VARIETIES OF EVERYDAY RESISTANCE IN NORTH KOREA

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Abstract

This dissertation investigates the theoretical puzzle of everyday resistance in North Korea. It reviews the literature on resistance studies, everyday life in North Korea, and social movements and then explores acts of resistance in the everyday lives of ordinary North Koreans within shifting structural and ideational conditions. The research aims to develop a foundational theory of everyday resistance in a totalitarian state, as a 'building block' for the development of a more comprehensive typological theory.

This research adopts a qualitative approach and uses a case study methodology. The cases were constructed from a blend of documentary and interview data collected between August 2015 and May 2018. Purposive and snowball recruitment and data sourcing methods were used to produce a triangulated research sample comprising documentary data (official North Korean documents, media), digital testimony (defector testimony, reporting from inside North Korea), archival data (material from governmental organisations, non-governmental organisations [NGOs]) and interviews (four defectors, six experienced NGO workers). Data analysis involved within-case analysis and cross-case comparison. The case studies present instances of diverse types of everyday resistance and classify them into categories based on a three-part framework of everyday resistance as reflexive, discursive and biopolitical. A set of possible causal explanations for each category of everyday resistance is distilled from the structural and ideational paradigmatic traditions of social movement theory and tested against each case.

The research results support a three-part framework of everyday resistance in North Korea for further development of a more comprehensive typological theory. The theoretical and practical implications of this research extend to the broader fields of political anthropology, comparative and contentious politics. From a practical perspective, the research gleans new insights for researchers and practitioners by discretely categorising varieties of social behaviour potentially experienced by defectors and the broader conditions underpinning them.

Dedication

For Caleb Christopher Cowan
My brother, my best friend, my inspiration

Acknowledgements

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Glossary of Acronyms

CF	Confidentiality Form
DD	Documentary Data
DMZ	Demilitarised Zone
DPRK	Democratic People's Republic of Korea/North Korea
DT	Digital Testimony
KCNA	Korean Central News Agency
KINU	Korean Institute of National Unification
KPA	Korean People's Army
KPW	Korean People's Won
MPS	Ministry of People's Security
MSC	Military Security Command
NDC	National Defence Commission
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
NSM	New Social Movement
OGD	Organisation and Guidance Department
PAD	Propaganda and Agitation Department
PDS	Public Distribution System
PT	Participant Testimony
PIS	Participant Information Sheet
POT	Political Opportunity Theory
PSE	Pseudo-State Enterprise
RMT	Resource Mobilisation Theory
ROK	Republic of Korea/South Korea
SMO	Social Movement Organisation
SSD	State Security Department
UAHPEC	University of Auckland Human Participants Ethics Committee
WPK	Workers' Party of Korea

Chapter 1: Introduction

1.1 Background and Context

Brimming over with empirical anomalies, North Korea under the Kim regime has proven resilient since its inception in 1948. However, the tumultuous events of the 1990s marked a loss in subsidised aid from its principal sponsor, the Soviet Union, a collapse of the socialist economy and its public distribution system (PDS), a devastating famine, and the death of its first supreme, now eternal, leader Kim Il-sung in 1994. As a result, the late 1990s triggered a grassroots marketisation coupled with an eroding information cordon. Nevertheless, hereditary succession ensued under Kim Jong-Il where his leadership was marked with a continuation of policies mirroring those of the previous generation. The effects of the 1990s carried over into the 2000s as markets, although systematically repressed, continued to operate and culture and information deemed decadent by the leadership continued to seep into the state. A second hereditary succession took place in 2011 when Kim Jong-un took the helm following his father's death. While living conditions have improved under the current leadership, and a new generation that is not used to the relative stability and care provided by the socialist system before the collapse ages, contemporary North Korea under Kim Jong-un has not experienced major changes to the totalitarian tendencies of the previous leaders. The country continues to dominate global headlines, and in the midst of the current leadership's campaign of international diplomacy, a reminder resonates that North Korea is not a sui generis museum piece.

Elementary theories of totalitarianism (e.g., Arendt, 1951; Friedrich & Brzezinski, 1956; Linz, 2000) lead one to expect little, if any, resistance in such societies. While North Korea exhibits strong repressive institutions typical of totalitarianism, the misconception and lingering clichés of North Korean people as completely dominated under the string of an autocratic puppeteer has been challenged through emerging research focusing on aspects of everyday life in the state (e.g., Lankov, 2007; Oh & Hassig, 2009; Fahy, 2015; Baek, 2016). As the only remaining state with such strong totalitarian features within the international political landscape, the context of everyday life in North Korea presents an

opportunity to launch an inquiry critical to the development of theory on everyday resistance.

The central theoretical puzzle addressed in this dissertation is the phenomenon of everyday resistance in North Korea. The concept of *everyday resistance* was introduced by James Scott (1985) to cover a lower scale, less public form of contention encapsulated in those "ordinary weapons of relatively powerless groups: foot dragging, dissimulation, false compliance, pilfering, feigned ignorance, arson, sabotage, and so forth" (p. 29). As Scott indicates, the political lives of subordinate individuals take place in the vast territory between overt collective resistance against powerholders and complete hegemonic compliance. It is this territory pursued by the researcher through an investigation into the qualitative variation of how everyday resistance is practised in North Korea coupled with its causal underpinnings. This aim goes beyond referencing such antithetical behaviour as 'accommodation', 'coping', 'surviving', or 'withdrawal' which suggest it does little to undermine hierarchal laws and norms, rather than embracing the agency and creativity involved in the practice of everyday life.[1]

The North Korean context also offers an opportunity to construct a theoretical framework from a range of possible causal explanations of social movements, tailored by the researcher to apply to individual actions. As the literature on social movements holds little material on 'early resisters' or the pre-conditions of social movements, the present study can shed light on and expand the scope and utility of social movement theory by aligning it with smaller-scale studies of resistance. The present study takes a full account of the broad range of factors affecting collective action in the social movement literature. It adopts a wide-angle lens, culling plausible factors affecting the emergence of everyday resistance from two paradigmatic families – structural and ideational social movement studies. These possible causes cannot account for the myriad factors that underpin practices of everyday resistance in North Korea. Nor is it meant to facilitate a detailed dissection of the North Korea state that furnishes a definitive understanding of how (and how well) its many layers function together. Instead, this research seeks to discover preliminary causal

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[1] See *The Practice of everyday life* (1984) by Michel de Certeau for an elaboration of creative resistance in everyday life practices.

paths of when and why some variations of everyday resistance in North Korea emerge and the theoretical merit of some causal factors.

There is no doubt that certain patterns of social behaviour occurring in North Korea need to be more fully described, differentiated, interpreted, and explained. Based on evidence gathered and synthesised by the researcher, this dissertation makes the case for a tripartite classification of three unfolding types of everyday resistance in North Korea. Proposing a new research agenda, it is a modest endeavour that pursues discovery, rather than confirmation of a single empirical answer, and is instilled with the potential to construct a rich 'building block' for the development of typological theory.

1.2 Problem Statement

A comprehensive assessment of studies on North Korea and the voluminous literature on contentious politics by the researcher concludes that the research agenda hitherto has not disaggregated the phenomenon of everyday resistance in North Korea or its causal underpinnings. Despite casual references (Haggard & Noland, 2011; Hassig & Oh, 2015), a dated article briefly discussing the issue (Suh, 1998), an article on politicised hidden transcripts in the marketplaces of North Korea (Joo, 2014), and a small collection of other works that discuss behaviour in the country that is paradoxical to a totalitarian state (Choi, 2013; Tudor & Pearson, 2015; Baek, 2016), there has been no focused attempt before now to make such patterns of social behaviour theoretically and practically manageable for researchers and practitioners alike.

1.3 Statement of Purpose and Research Questions

The purpose of this research is to address the problem outlined above by exploring the phenomenon of everyday resistance in North Korea through providing rich ('thick') descriptions and causal insights into evidence of such resistance, elaborated as a building block for the development of a typological theory of resistance.

As such, the primary research question posed in this inquiry asks, "*What accounts for the phenomenon of everyday resistance in North Korea?*". Two sub-questions then guide the development of typological theory - "*How* is everyday resistance qualitatively

exercised in North Korea?", and "*When* and *why* do particular types of everyday resistance emerge in North Korea?".

1.4 Significance of the Research

The research encompasses empirical, theoretical and practical significance in its contribution to academia and policymaking. First, this study is dedicated to exploring diverse types of everyday resistance and gleaning insights as to their causal underpinnings. It is the most comprehensive piece of scholarship related to building typological theory on this phenomenon in North Korea to date. Second, it adds to the empirical record on everyday resistance in North Korea by systematically demonstrating the variation of its practice in everyday life and how resistance interacts with contextual variables. Third, the research is not designed solely as a study about North Korea, but one that generates insights into the broader fields of comparative and contentious politics. In particular, a novel theoretical framework is developed by the researcher that tailors explanatory variables of collective action to individual action. Fourth, typological theory describing the causal relationships of contextual, structural and strategic factors offer configurations that can be used to predict variance in an outcome of interest (in this case everyday resistance), and is therefore useful for strategic management, providing a social scientific shorthand as a useful heuristic tool for researchers and practitioners alike (Fiss, 2011). Moreover, while not making concrete predictions, it is possible that a situation unfolds in which decision-makers and people in general would find a richer understanding of this phenomenon useful in managing a large outflow of defectors from North Korea in the event of the state's collapse or devolution.

1.5 Research Approach

This research adopted a qualitative case study methodology in pursuit of typological theory development. Three 'case' types (or categories) of everyday resistance were identified - reflexive, discursive, biopolitical - based on their qualitative distinctiveness to classify a set of examples of everyday resistance. Empirically, the cases were constructed

from August 2015 to May 2018. Purposive and snowball methods of data sourcing[2] were used to produce a triangulated research sample comprising: (1) documentary data (official North Korean media, cultural productions, rhetoric, state sanctioned literature); (2) digital testimony (defector statements made available digitally through NGO[3] collections, run by defectors or those working with defectors or experienced in North Korean affairs, and investigative agencies reporting information from sources inside North Korea); (3) archival data (organisations and governments producing information based on defector testimony); and (4) in-depth interviews (with four defectors and six experienced NGO employees, in Australia, New Zealand, South Korea, Thailand and the United States). The first part of each case study presents a range of data representing the exercise of a qualitatively distinct type of everyday resistance addressing the 'how' of its practice in North Korea. The second component of each case study uses within-case analysis to test a set of possible causal variables distilled from social movement studies to provide insight into the emergence of the three varieties of everyday resistance. Lastly, the findings are synthesised through a cross-case comparison that evaluates the theoretical merit of each explanation in terms of engaging with the same, or related, causal variables in future research.

This methodological approach is a mélange of political science, sociology, history and international relations. Overall, the study took a process-based approach, using the context of North Korea to understand variation among expressions of everyday resistance. The approach is interactive in that it seeks to show how these myriad forms arise from a state-agent nexus, and thus reflective of Kuran's (1995) notion that structuralism and individualism are compatible components of an overall story.

1.6 Delimitations

This research is delimited to a particular spatio-temporal context. The everyday practices of resistance observed derive from individuals in North Korea from 2003 or some time later. Hence, the spatio-temporal scope of this study is limited to social behaviour inside North Korea since 2003.[4] The study cannot account for all of the everyday resistance

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[2] See Patton (1990) *Qualitative Evaluation and Research Methods* (2nd ed.) for more detail on purposive and snowball sampling methods.
[3] The World Bank classifies NGOs as either (i) operational (community-based, national, or international) or (ii) advocacy. According to this typology, no particular type was omitted from data sourcing.
[4] This does not pertain to factors of causality as they may predate 2003 or occur outside North Korea.

in North Korea or the full diversity of factors that underpin it. Rather, it is restricted to exploring the qualitative variation of everyday resistance and testing a theoretical framework of causal variables to glean insights into when and why some variations may emerge. It is also confined to exploring an empirical puzzle and not a normative problem.

1.7 Structure of the Dissertation

This introductory chapter described the key components of the research including the background and context, problem statement, purpose and research questions, significance of the research, research approach, and limitations. The structure and content of the remaining chapters in the dissertation are described below.

Chapter 2 elaborates the theoretical puzzle in greater detail by situating the research questions in the context of relevant literature in the social sciences. It provides a critical framework informing the research design and methodology that consists of three components – *resistance studies*, *North Korean studies* and *totalitarianism*, and *social movement theory*. An exploration of *resistance studies* centres on an explicit assessment of the core definition of 'resistance' and serves as the basis for the conceptualisation and measurement of the 'everyday' distinction of the concept. The component addressing *North Korean studies* and *totalitarianism* delves into the current state of research on politics and resistance in North Korea. Specifically, the chapter explores scholarship on political structure and culture in the state, the growing literature on everyday life, and the few works addressing resistance in the state that represent the underdeveloped nature of scholarship devoted to such phenomena. Finally, key academic work on totalitarianism is reviewed and applied to North Korea as a tool for deeper contextual and theoretical understanding of the empirical and analytical components of the study. *Social movement theory* investigates the paradigmatic traditions of structural and ideational explanatory theories on social movements. This allows for the researcher to distil a set of possible explanatory variables for applying a novel theoretical framework of collective action-oriented variables to individual action.

Chapter 3 lays out key aspects of the research design and methodology. These include: (1) the research issue and objective; (2) specifying the research strategy, also comprising the conceptualisation and measures of the dependent and independent variables;

(3) case selection issues; (4) the approach to establishing causality; (5) the research sample and data collection methods; (6) data analysis and synthesis procedures; (7) ethical considerations; (8) issues of quality; (9) trade-offs and limitations; and (10) a section summary. This methodological framework also becomes a repository for the research data, providing a basis for and informing various iterations of a coding scheme. As such, it provides an organising structure for both reporting findings and for their interpretation and synthesis.

Subsequently, chapters 4, 5 and 6 represent the empirical and analytical core of the dissertation by presenting each case study through a process-based approach. Each chapter concludes its within-case analyses with a theory for each type respectively, that is, reflexive, discursive and biopolitical.

Chapter 4 addresses the first case study of everyday reflexive resistance, which is qualitatively similar to a type of everyday resistance suggested by Scott (1990) that undermines a state's material domination. Primarily situated in North Korea's hazy socio-economic context where individuals are subject to arbitrary and exemplary punishment, everyday reflexive resistance is instrumentally oriented toward material incentives and undermines the capacity of the state to control human and physical resources. It eludes spatial and temporal control over one's movement and labour. The first part of the chapter elucidates the elementary (evasion, theft) and complex (defection, illegal movement and trade) within-type patterns of everyday resistance identified by the researcher. The second part uses process-tracing to measure the impact of possible causal variables.

Chapter 5 delves into the second case study of everyday discursive resistance that resembles Scott's (1990) type of everyday resistance grounded in hidden transcripts shared linguistically and symbolically in everyday North Korean life. As previous studies on totalitarian regimes indicate, in the absence of institutional channels to voice dissatisfaction, people may creatively and subtly communicate dissent in the spaces of everyday life. Possessing anti-regime semantics, these hidden transcripts undermine hierarchal discourses disseminated by the Kim regime. The first part of the chapter explores a range of elementary (gossip, rumours, euphemisms, grumbling) and more elaborate (oral culture, folk tales, symbolic inversion, rituals of reversal) within-type patterns of everyday

resistance uncovered in the research. The second part uses process-tracing to measure the impact of possible causal variables.

Chapter 6 presents the third case study, on biopolitical resistance. The problem of biopolitics has become an increasingly influential research orientation in the social sciences and is applied in a variety of disciplines to analyse transformations in the rationalities of power over life in diverse spatio-temporal contexts. These include truth discourses about the vital character of living beings, an array of authorities considered competent to speak the truth, strategies of intervention upon collective existence in the name of life and health, and modes of subjectification (Lemke, 2011). Thus, in North Korea this case represents a type of everyday resistance that undermines the state's biopolitical control over life, eroding its pervasive ideology that guides it. The first part of the chapter elaborates self-affirmative (alternative sartorial trends, consumption of foreign culture and information, spiritual practices) and self-detrimental (methamphetamine use, suicide) within-type patterns of everyday resistance garnered from the data. The second part uses process-tracing to measure the impact of possible causal variables.

Chapter 7 takes stock of the findings and implications gleaned from this research, as well as recommendations for future research and policymaking. First, a summary of each of the three case studies is laid out, followed by an evaluation of the cross case comparison that tested possible causes of each case's emergence. A foundational typological theory is then presented, which supports the model of everyday resistance where the individual filters and refracts various forms of everyday resistance. Theoretical, practical and political implications broaden the significance of the study by illustrating the impact of this dissertation's findings to the wider relevant scholarship and policymakers in pertinent fields. Lastly, recommendations for future research and policymaking are elaborated based on the findings of this research, its limitations and the researcher's learning experience throughout the project.

Chapter 2: Literature Review

The purpose of this dissertation is to account for the phenomenon of everyday resistance in North Korea. Specifically, the research sought to understand the qualitative variation of everyday resistance in practice and to test a set of rival explanations to account for its emergence across cases. To carry out this study, it was necessary to complete a critical review of the relevant literature. This chapter discusses and weaves together several bodies of literature that contribute to an understanding of the phenomenon being considered in this study and the theories that have shaped the research concern. The critical review is delineated into the components of resistance studies, North Korean studies and totalitarianism, and social movement theory. A review of the literature on resistance relates to the definitional dispute centred on the concept, a distinction of the modes it assumes, a critique of Scott's conceptualisation of everyday resistance, and a subsequent outline of this study's understanding of the concept. The section on North Korean studies addresses the debate on political structure, political culture, everyday life, and resistance in the state. It concludes with an underlying argument that the state maintains totalitarian features that act as relevant constraints to individual action and decision-making. A subsequent discussion of social movement theory moves beyond its traditional canon to the structural and ideational paradigms that hold variables of theoretical interest for this investigation. Moreover, a novel theoretical framework is based on a set of variables from these paradigms that tailors explanations of collective action to individual action for assessing the causal significance of each on everyday resistance.

To conduct the literature review, the researcher used multiple information sources, including books, internet resources, professional journals, and periodicals. These sources were accessed through the University of Auckland's library and digital databases such as e-books and e-journals, ProQuest and Scopus. Throughout the review, the researcher attempted to point out important gaps and omissions in particular segments of the literature as and when they became apparent. In addition, relevant contested areas or issues are identified and discussed.

2.1 Resistance Studies

As resistance is the principal concept of this research, an explicit assessment of the debate centred on its core definition and distinctions, and a critical framework of the phenomenon is essential. This component is process-based as it traces the conceptualisation of everyday resistance for this study according to the researcher's review of key scholarship. First, the core elements (action and opposition) and key dimensions (recognition and intent) that underlie definitional disputes are explored. While normally considered a non-issue regarding large-scale protests, as participants are usually aware they are contesting some form of power, these elements are not as clear in lower-scale practices of resistance. Second, the focus shifts to the low-scale variety of resistance with an emphasis on James Scott's concept of *everyday resistance*. Third, the predominant critiques of Scott's concept will be addressed with concurrent amendments to establish a critical framework for this study's design and execution. Finally, concluding remarks summarise the discussion and reiterate the critical framework of everyday resistance transferable to the conceptualisation and measurement aspect of the research design. In this manner, the process of investigating the phenomenon of resistance does not simply extend a core definition that predisposes this study's findings in a particular direction. Hence, any findings from the research will reflect a justified approach to this study's operationalisation of everyday resistance traceable to this component of the review.

2.1.1 The Diverse Properties and Core Elements of Resistance

A reasonable starting point for discussing the concept of resistance rests in Hollander and Einwohner's (2004) attempt to aid in rectifying the chaotic nature of the imprecise, diverse and seemingly contradictory use of the term by review and synthesis of the interdisciplinary literature that speaks to it. As so loosely defined, everything from hairstyles to revolution has been described as resistance by scholars, who range from seeing it everywhere to seeing it nowhere. Hence, Hollander and Einwohner make an ambitious and insightful attempt to create an analytical framework of resistance. Acknowledging the tremendous variations of behaviours and settings, they classify resistances into groups based on their modes, scales, and levels of coordination, targets and goals.

The mode of resistance implies whether an act of resistance is physical or symbolic. Accordingly, some scholars view resistance as physical and material, hence focusing on the resisters' use of their bodies and various material objects as tools of opposition that range from dramatic acts such as violent behaviour in protests or picketing to subtle acts such as wearing particular types of clothes or stealing from one's employer. Alternatively, other scholars prefer to identify resistance with symbolic behaviour such as silence or breaking silence. The scale of resistance varies in it being individual or collective, widespread or locally confined, while the level of coordination refers to the extent that resisters purposefully act together. For example, "while revolutions and other organized protest activities require coordination, other acts such as dressing style or workplace confrontation require little or no coordination" (Hollander & Einwohner, 2004, p. 536). Targets of resistance vary from individuals (e.g., potential thief) to groups and organisations (e.g., employees resisting employers) to economic and political institutions (e.g., revolutionaries against the state) to social structures (e.g., individuals against gender expectations). In terms of resisters' goals, most frequently they are interpreted as aiming for change, but, in some cases, to curtail change. Additionally, the assumption that it is always 'progressive' or at least 'prosocial' is not necessarily the case (e.g., some writers argue that resistance may come from those who, at least structurally, have more power). It can also come from the *right* and well as the *left*, and can be antisocial, as in the case of drug trafficking and tax evasion, racial abuse or sexual assault (Hollander & Einwohner, 2004).

Transitioning from the diverse range of properties that scholars use to label resistance, Hollander and Einwohner explore how all these phenomena could possibly fall under the same umbrella. They move forward by noting that (1) a sense of action and (2) a sense of opposition are two core elements of resistance used almost unanimously in empirical and theoretical discussions regarding the concept. However, definitional disputes concerning the analytical dimensions of (3) recognition and (4) intent are variables at the heart of the debate on what constitutes resistance.

Across the literature, *recognition* is a commonly used variable addressing the dichotomy between visibility and invisibility to distinguish low-scale resistance that occurs in 'everyday life' from more open forms of political mobilisation. It concerns the question of who needs to interpret an act of resistance as such: the actor, target (power holders), or

other dispassionate observers. If these three groups agree, then there is no issue. However, a definitional dispute ensues when one or more do not recognise the act as resistance (Baaz, Lilja, Schulz & Vinthagen, 2016). According to Scott (1985), the powerless rarely have the resources or opportunity to resist openly against their superordinates and massive protest movements are rare, thus merely "flashes in the pan" (p. xvi). In contrast, more common 'everyday' forms of resistance by subordinates go unrecognised by the powerful as low profile techniques, such as foot dragging, slander, sabotage, and so forth. Moreover, some acts are observable by the powerful but not yet recognised as resistance. For example, Scott's (1990) concept of a 'hidden transcript' of humour among peasants may be at the expense of authorities and articulated in their presence but not recognised as such. Hence, such approaches to recognition underscore the intent of resisters as to whether they try to hide the act itself (as 'in passing') or the intent behind it.

Rubin (1996, p. 241), in contrast, includes recognition as a basis for resistance and critiques the 'minimalist' definition of the concept by arguing that "the term be reserved for visible, collective acts that result in social change", and not "everyday acts…that chip away at power in almost imperceptible ways" (cited in Hollander & Einwohner, 2004, p. 541). Other approaches (e.g., Carr. 1998; Tye & Powers, 1998) note opposition as a criterion for resistance, such as participation in an event despite awareness of opposition from others, or social action that elicits recognition and even reaction from others. Yet another approach, note Hollander and Einwohner (2004), "views two distinct groups of 'others' who may identify an act as resistance: targets (i.e., those to whom the act is directed) and other observers (who may include onlookers at the time of the act, the general public, media members and researchers)" (p. 541).

Aside from recognition, the other primary dimension of dispute centred on the concept pertains to the *intent* of the individual(s) who resist. Generally, three ways that theorists of resistance have approached intent suggest either: (i) the actor's conscious intent is critical, and sufficient, for the classification of an act or behaviour as resistance (Scott, 1985); (ii) it is difficult to assess the actor's intent or have access to the actor's internal states, which amounts to saying that the job of the theorists of resistance is either to 'assess the nature of the act' (Weitz, 2001) or to 'infer intent from actions' (Scott 1985); or (iii) an actor's intentions are not central to the understanding of an act or a behaviour as resistance,

as the actor may also be unconscious of his/her own action as resistance (St. Martin & Gavey, 1996; Hebdige, 1979; Hollander & Einwohner, 2004).

According to Scott (1985), the actor's conscious intent is central to classifying an act as resistance. Acts of resistance do not always have the desired effect and, therefore, an actor's intention to resist is a better indicator than its scope or outcome (p. 290). Moreover, LeBlanc (1999) argues that the person engaging in the act of resistance must do so consciously and be able to relate that consciousness and intent. These accounts suggest that resistance is defined more by intention than the particular act or its effects (Hollander & Einwohner, 2004).

A second approach argues that assessing intent is difficult, if not impossible. For instance, research methods such as interviewing that aim to uncover intent may not be reliable. The inability of an actor to fully articulate their motivations in a manner comprehensible for the researcher, lying, or concealing intention are all examples of difficulty in assessing intent. Again, Scott's (1990) concept of hidden transcripts denotes that the oppressed may be conscious of oppression and may intend to resist in some manner, but the resistance may occur privately due to the potential danger of public resistance. Moreover, Scott (1985) argues that reasonable inferences of intent may be accrued from actions. For example, he notes that "A peasant soldier who deserts the army is 'saying' by his act that the purposes of this institution and the risks and hardships it entails will not prevail over his family or personal needs … [a] harvest labourer who steals paddy from his employer is 'saying' that his need for rice takes precedence over the formal property rights of his boss" (p. 301).

A third approach mitigates the importance of the actor's intentions for understanding resistance and suggests that an actor may not be conscious of the action as resistance. For example, St Martin and Gavey (1996) note that bodybuilding can be either an unconscious or purposeful act of resistance, and Hedbige (1979) studies styles of dress as resistance without concern for intent, as resistance can occur at a level beneath consciousness (cited in Hollander and Einwohner, 2004, p. 543). Moreover, Baaz et al. (2016) suggest the exclusion of consciousness, motivation or intention as indicators of resistance. While omitting the element of intent may raise debate, they argue it is more problematic to include it by noting, "The point is that various actions or practices—even

when the intent is ambiguous, unknown, or non-political—still qualify as resistance …

some acts are arguably in themselves de facto a response to power relations, irrespective of

the intention of the actor (e.g., disloyalty, sabotage, evasion, or working slowly)" (p. 140).

Bayat (2000) argues that Scott and other resistance scholars "confuse an awareness of

oppression with acts of resistance against it" (cited in Hollander & Einwohner, 2004, pp.

533-557). He argues that, where possible, such mental or psychological properties should

be part of the researcher's investigation. Baaz et al. (2016) also note "intentions could be

considered plural, complex, contradictory, or evolving as well as occasionally something

that the actor is not sure about, views differently in retrospect, or is not able to explain" (p.

140). Therefore, while academia is undergirded by Scott's influence, there are scholars who

do not view an absence of any particular political purpose, class purpose or intent as

precluding an act(s) as resistance. Hence, any activity of the subordinated, in the view of

powerholders or targets, which causes a problem or is a threat to power, could amount to

resistance.

In an effort to mitigate the confusion inherent in approaches to these analytical

dimensions, Hollander and Einwohner's typology furthers the conceptual development of

resistance by which one is to decide if the act is *recognised* as such and if the act is

intended as such, by *target*, *agent* and *observer*. Johansson and Vinthagen (2016) argue that

while the authors' conceptualisation makes a significant contribution to the field of

resistance studies in their review of the concept, they fall short with a typology that

contradicts their concurrent emphasis of resistance as a *complex and on-going process of*

social construction. Privileging consciousness as 'recognition by' or 'intention of' actors

dramatically limits the scope of what they consider resistance, argue Johansson and

Vinthagen, who instead adopt and take as their point of departure the basic premise by

Hollander and Einwohner that "acts or patterns of actions are defined as 'resistance' within

on-going processes of negotiation between different agents of resistance (the resisters),

between the agents of resistance and agents of power (targets), and between the two former

parties and different observers. Such observers are, for example, researchers who make a

contribution to creating 'the truths' about resistance through scientific discourses" (p. 418).

Having departed from Hollander and Einwohner's (2004) elaboration of the

definitional debate on resistance, and from the general consensus on the core elements of

action and opposition in contrast to the contentious debate on the key analytical dimensions of recognition and intent, this section will conclude with the position assumed by the researcher. *First*, the researcher agrees that an *action* that is in some *opposition* to domination or a hierarchal power relation is a primary criterion for the concept of resistance. *Second*, the research will follow Johansson and Vinthagen's (2013) approach to *recognition* that interprets resistance actions as on-going processes of social construction. Moreover, whatever its intent, the recognition of any given act as resistance depends on its transgression of an established law or social norm in the hierarchal features of a certain context. For instance, in liberal-democratic states, both society and the state dictate what ought and what ought not be done. As long as a healthy civil society persists, it acts as a check on whatever authoritarian tendencies might arise in the government. In a non-democratic state, the voice of society is muted and the state is the key arbiter of what constitutes crime or deviance, as it plays a pivotal role in defining, discovering and obfuscating what accounts for resistant behaviour.[5] *Third*, this study adopts the stance of Baaz et al. (2016), noting that while intention is not necessary as a defining criterion, if explicit, the ability to identify it through the actor(s) content increases the likelihood of detecting power relations, conflict issues and understanding why there is resistance as pertains to its qualitative variation.

With these three stipulations in mind, *resistance is an action, in opposition to some form of domination or hierarchal power relation. It is socially constructed (contextually-dependent) and intent, while not a necessary indicator, is beneficial when explicit in the actor's content in understanding why there is resistance as pertains to its qualitative variation.*

2.1.2 The Everyday Variety of Resistance and its Qualitative Variation

Having laid foundations for the conceptualisation of everyday resistance pertaining to its core definitional elements of action, opposition, recognition and intent, this review transitions to a focus on the concept of *everyday resistance*. The usefulness of the concept, especially in contexts where it is too dangerous to rebel openly, marks a justification in

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[5] For example, what it chooses to label resistance and in what context is revealing of official motivation and relations of domination.

exploring the context of North Korea. First, this section will discuss Scott's seminal work on resistance. Second, it will summarise the everyday distinction of resistance as a backdrop for a critical framework, providing appropriate empirical measures of the concept that also reflect issues in the current academic debate.

Scott offered a seminal perspective on the concept of resistance by focusing as his main interest on 'class resistance' among the peasantry of Southeast Asia, which includes "any act(s) by member(s) of a subordinate class that is or are *intended* either to mitigate or deny claims (e.g., rents, taxes, prestige) made on that class by superordinate classes (e.g., landlords, large farms, the state) or to advance its own claims (for example, work, land, charity, respect) vis-à-vis those superordinate classes" (cited in Baaz et al., 2017, p. 39). The main line of argument in Scott's work is that resistance is rooted in the everyday lives of individuals, including collective covert acts of opposition and self-help against domination that require no recourse to political or labour organisations, as subordinates have their own agendas that may differ from those of the elite. In this manner, they make political choices about their lives and daily experiences under different variations in power relations (Heredia, 2013).

Driven by a response to a body of Gramscian literature that saw domination as resting on consent and those who defined resistance as an area of formally organised and revolutionary activity (Heredia, 2013), Scott's (1985) seminal distinction of resistance that still dominates the debate on the concept today is between the confronting and public challenges against power (revolutions, demonstrations, union strikes, boycotts) and the hidden, circumventing forms of disguised resistance (feigning sickness, poaching, spoilage, etc.). Scott's classic categorisation between public and disguised resistance is related to three forms of domination (material, status and ideological), resulting in six types of resistance. Those that exist in the public form are (1) publicly declared resistance (open revolts, petitions, demonstrations, land invasions, etc.) against material domination, (2) assertion of worth or desecration of status symbols against status domination, and (3) counterideologies against ideological domination. Resistance exists in the disguised form (low-profile, undisclosed, or infrapolitics) as (4) everyday resistance (e.g., poaching, desertion, evasion, foot-dragging) or direct resistance by disguised resisters against material domination, (5) hidden transcripts of anger or disguised discourses of dignity against status

domination, and (6) dissident subcultures (e.g. millennial religion, myths of social banditry, class heroes) against ideological domination (Scott, 1989). Again, the essence of this typology represents Scott's response to the literature on hegemony and false consciousness. In establishing such a distinction, he simultaneously outlined the nature of everyday resistance as prosaic, covert, unstructured, individual or collective, informal, and focused on modest demands and immediate gains (Heredia, 2013).

Thus, a typology of paired forms of resistance construes the difference between everyday resistance and a more direct, open confrontation. In everyday resistance one seeks tacit, *de facto* gains, while in the other "formal, *de jure* – recognition of those gains" (Scott, 1989, p. 34). Desertion corresponds to open mutiny in the same logic that pilfering is the hidden version of open attacks on markets, and so forth. The aims are similar, but the forms are different (Vinthagen & Johansson, 2013). Everyday techniques are small scale, relatively safe, promise vital material gains and "require little or no formal coordination" (Scott, 1989, p. 35), but some level of cooperation and evolve into "a pattern of resistance" (p. 36) that relies "on a venerable popular culture of resistance" (p. 35). The practical techniques come in many varieties but acquire "a certain unity ... [through their] invariably quiet, disguised, anonymous, often undeclared forms" (p. 37). According to Scott (1989, p. 49), these practices amount to:

> Quiet unremitting guerrilla warfare ... day-in and day-out [that] rarely make headlines. But just as millions of anthozoan polyps create, willy-nilly, a coral reef, thousands upon thousands of petty acts of insubordination and evasion create a political and economic barrier reef of their own. And whenever ... the ship of state runs aground on such a reef, attention is typically directed to the shipwreck itself and not the vast aggregation of actions which make it possible.

Scott (1989) argues that these activities constitute tactics that exploited people use to both survive and undermine repressive domination. Gradually, complicity becomes tacit and normative consensus grows to the extent that the authorities tolerate it. Once resistance has become a customary practice it generates its own expectations about what is permissible. In the words of Scott (1989, pp. 34-35):

> A pattern of quiet resistance both symbolically and materially suddenly becomes generalized, massive and open as the political situation presents new possibilities that previously seemed utopian. New levels of

coercion are required for something that becomes generalized to whole communities. The same is applied to symbolic resistance as peasants say in public pretty much what their masters expect, yet there are likely hidden transcripts of what subordinates actually think that can be recovered in off-stage conversation in slave quarters. These may be pictured as continually testing the line of what is permissible on-stage. If one particularly intrepid, risk-taking, angry unguarded subordinate says something that just touches or crosses the line is not rebuked or punished, others profiting from this example will venture across the line as well and a new de facto line is created that governs what may be said or gestured.

Having elaborated Scott's theorisation of everyday resistance, it is useful to note the analytical elements of Scott's typology that will serve as groundwork for the present study before transitioning to the establishment of a critical framework. Bayat et al. (2016) suggest that Scott's classic categorisation of resistance has two advantages: it systematically relates both to public and disguised resistance, and to the main forms of domination (material, status, and ideological). However, it does not (1) encompass all the variation of resistance that seems to exist or (2) use categories of domination that fit with current theories of domination (e.g. Foucault's sovereign, disciplinary and biopower). Noting that these shortcomings of an otherwise excellent categorisation indicate how the system of categories might be more or less dependent on theory, Bayat et al. elucidate a dilemma in suggesting that "if you subscribe to the theory on which the construction of categories builds, you get more detailed categories to work with. This is an analytical advantage. If you do not subscribe to the underlying theoretical framework, various problems occur" (p. 144). If so, they suggest two options: (1) using even more basic and open categories that are less tied to certain theoretical positions that extend the variation; or (2) making the classification relatively independent of the applied power theories and explicitly utilising more of the different positions and key concepts of current debates within the social sciences on power and social actions (Bayat et al., 2016).[6]

Above is an illustrative example of the dilemma the researcher faced in moving forward with Scott's theoretical framework of everyday resistance. Moving on, the researcher adopts the core of Scott's theory in that power interacts with resistance and causes a variation in the exercises of power and resistance. Additionally, the present study

[6] See Baaz et al. (2016) "Defining and Analyzing 'Resistance': Possible Entrances to the Study of Subversive Practices" for seven suggested analytical categories that may provide more in-depth (empirical) studies of resistance.

moves forward in contending that a typological framework of resistance such as Scott's is analytically advantageous for the empirical study of resistance and theory building. However, a universal dichotomy presents an issue for this study, as its focus is on the qualitative variation of everyday resistance in a particular context and regime type. Thus, the researcher rectifies this issue by using more basic and open categories to inductively produce hypothetical variations of everyday resistance based on the second component of this review, the examination of the literature speaking to the academic debate on North Korean studies and totalitarianism. Moreover, the subsequent development of a critical framework of everyday resistance will address the limitations of Scott's approach on power relations and other crucial debates related to the concept.

2.1.3 A Critical Framework on Scott's Everyday Resistance

While the core of Scott's theory remains intact for the current study, this section aims to mitigate its limitations and includes critique that overlaps with the challenges that emerge from applying a framework of everyday resistance to a context with totalitarian features. These relatively consensual critiques of Scott are pivotal in the literature and a discussion of them will also elucidate the scope of this study through clarification of concepts inherently related to studying everyday resistance, while disavowing certain methodological entrances, to empirically examining the concept that are delimited by the present study's parameters. Moreover, this critical framework avoids a laundry list of criticisms and instead uses the following categories to serve the purpose of conceptualising everyday resistance: *agency*, *intersectionality*, *political salience,* and *power relations*. While these issues may overlap in some instances, they are distinct enough to discuss individually and will also add clarity to the conceptualisation.

A common concern with Scott's theory of everyday resistance cited in the scholarship is his treatment of *human agency* in ascribing the individual with too vast an array of independent abilities. Embedded in this critique is also the notion covered in the preceding discussion of definitional dispute that cites Scott's assertion of the ability of the empirical researcher to infer the agent's intent. This critical framework aims to address such issues through relevant work in Bleiker (2003), de Certeau (1984) and Lilja, Baaz, Schulz and Vinthagen (2017).

Focusing on the conceptualisation of human agency, Bleiker's (2003) analysis centres on everyday forms of resistance in demonstrating how the acceptance of ambiguity, often misrepresented as relativism, is a crucial precondition for the conceptualisation and its application in practice. He uses Heidegger's concept of *Dasein* to underscore the ability of individuals to escape power. Dasein is a "specific and concrete being as incorporated into a cultural setting and constituted through interactions with people and things in this world" (p. 30). This *being* must be understood through its temporality, in that "the past is not an époque gone but an integral part of the presence of Being … always historical, or, in other words, one cannot separate who one is from how one grew up, from the education, the custom, the language and a whole set of experiences and impressions that shaped our Being over time" (Bleiker, 2003, p. 30). The past is not the only aspect of the temporal dimension of being as it also contains the future and its various possibilities in what may or may not materialise in what is, then, a being in perpetual transformation (Bleiker, 2003). Hence, the agent as a temporal being is capable of resistance strategies such as practising prefigurative politics, referring to dangerous future scenarios, and other issues involving temporality and time.

To amend the concept of everyday resistance pertaining to Scott's privileging of intent and the issues that raises for analysing resistance in relation to power, the present study follows Vinthangen and Johansson (2013) in noting the value of Michel de Certeau's work as the key competing theoretical approach to Scott's everyday resistance. De Certeau (1984) notes the 'tactics' that 'depend on time' that are the matter of everyday resistance where it "does not have a place" (p. xix). In reading de Certeau (1984, p. 26), it becomes evident that "everyday resistance is a 'way of using imposed systems' and how people use 'popular tactics' in their ordinary and daily activities to turn 'the actual order of things' 'to their own ends'". What can be drawn from de Certeau's approach, to mitigate Scott's privileged *intention,* is de Certeau's focus on *practices* (creative ways of acting). Hence, as individuals do not intend or recognise different things with the same acts, de Certeau's work suggests that it is the resistance act, the agency itself, or *the way of acting,* that matters.

Lastly, related to agency, a criticism in the literature suggests that Scott assumes the pre-existence of subjectivity. Since everyday resistance reveals *how* the 'resister' (subaltern

subject) might express certain acts of resistance, and at other times, in other sites and in other occasions will act in subordination, Vinthagen and Johansson (2013) argue that there is no point in tying resistance to the subject. They argue that resistance is about *actions* (practices) in specific contexts. As such, these acts are like any other, practised by someone, since all acts have actors and rely on some form of agency. Thus, individuals do resist, but the resistance is not a feature of the (subaltern) subject. Resistance is something that results from the combination of subjectivity, context and interaction (p. 36). Moreover, in their reading of Butz (2011) and Mitchell (1990), Lilja et al. (2017) note that the "relational view of the resisting subject implies that resistance, agency and subjectivity of the agent are informed by the dominant as well as the challenging and alternative discourses, which circulate the very context of the subject ... Scott relies on an understanding of domination as purely coercive. It is the bodies of the peasants that he [Scott] studies that are forced into subalternity" (p. 46). Hence, at the same time as their outward-oriented behaviour is dominated, the actors' minds remain free and unconvinced by hegemonic arguments. In this regard Lilja et al. (2017) align with Vinthagen and Johansson (2013) by arguing that Scott assumes a pre-existence of subjectivity despite dominating discourses and persuasions. Thus, domination is believed to function through limiting people's options, as opposed to creating truths and subjectivities.

Hence, the issue of agency in relation to everyday resistance is ultimately context-dependent, as an agent is a temporal subject in which a particular structural and ideational context filters through and provides the platform, tools and ideas by which one may choose to practice a particular variation of everyday resistance.

The issue of *intersectionality* alleviates a cluster of criticisms related to Scott and helps guide the design of the present research by narrowing its scope. These critiques are embedded in his initial class-based approach[7] and treatment of state-society relations. Addressed here are concerns with the dichotomy between the powerful and powerless, the relationships among agents and the plurality of resistances.

Harking back to the researcher's approach that resistance is socially constructed, the notion of *who* is carrying out resistance is crucial to all empirical studies speaking to the concept. While Scott assumes a single or fixed relationship between the powerful and

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[7] Scott has now expanded his view to include more aspects of state-society relations.

powerless in his class-based approach, the present study assumes a plural, complex, contextual and situational perspective that considers the construction of resistance according to an on-going process of negotiation between the resister, target and observer. Depending on the scientific discourses concerned and the positioning by and within them, scholars amend their points of departure regarding "what is considered resistance, and who is to be defined by targets and resisters" (Johansson & Vinthagen, 2016, p. 423). Relationships are continually negotiated in diverse contexts and interactional settings through multiple and shifting identities of agents. Without such an intersectional perspective, one is fixated around a specific set of relations (e.g., class, ethnicity, gender) and one type of conflict (e.g., workers/capital) and stuck in a one-dimensional, structural notion of resistance that leads to the pre-determination of which form of resistance is more or less important. Obscuring the intersectional nature of these relations leaves one with fixed essences without history or context and lacking acknowledgement of their variation in meaning and practice (Johansson & Vinthagen, 2016). However, North Korea is a highly class-based society embedded in the songbun[8] classification system resting on loyalty to the regime and family background. In this sense, some analytical advantage arises in the North Korean context where the researcher is able to focus on a more stable and homogenous configuration of actors.

A related issue of intersectionality is the spatialisation of everyday resistance. Johansson and Vinthagen (2016) point to the necessity of understanding everyday resistance in its situated site (e.g., body, workplace, street, kitchen) and how these sites as social spaces structure life in a particular contextual, relational and situational way. In essence, everyday resistance in the form of activities, social relations and identities is organised in an on-going spatial social construction at the level of social imagery (collective mythologies/discourses), as well as at the level of interferences in the landscape (e.g., built environment). This essential system of spatial division (e.g., process of inclusion/exclusion) is political and ideological, suggesting certain groups have a higher degree of access to power or space while others have more limited access. Here, the researcher agrees with the importance of the spatial dimension of everyday resistance and,

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[8] See Collins (2012) *Marked for Life: Songbun, North Korea's Social Classification System* for a more detailed explanation of the system. In essence, while withering, the system is based on three classes (loyal, wavering, hostile) that warrants heightened surveillance for some and determines upward mobility.

for purposes of clarification, the present study focuses on resistant practices in the spaces of the everyday. Vinthagen and Johansson (2013) cite Bhabha in asserting the necessity to understand the concept of 'everyday' in everyday resistance, to distinguish it from the 'spectacular'. In relation to public resistance and 'other' resistance, everyday resistance constitutes an "*initial, off-stage, or later stage activity*" (p. 9). Everyday resistance, then, happens in 'other spaces and times or in other relations', as actors themselves may consider these practices normal, a part of their life or personality, and not constituting 'resistance' at all. Additionally, in the words of Heredia (2013), "part of the advantage of making the everyday the site for theorisation and research is precisely the possibility of contextualising the research, and taking into account the more complex texture and depth of the processes societies go through" (p. 136).

Another issue of intersectionality is the notion of the spectrum between organised and individual resistance and the idea of resistance encouraging and/or creating new performances of resistance. Baaz et al. (2017) argue that resistance covers a range of individual practices (e.g., proletarian theft/whistle blowers with courage), mobilisations of specific categories (e.g., gender, ethnicity, sexuality) and diverse organisations (e.g., formal such as an NGO or informal such as a social movement). In addition, they argue that, in order to understand everyday and organised resistance, one must note that each form could inspire, provoke, generate or discourage the other, dependent on context. Raising these issues allows for a significant clarification regarding the scope of this study. While the researcher's position is to agree with the validity of these notions, it must be stated that this study focuses on the *how* of everyday resistance and the *emergence* of it as the central concerns. Therefore, the observation of organised resistance is precluded and the explanatory variables concern the emergence and not the outcomes of everyday resistance.

Hence, the issue of *intersectionality* and everyday resistance is approached by the researcher as a *focus on the actors who practice resistance in the sites of the everyday, using the weapons of the weak, whose actions undermine or have the potential to undermine hierarchal power relations*.

While the researcher believes Scott defends himself adequately in respect to this critique, he still garners criticism that his framework of everyday resistance is inclusive of acts that may be interpreted as negligible in terms of *political salience* or 'revolutionary

consequences'. The overall idea emanates from the common reference that Scott overstretches the concept by making it too broad, resulting in an inability to differentiate resistance from other coping strategies, modes of survival and actions that may not legitimately represent everyday resistance. For instance, some scholars assume that self-indulgent, individual and unorganised acts inherently lack revolutionary consequences. Scott (1985) counters this argument by indicating that there is hardly a modern revolution that can be successfully explained without reference to precisely such acts when they take place on a massive scale. He uses the example of desertion from armies and the role it has played in revolutions and argues that to see resistance only as a collective enterprise with a revolutionary end is to consign millions of actions to the unwritten records of history. Instead, he contends that covert actions, concerned with immediate gains and self-help, constitute a permanent layer of resistance in which struggle against domination takes place and in which class consciousness and even revolutions may take root (Heredia, 2013).

As the researcher has argued that the focus of everyday resistance should centre on its practice and not intent, concepts relating to social practices that undermine the *political salience* of everyday resistance will be addressed. This study follows Vinthagen and Johansson (2013) in discussing some of the more frequently debated types in the literature: *avoidance/escape*, *survival-technique*, *coping*, or *accommodation*. As noted in the intersectionality discussion, everyday resistance is about ways of acting that undermine or have the potential to undermine a hierarchal power relation. Citing the discussion on spatiality and temporality, *avoidance* can be everyday resistance by not engaging with the space, time or relation where power is exercised. However, critics may claim that avoiding or escaping power means that one does not influence or undermine it. Nevertheless, depending on context and the way one avoids or escapes a hierarchal power relation makes the exercise of power on that specific individual or group (temporarily) impossible, and when needed for the exercise of power, the individual resists by avoiding or escaping.

In terms of techniques of social and material *survival* in everyday life as well as *coping* under repression or immediate violent threats, Vinthagen and Johansson (2013) argue that it "might sometimes be resistance in its (cumulative) *consequences* of undermining power" (p. 24). Noting this effect is dependent on how the techniques are applied and in what context, they quote Scott in claiming that scattered acts of resistance

might have "aggregate consequences all out of proportion to their banality" (Scott, 1989, p. 34). In a similar manner, they argue that *accommodation* is not opposite to resistance, even if it accepts and follows the logic of power. Yet, they note that while most view accommodation as a reproduction of power, Scott's whole point with disguised forms of resistance is the appearance *as if* it were accommodation. Through acting as both accommodation and resistance simultaneously, but in different aspects, accommodation becomes a disguised form of resistance. For example, Crewe (2007) proposes a sliding scale of how prisoners might orient themselves and create variations in their public transcript: 'committed compliance', 'fatalistic or instrumental compliance', 'detached compliance', and 'strategic compliance and manipulation', since overt resistance is uncommon in such contexts (cited in Vinthagen & Johansson, 2013).

While this study is not focused on the outcomes of everyday resistance, it still underscores the political salience in its ability to gradually, or through punctuated equilibrium, affect hierarchal power relations. Through the examples of avoidance/escape, survival-technique, coping and accommodation, it is evident that low-scale everyday practices may not only reproduce hegemonic power relations but also undermine them.

This conclusion leads to the issue of *power relations* as concerns the everyday interaction of power and resistance. The critique of Scott's treatment of power relations is embedded in the idea that he conceives of reality only through a binary of domination and resistance, thus over-simplifying the dynamics and structures of power and state-society relations. In addition, his approach elicits critique pertaining to its lack of wider variation and categorisation that does not align with updated theories of power. In fact, in resistance studies overall, Lilja and Vinthagen (2014) argue that a gap exists regarding resistance in relation to different forms of power and especially in relation to empirical manifestations of historically and contextually particular combinations of these theoretical forms of power. For this study, Foucault's approach to power is adopted and grounded in his tripartite theory of sovereign, disciplinary and biopower technologies that emerged in different historical phases of modernity (the rise of the early modern European state, early capitalism, and modern liberalism) that did not replace one another, but rather continue to operate alongside one another. Hence, this discussion of the study's approach to power will

depart from a Foucauldian lens to include elements from Scott's typology, while ultimately articulating an approach suitable for the empirical analysis of this study's context.

The researcher argues in line with critique that Scott's typology has limitations for studying wider variations of everyday resistance. Foucault's treatment of power and its relation to resistance may assist in understanding what variation of everyday resistance is operating based on a more updated theorisation of power relations. For example, Foucauldian accounts of power relations (Foucault, 1981, p. 93) underscore the limitations of Scott's typology:

> [There is] a plurality of resistances, each of the a special case: resistances that are possible, necessary, improbable; others that are spontaneous, savage, solitary, concerted, rampant, or violent; still others that are quick to compromise, interested, or sacrificial; by definition they can only exist in the strategic field of power relations. But this does not mean that they are only a reaction or a rebound, forming with respect to the basic domination an underside that is in the end always passive, doomed to perpetual defeat.

Agreeing with Lilja and Vinthagen (2014), an understanding of how different power techniques serve as corresponding reference points for possible resistance techniques in which the peculiarities of power decide how resistance can be conducted according to Foucault's triangle of power would be insightful, but outside of the scope of this study. However, overarching totalitarian features of the state alongside references to Foucault's army of conceptual terms relating to power relations elucidate an understanding of power relations in the scholarship that draws on more diverse modes of governance to couple with Scott's typology of domination and resistance.

Foucault's work on power marks a radical departure from previous approaches of conceiving power and cannot easily be integrated with earlier ideas, as power is diffuse rather than concentrated, embodied and enacted rather than possessed, discursive rather than purely coercive, and constitutes agents rather than being employed by them (Gaventa, 2003, p. 1). Challenging the notion that people or groups wield power through episodic or sovereign acts of domination and coercion, Foucault argues its dispersed and pervasive nature. 'Power is everywhere' and, in this sense, comes from everywhere neither as an agency or structure. Alternatively, it is a sort of 'metapower' or 'regime of truth' that permeates society while in constant flux and negotiation. He uses the term

'power/knowledge' to signify power's constitution through accepted forms of knowledge, scientific understanding and truth. This approach transcends politics and sees power as an everyday, socialised and embedded phenomenon. However, his concept also elicits criticism for being too elusive and removed from agents and structures to the extent that it is difficult to conceive the possibility of resistance. However, he argues, "It's not a matter of emancipating truth from every system of power (which would be a chimera, for truth is already power) but of detaching the power of truth from the forms of hegemony, social economic and cultural, within which it operates at the present time" (Foucault, 1980, p. 133).

For the purpose of brevity, a concise summary of Foucault's triangle of power will assist in understanding particular types of everyday resistance. Emerging through the modern European state, sovereign power uses techniques of violence and punishment that forbid or limit certain behaviour. Often, it involves a dramatic show of force, use of examples, violent punishment and pain. It accepts no public dissent or any show of loyalty to any other commanding centre as, if people accept it, it makes sovereignty possible by claiming a monopoly of rule. Hence, its power transforms the individual into someone that does what the rulers say for fear of being punished that moulds them as subordinate subjects.

