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# **Migrants Reading Māori Television: mā rātou, mā mātou**

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A thesis submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy  
in Film, Television, and Media Studies, The University of Auckland, 2018.



## Abstract

Increasing immigration to New Zealand is part of a global rise in cross-border movements. This has led to changes in the nation's multi-ethnic demographic profile and has exerted a pressure to reimagine both national and migrant identities in the context of a society founded on a treaty that promised Māori self-determination. However, in reality its institutions, including the 'mainstream' media, continue to reflect the unequal power relations between Māori and Pākehā resulting from its settler colonial past. New Zealand's indigenous broadcaster, State-funded Māori Television with its mission to revitalise Māori language and culture, sits within this context to offer its audiences Māori images, stories and discourses as a counter to the ideology of 'mainstream' media.

Using Māori Television as a case study, I consider the extent to which its programming provides cultural resources for relatively recent migrants to understand a Māori world and navigate issues of identity and national belonging. I have used a combination of both qualitative and quantitative methods, including surveys, focus group discussions and interviews with different geographically based groups of self-selected migrants who had little previous exposure to Māori Television. They were asked to compare what they saw as the representation of Māori on Māori Television with the representations of Māori by the mass media in New Zealand. Focus groups viewed Māori Television for two months, both live-to-air and on-demand, and discussed their ideas about these differences within both face-to-face and on-line Facebook groups. While the nature of cross-cultural interpretations is complex, as neither content nor audiences can be separated from their cultural context, several studies have revealed that shared understandings do emerge when audiences engage with media embedded with other cultural messages.

The key cultural resources gained from their viewing experiences were identified by the participants as te reo learning opportunities, recognising affinities with Māori cultural concepts, an appreciation of the Treaty in Aotearoa New Zealand as the basis for the assertion of indigeneity, and new ways to consider issues of identity and national belonging. My findings are consistent with research from Canada and Australia that highlights the ability of indigenous media to build bridges of cultural understandings 'over the airwaves' with non-indigenous audiences. The outcomes of my research may be of interest in the future to funding bodies concerned with contributing to migrants' emotional settlement issues and/or asserting the role of indigeneity in Aotearoa New Zealand.

## Acknowledgements

I would like to thank my research participants for making this thesis possible. I am very grateful for their time and ability to share with me their personal stories of migration to Aotearoa New Zealand. My PhD journey has also been enriched by my principal supervisor Dr Sue Abel's time and energy in supporting my conceptualisation of this project, and the subsequent research and writing phase of the thesis. Thank you also to my associate supervisor Dr Sarina Pearson for her contribution to the theoretical scope of my research and her valuable insights.

I am enormously grateful for the support and friendship of Treaty educator Dr. Ingrid Huygens in particular, and other members of the Auckland Pākehā Treaty writers' group: Ray and Mitzi Nairn, Jenny Rankine, Biddy Livesey and Alex McConville. I am also grateful for the reassurance and encouragement of some of my Māori ex-colleagues from Television New Zealand, Tainui Stephens, Christina Milligan, Greg Mayor and Hone Edwards.

Thank you to all my talented PhD colleagues for their inspiring conversations and to my family and friends for their support and encouragement. A special thank you to Michael Edgar for his emotional and practical support. This PhD also had some lighter moments. My shut-up and write group was not only about writing. Thank you to Tina Newport and Suzanne Loughlin, and our insightful, mutual friend Stephenie Knight. Thank for your easy friendship, shared meals, critical insights into each other's work – and sometimes too much wine.

And finally, thank you to my parents Vlastislav Němec and Leslye Waterhouse for their gift of tenacity, and to my daughters Rheia and Elena Edgar-Nemec for their important ability to share their energy and hope for the future of Aotearoa New Zealand. Kia tau te rangimārie ki te iwi.

## Preface

The seeds for this research topic were planted many years ago. In the 1980s, just a decade after the start of the Māori Renaissance, I had the privilege as a European/Pākehā to work in Māori programming at TVNZ. I worked as a producer's assistant on *Koha*, one of the first weekly television broadcast Māori programmes. I was taken around the country with Māori producers and directors – some of whom have been my mentors for this research – listening into a Māori world as they interviewed Māori from all walks of life as part of their research for programme content. The knowledge I gained about this world raised my awareness of how the violence of early colonisation was perpetuated in the more subtle practices of a dominating monoculturalism.

This sparked numerous conversations with my Czech father, a refugee from the communist invasion of Eastern Europe who had arrived in New Zealand in the 1960s. Like many migrants then and since, he had no idea about what an indigenous world looked like, nor any knowledge of an 1840 treaty between the British Crown and Māori tribal leaders. As we talked, he began to see parallels between his life as a refugee in New Zealand and the Māori losses of land and culture. He saw similarities between the taunts directed at him – ‘you’re just a bloody foreigner’, ‘Nazi’ and ‘why don’t you go home’ – and the everyday racism that was directed at Māori. However, despite understanding how he was being ‘othered’ by the majority population, he still held onto his imported beliefs and stereotypes: he could never quite shift his idea that people from minority ethnic groups were ‘trouble makers’. This was shaped largely by the racialised attitudes in Czech culture about Romani people in Europe. He occupied an ambivalent position between being othered by the majority and benefitting from his whiteness. During his working life I was acutely aware of the way my father was differentiated as an outsider, and how despite this exclusion he still acquired the attitudes towards Māori of ‘mainstream’ New Zealand. Whether he felt it or not, it seemed to me that there was a tension between not being fully accepted by those of the dominant Anglo-Celtic heritage, but still benefitting from European privilege compared with Māori.

It would be fair to say he struggled with a predominantly linguistic and cultural Anglo world as he grew old and developed Alzheimers Disease, retreating into the language of his youth as he eventually lost the ability to speak English. When he could only communicate in Czech, a language none of us could understand, he became frustrated. I appreciated the depth of this frustration after many years of living in Chile where my attempts to speak Spanish were frequently thwarted because my accent was often indecipherable to locals, or my vocabulary did not include colloquialisms, or the locals spoke too quickly. My requests to ‘speak more slowly please’ made no difference. So not only could I understand my father's frustrations as he lost his ability to communicate with those around him, but

also the difficulties of numerous migrants of other ethnicities I met in Auckland. Many of these non-English speaking migrants struggled to be understood because of limited vocabulary, or difficulties in pronouncing English words.

Living in a non-English speaking country in South America also made me aware of how difficult it must have been for my father trying to recreate a complete identity in another language and a different cultural context with its own distinct historical narrative of nationhood. When I lived in Chile in the late 1990s with my family, I felt my identity was completely deconstructed by the process of settlement because of my own semiotically shaped and culturally centric Aotearoa New Zealand view of the world. I couldn't work in television, I had no friends and my language skills were not good enough to communicate meaningfully with non-English speaking locals.

On my return to New Zealand I trained as a secondary school teacher and began teaching English and Media Studies at large multicultural Auckland secondary schools. I also taught English to refugees and new migrants. In conversations with them and their families about some of the cultural difficulties of racialisation and marginalisation they faced adapting to their new home I learned that many of them watched Māori Television and I was curious to know why.

The story of this research about Māori Television and its migrant audiences recalled the seeds of discomfort, planted back in my *Koha* days, after learning about injustice in this nation. My research is informed by a combination of my family life as a young girl with a refugee father in the ambiguous world of being both outsider and insider in 'mainstream' society, of being a linguistic and cultural outsider in my adult family life, and observations from my professional encounters in the world of Māori and of non-white migrants. In undertaking this research, I bring similar experiences to those of my father – as both insider and outsider.<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> During the process of this research, I have discovered that my family name, Nemeč, literally means 'outsider' in Czech. In Old Czech the word 'Nemeč' was used to denote any foreigner, being derived from *nemý* (mute), referring to an inability to speak Czech. Germans (mainly Bavarians) were brought in large numbers by feudal overlords to the territory of present-day Slovenia and of the early medieval Slovenian state Carantania (present-day Carinthia and Styria, now divided between Austria and Slovenia).

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## Glossary

This section provides a glossary of te reo Māori words used in this thesis and, where there is a divergence of meaning, an explanation of some key terms. I recognise that definitions may limit the many nuances of the meaning of a word. At the same time, however, definitions can allow non te reo speakers an entry point into a Māori world.

### Key Words

Aotearoa	literally ‘long white cloud’, the Māori name for ‘New Zealand’
hapū	sub-tribe, kinship group of multiple whānau
hui	gathering or meeting to discuss issues of concern
iwi	Tribe
kai	Food
kaitiaki	Guardian
kaitiakitanga	guardianship or stewardship of the environment from a Māori standpoint
kapa haka	a form of self-expression for Māori where heritage and cultural Polynesian identity is expressed through groups performing song and dance routines
karakia	incantation, ritual chant, prayer
karanga	call of welcome by a woman during the time a visiting group moves onto a host’s marae
kaupapa Māori	a Māori approach and ideology, practice or principles
kaumātua	elder, a person of status within the whānau
kāwanatanga	Governance
kia ora	greeting, hullo
kōrero	a talk, discussion or meeting; to converse, or speak
kuia	elderly woman, grandmother, female elder with status in the whānau
kupu	word(s) and vocabulary
mana	authority related to Māori power and sometimes sovereignty (a difficult word to convey in English)
mana motuhake	Māori identity and sovereignty; mana through self-determination and control over one’s destiny

mana whenua	spiritual and customary authority over the land
manaakitanga	hospitality, help, care for others
manuhiri	visitor, guest, foreigner
Māori	normal, natural, hence the name, tangata whenua References to ‘Māori’ in this research have been used homogenously, but there are many distinct iwi and hapū differences both in language dialects and customary practices that have been subsumed by the generic use of ‘Māori’.
marae	a communal or sacred area used as a meeting space for iwi
marae ātea	courtyard in front of meeting house
Matariki	Māori New Year based on the Pleiades; the Seven Sisters star constellation
moko	Māori tattooing designs on the face or body done under traditional protocols
Ngāti Whātua	tribal group in the area from Kaipara to Tamaki-mākau-rau (Auckland)
Pacifika	a collective of South Pacific Islands people living in New Zealand who are either born in the Islands or in New Zealand. Although not indigenous to New Zealand there are strong whakapapa links between the Pacific Islands nations and Māori where the oceans are seen as highways rather than as a means of separation between Polynesian peoples.
Pākehā	non-Māori, New Zealander of European descent (discussed more fully below)
pepeha	a set form of words describing the places and people a person is connected to
pou whenua	carved wooden posts to mark traditional boundaries or places of significance
powhiri	formal welcome to a marae
rangatahi	young people
rangatira	chief, person of high rank, leader
rangatiratanga	chieftainship, right to exercise authority, sovereignty, self- determination
tamariki	Children
tangata Tiriti	people of the Treaty
tangata whenua	indigenous people born of the whenua (land)
tangi	rituals for the dead, funeral
taonga	treasure, property, possession, anything prized
tapu	closely linked to the concept of mana. It is linked to the sacred nature of people and the land

tauiwi	used to denote all non-Māori
te ao Māori	the Māori world
te reo Māori	the Māori language
tikanga	custom, protocol, correct procedure (discussed further below)
tino rangatiratanga	self-determination, sovereignty, autonomy, self-government
tukutuku	ornamental lattice work in the wharehau that convey a complex language of visual symbols
tūrangawaewae	a place where one has a right to stand; rights of belonging through kinship and whakapapa concept of belonging implicit within the Treaty
waiata	songs or chants
wairuatanga	Spirituality
whaikōrero	speech in reply to formal welcome
whakapapa	commonly understood as genealogy
whānau	extended family, family group
whanaungatanga	sense of family connection; relationship through shared experiences which provides people with a sense of belonging
whenua	land, afterbirth, earth, country
wharehau	meeting house, main building of a marae





## Discussion of Relevant Key Terms

### Decolonisation

The concept of decolonisation has several different meanings. Linda Tuhiwai Smith in her seminal book *Decolonizing Methodologies* defines it as a “long term process involving the bureaucratic, cultural, linguistic and psychological divesting of colonial power” (Smith, 1999, p.98). It also refers to the re-centering of indigenous ideologies and the intellectual re-positioning of those in power to participate in respectful relationships with colonised people (Huygens, 2007, Margaret, 2018). Margaret (2018) explains that for Pākehā “it also means understanding the intersections of Pākehā privilege, colonisation and racism so that we [Pākehā] can begin to unravel them and create other ways of being” (Margaret, 2018, p. 3). Huygens refers to the development of ‘narratives of decolonisation’ as the process of beginning to develop the linguistic and psychological skills to engage in dialogues between Māori and Pākehā about what decolonisation means (Huygens, 2016).

### Mainstream

I have used the word ‘mainstream’ in quotation marks throughout this thesis to highlight that mainstream is a construction of the majority population. There is often a tendency amongst the majority to think of their views as normative and consider alternative voices as non-mainstream and ‘other’. Pākehā poet Glenn Colquhoun expresses how he sees majority groups experiencing minorities:

The most difficult thing about majorities is not that they cannot see minorities, but that they cannot see themselves. There is no contrast, no dissonance, everything is white on white. (Colquhoun, 2012, p. 38)

Such attitudes are often reflected in the discourse of mass ‘mainstream’ media and render Māori and migrant groups issues and concerns invisible.

### Migrant

The Oxford online Dictionary defines ‘migrant’ as a person who moves from one place to another, especially in order to find work or better living conditions. Transnationalism and cosmopolitanism aside, I use the term ‘migrant’ to focus on individuals who come to Aotearoa New Zealand with a view to finding a place to settle and call home. Such a description has implications associated with migrant belonging and participation in forms of civic engagement.

I also refer to the experience of migrants, who should be considered as agents in their own right, rather than the experience of refugees. While similar issues are relevant to both groups, such as discrimination, refugees come from backgrounds where the fear of persecution means they have no

choice to return in their home country and have few options to leave a ‘host’ nation (McGrath, Butcher, Pickering, & Smith, 2005).

Pacific Island people are also considered ‘migrants’ but they have not been included in my research because of the many cultural similarities and shared experiences between Māori and Pasifika. For example, there are links everywhere in the languages, such as numbers, *tasi, lua, tolu, fa* (Samoan), *Taha, uā, tolu, fā* (Tongan) and *tahi, rua, toru, wha* (te reo Māori).

## Pākehā

Eminent Māori scholar and historian Ranginui Walker provides a useful account of the first use of the word ‘Pākehā’:

With the arrival of the European navigators, traders and missionaries, however, the Māori applied the descriptive term Pākehā (white man) to these strangers. Conversely, because white skin was a strange and abnormal condition to them they adopted the term Māori (normal or natural) to distinguish themselves. (Walker, 1989, p. 35)

The term ‘Pākehā’ is now applied to New Zealanders, usually with ‘white skin’, of British and European heritage. Spoonley (1991) argues that European New Zealanders who chose to adopt the term ‘Pākehā’ do so as a way of expressing a new politicised post-colonising identity. Identifying with the term Pākehā often means that an individual acknowledges the violence of the nation’s colonial past, as well as respect for a Māori understanding of Te Tiriti o Waitangi and support for a Māori-Pākehā partnership (Huygens, 2007). However, there are still many ‘white skinned’ New Zealanders who are opposed to the use of the term ‘Pākehā’. Black and Huygen clarify the position of migrants by suggesting that those “with white skin usually accept that they are identified as Pākehā, while Pasifika, pan-Asian and other ‘non-white’ people generally do not feel included by the term” (Black & Huygens, 2007, p. 49).

## Tikanga

Tikanga has many meanings and no clear definition. Māori legal scholars define tikanga as “values, standards, principles or norms to which the Māori community generally subscribed for the determination of appropriate conduct” (Durie 1996:449) and “the Māori way of doing things – from the very mundane to the most sacred or important fields of human endeavour” (Williams, 1998, p. 2). It is perhaps best described as having a fluid interpretation, with no rule like definition allowing it to be adapted to the needs of individual iwi at particular times or situations (Gallager, 2016).

## The Interrelationship between Tikanga and te Reo (*Te Reo Māori Me Ngā Tikanga*)

Māori Television's annual reports and content strategies reflect the broadcaster's vision of promoting 'te reo Māori me ngā tikanga'. This reflects its obligation to revitalise the taonga of te reo which is at the heart of Māori culture. 'Te reo Māori me ngā tikanga Māori' can be understood as the way the expression of culture is inextricably linked to how language is used to express people's cultural thoughts and beliefs. Brown (2000) succinctly explains that "a language is a part of a culture and a culture is a part of a language; the two are intricately interwoven so that one cannot separate the two without losing the significance of either language or culture" (Brown, 2000, p. 177). Hence 'te reo Māori me ngā tikanga Māori' can be understood in terms of the embedded and interwoven nature of te reo and tikanga. I have adopted this term throughout this thesis as a means to emphasis that language and culture cannot exist without each other.



# Chapter One

## Research Context

### 1.1 Introduction

This thesis is a case study of relatively recent migrants settled in Aotearoa New Zealand and their experiences of learning about a Māori world from a Māori perspective through Māori Television. It challenges the ‘mainstream’ expectation that new immigrants are co-opted by Pākehā hegemony and messages from ‘mainstream’ media when ‘integrating’ into New Zealand national culture. Its specific focus is on how a group of self-selected recent migrants used Māori Television as a mechanism through which to experience an alternative point of view in their quest for a sense of place and belonging as a member of a minority ethnic group in a society seemingly based on the relationship between Māori and Pākehā.

There are several important features of the historical and demographic context in which my research is located: (1) te Tiriti o Waitangi (the Māori version of the Treaty of Waitangi<sup>2</sup>), referred to as the Treaty in this thesis, as the founding constitutional document of Aotearoa New Zealand; (2) the relationship between Māori and Pākehā shaped by 19<sup>th</sup> century British colonisation, the ongoing breaches of the Treaty and the marginalisation of te ao Māori; (3) the nation’s changing demography resulting from immigration; and (4) the implications of these features for the changing narratives of New Zealand’s national identity.

A number of research strands run through the study: (1) how to develop more supportive attitudes by migrants both towards the Treaty, and towards a Māori and Pākehā nation within a multi-ethnic nation in a world of super-diversity; (2) migration and notions of cultural identity and belonging; (3) the ability of indigenous media to challenge ‘mainstream’ cultural, political and social norms; (4) affective audience engagement with indigenous television content; and (5) the importance of the acquisition of indigenous language skills. As this is a study of the personal experiences of migrants individually and within their own ethnic groups, the methodological choices in the study were informed by the best ways to gather these experiences. I chose to use individual interviews, surveys, focus groups and Facebook discussion groups. The study is an example of a media studies research project that uses a

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<sup>2</sup> In this research I use ‘the Treaty’ to refer to the Māori text of te Tiriti o Waitangi. The Māori version of the Treaty takes precedence in international law because it was signed by the majority of Māori chiefs and the British Governor, William Hobson.

combination of social science qualitative and quantitative methodologies but also a combination of Western and indigenous conceptual frameworks.

The contribution of this study to wider research is to include the voice of migrants in the growth of a nation that is being challenged to meet its Treaty obligations. Different migrant groups are mostly left to fend for themselves as they navigate complex issues of identity and belonging in an entangled post-colonial relationship between Māori and the Crown. This is a subject largely ignored academically and politically.

## 1.2 Background to the Study

The nation that greets new migrants when they arrive in New Zealand is one that has been shaped by the relationship between its founding cultures of Māori and Pākehā,<sup>3</sup> formalised by the 1840 Tiriti o Waitangi (Treaty of Waitangi). It is almost impossible for most New Zealanders to be oblivious to an indigenous existence as they go about their daily life (Bell, 2008). Political studies academic Katherine Smits (2010) notes the relative prominence, compared to other settler societies, of indigenous culture in New Zealand:

Indigenous culture and language are more broadly visible across public life in New Zealand ... Government ministries and departments feature Māori names and symbols; Māori ceremonies are common in public institutions; and some Māori words and phrases have achieved common currency among European or Pākehā New Zealanders. (Smits, 2010, p. 66)

The extent to which Māori language and culture is practically ubiquitous is a constant signifier of an indigenous existence in the political, economic and social landscape of the nation. However, many commentators see this as a ‘soft’ form of biculturalism which I will discuss in Chapter 2.

Although New Zealand was previously often painted as a bucolic, racially harmonious nation in the South Pacific (Barker, 2012), more recently, and particularly since urban migration of Māori in the 1950s, poor social indicators of wellbeing, economic potential and political voice for Māori have painted a different picture of systemic inequality between Māori and Pākehā. For example, there are disproportionately more Māori than non-Māori in New Zealand prisons. While Māori only account for approximately 15 per cent of the total population (Statistics NZ, 2014), 55.5 per cent of people who receive court-imposed sentences are Māori – compared to 30.6 per cent of non-Māori New Zealanders of European descent – for the year ended December 2015 (New Zealand Law Society, 2016).<sup>4</sup> In 2013, life expectancy at birth was 73.0 years for Māori males and 77.1 years for Māori females, compared

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<sup>3</sup> I have critically examined the words Māori and Pākehā in the discussion of key terms section at the beginning of this thesis.

<sup>4</sup> The then Labour Party Spokesman for Māori development, Kelvin Davis, says there is an unconscious bias [against Māori] ‘right throughout the judicial system’ (*The New Zealand Herald*, September 27, 2016).

to 80.3 years for non-Māori males and 83.9 years for non-Māori females and home ownership was 28.2 per cent for Māori compared to 56.8 per cent of Pākehā (Statistics NZ, 2013).

### 1.3 Contemporary Context

The Pākehā and Māori relationship has been highlighted by an increasingly multi-ethnic demographic profile due to migration. New Zealand migration policy changes since 1987 increased non-British immigrants (Figure 1 below) causing a nation of previously predominantly two cultures, Māori-Pākehā, to become a multi-cultural and multi-ethnic society. In 2015, 24 per cent of New Zealand's 4.5 million population was foreign-born (United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, 2015). These foreign-born New Zealanders have not had the same advantages of acculturation into New Zealand society and the influence of indigeneity that pervades most native-born New Zealanders' lives.

Figure 1 (below) shows new resident origins by geographic region. The total number of resident permits issued annually has remained reasonably static at about 50,000 despite changes in the source nation mix. Figure 2A (below) details the actual numbers by regional group. Figure 2B shows the top five source nations. From 2010/11 to 2016/2017 there was a significantly greater proportion of immigrants granted residency from North-East, South and South-East Asian countries (66.7 per cent) compared to Western countries (33.3 per cent) A 'spike' in residents from Western democracies in 2004 - 2007 is likely attributable to the introduction of the 'Expression of Interest' system prioritising applicants who had a job or job offer. Simon-Kumar (2015) argues that this privileged applicants having easy access to the labour market through speaking English as a first language, having English names and Western qualifications and who were white.

Figures 1 and 2 do not capture temporary residents granted a work visa for between three and five years, but in 2015/2016 there were almost 200,000 temporary residents, mostly from India or the United Kingdom (Ministry of Business Innovation and Employment, 2016). People with work visas can apply for permanent residency after five years and may vote in the nation's general elections. The large proportion of overseas-born New Zealanders being eligible to vote could potentially have a considerable political impact. Such people may have little investment in the country yet could shape the nation's political character, potentially reflecting uncritically the 'mainstream' cultural and social beliefs and attitudes.

It becomes crucial, therefore, for new residents to be well informed about indigenous issues and to have access to alternative representations to those prevailing in the nation's cultural and political 'mainstream'. This is particularly so because, as these demographic changes have changed the face of the nation, they have also introduced more complex multicultural discourses, some of which regard




the Treaty as largely irrelevant. The need to be well-informed is important for immigrants to understand their place in a multi-ethnic, bicultural society. New Zealand, unlike other British-settler societies, has not implemented multicultural policies because, as will be discussed in Chapter 2, the Treaty of Waitangi governs the relationship between Māori and all others.

As this study shows, Māori Television's broadcasting has the potential to contribute to a better understanding about this relationship and to counter predominant 'mainstream' media representations of indigeneity for its audiences. It can also offer new settlers/migrants cultural resources to participate in a nation based on the ongoing implications of an historical Treaty between the British Crown and the indigenous people of New Zealand.

# Figure 1: Residency Trends by Source Nations

Source: Migration Trends, Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment



**Figure 2A: Residency Trends by Source Nations**

Source: Migration Trends, Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment

Year to 30th June:	1997/98	1998/99	1999/00	2000/01	2001/02	2002/03	2003/04	2004/05	2005/06	2006/07	2007/08	2008/09	2009/10	2010/11	2011/12	2012/13	2013/14	2014/15	2015/16	2016/17
<b>NE Asian Nations</b> (China, Japan, South Korea, Hong Kong, Taiwan)	5298	4555	5540	8874	13082	12099	7752	7734	10122	7775	7617	8360	7670	7168	7653	7658	9565	9091	11456	9912
<b>South Asia Nations</b> (India, Pakistan, Nepal, Bangladesh, Bhutan, Sri Lanka)	2938	3485	4378	6705	9719	8699	3637	3944	3852	4659	4056	4302	5011	5360	6153	6429	8276	8472	10639	9185
<b>Western Democracies</b> (UK, Nth America, Europe)	6433	6534	7317	8055	9269	9491	10855	19288	19720	16501	13871	12042	11789	9943	9626	8828	9073	8206	9274	8596
<b>SE Asian Nations</b> (Philippines, Myanmar, Vietnam, Malaysia, etc. )	1940	2339	4174	4794	5367	4660	3078	2825	3619	4927	6027	5662	6193	5552	5692	5126	5256	5710	7217	6734
<b>Pacific Is.</b> (Samoa, Fiji, Tonga, Tuvalu, Kiribati)	5612	5814	6654	7311	7029	7063	7882	8393	6865	6668	7409	7388	6766	6563	6346	5931	6184	6298	6471	5981
<b>African Nations</b> (South Africa etc.)	3517	3980	4274	5010	5472	3581	4147	4703	5055	4641	5169	6146	5912	3784	2614	2250	2516	2489	3269	3719
<b>Latin American Nations</b> (Brazil, Columbia, Argentina, Chile etc.)	60	78	124	141	191	258	276	408	444	532	557	677	899	926	937	890	1023	929	1221	1361
<b>Middle Eastern Nations</b> (Syria, Iran, Egypt etc.)	802	651	1066	1213	1374	1510	614	611	617	407	506	683	559	499	611	864	1043	911	1404	1161
<b>Eastern Europe Nations</b> (Russia, Czech Republic, Poland etc.)	577	559	853	966	1353	1177	776	909	942	854	865	837	920	942	816	985	1072	979	1101	1035
<b>Other Countries</b> (Turkey, Afghanistan, Others)	1890	1455	1766	1254	1386	1030	1242	1353	1020	1022	864	830	944	692	719	945	1046	1064	1044	777
<b>TOTAL ALL NATIONS</b>	27177	27995	34380	43069	52856	48538	39017	48815	51236	46964	46077	46097	45719	40737	40448	38961	44008	43085	52052	47684

**Figure 2B: Residency by Top Five Source Countries**

Source: Migration Trends, Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment

Year to 30th June:	1997/98	1998/99	1999/00	2000/01	2001/02	2002/03	2003/04	2004/05	2005/06	2006/07	2007/08	2008/09	2009/10	2010/11	2011/12	2012/13	2013/14	2014/15	2015/16	2016/17
<b>China</b>	3547	2981	3418	5279	8750	7990	4809	5061	6773	5846	6070	6790	5909	5262	5412	5794	7488	7305	9360	8141
<b>India</b>	2197	2558	3247	5377	8430	7588	3057	3359	3334	4039	3293	3155	3712	4218	5220	5128	6354	6684	8498	7476
<b>United Kingdom</b>	4358	4153	4944	5532	6593	6729	8165	15045	14674	12273	10030	8641	7773	6549	6032	5184	5160	4549	4934	4514
<b>Philippines</b>	664	632	869	1152	1381	1456	873	898	1252	2775	3787	3484	4152	3179	3277	3051	3148	3610	4614	4497
<b>South Africa</b>	3194	3348	3611	3988	4303	2634	2630	3436	4033	3764	4166	5344	5310	3396	2236	1941	2212	2177	2970	3412
<b>Total Top Five Source Countries</b>	13960	13672	16089	21328	29457	26397	19534	27799	30066	28697	27346	27414	26856	22604	22177	21098	24362	24325	30376	28040
<b>% of Total Residencies by All Countries</b>	51%	49%	47%	50%	56%	54%	50%	57%	59%	61%	59%	59%	59%	55%	55%	54%	55%	56%	58%	59%

## 1.4 Māori Television

This study focuses on the impact and significance of indigenous broadcasting for immigrants within the context of te Tiriti o Waitangi and the relationship between Māori and Pākehā. After more than four decades of struggle by Māori, using the Treaty as a mobilising force (Smith, 2016), the government was finally persuaded that Māori language and culture should be protected under te Tiriti and that the State should fund Māori Television to promote and protect te ao Māori (*the Māori world*).

Māori Television was established in 2004 and has successfully established itself not only with Māori audiences but also amongst both a non-Māori majority culture and within the wider media culture of New Zealand (Smith, 2016). Indeed, Māori Television, through its ability to draw cultural and political strength from diverse iwi (*tribal*) communities, can be seen as participating in the struggle against the cultural hegemony of the ‘mainstream’ (Smith, 2016).

There have been some studies covering the effectiveness of Māori Television and its goals of cultural and language regeneration. A Māori Broadcasting Language Impact Evaluation Report (commissioned jointly by Māori Television and Te Māngai Pāho<sup>5</sup>) found that “thirty per cent of the increase in understanding Māori culture and receptivity towards te reo Māori (*the Māori language*<sup>6</sup>) among non-Māori can be attributed to Māori Television” (Māori Television, 2017a, p. 17).

There is limited academic research covering the impact of Māori Television on non-Māori audiences. While not measuring the up-take of te reo by non-Māori, Abel (2013b) and Turner (2011) both found that considerable numbers of such audiences were largely attracted to the broadcaster for its wide range of New Zealand content, rather than its assertion of an indigenous voice. However, to date no published research has investigated what integrative role Māori Television might have in the lives of migrant audiences as they seek to understand some of the complexities of a nation they have chosen to call home. This is not surprising as Māori Television is primarily focused on the revitalisation of Māori language and culture. However, given the potential social and political impact of migrant populations and the implications of rapidly changing demographics for New Zealand society and national identity, it becomes more pressing to investigate the relationship between migrants and Māori in a nation informed by the Treaty.

## 1.5 Aim of the Research

This research is a case study of a group of self-selected migrants from a range of geographical regions. The intent of my analysis has not been to look at the ‘effects’ of watching Māori Television but rather to examine participant experiences of how Māori Television broadcast content provided opportunities

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<sup>5</sup> The main government funding agency for broadcast media in te reo.

<sup>6</sup> Also referred to in an abbreviated form as ‘te reo’.

to widen their knowledge and appreciation of the Treaty's purpose and to understand and value Māori culture. Although a literature survey suggests there is little similar research to provide a baseline against which to measure impact, the aim of this research is to explore the ways in which Māori Television provides a lens into a Māori world for its new migrant audiences, the value the participants place on this access and how it might influence the intersection of their perceptions of indigeneity, of Aotearoa's national identity/ies and their own migrant identity, and the implications for future funding and research.

Central to this study are two questions: (1) to what extent does Māori Television facilitate migrants' experiences of learning about a Māori world from a Māori perspective and (2) how do these experiences offer cultural resources for settlement in a nation underpinned by the Treaty? This research contributes towards understanding the role indigenous media plays, if any, in facilitating positive behaviours and attitudes by migrants towards te ao Māori and as a counter to a Pākehā 'standard story'<sup>7</sup> about Māori. Māori Television is one of many non-'mainstream' forms of media available to migrants. However, the changing pattern of media consumption by audiences due to the proliferation of 'mainstream' and non-'mainstream' media sources means more research is needed into migrants' own use of, and preferences for, different types of media and possible interrelationships between minority ethnic media and indigenous media.

## 1.6 An Immigrant Nation

The cultural and political subordination of Māori by predominantly anglo-saxon settlers began fairly late in the near-1000-year-old history of the country. As recently as 1840 when Māori signed the Treaty, they outnumbered new settlers by about 40:1 (Ministry of Culture and Heritage, 2014b). This began to change with an influx of settlers after the signing of the Treaty, but by the latter half of the 19<sup>th</sup> century settlers dramatically outnumbered Māori as many had lost their lives in land wars and through introduced diseases. By the 1890s, the Māori population was down to about 40 per cent of what it had been before contact with Pākehā (Pool, 2011). The nation became largely white and monoculturally British because the majority of migrants came from the homelands of the early Irish and British settlers. There were a small number of French, Indians, Dalmatians and Chinese.

In the mid-20<sup>th</sup> century, migrants started to come to New Zealand in larger numbers from the Netherlands and Pacific nations. Post World War II refugees also arrived from continental Europe and from South East Asia after the Vietnam War. Since the early 1990s, New Zealand has had an annual quota of 750 refugees (increased to 1000 per annum from 2019), receiving people from a more diverse

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<sup>7</sup> The 'standard story' is a term first coined by psychologists Ray Nairn and Tim McCreanor (1990, 1991) to describe entrenched negative patterns in Pākehā attitudes towards Māori, based on a belief that Māori culture 'is fundamentally inferior to that of the settlers'. This belief is manifested in a 'standard story' prevalent in a range of media and political talk.

range of countries, such as Somalia, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Palestine, Zimbabwe, Kosovo, Sri Lanka and Syria.

The demographic changes from immigration and refugee settlement have met with some resistance. In a report commissioned by the Asia New Zealand foundation Gendell, Spoonley and Butcher (2013) found the most favoured migrant group by 'New Zealanders' were white migrants from the United Kingdom, followed by Australians and South Africans (Gendall et al, 2013, p. 25). Arguably, the apparent preference by many New Zealanders for white migrants, despite official policy changes which ended preferential treatment for British migrants, reflects the current majority Pākehā demographic profile of New Zealand.<sup>8</sup> As this profile becomes more diverse in its ethnicity through immigration, different fertility rates for minority ethnic groups, intermarriage and age demographics (Statistics NZ, 2013) this bias may be reduced.

When the New Zealand Immigration Act was revised in 1987 it removed any preferential treatment for New Zealand's traditional migrant source in the United Kingdom. Seeking to boost New Zealand's competitive edge in an increasingly global economy the 1987 Act declared "the selection of new immigrants would be based on criteria of personal merit without discrimination on grounds of race, national or ethnic origin" (Burke cited in Zodgekar, 2005, p. 54). This paved the way for significant increases in migrants from South Korea, South Africa, China (particularly Taiwan) and India, as well as smaller flows from a number of Middle Eastern and African countries. Since the 1987 immigration policy reforms, there have been several waves of migrants from the South Pacific, Malaysia, Thailand and Japan, as well as considerable numbers from European countries such as Greece, Poland, Hungary, Serbia and Croatia (Ministry of Social Development, 2008). These substantial demographic shifts have led social demographer Paul Spoonley to project that by the mid-2020s New Zealanders of Asian ethnicities will begin to outnumber Māori (Spoonley quoted in Tan, 2014).

New Zealand's immigration policy since 1987 is linked to its attempts to be part of the global economy. As a report by the Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment (MBIE) explains "immigration helps address labour and skills shortages. It also helps to build New Zealand's workforce by bringing in capital, expertise and international connections" (MBIE, 2012, p. 1). The New Zealand government has provided numerous community programmes under the umbrella of the Office of Ethnic Affairs to support migrants' integration into society and employment.<sup>9</sup> However, while a few organisations such as the Migrant Action Trust and Auckland Regional Migrant Services acknowledge the importance

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<sup>8</sup> According to the 2013 Census 74 per cent of New Zealand's population were of European descent.

<sup>9</sup> The research acknowledges the efforts that many groups such as churches, community groups, Non-Government Organisations and local councils undertake to contribute to migrant belonging and it is not the intent of this research to evaluate their effectiveness.

and role of the Treaty, there has been little other regard to the integration of migrants into the unique relationship that exists between Māori and Pākehā created by the nation's founding document in 1840, te Tiriti o Waitangi. It could be said that it is a relationship that is not always easily understood outside of its historical context. The Treaty, therefore, also raises questions about whether Māori should have more of a voice in immigration policy and practice (Kukutai & Rata, 2017; Simon-Kumar, 2014, 2015). Māori involvement in 'hosting' new migrants has the potential outcome of offering migrants a glimpse into a Māori world, and to some extent might facilitate greater opportunities for migrant belonging and participation in the nation.

## 1.7 A Wider Perspective

### 1.7.1 Migration, Migrants and Superdiversity

New Zealand's changing narratives of national identity are due, in part, to migration and demographic diversification, as well as to the increasing assertion of indigeneity by Māori. This aligns with the experiences of other nations because people have always migrated within and across frontiers to find new lands, opportunities or security. Since the end of the twentieth century, global technologies and communications have increasingly allowed the world to connect economically, socially, and politically through the complex phenomenon of international migration.

The United Nations (1998) defines an international migrant as any person who changes his or her country of usual residence for at least a year. But this seemingly simple definition based on physical presence belies a myriad of complexities. The migration experience for many includes 'transnationalism', or the experience of having multiple ties and transactions that link them across borders. Transnational migrants do not sever themselves from their home country, but rather nurture their ties to 'home'. Identity can become 'hyphenated', sometimes across several ethnicities (Glick Schiller, Basch, & Blanc, 1995). On the other hand, 'cosmopolitanism' and its conceptualisation of elite mobilities includes individuals who have no strong ties to home, but rather have dispositions of intellectual and aesthetic curiosity and an openness to people, places and experiences (Urry, 2003).

The term 'migrant' within societies of 'superdiversity', a term coined by sociologist Steven Vertovec in 2007, has many different (and sometimes legal) meanings. This can be due to the stratification of work visas and refugee status, residency requirements, gender balances, age distributions, notions of class and human capital (often between different minority ethnic groups), as well as diversity within and between national groups from a range of linguistic and religious backgrounds (Vertovec, 2007, Collins, 2018). It is beyond the scope of this research to determine how any of these variables might have influenced my research participants' journey of migration or informed their viewing experience of indigenous television. However, the majority of my study's participants had lived in New Zealand

between five and ten years and obtained residency thereby demonstrating some commitment to settling in Aotearoa New Zealand.

Vertovec (2007) began using the term ‘superdiversity’ to describe the challenges many societies face in existing patterns of social organisation due to a widening diversity of migration channels and the increased movements of people. Vertovec (2018) asks some questions which are relevant to New Zealand. Firstly, will the escalating global migration trend exacerbate the inability of many migrants to engage in civic participation? The sheer volume of people, often from vastly different cultures and language groups, and often in need of support, might hinder social and cultural integration. Secondly, will the stratification of migrant groups further widen and harden the divides in what he calls the ‘social organisation of difference’? (Vertovec, 2018).

One of the ways the ‘social organisation of difference’ can be explored in situations of super-diversity is the way in which diversity is represented or imagined, and how the ‘host’ nation manages images, discourses and identities associated with migrancy (Vertovec, 2009). These relationships should be analysed within the context of the maintenance of power by the ‘host’. In New Zealand the ‘mainstream’ media often reinforces a Pākehā world as the ‘norm’ – conflating this norm with the ‘host nation’ – with negative representations of minority ethnic groups, both migrants and Māori. It should also be noted that while New Zealand’s ‘mainstream’ television schedules do include current affairs, drama and entertainment from broadcast networks in the United Kingdom and the United States, such programmes are still encoded with cultural ‘norms’ that privilege Western ways of looking at the world (Hall, 1973).

### 1.7.2 Discrimination

Asians<sup>10</sup> are the dominant new immigrant group, as demonstrated by Figures 1 and 2, generating increased attention in academic literature and the popular press about how ‘mainstream’ New Zealanders imagine Asian and Māori relationships. Butcher, Spoonley and Trlin’s (2006) study, in particular, identified Asians, Muslims and people from the Middle East as experiencing discrimination in the areas of education, employment and housing. Research by (Lewin et al., 2011) ‘illuminated the widespread presence of discrimination’ experienced by Indians in Auckland. Revell, Papoutsaki and Kolesova (2014) in their research on race and racism in everyday communication in Aotearoa New Zealand, also found insidious and widespread use of racist attitudes and beliefs being used to marginalise and discriminate against minority ethnic groups in New Zealand.

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<sup>10</sup> In New Zealand ‘Asian’ normally refers to people from countries in South and East Asia, although the media usually uses the generic term ‘Asian’ without reference to the specific country (Colmar Brunton cited in Gendall, Spoonley, & Butcher, 2013, p. 14).



Māori and some migrant groups share similar negative representations in the ‘mainstream’ media. Racist and anti-Māori themes in ‘mainstream’ media have been well documented by academic researchers (Abel, 1997; Gregory et al., 2011; Moewaka Barnes, Taiapa, Borell, & McCreanor, 2013; Nairn, Moewaka Barnes, Borell, Gregory, & McCreanor, 2012). This extends to an examination of anti-migrant themes in New Zealand media (Robie, 2009, Papoutsaki & Kolesova, 2014) and the everyday discriminations experienced by migrants and refugees.

Media academic David Robie’s (2009) research found that Asian ethnic minorities living in New Zealand often feel under-represented, misrepresented or largely invisible within New Zealand ‘mainstream’ media. Similarly, Yu Yao’s research (2015) highlighted anti-Chinese bias in coverage of Chinese issues in the New Zealand ‘mainstream’ media. Māori and certain migrant groups from non-white cultures are ‘ethnically’ framed and represented in the ‘mainstream’ media in the context of social problems such as crime, family dysfunction, and health (Miller, 2008). This means that just as migrants are viewing negative representations of Māori in the ‘mainstream’ media, so too are Māori of migrants. As Chinese academic Manyng Ip notes, “much of what the Chinese feel about Māori and vice versa, is unflattering and some of these crucial opinions seem to be based on negative stereotypes current in the public media” (Ip, 2009, p. 157). Mutu and Abel (2011) concur with Ip and suggest that, for some people, negative attitudes by Māori towards migrants are a result of their reading ‘mainstream’ media’s negative representation of migrants.

Of note are similarities between the discriminatory and racialised experiences of both Māori and some migrants. Although my case study does not provide an in-depth analysis of Māori Television’s representations of migrants and how this might differ from ‘mainstream’ coverage, it did find that participants were fairly positive about how non-Western cultures, issues and concerns were covered by Māori Television. The focus of my research, however, is on migrants’ attitudes and values towards Māori, in particular how Māori Television might represent the role of Māori as ‘host’ through a presentation of te ao Māori. This has the potential to facilitate a greater sense of identification by a migrant audience with a nation informed by the Treaty in which Māori feature as host. This is discussed more fully within the findings section.

### 1.7.3 The Emotional Experience of Migration

The concept of ‘super-diversity’ involves investigating not only the everyday encounters or interactions between migrants and ‘hosts’ but also exchanges between migrants (Vertovec, 2009). This brings two strands of this research together: (1) building a sense of belonging and (2) establishing new narratives of nation in a world of super-diversity. My approach shifts the research from the more common method of studying migrants’ potential economic contributions to studying the emotional affect or embodiment of the immigrant experience within the wider structures of everyday life. Its

significance lies in assisting us to understand migration from a migrant's perspective and to acknowledge that migrants have agency in their interactions with people and institutions of the 'host' nation. Sociologist Amanda Wise (2018) uses the term 'multicultural encounter and coexistence' to describe how migrants in ethnically diverse societies, such as Singapore and Australia, manage and negotiate their differences at both an interpersonal level and within wider structures and material environments. Encounters across such differences as language, music, food, urban spaces and architecture can create fusion and hybridity and 'spaces of inclusion' (Vertovec, 2009; Wise, 2009, 2018). However, it is important to recognise that concepts of inclusion, like concepts of belonging, are not the same for all migrants. Ghassan Hage (1998) for example, in his analysis of migrant belonging in Australia, claims that different levels of social and cultural capital can influence the degree of belonging or inclusion that migrants experience. What Spoonley and Trlin describe as the media's "important role in communicating understanding between migrants and their host community" (Spoonley & Trlin, 2004, p. v) is reflected in my research which shows how Māori Television might serve a function in promoting positive encounters between migrant and Māori.

It is important to address issues such as those raised above because migrants' emotional wellbeing affects the lives of individuals and families and can affect the wider community (for example, in terms of official and community support required and the opportunity costs of non-participation in society and the economy). Factors such as unemployment or underemployment, experiencing discrimination, not having close friends, and spending time mostly with one's own ethnic group are predictors for poor adjustment among migrant groups (Pernice, Trlin, Henderson, & North, 2000). Ho, Au, & Amerasinghe for example, found that settlement difficulties can lead to feelings of depression, hopelessness, isolation and discrimination among Asian migrants and that Asian migrant groups in New Zealand have been identified as a vulnerable risk group in suicide attempts (Ho, Au, & Amerasinghe, 2015).

The World Health Organisation (WHO) recognises a broad range of suicide risk factors associated with migration and the process of acculturation and settlement. These factors include stress, family conflict, social isolation, loss of social support networks and barriers to accessing mental health services. While these factors may not necessarily lead to suicidal behaviour, they can trigger an individual's susceptibility to mental disorders (WHO, 2014). These risks can pose an economic and social risk to the wider community as well as to those immediately involved (as noted above). Many migrant settlement services, such as facilitating housing, access to health and employment and community networks, are offered by a wide variety of government and non-government agencies but there appears to be no research on what role Māori can play in the emotional aspects of settlement processes and outcomes for newcomers.

### 1.7.4 Māori Television and Migrants' Everyday Life

My findings discuss how viewing Māori Television has the potential to enhance migrants' sensitivity to everyday life and engagement with Māori and non-Māori in what Wise (2018) calls the 'lived sensual micro practices of urban conviviality'.<sup>11</sup> I also draw on New Zealand cultural studies scholar Avril Bell (2015) work on what she calls 'decolonising conviviality'. Bell refers here to the face-to-face encounters between her Māori and Pākehā research participants and the potential for reconstituted or different relationships when Pākehā relate to Māori *as* Māori, i.e., where Māori cultural difference is both respected and fundamental to the engagement. I suggest my research about migrant-Māori relationships are analogous to Bell's (2015) research. The participants in my study reported more supportive attitudes towards Māori issues after being exposed to Māori perspectives on Māori Television. Their viewing provided them with ideas and resources to engage more with a Māori world, and cultural resources for more convivial every-day encounters.

## 1.8 Thesis Structure

An important stylistic choice in using te reo Māori has been made in this thesis. The first time a te reo word is used a translation in English is offered. After that, no translation is provided as a means to emphasise and normalise te reo's existence in Aotearoa New Zealand. It should also be noted that the translations in English often fall short of truly reflecting the cultural context, or the many layers of meanings sometimes associated with a word.

The thesis is divided into two sections.

### 1.8.1 Section 1: Context of Research

Chapters 2 to 6 focus on why the Treaty is central to this research; the relevant scholarship from both Māori and the Western academy that informs my research; narratives in both 'mainstream' and indigenous media that inform concepts of the nation; the operation of Māori Television and mediascape in which it functions; and the methodological and theoretical concepts on which the study is based.

### 1.8.2 Section 2: Research Findings

Chapter 7 presents the results of the online survey of 62 respondents. It establishes the most popular genres watched on 'mainstream' television. Results cover two months of viewing across TV One, TV2,

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<sup>11</sup> The term 'conviviality' is used in this research in the sense of the Spanish word 'convivencia'. Wise & Noble (2016) revisit earlier scholarship by Gilroy (2004) to emphasise that the English word 'conviviality' does not capture the work and hard labour involved in creating *convivencia*. The root of *convivencia* is the verb 'vivir' which literally means 'to live'. 'Con' is used as a prefix to the verb to mean 'with'. Hence, *convivencia* is used in the sense of the effort attached to 'doing' or the 'becoming' of life with another.

TV3<sup>12</sup> and Prime as a basis for participants to compare their viewing of Māori Television with ‘mainstream’ television. The most popular motivations for watching Māori Television (other than news and current affairs) are identified using the following categories: learning the Māori language, seeing Māori living in rural communities and understanding a Māori perspective.

Chapter 8 is the first of my qualitative findings chapters and analyses the observations made by participants about differences between Māori Television and ‘mainstream’ content. The chapter highlights how participant recognition of these differences often led to a more supportive attitude towards Māori and indigenous issues. The notion of migrants belonging to an imagined nation also began to emerge, even though ideas about the nation were sometimes expressed in terms of a contestation between Māori and Pākehā.

Increasingly, research by Māori Television and government funders of Māori Television has found that watching Māori Television can be associated with an increased receptivity to ‘passive’ learning of te reo Māori. Chapter 9 discusses how the ZePa zero-passive-active language acquisition model applied by Te Māngai Pāho in its funding decisions has possibly found success with the indigenous broadcaster’s migrant audiences, and what the possible implications of this might be.

Chapter 10 applies the idea of ‘passive’ learning to the Treaty. The ZePa model, applied in Chapter 9 asserts that the ‘passive’ learning of te reo can be seen as an assertion of indigenous existence. Similarly, findings from my study suggest that a ‘passive’ understanding of the Treaty can also lead to an understanding and support of an indigenous existence in New Zealand. Māori Television’s coverage of Waitangi Day in 2015 was a key source of data here.

Chapter 11 discusses how participants discovered a cultural affinity or a connection between how they saw some of their own cultural values and several Māori cultural concepts that were represented in the programme content they viewed.

Chapter 12 considers the extent to which the values within Māori Television content contributed to a better understanding of te ao Māori and a sense of belonging and familiarity for some participants. This chapter also considers some of the contradictions and tensions associated with a migrant identity that becomes hyphenated between ‘home’ and ‘host’ (such as Indian-New Zealander).

Chapter 13 concludes the thesis with a reflection on the study, a discussion of its findings and what being involved in this study meant to participants. It also considers some wider implications associated with migrant and Māori relations.

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<sup>12</sup> TV3 was rebranded in 2017, changing its name to ThreeNow, its on-air logo to "+HR=E", and creating a new on-air image.



## Chapter Two

### Te Tiriti o Waitangi in a Multi-ethnic Society

#### 2.1 Introduction

*I think they [artists] are fairly typical of the people in this land where there is a huge chasm of understanding on some fairly basic things, whether it's the Treaty, the Declaration of Independence or whether it's a basic Māori perception of the world. I'm hoping the art they produce will be part of telling that story [of Pākehā/Māori relations] in a different way. (Moana Jackson, in *Canvassing the Treaty*, 19.44 mins)*

Māori lawyer and political activist Moana Jackson made this comment in the documentary *Canvassing the Treaty* (dir. Reeves, 2010) screened by Māori Television on Waitangi Day<sup>13</sup> 2010. The documentary is about a group of Māori and Pākehā artists who undertook a Treaty education workshop with the aim of creating works of art that reflected what the Treaty meant to each of them. This quotation is significant because it highlights, first, the differing understandings that people already living in New Zealand have about the Treaty between Māori and the Crown. Secondly, if there is indeed limited awareness about the Treaty amongst the general New Zealand population this raises for me the question of how new migrants might acquire information about the Treaty in what I would call a discursively defined Pākehā/Māori bicultural environment, in which there are different understandings of what 'biculturalism' might mean.

Central to this study is the role of both the mass media and the indigenous media in communicating Māori issues and concerns, and the relationship Māori envisioned they would have with the Crown under the Treaty. Once thought of as a dying language, the revitalisation of 'te reo Māori me ngā tikanga Māori'<sup>14</sup> is pivotal to Māori Television's strategic direction. The Treaty of Waitangi, as situated in this research, informs the revival of te reo, Māori narratives of both historical and contemporary relationships between Pākehā and Māori, the assertion of an indigenous existence, and the legitimacy of Māori broadcasting to enable a Māori voice to tell Māori stories.

While some studies investigating migrant attitudes to the Treaty suggest otherwise, (see Ip, 2003; Gregory et al., 2011; McGrath, Butcher, Pickering, & Smith, 2005) this study supports research which has found that the Treaty can be relevant to migrants who wish to call Aotearoa New Zealand home. In particular, Omura (2014) found that his research participants initially thought of the Treaty as

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<sup>13</sup> New Zealand's national day to commemorate the signing of the Treaty between Māori' and the Crown on the 6 Feb 1840.

<sup>14</sup> See discussion on the interrelationship between language and culture in the section outlining relevant key terms at the beginning of this thesis

irrelevant, but after completing Treaty Education for his research their attitudes became more favourable. This thesis argues that an appreciation of the importance of the Treaty of Waitangi can be gained from viewing Māori Television and can contribute to the process of migrants finding a sense of belonging and being more supportive of Māori issues and concerns.

In this chapter I begin with a brief history of Māori settlement and subsequent colonisation, drawing on a combination of academic writing, Waitangi Tribunal<sup>15</sup> statements and published Māori oral histories. Many migrants arriving in New Zealand are unfamiliar with the country's history and have little understanding of how vital and self-sufficient Māori society was before the arrival of British settlers and the violence associated with colonisation. As Warren, Forster and Tawhai (2017) argue, many of the key historical documents from that time continue to be expressed in a variety of mediums. Māori Television is one such medium, and its content at times draws on the history of colonisation to provide a context for various news and current affairs items, as well as some drama and documentary programmes.

I then discuss the concept of settler colonialism and how colonial discourses about the Treaty of Waitangi are still used today by Pākehā to maintain the privileges of 'whiteness' (Feagin & O'Brien, 2004), assert an inferiority of indigenous and other non-White peoples (McCreanor, 1997; Salmond, 2013), and position Pākehā – in relation to the Treaty of Waitangi – to benefit from colonial status, wealth and education (Bell, 2004; Terruhn, 2015). The emergence of the 'Māori renaissance'<sup>16</sup> in the 1970s focused on political justice and social inclusion. Māori, and many Pākehā, sought ways to support Māori coming in from the margins of 'mainstream' society to participate fully in establishing an inclusive national identity. A response to settler colonialism and the burgeoning desire amongst some Pākehā to have Māori claims for Treaty rights recognised saw the development of the discourse of biculturalism and the emergence of a Treaty education movement. This movement is now also touching the lives of some migrants as they engage with learning about the Treaty.

## 2.2 Early History

As the first settlers, Māori named the shores of Aotearoa when they arrived several hundred years before the signing of the Treaty of Waitangi. Over time, according to Mikaere (2011), Māori "developed an intimate connection with the environment and an intricate web of relationships that

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<sup>15</sup> The Waitangi Tribunal was formed as a Commission of Inquiry under the Treaty of Waitangi Act in 1975. Its purpose is to make recommendations to the government on appropriate matters of redress and compensation for claims by Māori that reflected inconsistent contemporary applications of the principles of the Māori and English versions of the Treaty of Waitangi. In 1985 the Act was amended to include historical claims from 1840 that concerned the Crown and Māori (Byrnes, 2004). The amendment also helped diffuse what has been called the angry activism of the 1970s (Carolyn & Morrow, 2013).

<sup>16</sup> The notion of a Māori renaissance is discussed more fully in section 2.7 of this chapter.

regulates [their] presence” (Mikaere, 2011, p. 126). Kaumatua (*elder*) Hone Sadler also expresses the deep connection Māori have with the land when he says, “[We] are born of the land. Our mana comes from the land. We come from the land” (Sadler in Healy, Huygens, & Walker, 2013, p. 27). However, in 1642 Dutch explorer Abel Tasman ‘discovered’ the islands (Walker, 1990), then in 1645 Dutch cartographers renamed Aotearoa as Nova Zeelandia after the Dutch province of Zeeland. Still, it was not until Captain Cook’s voyages in the 1700s that his detailed charts and his passengers’ scientific and artistic documentation became available in Europe (Mackay, 1990). Early sealers and whalers used these maps to navigate around the Pacific Ocean and in New Zealand they began trading with interacting with Māori. These activities heralded the introduction of a worldview fundamentally at odds with a Māori reality - and exposed Māori to the effects of an ontological divide with lasting consequences (Salmond, 2017).

Prior to the eighteenth century, Māori flourished for hundreds of years establishing economic, political and social systems that governed all relationships including bartering systems and regular trading patterns amongst their own whānau (*extended family*) and hapū (*descent group*) within their iwi (*tribe*), and between iwi (Love, 2012). By the early 1800s, a number of trading ships began visiting from Australia and North America to trade for natural resources and seek new opportunities. Māori were known by the early sailors to provide wood and water supplies for the European ships in return for oil and tools, and later muskets, blankets and clothing (Bawden, 1987; Orange, 2011). Interactions between localised iwi and manuhiri (*guests or visitors*) began when Pākehā missionaries arrived to establish mission stations – often on land gifted by Māori – and Pākehā sealers and traders began living in coastal settlements. Many white male settlers found marrying into a tribe not only gave them protection but also increased trading opportunities (Wright, 1959). They mostly abided by Māori laws, apart from drunken and disorderly whalers on leave ashore in the north. This behaviour resulted in a place called Kororareka<sup>17</sup> becoming known as the ‘hellhole of the Pacific’ (Thorns & Schrader, 2013). However, it was more than the drunken sailors that concerned local iwi and hapū (*extended family*), they were also troubled about changes in Māori society associated with the newcomers. Two kaumātua (*elders*), Parata and Walker from the Northland tribe of Ngāpuhi, recalled through hearing tribal oral history dating back from as early as 1808, that their tupuna (*ancestors*) were meeting to discuss issues of trade, lawlessness and disrespect for tikanga by early settlers (Healy et al., 2013).

## 2.3 Te Whakaminenga

Te Whakaminenga (*a type of general assembly of hapū, or ‘New Zealand United Nations’*) was formed in 1808 by Māori leaders to meet and discuss different iwi and hapū experiences and to express anger

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<sup>17</sup> Kororareka (later renamed Russell) in the Bay of Islands was the oldest settlement in Aotearoa New Zealand and the largest whaling station in the Southern Hemisphere at the time.



about their dealings with non-Māori manuhiri. According to Aldridge, one of the informants for the 2013 independent report of the Ngāpuhi claim to the Waitangi Tribunal, rangatira (*tribal leaders*) were keen to form diplomatic relationships with Europeans after hearing about the European system of justice. They felt that lawless Pākehā could be controlled by such laws (Healy et al., 2013).

Before Te Whakaminenga the entire country was under the authority of local hapū led by their respective rangatira. The hapū had absolute authority within their territories of the land, the sea, the resources and the people. While Māori were enthusiastic about some aspects of English culture (such as literacy and technology), they firmly rejected others, in particular, the lawlessness of the Pākehā (Mutu, 2014). Ngāpuhi had a long tradition of hosting rangatira who represented hapū from throughout the land for the purposes of building alliances and Te Whakaminenga became the forum for various hapū to discuss issues such as international trade and how to deal with new settlers. Te Whakaminenga has largely been forgotten in formal histories of New Zealand but the oral traditions of Ngāpuhi were accepted by the Waitangi Tribunal in 2014 and helped to inform the Tribunal's finding that Māori did not cede sovereignty to the British Crown in the Treaty.<sup>18</sup>

## 2.4 He Whakaputanga

Ongoing issues between Māori and non-Māori manuhiri prompted Māori to consider how they should react to the unruliness. He Whakaputanga (*A Declaration of Independence*), signed at Waitangi on 28 October 1835, had its origins in a meeting of thirteen rangatira who met at Kerikeri in 1831 to petition King William IV to “look after his hapū, [*clan*, referring to the British settlers] who are behaving in an uncivilised manner” (Huygens, 2007, p. 272). He Whakaputanga clarified that the principle of tino rangatiratanga (*absolute sovereignty, or paramount authority*) rested with Māori, that Māori would meet each year to make laws for ‘justice, peace, order and trade’ and that no ‘legislative authority’ other than Māori would be recognised. The significance of the document is its formal acknowledgment of Māori by the British Crown as an independent sovereign state with its own national flag (Healy et al., 2013; Owens, 1981).<sup>19</sup> The flag was a clear sign of international recognition and sovereignty that allowed access of Māori vessels into foreign harbours.

While tino rangatiratanga literally means ‘absolute or unconditional sovereignty’, its meaning has changed to reflect contemporary Māori meanings. For Pākehā, it is also arguably one of the most contentious phrases in New Zealand's race relations discourse (Orange, 2011). Brookes (2014) explains that the phrase has been shaped by Māori activists and thinkers involved in the Māori renaissance to become a living kaupapa (*principle*). Māori academic Maria Bargh (2007) in her book,

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<sup>18</sup> New Zealand historians Margaret Mutu, Moana Jackson and Anne Salmond also provided evidence to the Tribunal.

<sup>19</sup> Ranginui Walker, in *Ngāpuhi Speaks* (2014), simply considered He Whakaputanga to be a formal expression of what had already been in existence since Te Whakaminenga.

*An Indigenous Response to Neo Liberalism*, says that ‘tino rangatiratanga’ is now often understood as ‘self-determination’:

According to Māori understandings, tino rangatiratanga has particular connotations and rules attached to it, relating to mana whenua [*the right of a tribe to manage a particular area of land*], mana moana [*authority over the sea and lakes*], mana tangata [*power and status accrued through one's leadership talents*], and Te Tiriti. Self-determination [in applying these concepts] also has specific rules attached to it, particularly in the framework of the United Nations Declaration of the Rights of Indigenous Peoples [that] highlights the rights of self-determination. (Bargh, 2007, p. 142)

Bargh’s definition of tino rangatiratanga as self-determination is apparent in the Māori voice and perspectives that are central to much of Māori Television’s programme content, particularly in news and current affairs, and Māori-produced lifestyle programmes and documentaries. As Māori academic Jo Smith explains:

Māori Television could be understood within an overtly political framework of decolonisation, in that it is dedicated to centring indigenous concerns and world-views and building forms of knowledge that express indigenous perspectives for indigenous purposes. (Smith, 2013, p. 101)

Hence, it could be argued that the spirit of tino rangatiratanga is evoked by Māori Television’s assertion of an indigenous existence within the mediascape of Aotearoa New Zealand.

