence, *Force Structure Review*, Canberra, May 1991.

<sup>195</sup> Unknown Author, 'Australian Defence Act.'

<sup>196</sup> Interview with Former Australian Defence Official B, 22 November 2005; Interview with Former Australian Defence Official H, 30 November 2005; Interview with Former Australian Defence Official J, 30 November 2005; Interview with Former Australian Defence Official L, 24 November 2005.; Andrews, *The Department of Defence*.

arrangements.<sup>197</sup> In 1989 some reorganisation was carried out, shifting authority back to HQADF and away from the individual services.<sup>198</sup> Yet this move towards centralisation was limited; the position of Commander Joint Forces Australia, for example, was still a non-permanent role filled only during major exercises.<sup>199</sup> Thus, in 1991 there was still no permanent joint operational headquarters, although HQ Northern Command might have undertaken such a role. In the case of an overseas deployment it was usual procedure, as with the NZDF, to utilise the headquarters of the largest contributing service.

It should be noted that while the ADF did not possess a joint operational headquarters, it had plentiful institutional experience of joint, multinational operations.<sup>200</sup>

## **ADF Ethos and Doctrine**

The ADF in 1991 possessed a military history reaching back to the 19<sup>th</sup> century, when Australia provided volunteer contingents to suppress the Boxer Rebellion in China. During its history, traits of mateship, egalitarianism, irreverence, humour, and a lack of respect for rank or status had developed in the ADF.<sup>201</sup>

One aspect of the ADF's ethos at the time was a strong service tribalism, similar to that of the NZDF. This tribalism was strengthened by the fact that leadership training was single-service only until officers reached a very high level.<sup>202</sup> However, common attitudes, and especially the concept of mateship, helped unite the force.<sup>203</sup>

There was no cornerstone ADF doctrine. Joint operations, while given lip service in official policy statements, were not the subject of a great deal of analytical attention.

One area where an informal ADF doctrine existed was command. Initiative had been encouraged amongst subordinate commanders in the ADF at least since

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<sup>197</sup> Horner, *Making the Australian Defence Force*. p.79

<sup>198</sup> Ibid. p.116

<sup>199</sup> Ibid. p.124

<sup>200</sup> David Horner, *Towards a Philosophy of Australian Command*, Canberra: Centre for Defence Command, Leadership and Management Studies, 2002. p.23

<sup>201</sup> Ibid. p.22

<sup>202</sup> Shaun Love, *Leading Tomorrow Today: Officer Leadership Development in the Australian Defence Force*, Canberra: Australian Defence College, 2002. p.3

<sup>203</sup> Maurice Meecham, *Command: The Australian Way*, Canberra: Centre for Defence Command, Leadership and Management Studies, 28 November 2000. p.16

World War Two.<sup>204</sup> Thus in 1991 the ADF approached command from the directive-control paradigm, imposing constraints on the freedom of subordinate commanders only if they were essential.<sup>205</sup>

Personnel issues were not a major problem for the ADF, as it was already undergoing deliberate downsizing. It had reduced in size by some 2000 personnel since 1987.<sup>206</sup> Some morale issues were beginning to appear, largely related to the shift of major force elements from the popular south-east region to the barren and deserted northern coastline.<sup>207</sup>

## Existing Operations

The ADF in 1991 was engaged in a surprising small number of operations, considering its relative size in comparison to the NZDF. It maintained only a very restricted presence in a single United Nations operation, and provided advisors and trainers to various South Pacific and South East Asian nations.<sup>208</sup>

When the Gulf War erupted, Australia provided frigates, a supply ship, divers and surgical teams.<sup>209</sup> At the time, some said that the lack of a combat contribution to the Gulf indicated the ADF's shortcomings.<sup>210</sup>

## Force Structure Review

During 1991 a major Force Structure Review (FSR91) was carried out, which recommended reorganisation of the defence force.<sup>211</sup>

FSR91 was an internal exercise designed to test the capabilities of the ADF to fulfil the requirements of DOA1987 and ASP1990;<sup>212</sup> its goal was to better organise Australia's defence to obtain maximum combat capability in an efficient and

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<sup>204</sup> Ibid. and David Horner, *The Evolution of Australian Higher Command Arrangements*, Canberra: Centre for Defence Command, Leadership and Management Studies, 2002; Horner, *Towards a Philosophy of Australian Command*.

<sup>205</sup> Meecham, *Command: The Australian Way*. p.13

<sup>206</sup> Horner, *Making the Australian Defence Force*. p.87

<sup>207</sup> Australian Department of Defence, *Force Structure Review*. p.23-27 describes the movement of land forces.

<sup>208</sup> International Institute of Strategic Studies, *The Military Balance*. p.158-159

<sup>209</sup> P.J. Greville, 'Defence policy petrified', *Asia-Pacific Defence Reporter*, vol. XVIII, no. 6/7, January 1991/1992. p.189

<sup>210</sup> P.J. Greville, 'Are we building a high priced, ineffective defence force', *Asia-Pacific Defence Reporter*, vol. XVII, no. 12, June 1991. p.22

<sup>211</sup> Australian Department of Defence, *Force Structure Review*.

<sup>212</sup> Ibid. p.iii

affordable way.<sup>213</sup> FSR91 developed a comprehensive set of operational roles, against which the relevance of particular capabilities could be judged.<sup>214</sup> Three key principles were developed: maximising combat capability, meeting the northwestern strategic focus, and making better use of reserves.<sup>215</sup> Along with capability, however, financial issues were also addressed.

The main conclusion of the FSR91 was that the ADF needed to be downsized considerably, and re-oriented towards the northern coast. All the services would lose personnel, with the Army hardest hit, losing 5000, including a third of its Regular battalions.<sup>216</sup> A new organisation – the Ready Reserve – was to be established in the Army. This would be midway between the fulltime force and the general reserve, and was designed to improve the utility of the reserves.<sup>217</sup>

Along with downsizing and reorganisation, movement was also begun of force elements towards Darwin and surrounding bases, and the building of new and enhancement of existing bases in the north.<sup>218</sup>

FSR91 was, on the surface, an attempt to ensure that existent ADF capabilities matched policy, and, where they did not, to modify those capabilities. It is questionable whether operational efficiency was the primary driver, or whether the prospect of financial savings was more important. It did not change policy guidance, or introduce new roles, but it was important nonetheless, as it had major effects on the structure of the defence force.<sup>219</sup>

## The Australian Army

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<sup>213</sup> Australian Department of Defence, *Defence Report 1990/1991*. p.7

<sup>214</sup> Stewart Woodman, *A Question of Priorities: Australian and New Zealand Security Planning in the 1990s*, Working Paper 260, Canberra: ANU Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, 1992. p.6-7

<sup>215</sup> Australian Department of Defence, *Force Structure Review*. p.1

<sup>216</sup> Palozzo, *The Australian Army: A History of its Organisation 1901-2001*. p.348

<sup>217</sup> *Ibid.* p.354 and Australian Department of Defence, *Ready Reserve Program 1991*, Canberra, May 1991; Australian Department of Defence, *Ready Reserve Programme - Report to Minister of Defence*, Canberra, May 1991.

<sup>218</sup> Horner, *Making the Australian Defence Force*. p.91 and

<sup>219</sup> Australian Department of Defence, *Force Structure Review*. p.1-27

## Command, Force Structure and Readiness

The Australian Army was the largest of the three services, with approximately 32,000 active personnel.<sup>220</sup> It was divided territorially into six military districts and a separate independent Northern Command, although Northern Command was soon shifted from the Army to HQADF.<sup>221</sup> The Army was organised both into traditional brigades and capability-oriented force element groups. Overall the Army had six Regular infantry battalions; the rest were reservists.

The Army's roles were threefold: conducting effective land operations from the force-in-being, being able to expand in a timely manner against more substantial conflict, and being able to support civil authorities against terrorist attacks. The first was the most important.<sup>222</sup>

The Commander of the Australian Army was the Chief of General Staff (CGS), whose responsibilities were similar to those of his New Zealand equivalent: raising, maintaining and sustaining, rather than operational command, which was instead the responsibility of Land Command.

There were eight force element groups. They consisted of: command and control, the Ready Deployment Force (RDF), RDF augmentation, surveillance forces, manoeuvre forces, follow-on forces, protective forces and logistics forces.<sup>223</sup> Of the force element groups, the RDF and surveillance forces were maintained at the highest readiness, and had a combined strength of just over 5000 personnel.

The RDF was built on the 3<sup>rd</sup> Brigade at Townsville, which was based around three Regular infantry battalions, 1, 2/4 and 3 Royal Australian Regiment.<sup>224</sup> The RDF also included a brigade headquarters, signal troops, armoured cavalry, combat engineers, reconnaissance troops, artillery, and integral logistics support. It was expected that the RDF could deploy a brigade group on relatively short notice.

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<sup>220</sup> Palozzo, *The Australian Army: A History of its Organisation 1901-2001*. p.346. Actual establishment rather than authorised establishment. Cf. with International Institute of Strategic Studies, *The Military Balance*. p.158 which gives a strength of 30,300.

<sup>221</sup> International Institute of Strategic Studies, *The Military Balance*. p.158 and Australian Department of Defence, *Report for 1991/1992*. p.54

<sup>222</sup> Australian Department of Defence, *Defence Report 1990/1991*. p.58

<sup>223</sup> Palozzo, *The Australian Army: A History of its Organisation 1901-2001*. p.346

<sup>224</sup> *Ibid.* p.351 and Horner, *Making the Australian Defence Force*. p.90-91

The Surveillance Force was designed to keep watch over Australia's desolate northern coast, and was based at the time on two infantry battalions, although under the FSR it would be strengthened by cavalry units.<sup>225</sup>

The Manoeuvre Force was designed to be Australia's major contribution to any deployment, and consisted of three brigades – the 1<sup>st</sup>, 6<sup>th</sup> and 7<sup>th</sup>.<sup>226</sup> The former was based at Darwin, and included armoured and cavalry units. The second consisted of armoured infantry, and was to become a Ready Reserve formation. The last was a light infantry formation based in Queensland.<sup>227</sup> At the time, 6<sup>th</sup> Brigade was experiencing manning problems, with its two regular and one reserve battalions understrength.<sup>228</sup>

In addition to these forces, maintained at a medium level of readiness, were another six brigades maintained at skeletal levels. These provided the framework for the Army to muster an entire division.

Apart from the brigades, the Army maintained other assets at force level.<sup>229</sup> These included the 1<sup>st</sup> Aviation Regiment, a helicopter unit, various logistics and support units, and an SAS Regiment.<sup>230</sup> The latter unit included a Tactical Assault Group, tasked with urban and counter-terrorist operations.<sup>231</sup>

The Army was structured in such a way as to provide a brigade group for operations, based on the RDF and augmented with elements of the Manoeuvre Force. A single short term deployment would not have presented any problems. Sustainment of that brigade for any period of time, however, would have required the use of reserves, as the number of Regular personnel was insufficient. The Kangaroo series of exercises in 1989 had indicated the “hollow” nature of the Army when undertaking concurrent or extended operations.<sup>232</sup>

Under FSR91, the Army would be markedly changed. It would go from six to four Regular battalions. Its authorised personnel level would decline to 36,395, including reserves. Of that number some 11,110 would be Australian Regular Army,

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<sup>225</sup> Horner, *Making the Australian Defence Force*. p.91

<sup>226</sup> *Ibid.* p.91

<sup>227</sup> Palozzo, *The Australian Army: A History of its Organisation 1901-2001*. p.351-353

<sup>228</sup> Herschel Hurst, 'Zero growth in defence spending', *Asia-Pacific Defence Reporter*, vol. XVIII, no. 4, October 1991. p.27

<sup>229</sup> Palozzo, *The Australian Army: A History of its Organisation 1901-2001*. p.353

<sup>230</sup> International Institute of Strategic Studies, *The Military Balance*. p.158

<sup>231</sup> Michael Evans, *Forward from the Past: The Development of Australian Army Doctrine 1972-Present*, Study Paper 301, Duntroon: Australian Army Land Warfare Studies Centre, September 1999.

p.25

<sup>232</sup> *Ibid.* p.44

another 3,200 would be Ready Reserve, and the rest General Reserve.<sup>233</sup> This would affect both deployability and sustainability.

## Doctrine, Training and Experience

In direct contrast to the New Zealand Army, the Australian Army of 1991 had domestically developed operational doctrine. This was designed to meet policy guidance, namely the defeat of incursions onto Australian territory.<sup>234</sup>

This was not a new role; throughout its history, the Army had often been tasked with the continental defence of Australia.<sup>235</sup> However, it had paid little doctrinal attention to that role until the 1980s. Before then, while some note was made of low intensity warfare, little effort was made analytically identify the specific requirements of such operations.<sup>236</sup> A shift occurred in the mid-1980s. A series of doctrinal publications espoused various concepts relating to the continental Defence of Australia, focusing on low-level threats and the advantages that Australia's geographical size provided.<sup>237</sup>

Thus, by 1991 the Australian Army possessed doctrine that supported the flexible Defence of Australia through the employment of manoeuvre warfare and the use of directive control. Its applicability to other types of operations, such as expeditionary deployments, was more tenuous.<sup>238</sup>

The Army was involved in a large number of exercises. Unlike the NZDF, it still had strong relations with the US. Each year it was involved in exercises in South East Asia as well as northern Australia.<sup>239</sup> Very little joint training was carried out.<sup>240</sup>

The emphasis in training was to develop independent leaders, who would exercise their own initiative. Leadership training was thus rigorous and extensive. The

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<sup>233</sup> Palozzo, *The Australian Army: A History of its Organisation 1901-2001*. p.350

<sup>234</sup> Horner, *Making the Australian Defence Force*. p.85

<sup>235</sup> Michael Evans, *The Role of the Australian Army in a Maritime Concept of Strategy*, Working Paper 101, Duntroon: Australian Army Land Warfare Studies Centre, September 1998. p.4

<sup>236</sup> Palozzo, *The Australian Army: A History of its Organisation 1901-2001*. p.332

<sup>237</sup> Evans, *Forward from the Past: The Development of Australian Army Doctrine 1972-Present*. p.31-50

<sup>238</sup> Evans, *The Role of the Australian Army in a Maritime Concept of Strategy*.

<sup>239</sup> See Australian Department of Defence, *Report for 1991/1992*.

<sup>240</sup> The following relies largely on Meecham, *Command: The Australian Way.*, and Love, *Leading Tomorrow Today: Officer Leadership Development in the Australian Defence Force*. Despite the release dates of their works they are applicable to the period described.

command paradigm taught was that of directive control, whereby leaders were expected to grant freedom to their subordinates within certain boundaries.

The Army possessed its own higher level academy for staff, and also sent personnel overseas for advanced level courses. As with the NZDF, there was no compulsory university requirement for promotion.

Few personnel in the Army retained experience of operations other than peace support operations. Australia's last combat operations had been in Vietnam, and few veterans from that conflict remained.

## **Equipment**

The following section examines the Australian Army's equipment, grouped into major and minor categories.

### *Major*

The most powerful equipment of the Army was some 103 Leopard 1A3 main battle tanks.<sup>241</sup> They were assigned to 1<sup>st</sup> Brigade. They were fast, manoeuvrable and possessed a range of 600km without refuelling.<sup>242</sup> They carried 55 rounds for their 105mm L7A3 main gun, a weapon that if equipped with certain ammunition could defeat most targets frontally. However, the Leopards had flaws: they were thinly armoured, lacking composite armour or countermeasures, and at 42,400kg they were light for tanks but too heavy to be easily airtransportable. In a high intensity combat environment against anti-tank weapons, their survivability was very questionable.

The most common armoured vehicle in the Australian inventory was the M113. The Army possessed two major variants – the vast majority (some 700) were largely identical to those operated by the NZDF. Many were fitted with a stabilised turret for their main machinegun.<sup>243</sup> Another 53 had been converted into fire support vehicles by the fitting of a 76mm main gun. This provided a useful light anti-tank and high explosive support capability, but was handicapped by the M113's thin armour. It

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<sup>241</sup> International Institute of Strategic Studies, *The Military Balance*. p.158

<sup>242</sup> Most technical information taken from Danish Army, 'Leopard 1 Family', [accessed 28 October 2004]. Available from [www.armyvehicles.dk/leopard1a3.htm](http://www.armyvehicles.dk/leopard1a3.htm).

<sup>243</sup> Unknown Author, 'Australians show what they've got in their arsenal', *Army News*, no. 15, 12 June 1991. p.6

was thus, at best, a stopgap fire support solution utilising the large number of M113 chassis.

The Army also had fifteen Light Armoured Vehicles (ASLAVS), trialling a concept of operations. The ASLAVs were eight wheeled personnel carriers.<sup>244</sup> They were equipped with a 25mm Bushmaster cannon, and had both thermal imaging and image intensification sights. They could be air transported by C-130 Hercules, and were also fully amphibious after three minutes preparation. With a range of some 670km and a top speed of almost 100kmh, they were exceedingly useful on the flat hard ground of northern Australia. They were also more heavily armoured than the M113s and provided a quantum capability leap over those older vehicles.

The Australian Army fielded artillery in both 155mm and 105mm calibres. In the larger calibre, it possessed 35 M198 howitzers.<sup>245</sup> These were modern weapons, and could fire conventional ammunition out to 22.4km and rocket assisted projectiles to 30km. They could also be air transported by Chinook helicopters. In the smaller calibre, the Army possessed 205 weapons of three types – M2A2, L5 and Hamel. The last type was the most modern.

Ground based air defence was provided by nineteen Rapier launchers.<sup>246</sup> Each launched carried eight missiles with a range of 8km. Guidance was by Semi-Automatic-Command-Line-Of-Sight (SACLOS). The Rapier had proven useful in the Falklands conflict of 1982, but by 1991 was beginning to show its age. Its effectiveness against fast moving targets was limited, and its short range meant it was restricted to point defence.

Unlike the New Zealand Army, the Australian Army possessed its own helicopters. It operated 35 S-70 Blackhawks, sophisticated and powerful transport helicopters capable of transporting fully equipped squads of infantry across the battlefield. Together the fleet could lift an entire infantry company at once.<sup>247</sup> Some 44 OH-58 Kiowas provided aerial observation and reconnaissance. Six UH-1H Iroquois remained for transport and gunship duties.

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<sup>244</sup> Military Analysis Network, 'Light Armoured Vehicle-25', [accessed 28 October 2004]. Available from [www.fas.org/man/dod-101/sys/land/lav-25.htm](http://www.fas.org/man/dod-101/sys/land/lav-25.htm).

<sup>245</sup> Military Analysis Network, 'M198 Towed Howitzer', [accessed 28 October 2004]. Available from [www.fas.org/man/dod-101/sys/land/m198.htm](http://www.fas.org/man/dod-101/sys/land/m198.htm).

<sup>246</sup> Military Analysis Network, 'Rapier Field Standard C (FSC)', [accessed 28 October 2004]. Available from [www.fas.org/man/dod-101/sys/land/row/rapier.htm](http://www.fas.org/man/dod-101/sys/land/row/rapier.htm).

<sup>247</sup> A.W. Grazebrook, 'Army under pressure', *Asia-Pacific Defence Reporter*, vol. XVII, no. 9, March 1991. p.40

Nor was the Army solely a land and air based force. It operated its own small fleet of landing ships: 16 LCM and 85 smaller LARC-5 craft. These provided a useful capability for operations around the Australian coastline.

### *Minor*

The primary small arm of the Australian Army was the Steyr rifle as operated by the New Zealand Army; they had just begun to enter service.<sup>248</sup> Longer range fire support was provided by 7.62mm machineguns, which were also new. The Australian Army also possessed 294 81mm mortars.

Anti-tank firepower was provided by three different types of equipment. The longest range weapon was the Milan anti-tank guided missile. The Army possessed ten Milan launchers.<sup>249</sup> This was a SACLOS missile that had first entered service in 1972, with a maximum range of 2km and a penetration of 352mm of rolled homogenous armour.<sup>250</sup> Given that relatively low penetration, its effectiveness against main battle tanks was questionable, especially over the frontal arc.

Closer range firepower was provided by two types of recoilless rifle, the 84mm Carl Gustav and the 106mm M-40A1. The former were similar to those operated by the NZDF. The latter, while providing a substantial punch, were heavy and lacked range and accuracy; their utility was questionable.

Army communications were being enhanced with the addition of Raven tactical radios.<sup>251</sup> These were an advanced American digital design.

Finally, short range anti-aircraft protection was provided by 19 RBS-70 launchers. These manportable SAMs had a good performance but extremely limited range. Their effectiveness was also heavily limited by the training of the operator due to the mechanics of their guidance system.

## **Reserve System**

The Australian Army was heavily reliant on its reserve system, to a far greater extent than its New Zealand counterpart. Most vital was the General Reserve, which

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<sup>248</sup> Ibid. p.40

<sup>249</sup> International Institute of Strategic Studies, *The Military Balance*. p.158

<sup>250</sup> Military Analysis Network, 'Milan', [accessed 28 October 2004]. Available from [www.fas.org/man/dod-101/sys/land/row/milan.htm](http://www.fas.org/man/dod-101/sys/land/row/milan.htm).

<sup>251</sup> Grazebrook, 'Army under pressure'. p.40

while at a low state of readiness would be expected to fill out the various brigades in the event of any major operation.

The Ready Reserve was in the process of creation. This was designed to provide reserves at a higher state of readiness than the General Reserve, and had a higher training requirement.<sup>252</sup> It was expected that there would be 3200 Ready Reserve personnel in the Army by 1996.<sup>253</sup>

The Australian system did not attempt to maintain reserves in various specialised categories, preferring to use them as general forces for rounding out larger units. There was no focus on support and other capabilities in the reserves, and in fact the Ready Reserve was focused solely on the provision of combat forces.

## **The Army in Summary**

The Australian Army consisted of a balanced force based around a single ready brigade and several supporting and sustaining units. It was a force focused on combat operations, albeit at the lower levels of intensity. It possessed a good variety of equipment, if not always up-to-date, and had integral logistical support. It lacked sustainability, due to its reliance on reserves, especially in non-vital operations.

There were no major capability gaps, and the Army had organic air and anti-tank defence. It was also a largely mechanised force, with sufficient APCs to carry the majority of its combat infantrymen to the edge of, if not into, battle.

The Army's primary purpose, as stated by defence policy, was to defend the northern Australian coastline from any incursion. Its readiness level was sufficient to provide a brigade group or several independent battalions immediately for this task, at a good standard, but further deployments would have required the use of reserves. Unlike the New Zealand Army, the Australian Army knew precisely what was required of it, and was developing a force structure and doctrine suited to those roles.

## **The Royal Australian Navy**

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<sup>252</sup> Palozzo, *The Australian Army: A History of its Organisation 1901-2001*. p.354

<sup>253</sup> Australian Department of Defence, *Ready Reserve Program 1991*. p.12-15

## Command and Structure

The RAN was the smallest of the ADF's three services, with 15,650 Regular personnel.<sup>254</sup> The Chief of Naval Staff (CNS) was based at HQADF, but Maritime Headquarters was based in Sydney. CNS had a similar role to CGS, generating capability, and operational command was the responsibility of Maritime Headquarters.

The primary fleet base was in Sydney, but a second major fleet base was being developed at Garden Island, WA, and other smaller bases were located at Cairns and Darwin.

The RAN's mission focused it towards surveilling and patrolling the immediate sea approaches to Australia, especially towards the north, and the sea-air gap.<sup>255</sup> The seas around Australia were divided into six Naval Area Commands. The RAN itself was divided into five Force Element Groups (FEGs), which contained the RAN's operational capability.<sup>256</sup> These were Submarine, Surface Combatants, Amphibious, Patrol and Support.

## Force Elements

### *Submarine Force*

The Submarine FEG consisted of six Oberon-class conventionally powered submarines. These were seen as strategic assets, suitable for the roles of strike and maritime warfare as listed in ASP1990 and DOA1987.

These submarines were ageing vessels, although they were equipped with relatively modern weapons, including Mk 48 (21") heavyweight torpedoes and Harpoon anti-ship missiles.<sup>257</sup> However, their slow speed, lack of range, and relatively high ambient noise meant they possessed only limited capability against more advanced opponents. Against lesser opponents, or in littoral waters where their noise signature might be less evident, they would still have been useful. A decision had already been made a year earlier to replace the Oberons with domestically produced

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<sup>254</sup> International Institute of Strategic Studies, *The Military Balance*. p.156 and International Institute of Strategic Studies, *The Military Balance*. p.158

<sup>255</sup> Australian Department of Defence, *Report for 1991/1992*. p.33

<sup>256</sup> International Institute of Strategic Studies, *The Military Balance*. p.158

<sup>257</sup> International Institute of Strategic Studies, *The Military Balance*. p.156

Collins-class submarines, which would hopefully provide a quantum capability leap.<sup>258</sup>

### *Surface Combatant Force*

The RAN operated four types of surface combatants. The largest were the three Perth (US Charles F. Adams) class guided missile destroyers. Three Adelaide (US Perry) class guided missile frigates were also operated. The least capable surface combatants were the Swan and Paramatta-class frigates. The RAN operated two of the former and one of the latter.

The Perth-class guided missile destroyers were of a type that first entered US service in the early 1960s. They were equipped with Standard SM-1 anti-aircraft missiles, Harpoon anti-ship missiles, and lightweight torpedoes.<sup>259</sup> They also possessed two 5” guns. They were capable of 30 knots, and had a relatively large crew of 383 personnel. By 1991 they were showing their age. Their lack of helicopters limited their anti-submarine capability, the hulls were approaching structural failure, and their anti-aircraft capabilities were second rate.

More advanced were the Adelaide-class guided missile frigates. Three had entered service by September 1991,<sup>260</sup> and another three were due in the following years. These were of a class first developed by the US in the 1970s for anti-submarine duties. The Australian ships were constructed in the early 1980s, and Australia was the only export customer for the type. They possessed Standard and Harpoon missiles, a 76mm gun, and a Phalanx close-in-weapon-system.<sup>261</sup> This was a similar set of weapons to the Perth DDGs, but the Adelaides had superior sensors and computing systems, and, vitally, the ability to operate anti-submarine helicopters. The Adelaide-class was proven in war – an example in US service survived two Exocet impacts in the 1980s.<sup>262</sup> The crew of 300 was some 83 less than that of the Perth-class DDGs.

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<sup>258</sup> Horner, *Making the Australian Defence Force*. p.89

<sup>259</sup> Military Analysis Network, 'DDG-2 Charles F. Adams', [accessed 28 October 2004]. Available from [www.fas.org/man/dod-101/sys/ship/ddg-2.htm](http://www.fas.org/man/dod-101/sys/ship/ddg-2.htm).and International Institute of Strategic Studies, *The Military Balance*.

<sup>260</sup> Australian Department of Defence, *Report for 1991/1992*. p.44

<sup>261</sup> Military Analysis Network, 'FFG-7 Oliver Hazard Perry-class', [accessed 28 October 2004]. Available from [www.fas.org/man/dod-101/sys/ship/ffg-7.htm](http://www.fas.org/man/dod-101/sys/ship/ffg-7.htm).

<sup>262</sup> Ibid.

The ADF had only some 36 Harpoons to equip the Oberon, Perth and Adelaide fleets, so their surface combat capabilities may have been slightly limited.<sup>263</sup>

The least capable of the RAN's surface combatants were the three Swan and Paramatta-class frigates. Equipped with Ikara missiles (in the process of removal),<sup>264</sup> torpedoes and 4.5" guns, they lacked advanced sensors, helicopters and anti-aircraft weapons, and had ageing hulls.

### *Amphibious Force*

The Amphibious FEG was based on a single Tobruk-class LST, but also operated a variety of smaller craft, and worked in co-operation with the Army's amphibious units during operations.

*Tobruk* was a 6000 ton LST, capable of carrying fourteen tanks and from 300 to 500 equipped infantry.<sup>265</sup> She operated a helicopter and possessed the ability to operate smaller landing craft. She had entered service in 1981, and was a modified British design. Her LCTs could each carry three tanks.

### *Patrol Force*

The Patrol FEG was composed of some twenty odd patrol vessels, largely of the Fremantle class, but also a few older Attack-class boats. It was tasked with protection of the EEZ, and general surveillance of the maritime approaches to Australia.

The fifteen Fremantle-class patrol boats that provided the Patrol FEG's main strength were 220 ton boats, with a top speed of some 30 knots and a range of 1450 nautical miles.<sup>266</sup> Their seakeeping was poor, and they lacked a comprehensive sensor suite, limiting their surveillance capabilities.<sup>267</sup> The Attack-class patrol boats were even more limited.

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<sup>263</sup> Peter La Franchi, 'Taking Harpoon into the 21st Century', *Australian Defence Magazine*, vol. 4, no. 3, March 1996. p.36

<sup>264</sup> A.W. Grazebrook, 'ASW must be upgraded', *Asia-Pacific Defence Reporter*, vol. XVII, no. 12, June 1991. p.31

<sup>265</sup> Andrew Toppan, 'World Navies Today', 25 March 2002, [accessed 28 October 2004]. Available from [www.hazegray.org/worldnav/asiapac/austral.htm](http://www.hazegray.org/worldnav/asiapac/austral.htm).

<sup>266</sup> Matthew Flint, *The Timor Sea Joint Petroleum Development Area Oil and Gas Resources: The Defence Implications*, Working Paper 13: Royal Australian Navy Sea Power Centre, 2003. p.19

<sup>267</sup> Horner, *Making the Australian Defence Force*. p.179-180

## *Support Force*

The final FEG, Support, consisted of logistics and mine warfare ships. These included underway replenishment, fleet oilers, and other smaller vessels. This FEG was tasked with a variety of roles to enable the combat elements to reach their full capability.

The Support FEG included a Success-class replenishment ship.<sup>268</sup> This 17,933 ton vessel could carry ship fuel, aviation fuel, munitions, provisions, water and spare parts. It thus provided a very useful underway replenishment capability. It could undertake vertical replenishment with its onboard helicopter. The Westralia was the RAN's sole fleet oiler. At 40,870 tons full load it was capable of 16 knots and could carry out multiple refuellings at sea.

Mine clearance capability included some inshore vessels commissioned in the late 1980s, equipped with hull-mounted sonars.<sup>269</sup> The RAN also operated Bandicoot and Brolga class auxiliary minehunters, the former converted commercial tugs mainly useful for the clearance of harbour entrances, rather than distant mine clearance.<sup>270</sup> These carried out their operational evaluation in late 1991 and were due in service in February 1992.<sup>271</sup>

## **Doctrine, Training and Experience**

The RAN did not possess its own formal statement of doctrine. In fact, it was not until 2000 that it would release its own domestically developed naval doctrine.<sup>272</sup>

Despite the absence of formal doctrine, the RAN's role was seemingly oriented more towards being a "blue water" rather than a "green water" navy.<sup>273</sup> This was interesting, given that defence of the Sea Air Gap might have suggested a focus on littoral operations instead.

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<sup>268</sup> Information on Success, Westralia is taken from Toppan, 'World Navies Today.'

<sup>269</sup> Horner, *Making the Australian Defence Force*. p.178

<sup>270</sup> Toppan, 'World Navies Today.'

<sup>271</sup> Australian Department of Defence, *Report for 1991/1992*. p.39

<sup>272</sup> Horner, *Making the Australian Defence Force*. p.163-164

<sup>273</sup> Evidence for this can be found in: Australian Department of Defence, *Defence Report 1990/1991*; Australian Department of Defence, *Report for 1991/1992*., as well as Australian Department of Defence, *The Defence of Australia*., and Australian Department of Defence, *Australia's Strategic Planning in the 1990s*.

The RAN was involved in a large number of multinational fleet exercises with a variety of partners, including the US.<sup>274</sup> These were usually oceanic rather than littoral focused, and were often of a very large scale.

It is likely that almost none of the RAN's personnel in 1991 possessed experience of active combat operations, except those who had deployed to the Gulf War patrol.

### **The Navy in Summary**

The RAN in 1991 consisted of a medium sized force with a good spread of capabilities, including both surface and sub-surface combatants. The quality of equipment varied, and alongside modern types such as the Adelaides were obsolescent ships such as the Swan and Paramatta-class frigates.

There was a hint of confusion about the RAN's use. The primary purpose of the RAN in stated defence policy was the maritime defence of the Sea Air Gap to the north of Australia, a littoral role. Yet, the RAN was largely designed for oceanic operations. It is difficult to see how the structure of the RAN meshed entirely with stated defence policy. The RAN's ships were not optimised for littoral operations. None of its platforms possessed a great ability to engage coastal targets, which suggests that the goal was the defeat of attackers at sea rather than intervention in the littoral. A large proportion of the RAN's combatants possessed sophisticated anti-shiping missiles, but their air defence was more limited, further hindering their utility in coastal roles. The RAN's amphibious fleet was also quite small. The lack of fast patrol craft with anti-surface weaponry, and the lack of a sizeable amphibious capability, point to a potential mismatch between strategic guidance and force structure.

This mismatch existed largely because the structure of the RAN was the result of decisions made much earlier than policy had shifted to the continental Defence of Australia. And, despite some gaps in the force structure, the RAN still possessed sufficient combatants to deploy a substantial force into the Sea Air Gap, although given the sheer scale of those approaches, and the types of unit likely to prove useful, questions might be asked as to how effective such a deployment might have been.

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<sup>274</sup> Australian Department of Defence, *Defence Report 1990/1991*. p.44

# The Royal Australian Air Force

## Command and Structure

The RAAF was the middle service in terms of size, with 22,100 personnel and 158 combat aircraft.<sup>275</sup> Its commander was the Chief of Air Staff (CAS). Air Force Headquarters was located at Glenbrook, NSW. Air Command, co-located with Air Force Headquarters, was the operational command.

The RAAF's major bases included Amberley, Williamtown, Tindal and Pearce. A few "bare bones" airfields dotted the Northern Territory and WA, ready to be operationalised.

As with the RAN, the RAAF was divided into FEGs. There were four major FEGs: Tactical Fighter, Reconnaissance/Strike, Air Lift and Maritime Patrol. The RAAF also had control of the Jindalee Over-The-Horizon (JORN) radars that were entering service at the time.<sup>276</sup>

## Force Element Groups

### *Tactical Fighter*

The Tactical Fighter FEG consisted of 50 F/A-18A and 3 F/A-18B Hornets. It was primarily tasked with offensive and defensive counter-air operations in order to fulfil ASP1990's role number four, "air defence of the maritime areas and northern approaches."<sup>277</sup> It also had a secondary strike role.

The Tactical Fighter FEG was undergoing a shift to northern bases, notably Tindal, to better meet the goals of DOA1987. Some of the Tactical Fighter FEG's aircraft were kept on constant alert for the defence of Australian territory. Also, this FEG participated frequently in overseas exercises and was often forward deployed to South East Asia. Attached to the Tactical Fighter FEG was the Operational Conversion Unit, a training unit operating some 18 F/A-18Bs.

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<sup>275</sup> International Institute of Strategic Studies, *The Military Balance*. p.158

<sup>276</sup> Unknown Author, 'PDR Reporter'. p.22

<sup>277</sup> Horner, *Making the Australian Defence Force*. p.85

The F/A-18s of the Tactical Fighter FEG and Operational Conversion Unit were modern twin engined fighter bombers.<sup>278</sup> The -A model were single seat, the -B twin seat trainers.

The F/A-18 possessed a digital FBW control system, which combined with a high thrust to weight ratio and good design gave it exceptional manoeuvrability. It had an integrated avionics suite and a radar with look-down shoot-down capability. It could carry up to 6000kg of assorted ordnance, but in Australian service it was generally equipped with Sparrow and Sidewinder missiles for the air defence role. Its one major shortcoming was a relatively restricted combat radius, which at maximum was only 500nm. However, given its primary role in Australian service was as a land-based air defence platform, this restricted range was not a major shortcoming.

### *Reconnaissance/Strike*

The Reconnaissance/Strike FEG consisted of 18 F-111C Aardvarks and four RF-111Cs. Its primary function was the fulfilment of ASP1990 role ten “strategic strike.”<sup>279</sup> The F-111Cs were based in southern Australia.

These aircraft were the ADF’s most potent strike assets. They were capable of mach 2.5 at high altitude, and had a range of 2500nm on internal fuel.<sup>280</sup> With external fuel tanks that range was extended to 3565nm. They had terrain following radar and could carry a total payload of 11250kg, comprising bombs, rockets, and missiles. The Australian F-111Cs had received the Pave Tack upgrade in the 1980s, allowing them to laser their own targets when delivering precision guided munitions. The RF-111Cs were reconnaissance variants.

### *Maritime Patrol*

The Maritime Patrol FEG operated 19 P-3C Orions. They were tasked with anti-submarine duties, general surface surveillance, and patrolling of Australia’s EEZ. Given the size of Australia’s maritime zone, the fleet was far from generous in size.

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<sup>278</sup> Military Analysis Network, 'F/A-18 Hornet', [accessed 28 October 2004]. Available from [www.fas.org/man/dod-101/sys/ac/f-18.htm](http://www.fas.org/man/dod-101/sys/ac/f-18.htm).

<sup>279</sup> Horner, *Making the Australian Defence Force*. p.85. Malcolm McIntosh and John Prescott, *Report to the Minister for Defence on the Collins Class Submarine and Related Matters*, Canberra, 20 June 1999. p.11 also notes that the F-111s were/are seen as Australia’s primary strategic asset.

<sup>280</sup> Military Analysis Network, 'F-111', [accessed 28 October 2004]. Available from [www.fas.org/man/dod-101/sys/ac/f-111.htm](http://www.fas.org/man/dod-101/sys/ac/f-111.htm).

This, as with its equivalent in the RNZAF, was one of the most heavily worked FEGs. It was somewhat undermanned, and spent much of its time on surveillance and air search work.<sup>281</sup>

The 19 P-3C Orions of the Maritime Patrol FEG were similar to those operated by the RNZAF, albeit with superior equipment fitted. Unlike the New Zealand Orions, however, they could carry Harpoon anti-ship missiles.<sup>282</sup>

### *Air Lift*

The Air Lift FEG operated a range of aircraft, including 12 C-130E, 12 C-130H, six Boeing 707s, 21 DHC-7 Caribous, and some Falcon-900 business jets. The Air Lift FEG undertook strategic airlift, tactical airlift, and mid-air refuelling. It did not operate rotary wing aircraft as these were the responsibility of the Army.

The 24 C-130E/Hs were very similar to RNZAF models. The Boeing 707s were long range transport aircraft. Three of them had been converted into aerial tankers.<sup>283</sup> The final major type operated by the Air Lift FEG was the DHC-4 Caribou. Some 21 provided short range tactical air lift. These were rough field specialists, capable of short take off and landing.<sup>284</sup> Their maximum payload was three tons or 32 equipped troops.

### *Training*

Alongside the operational FEGs the RAAF maintained a sizeable training contingent. This included PC-9 and CT-45 propeller trainers, Macchi jet trainers, and HS-748s for multi-engine and navigation training.

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<sup>281</sup> Grazebrook, 'ASW must be upgraded'. p.31

<sup>282</sup> La Franchi, 'Taking Harpoon into the 21st Century'.

<sup>283</sup> Gregor Ferguson, 'RAAF tanker force meets its first test', *Asia-Pacific Defence Reporter*, vol. XVIII, no. 5, November 1991. p.23

<sup>284</sup> Military Analysis Network, 'Caribou C-7A (De Havilland Canada)', [accessed 28 October 2004]. Available from [www.fas.org/man/dod-101/sys/ac/c-7.htm](http://www.fas.org/man/dod-101/sys/ac/c-7.htm).

## Doctrine, Training and Experience

In 1989, the RAAF Air Power Studies Centre was tasked with developing doctrine. The result was the first edition of the Air Power Manual, released in 1990.<sup>285</sup> It was a first attempt, and it did not always mesh with the various operational concepts of the other services.

Doctrinally, the RAAF saw itself as fulfilling an independent role, rather than merely providing support for the RAN and Army. It saw itself as the primary defender of the Sea Air Gap, through air defence and maritime strike. Little attention was paid to the enabling aspects of air power such as maritime patrol and air transport.

Basic training for aircrew was carried out on PC-9 and CT-45 aircraft. Jet pilots then graduated onto Macchi trainers, while multi-engine pilots embarked on a HS-748 course. Rotary wing crews were trained by the Army.

The RAAF was frequently involved in major training exercises with foreign powers, including strike and ASW exercises.<sup>286</sup> It was permanently engaged with the RNZAF at Nowra, and often exercised with FPDA countries and the US. F/A-18 pilots flew against US fighter pilots to enhance their air combat skills.<sup>287</sup> These exercises not only enhanced operational capability but were also useful from a foreign policy perspective.

Operational experience in the RAAF in 1991 was limited.

## The Air Force in Summary

The RAAF was probably the most capable of the three services in terms of capability. It operated some 158 combat aircraft, and its F-111s, F/A-18s and P-3Cs would have borne comparison with any equivalent types around the world. It maintained sufficient numbers to achieve critical mass in each capability. The RAAF's equipment was, compared to the other services, generally of higher quality and technology. Even its older aircraft were still capable platforms in 1991. It was particularly well suited, given its force structure, to fulfil the continental defence role given it by policy.

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<sup>285</sup> Horner, *Making the Australian Defence Force*. p.206

<sup>286</sup> Australian Department of Defence, *Report for 1991/1992*. p.79

<sup>287</sup> Australian Department of Defence, *Defence Report 1990/1991*. p.79

At least two of the types – the F-111s and F/A-18s – could have operated in a high threat environment without extreme risk. Despite the age of the former they were still a very potent asset, and provided the RAAF with a strategic strike capability missing from almost all other East Asian nations.<sup>288</sup>

Given the orientation of the ADF to continental defence, it is not surprising the RAAF lacked a major strategic lift capability. Its air lift fleet was eminently suited to continental defence, comprising rugged types capable of operations from the restricted facilities available in northern Australia.

Unlike the RNZAF, the RAAF in 1991 did not face the prospect of block obsolescence within a few years. In direct contrast to the situation in New Zealand, the RAAF was perhaps the most secure of the ADF's three services, a modern, potent force capable of combat operations up and down the spectrum.

## **The Capability of the ADF in 1991**

The ADF in 1991 was a general purpose force. Few units, except the SAS and some minor technical teams, were designated for particular tasks. There was a strong emphasis towards combat, rather than non-combat roles, and an increasing focus on geography.

Policy guidance was clear on what it asked of the ADF: largely, the continental Defence of Australia. Glimpses of an attempt to narrow the force towards the specific requirements of continental Defence of Australia could be seen, but only in their initial stages, and the force structure was more a legacy of earlier, broader policy than it was of the 1987 Defence White Paper. However, the mere existence of clear guidance enhanced the ADF's capability.

The ADF retained a substantial capability for even high intensity combat operations, although any contingent would have been limited in size. The doctrine of two of its arms, the RAN and RAAF, was focused on conventional combat operations; the Army was perhaps more focused on semi-conventional, low-level

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<sup>288</sup> Indeed one might say the 22 F-111s of the RAAF provided Australia with a superior conventional strike capability than that possessed by China at the time.

operations.<sup>289</sup> All of this stemmed from the guidance of DOA1987. Doctrine for other operations, however, was non-existent.

Much of the ADF's equipment was of good quality. There were few obsolescent types, especially in the RAAF. Personnel and training was of equivalent if not higher quality than equipment.

The ADF maintained a very restricted deployment capability, despite the fact that any operations except strict continental defence would have required air and sealift. This affected its ability to carry out any expeditionary operations.

The major shortcoming within the ADF was the sustainability of the Army. The largest unit that could have been deployed for a long period without having major repercussions on the total force was a reinforced battalion group; deployment and sustainment of a brigade would have required a call-up of reservists. In general terms, the ADF was limited by its small size in global terms.

Overall, the ADF managed to maintain a broad range of capabilities at a satisfactory level. Its possession of submarines and F-111s gave it an independent ability for strategic strike, something few middle powers, and indeed few larger powers in East Asia, possessed. It was a small force, but one that packed a considerable punch.

## **A Brief Comparison**

Some comparisons between the two forces at the time might be made, although indepth analysis is not the goal of this chapter.

Australia's defence force was larger, both in raw terms and per capita, than New Zealand's. Both maintained similarly sized armies, in comparison to the rest of their defence forces. The Australian Army, however, was more heavily armoured and mechanised, and had heavier weapons. Oddly, though, the New Zealand Army maintained more regular infantry battalions for its size than did the Australian.

The navies were proportionally similar in size. The RAN maintained several capabilities missing from the RNZN: submarines, guided missile destroyers, and guided missile frigates. Its sixteen major combatants, however, were only four times

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<sup>289</sup> This was not necessarily a mismatch with policy. The roles envisaged for the various services under policy were different; whereas the RAN and RAAF would fight a conventional, high intensity maritime war the Army would not.

the size of the RNZN's frigate fleet, showing that the RNZN maintained more combat units for its size than did the RAN. The RAN's patrol boat fleet, however, was much larger and more capable than the RNZN's. In the field of support vessels, Australia again maintained a broader range of capabilities.

Perhaps oddly, the RNZAF was proportionally larger than the RAAF, although only slightly. The RAAF, however, was qualitatively far superior, with better types and a broader range of aircraft.

Overall, the ADF had superior equipment to the NZDF. The NZDF was full of obsolescent types, heavily limited in their utility. Also, the ADF maintained a much broader range of platforms than the NZDF.

The two forces also differed markedly in their orientation. The ADF was a relatively strict tool of military security, whereas the NZDF was more a tool of broader foreign policy. This, perhaps, led into another, and interesting difference: the higher frequency of involvement of the NZDF on overseas operations compared to the ADF.

There were some similarities. Both were balanced, general purpose forces with high quality training and good personnel. Both had learnt to deal with fiscal parsimony, and feared future funding shortfalls. Both would have struggled to deploy and sustain the land force contingents planned by policy. And, perhaps most importantly, both were focused on conventional combat (if of different scope and intensity); non-traditional security threats were not regarded as important, either in policy, doctrine, training or equipment decisions.

The following chapters describe how defence policymakers have attempted, throughout the post-Cold War period, to adjust the defence forces mentioned above to better meet the demands of that new era. The first sets the scene, by examining the environment within which defence policy is made in Australia and New Zealand.

# Chapter Four – The Australian and New Zealand Defence Policy Environment: Description of System

## Introduction

The role of this chapter is to provide a foundation for further analysis of specific defence policy issues by identifying, comparing and contrasting the environments within which defence policy is made in Australia and New Zealand. It describes the framework within which policy is made, rather than the policy itself. No framework is entirely static, and this should be kept in mind when reading this chapter; the focus is the policy-making system as it has been in the post-Cold War era.<sup>1</sup> However, mention is made of historical issues where relevant.

Per Chapter One, this chapter is structured around the modified funnel framework. The policy environment is not simple or homogenous; it is made up of very different actors and organisations. Understanding this environment, and the contexts within which defence policy is made, is a fundamental prerequisite to understanding the policy that is developed. The first section, foundational issues, analyses and compares Australia and New Zealand in a broad range of characteristics, including geography, demography and economy. The work then moves onto a discussion of the military histories of the two states, their various security policies, and their major alliances.

The next section of the chapter describes the recent external environment as it affects the two states. The section examines, briefly, the different phases in the post-Cold War foreign policies of the two states. It then identifies a number of security issues that have arisen in the post-Cold War period and are directly relevant to the two states.

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<sup>1</sup> For stylistic reasons, the policy environment is generally described in the present tense. There have been minor changes in the system since the end of the Cold War, but they do not change the generally continuous roles of the main internal actors, at least. One work on the Australian system, which might be read for a slightly different focus, is Graeme Cheeseman, 'Defence decision making: processes and influences', in J. Mohan Malik (ed.), *Australia's Security in the 21st Century*. St Leonards, Allen & Unwin, 1999.

The latter part of the chapter, which is concerned with the domestic environment, is divided into three sub-sections. This describes the actors of level two and three of the modified funnel taxonomy.

The first sub-section is concerned with the actors that influence defence policy. This sub-section includes a brief survey of the attitudes towards defence of the major political parties in each state. It also touches on other actors of influence, including interest groups and non-governmental organisations. Their roles, expertise and general goals are briefly summarised. Concluding this sub-section is a short examination of the effect and attitudes of wider public opinion on defence policy.

The second sub-section examines policy-formulating and decision-making bodies. Firstly, it analyses the role of the legislature. Secondly, the roles of the armed services and the defence bureaucracies are examined, with the roles of various actors such as the Secretaries of Defence identified and analysed. Finally, the roles of politicians, notably of Ministers of Defence and Cabinet, are described and assessed.

The third sub-section examines the process of implementation. By and large this is carried out by the defence forces themselves.

The chapter concludes with a summary of the differences in the defence policy-making structures of the two states. In general, the two systems are relatively similar, but there are differences of complexity and emphasis.

## **Geography, Demography, Economy, and History**

The most basic influences on policy-making are the foundational characteristics of geography, economy, demography and history. They thus provide a convenient place to start an examination of the policy-making environment.

Australia and New Zealand are both South Pacific nations, yet share few other geographical or geological characteristics. Australia is a large island or small continent, whose long northern coast is very close to the island archipelagoes of South East Asia. New Zealand, on the other hand, comprises two small islands, and is smaller and more isolated. Her closest neighbours are Australia, Fiji and the Antarctic, and even they are some distance away.

Much of Australia, especially her central and northern regions, is arid, and large scale agriculture is largely limited to a narrow coastal band in the east and south.

New Zealand is more consistently fertile, has a greater percentage of forest cover, and is comparatively more rugged and more mountainous.

Australia is roughly five times larger than New Zealand in terms of population. Both countries have experienced similar population growth during the post-Cold War period.

Figure 4.1 – Post-Cold War Population Growth

	<i>Population 1991</i>	<i>Population 2004</i>	<i>Percentage Growth</i>
<b>Australia</b>	16850336 <sup>2</sup>	19913144 <sup>3</sup>	18%
<b>New Zealand</b>	3373926 <sup>4</sup>	3993817 <sup>5</sup>	18%

Economically, while both states are largely reliant on primary production, there are major differences. New Zealand is heavily dependent on agriculture, and while Australia also has a large agricultural sector, its mineral wealth gives it a more diversified economy. There are also differences in the total sizes of the two economies. From 1991 to 2003 Australia's Gross Domestic Product (GDP) grew from AUD 255.9 billion<sup>6</sup> to AUD 570.3 billion.<sup>7</sup> Over the same period New Zealand's GDP grew from NZD 40.2 billion to NZD 85.26 billion.<sup>8</sup> Economic disparity is thus greater than population disparity, and Australia is significantly wealthier on a per capita basis.

Figure 4.2– GDP Per Capita Comparison – Purchasing Power Parity

	<b>1991</b>	<b>2003</b>
Australia	15186	28639
New Zealand	11914	21348
Difference	3272	7291

<sup>2</sup> Australian Social Science Data Archive, [accessed 21 September 2004]. Available from <http://assda.anu.edu.au/census/>.

<sup>3</sup> Central Intelligence Agency, 'CIA Factbook - Australia', [accessed 21 September 2004]. Available from <http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/as.html>.

<sup>4</sup> Statistics New Zealand, *1991 New Zealand Census of Population and Dwellings*, Wellington, 1994.

<sup>5</sup> Central Intelligence Agency, 'CIA Factbook - New Zealand', [accessed 21 September 2004]. Available from <http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/nz.html>.

<sup>6</sup> Unknown Author, 'Economic Information - Australia', [accessed 21 September 2004]. Available from <http://www.theodora.com/wfb1991/australia/australia-economy.html>.

<sup>7</sup> Central Intelligence Agency, 'CIA Factbook - Australia', [accessed.]

<sup>8</sup> Central Intelligence Agency, 'CIA Factbook - New Zealand', [accessed; Unknown Author, 'Economic Information - New Zealand', [accessed 21 September 2004]. Available from <http://www.theodora.com/wfb1991/new-zealand/new-zealand-economy.html>.

Both states are reliant on foreign trade, as their domestic economies are not large enough to be self sufficient. Because neither possesses contiguous land borders with any other state, the vast majority of their trade goes by sea, with the remainder by air. This maritime reliance means that the security of the two states is bound up with the security of their sea lines of communication.

While Chapter Three has described the state of the two defence forces in 1991, it is convenient to look back even further when examining the foundational influences on defence policy.

The two states were founded in markedly different fashions. Australia was originally founded as a group of states, most of which were penal colonies.<sup>9</sup> The first white inhabitants struggled to survive in the harsh and often infertile terrain. By the 1850s, a particularly independent Australia (rather than colony-based) national attitude developed, partly as a result of common convict roots, partly as a result of the battle with nature to carve out living space. Also, a sense of insecurity or fear developed early, often directed at a perceived threat from Asia, as a result of a feeling of isolation from Great Britain and other friends.<sup>10</sup>

New Zealand, in contrast, was founded as a settler colony in fertile terrain. Life, while never easy during the formative period, was still less difficult than it was in Australia. The strong spirit of independence that flared in Australia did not do so in New Zealand. Nor was there the same sense of danger as in Australia, as there was not the same closeness to the Asian landmass.

The military histories of the two states are characterised more by convergence than divergence. Both have proved consistently willing to engage in wars around the globe, especially Britain's. Both states sent contingents to the Boer War, beginning a long tradition of close co-operation in military matters.<sup>11</sup> In World War One, the two sent large contributions, relative to their size, and fought together at Gallipoli.

Around the turn of the century, the two feared a naval attack from either Russia or Japan. In response, the two states built coastal fortifications, but neither

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<sup>9</sup> While there were large indigenous populations prior to the entry of colonists, these cannot be regarded as states.

<sup>10</sup> Graeme Cheeseman, 'Back to 'Forward Defence' and the Australian National Style', in Graeme Cheeseman and Robert Bruce (eds.), *Discourses of Danger and Dread Frontiers: Australian Defence and Security Thinking After the Cold War*. Canberra, Allen & Unwin, 1996. p.260-261

<sup>11</sup> Jeffrey Grey, *A Military History of Australia*. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1990. p.102-121

attempted to maintain a sizeable army for home defence. Instead they placed their trust in the Royal Navy, a concept known as Imperial Defence, and provided financial contributions for the building of warships for that force.<sup>12</sup>

After World War One, both states were loath to spend too much on defence. They continued to rely on Imperial Defence, particularly what was termed the Singapore Strategy.<sup>13</sup> The idea behind this was simple: in the case of Japanese aggression in the Pacific, the Royal Navy would send a sizeable naval reinforcement to the Singapore base, sufficient to deal with any Japanese advances.

Rhetorical adherence to the Singapore Strategy, despite very real doubts about its effectiveness,<sup>14</sup> provided an excuse not to spend funds on other defence capabilities.<sup>15</sup> If the two states could rely on the Royal Navy, then they did not need to develop forces optimised for home defence.<sup>16</sup> This meant their forces were allowed to slide into obsolescence during the interwar period. However, neither Australia nor New Zealand provided the funds required by the Singapore Strategy, and the base itself was unfinished when it fell in 1942.

With the outbreak of World War Two, both states contributed sizeable forces to the Allied cause. At first they fought together in North Africa, and in one notable incident New Zealand troops relieved the beleaguered Australians trapped in the fortress of Tobruk. However, with the entry of Japan into the war in 1941, the strategic situation changed markedly. Australia, being closer to South East Asia, feared invasion. With the fall of Singapore, it appeared that little lay between the north coast of Australia and the advancing Japanese spearheads. In response to this, the Australian government demanded the return of its forces from North Africa, and this was done, albeit begrudgingly by the British command, which wanted instead to retain the Australian division in the Mediterranean.

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<sup>12</sup> Ibid. p.77

<sup>13</sup> Ibid. p.138-139

<sup>14</sup> John McCarthy, *Australia and Imperial Defence 1918-1939: A Study in Air and Sea Power*. St Lucia, University of Queensland Press, 1976. p.142-147

<sup>15</sup> David McCraw, 'The Zenith of Realism in New Zealand's Foreign Policy', *The Australian Journal of Politics and History*, vol. 48, no. 3, September 2002. and McCarthy, *Australia and Imperial Defence 1918-1939: A Study in Air and Sea Power*. p.21,42,136

<sup>16</sup> McCarthy, *Australia and Imperial Defence 1918-1939: A Study in Air and Sea Power*. p.54 and Grey, *A Military History of Australia*. p.125-130 and Graeme Cheeseman, *The Search for Self-Reliance: Australian Defence Since Vietnam*. Melbourne, Longman Cheshire, 1993. p.xv

New Zealand, on the other hand, and at the urging of Winston Churchill, maintained its division in North Africa.<sup>17</sup> It was felt that New Zealand was hardly vulnerable to invasion, and that the war would be won or lost in Europe. Thus, withdrawing forces for home defence would be counter-productive in the long term; the division could do more good for New Zealand if it stayed in Europe.

During the latter part of the war, both Australia and New Zealand were closely involved with the United States. The United States played the major role in the Pacific War, American troops trained and rested in Australia and New Zealand, and the American theatre commander based himself for a period in Australia.

When the Second World War ended in 1945, both Australia and New Zealand provided occupying forces in Japan, which stayed until 1948.<sup>18</sup> From 1950 to 1953, the two countries provided combat contingents to the Korean War.

The failure of the Singapore Strategy in 1942, and the major role played by the United States in the Pacific War, resulted in a major reconsideration of the two states' external security relations in the immediate post-WW2 era. In 1952 the Australia-New Zealand-United States (ANZUS) treaty was signed, and was perhaps the greatest shift in the focus of the two states' security stances since their foundations.<sup>19</sup>

With ANZUS, the United States became the primary ally of Australia and New Zealand. This heralded the end of Imperial Defence; the United Kingdom was no longer the pre-eminent ally, and Australia and New Zealand now looked to the east, across the Pacific. Australia was keener on the treaty than was New Zealand; the "Lucky Country" retained a strong sense of vulnerability relating both to its foundational experiences as an isolated outpost and also to more recent history, when it had come under direct attack during World War Two.<sup>20</sup>

During the 1950s and 1960s, Australia's security strategy was that of forward defence. This involved deploying Australian troops to South East Asia to support allied operations (Malaya and Vietnam),<sup>21</sup> and was based on the belief that such close

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<sup>17</sup> This was the only real division in the New Zealand Army. While 3 NZ Division was maintained in the South Pacific it was hardly a combat capable formation.

<sup>18</sup> <http://riv.co.nz/jf/forming.htm> accessed 1 August 2005

<sup>19</sup> William Tow and Henry Albinski, 'ANZUS: Alive and Well after Fifty Years', *The Australian Journal of Politics and History*, vol. 48, no. 2, June 2002.

<sup>20</sup> Rawdon Dalrymple, *Continental Drift: Australia's Search for a Regional Identity*. Aldershot, Ashgate, 2003. p.5-6 and Cheeseman, 'Back to 'Forward Defence' and the Australian National Style'. p.260-261

<sup>21</sup> Grey, *A Military History of Australia*. p.243

co-operation with allies was the best guarantee of Australia's security.<sup>22</sup> New Zealand also followed a policy of forward defence and maintained a military best suited to co-operation with allies rather than specifically New Zealand-based tasks.<sup>23</sup>

In 1971, the two joined the Five Powers Defence Agreement (FPDA) with the United Kingdom, Malaysia, and Singapore.<sup>24</sup> This was not a formal treaty, but rather a mechanism for enhancing co-ordination.

Soon after the end of the Vietnam War, two international events had major effects on the security stances of the two states.<sup>25</sup> Firstly, the United States announced its Guam doctrine, under which it stated that it would not again directly intervene in East Asia.<sup>26</sup> Secondly, the United Kingdom announced its "East of Suez" policy, and began the process of withdrawing its forces from east of that line.

These two events reduced the security umbrella under which Australia and New Zealand had sheltered since the end of World War Two.<sup>27</sup> Australia responded by shifting its policy from regional involvement and forward defence towards the direct defence of Australia.<sup>28</sup> This in turn required the procurement of new equipment, optimised for homeland defence.<sup>29</sup> Similar moves happened in New Zealand, where the election of a Labour government in 1972 triggered a brief shift away from alliance commitments and towards self-reliance.<sup>30</sup>

At the end of the 1970s, however, largely as a result of the Soviet Union's intervention in Afghanistan, and the resultant end of Cold War détente, Australia switched back to regional involvement.<sup>31</sup> New Zealand was more cautious, and its

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<sup>22</sup> Ross Babbage, 'Australian Defence Strategies', in Desmond Ball and Cathy Downes (eds.), *Security and Defence: Pacific and global perspectives*. Sydney, Allen & Unwin, 1990.

<sup>23</sup> Richard Kennaway, 'Foreign Policy in a Vacuum', *New Zealand International Review*, vol. 25, no. 6, November 2000.

<sup>24</sup> Richard Kennaway, 'Foreign Policy in a Vacuum #2', *New Zealand International Review*, vol. 26, no. 1, January 2001.

<sup>25</sup> Eric Andrews, *The Department of Defence*. South Melbourne, Oxford University Press, 2001. p.189

<sup>26</sup> Stewart Woodman, *A Question of Priorities: Australian and New Zealand Security Planning in the 1990s*, Working Paper 260, Canberra: ANU Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, 1992. p.5

<sup>27</sup> Dora Alves, 'The Changing New Zealand Defence Posture', *Asian Survey*, vol. 29, no. 4, April 1989. p.365 mentions the impact on New Zealand.

<sup>28</sup> Cheeseman, *The Search for Self-Reliance: Australian Defence Since Vietnam*. p.5-8 and David Lee, 'Australia's defence policy: a historical overview', in J. Mohan Malik (ed.), *Australia's Security in the 21st Century*. St Leonards, Allen & Unwin, 1999. p.26-27

<sup>29</sup> Allan Hawke, 'Money Matters', Royal United Services Institute, Victoria, 27 April 2000. p.4

<sup>30</sup> David McCraw, 'New Zealand's Foreign Policy under National and Labour Governments: Variations on the "Small State" Theme', *Pacific Affairs*, vol. 67, no. 1, Spring 1994.

<sup>31</sup> Cheeseman, *The Search for Self-Reliance: Australian Defence Since Vietnam*. p.10-11

1983 Defence Review was more heavily focused on the South Pacific than previous defence policy.<sup>32</sup>

The mid 1980s were a time of complexity for defence policy in both states. An important factor in this was turmoil in the ANZUS relationship. In 1984, New Zealand refused to allow a US warship into port, as part of a greater anti-nuclear movement. In response, the United States withdrew its security guarantee to New Zealand. This broke up the trilateral security apparatus, and partly as a result of this, both Australia and New Zealand instituted major rethinks of defence policy.

At the time, Australia's defence policy was already regarded by some as unclear and incoherent.<sup>33</sup> It wavered between forward and continental defence; the oscillations of the 1970s had not been damped down, nor had a new and clear course been set. The civilian bureaucracy and uniformed headquarters would not agree about basic priorities.<sup>34</sup> There was a feeling that there was a need for reconsideration of Australia's particular defence needs, especially as the relative simplicities of ANZUS were fast disappearing.

Eventually, it was decided by the Australian government that a reassessment needed to be done. They hired an external academic, Paul Dibb, to do so, and in 1986 the Dibb Review was published. The review recommended that Australia focus its defence policy on continental defence, because it lacked the resources to do otherwise.<sup>35</sup> Primarily, continental defence (also known as "Defence of Australia") would be achieved by air and sea forces protecting the Sea Air Gap to the north of Australia. The Review also suggested the army be re-oriented towards low-level warfare and the defeat of incursions and raids.<sup>36</sup> Because of its self-reliant theme, portending the possibility of an Australia free of alliance requirements, some have claimed that the Dibb Review "liberated Australian foreign policy."<sup>37</sup>

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<sup>32</sup> Alves, 'The Changing New Zealand Defence Posture'. p.365

<sup>33</sup> Ray Sunderland, *Problems in Australian Defence Planning*, Canberra Papers on Strategy and Defence No.36, Canberra: ANU Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, 1986.

<sup>34</sup> R.J. Worswick, 'New Strategy for New Times', *Australian Army Journal (Land Warfare Studies Centre)*, vol. 1, no. 2, December 2003. p.149

<sup>35</sup> Cheeseman, *The Search for Self-Reliance: Australian Defence Since Vietnam*. p.13

<sup>36</sup> Albert Palozzo, *The Australian Army: A History of its Organisation 1901-2001*. Melbourne, 2001. p.336

<sup>37</sup> Gary Smith, Dave Cox, and Scott Burchill, *Australia in the World: An Introduction to Australian Foreign Policy*. Melbourne, Oxford University Press, 1996. p.76

In 1987 an official Defence White Paper was published, which took into account many of Dobb's recommendations.<sup>38</sup> This White Paper was seen by some as the first to take the issues of Australian defence seriously, rather than subordinate them to external relations.<sup>39</sup> There was some criticism that its emphasis on high technology took resources away from other, lower-level tasks such as patrolling the exclusive economic zone and preventing illegal immigration.<sup>40</sup>

While the concept of Defence of Australia was prominent in Australia's 1987 White Paper, there were still indications in it that Australia would play a regional role.<sup>41</sup> In 1989, the Australian foreign minister stated that regional security was still regarded as the primary focus of the ADF.<sup>42</sup>

New Zealand published its own Defence White Paper in 1987. There was some similarity with the Dobb Review, in that the aim was to identify exactly what New Zealand needed in order to defend itself, free of alliance considerations.<sup>43</sup> The review's findings were that New Zealand should shift its defence focus to the South Pacific, and also attempt to become more self-reliant in defence, partly as a result of the breakdown of the ANZUS relationship.<sup>44</sup>

In 1991, the two countries established an informal arrangement called Closer Defence Relations (CDR),<sup>45</sup> partially motivated by a desire to make up for the suspension of New Zealand's ANZUS ties.

Thus, by the end of the Cold War both states' formal defence policies were focused, at least rhetorically, on self-reliance. However, the two were going about achieving such self-reliance in different ways. Australia, building on the Dobb Review, was focused on developing a high technology defence force that could dominate the Sea Air Gap to the north of the country. New Zealand, on the other hand, faced with no obvious threat, had no such major focus and was instead undergoing only incremental change suited to an increased role in the South Pacific.

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<sup>38</sup> Australian Department of Defence, *The Defence of Australia*, Canberra, March 1987. See Chapter Three for further examination of this document.

<sup>39</sup> Smith, Cox, and Burchill, *Australia in the World: An Introduction to Australian Foreign Policy*. p.142

<sup>40</sup> Ibid. p.143

<sup>41</sup> Australian Department of Defence, *The Defence of Australia*. p.2-8

<sup>42</sup> Cheeseman, *The Search for Self-Reliance: Australian Defence Since Vietnam*. p.19

<sup>43</sup> Woodman, *A Question of Priorities: Australian and New Zealand Security Planning in the 1990s*. p.9

<sup>44</sup> Kennaway, 'Foreign Policy in a Vacuum #2'.

<sup>45</sup> Athol Forrest, *Recent Developments in Australia-New Zealand: Closer Defence Relations*, Canberra: Australian Defence Studies Centre, 1996. provides a useful, early look at this relationship.

For the greater parts of their histories, Australia and New Zealand possessed similar defence policies, with a focus on alliances and only a recent shift towards defence independence. Both willingly contributed military forces to a multitude of international operations. But, whereas Australia consistently viewed its situation as vulnerable,<sup>46</sup> New Zealand often perceived its situation as benign.<sup>47</sup>

## The Post-Cold War External Environment

The role of this section is to describe and briefly analyse the external environment of the post-Cold War world as it relates to the two states.<sup>48</sup> First, it summarises the phases the two states' foreign policies have passed through. Second, it briefly inventories a range of international events and issues that have had, or continue to have, security implications for the two states; more information on the specific impact of particular events on defence policy is given in later chapters.

External events are a vital aspect of defence policy. After all, it is the external rather than the internal environment to which defence forces are oriented in most democracies.<sup>49</sup> Also, in the case of New Zealand in particular, the absence of a specific threat means that at times there is a tendency to treat the defence forces as merely extensions of other foreign policy apparatuses;<sup>50</sup> thus to understand defence policy we must first understand foreign policy, or, at the least, note some of its major features.

One might borrow from Robert Muldoon, and even extend him, to state that for Australia and New Zealand, foreign policy in the post-Cold War world has been trade.<sup>51</sup> While that is an exaggeration, it contains a sizeable kernel of truth. The focus of both nations' foreign policy apparatuses has been consistently on economic

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<sup>46</sup> Michael Evans, *The Tyranny of Dissonance: Australia's Strategic Culture and Way of War 1901-2005*, Study Paper 306, Canberra: Land Warfare Study Centre, February 2005. speaks about the dominance of geography in Australian strategic thinking.

<sup>47</sup> Richard Nottage, 'New Zealand's Foreign and Trade Policy: Past and Present', *New Zealand International Review*, vol. 22, no. 1, January-February 1997.; Kennaway, 'Foreign Policy in a Vacuum' and Kennaway, 'Foreign Policy in a Vacuum #2'.

<sup>48</sup> This section is thus less broadly thematic than was Chapter Two; its focus is "external events with a direct and measurable influence on Australia and New Zealand".

<sup>49</sup> One would be hard pressed to find a single democracy in which the primary role of the defence force is the defeat of internal tumult.

<sup>50</sup> Gerald Hensley, 'The Relationship between Defence and Foreign Policy', in Trotter (ed.), *Fifty Years of New Zealand Foreign Policy*. Dunedin, University of Otago Press, 1993. p.136-137,144

<sup>51</sup> Colin James, 'A hack at foreign affairs', 15 October 2003, [accessed 1 August 2005]. Available from [http://www.synopsis.co.nz/speeches\\_briefings/Inst\\_Int\\_Affairs\\_03Oct15.htm](http://www.synopsis.co.nz/speeches_briefings/Inst_Int_Affairs_03Oct15.htm).

matters. Both have been continually engaged in the negotiation of multilateral and bilateral trade agreements. Other foreign policy initiatives, such as disarmament and the environment, have been of secondary importance.

One can distinguish two major phases of foreign policy in each country in the period in question, which in turn correspond roughly with the particular governments in power. During the first period in Australia, roughly from 1991 to 1996, great effort was made towards engagement with Asia by the then-Labor Government, especially under the leadership of Paul Keating.<sup>52</sup> There was also a focus on multilateral organisations, involvement with the United Nations, and environmental issues; during this period Australia was seen as leading the way in several areas of “good international citizenship”.

The election of 1996 resulted in a major victory for the Coalition; the very size of their majority indicated they had a mandate for major change in every area of government.<sup>53</sup> In foreign policy, this change has encompassed a move away from idealism towards realism. Less emphasis has been placed on the United Nations and other multilateral organisations. There have been shifts in environmental and trade policy, with a change in focus in the latter away from the World Trade Organisation and towards bilateral agreements, especially with the United States; indeed increasing links with the United States are perhaps the single most important theme of the post-1996 period.<sup>54</sup>

Similarly, New Zealand’s foreign policy in the post-Cold War period can be divided into two phases, with a dividing point at 1999. During the first period, from 1991 to 1999, a National government, albeit in Coalition from 1996, carried out what might be termed a pragmatic idealist foreign policy, with attention on United Nations issues, environmental concerns, and multilateral trade. During this period New Zealand served on the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) and provided forces for a variety of peacekeeping operations.<sup>55</sup>

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<sup>52</sup> Maryanne Kelton and Richard Leaver, 'Issues in Australian Foreign Policy', *The Australian Journal of Politics and History*, vol. 45, no. 4, December 1999. and Dalrymple, *Continental Drift: Australia's Search for a Regional Identity*. p.97-116

<sup>53</sup> Keith Suter, 'The 1996 Australian Federal Election', *Contemporary Review*, vol. 268, no. 1568, June 1996.

<sup>54</sup> Interview with Australian Defence Commentator A, 28 November 2005.

<sup>55</sup> Zhivan Alach, 'Peace Support Operations: International Evolution and New Zealand Adaptation', MA, University of Auckland, 2002. Chapter Four.

Since 1999, the Labour-led coalition government has intensified the idealist aspects of New Zealand's foreign policy. There has been increasing rhetoric about the importance of human rights in international affairs, and occasional criticisms of the actions of some ostensible allies. Issues of traditional military security have been regarded as proportionally less important. Trade policy, however, has changed very little. Indeed, when one compares the differences between National and Labour foreign policy, one is struck by the vast degree of convergence. Thus the two phases of New Zealand foreign policy during this period are more similar to each other than are the respective phases in Australia.

During the post-Cold War period, a variety of international issues with direct effects on Australia and New Zealand's security have arisen. While they differ in their impact and intensity, they all exert some influence over foreign and thus defence policy. Some had historical effects only; some retain influence.

Terrorism has become perhaps the most important security issue of the period.<sup>56</sup> In 2001, when the airliners struck the World Trade Centre, Australian Prime Minister John Howard was already in Washington.<sup>57</sup> He was swift to announce his support for the United States. Soon after, Australians were directly targeted in the Bali bombing, and since then there has been a distinct sense of vulnerability in Australia about terrorism.<sup>58</sup> In New Zealand, the impact of September 11 has been much less.

The Asian financial crisis of 1998 was perhaps the second most influential event of the period.<sup>59</sup> This had a major effect on Australia's links with the region,

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<sup>56</sup> See Chapter Two for more detail on this subject. The impact of terrorism on the thinking of Australian defence thinking can be seen in the following: Peter Abigail, 'Preparing the Australian Army for 21st century conflict: problems and perspectives', in Michael Evans, Alan Ryan, and Russell Parkin (eds.), *Future Armies, Future Challengers: Land warfare in the information age*. Crows Nest, Allen & Unwin, 2004; John Armstrong, 'Defence - plugging the gaps', *New Zealand Herald*, 4 December 2002; Paul Dibb, *The War on Terror and Air Combat Power: A Word of Warning for Defence Planners*, Working Paper 369, Canberra: ANU Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, June 2002; Michael Evans, 'Appointment in Samarra: Western strategic thought and the culture of risk', in Michael Evans, Alan Ryan, and Russell Parkin (eds.), *Future Armies, Future Challengers: Land warfare in the information age*. Crows Nest, Allen & Unwin, 2004; Robert Hill, 'S11: Its Implications for Australia and the Defence White Paper', *Defender*, vol. XIX, no. 2, Winter 2002; John Howard, *The Prime Minister Speaks On National Security (Speech at Sydney 18 June 2004)*, ASPI Strategic Insights 7, Canberra: Australian Strategic Policy Institute, July 2004; Paul Monk, 'Australia's strategic policy and force structure: The emerging paradigm shift', *Australian Review of Public Affairs*, vol. Digest, 23 May 2005; Mark Thomson, *The Cost of Defence - ASPI Defence Budget Brief 2002-2003*, Canberra: Australian Strategic Policy Institute, May 2002.

<sup>57</sup> Allan Hawke, *Lecture to Politics 241*, Auckland: University of Auckland, 29 September 2004.

<sup>58</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>59</sup> Paul Dibb, *The Remaking of Asia's Geopolitics*, Working Paper 324, Canberra: ANU Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, 1998. p.1 sees it as one of the 3 most dramatic events of recent years.

generally worsening relations due to a variety of factors.<sup>60</sup> In comparison, the crisis had little impact on New Zealand, bar indicating the fragility of certain export markets.

A third event of importance was the end of the Suharto regime in Indonesia in 1998. Since Suharto's departure, Indonesia has been increasingly internally unstable, from East Timor through to Aceh and other regions. Suharto's departure has had largely indirect effects on New Zealand and Australia, except in the case of East Timor.

A fourth issue, South East Asian arms spending, was important in the early-mid 1990s, as certain countries modernised obsolescent forces, purchasing advanced fighters and warships.<sup>61</sup> This had an impact on Australian perceptions, but less so on New Zealand, which did not fear a direct threat from the region.

A fifth issue is increasing South Pacific instability. For a long period, the South Pacific was the most stable part of the world, but since 1987 there have been civil disturbances across the region. Given the parlous economic states of many of these nations, this instability is likely to continue. This is especially important to New Zealand, due to its large Pacific Island population, but also important to Australia, which fears instability in the neighbourhood.

A sixth issue of the post-Cold War world is nuclear proliferation in South Asia. Both India and Pakistan have tested and deployed new nuclear weapons. While this has few direct effects on Australia and New Zealand, it is indicative of a growing trend towards uncertainty and instability in the greater Asian region.

A final issue, and one that is perhaps a result of several of the others mentioned above, is that of increased refugee flows. The Asian financial crisis, subsequent poverty, and general regional instability have led to more and more refugees and economic migrants attempting to reach Australia and New Zealand in recent years. These unwanted intruders are a direct security risk, especially in regards to bio-security and terrorism, and their arrivals have proven to be an issue of some political controversy.

In summary, the post-Cold War security environment has not been particularly benign in East Asia and the South Pacific, the regions of most concern to Australia and New Zealand. A variety of issues have arisen that portend the possibility of direct

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<sup>60</sup> Dalrymple, *Continental Drift: Australia's Search for a Regional Identity*. p.97-116

<sup>61</sup> Greg Ansley, 'Arms bazaar', *New Zealand Herald*, 14 November 1992.

and indirect security threats. The Asia-Pacific, once one of the more stable and peaceful areas of the world, has become one of the more dangerous. At least one analyst believes that, except for the Middle East, the Asia-Pacific is now the most volatile region in the world, and thus the most at risk from war.<sup>62</sup>

While the external context is vital in the development of defence policy, changes to defence policy do not develop spontaneously to changes in the strategic environment; they are the product of conscious decisions by various actors. The following section examines those actors.

## **The Domestic Environment – Policy-Influential Bodies**

Utilising the framework mentioned in Chapter One, this section summarises the various policy-influential bodies in the two countries. These can be divided into firstly political parties, and secondly interest groups and public opinion. Each of these groupings is the subject of a following sub-section. First of all, however, the primary domestic constraint and influence – affordability – is examined.

### **Affordability**

A vital precursor to the creation of policy is of course the availability of the requisite resources. The budgetary process plays a direct role in policy-making, as financial limitations place constraints on the range of possible policies.

Governments cannot introduce new major spending programmes, which defence often involves, if their financial resources are already engaged in existent commitments.<sup>63</sup> Financial constraints are not easily swept aside, even if there is a change of government.<sup>64</sup> Thus, affordability is of constant concern to defence policy-makers in both nations.

Both Australia and New Zealand maintain a large range of domestic spending programmes, and must balance the needs of defence against these other, important priorities. Historically, defence has come off second best, as neither country has proven willing to provide a large amount of money for defence matters, even in times

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<sup>62</sup> Hawke, *Lecture to Politics* 241.

<sup>63</sup> Hyam Gold, 'The Social and Economic Setting', in Hyam Gold (ed.), *New Zealand Politics in Perspective*. Auckland, Longman Paul, 1992. p.9

<sup>64</sup> *Ibid.* p.12

of imminent danger such as the periods leading up to the First and Second World Wars.<sup>65</sup>

However, even though affordability is vital, occasionally policy is contemplated that is unaffordable. It is one of the persistent features of the political process that initiatives are agreed upon without sufficient resources being allocated for their success.<sup>66</sup> Later chapters note several incidents of this type, especially in New Zealand, where approved defence programmes were later found to be beyond financial limits.

This generally low level of funding acts as a major constraint on policy. It thus has a direct effect on defence policy formulation, although of course certain actors in the system can, and have, legitimated increases in funding.

## Political Parties & Elections

Within both the Australian and the New Zealand political systems, parties are the dominant actors.<sup>67</sup> In general, both countries have a political tradition of highly cohesive parties with a strong tendency to stick to stated policy.<sup>68</sup> Often, due to this cohesiveness and the structures of Parliament in the two nations, it is in the internal caucuses of the parties where real debate is carried out, rather than on the floor of Parliament.<sup>69</sup>

In relation to defence policy, parties have a limited direct role, and their primary role is influencing the opinions of those who have, or will later gain, a direct role over defence policy, such as the Minister of Defence.<sup>70</sup> The influence of parties on governmental policy depends, of course, on their electoral success. Later chapters will show the effect of elections and changes of government on defence policy.

A common technique of categorising political parties is to place them on a spectrum, usually economic. The same technique can be used in regards to defence

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<sup>65</sup> Grey, *A Military History of Australia.*, Andrews, *The Department of Defence.*, Michael O'Connor, 'Looking back for a change', *Defender*, vol. XX, no. 1, Autumn 2003., James Rolfe, *The Armed Forces of New Zealand*. St Leonards, Allen & Unwin, 1999; James Rolfe, *Defending New Zealand: A Study of Structures, Processes and Relationships*. Wellington, Institute of Policy Studies, 1993. should be read for further historical perspective on funding.

<sup>66</sup> Larry Gerson, *Public Policy Making: Processes and Principles*. New York, M.E.Sharpe, 2004. p.111

<sup>67</sup> Owen Hughes, *Australian Politics*. 3rd ed. South Yarra, Macmillan Education, 1998. p.108

<sup>68</sup> Keith Jackson, *The Dilemma of Parliament*. Wellington, Allen & Unwin, 1987. p.46,68

<sup>69</sup> *Ibid.* p.68

<sup>70</sup> Cheeseman, 'Defence decision making: processes and influences'.

policy, ranging from those parties opposed to military defence to those that support strong militaries. While a simplification, it is a useful tool.

In New Zealand, the most anti-defence political party is the Green Party. Their defence policy is in accordance with their general philosophy, which is pacifist and idealist. They have supported major reductions in defence spending and a shift towards a specialised peacekeeping force.<sup>71</sup>

The next party along the defence spectrum is the Alliance/Progressive Coalition. As with the Greens, they have supported a focus on peacekeeping and civil roles.<sup>72</sup> However they have not extolled such radical reductions in funding, nor the abolition of most combat capabilities.

Labour fills the next spot in the defence spectrum. They have supported the rationalisation of defence capabilities, and an increased focus on peacekeeping.<sup>73</sup> They have also focused on the social benefits of armed forces, and supported increases in wage rates for personnel. They have supported an army-focused defence force, in which the other services act as support.<sup>74</sup> Notably, despite occasional accusations to the contrary, Labour has not espoused a reduction in defence spending.

One runs into difficulties when attempting to categorise the next two parties in the defence spectrum, National and ACT. The reason is ACT's recent shift in attitude towards defence; while ACT is described first a valid argument could be put forward for either party being slightly more pro-defence than the other.

In 1999, ACT's defence policy was in agreement with the Defence Beyond 2000 report, which suggested a more narrowly focused defence force, rather than one in which New Zealand maintained a broad range of capabilities.<sup>75</sup> However, their policy has shifted since then to support a more expensive and ambitious defence

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<sup>71</sup> Keith Locke, 'Foreign Policy Starts with a Global Vision', in Rouben Azizian and Malcolm McNamara (eds.), *New Zealand Foreign and Defence Policy at the End of the 20th Century: Views of Political Parties*. Wellington, Centre for Strategic Studies, 1999. p.28

<sup>72</sup> Matt Robson, 'Human Rights - At the Centre of Foreign Policy', in Rouben Azizian and Malcolm McNamara (eds.), *New Zealand Foreign and Defence Policy at the End of the 20th Century: Views of Political Parties*. Wellington, Centre for Strategic Studies, 1999. p.23-25

<sup>73</sup> Phil Goff, 'Preventing Aggression and Upholding International Law', in Rouben Azizian and Malcolm McNamara (eds.), *New Zealand Foreign and Defence Policy at the End of the 20th Century: Views of Political Parties*. Wellington, Centre for Strategic Studies, 1999. p.12

<sup>74</sup> Labour Party of New Zealand, 'Defence Policy 2002', [accessed 21 September 2004]. Available from <http://www.labour.org.nz>.

<sup>75</sup> Derek Quigley, 'Pragmatic Basis for Security Relationships', in Rouben Azizian and Malcolm McNamara (eds.), *New Zealand Foreign and Defence Policy at the End of the 20th Century: Views of Political Parties*. Wellington, Centre for Strategic Studies, 1999. p.19

force.<sup>76</sup> They desire the return of the air strike capability lost in 2001. They also wish to renew ties with traditional allies, and believe that New Zealand has recently developed a “dangerous and isolationist strategy”. Oddly, despite their economically liberal philosophy and opposition to government spending, they espouse an increase in defence funding.

National has historically been pro-alliance and relatively pro-defence. Its 1999 defence policy, released in the wake of the somewhat revolutionary *Defence Beyond 2000* report, espoused a traditionalist view. It supported a balanced defence force, rather than focus on the army.<sup>77</sup> It regarded three frigates as the bare minimum for the navy, and stated that the retention of the Air Combat Force was vital for alliance relationships.<sup>78</sup> During the 2005 election, however, National’s defence policy was markedly undefined.

Probably the most pro-defence of all New Zealand’s major political parties is New Zealand First, a traditional conservative party. Their defence spokesman, Ron Mark, is a retired serviceman, and has been notably vocal in regards to defence issues. They have supported increases in funding, a radical restructuring of the force on a “Marine” model, and the restoration of some lost capabilities.<sup>79</sup>

The Australian party environment is less complex than New Zealand’s,<sup>80</sup> especially in regards to defence. There are only four parties that have major political influence: the Australian Greens, the Australian Labor Party, the Coalition, and the Australian Democrats.

The Australian Greens are the most anti-defence of the major parties. Their current defence policy is strongly idealist. They wish the ADF to be oriented towards peacekeeping, and, notably, wish to enhance the practice of such operations.<sup>81</sup> The

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<sup>76</sup> ACT New Zealand, 'Summary: Defence', 14 June 2002 [accessed 21 September 2004]. Available from <http://www.act.org.nz/item.jsp?id=22624>.

<sup>77</sup> Wayne Mapp, 'Dealing with the Consequence of Victory in the Cold War', in Rouben Azizian and Malcolm McNamara (eds.), *New Zealand Foreign and Defence Policy at the End of the 20th Century: Views of Political Parties*. Wellington, Centre for Strategic Studies, 1999. p.10

<sup>78</sup> Ibid. p.11

<sup>79</sup> Ron Mark, 'Inclusive Approach to Foreign and Defence Policy', in Rouben Azizian and Malcolm McNamara (eds.), *New Zealand Foreign and Defence Policy at the End of the 20th Century: Views of Political Parties*. Wellington, Centre for Strategic Studies, 1999. p.33 and New Zealand First, 'Defence', [accessed 21 September 2004]. Available from <http://www.nzfirst.org.nz/policies/defence.php>.

<sup>80</sup> In that there are fewer parties, although the internal dynamics of Australian parties are more complex than their New Zealand counterparts.

<sup>81</sup> Australian Greens, 'Policies: Peace and Security', [accessed 21 September 2004]. Available from <http://www.greens.org.au/policies/internationalissue/peaceandsecurity>.

Australian Greens also wish to see constitutional change so that Parliamentary approval is required for overseas deployment of military forces.

The Australian Democrat Party is next along the defence spectrum. As with the Greens, they believe in constitutional change, and that Parliament should have responsibility for any Australian military deployments.<sup>82</sup> They are also quite idealist, preferring intervention only when sanctioned by the UN. Their defence policy also places priority on the defence of Australia from attack. Their influence over government is limited as they have only a small number of seats.

The Australian Labor Party (ALP) has traditionally been wary of alliance entanglements and more oriented towards defence self-reliance. It was the party that moved Australia towards self-reliance in the early 1970s and mid 1980s. The ALP retains this distaste for alliance ties, and was notably critical of Australia's involvement in Iraq.<sup>83</sup> The ALP's stated defence policy, however, is relatively conservative. Its only major policy initiative in this area is the promotion of a separate coastguard for protection of the EEZ.<sup>84</sup>

Last of the major Australian political parties is the Liberal-National Coalition. While the two are formally separate, they have worked so closely for so long that they are functionally a single party.<sup>85</sup> Historically, the Coalition has been supportive of forward defence, regional engagement and alliance ties. This has continued in the post-Cold War period, and the Coalition's current policy is oriented towards high-technology, high-capability forces capable of not merely low-intensity tasks but also major, high-intensity alliance operations.

Thus, in summary, the party-political environment in both states spans a broad range of perspectives on defence. What is notable is that while highly pacifist parties occupy positions in Parliament in both states, there is no equivalently militaristic party in either.

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<sup>82</sup> Australian Democrats, 'Defence and Security', [accessed 21 September 2004]. Available from <http://campaign.democrats.org.au/issuedetail.asp?id=8>.

<sup>83</sup> Hawke, *Lecture to Politics* 241.

<sup>84</sup> Australian Labor Party, 'Labor's Maritime Security Strategy - An Australian Coastguard', [accessed 21 September 2004]. Available from <http://www.alp.org.au/policy/nationalsecurity/coastguard.php>.

<sup>85</sup> Hughes, *Australian Politics*. p.136

## Interest Groups & Public Opinion

A second set of policy-influential actors consists of interest groups and public opinion. By and large, however, the impact of the public on politics in either country is relatively restricted, except at election time; politics is not an issue that attracts a great amount of passion and excitement.<sup>86</sup>

One can start by summarising the defence-oriented interest groups in the two countries. New Zealand possesses several such organisations. There are analytical thinktanks, such as the Centre for Strategic Studies.<sup>87</sup> The Military Studies Institute, associated with Massey University, also analyses some issues of contemporary relevance.<sup>88</sup> The Returned Services Association is occasionally involved in the defence debate, and espouses a stronger NZDF and protection from external threats.<sup>89</sup> They have recently taken the step of publishing their own alternative White Paper, *Defending New Zealand*.<sup>90</sup> Occasionally, single issue groups have coalesced, such as “Save Our Skyhawks”, which was formed when the decision to axe the Air Combat Wing was announced.<sup>91</sup> Sometimes even more informal groupings, such as the group of retired generals who criticised policy in 2001, arise.<sup>92</sup> During the post-Cold War period, the influence of interest groups on New Zealand’s defence policy has been minimal.