Emerging with the modern European state, disciplinary power trains and controls individuals through institutions and scientific discourse while simultaneously punishing, pedagogically, in proportion to the violations as it builds up, trains and forms. Through the values and goals that reflect the interest of others and not the individual, the aim is to get individuals to keep themselves under surveillance, to discipline and train themselves. Power transforms a person into a tool for the interests of disciplinary power, and a tool that is increasing its productivity and effectiveness through the creation of new subjects.[9]

Originating with modern liberalism,[10] biopower is the governance of life/society concerned with the body of a population (e.g., nation, members of an organisation) and its 'health' and 'effectiveness' as a totality. Constituting the subject gradually, progressively and materially, biopower is exercised by the state apparatus, private ventures,

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[9] See *Discipline and Punish* (1979) as Foucault goes into detail on architecture, 'activity-control,' the organisation of geneses, and correct training as the primary features of disciplinary power.
[10] Giorgio Agamben refutes this, as he argues the antiquity of biopower/biopolitics.

philanthropists, or by public institutions. Alongside rapid development of various disciplines (e.g., universities, secondary schools, workshops), the classical period also witnessed the emergence in the field of political practices and economic observation the problems of birth rate, longevity, public health, housing, and migration. As a result, numerous and diverse techniques for achieving subjugation of bodies and the control of populations marked the beginning of the "biopower era" (Lilja & Vinthagen, 2014, p. 110).

Moreover, whereas Foucault's account of sovereign and disciplinary power can easily be situated in the totalitarian context, his take on biopolitics deserves further clarification. For instance, a different interpretation of the phenomenon sets aside its neoliberal, securitarian nature through the empirical investigation of biopolitics in arenas such as public health, sexuality, hygiene, and the upbringing of children. Rather, it focuses on the 'mode' in which political power takes life as its object, the way in which power engages with life, for instance, as an object of protection, regulation, transformation, and so forth (Prozorov, 2016). Hence, apart from the securitarian (liberal and fascist) cases of investigation, Prozorov notes its 'transformative' nature in the biopolitical rationality of Stalinist socialism. As Agamben (cited in Prozorov, 2016, p. 52) notes:

> The totalitarianism of our century has its ground in this dynamic identity of life and politics, without which it remains incomprehensible. If Nazism still appears to us as an enigma, and if its affinity with Stalinism is still unexplained, that is because we have failed to situate the totalitarian phenomenon in its entirety in the horizon of biopolitics.

The difference in Stalinist biopolitics occurs in the way it goes beyond demands for protection or corrective intervention and toward the affirmation of the possibility to attain new life through the revolutionary negation of the old life. With the capacity to intervene in life through both a positive and negative manner, this broader reading of the concept extends the focus from the strictly biological (physical, natural, etc.) facets and inquires into 'forms of life' presupposed and effected in the rationalities of government that comprise the wider socio-economic realm (Prozorov, 2016). The clutches of ideational politics in North Korea, as the subsequent component of the literature review shows, is still staked in totalitarianism and thus warrants a different approach from Scott's 'ideological

domination' as a third strand counterpoised with everyday resistance grounded in an elaborate counter-ideology.

Lilja and Vinthagen (2014) note that the separation of three ideal types of power is only possible on an analytical level. However, in any real political and empirical situation of resistance, it is necessary to look at the particular and historically evoked power configuration, or kind of 'governmentality', that particular combinations of sovereignty, discipline and biopower have established. Hence, Foucault's genealogical study of power corresponds with everyday resistance, having evolved from a forbidding punitive mode (producing a crude fear of the 'sovereign') into a discursive and detailed disciplinary mode (producing 'truth regimes' and 'subjects') and a biopolitical mode (producing a 'population'), in which all modes are still used.

Thus, the Foucauldian tripartite power approach has revealed through this discussion a similarity of the confluence of sovereign power, disciplinary power and biopower to Scott's three forms of domination (material, status, ideological), but with the notion of everyday power historically entangled with everyday resistance, not separated from it. Moreover, the intersectionality of Foucault's approach toward power relations allows, for example, the notion of biopolitics, and not simply a lone dimension of 'ideological domination', to construe a more context-dependent study of resistance. The advantage of fusing Scott's typology with the Foucauldian approach to power relations allows a deviation from class-centred/Marxist approaches while also focusing on the everyday distinction of resistance inspired by an otherwise well-crafted typology.

2.1.4 Summary: Conceptualising a Framework for Everyday Resistance

The foregoing component of the literature review has covered the following aspects embedded in resistance studies: (1) the definitional disputes centred on the core elements and dimensions of resistance; (2) Scott's seminal dichotomy of public and hidden resistance; and (3) the most common critiques and amendments to Scott's approach. In outlining the core elements and dimensions of definitional disputes, underlying approaches and definitional contestations centred on key analytical features of resistance were reviewed to provide key foundations regarding the dimensions of action, opposition, recognition, and intent. Specifically, action and opposition are key elements of the concept,

recognition is determined by context and social construction, and intent, while not privileged, is useful when explicitly available. Narrowing the focus to Scott's seminal distinction between public and hidden resistance, features and explanations of his theory were explicated to provide the groundwork for a critical framework of everyday resistance to guide the present study. Finally, the framework disaggregated the concept of human agency and addressed issues related to intersectionality and political salience, before fusing Foucault's approach to power relations with Scott's to alleviate limitations pertaining to the latter.

To conclude, three important consequences follow in the elaboration of a framework of everyday resistance to guide this study. First, Scott's typology provides important foundations in terms of hierarchal power dimensions (material, status, ideological) and everyday resistance (infra-politics, hidden transcripts, counter-ideologies), but these must be incorporated into Foucault's wider analysis of power to include a richer array of everyday resistances. Second, a reworking of the framework addressed the primary critiques of Scott to avoid preemption of a particular account of everyday resistance by justification through exposing the underlying assumptions of any count of resistance. Finally, it has been determined that the elaboration of a contextual paradigm must be established in order to usefully operationalise everyday resistance in a manner that will further benefit the research design. Hence, everyday resistance will be conceptualised here according to the following points, primarily adopted from Vinthagen and Johansson's treatment of the phenomenon: *It is done in a regular way, occasionally politically intended but typically habitual or semi-conscious; it is a practice (not a certain consciousness, intent or outcome, yet intent may aid in better understanding of the type if evident) carried out in a non-dramatic, non-confrontational or non-recognised way that undermines or has the potential to undermine some power relation, without revealing itself (concealing or disguising either the actor or act), or by being defined by hegemonic discourse as 'non-political' or otherwise irrelevant to resistance; it is done by individuals or small groupings without formal leadership or organisation, but typically encouraged by some subcultural attitude or 'hidden transcript'; it is historically entangled with power and understood as intersectional with the powers it engages; it is heterogeneous and contingent due to*

changing contexts and situations (not a universal strategy or coherent form of action)
(Vinthagen & Johansson, 2013).

2.2. North Korean Studies and Totalitarianism

This component of the literature review addresses the current state of research on politics and resistance in North Korea. As previously noted, the empirical observation of everyday resistance is heterogeneous and contingent due to changing contexts and situations. To glean a better understanding of the contextual environment applicable to this research, delving into the literature on North Korea's political structure, culture, everyday life and resistance is crucial. While scholarship on everyday life and resistance in the state is limited, it is a growing field in which this research aims to add substance. Ultimately, insights from this component of the literature indicate a dearth of attention to subtle forms of resistance in the state. Moreover, the researcher's interpretation of the state's structural and ideational features as staked in totalitarian tendencies presents an anomaly pertaining to resistance. However, as hindsight now indicates and this study reflects, totalitarianism and everyday resistance are not incompatible.

Accordingly, this component of the literature begins with an exploration of the debate on the nature of the political structure of North Korea and is followed by an analysis of the literature on political culture in the state. Following these discussions, the review situates itself in the growing literature on everyday life in the country before shifting to an explicit focus on the scholarship speaking to resistance that most closely mirrors the core of this investigation. Finally, key scholarship on the concept of totalitarianism is reviewed and applied to the realities of everyday North Korean life to provide a better contextual understanding of the study's empirical analysis.

2.2.1 Political Structure

A focus on political structure in this study shapes a better understanding of the structural features that affect the everyday lives of North Koreans. The overarching structures of the state are long-term historical, inspired by communist institutions, and a product of state power in line with ideological preferences. These institutions closely mirror those in the former Soviet Union and Eastern bloc that maintained a command economy

and the abolition of civil society that removed many of the intermediary resources necessary to translate grievances into protests. Emerging studies on such regimes suggest that this not only resulted in silence, but the adoption of simple strategies of resistance. However, due to widespread passivity and the relative weakness of resistance, the state was able to dominate society (Sharman, 2004).

Svolik (2012) notes, "Especially since the end of the Cold War, dictatorships have nominally come to resemble democracies in terms of formal institutions with North Korea as one of the few exceptions" (p. 22). Despite the anomaly between Marxism-Leninism and North Korean ideology, the state maintains structures inspired by Marxist-Leninist states. A growing trend in related academia dismisses, and occasionally laments, the usage of 'communism' or 'totalitarianism' pertaining to contemporary North Korea, with many accounts constructing hybrid variants of non-democratic regime types to capture the 'uniqueness' of the state. An observation by Smith (2015, p. 330) reflects this trend and is worth quoting in full:

> North Korean society is remarkably similar to societies transiting from communism to capitalism; its politics can be explained by reference to communist institutionalist models and nationalist perspectives; it has a lot in common with militarised dictatorships everywhere and much of its political development can be understood fairly easily by anyone with a minimal knowledge of the transition from Maoism to market socialism. The trivial comments that insist on North Korea's 'uniqueness' do not understand that analytical frameworks can be constructed such as to help explain specific cases. It is banal to assert that North Korea's political, economic and social trajectory is not identical to any other country; that is true for any and every country.

Scalpino and Lee (1972) provide a comprehensive introduction to the evolution of North Korean institutions and methods for maintaining power and political control. As Park and Snyder (2013) argue, the scholarship by Scalpino and Lee (1972) holds up well in its illustration of the enduring foundational institutional structures and characteristics of the system as it was under Kim Il-sung. Moreover, it is useful to embark from their work in order to understand institutional adaptations under Kim Jong-Il and the emergence of contemporary debates over the relative influence of North Korean institutions, ideology and the Kim family to the institutions over which they have presided. Scalpino and Lee argue that the system borrows its primary structural characteristics from the Soviet and Chinese

systems. Haggard, Herman and Ryu (2014) echo this view by noting the parallel institutions that the state shares with other communist systems, for example, the existence of the legislature (Supreme People's Assembly) and a hierarchy of party institutions (congress, central committee, politburo, politburo standing committee, as well as party secretariat). However, they note that North Korean structures shift in the familial nature of political rule and the extraordinary concentration of power in the hands of the leader. Rather than constraining the leadership, institutions are created and manipulated to maximise discretion, "as actual rule occurs in very small, informal, imperial court-like arrangements" (p. 798).

Nevertheless, some scholars hone a different interpretation of political structure in the state. McEachern (2010) argues that the Kim regime is less of a one-man dictatorship than a regime that takes institutions seriously. Assuming this stance, he analyses and frames the political system as constitutive of conflicts and negotiations among competing institutions and policy preferences. He suggests that it is an institutionally pluralistic state with military, party and state institutions bargaining and negotiating over political decision-making. However, he does note that the leader and a small circle of the elite have the final authority and may go with an entirely different option than one presented by any of the competing institutions. Overall, his argument proposes the regime as having evolved according to a post-totalitarian institutionalism in which a stronger level of plurality exists. Postulating a different stance, Green and Denney (2017) argue that "In the rigidly top-down Songun[11] system, power is highly concentrated around the supreme leader and his closest confidants …[where it is] not possible to countenance a plurality of opinions from competing power centres on issues of key national importance. Songun thus undermines the theory of a North Korean 'post-totalitarian institutionalism,' which posits competing bureaucracies within the state" (p. 100).

Denney, Green and Cathcart (2017) argue that the Songun doctrine acts as a realist political framework that defines the way North Korea is ruled and also forms the "rhetorical boundary within which state and party officials exercise what limited political freedom of movement they might at any specific time possess" (p. 53). The concept of Songun (i.e., 'carrying on the revolution and construction with the army as the main force

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[11] This is also referred to as 'military-first politics'.

on the principle of giving priority to military affairs') along with Juche, (i.e., 'the masses of the people are the master of the revolution and construction') are the two most frequently used notions to explain North Korea's worldview and ideology. However, as these authors argue, Songun coopts and inflects Juche as the official doctrine of the state and, as such, entrenches a highly militarised approach to the political (Denney et al., 2017). Hence, this approach to North Korean politics sees it as a garrison state that holds to a fluctuating state of emergency, providing itself with just cause to coerce individuals into periodic 'marches' or 'battles' through a bunker mentality that is reinforced by continuous articulation of threats that keep domestic tension high, impede challengers to the regime and justify clamping down on the social spread of foreign information (Denney et al., 2017). Further, Denney, Green and Cathcart note that "getting the party in a straight line behind the leader is what distinguishes North Korea, a state ruled over by a charismatic leader cloaked in the tradition of a revolutionary past and a revolutionary party, from an autocratic state ruled over by a revolutionary party" (Denney et al., 2017, p. 60).

Moreover, the debate on political structure in North Korea is often lodged in whether the Kim regime has pursued change or continuity in its politics following the tumultuous circumstances (famine, collapse of the Soviet Union and Eastern bloc, death of Kim Il-sung, etc.) of the 1990s. If one follows authors such as Green and Denney, then Kim Il-sung's son and successor, Kim Jong-Il, marked a continuation of politics by introducing Songun as a military-first politics to underscore continuity in political structure. Further, an argument is made that the positioning of Kim Jong-un within the Mount Baekdu bloodline[12] and the guerrilla, revolutionary tradition of his grandfather suggests a continuation of politics through to the third generation of family leadership. While the researcher agrees with the authors on the significance of Songun politics, this study maintains that the Kim regime's legitimacy is better explained as staked on totalitarian grounds, with Songun as a political framework acting as a component of the state's totalitarian structure by legitimising certain privileges and spending allotted to the military,

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[12] The highest and most sacred mountain on the Korean peninsula that straddles the China-North Korea border and is proclaimed through North Korean rhetoric as the site in which Kim Il-sung fought against the Japanese colonialists and the birthplace of his son and second generation leader of the state, Kim Jong-Il.

despite Kim Jong-un's contemporary 'byungjin' line of improving the economy at an equal pace alongside the military.[13]

The question arises in the literature as to whether North Korea is undergoing irreversible changes emanating from a degree of grassroots marketisation and influx of foreign culture and alternative ideas. While these changes certainly affect the everyday lives of North Koreans, the Kim regime continues to systematically repress any form of economic, social or political pluralism with relatively no alteration of state structures. Despite haphazard economic liberalisations[14], North Korea is still a single-party state adhering to a centrally planned and executed system of economic distribution and production, albeit significantly dysfunctional. Systems of social control (e.g., neighbourhood surveillance units, or inminban) and Stalinist rituals continue to be used by the state for legitimation. For example, the annual state budget continues to be certified by the Supreme People's Assembly and the leadership successions to Kim Jong-Il and Kim Jong-un were confirmed and established respectively by the 6th Party Congress and 3rd Party Congress. A popular, modern political legitimacy is reflected by these rituals rather than being merely symbolic (Ward, 2013).

Hence, it is important that the state's power is not overemphasised as owing only to its ideational characteristics. Its authority also rests in its putative and representative institutions. Supposedly representative institutions of the party and state have anointed all leaders of the state while their authority does not rest solely in charisma, but also rational-legal processes. Central institutions oversee members of the military, Party and administrative officials who are all part of the Party, thus generating policy coherence and strongly incentivising compliance (Ward, 2013). Thus, this study argues the resilience of North Korean political structures and the efficiency of their constraints on everyday life.

2.2.2 Political Culture and Ideology

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[13] The 'byungjin' line introduced by Kim Jong-un in March, 2013 was announced as successfully concluded in an April 20th, 2018 speech given by Kim at a plenum meeting of the WPK announcing a 'new strategic line' focusing on economic and scientific development.
[14] See Philo Kim (2018) as he argues that the segmented nature of marketisation in North Korea has meant that the socio-political effects of markets has not been as large as expected.

Having delineated the most contentious aspects of the debate on political structure in North Korea, transitioning to the state's political culture and ideology becomes more controversial. Tension in the literature on this topic is shaped by a debate over which 'isms' best encapsulate the state's ideational environment. Arguably, many of these matter to some extent and Park's (2015) apt illustration (**see Table 1**) of this blend captures what the researcher will term the state's mélange of ideational 'isms'.

Table 1: Adapted Illustration of North Korea's Political Culture (Park, 2015, p. 10)

Ethnonationalism	Authoritarian Culture	Militarism	Socialism	Cultural Purism
-National victim complex	-Submission & loyalty to leaders	-External threat narrative	-Anti-capitalism	-Cultural superiority complex
-Distrust of the outside world	-Cult of personality	-Expectation of war	-Statism	-Cultural isolation
-Self-determinism	-Honour culture	-NatSec > economy	-Collectivism & egalitarianism	-Social conservatism

Ethno-nationalism, authoritarian culture, militarism, socialism and cultural purism are all components of political culture and ideology in everyday North Korean life. While these 'isms' are extensive, this review merits discussion of the official ideology of Juche (i.e., self-reliance), as it is paramount to the scholarship on culture and ideology in the state. As an ideological doctrine, Juche has incited debate centred on its role in guiding North Korean domestic and foreign policy, along with the role it plays in state-society relations and the everyday lives of North Koreans. As Myers (2010, p. 12) notes:

> Regardless of their political leanings, scholars (and North Korean studies remains marked by a sharp left-right divide) have tended toward interpretations of the country in which ideology plays next to no role. Conservatives generally explain the dictatorship's behaviour in terms of a cyclical struggle to maintain power and privilege, while liberals prefer to regard the DPRK as a 'rational actor,' a country behaving much as any tiny country would in the face of a superpower.

Myers finds himself staunchly in the camp arguing that all efforts in the scholarship to understand the innocuous Juche ideology are wasting their time, as it holds no relevance to policy-making or true North Korean ideology.

In 1972, Scalpino and Lee argued that North Korea could be viewed as a communist system that is part of the emerging world, but also a society with traditional culture. Noting the state's commitment to Marxism-Leninism through its mobilisation system, they argue that it is a society where leaders use ideology as an instrument of modernisation "rather than seeing Marxism as the culmination of the modernisation process" (p. 1309). At the same time, the familial character of social organisation reflects traditional culture. Moreover, the authors deny originality to Kim Il-sung's Juche and claim "he cannot be considered a theorist in any sense, let alone a 'foremost creative theorist'" (p. 867). Hence, the notion of Juche as a theoretical innovation was recognised as an unoriginal, but powerful, orthodox form of nationalism even to early observers of North Korea.

Harking back to Myers (2010, 2016), his argument extends North Korean nationalism into the realm of ethno-nationalism by tracing the state's ideology to Japanese fascist symbolism. Primarily using North Korean propaganda to support his argument, Myers asserts a strong line throughout his work regarding the xenophobic nature of North Korean ideology, referring to Juche as a hollow doctrine mainly created to seek legitimacy in the West and South Korea while also serving to benefit Kim Il-sung's personality cult on the domestic front by claiming his own ruling philosophy. With its roots in colonial Japanese fascism, Myers (2010) argues that North Korean ideology can be summarised as, "The Korean people are too pure blooded, and therefore too virtuous, to survive in this evil world without a great parental leader" (p. 15). As opposed to Stalinism, in which intellect was privileged over instinct, North Korea does the opposite. Also with denigration towards approaches that consider North Korea neo-Confucian, Marxist-Leninist and other ideological variants, he argues that the tangible race-based nationalism accounting for North Korea's worldview is unlikely to collapse due to heterodox culture such as blue jeans, but instead from a decrease in legitimacy in the case of denuclearisation or awareness of South Korea's prosperity and general satisfaction with their government.

As expected, Myers elicits criticism based on his own work. From another angle, Abt (2014) describes Myers' arguments as shaky and questionable. Noting his experience

of witnessing the extent to which North Korean university students actually believe in Juche, Abt notes it as absurd to describe the ideology as window-dressing for foreigners. He also questions how only three decades of Japanese occupation could simply upend the impact of thousands of years of history in Korea. Further, he notes that Myers "took the propaganda more seriously than North Koreans do themselves" (p. 16). Park's (2002) work goes further in arguing the salience of Juche by promoting it as the mobilisation of a Korean identity and model of society distancing itself from its alliance with the Soviet Union and China, who were themselves engaged in mutual ideological and political conflict. As a "vocabulary that is inseparable from North Korean life" (Park, 2002, p. 75), Juche is not a political ideology designed to rationalise political orientations or a philosophical belief system officially promoted by the elite, but a way of life. Hence, Juche is present in virtually all spheres of life through the process of political socialisation whereby it is instilled in people's belief systems and reinforced by the fact that the idea is not just perceived and thought about, but, more importantly, it is lived in an array of tangible life situations.

Another element in the scholarship on North Korea's ideational politics is militarism, of which Wada (1998) and Buzo (1999) are supporters of such characterisation, penning North Korea as 'a garrison state' and 'guerrilla dynasty' respectively. This reflects the idea of a 'bunker mentality' that pervades daily life, drawing attention to a group of political actors who played a central role in the foundation of North Korea and to the career backgrounds of these formative figures as members of the armed resistance group during Japanese colonisation who were mainly based in Manchuria. Privileged over other nationalist groups by the Soviet Union in the early years of state construction in North Korea, this militaristic culture stresses a set of motives and values that emphasise the work of the partisans depicted as militants in the face of hostile outside forces through internal solidarity as resembling a family organisation with powerful values of paternal love and filial piety. The harmony of kinship in its contemporary rendering resembles the core element of revolutionary activism and by extension, the constitutional virtue of the revolutionary state. Hence, the mythology of the Manchurian partisan ethos has been actualised in state ideology (Kwon & Chung, 2012).

During the North Korean revolution, Suzy Kim (2013) argues, "everyday life became at once the primary site of political struggle and the most important area for experiencing the revolution in progress… Life after liberation was variously described as a *new life*, a *happy life*, and ultimately a total '*revolution in life*'" (pp. 14-15). Through life's redefinement by the revolutionary period, Kim challenges "the strict separation of state and society, examining the degree to which state-society relations are actually fluid and interdependent" (p. 12). She argues the overarching state priority on revolution affected life in the early years of the North Korean state and by extension, today (Denney et al., 2017). Similarly, Kwon and Chung (2012) utilise the theatre-state model to focus on theatrical spectacles and rituals that instil a sense of loyalty to the Manchurian partisans centred on Kim Il-sung in North Korea. These rituals take the form of mass games, parades or theatrical plays, along with monuments and cemeteries crucial to a routinisation of charismatic authority in North Korea. Contrary to the interpretation of Songun as policy-oriented, the authors argue it is the ideological vehicle for a partisan line that ties the military-dominated regime of Kim Jong-Il to the legacy of the regime under Kim Il-sung. The military's role in protecting the legacy of Kim Il-sung aided in legitimating Kim Jong-Il as successor to his father. The bestowal of gifts from the Great Leader unto his people and the act of gift-giving to the regime by world leaders also bestows a moral economy in which relations between the people are characterised by 'general reciprocity', that is, gift-giving instead of selfishness (Ward, 2013).

Cumings (1997) refers to the filial piety emanating from the Kim family as "neo-Confucianism in a communist bottle" (p. 413). He also describes the state's communist revolution as a "transformation into a new Confucian society or family state" (Cumings, 2004, p. 134). Noting the biggest difference between North Korea and other Marxist-Leninist systems, he introduces the concept of 'revolutionary nationalist corporatism' to argue that the "application of the universal truth of Marxism-Leninism to the concrete realities of Korea, as the saying goes, has resulted in a peculiar and fascinating form of socialist corporatism, mingling together classic corporatist verbiage and images, but growing out of the Korean political culture, with the progressive rhetoric and practices of Marxism-Leninism" (p. 283). Hence, Juche is infused with values from Confucianism that mitigate societal grievances during political, economic or other crises.

Sonia Ryang (2009, 2012) provides an account fusing the theory of biopolitics with North Korean modes of governance. Contending political life is the most decisive factor for individuals in the 'age of Juche' from all other forms of human existence, she argues against approaches that consider familyism, Confucianism or Japanese fascism as underpinning socio-political ideology in North Korea. She contends that every North Korean individual "aspires not only to be loyal and dedicated, but also close to him [Kim Il-sung] in the belief that it will earn that person eternal life, or more precisely, eternal political life" (Ryang, 2012, p. 196). Deeming North Korea as having an 'excess of the political,' she argues "social relations, including kinship relations, workplace relations, romantic relations, school camaraderie and other forms of interpersonal and intragroup relations, are dominated by political concerns and related to how one can be more loyal and dedicated to him [the Leader]" (p. 204). Further, she notes that it is not piety that North Koreans are striving for, but rather a political life attainable through demonstration of loyalty to the Great Leader. According to Ryang (2009, p. 60) on political life in North Korea:

> Humans are social beings and therefore, for them, jajuseong (self-mastery) is life…That a human being strives to realize his self-mastery corresponds to…enhancing one's political life. For humans, whose life is self-mastery, political and social life is more important than bio-physical life. If a human does not have socially and politically meaningful life [bios], he has no true life.

Utilising Agamben's (1998, 2005) work on biopolitics, Ryang adopts the notion of a 'state of emergency' that justifies the type of (eternal) sovereign in Kim Il-sung who can punish the enemy of the state through arbitrary forms of retribution. In North Korea, the precarious lawlessness in the name of the sovereign is what Agamben calls the 'logic of the concentration camp', where power is invested arbitrarily in the person representative of the uniformed officialdom, similar to martial law in a state of emergency (Ryang, 2009). According to Ryang, the innocuous and unsophisticated Juche doctrine came to dominate ideological discourse and can be coupled with the way the population is placed vis-à-vis its sovereign leader, as it begins to "emerge as one of the most dreadfully lethal doctrines of totalitarianism" (p. 78). Under the 'catch-all' concept of Juche, individuals begin to identify themselves closely to the leader by identifying themselves as the originary point of self-

subjection to the sovereign. Ryang points to a favourite banner in North Korea, 'Let us all become revolutionaries whose body has only Juche-type blood', and notes that the body of the population is individualised and collectivised, being held responsible for making themselves into better, purer North Koreans by way of self-referential criticism and ideological cleansing. Noting the lesser value of life compared to the sovereign, she posits a favourite saying, 'Let us defend our Great Leader with our own lives', and argues that North Koreans are expected to form one organic body in their march to attain goals set out by the Great Leader (Ryang, 2009).

Echoing a type of political religion approach, Ryang notes, "It is not piety that North Koreans are striving for but, rather, a political life attainable through demonstration of loyalty to the suryeong, the Great Leader" (2012, p. 196). Hence, at the apex of biopolitics in North Korea, one has to die loyally in order to live loyally for the Great Leader. Like the Great Leader himself, who lives eternally, one must die to show utmost loyalty; that is, the most valuable political life is found through death.

Overall, a variety of ideational 'isms' saturate the literature on North Korea and all matter to some extent. However, the researcher maintains the totalitarian model as the best fit to couch the North Korean state, but argues that a focus purely on regime type obscures the political rationalities and techniques of governance inscribed in everyday life by the Kim regime (Em, 2016). Hence, an additional asset of this study lies in the biopolitical case of everyday resistance. Thus, detritus of Marxist-Leninist overtones, collectivist/socialist values, ethno-nationalism, micro-fascism derived from Japan, a militarist bunker mentality, authoritarian culture, and so forth, all hold value in explaining North Korean political culture. As Burt (2013, para. 5) suggests, familial values, loyalty and social conservatism are inherent in everyday North Korean life, and, if packaged within the concept of Juche:

> Juche is the distinctive philosophy of social life in North Korea as it operates through a set of implicit and explicit rules that help to constitute meaning and sanction social conduct in day-to-day life … whether stemming from, or masquerading as, the Confucian logics of self-defence and sovereignty, Marxism-Leninism, anti-colonialism, Korean race-based nationalism, or even Kim Il-sung's understanding of Woodrow Wilson's concept of self-rule is debatable.

Hence, the researcher understands Juche as a totalitarian ideology, inscribed with a variety of 'isms' that articulate a sort of North Korean brand of socialism.

2.2.3 Everyday Life and Resistance in North Korea

This section addresses the growing literature pertaining to everyday life in North Korea and the limited range of scholarship on resistance that this study intends to enrich.

Fahy's (2015) research centres on the famine of the 1990s in North Korea and uses defector testimony of those who lived through it to understand why they did not resist in the face of such deprivation and difficulty. Through this, she is able to provide a subjective account from the perspective of these individuals as to the discursive strategies they undertook to rationalise and cope with severe hardship. The emergence of these coping mechanisms included subversive language, unofficial trade of food among individuals, and bribery. She even makes a casual reference to Scott's concept of hidden transcripts and their use to "make official discourse work toward the speaker's personal agency" (p. 93) in the state during the famine. Moreover, she argues that strategic framing by the regime's rhetoric established the famine as an object of resistance to destructive outside forces and high levels of repression, along with privileging of resources to stymie dissent. Fahy's subjective interpretation of defector testimony underscores its potential utility in studying everyday life in North Korea. It highlights the reality in North Korea of what the present research would consider everyday forms of resistance, albeit in the 1990s. Her work is a testament to using this type of data as the tool for interpreting social behaviour in the state.

Focusing on more recent patterns of behaviour considered deviant in North Korea, Tudor and Pearson (2015) use information from defector testimony, NGO officials and diplomats to elaborate different aspects of everyday North Korean life ranging from bribery, communications and private markets to drug use and sartorial trends. Also focusing on Kim Jong-un, geopolitics and nuclear weapons, the authors note that focusing entirely on these issues "is to miss the huge amount of internal change taking place, both at the top and bottom of North Korean society" (p. 7). As more of a journalistic, descriptive piece than academic in nature, its coverage of a wider range of subversive behaviour, without sensationalism, is laudable in that the authors are able to distinguish between state policy and everyday life, raising doubt as to claims of North Korea as a sui generis entity.

Baek (2016) focuses on the spread of illegal information through gossip, freedom balloons[15], radio and USBs in the state, alongside those actors who disseminate and consume foreign news, TV shows, books and film. She argues that the spread of information does not "magically liberate the person" (p. 158), but that it is an important component in exacerbating positive transformation in the state and enables North Koreans with the "agency, self-determination, and knowledge to write their own future and destiny as a nation" (p. 217). Through defector interviews, academic sources, and government and NGO documents, Baek illustrates what she refers to as a hidden revolution in North Korea. Her work is significant in its demonstration of the transformative power of foreign culture penetrating everyday lives in the state.

As for works more explicitly referencing everyday resistance, an article dating around 20 years has parallels to the present study. Suh (1998) argued that theoretical, ideological, and methodological biases were causing serious shortcomings in North Korean studies. Drawing on contemporaneous interviews with defectors and using content analysis of North Korean novels, Suh argued, "…there is a widening gap between official state ideals and the realities of everyday life in that society" (p. 15). Particularly, he dedicates a couple of pages to describe examples of Scott's everyday resistance in North Korea noting "forms as passive noncompliance, subtle sabotage, evasion, and deception" (p. 29). However, his discussion of the concept and application of it to the North Korean context is only one component of several that he used to argue for a bottom-up perspective as an approach to examine North Korea in contrast to the more common top-down method.

As one of the features that conflicts with the assumption of a static North Korea that he intended to challenge, everyday resistance as described by Suh resembles similar aspects of the phenomenon in North Korea today. Unfortunately, the brevity of the discussion does not provide the richness and diversity upon which to build. However, this was probably for a good reason as the number of defectors and availability of digital testimony were far less at the time. Suh does come to a conclusion that the present study also reflects 20 years later and is worth noting. He argues, "While North Korea may have certain distinctive features, remaining highly totalitarian and possessing a more firmly entrenched upper leadership

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[15] Since the Korean war, balloons containing propaganda and material censored in North Korea have been released at various locations in South Korea to cross into the North.

than other societies, this does not mean that social forces are inoperative there, nor that North Korea shares no features with other societies" (p. 36).

Haggard and Noland (2011) include a chapter in their book entitled "Political Attitudes and Nascent Dissent". In this chapter, they explore underlying political attitudes of North Koreans and the prospects for more overt political behaviour emerging in North Korea. In this chapter, they briefly discuss the concept of everyday resistance and cite the example of accessing alternative information as an extant example in North Korea. On the act, they note "The consumption of foreign media is but one aspect of a larger phenomenon in private economic activity" (p. 114). In all, they do not expand much on acts of everyday resistance in the state, but do conclude from their data that loyalty to the regime may be in shorter supply than previously thought. Nevertheless, their data also suggest despite adverse views of the regime and an increasing tendency to hold it accountable, there was little indication that adverse views were communicated widely or that markets were becoming a locus of collective action due to regime coercion and surveillance. In all, they summarise the results as pointing to "…a kind of 'market syndrome' in which participation in market activities is associated with higher arrest rates, a greater willingness to communicate those views with peers, and a greater propensity to cite political motives for emigration" (p. 117). While only briefly touching on everyday forms of resistance, Haggard and Noland do elaborate a convincing argument that the regime is right to fear the market. In addition, the survey data collected from China and South Korea was an impressive feat. Nevertheless, their work is reflective of the need for rich descriptions and analysis of diversity on these phenomena representing subtle subversive behaviour.

Hassig and Oh (2015) present a rich study on various aspects of everyday life in North Korea that is based on defector testimony, official North Korean news and documents, specialist interviews, and travel accounts. Here, the work is worth mentioning, as it is one of the most insightful pieces regarding everyday life in North Korea. Moreover, while only in passing, it does cite Scott's work on everyday resistance. They argue, "At the very top, Kim Jong-un may be partly aware of how rotten North Korean society is but there is little he can do about it…people go about constructing their own reality—not a coherent ideology or worldview but a rough-and-ready guide to everyday survival" (p. 138).

As far as relating the concept of everyday resistance to individual action, they note, "North Koreans occasionally grumble and, in recent years, even raise their voices at local meetings, but for the most part each person takes care of his or her own business with the collective result being a kind of silent rebellion that holds back the socialist economy and makes a mockery of the regime's politics" (p. 138). In contrast to the non-partisan approach of the present study, throughout their book, they take an approach to everyday North Korean life with an agenda to hold the Kim regime accountable for political oppression. They go as far as claiming "…the Kim regime is built on the violation of human rights…" (p. 139). However, a biased approach does not detract from value of their work, as they are clear in their position throughout the book.

Choi (2013) examines daily life in North Korea in an article based on the perspectives of North Korea defectors, and addresses how individuals live from day to day, what tactics are deployed in order to survive, and what theoretical and methodological frameworks are available to explain strategies of survival employed by North Koreans. Postulating an undue value given to macro-discourses such as the state's power structure, ideology, foreign policy and security issues, Choi suggests that the literature neglects the study of ordinary people. He notes that these ordinary people "engage in an intricate game of survival on a daily basis, employing strategies of disobedience, deviation, resistance, and compromise" (Choi, 2013, p. 656). In response to a 'routinisation of politics' from above, ordinary people develop an 'everyday politics' to deviate from the regime's rules in a clever manner. Through testimony, he focuses on how everyday politics is "formed by ordinary people in order to seek survival mechanisms under the totalitarian regime" (p. 657).

Choi's research indicates that state-society relations that were once constrained by the centralised regime's use of political and moral motivations have yielded more fragmented and autonomous systems against the backdrop of increasing self-interest. In the process, state and society have reshaped patterns of interaction regarding information flow structures, rules of behaviour and motivations. That is, both the state and society seek coexistence and "the market spontaneously developed by the population functions as shock absorb" (pp. 655, 671). Choi's work reflects the salience of the present study's interest in everyday resistance and suggests the manifestation of the phenomenon in North Korean

society. While certainly an important contribution to scholarship on state-society relations in North Korea, the phenomenon of everyday resistance is not explicit in Choi's account as to its operationalisation, variance or underlying triggers. Hence, development of typological theory can improve an overall understanding of this phenomenon.

In another article, Joo (2014) investigates the 'hidden transcripts' of the ordinary powerless in contemporary North Korean society. Also based on defector testimony, his article uses discourse analysis to identify the long-term effects of hidden transcripts on the powerless. Noting the disguise of subversive language, rising materialism, the 'South Korean Wave' and shamanism, Joo argues that, despite their potential, "hidden transcripts of the powerless are unlikely to lead to revolutionary upheavals in North Korea" (p. 68). While Joo's focus is on the long-term outcomes of these practices, his work is another example of good scholarship on a smaller scale. Hence, mechanisms underpinning the emergence of these practices and a wider variation of everyday resistance are left unexplored.

Lastly, an article on the decrease of loyalty in North Korea by Corrado (2017) argues that four critical factors have heightened tension between state and society, "leading to a reduction in loyalty among the general population" (p. 445). Factors addressed by Corrado are the decline in value of party membership, forced labour campaigns, outside information, extractive policies, and endemic rent-seeking. In evaluating these causes, he notes, "rent-seeking and extractive policies are the most important factors in explaining the declining loyalty of the North Korean people because no other factor puts the regime and the people in a directly adversarial relationship" (p. 465). The causal factors he correlates with a decrease in loyalty to the regime have indeed caused resentment among North Koreans since the famine of the 1990s. Yet, he states that, "Owing to the dominating oppression … there are currently few indicators of organised resistance or grassroots networks to oppose the regime … some exceptions to this generalisation, including a smattering of market riots, a limited amount of anti-regime graffiti and flyers, and a government in exile" (p. 450). However, he then goes on to note "But these remain few and far between … our analysis will focus on expressions of resentment … Later, I will show that these expressions have actually increased in frequency and boldness over time" (p. 450).

Corrado's work is significant in its connection of different causal mechanisms to expressions of resentment, but noting the totalitarian tendencies of North Korea and referencing market riots, graffiti and so forth leaves one ruminating over the 'exceptions' that are at odds with these tendencies. While Corrado did note that his concern was with the increase in the frequency and boldness of resentment among North Koreans over time, and his work is significant in its use of defector testimony, the notable dismissal of the range of low-scale resistant behaviour is another example of how scholarship to date has obscured the richer picture of everyday resistance in the state. Moreover, in bridging the sub-fields of resistance studies with social movement theory, a richer set of explanatory variables underlying such resistance will be useful.

This section has reviewed the current state of research on everyday life and resistance in North Korea by referencing and evaluating the works most closely related to this research. Accordingly, the literature will benefit from the present study's focused investigation on how expressions of everyday resistance vary qualitatively and the incorporation of a wider set of causal variables to postulate the conditions under which particular types emerge. Moreover, the groundwork of a foundational typological theory of everyday resistance can further a research agenda on this phenomenon.

2.2.4 Summary: North Korea as a Totalitarian Regime Type

Having discussed political structure, culture, ideology, everyday life and resistance in the literature, this summary will briefly delve into the scholarship on totalitarianism and piece together the characteristics of North Korea that affect the everyday decision-making of individuals in the state. Doing so allows for reflections in the conclusion pertaining to the enduring value of totalitarianism as a concept relating to North Korea and stresses its compatibility with everyday varieties of resistance.

Typologies of regimes are useful historical and conceptual tools that assist in the analysis of state-society relations. Different regimes stake their legitimacy in different patterns of governance and thus generate more predictable forms of interaction between the government and population.[16] Such legitimacy may, and frequently is, be contested or questioned and is rarely static. The most common way to typify a regime is according to the

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[16] Whether conceptualised according to Weber's (1922) pure types of traditional, charismatic or rational-legal, legitimacy here refers to the right and acceptance of an authority which is usually a law and/or regime.

polychotomous designation (democratic, totalitarian, post-totalitarian, authoritarian, sultanist) argued by Linz and Stepan (1996). However, countless sub-types, particularly variants of authoritarian and democratic regimes, have proliferated to capture emerging patterns of rule or to explain particular cases in a more nuanced manner (Dukalsis & Hooker, 2011).

Arendt (1951) described totalitarianism as "the permanent domination of each single individual in each and every sphere of life" (p. 326). Nazi Germany, Stalin's Soviet Union and the Eastern bloc were the essence of this concept for Arendt. While she stressed ideology in terms of its psychological domination of the individual and its rationale to transform human nature through an all-pervasive organisation of human life, her focus was on the coercive, external aspects of control carried out by the police under elite formations, the super-party and a functionally indispensable leader (e.g., Hitler and Stalin), while she understated the ideological differences between mobilisation of the masses in the name of race or class (Brooker, 2014). Mitigating the limitation of Arendt's failure to demarcate differences between rightist and leftist totalitarianism and her overemphasis on terror, Friedrich and Brzezinski (1956) provided a more detailed and widely applicable theory of the concept. They described a six-feature syndrome of interrelated traits exclusive to totalitarian regimes: (1) an ideology projected toward a final state of mankind and to which everyone is supposed to adhere, at least passively; (2) a single party, typically led by one person, organised hierarchically and typically superior to or intertwined with the state bureaucracy; (3) a system of terror, whether physical or psychic, effected through party and secret police control; (4) a technically conditioned near-complete monopoly of control, in the hands of the party and the government, of all means of effective mass communications; (5) a near-complete monopoly of the effective use of all weapons of armed combat; and (6) central control and direction of the entire economy (Grieder, 2007).[17]

Friedrich and Brzezinski's six-feature syndrome shows variations between communist and fascist types (e.g., fascist retaining of a private-ownership form of a centrally-directed economy as opposed to the communist state owned/collectivised as well

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[17] Moreover, in 1969, Friedrich added two additional qualifications. First, monopolistic control was extended to embrace all organisations, including economic ones. Second, he emphasised that monopolistic control does not need to be exercised by the party, but could be in the hands of whatever elite ruled the particular society and thereby constituted its regime (Grieder, 2007, p. 564).

as centrally planned economy), but omits an examination of the ideological differences between fascism and communism, despite their inclusion of ideology as a feature (Brooker, 2014). Among dozens of second-generation theorists, Linz (1975, 2000) expanded on Schapiro's (1972) feature of *mobilisation* to underscore a distinguishing feature of totalitarianism as its relevance to contemporary non-democratic regimes had little relevance except for "rare anomalies such as the as the Kim family's communist regime in North Korea or the early stage of Mao's cultural revolution" (Brooker, 2014, p. 20).

Linz and Stepan (1996) argue for the continued use of totalitarianism as a valuable analytical and historical concept. Under their typology, each regime type differs based on the four characteristics of pluralism, ideology, mobilisation and leadership. If a regime has "eliminated almost all pre-existing political, economic, and social pluralism, has a unified, articulated, guiding, utopian ideology, has intensive and extensive mobilisation, and has a leadership that rules, often charismatically, with undefined limits and great unpredictability and vulnerability for elites and non-elites alike, then it makes historical and conceptual sense to call it a regime with strong totalitarian tendencies" (p. 40). However, literature that criticises the use of totalitarianism as a concept poses an issue with a top-down approach that neglects developments in society that may entail acts that resemble some form of dissent. This notion can be refuted through the language used by scholars promoting the concept of totalitarianism, such as Friedrich and Brzezinski conceding to 'islands of separateness' in the 'totalitarian sea', of which the church was one. In addition, Friedrich and Brzezinski's typology notes that *most but not all* professional activities were subjected to the state, and Linz and Stepan (1996) stipulate, "pre-existing sources of pluralism have been uprooted or *systematically repressed*[18][19]" (p. 43).

In addition to leaving totalitarianism open to limited dissent, Linz (2000) notes that these regimes are not necessarily static, and different totalitarian systems or phases "may be characterised as more ideological, populist, or bureaucratic, depending on the character of the single party, and charismatic, oligarchic, or even feudal, depending on the structure of

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[18] Emphasis added by the researcher. Arguments against North Korea fitting the totalitarian type often discuss the erosion of the state's command economy. However, systematic repression of the economy is sufficient in the Linz and Stepan (1996) typological scheme.

[19] See the following works that indicate the everyday lives of ordinary citizens playing a role in totalitarian regimes: Fainsod (1958) on the inefficiency of the state machine in Soviet Smolensk; Kotkin (1997) on Soviet Magnitogorsk and how ordinary citizens reshaped their environment; grassroots circulation of *samizdat* in the Soviet Union; revelations of disobedience in *alltagsgeschichte* (history of everyday life) in Nazi Germany.

the dominant centre of power" (p. 69). For this study, the researcher has adapted Brooker's (2014, p. 19) table of classical and second generation totalitarian characteristics, primarily based on the six-point syndrome of Friedrich and Brzezinski (1956) and other features of general consensus, to the context of contemporary North Korea, as shown **Table 2**.

Table 2: North Korea's Totalitarian Features

Classic Characteristics of Totalitarianism	Features of North Korea
Eschatological ideology	*Juche*
Single party, typically led by one individual	*The Workers' Party of Korea (WPK)*
Terroristic police	*SSD, MPS, MSC, Inminban, ad hoc social monitoring organisations*
Communications monopoly	*Organisation and Guidance Department (OGD), Propaganda and Agitation Department (PAD), Groups 118, 109*
Weapons monopoly	*National Defence Commission (NDC), the Korean Peoples' Army (KPA)*
Centrally-directed economy	*State organisations, collective farms, pseudo-state enterprises (PSEs), systematic repression of primitive private markets*
Other Characteristics	
Continuous mobilisation	*Organisational life as a conduit for political, labour and material mobilisations*
'Permanent revolution' and 'passion for unanimity'	*Continuous transformation of everyday lives in accordance with achieving the revolutionary Juche idea*
Indoctrination system	*OGD, PAD*
Leader is absolutist and pseudo-religious/charismatic	*The Ten Principles of Monolithic Leadership, emotionalism, cult of personality, symbolism*

The use of totalitarianism as an analytical paradigm adds an additional asset to the research and its contribution. It enhances the external validity of this study pertaining to the

exploration of similar phenomena in other non-democratic contexts with one or more similar features. Moreover, the delineation of these features in the North Korean context provides a clearer understanding of the constraints under which individuals are operating when practising everyday resistance. Hence, this section will conclude by elaborating on the features listed in the above chart.

        Ideology. Pertaining to ideology in totalitarian systems, Linz (2000) argues "There is an exclusive, autonomous and more or less intellectually elaborate ideology with which the ruling group or leader, and the party serving the leaders use as a basis for policies or manipulate to legitimise them…has some boundaries beyond which lies heterodoxy that does not remain unsanctioned…goes beyond a particular programme or definition of the boundaries of legitimate political action to provide, presumably, some ultimate meaning" (p. 70). As the disaggregation of literature on political culture suggested, North Korean ideology is some mixture of 'isms' (ethno-nationalism, socialism, militarism, cultural purism, loyalism, etc.) packaged under the official ideology of Juche. This brand of North Korean socialism can only be realised under Kim leadership in an on-going revolutionary transformation of society according to the Juche idea, which in essence is the increasing development of loyalty toward eternal President Kim Il-sung and adherence to hierarchal laws, norms and values.

        Single party. In reality, the Workers' Party of Korea (WPK) is the only extant political party in North Korea. In contrast to other communist parties, it is designated as "the Party of Great Leader Kim Il-sung" rather than its formal designation as the party of the working class. The Party's ultimate objective is to "realise the complete independence of the masses by placing the entire society under the banner of Juche" (KINU, 2014, p. 59). The Party's role as a proletariat vanguard advocated by Marxism-Leninism is restricted by the unique leadership of the Suryeong. Hence, in reality the Party acts as a subordinated institution under the helm of Kim leadership, while still providing a link between the leader of the organic body and the masses with the key task of organising and mobilising them to accomplish his policies and political directions, implementing them through state institutions. The organisational and operational system of the WPK is based on democratic centralism, used in former Marxist-Leninist states, that North Korea defines as embodying "an important aspect of compliance, which requires the submission of individuals to

organisations, the minority to the majority, lower authorities to higher authorities, and all institutions and members to the central party" (KINU, p. 60).

      System of terror/coercive apparatus. This component is constituted by the state's internal security agencies - the State Security Department (SSD), Ministry of People's Security (MPS), Military Security Command (MSC), neighbourhood watch units (inminban) and ad hoc social monitoring organisations that arbitrarily and exemplarily punish behaviour perceived as illegal, anti-social or anti-state.[20] Approximately 50,000 personnel make up the SSD, which acts as a 'secret police' pursuing those accused of anti-government and dissident activities, economic crimes and disloyalty to the political leadership. It runs political prisons, has intelligence and counterintelligence responsibilities, monitors political attitudes, and surveys those returning from foreign areas (Gause, 2012). The MPS functions primarily as the national police and attends to normal police missions ranging from maintaining law and order, controlling traffic, investigating criminal cases, and overseeing the state's non-political prison system. As the most visible public security apparatus, it maintains around 210,000 personnel (Gause, 2012). The MSC is the counterintelligence and counterespionage organization responsible for internal security within the KPA and seeks out corrupt elements, disloyalty or the potential for a coup d'état. With the authority to make arrests on evidence of criminal activity or political unreliability, investigations, surveillance, and wiretapping of high-ranking officials are conducted. Regularly producing reports pertaining to ideological trends, friendships and daily activities of officers, the command consists of around 10,000 personnel (Gause, 2012). Extending beyond bureaucratic police entities, inminban consist of 20 to 40 households or an apartment building sharing the duty of monitoring members, providing ideological education and serving as a conduit for various mobilisation activities. Meeting once or twice a week, every North Korean must belong to one, and a leader is appointed with the responsibility to monitor suspicious activity, holding authority to visit homes at any hour, but must reserve punishment for other organisations. Ad hoc social monitoring organisations, such as the anti-socialism group, consist of five to six people from the central party apparatus that conduct intensive inspections, constant surveillance, and

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[20] See Linz (2000, p. 102) for a list of typical characteristics of coercion in totalitarian systems.

confiscation of illicit media, and advise arrests if the individual has little power or cannot afford a bribe (Gause, 2012).[21]

Communications. These are strongly restricted in North Korea, and with the proliferation of mobile phones, the regime is adapting with new techniques of control. Group 118 was originally established to control drug smuggling and use, but now is reportedly involved in the inspection of computer content through random home and workplace inspections as well as monitoring for Chinese cell phones. Most frequently mentioned by defectors, Group 109 inspects and confiscates a variety of goods and addresses ideological infractions particularly through the use of cell phones, computers, USBs, DVDs, MP3s, and so forth (Kretchun, Lee & Tuohy, 2017). The Organisation and Guidance Department (OGD) has ultimate authority over Group 109 as well as other ministries and agencies tasked with monitoring the distribution of computers, cell phones and other mobile devices. The OGD is a strong agency of the Central Committee of the WPK that has strong control and influence over society and political culture, also collecting information and creating detailed files on individuals (Kretchun et al., 2017). Another highly influential agency of the Central Committee of the WPK is the Propaganda and Agitation Department (PAD). The PAD has a number of sections that have policy and personnel controls over state news, media, and arts and cultural organisations, as well as those that produce and disseminate political education and ideological content used in Party life (Kretchun et al., 2017). Aside from human control of communications, the regime also enacts network and device controls. Technology and the proliferation of mobile phones have led the state to create a signature system in 2013 that has made using mobile phones more difficult. To control the digital environment beyond mobile phones, the state has instituted automated censorship, tamper resistance and surveillance tracking mechanisms. Automated censorship uses signature-checking software allowing the state to check media files and applications to determine if they have been approved by the state. Tamper-resistant software programmes block attempts to disable or modify information control schemes on operating systems (modified windows, Red Star OS and Android mobile OS). Surveillance and tracking mechanisms use a modified digital signature process to identify

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[21] See Gause (2012) Coercion, Control, Surveillance, and Punishment for a more elaborate account of North Korea's internal security apparatus.

approved content and advanced watermarking techniques to subtly change the visual appearance of illicit media with a filter identifying who has viewed it (Kretchun et al., 2017).

Military/weapons. In 2009, the National Defence Commission (NDC) was regarded in an amendment to the constitution as the supreme defence guidance organ of national sovereignty (KINU, 2014). The first chairman of the NDC, Kim Jong-un, establishes key state policies, commands the entire KPA, weaponry and its use, directs internal and external undertakings, creates and removes all central organs in national defence, establishes key state policies, decides the ratification or abolition of key treaties with foreign nations, and "exercises the prerogative of mercy" (KINU, 2014, p. 73).

Centrally directed economy. Whatever private control of the economy exists, it is systematically repressed or co-opted by the state. Under North Korean law, private property does not exist. The central control of the economy has changed slightly in North Korea after the disastrous 1990s. Earlier, North Korea was an extreme example of a Soviet-type command economy that controlled production and distribution (Lankov, Ward, Yoo & Kim, 2017). However, grassroots marketisation has created a primitive market system in which private enterprises that have extended beyond, for example, a small food stall with a few teenage employees (these systematically repressed and avoiding the state's gaze whenever possible) must access legal and technical infrastructure to survive (Lankov et al., 2017). In this sense, private state enterprises (PSEs) that emerged following the 1990s, absent a legal framework in North Korea, must pursue informal contracts based on cash and oral agreements with a superior state organisation (Lankov et al., 2017). While PSEs are highly productive and benefit the economy, there is always the chance that the state unilaterally changes conditions, increases the amount of compulsory payments or shuts down them down at any time, initiates investigations into their activities, or makes arrests. For instance, these entrepreneurs are technically guilty of embezzlement and a host of other economic crimes. Moreover, officials entrenched with hostility may also conduct audits that, when not handled properly, lead to trouble for PSEs. A defector and former 'entrepreneur' estimates 5-10% of people involved in these audits end up dying in prison or are executed. Hence, the PSE is an adaptive institution evolving from a highly repressive legal and economic order. Public in form, private in content, it exists to obscure its market

nature, providing it with a politically acceptable cover. On paper, North Korea remains dedicated to the core principles of economic Stalinism and, in reality, systematically represses private economic activity (Lankov et al., 2017).