Now I turn to 1840, a key date in the formal, or Western-based, history of New Zealand.

## 2.5 The Treaty of Waitangi<sup>20</sup>

Five years after the signing of He Whakaputanga, the British government received reports that large sections of land belonging to iwi were being sold to Europeans. It also became concerned about both the reported misbehavior of Europeans and the considerable number of British settlers arriving without the protection and authority of a British consul. In 1839 they sent naval captain William Hobson as the first consul to an independent New Zealand with directions to reaffirm Māori sovereignty, obtain land from Māori ‘by fair and equal contracts’, resell it to settlers at a profit to fund future operations, and establish a British colony through a treaty with Māori (Simpson, 1990). There were two texts of the Treaty, one in Māori and one in English. On 6 February 1840 the Māori text of the Treaty was signed by representatives of Queen Victoria, the Queen of England, and by about 40 hapū rangatira. Only William Hobson signed both the Māori text and the English translation (Waitangi Tribunal, 2016).

Following the ceremony in Waitangi, copies of the Treaty in Māori circulated around the country for hapū rangatira to sign. Between February and September 1840, missionaries, traders and officials organised 50 or so signing meetings with Māori from the far north of the North Island to Ruapuke

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<sup>20</sup> The Māori text of the Treaty is commonly referred to as te Tiriti o Waitangi.

Island in the Foveaux Strait. About 500 leaders, including 13 women, used their names or moko<sup>21</sup> as a sign of agreement. By October 184 copies of both the Māori and the English text were authenticated by Hobson's signature and sent to the Colonial Office in London (Ministry of Culture and Heritage, 2016).

The preamble of the Treaty sets out its purpose to protect Māori rights and property, keep peace and order, and establish a government. The inconsistencies of the first and second articles between the English translation and the Māori text of the Treaty are largely responsible for the emphasis on tino rangatiratanga in Treaty discourse, and the questions of whether or not Māori signatories intended to cede sovereignty to the British Crown. In Article 1 of the English text, Māori signatories ceded 'sovereignty' to the British Crown, but in the Māori text they only ceded 'governorship' or 'kawanatanga'. Article 2 assures signatories in the English text 'full, exclusive and undisturbed possession' of Māori lands, forests, fisheries, and other properties; and in the Māori text they are assured their tino rangatiratanga (absolute sovereignty or chieftainship) would remain undisturbed over their lands, homes and taonga (Waitangi Tribunal, 2014; Healy et al., 2013).

The English text of the Treaty of Waitangi was the basis for the settler colonial belief that Māori ceded sovereignty; an act which Māori, many Pākehā, the Waitangi Tribunal (2014) and many historians and academics claim was never intended (see, among others, Anderson, Binney, & Harris, 2014; Binny, 2004; Durie, 1991). The rangatira who signed the document operated within a specific indigenous worldview in terms of iwi and hapū law, politics and history, whilst the Crown after Governor Hobson died subsequently used the English translation to justify its ideologies of colonisation and dispossession of Māori land, language and culture (Jackson, 2010).

Some within the Western academy, such as Morris (2014), Palmer (2004) and Joseph (2014), suggest the Treaty countered the sovereignty declared in He Whakaputanga. However, many historians, academics, Māori and some Pākehā see the English version as being about colonisation and the expansion of the British Empire (Kawharu, 1989; Mikaere, 2011; Mutu, 2010; Salmond, 2013). They assert that the Māori text of the Treaty reinforced the sovereign power of hapū as declared in He Whakaputanga because at the time they out-numbered Pākehā by thirty to one and clearly had no intention of giving away the sovereignty of their land. For Māori, the Treaty was about protection from lawless Pākehā and access to the international economy through the British.

The first fifteen years after the Treaty saw a period of economic prosperity as many Māori adapted their economic production to take advantage of the numbers of settlers arriving (Walker, 2004). However, under the British interpretation of Article 2 of the English version of the Treaty, the Crown

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<sup>21</sup> A moko is a facial tattoo. However, its design can also be drawn as a type of hieroglyphic or symbolic mark as a form of signature.

believed it had the right to acquire and control land – and ultimately expropriate it – in clear breach of the Māori text of the Treaty. By 1865 the Crown and the New Zealand Company had acquired from Māori nearly 99 per cent of the South Island. Māori, however, successfully held onto most of their land in the North Island until the New Zealand land wars. These wars were a series of armed conflicts between 1860 and 1880 between some Māori tribes and government forces. Tribes who tried to prevent European settlement were branded 'rebels' and their lands confiscated<sup>22</sup> (Ministry of Culture and Heritage, 2014b). The British thus consolidated colonial sovereignty (Salmond, 2013; Walker, 2004), maintaining a fundamental contradiction between its “stated intention of protection of Māori authority and land and its unstated intention of colonisation” (Healy et al., 2013, p. 205). The expropriation of Māori land was only the beginning of an orchestrated campaign against Māori language and culture. For example, in 1867 the Native Schools Act declared that the education of Māori children should only be in English and by 1961 the Hunn Report on the Department of Māori Affairs described the Māori language as a relic of ancient Māori life. By 1979 historian and academic Richard Benton (1979) was predicting the death of te reo.

## 2.6 Settler Colonialism

To understand the ways in which recent migrants ‘read’ Māori Television content in the context of their own lives, it is useful to understand Māori/Pākehā relations and broadcasting through the lens of settler colonialism. The study of settler colonialism has emerged from a particular branch of postcolonial studies that focusses on the specific circumstances of settler colonial subjectivities (Veracini, 2010, 2012; Wolfe, 1999; Young, 2008). The dominant feature of settler colonialism is the replacement of the indigenous voice by that of the settler (Wolfe, 1999). Taking this a step further, Elkins and Pedersen (2005) argue the replacement is achieved through institutionalised settler privilege and the capacity to dominate government.

Historically, colonial discourses of superiority legitimised a settler takeover of political, legal and economic systems. For example, in New Zealand Chief Justice Prendergast declared in 1877 that the Treaty of Waitangi was void, stating “the whole Treaty is worthless – a simple nullity [which] pretended to be an agreement between two nations but [in reality] was between a civilised nation and a group of savages” (cited in King, 2004, p. 326). Nearly 170 years later some Pākehā – such as manufacturing magnate Sir William Gallagher – continue to question the Treaty’s validity. He controversially referred to the Treaty ‘industry’ as a ‘rot’ in a speech to influential businessmen in the Waikato in 2017 (Mather & Leaman, 2017).<sup>23</sup> Such sentiments implying Pākehā superiority, while no

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<sup>22</sup> Māori now own only 10 per cent of the North Island.

<sup>23</sup> Gallagher subsequently apologised for any offence he might have caused saying he was a businessman not a historian and needed to do more research to understand the Treaty from different perspectives (*NZ Herald*, 30 November, 2017).

longer as acceptable as they once were, have furthered the marginalisation of Māori in their own country and historically have justified an influx of settlers, wars, theft of land and racist colonial systems<sup>24</sup> (Belich, 1996; Durie, 2005; Hynds & Sheehan, 2010; McCreanor, 2006). A systematic takeover justified by the discourse of settler colonisation became “a structure not an event” (Wolfe, 2006, p. 163). My reading of Wolfe suggests settler colonialism was not a one-off event but rather was invisibly incorporated into the hegemonic structures and institutions of society. Hence, there have been lasting socio-economic effects on the Māori population who by almost every social, health and economic measure fall behind New Zealand Europeans (Durie, 1998; Walker, 2004).

Settler colonialism also uses more subtle practices such as the practice of ‘transferring’ indigenous culture into the settler colonial polity where, for example, the symbolic nature of indigenous art and culture is transferred or co-opted into ‘mainstream’ culture (Bell, 2014; Veracini, 2010, 2012). The commodification of these aspects of indigenous culture continues the process of incorporating indigeneity into a neo-liberal economic settler framework. For example, Pearson (2014), referring to the practices of British settler states, observes that the ongoing process of nation-making is “shaped by a melding of indigenous and introduced myths, symbols and practices continually reinvigorated by the arrival of succeeding generations of similar ancestries” (Pearson, 2014, p. 505). It was in this way that successive waves of Anglo Celtic migrants arriving in New Zealand – until the 1980s when immigration laws were liberalised – continued New Zealand’s version of settler nation-making.

The ongoing nature of settler colonialism can also be seen amongst the attitudes of many Pākehā New Zealanders. Despite immigration being opened to include migrants from non-traditional source countries, Pākehā have still reported a preference for white immigrants from South Africa, Britain and Australia (Ward & Masgoret, 2008). As Gray, Jaber and Anglem (2013) argue, ‘whiteness’ still occupies a dominating position in New Zealand politically, culturally and economically despite increasing ethnic diversity.

## 2.7 The Māori Renaissance<sup>25</sup>

A growing awareness of the impact of colonisation on Māori in the late 1960s saw the emergence of urban Māori protest movements such as Ngā Tamatoa (*The Young Warriors*) (Royal, 2005). These movements were fueled by an international ‘stagflationary’ recession in which New Zealand’s

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<sup>24</sup> New Zealand health policy is an example of a racist colonial system. According to health researcher Heather Came it is dominated by Western bio-medical discourses that preclude and under-value Māori in the formation, structure, content, and processes of health policies (Came, 2012).

<sup>25</sup> There are many views about when the Māori renaissance started. The Waitangi Tribunal (1986) recognised that the early roots of the Māori renaissance may well have come from the pride associated with the bravery and courage of the Māori Battalion in the Second World War noting that “it was probably in the sands of the desert and in the mountains of Italy that the new Māori renaissance had its origins” (Waitangi Tribunal, 1986). However, some Māori reject the idea of a Renaissance, suggesting there has always been a voice of discontent resisting the influences of colonisation.

economy, together with all the major industrialised democracies at the time, was severely affected. Knutson notes that “the period from 1973 to 1984 saw deteriorating terms of trade, declining balance of payments, increasing inflation, rising unemployment, and minuscule or negative economic growth rates” (Knutson, 1998, p. 16). These economic conditions pressured Māori to urbanise and cope with the associated conditions of cultural, social and political deprivation. Some Māori, during this time, also began engaging with consciousness-raising movements and the politics of Brazilian Paulo Freire and his discourse of conscientisation<sup>26</sup> described in his influential text, *Pedagogy of the Oppressed* (1970).

Māori, as with indigenous peoples from many countries experiencing the aftermath of the post-war withdrawal of colonial powers, were motivated by the American civil rights movement and the language of decolonisation and resistance from intellectuals such as Frantz Fanon (Harris, 2004). Fanon warned that indigenous cultures were in danger of being lost forever in the transition to a postcolonial world governed by what he called neo-colonialists or those who adopted the hegemonic practices of the colonialists (Macey, 2012). In New Zealand, the ongoing dialogue among Māori of resistance to colonisation was widely shared in the 1960s and 1970s with others in the nation agitating against Anglo European hegemony. Many Māori began to believe the assertion of the indigenous voice would ultimately result in a more equitable society between indigenous and settler descendants (Taonui, 2013). In 1975 Dame Whina Cooper led thousands of Māori from all over the country to the nation’s capital, Wellington, in a land march to protest against the ongoing alienation of Māori from their land. In 1977-78 the Ngāti Whātua iwi occupied Bastion Point in Auckland in an attempt to halt repeated government acquisitions of their land at the Point since 1870 (Royal, 2005). Discontent and controversy over whether the Treaty of Waitangi was being honored by the Crown paved the way for a protest movement supported by many Māori and some Pākehā. In addition, conditions of racial inequality and social deprivation, from which this consciousness of colonial oppression arose, were highlighted by Māori (Durie, 1998; O’Sullivan, 2007; Smith, 1999; Te Ahu Poata-Smith, 1996; Walker, 2004). The government responded by establishing the Waitangi Tribunal in 1975. However, the Treaty still became a symbol for dissatisfaction and as Claudia Orange claims in the foreword to her seminal 1987 publication, *The Treaty of Waitangi*, the debate on whether the Treaty was being

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<sup>26</sup> *Te Hiko*, a Māori publication named after the original Waikato newspaper from the mid-nineteenth century, appeared in 1968 and began engaging Māori as a ‘conscience-raising mechanism’ (Walker, 2004, p. 209) concerning environmental breaches of the Treaty of Waitangi. Walker (ibid.) here is using ‘conscience raising’ to describe the process of creating dialogue for change, not only between Māori but also with Pākehā. Roberts (2000) writing about Freire explains that dialogue is a key element in ‘conscientisation’ and is never simply a ‘collection of individual consciousnesses’. Rather, it must be understood as “the movement of ‘consciousnesses’, socially and culturally constituted and reconstituted through purposeful communication” (Roberts, 2000, p. 152). Māori began their own liberation recognising that Freire’s philosophy provided the intellectual reinforcement of their own initiatives in decolonisation with the aim of creating a new bicultural society.

honored centered on the Crown's assertion that the British considered Māori had ceded sovereignty, while Māori categorically refuted that claim.

The Waitangi Tribunal Act (1975) considers both texts to be the 'Treaty' and provides for the Tribunal to interpret the meaning of the Treaty in different contexts and situations. Through the work of the Tribunal, principles of the Treaty have been developed which attempt to reconcile inconsistencies between the texts. Examples of such principles are participation, partnership and protection, often called 'the three Ps'. Since then, government policy has increasingly included references to Treaty principles, although the principles themselves continue to be developed and redefined by the Crown, courts, and laws. In derogation of the principle of partnership, however, these principles were developed without consultation with Māori.

In some memorable instances, the government has overridden the principles resulting in major political controversy. For example, aboriginal title to the foreshore and seabeds of New Zealand was extinguished in the case of the Foreshore and Seabed Act 2004. This led to a request by Ngāi Tahu (a South Island iwi) to the United Nations Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (which oversees the implementation of the United Nations Declaration of the Rights of Indigenous Peoples) to consider the legislation. The Committee reported in 2005 that the legislation discriminated against Māori by extinguishing the possibility, without means of redress, of establishing Māori customary title over the foreshore and seabed. However, the legislation was not changed, despite ongoing protests and debate, until 2011 when it was repealed and replaced by the Marine and Coastal (Takutai Moana) Act 2011.

The use of the Treaty as a basis for sharing resources and as a political instrument has often caused friction between Māori and Pākehā. Debate within the public sphere and the role of the 'mainstream' media within it, shapes the agenda for understanding Treaty claim processes (Smith & Ruckstuhl, 2010). So often these claims – not only the Foreshore and Seabed legislation (2004), but also the Sealord settlement (1992), and the Moutoa Gardens settlement (2002) – have been framed by the 'mainstream' media as a form of contestation over resource allocation and as competition between Māori and Pākehā.<sup>27</sup> The lack of any historical context about Treaty claims as Moewaka Barnes et al (2012) point out, also means that "Treaty claims and settlements are treated as if they are fraudulent or even criminal ... thereby masking the fact that only minimal concessions are made in such arrangements" (Moewaka Barnes et al., 2012, p. 202). Despite the Waitangi Tribunal in 2014 finding

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<sup>27</sup> Treaty claims have been sometimes referred to pejoratively by those with anti-Māori rights sentiments as being part of a so-called 'treaty grievance industry'. Treaty settlements often only return a small percentage of the land originally taken by the colonial government. Tiopira McDowell's investigation into the Treaty claims of several iwi found that Crown settlements were worth less than between 1 and 3 per cent in terms of value compared with the land and resources that were lost (McDowell, 2016).

that Māori did not relinquish sovereignty, the issue of how to apply the Treaty to New Zealand society remains largely misunderstood by many New Zealanders and has yet to be fully addressed.

## 2.8 Understanding the Treaty in Aotearoa New Zealand

Pākehā knowledge and understanding of the historical and political context and content of the Treaty developed considerably in the 1970s – including the differences between the Māori and English texts (Carolyn & Morrow, 2013). However, this understanding is not widespread within the nation. At the beginning of this chapter, I quoted Jackson as saying in 2010 that there was ‘a huge chasm of understanding’ amongst New Zealanders of the Treaty. A year earlier fewer than half of all New Zealanders had a comprehensive understanding of it (New Zealand National Commission for UNESCO, 2009). Less than a decade later, it is likely that there is still a range of different understandings of the country’s founding document among the New Zealand-born population. Hence, migrants arriving in New Zealand are not alone in having little knowledge of the Treaty. Like many New Zealanders, migrants may see the Treaty as either irrelevant to them because it does not appear to reflect today’s multicultural population, or as being primarily a Māori issue. Other New Zealanders reject both the Māori and English version of the Treaty because they see it as a tool used by Māori to reassert power.

Jessica Terruhn (2015) found in her study of settler memory and the construction of Pākehā identities that Pākehā rejected debates about the Treaty when it was seen as a threat to Pākehā values and the hegemonic position of Pākehā. Although there is no evidence that migrants take such a strong position, they often feel excluded by Treaty discourses (Omura, 2014), sometimes question the Treaty’s relevance to them (McGrath et al 2005) and are concerned about their place within a society informed by the Treaty (Ip, 2005).

The question of relevance was confronted by many participants in my research. I discuss what I call the acquisition of a ‘passive’ understanding of the Treaty and place my findings within the context of the Treaty education movement and its potential to transform Māori and tauwiwi<sup>28</sup> relationships. ‘Passive’ understanding is a concept, discussed more fully in Chapter 3, that I have drawn from the work of Higgins and Rewi (2014) on language acquisition. Higgins and Rewi (2014) argue the acquisition of te reo and its use by non-Māori speakers asserts an indigenous existence in the ‘mainstream’. Based on this, I argue that those who acquire a ‘passive’ understanding of the Treaty are better equipped to use this knowledge to be more supportive of te ao Māori and to be in a better position to understand Treaty claims. My research on migrant participants’ understandings of the

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<sup>28</sup> I use ‘tauwiwi’ (from tau, meaning strange or foreign, and iwi meaning tribe) to mean all non-Anglo Celtic migrants. All non-Māori could be seen as tauwiwi but I make the distinction in this research in using Pākehā for those whose origins are from the British settler colonialists. See definitions section at the beginning of the thesis for a more comprehensive discussion.



Treaty is informed by a limited volume of academic research relating to migrant (Omura, 2014) and Pākehā (Black, 2010; Campbell, 2005; Huygens, 2007) engagement with the Treaty, and highlights the need for further study in this area.

As the Māori renaissance gained momentum in the 1980s many Pākehā became involved in Treaty issues. A form of decolonising activism developed as Pākehā worked intentionally with Māori on issues of injustice and inequality and increased their understanding of the impact of colonisation and institutional racism (Huygens, 2016). Māori political movements undertook a 'restless search to recover their lost sovereignty' (Walker, 1990) and the persistent activism of Māori has been recognised in New Zealand history. However, activism by Pākehā has been mostly ignored by historians (Carolyn & Morrow, 2013; Huygens, 2006) or confined to accounts of the anti-racism work of the 1970s and 1980s (Nairn, 2014). Abel et. al. (2012) point out that since the 1980s Treaty-related activism has involved both Māori and Pākehā but has been positioned by the media as almost entirely a Māori issue.

## 2.9 The Treaty Education Movement

One strategy used by Pākehā Treaty activists has been to aim education about the Treaty towards Pākehā. The national campaign *Project Waitangi: Pākehā Debate the Treaty*, launched in 1986, involved a media campaign and extensive adult education. Treaty education courses were offered around the country in community groups, tertiary education, teachers' professional development training, government departments, voluntary organisations, and professional associations (Huygens, 2016). The then Race Relations Office<sup>29</sup> also provided a range of resources on Treaty education for Pākehā and new migrants.

Treaty educators argued, the Crown's representative who signed the Treaty with Māori in 1840 was responsible to govern all migrants and in 1989 the term 'tangata tiriti' (*people of the Treaty*), was coined by the then Chief Judge of the Waitangi Tribunal, the Honourable Justice Taihākūrei Edward Durie, in his Waitangi Day address. Tangata tiriti refers not only to Europeans who have a right to live in New Zealand under the Treaty, but also includes peoples of other ethnic origins.

With the increased diversity of New Zealand's minority ethnic groups, migrant communities began to talk about the impact of the Treaty on their lives. While it is not the case for all migrants, some who had experienced dispossession of their homelands were supportive of the reparation process. Others saw the recognition of Māori rights and aspirations as an indication of the respectful treatment of other minority cultures (New Zealand National Commission for UNESCO, 2009). Many migrant groups

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<sup>29</sup> Now part of the New Zealand Human Rights Commission.

signalled an intention to work with Māori by formalising their Treaty education. Huygens (2016) in her article ‘Pākehā-Tauīwi Treaty education: an unrecognised decolonisation movement’ notes:

The desire by new migrants to New Zealand to learn about the Treaty sparked an educational project for all tangata tiriti. The regular Treaty workshops offered by the Auckland Regional Migrant Services are now their most popular course (pers. comm. Sally Chu 2015). Pākehā or tauīwi Treaty worker networks remain active in all the main centres, serving a steady demand for workshops and consultancy. (Huygens, 2016, p. 149)<sup>30</sup>

The impact of Treaty education has not yet been evaluated comprehensively, with ad hoc research exploring only the educational outcomes (Huygens, 2016). However, Huygens does assert in her study that Treaty education can develop a new “awareness of identity, bicultural relationships and constructions of belonging” (Huygens, 2016, p. 156). Two examples of the positive effect of Treaty education for Pākehā and migrants can be found in the work of Black (2010) and Omura (2014). Black (2010) found that through Treaty awareness Pākehā can “receive a sense of belonging to Aotearoa and a place to stand in justice alongside Māori and other people who are culturally different” (Black, 2010, p. iv). Japanese scholar Saburo Omura (2014), in one of the few academic studies focusing on migrants’ subjectivities of Treaty education, found that his pan-Asian participants did not see biculturalism or the Treaty as exclusionary once they had learned about the Treaty. Omura refers to the process as ‘psychological integration’ into the ‘mainstream’ host nation of Aotearoa New Zealand – in the sense that his participants went through a process of redefining their identity in a new country, instead of just adjusting to or coping with a different environment. They had, Omura reported, found that Treaty education played an important role in helping them to shape a sense of belonging to the nation.

Compared to Omura (2014) and Black’s (2010) studies which are about formal and comprehensive Treaty education, my study is related to the changing perceptions by migrants through a more informal and passive experience of learning about the Treaty through viewing mainly Waitangi Day commemorations on Māori Television. Within this limited scope, my research nonetheless attempts to investigate whether there might be similar outcomes to those of Omura and Black from my participants in terms of a sense of belonging, building new identities and a more positive relationship with Māori.

## 2.10 Biculturalism

One of the terms new migrants come across within New Zealand is ‘biculturalism’. A common

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<sup>30</sup> There are currently at least six groups and networks around the country most of which deliver Treaty education for Pākehā/Tauīwi - Network Waitangi Whangarei, Tamaki Treaty Workers in Auckland, Waikato AntiRacism Coalition in Hamilton, Wellington Treaty Workers Network in Wellington, Network Waitangi Otautahi & Waitangi Associates in Christchurch, and Tauīwi Solutions & Network Waitangi Otepoti in Dunedin.

misconception of biculturalism is that it excludes non-Māori and non-Pākehā (Lowe, 2009; New Zealand National Commission for UNESCO, 2009). Broadly speaking biculturalism – as used here – is based on the meaning in contemporary New Zealand of the partnership between Māori and Pākehā established by the Treaty in 1840 (Hayward, 2012). As an ideal, it “recognises the primacy of Pākehā and Māori as founding nations and Treaty partners” (Fleras & Spoonley, 1999, p. 237). Former Chief Judge and legal expert on the Treaty of Waitangi Eddie Durie says:

Biculturalism in New Zealand can be defined by its objectives. One is to acknowledge and respect those things that are distinctly Māori owned and operated, like Māori language, custom and lands, Māori schools (kohanga reo, kura kaupapa and wananga) and Māori governance institutions (runanga and urban authorities). Another is to make state-operated facilities more culturally amenable to Māori as with the recognition of Māori preferences and practices in schools, hospitals, and prisons. A third is to foster Pākehā engagement with Māori culture as with the teaching of Māori language and culture amongst predominantly Pākehā students. A fourth is to provide especially for Māori in national institutions, like the Māori Parliamentary seats. Yet another is to promote the settlement of land claims. And in addition, another goal is to combine elements of both cultures to forge a common national identity. (Durie, 2005, p. 43)

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Since the 1980s the term ‘biculturalism’ has been used widely in political, economic and social discourses in New Zealand. Understandings of the term have been influenced by Māori political movements of the 1960s and 1970s that highlighted injustices perpetuated by colonisation. Debates about biculturalism often include an acknowledgement that Māori signed a Treaty in te reo Māori (the Māori text) in which they never relinquished sovereignty (as discussed above in section 2.5). However, in contemporary New Zealand biculturalism can mean different things to different people. There are now a ‘multiplicity of biculturalisms’ ranging from the ‘soft’ mainstreaming of aspects of Māori culture to the ‘hard’ commitment to indigenous sovereignty (Johnson, 2008).

Some researchers reject the term ‘biculturalism’. Pākehā anti-racism activist and scholar Mitzi Nairn (2014) makes the point that the term ‘biculturalism’ is a misnomer because the Treaty was not about cultural accommodation or cooperation, but was a document that reflected a bi-partisan economic and political treaty between two nations. Therefore, discussions concerning Pākehā/Māori relations should be in terms of power and resource sharing, or a ‘hard’ biculturalism, rather than a ‘soft’ biculturalism that calls for visible, but token expressions of Māori culture, such as signage or singing the national anthem in te reo.

In practice, these debates are exemplified by a continuum of practice that ranges from ‘soft’ token

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<sup>31</sup> Kohanga reo (*Māori language pre-school*), kura kaupapa (*primary school based on Māori custom and language*), wananga (*university catering to Māori education needs*) and runanga (*tribal council council or assembly*).

institutional acknowledgement of Māori culture and values without sharing power and resources, to ‘hard’ biculturalism (or tino rangatiratanga) and active Māori management of organisations such as the Māori Television Service and wananga or iwi-based organisations that specifically have the power to control the resources of Māori. Many Māori academics, such as Dominic O’Sullivan (2007), assert that ‘biculturalism’ does encompass ongoing debates about sharing power and resources between the two ethnic groups – Māori and Pākehā – on the one hand, or the total control by Māori of their lives and resources on the other.

Critics of what is seen currently as a form of ‘soft biculturalism’ implemented by the State have argued that it exists within a social contract that is defined by a monocultural Pākehā framework and is in many respects ‘superficial’, implemented only to satisfy a national and international bicultural rhetoric. Durie (1998) rejects the inequalities of biculturalism and calls for bi-nationalism as a means to more forcefully assert Māori claims for political and economic equality. Others within Māoridom are also critical of biculturalism, claiming that policies do not sufficiently advance Māori culture and self-determination (O’Sullivan, 2007). For example, Moana Jackson has argued for a more substantial form of biculturalism through the establishment of a Māori justice system and Professor Whatarangi Winiata has called for New Zealand’s parliamentary democracy to better reflect the nature of the Treaty partnership by establishing a separate Māori House of Representatives in Parliament (Hayward, 2012). Critics such as these argue the current reality of biculturalism is a Pākehā construct with a few token aspects of Māori culture becoming widespread in the public arena. O’Sullivan (2007) argues strongly that biculturalism makes Māori the junior partner in a colonial relationship that obstructs Māori aspirations to self-determination.

## 2.11 Multiculturalism

Multiculturalism is often used interchangeably with cultural or ethnic pluralism. These terms describe a context in which various ethnic groups collaborate – with each other and with the dominant group – while maintaining all or part of their ethnic identities. Acculturation psychologist Professor Emeritus John Berry defines multicultural ideology as “the general and fundamental view that cultural diversity is good for a society and its individual members ... [and that] diversity should be shared and accommodated in an equitable way” (Berry, 2006, p. 728). While this definition might be good in theory, the discourse of cultural pluralism within a multicultural society is not without its complexities for liberal Western democracies, and in particular settler societies such as New Zealand, Canada, Australia and the United States of America (Kymlicka, 2012; Spoonley & Tolley, 2012).

Assumptions and practices of a shared civic culture and citizenship are challenged by the ‘superdiversity’ or ‘hyperdiversity’ of large numbers of migrants and ethnic groups (Vertovec, 2007;

Spoonley, 2014). In theory, multiculturalism is about an acceptance of cultural difference but in practice it requires a balance between, on one hand, human rights – which includes protection against unfair discrimination regardless of ethnicity, nationality or religious belief – and on the other hand, curtailing cultural, ethnic or religious customs that run counter to societal norms and the nation’s dominant practices (for example, polygamy or genital mutilation).

Some official responses to the changing demography of New Zealand include the establishment of an Office of Ethnic Affairs in 2001, which promotes the advantages of ethnic diversity.<sup>32</sup> Some cultural differences are also officially protected through the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 and the Human Rights Act 1993 (Durie, 2005). However, there is a relative dearth of social policy to maintain migrant groups’ heritage, language and culture, or to help new migrants to settle into a culture that is, at best, indifferent to their origins (Liu, 2007, Gooder, 2017). Migrants are often viewed as economic units and as part of a neo-liberal agenda with shared ‘similarities in global consumptive culture’ (Simon-Kumar, 2015). This hands-off approach to social policy has been criticised by Chinese New Zealand lawyer Mai Chen (2015) as being unsustainable for Aotearoa New Zealand’s future of ethnic superdiversity.

The ideals of multiculturalism and biculturalism have been subverted to some extent by those who advocate for the ‘One New Zealand’ discourse in New Zealand. Presented as an inclusive multiculturalism in which ‘we are all New Zealanders now’,<sup>33</sup> this discourse can be seen as a way to sidestep biculturalism. Popularised by the then leader of the Opposition National Party Don Brash in his 2004 incendiary ‘Nationhood’ speech, the ‘One New Zealand’ discourse argues that all citizens have the same rights, irrespective of when they, or their ancestors, arrived. Terruhn (2015) argues that Brash’s speech drew upon popular reactions against biculturalism, specifically “Treaty fatigue [and the] Treaty grievance industry” (Terruhn, 2015, p. 36). She asserts that migrants are exposed to this discourse through day-to-day interactions with many Pākehā, and in the ‘mainstream’ media (see also Abel, McCreanor, & Moewaka Barnes, 2012). The tendency for minority ethnic media to gather its news sources from ‘mainstream’ media (Li, 2009) has the effect of reinforcing ‘mainstream’ anti-Māori discourses by not offering migrants any alternative viewpoints on how the Treaty might contribute to their sense belonging to the nation.

This is not a uniquely New Zealand situation, but one associated also with other settler-based societies, such as Australia and Canada. Multiculturalism may mask the normative practices of settler colonial

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<sup>32</sup> See <https://ethniccommunities.govt.nz> for information about official support, advice and services available for migrant groups.

<sup>33</sup> See Mikaere (2005) and her critique of the assertion of this discourse by New Zealand politicians Trevor Mallard and Don Brash, and historian Michael King.

societies where dominant institutional policies and practices continue to serve white settlers. Gunew (2004) argues that Australia “fails its multicultural subjects as much as it does its indigenous ones” (Gunew, 2004, p. 44) because the founding principles of white superiority become camouflaged under state policies of multiculturalism. In reference to Canada, she writes that:

Multiculturalism ... has remained merely symbolic, reducing ethnic and racialised cultures to folklore and sponsoring celebrations ... of ethnicity while never actually alleviating the real inequalities within Canadian society. This criticism of multiculturalism charges that it cannot forcefully address racism. (Derkson cited in Gunew, 2004, p. 42)

Canadian-Bengali academic Himani Bannerji (2000) agrees. For her multiculturalism as currently practised “hides the continuing reality of racism in the labour market, education, and the media, and even multicultural policies themselves” (Bannerji, 2000, p. 118). New Zealand might celebrate its multicultural policy, but Fleras argues it can be ambiguous and ill-formed and “much of what passes for New Zealand multiculturalism does not involve major public resources, does little to make Pākehā uncomfortable, and puts the onus on minority communities to preserve their identity and culture” (Fleras, 2009, p. 134).

## 2.12 Biculturalism and/or Multiculturalism

When a new migrant arrives in New Zealand it might be a nominally bicultural nation but in reality is a multi-ethnic society. It can be difficult to know where they might ‘fit in’ to their new home (Ip & Pang, 2005). Many feel excluded by discourses about the Treaty (Rasanathan cited in a report by the Ministry of Social Development, 2008). Ip argues that biculturalism does not “define the place of anyone who is non-Māori or non-Pākehā, such as the Chinese” (Ip, 2003, p. 227). However, Omura (2014) demonstrated that Treaty education and understanding that the Treaty is between Māori and all others, can make a difference in his participants’ understanding of biculturalism. Similarly, other studies of Chinese and Indian communities in New Zealand have found that the discourses about biculturalism do not include or address migrant group concerns (Williams, 2009; Johnson & Molouhney, 2006; Bandyopadhyay, 2010, 2006). This confusion about where migrants ‘fit’ within a bicultural discourse means some migrant groups in New Zealand are more interested in aligning themselves with those who they perceive as more powerful in bicultural politics and feel they have to compete potentially with Māori for resources (Ip, 2009).

Many migrants may also be reluctant to understand cultural politics because they consider themselves, to varying degrees, to be transnational citizens<sup>34</sup> and refrain from any nationalistic tendencies (Pearson, 2005, 2014; Wang, 2016). Liu (2010) found many new Chinese migrants considered themselves as cosmopolitan transnationals, who used New Zealand citizenship as a stepping stone to gain access to other Western countries and had little desire to gain cultural resources to understand an indigenous perspective. They may also have little interest in what Fleras and Spoonley (1999) describe as the politically loaded terms of ‘multiculturalism’ and ‘biculturalism’, which they say “tend to alienate those who criticise one as being too inclusive and the other as too exclusive” (Fleras & Spoonley, 1999, p. 236). Simon-Kumar (2015) also challenges multiculturalism for its inability to address migrant exclusion within the structural hegemonies inherent in settler colonialism.

Many Māori, Pākehā, and tauwiwi oppose the politics of multiculturalism because it reduces the status of Māori to being just one of the many different minority groups in New Zealand without diminishing the power of the dominant group. Omura (2014) argues that the indiscriminate support of different cultural values in New Zealand has a “peculiar aspect ... of constructing a discourse against biculturalism and the Treaty” (Omura, 2014, p. 209). Māori also reject multicultural discourses because they erode their status as founding partners of the New Zealand nation (or State) (May, 2004). More than 30 years ago the Waitangi Tribunal stated explicitly the case for biculturalism in order that tangata whenua (*people of the land*) could not be relegated to the status of any other ethnic minority group. The Waitangi Tribunal argued:

Māori alone is party to a solemn treaty made with the Crown. None of the other migrant groups who have come to live in this country in recent years can claim the rights that were given to the Māori people by the Treaty of Waitangi. (Waitangi Tribunal, 1986, p. 27)

Not all critics view multicultural New Zealand and a Treaty-based society as inherently incompatible. The Human Rights Commission (HRC) noted that “while the Treaty established a bicultural foundation for New Zealand – which has still to be fully realised – it simultaneously established a basis for multiculturalism” (HRC, 2010, p. 39). As the Treaty Education movement has argued, a Treaty framework between Māori and the Crown means there can be an acceptance of all cultures without undermining the primary relationship between Māori and Pākehā. The Treaty relationship includes all non-Māori (tangata tiriti) because the Treaty is between Māori and all others (Maclachlan & DeSouza, 2006).

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<sup>34</sup> Transnationalism refers to dual lives of simultaneous economic and social activities across international borders, “speaking two languages, having homes in two countries, and making a living through continuous regular contact across national borders” (Portes, Guarnizo, & Landolt, 1999, p. 217).

Many within Māoridom, including the Māori Party's Dame Turiana Turia (cited in Hansard Debates, 2007), have argued that the Treaty is the nation's first immigration policy. Increasingly, Māori academics, such as Kukutai and Rata (2017), are also arguing this point. The signatories to the Treaty agreed that people from Britain, Europe and Australia could settle in New Zealand and called for all settlers to recognise the *mana whenua* (*authority and jurisdiction over land or territory*) of Māori. This means that Māori have the right under the Treaty to be more active in exercising influence on migration policies and potentially have a greater role in addressing concerns such as those expressed by Ip (2003) and Ip and Pang (2005).

## 2.13 Conclusion

From the time of the first migrants, Māori have been concerned about the ways in which indigenous society has been impacted. Their concerns led to several formal attempts to mediate migrant-indigenous relationships. Beginning with the establishment of Te Whakaminenga in 1808 as a forum to discuss issues related to iwi and hapu's dealings with traders, sailors and settlers, followed by a declaration of sovereignty (He Whakaputanga) in 1838, and finally a treaty with Queen Victoria (British Crown) in 1840. Walker (2004) has called the ongoing attempts by Māori to stake their claim as the nation's *tangata whenua* 'a struggle without end' because the devastating and long-term effects of settler colonial ideologies that shaped the lives of Māori in the 18<sup>th</sup> and 19<sup>th</sup> centuries continue to do so in the 20<sup>th</sup> and 21<sup>st</sup> centuries.

Māori Television's promotion of te reo and tikanga and its representation of a Māori worldview to its Māori and non-Māori audiences is one strategy deployed in this struggle. In 1993 the Privy Council, in a landmark decision based on the Treaty, instructed the Crown to provide Māori with the means to revitalise their language and culture through broadcasting. Nowadays, broadcasting and digital technologies have enabled Māori to voice their assertion of *tino rangatiratanga* in new and effective ways.<sup>35</sup>

Based on the experiences of the comparatively small number of migrants in this study, I argue there is the potential for migrant audiences of Māori Television content to understand aspects of te ao Māori and its colonial history. While the extent to which Māori Television provides explicit knowledge of the Treaty to its audiences is minimal, the historical background of many contemporary issues is often found in the broadcaster's programming, particularly in its news and current affairs. However, as I will discuss in Chapter 10, participants after viewing Māori Television demonstrated more supportive

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<sup>35</sup> I will discuss more fully Māori claims for the right to have access to broadcasting in Chapter 5.



attitudes towards the Treaty and an appreciation of its role in contemporary debates between Māori and Pākehā about past and present issues and the future direction of Aotearoa New Zealand.

## Chapter Three

### Informing the Research – Key Media Concepts

#### 3.1 Introduction

Academic studies of the media in New Zealand by both Māori and Western scholars have found a consistent theme of the ‘mainstream’ media hegemony suppressing indigenous voices (Abel, 2010, 2016); McCreanor, 2012; McCreanor et al., 2014; Moewaka Barnes et al., 2012; Rankine et al., 2008). A meta-study surveying international literature in the other British settler states of Australia, Canada, and the United States also found shared characteristics with New Zealand in the way that mass media serve the colonial project (Nairn, McCreanor, & Moewaka Barnes, 2017). In New Zealand, Māori Television as an indigenous broadcaster, offers a voice for indigenous people and counters negative stereotypes perpetuated in the ‘mainstream’ media (Abel, 2016; Abel & Smith, 2008; Prentice, 2013; Smith, 2013, 2015, 2016). This is consistent with research in both Australia (Meadows, 2005) and Canada (Roth, 2005; Bredin, 2010) that also suggests indigenous media may play a significant role in facilitating cross-cultural understanding between indigenous and non-indigenous audiences.

In this chapter, I discuss research about the reporting and representation of indigenous issues in the mass media.<sup>36</sup> I then turn to the focus of this research - Māori Television and its migrant audiences – and identify gaps in the literature related to the media’s role in the lives of migrant audiences in New Zealand. I finally outline the literature most relevant to the study of television audiences and I examine the link between media and migrants and their sense of identity and belonging in Aotearoa New Zealand.

#### 3.2 ‘Mainstream’ Media and the Construction of National Identity

National identity is a dynamic process of social construction that for the large part reflects established power relations. For example, writing in a New Zealand context, historian Claudia Bell (1996) writes that “national identity is comprised only of what is in the best interests of certain social groups and consists of positive messages” ( Bell, 1996, p. 10). While concepts of national identity in New Zealand have been slowly changing in recent years, narratives of the nation tend to have had the effect of silencing marginalised voices and those who exist outside the structures and institutions of those in power.

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<sup>36</sup> The terms ‘mass media’ and ‘mainstream media’ are used interchangeably in this thesis.

Media is vital to the processes of national identity and nation building, and television in particular, has been identified as an important ingredient in the imaginings of the nation (Castello, 2007, 2009; Cormack, 1994; Fiske, 2010; Louw, 2005; Pearson, 2005; Watson, 2002). What is important is that a sense of belonging is at the core of national identity and might be thought to exist where an “imagined sense of belonging is activated for some social, political or cultural purpose” (Anderson, 1983, p. 15). Television can help to activate a cultural sense of belonging and ideas of nationhood can seem very real to an individual. In fact, Anderson argues that the nation must be imagined because members of even the smallest nation will never meet each other, “yet in the minds of each lives the image of their communion” (Anderson, 1983, p. 15).

‘Mainstream’ television constructs a representation of national identity through the images and stories of a nation that it selects, constructs and broadcasts, and then reflects it back to its audiences (Luhmann in Horrocks & Perry, 2004). ‘Mainstream’ television, therefore, represents a dominant collective national identity and becomes part of the cacophony of messages that individuals incorporate into their ‘subjectivities’ as they negotiate the many meanings of ‘national identity’.

Ghassan Hage (2016) provides the metaphor of a lenticular photograph to illustrate this. His metaphor suggests that the subjectivities of identity and belonging to the nation are always shifting depending on one’s position.<sup>37</sup> Hence, there are numerous narratives that individuals and groups within a nation construct about what national identity might mean depending on the context of their lives in wider society. This is relevant to New Zealand, a nation with two founding peoples, Māori and Pākehā. Ideas about national identity have a further complexity because, according to Stephen Turner, ideas about what national identity might mean has been largely a Pākehā construct in which aspects of “Māori culture deemed acceptable to the ‘white majoritarian public’ have been inserted, to provide a sense of difference for both individual New Zealanders, and for the nation on the global stage” (Turner cited in Abel, 2013a, p. 204).

### 3.3 ‘Mainstream’ Media and the Representation of Indigeneity

With its semiotic representations of the nation, the mass media, and in particular news coverage, can operate as a site that reinforces hegemonic ideologies. This dynamic can be demonstrated by two Australian examples. Writing about the silence of the media in the reporting of Aboriginal issues, Banerjee and Osuri (2000) note that news stories that ignore indigenous voices reinscribe a bias that privileges white Australians and marginalises Aboriginal Australians. Gargett (2005), on the other

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<sup>37</sup> Lenticular photographs are created through a particular printing technology which is often used in creating 3D displays. An effect is created where there is a swapping of two to three images, each vanishing and then reappearing from one to another thereby providing a different perspective on each image. Hage used the example of a Jesus/Mary photograph where the image had an illusion of depth and could be changed or moved as the image is viewed from different angles.

hand, writes about the negative representation of Aborigines in ‘mainstream’ media reporting of the Redfern riots in Sydney in 2014. He argues that such reporting repeats “the violence of colonialism ... over and over again as the media continue to write indigeneity as deviant” (Gargett, 2005, p. 10). He highlights how mass-media representations of indigenous concerns, especially in the news, are about power relations and maintaining the ongoing colonial project.

In New Zealand, according to McCreanor (2012), it is these ‘stories’ that legitimise and naturalise the institutions, practices and hegemonies of the settler state. The mass media’s representations of Māori in New Zealand reaffirm an ongoing settler dominance (Nairn et al. 2017).<sup>38</sup> Media researchers Abel et al. (2012) found that news stories about Māori often fail to provide historical context, especially in stories in which the State has been implicated in working against indigenous people. A subsequent content analysis of a large representative sample of newspapers by McCreanor et al. (2014) also showed an unmarked Pākehā-centric ‘norm’ in which Pākehā were not identified by their ethnicity. Māori, on the other hand, were labeled according to ethnicity, were associated with crime, and often positioned as a threat in stories about economic resources or political sovereignty (McCreanor et al., 2014).

These findings were consistent with a research project examining broadcast media, in which a content analysis demonstrated that despite a range of Māori news being available, negative stories about Māori were prioritised in English-language television news (Moewaka Barnes et al., 2012). In contrast, the study found that Māori-language news bulletins screened a variety of content and lacked the relentless negativity of the mainstream media. The researchers said that on ‘mainstream’ television the news editors, “by unreflectively following normal practice chose to present Māori stories that, in effect, directed viewers to think about events and situations in which Māori people are mostly dangerous and unattractive” (Moewaka Barnes et al., 2012, p. 44).

It is these types of negative news stories reflect a ‘standard story’ about Māori. Nairn and McCreanor’s (1990, 1991) seminal work on Pākehā discourse analysed a number of submissions by Pākehā to the Human Rights Commission following the arrest and conviction of a number of Māori after what became known as the Haka Party Incident.<sup>39</sup> Their analysis uncovered a ‘standard story’ about Māori that was accepted uncritically by many Pākehā (Nairn & McCreanor, 1990; 1991). This story, reinforced through day-to-day ordinary Pākehā conversation, is based on several themes: (1) Pākehā

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<sup>38</sup> Although in all these studies it is a Pākehā cultural paradigm that provides the structure within which mass media news and current affairs stories are constructed (Abel, 2010, 2016; Rankine et al., 2008), the biased construction of news is not unique to New Zealand. Many years earlier, once-exiled Kenyan literary critic and academic Ngũgĩ wa Thiong’o had observed that mass media in general can be viewed as a central pillar of hegemonic colonial power and deeply implicated in the ‘colonisation of the mind’ (Wa Thiong’o, 1994).

<sup>39</sup> The Haka Party Incident refers to a skirmish in 1979 in which some people were injured when He Taua, a group of young Māori, attempted – successfully as it turned out - to put an end to what is now regarded as a racist ‘mock haka’ by Pākehā Engineering students during the annual university capping week at the University of Auckland.

was the norm or standard against which other ethnic groups were measured (therefore Pākehā were not usually referred to by their ethnicity in news coverage); (2) Māori were judged by Pākehā norms for success (good Māori versus bad Māori<sup>40</sup>); (3) Māori behaviour was evaluated without reference to any social or historical context (poor social indicators mean Māori culture is inferior); and (4) the prevalence of a ‘one people’ attitude in which the majority rule, that described everyone as a Kiwi or New Zealander (we should all be treated the same, without regard to a special status). McCreanor says it is critical that the role of the ‘standard story’ in reproducing the status quo of unjust and exploitative relations between Māori and Pākehā is acknowledged by those who work in the mass media (McCreanor, 2012).

Since 2004 this ‘standard story’ has been challenged most notably by Māori Television’s ability to offer counternarratives to mass-media representations of Māori, and to assert an indigenous existence in the nation. These counternarratives – with indigenous perspectives and concerns at their centre – enter into a battle with the culture of ‘mainstream’ New Zealand television over what counts as national identity in New Zealand (Smith, 2013). The extent to which migrant audiences of Māori Television read these counternarratives and can imagine a re-versioned national identity is explored in this thesis.

### 3.4 Media Coverage of National Days and National Identity

One of the most powerful semiotic representations of a settler colonial nation can be found in mediated coverage of national day events. The media plays a role in the representation of national identity by showing collective commemorations of events from its history (Billig, 1995). The mass media’s reporting of New Zealand’s commemorative days of Anzac Day<sup>41</sup> and Waitangi Day are sites where settler hegemony is maintained and reinforced (McConville, Wetherell, McCreanor, & Barnes, 2014). Often there is a reticence by the media to engage in coverage that includes critiques of settler colonial narratives; hence, it continues to support settler normativity (Pamatatau, 2012).

The most significant exception here is Māori Television. A turning point for the broadcaster came in 2006 when its coverage of Anzac Day reached an audience that was much broader than usual. This was, in part, due to the presence of veteran and much-respected presenter Judy Bailey, affectionately dubbed by the media as ‘the mother of the nation’, as one of the co-presenters. The then CEO of Māori

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<sup>40</sup> ‘Māori who are seen as happy with their lot, ‘fitting in’ or achieving in settler society are described as good, while Māori who resist, seek restitution, demand recognition, or do not achieve are bad. The same person or group can be described as ‘good’ or ‘bad’ depending on the speaker. The theme works most flexibly when the user does not specify who or how many are ‘bad Māori’; protesters can then be dismissed as a minority, estranged from their people’ (Kupu Taea, 2014).

<sup>41</sup> Anzac Day (April 25) was originally to mark the anniversary of the first major military action fought by Australian and New Zealand forces during the First World War, but it now commemorates those who served and died in all wars, conflicts, and peacekeeping operations. In addition to New Zealand and Australia, it is also observed by the Cook Islands, Pitcairn Islands, Niue and Tonga.

Television, Dr Jim Mather, said Bailey helped to “open many households in the country to Māori Television ... as she obviously felt very comfortable and was supportive of Anzac Day being presented by us [Māori Television]” (Mather, 2009, p. 18). A wider audience was attracted to stay tuned to the channel and watch content that was as much about being exposed to te reo and the Māori experience of military action, as it was about watching the Pākehā experience. In addition, as Abel (2013a) has observed, Māori Television’s coverage of Anzac Day means it has the ability to participate in the State’s use of Anzac Day as part of its nation-building agenda. The Labour-led government at the time was giving prominence to Anzac Day because it was seen as one of the important “formal markers of our sense of heritage and identity in a time of considerable cultural diversity” (Ministry of Culture and Heritage, 2006, p. 7). In promoting Anzac Day, the broadcaster clearly has the ability to insert a Māori voice into ‘mainstream’ conceptions of nationhood. Ranginui Walker sees that nationhood is a ‘work in progress’ and notes that “once Pākehā recognise Māori as social and intellectual equals we’ll be getting there” (Walker cited in Abel, 2013a, p. 204). Arguably, narrations of nationhood are always ‘a work in progress’ but Māori Television being seen as synonymous with Anzac Day commemorations has the potential to shift ideas of what Māori equality with Pākehā might mean.

If Anzac Day is now a taken-for-granted icon of shared Māori/Pākehā experiences, Waitangi Day is too often constructed as the opposite. The ‘mainstream’ media have played a significant role in the depiction of the Treaty and Waitangi Day as a national day of discontent (Abel, 1997; Abel et al., 2012; McAllister, 2012; McConville et al., 2014). Research covering ‘mainstream’ coverage of Waitangi Day has also identified a number of key phrases used to refer to Māori protests such as ‘an orchestrated grievance display’, ‘treaty grievance industry’ and ‘undermining democracy’ (Kupu Taea, 2014). McConville et. al. (2014) in their analysis of anti-Māori discourses in the mass media’s coverage leading up to, and including, Waitangi Day in 2013 analysed 69 articles from a survey of national and regional newspapers. They found “that whatever paper of the day the reader comes into contact with they are likely to be swept into images of Māori attacking government officials, ‘quarrelling’ amongst themselves, and generally stirring up ‘rancour’ and ‘ill feeling’ (McConville et. al., 2014, p. 8).

In contrast, Māori Television devotes much of its time on Waitangi Day to covering the various activities happening around the country. Its news bulletins explain the reasons why people take this opportunity to protest, and the schedule also includes content providing historical information about the Treaty. I discuss this more fully in Chapter 5.

If nationhood is staged by “important commemorative devices which shed light on how national identity is imagined, shaped and mobilised” (McCrone & McPherson, 2009, p. 8), more research is needed into Māori Television’s contribution to providing alternative imaginings of the nation. This

would find ways in which commemorative days are constructed that include Māori realities in Aotearoa New Zealand.

### 3.5 Public Sphere

It is within the realm of the public sphere that issues of national identity are contested. The concept of the public sphere was originally developed to describe “an imaginary space between the private sphere and the sphere of State authority” (Habermas, 1962, p. 30). It is a virtual space for debate on matters of public concern, usually through mass media, but also within the last decade through social media.

The notion of a unitary public sphere as a forum for political discussion has been critiqued to include the ways in which global and local media systems have extended their power and reach to generate ideological dominance over audiences. This can be demonstrated by examining the effect of ‘new media’ and how it has transformed the media’s role in society. For example, some media activist-theorists, such as Sunstein (2009) and Pariser (2011), writing about the prevalence of social media and the extensive fragmentation of audiences, suggest that audiences exist in echo chambers where opinions and views are being continually reinforced in a loop of self-referential content. Writing a decade earlier, Gitlin (1998) originally proposed the concept of a sphericule to describe how the overall public sphere had been “shattered in a scatter of globules, like mercury” (Gitlin, 1998, p. 173). This idea rejects the notion of a unitary coherent public while emphasising the fragmented nature of discourse and the important role alternative media plays in society.

As a response to the burgeoning digital era in the 1990s Habermas reconceptualised the idea of the public sphere between the State and society to be “for communicating information and points of view” (Habermas, 1996, p. 360). Sociologist and researcher in the area of the information society, communication and globalisation Manuel Castell (2009) also recognises that despite digital technology shifting notions of an homogenous public sphere, it is still “an essential component of socio-political organisation because it is the space where people come to articulate their concerns as citizens to influence the political institutions of society” (Castell, 2008, p. 78). Indeed, Flaxman, Goel, and Rao (2016) refute the claim of echo chambers and news and information bubbles, arguing that social media exposes audiences to a variety of opinions and sources outside of their own political views because the vast majority of online news consumption is still from ‘mainstream’ news sites.

Michael Meadows (2005), an Australian scholar working in the field of indigenous media, has argued that the media processes involved in the formation of the public sphere have played a primary role in the representation of indigenous people. For Meadows (2005) the concept of a ‘public’ is still a useful analytical tool to critique the notion of the mediated public sphere. As with Gitlin, Meadows proposes that those with similar cultural backgrounds are likely to operate within the realm of their own popular culture or ‘sphericule’, but Meadows departs from Gitlin’s theory of isolated ‘sphericules’ by

suggesting that by the very nature of existing within the wider ‘public’, ‘sphericules can “simultaneously have membership of several different public spheres and interact across lines of cultural diversity” (Meadows, 2005, p. 38).

Cunningham (2001) too argues that public sphericules should not be viewed as fixed but rather as “ethno-specific global mediatised communities”. An example of Cunningham’s idea of globalised ethno-cultural spaces is Māori Television’s global allegiances through the World Indigenous Television Broadcasters’ Network (WITBN), discussed further in Chapter 5. Cunningham asserts that ethno-specific communities may contain many of the elements of ‘the’ public sphere but because of their diasporic and globalised nature we cannot assume “there is a singular nation state to anchor it [the public sphere]” (Cunningham, 2001, p. 133).

Following this line of argument, we can see how the process of globalisation has led to the emergence of a global civil society (Castell, 2008) or, in other words, that there is an ongoing fluidity and negotiation between both the notion of public spheres and its sphericules. Sphericules should not be considered as operating in isolation.

Importantly, for both Meadows (2005) and Ginsberg (1994), the indigenous public sphere, or ‘indigenous sphericule’, has significantly more weight in the wider public sphere than other sphericules because the imagination of the ‘national’ has been formed in the unique context of a narrative drawing on both the colonised and coloniser. It can be argued that Māori Television’s presence in the public sphere, especially in the way it promotes itself to as wide an audience as possible, is playing a part in the indigenous public sphere’s disruption of ‘mainstream’ narratives about national identity (Abel & Smith, 2008; Williams, 2008). Where Māori Television is positioned within the public sphere in Aotearoa New Zealand is discussed in Chapter 5.

The assertion that Māori Television disrupts ‘mainstream’ narrations of national identity and contributes to a re-imagination of the nation-state forms the basis for much of this thesis. I use the concepts of mass media and the public sphere, and the example of media coverage of national days, to explore Māori Television’s presence in the public sphere and its potential impact on migrants as they develop their own understanding of what Abel (2013a) calls ‘New Zealandness’.

### 3.6 Mass Media and Migrant Identity

Media theorists have agreed that the media has a role in the formation of identity. However, the largely negative representation of migrants in ‘mainstream’ media (Leitner & Ehrkamp, 2006; Mahtani, 2001; Spoonley & Butcher, 2011) has become the concern of postcolonial scholarship in the analysis of the construction of migrant identity (and indigenous identity). Georgiou (2017) argues that the intensification and diversity of migration have presented a range of challenges to the concept of



identity. Reflective and participatory audience engagement<sup>42</sup> with the mass media by ethnically diverse audiences has seen “the fragmentation, multiplicity, and hybridity of identities” (Georgiou, 2017, p. 95). Therefore, Benedict Anderson’s (1991) ideas of a shared imagination of collective identities from watching the same news and media as others in the nation are no longer completely relevant.

When migrants view ‘mainstream’ representations of the nation, they bring to their viewing experiences a range of interpretations that influence their identity formation within the dominant culture. Gillespie’s (1995) study of South Asian Punjabis in Southall, London concludes that the communicative and self-reflective space of viewing and then talking about ‘mainstream’ television programmes or ‘TV talk’ provides young people with imaginative resources to mediate the complexities of their parents’ ethnic culture, the dominant white English culture, and the global teen culture to construct British Asian identities. Another study by Dreher (2000) in multicultural communities within a Sydney suburb also found that viewing ‘mainstream’ television played a crucial role in participants negotiating issues of identity. Similar studies, although not based on such intensive long-term participant observation as those of Gillespie and Dreher, have demonstrated how ethnic groups use ‘mainstream’ media to mediate a variety of hybrid identities such as ‘inward/outward’ identities (Dafna & Nelly, 2008), ‘in-between’ identities (Dhoest, 2009; Karim, 2010) and ‘negotiated identities’ (Sinclair & Cunningham, 2000).

Minority ethnic identities that are ‘negotiated’ with the dominant culture can contribute to the ‘othering’ of identity, in particular in settler colonial nations where non-European ethnicity is ‘other’ to the settler colonial norm. For example, an ad hoc study by journalist Sonia Gray (2016) analysed the number of Asian faces on New Zealand’s ‘mainstream’ television stations. She found a dearth of Asian faces on prime time, noting that “if you’re a male of North, South, East, West, in fact, any Asian descent, your only TV appearance is likely to be on *Border Patrol*<sup>43</sup> [and] the representation of Asian females is only slightly better” (Gray, 2016, para 5). According to the former TVNZ commissioning editor, Caterina de Nave, the broadcaster was well aware of minority audiences. However, they were not perceived as a significant enough advertising market. Broadcasters were of the opinion that ‘mainstream’ audiences, with the exception of sport, were not interested in visible minorities on prime time entertainment (de Nave, 2008). Hence, a segment of the nation’s demographic often remains unrepresented on its screens (Gray, 2016). This omission has the effect of perpetuating the ‘othering’ of ethnic minorities that are not represented on screen.

One of my research questions, therefore, was whether my research participants – who reflect some of the diversity of cultures within New Zealand – find that viewing Māori Television and the

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<sup>42</sup>Reflective and participatory audience engagement describes what is sometimes referred to as an ‘active’ audience.

<sup>43</sup> *Border Patrol* is a TVNZ reality prime-time television show dedicated to following New Zealand customs and immigration officers protecting the nation’s biosecurity and investigating breaches of immigration.

representation of another ‘other’ contributes to migrants connecting their own experiences, at some level, with that of Māori. I was interested in exploring the extent to which the participants in my study recognised a ‘joint subalternity’ with Māori. Does a strategy of “familiarising one’s ‘otherness’ in terms of ‘other’ others” (Spivak cited in Gillespie, 1995, p. 5) contribute to migrant identity and a sense of belonging to the national project?

Anecdotally, Māori broadcasters Haunui Royal (2014) and Tainui Stephens (2013) have both suggested migrants may identify with the minority status of Māori as ‘other’ and therefore prefer to view Māori Television. At an academic level, Australian history academic Lorenzo Veracini's (2010, 2012) work suggests the potential for some migrants to identify with the ‘other’. His research has been in the area of settler/migrant/indigenous relationships and he has found that both indigenous and some migrant groups have a sense of their own ethnic identity as it is positioned as ‘other’ within a settler colonial framework. Veracini (2012) suggests some migrants can create new notions of identity through forming anti-racist alliances with indigenous peoples. In Aotearoa New Zealand, an example of such an alliance was seen in 2016 when the Auckland-based group Asians Supporting Tino Rangatiratanga took part in that year’s traditional Waitangi Day hikoī (*walk or march*) of half a kilometre from Te Tii Marae to the Treaty Grounds in Waitangi (De Graaf, 2016). However, what role migrants may have as co-agents with indigenous people in developing strategies of decolonisation within the settler colonial framework is much debated amongst academics (Veracini, 2010, 2012; Huggans, 2008). As Canadian researcher Melissa Chung (2012) in her study of the relationships between racialised migrants and indigenous peoples in Canada notes, while shared experiences of marginalisation might lead to collaboration, migrants may often choose to identify with ‘mainstream’ hegemony and reap the benefits of colonisation and the settling of indigenous lands.