A wide range of defence-oriented interest groups exist in Australia, and the following is an indicative rather than exhaustive list.<sup>93</sup> In the academic arena, both the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre (SDSC) at the Australian National University

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<sup>86</sup> Suter, 'The 1996 Australian Federal Election'. and Richard Mulgan, *Politics in New Zealand*. Auckland, Auckland University Press, 2004.

<sup>87</sup> Centre for Strategic Studies, 'Welcome to the Centre for Strategic Studies', [accessed 24 May 2006]. Available from <http://www.vuw.ac.nz/css/>.

<sup>88</sup> Massey University, 'The Centre for Defence Studies', [accessed 24 May 2006]. Available from <http://defence.massey.ac.nz/>.

<sup>89</sup> Royal New Zealand Returned Services Association, 'The Royal New Zealand Returned Services Association,' [accessed 24 May 2006]. Available from <http://www.rsa.org.nz/>.

<sup>90</sup> Royal New Zealand Returned Services Association, *Defending New Zealand: A statement by the RNZRSA*, Wellington, April 2005.

<sup>91</sup> Unknown Author, 'Clarify Air Combat Force Policy - SOS To National', 27 June 2002, [accessed 24 May 2006]. Available from <http://www.scoop.co.nz/stories/PO0206/S00184.htm>; Unknown Author, 'Skyhawks Court Of Appeal Challenge', 21 December 2001, [accessed 24 May 2006]. Available from <http://www.scoop.co.nz/stories/PO0112/S00108.htm>; Unknown Author, 'SOS National Day of Protest', 13 October 2001, [accessed 24 May 2006]. Available from <http://www.converge.org.nz/pma/cra008.htm>.

<sup>92</sup> Unknown Author, 'PM defensive over defence', *New Zealand Herald*, 3 April 2000.

<sup>93</sup> Graeme Cheeseman and Desmond Ball, 'Australian Defence Decision-Making: Actors and Processes', in Desmond Ball and Cathy Downes (eds.), *Security and Defence: Pacific and global perspectives*. Sydney, Allen & Unwin, 1990. p.253

(ANU)<sup>94</sup> and the Australian Defence Force Academy (ADFA) feature.<sup>95</sup> The former is particularly prolific, and produces a large number of discussion and working papers on various aspects of Australia's defence. The Returned Services League (RSL) functions in a similar way to New Zealand's RSA.<sup>96</sup> Other groups, such as the government-funded Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI), also function in providing a separate stream of advice to government.<sup>97</sup> The Australian Defence Association (ADA) is an apolitical interest group that had been consistently critical of various aspects of defence policy.<sup>98</sup>

The influence of Australian interest groups is more difficult to determine, and various actors within the bureaucracy itself have differing views on the matter. Some have said that academics have had almost no influence on defence policy in the post-Cold War period.<sup>99</sup> Others have said that defence policy has become a contested field in recent times, and that academics have become increasingly influential.<sup>100</sup> Others steer a middle ground, noting that academic input has only been influential when it has already fit within the perceptions of the defence bureaucracy.<sup>101</sup> It seems, and will become clearer in Chapter Six, that since 2000 at least, academics and interest groups have indeed had a greater influence on defence policy.<sup>102</sup>

The influence of public opinion on any sort of government policy is difficult to establish. In most representative democracies, the impact of public opinion is greater on broad issues of policy rather than in specific decisions, unless they are extremely controversial.<sup>103</sup> Nor is the process direct, but rather involves pressure being exerted

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<sup>94</sup> ANU Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, 'Welcome to the SDSC', [accessed 24 May 2006]. Available from <http://rspas.anu.edu.au/sdsc/>.

<sup>95</sup> Australian Defence Force Academy, 'ADFA - The Australian Defence Force Academy', [accessed 24 May 2006]. Available from <http://www.defence.gov.au/adfa/>.

<sup>96</sup> The Returned & Services League of Australia, 'The Returned & Services League of Australia', [accessed 24 May 2006]. Available from <http://www.rsl.org.au/>.

<sup>97</sup> Australian Strategic Policy Institute, [accessed 21 September 2004]. Available from <http://www.aspi.org.au>.

<sup>98</sup> Australian Defence Association, [accessed 21 September 2004]. Available from <http://www.ada.asn.au>.

<sup>99</sup> Interview with Australian Defence Official B, 24 November 2005.

<sup>100</sup> Interview with Former Australian Defence Official A, 30 November 2005; Interview with Former Australian Defence Official E, 21 November 2005.

<sup>101</sup> Interview with Former Australian Defence Official L, 24 November 2005.

<sup>102</sup> Interview with Australian Defence Official A, 28 November 2005; Interview with Former Australian Defence Official H, 30 November 2005.

<sup>103</sup> James Anderson, *Public Policy Making*. London, Praeger, 1975. p.80. However, see also Yehezkel Dror, *Public Policymaking Reexamined*. Scranton, Chandler, 1968; Gerson, *Public Policy Making: Processes and Principles*; Charles Lindblom, *The Policy-Making Process*. Englewood Cliffs, Prentice-Hall, 1968. These include theoretical discussions of the impact of public opinion on policymaking

on backbench MPs, who in turn pressure or lobby their higher ranking colleagues in Cabinet.

The New Zealand public has generally been supportive of the NZDF, especially when it is seen as playing the role of good international citizen.<sup>104</sup> In recent years this has been exemplified by a high degree of support for involvement in UN peacekeeping operations or humanitarian interventions, such as East Timor. In other defence issues, public opinion can be somewhat eccentric. In 1983, for example, the country seen as the second greatest threat to New Zealand was the United States – which was at the time an ally of New Zealand.<sup>105</sup> Women and younger people are generally more pacific and less supportive of military roles.<sup>106</sup>

Beyond this general support, however, the public has largely been apathetic towards issues of foreign and defence policy since World War Two.<sup>107</sup> Occasional issues of significance, such as Vietnam and the nuclear ship debate, have captured public attention and generated debate, but such are rare. In general, the defence policy process, due to its closed nature, has taken no account of public opinion.<sup>108</sup> The few exceptions, such as the aforementioned nuclear ships dispute, arose not solely from public opinion, but through a convergence between that, organised interest groups and the interests of the party in power at the time.<sup>109</sup> Also, apart from the well known issues, there have been few other incidents of public opinion in New Zealand playing any part in defence policy decisions.<sup>110</sup> That trend has continued through the post-Cold War period, even in theoretically more open processes.

Australians have historically been supportive of greater defence funding, perhaps due to “entrenched insecurity” amongst the populace.<sup>111</sup> The existence of this

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<sup>104</sup> Interview with Former New Zealand Defence Official B, 12 July 2005. He notes, however, that public opinion towards defence was low in the early 1990s and only began to increase as the decade wore on.

<sup>105</sup> David Campbell, *The Domestic Sources of New Zealand Security Policy in Comparative Perspective*, Working Paper 16, Canberra: Research School of Pacific Studies, February 1987. p.9

<sup>106</sup> James Lamare, 'Gender and Public Opinion: Defense and Nuclear Issues in New Zealand', *Journal of Peace Research*, vol. 26, no. 3, August 1989.

<sup>107</sup> Roderic Alley, *The Politics of Australian and New Zealand Foreign Policy*, Working Paper 40, Canberra: Australian Defence Studies Centre, 1996. p.3

<sup>108</sup> Rolfe, *Defending New Zealand: A Study of Structures, Processes and Relationships*. p.23

<sup>109</sup> Kevin Clements, 'The Influence of Individuals and Non-Governmental Organisations on New Zealand Foreign Policy Making, 1943-1993', in Trotter (ed.), *Fifty Years of New Zealand Foreign Policy*. Dunedin, University of Otago Press, 1993. p.132

<sup>110</sup> Rolfe, *Defending New Zealand: A Study of Structures, Processes and Relationships*. p.41. Later chapters should also be read.

<sup>111</sup> Campbell, *The Domestic Sources of New Zealand Security Policy in Comparative Perspective*. p.13-14,41

insecurity is illustrated by public opinion polls on defence in Australia, which have usually featured a greater focus on threats than is the case in New Zealand.<sup>112</sup>

In recent years, especially since the 1970s and the shift to defence self-reliance, public awareness of defence matters has grown.<sup>113</sup> In 2000, the public consultation process associated with the drafting of a Defence White Paper indicated a high degree of community interest in defence matters.<sup>114</sup> This interest is not negative, and in April 2002 a poll indicated that 86% of the Australian community was “proud” of the ADF, and more than half supported its enlargement.<sup>115</sup> It should be noted that the Australian Department of Defence is Australia’s largest employer, and that this may be one factor for positive public opinion.<sup>116</sup>

Australian public opinion is not always totally supportive, and in recent times there has been substantial media criticism, especially in regards to cost blowouts in major equipment programmes.<sup>117</sup>

The impact of the public on defence matters has been quite limited; in general Australians have been as apathetic about political questions as New Zealanders.<sup>118</sup> And even when the Australian public has shown interest, with few exceptions official views have prevailed.<sup>119</sup> As with New Zealand, the Australian defence decision making system has usually been opaque if not closed, with little ability for external actors such as the public to make a difference.<sup>120</sup> This is true of both the Cold War and post-Cold War periods.

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<sup>112</sup> Ibid. p.8

<sup>113</sup> Hugh Smith, 'The Defence Force and Australian Society', in Desmond Ball and Cathy Downes (eds.), *Security and Defence: Pacific and global perspectives*. Sydney, Allen & Unwin, 1990. p.354-356

<sup>114</sup> Allan Hawke, 'The Defence of Australia and its National Interests', Royal United Services Institute, Tasmania, 14 June 2001. p.3-4

<sup>115</sup> Allan Hawke, 'Communicating with the media, the community and industry - a Defence perspective', ACT White Pages Business Series, 5 September 2002. p.3

<sup>116</sup> Smith, 'The Defence Force and Australian Society'. p.344

<sup>117</sup> Hawke, 'Communicating with the media, the community and industry - a Defence perspective'.

<sup>118</sup> Suter, 'The 1996 Australian Federal Election'.

<sup>119</sup> Desmond Ball, *The US-Australian Alliance: History and Prospects*, Working Paper 330, Canberra: ANU Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, 1999. p.23

<sup>120</sup> Cheeseman and Ball, 'Australian Defence Decision-Making: Actors and Processes'. p.253; Interview with Former Australian Defence Official H.; Cheeseman, 'Defence decision making: processes and influences'. p.128-146

## **The Domestic Environment – Policy Creating and Decision-Making Bodies During The Period From 1991**

The most important bodies involved in defence policy are those contained within the civilian bureaucracy, the defence forces, and the governments of the two nations concerned.<sup>121</sup> The following section examines these various actors and summarises their roles and influence.<sup>122</sup>

### **Constitutional Foundation**

The legitimacy of both the NZDF and ADF is derived from foundational legislation. In New Zealand this is the Defence Act 1990.<sup>123</sup> The Australian equivalent is the Defence Act 1903, which is largely similar and provides equivalent powers.<sup>124</sup> Both have been briefly examined in Chapter Three.

In both countries, the Commander-In-Chief (CINC) of the armed forces is the Governor General.<sup>125</sup> In reality, his or her powers are extremely limited. The Governor General has little or no influence over defence policy, and his or her authority is unlikely to be used except in situations of grave emergency, and in an operational fashion.

### **Defence Restructuring**

The structure of New Zealand's defence establishment is a legacy of public service reorganisation in the late 1980s. This reorganisation was a major initiative of the Labour government aimed at fundamentally transforming the behaviour of public

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<sup>121</sup> For a similar division see Cheeseman, 'Defence decision making: processes and influences'. p.138-141

<sup>122</sup> What follows is thus an approximation of the system as it has existed during the post-Cold War period – the policy-making actors are by and large treated as constants, although major changes to their roles and influence are noted. It would be impossible to fully describe every minor change in the actors etc. and would be a thesis in itself.

<sup>123</sup> Unknown Author, 'New Zealand Defence Act,' 1990.

<sup>124</sup> Unknown Author, 'Australian Defence Act,' 1903.

<sup>125</sup> David Forbes, 'Constitutional and Legal Command of the Australian Defence Forces', *Defender*, vol. XIX, no. 2, Winter 2002. p.29 notes, however that while the Constitution empowers the Governor General, the Defence Act 1903 grants the power of control to the Minister.

service employees.<sup>126</sup> Various changes were made to separate policy-making from policy-execution, and thus avoid what was seen as rent-seeking behaviour, as well as enhance the quality of policy advice.<sup>127</sup> Although the defence establishment was perceived as qualitatively different from the other public services, in the ideological atmosphere of the time it too was seen as a target for reorganisation.

In 1989, Strategos, a consultancy group headed by ex-MP Derek Quigley, were commissioned to report on the situation within the defence establishment. The general conclusion of their report was that “capture” had indeed occurred, and that the advice given politicians by the Ministry of Defence was not necessarily optimal. Their recommendation was to reform the Ministry of Defence and separate it from the NZDF, thus forming two competing streams of advice: one, civilian, from the Secretary of Defence, and the other, of more technical focus, from the Chief of Defence Force.<sup>128</sup> Such major changes in structure required the passing of the 1990 Defence Act.<sup>129</sup> Under it, the Ministry of Defence was directly bound by the State Sector Act. While the NZDF was not similarly subordinated, in recognition of its qualitative differences, it was still given statutory responsibilities to comply with relevant legislation.<sup>130</sup>

The post-Strategos structure of Defence followed the new paradigm of public service, in that in principle the Ministry of Defence and NZDF would now produce “outputs” that the Treasury would buy from them.<sup>131</sup> The theoretical division of labour within the defence establishment was:<sup>132</sup>

- The Secretary of Defence would define defence objectives in the context of New Zealand’s foreign policy;
- The Chief of Defence Force would identify capabilities to meet those requirements;

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<sup>126</sup> Herman Schwartz, 'Public choice theory and public choices: bureaucrats and state reorganisation in Australia, Denmark, New Zealand and Sweden in the 1980s', *Administration and Society*, vol. 26, no. 1, May 1994.

<sup>127</sup> Ibid.

<sup>128</sup> Nikki Silver, 'Rationale and Politics in the Restructuring of the Ministry of Defence', MA, University of Auckland, 1995. p.10

<sup>129</sup> Ibid. p.115

<sup>130</sup> New Zealand Defence Force, 'NZDF Overview', 2004, [accessed 27/09/04. Available from <http://www.nzdf.mil.nz/corporate/basic-info.html>].

<sup>131</sup> Schwartz, 'Public choice theory and public choices: bureaucrats and state reorganisation in Australia, Denmark, New Zealand and Sweden in the 1980s'.

<sup>132</sup> Silver, 'Rationale and Politics in the Restructuring of the Ministry of Defence'. p.98

- The Chief of Defence Force would then allocate expenditure to ensure that tasks were completed;
- The Secretary of Defence would monitor the results.

However, this strict separation of responsibilities was found to have problems, and so in 1991 informal changes were made within the defence establishment to rebuild the previously close relationship between the Secretary of Defence and the Chief of Defence Force.<sup>133</sup> Since then there have been few major changes to the internal structure of the New Zealand defence policy-making establishment. In 2003, a review of the policy structure recommended a return to a system similar to the pre-Strategos situation,<sup>134</sup> but its more extreme recommendations were rejected by government.<sup>135</sup>

In comparison, Australia's last major defence restructuring occurred in the early 1970s. In late 1972, the Minister of Defence Lance Barnard laid down a set of principles to the Secretary of Defence Arthur Tange.<sup>136</sup> The resultant 1973 Tange Reorganisation, legislated in the 1975 Defence Force Reorganisation Act,<sup>137</sup> established a diarchy within which the Secretary of Defence and the Chief of Defence Force were equal and jointly responsible for administration of the armed forces.<sup>138</sup>

There has been little change to Australia's defence policy-making structure since the Tange Reorganisation.<sup>139</sup> In 1997, a Defence Efficiency Review was established that focused its attention on the diarchy, proposing that their separate and joint responsibilities be made clearer.<sup>140</sup> It was thus reminiscent of New Zealand's 1989 Strategos Report. The arrival of Alan Hawke as Secretary of Defence in late

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<sup>133</sup> Ibid. p.15 and Jonathan Boston et al., *Public Management: the New Zealand Model*. Auckland, Oxford University Press, 1996. p.92 and Unknown Author, 'PM: NZDF and Ministry to work more closely together', *Army News*, no. 15, 12 June 1991. p.3 and New Zealand Defence Force and New Zealand Ministry of Defence, *Newsletter*, Wellington, 1990.

<sup>134</sup> Don Hunn, *Review of Accountabilities and Structural Arrangements between the Ministry of Defence and the New Zealand Defence Force*, Wellington, 30 September 2002.

<sup>135</sup> Michael Cullen, Parliamentary Question 4491, 27 March 2003, Wellington. Mark Burton, *Improving Joint Effectiveness in Defence (Reply to the Hunn Report)*, Wellington: New Zealand Ministry of Defence, 2002; Unknown Author, 'Government announces more of the same for defence force', *New Zealand Herald*, 26 March 2003.

<sup>136</sup> Allan Hawke, 'The Diarchy', Royal United Services Institute, Adelaide, 1 May 2000.

<sup>137</sup> Andrews, *The Department of Defence*. p.213

<sup>138</sup> A structure notably similar to New Zealand's at the time.

<sup>139</sup> Cheeseman, 'Defence decision making: processes and influences'. p.132-133 calls it constant but minor change.

<sup>140</sup> Hawke, 'The Diarchy'.

1999 heralded further reorganisation, if of a relatively minor nature.<sup>141</sup> The overarching goal of the Hawke restructuring was to improve internal processes and planning, make clear various responsibilities, and identify firm objectives for the Department.<sup>142</sup> There have also been restructurings designed to improve the process of capability development.<sup>143</sup>

In summary, the structures of the two policy-making systems have become slightly more similar over the period, in that both now adhere to the paradigm of a rationalised public service based around clearly identified outputs and outcomes. One should emphasise, however, that the largest part of the policy-making structure has remained intact and can thus be treated as a constant through the period.<sup>144</sup>

## The Services and Bureaucracy

Members of the armed services and the civilian bureaucracy play a major, if not pre-eminent, role in the initial creation of defence policy.<sup>145</sup> The following section compares and contrasts the influential actors in both New Zealand and Australia. It should be noted that the Australian bureaucracy is larger than that of New Zealand, not merely in absolute terms, but also relatively.

At the head of the civil bureaucracy in both nations is the Secretary of Defence. In New Zealand, he/she is the head of the Ministry of Defence, which has

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<sup>141</sup> See Michael McKernan, 'Defence Mechanisms', *Eureka Street*, vol. 12, no. 3, April 2002; Len Pullin and Ali Haidar, *Dismissing a Departmental Secretary: An Overt Exercise of Power in Public Employment*, Working Paper 32/04, Melbourne: Monash University Department of Management, May 2004. These provide interesting views on the Hawke period

<sup>142</sup> Allan Hawke, 'What's the Matter - A Due Diligence Report', National Press Club Defence Watch Seminar, Canberra, 17 February 2000. p.2 and Allan Hawke and Chris Barrie, *Radio Interview - ABC 666 2CN*, Canberra, 27 June 2000. and Allan Hawke, 'One Year On', National Press Club Defence Watch Seminar, 27 February 2001. p.8 and Allan Hawke, 'Organisational Renewal: Two and a Bit Years On', National Press Club Defence Watch Seminar, Canberra, 13 June 2002.

<sup>143</sup> Notably the Kinnaird Review and subsequent development of the DMO. Interview with Australian Defence Official B; Interview with Former Australian Defence Official J, 30 November 2005. and Australian Defence Association, *Defence Brief 113*, May-June 2005; Robert Hill, 'Speech to Defence Watch Seminar - Defence funding in the 2005/2006 Federal Budget', Press Release, 16 May 2005, MIN505016/05. [www.minister.defence.gov.au/HillSpeechtpl.cfm?CurrentId=4868](http://www.minister.defence.gov.au/HillSpeechtpl.cfm?CurrentId=4868). and Australian Department of Defence, *Annual Report 2003/04*, Canberra, 2004. p.19

<sup>144</sup> Where changes to the policymaking structure are regarded as having an influence on policy they are noted in subsequent chapters.

<sup>145</sup> Cheeseman, *The Search for Self-Reliance: Australian Defence Since Vietnam*; Cheeseman and Ball, 'Australian Defence Decision-Making: Actors and Processes'; Neil James, 'The Bureaucracy's Control over the Australian Defence Force', *National Observer*, Autumn 2001; Rolfe, *Defending New Zealand: A Study of Structures, Processes and Relationships*; Smith, 'The Defence Force and Australian Society'; Thomas-Durell Young, 'Capabilities Based Defence Planning', *Armed Forces and Society*, vol. 21, no. 3, Spring 1995.; Cheeseman, 'Defence decision making: processes and influences'. p.138

three roles: to advise, procure, and audit.<sup>146</sup> In relation to policy-making, it is the foremost of those roles that is most important. The Secretary is the most authoritative player within the Ministry.<sup>147</sup> He/she is directly responsible for the provision of advice to the Minister of Defence. He/she is also required to produce periodic defence assessments, such as Defence White Papers.<sup>148</sup> However, he/she does not do this all himself; rather, he/she collates and assesses the advice produced within his bureaucracy. Theoretically, the Secretary provides a completely separate stream of policy advice to government from the CDF. However, the Secretary is also a member of the Office of the Chief Executives with the CDF, which is a forum to facilitate consultation between the highest ranking members of the armed forces and the civil service.<sup>149</sup> Thus, while the formal model of policy separation is still retained in statute, in practice the Secretary works in co-operation with the CDF to provide policy advice.<sup>150</sup> The Secretary has been a highly influential actor during the post-Cold War period, although since the accession of Labour to power, his influence over high-level policy seems to have declined.<sup>151</sup> There have been only two Secretaries during the period, Gerald Hensley and Graham Fortune, both former diplomats.<sup>152</sup>

The Australian Secretary of Defence has similar responsibilities, but his/her role is slightly different due to the fact that he/she is jointly responsible with the CDF for the administration of the ADF.<sup>153</sup> The Secretary is primarily responsible for the general working and effective and efficient administration of the Department of Defence.<sup>154</sup> In the field of policy, he/she identifies issues to be brought before the Minister of Defence, determines their relative urgency, suggests solutions, and draws up briefs.<sup>155</sup> As in New Zealand, the Australian Secretary of Defence is responsible

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<sup>146</sup> New Zealand Ministry of Defence, 'The Ministry', 2004, [accessed 21 September 2004]. Available from <http://www.defence.govt.nz/about-us.html>. also Unknown Author, 'PM: NZDF and Ministry to work more closely together'. p.3

<sup>147</sup> Rolfe, *Defending New Zealand: A Study of Structures, Processes and Relationships*. p.29-40

<sup>148</sup> New Zealand Defence Force, 'NZDF Overview.'

<sup>149</sup> Ibid.; also note Minister of Defence's Bradford's assertions in 1998 that the policy-provider split worked satisfactorily: Max Bradford, Parliamentary Question 3956, 28 April 1998, Wellington. Also see Burton, *Improving Joint Effectiveness in Defence (Reply to the Hunn Report)*. p.3 that post-Hunn review the OCE will be enhanced to facilitate better discussion between the NZDF and MOD.

<sup>150</sup> Boston et al., *Public Management: the New Zealand Model*. p.92

<sup>151</sup> It seems to have been replaced by a managerial and accounting role.

<sup>152</sup> Unknown Author, 'Gerald Hensley - Personal profile - Secretary of Defence', *Navy Today*, no. 18, December 1997. and Unknown Author, 'Senior diplomats named for top military posts', *The Dominion*, 29 June 1999.

<sup>153</sup> Hawke, 'The Diarchy'.

<sup>154</sup> Ibid. and Cheeseman and Ball, 'Australian Defence Decision-Making: Actors and Processes'. p.256

<sup>155</sup> Cheeseman and Ball, 'Australian Defence Decision-Making: Actors and Processes'. p.256-257

for the production of defence reviews.<sup>156</sup> As such, the Secretary can exert considerable control over the defence establishment. However, he is not pre-eminent, as he/she is still highly reliant on other actors for the provision of intelligence and other resources.<sup>157</sup> In 1999, in an immensely controversial move, the Australian Minister of Defence sacked the Secretary, citing differences of opinion.<sup>158</sup>

The Australian Secretary is also a member of the Cabinet National Security Committee, set up in 1996 by the incoming Howard Government.<sup>159</sup> This is a committee involving both politicians and bureaucrats considering issues of national security. An equivalent body does not exist in New Zealand.

Generally, the Australian Secretary has not focused on strategic policy, instead concentrating on resource management and accounting.<sup>160</sup> Primary leadership in strategic policy has come from the Deputy Secretary Strategy and Intelligence (the name has varied), which position such men as Paul Dibb and Hugh White have filled.

In both Australia and New Zealand, the Secretary of Defence's counterpart within the defence force itself is the CDF. In New Zealand, the CDF is the primary manager of the NZDF, concerned with its day-to-day running;<sup>161</sup> under the 1991 Public Finance Act, the CDF is specifically responsible for the use of defence resources.<sup>162</sup> This is his/her managerial role; the other half of his/her job is policy-making. Here, he/she is theoretically responsible for the provision of separate advice to the Minister, but in practice this is often given after consultation with the Secretary of Defence via the Office of the Chief Executives. The CDF also has direct linkages with several of the NZDF's internal policy-making and advising bodies.<sup>163</sup> In the past, the CDF has occasionally acted as the primary provider of advice to the Minister, especially when the civilian bureaucracy has been unable to do so.<sup>164</sup> During the post-Cold War period the influence of the CDF over major defence reviews has been limited.

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<sup>156</sup> Interview with Allan Hawke, 29 September 2004; Hawke, *Lecture to Politics* 241.

<sup>157</sup> Cheeseman and Ball, 'Australian Defence Decision-Making: Actors and Processes'. p.257

<sup>158</sup> Pullin and Haidar, *Dismissing a Departmental Secretary: An Overt Exercise of Power in Public Employment*.

<sup>159</sup> Hawke, *Lecture to Politics* 241.

<sup>160</sup> Interview with Former Australian Defence Official J; Interview with Former Australian Defence Official L.

<sup>161</sup> Burton, *Improving Joint Effectiveness in Defence (Reply to the Hunn Report)*. p.2 requires the CDF to take a more direct role in command of the NZDF.

<sup>162</sup> Rolfe, *Defending New Zealand: A Study of Structures, Processes and Relationships*. p.158

<sup>163</sup> New Zealand Defence Force, 'New Zealand Defence Force Structure', 2004, [accessed 27/09/04]. Available from <http://www.nzdf.mil.nz/corporate/corporate-structure.html>.

<sup>164</sup> Rolfe, *Defending New Zealand: A Study of Structures, Processes and Relationships*. p.30

The Australian CDF's responsibilities are slightly different.<sup>165</sup> The CDF is primarily responsible for the administrative command of the ADF.<sup>166</sup> However, he/she is also the principal military advisor to the Minister of Defence, along with the Secretary. The CDF is also responsible for ensuring that the three services are capable of providing joint forces for military operations.<sup>167</sup> In the Australian capability based planning system, the CDF is also responsible for producing credible contingency plans as well as advising as to the resources necessary to meet those contingencies.<sup>168</sup> The CDF thus has great power in both policy advice and the daily administration of the ADF. However, his/her powers can be somewhat constrained by the lack of direct staff support given him, in comparison to other actors, especially the individual services.<sup>169</sup>

In Australia, the separation of responsibilities between the CDF and Secretary is achieved through the issuing of occasional joint Ministerial directives, which set out their respective roles.<sup>170</sup> This creates a de facto structure closer to the New Zealand model of separate responsibilities.

While the Secretaries and CDFs have the final say on whether policy devised and proposed by the bureaucracy will be forwarded to their political masters for approval, other actors within the services and bureaucracies do much of the initial work of formulating policy. These actors include both committees and individuals.

In New Zealand, these committees and individuals are the primary producers of policy.<sup>171</sup> There are bodies within both the NZDF and MOD, and some joint bodies.<sup>172</sup> This contributes to the contestability of advice.

The Ministry of Defence has a Defence Policy and Planning Unit (DPPU), which combines both Ministry and NZDF staff.<sup>173</sup> This unit provides advice on meeting defence needs and interests, advice on New Zealand's international defence relations, advice on policies and capabilities to meet future security needs, and co-

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<sup>165</sup> Australian Department of Defence, 'Chief of the Defence Force's Roles and Responsibilities', [accessed 21 September 2004]. Available from <http://www.defence.gov.au/cdf/role.cfm>.

<sup>166</sup> Cheeseman and Ball, 'Australian Defence Decision-Making: Actors and Processes'. p.258 and Hawke, 'The Diarchy'.

<sup>167</sup> Hawke, 'The Diarchy'.

<sup>168</sup> Young, 'Capabilities Based Defence Planning'.

<sup>169</sup> Cheeseman and Ball, 'Australian Defence Decision-Making: Actors and Processes'. p.259

<sup>170</sup> Australian Department of Defence, 'Chief of the Defence Force's Roles and Responsibilities'.

<sup>171</sup> Rolfe, *Defending New Zealand: A Study of Structures, Processes and Relationships*. p.43-46

<sup>172</sup> New Zealand Defence Force, 'Headquarters New Zealand Defence Force', 2004, [accessed 27/09/04]. Available from <http://www.nzdf.mil.nz/corporate/hqnzdf.html>. and New Zealand Ministry of Defence, 'The Ministry'.

<sup>173</sup> New Zealand Ministry of Defence, 'The Ministry'.

ordinates the Defence Planning System (DPS) introduced in 1992.<sup>174</sup> An inter-departmental body, the Officials Committee for Domestic and External Security Co-ordination, has been important in recent times, and is a potential element in policy-making.<sup>175</sup>

Within the NZDF, Development Branch co-ordinates capability development activities between headquarters NZDF (HQNZDF), the various services, and the Ministry. It is at the service level that equipment proposals are first developed. The Military Policy Development Adviser (MPDA) conducts research and analysis aimed at the development of policy, including organisational reform. The Deputy Chief of Defence Staff (DCDS) is responsible for co-ordinating NZDF and Ministry staff working on joint policy.

The Australian defence policy-making system is more complex than its New Zealand counterpart, which is not surprising given the size of the bureaucracy and individual services;<sup>176</sup> indeed, some have termed it almost anarchical.<sup>177</sup> The Australian defence system is largely reliant on committees.<sup>178</sup> This committee system is seen as facilitating agreement by enabling a process of consultation and commitment.<sup>179</sup> However, despite the range of formal committees, it has been said that the greatest part of interdepartmental interaction takes place informally, often on an ad hoc basis.<sup>180</sup>

The most senior committee is the Council of Defence, which meets but infrequently, and is used largely for matters of national security.<sup>181</sup> More relevant for policy development is the Defence Committee, which is defined as a “forum for deliberating strategic issues that require collective consideration in relation to the achievement of the results specified in the Ministerial directive.”<sup>182</sup> The Strategy Group develops military strategy and strategic policy for the development of future

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<sup>174</sup> Hunn, *Review of Accountabilities and Structural Arrangements between the Ministry of Defence and the New Zealand Defence Force*. p.13

<sup>175</sup> Mark Burton, Parliamentary Question 13621, 26 September 2001, Wellington.

<sup>176</sup> Because of this, and the myriad minor changes in the organisational structure of the ADOD, the following section does not go into great detail when examining the various elements of the bureaucracy.

<sup>177</sup> Interview with Former Australian Defence Official D, 30 November 2005; Interview with Former Australian Defence Official H.

<sup>178</sup> Cheeseman and Ball, 'Australian Defence Decision-Making: Actors and Processes'. p.260

<sup>179</sup> Cathy Downes, 'Defence Forces Personnel', in Desmond Ball and Cathy Downes (eds.), *Security and Defence: Pacific and global perspectives*. Sydney, Allen & Unwin, 1990. p.305

<sup>180</sup> Cheeseman and Ball, 'Australian Defence Decision-Making: Actors and Processes'. p.262-263

<sup>181</sup> Ibid. p.260

<sup>182</sup> Australian Department of Defence, 'Senior Defence Committees', 2004, [accessed 28 September 2004]. Available from <http://www.defence.gov.au/committee/>.

military capability. The Capability Development Group defines equipment needs to meet policy;<sup>183</sup> however, as with New Zealand, it is at the level of the services that equipment proposals are first mooted. A recent addition to the committee system is the Secretary's Committee on National Security, set up in 1996 to discuss various pressing issues at the level of heads of departments.<sup>184</sup>

Unlike the situation in New Zealand, there has often been a feeling within the Australian system that the balance of power favours civilian bureaucrats over their military counterparts, and the single services over the CDF.<sup>185</sup> Indeed, it has been said that the civilian bureaucracy has had policy-making dominance over the armed services since the 1920s at least.<sup>186</sup> There has also been a belief that tension exists between civilian and uniformed staff. During the post-Cold War period, the situation has remained the same. Defence personnel and external critics have been critical of excessive bureaucratic control, and the influence of policy "mandarins".<sup>187</sup>

This, however is not an opinion shared by all.<sup>188</sup> Even some commentators who believe in the thesis of civilian dominance have pointed out a recent resurgence in service influence.<sup>189</sup> Others have pointed out the continuing tendency of the services to propose new equipment.<sup>190</sup> This is also more than merely a "uniform vs. civilian issue"; it includes the respective roles of the corporate ADF vis a vis the services.<sup>191</sup> In general, the thesis of civilian dominance can be maintained for much of the post-Cold War period, but in very recent years it is more questionable.<sup>192</sup> This issue is examined in greater depth in later chapters.

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<sup>183</sup> Interview with Australian Defence Official B.

<sup>184</sup> Hawke, *Lecture to Politics 241*.

<sup>185</sup> Cheeseman and Ball, 'Australian Defence Decision-Making: Actors and Processes', p.259 and David Butler, 'A Reality Audit: Some other thoughts on defence', *National Observer*, no. 45, Winter 2000.

<sup>186</sup> The following section is largely reliant on: James, 'The Bureaucracy's Control over the Australian Defence Force'. See also Evans, *The Tyranny of Dissonance: Australia's Strategic Culture and Way of War 1901-2005*, p.42 and Andrews, *The Department of Defence*.

<sup>187</sup> Ray Carsin, 'So is it peace, or a piece of the action?' *The Sunday Age*, 26 December 1999. Fred Brenchley, 'A Rocket for Defence', *Bulletin with Newsweek*, vol. 120, no. 6339, 27 August 2002. James, 'The Bureaucracy's Control over the Australian Defence Force'.

<sup>188</sup> Paul Dibb, 'Defence policy is on the money', *The Australian*, 13 November 2002.

<sup>189</sup> Interview with Former Australian Defence Official H.

<sup>190</sup> David Horner, 'Force Structure: the hardware dimension', in J. Mohan Malik (ed.), *Australia's Security in the 21st Century*. St Leonards, Allen & Unwin, 1999. p.173

<sup>191</sup> Interview with Australian Defence Official B.

<sup>192</sup> Interview with Former Australian Defence Official H; Interview with Former Australian Defence Official J.

In the post-Cold War period, non-Defence actors have had an increasing influence over the shape of New Zealand's defence policy.<sup>193</sup> In New Zealand, these are mainly the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade (MFAT), the Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet (DPMC), and Treasury.<sup>194</sup> The former is usually concerned where defence policy has some impact on foreign relations, for example in the case of an overseas deployment, or the procurement of equipment that might have beneficial or harmful effects on an alliance. There is permanent liaison between MFAT and MOD in an effort to enhance relations between the two departments.<sup>195</sup>

The DPMC is a co-ordinating body that integrates the policies of various departments. In relation to defence policy, it has become increasingly important in the post-Cold War period, especially since the accession of Labour in 1999, due to Labour's focus on whole-of-government responses to security issues.

Treasury is often seen as the single most important bureaucratic player within the New Zealand public service.<sup>196</sup> In regards to defence, it is mainly concerned with the short-term financial cost of policy. Occasionally, it has gone further and attempted to shape longer-term strategic policy.<sup>197</sup> However, one should not overestimate its influence. Even in the Strategos-inspired restructuring of the Ministry of Defence, a process that met Treasury's particular desires, actual Treasury influence was limited.<sup>198</sup>

In Australia, the situation is similar. Treasury provides financial oversight of policy proposals.<sup>199</sup> Also involved is the Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet, which is responsible for ensuring that all proposals are coherent and encompass the whole of government.<sup>200</sup> That department has been perceived as being of increasing importance in recent years.<sup>201</sup>

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<sup>193</sup> Reaching an apogee, perhaps, in: New Zealand Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet, *Maritime Patrol Review*, Wellington, February 2001.

<sup>194</sup> Rolfe, *Defending New Zealand: A Study of Structures, Processes and Relationships*. p.29-40

<sup>195</sup> *Ibid.* p.40

<sup>196</sup> Jonathan Boston et al., *New Zealand under MMP: A New Politics?* Auckland, Auckland University Press, 1996. p.169

<sup>197</sup> Rolfe, *Defending New Zealand: A Study of Structures, Processes and Relationships*. p.40

<sup>198</sup> Silver, 'Rationale and Politics in the Restructuring of the Ministry of Defence'. p.120

<sup>199</sup> Interview with Former Australian Defence Official J. however suggests that Treasury has been consistently unable to adequately question military judgements on capability.

<sup>200</sup> Peter Bridgman and Glyn Davis, *The Australian Policy Handbook*. 2nd ed. St Leonards, Allen & Unwin, 2000. p.95-97

<sup>201</sup> Interview with Former Australian Defence Official J.

## The Politicians

While staff within the armed services and civilian bureaucracies can decide which proposals to develop and forward to ministers, it is at the political level that decisions on higher policy must be made.<sup>202</sup>

The Australian and New Zealand political systems are largely similar, but there are significant differences. The Australian system is federal, bicameral, parliamentary and constitutional.<sup>203</sup> The New Zealand system, on the other hand, is neither federal, nor bicameral, nor constitutional. It is a unitary system based on a single House of Representatives, and has no written constitution. However, these differences have little or no effect on defence policy-making.

### *The Ministers*

The two ministers with the most influence on defence policy are the Minister of Defence and the Prime Minister. The Minister of Foreign Affairs and Trade also exerts some influence, but to a lesser extent.

In New Zealand, the Minister of Defence has, under the Defence Act 1990, the “power of control of the New Zealand Defence Force”.<sup>204</sup> He/she is directly responsible and accountable for the actions of his Ministry. In general terms, he/she acts as the link between the bureaucracy and services, and the political arena.<sup>205</sup> By himself, he/she may authorise payments up to \$15 million NZD.<sup>206</sup> He/she has the final say on policy, and determines which proposals will go before Cabinet for approval. In Cabinet, he/she acts as the chief policy adviser for the other ministers.<sup>207</sup> Usually the Minister will meet frequently, perhaps weekly, with the Secretary and CDF, for briefings on recent issues.<sup>208</sup>

Historically, although the Minister sets the general political agenda for the Ministry, he/she has not always been a major participant in defence policy decisions. There have been few cases in New Zealand where it can be clearly shown that a particular Minister has had a strong influence on the shape of defence policy. Often,

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<sup>202</sup> Except in cases where delegated authority exists.

<sup>203</sup> Alan Ferra, *Essentials of Australian Government*. Croydon, Tertiary Press, 2001. p.1

<sup>204</sup> Rolfe, *Defending New Zealand: A Study of Structures, Processes and Relationships*. p.26

<sup>205</sup> *Ibid.* p.24-29

<sup>206</sup> New Zealand Cabinet Office, 'Financial Delegation and Delegation Limits for Responsible Ministers and Departmental Chief Executives', CO(99)7, 30 June 1999, Wellington.

<sup>207</sup> Interview with Former New Zealand Defence Official B.

<sup>208</sup> *Ibid.*

due to lack of expertise or other commitments (he may hold several other portfolios),<sup>209</sup> he/she is reliant on the Ministry to provide him with the requisite information on which to make decisions.<sup>210</sup>

Because of this, it is perhaps at the personal level, and in his/her ability to provide clear guidance to his staff, that the Minister has the most influence on defence policy. Crucial to this personal interaction are anticipated reactions, whereby the bureaucracy will attempt to anticipate Ministerial reactions before providing policy advice.<sup>211</sup> Another vital role of the Minister is to provide legitimization of defence policy to the public, who may well be critical of it.

The Australian Minister functions in similar fashion. He/she is responsible for selecting and endorsing recommendations of his Department to take to Cabinet. His/her influence is constrained by a variety of influences. Other ministers sometimes impinge on his role, especially in regards to financial matters. His/her own degree of interest in the area is vital, as are his/her capabilities, and whether or not he/she holds other portfolios that might distract him/her. He/she is reliant on information provided by the bureaucracy, although he/she can establish his own personal offices, separate from the Department of Defence itself, to provide an independent stream of advice. Also, his/her influence is greatest over already existent programmes, rather than those in which new decisions are required; those latter, in general, need to be considered at Cabinet level, where other ministers can debate them.<sup>212</sup>

While there might have once been a case of “Yes Minister-ism” between the ADOD and its Minister, the Australian public service reforms of the 1980s and 1990s have increased the influence of ministers in relation to the bureaucracy.<sup>213</sup> There is also a closer relationship between the bureaucrats and politicians, which in turn means that the personalities of the minister and senior bureaucrats need to mesh more closely than was the situation in the past, when there was greater separation.<sup>214</sup>

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<sup>209</sup> Hunn, *Review of Accountabilities and Structural Arrangements between the Ministry of Defence and the New Zealand Defence Force*. p.37 notes that it is unusual for Ministers of Defence in other countries to hold other portfolios.

<sup>210</sup> Perhaps this situation has improved a little in recent years with the growth of independent think-tanks that can provide independent advice to Ministers (if he/she is willing to take it).

<sup>211</sup> Mulgan, *Politics in New Zealand*. p.159

<sup>212</sup> Glyn Davis, 'Executive government: Cabinet and the Prime Minister', in Andrew Parkin, John Summers, and Dennis Woodward (eds.), *Government, Politics, Power and Policy in Australia*. Melbourne, 1995. p.58

<sup>213</sup> Hughes, *Australian Politics*. p.377

<sup>214</sup> *Ibid.* p.382. One should note the issues that have arisen in the Australian Department of Defence in relation to this. In 1999 the then-Secretary was removed due to a clash of wills with the Minister – see

By and large, Australian defence ministers during the period have had limited influence on the shape of policy, preferring to support bureaucratic orthodoxy.<sup>215</sup> They have, however, usually been supportive of maintaining or even increasing funding for their portfolio.<sup>216</sup> The most recent minister, Robert Hill, has been more controversial; he has attempted to engage with defence issues to a greater extent than his predecessors, although his legacy is still unclear.<sup>217</sup> Later chapters analyse his role in greater detail.

Historically, in both Australia and New Zealand the role and influence of the Minister of Defence have been heavily reliant on his individual skill, intelligence and personality.<sup>218</sup> Legally, Ministers are strongly empowered, but in practice they do not always utilise all their formal authority.

The other minister with major influence over defence is the Prime Minister. As the head of the party and head of government, he or she has a variety of mechanisms by which to influence policy. This is especially the case when decisions are referred to Cabinet. In both countries, the Prime Minister's interest in defence matters is often dependent on the political aspects of a particular decision.<sup>219</sup> In the past, Prime Ministers in New Zealand such as Muldoon and Lange have taken an interest in defence matters, and sometimes meddled with decisions. Helen Clark has also shown a great interest in defence, even to the point of being called the "de facto" minister.<sup>220</sup> In Australia, the situation is similar, and the role of the Prime Minister has become increasingly important in recent years. John Howard has been particularly assertive in this area.<sup>221</sup> Also, and vitally, the Prime Minister is one of the primary determinants of

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Bridgman and Davis, *The Australian Policy Handbook*. p.19. His replacement, Allan Hawke, then met a similar end – see Interview with Hawke.

<sup>215</sup> Interview with Former Australian Defence Official E.

<sup>216</sup> Interview with Former Australian Defence Official L.

<sup>217</sup> Interview with Australian Defence Official B; Interview with Former Australian Defence Official C, 1 December 2005; Interview with Former Australian Defence Official D; Interview with Former Australian Defence Official E; Interview with Former Australian Defence Official F, 23 November 2005; Interview with Former Australian Defence Official H; Interview with Former Australian Defence Official J.

<sup>218</sup> Interview with Former Australian Defence Official L.

<sup>219</sup> Rolfe, *Defending New Zealand: A Study of Structures, Processes and Relationships*. p.24-25 and Cheeseman and Ball, 'Australian Defence Decision-Making: Actors and Processes'.

<sup>220</sup> John Armstrong, 'PM outflanks the top brass', *New Zealand Herald*, 6 April 2001.

<sup>221</sup> Interview with Australian Defence Official B; Interview with Former Australian Defence Official A; Interview with Former Australian Defence Official B, 22 November 2005; Interview with Former Australian Defence Official C; Interview with Former Australian Defence Official D; Interview with Former Australian Defence Official E; Interview with Former Australian Defence Official H; Interview with Former Australian Defence Official J; Interview with Former Australian Defence Official L.

the level of defence funding, although in this he works closely with other ministers as well as the heads of the various financial departments.

A third minister worthy of comment is the Minister of Foreign Affairs and Trade. His or her influence is restricted, but in some areas, especially relating to the foreign policy implications of certain defence decisions, can be important.

### *Cabinet*

Cabinet consists of the ministers of the Crown, either in part or whole, and is usually regarded as the government. The New Zealand and Australian Cabinets are very similar in role and power.

In New Zealand, Cabinet's main power is its ability to effect policy without recourse to Parliament.<sup>222</sup> This is done by operating within the boundaries of existent legislation and funding; without the need to seek extra funds, there is no real barrier to Cabinet's decisions being carried out. However, in some policy cases, new legislation is needed before a certain decision can be carried out. In this case, Cabinet's other power becomes crucial: its size in relation to Caucus and Parliament. Usually, a decision made within Cabinet will also carry Caucus. And, given the nature of New Zealand's political system, it is almost a certainty that the government will already have a tenable majority, and thus a Cabinet decision will carry Parliament as well.<sup>223</sup> In recent years, however, the phenomenon of minority governments, such as the current Labour Government, has somewhat reduced the Parliamentary power of Cabinet.

Traditionally, Cabinet has not considered much defence-related material. It is a busy body, and defence matters are seldom politically important enough to warrant such high level consideration. However, major defence policy issues, such as operational deployment overseas,<sup>224</sup> the withdrawal of international deployments, the purchase of major equipment,<sup>225</sup> or the drafting of White Papers all require

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<sup>222</sup> Boston et al., *New Zealand under MMP: A New Politics?* p.159-160

<sup>223</sup> Jackson, *The Dilemma of Parliament*. is in general critical of such executive decisionmaking. Despite writing pre-MMP, many of his criticisms are still valid. See Boston et al., *New Zealand under MMP: A New Politics*; Mulgan, *Politics in New Zealand*.

<sup>224</sup> Mark Burton, Parliamentary Question 2112, 14 March 2001, Wellington.

<sup>225</sup> Ministers only have authorisation up to \$15 million NZD, and above this require Cabinet approval. Graham Fortune, 'Request for information - Letter to Zhivan Alach', OC003-2461, 14 June 2005, Wellington; New Zealand Cabinet Office, 'Financial Delegation and Delegation Limits for Responsible Ministers and Departmental Chief Executives'.

consideration by Cabinet.<sup>226</sup> These fall beyond the authority of the minister acting alone. Cabinet also deals with equipment proposals at earlier stages, for example in giving approval to undertake studies.<sup>227</sup> Along with the full Cabinet, a Cabinet sub-committee may examine defence policy proposals. This sub-committee might even be granted delegated authority to make a decision. Under the Clark government, this committee is known as the Cabinet committee for External Affairs and Defence.<sup>228</sup> Usually, Cabinet has not been a rubber stamp for policies advocated by the Minister of Defence, and in the early and mid 1990s obstructed various acquisitions, although since approximately 1999 it has been more supportive of defence. Also, the New Zealand Cabinet has seldom simply acquiesced in the initiatives of the bureaucracy, but has usually questioned and even opposed these.

The situation with the Australian Cabinet is similar. It can approve major policy decisions, as in New Zealand, that do not require new legislation.<sup>229</sup> There is a sub-committee of the Australian Cabinet concerned with defence matters, the latest incarnation being the Cabinet National Security Committee (NSCC).<sup>230</sup> Once a Cabinet sub-committee comes to a policy decision, and sends it to the full Cabinet for endorsement, it can be re-opened and debated only if the Prime Minister and other relevant ministers agree. This means a sub-committee that has gained the support of the Prime Minister and relevant minister has great powers.<sup>231</sup>

The Australian NSCC has played an increasingly important role during the post-Cold War period, acting as a forum for debate and a sounding board for various concepts.<sup>232</sup> It has been called the “focal point of executive decision-making on all national security matters”,<sup>233</sup> and it would not be an exaggeration to describe it as the most important defence policy body of the period. In general, the Australian Cabinet has been more supportive of the expertise of the civilian and uniformed bureaucracy than its New Zealand counterpart.

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<sup>226</sup> Rolfe, *Defending New Zealand: A Study of Structures, Processes and Relationships*. p.27

<sup>227</sup> Interview with Former New Zealand Defence Official C, 9 June 2005.

<sup>228</sup> Mulgan, *Politics in New Zealand*. p.85

<sup>229</sup> Davis, 'Executive government: Cabinet and the Prime Minister'. p.46

<sup>230</sup> Hawke, *Lecture to Politics 241*.

<sup>231</sup> Davis, 'Executive government: Cabinet and the Prime Minister'. p.50. See also Jenelle Bonnor, *The Politics of Defence in Australia*, Working Paper No.68, Canberra: Australian Defence Studies Centre, July 2001. p.14 and Gavin Keating, 'The Machinery of Australian National Security Policy: Changes, Continuing Problems and Possibilities', *Australian Defence Force Journal*, no. 166, 2005. p.21

<sup>232</sup> Interview with Former Australian Defence Official D; Interview with Former Australian Defence Official H; Interview with Former Australian Defence Official L.

<sup>233</sup> Warren Karle, 'The keys to the Cabinet', *Defence Magazine (The Official Magazine of the Australian Department of Defence)*, June 2005.

The Cabinets of both New Zealand and Australia exercise a great deal of authority in the field of defence policy. They determine acceptance or rejection for major policy proposals emanating from the civil and service bureaucracy and agreed to by the Minister of Defence; it is at Cabinet level that the major decision point for defence policy is found.

### *Parliament and Parliamentary Bodies*

The final political body that must be considered in the field of defence policy is Parliament. Australia and New Zealand have different Parliamentary structures. New Zealand has a single House of Representatives, elected until 1996 by a simple, first-past-the-post electoral system, and since then by a proportional voting system. Australia's federal parliament comprises two houses, the upper body a Senate whose assent is required for the passing of bills, both elected by a system of transferable votes.<sup>234</sup>

In New Zealand, Parliament has two functions relating to defence. The first is to vote the requisite funds. Given that few individual bills are floored in relation to defence,<sup>235</sup> the central issue is acceptance of the Estimates and Budget, by which funds are voted to the NZDF.<sup>236</sup> Theoretically Parliament could block funding for defence programmes. In practice, this has not been the case. Pre-MMP the Government always possessed a simple majority, and thus retained sufficient support within the House to ensure the passing of money bills, which had already been approved by the individual Ministries and Cabinet.<sup>237</sup> While it still found it prudent to justify legislation through debate on the floor of Parliament, the government could pass funding with little effective opposition.

The advent of MMP in 1996 has not changed the situation greatly. While there have been suggestions that MMP could act as a destabilising influence, by permitting the entry into Parliament of MPs from issue-based small parties,<sup>238</sup> defence has not proven to be one of those issues. There is the possibility, however, that defence matters might become a bargaining chip between parties seeking to reach a coalition

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<sup>234</sup> Ferra, *Essentials of Australian Government*. p.118-119

<sup>235</sup> This is very different to the situation in the United States.

<sup>236</sup> Jackson, *The Dilemma of Parliament*. p.151

<sup>237</sup> Richard Mulgan, 'Parliament: Composition and Functions', in Raymond Miller (ed.), *New Zealand Politics in Transition*. Auckland, Oxford University Press, 1997.

<sup>238</sup> Colin James, 'MMP's Instability', *New Zealand Management*, vol. 49, no. 6, July 2002.

agreement.<sup>239</sup> Whether those parties could then threaten to withhold support for the Budget and Estimates because of disagreement on defence is an interesting question.

The second function of Parliament in relation to defence is to debate current and planned policy. Given the coherence of political parties in New Zealand, what debate does occur on the floor of the House of Representatives is often politically charged rather than analytical.<sup>240</sup> In-depth analysis and debate have generally devolved to select committees.

New Zealand has had some sort of Parliamentary committee on defence since 1858.<sup>241</sup> The Parliamentary Select Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade has, however, not been seen as a particularly influential body in the past. At least one analyst has stated that its primary purpose has been to train and educate MPs in defence rather than produce substantive policy.<sup>242</sup> Yet, in the post-Cold War period that same committee produced what might be regarded as the most influential defence policy document of the period, the *Defence Beyond 2000* report.<sup>243</sup>

The situation in Australia is similar. The primary influence Parliament has over defence is that of withholding funding, as it has control over governmental expenditure.<sup>244</sup> Given the size of the Cabinet compared to Parliament in total, as well as the coherence and internal discipline of the parties, this is unlikely to happen in the lower house at least; executive control at this level of government is almost certain.<sup>245</sup>

However, due to the bicameral structure of the Australian system, it is not merely in the House of Representatives that funding must be approved. It must also pass through the Senate. In the past, and in a broad range of matters, the Senate has acted as a vigorous chamber of review, due to the fact it has not always been under executive control.<sup>246</sup> It has not been historically obstructive in regards to defence, but

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<sup>239</sup> In coalition agreements since 1996 defence has not been a major issue. It has been subsumed by other, more vital issues, especially domestic economic and security policy.

<sup>240</sup> Jackson, *The Dilemma of Parliament*. p.68 describes this trend in more general terms.

<sup>241</sup> *Ibid.* p.117

<sup>242</sup> Rolfe, *Defending New Zealand: A Study of Structures, Processes and Relationships*. p.28

<sup>243</sup> New Zealand House of Representatives, *Inquiry into Defence Beyond 2000: Report of the Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Committee*, Wellington, August 1999.

<sup>244</sup> John Uhr, 'Parliament', in Andrew Parkin, John Summers, and Dennis Woodward (eds.), *Government, Politics, Power and Policy in Australia*. Melbourne, 1995. p.40

<sup>245</sup> Bruce Stone, 'Size and Executive-Legislative Relations in Australian Parliaments', *Australian Journal of Political Science*, vol. 33, no. 1, March 1998.

<sup>246</sup> Patrick Weller and Jenny Fleming, 'The Commonwealth', in Jeremy Moon and Campbell Sharman (eds.), *Australian Politics and Government: The Commonwealth, the States, and the Territories*. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2003. p.33 and Ferra, *Essentials of Australian Government*. p.78

it might be if it were under opposition control, and governmental defence policy was highly controversial.

Unlike the situation in New Zealand, the use of select committees for detailed investigation is relatively rare in Australia.<sup>247</sup> While select committees on defence-related matters do exist, their influence is not particularly great.<sup>248</sup>

A comparison of the influence of Parliament over defence policy in Australia and New Zealand is highly illustrative. It indicates that despite their structural differences, there are many similarities. The primary power of Parliament is budgetary; and, given executive dominance of the House of Representatives in both nations, a failure to vote funding is unlikely. However, the Australian bicameral system means that there is the possibility that a non-executive-controlled Senate could block funding for defence matters.

## The Domestic Environment – Implementation

Implementation, for the purposes of this thesis, is regarded as the process by which high level defence policy, as evidenced by White Papers or similar documents, is converted into physical reality at the force structure level.<sup>249</sup> By and large, this involves three major types of process: acquisition, restructuring, and personnel change.<sup>250</sup> However, it also includes the development of doctrine, and other internal service processes. In general, the militaries themselves are the implementers. It should also be remembered that the mere maintenance of existing capabilities, the presence of a “force in being”, is implementation of sorts, given the nature of defence policy.

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<sup>247</sup> Uhr, 'Parliament'. p.39

<sup>248</sup> The following reports have been published by the Australian Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade in recent years: Australian Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs Defence and Trade, *Australia's Maritime Strategy*, Canberra, June 2004; Australian Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs Defence and Trade, *From Phantom to Force: Towards a More Efficient and Effective Army*, Canberra, 4 September 2000; Australian Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs Defence and Trade, *A Model for a New Army: Community Comments on the 'From Phantom to Force' Parliamentary Report into the Army*, Canberra, September 2001; Australian Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs Defence and Trade, *Review of the Defence Annual Report 2001-02*, Canberra, September 2003; Australian Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs Defence and Trade, *Review of the Defence Annual Report 2002-03*, Canberra, August 2004. It is notable that little or no notice has been taken of them by the government or defence bureaucracy.

<sup>249</sup> Along with the rationales mentioned below, the focus of this thesis on the entire defence force also necessitated this division. A thesis focused on a series of individual acquisition decisions, rather than broad policy, might well be able to use a different division between formulation and implementation.

<sup>250</sup> Operations, while a type of implementation, are not covered in this chapter.

Some might hold that such an approach commits an error in assuming a top-down policy process, which does not always exist in reality. This is not the case. While decisions in the aftermath of a major policy document may not seem to be particularly well founded on the prescriptions of that document, they are still implementation: they are merely bad implementation. The formal structure of the defence policy-making process makes it clear that decisions on equipment and organisation should flow from strategic guidance. By treating such as implementation, the distinction between good and bad implementation can be made.

However, it is a difficult issue. High level defence policy can be unclear. There is not a theoretically neat process, whereby strategy is developed, then passed onto the services for their analysis and development of proposals; rather there is a steady exchange of ideas and concepts. This is further confused by the various layers of the services, corporate defence force, civilian bureaucracy, and political leadership. A proposal for a new concept of operations could be perceived as implementation of strategic policy, either good or bad, or even an attempt to formulate new defence policy by influencing senior actors.

It is not the goal of this thesis to devise a precise theoretical approach to defence policy formulation and implementation; approximations and commonsense must suffice. Lastly, it should be emphasised that this chapter has already touched upon implementation at points where it examined the roles of various actors, who often participate in both formulation and implementation. This is held to be a more logical approach to writing than separating the various roles of a single actor into different sections of the chapter.

## **Defence Processes**

After the above actor-centric treatment, it is illustrative to examine, briefly, three types of defence policy process, and see how the various elements work together. These are: acquisitions and upgrades; the production of defence reviews; and deployments.

New equipment proposals are initiated in both countries within the services (or sub-branches of the services), either to meet strategic guidance or to fulfil service desires. They are then passed into the central defence bureaucracy. In Australia, this is the ADOD, in New Zealand, the NZDF first, then the MOD. If they are approved at

this stage, they are passed onto Cabinet, or a Cabinet sub-committee. If approved, they pass onto the implementation bodies noted above. If not approved, they may remain in the planning system for some time. It can take years for a proposal to move from the service through to Cabinet, and several more years before equipment enters service. As such, at times the link between strategic policy and acquisition can appear strained.

Defence reviews are initiated from the top, usually at the behest of the Defence Minister. Usually primary responsibility for them rests with the Secretary of Defence, and both the civilian bureaucracy and uniformed defence force work together to produce the final result. However, as later chapters will show, there are a large number of variables that alter the specifics of the review process.

Deployments are also initiated from the top. Usually, the Prime Minister or Defence Minister will discuss possible responses to a situation with the CDF, and then decide as to what capability they wish to send. Once that decision has been made, it is the responsibility of the various operational headquarters to implement the decision.

## **Summary**

This chapter has utilised the modified funnel taxonomy developed in Chapter One to examine the respective defence policy-making systems of Australia and New Zealand. By and large, their congruencies outnumber their differences. Thus, it is perhaps most illustrative to recap the differences, rather than the similarities.

First, the two differ in their strategic situations. Australia has a historical sense of vulnerability as well as a location that is more exposed to threat. This imposes certain demands upon the policy-making structure. In relation to the simplified model of policy-making used, this means there is a difference at the foundational, fundamental level of the two nations' defence policy-making systems.

Second, the two differ slightly in the high level structures of their bureaucracy and defence forces. Whereas Australia has a diarchy of shared authority, the specifics of which are determined by occasional Ministerial correspondence, New Zealand has a functional separation, softened by informal arrangements. When correlated to the theoretical approach used, this creates difference at the level of initial policy-formulation and acceptance.

Third, the Australian Parliament, with its upper house, is less vulnerable to executive control than is New Zealand's. This means that in an exceptional case, funding for defence might be blocked, although this has yet to happen. Again, when correlated to the theoretical approach used, this can be seen as a difference at the level of policy-acceptance.

Fourth, the Australian defence policy-making system is dominated more by civilian bureaucrats than is the New Zealand system. The latter is dominated more by politicians. This creates difference at the level of initial policy-formulation.

Fifth, the New Zealand system is markedly smaller than the Australian. There are far fewer policy analysts involved. This might result in a lesser amount of expertise within New Zealand, or perhaps a greater tendency to conformity as there are fewer areas from which innovation might develop.

Sixth, political attitudes towards defence differ. Australian political parties are, by and large, more pro-defence than their New Zealand counterparts. And, although differences have developed in recent years, there is a greater bipartisan accord on defence in Australia than there is in New Zealand.

Lastly, the two differ in the amount of funding they grant defence, although Australia has not been so liberal as is commonly believed. This attitude towards funding stems largely from the first difference mentioned above, a differing sense of security.

In conclusion, the two defence policy-making structures are comparable. The external environment, military history, the opinions of the public, interest groups, and political parties combine to provide influences on the bureaucracies and services. These latter systems in turn develop policy within a specific political environment, knowing the approximate intentions of their elected masters. Policy then passes to the Minister of Defence, who has some authority to accept or modify policy, but who in many cases must refer major decisions to Cabinet. It is Cabinet that is the most crucial of all the decision makers. Parliament's role is limited to that of voting funds and facilitating debate, and given that defence funding is usually voted as part of the governmental budget, it is almost unthinkable that Parliament could act as a major obstruction to defence policy.

This chapter has illustrated the environment within which defence policy is made, and briefly summarised the roles and influences of the various actors involved. The following chapters build on this static description, by examining the defence

policy process in the post-Cold War period, showing how in practise the various elements of the policy-making system have interacted.

# Chapter Five – New Zealand Defence Policy Since 1991

## Introduction

This chapter is a chronological treatment of New Zealand defence policy since 1991. It is focused on the major policy reviews of that period, but also examines other occurrences, such as changes to doctrine, major acquisitions, and major reorganisations. It is felt that major defence reviews provide the best expressions of the perceptions of policymakers as they have attempted to deal with the post-Cold War period.

Each defence review is analysed in similar fashion, utilising the framework developed and noted in Chapter One, although the actual division in the narrative of this chapter is slightly changed. The system is as follows:

1. Introduction
2. International Context
3. Domestic Political Context
4. Defence Force Issues
5. Themes and Actors
6. Process of Review
7. Result
8. Summary and Analysis
9. Aftermath

First, the introduction gives a brief summary of the document, foreshadowing further analysis. Second, there is a discussion of the international context, including major world events and the general security situation. Third, the domestic political context is analysed, and the attitudes of the various political parties towards defence summarised. This section also notes the timing of elections and the general economic health of the country. These sections illustrate the broad context of the review.

The closer context of the review is established by a section on defence force issues. This looks at the state of the defence force at the time of the review. It notes recent or ongoing acquisitions, the state of readiness or training, recent or ongoing operations, and any other defence force happenings. This section avoids, however, discussion of defence force events during the process of the review that had an impact on the review itself; these are covered later. This selection thus illustrates the narrow context of the review.

The following section analyses the themes and actors of the review. This includes the motivation and scope of the review, the issues discussed during the review, and the defence discourse of the time. It also discusses the personnel and organisations involved in the review process.

Then, the process of the review itself is analysed. Where possible, phases are identified, but due to limitations of evidence this is not always clear. Major interim reports are noted and analysed, as are the various stages of acceptance. This section also examines issues involving the defence force that had an effect on the course of the review.

The next section describes the result of the review. The final published document is analysed, with its various policy goals mentioned, as well as the perceived roles of the defence force.

Then, the review in total is summarised and analysed. The major points of the review are recapped, and comment is made about the nature of the process. Links or discontinuities with earlier policy are made clear. However, by and large qualitative evaluation – whether a review was “good” or “bad” – is avoided during this chapter.

It is important then to examine the aftermath of the review, and attempt to identify how the review was actually implemented. This includes discussion of acquisitions, reorganisations, and any other force structure changes that followed the review. These are not always linked to the review; in some cases reorganisations or acquisitions are long-term processes, and while they may be fulfilled immediately after the completion of a particular review, are not the result of that review. The aftermath of each review blends into the context of the following review, so there is a “blurred line” between each document. It is impossible to cut a continual narrative into neatly defined pieces, but an attempt is made to at least differentiate between major phases of the defence policy process.

A study of New Zealand defence policy during the post-Cold War period can validly be divided into two phases: National policy from 1992 to 1999, and subsequent Labour policy. National policy was characterised by conservatism and a gradual decline in capability, whereas Labour policy has been characterised by a small increase in funding and signs of innovation. The following chapter is thus divided into two main sections, each examining one of the aforementioned phases.

## **Phase One – Policy under National 1992-1999**

### **A Steady Decline – Budget and Capability Cuts 1992-1995**

From 1992 until 1995, the NZDF underwent a steady decline in capability, due largely to substantial reductions in the defence budget. Throughout this period the discourse on defence was dominated by economic considerations.

A major cut to defence funding was announced in the FY92 budget.<sup>1</sup> For 1991/1992, the budget would be cut by 10%, with subsequent cuts of 12% for the two years following.<sup>2</sup> Up to 960 personnel were to be laid off. This was perhaps the first year that New Zealand took a “peace dividend” from the end of the Cold War, and was the first year of a steady decline in NZDF capability.

The cut impacted on all three services.<sup>3</sup> The RNZAF reduced its EEZ-patrol flights from 118 to 78 per annum, and instituted an establishment review to deal with reduced funding. This review resulted in a general reduction of flying hours and personnel numbers, and a reorganisation of infrastructure.<sup>4</sup> The RNZN reduced its frigate and tanker at-sea days by 50%. The Army’s readiness was reduced due to personnel shortages. HQNZDF was also downsized substantially.<sup>5</sup>

Despite the size of these cuts, there was still public pressure for more, due to New Zealand’s economic recession. In early 1992, the right-wing interest group Business Roundtable propounded the concept of “least cost security”, and asked for a

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<sup>1</sup> Unknown Author, 'Defence Spending Cut', *Royal New Zealand Air Force News*, June/July 1991.

<sup>2</sup> Roger Foley, 'NZ budget cut by 10%', *Jane's Defence Weekly*, 10 August 1991.

<sup>3</sup> Roger Foley, 'Budget cuts curb defence operations', *The Evening Post*, 20 August 1992.

<sup>4</sup> Unknown Author, 'RNZAF Establishment Review results in 490 jobs cut', *RNZAF News*, December/January 1992.

<sup>5</sup> Roger Foley, 'Defence HQ staff level falls 60pc', *The Evening Post*, 24 June 1992.

major re-evaluation of New Zealand's defence needs.<sup>6</sup> The Minister of Defence, however, did not respond.

The 1991 White Paper had initiated a range of force structure reviews, which were not completed for some time.<sup>7</sup> The Air Combat Needs Review was delayed by the need for major consultation with Australia,<sup>8</sup> and was not completed until March 1992. It suggested several options for the future, including the dissolution of the Air Combat Force.<sup>9</sup> The Land Force Reserves Review was also not completed until March 1992. In July 1992, these reviews were examined by Cabinet.<sup>10</sup> In December 1992, the larger Land Force Review was finally concluded.<sup>11</sup> These reviews all largely recommended the status quo.

The Air and Sea Transport Review, however, recommended that the NZDF obtain a military sealift ship based on a commercial roll-on-roll-off design,<sup>12</sup> a recommendation that ended with the purchase of HMNZS *Charles Upham* some years later. It also recommended a future rationalisation of the air transport fleet.

Building on DONZ91 and the 1992 force structure reviews, in February 1993, the MOD and NZDF together produced the *Long Term Force Structure and Consolidated Resource Plan* (also known as the Defence Consolidated Resource Plan or DCRP). This was designed to map future capability acquisition over the following decade.<sup>13</sup>

The DCRP was a 10-year plan. It noted the Army exceeded the credible minimum and needed restructuring. It noted the Skyhawk fleet needed upgrading, and the helicopter fleet enlargement. It prioritised a range of defence roles.<sup>14</sup> Notably, maritime patrol was regarded as being more important than conventional operations,

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<sup>6</sup> Roger Foley, 'Cooper critical of Roundtable's defence ideas', *The Evening Post*, 15 April 1992.

<sup>7</sup> Headquarters New Zealand Defence Force and New Zealand Ministry of Defence, *Review of New Zealand's Combat Air Power Requirements*, Wellington, 1992; New Zealand Defence Force and New Zealand Ministry of Defence, *Land Force Review Study: Phase II*, Wellington, 10 December 1992; New Zealand Defence Force and New Zealand Ministry of Defence, *Review of Land Force Reserves*, Wellington, 30 June 1992.

<sup>8</sup> Unknown Author, 'Air combat needs review delayed', *The Dominion*, 21 October 1991.

<sup>9</sup> Paul East, Parliamentary Question 8736, 6 May 1997, Wellington.

<sup>10</sup> Roger Foley, 'Defence reviews go to Cabinet committee', *The Evening Post*, 15 July 1992.

<sup>11</sup> Paul East, Parliamentary Question 8735, 6 May 1997, Wellington.

<sup>12</sup> Warren Cooper, Parliamentary Question 7847, 6 December 1994, Wellington. and New Zealand Ministry of Defence, *Review of Defence - Air and Sea Transport*, Volume 1, Wellington, 1992. p.xvi-xvii

<sup>13</sup> Office of the Controller and Auditor General, *HMNZS Charles Upham: Report on Concerns Raised by the Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Committee*, 24 September 1998. p.17

<sup>14</sup> New Zealand Minister of Defence, *The Long Term Force Structure and Consolidated Resources Plan of the New Zealand Defence Force*, Letter to Chair, Cabinet Committee on External Relations, Defence and Security, Wellington, 19 February 1993. Annex A p.iv-vi

but traditional non-core roles such as peacekeeping and civil tasks remained a low priority.

The DCRP was costed by the MOD and NZDF at approximately 6.1 billion NZD over twenty years.<sup>15</sup> Treasury suggested slightly different figures, but predicted the DCRP would require an increase in the NZDF capital budget of 1 billion NZD over the period.<sup>16</sup> Perhaps in relation to this cost, the DCRP also recommended the production of a booklet to educate the public about the role of defence and forestall criticism.<sup>17</sup>

However, the DCRP was rejected by Cabinet, which instead said that each acquisition would be brought forward in the normal way.<sup>18</sup> This was directly linked to concerns over funding and the public response to any such long-term plan.

During 1993, there was some concern over the capability of the NZDF in this environment of fiscal austerity.<sup>19</sup> The Minister of Defence, Warren Cooper, publicly defended the force against both those who wanted it enlarged, and those who wanted it reduced.<sup>20</sup> He called it a “no frills” force, one that fulfilled the bare minimum of New Zealand’s security needs. In the latter part of the year, the CDF stated that the NZDF was “pared to the bone” and that continuing high operational tempo would further reduce capability.<sup>21</sup> Fiscal pressures were becoming extreme; in the four fiscal years to 1993/1994 the defence budget had been reduced by 812.5 million NZD, or the greater part of a single year’s funding.<sup>22</sup>

During the 1993 election campaign, defence was only of minor importance. Domestic issues were of far greater concern, especially as the New Zealand economy continued to struggle. In June, Labour suggested that the NZDF could be closer integrated with the civil defence infrastructure for superior performance in disaster relief.<sup>23</sup> Labour also suggested a review of the Anzac purchase, and the possibility of

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<sup>15</sup> Ibid. Annex A p.vi

<sup>16</sup> Ibid. p.9

<sup>17</sup> Ibid. p.11

<sup>18</sup> New Zealand Cabinet External Relations and Defence Committee, 'The Long Term Force Structure and Consolidated Resource Plan of the New Zealand Defence Force', ERD(93)M5/1, 7 April 1993, Wellington. p.1

<sup>19</sup> Unknown Author, 'Defence cuts a worry', *The Dominion*, 11 October 1993. H.B. Cockburn, *Defence 2000: Is the NZDF Ready to Meet the 21st Century?*, Whenuapai: RNZAF Command and Staff College, 1993. and I.R. McClelland, *Civilianisation: A 9 to 5 Defence Force*, Whenuapai: RNZAF Command and Staff College, 1994.

<sup>20</sup> Warren Cooper, 'No-frills force guards Pacific's triple star', *The Evening Post*, 6 May 1993.

<sup>21</sup> Andrew Stone, 'Warning over further defence cuts', *The New Zealand Herald*, 29 December 1993.

<sup>22</sup> Ibid.

<sup>23</sup> Martyn Gosling, 'Military and civil defence could share roles', *The Dominion*, 16 June 1993.

making the frigates more suitable for civil defence roles.<sup>24</sup> National's defence policy was not markedly different to Labour's, although it was more positive about defence alliances and further purchases of Anzac frigates.<sup>25</sup>

In March 1994, Cabinet received a further report on the DCRP, noting that additional expenditure would be needed over the next three years if the plan were to be fulfilled, and that input from other departments was necessary.<sup>26</sup>

In November 1994, several new equipment proposals were sent to Cabinet for noting: the rewinging of the Orions, the Hercules self-protection upgrade, the purchase of naval helicopters, and the military sealift ship.<sup>27</sup> The MOD and NZDF felt that these proposals were affordable within depreciation expenditure, but wanted the baseline budget slightly increased for surety. However, the decision to purchase the military sealift ship recommended by the Air and Sealift Review of 1992 was delayed due to funding shortfalls.<sup>28</sup>

There was occasional public criticism of National's management of defence at this time,<sup>29</sup> but little real interest. There was, however, a suggestion of disagreement within National<sup>30</sup> as to whether New Zealand should focus more on peacekeeping and UN operations rather than more traditional operations.<sup>31</sup>

More visible than these acquisitions and policy manoeuvres was the deployment of NZDF personnel to Bosnia as part of UNPROFOR in early 1994. The National Government was strongly supportive of involvement, especially after New Zealand's stint on the UN Security Council, but other parties were less keen.<sup>32</sup>

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<sup>24</sup> Mike Munro, 'Labour looks outward', *The Dominion*, 13 November 1993.

<sup>25</sup> Simon Kilroy, 'Into Asia but side-stepping Anzus', *The Dominion*, 29 October 1993.

<sup>26</sup> New Zealand Cabinet Strategy Subcommittee on Defence and External Relations, 'Briefing on Defence Consolidated Resource Plan [A]', SDE(94)M1/4, 9 March 1994, Wellington. p.1

<sup>27</sup> New Zealand Cabinet Strategy Subcommittee on Defence and External Relations, 'Defence Capital Equipment Proposals: Officials' Report on Financial Issues', SDE(94)46, 21 November 1994, Wellington. p.1-2

<sup>28</sup> New Zealand Ministry of Defence and New Zealand Defence Force, *Folder - Further Information Relating to the Charles Upham*, Wellington, 2000. Foreword; Warren Cooper, Parliamentary Question 7848, 6 December 1994, Wellington.

<sup>29</sup> John Robertson, 'Where are we going on defence policy?' *The New Zealand Herald*, 28 January 1994.; Graeme Hunt, 'NZ's decision to "go ANZAC" fools no one', *National Business Review*, 29 April 1994.

<sup>30</sup> Unknown Author, 'Breaking ranks on defence', *The Evening Post*, 25 March 1994.

<sup>31</sup> Unknown Author, 'NZ better off in UN than Anzus - Graham', *The Dominion*, 22 March 1994.

<sup>32</sup> Zhivan Alach, 'Peace Support Operations: International Evolution and New Zealand Adaptation', MA, University of Auckland, 2002. p.153-156

The operation demonstrated the NZDF's capability shortcomings.<sup>33</sup> NZDF APCs could not respond when targeted, due to a lack of range. Frustrations were experienced with the size of the deployment; it was noted that there were "inherent difficulties involved in being part of another country's contribution." There was a belief amongst some that New Zealand might need to consider larger deployments to future PSOs if those contributions were to be effective and efficient.<sup>34</sup> Later, the Minister defended the performance and equipment of the deployment in Parliament.<sup>35</sup>

In May 1995, there was a shift in National's defence policy, with a new focus on UN commitment, and a new perception of the NZDF as part of New Zealand's greater national role.<sup>36</sup> In November, Cabinet finally approved the purchase of *Charles Upham*, recommended in the 1992 Air and Sealift Review but delayed by funding issues.<sup>37</sup>

The pressure of attempting to maintain capability within the NZDF with declining funds began to tell. When challenged in Parliament in November 1995, the Minister of Defence admitted that the NZDF had failed to reach MLOC in eight important outputs.<sup>38</sup> In an attempt to save money, a Rationalisation Review was begun to enhance efficiency and effectiveness, especially in relation to logistics.<sup>39</sup>

The period from the production of DONZ91 to the Defence Assessment of 1996 was a period of budget cuts and capability reduction within the NZDF. There was a steady personnel decline in all three services and the Territorial force.<sup>40</sup> No major acquisitions, bar the *Charles Upham*, were authorised, and the Government was for the most part opposed to the purchase of new equipment, or the provision of long-term fiscal surety for the force – the refusal to approve the DCRP being a case in point. The NZDF underwent a steady process of rationalisation, the goal being internal efficiency gains and cost savings. By 1996, the NZDF had declined

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<sup>33</sup> The following is taken from A.M. Hayward, 'The Challenges of UN Service for the NZDF', Paper presented at the Conference on New Zealand's Strategic Environment, Military Studies Institute Trentham, 1996.

<sup>34</sup> See A.M. Greathead, *New Zealand Defence Force: A Credible Contributor to New Zealand's Foreign Policy?*, Whenuapai: RNZAF Command and Staff College, 1995. for a contemporary discussion of the issues.

<sup>35</sup> Paul East, Parliamentary Question 3695, 29 April 1996, Wellington.

<sup>36</sup> Ruth Laugen, 'National changes philosophy on defence', *The Dominion*, 17 May 1995.

<sup>37</sup> New Zealand Ministry of Defence and New Zealand Defence Force, *Folder - Further Information Relating to the Charles Upham*. - Foreword

<sup>38</sup> Warren Cooper, Parliamentary Question 8718, 22 November 1995, Wellington.

<sup>39</sup> Leanne Woon, 'The New Zealand Defence Force - How Does It Stack Up?' *Army Logician*, March/April 2004. p.30

<sup>40</sup> Paul East, Parliamentary Question 9609, 22 May 1997, Wellington.; Warren Cooper, Parliamentary Question 5859, 5 October 1994, Wellington.

substantially from its 1991 position, when measured against a framework of effectiveness, rather than efficiency.

### **The 1996 Defence Assessment and 1997 Defence White Paper Process**

The 1997 Defence White Paper, *Shape of New Zealand's Defence* (SONZ97), was the culmination of a protracted defence review process. The White Paper itself was the publically released version of a longer, classified Defence Assessment (DA97).<sup>41</sup> The process encompassed eighteen months from March 1996 to November 1997.<sup>42</sup>

#### *International Context*

Since the publication of DONZ91, the international environment had changed substantially.<sup>43</sup> Ethnic and tribal conflict was increasing in areas as widespread as Europe, Africa and East Asia. The White Paper itself noted “we are in a time of transition... (featuring) conflict within states... (and an) increase in peacekeeping operations.”<sup>44</sup> The security outlook in the Asia Pacific was positive, with the Asian Tigers experiencing very high economic growth rates, resulting in a region both stable and prosperous.<sup>45</sup> China was emerging as a major power, not merely in the region but also globally, at least partly due to the reduction in Russia's relative influence.

#### *Domestic Political Context*

At the beginning of the review process, National ruled as a single party majority; by the end it was the dominant partner of a two-party coalition. The New Zealand economy was in a much stronger state than it had been in 1991, when

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<sup>41</sup> New Zealand Ministry of Defence, 'Defence Assessment', July? 1997, Wellington. and New Zealand Government, *The Shape of New Zealand's Defence*, Wellington, November 1997.

<sup>42</sup> The start point being taken as New Zealand Cabinet Strategy Subcommittee, 'Defence Planning and Funding: The Current Situation and the Way Ahead [B]', SCS(96)M6/3, 13 March 1996, Wellington. which directed the production of a comprehensive defence assessment.

<sup>43</sup> The following is taken from Terence O'Brien, 'Defence in the 21st century', *The Dominion*, 30 April 1997.

<sup>44</sup> New Zealand Government, *The Shape of New Zealand's Defence*. p.12-13

<sup>45</sup> *Ibid.* p.16

recession gripped the nation and major economies of public expenditure were required.<sup>46</sup>

Defence was not a major issue of the 1996 general election, which was the first fought under MMP. Few politicians were concerned about defence, or had any great appreciation about defence roles and missions.<sup>47</sup> All four major parties (National, Labour, Alliance, and New Zealand First) were focused on domestic and economic concerns, and while there were differences in defence policy these were not focused on, either by the parties or the media. In general, National supported a more traditionalist approach to defence, notwithstanding their May 1995 shift, based on alliances and the maintenance of high-end capabilities, whereas Labour and Alliance supported the UN and a greater “constabulary” role for defence forces.

Given the closed nature of the review process, domestic politics had little impact on it, bar shaping the initial guidance given by the Minister, and providing broad constraints on what was fiscally possible.

### *Defence Force Issues*

The defence force context of the defence review was problematic. As noted earlier, the NZDF had undergone a steady decline for several years, and thus by 1996 was reaching a point of crisis. Personnel attrition across the force was reaching 15-20% and some areas lacked the capacity to train necessary replacement.<sup>48</sup> Members of the RNZAF made public comments that that force might soon stop working due to personnel problems.<sup>49</sup> The NZDF annual report noted that many force elements were unable to reach MLOC. Some of these problems were related to pay, as there had been no increase since December 1990.<sup>50</sup>

In March 1996, the NZDF reported a funding shortfall to Cabinet.<sup>51</sup> It was expected that there would be a 19.5 million NZD deficit in 1996/1997, a 40 million

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<sup>46</sup> O'Brien, 'Defence in the 21st century'.

<sup>47</sup> Unknown Author, 'Few friends of defence under MMP - report', *The Evening Post*, 26 March 1996.

<sup>48</sup> New Zealand Defence Force, *Briefing Notes for the Minister of Defence*, Wellington, December 1996. p.10 and Unknown Author, 'Defence staffing near crisis', *RSA Review*, vol. LXXII, no. 6, December 1996.

<sup>49</sup> Hank Schouten, 'New Zealand Defence Crisis', *Australian Defence Magazine*, vol. 4, no. 11, November 1996. p.6 and Russell Stout, 'New government faces critical questions', *Asia-Pacific Defence Reporter*, vol. XXIII, no. 1, January 1997. p.36

<sup>50</sup> New Zealand Defence Force, *Briefing Notes for the Minister of Defence*. p.11

<sup>51</sup> New Zealand Cabinet Strategy Subcommittee, 'Defence Planning and Funding: The Current Situation and the Way Ahead [A]', CSC(96)35, 11 March 1996, Wellington.

NZD deficit in the following year, and increasing deficits thereafter. Earlier, it had been predicted that this shortfall would not develop until the end of the decade, but new calculations showed that by 1997/1998 the situation would be critical and large parts of the NZDF would need to be shut down. In response, the Minister authorised the preparation of a comprehensive defence assessment.

The NZDF was not put on hold during the preparation of the Defence Assessment. The acquisition process continued on, largely unchanged, although the acquisitions of direct fire support and anti-tank weapons, and tactical communications equipment, were delayed pending completion of the Defence Assessment.<sup>52</sup>

In June 1996 HMNZS *Charles Upham* undertook her first deployment,<sup>53</sup> which indicated shortcomings in the vessel's design. In July 1997, the first of the new Anzac frigates, HMNZS *Te Kaha*, was commissioned.<sup>54</sup>

In 1997, it was decided that Land Force Command and Support Command would be rationalised as the result of an internal study that reviewed all Army staff functions.<sup>55</sup> The Army also undertook the first stage of the Tekapo Manoeuvres, designed to allow the development of a strategic framework for the Army in the 21<sup>st</sup> century, to ensure New Zealand could adapt to the modern battlefield.<sup>56</sup>

The RNZAF's Andover fleet was sold off during 1996.<sup>57</sup> Soon after a programme was instituted within the RNZAF to re-educate personnel about the need for an Air Force.<sup>58</sup> During 1997, a variety of decisions on replacement maritime helicopters were made, with the end result being the approval of the Seasprite purchase.<sup>59</sup>

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<sup>52</sup> Interview with Former New Zealand Defence Official C, 9 June 2005. However this seems to contradict New Zealand Cabinet, 'Defence Interim Capital Plan', CAB(96)M19/23, 27 May 1996, Wellington. See also Paul East, Parliamentary Question 4513, 5 March 1997, Wellington; Paul East, Parliamentary Question 11782, 30 July 1997, Wellington.

<sup>53</sup> Paul East, Parliamentary Question 5512, 20 June 1996, Wellington.

<sup>54</sup> Max Bradford, Parliamentary Question 12419, 1 December 1998, Wellington.

<sup>55</sup> Piers Reid, 'Commands to form single HQ', *Army News*, no. 160, 2 September 1997. p.2

<sup>56</sup> Rick Ottaway, 'Tekapo Manoeuvres', *Army News*, no. 162, 30 September 1997. p.2 and Unknown Author, 'Consultants brief key people on Tekapo Manoeuvres', *Army News*, no. 164, 28 October 1997. p.3

<sup>57</sup> Unknown Author, 'Grateful multitudes will miss this remarkable aircraft', *Royal New Zealand Air Force News*, vol. II, July 1997. p.3

<sup>58</sup> Unknown Author, 'From the Chief's desk', *Royal New Zealand Air Force News*, vol. I, September 1997. p.3. This was perhaps more important than it seems at first glimpse. The fact that the RNZAF had to institute a programme for its staff to understand the reason for their existence seems to indicate a perceived lack of coherence in defence policy at the time.

<sup>59</sup> New Zealand Cabinet, 'Maritime Helicopters: Interim Replacement of Wasp by Used Seasprite Helicopters', CAB(97)M8/7, 10 March 1997, Wellington; New Zealand Cabinet, 'Replacement Maritime Helicopter Project', CAB(97)M8/6, 10 March 1997, Wellington; New Zealand Cabinet

Overall, despite these few acquisitions, the situation within the defence force verged on the critical. Funding shortfalls had accumulated, attrition was rising, and equipment was becoming obsolescent.

### *Themes and Actors*

It appears that the Defence Assessment was largely an exercise in financial management and force development, rather than a true strategic review developed from first principles. Primarily, the review process seems to have been initiated because of the backlog of problems noted earlier. One senior official involved with the review notes that the problems noted above had reached a critical mass, due to previous reduction of defence funding.<sup>60</sup> The Terms of Reference for the review stated clearly that the broad policy settings of DONZ91 were to remain,<sup>61</sup> suggesting that economic issues were more important. Also, the first Defence Assessment Progress report stated baldly that the review was initiated “as a result of a projected budget deficit”.<sup>62</sup>

Others, however, have deemphasised the fiscal pressures, noting that it had been five years since the last review and there was thus a need for a new strategic re-evaluation.<sup>63</sup> A third official has said there was a need to “cleanse the mind” and also confirm that force structure development was consistent with policy; there was some concern that the Ministry was coasting.<sup>64</sup> Yet another official has said that, although the Terms of Reference for the review were couched in strategic terms, it was motivated almost solely by financial concerns.<sup>65</sup>

The question thus arises as to whether economic or strategic concerns were pre-eminent. In defence of the hypothesis that it was primarily a strategic review, one senior official has noted that funding problems were apparent throughout the decade, not just in 1996/1997, and that they thus did not provide the immediate motivation for

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Strategy and Priorities Committee, 'Maritime Helicopters: Interim Replacement of Wasp by Used Seasprite Helicopters', CSP(97)M4/3, 5 March 1997, Wellington; New Zealand Cabinet Strategy and Priorities Committee, 'Replacement Maritime Helicopter Project [A]', CSP(97)22, 5 March 1997, Wellington.

<sup>60</sup> Interview with Former New Zealand Defence Official A, 26 January 2005.

<sup>61</sup> New Zealand Ministry of Defence, 'Defence Assessment'. p.i

<sup>62</sup> New Zealand Cabinet Strategy Subcommittee on External Relations and Defence, 'Defence Assessment: Progress Report [A]', ERD(97)4, 10 March 1997, Wellington. p.1

<sup>63</sup> Interview with New Zealand Defence Official B, 28 January 2005.