Continuous mobilisation. This is facilitated by an organisational life in which individuals must belong to one organisation, so that each person is held accountable for tasks at any point. The five primary organisations (WPK, Youth Union, Trade Union, Farmer's Union, Women's Union), along with the inminban, act as conduits for political (rallies, indoctrination), labour (road work, statue upkeep) and material (donations to the party, lunchboxes for the military) mobilisations. Generally meeting once a week, the organisations also undergo two indoctrination sessions (lectures/political study sessions) and one mutual criticism session (Lankov, Kwak & Cho, 2012).

Permanent revolution/passion for unanimity. Inked in North Korean ideology is a historical sense of purpose aiming to transform social reality under the banner of Juche ideology in order to perfect the on-going socialist revolution. A passion for unanimity is reflected, as individuals are encouraged through loyalty to the socio-political being of Kim leadership to perfect the seemingly 'permanent' revolution. Moreover, according to Kim Jong-un, "last year…our revolution faced the harshest ever challenges…Workers' Party of Korea and the government of the Republic will never cease to struggle and advance until the final victory of the revolutionary cause of Juche by relying on the trust and strength of the people…Let us all march forward dynamically towards fresh victory of the revolution…" (Kim Jong-un, 2018).

Indoctrination system. Present through most of the characteristics presented here, the indoctrination system is underpinned primarily by the OGD, PAD, education, organisational life, mass media, cult of personality, symbolism, and so forth. Mandatory political sessions, mutual criticism sessions, and many other elements comprise this system.

Pseudo-religious/charismatic aspect of leadership. This is tied to a strong component of emotionalism in the relationship between the people and the leadership. The cult of personality that developed under Kim Il-sung has been hereditarily succeeded by his son, Kim Jong-Il, and now by his grandson Kim Jong-un. Symbolism abounds, with portraits, statues, lapel pins and museums dedicated to the Kim family's cult of personality.

Cultural and intellectual productions also aim to inculcate a sense of emotionalism and loyalty through Kim hagiography and historicism.

2.3. Social Movement Literature

This component of the literature review explores the scholarship on social movements in order to distil a set of causal variables that may explain the emergence of everyday resistance in North Korea. Moreover, it provides the groundwork for a novel theoretical framework that tailors the collective action-oriented nature of social movement theory to individual action. Taking stock of a cluster of variables within the literature, they can be subsumed under the structural and ideational paradigms. Classical theories such as mass society and relative deprivation, and those that synthesise the two paradigms are omitted in favour of the more prevalent, contemporary and less complex approaches.

The two most predominant and applied theories in the structural paradigm, resource mobilisation theory and political opportunity theory, will serve as plausible explanatory variables for this study. Featured in the ideational paradigm are many overlapping variables, but they can be separated into value-oriented, framing and social psychology theories to comprise the explanatory variables in this tradition for the present study. The substance of these five theoretical approaches accounts for the framework of variables tested for explanatory significance relating to the emergence of everyday resistance in North Korea, as all of them make intuitive sense and are likely to contribute to an overall explanation to some extent. However, some may be more reliable or consistent in their effects within particular cases or across cases.

2.3.1. Structural Paradigm

Within the structural paradigm, the distribution of resources, organisational characteristics of social movements, political and social contexts are of the strongest causal significance determining opportunities or constraints for protest. Underscoring the salience of ripe structural conditions over grievances or ideology, resource mobilisation theory and political opportunity theory offer this study two structural explanations that are likely to contribute to the emergence of particular types of everyday resistance in the North Korean context.

2.3.1.1 Resource Mobilization Theory

Resource mobilisation theory stresses the importance of structural factors, in particular the availability of resources to a certain social group and the capacity to organise them for action (Stekelenburg & Klandermans, 2009). Assuming rational decision processes that weigh the costs and benefits of participation, this theory is rooted in Mancur Olson's (1965) claim that rational, self-interested individuals will not combine to achieve common group interests unless coercion or selective incentives are deployed, or the group of individuals involved is very small. As Edwards and McCarthy (2004) suggest, even the 'simple availability' of resources is complicated, as they must be present in a specific socio-historical context and accessible to potential collective actors. Hence, the implicit assumption in resource mobilisation theory, that resources crucial to the initiation or continuation of collective action are distributed unevenly within and among societies, suggests that the Kim regime's monopoly on resource allocation precludes the explanatory salience of this theory. However, the literature on North Korea supports the notion that the influx of information and grassroots marketisation may have ripened the structural scene with increased resources and capabilities of smaller groups and individuals to mobilise them.

While this approach is mostly used to analyse social movements and institutional politics in democratic societies, a considerable amount of analysis has been applied to Eastern Europe and the 1989 revolutions (Sharman, 2004).[22] Sadowski (1988) sought an understanding of where resources necessary to the development of a movement in a totalitarian-ruled society plagued by shortages arise. Pointing to the characteristics of rigidly structured non-democratic societies, she noted that such conditions lend favourably to grassroots mobilisation. Citizens tend to avoid government restrictions by handling matters privately, outside of imposing bureaucratic control. In turn, alternative means are taken to fulfil daily needs and these become institutionalised in practice while remaining informal in structure. This, Sadowski (1998) argued, fosters an environment of attaining economic needs through illegal or extra-legal trading in self-help networks that manifest

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[22] See Kuran (1991), Lohmann (1994) and concepts such as threshold models, tipping points and informational cascades.

themselves to "form and reflect the grassroots of resources for movements in socialist authoritarian systems" (p. 199). Moreover, latent networks, proto-organisations, community leaders, and organisers that can provide the basis for social mobilisation are present in many non-democratic contexts. With the advent of technological resources, denser communication structures in society have developed that provide a resource that can be used to foster some form of resistance where civic activism is repressed and distrust is high. More spatially dispersed, loosely-knit personal networks can increase through such resources by allowing individuals to communicate across large distances to achieve collaboration and offer a concealed form of resistance that undermines techniques of social isolation (Breuer, Landman & Farquhar, 2015).

Through a synthesis of past work, Edwards and McCarthy (2004) offer a five-fold typology of resources that may be mobilised to alter prevailing patterns of resource stratification and challenge them through social movements. For this study, the availability and capacity to mobilise these resources would take place in a latent movement inscribed with patterns of everyday resistance. Hence, while there are no social movements proper or organised public resistance in North Korea, the availability of a variety of resources in society and a primitive capacity to mobilise them may propel certain patterns of everyday resistance. Thus, the adoption of the five-fold typology inclusive of moral, cultural, socio-organisational, human and material resources, and some capacity to mobilise them, will be tailored to individual and small group action in North Korea to test the salience of resource mobilisation theory.

Moral resources include aspects such as legitimacy, solidarity and celebrity. Cultural resources include tactical repertoires, organisational templates and technical know-how that are more easily obtained than moral resources. Socio-organisational resources are generally in the form of infrastructures, social networks or organisations that vary in formality, for instance, meeting spaces, roads and other factors that facilitate smooth functioning of daily life (Edwards & McCarthy, 2004). Jasper (2014) notes that actors "borrow and transform existing infrastructure, which includes communications, transportation, financial and legal systems, meeting rooms…to get things done…" (p. 70). Human resources are more tangible than the aforementioned types and include labour, experience, skills and expertise. Material resources have received the most analytical

attention given their tangibility and include physical capital, property, equipment, and so forth (Edwards & McCarthy, 2004).[23]

Hence, the causal significance of resource mobilisation theory to the emergence of particular varieties of everyday resistance in North Korea can be tailored to individual decision-making by posing the question, "What particular types of resources are available to individuals, to what extent are they mobilised and what effect does this have on the facilitation of everyday resistance?."

2.3.1.2 Political Opportunity Theory

While resource mobilisation theory focuses on the rise and fall of resistance through features internal to the acts themselves, political opportunity theorists stake their research in external features such as changes or differences in the political and institutional environment of social movements. Varying over time and contexts, political opportunity structures and their level of receptivity to challenges direct the crux of this explanation to action resting in the process by which a political system shapes, checks and absorbs these challenges. Unlike resources such as money and power, changes in the political and institutional environment create exogenous openings for even resource-poor individuals to act (Tarrow, 2011). Further, McAdam (1999) notes that instigators of change in political opportunity are numerous and "The point is that any event or broad social process that serves to undermine the calculations and assumptions on which the political establishment is structured occasions a shift in political opportunities" (p. 41). He also emphasises the necessity of avoiding conceptual confusion by openly clarifying through an explicit variable what one is seeking to explain and which dimensions of political opportunity are most germane to that explanation (McAdam, 1996).[24]

Synthesising a number of scholarly treatments of this concept, McAdam (1996) identifies a highly consensual list of four dimensions of political opportunity: "(1) system accessibility or the degree to which a political system is open or closed to challenge, (2) the relative stability of the pattern of political alignments within a system, (3) the presence or absence of influential allies, and (4) the repressive capacity of the state or relevant political

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[23] See also Tilly (2006) on repertoires.
[24] See also Kitschelt (1985) on political opportunity.

entity" (pp. 26-29). Presumably, degree of political opportunity can be explained by one or a combination of two or more of these dimensions. However, Gamson and Meyer (1996) argue, "Opportunity structures have been over-utilised, and are now becoming an all-encompassing fudge factor for all conditions and circumstances…used to explain too much, it may explain nothing at all" (p. 275). Nevertheless, Williams (2010) argues that the employment of opportunity structures is so frequent that it is a testament for their attractiveness and potential for the social sciences.

Hence, in order to mitigate the limitations of this theory and focus on its strengths, McAdam's advice will be followed by indicating the dimensions of political opportunity most germane to everyday resistance in North Korea. Tarrow (2011) argues that there are more stable aspects of opportunity/threat that condition contentious politics. These are centred on the concepts of 'state strength' (centralisation and decentralisation) and 'regime repressiveness' (prevailing strategies toward challenges). In North Korea, political institutions and prevailing strategies employed when dealing with challengers remain rooted in totalitarian tendencies and historically communist structures. Institutions are entrenched in a strong territorial centralisation with essentially no functional separation of power, while prevailing strategies toward challengers are repressive, confrontational and polarising. Given the high-capacity nature of the non-democratic regime, virtually no elements of civil society exist. However, germane to the opportunity structures in North Korea are patterns of economic centralisation and decentralisation as marketisation is systematically repressed to different degrees at particular time periods. Moreover, Linz and Stepan (1996) argue that the concept of totalitarianism is not static and processual change may ignite the potential for out-of-type regime change. This study will test changes in 'state strength' according to centralisation and decentralisation of economic, political and social pluralism in the state and the effect of 'regime repressiveness', based on the broader configuration of pluralism, as dimensions of political opportunity in North Korea. These exogenous features are conceptualised as filtering through the individuals and affecting their decision-making based 'state strength' and 'regime repressiveness'.

These broad processes of change tailored to individual decision-making pertaining to the exercise of everyday resistance determine the salience of political opportunity theory

by posing the question, "To what extent do shifting levels of 'state strength' and 'regime repressiveness' affect the emergence of everyday resistance in North Korea?".

2.3.2. Ideational Paradigm

Theories in the ideational paradigm of social movement theory derive from the position that structural explanations do not sufficiently explain why individuals in the same structural position do not display the same behaviour. Tarrow (2011) argues that movements define, crystallise and construct collective identities, frame contentious politics, and capture and shape emotions to mobilise followers. Thus, the ideational roots of contention centred on emotion, identity, interpretation, meaning and symbolism are central to these approaches. While this paradigm elicits criticism for the arbitrary operationalisation of these variables, this study aims to narrow the focus on the individual and use Giugni's (1998) categorisation of ideational theories of protest as staked in value-oriented, framing, and social psychology explanations.

2.3.2.1 Value-Oriented Theory

As Tarrow (2011) argues, movements define, crystallise and construct collective identities. Beginning with the pioneering work of Melucci (1989), the essentialist component of collective action relating to identities has shifted to scholars interpreting them as constructed sets of boundary mechanisms that define who "Who 'we' are, who 'they' are, and the locations and borders in between them" (p. 143). This approach can be considered value-oriented as its roots are in Weberian and Durkheimian sociological traditions. While carrying different conceptualisations of culture, both traditions suggest the idea of symbolic configurations and formations that constrain and enable action by structuring actors' normative commitments and understanding of the world and their own potentials within it. Weber considered culture as a set of internalised norms and values that guide collective action, while Durkheim sought to understand how collective representations solidify social solidarities. In 1937, Parsons attempted to synthesise these perspectives in his voluntarist theory of action, which resulted in a view of culture that was determinist in its view of social actors as provided with abstract and general norms of

conduct. More recently, the new social movements (NSM) approach has tended to relate macrostructural changes in societies to new cultural orientations in these societies so that the emergence of social movements are linked to the rise of new individual needs, internalisation of certain values in the course of socialisation, or the identification of individuals with values possessed by different social classes (Giugni, 1998).[25]

Melucci (1989) argues that the plurality of memberships and abundance of possibilities in contemporary society have weakened traditional reference points such as church, party, state and class. He notes, "The possibility an individual will say with continuity 'I am x, y, or z' becomes increasingly uncertain… [and individuals] need to re-establish continually who I am… [so that] 'homelessness' or personal identity is created, such that the individual must build and rebuild constantly his or her 'home' in the face of changing situations and events" (p. 109). A fixed identification of unity and continuity through individual experience can no longer be found in identification with a definite model, group or culture. Rather, identity must be constructed through an inner capacity to redefine itself in the present, to reverse decisions and alliances. Yet, "it also means cherishing the present as a unique, unrepeatable experience within which the individual realised oneself" (p. 110). The areas in which power determines policies over individuals are in the spaces of everyday life where individuals are increasingly claiming their autonomy by conducting their search for identity by transforming these spaces for the reappropriation, self-realisation and construction of meaning relating to what they are and do. Limiting social movement activity to interactions with the state is no longer acceptable as one should consider their cultural faces staked in the pre-political dimension of collective action in everyday life (Melucci, 1989).

Melucci's work on new social movements and value-oriented theory has traditionally been applied to more open, Western democracies. Moreover, in terms of culture and ethnicity, North Korea maintains one of the most homogenous populations. Nevertheless, the literature indicates the applicability of theory within the value-oriented approach to North Korea as its information cordon has grown more porous and marketisation has affected the regime's temporal control over everyday lives. Intuitively, it

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[25] See also the influence transnational advocacy networks (TANs), a set of relevant actors working internationally on an issue based on shared values, common discourse and a dense exchange of information and services.

is plausible that the identification of North Koreans with alternative values in the everyday process of socialisation may account for the emergence of everyday resistance. In order to test this theory the study will inquire, "To what extent do changing value-orientations explain the emergence of everyday resistance in North Korea?".

2.3.2.2 Framing Theory

While the value-oriented approach rests above all at the macro-sociological level, framing explanations rest on the meso- and micro-levels of interpretive schemes in everyday life and their relationship to the emergence of social movements (Giugni, 1998).

According to Tarrow (2011), movements frame contentious politics in the same manner as journalists frame a story by selectively punctuating and encoding objects. Snow, Rochford, Worden and Benford (1986) adopted Goffman's (1974) frame analysis to understand how social movement actors make sense of their world. According to Snow and Benford (1992), a frame is an "interpretive schemata that condenses 'the world out there' by selectively punctuating and encoding objects, situations, events, experiences and sequences of actions with one's present or past environments" (p. 137). In addition, frames may underscore and embellish the significance and injustice of a certain social condition or redefine as unjust and immoral what was previously seen as unfortunate but tolerable.

Snow and Benford (2000) argue that collective action frames focus attention on a particular situation deemed problematic, making attributions as to an antagonist and arrangements for action that will induce change. The authors articulate three core framing tasks as diagnostic (attributive function noting the cause of the problem or who is to blame), prognostic (outlines a plan for redress, specifying what should be done by whom including targets, strategies and tactics) and motivational (entailing the social construction and avowal of motives and identifying protagonists). Hence, framing theory stresses a link between existing interpretations of objective facts and events on the one hand and participation in social movements on the other. This is advantageous in the sense that it directs attention to the relationship between ideational elements and their transposition into action (Giugni, 1998).

Aside from core framing tasks, four types of frame alignment exist that may "orient their movements' frames toward action and fashion them at the intersection between a

target population's inherited culture and its own values and goals" (Tarrow, 2011, p. 145). These four types that may construct social and political issues are frame bridging, amplification, extension and transformation. Each type of alignment corresponds with particular mobilisation tasks and processes. The underlying premise of this is that one variety or another, nature or intensity, is an interactional accomplishment and is a pre-condition for movement participation (Snow et al., 1986).

First, frame bridging at the individual or organisational level involves the linking of two or more ideologically congruent but structurally unconnected frames regarding a particular issue or problem. Second, frame amplification involves the idealisation, clarification or invigoration of existing ideas and beliefs. Third, frame extension refers to the incorporation of interests or views that are incidental to primary objectives but considered salient to the values or interests of potential adherents. Fourth, frame transformation addresses the causes and values antithetical to traditional life and extant frames; it is a reconstitution of what is actually going on for the individual (Snow & Benford, 2000).

Tailoring these explanatory concepts in the framing approach to individual behaviour and decision-making is lodged in changing perceptions of socio-political conditions that legitimate, and thus trigger, everyday resistance. On an individual level, framing is a process that constructs reality. One's ideational environment provides the content that affects perceptions of that reality, including the legitimacy and justness of certain socio-political conditions or issues. Thus, an evaluation of this theory's causal significance will be drawn from inquiring, "To what extent do frames affect individual perceptions of social issues and regime legitimacy to trigger everyday resistance in North Korea?".

2.3.2.3 Social Psychology Theory

The study of social movements in the social psychology canon traditionally centred on classical approaches addressing irrational behaviour resulting from psychological dispositions leading to extreme behaviour such as panics, mobs and so forth. More recently, a focus on emotion has proliferated and is no longer necessarily seen as incompatible with

politics or irrational. According to Emirbayer and Goodwin (1996), these approaches concern "all those psychic structures that constrain and enable action by channelling flows and investments ('cathexes') of emotional energy" (p. 368). Moreover, Tarrow (2011) notes that scholars are increasingly focused on how movements reflect, capture and shape emotions to mobilise followers. As an explanation for the emergence of everyday resistance in the North Korean context, it makes intuitive sense that emotion would play a role. For instance, Linz (2000, p. 23) notes:

> Totalitarian regimes try to fill the emotional vacuum created by secularization with political rituals and liturgies derived from or inspired by religion … what is more difficult to ascertain is to what extent leaders, party organization members, and ordinary citizens succumbed to those pseudo-religious efforts to give meaning to their lives, and the extent to which participation in those rituals evoked feelings comparable to those of religious rituals.

Moreover, Brooker (2014) argues that a unique form of absolutist rule that involves a pseudo-religious or pseudo-charismatic emotionalism embodied in the totalitarian leader reduces the regime's political party to a wholly dependent status, following the leader more so than representing an organisation in its own right.

To a large degree, the marginalisation of emotions and feelings in political sociology up to this point has been the result of four factors: first, an association of passion with romantic and utopian conceptions unrelated to the political sphere because of an instrumental conception of the sphere popular at the end of the 1960s; second, the overriding of 'interest' as opposed to 'passion' as an explanatory factor in play by the eighteenth century; third, the dominance of the rational choice paradigm in the United States that portrayed these as irrational or objective traits that do not affect rational thinking; and last, even the mistreatment of emotions in the political culture paradigm due to the prevalence of quantitative methods in which the affective dimension denoted a numeric item (Demertzis, 2006).

Stressing the contribution of emotions to everyday social and political behaviour, Clarke, Hoggett and Thompson (2006) draw on several disciplines in tandem with political science and synthesise interlinked themes to articulate the centrality of emotions to one's understanding of politics. Of particular interest to this study, due to the ease of

measurement in the data compared with other themes of emotion in politics, is the five-fold typology of emotions affecting politics that Jasper (2006) introduces: physical urges (e.g., lust and hunger disrupting projects); reflex emotions (e.g., disgust and surprise flaring up and just as quickly subsiding); affects (e.g., love and hate at 'elaborate conditions' that can underlie political solidarities); moods (e.g., lacking an immediate object normally operating as a filter for perception, decision and action); and moral sensibilities (e.g., compassion and forms of anger related in complex ways to moral perspectives).

Overall, this new perspective of emotion challenges traditional dichotomies by counterpoising rationalist with non-rationalist epistemologies, making the case for a more integrated and complete rationalism through exploring the interpretation of reason, passion, thought and feeling (Clarke et al., 2006). This nuanced approach to the role of emotion in everyday political and social life provides the groundwork for its testing as a causal factor in the emergence of everyday resistance in North Korea. The question posed will ask, "What role does emotion play in triggering everyday acts of resistance?".

2.3.3 Summary: Elaborating a Theoretical Framework

This component of the literature review has provided a basis for which the rich theories in the canon of literature on social movements can be tailored to individual behaviour and decision-making, for investigating a set of rival structural and ideational explanations as to their salience in understanding varieties of everyday resistance in North Korea. The explanations included in this novel framework make intuitive sense, are backed by the literature, and all have impact on the emergence of everyday resistance to some degree. However, as previously noted, some may be more reliable or consistent with their effects for particular types or across types.

Under the structural paradigm, resource mobilisation theory and political opportunity theory were selected as likely components of an overall understanding of everyday resistance in North Korea. Under the ideational paradigm, value-orientation, frames and emotions serve as three likely factors also shaping the emergence of everyday resistance.

Chapter 3: Methodology and Research Design

The review and critique of the literature, combined with the researcher's own experience and insights, has contributed to developing a framework for the design and conduct of this study. The framework developed shapes the research process, informing the methodological design and influencing the data-collection instruments to be used. The framework also becomes the repository for the data collected, providing the basis for and informing various iterations of a coding scheme. As such, this framework provides an organising structure both for reporting this study's findings and for the analysis, interpretation and synthesis of the findings. The design is articulated through the following components: (1) specification of the research problem and objective; (2) research strategy; (3) case selection; (4) establishing causality; (5) research sample and data collection; (6) data analysis and synthesis; (7) ethical considerations; (8) issues of quality; (9) trade-offs and limitations; and (10) summary and reporting the findings.

3.1 Specification of the Research Issue and Objective

The issue addressed by this research is the dearth of scholarship and public knowledge around everyday acts of resistance in North Korea. This study seeks an account of the phenomenon and its qualitative variation. The study aims for thick description through an analysis of observed patterns from a multi-source research sample, and diverse explanations are canvased to explain the emergence of discrete types of everyday resistance. George and Bennett (2005) posit a fully developed typological theory as one that accomplishes the following:

> Specifies independent variables, delineates them into the categories for which the researcher will measure the cases and their outcomes, and provides not only hypotheses on how these variables will operate individually, but also contingent generalisations on how and under what conditions they behave in specified conjunctions or configurations to produce effects on specified dependent variables (p. 235).

Ideally, types are mutually exclusive and exhaustive; that is, each case of everyday resistance fits into a type, and only one type, where types are designed to minimise within-type variation and maximise variation across types (George & Bennett, 2005). However,

this is seldom the case in reality, and as this study draws from very limited existing literature, no single empirical or exhaustive answer is sought. Instead, the present study is based on the premise that, regardless of the findings, the development of theory will provide a foundational 'building block' for further research. Through making a complex phenomenon more manageable by dividing it into 'variants', typological theories suggest causal relationships among contextual, structural and strategic factors to predict variance in an outcome (everyday resistance in the present study) of interest, therefore useful for strategic management. As Fiss (2011) suggests, they act as social scientific shorthand inviting their use for researchers and practitioners alike.

3.2 Research Strategy

Using a qualitative approach, this research strategy pursues typological theory through case study methodology to identify and distinguish key features of the research focus. According to Bloomberg and Volpe (2012):

Qualitative research is essentially grounded in a constructivist philosophical position in the sense that it is concerned with how the complexities of the sociocultural world are experienced, interpreted and understood in a particular context at a particular point in time. The intent of qualitative research is to examine a social situation or interaction by allowing the researcher to enter the world of others and attempt to achieve a holistic rather than a reductionist understanding. Qualitative methodology implies an emphasis on discovery and description, and the objectives are general focused on extracting and interpreting the meaning of experience (p. 118).

A qualitative case study approach fits with the research objectives. A case study is an intensive description and analysis of a phenomenon, social unit or system bounded by time or place (Bloomberg & Volpe 2012). As Merriam (1998) notes:

A case study design is employed to gain an in-depth understanding of the situation and meaning for those involved. The interest is in process rather than outcomes, in context rather than a specific variable, in discovery rather than confirmation. Insights gleaned from case studies can directly influence policy, practice, and future research (p. 19).

The present design adopted a within-country approach to the observation of social behaviour in North Korea based on a multi-source research sample. The data were analysed for patterns of everyday acts of resistance and coded thematically.[26] Cases were selected based on thematic categories containing discrete subclasses of events denoting everyday resistance. Within- and cross-case comparison was used to construct rich, descriptive analytical narratives and identify strong, consistent patterns. Explanations were sought about the relationships among selected independent variables - for example political opportunity, value-orientation, and emotion - and the impact, or lack thereof, on everyday resistance in North Korea.

The conceptualisation and measurement of the dependent and independent variables was informed by the literature reviewed in the preceding chapter, to address the primary research question of "What accounts for everyday resistance in North Korea?", together with two sub-questions asking, "*How* is everyday resistance exercised in North Korea?" and "*When* and *why* do particular types of everyday resistance emerge in North Korea?". To address the first sub-question, the dependent variable of everyday resistance was operationalised. To answer the second sub-question, the independent variables acting as possible explanations were operationalised.

3.2.1 Conceptualising and Measuring the Dependent Variable

The dependent variable (outcome) of interest in this study is everyday resistance. The following fundamental criteria must be met for a unit of observation (act or behaviour) to be classified as 'everyday resistance':

It is done in a regular way, potentially politically intended but typically habitual or semi-conscious; it is a practice (not a certain consciousness, intent or outcome, yet intent may aid in a better understanding of the type if evident) carried out in a non-dramatic, non-confrontational or non-recognised way, that undermines or has the potential to undermine some power relation, without revealing itself (concealing or disguising either the actor or act), or by being defined by hegemonic discourse as 'non-political' or otherwise irrelevant to resistance; it is done by individuals or small groups without formal leadership or

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[26] See Braun and Clarke (2006) "Using Thematic Analysis in Psychology".

organisation, but typically encouraged by some subcultural attitude or 'hidden transcript'; it is historically entangled with everyday power and understood as intersectional with the powers that it engages; it is heterogeneous and contingent due to changing contexts and situations (not a universal strategy or coherent form of action) (Vinthagen & Johansson, 2013).

3.2.2. Conceptualising and Measuring the Independent Variables

The independent variables were distilled from social movement theory. Absent the capacity to engage in collective action outside the state's direction, causal variables reflect individual agency. These variables all likely affect the emergence of everyday resistance, but are not the total population of potential factors.

Structural Variables

"Resource mobilisation" as an explanatory variable focuses on the availability of resources and the process in which one or more people gain significant control over resources they previously did not control (Sadowski, 1988). The five-part typology developed by McCarthy and Edwards (2004) is used as an indicator of observable resources: moral (e.g., legitimacy, solidarity support, sympathetic support, celebrity); cultural (e.g., tactical repertoires, organisational templates, technical/strategic know-how); socio-organisational (e.g., infrastructures, social networks, organisations); human (e.g., labour, experience, skills, expertise); and material (e.g., monetary, property, meeting space, equipment, supplies). This typology provides some flexibility, even in rigidly structured systems, in the way in which resources can be used or reallocated when conceptualising movement possibilities.

'Political opportunity' as an explanatory variable denotes a dimension of a political system that is most indicative of the context of political opportunity and can thus function to signal something about its receptivity to challenge. State structures create stable opportunities, whereas changing opportunities within states provide the openings that resource-poor people can use to act (Tarrow, 2011). Changes in levels of political, social and economic pluralism will indicate 'state strength' and 'regime repressiveness'.

Ideational Variables

'Value orientation' is related to the value-oriented tradition of inquiry in social movement studies. The indicators for value-oriented explanations are as follows:

(1) The valuation of incentives according to one's identity; that is, identity affects the way one understands the world, and therefore the material and social incentives for a particular action will take on different values according to one's identity. Thus, action still flows from material or social incentives, but identity effects the valuation of incentives.

(2) Belligerence and conflict with the 'other' - the central causal process in behaviour deriving from in-group and out-group differentiation. Action is conditioned by a reaction to those who are different, (e.g. we are peace loving, you are not)—"anything goes in dealing with your disposition that threatens us".

(3) The role and logic of appropriateness action is driven by rules of appropriate or exemplary behaviour organised into institutions. The central causal process in behaviour is the performance of roles that are more or less consistent with role expectations flowing from the actor's identity—the logic of appropriateness is the decision to perform a role and not in a decision to choose between optimising paths to some preferred outcome (Abdelal, Herrera, Johnston & Martin, 2001, p. 8; March & Olsen, 1995, pp. 30-31).

'Framing tasks and processes' will focus on the individual-level effects of frames on subsequent behaviour or attitudes. The three framing tasks are diagnostic (the identification of a problem and assignment of blame), prognostic (the suggestion of solutions, strategies and tactics to a problem) and motivational (a call to arms or rationale for action). These processes may be discursive, strategic or contested. The resonance of these in producing action occurs through four types of frame alignment: frame bridging (linking of two or more ideologically congruent but structurally unconnected frames regarding a particular problem or issue), frame amplification (clarification and invigoration of an interpretive frame that bears on a particular issue, problem, or set of events), frame extension (extending the boundaries of a frame to include or encompass the views, interests or sentiments of targeted individuals or groups) and frame transformation (attempt to alter the status of people or change of world-views, conversions of thought or uprooting of

everything familiar). In addition, these framing processes may be identified through the way individuals evoke one frame or set of meanings rather than another to communicate a message, thereby indicating how the message is to be understood.

A central variable in the social psychology school of the ideational paradigm is 'emotion', representing psychic structures that constrain and enable action by channelling flows and investments of energy. These include urges (urgent bodily needs that crowd out other feelings and attention until they are satisfied: lust, hunger, substance additions, exhaustion or pain), reflex emotions (fairly quick, automatic responses to events and information, often taken as the paradigm for all emotions: anger, fear, joy, surprise, shock and disgust), moods (energising or de-energising feelings that persist across settings and do not normally take direct objects; they can be changed by reflex emotions, as during interactions), affective commitments (relatively stable feelings, positive or negative, about others or about objects, such as love and hate, liking and disliking, trust or mistrust, respect or contempt), and moral emotions (including of one's own self and actions, based on moral intuitions or principle, such as shame, guilt, pride, indignation, outrage and compassion) (Jasper, 2014).

3.3 Case Selection

The primary criterion for case selection was related to the research objective of developing typological theory. As the primary units of analysis were instances of social behaviour that acquired the measures of everyday resistance as outlined in the preceding section, the selection of cases was based on a diverse sample of the behaviour as conducted by individuals. Selecting the cases with some preliminary knowledge allowed for a stronger research design as the researcher gradually reduced the range of social behaviour to satisfy the study's operational measures.

The next task was to deduce from this assortment three cases based on the following criteria: (1) variation of the dependent variable in that a range of everyday resistance is selected to capture the broadest range of qualitative disparities, for example, a case likely to be highly conducive to structural effects (reflexive), one likely to be highly conducive to ideational effects (discursive), and one likely to be somewhere in between (biopolitical), to counteract as far as possible the selection bias problems associated with choosing cases

based on the dependent variable. Moreover, while aiming for diversity across the spectrum of cases, the class of phenomena within the cases (e.g., gossip, rumour and oral culture within the case of discursive resistance) required a high degree of internal homogeneity, as to not affect tests of causality relating to the overall case; (2) ease of measurement, in that there is enough data to observe patterns within the case; and (3) fit of these variants of everyday resistance with the spatio-temporal context, that is, within the physical borders of the North Korean state from 2003 at the earliest. However, causal variables underpinning the resistance may stem from outside these parameters.

Based on the selection procedures, no broad qualitative type of everyday resistance was omitted among the total population and cases of 'reflexive', 'discursive', and 'biopolitical' everyday resistance were justified as warranting further exploration. Thus, a tripartite classification of cases of everyday resistance acted as the study's hypothesis of categories spanning the diversity of the phenomena in North Korea.

Everyday reflexive resistance: Qualitatively similar to Scott's (1990) variation of everyday resistance that undermines the state's material domination in terms of its capacity to control the appropriation of human and physical resources. It eludes spatial and temporal control over one's movement and labour, in a socio-economic context. Coined 'reflexive', it suggests individual decision-making instrumentally oriented toward material incentives outside the scope of those offered by the state and restricted by its spatial and temporal controls. The researcher hypothesised it as a most likely caused by structural variables.

Everyday discursive resistance: Qualitatively similar to Scott's (1990s) variation of everyday resistance grounded in the notion of hidden transcripts that lie in linguistic and symbolic acts of individuals. Laced with anti-regime semantics, this variety is coined 'discursive'. It suggests a mixture of spontaneous, but likely careful, and intentional linguistic and symbolic practices outside the hierarchal state discourses that present a dissenting message. The researcher hypothesised it as mostly likely cause by ideational variables.

Everyday biopolitical resistance: While reflective of Scott's (1990) variation of everyday resistance to ideological domination, it derives primarily from Foucault's genealogy of power and its evolution into a biopolitics that deals with the population as a political problem, as a problem both scientific and political. In this constant warlike struggle between the 'healthy' and 'unhealthy' elements of the population, North Korean biopolitics diagnoses enemies of the state as the criminal and political adversaries who deviate from the immanence of ideology in everyday life, thus threatening the rest of the population. According to Foucault (2003), "This is not, then, a military, warlike or political relationship, but a biological relationship. And the reason this mechanism can come into play is that the enemies who have to be done away with are not adversaries in the political sense of the term; they are threats, either external or internal, to the population and for the population" (pp. 255-256). Encompassing a social reality more typical of everyday life in North Korea than blatant subculture, this pattern is indicative of an everyday resistance that undermines the regime's politicisation of life and idea. Coined 'biopolitical', its qualitative expression is demonstrative of those acts spanning self-affirmative and self-detrimental realms from alternative sartorial trends to suicide (the regime frames suicide as politically traitorous). The research hypothesised it to be caused rather consistently by a mixed bag of structural and ideational variables.

Hence, the central argument of this study is built around a selective but diverse range of social behaviour that was hypothesised to account for a tripartite classification of everyday resistance in North Korea. It is supported by rich descriptions drawn from analyses of observed patterns in the data and supplemented by a process-tracing method that pursues causal links between structural and ideational conditions and the three cases of everyday resistance respectively.

3.4 Establishing Causal Links

Here, it is important to contrast typologies and typological theories. Typologies characterise variants of a phenomenon, as opposed to typological theory that seeks to identify causal mechanisms and pathways that link the dependent variable (in this case, of each type) in typology to a typological theory (George & Bennett, 2005). Hence, to

progress from a typology to a typological theory, the multidimensional variable of everyday resistance was situated in a theoretical framework comprising the independent variables that act as probable causal factors contributing to the emergence of the three variations of resistance. Likely all 'necessary' but not independently 'sufficient', these explanatory variables made intuitive sense in that they would all matter to some degree. However, some were expected to be more consistent and reliable in their effects across cases.

Combining within-case and cross-case analysis through process-tracing helps one understand not only why but how certain outcomes occurred. In situations where more than one explanation seems to fit correlative patterns and researchers are unable to ascertain which is most important, process-tracing offers an additional means of eliminating and scoring the relevance of variables, leaving scholars with a more parsimonious answer. Significant and well suited for this dissertation, causal process observations provide 'thick' detailed descriptions of the specific cases under investigation, having the additional benefit of enabling researchers to push forward with new questions in light of richer information, elevating the potential for new theory development.

Hence, to establish causal links between the variables, the theoretical framework illustrated below reflects what George and Bennett (2005) refer to as a straightforward method of structured, focused comparison. This framework guided the second component of each empirical chapter in pursuit of testing each of the five variables in a consistent manner by referring to a set of standardised questions reflective of the research objective and theoretical focus of the inquiry, enhancing the acquisition of comparable data from cross-case comparisons. This allows for the avoidance of the pitfall that, even in intensive single case studies, when such cases were instances of a class of events, they are were not performed in a comparable manner and therefore did not contribute to an orderly, cumulative knowledge and theory about the phenomenon in question.

3.4.1 Structural Variables

(1) "The availability of a variety of resources to actors with the primitive capability of mobilising them affecting everyday resistance" (resource mobilisation theory);

To what extent does a variety of resources (moral, cultural, socio-organisational, human, material) with at least a primitive capacity to mobilise them affect this variety of everyday resistance?

(2) "The exogenous conditions such as 'state strength' and 'regime repressiveness' that at a particular time facilitate favourable conditions for everyday resistance" (political opportunity theory);

To what extent do opportunity structures ('state strength', 'regime repressiveness') account for the emergence of this variation of everyday resistance?

3.4.2 Ideational Variables

(1) "Shifting value-orientations and their effect on the emergence of everyday resistance" (collective identity theory/NSM theories);

To what extent does value-orientation (valuation of incentives according to one's identity, belligerence and conflict with the 'other', the role and logic of appropriateness) account for the emergence of this variety of everyday resistance?

(2) "Shifting perceptions as to issues of legitimacy and social justice that trigger everyday resistance" (framing theory);

What impact do framing tasks (diagnostic, prognostic, motivational) and processes (bridging, amplification, extension, transformation) have on this variety of everyday resistance?

(3) "The interplay of emotions and its impact on everyday resistance" (social psychology theory).

What role does emotion (urges, reflex emotions, affects, moods, moral emotions) play in triggering everyday acts of resistance?

Again, some of the variables may be 'necessary' but not 'sufficient' to ensure particular outcomes (types of everyday resistance), forming a partial answer dependent upon other supplementary factors not tested in the present study. The researcher adopted a strong assumption that conjunctural causal patterns would emerge, where certain effects would be produced under multiple conditions. While the strength of this dissertation's nominal measurements (in descriptive richness of *how* everyday resistance is exercised), ordinal measurements (low, moderate, high) shedding light on the theoretical merit of possible causal factors is a more modest endeavour aimed at suggesting further directions for exploring causality of types of everyday resistance. At least starting somewhere, this study follows the advice of Collier, Brady and Seawright (2010) that "identifying, assessing, and eliminating rival explanations is a key to reaching probabilistic claims in research" (p. 161).

Figure 1: Research Design and Analysis Scheme

3.5 Research Sample and Data Collection Methods

The empirical core of this research consists of four types of data collected between May 2015 and May 2018: *documentary* (official North Korean media, cultural productions, rhetoric and literature); *digital testimony* (defector statements available through NGO archives and reputable defector-run news agencies working with sources inside North Korea); *archival* (by governments, NGOs and other international organisations not based primarily on defector testimony); and *personal interviews* (four with defectors and six with experienced NGO employees) to supplement the three aforementioned types. These data were collected using purposive and snowball sampling and triangulated to enhance the quality of this study. The following is an elaboration of these data sources.

Documentary data. The bulk of the data emanating from official North Korean media were retrieved from digital outlets such as KCNA (internet outlet for North Korea's sole news agency), Rodong Sinmun (official newspaper of the Central Committee of the Workers' Party of Korea), Korea Friendship Association (government-run organisation promoting North Korea around the word and an outlet for collected works of North Korean literature, speeches, and so forth), The Pyongyang Times (North Korea's only English language newspaper), and Voice of Korea (North Korea's international shortwave radio broadcaster, consisting mainly of propaganda through audio clips). Moreover, the total control of publishing by the government implies that all of these publications convey an official line of some sort and therefore these data have helped provide state perspectives over time on various aspects on history, culture, politics, society, and economics. For instance, concerns pertaining to the rise of unorthodox views by the authorities may be expressed through language such as, "reactionary people are detrimental elements of socialist society..."

Digital testimony. The second type of data were drawn from defector testimony available digitally through agencies, often defector-run, such as Daily NK, The Committee for Human Rights in North Korea (HRNK), Citizens' Alliance for North Korean Human Rights (NKHR), New Focus International, Database Centre for North Korean Human

Rights (NKDB), People for Successful Corean Unification (PScore) , NKIS (North Korea Intellectuals Solidarity), Rimjin-gang, Network for North Korean Democracy and Human Rights (NKNET), and so forth. While given a mediated or biased voice historically, the 'self-organisation' of North Koreans in Seoul and publication of unmediated blogs and writings by North Koreans are offering far more useful insights into the nuances of North Korean politics than have been seen before in the public arena (Smith, 2015).

Archival. The third type of data was archival. They included human rights reports, NGO and international organisation reports and government accounts, for example, Food and Agriculture Organisation of the United Nations (FAO), United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), World Health Organisation (WHO), Intermedia, (KINU), (EU), (IFRC), (SDC) and Caritas Internationalis sources among others. Smith (2015) argues the utility of these accounts by praising diplomats and officials that provide a sub-genre of their own, noting the surprising absence of crude partisanship in their work, and an ability to provide valuable empirical insights into daily life in North Korea.

Personal interviews. The personally conducted interviews were anticipated to each run around 45 minutes, but for the most part ran from 1 to 1 ½ hours. The sample consisted of four defectors and six NGO workers with significant, on-going experience working with a diverse range of North Koreans. All but one interview (Skype video chat) took place in person. Interviews took place in Australia (Sydney), New Zealand (N/A), South Korea (Seoul), Thailand (Bangkok), and the United States (New York City, Washington, D.C.). The NGO workers conceded upfront that many stories can be sensationalised and stories must often be confirmed by consistency. In this manner, they were able to provide a natural filter to accounts that were more than likely false or overstated, and able to offer their professional opinion on accuracy, retelling many useful stories of everyday resistance in the state. Insights gleaned from these interviews were used to supplement the other three types of data.

Thematic coding was used to store data digitally and interview transcripts and researcher notes were only accessible by hard copies. In addition, a genuine concern for

participants, given the highly sensitive nature of political issues in North Korea, precludes the identification of individuals by name or organisation. Instead, participants are referred to by their location and year of interview (e.g., interviewee, Seoul, 2017). The notation DT following a quote indicates 'digital testimony', as in the second data type, while PT indicates 'participant testimony' and DD denotes 'documentary data'.

The limitation in demographic information provided is the result of the ethics committee and researcher agreeing that certain participant details should be excluded. Due to the relatively small community of defectors and NGOs run by/working with defectors, especially outside of South Korea, demographic details were unable to be included on a per participant basis. The researcher can reveal that, of the defectors interviewed, two were female and two were male. In addition, they all left North Korea sometime after 2012 and have remained outside since. Of the NGO employees interviewed, none of them were defectors.

Table 3: Participant Key

Participant	Category	Date	Locale
Participant 1	Defector	2017	Seoul, ROK
Participant 2	Defector	2017	Seoul, ROK
Participant 3	Defector	2017	Sydney, Australia
Participant 4	Defector	2018	N/A, New Zealand
Participant 5	NGO employee	2017	Bangkok, Thailand
Participant 6	NGO employee	2017	Washington, D.C., USA
Participant 7	NGO employee	2017	Washington, D.C., USA
Participant 8	NGO employee	2017	New York, N.Y., USA
Participant 9	NGO employee	2017	Seoul, ROK
Participant 10	NGO employee	2017	Seoul, ROK

3.6 Data Analysis and Synthesis Methods

Data analysis was based on within-case analysis and cross-case comparison. The within-case analyses are delineated into three chapters devoted to each case respectively. Each case study presents a range of data that is measured and presented as a discrete variety of everyday resistance. The second component of the empirical chapters tests a consistent set of possible explanatory variables distilled from the structural and ideational paradigms of social movement theory to explain each particular variety of everyday resistance. A secondary analytical component is the cross-case comparison in the conclusion chapter that further elaborates an overall 'building block' for typological theory on everyday resistance in North Korea. The following is a more in-depth outline of the methodological steps involved in the analytical pursuit of theory development.

(1) A comprehensive analysis of the relevant literature was conducted where the researcher's experiential knowledge, personal theories and thematic analysis deriving from the analysis led to the inductive extraction of three varieties of everyday resistance to measure against the data, as an implicit three-part classification for further development.

(2) After the collection and categorisation of the data described in the preceding section, interpretive analysis was undertaken to identify consistent indicators of everyday resistance as operationalised in this chapter.

(3) Fitting these operational parameters and following the case selection procedures, the three varieties of everyday resistance (reflexive, discursive, biopolitical) were thematically analysed and data were coded according to the qualitative discreteness in *how* each variety of resistance was demonstrated. Thematic analysis is a foundational method for identifying, analysing and reporting themes apparent within qualitative data and identifying patterns amongst those themes. It involves exploring the data for themes and then assessing both the consistency with which those themes occur in the data and the extent to which a particular item of data can be viewed as belonging to already identified thematic categories (content

analysis). The diverse themes identified are analysed to ascertain the way they link together.

(4) The data categorised within each coded variety of everyday resistance were further deduced to enhance internal homogeneity of particular patterns of social behaviour within their parameters.

(5) The within-case analyses were conducted, aided by discourse analysis, providing thick descriptions of 'how each particular variety of resistance is exercised in North Korea'. The discourse analysis involved a semantic analysis of conversation and text to identify both the overt and underlying meanings of the speaker or writer (as presented in Sections 4.2, 5.2 and 6.2 respectively).

(6) Each type of everyday resistance was situated in the theoretical framework of structural and ideational social movement variables, to be tested consistently through process-tracing across types to provide causal inferences as to their respective impact on each differentiated outcome (type) of everyday resistance[27] (presented in Sections 4.3, 5.3 and 6.3 respectively).

(7) The findings were aggregated into separate analytical themes to 'account for each variety of everyday resistance in North Korea' pertaining to how each is exercised and what causes its emergence, leading to a theory for each variation (presented in Sections 4.4, 5.4 and 6.4 respectively).

(8) A cross-case comparison was conducted to evaluate the explanatory power of the constituent set of structural and ideational theories, to determine which were more or less reliable in their effects across cases. This enhances the theoretical value of a typological theory that, in contrast to a general explanatory theory of a given phenomenon, provides a rich and differentiated depiction of phenomenon, thus capable of generating discriminating

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[27] See Sinkovics, N (2018) 'Pattern Matching in Qualitative Analysis' for further elaboration on this technique.

and contingent explanations and policy recommendations (George & Bennett, 2005). Here, this was a modest endeavour to provide potential causal paths for future research. (This analysis is presented in part as a synthesis of the findings in Section 7.2.2).

3.7 Ethical Considerations

As required by the University of Auckland Human Participants Ethics Committee (UAHPEC), approval for research with human participants was required. The ethics approval number for the present study is **017669**.

While dealing with human participants, the researcher considered potentially sensitive questioning, preparation for variance in responses to interview questions, informed consent, right to withdrawal, anonymity and confidentiality, language, and data storage, retention and destruction. Participants' reactions to questions were highly individualised and the researcher was aware that some questions might cause unease. Any strong emotion expressed by participants during the interview would result in the offer to terminate the interview or to resume the interview at another time. Sensitive interviews in earlier research were watched online to prepare for such issues. In addition to watching model interviews, the researcher had prior experience discussing sensitive issues through focus groups in South African communities. The researcher had also been immersed in the academic literature that used the method of interviewing defectors. This background provided a heightened sense of awareness to the researcher for this process. In particular, asking questions in an objective, not subjective, manner allows for more comfort discussing sensitive issues. The researcher's agnostic[28] approach also helped build a rapport of trust with the participants (e.g., understanding, but neutral body language).

Participants were fully informed of the methods and procedures of the research. They were able to obtain all the relevant information pertaining to the research by reading the Participant Information Sheet (PIS) (**see Appendix III**) and Consent Form (CF) (**see Appendix IV**) given to each person at the point of recruitment. Participants signed the CF if they agreed with all conditions in the document. Participants were also given the opportunity to withdraw from participation any time during data collection or to withdraw

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[28] This refers to a 'non-partisan' or 'non-judgmental approach in which the researcher did not portray any normative or subjective bias towards issues.

their data within one month following their interview. All participants agreed and signed the CF and no participants requested to withdraw their data. All identifying participant information has been kept confidential; that is, no identifying information about the participant is contained in any publications or presentations by the researcher, and participants' names have been replaced with pseudonyms or codenames in printed transcripts. The data collected is only accessible to the researcher and the researcher's supervisors. Consent forms have been stored separately from the data. Participants' employers were also required to give consent for the participant to participate in in the research. The employer sent the recruitment advertisement and PIS to the potential participant without the researcher directly contacting the potential participant. Employers were not informed as to whether an employee opted for participation or non-participation; rather, the researcher kept that information confidential and allowed the participant to independently decide whether to notify the employer regarding their participation or non-participation. By relaying the advertisement and PIS to the potential participant, the employer had already considered that the potential participant would confidentially decide on participation by contacting the researcher if they chose.

A semi-structured interview topic guide was constructed and the interview questions were based on the present study's research questions (**see Appendix V**). As with the majority of interview research, complementary questions were asked to further explore participants' answers. Additional questions were included as topics of relevance emerged from the interview. Each interview was conducted in English. The researcher was granted permission to take written notes (optional) with oral and written consent by each participant. All the collected data is used for the researcher's PhD thesis and future academic publications arising from this project. All the collected data in digital formats were stored into password protected computer files all non-digital data were securely stored in a locked cabinet at the University of Auckland when not in use. After six years the computer files will be deleted and all hard copies of the collected data will be destroyed using a secure disposal service.

3.8 Issues of Quality

The criterion of *credibility* (internal validity) tests whether the findings are accurate and credible from the standpoint of the researcher, participants and readers, determining how well matched the logic of the method is to the kind of research questions posed and explanations the researcher is attempting to develop. Similar to methodological validity, credibility refers to the quality and rigour with which the researcher interprets and analyses data in relation to the research design (Volpe & Bloomberg, 2012). To enhance the methodological validity of this study, the researcher triangulated data sources to permit contrast of information across sources. Enhancing the interpretive validity involved the researcher clarifying assumptions at the onset of the study, keeping a journal through which interpretations were made. In addition, various possible understandings of the phenomenon were sought in previous scholarship to challenge the researcher's interpretations.

Dependability (reliability) relates to the extent that research findings are consistent across sources and time. To this end, the rationale and decisions made during the research process were chronicled in a journal by the research, and data analysis explored commonalities and differences in the data across sources.

Confirmability (objectivity) corresponds to the notion of objectivity in quantitative research with an implication that findings are a result of the research rather than an outcome of bias and subjectivity of the researcher (Volpe & Bloomberg, 2008). A record of reflexive thinking was chronicled in journals by the researcher.

The issue of *transferability (*external validity*)* is particularly relevant to this study as it entails the determination of the researcher as to whether and to what extent the phenomenon of everyday resistance in the North Korean context can transfer to another context. For instance, Patton (1990) promotes thinking of "context-bound extrapolations" (p. 491), which he defines as "speculations on the likely applicability of findings to other situations under similar, but not identical conditions" (p. 489). Although generalisability was not a primary objective of this study, rich contingent generalisations aim to provide some basis for this qualitative study's claim to relevance in some broader context. In particular, the research compared the present study's findings with previous findings of similar social phenomena in other non-democratic contexts and found some degree of comparability.

3.9 Trade-Offs and Limitations

This study encountered certain limiting conditions. Some were related to the common critiques of qualitative research methodology in general and some resulted from this study's research design. Careful thought was given concerning ways to account for these and minimise their impact. With respect to this, trade-offs among goals pursued by the researcher arose with respect to seeking valid descriptive and causal inferences about the phenomena, refining theory to gain leverage in establishing what is important, and strengthening those descriptive and causal inferences (Collier, Brady & Seawright, 2004).[29]

Researcher bias. Qualitative studies are limited by researcher bias/subjectivity as analysis ultimately succumbs to the framing of assumptions, interests, perceptions and needs. Reflective journaling was used to trace the researcher's thoughts in order to mitigate this problem, serving as a check against normative bias. As noted relating to internal credibility, previous scholarship was sought to challenge the researcher's interpretations.

Indeterminacy: Related to the statistical problem of 'undetermination', this issue concerns the potential inability to discriminate between competing explanations on the basis of the evidence. As George and Bennett (2005) argue, the focus on case studies' supposed 'degree of freedom problem' is misguided and has diverted attention away from the fundamental problem of indeterminacy that affects all research methods. This situation renders evidence from a case or database potentially equally consistent with a large or potentially infinite number of alternative theories. Hence, the present study used a pragmatic approach that limited the testing of alternative theories to a set of possible causal variables from existing social movement theories rather than canvassing less evidently relevant potential theories that lack many proponents. While many studies attempt to avoid bias by including all relevant independent variables in the analysis, the present study sought inferential leverage by limiting the number.

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[29] To clarify, these trade-offs represent methodological affinities, not invariant laws.

Representativeness: The selection of diverse cases is arguably the best method to defend against the representativeness problem argued against qualitative research (Gerring, 2006).[30] The selection of diverse cases allowed for a close focus on theoretically relevant comparisons, not entirely sacrificing parsimony (and broad applicability) of theory but primarily concentrating on developing cumulatively contingent generalisations to well-defined types of cases with a degree of explanatory richness.

Generalisation: Not necessarily a limitation, a trade-off must be made in terms of the *scope conditions* of generalisability. The present study does not seek to generalise the findings or claim to have uncovered all causal paths. As this is the first study of its kind, it focuses on the more achievable objective of uncovering rich qualitative variation representing previously undocumented paths. Moreover, the conditions (structural and ideational) under which the specified outcomes (varieties of everyday resistance) occur are of interest as opposed to uncovering frequency with which those conditions and their outcomes arise.