Both Māori and migrants view negative representations of each other through ‘mainstream’ media. Ip (2009) notes that “much of what the Chinese feel about Māori, and vice versa, is unflattering and some of these crucial opinions seem to be based on negative stereotypes current in the public media” (Ip, 2009, p. 157). News stories about migrant and refugee groups are often framed in terms of ‘problems’ for ‘mainstream’ society (Miller, 2008). This could explain why some researchers have found there is a poor connection between Māori and Chinese migrants from the People’s Republic of China (PRC) (Li, 2009; Wang, 2016). Mutu and Abel (2011) also suggest that to some extent the popularised negative attitudes by Māori towards migrants is a result of Māori reading ‘mainstream’ media’s negative representation of migrants.

Visibly different migrants’ sense of identity and belonging in a settler colonial nation such as New Zealand is important because it can counter the experience of internalised racism and its accompanying negative consequences (De Souza, 2007). The concept of internalised racism is integral to critical race

theory and has been described as “the subjection of the victims of racism to the mystifications of the very racist ideology which imprison them and define them” (Hall, 1986, p. 26). In other words, the racist beliefs, attitudes, and ideologies of the dominant group – such as Pākehā New Zealanders – as represented in the ‘mainstream’ media, are internalised by visibly different ‘others’ and directed towards themselves and members of their own group. It is unlikely, therefore, that ‘mainstream’ media contributes to a positive positioning of ‘self’ for some migrants. De Souza (2007) identifies internalised racism as potentially leading to mental health problems amongst Asian migrant populations in New Zealand.<sup>44</sup> My research provides some counter to this form of racism by demonstrating that there are integration benefits for ethnic minority groups from viewing indigenous programme content.

### 3.7 Indigenous Television as a Bridge to Cross-cultural Understanding

Minority indigenous television has the potential to improve cross-cultural understanding and communication between minority and majority ethnic groups. Research in Canada and Australia has found indigenous media can play a role in informing and conscientising non-aboriginal audiences (Bredin, 2010; Meadows, 2005; Meadows, Ewart, Foxwell, & Forde, 2007; Roth, 2005, 2013). Both Meadows and Roth in their respective studies on indigenous Australian and Canadian broadcasting note that non-indigenous audiences felt stereotypes had been broken down by indigenous media providing an alternative to ‘mainstream’ programme content.

Roth (2005), more generally, is hopeful that indigenous broadcasting can be seen as one of the change mechanisms in creating racial tolerance and intercultural communication. However, she does note that more research needs to be done as “one cannot assume APTN [Aboriginal Peoples Television Network] is influential just because it is on the airwaves” (Roth, 2005, p. 222). It is more likely that indigenous broadcasting’s potential to be influential amongst its audience is a part of a matrix of interconnecting historical, cultural and interdisciplinary factors.

In New Zealand, little academic work has been done on the role of Māori Television as a cultural bridge for Pākehā to understand Māori and the potential for Pākehā to develop narratives of decolonisation – with the notable exceptions of research by Smith (2013), Abel (2012, 2013a) and Turner (2011). Jo Smith (2013) argues that Māori Television could be understood as an expression of Māori cultural sovereignty within an overtly political framework of decolonisation. However, Sue Abel’s (2012) research shows that while Pākehā audiences viewing Māori Television coverage of significant national events expressed more positive attitudes about the use of te reo (Abel, 2012), the realities and specificities of a Māori worldview mostly eluded a majority segment of this audience

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<sup>44</sup> Asian migrant groups in New Zealand were identified as a vulnerable risk group in suicide attempts in a report by Ho, Au, & Amerasinghe (2015) in which they suggest settlement difficulties can lead to feelings of depression, hopelessness, isolation and discrimination among Asian migrants.

(Abel, 2013b). Richard Turner (2011) also found that non-Māori audiences were strongly attracted to the public service values of Māori Television. He found there was a perception that Māori Television filled a void in the broadcasting environment at that time – arguably a void that still exists within the ‘mainstream’ broadcasting environment. A shortcoming in these studies is that they stop short of exploring the extent to which Māori Television contributes to cross-cultural understandings.

It is within such scholarship that my research on Māori Television and its migrant audience subjectivities is linked. However, little attention has been paid to whether indigenous television offers an integrative role in settlement outcomes for new migrants. One of the reasons for this could be that ‘integration’ is often seen as integration with ‘mainstream’ society rather than with a society of both indigenous and non-indigenous citizens.

### 3.8 Minority Ethnic Media and Identity

In New Zealand, there is an abundance of minority ethnic media<sup>45</sup> but there appears to be relatively little research on its role in the lives of migrants. I have found some studies that look at the role of Chinese print media in New Zealand and the maintenance of Chinese identity (Xiao, 2007, Lin, 2007), and the use of Chinese media in Chinese migrants’ adaption into life in New Zealand (Li, 2009). Yin (2013) and Wang (2016) also found that most People’s Republic of China (PRC) migrants’ sense of ‘belonging’ to their own community, rather than the ‘mainstream’ host, was strengthened by consumption largely of local PRC Chinese ethnic media and social media.

There is only some degree of understanding by researchers of how, or if, migrant groups use their own media to produce hybrid identities in New Zealand. Liu’s (2009) critical analysis of the Auckland-based Chinese-language media does point to a continued negotiation between a Chinese ‘home’ and the ‘mainstream’ host of New Zealand. Writing about the challenges migration poses to notions of national belonging, Castles & Davidson (2000) recognise that identity and a sense of belonging to the ‘mainstream’ host nation is increasingly complicated due to the challenges posed by the internet, globalisation and the international mobility of people (Castles & Davidson, 2000). The internet has been used widely by migrants to maintain strong links with both their home overseas (and a sense of belonging to the nation of origin) and their own local communities in New Zealand (Eriksen, 2007). Yin’s (2013) study on understanding the New Zealand PRC Chinese migrant experience of nationalism and identity construction online found:

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<sup>45</sup>In 2009, Derby (2012) noted there were more than 30 newspapers and magazines around the country targeting Asian readers alone and 1300 hours of ethnic radio programmes broadcast each week in over 60 languages on 17 radio stations. Nga Reo Tangata: Media and Diversity Network also reported that Radio Tarana, Auckland’s Hindi-speaking Indian community radio station, was one of the ninth top radio stations listened to in greater Auckland. There are also 7 Asian language TV channels, together with NZ on Air funded *Tagata Pacifika*. (See <http://www.hrc.co.nz/newsletters/diversity-action-programme/nga-reo-tangata/2009/05/ethnic-radio-station-makes-history/>)

The Chinese-language cyberspace as a transnational social field provides space for migrant netizens to create an imagined Cyber China and enables them to live parallel lives in the online and the physical worlds simultaneously. The constant tension exerted by the twin forces of Cyber China and migrant lived reality engender an ongoing renegotiation of identity. (Yin, 2013, p. iii)

Yin's research suggests to me that the high use of Chinese-language cyberspace by Chinese migrants' means it is unlikely that either 'mainstream' or indigenous New Zealand-based media have much influence in their lives.

An earlier Australian study by Cunningham and Sinclair (2000) also pointed to evidence of hybrid identities amongst certain migrant groups through their use of both 'mainstream' and minority ethnic media. They concluded that migrants have considerable agency in successfully resisting the powerful assimilatory forces of 'mainstream' media. Rather they assert a negotiated, or hybrid, cultural identity. Cunningham and Sinclair's (2000) study built on the seminal work of Hamid Naficy (1993) who explored how Iranians negotiated with the predominant culture of the United States of America through the process of 'borrowing'. Naficy suggested that "exiles create hybrid identities and syncretic cultures that symbolically and materially borrow from both their own culture and that of the new one to which they have relocated" (Naficy, 1993, p. 17).

Negative 'mainstream' representations of Māori could potentially compromise migrants developing supportive attitudes towards tangata whenua as they negotiate new identities between home and host. Māori Television operates as a counter to such negative representations and gives voice to Māori who are concerned about being regarded as just one of a number of competing groups living in a multi-ethnic society looking for recognition and/or state allocation of resources. Migrant engagement with alternative messages from 'mainstream' about Māori issues and concerns can contribute to new identities based on a relationship with tangata whenua.

### 3.9 Media Influence in Negotiating Identities

Concepts of identity have become extremely complex. Globally the proliferation of content available on digital platforms for diverse audiences has shifted audiences even further away from identities that provide a sense of belonging to the nation that is in any sense homogenised by 'mainstream' media (Castles & Davidson, 2000). I noted earlier Georgiou's (2017) assertion that ethnically diverse audiences who engage in mass media can negotiate fragmented, multiple and hybrid identities. To understand this process, I discuss two models that describe an ongoing and complex process of how migrants negotiate identities in a new country. Both Pearson's (2014) 'national identification' model and Berry, Phinney, Sam and Vebber's (2006) 'acculturation model' provide insights into understanding how migrants can identify with a multiplicity of orientations in their negotiation of a

sense of belonging to a nation. Pearson's (2014) study of the many positions English migrants take in conceptualising their identity or sense of belonging in New Zealand provides a model that can be extended and adapted to explain how other migrants might also orientate themselves to the nation. Pearson's study is focused on English migrant experiences but their fluidity of national orientation can be found also in writings about both Indian (Bandyopādhyāya, 2010) and Chinese identity (Ip & Pang, 2005; Wong, 2003; Yee, 2003) in New Zealand. This is not to suggest that all ethnic minorities have the same challenges, but rather that all migrants to some degree face negotiations of identity with a 'host' nation, where the 'host' nation is often understood as a Pākehā nation (Kukutai & Rata, 2017).

Orientations towards national identity can be illustrated in Figure 3 below. Some migrants see themselves as remaining firmly attached to multiple ethnicities. For example, the 2013 census revealed that ethnic Chinese in New Zealand tend to identify themselves according to their sub-ethnicities: Hong Kong Chinese, Cambodian Chinese, Malaysian Chinese, Singaporean Chinese, PRC Chinese, and Taiwanese Chinese.<sup>46</sup> Other migrants remain attached to the singular ethnicity of their 'home' country or see themselves in different stages of integration or assimilation with the 'host' culture. Examples of this may be seen in the common practice of some migrants creating an identity by combining ethnicity with New Zealand nationality, calling themselves, for example, Chinese Kiwi, Indian New Zealander, or Korean Kiwi.

Some theorists refer to integration as pluralism. Both terms emphasise the significance of migrants retaining their own cultural heritage even as they embrace and practice the culture of the 'mainstream' host society (Alba, 1990; Gans, 1999; Waters, 1990). Figure 3 offers a model of how identity is negotiated with a 'mainstream' host culture. This can occur in varying degrees and within different situations and without any directional cycle. Identity positions can range from the maintenance of a migrant's own cultural and ethnic heritage (multiple or singular ethnicities) to the adoption of a hyphenated identity (ethnicity/New Zealander) that joins the 'host' culture with their own ethnicity (Indian New Zealander, for example), to an assimilated identity (New Zealander or Kiwi) where there is a complete disavowal of cultural heritage.

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<sup>46</sup> <http://www.stats.govt.nz/Census/2013-census/profile-and-summary-reports/ethnic-profiles>




Figure 3. National identification (Adapted from Pearson, 2014)

Pearson’s (2014) circle of attachment to national orientation also includes the positions of ‘detached’ and ‘cosmopolitan’. A person is ‘detached’ when they are indifferent or dismissive of national affiliations and express these sentiments as ‘who cares where you are from’, while ‘cosmopolitanism’ is “a state which transcends national sentiments” (Pearson, 2014, p. 511).

Related to ‘cosmopolitanism’ and its ideal of belonging to an international community of like-minded people is ‘transnationalism’. Liu (2010) found that many new Chinese migrants considered themselves transnationals and only wanted New Zealand citizenship as a stepping stone to gain access to other Western countries. It is therefore likely many migrants to New Zealand might define themselves as both cosmopolitan and transnational, “living dual lives of simultaneous economic and social activities across international borders” (Portes, Guarnizo, & Landolt, 1999, p. 217). These activities are made possible by the rapid technological developments in transportation and communication, especially the internet. For many migrants, this identity challenges the boundaries of national citizenship. Instead, they favour “multiple and overlapping identities and belonging in relation to their old and new places

of residence” (Leitner & Ehrkamp, 2006, p. 1630).

Related to Pearson’s (2014) model is Berry et al.’s (2006) acculturation model with its four different strategies of integration, assimilation, separation, and marginalisation. Integration, or an integrated identity, is seen increasingly by psychologists as the most positive psychological adaptation strategy for migrants in a new country (Berry, Phinney, Sam & Vebber 2006; Ward & Lin 2005). This model also recognises that acculturation with a host culture occurs in varying degrees and within different situations – from completely maintaining a migrant’s cultural heritage to a complete disavowal of cultural heritage and the full adoption of the host culture.

Pearson’s (2014) and Berry et al.’s (2006) frameworks outlined above are helpful when considering my participants’ viewing experiences of Māori Television because the notion of an integrative approach to ‘identity’ includes the potential for an understanding of the role of tangata whenua as ‘host’.

### 3.10 Audiences

Audience research has evolved from early ideas about the passive domination of audiences by hegemonic media discourses to an awareness of audiences actively negotiating media messages (Croteau & Hoynes, 2003; Hall, 1973; Leibes & Katz, 1990; Livingstone, 1998). Increasingly, attention has been paid to questions of audience agency and the relative power of audiences to resist, negotiate and create their own meanings, interpretations, and responses (Ang, 1985; Morley, 1992). Ethnographic approaches have meant that personal experience, socio-cultural backgrounds, critical resources, and ideological beliefs are included as some of the factors that influence the interpretative activity of audiences (Siapera, 2010).

Media scholar Sonia Livingstone (1998) has extended the argument that television programmes should be seen as texts rather than visual stimuli: “as multi-layered, subject to conventional and generic constraints, open and incomplete in their meaning, providing multiple but bounded paths for the reader” (Livingstone, 1998, p. 171). She uses the idea of ‘an active viewer’ to describe the dynamic relationship between the ‘reader and the text’ and to think what such a viewer might inevitably ‘do’ with the text “as they draw upon their formidable resources of knowledge and experience to do so” (Livingstone, 1998, p. 171).

These theories echo Stuart Hall’s (1973) encoding/decoding model in which he theorised that television audiences derive their own meanings by their interaction with a text that has been encoded with cultural messages through media production practices. Hall was more concerned with hegemonic ideology and the way variables such as social class, gender and ethnicity can be seen as a prism through



which audiences decode and interpret the media text. However, what is useful for my research is the notion that audiences decode television text according to their own distinctive backgrounds.

The above approaches to audience research are not without critics. Morley (2006) argues that audience research that produces a range of interpretations based on age, gender, and ethnicity “runs the danger of descending into anecdotalism” (Morley, 2006, p. 106), while Dhoest (2012) suggests that slavishly looking for generalisable patterns can run the risk of essentialising audiences. However, while questioning concepts of an homogenous audience, Dhoest’s own extensive work within ‘ethnic interpretative communities’ in Belgium found that television viewers who belong to national or ethnic groups “do share significant characteristics with fellow group members” (Dhoest, 2012, p. 99). I sought to substantiate any generalisable audience characteristics I found in my methodological approach by gathering data from three separate sources as a form of validation, and to ensure a richness in the data.

In response to the criticism that research design in this field is either too particularistic (Morley, 2006) or too universalising (Dhoest, 2012), Gillespie (1995) has argued that ethnographic methods, based on long-term participant observation, “can deliver empirically grounded knowledge of media audiences in a way that other, less socially encompassing methods (such as surveys, interviews and brief observations) alone cannot” (Gillespie, 1995, p. 54). On the other hand, Siapera (2010) argues for the efficacy of short-term research methodologies. She suggests that shorter research projects – such as this study – have the potential to draw conclusions about the relationship between ethnicity and media use and interpretation without the duration of Gillespie’s anthropological observations. Indeed, Callaway (1992), for example, is critical of research for an extended duration. She questions how long-term immersion can produce authentic results because as researchers are drawn into the localism of the research the expectation of researcher objectivity becomes unrealistic.

Professor of Global Studies Divya McMillin (2007) is in favour of an ethnographic approach and argues that media ethnographers’ use of in-depth interviews, that normally characterises reception studies, should be supplemented by informal conversations, historical research into the participant’s historical/cultural context and policy analysis. While McMillin is in favour of an ethnographic approach she writes from the viewpoint of postcolonial scholarship, an approach she says should not be “anchored to a specific method and its methods of enquiry are driven by the larger social contexts it interrogates” (McMillin, 2007, p. 147). Shome and Hegde (2002) are also of the view that a postcolonial approach to audience research should not be driven by any particular method and might include anything from textual analysis to ethnography. A postcolonial approach is also relevant for understanding how audiences from different cultural contexts make meaning from the media they consume. Benwell, Procter, and Robinson (2012) call for a post colonial approach to reception studies because audiences are conceived as both global and local, which affects their interpretations:

reading, viewing, and listening are frequently activities involving mobile, exilic and diasporic audiences ... where the potential distances between producers and consumers place an increased emphasis on translation and mistranslation. (Benwell, Procter, & Robinson, 2012, p. 23)

However, research across axes of difference does present challenges. As Dhoest (2012) points out, all-important language nuances and meanings can also be compromised when research is carried out across language and cultural contexts. He emphasises the need for ‘cultural sensitivity’ and ‘cross-cultural literacy’ in cross-cultural research.

A number of media scholars, such as Bredin (2010), also acknowledge the significant variability that cross-cultural context exerts in terms of how audiences make meaning from media texts. Bredin’s (2010) ethnographic study of Canadian indigenous broadcaster APTN’s audience, based on an analysis of online forums, established there were differences of engagement and interpretation between aboriginal and non-aboriginal audiences. Similarly, Mankekar’s (1999) audience-reception study of the Indian state-run television’s broadcasting of the epic Hindu serials of *Ramayana* and *Mahabharatha* to promote nationalism, showed remarkably different interpretations between Hindu and Muslim audiences. Keown’s (2012) study about the difference between local and international audiences’ interpretations of *Bro ’Town* also found wide differences in cross-cultural readings of New Zealand society.

Cross-cultural readings can also be incorporated into the construction of identity. Leibes and Katz’ (1990) influential study on cross-cultural readings of American drama series *Dallas* (screened internationally) showed how audiences use foreign programmes as a ‘forum’ to reflect on their own cultural identities, displaying differences between cultures – and similarities within cultures – in their respective moral, ideological and aesthetic interpretations.

Drawing on the results of the types of studies discussed above it is possible to speculate that the meanings migrants in New Zealand make from Māori Television are different to the meaning-making of ‘mainstream’ Pākehā audiences. This becomes apparent in the subsequent findings chapters where I discuss participant responses to Māori Television content.

### 3.10.1 Audience and Affect

A concept that social science researchers have increasingly been applying to the emotional context of analysing text or discourse is the notion of affect. McConville, Wetherell, McCreanor, & Barnes (2014) and Wetherell (2012, 2013) have discussed how the experience of a feeling or emotion, as a response to an event or situation, can be a multilayered process. They argue that such responses can be experienced in the body (embodiment) simultaneously with ‘meaning-making’. McConville et al. (2014) describe a response (to an event or situation) as being a process in which “the emotional

body/brain processes intertwine with personal histories, discourses and culturally available ways of making sense [together] with larger-scale social histories and the material organisation of spaces and contexts” (McConville et al. 2014, p. 5). This means that while ‘meaning-making’ is uniquely individual, researchers also need to be cognisant of the emotional affect of an event on an individual. Research by McConville et al. (2014) has reinforced the notion that the media deliver to their audiences, not just a cognitive experience, but also an emotional one.

Such concepts have challenged traditional audience theories in a post-broadcast world. Traditional television viewing has moved from mass consumption to hyper-connected personalisation as viewers are able to engage concurrently with multiple technologies (Matrix, 2014; Mukherjee, 2014). The shift from linear to internet-based television has seen the emergence of many new theories in response. As Kristyn Gorton argues in her 2009 book, *Media Audiences: Television, Meaning, and Emotion*, television is increasingly using emotion, or affect, to sustain the interest of potentially distracted viewers. Also, producers are deliberately encouraging an intensely emotional engagement between the text and the audience. Gorton cites the example of television talent show *X Factor* where “tears are central to developing the persona of the character ... and the viewer can almost guess who will make it through depending on how much they cry” (Gorton, 2009, p. 72-73). Misha Kavka (2010) in her book *Reality Television, Affect and Intimacy: Reality Matters* also claims that television operates as a ‘technology of intimacy’ and that emotion has a role in audience response. Her study of reality television and its ‘affective capacity’ demonstrates “the genre’s ability to impart a sense of connection between offscreen viewers, onscreen characters and an ‘imagined community’ of viewers” (Kavka, 2008, p. 17). Theorising about the relationship between emotions and television, both Gorton and Kavka point out the need to draw upon cognitive film theory. Bordwell (1989) explains that a cognitive approach to film theory is that the construction of ‘meaning’ by the cognitive mind is not only dependent on the arrangement by the film maker of spatial elements and the manipulation of temporal structures (editing, sequences, plot structure etc), but also involves an individual’s physiological processes of perception together with concepts and conventions learned from history and culture.

Indeed, Laura Marks (2000), drawing on cognitive film theory and cultural anthropology, recognises the need to analyse audiences in the light that “knowledge is held in the body and memory in our senses” (Marks, 2000, p. xiii). Following Thomas Csordas (1994) and his ideas of the body as the subject of culture (embodiment<sup>47</sup>), Marks developed the notion that the moving image of cinema not only invokes memory but also an embodied experience and has led to “understanding [that] the embodied experience of cinema is especially important for representing cultural experiences that are unavailable to vision” (Marks, 2000, p. 22). Marks was writing here about intercultural cinema and its

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<sup>47</sup> At a basic level embodiment could be thought of as the way the body unconsciously expresses an emotion such as fear, happiness or sadness.

ability to represent embodied experiences to its audiences in a post-colonial and transnational world. Smit (2010), however, has called for film theories to be applied more readily to television as “theories of affect [are] well developed in film studies, [so] it is surprising that television, a medium long associated with intimacy and emotional excess, has so long been left on the side-lines of debates on affect in visual media” (Smit, 2010, p. 92). The notion of affect is important within my study because of the ability Māori to use an emotional repertoire (Hoskins, 2017) in the representation of te ao Māori. In my study, I argue that emotion can be a vital ingredient in the reading of Māori Television content. Indigenous philosopher and filmmaker, Barry Barclay hints at the use of ‘affect’ when he describes indigenous cinema and audience’s affective response to it as distinct from other cinema because it invokes te ao Māori and “a whole cosmology, a world of physical and spiritual things, a world of spirits and gods” (Barclay, 2003b, p. 14). Māori scholars outside film theory have also written about affect. Hoskins (2017), writing about those presenting iwi claims to the Waitangi Tribunal, has described how Māori ontological practice heightens affective intensities. Karanga, karakia, kōrero, waiata, haka, hongī and tangi are described by Hoskins as stirring “the affective force of ancestors, gods, earth and sky, spaces, taonga, human persons, logistics and narrative ... into affective engagement [with others]”<sup>48</sup> (Hoskins, 2017, p. 140).

Hoskins is concerned with how affect can be mobilised to challenge colonial power by creating a sense of Māori and Crown “being absorbed, captured together [and] immersed in the encounter from different angles” (Hoskins, 2017, p. 141). Following Hoskins, I suggest that Māori Television programming,<sup>49</sup> much of which includes many of the practices mentioned above, can generate a form of affective engagement with audiences.

Drawing on Hoskins work again, for Māori the relational is “ontologically privileged – we come into being not as autonomous entities but always already as relations” (Hoskins, 2017, p. 137). The relational is everything for Māori (Barlow, 1991; Durie, 1997; Henry & Pene, 2001) and is in contrast to the dominant Western concept of the ‘self-positing autonomous individual’. I apply Hoskins’ insights about the relational affect of Māori cultural practices to migrant audiences in this study and theorise that an emotional response to Māori Television content might lead to a connection to, or an affinity with, te ao Māori. As I have discussed, audience theories developed by non-Māori scholars Kavka (2008) and Gorton (2009) gesture towards the recognition of relationships between television

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<sup>48</sup> The style of this thesis is to translate te reo words the first time they are used. However, this practice would have detracted from Hoskins quote. Hence, in this case the translations are offered as a footnote: karanga (*ceremonial call of welcome*), karakia (*prayer or chant*), kōrero (*speech, story, news or discussion*), waiata (*song or chant*), haka (*dance or performance*), hongī (*symbolically sharing breath by touching noses in greeting*), tangi (*mourning or weeping*), taonga (*anything treasured*).

<sup>49</sup> Examples would include the karanga in the opening title sequence of *Paepae*, the haka in Te Matatini, Kapa Haka and the Māori Performing Arts series, *Kia Mau*, and waiata, karakia, karanga and haka in the opening titles of *Whaikōrero*.

content, emotion, and belonging. In doing so they offer some relevant insights into participant responses in my study in Chapter 12.

### 3.10.2 Audiences and Belonging

The human need to belong as described in Maslow's hierarchy of needs (Maslow, 1943) is a powerful social motivator. While much has been written about belonging, and about the role of the media in creating national identity (Anderson, 1983), there are no New Zealand studies about the role that indigenous media might play in shaping a sense of belonging for migrants.

A useful contribution to my discussion is a collection of work in *Senses and Citizenships*, edited by New Zealand anthropologists Trnka, Dureau, and Park (2013). They discuss sensory phenomena as an aspect of participation in collectives such as face-to-face communities, ethnic groups, nations, and transnational entities. The concept of sensory citizenship is also developed and they suggest that sensory phenomena play a part in the motivation for participation in societal collectives such as communities or ethnic groups (Trnka et al., 2013). The book provides examples of the intersection of the senses and forms of belonging from a variety of cultures.

Weismantel (2001) also provides an example of how a sense of smell can indicate different bodily practices involving cleanliness or different food practices and associated values of taste. Hence, smell can trigger an awareness of class or cultural divisions and therefore help to maintain perceived social bonds and distinctions. Magowan (2007) provides another example from the case of the Yolgnu people in Arnhem Land, Australia, where “aural, visual and kinesthetic fields are complexly intertwined and the ways in which they combine and recombine can either sustain connections or make distinctions [between others]” (Magowan, 2007, p. 15). Extrapolating from this research it can be seen how the role of the senses in Māori Television – from the ‘look’ of the content or the warm tone of the verbal delivery – can trigger a sense of connection or belonging to societal collectives.

A sense of belonging can emerge from an emotional response to an ‘event’. Wetherall (2012) postulates that an affective-discursive ‘event’ is registered simultaneously as both affect and meaning. Adapting Wetherall's theories to my study an affective-discursive approach to watching television would take into account “embodied psychophysiological processes, subjective feelings, memories, perceptions and appraisals, contexts, institutions, spaces, histories and relationships” (Wetherell, McCreanor, McConville, Barnes, & le Grice, 2015, p. 60). In some instances, media scholars (Kavka, 2008; Gorton, 2009) have suggested a fluid, everyday embodied emotional response to television content can be taken to mean that there is a link to an imagined community of viewers and a related sense of belonging. As Gorton (2009) argues, the “value of emotion in a [television] text can be

understood as something that creates good television and constructs a sense of connectedness and belonging” (Gorton, 2009, p. 110).

At a ‘common-sense’ level, an audience’s emotional response to television viewing and an identification with national belonging can be seen most dramatically in the spectacle of international rugby and televised sport. As Kavka (2008) argues, audience affect constitutes a meeting point or “cusp between the individual and the collective psyche” (Kavka, 2008, p. xi). In other words, the universality of emotion, in response to televised sport or reality television, for example, can be seen as contributing to an imagined community of national sports followers, or of fans of popular reality shows such as *Survivor* or *The Bachelor*. It is within an imagined community where members of an audience can discuss and debate their respective emotional responses (Kavka, 2008).

### 3.11 Other Concepts of Belonging

This section surveys the relevant literature to show why it is important to further investigate notions of migrant belonging. Official policies of ‘belonging’ are closely associated with ‘social cohesion’, a key policy goal in New Zealand – and internationally – particularly within the context of the country’s changing demography and national super-diversity (Spoonley, Peace, Butcher, & O’Neill, 2005; Bruhn, 2009; Kymlicka, 2010; OECD, 2011). Nowhere is social cohesion more important than in the area of immigration with the potential for racialisation and unfair discrimination, institutionally or individually – especially for visibly different migrants – in the housing, education and employment sectors (Collins, 2016; Gooder, 2017; D. Hall et al., 2017). Policy demographers (Spoonley et al., 2005) advocate for the use of a policy and indicator framework to assess social cohesion as an outcome for both migrants and New Zealand as a host nation. They describe a ‘socially cohesive society’ as one where all groups have a sense of “belonging, participation, inclusion, recognition and legitimacy” (Spoonley et al., 2005, p. 98).

McMillan (2016) argues that social cohesion policies are seen as one way of redressing the inequality of New Zealand’s immigration policies. In New Zealand, immigration policies favour certain groups of migrants, such as high-income individuals, and provide unequal paths to citizenship that are often based on perceived economic contribution to the nation (Simon-Kumar, 2015). Simon-Kumar questions whether such individuals have any commitment to the politics and history of the country and she is critical of a policy in which “belonging to New Zealand society seems less relevant than economic viability” (Simon-Kumar, 2015, p. 1186). Anthias (2008) is also critical of notions of social cohesion and belonging to the nation because they can mask prevalent inequality, discrimination and exploitation. For example, a 2016 TVNZ ‘kiwimeter’ survey attempted to establish criteria that defined New Zealand’s national identity. Politicians, academics, and members of the public criticised the survey claiming that its euro-centric and racist framing of questions placed Pākehā culture as

naturalised at the expense of indigenous, migrant and other identities (Edwards, 2016; Trevett, 2016). Interestingly, policy researcher David Hall (2017) asserts that “fairness is New Zealand’s characteristic political virtue” (Hall, 2017, p. 10). However, as he points out, despite the unfair treatment of non-Anglo Celtic migrants and Māori the notion of fairness “remains a popular feature of our imagined community” (Hall, 2017, p. 11). Ironically, fairness as a national virtue coincides with systemic discrimination based on religion, ethnicity, class, sexuality, and gender. This means that many people, including Māori, Pasifika, women, migrants, Muslims and those with minority sexual and gender identities, may not have equal experiences of citizenship.

It is important that migrant ‘belonging’ is addressed because in the first 10 years after migration to New Zealand only one in five migrants say they feel strongly that they belong to the nation<sup>50</sup> (Statistics New Zealand, 2011) This suggests that what ‘belonging’ might mean in New Zealand and how this can be achieved needs to be further investigated to avoid migrant perceptions of exclusion and feelings of detachment. My case study involving migrants viewing Māori Television is one way that issues of belonging to the nation can be explored.

### 3.12 Conclusion

The insights I have gained from exploring a variety of academic concepts discussed in this literature review inform the subsequent interpretation and discussion of my findings. Firstly, my analysis of participant observations of the differences between mainstream media and Māori Television is informed by literature concerning the representation of imagined national identities by the mass media, including Waitangi Day and Anzac Day, and the marginalisation of a Māori voice in ‘mainstream’ media. The ‘standard story’ (Nairn & McCreanor, 1990, 1991), as a term used to describe entrenched negative patterns in Pākehā attitudes towards Māori, and often found in the discourses of mainstream media, has also helped identify participant perspectives of the mass media’s representation of indigeneity.

Secondly, my assertion that Māori Television has the ability within the public sphere to disrupt the ‘mainstream’ belief that Māori culture ‘is fundamentally inferior to that of the settlers’ draws its strength in this thesis from the assertion that the indigenous ‘sphericule’ plays a vital role in the public sphere. Ginsberg (1994) and Meadows (2005) argue that the public sphere, as a space where national identities are debated and contested (usually by ‘mainstream’ and social media), is being continually informed by an ongoing narrative of the nation based on the coloniser’s unequal power relationship with the colonised. I argue that Māori Television’s presence as a ‘sphericule’ within the wider public sphere is one space where this contestation can be observed and debated.

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<sup>50</sup> This statistic covers all migrant ethnic groups.

Thirdly, concepts of migrant identity are explored in order to theorise where migrants ‘fit-in’ to a ‘mainstream’ nation building narrative based on the domination of Māori by the settler. The negotiation of fluid identities between migrant attachment to ‘home’ versus a desire to fit-in to a ‘host’ society is placed within the context of the role of mass media and minority ethnic media in contributing to identity formation in migrant settlement. The extent to which migrant and Māori shared histories and joint subalternities relate to migrant identity and belonging to the nation are also discussed.

Fourthly, my review of literature related to audience research explains the evolution of various research approaches within media and concludes that studies related to cross cultural research are most relevant to my thesis. The theoretical frameworks of these studies are discussed and adapted to my research in the methodology chapter, Chapter 6. In particular, the emotional context of analysing participant responses is applied to subsequent findings where I discuss the notion of affective audience engagement in television text.

Finally, the complexity of how to define migrant belonging is raised in this literature review. I suggest that the emotional needs of migrants in their settlement process are often unacknowledged. Viewing Māori Television is not a panacea to migrant feelings of belonging. However, an important thread in all the findings chapters identifies various emotional factors from viewing indigenous content that can contribute to notions of migrant belonging.





## Chapter Four

### Re-imagining the Nation

#### 4.1 Introduction

In this chapter I explore existing theories about how the intersection of coloniser and colonised, and migrant and ‘host’, give rise to the emergence of new generative cultures. This provides a framework for a discussion about the cultural impact of migration, specifically the extent to which migrants contribute to a re-imagining of the nation state. While I draw on a number of theorists, the seminal works on cultural identity by both the literary and cultural critics Homi Bhabha and Stuart Hall provide the backbone of the first section of this chapter. I also discuss Richard White’s concept of the ‘middle ground’ as a site in which Māori and non-Māori might find an accommodation of difference and common meanings. However, this analogy is not completely satisfactory because as with most Western theorising it is not located within Aotearoa New Zealand and does not allow for a Treaty relationship. This points to a need for more location-specific concepts to be developed in order to discuss the role indigenous media might play in the contribution of migrants to a re-imagining of the nation. I have turned, therefore, to New Zealand’s indigenous scholars Barry Barclay, Jo Smith, Tahu Kukutai and Arama Rata, to help guide me to develop a more appropriate model that incorporates Māori Television’s migrant audiences – the communications marae.

#### 4.2 Postcolonial Scholarship

Postcolonial scholarship provides an analysis which reveals how settlers hold on to power in settler societies. It offers some insights into dismantling the power relationships that sustain the settler narrative. While not specifically referring to the influence of migrancy, postcolonialism demonstrates how concepts of nationhood built on a colonial/indigenous binary can be disrupted and reimagined. McMillin (2007) suggests postcolonial culture and national identity should be seen as a dynamic of “transgressions, complexities and transboundary interactions” (McMillin, 2007, p.134). This dynamic within postcolonialism is concerned ultimately with centring indigenous concerns and issues and ensuring the marginalised voice can find cultural and political expression – despite an overriding and always-present colonial hegemony.

Postcolonial approaches are useful in critiquing the discursive ways “rhetoric, images and words” (Smith-Rosenberg, 2010, p. 18) are used by the majority group of settlers to continue to exert control (see discussion on the representation of indigeneity by the mass media in Section 3.3). Postcolonialism

can also critique the enduring hierarchies of power in postcolonial nations and engage in the process of analysing “spaces for new narratives and of becoming and emancipation” (Venn cited in McMillin, 2007, p. 3). In this sense, Māori Television offers a space where alternative representations of Māori interrupt ‘mainstream’ representations of Māori culture and can contribute to a re-imagining of the nation.

## 4.2 The Middle Ground and Re-imagining the Nation State

In my study a postcolonial approach has been extended to discuss the contested nature of an imagined inclusive national identity within the dynamics of settler/indigenous/migrant relationships. This approach is useful in arguing that Māori Television and its implicit form of media political activism can disrupt the settler/indigenous binary by asserting its presence on the national polity.

White’s (2011) concept of the ‘middle ground’ attempts to disrupt this binary relationship. He uses an historical ‘middle ground’ concept – referring literally to the region around the Great Lakes region of North America in the 17<sup>th</sup> and 18<sup>th</sup> centuries where Europeans and ‘Indians’ met to construct a common, mutually comprehensible world. Basing his ideas on historical evidence about the interaction of Europeans and Algonquians in the American Central North East, White claims that for long periods of time in large parts of pre-colonial North America white people could neither dictate to, nor ignore indigenous peoples. Using White’s concept, it is possible to draw a modern-day analogy and see broadcasting as a metaphorical ‘middle ground’.

It is on this ‘middle ground’ that the State and Māori might negotiate equitable power relationships in line with the Treaty and search for accommodation of difference and common meanings within their interaction. White explains this process as being when two parties:

adjust their differences through what amounts to a process of creative and often expedient, misunderstandings. People try and persuade others who are different from themselves by appealing to what they perceive to be the values and practices of those others. They often misinterpret and distort both the values and the practices of those they deal with, but from these misunderstandings arise new meaning and through them new practices – the shared meanings and practices of the middle ground. (White, 2011, p. 26)

White is saying that when different groups or individuals misunderstand each other’s values and practices it can sometimes open up the opportunity to engage in a dialogue that finds a ‘middle ground’ in which worlds overlap and new systems of meaning and exchange are created. For example, in New Zealand, prior to the signing of the Treaty of Waitangi, interactions between Māori and non-Māori (mainly whalers and sealers at that time) demonstrated a similar relationship (Healy et. al., 2013).

However, once the ‘middle ground’ worlds broke down in 19<sup>th</sup> century America, as frontier settlements spread west of the Appalachians and pushed First Nations peoples away from their traditional lands,

they were reinvented as ‘exotic’ and ‘alien’ – as ‘other’. Parallels with New Zealand can be seen in the ethnocentric colonial practice of defining British culture as the central point against which all other cultures were compared and judged.<sup>51</sup>

White’s concept of a ‘middle ground’ provides a way of thinking about the potential for Māori Television to insert an indigenous voice into the public sphere through its audiences’ day to day engagement with wider societal debates. In this sense, Māori Television is inviting its non-Māori audiences (including migrants) to come into an indigenous space to find “the shared meanings and practices of the middle ground” (White, 2011, p. 26).

### 4.3 The Politics of Representation

Influential Cultural Studies theorist Stuart Hall’s writings offer valuable insights into the centrality and practice of representations and the discursive systems at play in hegemonic social relations. In his analysis of racism, he sees its representational properties as a political process, or what he calls the ‘politics of representation’:

Racism, of course, operates by constructing impassable symbolic boundaries, and its typically binary system of representation constantly marks and attempts to fix and naturalise the difference between belongingness and otherness. (Hall, 1988, p. 28)

In discussing the struggle in Britain of ‘the black experience’ and the binary opposites of ‘belonging’ or ‘other’, Hall recognised that the representation of ‘black’ has shifted from being positioned as the unspoken and invisible homogeneous ‘other’ of predominantly white culture, to a struggle that has assumed new forms of heterogeneity in identity, subjectivity and agency in social and political life. This struggle from the margins, Hall maintains, is a “struggle over cultural hegemony which is waged as much in popular culture as anywhere else... and is about shifting the balance of power in the relations of power” (Hall, 1993, p. 106). For example, Hall’s seminal work on popular culture and cultural identity has found expression in his insights into new forms of Black and Asian belonging in Britain, and the changing nature of how British national identity is imagined. Historically Britain has been imagined as White but new versions of British identity are emerging with ethnic minority people identifying themselves as Black-British or British-Asian (Hall, 2000).<sup>52</sup> Such distinctions found expression, he argues, through the politics of representation, with the outcome of many individuals feeling as if they belong in some way to Britain.

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<sup>51</sup> See also the discussion in Chapter 3 about McCreanor & Nairn’s (1990, 1991) analysis of the Good Māori/Bad Māori narrative in contemporary media.

<sup>52</sup> Hall (2000) argued this point as a member of the Runnymede Commission (an independent race equality think tank) in defence of the book ‘Report of the Commission on the Future of Multi-ethnic Britain’, by B. C. Parkeh (Profile Books, London).

Reconceptualising the ‘politics of representation’ within Aotearoa New Zealand introduces factors that can destabilise settler-centric notions of national identity and the nature of belonging. Māori Television, with its legislative mandate for the preservation, protection and promotion of a threatened indigenous language, can be seen as a participant in the struggle against the cultural hegemony of the ‘mainstream’.

Smith (2013), informed by both postcolonial and settler studies, has asserted that Māori Television offers a form of ‘televisual consciousness’. This consciousness represents a different world view that competes with ‘mainstream’ representations and stages what Smith (2013) refers to as a ‘televisual re-occupation’. Māori Television and its ability to intersect and interrupt common ‘mainstream’ narratives about the nation offers a counter to Hall’s observation that “the white eye is always outside the frame – but seeing and positioning everything within it” (Hall, 1981, p. 14). Māori Television by offering a counternarrative to the ‘dominant eye’ of the ‘mainstream’ allows an articulation of the politics of indigeneity and “gives the New Zealand nation new words, images and ideas to think about: a kind of gathering of different knowledge bases from which new ideas about community and belonging might emerge” (Smith, 2013, p. 13). Smith here is arguing for a form of indigenous ‘televisuality’ that asserts an influence in the ‘politics of representation’ in the nation.

Māori Television has the ability to insert an indigenous voice into the public sphere and it is within this space that the indigenous/settler/migrant relationship needs to be considered. When migrants engage as viewers of Māori Television, they can potentially contribute their new understandings of an indigenous world view to the changing dynamics and forces of “cross ethnic representational politics” (Prentice, 2013, p. 181).

#### 4.4 The Cultural Impact of Migrants

Many theorists have considered the cultural impact of diasporic and migrant groups on the imagining of the nation. For some, migrancy has been celebrated as a form of cosmopolitan multiculturalism: “a metropolitan aesthetic where the model of the city becomes ... the model of the contemporary world” (Chambers, 2008, p. 27). Such ideas suggest a homogenisation of migrant experiences and the collapse of difference in the creation of a new form. However, Burke (2009), among other scholars, uses the term ‘cultural translation’ to describe cultural encounters that produce new forms. He uses the idea of ‘culture as text’ as “a metaphor favoured by anthropologists, structuralists and semioticians of the nation” (Burke, 2009, p. 64) to describe the multiple readings of the nation available to migrants. Hence, Māori Television provides a rich potential for such ‘cultural translations’ to occur where migrants are able to view Māori-produced content and engage with ‘culture as text’.

Homi Bhabha (1994, 1996) developed his concepts of ‘hybridity’ and the ‘third space’ to argue that the disruption of hegemonic colonial narratives of cultural structures and practices, where cultures collide and intersect, gives rise to a new generative energy and forms of cultural hybridity. Bhabha explains that “it is this space of intervention ... that introduces creative invention into existence ... and which enables other positions to emerge” (Bhabha, 1994, p. 12 and p. 89). His idea of a ‘third space’ has been widely interpreted in a general sense as a meeting point between the first space (indigenous) and the second space (the colonial) (Meredith, 1998). However, it is not fixed and essentialised but rather should be understood as occurring “in the emergence of the interstices – the overlap and displacement of domains of difference – that the intersubjective and collective experiences of nationness, community interest, or cultural value are negotiated (Bhabha, 1994, p. 3). Hence, the established categories of culture and identity can be productively questioned in a way that engenders new possibilities.

Bhabha’s theories of the third space originally focused on the antagonism amongst colonised people created by the process of colonisation and inequity and how it could be experienced as the “creation of new transcultural forms within the contact zone produced by colonisation” (Ashcroft, Griffiths, & Tiffin, 2003, p. 118). However, Bhabha (2008) subsequently clarified notions of the third space without actually defining it by saying the very act of translating cultural meaning is to enter a third space.

Huggan (2007) introduces migrants into Bhabha’s third space when he suggests that Bhabha sees this space “as being occupied by, among others, migrants in the Western metropolises” (Huggan, 2007 p. 132). However, notions of the third space lack an analysis of power, and the dynamics of Pākehā systems of hegemonic control in New Zealand make an analysis of migrancy within this ‘third space’ inadequate. Notwithstanding these limitations, Bhabha does allow for multiple third spaces and it is this conceptualisation of the third space that I would suggest provides a space for migrants in Aotearoa New Zealand to develop positions of cultural hybridity beyond the binary of colonised and coloniser. While Bhabha’s ideas have limited application to my study, his ideas do gesture towards migrants’ facility to re-imagine the nation.

Māori academics Jo Smith, Tahu Kukutai and Arama Rata have discussed ideas related to the creation of a generative energy arising from the insertion of a migrant voice into the discourses of a nation. Their ideas do have some parallels with Western theorists’ analyses of how migrants might have a cultural impact on the nation, but they differ because they draw on indigenous epistemologies within the context of Treaty based relationships. Smith (2007), for example, suggests migrants in settler colonial countries can help to create decolonised landscapes. She argues from the position of Māori as tangata whenua to suggest a centering of Māori as the instigators of ‘transformative relationships’,

with Māori having the role of ‘host’ to migrants. Rather than Pākehā viewing themselves as the ‘host’ and Māori and other ethnic minority groups being just one of many minorities, Māori would assume responsibility in the dynamic of host/guest relations and promote the “mutually transformative effects of the colonial encounter and the alternative systems of exchange and value that circulate alongside, if imperceptibly, the dominant and more orthodox systems of exchange (Smith, 2007, p. 74).

In other words, Māori could insert different ontological and epistemological presuppositions into the public realm thereby providing the grounds for imagining a ‘bicultural’ future that would “include migrant subjects other than and alongside those who inherit a settler-past” (Smith, 2007, p. 77). Kukutai and Rata (2016) also argue that migrant Māori relationships could be enhanced by Māori having a more substantial role in immigration discourse in order to adequately fulfil the function of ‘host’.

Such Māori scholars and their active engagement with settler/indigenous/migrant encounters signal the need to develop further concepts and metaphors that can describe migrants entering into an indigenous space. It is within such thinking that I can explore ideas of how to position Māori Television and its migrant audiences.

## 4.5 Barclay’s Communications Marae as a Theoretical Framework

### 4.5.1 Introduction

In addition to Western discourses and theories of knowledge, my research has been influenced by the indigenous philosophies of Māori filmmaker Barry Barclay. His seminal works have made him a founding figure of indigenous cinema and media theory, and his concept of ‘fourth cinema’ is now widely used to describe indigenous films. I have adopted his concept of a ‘televisual’ communications marae (Barclay, 1990) as a framework within which to consider Māori Television’s presence on the mediascape together with its audiences.

In his book *Our Own Image* (1990) Barclay uses the metaphor of the marae to describe the relationship between Māori filmmaking and its audiences. Māori academic and film producer, Christina Milligan points out that in developing his philosophy, based on his own practice as a director, “he sought to privilege the indigenous gaze and the indigenous audience by centralising te ao Māori or the Māori world view in principle and in practice” (Milligan, 2015, p. 347). In this thesis I adapt two of Barclay’s theories about indigenous filmmaking to inform my research about Māori Television content and its audience. The first is his metaphorical use of the marae to establish what he calls a ‘communications marae’, and the second is his concept of film either ‘talking in’ or ‘talking out’,

#### 4.5.2 The Communications Marae

A marae can be seen as the area outside the whareniui (*meeting house*) but can also include the ground on which all the surrounding buildings are situated. It is “a space which brings people together and provides a context and occasion in which Māori might practice their values, conduct their protocols, enact their ceremonies and celebrate their taonga” (Pānoho, 2010, p. 28). Within the whareniui, carvings, weavings and other decorative elements operate as a type of archive, or library and it is also the place where histories, genealogical connections, philosophical and social values are sustained, issues are debated, and knowledge shared. It is within this meeting house that Māori gather together to discuss issues at a hui where people present their opinions and arguments, listen to each other and build consensus. These discussions follow a format that adheres to the protocol of each particular marae.

Similar dynamics apply in the metaphorical ‘communications marae’. Barclay wrote, “please don’t ask us to change the rules of the marae ... when you enter this space you will hear our people talking *in their own way* to their own people” (emphasis added, Barclay, 1990, p. 77). In terms of the production of Māori broadcasting this means that non-Māori can make contributions to a programme but they must work within Māori protocols and adhere to tikanga (Milligan, 2015). For example, Myles Thomas is a freelance Pākehā director on Māori Television's cooking shows. In pre-production he is always briefed thoroughly on the kaupapa of the production by the Māori producer and there is always a Māori key ‘creative’ within the production who ensures tikanga is upheld (Thomas, 2017). Hence, Barclay’s model is sustained whenever there are non-Māori crew and directors working to produce Māori content. Barclay himself worked with non-Māori, however, he always made the final decisions. His landmark *Tangata Whenua* (1974) television series included historian Michael King as the Pākehā writer and interviewer and Pākehā producer John O’Shea, who also produced Barclay’s pioneering Māori feature film *Ngati* (1987) and short film *Ka Mate! Ka Mate!* (1987).

Māori Television’s then General Manager of Programming, Haunui Royal (2014) concurs with Barclay’s concept of a communications marae. Speaking about non-Māori audiences, he says they are welcome to ‘drop in’ to Māori Television’s ‘invisible’ type of marae and view content produced by Māori programme makers, other indigenous filmmakers and international programming that offers different cultural perspectives to the ‘mainstream’.

#### 4.5.3 Talking In and Talking Out

Barclay explains the distinction between ‘talking in’ and ‘talking out’ by comparing a radio report such as Radio New Zealand’s *Rural Report*, which is by farmers for farmers, with a populist country-life programme such as Television New Zealand’s *Country Calendar*, designed for a popular audience. In



the former, farmers are ‘talking in’ to each other, discussing “stock units, pasture mixes, fertiliser regimes, spore counts and the like” (Barclay, 1990, p. 74). The latter is an example of a programme that ‘talks-out’ to a popular audience where the content is “designed to be understood and enjoyed by all New Zealanders, 95 per cent of whom are urban dwellers who may not have mustered sheep or milked a cow in their lives” (ibid.). In other words, ‘talking out’ explains content to ‘outsiders’ that ‘insiders’ already know. *Country Calendar*, for example, is a television programme about farming but it ‘talks-out’ and is

made for as wide an audience as possible. The content includes profiles on interesting but general farming practices and people, together with rural spectacles such as country fairs or converting farmland to vineyards. Barclay’s preference is for programmes that ‘talk in’ because, he says, with programmes such as the radio *Rural Report*, “I feel as if I have suddenly been dropped in among farmers and am catching something of their real lives” (Barclay, 1990, p. 74).

It is the sense of ‘talking in’ – dropping in on ‘real lives’ – that Barclay is attempting to capture with the filmmaking metaphor of the communications marae. He theorises that films made from the centre of a communications marae present Māori culture to Māori in a Māori way and that this marae should be “a different sort of marae – an invisible one, looking inward but open to all” (Barclay, 1990, p. 76). Extending Barclay’s ideas, I suggest that content produced for Māori Television ‘talks-in” and both ‘talks-in and talks-out” to its audiences.

#### 4.5.4 Applying Barclay’s Theories

The concept of ‘talking in’ and both ‘talking-in and talking-out’ offers a perspective on Māori Television’s relationship with both its Māori and non-Māori audiences. Barclay (1990) suggests that a film that is ‘talking in’ has “cultural integrity [and] will have far more appeal to other cultures than if it were tailored to them” (Barclay, 1990, p. 78). Echoing Barclay, the cultural integrity of its programme content is what veteran broadcaster Tainui Stephens believes is one of the appeals Māori Television has for its non-Māori audiences (Stephens, 2013b).

Distinctive Māori film production values can be seen in much of Māori Television programming. Māori Television’s programming schedule is 80 per cent locally made content and its range of bilingual and English-language programming has a strong ideological approach that reflects a Māori world view (Smith, 2011). Māori filmmaker Don Selwyn, commenting before the advent of Māori Television on the emerging filmmaking community of which he was a part, made the point that the cultural perspective of a Māori production crew was integral to the aesthetic success of a Māori film (Selwyn cited in Greenwood et al., 2011). Barclay makes a similar point about how Māori filmmaking is distinctively different:

If we Māori look closely enough and through the right pair of spectacles we will find examples at every turn of how old principles have been reworked to give vitality and richness to the ways we conceive, develop, manufacture and present our films. (Barclay, 2003a, p. 10)

Often in opening-title sequences particular visual motifs, music and sound are used to evoke indigeneity. For example, in the current affairs programme *Paepae*, the opening title sequence includes the camera moving through a series of pou whenua. This visual sequence is accompanied by the sound of karanga, a chant steeped in tikanga that forms part of a Māori welcoming ceremony, traditionally seen as a connection between the living and spiritual worlds and epitomising mana wahine (women's power). In the case of *Paepae*, the karanga is used as a cultural metaphor to signify the powhiri or welcome to the programme's audience. While the title sequence finishes the camera reveals the presenter and guests sitting in a stylised marae set, as if they are present at a hui. As the discussion unfolds the cultural protocols of a hui are followed to maintain the integrity of the hui format. *Paepae* is a good example of the televisual representation of tikanga many of these studio elements I have described can be seen as analogous to marae visits that some members of audiences may have experienced.

There are also other examples. A closer look at some Māori-produced television content reveals non-'mainstream' production practices such as privileging talk without fast cutting, reducing voice over, and replacing close-up shots with fixed-camera long shots. Former Māori Television commissioning editor and television director Greg Mayor (2013) provides an example by explaining that it was common during the filming of *Marae DIY* for many of his interviewees to want their whanau's comments included in the interview shots. Rather than a conventional approach that favours a single shot of the subject responding to questions and providing descriptive details with pauses and off-subject comments being edited out, a Māori approach might include a wide shot with the main interview subject being surrounded by their whanau and their supporting comments included. A mixture of camera and editing styles means the content has a different feel to its equivalent 'mainstream' programme. These techniques have the dual effect of slowing the pace of the programme at the same time as allowing an unspoken space between the content and the audience. Non-Māori film editor Annie Collins describes the way this space was allowed to emerge on-screen from her experiences editing the films of much respected Māori filmmaker Merita Mita. Collins had worked with Mita over many years and had learnt the ways in which Mita was aware of leaving spaces for the wairua of a scene to speak to its viewer. In particular, Mita always instructed the camera person to be aware of the relevance of the whenua of the land and the film editor, during the editing process, "to wait for the spirit to come out of the film and allow it to speak" (Collins, 2016). It is in this way that 'talking-in' can be understood – by the privileging a Māori world view.

Royal (2014) agrees with the idea of Māori Television ‘talking-in’ because its programming decisions are largely focused on providing ‘sophisticated’ content to Māori audiences<sup>53</sup> with a primary focus on the revitalisation of te reo. Royal’s use of the word ‘sophisticated’ in this context means there is no need to simplify content by explaining history or the meaning of tikanga because Māori audiences are assumed to possess a level of cultural knowledge. In other words, Royal (2014) is saying that Māori produced content for Māori Television ‘talks-in’ to its audiences. In programmes that ‘talk-in’, such as *Iwi Anthems*, it is assumed by the makers that the content and context will be readily understood by the audience. Each episode of *Iwi Anthems* is a series of waiata and haka unique to a particular iwi, but while there are English subtitles, the concepts and protocol relevant to the cultural performances are not explained. Hence, *Iwi Anthems*, while it does offer English subtitles, can be described as a programme that to a large extent ‘talks-in’ to its Māori audience.

‘Talking-in’ can also be seen in the form of the cultural values that influence camera techniques. In the documentary *Hitler and the Gum Digger* (Dir. Tainui Stephens, 2013a), there are a series of mid-shot single interviews with kaumātua explaining the circumstances behind the formation of the 28<sup>th</sup> (Māori) Battalion by Māori Members of Parliament and organisations to fight in World War Two. In a section of the interview content that described the process followed by young Māori men to prepare for the possibility of death through sacred warrior traditions, the camera frame included four people and a stream of water. In the foreground sat the interviewee, Ngāpuhi elder Ben Morunga, and behind him sat two younger women and a child. They were all sitting on the bank of a flowing stream. Stephens explained to me that he framed the shot in this way to demonstrate the intergenerational connections of the kōrero (Stephens, 2013). For Māori audiences such content ‘talked in’ but the broad appeal of the documentary that screened on Anzac day in 2013 also meant it ‘talked-in and talked-out’ at the same time.

Other programmes such as celebrity chef Peter Gordon’s *Fusion Feast* contains examples of both ‘talking-in and talking-out’. Made as much for an overseas audience as a local audience, the programme’s fusion cuisine combines global flavours with traditional Māori kai (*food*). Although the programme is in English it uses some Māori words that are commonly used in everyday New Zealand. Frequently used words such as ‘kia ora’ (*welcome*), ‘paua’ (*abalone*), ‘Amine’ (*Amen*) or ‘whanau’ are translated for non te reo speaking audiences, that is to say it ‘talks-out’. But even here there is an element in which the programme ‘talks-in’. Some cultural practices remain unexplained such as the offering of a karakia to Tangaroa (*god of the sea*) before a fishing expedition.

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<sup>53</sup> Māori audiences of course are not homogeneous, and individuals bring their own sense of identity and knowledge of tikanga and te reo to their viewing experience. See Belinda Borell (2005) for a discussion about the complexities of what Māori identity can mean and the different perceptions of the importance of te reo.

Some programming styles and opening-title sequences, such as *Sidewalk Karaoke*<sup>54</sup>, do appear to be similar to ‘mainstream’ television programmes but the tone and humour of the presenters’ piece-to-camera introduction in te reo always marks the programme as non-‘mainstream’. For Barclay this might have been a visible example of ‘talking-in’ where the filming practice and the production appeals to its community. In other words, the communication values of a marae are mirrored in the production so that Māori feel comfortable speaking in their own voice to each other, using their own anecdotes and inflections – with other cultures ‘dropping in’ should they wish.

#### 4.4.5 Positioning Māori Television Content

Adapting Barclay’s theories to my research, I place Māori Television’s content at different places on the marae. Māori produced programming for Māori Television can operate along a continuum between content that either just ‘talks-in’ or both ‘talks-in and talks-out’. Such content is placed within the metaphorical space of the whareniui, or the carving decorated building at the heart of the marae, where tikanga and te reo are expressed and upheld. Content that predominantly ‘talks-in’ means that it has its cultural integrity preserved and the indigenous audience is privileged. Milligan (2015) affirms this when she explains that the fundamental principle of Barclay’s theorising’ is that Māori protocol must be observed in the production process and that content ‘talks-in’ to its Māori audiences. Māori content, produced by Māori for Māori, whether it ‘talks-in’ or both ‘talks-in and talks-out’ is therefore imbued with cultural values that Māori audiences can potentially understand (and non-Māori can ‘listen-in’ to such programming).

I next position programming of widespread appeal such as culturally diverse programming, not necessarily produced originally for Māori Television (such as *Both Worlds*, *Tagata Pasifika* and *Journey to the West*), international documentaries and sport, art house and ‘family’ cinema within the space of the marae ātea (*courtyard or open debating area*). This space is a sacred area situated immediately outside the whareniui and it is here where Māori greet visitors through a powhiri (*traditional welcome*) and offer manaakitanga (*hospitality*). While historically the ritual of the powhiri was about the host marae discovering whether the visiting party was friend or foe, the powhiri today is about welcoming visitors and drawing them into the lives of the tangata whenua. In the case of Māori Television the ritual of the powhiri can be seen as a metaphor for an invitation to its wider audiences to enter the marae by offering a programming selection that “informs, educates, and entertains viewers, and enriches New Zealand’s society, culture, and heritage” (Māori Television, 2013a, p. 18).

The challenge then for Māori Television is to draw audiences from outside, to inside the whareniui. Once inside, audiences can both ‘listen-in’ to stories that ‘talk-in’ or both ‘talk-in and talk-out’ and it

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<sup>54</sup> *Sidewalk Karaoke* is discussed more fully in 5.6

is here within the heart of the marae, or the wharenuī, that Māori Television's audiences can discover a different world view holding an equal place in Aotearoa New Zealand. Drawing on Hoskins (2017) research and the relational nature of Māori interactions, I argue that much of the content and 'flow'<sup>55</sup> of the broadcaster's programming is informed by the worldview where the 'relational' for Māori is "ontologically privileged" (Hoskins, 2017, p. 137). Such content therefore offers the viewer a metaphorical invitation to enter the marae.

However, the communications marae is only a metaphor, and viewing content within the wharenuī does not necessarily enable audiences to understand a Māori world in a meaningful way. Rather the invitation can be seen as more of providing an opportunity for audiences to potentially choose programming from within the wharenuī in order to 'listen-in'. The extent to which my study's migrant participants wanted to view content from within the wharenuī and the outcome of their 'listening-in' to such programming are linked to important strands of my research.