<sup>64</sup> Interview with New Zealand Defence Official D, 27 January 2005.

<sup>65</sup> Interview with Former New Zealand Defence Official E, 11 July 2005.

the review.<sup>66</sup> Yet is it notable that until that time, the NZDF had been able to live within its means, if barely, whereas a deficit was for the first time forecast for the 1997/1998 fiscal year.<sup>67</sup> It is possible that the reason for this difference of opinion comes from the differing positions of the participants.

The strongest answer to this question is that fiscal issues were indeed the most important, and strategic concerns were secondary. Impending block obsolescence created urgency, as major new procurement decisions would be required in the near future, and could only be justified by a clear statement of defence policy. Also, perhaps the dichotomy is a false one: some strategic issues were considered, but only within the broad framework of DONZ91; thus in a way both sides were correct.

Despite the fact that the review was bound by five-year-old policy settings, there was still a great deal to consider.<sup>68</sup> The major issues were related to force structure: the Air Combat Force, the Naval Combat Force, and the size of the land forces. Other issues were also examined: the importance of the RMA, the importance of PSOs, interoperability with Australia and the United States, and operational tempo.<sup>69</sup> The overall aim was to develop, based on the broad policy settings of DONZ91 and the legacy force, a range of costed force structure options for the future.

The review took little account of evolving strategic issues. The Secretary, who was the prime driver of the process, noted that the world had not changed enough to risk a re-examination of DONZ91 policy settings.<sup>70</sup> There was an awareness of change, but a general feeling that what this meant for New Zealand was difficult to determine,<sup>71</sup> and thus adaptation to such change might be flawed. There was a deep doctrinal belief that it was unwise to restructure for peace operations, despite the lessons of Bosnia,<sup>72</sup> but there was also an equivalent scepticism about RMA-paradigm military operations, and what they might actually mean for force structure.<sup>73</sup> The RMA was recognised as having an effect on command and communications, but little

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<sup>66</sup> Interview with New Zealand Defence Official D.

<sup>67</sup> New Zealand Defence Force, *Briefing Notes for the Minister of Defence*.

<sup>68</sup> Interview with Former New Zealand Defence Official E.

<sup>69</sup> These issues are derived from a broad reading of a range of Cabinet and Ministry documents as well as several interviews and are the author's view of the vital issues of the review process.

<sup>70</sup> Interview with Former New Zealand Defence Official A.

<sup>71</sup> Interview with New Zealand Defence Official D.

<sup>72</sup> Interview with New Zealand Defence Official B.

<sup>73</sup> Interview with Former New Zealand Defence Official A.

else.<sup>74</sup> Civil tasks were not a major issue, or a driver of capability decisions. It is interesting that both RMA-paradigm operations and PSOs were largely ignored.

The most important individual actor in the review process was the Secretary, Gerald Hensley. He was known as an academic and thinker.<sup>75</sup> One senior official has noted that Hensley already had a clear idea of what he hoped the review to achieve, and guided the process in that direction.<sup>76</sup> Hensley was keen to ensure that the end product of the review process would not be debated between departments.<sup>77</sup>

The Minister of Defence, Paul East, was not as involved, but was still the key link between the bureaucracy and Cabinet. He was an experienced MP, and held multiple portfolios;<sup>78</sup> thus the time he could devote to defence was limited. There was little involvement by other Ministers.<sup>79</sup>

While the Ministry of Defence was the lead agency, a wide range of other governmental organisations were involved.<sup>80</sup> An Interdepartmental Steering Committee headed by the Deputy Secretary (Policy) helped coordinate the other departments.<sup>81</sup> The corporate NZDF and the individual services were involved in close partnership with the MOD.<sup>82</sup> The Ministry and NZDF formed working level teams together. There were some separate responsibilities, such as resourcing, which was done entirely by Resources Branch NZDF.<sup>83</sup> The Ministry was more concerned with identifying requirements,<sup>84</sup> whereas the NZDF dominated the capability debate due to its greater institutional knowledge.<sup>85</sup> Development staffs were still service-linked, so the individual services were heavily involved. The service Chiefs were also the lead professional advisors to the CDF.<sup>86</sup> The services were steered through HQ NZDF and thus did not operate independently in the review process.<sup>87</sup> At times, the

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<sup>74</sup> Interview with New Zealand Defence Official D.

<sup>75</sup> Unknown Author, 'Gerald Hensley - Personal profile - Secretary of Defence', *Navy Today*, no. 18, December 1997.

<sup>76</sup> Interview with Former New Zealand Defence Official A.

<sup>77</sup> Interview with Former New Zealand Defence Official E.

<sup>78</sup> Unknown Author, 'Personal Profile - Paul East Minister of Defence', *Navy Today*, no. 16, October 1997. p.4

<sup>79</sup> Interview with Former New Zealand Defence Official E.

<sup>80</sup> The following is taken from: Interview with Former New Zealand Defence Official A; Interview with New Zealand Defence Official B; Interview with New Zealand Defence Official D.

<sup>81</sup> New Zealand Cabinet Strategy Subcommittee on External Relations and Defence, 'Defence Assessment: Progress Report [A]'. – Attachment p.12

<sup>82</sup> Interview with Former New Zealand Defence Official A.

<sup>83</sup> Interview with Former New Zealand Defence Official A.

<sup>84</sup> Interview with New Zealand Defence Official D.

<sup>85</sup> Interview with New Zealand Defence Official B.

<sup>86</sup> Interview with New Zealand Defence Official D.

<sup>87</sup> Interview with New Zealand Defence Official B.

three services were concerned with the protection of existing capabilities, leading to disagreements.<sup>88</sup> At other times, various members of the services promoted more innovative concepts.<sup>89</sup>

Treasury was heavily involved at every level. Its primary concern was fiscal economy, and at times it paid close attention to parts of the review, even modelling the size of the Naval Combat Force. MFAT was involved, with its major concern the effect of any change in defence policy on New Zealand's foreign relations, and its opinions were usually congruent with those of the NZDF.<sup>90</sup> Other minor actors included the Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet, which kept an overall eye on the process and ensured co-ordination with general policy, and the State Services Commission. There was very little involvement by external analysts.<sup>91</sup>

Generally, there was not a great deal of tension between the various actors, although it was notable that Treasury's constant concern with cost issues was not always regarded positively by the other actors. There was general agreement between the major actors as to the structure of the defence force, and few advocated major change or restructuring. The one area where disagreement primarily occurred was fiscal.

### *Process of Review*

The Defence Assessment was initiated by the Cabinet Strategy Subcommittee, on 13 March 1996,<sup>92</sup> in response to a Cabinet paper presented two days earlier.<sup>93</sup> Originally it was intended that the review would be largely finished by January 1997.<sup>94</sup> However, the final White Paper, *Shape of New Zealand's Defence* (SONZ97), was only finished in November 1997. These delays were largely the result of internal factors including staff turnover.<sup>95</sup>

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<sup>88</sup> Interview with Former New Zealand Defence Official E.

<sup>89</sup> Interview with Former New Zealand Defence Official E.

<sup>90</sup> Interview with Former New Zealand Defence Official E.

<sup>91</sup> G.A. Vignaux, *The Navy Critical Mass Argument*, Revision 2, Wellington: Victoria University of Wellington, 19 July 1997.

<sup>92</sup> New Zealand Cabinet Strategy Subcommittee, 'Defence Planning and Funding: The Current Situation and the Way Ahead [B]'.

<sup>93</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>94</sup> New Zealand Cabinet Strategy Subcommittee on External Relations and Defence, 'Defence Assessment: Progress Report [A]'. Attachment p.12

<sup>95</sup> Interview with New Zealand Defence Official B.

The first task was to develop Interdepartmental Terms of Reference, with Hensley determined the review would cover only capabilities and affordability.<sup>96</sup> This entailed negotiations with Treasury, who were determined that it would be a full-scale policy review from first principles, which in turn might develop into greater funding cuts. However, the Minister of Defence was not pushing in that direction, and there was no interest from either the Ministry or the NZDF to re-evaluate national strategy in the absence of such political guidance. Final Terms of Reference for the review were agreed on 24 April 1996.<sup>97</sup> Importantly, and as briefly noted earlier, these were based on the strategy of self-reliance in partnership propounded by DONZ91.<sup>98</sup> They were:

To develop a range of force structure options that will permit the Government to make decisions on balancing New Zealand's defence effort with an appropriate level of resources to meet New Zealand's security requirements.<sup>99</sup>

The first phase of the review process was designed to outline strategic requirements.<sup>100</sup> This involved the development of nine strategic issue papers by various organisations.<sup>101</sup> It was intended to link this strategic analysis to a range of force structure options. Unfortunately, this linkage was not done particularly well, and there was little attention paid to the immediate level, that of identifying specific roles for the NZDF.<sup>102</sup> A further problem was the fact that the mission requirements developed by the review team were not approved formally by the political leadership,

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<sup>96</sup> Interview with Former New Zealand Defence Official A.

<sup>97</sup> New Zealand Cabinet Strategy Subcommittee on External Relations and Defence, 'Defence Assessment [A]', ERD(97)18, 19 September 1997, Wellington. Attachment p.2

<sup>98</sup> Ibid. Attachment p.10

<sup>99</sup> New Zealand Cabinet Strategy Subcommittee on External Relations and Defence, 'Defence Assessment: Progress Report [A]'. Attachment p.9

<sup>100</sup> Interview with Former New Zealand Defence Official E. See also Russell Stout, 'Improving defence forces gaining in public support', *Asia-Pacific Defence Reporter*, vol. XXIII, no. 4, June-July 1997. p.11. While not an official document, his summary of the phases of the process meshes well with that concluded by the author from interviews and documentary evidence.

<sup>101</sup> New Zealand Cabinet Strategy Subcommittee on External Relations and Defence, 'Defence Assessment: Progress Report [A]'. – Attachment p.11

<sup>102</sup> Interview with Former New Zealand Defence Official E.

but instead merely noted.<sup>103</sup> During this time the MOD took a greater role than the NZDF, due to the nature of the analysis being undertaken.

A progress report was given to Cabinet in December 1996.<sup>104</sup> In January 1997, the Ministry noted that the assessment would be delayed up to two months because while the broader requirements of defence had been identified, force structure options were still being analysed.<sup>105</sup>

On 10 March 1997, a Defence Assessment Progress Report was given to the Cabinet Strategy Subcommittee on External Relations and Defence (CSSERD). It noted that the phases of strategic analysis and government requirements for defence had been completed.<sup>106</sup> Defence, it said, was at a turning point. Its interim conclusion was that DONZ91 remained a valid framework.<sup>107</sup> New Zealand had five broad defence requirements: naval combatants, maritime patrol and air attack, land and special forces, strategic air and sealift, and a range of more specialised capabilities.<sup>108</sup> It noted that these requirements had been provisionally agreed interdepartmentally.<sup>109</sup> Three days later CSSERD noted the report and directed officials to prepare a further submission for April.<sup>110</sup> By this time the RNZN, was already concerned that the force structure options being developed were not thoroughly costed.<sup>111</sup>

After a briefing in April on the progress of the Defence Assessment, which included comparison of the various force structure options being developed, CSSERD directed officials to report back with the pros and cons of each position.<sup>112</sup> Option A involved the maintenance of four frigates, the retention of the ACW, and the retention of the Army. Other options involved reductions in various areas both large and small; Option C4, for example, would reduce the RNZN by one frigate but maintain all other

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<sup>103</sup> Interview with Former New Zealand Defence Official A.

<sup>104</sup> New Zealand Cabinet Strategy Subcommittee on External Relations and Defence, 'Defence Assessment [A]'. Attachment p.2

<sup>105</sup> Hank Schouten, 'Officials admit defence review delayed', *The Evening Post*, 23 January 1997.

<sup>106</sup> New Zealand Cabinet Strategy Subcommittee on External Relations and Defence, 'Defence Assessment: Progress Report [A]'. p.1

<sup>107</sup> Ibid. Attachment p.3-5. Given the fact that the TOR for the review had required the retention of DONZ91 settings it is unclear why they were then tested; perhaps this interim conclusion was not, in fact, the product of analysis, but rather a statement of belief.

<sup>108</sup> Ibid. Attachment p.5

<sup>109</sup> Ibid. Attachment p.5-7

<sup>110</sup> New Zealand Cabinet Strategy Subcommittee on External Relations and Defence, 'Defence Assessment: Progress Report [B]', ERD(97)M1/3, 13 March 1997, Wellington. p.1-2

<sup>111</sup> Royal New Zealand Navy Naval Staff and Jack Welch, *DA96 - Infrastructure Costs Policy Baseline Option*, NA1001-0014, 25 March 1997.

<sup>112</sup> New Zealand Cabinet Strategy Subcommittee on External Relations and Defence, 'Briefing on Defence Assessment [C]', ERD(97)M2/2, 22 April 1997, Wellington.

capabilities. Already there was growing support for Option C4 from some quarters, although the RNZN was slightly opposed.<sup>113</sup>

In June 1997, another substantial report on the progress of the Defence Assessment was provided to CSSERD.<sup>114</sup> This report noted that there was not yet an agreed interdepartmental position on the total review.<sup>115</sup> However, a range of options had been developed. Certain parts of the force structure: the size of the NCF, the size of the ACW, the airlift fleet, and the size and number of the infantry battalions – had been treated as variables.<sup>116</sup> The progress report noted that the most likely tasks the NZDF faced were PSOs, resource protection, and defence diplomacy, but that the force needed to retain capability for future contingencies.<sup>117</sup>

In response, CSSERD directed that only three options were to be further developed and analysed – A, C1 and C4 – the three most capable of the six options.<sup>118</sup> However, they also directed that the final Defence Assessment was to include all six options as illustration of analysis.

On 18 September 1997, another progress report on the Defence Assessment was presented to Cabinet.<sup>119</sup> This recommended a refined C4. Under this plan, the RNZN would drop to a three frigate fleet, an extra rifle company would be added to each battalion, and the ACW would be maintained. Original versions specified that the replacement for *Canterbury* would be an Anzac frigate, but handwritten notes indicate that this was not accepted.<sup>120</sup> It was noted that option C4 would mean a decline in capability, but would provide a starting point from which to rebuild.<sup>121</sup>

A meeting of the CSSERD on 22 September 1997 decided to present the draft Defence Assessment to Cabinet a week later. It also directed officials to commence

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<sup>113</sup> Piers Reid, *DA's Military Evaluation of Options - Letter to AC Dev*, Army 1001/2: Army General Staff, 21 May 1997; Royal New Zealand Navy Naval Staff and K.F. Wilson, *DA96 - Options Comparison*, NA1001-0014, 12 May 1997. although New Zealand Army General Staff, *Comment on DA 96 Phase Three: Options Comparison: 'Technical Issues'*, Army 1001/2, 15 May 1997. This notes some Army concerns about terminology.

<sup>114</sup> New Zealand Cabinet Strategy Subcommittee on External Relations and Defence, 'Briefing on Defence Assessment [A]', ERD(97)9, 6 June 1997, Wellington.

<sup>115</sup> Ibid. Attachment p.9

<sup>116</sup> Ibid. Attachment p.11

<sup>117</sup> Ibid. Attachment p.16

<sup>118</sup> Ibid. p.2

<sup>119</sup> New Zealand Cabinet Strategy Subcommittee on External Relations and Defence, 'Defence Assessment [A]'.  
<sup>120</sup> Ibid. p.2 – the author's copy has very clear deletions.

<sup>121</sup> Ibid. Attachment p.4

work on a public White Paper.<sup>122</sup> By this time further leaks had reached the public, pointing to major equipment decisions.<sup>123</sup>

The full Cabinet noted and deferred the conclusions and recommendations of the draft Defence Assessment on 29 September.<sup>124</sup> Further submissions were then made to Cabinet, and another meeting on 13 October resulted in further deferment.<sup>125</sup>

Final approval for the Defence Assessment came on 20 October 1997. The Cabinet agreed that the strategy of self-reliance in partnership, as stated in DONZ91, remained valid.<sup>126</sup> They agreed on the refined option C4 – three frigates, two four-company infantry battalions, an upgraded maritime patrol force, the Air Combat Force, and new transport aircraft.<sup>127</sup> They noted that the most immediate priority was the Army and the Orion upgrade. In relation to the public White Paper, they deferred a decision until 3 November, and directed officials to redraft the document to reflect Cabinet decisions and include commentary on surveillance of illegal fishing activities.<sup>128</sup>

The White Paper was revised and shortened per the instructions of Cabinet.<sup>129</sup> On 3 November Cabinet received a further draft, and asked for more editing.<sup>130</sup> However, authority for the final text was delegated to the Prime Minister, Deputy Prime Minister, Minister of Foreign Affairs and Trade, and the Minister of Defence rather than the full Cabinet.

In general, the review was carried out in a co-operative and joint fashion, which facilitated early agreement and avoided problems developing in the later stages. There was little tension between the Ministry and the NZDF, with only a “healthy” level of challenging of views.<sup>131</sup> The primary actors sometimes experienced frustration with the Treasury, and there were hints of tension between the services and

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<sup>122</sup> New Zealand Cabinet Strategy Subcommittee on External Relations and Defence, 'Defence Assessment [B]', ERD(97)M10, 22 September 1997, Wellington. p.1-2

<sup>123</sup> Bluejacket, 'In my opinion', *Navy Today*, no. 15, September 1997.

<sup>124</sup> New Zealand Cabinet, 'Defence Assessment [B]', CAB(97)M37/23, 29 September 1997, Wellington.

<sup>125</sup> New Zealand Cabinet, 'Defence Assessment [A]', CAB(97)M39/6, 13 October 1997, Wellington.

<sup>126</sup> New Zealand Cabinet, 'Defence Assessment [C]', CAB(97)M40/8A, 20 October 1997, Wellington. p.1

<sup>127</sup> *Ibid.* p.2

<sup>128</sup> New Zealand Cabinet, 'Defence Assessment: Draft White Paper', CAB(97)M40/8B, 20 October 1997, Wellington. p.2

<sup>129</sup> Office of the Minister of Defence, 'Revised Draft Defence White Paper', Linked to CAB(97)880, 20 October 1997, Wellington.

<sup>130</sup> New Zealand Cabinet, 'Defence Assessment: Revised Draft White Paper', CAB(97)M41/18, 3 November 1997, Wellington.

<sup>131</sup> Interview with New Zealand Defence Official D.

the corporate NZDF.<sup>132</sup> However, one official involved in the review has stated that there was no major disagreement between the services, as the service roles were expounded clearly and early.<sup>133</sup> It was, however, notable that the services put a great deal of effort into ensuring they would retain a voice at the policy table.<sup>134</sup>

In regards to funding, the main steering committee was involved in a number of debates.<sup>135</sup> There were difficulties in establishing exact costs. Treasury was particularly concerned that defence spending not be pegged to GDP.<sup>136</sup> Various versions of force structure were modelled and costed, and various ways of spreading the cost out over time were examined.<sup>137</sup> One official believes the estimates were not costed precisely and robustly, and that there was a significant underestimation of future costs.<sup>138</sup>

Treasury had some qualms as to the affordability of the final result; although they formally signed on, they were unsure that the capability plan, Annex A, could be achieved, and were proponents of a “depth over breadth” approach to capability.<sup>139</sup> It is notable that Annex A was not a formally approved Cabinet document.

Most of the actors, except perhaps Treasury, seemed inclined towards a conservative approach. The “Balanced Force” concept was regarded as the most suitable force structure for the NZDF.<sup>140</sup> The necessity to afford expensive units such as the Anzac frigates allowed little room for reorganisation proposals, and any discussion as to major restructuring and reorientation took place around the fringes of the review process.

The review process was lengthy and bureaucratic. The Government itself was not heavily involved with the process, and Ministerial involvement was limited.<sup>141</sup> The Minister received progress briefings but little else. One official noted that the Minister at the time took much less of an interest in the process than his predecessors

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<sup>132</sup> Interview with Former New Zealand Defence Official A; Interview with Former New Zealand Defence Official E.

<sup>133</sup> Interview with New Zealand Defence Official D.

<sup>134</sup> Interview with Former New Zealand Defence Official A; Interview with Former New Zealand Defence Official E.. See also Piers Reid, 'CGS's Christmas Message', *Army News*, no. 167, 16 December 1997. p.2 which notes the Army review team did a sound job on “our behalf”.

<sup>135</sup> Interview with Former New Zealand Defence Official A.

<sup>136</sup> Interview with Former New Zealand Defence Official A.

<sup>137</sup> Interview with New Zealand Defence Official D.

<sup>138</sup> Interview with New Zealand Defence Official B.

<sup>139</sup> Interview with Former New Zealand Defence Official A.

<sup>140</sup> Interview with New Zealand Defence Official B.

<sup>141</sup> Interview with New Zealand Defence Official D.

had.<sup>142</sup> Overall, the review process was a very in-house review with little external consultation.<sup>143</sup>

## *Result*

In November 1997, the White Paper was released to the public. As to be expected, given the nature of the review process, it noted that “for the near-to-medium term, New Zealand’s security interests are best served within a structural framework that has evolved over the past several decades.”<sup>144</sup> The document retained much of the broad sweep of the 1991 White Paper’s policy, dividing tasks into the defence of New Zealand, contributing to regional security, and involvement in global security.<sup>145</sup> Also retained was the concept of “self-reliance in partnership.” *SONZ97* noted:

There is no need for a new defence policy... there is nothing in the present strategic situation to indicate that this (major change) is necessary... it is not possible to do away with a major capability and still have a militarily effective (and credible) force.<sup>146</sup>

*SONZ97* listed five areas in which the NZDF might be involved:

1. New Zealand and Environs:
  - a. to prevent low level security challenges and deal effectively with any that may occur (e.g. sabotage, terrorism);
  - b. to assist the civil authorities in NZ and the SP in moving people away from situations of peril, minimising loss of life, and fulfilling international obligations for air and sea safety (disasters, law and order);
  - c. to preserve a force structure that provides a basis for responding to serious changes in NZ's strategic circumstances in the longer term,

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<sup>142</sup> Interview with New Zealand Defence Official B.

<sup>143</sup> David Dickens, *Letting Ordinary Kiwis In On Defence*, CSS Discussion Paper 03/99, Wellington: Centre for Strategic Studies, 1999. p.6-7; Interview with Former New Zealand Defence Official A; Interview with Former New Zealand Defence Official E; Interview with New Zealand Defence Official B; Interview with New Zealand Defence Official D.

<sup>144</sup> New Zealand Government, *The Shape of New Zealand's Defence*. p.6

<sup>145</sup> *Ibid.* p.7

<sup>146</sup> *Ibid.* p.53

as well as demonstrating a commitment to national defence that is sufficient to secure the support of others.

2. South Pacific:

- a. to play an appropriate role in the maintenance of stability and security in the SP and to assist in the economic development of the island states (including security under constitutional obligations, law and order, protect NZers.)

3. Australia:

- a. to contribute effectively to the common security of the Australia-NZ strategic area, both in the short and long term, by maintaining defence capabilities that are interoperable with those of Australia and that can look after NZ's fair share of the defence burden.

4. Asia Pacific:

- a. to make an appropriate contribution to the maintenance of security in the Asia-Pacific region by having a range of militarily effective capabilities that are interoperable with those of our allies and friends;
- b. to fulfil NZ's obligations under the FPDA;
- c. to ensure that NZ's contribution to regional security is valued by regional partners and contributes to NZ's standing in the region.

5. Globally:

- a. to demonstrate NZ's commitment to maintaining global security by having a suitable range of militarily effective capabilities that can contribute to collective security efforts in response to the development of a serious security threat;
- b. to fulfil NZ's obligations and responsibilities under the United Nations Charter by maintaining a suitable range of militarily effective capabilities that can participate in the full range of peace support and humanitarian relief operations;

- c. to contribute to NZ's image and standing in the world community.<sup>147</sup>

*SONZ97* stated that New Zealand had a wide range of security interests, and thus required a broad range of capabilities.<sup>148</sup> Due to the possibility of future instability, some military capabilities such as the Air Combat Wing needed to be retained, as there would not necessarily be enough time to rebuild them in the future.<sup>149</sup> It noted trends towards more complex peacekeeping, but stated that forces structured and trained for combat were the best suited to such operations, whereas “the reverse is not true.”<sup>150</sup> The NZDF would likely be more involved in Operations Other Than War than had previously been the case.<sup>151</sup> The RMA was mentioned as having implications for the NZDF, and while the NZDF did not need to match others it would need to make some contribution in this area.<sup>152</sup>

In relation to regional concerns, *SONZ97* stated that the security of the South Pacific would largely be ensured by non-military means, but it was important that New Zealand retained the capacity to operate in the region in low-level tasks.<sup>153</sup> It also noted the need to retain military capabilities to ensure relations with South East Asian nations.<sup>154</sup>

*SONZ97* analysed each part of the NZDF, identifying its role and its “critical mass”, the minimum size required to retain capability. For the Naval Combat Force, this was three surface combatants, for the Army, two Regular Force infantry battalions, and for the Air Combat Wing, eighteen aircraft.<sup>155</sup>

The Naval Combat Force was noted as providing “maritime surface capabilities”, thus contributing to New Zealand’s necessary maritime security.<sup>156</sup> The NCF would undertake a variety of tasks, including EEZ patrols, low-level contingencies, contributions to regional security, and contributions to collective security. It would maintain anti-surface, anti-submarine, surveillance and fire support

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<sup>147</sup> Ibid. p.24-25

<sup>148</sup> Ibid. p.30

<sup>149</sup> Ibid. p.29

<sup>150</sup> Ibid. p.27

<sup>151</sup> Ibid. p.26-27

<sup>152</sup> Ibid. p.28

<sup>153</sup> Ibid. p.21

<sup>154</sup> Ibid. p.16

<sup>155</sup> Ibid. p.30-31

<sup>156</sup> The following is taken from Ibid. p.40-44

capabilities. Because of the need for range and sea-keeping, it was noted that frigates were the smallest possible choice. The decision not to take on a fourth Anzac frigate was mentioned, but there was no mention of what might replace *Canterbury*.<sup>157</sup>

In regards to the Naval Support Force it was noted that reliance on an external source for sealift was unacceptable, and thus *Charles Upham* would have to serve.<sup>158</sup> It was also noted that the credibility of New Zealand's defence policy relied on the air and sea lift capacity to deploy and sustain forces.<sup>159</sup>

Land Forces would be required to operate in a full spectrum of operations, and provide two Regular Force battalions in a brigade structure.<sup>160</sup> A fourth infantry company would be attached to each battalion. There would be no change in structure, as the "need for rapid deployment calls for lightly equipped forces." However, various re-equipment proposals were noted, including new armoured vehicles and a variety of support weapons.<sup>161</sup>

The Air Force's three FEGs would be retained much as they were.<sup>162</sup> The Maritime Patrol Group was noted as needing to retain its sub-surface surveillance capability, and would be upgraded. The Air Combat Force would be retained, but consideration of its future replacement would begin soon. The option of purchasing C-130Js to enhance the Air Transport Force was noted.

Thus, *SONZ97* differed very little in its recommendations from *DONZ91*. Officials note that while it is easy to say nothing radical changed,<sup>163</sup> this was not the product of intellectual laziness, or capture by elements with preconceived ideals, but rather the product of rigorous analysis that decided that New Zealand in 1997 required largely the same force as had been required in 1991.<sup>164</sup>

### *Summary and Analysis*

The defence review process of 1996 and 1997 produced a Defence Assessment and a Defence White Paper that were both deeply conservative. The findings of the White Paper differed in detail only from those of the 1991 paper,

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<sup>157</sup> Ibid. p.8

<sup>158</sup> Ibid. p.45

<sup>159</sup> Ibid. p.32

<sup>160</sup> The following is taken from Ibid. p.46-47

<sup>161</sup> Ibid. p.9

<sup>162</sup> The following is taken from Ibid. p.10 and p.48-52

<sup>163</sup> Interview with Former New Zealand Defence Official A.

<sup>164</sup> Interview with New Zealand Defence Official D.; Interview with New Zealand Defence Official B.

despite marked changes in the international environment. Little effort was made to truly establish whether the NZDF needed to adapt to new demands. The White Paper was, in the words of one official, a “revisitation and update.”<sup>165</sup>

Primarily, this was due to the Terms of Reference given the review process. However this does not tell the full story; even within the boundaries of those policy settings there was still room for some innovation. The role of the Secretary was also vital in ensuring a conservative line was taken. There were few policy innovators.<sup>166</sup> The review process was closed, with non-bureaucratic actors having almost no influence. There was little political involvement bar the minimum required.<sup>167</sup> The two main actors, the Ministry and NZDF, had very similar views, and Treasury was the one actor that supported a more fundamental reassessment of defence needs, although largely for financial reasons.

Indeed, the primary motive for the review was financial, not strategic. The NZDF had declined steadily since the early 1990s as a result of restricted funding, and by 1996 was reaching a state of crisis. The review process was designed to identify what force structure the NZDF might be able to affordably maintain in the future, based on what it already had, in order to achieve existing tasks.

Because of this, the strategic analysis of *SONZ97* was limited. The post-Cold War world was described but there was no rigorous examination of its effect on New Zealand defence. There was no attempt to engage with new concepts of security. The ability of the NZDF to function as part of a whole-of-government response was not identified.<sup>168</sup> The mindset was still traditional in relation to military capabilities.

Internal problems, changing political circumstances, and a general shortage of resources delayed the review process substantially. It took more than eighteen months from initiation to final release, and during that time the world had changed even more. By the time the White Paper was published, some of its strategic assumptions were already obsolescent.<sup>169</sup>

The main result of *SONZ97* was to confirm existent, and introduce new, equipment proposals. Yet it did not include a detailed, coherent and rigorously costed capability plan with Cabinet approval. Annex A was instead a list of things “nice to

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<sup>165</sup> Interview with New Zealand Defence Official D.

<sup>166</sup> Interview with Former New Zealand Defence Official E.

<sup>167</sup> Interview with New Zealand Defence Official B.. He notes this as a distinct difference from Labour-led policy frameworks

<sup>168</sup> Interview with New Zealand Defence Official D.

<sup>169</sup> As will be shown, this also happened in Australia.

have” with little prioritisation, and although later Cabinet documents, building on *SONZ97* did attempt to prioritise somewhat, it was not an entirely rational process.<sup>170</sup>

The above should not necessarily be taken as a criticism of the analysts. After all, their work was bound by the overarching guidance and especially the limits imposed by the Terms of Reference. *SONZ97* was largely intended to ensure that the NZDF received adequate funding. There was little attempt to stimulate new thinking.<sup>171</sup> Despite its substantial length, *SONZ97* made no new recommendations to force structure, less some small reductions in the NCF, and in actuality largely continued the same path the NZDF had followed since 1991: relative continuity but a steady decline in total capability. Thus, it is interesting to note that in 1998, only a few months after *SONZ97* was completed, Secretary of Defence Hensley stated that global changes demanded a major shift in New Zealand’s defence outlook.<sup>172</sup>

### *Aftermath*

After the publication of *SONZ97* there were several happenings within the NZDF, some directly related to its implementation, and some the result of different processes.

In April 1998, the new Minister of Defence, Max Bradford, noted the current work priorities of the Ministry of Defence in implementing the White Paper. He noted the first priority was revising the acquisition framework, the second was undertaking further reviews, and the third was managing international defence relations.<sup>173</sup>

In March 1998, Land Force Command shifted from Takapuna to Trentham.<sup>174</sup> This created a fully integrated Army Headquarters, remedying the problems caused by the previous separation of operational and support commands. Soon after, in relation to *SONZ97*’s prioritisation of the Army, the Cabinet Strategy Committee (CSC) received a paper relating to the replacement armoured vehicle project.<sup>175</sup> It was

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<sup>170</sup> Derek Quigley, *Review of the lease of F-16 aircraft for the Royal New Zealand Air Force*, 6 March 2000. p.11-15

<sup>171</sup> Interview with Former New Zealand Defence Official A.

<sup>172</sup> Gerald Hensley, 'The effect of war on New Zealand', in Carl Bridge (ed.), *Pacific Prospects: Australia, New Zealand and Future Conflicts*. London, Menzies Centre for Australian Studies, 2002.

<sup>173</sup> Max Bradford, Parliamentary Question 3935, 28 April 1998, Wellington.

<sup>174</sup> Hank Schouten, 'NZ Army Headquarters Amalgamating', *Australian Defence Monthly*, September 1997. p.33 and James Rolfe, *The Armed Forces of New Zealand*. St Leonards, Allen & Unwin, 1999. p.113

<sup>175</sup> New Zealand Cabinet Strategy Committee, 'Armoured Vehicles [A]', STR(98)34, 11 March 1998, Wellington. p.1-2

estimated to cost 180mn NZD and involve 69 APCs and 12 FSVs. CSC approval was given on 18 March, and full Cabinet approval on 23 March.<sup>176</sup>

During this period, the Army was developing new ideas. In April 1998, CGS released his vision for the future Army, building on the guidance of the White Paper and internal staff studies.<sup>177</sup> In October, the Army released its *Army 2005* vision document. This noted that the Army needed to develop new capabilities, particularly motorisation, and thus new equipment needed to be purchased.<sup>178</sup> It suggested the raising of a new Reconnaissance-Intelligence-Surveillance-Target Acquisition (RISTA) group, and enhanced combat support.<sup>179</sup> It also noted that if the Army was to deploy the 1200-strong battalion group required by policy it might be necessary to expand the Army by a thousand or so personnel.<sup>180</sup>

Another priority of SONZ97 had been Project Sirius, the upgrade of the Orion fleet.<sup>181</sup> On 13 March 1998, a paper requesting approval in principle for the upgrade reached CSC. It was estimated to cost \$236mn NZD and to be introduced from 1999-2003.<sup>182</sup> It was agreed to by CSC and by the full Cabinet on 23 March, simultaneous with the decisions on the armoured vehicles.<sup>183</sup>

The 1998/1999 defence budget, the first since the White Paper, featured a small increase in funding.<sup>184</sup> In September 1998, Max Bradford made a speech stating that the next five years would see the NZDF rebuild its capabilities.<sup>185</sup> Soon after the

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<sup>176</sup> New Zealand Cabinet, 'Armoured Vehicles', CAB(98)M10/5B(4), 23 March 1998, Wellington; New Zealand Cabinet Strategy Committee, 'Armoured Vehicles [B]', STR(98)M5/7, 18 March 1998, Wellington.

<sup>177</sup> Maurice Dodson, 'CGS's vision', *Army News*, vol. 173, 14 April 1998, p.2

<sup>178</sup> New Zealand Army General Staff, *Army 2005 - A Force of Utility: Refocussing the Army*, Army 1001/2, October 1998, p.1-4

<sup>179</sup> *Ibid.* p.36

<sup>180</sup> *Ibid.* p.13-14

<sup>181</sup> New Zealand Cabinet Strategy Committee, 'Project Sirius: Replacement of Tactical Systems on P-3K Orion Aircraft [A]', STR(98)32, 13 March 1998, Wellington.

<sup>182</sup> See Mark Burton, Parliamentary Question 4197, 13 March 2000, Wellington; Mark Burton, Parliamentary Question 4198, 13 March 2000, Wellington; Mark Burton, Parliamentary Question 4199, 13 March 2000, Wellington; Mark Burton, Parliamentary Question 4211, 13 March 2000, Wellington. for the way in which the Greens in particular investigated the usage of the Orion fleet.

<sup>183</sup> New Zealand Cabinet, 'Project Sirius: Replacement of Tactical Systems on P-3K Orion Aircraft', CAB(98)M10/5B(2), 23 March 1998, Wellington; New Zealand Cabinet Strategy Committee, 'Project Sirius: Replacement of Tactical Systems on P-3K Orion Aircraft [B]', STR(98)M5/5, 18 March 1998, Wellington.

<sup>184</sup> Unknown Author, 'Budget 1998/99', *Royal New Zealand Air Force News*, vol. II, May 1998, p.7

<sup>185</sup> Max Bradford, 'Time for rebuilding', *Army News*, no. 183, 1 September 1998, p.2

Prime Minister reiterated the need for the NZDF to remain focused on conventional operations.<sup>186</sup>

In October 1998, the *Final Report of the Air Combat Capability Study*, better known as the Whineray Report, after its chairman, was completed.<sup>187</sup> This had been initiated in May and was an interdepartmental review, with MOD, NZDF, MFAT, DPMC and Treasury officials involved. It stated that New Zealand retained a need for air combat forces, discarding the possibility of other more innovative options.<sup>188</sup> The best solution would be newer F-16-type aircraft, but the expected cost for any replacement was 1.3 to 1.7 billion NZD, far above the 693 million NZD estimate of *SONZ97*.<sup>189</sup>

A raft of important capability proposals reached Cabinet in late November 1998.<sup>190</sup> The *Defence 10 Year Capability Plan* suggested a defence force rebuilding strategy based on *SONZ97* but with some modifications.<sup>191</sup> Treasury noted that the capital plan suggested by *SONZ97* was no longer able to fit within the expected budget, due to exchange rate fluctuations.

There were five major differences from *SONZ97*. *Charles Upham* was to be modified, the fifth maritime helicopter was to be bought earlier, the acquisition of C-130Js was to be delayed, the replacement of the A-4s was to be brought forward, and the delivery period of the armoured vehicles was to be lengthened.<sup>192</sup> It noted the prospect of purchasing a second hand Anzac to replace *Canterbury* in 2003.<sup>193</sup>

Accompanying the plan were several specific proposals. One sought approval to enter into negotiations to lease F-16 aircraft from the United States.<sup>194</sup> Treasury noted the need to ensure that such aircraft met policy, but was relatively positive about the deal itself. Another document sought approval for the third Anzac frigate, noting the possibility of a cheaper deal via Australia.<sup>195</sup> A summary paper, entitled *Rebuilding New Zealand's Defence Capability*, claimed that New Zealand had

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<sup>186</sup> Unknown Author, 'PM says Government committed to defence', *Army News*, no. 178, 23 December 1998. p.13

<sup>187</sup> Wilson Whineray, *Final Report of the Air Combat Capability Policy Study*, Wellington, 23 October 1998.

<sup>188</sup> *Ibid.* p.10-11,25

<sup>189</sup> *Ibid.* p.91

<sup>190</sup> This was almost simultaneous with the *Defence Beyond 2000* report.

<sup>191</sup> New Zealand Cabinet, 'Defence 10 Year Capital Plan', CAB(98)854, 27 November 1998, Wellington. p.1

<sup>192</sup> *Ibid.* Attachment p.2-3

<sup>193</sup> *Ibid.* Attachment p.7

<sup>194</sup> New Zealand Cabinet, 'Lease of F16 Aircraft', CAB(98)853, 27 November 1998, Wellington.

<sup>195</sup> New Zealand Cabinet, 'Replacement Frigate Project', CAB(98)852, 27 November 1998, Wellington.

reached a critical point in defence policy, and that decisions on the F-16 lease and third Anzac frigate would affect New Zealand's external relations for many years.<sup>196</sup>

On 30 November 1998, Cabinet approved in principle most of the 10 Year Plan, reaffirming *SONZ97* policy, and stated that New Zealand would continue to play a "full and appropriate role in its own defence".<sup>197</sup> The Minister of Defence was clear that the Army would be the first priority, with a half-billion dollar capital equipment plan.<sup>198</sup> The F-16s would be leased. Importantly, however, the decision was made to delay the purchase of the third Anzac frigate.<sup>199</sup> While this had been expected, the actual announcement was still somewhat of a shock.

Overall, November 1998 was a crucial month for New Zealand defence policy: in the aftermath of *SONZ97*, all major capital projects were reprioritised, and a new course for the rebuilding of the NZDF was set.<sup>200</sup> Importantly, however, approval was only given in principle for the various projects, and funding was not as yet forthcoming. Still, the fact that these projects were approved at all was partly an indication of the energy and motivation of the "hawkish" Bradford.<sup>201</sup> He noted publically that he wished he could go faster with acquisition, but fiscal constraints prevented that.<sup>202</sup>

These major decisions had an immediate political aftermath, when independent MP Deborah Morris announced in December 1998 she would withdraw support for the National Government and quit Parliament in opposition to defence spending.<sup>203</sup>

Soon after, new equipment and organisational proposals took centre stage.<sup>204</sup> A major paper entitled *Motorisation of the NZ Army* reached CSC in May 1999. It sought approval to change the Army's concept of operations to that of a motorised

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<sup>196</sup> New Zealand Cabinet, 'Rebuilding New Zealand's Defence Capability', CAB(98)855, 27 November 1998, Wellington. p.5

<sup>197</sup> New Zealand Cabinet, 'Defence Planning: Defence Capital Purchases', CAB(98)M45/25, 30 November 1998, Wellington.

<sup>198</sup> Interview with Former New Zealand Defence Official B, 12 July 2005; Interview with Former New Zealand Defence Official C.

<sup>199</sup> Jack Welch, 'The Critical Size of Our Combat Fleet', Paper presented at the Papers on the Interim Report of the Defence Beyond 2000 Inquiry, Wellington and Hamilton, 15 April and 1-2 May 1999.

<sup>200</sup> Quigley, *Review of the lease of F-16 aircraft for the Royal New Zealand Air Force*. p.6

<sup>201</sup> Interview with Former New Zealand Defence Official B; Interview with Former New Zealand Defence Official C.

<sup>202</sup> Max Bradford, 'Message from Minister', *Army News*, no. 190, 15 December 1998. p.4

<sup>203</sup> Guyon Espiner, 'War toys the last straw', *The Evening Post*, 2 December 1998.

<sup>204</sup> New Zealand Cabinet Strategy Committee, 'Defence Planning: Defence Capital Purchases', 11 May 1999.

force, and thus alter earlier approvals in respect to replacement armoured vehicles.<sup>205</sup> The paper noted that, subsequent to *SONZ97*, the Army had continued to develop its warfighting concepts, taking into account experience in Bosnia and the Tekapo Manoeuvres.<sup>206</sup> The major conclusion was that the Army needed to shift to motorisation, by purchasing as many as 151 armoured vehicles.<sup>207</sup> The cost was estimated at 408 million NZD.<sup>208</sup>

On 12 May, CSC approved the motorisation concept, but did not approve the full 151 vehicle buy.<sup>209</sup> On 24 May, the full Cabinet confirmed the decision.<sup>210</sup>

In October, the Request For Tender for the armoured vehicles was finally released.<sup>211</sup> The decision had been made to purchase wheeled vehicles, a total of 54 IMVs and 24 FSVs at first, with more to come later.

In September, Cabinet approval in principle was given for the refit of *Charles Upham* to enable her to undertake sealift tasks, four years after her initial purchase had been approved.<sup>212</sup> At roughly the same time rumours floated about that the RNZN might receive two ex-ADF Perry-class frigates instead of a third Anzac.<sup>213</sup> This would be a cheaper alternative, with other benefits as well.

The biggest defence happening of 1999, however, was not related to acquisition or restructuring. Rather, it was the September deployment of NZDF personnel to East Timor in the aftermath of civil disorder, a deployment that exceeded 1000 personnel and was New Zealand's largest deployment since the Korean War. Further discussion of that operation, however, is best treated in the context of the Labour Government's *Defence Policy Framework*, which is covered in a later section.

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<sup>205</sup> New Zealand Cabinet Strategy Committee, 'Motorisation of the NZ Army [A]', STR(99)87, 11 May 1999. p.1

<sup>206</sup> Ibid. p.3-5

<sup>207</sup> Ibid. p.5-6

<sup>208</sup> Ibid. p.6

<sup>209</sup> New Zealand Cabinet Strategy Committee, 'Motorisation of the NZ Army [B]', STR(99)M12/6, 12 May 1999.

<sup>210</sup> New Zealand Cabinet, 'Report of the Cabinet Strategy Committee: For the Period 12-21 May 1999', CAB(99)M13/2B, 24 May 1999, Wellington.

<sup>211</sup> Ian Bostock, 'New Zealand infantry gears up for motorisation', *Asia-Pacific Defence Reporter*, vol. XXV, no. 7, December 1999. p.25

<sup>212</sup> Russell Stout, 'Military conversion for Kiwi ship', *Asia-Pacific Defence Reporter*, vol. XXV, no. 6, October/November 1999. p.42

<sup>213</sup> Greg Ansley, 'Navy eyes two frigates to replace one', *New Zealand Herald*, 26 July 1999.

## **The Defence Beyond 2000 Review**

The *Defence Beyond 2000 Review (DB2000)* was launched in August 1997, before the completion of *SONZ97*, and completed in August 1999. It was a Parliamentary review of all matters related to New Zealand's defence and its interim and final reports attracted substantial comment and criticism. As a Parliamentary rather than Government report, it was not directly implemented, but it had a major influence on subsequent Labour defence policy.

### *International Context*

As of August 1997, the international situation was largely stable. The Asia-Pacific was continuing its steady economic growth, and there were no indications of conflict in the region. On a global scale, it was a time of relative peace and stability, a period of calm between the ethnic conflicts of the mid-1990s and those of the end of the decade.<sup>214</sup> The international context was thus little different to that of *SONZ97* and the shocks of the Asian financial crisis, regional ethnic conflict, and global terrorism were still in the future. However, those events did occur during the latter parts of the review process.

### *Domestic Political Context*

Throughout 1998 and 1999 the domestic political situation was somewhat unstable. The National-New Zealand First coalition experienced several problems, eventually leading to the breakup of that relationship. An election was scheduled for the end of 1999, but there was the distinct possibility of an earlier failure of confidence. While defence was not a crucial issue, it was still one in which disagreements could occur.

For the other parties a Parliamentary review of defence was seen as a way to stamp their own policies on the public consciousness. Indeed, as the review wore on, domestic political considerations grew increasingly important as the election

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<sup>214</sup> Evidenced by Somalia, Rwanda and Bosnia in the first case, and Kosovo and East Timor in the latter. See Alach, 'Peace Support Operations: International Evolution and New Zealand Adaptation'. Chapter Two.

approached. There were deep-seated differences between the two largest parties, National and Labour, on defence.<sup>215</sup>

### *Defence Force Issues*

To understand the context of this review the reader is recommended to read the previous section on *SONZ97*.

### *Themes and Actors*

*DB2000* was given broad-ranging terms of reference to engage with any defence issue, and to treat defence as part of New Zealand's broader international relations. In relation to force structure, several main themes can be identified.<sup>216</sup>

First was the issue of non-conventional operations, and operations other than war, and how the NZDF should be oriented in relation to them. Second was the issue of broad versus narrow defence forces. This revolved around whether New Zealand could indeed afford a wide range of capabilities, or whether it should focus on certain more utilitarian areas. A third issue was the relative importance of land forces, which was linked to the broad versus narrow debate. Because of its importance, and the controversy that has attached to it, it is well to go a little further into this theme before engaging with the review process itself.

Throughout the 1990s opinion had developed within the Army that it was being unfairly treated by the acquisition process, while the other services received new equipment.<sup>217</sup> Despite *SONZ97* and subsequent Cabinet decisions affirming that the Army was priority one,<sup>218</sup> there was still some feeling amongst Army personnel

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<sup>215</sup> Cathie Bell, 'Party agreement tops new defence boss' wish list', *The Dominion*, 8 March 1999. and Russell Stout, 'New Zealand - fighters not frigates', *Asia-Pacific Defence Reporter*, vol. XXV, no. 1, Annual Reference Edition 1999. p.17-18

<sup>216</sup> Derived from close reading of submissions and also New Zealand House of Representatives, *Inquiry into Defence Beyond 2000: Report of the Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Committee*, Wellington, August 1999. p.109-132 and also Interview with Former New Zealand Defence Official D, 28 November 2005.

<sup>217</sup> It is beyond the scope of this thesis to go further into these accusations. Information on this issue has been obtained from Interview with Former New Zealand Defence Official C.; C.R. Carruthers, *Report of Inquiry into the Propriety of a Letter Allegedly Generated from within the Army and an E-Mail Allegedly Generated from within the Navy*, 18 March 2002; Andrew Laxon, 'The bitter battle for Wellington', *New Zealand Herald*, 15 May 2002.; Bluejacket, 'In my opinion'.

<sup>218</sup> Maurice Dodson, 'Pace of change unlikely to let up', *Army News*, no. 190, 15 December 1998. p.2

that they were regarded as the least important of the three services. This was an issue that would have a major influence on the *DB2000* process.

Another motivation for the review was political: a feeling by some within the Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Subcommittee that the body was becoming increasingly irrelevant, and needed to make a gesture to prove its worth.<sup>219</sup> There was also a financial aspect: generally, the Subcommittee felt that no more funding would be given defence, and thus what needed to be done was to devise how best to allocate existing funding, rather than consider increases.

The actors in *DB2000* included politicians, officials and general citizens. The committee consisted of eight Members of Parliament representing ACT, Labour, Alliance, National and New Zealand First.<sup>220</sup> It received 83 submissions from the public and undertook several visits to camps, several round-table discussions, as well as a trip to Australia.<sup>221</sup> The committee interviewed servicemen and defence officials, and at times commented upon the difficulties encountered in obtaining information.<sup>222</sup> The content of the individual submissions is covered in the following section on the process of the review.

### *Process of Review*

*Defence Beyond 2000* stemmed from two inquiries into New Zealand's foreign policy made during 1997, *New Zealand's Place in the World* and *New Zealand's Role in Asia-Pacific Security*.<sup>223</sup> The first part of the review involved the taking of public submissions, consultations with senior servicemen, Treasury staff, Ministry of Defence staff, as well as consultations with universities, businesses and other non-governmental actors.<sup>224</sup> The opinions of various Australians were also gauged. The

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<sup>219</sup> Interview with Former New Zealand Defence Official D.

<sup>220</sup> New Zealand House of Representatives, *Inquiry into Defence Beyond 2000: Report of the Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Committee*. p.154

<sup>221</sup> Ibid. p.158-159 and New Zealand Foreign Affairs Defence and Trade Subcommittee of Parliament, *Letter to Parliamentary Library*, Wellington, 24 September 1999.

<sup>222</sup> Unknown Author, 'Defence officials accused of blocking access to information', *The Dominion*, 25 November 1998.; Interview with Former New Zealand Defence Official D.

<sup>223</sup> New Zealand House of Representatives, *Inquiry into Defence Beyond 2000: Report of the Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Committee*. p.13

<sup>224</sup> New Zealand House of Representatives, *Inquiry into Defence Beyond 2000: Interim Report of the Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Committee*, Wellington, 1998. p.8

actual writing of the report was undertaken by Robert Ayson, Derek Quigley, and Malcolm McNamara at various times.<sup>225</sup>

Between September 1997 and November 1998, a large number of public submissions were received, from defence academics, ex-servicemen, and interested members of the public. The following is a selective summary of those submissions.

Ron Smith recommended a useable Rapid Reaction Force, a reconsideration of the role of the Territorials, and saw the need for a funding increase to enable New Zealand to be a “responsible member of the international community”.<sup>226</sup> Jim Rolfe said the key was to “maintain armed forces capable of defending New Zealand’s interests as required”, and this would require flexible rather than narrow forces.<sup>227</sup> Stewart Woodman used the submission process to criticise existent policy, saying the ongoing Defence Assessment process was merely an attempt to put a floor under a steady decline.<sup>228</sup>

David Dickens advocated a more revolutionary restructuring, a small, mobile but highly sophisticated NZDF, developed on the RMA-paradigm.<sup>229</sup> The New Zealand Army Association supported an expansion of the Army to a full, regular brigade group.<sup>230</sup> The Dunedin North Labour Electorate recommended a continuation of the same level of defence funding, but renewed focus on peacekeeping and no more frigates.<sup>231</sup>

Terence O’Brien made a conservative submission, claiming that the concepts of *DONZ91* such as the credible minimum and self-reliance in partnership were still valid.<sup>232</sup> The Royal New Zealand Returned Services Association put forward a similar

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<sup>225</sup> Interview with Former New Zealand Defence Official D.

<sup>226</sup> Ron Smith, *Submission to New Zealand Parliamentary Subcommittee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Inquiry Into Defence Beyond 2000*, 8 September 1997. p.2

<sup>227</sup> James Rolfe, *Submission to New Zealand Parliamentary Subcommittee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Inquiry Into Defence Beyond 2000*, 8 September 1997. p.1-3

<sup>228</sup> Stewart Woodman, *Submission to New Zealand Parliamentary Subcommittee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Inquiry Into Defence Beyond 2000*, 10 September 1997.

<sup>229</sup> David Dickens, *Submission to New Zealand Parliamentary Subcommittee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Inquiry Into Defence Beyond 2000*, 11 September 1997.

<sup>230</sup> New Zealand Army Association, *Submission to New Zealand Parliamentary Subcommittee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Inquiry Into Defence Beyond 2000*, 10 September 1997. p.2

<sup>231</sup> Dunedin North Labour Electorate Committee, *Submission to New Zealand Parliamentary Subcommittee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Inquiry Into Defence Beyond 2000*, 1997.

<sup>232</sup> Terence O’Brien, *Submission to New Zealand Parliamentary Subcommittee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Inquiry Into Defence Beyond 2000*, 18 September 1997. p.4

statement, and said that political involvement was necessary to rebuild New Zealand's defence as the problems were beyond the control of the NZDF and MOD.<sup>233</sup>

One of the more influential submissions was that provided by Grant Crowley.<sup>234</sup> He said New Zealand's defence priorities were, in order of importance:

1. UN contributions;
2. Protection of New Zealand interests;
3. Provision of public services;
4. Assistance to the civil power;
5. Collective security contributions;
6. Defence of New Zealand.<sup>235</sup>

Crowley said that the core activities of the NZDF bore little relationship with the likely contingencies over the next fifteen years.<sup>236</sup> He said NZDF training lacked any focus on peace support.<sup>237</sup> He also said the protection of New Zealand's EEZ was a law enforcement, not military problem.<sup>238</sup>

Crowley suggested a four-battalion Army, with organic air and naval support, equipped and trained largely for UN contributions.<sup>239</sup> He noted this might result in a reduction in the defence budget as the NCF, ACF and part of the MPF could be disbanded as a result of this Army focus.<sup>240</sup> One of his more interesting assertions was that the failure of various force elements to achieve MLOC, taken by most as a sign of the low capability of the NZDF, was instead an indication that MLOC levels had been set too high.<sup>241</sup> In October Crowley defended his submission orally to the committee. He claimed that the strategic situation did not justify increased expenditure, and what was needed instead was redirection.<sup>242</sup>

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<sup>233</sup> Royal New Zealand Returned Services Association, *Submission to New Zealand Parliamentary Subcommittee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Inquiry Into Defence Beyond 2000*, September 1997. p.2-4

<sup>234</sup> Gordon Campbell, 'Armed farces', *Listener*, vol. 611, no. 3004, 29 November 1997.

<sup>235</sup> Grant Crowley, *Submission to New Zealand Parliamentary Subcommittee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Inquiry Into Defence Beyond 2000*, Wellington, 1997. p.3-4

<sup>236</sup> *Ibid.* p.4

<sup>237</sup> *Ibid.* p.12

<sup>238</sup> *Ibid.* p.2-3

<sup>239</sup> *Ibid.* p.14

<sup>240</sup> *Ibid.* p.22

<sup>241</sup> *Ibid.* p.20-21

<sup>242</sup> Grant Crowley, *Oral Report Submission to New Zealand Parliamentary Subcommittee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Inquiry Into Defence Beyond 2000*, Wellington, 15 October 1997. p.1

The defence bureaucracy felt compelled to defend the status quo before the Select Committee. Before appearing in November 1997, the Deputy Secretary (Policy) asked for advice from the MOD to defuse criticisms already developing from the process, criticisms often built on the Crowley submission.<sup>243</sup> Joint submissions by the CDF and Secretary of Defence defended the policy-making structure,<sup>244</sup> and also claimed that ancillary domestic services should not be a force structure determinant.<sup>245</sup>

The Secretary of Defence and CDF also made individual submissions. Gerald Hensley noted the future was unknown, and the need for a long term view meant that flexible capabilities were required.<sup>246</sup> The CDF criticised concepts of radical restructuring, noting the vital importance of service ethos, and that many operations were single service-oriented anyway.<sup>247</sup> The CGS also came to the defence of *SONZ97*, pointing out that problems relating to the army had been resolved in the final draft of that paper.<sup>248</sup>

In April 1998, Malcolm McNamara, who would become the main Select Committee adviser,<sup>249</sup> commented on the progress of the review. He noted that the committee already believed in the need for new policy leading to new force development priorities.<sup>250</sup>

Throughout 1998, the Select Committee continued its study, visiting Australia and various domestic bases,<sup>251</sup> and meeting with the service chiefs.<sup>252</sup> In August, it attended the Military Studies Institute conference on *New Zealand's Strategic*

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<sup>243</sup> Deputy Secretary (P), *Appearance Before Select Committee: Request for Advice from Secretary of Defence*, Wellington, 27 November 1997. p.1

<sup>244</sup> Dep Sec (Pol) and DCDS) Office of the Chief Executives (Gentles R and Hill D, *Priority Issues for Future Study: Submission to the New Zealand Parliamentary Subcommittee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Inquiry Into Defence Beyond 2000*, 5 December 1997. p.1 and Dep Sec (Pol) and DCDS) Office of the Chief Executives (Gentles R and Hill D, *Issues Arising from Inquiry: Submission to the New Zealand Parliamentary Subcommittee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Inquiry Into Defence Beyond 2000*, 5 December 1997. p.11

<sup>245</sup> Office of the Chief Executives (Gentles R and Hill D, *Priority Issues for Future Study*. p.4

<sup>246</sup> Gerald Hensley: Submission to New Zealand Parliamentary Subcommittee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Inquiry Into Defence Beyond 2000, 11 December 1997. p.1

<sup>247</sup> New Zealand Chief of Defence Force, *Notes to New Zealand Parliamentary Subcommittee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Inquiry Into Defence Beyond 2000*, 11 December and 18 December 1997.

<sup>248</sup> Maurice Dodson, *CGS Submission: Submission to New Zealand Parliamentary Subcommittee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Inquiry Into Defence Beyond 2000*, 19 March 1998. p.3

<sup>249</sup> At the time, however, was employed by the NZD.

<sup>250</sup> Malcolm McNamara, *Defence Beyond 2000 Inquiry*, NZDF 1550/9/1, 27 April 1998. p.3

<sup>251</sup> Interview with Former New Zealand Defence Official D. He notes that while senior opinion in Australia was often critical of the NZDF, at the lower levels there was a great deal of respect.

<sup>252</sup> K. Wilson, *Submission to New Zealand Parliamentary Subcommittee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Inquiry Into Defence Beyond 2000*, NA 1150-0001, 24 March 1998.

*Environment*.<sup>253</sup> It also received a submission from Roger Mortlock, who had previously been a senior army officer. He said New Zealand needed land forces, but light, affordable contributions: “a combat niche market capability”.<sup>254</sup>

On 24 November 1998, the Select Committee released an Interim Report, feeling that it was important to put forward their views when the Government was about to consider several major capability decisions.<sup>255</sup>

The Interim Report’s Executive Summary noted that New Zealand did not face a direct military threat, and that the most likely threats were terrorism and the infringement of New Zealand’s EEZ.<sup>256</sup> In a famous phrase, it suggested that the NZDF “needs to be structured around a niche market capability.” It also stated that New Zealand and Australia had different strategic needs and thus New Zealand policy needed to be independent.<sup>257</sup>

The Interim Report recommended that the allocation of responsibility for domestic counter-terrorism between the Army and the Police be reconsidered, and also recommended more attention be paid to the RMA.<sup>258</sup> However, it was in regards to the issues of peacekeeping and air combat that its more controversial findings were made.

The Interim Report noted that peacekeeping was not a soft option, and suggested that New Zealand might do best to orient itself more towards such a role, for example by investigating peacekeeping specific training.<sup>259</sup> In relation to this, it suggested enhancements to the Army, including the maintenance of a quick-response ranger company within the battalion group, and a general increase in Army readiness. It did, however, note that these forces would be trained for mid-level combat.<sup>260</sup>

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<sup>253</sup> New Zealand House of Representatives, *Inquiry into Defence Beyond 2000: Report of the Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Committee*. p.158

<sup>254</sup> Roger Mortlock, *Submission to New Zealand Parliamentary Subcommittee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Inquiry Into Defence Beyond 2000*, 16 August 1998. p.7-10

<sup>255</sup> New Zealand House of Representatives, *Inquiry into Defence Beyond 2000: Report of the Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Committee*. p.15-16 and see New Zealand Cabinet, 'Defence 10 Year Capital Plan'; New Zealand Cabinet, 'Lease of F16 Aircraft'; New Zealand Cabinet, 'Rebuilding New Zealand's Defence Capability'; New Zealand Cabinet, 'Replacement Frigate Project'.

<sup>256</sup> New Zealand House of Representatives, *Inquiry into Defence Beyond 2000: Interim Report of the Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Committee*. p.4-7

<sup>257</sup> *Ibid.* p.12-13

<sup>258</sup> *Ibid.* p.10,14

<sup>259</sup> *Ibid.* p.4-7,16,21

<sup>260</sup> *Ibid.* p.23-24

The Interim Report noted that the Air Combat Force had never been used for combat, and was largely useful diplomatically.<sup>261</sup> It suggested the disbandment or replacement of the Skyhawk force. It also noted that the Anzac frigates were not combat-viable, and that it might prove impossible to upgrade them to a sufficient standard to undertake combat operations;<sup>262</sup> the unstated implication was that the frigate force might be disbanded.

In other areas, the Interim Report made a series of recommendations aimed at enhancing the NZDF's efficiency. It supported the recruitment of Territorials for support rather than combat roles, mirroring United States practice.<sup>263</sup> It recommended closer links between civilian emergency relief agencies and the NZDF.<sup>264</sup> It also recommended a greater joint focus, to include a Joint Staff and Joint Operational HQ, joint basic training, and the reintegration of the NZDF and MOD.<sup>265</sup>

Overall the Interim Report differed markedly from *SONZ97*. The Select Committee members had taken onboard some of the more radical submissions, especially those advocating peacekeeping and land forces (exemplified by Crowley, Mortlock, and the New Zealand Army Association).

The release of this Interim Report triggered a burst of criticism from both within and without government. It was felt by some that Labour and the other opposition parties had "hijacked" the Select Committee process and were suggesting a defence policy harmful to New Zealand's interests. A number of New Zealand academics met in April and May 1999 to discuss the Interim Report and make further submissions to the committee. By and large, their responses were negative. The most commonly criticised issues were the report's focus on niche forces,<sup>266</sup> its focus on peacekeeping,<sup>267</sup> and its perceived effect on New Zealand's international relations.<sup>268</sup>

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<sup>261</sup> Ibid. p.26-28

<sup>262</sup> Ibid. p.30-32

<sup>263</sup> Ibid. p.25

<sup>264</sup> Ibid. p.33

<sup>265</sup> Ibid. p.39,48,55

<sup>266</sup> David Dickens, 'Force Structure and Capabilities', Paper presented at the Conference on the Interim Report of the Defence Beyond 2000 Inquiry, Wellington and Hamilton, 15 April and 1-2 May 1999.

<sup>267</sup> David Dickens, 'An Independent Review of the Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Parliamentary Select Committee's Interim Report "Inquiry Into Defence Beyond 2000"', Paper presented at the Conference on the Interim Report of the Defence Beyond 2000 Inquiry, Wellington and Hamilton, 15 April and 1-2 May 1999.

<sup>268</sup> Stephen Hoadley, 'Submission responding to the Committee's Interim Report on Defence Beyond 2000', Paper presented at the Papers on the Interim Report of the Defence Beyond 2000 Inquiry, Wellington and Hamilton, 15 April and 1-2 May 1999.

As might be expected, the chairman of the committee, Quigley, came out in defence of the Interim Report. He compared it to the 1997 White Paper and noted that it included a “more extensive catchment of views” than that document.<sup>269</sup>

Apart from the conference noted above, there were other submissions on the Interim Report. John Pallot both suggested an increase in defence funding and criticised the logic of the Interim Report.<sup>270</sup> He said the Select Committee had skipped the definition of roles and instead jumped to conclusions about force structures. He also criticised what he saw as a preponderant focus on events of the last decade, rather than a longer term view. When brought before the Select Committee Pallot was criticised by Labour MP Geoff Braybrooke, who termed Pallot’s view “archaic” and suggested defence funding could not be increased.<sup>271</sup>

Interestingly, in February 1999, the Government announced that it would restructure the infantry forces as per the recommendations of the Interim Report, with three infantry companies at 60 days and a ranger company at 28 days.<sup>272</sup> At the same time the Government also suggested that it might include peacekeeping specific training in the general programme.

During this last phase the final draft of the report was completed. Due to the lack of information and access to resources, no detailed costings were done on the various recommendations.<sup>273</sup> In August 1999, the Final Report was released, triggering a major debate in Parliament.<sup>274</sup>

## *Result*

Quigley described the final product as the most comprehensive Select Committee review ever, featuring a level of public consultation previously unheard of

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<sup>269</sup> Derek Quigley, 'Remarks', Paper presented at the Papers on the Interim Report of the Defence Beyond 2000 Inquiry, Wellington and Hamilton, 15 April and 1-2 May 1999.

<sup>270</sup> John Pallot, *Submission to New Zealand Parliamentary Subcommittee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Inquiry Into Defence Beyond 2000*, 15 April 1999. p.1

<sup>271</sup> The Parliamentary Monitor, *Report on the FADT Select Committee: Inquiry into Defence Beyond 2000*, Wellington, 20 May 1999. p.2

<sup>272</sup> Matthew Dearnley, 'Rapid-reaction battalion to be on 60-day standby', *New Zealand Herald*, 23 February 1999.

<sup>273</sup> Interview with Former New Zealand Defence Official D.

<sup>274</sup> Matthew Dearnley, 'Smaller, sharper military say MPs', *New Zealand Herald*, 31 August 1999.

in defence.<sup>275</sup> The Final Report as published included both a Majority Report, supported by all the parties bar National, and a separate Minority Report.<sup>276</sup>

The Report began by stating:

in the prevailing fiscal climate, New Zealand cannot maintain a credible, relevant defence force at appropriate readiness without prioritising our strategic interests and defence tasks, and then logically deriving the most appropriate force capabilities.<sup>277</sup>

Stemming from this;

defence policy must be developed to address credible threats to New Zealand and New Zealand's interests rather than aiming to deal with the widest possible range of purely military contingencies.<sup>278</sup>

The issue was seen as ensuring the NZDF remained relevant in the post-Cold War era, rather than merely continued on with policy developed almost a decade before.<sup>279</sup> The Report claimed that New Zealand was in desperate need of innovative thinking. Traditional concepts, such as developing forces to be involved in East Asia, were pointless, as New Zealand could not make more than a marginal commitment anyway.<sup>280</sup> What was needed was to clearly identify what the most likely contingencies were, and then assess how New Zealand could best contribute to those contingencies. The best use of the NZDF as an instrument of state policy was seen as giving priority to those tangible tasks it currently undertook, or would likely undertake in the short to medium term, rather than structuring the force for long term threats that might not occur.<sup>281</sup> Also, given financial restrictions, the NZDF could not hope to do everything.

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<sup>275</sup> Ibid.

<sup>276</sup> The Alliance provided its own minority report but this differed from the majority report only on two minor matters of military cooperation.

<sup>277</sup> New Zealand House of Representatives, *Inquiry into Defence Beyond 2000: Report of the Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Committee*. p.5

<sup>278</sup> Ibid. p.11

<sup>279</sup> Ibid. p.10

<sup>280</sup> Ibid. p.26

<sup>281</sup> Ibid. p.56

Prioritisation was thus an important requirement, and the Report then listed the most likely contingencies from most to least probable:<sup>282</sup>

1. Protection of NZ's interests including EEZ & SP;
2. Contribution of forces to PSOs;
3. Provision of services to domestic community;
4. Assistance to the police to maintain law and order;
5. Contribution of forces under collective security arrangements;
6. Defence of NZ against armed force.<sup>283</sup>

Given the nature of these likely contingencies, and the nature of military operations, the three most important military capability considerations were a joint force approach, preparedness, and procurement.<sup>284</sup> In order to create a force that fulfilled such capability considerations, four priorities for force development were listed.

The first was “well-equipped, highly-trained, sustainable force elements at short notice to the most credible crisis-management and peace-building tasks.”<sup>285</sup> The second was to strengthen selected force elements to be more sustainable and flexible.<sup>286</sup> The third was the introduction of new and development of existing capabilities to increase NZDF flexibility, and the fourth priority was to maintain expertise and limited operational capability in force elements required if the strategic situation deteriorated.<sup>287</sup>

In order to meet the first priority, the general focus should be on deployable land force elements and their associated transport.<sup>288</sup> These land forces should be trained and equipped for medium-level combat, which was above the requirements of SONZ97.<sup>289</sup> The Report noted the need for a reconnaissance company available at shorter notice than other Army force elements. Because of the need for deployability,

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<sup>282</sup> Except for the first two points, which are interchanged, the resemblance with the Crowley submission is remarkable.

<sup>283</sup> New Zealand House of Representatives, *Inquiry into Defence Beyond 2000: Report of the Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Committee*. p.6

<sup>284</sup> *Ibid.* p.7-8

<sup>285</sup> *Ibid.* p.75

<sup>286</sup> *Ibid.* p.76

<sup>287</sup> *Ibid.* p.76

<sup>288</sup> *Ibid.* p.77-79

<sup>289</sup> *Ibid.* p.89-92

an enhancement to maritime transport would have great benefits, and the need for an across the beach capability was also identified.<sup>290</sup>

A peacekeeping focus remained, if to a lesser extent than in the Interim Report, and specific training was recommended, including negotiating techniques.<sup>291</sup> However, it was clearly stated that these would not be at the expense of conventional soldiering skills.

Jointness again proved a favourite of the committee. The Report supported a joint force approach at the planning and operational levels, joint basic training, and a joint headquarters.<sup>292</sup>

The issue of force modernisation was also engaged with. The report stated that evidence from the Chiefs of Staff indicated that the NZDF was not absorbing RMA-paradigm concepts and equipment at all quickly, despite Dickens' assertions to the contrary.<sup>293</sup> The report claimed the "fitted for but not with" concept used in purchasing the Anzac frigates was flawed, and that the current NZDF was simply not useful at its level of capability; equipment was not up to the demands of contemporary military operations.<sup>294</sup> To remedy this, a stepped approach to procurement was recommended to keep abreast of technology.<sup>295</sup> The Report also criticised doctrine as being dated.

The Air Combat Force was examined closely. The Report attacked the listing of the Skyhawk forces in the schedule of forces for the UN, a listing that suggested the Skyhawks might be used for collective security or peacekeeping operations, when in all likelihood this would never be the case.<sup>296</sup> The idea of replacing the Skyhawks with attack helicopters was mooted, and the report's Recommendation 20 said that the Skyhawk force either needed to be disbanded, downsized or upgraded; in its current form it was of extremely limited utility.<sup>297</sup>

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<sup>290</sup> Ibid. p.86-88

<sup>291</sup> Ibid. p.31-32

<sup>292</sup> Ibid. p.7,68-73

<sup>293</sup> Ibid. p.54 and David Dickens, 'The Implications of the RMA: Fearing Capability', Paper presented at the Conference on the Interim Report of the Defence Beyond 2000 Inquiry, Wellington and Hamilton, 15 April and 1-2 May 1999. p.2. Evidence from Interview with Former New Zealand Defence Official E. suggests that in the Army, at least, the process of moving towards the RMA-paradigm during the SONZ97 process was hamstrung by the conservatism of the CDF of the time.

<sup>294</sup> New Zealand House of Representatives, *Inquiry into Defence Beyond 2000: Report of the Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Committee*. p.61

<sup>295</sup> Ibid. p.63

<sup>296</sup> Ibid. p.37

<sup>297</sup> Ibid. p.97-99

The report also criticised the policymaking system itself. It claimed that recent defence policy had highlighted problems in funding, intensified interservice rivalries, shifted the focus of real defence priorities, and damaged New Zealand's international credibility.<sup>298</sup> To improve policymaking, the Report suggested a greater distance between military and civilian advice and a return of the auditing function of the NZDF to the Ministry, a function that had gradually been shifted to the NZDF itself.<sup>299</sup>

The Government Minority Report, which encompassed approximately 20 pages of a 120-page report, criticised many of the Majority Report's findings. It stated that the narrowing of forces recommended by the report failed to meet the needs of a broad strategic policy, and that the Committee had gone about business backward and was overly focused on capability rather than policy.<sup>300</sup> It claimed a narrow force would limit the range of available options, thus hindering New Zealand's strategic freedom.<sup>301</sup> The Minority Report placed greater emphasis on insurance for an uncertain future, whereas the Majority Report focused on current and short term considerations.<sup>302</sup>

The Minority Report also criticised the Majority Report's statements about the capability of the NZDF. It noted the Defence Capital Plan would solve Army shortcomings, without damaging the other services (as it asserted the recommendations of the Majority Report would).<sup>303</sup> It pointed out that a large number of new items were already being purchased to remedy existent problems, ranging from APCs through to LOVs, tactical radios, fire support weapons and air-defence missiles.<sup>304</sup> It also claimed that the NZDF was absorbing RMA technology, although its defence of such a statement was limited, to say the least.<sup>305</sup>

Thus the Final Report failed to reconcile the two sides within the Select Committee. The CDF's hopes that a multiparty accord on defence might develop during 1999 were dashed;<sup>306</sup> the differences between National and Labour were simply too great.

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<sup>298</sup> Ibid. p.39

<sup>299</sup> Ibid. p.40-44

<sup>300</sup> Ibid. p.113

<sup>301</sup> Ibid. p.113-114

<sup>302</sup> Ibid. p.115

<sup>303</sup> Ibid. p.119

<sup>304</sup> Ibid. p.124

<sup>305</sup> Ibid. p.121-122

<sup>306</sup> Bell, 'Party agreement tops new defence boss' wish list'.

## *Summary and Analysis*

The *DB2000* review process took a long time to complete – two years from start to finish, longer even than *SONZ97*. This length stemmed from several causes, including the other responsibilities of the participants, the large number of visits undertaken, and the broad range of submissions received.<sup>307</sup>

As the product of a political, Parliamentary process, it was perhaps inevitable that *DB2000* would produce a more controversial and less conservative document than the bureaucratic process that produced *SONZ97*. Yet there is no evidence that the political parties involved went into the Select Committee with the specific goal of enforcing their own policy on the others. Rather, the process seems to have involved consultation, discussion and recalculation of defence requirements, rather than merely the legitimisation of pre-held views through the “window-dressing” of a Select Committee process.<sup>308</sup>

Some broad conclusions about the process can be made. First, it would appear that the National Government did not pay close attention to the Select Committee, at least during the early stages of the review process. This allowed the Interim Report to “blindsides” the Government by espousing a very different defence policy to that produced only a year earlier in *SONZ97*. Second, it appears that public opinion in New Zealand was generally supportive of non-combat and peace related defence roles. A study of the submissions received shows that the more conservative documents were almost always the product of defence academics, whereas ex-servicemen and the general public usually supported a more innovative approach. Third, while the National Government reacted to the Interim Report, it was still unable to swing the majority towards its own views. It was not a simple case of Labour versus National. The policy espoused by the Final Report was supported by Labour, ACT, New Zealand First and the Alliance. National simply did not have enough political influence to force the other parties around. Its coalition agreement with New Zealand First had disintegrated, and an election was fast approaching. It was not in the other parties’ interests to associate themselves with National policy. Lastly, there is evidence of some differences of opinion between the three services

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<sup>307</sup> Interview with Former New Zealand Defence Official D.

<sup>308</sup> Interview with Former New Zealand Defence Official D.

about their respective roles, although there is no conclusive evidence about this. Rather there have been assertions by a variety of defence actors that elements within the Army especially had a strong influence over the Select Committee and managed to slant defence policy in that direction.<sup>309</sup>

The final report of *DB2000* was not a clear, coherent document. It was, after all, the product of a committee process and the combination of many competing views.<sup>310</sup> There are so many recommendations that one could pick and choose from them to support a range of defence forces. Only by reading the report in its entirety, and comparing it to *SONZ97*, can one detect a continuing support for a “niche force” although that specific term was deleted from the Final Report.

*DB2000* has been described as the first major defence policy document within New Zealand to really switch focus to the post-Cold War international environment, and that statement seems justified.<sup>311</sup> Overall, *DB2000* supported a defence policy less oriented towards the concept of “insurance” and more towards the concept of “immediate use”.<sup>312</sup> It was a marked change from the existent White Paper.

### *Aftermath*

The one significant outcome of the Report was its adoption by Labour,<sup>313</sup> which won the general election of late 1999. Labour’s 1999 defence policy was strongly supportive of *DB2000*, and stated flatly that “Labour will ensure that our armed forces are oriented towards positive and comprehensive security roles.”<sup>314</sup> The Army would be the first priority, and the role of the RNZAF and RNZN would be to support the Army.

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<sup>309</sup> Understanding this assertion cannot be gained through a single source. Rather, it is the product of several sources, including: Interview with Former New Zealand Defence Official B; Interview with Former New Zealand Defence Official C. These suggest certain underhand army tactics. Other useful sources are Carruthers, *Report of Inquiry into the Propriety of a Letter Allegedly Generated from within the Army and an E-Mail Allegedly Generated from within the Navy*; Laxon, 'The bitter battle for Wellington'. and Campbell, 'Armed farces'; Gordon Campbell, 'Unfriendly fire', *Listener*, vol. 180, no. 3206, 20 October 2001; Unknown Author, 'Shipley points to Army sedition', *New Zealand Herald*, 31 August 2001.

<sup>310</sup> Francis van der Krogt, 'Blueprint for Defence: Labour-Alliance Defence Policy and the Inquiry into Defence Beyond 2000', Massey University, 2001. p.44

<sup>311</sup> *Ibid.* p.10

<sup>312</sup> *Ibid.* p.115-120 provides the term “insurance” but the term “immediate use” is the author’s own.

<sup>313</sup> Ian Templeton, 'Defence "pact" sparks conflict', *Sunday Star-Times*, 5 September 1999.

<sup>314</sup> Labour Party of New Zealand, *Labour on Defence*, November 1999. p.2

The later sections of this chapter on Labour policy will illustrate how many of the findings of *DB2000* found their way into governmental policy.

## **Part Two – Policy Under Labour 2000-2005**

From 1992 to 1999, defence policy in New Zealand remained largely the same. However, with the election of Labour in 1999, the prospect of change beckoned. Labour had been a major participant in the *DB2000* process, and had clearly stated that once in power it would recraft New Zealand defence policy along such lines. This has indeed been the case, although it is not as simple as saying *DB2000* has become government policy.

Labour defence policy has been most clearly expressed in two documents: *The Government Defence Policy Framework 2000* (GDPF2000), and *The Government Defence Statement 2001* (GDS2001). The second part of this chapter examines both of these documents.

### **The Government Defence Policy Framework June 2000**

Less than a year after gaining power the new Labour Government attempted to stamp its own influence onto New Zealand defence policy. It did this by releasing a *Government Defence Policy Framework* in June 2000. *GDPF2000* was neither a party political statement nor a departmental review. Rather, it fell between those two poles, and was instead an executive document, the product of Cabinet more than anything else.

#### *International Context*

The international situation was less stable than it had been at the initiation of *SONZ97* and *DB2000*. The world was undergoing a second period of post-Cold War instability, with ethnic conflicts in Kosovo, East Timor and Sierra Leone. The United States' hegemony remained unchallenged, and indeed had grown in relative terms since 1997, but its willingness to involve itself in regional activities was questionable. Instead, as seen in East Timor, it was supportive of regional actors playing their own parts and preferred to provide support only.

The East Asian economies had been seriously harmed by the 1998 financial crisis, but were slowly recovering; their own military modernisation plans had largely been put on hold. China's power in the region was rising.

The relationship with Australia was problematic. There had been criticism from across the Tasman about New Zealand defence policy,<sup>315</sup> and Helen Clark had dropped the term "single strategic entity" when referring to the defence relationship with Australia.<sup>316</sup> Minister of Defence Mark Burton also made New Zealand's attitude towards Australia clear when he stated in Parliament that "our allies' perceptions of our defence spending is important but the priorities for our defence spending are this Government's."<sup>317</sup>

Overall, despite elements of global insecurity, there were no obvious threats to New Zealand, and the situation viewed from Wellington was one of a benign security environment.

### *Domestic Political Context*

Defence became an issue of some public concern during the latter part of 1999 due to the deployment to East Timor. Although both parties were supportive of deployment, Labour used the operation to criticise the standard of NZDF equipment and suggest that National might have done better. This debate is described in greater detail in the following section on Defence Force Issues.

Despite the East Timor deployment, defence was not a major issue of the 1999 election, although the parties did have widely varying defence policies.<sup>318</sup> In June 1999, Clark made an influential speech to the RNZRSA, in which she stated that if Labour won there was little likelihood of funding being increased, but that Labour would focus on where that funding went.<sup>319</sup> Labour, as noted before, based their

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<sup>315</sup> Greg Ansley, 'NZ accused of shirking local defence role', *The New Zealand Herald*, 24 February 2000.

<sup>316</sup> John Armstrong, 'PM shuns 'single' defence entity', *New Zealand Herald*, 1 March 2000.

<sup>317</sup> Mark Burton, Parliamentary Question 4346, 14 March 2000, Wellington.

<sup>318</sup> Rory Paddock et al., *The Effect of a Labour-Alliance Coalition Government on the NZDF*, Exercise RURU, Whenuapai: RNZAF Command and Staff College, 1 December 1999. p.1 and Miranda Alison, *Debate Notes on Political Party Debate on NZ's Foreign and Defence Policy*, Email to Steve Hoadley, 2 November 1999.

<sup>319</sup> Helen Clark, 'Speech to RSA Conference Meeting', Press Release, 15 June 1999; Interview with New Zealand Defence Official A, 14 July 2005.

election policy on *DB2000*, and were opposed to the F-16 lease and third Anzac,<sup>320</sup> while the Alliance supported an even more limited policy based on peacekeeping and the removal of sea and air combat capability.<sup>321</sup>

When Labour won the election, albeit in coalition with the Alliance, it made its intentions clear. In December 1999, Prime Minister Clark announced her desire to review and possibly scrap the recently signed deal to lease F-16s from the United States.<sup>322</sup> Her announcement met with public criticism, with the *New Zealand Herald* stating that cancelling the F-16 deal would have negative implications for the relationship with Australia.<sup>323</sup> In March 2000, fulfilling her speech to the RNZRSA, the Prime Minister announced she was committed to 1.1% of GDP for defence spending.<sup>324</sup>

Domestically, Labour had a free hand in policy. Their coalition partner, the Alliance, was known to be supportive of the more extreme aspects of *Defence Beyond 2000*, but at the same time was keen to act in a constructive fashion as Labour's junior partner. Also, the Alliance's key focus was domestic policy, and thus its interest in defence reviews limited.

General public opinion was also increasingly supportive of the NZDF.<sup>325</sup> The end of the 1990s appears to have been a time when the groundswell of public opinion turned in favour of defence.<sup>326</sup> This was partially linked to the types of deployments carried out by the NZDF in recent years, including PSOs and other humanitarian activities.

### *Defence Force Issues*

It is useful to forego, briefly, the conventions of chronology and look at the impact of the East Timor operation, as it clearly illustrates the state of the NZDF at

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<sup>320</sup> Unknown Author, 'Fighter jets and frigates off Labour's defence list', *The Dominion*, 9 November 1999.

<sup>321</sup> Paddock et al., *The Effect of a Labour-Alliance Coalition Government on the NZDF*. p.5-9

<sup>322</sup> Unknown Author, 'Clark wants to scrap F-16 deal', *New Zealand Herald*, 3 December 1999.

<sup>323</sup> Greg Ansley, 'F-16 retreat will be seen as more NZ scrounging', *New Zealand Herald*, 14 December 1999.

<sup>324</sup> Colin James, 'Flinty Clark fronts up for her fiscal test', *New Zealand Herald*, 8 March 2000.

<sup>325</sup> A.H. Keating, *Civil-Military Relations in New Zealand: Does the New Zealand Defence Force Generate a Positive Image Within Wider New Zealand Society?*, Whenuapai: RNZAF Command and Staff College, 7 November 1999. p.4-6

<sup>326</sup> Interview with Former New Zealand Defence Official B; Interview with New Zealand Defence Official A.

the time (1999-2000) as well as some of the issues engaged with by the review. The period before deployment was a period of ongoing public debate about NZDF capability, largely fought out in the opinions page of the New Zealand Herald. Some commentators said New Zealand would struggle to provide a capable contingent to the operation.<sup>327</sup> Others said only a few minor enhancements to equipment would be needed.<sup>328</sup> Retired Army General Piers Reid made perhaps the strongest criticism, claiming that New Zealand troops would face “embarrassment”.<sup>329</sup> Another debate centred on the need for other types of force in the operation, including fighters and warships.<sup>330</sup>

In September 1999, the NZDF sent its contingent to East Timor.<sup>331</sup> This deployment indicated several shortcomings in the NZDF, notably a lack of lift capability, and a need for greater readiness.<sup>332</sup> Any rotation would require Territorial forces, as the Regular strength of the army was simply not sufficient.<sup>333</sup> There were equipment shortages, requiring the contingent to borrow items from the Australians.<sup>334</sup> Linguistic skills were lacking within the force, hindering involvement with the civil community.<sup>335</sup> In general, however, the performance of New Zealand troops was good. Their conventional oriented training was seen as being most suitable, as at any time the situation might have deteriorated and required a warfighting response.<sup>336</sup>

In general, and despite the size of the commitment, deployment to East Timor does not appear to have had much impact on the review process. This was perhaps largely an issue of timing, as there was little time between deployment and the

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<sup>327</sup> Derek Quigley, 'Army needs shakeup for peace-keeping role', *The New Zealand Herald*, 29 April 1999.

<sup>328</sup> David Dickens, 'Our Army does have ability for peacekeeping', *The New Zealand Herald* 1999.

<sup>329</sup> Piers Reid, 'NZ troops in Timor would face only embarrassment', *The New Zealand Herald*, 17 May 1999.

<sup>330</sup> Piers Reid, 'The Lessons of East Timor', Paper presented at the Conference on Defence Policy After East Timor, Victoria University of Wellington, 2000. p.10-11

<sup>331</sup> Alach, 'Peace Support Operations: International Evolution and New Zealand Adaptation'. Chapter Six provides a summary of New Zealand's involvement in this operation.

<sup>332</sup> Mark Burton, 'Opening', Paper presented at the Conference on Defence Policy After East Timor, Victoria University of Wellington, 2000. p.7-8

<sup>333</sup> Mark Burton, Parliamentary Question 13856, 27 November 2002, Wellington.

<sup>334</sup> Reid, 'The Lessons of East Timor'. p.5

<sup>335</sup> *Ibid.* p.8

<sup>336</sup> *Ibid.* p.3 also see Mark Burton, Parliamentary Question 18438, 12 December 2001, Wellington. which discusses one aspect of pre-deployment training.

production of the review,<sup>337</sup> or perhaps because there was a perception that the lessons of East Timor were more at the operational and tactical levels.<sup>338</sup>

When the new Minister of Defence, Mark Burton, arrived in his office in November 1999 he was given a briefing on the current state of the NZDF. Regular personnel strength stood at 9401, the capital plan of *SONZ97* was undergoing reassessment due to cost increases,<sup>339</sup> and major proposals such as the F-16 lease and the Sirius upgrade of the RNZAF's Orion fleet were reaching the acceptance stage.<sup>340</sup> Important decisions would be needed in the near future.<sup>341</sup> The NZDF was also troubled by several equipment problems, including the VLLAD system<sup>342</sup> and the Hercules fleet.<sup>343</sup>

In December 1999, Burton stated to Parliament that current and projected funding was insufficient to pay for the equipment proposals listed in *SONZ97*. He said capital injections would likely be required, as would further reviews to determine the optimal force structure.<sup>344</sup> Soon after, Minister of Foreign Affairs Phil Goff also suggested that the F-16 deal be scrapped to save funds.<sup>345</sup> It was also noted that while the Army had been priority one in recent re-equipment plans, no funding for their equipment had yet been provided.<sup>346</sup>

As noted, Labour had promised to review the lease of F-16 aircraft authorised by National. This report, carried out by Derek Quigley, was released in March 2000.<sup>347</sup> It was a critical indictment of National's financial management of defence.

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<sup>337</sup> Interview with New Zealand Defence Official A.

<sup>338</sup> Robin Klitscher, 'The NZDF's Mission', Paper presented at the Conference on Defence Policy After East Timor, Victoria University of Wellington, 2000.

<sup>339</sup> As noted earlier it was in fact unaffordable.

<sup>340</sup> New Zealand Minister of Defence, *Project Sirius: Briefing to Minister of Defence*, April 2000; New Zealand Ministry of Defence, *Powerpoint Presentation: Project Sirius Policy Linkages*, April 2000; New Zealand Ministry of Defence, *Project Sirius Questions and Answers*, April 2000.

<sup>341</sup> New Zealand Ministry of Defence, *Post Election Brief for the Minister of Defence*, Wellington, 1999. p.17-28

<sup>342</sup> Unknown Author, 'New Zealand Army Mistral firings', *Jane's Defence Weekly*, vol. 32, no. 23, 8 December 1999. p.17 and New Zealand House of Representatives, *2000/01 Financial Review of the Ministry of Defence and the New Zealand Defence Force: Report of the Foreign Affairs and Defence and Trade Committee*, Wellington, 2002. p.7 and Mark Burton, Parliamentary Question 8560, 5 September 2002, Wellington.