Causal conclusions: In the present study, inferences of causal 'necessity'[31] or 'sufficiency'[32] (as to the effects of the causal variables on types of everyday resistance) in particular cases are set aside for a more defensible claim that the presence of a variable 'favours' an outcome. As the variables in this study were all contributing causes of the outcomes to some extent, an ordinal scale was adopted for cross-case comparisons that inferred possible causal relevance (low, moderate, high) of the variables contributing to everyday resistance. As noted, case studies can only make tentative conclusions on how much gradation of a particular causal variable affects the outcome in a particular case or

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[30] To the extent that there is a representativeness problem or a selection bias problem in a particular case study, it is often better described as the problem of 'overgeneralising' findings to types or subclasses of cases unlike those actually studied.

[31] 'Necessity' is separate from how much it contributed to magnitude of outcome. One 'last straw' may be necessary to break a camel's back, but it does not contribute as much to the outcome as the bales of straw that preceded it.

[32] There are three claims of necessity or sufficiency. The most general would be that a single variable is necessary or sufficient for an outcome with respect to an entire population of cases (rare). Second, a variable was either necessary of sufficient in a particular historical context or case for a specified historical outcome to have occurred (only counterfactual testing, no guarantee). Third and most useful concerns the relationship of a variable to conjunctions of variables that are themselves necessary and/or sufficient for an outcome (George & Bennett, 2005).

how much they 'generally' contribute to the outcome in types of cases. This was done in the present study to suggest theoretical merit of the causal variables in order to advise future research and development of the typological theory.

Demographic overrepresentation (see Appendices I and II): The research sample contains demographic overrepresentation (from the northern provinces of Ryanggang and North Hamgyong). Purposive selection of testimony based on a diverse demographic was pursued as best possible. To further correct this issue, data from reliable defector-run news outlets utilising sources within North Korea and experienced NGO employees who were able to act as a filter pertaining to which stories were more consistent and in what geographical region were used. As one interviewee noted, "The notion of bias and hyperbole in defector recollection is certainly adequate, but people who work with a large sample of defectors are offered a wider set of demographic information and through years of experience, take each account with a grain of salt until consistency emerges" (Participant 6, 2017). Moreover, Joo (2014) notes that the issue of misrepresentation, that 'having voted with their feet' may create biased samples from defectors, would face a similar problem in a post-totalitarian North Korea likely to be affected by anti-regime bandwagoning. The best strategy is to make cautious interpretations and avoid under-interpretation or over-interpretation. These procedures and samples remain the best source for examining North Korean society from below as no existing alternatives are available and remarkable consistency given thousands of testimonies spanning demographic variation is reported by many.

Data limitations: Critically engaging with data is crucial, especially when interacting with North Korean defectors and those reporting on North Korea. When and why one might choose to study something of this nature given the inherent challenges of data reliability required serious reflection by the researcher. A trade-off was made determining that such studies should not be avoided because all of the data cannot be trusted, as there is nevertheless merit in its use for attempting to understand resistance better. Moreover, it is inherently problematic to regard the evidence collected as "data" for a research project focusing on the complexities of human social experience in a setting where one cannot

possibly control for all relevant factors. North Korea is not a laboratory and defectors are not protons that can be manipulated in a controlled environment to observe how they operate. Social science has obvious limitations and the "science" label applies to this project in a loose sense. Using terms like "data" makes sense as shorthand, if that's one's training, but cannot be used uncritically.

Number of interviews: The intention of the research was not to create a "complete dataset". Rather, as an ethnographer conducting research in the interpretive tradition, the researcher was led to discover things, which is not dependent on achieving a specific threshold of interviews (data points). The number of interviews brought the researcher to a saturation point—learning new things was no longer occurring and the researcher judged that more interviews would not lead to more novel results, managing priorities and resources properly. The primary and secondary evidence collected was more than sufficient to develop the model created of the individual through which various frames or other factors are filtered, resulting in a typology of everyday resistance and its contributors. It is not a statistical project, and the ability to make inferences does not rely on statistical significance, as the main value of his study lies in its theoretical muscularity.

Language: As the interviews were conducted in English, a potential limitation arises concerning those interviewees who were not native English speakers. However, of the *ten* total interviewees only *five* were using English as their second language, all native speakers of Korean. Those using English as their second language were fluent, asked to check the researcher's written transcripts for clarification, and situated in a comfortable environment of their choosing.

3.10 Summary and Reporting the Findings

This chapter has presented the research design and methodology of the present study in accordance with the objective of building typological theory. It conceptualised and provided operational measures used to identify the dependent variable (everyday resistance) and independent variables (causal explanations from social movement theory). It outlined a case selection procedure based on maximising the variation of the dependent variable, ease

of measurement and spatio-temporal requirements, resulting in the selection of reflexive, discursive and biopolitical types of everyday resistance for within-case and cross-case analysis. Issues of causality were presented alongside a theoretical framework before transitioning to an elaboration of the triangulated research sample (documentary data, digital testimony, archival data, personal interviews) and recruitment methods (purposive, snowball). Steps in the data analysis and synthesis phase of this research were then set out and followed by ethical concerns, issues of quality and research trade-offs and limitations.

For the remainder of the dissertation, the reporting of findings is facilitated by a side-by-side approach in which each case is presented as a single analytical chapter that expounds a range of data reflecting an answer to the first sub-question posed, "How is (reflexive/discursive/biopolitical) everyday resistance exercised in North Korea?". Subsequently, each chapter tests the explanatory power of each theoretical variable to answer the question, "*When* and *why* do particular types (reflexive/discursive/biopolitical) of everyday resistance emerge in North Korea?". These findings are further synthesised in the conclusion chapter, with a summary of the within-case analyses, and through a cross-case comparison that illustrates the particular theoretical value of the independent variables across cases, enhancing the overall typological theory that provides a final answer to the central research question of, "What accounts for everyday resistance in North Korea?". The conclusion chapter closes by delineating the implications of this dissertation and recommending future research and policy directions.

The selection of quotes was based on common statements as opposed to extreme/sensational ones. As noted in the limitations section, the selection of speakers contains a small degree of overrepresentation from Ryanggang and North Hamggyong provinces. To preserve the integrity of the data, digital testimony is retained in its original form. These may contain incorrect spelling or grammar or discrepancies in styles of romanising the Korean language. Moreover, varying degrees of demographic information included in the digital testimony have been used to the extent possible. Quotes from the research participants are given verbatim, including the speaker's grammar. As noted, those non-native speakers were generally fluent. Repetitions and hesitations ('um'. 'ah') have been omitted where doing so does not alter the meaning, following usual practice in qualitative research.

Chapter 4: Reflexive Resistance

4.1 Introduction

A defining characteristic of totalitarianism is that political, economic and social pluralism is non-existent in the polity and its pre-existing sources have been uprooted or systematically repressed. Moreover, under state socialism, all the vital decisions about commodity prices, the prices of agricultural inputs, credit, cropping patterns and—under collectivisation—the working day and wage are direct matters of state policy (Linz & Stepan, 1996). In the words of Scott (1989), "Conflicts that may have been seen as private-sector matters, with the state not directly implicated, become, under state socialism, direct clashes with the state" (p. 44). Although systematically repressed, a primitive marketisation with grassroots origins has developed in North Korea. Nevertheless, commercial activity operates under the auspices of totalitarian structural and ideational features in which socioeconomic practices are inhibited in an arbitrary and exemplary manner according to the regime's discretion and interests at the time. As such, the legality and illegality of these practices remain hazy and likely to be suppressed when a certain threshold is crossed that is deemed threatening to the state.

Labelled by the researcher as the 'reflexive' variety of everyday resistance, these instances are centred on practices that mitigate, circumvent or undermine the regime's systematic forms of appropriation and claims lodged in its rent-seeking through an extraction of resources from ordinary North Koreans. The aim of this chapter is to clarify the qualitative variation of such instances in North Korea and explore the causal significance of a set of rival variables pertaining to the emergence of this variant of everyday resistance. Accordingly, the first section of the chapter begins with an overview of the key literature by elaborating Scott's theory of everyday resistance and fusing it with a range of empirical data supporting the salience of a 'reflexive' manifestation of the phenomenon in North Korea. The second component of the chapter tests a set of variables distilled from the structural and ideational paradigms of social movement theory to elicit causal factors underpinning a 'reflexive' variation of every resistance in the state. Lastly, a concluding reflection will postulate a theory on the operation of this variant in North Korea.

4.2 The Reflexive Variety of Resistance in North Korea

Scott (1990) accords circumspect actions taken by subordinates that harm interests of the elite class or advance those of the individual member of a subordinate group with the label *infrapolitics*. Providing much of the cultural and structural roots of the more visible political action normally of scholarly focus, these acts centre on the material struggle of both sides that probes for weaknesses and exploitation of small advantages respectively. Not only a clash of ideas about the dignity and right to rule, relations between elite and subordinates are a process firmly anchored in material practices. Essentially every instance of personal domination is intimately connected with a process of appropriation, where elites extract material taxes in the form of labour, grain, cash and services, in addition to the extraction of symbolic taxes in the form of deference, posture, demeanour, verbal formulas, and acts of humility. In essence, he suggests that everyday public acts of appropriation are coupled with rituals of subordination. The bond between domination and appropriation is indicative of the inability to separate the ideas and symbolism of subordination from a process of material exploitation. Hence, it is impossible to separate disguised symbolic resistance to ideas of domination from practical struggles to thwart or mitigate exploitation. Scott suggests that "Resistance, like domination, fights a war on two fronts … the hidden transcript is not just behind-the-scenes griping and grumbling; it is enacted in a host of down-to-earth, low-profile stratagems designed to minimise appropriation" (p. 188).

Against the backdrop of Scott's theory on everyday resistance, these low-profile material stratagems constitute the basis for the qualitative variation of everyday reflexive resistance that undermines the Kim regime's systematic forms of appropriation. Essentially, this chapter explores these practices, posed against the regime's hierarchy of appropriation through control and allotment of resources in everyday life. Hence, the following section begins with an exploration of elementary varieties of everyday reflexive resistance in North Korea and an examination of more complex patterns. The chapter then shifts to testing the causal significance of rival explanatory variables underpinning its emergence.

Elementary Forms of Reflexive Resistance: Evasion and Theft

Scott (1989) notes that everyday forms of resistance are an integral part of the small

arsenal of relatively powerless groups that includes such acts as "foot-dragging, dissimulations, false compliance, feigned ignorance, desertion, pilfering, smuggling, poaching, arson, slander, sabotage, surreptitious assault and murder, anonymous threats and so on" (p. 34). In essence, he argues that these practices affect the disposition of scarce resources among elite and subordinate classes. A representation of such elementary patterns of everyday reflexive resistance in the North Korean context can be exemplified by evasion and theft. *Evasion* in North Korea is antithetical to a distinguishing characteristic of totalitarian regimes that maintains the imperative aim of mobilisation. According to Linz (2000), in totalitarian systems, "Citizen participation in and active mobilisation for political and collective social tasks are encouraged, demanded, rewarded and channelled through a single party and many monopolistic secondary groups. Passive obedience and apathy, retreat into the role of 'parochials' and 'subjects,' characteristic of many authoritarian regimes, are considered undesirable by the rulers" (p. 70). A long-standing feature of everyday life in North Korea, avoiding such mobilisation puts one at odds with the state's capacity to spatially and temporally mobilise subjects for a particular purpose at a given time. Moreover, the long-term stability of the regime, resting in the Party's capacity to penetrate society through presence in many institutional realms, renders the system with efficient capacity to mobilise individuals on a voluntary or pseudo-voluntary basis, rather than only through material incentives and awards. This approach normally allows the regime to carry out important changes with limited resources to serve as instruments for certain types of economic and social development (Linz, 2000).

In North Korea, a citizen experiences constant mass mobilisations every year, leaving them unable to earn money during this time. The WPK rigorously monitors and enforces this participation, using it as a measurement of loyalty to the Party. If one does not participate, they must attend ideological self-criticism, potentially escalated to further political penalties. From the age of six, North Koreans are required to participate in various organisations.[33] As independent assemblies, associations and other social organisations are prohibited, these organisations are all state-controlled and mandated. They are able to

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[33] These include kindergarten, Chosun Sonyeondan (North Korean Boy Scouts), various educational institutions, Kim Il-sung Socialist Youth League, Chosun General Federation of Trade Union, Chosun Agricultural Worker's Union, Chosun Democratic Women's Union, Korean Worker's Party, and others (White Paper, 2015, p. 253).

facilitate mobilisation that may then vary according to *political*, *labour* and *material* purposes. *Political mobilization* reflects government-sponsored rallies, political study sessions, self-criticism, ideological sessions, and so forth. This happens according to the annual calendar, including the births and deaths of the Kim family, days such as New Year, public holidays, the founding of the Party, and anniversaries of other events. Each people's unit (inminban) practices slogans and songs with other members of the group prior to events (Jang, 2013). Nevertheless, a pattern of *evasion* relating to participation in such mobilisation allows individuals to re-appropriate their time and engage in alternative daily undertakings. Avoiding the political variety of mobilisation is particularly antithetical to state power, as the regime's legitimacy is in part based on a public transcript of mass support. However, it is a pattern.

> The North Korean authorities ordered a mobilization of young people to participate in celebrations marking the 63rd anniversary of the ceasefire that ended the Korean War in 1953. In reality, however, many university students are paying bribes to avoid the event … an order mandating all university students attend Victory Day celebrations in the plaza in front of the Kim Jong Suk Art Theater in Hyesan City. The center is named after the first wife of deceased North Korean leader Kim Il Sung … Approximately 70% of undergraduate students [from Kim Jong Suk University] paid a bribe to evade the event … this is especially significant when considering the types of students able to attend the Kim Jong Suk University of Education. The school is designed to train future Party cadres in the province, and as such the students who are accepted to this institution tend to be well off and from connected families. Instead of expressing loyalty to the Party, many students who did end up attending the Victory Day celebration told the source that they went so they could find a boyfriend or a girlfriend … Others, including the children of cadres, chose to skip the event so that they could spend time trying to earn money--most commonly by carrying baggage--to put towards school fees. The profits are said to outweigh the bribe burden required to sidestep the celebrations. (DT: Kim, 2016, para. 1-10, sources in Ryanggang Province)[34]

The evasion of political mobilisation is precarious behaviour on the part of individuals. Not only does it have the potential to distort the public transcript of legitimacy, loyalty and solidarity under Kim leadership, but it also disrupts the mobilisation of labour.

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[34] See section 3.5 for reference to data presentation scheme and abbreviations.

Known as chollima[35] in regime discourse, these tasks are framed as military-style speed battles to be won within a specified number of days. *Labour mobilisation* refers to the supply of human labour from employees of each enterprise, students of each school and residents of each People's Unit. For instance, prior to anniversary days, people are sent to clean Kim family statues and revamp their surroundings. They may also be tasked with construction site and warehouse work, farm labour, disaster relief during emergencies, and road renovations (Jang, 2013). However, evasion of labour mobilisation is a growing reality of everyday North Korean life.

A social mobilization proposed by the people's unit (Inminban) is held every two or three days. A unit leader wakes people up at 5 a.m. to perform chores such as removing weeds and sweeping or maintaining the streets. I would pay 3,000 North Korean won and not participate. The organization was comprised of 30 households and approximately 10 of them paid the bribe to not work. The rest would usually go out to work. There were also five to six households who would not pay and fought with organization leaders not to work. People are annoyed when they are told to participate in mobilization and pay money amid economic difficulties. Even the people's unit leader does not like to go from house to house. For example, he would instead, send a message to one household saying, 'Come out tomorrow at a certain time to a certain location to complete a certain task,' and then let it be relayed to other households. A leader is exempt from paying any money but the work is to organize the people. However, due to difficulties in managing households, people are reluctant to assume this position. (DT: Kretchun et al., 2017, p. 68, female, 49, North Hamgyong Province, homemaker, left NK 2014)

A similar representation of this pattern was relayed by a source in Ryanggang Province.

Social mobilization occurs very frequently. In the spring, only husbands are mobilized for 'householders' mobilization'. The head of the people's unit walks around saying, 'It is time for the mobilization for householders'. The work is mainly to clean or maintain the Hyesandong district office or areas around the homes. If a certain region suffers from a flood, we are mobilized to go and help with rehabilitation work... there is particularly a lot of work during the summer when I would go out two to three times a week. A people's unit was divided into three separate groups, each consisting of 15 to 20 members. If you do not participate in the social mobilization, [you] must pay a fine. (DT: Kretchun et al., 2017, p. 68, female, 45,

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[35] Referring to a mythical winged horse, an important symbol in North Korea that developed under Kim-Il-sung as the slogan to 'rush at the speed of chollima' for economic development. Kim Jong-un is said to be using a term with the same meaning, 'mallima'.

Ryanggang Province, wholesaler, left NK 2014)

As youth are not exempt from such mobilisation, parents are increasingly finding ways for their children to evade participation. According to an interviewee:

There are many incidents of bribery in terms of avoiding mobilisation. I have heard many stories from parents who pay for their daughters or sons to sit out of the hot sun to avoid collective labour. (PT: Participant 6, Washington, D.C., 2017)

Moreover, state socialist institutions are manipulating minor reforms to profit from these evasions.

Leaders of the Socialist Women's Union of Korea are accepting large bribes in exchange for excusing female merchants from organizational activities and forced agricultural mobilizations … heads of the Women's Union branches have amassed new powers and gained new opportunities to engage in corruption as a side-effect of the country's marketization … despite increasing restrictions form the central authorities, many women are looking to avoid rice-planting mobilizations and other state-mandated activities. Such tasks can be avoided by paying bribes to the heads of the Women's Unions … Female merchants are paying 50,000-80,000 KPW to the local Women's Union per month … Doing so excuses them from agricultural activities for the month. So instead of having to do forced labor, they are moving about freely, taking taxis and selling products wholesale. Currently, the central authorities have restricted the operating hours of the marketplaces and the movement of its participants for the duration of the rice-planting mobilization, but these women are finding ways to work around it … The fact that those who do participate in the mobilization receive no money actually incentivizes people to pay the bribe … Taking advantage of the situation, the union heads are raking in significant sums of money. The model follows a similar measure previously enacted by the state. Under the August 3rd (8.3) Movement, workers can pay their factories a monthly fee in return for being excused from work duties … 8.3 money is a way for state factories to gain capital by allowing their laborers to skip work in exchange for money. Now the Women's Union has adopted a similar practice. However, unlike the official practice, the Women's Union heads are doing it illegally for personal gain … (DT: Ah, 2017, para. 1-7, source inside South Pyongan Province)

Again, undermining the availability of free labour raises the cost of regime survival. Finally, there is the *material variety of mobilisation*. For instance, earning foreign currency, supplying lunchboxes for soldiers of the KPA, picking bracken during spring, and mining gold during autumn to support foreign currency operations in order for the WPK to export

goods to foreign nations, are all representative of this variety (Jang, 2013). The extent of the burden on individuals due to these mobilisations is reflected in the following account from sources in North Pyongnan and South Pyongan Provinces.

> Authorities are emphasizing political enthusiasm and material progress for this Founders Day celebration. Residents are therefore being mobilized to perform all manner of preparatory tasks. Residents are also required to pay a one time fee to the Workers' Party … *Inminban* leaders are going from house to house early in the morning to force people to participate in the mobilizations and commanding them to fork over cash for the Party. From the crack of dawn to late at night, authorities are also broadcasting propaganda from car-mounted loudspeakers that encourages residents to energetically engage in the 'construction battleground,' to prepare for the festivities … Road repair work sections, who, incidentally, are also tasked with rebuilding concrete walls located near the roads--which is very technically demanding work--are divided by age. To pay for the project's requisite concrete, paint, sand, and gravel, the *inminban* leaders turn once again to the residents, collecting an average amount of 10,000 KPW per person (~US $1.21) … Students and factory workers are also being forced to pay the fee, which is putting considerable financial strain on poorer families. Students are putting their noses to the grindstone by repairing and rebuilding their school's exterior, fences, and walls … Workers are being forced to do work on their factory's building and spruce up the interior. They are also being asked to hand over tens of thousands of KPW. (DT: Choi, S., 2015, para. 2-8, several sources in North Pyongan and South Pyongan provinces)

Evading this form of mobilisation is a more defensive effort to defeat or minimise direct appropriation. A struggle between the regime and ordinary North Koreans is clearly reflected by this extraction of material taxes. An interviewee who works daily with defectors remarked:

> The government basically steals from people for construction campaigns that are undertaken for political purposes to just throw up buildings. Local officials receive central instructions to extract resources from ordinary people—this is essentially a forced monetary tax that amounts to the government stealing because they lack resources. Most people bribe officials to pay a lower price. If there is a way to evade these taxes, people try and sniff it out. (PT: Participant 9, Seoul, 2017)

Moreover, relating to everyday resistance against material extraction, an individual in Ryanggang Province commented:

The authorities in Ryanggang distributed lecture materials this past summer demanding that citizens purchase the prepaid card-reading smart electricity meters, apparently to reduce electricity wastage. But they're expensive (around 240,000 KPW or US$30 including installation), and due to the poor harvest and tough economic times, not many people are following through with the orders. (DT: Kang, 2017, para. 5, source in Ryanggang Province)

As Scott (1985) suggests, "A harvest labourer who steals paddy from his employer is 'saying' that his need for rice takes precedence over the formal property rights of his boss" (p. 301). Hence, transitioning to a pattern of *theft* in North Korea leads to another pattern of behaviour indicative of everyday reflexive resistance. The inception of the North Korean state entailed a shift in property relations that led to state ownership over common resources that were once subject to competing claims. Amid the economic collapse and famine of the 1990s, a systematic pattern of re-appropriation by individuals began to emerge in the form of theft. The stealing of state resources ranged from the stripping of copper piping from state-owned factories for scrap to the bulk selling of coal from North Korea to China (Tudor & Pearson, 2015). The manner in which the government perceives theft of state property is evidence of its contentious roots. In fact, the state added a provision to its criminal law called 'Addendum to the Criminal Law (General Crimes)' in 2009. Strengthening punishments for general crimes and imposing the possibility of the death penalty, the addendum contains the following articles explicitly related to theft: plundering of state property under article 2 (extremely serious cases of plundering state property); theft of state property under article 3 (extremely serious cases of stealing state property); smuggling of state resources under article 8 (extremely serious cases of unlawfully selling state resources such as state-owned underground resources, forest resources, and fishery resources to another country); and theft of private property under article 22 (extremely serious cases of stealing another person's private property) (Do, Kim, Han, Lee & Hong, 2015). Punishments far disproportionate to the nature of the crime documented here are instances of how far the state goes to deter this behaviour.

In July 2009, three men, including the chairman of the management committee of Yonglim-ri, Mundok County, South Pyongan Province, were executed at the Pyongsung Stadium in Pyongsung, South Pyongan Provice for squandering state property. (Do et al, p. 46, NKHR2011000111[36])

In another instance:

In 2012, the brother-in-law of a foreman on Yong-o Island was executed for stealing government funds. (Do et al., p. 46, NKHR2013000097)

A former North Korean mechanical engineer comments on a pattern of stealing state property.

When you look under a locomotive, there are steel components weighing around 5 kg. In North Korean, we call these "jirenda" [transliteration of English term 'cylinder']. People waited for opportunities to steal parts from the *jirenda* because if they smuggle these into China, they can make a tidy sum … with the recent blockage of export-import routes, *jirenda* now fetch even higher prices than last year … the most costly part of locomotive repairs for us was the replacement of components for *jirenda*. Because they were so prone to theft, we assigned people to a rotating guard whenever a locomotive was not moving … we often had to improvise using old parts. But if you operate a locomotive using parts that are not up to standard, the trains don't run smoothly. If trains continue to operate under such circumstances, accidents on a larger scale become inevitable. Yet when new parts were obtained and fitted, we ran the risk of people stealing them. You can say that ordinary North Koreans contribute to rail accidents by stealing train parts. (DT: Choe Ji-Hwan, Specialist Mechanical Engineer for the Locomotives Division of North Korea's Hyesan Railways Bureau until 2015)

Following the famine of the Great Leap Forward in China, Scott (1989) noted that "A host of strategies emerged which included the underreporting of land, misreporting of cropping patterns and yields, making exaggerated claims about thefts and spoilage of grain, illegal procurements, hoarding of grain for local welfare funds and so on" (p. 45). Often assisted by local cadres, the peasantry used these strategies to re-appropriate their time, since one's working day belonged to the collective and was heavily taxed (through pricing and delivery regulations) for activities that became a significant means of resistance and survival. Hence, Scott cites much of the implementation of Chinese economic reforms

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[36] The annual "White Paper on Human Rights" uses, e.g., 'NKHR' and a number to indicate a certain testifier.

emerging from 1978 as nothing more than ex-post facto legalisation of everyday acts of resistance that peasants and local cadres were exercising. According to the testimony of defector Jang Jin-sung, theft in the form of pilfering and sabotage on collective farms is indicative of a strikingly similar pattern of everyday resistance relating to theft of time and materials in North Korea. To elaborate, there are two classes in North Korea. One is the ration-based class remaining in the Party and military, and the other is the market-centric class that relies on the market for goods (Jang, 2013).[37] While the agricultural sector belongs to the ration-based class, they are not admitted equal access to their own produce as others within the class.[38] Kim Jong-un's regime introduced the 'paddy unit responsibility system'[39] to boost the enthusiasm of farm workers for production in 2014, but it does little except re-emphasise the 'socialist principles of distribution' that remain distributed in an inequitable manner to the elite class and military (while apparently still insufficient in the case of the latter), as is reflected in the following statements from multiple sources within North Hwanghae Province in 2016.

> The North Korean authorities are reappropriating rice provisions from the breadbasket region of North and South Hwanghae provinces under the pretext of distributing the foodstuffs to the military and the capital city of Pyongyang. Residents in North and South Hwanghae provinces are becoming severely malnourished as a result of the policy … Our provinces are known as the breadbasket, but the rice we've harvested has all been sent to the army, leaving us with nothing. Furthermore, the public distribution system is dispensing nothing. So people from this province haven't been able to even taste the very rice they grew. They have to go as far as Ryanggang Province when they want to buy rice … While nascent marketization has indeed raised the standard of living for many people in urban settings, residents in rural areas have actually seen a decline in their welfare. The economic divide between rural and urban areas is increasingly pronounced … Kim Jong Un has focused the allocation of provisions on key populations (such as Pyongyang residents and military personnel) because keeping these groups satisfied is essential for maintaining his political legitimacy … People around here are forced to watch the rice they've harvested being sent to Pyongyang. Far from receiving public distribution rations, they haven't even seen that system in action. It's ironic that this province produces the largest rice yield in the country, and yet its

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[37] Albeit there is still significant inequality within each of the classes.

[38] Farm workers are estimated to receive only 30 to 40 percent of the standard amount of rations (White Paper 2015, p. 281).

[39] See Kim Jong-un, "A Letter to the Participants of the Agricultural Division Managers Rally: Let Us Bring about Innovation in Agricultural Production under the Unfurled Banner of the Socialist Rural Theses," *Korean Central News Agency*, February 7, 2015.

residents are forced to purchase smuggled Chinese rice in Ryanggang Province at above market price. (DT: Kim, August 5, 2016, para. 1-8, source in North Hwanghae Province)

Another account from sources within North Hwanghae Province related how these practices have led to pillaging and, to an extent, its everyday practice is similar to the Chinese context exemplified by Scott.

The farmers, who are fed up with their exploitation every year, are now working the fields in the daytime and stealing rice at night … It has become common practice to hide rice during the harvest season. Unlike those in the cities who can make a living in the markets, farmers cannot survive the year if they don't store enough rice during the fall … In North Korea, the theft of grain warrants severe punishment under the law. Particularly in the autumn, task forces are dispatched to monitor the movement of rice and corn harvested from collective farms and residents' personal plots. But the crackdowns are often carried out as little more than a formality, as residents face increasing hardships. (DT: Kim, C., November 2016, para. 3-9, sources in North Hwanghae Province)

An interviewee in Seoul attested:

It is even evident from photos—people are erecting fences because of the prevalence of theft. Stealing from the state is a different matter—it is much more dangerous for citizens to steal state property. The state perceives this as undermining their authority and dangerous to allow it as a precedent. I know farmers that steal from their own crops. This is forbidden but taken advantage of when it will be hard to detect. (PT: Participant 9, Seoul, 2017)

In another pattern of theft, a source in Ryanggang Province describes a man punished for 'nose hooking,' a term used for illegally siphoning electricity from the state.

A North Korean resident in his 40s in Masandong, Hyesan City (Ryanggang Province), was recently accused of stealing electricity from the Hyesan Youth Mine and was punished with a sentence of two months in a labor-training camp … The resident was caught secretly siphoning off electricity without paying a bribe during a crackdown by the official in charge of the power station. The accused asked, 'Why are they only punishing me when there are many others stealing electricity as well?' He said … nearly half of the households in Hyesan are secretly using electricity intended for a state-run plant. The officials in charge of the power distribution stations earn money by allowing individuals to use the electricity generated by the state … Residents connect their own wires to the electricity cables that provide electricity to the state-run enterprises or the homes of high-ranking officials. This form of illegal connection is

referred to as 'nose hooking' … The regime does not provide enough electricity for civilian use, so residents have no choice but to pay bribes to use the electricity provided to state-run enterprises. In Hyesan, you have to pay 100 RMB (about USD$15) a month to the officials in charge of power stations, as well as a pack of cigarettes and a nice meal at least twice a month (DT: Kim, 2017, para. 2-6, source in Ryanggang Province)

In addition, Bae Myung-chul, chief engineer in the 12th naval corps until he defected, testified:

The fuel tanks in those warships were filled with water. An investigation was launched on the Ministry of People's Armed Forces. As a result, many soldiers were framed and called in for interrogation. According to those soldier's confessions, the soldiers sold the fuel from the reserve tanks of the warships as a way to earn money and fight hunger, and in turn, replenished the tanks with water to avoid getting caught. Authorities use a metal rod to check the inside of tanks. If there's oil on the rod, they don't suspect anything. … It would be difficult for authorities to thoroughly check the inside of tanks, and relying on the rods would be an insufficient means to do so; the soldiers had been long taking advantage of the fact that a film of oil floats on the surface of the water. (DT: Bae Myung-chul, Engineer)

Hence, theft in North Korea is a multi-layered phenomenon. In essence, citizens steal from citizens, the military steals from citizens, and citizens steal from the state. While these accounts have focused on the pattern of theft by individuals stealing from the government, it is important to note that the state is rather apathetic to other relations of theft as no serious attempts to quell them are pursued. As Scott (1985) differentiated, resistance is not simply whatever peasants do to maintain themselves and their households. In fact, "The poor landless labourer who steals paddy from another poor man or outbids him for a tenancy is surviving but he is surely not resisting …" (p. 30). As he argued, 'beggar thy neighbour' strategies are advantageous for a system of domination in which they subordinate classes are exploiting each other. Indeed in North Korea, the combinations of atomisation, repression and pressing material needs often result in ideal domination for the regime: to have the subordinated exploit each other. However, theft from the government continues to be perceived by the state as a serious offence and represents a pattern of everyday reflexive resistance in North Korea.

Complex Forms of Reflexive Resistance: Illegal Trading and Movement

In order to enhance control, the Kim regime has long restricted citizens' rights to choice of residence and movement in order to promote the socialist economic system through institutions such as the PDS and the registration of personal background (i.e., songbun). In principle, individuals must go through pre-set procedures and obtain approval from the authorities to move residence or travel to another region. As the line between legal and illegal remains hazy, disguised movement and strategic skirting of regime rules are an everyday reality. Complex forms of reflexive resistance tend to involve the complicity of several actors on different levels.

The narrow Tumen River on the Eastern part of the border with China is the most common *defection*[40] route for North Koreans. However, there are other ways of defecting such as escaping workplaces when assigned jobs abroad or defecting to a third country while visiting relatives in China on regular passports.[41] The nature of defection from North Korea has changed since the 1990s when it was primarily related to hunger and desperation. An interviewee who speaks daily with recent defectors elaborates.

> Basically, there have been two long-term trends of defection. First it was instinctual due to hunger, with China as the endgame. Now, forgive me for the cliché, people are hungry for freedom and the endgame is normally Seoul. (PT: Participant 9, Seoul, 2017)

Considered 'voting with one's feet', the complexity of defection emanates from the strenuous effort that normally goes into the preparation and practice of leaving North Korea. Reflective of Scott's (2013) attention to everyday deserters from the army, their intentions are inscribed in the acts themselves in one sense. "A peasant who, like others, deserts the army is, in effect, saying by his act that the purposes of this institution and the risks and hardships it entails will not prevail over his family or personal needs. To put it another way, the state has failed sufficiently to commit this particular subject to its enterprise so as to retain his compliance" (p. 29). This is reflected in the context of North

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[40] As of December 2017, 31,339 defectors have settled in the South since ~1998 (Ministry of Unification).
[41] These visits are very restricted.

Korea, as it may account for the only perceptible act of everyday reflexive resistance for individuals to express dissatisfaction or reject the regime's constraints.[42] For instance:

> I have met many [North Koreans] that were successful in China. They find out about how much more they can make when doing work legally in South Korea and start planning to get there. They develop a trade, save money and take off when they get the chance. Cash is king. (PT: Participant 10, Seoul, 2017)

Thus, monetary concerns are commonly cited as factors driving defection. Yet, another variable often cited points to the growing discrepancies between social classes regarding upward mobility.

> I wanted to progress in life, I wanted to go to university, but because my mother had defected to China, it looked like I would not be able to go any further. It looked like I would be stuck in North Korea where I was. I could have moved, lived, no problem, but I felt like I didn't have any future in North Korea. That's why I decided to leave. (DT: Fifield, 2017, bean trader from Hyesan, 23, defected in 2014)

Moreover, a construction worker who left North Korea in 2015 cites the lack of opportunity in the state:

> I worked for three and a half years, but I made only $2,000 during that time. We were allowed to work overseas for five years maximum, and I was hoping to save $10,000 and return home proud. I realised it wasn't going to happen, so I started looking for a chance to escape. (DT: Fifield, 2017, construction worker from Pyongyang, 40, defected in 2015)

In other cases, some testimony cites the future of the defectors' children as a factor in regards to defection.

> People in Pyongyang defect from North Korea not to improve their own lives. I was happier going back and forth from China rather than living in South Korea. But because of the future of your children, you

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[42] For example, according to Hirschmann's (1993) loyalty, voice and exit model, an individual may respond to an unfavourable condition by remaining loyal, voicing their discontent or 'exiting'. In this case, a high level of repression makes voicing dangerous and the ideational pervasiveness of regime discourse creates a certain level of loyalty. While intention is not the immediate concern of this section, a demonstrative sample of data from testimony pertaining to acts of defection is revealing.

can't help but escape North Korea. (DT: Kretchun et al., 2017, p. 63, female, 49, Pyongyang, chemical engineer, Yongbyun facility, left NK 2014)

To a lesser extent, defection is reflected by a sense of fear regarding Kim Jong-un's arbitrary or exemplary punishment.

By 2009, Mr. Song, who had lost many peers to government purges, was thoroughly disillusioned with the regime and desperately hoped that no one would succeed the then ailing Kim Jong Il. Hopes were dashed, however, when Kim Jong Un emerged and began rapidly consolidating power in 2011. Finally, when Jang Sung Taek and his associates were brutally executed in 2013, Mr. Song made up his mind. He defected in 2014, completing a perilous forty-day journey through China to leave it all behind. He declined to comment on the details of his transit. (DT: Uchima, 2017, para. 14, male, defected in 2014)

A trend often associated with defection, smuggling and illegal trade, *cross-border movement* refers to North Koreans who travel to and from China to engage in illicit activities. This is often practised on a small scale in tandem with other individuals. A North Korean living in China elaborated:

When smuggling [cross border], all you need is a Chinese mobile phone. I bought a North Korean phone to do business with a cement complex in Sunchon. (DT: Kretchun et al., 2017, p. 36, female, 45, Ryanggang Province, wholesaler, left NK 2014)

Another instance related by a resident of Pyongyang illustrates the state's efforts to stymie smuggling.

After arresting a man for smuggling a phone directory into China, the government launched a massive campaign to collect the remaining books, explaining that it was 'due to scumbags who want to sell them for profit to South Korea' … Starting in June this year, the central authorities handed down orders to all the major administrative, party, and judicial departments across the country to return their phone directories. While they made some assurances of publishing a new directory soon, many of the more sceptical individuals made photocopies of the old books before turning them in. Along with increased surveillance of defector families, smugglers have also become a major target of the regime. The source noted that smugglers these days fear arrest and are wary of undercover State Security agents infiltrating their networks. Arrests of smugglers have increased nonetheless, as people are desperate to make a living through the smuggling of valuable information. This year's poor harvest and tightened sanctions have

forced people to turn to increasingly illegal activities, resulting of course in more arrests as the authorities crack down. (DT: Kang, 2017, para. 2-5, a source in Pyongyang)

Moreover, many North Koreans are involved in human smuggling by assisting, and usually benefitting monetarily from, individuals seeking to defect, by facilitating their entry into China. An example of the seriousness of this crime is documented here.

In May 2009, two men in their 20s and one woman in her 40s were executed in Hyesan, Ryanggang Province on charges of human trafficking for helping 27 people, who voluntarily sought to go to China, cross the border. (DD: Do et al., 2015, p. 46, NKHR20120000046)

Nevertheless, smuggling ensues as individuals increasingly adopt more strategic methods of adapting to surveillance.

Since the onset of the Kim Jong Un era, the task of regulating smuggling was handed to the State Security Department. Subsequently, house searches became much more frequent. What they search for most is the Chinese mobile phone. If you have a Chinese mobile phone, people will know it's a smuggled product. The crackdown became so intense that I even thought, it is now hopeless to smuggle goods here. In order to smuggle goods, you need a large sum of money so people borrow from a moneychanger. However, if you are caught and the goods are confiscated or money is spent for the bribe, you go bankrupt. (DT: Kretchun et al., 2017, p. 61, female, 45, Ryanggang Province, wholesaler, left NK 2014)

With the use of drugs on the rise in Southeastern China and demand skyrocketing in North Korea, the smuggling and trading of drugs (particularly methamphetamine) is an everyday occurrence. Typically, crowded Chinese cities are more suspect to detection when making the substance in private homes, so while North Koreans lack the material resources to make it, they receive them from China in exchange for producing them inside North Korea. However, this is also a risky practice.

In 2013, three men and one woman (including the witness's cousin and cousin-in-law) were shot to death on the banks of Susong Stream, Chongjin, North Hamgyong Province for trading drugs (*bingdu*) (DD: Do et al., 2015, p. 45, NKHR2013000155)

The result of smuggled goods finding their way into the hands of traders, *illegal trading* entails the selling of non-sanctioned goods such as foreign media, drugs, clothing, and so on through the black market. A former doctor described his complicity.

> The salary for doctors was about 3,500 won a month. That was less than it cost to buy one kilogram of rice. So of course, being a doctor was not my main job. My main job was smuggling at night. I would send herbal medicine from North Korea into China, and with the money, I would import home appliances back into North Korea. Rice cookers, notels,[43] LCD monitors, that kind of thing. (DT: Fifield, 2017, doctor, 42, left NK in 2014)

A former phone connector[44] described her illegal purchase of such goods through the black market.

> I watched lots of [smuggled] movies and soap operas on USB sticks from the market. I would plug them into my TV. Vendors who are selling ordinary things like batteries or rice or whatever, they hid the USBs inside under the counter. When you go into the market you say to the vendors: Do you have anything delicious today? That's the code. USBs are also good because they are so easy to hide, and you can just break them if you get caught. (DT: Fifield, 2017, Female, phone connector, 49, Hoeryong, left NK in 2013)

Grasshopper markets[45] refer to operations by illegal traders who avoid high taxes by packing and moving from location to location to elude authorities. The secret police are increasingly following traders and attempting to shut down the vendors.

> The number of people selling goods in the town streets near the markets and bridges has declined noticeably because the Provincial People's Committee has issued instructions to crack down on grasshopper vendors. There are many of these sorts of vendors, who opt to pay bribes in return for being excused from agricultural mobilization during the harvest season ... The residents who used to conduct business on the streets are now moving around to avoid the crackdowns that begin early in the morning. Some residents who used to trade under the Uiyeon Baekchol bridge have become fed up with running away and have moved to rural areas … The grasshopper vendors often say that it's 'doubly tiring' as they have to stay constantly on the move to avoid the crackdowns … However, the measures have proven to be

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[43] This is a type of portable media player made in China that is popular in North Korea.
[44] Arranging calls between North Koreans and relatives on the outside, either in China or South Korea.
[45] Romanised, this is 'Maeddugi shijang'.

a double-edged sword for Kim Jong Un, as these vendors have acquired greater freedom of movement, residence, and even occupations that were once strictly controlled by the authorities … The crackdowns on grasshopper vendors may have been implemented in haste to prevent a perceived ideological weakening which has arisen from the increase in market activity. (DT: Kang, 2017, para. 2-6, source in Ryanggang Province)

According to an interviewee familiar with the phenomenon, cottage markets have also emerged that attempt to operate outside of the regime's purview.

There is the paradox of the housing market—also, outside of the official markets, people selling in homes nearby the markets that are illegal and more highly valued—that is allowing individuals to work their way around state restrictions and facilitate de facto private investment. (PT: Participant 9, Seoul, 2017)

Additionally, a wider breadth of institutions are trading illegally according to testimony:

Hospitals had medicines, but they would treat them as private property, and sell them illegally to in-patients. (DD: Do et al., 2015, NKHR2013000005)

Another account suggests the complicity of telecommunications engineers.

Smuggled cell phones ... when they are turned on, have a menu in Korean but inputting or controlling them in Korean is not possible. I heard that they are only operable if engineers from the Telecommunication Office replaced a device in the phone. I once saw them working on about 100 cell phones piled on the desk. It is the way engineers earn extra money for themselves. (DT: Kretchun et al., 2017, p. 34, female, 46, Ryanggang Province, Provincial Post and Telecommunications Office employee, left NK 2013)

However, as noted, the inherent risk of receiving punishment far disproportionate to the act committed remains a concern.

In October 2008, a woman was executed at Sinpung Stadium in Sinpung-dong, Wonsan, Gangwon Province for the crime of selling South Korean compact discs. (DD: Do et al., 2015, p. 298, NKHR2011000158)

The widespread practices of everyday reflexive resistance are significant. As Scott (1989) argued, it is an ironic aspect of everyday resistance that upon becoming a customary practice, such a pattern generates its own expectations about what is permissible and in tandem raises the political and administrative costs for any regime that subsequently decides it will enforce the rules in earnest. Likely to remain extra-legal and suspect to crackdowns, arbitrary and exemplary punishment, these patterns of everyday reflexive resistance share in undermining the regime's capacity to allocate resources and control the everyday temporalities of ordinary North Koreans. As to the interactive dynamic between material domination and its mitigation manifested in the practices of ordinary North Koreans in their everyday lives, a hotbed of corruption in society adds to the haziness of the demarcation line between legal and illegal. Nonetheless, with this qualitatively distinct pattern elaborated to satisfy the question of 'how' it is practised, transitioning to the causal factors underpinning its emergence will further enrich an understanding of this variation's properties.

4.3 Explanations

While the previous section sought to uncover an illustrative sample of *how* individuals practice everyday reflexive resistance in North Korea, this section aims to uncover the factors underpinning the practices. Accordingly, *when* and *why* everyday acts of reflexive resistance emerge in North Korea will be explored by utilising variables offered by a range of theory under the umbrella of social movement scholarship. As these acts of resistance are of the 'everyday' variety, distinct from publicly declared acts, potential explanations will be tailored to individual as opposed to collective action. First, relevant structural variables will be tested according to their explanatory salience. According to the same logic, ideational variables will be subsequently examined. Lastly, a concluding reflection will fuse the *how* of everyday reflexive resistance practice to causes contributing to the *when* and *why*, to postulate a theory of the variant's operation in North Korea.

4.3.1 Structural Explanations

This section draws on the structural paradigm of social movement theory to test two plausible hypotheses pertaining to the emergence of the reflexive variation of everyday resistance elaborated in the preceding section. The causal significance of resource mobilisation theory is determined in relation to two key attributes: the availability of five resource types (moral, cultural, socio-organisational, human, material), and the primitive capacity to mobilise them. The explanatory power of political opportunity theory is also evaluated according to two primary attributes: the variables of 'state strength' and 'regime repressiveness'.

4.3.1.1 Resource Mobilization Theory

To what extent does the availability of particular resources and the capacity to mobilise them account for the emergence of everyday reflexive resistance? At first glance, the absence of organisations outside the state's mandate indicates that explanations grounded in this theoretical tradition may be negligible. However, tailoring its tenets to pre-movement conditions illustrates a variety of available resources that are loosely organised. This suggests that an explanation situated in this theoretical tradition is causally relevant to the conditions that facilitate the reflexive variety of resistance. Hence, utilising Edwards and McCarthy's (2004) five-party typology will allow for an assessment of the causal significance of resource mobilisation theory.

Resource mobilisation theory is rooted in rational explanations of contentious politics derived from the work of Mancur Olson (1965), who first advanced the claim that rational, self-interested individuals will not combine to achieve common group interests unless coercion or selective incentives are deployed or the number of individuals is very small (Sharman, 2004). Pertaining to works shaped by this tradition, Kuran (1991) and Lohmann (1994) are among the relatively few scholars that consider the salience of such theory in relation to non-democratic contexts, demonstrated in their respective analyses of communist revolutions in 1989. Concerned with solving the problem of dispersed information relating to others' preferences, or 'pluralistic ignorance', Kuran suggests that discontent is general, but due to the closed nature of society and lack of outlets for free expression, people are unaware of widely shared grievances. Remaining ignorant of potential allies' willingness to join an initial movement, the regime remains stable despite a

propitious distribution of thresholds without a "spark to unite the powder keg" (Sharman, 2004, pp. 30-31).

The North Korean state is successful in maintaining a strong information cordon and systematically represses any social pluralism in a similar manner to the closed societies to which Kuran is referring. As his analysis concludes, small change or initial protest may generate a snowball effect in which revolutionary outcomes are often finely balanced, resting on brittle flows of information patterns of individual proclivities to opt out or join. Moreover, an embedding of individuals in some form of social structure that emphasises social networks, ties, both formal and informal, that is "practically a truism for social movement theorists" (Sharman, 2004, p. 31) may be found in the North Korean context as more informal, but with a latent capacity for mobilisation.

In order to disaggregate such resources, harking back to Edwards and McCarthy's (2004) typology of resources will underpin an assessment of RMT's causal significance around the emergence of everyday reflexive resistance. The capacity to mobilise *moral resources*, such as legitimacy and solidarity, is relatively surprising given structural constraints in North Korea. A variety of NGOs[46] exists outside of North Korea, particularly in South Korea, that are involved in the dissemination of information on human rights abuses in North Korea and general messages of solidarity through radio, leaflets and media. Moreover, a culture of corruption harvests a shared degree of legitimacy relating to reflexive acts of everyday resistance resting in the fact that one may opt out of punishment if they have the material resources to do so.

Delving into *cultural resources*, these include prior experience involving practices including such as obtaining knowledge about evasion of punishment. While the state stratifies these resources in an effort to keep them confined as a means to the regime's goals, data indicate that technologies within North Korea, such as the facilitation of defections and smuggling of goods, include smaller groups of actors who have experience in these areas. In addition, these resources are often linked internationally with NGOs or extended family in the transfer of money or other assets in confluence with other everyday reflexive practices of resistance. For instance:

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[46] E.g., LibertyinNorthKorea, HRNK, NKHR, NKIS, Pscore, Radio Free Asia, the Korea Society and so forth.

In the neighbourhood, there were "remittance brokers" who delivered money that was sent from relatives in South Korea to the neighbours. I often observed those brokers going around making phone calls. However, they didn't necessarily disclose information about the outside world. It was only to the extent of boasting how much money they made by doing "phone call errands". And because young people need money to live, they are only interested in ways to make money. There aren't many rich people in the city of Hoeryong. But households that receive money from their relatives in South Korea seem to live relatively better. (DT: Kretchun et al., 2017, p. 63, Male, 22, North Hamgyong Province, student, left NK 2015)

A 2016 survey from the NKDB suggested that 58.5% of 400 defectors in the South have sent money to North Korea (NKDB, 2016). According to a poll released by Chosun Ilbo in 2016, 140 of 200 defectors said they regularly transferred money to their families in the North via China-based agents. Almost 63% said they send 1-2 million won a year, while a few respondents put the sum at over 10 million won. However, most defectors are not well established and their income averages around 1.5 million won per month. Additionally, the broker fee is normally between 20 and 30 percent (Chosun Ilbo, 2016).

Socio-organisational resources are generally divided into infrastructures, organisations and social networks. These, if existing in North Korea, are latent, and the government has been efficient in monopolising them for state-direction only. For example, transportation infrastructure is weak in North Korea, non-state organisations are not permitted, and social networks primarily consist of extended family. On the other hand, *human resources* exist in individuals rather than socio-organisational structures, as people usually have propriety control over the use of labour, except in cases when it is forced or extorted (Edwards & McCarthy, 2004). The evidence suggests that human resources are dependent upon inter-personal relationships and trust. According to a formal chemical engineer:

If you want to work in trade, you have to have a wide breadth of information on topics such as politics, economy, culture, etc. It is expensive to obtain such information. Information on crackdowns is particularly important. If you want to know when they are cracking down, you have to be close with the party functionaries. Party functionaries live off of information. If we had known in advance about things like the closure of the Kaesung Industrial Complex, we could have coped with it … this kind of information becomes money. (DT: Kretchun et al., 2017, p. 66, female, 49, Pyongyang, chemical engineer, Yongbyun facility)

Material resources are comprised of financial and physical capital, including monetary resources, office space, equipment, and supplies (Edwards & McCarthy, 2004). In North Korea, a sizable growth has occurred in the number of illegal "running traders" (local buyers), truck vendors, smugglers, peddlers, and vendors emerging from residential alleys. While legal boundaries for these activities remain blurred to the extent that government agencies, state-owned corporations and residents cannot determine what is and is not legal, material resources have been increasingly accessible through extra-legal means. In particular, private money lenders, the 'donju', emerged after the tumultuous 1990s and began the business of 'Ssoebich' (service-car) as a transportation company under the names of military or government agencies. Producers of household items, who turned their homes into small factories with sparse amounts of money, emerged after borrowing from the donju (KINU, 2013).

These market activities and private businesses necessitate networking among suppliers, service providers and partners or employees, and such networks can be become quite extensive and far-reaching, resulting in networked collaboration outside of government monitoring and often even explicitly in opposition to government restrictions. In recent years, these networks and bonds have been augmented by the spread of mobile phones to the wealthiest 10% of the population, which includes many business people, accelerating information-sharing as well as increasing market efficiency (Park, 2015). However, the state is still able to coopt the donju class and has historically invested a lot of resources into monitoring all associations and preventing the formation of independent groups or organisations, horizontal linkages and human networks operating outside of government-controlled space. In fact, government interference in market activity does, to an extent, cause dissent.

> The most contentious space for grievances is when the markets close early, are limited or reduced. When people are not able to trade legally, they resort to illegal measures. Local officials are often targets of spontaneous complaints. (PT: Participant 5, Bangkok, 2017)

Shaped by rational action theories, the tenets of RMT that assume a cost-benefit assessment by agents are particularly relevant to the reflexive variety of everyday

resistance. For instance, the reflexive assessment in its practice, according to an interviewee:

> Bribes works in this way: they are paid in advance to preclude danger or when one is caught doing illegal activities in the market. It can also be paid to mitigate the punishments for relatives and friends who are caught. It is an epidemic in North Korea, but people are smart about it. (PT: Participant 10, Seoul, 2017)

Hence, this practice is indicative of the reflexive need to understand one's bargaining position and, crucially, the point at which strategic behaviour undermines principle and reflects rational behaviour.

A variety of resources with at least a loose capacity of individuals to mobilise them tends to facilitate reflexive patterns of everyday resistance. While the most fruitful social networks are dense, enduring and overlapping, shared disobedience through loosely available resources and a grassroots mobilising of them holds explanatory salience. Therefore, an inference can be made based on the data that everyday acts of reflexive resistance correlate with a mechanism in individuals' and small groups' primitive mobilisation of loosely available resources. Nevertheless, this does not provide a full explanation of such practices.

4.3.1.2 Political Opportunity Theory

Distinct from society-centric factors, dimensions of political opportunity represent structural conditions exogenous to the individual that vary over time and affect the receptivity of the political system to challengers. Hence, a key question is the extent to which opportunity structures account for the emergence of this variation of resistance. In particular, factors relating to 'state strength' and 'regime repressiveness' will be explored.

In a nutshell, political opportunity for everyday reflexive resisters correlates with an unhinged process of *marketisation*. Historically, the communist variant of totalitarianism is underpinned by almost total public ownership of property, and the link between the party and economy makes the growth of any autonomy of civil and political society particularly difficult. Fundamental reform of the economy is imperative, but the absence of a legal institutional framework for a market economy and a weak legal culture make reform

difficult and often lead to the emergence of illegal or alegal practices (Linz & Stepan, 1996). Until the 1990s, North Korea's socialist economy was neither efficient nor innovative, but operative and able to provide individuals with their basic needs, in large part due to subsidised trade and aid from Cold War allies. Exogenous shock hit the state when its international alliances were shattered by the collapse of the Soviet Union and Eastern bloc, causing a collapse and long-term restructuring of the economy. Private farming, business and market activities became a part of everyday life as these circumstances forced households and work units into alegal and illegal activities to sustain livelihoods in the absence of state provisions (Park, 2015).