I also need to distinguish between Māori-produced programming that appears on Māori Television and Māori-produced programming screened on 'mainstream' broadcasters. Viewing programming on Māori Television can be likened to entering what Jackson and Poananga (2001) have called a Māori house. This analogy was used by Te Kawa a Maui Media Research Team (2005) to describe Māori programming appearing on Māori Television. They claimed that such programming appeared in what could be likened to a Māori house, as opposed to appearing in a 'room' within a Pākehā broadcaster's house. In a Pākehā house, as in a Māori house, all programming is subject to the broadcaster's own policies and practices. But in a Pākehā house, they argue, Māori programming will always be framed within a Pākehā room. For example, 'mainstream' television finds it difficult to attract advertisers for the smaller audiences attracted to off-peak viewing and therefore schedules Māori programming at these times. On the other hand, as my subsequent findings demonstrate, audiences viewing Māori Television can perceive a distinct mode of address, visual presentation, tone of advertising and mis-en-scene when viewing Māori Television programming framed within a Māori context. Hence, the on-screen presentation of programming within a Māori house represents a house constructed metaphorically by the riches within the wharenuī. I argue that the programming schedule within a Māori house exerts an indigenous ontological world view, and therefore can be compared to the distinctiveness of filmmaking made from within Barclay's communications marae.

#### 4.5.6 Political Activism

Barclay (1990) argues that 'talking-in' is a far more effective strategy of political activism than 'talking-out' to audiences who may otherwise never actually 'hear' or 'see' a Māori world, and whose

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<sup>55</sup> I am referring to Kompare (2017) and Williams' (1974) concept of television 'flow' discussed in Chapter 5.

viewing experience is merely part of a cultural sojourn. Barclay describes such audiences as being “like a great sponge ... willing to merely absorb but not to learn” (Barclay, 1990, p. 76). Kavka and Turner (2012) expand on this point and suggest these audiences usually refuse to acknowledge any historical basis for the contemporary social deprivation of Māori. Films such as *Whale Rider*, *Once Were Warriors* and *Boy* are based on repetitions of the ‘spectacle of indigenous presence’ that place narratives within the context of colonisation without appearing to suggest non-Māori have any responsibility for some of the inequitable outcomes of the colonial project (Kavka & Turner, 2012). Barclay would argue that these films are examples of the compromise required by commercial funding models which could leave the communications marae being likened to “a Hollywood motel ... with nothing left to share with anybody” (Barclay, 1990, p. 77).

However, Māori Television does not operate under such commercial constraints. The New Zealand film industry and ‘mainstream’ television might be under pressure to make productions that attract wide audiences, but this is not the case for Māori Television. The funding model for Māori Television (discussed in Chapter 5) ensures the broadcaster is enabled to produce content that ‘talks-in’ and both ‘talks-in and talks-out’ without the constraints of working within the boundaries of audience-driven commercial imperatives. I would suggest this funding model concurs with Barclay’s ideas. He writes about the importance for Māori to access and disseminate communication technologies that enable them to ‘talk-in’ with their own voice about whatever they choose and in doing so “having a feeling that the talk will be of interest to others who wish to drop in” (Barclay, 1990, p. 78).

The production of programmes in which the degree of ‘talking-in’ is not compromised by a need to ‘talk-out’ to commercially valuable audiences can also be seen as a form of what Smith calls Māori political activism. As Smith (2013) suggests, “Māori Television could be understood within an overtly political framework of decolonisation” (Smith, 2013, p. 110). She sees some of Māori Television’s programming as disrupting ‘mainstream’ assumptions for its non-Māori audiences about the role and place of tangata whenua within the nation. This is where the political potential of indigenous television lies, argues Smith. She asserts that an increase in indigenous images on screen does not necessarily “lead to a greater understanding of how these images matter or become meaningful” (Smith, 2011, p. 727). Echoing Freire (1970) and his theories of conscientisation,<sup>56</sup> Smith goes on to argue that “the political potential of Māori Television lies in its ability to expand the existing vocabulary for understanding cross-cultural and intra-cultural encounters” (Smith, 2011, p. 727).

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<sup>56</sup> Freire (1970) demonstrated that once workers in Brazil had the vocabulary and other resources to name and analyse their situation they were able to plan for and initiate change.

## 4.6 Conclusion

Western theorists have made a significant contribution to the study of the potential for new generative cultures to emerge when ‘host’ cultures interact with new migrant cultures. While it is important to recognise the considerable influence of cultural studies in the western academy, my study highlights the limitations of applying these concepts to the study of indigenous media. Developing an indigenous theoretical framework to study Māori Television based on the work of Barry Barclay allows the centering of Māori within a broadcasting communications marae grounded in the rights of the Treaty and the cultural, economic and political rights of Māori in relation to the crown.

The positioning of Māori Television within this model affirms the broadcaster’s stand in making Māori content *by* Māori, *for* Māori but at the same time it also fulfills its statutory obligation to promote language and culture through content that ‘enriches New Zealand’s society, culture and heritage’.<sup>57</sup> However, drawing non-Māori audiences into the metaphorical wharenui to ‘listen in’ to Māori language and culture is no guarantee that such audiences viewing Māori Television see an association between the reality of life for many Māori and the structural inequalities of New Zealand. The ambition for this form of activist reading of content, where the audience is invited to ‘listen-in’, is for audiences to become more aware about indigenous issues and concerns. In particular does the communications marae as a concept enable this study to understand the potential for Māori Television’s migrant audiences to learn about a Māori world from a Māori perspective?

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<sup>57</sup> The statement ‘enriches New Zealand’s society, culture and heritage’ is from the Māori Television Service Amendment Act, 2013, and is discussed more fully in Chapter 5.

## Chapter Five

### Māori Television

#### 5.1 Introduction

Māori Television, a small indigenous minority broadcaster in Aotearoa New Zealand, has provided programming for both Māori and non-Māori audiences since 2004. Its emergence represented perhaps the most significant recent shift in New Zealand media culture since the introduction of television in 1961 (Abel & Smith, 2008) and is the result, according to Māori broadcaster Tainui Stephens, of three decades of agitation and political determination by Māori (Stephens, 2004). The broadcaster operates as a national free-to-air station and its principal function is “to contribute to the protection and promotion of te reo Māori me ōna tikanga through the provision, in te reo Māori and English, of a high-quality, cost-effective television service that informs, educates and entertains viewers, and enriches New Zealand’s society, culture and heritage”<sup>58</sup> (Māori Television Service Amendment Act, 2013<sup>59</sup>). Since its inception, Māori Television has been a key site for the construction of nationhood, nation-building, and national identity (Abel, 2013a, p. 205).

At the powerful opening ceremony of Māori Television, iwi gathered from around the country to celebrate Māori finally being able to broadcast their stories in their own way. Ten years later, Ranginui Walker (2014), speaking about the first decade of Māori Television’s achievements, affirmed that Māori Television represented the wairua of te ao (*the spirit of a Māori world*) that would never end (Walker, 2014). This chapter explores, first, a history of the indigenous struggle for the protection of te reo and how Māori Television continues this struggle by inserting te ao Māori into the psyche of a settler colonial nation and its conceptions of national identity. Secondly, I provide an overview of the emergence of Māori Television and the type of programming it provides, the audiences it attracts, and how Māori Television is funded. Thirdly, I turn to my assertion that migrant viewing experiences of Māori Television are potentially different from those of non-Māori New Zealanders.

The following brief background provides the historical context to some of the contributing factors leading to the politicisation of Māori, the demands for te reo to be protected and the establishment of

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<sup>58</sup> Two concepts within the legislation require clarification. The Reithian concept of public service broadcasting means that television content promotes the values of, information, education and entertainment, and the Māori Television Board made submissions to its stakeholders in 2014 to have the phrase ‘te reo Māori me ōna tikanga’ changed back to the original 2003 wording of ‘te reo Māori me ngā tikanga’ (for a detailed discussion of why this clarification was needed see, p. 18 in <https://www.maoritelevision.com/sites/default/files/attachments/Briefing%20to%20Incoming%20Ministers%202014.pdf>)

<sup>59</sup> The original 2003 legislation covering the function of Māori Television was amended in 2013 to reflect more the broadcaster’s emphasis on the regeneration and revitalisation of te reo.



Māori Television.

## 5.2 The Crown, te Reo and Māori Broadcasting

The assertion of indigenous rights within postcolonial nations such as New Zealand has been an ongoing feature of settler colonial nations since the end of the Second World War (Walters, 1972). What has been named the Māori Renaissance, as discussed in Chapter 2, and its renewed assertion of indigenous politics from the 1960s to the 1980s (Harris, 2004; Walker 1990) provided the impetus to lodge a claim to the Waitangi Tribunal that under Article 2 of the Treaty te reo is a taonga that the Crown has a duty to protect.

Māori urban groups were expressing deep concerns about the declining use of te reo from the early 1970s<sup>60</sup> because as Lysaght (2010) explains, language has always been seen as one of the integral ways a culture can not only survive, but also be maintained. By the turn of the decade only about 70,000 Māori, or 18-20 per cent of Māori (mostly elderly), were fluent Māori speakers with less than five per cent of Māori school children having te reo language capability (NZ Parliament Research papers, 2010). This figure contrasted dramatically with the 90 per cent of Māori school children who were fluent in 1913 (Report of the Waitangi Tribunal on the te reo Māori Claim, 1986). The diminishing numbers of te reo speakers were a result of the pervasive assimilatory practices of the dominant European settlers. These factors included the banning of Māori language in schools and the urbanisation of Māori. Migration to the cities was first stimulated by the 1930s depression and continued in the post war period. The mid-century State practice of ‘pepper potting’ or distributing Māori families on government assistance throughout predominantly ‘mainstream’ Pākehā /European urban housing areas of State-funded and owned housing further threatened the use of te reo in everyday urban life. These combined factors led to massive social changes and the virtual loss of te reo (King, 1993, Belich, 2001). The introduction of television in 1960 and its largely monolingual programming in English representing a Pākehā world to audiences further added to the demise of te reo (Fox, 2001).

Examining the history of Māori media in New Zealand is one way to demonstrate how te reo was once a thriving language in the settler colony. The proliferation of the early Māori print media in the 1800s reflected the everyday usage of te reo. The first Māori language newspaper was published in 1842 and a number of different independent publications flourished until the 1930s (Māori Language Commission, 2014; Curnow, Hopa & McCrea, 2003).<sup>61</sup> Paterson (2013) holds the view that *Te Hokioi*,

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<sup>60</sup> According to the 1961 Hunn Report there was a general belief that the language was a ‘relic of ancient Māori life’ (cited in Parliamentary Library, 2010, p.3).

<sup>61</sup> The only other publication to appear until the 1990s was the Government’s Ministry of Māori Affairs (now Te Puni Kokiri). The Ministry began publishing a magazine for Māori in the 1950s and continues to do so. Since the 1990s Māori print media has begun to flourish again (see Durie, 1998). Currently in 2014 there are several Māori print media

a Māori Language newspaper from 1861-63, was historically the “most radical example of indigenous media activism in New Zealand” (Paterson, 2013, p. 124) because of the way it actively promoted tino rangatiratanga. While tino rangatiratanga is a concept generally known as Māori self-determination, it can “simultaneously be identified as Māori capitalism, Māori electoral power, cultural nationalism or revolutionary activity” (Te Ahu Poata-Smith, 1996, p. 98). By the 1970s the concept of tino rangatiratanga had become increasingly important to Māori and the realisation that many of the promises in the Treaty had been ignored spurred many Māori into a battle to redress these injustices. The fight to include te reo as a taonga that the Crown had a duty to protect under Article 2 of the Treaty became a vital attempt to preserve a once flourishing language.

Despite an increasing call by Māori to have their language recognised, the government response was inadequate. As a result, a number of political initiatives were undertaken by Māori to place pressure on the State. A 30,000-signature petition calling for courses in Māori language and culture to be offered in all New Zealand schools was presented at Parliament in 1972, resulting in an annual Māori Language Week being established in 1975. In 1980 during Māori Language Week a protest march to Parliament demanded that the Māori language have equal status with English. By 1981 another petition was tabled in Parliament calling for Māori to be made an official language of New Zealand. Concerns about the survival of the language resulted in the then Ministry of Māori Affairs in 1982 taking responsibility for the Māori initiated Te Kōhanga Reo (language nests) movement to promote the Māori language among Māori pre-schoolers. Experiments in Māori radio broadcasting led to the first Māori-owned Māori language radio station (Te Reo-o-Poneke) going to air in 1983 (NZ Parliament Research papers 2010).

### 5.3 The Establishment of Māori Television

Finally, after years of dissatisfaction with the level of state recognition of the language the Wellington Board of Māori Language, Huirangi Waikerepuru and Ngā Kaiwhakapumau i te Reo (Inc) lodged a claim with the Waitangi Tribunal in 1985 asking that the Māori language receive official recognition and its use be encouraged in broadcasting, education, health and the government at all levels.

The claimants made the case against the Crown because it had failed to protect the Māori language thereby breaching the promise made in Article II of the Treaty of Waitangi. These claims could be best summed up by the Secretary and Head of Māori Affairs at the time, Dr. Tamati Muturangi Reedy:

Māori oral literature abounds with expressions of the regard for their language by the Māori people, e.g., 'ko te reo te mauri o te mana Māori ' (the language is the heart and soul of the mana of Māoridom) ... Language, te reo Māori, is an asset in itself not merely a medium of

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publications such as Ngā Kohinga (Iwi: Ngati Porou), Pīpīwharauoa (Iwi: Turanganui), Pu Kāea (Iwi: Mataatura) and Te Karaka (Iwi: Ngāi Tahu).

communication ... It is sufficient for me to say that it is inconceivable that Māori people can retain any measure of (their) identity without the language. (8.1.3. Report of the Waitangi Tribunal on the te reo Claim, 1986)

The Tribunal was told by one witness after another of the importance of the proverb which compares the loss of the language to the Moa, a flightless and now extinct bird:

Ka ngaro te reo, ka ngaro taua, pera i te ngaro o te Moa  
*(If the language be lost, man will be lost, as dead as the moa).*

Responding to the various claimants' submissions, the Waitangi Tribunal acknowledged the vital link between the language and the maintenance of Māori culture, that the Māori language was indeed a 'taonga' under Article II of the Treaty of Waitangi and that the Crown had a responsibility for its preservation. This decision helped pave the way for te reo to have a presence on the airwaves by acknowledging:

that in its widest sense the Treaty promotes a partnership in the development of the country and a sharing of all resources. It is consistent with the principles of the Treaty that the language and matters of Māori interest should have a secure place in broadcasting. (7.2.5. Report of the Waitangi Tribunal on the te reo Māori Claim, 1986)

The Tribunal made a number of recommendations relating to the revitalisation of te reo but, as with all the Tribunal's recommendations, they were not legally binding. However, these recommendations provided a major impetus for the implementation of the Māori Language Act 1987. Māori was declared an official language and Te Taura Whiri i Te Reo Māori – The Māori Language Commission – was established.

However, the struggle for Māori broadcasting was not over yet. The recognition by the Tribunal of the place of te reo in broadcasting in order to revitalise the language and Māori being made an official language did not remove all the roadblocks in the way of the establishment of Māori broadcasting. In 1984 the New Zealand Māori Council stepped up their protest for access to the airwaves and applied for a warrant from the broadcasting authorities for the establishment of a Māori television channel. The Aotearoa Broadcasting System (ABS) was created but unfortunately despite an initial commitment from the Broadcasting Corporation the channel did not eventuate (Durie, 1998). In 1988 the government's Broadcasting Amendment Act (No 2) enabled the corporatisation of State assets (State Owned Enterprises, or SOEs) from public radio and television resources. The government's strategic intent was to sell the corporation of Television New Zealand (TVNZ) by privatising it. Māori sought interim injunctions to restrain the transfer of these assets and argued that the State needed to own television resources. State ownership would ensure they could be used by Māori to assert their presence on settler airwaves.

In 1992 the Wellington Board of Māori Language (*Nga Kaiwhakapumau i Te Reo*) and the New Zealand Māori Council took a case to the Privy Council<sup>62</sup> in the United Kingdom. Māori argued that the Government's Treaty obligations to protect the language could not be fulfilled unless there was access to a share of these public broadcasting assets (Orange, 1987). The Privy Council required that proof of a mechanism to protect the language was needed before a transfer of assets was allowed. Such a mechanism was Te Māngai Pāho (the Māori Broadcasting Funding Agency) and in 1993 it was established under the Broadcasting Amendment Act to distribute funds to promote Māori language and Māori culture through funding the broadcast and production of programmes for both radio and television.

Te Māngai Pāho funded Māori content television programming such as *Koha*, *Marae*, *Waka Huia* and *Te Karere* for 'mainstream' television but in terms of overall television content the presence of Māori programming was minimal. The programmes that were produced were relegated to non-commercial times, in the late afternoon, late at night and on Sunday mornings. In 1998 Māori content programming accounted for 255 hours (or 0.4 per cent) of the total TV One, TV2 and TV3 local-content broadcast hours (NZOA, 2000, p. 29). Difficulties remained in initiating and sustaining an independent Māori television broadcaster. In 1996 the Aotearoa Māori Television Network (ATN) was set up as a pilot scheme for 13 weeks in the Auckland region (Fox, 2001; Hokowhitu & Devadas, 2013; Middleton, 2010). It was not a success. Short production time frames, small budgets and much-publicised financial troubles, "ultimately tainted the reputation of Māori programme makers" (Abel & Smith, 2008, p. 3). 'Mainstream' media focused intense scrutiny on the financial problems and alleged mismanagement of government fundings that led to ATN's collapse rather than an acknowledgment that ATN was at long last an opportunity for Māori television to become a reality.

Finally the decades of political agitation came to fruition. In 2003, seventeen years after the Waitangi Tribunal's recommendations to secure the place of Māori language and culture in broadcasting, the government passed 'The Māori Television Service Act 2003'. The Act stated that Māori Television's principal function was to promote the Māori language and culture at the same time as reaching a wide an audience as possible:

through the provision of a high quality, cost-effective Māori television service, in both Māori and English, which informs, educates and entertains, and in doing so enriches New Zealand's society, culture, and heritage. (Māori Television Service Act 2003, S8 (1))

The governance of Māori Television's goal of language regeneration and the strategies associated with its vision continue to evolve. Four years after the launch of Māori Television the Te Reo Māori channel

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<sup>62</sup> In 1992, the British Privy Council was the highest court in New Zealand, however, it was much debated whether this was appropriate for an independent nation and in 2003 the right of appeal to the Privy Council was abolished.

was launched. Its programming was totally in te reo without subtitles, to cater for those with high levels of Māori language fluency. Māori Television’s legislation was also amended in 2013 to specifically reflect the broadcaster’s focus on the regeneration of te reo. A shift in focus from Māori Television producing content of ‘broad’ appeal (Māori Television Service Act 2003) to content that aimed more on developing ‘te reo Māori me ōna tikanga Māori’<sup>63</sup> (Māori Television Service Amendment 2013) can be noticed after the disestablishment of Te Pūtahi Paoho. This agency was originally established under the Māori Television Service Act 2003 to represent Māori stakeholder interests in the Māori Television Service while the Crown was represented by the ministers of Māori Affairs and of Finance. However, in 2014 Te Pūtahi Paoho began discussions with Te Puni Kōkiri (the Ministry of Māori Development) about how to establish more of a government led and nationwide Māori-language strategy that included more input from iwi Māori. In April 2016 the Māori Language Bill was passed and a new independent Māori language entity, Te Mātāwai, was established, with representatives from iwi, Māori-language stakeholder organisations and the Crown, to help the Government develop more co-ordinated national Māori language strategies to increase the uptake of te reo Māori. Te Mātāwai then took over the functions of Te Pūtahi Paoho.

## 5.4 Funding Māori Television

The government, through Te Puni Kōkiri, delivers funding of \$35m a year to Māori Television. This covers the operating costs of both the exclusively Māori language Te Reo channel and the bilingual Māori/English language channel. Government funding means that Māori Television is not constrained by the commercial imperatives of ‘mainstream’ broadcasters and its lack of reliance on revenue from television advertising means that entire days of programming can cover important nation-building days such as Anzac Day (Smith, 2016).<sup>64</sup> However, Māori Television and Te Māngai Pāho have not had an increase in funding in ten years, and some of the implications of this will be discussed later in this chapter.

Included in Te Puni Kōkiri’s funding is \$16million which is administered through Te Māngai Pāho, the agency responsible for commissioning Māori language content in radio, TV, and new media shows in order to promote te reo Māori. Te Māngai Pāho has the final say on which content will be funded, and how much funding will be given to producers. All funding applications require producers to submit measurable Māori language objectives that “ensure high-quality Māori language and cultural content”

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<sup>63</sup> The Māori Television Board made submissions to its stake holders for this term to be changed – see footnote 54.

<sup>64</sup> Audiences viewing significant events, such as the annual Anzac Day commemorations, are also attracted to watching Māori Television throughout the day. For example, in 2016, 21,000 watched Māori Television’s coverage of the Anzac Day 6 am Dawn parade at the Auckland War Memorial Museum but a further 48,000 tuned in for *Schindler’s List* and an overall 924,671 viewers were attracted to later programming throughout the day. Anzac Day programming “boosted audience numbers that week to the highest rating of the year – 924,671 viewers – so very close to our goal of one million viewers each week”(Māori Television, 2016a, p. 10).

(Te Māngai Pāho, 2015, para 13). The overriding funding criteria for all programmes are that the language learning component is based on the ZePa approach of language acquisition. The ZePa philosophy, discussed in more detail later in this chapter and in Chapter 9, is based on the belief that normalising te reo with its audience creates an environment to actively learn words and phrases that leads ultimately to te reo fluency.

Te Māngai Pāho provides funding for both internally produced programmes and programmes commissioned by Māori Television from outside production companies. For some programmes, such as the annual Anzac Day commemorative documentaries, joint funding is provided by Te Māngai Pāho and New Zealand On Air (NZOA).<sup>65</sup> NZOA, as does Te Māngai Pāho, provides funding for a diverse range of content providers, including those in the ‘mainstream’, but it has a specific Māori programme funding strategy “as an ancillary and complementary role to Te Māngai Pāho ... but at a relatively modest proportion” (NZOA, 2018, para 1).<sup>66</sup> NZOA will fund Māori content that appeals to a general English speaking audience but it focuses on complementing the work of Te Māngai Pāho and encouraging “the use of Te Reo in content, as appropriate, to normalise the language for those not fluent in te reo” (NZOA, 2017, p. 15<sup>67</sup>). The ‘zero-passive’ ZePA model used in Māori language policy also forms the basis for Māori Television content funding by NZOA.

## 5.5 Māori Television’s Approach to Language Learning

One of Māori Television’s main roles is to provide programming that contributes to the revitalisation of the Māori language. Indeed, *A Māori Broadcasting Language Impact Evaluation Report* (Māori Television, 2017d),<sup>68</sup> found that viewing Māori Television had resulted in 11 per cent of Māori improving their te reo ability. Amongst its non-Māori audiences, 30 per cent were receptive to te reo Māori and also reported an increased understanding of Māori culture as a result of viewing Māori Television.

It could be argued that this success has been due to Te Māngai Pāho’s adoption of the Zero-Passive-Active (ZePA) model as part of its funding criteria for all Māori broadcast programming. This model considers that learning te reo is not just about learning words and phrases, but is also about acknowledging the language as a catalyst for “indigenous existence and, therefore, [it] affords the delivery and receptivity of indigenous knowledge within ‘mainstream’ and indigenous forums” (Rewi & Rewi, 2015, p. 137). The value of passive language acquisition under the rubric of the ZePA model

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<sup>65</sup> An independent New Zealand Crown entity that provides broadcast funding.

<sup>66</sup> <http://www.nzonair.govt.nz/scripted/what-we-fund>

<sup>67</sup> <http://www.nzonair.govt.nz/document-library/nz-on-air-funding-strategy-2017/>

<sup>68</sup> The evaluation was a joint venture between Māori Television and Te Māngai Pāho and research was conducted by independent Kantar TNS and Colmar Brunton.

is its focus on generating an increased awareness and support for te reo to shift the language into the ‘mainstream’. The model is described as follows:

[ZePA] looks at the attitudinal and psychological position of the individual in regard to the Māori language. ZePA comprises three major states – Zero, Passive and Active. Zero (Ze) is the state whereby there is zero use and zero receptivity towards the Māori language. Those in the Zero state are dismissive and resistant to any acknowledgment of, or advocacy for, the Māori language. They are intolerant of the Māori language and have positioned themselves at a place of indifference, for whatever reason (not necessarily a lack of wanting). Passive (P) describes a position of receptivity to the Māori language. This refers to an inert cohort who may have no proficiency in the Māori language whatsoever; however, in terms of receptivity they are accommodating of the language and do not restrict the use of it in society, in the home, or in the workplace. Those in the Passive state will, for example, service Māori language needs upon request and support Māori language endeavours activated by others. The Active (A) component refers to operationalisation of the language. Individuals in this cohort actively strive to advance the Māori language in all arenas. (Higgins & Rewi, 2014, p. 23)

The ZePA model highlights how an individual shifting from a position of *zero* language knowledge to a *passive* level and finally to an *active* level can strengthen the language’s position in society. It is therefore closely associated with the assertion of indigeneity in ‘mainstream’ society because increased awareness and use of te reo can contribute to the development of supportive attitudes required for indigenous language rejuvenation, and for an awareness of the indigenous knowledge implicit within the use of te reo. The model also recognises that supportive attitudes that promote the normalisation of te reo into the ‘mainstream’ are the measure of success rather than just an individual moving from *zero* proficiency to *active* fluency. The development of such supportive attitudes also makes the subsequent shift to more active language use easier to achieve (Higgins, 2015).

One of the reasons that the regeneration of the language is so important is that it is seen as a core element of Māori identity. It is generally agreed that language and culture are inextricably linked but the extent to which language is the most important marker of identity is more debateable. In general, the acquisition of language is seen as a fundamental and central feature in defining and exploring human identity, values, beliefs and transmitting knowledge from one generation to the next (Fishman, 2001; Marsden, 2003b; Mead, 2013; Walker, 1990). It is also a “powerful symbol of national and ethnic identity” (Spolsky, 2010, p. 181). Fishman concludes that it is the association of the linguistic bond to most cultural practices such as “education content and practice, legal systems, religious beliefs and observances, self-government operations, spoken and/or written mythology, the philosophy of morals and ethics, the medical code of illnesses and diseases, friendship and kinship practices and ties” (Fishman, 2001, p. 3), that means a significant part of every ethno-culture is a linguistically expressed discourse.

However, it is within the context of the New Zealand government's offering of rather limited political support that Māori Broadcasting and Māori Television's legislative mandate to promote te reo Māori should be understood.

## 5.6 Māori Television Programming

While the overall vision of Māori Television is the revitalisation of the Māori language, its strategy is one of inclusiveness. Its goal of building a connection to Māori culture for all New Zealanders is achieved not only through the delivery of Māori produced programmes, free-to-air sport and some international programmes but also coverage of events of national significance such as New Zealand's commemorative days of Anzac Day and Waitangi Day.

From the very beginning, it appeared the channel was attempting to fulfil its statutory obligations of aiming to reach a wider audience as possible. This focus can be seen in the channel's promotion of a vision of Māori-Pākehā partnership. In Smith and Abel's (2008) analysis of Māori Television's opening television promotional advertisement, they observe a type of bicultural rhetoric with the use of images of former adversaries: then Prime Minister Helen Clark pictured with two prominent Māori figures (one of whom was Huirangi Waikerepuru who fought for the recognition of te reo as a taonga before the Waitangi Tribunal in 1986). This powerful image was not in the original production of the station promotional advertising but Māori Television's Board insisted on its insertion (Abel, 2014). It seems the public face Māori Television wished to portray was an image of 'togetherness'. As Smith and Abel (2008) suggest, the visual metaphor of putting former opponents in one image indicates 'a coming together to forge a future together'. This metaphor continues on occasions within Māori Television's publications. For example, on the front cover of the 2015 Annual Report is a visual image of three children, two Māori and one Pākehā. All children are standing holding a photograph of one of their forebears in military uniform, perhaps suggesting the strength of the bond between Māori and Pākehā forged on the WWI battlefields. Māori Television's strategy of using these types of Māori-Pākehā images could also be understood in terms of an invitation to non-Māori to enter the broadcaster's 'communications marae'.

Creating programming of widespread appeal has been largely successful in attracting non-Māori audiences. Jim Mather, the then CEO of Māori Television, suggested that Māori events presented in a "very non-threatening and informative way" (Mather, 2009, p. 18) have contributed to the broadcaster's general appeal. In particular, as Turner (2011) found in his study of non-Māori viewers, Māori Television gains much of its appeal for news and current affairs from a Māori perspective because "on a fundamental and ideological level, it doesn't seek this ['mainstream' news reporting] confrontational style" (Turner, 2011, p. 137).



A successful documentary slot was also created to attract non-Māori audiences. It screens New Zealand orientated stories which include at times special features such as the issues-based *Tamariki Ora* programme on child abuse, or the 12 hour *Rise Up Christchurch –Te Kotahitanga* Telethon which raised \$2.7 million for the Prime Minister’s Christchurch Earthquake Appeal Fund. Māori Television’s then general manager of programming, Haunui Royal, has said that these styles of information programme are attractive to both Māori and non-Māori audiences because of their perceived public service value (Royal, 2014). This was at a time when ‘mainstream’ television had moved away from scheduling such programmes after the demise of the TVNZ charter in 2011 and of the public broadcasting channel TVNZ 7 in 2012.<sup>69</sup> Māori Television also increased its non-Māori audiences by importing foreign documentaries and art house movies with a general focus on films in non-English languages. Some of the international programming serves to promote other indigenous perspectives and the use of English sub-titling on such content can function as a reminder to audiences that non-English voices represent alternative discourses to the dominating influences of settler colonialism in New Zealand (Greenwood, Harata Te Aika, & Davis, 2011). International programming also helps situate the global world within the perspective of a Māori-centric view.

Both the 2003 and 2013 Māori Television legislation provides for programming that ‘entertains’ as part of its strategy in the promotion of language and culture. As with other television broadcasters, entertainment programming plays a large part in the television schedule. The channel started screening blockbuster movies on Saturday nights aimed at creating a family entertainment slot for ‘mum, dad and the kids’ (Royal, 2014). Indigenous versions of ‘mainstream’-style format programmes such as the cooking show *Kai Time on the Road*, the sports show *Code*, the reality television show *Mitre 10 DIY Marae* (where whanau [family] and the wider community work together to restore local marae) or *Homai Te Pakipaki* (a karaoke-style talent quest) have all been winners in the ratings (AGB Ratings cited in *Mana* magazine, 2009, p. 18).<sup>70</sup> *Homai Te Pakipaki* might at first appearance look like a version of the globally franchised *Idol* but with its lack of *Idol* glamour and format which has the audience voting who wins, it remains one of the station’s most popular shows (Mather, 2009). Speaking at the annual *Ngā Aho Whakaari* Conference in 2009, then CEO Jim Mather told the audience:

More than two-thirds of our audience are non-Māori who are looking for local programming such as *Kai Time on the Road*, *Kete Aronui* and *Ask Your Auntie*, many New Zealand movies and documentaries, and the diverse range of international movies and documentaries that normally would not get air-time on the main commercial networks. (Mather cited in Smith,

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<sup>69</sup> The TVNZ Charter (2003-2011) obliged the state-owned broadcaster to balance commercial and creative and cultural objectives. Its abolishment meant there were no specific provisions for the broadcaster to show a wide variety of New Zealand-made content.

<sup>70</sup> The programmes *Kai Time on the Road*, *Homai Te Pakipaki* and *Code* are currently off air.

2011, p. 721)

Māori Television has distinguished itself from other broadcasters in New Zealand by consistently offering a Māori frame of reference on its factual local content about New Zealand life and New Zealand stories and its distinctive treatment of overseas ‘format style’ programming. For example, in 2016, the Māori-conceived and produced *Sidewalk Karaoke* ‘tripled the broadcaster’s Thursday night prime-time average across all key demographics, as well as securing nine times its normal prime-time average with young adults’ (Stuff, 2016). Appealing to both non-Māori and Māori audiences, *Sidewalk Karaoke* has a simple weekly format using everyday people in different ‘sidewalk’ locations to crowd-vote in a karaoke-style singing competition format. Its international generic popularity has enabled the producers to partner with the global rights holders of *Idol*, *X factor* and the *Got Talent* stable. Such hybrid-style programming contains recognisable elements of global formats yet is made distinctly Māori by the use of indigenous language, laid-back humour, music themes and contexts. It could be argued that it is these types of programmes that not only serve to attract non-Māori audiences into a communications marae but also function as a type of cultural bridge for non-Māori to appreciate Māori entertainment culture.

Cross-cultural programmes are also a part of the programming mix, although the broadcaster’s commitment appears to fluctuate. For example, *Tagata Pasifika*, a Television New Zealand-produced and NZOA-funded Pacific Islands magazine show, is re-screened weekly on Māori Television. The programme draws on some of the shared histories of colonial oppression for Pacific Island nations and iwi Māori as well as a number of shared cultural elements. Other programmes that have attempted a cross-cultural connection include *Both Worlds*, which looks at individual experiences of young migrants living in New Zealand, and the *Kia Ora* series, which took groups of young Māori to live in countries such as Chile, South Africa, and China from where New Zealand migrants have originated. Under the helm of the then CEO Jim Mather, Māori Television’s annual programme *Matariki*, (the Māori name for a cluster of stars, also known as the Pleiades and associated with the winter solstice) was also aimed at attracting a multicultural audience. Māori Television’s Executive Producer Current Affairs Hone Edwards (2014) said that although the broadcaster’s main focus was to revitalise and promote te reo, the annual broadcast was an attempt to build a connection through the *Matariki* event between Māori and other cultures. This same intention for inclusivity and connectivity is reflected in the prominence the news programme *Te Kaea* gives to cross-cultural events such as its coverage of the *Taniwha and Dragon Festival* celebrated in 2013 by Māori and Chinese at Auckland’s Orakei marae – an event the State’s broadcaster relegated to the non-prime-time programmes *Te Karere* and *Marae*. However, under Mather’s successor, Paora Maxwell, there has been a refocusing on the broadcaster’s vision of language revitalisation in line with legislative changes, as discussed earlier in this chapter, and potentially less of an emphasis on cross-cultural content. The *Matariki* show, for example, under

the helm of Maxwell places greater emphasis on Māori success stories over connecting with other ethnic minority groups.

*Te Matatini*, a biennial Māori Performing Arts competition featuring kapa haka performances from Māori groups in New Zealand and Australia, has also been an audience winner in both on-demand and live formats. In 2015 there were more than one million viewers of the week-long competition. The on-demand site also attracted just over 200,000 visitors including 60,200 in Australia, almost half of all Māori living across the Tasman (Māori Television, 2015a). Despite the popularity of *Te Matatini* and kapa haka, Māori Television, in response to the perception by some non-Māori that the channel is ‘for Māori only’ has shifted the time for its weekly kapa haka programme from the prime-time of 7.30pm to shoulder-primetime slots of 5pm or 10pm because primetime is one of the “biggest junctions to place some receptive programming” (Māori Television, 2015b, p. 31). This suggests Māori Television programmers always have an eye to attracting a wide range of audiences.

In addition to *Te Matatini*, other significant broadcasting events for Māori Television are Waitangi Day and Anzac Day. These programmes are part of what makes Māori Television unique because they “provide viewers with a direct connection to Māori culture” (Māori Television, 2016a, p. 10) and continue to be an important part of a nation-building approach by Māori Television (Māori Television, 2015a).

Turning to Waitangi Day, the focus of ‘mainstream’ media is largely on constructing ‘a day of discontent’ (McAllister, 2012; McConville et. al., 2014; Abel, 1997, 2012). Even with the more positive coverage of the well-received visit to Waitangi by Prime Minister Jacinda Ardern in 2018, the ‘mainstream’ media persisted in reminding audiences of the disruptions and demonstrations of previous years. In contrast, as discussed in Chapter 3, Māori Television constructs the national day as one of formal ceremonies, displays of Māori culture and gatherings of Pākehā and Māori around the nation. The television schedule for the day, other than coverage of these events, also includes programming that is relevant to Māori history and the Treaty and provides a balance of information concerning contentious issues between Pākehā and Māori.

In contrast to Waitangi Day, Māori Television dedicates its entire day’s schedule to the commemoration of Anzac Day, screening programmes “reflecting and enhancing the growing public awareness and interest in our national day of honouring those who have served the country in war, which reaches back more than one hundred years around the world” (Māori Television, 2017a, p. 12). Its programming selection provides both Māori and non-Māori Anzac Day stories and more recent war memories, starting with live coverage of the Anzac Day memorial service outside the entrance to the Auckland Domain War Memorial Museum. Documentaries produced by Māori Television reflect Māori experiences and standpoints which, as Faye Ginsberg reminds us, allow “the insertion of

[indigenous] histories into national imaginaries” (Ginsburg, 1994, p. 378). A particular Pākehā – Māori interrelatedness is also emphasised. For example, in the 2017 Anzac Day coverage an enigmatic trailer or extended promotional between scheduled documentaries featured two young men, one Pākehā and one Māori, looking at an image of two intersecting and overlapping large painted red globules in front of them. Turning towards each other they touched noses, exchanging and acknowledging te hā, or the breath of life. The image then cross-faded to the words on a grey screen ‘The Blood We Share; Nō Tātou Te Toto’. This powerful Pākehā – Māori image affirms Māori Television’s positioning of Anzac Day as a part of the broadcaster’s approach to nation-building.

However, Māori Television’s coverage of Anzac Day could also be viewed another way, not for what is included in its programme schedule, but for what is excluded. Abel (2013a) notes that on critical and closer examination of Anzac Day programming there are always other stories to be told. The Māori struggle to keep their lands from the early British colonialists, Māori resistance to supporting Britain and its allies in the 20<sup>th</sup> century World Wars, the inequality between Māori and Pākehā in receiving post World War support and the unrecognised importance by the State of the earlier Land Wars are all examples of stories that might cause audiences to question the dominance of the Anzac Day narrative in nation-building. Indeed, historians such as Keenan (2006) argue that it was the Land Wars from the 1840s to the 1870s and not Gallipoli in 1916 that forged the nation that we are today. Stephen Clarke, the historian for the Returned Servicemen’s Association, has suggested that “perhaps when we are mature enough as a nation we will be able to commemorate our own battles, and make pilgrimages to sites such as Rangiriri”<sup>71</sup> (Clarke cited in Abel, 2013a, p. 212). Abel (2013a) suggests that an acknowledgment of issues around the Land Wars are, at this current stage in the nation-building project, too confrontational for many Pākehā. While this may be the case, Abel (2013a) astutely notes that in the meantime Māori Television is gathering political capital and it is only a matter of time before the interdependence between Māori and non-Māori will contribute to a changing sense of ‘being a New Zealander’. Potentially this means ‘being a New Zealander’ includes being able to embrace more critical narratives of the nation’s colonial past.

What ‘being a New Zealander’ means for migrants who wish to call New Zealand home is an important idea. Does Māori Television’s representation of Waitangi and Anzac Day contribute to a sense of belonging to the nation for migrants’ negotiating migrant-‘New Zealander’ identities? (Berry, Phinney, Sam, & Vedder, 2006; Pearson, 2014). Migrant audiences from different cultural backgrounds may identify with at least some aspects of Māori Television’s programmes and have alternative interpretations of Māori Television’s coverage compared to audiences who are embedded in settler colonial discourses. However, more research is needed about the extent to which migrants

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<sup>71</sup> Rangiriri, in the Waikato region of New Zealand’s North Island, is the site of an important Land War battle.

identify with the national unifying discourse of days of national commemoration.

## 5.7 Māori Television and its Audiences

Māori Television departs from mass media's demographic analysis of its viewers and rather thinks of its audiences' language capabilities in terms of its strategic vision for te reo to be 'valued, embraced and spoken' by all New Zealanders. Content is funded first and foremost by Māori Television's language strategy of revitalising the language and culture:

There is no free ride on MTS platforms. If you are a documentary or French rugby fan you will be exposed to simple kupu (*words*) and suggestions of how you can learn more te reo. Also we will lay out pathways for language learning. (Māori Television, n.d., p. 29<sup>72</sup>)

Language learning is directed at four audiences as defined by the broadcaster's founding legislation: 1) fluent speakers of te reo, 2) tamariki (*children*), 3) youth audiences (under 23), and 4) language learners ('Māori Television, n.d., p. 15). Māori Television has also identified a number of 'growth persona'<sup>73</sup> segments within their audiences where there is potential for growth in viewership. None of the audience segments, as Royal, (2014) points out, preclude any of the audiences viewing any of the programming. Māori Television's aim is to have at least 51 per cent of spoken te reo content during prime-time (5.30pm to 10.30pm) and core time (3pm to 11.30pm) (Māori Television, 2017a, p. 18), and meeting the needs of New Zealanders at different levels of te reo fluency.

Māori Television's main bilingual channel continues to provide a wide range of local and international programmes capable of "driving sustainable audience growth [that] provides a pathway for taking all viewers through the various stages of their language learning journeys" (Māori Television, 2017b, p. 11). Its goal is to "attract one million viewers every week" (Māori Television, 2015a, p. 4). Research by Te Māngai Pāho shows that Māori Television is viewed by both Māori and non-Māori audiences. More Māori (31 per cent) than non-Māori (12 per cent) view the broadcaster 'several days a week', although on a weekly basis Māori and non-Māori view at the same levels (16 per cent) (Te Māngai Pāho, 2016, p. 13).

Royal acknowledges that "we do know certain programmes tend to attract higher numbers of non-Māori audiences but we want to encourage all people in New Zealand to learn the language through our programming" (Royal, 2014). All programming on Māori Television's bilingual channel has an element aimed at language revitalisation, even the title sequences for international documentaries and

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<sup>72</sup> MTS Content Strategy Segmentation 2015-2018.

<https://www.maoritelevision.com/sites/default/files/images/Producers/Content%20Strategy%20Segmentation%202015-2018.pdf>

<sup>73</sup> Five growth areas have been identified by the broadcaster. Māori and non-Māori 15-29, loyal viewers who watch with their families, lapsed viewers and urban professionals, those open to learning te reo, and viewers likely to view documentaries and festival movies.

festival films. While there are programmes totally in te reo, they usually have English subtitles. Vocabulary and grammar structures are introduced overtly for language learners in some programmes, and in other programmes, Māori speakers weave English and Māori together in informal conversation with English subtitles for the sections where te reo is spoken. The Te Reo channel broadcasts only in the Māori language and, amongst other content, screens a daily language-learning programme and special iwi programmes. It also caters for pre-school and primary school children with programmes aligned with the school curriculum.

However, in terms of traditional audience research, the number of viewers is small. AGB Nielsen ratings for the total New Zealand audience in 2017 compared Māori Television (0.7 per cent) with other commercially focused ‘mainstream’ broadcasters including TVNZ 1, (31 per cent), TVNZ 2 (12.7 per cent), Three Now (14.4 per cent), and Prime (4.2 per cent). Yet, these commercial ratings do not include live internet screening and the many digitally based platforms in New Zealand and overseas from which Māori Television content can be viewed. Nor does AGB Nielsen measure the success of Māori Television’s legislative mandate to protect and promote te reo.

Traditional audience ratings driven research also provides no insights into the extent to which audiences might gain language and cultural benefits from ‘listening-in’ to Māori stories being told by Māori, for Māori on Māori Television. In the case of this study, neither can commercial ratings measure the varying degrees that migrant audiences could also offer Māori increased support for the normalisation of te reo and the acknowledgment of indigenous perspectives on a wide range of national and nation-building topics.

What indigenous television offers is the potential for all audiences to enter into a communications marae to ‘listen-in’ to a Māori world view, to develop supportive attitudes towards indigenous issues and appreciate the basis for Māori sovereignty in a type of electronic parcel of televisual space.

## 5.8 Māori Television and the Digital Age

In March 2013 Māori Television embraced the digital age in response to the changing media consumption habits of its youth audiences. It launched a new website, linked to multiple platforms, to give viewers in New Zealand and overseas improved online and on-demand access to the television service’s most popular programming and the latest in Māori news and current affairs (Māori Television, 2017b).<sup>74</sup> Its website’s YouTube promotional video at the time reinforced Māori Television’s strategy of inclusivity and building a connection to Māori culture for all New Zealanders

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<sup>74</sup> <https://www.maoritelevision.com/sites/.../Content%20Strategy%20Segmentation%202>

through the use of visuals depicting cross-cultural Māori/Migrant/Pākehā connections (Māori Television, 2013b).

By 2015, the numbers of New Zealand-based digital viewers from the various multiplatform content portals had increased by more than 25 per cent and about half of all Māori living in Australia viewed online streaming or on-demand coverage of *Te Matatini* (Māori Television, 2015a). In 2017, then CEO of Māori Television, Paora Maxwell, announced the total online video views over the four days of *Te Matatini* were 1,133,591 (including live stream, pre-rolls, and on-demand) compared to 546,000 in 2015 (Māori Television, 2017c). These online viewing figures demonstrate first, that traditional ratings cannot be used to accurately reflect audience viewership, and secondly, the potential of Māori Television's internet presence to significantly increase its audiences.

Increased coverage means technological change has 'altered the terrain of cultural struggle by creating new sites of contestation' (Wayne cited in Spoonley & MacPherson, 2004, p. 235). Audiences no longer have to rely on 'mainstream' media for representations of minority groups because the internet can offer alternative images to its audiences. As MacPherson and Spoonley (2004) explain, 'mainstream' television has lost its dominant position in the 'brokering' of ethnic images. Social media and the internet connect people who share descent but may live in different places experiencing different lifestyles, facilitating their meeting in cyberspace and building ethnic cyber-communities (MacPherson & Spoonley, 2004). Such technologies also provide a browsing portal for non-indigenous audiences interested in 'non-mainstream' information and entertainment. The above theorists' ideas combine to reinforce the notion of ethno-specific sphericules, as discussed in Chapter 3 and later in this chapter.

## 5.9 Can a High-quality Service be Cost-effective?

The Māori Television legislation calls for a television service that is a cost-effective, high-quality service that promotes the revitalisation of Māori language and culture. These outcomes require appropriate budgets but an examination of Māori Television's Annual Reports between 2012 and 2017 shows that State funding for Māori Television programming has been capped at a more or less consistent level since 2012. Māori Television programming is extremely cost-effective: the 2013 Annual Report showed that Māori Television costs of production and broadcast are between 10 and 35 per cent of 'mainstream' costs (Māori Television, 2013a, p. 12), but many Māori Television content producers find the lack of more funding disappointing (Edwards, 2015).

As Smith (2013) argues, it is ironical that while it is politically expedient for the State to provide funding to place Māori cultural difference and a Māori world view centre stage, State support also binds Māori Television to aesthetic, audience and economic imperatives contained in the Māori

Television 2003 Act<sup>75</sup>, which restrict the “creativity, enterprise and opportunity in a post-settlement climate” (Smith, 2011, p. 723). In practice making programmes that balance both being cost-effective and high quality runs the risk of what Edwards (2014) describes as compromised production values because of smaller budgets than ‘mainstream’ programming (despite Māori Television’s capacity for cost-effectiveness):<sup>76</sup>

In terms of our television diet we [Māori] are no different from any other sector. We have got used to quality television programming. We are not prepared to watch [low-quality television] and Māori Television in our opinion hasn’t been funded sufficiently. In our attempt through quality programming to fulfil our role and function with Māori culture and language, the compromise becomes immediately obvious ... you are making it with crumbs ... made on a smell of an oily rag. (Edwards, 2014)

Former Member of Parliament Hone Harawira has also said that “limited funding has compromised Māori Television’s efforts to incorporate indigenous values into television’s organisational and production practices” (Harawira in Smith, 2016, p. 40). This has the effect of squeezing production budgets in order to fulfil the programme requirements of Māori Television legislation.

However, despite having limited production resources, Māori Television still creates, for example, ‘quality’ drama. Duncan Grieve (2016) is scathing in his comparison of Māori Television’s *Kairākau* with TVNZ’s *Filthy Rich*:

*Kairākau* [with a budget of \$40,000 an episode] evokes a pre-colonial New Zealand in a convincing and evocative style. Particularly by comparison to the slick but ultimately empty *Filthy Rich*, which flaunts its wealth both as a production and a concept, but never feels remotely connected to this land or its people. Whereas *Kairākau*, despite its tiny budget and far more earnest intentions, could be from nowhere else [but Aotearoa]. (Grieve, 2016, para 16)

Here Grieve is using both an economic and a public service broadcasting argument in favour of *Kairākau* because of the drama’s ability to reflect a distinctiveness between Aotearoa New Zealand and other nations – despite it costing ten per cent of the budget of *Filthy Rich*. It is against these financial challenges of productions and compromises that Māori Television has managed to establish

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<sup>75</sup> Smith’s comments could equally apply to the more recent legislation found in the 2013 Māori Television Amendment Act.

<sup>76</sup> Te Māngai Pāho’s paper ‘Briefing to the Incoming Minister for Māori Development 2017’ unreservedly affirms Edwards’ view and reveals that “Māori language content producers are generally funded at rates 30-40 per cent lower than those received by producers for like genre content destined for ‘mainstream’ platforms. This has an impact on the quality of content and the sustainability of the production sector” (Te Māngai Pāho, 2017, p.3).



a reputation for quality, cost-effectiveness while presenting a Māori narrative of the nation to its audience.

## 5.10 Public Service Broadcasting

Māori Television presents itself as “a complementary public service broadcaster, continuing to lead the way as New Zealand’s largest free-to-air provider of local content in prime-time” (Māori Television, 2015a, p. 5). However, ‘public service broadcasting’<sup>77</sup> can mean different things to different audiences. For Māori audiences, this might mean programming, as Smith (2015) suggests, for Māori families and communities, or language learners. Alternatively, as Turner (2011) found, non-Māori audiences attracted to Māori Television had a perception of the broadcaster as fulfilling a form of public service provision. But Royal (2015) rejects this idea, arguing that this perception means Māori Television is standing as a form of television that privileges Pākehā:

So you call [Māori Television] public broadcasting, but the reality is that [public broadcasting] is Pākehā TV and the unfortunate thing for Pākehā is that Māori are the only ones that are constitutionally guaranteed a television channel. No one else is. (Royal cited in Smith, 2015, p. 191)

Royal is referring here to the fact that there is no other publicly funded broadcaster in New Zealand, so Māori Television, with its mandatory public service values – albeit with a mission to revitalise Māori language – becomes the de facto public service broadcaster. Consequently, Pākehā are framing Māori Television as a public service broadcaster where they are wanting, what Smith (2015) refers to as, “the majority culture’s ‘pick and mix’ approach to things Māori” (Smith, 2015, p. 190).

For a public service model to exist in Māori terms the content needs to be different to ‘mainstream’ because the broadcaster’s primary function is to support Māori forms of cultural and linguistic expression and counter ‘mainstream’ discourses, as if Māori were the majority audience (Smith, 2015). This is achieved through Māori Television’s assertion in the airwaves of an “indigenous insistence as a form of televisual re-occupation” (Smith, 2013, p. 101). The representation of a Māori worldview competes with ‘mainstream’ representations of Māori in what Smith refers to as ‘stealth tactics where techniques of normalisation [of te ao Māori] ... are derived from ... a quiet assertion of indigenous insistence and indigenous affirmation’ (Smith, 2013, p. 106). This ‘re-occupation’ allows indigenous articulations to be viewed differently and “gives the New Zealand nation new words, images and ideas

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<sup>77</sup> Public service broadcasting refers to programming that ‘educates, informs and entertains’ However, it should be noted that this definition is used to refer to the public service ethic that characterised the BBC. Lord John Reith, the BBC’s Director General until 1938, had defined the three tenets of British broadcasting – to educate, inform and entertain. A public service system was subsequently defined more broadly to include other characteristics. (See Blumer’s (1992) discussion in *Television and the Public Interest: Vulnerable values in Western European Broadcasting*)

to think about: a kind of gathering of different knowledge bases from which new ideas about community and belonging might emerge” (Smith, 2013, p. 13).

Hence, Māori Television’s mission to promote ‘te reo Māori me ngā tikanga Māori’ means that notions of it being seen as a ‘public service broadcaster’ must be seen as different to the expression of cultural diversity found in other public service broadcasters such as Australia’s Special Broadcasting Service (SBS) or the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation (CBC).

If the public sphere as conceptualised by Habermas (1996) is a place where nation-building is debated, constructed and imagined, then Smith’s (2013) notion of Māori Television’s televisual re-occupation might be seen as an intervention in the public sphere. Non-Māori audiences of Māori Television, therefore, when viewing programming made from within an indigenous public sphere, can ‘listen-in’ and engage with the content, opening the way potentially for both the possibilities of cross-cultural encounters and the emergence of new narratives of decolonisation and concepts of the ‘nation’. However, considering Māori Television’s comparatively small audience share in traditional rating measurements this might seem a grand claim. However, unlike the impact evaluation of Māori Television commissioned by Te Māngai Paho in 2016 (discussed in 3.10), commercial ratings are not designed to measure the cultural contribution Māori Television makes to debate in the public sphere. Commercial ratings also do not measure interactive community dialogue across cultures, nor changes in attitudes and values towards indigenous people. Indeed, when comparing the ratings between commercial and indigenous media, questions should be asked about the validity of subjecting audiences to what Canadian scholar Lorna Roth, writing about Canadian indigenous media calls “the logic and dictatorship of commercial ratings and comparisons between them” (Roth, 2005, p. 222).

One way to analyse Māori Television’s contribution to the public sphere is through the notion of ‘sphericules’. Using ideas from Gitlin (1998), Cunningham (2001) and Meadows (2005), the broadcaster can be imagined as being involved in the creation of a ‘public sphericule’. This idea, as discussed in Chapter 3, describes a public sphere that has been “shattered into a scatter of globules, like mercury” (Gitlin, 1998, p. 173). However, there remains a debate over the extent to which these sphericules communicate with each other, particularly within the fragmented audiences of post-broadcast global media and the so-called echo chambers of the digital world (Sunstein, 2009; Pariser, 2011). Meadows (2005), writing in an Australian context, and at the cusp of the mass explosion of media formats such as Facebook, Twitter and YouTube feeds, argues that the indigenous sphere is different again:

So indigenous public spheres should not be understood in terms of a non-dominant variant of the broader public sphere. Although they develop in close proximity to - and with a great deal of influence from - mainstream society, they should be seen as discrete formations that exist in

a unique context as the product of contestation with the mainstream public sphere. (Meadows, 2005, p. 38)

Ginsberg (1994) was also writing in an Australian context, but at a time when the use of digital media technologies was just beginning to escalate. She argues that the indigenous public sphere, far more so than any other ethnic minority sphericule, plays a vital role in the imaginings of a nation. I concur with her idea and suggest that an indigenous public sphere is visible in Aotearoa New Zealand because of the inclusion of a ‘soft version of biculturalism’<sup>78</sup> in the wider public sphere. The influence of the Treaty, albeit as a ‘soft version’, is evident in almost every aspect of the broader public sphere, from health and education to economic development and political representation.

The term ‘indigenous public sphericule’ has also been used to describe globalised ethno-cultural spaces and is useful in considering Māori Television’s global allegiances through the World Indigenous Television Broadcasters Network (WITBN). This network of indigenous television broadcasters which includes Australia, Canada, Ireland, Wales, Norway, Scotland, Taiwan, and South Africa incorporate each other’s indigenous programmes into their own schedules. Māori Television, therefore, not only provides content for WITBN but its access to such globalised ethno-cultural spaces provides its audiences with ‘mediated’ cross-cultural messages through a ‘public sphericule’ that extends way beyond New Zealand’s shores. The idea of a globalised ‘indigenous public sphericule’ also recognises the internationalisation of Māori Television and its significant native and non-native audiences outside New Zealand. For example, according to Stephens (2013), in 2006 the whole-day coverage of the tangi (*funeral*) of the Māori Queen, Dame Te Atairangikaahu, gave viewers here and overseas a unique window into te ao Māori. Stephens said if Māori Television had not initiated the widespread international broadcast it is likely there would have been little ‘mainstream’ coverage of the tangi. Māori Television and its access to an indigenous globalised ‘public sphericule’ help to ensure the presence of a Māori voice on the world stage.

## 5.11 Building Bridges Between Cultures

Since it first started broadcasting in 2004, Māori Television has created an image of a partnership between Māori and Pākehā. This is redolent of the image of a bridge in Roth’s airwaves-as-cultural-bridge metaphor that she used in her analysis of Aboriginal broadcasting in Canada. In her study, she says indigenous content provides “a return of information from the Canadian Inuit to the Canadian population as a whole ... [that] may become for the Canadian nation a bridge over the airwaves” (Roth, 2005, p. 172). In other words, the airwaves are providing a means of joining the two parties with the potential for partnership.

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<sup>78</sup> ‘Soft biculturalism’ is discussed in Chapter 2 and refers to ‘bicultural’ initiatives where the full implications of the equal partnership between Māori and the Crown undertaken in the Treaty are not fully implemented.

This resonates with former Māori Television CEO Jim Mather's insight into "the potential of Māori Television as a bridge to promote understanding between Māori and all other New Zealanders" (Mather cited in Smith, 2011, p. 722), and the statement by George Henry, board member of Northern Native Broadcasting, Yukon (NNBY), when he speaks of the importance of building connections between indigenous communities and Canada's majority cultures:

Indian people have been fighting to change the minds of the Canadian middle class or the middle ground. They're not really dealing with the politicians. They are not really dealing with the ethnic communities. They're trying to change the views of the majority in Canadian society. They've carved out their allies and that's where communication comes in. The more understanding and education you give people, the more tolerant a society you have. (Henry cited in Roth, 2005, p. 182)

Henry, here, is talking more about a connection between two existing sites rather than creating a new site on which both can meet. However, Barclay's communications marae offers a very different analogy: a virtual meeting ground on which two worlds converge but on indigenous terms.

Māori Television's aim of the protection and promotion of the Māori language and Māori traditional cultural practices offers all audiences not only language-learning opportunities but also the opportunity to experience content drawn from te ao Māori. Put simply, audiences are being drawn in to 'listen-in' to content within the marae in a way that Barclay might have envisaged. However, the ontological divide between indigenous and Western world views potentially means that Māori Television content has different meanings for its Māori and non-Māori audiences.

Programme content that 'talks-in' has the power to strengthen Māori identity. In a Dunedin-based study of Māori women viewing Māori Television, Poihipi (2007) found an 'overwhelmingly positive' correlation between the viewing experience and connecting with te ao Māori. Royal also suggests there is a strong link between Māori Television and Māori identity that then forms the 'basis for a confidence and pride to share te ao Māori with others and build connections with non-Māori' (Royal, 2014). Building a strong sense of identity through Māori Television for many Māori occurs in at least two ways. Firstly, Māori Television offers a counter to the largely negative representation of Māori in the 'mainstream' media (Abel, 1997; Fox, 2001; Gregory et. al., 2011; King, 2012; Mutu, 2011). Poihipi (2007) argues that such counternarratives can facilitate the formation of an individual's positive sense of identity. Secondly, Māori learning te reo through Māori Television not only supports the intergenerational transmission of te reo in the home but also provides a "sense of connection and importance of te ao Māori" (Māori Television, 2017a, p. 17).

However, it is not clear how far non-Māori audiences might identify with Māori Television as a cultural bridge to understanding, let alone as a communications marae. It might be difficult to recognise the potential Mather observes for Māori Television to operate "as a bridge to promote understanding

between Māori and all other New Zealanders” (cited in Smith, 2011, p. 722). As mentioned in Section 3.10, the *Māori Broadcasting Language Impact Evaluation Report*<sup>79</sup> showed that “thirty per cent of the increase in understanding Māori culture and receptivity towards te reo among non-Māori can be attributed to Māori Television” (Māori Television, 2017a, p. 17). Arguably, Māori Television plays a significant role in the increasingly positive attitudes towards Māori language and culture. However, the extent to which these attitudinal changes amongst non-Māori audiences lead to an understanding of the processes required to dismantle structural power inequalities between Māori and Pākehā needs further investigation. In an interview with Jo Smith about Māori Television’s ability to decolonise non-Māori, Māori post-colonial theorist Linda Tuwhai Smith said:

I think it informs things, definitely, and I am not sure it does that work of forcing [non-Māori] to question, because there is a thing going on that I guess you would call privilege – you can always go back to the mainstream channel. (Smith cited in Smith, 2016, p. 36)

Decolonisation requires a re-centring of indigenous ideologies and the development of psychological, cultural and linguistic skills to re-position power relationships (Huysens, 2016; Smith, 1999; Margaret, 2018). Shifting power relations can lead to a new type of middle ground for Pākehā and Māori relationships, the emergence of further narratives of decolonisation and potentially a reconceptualisation of national identity. How these notions relate to Māori Television’s migrant audiences are explored in the findings chapters that follow.

## 5.12 Conclusion

This chapter has drawn on historical information, academic studies, government and Māori Television publications and the opinions of Māori broadcasters. It has demonstrated that the emergence of Māori Television should be understood within the context of the Treaty and the indomitability of Māori resistance and on-going claims by tangata whenua to have an equal relationship with the Crown. The broadcaster’s political significance in relation to the many factors that inform its strategies for the revitalisation of Māori language and culture, and the assertion of an indigenous voice in the nation provides an important framework for this study.

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<sup>79</sup> A joint venture between Māori Television and Te Māngai Pāho.

# Chapter Six

## People and Procedures

### 6.1 Introduction

The open-ended nature of this research inquiry required a multifaceted approach. In this chapter, I discuss the theoretical background to the different methods I have used in some detail in order to demonstrate some of the complexities that developed in the methodology over the course of the research. I then describe the procedures I followed to explore my research questions.