<sup>343</sup> Max Bradford, Parliamentary Question 3385, 19 May 1999, Wellington.

<sup>344</sup> Mark Burton, Parliamentary Question 1141, 23 December 1999, Wellington. See also Mark Burton, Parliamentary Question 4634, 17 March 2000, Wellington.

<sup>345</sup> Matthew Dearnley, 'Goff expects Aussie flak on F-16s', *New Zealand Herald*, 17 January 2000.

<sup>346</sup> Mark Burton, Parliamentary Question 2768, 16 February 2000, Wellington; Mark Burton, Parliamentary Question 2771, 16 February 2000, Wellington.

<sup>347</sup> Quigley, *Review of the lease of F-16 aircraft for the Royal New Zealand Air Force*. p.1; Cathie Bell, 'Quigley's F16 review to cost \$85000', *The Dominion*, 21 December 1999.

The review noted increases had occurred in the price estimates for all major acquisition projects.<sup>348</sup> It noted that little funding had actually been granted; eleven projects ranked priority one in November 1998 had still not had funds committed by early 2000.<sup>349</sup> It noted that despite Max Bradford's 1997 comment that naval, land and maritime capabilities were more important than fighters, the F-16 purchase had jumped the queue; there was no rigorous prioritisation process within the NZDF and MOD that determined the order of project approval.<sup>350</sup> And, in perhaps the most astonishing section, the review noted that while *SONZ97* had estimated a total of 4.4 billion NZD for a 20-year capital equipment project, new calculations showed 5 billion NZD would be required for only the next ten years, if all projects in that document's plan were approved.<sup>351</sup>

The Prime Minister, Helen Clark, responded swiftly and decided not to proceed with the F-16 lease deal.<sup>352</sup> She noted the programme was “not a sufficiently high priority” and there was “huge pressure on the defence budget.”<sup>353</sup> In the resultant Hansard debate, she accused National of creative accounting, of developing policy with no chance of fulfillment, and stated that a new review of defence policy was being planned.<sup>354</sup> There were rumours that Quigley, rather than the MOD, would be chosen to head that review process.<sup>355</sup> There were already rumours that the policymaking structures within the NZDF and MOD were dysfunctional, and that even those within the policy loop found it difficult to acquire information.<sup>356</sup>

In this unstable atmosphere the Army was also undergoing the change in its concept of operations authorised in May 1999, which stemmed from *Army 2005* and *Motorisation of the NZ Army*. Its battalions were shifting from four companies of riflemen per battalion to three companies of riflemen, plus one manoeuvre company, per battalion.<sup>357</sup>

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<sup>348</sup> Quigley, *Review of the lease of F-16 aircraft for the Royal New Zealand Air Force*. p.10

<sup>349</sup> *Ibid.* p.11

<sup>350</sup> *Ibid.* p.15-21

<sup>351</sup> *Ibid.* p.51 and Treasury Paper Attachment

<sup>352</sup> Helen Clark, *Prime Ministerial Statement on F16s Decision*, Wellington, 20 March 2000. Covering Letter. There are also suggestions that Clark wished to cancel the deal no matter what and used the review merely to legitimate this decision. Interview with Former New Zealand Defence Official D.

<sup>353</sup> Clark, *Prime Ministerial Statement on F16s Decision*. p.1

<sup>354</sup> *Ibid.* Hansard Debate Attachment B08-2 and B08-7

<sup>355</sup> Bell, 'Quigley's F16 review to cost \$85000'; Brent Edward, 'Quigley's job a snub for Defence', *The Evening Post*, 14 December 1999.; Interview with Former New Zealand Defence Official D.

<sup>356</sup> Cathie Bell, 'Problems in defence policy advice - review', *The Dominion*, 3 August 1999.

<sup>357</sup> Mark Burton, Parliamentary Question 608, 22 December 1999, Wellington.

Overall, the NZDF was in a troubled state. The ambitious capital acquisition plan of *SONZ97* had ballooned in cost and was now unaffordable.<sup>358</sup> Funding shortages were apparent throughout the force, and equipment that should have been replaced earlier was becoming increasingly obsolescent. Attrition rates were still relatively high.

### *Themes and Actors*

*GDPF2000* was, as with *DB2000*, a broad ranging review of defence policy. It was not, however, designed to make specific force structure decisions. Rather, it was designed to set the wider parameters of New Zealand defence policy.

The primary issue of *GDPF2000* was to devise the most fitting structure of the NZDF for the strategic situation. It thus devolved, again, to the broad versus narrow force argument.<sup>359</sup> A secondary issue was the respective weighting of current and future requirements; this was linked to the broad and narrow debate because it was felt that a broad force structure was more suited to longer term insurance. Another issue was the importance of operations other than war, especially peace support operations. However there was little attention paid to non-conventional combat operations despite the rising number of such around the world. The issue of defence transformation, and indeed even the specific requirements of peace support operation, did not figure in the review. A fourth issue was the perceived poor performance of some force elements in East Timor and the need to identify remedies. A fifth, and perhaps the most important, issue was the growing cash crunch in relation to acquisition, which required a fundamental review to identify what capabilities could be retained and what might need to be discarded.

A sixth, non-defence factor was political. This was the need for Labour to express its defence policy coherently early on in its term, in order to stamp its own shape upon the defence establishment. It was known that some within Labour were relatively suspicious of the MOD and NZDF upper echelons, and *GDPF2000* may

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<sup>358</sup> Interview with New Zealand Defence Official D.

<sup>359</sup> See for example Burton's response to questions about anti-submarine warfare and the need for frigates: Mark Burton, Parliamentary Question 4345, 14 March 2000, Wellington.; Mark Burton, Parliamentary Question 3260, 29 February 2000, Wellington.

thus have been an attempt to illustrate clearly the dominance of political actors over their bureaucratic servants.<sup>360</sup>

Thus, from these issues one can identify two major themes: first, the need to realign defence policy to meet strategic requirements; and, second and perhaps most importantly, the need to realign defence policy to meet financial constraints and political pledges.

The latter, political, motivation is reinforced by the actors involved in the review process. *SONZ97* had been a bureaucratic review; *DB2000* a Parliamentary process. *GDPF2000* was an interesting new development: an executive-centred process. By and large it was the personal staffs of the Ministers involved (largely Defence, FAT, and the Prime Minister) and the Ministers themselves who drafted the review.<sup>361</sup> Officials from various departments reviewed drafts but had little or no real input into the process.<sup>362</sup>

Because the review was carried out by Labour Ministers, and their personal staff, there was little disagreement on the central issues. Labour had been clear about its preference for the narrow force approach recommended by *DB2000*. Opposition politicians, and perhaps some bureaucrats, who favoured the broad force structure were simply not involved in the review.

Also important was the experience of the various persons involved. The Labour Ministers were, for the most part, first-time ministers.

### *Process of Review*

As noted earlier, Labour had stated during the 1999 election that it would produce a new Defence White Paper based on *DB2000*. Indeed, *DB2000* was treated as a Green Paper from which to develop this new framework.<sup>363</sup> Also, a comprehensive paper reconciling existing policy with expected guidance, was produced within the MOD itself and passed onto the Minister.<sup>364</sup>

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<sup>360</sup> Edward, 'Quigley's job a snub for Defence'.

<sup>361</sup> Interview with New Zealand Defence Official A.

<sup>362</sup> However, and as will be noted later, there may have been greater involvement by certain elements in the MOD very early on. Interview with Former New Zealand Defence Official D.

<sup>363</sup> Interview with New Zealand Defence Official A.

<sup>364</sup> Interview with Former New Zealand Defence Official D.

Around January 2000, work began on turning the 1999 election platform, as well as the paper received from the MOD, into a proper framework.<sup>365</sup> The delay from the election was occasioned by the need for the new Labour ministers, especially Mark Burton, to become acquainted with their new positions.

The Minister and other Cabinet colleagues drafted early versions of the review. Policy was discussed by Cabinet colleagues, then given to Caucus for its approval. There was a general consensus amongst the actors. Only minor tweaks and changes were required during the early part of the process. Other departments proffered advice, if only informally, and the chief executives of DPMC, FAT, MOD, as well as the CDF and Deputy Secretary of Treasury, all reviewed the drafts.<sup>366</sup>

On 20 March 2000, the same day the F-16 deal was cancelled, Cabinet formally requested an official statement of defence policy.<sup>367</sup> In early May, Prime Minister Clark publicly presaged many of the review's recommendations, noting that the prioritisation of defence spending was to be the Army first, air and maritime lift second, surveillance and patrol third and air combat last.<sup>368</sup>

In March 2000, Mark Burton noted that the Naval Combat Force study inherited from National would be broadened as part of Labour's new review process.<sup>369</sup> In May he told Parliament that:

The Labour/Alliance Government will produce a statement of its defence policy goals. As envisaged in the Defence Act, this will provide a basis for reviewing options capable of achieving those goals.<sup>370</sup>

A day later, he stated that rumours circulating in the press that a draft defence policy document would shortly be taken to Cabinet were inaccurate.<sup>371</sup> However, on 30 May 2000 a draft framework did reach CSSERD, entitled *The Labour-Alliance Government's Defence Policy Framework*.

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<sup>365</sup> Much of the following paragraph is taken from Interview with New Zealand Defence Official A.

<sup>366</sup> New Zealand Cabinet External Relations and Defence Committee, 'The Labour-Alliance Government's Defence Policy Framework', ERD(00)19, 30 May 2000, Wellington. Attachment p.5

<sup>367</sup> Ibid. Attachment p.1. See also New Zealand Cabinet, 'The Government's Defence Policy Framework [A]', CAB(00)314, 9 June 2000, Wellington. Attachment p.1

<sup>368</sup> Unknown Author, 'Orion upgrade not a priority - Clark', *New Zealand Herald*, 2 May 2000.

<sup>369</sup> Mark Burton, Parliamentary Question 4358, 14 March 2000, Wellington.

<sup>370</sup> Mark Burton, Parliamentary Question 9280, 17 May 2000, Wellington.

<sup>371</sup> Mark Burton, Parliamentary Question 9561, 18 May 2000, Wellington.

The draft statement stated that it was based on six principles:

1. New Zealand's own assessment of needs;
2. A primary purpose of securing New Zealand and New Zealand's EEZ and having the ability to meet likely contingencies;
3. A need to work closely with like minded partners;
4. The ability to make as full a contribution to PSOs as possible;
5. The retention of the nuclear free policy;
6. No co-operation with human rights infringing states.<sup>372</sup>

The paper saw the key components of the NZDF as being Ready Reaction Forces, Strategic Transport Forces, Maritime Patrol and Surveillance Forces, Other Forces and Joint Operational Headquarters.<sup>373</sup> Air and naval combat forces were expressly stated not to be priorities. The draft noted that it "reflect(ed) the policies that were articulated during the election and statements that had been made since then."<sup>374</sup> Little mention was made of medium-intensity operations and PSOs were actually listed after overseas development assistance in the list of expected roles.<sup>375</sup>

The key considerations of the draft framework were (1) likely security challenges, (2) the role New Zealand wanted for its defence force, (3) how much New Zealand was willing to pay, and (4) the force structure that would result. The draft noted that prioritisation was necessary and this might mean a reduction in the range of capabilities.<sup>376</sup>

The paper then recommended four further steps:

1. The completion of a defence capability blueprint to identify required outputs;
2. The development of a long term defence plan for capital and operating investments;
3. The completion of 5-year programmes for the services;

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<sup>372</sup> New Zealand Cabinet External Relations and Defence Committee, 'The Labour-Alliance Government's Defence Policy Framework'. Attachment p.1-2

<sup>373</sup> Ibid. Attachment p.3

<sup>374</sup> Ibid. Attachment p.4

<sup>375</sup> Ibid. Attachment p.7

<sup>376</sup> Ibid. Attachment p.11

4. The development of a capital budget for the next year and indicative budgets for the following two years.<sup>377</sup>

Further revision was requested by CSSERD, and it was decided that the paper would be reported back to the full Cabinet in early June.<sup>378</sup>

On 9 June, the revised document was presented to Cabinet, now entitled *The Government's Defence Policy Framework*. It noted that other reviews were ongoing and also requested that urgent capital acquisitions be considered prior to the completion of those reviews.<sup>379</sup> It also asked for reconsideration of several funding issues.

The main part of the revised framework differed little from the May submission. The new document noted that “adoption of the Policy Framework does not commit the Government to any particular level of defence funding.”<sup>380</sup> It directed officials to prepare papers to set out the steps required to achieve the goals of the *GDPF2000*, a process that would result in subsequent reviews.<sup>381</sup>

On 12 June 2000, Cabinet approved this draft of *GDPF2000*, as well as the other recommendations provided – the final public version of *GDPF2000* was almost exactly the same as this Cabinet submission. Some leaks reached the press immediately before the Framework's release. They were largely accurate, claiming that the Army would get the highest priority and that the document would not go into force structure specifics.<sup>382</sup>

Overall, the review was an executive dominated process. It was noticeable how differently Labour approached the review process, compared to National.<sup>383</sup> On the surface, the review process involved the enhancement of *DB2000*'s rigorously derived recommendations, rather than merely a restatement of pre-existing Labour defence policy. Later sections will deal with this question in more depth.

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<sup>377</sup> Ibid. Attachment p.12

<sup>378</sup> New Zealand Cabinet External Relations and Defence Committee, 'Meeting Minutes', ERD(00)M8/4, 31 May 2000, Wellington.

<sup>379</sup> New Zealand Cabinet, 'The Government's Defence Policy Framework [A]'. p.1

<sup>380</sup> Ibid. p.1

<sup>381</sup> Ibid. p.2

<sup>382</sup> Audrey Young, 'Defence 'depth' dominates review', *New Zealand Herald*, 19 June 2000.

<sup>383</sup> Interview with New Zealand Defence Official B.

## *Result*

The final version was published explicitly as a framework rather than a White Paper.<sup>384</sup> It stated that “the Government’s approach has been substantially guided by, and builds on, the Defence Beyond 2000 report.”<sup>385</sup> It was a short document, only eleven pages including a glossary, but was novel in many of its conclusions and recommendations.

The Framework listed five security “interests”:

1. A secure New Zealand, including the EEZ and critical infrastructure;
2. A strong strategic relationship with Australia;
3. A political environment in the South Pacific marked by good governance;
4. An expanding role in regional dialogue with Asia;
5. A global role committed to the maintenance of human rights and UN collective security responsibilities.<sup>386</sup>

In the Framework’s rhetoric, the primary rationale for the NZDF’s existence was to secure New Zealand against external threats, protect sovereign interests including the EEZ, and meet likely contingencies in strategic areas of interest.<sup>387</sup>

Linked with these security interests were five Key Defence Policy Objectives:

1. To defend New Zealand and to protect its people, land, territorial waters, EEZ, natural resources and critical infrastructure;
2. To meet our alliance commitments to Australia by maintaining a close defence partnership in pursuit of common security interests;
3. To assist in the maintenance of security in the South Pacific and to provide assistance to our Pacific neighbours;
4. To play an appropriate role in the maintenance of security in the Asia-Pacific region, including meeting our obligations as a member of the FPDA;

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<sup>384</sup> Interview with New Zealand Defence Official A.

<sup>385</sup> New Zealand Government, *The Government's Defence Policy Framework*, Wellington, 2000. p.1

<sup>386</sup> *Ibid.* p.3

<sup>387</sup> *Ibid.* p.3

5. To contribute to global security and peacekeeping through participation in the full range of UN and other appropriate multilateral peace support and humanitarian relief operations.<sup>388</sup>

In order to best perform in these roles, the Framework stated that “our core requirement is for well-equipped, combat trained land forces which are also able to act as effective peacekeepers, supported by the Navy and Air Force.”<sup>389</sup> The Framework directed “a shift towards a range of military capabilities which are sustainable, safe and effective in combat and peacekeeping.”<sup>390</sup>

In accord with its emphasis on land forces, the Framework stated that the greatest need within the NZDF was to upgrade the Army’s mobility, communications, surveillance and fire support.<sup>391</sup> Other, lesser priorities included upgrading air and sea transport and maintaining effective maritime surveillance.

The Framework was unashamedly “nicheist” in orientation: “(the) Government accepts that this (policy) could mean a reduced range of capabilities.”<sup>392</sup> The focus was largely on non-combat tasks, including EEZ patrols, counter-terrorism and civil aid,<sup>393</sup> and deployments to peace support operations.

The Framework did not make specific recommendations. Rather, it noted that a range of more detailed reviews were underway, which would provide the necessary analysis for further decisions. The Framework’s role was instead to set out the broad objectives and outcomes needed, rather than the specific method to achieve them. A month after the Framework was completed Mark Burton stated that the document was merely the beginning of policy.<sup>394</sup>

### *Summary and Analysis*

The *Government’s Defence Policy Framework* was a controversial document. It was the product not of bureaucrats, nor of MPs, but of Ministers and their staff. It was reviewed by departmental heads, but was deliberately not an official-drafted

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<sup>388</sup> Ibid. p.4

<sup>389</sup> Ibid. p.7

<sup>390</sup> Ibid. p.6

<sup>391</sup> Ibid. p.8

<sup>392</sup> Ibid. p.9

<sup>393</sup> Ibid. p.5

<sup>394</sup> New Zealand House of Representatives, *Debate on Defence*, Wellington, 23 August 2000.

document. It was perhaps unique in the history of New Zealand defence policy documents. It was politically micromanaged, and it claimed that it was built on the very public and open process of *DB2000*. That claim deserves some critical attention.

Links between *DB2000* and *GDPF2000* can be seen in a variety of areas. Both had a strong internationalist emphasis.<sup>395</sup> Both were focused on current issues and short-term contingencies, and did not believe that insurance against an uncertain future was the primary purpose of defence policy.<sup>396</sup> Both were also supportive of increasing jointness and more involvement in peacekeeping.<sup>397</sup>

Yet there were perhaps as many differences between the two as there were similarities. *DB2000* did not foreclose the possibility of either a third frigate or the Sirius upgrade, but Labour policy post-*GDPF2000* cancelled both projects.<sup>398</sup> Nor did *DB2000*'s grab-bag of recommendations find their way wholesale into government policy. *GDPF2000* was more consolidated and consistent than was *DB2000*, and prioritised roles and capabilities in a more coherent fashion.

*GDPF2000* was a more polished document than was *DB2000*. This was largely the result of the process whereby an open, Parliamentary review was turned into policy by a small coterie of executive actors; while the terms were not usually used, the Green Paper of *DB2000* was developed into the White Paper of *GDPF2000*.<sup>399</sup> A question arises, however, as to whether *DB2000* was actually the precursor to *GDPF2000* or whether both *DB2000* and *GDPF2000* descended from a common, ancestral Labour defence policy and were thus distant brothers rather than parent and child.<sup>400</sup> The evidence is lacking for both assertions; it is difficult to prove a negative. The simplest explanation is the most obvious, that Labour policy fed into *DB2000* which in turn fed into *GDPF2000*. It is the explanation this thesis agrees with.

Despite assertions of radical change, at its heart *GDPF2000* did not demand the wholesale restructuring of the NZDF.<sup>401</sup> Major defence decisions were left to the

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<sup>395</sup> van der Krogt, 'Blueprint for Defence: Labour-Alliance Defence Policy and the Inquiry into Defence Beyond 2000'. p.15

<sup>396</sup> Ibid. p.8,19

<sup>397</sup> Ibid. p.44,80-81

<sup>398</sup> Ibid. p.98

<sup>399</sup> The term Green Paper, was, however, used during Interview with New Zealand Defence Official A.

<sup>400</sup> Into this question comes the issue of the MOD paper produced after the election, reconciling expected guidance with existing policy. Interview with Former New Zealand Defence Official D.

<sup>401</sup> That is, during the period from its production until 8 May 2001 and the production of the Government Defence Statement.

subsequent review process, and returned to the officials with greater expertise; there was no attempt to railroad through politically-motivated decisions, although the bureaucrats had a clear understanding of the views of their political masters. In the years since, only one major force element has been heavily affected, and that only after further study and debate.

Close analysis of the rhetoric used in the document indicates that the major changes feared by some were merely panicked responses, or perhaps fear mongering. The wording was actually very similar in parts to that used in *SONZ97*. There was no indication anywhere of shifting the NZDF towards a solely peacekeeping role, or of focusing solely on civilian tasks. What *GDPF2000* did do, however, was re-evaluate the NZDF against the perceived requirements of the period. In many areas, it found the force lacking.

One can criticise the conclusions of the Framework easily enough, but its approach seems valid. At the time, the NZDF was experiencing serious financial problems. The capital plan of *SONZ97* was unaffordable and without a serious rethink of policy and priorities the NZDF was in danger of becoming a hollow force with obsolescent equipment. In order to maintain at least some capability, *GDPF2000* suggested shearing off other elements of the force.

### *Aftermath*

Soon after the release of *GDPF2000* the Government was faced with several important decisions relating to further acquisitions, including the Sirius upgrade, the purchase of armoured vehicles, and tactical communications systems.<sup>402</sup> A paper on the upgrade of the Orion fleet reached Cabinet on 14 August, noting the increased cost of the upgrade, and the possibility of other options.<sup>403</sup> It also noted that the Sirius upgrade was the lowest priority of the three acquisitions being considered at the time.<sup>404</sup> Publicly it was rumoured that Cabinet would cancel Sirius,<sup>405</sup> and this indeed proved the case, with Cabinet noting the upgrade did not necessarily link well with

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<sup>402</sup> John Armstrong, 'Cabinet to shoot down Air Force Plans', *The New Zealand Herald*, 21 August 2000.

<sup>403</sup> New Zealand Cabinet Policy Committee, 'New Zealand's Orion Maritime Patrol Force', CAB(00)93, 14 August 2000, Wellington. p.1-2

<sup>404</sup> *Ibid.* Attachment p.9

<sup>405</sup> John Armstrong and Greg Ansley, 'Overseas backlash as Orions sidelined', *New Zealand Herald*, 24 August 2000.

*GDPF2000* policy settings. Cabinet also initiated a wider review of maritime patrol requirements to be presented in February 2001,<sup>406</sup> and a projection of planned future defence spending to be presented in late October 2000.<sup>407</sup>

National attempted to use the Sirius cancellation for political leverage, claiming that such a decision would have adverse effects on New Zealand's foreign relations.<sup>408</sup> There was some comment from overseas partners, including Australia and the United States.<sup>409</sup>

The LAV acquisition, however, was approved. By now the request was for "up to" 105 LAV-IIIs, which were held to be equivalent to the full 152-vehicle buy requested earlier, due to certain synergies.<sup>410</sup> Approval in principle was given on 21 August, with the cost estimated at \$611.764 million NZD.<sup>411</sup> The tactical communications systems were also approved. The approval of the LAVs and communications took away much of the sharpness of the criticism directed at the Sirius cancellation.<sup>412</sup>

On 2 November 2000, a paper entitled *Projection of Future Defence Funding Levels* reached the Cabinet Policy Committee (CPC). This paper included two 10-year projections, both involving substantial baseline increases and capital injections. The higher projection involved an increase in defence spending of some seven billion dollars over the next ten years.<sup>413</sup> It was noted that the Government faced major decisions involving the Army, Air Combat Force, Naval Combat Force, Maritime Patrol Force, Air Transport Force and Utility Helicopters; in other words, every major capability.<sup>414</sup>

The document noted that the minimum funding increase of 3.5 billion NZD over ten years would still only make the Army capable for PSOs and would entail the

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<sup>406</sup> New Zealand Cabinet, 'New Zealand's Orion Maritime Patrol Force', CAB(00)M28/9, 21 August 2000, Wellington. p.2

<sup>407</sup> New Zealand Cabinet, 'Defence Projects: Overview', CAB(00)M28/6, 21 August 2000, Wellington. p.1

<sup>408</sup> Colin James, 'Of ships and planes and land attack', *The New Zealand Herald*, 23 August 2000.

<sup>409</sup> John Armstrong, 'You know best, US tells NZ', *The New Zealand Herald*, 25 August 2000.

<sup>410</sup> Office of the Minister of Defence, 'Purchase of Replacement Light Armoured Vehicles', Letter to the Cabinet Policy Committee, 10 August 2000, Wellington.

<sup>411</sup> New Zealand Cabinet, 'Purchase of Replacement Light Armoured Vehicles', CAB(00)M28/7, 21 August 2000, Wellington.

<sup>412</sup> Armstrong and Ansley, 'Overseas backlash as Orions sidelined'.

<sup>413</sup> New Zealand Cabinet Policy Committee, 'Projection of Future Defence Funding Levels', POL(00)173, 2 November 2000, Wellington. p.2-3

<sup>414</sup> *Ibid.* Attachment p.1-4

dissolution of the ACF.<sup>415</sup> The larger increase would make the Army capable of medium-intensity conflicts and enable the ACF to be retained and a substantial new sealift capability to be acquired. As the paper was an indication rather than a proposal it was noted by Cabinet and further information on funding requested.

The *Sustainable Defence Plan*, prepared by DPMC and Treasury, was provided to the Prime Minister, Deputy Prime Minister, and Ministers of Finance and Defence on 21 December 2000.<sup>416</sup> The document provided advice on defence force structures that meshed the Government's objectives as stated in *GDPF2000* with fiscal constraints.

The plan put forward three broad options:

- a) A reduced ACF and base consolidation;
- b) Removal of the ACF and base consolidation;
- c) Removal of the ACF, base consolidation, no *Canterbury* replacement, and no 727 replacement.<sup>417</sup>

The plan examined each element of the force structure.<sup>418</sup> An increase in the size of the Army was not supported. It suggested *Charles Upham* should be sold, and a multipurpose ship considered to replace *Canterbury*. It suggested the C-130s be upgraded, the UH-1s be replaced, and a single 757 be bought to replace the 727s.

The plan noted that at least an extra billion dollars would be needed over the next ten years simply to maintain spending levels in real terms.<sup>419</sup> Significant short-term pressures on funding would be felt, as the current budget was simply not sufficient. Vitality, it stated that "it is likely that at least one combat capability will have to be reduced or cut."<sup>420</sup>

While these funding and acquisition decisions were being discussed, other changes were also underway. In September 2000, Mark Burton announced the decision to create a Joint Force Headquarters at Trentham camp, a decision directly

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<sup>415</sup> Ibid. Attachment p.4-7

<sup>416</sup> Mark Prebble and John Whitehead, *Sustainable Defence Plan*, Wellington: Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet, Treasury, 21 December 2000.

<sup>417</sup> Ibid. p.1-2

<sup>418</sup> Ibid. p.4-5

<sup>419</sup> Ibid. p.8

<sup>420</sup> Ibid. p.9

traceable to *DB2000* and *GDPF2000*.<sup>421</sup> A reorganisation of the Army was also presaged when Mark Burton noted in November that with the impending introduction of the NZLAVs a merger of the armoured and infantry corps was likely.<sup>422</sup>

Substantial public criticism flowed from Labour's changes to defence policy. There were claims of problems within the MOD and financial mismanagement.<sup>423</sup> Others focused on capability decisions, claiming the NZDF was declining quickly, with negative effects on morale.<sup>424</sup> There were also rumours that the ACF would be disbanded.<sup>425</sup>

The final government decision of 2000, however, was the approval in principle of 308 Light Operational Vehicles (LOVs).<sup>426</sup> However, this did not stop the New Zealand Herald from again editorialising against Labour defence policy. The Herald said that future defence reorganisation was highly likely under a "Government of peacenik persuasion" that appeared to be overly influenced by domestic political considerations rather than the "genuine needs and obligations" of the country.<sup>427</sup>

## Subsequent Force Structure Reviews

The Government had made it clear that a range of force structure reviews would flow from the *GDPF2000*.<sup>428</sup> The three most important of those reviews were the *Land Force and Sealift Review 2000* (LFSR2000), the *Air Combat Review 2001* (ACR2001), and the *Maritime Patrol Review 2001* (MPR2001). These reviews provided the primary input into the subsequent *Government Defence Statement* and

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<sup>421</sup> Bernard Orsman, 'Defence staff go south to work together', *New Zealand Herald*, 19 September 2000. See also Mark Burton, Parliamentary Question 12889, 5 July 2000, Wellington.; Mark Burton, Parliamentary Question 12886, 5 July 2000, Wellington.

<sup>422</sup> Mark Burton, Parliamentary Question 19864, 9 November 2000, Wellington; Mark Burton, Parliamentary Question 19867, 9 November 2000, Wellington.. This decision stemmed from a long term process preceding *GDPF2000* and involving: New Zealand Army General Staff, *Army 2005 - A Force of Utility: Refocussing the Army*.

<sup>423</sup> New Zealand House of Representatives, Parliamentary Debate on Defence, 5 July 2000, Wellington.

<sup>424</sup> David Dickens, 'Does our Air Force have a future?' *New Zealand Herald*, 6 December 2000.

<sup>425</sup> John Armstrong, 'PM de-claws attack on Skyhawks', *New Zealand Herald*, 6 December 2000.

<sup>426</sup> Unknown Author, 'New Army vehicles will cost tens of millions', *New Zealand Herald*, 14 December 2000. and New Zealand Government, *Defence Long-Term Development Plan*, Wellington, 27 May 2002. p.11

<sup>427</sup> Unknown Author, 'Editorial: Effective Defence vital for security', *New Zealand Herald*, 18 December 2000.

<sup>428</sup> Mark Burton, Parliamentary Question 12910, 5 July 2000, Wellington; Mark Burton, Parliamentary Question 12911, 5 July 2000, Wellington. and Mark Burton, Parliamentary Question 19428, 1 November 2000, Wellington. and Helen Clark, Parliamentary Question 18551, 12 October 2000, Wellington.

were thus the crucial link between the broad objectives of *GDPF2000* and later, more detailed policy.

The force structure reviews were undertaken by bureaucrats and servicemen,<sup>429</sup> not the executive, but care was taken as to who was granted the responsibility for each review.<sup>430</sup> *LFSR2000* was a joint NZDF and MOD review. *ACR2001*, for reasons of sensitivity in relation to the ACW, was a MOD-only review. *MPR2001*, due to its broad goals, was run by DPMC.

The Terms of Reference for the reviews were broad enough to allow analytical skills to be brought into what was until then a largely political process.<sup>431</sup> The general process for the reviews was that officials would develop drafts, refer to Cabinet, and then receive either acceptance or requests for further modification.

*LFSR2000* involved all three services, and took approximately seven to eight months.<sup>432</sup> The stated aim of *LFSR2000* was “to provide advice to the Government on the range of military capabilities required to meet its defence policy objectives that are sustainable, safe and effective in combat and peacekeeping and structured for maximum operational and political impact.”<sup>433</sup> The review built on the Framework’s stated policy but also had strong linkages with the Army’s *Army 2005* concept document.<sup>434</sup>

*LFSR2000* noted that in order to fulfil policy, the Army needed to be able to provide a deployable battalion group.<sup>435</sup> However that would be difficult to sustain given the limitations of the Army.<sup>436</sup> It noted that the Army should focus on light infantry operations,<sup>437</sup> albeit with superior fire support than that already operated.<sup>438</sup> In relation to this, it listed capital acquisition priorities as being LOVs, fire support, reconnaissance vehicles, and medium range anti-tank weapons.<sup>439</sup> It also mentioned

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<sup>429</sup> The latter had to be cleared by their chief of service.

<sup>430</sup> Interview with New Zealand Defence Official C, 14 July 2005.

<sup>431</sup> Interview with New Zealand Defence Official C.

<sup>432</sup> Interview with New Zealand Defence Official D.

<sup>433</sup> New Zealand Government, *New Zealand Defence Force Capability Reviews Phase One - Land Forces and Sealift*, Wellington, November 2000. p.4

<sup>434</sup> New Zealand Army General Staff, *Army 2005 - A Force of Utility: Refocussing the Army*.

<sup>435</sup> New Zealand Government, *New Zealand Defence Force Capability Reviews Phase One - Land Forces and Sealift*. p.6 .

<sup>436</sup> *Ibid.* p.6

<sup>437</sup> *Ibid.* p.55

<sup>438</sup> *Ibid.* p.65

<sup>439</sup> *Ibid.* p.10

investigating more flexible personnel practises, the use of the Territorials, and the possibility of raising a third battalion.<sup>440</sup>

*LFSR2000* noted that the nature of military operations had changed, and that “quick response” was now required.<sup>441</sup> It also noted the importance of hearts and minds, and recommended developing negotiating, language and political skills.<sup>442</sup> It suggested a review of psychological training, noting that civil-military and cultural training was only rudimentary.<sup>443</sup> The review also suggested that “the basics of dealing with the media should be a core training requirement for the NZDF.”<sup>444</sup>

The second half of *LFSR2000* discussed sealift. It noted the requirement was sporadic, and thus any vessel purchased for the role would likely need to undertake other taskings such as surveillance.<sup>445</sup> Four sealift options were considered: chartering, purchasing a used military sealift ship, purchasing a new military sealift ship, and modifying *Charles Upham*.<sup>446</sup> The concept of a multirole ship capable of sealift and resource protection was mentioned.<sup>447</sup>

During the review process, the RMA and the roles required of the Army all came under consideration.<sup>448</sup> However the end result was conservative, and only minor changes were recommended. Special forces were engaged with in a separate review.

The second review stemming from *GDPF2000* was *ACR2001*, released in February 2001. It was this document that sounded the death knell for New Zealand’s fast jet fleet.<sup>449</sup>

*ACR2001* mentioned the high annual operating cost of the Air Combat Force, giving a figure of some NZD 150 million.<sup>450</sup> It also noted the operational shortcomings of the fleet, and the fact that additional capital expenditure would be needed to keep the A-4s in service.<sup>451</sup> However, it also noted that it was unlikely that

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<sup>440</sup> Ibid. p.10

<sup>441</sup> Ibid. p.36

<sup>442</sup> Ibid. p.42

<sup>443</sup> Ibid. p.62

<sup>444</sup> Ibid. p.45

<sup>445</sup> Ibid. p.12

<sup>446</sup> Ibid. p.13

<sup>447</sup> Ibid. p.14

<sup>448</sup> Interview with New Zealand Defence Official D.

<sup>449</sup> The mere fact that this review was given to MOD rather than NZDF suggests that the decision to scrap the ACW, while perhaps not entirely confirmed, was probable.

<sup>450</sup> New Zealand Government, *Review of the Options for Air Combat Capability*, Wellington, 2001.

p.15

<sup>451</sup> Ibid. p.15

the Government would commit significant amounts of capital to defence in the near future. This in turn meant that there was a need for serious thinking about the future of the Air Combat Wing, and three options were suggested.<sup>452</sup>

The first was to retain the current level of capability, by upgrading or replacing the Skyhawks.<sup>453</sup> The second was to retain a reduced level of capability, and the third was to disband the Air Combat Wing completely. *ACR2001* noted that the first option would have the most foreign policy benefits, whereas the last would have serious foreign policy costs; the issue was whether the financial gains would outweigh those negatives.<sup>454</sup> It was believed that the savings from disbanding the Air Combat Wing would be NZD 870 million over ten years.<sup>455</sup> There would be other costs as well, such as reducing training for the other services, and possibly reduced participation in multinational operations.<sup>456</sup>

This review was important in that it set the analytical ground for the later decision to disband the Air Combat Wing, and provided the background for the *Government's 8 May Statement on Defence*. Compared to *LFSR2000*, *ACR2001* was slightly more innovative and suggested a force structure markedly different from the status quo.

The third of the major reviews was *MPR2001*. This was a DPMC-steered, whole-of-government review, which “consider(ed) New Zealand’s civil and military requirements for patrolling its ocean areas.”<sup>457</sup>

This review stated that civil requirements could be met through a combination of commercial aircraft and civil and naval vessels, coordinated centrally.<sup>458</sup> It stated that military maritime patrol was hard to justify in comprehensive terms, but contingency requirements supported retention.

The review used a zero-based methodology to establish key concepts, define requirements, identify gaps and then set clear directions to solve problems.<sup>459</sup> It noted several categories of maritime patrol important to New Zealand.<sup>460</sup> It suggested the

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<sup>452</sup> Ibid. p.11

<sup>453</sup> Ibid. p.18-19

<sup>454</sup> Ibid. p.21-22

<sup>455</sup> Savings included capital charge and depreciation so an element of creative accounting was present.

<sup>456</sup> New Zealand Government, *Review of the Options for Air Combat Capability*. p.25

<sup>457</sup> New Zealand Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet, *Maritime Patrol Review*, Wellington, February 2001. p.1

<sup>458</sup> Ibid. p.1

<sup>459</sup> Ibid. p.2-3

<sup>460</sup> Ibid. p.5

purchase of a Multi Role Vessel of roughly 5000 tonnes as a potential solution to patrol problems.<sup>461</sup> The final conclusions of the review were that a Maritime Coordination Centre be developed, that resources allocated to maritime surveillance be rebalanced, that aerial surveillance hours be increased, and that New Zealand acquire a substantially enhanced surface military maritime patrol capability, consisting of three layers of craft.<sup>462</sup>

### **The Government Defence Statement May 2001**

In May 2001, the Labour-led Government released *The Government Defence Statement (GDS2001)*. This was the culmination of the various force structure reviews initiated by *GDPF2000*. Rather than focus on strategic issues, *GDS2001* looked at capability and force structuring, and the path needed to fulfil the objectives of *GDPF2000*.

#### *International Context*

Internationally the situation was stable. The East Asian economies continued their post-crisis recovery, and defence spending in the region was slowly increasing to near its mid-1990s peak. There were minor concerns about Indonesia and the Philippines but no other real worries in the region.<sup>463</sup>

#### *Domestic Political Context*

The Statement was released during the middle of Labour's first term in power. Defence was not a major issue, especially with any election still distant. Coalition relations with the Alliance were good, and the breakup of that party was still in the future. Labour had been the subject of substantial public criticism on defence from both the Opposition and other commentators,<sup>464</sup> although its effect on public opinion was almost zero.

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<sup>461</sup> Ibid. p.30

<sup>462</sup> Ibid. p.33-40

<sup>463</sup> Terence O'Brien, 'Security Arrangements in the Asia-Pacific Region', in Peter Cozens (ed.), *The Asia-Pacific Region: Policy Challenges for the Next Decade*. Wellington, Proceedings of a Workshop at Victoria University of Wellington with the Shanghai Institute of International Studies, 2002. p.45

<sup>464</sup> Unknown Author, 'PM defensive over defence', *New Zealand Herald*, 3 April 2000.

The Prime Minister had developed a strong grasp of defence matters, and was regarded by some as the “de facto” Minister of Defence.<sup>465</sup> While criticism was directed at Clark as an “isolationist peacenik”, Labour was still able to gain political points from its re-equipment plan, which annoyed National, which saw it as Labour taking credit for previous National policy.<sup>466</sup> Generally, while National had given approval in principle for equipment, it was Labour that had actually provided the funds.<sup>467</sup>

### *Defence Force Issues*

By May 2001, the NZDF was in a slightly improved position from June 2000. Some new equipment was entering service, and there had been a slight increase in funding in the 2000/01 budget, with more predicted. However the situation was not markedly changed, and funding pressures, obsolescence, and issues of attrition were still very much evident.

### *Themes and Actors*

The purpose of *GDS2001* was to flesh out the broad objectives of *GDPF2000* with specific force structure decisions. The most important of these was the survival of the ACF. A second issue was the future of the NCF and whether a multi-role vessel would indeed be acquired. A third was the shape and future structure of the Army. Strategic issues, such as the importance of PSOs, civil tasks and jointness had by and large already been decided upon by *GDPF2000*.

*GDS2001* was produced by a broad group of actors. The force structure reviews were combined, and then a special team was assembled within MOD to develop a single cohesive document from that basis.<sup>468</sup> MOD’s DPPU provided the initial input, and NZDF then provided follow-on analysis.

The process was similar to that of *SONZ97*: officials produced drafts, referred them to Cabinet, or to a group of Ministers including the PM, Minister of Defence,

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<sup>465</sup> John Armstrong, 'PM outflanks the top brass', *New Zealand Herald*, 6 April 2001.

<sup>466</sup> Ibid.; Interview with Former New Zealand Defence Official B.

<sup>467</sup> See Quigley, *Review of the lease of F-16 aircraft for the Royal New Zealand Air Force*. and New Zealand Cabinet Policy Committee, 'Projection of Future Defence Funding Levels and Defence Review Process', POL(00)M31/1&2, 8 November 2000, Wellington; Prebble and Whitehead, *Sustainable Defence Plan*.

<sup>468</sup> Interview with New Zealand Defence Official C.

and Minister of Finance, and then either received approval or a request for further work.

Treasury was closely involved, due to the costs of the various acquisition proposals. Also, the capability rather than strategy focus of the review gave greater scope for Treasury to analyse proposals.

### *Process of Review*<sup>469</sup>

The three main force structure reviews initiated by *GDPF2000* began to wrap up around the end of 2000. In January 2001, work began within the MOD and NZDF to develop a statement combining those reviews and developing a coherent plan for the future.<sup>470</sup> A substantial quantity of work was done during March and April, providing drafts to the Minister of Defence, and then reworking on his recommendations.

On 30 March 2001, Cabinet met to consider the *Sustainable Capability Plan for the New Zealand Defence Force*. By now, many of the conclusions that would flow into *GDS2001* had been established. The Cabinet Policy Committee recommended that:

1. The Army not be enlarged, but the Territorial force's role be expanded;
2. Any decisions on the surface fleet be delayed until a follow-on review from the Maritime Patrol review was completed;
3. *Charles Upham* be disposed of;
4. The ACF be disposed of;
5. The Orion fleet be retained and upgraded;
6. Studies be undertaken on strategic and helicopter air transport;
7. A Maritime Co-Ordination Centre be established with the JFHQ.<sup>471</sup>

An attachment to the paper noted that collective security operations were

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<sup>469</sup> Because much of the process of the GDS2001 was contained within the force structure reviews this section is shorter than for other reviews.

<sup>470</sup> Interview with New Zealand Defence Official C.

<sup>471</sup> New Zealand Cabinet, 'Sustainable Capability Plan for the New Zealand Defence Force [A]', CAB(01)100, 30 March 2001, Wellington. p.1-4

likely to be the NZDF's primary role and should thus be the point of reference for force development.<sup>472</sup>

The Cabinet accepted the recommendations en masse, but asked for more work on the Maritime Patrol Review, due to its size and inclusion of civilian roles.<sup>473</sup> The following month involved further redrafting of the policy document, in order to produce a final result that was publicly acceptable.

### *Result*

On 8 May 2001, the Statement was publically released.<sup>474</sup> The Statement stated that the key components of the NZDF would be:

1. A joint approach to structure and operational orientation;
2. A modernised Army;
3. A practical Navy fleet matched to New Zealand's wider security needs;
4. A refocused and updated Air Force (including the disbandment of the ACF);
5. A funding commitment to provide financial certainty.<sup>475</sup>

The most controversial decision was the disbandment of the Air Combat Force.<sup>476</sup> While it had been expected it still came as a substantial shock. The foreign policy gains that would result from retention of the force were "not considered a sufficient reason to justify the outlays required to maintain the capability."<sup>477</sup> It was expected that savings from disbanding the force would reach NZD 870 million over ten years.

Other decisions of *GDS2001* included that *Charles Upham* would be sold, and that *Canterbury* would be replaced by a multi-role vessel rather than another frigate;<sup>478</sup> however a whole of government review would precede any decision in the latter matter. *Charles Upham* was seen as being limited in utility and likely to spend

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<sup>472</sup> Ibid. Attachment p.2

<sup>473</sup> New Zealand Cabinet, 'Sustainable Capability Plan for the New Zealand Defence Force [B]', CAB Min(01)10/10, 2 April 2001, Wellington.

<sup>474</sup> New Zealand Government, *Government Defence Statement: A Modern, Sustainable Defence Force Matched to New Zealand's Needs*, Wellington, 8 May 2001.

<sup>475</sup> Ibid. p.2

<sup>476</sup> Ibid. p.10

<sup>477</sup> Ibid. p.10

<sup>478</sup> Ibid. p.3, 7-9

much of its time tied up alongside. Another move was the co-location of a Maritime Co-ordination Centre with the JFOQ to integrate the work of all civilian and military actors concerned with maritime risks.<sup>479</sup> There would also be an increase in funding for defence of NZD 2 billion over the following decade.<sup>480</sup>

No change to the structure of the Army was mentioned, apart from some note that the Territorial Army might need to be enlarged.<sup>481</sup> In general, apart from confirmation of the disbandment of the ACF, and mentioning what would replace *Canterbury*, the Statement said little that was controversial. By and large, *GDS2001* was the *Sustainable Capability Plan for the New Zealand Defence Force* presented to Cabinet in March, with only minor changes to rhetoric and none to its major decisions.

### *Summary and Analysis*

*GDS2001* was another short document. It was the culmination of the reviews initiated by *GDPF2000* and can thus perhaps be seen as the second half of a “long term” White Paper process stretching from early 2000 to May 2001. It was the product of bureaucrats and officials operating under close political supervision, and contained several controversial decisions in amongst what was largely a conservative document.

The primary difference of *GDS2001* with *GDPF2000* was its inclusion of concrete policy decisions rather than merely broad principles. It was the first indication of the precise shape of Labour defence policy. It showed that the more extreme aspects of earlier policy based on *DB2000* had been removed; perhaps the Labour party was “mugged by reality”.<sup>482</sup> What remained was a policy that while innovative at its edges retained a solid core of continuity.

*GDS2001* did not attempt to substantially re-evaluate the roles and capabilities of the defence force. Perhaps surprisingly, given earlier rumours, the Army was not enlarged nor reorganised. Nor was there any decision to grant operations other than

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<sup>479</sup> Ibid. p.9

<sup>480</sup> Ibid. p.3

<sup>481</sup> Ibid. p.6

<sup>482</sup> The phrase “mugged by reality” was used in Interview with Former New Zealand Defence Official B.

war pre-eminence. The accusations that *GDS2001* would turn the NZDF into a police force were not based on the facts.

## **Policy Since The Government Defence Statement 2001-today**

The following sections discuss the course of New Zealand defence policy since the release of *GDS2001*. They are divided into sections on higher policy and operations, and acquisitions and capability.

### *Higher Policy and Operations*

There has been little change in higher policy throughout this period, though various events and reviews have resulted in minor modification.

In the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks, the Officials Committee for Domestic and External Security Co-ordination met in the early hours of 12 September.<sup>483</sup> However the government did not announce that it would re-evaluate policy because of the attack. Yet, in December, the SAS began to increase its recruitment, ostensibly due to the changing nature of warfare but perhaps more directly linked to the terrorist attacks.<sup>484</sup>

Soon after, controversy erupted over the decision to axe the ACF and linked accusations that the Army was being unfairly privileged at the expense of the other services. There were accusations of improper activities by members of the Army,<sup>485</sup> tending almost to “sedition”.<sup>486</sup> An inquiry under a QC was launched, running from late 2001 to early 2002, and its primary conclusion was that there was no evidence that the Army had indeed attempted to improperly affect the course of defence policy.<sup>487</sup> In November 2002, perhaps as a result of further rumours, the Minister of Defence reiterated that there was no plan to increase the size of the Army.<sup>488</sup>

In January 2002, a follow-up to MPR2001 was released: the *Maritime Forces Review (MFR2002)*. The review noted that the fulfilment of New Zealand’s naval

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<sup>483</sup> Mark Burton, Parliamentary Question 13621, 26 September 2001, Wellington.

<sup>484</sup> Francesca Mold, 'Army looks to recruit more crack troops', *New Zealand Herald*, 21 December 2001.

<sup>485</sup> Gordon Campbell, 'Arms race', *Listener*, vol. 181, no. 3207, 27 October 2001. p.22

<sup>486</sup> Unknown Author, 'Shipley points to Army sedition'.

<sup>487</sup> Carruthers, *Report of Inquiry into the Propriety of a Letter Allegedly Generated from within the Army and an E-Mail Allegedly Generated from within the Navy*.

<sup>488</sup> Mark Burton, Parliamentary Question 13855, 27 November 2002, Wellington.

requirements necessitated a range of capabilities, including a Naval Combat Force, a Naval Support Force, Naval Patrol Force, Mine Countermeasures and Diving Support Force, and a Hydrographic Force;<sup>489</sup> thus the extant structure of the Navy was justified.

The review noted that New Zealand's major maritime shortcoming was its inability to adequately police its own EEZ. The main gap in patrol capability was perceived as being the inshore/offshore zone, carrying out fisheries protection, border patrols, conservation support and towage.<sup>490</sup> The review noted that frigates should not be used for patrol tasks unless necessary.<sup>491</sup> Instead, dedicated patrol vessels would be purchased, and to fulfil patrol requirements, a total of eight patrol craft (inshore and offshore) would be needed. However such a solution would probably not be affordable and thus a smaller number would be more likely.<sup>492</sup>

Offshore patrol craft would also need to be able to operate in the extreme sea states of the Southern Ocean, a capability not present in the existing force.<sup>493</sup> Patrol craft might also be needed for counter-terrorist roles as the frigate force would not always be available; indeed it was noted that "(the) offshore patrol vessel is also the desired platform for maritime counter-terrorism."<sup>494</sup>

In relation to the MRV mentioned in *GDS2001*, *MFR2002* again stated a requirement for over-beach disembarkation of heavy equipment: "New Zealand will need an independent ability to conduct (operations such as peace support, humanitarian interventions)".<sup>495</sup> The MRV was seen as a priority as *Canterbury* would be decommissioned in 2005 and without an additional large vessel training requirements would not be met.<sup>496</sup>

*MFR2002* noted that the total budget for new purchases was NZD 500 million, and a set of functional statements would be forwarded to industry so that a range of alternative options could be assessed.<sup>497</sup>

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<sup>489</sup> New Zealand Ministry of Defence, *Maritime Forces Review: Key Findings*, Wellington: Defence Policy and Planning Unit, January 2002. p.4

<sup>490</sup> Ibid. p.24

<sup>491</sup> Ibid. p.5

<sup>492</sup> Ibid. p.7

<sup>493</sup> Ibid. p.10,24

<sup>494</sup> Ibid. p.14,26

<sup>495</sup> Ibid. p.5

<sup>496</sup> Ibid. p.9

<sup>497</sup> Ibid. p.33

*DB2000* had suggested a review of policymaking structures and especially the functional gap between the MOD and NZDF. This Hunn Review was initiated in August 2001 and published in September 2002.<sup>498</sup> The main theme of the report was that key components of the 1990 defence restructuring had not worked.<sup>499</sup> It suggested a partial return to the pre-1990 situation.<sup>500</sup> In response, the Government accepted some of its recommendations, but not the major one about structural reintegration of the uniformed and civilian sides of the defence organisation.<sup>501</sup>

In December 2003, the Ministers of Defence, Finance and State Services, at the request of the CDF, commissioned a report to determine the optimum capability configuration and resource requirements of the NZDF.<sup>502</sup> They expressed concerns that the NZDF was deficient in multiple areas of capability and unable to fulfil the requirements of policy set out in *GDPF2000* and *GDS2001*. An interdepartmental team from all three departments and the NZDF carried out a detailed study between February and October 2004.<sup>503</sup> The urgency of this report was starkly displayed in the middle of 2004, when the CDF stated that the NZDF was stretched and was doing more with fewer staff.<sup>504</sup>

In February 2005, the report reached Cabinet as the *Defence Capability and Resourcing Review (DCARR)*.

*DCARR* stated that:

The NZDF should have the capacity to be able to conduct essential tasks in and about the South Pacific, to continue to be committed to a number of small scale military operations, and to be able to commit a larger force to medium intensity deployments within the agreed response time.<sup>505</sup>

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<sup>498</sup> Don Hunn, *Review of Accountabilities and Structural Arrangements between the Ministry of Defence and the New Zealand Defence Force*, Wellington, 30 September 2002. p.iv

<sup>499</sup> *Ibid.* p.v

<sup>500</sup> *Ibid.* p.64, p.84-85

<sup>501</sup> Unknown Author, 'Government announces more of the same for defence force', *New Zealand Herald*, 26 March 2003.

<sup>502</sup> New Zealand Ministry of Defence, *Final Report of the Defence Capability and Resourcing Review*, Wellington, February 2005. p.4-5

<sup>503</sup> *Ibid.* p.6

<sup>504</sup> Unknown Author, 'Defence force needs more staff, military chief warns', *New Zealand Herald*, 16 June 2004.

<sup>505</sup> New Zealand Ministry of Defence, *Final Report of the Defence Capability and Resourcing Review*. p.8

The report noted major problems with personnel strength, and claimed the personnel shortfall was in the order of 2500.<sup>506</sup> Attrition rates were too high, and the move from tail to teeth had caused personnel shortfalls at the command levels.<sup>507</sup> The Army was in a very bad shape and was “unable to sustain a motorised battalion in the near term.”<sup>508</sup> All three services suffered from shortages in contingency reserve stocks, shortcomings in information systems, and a general lack of capability.<sup>509</sup> The report recommended a major increase in funding and a special study on the Army.<sup>510</sup>

On 2 May 2005, the Labour-led Government announced a major programme to address those shortfalls, the *Defence Sustainability Initiative*. This was described as:

A major remedial programme and a firm commitment of increased resources over the next ten years to achieve long-term sustainability for defence.<sup>511</sup>

The report committed new funding of 4.6 billion NZD over the next ten years, almost all on operating rather than capital costs, especially recruitment, training and retention initiatives.<sup>512</sup> It also noted the construction of an interim Strategic Plan and Corporate Planning Framework to enhance the policymaking process.<sup>513</sup>

In April 2005, a major piece of legislation was passed. The Volunteers Employment Protection Act provides protection for Territorials involved on national service.<sup>514</sup> Although it is too early to tell, this will likely enhance the use of Territorials in future operations.

In the New Zealand General Election of September 2005, defence was scarcely mentioned by any of the political parties. It thus set a new standard in domestic ignorance of defence policy.

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<sup>506</sup> Ibid. p.10

<sup>507</sup> Ibid. p.12

<sup>508</sup> Ibid. p.10

<sup>509</sup> Ibid. p.10

<sup>510</sup> Ibid. p.19-22

<sup>511</sup> New Zealand Ministry of Defence, *The Defence Sustainability Initiative: Building a long-term future for the New Zealand Defence Force*, Wellington, 2 May 2005. p.2

<sup>512</sup> Ibid. p.4-12

<sup>513</sup> Ibid. p.12-13

<sup>514</sup> Mark Burton, Parliamentary Question 4640, 6 April 2005, Wellington.

Throughout this period, New Zealand has provided contingents to several operations. It maintained its battalion in East Timor for several years, and during the initial stages of the War on Terror provided SAS soldiers for Afghanistan. It has also provided a reconstruction group for Iraq, as well as several smaller contingents for various peace support operations around the globe. More recently, it has again provided contingents to the Solomon Islands and East Timor to help quell civil disturbances in those places.

### *Acquisition*

The period since *GDS2001* has seen a steady stream of new acquisitions enter the NZDF. The key documents in relation to this have been the three editions of the *Long Term Development Plan* (LTDP). Notably, every acquisition proposal in these documents has referred directly back to *GDPF2000* and *GDS2001*, tightening the links between acquisition and strategic direction.<sup>515</sup>

The first LTDP, *LTDP2002*, was published in May 2002 and heralded a new era in New Zealand defence policy. It was the first time that a long-term defence capability plan was a Cabinet-approved document, with careful prioritisation of capabilities. While separate approval for funding each acquisition was still required, this new approach gave greater surety about future purchases.

The introduction of *LTDP2002* noted that “the plan links the Government’s defence policy objectives, which were set out in the Defence Policy framework released in June 2000, with the capability requirements announced in the defence statement of 8 May 2001.”<sup>516</sup> It might be said that the Framework established what the NZDF was to do, the Statement identified what was required in general terms, and the LTDP identified the specific equipment that would be purchased to fulfil those requirements.

*LTDP2002*’s funding parameters included up to 1 billion NZD in capital injection over the following ten years.<sup>517</sup> The various equipment proposals were prioritised by gap and sensitivity analysis, comparing current capability with perceived objectives.<sup>518</sup> Programmes were categorised as being essential or merely

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<sup>515</sup> Interview with New Zealand Defence Official A; Interview with New Zealand Defence Official C.

<sup>516</sup> New Zealand Government, *Defence Long-Term Development Plan*. p.3

<sup>517</sup> *Ibid.* p.3

<sup>518</sup> *Ibid.* p.4-5

nice to have, and it was noted that many of the proposals in the latter category would likely never be funded. Proposals included LOVs, the MRV, patrol vessels, an upgrade to the P-3s “to conduct surface surveillance roles”, upgrades to C-130s, replacement of the Boeing 727 fleet, replacement of the NZDF’s helicopter fleet, and various other smaller programmes.<sup>519</sup> The document also said that an updated plan would be produced whenever major acquisition proposals were submitted for government consideration.<sup>520</sup>

Throughout the second half of 2002 and the first half of 2003 various acquisitions were progressed. These included Project Protector,<sup>521</sup> linked to the earlier *Maritime Forces Review*, the VLLAD system,<sup>522</sup> and possible upgrades to the Anzac frigates.<sup>523</sup>

An update to the LTDP was released in June 2003.<sup>524</sup> There were few major changes. Various programmes had now reached more advanced stages. There were no new equipment proposals, nor had the funding parameters been changed.

In December 2003, Cabinet approved the first tranche of LOVs<sup>525</sup> as well as the acquisition of Javelin anti-tank missiles.<sup>526</sup> Linking this acquisition to policy was a statement that the weapons were a “critical part of any contribution to peace enforcement operations.”<sup>527</sup> In June 2004, the second tranche of LOVs<sup>528</sup> was also approved by Cabinet.<sup>529</sup>

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<sup>519</sup> Ibid. p.11-54

<sup>520</sup> Ibid. p.9

<sup>521</sup> New Zealand Ministry of Defence, *Invitation to Register Interest in Project Protector*, Wellington, 26 July 2002. Mark Burton, Parliamentary Question 15556, 13 December 2002, Wellington. Mark Burton, Parliamentary Question 9781, 20 September 2002, Wellington.

<sup>522</sup> Burton, Parliamentary Question 8560,

<sup>523</sup> Mark Burton, Parliamentary Question 8556, 5 September 2002, Wellington.

<sup>524</sup> New Zealand Government, *Defence Long Term Development Plan - Update - June 2003*, Wellington, June 2003.

<sup>525</sup> New Zealand Cabinet External Relations and Defence Committee, 'Defence Acquisition of Light Operational Vehicles [A]', ERD(03)65, 1 December 2003, Wellington.

<sup>526</sup> New Zealand Cabinet External Relations and Defence Committee, 'Medium Range Anti-Armour Weapons for the New Zealand Army', ERD(03)68, 1 December 2003, Wellington. p.1

<sup>527</sup> Ibid. Attachment p.1; New Zealand Cabinet External Relations and Defence Committee, "Defence Acquisition of Light Operational Vehicles"; New Zealand Cabinet External Relations and Defence Committee, "Medium Range Anti-Armour Weapons Systems for the New Zealand Army", ERD Min(03)14/6, 3 December 2003, Wellington

<sup>528</sup> New Zealand Cabinet External Relations and Defence Committee, 'Defence Acquisition of Light Operational Vehicles [A]', ERD(04)21, 14 June 2004, Wellington.

<sup>529</sup> New Zealand Cabinet External Relations and Defence Committee, 'Defence Acquisition of Light Operational Vehicles [B]', ERD Min(04)6/4, 16 June 2004, Wellington. p.1-2

In July, the winner of Project Protector was announced.<sup>530</sup> This 500 million NZD project was awarded to Tenix, and the final composition of the fleet was to be seven vessels: the MRV, two Offshore Patrol Vessels, and four Inshore Patrol Vessels.

After Project Sirius was cancelled in early 2000, the NZDF had continued to look at surveillance options. *GDS2001* confirmed that an upgrade to the Orion fleet was still necessary. In October 2004 this upgrade, entitled Project Guardian, was granted funding approval.<sup>531</sup> Project Guardian was largely similar to Sirius, except that it lacked anti-submarine capabilities and instead focused on overland surveillance.<sup>532</sup> In the same month, the decision to acquire identification, alert and cueing systems for the NZDF's Mistral missiles was announced, remedying a capability gap that had existed since 1998 when the-then National Government purchased the weapons without the additional systems.<sup>533</sup>

The third LTDP was released in November 2004. Again it was largely continuous with earlier documents. It noted that a wide range of equipment was expected in 2006.<sup>534</sup> A new, important requirement was army engineering equipment, necessary for NZLAV/LOV operations, and thus linked to the new motorisation concepts.<sup>535</sup> Also interesting was the emphasis on joint communications, noting the NZDF needed to speed up its decision cycle, and that "current communication systems are single service oriented, technologically dated, and comprise ad hoc and short term solutions."<sup>536</sup> In April 2005, the decision was made to purchase NH-90 helicopters, which would be able to operate from the new MRV, to replace the Iroquois fleet.<sup>537</sup>

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<sup>530</sup> Mark Burton, 'Project Protector', 6 August 2004, [accessed 27 October 2004]. Available from [www.beehive.govt.nz/ViewDocument.cfm?DocumentID=20563](http://www.beehive.govt.nz/ViewDocument.cfm?DocumentID=20563); Unknown Author, 'Tenix wins NZ's Project Protector', *Australian Defence Monthly*, 2004.

<sup>531</sup> Mark Burton, *Background: RNZAF P-3 Orions*, Wellington: Ministry of Defence, 5 October 2004; Mark Burton, 'Burton signs Orion upgrade contract', 5 October 2004, [accessed 27 October 2004]. Available from [www.beehive.govt.nz/ViewDocument.cfm?DocumentID=21116](http://www.beehive.govt.nz/ViewDocument.cfm?DocumentID=21116).

<sup>532</sup> Office of the Minister of Defence, 'P-3 Mission Systems Upgrade and Communications and Navigation Systems Upgrade', Letter to the Cabinet External Relations and Defence Committee, November 2002, Wellington.

<sup>533</sup> Mark Burton, 'Another significant step in re-equipping our forces', 2 June 2004, [accessed 27 October 2004]. Available from [www.beehive.govt.nz/ViewDocument.cfm?DocumentID=19931](http://www.beehive.govt.nz/ViewDocument.cfm?DocumentID=19931).

<sup>534</sup> New Zealand Government, *Defence Long Term Development Plan Update*, Wellington, November 2004. p.11-25

<sup>535</sup> *Ibid.* p.28

<sup>536</sup> *Ibid.* p.29,42

<sup>537</sup> Mark Burton, Parliamentary Question 4644, 6 April 2005, Wellington.

Thus during the period since *GDS2001*, a relatively large number of acquisitions have been approved, either in principle or with funding, for all three of the services.

## **Summing Up The Past Fifteen Years**

The past fifteen years have seen change in New Zealand's defence policy, but it would be incorrect to term that change "major" or "revolutionary". For approximately five years from 1991, the NZDF was subjected to reduced funding, which resulted in a loss of capability and the retention of obsolescent equipment. By 1996, problems had reached a head, and a review process was launched to establish a firm foundation from which the force might be rebuilt. Despite the evolving post-Cold War environment, the 1997 White Paper was deliberately restricted to earlier policy settings, and produced a defence policy scarcely touched by new considerations of the RMA, non-military threats and peace support. In the following two years, its ambitious capability plan largely fell by the wayside due to a lack of funds and loose prioritisation, as expensive proposals jumped the queue. Yet, even if that capability plan had been fulfilled, it would not have markedly changed the NZDF; instead it would have merely modernised a traditionally structured force.

The *Defence Beyond 2000* review was the first time that defence issues were subjected to major public debate. Its final report, while disjointed, seemed to support an innovative defence policy, one more oriented towards global collective security and peace support operations, a policy that would be best met by a narrowed defence force. When Labour gained power in 1999, *Defence Beyond 2000* provided the major influence on policy, in partnership with pre-existing Labour policy.

*GDPF2000* and *GDS2001* were integrated documents, and together developed a particular approach to defence. They confirmed the narrowing of the defence force suggested in *Defence Beyond 2000*, with a focus on land forces and deployability, and a shift away from high-technology platforms such as frigates and jet fighters.

The major battles over policy were fought from 1999 through to 2001. Since then there has been relative calm, marked only by a steady increase in NZDF capability as new equipment reaches service and funding continues to increase.

Overall, for the past fifteen years, conservatism has ruled. Governments have changed, rhetoric has been modified, but the central core of defence policy remains.

Later chapters will posit a range of hypotheses to explain the general shape of New Zealand defence policy during the period, and its conservatism. The following chapter, however, examines Australian defence policy during the post-Cold War period.

## Chapter Six – Australian Defence Policy Since 1991

### Introduction

This chapter is a chronological treatment of Australian defence policy during the post-Cold War period. It utilises the framework used in Chapter Five to examine major policy reviews as well as a range of other defence decisions and events.

As with New Zealand, a study of Australian defence policy in the post-Cold War period can validly be divided into two periods. The first encompassed the years from 1992 to 1996 under the Australian Labor Party (ALP), which in general were characterised by focus on the continental Defence of Australia (DOA). The second has encompassed the period from 1996 to date, under the Liberal-National Coalition, and has been characterised by an increasingly expeditionary focus to defence policy.

### Part One – Australian Labor Party Policy 1992-1996

#### Implementing Defending Australia 1992-1993

This period was marked by a steady process within the ADF to better adapt it to fulfil the policy requirements of DOA1987 and FSR1991. There were few major procurement decisions, and only some minor restructuring within the services. The following section examines defence events of the period, focusing first on broader issues and then looking at the individual services.

#### *Higher Policy and Operations*

As noted in Chapter Four, the Australian Government released a defence review in 1992 that had actually been completed in 1989.<sup>1</sup> A year later, in December 1993, a new Strategic Review was completed. This paper analysed the strategic

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<sup>1</sup> Australian Department of Defence, *Australia's Strategic Planning in the 1990s*, Canberra, 27 November 1989.

situation of the post-Cold War world, and concluded that the then-current Australian posture was appropriate for the next three to five years.<sup>2</sup>

One of the major initiatives of this period was the Ready Reserve Program, noted in Chapter Four as part of the Force Structure Review. This began in January 1992, and was designed to provide a “particular class of reserves” significantly more capable than the existent General Reserve.<sup>3</sup> Also linked to the Force Structure Review was a steady relocation of elements of the ADF to Northern Australia.<sup>4</sup> Organisational shifts also followed, with HQ Northern Command, which had been subordinate to Army HQ, becoming directly subordinate to ADFHQ instead.<sup>5</sup>

The issue of defence civil tasks was addressed in May 1992, when the Emergency Management System was reviewed. Some of the ADF’s responsibilities in this regard were civilianised, although in general terms the management of major emergencies remained a defence responsibility.<sup>6</sup> From August to December 1993 a small team reviewed the management of Australia’s whole-of-government counter-terrorism machinery.<sup>7</sup>

The two major operations of this period were the Cambodian and Somalian peace support operations. The former began in 1992 and was commanded by Land Headquarters, but involved elements from the other services.<sup>8</sup> Up to 500 Australian personnel were deployed in support of the operation, generally in communications and other specialist roles.<sup>9</sup>

In 1993 Australia, while maintaining its Cambodian force, sent a sizeable contingent to Somalia. The core of this force, an infantry battalion, deployed for only seventeen weeks, but other elements from all three services stayed for a longer period.<sup>10</sup> These two deployments to Cambodia and Somalia stressed the ADF’s capacity, and it was noted in the Defence Annual Report at the time that prolonged

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<sup>2</sup> Australian Department of Defence, *Defence Annual Report 1993/1994*, Canberra, 6 October 1994. p.3

<sup>3</sup> Australian Department of Defence, *Ready Reserve Program 1991*, Canberra, May 1991. p.2-11

<sup>4</sup> David Horner, *Making the Australian Defence Force*. South Melbourne, Oxford University Press, 2001. p.91,190

<sup>5</sup> Australian Department of Defence, *Report for 1991/1992*, Canberra, November 1992. p.54

<sup>6</sup> Australian Department of Defence, *Defence Report 1992/1993*, Canberra, 9 November 1993. p.20

<sup>7</sup> Alan Thompson, *Management of Australia's Counter-Terrorism Program*, Working Paper No. 28, Canberra: Australian Defence Studies Centre, September 1994. p.1

<sup>8</sup> David Horner, *The Evolution of Australian Higher Command Arrangements*, Canberra: Centre for Defence Command, Leadership and Management Studies, 2002. p.27

<sup>9</sup> Australian Department of Defence, *Defence Report 1992/1993*. p.47

<sup>10</sup> *Ibid.* p.30-31,47

deployments of some 2000 personnel “may not be sustainable at current resource levels.”<sup>11</sup>

Partly as a result of this increased involvement, in June 1993 the ADOD released *Peacekeeping Policy: The Future Australian Defence Force Role*.<sup>12</sup> In this document the Minister of Defence noted that despite its increasing frequency, peacekeeping was not a primary role for the ADF.<sup>13</sup> It was instead a “supplementary activity”, and an average deployment of 200 personnel to peacekeeping operations worldwide was mooted.<sup>14</sup> In relation to this increased attention on the demands of peacekeeping, an ADF Peacekeeping Centre was founded,<sup>15</sup> the ADF Warfare Centre produced a draft handbook for UN operations, and Exercise Kingfisher was held to rehearse peacekeeping concepts.<sup>16</sup>

An important document, the Defence Corporate Plan, was published in August 1993.<sup>17</sup> It was intended to illustrate how the ADF would go about meeting its policy requirements. This document noted the end of the Cold War and the effect of that in creating change and destroying certainty in security matters.<sup>18</sup> It listed several key priorities for the period to 1997, aimed at enhancing overall performance.<sup>19</sup> While it was not mentioned as a key priority, the Corporate Plan noted that peacekeeping was an “important new element of our wider security agenda.”<sup>20</sup>

## *Army*

During this period the Army continued to reorient itself towards the territorial protection of Northern Australia.<sup>21</sup> There was a hint of change between 1992 and 1993, when the Army’s role description was slightly altered to include the provision of forces “in the region.”<sup>22</sup>

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<sup>11</sup> Ibid. p.51

<sup>12</sup> Australian Department of Defence, *Peacekeeping Policy: The Future Australian Defence Force Role*, Canberra, June 1993.

<sup>13</sup> Ibid. p.iii

<sup>14</sup> Ibid. p.3-6

<sup>15</sup> Australian Department of Defence, *Defence Report 1992/1993*, p.13-15

<sup>16</sup> Australian Department of Defence, *Defence Annual Report 1993/1994*, p.43

<sup>17</sup> Australian Department of Defence, *The Defence Corporate Plan 1993-1997*, Canberra, 23 August 1993.

<sup>18</sup> Ibid. p.3

<sup>19</sup> Ibid. p.7-8

<sup>20</sup> Ibid. p.8

<sup>21</sup> Australian Department of Defence, *Defence Report 1992/1993*, p.49

<sup>22</sup> Australian Department of Defence, *Defence Annual Report 1993/1994*, p.104

The tasking of the Regional Force Surveillance Units was modified to increase their effectiveness, for example by establishing links with Customs agencies.<sup>23</sup> Land Warfare Command released an updated version of *Fundamentals of Land Warfare*, focused on low-level tasks and the defence of Australia.<sup>24</sup> During 1993 it was announced that the Army would receive an additional 112 ASLAVs from 1996.<sup>25</sup>

## *Navy*

In February 1992, the Interim Minesweeping Force began operations,<sup>26</sup> and the RAN's third Perry-class frigate, *HMAS Melbourne*, entered service soon afterwards.<sup>27</sup> In June 1993, the first Collins-class submarine was launched after a lengthy gestation period.<sup>28</sup>

## *Air Force*

In July 1992, the RAAF established the 1<sup>st</sup> Radar Surveillance Unit, using the Jindalee radar, thus inaugurating Australia's first strategic surveillance formation.<sup>29</sup> During 1993, the RAAF began the process of updating its service doctrine.<sup>30</sup>

In October 1992, a defence delegation travelled to the US to research the possibility of acquiring additional F-111s to strengthen the RAAF's strike force.<sup>31</sup> In June the following year, the purchase of fifteen F-111Gs, including spares and training, was approved by Cabinet.<sup>32</sup> There were accusations that this major acquisition was dominated more by politics than capability issues.<sup>33</sup>

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<sup>23</sup> Australian Department of Defence, *Defence Report 1992/1993*. p.50

<sup>24</sup> Michael Evans, *Forward from the Past: The Development of Australian Army Doctrine 1972-Present*, Study Paper 301, Duntroon: Australian Army Land Warfare Studies Centre, September 1999. p.40-43 and Australian Department of Defence, *Report for 1991/1992*. p.57

<sup>25</sup> Australian Department of Defence, *Defence Report 1992/1993*. p.102-104

<sup>26</sup> Australian Department of Defence, *Report for 1991/1992*.

<sup>27</sup> *Ibid.* p.44

<sup>28</sup> Horner, *Making the Australian Defence Force*. p.89

<sup>29</sup> *Ibid.* p.217

<sup>30</sup> Australian Department of Defence, *Defence Annual Report 1993/1994*. p.132-145

<sup>31</sup> T.A. Warren, 'Prayers and Practice: Defence Management Under Labour', in Graeme Cheeseman and Robert Bruce (eds.), *Discourses of Danger and Dread Frontiers: Australian Defence and Security Thinking After the Cold War*. Canberra, Allen & Unwin, 1996. p.285

<sup>32</sup> *Ibid.* p.285

<sup>33</sup> David Horner, 'Force Structure: the hardware dimension', in J. Mohan Malik (ed.), *Australia's Security in the 21st Century*. St Leonards, Allen & Unwin, 1999. p.190

## *Summary*

The first few years of the post-Cold War era were a period of continuity for Australian defence policy and force structure, but a period of change in operational tempo. Policy focus stayed squarely on continental defence, although there were signs of increased attention to the demands of the region.<sup>34</sup> Implementation of this policy was carried out by minor reorientation of the Army, reequipment of the RAN and RAAF, and minor adjustments to doctrine and policy. It is interesting that this continuity remained the case despite the ADF's greatly increasing operational tempo, and its heavy involvement in peace support operations; there were, perhaps, developing signs of a disjuncture between policy and practise.

In comparison with New Zealand, Australia had more surety about the direction of defence policy. Also, the ADF did not have to deal with the same degree of funding cuts.

The following sections continue the narrative by analysing *Defence White Paper 1994*, the first major Australian defence policy review of the post-Cold War era.

## **The 1994 Defence White Paper**

### *Introduction*

*Defending Australia: Defence White Paper 1994* (DWP1994) was the final defence review of the Hawke-Keating administration.<sup>35</sup> While not a particularly innovative document, it introduced some minor changes into Australian defence policy.

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<sup>34</sup> Interview with Former Australian Defence Official L, 24 November 2005.

<sup>35</sup> Australian Government, *Defending Australia: Defence White Paper 1994*, Canberra: Australian Government Printing Service, 1994.

### *International Context*

Since the previous White Paper the broader global situation had changed markedly, but Australia's area of interest was still relatively stable.<sup>36</sup>

The primary change in the international environment, and indeed one cited as a rationale for the production of the White Paper (as will be discussed later), was the end of the Cold War.<sup>37</sup> This altered Australia's role in the region. Australia was no longer regarded as a major bulwark against Communism. The relative simplicities of the Cold War had disappeared, and the brief period of relative peace that had inaugurated the initial years of the 1990s had ended.<sup>38</sup> Ethnic conflicts were springing up around the globe, and Australia had already been involved in two.

A second major issue of the international environment was East Asian economic growth. Many states in that region were purchasing new weapons systems, and China was becoming increasingly influential as Russia withdrew. There were also signs that the United States was considering a withdrawal from the region.<sup>39</sup> In turn, the Keating administration was attempting close engagement with Asia.

Overall, the international situation at the time was one in which change was evident but Australia faced no direct or indirect threats.

### *Domestic Political Context*

Defence was not a matter of great political concern at the time. An election was still two years distant, Labor retained a sizeable majority, and despite deployments to Cambodia and Somalia, there had been little attention on defence issues.<sup>40</sup>

Generally, the political attitude towards defence at the time (from both sides) was conservative, and took little account of post-Cold War changes.<sup>41</sup> However the

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<sup>36</sup> D.W. Richards, 'An Essay on Force Development in the Absence of a Direct Military Threat', *Balmoral papers*, 1993/1994. p.50

<sup>37</sup> R.A.K. Walls, 'Defending Australia - The 1994 Defence White Paper', Press Release, 1 March 1995. p.1-2

<sup>38</sup> Australian Government, *Defending Australia: Defence White Paper 1994*. p.11

<sup>39</sup> Interview with Australian Defence Commentator A, 28 November 2005.

<sup>40</sup> One exception being: Peter Jennings, *An Agenda for Defence Policy Reform*, Canberra: Australian Defence Studies Centre, July 1993.

<sup>41</sup> Graeme Cheeseman, 'Back to 'Forward Defence' and the Australian National Style', in Graeme Cheeseman and Robert Bruce (eds.), *Discourses of Danger and Dread Frontiers: Australian Defence and Security Thinking After the Cold War*. Canberra, Allen & Unwin, 1996; Simon Dalby, 'Security Discourse, the ANZUS Alliance and Australian Identity', in Graeme Cheeseman and Robert Bruce

importance of domestic politics should not be exaggerated, as the review was very much a departmental rather than political document, as will be seen.<sup>42</sup>

### *Defence Force Issues*

Earlier sections have noted the various acquisitions, reorganisations and other changes within the ADF during the years leading up to 1994. The most important issue by 1994 was the pressure imposed by operational tempo.

Involvement in peacekeeping operations had resulted in a greater number of personnel being deployed than at any time since Vietnam, and stretched Australian capabilities.<sup>43</sup> The Somalia deployment also indicated some shortcomings in institutional knowledge about peace support operations.<sup>44</sup>

By 1994, the three services were undergoing different processes. The RAN and RAAF were scarcely changing, bar the addition of new equipment, whereas the Army was shifting its focus towards low-level operations, as well as struggling to meet the new demands of peace support operations.

### *Themes and Actors*

The White Paper was the product of a bureaucratic process, with the ADOD acting as the lead agency. Other agencies, such as Treasury, had a relatively limited role. The most vital individual, and the primary writer, was Hugh White,<sup>45</sup> then the head of the International Policy Division of the ADOD.<sup>46</sup> There was a suggestion that the Minister of Defence wrote one of the chapters,<sup>47</sup> but there is little evidence of his overall influence over the document.

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(eds.), *Discourses of Danger and Dread Frontiers: Australian Defence and Security Thinking After the Cold War*. Canberra, Allen & Unwin, 1996.

<sup>42</sup> Interview with Former Australian Defence Official H, 30 November 2005.

<sup>43</sup> Marion Rae, 'Peacekeeping: A Minor Determinant of Australia's Force Structure', *Australian Defence Force Journal*, vol. 104, January/February 1994. p.92-94

<sup>44</sup> Graeme Cheeseman, *Structuring the ADF for UN Operations: Change and Resistance*, Working Paper No.34, Canberra: Australian Defence Studies Centre, December 1995. p.7

<sup>45</sup> Interview with Former Australian Defence Official H.

<sup>46</sup> Interview with Former Australian Defence Official K, 21 November 2005.

<sup>47</sup> Michael O'Connor, 'Defending Australia: The 1994 Defence White Paper', *Defender*, Summer 1994/1995. p.5

There were rumours that the services had limited influence on the review, and that there was infighting between the civilian and uniformed sides of the process.<sup>48</sup> There was also a feeling amongst some that the influence of the departed Paul Dibb was still very strong, and his stamp could be seen clearly on the final product.<sup>49</sup> The following section will describe the process further, but before doing that it is useful to analyse the defence issues under consideration in the review.<sup>50</sup>

The White Paper was not motivated primarily by financial concerns, but they did figure. In October 1993 the Australian CDF had expressed concern about his declining budget, stating that the “defence of Australia might be in jeopardy” if funding continued to drop.<sup>51</sup> As always, there were advocates in the general public and Parliament for a drop in ADF funding, and those within the force who wanted more. However, the ADF was not experiencing the sort of block obsolescence that might have justified a large funding increase. And, as the ADF had already undergone a 15% reduction in uniformed personnel over the previous three years, demands for further cuts were not likely to have any great support.<sup>52</sup>

A second issue was the traditional debate between regional and continental defence. The latter was a favourite of Labor, whereas the former was supported by the Liberal-National coalition. There was some increasing recognition within Defence of the importance of the Asia-Pacific region,<sup>53</sup> and public commentators had also noted that Asian engagement might necessitate forward deployment, despite stated policy.<sup>54</sup>

A third issue was the United States alliance. Any statement of Australian defence policy would have obvious impact on that alliance, and in the environment of the time, with pressures evident on the relationship,<sup>55</sup> care had to be taken.

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<sup>48</sup> Michael O'Connor, 'Defence policy shoots holes in our credibility', *The Australian*, 26 July 1994; Michael O'Connor, 'Military must fight its own Gulf War', *The Australian*, 28 July 1994. Also Interview with Former Australian Defence Official H.

<sup>49</sup> Interview with Australian Defence Official B, 24 November 2005; Interview with Former Australian Defence Official H; Interview with Former Australian Defence Official L.

<sup>50</sup> Due to the difficulty in accessing evidence, the following defence issues have been gleaned from a variety of sources. The memories of those involved in the DWP1994 have often not been sufficient to identify exactly what was considered during the process, and thus a holistic approach towards written material of the period has been taken. They are thus the public issues of defence of the period in question, and the assumption has been made that these were also the issues considered by the review team.

<sup>51</sup> Warren, 'Prayers and Practice: Defence Management Under Labour'. p.272

<sup>52</sup> Australian Government, *Defending Australia: Defence White Paper 1994*. p.59

<sup>53</sup> Interview with Former Australian Defence Official L.

<sup>54</sup> O'Connor, 'Defence policy shoots holes in our credibility'.

<sup>55</sup> Unknown Author, 'Put in our place', *Australia & World Affairs*, vol. 22, Spring 1994. p.43-45 indicates a small example of this; see also earlier mention of possible US withdrawal from region.

A fourth issue revolved around the orientation of the ADF in regards to preparedness – whether it should be designed for short term conflicts or more for long term capability expansion. Advocates for both stances could be found within the force and the defence bureaucracy, and one notable defence commentator pointed out that in the rapidly evolving global environment reserve forces were losing their utility.<sup>56</sup>

A fifth issue might be termed “traditional vs. holistic security”. Some amongst the peace movement advocated a larger shift in the ADF to better accommodate post-Cold War demands, rather than merely modifying the existent force.<sup>57</sup> It was suggested that while DFAT was supportive of force structure changes within the ADF to better perform in peace support roles, the ADOD remained conservative and unwilling to adapt.<sup>58</sup>

A final issue related to the nascent RMA and the aftermath of the Gulf War. Some within the ADF had already begun to focus on the lessons of that war and advocate research on RMA-related matters.<sup>59</sup> Related to this was debate about whether the ADF should focus on high technology to make up for its small size, or whether low technology might be suitable for certain tasks.<sup>60</sup>

Overall, there were no greatly pressing security issues. Rather, there was a desire to check whether the emerging post-Cold War environment required major changes to Australia’s existent policy settings.

### *Process of Review*

The review process was simple. The White Paper writing team was guided by a steering group run in partnership by the Vice Chief of Defence Force and the Deputy Secretary Strategy and Intelligence.<sup>61</sup> They reported directly to the Minister of Defence. The process supposedly involved wide consultation both domestically and internationally.<sup>62</sup> There was criticism about this assertion, with some analysts terming

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<sup>56</sup> Michael O'Connor, 'A lean fighting machine must be mean', *The Australian*, 27 July 1994. p.9

<sup>57</sup> Graeme Cheeseman and Robert Bruce, (eds.), *Discourses of Danger and Dread Frontiers: Australian Defence and Security Thinking After the Cold War*. Canberra, Allen & Unwin, 1996.; Rae, 'Peacekeeping: A Minor Determinant of Australia's Force Structure'.

<sup>58</sup> Cheeseman, *Structuring the ADF for UN Operations: Change and Resistance*. p.9-10

<sup>59</sup> Michael Evans, 'Australia's Approach to the Revolution in Military Affairs 1994-2004', in Emily Goldman and Thomas Malunke (eds.), *The Information Revolution in Military Affairs in Asia*. New York, Palgrave Macmillan, 2004. p.24-25

<sup>60</sup> Dalby, 'Security Discourse, the ANZUS Alliance and Australian Identity'. p.123

<sup>61</sup> Walls, 'Defending Australia - The 1994 Defence White Paper', Press Release. p.2

<sup>62</sup> Ibid. Press Release. p.2

the process narrow, bureaucratic, self-assured, fragmented and lacking in consultation.<sup>63</sup>

The White Paper was written in virtual isolation, and there was restricted flow of information between the Department and the uniformed services.<sup>64</sup> While it cannot be confirmed, it is likely that many of the capability decisions of the process were largely decided on by Force Development and Acquisition Division within the ADOD, and that military judgement had little part to play.<sup>65</sup>

There was no public consultation, nor a great deal of engagement with non-ADOD actors. No external consultant was commissioned to produce an independent report, as was done in 1986, as the strength of the civilian bureaucracy was now great enough to overcome most disagreements.<sup>66</sup>

### *Result*

The White Paper was released in late 1994. It was divided into sections on Defence and Australia's Security; the Changing Strategic Outlook; Australia's Defence Policy; Capabilities for the Defence of Australia; International Defence Interests; National Defence Support; and Funding.<sup>67</sup> Its preface noted that the strategic environment was characterised by increasing change,<sup>68</sup> and yet, despite that, the document largely suggested that existing policy could be maintained.<sup>69</sup>

*Defending Australia* stated that "above all... (the goal is that) in the decades ahead Australia will continue to be secure from military threat"<sup>70</sup> and that "the structure of the Defence Force is determined by its essential roles in providing for the defence of Australia."<sup>71</sup> The White Paper reinforced the findings of earlier policy by stating that self-reliance remained the foundation of defence policy.<sup>72</sup>

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<sup>63</sup> Cheeseman and Bruce, (eds.), *Discourses of Danger and Dread Frontiers: Australian Defence and Security Thinking After the Cold War.*; O'Connor, 'Defence policy shoots holes in our credibility'.

<sup>64</sup> Interview with Former Australian Defence Official H.

<sup>65</sup> Interview with Australian Defence Official B.

<sup>66</sup> Interview with Former Australian Defence Official H.

<sup>67</sup> Australian Government, *Defending Australia: Defence White Paper 1994.*

<sup>68</sup> *Ibid.* p.iii

<sup>69</sup> Stewart Woodman, 'Strategies and concepts', in J. Mohan Malik (ed.), *Australia's Security in the 21st Century.* St Leonards, Allen & Unwin, 1999. p.48

<sup>70</sup> Australian Government, *Defending Australia: Defence White Paper 1994.* p.iv

<sup>71</sup> *Ibid.* p.5

<sup>72</sup> *Ibid.* p.13

*Defending Australia* saw the ADF as part of a greater integrated national security effort, rather than merely a standalone organisation.<sup>73</sup> Defence's specific role in that national security effort was protecting Australia from "short-warning conflicts".<sup>74</sup> Yet it also said that Australia needed to take a long term approach to force structure, rather than focusing on readiness, stating quite baldly that "we will continue to emphasise... the long term capacity of our Defence Force."<sup>75</sup> There was thus a tension between the focus on short-warning conflict and the long-term orientation of the ADF's force structure.

Because of the physical and demographic limits of the nation, *Defending Australia* stated priority would be given to "naval, air and highly mobile land forces that are technology intensive."<sup>76</sup> While advocating a defensive posture, *Defending Australia* noted the ADF might take the initiative in responding to any attack, particularly through strategic strike.<sup>77</sup>

Three defence posture key tasks were listed:

1. Ensuring timely warning of significant developments in the strategic environment;
2. Maintaining a force able to defeat short-warning conflicts;
3. Maintaining the adaptability to expand/restructure the ADF in response to strategic developments.<sup>78</sup>

In order to carry out these three key tasks, *Defending Australia* listed nine roles for the ADF:

1. Command, control and communications;
2. Intelligence collection and evaluation;
3. Surveillance of maritime areas and northern Australia;
4. Maritime patrol and response;
5. Protection of shipping and offshore territories and resources;

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<sup>73</sup> Ibid. p.13

<sup>74</sup> Ibid. p.24

<sup>75</sup> Ibid. p.4,32. See also Walls, 'Defending Australia - The 1994 Defence White Paper', Press Release. p.5

<sup>76</sup> Australian Government, *Defending Australia: Defence White Paper 1994*. p.22

<sup>77</sup> Ibid. p.14,29

<sup>78</sup> Ibid. p.25

6. Air defence in maritime areas and Northern Approaches;
7. Defeat of incursions on Australian territory;
8. Protection of important civil and defence assets;
9. Strategic strike.<sup>79</sup>

Four Force Development Priorities were listed as necessary to ensure that the ADF would be able to carry out these roles efficiently:

1. Developing the ADF as an integrated whole, including command arrangements and operational doctrine;
2. Identifying capabilities that require high excellence;
3. Cultivating the ability to expand and enhance forces in response to any potential significant new capability;
4. Strengthening the national support base.<sup>80</sup>

Improvements would be made to all three services. The RAAF would receive AEW&C aircraft by 2000.<sup>81</sup> A fifth Regular battalion would be raised within the Army, who would also receive new light vehicles and in the course of time have their Leopards replaced by smaller tanks “suited to our northern environment.”<sup>82</sup> The Reserves would be better integrated into the ADF, and possible measures to enhance their performance were considered.<sup>83</sup>

One interesting aspect of the published White Paper was its admission that Australia could not continue to maintain a technology edge in the region over the entire range of capabilities, as other nations were modernising their own forces.<sup>84</sup> Thus Australia would need to focus on knowledge related capabilities, such as surveillance, where it was felt an edge could still be maintained. While the term RMA was not mentioned here, this was still an indication that Australia was already

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<sup>79</sup> Ibid. p.30

<sup>80</sup> Ibid. p.34

<sup>81</sup> Ibid. p.42

<sup>82</sup> Ibid. p.49-51

<sup>83</sup> Ibid. p.73-81

<sup>84</sup> Paul Dibb, *The Relevance of the Knowledge Edge*, Working Paper 329, Canberra: ANU Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, December 1998. p.3; Australian Government, *Defending Australia: Defence White Paper 1994*. p.25

beginning to engage with the concepts of RMA-paradigm warfare, especially the central importance of information dominance.