As noted, circumstances following the tumultuous 1990s in the state led to such practices in North Korea, although they continue to be systematically repressed and oscillate between legal, alegal and illegal based on the state's perception of what constitutes dangerous elements at the time. The *decentralisation of the economy*[47] increased when, in July of 2002, the Kim Jong-Il leadership introduced the 7.1 measures that transformed old farmers markets into general markets, thus making market-based cash transactions official. Consequently, the state increasingly used individuals and market institutions to operate state-owned companies (Kim, 2018). Moreover, the regime consolidated trading companies run by the myriad state institutions to strike a balance between supply and demand, limiting their authority so that the items traded were only those suitable to the nature of the respective organisations (Jang, 2013). After 2002, the state created confusion through intermittently repressing market activities, causing perplexity as to what had appeared to be a process of marketisation from above. Ultimately, the reform process acted as an attack on traders and their cash holdings through a disastrous currency reform in 2009. Individuals were forced to exchange old notes for new ones at a rate of 100 to 1 while the amount they could exchange was limited. According to an interviewee:

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[47] The representation of the interests of territorial communities (perhaps facilitated because of a relatively centralised system with a national policy and monocentrism for major decisions) by the local party organisations is not unlike democratic parties and democratically elected lower government units. Less divided over and involved in overall policy formulation and resource collection, they can agree on demanding as much as possible from the centre for the benefit of their constituents. Successful, influential, old-time party leaders can act as mediators between a variety of local, special, and even private interests and the higher bureaucratic structures, and this, as in democratic government, is obviously an opportunity for corruption and for diversion of policy (Linz, 2000, 96).

The 2009 currency revaluation deserves much more attention as concerns rare contention in the DPRK. People were burning piles of useless money in rare instances of protests. Officers actually began firing at people in some instances. Any reform process that resembled freedom of the market was threatened. While the state found a scapegoat in Pak Nam-gi and backpedalled on the revaluation, individuals began to increasingly distrust the North Korean won and engaged in more shady business to accrue foreign capital. Decentralisation then started up again. (PT: Participant 9, Seoul, 2017)

Ultimately, the potential antisocialist threats that lie dormant in the marketplaces remain, as the revaluation actually increased inflation and led the government to ease the exchange amount and restore the general market system. Such uncertainty about the extent of marketisation continued with the ascent of the Kim Jong-un leadership in 2011, as discrepancies remain between processes of facilitation and subsequent crackdowns of market activity on the ground. Even with the advent of his byungjin policy, parallel development among the economy and nuclear weapons development in the spring of 2013, the process of marketisation remains hazy.

While decentralisation of the economy associated with marketisation facilitates the opportunity for individuals to reflexively resist through extra-legal material practices, evidence suggests that such activity has been sporadically affected by *exogenous shock*. China's support of North Korea is coupled with its selective sanctions of the state at any particular time and affects sectors of the population engaged in everyday reflexive resistance. Less relevant to elementary forms of reflexive resistance such as everyday evasion and theft, those involved in illegal trading and movement are particularly affected. For instance, according to sources in China close to North Korean affairs, the adoption of UNSC resolution 2371 in 2017 caused such an impact.

The Chinese authorities are said to be conducting an unprecedented level of crackdowns on smuggling activity around Yalu River region since the adoption of UNSC Resolution 2371 against North Korea … even small-scale smuggling activities have been curtailed, with control tightened following an incident in which casualties resulted from smugglers conducting activities at night to avoid surveillance … With the international community keenly watching China and North Korea, the Chinese authorities have had no choice but to strengthen crackdowns on smuggling. Until 10 years ago, it was fairly easy to talk to North Korean soldiers near the Yalu River, but now with the constant provocations, there is a warlike atmosphere in the border area between the two countries. (DT: Kim, 2017, para. 2-4, source in China)

Another statement was made by a North Korean trader residing in China.

In broad strokes, I'd say at least 80% of us North Korean merchants in Dandong were stomping our feet and complaining that we have no work now as soon as the new sanctions were released. Joint ventures with Chinese firms are blocked, bank accounts are blocked, and use of North Korean laborers is limited. These were all important sources of money for us. There is no work left for us to do … It has now become hard to send textile raw materials back to North Korea to produce those garments. I think the North Korean textile factories will struggle because of this. The authorities will definitely take a hit, but so will the residents … in just a few months, it will become winter. Now even oil has become a target of sanctions. I think we residents will have a very hard time. North Korea and China need to improve relations in order for the lives of ordinary people to improve. Right now, I see no hope for that outcome. (DT: Kim, September 2017, para. 3-9, North Korean merchant in China)

While it is likely that the state maintains the use of its intelligence agencies to coopt certain smuggling activity along the border, they are simultaneously attempting to eliminate all private, unapproved activities through an increase in surveillance. For instance, in the lead-up to the Winter Olympics in Pyeongchang, South Korea, the border with China was allotted additional surveillance according to a source in Ryanggang Province.

The Central Committee had been trying hard to stop defections and smuggling along the Tumen and Yalu rivers, but they failed, as some residents and border guards had been secretly working together in smuggling and other kinds of livelihood activities … Since the Central Committee's State Affairs Commission issued orders to secure the border areas, the guards are being managed by battalion, and their places of duty are frequently being changed. (DT: Kim, January 2018, para. 4-11)

Moreover, the *capacity of the state to repress* everyday acts of reflexive resistance inherently constrains opportunities for individuals to engage in such activity. The deterrent of repression is reflected by a source in Ryanggang Province regarding the prospect of defection.

Even no ant let loose around the border these days. As they supplied power to the barbed fence, people sometimes were electrocuted and killed. It is said that a woman in Weeyon area lost her eardrum by the electrocution. (DT: Kang, July 2017, source in Ryanggang Province, para. 2)

As grassroots markets have become highly networked to the Chinese economy while sub-systems of capitalism become increasingly entrenched, the government has been uneasy with this development but unable thus far to completely stymie it. Instead it has oscillated between trying to rein in market forces through repression and making halting steps to formalise and coopt aspects of the market economy (Park, 2015). The three primary agencies for internal security and surveillance are the SSD, MPS and MSC. At its most basic level, surveillance is the responsibility of each individual citizen at the level of the elaborate neighbourhood watch programme known as the inminban system. Each individual belongs to an inminban, which monitors its members, provides ideological education and serves as a conduit for a variety of mobilisation campaigns (Gause, 2012). However, marketisation has weakened the regime's capacity to repress in terms of surveillance. According to defector Jang Jin-sung (2013, pp. 10-11):

> The private collusion between the heads of people's neighbourhood units and residents has gradually paralysed directions from the top, while simultaneously a dynamic between local neighbourhood unit systems, local and town planning agents, security officers and party officials has emerged in which they are seeking to personally benefit from their ties with the residents they are responsible for.

Hence, the regime's capacity to contain social pluralism and maintain control over all aspects of personal and civic life and the information cordon suggests that a hotbed of corruption resulting from economic decentralization has facilitated a network of subversive activity related to illegal trade and movement.

Linz and Stepan (1996) argue that detotalitarianisation may occur by the softening of policy occurring after the death of a leader, thus enhancing political opportunity. In other words, when institutional access opens through decentralisation, rifts appear within elite circles, allies become available and state capacity for repression declines, and challengers see opportunities to advance their claims. When combined with high levels of threat but declining capacity for repression, such opportunities create episodes of contentious politics, sometimes producing change in regimes (Tarrow, 2011).

The capacity to repress was at its apex under the leadership of Kim Il-sung and somewhat decreased under Kim Jong-Il (Smith, 2015). Under Kim Jong-Il, some political decentralisation occurred in a sort of small-scale bureaucratic pluralism that saw local

problems produce parochial countermeasures to central problems and central policies bent in favour of the military. However, as the totalitarian leadership structure is of a monolithic nature, elite factionalism and in-fighting is not as prevalent as in authoritarian regime structures and only occurred under Kim Jong-Il as a 'divide-and-rule' strategy that had different organisations competing through loyalty. Yet, political successions often result from the death of the leader and, as noted, political alliances were realigned to favour the military as Kim Jong-Il posted the old guard to 'honour positions'. Hence, the succession of Kim Jong-Il saw adaptations to social changes as he raised the status of the military (though not harming the monolith) through the initiation of Songun (military-first politics). Consequently, the allocation of the scant resources that the regime could obtain was funnelled to the military and the imperative goal of developing nuclear weapons (Smith, 2015). Thus, this had an effect on the practices of everyday reflexive resistance.

> The government was less centralised under Kim Jong-Il than his predecessor and successor. The military replaced the party as part of everyday life and surveillance. As an institution, they are less ideological than the party. They would abuse their power to steal from collective farms and markets that caused even more incidents of daily bribery and theft. Kim Jong-Il's politics caused the reorganisation of social strata. (PT: Participant 8, New York, 2017)

Under the leadership of Kim Jong-un, most accounts suggest that while people's livelihoods have improved, the capacity and willingness to repress has increased. For instance, the extension of terror to the elite has reached heights not witnessed since the Kim Il-sung era, most notably of Kim Jong-un's own uncle, Jang Song Thaek, in 2013. According to a professor who left North Korea in 2014:

> I heard that Kim Jong Un said that he would 'put wings on the State Security Department'. And in reality, the authority of the security department has strengthened. Before, only the guard post was able to walk along the Amnokgang embankment, but now the SSD can go up there as well. Previously, the SSD did not have much connection to the daily lives of people. For example, if a person was caught by the SSD for bringing back smuggled goods, people would resist by saying, 'Why don't you go find a spy?'. Or, 'Go catch the North Korean defectors'. However, the SSD now even confiscates smuggled products. (DT: Kretchun et al., 2017, p. 28, Male, 45, Ryanggang Province, doctor/professor, left NK 2014)

Hence, the regime's willingness to arbitrarily and exemplarily repress dissent remains a hallmark of its totalitarian tendencies. Moreover, the likelihood of a general level of economic grievance in the country suggests that repression significantly limits opportunity structures. In the words of Scott (1989), resisters are "rather like opponents of a law who estimate that it is more convenient to evade it or bribe their way around it rather than to change it" (p. 57).

A causal inference can be made based on the data that everyday reflexive acts of resistance are affected by a cyclical pattern of opening and closing opportunity structures. Evidence suggests exogenous shocks from the international climate and a resulting decentralisation of the economy has weakened the strength of the North Korean state in its capacity to repress everyday reflexive resistance, such as evasion, theft, illegal trade and movement on a consistent basis, opening an environment in which such activities may increase at a particular time. While not the complete picture, political opportunity theory is useful in explaining the emergence of everyday reflexive resistance. The limitation of this argument, however, results from the complexity of its associated variables rather than their explanatory salience.

4.3.2 Ideational Explanations

This section draws on the ideational paradigm of social movement theory to assess three different plausible explanations in accounting for the emergence of the reflexive variety of everyday resistance. Changing value-orientations will be considered in the determination of value-oriented theory as a factor in the emergence of this variant. Framing theory will evaluate the extent to which frames affect individual perceptions of social issues and regime legitimacy to trigger everyday reflexive resistance. Lastly, social psychology theory will weigh the effects of five different categories of emotion on the exercise of this variety of everyday resistance - urges, reflex emotions, moods, affective commitments, and moral emotions.

4.3.2.1 Value-Oriented Theory

The question on everyday reflexive resistance is the extent to which variables within value-oriented theory may account for the emergence of this variety in North Korea. With the roots of value-oriented theory in NSMs, the relation of macrostructural changes in society to new cultural orientations suggests that new types of resistance over the last few decades are linked to the emergence of new individual needs, to the internalisation of certain postmaterialist values in the course of socialisation, or to the individuals' identification with values carried by certain social classes (Giugni, 1998). Traditionally referencing Western democracies, postmaterialist value theory argues that a new set of 'post-materialist' values and attitudes has emerged in the industrial world as a result of increasing affluence and security. These values emphasise quality of life and self-expression as important desires in society, in contrast to materialist values that have stressed economic well-being and personal and national security (Giugni, 1998).

From the outset, Kim Il-sung's leadership contained identity markers including occupation, geographical provenance, gender, and generation (Smith, 2015). Nevertheless, Kim Il-sung was able to foster a strong sense of national identity in which politics and resource allocation were highly centralised and the government was able to provide basic needs such as healthcare, education, housing, and the PDS. The development of Juche ideology ensued through theory and practice in the 1960s and held nationalist connotations that made it difficult for North Korea to classify as a 'leftist' totalitarian state. Roughly translated as self-reliance, Juche not only affected economic, military and political policy, but had a broader concern with national 'self-identity' which produced a distinctly nationalist impact upon cultural matters and historical interpretation (Brooker, 2014).

Three ways in which identity may affect behaviour are through *the valuation of incentives according to one's identity*, *belligerence and conflict with the 'other'* and the *role and logic of appropriateness*. Arguably, the valuation of incentives according to identity in North Korea has been affected by recent changes in its social environment. Coupled with the effects of marketisation, testimony suggests that individual solidarity is more valuable than organisational solidarity. According to defector Jang Jin-sung:

> Aside from special organizations like the central party or the Ministry of State Security, workers for other
> institutions avoid living in institutional apartments in an attempt to evade censorship under the local
> people's neighbourhood unit system and thereby genuinely enjoy their "life after work." This is

attributable to recent changes in the social environment—driven largely by the expansion of the market—where individual solidarity is more valued than organizational solidarity. As the state fails to provide rations, people have no choice but to rely upon the market. In other words, the unity between individuals brings greater benefits in their everyday lives than competition to prove their loyalty toward the state (DT: Jang Jin-sung, 2013, p. 10).

The hierarchy of values espoused by the Kim regime creates norms that may be overturned, as in any society, if sectors of the population begin to identify with other norms. Melucci (1989) suggests that the production of one's own identity—self-identification—is a necessary condition for enabling the individual to establish social bonds and to locate oneself as one of the poles in a relationship of solidarity or conflict. Therefore, everyday reflexive resistance may be affected by the loss of solidaristic commitment to the regime as the result of changing values. In fact, the normative elements such as mobilisation, socialist practices and maintenance of loyalty that underpin the standards of behaviour in the state are increasingly undermined by everyday reflexive practices of resistance such as evading mobilisation, theft, defection, illegal movement and trade, and so forth. Everyday patterns of reflexive resistance tend to be imbued with cost-benefit undertones that exceed an adherence to regime-constructed identities. For instance, testimony suggests that personal gain surpasses a sense of national duty.

> If you observe all the faces of the soldiers of the KPA, you will notice that the ones with the most colour and life belong to drivers. In North Korea, fuel is as valuable and precious as gold. Drivers siphon off fuel and exchange it for money. Some drivers bribe the provision authorities to exceed the amount of fuel rationed so that they can make even more money … Drivers are regular customers of those authorities and soldiers that are in charge of the provision of fuel. In addition, soldiers who work with transportation gear or machinery also bribe the provision officers. Of these soldiers, drivers of cars transporting elite officials and truck drivers transporting army supplies are generally the wealthiest. For these soldiers, serving in the army would be considered a personal gain, rather than a national duty. (DT: Lee Myung-kwan, former driver in Training Base 108 of the KPA, defected March 2013)

Coupling these acts of theft, a sense of unity and trust seems to be shared between drivers and provision officers. This is indicative of personal gain supplanting the values of collectivism, socialism and nationalism.

In particular, an identity shared by the marker of youth is stressed throughout witnesses' testimonies.

> People in this generation generally don't study much and start their businesses in the last year of middle school. Having only experienced hardship rather than good times, we seem only to be desperately looking for ways to make money. (DT: Kretchun et al., 2017, p. 70, female, 25, Ryanggang Province, kindergarten teacher, left NK 2015)

In addition to this statement from a female in Ryanggang Province, a male in North Hamgyong Province spoke to similar concerns.

> In 2015, at the military parade commemorating the 70th anniversary of the DPRK Labor Party, Kim Jong Un proclaimed that after the people and the army, he values the youth. He stated the youth should lead the revolution and be responsible for the nation's future. I think he means as a young leader himself, he wanted to carry out a generational transition and place younger people in positions of power. However, for us young people, Kim Jong Un's message is burdensome. We worry what other tasks he will place on our shoulders and make our lives even more difficult. (DT: Kretchun et al., 2017, male, 22, North Hamgyong Province, student, left NK 2015)

This suggests that the value placed on the youth may not be connected to the normative commitments of the youth. It appears that discourse such as 'lead the revolution' is instilled with a message of the continuation of tasks that detract from a transformation of values typical of everyday patterns of reflexive resistance. Nevertheless, while value-oriented theory holds weight, it is important not to overstate it, as the regime is still able to homogenise identity and deter its impact on resistance to an extent, especially through nationalism. According to an interviewee who works frequently with defectors:

> Many youth tend not to resist by breaking the rules of the regime because their families' identities are still strongly associated with the state. In addition, for example, if you speak with defectors in China after a missile test, they will say, 'Hell yeah. We did that'. (PT: Participant 9, Seoul, 2017)

One defector commented:

> I didn't trust what the North Korean authorities said that much because of the information I already knew.

However, I still possessed basic loyalty toward my fatherland. Even though some said, 'What's the country for when you are about to die in hunger', I still thought regardless of whether you die of starvation or not, one must have a fatherland. (DT: Kretchun, et al., 2017, p. 68, female, 25, North Hamgyong Province, service worker at the Hoeryong City Services Facilities, left NK 2013)

The process of socialisation in North Korea that emerged from the state's inception, emphasising values such as collectivism, nationalism and socialism that are reproduced in everyday life through normative behaviour associated with the regime's hierarchal value-norm structure, is facing a challenge. Marketisation has created a space in which individuals can subtly lay claim to their autonomy, re-appropriate, self-realise and construct the meaning of what they are and what they do (Melucci, 1998). While the state attempts to homogenise meaning according to its will by tapping into deeply rooted feelings and identities, such as nationalism, identification of individuals with new values has become inscribed in the norms of everyday practices of reflexive resistance. Overall, value-oriented theory provides a credible explanation of everyday reflexive resistance in changing value-orientations that have translated potential into action.

4.3.2.2 Framing Theory

The question posed here is the extent to which framing tasks and processes account for the emergence of the reflexive variant in North Korea. Here, when a problem or injustice is perceived and resonates with an individual, it may instigate everyday resistance. Snow and Benford (1988) argue that three core framing tasks determine participation in social movements. These are diagnostic (identifying the problem/attributing blame), prognostic (solutions to the problem), and motivational (rationale for action). Thus, evidence is sought of framing tasks and processes that affect everyday practices of reflexive resistance on the individual level and are grounded in articulated perceptions.

As noted, everyday acts of reflexive resistance tend to correlate with marketisation. Concerning economics and the politics of alternatives and system blame, "If the political situation is such that there is no strong perception of a possible alternative, a nondemocratic regime can often continue to rule by coercion. However, when the belief grows that other alternatives are possible (as well as preferable), the political economy of legitimacy and coercion changes sharply" (Linz & Stepan, 1996, pp. 79-80). This may lead individuals to

frame issues in ways that challenge the regime's framing of a particular issue, inspiring defection and other reflexive acts of everyday resistance.

> The one and only TV broadcasting network in North Korea is Chosun Central Television. It broadcasts from 3 pm to 10 pm weekdays and 10 am to 10 pm on the weekends. They had a three-hour lunch break. The broadcast always reports that Kim Il Sung provided all the necessities. I never knew the word Hangook (South Korea). I always thought that South Korea was in poverty. I learned from the TV that the US was a great enemy to North Korea, and that is the reason why we are so poor. I believed that because we did not have freedom of the press. I did not know, so I could not perceive that the leaders were all wrong. (DT: Choi, 2016, F, school teacher, NKHR, left North Korea in 2003)

One interviewee described the impact of perceptions among family members.

> I know of a couple of families who have defected from North Korea because they decided among themselves that it was Kim Jong-un and his cronies who were causing them to struggle. They said the system had to change at the top. (PT: Participant 7, D.C, 2017)

This statement suggests that diagnostic and prognostic tasks of framing were salient among the family, who perceived the political system as the culprit for their struggle and addressed this issue by defecting. Often, totalitarian ideology has to be incorporated into its ideational politics and requires a credible response to a severe national crisis which can be perceived as due to structural causes, while the leader must be able to provide a credible solution to the crisis, which presupposes a close fit between him and the crisis-traumatised audience. Such leaders tend to respond to socioeconomic crises by enhancing charismatic mobilisation instead of adopting appropriate economic policies that they perceive as ideologically dangerous. Structural constraints are only instrumental in allowing a specific leader to create a totalitarian regime; in terms of approach and subsequent regime trajectory, they are overshadowed by non-structural factors (Tudoroiu, 2016). With an ideology of self-reliance primarily used to justify the state's economic integrity, framing theory can explain how interpretive schemata play a role in the individual's perception of the regime's legitimacy. For example, according to an interview with a North Korean residing near the Chinese border in September 2016:

We don't know. We know about the missile launches because they publish photos after it happens, but what do we actually know about the nuclear tests? We are just told: "It succeeded'" or "It was powerful". We don't really care whether they launch missiles or not. We care more about making a living. People ask, "If they can spend so much on nuclear tests and missiles launches why don't they distribute rations?". (DT: Kang & Park, 2016, p. 2, para. 4)

This proposes a decline in the perception of the regime's legitimacy and further reflects what Snow and Benford (1992) postulate as frames that may "underscore and embellish the seriousness and injustice of a social condition or redefine as unjust and immoral what was previously seen as unfortunate but perhaps tolerable" (p. 137). While this echoes a value-oriented explanation in noting the importance of making a living over money spent on nuclear weapons tests, it also articulates a perception of injustice by aligning these expenditures with a defunct public distribution system. For instance, according to an interviewee:

Juche has a large impact—society believes in it as a method of the leadership to express itself to society and the outside world. People are beginning to perceive self-reliance as a farce because of the government's irrational spending. Their solution is to engage in illegal activities if the government behaves like that. (PT: Participant 5, Bangkok, 2017)

This indicates a prognostic function in framing through blaming the government and subsequently engaging in illegal activity because of the government's missteps. Additionally, frames are relevant to existing cultural myths and narratives.

There are also an increasing number of people who think that they were previously naive after receiving information through their defector family members in South Korea. The general sentiment towards Kim Il Sung has naturally worsened as a result … Kim Il Sung's reputation had stayed largely intact, as Kim Jong Il was largely blamed for the period of mass famine in the mid-1990s. But as a source in Ryanggang Province told Daily NK, the situation appears to be changing. … North Koreans dispatched to Russia for work have told us that we lived off money borrowed from Russia in the 1980s, not thanks to the Suryong (Kim Il Sung), and that he was also partly responsible for the Arduous March (famine in the mid 1990s) as it correlated with the collapse of the Soviet Union … Kim Jong Il watched the country devolve into a debt binge and spiral out of control thanks to his father, choosing to do nothing as millions died from starvation and he instead hoarded money for himself and eventually his son … Therefore, it has been pointed out that

Kim Jong Un's strategy to maintain the instructions from his predecessors is highly likely to meet resistance … (DT: Kang, April 2017, male, para. 6-10, North Hamgyong Province)

Moreover, according to an interviewee, following the currency reform of 2009 conversations with defectors often reflected blame on the regime.

The currency reform was enough for people to say 'this is not the U.S., it is our government.' Everything always leads back to blaming somebody else for their failures. (PT: Participant 1, Seoul, 2017)

Again, statements such as these indicate that the narrative of hostile states causing practically every grievance in the state is shifting to the state itself as the antagonist.

Similar to the value-oriented explanation, frame theory does not necessarily resonate with all North Koreans. For instance, according to an interviewee with expertise and frequent travel to North Korea, not all inequality of appropriation is framed as Kim Jong-un's fault.

The mind-set is that, under Kim Jong-Il, things were tough because of extenuating circumstances – however, he kept them safe and secure—now, under Kim Jong-un, there is space to improve living conditions for the people. (PT: Participant 5, Bangkok, 2017)

Moreover, the resonance of the three tasks in producing action occurs through four types of frame alignment - bridging, amplification, extension and transformation. However, there is not strong enough evidence to support these processes.

The Kim regime has traditionally framed structural failures as a result of natural disasters, a hostile international environment and other exogenous forces outside of the regime's control. The corrosion of the information cordon and marketisation have, to some extent, triggered individuals to subtly challenge the regime's rhetoric on such issues. As the state attempts to shift blame elsewhere for its shortcomings, personal perceptions are leading individuals to everyday acts of reflexive resistance such as evasion and defection. Overall, framing theory offers a modest explanation for everyday acts of reflexive resistance. It is left primarily to speculation due to limited elaboration in the data. Hypothetically, the absence of innovative master frames may account for the failure of mass mobilisation when the structural conditions are otherwise ripe; or a decline in

movement protest activity when the structural conditions remain fertile may be partly due to the failure of individuals to exploit and amplify the anchoring frame in imaginative and inspiring ways. In either case, latent structural potential fails to manifest itself completely and the question turns to why framing processes succeed in some circumstances but not others (Snow et al., 1986). Ultimately, the diagnostic function is there but the prognostic and motivational functions are lacking.

4.3.2.3 Social Psychological Theory

The question posed here is the extent to which emotions may account for the emergence of this variety in North Korea. Recent social psychology theory focuses on the role of emotion in socio-political contention. Different levels and manifestations of emotion may provide a causal explanation as to everyday patterns of reflexive resistance in North Korea. The aim is to determine how emotions compare with the other explanations for action, for instance, if emotions sit alongside, give rise to or energise interests subsequently triggering resistance.

Like intentions, emotions may be hard to identify and analyse, but can help understand resistance (Baaz et al., 2016), and in totalitarian systems, the charisma of the leader and emotional investment in politics are significant. However, the reflexive variety of everyday resistance suggests that it is underscored by a 'money over emotion' drive. For instance, according to an interviewee's interaction with a defector from a rural southern province in North Korea who was visiting North Hamgyong Province, closer to the Chinese border, in 2011 when Kim Jong-Il died:

> The news of Kim Jong-Il's death had just spread. The man was very emotional, yet, expressed to me extreme confusion as he saw the people of the Province going on to trade and wasting no time on individual grief or collective tears for the General. He could not believe this—in his Province, people must have been [were] unable to work due to deep despair. How could we go on without the General? (PT: Participant 9, Seoul, 2017)

A clear contrast can be seen here. One would expect individuals in a society that pours historic amounts of resources into the personality cult to foster deeply emotional ties between the people and leader to immediately drop all commercial activities in mourning as

opposed to evading it. However, this account suggests that material interests overrode the need for this individual to reproduce a transcript of despair.

Jasper (2006) argues that emotionality on the behalf of those who resist does not make them irrational. Emotions permeate all social life and occur not only in responses to events but likewise in the form of affective attachments that may shape individual goals and action. However, it is not so apparent in cases of everyday reflexive resistance, with the exception of cases in which evidence suggests the psychological drive underpinning defection.

> We were told in school that we could be anybody. But after graduation, I realised that this wasn't true and that I was being punished for somebody else's wrongdoing. I realised I wouldn't be able to survive here. So for two years I looked for a way out. When I thought about escaping, it gave me a psychological boost. (Fifield, 2017, male, meat deliverer, 23, left North Korea in 2014)

In a sense, frustration may drive some of the practices in which reflexive resistance is represented, but this is a stretch for the relevancy of emotion to this variation. However, individuals need to be emotionally engaged by their claims if they are to be induced to participate in possibly dangerous and certainly costly actions. Moreover, some emotions, such as loyalty and reverence, are more mobilising than others such as despair, resignation and shame. While others such as optimism and confidence are frequent accompaniers to resistance, so are anger, indignation, fear, compassion and a sense of obligation (Tarrow, 2011). In this manner, loyalty, reverence, fear and a sense of obligation are neglected as individuals disregard the regime's traditional hold on such emotions and distract themselves with everyday patterns of reflexive resistance.

The Kim regime has traditionally embedded emotionalism in its politics in order to instil a deeper devotion to its leadership among the North Korean populace. However, evidence suggests that such emotional attachments have declined and alternative emotions in everyday life have contributed to more negative feelings toward the regime. Overall, the role of emotion in everyday reflexive resistance is less convincing due to the variation's 'rational action' overtones. The decline in emotion appears to be more relevant than emotion work among individuals driving these acts of resistance. Ultimately, this variation may be amplified by anger or, in more extreme incidents, despair. However, moral

emotions or the cultivating of emotions by actors of other actors is not readily apparent and this form of resistance seems to be underpinned by more cognitive and evaluative triggers.

4.4 Conclusion: A Theory on Reflexive Resistance in North Korea

In the words of Scott (2013), "The goal, after all, of the great bulk of peasant resistance is not directly to overthrow or transform a system of domination but rather to survive—today, this week, this season—within it … '*working the system to their minimum disadvantage'* … their persistent attempts to 'nibble away' may backfire, they may marginally alleviate exploitation, they may amount to a renegotiation of the limits of appropriation, they may change the course of subsequent development, and they may more rarely help bring the system down" (p. 30).

The objective of this chapter was to elaborate a reflexive variation of resistance through everyday practices in North Korea and to investigate a set of explanations that may underscore their emergence. It has shown a characteristic sample demonstrating the qualitative discreteness of these practices and how they interact with one another undermining hierarchal material appropriations and claims by the Kim regime. Performances of everyday reflexive resistance cannot be understood outside of the structural and ideational conditions from which they emerge. Put another way, the process of engaging in these practices is underpinned by the structural and ideational variables that influence individuals' ability and willingness to sustain these contextually-dependent actions.

A theory of everyday reflexive resistance as a 'building block' for an overall understanding of everyday resistance in North Korea is couched in distinct practices and mechanisms underpinning its emergence. As hypothesised, these acts share a qualitative similarity inscribed in their practice that undermines the appropriation of resources in the state coupled with spatial and temporal separation from the regime's socio-economic logic of everyday life. As to their causal mechanisms, resource mobilisation theory set out the premise that the availability of certain resources, especially human and material, coupled with a primitive ability to mobilise them, fostered a more favourable environment for this variation of resistance. As for political opportunity theory, state strength in terms of decentralisation lessened the capacity for regime repressiveness, thus inspiring the

replication of these acts when such exogenous conditions were present. From the ideational paradigm, value-oriented theory provided a convincing explanation as the valuation of market-oriented identities stimulated the reproduction of everyday reflexive resistance. Framing theory suggested that the perceptive political economy of legitimacy was weakened by the regime's economic performance, thus legitimising and stirring this variation of everyday resistance. Social psychology's focus on emotion was the least convincing as an explanation. While emotion is inherently an aspect of social action, this qualitative variety seemed driven more by a cost-benefit/rational action calculus.

Thus, everyday reflexive resistance in North Korea is a practice that undermines hierarchal appropriation of resources, separating individuals to some extent from spatial and temporal controls. Evidence supports their emergence due in part to an increase in material resources with at least a primitive capability to mobilise them, economic decentralisation coupled with lessened regime repressiveness, changing values and changing perceptions regarding the political economy of legitimacy.

Chapter 5: Discursive Resistance

5.1 Introduction

Through legislation and the reorganisation of society's public life, the totalitarian state aims to sever citizen connections, first by destroying all civic and oftentimes personal relationships based on trust, and second by channelling collective investments in community life only to the extent in which these investments reinforce state ideology and nothing outside of it. The totalitarian state thus attempts to legitimise its political, economic and social control of the community's life by demanding a "total, unrestricted, unconditional, and unalterable loyalty of the individual" (Arendt, 1976, p. 323). The state's ideology as articulated by its leader is the only discourse that can represent the community both internally and internationally. Elementary theories of totalitarianism indicate that organised resistance, let alone the everyday variety, is negligible in such societies. However, hindsight shows that subordinate social groups have invented and circulated counter-discourses to formulate oppositional interpretations of their identities, interests and needs even in the most pervasive contexts.

This chapter aims to explore and explain such instances in the context of North Korea. This 'discursive' variety of everyday resistance is centred on counter-discourses that are dependent upon clandestine dissemination of information and informal interpersonal networks and grounded in the 'hidden transcripts' constructed in everyday life. Accordingly, this chapter will draw attention to linguistic and symbolic practices that run counter to the regime's hierarchy of discourse that it expects to be reproduced as relates to values and norms that emphasise its imposed political philosophy. As Johnston (2005) notes, "themes of opposition speech are potentially innumerable, but certain themes can be identified: criticisms and complaints about the party, leaders and state; ideological debate about society and economy; discussion of emigration, of world events, of situations in open societies; ethnic-national issues; the secret police and repression; nonofficial, propagandised information about contemporary society of historical event" (pp. 114-115). In North Korea, the hidden transcript is the common element that embraces many of these issues. Hence, the first section of this chapter begins with an overview of the key literature by elaborating James Scott's (1990) theory of hidden transcripts and provides evidence of

its operation as a form of everyday discursive resistance in North Korea. After identifying this pattern of resistance, the next section will use variables from the extensive literature on social movements, subsumed under structural and ideational paradigms, to seek explanations as to when and why it emerges. To conclude the chapter, an assessment of the second hypothesis of everyday discursive resistance and a theory on its practice and contributing causal factors in North Korea will be elaborated.

5.2 The Discursive Variety of Resistance in North Korea

Scott (1990) refers to the *public transcript* as the openly articulated interactions between subordinates and superiors. Conversely, the *hidden transcript* represents discourse that takes place outside direct observation of superiors. This study focuses on what Scott refers to as varieties of political discourse among subordinates. These come in the form of (1) flattering self-images of the elites, (2) the hidden transcript itself, (3) disguise and anonymity that takes place in public view but is designed to have a double meaning or to shield the identity of actors, and (4) the rupture of the political communications cordon between the hidden and the public transcript (Scott, 1990). These forms of political discourse uncover a pattern of resistance that challenges the Kim regime's control of the public transcript in everyday North Korean life.

In order to understand *what* is being challenged, it is necessary to review the *affirmation*, *concealment*, *euphemisation*, *stigmatisation* and *appearance of unanimity* in the public transcript that is central to patterns of regime control. Scott suggests "dominant elites attempt to portray social action in the public transcript, metaphorically, a parade, thus denying, by omission, the possibility of autonomous social action by subordinates" (pp. 45-46). For instance, discursive *affirmations* of power may be viewed in North Korea's large-scale military parades that give impressions of solidarity to party members, citizens and the international community. *Concealment* refers to the propaganda and deception exercised by elites on the public stage to bolster their image while hiding what may detract from their authority and grandeur, such as the opulent rents afforded to the upper echelon of the Kim regime. *Euphemisation* is the use of language to obscure something that is negatively valued, for example, using the language of 're-education camps' for prisons that house political opponents. Similarly, *stigmatisation* is a pattern of labelling activities or persons

that call into question official realities, for example, rebels labelled by the regime as 'traitors'. *The appearance of unanimity* seeks to foster a public image of cohesion, shared belief and the appearance of unity among elites and the image of consent among their subordinates. Any act of insubordination is likely to require a symbolic tax from the perpetrator, such as an apology or confession, to reproduce the image of unanimity and uphold the moral economy of domination (Scott, 1990).

Scott emphasises the hidden transcript as a social product resulting from power relations among subordinates and existing only to the extent that it is practiced, articulated, enacted and disseminated within offstage social sites, and that social spaces where the transcript grows are achievements of resistance themselves "won and defended in the teeth of power" (p. 119). These social sites are the locations where unspoken retorts, muffled anger and bitten tongues created by relations of domination find a fervent, full-throated expression.

With Scott's theory in tow, the linguistic and symbolic practices that amount to everyday discursive resistance against the Kim regime's hierarchal public transcript will be explored. To clarify, this public transcript is the expected pattern of normative behaviour according to one's niche in society. For instance, outside of the monolithic purview of the regime, elites and subordinates alike are expected to participate in certain rituals, follow prescribed laws and live a loyal and obedient life in relation to the leader. This section begins with an exploration of elementary patterns of everyday discursive resistance in North Korea and proceeds to more elaborate patterns. This discussion also seeks to uncover when and why this resistance emerges and is adopted in the everyday interactions of ordinary North Koreans.

Elementary forms of Disguise: Gossip, Rumours, Euphemisms and Grumbling

Subordinate individuals have developed a large arsenal of techniques that serve to shield their identity while facilitating open criticism, threats and attacks. Elementary techniques that achieve this purpose include practices such as gossip, rumour, humour, anonymous letters and counter-symbolism (Scott, 1989). *Gossip* has no identifiable author, but rather scores of eager retailers who can claim they are just passing on the news. The

character of gossip that distinguishes it from rumour is that it consists typically of stories that are designed to ruin the reputation of some identifiable person or persons. Above all, most gossip is a discourse about social rules that have been violated (e.g., through cheating, dishonesty, inappropriate dress). Without a recognised normative standard from which degrees of deviation may be estimated, the notion of gossip would make no sense. Gossip, in turn, reinforces these normative standards by invoking them and teaching anyone who gossips precisely what kinds of behaviour are likely to be mocked or despised. While the more familiar method of gossip is from above, that is, by superiors or elites to enhance social control, gossip from below exists but must take a more circumspect form against superiors to avoid detection and punishment (Scott, 1989). Residents of North Korea and defectors report numerous instances of such gossip. For instance, the following statement criticises Ri Sol-ju, the wife of leader Kim Jong-un for the inappropriateness of her dress.

> At first people just felt a bit awkward seeing old cadres bow at the waist to her, but now they say it looks really ugly … The Republic is struggling and rations are not coming, so people do not understand how a woman who appears only to care for her appearance would be able to guide the nation. (DT: Kang, 2014, para. 4, Pyongyang resident)

This suggests that the normatively accepted standard for proper sartorial conduct in the regime's discourse is being violated in the top echelons of power and articulated as gossip among ordinary North Koreans. Similarly, a professional who works daily with recent North Korean defectors suggests another subject of everyday gossip in North Korea.

> It is not uncommon for some to quietly gossip about their unease relating to Kim Jong-un's youth and inexperience. They refer to him as spoiled or sometimes a liar. (PT: Participant 2, Seoul, 2017)

Moreover, this type of discursive language threatens the public transcript's concealment of facts, such as Kim Jong-un's alleged inexperience, that run counter to hierarchal rhetoric. In essence, discursive acts of resistance such as gossip call to mind issues of legitimacy, pro-regime consensus and so on. These perceptions may, through moral judgment, diminish emotional attachment in relation to his charismatic leadership that serves as an important factor in regime perpetuation.

Similarly, *rumour,* although not directed at a particular person, is a powerful form of anonymous communication that can serve particular interests. Rumour thrives most in situations amid events of vital significance to people's interests and, often, where no reliable information is available. Life-threatening events such as war, epidemic, famine and riot are thus among the most fertile social sites for the generation of rumours (Scott, 1990). As defector Jang Jin-sung related:

> Since North Korea bombarded the South Korean island of Yeonpyeong, "You are so acting like the little idiot" has become a catch phrase in North Korea, likening someone who does a stupid thing to Kim Jong-un. This is the exact opposite of the North's propaganda message that the young leader took resolute action. There have also been many rumours spreading across the society, including one that the portrait of Kim Jong-il was taken down in a state institution. These secret rumourmongers are challenging the regime's deceptive propaganda head-on. (DT: Jang Jin-sung, 2013, pp. 54-5)

The rapidity with which a rumour is propagated is significant.

> That [graffiti] seems to happen once or twice a year. Last March there was also graffiti criticizing the Party. They caught the person who did it; it was a college student. After that there was one talking badly about Kim Jong Il on the wall of a revolutionary historical site in Pyongsong. Whenever such incidents occur rumours spread like wildfire. (DT: Green, 2011, p. 16, defector in China, female, May 2011)

More impressive, Scott argues, is its elaboration.

> There was a rumour that we shouldn't talk about political issues because our cell phones could be tapped. But I didn't think I was a subject of wiretapping so I was not particularly concerned. (DT: Kretchun et al., 2017, p. 39, Male, 29, North Pyongan Province, paper factory employee/worker, left NK 2014)

The symbolism in rumours may be just as powerful. Rapidly spreading and elaborating rumours indicate the intrigue of the social actors involved in its spread. At this, the optics of conformity in the public transcript is called into question. For example, take the government's response to vandalism prior to celebrations marking the 70th anniversary of the Party's founding.

On Sept. 9, a poster was found damaged in Pyongsong, with references on the poster to the country as 'the victor' changed to 'the defeated' … By publicizing news of the graffiti attacks, and threatening to harshly punish those found responsible, the government has shown North Korea's people 'the best target' for their anger against the regime. (DT: Moon, 2015, para. 5-8, sources from Ryanggang Province)

According to Scott, the key takeaway is that the process of embellishment and exaggeration is not random. As rumour travels, it is altered in a fashion that brings it more closely into line with the hopes, fears and worldviews of those who hear it and retell it (Scott, 1990). Considering this, one must expect rumours to take quite divergent forms depending on the class, strata, region, or occupation in which they are circulating. For example, one comment reflected the position of some of the youth in North Korea.

The younger generation will occasionally respond to rumours of threats from the regime with statements such as 'oh, now we can finally have war and live a better life'. (PT: Participant 6, Washington, D.C., 2017)

The statement above was meant as an exaggeration, and in reality, the expression reflects the desire for a better life under a *different* regime. Scott notes that oppressed groups give meaning by frequently reading into rumours inscribed with promises of liberation. He remarks, "Social theorists who assume that a hegemonic ideology encourages a naturalization of domination in which no alternatives are imagined possible, will find it hard to account for these occasions on which subordinate groups seem to pick themselves up by the bootstraps of their own collective desires … If oppressed groups misconstrue the world, it is as often to imagine that the liberation they desire is coming as to reify domination" (Scott, 1990, p. 148). In the words of defector Jang Jin-sung:

These rumours fabricated by the North Korean regime have their limits. In order for stories to become rumours, they first need to be spread, but all of the rumours about Kim Jong-il are gossip that the regime is afraid of. As the popular Korean saying goes, 'the voice of people is the voice of god.' Spreading faster and igniting more interest than the false propaganda from the regime, rumours among ordinary people are breaking down the very foundation of the efforts to deify the Kim family. (DT: Jang Jin-sung, 2013, p. 56)

Scott contends that the alternative to complete deference is to disguise the message just enough to skirt retaliation. If anonymity often encourages the delivery of an *un*varnished message, the veiling of the message represents the application of varnish. The appropriate sociolinguistic analogy for the process of varnishing is the way in which what begins as blasphemy is transformed by *euphemism* into a hinted blasphemy that escapes the sanctions that open blasphemy would incur (Scott, 1990). Euphemisms in North Korea have a surprisingly elaborate transcript, as the following quote illustrates relating to the Party.

> Also called 'jargon,' slang expressions are used exclusively within a certain group so only the members of the group can understand what they mean. Slang is used primarily to satirize contradictions and irrationalities in society. In North Korea, slang expressions about the Communist Party or food shortages have been the most commonly used. First of all, the Workers' Party of Korea is mocked as the 'Disaster Party', implying the party brings the people nothing but misfortune. The Communist Party is ridiculed as 'bean candy' (kongsatang), which sounds similar to 'communist party' (gongsandang) in Korean. Party officials for their part, are referred to as 'wolves'. There are other slang expressions about idolization: The party's politicians who simply talk about the idolization of the Kim family are called 'baby pheasants'. The term 'handclap medicine' means that clapping hands more enthusiastically during congresses or learning sessions can make life safer. (DT: Jang Jin-sung, defector, 2013, pp. 72-3)

Further, not only is the Party itself a target of euphemisms, but Party policies are also prone to subversive discourse.

> There also is slang terminology about policies implemented by the party. 'Digging up the bones' means investigating even the bones of one's ancestors buried in their graves—in the name of family background investigations—to root out weaknesses. 'Burning the bedbugs' refers to the Chollima Movement and other forms of labour exploitation, which are so severe that even the bedbugs on people's bodies are burned. 'Empty cart' means high-profile ideological learning sessions having no substantial content and bearing no fruit. Plus, the informants from the Ministry of State Security and the Ministry of the People's Armed Forces, who are working in various workplaces and organizations to gather information on what goes on there, are called 'rats' (meaning they keep 'squeaking') or 'wedges'. (DT: Jang Jin-sung, 2013, p. 73)

In particular, jargon related to food shortages in reference to the famine of the 1990s has elaborately developed.

In addition to this party-related jargon, many expressions on food shortages have been coined since the Arduous March in the early 2000s. First of all, food-related slang includes: 'powder rice' (a powdery meal made of corn powder); 'bomb rice' (a very small portion of rice in a bowl, looking dented as if it was hit by a bomb); and 'planes rice' (a bowl of rice with the surface neatly cut off, as if it was planned). The leading examples of other slang expressions about soup are: 'pork broth soup for your health' (a bowl of soup with only oil on the surface and no meat inside); and "nylon soup" or 'salt soup for your health' (soup or porridge cooked only with salt). Also, the country's free medical care system lacking hospitals, doctors and drugs is satirically called the 'medical system without three elements'. (DT: Jang Jin-sung, 2013, pp. 73-4)

Seemingly bolder, the highest echelons of the Party also become subjects of these euphemisms.

North Korea also has various satires about party officials and the regime as well as slang for denouncing them. Even the party officials themselves have a dig at Kim Jong-il by saying, "Yes, he indeed is the Sun. We burn to death if we get too close to him, and we freeze to death if we stay too far away from him". Since the fall of the ration economy in the mid-1990s, all manufacturers in North Korea have closed down. The clear lack of materials, coupled with extortion by party officials, led to even more serious consequences. To criticize this, North Koreans argued: "Group leaders embezzle only half, office heads embezzle directly, cell secretaries embezzle carefully, managers embezzle by giving orders, and party secretaries embezzle proudly. No wonder employees have no choice but to steal!" (DT: Jang Jin-sung, 2013, p. 74)

In addition, Party slogans have become the target of subversive discourse.

The party's slogans are also ridiculed by the people. One of the slogans goes, 'After going thousands of miles in hardship, you will find millions of miles full of happiness', which is openly mocked by ordinary people who respond, 'After going thousands of miles in hardship, you will find millions of miles full of more hardship'. The Workers' Party of Korea created the slogan, 'When the party decides, we do', claiming there is no such word as 'impossible' in Kim Jong-il's dictionary. North Koreans, however, use this slogan when they make the impossible possible not for the party but for their own interest. They use a modified version of the slogan, 'When we decide, we do', to explain their decisions and actions when, for example, soldiers steal civilian assets or when labourers steal and sell state property in the market. (DT: Jang Jin-sung, 2013, p. 75)

Lastly, among these examples of euphemisms, counter-propaganda finds a place in

these discourses.

> North Koreans also secretly criticize the regime's propaganda on Kim Il-sung as a 'hero of anti-Japanese independent movements' by saying, 'He ousted the terrible Japanese colonists and managed to create an even more terrible world than during Japanese colonial rule'. These countless slang expressions and satires on the North Korean regime imply that the country's public sentiment is very much against the regime. (DT: Jang Jin-sung, 2013, p. 76)

Just as propaganda uses euphemisms such as 'traitor' when referring to defectors or 're-education camp' when referring to political prisons, the aforementioned practices suggest that subordinates seem to have adopted a similar practice. Moreover, euphemisms may be intended as a threat whose force is lost unless it is taken as intended. The verbal formula of the threat, however, follows the path of euphemism in allowing the intention to be disavowed if challenged, that is, "have your cake and eat it too: deliver a clear threat in a form sufficiently ambiguous to escape prosecution" (Scott, 1990, p. 154). For instance, an interviewee related:

> A lot of North Koreans comment, 'I wish there was a war', to be overheard by officials so they can respond by saying, 'No, I wish there was a war to take out South Korea'. This is the type of manipulative transcript that people employ. (PT: Participant 3, Sydney, 2017)

Grumbling is another form of discursive dissent in North Korea that represents a veiled complaint usually intended to communicate a general sense of dissatisfaction without taking responsibility for an open complaint. It may be clear to the listener from the context exactly what the complaint is, but, via the grumble, the complainer has avoided an incident and can, if pressed, disavow any intention to complain (Scott, 1990). The class of events to which the grumble belongs, as an example, would include any communicative act intended to convey an indistinct and deniable sense of ridicule, dissatisfaction or animosity. Providing such a message is imparted, almost any means of communication might serve a purpose: "a groan, a sigh, a moan, a chuckle, a well-timed silence, a wink, or a stare" (Scott, 1990, p. 155). An interviewee notes that these acts are common in North Korean markets.

> What upsets the people tremendously is when officials change jangmadang[48] [market] hours, for example, by shutting them two hours early on weeknights. It is very risky, due to repression, for people to openly complain about a central directive coming from top—instead, muttering and groaning are commonplace and contagious. (PT: Participant 5, Bangkok, 2017)

Digital testimony supports this participant's account in a statement that depicts laughter.

> The students giggle and sneer when they watch propaganda documentaries that brag that, at the tender age of three, Kim Jong Un was able to spell difficult words like Kwangmyeongseong Changa ('hopeful paean') …. (DT: Lee, October 2015, female, South Pyongan Province)

As with thinly veiled threats expressed in euphemisms, the message must not be so cryptic that the antagonist fails, utterly, to get the point. The purpose is often not self-expression, but the attempt to bring the pressure of discontent to bear on elites. If too explicit, bearers risk retaliation; if it is too vague, it passes unnoticed altogether. However, often what grumbling intentionally conveys is an unmistakable tone, be it one of anger, contempt, determination, shock or disloyalty (Scott, 1990). For example, the rolling of the eyes at the announcement of mobilising for a 'speed-battle'.[49]

> Normally, instead of people [openly] complaining about what amounts to forced labour is the rolling of eyes or a dissatisfactory gesture. (PT: Participant 5, Bangkok, 2017)

Elaborate Forms of Disguise: Oral Culture, Folk Tales, Symbolic Inversion and Rituals of Reversal

In addition to elementary practices of discursive resistance, a more public form of disobedience takes place in folk or popular culture that serves to embody meanings that potentially undercut, if not contradict, the public transcript (Scott, 1990). Insofar as popular culture is the property of a social class or strata whose social location generates distinctive

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[48] Meaning 'market grounds' in Korean, this term is used to refer to the informal economy (farmers' markets, local markets, black markets) that proliferated after the famine in the 1990s.

[49] Speed-battles, or Chollima, were instituted in the 1950s by the Kim Il-sung regime to mobilise individuals for collective labour-related tasks.

experiences and values, those characteristics should appear in their oral culture, folk tales, symbolic inversion and rituals of reversal. Members will adopt these for their own use and create new cultural practices and artefacts to meet their felt needs. This is not to imply that the realm of cultural practices is unaffected by the dominant culture; only that it is less effectively patrolled than, say, the realm of production (Scott, 1990). In the case of North Korea, given its strong emphasis on ethno-nationalism and cultural purism coupled with a high rate of repression, these are more sparsely attested to. However, despite significant efforts in the centralisation of all social practices according to political rituals enforced by the state, discursive resistance in non-political spaces exist. An interviewee explained how these spaces foster patterns of discourse that cannot be safely reproduced in public.

> We gather more often than before in safe spaces to eat, drink and gossip together. We are not focusing on political events but attending to friends and speaking of desires outside of the constant ideological tone of everyday life. The problem is that many people together listening to music and talking about life in safer places is not allowed and we are in trouble if the regime finds out about it. Trust between people is increasing and these small drinking parties are worth the risk sometimes. There is a lot of inappropriate conversation at these parties. (PT: Participant 2, Seoul, 2017)

Another reason why subordinate groups might wish to find ways of expressing dissonant views through their cultural life is simply as a riposte to an official culture that is almost invariably demeaning. The existing cultural hierarchy holds out a model of behaviour for citizens with which those of lower status lack the cultural and material resources to comply. In other words, subordinates are asked to revere a standard that is impossible for them to achieve. Inasmuch as the cultural dignity and status of ruling groups are usually established through the systematic denigration and indignities imposed on subordinates, it is not surprising that those of lower status are not likely to discursively share these assumptions with quite the same fervour (Scott, 1990). For example, in North Korea, the depiction of Kim Jong-un as a 'pig' may be symbolic in this manner by elevating subordinate dignity through portraying him in an undignified manner.

> Criticisms of North Korean leader Kim Jong Un are spreading quickly in the country's capital city, with Pyongyang residents mocking his obesity and distrust of the officials surrounding him, sources in the isolated … The unflattering descriptions spread quickly following the August broadcast of a video

showing the overweight Kim inspecting the Taedong River Pig Factory … Close friends would watch the inspection video together and say, 'He seems happy to see his friends, the pigs', or 'Among this group of pigs, the human pig seems the largest' … Other insulting terms have recently become popular among Pyongyang residents tired of Kim's rule, with overly fat animals found in local markets often sneeringly ranked as 'leader-class' **….** (DT: Kim, 2016, para. 1-5, source in Pyongyang)

Moreover, what permits subordinate groups to undercut the authorised cultural norms is the fact that cultural expression by virtue is polyvalent symbolism and metaphor lends itself to disguise. By the subtle use of codes, one can insinuate into a ritual, a song or a story meanings that are accessible to one intended audience and opaque to another audience the actors wish to exclude (Scott, 1990). Again, codes such as these may only lend themselves as intelligible to smaller groups of social actors.