### 6.2 An Overview of the Research Method

My methodological approach combined quantitative and qualitative approaches. A quantitative approach was used to gather data through an online survey about the media viewing patterns of migrants. Its main purpose was to understand what Television programmes people watch, whether they watched Māori Television, what content they liked and their attitudes towards indigenous people in Aotearoa New Zealand. The survey also intended to invite people to participate in further more intense research that involved watching Māori Television.

A qualitative approach was then employed using both focus groups and interviews. These methods provided more nuanced and insightful data than the online survey data. Some of the questions from the online survey were also asked in gathering qualitative data from migrant participant responses in both focus groups and interviews. This approach ensured there was a consistency of data sought amongst all participants across the different research methods. In other words a triangulation approach was used which allowed cross-validation of data.

Participants for both the focus groups and interviews in the qualitative section of the research were found through the online survey. Some of these respondents were interested in being involved in further research and provided contact details.

For the focus group section of the research 17 participants were divided into four groups based on shared geographical and cultural origins: those from Eastern Europe countries (4); from the PRC (4); from Western nations (4); and those with origins from the Indian subcontinent (5). Each group met at an initial face-to-face focus group meeting where relationships were established and participants discussed their initial impressions of Māori Television. Following this, they began to view Māori Television for a two month period. These subsequent Facebook Group (FBG) could be seen as an on-going form of relationship building. Each group had its own FBG and each individual group member

posted comments to be shared solely with other participants within the same group. No one group had access to another group's FB posts.

At the end of the two month viewing period, face-to-face focus group meetings were conducted with each group. It was at this final meeting where individual groups further explored the meanings they had gathered from viewing Māori Television.

In addition, other participants were recruited for the interview section of the research. They had indicated an interest in being involved in this research during the online survey but did not wish to be involved in the intensity of the focus group methodology. A total of 8 participants were involved at this stage. I gave the interviewees a list of the programmes that the FBGs had viewed and posted comments and arranged a future time for a formal interview. I encouraged them to not only view these programmes on Māori Television's 'on-demand' site, but also to watch Māori Television to get a general 'feel' for the broadcaster. They were also asked the same questions as the FBG focus groups, but in an interview situation.

The timeline of the research at each stage can be outlined as follows;

- |   |                           |
|---|---------------------------|
| 1. ONLINE SURVEY:                                 | August to November, 2014. |
| 2. PRE VIEWING FACE-TO-FACE FOCUS GROUP MEETINGS: | End of January, 2015      |
| 3. ONLINE FACEBOOK GROUPS:                        | February, 2015            |
| 4. POST FACE-TO-FACE FOCUS GROUP DISCUSSIONS:     | April, 2015.              |
| 5. INTERVIEWS:                                    | April – June, 2015        |

The research procedure used can be summarised as follows:

- 1) Designing a questionnaire seeking data about whether participants might watch Māori Television, their general television viewing patterns, and what ideas they might have about te ao Māori.
- 2) Contacting participants and snowballing the questionnaire using the online survey platform Survey Monkey and conducting an initial analysis.
- 3) Inviting respondents from the online survey who had provided contact details and had expressed an interest in being involved in further research to watch Māori Television for two months and join a FBG. Four FBGs were established.
- 4) Starting the FBGs. I organised an initial meeting for the participants. The aim of these FBGs was to operate like more traditional face-to-face focus groups but in an online format. I provided them with guideline questions to consider and respond to whilst viewing Māori Television.

- 5) Overseeing the participants' FBG viewing of Māori Television, suggesting programmes that reflected the range of Māori Television's schedule (as they were not regular Māori Television viewers) and encouraging active participation in the research. I saw my guidance of the process as similar to that of the moderator of a face-to-face focus group.
- 6) Organising four final face-to-face focus groups at the termination of the FBGs. Participants from each of the four FBGs met again in-person to expand and clarify the comments and conversations within the online FBGs.
- 7) Interviewing additional participants who were either unable at the time to participate in the FBG discussions but wished to be included in the research, or had heard about the research through participants and contacted me, or were migrants I had contacted through my own networks to replace participants who had withdrawn from the FBGs because of other commitments.
- 8) Analysing the data using a thematic analysis approach.

### 6.3 Framing the Research in Theory

A qualitative research methodology based on social constructivism was most suitable for this type of research because it helped address the open-ended and exploratory nature of the research questions. Social constructivism seeks an understanding of how and why society operates and investigates phenomena in the social sciences through interpretative inquiry (Creswell, 2013; Hesse-Biber & Leavy, 2011). Social constructivism assumes there are multiple constructed realities based on human inter-subjectivity and human interaction, and interpretative inquiry seeks to interpret the meanings of these realities. Interpretative inquiry draws on philosophical hermeneutics where understandings (such as those from participant posts on FBG) are produced both from their 'reading' of a text and through a dialectical process, or transformative dialogue between participants (Gadamer, 2004). Applying an interpretative approach to my research acknowledged my role in analysing comments and the participants' role in interpreting one another's comments. Hence, as the investigation proceeded knowledge claims were continually being created and recreated by the participants. The more participants viewed Māori Television and listened and talked to the other group members' opinions, the more differing interpretations were discussed thereby creating the potential for new meanings to emerge. Importantly, as Cohen and Grabtree (2006) note, these differing interpretations can also be dependent on such discursive variables as a participant's cultural and experiential context. Indeed, some writers such as Willig (2014) have reservations about the validity of knowledge claims, however, interpretative inquiry has become a popular framework used for qualitative research (Regan, 2012, Wernet, 2014).

Interpretative inquiry is relevant to understanding the interface of the researcher with both the online



FBGs and the face-to-face focus groups. The process of interpretation is very relevant to my research because as Vessey (2006) says “we always interpret in the context of received interpretations; we move back and forth, adjusting our new interpretations to our received understandings and adjusting our received understanding in light of the new interpretations” (Vessey, 2006, p. 209). This leads to an analysis of the data that requires an interpretation of the interconnections of values, beliefs and practices and “requires unpacking the larger web of meanings in which they are embedded” (Gorton, 2010, para. 26). Gorton’s point suggests a discursive range of interpretations for a researcher to understand. Such a call on the researcher’s cross-cultural interpretative ability may be an unreasonable expectation with research such as this which involves a range of cultural groups. The use of face-to-face focus group discussions is one method that can make a reasonable attempt to tease out what Gorton (ibid.) refers to as ‘the larger web of meaning’.

My role as ‘researcher’ needs to be acknowledged as being a vital part of the FBG and face-to-face focus group interpretative process. Regan describes how the terms ‘researcher’ and ‘interpreter’ are used interchangeably to suggest the researcher’s biases, presuppositions, reflective capability, history and culture “become a significant part of the interpretative research relationship of the qualitative research process” (Regan, 2012, p. 287). Indeed, Lavery (2003) asserts in her discussion of hermeneutic approaches that “specifically, the biases and assumptions of the researcher are not bracketed or set aside, but rather are embedded and essential to the interpretive process” (Lavery, 2003, p. 28). This suggests, that despite my best intentions, my own experiences and sensitivities towards migrants and refugees feeling ‘othered’ by the dominant culture, are inserted into the research process. In addition, I have taken on the role of facilitating a migrant understanding of te ao Māori, where I am neither Māori, nor the ethnicities of the participants. There can be some sensitivities amongst indigenous scholars concerning non-indigenous researchers studying indigenous subjects. However, in this project I see my role as one of co-learning with the participants some of the ways in which we can see a Māori world, through Māori telling their own stories. My contribution has been to collate and interpret the participants’ understandings of te ao Māori, rather than interpreting a Māori world for them. Ultimately, the potential for different ethnicities to build bridges of cultural understanding with Māori requires exploring the means in which cultural difference can be acknowledged and respected.

## 6.4 Relevance of Interpretative Inquiry to the Research Method

Interpretive inquiry recognizes that there is no privileged position from which a researcher can interpret the world, but rather it focuses on interpreting, or understanding, “the meanings, purposes, and intentions that people give to their actions and interactions with others” (Given, 2008, p. 459). This is particularly relevant to the cross-cultural nature of my research where the world view of indigenous

culture is encoded in a text, but the process of decoding is through the cultural lens of individual participants. The metaphor of the communications marae suggests at best, non-Māori audiences can ‘listen-in’ to Māori produced content that ‘talks-in’ with the process of decoding being located within their own cultural framework.

The Māori-migrant cross-cultural nature of this research suggests there can be multiple audience ‘decodings’ in what Lopez (1999) calls the ‘collision’ (differing, or exclusive) or ‘collusion’ (similar, or inclusive) of discourses between participants and media texts. The variety of participant interpretations of indigenous television content means some audiences may feel excluded or experience a sense of ‘collision’ between their own cultural values and their perception of Māori values. On the other hand, a variety of collusions, or inclusions may be experienced. Feelings of being included by a television ‘text’ could be described as a participant experiencing an emotional sense of affinity (rather than articulating a conscious ‘decoding’ of cultural messages). I discussed more fully in 3.8.1 an affective-discursive audience response to television content and how cognitive film theory can be used to explain how television can provoke an emotional response of belonging.

One way to understand the process of how participants in focus groups generate new understandings and insights starts with the way individuals, as interpreters of text, make meanings. It is then the subsequent articulated self-reflective conversation with other ‘readers’ that moves people towards finding a ‘middle-ground’ and “opens up human potential for infinite dialogue with others in a fusion of horizons” (Regan, 2012, p. 289). Regan here is referring to Gadamer’s (2004) idea of the fusion of horizons, where horizons are broadened through a change in perspective of old views and maybe the acceptance of new views. The process of dialogue leads to not simply understanding a view but also allows the possibility for individuals “to seriously consider whether that way of looking at a subject (or view) has some validity for them” (Gadamer, 2004, p. xvii), and whether ways can be found to accommodate new thinking. Relating this to the meanings generated by focus groups, Hollander (2004) recognises the holistic nature of the group process of knowledge creation and asserts that “the participants in a focus group are not independent of each other, and the data collected from one participant cannot be considered separate from the social context in which it was collected” (Hollander 2004, p. 602). Similarly, Kitzinger (1995) argues that interaction is the crucial feature of focus groups because the dynamics of a group allow participants the possibility of creating new understandings and re-evaluating and clarifying their views and beliefs about an issue. Hence in this research the interpretation of the text is bound by Gadamer’s (2004) concept of the circle of hermeneutics, where the meanings of a text is created not just through an individual within a focus group, but also through the resultant discussions and new understandings reached with and between other members of the group.

## 6.5 Background to the Research Methods

### 6.5.1 Online Surveys

Surveys are commonly used for large random-sample market and political research to generate quantifiable data for statistical analysis. However, in this research online quantitative survey methods were employed in a preliminary capacity to yield data for subsequent exploration. Morgan (1996) recommends this approach when focus groups are “the primary method and surveys are used to provide preliminary inputs that guide the application [of focus group discussion]” (Morgan, 1996, p. 135). The quantitative section of the research was used for its ability to suggest and highlight directions for the more in-depth qualitative research in areas such as insights into the discourses of biculturalism; explanations for migrant motivations for viewing of indigenous television; and what meanings migrants might take from viewing Waitangi Day on Māori Television. This online survey data was then used to inform the qualitative research questions that followed, and to provide a basis for subsequent FBG questions and face-to-face focus-group discussion.

### 6.5.2 Sampling

This research used ‘snowball’ sampling techniques. Snowballing works through one participant emailing the survey to a range of contacts asking them to complete the survey. In turn, these participants email the online survey to their contacts and so on. Hence, in theory, the survey snowballs as more and more people participate. Snowball sampling is a form of non-probability sampling<sup>80</sup> because it reaches out to a network of individuals, as opposed to probability sampling which ensures the total population has an equal probability of being chosen. Probability sampling is usually done on large-scale projects at considerable expense and administrative complexity, hence non-probability sampling is more appropriate for this type of research (Asamen, Ellis, & Berry, 2008). This means the participants are not necessarily representative samples of the geographical and cultural FBG I have assigned to them. Snowballing techniques by implication access networks of potentially like-minded people such as those predisposed to social justice issues, or an openness to engage with indigenous concerns, and, in particular, those with a certain level of English proficiency. Nearly all the participants had gained permanent residence visas and had a reasonable level of English language proficiency (IELTS 6.5).<sup>81</sup>

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<sup>80</sup> Non-probability sampling is a sampling technique where the odds of any member being selected for a sample cannot be calculated. It is the opposite of probability sampling, where you can calculate the odds.

<sup>81</sup> IELTS is the minimum English level for international students who intend to study in New Zealand. All my participants had been involved in some form of tertiary education in New Zealand.

Despite the relatively small sample size of 62 and the strong possibility of a sample of like-minded people it is possible to make general inferences about migrants' indigenous media consumption and their attitudes towards Māori issues and concerns. I am confident migrant groups larger than my sample would concur with the research findings because I have used additional interviews as a means of verifying the research through triangulation (a mixed-methods approach used to verify data).<sup>82</sup> Guest, Namey, & McKenna (2016) also assert that small numbers of focus groups can provide an evidence base for non-probability sample sizes.

### 6.5.3 Focus Groups

From the 1940s focus groups have been used in the social sciences to gather information (Hollander, 2004). One of the reasons for their popularity is that out of all the qualitative inquiry methods (surveys, questionnaires, interviews and focus groups), focus groups are the only method that provides a window on how meaning is created when people interact. Goss and Leinbach (1996) express a strong opinion as to the efficacy of focus groups rather than interviews as a primary research tool, stating that:

Group discussion itself provides valuable insight into social relations and the stories produced in the collaborative performance of a focus group better reflect the social nature of knowledge than a summation of individual narratives extracted in interviews. It is a conceit to believe that a personal interview, itself structured by inequalities of power, provides privileged access to the truth of an individual's world, or that this truth exists independent of a specific social context. (Goss & Leinbach, 1996, p. 115)

Wilson also argues that participants naturally encourage and elicit each other's responses in order to express their understanding of the issue (Wilson, 1997), or as an attempt to 'collectively construct' their responses (Romm, 2014). Also, although not specifically referring to FBGs, Farquhar (1999) suggests:

Group methods can make an important contribution to sensitive research. They can be helpful in facilitating access to particularly sensitive research populations, and in giving voice to sections of the community who frequently remain unheard. They may create a relatively safe space for the disclosure of experiences or behaviours which in other contexts would be seen as taboo. (Farquhar, 1999, p. 62)

Focus groups also have the potential to empower participants. Barbour's (2007) work amongst professional people in the United Kingdom found that focus groups provided practical information about how to overcome structural barriers that informed professional practice. Wilkinson (1999) also

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<sup>82</sup>The concept of triangulation suggests that research findings can be best understood when a combination of methods are used. My research uses an online survey, focus groups and interviews. However results from these types of methods should not provide a fixed point of reference but should be used to identify and illuminate perspectives in the understandings of research data (Barbour, 2007; Rothbauer, 2008).

notes that for feminist researchers focus groups can have value as a form of consciousness-raising because:

[by] meeting together with others and sharing experiences, and through realizing group commonalities in what had previously been considered individual and personal problems, women will develop a clearer sense of the social and political processes through which their experiences are constructed. (Wilkinson, 1999, p. 75)

In terms of my research, the idea of giving voice to some of the participants was especially relevant. The methodology provided the format for participants to express ideas about ‘mainstream’ society they might normally be reluctant to express. Such opinions were perceived to be deviant from ‘mainstream’, or even their own cultural group. However, as Kitzinger (1994) warns, the cultural background of the researcher may inhibit the expression of ‘voice’ and a sensitivity is required in building trust between the researcher and participants. I was especially aware of the need to create an environment where participants felt their ‘voice’ was heard. However, I did feel that my own background contributed to an ability to create an empathy with many of the research participants.

The literature about focus groups recognises the importance of the social context in eliciting the active engagement of participants (Hollander; 2004; Kitzinger, 1994). For example, when there are individuals within focus groups from different ethnic backgrounds they may potentially feel uncomfortable disclosing their opinions. (Carey, 1995; Campbell et al, 2001; Morgan, 1996; Wellings, Branigan, & Mitchell, 2000). I therefore followed Morgan’s (1995) advice about how participant disclosure can be encouraged by “the sorting of different categories of participants into separate groups” (Morgan, 1995, p. 519). My rationale for dividing the participants into their various FBGs is explained below in 6.6.3 of the research procedure.

Critics of focus group methodology suggest that not only the social context of the individuals within the group, but also the power dynamics between both the researcher and the participants, and between the participants, can influence levels of disclosure. I was therefore mindful of how I positioned myself as an active player in creating meaning from participant discussions; firstly, by my choice of questions as both a guide for the online FBG discussions and for the face-to-face focus-groups, and secondly, the way in which I moderated both the FBG and face-to-face discussions. My interpretative contribution, or bias, became apparent in the Eastern European focus group where, because of my own Czech background, I could relate more to their experiences compared to the other cultural groups. Consequently, I realised there might be cultural nuances expressed in the other focus groups that were beyond my own cultural reference.

#### 6.5.4 Viewing Diaries

Viewing diaries are common within the tradition of television audience studies and have been used by media researchers, to interpret, explain and thereby understand the social world of television audiences (Gunter, 2000). Hard copy paper diaries were first introduced to study radio audiences' listening habits in the 1920s and have since been adapted by numerous researchers to include the study of not only what audiences are watching, but also their viewing preferences and how they 'read' television content (Gunter, 2000).

I have adapted the traditional research method of paper viewing diaries from an isolated individual activity to an online interactive record of posts between participants viewing Māori Television. The digital capabilities of Facebook enabled each of the participants in the four different FBGs to post online and interact with other members of the group.

#### 6.5.5 Online Facebook Groups

The interpretative nature of meaning within a social context is also applicable to meanings created through interactions within social media. What all interaction has in common is the potency of language and "the power of dialogue to increase awareness and to help individuals to change their circumstances" (Padilla, 1993, p. 153). The internet and Facebook have become ubiquitous features of daily contemporary life as a form of communication. I therefore assumed, because of the participants' equivalent social and economic demographics, that they would have access to the internet and be competent users as they maintained family connections and links with their social and professional networks in their home countries. I also assumed posting on FBGs would be relatively undemanding for participants. The ubiquity of OSNs means that for vast numbers of people sites such as Facebook are a feature of daily life with little distinction for some between their online and offline worlds (Yin, 2013).

Wilson, Gosling, & Graham's (2012) literature review of 412 social science studies about Facebook users concluded there was value in Facebook as a domain in which to conduct social science research. One of the advantages of virtual groups, according to Barbour (2007), is that individuals are less likely to dominate discussion than in face-to-face groups because in the absence of visual contact, signifiers of status and body language are unlikely to be influential. It is for these reasons that I chose virtual online focus groups for my research, believing that FBGs could operate in a similar fashion as face-to-face focus groups and be as effective.

The FBGs offered a dual function: not only could participants write (post) their thoughts and ideas about Māori Television content, they could also comment on other group members' posts. This meant a participant's thoughts were continually evolving as they each created online posts about their own

viewing experiences at the same time as responding to each other's posts. In this way, understanding and meanings were collectively created through the Facebook dialogue. New meanings that emerged were discussed in greater depth at the final face-to-face focus groups. As in conventional focus-group procedure I also intervened in the FBGs to ensure discussion and request elaboration of online posts. Guideline questions were re-posted to generate discussion.

On-line focus groups can have disadvantages. Campbell et al. (2001), for example, compared the advantages and disadvantages of face-to-face and online focus groups and concluded that while "the face-to-face format caused some participants to hold back from discussing information they felt was too personal or potentially embarrassing ... [with online groups] the need to type, may have led some people to shorten or omit comments they would have voiced in a face-to-face discussion" (Campbell et al., 2001, p. 101).

I was also aware that FBGs could be limited by the level of a participant's literacy and comfort in expressing high-level thoughts and ideas in written English. Face-to-face focus groups did provide an opportunity for those participants who felt some limitation in their ability to express themselves in writing. Hence, neither FBGs nor face-to-face focus groups provided an ideal format for eliciting participant responses. Bloor et al. (2001), however, in discussing the efficacy of using virtual focus groups suggest they are not the future of focus group research but "offer a useful stable-mate in the focus group tradition, and a worthwhile tool for the social researcher" (Bloor, Frankland, Thomas, & Robson, 2001, p. 75). Therefore, I used FBGs as a tool in data generation to be used inductively in an interpretative approach to my research.

#### 6.5.6 Methodology as Social Justice Praxis

As my research progressed, I realised that for many participants, their viewing experiences and discussions with other participants were providing insights into the way they viewed and interacted with Māori issues and concerns generally. The potential for critical self-reflection and the cultivation of critical consciousness from exposure to new ideas is discussed by Roberts (2005) who remarks that the Brazilian educationalist Freire:

makes it clear ... that there are multiple ways of participating in the process of social transformation, and sometimes the most effective approaches, *in the long term*, are the quiet, unnoticed forms of gentle intellectual 'subversion' practised by educationalists and others as they go about their daily work. (Roberts, 2005, p.453, emphasis in the original).

In my research the participants have viewed and engaged with programming on Māori Television and have been 'gently subverted' to view Māori issues from a perspective other than 'mainstream'. Alternative narratives of decolonisation began to emerge for some of the participants as they engaged

with programming that placed a Māori perspective centre-screen. I realised that the methodology of this research with its combination of online and face-to-face focus groups offered the potential for a type of social justice<sup>83</sup> praxis as participants created meaning in the interactive dialogue of the group. By employing a ‘dialogical research method’ promoted by Freire (1970) the focus group participants were encouraged to enter into relationships of enquiry and critical self-reflection. This process is sometimes called ‘conscientisation’,<sup>84</sup> or the ability to recognise alternative discourses in order to take action. As Bohm reminds us, dialogue does not happen in a fixed, static, finite and controlled manner, rather it has the potential to bring to its participants “a new kind of mind” (Bohm, 1985, p. 175). It is through this dialogue, or in this case, ‘TV Talk’<sup>85</sup> (Gillespie, 1995), that participants could support each other in articulating each other’s thoughts and feelings. Hence, the research process not only explored the research questions but also helped the participants to become more aware of how engaging with Māori issues and concerns in a Pākehā-dominated society could shift their ideas of how they participated in society.

One of the research aims of this project was to see whether watching Māori Television made a difference in participants’ lives. I was interested in whether knowledge or insights about the reality of a Māori world view and historical realities gathered from watching Māori Television had initiated conversations and had operated as a form of consciousness-raising. Or, as Livingstone (1998) might ask, what might active viewers ‘do’ with their knowledge?

### 6.5.7 Interviews

Some researchers have combined information from focus-group discussions with one-to-one interviews (Barbour, 2007). Known as a mixed-methods approach, these techniques have been used successfully by researchers to identify any differences or similarities in results between individuals and focus groups and what they might mean. A mixed-method approach for this research, which involves cross-cultural dynamics, is particularly suitable because as Pollack (2003) suggests “a mixture of focus-group discussions and one-to-one interviews is most appropriate in cross-cultural or cross racial research ... where issues of power (inherent within the researcher/participant relationship) and disclosure are amplified” (Pollack, 2003, p.472).

One-to-one interviews can also help draw out views that participants feel too intimidated to express or

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<sup>83</sup> A study by Friesen (2007) about what social justice means amongst New Zealanders revealed a diverse range of definitions. However, a broad typology emerged within the study of the principles of social justice of which equality, tolerance, compassion, fairness and participation were of primary concern. When I refer to migrants’ stated predisposition to social justice for indigenous concerns, I am interpreting their statements through this New Zealand cultural lens.

<sup>84</sup> Conscientisation or critical consciousness is the “process of learning to perceive social, political and economic contradictions –and of taking action against the oppressive elements of reality” Freire (1970, p. 35).

<sup>85</sup> ‘TV talk’ is “talk about TV, occasioned by TV or informed by the experience of it. TV talk is a crucial forum for experimentation with identities” (Gillespie, 1995, p. 25).



reluctant to disclose in a group situation (Barbour, 2007). Omura (2014) in his work with Asian migrants in New Zealand argued that interviews should be used in conjunction with focus-group interviews because they provided a research method that allowed Asian participants to express their 'private voice'. Omura observed that his Asian participants' 'private voice' in interviews was often very different to the public image or voice they felt compelled to portray to their fellow focus group members.

On the other hand, however, interviews, where the researcher can be perceived to represent societal hegemonies, can also risk reproducing, what Pollack calls "colonising discourses" (Pollack, 2003, p. 461), because participants may provide information in the interview they perceive is wanted by the researcher. This appears to be a potential problem for all qualitative research methods as interviewees may shape their research answers to what they perceive as the preferences of the researcher.

I sought to address this problem by using a combination of techniques that could highlight any new ideas or significant differences in responses. I asked the interviewees the same questions as I asked the FBGs and included in the final focus-group questionnaire. Although the individual interviews did not provide the same depth of material and description of programme content as the FBGs, the more generalised comments of the interviewees allowed me to verify many of the emergent FBG themes.

#### 6.5.8 Analysis

Thematic analysis (TA) is a method for identifying and analysing patterns of meaning in research findings (Braun & Clarke 2006). My choice of TA reflects the importance of identifying themes of 'meaning making' by migrant audiences in this research. There are a number of different approaches to thematic analysis (Boyatzis, 1998; Charmaz, 2006; Guest, 2012) but they are all based on coding frames where codes are predetermined after a process of data familiarisation. A coding frame, as described by Joffe, is "a conceptual tool with which to classify, understand and examine the data" (Joffe, 2012, p. 215). He argues that each code in the coding frame has its own unique "definition of what should be classified with this code [and an] example of material that should be coded with this code" (Joffe, 2012, p. 215). Braun and Clarke (2006) have a different view, arguing that this approach to coding is grounded in a theoretical or ontological framework that restricts any flexibility to the codes being developed as part of the analytical process. This means there is no accurate way to code data because the researcher is always playing "an active role in identifying patterns or themes and selecting those which are of interest" (Braun & Clarke, 2006, p. 7). This approach also ensures the mark of the researcher is situated in the research outcome because the themes are being drawn from the raw data itself. I chose to use the method recommended by Braun & Clarke (2006) because, as they argue, their approach is theoretically flexible and involves an organic coding process. This approach, and the use

of TA, coincides with the organic nature of the interpretative approach employed in this research project.

I chose not to use discourse analysis because, as Willig (2014) explains, researchers who use discourse analysis are concerned with how meaning is produced through language rather than interpretation. In other words, “discourse analytic research is driven by research questions about the capacities and characteristics of language rather than questions about the participants and their experiences” (Willig, 2014, p. 144). Likewise, critical discourse analysis (CDA) was not seen as applicable. CDA analyses discourse, and the exercise and effects of its power (Wodak & Meyer, 2001). It is primarily interested in how discourse functions in “bourgeois-capitalist modern industrial society [and its] techniques to legitimize and ensure government” (Wodak & Meyer, 2001, p. 32). Māori Television can be seen as a counter-narrative to the dominant hegemonic discourse in the wider ‘mainstream’ nation. This research seeks to understand the extent to which some of the participants understand how this may influence their awareness of dominant discourses and their responses to Māori Television content.

## 6.6 Procedure

In the above section I have outlined the theory and background of the research methods I have employed. What follows are the details of how I applied the eight stages of my research procedure.

### 6.6.1 Stage One: Designing the Questionnaire

The design of the questionnaire was based on conversations with secondary school migrant students, migrant adults in English literacy classes and conversations within my own migrant networks amongst Latin American, Indian and Eastern European communities. It was designed to record each participant’s viewing patterns of both ‘mainstream’ television and Māori Television. I asked questions about participants’ programme preferences, whether their viewing experience of Māori Television promoted discussion or influenced their experience of racism directed towards Māori and their own ethnic group, and their knowledge and television viewing practices of New Zealand’s national celebrations. It also explored participants’ uses for and gratification from watching Māori Television, including whether they shared any cultural values with Māori (if known) and if it influenced their desire for knowledge about Māori histories, language and culture. My survey questionnaire was adapted from 14 descriptive factors identified in viewer programme qualitative evaluations used by the Corporation of Public Broadcasting in the United States (cited in Gunter, 2000, p. 146). Their schedule was designed to gather information about the sources of viewer (dis)satisfaction about a particular television programme and to identify gaps in available programming. I adapted some of these descriptive factors for use in the survey about Māori Television (as opposed to a single programme) in order to explore these factors further in the qualitative section of the research. This

questionnaire was first piloted on individual migrants whom I had met whilst scoping this research project. They had expressed an interest in the study and offered to critique the questionnaire for meaning and content.

I also realised there could be biases in the quantitative survey due to cultural misunderstandings of the questions. Jefferson and Hollway (2000) question the assumption that language is transparent and that words have a shared meaning and mean the same thing to the participant and the researcher. Therefore grouping people together who shared a cultural and ethnic background in FBGs was more likely to reveal any cross-cultural misunderstanding of ‘meaning’ between the researcher and participants.

### 6.6.2 Stage Two: Snowballing the Questionnaire

I started snowballing the questionnaire by recruiting help from individuals within my own networks of migrant groups developed over the years prior to starting this project. Many of my former ESOL students emailed the questionnaire to their English schools and to their own networks of migrant friends. I also asked representatives from various community groups such as Aotearoa Ethnic Network, Auckland Regional Migrant Services, adult educational institutes, Awataha Marea on Auckland’s North Shore, and media representatives at the Unitec Ethnic Migrant Media Forum 2014 to assist in promoting the research project through their organisation’s websites and email lists. They posted a short statement providing a brief description of the project and the web site address for the online survey platform ‘Survey Monkey’. I also contacted an immigration consultant and a recruitment and human resources agency who specialised in migrant management positions for help in identifying individuals interested in snowballing the questionnaire.

I had hoped to have a minimum of 100 respondents but the uptake of interest in passing on the survey to other interested parties (snowballing) was relatively limited. Because the snowball survey produced only 62 respondents after three months, I realised that, despite an incentive of entering a draw to win an iPad, the snowball methodology had limitations for this type of project. The motivation or interest level for participants to pass on the questionnaire was insufficient. I then turned to a more personal approach by visiting and speaking at migrant community group meetings and Treaty Education classes to generate interest in completing the survey. I asked groups from these meetings and classes to complete an email list for me to forward them the online survey, after which I would follow up a few days later by email to ensure the survey had been completed. I successfully recruited individuals from both Eastern Europe and Western nations, but my survey did not attract any from the small segment of African, Middle Eastern and Latin American migrants in New Zealand. Possibly this was due to the snowball methodology being unsuccessful in accessing and attracting this segment of the population. Attracting Chinese and other Eastern and Southeast Asian participant interest in the online survey also

proved a challenge. This was possibly, as some researchers such as Omura (2014) have suggested, due to their lack of English language proficiency or their desire to simply focus on ‘getting ahead’. Another researcher involved in Chinese identity and cyberspace, Hang Yin (2014) thought that many PRC migrants would not wish to be involved because of a perception this project’s concern is Māori political issues. Another problem I had was access to a reliable distribution point to promote the survey for participants from the PRC. I had hoped my approach to various Asian business associations and media outlets would result in an interest in the research. However, this did not happen. In the hope of recruiting Indian participants I published an article about a media diversity conference which also promoted the online survey web link for this research in the November 28, 2014 edition of New Zealand national website *Indian Weekender* (Nemec, 2014, p. 11). Despite many of these efforts I was disappointed the snowball methodology had not attracted more than the 62 respondents.

### 6.6.3 Stage Three: Selection of Participants

I selected participants for Stage Three of this project from the online respondents who met three criteria. They had to provide contact details, be prepared to view Māori Television for two months to participate in the research. Although 40 participants out of 62 in the online survey expressed an interest in the research project, recruitment of participants for this stage proved a challenge. Once contacted many did not have the time to dedicate to watching television either ‘on-air’ or ‘on-demand’, and some in the PRC group felt their written English was not fluent enough to participate in the FBGs online group. Furthermore, although there was an equal gender balance in the respondents to the online questionnaire, I could only recruit two men to participate in the qualitative section of the research.

Some early criteria for participant involvement were waived. I had initially wanted migrants who had been in New Zealand for between one and ten years who had NOT watched Māori Television. This would have provided an ideal before and after comparison. However, of the 17 respondents who agreed to be members of the FBG qualitative research only 10 had not watched any Māori Television. The other seven participants watched under an hour a week of Māori Television and could be considered ‘inactive’ viewers because their viewing consisted of channel surfing around news time. Although this seemed a compromise, because these seven participants had viewed such little Māori Television, I felt their participation did not unduly influence the results.

I also had thought duration of residence in New Zealand should be a criterion assuming that after ten years migrants’ critical cultural-difference ‘antennae’ would be more integrated into New Zealand society. However, in discussing the focus of this research with participants in the recruitment for this qualitative stage of research I realised there was to some extent a commonality of experience and interest in Māori/Pākehā/ migrant relations irrespective of duration of residence. However, in all cases

except one, the participants had been in the country for less than 15 years. All participants had been in New Zealand for over two years.

#### 6.6.4 Stage Four: Starting the Facebook Groups (FBGs)

Four distinct categories of online FBGs were established. The participants came from a variety of countries, so I looked for historical and cultural commonalities as the basis for each of the groups. According to Kitzinger (1995), most researchers recommend a homogeneity of shared experience within each group and I hoped some form of categorisation would create, to some extent, internally homogeneous groups based on shared cultural and ethnic backgrounds. Each distinct group therefore had the potential to be compared with the other groups (Kitzinger, 1991). Morley (2006), also suggests that segmentation of participants into distinct categories has two main advantages - homogeneity within the groups allows for more free-flowing conversations amongst participants as they have similar backgrounds and experiences, and it facilitates an analysis of inter-group differences in perspectives. I recognised that while I was aiming to create relative homogeneity within each group, there would be internal differences based on factors such as region, social background and cultural variations. As Gibbs (1997) reminds us, homogenous groups tend to have the disadvantage of not expressing the diverse opinions and experiences of a larger population. Asaman et al. (2008) warn that the generalisation of such research findings should therefore be treated with caution. However, focus group methodology was just one of my approaches. My research used a combination of methods that provided me with some confidence in applying my findings to larger population groups engaged in viewing Māori Television.

I was also interested in exploring whether a settler/colonial or 'white-privilege' framework could be used to understand some of the participants' responses. Hence, three of the four groups consisted of 1) migrants from Eastern European countries with a history of recent political domination (Bosnia, Hungary, Romania, Macedonia), 2) those from Western countries with a history of Eurocentric colonising (Germany, England, South Africa, USA) and 3) those with a history of being colonised (India/Sri Lanka and more recently, Fiji). The fourth group consisted of PRC participants. The Chinese and Indian participants were important as, after English migrants, they reflected the two most common migrant groups in New Zealand (Census 2013).

Although I had originally envisioned larger FBGs with a greater range of age, gender, social economic status and occupational backgrounds, the limitations of finding a sufficient number of participants through the snowball method resulted in each group only having three or four members. However, in hindsight, I realised the smaller groups promoted more relationality between participants than might larger focus groups. This supports Barbour's (2007) observation that smaller focus groups can generate more meaningful discussion. Morgan (1995) also suggests smaller groups mean participants have a

greater opportunity to tell their stories and compare them with each other when dealing with more complex or intense topics.

Once the participants had agreed with me over the phone or by email to be involved in the project, I emailed them the University of Auckland Human Subjects Ethics Participant Information Sheet and organised the first face-to-face focus group. A koha of a petrol and a supermarket voucher was also offered to those participating in this stage to express gratitude for their time and willingness to share their experiences and thoughts.

I also ensured an initial social context was created by holding one-off informal meetings where I provided food. As this was the start of the qualitative research, the main aim of this initial meeting was for the participants to become more familiar with each other. These physical meetings encouraged participants to talk about themselves and form interactive relationships, to ask any questions relevant to the research guideline questions and sign the previously emailed consent forms. The conversations were unstructured and allowed the participants to realise commonalities of background and experience and ways of viewing the world. They talked about where they were from, how long they had been in New Zealand, their families and their jobs. They made some observations about race relations and the representation of Māori in the media that aligned with their attitudes expressed in the online survey. Another thread of their conversation also included why they tuned into Māori Television (albeit sometimes only channel surfing). Most importantly they made connections with each other.

Each group suggested their preferred type of environment for their initial meeting. The ‘Western’ nations’ group met in a wine bar, the ‘Eastern European’ group met at one of the participant’s homes for lunch, the ‘Indian/Sinhalese’ group met for coffee at McDonalds while participants from the ‘Chinese’ group met me at a café. In each of these gatherings I provided beverages and food. The practice of hospitality follows many cultural traditions and is consistent with tikanga Māori protocols. Barlow (1991) describes ‘manaakitanga’ as being the most important quality of a host, while Mead asserts “all tikanga are underpinned by the high value placed on manaakitanga – nurturing relationships, looking after people, and being very careful about how others are treated” (Mead, 2003, p. 29). These values were central to ensuring participants felt comfortable and safe, not only with me, but also with each other, in order to participate fully in the research.

Establishing manaakitanga also acknowledged the potential benefits available to participants – to have their opinions valued, to have a sense of empowerment from collaborating with others in supporting the aims of the research, and potentially as an agent of change making a difference (Gibbs, 1997). As Goss and Leinbach (1996) argue from their work with trans-migrants in Indonesia, focus groups reflect the social nature of knowledge that is co-created with the researcher in a collaborative project that often potentially reveals “local and global power relationships ... and gives voice to those who do not

speak enabling them in dialogue with others to make their own discoveries about their condition” (Goss & Leinbach, 1996, p. 115, 116). In their research they found that participants discovered their voice within a group where their opinions were valued and acknowledged. My aim was to engender for my participants a similar sense of having a voice and expressing opinions that were valued. I felt this was particularly relevant for those participants, who in their everyday life experienced a power differential between themselves and dominant Pākehā hegemonies.

I realised when facilitating these first face-to-face meetings that I had achieved, what Barbour (2007) would describe as ‘purposive or selective sampling’, where data is obtained from a specific group of respondents. However, sampling in this research was not researcher-led, instead participants self-selected based on their prior interest in learning about Māori, race relations and diversity issues and their perception that involvement in this study would satisfy these interests. What I had not expected was that many of the participants had also completed Treaty Education programmes. Their common interest in social justice resulted in the participants being “self-selecting on the basis of their potential contribution to theory development” (Ritchie & Lewis, 2003, p. 107). This shared experience formed the basis for participants to share perspectives on the research topic and generate meaningful discussions.

Viewing of Māori Television for this project commenced at the beginning of February 2015, just before Waitangi Day commemorations. Participants were not required to view certain hours each week but rather they were asked to watch programming that interested them and post relevant comments 2 -3 times a week. The approach of only viewing content that interested a participant recognised that not only is the study for two months, but also that it is a long commitment that needs to fit in with the ebbs and flows of participant lives. In addition, dictating what programmes participants should watch would have been an intervention that potentially meant that a participant’s choice of meaningful content could have been missed. Allowing participants to choose content also meant that my observation of their programme choices allowed me to confirm that FBG participant preferences aligned with the programme preferences of the online survey.

Participants watched Māori Television both ‘live’ and ‘on-demand’. However, I did encourage them not to rely on ‘on-demand’ programming as it is in isolation from the broader context of Māori Television. I wanted FBG comments and discussions to include viewpoints about on-screen promotions, programme ‘teasers’ and advertisements and public service announcements that the ‘on-demand’ service does not include. Viewing the ‘flow’ of ‘live’ television meant the participants could engage in the diversity of the broadcaster’s schedule and experience an ‘affect’ from being a member of the audience. It also meant they could bring a diverse range of content, ideas and experiences to the FBG to discuss. Nevertheless, when participants shared their thoughts about a programme that

interested them by posting on the FBG, it meant that other group members would find the content ‘on-demand’ and respond accordingly.

#### 6.6.5 Stage Five: Overseeing the FBGs

I was in constant contact through email, FB posts, texts or mobile phone conversations with all the participants suggesting content that others had viewed in other groups, or that I thought would be of interest for them to consider when posting. Nevertheless, at times participants did not always post comments about what they were watching despite my encouragement to do so. I also cross posted comments between each group, highlighting posts from participants in other groups in order to generate discussion. No participant could identify other people from other FBGs.

My role in this stage was important for two reasons. Firstly, maintaining regular contact can be a strategy to maintain a high retention rate (Asamen et al., 2008). Secondly, because the FBGs were operating for a two-month period I needed to make sure participants continued to be engaged with the research process and were responding to each other. This was achieved by posting and re-posting guideline questions (See Appendix 2) to encourage and promote participant interaction within their FBG conversations. I also watched the programmes the participants were viewing in order to better understand and seek clarification of some of the comments

It was difficult at times to maintain interactive discussion amongst the members because of their other time commitments, but when they did interact with comments about a programme the small groups worked well. As Morley (2006) observes, when participants are interested in the topic and they have a clear idea of the research focus there is greater potential for meaningful conversations. I noticed group members increased their engagement in writing FBG posts when the programmes related more to their experience or interests. What also helped to maintain the interaction of the FBG posts was my active affirmation that each of their responses in the FBGs made an important contribution. Not only did I ‘like’ comments on the FBG post, I also posted affirmative responses such as ‘that is an interesting perspective’ or ‘I’m looking forward to reading what others think’. I had to be sensitive to the demands of participants’ lives, so they did not feel I was harassing them to be more active in the FBG. Sometimes I arranged a telephone call with a participant to elicit their comments if they had not been active on the FBG page for a week. In instances, where their busy lives restricted their viewing to one or two programmes in the week, I would ask them about their viewing experiences within the context of the guideline questions and the conversation would be recorded, transcribed and emailed to the participant for verification. I would then post their comment on the FBG page on their behalf. In a related research context of sharing responses to learning about the Treaty and te ao Māori, Huygens (2007) also used a method of gathering group responses and sharing it with others in the study to engender discussion.



To make comparisons between the four FBGs a structured approach was chosen with each group having the same guideline questions to discuss. Although an unstructured approach might have allowed more exploratory research – and some unexpected findings – “the data [would have been] more difficult to analyse than the well-ordered discussions that more structured approaches produce” (Morley, 2006, p. 40). As Morley (2006) highlights, structured approaches are especially appropriate when the research question requires some focus.

After two months of FBG online posting and discussion it appeared the goal of ‘saturation’ had been achieved. Saturation, according to Glaser and Strauss (1967), is the point at which, in this case, additional posts or data collection from interviews no longer generates new understanding.

#### 6.6.6 Stage Six: Final Face-to-Face Focus Group Meetings

This stage of the research process brought each FBG together for a final face-to-face focus group meeting. The extent to which relationships had been established amongst the participants was very clear in each of the four final and very convivial face-to-face meetings. After initially meeting their fellow FBG members and then continuing a virtual group on Facebook they reported very favourably about their experiences sharing with the FBG and feeling part of an ongoing small and intimate research community. The FBGs were far more effective than individually based viewing diaries because the online discussions prompted other individuals in the group to respond and participate. From a research perspective the value of the FBG was confirmed as an effective means of maintaining the study’s momentum.

At each of these final meetings participants completed a questionnaire that covered similar ideas explored within the online survey. This allowed participant attitudes to be compared between the beginning of the research and the end. The results revealed:

- 1) what the participants’ perceptions were of ‘mainstream’ media representation of Māori,
- 2) whether they felt more supportive of Māori issues and concerns after viewing Māori Television,
- 3) whether their viewing experience made any difference in their lives, and
- 4) whether they discovered points of connection between their own cultural values and those of Māori.

The questionnaire also provided the basis for a group discussion to explore further individual participant’s responses. The focus group also talked about some of the subtleties and nuances of their individual FBG comments based on the guideline questions as described in 6.6.5.

### 6.6.7 Stage Seven: Interviews

Verification of some of the emerging themes from the FBGs was the most significant factor in initiating the interview stage of the research. I felt I needed this stage as I knew implementing triangulation as a methodology would further validate the interview data. There were eight interviews with people who were unable to participate in these FBGs because of time pressure and work commitments but who were keen to be involved in the project. The criteria for interview selection was that interviewees had lived in New Zealand for between two and 15 years and that they were willing to watch Māori Television programming, both on-demand and live-to-air, 'as much as they could' for between three to six weeks. I maintained weekly contact through email to enquire about what they were viewing. Their viewing patterns varied considerably, and I did not discuss meanings they were making from their viewing during this time. In the interview, I asked them the same guideline questions as the FBG had been asked, and the final face-to-face focus group questionnaire to make comparisons between these one-to-one interviews and the focus group responses. This was beneficial because it allowed me to determine whether some of the FBG participants' ideas and meanings taken from viewing Māori Television were only a result of the dynamics of the focus groups or whether they might be "relevant to, or appear within the wider universe" (Mason, 1996, p. 92). Interviews also allowed me to compare the ideas and attitudes of individual Chinese, Indian, South African and English interviewees with their counterparts in FBGs.

### 6.6.8 Stage Eight: Analysis

Finally, I correlated, created tables and interpreted the quantitative data from the online survey. I then transcribed all the qualitative data from the interviews, the four FBGs and face-to-face focus groups and analysed thematically all the data as one set using the Nvivo software package developed for qualitative social science research. Analysing this data allowed a 'snap shot' of attitudes and perceptions of issues concerning Māori to be formed. The qualitative information also illuminated the advantage of using a triangulation approach because all the data from the three methods could be validated through cross verification and subsequently be treated as one data set.

In using the transcribed data in the findings chapters I chose not to edit the material for sentence structure and grammar. Hence, I do not use the convention of 'sic' to indicate 'poor' English levels. As English is a second language for many of the participants, it felt disrespectful, on my behalf, to further highlight their difference within the linguistic structures required to be accepted into an English language dominated society.



## Chapter Seven

### An Introduction to the Research Outcomes

*Māori Television makes Māori culture accessible for me while I find mainstream television objectifies Māori people because they don't provide a context to stories in news or general coverage. I see the difference between mainstream television in New Zealand and Māori Television is like the difference between CNN and Al Jazeera. (Rahul, India)*

Rahul's assessment of the difference between Māori Television and 'mainstream' broadcasting acknowledges that different media can represent contrasting political and socio-cultural views in their coverage of issues and events. His view was consistent with those expressed by many others involved in this study. Indeed, for many of my participants their viewing of Māori Television played a vital role in providing alternative narratives to the 'mainstream' representation of Māori issues and a Māori world.

'Mainstream' representations of Māori and Pākehā are inextricably linked in the ongoing nation-building imaginings of Aotearoa New Zealand. However, these practices have been criticised as a site where settler ideology is maintained (McConville, et al. 2014). Māori Television's intervention in these dominant settler narratives of nationhood has been recognised since its inception (Smith, 2006) and a small but growing body of research has affirmed already that Māori Television offers alternative ways for Pākehā audiences to examine the national imagination (Smith, 2016; Abel, 2012, 2013; Turner, 2011). However, apart from a small section in Gregory et al.'s 2011 research into the mass media's representation of Māori, relationships between Māori and non-Māori, and into its promotion of particular understandings of the Treaty of Waitangi, no-one else has addressed Māori Television's migrant audiences. My study has extended what limited research exists about Māori Television and its migrant audiences.

This chapter discusses the quantitative results of my online survey while the qualitative findings from focus groups are discussed in Chapters 8-12. These chapters reveal that watching Māori Television opened a window into a Māori world for the participants by providing them with a means to learn about the culture, language and values of tangata whenua. It provided information about the history of Māori/Pākehā relations and the Treaty of Waitangi and offered positive stories about diverse Māori communities. Viewing Māori Television also provided many of the participants with points of cultural connection and a sense of belonging that supported their integration into the contested discourses of national identity.

## 7.1 Quantitative Results

I started this research with an online survey. A total of 62 respondents from migrant communities answered a range of questions about their viewing habits and preferences. This first chapter of my findings presents the quantitative results of the online survey conducted over two months from February 2015 – April 2015. The findings present the answers to three main questions:

- 1) What were the preferred genres of programmes viewed on both ‘mainstream’ and Māori Television?
- 2) How many hours were typically spent viewing ‘mainstream’ and Māori Television?
- 3) What were the motivations for viewing Māori Television?

The answers to these questions have been compared to respondents’ regular viewing habits of ‘mainstream’ media to see if Māori Television offered them alternative cultural resources.

## 7.2 Viewing ‘Mainstream’ Content

News and current affairs were the most popular ‘mainstream’ media content viewed in the study. Of the 62 respondents in the online survey, 63 per cent watched the category of news and current affairs ‘moderately’ (between one to five hours) and ‘mostly’ (over six hours). Of the 58 respondents who watched documentaries 40 per cent watched at ‘moderate’ and ‘mostly’ levels (see Table 1 below) but 24 per cent did not watch documentaries at all. Most of the sample watched a little (less than one hour a week). Not all the respondents completed each programme category of the survey but by determining the percentages of the actual number of respondents for each category the results can be compared.

**TABLE 1: What category of programme do you watch on ‘mainstream’ television<sup>86</sup> and for what duration each week?**

	Not at All (%)	A Little (%)	Moderately (%)	Mostly (%)	Total (%)	Total Respondents (N = )
<b>News and Current Affairs</b>	10	27	24	39	100	62
<b>Documentaries</b>	24	36	33	7	100	58
<b>Drama</b>	40	37	16	7	100	55
<b>Lifestyle and Entertainment</b>	23	43	30	4	100	53
<b>Sports</b>	38	45	13	4	100	27
<b>Language Learning</b>	57	35	8	0	100	51
<b>Waitangi Day and/orAnzac Day</b>	49	33	13	5	100	55

<sup>86</sup> For the purposes of this study, ‘mainstream’ television refers to TVOne, TV2, TV3 and Prime.

The relatively high level of news and current affairs viewing is noteworthy because several academic studies have demonstrated a link between news values of ‘mainstream’ media and negative attitudes of some New Zealanders toward indigenous people (Abel, 2016; Nairn, Moewaka Barnes, Borell, Gregory, & McCreanor, 2012). My interest was in whether the negative representations of Māori on ‘mainstream’ television influenced my migrant participants’ attitudes toward indigenous people, and how this compared to other academic studies - a question that is explored in the following section.

### 7.3 Hours Spent Viewing ‘Mainstream’ Broadcasting

In the online survey, respondents were asked to estimate how many hours of ‘mainstream’ television they viewed. This was important because some of the respondents from the online survey would become participants in the subsequent qualitative research section and would be asked to make comparisons between Māori Television and ‘mainstream’ television. These comparisons provided a sufficient basis for participants to compare and discuss different representations of Māori issues and concerns between ‘mainstream’ and Māori television.

Table 2 below shows that 67 per cent of respondents in the online survey viewed more than one hour of ‘mainstream’ television each week.

**TABLE 2: In a typical week how many hours of ‘mainstream’ television do you watch?**

No. of Hours	Responses (%)	Respondents (N=62)
<b>None</b>	10	6
<b>Less than 1 hour</b>	23	14
<b>1-4 hours</b>	27	17
<b>5-9 hours</b>	19	12
<b>10 or more hours</b>	21	13
<b>TOTAL</b>	100	62

### 7.4 Hours Spent Viewing Māori Television

In the online survey, slightly more than half of the respondents reported watching Māori Television, although only 20 per cent viewed it for between one hour and 10 or more hours a week.

**TABLE 3: In a typical week how many hours of Māori Television do you watch?**

No. of Hours	Responses (%)	Respondents (N=62)
None	45	28
Less than 1 hour	35	22
1-4 hours	15	9
5-9 hours	3	2
10 or more hours	2	1
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>62</b>

My online survey cannot be compared directly to the 2015 Te Māngai Pāho audience research survey because it used different methodologies.<sup>87</sup> However, my results showing the seemingly low level of viewing were not substantially lower than the non-Māori viewing audience in the general population in the Te Māngai Pāho survey. That survey found that 25 per cent of non-Māori over the age of 15 watched Māori Television ‘frequently’ (TNS Conversa, 2015, p. 13) whereas my survey found that 20 per cent viewed from one to ten or more hours each week. The Te Māngai Pāho survey found that just over half of those who viewed the broadcaster reported it had increased their knowledge and awareness of Māori perspectives (TNS Conversa, 2015, p. 26). It is therefore possible to hypothesise that the number of migrants viewing Māori Television revealed in my online survey demonstrates the potential for such audiences to also increase their knowledge and awareness of Māori perspectives.

## 7.5 Viewing Māori Television Content

The results in Table 4 below demonstrate a similar pattern of programme-content viewing by respondents across ‘mainstream’ (see Table 2) and Māori Television media. In both cases ‘news and current affairs’ and ‘documentaries’<sup>88</sup> genres are a notable part of the survey-respondent viewing. Fewer respondents completed this section of the online survey presumably because they did not watch Māori Television.

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<sup>87</sup> The Te Māngai Pāho survey was based on a mix of email and telephone interviews and had a sample size of over 1140 respondents covering both Māori and non-Māori.

<sup>88</sup> There may be some overlap between documentaries with factual programmes.

**TABLE 4: What programmes do you watch on Māori Television?**

Genres	Not at All (%)	A Little (%)	Moderately (%)	Mostly (%)	Total (%)	Total Respondents (N =)
<b>News and Current Affairs</b>	28	37	23	12	100	34
<b>Documentaries</b>	21	37	21	21	100	34
<b>Drama</b>	52	45	0	3	100	29
<b>Lifestyle and Entertainment</b>	54	25	15	6	100	31
<b>Sports</b>	70	15	11	4	100	27
<b>Language Learning</b>	48	19	23	10	100	31
<b>Waitangi Day and/or Anzac Day</b>	53	23	10	14	100	30

The following table (Table 5) looks more closely at this pattern of a preference for viewing ‘news and current affairs’ and ‘documentaries’ by comparing viewing content of only the respondents who recorded their viewing for each of the genres as either in the ‘moderately’ or the ‘mostly’ categories. The data for the two categories has been combined in this table to demonstrate viewer programme preferences.

**TABLE 5: Comparison of content watched on ‘mainstream’ and Māori Television by ‘moderately/mostly’ responses**

Genres	Mainstream (% of total respondents who answered this question)	Māori Television (% of total respondents who answered this question)
<b>News and Current Affairs</b>	63	35
<b>Documentaries</b>	40	42*
<b>Drama</b>	23	3
<b>Lifestyle and Entertainment</b>	34	22
<b>Sports</b>	17	15
<b>Language Learning</b>	8	33*
<b>Waitangi Day and/or Anzac Day</b>	18	23*

This comparison, created through combining data from Tables 1 and 4, highlights several points:



- ‘News and current affairs’ is a more significant content genre for respondents on ‘mainstream’ television compared to Māori Television.
- ‘Documentary’ is the most significant content genre watched on Māori Television.
- There are three genres (highlighted by the asterisks [\*] in Table 5) with higher viewing levels on Māori Television than on ‘mainstream’ television – documentaries, language learning and Waitangi Day/Anzac Day-related content. (This could be because, as Figure. 4 below shows, Māori Television screens more hours of local content than other broadcasters.)

The insights from Table 5 are confirmed and explained by the section below which examines the responses to the question, ‘Why watch Māori Television?’

## 7.6 Why Watch Māori Television?

Forty of the 62 participants in the online survey had viewed a limited amount of Māori Television prior to the study. To find the reasons for watching Māori Television I designed the following checklist which asked the respondents to rank the following statements according to their most preferred reasons for watching Māori Television. The responses appear in brackets:


- 1) I like viewing documentaries about New Zealand and other cultures’ issues that I cannot find on other channels. (68%)
- 2) I enjoy foreign movies because they are often about a non-Anglo world. (65%)
- 3) Watching programmes [on Māori Television] helps me to engage with the Māori language. (47%)
- 4) News and current affairs give me another perspective compared to ‘mainstream’ media. (42%)
- 5) I can relate to the values shown. (37%)
- 6) Generally, I can see people other than white New Zealanders. (29%)
- 7) Lifestyle programming helps me to see the physical landscape of New Zealand that I would not normally visit. (24%)
- 8) The spoken English is easier to understand than on other media because it is slower and the subtitles make it easier to understand. (21%)
- 9) The programming is entertaining. (16%)
- 10) There is little advertising. (16%)

Respondents expanded on these sentiments in the subsequent qualitative sections of the research. Focus group participants discussed the differences between ‘mainstream’ and Māori Television. In particular,

the qualitative research explored the third reason – watching programmes leads to greater engagement with te reo Māori, and the fifth reason – watching because they could relate to Māori cultural values. Discussion about these is covered in the following findings chapters.

Looking at the above reasons for watching Māori Television suggests that there were specific points of connection for the participants across the range of content on Māori Television, such as Māori Television’s high level of local content covering New Zealand lifestyles, landscapes, issues and Māori realities. Māori Television screens more local content than other broadcasters (NZOA, 2015), with 82 per cent of its content comprising local-content prime-time hours (including news and current affairs). By comparison, ‘mainstream’ broadcasters’ local content averaged only 33 per cent.<sup>89</sup> When news and current affairs are excluded, as shown in the graph below (Figure 4), Māori Television has, since the year 2004, a significantly higher level of local content (60-70 per cent) than other broadcasters (20 per cent).

**FIGURE 4: Prime Time Local Content (excluding news and current affairs)**



Source (NZOA, 2015, p.15)

The significant difference in the proportion of local content is consistent with the reason the majority of respondents (68 per cent) gave for watching Māori Television – to learn something about New Zealand they could not find on other channels. During the focus group discussions a preference for local content emerged as a response to an understandable level of curiosity about learning something about one’s new host country.<sup>90</sup> This was described by the following two participants:

*When I first came to New Zealand 10 years ago I watched a lot of Māori Television because I wanted to learn something about the country, especially from the Māori point of view because*

<sup>89</sup> NZOA information covers ‘mainstream’ broadcasters, TV One, TV2, TV3 and Prime - local content for these channels was 51%, 14%, 50% and 17% respectively.

<sup>90</sup> Chung’s (2012) research based in Canada on migrant/indigenous relations found that amongst racialized minorities and immigrants there are narratives that reflect a curiosity and respect for Canada’s First Peoples.

*people talk about a bicultural country. Māori Television takes you to all sorts of places and lets you look at some of the lifestyles of people around the country. It seems like a lot of Māori live in rural areas. (Merle, South African)*

*When you arrive in a country you know nothing about the history at all and you need to understand the history to understand the context of what is happening now. I think it's a shame to be honest ... I think it's a shame we don't have more mixed stuff on our programming in mainstream. (Laure, French)*

Watching Māori Television to see more local content meant participants were immersed in a culturally specific representation of Māori through programmes produced by Māori<sup>91</sup> (this was discussed more fully in Chapter 5). The range of local content on Māori Television provided multiple entry points for the focus groups to discuss the meanings each participant made from the programming. From the list above covering the reasons for viewing Māori Television, reasons 3, 4 and 5 suggest that audiences perceive Māori content to convey its world view to “a world beyond” (Barclay, 1990, p. 75). In Barclay’s terms Māori-related content appeared to not only ‘talk-in’ to Māori audiences, but also could ‘talk-in and talk-out’ to respondents because they were experiencing a Māori world from a Māori perspective.

## 7.7 Conclusion

The results from the online survey provides quantitative data that informs the qualitative section of my research about the experiences of participants learning about a Māori world from a Māori perspective. It answers questions about what programmes participants watch and why. However, at this stage the data only offers numerical indications rather than providing robust explanations for many of the complex issues this thesis subsequently addresses.

Online survey data demonstrated that the majority of respondents preferred news and current affairs and documentaries on both Māori and ‘mainstream’ channels. Documentary viewing on Māori Television was more popular than news and current affairs and could possibly be higher if some lifestyle programmes, such as *Hunting Aotearoa* or *HoiHo*, were also considered to be documentaries. Conversely, lifestyle programming could also be higher depending on how respondents categorised lifestyle/documentary. Overall the most popular reason respondents gave for viewing Māori Television was to see programming about New Zealand and other cultures that could not be found on other ‘mainstream’ channels. An analysis of these comparisons is covered in the following qualitative research findings chapters.

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<sup>91</sup> In 2007, NZ On Air defined a Māori programme as making “a conscious decision to reveal something of the past, present or future Māori world. Its creative core will be Māori, its cultural control will be Māori. Its management may be Māori or Pākehā [*European New Zealander*]” (Ngā Matakiirea, 2010, p. 24).

Significantly, the online survey results covering preferred viewing on Māori Television also revealed that programmes covering te reo learning and Waitangi and Anzac Day were reasons to watch the broadcaster. The qualitative research findings in the following chapters investigate the extent of participants' language acquisition and 'passive' learning about the intentions of the Treaty.<sup>92</sup> In addition, the connection respondents made between their own culture and Māori culture is investigated. At this stage of the research there was little indication that these themes would be related to issues of migrant identity and belonging.

The online survey respondents' reasons for watching Māori Television highlight the value they perceive in learning more about Māori language and culture. It is useful to explore ways in which Māori Television can offer relevant information about Māori issues and the history of Māori/Pākehā relations to migrants who have chosen to call Aotearoa New Zealand home. The following chapters explore what meanings selected groups of migrants made of viewing Māori Television programmes.

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<sup>92</sup> See discussion in Chapter 8 about my use of the term 'passive' learning of the intentions of the Treaty.