Little attention was given to ethnic conflicts or counter-terrorism. In relation to peace support, *Defending Australia* stated that “we do not establish special units or earmark elements within the ADF for peace support”, as Australia wished to retain the ability to provide a flexible response for any PSO.<sup>85</sup> Thus, peace support would not have much influence over force development.

Eight out of 159 pages were devoted to “Defence and the Australian Community”. Mention was made of disaster relief, civil defence, search and rescue, counter-terrorism, customs and EEZ patrols, but there was little analysis of what assets might be required to carry out such tasks.<sup>86</sup> The document did note that some defence assets were inappropriate for routine taskings in community roles.

In relation to budgeting, *Defending Australia* forecast only a very modest increase in funding over the next few years.<sup>87</sup> Any real growth would be allocated to new capital equipment rather than personnel or operations.<sup>88</sup> The White Paper stated that there was no real need for enhanced funding, as “with only very modest real growth in Australia’s defence budget, we can maintain the capabilities needed.”<sup>89</sup>

### *Summary and Analysis*

*Defending Australia* was a conservative document produced by an insular bureaucratic process. It was an incremental advance on its predecessor, *The Defence of Australia*, rather than a bold new statement.

The policy-making process was neither convoluted nor delayed. The White Paper was produced on time and with few apparent difficulties. This may have been reflective of prior agreement within the greater defence bureaucracy as to many of the potentially controversial issues. Evidence suggests,<sup>90</sup> however, that this was instead reflective of the power of the civilian bureaucracy, and especially the Strategic Policy and Force Development and Acquisition Divisions within the Department. They were able to force through their views without major consultation.

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<sup>85</sup> Australian Government, *Defending Australia: Defence White Paper 1994*. p.106

<sup>86</sup> *Ibid.* p.136-139

<sup>87</sup> *Ibid.* p.146

<sup>88</sup> *Ibid.* p.147

<sup>89</sup> *Ibid.* p.151

<sup>90</sup> Interview with Australian Defence Official B; Interview with Former Australian Defence Official H.

The continental Defence of Australia remained the primary rationale for the defence force, albeit in a slightly expanded form that portended the possibility of increased regional involvement.

*Defending Australia* stated that the balanced force structure of the extant ADF was sufficiently suited to the future, except in the case of the Army. That service was seen as requiring some substantial enhancement, in both organisation and equipment. This was so it could meet the demands of low level operations in a highly geographically dispersed theatre.

*Defending Australia* can now be seen, with the benefit of hindsight, as the culmination of Defence of Australia rhetoric. It continued to advocate a conventional focus for the ADF, and reflected little on operations other than war, other than to note them as possible distractions. The impact of the RMA was noted, but only briefly (and in different terms), and there was no suggestion that such a paradigm might prove very useful to the small but high-technology ADF. Little of what had occurred since the end of the Cold War was taken into account. The focus remained the high-technology defence of the Sea Air Gap. The flexibility of such an approach to other roles was left largely unconsidered, except for broad statements that the forces maintained for such a posture granted flexibility.

However, an interesting hypothesis can be offered here, that *despite* being designed to meet a quite different strategic situation, *Defending Australia*, and especially the subsequent *Army in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century Review* (A21R96), portended the possibility of an Army, especially, quite capable in post-Cold War “van Creveld” operations. Had the White Paper been fully implemented, it is likely that a force eminently suited for expeditionary (given support) low-intensity, decentralised operations – including peace support operations – would have been the result, although the rationale would have been quite different.

### *Aftermath*

The implementation of *Defending Australia* was, as will be seen, cut short by the election of the Coalition Government in 1996. However, in the period immediately after the release of the White Paper, there were several changes within the ADF.

The most important result of *Defending Australia* was the *Army in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century Review* (A21R96). This was designed to trial various ideas relating to continental defence.<sup>91</sup> It was based around low-level scenarios, such as commando and terrorist attacks.<sup>92</sup> It undertook trials throughout 1995 and 1996, and produced a report at the end of the latter year. Further discussion of *A21R96* and its successor, *Restructuring the Army 1997* (RTA97), is contained in the section on *Australia's Strategic Policy*.

Another Army reorganisation was the conversion in 1996 of 4 Royal Australian Regiment into a commando battalion, tasked with a long range, special forces role.<sup>93</sup> This was the first major change to the composition of Australia's special forces for many years.

January 1996 was a busy month. There were significant changes to higher level command and control at this time. The various Chiefs of Staff became the Chiefs of Army, Navy and Air Force.<sup>94</sup> Also, the first permanent Commander Australian Theatre was announced.<sup>95</sup> These command changes were linked to the White Paper's findings.

At the same time, after major delays, the first Collins-class SSK was commissioned.<sup>96</sup> However, due to problems, the introduction into service of this vessel was not the major capability leap that had been expected. Later in 1996 the first Anzac-class frigate was launched. These were the results of acquisition processes begun long before *Defending Australia* was produced.

The Defence Annual Report of 1995/1996, the last of the Labor government, provides a convenient place to pause. This report noted that policy advice was produced on the basis of *Defending Australia* until March 1996 and the change of government; at that time the "focus of activity turned to the development of policy in accordance with the new Government's priorities as a basis for making defence

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<sup>91</sup> Horner, *Making the Australian Defence Force*. p.93-94

<sup>92</sup> Michael Evans, *From Deakin to Dobb: The Army and the Making of Australian Strategy in the 20th Century*, Working Paper 113, Duntroon: Australian Army Land Warfare Studies Centre, June 2001. p.32-33

<sup>93</sup> J.H. Farrell, 'TAG-East', *Australia & NZ Defender*, no. 40, 2002. p.9

<sup>94</sup> Horner, *The Evolution of Australian Higher Command Arrangements*. p.27-28

<sup>95</sup> Horner, *Making the Australian Defence Force*. p.128

<sup>96</sup> *Ibid.* p.89

portfolio decisions.”<sup>97</sup> As such, any discussion of later events is best treated in the context of Coalition policy in the following sections.

## **Part Two – Coalition Policy 1997-2004**

### **Australia’s Strategic Policy 1997 (ASP97)**

#### *Introduction*

While *Australia’s Strategic Policy* was not a White Paper in name, it was one in nature. Produced soon after the Coalition took power, it departed to some extent from the policy prescriptions of *Defending Australia*.

#### *International Context*

The external environment was relatively stable. East Asia was experiencing a period of peace and steady economic growth. There were some concerns, notably in the “arc of instability” to the north of Australia,<sup>98</sup> the Taiwan Straits,<sup>99</sup> and in relation to the United States’ commitment to the region.<sup>100</sup>

The new Australian Foreign Minister, Alexander Downer, noted soon after taking office that the Asia Pacific was transforming, with economies growing and an evolving balance of power. He also noted the rise of a range of non-military challenges to Australia’s security.<sup>101</sup>

Unfortunately for the drafters of *ASP97*, this healthy state of international affairs ended almost immediately after the publication of the document, with the Asian financial crisis.

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<sup>97</sup> Australian Department of Defence, *Defence Annual Report 1995/1996*, Canberra, 15 October 1996. p.125

<sup>98</sup> Paul Dibb, 'Force structure priorities: the need for greater self-reliance', *Dissent*, Summer 1999-2000. p.9

<sup>99</sup> Peter Jennings, 'Australia's strategic outlook: growing regional complexity', *Asia-Pacific Defence Reporter*, vol. XXIII, no. 3/4, March/April 1996. p.6-7

<sup>100</sup> Interview with Australian Defence Commentator A.

<sup>101</sup> Alexander Downer, 'Security Through Cooperation', in Helen Hookey and Denny Roy (eds.), *Australian Defence Planning: Five Views from Policy Makers*. Canberra, 1997. p.40-41

## *Domestic Political Context*

A Federal election was held in March 1996. Defence was not a major issue, but there were differences. The Coalition campaigned on a defence policy slightly different to that of Labor, emphasising efficiency and the need for a review of defence responsibilities.<sup>102</sup>

After the Coalition won, there were immediate signs of a shift in defence policy. The new Minister of Defence, Ian McLachlan, noted in May 1996 that a “rethink” of defence was needed.<sup>103</sup> There were hints this rethink might include an increasing regional role.<sup>104</sup>

In a speech to the Royal United Services Institute, McLachlan summarised the Coalition stance on defence. There would be three key objectives over the next three years: the defeat of attacks on Australia, contributing to regional security, and enhancing the alliance with the United States.<sup>105</sup> Interestingly, global commitments were not mentioned in this speech. The Coalition had five priorities for the ADF:

1. Increasing combat capability, with an emphasis on sea and air forces but some attention on the army;
2. Developing strategies for cost-effectiveness within defence;
3. Building more satisfying careers;
4. Managing Australia’s alliances to ensure their relevance and revitalise them;
5. Setting an agenda for regional co-operation.<sup>106</sup>

The ALP criticised this new trend in defence policy, claiming the Coalition was departing from previous bipartisan support for the Defence of Australia, and undertaking “defence policy by press release”.<sup>107</sup>

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<sup>102</sup> Australian Liberal and National Party Coalition, 'Defence policy overview', *Insight*, vol. 5, no. 5, 24 April 1996.

<sup>103</sup> Ian McLachlan, 'Australian Defence Policy after the Year 2000', in Helen Hookey and Denny Roy (eds.), *Australian Defence Planning: Five Views from Policy Makers*. Canberra, 1997. p.3

<sup>104</sup> Ibid. p.11-12 and Malcolm Davis, 'Force structure options for an Australian regional defence posture', *Asia-Pacific Defence Reporter*, vol. XXIII, no. 2, April-May 1997. p.14 and Arch Bevis, 'Australia's Security Relations with the Asia-Pacific Region', in Helen Hookey and Denny Roy (eds.), *Australian Defence Planning: Five Views from Policy Makers*. Canberra, 1997. p.35

<sup>105</sup> Ian McLachlan, 'Australian defence policy after 2000', *Defender*, vol. 13, no. 2, Winter 1996. p.5-6

<sup>106</sup> Ibid. p.7

<sup>107</sup> Bevis, 'Australia's Security Relations with the Asia-Pacific Region'. p.37 and Arch Bevis, 'Year of disjointed decisions', *The Australian*, 20 June 1997.

The new Coalition government also showed interest in the concepts of the RMA, possibly as they felt that such a route was the best way to ensure increased, cost-effective combat capability.<sup>108</sup> There were definite hints of a developing disjuncture between the two main parties in relation to defence.

### *Defence Force Issues*

*Australia's Strategic Policy* was produced during a time of some change within the ADF.

There were reorganisations in the structure of the ADF, especially at the higher levels. In July 1997, Logistic Command was replaced by Support Command Australia.<sup>109</sup> Special forces were placed directly under COMAST, rather than under the Chief of Army, in order to enhance their strategic utility.<sup>110</sup>

The *Army 21* review produced a report in the middle of 1996, but the change of government meant that implementation was delayed.<sup>111</sup> This report espoused a continental defence strategy for the Australian Army, rather than the maritime strategy hinted at by Coalition defence statements.<sup>112</sup> The review supported embedding capabilities, and using battle groups rather than traditional formations such as companies and battalions.<sup>113</sup> The ideal was a highly mobile, self-reliant force capable of operating over a widely dispersed battlefield for short-warning conflict.

By the end of 1996, approval to proceed fully had still not been given, and the Minister of Defence stated that only parts of the review would be implemented.<sup>114</sup> Despite this, there was still some confidence amongst Army personnel that A21R96 would be carried out,<sup>115</sup> and trials eventually got underway in the second half of

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<sup>108</sup> Evans, 'Australia's Approach to the Revolution in Military Affairs 1994-2004'. p.25-27

<sup>109</sup> Horner, *Making the Australian Defence Force*.

<sup>110</sup> *Ibid.* p.197

<sup>111</sup> Kevan Wolfe, 'Army 21 - a new culture for the Australian Army', *Asia-Pacific Defence Reporter*, vol. XXII, no. 5/6, May/June 1996. p.8

<sup>112</sup> Michael Evans, *The Role of the Australian Army in a Maritime Concept of Strategy*, Working Paper 101, Duntroon: Australian Army Land Warfare Studies Centre, September 1998. p.25-26

<sup>113</sup> Albert Palazzo, *The Australian Army: A History of its Organisation 1901-2001*. Melbourne, Oxford University Press, 2001. p.362-365

<sup>114</sup> Kevan Wolfe, 'Army ready to go with A21', *Asia-Pacific Defence Reporter*, vol. XXII, no. 11/12, November/December 1996. p.12

<sup>115</sup> A.W. Grazebrook, 'Mobility, flexibility, jointery & change - Army welcomes the future', *Asia-Pacific Defence Reporter*, vol. XXII, no. 7/8, July/August 1996. p.28

1997.<sup>116</sup> Unfortunately, as noted, the report went against the grain of emerging Coalition defence policy;<sup>117</sup> it was continentally oriented, and built on the policy prescriptions of the 1987 and 1994 White Papers.<sup>118</sup>

In October 1996, the Defence Efficiency Review was begun.<sup>119</sup> This was motivated by a desire to save money through internal streamlining, and was clearly presaged in the Coalition's election policy;<sup>120</sup> the goal was to focus available funding onto operational capability.

The final report, published in March 1997, was entitled *Future Directions for the Management of Australia's Defence*.<sup>121</sup> The review panel noted that the Australian Defence Organisation was still in generally good shape, but there were some problems.<sup>122</sup> The review made several recommendations for enhanced practise.<sup>123</sup> These in turn led to the Defence Reform Programme, characterised by some as a move from tail to teeth within the ADF,<sup>124</sup> and subject to some criticism.<sup>125</sup>

Signs of increasing attention towards the RMA were also apparent. A major conference on the topic was held in 1996.<sup>126</sup> In the following year, the ADF began a close involvement with the United States Office of National Assessment (ONA) in regards to matters relating to the RMA.<sup>127</sup>

### *Themes and Actors*

Due to the quality of evidence, it is possible to establish the motivations behind, and issues discussed in, ASP97 in some detail. While the perspectives of

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<sup>116</sup> Kevan Wolfe, 'The age of rapid change', *Asia-Pacific Defence Reporter*, vol. XXIII, no. 6, October-November 1997. p.30

<sup>117</sup> McLachlan, 'Australian defence policy after 2000'; Ian McLachlan, 'Defending Australia's Interests: Challenges for a New Strategic Era', *Royal United Services Institute Journal*, vol. 18, September 1997. should be noted.

<sup>118</sup> Palazzo, *The Australian Army: A History of its Organisation 1901-2001*. p.366 and Evans, *The Role of the Australian Army in a Maritime Concept of Strategy*. p.28-32 and Evans, *Forward from the Past: The Development of Australian Army Doctrine 1972-Present*. p.50-53

<sup>119</sup> Australian Government, *Future Directions for the Management of Australia's Defence - Report of the Defence Efficiency Review*, Canberra, 10 March 1997. p.1

<sup>120</sup> Australian Liberal and National Party Coalition, 'Defence policy overview'. p.3, 14-17 especially.

<sup>121</sup> Australian Government, *Future Directions for the Management of Australia's Defence - Report of the Defence Efficiency Review*.

<sup>122</sup> *Ibid.* p.57

<sup>123</sup> *Ibid.* p.57

<sup>124</sup> John Baker, 'Rethink will spotlight future security', *The Australian* 1997.

<sup>125</sup> Michael O'Connor, 'Redirecting the defence dollar', *IPA Review*, vol. 50, no. 1, October 1997.

<sup>126</sup> Interview with Australian Defence Official A, 28 November 2005.

<sup>127</sup> Evans, 'Australia's Approach to the Revolution in Military Affairs 1994-2004'. p.27

participants vary, some commonalities can be identified, and anomalies can also be very illustrative.

One senior participant has stated the review arose from three main imperatives:<sup>128</sup> a feeling by Prime Minister John Howard that it would be good to match the forthcoming foreign policy White Paper with a defence equivalent; a feeling by Ian McLachlan that existent Defence of Australia Policy was too narrow; and a feeling within the ADO itself as well that there was a need to move away from “narrow” Defence of Australia due to the changing nature of the post-Cold War world. There was a belief by some that Australia could not take its strategic situation for granted, and that Asian economic growth would overtake Australia’s technological edge within a few years.

Other participants have noted the importance of politics in initiating the review, in that the Coalition needed to stamp its own shape onto defence policy.<sup>129</sup> Whereas the ALP had been a mature government, the Coalition was new, and wished to change things. It has been claimed that the Coalition was very sceptical about the ALP’s existing defence policies, but didn’t wish to develop a full-blown White Paper,<sup>130</sup> preferring a strategic review. In this way the goal was slightly more limited than it might have been.

Another official claims that the review was motivated, at least partially, by the experience of the 1990s, with the “contradictions” of the Dobb policy, especially in relation to Somalia and other deployments, beginning to show.<sup>131</sup>

The review team engaged with a number of issues of varying importance. Perhaps the most crucial was the classic choice of Australian defence, the balance between continental defence and expeditionary focus. Already, as noted, hints had been dropped by the new government that it favoured a regional or forward defence posture.<sup>132</sup> Minister of Defence McLachlan stated in late 1997 that “we want to be active partners with our neighbours – and active defence engagement is an important part of that partnership.”<sup>133</sup> He added that the Coalition believed national and regional defence were inextricably linked, and that thus the differentiation between continental

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<sup>128</sup> Interview with Former Australian Defence Official K.

<sup>129</sup> Interview with Australian Defence Official A; Interview with Australian Defence Official B.

<sup>130</sup> Interview with Former Australian Defence Official I, 30 November 2005.

<sup>131</sup> Interview with Former Australian Defence Official H.

<sup>132</sup> McLachlan, 'Australian defence policy after 2000'. See also Alan Stephens, 'Unoffensive defence', *Asia-Pacific Defence Reporter*, vol. XXIII, no. 5, August-September 1997.

<sup>133</sup> McLachlan, 'Defending Australia's Interests: Challenges for a New Strategic Era'. p.1

and forward defence was tenuous.<sup>134</sup> There was thus clear guidance from the Ministerial leadership to the bureaucracy.

It is also interesting, given his close participation in the review, to note the published works of then-Deputy Secretary of Defence Hugh White. In a recent article he had assessed the relevance of Australia's traditional defence self-reliance in a changing international environment, and pointed out the rise in regional instability, and the changing nature of warfare.<sup>135</sup> His conclusion was that self-reliance was still viable, but needed to be rethought in order to remain so. In another article he pointed out the need for Australia to think carefully about the balance between maritime and land operations.<sup>136</sup> Overall, the evidence seems to be that there was pressure from the Government, and agreement within the ADOD, towards a greater regional focus for defence policy, away from strict continental Defence of Australia.<sup>137</sup> There was a feeling that Australia's defence responsibilities required a defence force that could perform beyond Australia's shores.

A continuing issue, and one directly linked to the geostrategic focus of the ADF, was the balance of the force: whether to retain a balanced conventional force, or whether to develop an unbalanced conventional force, or whether to shift it towards operations other than war, such as peacekeeping and estate management. While Australia had been increasingly involved in such operations during the middle of the 1990s,<sup>138</sup> the evidence seems to suggest that review participants were opposed to any move away from conventional, balanced forces.<sup>139</sup>

There was no appetite within the ADO to restructure the ADF in order to undertake military operations other than war; in recent public statements both the Minister and CDF had said the ADF needed to be designed for traditional

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<sup>134</sup> Ibid. p.2

<sup>135</sup> Hugh White, 'Is Defence Self-Reliance Still Realistic?' Royal United Services Institute, 7 August 1996. p.57-58

<sup>136</sup> Hugh White, 'New Directions in Australian Defence Planning', in Helen Hookey and Denny Roy (eds.), *Australian Defence Planning: Five Views from Policy Makers*. Canberra, 1997. p.24

<sup>137</sup> Interview with Australian Defence Official A; Interview with Australian Defence Official B; Interview with Former Australian Defence Official A, 30 November 2005; Interview with Former Australian Defence Official I; Interview with Former Australian Defence Official K.

<sup>138</sup> Hugh Smith, 'Australia', in David Sorenson and Pia Wood (eds.), *The Politics of Peacekeeping in the Post-Cold War Era*. Milton Park, Frank Cass, 2005.

<sup>139</sup> Australian Department of Defence, *Australia's Strategic Policy*, Canberra, 1997; Dibb, 'Force structure priorities: the need for greater self-reliance'; Evans, *From Deakin to Dibb: The Army and the Making of Australian Strategy in the 20th Century*; Evans, *The Role of the Australian Army in a Maritime Concept of Strategy*; McLachlan, 'Defending Australia's Interests: Challenges for a New Strategic Era'; Hugh White, 'The Strategic Review - What's New', Royal United Services Institute, 11 February 1998.

contingencies.<sup>140</sup> It was held to be a mistake to restructure, and the belief was that a core designed for conventional warfare would allow other tasks.<sup>141</sup> It was also felt that a balanced force was the best choice.<sup>142</sup> There was, however, a feeling held by some participants that any future war into which Australia committed land forces would be low-intensity.<sup>143</sup> This was linked to another belief, which was that despite an increasing emphasis on regional involvement, Australia still needed to focus on high-technology air and sea forces rather than its land forces.

Finance was a vital issue. The ADF was approaching a period of block obsolescence. Decisions would have to be made, and quickly, given the long lead times of major procurement programmes. However, such financial decisions could not be made without a policy backing, and thus there was a need to update that policy to ensure that new capabilities could be acquired.<sup>144</sup> It was also apparent that there would not be enough money to do everything, which in turn led to the focus (noted earlier) towards the RAN and RAAF, partly at the expense of the Army.<sup>145</sup> Pressures from other sectors of government would impose limitations on any increase in the total defence vote.<sup>146</sup> Still, it was likely that defence would be treated more leniently than other areas of government expenditure.<sup>147</sup>

The RMA was also an issue of some importance. In 1997, McLachlan stated that information warfare was key for Australia.<sup>148</sup> There were some within the defence bureaucracy and political leadership who were supportive of increased emphasis on such concepts, while others were more conservative in their approach. The concept of the “Knowledge Edge” was developed to capture the information revolution,<sup>149</sup> but there was no great pressure to transform the ADF to utilise emerging technologies and

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<sup>140</sup> Alan Stephens, 'New era security: The RAAF in the next 25 years', *Asia-Pacific Defence Reporter*, vol. XXII, no. 9/10, September/October 1996. p.16

<sup>141</sup> Interview with Former Australian Defence Official A; Interview with Former Australian Defence Official I; Interview with Former Australian Defence Official K.

<sup>142</sup> Interview with Former Australian Defence Official A.

<sup>143</sup> Interview with Former Australian Defence Official A.

<sup>144</sup> Interview with Former Australian Defence Official A; Interview with Former Australian Defence Official C, 1 December 2005.

<sup>145</sup> Interview with Former Australian Defence Official A.; Martin Hamilton, 'Worthy aims, scant resources', *The Australian*, 20 June 1997.

<sup>146</sup> Don Greenlees, 'Price tag on keeping the peace', *The Australian*, 20 June 1997.

<sup>147</sup> Geoffrey Barker, 'Three vital changes in Government approach to getting the mix right', *Australian Financial Review*, July 3 1997. p.28 and McLachlan, 'Australian defence policy after 2000'. p.7 and Australian Liberal and National Party Coalition, 'Defence policy overview'. p.17 and Australian Department of Defence, *Defence Annual Report 1996/1997*, Canberra, 15 October 1997. p.19

<sup>148</sup> Ian McLachlan, 'Information warfare holds the key', *The Australian* 1997.

<sup>149</sup> Interview with Former Australian Defence Official K.

doctrines. There was a belief that it was difficult to establish exactly how the RMA might be put into practice.<sup>150</sup>

Other geostrategic considerations were also discussed during the review. There was a belief amongst some that Australia had moved too far towards Asia in the early 1990s,<sup>151</sup> and that a new statement of defence policy might strengthen the relationship with the United States. Others have claimed that it was more about balancing the relationships with Asia and the United States, than choosing between them.<sup>152</sup> General alliance issues were also important, because any decision on strategy and force structure would have obvious implications on Australia's relationships.<sup>153</sup>

The review was written by a small team, with Hugh White at its head.<sup>154</sup> By and large, this was an in-house departmental document, with little consultation with other government departments, and little consultation with the uniformed services.<sup>155</sup> The influence of White should be emphasised: he had been the primary force behind the previous White Paper, and his views were regarded at the time as being quite similar to those of Paul Dibb, the originator of the 1980s Defence of Australia policy.<sup>156</sup> What is intriguing about this is that despite some attempts by the new government to institute a stronger whole-of-government approach,<sup>157</sup> narrow bureaucratic interests remained paramount. It was also suggested by some that the mood within the defence bureaucracy at the time was "nasty", and that those with conflicting opinions were afraid to speak out.<sup>158</sup>

### *Process of Review*

The production of the document took up most of 1997, and as noted involved only a small number of participants. By and large, there was no great deal of involvement by Cabinet; instead the writing team produced a draft, consulted in-

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<sup>150</sup> Interview with Australian Defence Official A.

<sup>151</sup> Interview with Australian Defence Commentator A.

<sup>152</sup> Interview with Former Australian Defence Official I.

<sup>153</sup> Interview with Former Australian Defence Official C; Interview with Former Australian Defence Official G, 22 November 2005.

<sup>154</sup> Interview with Former Australian Defence Official C; Interview with Former Australian Defence Official K.

<sup>155</sup> Interview with Former Australian Defence Official H.

<sup>156</sup> Various interviewees provided this insight.

<sup>157</sup> Interview with Australian Defence Official A; Interview with Former Australian Defence Official K.

<sup>158</sup> John Lyons, 'Operation Backflip', *Bulletin with Newsweek*, vol. 117, no. 6185, 8 March 1999.

house, then went to government for approval. The review was purportedly developed in close co-ordination with the foreign policy White Paper, *In The National Interest*,<sup>159</sup> although some participants have suggested that ASP97 was finished well before its foreign policy counterpart.<sup>160</sup>

The initial stages of the review involved the development of a strategic overview, during which the intelligence agencies were vital.<sup>161</sup> In July 1997, five months before the document was released, the Minister of Defence stated he expected the review to provide a basis for an increase in defence funding.<sup>162</sup> The Departments of Finance and Treasury were involved near the end of the process, when major capability decisions needed to be made, and firm costings established.<sup>163</sup>

Due to the absence of written evidence, it is impossible to identify major phases during the drafting process. However, it is convenient to discuss here a purported unreleased and classified variant of the final document.

An article in the journal *Bulletin with Newsweek* secured a copy of this variant, and released an analysis.<sup>164</sup> This article claimed “Australia is now moving towards a forward defence policy by stealth.” It was claimed Australia was developing an expeditionary force suited for alliance operations in North East Asia, presumably in concert with the United States, equipped with high-technology weapons. Portions of the classified document stated that Australia needed to go further than the Sea Air Gap. There are major differences between this variant and the official document. However, some participants in the review process have stated that there was no major difference between the published document and the classified version.<sup>165</sup>

## *Result*

The published document, released in December, began with a bold statement:

Australia needs a strategic approach which takes full account  
of the new challenges we face... an approach which explicitly

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<sup>159</sup> Australian Department of Defence, *Australia's Strategic Policy*. p.3

<sup>160</sup> Interview with Former Australian Defence Official J, 30 November 2005.

<sup>161</sup> Interview with Australian Defence Official A.

<sup>162</sup> Geoffrey Barker, 'Spending rise likely to follow new strategic review', *Australian Financial Review*, 3 July 1997. p.30

<sup>163</sup> Interview with Australian Defence Official A.

<sup>164</sup> Lyons, 'Operation Backflip'.

<sup>165</sup> Interview with Former Australian Defence Official C.

reflects the full breadth of our security interests. Australia's strategic interests do not begin and end at our shoreline.<sup>166</sup>

It stated that the strategy of Defence of Australia was to be remodelled and restructured, and a more outwards-looking strategy put in its place. At its most basic, the fundamental strategic outcome sought was to prevent armed attack or coercion against Australia.<sup>167</sup> It also noted that Australia's primary strategic focus was within its own region, the Asia-Pacific.<sup>168</sup>

*Australia's Strategic Policy* analysed the regional environment, and concluded that while military modernisation within South East Asia was not a threat, it had impact on the nature of conflict, and thus on Australia's force planning.<sup>169</sup> It stated that the alliance with the United States was "by any measure our most important strategic relationship", and commented on the strength of the defence relationship with New Zealand, but not without some subtle criticism of New Zealand's armed potential.<sup>170</sup> In the Asia-Pacific, the document declared that Australia had five key interests:

1. To help avoid destabilising strategic competition between the regions's major powers;
2. To help prevent the emergence in the Asia-Pacific region of a security environment dominated by any power(s) whose strategic interests would likely be inimical to those of Australia;
3. To help maintain a benign security environment in South East Asia, especially in maritime South East Asia, which safeguards the territorial integrity of all countries in the region;
4. To help prevent the positioning in neighbouring states by any foreign power of military forces which might be used to attack Australia;
5. To help prevent the proliferation of WMD in the region.<sup>171</sup>

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<sup>166</sup> Australian Department of Defence, *Australia's Strategic Policy*. p.iii

<sup>167</sup> Ibid. p.8

<sup>168</sup> Ibid. p.9

<sup>169</sup> Ibid. p.16

<sup>170</sup> Ibid. p.18-20

<sup>171</sup> Ibid. p.8

*Australia's Strategic Policy* noted that there were three core tasks that might require the ADF to undertake combat operations.<sup>172</sup>

The first of these was Defeating Attacks on Australia (DAA). This was stated to be the most vital force structure priority, as it was the ultimate guarantee if all else failed. This needed to be a self-reliant capability. It would require the ability to protect the maritime approaches, prevent territorial footholds, and prevent political concessions being extracted from Australia through the threat of force. DAA would set the minimum required of the ADF, and was further complicated by the need to defend Australia's offshore territories.

The second was Defending Australia's Regional Interests (DRI). The document noted that "(our) defence posture must include the means to influence strategic affairs in our region." This might involve both defence diplomacy and military operations.

The third was Supporting Australia's Global Interests (SGI). The primary issue here would be support of the United Nations. This might include collective security operations and peacekeeping. Peacekeeping deployments would only be undertaken if they passed a checklist of national interest and feasibility.

A fourth, non-core task was helping Australia's civil community. This might involve counter-terrorist operations, or the surveillance of the maritime area.<sup>173</sup>

*Australia's Strategic Policy* stated that the first two core tasks, DAA and DRI, would be the priorities for force structure.<sup>174</sup> It suggested that to meet the requirements of those tasks the best strategy would be a "Maritime Concept," focusing on the defeat of the enemy in the maritime approaches to Australia.<sup>175</sup> As such, aircraft and ships would be the first line of defence, and thus the highest priority for the ADF.<sup>176</sup> Such a strategy sounds similar to the Defence of Australia concept enunciated in earlier policy, but *Australia's Strategic Policy* also introduced some minor changes.

For example, in a discussion on proactive and reactive operations, the document suggested that proactive operations were somewhat better.<sup>177</sup> And, the two

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<sup>172</sup> The following paragraphs are taken from *Ibid.* p.29-34

<sup>173</sup> *Ibid.* p.34-35

<sup>174</sup> *Ibid.* p.36

<sup>175</sup> *Ibid.* p.44

<sup>176</sup> *Ibid.* p.45

<sup>177</sup> *Ibid.* p.46

capability benchmarks set were not only the defence of Australia, but also the maintenance of a strong regional presence as a maritime power.<sup>178</sup>

Thus the document first established Australia's strategic goals, then moved onto the specific roles the ADF would be required to fulfil in order to achieve those goals. The next stage was to state four Force Structure Priorities, which would enable the ADF to best undertake the core tasks.

The first was "The Knowledge Edge," defined as "the effective exploitation of information technologies to allow us to use our relatively small force to maximum effectiveness."<sup>179</sup> It consisted of three areas, intelligence, command and control, and surveillance. The aim was an integrated system. The RMA was noted as being "particularly significant" for Australia.<sup>180</sup> Indeed, *Australia's Strategic Policy* was the first major official document in Australia to mention the RMA.<sup>181</sup> Achieving the Knowledge Edge might require new platforms such as AEW&C aircraft, new communications equipment, and possibly new organisational structures.

The second priority was defeating threats in Australia's maritime approaches.<sup>182</sup> This would involve a mix of air, surface and subsurface capabilities. No need for new major surface combatants was identified, but minor upgrades such as Harpoon were mentioned, and the possibility of acquiring additional submarines was suggested.

The third priority was strike, defined as the "capability to engage targets in an adversary's own territory."<sup>183</sup> The RAAF's F-111s and the Army's various special forces were seen as useful here, and some enhancements involving stand-off weapons were mentioned, but by and large little change was suggested.

The fourth priority was Australia's land forces.<sup>184</sup> Their role was defined as defeating enemy incursions, most probably against small scale landings. The most suitable means of organisation was noted as being integrated combined arms task forces, a finding that might have been built on the *Restructuring the Army* report. *Australia's Strategic Policy* perceived light land forces as being sufficient for

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<sup>178</sup> Ibid. p.47

<sup>179</sup> The following is taken from Ibid. p.56-60

<sup>180</sup> Ibid. p.55

<sup>181</sup> Evans, 'Australia's Approach to the Revolution in Military Affairs 1994-2004'. p.27

<sup>182</sup> The following is taken from Australian Department of Defence, *Australia's Strategic Policy*. p.60-63

<sup>183</sup> Ibid. p.63

<sup>184</sup> The following is taken from Ibid. p.64-66

Australia's likely needs. It also noted that ensuring an entire brigade group was actually available for operations might require a reallocation of resources within the ADF.<sup>185</sup> There was no mention of the land forces being organised to largely undertake expeditionary operations.

Hugh White, who played a major part in drafting the document, identified nine differences between *Australia's Strategic Policy* and previous documents.<sup>186</sup> These were: (1) a less specific approach to predicting the future, (2) a move away from doctrinal concepts of warning time and low-level contingencies, as Australia could no longer be so sure about the wars it would fight, (3) a change in balance of priorities between continental and regional stances, (4) a proper formulation of strategic interests, (5) developing capabilities to respond to interests, (6) expanding the concept of defence of Australia to encompass more proactive operations, (7) more clearly setting out force structure priorities than previously, (8) establishing clear benchmarks for capability, and (9) giving some financial certainty to defence.

It has been commonly stated that *Australia's Strategic Policy* was a marked departure from previous policy, because of its emphasis on maritime strategy,<sup>187</sup> but this should not be overemphasised. The defence of Australia and protection of the Sea Air Gap by air and naval forces remained the primary force structure determinant for the ADF; while regional interests were mentioned they were far from predominant. No major restructuring or procurement programmes to better enhance the ADF's deployable capacity were listed. This may have been because a more explicit statement of forward defence would have been unacceptable diplomatically.<sup>188</sup>

### *Summary and Analysis*

*Australia's Strategic Policy* was a chance for the newly elected Coalition to set a new course in Australian defence policy early in their administration. Its opening

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<sup>185</sup> Ibid. p.65

<sup>186</sup> The following is taken from: White, 'The Strategic Review - What's New'. p.55-60

<sup>187</sup> Dibb, 'Force structure priorities: the need for greater self-reliance'; Evans, *Forward from the Past: The Development of Australian Army Doctrine 1972-Present*; Evans, *From Deakin to Dibb: The Army and the Making of Australian Strategy in the 20th Century*; Evans, *The Role of the Australian Army in a Maritime Concept of Strategy*; White, 'The Strategic Review - What's New'. These all suggest such a conclusion.

<sup>188</sup> Stuart Harris, 'Australia's regional security planning', in J. Mohan Malik (ed.), *Australia's Security in the 21st Century*. St Leonards, Allen & Unwin, 1999. p.112

page indicates its clear political leanings, which took it away from previous bipartisan approaches to defence.<sup>189</sup>

When released, the paper was seen as a marked change in Australian defence policy. Yet that was not entirely the case. Indeed, the final published version of *Australia's Strategic Policy* was itself a change from defence policies earlier promulgated by the Coalition; *ASP97* was a drawback from those more radical concepts. It is likely that such was the result of bureaucratic influence, moderating and blunting the more innovative desires of the politicians.

Despite some modified rhetoric, the geographical Defence of Australia remained predominant, and although maritime operations were mentioned, they were of secondary importance. Still, questions might validly be asked as to whether this was merely a method of ensuring the document was not too controversial internationally, and whether in actual fact the new Coalition espoused an even more active and interventionist defence policy, as has sometimes been suggested.

A few new concepts, notably the RMA and Knowledge Edge, entered into official defence discourse. Yet in other areas the document was remarkably conventional, and seemed to take little account of the changing nature of post-Cold War military operations. It continued to demote civil aid tasks to secondary or even tertiary importance, and while being somewhat supportive of involvement in peace support was swift to confirm that such operations would not be force structure determinants.

The continuities with *Defending Australia* are clear, despite changes in the international environment, and major changes in the domestic political landscape. What did not change, however, was the policy process: both the 1994 and 1997 documents were produced by a small team within the ADOD, with relatively little external consultation, and had many of the same personnel, notably Hugh White at a senior level. As such, it might be asked whether *Australia's Strategic Policy* was indeed a truly fundamental reassessment of requirements and needs, or whether it was merely an evolutionary successor to *Defending Australia* produced by a bureaucracy that did not see the need for any real change, but with a small coating of politically-derived rhetoric – the emphasis on regional engagement – applied over the top.<sup>190</sup>

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<sup>189</sup> See Australian Department of Defence, *Australia's Strategic Policy*. p.iii

<sup>190</sup> Indeed it might be said that some of the more “revolutionary” rhetoric in the earlier parts of *ASP97* about change does not integrate well with the rest of the document itself.

The most valid assessment of this document requires a slight reassessment of its predecessor. *Defending Australia* was not a totally insular, continental document; neither was *Australia's Strategic Policy* a greatly outwards looking successor. The two were closer than that, and an overly simplistic reading of their differences does not take into account the vast preponderance of similarities.

If one then pauses at this point, the beginning of 1998, and looks back to 1991, then Australia's defence policy can be seen as following an incremental, steady path: the acquisition of capabilities authorised before the end of the Cold War, the production of two similar major policy documents, a trend towards internal efficiency and civilianisation, and overall a lack of emphasis on major change, of a truly fundamental reassessment of requirements. Only in relation to the RMA are hints of a slightly more innovative approach seen.

### *Aftermath*

Problems in implementing the somewhat ambitious programmes espoused by *Australia's Strategic Policy* began to appear soon after its production.<sup>191</sup> There were problems with funding, and soon problems with the policy foundations, as the South East Asian region entered a period of turmoil during its financial crisis.

Wider ADF doctrine and strategy underwent some change in the period immediately following the release of *Australia's Strategic Policy*. The drafting of a document entitled *Australia's Military Strategy* was begun.<sup>192</sup> A doctrinal publication, *Decisive Manoeuvre: Australian Warfighting Concepts to Guide Campaign Planning* was notable as being the first time an authoritative, joint, uniquely Australian operational-level doctrine had been produced.<sup>193</sup> There were also indications of the increasing importance of the RMA. In 1999, a major conference on the topic was held, in which a variety of concepts were discussed.<sup>194</sup> Also, the ADF established its first Chief Knowledge Officer, and established the Defence Imagery and Geospatial Organisation, both moves with strong links to the RMA. Further confirmation of

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<sup>191</sup> Horner, *Making the Australian Defence Force*. p.97-99

<sup>192</sup> Interview with Former Australian Defence Official A.

<sup>193</sup> Horner, *Making the Australian Defence Force*. p.154-155

<sup>194</sup> Evans, 'Australia's Approach to the Revolution in Military Affairs 1994-2004'. p.31-37

Australia's approach to the RMA was seen soon after with the establishment of the Office of the Revolution in Military Affairs.<sup>195</sup>

*Restructuring the Army* (RTA97)<sup>196</sup> was vulnerable in the aftermath of ASP97; it had been developed under DWP94 policy guidelines, and was specifically designed for continental purposes. However, trials continued, although they were modified in June 1998 to better mesh with the requirements of ASP97.<sup>197</sup> Nor was RTA97 the only issue of concern for the Army at the time; there were worries about readiness and capability, despite the prospect of new equipment, including new helicopters,<sup>198</sup> upgrades to the M-113s<sup>199</sup> and new Bushmaster vehicles.<sup>200</sup> The end of RTA97 was seen in October 1998, when the Chief of Army announced that the Army would embrace a maritime strategy.<sup>201</sup>

At around this time, with the failure of RTA97, and a feeling within the service that it lacked coherence in its doctrine and strategy, a major effort was begun within the Army to develop a clear operational concept for the future.<sup>202</sup> The first public sign of this came in 1999, with the launch of the Army's publication *LWD1: Fundamentals of Land Warfare*. This was seen as an "ambitious" and "dramatic" document, and moved Army doctrine from a narrow base to a broader paradigm of post-Cold War conflict; importantly, it realigned Army doctrine with defence policy.<sup>203</sup> In some ways, it reversed a quarter century of Army preparation for continental defence, by claiming that manoeuvre operations in the littoral environment were the Army's primary mission.<sup>204</sup> Also important was the document's mention of the RMA; it was

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<sup>195</sup> Ibid. p.27-31

<sup>196</sup> As noted earlier this was the follow on to the A21R96 review.

<sup>197</sup> Evans, *Forward from the Past: The Development of Australian Army Doctrine 1972-Present*. p.54 and Kevan Wolfe, 'Strategic review shapes Army 21', *Asia-Pacific Defence Reporter*, vol. XXIV, no. 4, June-July 1998. p.20

<sup>198</sup> Kevan Wolfe, 'A new era for Australian Army aviation', *Asia-Pacific Defence Reporter*, vol. XXV, no. 2, February-March 1999. p.51

<sup>199</sup> Ian Bostock, 'Born again: Army's newest AFV', *Asia-Pacific Defence Reporter*, vol. XXIV, no. 5, August-September 1998. p.33

<sup>200</sup> Ian Bostock, 'Fielding the Bushmaster family', *Asia-Pacific Defence Reporter*, vol. XXV, no. 3, April-May 1999. p.60

<sup>201</sup> Greg de Somers, *The Capacity of the Australian Army to Conduct and Sustain Land Force Operations*, Working Paper 106, Duntroon: Australian Army Land Warfare Studies Centre, August 1999. p.74-75

<sup>202</sup> It was approximately at this point that the first stages of what would become the Hardening and Networking the Army initiative began.

<sup>203</sup> Evans, *Forward from the Past: The Development of Australian Army Doctrine 1972-Present*. p.60 and Kevan Wolfe, 'LWD1 - Doctrine for the Information Age', *Asia-Pacific Defence Reporter*, vol. XXV, no. 3, April-May 1999. p.30

<sup>204</sup> Evans, *Forward from the Past: The Development of Australian Army Doctrine 1972-Present*. p.62

the first major service doctrine document to do so.<sup>205</sup> This document seems to have been a direct response of the Army towards *Australia's Strategic Policy* to ensure that the service was still seen as a valid tool of government.<sup>206</sup>

In 1999, the Government, tired of continuing problems, requested a report on the Collins-class submarines.<sup>207</sup> This report was damning, and illustrated clearly that the boats would require major work before becoming operationally capable.<sup>208</sup>

The RAAF underwent some minor changes in the period following *ASP97*. In May 1998, the RAAF Combat Support Group was founded.<sup>209</sup> In September, another new FEG appeared, the Surveillance and Control Group, to be equipped with Jindalee and possibly a new, domestically developed radar.<sup>210</sup> The RAAF also updated its doctrine, but some disjunctions when compared to its Army counterpart were apparent.<sup>211</sup>

Various acquisitions were progressed at this time. The Army received new radars and soldier combat systems,<sup>212</sup> the Hawk trainer entered RAAF service, and it was announced that Boeing would provide aircraft for the long delayed AEW&C programme.<sup>213</sup> In March 1999, the RAN carried out a naval review, resulting in the fleet being divided into Force Element Groups,<sup>214</sup> and soon after released the first edition of *Australian Maritime Doctrine*.<sup>215</sup> In March 1999, the ADF announced it would participate in the production of the Global Hawk UAV.<sup>216</sup> This announcement was a clear illustration of the increasingly close defence relationship with the United States, as well as a clear indication of a continued fixation on “bleeding edge” technology.

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<sup>205</sup> Ibid. p.63

<sup>206</sup> Dibb, 'Force structure priorities: the need for greater self-reliance'. p.11

<sup>207</sup> Malcolm McIntosh and John Prescott, *Report to the Minister for Defence on the Collins Class Submarine and Related Matters*, Canberra, 20 June 1999. p.3

<sup>208</sup> Ibid. p.5-20

<sup>209</sup> Horner, *Making the Australian Defence Force*. p.220

<sup>210</sup> Australian Defence Science and Technology Organisation, 'New Defence surveillance radar to undergo trials in NT', 16 March 1999, [accessed 17 March 2005]. Available from [www.dsto.defence.gov.au/corporate/publicity/media/iluka.html](http://www.dsto.defence.gov.au/corporate/publicity/media/iluka.html).

<sup>211</sup> Royal Australian Air Force, *The Operational Air Doctrine Manual*. 1st ed. Glenbrook, 1999.

<sup>212</sup> Kevan Wolfe, 'Efficient training for an effective army', *Asia-Pacific Defence Reporter*, vol. XXV, no. 6, October-November 1999. p.31-34 and Ian Bostock, 'Soldier Combat System Progress', *Asia-Pacific Defence Reporter*, vol. XXVI, no. 9, February-March 2000. p.44-45

<sup>213</sup> A.W. Grazebrook, 'Boeing wins RAAF AEW&C', *Asia-Pacific Defence Reporter*, vol. XXV, no. 5, August-September 1999. p.17

<sup>214</sup> Horner, *Making the Australian Defence Force*. p.165

<sup>215</sup> Royal Australian Navy, *Australian Maritime Doctrine - RAN Doctrine I*. Canberra, 2000.

<sup>216</sup> Peter Ashworth, *Unmanned Aerial Vehicles and the Future Navy*, Working Paper 6: Royal Australian Navy Sea Power Centre, May 2001. p.3; Horner, *Making the Australian Defence Force*.

The period between *ASP97* and *Defence 2000* was also marked by two important operations, Desert Fox and East Timor, which are discussed in the section that discusses the latter document.

## **Defence 2000 – Our Future Defence Force**

### *Introduction*

In 2000 the Coalition Government released a White Paper entitled *Defence 2000 – Our Future Defence Force* (D2000). This document has been the subject of substantial comment, receiving both great praise and incisive criticism. It differed from earlier strategic reviews in its methodology and content.

### *International Context*

At the time of the review, the international situation was less stable than it had been in 1997. Three major events in the intervening period: the Asian financial crisis, the end of the Suharto regime in Indonesia, and the escalation of nuclear rivalry between India and Pakistan, had all rendered the Asia Pacific increasingly dangerous.<sup>217</sup> Australia's intervention in East Timor had also altered its role in the region, with some countries perceiving it as an interventionist "deputy" of the United States.

There were three areas of geopolitical tension within Australia's area of interest. The island chain just to the north of Australia had become an arc of instability, with problems in Papua New Guinea and the Solomons Islands especially. In the latter country, Australia carried out a SAE during 2000.<sup>218</sup> South East Asia was no longer the strategic shield it had been, due to ongoing internal problems in those nations, and the possibility that conflict there might leak into Australia, for example through refugee flows. The final area of tension was North Asia, where China's continued rise was changing the balance of power; already tensions had been seen in

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<sup>217</sup> Paul Dibb, *The Remaking of Asia's Geopolitics*, Working Paper 324, Canberra: ANU Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, 1998.; Desmond Ball, 'Australia's strategic environment: Implications for defence planning', *Dissent*, Summer 1999-2000.

<sup>218</sup> Unknown Author, 'Australian Operations in the Solomon Islands', *Semaphore - Newsletter of the Sea Power Centre Australia*, no. 12, November 2003.

the Taiwan Strait in 1998. Analyst Paul Dibb, in discussing the region in 1998, talked about a “revolution in strategic affairs” that portended the possibility that Australia might need to confront a far more complex international situation than had previously been the case.<sup>219</sup> Relations with the United States were increasingly close.

### *Domestic Political Context*

In December 1999, the new Minister of Defence John Moore stated that Australia did not want to become a regional policeman: defence doctrine had not changed and the Defence of Australia remained the main role.<sup>220</sup> This followed some assertions that Australia’s involvement in East Timor indicated a turn towards increasing intervention.<sup>221</sup> There were rumours in late 1999 that Howard believed that defence spending needed to increase, but that other members of Cabinet were less sure.<sup>222</sup>

An election was planned for late 2000, and although defence was not expected to be a major issue it was perceived by some in the Coalition as an area in which they had an advantage over the ALP.

The defence bureaucracy was in some disorder. In October 1999 the Secretary of Defence, Paul Barratt, was fired after disagreeing with his political masters.<sup>223</sup> His replacement, Allan Hawke, instituted an overhaul of the defence policymaking system, focusing not only on strategy but also internal efficiency.<sup>224</sup> Hawke felt that defence was too inwardly focused and had lost sight of its primary goal: serving the government.<sup>225</sup> Hawke also perceived a lack of rational, logical planning based on

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<sup>219</sup> Dibb, *The Remaking of Asia's Geopolitics*. p.11

<sup>220</sup> Brendan Nicholson, 'No shift in defence roles, says Moore', *The Age*, 21 December 1999.

<sup>221</sup> Fred Brenchley, 'The Howard defence doctrine', *Bulletin with Newsweek*, vol. 117, no. 6193, 28 September 1999.

<sup>222</sup> Graeme Cheeseman, 'The Howard Government's Defence White Paper: Policy, Process and Politics', *The Drawing Board*, vol. 2, no. 1, July 2001. p.14 and Nicholson, 'No shift in defence roles, says Moore'.; Brenchley, 'The Howard defence doctrine'.

<sup>223</sup> Allan Hawke, *Lecture to Politics 241*, Auckland: University of Auckland, 29 September 2004.; Len Pullin and Ali Haidar, *Dismissing a Departmental Secretary: An Overt Exercise of Power in Public Employment*, Working Paper 32/04, Melbourne: Monash University Department of Management, May 2004.

<sup>224</sup> Allan Hawke, 'One Year On', National Press Club Defence Watch Seminar, 27 February 2001; Allan Hawke, 'Organisational Renewal: Two and a Bit Years On', National Press Club Defence Watch Seminar, Canberra, 13 June 2002; Allan Hawke, 'What's the Matter - A Due Diligence Report', National Press Club Defence Watch Seminar, Canberra, 17 February 2000.

<sup>225</sup> Hawke, 'What's the Matter - A Due Diligence Report'. p.2

first principles.<sup>226</sup> He believed the solution was to get the corporate structures right, which would in turn enable and sustain the rest of the defence organisation.<sup>227</sup>

As part of this restructuring, the Defence Materiel Organisation (DMO) was established in June 2000.<sup>228</sup> In the following month, the Department of Defence was reorganised.<sup>229</sup> During this period, accrual accounting was introduced as well, to further ensure resources were devoted to measurable outputs.<sup>230</sup>

This new realignment of the ADF was met by some criticism. One commentator noted that many personnel felt they had a deeper underlying duty to the nation, rather than merely the minister; the ADF was not just another public service.<sup>231</sup>

### *Defence Force Issues*

There were some concerns about the state of the ADF, stemming largely from operational experience in regards to East Timor and Operation Desert Fox.

Australia deployed forces to East Timor in September 1999. This deployment indicated some problems within the ADF, including a lack of specific training,<sup>232</sup> and a lack of capacity within the ADF to sustain such a sizeable force for any period of time.<sup>233</sup> This led to a temporary expansion of the Army to six Regular battalions. There was also an indication of a mismatch between force structure – which still largely favoured the Defence of Australia – and the reality of policy, which seemed to favour overseas deployments.<sup>234</sup> However, in general the ADF performed well, showing improvements over its earlier performance in Somalia,<sup>235</sup> and the deployment was seen as a good learning experience.

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<sup>226</sup> Ibid. p.3

<sup>227</sup> Ibid. p.8

<sup>228</sup> Hawke, 'One Year On'. p.13

<sup>229</sup> Ibid. p.8

<sup>230</sup> Hawke, 'Organisational Renewal: Two and a Bit Years On'.

<sup>231</sup> Michael McKernan, 'Defence Mechanisms', *Eureka Street*, vol. 12, no. 3, April 2002.

<sup>232</sup> Bob Breen, 'Peace Keeping Lessons: East Timor and Bougainville', *The Sydney Papers*, Winter 2001. p.32

<sup>233</sup> Interview with Australian Defence Official C, 25 November 2005; Interview with Former Australian Defence Official G.; Susan Smith, *A Handmaiden's Tale: An Alternative View of Logistic Lessons Learned from Interfet*, Working Paper No. 65, Canberra: Australian Defence Studies Centre, April 2001.

<sup>234</sup> Bill Hayden, 'New Imperatives for Australian Defence', *National Observer*, no. 46, Spring 2000.

<sup>235</sup> Breen, 'Peace Keeping Lessons: East Timor and Bougainville'. p.27-28

Operation Desert Fox was a punitive operation by the United States and United Kingdom against Iraq in 1998. Australia was asked to contribute, but due to issues of equipment, training, and deployability, the ADF found it could not make any sort of meaningful contribution to any possible operation.<sup>236</sup> Many people within government and the ADO were unpleasantly surprised at how difficult it was for the ADF to involve itself in such an operation.<sup>237</sup> Given Howard's relationship with the United States, it might be valid to suggest that his inability to provide support was somewhat embarrassing, and provided an impetus towards later strengthening of Australia's defence capabilities.<sup>238</sup>

In late 1999 and early 2000, the Australian Parliament carried out a review on the Army, publishing its report in August 2000, entitled *From Phantom To Force*.<sup>239</sup> It made a range of recommendations, the core theme being a new emphasis on the Army within the ADF.<sup>240</sup> Some submissions to this review were doubtful of the ability of the Army to deploy and sustain a sizeable force, and alleged the Army had been marginalised by defence policy since 1987.<sup>241</sup> Worries were expressed that the force was structured in such a way as to leave little for operations like East Timor.<sup>242</sup>

The greatest concern, however, was finance. Defence's financial affairs were in a parlous state that potentially constrained the options of Government.<sup>243</sup> The need for economy during the 1990s had led to a major rationalisation of ADF personnel.<sup>244</sup> Also, during the 1990s, while operational tempo had risen, budgets and personnel numbers had been reduced. In the words of one commentator, funding was given "for

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<sup>236</sup> Aldo Borgu, *Reshaping the Australian Defence Force*, Canberra: Australian Strategic Policy Institute, 29 July 2004. p.1

<sup>237</sup> Interview with Former Australian Defence Official G; Interview with Former Defence Official G, 22 November 2005.

<sup>238</sup> See Graeme Dobell, 'The Politics of the White Paper', *Australian Defence Force Journal*, vol. 147, March/April 2001. p.29

<sup>239</sup> Australian Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs Defence and Trade, *From Phantom to Force: Towards a More Efficient and Effective Army*, Canberra, 4 September 2000. p.4

<sup>240</sup> Evans, *From Deakin to Dobb: The Army and the Making of Australian Strategy in the 20th Century*. p.43-44 and Australian Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs Defence and Trade, *From Phantom to Force: Towards a More Efficient and Effective Army*. p.177-196

<sup>241</sup> An example being: Australian Defence Association, *Submission on the Suitability of the Australian Army for Peacetime, Peacekeeping and War to the Defence Sub-Committee of the Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade of the Australian Parliament*, Melbourne, July 1999.

<sup>242</sup> David Butler, 'A Reality Audit: Some other thoughts on defence', *National Observer*, no. 45, Winter 2000.

<sup>243</sup> Allan Hawke, 'Money Matters', Royal United Services Institute, Victoria, 27 April 2000. p.2

<sup>244</sup> *Ibid.* p.6

the existence of the ADF, but not for its use.”<sup>245</sup> There were also accusations that funding was focused on the central defence administration rather than the operational arms.<sup>246</sup> The question now was whether such fiscal tightness could be allowed to remain; the Secretary in April 2000 stated that “Australia can no longer afford a balanced, self-reliant, capable and ready defence force of 50000 within its current capabilities on 1.8% of GDP.”<sup>247</sup> Australia was facing the obsolescence of its FFG-7, FA-18, P-3, C-130, afloat support and small arms holdings between 2007-2015, unless something was done to ensure their replacement,<sup>248</sup> yet no programme to do any of that had yet been authorised.

### *Themes and Actors*

The primary issue of Defence 2000 was finance.<sup>249</sup> In the words of one major actor, it was driven by “one thing: dollars.”<sup>250</sup> As noted above, the defence budget had remained stable in real terms, but costs had risen steadily, and the conclusion was reached that the force structure could not be maintained at the same level. There was thus a need to rethink the basis of defence to ensure that the correct force structure was maintained; funding couldn’t be cut or increased unless policy was updated.<sup>251</sup> This included educating the public to understand the need for defence funding.<sup>252</sup> Such public education was assisted by the heightened level of public interest at the time, partly triggered by the deployment to East Timor.<sup>253</sup>

While some actors have stated that it was understood at the beginning of the review that defence funding would be increased,<sup>254</sup> others have said this was not the case, and it was only through the review itself that the case for additional money was

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<sup>245</sup> Adam Cobb, 'All the Way with the RMA?: The Maginot Line in the Mind of Australian Strategic Planners', in Emily Goldman and Thomas Malunke (eds.), *The Information Revolution in Military Affairs in Asia*. New York, Palgrave Macmillan, 2004. p.70

<sup>246</sup> Australian Defence Association, 'Defending Australia: A policy discussion paper', [accessed 28 October 2004]. Available from [www.ada.asn.au](http://www.ada.asn.au). p.6

<sup>247</sup> Hawke, 'Money Matters'. p.3

<sup>248</sup> Allan Hawke, 'Defence - The State of the Nation', Australian Defence College, 2 February 2000. p.15

<sup>249</sup> Interview with Former Australian Defence Official C; Interview with Former Australian Defence Official D, 30 November 2005; Interview with Former Australian Defence Official K.

<sup>250</sup> Interview with Former Australian Defence Official K.

<sup>251</sup> Interview with Former Australian Defence Official C.

<sup>252</sup> Interview with Former Australian Defence Official I.

<sup>253</sup> Hawke, 'Defence - The State of the Nation'. p.13

<sup>254</sup> Interview with Former Australian Defence Official D.

made.<sup>255</sup> There was an emphasis in the review to ensure that decisions were fully mapped out into capability decisions, and then matched with dollars.<sup>256</sup>

Below this overarching motivation for the review were several sub-themes relating to process, orientation, roles, and capability.

One vital issue was the review process itself. Because the Coalition had not undertaken a White Paper before, it was felt essential to take the Government through the decisionmaking process, thus illustrating the costs and benefits of defence.<sup>257</sup> The effect of this focus can be more clearly seen in the section on process.

Another issue was whether to continue the focus on high-tech air and maritime capabilities, or whether to shift towards deployable land forces.<sup>258</sup> This related to Australia's strategic orientation. During 1998 and 1999, Howard had been tarred with criticism for his "deputy" comments, and thus the production of a new White Paper could clarify Australia's defence policy and defeat arguments that Australia was embarking on a new, assertive path.<sup>259</sup> Globalisation and the primacy of the United States were considered in relation to this, but generally attitudes were quite conservative, in regarding relatively little as having changed.<sup>260</sup> Review participants distinguished between the effect of the end of the Cold War on the Asia Pacific, which had been relatively limited, and its effect on the greater global scale.<sup>261</sup>

The types of roles expected to be performed by the ADF were also debated. In general, conservatism was key. Review participants did not engage closely with the changing nature of the security environment at the "lower levels" below grand strategy.<sup>262</sup> The evolution of peace support was not examined, with some actors clinging to a view of peacekeeping as a "soft" option rather than one that was becoming increasingly violent.<sup>263</sup> In relation to this, it is interesting to note some public comments by the Chief of Army at the time. He stated that a focus on peacekeeping would not give Australia a proper force.<sup>264</sup> While peacekeeping would be more likely than warfighting, it would be dangerous to set it as the ADF's core

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<sup>255</sup> Interview with Former Australian Defence Official K.

<sup>256</sup> Interview with Former Australian Defence Official I.

<sup>257</sup> Interview with Former Australian Defence Official I.

<sup>258</sup> Interview with Former Australian Defence Official K.

<sup>259</sup> Cheeseman, 'The Howard Government's Defence White Paper: Policy, Process and Politics'. p.14

<sup>260</sup> Interview with Australian Defence Official A.

<sup>261</sup> Interview with Former Australian Defence Official I.

<sup>262</sup> Interview with Australian Defence Official A; Interview with Australian Defence Official B.

<sup>263</sup> Interview with Australian Defence Official A.

<sup>264</sup> Kevan Wolfe, 'A focus on combat', *Asia-Pacific Defence Reporter*, vol. XXV, no. 4, June-July 1999. p.40-41

business.<sup>265</sup> However, there was also evidence of internal thinking within the ADF that the future would likely be one dominated by OOTW, rather than conventional wars.<sup>266</sup> In general, it should be said that only “lip service” was paid to non-traditional military roles.<sup>267</sup> There was also only restricted analysis of whole-of-government concepts and the broader security role of the ADF.<sup>268</sup>

A final important issue was the focus given the RMA in the review. It was obvious that such issues were under consideration within the ADF. In early 2000, the Military Strategy Branch of ADFHQ released a major document on the direction of the ADF’s approach to the RMA.<sup>269</sup> However, concerns were expressed at the cost of RMA-paradigm force structures, and it was said the ADF could not afford the full range of capabilities.<sup>270</sup> Within the ADO a variety of concepts were put forward, especially in the RAAF,<sup>271</sup> but there was a wide range of differing views, and there was thus little consensus on what the RMA might really mean for the ADF.<sup>272</sup> There was still a fair sensitivity to such issues.<sup>273</sup>

The participants in the review differed from those of earlier papers. *D2000* was not an internal ADOD document. An interdepartmental steering committee was set up, representing all the departments of the NSC, although the ADOD retained primary responsibility.<sup>274</sup> There was a small writing team, headed by Hugh White, but it did not have the independence of earlier review teams.<sup>275</sup> Cabinet ministers were regularly involved, and both the Minister of Defence, John Moore, and the Prime Minister, John Howard, had a major role in the direction of the review. Also important, if to a lesser extent, were the service chiefs, the CDF, Chris Barrie, and the Secretary, Allan Hawke. It is interesting to note a contemporary analysis of the defence bureaucracy of the time. It was termed an “uneasy alliance of competing

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<sup>265</sup> Arnie White, 'Chief of Army gives his views on future operations', *Asia-Pacific Defence Reporter*, vol. XXVI, no. 9, February-March 2000. p.48

<sup>266</sup> Ian Wing, 'Australasian Defence 2048 - An Alternative Future', *Australian Defence Force Journal*, no. 132, September/October 1998. p.6-7

<sup>267</sup> Interview with Former Australian Defence Official E, 21 November 2005.

<sup>268</sup> Interview with Former Australian Defence Official I.

<sup>269</sup> Evans, 'Australia's Approach to the Revolution in Military Affairs 1994-2004'. p.31-37

<sup>270</sup> Robert Garran, 'War too costly to wage', *The Australian*, 4 January 2000.

<sup>271</sup> Interview with Former Australian Defence Official A.

<sup>272</sup> Interview with Former Australian Defence Official E.

<sup>273</sup> Interview with Former Australian Defence Official C.

<sup>274</sup> Interview with Former Australian Defence Official D.

<sup>275</sup> Interview with Australian Defence Official A; Interview with Former Australian Defence Official K.

cultures.”<sup>276</sup> Moore was described as “ruthless”, and Hawke as a “political operator.” External thinktanks, and outside academics, had little or no influence on the review process.

Generally, there were few advocates for major defence innovation. Most participants felt there was no pressure for radical change, but rather that a steady process of evolution and development was needed. As such, many of the major defence issues came down to costing issues: what capabilities could be acquired, when, and what other capabilities would have to give way?<sup>277</sup>

In the words of the Secretary of Defence, the White Paper was “intended to deliver a strategically relevant, financially sensible, and politically feasible response for the early part of the 21<sup>st</sup> century.”<sup>278</sup> It engaged with issues of finance, strategy, defence roles and advances in technology.

### *Process of Review*

There were two parallel processes during *D2000*: one internal, one public, which then meshed near the end to produce the final document. It is convenient to first examine the internal process before moving onto the public consultation.

There was a feeling amongst Ministers that they did not “own” defence policy, and, as noted, one aim of the review process was to improve this.<sup>279</sup> Thus, there was a constant conversation between the bureaucracy and the government.<sup>280</sup> Drafts were exposed early, talked through with government, and there was an increased frequency of meetings.<sup>281</sup> Often the Ministers made major changes to drafts,<sup>282</sup> rather than merely rubberstamping the findings of the ADO, an “unprecedented” level of Ministerial involvement.<sup>283</sup>

The process began in late 1999, when a meeting of the NSC agreed broad outlines and methodology, but the deployment to East Timor caused a delay.<sup>284</sup> It was

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<sup>276</sup> Geoffrey Barker, 'The big shots in defence', *Australian Financial Review*, 25-26 November 2000. p.16

<sup>277</sup> Interview with Former Australian Defence Official D.

<sup>278</sup> Hawke, 'Defence - The State of the Nation'. p.16

<sup>279</sup> Interview with Former Australian Defence Official K.

<sup>280</sup> Interview with Australian Defence Official A.

<sup>281</sup> Interview with Former Australian Defence Official K.

<sup>282</sup> Interview with Former Australian Defence Official D.

<sup>283</sup> Hugh White, 'White on White Paper', *Defence Information Bulletin*, June 2001. p.10

<sup>284</sup> Interview with Former Australian Defence Official I; Interview with Former Australian Defence Official K.

in February-March 2000 that the process began again in earnest.<sup>285</sup> At approximately this time a major breakthrough was made, when it was decided that funding would be dealt with over a 10-year period,<sup>286</sup> and that funding would increase.<sup>287</sup> By April 2000 there were hints of a significant shift in the focus of defence policy, towards the 'inner-arc' of Australia's region.<sup>288</sup>

The writing team produced drafts of each individual chapter in order. These drafts were then circulated amongst other participants.<sup>289</sup> Problems were sometimes encountered when participants received only a single piece, and lacked the context to adequately assess that draft. While this was not a problem for Cabinet ministers, who received the full complement, it hindered the ability of the services, especially, to comment.

Some actors believe that the critical decisions of the review were already preordained when the process began again. They have stated that Hugh White was working to a set of concrete premises, developed after the experience of East Timor.<sup>290</sup> It is difficult to maintain this thesis, given the evidence of other participants and the specifics of timing, but it should be kept in mind. This work, however, assumes that the conclusions of the document were developed over time and were not preordained.

During 2000, the NSC engaged closely with the developing issues, delving beyond finance into issues of strategy. Indeed, it was the NSC that triggered the one major change of methodology during the review.<sup>291</sup> Initially, the idea was to offer the government a range of future force structure options. These might have involved the removal of some extant capabilities. However, it was decreed by the NSC that all force structure options be based on the preservation of extant capabilities, either through upgrading or replacement.<sup>292</sup> This was a conservative approach, and one that

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<sup>285</sup> Interview with Former Australian Defence Official I.

<sup>286</sup> See Paul Kelly, 'All quiet on the spending front', *The Australian*, 23 February 2000. This may relate to this decision.

<sup>287</sup> Interview with Former Australian Defence Official I.

<sup>288</sup> Trevor Thomas, 'Working up to the DY2K White Paper', *Australian Defence Business Review*, vol. 19, no. 4, 14 April 2000. p.10

<sup>289</sup> Interview with Former Australian Defence Official I.

<sup>290</sup> Interview with Former Australian Defence Official C.

<sup>291</sup> Interview with Former Australian Defence Official K.

<sup>292</sup> Interview with Former Australian Defence Official K.

became affordable only because the government was willing to spend an additional 3% per annum.<sup>293</sup>

In October, Cabinet considered the new capability plan developed by the review team.<sup>294</sup> It was said that Minister Moore actively sought a major increase in funding, but that this was opposed by Treasury, and there were accusations the finance departments were being too frugal.<sup>295</sup> It is possible that Howard and Moore were more “hawkish” than their NSC/Cabinet counterparts, and that the latter especially worked hard to ensure that capability plans were approved and funding authorised.<sup>296</sup>

One participant has claimed that the first full draft of *D2000* was “kicked out” by the government,<sup>297</sup> but this seems to be more a confusion over the change of methodology, or perhaps over the way it was presented,<sup>298</sup> than an indication that the findings of the writing team were directly opposed by Cabinet.

The services were somewhat dissatisfied with the process, as it seemed to reduce their power.<sup>299</sup> It is distinctly possible that the service chiefs were sidelined by the review process.<sup>300</sup> Previously they had brokered agreements amongst themselves, but now it appeared that the central defence bureaucracy and the government had taken the pre-eminent role. There were disagreements, including the emphasis on land forces. There was tension between the RAAF/RAN on one hand and the Army on the other, and a lot of it came down to perceptions of service roles. Prominent personalities in Army and Navy were known for especially strong views.<sup>301</sup> They said the White Paper was compromised by an acceptance of the Government’s spending cap, and also various capability decisions. Other commentators wondered whether the process was sufficiently military dominated, or whether civilians were pre-eminent.<sup>302</sup>

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<sup>293</sup> Interview with Former Australian Defence Official K.

<sup>294</sup> Robert Garran, 'Defence's \$500mn call for arms', *The Australian*, 10 October 2000.

<sup>295</sup> Robert Garran, 'Defence's strategy for survival', *The Australian*, 10 October 2000.

<sup>296</sup> Interview with Australian Defence Official A; Interview with Former Australian Defence Official C; Interview with Former Australian Defence Official E; Interview with Former Australian Defence Official H; Interview with Former Australian Defence Official I; Interview with Former Australian Defence Official K.

<sup>297</sup> Interview with Former Australian Defence Official A.

<sup>298</sup> Interview with Former Australian Defence Official D.

<sup>299</sup> Interview with Former Australian Defence Official I.

<sup>300</sup> Unknown Author, 'Editorial - Strategy must determine resourcing', *Defender*, vol. XX, no. 4, Summer 2003. p.3

<sup>301</sup> Interview with Former Australian Defence Official C.

<sup>302</sup> A.W. Grazebrook, 'Serious concerns in defence', *Asia-Pacific Defence Reporter*, vol. XXVI, no. 6, October/November 2000. p.4 and Michael O'Connor, 'Australia's War of Confusion', *Defender*, vol. XIX, no. 4, Summer 2002. p.30

The second part of the process was the public consultation process. This revolved around a public discussion paper, drafted by Hugh White and Peter Jennings.<sup>303</sup> The impact of this Community Consultation Team is a matter of some debate.

The paper was released in June 2000. It was intended that the submissions on this, both in writing and at the meetings of the Community Consultation Team (CCT,) would be taken into account by the review process; this was termed “a new approach to making defence policy.”<sup>304</sup>

The discussion paper noted that the review would take into account major changes in the strategic environment, military technology, as well as financial pressures.<sup>305</sup> The government, it said, wanted all Australians to have input, and to encourage a vigorous, challenging and constructive discussion.<sup>306</sup>

Despite being a discussion paper, the document made a large number of concrete statements.<sup>307</sup> It seemed to be, in the words of one analyst, an “explication of the advantages and importance of the government’s current approach and policies” rather than a true request for alternative views.<sup>308</sup> There were rumours that some departments, as well as some of the services,<sup>309</sup> did not like the wording of the paper, and there was also some public criticism.<sup>310</sup> Many commentators welcomed the public consultation, but there was also some suspicion as to its motivation.<sup>311</sup>

After the discussion paper had been released, a community consultation process followed. Between 18 July and 28 August, 2000 people attended meetings in some 28 locations.<sup>312</sup> A report by the CCT was given to the government on 4 October and released publically on 9 November.

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<sup>303</sup> Interview with Australian Defence Official A.

<sup>304</sup> Australian Department of Defence, *Defence Review 2000 - Our Future Defence Force - A Public Discussion Paper*, Canberra, June 2000. p.v

<sup>305</sup> *Ibid.* p.vii

<sup>306</sup> *Ibid.* p.1

<sup>307</sup> *Ibid.* p.4-31

<sup>308</sup> Cheeseman, 'The Howard Government's Defence White Paper: Policy, Process and Politics'. p.17

<sup>309</sup> Interview with Former Australian Defence Official D.

<sup>310</sup> A.W. Grazebrook, 'Need for a well balanced ADF', *Asia-Pacific Defence Reporter*, vol. XXVI, no. 5, August/September 2000. p.4; Sam Bateman, 'Benefits of a balanced ADF', *Asia-Pacific Defence Reporter*, vol. XXVI, no. 5, August/September 2000. p.7; Kevan Wolfe, 'The Army's case', *Asia-Pacific Defence Reporter*, vol. XXVI, no. 5, August/September 2000. p.12

<sup>311</sup> Graeme Cheeseman and Hugh Smith, 'Public consultation or political choreography? The Howard Government's quest for community views on defence policy', *Australian Journal of International Affairs*, vol. 55, no. 1, 2001. p.87

<sup>312</sup> *Ibid.* p.83

The CCT consisted of three former politicians and one former serviceman.<sup>313</sup> It received 1160 written submissions, and also canvassed views within the ADF itself.<sup>314</sup> In general, the meetings were short, with little debate. Approximately half the speakers were current or ex-servicemen. In general, most of the speakers did not seem to support an assertive, deployable military posture; they generally saw non-traditional threats as more dangerous.<sup>315</sup> The final report differed slightly from observations made of public submissions, which suggests it might have been more an interpretation rather than a strict reporting of the facts.<sup>316</sup>

Cheeseman sums up the process as being more about politics than policy. While that might be a valid argument from a strict theoretical viewpoint, the CCT was still a major advance, from a democratic viewpoint, over the highly bureaucratic processes of previous White Papers. The Secretary of Defence also reiterated that it was a consultative process rather than merely a political device to portray dialogue.<sup>317</sup>

The final CCT report was generally perceived as indicating a common view amongst the public that the defence budget should be increased.<sup>318</sup> As such, it likely reinforced the pre-existing views of major defence decisionmakers, who as we have seen had already decided earlier in the year to increase the defence budget.

A week before the release of the White Paper in December it was rumoured that the forthcoming document would be a major defence shake-up.<sup>319</sup> Other commentators, however, were less convinced of the White Paper's potential, and assumed it would be largely a reconfirmation of existing policy, rather than a major change.<sup>320</sup>

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<sup>313</sup> The following paragraph is taken from Ibid. p.87-91

<sup>314</sup> The following paragraph is taken from Ibid. p.91-93

<sup>315</sup> Ibid. p.94

<sup>316</sup> Cheeseman, 'The Howard Government's Defence White Paper: Policy, Process and Politics'. p.20

<sup>317</sup> Allan Hawke, 'The Defence of Australia and its National Interests', Royal United Services Institute, Tasmania, 14 June 2001. p.3-4. See also Richard Hill, 'The Problem of Distance', *Australian Defence Force Journal*, vol. 147, March/April 2001. p.36

<sup>318</sup> Trevor Thomas, 'Howard gets the nod to crank up defence', *Australian Defence Business Review*, vol. 19, no. 16, 10 November 2000. p.11 and Unknown Author, 'Public wants cash boost for defence', *The Australian*, 6 October 2000.

<sup>319</sup> David Lague, 'White Paper will put defence on front foot', *Sydney Morning Herald*, 30 November 2000.

<sup>320</sup> Greg Sheridan, 'New equipment aside, post-coital blues are inevitable', *The Australian*, 1 December 2000.

The final version of *D2000* went to Cabinet accompanied by the CDF, Secretary of Defence, and various senior civilian bureaucrats, but not the service chiefs.<sup>321</sup> It was approved, and the White Paper published in December.

As noted, it was early October when the CCT process finished, and December when the White Paper was released. Because of this short gap, it is arguable whether many of the CCT's findings made their way into the final paper. Discussions with participants suggest that the CCT did not have a major impact on the already-largely-existent draft,<sup>322</sup> but that it did indicate to the politicians that there was public support for increased spending,<sup>323</sup> and thus helped reinforce their belief in greater funding.

Overall, the best way of summing up the process is in the words of Hugh White – a product of intensive debate among the six members of the National Security Committee of Cabinet in a series of extended meetings.<sup>324</sup> This was not a departmental process, and has some (albeit limited) parallels with New Zealand's *Government Defence Policy Framework* of June 2000.

## *Result*

The White Paper began by stating that defence had been seen as one of the government's top priorities for 2000; a need for tough decisions required a new approach to defence planning.<sup>325</sup> The ADF was under pressure to meet a range of tasks within a very strict budget.<sup>326</sup> This was becoming impossible, and thus a major increase in defence spending was planned.<sup>327</sup>

In summarising itself, the document stated that:

This Defence White Paper announces and explains the Government's decisions about Australia's strategic policy over the next decade. It sets out a plan for the development of our armed forces, and makes a commitment to provide

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<sup>321</sup> Australis, 'On the right path but too small a step', *Defender*, vol. XX, no. 2, Winter 2003. p.16-17

<sup>322</sup> Interview with Former Australian Defence Official H; Interview with Former Australian Defence Official I; Interview with Former Australian Defence Official K.

<sup>323</sup> Interview with Former Australian Defence Official D.

<sup>324</sup> Hugh White, 'Australian defence policy and the possibility of war', *Australian Journal of International Affairs*, vol. 56, no. 2, July 2002. p.255

<sup>325</sup> Australian Government, *Defence 2000: Our Future Defence Force*, Canberra, 2000. p.v

<sup>326</sup> *Ibid.* p.5

<sup>327</sup> *Ibid.* p.xvii

the funds required.<sup>328</sup>

The White Paper, it was claimed, differed from previous documents in three ways: (1) increased ministerial involvement, (2) a better funding commitment, and (3) a clear statement of the government's requirements for defence.<sup>329</sup> It retained a strategic focus on Australia and its approaches, including the regional neighbourhood.<sup>330</sup> The preferred military strategy was defined as self-reliant, maritime and proactive.<sup>331</sup>

*Defence 2000*'s goal was for the ADF to be "a professional, well-trained, well-equipped force that is available for operations on short notice, and one that can be sustained on deployment over extended periods... (with) the flexibility to deal with operations other than conventional war, and contribute to coalition operations."<sup>332</sup> When one compares that statement to *Defending Australia*, six years earlier, a major change is apparent in the emphasis on readiness and also in the variety of expected roles.

*Defence 2000* took new account of OOTW.<sup>333</sup> It noted that the ADF would likely be more involved in such operations, but that conventional capabilities would be applicable to them. Important, however, would be to ensure that undertaking these secondary roles did not detract from the ADF's core warfighting function.

The three core tasks of *Australia's Strategic Policy* were replaced with five new Strategic Objectives, although linkages between the two are obvious.<sup>334</sup> These were:

1. Ensuring the Defence of Australia and its Direct Approaches – (DADA) – where although the risk of conflict was low, the consequences if it occurred were very high;
2. Fostering the Security of our Immediate Neighbourhood – (SIN) – this might relate to internal problems within, or external aggression into the region;

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<sup>328</sup> Ibid. p.3

<sup>329</sup> Ibid. p.v-vi

<sup>330</sup> Ibid. p.x

<sup>331</sup> Ibid. p.xi

<sup>332</sup> Ibid. p.xiii-xiv

<sup>333</sup> The following is taken from Ibid. p.10-13

<sup>334</sup> Also included was Protecting National Interests, involving community assistance tasks, but this was not listed as a Strategic Goal. See Ibid. p.52-53

3. Promoting Stability and Cooperation in South East Asia – (SCSEA) – maintaining a resilient regional community;
4. Supporting Strategic Stability in the Wider Asia-Pacific Region – (SSWAPR) – helping avoid destabilising strategic competition;
5. Supporting Global Security – (SGS) – participation in UN operations, supporting the United States, assisting in WMD non-proliferation initiatives.<sup>335</sup>

*Defence 2000* identified the characteristics of likely roles in each of these areas.<sup>336</sup> In the defence of Australia, the need was for a “fundamentally maritime strategy”, proactive enough to secure a rapid end to hostilities. In SIN, Australia might be the largest contributor, or involved in simultaneous operations; the key was to recognise the limits of any Australian involvement and note that armed forces might not always be the best contribution. For low level operations, training would need to be good, a higher level of readiness would need to be maintained, and there would need to be enough slack within the ADF to ensure the capacity for rotation. Also important would be air and sealift capacity. For SCSEA and SSWAPR, the spectrum of operations might range from peacekeeping through to high intensity war. Australia would almost certainly fight as part of a coalition, rather than by itself. Because of the probable nature of such conflicts, an air or sea contribution would be more likely than a land force contingent.

In order to fulfil these roles, the need was for an ADF that was “an integrated and balanced joint force that can provide two key sets of capabilities.”<sup>337</sup> Those capabilities were maritime forces and land forces; the similarity with *Australia’s Strategic Policy* was clear.

To ensure that the ADF would reach those benchmarks, nine Capability Development Principles were enunciated:

1. Operational flexibility – the ADF would not be too narrowly focused, but rather be designed for a range of military options across a spectrum of credible situations;

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<sup>335</sup> Ibid. p.30-32

<sup>336</sup> The following paragraph is derived from Ibid. p.46-52

<sup>337</sup> Ibid. p.53

2. Integrated capability – combining personnel, training and the wider national infrastructure;
3. Interoperability – the need to work with allies;
4. Fully developed capability – capabilities would be fully developed for crises, no more fitting-for-but-not-with;
5. Capability edge – the ADF would maintain a clear margin of superiority over any credible adversary;
6. Operational concurrency – the ADF would develop the ability to conduct simultaneous operations within a single theatre of operations;
7. Sustainment – the ability to recruit and retain personnel as well as maintain an industrial backup;
8. Technology focus – emphasis on information capabilities, the RMA, the exploitation of developing technologies;
9. Cost-effectiveness.<sup>338</sup>

*Defence 2000* divided the ADF into five force elements: land forces, air combat, maritime forces, strike, and information. It then listed a capability goal for each element.

The Land Forces Capability Goal was “land forces that can respond swiftly and effectively to any credible armed lodgement in Australian territory and provide forces for more likely types of operations in our immediate neighbourhood.”<sup>339</sup> Gone was the emphasis on a continental war expansion base; the emphasis now was on expeditionary operations. The six Regular battalion structure developed during East Timor would be maintained. Combat enhancements in the near future would include new gunship helicopters, upgrades to the M113s, new anti-tank and anti-aircraft missiles, new surveillance equipment and new fire support weapons. The White Paper noted that heavy armour would not be maintained.<sup>340</sup>

Air Combat, listed as the “most important single capability for the defence of Australia,”<sup>341</sup> was defined as the “ability to protect (Australia) from air attack, and

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<sup>338</sup> Ibid. p.54-57

<sup>339</sup> This paragraph is derived from Ibid.p.78-84

<sup>340</sup> John Lenehan, 'The Impact of the White Paper on Australian Armour', *Defender*, vol. XVIII, no. 2, Winter 2001. p.6-7

<sup>341</sup> While listed as the most important task it was listed second behind land forces in the actual text.

control our air approaches.”<sup>342</sup> Challenges in this area included regional capability growth, the upcoming loss of the 707 tanker fleet, and the obsolescence of the jet fleet between 2012 and 2015. *Defence 2000* stated that the F/A-18s would be upgraded, four AEW&C aircraft would be purchased,<sup>343</sup> and that examination of the option to replace the airborne refuellers would begin.

The Maritime Forces Capability Goal was primarily “an assured capability to detect and attack any major surface ships, and to impose substantial constraints on hostile submarine operations in our extended maritime approaches.”<sup>344</sup> The key issues here were the survivability of the surface fleet against missiles, the lack of long range air defence, and the replacement of support ships. Decisions included the upgrade of the Anzacs, the replacement of some FFGs with new air warfare ships, and the replacement of the tankers with purpose built ships. Also, the Collins-class boats would be upgraded.

The Strike Capability Goal was to “attack military targets within a wide radius of Australia”, against credible air defences and at low risk.<sup>345</sup> The primary issues here were the survivability of the F-111, and the length in service of that aircraft. Here, for the first time publically, the possibility of a joint replacement with the F/A-18 was mentioned.

The final Capability Goal was Information.<sup>346</sup> The separate focus paid to this indicated its importance and the degree to which the ADF was embracing RMA concepts. Issues here included intelligence, surveillance, command and control, logistics and even cyberwarfare. Few concrete decisions in this area were announced. It was notable that the document stated that “(Australia) must be careful not to be oversold on technology change.”<sup>347</sup>

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<sup>342</sup> This paragraph is derived from: Australian Government, *Defence 2000: Our Future Defence Force*. p.84-87

<sup>343</sup> Interview with Allan Hawke, 29 September 2004. He suggests that the decision to purchase four, rather than six, AEW&C aircraft was the result of political pressures being imposed on decision makers; the result of fiscal constraints, perhaps. It is interesting that the ADF will now indeed be purchasing six AEW&C aircraft.

<sup>344</sup> This paragraph is derived from Australian Government, *Defence 2000: Our Future Defence Force*. p.87-92

<sup>345</sup> This paragraph is derived from Ibid. p.92-94

<sup>346</sup> This paragraph is derived from Ibid. p.94-96

<sup>347</sup> Ibid. p.107

One notable aspect of the White Paper was its decision to upgrade Australian capabilities across the full spectrum, rather than only in some areas of capability.<sup>348</sup> This stemmed from the decision, noted earlier in the section on process, to maintain all existing capabilities.

Personnel issues were engaged with. The people who made up the ADF were noted as being one of its key potential capability edges.<sup>349</sup> Yet there were problems; it was noted that recruitment targets had not been met in the previous year and that separation rates were higher than normal.<sup>350</sup> Related to this was the role of the reserves. They were now to support and sustain operations, rather than merely act as a base for long term planning, and it was stated that moves were underway to enhance their efficiency.<sup>351</sup> This was the first time the reserves had ever been given a specific role.<sup>352</sup>

Perhaps the most novel aspect of the entire White Paper was its approach to funding. It introduced a Defence Capability Plan (DCP), which set “clear, long-term goals for the development of our armed forces, and the funding needed to achieve those goals.”<sup>353</sup> The links with New Zealand’s Long Term Development Plan, released at a similar time, are remarkable, yet evidentially there was no cross-Tasman pollination of similar ideas.<sup>354</sup>

To fund the DCP would require an increase in defence spending by 3% pa over the following decade.<sup>355</sup> In addition to this, an extra 1.5 billion would be invested in the following two years. The rationale for this new funding included rising personnel costs, operating costs, and the need for new capability and increased readiness.<sup>356</sup>

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<sup>348</sup> Lance Beath, 'Imagination, Ambition, Vision and Realism: Moving Forward in the Defence Relationship with Australia or "The Story of Little Babaji"', in Arthur Grimes, Lydia Wevers, and Ginny Sullivan (eds.), *States of Mind: Australia and New Zealand 1901-2001*. Wellington, Institute of Policy Studies, 2002. p.120-121

<sup>349</sup> Allan Hawke, 'People Power', Royal United Services Institute Australia, 17 November 2000. p.15

<sup>350</sup> Australian Government, *Defence 2000: Our Future Defence Force*. p.62-63

<sup>351</sup> *Ibid.* p.69-72

<sup>352</sup> Greg Garde, 'The ADF Reserves', *Royal United Services Institute Journal*, vol. 23, December 2001. p.25

<sup>353</sup> Australian Government, *Defence 2000: Our Future Defence Force*. p.77

<sup>354</sup> Interview with Australian Defence Official A; Interview with Australian Defence Official B; Interview with Former Australian Defence Official C; Interview with Former Australian Defence Official E; Interview with Former Australian Defence Official H; Interview with Former Australian Defence Official K.