The word '*jongbuk*' has been used a lot in the papers and television to criticize the South these days, and now it has become a new term used by many people in daily life … In the North, '*jongbuk*' refers to someone who kowtows to others, and it's popular for being a fun but poignant expression … In the past, people used to refer to those who focused only on their work at factories and state-run companies as 'passionate Party members Jang Jin-sung', but now they're mostly called '*jongbuk*' … People use it as a form of sarcasm to describe people that only look above [at Kim Jong-un], just like a dumb bird hitting its head against a rock without realizing that it will kill itself … '*Jongbuk*' is also used as an expression to describe people who go around spying on others for state security officials … When trade workers go overseas and secretly gather information on other workers to report back to the State Security Department, people call it 'doing *jongbuk* things' … Due to the ambiguous nature of the word and its applications, people using it are able to evade potential punishment to which they would normally be subjected by surveillance forces … *Donju* [new affluent middle class], who have a monopoly on market goods, are called the 'highest dignity' [a term typically used to describe Kim Jong Un]. It shows how people in this socialist society still understand that money rules over all else … adding that while new words often permeate North Korean society via smuggled discs filled with foreign media, many derive from words used in propaganda messages on North Korean state media ... Loyal or disloyal, both ways, people can be called '*jongbuk*', so it has become a popular word that the state cannot hold people accountable for … Some women even joke in the marketplace, telling each other to stop living with their '*jongbuk*' husbands [who don't know how to make money] and instead live with the rich 'highest dignity' [donju]. (DT: Seol, April 2015, para. 1-7, source in North Pyongan Province)

The bulk of subaltern cultural expression has typically taken an oral rather than written form. Oral traditions (e.g. colloquial songs) by means of their transmission offer a

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kind of seclusion, control and anonymity that make them ideal vehicles for discursive resistance. Scott notes that speech, particularly between friends or intimates, is "likely to take greater liberties in syntax, grammar, and allusions than formal speech, let alone print" (p. 160). An example of this in North Korea is the use of 'panbal'[50], South Korean grammar and so on. For instance, this individual notes a pattern in which a song in North Korea has been infused with colloquialisms.

> I'm excited. I'm excited. That sound is thanks to Juche steel. It's beautiful, following the General's march in our own country, it's the sound of the stars and the new creation of the heavens and earth. Oh~Sing~Oh~Be Proud~It's the order of Baekdu[51], the star (here, they sing 'problem' not 'star') of the military-first policy, of my country. (DT: Green, 2011, p. 44, female, Lee In Suk, trader)

Narratives of the under-dog or those involving a subordinate in an act of aggression towards a member of the elite, according to Scott, "may be less satisfying than an open declaration of the hidden transcript [but] nevertheless achieves something the backstage can never match … carves out a public, if provisional, space for the autonomous cultural expression of dissent" (1990, p. 166). Moreover, if it is disguised, at least it is not hidden as it speaks to power, thus no small achievement under domination. Take the story of Kim Seon-dal for example according to a source in North Pyongan Province.

> Residents in North Korea are criticizing Kim Jong un for investing in the drinking water and beer markets as they understand that the regime's intention is to earn more money from the residents … Kim Jong un issued orders to establish spring water production plants across the country after inspecting the Ryongaksan spring water plant in Pyongyang in September last year … People are widely commenting that Kim Jong un's intention to sell water is analogous to the classic folk story of Kim Seon Dal, [a clever swindler most famous for selling the public, free water from the Taedong River] (DT: Yejie, August 2017, para. 2-3, source in North Pyongan Province)

In addition, a source in Ryanggang Province commented on the same story of Kim Seon-dal circulating.

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[50] This has a similar meaning to 'backlash', disaffection, repulsion.
[51] This is the supposed birthplace, atop a symbolic mountain in North Korea, of Kim Jong-Il.

The spreading of this narrative is significant in that it reveals the creative and elaborate nature of everyday discursive resistance in North Korea. The story of 'Kim Seon-dal' is based on a South Korean film that, by regime rules, should not be watched or spoken of. In addition, discursive resisters are likening the Kim regime's involvement in production and selling of beverages to that of a swindler who deceives people.

Scott (1990), using upside-down prints as an example, describes the notion of symbolic inversion. He notes that the symbolic opulence of popular culture is such that a single symbol could represent virtually an entire worldview. However, it is impossible to envision a world upside down without beginning with a world right side up of which it is the mirror image.[52] Inversions of this kind, if nothing else, play an important imaginative function. When one manipulates any social classification imaginatively—turning it inside out and upside down—one is forcibly reminded that it is to some degree an arbitrary human creation. Scott asks what one is to make of the mixture of implicit social critique with inversions that either have no obvious social content or that actually violate the physical laws of nature. He contends, "it takes an interpretive leap of faith to see the subversive import of the following sorts of broadsheets: the lord serves a peasant at a table; the poor man hands his sweat and blood to the rich … Given the codes and imagery then in circulation, a subversive interpretation is also available" (p. 169). For instance, there are many ways one may interpret the following imagery that was sighted at Hyesan stadium in Ryanggang Province.

Another flag theft on Sept. 9, 2015 has also apparently gone unsolved … That heist occurred on another important political holiday known as Foundation of the Republic Day … The national flag that was raised on a flag staff disappeared on the opening day of an athletic competition at Hyesan Stadium in Ryanggang

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[52] The same is true by definition for any cultural negation (e.g., the "hippie" lifestyle represents a protest only by being seen against the background of middle-class conformity).

Province … Instead, a black plastic bag on the flagstaff looking like a croaker (fish) was raised on a flagstaff. (DT: Kim, August 2016, source in North Hamggyong Province)

Scott (1990) notes that the vital role in symbolic inversion is disguise. As *public* popular culture the world-upside-down prints are disguised by the anonymity of their authorship, by the ambiguity of their meaning and by the addition of obviously harmless material. When conditions that constrain this evasive popular culture are, as occasionally happens, relaxed, one may expect to see the disguises become less opaque as more of the hidden transcript shoulders its way onto the stage and into action.

The hidden transcript is evident in the set of discursive encounters positioned in different social spaces with different social actors in everyday North Korean life. These daily interactions, while just a sample of the full range, are a pattern of everyday resistance that is spatially situated to safely articulate grievances in a disguised and subtle manner. Practices are banal, pragmatic, or selective, but all influence the quality and extent of counter-discursive expressions in society. The continued practice of such behaviour has the potential to foster the emergence of a more public repertoire of discourse running counter to regime rhetoric. In the meantime, testing a set of rival explanations that potentially cause the emergence of everyday discursive resistance will enhance the overall picture of the phenomenon.

5.3 Explanations

While the preceding section sought to uncover a demonstrative sample of *how* individuals practice everyday discursive resistance in North Korea, this section aims to unearth the causal factors that underpin these practices. Accordingly, *when* and *why* everyday expressions of discursive resistance emerge will be explored by testing a range of variables grounded in the structural and ideational paradigms of social movement theory. As these acts are of the everyday variety as opposed to collectively and overtly expressed, the explanatory variables have been tailored to individual action.

5.3.1 Structural Explanations

This section draws on the structural paradigm of social movement theory to test two possible explanations for the emergence of the discursive variation of everyday resistance. The causal significance of resource mobilisation theory will be determined in relation to two key attributes: the availability of five resource types (moral, cultural, socio-organisational, human, material), and the primitive capacity to mobilise them. Political opportunity theory and its causal salience will be evaluated according to two primary attributes: the variable of 'state strength' and 'regime repressiveness'.

5.3.1.1 Resource Mobilisation Theory

The question here concerns whether the availability of resources and at least a primitive capacity to organise them are apparent as a causal factor in this variation of everyday resistance. Resource mobilisation theory suggests that social action will emerge from rational behaviour and an individual's conclusions about the costs and benefits of such action, rather than from a psychological predisposition to marginality and discontent (Klandermans, 1984). In this regard, deprived people with grievances who lack resources are unlikely to succeed through effective mobilisation of resources. However, as noted, while the stimulation of resistance in regimes with strong totalitarian tendencies runs counter to RMT, Sadowski (1988) points to the characteristics of rigidly structured societies that lend nicely to grassroots mobilisation. She argues that citizens often circumvent government restrictions by handling matters privately, outside of imposing bureaucratic control. In this manner, alternative means of taking care of daily needs become institutionalised in practice while remaining informal in structure. Through illegal or extra-legal trading, independent self-help networks are formed and reflect the grassroots of resources for movements in socialist authoritarian systems. Even in totalitarian societies, it is never the case that resources are so rigidly allocated for narrowly or strictly defined purposes to preclude the possibility of any reallocation or multiple use, as such systems are thought of as unlikely arenas for such resource mobilisation. As noted, the occurrence of resistance in closed non-democratic societies runs counter to the basic premises of resource mobilisation theory. However, many such societies have the presence of latent networks, proto-organisations and community leaders and organisers, all of which can provide the

basis for social mobilisation. The explanatory salience of access to a variety of resources, according to Edwards and McCarthy's (2004) five-part typology, and a loose capacity to organise them will serve to test the impact of RMT on everyday discursive resistance.

Moral resources include legitimacy, solidarity support, sympathetic support and celebrity. As Scott (1990) argues, hidden transcripts are often used as assertions against attacks on dignity by superior classes. Characteristic of a totalitarian regime, the Kim regime maintains a public moral self-righteousness in its public transcript. Nevertheless, moral resources are influencers of human behaviour and can act as mechanisms for reducing, or at least restricting, a hierarchal differentiation of status. However, the Leader's status as a caring and benevolent leader is a moral source of power used to harvest legitimacy. Evidence indicates that those practising everyday discursive resistance share moral norms but do not have a counterforce strong enough to challenge the regime as the central force of morality. In other words, it is difficult for the weak to coalesce in order keep the stronger in check as the latter are above the law (Folger, 2012).

However, human rights discourse and the increasing role of defectors in the dissemination of information into North Korea is significant. By maintaining contact with home communities through broker networks and illegal Chinese mobile phones, alongside smuggling resources and money back into the state, defectors are accelerating the rate of foreign information penetrating North Korean society. More than 28,000 defectors have resettled in South Korea and survey research has estimated that approximately half of them are able to maintain contact and send money back to relatives in North Korea, amounting to around 15 million USD per year. The significant niche market for broker services has become remarkably reliable given that those on North Korea's border regions are able to use mobile banking with their Chinese bank accounts to secure remittances within minutes (Park, 2015). According to an interviewee:

I have spoken with North Koreans who said that radio broadcasts caused them to converse with each other about the indignities of the government. They would quietly communicate about what they called 'myth lies' by the regime. (PT: Participant 6, Washington, D.C., 2017)

In a strange turn, Kim Jong-un's attribution of fault to local authorities has acted as a sort of 'moral authorisation' among individuals to manipulate his public transcript and complain.

> Kim Jong-un has started a pattern of criticising local officials for structural failures. In turn, because he does it, individuals in society have begun to do it. (PT: Participant 1, Seoul, 2017)

From a structural perspective, *cultural resources* are contextual to the North Korean case and include the pre-existing social ties, skills acquired through socialisation, and cultural knowledge. There has been an increase in cultural resources that have fostered an environment of everyday discursive resistance. In particular, a repertoire of communicative disaffection has developed based on social ties.

> Just like in North Korea or anywhere else…relationships formed throughout life through family, classmates and so on, you are able to understand among each other who to speak to and where to speak to them. It is a local thing. (PT: Participant 2, Seoul, 2017)

Socio-organisational resources in North Korea available to subalterns are loose and informal. However, the advent of technological resources builds on increasingly dense communication infrastructures as societies develop and provide a resource that can orchestrate resistance where institutional distrust appears considerable and civic activism is systematically suppressed. For instance, internet use can coincide with a kind of participatory dynamics which are characterised less by formal relationships in society and more by spatially dispersed, loosely-knit personal networks, heavily and increasingly mediated through electronic communication (Breuer et al., 2003). According to an interviewee:

> There are not any organisational platforms in which North Koreans can opine on issues. An increase in illegal Chinese mobile phones and radio sometimes facilitates subversive conversations. (PT: Participant 10, Seoul, 2017)

Moreover, the availability of internet communication technologies may enable groups to communicate with potential constituencies across long distances. Thus, they

constitute important resources to achieve intergroup collaboration and challenge the strategies of social isolation employed by non-democratic regimes (Breuer et al., 2015). However, in North Korea, these internet communications technologies are significantly repressed.

Pertaining to *human resources*, there is no shortage of economically aggrieved individuals, yet there is no significant platform or collective will to mobilise them. As far as material resources in money and other physical capital, the economic resources of defectors have been considered a critical factor in supporting democratic movements in their respective homelands. As noted on moral resources, this is significant in North Korea.[53] *Material resources* emanating from NGOs, making their way into North Korea and China and received by a family represent significant spending power in North Korean markets, as the resource is used beyond securing the well-being of a family to allot bribe money as seed capital for market trading and entrepreneurship. Additionally, this is a platform for laundering remittance money without drawing unnecessary suspicion from neighbours or officials as to where their capital originated (Park, 2015). The ability to learn about South Korea through a direct line of communication with successful defectors is supported by tangible evidence in the form of large quantities of money being sent. In turn, this challenges the Kim regime with the rising potential for defectors to reveal 'inconvenient truths' about it.

Overall, resource mobilisation theory offers a limited explanation for the instigation of everyday discursive resistance. The state's efforts at atomisation of society successfully obstructs the spread of information regarding its failures, to a significant extent. Nevertheless, unpacking the variety of resources available to individuals is indicative of their impact on the linguistic and symbolic challenges embedded in these acts. In particular, moral resources emanating from external sources of information and the cultural resources available in the strategic repertoires of disguising speech are the most salient. However, while the socio-organisational platform latent in technological resources and increasing material resources in the form of capital exists, there has not been a significant will to mobilise them. Thus, the North Korean state remains a critical agent in the contentious

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[53] However, the economic and social standing of North Koreans in the South is still weak and only four defector groups have explicit political goals.

sacralisation of private talk, rendering only quiet communicative exchanges as options for free, honest and open communication.

5.3.1.2 Political Opportunity Theory

The question posed regarding political opportunity theory is the extent to which exogenous factors affect this form of everyday resistance. Tarrow (2011) refers to political opportunity structures as consistent but not necessarily formal, permanent or national dimensions of the political environment that either encourage or discourage people from using action. Unlike money or power, the concept emphasises resources external to a group that can be taken advantage of even by weak, disorganised and resource-poor actors. The dimensions of political opportunity most germane to everyday discursive resistance in North Korea correlate with the general characteristics of 'state strength' and 'regime repressiveness'.

As Johnston (2004) notes, "When political opportunities are severely constricted in repressive regimes, much of the doing of contentious politics is talking about it" (p. 102). However, from its inception, the North Korean state has been efficient in severing social ties that exist outside of state-controlled institutions. Tracing these factors back to the foundations of the Kim regime following the Korean War (1950-1953), Kim Il-sung staked claims of his political legitimacy in nationalist credentials based on his role in the anti-Japanese colonial struggle. Alongside these claims of legitimacy were hierarchal, coercive and authoritative political methods. Rejecting notions relating to the state being nominally separated from the party, instruments of party control subordinated individuals to the interests of the state as party officials dominated and controlled institutions of government (Smith, 2015).

Arguably at an unprecedented peak in world history, political organisation as a mass-mobilised population, a key trait of totalitarianism, was driven by loyalty to the leader, whose policies were enacted by the Party according to his will. These organisations acted as mechanisms of economic development, civil defence and social control, while all activities simultaneously reinforced and reiterated the political ideology that centred on self-reliance in ideology, politics and military affairs. Employment was guaranteed, as all able-bodied adults were expected to work in Party-controlled institutions and provided with

food rations, accommodation and other social benefits. Here, when the ideological apparatus failed to prevent deviations from hierarchal value and norm structures, the pervasive institutions of coercion, including the military, police and security services, were responsible for varying degrees of 'revolutionary discipline' (Smith, 2015).

The high capacity to repress that is typical of totalitarian regimes remained entrenched throughout Kim Il-sung's leadership, while cultural and intellectual production under state control were focused on proliferating regime symbolism in society, alongside hagiography and mythology surrounding the Kim family to enhance the entrenchment of ideological fervour. Political opportunity for everyday discursive dissent during Kim Il-sung's leadership was negligible. Political, social and economic structures overlapped under the central power structure to the extent that the public transcript pervaded all aspects of life.

Long prepared for succession, Kim Jong-Il had already consolidated a loyal power base of elites while gradually ascending to control the military with his self-appointment as the first Vice Chairman of the National Defence Commission in 1990. By virtue of holding this position, upon Kim Il-sung's death in 1994 he was able to consolidate central leadership (Smith, 2015). However, alongside exogenous shock from the collapse of the Soviet Union and Eastern bloc and Kim Il-sung's death, Kim Jong-Il's leadership oversaw a decentralisation of the economy, high rates of repression and a slight alteration of the political structure. After the famine and into the 2000s, social control in the manner of physical, institutional and ideological coercion was disrupted by bureaucratic politics rearing its head during the Kim Jong-Il leadership. The organisational lives of people through membership in state-socialist organisations and associations were also deteriorating and the ideological disposition to hierarchal value and norm structures became increasingly undermined by 'facts on the ground'. A 'market syndrome' eclipsed the regime's rhetoric as a greater willingness to communicate with one's peers was in tow (Haggard & Noland, 2011).

> People really portrayed distaste for Kim Jong-Il. While they were not able to say much during the famine due to high levels of stress and fatigue, people have told me of the spaces in which they would grumble about him, relating his leadership to a disaster. (PT: Participant 9, Seoul, 2017)

The high levels of repression that were maintained during the famine of the 1990s would ease as marketisation crept into the everyday lives of North Koreans. While political complaints were still off limits as far as the discursive elements in society, high levels of bribery and increasing free spaces in the marketplace facilitated an increase in subversive talk. A culture of muted criticism developed as the relative autonomy of officials and arbitrary nature of the legal system fostered such a situation. Through state rhetoric, the informal politics of private family-directed economic and social networking was deemed non-political and thus a safe place in which economic and social activity could be organised, yet non-state organisational life remained unpermitted.

> When the Suryeong was alive, the state was doing fine. There were no problems with production. After his passing, production began to deteriorate. From then, because of problems with production our lives worsened. So, if you ask me, things are now much worse now than under Kim Il Sung. What are lower level workers supposed to think of the leaders of the people? (DT: Green, 2011, p. 27, female from South Pyongan Province)

From the perspective of political structures, communist institutional models that conflated state and Party were maintained, but the government stressed military-first politics as a new form of political organisation. It remained ideologically opposed to marketisation from above but in practice relied on it from below. Constitutional changes in 1998 and 2009 altered structures to reflect the dominance of the military in domestic politics. Ideology and institutional conflicts between the Party and military did provide a basis of intra-elite conflict, as elite members routinely held positions in both civilian and military hierarchies so that they had loyalties to both institutions. Having a lot to lose from regime collapse, a third generation of elite families had fragmented and conflictual personal interests as individual allegiances become opportunistic and unstable (Smith, 2015).

The Songun politics of the Kim Jong-Il era did not represent a fundamental change to the administrative structure of government, political or legal philosophy as politics remained antithetical to liberal notions and to the rights of individuals to challenge the state by recourse to law. Members of society were expected to model the traits of soldiers in obedience, discipline and subordination to leadership. The interest of the collective society was put first, while political and social rhetoric continued to hail the superiority of the state

system. State policy did not change much as the mass mobilisation of the Kim Il-sung era transformed into military-first politics, given that the superseding object of regime survival dominated domestic and foreign policies (Smith, 2015). This situation has continued to have effects even under Kim Jong-un's leadership.

> Not surprisingly, word of the incident [of murder committed by a sergeant agent] circulated fast, accompanied by deprecating remarks about the military's lack of discipline. A lot of people mockingly point out that army members are supposed to be the guardians of the homeland, but instead, they have become a money earning operation that will do anything and everything to earn a buck. (DT: Kim, August 2016, para. 10, source in Ryanggang Province)

The decentralisation of the economy has created incentives for poorly paid officials to waive and reduce penalties as the legal system becomes more porous. The decentralisation of the economy and declining capacity to repress the inflow of foreign information has facilitated a breakdown in state capacity to reward acquiescence and punish dissent, allowing North Koreans to carve out a space for limited freedoms, primarily in daily economic decision-making. This resulted in a culture of corruption that was instituted into everyday politics during Kim Jong-Il's leadership and contributed to a weakening capacity for the regime to repress due to the softening of social control.

The succession of Kim Jong-un presented more uncertainty as to how his legitimacy would be perceived. As he continues to fashion his regime, Kim Jong-un has made minor policy changes and exacerbated existing policy, primarily through his byungjin line that asserts the symbiosis of economic development and military enhancement. In terms of regime repressiveness, a 2015 defector survey of 103 foreign radio listeners in North Korea reported 77% attesting to more severe punishments for such behaviour under Kim Jong-un (BBG Survey of North Korean Defectors and Travelers, 2015).

> Frequently at local Party meetings and education sessions, North Koreans are tested for their guilt. For example, they may be asked about a certain South Korean show. The reply, according to North Koreans in exile, is always the same: I've never watched a South Korean TV show … Once we were certain the police were out of earshot, we would laugh at their hypocrisy. We know that they too were watching South Korean TV shows. (DT: Defector, Trends in NK 2014, 2015)

The process of economic decentralisation also increased the difficulty in repressing the inflow of foreign information. The control of information filtering in and out of the state has long been subject to the Kim regime's efficient apparatus of information control. Across state borders and among individuals, the government and security forces pursue the goal of strictly controlling inflows and outflows of information. Assumption of communication between each other, through incentivising snitching and monitoring of cellular communication, has constrained the prospect of collective action. However, technology has cross-border movement and has presented challenges for the information cordon (Baek, 2016). This provides individuals, for instance, with an arsenal of information to complain about.

> The process of marketisation has been the key for subversive discourses. It has made the quelling of foreign information very difficult for the people. Armed with such information, complaints are rife and rumours spread fast. This is the ultimate empowerment. People stop short of talking too loud and must be careful because of snitches. Yes, I have been told many times that information because of marketisation is very significant. (PT: Participant 6, Washington, D.C., 2017)

In addition, decentralisation of the economy has also facilitated the growth of intercity travel and the infrequency of train services, meaning that North Korean trains are overflowing with people, providing an opportunity to socialise. Non-official gatherings of four or more people are potentially illegal in North Korea, making it difficult for any group activity to exist outside the discretion of authorities, but the train is a notable exception, and the fact that passengers will likely not meet again emboldens them to be more open with one another. Traditionally, North Korea is a society that values performance and lively storytelling, which makes for a livening up of long rail journeys with songs, jokes or vulgar tales. More importantly, train travellers are known for sharing news and rumours, and even conveying criticism of the authorities (Tudor & Pearson, 2015). An interviewee remarked on this development.

> The increase in movement due to the economy's decentralisation has increased the amount of information people share with each other. Of course, if caught discussing such things, they are in trouble…but it has increased non-sanctioned discussions, nevertheless. (PT: Participant 9, Seoul, 2017)

The intensity of the state's efforts to atomise the population and promulgate their ideologies and national narratives has resulted in extremely limited access to information and expression for the population. The two main sources of foreign information inside the state result from cross-border movement involving legal or illegal work and trade, primarily in China, and through new information technologies available through the market economy (Park, 2015). The insights and realities gained in China spread in North Korea by word of mouth and the foreign media facilitated by the market economy has caused an erosion of the state's control through their information cordon. According to a defector who managed a farm in North Hamgyong Province:

> During Kim Jong Il's reign, unless you are among family members only, you couldn't openly express dissatisfaction about the government's policies. On the other hand, now in the Kim Jong Un era, we talk a lot about this with most friends. Even the SSD guards say, 'What can we do, we just have to live by the national laws.' (DT: Kretchun et al., 2017, p. 29, male, 46, North Hamgyong Province, manager at a collective farm, left NK 2015)

International pressure from global regimes such as trade (sanctions), environmental, human rights and so on have found their way into public discourse. While the regime thrives on brinkmanship diplomacy and, to an extent, receiving external threats that enhance domestic legitimacy, there is a sector of the population that expresses discontent toward these policies.

> Nobody trusts what the authorities say any more. They always cheat. They don't deliver any real news. They only give us information in their favor. So nobody listens to the government. North Koreans are not what they used to be … As outside information is blocked, if the government announces a successful missile launch we respond like, 'Aha! They did it!' … North Koreans don't know how much it costs (for nuclear and missile tests). If people knew how much money went to these things they'd say it is ridiculous … Frankly speaking, I think that the money should be spent feeding people. (DT: Kang, October 2017, para. 3-5, woman living in northern North Korea)

Kim Jong-un's extension of terror through elite[54] purges has also facilitated the expression of dissatisfaction among individuals in closed quarters.

> (He) killed his uncle and furthermore step brother (Kim Jong-nam) … He went far beyond human ethics … That greenhorn really knows anything about politics or the real world? He just mimics his grandfather (Kim Il-sung). (DT: Ishimaru, 2017, p. 2, source in North Korea)

Moreover, Kim Jong-un's leadership has overseen an increased alignment with the emerging middle-class, the 'donju', further alienating the lower classes from resources. Individuals in this class began to trade goods in private markets when repression of such activities was eased and the 2002 economic measures further pushed them to invest accumulated capital in ventures such as karaoke bars. Given this alignment of interest, the donju have even assisted in financing some of the government's development projects (Habib, 2015). In addition, official public-state power and institutions are rapidly coopted into the informal 'donju economy' and governing elites in the party, cabinet, and military have become rent-seeking accomplices to emerging trade networks. Again, this political opportunity afforded to the donju class has upset some in the lower classes.

> The majority of Pyongyang citizens are beginning to detest the donju, who ignore the suffering of ordinary people while spending ridiculous amounts of money openly. Some of the more opinionated residents are saying that, 'They (the cadres and donju) should be bumped off first if a war breaks out. (DT: Ah, March 2017, para. 8, source in Pyongyang)

An interviewee related a similar observation that supports the above digital testimony.

> There are certainly more reports of individuals slagging off Kim Jong-un as opposed to his father and grandfather due to his age and questions of his leadership capabilities. The issue is that people are actually somewhat better off under his leadership than they were under his father. The majority of complaints come from the rising status of the donju. Inequality among different classes is more apparent to people under Kim Jong-un. (PT: Participant 5, Bangkok, 2017)

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[54] Elites in North Korea are divided according to (1) geographical region, (2) generation, (3) policy orientation (e.g. pro-China or self-reliance), (4) whether they are communist party members or die-hard military men.

Ultimately, the hidden transcript is least inhibited when surveillance and repression are isolated from its quarters and are operating among those with similar experiences of subjugation. While change among political opportunity structures is not itself sufficient to explain everyday discursive resistance, structural change often precedes other developments and therefore serves as a guide for understanding a particular pattern of resistance as a whole. While a clear pattern is difficult to ascertain, it does appear that shifts in political opportunity serve as a limited explanation of everyday discursive resistance in North Korea. The main dimensions of opportunity for such resistance have resulted from the decentralisation of the economic subsystem through marketisation, private business and the growth of unofficial influences through access to foreign information, indicating the weakening capacity of the regime to repress. The most salient point to take from this explanation is the opportunity created by the marketplaces that allow individuals some degree of non-politicised space to articulate counter-discourses.

5.3.2 Ideational Explanations

This section draws on the ideational paradigm of social movement theory to assess three different plausible explanations in accounting for the emergence everyday discursive resistance. Changing value-orientations will be considered in the determination of value-oriented theory as a factor in the emergence of this variant. Framing theory will evaluate the extent to which frames affect individual perceptions of social issues and regime legitimacy to trigger everyday discursive resistance. Lastly, social psychology theory will weigh the effects of five categories of emotions on the exercise of this variety of everyday resistance - urges, reflex emotions, moods, affective commitments and moral emotions.

5.3.2.1 Value-Oriented Theory

The question posed here is the extent to which value-orientation may account for the emergence of everyday discursive resistance in North Korea. Three ways in which value-orientation may affect behaviour are through the valuation of incentives according to

one's identity, belligerence and conflict with the 'other', and the role and logic of appropriateness.

Individuals, especially the younger generation, do not seem to associate with the values of collectivism and socialism embedded in activities that once were able to incur enthusiasm through moral incentives. For example, North Korea attempts to mobilise society for labour in projects it terms military-style 'speed battles', in which an economic task was transformed into a battle to be won within a specified number of days. In addition, enthusiasm was incited for participation in political events. Evidence suggests that the younger generation[55] do not identify with such incentives.

> Nowadays, people are accustomed to making a living on their own, and no one is really interested in Central Party political events. This is especially true for the younger generation, who strongly believe that 'loyalty' is not sustenance and their new master is entrepreneurship. (DT: Kang, 2017, para. 3, source in South Pyongan Province)

More significantly, belligerence and conflict emanating from individuals' differentiation with traditional societal values is embedded in everyday discursive resistance. Kim Jong-un's message is beginning to assume the role of 'other' as individuals are no longer associating with it.

> The younger generation today is different from the older generation, which dared not make critical remarks about the North Korean system … They are more open-minded and critical than the older generation. When they meet up, these young people tend not to hesitate to criticize their supreme leader Kim Jong-un and the [ruling] Workers' Party. (DT: Kim, April 2017, para. 4-5, resident of Pyongyang who spoke under condition of anonymity while traveling in China)

Additionally, individuals are seeking to fulfil the obligations encapsulated in their growing independence.

> As the markets grown, people do not identify with the state as much. They do not receive anything from the state. They are gaining independence and have to find their own identities. (PT: Participant 7, Washington, D.C., 2017)

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[55] This refers to those 14-30 years of age.

Traditional culture and ideology are not necessarily *completely* rejected by this generation, but certain aspects seem to be less internalised. Therefore traditional government propaganda runs the risk of becoming increasingly irrelevant and hollow, and possibly even counter-productive with this generation.

> When I was in North Korea, I did not have much interest and was indifferent to whether they developed nuclear weapons or launched a missile. However, I did feel a bit of pride when the satellites were launched. There was a movie I watched called 'The Country I Saw' and it was about satellite launches. On the other hand, I never believed we had a strong army since soldiers also barely survived on two potatoes a day. (DT: Kretchun et al., 2017, p. 30, Female, 20, North Hamgyong Province, candy maker, left NK 2013)

An interviewee who spends a significant amount of time with defectors of this generation supported this perception.

> North Korean values such as loyalism, socialism, ethno-nationalism and so on do not resonate as an identity with these people. It leads them to ridicule the regime's handle of everyday life. (PT: Participant 9, Seoul, 2017)

Overall, a common theme in the data suggests that identity may play a role in explaining everyday discursive resistance according to a generational divide. The jangmadang generation refers to North Koreans born in the 1980s and 1990s, therefore constituting a 'young adult' demographic currently aged around 18-35. This age group makes up approximately 25% of the total population (6 million people) (Park, 2015). In stark contrast to their parents' generation, many jangmadang generation defectors report having no memory of receiving anything from the government, or they may have received only token amounts of rations. Instead they grew up in a period where they and their families faced hardship and were reliant on the markets and their own business activities, and the government was more of an obstruction than a provider. Many of them have assisted their parents' informal business activities since childhood, and some even started their own private entrepreneurial activities from an early age. Market activities therefore represent the natural state of the world for this new generation. Having never experienced

socialism makes them qualitatively different from previous generations of North Koreans (Park, 2015).

Furthermore, those born into this generation received less state-provided education during times of severe economic hardship in the 1990s when absenteeism in North Korea schools was rife, and in any case much of the traditional socialist ideology and key state narratives such as government benevolence did not match up with the reality of the society in which they grew up. In addition, this generation came of age at a time when unprecedented access to foreign information and media, youthful curiosity, risk tolerance and peer competition naturally made them the vanguard of foreign media consumption in North Korea (Park, 2015).

Hence, changing incentives, a differentiation with the regime's prescribed values and identification with different roles are all embedded in the everyday patterns of discursive dissent in North Korea. Traditional values such as collectivism, loyalty and so forth are no longer strongly identified with by some people and the rhetoric espousing those values has led to subversive discourse in closed quarters. Thus, value-oriented theory has strong explanatory relevance to this variant of everyday resistance.

5.3.2.2 Framing Theory

The question posed here is the extent to which framing tasks and processes may account for the emergence of this variety in North Korea. When a problem or injustice is perceived and resonates with an individual, it may instigate everyday resistance. In particular, the individual-level effects of frames relating to their impact in thought on subsequent behaviour or attitudes is of interest in this study.

Framing theory argues for the relevance of cognitive processes where people bring to bear background knowledge to interpret an event or circumstance and to locate it in a larger system of meaning. Through framing processes, actors invoke one frame or set of meanings rather than another when they communicate, thereby indicating how the message is to be understood. In everyday interaction, framing is often done subtly and with extra-linguistic cues. Snow and Benford (1988) address the three core framing tasks as: (1) diagnostic framing that identifies a problem and assigns blame; (2) prognostic framing that

suggests solutions, strategies and tactics to a problem; and (3) motivational framing as a call to arms or rationale for action.

Evidence suggests diagnostic framing as operating in North Korea.

Yes, on the sly, [we] know that it is the regime's fault that we don't live as comfortably as others, like China. We know, we talk about [it], but it has to remain quiet. (PT: Participant 4, New Zealand, 2018)

However, the prognostic task is not as relevant as that of the diagnostic to everyday discursive resistance.

Solutions or alternatives? It is not so possible at the moment. It doesn't really cause us to talk badly. No plans, no alternatives, just the jokes and sometimes swearing. (PT: Participant 4, New Zealand, 2018)

While motivational framing is not evident, in addition to the diagnostic, prognostic and motivational framing tasks, four types of frame alignment may construct socio-political issues. These are *frame bridging, frame amplification, frame extensions* and *frame transformations*. For each type of alignment, there are corresponding mobilisation tasks and processes. The underlying premise is that, of one variety or another, nature or intensity, it is typically an interactional accomplishment and is a (pre) condition for movement participation. *Frame bridging* can occur at the individual or organisational level and refers to the linkage of two or more ideologically congruent but structurally unconnected frames regarding a particular issue or problem (Snow, 2008). For example, a North Korean residing in the north of the country suggested that behind-the-scenes discourse may be bridging dissatisfaction of the execution of Jang Song Thaek with his plans to reform the state along the lines of capitalism.

People are very much scared. Even a person like Jang Song-taek who had a strong power base in the state can be executed. It is beyond our imaginations to think about what kind of circumstances people like us, who do not have any power, will face. Most probably many people will be killed in connection to the purge of Jang song-taek. There is a rumour that anybody who had a connection with Jang will be subject to liquidation … There are a considerable number of people who are feeling of a kind of aversion to the purge of Jang Song-taek. The opinion is that if Jang's plans for political change were successful, the people's life could be much easier. It would be great if people's life conditions improve, even if we

implement capitalism. Everybody who has a smart mind has, more or less, this kind of opinion. But of course it is not possible to express these opinions publicly, so it is only spoken behind closed doors. (DT: Paek, January 2014, para. 3-9, North Korean residing in the north of the country)

Frame amplification refers to the clarification and invigoration of an interpretive frame that bears on a particular issue, problem or set of events. The meaning of events and their connection to one's immediate life situation are often hidden by indifference, deception or fabrication by others, and by ambiguity or uncertainty, which leads support for and participation in movement activities to be frequently contingent on the clarification and reinvigoration of an interpretive frame (Snow et al., 2008). Snow et al. (2008) suggest value and belief amplification as two varieties of this alignment. As individuals subscribe to a range of values that vary in the degree to which they are compatible and attainable, they are normally arrayed in a hierarchy such that some have greater salience than others. Hence, value amplification refers to "the identification, idealization, and elevation of one or more values presumed basic to prospective constituents but which have not inspired collective action for any number of reasons … Atrophied, fallen into disuse, or have been suppressed because of the lack of an opportunity for expression due to a repressive authority structure or the absence of an organizational outlet …" (Snow, 1986, p. 469). Belief amplification refers to presumed relationships between two things, or between something and one of its characteristics. With no official institutional channels to voice dissatisfaction in North Korea, it is not surprising that frame amplification has not spurred collective action on a large scale. However, subversive discursive interactions among individuals may provide a partial explanation for their increase. For example, take the amplification of capitalist values and the manner in which they may be juxtaposed to those of a socialist nature.

Illegal foreign media that is shared, sold and watched among trusted contacts fosters horizontal linkages. Recent defectors have reported that subversive discourse about the leadership is caused by more than just a for-profit motive. Even so, that [profit] value in everyday life has turned conversation away for the regime's brand of socialism. (PT: Participant 9, Seoul, July 2017)

Frame extension refers to the incorporation of interests or points of view that are incidental to actors' primary objectives but of considerable salience to potential adherents.

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In this situation, actors are attempting to enlarge their followers by portraying activities or objectives as attending to or being congruent with the values or interests of potential adherents. In the case of North Korea, evidence of this tactic is absent. Everyday discursive resistance has not developed into these organizational/networking tactics. However, something close to this may be strategic slandering of the regime to boost discursive resistance.

Frame transformation addresses the programmes, causes and values that some actors promote that may not resonate with or, on occasion, may seem antithetical to conventional lifestyles or rituals and existing interpretive frames. Such a transformation redefines activities, events and biographies that are already meaningful from the position of some primary framework, in terms of another framework, such that they are now seen by the participants to be something else (Snow, 1986). It is a "systematic alteration that radically reconstitutes what is for participants that is going on" (Goffman, 1974, p. 308). Domain-specific and global interpretive frames are two transformation processes that are pertinent to this type of alignment. Both of these require more than the development of an 'injustice frame', as something may be considered an injustice, while blame or responsibility is internalised or externalised. In order to represent frame transformation, an injustice frame must be accompanied by a shift corresponding in attributive orientation (Snow et al., 2008). Transformation of domain-specific frames may include particular life domains such as consumption patterns, social relationships, dietary habits and so on. For global interpretative frames, the scope is broadened to a new primary framework gaining ascendance over others and comes to function as a kind of 'master frame' that interprets events and experiences in a new manner (Snow et al., 2008). As for causing everyday discursive resistance, transformation of frames was evident in the data. For instance, individuals are now questioning their own government as unjust in situations that would normally entail discourse externalising blame to the United States and South Korea.

Overall, framing theory holds modest explanatory salience for the emergence of everyday discursive resistance. While its diagnostic dimension seems to be inherent among these acts, its prognostic and motivational tasks are absent. Hence, while the articulation of blame that is a component of framing theory may inspire people to speak in a similarly discursive manner, its causal impact is not highly significant.

5.3.2.3 Social Psychology Theory

The question posed here is the extent to which emotions may account for the emergence of everyday discursive resistance in North Korea. Recent social psychology theory focuses on the role of emotion in politics, society and protest, where different levels and manifestations of emotion may provide a causal explanation as to everyday patterns of discursive resistance in North Korea. Jasper (2006) addresses the degree to which emotions are defined by context and culture in the same way that cognitive meanings are. He distinguishes between emotions that are transitory responses to external events and new information (e.g., anger, indignation, fear) and underlying positive and negative effects (e.g. loyalties to or fears of groups, individuals, places, symbols, moral principles). In order to determine the effect of emotions on everyday discursive resistance, urges, reflex emotions, affects, moods and moral emotions will be investigated.

In the North Korean context, totalitarian regimes try to fill the emotional vacuum created by secularisation, with political rituals and liturgies derived from or inspired by religion. What is more difficult to ascertain is to what extent leaders, party organisation members and ordinary citizens have succumbed to those pseudo-religious efforts to give meaning to their lives, and the extent to which participation in those rituals has evoked feelings comparable to those of religious rituals (Linz, 2000). The North Korean regime to a large extent attempts to inculcate emotion in this manner.

> It's like a religion. From birth, you learn about the Kim family, learn that they are gods, that you must be absolutely obedient to the Kim family. The elites are treated nicely, and because of that the system stays stable. But for everyone else, it's a reign of terror. The Kim family uses terror to keep people scared, and that makes it impossible to stage any kind of social gathering, let alone an uprising. (DT: Fifield, 2017, doctor, Hyesan, 42, defected 2014)

However, a loss of emotional fervour may play a role in the willingness of some individuals to challenge prevailing discourses.

> I also cried bitterly when Kim Il Sung died but when Kim Jong-Il died, I didn't shed a tear. When the rations stopped and after experiencing the Arduous March, there was no affection for the government.

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You can say that, at that time, people who didn't trust the government became rich while those who believed the government died. (DT: Kretchun, et al., 2017, p. 70, female, 57, North Hamgyong Province, industrial chemist)

In the long-term, this growing psychological independence is a significant threat to the government's domestic legitimacy and its ability to maintain control through traditional ideology and propaganda.

Urges are immediate-term goals of action, not usually interesting for politics, except that their urgency suggests conditions under which humans are distracted from political goals. A person may take enormous risks for longer-term projects to satisfy a momentary desire, whereas those suffering famine or other deprivation will not devote time and resources to political organising. However, not all risks are unforeseen and one may go to great lengths to satisfy desires or prevent painful urges. Individuals make elaborate plans to satisfy lusts or work especially hard to avoid severe deprivation for oneself, including sometimes political projects (Jasper, 2006). Urges may lead one to discursively resist, but individuals seem to be able to control these regarding their interactions for the most part.

Reflex emotions are fairly quick, automatic responses to events and information, often taken as the paradigm for all emotions - anger, fear, joy, surprise, shock, and disgust. These may all play a role in everyday discursive resistance.

Moods are energising and de-energising feelings that persist across settings and do not normally take direct objects; they can be changed by reflex emotions, as during interactions. Hence, these are salient regarding everyday discursive resistance.

Affective commitments are relatively stable feelings, positive or negative, about others or about objects, such as love and hate, liking and disliking, trust or mistrust, respect or contempt. These are relevant to the emergence of everyday discursive resistance as, in the past, trust and respect for the regime was much higher. Now, feelings of distrust and contempt are embedded in the everyday discourse of individuals. Thus, arguably, these feelings trigger the subversive language itself.

Moral emotions are feelings of approval or disapproval (including of one's own self and actions) based on moral intuitions or principles, such as shame, guilt, pride, indignation, outrage and compassion (Jasper, 2014). These are relevant in amplifying the willingness to speak in a precarious manner.

The causal significance of emotions pertaining to the facilitation of everyday discursive resistance is arguably modest. While they may trigger subversive discourse in closed quarters, they do not appear integral to this variation. However, far from a strategic calculation, they do underpin individual choice pertaining to these acts, as fear or moral unease, trust or admiration may lead to linguistic expression.

5.4 Conclusion: A Theory on Discursive Resistance in North Korea

Bleiker (2003), referencing a scene of obscenity toward the powerful on a bathroom wall, noted that it "is enough to evoke the subversive aspects of this act. Anonymity provided the security necessary to scream out what cannot even be whispered in the face of the oppressors… clear target, but no visible author, no agitator who could be prosecuted… [the] audience is potentially limitless" (p. 35).

The objective of this chapter was to explore the qualitative variation of everyday resistance in North Korea as 'discursive' and test a set of explanations as to their causal significance in triggering this social behaviour. It has demonstrated a sample of how the practices qualitatively converge through linguistically and symbolically expressive anti-regime codes expressed in hidden transcripts. Moreover, the facilitative structural and ideational factors underpinning these practices add to an understanding of when and why individuals choose to act.

As to the structural explanations, RMT set out the premise that the availability of certain resources, coupled with a primitive ability to mobilise them, fostered a favourable environment for this variant of resistance. Political opportunity theory suggested that decentralisation of the economy (likely) provided safer spaces in the markets for subversive discourse. Regarding ideational explanations, value-oriented theory revealed increasing identification with alternative sets of values as, to an extent, underpinning subversive discourse. The explanatory salience of frame theory was evident as the content of the conversation tended to situate itself within an unjust socio-political environment. In the social psychology approach, emotion seemingly played a role through amplifying anger and inciting its linguistic expression. As a 'building block' for typological theory on everyday resistance in North Korea, the discursive variation discussed in this chapter

confirms the hypothesis of a qualitatively distinct type of everyday resistance manifesting itself linguistically and symbolically in everyday life.

Thus, everyday discursive resistance is a practice underscored by the elusiveness and creativity of linguistic and symbolic hidden transcripts among ordinary North Koreans. Laced with anti-regime codes, these practices have the potential to undermine hierarchal discursive structures. Evidence supports the argument that resources and favourable opportunity structures are overshadowed by the ideational impact of values, perceptive frames and, to a lesser extent, amplifying emotions.

Chapter 6: Biopolitical Resistance

6.1 Introduction

Totalitarian systems maintain an exclusive, autonomous and intellectually elaborate ideology that the ruling group or leader, and the party serving the leaders, identify with and use as a basis for policies or manipulation to legitimise policies. The ideology has some boundaries beyond which lies heterodoxy that is not authorised. The ideology goes beyond a particular programme or definition of the boundaries of legitimate political action to provide, presumably, some ultimate meaning, sense of historical purpose, and interpretation of social reality (Linz, 2000). This stipulation emphasises the entrenched nature of ideology that permeates and dictates everyday relations in totalitarian societies. However, Scott (1990) argues that the major historical forms of domination that have presented themselves as metaphysics, a religion or a worldview have provoked the development of a more or less equally elaborate confrontation to such systematic doctrine. Accordingly, this chapter seeks to develop an understanding of the everyday practices that resist the imposition of the Kim regime's ideology to the immanent domain of everyday North Korean life. However, this study argues in line with Kuran (1995) that Scott overstates this variation in his typology of resistance in suggesting it as complete cognitive autonomy from ideological domination. Instead, Kuran argues that one can resist an oppressor and still fail to fully develop autonomy of one's own due to social conditions created by that oppressor.

Hence, this chapter adopts the theory of biopolitics as an alternative lens through which to explore this variation of everyday resistance in North Korea. Initiated by Michel Foucault's genealogical research on the governance of sexuality, crime and mental illness in modern Europe, the concept of biopolitics has recently developed into a much wider research orientation, addressing the rationalities of power over living beings in a variety of spatial and temporal contexts. The study of biopolitics is not limited to the empirical investigation of power relations in such areas as public health or sexuality, hygiene or the rearing of children, but rather pertains to the 'mode' in which political power takes life as its object, the manner in which power engages with life, for example as an object of protection, regulation and transformation (Prozorov, 2016). Prozorov operationalises

biopolitics neither as an alternative nor a successor to a purely ideological or ideational politics, but rather refers to the *"reciprocal problematisation of life and idea"* (p. 67) in how life should be lived in accordance with an idea or how a given idea should be translated into life. Against this backdrop, the aim of the current chapter is to demonstrate a pattern of everyday resistance that undermines the Kim regime's biopolitics and test possible variables relating to the emergence of the resistance.

This chapter begins with an overview of the key literature on the concept of biopolitics before presenting a range of everyday resistance that challenges its operation in North Korea. Self-affirmative and self-detrimental patterns of everyday biopolitical resistance are then explored before shifting to possible causal explanations as to their emergence. Lastly, a conclusion will propose a theory on the biopolitical variety of everyday resistance in North Korea.

6.2 The Biopolitical Variety of Resistance in North Korea

Practices of resistance may mitigate daily patterns of material appropriation, while gestures of negation in hidden transcripts may answer daily insults to dignity. However, at the level of systematic social doctrine, subordinate groups confront elaborate ideologies that justify inequality, bondage, monarchy, caste, and so forth. Resistance at this level requires a more elaborate riposte, one that goes beyond disconnected practices of resistance. In other words, resistance to ideological domination requires a counter-ideology—a negation—that will effectively provide a general normative form to the bevy of resistant practices intended in self-defence by any subordinate group (Scott, 1990). In North Korea, the immanence of ideology in everyday life is not challenged by an elaborate negation. While similar to Scott's notion of everyday resistance staked in counter-ideology, this study argues that such behaviour rests in a 'self-affirmative' or 'self-detrimental' everyday resistance to biopolitics. Hence, coined 'biopolitical' in this study, it represents the third variant of everyday resistance in North Korea.

Theorists of biopolitics have suggested forms of resistance that range from the self-production of 'alterity', being 'other', techniques of self-care or self-destruction that elude the state's politicisation of life. Biopolitics extends focus on political power from traditional functions of defending territory and enforcing the law toward the projects of

positive management of the vital processes of the population. According to Prozorov (2016), a narrow reading of the concept limits its examination to socio-medical governmental interventions that seek to positively impact the life of the population by improving longevity, increasing birth rates, lowering mortality rates and so forth. However, he argues for a broader reading of the concept that goes beyond strictly biological (physical and natural) aspects and rather inquires as to the forms of life presupposed and effected in the rationalities of government. Hence, rather than separating biopolitics from ideology, the question posed should ask "*how ideology itself becomes political*" (p. x), that is, how its ideas are to be converted into life in governmental practices. According to this logic, the object of biopolitics must be expanded beyond the strictly biological understanding of life towards the entirety of human existence and its domain beyond the medico-social field of intervention, covering the wider socio-economic domain (Prozorov, 2012).

Foucault and Agamben represent the two most referenced scholars in the field of biopolitics and their respective works are often distinguished from one another. Foucault argues that biopolitics emerged in the West during the eighteenth century seeking a rationale of governance through principles and limits of its exercise according to the idea of individual liberty. Agamben, on the other hand, reads biopolitics as 'at least as ancient' as sovereign power. While Foucauldian approaches tend to focus on historically discontinuous series of the positive governance of life, Agambenian orientations affirm the historical continuity of the negative operation of biopolitics as the reduction of positive forms of life to 'bare life'. Prozorov (2016) notes the compatibility of the two orientations through the case of Stalinism and its desire to produce socialism as a positive form of life aligned with the Foucauldian 'discontinuist' approach on the one hand and, on the other, the radical negativity of subjectivity it fashions with Agamben's notion of 'bare life' as the product of biopolitics.

To elaborate on Agamben's notion of biopolitics, the Roman figure of the 'homo sacer' is representative of the ancient origin of biopolitics. In Roman law, this figure had all political rights stripped and could be killed by anyone. Hence, its life was only included in the juridical order in the form of its exclusion, that is, the capacity to be killed. The sovereign, however, is the figure that stands both within the law (susceptible to condemnation) and outside the law (able to suspend law for an indefinite period). This

capacity indicates the inability of all life to be subsumed by the law. Thus, a 'state of emergency' is inclusive of life and necessity in the order of law solely in the form of its exclusion (i.e., that is, the figure of homo sacer). Hence, Agamben criticises Foucault for not connecting his analysis of biopolitics with totalitarianism and neglecting to extend his analysis into Agamben's perceived primary spaces of biopolitical state violence: the camps of totalitarianism, where power confronts its victims with the greatest intensity - the camp is "the hidden matrix and nomos of the political space in which we are all living" (Bargu, 2014, p. 73).

Hence, Agamben's conception of 'bare life' in the figure of the 'inclusive exclusion' of homo sacer reflects the idea that life serving as the object of governmental practices is unqualified life or literally any life there is (*zoe*). The life that is the *telos* of political rationality is a qualified, positive form of life (*bios*). Biopolitics, then, is the transformation of unqualified life into qualified life through political rationalities in which unqualified life (*zoe*) is the object of politicisation that may be either positive or negative. Thus, biopolitics is the 'inclusive exclusion' of *zoe* into *bios*. Therefore, *zoe* is an object included in the marginalised, subordinated or suppressed position of being excluded, "as if politics were the place in which life had to transform itself into good life and in which what had to be politicised were already bare life" (Prozorov, 2016, p. 69). This refers to the notion that biopolitics exists in the negation of unqualified life in the process of its politicisation as good life (i.e., transformation of *zoe* into *bios*). Irreducible to mere government for its own sake, there is nothing in *zoe* that could lead or direct government activity, no content or qualification that politics could immediately appropriate as value. Even the most 'biological' modes of governance such as Nazism idealised a privileged form of *bios*, in whose image *zoe* is to be transformed, maintained, or secured (Prozorov, 2016).

Foucault's earlier work provided a more general medium for addressing the governmental problematisation of life in its essential confluence of *power over life* (making live) and the negative power of death (letting die) (Prozorov, 2016). Thus, "As an object of problematisation, life always figures in biopolitical rationality in a dual manner, as a problem and a solution, an end and a means, a *telos* and an instrument" (Prozorov, 2016, p. 68). As Foucault argues, when the state is invested in protecting the life of the population,

the dark side of biopolitics in governmental violence or in some cases thanatopolitics[56], groups identified as a threat to the well-being of the population may be eradicated with impunity. In this manner, biopolitical violence is not extrinsic to biopolitics or its pervasive exercise of power. As noted, in all biopolitical rationalities, life is viewed in two senses: as the unqualified life (*zoe*) serving as the object of governmental practices; and as the qualified life (*bios*) that serves as the ultimate aim of biopolitical rationalities (Prozorov, 2016). So, to reiterate, state biopolitics is defined as the transformation of unqualified life (*zoe*) into qualified life (*bios*) through political rationalities, in which *zoe* is the object of positive or negative politicization. However, this 'dark side' that Foucault describes and Agamben refers to as thanatopolitics at the micro-level can be both a response and resistance to state biopolitics, according to Murray (2006). In this manner, death destroys the very condition of possibility for biopolitical regulation and control, as the dead are unable to be subjected to the mechanism of justice. While detrimental, it is clearly a form of negation, yet it may also be understood as a productive act in its production of something that has rhetorical effects not easily understood within a biopolitical logic (Murray, 2006).