## Chapter Eight

### Contrasting Māori Television and ‘Mainstream’ Media

*I encourage family and friends who are also new immigrants to watch Māori Television because it helps them get a more balanced impression of who Māori are and what Māori culture is. I have two friends who have just moved here, and I can already see them adopting attitudes from mainstream representations of Māori, for example should we move to South Auckland, it is full of crime, and we hear there is lots of Māori and Pacifica there and they have lots of social problems. (Mihili, Sri Lanka)*

Mihili’s insight into the ability of Māori Television to redefine Māori who are often positioned in the nation’s ‘mainstream’ discourse as an “homogenous disadvantaged ethnic group” (Kukutai, 2011, p. 49) has important implications. New migrants consuming ‘mainstream’ media and its absence of a Māori voice and/or lack of balance in its portrayal of Māori issues means they can unconsciously absorb negative representations of tangata whenua. Based on viewing preferences analysed in Chapter 7, ‘mainstream’ media viewed by migrants is also likely to be news and current affairs. It is within this genre that several academic studies have revealed a link between the negative stereotyping of Māori in ‘mainstream’ media and the negative attitudes of some Pākehā (Abel, 2016; Moewaka Barnes et al., 2012; Nairn et al., 2012). As Mihili observes, it seems her family and friends have also adopted such attitudes. If they do take her advice and watch Māori Television, the high level of local content across all genres on Māori Television, compared to ‘mainstream’,<sup>93</sup> means they will be viewing a range of programming that unexpectedly draws them into a world of Māori voices telling Māori stories. Such stories can increase migrant audience understanding of te ao Māori, help redress negative attitudes and also provide information that can be used as a resource in building relationships across axes of differences.

This is the first of my qualitative findings chapters and highlights what the 17 focus group participants and eight interviewees identified as the main differences between the representations of Māori in ‘mainstream’ television and on Māori Television. It also discusses how participant recognition of these differences achieved a variety of outcomes for those involved in the study and demonstrates that Māori Television seems to play a more vital role in their understanding of New Zealand than does ‘mainstream’ television.

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<sup>93</sup> When adjusted for news and current affairs Māori Television screened nearly 70% local content compared to under 20% for TV One, TV2, TV3 and Prime (NZOA, 2015, p.15).

## 8.1 Alternatives to Mass Media's Representation of Māori

A significant idea that emerged was that indigenous media is a site where colonial ideologies and indigenous struggles are contested. For example, the absence of placing historical and contemporary narratives within a Māori context in the 'mainstream' demonstrates how unconscious Eurocentric ways of viewing the world dominate the 'standard story' about Māori and effectively silence, what one of my participants called, the alternative 'tiny voices'.

The absence of a Māori voice in 'mainstream' coverage of news demonstrates how "the white eye is always outside the frame – positioning everything within it" (Hall, 1981, pp. 38-39) Abel (2016) notes that the framing of news stories from white perspectives is not conscious. This means that white ways of looking at the world seem to be at the level of 'commonsense', while other viewpoints are seen as deviations from the 'norm'. Abel (2016), identified four main levels where there is a relative absence of Māori voices in 'mainstream' media. The first is the dearth of stories that present a Māori world to all New Zealanders and the second is the absence of Māori as sources (even as vox pops or bystanders). At a third level, when Māori do speak as sources they do not necessarily get the chance to offer a distinctive indigenous world view. Finally, Abel concludes, that "most absent of all, is a Māori voice informed by the processes of colonisation and their aftermath, including the relevant history which is important to an understanding of the issue at stake" (Abel, 2016, p. 226). Ross (2014) also notes that New Zealand 'mainstream' newsrooms select and construct stories in ways that are framed by the 'commonsense' assumptions of dominant 'mainstream' values and "remain, by and large, mainly white and middleclass"<sup>94</sup> (Ross, 2014, p. 63). News stories are therefore unlikely to challenge anti-Māori discourses in society because in news reporting, Pākehā are positioned "as natural, the nation ... against which all other ethnic groupings are viewed and measured" (Moewaka Barnes et al., 2012, p. 197). However, it is these 'mainstream' narratives within news and current affairs that led many of the participants to notice counternarratives on Māori Television that disrupted dominant ideas of what constitutes an imagined New Zealand nation.

Although the study participants would not use this terminology, I use the term 'counternarrative' to mean a narrative that is counter to a 'Western-centric' worldview. However, I use the term with some reservation because some Māori scholars have suggested the word to mean that non-Māori, the Crown, and 'mainstream' are placed as the central reference point from which Māori histories and stories are compared. Although 'counternarratives' as a term was not explicitly used by the participants, I have

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<sup>94</sup> Ross is referring to a New Zealand Journalists Training Organisation workplace survey in 2006 where four in five respondents were European/Pākehā and fewer than one in ten recorded themselves as Māori. More recently '*e-tangata*', (a Māori/Pasifika news website) while not quoting workplace numbers, has highlighted the ongoing paucity of Māori reporters in 'mainstream' news (Deane, 2016).

decided to use it, not because I am suggesting that a Western view is central, but because there was a general coalescence amongst the comments that implied an awareness of the role Māori Television played in contesting ‘mainstream’ representations of te ao Māori. Arguably, this awareness arose because participants made meanings from viewing Māori-centric content on Māori Television and compared it to ‘Western-centric’ ‘mainstream’ television.

The contrast between Māori-centric content on Māori Television and ‘Western-centric’ ‘mainstream’ programmes became most apparent for the participants on Māori Television’s news programmes *Te Kaea* and *Native Affairs*. These news and current affairs programmes offer a diverse range of voices to provide more context in which to locate contemporary indigenous issues and to provide an historical perspective on news and current affairs. Alice here provides an example of how participants noticed a range of perspectives being provided:

*Māori Television news and current affairs seems to have a sense of the responsibility to tell stories from different perspectives ... [It] places the stories in a different context to mainstream news and is more inclusive of difference. (Alice, British).*

Jian recognised that the broadcaster challenged ‘mainstream’ media’s negative representation of Māori:

*On non-Māori media there are often stories about Māori being problems in some way. It paints a very sad picture. But Māori Television doesn’t appear to be afraid to talk about these things [problems] and in the news and current affairs there are items looking at some of the issues Māori face. Māori Television helps me think differently about some of the causes and think positively about how Māori are addressing their own concerns in their own way. (Jian, PRC Chinese)*

Jian and Alice’s observations, which are typical of many of the participants, affirm Māori Television’s ability to create a space where Māori cultural and political representations are placed centre screen. Jian began to realise that some of the reasons Māori might be seen as a ‘problem’ is because the ‘mainstream’ media is not providing the full story. As Smith (2016) points out, “Māori Television has an ability to create a space for a ‘Māori voice’ which heightens the broadcaster’s ability to advance a decolonising political agenda because it makes visible Māori agendas for social change and political change” (Smith, 2016, p. 135). It is apparent that my research participants recognised this potential in Māori Television.

Veteran media educator and commentator David Robie (2013) also provides an insight into the difference between the mass media and Māori Television observed by both Jian and Alice. When discussing news values in the Pacific region, he suggests broadcasters have followed the “monocultural Western news model as typified by New Zealand and Australia ... to exclude a range of perspectives that need to promote the participation of all stakeholders” (Robie, 2013, p. 87). This comment by



another participant, Rahul, typifies the contrast between Robie's description and what many participants noticed about a Māori approach to the coverage of news and current affairs:

*If I want to get a wider perspective and something that a migrant would understand in news and current affairs, I would watch Māori Television even though the programmes are not necessarily made with a non-Māori audience in mind. (Rahul, India)*

According to Edwards (2015), it is the tradition of the hui and the gathering of different voices that influences the treatment of news and current affairs stories on Māori Television. Clearly, Rahul noticed the impact of different voices on the reporting style of Māori Television. Carol Archie (2007) goes further than just noting different processes of decision making for Māori. She highlights that "fundamental Māori values" (Archie, 2007, p. 86) require a process of consensus and resolution within a hui and are reflected in Māori news reporting. This approach to coverage of news and current affairs implicitly provides a wider context for audience understanding.

However, it is not only the negative representations of Māori on 'mainstream' news programmes that compromise the ability of the public to be 'informed and educated' about the politics of the nation. Baker (2016) suggests the proliferation of infotainment and reality-style shows on New Zealand's 'mainstream' prime-time broadcasters' schedules have also eroded the quality of information in the public sphere with programming now focusing on tabloid angles at the expense of research or context. Baker suggests that while Māori might appear on such programmes, it is unlikely infotainment and reality-style formats would allow for the presentation of viable alternatives to dominant Pākehā world views.

The reality-style programme *Police Ten-7* is a case in point. *Police Ten-7* features police catching criminals, most of whom are Māori. Merle used the example of *Police Ten-7* to demonstrate how she had become more mindful of the mass media's representation of Māori. She considers that *Police Ten-7* representations of Māori on 'mainstream' television as criminals encourage misinformation about things Māori. Merle had a sense of injustice about the negative representation of Māori, having developed a more supportive attitude toward Māori after viewing Māori Television and understanding the context of Māori social statistics:

*We have been watching those Police Ten 7 programmes. The big thing is the photos. It's all Māori. I am wondering if perhaps that is true and possibly the police are looking for a lot more Māori, but is that a good thing to have on your mainstream TV where people already discriminate against a certain sector of the people? ... If Māori Television came up with something similar looking for white people how would they [white people] feel. They put a Māori presenter on the Police programme but it's still not right. It makes me realise the difference between Māori Television and mainstream. Māori Television news might tell me about problems with gangs and crime, but they also have stories about how the New Zealand*

*system is quite unfair to Māori ... and yes understanding more about the system helps me be more supportive of Māori rights. (Merle, South African)*

Merle suggested programmes such as *Police Ten-7* reinforced discriminatory attitudes toward Māori but recognised there was more to the story behind being labelled a ‘criminal’. She reflects on a system controlled by Pākehā values that ‘is quite unfair to Māori’ even without, perhaps, knowing the extent of any systematic bias against Māori in the justice system. Merle’s comment reflected recognition by some participants in this study of the wider effect of objectifying Māori as mostly criminals on TVNZ’s prime time and why Māori Television’s role in providing counternarratives to the negative stereotyping of Māori is important.<sup>95</sup> The representation of Māori as criminals forms a significant part of the prime-time screen presence of Māori on ‘mainstream’ television. While it is true that the proportion of Māori in prison is high compared to other ethnicities, the issue here is that Māori are not seen in the wide range of roles played by Pākehā, nor within the context of the lived reality of Māori lives (such as in the representation of Aboriginal people in the Australian television drama, *Redfern Now*)<sup>96</sup>.

## 8.2 The Absence /Inclusion of Māori History

In order to understand the interaction between Pākehā and Māori, and many of the issues that concern Māori today, knowledge of both colonial and more recent history is vital (Abel, 2016). Māori telling their own stories to audiences on Māori Television is one way to counteract the ‘mainstream’ media’s “contribution to continuing stereotypes of indigenous people through ... the absence of historical context” (Abel, 2016, p. 226). Māori Television’s inclusion of history within storytelling stood out for many of the participants. David, for example, noted:

*[In Māori Television] it is not only news and current affairs but also shows like Beyond the Brush and Te Araroa where the content acknowledges the past with a Māori view of history rather than history just being from a Eurocentric point of view. (David, British)*

David here is articulating the positioning of the ‘white eye’, a concept from Stuart Hall (1981) that I referred to earlier. While Hall was writing more generally, Abel’s (2016) specific study of the news, I would suggest, also observes the role of the ‘white eye’. She says, “the elimination of [colonial] history from the [‘mainstream’] news contributes to its mono-cultural nature ... at the same time, it also

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<sup>95</sup> Ironically, former CEO of Television New Zealand, Rick Ellis, once defended ‘*Police Ten 7*’ as an example of TVNZ’s commitment to meeting its legal obligations for greater Māori representation on the State broadcaster. Ellis claimed that ‘mainstream’ programming with Māori presenters or participants did have Māori representation saying that there is “a Māori presence in ‘*Location, Location*’, ‘*Animal House*’, ‘*Dream Home*’ ... and ‘*Police Ten-7*’” (Oliver, 2007). Ellis’ comment prompted then Prime Minister Helen Clark to suggest he needed to take “a course in intercultural understanding” (Trevett, 2007). The ensuing debate between broadcasters and politicians about the difference between a Māori presence and a Māori perspective on TVNZ reflects the fragmentation in ideas about how to represent Māori on ‘mainstream’ television (Trevett, 2007).

<sup>96</sup> *Redfern* is an Australian drama series produced in 2012 by Blackfella Films. It was the first Australian drama series written, directed and produced by indigenous Australians,

produces a version of events that favours Pākehā” (Abel, 2016, p. 226). Migrants are not actively encouraged to learn about the history of colonisation and its continuing impact on Māori - although it is arguable that many Pākehā are in the same position. Academics and some educators observe that within the New Zealand education curriculum Māori content is viewed as too controversial by history teachers and non-Māori students. Manning (2009), in a study of secondary schools in the Wellington area, found that “teachers agreed that Māori content was often avoided because it would require Pākehā students, parents and teachers to address a contested past” (Manning, 2009, p. 12). One of Manning’s teacher interviewees said, “the Treaty of Waitangi is a major issue in New Zealand history but a number of students think it is a total waste of time” (ibid.). Such thinking is unlikely to change when at an institutional level the government still does not make it compulsory for significant Māori historical events, such as the New Zealand Land Wars to be taught at schools.

### 8.3 A Sense of a Shared History with Māori

Pearson’s (2014) model of ‘national identification’ and the model of ‘acculturation’ by Berry et. al. (2006) point to the variety of migrant experiences in their negotiation of identity between ‘home’ and the ‘host’. This becomes relevant for migrants in Aotearoa New Zealand as they negotiate issues of identity, where the ‘host’ society is both Māori and Pākehā. This negotiation can often be thought of as a contradictory process, with migrants adapting to their host community, on one hand, at the same time as strengthening bonds to their original traditions on the other (Mata-Benítez & Gomez-Estern, 2013). I am suggesting in this study that the gulf between ‘home’ and ‘host’ can be bridged by finding commonalities between a migrant’s home culture and that of both Māori and Pākehā.

For some migrants in my study, the Māori experience of colonisation represented on Māori Television resonated with them because of similar experiences in their own backgrounds. In many former colonial nations, an indigenous view of history and colonisation – and its disruption to health, education and the social fabric of the culture – is largely absent from ‘mainstream’ media.<sup>97</sup> By comparison, Māori Television, by offering Māori realities of New Zealand colonial history, can potentially facilitate a better understanding of the complexities of migrant experiences of colonisation in their ‘home’ cultures, and Māori experiences of colonisation in Aotearoa/New Zealand.<sup>98</sup>

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<sup>97</sup> As researchers based in Western nations have shown, mass media in other settler societies continue to publish stories that similarly serve settler needs and goals: North America, (Daniels, 2006); Australia, (Due & Riggs, 2010) ; Canada, (Henry & Tator, 2002); Aotearoa, (Phelan & Shearer, 2009).

<sup>98</sup> See Mutu (2009) for a discussion about the shared Māori and Chinese cultural experience of the dominating “racial discrimination .... and delusion of white supremacy” (Mutu, 2009, p. 237).

Viewing counternarratives of a New Zealand history from a Māori standpoint and the ongoing injustices established a shared point of connection for some participants and was apparent in focus group discussions about Māori Television content around the time of Waitangi Day:

*Māori carry some of that experience [of colonisation] that I carry with me through my ancestry. The experience of colonisation by the British I think is a powerful point of connection. The more I learn about Māori culture and Māori Television is helping me, the more I think it will increase my sense of belonging. (Mihili, Sri Lanka)*

*I grew up on stories of the Indian Independence movement and its historic importance and influence in global colonial politics as well as domestically in India - including the extraordinary partition into India-Pakistan. I think this, and much of my travels, have made me more sensitive to issues of social and political justice - especially as it relates to indigenous people. My respect for the Treaty of Waitangi and its importance to New Zealand is originated from those experiences, I think. I find myself more sympathetic to the Māori translation and understanding of the Treaty of Waitangi. (Rahul, India)*

*I think China and New Zealand - Māori New Zealand - they share a similar past, the colonies of European countries, you know like Hong Kong was a British colony for over a century and China was also invaded during the mid 19<sup>th</sup> century, I think. I mentioned this I think, so the year the Waitangi Treaty was signed was also the beginning of China's modern history because in that age ... China was a huge country, the major cities along the coast line, they all became colonies to European countries during the second half of 19<sup>th</sup> century ... if you think of the Treaty of Waitangi that was signed in 1840, right? So the same year, China was engaged in a war against Britain which led to the secession of Hong Kong, so think about that, make this connection, so think about Hong Kong in its post-colonial society and think of New Zealand as post-colonial society. (John, PRC Chinese)*

These participant experiences of marginalisation under British colonial rule in Sri Lanka, India and China, and an understanding of Māori experiences related to the Treaty of Waitangi, might shed light on why some ethnic groups support Māori more than others. Margaret Mutu (2009) recounts how many Chinese approached her in 2004 to help the Māori battle to stop the New Zealand government confiscating traditional areas of Māori foreshore and seabed. She suggests Chinese support of Māori came from the Chinese experience of, ultimately, resisting British colonisation and a sense they could help Māori in their strategies of decolonisation and ongoing settler colonial oppression. Mihili and Rahul speak of a similar sense of shared history between Sinhalese, Indian and Māori. They recognised, or assumed, Māori Television programmers probably saw similar connections with other colonised or occupied societies. This following remark refers to the Waitangi Day screening of *Indochine* (1992), a film depicting the unravelling of the French colonisation of Vietnam:

*I was watching Māori TV and they were showing a French film depicting a French colony, maybe in Vietnam, maybe half a century ago and that was nice because I was thinking about here, what was happening here in New Zealand when the European that made British colonists came to the islands and ah kind of took the land, so I could see the connection, I could see why*

*they chose to show that film, yeah that was quite close to the Waitangi Day I think. (John, PRC Chinese)*

This is a reminder that individuals within an audience can read texts in a multiplicity of ways. John's awareness of the impact of European colonisation in Asia allowed him to read the programming of Māori Television's festival film, *Indochine*, from his perspective and demonstrates the power of the social imagination to place one's experiences within a larger social and political context (Mills, 1959). Although the festival film slot is often not indigenous programming, its presence on Māori Television reinforces the broadcaster's power to situate a global world view from a non-Western perspective and promote non-English speaking voices and discourses. Where necessary, subtitles remind audiences that there are many other alternative voices compared to the dominating discourses of settler colonialism in New Zealand (Greenwood, Harata Te Aika, & Davis, 2011).

## 8.4 Content with a Focus on Social Issues

Turner's (2011) study of non-Māori viewers of Māori Television found that many of his participants were attracted to programming that centered on "colonialist oppression, alienated rights and the voice of the minority" (Turner, 2011, p. 120). In my study, participants also noticed the potential for Māori Television programming to counter 'mainstream' hegemonic narratives related to social justice and inequality. As Jenny notes:

*Māori Television documentaries cover such a wide range of topics about social justice. Topics that you would never ever, ever see on mainstream television.... I looked at the programme about social issues up North. I couldn't help thinking about how positive it was with stories of how the community was tackling and solving its own issues of unemployment and poor achievement. If our mainstream media had focused on these stories it would not have had the inspirational dimension of people telling their own stories in their own way. (Jenny, Fijian/Indian)*

Jenny's observation affirms Māori Television's ability to create a space for an indigenous voice to tell Māori stories in Māori ways, where Māori cultural and political representations are placed centre-screen. For example, as Jenny noticed above, Māori were taking control of the social change required in an impoverished Northland community. Her observation of this story operating as a counternarrative to a 'mainstream' story is an example that contrasts with the mass media's representation of Māori through the lens of settler hegemony and its perpetration of the 'standard story' of Māori.

Laure also observes a contrast between 'mainstream' and Māori Television in how an indigenous view about oppression is given a voice. She compares news coverage of a visit to New Zealand by reggae artist, Jimmy Cliff. She notes that Cliff's politics of social justice were used to encourage Māori in Aotearoa:

*I liked the advice Jimmy Cliff gave to indigenous people on Māori Television. I doubt that this [the interviewer's] question [about a message to Māori] would have come up in mainstream TV. The words [Jimmy Cliff] he used were quite strong, talking about oppression and how you [indigenous] have to fight back etc, I wonder if he would ever be allowed to use the same language on mainstream TV? [In comparison to Māori Television] the mainstream item was just all hype and about what's it like being famous. (Laure, French)*

Mita, referring to a television drama series *Redfern Now* about some of the problems indigenous Australians' face in an inner-city suburb of Sydney, drew parallels between the social issues facing indigenous peoples in Australia and in New Zealand:

*I watch a bit of everything, but I do notice that many programmes on mainstream television are irrelevant to New Zealand, for example, why are we watching programmes about social welfare and beneficiaries in the UK? On Māori Television they have programmes about social issues and address these problems here. I have been watching a drama programme called Redfern; it reminds me of what life is like in South Auckland and I identified with it being a New Zealander and having Māori and Pasifika<sup>99</sup> neighbours. Redfern also reflects what life is like here in New Zealand. (Mita, Fijian/Indian)*

Dramas such as *Redfern Now*, festival films, New Zealand and international documentaries, and news and current affairs items from the World Indigenous Television Broadcasters Network (WITBN) provide commonalities for New Zealand audiences with local and international social justice issues for a range of indigenous and other marginalised groups. Although some of the respondents could not remember the name of the series, they did refer to Māori Television's former *Indigenous Insight* because it made them aware of many of the issues facing indigenous peoples globally. It also provided alternative indigenous models of responding to specific needs. These models were more holistic and self-determining compared to 'mainstream' models or those covered in 'mainstream' media. These provided insight into how a Māori approach could support Māori in their desire to be self-determining in their solutions to social issues:

*For example, I work in mental health and you look at dominant models of health care, but if you are working with Māori whanau it's very inclusive, there's not just one person, it's everything, very holistic, there's a raft of factors, spirituality, relationship with the land ...that's why I have a keen interest in watching Māori Television because I like to see what type of models are used in addressing various social issues which is about social justice. (Mihili, Sri Lanka)*

Differences between participants from different geographical locations became more apparent in discussions about social justice issues. While generalisations based on the small sample size are to be

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<sup>99</sup> 'Pasifika' (sometimes also spelled 'Pacifica') is a collective term used to refer to people from the Cook Islands, Niue, Fiji, Tonga, Samoa and other South Pacific nations. Its communities comprise of people born in the Pacific Islands and New Zealand. However, care should be taken when using the term because, as Samu (2010) warns, there can be a tendency to overlook the diversity of the South Pacific nations by using a homogenous term such as Pasifika.

avoided, it is worth noting that some of the participants had certain life experiences that had shaped their values and predispositions prior to the research. For example, Chen from mainland China had not thought about issues of social justice in his own country, but after experiencing racially based discrimination in New Zealand and viewing some Māori Television he became more aware about issues of social justice:

*When I lived in China I didn't really think about social justice. I knew about it but it wasn't until I was here that I felt it. Hearing shocking stories about the treatment of migrants and Māori, and experiencing racially based abuse myself, I realised I needed to be more open to ideas of what social justice actually meant. Chinese migrants share a similar oppression by Pākehā to Māori. I have become a lot more open and interested about ideas of social justice since I have been in New Zealand and watching some Māori Television is part of that. (Chen, PRC Chinese)*

As Chen suggests above, one of the outcomes from viewing counternarratives about social issues was that for some participants from ethnic minority communities, the content increased an awareness about inequality and discrimination of other ethnic minorities. This awareness was not only confined to New Zealand society but also shed new light on their own country of origin – and in a couple of cases on cross-cultural elements in the sectors in which they were employed. Charlie, provides an example:

*I'm from mainstream China and part of the main identity of Chinese. We have 56 minority groups and I never noticed the tiny voices. I think I am now more open to different voices from my own country and there is not one dominant way of looking at issues. Watching Māori Television has helped me understand more that Asian mental health has many parallels with the reasons for Māori mental health - marginalisation and discrimination. I feel that my work in mental health is about social justice and is very important here in New Zealand. (Charlie, PRC Chinese)*

For both Chen and Charlie, their engagement with Māori experiences of social injustice helped them to make greater sense of their own situations. Viewing content on Māori Television resulted in a shared awareness of racialisation, marginalisation, and injustice.

In contrast, participants from the 'western nations' group, who came from an ethnic background that allowed them to blend more easily into the majority white Pākehā population, engaged at a level that demonstrated an intellectual awareness, rather than an experiential awareness, of the politics behind ideas of social justice in programming, as shown in this exchange:

*Laure (France): I did connect with a feeling of solidarity and the importance of the group vs the individual.*

*Sally: (USA): Ditto with her. Yes, the group versus the individual. And social justice, human rights.*

*Laure: Yes, human rights.*

*Jessica (Germany): It's about the political values and connecting to that, advocating for minorities, social justice, challenging hegemonic ideas.*

While there are risks in extrapolating these findings from such a small group onto larger migrant populations, the findings do offer insight into the ways in which individuals interact with alternative media to the ‘mainstream’, and the power and potential that exists to make a difference at a personal level – one that extends beyond the study as participants become advocates for Māori Television among friends and work colleagues and recognise opportunities to challenge dominant discourses.

## 8.5 Reversing Negative Stereotypes of Māori in Other Minority Ethnic Media

Although the study began with each participant comparing Māori Television with ‘mainstream’ media, it also exposed the power of Māori Television to disrupt and transform negative stereotypes embedded in migrants’ own discourses imported from their home nation and in local ethnic media. Jenny, for example, observes that it is not only ‘mainstream’ media but also minority ethnic media that could play a part in the negative representation of Māori:

*Migrants when they come to NZ, the mainstream media and local ethnic media is about how Pacific Islanders and Māori are mad, bad, sad, losers and liars and trying to get money from Treaty claims. (Jenny, Fijian/Indian)*

Locally produced minority ethnic media provides an important source of information for many migrant groups. While racist and anti-Māori themes<sup>100</sup> in ‘mainstream’ media representations of New Zealand identities<sup>101</sup> have been well documented by academic researchers (Abel, 1997, 2016; Gregory et al., 2011; Moewaka Barnes, Taiapa, Borell, & McCreanor, 2013; Nairn, Moewaka Barnes, Borell, Gregory, & McCreanor, 2012) there is a dearth of studies that examine the representation of Māori in migrant media. Limited research suggests that racist and anti-Māori themes from ‘mainstream’ sources are imported into local migrant media. Media scholars Phoebe Li (2009) and Sally Liu (2009) have both researched locally produced PRC Chinese ethnic media – including radio, print and television news - and separately concluded that without having the resources to source independent material about contemporary Māori concerns, PRC Chinese media in New Zealand tends to import the already negatively biased ‘mainstream’ media’s reporting on issues related to Māori.<sup>102</sup> As a result, when new PRC Chinese settlers view their own community’s New Zealand-produced language media, there is the potential for them to adopt predominately negative attitudes towards Māori. Independent commercial research with a focus on niche advertising markets has shown that Asian language

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<sup>100</sup> Racism refers to the language used to sustain dominance of a group while anti-Māori themes is a term used to indicate the often unconscious thoughts and expressions that serve racism against Māori. These are often the ‘taken for granted’ attitudes used in everyday and interpersonal talk and expressed within the discourse of policies and practices within institutional structures (Nairn, 2016)

<sup>101</sup> Literature from other post-colonial nations such as Australia, Canada, North America also suggest that ‘mainstream’ media produces and reproduces news items that support the marginalisation and domination of the indigenous voice (Daniels, 2006; Due & Riggs, 2010; Henry & Tator, 2002).

<sup>102</sup> Research revealing the negative representation of Māori in the locally produced Chinese media should also be contrasted against a long history of positive Chinese/ Māori relations (Ip, 2003, 2008; Lu, 2009; Mutu, 2007, 2009).



communities also report a preference for consuming media in their own language (Reid Research, 2014), but it is unknown to what extent these audiences also consume locally produced media (such as ‘mainstream’ New Zealand news sources that include negative representations of Māori issues) versus media produced in their countries of origin.

In the New Zealand Indian community, media scholar and publisher Paula Ray (2015) notes that in Indian online media portals there is a dearth of Māori success stories and a tendency to focus on negative representations of Māori. However, there appear to be few academic studies on the representation of Māori in minority ethnic media other than local PRC Chinese media. While there are studies on the negative representation of migrants in the mass media (Spoonley & Butcher, 2011), the negative representation of Māori, Muslims, people from Asia and refugees on social media (Rankine, 2017) and the homogenising strategies and distorting stereotyping of Asians on New Zealand Television (Kothari, Pearson & Zuberi, 2004), there exists a research gap on how Māori are represented in different minority ethnic media. This would be important research because the negative representation of Māori in locally produced minority ethnic media could predispose audiences to develop unsupportive attitudes to te ao Māori.

## 8.6 Māori Television as a Resource for Reversing Negative Attitudes

As discussed above, the negative representation of Māori in both the ‘mainstream’ media and ethnic minority media can result in migrants adopting less than positive attitudes towards Māori. However, when watching Māori Television, participants’ comments concur with a study by Gregory et al (2011), where Pākehā and other tauwiwi<sup>103</sup> talked about the positive portrayals of the Treaty and Māori/non-Māori relations by Māori Television. In addition, my study also asked participants to consider whether listening to a Māori voice on Māori Television helped them form a basis for a positive change in their attitudes towards Māori.

As the study progressed and participants viewed more Māori Television, some became aware of a change in their negative attitudes towards Māori (and Pacific Islands people<sup>104</sup>) that had been shaped by the ‘mainstream’ media’s tendency to associate them with crime and violence (Moewaka Barnes et al., 2012; Nairn et al., 2012):

*I used to be frightened of Māori with tattoos but after watching Māori Television and seeing lots of tattoos and now understanding that a tattoo doesn’t mean being in gang I am not*

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<sup>103</sup> Gregory et al (2008) study refers to tauwiwi as immigrants but the study does not say from what geographical/ethnic group they are from, or their duration of residence in New Zealand.

<sup>104</sup> Pacific Island people living in New Zealand often are represented negatively within the ‘mainstream’ media and Pākehā-dominated society. Although they are not indigenous to New Zealand there are strong whakapapa links between the Pacific Islands nations and New Zealand where the oceans are seen as highways rather than as a means of separation between Polynesian peoples.

*frightened. Sometimes Māori people with tattoo seem respected and hold good position in society. (Jian, PRC Chinese)*

*I realise when I first arrived people told me Māori are strong and scary ... [and to] watch out for those Islanders too, they are mostly thieves. I think I didn't know much about Māori until I watched Māori Television and I now think that Māori people are easier to get along with than Pākehā. I think I have more in common with them, like some of the values. Actually when I have some contact with Māori now [around University] it is not like that and I am not scared. (Ye Jin, PRC Chinese)*

Like Jian and Ye Jin, Charlie's negative perceptions were challenged by alternative representations in Māori programming:

*Until I watched Māori Television I never realised that the Māori economy was such a huge part of New Zealand. This totally changed my mind that not all Māori are on benefits from the government, this is just one end of the economy. The other end is a huge business economy. I watched these stories about Māori business success on Te Kaea but also other success stories, like sport and community and what old people say and how Māori want to solve their own problems. (Charlie, PRC Chinese)*

Charlie's initial idea that most Māori were on some form of government benefit is shared by many recent PRC migrants. Li (2009) suggests many migrants from the PRC have difficulty understanding New Zealand's social welfare State and the State provision of housing, education, health and unemployment benefits because "attaining social equality and justice through redistributing social resources seems an alien ideology to China's new urban rich" (Li, 2009, p. 193). Li (2009) also points out that many new Chinese migrants come from backgrounds that are largely unsympathetic towards indigenous and minority peoples in their own country, considering them to be 'backward'. As a result, she says, "recent PRC migrants come to New Zealand with negative attitudes towards ethnic minorities and indigenous peoples both in China and in New Zealand" (Li, 2009, p. 196). Perhaps this attitude can best be summed up by John from China:

*I'm not sure if I should mention this or not, but I think the common stereotype even in South Chinese community here in New Zealand is that Māori and Polynesian people, Pacific Islanders, I don't know, maybe the common stereotype is that they are at the bottom of the social hierarchy, there's high rates of crime and everything, you know, so this stereotype that you know, they don't really want to affiliate themselves with this low culture so to speak, well I don't know, that's just speculation – a stereotype, yeah. (John, PRC Chinese)*

The most significant feature about the negative attitudes toward Māori tangata whenua described above is that they were accompanied by accounts of how the attitudes of most participants had changed considerably as a result of watching Māori Television. There were also some thoughtful observations about the consequences of racism, discrimination and inequality for Māori living in a Pākehā world:

*I talked about that racism programme amongst my friends, the one about Māori and Pasifika [I too am Auckland]... Wow, I really didn't know people would treat Māori like that. We have*

*the idea that government pay more attention to Māori. After I talked about the programme with my [Chinese] friends they were surprised. (Angel, PRC Chinese)*

*When I first came here, I thought English was my problem for really understanding what was happening. There is a lot of inequality between Māori and Pākehā. Māori often seem to be very poor and have a lot of problems. I work in the area of Asian mental health and the more I watch Māori Television the more I realise Māori have double discrimination, both racism and mental health issues. I don't understand why Māori are so discriminated against? I think Pākehā are totally different to Māori and Asian cultures. I think Pākehā are even more different after watching Māori Television. Thinking about what I watch on Māori Television has opened my eyes to lots of things ... Māori news, Te Kaea gives Māori a voice, a voice that is shut off from mainstream. I think it is similar to the Asian voice that is shut off from mainstream. (Charlie, PRC Chinese)*

Here we see a realisation by participants that an experience of marginalisation is a common reality for many Māori. Angel's comment that she thought the government would look after Māori might reflect a misconception that 'all Māori are on benefits', as suggested by Charlie earlier. Charlie's realisation of the power inequalities between Māori and Pākehā in a settler society provided him with an insight about the shared marginalisation between Asians and Māori. Charlie and Angel's change of attitude suggests a potential for some level of intercultural relationship, or at least dialogue across axes of difference, between themselves and Māori.

## 8.7 The Potential for Intercultural Bridge Building

The research has shown that counternarratives to 'mainstream' narratives can lead to positive attitude change amongst viewers. Not only do such narratives have the potential to improve intercultural relationships between Māori and migrants but also between migrants from different countries because they can sense a shared experience. Lucia, from Romania, senses this offering of stories from different perspectives as a form of cultural bridge-building:

*Māori Television is the most open TV station in New Zealand towards other ethnicities and different voices .... because I can see programmes in other languages about other minority cultures that have experienced similar things to me, topics about migrants and racism, they are all interesting to me ... Its collection of foreign movies is [also] impressive, and many of my migrant friends appreciate that. I do think Māori TV not only presents only one indigenous world view, but it opens possibilities of collaboration between Māori values and our values and sharing them with others, making room for negotiating the new New Zealand in a positive rapport with the native population. (Lucia, Romania)*

Lucia saw the possibilities Māori Television offers its audiences for building cross-cultural understandings in an increasingly diverse nation. Laure, from France, expands in the comment below about how Māori Television offers stories about those who often have no voice in Western 'mainstream' media - in this case, two items on the news programme, *Te Kaea*. Her comment relates,

first, to the Western Australian government eviction of Aboriginal communities from their traditional homelands and, secondly, to the Sydney siege of the Lindt café in Dec 2014 and subsequent concerns about an increased potential for Islamophobia and associated violence directed at Muslims in Australia. These two examples demonstrate how Māori Television includes stories about other ethnic minority groups. Potentially such content can facilitate intercultural bridge building because viewers like Lucia above see that “other minority cultures have experienced similar things to me”:

*Not only do I want to look at Māori but also look at other minorities, all these people that we might not even see ... it's quite nice there is a Māori Television that shows differences. The thing about the Aborigines that Māori Television showed was how they were being displaced from their land in Western Australia. I would not have known about it on mainstream media. Or the white Australian women in Australia wearing the burqa [to support Muslim women]. That was after that café bombing when Muslim women didn't feel safe. Mainstream don't bother about this. (Laure, France)*

While these stories are not related to New Zealand, some participants, like Laure, valued the opportunity provided by Māori Television to create a space for stories about minorities and marginalised groups that ‘mainstream’ media might not otherwise screen.

Other participants such as Rahul initially did not see Māori Television as serving a function of building bridges across cultures. Rahul was one of my participants who had previously viewed some Māori Television. In our first face-to-face focus group discussion he noted that while Māori Television could offer content not be found elsewhere in media sources, it did not necessarily promote intercultural understanding between migrants and Māori:

*I like the documentary and festival films Māori Television screens. They have a different documentary selection than mainstream. This appeals to the non-Māori audience. These documentaries are better than mainstream and generally, there is a courage in the issues they tackle and how they present them. Documentaries and programmes about Māori help me understand a Māori perspective better when I watch a Māori production as opposed to a mainstream production especially if it is about a particular Māori issue or concern. Māori Television does not oversimplify the issue or focus on fancy presentation. Māori Television is focused on its content. I like that. It's nice for me but it doesn't shift the dial for Māori and ethnic relationships. (Rahul, India)*

A few weeks after the final focus group meeting, I was in contact with Rahul and he told me he had just attended the annual conference of his New Zealand-based, but globally positioned, organisation. Personnel from all over the world met to discuss how to move their organisational goals going forward. Rahul said that after being involved in this study, he took the opportunity to speak to other delegates about why it is important to watch Māori Television when working for a New Zealand organisation. Interestingly, as per his comment above, his own inter-ethnic ‘dial’ had shifted. He had become an advocate for cross-cultural understanding:

*Watching Māori Television gave me an opportunity to speak to Māori leaders at our department induction programme. It gave me an entrée into a conversation about issues I had become aware of. In the staff induction programme, because I had watched Māori Television and been involved in the Facebook groups and discussion, it meant I could be sympathetic to a Māori world view. It helped me to connect to the stories they [the kaumātua] conveyed. I was empathetic to ideas of Māori economic development and how that could lead to more social justice within society and I could see how that [lack of social justice] is linked to Māori grievances. I encouraged many non-Kiwis and Kiwis working in overseas postings to watch Māori Television, so they don't lose touch with different perspectives [about issues]. (Rahul, India)*

Rahul's statement articulates the potential of Māori Television to promote intercultural relationships and connections between Māori and migrants from diverse ethnic backgrounds. This idea was shared by participants who felt that culturally diverse programming in the form of festival films, international documentaries and globally relevant indigenous stories together with informed Māori-related media content produced by Māori Television has the potential to create dialogue despite perceived cultural differences.

## 8.8 Conclusion

The findings discussed in this chapter demonstrate some of the ways in which a Māori voice on Māori Television exposes its audience to counternarratives to the 'mainstream' representations of Māori and understand a Māori world from a Māori perspective. Using my adaption of Barclay's communications marae as an analogy for the broadcaster's audiences, my participants' openness to 'active' viewing allowed them to be drawn from the conceptual space of the marae ātea and into the whareniui to 'listen-in' to content produced and informed from a Māori standpoint. It can be compared to a participant metaphorically standing in the marae ātea and 'listening in' to content that is made from within the whareniui. It is this content made from within the whareniui that 'talks-in' and both 'talks-in and talks-out' (as explained in Chapter 4) that has the ability to pull the viewer into the heart of the marae. It is 'listening-in' to this content that opens up possibilities for understandings of te ao Māori to emerge.

The participant responses reveal that the process of 'listening-in' to Māori Television content has the potential to make its migrant audiences aware of issues of historical injustices, the inequalities experienced today by Māori and challenge common stereotypes they had adopted from 'mainstream' discourses. As a result, many participants displayed a more positive and less discriminatory attitude to te ao Māori after watching Māori Television content.

This complements research in Canada and Australia that also indicates that indigenous media has played a role in informing and conscientising non-aboriginal audiences (Bredin, 2010; Meadows, 2005; Meadows, Ewart, Foxwell, & Forde, 2007; Roth, 2005, 2013). My focus group methodology

meant that participants' 'television talk' (Gillespie, 1995) about their viewing has resulted in their becoming involved knowingly or unknowingly in a level of attitudinal transformation.

The findings also suggest Māori Television had a pedagogical function for the participants and potentially wider audiences. What does seem apparent is that 'mainstream' narratives led many of my participants to notice counternarratives on Māori Television that disrupted dominant ideas of what constitutes an imagined New Zealand nation. Arguably, counternarratives emerging from within what Meadows (2005) has termed an 'indigenous public sphere' could be seen as contributing to a wider public sphere. My study's findings support Meadow's assertion of a relationship between the wider public sphere and an indigenous public sphere because my participants coming from various cultural backgrounds "simultaneously have membership of several different public spheres and interact across lines of cultural diversity" (Meadows, 2005, p. 38). For example, Mihili's comment in the beginning of this chapter suggests she has contributed to her own ethnic sphericule by encouraging her friends to watch Māori Television. Basing my argument on both Meadows (2005) and Ginsberg (1994) ideas (that the indigenous sphericule has significantly more weight in the public sphere for the reasons laid out in 3.5), I am suggesting that despite Māori Television having small commercial ratings compared to the 'mass' media, the broadcaster's contribution to the "advance [of] a decolonising political agenda" (Smith, 2016, p. 135) in the wider public sphere should be acknowledged.



## Chapter Nine

### Migrants Learning te Reo from Māori Television

Ko te reo te mauri te mana Māori.  
*Language is the essence of Māori identity.*<sup>105</sup>  
(Sir James Henare)

Whiua ki te ao, whiua ki te rangi, whiua ki ngā iwi katoa  
*Kaua rawa rā e tukua e, kia memeha e.*  
*Send them out to the world, to the sky; send them out to the people everywhere. Don't ever let*  
*them wither and die.*  
(Ngoi Pēwhairangi<sup>106</sup>)

This whakatauki by Sir James Henare and the verse by Ngoi Pewhairangi are affirmations of both the inextricable link between te reo and Māori identity and the ongoing struggle to revive the language. These two factors formed the fundamental argument in the successful Waitangi Tribunal claim in 1985 for te reo to be considered a taonga that needed to be protected under the Treaty. However, while the Treaty provided the legal basis for indigenous broadcasting, it took another 30 years of political agitation for an indigenous television broadcaster to emerge.

This chapter considers the extent to which exposure to te reo on Māori Television contributed to a 'passive' learning of the language for the broadcaster's migrant audiences and whether 'passive' language acquisition by the participants could be considered a successful outcome of Māori Television's mandate for the protection and promotion of te reo Māori. It also looks at how engaging in learning te reo Māori not only contributes to Māori Television's language revitalisation outcomes but also to participants' consideration of issues of belonging and identity.

'Passive' learning of te reo refers to language acquisition defined by Higgins and Rewi's (2014) Zero-Passive-Active (ZePA), model which underpins all Te Māngai Pāho funded programmes. Its potential value is not about an individual moving directly from *zero* proficiency to *active* fluency, as in a

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<sup>105</sup> The full whakatauki is as follows:

Nā te reo te kākahu o te whakaaro, te huarahi ki te āo tū roa o te hinengaro. Ko te reo, te mauri o te mana Māori.  
*Language clothes one's thoughts, one's ideas, and provides the pathway to enlightenment of the mind. The Māori language is the ethos that embodies all that it is to be Māori.*

<sup>106</sup> This quotation appeared in the *Review of Te Reo Mauriora* authored by leading academic in te reo Māori, Rawinia Higgins (2011). She explained that Ngoi Pēwhairangi originally composed this song and used these words specifically for the Television New Zealand *Koha* programme. Screening in the early 1980, "[*Koha*] broadcast the Māori language and culture to the nation and to the world. The popularity of the song was captured by all and has become the hymn for the Māori language and the struggle for language revitalisation" (Higgins, 2011, p. 3).



language proficiency scale, but about generating increased awareness and support more broadly. For example, success within the framework of ZePa could be seen as learning phrases, words and correct pronunciation without the expectation of proficiency (Higgins, 2015). The ZePA model highlights the process of how an individual shifting from a position of *zero* language knowledge, to a *passive* level and finally to an *active* level can strengthen the language's position in society. It also makes an individual's subsequent shift to more active language use easier to achieve (Higgins 2015). The ZePA model, importantly, acknowledges the language as a “[catalyst for] indigenous existence and, therefore, it affords the delivery and receptivity of indigenous knowledge within mainstream and indigenous forums” (Rewi & Rewi, 2015, p. 137). I discussed the ZePa model more fully in Chapter 5.

Research has already confirmed the link between non-Māori viewing Māori Television and language and cultural outcomes. A *Māori Broadcasting Language Impact Evaluation Report* (Māori Television, 2017d)<sup>107</sup> found 30 per cent of non-Māori viewers were receptive to te reo Māori and had increased their understanding of Māori culture as a result of Māori Television viewing. These results suggest the broadcaster has used its multi-platform digital and linear broadcast media to its strategic advantage, which might reassure the State funders that the broadcaster is contributing to the revitalisation and protection of te reo Māori. My research highlights that Māori Television, in pursuing its statutory obligation, can offer new migrants an understanding of the importance of valuing, embracing and speaking te reo,<sup>108</sup> and why te reo needs to be revitalised in the context of the impact of colonisation on the Māori language.

Participants in my study represent a segment of Māori Television's ‘growth personas’<sup>109</sup> audience strategy and could be seen as being part of Māori Television's strategic direction based on inclusivity and building a connection to Māori culture for all New Zealanders. While unreservedly, Māori Television tells Māori stories, made by Māori, for Māori, at the same time there are numerous popular generic-style programmes with a Māori twist – such as Māori-themed cooking or musical talent quest shows – that offer an alternative to ‘mainstream’ programmes, as well as news and current affairs programmes, international films, family-oriented ‘mainstream’ films and documentaries. Smith (2016) suggests such programming has the means “to divert the flow of audience attention away from ‘mainstream’ media providers by using new and novel content as the bait” (Smith, 2016, pp. 69-70). Not including the 100 per cent te reo channel, many programmes on the broadcaster's bilingual channel are entirely in English, such as some documentaries and films, while other programmes, such as *Marae*

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<sup>107</sup> The evaluation was a joint venture between Māori Television and Te Māngai Pāho and the research was conducted by independent Kantar TNS and Colmar Brunton.

<sup>108</sup> Māori Television's vision is for te reo to be valued, embraced and spoken by all New Zealanders (Māori Television, 2016b).

<sup>109</sup> See Chapter 5 for a breakdown of five audience segments identified as representing growth potential.

*Kai Masters*, include a language learning component by using either subtitles or immediate translation by the presenter. Some programmes, such as *Te Kaea*, are predominantly in te reo but offer English subtitles.

## 9.1 Māori Television and Learning te Reo

Māori Television's language strategy of revitalising the language and culture is demonstrated by a statement I have used previously:

There is no free ride on MTS platforms. If you are a documentary or French rugby fan you will be exposed to simple kupu (*words*) and suggestions of how you can learn more te reo. Also we will lay out pathways for language learning (Māori Television, n.d., p. 29).<sup>110</sup>

Hence, when audiences engage in viewing Māori Television content they are intentionally or unintentionally being exposed to language learning opportunities through watching subtitles offering direct translations<sup>111</sup> and having words reinforced in both station promos and within television content.<sup>112</sup> For example, in some prime-time programmes produced for Māori Television, such as the popular comedy drama *How to Find Me a Māori Bride*, there are many instances of implicit language learning opportunities through the use of English subtitles for selected key words such as *wero* (*challenge*), referring to the difficulty protagonists have in finding a Māori bride.

Higgins (2015) believes the ZePA approach has the potential to normalise the use of te reo and move towards a more meaningful official recognition. Normalisation of te reo goes hand in hand with Māori Television's aim of protecting and promoting te reo amongst its audiences. While some programming on the bilingual channel, and all programming on the exclusive te reo channel, encourages 'active speakers', many programmes are produced to encourage right-shifting attitudes and language use:

The shift from Passive to Active means a commitment to operationalising the conscious: transferring the thought to action. We believe there is a greater need to recognise the significance of right-shifting people from a position of Zero to Passive, when there is a strong propensity to become predisposed with right-shifting from Passive to Active. (Higgins and Rewi, 2014, p. 33)

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<sup>110</sup> MTS Content Strategy Segmentation 2015-2018.

<https://www.maoritelevision.com/sites/default/files/images/Producers/Content%20Strategy%20Segmentation%202015-2018.pdf>

<sup>111</sup> Education theorists (d'Ydewalle & Pavakanun, 1997; Neuman & Koskinen, 1992) have established that subtitled audio-visual material is a powerful pedagogical tool in helping to improve listening and comprehension of second and other language learners.

<sup>112</sup> While some research suggests that official language regeneration policies of various government agencies aimed at non-Māori through education and the media have been ineffective (de Bres, 2011), other scholars see television as a tool for the revitalisation of minority languages (Bell, 2010; David, 2010; Lysaght, 2009). De Bruin and Mane's (2016) research based in a New Zealand prison demonstrated that radio can be a powerful means for language revitalisation efforts. Although their research is not directly transferrable to my study involving migrants, they found that with Māori there was both a clear link between listening to Māori radio station *Tautoko FM* and both language learning and the development of a critical awareness of self-determination within the context of decolonisation.

Participants in my research were not active speakers but the study found several indicators of the ZePa model of right-shifting language acquisition — passive to active — from watching Māori Television, particularly because of the use of subtitles and translations. Participants reported Māori Television had reinforced their existing vocabulary, improved their pronunciation, and increased their understanding of the meaning of individual te reo Māori words:

*I have learned some important phrases through my work and I know when I use words like mana, mauri, whānau, taonga, manaakitanga, wānanga what they mean. So when I hear these words, or phrases with these words, in programmes ... I know what is meant and it reinforces that some of them represent familiar concepts found in my own culture. (Mita, Fijian/Indian)*

*I also liked how the reporter's comments were in Māori and translated in English [with the subtitles] — it is indeed a good way to remember Māori words and to practice them in sentences [with others]. (Sally, USA)*

Mita and Sally's work in social services and education respectively means that the use of te reo in the workplace, from a ZePa perspective, represents an 'assertion of indigeneity' in everyday 'mainstream' society. As Rewi & Rewi (2015) remind us, the ZePa model considers that learning te reo is not just about learning words and phrases, but is also about acknowledging the language as a catalyst for "indigenous existence and, therefore, [it] affords the delivery and receptivity of indigenous knowledge within 'mainstream' and indigenous forums" (Rewi & Rewi, 2015, p. 137).

Mita and Sally's comments also suggest strongly that while Māori Television reinforces and improves their prior knowledge, their fluency did not improve in a way that could be measured on a proficiency scale. Nevertheless, their experience from a political perspective and their support of the 'assertion of indigeneity' through their use of words in te reo could be viewed as successful according to the ZePA model.

Another example of learning te reo words within the context of the ZePa learning model can be seen in the case of Rahul (below) where he displays a 'passive', or supportive, attitudinal position towards the language. By learning a few words, he is demonstrating right shifting behavior along the spectrum towards an emergent 'active' state:

*I do like the Māori language show [the drama, Kōrero Mai]. They repeat words. I did like that but generally, no, it hasn't help me learn the language, it just helped me learn a few words and recognise them. Maybe I need to consciously try to learn the language. (Rahul, India).*

In Rahul's case, even though he is not actively learning te reo Māori, he is identifying and recognising some limited vocabulary at the same time as enjoying the mini-dramas created to teach the language. The following participants show how Māori Television supports their generally positive attitudes towards the language:

*Hearing te reo on Māori Television does help. When you look at the use of the English language today in New Zealand, when New Zealanders speak, I think it's very positive that they often incorporate quite a few Māori words. (Jenny, Fijian/Indian)*

*Seeing buildings with Māori names and having Māori place names and hearing the odd word when people are speaking always made me curious about the language. So when I started hearing te reo on Māori Television it just started making me more curious and I would look up some of the words. (Alice, Britian)*

Perhaps most importantly, and in support of the ZePa model's promotion of the development of individual's supportive attitudinal positions towards te reo, both Alice's and Jenny's comments demonstrate right shifting language behaviour.

Learning te reo and having the opportunity to learn new vocabulary and have it reinforced from watching Māori Television was also important because there is little use of the language more generally in New Zealand. Sally had enrolled in te reo language courses but ended up feeling despondent about continuing because of a feeling that her efforts were unsupported in her workplace, together with a general lack of opportunity in her wider day-to-day interactions:

*For me, I feel more affirmed and encouraged to study te reo when I watch Māori Television. In the business world no-one mentions learning Māori. Sometimes I did feel, am I wasting my time learning Māori? But after watching Māori Television I just feel a lot more affirmed and strengthened to pursue language because in the business world I have no encouragement. It's strengthened my hope that learning te reo is a good thing. (Sally, USA)*

Sally's experience shows that learning te reo Māori and feeling 'affirmed and encouraged' to do so by Māori Television needs the support of 'mainstream' society. However, in the course of being involved in this research project, viewing Māori Television and sharing with her focus group, her interest in gaining more te reo fluency and vocabulary was renewed. This suggests the research process of creating 'dialogic' focus groups for two months provided Sally with a degree of support for learning te reo and acted as a counter to any negative 'mainstream' attitudes. Sally's awareness that language learning needs to be associated with more supportive attitudes within wider society raises the question of how this can be achieved.

Te reo might be an official language of New Zealand, but language scholar Joshua Fishman (1997) has questioned whether mandatory measures without sufficient resources and cultural support for language revitalisation is sufficient for the language to survive. It is within this context that Māori media and Māori Television's legislative mandate to promote te reo Māori should be understood. Māori Television's *Māori Broadcasting Language Impact Evaluation Report* goes some way to suggesting that Māori Television is contributing to the mix of resources needed for the more widespread cultural support that language revitalization requires. While cultural support in the media for te reo predominantly comes from Māori Television, and to some extent Radio New Zealand, there is also

some limited, and arguably token, support in the form of mainly off-peak programming from state-owned Television New Zealand.<sup>113</sup>

However, widespread revitalisation of te reo Māori amongst ‘mainstream’ New Zealand may not be what some Māori want. Ngaha’s (2011) study concerning Māori attitudes towards non-Māori learning te reo found that her Māori participants overall were not in favour of compulsory acquisition and had mixed feelings about non-Māori learning the language. She discovered that some Māori were concerned about the mispronunciation of te reo and that many words can only be translated appropriately in a particular cultural context — a context non-Māori are unlikely to fully understand. Some of Ngaha’s (2011) participants, based on their experience of a Pākehā history of cultural appropriation and disrespect for Māori, were particularly against non-Māori using the language.

Ambivalent feelings about non-Māori learning te reo also became apparent in the current study. One participant felt keenly the sensitivities of some Māori surrounding non-Māori speaking the language:

*I've taken some te reo classes, it was a beginners' class and once I used it [teaching students] and I could see in some eyes it was, 'how dare you use my language' and then I stopped. They didn't say it but I felt it was like 'you're just a foreigner'. I thought this is not my territory – I was just learning it because I like learning languages. (Laure, France)*

Another participant, who had previously also learned some of the language, was sensitive to the fact that speaking te reo might be used by non-Māori for questionable reasons or seen by Māori as cultural appropriation. Rather than learn te reo for a sense of belonging, Jessica wanted to learn the language as a political statement to demonstrate her support for both the revitalisation of te ao Māori and the redress of past injustices against Māori:

*I don't use te reo. I have learned it for a sense of belonging, it is more a political statement. I can understand it but for myself, I find it more problematic – a bit more into the slippery slope of appropriation stuff – using it to give yourself a sense of belonging or mana. It's just a personal thing. (Jessica, Germany)*

Jessica is sensitive of the need to offer political support to Māori in the regeneration of their language, but perhaps needs more assurance from organisations such as Te Mātāwai that the use of the language by all New Zealanders is a political act of ‘indigenous assertion’.

Both Laure and Jessica’s observations echo some of the anxieties about non-Māori learning te reo raised in Ngaha’s (2011) study. In the context of both Laure’s and Jessica’s comments, even if Māori

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<sup>113</sup> Off-peak Māori language programming in 2017 on TVNZ consisted of *Whānau Living* and *Morena*, a daily morning 20-minute English/te reo lifestyle programme, *Te Karere*, a 20 minute late-afternoon English-subtitled news programme, and *Marae*, a 30 minute Sunday-morning current affairs programme. However, for the first time in prime time, a one-off series *Moving out with Tamati* (funded by *Te Māngai Pāho*) about Aucklanders shifting out of the city, featured both English and te reo. The programme received only some criticism about its use of te reo from its audiences (Media Watch, 2017).

Television does achieve more positive attitudes to the language and an openness to passive language acquisition amongst its non-Māori audiences, there may still be some internal issues, within Māoridom related the use of te reo by non-Māori, which need to be addressed.

But while there are debates about whether or not non-Māori should learn te reo, Māori Television continues to be bound by its founding legislation to be inclusive of all audiences. The broadcaster's language strategy concurs with Higgins' call for an overall strategic vision for te reo Māori that is inclusive of non-Māori. She says, "we cannot get locked into some sort of binary position that keeps Māori in and non-Māori out" (Higgins 2015, 32:18). Māori film and television broadcaster Tainui Stephens also agrees with Higgins in his support of non-Māori learning te reo because "if no one tries to understand each other Māoridom will never survive" (Stephens, 2016). However, Ngaha (2011) maintains there are certain conditions that would engender support by Māori for non-Māori in learning te reo. She lays out these parameters:

Certainly, an environment that is supportive of te reo is what Māori desire. When Māori culture and language is valued, when its intrinsic value is recognised, acknowledged and respected, at that point Māori in this study felt they could support and accommodate some non-Māori in learning te reo. The underlying issues that guide or promote that support are the attitudes and language behaviours exhibited by non-Māori towards te reo and respect for tikanga Māori. Anxiety and tensions arise for Māori when the language behaviours demonstrated by non-Māori do not show appropriate respect for the language, the people and/or tikanga Māori. (Ngaha, 2011, p. 239)

In this present study, although migrants from Western Europe felt this sense of censure most, it was not shared by everyone:

*Māori is pronounced quite similarly to Chinese so it has been easy for me to learn some Māori words and phrases. I then practise with Māori work colleagues and they are very happy. (Charlie, PRC Chinese)*

*I often find in my work in community development I am working with Māori. I pick up some words here and there especially after watching Māori Television. Sometimes I struggle with remembering how to pronounce te reo but they are very encouraging and help me. (Lucia, Hungary)*

While these non-Western participants felt comfortable using te reo with Māori, the study did not address the ways different Māori might feel towards different ethnicities learning te reo. Possibly Māori may be more supportive of visibly different migrants speaking te reo. Veracini (2012) suggests shared migrant and indigenous experiences of being 'othered' by the dominant settler colonial culture can potentially lead to shared alliances. For example, Māori and Chinese shared many commonalities as a result of negative experiences from 'mainstream' New Zealand (Lee cited in Mutu, 2009). However, a study by West-Newman (2015) found Māori attitudes to new migrants are possibly more

nanced. Her study was based on Māori attitudes to refugees and although there are no immediate parallels to the migration experience of the participants in my study, Newman-West makes the observation that “those [Māori] who were most sympathetic towards refugees tended also to draw a parallel between the newcomer’s situation and their own as a colonised people who at times had felt like refugees within their own country” (West-Newman, 2015, p. 17). Likewise, migrants from non-Western origins often experience the exclusionary effects of structural and systematic practices from ongoing settler colonialism (Chen, 2015; DeSouza, 2011). Hence, it may be that Māori are more supportive of language learning by those migrants who share a similar marginalisation in New Zealand.

Despite studies such as that of Ngaha (2011) revealing a hesitance by some Māori for non-Māori to speak te reo (and it is unclear from what limited research there is whether this includes migrants), the attitudes and behaviours of majority language speakers that support Māori language efforts, such as “attention to pronunciation of Māori words, use of Māori words, and speaking Māori” (de Bres 2008, 40) play a significant role in the long-term success of minority language initiatives (see de Bres, 2011; Fishman, 1991, 2001). My study found there were similarities between the attitudes and behaviours of participants and majority language speakers.

De Bres (2015) also makes the case for minority language hierarchies with Māori language at the top, followed by New Zealand sign language then Pacific languages, and finally minority community languages. Drawing on policy documents and interviews with policy makers and representatives of minority language communities, de Bres (2015) found there was a strong argument that language groups at the lower levels of the hierarchy, such as minority community languages, more readily accepted initiatives directed at the promotion of the Māori language rather than their own, or other language communities.

## 9.2 Other Reasons for Learning te Reo

Many migrants come from countries where more than one language or dialect is spoken or understood as part of everyday life. Living in New Zealand’s largely monolingual country is unfamiliar to them. This seems to be one reason some participants felt strongly about engaging with te reo language learning through Māori Television — wanting to learn te reo Māori, both as an official language and as a cultural requirement for living in New Zealand. The following participants provide some examples of this:

*As a migrant, I felt a need to learn te reo the first year I came to New Zealand. I come from a culture where learning a foreign language is compulsory. I studied four at one point of my schooling years. I am a believer that ‘in order to enter a world, one needs to enter its language’. I cannot remember who said that, but it is wise. (Laure, France)*

*I came here expecting to learn Māori as on Immigration New Zealand's website it says te reo Māori is an official language. I was quite surprised when I arrived, it was quite monolingual. (Shahi, India).*

Being familiar with learning new languages is not uncommon for many migrants who come from multilingual backgrounds and possess what is termed 'metalinguistic awareness' (Olthuis, Kivela, & Skutnabb-Kangass, 2013, p. 223). In fact, the ability to compare languages and understand how they function is a likely explanation of why bilinguals and multilinguals are better language learners than monolinguals (Olthuis et al., 2013, p. 223). Hence, Te Matāwai might consider that migrants could be an important group to consider in its efforts to normalise the use of te reo in the nation.