<sup>355</sup> Australian Government, *Defence 2000: Our Future Defence Force*. p.117

<sup>356</sup> *Ibid.* p.119-121

Mention was also made of other nations and their relations with Australia. In regards to New Zealand, *Defence 2000* noted it would regret any decision by that nation not to maintain air and combat capabilities; yet it softened this implied criticism by stating that New Zealand was a “very valued defence partner.”<sup>357</sup>

### *Summary and Analysis*

*Defence 2000* was the product of a slightly different process to previous White Papers. There was increased political involvement: Ministers of the NSC and wider Cabinet were closely involved during the drafting, although the actual writing was carried out by a small bureaucratic team, again headed by Hugh White. Both the Prime Minister and Minister of Defence took a keen interest in the review, and were likely instrumental in ensuring Defence’s increased funding. This political influence was the culmination of a trend apparent since the Coalition took power in 1996, that the government, not the ADOD, set policy, perhaps best exemplified by the sacking of the Secretary of Defence in 1999. The individual services, and perhaps even HQADF, had limited influence on the process.

There seems to have been a substantial degree of prior agreement about concepts. The White Paper did not attempt to introduce anything markedly new into policy; rather, it developed the ideas of *Australia’s Strategic Policy*, such as maritime operations and the Knowledge Edge, further. Issue of non-traditional security and OOTW were mentioned but not regarded as influences on force structure. The Defence of Australia remained the foundational concept, from which all other roles would be derived. This conservatism might be explained as the result of continuity in the writers, the strength of the Ministers, who were unlikely to be *au fait* with emerging concepts, and the absence of strong involvement by the services, within which many of the more innovative ideas were developing.

One major innovation in the White Paper was the Defence Capability Plan. This was more a procedural improvement than anything else. Its aim was to improve long-term planning by ensuring that future acquisitions were programmed and costed in a more rigorous manner. Yet, while largely an accounting improvement, this new idea had a positive effect on the ADF as a whole, perhaps more so than some of the force structure recommendations themselves. For once, a White Paper had “dollars

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<sup>357</sup> Ibid. p.42

attached”, and might have been perceived as a contract between the Government and the public.<sup>358</sup>

Another hint of innovation came with the White Paper’s treatment of the Army. Throughout the 1990s, the Army had suffered in comparison to the other services. It had been relocated to the north of the country, away from its major bases. It had developed a new concept of operations in 1995-1996, only to see that doctrine made obsolete by the accession of a new government. It had been deployed to East Timor, only to find that deployment difficult to sustain with a force structure designed for the Defence of Australia.

*Defence 2000*, however, set out more clearly the goals expected of the land forces, as well as the enhancements to capability that would follow. The Land Force Capability Goal was listed first of all the force elements, an indication perhaps of rising importance.

Overall, *Defence 2000* was conservative in both process and content. The novel public consultation had little impact on the final product, bar confirming to the political leadership that the public was not averse to additional expenditure. As with the two reviews analysed earlier, the primary writing was done by the civilian bureaucracy, but there seems to have been a decline in the uniformed role, balanced by an increasing political influence.

The White Paper was an extension of *Australia’s Strategic Policy*, which was in turn a development of *Defence White Paper 1994*. It differed little in its broader conclusions from its predecessor, but it enhanced substantially the link between required tasks and capability. As such it was not a great revolution in strategy, but it was a great improvement in defence management.

## **Policy Since Defence 2000**

Rather than utilising the conventional aftermath section used earlier, it is convenient to divide defence policy since the publication of *Defence 2000* into five sections: higher policy and reorganisation, operations, doctrine and concepts, acquisitions and upgrades, and evolving defence dynamics. The first entails formal statements of policy, including Ministerial speeches, and major force wide reorganisations. The second involves the ADF’s involvement in operations. The third

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<sup>358</sup> Interview with Former Australian Defence Official K.

involves the development of doctrine and operational concepts by both the corporate ADF and the individual services. The fourth relates to the development of physical capabilities, both new equipment and upgrades to old. The fifth examines the development of the policymaking environment itself during the period. Overall, during this period there has been a steady drift away from the policy prescriptions of *Defence 2000*, and defence policy has become increasingly decentralised.

### *Higher Policy and Reorganisation*

Since the release of *Defence 2000*, defence policy settings have been formally updated twice, in *Defence Update 2003* and *Defence Update 2005*. However, even before then, there were signs of shifts in the focus of defence policy.

The events of September 11 seemed to have a major effect. In the aftermath of the attacks, Minister Hill stated publicly that they were an indication of how much the world had changed in the post-Cold War era.<sup>359</sup> He stated, however, that there were still continuities, and that the White Paper was still relevant.<sup>360</sup> He said the government was already moving towards an enhancement of counter-terrorist capability.<sup>361</sup> Within two days of the September 11 bombings the ADF was already planning for a second TAG.<sup>362</sup> It was also announced that spending on special forces would rise substantially over the next decade.<sup>363</sup>

Soon after, Hill stated that the greatest threats in the Asia Pacific were the proliferation of WMD and the threat of transnational terrorism.<sup>364</sup> While a balanced joint force was still the aim of policy, he said that the ADF should plan for an increased involvement in peace support operations.

The defence budget for 2002/2003 was eagerly awaited due to the events of September 11.<sup>365</sup> The budget had an increase in funding from the previous year,

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<sup>359</sup> Robert Hill, 'S11: Its Implications for Australia and the Defence White Paper', *Defender*, vol. XIX, no. 2, Winter 2002. p.8-9. See also Robert Hill, 'Beyond the White Paper: Strategic Directions for Defence', *The Yolla*, 18 June 2002. p.9-13

<sup>360</sup> Hill, 'S11: Its Implications for Australia and the Defence White Paper'. p.10

<sup>361</sup> *Ibid.* p.12

<sup>362</sup> Duncan Lewis, 'Guarding Australians Against Terrorism', *Australian Army Journal (Land Warfare Studies Centre)*, vol. 1, no. 2, December 2003. p.48

<sup>363</sup> Peter La Franchi, 'Redeveloping Australia's counter terrorism capability', *Asia-Pacific Defence Reporter*, vol. 27, no. 7, November/December 2001. p.10

<sup>364</sup> Unknown Author, 'Interview: Senator Robert Hill, Australian Minister for Defence', *Asian Defence Journal*, vol. 7-8, July/August 2002. p.15-22

<sup>365</sup> Mark Thomson, *The Cost of Defence - ASPI Defence Budget Brief 2002-2003*, Canberra: Australian Strategic Policy Institute, May 2002. p.1

although smaller than that stated publicly.<sup>366</sup> However, there were concerns that this increase was largely offset by increased operational tempo, which ate up much of the funding.<sup>367</sup>

In June 2002, the Minister of Defence made a speech identifying the new strategic environment. He made three claims: (1) the ADF was increasingly likely to be deployed outside Australia, (2) the ADF must be able to operate throughout the entire spectrum of conflict, and (3) the ADF might thus face very clear choices in regards to structure, if it were to fulfil such roles.<sup>368</sup>

In late 2002, Australian nationals were killed in the Bali bombings, resulting directly in the formation of Special Operations Command on 19 December 2002.<sup>369</sup> This was an event of great impact in Australia, as it seemed to indicate that Australians were being directly targeted by transnational terrorism.

In February 2003, a major document, *Australia's National Security – A Defence Update 2003* was released.<sup>370</sup> There were assertions that drafts for this document had twice been rejected by Cabinet before being finally accepted.<sup>371</sup>

This update noted the changing security environment, especially the rise of terrorism and proliferation of WMD, and mentioned that since September 2001 the Government had “introduced new Defence capabilities to combat terrorism.”<sup>372</sup> The paper claimed that the strategic environment was now “shaped by the threat of terrorism.” The relationship with the United States was emphasised as being vital to the new strategic situation.<sup>373</sup> Despite this new threat, however, the emphasis of the ADF would remain on flexibility.<sup>374</sup>

*Defence Update 2003* noted that involvement in expeditionary operations by the ADF was now more likely than it had been in the past.<sup>375</sup> It noted that in the South

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<sup>366</sup> Ibid. p.27

<sup>367</sup> Ibid. p.73 and Unknown Author, 'Is Defence turning the corner?' *Defender*, vol. XIX, no. 2, Winter 2002. p.16

<sup>368</sup> Alan Dupont, *Transformation or Stagnation? Rethinking Australia's Defence*, Working Paper 374, Canberra: ANU Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, May 2003. p.2

<sup>369</sup> Lewis, 'Guarding Australians Against Terrorism'. p.48

<sup>370</sup> Australian Government, *Australia's National Security - A Defence Update 2003*, Canberra, 2003.

<sup>371</sup> Geoffrey Barker, 'White paper wipe-out', *Australian Financial Review*, 13 May 2003. p.61

<sup>372</sup> Australian Government, *Australia's National Security - A Defence Update 2003*. p.5

<sup>373</sup> Ibid. p.9

<sup>374</sup> Ibid. p.9

<sup>375</sup> Ibid. p.23-24

Pacific, the ADF might need to restore law and order, carry out evacuations, or even involve itself in disaster relief.<sup>376</sup>

Overall, *Defence Update* was not a major shift from *Defence 2000*. Instead it merely increased the emphasis towards counter-terrorism and other non-conventional military operations;<sup>377</sup> its general strategic assumptions, and the force structure determinants for the ADF, remained the same. One might suggest its publication was intended mostly to reassure the public that the government was cognisant of the threat of terrorism, and was undertaking moves to enhance Australia's anti-terrorist capability.

In introducing the update, the Minister of Defence noted it was not “a major change in principle.”<sup>378</sup> He noted that changes had already occurred within the ADF, and that thus in some ways the document merely matched policy to reality. Important was his rhetoric that the document was designed to “address the threats that we see as present – immediate and real threats.” Comparing this rhetoric with that of *Defending Australia*, and that document's emphasis on the long term, indicates the substantial shift that nine years had occasioned.

In May 2003, the Reserve Rapid Response Force was established as a result of *Defence Update 2003*. The government termed it “another response to the uncertain security environment.”<sup>379</sup> It is discussed further in Chapter Seven.

Building on the Defence Update was the Defence Capability Review, released in November 2003, and which is examined in the section on acquisitions.<sup>380</sup>

The Coalition responded to Parliament's *From Phantom To Force* review in mid-2003, four years after the review had been submitted.<sup>381</sup> By and large, the Government rejected most of its recommendations, suggesting that *From Phantom To Force* was overly Army-centric and did not engage with issues on a joint basis. Soon

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<sup>376</sup> Ibid. p.20

<sup>377</sup> Riaz Ahmed, 'Defence Update 2003: An Adequate Review of Australian Defence Policy?' *Australian Defence Force Journal*, no. 166, 2005. p.5-6; Interview with Former Australian Defence Official E.

<sup>378</sup> The following paragraph is derived from Australian Department of Defence, 'Doorstop interview - Launch of Defence Update 2003', Press Release, 26 February 2003, MIN260203/03. [www.minister.defence.gov.au/Hilltpl.cfm?CurrentId=2382](http://www.minister.defence.gov.au/Hilltpl.cfm?CurrentId=2382).

<sup>379</sup> Robert Hill, 'Reserves to bolster Australia's defences against terrorism', Press Release, 18 May 2003, MIN64/03. [www.minister.defence.gov.au/Hilltpl.cfm?CurrentId=2760](http://www.minister.defence.gov.au/Hilltpl.cfm?CurrentId=2760).

<sup>380</sup> This paragraph is derived from Australian Department of Defence, 'Press Conference on the Defence Capability Review', Press Release, 7 November 2003, MIN71103/03. [www.minister.defence.gov.au/Hilltpl.cfm?CurrentId=3253](http://www.minister.defence.gov.au/Hilltpl.cfm?CurrentId=3253).

<sup>381</sup> Australian Government, *Government Response to the Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Report - From Phantom To Force*, Canberra, 29 May 2003.

after, the Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade published a review of Australia's Maritime Strategy,<sup>382</sup> following on from *From Phantom To Force*. This recommended a national security strategy, as well as the production of a new White Paper.<sup>383</sup> It steered a middle ground between the "reformers" and the "traditionalists", suggesting that Australia needed to maintain a range of defence objectives.<sup>384</sup> It has not been replied to by the government as of the time of writing.

In March 2004, Joint Operations Command was formed, superseding HQAST.<sup>385</sup> This signified further movement towards centralisation of operational command.

In June 2004, Prime Minister Howard made an important speech on national security.<sup>386</sup> He said Australia needed to recast its security thinking to deal with the issues of terrorism, WMD proliferation, and transnational threats. He claimed this new environment required a whole-of-government approach centred on Cabinet. He noted Australia had "no option but to engage with, adapt to, and help to shape a constantly changing security environment."<sup>387</sup>

Given involvement in Iraq, controversy over spending, and a variety of other issues including refugees, some held that the election in late 2004 would be a "national security election." However, one experienced analyst pointed out the general lack of interest in the public, and especially the parliamentary leadership, towards defence; thus the election would not be a "national security election."<sup>388</sup>

Kim Beazley, former Minister of Defence during the Hawke years, returned as Labor's shadow minister, and quickly attracted controversy with comments about Iraq.<sup>389</sup> The ALP's defence policy supported the review of most acquisition

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<sup>382</sup> This review had been initiated in 2002.

<sup>383</sup> Australian Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs Defence and Trade, *Australia's Maritime Strategy*, Canberra, June 2004. p.xv-xvi

<sup>384</sup> *Ibid.* p.47

<sup>385</sup> Graham Davis, 'VADM to lead new Joint Ops Command', *Navy News (Australia)*, vol. 47, no. 04, 25 March 2004; Simone Liebelt, 'We have a great job to do', *Air Force*, vol. 46, no. 01, 12 February 2004; Unknown Author, 'Command changes', *Air Force*, vol. 46, no. 04, 25 March 2004.

<sup>386</sup> John Howard, *The Prime Minister Speaks On National Security (Speech at Sydney 18 June 2004)*, ASPI Strategic Insights 7, Canberra: Australian Strategic Policy Institute, July 2004. p.2 onwards.

<sup>387</sup> *Ibid.* p.13

<sup>388</sup> Michael O'Connor, 'A National Security Election?' *Quadrant*, vol. 48, no. 9, September 2004.

<sup>389</sup> Jennifer Hewett, 'Bomber Beazley is back and it's peace in our time', *Australian Financial Review*, 17-18 July 2004. p.18

programmes,<sup>390</sup> as well as the development of a new White Paper, and perhaps most importantly, the foundation of an independent Coastguard.<sup>391</sup>

The Coalition's election policy was to maintain funding increases, expand the Army by 1000 personnel, enhance training for soldiers, and generally continue the same trends they had followed since *Defence 2000*.<sup>392</sup> Others, however, wondered whether the Coalition was attempting to "bury" the Defence of Australia mantra, and replace it with a policy oriented towards offshore operations.<sup>393</sup>

It is open how much of this was mere politicking. It may have been largely rhetoric, with politicians engaged in a battle for the security vote, rather than truly engaging with the issues.<sup>394</sup> Neither party released its defence policy particularly early, an indication of low importance.<sup>395</sup>

The Coalition won the election, and in the next defence budget announced a decade-long 20-billion AUD increase in defence funding.<sup>396</sup> This was justified by concerns about the arms purchases of other East Asian states.

In April 2005, a Joint Future Warfighting Conference was held, and Minister Hill made the keynote speech.<sup>397</sup> In it can be seen, perhaps, the clearest indication of what might be called the Hill doctrine, and hints for the future direction of Australian defence.

The Minister noted that the lines were blurring between warfighting and broader national security issues. He stated that contemporary threats included terrorism, extremism, WMD proliferation, missile systems, unconventional and asymmetric capabilities, transnational crime, piracy, illegality, and biological threats. Warfighting, while valuable, was not the whole solution, but "we still see our first responsibility to be to continue to build the warfighting capability of the nation."

The newest formal statement of defence policy is the *Defence Update 2005*, released in December of that year. This begins with a Ministerial statement that "the

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<sup>390</sup> Trevor Thomas, 'Beazley still feeling his way back into defence', *Australian Defence Business Review*, vol. 23, 31 August 2004. p.20-21 see also Unknown Author, 'Defence policy', *Post-Courier*, 21 September 2004.

<sup>391</sup> Louise Yaxley, *Interview - Coastguard central to Labor's regional defence policy*, Television Interview - AM (ABC), 20 September 2004.

<sup>392</sup> Patrick Walters, 'More soldiers but not gear', *The Australian*, 6 October 2004.

<sup>393</sup> Ian Bostock, 'Reaching out', *Jane's Defence Weekly*, vol. 41, no. 44, 3 November 2004. p.25

<sup>394</sup> Unknown Author, 'The Advertiser Editorial: Defence policy is a battle of rhetoric', *The Advertiser*, 22 September 2004.

<sup>395</sup> Australis, 'Current comment', *Defender*, vol. XXI, no. 4, Summer 2004/05. p.5

<sup>396</sup> Lincoln Wright, 'Defence funding gets big increase', *The Sunday Mail*, 1 May 2005.

<sup>397</sup> Robert Hill, 'Keynote Address - Joint Future Warfighting Conference', Press Release, 20 April 2005.

Government's management of strategic policy remains sound and well-founded."<sup>398</sup> It identifies a range of strategic issues of concern, including asymmetric threats, non-state powers, and the technological revolution,<sup>399</sup> and supports greater emphasis on whole-of-government approaches to security issues, and non-combat involvement by defence.<sup>400</sup> However, it remains largely conservative, claiming that the principles of *Defence 2000* and the decisions taken within that framework remain sound, despite the evolving strategic environment.<sup>401</sup> It is no great alteration to policy, but rather a reconfirmation and assurance. The most important aspect of this document, and one treated later, is its confirmation of the *Hardened and Networked Army* concept for the Army.<sup>402</sup>

Another vital higher policy issue of the period has been the increasingly intimate relationship with the United States. Since September 11, the two states have intensified their defence relationship and strengthened their alliance. This may well have had some influence over the development of Australian defence policy during the period.

Throughout the period, higher policy has appeared disjointed at times. The various statements of Minister Hill, Prime Minister Howard, and extant written policy as found in *Defence 2000* and the Defence Updates, have not always meshed in all particulars, especially in relation to emphasis on non-conventional tasks.

## *Operations*

The ADF's operational tempo has been high since 2000, both in operations presaged in extant policy, and in operations that have differed from those expected roles.

During 2001, the ADF was increasingly involved in a variety of operations other than war. In April, RAN vessels undertook a hot pursuit of illegal fishers from Australian to South African waters.<sup>403</sup> In September, the ADF began Operation Relex, a surveillance patrol of waters to the north of Australia. Up to nine surface warships

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<sup>398</sup> Australian Department of Defence, *Australia's National Security - A Defence Update 2005*, Canberra, December 2005. p.v

<sup>399</sup> Ibid. p.3-4

<sup>400</sup> Ibid. p.10

<sup>401</sup> Ibid. p.26

<sup>402</sup> Australian Department of Defence, *The Hardened and Networked Army*, Canberra, December 2005.

<sup>403</sup> Andrew Forbes, *Protecting the National Interest: Naval Constabulary Operations in Australia's Exclusive Zone*, Working Paper 11: Royal Australian Navy Sea Power Centre, April 2002. p.26

and a pair of Orion aircraft were involved at any one time.<sup>404</sup> Such operations were also undertaken in 2002, exemplified in February when a RAN surface combatant involved in EEZ patrols approached two suspected illegal fishing vessels with a catch of 200 tonnes.<sup>405</sup>

After the September 11 attacks on the United States, the Australian government was swift to announce its support for the War on Terror. The ADF deployed to Afghanistan in 2002, contributing special forces and other units to the War on Terror. There was also a suggestion that forces might be required in Iraq, and discussion as to what Australia could validly provide.<sup>406</sup> Involvement in the War on Terror caused the United States alliance to come under close scrutiny, with John Howard offering clear and unequivocal support.<sup>407</sup>

From March 2003, the ADF engaged in military operations against Iraq as part of the United States coalition.<sup>408</sup> Some controversy has surrounded the beginning of operations, as for one and a half days before any public acknowledgement Australian soldiers were engaged with Iraqi forces.<sup>409</sup> The role of Australia's special forces was also questioned, with some wondering whether they were indeed designed to protect Israel from ballistic missile attack.<sup>410</sup> Australia retains forces in theatre, including a security contingent and a task force assigned to protect local reconstruction efforts.<sup>411</sup> Most recently Australia has sent forces to the Solomon Islands and East Timor.

### *Doctrine and Concepts*

The period since *Defence 2000* has been marked by a steady evolution of doctrine in the direction of what might be called the RMA paradigm. It has also been

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<sup>404</sup> Matthew Flint, *The Timor Sea Joint Petroleum Development Area Oil and Gas Resources: The Defence Implications*, Working Paper 13: Royal Australian Navy Sea Power Centre, 2003. p.16

<sup>405</sup> Forbes, *Protecting the National Interest: Naval Constabulary Operations in Australia's Exclusive Zone*. p.26

<sup>406</sup> Ian Bostock, 'The "armoured brigade" issue', *Defender*, vol. XIX, no. 4, Summer 2002. and Bostock, 'Reaching out'. p.25-26; Australian Defence Association, *Defence Brief 91*, August 2002.

<sup>407</sup> Tom Mueller, *The Royal Australian Navy and Theatre Ballistic Missile Defence*, Working Paper 12: Royal Australian Navy Sea Power Centre, March 2003. p.6

<sup>408</sup> Australian Defence Force, *The War in Iraq: ADF Operations in the Middle East in 2003*, Canberra, 2004.

<sup>409</sup> Tony Kevin, 'Australia's secret pre-emptive war against Iraq 18-20 March 2003', *Australian Journal of International Affairs*, vol. 58, no. 3, September 2004. p.321

<sup>410</sup> *Ibid.* p.324

<sup>411</sup> Matt Brown, 'Snapshots from Al Muthana province', *Defender*, vol. XXII, no. 2, Winter 2005; Damian Shovell, 'Good to go', *Army: The Soldier's Newspaper*, vol. 1117, 7 April 2005; Damian Shovell, 'Ready and able', *Army: The Soldier's Newspaper*, vol. 1115, 10 March 2005.

marked by the emergence of an Army concept that seems to have developed slightly independently of stated policy.

Two major ADF doctrinal publications were released during 2002. In June, *Force 2020* was published, and then in December *Future Warfighting Concept* was released.<sup>412</sup> Both espoused a clear RMA-paradigm approach to doctrine. In a related internal organisational shift, the Office of the RMA within ADFHQ was incorporated into the Directorate of Future Warfare and Concepts, in a move designed to enhance efficiency.<sup>413</sup>

As noted, *Defence Update 2005* confirmed that the *Hardened and Networked Army* concept had been approved. As such it is useful to engage with the development of that concept, which is best described in a series of public speeches by Chief of Army Peter Leahy.<sup>414</sup> Earlier sections on the aftermath of *Australia's Strategic Policy* should also be noted, as they describe the birth of the concept.

In the middle of 2002, recently released Army concept papers argued for a substantially increased army, focusing on the RMA-paradigm.<sup>415</sup> These had been developed by CATDC during 2000, built on *Defence 2000* policy prescriptions, and were entitled the “win now” series.

In October 2002, Leahy noted that Australia had a historical tendency towards expeditionary operations, rather than continental defence.<sup>416</sup> Yet policy had been oriented towards the latter, less common task. By June 2003, these thoughts had developed further,<sup>417</sup> with Leahy stating the Army needed to be deployable and sustainable. Soon after he was blunt: the “Army of today is not the Army we require tomorrow.”<sup>418</sup> His vision was a “hardened, networked Army fully integrated into a seamless ADF.” He extolled a rather extreme NCW paradigm, and said the future Army needed tanks. The future Army would be agile, capable of entry from land and sea, well protected, with lethal organic fire, and be linked to other shooters. It would

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<sup>412</sup> Australian Defence Force, *Future Warfighting Concept*, ADDP-D.02, Canberra, 2003; Australian Department of Defence, *Force 2020*, Canberra, June 2002.

<sup>413</sup> Evans, 'Australia's Approach to the Revolution in Military Affairs 1994-2004'. p.31-37,41-43

<sup>414</sup> It is likely, however, that the first glimpses of this concept emerged in the aftermath of *Australia's Strategic Policy* in 1997. Interview with Former Australian Defence Official A.

<sup>415</sup> Peter La Franchi, 'Asia Pacific Complexity Dominates Army 2025 Vision', *Asia-Pacific Defence Reporter*, vol. 28, no. 1, January 2002. p.34-35

<sup>416</sup> Peter Leahy, *Address by the Chief of Army to Land Warfare Conference: Future Wars - Futuristic Forces*, 22 October 2002.

<sup>417</sup> Peter Leahy, 'A Land Force for the Future', *Australian Army Journal (Land Warfare Studies Centre)*, vol. 1, no. 1, June 2003.

<sup>418</sup> Peter Leahy, *Address by Chief of the Australian Army to the United Services Institution of the ACT*, Canberra, 11 June 2003.

be flexible, capable of transition from warfighting to stabilisation operations. In October 2003, Leahy noted that the Army needed to be hardened to handle future warfighting requirements.<sup>419</sup> It would need to be able to seamlessly transit from one type of operation to another. During 2004, Leahy made further speeches, asking for the removal of hollowness in the force,<sup>420</sup> and noting his goal was for every soldier to ride into battle in an armour protected seat by 2012.<sup>421</sup> This concept, the *Hardened and Networked Army*, became official policy in December 2005.<sup>422</sup>

It might be asked whether this evolving concept within the Army – the RAAF and RAN have been far less innovative in redefining their operational doctrine – is built on policy guidance or instead is service independence such as might be seen in the United States. It appears the answer is that it is a combination. The Army has steered its own path to an extent allowed by government policy loosely interpreted.<sup>423</sup> It has never gone outside those limits.<sup>424</sup> In this, the role of Robert Hill has probably been important, because Hill himself has propounded a view that has sometimes been at odds with stated policy.

### *Acquisition and Upgrades*

Acquisitions since *Defence 2000* have been governed by the initial Defence Capability Plan, the 2003 Defence Capability Review, and the 2004 Defence Capability Plan. This section summarises the major acquisitions and upgrades of the period across all three services. It does this by first discussing the acquisitions and upgrades between *Defence 2000* and the 2003 Defence Capability Plan, then discusses that review and moves onto the subsequent acquisitions and upgrades. The initial DCP was termed “historic” by the then-Minister, Peter Reith, and included 88 purchase proposals, with a total cost of 47 billion dollars.<sup>425</sup>

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<sup>419</sup> Peter Leahy, *Address by Chief of Army to Land Warfare Conference*, 28 October 2003.

<sup>420</sup> Peter Leahy, *Speech by the Chief of Army to the Defence Watch Seminar*, 10 February 2004.

<sup>421</sup> Peter Leahy, *Address by Chief of Army to Army Command and Staff College*, Weston Creek, 7 September 2004.

<sup>422</sup> Australian Army, 'The Hardened And Networked Army', 2006, [accessed 20 April 2006]. Available from <http://www.defence.gov.au/army/HNA/Home.htm>.

<sup>423</sup> Interview with Former Australian Defence Official F, 23 November 2005.

<sup>424</sup> In saying this, however, it might be argued that this doctrine exists independently of strategic policy. Interview with Australian Defence Official C.

<sup>425</sup> Peter Reith, 'Historic Defence Capability Plan 2001-2010', 26 June 2001, [accessed 17 May 2005]. Available from [www.minister.defence.gov.au/Reithtpl.cfm?CurrentId=770](http://www.minister.defence.gov.au/Reithtpl.cfm?CurrentId=770).

In December 2001, a contract for Armed Reconnaissance Helicopters was signed with Eurocopter.<sup>426</sup> In early 2002, the RAN released its plan for the future fleet, including operational concepts.<sup>427</sup> The RAN also progressed its replacement patrol boat programme, releasing an RPB for new craft built to commercial standards.<sup>428</sup> The contract to replace the Fremantles with new Armidale class vessels was signed in August 2003.<sup>429</sup> In an important, although hardly highly-visible, move, the RAN's Perry-class fleet began a major upgrade cycle during 2003, with *HMAS Sydney* the first into the drydock.<sup>430</sup>

During 2003, a Defence Capability Review (DCR2003) was undertaken. This built on *Defence Update 2003*, and its report was released in November 2003.<sup>431</sup> The review was heavily reliant on the CDF and service chiefs rather than the civilian bureaucracy.<sup>432</sup> Its decisions included the acquisition of heavy tanks, the upgrading of the FFGs with SM2 missiles, the laying up of several Huon minesweepers, and a major enhancement to amphibious capability.<sup>433</sup> The most controversial decision related to the acquisition of heavy tanks, with the media especially interested as to the rationale for this decision. Also controversial was the decision to purchase larger amphibious ships than originally expected.<sup>434</sup> Some termed the review the "end of the 'Defence of Australia' doctrine",<sup>435</sup> while other commentators saw in it only minor change, and a shift towards reduced numbers of platforms, but higher capabilities.<sup>436</sup> Notable in the review was talk about "networking", and there were some qualms

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<sup>426</sup> Allan Hawke, 'Communicating with the media, the community and industry - a Defence perspective', ACT White Pages Business Series, 5 September 2002. p.11

<sup>427</sup> Unknown Author, 'RAN Plans for future fleet', *Asia-Pacific Defence Reporter*, vol. 28, no. 1, January 2002. p.14

<sup>428</sup> Frank Lindsey, 'Patrol boats with punch', *Defender*, vol. XIX, no. 1, Autumn 2002. p.8 and Ian Bostock, 'RAN's Replacement Patrol Boat Project', *Defender*, vol. XIX, no. 2, Winter 2002. p.25-26

<sup>429</sup> Robert Hill, 'Media Conference on Patrol Boat Contract', Press Release, 30 August 2003, MIN290803/03. [www.minister.defence.gov.au/Hilltpl.cfm?CurrentId=3085](http://www.minister.defence.gov.au/Hilltpl.cfm?CurrentId=3085).

<sup>430</sup> Horner, *Making the Australian Defence Force*. p.172 and Graham Davis, 'Sydney packs more punch', *Navy News (Australia)*, vol. 47, no. 05, 8 April 2004.

<sup>431</sup> Australian Department of Defence, 'Press Conference on the Defence Capability Review', Press Release.

<sup>432</sup> Trevor Thomas, 'Defence capability review: a summary', *Defender*, vol. XX, no. 4, Summer 2003. p.17

<sup>433</sup> Australian Department of Defence, 'Press Conference on the Defence Capability Review', Press Release.

<sup>434</sup> Hugh White, 'Fewer but bigger doesn't mean better equipment when it comes to security', *Sydney Morning Herald*, 24 November 2003.

<sup>435</sup> Ian McPhedran, 'Shake-up for defence', *Herald Sun*, 8 November 2003. and Borgu, *Reshaping the Australian Defence Force*. p.2

<sup>436</sup> White, 'Fewer but bigger doesn't mean better equipment when it comes to security'.

about whether this was merely an excuse to reduce the total force size, but claim that such was possible due to the advantages of network-centric-warfare.<sup>437</sup>

In general terms, the review indicated four major shifts: (1) a move towards naval amphibious capability, (2) increased integration of land forces, (3) confirmation that UAVs would likely provide the ADF's primary surveillance capability, and (4) the future move towards standoff missiles for the long-range strike role.<sup>438</sup> The ADA was positive about the review, especially its emphasis on balance and versatility.<sup>439</sup>

It is perhaps valid to ask whether DCR2003 was merely an acquisition plan built on stated policy in *Defence 2000* and *Defence 2003*, or whether it was an indication of an emergent strategy built on the force structure desires of the individual services.<sup>440</sup> Some mismatches between the decisions of DCR2003 and the recommendations of earlier documents can be seen.<sup>441</sup> This question is examined more closely in the section on defence dynamics.

In February 2004, building on the Defence Capability Review, an updated Defence Capability Plan (DCP2004) was released. The Minister of Defence, Robert Hill, in introducing it noted "we... need to look out to the future and, in a very unpredictable world, nevertheless try to determine the sort of equipment and capabilities that we're going to need."<sup>442</sup> A new emphasis on outcomes rather than platforms was evident. Mention of new trooplift helicopters was made. Perhaps the most important part of this DCP was not the types of acquisitions, but rather the way funding was restructured to reduce near term demands on money.<sup>443</sup>

Since the DCP2004, all three services have been relatively busy acquisition wise. In March 2004, it was announced that the M1A1 AIM Abrams would be

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<sup>437</sup> Borgu, *Reshaping the Australian Defence Force*. p.5-6

<sup>438</sup> Thomas, 'Defence capability review: a summary'.

<sup>439</sup> Unknown Author, 'Editorial - Strategy must determine resourcing'. p.3

<sup>440</sup> Others have suggested that it was perhaps more a case of Australia endeavouring to act as a strong ally of the United States, by enhancing its defence force in those areas felt most useful for ANZUS operations.

<sup>441</sup> Interview with Former Australian Defence Official C; Interview with Former Australian Defence Official J.

<sup>442</sup> Australian Department of Defence, 'Doorstop interview - Launch of Australia's Defence Capability Plan 2004-2014', Press Release, 4 February 2004.

[www.minister.defence.gov.au/HillTranscripttpl.cfm?CurrentId=3491](http://www.minister.defence.gov.au/HillTranscripttpl.cfm?CurrentId=3491). See also Chris Jones, 'Defence forces in \$50b overhaul', *The Courier Mail*, 5 February 2004.

<sup>443</sup> Aldo Borgu and Mark Thomson, *Reviewing the Defence Capability Plan 2004-2014*, ASPI Strategic Insights 3, Canberra: Australian Strategic Policy Institute, February 2004. p.11; Trevor Thomas, 'ADF funding lays down a year of consolidation', *Australian Defence Business Review*, vol. 25, no. 4-5, 31 May 2004. p.7

Australia's new main battle tank.<sup>444</sup> This decision was greeted with some criticism, with some wondering whether the Abrams was strategically mobile enough for the ADF's requirements.

Decisions were also made to purchase five new airborne refuellers for the RAAF,<sup>445</sup> and to consider stealth cruise missiles, largely to ensure that Australia retained a strike capability with the F/A-18 when the F-111 was phased out.<sup>446</sup> The RAN was not left out during this period. In June 2004, the replacement for *HMAS Westralia* was purchased.<sup>447</sup>

Overall, the period since the release of *Defence 2000* has been a busy one acquisition wise. All three services have received, or will receive in the near future, major new capabilities. It is noticeable, however, that there are few truly innovative new capabilities, and by and large acquisition has followed the platform replacement paradigm.

### *Evolving Defence Dynamics*

One of the key themes of the period since 2000 has been a change in the power structures at the top of the defence policymaking environment – the Prime Minister and Minister of Defence especially. It is useful to examine these changing dynamics, and the evolving roles of the various actors.

In this period, and especially since the September 11 bombings, John Howard has had “unusual dominance” over defence policy.<sup>448</sup> The symbolic power of September 11 gave him the opportunity to express his fundamental beliefs on defence, by appearing tough and raising funding.<sup>449</sup>

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<sup>444</sup> Australian Department of Defence, 'Briefing on the M1A1 Abrams Integrated Management (AIM) Main Battle Tank', Press Release, 4 August 2004.

[www.defence.gov.au/media/DepartmentalTpl.cfm?CurrentId=4094](http://www.defence.gov.au/media/DepartmentalTpl.cfm?CurrentId=4094); Robert Hill, 'M1 Abrams Chosen as Australian Army's Replacement Tank', Press Release, 10 March 2004, MIN47/04.

[www.minister.defence.gov.au/Hilltpl.cfm?CurrentId=3643](http://www.minister.defence.gov.au/Hilltpl.cfm?CurrentId=3643); Interview with Hawke.

<sup>445</sup> Graham Davis and Andrew Stackpool, 'Five new tankers', *Air Force*, vol. 46, no. 06, 22 April 2004.

<sup>446</sup> Unknown Author, *Interview - ADF plans to buy stealth cruise missiles*, Television Interview - AM(ABC), 26 August 2004. See also Carlo Kopp, 'Stretching the F-111 past 2010', *Defender*, vol. XXI, no. 1, Autumn 2004.

<sup>447</sup> Graham Davis, 'Good Oil on Westralia', *Navy News (Australia)*, vol. 47, no. 01, 12 February 2004.

<sup>448</sup> Interview with Former Australian Defence Official L.

<sup>449</sup> Interview with Former Australian Defence Official C.

The Minister for Defence since November 2001,<sup>450</sup> Robert Hill, has also been highly vocal in his statements, and at times it has appeared that Hill and Howard have not been in agreement over concepts.<sup>451</sup> Hill has been seen by some as an activist, but it is arguable if any major innovations have stemmed from his time in office.<sup>452</sup> Some critics have claimed that Hill is remote from the defence organisation, preferring to develop his own strategies independently.<sup>453</sup> What is not argued is that Hill has publically propounded strategies and policies that do not always mesh with White Paper guidance.<sup>454</sup> However, Hill is now no longer the Minister, and the capabilities and opinions of his successor are unknown.<sup>455</sup> Other Ministers, particularly in the NSCC, have also increased in importance and are no longer regarded merely as rubber stamps for decisions already made.<sup>456</sup> There has also been an increase in contestability, especially from the external commentariat. Thinktanks such as ASPI have begun to provide advice to government, but perhaps more importantly other government departments, especially DPMC, have also begun to do the same.<sup>457</sup> There has been a trend, pushed from the top, towards a whole-of-government approach to security problems.<sup>458</sup>

While *Defence 2000* was marked by a lack of service involvement, there has been a resurgence in service influence since.<sup>459</sup> Partly this has been a result of a lack of clarity of strategy, with the White Paper being vague enough to allow services to argue for their own platforms and concepts. It has also come about as a result of

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<sup>450</sup> Barker, 'White paper wipe-out'. p.61 and Julian Kerr, 'Editorial', *Asia-Pacific Defence Reporter*, vol. 27, no. 7, November/December 2001. p.7

<sup>451</sup> Interview with Former Australian Defence Official E; Interview with Former Australian Defence Official K; Interview with Former Australian Defence Official L. However Interview with Former Australian Defence Official H. would suggest disagreements are only at the margins about issues of timing.

<sup>452</sup> Interview with Former Australian Defence Official J.

<sup>453</sup> Interview with Australian Defence Official C; Barker, 'White paper wipe-out'.

<sup>454</sup> Interview with Former Australian Defence Official I.

<sup>455</sup> Australian Defence Association, *Defence Brief 116*, October 2005.

<sup>456</sup> Interview with Former Australian Defence Official I; Interview with Former Australian Defence Official L.

<sup>457</sup> Interview with Australian Defence Official A; Interview with Former Australian Defence Official J. See also Australis, 'On the right path but too small a step'. p.16. What is also notable is the developing militarisation of the top levels of DPMC.

<sup>458</sup> Interview with Former Australian Defence Official H.

<sup>459</sup> Interview with Australian Defence Official A; Interview with Former Australian Defence Official C; Interview with Former Australian Defence Official E; Interview with Former Australian Defence Official H; Interview with Former Australian Defence Official I; Interview with Former Australian Defence Official J; Interview with Former Australian Defence Official L.

increasing political involvement,<sup>460</sup> which has meant the pre-eminence of the civilian bureaucracy has been reduced, allowing greater space for service-defined concepts. Some have even claimed that the services are pursuing their own individual agendas, and the result is an “emergent strategy” that combines those agenda together despite their potential lack of coherence.<sup>461</sup> In response, it has been suggested that elements within the civilian bureaucracy and media are fighting a rearguard action to save past policy and ensure their legacies.<sup>462</sup> There is also the suggestion that the civilian bureaucracy, while weakened, still holds parity at least, through their control of the formulation of strategic and international policy.<sup>463</sup> Some have argued that this decline has also been caused by, or was the impetus for, a major loss of experience within the department from 2000 to 2003.<sup>464</sup>

Allegations have even been made that “rogue” service chiefs have, during this period, “torn up the White Paper” to achieve their own service goals.<sup>465</sup> There has also been criticism of the mismatch between stated policy and actual practise in regards to overseas deployments, which might be termed “strategy creep”.

The first thesis seems partially correct. Some of the acquisitions announced during the period, especially in DCR2003, do not seem particularly firmly founded on the policy prescriptions of *Defence 2000* and the *Defence Updates*. They fit the admittedly-vague wording of those documents to some extent, but do not truly fit the spirit. As such, there is definitely evidence of growing service independence and a willingness by those services to argue for capabilities only tenuously linked to policy guidance.<sup>466</sup>

The second issue is more troublesome, as there is a distinct difference between force structure decisions and decisions on deployment. In operational deployments, such as Iraq, decisions on foreign policy gains and the need to be seen as a strong ally probably count for more than stated defence policy guidelines on the use of the ADF.

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<sup>460</sup> Interview with Former Australian Defence Official C. He claims it is related to politicians fixation on the current situation, which leads them to lose sight of the broader strategic direction.

<sup>461</sup> Interview with Former Australian Defence Official J. I am also indebted to further correspondence with this interviewee.

<sup>462</sup> Interview with Former Australian Defence Official H.

<sup>463</sup> Interview with Former Australian Defence Official H. The argument being that even if strategic policy is controlled by civilians the military can still get their own preferred capability decisions and money anyway. See also Malcolm Kennedy, 'Editorial', *Defender*, vol. XVIII, no. 3, Spring 2001. p.3 who says reforms have not markedly changed the system.

<sup>464</sup> Barker, 'White paper wipe-out'. p.61

<sup>465</sup> Peter Cosgrove, 'How to avoid backing into the future', *Defender*, vol. XXII, no. 2, Winter 2005.

p.18

<sup>466</sup> And, perhaps, to argue for shifts in that policy guidance to fit their own service-developed concepts.

## Summing Up The Past Fifteen Years

The conclusions reached in Chapter Five about New Zealand are largely applicable here. There has been only slight change in Australian defence policy over the past fifteen years, with the primary theme the oscillation between the Defence of Australia and a more outwards focus.

During the initial period of Labor government, emphasis remained on the Defence of Australia, and enhancing the force to best undertake such roles. Until the release of *Defending Australia*, policy largely involved small scale relocation of forces, and the upgrading of obsolescent capabilities. The 1994 White Paper was not a marked advance, but did make some minor changes to policy and force structure. The following two years were perhaps the apogee of the Defence of Australia approach, with the Army in particular undergoing a process of change to best carry out its prescribed mission.

The election of the Coalition altered the situation. Right from the beginning that party was supportive of a more high technology approach to force structure, especially in regards to the RMA; at the same time it was also supportive of a more assertive strategic posture, especially in regards to expeditionary operations. These two viewpoints soon made an impact upon policy.

*Australia's Strategic Policy* claimed to be the end of traditional Defence of Australia rhetoric, although much of that policy remained. It did shift, albeit around the edges, the focus of Australia's defence policy further from its own coast. Yet perhaps more important than the continental vs. expeditionary debate was *Australia's Strategic Policy's* confirmation that conventional warfare would remain the primary force structure determinant for the ADF, rather than other post-Cold War security issues.

*Defence 2000* was an incremental advance on *Australia's Strategic Policy*. Again, some attention was paid to non-traditional security, and new roles for defence forces, but this was done in a summary manner. Yet *Defence 2000* revitalised the defence establishment, stabilised funding, and set a firm course for the near future. In the period since, enhancement to the ADF has continued steadily.

Policy since *Defence 2000* has been increasingly decentralised. Whereas the central bureaucracy held tight control over strategic policy and capability acquisition

for the majority of the period, in recent years there has been a resurgence in the power of the services, and signs that policy has become more fragmented.<sup>467</sup> There has also been some disagreement between the Prime Minister and his Minister of Defence, indications of at least two competing visions for defence. The release of *Defence Update 2003* and *Defence Update 2005* indicated a growing appreciation of new security issues, but in this case largely terrorism and estate management.

The difference between Labor and the Coalition is less than it has sometimes been claimed to be. The largest difference has been in rhetoric rather than reality, and that might simply be a case of each party attempting to ensure its own electorate remains supportive of stated policy. Both have been supportive of a high technology approach to defence, and generally prioritised air and naval forces; the slight difference in attitude towards the RMA can be explained as a question of timing rather than anything else.<sup>468</sup>

Where change has occurred, it has often followed a relatively conservative path: enhancements to warfighting practice, especially in regards to the RMA, are the dominant theme. In many ways the ADF has followed along the path set by the United States, which has itself come under criticism for conservatism.<sup>469</sup>

The world has changed around Australia, but its defence policy has changed only slightly. Later chapters will posit a range of hypotheses to explain this conservatism. The following chapter, however, identifies exactly what has changed and what has stayed the same in the ADF and NZDF since 1991, thus showing the end result of the policy processes examined in this and the preceding chapter.

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<sup>467</sup> The question here is whether services have greater influence over higher policy through the proper processes or whether they can circumvent strategic guidance, and gain governmental approval for service concepts and acquisitions anyway.

<sup>468</sup> In that during the period that the ALP was in power the RMA was not a sufficiently mature concept around which to build a defence policy.

<sup>469</sup> Richard Lacquement Jnr, *Shaping American Capabilities After the Cold War*. Westport, Praeger, 2003.

# Chapter Seven – Force Structure Continuity and Change

## Introduction

This chapter shows what the overall result of the policy processes examined in Chapters Five and Six has been on the force structures of the NZDF and ADF. It examines the current state of the two forces to a varying degree of detail, and identifies continuity and change in key elements of force structure and doctrine.

Three analytical categories are used.<sup>1</sup> The first, restructuring, refers to a “dramatic or innovative change”, including major increases.<sup>2</sup> The second, reduction, refers to a decline in numbers and capability. The third, continuity, refers to a force element that has been little changed in the period.

The chapter finds that for both defence forces, continuity has been the primary trend. In regards to the NZDF, there has also been substantial reduction. The ADF, on the other hand, has seen relatively little reduction. Restructuring in both defence forces has been minimal, and where new capabilities have been acquired they have often been merely replacements for obsolescent platforms.

The chapter ends by summarising change and continuity, and concluding as to whether the total of changes adds up to a substantially restructured defence force, or whether the two militaries today are largely similar to their Cold War states.

## The NZDF

Restructuring	Reduction	Continuity
<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Service Roles and Balance</li><li>• Doctrine</li><li>• Command Structure</li></ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Budget</li><li>• Personnel</li><li>• Air Combat Force</li><li>• Naval Combat Force</li></ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Land Forces Organisation</li><li>• Maritime Patrol Force</li><li>• Airlift</li></ul>

<sup>1</sup> See Richard Lacquement Jnr, *Shaping American Capabilities After the Cold War*. Westport, Praeger, 2003. p.32 for a similar division.

<sup>2</sup> Ibid. p.35; Stephen Rosen, *Winning the Next War: Innovation and the Modern Military*. Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 1991. p.7-8

<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Naval Support Force</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Reserves</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Special Forces</li> <li>• Focus of Training</li> <li>• Selection of Future Weapons</li> </ul>
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## Restructuring

As noted above, restructuring refers to a dramatic or innovative change in an element of force structure or doctrine. Four elements of the NZDF can be regarded as restructured.

### *Service Roles and Balance*

A brief glance over the 1991 White Paper, and the 2001 Government Statement on Defence, indicates the degree of change in the perceived roles of the three services. There has been a distinct shift from a balanced view that saw each service as roughly equal in importance, to one in which the RNZAF and RNZN act mainly in support of the Army.

The Army is today seen as the NZDF's primary arm, and is tasked with being able to provide both combat and peacekeeping forces.<sup>3</sup> It is also now a motorised rather than leg-infantry force. The RNZN and RNZAF are now tasked with supporting the Army, through the provision of transport especially, but also through surveillance and other enabling roles. They have lost almost all of their combat roles, and are increasingly focused towards civil tasks.<sup>4</sup> The most recent NZDF annual report has noted that the NZDF is likely to be involved in an increasing number of non-traditional security threats such as terrorism and criminal activities.<sup>5</sup>

This change in service roles can also be seen in the changing percentages of the defence budget allocated to each service.<sup>6</sup> The RNZAF now receives a substantially smaller proportion than it did in 1991. Personnel numbers have also seen major internal restructuring: while the Army has reduced in size only 9%, the RNZN

<sup>3</sup> New Zealand Government, *The Government's Defence Policy Framework*, Wellington, 2000. p.7

<sup>4</sup> Mark Burton, *Speech to Australian Defence College*, 11 August 2005.

<sup>5</sup> New Zealand Defence Force, *Report of the New Zealand Defence Force for the year ended 30 June 2005*, G.55, Wellington, October 2005. p.7-8

<sup>6</sup> New Zealand Defence Force, *Vote Defence Force*, B5 Vol 1, Wellington, 2005. p.358

has lost 22% of its personnel, and the RNZAF some 42%.<sup>7</sup> This means that the Army has more personnel than the other two services combined, and can be firmly stated to be the dominant service today.

Overall, current policy is focused on operationally ready forces, and there is an increasing emphasis on collective security operations, whole-of-government tasks, and using the NZDF as part of a broader national security apparatus. There is much less emphasis today than in 1991 on the foreign policy gains of maintaining military capabilities.

This evolution of service roles can be directly traced to the period of 2000-01, when Labour altered defence policy. Before then there was little or no change to service roles, and there has been little change since.

### *Doctrine*

There has been substantial change in NZDF doctrine during the period. In 1991, the NZDF had no domestically developed doctrine. Now it has its own keystone document, *The Foundations of New Zealand Military Doctrine (FNZMD)*.<sup>8</sup>

This document notes that New Zealand's current strategic environment is characterised by a growing number of non-traditional security challenges, and while the NZDF must retain a conventional warfare capability, it must also be flexible enough to engage in other operations.<sup>9</sup> *FNZMD* defines a spectrum of operations, ranging from Aid to the Civil Authority through to Conventional Warfare, and reiterates the need for the NZDF to have a warfighting emphasis if it is to respond across the full spectrum.<sup>10</sup> *FNZMD* also notes that the NZDF, by reason of geography, needs to be focused on expeditionary operations.<sup>11</sup>

*FNZMD* propounds a characteristic New Zealand way of war, founded on six operational tenets:

1. Warfighting ethos;

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<sup>7</sup> New Zealand Defence Force, *Report of the New Zealand Defence Force for the year ended 30 June 1992*, G4, Wellington, 1992.; New Zealand Defence Force, *Statement of Intent 2006/2007*, May 2006.

<sup>8</sup> New Zealand Defence Force, *Foundations of New Zealand Military Doctrine (NZDDP-D) First Edition*, Wellington, February 2004.

<sup>9</sup> *Ibid.* p.1-3

<sup>10</sup> *Ibid.* p.1-4 and 5-6

<sup>11</sup> *Ibid.* p.1-3

2. Effects based approach;
3. The principles of war;
4. Command philosophy;
5. A manoeuvrist approach;
6. Inherent flexibility and pragmatism.<sup>12</sup>

Most important of these to the document is the warfighting ethos; this underpins all the other tenets. The manoeuvrist approach refers to utilising the indirect method, defeating the enemy's will, and focusing strength on weakness; *FNZMD* regards this approach as being suited to the entire spectrum of military operations.<sup>13</sup> In relation to command philosophy, *FNZMD* expounds mission command (also known as directive control), granting subordinates greater freedom of action, although it does note that the NZDF might still tend towards more conservative and hierarchical command structures despite this doctrinal recommendation.<sup>14</sup>

While focused on warfighting, *FNZMD* also touches on other operations. It mentions that the use of force needs to be very restricted in non-combat operations, as long term results might be harmed in achieving short term gain.<sup>15</sup> In regards to humanitarian intervention, it mentions that the role of the military force is the protection of aid givers, rather than the giving of aid itself, and that as soon as possible civilian agencies should be given authority for the operation.<sup>16</sup>

*FNZMD* is a first edition, an attempt to create a basis from which further New Zealand doctrine could be built. Perhaps the most interesting aspect of it is the constant reiteration of the importance of warfighting for all other roles. Also, as a military-strategic level document, it does not touch much on the specifics of various operations. There is some mention of the RMA, but it is not a dominant theme, and thus *FNZMD* can be seen as a pragmatic rather than revolutionary document, one that does not expound a particularly new or changed style of warfare for the NZDF.

The only available service doctrine is the RNZN's, *Maritime Doctrine for the Royal New Zealand Navy*, produced in 1997.<sup>17</sup> This is a generalist work that does not so much produce doctrine as attempt to justify the retention of existing capabilities. Its

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<sup>12</sup> Ibid. p.6-2

<sup>13</sup> Ibid. p.6-18

<sup>14</sup> Ibid. p.6-21 and 6-23

<sup>15</sup> Ibid. p.8-5

<sup>16</sup> Ibid. p.8-6

<sup>17</sup> Royal New Zealand Navy, *Maritime Doctrine for the Royal New Zealand Navy*, March 1997.

impact on current practice within the RNZN, given the major changes in defence policy since 1997, must be questionable at best.

The obsolescence of *Maritime Doctrine* might be seen in current statements by the RNZN that it does not espouse an independent role within the NZDF, but rather sees itself as a vital supporting enabler for other operations, especially Army deployments.<sup>18</sup> The RNZN, while focusing itself on combat, also realises that the South Pacific demands naval forces useful for OOTW.<sup>19</sup> It is interesting to note that in justifying its existence, the RNZN focuses on resource protection and operations such as peacekeeping and civil defence.<sup>20</sup>

The other services lack domestic keystone doctrine, and as such little past their vision statements can be examined, which are unsurprisingly broad and uncontroversial.<sup>21</sup>

Tactical doctrine is still reliant on other nations, notably the United States.<sup>22</sup> This is the situation in all fields of operations, even in those such as peacekeeping and estate management where a specific New Zealand approach might be expected.

Overall, the NZDF's operational doctrine has developed in a way that puts increasing attention on non-combat tasks, while retaining a focus on warfighting. Two reasons for this development can be given. Firstly, *FMNZD* was developed in the aftermath of the changes that followed Labour's accession to power, and thus allowed doctrine to "catch up" with new governmental guidance. It might be suggested that until such changes, unstated doctrine was sufficient as it was clear what was expected of the NZDF (to act as a balanced, combat-oriented force). However, it might also be suggested that *FMNZD* is partly an attempt by the NZDF to defend its own position against future policy that may be increasingly pacifist.

### *Command Structure*

The establishment of Headquarters Joint Forces New Zealand (HQJFNZ) justifies describing the command framework as restructured.

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<sup>18</sup> Royal New Zealand Navy, *RNZN Strategic Plan 2001-2006*, Wellington, July 2001. p.4,18

<sup>19</sup> *Ibid.* p.13

<sup>20</sup> Royal New Zealand Navy, 'What Your Navy Does And Why', 2005, [accessed 9 February 2005]. Available from [www.navy.mil.nz/rnzn/does.cfm](http://www.navy.mil.nz/rnzn/does.cfm).

<sup>21</sup> New Zealand Army, *New Zealand Army Strategic Plan*, Wellington, 2004. p.1

<sup>22</sup> This is a finding made from the absence of any mention of doctrine by the services, and also the statements found on their websites in regards to doctrine.

HQJFNZ is based in Trentham,<sup>23</sup> and was established on 1 July 2001 as New Zealand's first permanent joint operational headquarters.<sup>24</sup> Its mission is:

To provide command, leadership and support to our men and women on joint and combined operations and activities, in order to contribute to the security of New Zealand and her interests.<sup>25</sup>

This means that HQNZDF commands virtually all NZDF operations and major exercises. The commander of HQJFNZ is the Commander Joint Forces New Zealand (COJFNZ), and he has three single-Service component commanders below him.

HQNZDF has approximately 200 personnel.<sup>26</sup> It is designed around the basic NATO J-staff system, and its most important department is the Joint Operations Division, which includes a Joint Watch Centre, Movements Operations Centre, and a Joint Intelligence Branch.<sup>27</sup> It is within this division that much of the command and control of operations is carried out.

With HQJFNZ operational, the procedure for overseas deployments and major exercises has changed. Now, HQJFNZ commands almost every operation or major exercise. Each service assigns various force elements to HQJFNZ, such as ships or infantry units, and their management is the responsibility of the various component commanders. The utility of HQJFNZ was displayed during the recent response to the East Asian Tsunami.<sup>28</sup> HQJFNZ also coordinates Operation Awhina, the NZDF's comprehensive joint plan for disaster response.<sup>29</sup>

HQJFNZ is a substantial enhancement to the NZDF's operational capability, as it enables coherent control of deployments, and the maximisation of joint capabilities. It was founded as a direct result of early Labour defence policy, and was clearly presaged in the *Defence Beyond 2000* report.

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<sup>23</sup> New Zealand Defence Force, 'Headquarters Joint Forces New Zealand (HQ JFNZ)', 2005, [accessed 9 February 2005]. Available from [nzdf.mil.nz/operations/hqjfnz.html](http://nzdf.mil.nz/operations/hqjfnz.html).

<sup>24</sup> Ibid.

<sup>25</sup> New Zealand Defence Force, *Annual Report 2003-2004*, Wellington, 2004, p.22

<sup>26</sup> New Zealand Defence Force, 'Personnel Composition', 2005, [accessed 9 February 2005]. Available from [nzdf.mil.nz/at-a-glance/personnel-composition.html](http://nzdf.mil.nz/at-a-glance/personnel-composition.html).

<sup>27</sup> New Zealand Defence Force, *Annual Report 2003-2004*, p.30

<sup>28</sup> Judith Martin, 'Tsunami! The Head Sheds React', *Navy Today*, no. 98, April 2005, p.15

<sup>29</sup> Mark Burton, Parliamentary Question 13393, 21 November 2002, Wellington.

## *Naval Support Force*<sup>30</sup>

The Naval Support Force (NSF) will be, within the next year or so, substantially restructured from its state in 1991. At that stage it consisted of a single fleet oiler, four ageing patrol vessels, as well as hydrographic and diving support vessels. Capability was extremely limited.

However, recent policy decisions will soon see a major enhancement, with the addition of seven new vessels under Project Protector.<sup>31</sup> These include a Multi-Role Vessel (MRV) capable of long-distance amphibious operations, strategic and tactical sea-lift, and command and control. They also include two new Offshore Patrol Vessels and four Inshore Patrol Vessels, each a major improvement on the preceding Moa-class craft.<sup>32</sup> Hydrographic and diving support capabilities will largely remain the same.

These new vessels will broaden the capabilities of the NSF appreciably, allowing it greater involvement in the South Pacific, a better ability to deploy Army units, and greater flexibility in supporting other Government agencies such as Customs and Fisheries.<sup>33</sup>

The largest of the new ships will be the MRV,<sup>34</sup> a 131m, 8900 tonne vessel. This will be capable of patrol, tactical sealift, disaster relief and a variety of other tasks.<sup>35</sup> It will be capable of carrying a full infantry company with equipment, and will be ice strengthened for operations in the Ross Sea.<sup>36</sup> It will carry a 25mm automatic cannon but few other weapons.<sup>37</sup> The MRV will carry two LCMs and various smaller amphibious craft,<sup>38</sup> and will be able to hangar four of the RNZAF's new NH-90 helicopters.<sup>39</sup> Given its size, the MRV could be retrofitted with additional weapons systems.

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<sup>30</sup> This category is not entirely concomitant with the RNZN's terminology, and encompasses all non-combat elements.

<sup>31</sup> Unknown Author, 'Tenix wins NZ's Project Protector', *Australian Defence Monthly*, 2004.

<sup>32</sup> Mark Burton, 'Project Protector', 6 August 2004, [accessed 27 October 2004]. Available from [www.beehive.govt.nz/ViewDocument.cfm?DocumentID=20563](http://www.beehive.govt.nz/ViewDocument.cfm?DocumentID=20563); Unknown Author, 'Tenix wins NZ's Project Protector'.

<sup>33</sup> David Ledson, 'Yours Aye', *Navy Today*, no. 92, September 2004. p.3

<sup>34</sup> To be named *HMNZS Canterbury*.

<sup>35</sup> Ledson, 'Yours Aye'. p.3 and Unknown Author, 'Tenix wins NZ's Project Protector'.

<sup>36</sup> Burton, 'Project Protector.'

<sup>37</sup> Phil Goff, 'Goff inspects Navy's new MRV at Dutch shipyard', Press Release, 4 February 2006.

<sup>38</sup> Unknown Author, 'The Sister Ships to our MRV', *Navy Today*, no. 98, April 2005. p.5

<sup>39</sup> Mark Burton, Parliamentary Question 4644, 6 April 2005, Wellington.

There will be two types of patrol boat. The OPV will be 1580 tonnes, ice-strengthened, and capable of helicopter operations. The IPV will be 340 tonnes and carry a RHIB for interception operations. The OPV will carry a 25mm cannon and machine guns, whereas the IPV will carry two machine guns.<sup>40</sup> The OPVs will have a speed of 22 knots and 6000nm range, while the IPVs will be capable of 25 knots and 3000nm before refuelling.<sup>41</sup> In general, however, the equipment of Project Protector will be modern, reliable and possess good seakeeping qualities, in keeping with its largely non-combat orientation.

The NSF is currently tasked “to conduct operational and maritime logistic support for deployed military forces”<sup>42</sup> but this tasking will evolve as new equipment enters service. At present, the NSF’s major capability is *Endeavour*. That ship is very busy, having recently engaged in a four and a half month deployment.<sup>43</sup> During the past period of reporting it was at sea for 180 days, achieved and maintained DLOC, and spent 153 days in company with other vessels or on exercise.<sup>44</sup> *Endeavour* has recently experienced a number of machinery problems, which affect her reliability. It is believed that “there is limited life remaining in many of the ship’s systems.”<sup>45</sup> However, no replacement programme has yet entered the Long Term Development Plan.

Restructuring of the NSF will have flowed directly from Labour decisions, notably in the aftermath of *GDS2001*, to modify the structure of the RNZN to best meet new policy. It will give the NSF enhanced capability in amphibious and estate management operations, and is further indication of continuing trends towards non-combat operations, as seen in earlier sections.

## Reduction

Reduction is defined as a substantial decrease in numbers or capability in the particular force element examined.

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<sup>40</sup> New Zealand Ministry of Defence, *Invitation to Register Interest in Project Protector*, Wellington, 26 July 2002. p.35-41

<sup>41</sup> Royal New Zealand Navy, ‘Project Protector’, [accessed 23 January 2007]. Available from <http://www.navy.mil.nz/visit-the-fleet/project-protector/default.htm>

<sup>42</sup> New Zealand Government, *Vote Defence Force 2004/2005*, Wellington, 2004. p.17

<sup>43</sup> Royal New Zealand Navy, ‘Operation Cutlass 04 - Endeavour's last report’, 2004, [accessed 9 February 2005]. Available from [www.navy.mil.nz/rnzn/article.cfm?article\\_id=1644&article\\_type=ops](http://www.navy.mil.nz/rnzn/article.cfm?article_id=1644&article_type=ops).

<sup>44</sup> New Zealand Defence Force, *Report of the New Zealand Defence Force for the year ended 30 June 2005*. p.64-66

<sup>45</sup> New Zealand Defence Force, *Annual Report 2003-2004*. p.57-59

## *Budget*

Throughout the post-Cold War period, the percentage of GDP devoted to New Zealand has declined steadily, from approximately 1.5% to approximately 0.8%. It has stayed relatively constant in raw terms, although there was a substantial reduction through the early and middle part of the 1990s, and only a recent increase. In real terms it has also declined. Thus, through comparison of these three methods of measurement, it can be seen that the defence budget has declined in the post-Cold War period.

Funding for the 2006-2007 budget, not counting capital charge,<sup>46</sup> will be approximately \$1440 million NZD. Of this, \$621 million NZD will be expended on personnel, \$555 million NZD on operating costs, and \$263 million NZD on depreciation.<sup>47</sup>

The MOD handles capital purchases for the NZDF, as noted in Chapter Four. In the past five years the amount expended on capital purchases has varied widely, from \$128 million NZD to \$400 million NZD, but usually averages around the \$300 million NZD mark.<sup>48</sup>

New Zealand's defence expenditure is very low when compared to other nations, such as Australia, the UK, Singapore or the USA.<sup>49</sup> The Defence Sustainability Initiative noted in Chapter Five portends an increase in raw defence funding over the next decade, but it is unlikely that this will increase the percentage of GDP expended.<sup>50</sup> In general, despite the healthy nature of the economy, the large budget surplus, and the strong condition of most public services it is unlikely that defence funding will increase markedly in the near future.

A single explanation for this decline cannot be given. The largest decline, during the early-mid 1990s, was partly the result of the economic recession of the time, but also the result of general state service economies instituted by the then-

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<sup>46</sup> Royal New Zealand Returned Services Association, *Defending New Zealand: A statement by the RNZRSA*, Wellington, April 2005. p.53-58 for an explanation of this methodology.

<sup>47</sup> New Zealand Defence Force, *Statement of Intent 2006/2007*. p.169

<sup>48</sup> New Zealand Ministry of Defence, *Vote Defence*, B5 Vol 1, Wellington, 2005. p.351; New Zealand Ministry of Defence, *Statement of Intent 2006-2009*, May 2006. p.56-57

<sup>49</sup> New Zealand Parliamentary Library, *Defence Expenditure: Trends and International Comparisons*, 2005/01, Wellington, 2 March 2005. and New Zealand Ministry of Defence, *Defence Sustainability Initiative (DSI) Q&A*, Wellington, 2 May 2005.

<sup>50</sup> Projections done by the author indicate that if anything the proportion of GDP allocated to funding will drop.

National Government. Also, the lack of any direct threat to New Zealand during the period has helped keep defence funding at a relatively low level. A final explanation is that defence has simply not had sufficient domestic political importance to secure a higher level of funding.

### *Personnel*

Personnel numbers have declined throughout the period, from 11,300 regulars in 1991 to 8,600 today.<sup>51</sup> This decline has been largely the result of the major drawdown in personnel numbers during the early part of the period, following the major economies of 1992-1996. It has also been linked to problematic wage rates, which have caused problems in morale and retention. In recent years personnel decline has tapered off,<sup>52</sup> and there are definite signs of an increase in the near future. Under the DSI an additional 2000 Regulars will be recruited, bringing the NZDF close to its 1991 size.

National, especially, was responsible for reduction in personnel, but during the latter part of its administration it did attempt to stem the outflow. Labour has been consistently concerned with maintaining personnel levels. This might be linked to differing attitudes towards defence, or perhaps more accurately to the fact that by the time Labour reached power the NZDF had been “pared to the bone” and there was little or no slack left.

### *Air Combat Force*

This is the one major element of the NZDF that has disappeared in the post-Cold War period. The 18 Skyhawks maintained in 1991 were retained in service until 2001. Then, when *GDS2001* was produced,<sup>53</sup> they were taken out of service, and will soon be sold to private interests. Currently, the NZDF does not maintain any jet strike or jet training capability; nor has any provision been made for the replacement of the

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<sup>51</sup> New Zealand Defence Force, *Report of the New Zealand Defence Force for the year ended 30 June 2005*. p.33

<sup>52</sup> *Ibid.* p.41

<sup>53</sup> New Zealand Government, *Government Defence Statement: A Modern, Sustainable Defence Force Matched to New Zealand's Needs*, Wellington, 8 May 2001; New Zealand Government, *Review of the Options for Air Combat Capability*, Wellington, 2001.

ACF by other aerial systems for the delivery of ordnance, such as gunship helicopters or cruise missiles.<sup>54</sup>

In parallel with the loss of the Air Combat Force, there has been a sizeable reduction in air training capacity. The Strikemasters that provided jet training in 1991 were replaced by Macchis, which were withdrawn from service in 2001. The loss of other platforms, such as the Andovers, has also reduced the advanced training capacity of the NZDF.

The loss of the ACF is the simplest of all the changes discussed in this chapter to explain. It was the direct result of the review process instigated by Labour during 2000-2001, although there are questions as to whether the outcome was preordained, and there is a possibility that Labour had already decided to scrap the Skyhawks when it entered government in 1999.

### *Naval Combat Force*

The NCF has seen a 50% reduction in numbers. In 1991 it possessed four Leander-class frigates, and currently has but two Anzac-class frigates, with the last Leander-class frigate *HMNZS Canterbury* having decommissioned early in 2005.<sup>55</sup> Despite the increased effectiveness of the Anzac over the Leander, the total result has been a loss of capability. The NCF now lacks the ability to conduct extended deep water deployments while retaining training and maintenance capability. The replacement of the Wasps by Super Seasprite helicopters has given it a much enhanced anti-submarine capability in technological terms, but again questions arise as to whether total capability (including deployability and sustainment) in that area has actually increased.

The Anzac-class frigates *HMNZS Te Kaha* and *HMNZS Te Mana* are the most powerful warships in New Zealand service. The first, *Te Kaha*, was commissioned on 22 July 1997. The Anzacs displace 3600 tonnes, and are capable of 27+ knots.<sup>56</sup> Their armament is relatively limited, with a single 5" gun, an eight-cell Seasparrow air defence system, Mk 46 lightweight torpedoes, and a Phalanx Close-In-

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<sup>54</sup> While the Orions may receive Harpoon, this will be a maritime strike weapon only, and my point in this paragraph was the delivery of air-to-ground ordnance.

<sup>55</sup> Royal New Zealand Navy, 'A Quick Voyage Around', 2005, [accessed 9 February 2005]. Available from [www.navy.mil.nz/rnzn/voyage.cfm](http://www.navy.mil.nz/rnzn/voyage.cfm).

<sup>56</sup> Following information taken from: Royal New Zealand Navy, 'HMNZS Te Kaha F77', 2005, [accessed 9 February 2005]. Available from [www.navy.mil.nz/ops/ship.cfm?ship\\_ID=3](http://www.navy.mil.nz/ops/ship.cfm?ship_ID=3).

Weapons-System for point defence. They also carry SH-2G Seasprite helicopters for anti-submarine and surface surveillance work. The Anzacs have a 163 man crew and a range of some 6000nm.

The Anzacs are not state of the art surface combatants by any means. They lack a surface-to-surface missile capability, and are restricted in their anti-submarine work by the lack of a towed array sonar. Their Seasparrow and Phalanx defensive systems are capable only of point defence, and thus in a high intensity operation the Anzacs would require air defence escorts. There are concerns about their lack of compliant ESM, the size of their RCS, and the reliability of various fire control systems.<sup>57</sup> They also have restricted NBC protection.<sup>58</sup> However, they are reliable vessels, with sufficient weaponry for most tasks, and have good seakeeping qualities. Also, they are more responsive than the Leanders due to their different propulsion systems, as they do not require time to build up steam. Recently the Anzacs received a new shipboard satellite communications system.<sup>59</sup> They are also due to have self-defence upgrades, although whether this will substantially improve their survivability is difficult to establish.

The NCF is seen as being critical to the protection of Australian and New Zealand territorial sovereignty, involvement in FPDA activities, support for peace support operations, and regional exercises and diplomatic deployments.<sup>60</sup> Estate management roles have received increased emphasis in recent years.<sup>61</sup> The NCF is a busy FEG.<sup>62</sup> During the last period of reporting, the two Anzac frigates spent a total of 286 days at sea. Both met their DLOC requirements, although personnel shortages hampered performance. The NCF is also tasked with having a frigate on eight hours notice for search and rescue, if possible.<sup>63</sup>

Pressures on the NCF are apparent. Despite stated requirements, for a period in the last year only one frigate was actually available on short notice, due to a combination of maintenance and training requirements, and the limited number of

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<sup>57</sup> Mark Burton, Parliamentary Question 8556, 5 September 2002, Wellington.

<sup>58</sup> Max Bradford, Parliamentary Question 7420, 8 September 1999, Wellington.

<sup>59</sup> Unknown Author, 'NZ selects shipboard satellite system', *Australian Defence Monthly*, 2004.

<sup>60</sup> New Zealand Ministry of Defence, *Annual Report for the year ended 30 June 2004*, Wellington, September 2004. p.52

<sup>61</sup> Judith Martin, 'Poacher patrol', *Navy Today*, no. 83, December 2003. p.29; Peter McHaffie, 'Yours Aye', *Navy Today*, no. 85, February 2004. p.3; Vicki Rendall, 'HMNZS Te Kaha', *Navy Today*, no. 85, February 2004. p.28-29

<sup>62</sup> New Zealand Defence Force, *Report of the New Zealand Defence Force for the year ended 30 June 2005*. p.59-62

<sup>63</sup> *Ibid.* p.104

vessels. Manning problems have been experienced, but the retirement of *Canterbury* should lessen pressure a little in that area, at least until Project Protector reaches service. The ability of a two-frigate force to meet rotation and sustainment requirements is also highly questionable.<sup>64</sup>

While officially part of the RNZAF, the SH-2G Seasprites of the Naval Support Flight operate almost invariably with the NCF, and thus deserve to be treated alongside it. The Naval Support Flight operates six Seasprites. They have a range of 600nm, an 1800kg warload, and substantially increase the surveillance capabilities of their warships.<sup>65</sup> The Seasprites are a relatively sophisticated platform, perhaps not as good as the Seahawks in service with Australia and other navies, but still sufficient for most anti-submarine and anti-surface tasks.

The reduction in the NCF has been the result of three major decisions. The first was when the initial order for the Anzacs was made, and it was decided only two would be purchased at the time. The second happened in the latter part of the National administration, when it was decided to delay the acquisition of a third frigate. The third came during the early period of the Labour administration, when it was finally decided that two Anzacs was enough, and that other types of ship would be purchased instead.

### *Reserve Structure*

The various Reserve units have declined markedly in size during the post-Cold War period. There have also been some minor changes in their usage.

Both RNZAF and RNZN Reserves are of small size and limited utility, and can safely be discounted. It is better to focus on the Army when discussing the development of the Reserves during the period.

Army Territorials have become slightly more integrated with the Regular force, and have been increasingly involved on operations. Their stated role is to enhance the Army's capacity to sustain force element groups, provide an expansion

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<sup>64</sup> Ibid. p.61-62; G.A. Vignaux, *The Navy Critical Mass Argument*, Revision 2, Wellington: Victoria University of Wellington, 19 July 1997.

<sup>65</sup> Royal New Zealand Navy, 'Kaman SH-2G Seasprite Helicopter', 2005, [accessed 9 February 2005]. Available from [www.navy.mil.nz/ops/ship.cfm?ship\\_ID=17](http://www.navy.mil.nz/ops/ship.cfm?ship_ID=17).

base for larger operations, and, to maintain a link with the community at large.<sup>66</sup> Their ability to do so is questionable for two main reasons.

Firstly, the Territorial force has declined markedly in size. In 1998 there were some 4500 Territorial soldiers, but today there are only 1888.<sup>67</sup> That is scarcely enough, even if combined together, to provide a single reinforced battalion group. Also, if past figures are anything to go by, less than half of those are efficient personnel.<sup>68</sup>

Secondly, Territorial units only train to the company level, and thus their proficiency is questionable.<sup>69</sup> When deployed, they must generate the same level of capability as their regular counterparts,<sup>70</sup> and thus require a more sustained course of training.

However, moves are underway to reverse the downward trend in the size of the Territorial Force. New legislation has been enacted to protect the civilian jobs of deployed Territorials.<sup>71</sup>

The primary reason for decline in the Territorial force has been fiscal constraints, leading to little spare money being available for their maintenance. Also important, especially during the early part of the period, was a belief that the Territorial forces were too large, and unnecessary in the post-Cold War world when it was very unlikely the Army would deploy a full brigade group. A final factor has been a general lack of attention by policymakers, who have not felt that the Reserves are of great utility. There are signs, however, that these attitudes may be changing.

## Continuity

Continuity is the norm for any element of force structure. Change requires an explicit decision, and often requires resourcing, thus it is usually rarer than

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<sup>66</sup> New Zealand Army, 'Territorial Force', 2005, [accessed 9 February 2005]. Available from [www.army.mil.nz/default.asp?CHANNEL=ABOUT+NZ+ARMY&PAGE=Territorials](http://www.army.mil.nz/default.asp?CHANNEL=ABOUT+NZ+ARMY&PAGE=Territorials).

<sup>67</sup> New Zealand Defence Force, *Report of the New Zealand Defence Force for the year ended 30 June 2005*. p.33; Izzy Horton, 'Tasman Reserve employer day a 'huge success'', *Army News*, no. 303, 17 February 2004. p.7

<sup>68</sup> Mark Burton, Parliamentary Question 13858, 27 November 2002, Wellington.

<sup>69</sup> New Zealand Army, 'Territorial Force.'

<sup>70</sup> Mark Burton, Parliamentary Question 17098, 18 September 2000, Wellington.

<sup>71</sup> Unknown Author, 'Employment protection for Volunteer Reserves', *Navy Today*, no. 87, April 2004. p.22; Izzy Horton, 'Amended act to make TF civilian jobs safer', *Army News*, no. 303, 17 February 2004. p.9

continuity.<sup>72</sup> Because of this, in analysing why the following force elements have remained the same, it is often difficult to identify specific reviews or incidents that have been causal – continuity is the result of a series of decisions, or even the absence of decisions. There is also the issue of long lead times in developing capabilities, where a policy decision may require a decade to come into service. Rather, the reader is recommended to note the respective sections of the various policy reviews of the period and compare their treatment of the following force elements. Where continuity has ruled, it has largely been justified by the statement that existing capabilities are still useful for developing or new roles.

### *Land Forces Organisation and Equipment*

In broad terms the structure of the Land Forces has remained unchanged from 1991. The Army still retains two Regular Force battalions with various elements at different stages of readiness. There have been minor changes, such as new equipment, and a reorganisation of Logistics Command, but the general trend has been one of continuity. Motorisation is merely re-equipment, and no radical changes to structure to take best advantage of these new capabilities have been suggested.<sup>73</sup>

The New Zealand Army remains the largest of the three services, with 4438 Regular Force personnel.<sup>74</sup> Its stated mission is “to provide world-class operationally focused land forces that are led, trained and equipped to win.”<sup>75</sup> It is designed to be able to participate in the full spectrum of likely operations, to the highest standard in the world.<sup>76</sup>

The head of the Army is the Chief of Army (renamed from Chief of General Staff).<sup>77</sup> Directly under him is the Land Component Commander (LCC), HQJFNZ. The role of the LCC is to generate and sustain that service’s capabilities as provided

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<sup>72</sup> See Chapter One.

<sup>73</sup> The mere addition of NZLAVs to infantry battalions does not necessarily mean major change. One can look at the example of WW2, where it was not the number of tanks in an army that determined its effectiveness, but rather how they were allocated – whether spread out in penny packets, or combined into powerful armoured fists.

<sup>74</sup> New Zealand Defence Force, *Report of the New Zealand Defence Force for the year ended 30 June 2005*. p.33

<sup>75</sup> New Zealand Army, *New Zealand Army Strategic Plan*. p.1 and New Zealand Defence Force, *Report of the New Zealand Defence Force for the year ended 30 June 2005*. p.20

<sup>76</sup> New Zealand Army, *New Zealand Army Strategic Plan*. p.3

<sup>77</sup> New Zealand Defence Force, *Annual Report 2003-2004*. p.28 notes “responsible for maintaining Army’s capability.”

to HQJFNZ.<sup>78</sup> This largely involves bringing assigned forces to a Designated Level of Capability (DLOC). LCC is also involved in planning and supervising operations, but is not an operational commander.

The Army is divided into force elements: Land Combat Forces, Land Combat Support Forces, Land Combat Service Support Forces, and Specialised Forces.<sup>79</sup> The two Land Force Groups (2LFG and 3LFG) include units from each of these force elements.

2LFG is based at Linton, and is the highest readiness infantry formation in the Army.<sup>80</sup> It is built around a single infantry battalion, which is currently undergoing a process of motorisation through the addition of NZLAV vehicles.<sup>81</sup> Under Phase One of that programme, 2LFG will include a single LAV company of some fifty-one vehicles; Phase Two will see the LAVs integrated down to platoon level thus truly motorising the infantry of the battalion.<sup>82</sup> The first NZLAV company achieved DLOC in December 2004, the second in July 2005, and full battalion DLOC was achieved in December 2005.<sup>83</sup>

The NZLAVS are described by the Canadian Armed Forces as a “state-of-the-art troop carrier that will serve the needs of mounted infantry well into the next century.”<sup>84</sup> They carry seven fully equipped troops, along with three crew members, and are armed with a 25mm chaingun, 7.62mm machineguns, and grenade launchers. Ammunition includes APFSDS-T<sup>85</sup> rounds capable of penetrating thick armour.<sup>86</sup> The NZLAV is armoured to defeat small-arms fire, and with appliqué armour in NZDF service will supposedly be immune to 14.5mm heavy machine gun fire.<sup>87</sup> There is also an option to retrofit additional slat armour.<sup>88</sup> The NZLAV is equipped with a

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<sup>78</sup> New Zealand Defence Force, 'Headquarters Joint Forces New Zealand (HQ JFNZ)', [accessed].

<sup>79</sup> New Zealand Defence Force, *Annual Report 2003-2004*, p.67-81

<sup>80</sup> Ibid. p.18 – excepting the SAS, who while infantry are better regarded as special forces

<sup>81</sup> Ibid. p.10

<sup>82</sup> Glenn King, 'LAV Coy rolls out', *Army News*, no. 304, 2 March 2004. p.5

<sup>83</sup> Mark Burton, Parliamentary Question 241, 1 February 2005, Wellington; Mark Burton, Parliamentary Question 5629, 27 April 2005, Wellington.

<sup>84</sup> Canadian Army, 'LAV III (Light Armoured Vehicle)', [accessed 28 October 2004]. Available from [www.army-forces.gc.ca/Land\\_Force/English/](http://www.army-forces.gc.ca/Land_Force/English/).

<sup>85</sup> Armour Piercing Fin Stabilised Discarding Sabot – Tracer. See: Answers.com, 'Kinetic Energy Penetrator', [accessed 25 May 2005]. Available from <http://www.answers.com/topic/kinetic-energy-penetrator>.

<sup>86</sup> New Zealand Army, 'LAV Update No 4', 25 July 2003, [accessed 9 February 2005]. Available from [www.army.mil.nz/?CHANNEL=LAV+UPDATE&PAGE=LAV+Update+No+4](http://www.army.mil.nz/?CHANNEL=LAV+UPDATE&PAGE=LAV+Update+No+4).

<sup>87</sup> New Zealand Army, 'LAV Update No 9', 29 September 2003, [accessed 9 February 2005]. Available from [www.army.mil.nz/?CHANNEL=LAV+UPDATE&PAGE=LAV+Update+No+9](http://www.army.mil.nz/?CHANNEL=LAV+UPDATE&PAGE=LAV+Update+No+9).

<sup>88</sup> Mark Burton, Parliamentary Question 4076, 29 March 2005, Wellington.

TACNAV system that links the GPS to the laser range-finder and digital compass, enhancing both navigation and accuracy of shooting.<sup>89</sup> It also possesses thermal imaging sights, allowing it to fight at night or in situations of smoke or other visual obstruction. While weighing 16950kg in full battle trim, the NZLAV is airportable by C-130 Hercules after brief modification.<sup>90</sup>

The NZLAV is not sufficiently armoured to engage enemy main force elements, but that is not its function. In Canadian service the vehicle has proven very effective in all required roles.<sup>91</sup> A similar vehicle in US service, the Stryker, has proven equally effective in Iraq.

The major potential difficulty of the NZLAV is its logistic sustainment.<sup>92</sup> It is a new vehicle, and will be employed in large numbers. This will require a major effort logistically to ensure vehicles are kept in repair and fuelled and provisioned. Other performance issues are also apparent: the NZLAV is a large vehicle, presenting a relatively high silhouette compared to tracked vehicles, and it also lacks any sort of anti-tank missile system, restricting its capability. There are also questions about the utility of the vehicle in South Pacific situations.<sup>93</sup> Still, despite these shortcomings, the NZLAV provides a quantum leap in capability for the Army.

2LFG also includes the Queen Alexandra Squadron, an armoured reconnaissance unit; however, this is moving to 3LFG.<sup>94</sup> Overall, 2LFG includes the full spectrum of supporting weapons, from armoured vehicles, through to anti-tank and anti-air missiles, and indirect fire support.

3LFG, based in the South Island, is held at a lower state of readiness. It consists of a single infantry battalion, and will also undergo some motorisation by

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<sup>89</sup> Canadian Army, 'LAV III (Light Armoured Vehicle)', [accessed; New Zealand Army, 'LAV Update No 10', 15 October 2003, [accessed 9 February 2005]. Available from [www.army.mil.nz/?CHANNEL=LAV+UPDATE&PAGE=LAV+Update+No+10](http://www.army.mil.nz/?CHANNEL=LAV+UPDATE&PAGE=LAV+Update+No+10).

<sup>90</sup> Rebecca Reedy, 'No concern with NZLAV' says Herc captain', *Army News*, no. 308, 11 May 2004. p.3

<sup>91</sup> New Zealand Army, 'LAV Update No 10.'

<sup>92</sup> New Zealand Army, 'LAV Update No 8', 16 September 2003, [accessed 9 February 2005]. Available from [www.army.mil.nz/?CHANNEL=LAV+UPDATE&PAGE=LAV+Update+No+8](http://www.army.mil.nz/?CHANNEL=LAV+UPDATE&PAGE=LAV+Update+No+8).

<sup>93</sup> Phil Goff, Parliamentary Question 8188, 28 August 2003, Wellington.

<sup>94</sup> New Zealand Army, 'Second Land Force Group (2LFG) Organisational Chart', [accessed 25 May 2006]. Available from [http://army.mil.nz/default.asp?CHANNEL=ABOUT+NZ+ARMY&PAGE=2LFG+ORGANISATION+AL+CHART+%2D+March+04.](http://army.mil.nz/default.asp?CHANNEL=ABOUT+NZ+ARMY&PAGE=2LFG+ORGANISATION+AL+CHART+%2D+March+04.;); Unknown Author, 'On parade in the Bay', *Army News*, no. 319, 12 October 2004.

receiving LAVs. The addition of the Queen Alexandra Squadron will strengthen 3LFG by providing a previously absent reconnaissance capability.<sup>95</sup>

2LFG is designed to provide a battalion group for deployment within 60 days, and also provide the framework for a brigade group to be established, given a longer warning period.<sup>96</sup> However, there are problems within the force.<sup>97</sup> Many units are staffed at below 80% of establishment. A battalion group can only be raised for low-level contingencies; higher level contingencies “could not be fully met without significant risk.” There are equipment deficiencies, in both minor and major equipment, and personnel shortages. Nor is there sufficient capacity to rotate or reinforce a deployment.

There are also problems within the supporting arms, the Land Combat Support Force, which comprises artillery, engineers, and communications.<sup>98</sup> There are only sufficient engineers and communications for an infantry company deployed on low-level tasks. Many of the supporting elements are staffed below 70-80% of establishment; only the artillery is capable of supporting a full battalion group. There are shortages of specialist combat service support equipment and utility vehicles. However, these problems were remedied in deploying engineers to Iraq and Afghanistan.

The Army has received some other new equipment since 1991. Providing medium-range anti-tank firepower is the Javelin missile system. The Army has purchased 24 launchers.<sup>99</sup> The Javelin is a fire-and-forget system with a maximum range of 2500m.<sup>100</sup> This long range, and the guidance system, considerably enhances the survivability of the launch team. Against tanks, the Javelin employs a top-attack mode, striking the thinnest armour. This means the Javelin is effective against main battle tanks even when engaging from the front.<sup>101</sup> Javelin provides the NZ Army with

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<sup>95</sup> John Archer, 'Queen Alexandra's Mounted Rifles Moving South', *Army News*, no. 334, 28 June 2005. p.1-2

<sup>96</sup> New Zealand Ministry of Defence and New Zealand Defence Force, *The Defence Portfolio: Briefing to the Incoming Government 2002*, Wellington, 2002. p.9 states a 600-900 person battalion group can be deployed and sustained for twelve months.

<sup>97</sup> New Zealand Defence Force, *Report of the New Zealand Defence Force for the year ended 30 June 2005*. p.74-75 provides much of the information for the following paragraph.

<sup>98</sup> *Ibid.* p.77-80 provides much of the information for the following paragraph.

<sup>99</sup> New Zealand Government, *Defence Long Term Development Plan - Update - June 2003*, Wellington, June 2003.

<sup>100</sup> [www.army-technology.com](http://www.army-technology.com), 'Javelin Anti-Armour Missile, USA', [accessed 25 May 2006]. Available from <http://www.army-technology.com/projects/javelin/>.

<sup>101</sup> Various types of countermeasures similar to the Russian Arena system could degrade the effectiveness of a top-attack weapon.

an effective anti-armour and anti-bunker capability, with a similar maximum range to the NZLAV's weapons.

Anti-aircraft protection is provided by the Mistral missile system. The Mistral is a very low level system, with an all-aspect IR seeker.<sup>102</sup> Maximum range is only 5km, limiting the Mistral to point defence of field forces. The Mistral first entered Army service in April 1998, but was delivered without its identification, alert and cueing system for cost reasons.<sup>103</sup> This rendered it less effective, due to the necessity for gunners to visually acquire targets. However, by December 2006 that system will have been retrofitted to the launchers and integrated with the Army's communication system, considerably enhancing overall capability.

Indirect fire support is provided by 81mm and 105mm systems, as in 1991, although currently all 105mm weapons are Hamel Light Guns. Direct fire support has been considerably enhanced with 0.50 calibre heavy machineguns.<sup>104</sup> A project to purchase grenade launchers has been suspended due to the unavailability of suitable systems.

It is notable that the defensive "bubble" around Army elements has increased two-fold since 1991; whereas at that date the major weapons systems in service had a maximum effective range of 1000m or less, the current combination of 25mm fire, Javelin missiles, and 0.50 calibre machine guns allows the accurate engagement of targets out to 2000m.