Hence, in everyday life under totalitarian systems, there is exclusion by commitment to an ideology of other systems of ideas or the fear of questioning values implicit in that hierarchal ideology (Linz, 2000). While no exception, embedded in its mélange of 'isms', the Juche ideology in North Korea is coupled with values of fierce loyalty, nationalism and socialism. North Korean ideology derives much of its sense of mission and legitimation from policies related to the on-going construction of a revolutionary Juche subject who is increasingly dedicated and loyal to that ideological mission represented by Kim Il-sung and his bloodline without the allowance of autonomous life experiences. The radical negativity of this ideology is not in its actual ideological dimension, but in its biopolitical re-deployment of the 'Korean-style' socialism idea as the transcendence of the existing order of things in the immanent (level of everyday life) terms of a positive order of socialism to be constructed (the 'on-going' revolution that is a trait of totalitarianism). While ideological fervour has waned since its height under the leadership

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[56] Thanatopolitics is a concept concerning the theoretical puzzle of biopolitics frequently turning to the mass production of death, paradoxical to its positive attributes seeking to protect life. To avoid conceptual confusion, this study uses thanatopolitics to refer to any violence that the state inflicts on its subjects through techniques of governance that seek to 'transform' lives deemed threatening to the ideal life, which is the *telos* of biopolitics.

of Kim Il-sung, policies emanating from the North Korean brand of socialism are a cornerstone of imbuing its tenets through propaganda, education, training of cadres, intellectual elaboration of ideology, and so forth. Proclaiming a socio-political being made up of the Suryeong (Kim Il-sung), the WPK as a nurturer and the working masses as the children, the Suryeong dictates all directions and methods for the realisation of the masses' wishes and demands. As the basis for a unitary ruling system and the absolute authority of Kim leadership, the veneration of the Suryeong is mandatory and no other ideas and values external to his crafted Juche ideology are permissible (Do et al., 2015). As opposed to biopolitics protecting reality with its constituent negativity from inferior forms of life, as is the case with its liberal and Nazi counterparts, it rather treats life as an object to be transformed into a subject compatible with hierarchal ideals and aims to eradicate adverse ideas harmful to its own, similar to the case of Stalinist biopolitics explored by Prozorov.

The next section explores the exercises that oppose North Korean biopolitics through the power of life to resist as individuals practice autonomous life experiments, moulding their own subjectivities. Thus, everyday practices of biopolitical resistance are counter-productive in terms of North Korean ideology through their self-affirmative and self-detrimental techniques of pursuing alterity.

Self-Affirmative Resistance: Alternative Sartorial Trends, Consumption of Foreign Culture and Information, and Spiritual Practices

For the first time in 39 years since April 14, 1974 when 'The Ten Principles for Unitary Ideology'[57] were introduced, the title of the document was changed to the 'Ten Principles to firmly establish the Party's Unitary Leadership System'. Under these principles, unconditional loyalty to the leadership of the state is promoted and an absolute guideline for the deification of eternal President Kim Il-sung is outlined. Overriding the constitution and statute of the WPK, a new section was added to safeguard Kim Jong-un's rule that states "unprincipled behaviours must be absolutely discarded, including illusions toward individuals' superiors, fawning and idolising toward superiors, and blindly obeying

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[57] See Tertitskiy "1967 Transition to Absolute Autocracy in North Korea" in *Change and Continuity in North Korean Politics* (2017) for a more detailed account of the origins of North Korea's monolith.

superiors for their power" (Principle No. 6-4). In addition, everyone must "firmly struggle against factionalism, parochialism, paternalism and other anti-Party elements, as well as day-dreaming and honey-chasing behaviours" (Principle 6-5). In a speech orated to high-ranking members of the Party, Cabinet and Military on June 19th, 2013, the state tightened ideological control of everyday life in society through 'harmonious life' (nightly meetings) and 'self-criticism' diaries in compliance with the newly revised Ten Principles (Do et al., 2015). Hence, under the banner of revolutionary Juche ideology, the state maintains its aim of transforming everyday life according to its rationalisation of politics.

Moreover, classical theories of totalitarianism consider communist inspired ideology as an extraneous force imposed on the anterior, already formed subject by eradicating and dominating it with assistance from security apparatuses. In contrast, biopolitics would evidently be the implementation of the transcendent ideal, in this case North Korean ideology, into social immanence that devalues anterior forms of life as obsolete, resulting in this obsolescence becoming materialised in acts of governmental violence (Prozorov, 2016). In opposition to this governance in North Korea, an 'affirmative' strand of everyday biopolitical resistance undermines the regime's power over life through conduct that takes life as an object in a positive way and affirms greater rights, privileges, conditions and well-being through practices of the self (Bargu, 2014). As described by Foucault, these 'technologies of the self' are operations on the individual's own body and soul, thoughts, conduct and way of being, done in order to transform oneself (Hellberg, 2015). Thus, this section demonstrates everyday biopolitical resistance that uses these techniques to transform oneself through 'affirmative' practices such as alternative sartorial trends, consumption of culture and information deemed subversive and prohibited spiritual acts.

The rationality of North Korean socialist discourse politicises ordinary objects and examines them from an ideological standpoint. This has historically been the case pertaining to how the body is to be expressed in a sartorially hygienic manner through the lens of North Korean biopolitics.

Another important aspect in making the cultural and emotional life prevail in society is to help the people live in a cultured way under hygienic conditions. Neat clothing and a smart appearance mirror the state of people's ideological and mental quality and the standard of their cultural life. A man with a sound

ideological consciousness, high cultural attainments and noble communist moral traits is always smart and neat in his dress and personal appearance. People should be educated to dress neatly. As the saying goes, clothing makes the man. Smart clothing improves one's personality. Only when people dress smartly can the streets and villages look more beautiful and the external prestige of the country be raised. (DD: Kim Il-sung, 'On Making the Cultural and Emotional Life Prevail throughout the Society', January 5, 1989)

Ideological ruminants that seek to transform nature and inferior forms of life (*zoe*) into qualified forms of life (*bios*) are translated into everyday North Korean life and disguised as superior culture and ideology. Shedding the majority of Marxist-Leninist lexicon in its cultural artefacts and discourse, North Korean biopolitics has evolved throughout the years pertaining to traits that its fashioned 'qualified life' (*bios*) should acquire. These emanate from iconography and the rhetoric of Kim familyism, ethnonationalism, militarism and so forth that meet the needs of regime perpetuation. In this sense, symbolic life exceeds the natural biological life, conferring meaning upon it. It refers to spiritual life as a work of art, life as care of the self and the shaping of being, shedding one's presence in the world away from its exclusively obscure natural dimension (Malabou & Shred, 2016). Hence, escaping the immanence of the state's ideological penetration of everyday life would entail a self-care that embraces alterity and even reverts back to 'old forms' of life such as those found in the natural dimension. However, in the words of Kim Jong-Il, forms of life are to undergo continual transformation to mirror the transcendent image of the ideal Juche subject.

The people's ideological and moral life and material life constitutes two aspects of social life and the *Chajusong*[58] of the working masses should be realized in these two spheres. In order to realize the Chajusong of the popular masses completely, therefore, we should attain both the ideological and material fortresses of communism without fail. Our Party's programme of modelling the whole society on the Juche idea is a great programme for the building of communism. It enables us to take the ideological and material fortresses of communism with success by transforming men, society and nature in accordance with the Juche idea and fully realize Chajusong for the working masses. (DD: Kim Jong-Il, 1982, 'Let us advance the banner of Marxism-Leninism and the Juche Idea', treatise sent to the national seminar on the juche idea held to mark the 70th birthday of the Great Leader Comrade Kim Il-Sung, March 31st, 1982)

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[58] Chajusong refers to 'independence', or one's [sic] innate will to live, to develop independently, and master one's [sic] own destiny and world. Chajusong involves one [sic] subordinating nature to one's [sic] own ends, adapting the environment to suit one [sic], as opposed to adapting to the environment as plants and animals do. (See Willoughby, 2014, pp. 26-28).

In the words of Scott (1990), "The symbolic opulence of popular culture [is] such that a single symbol could represent virtually an entire world view" (p. 167). One can imagine the impact of adverse sartorial practices on the Kim regime's power over everyday lives. According to an interviewee who regularly engages with recent defectors:

> Yes, I have spoken [with defectors] about fashion. The youth goon squad harasses them because of their style of dress. People still continue to do it regardless. It is a sign of growing individualism. This is especially the case in the border regions close to China. They tend to stop short of dying the hair—on the other hand, earrings are becoming increasingly popular but still risky. (PT: Participant 10, Seoul, 2017)

Another interviewee described other subtle acts of sartorial resistance.

> The hairstyles promoted by the government are often ignored by youth in particular. Still, many are scared to go too far. And, yes, long nails with the polish are sometimes done. Backpacks, shoes, earrings and Western looking clothes can be found in the markets and you sometimes see people with them. The state calls this sort of thing a bad hygiene for the people. I should say, the change is more disguised and I don't think you will find it around authorities. (PT: Participant 7, Washington, D.C., 2017)

Supported by the state's rhetoric of 'bad hygiene', this interviewee noted that disguised sartorial trends occur through self-fashioning of oneself adversely in relation to state-sanctioned norms espoused through ideological discourse. Interviewees indicated that the spaces of everyday life in North Korea are proving harmful to the regime's power as its honed dress code is not being uniformly followed. As Jasper (2014) contends on styles of dress, "They are not always overtly political, but these expressions capture a sensibility of refusal out of which protest easily emerges…our bodies are physical carriers of meaning every bit as important as books, songs or blogs" (p. 63). According to defectors Park Jiyong, Lee Ju-hyun and Yoon Hyunjin:

> Park Jiyong, who left North Korea in 2013, says, "Defectors who were repatriated to North Korea after fleeing over the border to China bring back with them distinct characteristics of different cultures and spark new trends. As the government captured more escapees who had been living in China for extended periods, the speed in which such trends spread increased all the more" …. Lee Ju-Hyun, who left North Korea in 2012, testifies, "It seemed to me that there were definite differences between those regions that

had repatriates and those that had few. People living in villages with no repatriates may occasionally see necklaces or earrings in the markets and consider them as 'pretty', but not purchase them. But in other regions, when repatriates wore them, they became a kind of fashion trend … As market forces in North Korea flourish, the 'culture of capitalism' is no longer a clearly defined boundary. But what is becoming clearer is that things associated with the 'yellow winds of capitalism' in the past are no longer viewed so negatively. Instead, they are turning into something beautiful"…. Yoon Hyunjin, who left in 2012, notes, "North Koreans don't wear large, fancy earrings like South Koreans do. It's because authorities will notice them immediately. Small earrings are the trend. Women everywhere in the world want to be beautiful. North Korean women are no different". (DT: Park Jiyong, Lee Ju-hyun and Yoon Hyunjin, 2015, New Focus)

Nevertheless, those who dress unconventionally in North Korea have long been subject to punishment or shaming. Jeans, signifying the West more than any other type of clothing, are banned and those wearing them can even be sent to labour camps (Tudor & Pearson, 2015). Having gone to extreme lengths to instil ideology in daily life and block alternative influences, 'unhygienic' practices of sartorial decadence in everyday life symbolise a threat to the regime's biopolitics. Despite the view that these practices are normalising under Kim Jong-un, constraints are still in place, even if only amounting to paying a bribe. According to a defector:

… however, people still cannot dye their hair red or yellow. There are jeans but there are no ripped jeans like the ones you can see in South Korea. It doesn't stand out too much if you wear black jeans instead of blue jeans. However, you still have to give a pack of cigarettes if you get caught wearing black jeans. (DT: Kretchun et al., 2017, p. 24, female, 25, Ryanggang Province, kindergarten teacher, left NK 2015)

Moreover, following the April 27th inter-Korean summit, many defectors reported a newly assembled 'unit' cracking down on anti-socialist elements. According to a source inside South Pyongan Province:

The unit was formed by the central authorities and has become quite active recently. The unit is evaluating people's clothes and hairdos, engaging in fierce reprimands…Within the provincial level, there are units formed within the regional People's Committees Ministry of State Security offices, police stations, and legal offices. They have all been given licenses to conduct censorship. On a white piece of paper, 20 centimetres by 10 centimetres, is red writing that permits the holder to engage in crackdowns against any type of antisocial behaviour. (DT: Ha, May 2018, para. 2-3)

In a similar vein, the consumption of foreign cultural, ideological and intellectual productions is an everyday pattern of 'affirmative' biopolitical resistance most reflected by the '(South) Korean Wave' or 'hallyu'. Affecting some elements of North Korean society, this phenomenon refers to the remarkable increase of interest in South Korean popular culture that began to sweep across Asia in the late 1990s through dramas and music. In turn, this has reached the everyday lives of North Koreans and the mere content of this material is perceived by the regime as dangerous to their ideological prowess in the state. The illegal consumption of such material, for example through drama series, music, film and so forth, suggest anti-regime sentiment.

Outmoded ideas remain in our ranks, and they may infiltrate from outside, too. We must strongly combat the outmoded ideas of all shades such as capitalist and feudal Confucian ideas, revisionism, sycophancy, factionalism, provincialism and nepotism so as to eliminate the remnants of obsolete ideas that linger in our ranks, and we must also prevent the infiltration of the poison of reactionary ideas from outside. (DD: Kim Jong-Il, "On Further Improving Party Ideological Work, concluding speech at the National Meeting of Party Propagandists," March 8, 1981)

Deemed most threatening to Kim hagiography and regime historicism, the consumption of South Korean culture is particularly risky, with American culture following closely. Adding to the trouble, shared language, ethnicity and history make this material more appealing.

Watching South Korean dramas and film is more dangerous because of the shared language and competition over 'which is the better Korean life'. The North cannot compete with the buildings and prosperity seen in South Korean film. It has to outdo the South in terms of 'virtue', 'Korean-ness'. A group of us were watching a South Korean film 'Chingu' when the authorities did a crack-down manoeuvre. The said at least we could watch the Chinese stuff instead of this filth. We had to pay a lot of monies for this. (PT: Participant 2, Seoul, 2017).

This pattern is reiterated by an interviewee who has spoken frequently with defectors regarding the influx of foreign culture.

Sure, I have heard from defectors about the black hole of information leaking into North Korean society. It is very serious and causes those who watch it to think about new life. A life that is different than what they are living in North Korea. That other culture occupies their minds. Especially South Korean culture. (PT: Participant 6, Washington, D.C., July 2017)

The strategic nature of everyday resistance is apparent in this biopolitical variant. A defector recounted her strategy to access American and South Korean films.

I knew South Korean and American movies were dangerous but I think my curiosity was greater [than my fear]. I thought that in the neighborhood if I was caught watching movies, I could get away with it by paying money, so I continued to watch. But if the central party or others conducted the crackdown, I didn't watch anything during that time since it was dangerous. (DT: Kretchun et al., 2017, p. 26, female, 25, North Hamgyong Province, service worker at the Hoeryong City Services Facilities, left NK 2013)

The data suggest that the on-going struggle to implement ideology in everyday lives in North Korea is undermined through the intake of alternative ideas. According to a defector statement, foreign culture shapes adverse norms.

People's way of living has changed a bit from continuing to watch South Korean and Chinese dramas... Men now confess their affection to women. Instead of arranged marriages, the majority are marriages that result from dating. There are even cases where men go to the girlfriends' parents and say, 'I will marry her'. (DT: Kretchun et al., 2017, p. 26, male, 22, North Hamgyong Province, road construction worker, left NK 2014)

Informal networks of these everyday practices can grow into subcultures with distinctive styles of dress and tastes in tactics and ideas. Trust and relationships may be formed through complicity with others. In fact, evidence points to the significance this plays in the everyday lives of some North Koreans.

Cultural life consisted of watching South Korean and Chinese movies at home. If a friend brought over a CD, we would watch together over drinks. After 2010, I would watch South Korean and Chinese movies once or twice a month by using a USB and sticking it into a Notel. I would watch North Korean movies only when I had nothing else to watch. (DT: Kretchun et al., 2017, p. 26, male, 44, Ryanggang Province, smuggler, left NK 2014)

An interviewee spoke to a pattern similar to that of the above digital testimony.

South Korean colloquialisms are used, dramas are watched and K-pop is privately listened to. Trust is formed through consuming foreign culture with trusted contacts. This is everyday disobedience. It is still only low-level and spontaneous because of the regime's tendency to harshly repress such activity. (PT: Participant 10, Seoul, 2017)

Reflective of achieving alterity, a defector speaks to the consumption of foreign culture that resembles a technique of everyday biopolitical resistance.

Even though it was scary to watch South Korean dramas [because it was dangerous], I continued to watch because it was fun. I began to dream of a new world while watching South Korean dramas. The streets of South Korea, places such as Myeongdong became familiar to me after watching many South Korean dramas. (DT: Kretchun et al., 2017, p. 26, female, 20, North Hamgyong Province, candy maker, left NK 2013)

Inversions of this kind do play an important imaginative function, even if they accomplish nothing else (Scott, 1990). The criminal code illustrates the seriousness of practising this variant of everyday resistance as two institutions have specific legal missions to repress it.

The specific legal missions of these two prominent groups [group 108 and group 109] are somewhat amorphous because their tasks involve a wide variety of 'non-socialist' private behaviour and transactions. But available information suggests they are tasked to enforce Articles 193 through 195 of the DPRK Criminal Code. Article 193 deals with the 'crime of bringing in and spreading decadent culture' and prohibits a DPRK citizen 'without authorization to bring in from other countries or makes or spreads music, dances, paintings, photographs, books, videos, or memory media such as CD-ROMs reflecting decadence, sexuality, and obscenity'. Article 194 deals with 'committing acts of decadent culture' and prohibits 'acts of seeing or listening to music, dances, paintings, photographs, books, videos, or memory media such as CD-ROMs reflecting decadence, sexuality, and obscenity in content'. Additionally, article 195 concerns 'the crime of listening to hostile broadcasts, or collecting, keeping and spreading printed matters or objects of allurement' and prosecutes 'whomever, without anti-state[59] purposes, listens systematically to anti-DPRK broadcasts or collects, keeps, or spreads handbills, photographs, videos, printed matters of objects of allurement'. (DD: Kretchun et al., 2017, pp. 26-27)

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[59] The arbitrary interpretation of these as 'anti-state' acts can lead to much harsher punishment.

As is the norm for states with totalitarian features, punishment is usually exerted disproportionately to the nature of the crime committed.

> Yes, I know some friends in North Korea who are very frightened of being in trouble for watching videos that are not allowed. It is not just the videos, but sometimes it what the music is saying. Other times it can be a suspicious newspaper or something like that. The parents get in more trouble. In 2014, this sort of thing happened and we never saw the man again. It was videos that time. The government is afraid of what the people will believe on the recordings. (PT: Participant 4, New Zealand, 2018)

Privatised, inner-oriented individuals are a latent threat to totalitarian regimes and certainly many forms of aesthetic expressions search for that orientation (Linz, 2000). Defector Jang Jin-sung persuasively recollects such an affirmation of exploring one such expression.

> In North Korean literature and culture, you have one protagonist and one story. Everything else is a variation. When, for the first time, I thought, 'these are like North Korean people! They have emotions like people I know, and [they are] like mine!' It was more real than any North Korean literature I had ever come across. I cried while reading it. It moved me... can actually reflect reality, as opposed to 'reality' set by the state. The poem I enjoyed the most was called the corsair, about a pirate falling in love. Before coming across Byron, I thought 'dear' was a name for Kim Jong-il—a quality that was ascribed that belonged to him. It was shocking to me that normal people could be 'dear' or 'great' or 'beloved'. (DT: Jang jin-sung, 2014, para. 4)

This aesthetic 'otherness' imbued in the subjectivity of Jang Jin-sung represents the dangers of 'affirmative' practices of everyday biopolitical resistance in their subtle articulation of alterity. Here, the administration of everyday North Korean lives is undermined and in some cases replaced by a large segment of society which instead uses alternative and self-governed practices (Thorn, 2015).

The last pattern explored in the 'affirmative' strand is spiritual behaviour, supposedly eradicated under the leadership of Kim Il-sung as a remnant of 'old forms of life'. Among the most common are delving into fortune-telling and shamanism, Buddhism and, perceived by the state as the most subversive, Christianity.

There has been a wildly sharp rise in interest among people in exceptional fortune-tellers. Even people who had not been into clairvoyancy in the past are now looking towards superstition to find relief from their continuing difficulties… [It is] dangerous to hit the road without having gotten your fortune told … [But you can] receive the courage to travel long distances as long as you have a good fortune teller … These days, people are looking to fortune tellers to decide their wedding dates and even the names of their babies … Rumors spread about the best shamans in the area, leading to huge lines of people showing up each day from sunrise to sunset outside their homes. (DT: Kang, April 2018, para. 2-4, source in Ryanggang Province)

In addition to this statement from a source in Ryanggang Province, a source in North Hamgyong Province commented on superstitious behaviour in North Korea.

People are looking to different sources for mental support as conditions get worse. Some [superstitious] phrases are becoming popular, such as, 'Keep your fingernail and toenail clippings in your pocket and you won't lose your things,' and, 'Mix some red pepper powder in with your salt and your business won't suffer (DT: Kang, April 2018, para. 7, source in North Hamgyong Province)

As noted, forms of spiritual life harvesting disloyalty threaten the state's biopolitics. In North Korea, privatised life such as this is not compatible with the 'Juche individual' and was meant to be eradicated decades ago. During a speech to the Ministry of Peoples' Security (MPS) in 1962, Kim Il-sung accounted for the disappearance of thousands of individuals, Buddhists and Christians, leading unqualified (*zoe*) forms of life.

[We] cannot carry such religiously active people along our march toward a communist society. Therefore, we have tried and executed all religious leaders higher than a deacon in the Protestant and Catholic churches. Among ordinary religious believers, those who recanted were given jobs and those who did not were held in prison camps. (DD: Do et al., 2015, p. 204)

Buddhist and Christian practices also attracted harsh penalties, resulting in disguised or hidden practices.

My eldest sister-in-law live in Onsung and used to visit China because she was a doctor. The problem was she made wishes in front of a table with a bowl of water on it. She told use she learned such practice during her visit to China. Looking back, it seems like a Buddhist practice. Last year, I lived in the house of my acquaintance selling goods at Sunam market after my husband had gone on a journey to South Korea. And she propagated Buddhism and had visitors. That's how I saw Buddhists. By the way, she moved from

a place to another to avoid report. (DT: Yoon, Chung & An, 2013, pp. 214-5, interview with 'Sung' in June, 2009)

A defector commented on the presence of a bible in a North Korean home.

I know many people who pray. There is no organisation. When I travelled to the rural area as an oriental doctor, I went to my friend's house in Hamhung to treat someone and my friend showed me a bible (in 2004). It was a book with a red cover. [My friend said] 'Everything will be alright if you believe in God'. That friend was a teacher in an elementary school. I didn't read it thoroughly. [My friend told me], when something goes wrong, 'I pray to God. [You] believe in Kim Il-sung throughout your life, but I believe in God. I told my friend that 'You should be careful the NSA officials said that people who have or saw the bible should confess. It seemed that she had gotten it from a relative, not an acquaintance, from China. My friend said 'Since the police talk about it, I'm assuming many people have one because even I have one'. (DT: United States Commission on International Religious Freedom (USCRF), 2008, p. 22)

The regime's perception and punishment of these practices has not changed significantly.

It is the same as always. The past few years have been the same. People are saying prayers and practising Christianity in some cases but it [must be] disguised. You will be arrested if you are caught for these things. A bribe only works for religion sometimes. (PT: Participant 1, Seoul, 2017)

The Kim regime claims the full authority of North Korean temporality. The *telos* of the on-going revolution that is instilled upon the spaces of everyday life does not rest in the visions of a fortune-teller, superstitions of shamanism or salvation through leading a certain religious lifestyle, but in loyalty to the Kim regime attained through its prescribed way to *live everyday life*.

Self-Detrimental Resistance: Methamphetamine Use and Suicide

The preceding 'affirmative' strand of everyday biopolitical resistance included sartorial dissent, consumption of foreign culture and decadent spiritual practices embedded in alterity to the immanence of North Korean ideology in everyday life. The practices presented in this section continue to represent a 'subculture light', but take on a

'detrimental' form by using the power of life against the regime's objectification of it. As such, North Korean biopolitics[60] centres around and legitimates itself through a multifaceted discourse on life and death, its sanctity, inviolability, sacredness, security, purity, health, and quality on the one hand, on the other its dispensability, violability, impurity, and dangerousness (Bargu, 2014). Utilising positive notions of life, the state rationalises its regulation of life through politicising health and hygiene inherent in proper sartorial practices, ensuring purity and quality through control of cultural, ideational and intellectual productions and elevating the sacredness of Kim family leadership through its 'Ten Principles' discussed in the preceding section. These attributes constitute qualified life (*bios*) in which any life (*zoe*) should aspire to reach. However, the latter notions of death that are politicised provide the rationale for dispensing with unqualified forms of life (*zoe*) by stripping them of their political life, thus making them 'bare life'. Hence, the on-going revolution under the banner of Juche, seeking to transform individuals in the image of North Korean ideology, problematises deviant life as a threat to qualified life (*bios*). Here, the focus is not to correlate 'affirmative' forms of everyday biopolitical resistance with positive rationalities of governance while ascribing 'detrimental' forms with negative rationalities of governing unqualified life. These strands of everyday biopolitical resistance can be correlated interchangeably in both contexts. Instead, the argument rests in the notion that, just as biopolitics is qualitatively distinct as a 'positive' rationalisation of transforming life and a 'negative' rationalisation of excluding unqualified life, biopolitical resistance can also be expressed in an 'affirmative' manner and a more 'detrimental' manner. Two patterns explored here in the 'detrimental' strand are suicide and methamphetamine use.

A 2012 report based on testimony from former North Korean medical doctors suggests a low suicide rate in North Korea due to its politicisation as a counterrevolutionary act of rebellion and betrayal through regime rhetoric. Even in the event of suicide, doctors and family members of the deceased attempt to attribute the death to a different cause in light of its potential effect on the family's 'songbun'[61] (Kim, Lee, Park & Kim, 2012). However, under the pretence of acknowledging difficulties of data collection and possible

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[60] See Hardt & Negri (2000, 2004, 2009) on biopolitics as resistance.

[61] One's songbun, or social class, is taken seriously in North Korea and can affect residence, party membership, social benefits, education, travel permission, and other prospects for social mobility, a principle called *yeonjwaje* which punishes three generations of the family.

misreporting of death under state custody as suicide, a 2012 World Health Organisation (WHO) report estimated a very high rate of 38.5 suicides per 1 million people (Kim, 2015). Again, it is important to underscore the framing of suicide as treasonous by the state and the inconvenient facts resulting from its practice that the regime does not want to publicise.

> Even if it is suicide they don't say it up front. After all, it's not a good thing. But in terms of the state, if you commit suicide you become a traitor and your family pays the consequences. So they say they died from illness. But still, rumors fly. (DT: Green, 2011, p. 43, Kim Young Ho and Lee in Suk (married), mid 40s, farmer (male), trader (female), North Koreans interviewed in Hunchun, Jilin Province, China)

A North Korean residing in China also made a statement on suicide in North Korea.

> There are people who have committed suicide from their struggle with everyday hardships. Even if they do commit suicide, though, it's not reported as suicide because the family would suffer harm from that. (DT: Green, 2011, p. 7, Hong Nam Hee, female, late 40s, Songcheon County, South Pyongan Province, trader)

As the preceding statement indicates, one is most likely aware of the political consequences of such action and, despite intent, the practice itself is a form of resisting the political life (*bios*) accorded to the individual by the state through an act that is antithetical to how that life should be lived. A theme in much of the testimony relating to suicide cites the harsh realities of everyday life as probable causes. Again, it is the nature of the act itself and not the intent of the individual that indicates everyday resistance. The intent may have little or nothing to do with resisting against the state, but it is widely known that the practice will affect one's family because of its framing as rebellious by the regime.

> Life is hard and, like anywhere else, some people commit suicide. I am told that these incidences are particularly high among those struggling though. The difference in North Korea is the political damage it does on your family and not just the emotional. (PT: Participant 10, Seoul, 2017)

Digital testimony reveals a similar pattern as told by a resident of Pyongyang.

> Even in Pyongyang, there are suicides by people who lose the struggle to survive. They have no means of making a living. Once you run out of money, you sell your TV or clothes or chest of drawers or other

household goods. After you have sold everything off, then you have nothing to exchange for food. Those kinds of people commit suicide. (DT: Ishimaru & Lee, 2014, p. 2, Gu Gwang-ho, Rimjin-gang reporter and resident of Pyongyang, November 2011)

Pertaining to everyday resistance, these acts cannot be denoted as a non-issue. As Murray (2006) argues, "This view assumes that the act of suicide ends at the moment of death, that the suicide does not live to haunt the places of everyday life. Unlike 'natural' death, the suicide never really ends; it has far reaching social and historical valences. It is a wound that never closes…Whether or not it results in the literal death of others, our suicide is never entirely our own, never merely our own death" (p. 205). It is in the spaces of everyday life that suicide in North Korea produces a lasting effect against the regime's authority by reflecting the notion that the individual escapes the clutches of state biopolitics in manner that their life is no longer suspect to transformation according to the regime's will. They would rather use the power *of* life in a detrimental act to escape the regime's power *over* life, indicative of one who would rather not live than to live *like that* (ideologically pure individual).

According to two separate sources in Chagang Province in March 2017:

Recently, a woman in her 20s hanged herself on a tree in the hills nearby. She was already dead and accidentally found by children who were collecting branches … as most of the munitions factories in Chagang Province have stopped or reduced production, unemployment has increased together with the number of families suffering from the fallout. The woman who killed herself seems to have acted in despair after having a heated argument with her parents about their poverty and lack of food. … Chagang Province … deviates from the general trend of marketization enveloping the rest of the country, thus making its constituents far more dependent on state provisions than other regions where the markets sustain the local economy … The situation in Chagang took a turn for the worse when the Chinese government began to enforce sanctions against North Korea, banning the import of military-related items … The Huichon Machine Tool Factory provided its workers with aluminum goods to be exchanged for grain. But most people save their food during March so it is almost impossible to swap food for aluminum. People in the area are really suffering as a result … To date, the authorities have not put forth any measures to alleviate the situation. In fact, Ministry of People's Security (MPS) personnel are seeking to shift the blame on to the victims…They are compounding the sorrows of the family of the victim by decrying suicide as an 'act of rebellion' and downplaying the factors that drove her to it by emphasizing that circumstances are hardly akin to the Arduous March (the widespread famine of the mid-1990s). (DT: Kang, March 2017, para. 1-7)

A separate statement from a second source in Chagang Province reveals a similar reality.

'It's nothing like the Arduous March, so she didn't have to kill herself', a separate source in Chagang Province said, quoting MPS officials … The victim's family was irate upon hearing this and replied to the officials, "Let's see what you'd say if it were your own child". … Others in the area are sympathetic, wondering when they will all be liberated from this poverty. (DT: Kang, March 2017, para. 7-9)

Another rhetorical contradiction resting in this reality is the regime's propaganda alluding to an inferior 'South Korean life' that causes a high suicide rate in the coined 'puppet state'. For instance, KCNA propaganda reads:

South Korean MBC on September 22 said more puppet police committed suicide in the past 5 years. The number of police suicides was over 20 more than the past number. The melancholy frame of mind and mental stress of the police officers are said to be main reasons for suicides as they are frequently forced to crack down upon the people as tools of fascist dictatorship. (DD: KCNA, September 27)

A defector related information similar to the above portrayal by North Korean media.

Suicide is something that does not happen in North Korea. It happens in South Korea. It is a type of action that only happens if the lifestyle is obsessive over money. People who live in the South have to compete and this is why the level is so high. It does happen often in the North. But not like in South. When it does happen in the North, it is because of hunger and not unhappiness in the country. (PT: Participant 1, Seoul, 2017)

As noted, central to the notion of biopolitics is its negative turn to violence. Frequently using the Ten Principles to penalise those with political grudges as ideological or political criminals, individuals are sent to detention and labour facilities for anti-socialist crimes under the pretence of 're-education'. However, at the apogee of violent biopolitics in North Korea, crimes interpreted as too heinous to allow for continuation of political life in everyday society may result in one's confinement in the 'gwalliso' strand of political

prison camps that may subject them to 'total control zones'.[62] Release from these is not possible and, no longer considered citizens of North Korea, detainees are told that it is by the grace of the state that they will be allowed to live out their days as prison labourers (Tudor & Pearson, 2015). Reflecting forms of life not tolerated through the lens of North Korean biopolitics, more serious crimes deemed 'political' result in indefinite terms of detention, hard labour and possible execution. For instance, under the leadership of Kim Il-sung, discourse did not obscure the violent nature biopolitics may take in its transformation of lives.

> As the official propaganda never tired of reminding us, it was necessary to 'desiccate the seedlings of counterrevolution, pull them out by their roots, and exterminate every last one of them'. (Kang-Chol-Hwan, 2000, p. 79, Yodok Gwasillo 15 from 1977-87)

Later, in 1996, Kim Jong-Il remarked:

> Young people must highly value and ardently love socialism, the lifeblood of our people, and smash every attempt of the imperialists and reactionaries to disintegrate our socialism. They must sharpen their vigilance against the infiltration of all manner of anti-socialist ideas and bourgeois mode of life, reject them categorically and staunchly defend the socialist ideology and our socialist system from the abuses, slanders and subversive moves by the enemies of socialism. (DD: Kim Jong-Il, 'Let us Exalt the Brilliance of Comrade Kim Il Sung's Idea on the Youth Movement and the Achievements made under his Leadership', August 24th, 1996)

In contemporary North Korea under Kim Jong-un, the message is still laced with biopolitical overtones suggesting the ongoing revolutionary transformation of *zoe* into *bios*.

> Ideological work should not be a flash in the pan or conducted with everyone standing on ceremony, but done regularly regardless of the time and place, so that people can imbibe the Party's ideas the way they breathe air. A ceaseless and intensive ideological campaign should be conducted to sweep away alien ideological trends and lifestyles. (DD: Kim Jong-un, Let us Hasten Final Victory through a Revolutionary Ideological Offensive, Speech at the Eighth Conference of Ideological Workers of the Workers' Party of Korea, 2014, p. 19)

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[62] Yodok, the largest of the 'gwalliso' facilities, also maintains a revolutionary zone in which individuals may earn release.

Defector Kang Chol-hwan commented on suicide in prison facilities.

Firstly, committing suicide is prohibited. Pae Chong-chol was my friend. His father, Pae Yong-sam, left a will apologizing to the entire family for the severe suffering he caused and said he could no longer endure the pain. He went up to Limsan valley and killed himself. SSA officers declared that Pae Yong-sam betrayed the country and the Korean people, was a traitor, and therefore, the term of imprisonment for his family must be prolonged. In the camp, not only the offender, but also his family were branded as traitors and their imprisonment term was extended by five years. The dead body was taken away from the family to an unknown location…. (DT: NKDB, 2011)

An interviewee suggested that the state is aware of the regularity of suicide in these facilities.

People are no longer citizens when they are sent to large penal facilities in North Korea. Punishment is not very productive for the regime but tends toward transforming you ideologically from the behaviour you previously committed. I hear that many people commit suicide in these facilities. It is obvious by the extent the state goes to in order to prevent people from doing it. They take away any items that might assist in it. Also, there is even a law punishing officials who display inappropriate conduct on women causing their suicide.[63] (PT: Participant 7, Washington, D.C., 2017)

Hence, suicide in confinement represents a severing of the political meaning of life from its biological existence in what Bargu (2014) coins 'necroresistance.' This is the opposition of the valorisation of survival over political existence, thereby defying the logic of the production of life by sovereignty. This approach criticises the politics of survival associated with 'bare life' while it also contests the equation of vulnerability with powerlessness. In contrast to embracing pure existence and its susceptibility, agents actively seek to avoid and refuse it by sacrificing their biological existence in the name of their political existence. This sheds light on the self-detrimental technique of these practices, not as the mimicry of state violence through the politicisation of life, but as the politicisation of death. This separates these self-induced deaths from ordinary acts of violence and attributes political and spiritual meaning to them. The mimicry of violence on

[63] Criminal Law of North Korea 2012, Article 28. In addition, article 260 is vaguer on punishment of authorities committing mistreatment leading to suicide. See "The Parallel Gulag: North Korea's 'An-Jeon-Bu' Prison Camps (2017).

the body can be the source of transforming the body from the object of the state to a tool against it, but this transformation itself is based on the integrity of agents and their bifurcation. Self-detrimental violence, rather than being destructive, shows the inadequacy of power to produce its subjects in its own image and to overcome their alterity because it cannot prevent mimetic reversals in which the body is turned against the state (Bargu, 2014).

Self-detrimental resistance transforms the body from a site of subjection to a site of insurgency and presents death as a counterconduct to the administration of life (Bargu, 2014). Widely considered destructive due to its potentially body-negating effects, drug use is represented here by the illegal consumption of methamphetamine cited as a frequently used drug in North Korea. In typical bipolitical overtones, the Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) remarked in 2013, "The illegal use, trafficking and production of drugs which reduce human beings into mental cripples [does] not exist in the DPRK" (KCNA, 2013). This reveals two things about the use of methamphetamine in North Korea: (1) the state claims its use does not exist domestically; and (2) the state perceives individuals who use illegal drugs to be mentally and physically unproductive (*zoe*) and thus, like the act of suicide, denying the state bodies conducive to its ideal form. Moreover, communists and socialists generally reasoned that thieves, prostitutes, drug addicts and so forth were dangerous, either morally dangerous, because they were unproductive social parasites, or politically dangerous because they were disorganised, unpredictable and tangentially reactionary (Hardt & Negri, 2004). However, asserting that drug use does not occur is simply inaccurate. According to the Database Centre for North Korean Human Rights (NKDB), a seminar hosted at the Korea Press Centre to discuss illicit drug use in the state produced findings from interviewing 18 different individuals from February 2016 to October 2016 that regular use of illicit drugs is becoming socially acceptable and at least 30% of all North Koreans are estimated to consume them (Kim, 2016).[64]

Lankov and Kim (2013) suggest the historical trajectory of methamphetamine[65] has undergone three stages in North Korea. First, 2004-2008 constituted use by male mid-ranking Party officials, police officers, smugglers and private entrepreneurs aged around

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[64] It is not clear, but implied that this refers to adults.
[65] Primarily referred to in slang by the terms 'bingdu' or 'oelum', both meaning ice.

35-50 years. Next, from around 2007-2010, use manifested itself among male and female white- and blue-collar workers and small-scale market vendors around the ages of 20-50 years. The present stage began in 2009 and has seen use spread to male and female students and youth in their late teens, and others up to 50 years of age. The production of meth has also shifted gradually from worn-down factories to smaller home-based kitchens, and whereas the drug was primarily being smuggled into China for profit, Chinese authorities have cracked down harshly on synthetic drug use, thus most product ends up in North Korean markets (Lankov & Kim, 2013).

Despite the regime's rhetoric denying the use of drugs in North Korea, visitors to Pyongyang have cited anti-drug posters. Rodong Sinmun (2012) reported on anti-drug campaigns in other countries and the mental and physical cost of drug addiction. However, that report attributed the trade of drugs to the United States and imperialists who seek to plunder and prey on other societies. It also mentioned American banks laundering money for traffickers worldwide, citing the U.S. military's pumping of drugs into South Korea. In addition, weekly indoctrination sessions in North Korea have started to stress the dangers of drug use (Grietens, 2014).

Moreover, the state treats illegal drug use as 'crimes against the morality of the people'.

> Article 216 (Illegal Cultivation of Opium and Manufacture of Drugs) A person who grows opium poppies or manufactures drugs illegally shall be punished by reform through labour for less than two years. In cases where the person commits a grave offence, he or she shall be punished by reform through labour for more than two years and less than five years. Article 217 (Illegal Use of Drugs) A person who uses drugs illegally shall be punished by short-term labour for less than two years. In cases where the person commits a grave offence, he or she shall be punished by reform through labour for less than five years. Article 218 (Smuggling and Illegal Trafficking of Drugs) A person who smuggles or traffics drugs illegally shall be punished by reform through labour for less than five years. In cases where the foregoing act is committed repeatedly or in collusion, or where a large quantity of drugs are smuggled or trafficked illegally, the punishment shall be reform through labour for more than five years and less than ten years. In cases where the person commits a grave offence, he or she shall be punished by reform through labour for more than ten years. (DD: Amended Criminal Law of the Democratic Peoples' Republic of Korea, 2009)

Additional clauses emphasise more serious cases 'impairing socialist culture'.

Article 11 (Extremely Grave Form of Smuggling and Illegal Trafficking of Drugs) In cases where the smuggling or illegal trafficking of drugs is extremely grave, the punishment shall be the death penalty and confiscation of property. Article 12 (Violation of the Regulations for Storage and Supply of Drugs and its Raw Material) In cases where the violation of the regulations for storage and supply of drugs and raw material for drugs is extremely grave, the punishment shall be the death penalty and confiscation of property. (DD: Amended Criminal Law of the Democratic Peoples' Republic of Korea, 2009)

Sources in South Hamgyong and North Hamgyong provinces drew attention to widespread drug use.

Security officials in charge of schools are intimidating and interrogating elementary school students to investigate drug offenses, and their parents have been immensely shocked about it … During one such period of intensive investigation of local drug use, a security official in Sapo district of Hamhung, capital of South Hamgyong Province, drew pictures of paraphernalia for injecting drugs on the board in an elementary school and asked the seven-year-old students in the class what they were …The security official from the country's state security department, which is similar to the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, recorded the names of all the students who responded with "konapal" or "koggiri," Korean slang words for drug paraphernalia. He called them up one by one to ask them how they knew the names of the items … As the security official cajoled and threatened the students into giving him information, many of them admitted that their parents used drugs. Their parents were then arrested on drug offenses. (DT: Kim, June 2015, para. 2-5)

All residents in people's units are forced to anonymously turn in materials relevant to drug offenses … Kim Jong Un's regime has resurrected the method of investigation which [former leader] Kim Jong Il suspended because of worries about public disaffection. (DT: Kim, June 2015, para. 7)

One participant described the extent to which many understand the use of methamphetamine to hold many health benefits.

I have had conversations with defectors who used it a miracle, cure-all drug. People just resort to it, as an alternative to the care the state is not affording them. (PT: Participant 6, Washington, D.C., July 2017)

However, anger and despair experienced by individuals who feel confined to poverty can ignite into destructive forms of agency against themselves. In some cases,

dependence on hard drugs represents an attempt to blank out the despair of these conditions (Lister, 2004). While serious misuse can impair strategic agency, everyday agency is underscored in North Korea by the hard work required to secure methamphetamine from the informal economy.

> Regardless of its social acceptance in certain arenas, individuals have to neglect other duties to get it from wherever they can get it. Many times it is unavailable due to certain circumstances and people will have to travel further, which is difficult, to get it. (PT: Participant 7, Washington, D.C., 2017)

A defector spoke to the popularity of methamphetamine as an effect of little hope among people in the state.

> Selling ice is the easiest way to make money… [every defector] knows about ice…. There's so little hope in North Korea. That's why ice is becoming popular. People have given up. (DT: Greitens, 2014, p. 84)

According to Melucci (1989), "It is no accident that today there exists widespread tendencies to extend artificially the subjective dimensions of time by means of particular stimuli or constructed situations. There is for example the recourse to experiences and artificially dilated inner time, such as those produced by drugs … in which deep individual needs are transformed … cited here as signs of an unresolved tension between the multiple times of everyday experience" (pp. 104-5). Interviewees commented on on the use of meth in North Korea.

> Alcohol is still the preferred substance to escape the harsh realities of everyday life. But meth…yeah, it is widely used in North Korea. It sort of speaks to the trend in Southeast Asia. It is cheap and accessible. North Koreans use it in daily life as a means to blank out stresses and tension. (PT: Participant 5, Bangkok, 2017)

> Of course I have heard about meth. It is a medical alternative in North Korea that frequently leads to addiction but it is desired by people to drift into an alternative and peaceful life. (PT: Participant 8, New York, July 2017)

Even more striking is the collective use among individuals indicative of some form of subculture.

When meeting people, we not infrequently swapped drugs to compare whose ice was more potent. We didn't have the serious attitudes that South Koreans seem to have, we just did it naturally as if we were exchanging cigarettes… (DT: Greitens, 2014, p. 87)

Seventeen to twenty people will often share a gram among them, consuming the drug as a group rather than individually. (DT: Greitens, 2014, p. 89)

Self-detrimental in most aspects, this pattern of everyday biopolitical resistance garners alterity through its use. Melucci (1989) argues that a trend toward hard drugs is indicative of various paths of individual escape as a common motivation—"there was no longer any room in the organisation for personal needs…I felt suffocated by the organisation" (p. 59). These, he asserts, were oft-repeated remarks by those seeking individuation. Like suicide, the use of methamphetamine is not usually underscored by the intent to undermine the Kim regime, but an awareness of its illegality and potential punishment for use inscribes the act with the qualities of everyday resistance.

'Affirmative' or 'detrimental', everyday practices of biopolitical resistance detract from the state's power to manage the population according to the transcendence of its discourses on how life should be ideally lived. Through these acts, individuals are deviating from working on themselves according to the scientific, moral, and other authorities on the basis of socially accepted arrangements of life.

6.3 Explanations

This section aims to investigate plausible explanations as to the emergence of everyday biopolitical resistance in North Korea. Accordingly, *when* and *why* these 'affirmative' and 'detrimental' strands occur will be examined by utilising a set of structural and ideational variables garnered from the literature on social movements to supplement a theory of everyday biopolitical resistance in the state.

6.3.1 Structural Explanations

This section draws on the structural paradigm of social movement theory to test two possible causal variables pertaining to the emergence of everyday biopolitical resistance. The causal significance of resource mobilisation theory is determined in relation to two key attributes: the availability of the five resource types (moral, cultural, socio-organisational, human, material), and the primitive capacity to mobilise them. Political opportunity theory and its causal salience will be assessed according to two primary attributes - the variables of 'state strength' and 'regime repressiveness'.

6.3.1.1 Resource Mobilisation Theory

The question posed here concerns the availability of resources and capacity to mobilise them as a causal factor in this variation of everyday resistance. Focusing on the distribution of resources and the organisational characteristics of social movements, the relevant structures and resources include the vehicles, formal and informal, in which people engage in action (McAdam, 1999). Moreover, resource mobilisation theorists conceive social conflict as the struggle for the appropriation of existing resources and the formation of new ones, in which they are permanently created, consumed, transferred and lost (Oberschall, 1973). Here, RMT is tailored to resources available to individuals and small groups with at least a primitive capacity to organise them for action.

The 'simple availability' of resources is complicated, as they must be present in a specific socio-historical context and accessible to actors for use. However, resources crucial to the initiation of action are unevenly distributed within and among societies. This uneven nature also varies from one group to another as well as across individual members within each group. Hence, in lieu of pursuing a general theory of stratification, Edwards and McCarthy (2004) depart from the tradition of RMT with the aim of emphasising the varying contextual factors that affect the presence of resources and their capacity to be mobilised by specific actors. They argue that the root of RMT is better aimed at understanding how actors are able to overcome prevailing patterns of resource inequality in their efforts to pursue goals. As the present study focuses on individuals interacting under totalitarian structural and ideational constraints, it is noted that the state systematically represses the distribution of resources and allocates them according to interests aligning

with regime perpetuation during any particular period. Thus, utilising Edwards and McCarthy's five-part typology of resources (moral, cultural, socio-organisational, human, material) will assist in testing this theory's causal significance pertaining to the emergence of everyday biopolitical resistance.

Moral resources include legitimacy, solidary support, sympathetic support, and celebrity. Of these, legitimacy has received the most theoretical attention. Neo-institutional organisational theorists make strong claims about the importance of legitimacy as a link between macrocultural contexts and meso- and microlevel organisational processes, claiming actors who most closely mimic institutionally legitimated features for their particular kind of endeavour gain an advantage relative to those who do not reflect that template as well (Edwards & McCarthy, 2004). Moral resources tend to originate outside of a social movement or social movement organisation (SMO) and are generally bestowed by an external source known to possess them. In terms of the self-affirmative sub-class of biopolitical resistance, moral resources are staked in the broader utilisation of alternative, decadent cultural resources.

> A lot of the time, people in North Korea are encouraged by the dress of others or about hearing that even authorities watch foreign movies. It is a source of legitimacy hearing about it coming from the top. (PT: Participant 10, Seoul, 2017)

In terms of the self-detrimental strand of biopolitical resistance, the same can be said about the use of illegal substances.

> Yes. There are many. Sometimes they go and buy eoleum by themselves. If they don't have money with them, they've been known to pawn something like a bicycle. Since those who carry out the crackdowns are involved in eoleum trafficking and some of them are also users, the authorities are not able to enforce controls. (DT: Paek, 2015, para. 9, source in North Hamgyong Province)

Cultural resources are artefacts and cultural products such as conceptual tools and specialised knowledge that have become widely, though not necessarily universally, known. These include tacit knowledge about how to accomplish specific tasks such as running a meeting, forming an organisation, or surfing the web. This category includes tactical repertoires, organisational templates, or technical or strategic know-how,

encompassing both mobilisation and production technologies. For example, familiarity with how to navigate the internet is a rapidly diffusing cultural resource and one that is capable of facilitating activities generally. Yet the cultural availability of such a resource is distinct from whether or not a specific actor or group possesses either the material resource of required equipment, or the human resource of web-competent members (Edwards & McCarthy, 2004). These resources are not particularly relevant to everyday biopolitical resistance.

There are three general forms of *socio-organisational resources* - infrastructures, social networks, and organisations. Infrastructures are the social-organisational equivalent of public goods like postal services, sanitation, or civil infrastructures like roads, sidewalks, and traffic lights that facilitate the smooth functioning of everyday life. Infrastructures are non-proprietary social resources. By contrast, access to social networks and especially groups and formal organisations, and thereby the resources embedded in them, can be controlled. Since a chief benefit of any form of social organisation is to provide access to other resources, the issue here is uneven access to social-organisational resources among potential social movement constituencies. Such differential access creates further inequalities in the capacity to access crucial resources of other kinds (Edwards & McCarthy, 2004). Jasper (2014) notes that social actors "borrow and transform existing infrastructure, which includes communications, transportation, financial and legal systems, meeting rooms, social networks, formal organisations, and all other capacities that allow people to get things done …" (p. 70). In terms of everyday biopolitical resistance, pre-existing networks can facilitate the use of illegal materials.

> Regardless of continued censorship of illegal pirated films, I still watched them. Recently, I have been watching them usually using a USB. I watch Hong Kong films with friends, but South Korean films only with family members. I have never directly acquired South Korean films myself and I only watched when relatives would bring them over. The most memorable Korean drama was 'Empire of the Sun'. (DT: Kretchun et al., 2017, p. 20, student, male, 22, North Hamgyong Province, defected in 2015)

Human resources include labour, experience, skills, expertise, or leadership. Human resources exist in individuals rather than in social-organisational structures or culture more generally. Individuals typically have proprietary control over the use of their labour and

human resources, except in extreme cases like forced labour or extortion. Through their participation, individuals make their labour accessible and usable to specific resistance or movements. SMOs can aggregate and deploy individuals who are rather portable compared to socio-organisational resources, yet the capacity of a movement to deploy personnel is limited by the cooperation of the individuals involved. Moreover, their participation is in turn shaped by spatial and economic factors as well as by social relationships, competing obligations, life-course constraints, and moral commitments (Edwards & McCarthy, 2004). For everyday acts of biopolitical resistance, human resources are not particularly relevant.

The category of *material resources* combines what economists would call financial and physical capital, including monetary resources, property, office space, equipment, and supplies. Monetary resources have received the most attention and there are good reasons for that. Money is a necessity. No matter how many other resources a movement mobilises, it will incur costs that must be paid. Material resources have also undergone much analysis because they are generally more tangible, more proprietary, and in the case of money more interchangeable than other resource types (Edwards & McCarthy, 2004). As with other forms of everyday resistance, the biopoltical variation is enabled by less restricted physical space and monetary resources.

> There were youth leaders who would patrol around, looking for things that we weren't supposed to be doing. If you were wearing jeans or skinny pants, or if you had a manicure or your hair was too long, you would get in trouble. They would sometimes check your phone to see if you had any South Korean songs. I got busted for this, but I got out of it by buying them a box of 20 bottles of beer. (DT: Fifield, 2017, Chongjin, 20, defected in 2014)

Another defector commented on the advantage of possessing methamphetamine as a resource.

> My main business was selling ice. I think that 70 or 80 percent of the adults in Hoeryong city were using ice. My customers were just ordinary people. Police officers, security agents, party members, teachers, doctors. Ice made a really good gift for birthday parties or for high school graduation presents. It makes you feel good and helps you release stress, and it really helps relations between men and women. My 76-year-old mother was using it because she had low blood pressure, and it worked well. Lots of police officers and security agents would come to my house to smoke, and of course I didn't charge them—they

were my protection. They would come by during their lunch break, stop by my house. The head of the secret police in my area was almost living in my house. (DT: Fifield, 2017, dealer of illicit drugs, Hoeryong, 46, defected in 2014)

Whether an unmonitored room to watch South Korean dramas, money for fortune-telling services or methamphetamine, mobilisation of material resources postulates relevance to everyday practices of biopolitical resistance. The explanatory significance of resource mobilisation theory, however, is modest. Again, the problem emanates from the inability to garner enough reliable data for this particular variation of resistance as pertains to mobilised resources. However, as far as the consumption of alternative ideas and illegal substances, the interplay between the mobility of these resources does hold some explanatory value.

6.3.1.2 Political Opportunity Theory

The question posed here is the extent to which conditions of the exogenous structural environment facilitate the biopolitical form of everyday resistance. The concept of political opportunity structure is broad, but a synthesis of scholarly treatment denotes a highly consensual list of four dimensions: (i) degree in which a political system is open or closed to challenge; (ii) the relative stability of political alignments within a system; (iii) the presence or absence of influential allies; and (iv) the repressive capacity of the state or relevant political entity. As the degree of political opportunity can be indicated by any one of those dimensions, or a combination of two or more, the structure of political opportunity within a system can be assessed empirically by any one of the dimensions (McAdam, 1996). Hence, most relevant to everyday practices of biopolitical resistance are the dimensions of 'state strength' and 'regime repressiveness'.