Language learning through Māori Television also assisted some participants with a sense of cultural integration. The study found that learning te reo had the potential to provide emotional benefits for migrants and a sense of psychological adjustment to living in a new country. Charlie, a migrant from the People's Republic of China (PRC), said learning the language "helps me with my acculturation". He wanted to understand some of the language because it helped him to engage with the history and culture of an integral, but minority, host culture in New Zealand.

In discussing his experience, he used the term 'acculturation' that Liu, Gallois and Volčič describe as "often marked by physical and psychological changes that occur as a result of the adaption required to function in a new and different cultural context" (Liu et al. 2010, p. 247). The acculturation model, originally developed by Berry (1990), observes that immigrants are faced with operating along a continuum between maintaining their heritage culture and maintenance of relationships with the host society. The important point here is that acculturation represents a fluidity and is a process where there are significant variations at the individual level in how people acculturate — culturally and psychologically — and how well they adapt to the process of being able to move between two cultures and in and out of different cultural world views effectively as the circumstances and situations demand (Sam & Berry, 2010). Bennett, Bennett and Alan (2003) also describe a continuum of attitudes from ethnocentric stages of denial and defensiveness towards other cultural views to ethno-relative stages of adaption and integration and an increasing ability to adapt behaviour and communication inter-culturally. Migrants who arrive without English speaking skills need to learn English to function within the structures and institutions of New Zealand, but little has been asked about whether migrants need to learn te reo as a start to understanding both the founding cultures of Māori and Pākehā. Jenny reflects on how her journey of acculturation is enhanced through learning te reo:

*The more I understand and pick up words from Māori Television means sometimes when I go to work the next day, I can start a conversation with my Māori colleagues practising what I have learned. So it does help. I feel that learning some te reo helps me to feel I belong. It helps me navigate my way in terms of identity. I say 'navigate' because we struggle with our own*



*ethnic world and the nationality of being a New Zealander and living amongst a very diverse community. (Jenny, Fijian/Indian)*

Charlie and Jenny work in what might broadly be called social service environments where they interact with Māori colleagues and clients. In contrast to Ngaha's (2011) study they both observed that the acquisition and reinforcement of even limited te reo vocabulary through Māori Television, when used in interacting with Māori, facilitates the formation of relationships within an intercultural space.

While much of the literature contextualises acculturation as migrant interaction with a 'host' culture (Berry, Phinney, Sam, & Vedder, 2006; Ward & Lin, 2005), Jenny describes this complex issue of identity in a 'bicultural' nation as 'navigation'. She says it is a 'struggle' when a migrant is not only dealing with the host cultures of Māori and Pākehā but also other ethnic migrant groups. Since acculturation is a process, there are many nuanced differences between adaption and integration. Jenny's awareness of the need to 'navigate' suggests she has the conscious ability to adapt behaviors to different cultural norms in her environment.

Bennett et al. (2003) describe this adaption of behaviours' as being about an individual shifting cultural reference points and being intentionally able to change their behaviour as the situation demands. They see this conscious act of adapting as a type of "intercultural empathy which involves temporarily setting aside one's own world view" (Bennett et al. 2003, 251). On the other hand, a fully integrated person is "one who can perceive events in cultural context to include their own definitions of identity. For these people the process of shifting cultural perspective becomes a normal part of self and so identity itself becomes a more fluid notion" (ibid.). The difficulty of dealing with two host cultures feels to Jenny like a tension between adaption and integration.

Sally also touches on the theme of her own identity and belonging to Aotearoa/New Zealand through learning and using the language. She recognises that for her te reo Māori is a powerful tool in both accessing a connection to a Māori history and her own sense of belonging to the land of Aotearoa:

*I would like to know more — for me, it is both personal interest in the language as well as political ... It helps me connect to the land and history of New Zealand as I'm a migrant and want to feel a sense of roots here ... I feel a sense of mana when I use the language that I don't feel with English — plus I like the idea of uplifting Māori to a place of respect in our society beyond just a 'formality' ... I like the idea of Māori being a required language in our schools - to cultivate a sense of identity, mana, pride, and connection in all New Zealanders. (Sally, USA)*

Both Jenny's and Sally's experience demonstrates the importance of resources for migrants, such as those provided by Māori Television, to facilitate a feeling of a 'sense of place' in the context of some of the negativity from 'mainstream' media and culture towards migrants in New Zealand. Sally also

touches on the idea that using the language is a political act and that understanding te reo words, such as place names, helps users to connect more to the land and history of the nation.

### 9.3 The Political Status of te Reo Māori

The participants were not conscious of the philosophy of indigenous assertion inherent within the ZePA model, but my findings suggest they became aware of the need for an ‘assertion of indigeneity’ through the language. They became aware of the difficulties of minority language revitalisation and its niche use in ‘mainstream’ New Zealand.

Both Mihili and Alice observe that the normalisation of the language on Māori Television is a direct contrast to majority ‘mainstream’ programming and that there is little opportunity to use te reo in the wider society:

*It is difficult to learn te reo from Māori Television because there are not many opportunities to practise the language, but it has helped my pronunciation and learn a few key words that I see often. (Alice, Britian)*

*I have sometimes been able to catch an episode or two of ‘Tōku Reo’<sup>114</sup> I think they introduce new Māori words and concepts in a very accessible way in the programme, the problem though is retention because of lack of usage and visibility of te reo in the ‘mainstream’. (Mihili, Sri Lanka)*

The lack of visibility of te reo, observed not only by migrants, could be seen as confirming some of the objections against the 1985 Wai 11 claim for the official recognition of te reo Māori. These objections included beliefs that te reo Māori could not meet the needs of a modern society, that most of New Zealand could not understand or speak it, that the majority should not be forced to adopt the values and standards of a minority, and that official recognition is an empty gesture (Waitangi Tribunal, 1986). Although these comments were made 30 years ago, these types of sentiment, as Higgins (2015) points out, are still expressed by some of those in influential positions, such as former Prime Minister John Key (See Fagan and Day, 2015), and vocal but not representative groups such as Hobson’s Pledge, where spokesperson Don Brash said in 2017 that he was sick of hearing te reo Māori on Radio New Zealand because very few New Zealanders could understand the basic phrases and greetings being used.

Given some of the objections to the widespread normalisation of te reo, it is understandable, as an insightful participant observed, that the presence of Māori Television might limit a more general acceptance of te reo:

*So, while the Māori channel is a great source and reflection of indigenous perspectives, it may also have the effect that things like te reo do not become normalised and integrated into the*

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<sup>114</sup> *Tōku Reo* is a television series for Māori language beginners.

*mainstream. Hence you can have ... programmes in te reo all day long without anyone raising an eyebrow but as soon as someone utters a few words in te reo on a mainstream channel they are criticised and threatened. (Jessica, German)*

Jessica makes explicit the inherent tension in language rejuvenation policies where, on one hand, language must firstly be nurtured and normalised within a safe environment before being accepted by the wider community, but, on the other hand, the wider community remains unsupportive. Her comment echoes some of the reasons for the establishment of Te Mātāwai - an independent entity set up under Te Ture mō Te Reo Māori (the Māori Language Act, 2016). Te Mātāwai aims to promote the use of te reo in homes, the community and wider society. The organisation represents a body of Māori stakeholders, including Māori Television, working towards the normalisation of te reo through a more coordinated nation-wide and iwi supported approach across all sectors, aimed at language revitalization. According to Te Mātāwai chief executive Te Atarangi Whiu, while the language is currently used in a range of everyday settings by iwi, Māori and wider society, its use needs to be intensified across a range of environments and settings and more importantly, normalized (Walters, 2018).<sup>115</sup> At this stage it is too early to know the extent to which Te Mātāwai's policies have contributed to a more widespread acceptance of te reo. Once this is known, potentially Jessica could be reassured that Māori Television does not represent a form of containment for the language.

Jenny recognised the ambivalent attitude a relentlessly monocultural nation has towards te reo Māori when a weather presenter used a few te reo words for place names in Aotearoa/New Zealand. TV3 News weather presenter, Kanoa Lloyd, posted in a tweet referring to weekly complaints about her 'slipping odd Māori words' into weather forecasts, such as using Māori names for the country, and for the North Island and South Island (Lloyd, 2015). Many of the participants, such as Jenny, experienced the loss of the everyday use of their own language, and so were perhaps painfully aware of how some Māori might feel about the status of te reo:

*The classic example of this for me was on [mainstream channel] TV 3 last week. The weather presenter had been using te reo in her report, but it did not go down well with mainstream New Zealand. It's great that TV 3 stood by her. Te reo is one of the official languages of New Zealand. I think it is very strange because on mainstream news there is always a welcome in te reo so why do viewers not like te reo being used on the weather. I think this is an example of the official recognition of Māori culture but, in reality, mainstream New Zealand do not want to know, or be challenged too much by an indigenous presence. (Jenny, Fijian/Indian)*

The ensuing storm of criticism from some members of the public about Lloyd's use of te reo received widespread 'mainstream' media coverage in both New Zealand and Australia (NZ Herald, 2015; Te Manu Korihi, 2015; SBS News, 2015) and suggests that some Pākehā intolerance of te reo Māori in broadcasting is symptomatic of the domination of the English language and cultural environment. As

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<sup>115</sup> <https://www.stuff.co.nz/national/politics/100798050/can-te-mtaiwai-save-te-reo-first-regional-funding-round-underway>

Simon Day (2015) explains, this push back by some Pākehā could be their reaction to the increasing presence of te ao Māori since the Māori renaissance, and the normalisation, to some extent, of the place of Māori in popular culture.

The political will for the widespread adoption of te reo appears to be changing. In 2015, at the time of this research, New Zealand's then National Party Prime Minister John Key responded to a school girl's suggestion that New Zealand have a Māori language month rather than the usual Māori language week by suggesting it would be boring (Fagan and Day, 2015). Although Key later defended his statement by saying that a month would lose the intensity of the annual week, Māori academic Rawinia Higgins suggested at the time that Key's position reinforced the view that "te reo is still considered as not being important, nor is it part of any vision to see a functioning bilingual New Zealand" (Higgins (2015). However, just two years later, in 2017, the newly elected Labour government committed to ensuring that by 2025 every child during early childhood education, primary and intermediate school would have te reo Māori integrated into their learning. While this has met with some controversy within opinion pieces in the 'mainstream' media,<sup>116</sup> there is anecdotal evidence suggesting that since the last census numbers of non-Māori speakers of the language are rising, especially amongst young Māori adults and professionals (Roy, 2018).

There are also many further signs of language revitalisation within the nation. Te reo Māori is increasingly being inserted into New Zealand's everyday lexicon and, as Macalister (2005, p. viii) suggests, that is precisely what makes the New Zealand form of English distinctive. Mulholland (2006) has observed that te reo Māori has begun to penetrate nearly every aspect of cultural and political life from education and government institutional signage, to the business and service sectors, to New Zealand's iconic nightly television soap opera *Shortland Street*. In 2009 a Te Puni Kōkiri (*Ministry of Māori Development*) survey found there was a steady improvement since 2000 of non-Māori attitudes towards the Māori language. For example, the number of non-Māori who believed not enough te reo was being spoken had risen from 30 to 38 per cent (Te Puni Kōkiri 2009, 6). More recently, in 2017, 'mainstream' broadcaster TVNZ launched *Moving Out with Tamati*, its first primetime programme that included te reo content, most of which was subtitled. However, while only twenty per cent was in the Māori language, the presenter Tamati Coffey and the TV Guide received complaints about the use of te reo on the show (Bamber, 2017). While 80 per cent of the feedback was positive, some level of criticism was aimed at both TVNZ and Coffey with comments such as 'stop speaking that language', 'we don't understand', 'I got bored', 'I switched off', 'we don't like the language' (Bamber, 2017, para. 4). Viewer feedback such as this demonstrates that a small, but vocal number of 'rednecks' have no hesitation in making known their negative attitudes towards te reo Māori. However, it appears that the

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<sup>116</sup> The most vocal group against the introduction of compulsory learning of te reo in schools and the use of te reo on Radio New Zealand is Hobson's Pledge, formed to oppose what they see as Māori favouritism.

revitalisation of te reo is still gaining traction. In 2018, beginners' courses in the Māori language reached full capacity around the country, with waiting lists as long as 300 people in some areas<sup>117</sup> (Hurihanganui, 2018).

## 9.4 Conclusion

In my study of Māori Television's migrant audiences, it has been important to look at cultural benefits, such as a 'passive' acquisition of te reo, that participants might receive from engaging with Māori content on Māori Television. Participants found any prior knowledge of te reo vocabulary used in Māori Television content was reinforced, and that the learning of various kupu was enhanced through the provision of English subtitles when te reo was spoken. Being exposed to te reo on Māori Television and engaging in the language learning programmes also engendered a desire for further learning of te reo and curiosity in te ao Māori.

A heightened level of participant exposure to the Māori language in this study was also a factor in facilitating settlement processes. Many respondents found issues of acculturation and individual identity in Aotearoa/New Zealand were addressed to some extent by 'passive' language acquisition because it helped them understand various kupu used in the everyday lexicon of New Zealanders. Furthermore, participants learning everyday te reo words found a confidence to engage in using the language in ordinary day to day contact with Māori. I will return to this discussion in Chapter 13.

While not directly related to the research questions, the relationship between the normalisation of te reo in the nation and the 'assertion of indigeneity' (Rewi & Rewi, 2015) was also noticed by some of the participants. Migrants often come from multilingual backgrounds and arrive in New Zealand with a readiness to learn te reo as an official language of the nation. Capturing migrants' readiness to learn te reo by independent statutory entities charged with revitalising New Zealand's indigenous language can be a way of facilitating a shifting of discourses surrounding the nation's identity and can offer Māori increased support for the normalisation of te reo.

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<sup>117</sup> <https://www.radionz.co.nz/news/te-manu-korihi/351351/hundreds-on-wait-lists-for-beginner-reo-classes>

## Chapter Ten

### Te Tiriti o Waitangi and Migrants' Sense of Belonging

*The Treaty is a way that I can find my place in New Zealand and through the Treaty, I can make Aotearoa my home, and it doesn't have to be a conflict with me also being Romanian. (Lucia, Romania)*

*After watching Māori Television, I think I get what Māori people claim and why. The whole story about giving up your sovereignty is fishy. Why would anyone do that? (Laure, France)*

Those who immigrate to New Zealand to work in the private sector are given few opportunities to learn about the Treaty before and after their settlement (Huygens, 2016). However, for migrant participants in this research, engaging in viewing Māori Television's programming provided a sense of te Tiriti o Waitangi, the Māori text of the Treaty, and offered a comparison to the negative sentiments in 'mainstream' media's representation of the Treaty and Māori. My audience study of Māori Television complements and expands a study by Gregory et. al. (2011) about 'mainstream' media which found amongst what the researchers call a tauwiwi group of non-Pākehā and non-Māori New Zealanders:

The lack of historical and contextual information about the Treaty of Waitangi contributed to a questioning of the validity of Treaty settlements and a lack of support for affirmative policies ... moreover, the media focus on mismanagement of settlement monies was perceived to encourage the idea that Māori should not receive such settlements as they were poor managers of assets. (Gregory et al., 2011, p. 57)

Only a few studies demonstrate that prior to formal Treaty education<sup>118</sup> many migrants see the Treaty, as New Zealand's founding document, as largely irrelevant to them (see Ip, 2003; McGrath et. al., 2005; Omura, 2014). However, as the above comments demonstrate, participants in this study came to understand how the Treaty is relevant and potentially can increase their sense of belonging to the nation.

This section of my findings discusses comments such as those above and the meanings research participants made after viewing Māori Television's representation of the Treaty. The main focus of the chapter is coverage of Waitangi Day 2015: a representation as seen and constructed through a Māori lens, and in direct contrast to the day of contestation represented by 'mainstream' media as demonstrated by the following selection of mass media representations from 2012 to 2017 (See Figure. 5).

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<sup>118</sup> Treaty Education, as a movement of educators, works mainly in the public sector with the aim of increasing the awareness of the Māori view of te Tiriti and colonisation. The movement is described more fully in Chapter 2; section 2.6

As explained in Chapter 2, in the Māori text of the Treaty, Māori assert their tino rangatiratanga and clearly do not cede sovereignty. Māori Television affirms this position of Māori sovereignty and represents the Māori text, te Tiriti o Waitangi, as the basis for contemporary Māori and Pākehā relationships. A Māori view of the text is that at its heart are also relationships of mutual benefit to both Māori, Pākehā and all tauwiwi, including a clause, known as Article 4 that guarantees cultural and religious freedom for all.<sup>119</sup> Participant recognition of Māori Television's counternarratives to the 'mainstream' representation of the Treaty forms the basis of chapter 10. Therefore, what follows in this chapter is that the Treaty is referred to as Te Tiriti, whenever a Māori centric world view, as seen through the lens of Māori Television, is intended.

I use the phrase 'passive learning of the intentions of te Tiriti' to provide a distinction between purposive learning from a Treaty education workshop and a more passive learning from viewing indigenous television. Watching Māori Television on Waitangi Day, or more widely Māori-related content on Māori Television, is *not* like attending a formal education course where those attending gain a detailed knowledge of the content, historical context and debates about the interpretation of the Treaty texts. Rather, I have extended Higgins & Rewi's (2014) language acquisition model about the importance of language strategies that engender supportive attitudes towards te reo and how through the use of the language, there is an acknowledgment of indigenous existence in the 'mainstream'. Higgins and Rewi (2014), for example, argue that "those in the Passive state will ... support Māori language endeavours activated by others" (Higgins & Rewi, 2014, p. 29). Applying their idea of 'passive' learning, my use of the term 'passive learning of the intentions of te Tiriti' also relates to the potential for viewers to become more receptive and more supportive to the concept of te Tiriti as the foundation of Pākehā-Māori relationships and how it informs many of the current issues arising from that association. I argue that a 'passive learning of the intentions of te Tiriti is demonstrated through participants developing more supportive attitudes towards te Tiriti. Such attitudes are gained through engagement with content that includes issues related to te Tiriti more generally on Māori Television's daily programming, and specifically on its Waitangi Day programming.

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<sup>119</sup> Article Four relates to an individual's right the freedom of religion and belief (wairuatanga) and appears only in the Māori text, te Tiriti o Waitangi.

# Waitangi Day

**Paul Holmes: Waitangi Day a complete waste**  
 3:10 AM Saturday Feb 11, 2012  
 391 comments  
 APN News & Media Ltd. View New Zealand  
 SHARE: f t G+ in ☆  
 It's time to cancel our repugnant national holiday  
 Waitangi Day produced its usual hatred, rudeness, and violence against a clearly-elected Prime Minister from a group of hateful, hate-fueled weirdos who seem to exist in a perfect world of benefic provision. This enables them to blissfully continue to believe that New Zealand is the centre of the world, no one has to have a job and the Treaty is all that matters.

**Hostility won't deter me, says PM**  
 Hindon gets her own year: Oil tracers hampered to honours - coronal  
 Despite Sir Peter Hoare's attempt to shut the show at Waitangi, Prime Minister John Key has vowed to hold a ceremony to attend celebrations three regardless of the reception he receives.

**John Key throws Waitangi visit in doubt as he calls Te Tii Marae group 'Mickey Mouse'**  
 Audrey Young is the New Zealand health's political editor  
 Photo: Waitangi Day

**Bill English says Waitangi organisers need to 'get to grips' with a national day Kiwis will support**  
 12:05 PM Saturday Feb 11, 2012  
 12 comments

**TITEWHIRI HARAWIRA**  
 Maori Activist  
 LIVE  
 TVNZ NEWS  
 WAITANGI

**CELEBRATING WAITANGI DAY**  
 (THIS PAPER IS FREE OF PROTESTS)  
 KIDSCOURTAGE

Figure 5: Mass Media Coverage of Waitangi Day



## 10.1 A Sense of Why te Tiriti is Important

Participants did not make the distinction between ‘passive’ learning from watching television and more formal or active Treaty education. Hence, when Jenny uses the word ‘learning’, in this case, it does not necessarily mean detailed or purposive learning, but rather a developing sense of the meaning and importance of te Tiriti, or what I have termed a ‘passive learning of the intentions of te Tiriti’:

*I think to a great extent Māori Television been a pathway for learning about the Treaty and Māori in New Zealand. For example, they screen New Zealand documentaries. I remember watching a couple of documentaries especially the one about Bastion Point: the occupation of Bastion Point. That was a real eye-opener, I knew about it, but seeing it on screen, I remember being so surprised getting to know a little more history and the reality of the fight for the land of Ngāti Whātua right here in the middle of the city. (Jenny, Fijian/Indian)*

*Bastion Point - The Untold Story*, made by Bruce Morrison in 1999, tells the story of the loss suffered by Ngāti Whātua of their remaining homeland in 1951 and their re-occupation of it to prevent a proposed upmarket housing development on the land. Some of this land was eventually returned to Ngāti Whātua, with compensation, as part of the 1988 Treaty of Waitangi settlement process.<sup>120</sup> While the documentary provided an overview of both Ngāti Whātua’s grievances and more generally Māori historical grievances about the land, it could not be regarded as an ‘education’ documentary about the te Tiriti *per se*. Nevertheless, Jenny examples this documentary as “a pathway to learning about the Treaty” and indicates Māori Television’s pedagogical function of offering its audiences more of a ‘passive learning of the intentions of te Tiriti’. Mezirow (1990) suggests that learning is the “process of making a new or revised interpretation of the meaning of an experience, which guides subsequent understanding, appreciation and action” (Mezirow, 1990, p. 1). While Jenny might not have the same understandings as she would probably gain from completing a Treaty education course, she can still make ‘meaning’ from viewing the documentary and gain both an understanding of some of the historical and contemporary injustices Māori experience and a ‘passive learning of the intentions of te Tiriti’.

At times Māori Television content, particularly within the genres of news and current affairs, is within the context of an assertion of te Tiriti and thereby offers all of its audiences a ‘passive understanding of te Tiriti’s intentions’. For example, *Rethink*, a series that investigated current affairs issues from both a Māori and non-Māori perspective, investigated the Resource Management Act from both a Māori and Government perspective. Laure viewed an episode and noticed that within the context of

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<sup>120</sup> It was also agreed that Ngāti Whātua would share management with the Auckland City Council of a reserve on the land, part of which is an obelisk that commemorates the burial place of Michael Joseph Savage, New Zealand’s first Labour prime minister. It was under Savage’s government that Māori, for the first time, received – at least in theory – equal access to unemployment benefits and housing finance (Ministry of Culture and Heritage, 2014a).

the programme Māori commitment to environmental policy and resource management was referred to as being recognised under the Treaty. Although there was no explicit explanation in the content of how the principles of kaitiakitanga were incorporated within te Tiriti, she recognised why it was so important to engage in the issue from a te Tiriti perspective. Here, Laure demonstrates that her ‘passive learning of the intentions of te Tiriti’ had made her think about issues differently:

*Sometimes issues to do with the Treaty of Waitangi are in the background of many of the programmes I watch on Māori Television. For example, the discussion about changes in the Resource Management Bill was discussed on Rethink from different, both Māori and non-Māori perspectives ... it makes a difference to the way I think about Māori and New Zealand. Learning about a Māori view [of an issue] has forced me to position who I am here [in New Zealand] differently [in relation to Māori]. (Laure, France)*

Laure’s comment about positioning herself differently in relation to Māori foreshadows an important thread to my research that I will return to shortly. My study builds on the work of Omura (2014) who found that when Asians completed formal Treaty education they experienced improved psychological integration and a sense of belonging to Aotearoa New Zealand. My research also considers the extent to which an understanding of te Tiriti, albeit a ‘passive’ understanding, might contribute to a repositioning of identity.

I will now turn to examine how viewing Māori Television’s representation of Waitangi Day firstly, enhanced many of the participants’ understanding of the historical basis for some of the contemporary issues surrounding te Tiriti and secondly, contributed to migrant’s issues of integrating identity and belonging.

## 10.2 Viewing Waitangi Day programming on Māori Television

The ‘mainstream’ media have played a significant role in the shaping of the agenda of how New Zealanders’ understand Waitangi Day and te Tiriti (Abel, 1997; Abel, McCreanor, & Moewaka Barnes, 2012; McConville et. al., 2014). As previously discussed, Waitangi Day is often portrayed by the ‘mainstream’ media as solely a day of political protest and social disharmony. Māori Television offers an alternative representation. Rather than just focusing on Māori political protest, the broadcaster’s main coverage is of the dawn service, the formal ceremonies at Te Whare Rūnanga at the Treaty Grounds, live web streams from locations both locally and internationally where New Zealanders gather for the commemoration, traditional waka races at Waitangi and the festivities in the Treaty grounds.

As well as coverage of events at Waitangi and around the nation, in 2015, the year of this research, Māori Television also screened a morning two-hour presenter-led live-to-air broadcast from Waitangi. *Ata Marie Waitangi* (Good Morning Waitangi) provided extensive coverage of different ways to

participate in Waitangi Day and showcased Māori achievement in sport, music, fashion, and culture together with appearances by Māori and non-Māori ‘personalities’. Programming during the day also included the Māori written, produced and directed feature film *Mt Zion* (dir: Tearepa Kahi) with a story line that stresses the importance of indigenous values; the start of the NZOA funded six-part television documentary *Lost in Translation* about the stories behind the various copies of the Treaty as it was taken around the country in 1840 gathering iwi signatures; children’s language and kapa haka shows; and interviews with elders in the programme *Ngā Pari Kārangaranga*. Later in the day, an evening special featured a comedy show hosted by popular Māori New Zealand comedian Mike King. Māori Television’s Waitangi Day programming was viewed by my participants as a day devoid of conflict. The impression was that Māori Television intended to insert into the mediascape a view of Waitangi Day as a day of celebration as well as education for everyone.

In contrast to Māori Television, ‘mainstream’ coverage was remarkably different with no dedicated programming covering Waitangi Day events other than news items within the nightly news bulletins. The one exception was the 15-minute Māori news programme *Te Karere* screened on TVOne which contained extensive national coverage of the day’s events. As the *New Zealand Listener* remarked some years earlier, “when it comes to wide and varied coverage of Waitangi Day, it’s hard to go past Māori Television” (Barnett, Feb, 2010). To this day, Māori Television is still the only broadcaster to inform and remind the nation about why Waitangi Day is an important national day. However, this may be due to Māori Television not having the same commercial imperatives as ‘mainstream’ broadcasters. Dedicating resources to covering Waitangi Day may not seem viable and there may be difficulties attracting advertisers when for many New Zealanders it is a mid-summer public holiday to be enjoyed outside in the sunshine and not watching television.

### 10.3 Issues of Identity

During the *Ata Mārie* live broadcast, a mobile social-media app called KEA was introduced as a means to build connections and networks between local and international audiences. The television hosts encouraged viewers to send in their Waitangi Day ‘selfies’. Following the introduction to KEA, New Zealanders based in Australia, England, German, and France were interviewed in the show. Their New Zealand roots were emphasised together with their global mobility. The interactive nature for audiences of *Ata Mārie* became an important part of the programme and its intersection with social media affirms the broadcaster’s awareness of the changing nature of television audiences. For migrants, viewing programming with a global flavour added to a sense of connection:

*For me this [KEA] also implied the issue of belonging and identity in the globalising world. As migrants, we empirically understood the struggles and plights to define and redefine our identities between our original roots and the migrating routes. (John, PRC Chinese)*

John related to the issues of belonging and identity experienced by New Zealanders living overseas and saw similarities with migrants also navigating issues of identity between home and host.

The subtext of much of Māori Television's programme content on Waitangi Day includes the ongoing narrative of entanglement between Māori and Pākehā. Understanding this tension has the potential to address migrant questions of 'where do I fit in?'

*I guess to me the programmes on Waitangi Day, like Lost in Translation and programmes that refer to the loss of land and 'mana', have been thought-provoking. In some ways, it has made a difference to where I feel I fit in Māori/Pākehā relations. (Laure, France)*

Laure refers here to programming that has helped her think about where she places herself within the relationship between Māori and Pākehā implicit within Te Tiriti. While Laure does not mention specifically how the programmes on Māori Television made her think about her 'identity', it is clear that some of the content about the injustices in the nation's colonial past provoked a change in how she related to some of the dynamics of Māori-Pākehā relations.

Huygens's (2007) research exploring Pākehā identity and Treaty education programmes offers insights into this change process. Huygens found that Pākehā encounters with the facts of the historical injustices under the Treaty resulted in a number of 'uncomfortable' emotional outcomes leading to a new consciousness. Laure, coming from a colonising country, might have felt some commonality here with Pākehā about New Zealand's colonial past, although this may stop short at the culturally specific 'discomfort' of some Pākehā in Treaty education sessions.

Mezirow and his colleagues have offered theories about how critical reflection on the commonly accepted cultural frames of reference may lead to a transformation of dominant groups' ability to critique 'mainstream' discourse (Mezirow & Associates, 1990). Although it is arguable whether Laure felt she was part of a dominant group, she did appear to have the ability to critically reflect on the content she was viewing which led to a re-positioning of self and identity in her 'host' nation. Māori, as well as Pākehā, being jointly the 'host' nation is an important distinction for Laure to understand because it is through the Crown that all non-Māori are included in te Tiriti. Laure's statement demonstrates the potential for te Tiriti to facilitate a reconceptualisation of what 'home' might mean in Aotearoa.

Insights into migrant issues of identity and belonging were also apparent from Jian's experiences of Waitangi Day programming. Here, she specifically mentioned an interview she saw on *Ata Mārie* about how te Tiriti included non-British settlers. This helped her connect with other migrants' experiences:

*Watching an interview [on Ata Mārie] with an old Polish couple migrating to New Zealand half a century ago and the discussions around the Treaty and their difficulties [feeling excluded] made me think some things and problems they faced were the same for other migrants all along not just Chinese migrants like me. (Jian, PRC Chinese)*

Jian's identification with the Polish couple's story suggests a reflexive understanding of a shared biography with the Polish couple. The Polish couple's historical experience of being 'othered' by British settlers in New Zealand helps Jian make sense of her own narrative, as she related the problems she experienced as a migrant in New Zealand to the wider migrant experience of varying forms of exclusion<sup>121</sup> and considered the possibility that her difficult experiences might not necessarily have been solely because she was Chinese. Māori Television's ability to position itself as being inclusive of all migrants under te Tiriti highlights how the experience of the Polish couple is yet another example of how the dominant Pākehā group dishonours te Tiriti.

Giddens (1991) sheds a light on the experiences of migrants, such as Jian, as they construct narratives of how they navigate their identities. He suggests that identity is linked to the:

capacity to keep a particular narrative going. The individual's biography, if she is to maintain regular interaction with others in the day-to-day world, cannot be wholly fictive. It must continually integrate events which occur in the external world, and sort them into the ongoing 'story' about the self. (Giddens 1991, p. 54)

It could be argued that Giddens's notion of an ongoing 'story' is occurring when Jian relates the problems she has experienced as a migrant in New Zealand to the wider migrant experience. As previously discussed, the idea of integrating new information into 'identity' can also be found in Omura's (2014) study of Asians participating in Treaty education.

The emotional attributes of place and belonging are referred to in the academic literature as a necessary precursor for migrants' psychological integration (Fisher, Sonn, & Bishop, 2002; Ward & Lin, 2005). Australian academics Liu, Volčič, & Gallois (2014) acknowledge the importance of addressing migrants' feelings of being unsettled by recognising that "[an] immigrant's ability to achieve a sense of place in the host country where they feel somewhat 'out of place' is crucial to psychological and social well-being" (Liu, Volčič, & Gallois, 2014, p. 200).

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<sup>121</sup> From the first arrivals of non-British settlers, migrants have experienced marginalisation and exclusion. For example, Nordic settlers were treated like second class citizens when they arrived in the 1870s. They were promised farmland on the East Coast of New Zealand and unlike the English settlers were given impossibly remote and densely forested bush. Treated as second class citizens by the British, they experienced mounting debt and poverty and eventually shifted to the area now known as Dannevirke where they were supported by local Māori.

See [http://podcast.radionz.co.nz/sun/sun-20141116-0940-wayne\\_brittendens\\_counterpoint-00.ogg](http://podcast.radionz.co.nz/sun/sun-20141116-0940-wayne_brittendens_counterpoint-00.ogg)

The importance of place and belonging is also of vital importance to Māori, whose understandings of these concepts come together in the notion of *tūrangawaewae*. According to Mead (2003), it is the land that is ‘inherent in the concept of *tūrangawaewae*, a place for the feet to stand; where one’s rights are not challenged, where one feels secure and at home’ (Mead, 2003, p.272).

As a further explanation, Margaret Kawharu (Ngati Whatua) (2017) in an audio-visual interview about the book *Tūrangawaewae: Identity and Belonging in Aotearoa New Zealand* also says that *tūrangawaewae* for Māori is about identity. This is often expressed through *whakapapa* which can be seen as an ongoing narrative of belonging that has a tangible connection to the land.

It is these types of traditional *tikanga* practices, such as *whakapapa* which are often ritualised in a *marae* setting, that help develop a deep bonding and relationship with the land for Māori. Both Mead (2003) and Kawharu (2017) say belonging could be considered in the light of *tūrangawaewae*, where the relationship is about ‘bonding to the land and having a place upon which one’s feet can be placed with confidence’ (Mead, 2003, p.272).

Kawharu (2017) has suggested there is a second application of the concept of *tūrangawaewae* that can include migrants. She recounts occasions when migrants have been welcomed onto her *marae* and explains that it is through the cultural proceedings of *tikanga* and the ritual of *powhiri* that many non-Māori find a sense of belonging. She asserts that “it is the people who hold *tūrangawaewae* that say come into our space where we belong and make yourself welcome alongside us – that’s the message we have been giving since 1840” (Kawharu, 2017, 22:20).

Hence, it is through a Māori connection to *tūrangawaewae* that migrants can develop their own sense of place. However, Kawharu (2017) is quite clear that it is a different type of *tūrangawaewae* for migrants, and that this is quite distinct from a Māori sense of belonging and identity based on land and *whakapapa*. The Human Rights Commission explains further by extending the importance of *tūrangawaewae* to include all people living in a Treaty nation:

What binds the [Articles of the] Treaty together is the concept of *tūrangawaewae* (a place to stand), which articulates one of the most important elements of the Treaty debate: the right of all peoples to belong, as equals. This means that the Treaty belongs to all New Zealanders, and all New Zealanders have responsibilities towards each other based on belonging to this place. (Human Rights Commission, 2010)

Here, *tūrangawaewae* for non-Māori is based on the Treaty, rather than the land and *whakapapa*, and forms the basis of the phrase ‘*tangata tiriti*’ (*people of the Treaty*<sup>122</sup>) as the basis of belonging to New

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<sup>122</sup> See 2.9 for a discussion about the origins of the term, *tangata tiriti*.

Zealand. Hence, tūrangawaewae can be used both in the traditional sense for Māori, but also more generally, as I have in this research to relate to migrant belonging to the nation.

It is possible to look at Māori Television through the lens of te Tiriti and suggest an outcome of the broadcaster's core principles is the concept of tūrangawaewae. The broadcaster's strategic direction, as stated on its website, is inclusivity and building a connection to Māori culture for all New Zealanders. Inclusivity and connection offer the opportunity for audiences to understand a Māori sense of 'belonging' - tūrangawaewae – and find a pathway to their own 'belonging'.

Although Jenny's comment below does not relate specifically to Waitangi Day programming, it gives a more specific example of how issues of identity can be addressed by te Tiriti o Waitangi and the notion of tūrangawaewae. She provides this insight after viewing an item on Māori Television about some graduates from Te Wānanga o Aotearoa<sup>123</sup>:

*She was a Muslim woman, wearing a headscarf and originally from Ethiopia. She talked about an article in the Treaty that had enabled her to feel she had rights in New Zealand, freedom of speech and practice different religions. I can relate to her story of how migrants can feel included by the Treaty of Waitangi. (Jenny, Fijian/Indian)*

Earlier, in Chapter 9, Jenny had spoken about how viewing Māori Television and learning some te reo helped her to navigate issues of identity. Here, she relates to the representation of the Ethiopian woman also navigating her way between 'home' and 'host'. On one hand, the woman is declaring her difference to the 'host' through wearing the signifiers of her religion and culture, but on the other hand embracing a feeling of belonging in her new 'home' through the rights and privileges she perceives as being enshrined for all New Zealanders in te Tiriti o Waitangi.<sup>124</sup> This spoke in some way to how Jenny viewed her own identity in Aotearoa and her sense of belonging. She clearly relates to the Muslim woman finding a place for herself within the context of the rights and privileges initiated by te Tiriti.

The Muslim woman's experience also provides Jenny with the identification to 'collaborate' in the social behaviour of belonging. Gorton (2009) and Kavka (2008) have already explored the relationship between television audience emotion and belonging but it is also useful to turn to psychologist and social constructionist Kenneth Gergen to understand further the interplay of emotions and belonging. Gergen (2009) explains that we create a meaning from the representational encounter between viewer and subject, where meaning lies "not within the private minds but in the process of relating" (Gergen, 2009, p. 98). As a social constructionist, Gergen's premise is that the world becomes meaningful in relationships and although he is not writing about audiences viewing television, his argument that it is

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<sup>123</sup> Te Wānanga o Aotearoa is a tertiary education provider guided by Māori principles and values.

<sup>124</sup> The Muslim woman here is referring to Article 4

the relational encounter that creates an emotional response appears to be applicable here. In Gergen's terms, Jenny senses a feeling of belonging that comes from an imagined encounter through the representation of the Muslim woman, as a tele-visual subject, negotiating her identity between 'home' and 'host'.

In my study, it was clear that participants identified with a broader migrant narrative of adjusting to issues of identity within Aotearoa, while maintaining a link to their 'home' identity. Comments above, such as 'forced me to position who I am' and 'feel included in the Treaty', indicate that watching Māori Television and recognising the ongoing promise of te Tiriti to include all people provoked a re-positioning of identity. However, we need to be reminded that the repositioning of identity is never fixed. Identities can always be shifting along a continuum between an ethno-cultural connection with one's homeland cultures and the process of 'becoming' within the space of the 'host' nation (Cunningham, 2000).

#### 10.4 A Vision for the Future

Many of the participants perceived Māori Television's coverage of Waitangi Day as a day of celebration and was seen as having an impact on the cohesiveness of the nation and the promotion of positive race relations. Waitangi Day on Māori Television had a big impact on changing perceptions, even for Mita who worked in the area of social services and had previously attended Treaty education courses required for her employment:

*Sadly, for the first few years living in New Zealand, Waitangi Day didn't hold any value for me but segments from the Waitangi Day programming [on Māori Television] gave me huge insight [into te Tiriti] and prompted me to think about the realistic possibilities that are out there [for a bicultural nation] that we tend to overlook so often. (Mita, Fijian/Indian)*

I will turn to discuss the impact of prior exposure to Treaty education on participants' experiences of 'passive learning about the intentions of te Tiriti' shortly, but Mita's observation here is important because it emphasises Māori Television's contribution to the pedagogical process of learning about the te Tiriti.

John, on the other hand, found that viewing the *Ata Marie* programme on Waitangi Day emphasised more the importance of relationships and the intergenerational nature of culture:

*Instead of a focus on politics, that is to say, Ata Marie put much more emphasis on people and family life, and how cultural traditions have been passed on to younger generations. In this sense, Waitangi Day was not only about the past but about the future. Ata Marie actually told us little about the history of the Treaty, and more about the present everyday life and the future of New Zealand. (John, PRC Chinese)*

Jenny also noticed that coverage included an appreciation of the reality for Māori living in a multicultural nation:



*Viewing Ata Mārie on Waitangi Day was a positive experience. The programme had broad appeal to all audiences, Pākehā, Māori, and migrants. I especially enjoyed an interview with a cameraman where he talked about the inter-generationality of knowledge that had been passed down from his great-grandfather to his grandfather, himself and then his children. I could relate to this because in my culture we have the same respect for knowledge that is passed on through generations. Also coming from a background in Fiji and its own turbulent history of race relations... I am particularly interested in race relations in NZ. I was encouraged by the Waitangi Day programmes as with Auckland's growing ethnic diversity, it is a great way of participating in various activities, which contribute to a better understanding of the Treaty, Māori history and positive race relations. (Jenny, Fijian/Indian)*

For Mita, John, and Jenny, their hope for a positive 'bicultural' and multi-ethnic future between Pākehā and Māori and migrants suggests they are acquiring discursive resources to enter into dialogue about possible futures for a bicultural and multicultural nation. That understanding has echoes of Freire (1970) who demonstrated that once workers had the vocabulary and other resources to name and analyse their situation, they were able to plan for and initiate change. The idea of speaking a different future can also be found in the more contemporary work of Jo Smith (2013) who suggests Māori Television can operate as:

*a form of televisual occupation ... that gives the New Zealand nation new words, images and ideas to think about: a kind of gathering of different knowledge bases from which new ideas about community and belonging might emerge. (Smith, 2013, p. 107)*

Many of the participants decided they would watch Māori Television's Waitangi Day coverage and programming in the future because they perceived the broadcaster as having a role in promoting the importance of the Treaty:

*Yes, I will watch Waitangi commemorations on Māori Television in the future because of being involved in this study. Hearing positive feedback from fellow group members about the programmes on Waitangi Day made me feel like I was more involved in something important for New Zealand. (Mihili, Sri Lanka)*

*When I first arrived in New Zealand a few years ago I had no interest in Waitangi Day. This study has helped me cultivate an interest and I will be watching Waitangi Day on Māori Television. (Sally, USA)*

*The Treaty is part of this country's history and I would like to watch Waitangi Day on Māori Television in the future to feel part of that history. (Bella, Macedonia)*

The participants sensed the possibility that Māori Television's Waitangi Day coverage offered the nation a day of celebration. While issues of discrimination by Pākehā towards Māori and migrants might be the present reality, my participants expressed a hope that is aligned with an identity placed within a broader te Tiriti based national meta-narrative. However, while the majority of participants expressed positive sentiments about viewing Waitangi Day coverage in the future, it needs to be

acknowledged that this may be possibly a result of the collegial feeling from being members of Facebook groups and engaging in discussions about Waitangi Day.

## 10.5 A New Understanding of the Basis for Māori Discontent

Participants gained an insight into some of the reasons many Māori feel discontented with the government response to Treaty issues. Laure had this to say after watching Māori Television Waitangi Day programmes:

*I think I get what Māori people claim and why. The whole story about giving up your sovereignty is fishy. Why would anyone do that? This is what I like about the doco Lost in Translation, we learn about the reasons which pushed some chiefs to sign the Treaty. (Laure, France)*

Merle had been in New Zealand for nine years and had never watched Waitangi Day celebrations on ‘mainstream’ or Māori Television:

*I was watching the – the Waitangi things, because I know very little about the Waitangi thing, I wanted to know more about the history of Russell and how it was formed, why it was formed, what happened there, etc, etc, and I just thought to myself that again I think, I hate to say it but right from the start obviously the Māoris were exploited, I mean you can't deny that right from the beginning. (Merle, South Africa)*

Merle focuses her insights on the historical context of the exploitation of Māori and ‘hates’ that this is yet another example of colonial exploitation. As a white South African growing up in the time of South Africa’s now dismantled apartheid regime, this view of exploitation is possibly familiar to her.

Jessica, on the other hand, already knew about the Treaty through her work and was particularly attracted to being involved in this study as an opportunity for both watching Māori Television and talking about the experience. Like Merle, she had never watched Māori Television nor ‘mainstream’ coverage of Waitangi Day:

*In particular I learnt things from the documentary Lost in Translation on Waitangi Day and thinking about what it was like at the time for Māori and settlers and what different people's expectations and how Māori didn't expect the millions of newcomers to arrive, that sort of stuff makes me think a little bit more about the historical developments and reasons for Māori discontent now. (Jessica, Germany)*

Neither had Alice watched coverage of Waitangi Day on Māori Television before. She too found Māori Television dispelled any ideas that Māori are troublemakers:

*Waitangi Day coverage was really accessible with the show being quite entertaining. We were curious about the national day, why it is a public holiday and what can we learn about the country. We understood there were disgruntled people but what were the issues? Waitangi Day*

*was portrayed to me as a few troublemakers making a fuss but I now realise it's justified and programmes on mainstream television don't give the Māori point of view unless it is controversial. It is helpful to understand the Treaty of Waitangi to understand the issues when they come up. (Alice, Britian)*

Overall, the study found that participants' viewing of Māori Television content on Waitangi Day exposed them to new ideas about the injustices of history and provided them with the opportunity for critical reflection on the 'mainstream' media's misrepresentation of both te Tiriti and Māori issues.

As discussed in Chapter Two, these observations are not just confined to Waitangi Day viewing. In fact, as McConville et al. observe, "[mainstream] media practice has long been criticised as a site where settler ideology is privileged and Māori perspectives are marginalised" (McConville et al., 2014, p. 2). The cultivation of the participants' critical consciousness in this area is reminiscent of Roberts' (2005) remark about Freire who "makes it clear .... that there are multiple ways of participating in the process of social transformation, and sometimes the most effective approaches, *in the long term*, are the quiet, unnoticed forms of gentle intellectual 'subversion' practiced by educationalists and others as they go about their daily work" (Roberts, 2005, p. 453, emphasis in the original). Taking Freire's idea and applying it to the participants in this study, I am suggesting they have viewed and engaged in programming on Māori Television and have been gently 'subverted' to view te Tiriti in a way not seen on 'mainstream'. While Roberts and Freire are not referring to the influence of the media, its educative role is one of the long-standing principles of the Reithian tradition of public service broadcasting.

Participants who engaged in 'television talk' about their viewing responses knowingly or unknowingly were involved in a type of educative process through the dialogic research method discussed in Chapter 6. The following comment from Laure encapsulates how critical self-reflection on the basis of Māori discontent offered her an alternative way of viewing the effects of colonisation by both French and British in New Zealand:

*I had never really thought about the negative influence of colonial times and watching Māori Television programming on Waitangi Day it made me realise about my own country and the French involvement here with the missionaries. (Laure, France)*

This analysis concurs with Mezirow and Associates' (1990) argument, referred to earlier, that critical reflection on the commonly accepted cultural frames of reference may lead to a transformation in the ability to critique dominant discourses.

Many participants noticed that a general lack of recognition of the substance of te Tiriti and Treaty settlement issues formed the basis for much of Māori discontent. Some of the participants also shared a feeling of being disheartened by the level of institutional political tokenism that surrounds the Treaty. As demonstrated in the following conversation, learning more about te Tiriti and Māori issues while watching Māori Television highlighted for the participants power inequalities between Māori and

Pākehā and many issues of social injustice within New Zealand. The exchange of comments below from the “Indian/Sinhalese’ group also demonstrates that the participants had a level of knowledge and critical observation of tokenistic practices that they brought into the research context. However, the research process provided the vehicle for this conversation in their face-to-face focus group:

*Mihili: I have very mixed thoughts and feelings when it comes to the Treaty because there is a part of it that feels very prescriptive, like this is the Treaty and you are supposed to adhere to it, and a part of it feels very token like. I guess I have a resistance to that but what I would really like is to think in practice more about how to incorporate Treaty principles into everyday life a little bit more, rather than it just being a document that just legitimises the different arguments. Because I am in the Mental Health field pretty much every job vacancy says you have to adhere to the Treaty, you have to know something about the Treaty and sometimes that is just about them asking in the interview, do you know the Treaty Principles? You know what, what....*

*Jenny: Yes!! Like, what does that mean?*

*Mihili: Yes.*

*Rahul: There’s only one correct answer to that question and that’s ‘yes’ and then you move onto the next question.*

*Mihili: Yes, it should be more than just that.*

This conversation reveals a level of cynicism about a merely symbolic approach to the implementation of bicultural policies and approaches, especially in the workplace. Participants in my research dealing with day-to-day structures of power seemed to sense an institutional discomfort in the implementation of Treaty principles (see the discussion on Treaty Principles in Chapter 2). An involvement in the research process together with discussing and viewing Māori Television provided them with the vehicle to express ideas about how the appearance of ‘bicultural’ practices is often token in nature.

## 10.6 Impact of Prior Treaty Education on the Research Outcomes

My research also looked at participants’ prior exposure to Treaty education to provide a context for the investigation into possible links between viewing Māori Television and a ‘passive learning about the intentions of te Tiriti’. Many of the participants had previously had the opportunity to engage in Treaty education, but this was usually in connection with their work environment in the public sector and raises the question about how migrants working in the commercial or private sector might gain such cultural knowledge, a point emphasised by Huygens (2016):

There are also marked differences in penetration of Treaty education into various sectors of New Zealand society. For instance, the health and social services, and public and local authorities have sought Treaty education, and have been made aware of the Māori view of Te

Tiriti and colonisation, while the commercial and private sector has largely ignored the opportunity [for Treaty Education]. (Huygens, 2016, p. 152)

Initially, via the online survey, I asked participants the question, “what is the Treaty of Waitangi?” Comments from the snowball questionnaire ranged from, “it is an agreement”, “signed in 1840, it’s a living document”, “it’s a relationship between tangata whenua and Crown”, “it’s a Treaty between Māori and Pākehā to achieve peace, and supposedly to work together” and “the birth certificate of New Zealand”.

These types of comments set the scene for some of the in-depth discussion during the course of the research. At the end of the research, in the four face-to-face focus group discussions and during the individual participant interviews, I asked whether their understandings of the Treaty and some of its implications for modern-day Aotearoa New Zealand had increased or stayed the same. Of the twenty-five participants across the four groups and the interviewees, twelve had completed Treaty education courses, mostly as a requirement for employment. The thirteen participants who had not completed Treaty education and had no prior knowledge felt their understanding had grown. These individuals tended to be from the commercial or private sector and found viewing Waitangi Day coverage on Māori Television, in particular, to be somewhat of a revelation, while those who had some prior knowledge found their increased understanding to be more nuanced.

It is also likely that being involved in this study, with its focus on Māori Television content with a Māori centric world view, meant the participants were more aware of te Tiriti and therefore were more predisposed to learning and more motivated to seek information from other sources, such as alternative media or independent research, to “look things up”. With the blurring of lines between the sources of their understanding, attribution to a single cause is not possible - in reality, the changes that took place were most likely a combination of Māori Television content, discussion within focus groups, and other sources.

While most of the participants felt their understanding had improved, three who had completed Treaty education programmes said it had remained about the same. Rahul, who works in the public sector, made the following comment that is indicative of the application of Treaty principles within the public sector:

*I have been exposed to more about the values of the Treaty (through my work) than the programming I have watched on Māori Television. (Rahul, India)*

Rahul’s insight into learning about the Treaty and his reference to ‘values’ highlights the difficulty of this research. It suggests he has a deeper level of understanding through Treaty education in his work place than the ‘passive’ learning offered by Māori Television.

Hence, there is not a clear-cut answer as to whether Māori Television makes a difference in understanding te Tiriti. Overall, however, 22 participants reported their understandings of te Tiriti had grown from viewing Māori Television. While this understanding may have been from a variety of sources, their actual viewing experience is more likely to have contributed to a greater *sense* that te Tiriti is an important and relevant document to Māori.

## 10.7 Conclusion

My research has investigated the extent to which participants gained a ‘passive knowledge of the intentions of te Tiriti’ through watching Māori Television. Participant understandings of a Māori perspective of the Treaty confirmed that those watching Māori Television might experience similar outcomes to participants in Omura’s (2014) research. Participants in both Omura (2014) and my study who experienced greater knowledge of the Treaty found that this new awareness contributed to a sense of belonging, the building of new integrated identities and supporting more positive relationships with Māori.

In an analysis of settlement issues for migrants, Ghassan Hage identifies the emotional attributes of “security, familiarity, community and a sense of possibility or hope” (Hage, 1997, p. 102) as key features of feeling at ‘home’ in migrant home-building in Australia. Extending Hage’s ideas, I am also including a ‘passive knowledge of the intentions of te Tiriti’ as a contributing factor in the process of settlement because of the security it offers migrants in gaining the feeling of a sense of place – a key aspect of te Tiriti and “crucial to psychological and social well-being” (Liu et al., 2014, p. 200). For some of my participants the concept of *tūrangawaewae*, as it applies to migrants, provided, in Hage’s (1997) terms, a ‘sense of possibility or hope’, or, what I would describe as, a sense of hope from being part of ongoing Treaty based narratives of nation building.



## Chapter Eleven

### Cultural Connections and Belonging

*What draws me in is I can relate to Māori culture ... even though the target audience might be Māori, but I feel I can relate to many commonalities and feel included. (Jenny, Fijian/Indian)*

In this chapter, I explore the extent to which migrant participants, in perceiving a difference between ‘mainstream’ programming and Māori-produced programmes, were able to recognise a world view on Māori Television that contrasted with dominant cultural values represented by the mass media. Many of the concepts discussed in this chapter are based on participants observing the relational nature of Māori. In contrast to the dominant Western concept of the ‘self-positioning autonomous individual’, the relational for Māori is “ontologically privileged ... we come into being not as autonomous entities but always already as relations” (Hoskins, 2017, p. 137). Inherent, for example, in whanaungatanga, manaakitanga, and kōrero<sup>125</sup> are the ontological practices of face-to-face relationships and the complexities and primacy of good personal relations. The prioritising of relationships in stories told by Māori on Māori Television led many of the participants to discuss a range of interconnective values that they saw as representing a commonality between the values of their own world view and that of Māori.

While it is true that all audio-visual content is shaped by cultural knowledge and values (Hartley, 1999), the extent to which an individual from one culture can read another culture’s values is extremely complex and dependent on a number of factors. For Māori, according to Durie (2000) engaging with others is about respecting their mana, which involves “acknowledging others according to how they see themselves” (Durie, 2000, p. 96). The following findings, I believe, also reflect the participants’ respectful encounter with a Māori voice telling Māori stories of resistance and agency on Māori Television and their experience of finding cultural affinities. Extending Hoskins’s (2017) work and her analysis of how Māori draw on an ‘emotional repertoire’ to promote connections in formal proceedings, I am suggesting that on the basis of my findings, Māori Television offers similar connections with its audiences.

#### 11.1 Māori Television’s Distinctive Content

Barry Barclay, in his seminal writings about indigenous filmmaking, argues that indigenously produced content establishes a ‘fourth cinema’ by representing its own distinctive worldview based on tikanga:

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<sup>125</sup> Only these few concepts are named because of their relevance to this research.



Indigenous cinema, the cinema of First Nations, differs fundamentally from what has gone before. This is the heart of his argument: the indigenous camera will see differently, frame differently, provide a different context and serve a different philosophy. (Milligan, 2015, p. 349)

Barclay (2003a) speaks of “core values which govern life in the Māori world, values such as whanaungatanga, mana, manaakitanga, aroha ... wairua” (2003a: p. 10). Barclay believes it is these values that shape and make indigenous cinema distinct because “te ao Māori evokes a whole cosmology, a world of physical and spiritual things, a world of spirits and gods” (Barclay, 2003b, p. 14).

I have identified an association between Barclay’s philosophy and reference to indigenous cinema with many Māori Television productions. This is supported by conversations I had with two Māori media practitioners. Greg Mayor (2015), a former commissioning editor for Māori Television, told me that Māori producers intuitively draw on an ‘underlying agenda or kaupapa’ and that new content was prioritised by first looking at “the Māori-centricness of the ideas, and secondly whether that idea can hold an audience with this unique Māori-centric core” (Mayor, 2015). Māori independent documentary maker and programme maker Kay Ellmers has produced content of interest to Māori and Pākehā for nearly three decades. Reflecting on producing the Māori Television cooking show *Marae Kai Masters*, she said “we can use what is a highly commercial format [such as a cooking show] and infuse it with really deep cultural values” (Ellmers, 2015). Ellmers’ and Mayor’s comments are examples that affirm Barclay’s observation that a distinctive worldview permeates the moving images of indigenous cultural expression.

## 11.2 The Complexity of Cross-cultural Research

It is beyond the scope of my study to discuss how tikanga informs the representation of Māori cultural practices because I am Pākehā researcher without full knowledge of te ao Māori. Instead, I have focused on the meanings each participant made from their own specific cultural context. Content was not analysed on the basis of a Māori world view because Māori Television content and its representation of tikanga for a non-Māori is enormously complex. For example, tikanga provides a type of template for actions, ideas and beliefs in a specific context, at the same time as linking Māori to “the ancestors, their knowledge base and their wisdom” (Mead, 2003, p. 21).

Mead also stresses that “ideas and practices relating to tikanga Māori differ from one tribal region to another ...[so] there is always a need to refer to the tikanga of the local people” (Mead, 2003, p. 8). Epa Huritau affirms this when he says “the Māori value system has the flexibility built into it to accommodate variation ... [If] we know the principle, we can make adjustments” (Huritau cited in Metge, 2014, p.105). Given this local specificity of tikanga, it is understandable some Māori might

feel that without the understanding of local or regional traditions and histories to guide the thinking of non-Māori, there is a greater chance of misinterpretation of Māori concepts. Meanings will always vary from one context to another, and to the uninitiated, the subtleties of meaning can be misconstrued within the various contexts in which values are expressed. This also applies to my participants and the difficulty they are likely to experience in understanding the Māori cultural contexts in which particular programming was produced.

### 11.3 Understanding Māori Cultural Values?

A challenge for non-Māori in expressing Māori cultural concepts in English is the difficulty of conveying accurately a meaning within a Māori cultural system without limiting the complexity and interconnected nature of the concept. This sensibility is not new. Writing in 1925, Te Rangi Hiroa warned that definitions and explanations that are not culturally rooted can completely misconstrue meanings:

Much error already has been handed on in ethnological writings through inexact translations of Māori words. In cases where the European and Māori look at a question from an entirely different viewpoint, the use of particular English words often gives to the general European reader the impression that the Māori shares the view that the word conveys to him; when in reality their views may be as divergent as the poles. (Te Rangi Hiroa cited in McNatty & Roa, 2002, p. 91)

I have drawn upon the work of three scholars well-regarded by Māori to give some sense of what different Māori cultural values might mean. The first scholar whose knowledge I have drawn on is Professor Paul Tapsell. Of Ngāti Whakaue and Ngāti Raukawa descent, he is both a distinguished scholar and museum curator. His research interests include Māori identity in 21st century Aotearoa New Zealand. Secondly, I have been drawn to the work of Hirini Moko Mead and his influential book, *Tikanga Māori: Living by Māori Values* (2003). Of Ngāti Awa, Ngāti Tūwharetoa, Ngāti Tuhoe and Tūhourangi descent, Mead is an anthropologist, academic, Māori leader in Education and member of the Waitangi Tribunal. Finally, renowned Pākehā academic Dame Joan Metge has been an influential scholar I have referred to in my study. She is a pioneering social anthropologist who lived with, and studied, Māori communities for many decades. Numerous awards have acknowledged her scholarship in promoting cross cultural awareness between Māori and Pākehā.

The above scholars have helped me describe some Māori cultural values relevant to this study. However, the discussion below should be seen in the light of migrants discovering a sense of having a cultural connection with Māori. This does not necessarily mean a connection with the value itself - and all the complexities of definition - but more a sense, or perception, of there being some commonality, or resonance between the two cultures. While it may be impossible for non-Māori to ever understand

fully cultural values implicit in indigenous productions, this does not necessarily diminish the potential for some audiences to draw some comparisons with what they believe to be their own cultural values.