Replacing the large Landrover fleet, which is obsolescent, is a sizeable quantity of Pinzgauer Light Operational Vehicles (LOVs). In October 2004, the LOVs were officially accepted into service.<sup>105</sup> Currently, almost all of the first tranche have arrived in country.<sup>106</sup> The Pinzgauer is a major improvement over the Landrover.<sup>107</sup> The armoured and modified variants are especially useful for special forces

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<sup>102</sup> Military Analysis Network, 'Mistral', [accessed 28 October 2004]. Available from [www.fas.org/man/dod-101/sys/land/row/mistral.htm](http://www.fas.org/man/dod-101/sys/land/row/mistral.htm).

<sup>103</sup> Mark Burton, 'Another significant step in re-equipping our forces', 2 June 2004, [accessed 27 October 2004]. Available from [www.beehive.govt.nz/ViewDocument.cfm?DocumentID=19931](http://www.beehive.govt.nz/ViewDocument.cfm?DocumentID=19931).

<sup>104</sup> While the latter have not yet been obtained, they will be soon. See New Zealand Government, *Defence Long Term Development Plan Update*, Wellington, November 2004. p.25 for the newest update.

<sup>105</sup> Murray Brown, 'Good to go', *Army News*, no. 319, 12 October 2004. p.1

<sup>106</sup> New Zealand Defence Force, *Report of the New Zealand Defence Force for the year ended 30 June 2005*. p.45

<sup>107</sup> Pinzgauer, 'Pinzgauer Base Specifications', 2005, [accessed 9 February 2005]. Available from [www.pinzgauer.uk.com/Specifications.htm](http://www.pinzgauer.uk.com/Specifications.htm).

operations. Some problems have been experienced with the mechanical reliability of these vehicles, but it is expected this will be only a minor issue.<sup>108</sup>

The main infantry weapon remains the Steyr rifle, and replacement is not expected for some years. The C-9 remains the main squad machine gun, but it is expected that approximately 1000 of them will be replaced beginning in 2007.<sup>109</sup>

New minor equipment is relatively limited. New bulletproof vests have entered service, lighter and providing better protection than their predecessors.<sup>110</sup> The IEDD/CB Response teams have received ANDROS and Echidna remote handling systems to deal with explosive devices.<sup>111</sup>

Probably the most vital minor re-equipment programme has involved the communications system.<sup>112</sup> The Army has received new digital radios that are a major increase in capability over their predecessors. In the near future it is likely that an integrated communications system will be developed.

Overall, the Army has retained much of its post-Cold War structure, while steadily replacing obsolescent equipment. This continuity can largely be explained as the result of a belief amongst both the political and military leadership that there has not been a need for a major restructuring of the land forces. While there have been occasional suggestions of change,<sup>113</sup> the major policy reviews of the period have all supported a regular, two-battalion structure for the Army, without major changes to equipment mix or capability. Fiscal issues have also likely been of importance.

### *Maritime Patrol Force*

The Maritime Patrol Force (MPF) has seen very little change during the post-Cold War period. The number of P-3K Orions has remained the same, as has their tasking. However, they are undergoing a major upgrade of mission systems and structural elements.

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<sup>108</sup> Mark Burton, Parliamentary Question 2718, 7 March 2005, Wellington.

<sup>109</sup> New Zealand Government, *Defence Long Term Development Plan Update*. p.34

<sup>110</sup> New Zealand Army, 'Solomon Island', 2005, [accessed 9 February 2005]. Available from [www.army.mil.nz/?CHANNEL=OPERATIONS&PAGE=Solomon+Islands](http://www.army.mil.nz/?CHANNEL=OPERATIONS&PAGE=Solomon+Islands).

<sup>111</sup> New Zealand Army, 'Bomb Disposal Assistance', 2005, [accessed 9 February 2005]. Available from [www.army.mil.nz/default.asp?CHANNEL=COMMUNITY+ASSISTANCE](http://www.army.mil.nz/default.asp?CHANNEL=COMMUNITY+ASSISTANCE).

<sup>112</sup> New Zealand Ministry of Defence, *Annual Report for the year ended 30 June 2004*. p.64

<sup>113</sup> New Zealand Government, *New Zealand Defence Force Capability Reviews Phase One - Land Forces and Sealift*, Wellington, November 2000.

As in 1991, the MPF today is based on No.5 Squadron and operates six P-3K Orions.<sup>114</sup> It has some 75 aircrew and 70 support personnel. The MPF has two required roles: the surveillance of New Zealand's EEZ, and the provision of protective support for peace support operations. Apart from the required roles, the MPF also undertakes search and rescue, resource protection and disaster relief flights. In the most recent annual report, the MPF's roles were prioritised as maritime surveillance, search and rescue, and maritime air operations.<sup>115</sup> There is also some suggestion that the term "maritime patrol" might better be thought of as "multi role", and that land surveillance might become a future task for the MPF.<sup>116</sup>

The MPF is currently experiencing a shortage of crews, as well as equipment problems. Despite that, in the 2003/2004 reporting period it still managed to complete 97% of assigned tasks.<sup>117</sup> Two P-3s are available at all times for deployment, with another available on short notice for search and rescue.<sup>118</sup> During May 2003, elements of the MPF deployed to the Persian Gulf, flying surveillance operations as part of collective security operations.<sup>119</sup> The MPF is also engaged in various South Pacific tasks, including the first ever night patrol of Vanuatu's EEZ in May 2004.<sup>120</sup>

The P-3K Orions are now ageing aircraft, with one over the 20,000 flying hour mark, and the fleet in total having flown over 110,000 hours.<sup>121</sup> Under Project Kestrel, the Orions were rewinged in 2001, so their structural integrity is still good. However, their onboard equipment has reached the point of obsolescence. To remedy this, a major refit known as Project Guardian will see the Orions modified to P-3K2 standard. This will include the replacement of sensors, communications, data management and navigation systems.<sup>122</sup> A new imaging radar will be installed, with a

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<sup>114</sup> The following information is taken from Royal New Zealand Air Force, 'Maritime Patrol Force', 2005, [accessed 9 February 2005]. Available from [www.airforce.mil.nz/about/forceelements/maritime.htm](http://www.airforce.mil.nz/about/forceelements/maritime.htm).

<sup>115</sup> New Zealand Defence Force, *Report of the New Zealand Defence Force for the year ended 30 June 2005*. p.86

<sup>116</sup> Mark Burton, *Background: RNZAF P-3 Orions*, Wellington: Ministry of Defence, 5 October 2004.

<sup>117</sup> New Zealand Defence Force, *Annual Report 2003-2004*. p.82-85

<sup>118</sup> New Zealand Defence Force, *Report of the New Zealand Defence Force for the year ended 30 June 2005*. p.87-88

<sup>119</sup> Unknown Author, 'Eyes over the Gulf', *Royal New Zealand Air Force News*, no. 43, November 2003. p.19

<sup>120</sup> Unknown Author, 'We are watching you: illegal fishers warned', *Royal New Zealand Air Force News*, no. 50, July 2004. p.7

<sup>121</sup> Royal New Zealand Air Force, 'Major Milestone for Air Force Orion', 2004, [accessed 9 February 2005]. Available from [www.airforce.mil.nz/latestinfo/mediareleases/oldmediacontent.cfm?article\\_id=226](http://www.airforce.mil.nz/latestinfo/mediareleases/oldmediacontent.cfm?article_id=226).

<sup>122</sup> Royal New Zealand Air Force, 'Project Guardian', 2005, [accessed 9 February 2005]. Available from [www.airforce.mil.nz/latestinfo/projects/orion.htm](http://www.airforce.mil.nz/latestinfo/projects/orion.htm).

capacity for detecting land based targets, as well as an advanced electro-optical system with enhanced night vision capabilities.<sup>123</sup> The first stage in this upgrade was an upgrade to the electro-optical systems of three aircraft, which entered service in September 2005.<sup>124</sup> The full fitout for the entire fleet will not be completed until 2010.

The Chief of Air Force has described this upgrade as “right up there with the most modern of operational capability.”<sup>125</sup> It is notable that the upgrade will not enhance anti-submarine capability, but will substantially improve the Orion’s overland capability.<sup>126</sup> Once complete the Orions will be structurally sound, well-equipped patrol aircraft suitable for a broader range of tasks than they are currently capable of.

Continuity in this force element has occurred despite it being perhaps one of the most reviewed elements of the NZDF. Yet, despite changing policy, each review – be it White Paper or internal document - has come to a similar conclusion: that New Zealand requires a fleet of approximately six long range maritime patrol aircraft.<sup>127</sup>

### *Airlift*

Either continuity or reduction could be used to characterise the development of air transport during the post-Cold War period. The RNZAF has lost its Andover fleet, but maintained all other capabilities.

The RNZAF still has a fleet of five C-130H Hercules, the same number and type as it operated in 1991. They have received only minor self-defence upgrades during the period. They are becoming increasingly problematic to maintain, due to age.<sup>128</sup> On some days in the recent past, no Hercules at all have been serviceable.<sup>129</sup> However, a programme to upgrade the engines and airframe of the C-130s has been

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<sup>123</sup> Burton, *Background: RNZAF P-3 Orions*.

<sup>124</sup> Unknown Author, 'Surveillance upgrade', *RNZAF News*, vol. 63, September 2005. p.8

<sup>125</sup> Unknown Author, 'Green light for Orion upgrade', *Royal New Zealand Air Force News*, no. 52, September 2004. p.8-9

<sup>126</sup> Burton, *Background: RNZAF P-3 Orions*.

<sup>127</sup> Or, in the case of MPR2001, that while surveillance considerations did not justify the fleet, the need for some insurance necessitated their retention.

<sup>128</sup> New Zealand Defence Force, *Report of the New Zealand Defence Force for the year ended 30 June 2005*. p.92

<sup>129</sup> Unknown Author, 'Broken down planes leave transport squadron in 'parlous state'', *New Zealand Herald*, 15 July 2002.

authorised, and it is expected that these aircraft will remain in service until 2017 at least.<sup>130</sup>

Two Boeing 757s are the only major new type acquired by the RNZAF since 1991. They arrived in May and June 2003 as urgent replacements for the obsolescent Boeing 727s.<sup>131</sup> They have a maximum payload of 32,755kg, and provide non-deployable strategic air transport, delivering personnel and some non-bulky equipment.<sup>132</sup> They are currently undergoing a modification programme to enhance their cargo-carrying capability, and are expected to be fully operational by the middle of 2006.<sup>133</sup>

The RNZAF notes that “strategic transport remains a vital asset for a country that is surrounded by a 2000km moat,” requiring the maintenance of a “powerful, adaptable balance of air transport capability.”<sup>134</sup> The FEG is experiencing some problems. Manning levels are sufficient, but a heavy operational tempo has limited training for other tasks, and there have been major equipment problems, as noted above.<sup>135</sup> A shortage of maintenance personnel limits the sustainment capacity of this FEG.

As well as air transport, this FEG also provides VIP transport, support to the government, support for the Antarctic programme, search and rescue, and civil defence support. This FEG is perhaps the most hardworking part of the entire defence force.<sup>136</sup> The seven aircraft provided a total of 3591 flying hours in the latest reporting period.<sup>137</sup>

The rotary-winged fleet has stayed the same, with no change in the number of UH-1 helicopters operated. However, beginning in 2008, the UH-1s will be replaced with new, larger NH-90 helicopters.<sup>138</sup>

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<sup>130</sup> Royal New Zealand Air Force, 'Fixed Wing Transport Force', 2005, [accessed 9 February 2005]. Available from [www.airforce.mil.nz/about/forceelements/fixedwing.htm](http://www.airforce.mil.nz/about/forceelements/fixedwing.htm). and New Zealand Government, *Defence Long Term Development Plan - Update - June 2003*. p.18-19

<sup>131</sup> New Zealand Government, *Defence Long Term Development Plan - Update - June 2003*. p.24-25

<sup>132</sup> Royal New Zealand Air Force, 'Aircraft Boeing 757-200', 2005, [accessed 9 February 2005]. Available from [www.airforce.mil.nz/about/aircraft/boeing757.htm](http://www.airforce.mil.nz/about/aircraft/boeing757.htm).

<sup>133</sup> New Zealand Government, *Defence Long Term Development Plan Update*. p.11

<sup>134</sup> Royal New Zealand Air Force, 'Fixed Wing Transport Force', [accessed].

<sup>135</sup> New Zealand Defence Force, *Report of the New Zealand Defence Force for the year ended 30 June 2005*. p.91-93

<sup>136</sup> Royal New Zealand Air Force, 'Fixed Wing Transport Force', [accessed].

<sup>137</sup> New Zealand Defence Force, *Report of the New Zealand Defence Force for the year ended 30 June 2005*. p.91

<sup>138</sup> Burton, Parliamentary Question 4644; Goff, 'Goff inspects Navy's new MRV at Dutch shipyard', Press Release.; New Zealand Government, *Defence Long Term Development Plan Update*. p.26

The only real change to this FEG, the loss of the Andovers, was the direct result of economisation by National during the early part of the post-Cold War period. Apart from that, strategic policy has been consistent on the need for the existing transport fleet to be maintained. This is interesting, because with recent policy moves towards operational focus, an expansion of the transport fleet might have been expected. It is likely, however, that fiscal considerations have rendered any discussion of a restructured and expanded transport fleet moot.

### *Special Forces*

The smallest force element of the NZDF has seen markedly little change in the post-Cold War period. This is quite different to the situation in Australia. The NZDF retains a single SAS group and some other specialised forces.

1 NZ SAS Group is based in Papakura.<sup>139</sup> It consists of some 70 to 100 troops, divided into two squadrons.<sup>140</sup> Green squadron is a long range special forces group, whereas Black squadron is a dedicated counter-terrorist group.<sup>141</sup> The SAS is held at a very high state of readiness, and has often been deployed on overseas operations, including East Timor and Afghanistan.<sup>142</sup> The long range squadron operates in small teams, while the counter-terrorist group is a “last option” when all other attempts have failed; it operates under police command, rather than through strictly military channels. The SAS has experienced some personnel problems in recent years.<sup>143</sup>

Other specialised units include the Improvised Explosive Device Disposal and Chemical and Biological Response (IEDD/CB Response) teams.<sup>144</sup> The NZDF has been responsible since April 1999 for all explosive disposal in New Zealand.<sup>145</sup> The IEDD/CB Response teams are specifically tasked to deal with improvised weapons or other terrorist attacks. They have experienced difficulties in retaining personnel, and due to their importance substantial resources are being invested in this area, including

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<sup>139</sup> New Zealand Army, 'Army Organisational Chart', 2005, [accessed 9 February 2005]. It has been noted that the SAS spend much of their time at Hobsonville

<sup>140</sup> Unknown Author, 'Licensed to kill in the shadows', *New Zealand Herald*, 2 October 2001.

<sup>141</sup> New Zealand Defence Force, *Annual Report 2003-2004*, p.79-81 does not use Green/Black but does note the division into two separate teams.

<sup>142</sup> Unknown Author, 'Orion part of new deployments to Gulf and Afghanistan', *Royal New Zealand Air Force News*, no. 47, April 2004, p.8 and Unknown Author, 'Licensed to kill in the shadows'.

<sup>143</sup> New Zealand Defence Force, *Annual Report 2003-2004*, p.79-81 and Francesca Mold, 'Army looks to recruit more crack troops', *New Zealand Herald*, 21 December 2001.

<sup>144</sup> New Zealand Government, *Vote Defence Force*, Wellington, 2004, p.21

<sup>145</sup> New Zealand Army, 'Bomb Disposal Assistance.'

a lump sum retention bonus.<sup>146</sup> There is also a major re-equipment proposal currently awaiting Cabinet approval for these teams.<sup>147</sup>

Continuity in this area seems to be the result of a lack of attention being paid to special forces throughout the period. None of the major policy reviews of the period have suggested restructuring of the SAS group.<sup>148</sup> This is interesting, as developments throughout the period – and especially since 9/11 – have substantially increased the utility of special forces for a range of tasks.<sup>149</sup> Unfortunately, due to the secrecy surrounding the SAS, it is difficult to be sure exactly why they have not been expanded during the period.

### *Focus of Training*

The focus of training in the NZDF has remained on conventional operations, despite major changes in the strategic environment.

Within the Army, collective training is based on a two-year cycle.<sup>150</sup> Most exercises are modelled on conventional warfare.<sup>151</sup> Other types of exercise are also undertaken. Services-assisted evacuations are occasionally rehearsed, often in conjunction with the armed forces of other nations, where the lack of a particular capability in the NZDF can be made up.<sup>152</sup> Exercise Lawman was a major, multi-agency counter-terrorist exercise involving a wide swathe of territory.<sup>153</sup> Few peace-support exercises are held, with one notable exception being Tasman Reserve, an East Timor-style reserve exercise.<sup>154</sup> The Army does very little urban warfare training.<sup>155</sup> It

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<sup>146</sup> Shannon Fell, 'Day's work a real blast', *Army News*, no. 319, 12 October 2004. p.4

<sup>147</sup> New Zealand Government, *Defence Long Term Development Plan Update*. p.30

<sup>148</sup> New Zealand Cabinet Policy Committee, 'Defence Review Process', POL(00)180, 7 November 2000, Wellington. p.1 notes a special forces review but no information on this has come to light.

<sup>149</sup> There are signs of movement: a new Counter-Terrorist Tactical Assault Group and Explosive Ordnance Disposal Squadron have been established in the last year or so. However, these changes do not alter the analytical category from continuity to restructuring due to their relatively small scope. New Zealand Defence Force, *Report of the New Zealand Defence Force for the year ended 30 June 2006*, Wellington, October 2006, p.90

<sup>150</sup> New Zealand Army, 'Training - Collective', 2005, [accessed 9 February 2005]. Available from [www.army.mil.nz/default.asp?CHANNEL=ABOUT+NZ+ARMY&PAGE=Training](http://www.army.mil.nz/default.asp?CHANNEL=ABOUT+NZ+ARMY&PAGE=Training).

<sup>151</sup> Rebecca Reedy, 'NZLAVs off to Oz', *Army News*, no. 311, 22 June 2004. p.1; Unknown Author, 'W Coy eyes on LAV', *Army News*, no. 311, 22 June 2004. p.8-9; Barry Allison, 'Under the shadow of Ruapehu', *Army News*, no. 299, 11 November 2003. p.7-8

<sup>152</sup> Phil McMillan, 'The 1 RNZIR French connection', *Army News*, no. 313, 20 July 2004. p.5 and Unknown Author, 'W Coy in jungle exercise', *Army News*, no. 319, 12 October 2004. p.10

<sup>153</sup> Murray Brown, 'Ex LAWMAN tests terrorist attack response', *Army News*, no. 307, 27 April 2004. p.3

<sup>154</sup> Carey Clements, 'A 'national flavour' for Kiwi contingent to Tasman Reserve', *Army News*, no. 304, 2 March 2004. p.7

is also notable that there is little emphasis on non-conventional combat operations, such as counter-insurgencies.

In the NCF, training emphasises conventional warfare and blue water operations.<sup>156</sup> A similar blue water orientation is reflected across the fleet. The RNZN as a whole engages quite frequently in multinational exercises, especially with Australia. Again, most of these are conventional-type exercises. Little training is done in littoral operations or in preparing for non-conventional operations, both combat and non-combat. Some training capabilities may not be up to standard.<sup>157</sup>

The loss of the Air Combat Wing has reduced the number of large, multinational exercises the RNZAF participates in, but there are a variety of other training programmes.<sup>158</sup>

Continuity in training largely reflects the broad continuity of governmental policy, which has retained conventional warfighting as the primary task for the NZDF. It might also be suggested that the NZDF has also retained a focus on conventional training because of its own institutional beliefs and desires.

### *Selection of Future Weapons*

While the procurement process has been restructured in the period since 1991, the types of capabilities acquired have not. By and large, the NZDF has continued along a platform replacement path, and has not considered any greatly innovative systems throughout the period.

## **Summing Up NZDF Continuity And Change**

As can be seen, reduction and continuity are the most common trends in the development of the NZDF since 1991. When force elements are weighted for importance, the dominance of reduction and continuity is even greater. Restructuring

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<sup>155</sup> Lorraine Carmody, 'D Company 2/1 RNZIR trains in urban warfare', *Army News*, no. 296, September 2003.

<sup>156</sup> Ryan Marsden, 'HMNZS Te Mana', *Navy Today*, no. 86, March 2004. and Kerry Driver, 'HMNZS Te Kaha', *Navy Today*, no. 86, March 2004. p.6

<sup>157</sup> Royal New Zealand Navy, *RNZN Strategic Plan 2001-2006*. p.24

<sup>158</sup> Unknown Author, 'Blackbird', *Royal New Zealand Air Force News*, no. 53, October 2004. p.25-26; Unknown Author, 'Skytrain 2003', *Royal New Zealand Air Force News*, no. 43, November 2003. p.27; Grant Carr, 'TACEX 14-24 March', *Royal New Zealand Air Force News*, no. 59, May 2005. p.24; Grant Carr, 'Creatures of the Night', *RNZAF News*, no. 60, June 2005. p.20

is apparent only in those areas where it did not require major new acquisitions, such as roles, doctrine, and command structure. In those elements where restructuring would have required major new funding, such as the force element groups, it has not occurred, except for one or two exceptions. Overall, the NZDF is a smaller version of its 1991 state, albeit often with modernised equipment.

This continuity and reduction is the direct result of the policy process examined in Chapter Five. The general continuity of policy has been reflected in force structure. And, where policy has suggested economisation, this has also been reflected in force structure. There is no evidence of force structure development being independent of strategic policy.

The Army has changed little. It has received some new equipment, but this is platform replacement, not restructuring. It is roughly the same size and has similar overall capabilities. Its role has changed, however, but that has not been reflected in physical capabilities. The period since 1991 has been one of decline then growth for the Army, with the turnaround during the period from 1997-1999, in the aftermath of *SONZ97*.

The RNZAF has lost much of its capability during the period. It has lost the ACF, its Andover fleet, and its training capability. Today it is tasked almost solely with supporting and enabling tasks, notably transport and surveillance.

The RNZN, of all the three services, has been the most restructured. It has changed its focus from frigates to patrol craft, and gained (and lost) transport capability. It would be unable to operate in a conventional combat environment, but has enhanced capability for many tasks other than war.

Overall, if the three categories of analysis were applied to the three services, we might say that the Army has undergone continuity, the RNZAF reduction, and the RNZN restructuring. The end result, however, is an NZDF that is not particularly altered. There are shifts away from combat operations and towards other operations, but they are not extreme. Broad explanations for this continuity and reduction are given in the following chapter, but before that can be done the ADF must also be examined, as is done below.

## The ADF

Restructuring	Reduction	Continuity
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Command Structure</li> <li>• Amphibious Force</li> <li>• Service Roles and Balance</li> <li>• Doctrine</li> <li>• Reserve Structure</li> <li>• Special Forces</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Personnel</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Surface Combatant Force</li> <li>• Strike/Reconnaissance Force</li> <li>• Fighter Force</li> <li>• Patrol Boat Force</li> <li>• Air Lift Group</li> <li>• Land Forces Organisation and Equipment</li> <li>• Budget</li> <li>• Focus of Training</li> <li>• Selection of Future Weapons</li> </ul>

### Restructuring

#### *Command Structure*

While much of Australia's higher command and control structure has remained unchanged over the past fifteen years, the establishment of the Joint Operational Command (JOC), Special Operations Command (SOC) and Joint Offshore Protection Command (JOPC) justifies classifying the command framework as restructured.

During the 1990s and early part of the 2000s, Commander Australian Theatre (COMAST) was the primary operational commander, with Maritime, Air and Land

Components below him.<sup>159</sup> In 1997, command of Special Forces was shifted to COMAST control as well.<sup>160</sup>

In March 2004, however, a new Joint Operations Command (JOC) was established. While for now it lacks a single geographical location, by 2007/2008 a fully operational headquarters will be built in Bungendore, New South Wales.<sup>161</sup> The goal of the JOC is to “simplify and streamline the ADF’s command structure and allow more effective control of force on operations.”<sup>162</sup> JOC is headed by the Vice Chief of Defence Force as Chief Joint Operations. JOC includes Maritime, Land, Air, Special Operations and Joint Logistics Components.<sup>163</sup> It combines a variety of previously existent headquarters and organisations: HQAST, Northern Command, the Deployable Joint Force Headquarters, and the Strategic Operations Division.<sup>164</sup> JOC is responsible to the government for all ADF operations. Its Strategic Operations Division undertakes 24hr monitoring of operations,<sup>165</sup> and its utility will likely only rise when the dedicated headquarters is completed. JOC is more than merely a successor to HQAST.

Special Operations Command was founded in the aftermath of the Bali bombings, and is responsible to JOC, CDF or Chief of Army, depending on the specifics of the issue.<sup>166</sup> Joint Offshore Protection Command links Customs and the ADF.<sup>167</sup> It is responsible for the implementation, coordination and management of off-shore maritime security. It is jointly responsible to both CDF and the CEO of Customs, and is designed primarily to protect against terrorism.

Overall, the higher command structure of the ADF has been restructured during the post-Cold War period. It now encompasses a single dedicated operational command, a separate special forces command, and has enhanced linkages to other

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<sup>159</sup> David Horner, *Making the Australian Defence Force*. South Melbourne, Oxford University Press, 2001. p.128

<sup>160</sup> Ibid. p.197

<sup>161</sup> Unknown Author, 'New HQ approved', *Air Force*, vol. 46, no. 15, 26 August 2004. and Robert Hill, 'Changes to Australian Defence Force Higher Command Arrangements', Press Release, 16 March 2004. [www.minister.defence.gov.au/Hilltpl.cfm?CurrentId=3657](http://www.minister.defence.gov.au/Hilltpl.cfm?CurrentId=3657). and Unknown Author, 'Progress on joint force HQ', *Asia-Pacific Defence Reporter*, vol. 27, no. 6, October 2001. p.25

<sup>162</sup> Unknown Author, 'Command changes', *Air Force*, vol. 46, no. 04, 25 March 2004. cf. with Hill, 'Changes to Australian Defence Force Higher Command Arrangements', Press Release.

<sup>163</sup> Unknown Author, 'Command changes'.

<sup>164</sup> Australian Department of Defence, *Annual Report 2003/04*, Canberra, 2004. p.62

<sup>165</sup> Ibid. p.192

<sup>166</sup> Duncan Lewis, 'Guarding Australians Against Terrorism', *Australian Army Journal (Land Warfare Studies Centre)*, vol. 1, no. 2, December 2003. p.49

<sup>167</sup> Graham Davis, 'New structure set to secure assets', *Navy News (Australia)*, vol. 48, no. 04, 24 March 2005.

government agencies. Change to the command structure has flowed from a variety of reviews,<sup>168</sup> and seems to be a direct response to the increasing operational tempo experienced by the ADF in the post-Cold War period.

### *Amphibious Force*

The RAN's amphibious element has been substantially upgraded, with the addition of two Landing Platforms Amphibious (LPAs), HMAS *Manoora* and *Kanimbla*. These provide improved capability for littoral operations, and both over-the-beach and vertical envelopment assaults. *Tobruk* remains in service without major modifications, but there are questions about how long she can continue to do so.

The current mission of the amphibious element is "to provide amphibious... force elements capable of successful operations with joint or combined forces – both now and into the future."<sup>169</sup> It is involved in estate management, surveillance operations, peace support, and also has a major training role.

The LPAs are converted LST-1179 class ships, and were originally American tank landing ships with a large over-bow ramp, a capacity for 29 tanks and 350 troops, and a speed of 20 knots.<sup>170</sup> They underwent a major conversion to helicopter-capable ships, and can now carry up to 450 troops and 4 UH-60 helicopters.<sup>171</sup> They are armed with a single Phalanx close-in-weapons-system, and have large command and control facilities, thus allowing them to serve as command ships during amphibious operations.<sup>172</sup> They are being refitted to allow them to transport Abrams tanks.<sup>173</sup> During recent disaster relief operations in Indonesia HMAS *Kanimbla* operated as a command ship.<sup>174</sup>

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<sup>168</sup> Including the 1991 FSR, 1994 White Paper, 1997 Strategic Review, and 2000 White Paper.

<sup>169</sup> Royal Australian Navy, 'Amphibious and Afloat Support Group', 11 October 2004, [accessed 18 February 2005]. Available from [www.navy.gov.au/fegs/aasg.htm](http://www.navy.gov.au/fegs/aasg.htm).

<sup>170</sup> Military Analysis Network, 'LST-1179 Newport-class', [accessed 28 October 2004]. Available from [www.fas.org/man/dod-101/sys/ship/lst-1179.htm](http://www.fas.org/man/dod-101/sys/ship/lst-1179.htm).

<sup>171</sup> Andrew Toppan, 'World Navies Today', 25 March 2002, [accessed 28 October 2004]. Available from [www.hazegray.org/worldnav/asiapac/austral.htm](http://www.hazegray.org/worldnav/asiapac/austral.htm).

<sup>172</sup> Royal Australian Navy, 'Landing Platform Amphibious', 11 October 2004, [accessed 18 February 2005]. Available from [www.navy.gov.au/fleet/amphib.htm](http://www.navy.gov.au/fleet/amphib.htm).

<sup>173</sup> Unknown Author, 'Manoora due for a return', *Navy News (Australia)*, vol. 47, no. 11, 1 July 2004.

<sup>174</sup> Graham Davis and Kate Noble, 'Oasis amidst the havoc', *Navy News (Australia)*, vol. 48, no. 03, 10 March 2005.

The acquisition of *Manoora* and *Kanimbla* was the result of a process begun in the very end stages of the Cold War, but modified by policymakers during the early post-Cold War period.

The future will see change in this area, as the RAN is in the first stages of a process to acquire new amphibious ships. They will be of a size and capability far greater than any operated today. One will replace the *Tobruk*, while the other will replace either *Manoora* or *Kanimbla*. There are two possible options, ranging in size from 22,000 to 27,000 tonnes, each capable of operating six helicopters and deploying 1,000 personnel.<sup>175</sup> These new ships will enhance ADF amphibious operations substantially,<sup>176</sup> and can be seen as a vital part of a true maritime strategy. They have their genesis in *Defence 2000* but it also seems that there has been some “specification creep” since.<sup>177</sup>

### *Service Roles and Balance*

As part of the move towards a “maritime strategy” the roles of the three services have changed markedly. The Army is no longer tasked merely with low level operations in protection of Australia, but is now increasingly focused towards expeditionary, littoral operations. The RAAF has also shifted towards expeditionary operations, as has the RAN. However, in the case of the last two services, while their roles have shifted, equipment has lagged a little behind, and it will be some time before their equipment fit matches their expeditionary focus.

Service roles have evolved directly from the various policy reviews of the post-Cold War period.<sup>178</sup> The development of them can be clearly tracked through examination of the rhetoric of each document. Unfortunately, public Australian defence policy does not include the same detailed list of Employment Contexts found

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<sup>175</sup> Unknown Author, 'New ships on the way', *Navy News (Australia)*, vol. 48, no. 16, 8 September 2005.

<sup>176</sup> See Australian Defence Association, *Defence Brief 106*, July 2004, p.2-3 and Unknown Author, 'ADF Amphibious Capability: Implications for Navy', *Semaphore - Newsletter of the Sea Power Centre Australia*, no. 8, August 2004.

<sup>177</sup> Hugh White, 'Fewer but bigger doesn't mean better equipment when it comes to security', *Sydney Morning Herald*, 24 November 2003.

<sup>178</sup> Australian Government, *Defending Australia: Defence White Paper 1994*, Canberra: Australian Government Printing Service, 1994.; Australian Department of Defence, *Australia's Strategic Policy*, Canberra, 1997.; Australian Government, *Defence 2000: Our Future Defence Force*, Canberra, 2000.; Australian Department of Defence, *Australia's National Security - A Defence Update 2005*, Canberra, December 2005; Australian Government, *Australia's National Security - A Defence Update 2003*, Canberra, 2003.

in its New Zealand equivalent, so a closer examination of specific changes in expected roles cannot be made.

Overall, the major change has been a shift towards expeditionary operations, rather than a move away from conventional operations towards operations-other-than-war. Only in one non-conventional area, terrorism, has there been a major change in the expected roles of the services.

However, in relation to this there has been only minor change in the proportionate sizes of the various services within the ADF. In 1991, the Army possessed 44.5% of total Regular personnel strength, the Navy 23%, and the Air Force 32.5%.<sup>179</sup> The figures today are 49% Army,<sup>180</sup> 26% RAAF,<sup>181</sup> and 25% RAN.<sup>182</sup> This shift towards the Army has developed despite continuing focus at the strategic policy level on maritime forces, and is difficult to explain fully. The *Force Structure Review 1991* cut all three forces, and personnel cuts since have not been focused on one service. Recent moves towards a greater Army role have not had sufficient time to substantially alter the personnel share of that service. It may merely be the result of the various efficiency programmes carried out throughout the 1990s, and suggest either that the RAAF has been more vigorous in its pruning of excess capabilities, or that the Army requires a larger number of personnel to maintain its basic capabilities.

### *Doctrine*

There has been dramatic change in the doctrine of both the ADF as a corporate whole, and its constituent services. This is deserving of close examination, as it indicates a greater degree of innovation than is apparent in strategic policy. Generally, current doctrine is oriented towards RMA-paradigm conventional warfare, although some mention is made of OOTW.

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<sup>179</sup> Check the 1991 figures

<sup>180</sup> Australian Department of Defence, *Annual Report 2004-05*, Canberra, November 2005. p.93

<sup>181</sup> *Ibid.* p.90

<sup>182</sup> Australian Government, *Portfolio Budget Statements 2004-2005, Defence Portfolio*, Canberra, 7 May 2004. p.205

The ADF Warfare centre is responsible for the production of ADF joint doctrine.<sup>183</sup> The cornerstone ADF doctrinal publication is *The Australian Approach to Warfare* (AATW), the latest edition of which was published in 2002.<sup>184</sup>

AATW espouses several key warfare concepts:

- the integration of multiple services into joint operations;
- the early resolution of conflicts allowing Australia to also win the peace;
- the maximisation of physical and psychological pressure on the enemy, rather than focusing on attrition and territory;
- the mobility of forces and use of well-directed firepower to ensure economy of effort and decisive effect;
- the ability to operate effectively in coalition.<sup>185</sup>

AATW supports the use of manoeuvre warfare, and due to the ADF's relatively small size notes that such an approach may indeed be a matter of necessity, as the ADF lacks the size and capacity for attritional warfare.<sup>186</sup> In relation to focus, AATW notes the need to train for conventional, high-intensity warfighting, as this allows a step-down to lower intensity tasks, whereas it notes the reverse is not true.<sup>187</sup>

Overall, AATW is a relatively conventional doctrinal publication. It does not embrace the Revolution in Military Affairs to any great extent, although it does focus on manoeuvre over attrition. However, another major doctrinal publication indicates a shift within the ADF towards the RMA-paradigm.

The *Future Warfighting Concept* (FWC) dates from 2003, only a year after the latest edition of AATW, but is a far more forward-looking publication.<sup>188</sup> Its purpose is "to guide joint and single-service concept development and capability decisions."<sup>189</sup> It is an indication as to how the ADF "aspire(s) to fight in the future."<sup>190</sup>

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<sup>183</sup> Horner, *Making the Australian Defence Force*. p.283. Interview with Australian Defence Official C, 25 November 2005. He notes that all three services have input.

<sup>184</sup> Australian Defence Force, *The Australian Approach to Warfare*, Canberra, June 2002.

<sup>185</sup> *Ibid.* p.23-24

<sup>186</sup> *Ibid.* p.24

<sup>187</sup> *Ibid.* p.27

<sup>188</sup> Australian Defence Force, *Future Warfighting Concept*, ADDP-D.02, Canberra, 2003.

<sup>189</sup> *Ibid.* p.2

<sup>190</sup> *Ibid.* p.2

*Future Warfighting Concept* states that Australia's approach to warfighting will be shaped by the international system and the nature of the future battlespace.<sup>191</sup> The key to success is an approach termed multidimensional manoeuvre, involving high tempo, agility, simultaneity, and delivered through an indirect approach.<sup>192</sup> The need for surprise and asymmetric fighting capability is also mentioned. Joint task forces are seen as the primary means of fighting.

*Future Warfighting Concept* is extremely supportive of network enabled warfare.<sup>193</sup> It favours effects-based operations (EBO), focusing on outcomes rather than inputs, and utilising a whole-of-nation approach to warfare; this is noted as being "very different from today."<sup>194</sup>

*Future Warfighting Concept*, despite its name, sees its approach as being applicable across the entire spectrum of operations – this, in the publication, ranges from disaster relief through to high intensity conventional war.<sup>195</sup> It notes that the ADF needs to be versatile, but reiterates the *AATW* statement that warfighting must be the core of preparation and training, because only then will the ADF be able to contribute to the full spectrum of operations.<sup>196</sup>

There are definite signs that the ADF is moving towards the network-centric approach of *Future Warfighting Concept*.<sup>197</sup> Recently, a *Network Centred Warfare Roadmap* was released as "defence's internal guide to discovering and exploiting the opportunities of network centred warfare."<sup>198</sup> Its goal is a "seamless, network enabled, information age force"<sup>199</sup> by the year 2020.<sup>200</sup> The Minister of Defence, in addressing a recent NCW conference, indicated he felt a network-based approach, away from platform orientation, and towards systems focus, was the best direction for the ADF to move in.<sup>201</sup>

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<sup>191</sup> Ibid. p.6

<sup>192</sup> Ibid. p.25-26

<sup>193</sup> Ibid. p.37

<sup>194</sup> Ibid. p.29

<sup>195</sup> Ibid. p.24

<sup>196</sup> Ibid. p.14

<sup>197</sup> Richard Bitzinger, *Defense Transformation and the Asia Pacific: Implications for Regional Militaries*, Vol 3 Number 7: Asia-Pacific Center for Strategic Studies, 2004. p.2

<sup>198</sup> Andrew Stackpool, 'Warfare map is out soon', *Air Force*, vol. 46, no. 18, 7 October 2004.

<sup>199</sup> Australian Department of Defence, *NCW Roadmap 2005*, Canberra: Defence Publishing Service, October 2005. p.iii

<sup>200</sup> Australian Department of Defence, 'Network Centric Warfare', Press Release, 6 October 2005, CPA 237/05.

<sup>201</sup> Robert Hill, 'Address to the ADF Network Centric Warfare Conference', Press Release, 20 May 2003, MIN200503/03. [www.minister.defence.gov.au/Hilltpl.cfm?CurrentId=2770](http://www.minister.defence.gov.au/Hilltpl.cfm?CurrentId=2770).

There is a distinct difference between *AATW* and *Future Warfighting Concept*. The former, while espousing manoeuvre, speed and the indirect approach, is somewhat traditionalist; it is the expression of a hundred years of concentrated institutional wisdom. The latter is a more innovative doctrine. The applicability of *Future Warfighting Concept*, however, may be somewhat less than that of *AATW*. It is difficult to see how NCW and EBO concepts can be satisfactorily translated to operations other than combat,<sup>202</sup> whereas *AATW* is inherently more flexible. Also, one can question whether *Future Warfighting Concept* is particularly Australian-centric, as it reads much like US doctrine.

However, while its qualities or lack thereof are matters of debate, it seems certain that it is *Future Warfighting Concept* that will be the primary doctrinal guide for the ADF in the near future, and that the next edition of *AATW* will likely be focused on NCW and EBO.

Overall, the ADF's doctrine is oriented primarily to warfighting by networked, joint forces; espouses swift, decisive strikes; and seeks to avoid strength on strength confrontations. There is, however, some attention paid to the requirements of peacekeeping.<sup>203</sup>

The three services each have their own fundamental doctrine, and some disjunctures between them can be seen. The Army's is entitled *Fundamentals of Land Warfare (FLW)*.<sup>204</sup> The latest edition dates from 2003. It states that modern land warfare is continuous, with a high operational tempo, reduced density, is fought at extended range with precision weapons, is increasingly reliant on perception and information, and is more and more decentralised and thus focused on the individual soldier.<sup>205</sup>

*FLW* states that the Army must be able to uphold and protect Australia's sovereignty, and also function in other operations; however, yet again it reiterates the need for warfighting skills first and foremost: "the Army's adeptness in warfighting

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<sup>202</sup> See Adam Cobb, 'Can We Defend Ourselves Against Terrorism?' *Quadrant*, vol. XLVII, no. 6, June 2003. This criticises the ADF's focus on RMA concepts.

<sup>203</sup> Unknown Author, 'The peacekeeping business', *Defence Magazine (The Official Magazine of the Australian Department of Defence)*, June 2005.; Andy Anderson, 'Keeping the peace on-line', *Air Force*, vol. 47, no. 13, 8 July 2005.

<sup>204</sup> Australian Army, *Fundamentals of Land Warfare - LWD1*, 2003.

<sup>205</sup> *Ibid.* Chapter One

provides the essential foundation for it to be able to undertake the full range of military operations.”<sup>206</sup>

*FLW* notes “the Army’s mission is to win the land battle.”<sup>207</sup> Land operations might encompass warfighting, MOOTCW, and shaping operations.<sup>208</sup> The first includes contribution to coalition operations, strike and denial operations, and others. The second includes peacekeeping and peace enforcement. The third includes exercises and training programmes, and contributing to regional surveillance.

*FLW* notes that the maritime concept of strategy espoused by Australia still requires the involvement of land forces. *FLW* promotes an Australian style of warfare, based on manoeuvre, the Knowledge Edge, co-operation in military operations, versatility and adaptability. Commanders “should expect to confront a clever and creative enemy who will also attempt to apply manoeuvre theory. Superior tempo and security are essential to developing a winning advantage.”<sup>209</sup> Thus, the key to success is superior use of “manoeuvre theory,” a concept deserving of further attention here:<sup>210</sup>

the manoeuvrist approach is a warfighting philosophy that is well suited to Australia... (it is) not a detailed prescription of what to do in battle. Instead the manoeuvrist approach aims to develop a state of mind that focuses the Australian soldier's courage, initiative and teamwork against a creative and thinking enemy.<sup>211</sup>

Australian land commanders should thus avoid attritional warfare, and strength-on-strength confrontation. They should utilise combined arms teams, joint warfare, mission command, and superior training to ensure success. However, along with descriptions of the right fighting techniques is an emphasis on purpose, integrity and morale; *FLW* believes not merely in fighting well, but in fighting the right way.<sup>212</sup>

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<sup>206</sup> Ibid. Chapter Three

<sup>207</sup> Ibid. Chapter One

<sup>208</sup> Ibid. Chapter Three

<sup>209</sup> Ibid. Chapter Four

<sup>210</sup> It should be noted that this concept looms larger in *The Australian Approach to Warfare*.

<sup>211</sup> Australian Army, *Fundamentals of Land Warfare - LWD1*. Chapter Four

<sup>212</sup> Ibid. Chapter Five

While there is emphasis on NCW and such concepts in *FLW*, it is less revolutionary than *Future Warfighting Concept*.<sup>213</sup> *FLW* again harks back to traditional Australian warfighting concepts of manoeuvre and directive control. It is a clear and coherent operational level doctrine for warfighting, and emphasises combat tasks above others, for the reason that it is believed such an approach is applicable to all military roles.

The RAN's primary doctrinal publication is *Australian Maritime Doctrine (AMD)*.<sup>214</sup> It is a comprehensive document dealing with the entire range of naval operations.

*Australian Maritime Doctrine* states the RAN's role is to:

1. Be able to fight and win in the maritime environment as an element of a joint or combined force;
2. Assist in maintaining Australia's sovereignty, and;
3. Contribute to the security of the region.<sup>215</sup>

*AMD* uses Booth's concept of three types of naval roles: diplomatic, constabulary, and military.<sup>216</sup> The first set includes assistance to the civil community and disaster relief amongst others. Constabulary roles include sanctions and blockade enforcement. Military tasks are those related to actual warfighting. As with other ADF doctrine, *AMD* states the RAN is "focused on delivery of combat capability."<sup>217</sup>

*AMD* states that "success in the maritime environment depends upon creating and maintaining battlespace awareness."<sup>218</sup> There is an emphasis on C4, intelligence and networking, and the point is made that few maritime operations can be successfully carried out without air units.<sup>219</sup>

Time and time again, *AMD* returns to the importance of knowledge. It states the single most important factor in a maritime operation is information flow.<sup>220</sup> It

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<sup>213</sup> See criticism in Alan Stephens, 'Future army - NCW or knife fights', *Asia-Pacific Defence Reporter*, vol. 31, no. 4, May 2005. p.37

<sup>214</sup> Royal Australian Navy, *Australian Maritime Doctrine - RAN Doctrine 1*. Canberra, 2000.

<sup>215</sup> *Ibid.* p.5

<sup>216</sup> *Ibid.* p.57

<sup>217</sup> *Ibid.* p.81

<sup>218</sup> *Ibid.* p.89

<sup>219</sup> *Ibid.* p.91-95

<sup>220</sup> *Ibid.* p.113

states the key issue of combat is not weaponry but knowledge.<sup>221</sup> These statements seemingly indicate that *AMD* is an RMA-paradigm doctrine, although mention of the concepts of NCW and EBO is strangely lacking.<sup>222</sup>

The blue vs. green water debate is not particularly apparent in this publication. There is no major emphasis on littoral operations, although mention is made of supporting shore deployments.<sup>223</sup> Because of the fact it is a force-level publication, it does not delve too deeply into operational requirements. One can, however, discern some attention towards non-combat operations, if at a limited level; combat remains pre-eminent, although the sort of combat to be expected is not assessed. As with *FLW*, *AMD* is an evolutionary rather than revolutionary document, and one that does not attempt to direct the RAN in a particularly new and different path. There is little mention of post-Cold War security challenges, or the need for estate management operations.

The current foundational doctrinal publication for the RAAF is *Fundamentals of Australian Aerospace Power (FAAP)*, 4<sup>th</sup> Edition, 2002.<sup>224</sup> It is a lengthy document covering a wide range of issues.

*FAAP* states that control of the air is the first principle of doctrine.<sup>225</sup> Air power is seen as an “essential component of a nation’s military capability.”<sup>226</sup> Indeed, aerospace power is seen as being differentiated from other forms of combat power by the “synergistic effect of its characteristics.”<sup>227</sup>

*FAAP* attempts to identify the strengths and weaknesses of aerospace power along a broad range of scenarios.<sup>228</sup> It notes the use of aerospace power for civil as well as military tasks, but as with other service doctrine is careful to point out the vital importance of warfighting.<sup>229</sup>

*FAAP* identifies four capability groupings – Offensive Combat, Rapid Mobility, Flexible Combat Support, and Surveillance and Battlespace Management.<sup>230</sup>

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<sup>221</sup> Ibid. p.124

<sup>222</sup> Perhaps due to the fact this publication was released in 2000.

<sup>223</sup> Royal Australian Navy, *Australian Maritime Doctrine - RAN Doctrine 1*. p.121

<sup>224</sup> Royal Australian Air Force, *Fundamentals of Australian Aerospace Power AAP1000*. 4th ed. Fairbairn, 2002.

<sup>225</sup> Ibid. p.5

<sup>226</sup> Ibid. p.58

<sup>227</sup> Ibid. p.122

<sup>228</sup> Ibid. p.122

<sup>229</sup> Ibid. p.92, 100 cf. Australian Army, *Fundamentals of Land Warfare - LWD1*; Royal Australian Navy, *Australian Maritime Doctrine - RAN Doctrine 1*.

<sup>230</sup> Royal Australian Air Force, *Fundamentals of Australian Aerospace Power AAP1000*. p.156

The correlation with the RAAF's FEGs can be easily seen, an indication, perhaps, that doctrine has stimulated reorganisation.<sup>231</sup> Below capabilities are roles, and *FAAP* identifies a broad range of such, including counter-air, strike, aerial mining, offensive air support, airlift, information operations, search and rescue, battlespace management and combat support.<sup>232</sup>

It is interesting that *FAAP* does not espouse a more revolutionary NCW-centric paradigm of warfighting. Mention of the RMA is somewhat limited, even given the fact that, in general, it is Air Forces that are more supportive of such concepts.

There has thus been a clear trend in doctrine towards innovative concepts of conventional warfighting building on the RMA paradigm. This can be seen most clearly in Army doctrine, and the *Future Warfighting Concept*; however the doctrine of the other two services seems, surprisingly, to be less supportive of RMA concepts. Comparing doctrine to strategic policy, as seen in the previous chapter, seems to indicate that doctrine has been consistently more innovative than strategic policy, especially in recent years.<sup>233</sup> Indeed, linkages between such documents as *Future Warfighting Concept* and stated policy as in *Defence 2000* and *Defence Update 2005* are thin at best; doctrine seems to support a higher intensity concept of expeditionary warfare than that supported by strategic policy. What is clear, however, is that both ADF and service doctrines have consistently focused on conventional operations in the post-Cold War period, rather than OOTW.

### *Reserve Structure*

There has been substantial change in the structure and tasking of the ADF reserves in the post-Cold War period. This has been especially apparent in the period since 2001, and is best explained as a reaction to evolving demands for homeland security in the aftermath of the September 11 attacks. There are now four categories

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<sup>231</sup> Or, possibly, vice versa.

<sup>232</sup> Royal Australian Air Force, *Fundamentals of Australian Aerospace Power AAPI000*. p.162-220

<sup>233</sup> This may be linked to increased service independence in recent years, as noted in Chapter Six. This issue is considered in greater depth in the following chapter also.

of reserves: High Readiness Active, High Readiness Specialist, Active and Specialist, and Standby.<sup>234</sup>

The Army Reserve Response Force was established in 2003. Its primary role is domestic security, cordoning off areas and providing static protection of a site; to “complement the ADF’s full-time capabilities.”<sup>235</sup> Currently one Reserve Response Force is maintained per reserve brigade, and another in Special Operations Command.<sup>236</sup> They are company sized, and total strength is approximately 750 personnel.

The Naval Reserve is designed to act as part of a “total force.”<sup>237</sup> Members of the reserve have the chance to sail on any of the RAN’s ships, and reservists have been frequently involved on operations. Approximately 240 reservists are on active duty at any one time.<sup>238</sup> Some reservists work in formed reserve units, as in New Zealand, while others are parcelled out amongst the regular force.

This seeding of reserve personnel amongst regulars seems to have two major benefits: firstly, it enhances the capability of the regular force, by averting personnel shortfalls, and secondly, it improves the capability of the reservists by exposing them more frequently to operations.

The effectiveness of Australia’s reserve forces is higher today than it was in 1991, and their role has shifted. Their primary function is now domestic security rather than the sustainment of regular force deployments. There has been no shift towards providing certain niche capabilities for overseas operations, such as is the paradigm in the United States. The question is, given the small size of the reserves, whether they can fulfil both roles. Will their tasking towards domestic security hinder the already limited ability of the ADF to undertake sustained deployments overseas? It seems that the shift of reserve focus to domestic security in the aftermath of

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<sup>234</sup> Greg Garde, 'The ADF Reserves', *Royal United Services Institute Journal*, vol. 23, December 2001. p.28

<sup>235</sup> Robert Hill, 'Reserves to bolster Australia's defences against terrorism', Press Release, 18 May 2003, MIN64/03. [www.minister.defence.gov.au/Hilltpl.cfm?CurrentId=2760](http://www.minister.defence.gov.au/Hilltpl.cfm?CurrentId=2760).

<sup>236</sup> Robert Hill, 'Army tests Reserves response to terrorism', Press Release, 19 March 2004, MIN56/04. [www.minister.defence.gov.au/Hilltpl.cfm?CurrentId=3671](http://www.minister.defence.gov.au/Hilltpl.cfm?CurrentId=3671).

<sup>237</sup> Royal Australian Navy, 'About Naval Reserve', 11 October 2004, [accessed 18 February 2005]. Available from [www.navy.gov.au/reserves\\_new/about/about.cfm?mnoID=2](http://www.navy.gov.au/reserves_new/about/about.cfm?mnoID=2); Royal Australian Navy, 'Welcome to the Australian Naval Reserve online', 11 October 2004, [accessed 18 February 2005]. Available from [www.navy.gov.au/reserves\\_new/home/home.cfm](http://www.navy.gov.au/reserves_new/home/home.cfm).

<sup>238</sup> Kathryn Fitch, 'Reserves - in high readiness', *Defence Magazine (The Official Magazine of the Australian Department of Defence)*, September 2005.

September 11 and Bali contradicts shifts in the larger force towards expeditionary, maritime operations.<sup>239</sup>

It should also be remembered that the development of the ADF reserves during the post-Cold War period has not been one of steady evolution. Early restructurings, such as the Ready Reserve, were stillborn, and it has rather been Coalition policy since 2000 that has created the reserve structure of today.

### *Special Forces*

Perhaps the one element of ADF force structure that has seen the greatest degree of restructuring is special forces. From a single SAS regiment and commando battalion it has grown to include an additional commando battalion, an additional Tactical Assault Group, an Incident Response Regiment, and as noted earlier, its own dedicated command. This has given ADF special forces a greater capability in all special operations tasks than was the case in 1991.

Special Operations Command controls four major formations today: the SAS Regiment, 4<sup>th</sup> Bn (Commando) the RAR, 1 Commando Regiment, and the Incident Response Regiment.<sup>240</sup> Special Operations Command has both an expeditionary and domestic role, but ADF units can only be called on for domestic tasks when state/territory organisations do not have the capability to deal with a security incident. The state or territory must then apply to the federal government for assistance, which will be controlled by the Protective Security Coordination Centre within the Attorney General's department.<sup>241</sup> Recent legislation, yet to be passed, aims to streamline that process.<sup>242</sup> Recent budgets have allocated sizeable increases to enhance the ADF's counter-terrorist capability.<sup>243</sup>

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<sup>239</sup> During operations in East Timor the ADF's infantry capacity was severely stressed and required reserve involvement in order for the operation to be maintained. It is questionable whether the current ADF reserve structure could do the same, given its tasking, although in times of crisis it is likely that the stated tasking of the reserves would be less important than the need for additional personnel.

<sup>240</sup> Australian Department of Defence, 'Defence response to a terrorist incident within Australia', [accessed 18 February 2005]. Available from [www.defence.gov.au/terrorism/](http://www.defence.gov.au/terrorism/). and Australian Army, 'Special Forces', [accessed 18 February 2005]. Available from [www.defence.gov.au/army/RAINF/RAR%20Sites/special\\_forces.htm](http://www.defence.gov.au/army/RAINF/RAR%20Sites/special_forces.htm); Australian Department of Defence, 'Special Forces - Role', [accessed 18 February 2005].

<sup>241</sup> Australian Department of Defence, 'Defence response to a terrorist incident within Australia', [accessed].

<sup>242</sup> Robert Hill, 'New ADF Powers For Domestic Terrorism', Press Release, 9 December 2005.

<sup>243</sup> Australian Department of Defence, 'Defence response to a terrorist incident within Australia', [accessed].

In general, the role of Australia's special forces is "to achieve military objectives outside the means of conventional forces... (in) peacetime, conflict and war."<sup>244</sup> However, the four main units are not homogenous, and each has its own particular tasking within that greater role. In the most recent evaluation all special operations formations met their performance requirements fully.<sup>245</sup>

1 Commando Regiment is tasked with four roles: large scale offensive operations (generally in wartime), acting as a Commando Reserve Response Force for domestic security incidents, acting as part of the High Readiness Reserve, and other specialist tasks including operational intelligence gathering.<sup>246</sup> It is thus primarily a warfighting force, and has only secondary roles in counter-terrorism and domestic security.

4 RAR (Commando) is similar to 1 Commando, but also includes Tactical Assault Group – East (TAG-E) tasked with counter-terrorist operations. TAG-E achieved full operational capability in September 2002, roughly a year after the September 11 attacks.<sup>247</sup> 4 RAR also includes two commando companies for special action operations. Their focus is towards maritime raids and airborne assault.<sup>248</sup> Thus 4RAR is a flexible special forces unit capable of a variety of non-conventional operations.

The two Commando battalions are tasked to provide a battalion group for operations on 90 days notice. During the latest reporting period all readiness requirements were met.<sup>249</sup> Their numbers are also to be strengthened by the addition of an extra company.<sup>250</sup>

The Incident Response Regiment is a new formation, designed to respond to chemical, biological and radiological attacks.<sup>251</sup> It includes intelligence, signals,

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<sup>244</sup> Australian Department of Defence, 'Special Forces - Role', [accessed.

<sup>245</sup> Australian Department of Defence, *Annual Report 2004-05*. p.187

<sup>246</sup> Australian Army, 'Role of 1 Commando Regiment', [accessed 18 February 2005]. Available from [www.defence.gov.au/army/1commando/role.htm](http://www.defence.gov.au/army/1commando/role.htm).

<sup>247</sup> J.H. Farrell, 'TAG-East', *Australia & NZ Defender*, no. 40, 2002. p.9

<sup>248</sup> *Ibid.* p.9-10

<sup>249</sup> Australian Department of Defence, *Annual Report 2003/04*. p.130-131. They also responded very quickly to the recent East Timor emergency: Australian Department of Defence, 'ADF Operational Update - Op Astute', Press Release, 29 May 2006, CPA105/06; Australian Department of Defence, 'Current ADF Commitment to Operation Astute', Press Release, 26 May 2006, CPA099/06.

<sup>250</sup> Australian Government, *Portfolio Budget Statements 2004-2005, Defence Portfolio*. p.6-7

<sup>251</sup> Australian Department of Defence, 'Defence response to a terrorist incident within Australia', [accessed; Australian Department of Defence, 'Doorstop interview - Launch of Defence Update 2003', Press Release, 26 February 2003, MIN260203/03. [www.minister.defence.gov.au/Hilltpl.cfm?CurrentId=2382](http://www.minister.defence.gov.au/Hilltpl.cfm?CurrentId=2382).

medical, transport, engineering, scientific and ordnance disposal personnel. It is designed to move out at short notice, and is based in Sydney.

The *crème de la crème* of Australian special forces is the SAS Regiment. This includes Tactical Assault Group – West (TAG-W), functioning in the same way as TAG-E, but based in Perth. The SAS Regiment is tasked with special reconnaissance and other covert tasks, such as developing indigenous resistance. During operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, the types of tasks undertaken by the SAS included calling in air support, direct assault of facilities, and covert surveillance.<sup>252</sup> Their performance in recent counter-terrorist exercises has been highly praised.<sup>253</sup> TAG-W is also Australia's designated overseas counter-terrorist force.<sup>254</sup>

In the post-Cold War period, the size and capability of Australia's special forces have increased, as has their tasking. They now encompass a range of units, each with its own specific tasking, and can fulfil the full range of special operations. Change in special forces has largely occurred in the past few years, and as a result of the September 11 and Bali terrorist attacks. In some ways restructuring of the special forces has preceded changes in stated policy, and indicates the ability of the government to act rapidly at the limits of White Paper prescriptions, or indeed break them, and let the rhetoric catch up at a later date.<sup>255</sup> The flexibility of special forces has likely made them more attractive in the post-Cold War period, due to the uncertainty that has characterised that period.<sup>256</sup>

### *Surveillance and Response Group*

The Surveillance and Response Group is the ADF's newest major force element. It was formed by the amalgamation of the RAAF's major surveillance assets, including maritime patrol and over-the-horizon radar, and will soon include the

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<sup>252</sup> Australian Defence Force, *The War in Iraq: ADF Operations in the Middle East in 2003*, Canberra, 2004. p.20-25

<sup>253</sup> Robert Hill, 'Defence Minister praises ADF counter-terrorism response', Press Release, 26 March 2004, MIN61/04. [www.minister.defence.gov.au/Hilltpl.cfm?CurrentId=3690](http://www.minister.defence.gov.au/Hilltpl.cfm?CurrentId=3690).

<sup>254</sup> Duncan Lewis, 'Special Operations Inside and Outside the Modern Battle-Space', *Royal United Services Institute Journal*, vol. 25, December 2003. p.154

<sup>255</sup> The reader is invited to compare the treatments of terrorism and special forces in: Australian Government, *Defence 2000: Our Future Defence Force.*, and Australian Government, *Australia's National Security - A Defence Update 2003.*, and then consider the development of Australia's special forces in the intervening period.

<sup>256</sup> See Chapter Two and Lacquement Jnr, *Shaping American Capabilities After the Cold War*. p.37

RAAF's Wedgetail AEW&C aircraft when they enter service.<sup>257</sup> As such, it will provide a major enhancement to the ADF's long range surveillance capabilities, both over water and land.

The development of this group can be seen as restructuring rather than continuity, as it has markedly changed the organisational structure of ADF surveillance units, centralising them for greater efficiency. Change in this area has stemmed from the policy prescriptions of recent reviews, as well as the impending technological imperative of the new Wedgetail platforms.

## **Reduction**

### *Personnel*

The total regular personnel strength of the ADF has dropped from 68,100 to 51,800 in the past fifteen years, a reduction of roughly a quarter. There has been some oscillation in strength in recent years, but it is likely that a total force structure of approximately 50,000 will be maintained.

By and large, this decline was the result of the 1991 *Force Structure Review*, and the steady bleed of personnel over the next few years it instigated.<sup>258</sup> In recent years, this decline has halted as the Coalition has felt that critical mass was in danger.

## **Continuity**

### *Naval Combatant Force*

The Surface Combatant force has evolved from a mixed force of missile destroyers, missile frigates and gun frigates into an equivalent force comprising only

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<sup>257</sup> Australian Department of Defence, 'First Wedgetail Arrives at Amberley', Press Release, 16 January 2006, 003/2006; Leesha Furse, 'Wedgetail testing on track', *Air Force*, vol. 46, no. 17, 23 September 2004; Aaron Matzkows, 'Wedgetail soars', *Air Force*, vol. 46, no. 09, 3 June 2004; Andrew Stackpool, 'Wedgetail era opens', *Air Force*, vol. 46, no. 04, 25 March 2004.; Royal Australian Air Force, 'Force Elements Groups', [accessed 18 February 2005]. Available from [www.defence.gov.au/raaf/organisation/info\\_on/groups/fegs.htm](http://www.defence.gov.au/raaf/organisation/info_on/groups/fegs.htm).

<sup>258</sup> Mark Thomson, *You ask, what is our policy?*, Unpublished Draft Document, Canberra: Australian Strategic Policy Institute, December 2005. p.7

two types of missile frigates. However, total capability has not changed markedly and numbers are roughly equivalent, thus continuity is a fair classification.

Currently, the RAN maintains a fleet of twelve frigates, six Adelaide-class and six Anzac-class, with a seventh Anzac in the process of commissioning.<sup>259</sup> These ships are regarded as capable of dealing with regional surface and subsurface threats, as well as providing limited support to land forces.<sup>260</sup> The ADF does not distinguish between the two types of ships in their tasking.<sup>261</sup>

The six Adelaide class ships are largely the same as they were in 1991. However, there is a major upgrade programme underway. Four of the six will receive a new vertical launch system for Evolved Seasparrow missiles, new missile and gun fire control systems, new sonars, new towed arrays, new torpedo decoys and a variety of countermeasures. The first upgraded ship, HMAS *Sydney*, has already returned to service.<sup>262</sup> From 2009, the Adelaides will receive the SM-2 surface to air missile, a major improvement over the SM-1, and one that will improve their low level and multiple target engagement abilities.<sup>263</sup> However, the two Adelaides that are not upgraded will be laid off in 2006, when the final Anzac class ships are commissioned.<sup>264</sup>

The six Anzac class ships are similar to their New Zealand counterparts, with a few minor equipment differences. They are currently being fitted with two quad-canister launchers for Harpoon missiles.<sup>265</sup> Block II Harpoon missiles, capable of land attack missions, will be purchased.<sup>266</sup> They are also in the process of receiving the MU90 system, capable of firing both Mk 46 and more advanced MU90 torpedoes.<sup>267</sup>

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<sup>259</sup> Unknown Author, 'Gangway Toowoomba', *Navy*, vol. 48, no. 19, 20 October 2005.

<sup>260</sup> Australian Department of Defence, *Annual Report 2003/04*. p.112

<sup>261</sup> Australian Department of Defence, *The Australian Defence Force Capability Fact Book*, Canberra, April 2003. p.3

<sup>262</sup> Graham Davis, 'Sydney packs more punch', *Navy News (Australia)*, vol. 47, no. 05, 8 April 2004.

<sup>263</sup> Unknown Author, 'Missile upgrade', *Navy News (Australia)*, vol. 47, no. 13, 29 July 2004.

<sup>264</sup> Unknown Author, 'Australia's Need for Maritime Area Air Defence', *Semaphore - Newsletter of the Sea Power Centre Australia*, no. 14, November 2003.

<sup>265</sup> Brett Bower and Jonathan Grimshaw, 'Harpoon added to the armoury', *Navy News (Australia)*, vol. 47, no. 22, 2 December 2004.

<sup>266</sup> Robert Hill, 'Harpoon Missiles To Be Upgraded', 13 February 2004, [accessed 18 February 2005]. Available from [www.minister.defence.gov.au/Hilltpl.cfm?CurrentId=3526](http://www.minister.defence.gov.au/Hilltpl.cfm?CurrentId=3526).

<sup>267</sup> Unknown Author, 'Torpedo trials a success', *Navy News (Australia)*, vol. 47, no. 02, 26 February 2004. and Unknown Author, 'Torpedo adds to underwater arsenal', *Navy News (Australia)*, vol. 48, no. 19, 20 October 2005.

Recently, approval was granted to upgrade the Anzacs with a phased array system to defend them against missile attack.<sup>268</sup>

The Surface Combatant Force has been involved in a variety of estate management operations in recent times. In the latest reporting period, the Surface Combatant Force achieved mission capability (availability) of 100%, with only slight shortfalls in training and equipment reliability.<sup>269</sup>

Over the next few years, due to the retirement of the Adelaides, it is likely there will be a dip in the size of the RAN's surface combatant fleet.<sup>270</sup> However, on the horizon is the Air Warfare Destroyer programme, noted in the 2000 White Paper.<sup>271</sup> These ships will be based around the Aegis system<sup>272</sup> and it is expected they will remain in service from approximately 2013 to 2050.<sup>273</sup>

The Submarine fleet has also remained relatively similar, in that Oberons have been replaced by Collins-class boats. It might be argued, however, that the capability of the Collins is so superior to the Oberons that restructuring would be the applicable category; however, as tasking has not changed markedly, nor has their organisation, it is felt that continuity is the best classification.

Continuity in this force element is largely the result of the long lead times required for capability to enter service. The Anzac frigates, for example, were authorised before the end of the Cold War. The fleet is still more oriented towards continental Defence of Australia in the Sea Air Gap than expeditionary operations, although the nature of the recent FFG upgrades, and the future purchase of the AWDs, indicates the possibility of a shift. Generally, strategic policy in relation to the combat fleet has been conservative and has not espoused major change. Policy makers have felt that Australia possesses the correct mix of naval capabilities, or perhaps the mix that best matches capability and budgetary considerations.

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<sup>268</sup> Robert Hill, 'Anti-Ship Missile Capability for ANZAC Ships', Press Release, 9 September 2005, MIN147/2005. and Australian Department of Defence, *Annual Report 2004-05*. p.171

<sup>269</sup> Australian Department of Defence, *Annual Report 2004-05*. p.172. Unit Readiness Days are the "number of days a force element is available for tasking by the Maritime Commander, outside of major maintenance and within planned readiness requirements."

<sup>270</sup> Australis, 'A strange way to run a railroad', *Defender*, vol. XX, no. 4, Summer 2003.

<sup>271</sup> Australian Government, *Defence 2000: Our Future Defence Force*. p.87-92

<sup>272</sup> Unknown Author, 'Aegis warfare system chosen', *Air Force*, vol. 46, no. 16, 9 September 2004.

<sup>273</sup> Unknown Author, 'Air Warfare Destroyers and Combat Operations from the Sea', *Semaphore - Newsletter of the Sea Power Centre Australia*, no. 5, April 2005. p.2

## *Strike / Reconnaissance Force*

The RAAF currently has some 22 F-111C and 15 F-111G aircraft. However, the operational fleet is only 28 aircraft, due to the fact that not all 37 airframes are used continually. Rather, some are rotated to ensure flying hours are kept low. The F-111 fleet is currently upgrading with new ECM, new Block II Harpoons, and will receive the AGM-142 missile in the near future.<sup>274</sup>

There is some controversy about the future of the ADF's F-111 fleet. During the late 1990s, a variety of structural problems were experienced, causing groundings and a reduction of flying hours, but it has been stated since that the fleet is working as well as it did in 1996.<sup>275</sup> Various structural components are getting old and are unlikely to last beyond 2010 without a major upgrade. However, it has been said that keeping the F-111 going through such an upgrade would distort the transition of the RAAF to a networked force as hoped, and so the F-111 will be retired by 2010, sooner than was expected, and its strike role taken up by the F/A-18 and AP-3C fleets with stand-off weapons.

This decision has been criticised.<sup>276</sup> The F-111 is a substantially superior strike platform to the F/A-18, with a greater warload and range, and has been upgraded in recent years. Its warfighting capability is beyond doubt; the only issue is whether the 40 year old airframes can be nursed along. Currently, the F-111 is still unique in the region, until various countries put Russian Su-32FN/Su-34 aircraft into service. Even then it will be a very potent instrument of the Australian government's will, capable of delivering precision attacks at long range in all weather. It is likely that the period between the F-111's retirement and the introduction of the Joint Strike Fighter will be a strike capability gap.

Strategic policy has remained largely conservative in relation to the importance of the strike capability. The enlargement of the F-111 fleet was the result of a snap decision made in 1992, and one that seemed somewhat disjointed from policy at the time.<sup>277</sup> Apart from that, there have been no initiatives to enlarge or

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<sup>274</sup> Andrew Stackpool, 'Pigs to get more punch', *Air Force*, vol. 47, no. 15, 25 August 2005.

<sup>275</sup> Leesha Furse, 'F-111: What the future holds', *Air Force*, vol. 46, no. 10, 17 June 2004.

<sup>276</sup> Carlo Kopp, 'Stretching the F-111 past 2010', *Defender*, vol. XXI, no. 1, Autumn 2004. p.30-32

<sup>277</sup> David Horner, 'Force Structure: the hardware dimension', in J. Mohan Malik (ed.), *Australia's Security in the 21st Century*. St Leonards, Allen & Unwin, 1999. p.190 and D.W. Richards, 'An Essay on Force Development in the Absence of a Direct Military Threat', *Balmoral papers*, 1993/1994. p.53 and T.A. Warren, 'Prayers and Practice: Defence Management Under Labour', in Graeme Cheeseman

disband the fleet, and the likely future temporary loss of strike capability will be linked more to the date in service of the JSF rather than any belief that this capability is unnecessary.

### *Fighter Force*

The RAAF maintains a similar sized force of F/A-18s to that of 1991. The only changes have been to the equipment fitout of the aircraft, and the addition of new weapons. Change in this area is unlikely for at least another decade, when the JSF may enter service.

The Hornets have received upgrades to their radars and combat systems. They are now equipped with ASRAAM and AMRAAM missiles, both of which are the equal of any counterpart in the world.<sup>278</sup> They will also be equipped with both JDAMs<sup>279</sup> and new long range anti-surface missiles by 2007-2009, in order to take up the strike role vacated by the decommissioning F-111s. Also due in the same period is a major upgrade of protective systems, including new ECM and radar warning systems, and new chaff and flare dispensers. Another upgrade will install a self-contained target designation system onto the Hornets by 2007; thus in a few years the Hornets' capabilities will be heavily enhanced. Although the Hornets are more than 20 years old, their important systems are much newer, and they retain an excellent capability for air to air combat, although their air to ground capability is still somewhat questionable.

The future of the Air Combat Group will be decided in late 2006, at which time a decision on the Joint Strike Fighter is due.<sup>280</sup> It is highly likely that up to 100 of these aircraft will be purchased to replace both the F/A-18 and F-111 fleets. It has been stated that the RAAF requires a fifth-generation fighter to maintain the necessary "decisive combat edge," and that the JSF best meets that requirement.

Strategic policy on the role of the fighter force has remained largely unchanged during the period in question. It is also likely, although difficult to prove,

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and Robert Bruce (eds.), *Discourses of Danger and Dread Frontiers: Australian Defence and Security Thinking After the Cold War*. Canberra, Allen & Unwin, 1996.

<sup>278</sup> Unknown Author, 'Hornets get new missile', *Air Force*, vol. 46, no. 15, 26 August 2004.

<sup>279</sup> Robert Hill, 'New 'Smart' Bombs for Australia's F/A-18 Aircraft', Press Release, 19 October 2005, MIN 174/2005.

<sup>280</sup> Angus Houston, 'The case for the JSF', *Air Force*, vol. 46, no. 17, 23 September 2004.

that issues of prestige and service pride have rendered any discussion of alternatives unlikely.

### *Patrol Boat Force*

The patrol boat force is currently undergoing a process of change, with the fifteen Fremantles being replaced by twelve Armidale-class boats. This, however, is not a major restructuring, as neither capability nor tasking will change markedly.

The mission of the patrol boat force is to “provide patrol boat capability for the protection of Australia’s national interests.”<sup>281</sup> In practise, this involves estate management, especially off the northern coast,<sup>282</sup> and is scarcely different to their Cold War role, albeit with a greater operational tempo.

The Armidales are larger and more capable than the Fremantles, displacing 270 tonnes, armed with a 25mm cannon and carrying a crew of 21.<sup>283</sup> They will substantially improve the RAN’s capability to intercept suspected vessels. It has been stated they can operate to the limits of the EEZ, despite their small size, and they will be based in Darwin and Cairns.<sup>284</sup> That basing seems to suggest they are not, as might be expected, able to operate to the limits of Australia’s EEZ in the Southern Ocean. The first metal for the Armidales was cut on May 5 2004, and the first ship was commissioned on 24 June 2005.<sup>285</sup> Under the building contract, they are guaranteed to provide a minimum of 3000 sea days a year, or 250 per boat.<sup>286</sup> Their work will be primarily to protect the seaways of Australia, but also to act in support of civil authority, and possibly to support special forces operations. The first Armidale assisted in an illegal fishing boat apprehension on only its second day of active duty.<sup>287</sup>

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<sup>281</sup> Royal Australian Navy, 'Australian Patrol Boat Group', 11 October 2004, [accessed 18 February 2005]. Available from [www.navy.gov.au/fegs/patrol\\_boat.htm](http://www.navy.gov.au/fegs/patrol_boat.htm).

<sup>282</sup> See Australian Department of Defence, *The Australian Defence Force Capability Fact Book*. p.12

<sup>283</sup> Robert Hill, 'Media Conference on Patrol Boat Contract', Press Release, 30 August 2003, MIN290803/03. [www.minister.defence.gov.au/Hilltpl.cfm?CurrentId=3085](http://www.minister.defence.gov.au/Hilltpl.cfm?CurrentId=3085); Royal Australian Navy, 'Armidale Class Patrol Boats (ACPB)', 11 October 2004, [accessed 18 February 2005]. Available from [www.navy.gov.au/fleet/armidale.htm](http://www.navy.gov.au/fleet/armidale.htm).

<sup>284</sup> Graham Davis, 'Patrol boats full steam', *Navy News (Australia)*, vol. 47, no. 08, 20 May 2004.

<sup>285</sup> Australian Department of Defence, 'First Armidale Class Patrol Boat Arrives', Press Release, 10 May 2005; Robert Hill, 'Commissioning of Navy's First Armidale Class Patrol Boat', Press Release, 23 June 2005, CPA166/05.

<sup>286</sup> Hill, 'Media Conference on Patrol Boat Contract', Press Release.

<sup>287</sup> Australian Department of Defence, 'HMAS Armidale involved in apprehensions on day two in Northern Australian waters', Press Release, 18 October 2005, CPA255/05.

The change from the Fremantles to the Armidales can be seen as simple platform replacement, with obsolescent capabilities retiring and new ones entering service to function in the same way. This is a long term policy process, dating back from the early 1990s at least, although delayed and only approved when obsolescence became overpowering, and funding was made available. There has been no sign of any belief that post-Cold War demands greater focus on patrol boat capabilities.

### *Air Lift Group*

The Air Lift Group is largely the same as it was in 1991. The only major change has been the purchase of 12 C-130Js to replace older Hercules models, and the retirement of a handful of Caribou aircraft. Recent decisions to purchase C-17 strategic airlifters, however, portend change in the future.

The Air Lift Group is responsible for air transport support, airborne operations, special purpose transport, air to air refuelling, and the provision of aircraft support for navigator training.<sup>288</sup> It operates seven types of aircraft from five bases, with three wings and seven squadrons. Of all the RAAF's FEGs it is probably the busiest, and the one with the broadest range of missions. It frequently operates in support of the civil community. During the latest reporting period almost all of its elements met preparedness requirements. However, training for some tasks was incomplete, due to high operational tempo.<sup>289</sup>

The heart of the Air Lift Group is composed of 24 C-130H/J Hercules. The –H variants are largely the same as they were in 1991, bar a few upgrades, but the –J model is new. It entered service in 1999, and is highly automated, with a glass cockpit and other avionics enhancements, allowing a minimum crew of only three.<sup>290</sup> The –J has 30% more cargo capacity than the –H when carrying pallets, and has a range of 5100km with an 18155kg payload. The C-130 fleet has achieved a 96% serviceability rate when deployed to Operation Catalyst, flying over 1000 missions.<sup>291</sup>

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<sup>288</sup> Royal Australian Air Force, 'Air Lift Group', [accessed 18 February 2005]. Available from [www.defence.gov.au/raaf/organisation/info\\_on/groups/air\\_lift\\_group.htm](http://www.defence.gov.au/raaf/organisation/info_on/groups/air_lift_group.htm).

<sup>289</sup> Australian Department of Defence, *Annual Report 2004-05*. p.202

<sup>290</sup> Royal Australian Air Force, 'C130-J Hercules', [accessed 18 February 2005]. Available from [www.defence.gov.au/raaf/organisation/technology/aircraft/herc\\_J.htm](http://www.defence.gov.au/raaf/organisation/technology/aircraft/herc_J.htm).

<sup>291</sup> Paul Lineham, 'Milestone reflects herculean effort', *Air Force*, vol. 47, no. 17, 22 September 2005.

Four Boeing 707s provide strategic lift and air to air refuelling. Three of the four are fitted for airborne refuelling, while the fourth is solely an airlifter.<sup>292</sup> These aircraft are ageing, and their readiness in the latest period was reduced.<sup>293</sup> Because of this, and the evidence of operations in Iraq, which indicated the RAAF needs to maintain tankers, a decision to purchase five new A330 tankers was announced in 2004.<sup>294</sup> These will enter service in 2007, have both boom and probe-drogue systems, and will be able to carry up to 293 passengers. They will provide a substantial enhancement to the RAAF as a whole, and act as a significant force multiplier, especially in partnership with the Wedgetail AEW&C aircraft.

The Air Lift Group is rounded out by No.38 Squadron, operating the DHC-4 Caribou. Its military roles include airborne operations, air supply, and search and survivor assistance, but it also plays a large part in other government tasks, such as disaster relief and grasshopper eradication. While the Caribous are ageing, and are experiencing some reliability issues,<sup>295</sup> it is likely they will serve at least into the foreseeable future.

There will be a substantial enhancement to air lift capability in the near future with the entry into service of up to four C-17 Globemasters.<sup>296</sup> The first aircraft may be delivered by late 2006, and it is expected they will serve in both the strategic and tactical airlift roles.<sup>297</sup>

As with the patrol boat force, the only change to date in this element of force structure has been platform replacement. This, however, will change in the future with the C-17s. This is interesting, as with the shift in strategic policy towards expeditionary operations it might be expected that moves would have been made earlier to enhance Australia's ability to support such operations through strategic airlift. It is likely, however, that costing considerations rendered such acquisitions unlikely until very recently.

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<sup>292</sup> Royal Australian Air Force, '707', [accessed 18 February 2005]. Available from [www.defence.gov.au/raaf/organisation/technology/aircraft/707.htm](http://www.defence.gov.au/raaf/organisation/technology/aircraft/707.htm).

<sup>293</sup> Australian Department of Defence, *Annual Report 2004-05*. p.202

<sup>294</sup> Graham Davis and Andrew Stackpool, 'Five new tankers', *Air Force*, vol. 46, no. 06, 22 April 2004; Unknown Author, 'Features - Air Power Conference', *Air Force*, vol. 46, no. 19, 21 October 2004.

<sup>295</sup> Australian Department of Defence, *Annual Report 2004-05*. p.202

<sup>296</sup> Unknown Author, 'Meet the MASTER', *Air Force*, vol. 48, no. 03, 9 March 2006.

<sup>297</sup> Andrew Stackpool, 'Master plan for C-17s', *Air Force*, vol. 48, no. 04, 23 March 2006.

## *Land Forces Organisation and Equipment*

The Army's number of manoeuvre battalions, as well as their tasking, remains largely the same as in 1991. The force is still dominated by light infantry, although this will change in the near future.<sup>298</sup>

The goal of the ADF's land forces is:

the provision of land forces that can respond swiftly and effectively to any credible armed incursion on Australian territory and provide forces for more likely types of operations in our immediate region.<sup>299</sup>

The Australian Army maintains a ready force of five infantry battalions at 90 days readiness, a commando battalion, and seven reserve response forces.<sup>300</sup> In general, the Army is experiencing problems with preparedness, due to shortages of supplies and personnel, but there have been recent improvements.<sup>301</sup> Under the Army sustainment model, the Army is supposed to be able to deploy both a brigade and a battalion group simultaneously.<sup>302</sup>

The Army is divided into several force categories: Light Combined Arms Forces, Medium Combined Arms Forces, Motorised Combined Arms Forces, as well as various supporting categories.<sup>303</sup>

Three of the five infantry battalions provide Light Combined Arms capability as part of 3<sup>rd</sup> Brigade based in Queensland.<sup>304</sup> They meet their readiness requirements, despite a very high operational tempo, and are manned at sufficient levels.<sup>305</sup> One of the battalions, 3RAR, is a Parachute Battalion Group (PBG).<sup>306</sup> One company of the PBG is maintained at a higher readiness, and evidence from East Timor indicates it is

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<sup>298</sup> Australian Department of Defence, *The Hardened and Networked Army*, Canberra, December 2005.

<sup>299</sup> Australian Department of Defence, *Annual Report 2003/04*. p.25

<sup>300</sup> Australian Department of Defence, *Annual Report 2004-05*. p.183. The commando battalion and reserve response forces have been examined in the sections on Special Forces and Reserves respectively.

<sup>301</sup> Ibid. p.183

<sup>302</sup> Ibid. p.183

<sup>303</sup> Ibid. p.182

<sup>304</sup> The split of battalions is taken from Australian Government, *Portfolio Budget Statements 2004-2005, Defence Portfolio*. p.153-164

<sup>305</sup> Australian Department of Defence, *Annual Report 2004-05*. p.188

<sup>306</sup> Australian Army, 'Parachute Battalion Group Concept', [accessed 18 February 2005]. Available from [www.defence.gov.au/army/3RAR/Unit\\_Role.htm](http://www.defence.gov.au/army/3RAR/Unit_Role.htm).

able to move out in a matter of hours.<sup>307</sup> Apart from the PBG (3RAR), 3<sup>rd</sup> Brigade also includes 1RAR and 2RAR, infantry battalions with a deal of experience in East Timor.<sup>308</sup> 3<sup>rd</sup> Brigade is the heart of the Rapid Deployment Force.

1<sup>st</sup> Brigade, Darwin, provides Medium Combined Arms capability.<sup>309</sup> 1<sup>st</sup> Brigade is designated a “high readiness mechanised formation”, capable of mid-intensity conventional warfare and UN peace operations in both urban and rural landscapes.<sup>310</sup> Its primary formation is the 5<sup>th</sup>/7<sup>th</sup> Battalion, equipped with M113s. It also possesses the 1<sup>st</sup> Armoured Regiment, with tanks, the 2<sup>nd</sup> Cavalry Regiment, with light armoured vehicles, an artillery regiment, and integral helicopter support. On paper it appears a flexible, potent force, if somewhat small. However, its effectiveness is questionable. It possesses only a single infantry battalion and supporting forces. Its preparedness requirements have been only partially achieved lately due to shortages.<sup>311</sup> Its training regime has also been restricted, and it is undermanned. There are also questions about the quality of its tanks.<sup>312</sup> However, despite its shortcomings, 1<sup>st</sup> Brigade provides the Army’s heaviest punch, if one that is difficult to deploy. It is also undergoing a major upgrade programme.

7<sup>th</sup> Brigade, Brisbane, provides Motorised Combined Arms capability, equipped with Bushmaster vehicles.<sup>313</sup> It is an integrated formation, combining regular and reserve units, and is tasked with providing a single battalion on 90 days notice. It trains for credible tasks against an unconventional threat, and the mission of one of its sub-units mentions “undertak(ing) a range of credible tasks in a Defence of Australia/ Defence of Regional Interests setting.”<sup>314</sup> 7<sup>th</sup> Brigade has only partially met its preparedness or training requirements recently, due partly to shortcomings within its reserve component.<sup>315</sup>

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<sup>307</sup> Australian Army, 'East Timor', [accessed 18 February 2005]. Available from [www.defence.gov.au/army/3RAR/East\\_Timor.htm](http://www.defence.gov.au/army/3RAR/East_Timor.htm).

<sup>308</sup> Australian Department of Defence, *Annual Report 2003/04*. p.445

<sup>309</sup> *Ibid.* p.131

<sup>310</sup> Australian Army, '1st Brigade Units', [accessed 18 February 2005]. Available from [www.defence.gov.au/army/HQ1BDE/units.html](http://www.defence.gov.au/army/HQ1BDE/units.html). See, however, Australian Department of Defence, *The Australian Defence Force Capability Fact Book*. p.16 which suggests the brigade is best suited to low intensity operations.

<sup>311</sup> Australian Department of Defence, *Annual Report 2004-05*. p.187

<sup>312</sup> Australian Defence Association, *Defence Brief 91*, August 2002.

<sup>313</sup> Horner, *Making the Australian Defence Force*. p.192. The Bushmaster is roughly comparable to NZ’s armoured Pinzgauers.

<sup>314</sup> Australian Army, 'Mission', [accessed 18 February 2005]. Available from [www.defence.gov.au/army/2549rqr/Introduction.htm](http://www.defence.gov.au/army/2549rqr/Introduction.htm).

<sup>315</sup> Australian Department of Defence, *Annual Report 2004-05*. p.193

Three Regional Force Surveillance Units (RFSU), the 51<sup>st</sup> Battalion Far North Queensland Regiment (51FNQR), the Pilbara Regiment, and the North West Mobile Force, patrol the rural coastlines of Australia.<sup>316</sup> All three of the RFSUs met their required readiness in the latest reporting period, and have not had problems with manning.<sup>317</sup> Very little has changed in their employment and performance during the post-Cold War period.<sup>318</sup>

Army Aviation consists of two regiments, tasked with tactical airlift, counter-terrorism, command, liaison and reconnaissance operations.<sup>319</sup> During November 2004 a minor reorganisation added two independent squadrons to the order of battle, partly due to the need to integrate new Tiger helicopters. A squadron will be based in Sydney, largely to provide support for Special Operations Command.<sup>320</sup> Army Aviation has been continuously engaged on operations since 1998, yet maintains a fairly high standard of readiness.<sup>321</sup>

Overall, the Army is experiencing logistics problems, with shortages of equipment and personnel. There are deficiencies in night-vision equipment, general service vehicles, and a shortage of ammunition stocks.<sup>322</sup> The Logistic Support Force simply does not have the capability to undertake all required tasks, and has been seriously affected by a very high operational tempo.<sup>323</sup>

While the Army maintains a large number of units on paper, most are hollow,<sup>324</sup> and it is questionable whether they provide more benefits than costs, considering the expense and administration required to maintain them. Under current policy, the Army is required to deploy a brigade and battalion simultaneously, but maintains only six Regular battalions.<sup>325</sup> Readiness is not high, and the ability to

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<sup>316</sup> Australian Army, 'Regional Force Surveillance Units', [accessed 18 February 2005]. Available from [www.defence.gov.au/army/RAINFRAR%20Sites/rfsu.htm](http://www.defence.gov.au/army/RAINFRAR%20Sites/rfsu.htm).

<sup>317</sup> Australian Department of Defence, *Annual Report 2004-05*. p.192

<sup>318</sup> Australian Army, 'Introduction to 51 FNQR', [accessed 18 February 2005]. Available from [www.defence.gov.au/army/51fnqr/introduction.html](http://www.defence.gov.au/army/51fnqr/introduction.html). Australian Army, The Pilbara Regiment ([accessed 18 February 2005]); available from [www.defence.gov.au/army/pilbara/pilbara.htm](http://www.defence.gov.au/army/pilbara/pilbara.htm)

<sup>319</sup> Australian Department of Defence, *Annual Report 2003/04*. p.133 and Australian Department of Defence, *Annual Report 2004-05*. p.189

<sup>320</sup> Australian Defence Association, *Defence Brief 106*. p.1 and Robert Hill, 'Black Hawk Helicopters to be Based in Sydney', Press Release, 30 July 2005, MIN119/2005. and Unknown Author, 'Move approved', *Army*, vol. 1131, 20 October 2005.

<sup>321</sup> Australian Department of Defence, *Annual Report 2004-05*. p.189

<sup>322</sup> Australian Department of Defence, *Annual Report 2003/04*. p.129-130

<sup>323</sup> *Ibid.* p.136

<sup>324</sup> Australian Defence Association, *Defence Brief 93*, November 2002. p.2

<sup>325</sup> These six battalions include the Commando battalion.

quickly deploy even a single brigade is questionable.<sup>326</sup> The Australian Army could possibly deploy the required brigade group, but at the expense of training and other requirements. Prolonged sustainment of a brigade would be impossible without drawing heavily on reserve forces.