'State strength' is indicative of centralisation and decentralisation of the state. In totalitarian systems, a defining characteristic is the absence of political, economic or social pluralism, or at least its systematic repression (Linz & Stepan, 1996). As regards political pluralism, the state is highly centralised under the monolithic Suryeong system of the Kim regime. Any political or social organisations outside of those mandated by the state are illegal and any exertion of influence on the political process is confined to the close

configuration of elites within the regime. Nevertheless, the static nature of totalitarian regimes may wane when an opportunity presents itself, such as the death of the leader. In 1994, Kim Il-sung unexpectedly died and Kim Jong-Il succeeded him in leadership. His tenure as second leader of North Korea was marked by his 'military-first politics' that elevated the status of the military. Nevertheless, his configuration of loyal elites was consolidated prior to the leadership succession and political alignments did not have much effect on everyday acts of biopolitical resistance. However, the collapse of the command economy and resulting famine led to decentralisation of the economy via marketisation and triggered a slight change in economic policy. Food, daily necessities and other items flowed into jangmadang as the rationing system failed to operate effectively and by the late 1990s government institutions began to take part in market operations (KINU, 2004).

In 2002, the July 1st measures included decentralisation in economic activities by individual economic units such as state enterprises and collective farms, modification of economic indicators based on earned income, adjustment of state prices to reflect market prices more efficiently, reduction in the size of working units in collective farms and enlargement of private plots, permission for general markets to offer a larger variety of consumer goods and foods for the general masses (2003), socialist markets for raw and intermediary goods for enterprises (2002), import markets for imported goods (2004), and the introduction of material incentives (KINU, 2004). However, the state retracted these measures in 2005, and there has been confusion ever since as to what is legal and illegal. Nonetheless, the dependence of the majority of the population on jangmadang has created a niche market for illegal foreign clothing and media, drugs and other items considered anti-socialist to be obtained on the black market, increasing opportunity for individuals to consume such products.

Overall, a process of fluctuating crackdowns and reforms on grassroots marketisation that occurred in the 1990s following the famine has opened opportunities for biopolitical resistance. Due to the incapacity of the state to continue operating its universal PDS, individuals were forced to acquire daily necessities elsewhere. Hence, grassroots marketisation led to the decentralisation of the economy into what are now government-controlled and taxed markets. However, this *decentralisation* has increased the cost of *repression* for the government, as illicit activity among market practices has led to a culture

of corruption. The facilitation of illegal trade, including restricted media and drugs, has provided opportunity for biopolitical resisters to obtain, consume and usually skirt punishment for these crimes, as long as they are not overtly political in nature. In the end, growing economic pluralism contributes to social pluralism, also raising the cost of repression. The evidence suggests that while social pluralism is still largely absent, social spaces that allow individuals the opportunity to interact and collectively consume foreign information increase practices of biopolitical resistance. Nevertheless, with economic pluralism prone to stagnation due to crackdowns and the precarious nature of congregating outside of official state channels, this opportunity is often complicated.

As for regime repressiveness during Kim Jong-un's unfolding tenure, a 2015 survey of 350 defectors indicated 64% of them believe it is more dangerous to watch foreign dramas under Kim Jong-un than the previous leadership (BBG Survey of North Korean Refugees, Defectors and Travellers, 2015). Moreover, according to his 2018 New Year's address, "A vigorous struggle should be waged to tighten moral discipline throughout society, establish a socialist way of life and eliminate all kinds of non-socialist practices, so as to ensure that all the people, possessed of ennobling mental and moral traits, lead a revolutionary and cultured life" (Kim Jong-un, 2018). Other sources have recognised this pattern.

> Group 109 (the special task force in charge of the crackdown) and other authorities are extremely wary of the potential for a student movement arising if foreign media consumption becomes widespread. … Although large numbers of youth have been incarcerated in labor-reform centers during the Kim Jong Un era, there has not been a decline in the number of kids viewing South Korean dramas … If they imprisoned kids every time they were caught watching South Korean dramas, every single young person would be in a labor-reform center. So they let them off once or twice. (DT: Lee, March 2018, para. 5-8, sources from South Pyongan Province)[66]

> The Special Rapporteur was informed of a recent crackdown on audiovisual materials with foreign content. A former resident of North Hamgyong Province said that Government and local structures of the Workers' Party of Korea tightened their monitoring of the population's access to foreign media in the past

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[66] Activities targeted in the crackdown are stated to include: spreading religion, illegal border-crossing, smuggling, illegal foreign communication, using foreign currency, selling or using illegal drugs, practising superstition, speculative investing, high-interest lending, possessing or circulating illicit media (such as DVDs or USBs), running an unpermitted business, and gambling.

few years, especially radio stations. A man from Pyongyang said that he had watched films and television shows from the Republic of Korea with his friends since 2007. He received the material through traders who regularly travel to China. In January 2017, the man was caught during a police raid on his home, and the prospect of receiving a severe punishment, possibly the death penalty, led him to bribe security officers to allow him to escape the country within a few hours. (DD: United Nations, 2017, p. 19)

Thus, political opportunity theory suggests that resisters will seize opportunities, such as the consumption of drugs or illegal foreign media, when structural conditions are ripe. However, this explanation is limited as it does not account for a continued pattern of everyday biopolitical resistance even when conditions of repression are heightened. Therefore, its impact is considered modest.

6.3.2 Ideational Explanations

This section draws on the ideational paradigm of social movement theory to assess three different plausible explanations for the emergence of the biopolitical variety of everyday resistance. Changing value-orientations will be considered in the determination of value-oriented theory as a factor. Framing theory will evaluate the extent to which frames affect individual perceptions of social issues and regime legitimacy to trigger everyday biopolitical resistance. Lastly, social psychology theory will weigh the effects of five different emotions on the exercise of this variety of everyday resistance - urges, reflex emotions, moods, affective commitments, and moral emotions.

6.3.2.1 Value-Oriented Theory

The question posed here is the extent to which value-oriented theory may account for the emergence of bioplotical resistance in North Korea. Three ways in which identity may affect behaviour are through the valuation of incentives according to one's identity, belligerence and conflict with the 'other', and the role and logic of appropriateness.

The valuation of incentives according to traditional identity markers in North Korea has declined, which, in some ways, facilitates everyday biopolitical resistance. According to Hardt and Negri (2000), the totalising effects of social life and the subordination of them to a social norm in totalitarian systems also consists in the negation of social life itself, the erosion of its foundation, and the theoretical and practical stripping away of the existence

of the people. Through its organic foundation and the unified source of society and the state, society is not a dynamic collective creation but a primordial founding myth in which "An originary notion of the people poses an identity that homogenises and purifies the image of the population while blocking the constructive interactions of differences within the multitude" (Hardt & Negri, 2000, pp. 112-113) In essence, the North Korean state continuously represses external ideas and reproduces a public transcript according to Kim hagiography, Juche ideology and other cultural elements that homogenise the collective identity of the North Korean people.

However, as the value-oriented tradition of social movement theory emphasises, macro-level changes in identity and culture may erode such meaning and serve as a salient factor in underpinning everyday resistance. As the first part of the chapter outlined, a potential internalisation of certain values resulting from the process of socialisation in everyday life and external cultural ideas in North Korean society indicated the emergence of new values. These factors, according to the NSM literature within value-oriented theory, can lead to identification by individuals with values carried by certain identity markers that are inherently belligerent to the regime's ideals. As Melucci (1989) argued, establishing who one is amid the pace of social change is what generates a 'homelessness' of personal identity so that the individual must reconstruct their 'home' in facing these changing circumstances and events.

The *telos* in which the North Korean state marches toward is revolutionary salvation where events assume a meaning in light of an ultimate goal, philosophy of history, myth of progress, and revolution. These factors are shored up in a temporal structure in which the meaning of the present is found in the final destination of a unified Korea under the leadership of the Kim regime. However, this *telos* has weakened as meaning in people's lives increasingly becomes individualised and collective goals erode.

Hence, rapidly changing and multifaceted social experiences embedded in the values represented by new sartorial trends, the consumption of foreign materials and use of illicit substances are difficult to acquire as a fixed identification with a definite model, group or culture. Instead, Melucci (1989) argued that everyday social experience must be grounded in an internal capacity to redefine itself repeatedly in the present, to reverse decisions and alliances while treating the present as a unique, unrepeatable experience

within which the individual realises oneself. As the evidence suggests, these new values underlie acts of everyday resistance and even trigger a belligerence with traditional ones.

> Recent North Korean dramas show the use of cell phones and show content that reflects reality to some extent. But the conclusion is that these shows emphasize loyalty, so it's no fun. Older series such as 'My Family's Problems', 'The People and Destiny' were actually more entertaining. (DT: Kretchun et al., 2017, p. 30, female, 49, North Hamgyong Province, homemaker, left NK 2014)

Hence, to live the discontinuity and variability of time and space, one must find a way to unify experience in a manner other than instrumental rationality. Passing from one time to another, fragmentation and unpredictability, escaping the clutches of cause and effect, criteria of efficiency and the logic of rational calculation and instead demanding the use of more immediate perceptions, intuitive awareness and imagination are inherent in everyday biopolitical acts (Melucci, 1989). These include actions such as embracing the 'other' through alternative sartorial trends, foreign ideas, shamanism and even the use of drugs.

The lifetime of mass mobilisation experienced by North Koreans under totalitarian leadership has been an increasing integration of subordinate classes into the dominant cultural models and rules of politics controlled by the Kim regime. Hence, access to foreign ideas and 'subversive resources' has been limited. However, value-oriented theory suggests that inculcation in universalistic codes of communication has extended the range of actions of individuals, increasing their independence, and triggering everyday acts of biopolitical resistance.

As such, the appeal to nature through these values has played a crucial role in the formation of new conflicting demands. Lying beyond the regime's transcendent ideology, nature appeals as that which resists external pressures. It retains the weight of a 'given entity' in opposition to the enforced 'socialisation' of identity by forms of totalitarian domination. The biopolitical rationality of North Korean socialism acts as the antithesis of this, as it dictates the need for the subject to overcome the unjust immanence of natural life in order to transform oneself according to the transcendent ideals of the regime's construction of identity.

The value-oriented approach to social movements provides a convincing explanation for everyday biopolitical resistance. While exogenous factors such as the deterioration of the information cordon and marketisation provide opportunity for such resistance, the internalisation of new values has pointedly incited the embracing of such acts.

6.3.2.2 Framing Theory

The question posed here is the extent to which framing tasks and processes may account for the emergence of biopolitical resistance in North Korea. Here, an extant issue is framed in a certain manner in the spaces of everyday life and, when a problem or injustice is perceived and resonates with an individual, the frame may instigate everyday resistance. In particular, the individual-level effects of frames relating to their impact in thought on subsequent behaviour or attitudes is of interest in this study. Given the focus, articulation, and transformative functions of frames, it is arguable that they are fundamental to interpretation, so much so that few, if any, utterance, gesture, action, or experience could be meaningfully understood apart from the way it is framed. Goffman (1974) argues that frames function to organise experience and guide action by enabling individuals to locate, perceive, identify and label happenings within their everyday lives. Yet, *collective action frames* not only perform an interpretive function, in the sense of providing answers to the question of "What is going on here?", but are also more "agentic and contentious in the sense of calling for action that problematizes and challenges existing authoritative views and framings of reality" (Snow, 2004, p. 385).

The key to assessing framing theory as an explanatory factor for the everyday practice of biopolitical resistance rests in its refashioning of certain notions into alternative ideas that may lead to resistant behaviour. While the value-oriented approach is primarily theorised at the macrosociological level, the framing perspective rests on meso and micro levels of schemes of interpretation in everyday life and their relationship to social behaviour (Giugni, 1998). These collective representations guide actors' interpretations of what needs to be changed, how to do it, and why, also directing attention to some aspects of a situation and away from others (Johnston, 2014). For instance, changing the meaning of

something formerly accepted to something that has become perceived as unjust may lead to subtle acts of resistance.

In totalitarian regimes, there is not only an elaborate ideology, but ideology has the function of legitimating the regime. Pressures created by the tension between doctrine and reality may lead to weakened commitment and faith in the system. As pertains to framing, in the politics of alternatives and system blame in non-democracies, a non-democratic regime can often rule by coercion. However, when the belief grows that other alternatives are possible, the political economy of legitimacy and coercion changes sharply (Linz & Stepan, 1996). In North Korea, the political economy is such that the regime is no longer legitimised based on performance. In essence, it is nationalist credentials embedded in the regime's ideology and its framing of exogenous factors as responsible for any failures that have kept its doctrine from complete ossification. However, the three components of framing tasks may provide clues as to how changing perceptions lead to erosion of ideology, a decline in legitimacy and, thus, everyday acts of biopolitical resistance.

The three components of framing tasks are diagnostic, prognostic and motivational. Seeking to remedy or alter a problematic situation or issue, a diagnostic component is contingent on identifying the causality, blame or culpable agent(s) (Snow & Benford, 2000). In the context of this study, the diagnostic component would consist of a change in perception of individuals as to *who to blame* for an existing problem. According to an interviewee:

> We never really thought it was our government causing us hardships in everyday life. Watching TV from South Korea secretly with friends made me start to understand that so many restrictions from the government were harmful. (PT: Participant 4, New Zealand, 2018)

The prognostic component of the framing process involves the articulation of proposed solutions to the problem and strategies to carry out a plan of redress. As far as the evidence illustrates, this does not seem significant.

> All cultural products are strictly meant to be recorded and sanctioned by the state. Ideology has a huge impact on society and the people believe in juche as a method of the leadership to express itself to society and the outside world. A lot of people strongly buy into everything; yet, a lot just get by saying 'What else can I do?' There is still no platform for organisation—it is largely limited to the mind and deeply imbued

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in personal life. People are very interested in South Korean culture. That is what causes ideology to fade for some. (PT: Participant 5, Bangkok, 2017)

Finally, the motivational component includes socially constructed vocabularies to provide individuals with convincing accounts for engagement in everyday resistance. This component is a more of a 'call to arms'. As pertains to everyday biopolitical resistance, this does not seem to be a significant trigger.

Snow and Benford (1988) propose that once someone has constructed proper frames as described above, large-scale changes in society such as those necessary for social movement can be achieved through frame alignment. The concept of 'frame alignment' denotes a process in which strategic efforts by SMOs to link their interests and interpretive frames with those of prospective constituents and actual or prospective resource providers can also be tailored to individual action as a tool for uncovering the explanatory salience of framing theory in this context. The four basic frame alignment processes that have been identified and researched are frame bridging, frame amplification, frame extension and frame transformation. There is insufficient evidence in the data collected here to argue the significance of these processes.

A change in perception seems to have arisen through a combination of marketisation and the influx of external information. The explanatory value of framing theory for acts of everyday biopolitical resistance has suggested that everyday interactions have increased solidarity among consumers of foreign culture and a general acceptance as to some level of alternative ideas. Shared disobedience is evident as some individuals are now framing social concerns that the regime usually attributes to exogenous factors as the fault of the state itself. However, changing perceptions resulting from framing tasks do not appear to hold more than a modest impact as an explanatory factor for everyday biopolitical resistance.

6.3.2.3 Social Psychology Theory

The question posed here is the extent to which emotions may account for biopolitical resistance in North Korea. Classical approaches to social movements assumed a causal sequence resulting from some form of structural strain that produced subjective

tension and therefore led to spontaneous, irrational and expressive outbursts. Accordingly, the actors were stressed, alienated, frustrated, deprived, disintegrated and marginalised individuals, affected by economic crises (Stekelenburg & Klandermans, 2009). While these theories are now largely neglected and not the focus of this study, there has been a re-emergence of social psychology perspectives focusing on resistance primarily at the individual level. According to Emirbayer and Goodwin (1996), variables of interest may include "all those psychic structures that constrain and enable action by channelling flows and investments ('cathexes') of emotional energy" (p. 368).

Clarke et al. (2006) argue that emotions occupy a place of ambiguity in the popular imagination and consciousness. Often, it is seen as an eruption of the irrational in which an individual is unable to contain his or her feelings and act in a rational manner. Academically, they argue that tension has always existed between a social constructionist view of emotions and that of a biological standpoint. In other words, they question whether emotions are part of cultural socialisation or an innate structure of biology, or a combination or interaction of these two factors. The counter-position of social constructionism to biological reductionism, the nature-versus-nurture debate, detracts from academic studies according to the authors.

As noted, the totalitarian leader embodies a unique form of absolutist rule that involves a pseudo-religious or pseudo-charismatic emotionalism (Brooker, 2014). Emotions such as envy, resentment, love, hate and anger proliferate in everyday social practices and discourse. Moreover, many of these have a double bind. For instance, anger on the one hand is destructive and on the other leads to political participation and mobilisation. Jasper (2006) argues that human action has goals toward which individuals strive, and when these goals require interaction with others, especially through coercion but also sometimes through persuasion or payment, then these actions are political, or strategic, in the broadest sense. He suggests that too many political analysts have either disregarded goals that individuals pursue or assume that they know the most significant ones, such as assuming one goal, either wealth or power, inevitably dominates the rest. To rectify this assumption, he argues that understanding emotions as ends may avoid this oversimplification. Using his classification of emotions as urges, reflex emotions, affects, moods and moral emotions, this section will fuse theory on emotion with the data.

According to Melucci (1989), the body is accepted as the centre of impulses and desires, as a source of energy that is no longer considered a foreign or alien force 'possessed by mysterious demons'. Whether one talks of libido or biological energy, the new body culture reveals a human dimension that is neither reducible to instrumental rationality nor stamped with the sign of darkness or perversion. Desire, impulse, energy and emotions all become dimensions of experience, recognised and accepted as one measure of humanity among many. At the same time they create difficulties for a society, which is structured around instrumental efficiency, and which tends to deny or denigrate whatever does not conform to its logic (Melucci, 1989)

As Jasper (2006) notes, urges are immediate-term goals of action, not usually interesting for politics, except that their urgency suggests conditions under which humans are distracted from political goals. An actor may take enormous risks for longer-term projects to satisfy a momentary desire while those suffering famine or other deprivation will not devote time and resources to political organising. However, not all risks are unforeseen and one may go to great lengths to satisfy them or prevent painful urges. Individuals make elaborate plans to satisfy their wants or work especially hard to avoid severe deprivation for oneself, and such projects are sometimes political. As for self-affirmative acts of resistance, the evidence does suggest urges play a significant factor. Most often, a strong level of curiosity drives the consumption of foreign information. Moreover, pertaining to the self-detrimental variety, suicide in the form of pain, exhaustion, or the general urge to die is a factor. Use of methamphetamine also reflects strong urges, as is often the result of addiction. The urge for liberation may result in the exaltation of an illusory 'spontaneity', the veneration of immediate experience over and above reflective thought (Melucci, 1989).

Reflex emotions are fairly quick, automated responses to events and information, often taken as the paradigm for all emotions: anger, fear, joy, surprise and shock. The evidence suggests that these are all underlying components of everyday biopolitical resistance. More relevant are moods which energise or de-energise feelings that persist across settings that are changed by reflex emotions, such as during interactions. Yet, affective commitments such as relatively stable feelings, positive or negative, about others or about objects, such as loyalty and hate, liking and disliking, trust or mistrust, respect or

contempt, are by far the most relevant. Pertaining to a sense of loyalty and mistrust, those who have lost that sense towards the regime are inherently more likely to dress subversively, watch a foreign drama, visit a shaman, and so forth. As for self-detrimental acts, resentment and mistrust are significant.

> The first time I met Kim Jong Il, I felt overwhelmed with emotion. But once I realized that he was the world's richest king, ruling over the poorest country on the face of the Earth, that was a turning point … To me, he was no longer a god, and I came to think that I could no longer live under that system. Preserving that regime while the people of North Korea are starving to death, that is an abomination." (DT: Lee, 2008, para. 3-4, Jang Jin-sung)

Moral emotions include one's own self and actions, based on moral intuitions or principle, such as shame, guilt, pride, indignation, outrage and compassion (Jasper, 2014). According to Hochschild (2003), feeling is a form of pre-action, a script of a moral stance toward it is one of culture's most powerful tools for directing action. Yet, the definitions and approaches to terms like emotion, affect and sensations remain contested, diverse, blurred and complex. Moreover, Taylor (1995) writes that emotions are "the site for articulating the links between cultural ideas, structural inequality, and individual action" (p. 227).

> The South Korea of my thoughts has conscience, morality and loyalty. Until now I have been taught that South Korean's lives are very hard and lots of murders occur, but having seen South Korean films, there is conscience, morality and loyalty. And the people seemingly live comfortably. (DT: Green, 2011, p. 33, female, Cho Sook Hee, factory worker)

In the most extreme instance, suicide is triggered by such emotional charge by removing the very object of production from the political and social realm that the Kim regime seeks to govern.

Overall, emotion provides a relatively strong explanation for some acts of everyday biopolitical resistance. In terms of the self-affirmative variety, a decline in loyalty, an increase in mistrust and curiosity trigger such acts. Pertaining to self-detrimental acts, urges, despair and resentment are more relevant.

6.4 Conclusion: A Theory on Biopolitical Resistance in North Korea

According to Hardt and Negri (2009), "…the other to power… best defined as an alternative production of subjectivity, which not only resists power but also seeks autonomy from it… between biopower and biopolitics, whereby the former could be defined (rather crudely) as the power over life and the latter as the power of life to resist and determine an alternative production of subjectivity" (pp. 56-57).

The objective of this chapter was to elaborate the biopolitical variation of everyday resistance in North Korea according to its self-affirmative and self-detrimental strands. Moreover, variables were distilled from the literature on social movements to evaluate potential explanations for this variation of everyday resistance. The sample delineating these practices has shown their similarity through the embrace of an alterity that is disparate from the pervasiveness of the Kim regime's penetration of everyday life with its rationalised mode of living. These practices are further understood through the structural and ideational conditions that facilitate their emergence.

A theory of biopolitical resistance as a 'building block' for an overall understanding of everyday resistance in North Korea is represented by qualitatively similar practices and mechanisms underpinning its emergence. As stated in the hypothesis, these acts are embedded in a detachment of oneself from the ideational rules and manner in which life is to be lived according to regime ideology embedded in everyday North Korean life, through techniques of self-care and self-detriment. As to the conditions underpinning these practices, resource mobilisation theory suggests partial impact through myriad resources, and the capacity to latently mobilise them facilitated the practice of everyday resistance. Political opportunity theory addressed 'state strength' and 'regime repressiveness' as variables relating to these practices. Overall, the decentralisation of the economy has led to increasing opportunity for individuals to procure subversive clothing, ideas, videos and drugs. However, an increase in regime repressiveness under the Kim Jong-un regime indicates that opportunity is lessening. From the ideational paradigm, value-oriented theory indicated dissociation with traditional regime values grew into a pattern of consuming alternative ideas. Framing theory suggests that the consumption of culturally decadent materials and ideas reproduces everyday biopolitical resistance as individuals begin to perceive their everyday lives differently. The variable of emotion according to the tradition

of social psychology theory was convincing as a factor underpinning this variation of resistance. Desire, anger, despair and resentment were commonly cited as triggers for engaging in everyday biopolitical resistance.

Thus, everyday biopolitical resistance is a form of social behaviour that emanates from a decoupling of everyday life from the regime's imposed ideology and instead embracing ideas or behaviour that emphasise alterity. Evidence points to an increase in available resources, decentralisation and increased hostility from the regime toward this behaviour, illustrating the changing values, perceptions and heightened emotion that underpin its practice.

Chapter 7: Conclusion

7.1 The Puzzle of Everyday Resistance in North Korea

The puzzle addressed by this research project has centred on everyday resistance in North Korea. To account for the diversity of this phenomenon, two sub-questions were posed: (1) "How is everyday resistance qualitatively exercised?" and (2) "When and why do particular types of everyday resistance emerge?". The central argument of this thesis has been that a tripartite classification of everyday resistance can account for variations in the phenomenon in the state. The data and analyses point to rich patterns of internal homogeneity within the cases and diversity across them. Moreover, within-case analysis facilitated an assessment of causality that further developed typological theory.

With the bulk of this chapter dedicated to synthesising the findings, the first section will provide a summary of the findings of each case study. Next, a cross-case comparison will demonstrate the theoretical merit of the independent variables related to their impact across the varieties of everyday resistance. This will facilitate a reflection on North Korea as a totalitarian regime type, with concluding remarks as to the current state of this research programme of building typological theory. Finally, theoretical, practical and political implications will be drawn before closing the chapter with recommendations for future research and policy.

7.2 Summary and Synthesis of the Findings

7.2.1 The Case Studies

Having laid out the features of totalitarianism permeating everyday life in North Korea, anomalies are evident in everyday practices of resistance within the state. While classical theories of totalitarianism postulate little or no resistance in such societies, the case study findings portray distinct variations of everyday resistance. Ideally, the types of resistance identified should be mutually exclusive and exhaustive; that is, every case of the phenomenon fits into one type in which these types are designed to minimise within-type variation and maximise variation across types (George & Bennett, 2005). For the most part, the patterns of everyday resistance identified were confirmed by the data to fit one of the

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three variations - reflexive, discursive or biopolitical. As a starting point for typological theory, the three-part classification appears to account for the diversity of everyday resistance.

7.1.1 Reflexive

The case study of everyday reflexive resistance revealed a qualitative discreteness that was exemplified in evading mobilisation, theft, defection, and illegal movement and trading. These activities took place in the context of a hazy, quasi-legal socio-economic landscape further obscured by a hotbed of corruption and arbitrary and exemplary punishment doled out at any time, at the regime's discretion.

Evasive of spatial and temporal controls by the state over the everyday lives of its citizens, everyday reflexive resistance is the bane of the Kim regime's attempt to rein in subversive socio-economic elements that facilitate the decay of its social institutions of control, while undermining its capacity to dominate the allocation of human and physical resources.

7.1.2 Discursive

The case study of everyday discursive resistance underscores the elusiveness and creativity embedded in linguistic and symbolic practices among ordinary North Koreans. Elementary (gossip, rumours, euphemisms, grumbling) and more elaborate (oral culture, folk tales, symbolic inversion, rituals of reversal) manifestations of everyday resistance were exposed in the spaces of everyday North Korean life. In the absence of institutional channels to voice dissatisfaction, people creatively and subtly communicated dissent. Possessing anti-regime semantics, these hidden transcripts undermine hierarchal discourses disseminated by the Kim regime.

7.1.3 Biopolitical

The case of everyday biopolitical resistance offered the most unique perspective on power relations, where the tensions between the state's politicisation of life and individual regressions from it were on vibrant display. Attempts by the state to use the population as a

referent to eliminate supposed adversarial elements were undermined by self-affirmative (alternative sartorial trends, consumption of foreign culture and information, spiritual) practices and self-detrimental (suicide, methamphetamine use) practices of alterity that subtly, but consistently, undermined the state's biopolitical governance.

7.2.2 Cross-Case Comparison

This cross-case comparison synthesises the findings of the case studies to evaluate the theoretical merit of the independent variables across types, to solidify a foundational typology of everyday resistance within North Korea by adding an element of causality that will also aid in steering future typological development. Adding to *how* everyday resistance is practised, this section will compare the relative impact of possible explanations in a cross-case fashion, assigning them ordinal scores, and suggesting potential causal paths for future research as to *when* and *why* they are likely to emerge.

In social movement studies, a 'demand and supply' metaphor is used to capture the mobilising context of participation. 'Demand' refers to the potential in society for protest, while the 'supply' side refers to the opportunities staged by organisers to protest. Thus, mobilisation brings a demand for protest that exists in a society, together with a supply of opportunities to take part in protest. This metaphor can be tailored to everyday resistance. The cross-case comparison demonstrates the relationship between the structural and ideational variables to suggest likely conditions affecting an individual's choice to exercise a particular type of everyday resistance. For instance, the structural conditions in North Korea may be ripe with resources and receptive opportunity structures, but absent the will to resist, with a lack of favourable valuations of incentives, perceptive frames of injustice or amplifying emotions. On the other hand, the will to mobilise may be inherent through the valuation of particular incentives, interpretive frames diagnosing something as illegitimate, and amplified anger, but lacking necessary resources to mobilise, as well as high levels of regime repressiveness stifling opportunity structures. Thus, a cross-case comparison assesses the contextual conditions most favourable to impact the potential variation in everyday resistance, along with the reliability of certain variables to be consistent across cases in their effects. *However, the findings should not be read as causal*

claims of 'necessity' or 'sufficiency', but rather as defensible claims of a variable's
presence favouring certain outcomes.

Table 4: Cross-Case Comparison for Scoring the Impact of Explanations[67]

Causal Variables: *Structural* and *Ideational*	*Reflexive Resistance*	*Discursive Resistance*	*Biopolitical Resistance*
(I) Resource mobilisation (*structural*)	High	Low	Moderate
(II) Political opportunity (*structural*)	High	Moderate	Moderate
(III) Value-orientation (*ideational*)	High	High	High
(IV) Framing (*ideational*)	Moderate	Moderate	Moderate
(V) Emotion (*ideational*)	Low	Moderate	High

The reflexive case was more prone to operation when structural conditions were ripe. The increasing availability of resources and opportunities arising from a tacitly accepted primitive market economy, albeit without a legal framework leaving it prone to systematic repression, is more likely to trigger reflexive acts of everyday resistance. Among the data it was evident that ripe structural conditions facilitated evasion of mandated mobilisation, opportunity for theft, defection, illegal movement and trade, smuggling and so forth. The interplay of factors - mobilised resources, decentralisation of the economy and a tempered level of regime repressiveness - against these qualitatively economic acts is significant. The causal variables of interest in the ideational paradigm were relevant but less significant than those of the structural paradigm. Among the ideational variables, value-orientation theory offers a convincing explanation in the valuing of economic incentives over traditional values such as loyalty and socialism. In contrast, framing theory was less clear, but offered a partial explanation through the political

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[67] As noted in **chapter 3**, only tentative conclusions can be made in the present study on how much gradation of a particular causal variable affects or how much they 'generally' contribute to the emergence of a particular type of everyday resistance. Here, 'low', 'moderate', and 'high' were used to suggest the extent to which the research supports the possible effect of each causal variable on particular forms of everyday resistance.

economy of legitimacy. Perceiving the state as no longer capable of providing necessary goods, citizens see these acts as justified, where alternative means must be pursued to provide for oneself and family. The trigger of emotion on these acts is the least apparently relevant variable. The researcher did not interpret a hotbed of emotion underlying these acts, but rather a more 'reflexive' calculus underscored by ripe structural conditions, valuing of material incentives, and justification through attributive framing.

The discursive case was underpinned more by the ideational will to participate in everyday resistance than by favourable structural conditions. Through discourse and symbolism, antagonism towards the values of a regime-constructed heterogeneous identity was apparent. Many accounts of this variant of everyday resistance indicated the regime as 'the other', so that subversive, insulting and symbolic acts thrived through hidden transcripts. This 'other' was framed in many instances as a villain figure, the representation of the injustices perceived in everyday life. Emotion was also relevant in the sense of the frustration and anger that interviewees displayed, albeit only in a subdued sense, as some individuals were more passive in their subversive discourse. Structurally, an argument can be made that external resources such as leaflets, media and other intellectual productions provided the moral resources needed to trigger such acts. However, in relation to structure, political opportunity is a more convincing account, where the evidence suggests the decentralisation of the economy as providing more free spaces in the markets to disguise an evolving lexicon of seditious discourse.

Fittingly, the biopolitical case was a mixed bag conducive to a relatively even level of impact from structural and ideational supply and demand. The availability of resources around styles of dress, consumption of foreign culture and information and use of methamphetamine is clearly a necessity for these patterns of biopolitical resistance. Spiritual practices may benefit from the availability and penetration of outside material, but suicide is less related to this variable. Opportunity structures are germane to this variant, as evidenced by an increase in repressiveness relating to sartorial trends, the consumption of foreign media and illicit drug use, leading to a tempering of these social patterns. However, around spiritual practices and suicide, the evidence suggests that increased levels of repression are likely to trigger such acts. From an ideational perspective, a logic of appropriateness according to hierarchal values has declined. This effect is evidenced by all

of the patterns of biopolitical resistance. Even suicide is alleged to have increased, especially among the elderly as they come to perceive themselves as an economic burden to their children and thus disregard the state ideology of suicide as disloyal. Framing is moderately accountable for these acts, as constraints on these patterns of behaviour are seen as unjust and underscore participation in acts such as consuming foreign media and using methamphetamine. The evidence strongly supported the variable of emotion across these patterns. For instance, high levels of curiosity drove the consumption of foreign media, just as the use of methamphetamine was underscored by strong urges to escape everyday life stresses.

Comparing the relative merit of each theoretical variable across cases, resource mobilisation had the level of impact expected by the research on each case. Unexpected complications resulted from the use of political opportunity theory. While its effects were relatively consistent across the cases, the broad range of variables comprising the concept deserves further exploration. For instance, 'state strength' and 'regime repressiveness' clearly had reliable impact, but other factors such as geopolitical climate, environmental issues (flooding), and other exogenous shocks were commonly cited in the data. Value-orientation proved the most consistent of all the causal variables across the cases. Thus, the researcher argues it as the closest among the five to acquiring a causal claim of 'necessity' for the emergence of everyday resistance across the board. The causal impact of interpretive frames and emotion proved more difficult to ascertain than expected. Relating to frames, the diagnostic function of identifying an injustice, antagonist, or asserting blame was significant for each case. However, the other aspects of framing are not very evident. Emotion is clearly a factor for each type but proved difficult to decipher in the data.

7.2.3 Typological Theory on Everyday Resistance in North Korea

Having summarised the findings of the within-case analyses and compared the causal significance of the independent variables across the cases, the central research question permeating this study can be posed for concluding remarks: What accounts for the phenomenon of everyday resistance in North Korea?

Elicited by structural and ideational conditions, everyday resistance in North Korea is exercised by individuals, or small groups of individuals, and undermines or has the

potential to undermine its totalitarian features through one of three discrete variants of the phenomenon: reflexive, discursive or biopolitical. Reflexive resistance (e.g., evasion of mobilisation, theft, defection, illegal movement and trade) is most likely to occur when structural conditions are ripe in terms of available resources and a primitive capacity to mobilise them during periods of relatively stable levels of economic decentralisation that render regime repressiveness tame concerning primitive marketisation. Increased valuing of material incentives in favour of moral incentives further enhances the likelihood of this variety, with a perception of the acts as justified due to a weakening political economy of legitimacy. Discursive resistance (e.g., gossip, rumours, folk tales, slander, symbolic inversions) are most prone to arise when the ideational will to pursue these exercises is inherent. Belligerence with the regime's onerous public morality, for example, encourages subversive discourse. Perceptions of injustice through diagnostic frames, amplified by anger and humiliation, add the ideational impetus to pursue these practices. Biopolitical resistance (e.g., alternative sartorial trends, foreign culture consumption, spiritual practices, drug use, suicide) is most likely to occur when a mixture of structural and ideational elements are present in everyday life. Most significantly, strong emotional overtones drive these acts of everyday resistance that are grounded in alterity and ideational escape.

7.3 Implications of the Research

7.3.1 Theoretical Implications

Aside from adding to the empirical record on everyday resistance in North Korea, the findings of this study have a number of theoretical implications. First and foremost, a foundational middle-range theory on everyday resistance in North Korea was introduced and provides academia with the opportunity to engage in its refinement. This may allow for further contingent generalisations by broadening or narrowing scope conditions or introducing new types or subtypes through the inclusion of additional variables.

For resistance studies, social movement studies and the broader field of contentious politics, the theoretical framework constructed to tailor variables from social movement theory to individual acts of resistance provides a novel platform for research. This is especially the case when studying how a current or historical movement was configured pre-politically, or the conditions of its pre-mobilisation. Moreover, it reconciles broader

structural effects on resistance with more agency-centred ideational factors, bridging the sub-fields of resistance studies with social movement studies in a framework less complex than the likes of models such as the political process theory. In addition, the framework is not tailored to fit only Western democracies, but allots applicability to a variety of regime types.

Classical totalitarianism theory was resurrected in this study to confront a contemporary phenomenon of what is now evidenced in scholarship pertaining to former totalitarian systems. The findings of the present study suggest, at least for now, everyday resistance exists alongside such governance in North Korea. On a broader level, theorists of comparative politics can use this study as evidence of the on-going usefulness of Linz and Stepan's (1996) polychotomous typology as an analytical tool. As this research project has emphasised, North Korea is not a sui generis state, as many of the paradoxes in state-society relations reveal similarities to past totalitarian systems and contemporary non-democratic states. Aside from focusing on regime characteristics, the theory of biopolitics served as a backdrop for studying particular rationalities and techniques of governance in North Korea. Examining everyday resistance from this lens provided a unique variation of the phenomenon that is aptly construed through a state-agent nexus connection, tying it to a particular technique of governance.

7.3.2 Practical Implications

Practical implications are relevant in three primary respects. First, an understanding of the complex phenomenon of everyday resistance has been made more manageable for those interested in aspects of policymaking. Hence, working with related social issues in North Korea, now or in the future, benefits from the minimising of within-type variation and maximisation of variation across types achieved by this research. Second, the research gleans new insights for NGO employees who engage in various roles with defectors by associating this social behaviour with a richer understanding of North Korean structural and ideational conditions to put the phenomenon in its proper context. Third, social issues such as suicide and drug use warrant greater attention, as those who have successfully defected and those who may potentially defect could be at risk. As already developed democratic states struggle with addressing suicide and drug abuse, the nature of psychiatry and drug

treatment in North Korea is particularly concerning. As the study indicated, the state frames suicide as counterrevolutionary and many perceive the use of methamphetamine as a panacea for other medical problems. While the level of treatment is indeterminate, this study has shown that contextual awareness of these issues should be encouraged for future engagement with affected individuals.

7.3.3 Political Implications

While the aim of the thesis was not to trace the outcomes of everyday resistance, it is still useful to draw some political implications observed by the researcher related to the case studies. The broader political implications arising from the study suggest that the strength of popular support for the North Korean government is insecure at best. Moreover, the political implications of the study suggest that the strength of everyday resistance has weakened the regime's power.

The range of acts that comprise the reflexive case of everyday resistance suggest the resilience of the Kim regime has benefitted from allowing some market-oriented practices that generate more wealth for the people. For instance, tacitly allowing the bartering of certain products and services outside official market trading hours does not appear to significantly affect the regime's power negatively, while limiting these privileges may cause backlash. However, while levels of defection have dropped in recent years, this is in part due to increased border security, not simply better living conditions. What is more concerning for the regime is an increase in cross-border movement, illegal movement, and domestic travel that provide more space for other acts of everyday resistance. For instance, more space for discursive dissent and an increase in illegal foreign materials in the marketplaces enabling biopolitical resistance.

Subversive discursive practices provide a more troublesome perspective of popular support for the Kim regime. The findings suggest that the state's repressive institutions continue to operate efficiently for the most part, but dissatisfaction with regime politics and everyday living conditions is evident in the data. Most notably, it is clear through the discourse of the younger demographic that the regime is struggling to bolster its legitimacy with a generation that has experienced more hardships than social benefits.

Evidence related to biopolitical acts of resistance supports the notion that willingness to access foreign culture and ideology points to a long-term problem for the Kim regime. It appears that while currently enhancing technology to limit access to such materials, long-term sustainability for managing the inflow of foreign culture and information appears bleak. The state's ideology is at serious odds with the consumption of foreign culture and ideas, the counterrevolutionary act of suicide and methamphetamine use.

7.4 Recommendations

7.4.1 Further Research

Building on the groundwork of this study, several possible directions for future research have emerged that can make further contributions to the social sciences. First, the case studies have indicated a future possibility for unpacking a more comprehensive approach to interpreting everyday patterns of resistance in North Korea. For instance, as the previous section suggested, the incorporation of a wider set of variables may both minimise within-case variation and maximise cross-case variation. As these cases are not consigned to history, and the exercise of everyday resistance is heterogeneous and contingent due to changing contexts and situations, it is important to continue observing these exercises as their current patterns continue to unfold. Second, in the meantime, replication of this study with a broader sample of defectors may enrich the research conducted in this study.

Third, in any future scenario, it is important to consider the outcomes of these types of everyday resistance should more public forms of contention emerge. Hence, the spectrum between organisational and individual resistance would be an interesting area to explore. For now, consideration of how different types of resistance encourage new performances or other types would be insightful. Fourth, a customised research design could implement a more interactive approach to determining types of state power and their correlation to specific types of resistance. As this study did to an extent, examining the broader totalitarian features of constraint on human behaviour and the inclusion of Scott's

forms of domination and Foucault's power triangle, further research could utilise this three-part classification to focus more explicitly on correlations with types of power.[68]

Fifth, a specific consideration of spatial and temporal aspects pertaining to these types of resistance may add substance to the overall understanding of the phenomenon, for example, how these types are practiced differently in the marketplace, kitchen and geographical province, and how individuals build on past experiences and future actions through particular repertoires. Lastly, the data suggested a semi-public form of resistance that could not be integrated into the typology on everyday types of resistance. The spontaneous collective pushback that authorities receive in the form of economic grievances when market hours are shortened may be of particular interest. While these are rarely observed, a particular case that deserves more analytical attention regarding scattered, semi-public pushback is the 2009 currency revaluation.

These recommendations are just a few possible suggestions for future research and other directions may be gleaned from a reading of this dissertation. For the time being, this study has provided academics and policymakers with a richer illustration of distinct variations of everyday resistance in North Korea and the structural and ideational impetus that facilitates their emergence.

7.4.2 Policy

The year 2018 has witnessed North Korea seemingly come out from the cold to embark on a campaign of international diplomacy. From a policy perspective, given the evidence of distinct patterns of everyday resistance in the state, the researcher recommends continued dialogue and exercise of patience from the international community toward North Korea.

In particular, the Moon Jae-in leadership in South Korea and the Trump administration in the United States may benefit from an ease of pressure on the North by allotting the Kim regime time to focus more concretely on the state's economy through actualising its proclaimed shift of policy from development of the economy in line with nuclear weapons development to solely the economy. If, in fact, policymakers are seeking

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[68] For instance, Lilja and Vinthagen (2014) link three forms of Foucauldian power forms with corresponding resistance, thus demonstrating through empirical examples within the emerging field of resistance studies that the peculiarities of power decide how resistance can be conducted.

increased pluralism or freer choice for North Korean citizens (not just denuclearisation), one should look to the case of everyday reflexive resistance in the present study that comprises a cluster of acts now tacitly accepted by some authorities. Patience has the capacity to facilitate change in non-democratic states. As Kuran (1995) observed on the predictability of unpredictability, "…a complex array of trends, events, and decisions thus determines a regime's fate…because the imperfect observability of private variables is a universal feature we can expect to be surprised again and again. In the future, as in the past, seemingly tranquil societies will burst aflame with little warning, toppling regimes considered invincible" (p. 288).

However, while Kim's message 'a new history begins now' remains etched in the visitor's book in the Peace House at the DMZ from the 2018 Inter-Korean Summit, scepticism abounds among the community of North Korea observers as to whether this notion is another ploy of brinkmanship diplomacy to garner economic concessions. Denuclearisation of the Korean peninsula is the endgame for South Korean President Moon, but it may threaten 'the end' of decades of Kim leadership in the North. Yet North Korea has proven sophisticated when it comes to its true foreign policy aim: regime perpetuation. Nevertheless, while eliciting mostly positive reactions from the international community, the significance of diplomacy with North Korea has a broader impact globally.

Tension on the Korea peninsula has affected the global community for decades and this is potentially a critical juncture and political opportunity to stymie any further hostilities. In a sense, any progress is good progress and a peaceful conclusion to the last bastion of the Cold War would be positive internationally. Yet those with high hopes for meaningful steps in the near future should exercise patience. Barring an internal collapse of the North, the Kim regime is unlikely to concede complete denuclearisation or end its hostile rhetoric toward its historical adversaries[69], at least domestically. Moreover, a span of documented human rights abuses extending to the Kim Jong-un era are not likely to be neglected should reunification occur on the South's terms, as the North Korean elite are aware of their fate as bound to that of the regime. Hence, stated intentions on the side of the North are unlikely to be genuine. Still, the stakes have been raised for future meetings between North Korea and its historical antagonists, primarily the United States and South

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[69] This predominantly refers to South Korea, the United States, and Japan.

Korea. Despite probable setbacks, the researcher urges continued dialogue, patience and transparency on behalf of the international community.

From the perspective of supporting North Korean defectors, those viewing their predicament through the lens of 'their problems aren't my problems' should consider a re-evaluation of their position. As this dissertation indicates, even the sensitive issues of suicide and methamphetamine use often carry over to third countries and should garner special attention due to the lack of medical, scholarly or psychiatric consideration and political framing of those issues in North Korea.

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APPENDIX I: A Map of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and Provincial Populations

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Political Map of North Korea (geology.com)

Provincial Populations

Province	Population
Ryanggang (Yanggang-Do)	719, 269
North Hamgyong (Hamgyong-Bukto)	2, 327, 362
South Hamgyong (Hamgyong-Namdo)	3, 066, 013
Kangwon (Kangwan-Do)	1, 477, 582
Chagang (Chagang-Do)	1, 299, 830
North Pyongan (Pyongan-Bukto)	2, 728, 662
South Pyongan (Pyongan-Namdo)	4, 051, 696
North Hwanghae (Hwanghae-Bukto)	2, 113, 672
South Hwanghae (Hwanghae-Namdo)	2, 310, 485
Pyongyang (P'yongyang Si)	3, 255, 288
Total	24, 052, 231

DPR Korea, 2008 Population Census, National Report, Central Bureau of Statistics, Pyongyang, DPR Korea, 2009, Special Cities Incorporated (Spellings in parentheses correspond with the political map. North Korea plans for another census in 2018)

APPENDIX II: Data on North Korean-born South Koreans

Category	~'98	~'01	~'02	~'03	~'04	~'05	~'06	~'07	~'08	~'09	~'10
Male	831	565	510	474	626	424	515	573	608	662	591
Female	116	478	632	811	1,272	960	1,513	1,981	2,195	2,252	1,811
Total	947	1,043	1,142	1,285	1,898	1,384	2,028	2,554	2,803	2,914	2,402
Percentage of female defectors	12%	46%	55%	63%	67%	69%	75%	78%	78%	77%	75%

Category	~'11	~'12	~'13	~'14	~'15	~'16	~'17	'18.9 (provisional)	Total
Male	795	404	369	305	251	302	188	111	9,104
Female	1,911	1,098	1,145	1,092	1,024	1,116	939	697	23,043
Total	2,706	1,502	1,514	1,397	1,275	1,418	1,127	808	32,147
Percentage of female defectors	71%	73%	76%	78%	80%	79%	83%	86%	72%

(Ministry of Unification 2018: https://www.unikorea.go.kr/eng_unikorea/relations/statistics/defectors/)

APPENDIX III: Participant Information Sheet

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PARTICIPANT INFORMATION SHEET

To: The Participants
Project Title: Classifying Daily Forms of Resistance in North Korea

Researcher Introduction
The researcher, Jacob Cowan (PhD candidate at the University of Auckland) is supervised by Dr. Changzoo Song (Asian Studies) and Dr. Stephen Noakes (Political Studies) is undertaking a study concerning daily life and subtle resistance in North Korea.

Project Description and Invitation
The project addresses developing forms of subtle resistance in North Korea. There is a limited amount of literature available on daily life in North Korea and the changes that are taking place within the state. Therefore, the research intends to illustrate a clearer picture of the different forms of subtle resistance along with when and why they may occur. In order to contribute to a better understanding regarding subtle forms of resistance in North Korea, you are invited to participate in an interview with the researcher.

Project Procedures
The interview will take approximately 30 minutes. It will be conducted in English or in Korean if requested. As the interview is semi-structured and open-ended, you will be asked

to answer a list of questions according to your own experience and knowledge, but may digress from the list if you choose. With your consent, your interview will transcribed through written notes, but you may choose to conclude the interview at any time. You have the right to amend or retract any information communicated to the researcher up to four weeks after the interview. Ideally, the interview will be conducted at your place of business. If this is not possible, another location may be considered. The interview may also be conducted through an online platform such as skype or google talk. In the case of an interview through an online platform, an electronic signature or a signed signature sent through the post will be acceptable. The employer and employees may obtain a summary of the research findings and gain the access to the final PhD thesis by contacting the researcher via email.

Data Use/Storage/Retention/Destruction/Future Use
Data and transcripts/translations will be entered into password-protected computer files; hard copies are stored in a locked cabinet at the University of Auckland when not in use; except the researcher and the researcher's supervisor(s), no third party has access to the data; after being retained for 6 years, the computer files and audio recordings will be deleted and all hard copies of the collected data will be destroyed using a secure disposal service. While on location during field research, handwritten notes will be kept under the control of researcher in secure hotel facilities, including in-room safes, where possible. These handwritten notes will then be converted to e-documents stored in a password protected laptop computer, and the originals destroyed. Participants have the opportunity to retract their statements up to four weeks following the interview. For those choosing to exercise the right to retract their interview in full, electronic data will be deleted and all hard-copy material shredded. A summary of the project findings will be provided to those who participated in the research in a language as requested. Information gained from the data may be published at a future date. No identifying details (such as name or organization) will be given in connection without the participant's permission

Rights to Withdraw from Participation
Your participation is entirely voluntary. You have the right to withdraw from participation at any time during or within four weeks after your interview. You may request a written record of the interview to assist with this process.

Anonymity and Confidentiality
Participants' names will be replaced with pseudonyms or codenames in the printed transcripts. No identifying information of the participants will be contained in any form through publications or presentations. All the collected data will be securely stored and only accessible to the researcher and supervisors. The consent forms will be stored separately from the data, securely with my main supervisor.

Researcher Contact Details

Participants are invited to contact the researcher for any clarification or further information required before signing the consent form. The researcher welcomes inquiries from participants in any country at any time at the below email address.

Name: Jacob Cowan
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Email: jcow316@aucklanduni.ac.nz

Primary Supervisor Contact Details

Name: Dr. Changzoo Song
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For any queries regarding ethical concerns you may contact the Chair, The University of Auckland Human Ethics Committee, The University of Auckland, Research Office, Private Bag 92019, Auckland 1142. Telephone 09 373-7599 (extension: 87830/83761) Email: humanethics@auckland.ac.nz

APPROVED BY THE UNIVERSITY OF AUCKLAND HUMAN PARTICIPANT ETHICS COMMITTEE ON <u>28/02/17</u> FOR (3) YEARS, REFERENCE NUMBER <u>017669</u>

APPENDIX IV: Consent Form

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CONSENT FORM (ALL PARTICIPANTS)
THIS FORM WILL BE HELD FOR A PERIOD OF SIX YEARS
Project title: Classifying Daily Forms of Resistance in North Korea
Researcher: Jacob Cowan
I have read the Participant Information Sheet, have understood the nature of the research and why I have been selected. I have had the opportunity to ask questions and have them answered to my satisfaction
I agree to take part in this research.
I understand that my identity will not be revealed and will be kept confidential. Pseudonyms or codenames will be used in place of participants' real names in all written notes and electronic transcripts.
I understand that I am free to withdraw my participation at any time, and to amend or withdraw any traceable data to me up to four weeks after the interview.

I understand that the electronic data will be stored on a password-protected University of Auckland computer and it will be deleted at the end of this project. Hardcopy material will be kept in a locked cabinet at the Department of Cultures, Languages, and Linguistics, the University of Auckland, for six years, after which time they will be destroyed.

By signing below, I agree to take part in this research under the terms indicated above.

Participant Name: _____
Participant Signature: _____
Date: _____
APPROVED BY THE UNIVERSITY OF AUCKLAND HUMAN PARTICIPANTS ETHICS COMMITTEE ON 28/02/17 for (3) years, Reference Number 017669

APPENDIX V: Interview Topic Guide

Introduction
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1. Clarify purposes of the interview

2. Relate intended uses of data

3. Rights to withdraw participation at any time, and to amend or withdraw any traceable data up to four weeks after the interview

4. Independence of the researcher

5. Confidentiality

6. Permission to take notes (optional)

*Do you have any questions for me?

Ensuring Quality

Style. Use open-ended questions to get lengthy and descriptive answers rather than close-ended questions

Biases. Avoid leading questions

Language. Use terms that participants can understand, given their knowledge, language skills, cultural background, age, gender, etc. Be mindful of the social or cultural contexts of the questions.

Concise. Keep the questions as short and specific as possible. Avoid asking two-in-one questions, such, "What is it like to work in the marketplace and what do you sell?"

Frame. Avoid questions with strong positive or negative association. Avoid phrasing questions as negatives (e.g., how don't you like to interact with the police?")

Question Set 1

A. *What sort of work do you do?*

B. *What is work like in North Korea?*

C. *What do people think of the economy?*

D. *What kinds of items are available in the markets?*

Question Set 2

A. *What sort of conversation is had in North Korea?*

B. *What sort of conversation do people have regarding societal issues?*

C. *What is the sense of humour like?*

D. *Is gossip as common as it is in [current country]?*

Question Set 3

A. *What is the dressing style like?*

B. *What kind of music is listened to?*

C. *What is watched on television?*

D. *Who do people listen to music with/watch television with?*

Question Set 4

A. *Are there any health issues in North Korea? Such as drinking or smoking?*

B. *If people are feeling upset, who do they speak to?*

Closing

1. Do you have anything you would like to add?

2. Do you have any questions for me?