Projections indicate that the Army will only grow by a small amount through to 2009/2010.<sup>327</sup> As such, it does not appear that the sustainment capacity, at least, of the Army will improve in the short term, although its readiness may do as operational tempo reduces and various capabilities are renewed.<sup>328</sup>

As well as organisation, Army equipment has largely remained continuous throughout the post-Cold War period, apart from platform replacement of obsolescent capabilities.

The Leopard tanks are being replaced with 59 M1A1 Abrams Integrated Management main battle tanks.<sup>329</sup> These are old-build M1A1s subjected to a major overhaul to restore them to “as new” condition, and are capable vehicles. Weighing approximately 63,000kg, they are equipped with an M256 120mm smoothbore main gun.<sup>330</sup> The M1A1 is a fast tank, with good manoeuvrability and excellent survivability. Its sensor suite is relatively sophisticated, and can be integrated into network-centric structures. It is capable of fighting at night, due to its thermal imaging system, and is battle proven in both the first and second Iraq Wars. Its one shortcoming, perhaps, is strategic mobility: it cannot be moved by any aircraft in Australian service,<sup>331</sup> and modifications are required to sealift vessels to carry it, due to its weight.

Providing motorised support to the Abrams will be some 255 ASLAV vehicles, similar to the 15 operated in 1991 bar some slight changes. The Army operates six variants: a 25mm armed reconnaissance vehicle, a personnel carrier, a

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<sup>326</sup> Unknown Author, 'Editorial - Defence debate or national security pantomime', *Defender*, vol. XXI, no. 1, Autumn 2004. p.3

<sup>327</sup> Australian Government, *Portfolio Budget Statements 2004-2005, Defence Portfolio*. p.146

<sup>328</sup> Peter Leahy, *Speech to the Royal United Services Institute*, Victoria, 24 June 2004. p.1 notes the need to begin renewal of capabilities, which will enhance readiness. See also Australian Department of Defence, *Annual Report 2003/04*; Australian Government, *Portfolio Budget Statements 2004-2005, Defence Portfolio*.

<sup>329</sup> Robert Hill, 'M1 Abrams Chosen as Australian Army's Replacement Tank', Press Release, 10 March 2004, MIN47/04. [www.minister.defence.gov.au/Hilltpl.cfm?CurrentId=3643](http://www.minister.defence.gov.au/Hilltpl.cfm?CurrentId=3643).

<sup>330</sup> Australian Department of Defence, 'Briefing on the M1A1 Abrams Integrated Management (AIM) Main Battle Tank', Press Release, 4 August 2004.

[www.defence.gov.au/media/DepartmentalTpl.cfm?CurrentId=4094](http://www.defence.gov.au/media/DepartmentalTpl.cfm?CurrentId=4094).

<sup>331</sup> Although it will be airtransportable in the C-17s when they enter service.

surveillance vehicle, an ambulance, a fitter repair vehicle, and a recovery vehicle.<sup>332</sup> The latest tranche of ASLAVs have also received some minor upgrades to protection, enhancing their survivability. The ASLAVs are slightly less well-armoured than the NZLAVs.

Unlike the NZDF, the Australian Army is retaining its M113s, albeit in an upgraded condition.<sup>333</sup> It is anticipated that 350 upgraded M113s will enter service.<sup>334</sup> They will have enhanced protection and fire control, as well as drivetrain improvements. The capability of the M113s will still be very limited, especially in firepower, and it is difficult to see how they could function in a high intensity combat environment.

One new capability is the Bushmaster, a light infantry mobility vehicle or high-speed battle taxi.<sup>335</sup> The Army will eventually have some 299 Bushmasters.<sup>336</sup> They have already seen action in Iraq, where reports have been generally positive, especially in regards to crew comfort.<sup>337</sup>

Ground based air defence will shift from a combination of RBS-70 and Rapier missiles to solely RBS-70 in the next few years. It is notable that there is no programme to purchase an area-defence SAM system, and this remains a capability gap.

Airlift is still provided largely by Blackhawk helicopters, although a new programme is underway to purchase successors.<sup>338</sup> Heavy vertical lift is provided by six CH-47D Chinooks, which can carry up to 25000lbs to a range of 240km on internal fuel.<sup>339</sup> They have been very recently upgraded with armour and new communications equipment.<sup>340</sup> Kiowas and Iroquois round out the helicopter fleet.

Within a few years the Army will obtain 22 Tigers, a modified variant of the standard PAH-2 Tiger produced by Eurocopter.<sup>341</sup> Its maximum speed is 179mph, and

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<sup>332</sup> Australian Army, 'The Australian Light Armoured Vehicle', [accessed 18 February 2005]. Available from [www.defence.gov.au/army/equipment/aslav.htm](http://www.defence.gov.au/army/equipment/aslav.htm).

<sup>333</sup> Robert Hill, 'Delivering the Future', Press Release, 5 October 2004, MIN201/04. [www.minister.defence.gov.au/Hilltpl.cfm?CurrentId=4341](http://www.minister.defence.gov.au/Hilltpl.cfm?CurrentId=4341).

<sup>334</sup> Australian Department of Defence, *Annual Report 2003/04*, p.25

<sup>335</sup> Ian Bostock, 'Fielding the Bushmaster family', *Asia-Pacific Defence Reporter*, vol. XXV, no. 3, April-May 1999, p.60

<sup>336</sup> Hill, 'Delivering the Future', Press Release.

<sup>337</sup> Cameron Jameson, 'Masters of the desert', *Army*, vol. 1126, 11 August 2005.

<sup>338</sup> Australian Defence Association, *Defence Brief 106*, p.1

<sup>339</sup> Australian Army, 'The Chinook CH-47D', [accessed 18 February 2005]. Available from [www.defence.gov.au/army/equipment/chinook.htm](http://www.defence.gov.au/army/equipment/chinook.htm).

<sup>340</sup> Robert Hill, 'Chinooks To Deploy To Afghanistan', Press Release, 10 January 2006, MIN001/2006.

<sup>341</sup> David Edlington, 'Tiger skies', *Army: The Soldier's Newspaper*, no. 1113, 10 February 2005.

it has a range of 432 nautical miles.<sup>342</sup> The Tiger is seen by the Army as a “huge leap forward,” and an “important element in the hardening of the Army.”<sup>343</sup> With a gun, anti-tank and potentially anti-air missiles, as well as a potent surveillance and targeting suite, the Tiger will be capable of operating in high intensity combat operations.

The Army still maintains approximately the same numbers of 105mm and 155mm guns as in 1991, as well as a fleet of small landing craft. Current landing craft, however, are larger than those in service in 1991.<sup>344</sup>

Infantry equipment in the Army remains largely the same as it was in 1991: the Steyr rifle, 81mm mortars, and 7.62mm machineguns. One weapons system, the Milan ATGM, has disappeared, and the Javelin ATGM, as operated by New Zealand, has replaced it.<sup>345</sup>

A variety of minor equipment is entering service through the Land 125 programme. This includes new personal radios, thermal weapons sights, new webbing, enhanced combat helmets, and protective padding.<sup>346</sup> Almost all of the Army will receive this new equipment over the next couple of years.

While the Army has been reduced, and enlarged, in the past fifteen years, the end result has been little change from its status in 1991. The types of force maintained, their expected roles, and their size, has changed little. During the 1990s, this occurred despite increasing operational tempo. The impact of East Timor, which caused two additional battalions to be added to the then-four battalion structure, was great, but did little except return the situation to that which it had been a decade previously.

In the future the Army will change markedly under the Hardened and Networked Army Initiative.<sup>347</sup> This is a ten year plan that will not have discernible effects until well after 2010.<sup>348</sup> The Army will be enlarged by roughly 1500 personnel, and shift towards becoming a fully mechanised force. 3RAR will switch from its

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<sup>342</sup> Military Analysis Network, 'PAH-2 Tiger', [accessed 28 October 2004]. Available from [www.fas.org/man/dod-101/sys/ac/tiger.htm](http://www.fas.org/man/dod-101/sys/ac/tiger.htm).

<sup>343</sup> Edlington, 'Tiger skies'.

<sup>344</sup> Graham Davis, 'Landing new watercraft', *Navy News (Australia)*, vol. 48, no. 04, 24 March 2005.

<sup>345</sup> Peter Leahy, *Speech by the Chief of Army to the Defence Watch Seminar*, 10 February 2004.

<sup>346</sup> Hamis Gray, 'New field kit due mid-year', *Army: The Soldier's Newspaper*, vol. 1116, 24 March 2005.

<sup>347</sup> Australian Department of Defence, *The Hardened and Networked Army*. p.2

<sup>348</sup> Australian Army, 'The Hardened And Networked Army', 2006, [accessed 20 April 2006]. Available from <http://www.defence.gov.au/army/HNA/Home.htm>; Damian Shovell, '3RAR's new task', *Army*, vol. 1136, 9 February 2006; Damian Shovell, 'Hard and Fast', *Army*, vol. 1136, 9 February 2006.

current parachute role to one of mechanised infantry. There will be other changes throughout the structure of the force. It is questionable, however, whether HNA will truly restructure the Army, or will merely incrementally advance its capabilities in some areas.

The reasons for this continuity can be seen quite clearly in the major policy documents analysed in the previous chapter. Influential policymakers have felt themselves sufficiently served by the existing structure and equipment fitout, and have suggested change only when the exigencies of certain crises or impending obsolescence have demanded it. There has also been a strong theme throughout the period, and one which only began to change in approximately 2001, that land forces are only of secondary importance to Australia. Platform replacement, especially in regards to the Abrams tank, might also have been the result of service lobbying rather than strategic policy guidance.

There have been, however, hints of greater innovation, especially in equipment. The Land 125 programme and the Tiger helicopters suggest a greater focus on the RMA-paradigm. There have been occasional efforts aimed at restructuring the Army's organisation; only time will tell whether the HNA proposal will do better than those earlier attempts.

### *Afloat Support*

The RAN retains two underway replenishment ships, HMAS *Success* and *Westralia*. *Westralia* is being replaced by a 37000 tonne double-hulled commercial tanker, purchased for military conversion, and likely to enter service by the middle of 2006.<sup>349</sup> Afloat support is a primary enabler for the surface combatant FEG, and expected capacity is 600 Unit Readiness Days for two ships.<sup>350</sup> The replenishment fleet achieved 95% readiness in the latest reporting period.<sup>351</sup>

Continuity has again stemmed from a belief that Australia's capabilities are sufficient for evolving tasks. It is interesting, as with the Air Lift Group, to consider whether increasing focus on expeditionary operations will demand an increase in the size of the afloat support fleet.

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<sup>349</sup> Antony Underwood, 'CN on force structure', *Navy*, vol. 48, no. 15, 11 August 2005.

<sup>350</sup> Australian Government, *Portfolio Budget Statements 2004-2005, Defence Portfolio*. p.138

<sup>351</sup> Australian Department of Defence, *Annual Report 2004-05*. p.176

## *Budget*

In raw terms, the ADF's budget has increased substantially since 1991, although as a percentage of GDP, and in real terms, it has declined slightly. Given that, it seems acceptable to state that overall, the funding given the ADF has remained continuous.

Defence funding for 2006-2007 is \$19.62 billion AUD, a substantial increase on the previous year.<sup>352</sup> The total amount spent on major capital equipment will be approximately \$4.37 billion AUD.<sup>353</sup> The lion's share of funding is taken up by capability maintenance.

One major difference between Australia and New Zealand, in relation to funding, is the way operations are dealt with. Whereas in the NZDF operational costs are to be met from moneys already allocated, the Australian government provides additional funding.<sup>354</sup> For 2006-2007 it is expected just under half a billion AUD will be expended on these operational costs.<sup>355</sup>

Defence funding in Australia declined during the 1990s, but has risen steadily since 2000; the White Paper of that year was pivotal in supporting a 3% annual increase in funding. This recent increase has been the result of two main factors: first, developing obsolescence within the force, which demanded increased funding if capabilities were to be maintained; and secondly an increasingly unstable international environment, especially since the September 11 attacks, which has led to a greater probability of conflict in which Australia might wish to involve itself. Despite that increase, however, defence funding has still not risen in real terms over 1991 levels. Thus there is still some criticism that the level of funding is too low, and some commentators believe the amount of funding limits modernisation and operational capacity.<sup>356</sup>

The public perception of defence in Australia is relatively positive, and there is thus a greater amount of public opinion supportive of increased defence spending than

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<sup>352</sup> Australian Government, *Portfolio Budget Statements 2006/2007, Defence Portfolio*, Canberra, May 2006. p.19

<sup>353</sup> *Ibid.* p.41

<sup>354</sup> *Ibid.* p.29

<sup>355</sup> *Ibid.* p.29

<sup>356</sup> Australian Defence Association, 'Latest comment by the Australian Defence Association', [accessed 18 February 2005]. Available from [www.ada.asn.au/latest\\_comment.htm](http://www.ada.asn.au/latest_comment.htm). p.9

is the case in New Zealand. With the re-election of the Coalition, and the healthy state of the Australian economy, as well as the unstable international environment, the probability is that defence funding will continue to increase in raw terms in the near future.<sup>357</sup>

### *Focus of Training*

As with the NZDF, the ADF's focus of training has remained on conventional operations, despite the evolving strategic environment.<sup>358</sup> All three services are focused on warfighting exercises.<sup>359</sup> Little attention is paid to van Creveld type operations, or PSOs, in the major training programme.<sup>360</sup>

This continuity in training reflects the broad continuity of defence policy, which has kept conventional combat operations as the pre-eminent role for the ADF.

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<sup>357</sup> The Coalition have said as much: Australian Department of Defence, *Budget 2006-07: To Defend Australia*, Canberra, May 2006.

<sup>358</sup> Australian Department of Defence, 'Amphibious Exercise Sea Eagle Begins', Press Release, 31 October 2005, CPA269/05; Australian Department of Defence, 'Navy Exercise Dugong Commences In Port Phillip Bay And Yarra River', Press Release, 31 October 2005, CPA268/05; Graham Davis, 'Head-to-head battle in Tasmanex', *Navy News (Australia)*, vol. 47, no. 03, 11 March 2004; Graham Davis, 'Navy takes to Tasman', *Navy News (Australia)*, vol. 48, no. 03, 10 March 2005; Robert Hill, 'New Special Forces training facilities', 21 May 2004, [accessed 18 February 2005]. Available from [www.minister.defence.gov.au/Hilltpl.cfm?CurrentId=3841](http://www.minister.defence.gov.au/Hilltpl.cfm?CurrentId=3841); Cameron Jamieson, 'Kanimbla's effort swift as an eagle', *Navy News (Australia)*, vol. 47, no. 18, 7 October 2004; Cameron Jamieson, 'Swift moves', *Air Force*, vol. 46, no. 18, 7 October 2004; Damian Shovell, 'Good to go', *Army: The Soldier's Newspaper*, vol. 1117, 7 April 2005; Damian Shovell, 'Ready and able', *Army: The Soldier's Newspaper*, vol. 1115, 10 March 2005; Andrew Stackpool, 'Blackout', *Air Force*, vol. 46, no. 14, 12 August 2004; Andrew Stackpool, 'Major exercise hits Fever Pitch', *Air Force*, vol. 46, no. 13, 29 July 2004; Unknown Author, 'Centrepiece Northern Basics', *Air Force*, vol. 46, no. 13, 29 July 2004; Unknown Author, 'Exercise Sea Lion roars into action', *Navy News (Australia)*, vol. 47, no. 04, 25 March 2004; Unknown Author, 'Quicksilver response', *Air Force*, vol. 46, no. 06, 22 April 2004; Unknown Author, 'Red hot', *Air Force*, vol. 46, no. 22, 2 December 2004; Unknown Author, 'Tracking range and MCM systems to test capabilities', *Navy News (Australia)*, vol. 47, no. 12, 15 July 2004.

<sup>359</sup> Australian Department of Defence, *Annual Report 2004-05*. p.168

<sup>360</sup> Australian Department of Defence, 'Exercise Demonstrates Value of Multi-Agency Training', Press Release, 18 October 2005, CPA 256/05; Bob Breen, 'Peace Keeping Lessons: East Timor and Bougainville', *The Sydney Papers*, Winter 2001; Robert Hill, 'Counter-Terrorism Exercise Highlights Regional Cooperation', 4 July 2004, [accessed 18 April 2006]. Available from [www.minister.defence.gov.au/Hilltpl.cfm?CurrentId=4002](http://www.minister.defence.gov.au/Hilltpl.cfm?CurrentId=4002); Robert Hill, 'First Regional Counter Terrorism Expert Exchange to Boost Regional Security', Press Release, 22 August 2005, MIN134/2005; Hill, 'New Special Forces training facilities', [accessed]; Unknown Author, 'City slickers', *Army*, vol. 1130, 6 October 2005; Unknown Author, 'The peacekeeping business'.

## *Selection of Future Weapons*

The process for acquiring weapons has been continually developed during the post-Cold War period, with the latest system the Defence Materiel Organisation,<sup>361</sup> but in general the result has remained the same. In each service, it seems that platform replacement is the most important issue. There are few innovative or revolutionary weapon systems in future capability plans, and instead the focus is on evolutionary improvements to combat systems that are already in use.<sup>362</sup> This has stemmed from strategic policy, but also likely from the lobbying strengths of the various services, and is examined in the following chapter.

## **Summing Up ADF Continuity And Change**

The above examinations of various elements of force structure indicate that while there has been change in the ADF during the post-Cold War period, the dominant theme has been continuity. Most of the force has remained largely similar to what it was, albeit slightly downsized, replacing equipment with improved, but like, equivalents, and changing its tasking only slightly.

This continuity is the outcome of the defence policymaking process described in the previous chapter. The continuity of policy has been reflected in force structure, and indeed perhaps even to a greater extent, because of the lag between changes in policy and their results on force structure.

The ADF today is largely the same force it was in 1991, upgraded, improved, but not radically different. The Army is shifting from a light infantry force to an armour-focused force, but slowly. Currently it has some major shortcomings in urban warfare and other high intensity operations, shortcomings that will take time to overcome. The period since 1991 has been one of turmoil for this service, with reviews cancelled, policies changed, and a general lack of clarity. Even now there seems to be a developing disjuncture between the Army's homeland defence responsibilities and its expeditionary focus.

The RAN maintains a limited blue water combat capability, but appears to be slowly shifting towards green water, littoral operations as part of a joint force. Much

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<sup>361</sup> Australian Department of Defence, *Annual Report 2003/04*. p.19, 30-31.

<sup>362</sup> For example the Abrams replacing the Leopard, Anzacs replacing other frigates, AWDs to replace the FFGs, and replacement of towed artillery.

of the RAN would find it difficult to operate in high intensity conventional operations. There is seemingly a shift towards estate management operations, if in practise rather than policy, but no doctrinal or organisation shifts to enhance their fulfilment are evident.

The RAAF is still a very potent force in regional terms, but is facing an uncertain future. Of the three services, it is the one that has seen the least change in the post-Cold War period. Because of this certain capabilities are approaching obsolescence, and the prospect of a capability gap until new platforms are operated is apparent. Interestingly, given the applicability of the RMA to air operations, the RAAF has been perhaps the service least amenable to such change.

Perhaps oddly, in some elements where restructuring has occurred, it has been the result of delayed Cold War era decisions eventually entering the force structure. However, as with the NZDF, restructuring has also been apparent in less expensive elements of the force, such as doctrine, roles, command structure and reserve tasking. In none of the “concrete” elements – air combat, naval combat, or land forces – has major restructuring taken place, likely because of the massive costs such would entail.

The following chapter examines the findings of this chapter, and the one previous, to synthesise a series of generalised hypotheses about why the ADF and NZDF have changed or remained the same during the post-Cold War period. These take into account the broad scope of policy during the period, rather than examining specific case studies as did the previous chapter.

## Chapter Eight – Explaining Defence Policy

This chapter provides a set of general explanations for the course of defence policy in New Zealand and Australia during the post-Cold War period. To do so, it relies partly on the theories examined in Chapter One, but also utilises other approaches. The first section examines New Zealand, the second Australia.

While explanations are treated separately for ease of understanding, they are interlinked. For example, a lack of funding is linked to a lack of public interest, which is in turn linked to the absence of a direct threat. Where possible, these linkages are identified.

The general conclusion of this chapter is that continuity and reduction in both defence forces is partly the result of similar factors, but in other cases continuity is the result of quite different causes.

### Explaining General Continuity and Reduction in New Zealand Defence Policy

Chapter Seven showed that the general nature of New Zealand defence policy during the post-Cold War period has tended to continuity and reduction. This has been the result of several broad factors; there is no monocausal explanation.<sup>1</sup>

#### *1. Absence of Direct Threat*

During the post-Cold War period, New Zealand has not faced a direct threat to its military security. This in turn has led to an absence of public and political interest in defence, and a resultant lack of funding. As such, this absence of a perceived threat is the primary cause for the conservative and reductionist nature of defence policy during the post-Cold War period.

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<sup>1</sup> Many of the following hypotheses have been gleaned from various interviews: Interview with Former New Zealand Defence Official A, 26 January 2005; Interview with Former New Zealand Defence Official B, 12 July 2005; Interview with Former New Zealand Defence Official C, 9 June 2005; Interview with Former New Zealand Defence Official E, 11 July 2005; Interview with New Zealand Defence Official A, 14 July 2005; Interview with New Zealand Defence Official B, 28 January 2005; Interview with New Zealand Defence Official C, 14 July 2005; Interview with New Zealand Defence Official D, 27 January 2005.

Without the presence of a threat, it is difficult to argue for any change in the shape of the defence force, as there is no feeling that without restructuring the force will become obsolete. Indeed it can be difficult to argue for the retention of the defence force itself, if influential actors cannot see its utility.

This absence of a direct threat is not a new theme; historically, as Chapter Four showed, New Zealand has seldom been in danger. However, it might be suggested that the events of September 11 and Bali do indeed portend the possibility of a threat to New Zealand. If they do, then perhaps the issue is not so much the absence of a direct threat, but rather perceptions by influential decisionmakers and the general public that there is no threat.

## *2. Limited Resources*

Throughout New Zealand's history, due to geographical location especially, defence has seldom been a matter of great importance. This has not changed in the post-Cold War world, largely because of the absence of threat noted above.

Because of this, and given the multiple other demands on government funding, only a restricted amount of funding has been provided to the NZDF during the post-Cold War period.<sup>2</sup> This has been a major factor in continuity and reduction.

Without funding, major force restructuring is usually impossible, as change requires money. Chapter Seven has shown that only around the edges, and in those elements that do not require such funding, has restructuring been possible.

Restricted funding also led to major reductions in personnel during the early part of the post-Cold War period. This economy has also helped develop a "laager mentality" within the NZDF. That is, because of fiscal uncertainty, they have been more concerned with retaining what they have, rather than considering more radical options.

## *3. Bureaucratic Conservatism*

Throughout the post-Cold War period, the New Zealand defence bureaucracy has espoused a conservative line. This was best exemplified during the setting of the

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<sup>2</sup> Compared to other nations. See New Zealand Parliamentary Library, *Defence Expenditure: Trends and International Comparisons*, 2005/01, Wellington, 2 March 2005.

Terms of Reference for the 1996-1997 Assessment-White Paper. It was also seen in the aftermath of *GDPF2000*. That document, produced by executive rather than bureaucratic actors, suggested a particularly innovative approach to policy. However, once a bureaucratic process had been undertaken, the result was largely conservative except in one area, the Air Combat Wing.

Bureaucratic conservatism is a common theme of the policy theories examined in Chapter One, but it is useful to examine why the MOD has been conservative during the post-Cold War period. Often, the MOD has been primarily concerned with resourcing and management issues, rather than strategy and the development of new concepts. This, again, is primarily linked to the lack of funding mentioned earlier. When existing responsibilities already exhaust funding, there is little motivation to search for new ideas. It is also probable that there is an element of turf protection as well, and that the bureaucracy has defended elements of force structure due simply to their existence. Another possibility, and one difficult to judge, is that the bureaucracy has been at least partially captured by military interests during the period, and has echoed their conservatism.

#### *4. Service Attitudes*

Linked to the limited funding given defence during the post-Cold War period has been consistent military conservatism. The services have been primarily concerned with the retention of capabilities. In 1996 and 1997, especially the military promoted a conservative approach to force structuring during the review process, and by and large this has remained the case since.

Few, if any, policy entrepreneurs within the military can be identified. Evidence from the major reviews suggests that the services have been largely concerned with minor changes and platform replacement. Because of their strong position, due to expertise and reputation, they have had considerable control over the process of force structure change, even in the aftermath of policy reviews in which they had little influence, such as *GDPF2000*.

It is also likely that service rivalry and bargaining have been instrumental in ensuring conservatism. Because of the triangular structure of the NZDF, it is likely that had any service espoused a radical restructuring plan that would have led to a

marked change in the interservice balance, the other services would have opposed and likely blocked it.

### *5. Restricted Imagination*

The reason for military and bureaucratic conservatism may not be related to resource issues, and turf protection, but rather restricted imagination. Pierce's two-step theory, discussed in Chapter One, shows that any military innovation requires, first of all, an imaginative leap, and the development of potential concepts. However, study of NZDF policy throughout the post-Cold War period reveals little evidence of innovative and imaginative concepts entering the policy process.

It is possible that such imaginative concepts did exist, but were debated only at very low levels, and not during the major defence reviews. Thus there would be little record of them. If so, then this is not so much restricted imagination, but rather the conservatism noted above. It might be asked, if this is the case, as to why those imaginative concepts did not enter the review stage – and, again, one can look to earlier themes such as an absence of resources.

One issue is that both active and retired NZDF personnel, for whatever reason, have not suggested innovative structures for the NZDF in public fora.<sup>3</sup> This may be linked to conditions of service, but it does mean that there is a major restriction on the debate of innovative concepts.

### *6. Absence of Executive Leadership*

In general, and the *GDPF2000* notwithstanding, there has been a general absence of executive leadership in defence policy throughout the period. While Helen Clark has had substantial engagement with defence, her case is an anomaly; no other Prime Minister has been so closely involved. And, in her case, she has been primarily concerned with funding and resourcing issues, relating to the maintenance of capabilities, rather than the rigorous examination of policy alternatives; her role has been managerial. Not one Minister of Defence can be shown to have propounded an

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<sup>3</sup> The Defence Beyond 2000 review is one exception to this.

innovative force structuring concept, as has been done by executive actors in other states.<sup>4</sup>

In general, the executive's primary interest in defence has been financial, and generally negative. They have been concerned with ensuring that the NZDF does not become too great a drain on funding, or ensuring that it remains affordable: they have put the budgetary cart before the strategic horse. When the executive has got involved in defence, the result has usually been reduction, rather than restructuring.<sup>5</sup>

The absence of executive leadership has been partly the result of a lack of public interest, but also partly the result of the executive's lack of expertise in strategic and military concepts. While they have usually been able managers, they have done little beyond that. This is perhaps an indictment of New Zealand's generalist system for appointing Ministers. It is also an indication of the lack of military expertise amongst New Zealand's elected officials, from whom Ministers are chosen.

As classical bureaucratic theory notes, in the absence of executive guidance and leadership, bureaucratic paradigms will be pre-eminent, usually leading to conservatism. This has indeed been the case. Had the executive been more heavily involved, then the bureaucratic and service conservatism noted above, as well as the absence of funding, might have been less important: the executive could have overcome service and bureaucracy opinion, as well as gained an increase in funding. This might well have resulted in increased innovation.

### *7. Restricted Public Interest in Defence*

Throughout New Zealand's history, defence has seldom been an issue of major public concern, and this has not changed in the post-Cold War period. There has been one major public discussion, and occasional debate within the media. As such, the actors that have been active in defence, and influential on policy decisions, have been those who are generally supportive of the status quo.

Often, innovative policy ideas develop from the general public, due to the issue of bureaucratic conservatism already mentioned. Without public interest, there

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<sup>4</sup> Exemplified by Donald Rumsfeld's support for transformation in the US armed forces.

<sup>5</sup> Exemplified by the decline in the NCF, axing of the ACW, and general decline in personnel numbers during the early part of the period.

has been little push to consider transformation or innovation. Also, the absence of analytical interest groups has meant a dearth of debate on defence issues to any degree of depth. The few interest groups that have occasionally involved themselves have seldom provided cogent and well-argued alternatives to policy. They have often seemed captured by political rather than strategic interests, and have focused on individual and short-term decisions, rather than the broad scope of defence policy.

Restricted public interest may have been caused by the lack of funding and general lack of political interest in defence, or it may have caused that lack of funding and political interest. More probably, there is a mixture of the two.

Public interest has occasionally increased, especially around the times of major deployments, but has seldom exceeded general support for the NZDF. Even recent terrorist events have not caused an increase in public interest on the structure and roles of the NZDF. The small size of the NZDF, and the absence of domestic production, also means that there is no domestic constituency, electorally important, that has influence over elected officials who might shape defence policy.

#### *8. Lack of Parliamentary Expertise and Involvement*

For the most part, with *Defence Beyond 2000* an exception, Parliament has not been closely involved with defence policy. This has allowed the bureaucracy, services and executive to retain control of the policy process, thus assisting continuity.

By and large, few MPs are conversant with military issues, and even those that are, are usually more concerned with the criticism of acquisitions, and operations, than they are with strategy and broader policy issues. This is directly related to the lack of public interest in defence, as the interest of MPs usually follows that of the general public. It would be impossible for an MP to make a name for him/herself by debating esoteric issues of force structuring on the floor, whereas attacking overspending on various equipment can cause problems for the government.

Thus, Parliament seldom debates the direction of Government policy, bar in the immediate aftermath of the release of a major policy review. Even then, criticism and comment is usually shallow and heavily politicised, and dies off as soon as it is felt there is no more political capital to be made. The sub-committee that deals with defence seldom produces any reports of interest. Without an interested and informed

Parliament, there is little pressure on the Government of the day to rethink the broad framework of its policy.

### *9. Breadth of Policymaking Process*

All of the reviews examined in Chapter Five, bar *GDPF2000*, involved a relatively large number of actors from the services and bureaucracy. Some analysts have noted that, in general policy terms, the more participants there are in a review, the less likely that radical change will result.<sup>6</sup> Thus, smaller groups are usually more innovative.

This seems to have been the case in New Zealand.<sup>7</sup> The 1996-1997 process was the most conservative, and had a very large number of participants. *DB2000*, while written by a relatively small committee, included a very broad range of opinions, and in attempting to integrate them retained substantial continuity. The *GDS2001*, again produced by a relatively broad team from multiple organisations was also conservative in many ways. Only *GDPF2000*, produced by a small team of empowered actors, produced particularly innovative policy.

### *10. Missing the Policy Windows*

Kingdon's theory of policy windows, discussed in Chapter One, also provides an explanation for conservatism. Throughout the post-Cold War period there were two major policy windows caused by external occurrences: first, the end of the Cold War, and subsequent change in world affairs during the very early years of the 1990s; and, second, the September 11 attacks and subsequent War on Terror that in the eyes of some analysts inaugurated a new world order. There have also been policy windows caused by domestic elections.

In the first policy window, no attempt was made to recalibrate policy apart from a reduction in funding. There was no deep consideration of the future shape of the global security environment and what this might mean for the NZDF. This set the policy trajectory to one that favoured reduction and continuity.

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<sup>6</sup> Richard Lacquement Jnr, *Shaping American Capabilities After the Cold War*. Westport, Praeger, 2003. p.152-153

<sup>7</sup> However, of the explanations offered here it is felt this is the weakest.

In the second policy window, there was again no attempt to recalibrate policy, as policy actors claimed existing guidance was still suitable despite the changes in the global environment.

In relation to elections, only one – 1999 – resulted in substantial change to defence policy.

At other times from these policy windows, it would have been more difficult to change policy, due to the lack of a strategic rationale. Thus, given that the main opportunities were missed, it is not surprising that innovation has not occurred at other times.

## **Summary**

The general themes of continuity and reduction have been the result of a range of factors. Perhaps they can be most easily summed up by saying that defence has not been a particularly important issue for New Zealand, and most New Zealanders.

The absence of a threat, and resultant public interest, has led to a lack of political interest, and subsequent reduction in funding. As such, policymaking has fallen squarely on the services and bureaucracy, who have been primarily concerned with the retention of capabilities, rather than the pursuit of innovation. There has been little real debate about defence, with political attacks taking the place of analytical study. Few people within New Zealand understand the issues in question, and thus the bureaucracy's views have seldom been challenged. There have been opportunities for change, stimulated by internal and external events, but none have been taken.

The above should not be taken as a criticism of conservatism, rather as an explanation for its existence. The question to be asked, and to which an answer will be essayed in the following chapter, is whether or not New Zealand is well served by its current military, given the strategic environment.

## **Explaining General Continuity in Australian Defence Policy**

Chapter Seven showed that the general nature of Australian defence policy during the post-Cold War period has been conservative and continuous. A range of

possible explanations for this can be offered.<sup>8</sup> First, however, an issue of some importance, that may alter the conclusions of Chapter Seven, is examined.

### *Emerging Innovation*

One issue that requires consideration is whether there have been signs of increasing innovation in recent times, most notably since 2003.<sup>9</sup> This issue was briefly noted in Chapter Six.

If this is indeed increasing innovation, then many of the explanations for defence continuity mentioned below may be becoming less relevant. Most probably, this increased innovation (generally around the edges) has come directly from increased service influence in a time of improved financing. The bureaucracy, noted as a strong force for conservatism, has become less important.

Still, this is a thesis that is far from proven. While there are signs of emerging change, they have as yet had little or no influence on force structure. Also, even if recent trends in defence policy continue, it is questionable whether this will result in real restructuring rather than mere enhancement and improvement to existing force structures.

#### *1. Presence Of Threat*

In the case of New Zealand, the absence of a direct threat, which in turn led to decreased interest and funding, led to reduction in some areas, continuity in others. Interestingly, the presence of a perceived threat has been a strong force for continuity in Australian defence policy.

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<sup>8</sup> Many of the following hypotheses have been gleaned from various interviews: Interview with Australian Defence Official A, 28 November 2005; Interview with Australian Defence Official B, 24 November 2005; Interview with Australian Defence Official C, 25 November 2005; Interview with Australian Defence Official D, 28 November 2005; Interview with Former Australian Defence Official A, 30 November 2005; Interview with Former Australian Defence Official B, 22 November 2005; Interview with Former Australian Defence Official C, 1 December 2005; Interview with Former Australian Defence Official D, 30 November 2005; Interview with Former Australian Defence Official E, 21 November 2005; Interview with Former Australian Defence Official F, 23 November 2005; Interview with Former Australian Defence Official G, 22 November 2005; Interview with Former Australian Defence Official H, 30 November 2005; Interview with Former Australian Defence Official I, 30 November 2005; Interview with Former Australian Defence Official J, 30 November 2005; Interview with Former Australian Defence Official K, 21 November 2005; Interview with Former Australian Defence Official L, 24 November 2005.

<sup>9</sup> Examples would include the HNA initiative, the purchase of ACWs and large amphibious ships, and the Land 125 programme amongst others.

The explanation for this is that the presence of a perceived threat has given Australian defence decisionmakers a belief that they cannot alter too much within the ADF; continuity is better as it ensures security. They have thus been less willing to gamble with major elements of force structure.

There is the issue, however, as to whether the perceived threat has stayed the same during the entire post-Cold War period. Until 2001 or so, the perceived threat was military aggression from South East Asia; this has changed, and terrorism is now seen as the more obvious danger. And, indeed since that time greater signs of innovation have been seen in Australian defence policy. However, they have not had time yet to change the structure of the ADF markedly, except in relation to special forces.

## *2. Limited Resources*

While Australia has funded its defence apparatus considerably more freely than has New Zealand, the level of resourcing has also provided impetus for continuity. Defence funding dropped through the 1990s, in real terms, and has stabilised since. The level has been high enough to avoid reduction, but not high enough to support restructuring.

In an environment of relative fiscal shortage, the services have been more defensive than might have been the case. They have been firmly focused on the need to defend existing capabilities and their linear replacements, rather than suggest new ones. Perhaps they have feared that any major restructuring of the ADF could lead to their service being sidelined, as happened to the RNZAF in New Zealand. Also, the need to devote all resources towards existing capabilities means there is no spare money for experimentation, as done in the United States.

Further evidence for this hypothesis comes from the fact that since 2000, when defence spending was increased, there have been more signs of innovation in defence policy.

## *3. Bureaucratic Conservatism*

Throughout the post-Cold War period, with only some slight changes in recent times, the ADOD bureaucracy has had almost a monopoly over the creation of

strategic policy. This was exemplified in the various strategic reviews of the period, especially those up to *Defence 2000*, which were incremental advances on the policy espoused in the 1987 Defence White Paper. Further evidence for this comes from the fact that since 2000, when policy has become more innovative, the bureaucracy has had less control.

The sheer size of the Australian bureaucracy requires bargaining between groups, which lessens the chance of innovation. The constant need for the various parts of the bureaucracy to agree on any proposal lessens the chance of innovative ideas being propounded. There are also issues of inertia, due to the size of some capability proposals. Often, the attention of the bureaucracy has been more focused on resourcing and management, although less so than has been the case in New Zealand. The evidence from bureaucrats who have left the service is that there is a strong tendency within the ADOD to defend past decisions, due to justification of effort. There has also been the issue of reputation protection, whereby influential thinkers and their followers have defended their legacies against more innovative concepts.

Another element of this has been the continuing strength of the Capability Development Group.<sup>10</sup> In the absence of clear strategic guidance, it has often been the decisions of this group that have become “de facto” strategic policy, which given their focus have often been conservative.

#### *4. Service Attitudes*

Service attitudes have also been a force for continuity, due both to their conservatism and interservice rivalry. They have, however, been slightly more innovative than those of the bureaucracy.

The services have usually promulgated conservative views in relation to force structure. While they have disagreed with strategic policy, it has not been a criticism of its basic foundations; rather, they have criticised the level of resourcing, or the allocation of funding, usually from a single-service perspective that seeks additional funding.

Service rivalry has also been important. Due to the finite pool of resources, there has been substantial bargaining between the three services. This has been especially apparent at the capability development level, where the services have, in

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<sup>10</sup> This organisation has had various names over the period.

general, “log-rolled” or otherwise achieved compromises. They have focused on the retention of existing capabilities, and their replacement. Often, due to issues of service pride, they have promoted “gold plating” for new equipment. This, in turn, has reduced the resource pool available for restructuring initiatives. It has also resulted in the continuous nature of capability replacement within the three services.

Recently, the services have gained new influence over the direction of defence policy. While the Army has usually been the more innovative service in its concepts, it has been counterbalanced by the RAN and RAAF, who are the services most served by continuity, as their force structures are oriented primarily towards conventional, Defence of Australia warfare.

### *5. Restricted Imagination*

As with New Zealand, restricted imagination appears to have been a powerful force for continuity in Australian defence policy in the post-Cold War world. A study of the defence reviews, interviews with participants, and an examination of the discussion paper for *Defence 2000*, all seem to indicate very little evidence of innovative and greatly imaginative concepts entering the policy process. Few, if any, policy innovators can be identified. There has been a strong feeling amongst policymakers that Australia requires much the same force as it had at the end of the Cold War, albeit upgraded, rather than one more oriented towards non-traditional military operations.

It is possible that such imaginative concepts did exist, but were kept to a low level. Policy participants who have left the bureaucracy or services have often propounded more innovative concepts, evidence, perhaps, that they were stifled within the organisation but have become freer since their exit.

There are signs that this is changing. The various service periodicals have featured various imaginative articles by serving and retired personnel. Public debate on the direction of defence policy, often involving serving personnel, has increased, and the various service chiefs have propounded innovative ideas. However, this is yet to have any real influence on ADF force structure.

## *6. Restricted Public Interest in Defence*

The situation in Australia as regards public interest in defence has largely been the same as in New Zealand. There has been little analytical debate about Australian defence policy, although that has changed slightly in recent times. Also, the public has had little opportunity to influence policy, except during the *Defence 2000* process and occasional Parliamentary reviews. As with New Zealand, this has left the field of defence policy open to those who support a more conservative approach.

There is also the issue, mentioned in the following section, that those members of the public who have been interested in defence are those who support the status quo in regards to defence policy.

## *7. Developing Military Industrial Complex*

While Australia is still far from the United States in regards to domestic production, its military-industrial capacity has grown through the post-Cold War period. This has also been a force for continuity.

Weapons manufacturers are usually supportive of continuity, as they are already the recipients of national resources.<sup>11</sup> They support platform replacement of familiar capabilities, as this makes best advantage of their manufacturing base. In Australia, manufacturers have developed by building conventional weapons, and as such have a vested interest in ensuring that the next generation of such equipment, rather than more radical alternatives, is purchased.

Linked to this is the domestic power of the military-industrial complex, and the defence constituency. A large number of Australian voters are employed by either defence or the various weapons manufacturers. By and large, these people are supportive of continuity, as it provides them with stability in their employment. And, through indirect pressure on their politicians, they provide an influence on defence policy in the direction of conservatism. Restructuring would not be popular amongst this constituency, as it would likely lead to some economic loss.

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<sup>11</sup> This is a generalisation. New weapons manufacturers may support innovation, but their position is usually weaker than that of established firms.

## *8. Executive Absence and Conservatism*

Unlike in New Zealand, where the executive has been generally disinterested in defence, in Australia one can differentiate two phases, one of disinterest and one of increasing interest, but conservatism.

During the first period, roughly until 2000, the executive was little involved with defence. This left the field open for the bureaucracy, who as noted earlier were conservative in their approach. The executive was primarily concerned, during this period, with fiscal issues, rather than strategy

Since 2000, however, the executive, especially John Howard and Robert Hill, has been involved with defence policy. Indeed, the latter has occasionally propounded quite innovative concepts for defence. The former, however, has been more conservative, and while he has promoted an increase in defence funding, he has not promoted any major rethink in relation to defence roles. This may be because he perceives Australia is well served by its existing military, or perhaps because his interest is more in the political aspects of being seen as a strong supporter of defence during a period of economic strength. In general, it has been Howard's conservative views that seem to have triumphed over Hill's more innovative ideas.

## *9. Lack of Parliamentary Expertise and Involvement*

The Australian Parliament has, by and large, been an invisible player in defence policy. While its Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Committee has produced regular reports on various aspects of defence, it has had little or no influence.

As noted in Chapter Four, there is little that the Australian Parliament can do in relation to defence, apart from debate the issues. Even this debate, however, has not happened often. As in New Zealand, Parliamentary debate has usually been concerned with crises and budget blowouts, rather than the direction of policy.

As in New Zealand, few Australian MPs are particularly qualified in relation to defence. This has also acted to reduce their interest in regards to defence policy, as it is not an area they are comfortable with. This lack of involvement and expertise has allowed the bureaucracy, services and executive to retain control of the policy process. They have not been subject to the level of criticism that might have resulted in major changes to policy.

## 10. Breadth of Process

The size of the Australian defence bureaucracy has also been a force for continuity. While, in general, the writing teams of major reviews have been small, they have had to balance out the demands and wishes of widely different parts of the organisation, as well as other organisations.

As noted earlier, the more participants in a policy process, the more likely the end result will be conservative. This seems to have been the case in Australia, although there are no counter-examples to prove this, as was the case in New Zealand with the *Government Defence Policy Framework*. Participants have consistently attempted to trade off costs and benefits between interested parties, resulting in policy that is based on compromise as much as rational decision-making.

This explanation might be criticised, as briefly mentioned above, because the writing teams have indeed usually been small. However, the fact remains that these teams have received influence from a wide range of sources, and have also had to seek approval for their drafts from an equally wide range of decisionmakers. While their initial concepts might have been innovative, it would be very difficult for such innovation to remain, given the quantity of checks and balances within the policymaking system.

## 11. Policy Windows

Kingdon's theory again provides an explanation for conservatism, if only partially. This is because innovation, or at least partial restructuring, has followed in the aftermath of the most recent policy window – the eruption of global terrorism.

During the early part of the post-Cold War period, no attempt was made to recalibrate defence policy, as it was felt that *Defence of Australia*, and indeed even earlier policy, was already Cold War independent.<sup>12</sup> This set a conservative policy trajectory up to roughly 2001-2002.

The events of September 11 and the Bali Bombings, however, provided a policy window, and one that seems to have been used. In the period since there have

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<sup>12</sup> This is an important issue. As noted earlier, Australian defence policy in 1991 believed that it was not a Cold War-dependent policy. As such, the end of the Cold War may well not have been perceived as a major policy disjuncture.

been increasing signs of change in defence policy. Most likely, Australian defence policymakers felt that these terrorist attacks heralded a new world era, one that Australian defence policy was not oriented towards.

Other policy windows, such as elections, have resulted only in minor change to defence policy, largely due to the fact that bipartisan support for existing defence policy has been a continuity throughout most of the post-Cold War period.

## **Summary**

Continuity in Australian defence policy has been the result of similar, but importantly different, factors to New Zealand.

Australian defence policymakers have consistently perceived a direct threat to Australia's security, and as such have often been loath to markedly change a force structure they believe is sufficient for Australia's defence. The bureaucracy, especially, has supported a limited and conservative approach to defence planning. The services have usually supported a similar approach, and the rivalry between them has also been a force for continuity, as it has stimulated platform replacement and service-oriented views rather than a broader and more holistic outlook.

Vitality, the important debate in defence policy – sometimes fought between the uniformed and the civilian sides of the ADO – has been about the balance between expeditionary operations and continental defence. It has not been about focusing for non-traditional operations, or shifts in the character of warfare. Because the amount of intellectual resource within the ADO is finite, this has often been exhausted by this debate, and arguments about equipment and financing, and thus has not engaged in analysis of restructuring.

The level of funding has also been a vital factor in continuity; less, and reduction might have resulted, more, and restructuring might have developed due to the increased freedom of the services.

For much of the period, the executive was largely absent from the making of strategic policy, and while it has now become more involved, it has been a force for conservatism. Thus policymaking has largely fallen on the bureaucracy and services. Neither the Parliament nor the public have provided a great deal of debate on the course of policy. Nor have other elements of the Australian public service, such as the Treasury.

There are signs of innovation in recent policy. By and large, these have resulted from the opposites of the factors noted above: a modified threat, increased funding, increasing public interest, a decline in bureaucratic influence, and increased involvement by the executive. But, in general, continuity is still the dominant theme, even today.

Continuity has been the child of many fathers. While defence has been important for Australia, it has not been the subject of rigorous debate, and as such the conservative views of the bureaucracy and services have held sway during the post-Cold War period.

## Chapter Nine – Evaluation and Recommendation

### Introduction

Previous chapters have examined the process of defence policy and force structure change within the NZDF and ADF. They have shown that by and large the process has been characterised by continuity, in that the two defence forces are today largely similar to their states in 1991.

The role of this chapter is to firstly, evaluate the capabilities of the two defence forces, and, secondly, provide recommendations for enhanced performance. It is divided into two parts, one examining the NZDF, and the other examining the ADF.

Each section begins by assessing the current military operational capability of the defence force in question. To do so, it uses the tool first noted in Chapter Two: the DOTLMS-R/Role Demand assessment grid.

Once capability has been measured, it is evaluated against the demands of stated defence policy. In evaluating the ability to fulfil policy, strategic, technological and other developments, as examined in Chapter Two, are considered. Also taken into account is the relative importance of these objectives.

Once shortcomings, and qualities, are identified, this chapter makes a list of force structure and other recommendations, aimed at improving the capabilities of the defence forces. These recommendations range from major restructurings, to reconsideration of large acquisitions, to minor alterations to doctrine. Possible constraints for such changes are also examined, and ways of overcoming these explored.

Then, there is a brief criticism of defence policy guidance. It is asked whether or not current policy fits the strategic environment. There are also recommendations aimed at improving the policymaking process.

The general conclusion of this chapter is that continuity has not been completely positive for the two defence forces. Neither has truly altered itself in such a way as to be fully relevant for the range of contemporary role demands. Changes are possible, and would be of great utility, but are relatively unlikely.

# New Zealand

## DOTLMS Measurement of Current Capabilities

The first step in judging the capabilities of the NZDF is to identify what those capabilities are. This section utilises the assessment grid examined in Chapter Two, the DOTLMS-R/Role Demand matrix, to measure the capability of the NZDF today to fulfil the role demands deemed relevant to the contemporary world.<sup>1</sup>

### *NZDF DOTLMS and Role Demand Measurement Table*

#### Key to Evaluation Grid

Very Low	Low	Fair	High	Very High
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	Doctrine	Organisation <sup>2</sup>	Training	Leadership	Materiel	Soldier Systems	Readiness	Overall
Conventional War	High	Very Low	Low	Low	Low	Low	Low	Low
Van Creveld Operations	Low	Very Low	Low	Low	Low	High	Low	Low
Cyberwarfare	Very Low	Very Low	Very Low	Very Low	Low	Very Low	Very Low	Very Low
Counterterrorism	Low	Low	Low	Low	Low	High	High	Low
Raids and Strikes	Very Low	Very Low	Low	Low	Low	Low	Low	Low
Exclusion Operations	High	Low	Low	Low	Low	Low	Low	Low
Aid to Civil Power	Very Low	Low	Low	Low	Low	High	Low	Low
Quarantine Operations	Low	Low	Low	Low	Low	Low	Low	Low
Humanitarian Assistance	Low	Low	Low	Low	Low	Low	Low	Low
Peace Support Operations	Low	Low	Low	Low	Low	High	Low	Low

<sup>1</sup> This evaluation assumes that certain capabilities that will shortly be in service – e.g. Project Protector – are in service.

<sup>2</sup> Double weighted

Total Capability Score Over All Role Demands: **2.3375** (Low-Fair)<sup>3</sup>

Capability in conventional operations is assessed as low. While training, leadership and soldier systems are evaluated as fair, shortcomings in equipment, and especially organisation (related to the size of the NZDF), cause this assessment.

Capability in van Creveld operations is also assessed as low. While the demands of this role are not as extreme in some ways as conventional operations, the lack of size in the NZDF, as well as the focus of its training, hinders its capability in this role demand.

Capability in cyberwarfare is assessed as very low. While the NZDF's existing computer infrastructure provides a fair capability, no indications of any move towards the development of a cyberwarfare capability can be identified.

Capability in counterterrorism is assessed as fair. The size of the SAS is sufficient for domestic tasks, and its training, soldier systems and leadership are evaluated highly. There are questions about doctrine, and its relevance to new trends in terrorist incidents.

Capability in raids and strikes is assessed as low. There is no evidence of specific tasking or training for this role, and little equipment within the NZDF would be suitable for it. Only the SAS could be safely utilised in this area.

Capability in exclusion operations is assessed as fair. The primary shortcoming is in the size of the fleet, but the qualities of the new patrol vessels, as well as the personnel skills of the RNZN, are regarded as capable for this role.

Capability in aid to the civil power is assessed as fair. While there is no doctrine, and very little training carried out in this area, the size of the NZDF, its organisation into response groups, as well as the high morale of personnel, combine to provide a fair capability. This is enhanced by the domestic nature of such roles, which reduces the demands on transport capabilities.

Capability in quarantine operations is assessed as low. Many of the same considerations as apply to exclusion operations are relevant here, but the demands of quarantine operations are slightly higher, and NZDF naval capability is somewhat lacking for such operations.

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<sup>3</sup> For space reasons the qualitative assessments of each category have not been placed in the text.

Capability for peace support operations is assessed as fair. Little training or doctrinal attention is given to this role, and there is no dedicated force element for such tasks. However, the quality of NZDF personnel in such roles is generally high, and brings total capability substantially up.

Capability for humanitarian intervention is assessed as low. Similar considerations to those for peace support operations come into the equation here, and it is largely the increased danger and intensity of humanitarian operations that means the NZDF's capability is more restricted than for PSOs.

Overall, the NZDF has restricted capability over the full spectrum of role demands. Its best capability is in counter-terrorism, which is due largely to the domestic location of such a role. It also has a fair capability in some of the lower-intensity operations, but in higher-intensity operations its capability is generally low. The highest quality aspects of the NZDF are its soldier systems, which is related to the quality of its personnel, and its leadership. Oddly, its materiel is evaluated higher than its training, due to the fact the latter seldom seems to take into account the nature of contemporary role demands; there remains a sizeable element of continuity in this area.

## **Evaluating the NZDF**

In evaluating the NZDF's capabilities, there is a question as to what standards those capabilities should be judged against: should it be declared policy, or should that declared policy itself be critiqued and examined, and the force examined against other elements of the strategic environment? To overcome this problem, this chapter follows a two-phase process. First, and primarily, it evaluates the capability of the NZDF against the requirements of stated policy, taking into account the evolving strategic environment.<sup>4</sup> Second, and more speculatively, it evaluates the quality of that stated policy, and asks whether new guidance might be useful.

New Zealand's stated defence policy objectives are as follows:

- to defend New Zealand, and to protect its people, land, territorial waters, EEZ, natural resources and critical infrastructure;

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<sup>4</sup> As such the issue at this point is not criticism of policy goals but rather criticism of the mismatch between those goals and the extant force structure.

- to meet our alliance commitments to Australia, by maintaining a close defence partnership in pursuit of common security interests;
- to assist in the maintenance of security in the South Pacific and to provide assistance to our Pacific neighbours;
- to play an appropriate role in the maintenance of security in the Asia-Pacific region, including meeting our obligations as a member of the FPDA;
- to contribute to global security and peacekeeping through participation in the full range of UN and other multilateral peace support and humanitarian relief operations.<sup>5</sup>

The NZDF's capability for the first objective is fair. In this the role demands of exclusion operations, counter-terrorist operations and aid to the civil power are relevant. As noted above, capability in these role demands is higher than in other, more demanding tasks. There are questions about the capability of the NZDF, given its size, to adequately patrol New Zealand's territorial waters and EEZ.

In the second objective, capability is not so high. Operations in this area might include the higher intensity role demands, or the lower intensity role demands at a greater distance. Developing issues of technological divergence are also important here, and the NZDF has definite shortcomings in this area.

The NZDF's capability for South Pacific objectives is fair. This might involve counter-terrorism, or even van Creveld operations. There is a distinct possibility of combat operations in this regard. The NZDF's primary shortcomings here are its lack of naval and air transport.

In the Asia-Pacific region, capability is very low. While policy notes an "appropriate role", it is difficult to see how the NZDF could make anything more than a gesture to any security breakdown in the Asia-Pacific. Conflict there would likely be of high intensity, and beyond the safe capabilities of the NZDF.

In regards to global operations, the NZDF's capability is also quite low, which might be surprising given the rhetoric and criticism surrounding recent policy. The NZDF's capability for PSOs is restricted, its global deployment capability even more so, and it could not provide sustainable contributions at any great distance. There are

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<sup>5</sup> New Zealand Government, *The Government's Defence Policy Framework*, Wellington, 2000. p.4

also issues surrounding the orientation of training and doctrine in relation to the demands of such operations.

Overall, then, one can see that the NZDF does not necessarily fulfil the broad objectives of New Zealand defence policy. There are shortcomings in most areas, even in those roles seen as desirable by the political leadership.

Other, less task-specific, shortcomings in the NZDF can also be identified. The NZDF's capability for RMA-paradigm operations is almost non-existent. It lacks the organisational, technological and doctrinal foundations to operate in such a fashion, and there is very little sign of any movement in that regard. While its capability for counter-terrorism is adequate, the increased frequency of attacks around the world suggests that additional capability would be welcome. And, given the fact that conflict around the world is seldom conventional, the NZDF's continuing focus on such operations, and lack of attention to van Creveld operations, can be seen as another shortcoming. Continuity and reduction in defence policy has been negative for the defence force, hindering its ability to adapt to new demands. Also, there has been a mismatch between the broad goals of policy, and the mechanisms designed to achieve those goals; a gap between rhetoric and reality.

In general, the shortcomings of the NZDF are organisational, doctrinal and technological, rather than related to personnel and training. The size of the NZDF heavily restricts its capability, as does the general standard of its equipment. There is little intellectual attention paid to the developing strategic environment. Some of these problems, as noted in earlier chapters, are the result of resource shortfalls, but not all. Given these shortcomings, and the nature of the contemporary strategic environment, several recommendations for the NZDF, and the New Zealand defence policymaking apparatus, can be made. Their intent is to enhance the capability of the NZDF in what are seen as appropriate and likely roles over the near-term future, especially peace support operations, counter-terrorism, exclusion operations, and van Creveld operations.

## **Force Structure Recommendations**

The following force structure recommendations would substantially improve the NZDF's capability in the tasks required of it by stated defence policy.<sup>6</sup>

*A Third Regular Battalion:* One of the primary shortcomings of the NZDF is the restricted size of its Army. With two battalions, it is incapable of long-term rotations without the heavy use of Territorial forces. The addition of a third Regular battalion would increase the NZDF's capability substantially. It would be able to deploy indefinitely, without major problems to training programmes. This battalion need not be motorised; indeed, a light battalion, able to deploy quickly with limited weaponry, would likely be most useful for PSO and van Creveld type deployments.

*A Ready Company:* The NZDF's readiness is restricted. It lacks a quick response capability. One possible solution to this would be to assign one company of the Army "ready status", and have it ready to move on short notice – 48 hours, for example. This would enable the NZDF to make a significant early response to developing crises, for example PSOs or van Creveld operations. This company could also be tasked specifically with PSO operations, thus reducing some of the difficulties in deciding which forces to send to such operations.

*Enlarge Special Forces:* In today's environment, special forces are of increasing utility. The NZDF maintains a single SAS squadron, and a valid argument could be put forward for doubling this force. This would give New Zealand an additional domestic counter-terrorist group, but would also provide the Government with additional, flexible capability for deployment to a range of overseas operations. This would have distinct foreign policy benefits, and may indeed be a relatively cheap option.

*Reconsider the NCF:* The RNZN's two frigates are of restricted utility, are expensive, and due to the size of the fleet could not carry out extended long range deployments. As such, the need for such a force should be seriously considered.

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<sup>6</sup> It is the author's belief, as well, that the NZDF could do well to substantially increase its cyberwarfare capability, but it is unclear whether such a move would fit well within current policy goals.

Either the NCF could be expanded to four frigates, or it could be disbanded, and the money saved from such a move reinvested into other capabilities.

*Expand Sea and Airlift:* One definite about any operations the NZDF is involved in, in the future is that they will involve overseas deployment. The NZDF's sea and airlift capacity is very restricted. Serious consideration should be given to the purchase of additional air transports, perhaps C-130Js, and the acquisition of an additional MRV or some other form of sealift. This capacity would free up the NZDF considerably, and enable it to make quick responses to operations, rather than rely on the chartering of commercial shipping.

*Modify Doctrine and Training:* A cheap improvement in capability could be gained by a realistic appraisal of contemporary role demands. Combat today is unlikely to be conventional. The NZDF has organisational experience of van Creveld and similar operations, and its personnel have often displayed great proficiency in such roles. Codification of this experience and expertise into doctrine for such roles would be of great benefit. In relation to this, training programmes might be modified, taking into account the lessons of recent operations. This would not mean a loss of combat capability – rather, it would mean a gain of combat capability in the irregular, unconventional operations that are likely to dominate the 21<sup>st</sup> century. This would also have a positive effect on performance in PSOs.

*Increased Budget:* In considering such force structure recommendations, it is obvious that there will be major financial constraints. While some of the recommendations would be quite cheap, especially modifying doctrine and training, others would be expensive. Some money might be saved through the deletion of the NCF, or other capabilities deemed redundant, but there would be a definite need for increased defence funding.

The argument for this funding rests on two points: first, the strategic environment has become increasingly unstable, and by free and willing involvement the NZDF can help reduce global conflict, and second, that New Zealand can afford it. The New Zealand economy has grown substantially over the past few years, and defence spending has dropped considerably as a proportion of GDP. Increasing the

defence budget by 25%<sup>7</sup> would still only bring spending back to approximately 1% of GDP.

Such an increase would likely be unpopular. But the point is that defence spending has grown at a much lower rate over the last fifteen years than has Government spending in health, education and welfare. While defence may have fewer obvious benefits, they do exist, and should be pursued.

## **Criticising Policy**

A separate question is whether or not defence policy guidance is itself adequate. The strategic environment might have changed enough not only to warrant alterations to the defence force in order to fulfil existent roles, but also to suggest new policy goals themselves.<sup>8</sup>

It is notable that policy gives little or no attention to the rise in global terrorism. It is also notable that there is little attention given to the rising importance of resource issues, including illegal immigration. Some consideration might also be given to the ordering of defence policy objectives: should security in the Asia-Pacific, which is probably beyond New Zealand's capabilities, be listed before global security and peacekeeping?

It is not the purpose of this thesis to make an indepth critique of policy goals, but the points briefly mentioned above indicate some areas where policy itself may be inadequate for the evolving security environment. As such, recommendations aimed at enhancing the quality of defence policy advice are given below.

## **Polymaking Recommendations**

*Found a New Zealand Strategic Policy Institute:* One of the emerging strengths of the Australian defence policy environment is interest group involvement, largely through ASPI. A similar institute might be established in New Zealand, funded by

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<sup>7</sup> On top of the projections mentioned in the Defence Sustainability Initiative.

<sup>8</sup> There are two aspects to criticising the policy apparatus: first, criticising the policy goals themselves, and secondly, criticising the way in which policy goals are implemented; the following criticisms encompass both aspects, as do the recommendations.

Treasury, and staffed with academics and ex-bureaucrats from both within and without New Zealand. This would provide an alternative stream of policy advice to the MOD. It might be able to consider strategic issues in greater depth, considering it would be largely free of accounting and management worries.

*Increase Parliamentary Involvement:* Continuity has resulted from an absence of oversight and criticism by Parliament. This is understandable, as Parliament has almost no role in the setting of policy. However, were Parliament's defence sub-committee empowered to produce an "alternative" strategic review or White Paper every two years, then the level of debate would rise. Even more useful would be separate appraisal of the defence budget, but given the structure of the New Zealand political system this would be an impossibility.

*More Senior Exchanges:* One way of increasing the level of innovation amongst senior personnel involved in defence policy would be to send them overseas, to the United States, United Kingdom and perhaps even other countries such as Canada. On their return, they would likely bring with them knowledge and experience of defence policy initiatives in other countries. This would stimulate the flow of ideas, and hopefully result in a more rigorous examination and comparison of alternative force structures.

## **Summary**

The NZDF is a limited force, especially at the higher intensity part of the operational spectrum. Its limitations stem from both technological and organisational shortcomings, and are largely the result of limited funding. It fulfils defence policy only partially, especially when the evolving strategic environment is taken into account.

Various enhancements to force structure can be made, largely directed at improving its performance in the likely land-based tasks it will face in the future. These, however, will require an increase in funding, and it is unlikely that such will happen without some major crisis developing. Other recommendations can also be made, aimed at enhancing a defence policy process that has produced conservative and partially inadequate defence policy over the past fifteen years.

The NZDF has lagged behind the changes in the global security environment in the post-Cold War era. The question now is whether this will change in the near future.

## Australia

### DOTLMS Measurement of Current Capabilities

	Doctrine	Organisation	Training	Leadership	Materiel	Soldier Systems	Readiness	Overall
Conventional War	Dark	Light	Dark	Dark	Light	Light	Light	Light
Van Creveld Operations	Light	Light	Light	Light	Dark	Dark	Dark	Light
Cyberwarfare	White	White	White	White	Light	White	White	White
Counterterrorism	Light	Dark	Dark	Dark	Dark	Dark	Dark	Dark
Raids and Strikes	Light	Dark	Light	Light	Light	Light	Light	Light
Exclusion Operations	Light	Light	Light	Light	Light	Dark	Light	Light
Aid to Civil Power	Light	Light	Light	Light	Light	Dark	Dark	Light
Quarantine Operations	Light	Light	Light	Light	Light	Dark	Light	Light
Humanitarian Assistance	Light	Light	Light	Light	Dark	Light	Dark	Light
Peace Support Operations	Light	Light	Light	Light	Dark	Light	Dark	Light
Overall	White	White	White	White	White	White	White	Light

Total Capability Score Over All Role Demands: **2.9** (Fair)

Capability in conventional operations is assessed as fair. The primary shortcoming is the size of any possible deployment. Doctrine, training and leadership

for this role demand are all evaluated highly, as attention is paid to the RMA-paradigm of conventional warfare.

Capability in van Creveld operations is assessed as fair. While doctrine and training for this role demand is not as good as for conventional operations, the lower intensity of this role demand gives the equipment of the ADF a higher ranking. Also, ADF personnel are well suited to this type of operation.

Capability in cyberwarfare is assessed as very low. As with the NZDF, no evidence of any moves in this area can be discerned. Existing computer technology, however, provides an adequate framework.

Capability in counter-terrorism is assessed as high. The only identified shortcoming is a lack of doctrine relevant to the evolving nature of terrorist actions. The ADF has a sufficiently large, well-equipped and well-trained counterterrorist force.

Capability in raids and strikes is assessed as fair. The ADF has several elements, notably its F-111 fleet and Collins submarines, capable of long range operations.

Capability in exclusion operations is assessed as fair. The primary force element relevant here would be the surface combatant fleet, which has adequate technical capability, but limited size and sustainability. One strength of the ADF in this regards is high organisational experience.

Capability in aid to the civil power is assessed as fair. Little doctrinal or training attention is paid to this role, and there are questions about the attitude of the leadership towards what might be seen as a distraction. Equipment is adequate, and the high morale of ADF personnel would also be of benefit here.

Capability in quarantine operations is assessed as fair. Again, the ADF has good operational experience here, but the rest of its capabilities are only adequate.

Capability in humanitarian assistance is assessed as fair. There is little doctrinal or training focus on this role demand, and there are also questions about the attitude of the leadership. Equipment, however is good, as is the ADF's readiness.

Capability in peace support operations is assessed as fair. Many of the considerations as apply to humanitarian assistance are relevant here, but there is a slightly increased doctrinal focus in this role demand.

Overall, the ADF has a fair capability over the full spectrum of role demands. It scores highest in counter-terrorism, but also has good scores in conventional

operations, raids and strikes, and quarantine operations. When individual elements of capability are assessed, its materiel, soldier systems and readiness score highest. Doctrine and training score relatively lowly. This is because little attention has been paid in those areas towards non-conventional operations; the focus of exercises remains on high intensity operations, for example.

## **Evaluating the ADF**

As with the NZDF, the ADF will be evaluated against the requirements of stated defence policy, modified to take into account strategic considerations as examined in Chapter Two. In general, the ADF is a better tool at fulfilling governmental requirements than is the NZDF.

Australia's stated strategic objectives are:

- to ensure the defence of Australia and its direct approaches;
- to foster the security of our immediate neighbourhood;
- to promote stability and cooperation in Southeast Asia;
- to support strategic stability in the wider Asia Pacific region;
- to support global security.<sup>9</sup>

While these have been slightly updated in various more recent publications, their central core remains the same. And, as with New Zealand, the evolving strategic environment affects their fulfilment.

In the first objective, the ADF's capability is still high. Its force structure is still firmly oriented towards this role, especially as regards air and naval capabilities. Its level of technological sophistication, and general force size, is more than adequate for likely tasks in this area. There are shortcomings, especially related to lower-level threats. In this regard, the size of the RAN's patrol fleet is problematic, as is the issue of integration with other surveillance agencies.

Capability in the immediate neighbourhood is good, but not as high as for the defence of Australia. In such an environment, the threat level would likely be quite high. There would also be questions around deployment and readiness, although in

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<sup>9</sup> Australian Government, *Defence 2000: Our Future Defence Force*, Canberra, 2000. p.30-31

general the ADF's capability in this regard is quite good. The primary shortcoming in such a role would be sustainability, but there is also the issue that if this objective required a low-intensity combat deployment, the ADF's doctrine and training might be suboptimal.

In Southeast Asia, the level of ADF capability declines again. Operations here would further stretch deployment capacity, and would also likely be of a higher intensity than operations in the immediate neighbourhood. In some ways, however, this would be beneficial, as the ADF's doctrine and training is oriented towards conventional tasks.

Equipment shortcomings provide a major problem in relation to operations in the wider Asia Pacific. This objective would likely involve high-intensity, conventional operations, and not all force elements of the ADF would be adequate for such operations. Doctrine and training, however, would be well suited.

In supporting global security, the likely operations are PSOs and humanitarian intervention. The ADF's capability in this regard is quite good, but handicapped by a lack of doctrinal and training focus. There would also be questions about the sustainability of a distant force in such manpower-intensive roles.

Overall, the ADF fulfils the tasks of defence policy adequately. There are shortcomings. The size of the ADF, given its area of responsibility, is perhaps too small, and in operations that involve any form of sustainment over time, likely inadequate. There is a distinct lack of doctrinal attention, as well as focus in training, on the evolving nature of combat operations, and the increasing prevalence of van Creveld-type wars. The leadership, and the structure of the force, remains oriented towards conventional operations. Despite the focus in policy on the RMA, little has actually changed in force structure to better operate in a network-centric fashion.

Continuity has had some negative effects on the ADF. It has hindered its ability to respond to new types of combat operation, although it has enhanced its capability in conventional warfare. Given the defence policy objectives noted above, and new strategic circumstances, recommendations can be made for the ADF to better align its capabilities with the contemporary environment. As with New Zealand, these are oriented towards the fulfilment of likely tasks.

## **Force Structure Recommendations**

Because the ADF fulfils policy better than does the NZDF, the following recommendations are largely improvements to an already adequate (or even good) capability.

*RMA Experimentation:* The ADF is moving very slowly along the RMA-paradigm path, with the *Network Centric Warfare Roadmap* its primary guide. Experimentation with some elements of the force structure might be a better route. During the *Restructuring the Army* trials, parts of the Army were designated experimental forces. Elements of the current ADF force structure might be tasked with similar roles in experimenting with NCW warfare. This could involve testing new and experimental equipment, doctrine, training programmes and concepts of operations.

*Designate Forces For Peace Support:* Performance in PSOs could be considerably enhanced by designating elements of the ADF as PSO-ready forces. Within the ADF there is a strong feeling that peace support is a secondary task. However, such operations are undertaken anyway, and once they return from operations contingents must be retrained for conventional tasks. If elements were tasked for PSOs, they could train permanently for such roles, and allow other parts of the force to focus consistently on warfighting. The PSO-roled forces could include contingents of civil affairs and other specialised forces suitable for such tasks. They would provide a rapid response capability for emerging PSOs.

*Enlarge the Patrol Boat Fleet:* One of the primary shortcomings of the ADF in respect to the defence of Australia is the size of its navy. Surveillance can only do half the job; there remains the need to intercept and investigate threats, whether they be illegal fishers or potential smugglers. The size of the current fleet, given rotation considerations, and the size of the EEZ, is inadequate. Doubling of its size would be of great benefit, and given modular weapons systems could also be of substantial use during a higher intensity conflict situation, for example by carrying out anti-shipping strikes with Harpoon or similar missiles.

*Reconsider the JSF Buy:* The ADF is likely to receive some 100 Joint Strike Fighters from 2012 onwards. The size of this buy should be reconsidered. If substantial savings can be gained from reducing the number of aircraft, this should be pursued. The JSF, while a sophisticated and able platform, is largely a weapon for conventional warfare. The costs devoted to it are unlikely to result in equivalent benefits, especially given the probable nature of military operations in the future. Other air combat possibilities, those that “leap” a generation, such as UCAVs, could be considered instead. More useful would be to use the money saved for other tasks.

*Reconsider Hardening and Networking the Army:* In some ways the Australian Army appears to be moving in the opposite direction to armies around the world. In going to an all-armoured force, it risks being unable to perform in low-intensity roles, such as PSOs and some van Creveld operations. As the Red Army showed in Berlin in April 1945, armoured forces can be of restricted utility in urban fighting. HNA will also make it more difficult to deploy the Army overseas, due to increased demands on sealift capacity. The loss of the parachute force will also hinder the ADF’s readiness for crisis situations.

*Reconsider the Air Warfare Destroyers:* While the logic behind the AWD buy is excellent, in ensuring aerial protection for deploying forces, the size and capability of these ships might be reconsidered. They will be large targets, with expensive weapons systems, and primarily oriented for dealing with high-technology opponents. A larger number of slightly more sophisticated ships, better able to operate in the littoral, might be an alternative.

*Enlarge Sea and Air Transport:* Most operations will involve overseas deployment. While the C-17 buy is a good sign, the purchase of other additional aircraft (similar to the C-141 or Il-76) would also be of great utility. Additional sealift would also be useful. This might include bulk shipping vessels, suitable for carrying the Abrams and other armoured vehicles operated by the Army, or additional, smaller amphibious ships to complement the large vessels entering service past 2010. Improved transport capacity will substantially enhance the ADF’s ability to rapidly deploy its forces within its area of interest.

*Modify Doctrine and Training:* The ADF today clings to the same type of training it carried out during the Cold War, focused on conventional operations. Adjustment of training programmes, to better focus on PSOs, van Creveld operations and other non-conventional operations, would better align the ADF with current realities. Training for conventional warfare should also shift, to better engage with RMA-concepts and the experience of Iraq 2003. In regards to doctrine, while the RMA has been adequately engaged with, non-conventional operations have not. Thus, below the level of foundational doctrine, the ADF and its constituent services should produce operational doctrine focused on the new range of non-conventional tasks.

### **Criticising Policy**

Australia's defence policy, because it has been consistently updated in recent times, seems more fitted to the evolving strategic environment than is New Zealand's. As such, only two major recommendations for enhancing the policymaking process can be made.

### **Policymaking Recommendations**

*Greater Whole-Of-Government Approach:* While defence policy in New Zealand has involved bargaining between government agencies, the situation in Australia has been one in which the ADO has usually had little problem in pushing its own view over that of other agencies. This has been a force for continuity. Increased involvement by Treasury, DFAT, DPMC and other agencies with security concerns would likely force defence policymakers to reconfirm their views. It would be a strong force against inertia. While the result might not change, a whole of government approach to defence policy would likely result in a better examination of Australia's security situation and needs.

*Increase Parliamentary Involvement:* As in New Zealand, greater involvement by the Australian Parliament in defence would also cause a closer examination of views. If the defence sub-committee were empowered to make strategic reviews, and the Government was required to respond within a certain date, the amount of debate

would likely increase. This would also act to stimulate public interest in defence, and open up the policy process.

## **Summary**

The ADF is a substantially more sophisticated force than is the NZDF. It is capable of operating towards the higher intensity part of the operational spectrum. Its equipment is, by and large, sophisticated and adequate for most likely roles. Its doctrine is also sophisticated in regards to conventional war, at least, as are its training programmes. Its limitations are, as with the NZDF, largely related to size. The ADF, for all its quality, is still a small force in global terms. It lacks sustainability and the ability to provide a truly substantial force to a major operation. The ADF's capability limitations are as much related to funding as they are to the demographic base it is built on; it is questionable whether it could be much larger.

The ADF is a potent instrument of Government policy, and fulfils the requirements of that policy adequately. Still, given the nature of the contemporary strategic environment, and the effect that has on strategic objectives, several force structure recommendations can be made.

Closer attention to the RMA, and the specific requirements of PSOs, might be made. Several major acquisition programmes, which threaten to perpetuate platform replacement syndrome, might be reconsidered, and their applicability to future requirements tested. Deployable capability could be enhanced through increased sea and airlift. Performance in non-conventional operations could be enhanced through doctrinal and training improvements. It is likely that, given the possibility of cancelling or reducing some deals, even major restructuring would not require the injection of additional defence funding. All that would be required is the internal reallocation of funds.

The ADF, as the NZDF, has lagged behind the changes in the global security environment. However, it is still a powerful force in some regards, a more sophisticated and stronger version of its Cold War self. In the future, however, strategic requirements may demand change in that force structure, if it is to perform adequately in new types of operations.

## Conclusion

Neither the NZDF, nor the ADF, optimally fulfils all requirements of government policy. Both have shortcomings, the NZDF more so, often related to changes in the global security environment that have taken place over the last few years. Both are small forces, but whereas the ADF retains a high technology focus, the NZDF has gone towards the lower intensity part of the conflict spectrum.

Few changes to the ADF are necessary for it to meet policy goals; changes could be made, but they would be improvements, not necessities. With the NZDF the situation is more difficult. In order to adequately meet policy goals, substantial and expensive changes might well be necessary.

Policymakers within the two states are not faced with immediate crises, demanding force restructuring. They are, however, faced with an uncertain future. How they respond now will determine how well the NZDF and ADF are able to deal with that future.

The following chapter concludes the thesis. It ties together all that has gone before, and answers the question as to whether the ADF and NZDF have diverged over the course of the post-Cold War era, or whether differences today are merely the same as the differences of yesterday.

## Chapter Ten – Conclusion

### Introduction

This chapter concludes the thesis, summarising the main points covered during the course of this work, posing an answer to the major questions, and suggesting areas for future study.

The chapter begins by summarising the thesis. It notes how Chapter Two traced the development and evolution of the strategic environment during the post-Cold War era. It summarises Chapter Three's findings on the states of the NZDF and ADF at the beginning of the post-Cold War era. It describes Chapter Four's analysis of the defence policymaking system in the two states. It notes the findings of Chapters Five and Six, which covered the policy process in the two states in the post-Cold War era. It summarises the conclusions of Chapter Seven as to the degree of continuity and change in the two defence forces during the period, and lists the reasons given for those trends in Chapter Eight. Then, it reiterates the evaluations and recommendations of Chapter Nine.

The chapter then examines the question this thesis began with: have the ADF and NZDF converged during the post-Cold War era? Various factors for this thesis are examined, as well as a range of factors against it. Some further issues that factor into any answer are noted, and a tentative conclusion made as to the extent of convergence or divergence.

The chapter then makes a list of suggestions for further study. In the course of this work, various topics have been briefly touched on. Deeper analysis in these areas would be of great benefit to the study of ANZAC defence policy in the post-Cold War era.

The chapter then concludes the thesis by briefly summarising the broad themes of the thesis, as well as its findings, and making some final recommendations.

## Summary of Thesis

This work began with an examination of the motivations and reasoning behind such a study. It noted various reasons that favoured the production of this work, including the development of better defence policy advice. It then moved onto a brief examination of policymaking theories, noting their various levels of applicability to the questions at hand, and synthesising a pair of descriptive models to use in examining the policy process. Some theories were found to be lacking in utility, but others, and especially those used for comparative studies, were examined more closely, and mentioned as possible explanatory tools.

The work then examined the development of the post-Cold War strategic environment. In doing so, it first analysed the Cold War itself. It noted how the influence of the bipolar confrontation coloured all other issues of security, leading to militaries usually oriented towards major conventional war, rather than non-traditional operations, despite their frequency. This all began to change at the end of the Cold War. New security threats arose, and the character of military operations changed. New dynamics, stimulated by the end of the bipolar confrontation, altered international relations. And technology developed for the Cold War found fruition, heralding a potential Revolution in Military Affairs.

This developing strategic environment was noted as changing and modifying the expected roles of militaries, both now and in the future. A list of ten military role demands, encompassing the full spectrum of operations, was posited. These role demands were examined, and their character and requirements identified. Then, an assessment tool was devised in order to measure the capability of a particular military to undertake those role demands. Overall, this analysis set the context for a closer analysis of the specifics of Australian and New Zealand military development during the post-Cold War era.

The thesis then examined the states of the two defence forces at the end of the Cold War. It noted that the ADF was oriented towards the continental Defence of Australia, and was a relatively sophisticated, albeit small, force. It was focused on air and naval capabilities, and its land forces were relatively small for its size. The NZDF, on the other hand, had no such clear orientation. It was a balanced force, without any great capability in any area, and was approaching obsolescence in many

of its force elements. The two forces, however, were both focused towards conventional warfare.

Then, the defence policymaking environments of the two nations were examined, utilising the taxonomy devised in Chapter One. This showed that the two states share a similar military history, but that other foundational influences, such as geography and economy, are markedly different. Vitality, Australia has consistently perceived a direct military threat to its own territory, unlike New Zealand. Politically, both have parties that span a wide range of views on defence. In New Zealand, there are few interest groups concerned with defence, whereas Australia has several organisations examining and analysing such issues.

The thesis then examined the role of the two states' bureaucracies and armed forces in the formulation of defence policy. It showed that Australia's bureaucracy is larger and more complex than New Zealand's, but that the two share a common feature in being the primary source of defence policy advice. In relation to military influence, there is a perception in Australia that uniformed personnel have often been relegated to secondary importance behind their civilian counterparts. Such a view has no validity in New Zealand.

In both states, Cabinet is the primary decision point for major defence policy decisions, but other actors, including the Minister of Defence and the Prime Minister, are also important. Parliament can do little to alter the course of defence policy. In implementing policy, both states use their civilian bureaucracies and uniformed services.

The thesis then examined the development of policy in the two states. In New Zealand, defence was a matter of little concern for the first part of the period, leading to a drawdown in capabilities. By 1996 matters had reached a crisis point, and a defence review was initiated to remedy the situation. When published in 1997, it was a conservative document, and recommended only minor changes. Partly simultaneous with this review was an alternative, Parliamentary examination of defence issues. This resulted in a more innovative alternative report, but the government of the time ignored it. In 1999, however, the government changed, and some of the more innovative ideas of the alternative report on defence were taken onboard. Through 2000 and 2001 this led to a series of defence decisions, which altered the nature of defence policy. Their effect on force structure, however, was not as great as sometimes perceived. Since that time, defence has again been a matter of little

concern. Few major decisions have been announced, and the period has instead been marked by a steady stream of new acquisitions.

In Australia, a similar drawdown throughout the early 1990s was punctuated by the publishing of a White Paper that barely altered the fundamentals of continental defence policy. However, with the election of the Coalition in 1996, change was apparent. Policy shifted to a slightly more outwards focus, promoting the acquisition of capabilities suited for expeditionary roles. In 2000, another major review heralded little change to policy fundamentals, but a substantial increase in funding. Since then, however, there have been signs of emerging change in the character of defence policy. This has been best exemplified by some recent acquisitions, which in supporting heavy tanks and sophisticated, long range naval vessels do not appear to be fully founded on earlier policy recommendations.

Then, the degree of continuity and change in the two militaries was examined. The thesis showed that continuity and reduction have been the dominant themes in relation to the NZDF; it is today a smaller, but substantially similar, force than the one it was in 1991. Continuity has also been dominant in Australia, but there has been little reduction in capabilities.

Explanations for this were then proffered. Many of the factors that have caused conservatism in one state were also present in the other, but there were also some differences. The differing perception of threat in Australia, which led to slightly higher defence funding, was the primary difference: this favoured continuity over reduction.

Then, evaluation was made of the two defence forces' capability in fulfilling the requirements of defence policy. First, the defence forces were measured against the DOTLMS-R/Role Demand matrix devised in Chapter Two. Then, this capability was evaluated against the broad objectives of defence policy. This showed that the NZDF has significant shortcomings in fulfilling defence policy. The ADF also has some shortcomings, but is in general a superior tool of government policy.

Building from these evaluations, several recommendations were proffered. In the case of the NZDF, these often involved the expansion of various land-based capabilities. The need for increased funding to undertake these recommendations was noted. In the case of the ADF, only minor changes were suggested, which largely involved a slight internal reallocation of resources away from conventional tasks, and

towards non-conventional operations. Also, for both states a series of recommendations to enhance their policymaking was given.

Overall, the thesis began by examining various theories of policymaking. It then examined the global context for any examination of military change. Then, it examined the process and content of defence policy in the two states, and the results of that policy on force structure. Finally, it explained that policy, evaluated the results of that policy, and recommended improvements to that policy.

## **Convergence or Divergence?**

This thesis began by asking a question: have the ADF and NZDF diverged in the post-Cold War period? The answer depends on a variety of issues. Neither “yes” nor “no” seems an adequate response.

Various elements can be taken as evidence of divergence. The NZDF has lost some of its major combat capabilities during the post-Cold War period. Primarily, these have been the NCF and ACF. In the case of the former, the size of the fleet has halved during the period. In the case of the latter, the entire capability was removed. The ADF, in comparison, has retained both of these force elements at a continuous level.

Also suggestive of divergence is the ADF’s increasing focus on the RMA and NCW concepts of warfare. The NZDF, on the other hand, has largely ignored such concepts, and has retained a conservative approach to doctrine. This is related to the respective levels of funding in the two states, as well as the ADF’s greater focus on conventional operations.

Technology, in general, is also suggestive of divergence. The ADF has consistently upgraded or replaced its capabilities throughout the post-Cold War period. The NZDF has been slower to do so, leading to a quantity of obsolescent capabilities being maintained today.

One attitude, of both the press and defence analysts, is that Australia has retained an adequate, warfighting oriented military, whereas New Zealand has shifted towards a glorified police force, adequate only for peacekeeping. Chapters Seven and Eight, however, showed this was incorrect; the degree of change in the NZDF has been quite low, and it still retains a focus on warfighting and other combat operations. Thus, this criticism can be countered.

Other elements suggest, if not convergence, then at the least parallel courses. In both the NZDF and ADF there has been a shift, since 1998 or so, towards a greater focus on land forces. In New Zealand, this resulted in *Motorisation of the New Zealand Army*; in Australia, the *Hardened and Networked Army*. Also, both have moved towards better integration of their naval patrol capabilities with other agencies. Another continuing similarity is the division of resources between the various services, and the general respective sizes of those services.

Thus, evidence for both the convergence and the divergence thesis can be found. Perhaps the best answer is that while individual force elements have diverged during the period, others have converged; the overall result is that the respective positions of the ADF and NZDF today are the same as they were in 1991.

However, timing is also important. Currently, various acquisitions are underway within the ADF that will substantially enhance its capabilities compared to the NZDF. All of these have been authorised since 2000. If one is looking for divergence, then it is perhaps not over the entire post-Cold War period that such divergence has occurred, but rather since 2000. It was at that date that Australia increased its defence funding, and began to investigate major, high-tech capabilities suitable for expeditionary warfare: the AWDs, the JSF, the amphibious replacements, and others. Since then, other items have also entered the acquisition process, including main battle tanks. In comparison, defence policy since 2000 in New Zealand has tended increasingly towards capabilities suitable for lower-intensity, and usually land-based, operations.<sup>1</sup>

There are other issues as well. Perhaps oddly, the policymaking processes in the two states have converged. Both have public capability plans: the DCP and LTDP. Both have separate agencies tasked with acquisition. And in both, the Prime Minister has taken an increased role in defence since approximately 2000.

The answer, as noted earlier, is thus far from simple. The likelihood is, however, that the future will bring further divergence. The level of defence funding difference will rise. The capabilities purchased by Australia will enhance its capability in expeditionary, conventional roles. The capabilities purchased by New Zealand will enhance its capability in lower-intensity roles. As such, while the remnants of an

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<sup>1</sup> A full explanation for this divergence cannot be given, but it is likely that a central issue has been a differing attitude towards the United States relationship. Australia, in endeavouring to act as a strong ally, had focused on developing those capabilities deemed most useful for ANZUS operations. New Zealand, on the other hand, has not had such strong alliance ties.

“ANZAC attitude” to defence remain today, they will not tomorrow. However, it might be asked just how strong that “ANZAC attitude” ever was, as even a cursory examination of history shows as many disagreements as agreements, and the comparison in 1991 also showed several major differences.

## **Suggestions for Future Studies**

An intriguing study might be made of the comparative levels of defence funding in the two states over the past twenty years, since the ANZUS breakdown. Another study might examine more closely the development of service doctrinal concepts, and their path into the bureaucracy, and eventually governmental policy. Another study might examine the interactions between the defence forces and other security agencies, such as Customs, and how those relationships have changed over time.

Politics would also be a fertile ground. The issue of whether or not Labour policy was imported wholesale into *Defence Beyond 2000* would be one deserving of close attention, and would potentially answer several major questions. In Australia, a useful study might be made of the development of political disagreement on defence during the last decade, ending what was a bipartisan attitude towards various defence fundamentals.

## **Conclusion**

Since the end of the Cold War, the strategic environment has evolved dramatically. New threats have emerged, old threats have evolved, and technological, social and other factors all affect the abilities of militaries to respond to threats to national security.

Neither Australia, nor New Zealand, has modified its defence force considerably in the post-Cold War period, in order to engage with these new circumstances. As such, their ability to respond to security threats, both now and in the near future, is not as great as it might be. Change, in both defence forces, would be beneficial. The issues are overcoming bureaucratic inertia, resource constraints, and the attitudes of serving military personnel.

It is not a matter of turning a warfighting force into a police force. It is a matter of engaging firmly with the changing character of military operations. Force on force confrontations are rare today, and will be rarer tomorrow. The future will look more like Iraq, 2006, than Iraq, 2003. If Australia and New Zealand are to maintain defence forces adequate for this evolving environment, then they must modify their defence policy. Otherwise, they run the risk of devoting considerable resources, resources that might be spent on other social goals, on forces inadequate for likely tasks. Such is false economy; sometimes it is better to spend a little more, in order to gain substantial benefits.

Defence issues have become intermingled with broader security concerns. Criminals, illegal immigrants, terrorists and resource shortages are all issues that militaries may need to engage with today and in the future. The nature of war may not have changed, but its character has. As such, militaries must evolve if they are to remain relevant. It is hoped that the analysis and recommendations of this thesis will provide a contribution to this ongoing endeavour.

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