### 11.3.1 Whakapapa

Participants in this study might not all know the word ‘whakapapa’ but some connected strongly to what they would call, in the English language, a sense of the importance of ‘genealogy’ for both Māori and themselves. These participants related to what Tapsell (1997) described as the strength of feeling Māori have for the taonga of whakapapa that is based on the force of ancestral experiences. He uses this definition:

*Whakapapa: genealogy; to layer one upon the other; kin ties; systematic framework ordering descendants under common ancestors; genealogical descent lines connecting gods with all living things. (Tapsell, 1997, p. 326)*

As Tapsell explains, the fundamental importance of whakapapa is that it:

*allows the structural sequencing of the universe by tying all things into a genealogical order where the human element along with all living things comes into being, each having genealogically descended from the heavens down to their living descendants today. (Tapsell, 1997, p. 327)*

He goes on to explain that whakapapa represents the connection between an individual’s kinship with their hapū and a complex identity based upon the hapū’s traditional landscape. This is illustrated in the Māori practice of ‘pepeha’ where an individual, in introducing themselves to another, links their identity to significant tribal geographical locations such as a mountain and/or a river. The offering of this information helps other Māori to locate them and build connections. Migrants from a range of cultures in this study clearly related to the concept of whakapapa:

*That was a bit of a revelation on how values from the Romanian country side are similar with Māori village values. We have the same respect for elders, we think that it takes a village to raise a child, we introduce each other's whakapapa, looking for things that connect us. I'm watching now the beautiful ‘Poutiriao’ series about Aotearoa legends and myths and see how these people are grounded in the history of this land. Reminds me of my people's legends, and while the narratives are different, the fact that we need these narratives to maintain and transmit an identity and knowledge is similar. (Lucia, Romania)*

*We see Chinese civilisation having two mother rivers, the Yellow River and the Yangtze River, that’s a strong connection to the natural landscape, so I think people say that is in your blood, you know, we still remember that’s the beginning, the origin of Chinese civilization and*

*attributing that kind of origin to life force of the natural landscape would be our strongest and deep rooted connection to Mother Nature. (John, PRC Chinese)*

*What draws me in is I can relate to it. I can relate to, for example I don't know the name of the programme, but often when the elders, kuia and kaumātua get interviewed, they tell their stories and then I think and reminisce and go down memory lane and I recall my grandparents and the way they we were brought up and the stories they would share about our ancestors so I feel that what I watch on Māori Television, I feel welcome and included even though the target audience might be Māori but I feel I can relate to many commonalities and feel included. (Jenny, Fijian/Indian)*

*The importance of ancestry, family and the connection to the land so I think those sort of themes come out quite strongly on Māori Television and I can definitely relate to them. (Rahul, India)*

Access to whakapapa is a prized form of knowledge (Metge, 2014). Not only does this knowledge reveal the descent line through which mana tūpuna is handed down through the generations, it also binds together co-descendants from a founding ancestor and enables whānau members “to establish linkages with each other with their hapū and iwi and with a wide range of whanaunga” (Metge, 2014, p. 91). The desire to establish linkages can be seen in the excerpts above. Lucia says that “we introduce each other’s whakapapa, looking for things that connect us”. Jenny remembers, almost nostalgically, how important it was as a child to listen to the stories about her ancestors and Rahul can readily identify with ‘the importance of ancestry’. Both Rahul and John share similarities between their respective cultures and Māori with the idea that they are tied through their ancestors to a traditional landscape. While the tangata whenua in Aotearoa relate to distinct geographical areas according to the physical locations of hapū and iwi, John’s comments indicate that he feels there is a more overarching sense of belonging to the land for Chinese through the ‘life force of the natural landscape’. Within Chinese culture, the Yellow River is the ‘mother of Chinese civilisation’ that represents a life force. As Pietz explains, “it is what binds together their souls and flows in the blood of every Chinese spanning all places and all times” (Pietz, 2015, p. 100). This is an example of a culturally distinct but parallel understanding of whakapapa and its link to traditional landscapes.

In contrast, the ‘Western’ group, with perhaps more of a culture of individualism, did not identify as strongly to the concept of whakapapa. Laure, for example, sees it as somewhat intrusive – “Well I did not connect with whakapapa ... I don’t like the idea of my ancestors looking over my shoulder” (Laure, France) while Sally provides a different take: “[these relationships] were something I missed out on” (Sally, USA). Sally and Laure’s comments reflect the complexity of discussing feelings about levels of cultural connection. Edit offers this perspective on some of these difficulties:

*I feel that my background prior to New Zealand where I used to be living amongst other cultures, sub cultures and ethnicities has helped me to develop the art of slipping between cultures and intercultural communication. Hence living in New Zealand has meant that I have*

*been able to draw upon those skills to find points of connection with Māori. And watching Māori Television has helped to understand where aspects of my own culture can connect with the values and importance of traditions within Māoridom. This has helped me at work, too, especially with Māori and other ethnic organisations. (Edit, Hungary)*

While I have allocated my participants into groups according to their geographical origins, an individual's experience of finding commonalities with another culture could well be dependent on their own background and predisposition. Edit's comment, for example, could well be a signal towards some of the advantages of accepting migrants to New Zealand from transnational and multicultural contexts. Living amongst diversity, in the case of Edit, has promoted an attitude of cultural pluralism.

### 11.3.2 Whanaungatanga

Although most participants might not have understood fully the cultural concept of whanaungatanga, a discussion of the idea is useful in analysing how and why they made cultural connections with this value. Mead (2003) offers this definition:

Whanaungatanga embraces whakapapa and focuses upon relationships. Individuals expect to be supported by their relatives, near and distant, but the collective group also expects the support and help of its individuals ...[the] principle reaches beyond actual whakapapa relationships and includes relationships to non-kin person who became like kin through shared experiences. (Mead, 2003, p. 28)

Ritchie (1992) has also described whanaungatanga as a type of interrelated grid of relationships - bonds of association, obligations and spirituality,<sup>126</sup> while Bannett-Aranui (1999) has described whanaungatanga as complex inter-relationships often narrated through storytelling and woven into carvings and art forms. McNatty and Roa (2002) suggest that whanaungatanga should be thought of in terms of a physical, cultural and spiritual approach to relationships. In my study, a *Te Kaea* news item demonstrated the value of whanaungatanga in a story about an iwi's approach to a health and fitness gym programme where attendees were linked through a common purpose to engage and interact with each other:

*It was not just for their own iwi but all Māori in the area who wanted a collective group approach to health and fitness rather than it being an individual thing. It was about a whole group together, getting fit, not just the individuals like in other gym programmes. But it was also a lot more than just the fitness programme. There was an underlying ethos of something bigger at stake. (Edit, Hungary)*

Māori Television audiences viewing the members of the fitness programme were likely to have had a clear sense of a strong relational context underlying the scheme and the importance of whanaungatanga. My participants also understood and appreciated the value of whanaungatanga, even

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<sup>126</sup> Ritchie's (1992) interrelated grid of whanaungatanga involves processes of manaakitanga, kotahitanga, rangatiratanga, and, finally, wairuatanga as an overall governing principle.

if they did not use the word, using instead various phrases such as ‘group values’, and ‘values bigger than the individual for the good of the people’. Edit was the exception in her understanding of the concept (above) and her use of the word:

*I first came upon this Māori word of ‘whanaungatanga’ through my work a couple of years ago and had a general idea that it was about the importance of relationships but when I started watching Māori Television I noticed this concept or value as an idea behind many stories. (Edit, Hungary)*

When asked if she felt there was a connection between her perception of Māori culture and her experience of her own Hungarian culture, she said:

*What’s important to us is inter-connectiveness, the relationships around kinship and family connection based on shared experience and working together to provide a sense of belonging. (Edit, Hungary)*

The connection Edit felt between her own culture and Māori is just one example of the many connections different participants felt with aspects of Māori culture.

Discussing whanaungatanga on face value, it might appear to be simply about camaraderie and a type of team spirit that emerges when people work together. McNatty & Roa (2002) warn, for example, that there is a real danger of miscommunication when speakers use the same word without knowledge of its cultural roots. The element of mauri, or a spiritual dimension, may be overlooked or misunderstood and “so far as tikanga Māori is concerned, any omission of the spiritual dimension would wholly invalidate the model” (McNatty & Roa, 2002, p. 92). Marsden (2003a) also stresses the importance of acknowledging a particular mauri as an aspect of a project motivated by whanaungatanga. While this might be so, whether or not Edit fully understood the Māori cultural concept of whanaungatanga should not detract from the fact that she observed an approach to storytelling in which people on screen were relating to each other on many different levels - and that she perceived this as different from her ‘mainstream’ viewing. Her own cultural experience of the importance of kin relationships - working together to create a sense belonging - suggest the meaning she took from viewing a representation of Māori culture on screen evoked a resonance, a ghost from her own cultural context.

Another respondent, when watching the programme *Marae DIY* about a whānau community working together to restore their marae buildings, also noticed how the process helped to reinforce and build relationships at the same time as restoring their material culture:

*That programme Marae DIY, it brings everyone in from the community to share the project, the highs and the lows, the hard work. It’s for the good of the whole community. They all work together to create something for everyone. To save their culture and the important things for them that are part of the marae, like the carvings and tukutuku. (Zoran, Serbia)*

Here, Zoran describes an underlying value of whanaungatanga seen amongst the on-screen relationships within *Marae DIY*. He recognises the restoration of the marae is far more than the physical buildings - that it is associated with ‘important things’ for the culture. Watching this programme and how all the people worked together reminded him of his experiences with the Serbian Orthodox Church in Auckland, where he had been involved in creating a community based on a shared Slavic background:

*At the entrance to the altar at the Serbian Orthodox Church we have a number of carvings that are part of our Slavic bonds. We are all a variety of orthodox people; Hungarians, Croatians, Macedonians, Latvians, Bulgarians, Romanian, Russian, Greeks brought together to be a community. On the left side of the entrance is a Māori carving as part of our respect to the original people of the land and we share values of family and togetherness. The other carvings on the altar are to bring all the variety of orthodox people together. We often get together to make various activities for example making special pasta at Easter, doing the mid-winter swim. But here we do it in January symbolizing the blessing of the water like St John. We support each other when anyone is in need. It brings us together as a community and strengthens our relationships. The church keeps the traditions. We sing traditional Slavic songs and make blessings that bring peace to our souls. I can understand why the marae is important. It's different of course to our Serbian Orthodox Church but there are some similar purposes. (Zoran, Serbia)*

The Serbian church’s respect for Māori demonstrated by the carvings on the church templon<sup>127</sup> is a reflection of a shared history between Māori and people from the former Yugoslavia that dates back to the 1880s. Bozic-Vrbancic (2008) writes that many Dalmatian people settled in New Zealand after arriving in the Far North of New Zealand to work in the gum fields, with some marrying Māori women and creating a distinct community of shared cultural values. It is these shared values that Zoran as a migrant can relate to. His experience, based on social, cultural, spiritual and ancestral inter-relationships, concurs with McNatty and Roa’s (2002) conceptualisation of whanaungatanga as previously discussed.

### 11.3.3 Kōrero

Many respondents, in recognising the importance of whakapapa, also noted a particular type of programming on Māori Television devoted to transmission of knowledge through the taonga of kōrero. According to Tapsell (1997) “as taonga travel from one generation to the next, so do their complex genealogical-ordered histories, or kōrero which are individually attached to each item [taonga]” (Tapsell, 1997 p. 328). Hence kōrero is the most important taonga because it is the mechanism by which all taonga are passed from one generation to the next. The definition of kōrero is more than oral

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<sup>127</sup> A templon is a feature of Eastern orthodox churches. Traditionally it is an ornately decorated barrier that separates the nave from the sacraments at the altar. However, in the case of the Serbian Church in Pt Chevalier in Auckland the templon is behind the altar.

historical knowledge because it also helps position taonga as representing a specific genealogical point through karakia:

*Kōrero*: oratory; to speak knowledge; speech; talk; verbal discourse; orally transmitted knowledge; truth account of the past; historical utterance; narratives associated with ancestors. ... In its pure state *kōrero* takes the ancient form of *karakia*: recitation; incarnation; highly ritualised prayer; oratory requiring correctness in word form, fluency and intonation; mediation with the gods; ancient verse that defies translation and is traditionally regarded as pure. (Tapsell, 1997, pp. 328-9)

It is not surprising that the importance of *kōrero* aligns with a myriad of Māori Television programmes, where oral histories are recorded and recounted, Māori histories are reasserted and rescreened,<sup>128</sup> Māori proverbs are explained, and current affairs are discussed in the context of Māori knowledge. I will turn shortly to discuss my participants' observations of such programmes.

One of the goals of Māori Television is the protection and promotion of Māori traditional cultural practices.<sup>129</sup> Programmes such as *Ngā Pari Kārangaranga*, *Kuia* and *Whakatauākī*, where the audience listens to the *kōrero* of the elders, play a role in reinforcing to audiences the relevance of history and cultural practices to understand the present and the interconnectedness of time. Although non-indigenous cultures also place an importance on national, community and personal histories, the airtime devoted to this type of programme on New Zealand 'mainstream' television, especially in primetime, is minimal. These kinds of programmes might be more prevalent on indigenous television because:

History is held as central in a world where the boundaries between past and present merge and blur. The deceased are recalled and farewelled, the living go forward into the familiar network of their *tūpuna* and ancestral ways are invoked in the decisions of the present. Important things have remained important, shifting in shape while following the patterns of the past. The past matters. (Anderson, Binney, & Harris, 2014, p. 488)

The participants did not use the word 'kōrero', but it was apparent from their comments that they related to the concept. The topics that *kuia* and *kaumātua* spoke about reminded the participants of the importance of their own oral histories and the passing on of knowledge. In this excerpt, three women from my 'Eastern European' face-to-face focus group talked about programmes that featured the oral traditions and knowledge of elders:

Lucia (Romania): *Watching programmes like Whakatauākī [a programme interviewing Māori elders about the relevance of traditional proverbs today] I realise we have the same respect for elders and listen to their advice. In our village, there are things that are allowed and things*

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<sup>128</sup> Māori Television rescreens the wealth of *kōrero* within the originally produced TVNZ Māori Department series in the 1980s, *Waka Huia*. Both *Kuia* and *Kaumātu*, many of whom have now passed away, recount traditions and knowledge for younger generations.

<sup>129</sup> This goal is encapsulated by 'te reo Māori' me ngā tikanga', a phrase that appears in Māori Television publications.



*that are not allowed, and in my grandparents' villages, like here, sometimes we forget the safety reason behind a particular sacred rule, but we still obey it out of respect (and undefinable fear of possible negative consequences).*

Bella (Macedonia): *I also discovered another interesting documentary series [Ngā Pari Kārangaranga] where elders speak about their lives and important things about their culture. One I watched was about an old Māori woman who shared the story of her very difficult life; poverty, shortage of food, having a grandmother who taught her te reo but being punished at school for speaking it. She eventually was schooled in the marae where she learnt about the protocols of Māoridom. These stories are very important to them.*

Edit (Hungary): *Some of the programmes the reporter sits by the person on the floor in an intimate way. You just reminded me of that, I like that.*

Bella (Macedonia): *... interviews with the old ladies, their life stories, like watching my grandmother. Simple stories where they remember the warm things and for some people they are not interesting, but they are beautiful memories and they were proud even though life was difficult and poor and hungry.*

Edit and Bella are drawn into the storytelling by a sense of intimacy and that “the stories are very important to them [Māori]” while Lucia can connect with the idea that history informs the present when she says, “some times we forget the safety reason behind a particular sacred rule”. In another example Mita explains that from her own cultural perspective viewing kuia talking about their lives gave her a sense of cultural loss not knowing her own history:

*I also think their history is important, like the programme Kuia where the grandmothers talk about their lives. I realise this knowledge will die when they die and why it is important to make these programmes for future generations because knowing about their elders and how they lived and what they thought is very important. I have a sense of loss because I cannot find where my family originally came from in India and I can relate to the importance of the stories. (Mita, Fijian/Indian)*

Many respondents, coming from cultures where a sense of belonging emanated from being linked to their ancestors, connected to the historical story telling within Māori Television's content. Perhaps they are painfully aware of the importance of history and its link to cultural identity because, like Māori, their own national stories that once anchored them to their 'homeland' are not valued by the dominant culture.

#### 11.3.4 Mauri and Wairua

Significant concepts such as 'mauri' and 'wairua' are strongly imbued in indigenous-produced programming. It is not uncommon to hear the word 'mauri' and see it in news headlines in the nightly news show, *Te Kaea* – for example, 'Tauranga Moana Iwi maintaining the mauri of ancestral land'; 'The Mauri of Matatini arrives in Wellington'; 'Decades of increased pollution has diminished the mauri of Ōkahu Bay'.

Tapsell (1997) uses these two definitions:

*Mauri*: life essence; life force; power of creation from the gods; sustains existence of form; binds the physical with the spiritual. (Tapsell, 1997, p. 329)

*Wairua*: spirit; essence of being; soul of an ancestor; when not occupying a living being it dwells in the Māori mystical homeland of Hawaiki. (Tapsell, 1997, p. 331)

Metge (2014) includes mana within the concepts of wairua and mauri, and teases out their interconnectedness by explaining that:

physical substance is given life and empowered by the indwelling of mauri (*life principle*) and mana (*spiritual power*), which originate in the spiritual realm. Human beings also have a wairua (*spirit*) which is given by God at birth and returns to God at death. (Metge, 2014, p. 83)

But do migrant groups relate to these concepts? One participant, Jenny, said she related to both mauri and wairua because of her work relationships with Māori colleagues in a government department:

*I think what you see on [Māori] TV is what you get to see when you get to know Māori; they are very welcoming, there is a lot of aroha, manaakitanga, there is a lot of hospitality reaching out to others, a lot of wairua, mauri, their spirituality (Jenny, Fijian/Indian).*

With mauri, all things – even rocks – have a life force which departs, once it is destroyed, back into the earth. For migrants in this study who have identified as Indian, the concept of ‘mauri’ brought to mind the notion of the creator, the preserver and the destroyer gods within Hindu philosophy:

*I can really see a type of life force coming out of Māori Television programming. I was watching a programme [Ngā Pari Kārangaranga] and an interview with an elder about fire. He spoke about how embers of a fire are the life force of the flames that either keep you alive or go out and let you die if it's cold. Watching the elder look at the fire, and somehow the reverence of what he was saying, took me right back to remembering the priests in the temple back home – when they make offerings. Fire is important in my traditions, it creates and it destroys and I could understand the elder's stories in that context. (Shahi, India)*

Another respondent, Mihili, from a Buddhist background in Sri Lanka, had watched the same programme as Shahi and had also connected with the kaumātua's story about a life force contained within the element of fire:

*I found the episode very interesting and was struck by the wisdom behind the elderly man's kōrero about the meaning and significance of fire, and how fire symbolises life force and energy. Watching this episode, I was reminiscing about my childhood in Sri Lanka, about certain cultural rituals associated with the element of fire and the symbolisation of fire in Sri Lankan culture. My recollections lead me to re-identify with the notion that in my culture fire is seen as a life force that both brings about new life and sustenance and is a protective element that helps ward off danger and evil spirits. (Mihili, Sri Lanka)*

According to Metge (2014), while some Māori might reject the spiritual beliefs of their ancestors, most value the symbolism as a way of understanding the world. The symbolism of a spiritual force of mauri, or life force, although explained in different cultural contexts by the respondents, has conceptual parallels for migrants when discussing the cultural connections they perceive in Māori Television content. Mihili especially seemed to feel a sense of nostalgia for her childhood as viewing the programme prompted her to remember the tradition of lighting the first fire in the New Year and using it to boil a pot of milk:

*It was very moving watching the programme as it reminded me of the first cultural ritual observed during the New Year - the boiling of a pot of milk with the first fire lit at the start of the day. I felt like I could almost smell aspects of my childhood with the warmth of the fire and the smell of the boiling milk. We observed the same ritual when moving into a new house. The fire and boiling milk symbolises an affirming energy for new beginnings. (Mihili, Sri Lanka)*

Mihili's experience is quite different culturally to Māori, but for all the respondents in this study who came from countries where symbolism and ritual play such an important part of cultural expression, it is likely that those who place a similar value on such practices within their own cultural context have the basis to explore shared beliefs. I discuss Mihili's response further below.

### 11.3.5 Kaitiakitanga

The participants who reported a sense of underlying spiritual connections often extended this to their relationship with nature and linked this feeling with concepts they picked out from their viewing of Māori Television, such as kaitiakitanga – often referred to as 'guardianship of the environment'. However, Kawharu (2000) argues that kaitiakitanga should not be defined just as 'guardianship' but as 'resource management', and Royal (2015) sees kaitiakitanga as a way of managing the environment, based on the traditional Māori world view. Lucia's comment below shows she noticed the silence of a Māori voice in any 'mainstream' debates about the tension between environmental management versus the farming industry's need for short-term economic returns. She also recognised that an important role of Māori Television is to tell these stories:

*I've been watching Native Affairs: River Cop about Millan Ruka on the case for Northland rivers. It was about rivers up north, polluted by farming. It was sad to see the Regional Council's response: despite the risk that cows around rivers put on the health of those using them, there are no restrictions around that. The only thing that authorities are doing is to match funding on any investment in fencing. And they brush off reports of cows mimi-ing and poo-ing into the rivers... It is great that Māori TV took a stand on an issue like this, and it concerns Māori, of course, their rivers and creeks are very important to them, but all of us: it is about the purity of our rivers. It is a controversial issue as well, as farming is a big New Zealand*

*industry. There are two different ways of thinking: this year's profit against the well-being of future generations. It's good that Māori Television is highlighting this. (Lucia, Romania)*

Jian also noted the lack of Māori consultation in environmental issues and goes as far as to make the judgement that it is 'really bad' the sentiments of Māori were ignored:

*I watched a news item about a man helping eels get to their breeding grounds. A dam on the river had prevented them but every year this man's project was to help the eels continue their life by building paths on the sides of the dam. Now why would you bother with this unless you felt there was a special connection between nature and humans? I think it's really bad that the people who built the dam didn't listen to the Māori people in the first place. (Jian, PRC, Chinese)*

Discussions for Jian and many of the other participants within their respective Facebook groups revealed their viewing experience of Māori Television often made them realise the absence of a Māori voice in 'mainstream' media stories about environment issues.

Although sustainable resource management is of interest to many, neglect of indigenous values in environmental debates is a common issue in previously colonised countries such as Canada and Australia (Jollands & Harmsworth, 2007). Māori Television offered, for the participants in this study, the realisation that the spiritual nature of kaitiakitanga is a shared concept amongst many cultures. Indigenous values incorporate, as Jian explained, "a special connection between nature and humans". Mana is also often associated with the concept of kaitiakitanga, or personal responsibility for the environment. Mutu (2014), citing Marsden, explains that mana whenua in Article 2 of the Treaty of Waitangi "while sometimes argued as the closest word to sovereignty ... is power, authority and control of the land derived from the gods and has strong spiritual inherent meanings" (Marsden in Mutu, 2014, p. 23). This explains why maintaining the mana of the land, intrinsically bound up in the concept of kaitiakitanga, is the underlying ethos of Māori Television's *Kaitiaki Wars*, a programme following Māori environmental 'warriors' as they investigate infringements against the environment (Mayor, 2015).

There are moves to restore customary rights and recognise the relationship between nature, culture and spiritual values in the Resource Management Act (1991).<sup>130</sup> But, as Māori Television's many programmes and news items on the topic repeatedly show, Māori still feel the need to assert their voice and their rights to exercise kaitiakitanga. This study found that many participants are hearing that 'voice'.

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<sup>130</sup> Under the Act applications for resource consents for environmental development require consultation with iwi authorities (Taonui, 2012).

## 11.4 A Potential Interface of Western and Indigenous Knowledge

Participants sensed other cultural commonalities with Māori through their experience of watching Māori-produced content. In my study I draw on three concepts from Western and Māori knowledge – embodiment, resonance and clue techniques to discuss the relationship between emotion (provoked by audio-visual content) and migrant belonging.

Embodiment can be thought of as a “mode of presence and engagement in the world” (Csordas, 2002, p. 184). For example, unconscious body language, such as frowning, or sweating, can be an indication of the embodiment of a perception or experience. I draw on this concept to consider an unconscious sensual and physical response viewing visual content. Dion, Sitz and Remy (2011) applied Csordas’s (1994, 2002) ideas to their own research which studied the experience of ethnicity through the body. They found ethnicity includes not only cultural representations and practices, but also the bodily experience of ethnicity and reflects “being-in-the-world through the body and ... a grammar of feelings and experiencing the world” (Dion et al., 2011, p. 323): They go on to say that “embodiment does not appear as a receptacle of internalized and fixed structures [as in the notion of habitus]... but as a mode of experiencing and interpreting the ever changing environment” (ibid., p. 312).

Writings about the moving image Marks (2000) also drew on Csordas’s (1994) ideas and suggested memory invokes embodiment. She argues that:

since memory functions multisensorially, a work of cinema, though it only directly engages two senses, activates a memory that necessarily involves all the senses. I suggest that an understanding of the embodied experience of cinema is especially important for representing cultural experiences that are unavailable to vision. (Marks, 2000, p. 22)

My analysis of these more intuitive or visceral responses also extends the work of both Gorton (2009) and Kavka (2008) and their studies on audience response to reality television where the relationship between content, emotion and belonging were recognised. Hence, to relate the work of film and media scholars, Marks (2000), Kavka, (2008) and Gorton (2009) to my research, I return to the discussion about Mihili’s nostalgic response to viewing the kaumātua speak of a life force contained within the embers. Her experience speaks to the multisensorially affect of the moving image. Mihili’s nostalgia evoked a connection with her childhood sensations of the warmth of the fire and the smell of the boiling milk. In Dion et al.’s (2011) terms, Mihili’s experience could be termed ‘embodied ethnicity’ where her experience of remembering her childhood in Sri Lanka is embodied in her senses.

The second concept I discuss here in analysing audience responses is that of ‘resonance’. Drawing on the ideas from Barclay (2003) and Selwyn (2016),<sup>131</sup> ‘resonance’ describes the memories that might

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<sup>131</sup> Selwyn, as the tumuaki (the Rumaki principal) of Nga Puna o Waiorea, has seen the Rumaki’s kapa haka students win the annual secondary school Polyfest from 2011-2016. He is also currently involved in establishing guidelines for

emerge when migrants experience a cultural connection with Māori. Barclay, as already noted, believes indigenous cinema is distinct because *te ao Māori* evokes “a whole cosmology, a world of physical and spiritual things, a world of spirits and gods” (Barclay, 2003b, p. 14). The elements of cosmology may resonate with certain individuals with a particular sensibility. In this research, it seems as if aspects of the cosmological distinctiveness of one culture can resonate with elements of another. Selwyn (2016) also has noticed that Māori cultural performance resonates with audiences on many different emotional and spiritual levels. He suggests that some performances that invoke Māori ancestors can also resonate with the spirits of non-Māori audience ancestors. This concept of ‘resonance’ is helpful because it gestures towards the importance of recognising audience affect beyond the corporeal representation of *te ao Māori*. There are many factors that can explain why some participants experienced a sense of nostalgia and longing for their own culture when viewing particular Māori Television content. However, more audience theory needs to be developed to recognise the place of emotions in reception studies.

Finally, Māori elder Hinekahukura Barrett-Aranui discusses what she calls ‘clue techniques’ to describe the wisdom contained in her ancestral *whareni*. In contrast to Csordas (1999), Marks (2000), Barrett-Aranui (1999), writing about the experience of visiting a *marae*, describes ‘clue techniques’ as a means to trigger memory. She says that within Māoridom story telling, carvings and art forms such as *kapa haka*, *waiata*, speech making, tattoo, weavings, scroll paintings and proverbs are used to trigger memories for Māori to retrieve information. The historical information within these art forms “encloses a myriad of ‘clues’ which prompts [an individual] to retrieve their [founding] myths” (Barrett-Aranui, 1999, p. 3).

I have adapted Barrett-Aranui’s (1999) ideas to suggest that when new migrants watch Māori Television content imbued with Māori cultural values through images, sounds and music, they may experience the content as a means to ‘trigger’ their own specific cultural memories. Hence, as previously discussed, while watching an interview with a *kaumātua* about *ahi tapu* (*sacred fire*), Shahi felt ‘triggered’ into memories of his own spiritual traditions and the important symbolism of fire within his own cultural rituals.

However, the above concepts should be thought of as having a nuanced and overlapping nature. Mihili’s experience of the story about *ahi tapu* is an example. Watching the story also triggered an embodied sensation, because she could equally imagine the smell of fire – and the taste of hot milk –

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*kapa haka* and Māori performing arts within the curriculum of NZQA. Within the oral traditions of *kaupapa Māori* he is well placed to discuss his interpretation of *kapa haka* evoking the *wairua* of ancestors for both Māori and non-Māori audiences.

from the use of fire in her own cultural practices. I am suggesting Mihili's experience 'triggered' a type of 'embodied resonance' between her own and Māori culture.

Another example that illustrates the difficulty of differentiating between the three concepts discussed is Māori Television's extensive coverage of *Te Matatini*, a biennial Māori Performing Arts competition featuring kapa haka performances from Māori groups in New Zealand and Australia. Kapa haka is primarily a performance of narrative through a variety of singing, chanting, movement and dance. The *Nga Hua a Tane Rore Report* (2014) identifies kapa haka as a "unique part of our identity as New Zealanders [that] helps facilitate meaningful connections with other cultures" (Te Kotahi Research Institute et al., 2014, p. 3). It has been recognised for its cultural, social and economic contribution to the country. This same report identified kapa haka's potential to be a gateway for non-Māori to enter te ao Māori. It also brings to mind the work of Hoskins (2017) and her analysis of how Māori cultural practices can be used to establish affective connections with non-Māori.

The performance of Māori cultural identity represented in *Te Matatini* can not only 'trigger' cultural identity markers in one culture but can also trigger them in another. Overwhelmingly, participants in this study found when viewing *Te Matatini* that the performances triggered a feeling of awe at the emotional language of the performances – but for a few it also 'triggered' a sense of nostalgia or sadness for a loss of the richness of their own cultural performance traditions:

*I always feel very moved when I watch Māori cultural performances and this was no different. I love how expressive it is, it's like they embody the song and the performance, so the fact that I don't understand the words doesn't matter so much. Something else that gets triggered for me when I'm watching is homesickness, I haven't quite made sense of this yet, I suppose watching Māori embrace their culture in this way makes me long for what I've left behind. (Mihili, Sri Lanka)*

One way to tease out the type of resonance Mihili felt between the cultural performances of Māori and her own culture is through the concept of embodiment, as discussed above. She felt emotional about the performance, recognising how her own ethnicity with its "type of grammar of feeling and experiencing the world" (Dion et. al., 2011, p. 323) allowed her to recognise the embodiment of identity performance within kapa haka. *Te Matatini* triggered for Mihili her own cultural world as perceived through her own lived experiences "which stimulate[d] her body, her perceptions and cognitions" (Dion et al., 2011, p. 317). Her cultural memories in turn contributed to a feeling of loss.

Mihili was not alone in this feeling:

*The performances I watched, left really very strong impression on me. The festival itself proved that the language of songs and dances is the universal, and I believe that everybody can understand it. Te Matatini was the best way for Māori people to express and showcase their heritage and their cultural identity. Lack of Māori language knowledge was not a problem for*

*me to feel all the energy flowing on the stage, but it was a problem to understand the chants and the stories. Having said this, I just made a comparison with our Macedonian cultural traditions, and we Macedonians are really closely connected with our traditions, where every song and dance tells a story, sometimes love story but most of them tell a story about the hardship and struggle for freedom. Watching the kapa haka competition I could feel the pride and smell the countryside of the summer festivals back home when I went with my husband to see traditional dances. The link I posted will help you get a peak of Macedonian traditional songs and dances. (Bella, Macedonia)*

In these examples, watching the programme content evoked what psychologists Dion, Sitz, & Rémy (2011) would describe as 'embodied ethnicity', where ethnicity is lived and felt through bodily perceptions. In these situations of community gatherings, such as *Te Matatini*, the body is merged as in a common flow with others. The shared bodily perceptions give us a feeling of being in a shared community. Dion et. al. (2011) call this an example of embodied interactions, which allow the possibility of those with familiar body techniques to interact with each other in a similar way. I am using kapa haka as an example of the idea of embodied interactions amongst the cultural performers because it triggered for Bella her own embodied cultural equivalent. Her use above of the word 'universal' could also be interpreted as meaning the universal language and connecting nature of song and dance. Kapa haka triggered an awareness for her of a shared body perception. The pride in her identity as a Macedonian has been reinforced as she seeks to share her culture's songs and dances with the rest of her Facebook group. Bella's awareness bears out Dion et al.'s (2011) argument that participants in different ethnic settings have the potential to perceive a shared body experience and therefore shared sense of commonality and belonging.

Despite kapa haka being performed in te reo, neither Mihili or Bella found their lack of te reo skills prevented them from emotionally responding to the content. Selwyn (2016), in discussing his interpretation of why audiences can connect with the emotion of the performance despite having no prior knowledge of te ao Māori, suggests that they "identify and engage with the spirit of the performance, where the ancestors of the audience connect with the ancestors implicit within the kapa haka narrative" (Selwyn, 2016). Selwyn can see why Western audiences feel an emotional response to kapa haka: "you can't put your finger on it, but the mana and wairua of the performance affects audiences on many levels". It is the analysis of this emotional response, rather than the programming content itself, that has formed the basis of much of this chapter's discussion.

## 11.5 Cultural Connection and Belonging

This type of emotionally complex intertwining of concepts - from the triggering of memory, to the sense of another world to an emotional, or 'embodied' response to Māori Television content - could also be more specifically analysed as a means to discuss perceptions of belonging to a community. In



Chapter 3, I discussed the work of anthropologists Trnka, Dureau, & Park (2013), Magowan (2007) and Weismantel (2001). Basing some of my analysis on their ideas about the intersection of the senses and forms of belonging, it can be argued that the incorporeal experiences of Mihili and Bella (discussed above) provided a sense of cultural commonality and belonging.

Māori Television, for some audiences has the potential to engender an emotionally visceral response through the senses to its content that facilitates a sense of belonging. Here, is an example where an emotional response of the senses, or an ‘embodied experience’, is evoked in Lucia through Māori Television’s content:

*I feel welcomed, it's the same kind of warm voice that I find on a marae ... watching Māori Television makes me feel like I belong to New Zealand ... the way presenters talk with me. They don't talk at me, they talk to me. I feel like I am engaged in a conversation and I am not being talked to, they just don't give one point of view. It introduces me to particular places and rituals ... and they embrace part of you as part of their world and I do find an openness [to including the audience]. (Lucia, Hungary)*

Lucia felt embraced and connected with the presenters and recognised an association between a cultural representation of tikanga in televisual form and her emotive responses. Hence, investigating the way Māori Television productions embody ethnicity and ‘speak’ to the audience is one way to explore whether participants experience a sense of belonging from a visceral, or emotional, response to content. I have discussed earlier how the senses have a role in belonging (Trnka et al., 2013). However, more specifically related to the moving image, Marks’ (2000) ideas about embodiment could offer one explanation for Lucia’s response. As I have already discussed, Marks asserts that “since memory functions multisensorially, a work of cinema, though it only directly engages with two senses, activates a memory that necessarily involves all the senses” (Marks, 2000, p.22). The role of Lucia’s memory here speaks to Marks’ ideas about multisensoriality. Lucia equates feeling warm and embraced from viewing Māori Television to her corporeal experiences of a marae, which in turn provoke feelings of being included as a member of Māori Television’s audience and a sense of being embraced as part of a Māori world.

Lucia’s response (above) is referring to what is termed as a medium’s ‘mode of address’. In particular, Māori Television’s mode of address may also lead migrant audiences to more of a sense of being welcomed by the indigenous broadcaster than they are by ‘mainstream’ television. Modes of address can operate as ‘cultural signifiers’ (Gurevitch & Curran, 2005) and provide audiences with numerous signposts that indicate cultural difference. Several modes of address found on Māori Television can be contrasted with ‘mainstream’ media, such as informal conversational interviews, a respectful tone and less confrontational styles of reporting in Māori news programmes (Rankine et al., 2008). Māori Television content also demonstrates a different taken-for-granted version of common sense such as

in the automatic way deference and respect are given to older people and whakapapa is acknowledged for interview subjects.

Even the visual look of Māori-produced content and the on-screen channel presentation can be seen as a cultural signifier. For example, drawing on Barclay's ideas, Mercier (2007,2010) has analysed the works of filmmaker Taika Waititi, *Boy*, *Tama Tu* and *Two Cars, One Night*, and found parallels between different types of traditional relational encounters that occur on a marae and the types of encounters that occur between the characters of the films. Likewise, on Māori Television similar instances can be found of Barclay's notion of a type of on-screen filmic articulation of te ao Māori such as the opening title sequence of the programme *Paepae* discussed in Chapter 4. These types of cultural signifiers can operate as a type of trigger for Māori and non-Māori audiences to find a connection to the content at both a corporal and incorporal level. I have discussed in this chapter examples of how participants have experienced an emotional response to viewing Māori Television. Such responses are analogous to how Barclay wanted visitors to feel in a 'communications marae'. An important general marae protocol involves making visitors feel welcome and comfortable. As Barclay says, "if visitors feel they have not been brought in warmly and treated well then the marae will be considered hollow and will die ... we must be conscious of that duty to offer suitable hospitality" (Barclay, 1990, p. 78).

## 11.6 Conclusion

Although it is not appropriate or valid to make direct cultural comparisons in a study of this kind, it is clear that migrant participants discovered some common ground, in terms of sensing cultural affinities between their own and Māori cultural values that could provide the basis for communication across axes of difference. I have also discussed how common ground might be achieved at an emotional level through affinities being felt at what could be thought of as an unconscious level through embodiment, an emotional resonance and finally through cultural or emotional memory being triggered by cultural performance. For many of my participants, viewing and engaging with the content of Māori Television programming and then discussing the programmes amongst their focus groups did allow them to recognise shared cultural connections between their own and Māori culture. Hence, one of the outcomes of my research is that it does provide one way to think about a means for audiences to engage with an indigenous perspective and develop the confidence to participate in face-to-face encounters with their Māori colleagues in their respective places of work. How viewing Māori Television and noticing cultural affinities is translated beyond theoretical interest to making a difference in their lives is the subject of the next chapter.



## Chapter Twelve

### Inclusion/Exclusion - Where Do I Fit In?

A recurring idea in the previous findings chapters has been the extent to which Māori Television facilitates the negotiating of issues of identity and belonging by new migrants. This has been achieved by participants understanding the importance of te reo and te Tiriti, recognising counternarratives to the ‘mainstream’ representations of Māori, together with a sense of there being a cultural connection between aspects of the participants’ world views and those of Māori. Many participants, particularly those from non-Western focus groups, observed that engaging with the above concepts also contributed to their own sense of ‘where do I fit in?’ or ‘how do I belong?’ to the imaginings of the nation.

However, belonging from feeling a sense of connection with a Māori world through Māori Television, given all the complexities of audience reception, can only be understood as one of the many factors that contribute to migrants’ sense of belonging and the process of re-negotiating more integrated identities within the imaginings of a nation informed by the Treaty.

The purpose of this chapter is to highlight some of these complexities in discussing participants’ sense of national belonging gained from viewing Māori Television content. While some of the participants might have experienced a sense of inclusion and belonging from viewing indigenous content, at other times their experiences also engendered feelings of exclusion.

#### 12.1 The Problem of Defining ‘Belonging’

Before I discuss my findings it also needs to be acknowledged that definitions of what the participants meant by ‘belonging’ are problematic because of the subjectivities associated with the term. For example, while people might not experience belonging to the dominant sense of the national, they still may experience a belonging from more general alternative narratives within the nation. As Ghassan Hage reminds us, ‘national belonging is not just an either/or matter ... [i]t varies both quantitatively and qualitatively’ (Hage, 1996, p. 466). Hage (1997) also suggests that within a nation there may be a multiplicity of communities that share symbolic forms, values and morals and language. In New Zealand, for example, Sibley, Liu, & Khan (2010) found there was support for the symbolic representation of te ao Māori in national identity amongst a range of ethnic participants.<sup>132</sup> However, they also suggest that “symbolic support for Māori by the ethnic group of Pākehā may be one of many possible ideologies that members of the majority group draw upon to legitimise the system [of

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<sup>132</sup> The participants in Sibley et al. (2010) research included 127 New Zealand Europeans, five Māori, three Pacific Nations New Zealanders, four Asian New Zealanders and three Indian New Zealanders.

dominance]” (Sibley et al., 2010, p.43). Their research demonstrates the complexity of concepts of national belonging. For many, belonging to the nation only includes the support of aspects of the symbolic representation of te ao Māori, such as the wearing of pounamu, or the use of te reo greetings. However, amongst some Pākehā, as a majority ethnic group, symbolic belonging can support inequalities and exclusion of others because of a reluctance to share resources and power. Supporting the inequality of Māori in society may also, as De Souza (2011) points out, lead to economic, social and political advantage for migrant groups. Hence, new migrants may well find many challenges in negotiating new identities and belongings given this type of complexity of what national identity might mean for New Zealanders.

## 12.2 ‘Belonging’ Through an Increased Sense of a Māori World

One response to the pressures and complexities of finding a new identity from the experience of migration is the question ‘where do I fit in? This is important, particularly for visibly different migrants, because in a settler colonial nation such as New Zealand, a strong sense of identity and belonging can counter the experience of internalised racism and its accompanying negative consequences (De Souza, 2007).

For many participants, a feeling of belonging to the nation was linked to an increased understanding of a Māori world, despite feeling at times excluded by the extent of Māori language within programming. This is demonstrated in the following excerpt from a focus group discussion between Mihili and Rahul:

*Rahul (India): I think Māori Television helps me understand Māori culture which for me is important for my sense of belonging. So I feel that if I just understand the dominant culture my circle is incomplete. I need to understand Māori culture as well to be able to understand the debates and the politics that are going on. I think because Māori Television presents Māori perspectives really strongly it helps me to do that, but I'm not sure if that is its point ... The programmes are not produced for us [migrants] but we feel drawn in, we feel we can identify with the position of Māori and some of the content of some of the documentaries ... but I feel excluded where there is a language barrier especially programmes that don't have subtitles, and programmes that go deep into cultural stuff, like I can't watch the whole kapa haka.*

*Mihili (Sri Lanka): Yes, I think I feel included in programmes that makes reference or view Māori in relation to, or interaction with other Pākehā, multicultural [issues] or historical events. I feel excluded when [content] is about Māori in Māori [te reo] .... but the more I think about it I think my integration feels incomplete if I am only integrated into the monocultural bit of New Zealand, the Pākehā world ... The more I learn about Māori culture and Māori Television is helping me, the more I think it will increase my sense of belonging.*

Māori Television does segment its audience according to language ability and at least fifty one per cent of programming is broadcast in te reo during primetime (Māori Television, 2016a). Indeed, both

Rahul and Mihili experienced the tension of sometimes feeling included and at other times excluded by content. They felt excluded by programming in te reo without English subtitles but experienced a heightened sense of belonging through content that facilitated their understanding of a Māori world. Their comments provide another example of how connecting with aspects of te ao Māori can contribute to an experience of integrating their own ethnic identity with that both Māori and Pākehā.

Paying attention to migrants' sense of belonging is important. Indeed, concepts of 'belonging' have been used as one of the indicators for a nation's social cohesion (Spoonley et al., 2005). Social fragmentation caused by increasingly diverse populations has resulted in policies which promote social inclusion between citizens and newcomers both in New Zealand (Spoonley et al., 2005) and internationally (Bruhn, 2009; Kymlicka, 2010; OECD, 2011). In New Zealand, official policies have promoted social cohesion and inter-ethnic contact because it is believed that personal contact and intercultural knowledge and empathy tends to break down stereotypes and negative attitudes (Gooder, 2017). However, not only can belonging mean different things to different people (as discussed in 12.1) because, as Anthias (2008) argues, notions of social cohesion and belonging can also mask prevalent inequality and exploitation because 'belonging' can become "naturalised and thus invisible within hegemonic structures" (Anthias, 2008, p. 8). 'Belonging' is often associated with belonging to the systems of the dominant culture without necessarily recognising that those structures and systems can perpetuate exclusion and inequality.

Returning to Mihili's comment above, she clearly recognised a disruption, or unsettling of notions of belonging to an homogeneous 'imagined community' (Anderson, 1983). This idea of a imagined community has been contested for some time (Castles & Davidson, 2000; Gitlin, 1998). Concepts of belonging to a nation's imagined community have also been challenged by Appadurai's (1990, 1996) mediascapes, Cunningham's (2001) ethno-specific global mediated communities and the echo chambers of Sunstein (2009) and Pariser (2011). These theorists have in common the idea that due to the rise in media production and distribution, multiple platforms can provide extensive niche audiences, each providing distinct and different senses of 'belonging' to the nation.

Māori Television can be seen as an example of the diversity of New Zealand's mediascape. A wide variety of Māori cultural expression can be seen through the broadcaster's range of programming with its potential for cultural revitalisation and expression on the airwaves of a visible alternative community. What is clear from many of the participants in this research is that the broadcaster's representation of a Māori world, with its alternative representation of Māori issues to 'mainstream' media and positioning of a Māori voice centre screen, has offered them a different perspective on what national belonging might mean to that of many Pākehā.

Comments such as those of Mihili and Rahul concur with participants' comments from previous chapters and represent a provisional indication of the ability for participants in this study to negotiate new integrated and fluid identities to enhance their sense of 'belonging'. As discussed in my literature review, researchers (Pearson, 2014; Bandyopadhyoy, 2010; Ip & Pang, 2005; Wong, 2003; Yee, 2003; Leitner & Ehrkamp, 2006) suggest the relationship between a migrant's identity and a sense of belonging has a fluidity depending on differing situations and circumstances. Identity can range from a strong identification with one's 'home' culture – and a detachment from a 'host' culture – to an over-identification with a new 'host' culture (assimilation). While acknowledging there are different subject positions, researchers Berry et al. (2006) and Ward & Lin (2005) have found that increasingly integration is the most positive psychological adaptation strategy for migrants in a host country. Examples of this may be seen in the common practice of some migrants calling themselves by a combination of their ethnicity and their nationality, for example, Chinese-Kiwi, Indian-New Zealander, Korean-Kiwi.<sup>133</sup> However, implicit in the psychologically affirming position of an integrated identity is an identification with the 'host' nation and a sense of connecting to the host's places and peoples. Māori Television counters and disrupts conceptions of a Pākehā 'host' nation with its hegemonic institutions and values by asserting a Māori view of a society that is, like all settler societies, racialised and unequal.

For Mihili, the more she engaged in thinking about her identity, the more she realised there is a dominant 'monocultural' Pākehā world, and that previously she had not thought about a Māori world. Mihili links her sense of 'belonging' to being integrated into both a Pākehā and a Māori world, she might not experience 'belonging' to the dominant sense of the national but may feel more of a sense of 'belonging' to an alternative indigenous narrative of the nation. An awareness of Pākehā dominance, seen here in Mihili's comment, has been a consistent idea emerging from the findings in previous chapters. A feeling of being excluded from the dominant Pākehā world might also be seen in the broader picture of the day-to-day, lived reality of migrant exclusion from a nominally bicultural 'host' nation.

### 12.3 Inclusion/Exclusion

While participants, such as Mihili and Rahul, relate to issues of belonging arising from content on Māori Television, there were other comments from participants' discussions that related to feeling excluded from content about a Māori world. The extent to which these observations contributed to a

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<sup>133</sup> As an interesting aside, in an indigenous context "it is not uncommon for a person to state that he or she is of, for instance, Ngāti Porou and Tainui, or Ngāti Hine and Scottish descent" (Brandt, 2013, p. 79).

feeling of not belonging to the nation is unclear. However, the feelings of being excluded by language and culture did foster an awareness of cultural boundaries that many may experience within the nation.

Jenny, a participant in the same focus group as Rahul and Mihili, recognises she is not in the broadcaster's target audience. Nevertheless, she still supports programming focused on the indigenous broadcasters' Māori audiences:

*Māori Television programmes content is predominantly for Māori. I'm not fussed if I don't see my face at all from my community or understand the language. As long as they cater to their own. But there are certain programmes which are of interest [to non-Māori audiences] that I feel are more balanced [than 'mainstream'] .... Programmes like non-Anglo international movies, those documentaries on Tuesday nights, documentaries about other indigenous peoples and Native Affairs, cooking show and some of those lifestyle programmes about horses or hunting, those sort of programmes makes Māori Television inclusive for migrant and other viewers. (Jenny, Fijian/ Indian)*

Jenny was supportive of Māori Television's ability to tell Māori stories, made *by* Māori *for* Māori audiences, and like Mihili and Rahul, she was not negative about Māori having a specific channel to promote language and culture. Here, there is not necessarily a conflict between programming in te reo and attracting a non-fluent migrant audience.

As participants identified with the content of Māori Television it appears they moved along a continuum of inclusion and exclusion. Where they positioned themselves on the continuum at any given time appeared to be dependent on the level of connection they had with individual programme content. The comments above demonstrate an awareness, as Rahul points out, that 'some programmes are not made for us' but that overall the programme schedule provides content that still offers cultural benefits to migrant audiences. Arguably, study participants here demonstrate that they were drawn into an indigenous public sphere because they felt the range of programming, such as international documentaries and festival films, were part of a strategy "that informs, educates and entertains viewers, and enriches New Zealand's society" (Māori Television Service Amendment Act, 2013). Jenny's comment reflects that not only does she feel included by Māori Television's selection of programming, but that the inclusivity she senses from watching a range of programmes means Māori Television has drawn her into its communications marae – a discussion I will return to more fully in Chapter 13.

Indeed, Barclay's metaphor of the communications marae and Māori produced content 'talking-in' to Māori audiences could also be one explanation as to why there was a sense of exclusion felt by some participants. The focus group dialogue below could be understood in terms of a reaction to an audience 'listening-in' to Māori-centric programming. Undeniably, content produced for Māori should, in Barclay's terms, maintain its integrity by 'talking-in' to Māori. In the following dialogue, these



participants from the Western nations' group express a level of exclusion they experienced from 'listening-in':

*Sally: I sometimes feel there is something else going on in terms of the sub texts of programmes on Māori Television and I feel a bit left out and I didn't grow up here. Sometimes I do feel like an outsider looking in, as opposed to that big embrace. It does feel like Māori talking to Māori rather than Māori talking to me and saying welcome nau mai haere mai. There's not a lot of explaining to outsiders what things might mean.*

Laure and Jessica: *Yes, that's true.*

*Sally: It's like when you go to the marae you just sort of fit in with what they are doing, there's not a lot of, let us make the visitor comfortable and explain all this stuff.*

Laure and Jessica: *Yes, yes.*

One way to interpret the above conversation by my Western nations' focus group is to theorise that new settlers who come from traditional colonising countries inadvertently, or unconsciously, feel uncomfortable with other knowledge systems. Inherent within white privilege discourse is the expectation that the base from which everything is compared is the dominant culture's epistemological framework. Sally's expectation of being welcomed, 'nau mai haere mai' and the general agreement amongst the other participants that, like visiting a marae, there should be more explanation about programme content, seems to indicate some expectation of a level of inclusion.

However, issues of audience exclusion were not so clear-cut. While Jessica agreed with Sally about not feeling welcomed, she also was 'not bothered' about not understanding the cultural performance of *Te Matatini*:

*I would have really liked to be able to understand more of what was being sung and said, especially the young man who was interacting with the audience and got a lot of laughs. It didn't bother me that I wasn't able to understand it – in an 'oh, why don't they have subtitles' way. (Jessica, Germany)*

I have discussed in Chapter 11 the degree to which participants created meanings from cultural performances. However, what is insightful here about Jessica's comment is that in her previous dialogue (above) amongst her focus group members, she appears to be concerned about not understanding the content. One way to understand this apparent paradox is to understand that viewers can feel different degrees of inclusion and exclusion at the same time depending on the content.

In some cases, such as of Merle from South Africa, this paradox became more nuanced because a feeling of not understanding some programming provoked an interest in 'listening in' to other content and learning more about te ao Māori. Her comment demonstrates the ability of Māori Television to engender a level of curiosity to know more, and suggests the broadcaster's pedagogical function needs to be acknowledged by its government funders:

*I don't watch programmes I don't understand but curiously not understanding some programmes makes me want to watch other things about various aspects of life for Māori. Because I have watched things I've gone into it, researched a bit and come back for more. It most definitely made me feel like there is something I could belong to. (Merle, South Africa)*

Māori Television might contribute to issues of negotiating new integrated identities for migrants, but the above responses are also a reminder that “national belonging is not just an either/or matter” (Hage, 1996, p. 446). There will always be a tension between “where you are from ... [and] ‘where you are at’” (Ang, 2001, p. 34), or, in Cunningham and Sinclair’s (2000) terms, a tension between ‘home’ and ‘host’. ‘Belonging’, like identity, is fluid and contextual.

## 12.4 The Conundrum of ‘Belonging’

While Rahul and Mihili experienced a greater sense of belonging to a nation of both Māori and Pākehā because of an increased understanding about Māori, one of my interviewees, Rucai, was more ambivalent about ever belonging to Aotearoa New Zealand:

*I think the concept of ‘perpetual foreigner’ can describe better the feelings of alienation and barriers I encounter daily, which could be systemic, linguistic or cultural, or in very subtle and unconscious ways. However, I think this sense of alienation might be the beginning and possibility of understanding, belonging and trust. This might be partly true of other Asian or Chinese who attempt to barge into a both familiar and alien world. With this sense of alienation, the viewing experience [of Māori Television] is emotionally complex. There’s certainly a strong sense of community on screen that everyone longs for, but meanwhile one realises there are so many structural/cultural/linguistic impossibilities that keep you from the community. (Rucai, PRC Chinese)*

There are no easy answers for migrants on how to best address issues of cultural belonging. What Rucai refers to above as ‘levels of alienation’ could be understood by turning to Ang’s (2001) insight into the conundrum of ‘belonging’. She describes it as an uneasy dynamic between ‘home’ and ‘host’ locations. While migrants might gain a sense of belonging from their connection with their homeland while living in a host country “this very identification with an imagined ‘where are you from’ is also a sign of, and surrender to, a condition of actual marginalisation in the place ‘where you are at’” (Ang, 2001, p. 34). Rucai illustrates this complexity by firstly, recognising the dynamic of both inclusion and exclusion, or, as he says, a world that is both ‘familiar and alien’. My analysis of Rucai’s statement comes from the recognition, or ‘familiarity’, of cultural connections between some participants’ values and Māori values that I have discussed in Chapter 11. At the same time, the cultural boundaries that Rucai distinguishes, means he will always be ‘an alien’. Secondly, this complexity leads him to identify ultimately with the marginalisation of Māori. He feels that both Māori and Chinese are often represented as ‘other’ in ‘mainstream’ media, but to some extent, he still feels ‘alienated’ by Māori Television;

*So, the levels of alienation I experienced with both mainstream and Māori TV are different due to their different contents. If I identify myself with the Māori representation [on mainstream], I probably stand in line with the 'suppressed' Māori. (Rucai, PRC Chinese)*

As discussed in the previous finding's chapters, a shared sense of marginalisation between participants and Māori seemed to be a common idea articulated amongst non-Western focus groups. Another of my interviewees, Shiv, remarked that his sense of 'solidarity' and 'belonging' to Māori comes from his recognising a division in the nation after watching Māori Television:

*I didn't so much feel a sense of belonging to the Pākehā/European New Zealand but more a sense of solidarity with Māori and somewhat of a sense of belonging to the indigenous peoples of New Zealand. (Shiv, India)*

These non-Western migrant groups identified with the marginalisation Māori have experienced within a settler colonial society and shared a sense of alienation and discrimination, or invisibility, by 'mainstream' representations of their concerns. Veracini (2012) suggests this type of shared experience of migrant and indigenous populations – that of being 'othered' by the dominant settler colonial culture – can potentially lead to shared alliances. For example, Māori and Chinese share many commonalities based on negative experiences from 'mainstream' New Zealand (Lee cited in Mutu, 2009). More recently a Māori-initiated group, Asians Supporting Tino Rangatiratanga and Racial Equity Aotearoa, was founded for Māori and Asians to support each other's political agendas. While migrant and Māori experiences might be connected, the reasons for the racialisation of migrants and ongoing colonisation of indigenous people should not distract from recognising the Treaty rights of tangata whenua (Fleras & Maaka, 2010). Nevertheless, shared experiences of exclusion, as Rucai observed, 'can be the beginning and possibility of understanding, belonging and trust'.

## 12.5 Conclusion

This chapter suggests that Māori Television can offer its migrant audiences insights into finding an answer to the question of 'where do I fit in?', and to some extent, the cultural resources necessary for conceptualisations of identity and belonging. Notions of belonging are extremely complex, especially considering media text and the ways in which it can simultaneously prompt feelings of inclusion and exclusion for members of an audience. However, relating ideas of media text and interpretation to identity formation, Madianou (2005) and Dhoest (2012) note that media in itself does not help create the negotiation of identity, but rather contributes to 'common communicative spaces' which affect audience discourses about identity and belonging. Māori Television can be seen as one of the numerous forms of media that migrant groups might have in common, and can be regarded as representing a contribution to the many sources that provide information for a migrant in their construction of 'fluid' identities. Hence, these findings should be understood as one of the many resources that can equip

migrant audiences in their search for ‘spaces of inclusion’ within an ethnically diverse society informed by the Treaty.



# Chapter Thirteen

## Conclusion

### 13.1 Overview of Research

Migration to New Zealand is part of a global increase in cross-border movement through ever-widening immigration channels. Vertovec writes of the challenges from this increased movement to existing patterns of social organisation that are widening and hardening the stratification of migrant groups in a process he calls the ‘social organisation of difference’ (Vertovec, 2007). As in other nations, increasing migration to New Zealand is changing the imaginings of the nation and concepts of national and migrant identities, but here it is within the context of an apparently constitutionally ‘bicultural’ society. However, institutions, including ‘mainstream’ media, continue to reflect the power relations between Māori and Pākehā resulting from the nation’s settler colonial past. One response to the unequal power relations in New Zealand has been to return to the constitutional founding document, the Treaty of Waitangi Māori assert that a number of the Treaty Articles have been breached and that Article 2 specifically provides for the protection of indigenous taonga, one of which is the language, te reo Māori. Decades of social and legal efforts by Māori have resulted in the establishment of Māori Television in 2004.

This thesis is a case study of new migrants from a variety of geographical regions who had gained residency in New Zealand mostly within the last 10 years at the time of the research. It explores their experiences as viewers of Māori Television, and shines a light on the relationship between migrants and te ao Māori in ways rarely seen in the literature on migrants. It attempts to show how migrants negotiate new integrated identities and view their unfamiliar ‘home’ as they understand more about the history and context of Māori and the country’s colonial settler past through the representation of a Māori world view on Māori Television.

This study of migrants’ experiences of Māori Television challenges a ‘mainstream’ expectation that they will necessarily be co-opted by Pākehā hegemony and messages from the mass media as they ‘integrate’ into the national culture. Instead, it found that, firstly, Māori Television provides migrants with a viewing experience that contributes to the many resources migrants need in their quest for a sense of identity and belonging as a member of a minority ethnic group in an officially bicultural society. Secondly, participant experiences of engaging with Māori Television content led many to develop a more critical appreciation of what a Treaty relationship between Māori and all others might

mean, such as being supportive of Treaty issues, the revitalisation of the language, and a recognition of a Māori world view.

## 13.2 Aim of this Research

The question driving this research project has been: What meanings do new migrants make from viewing Māori Television? Anecdotally, I knew from teaching in schools with a high proportion of migrants and refugees, and from doing voluntary work in teaching conversational English to mostly women from various countries in Asia, that migrants, particularly those who were visibly different from Pākehā, welcomed reminders that a non-Anglo world also existed in Aotearoa New Zealand. They enjoyed seeing brown faces, hearing languages other than English and sensing a familiarity between their own world view and that of Māori.

I then formulated two key questions that guided my research: (1) to what extent does Māori Television facilitate migrants' experiences of learning about a Māori world from a Māori perspective and (2) how do these experiences offer cultural resources for settlement in a nation underpinned by the Treaty? To investigate these questions, I used a mixed methods audience study based on migrant viewers' responses to Māori Television content. I sought to understand what key meanings could emerge from their viewing experience. To this end, an online survey completed by 62 migrants formed the quantitative section of the research, and four focus groups of 17 participants and eight interviews provided the qualitative research material as a basis for analysis.

## 13.3 Main Findings

The main finding that emerged from participants engaging in viewing Māori Television can be summarised as follows:

- 1) Māori language – participants expressed supportive attitudes and behaviours, such as attention to pronunciation of te reo, learning and using te reo words, and speaking Māori.
- 2) The Treaty – an understanding developed amongst participants of how ongoing breaches of the Treaty have resulted in the current situation of social deprivation experienced by many Māori. Participants also developed supportive attitudes towards Māori issues concerning the Treaty.
- 3) Cultural connection – some participants discovered a sense of having a cultural connection with Māori cultural values. This did not necessarily mean a connection with the value itself – with all the complexities of definition here – but more a sense, or perception, of there being some commonality, or resonance between two cultures. While it may be impossible for non-Māori to ever understand fully cultural values implicit in indigenous productions, this did not

diminish the potential for some audiences to draw some comparisons with what they believed to be their own cultural values.

- 4) Identity and belonging – participants who engaged in te ao Māori gained a sense of what Māori expectations were from the Treaty, recognised cultural affinities between their own culture and that of Māori, and developed more supportive attitudes towards building positive relationships with Māori, and helped address, to some extent, their issues of identity and belonging.

This research represents a major contribution on the role of New Zealand’s indigenous broadcaster in the lives of migrant audiences. Furthermore, while the research has been carried out in the context of New Zealand, there is also very little existing research in other countries with significant indigenous populations that examines the role of indigenous media in cross-cultural communication with a specific focus on migrant audiences. The thesis also fills a gap in research about how indigenous media can shape processes of national and cultural identity formation in migrant audiences. In particular, in the study of migrancy, my research extends the work of Vertovec (2007, 2009) and Wise (2009, 2018). They looked at the ‘spaces of inclusion’ for migrants through architecture, urban spaces, food, and music but my study also adds the concept of indigenous media and its contribution to ‘common communicative spaces’ for migrant audiences.

#### 13.4 Barry Barclay, the Communications Marae and Māori Television Audiences

In this research I theorise that Māori Television’s migrant audiences viewed Māori Television’s representation of a Māori-centric world view, in an analogous way to Barry Barclay’s ideas of how film audiences are presented with an indigenous voice that ‘talks-in’ within indigenous filmmaking. In Chapter 4, I analysed Māori Television as operating like Barclay’s communications marae, where the broadcaster’s audiences ‘listen-in’ to content informed by a Māori standpoint. I positioned Māori Television’s programming that is made from outside a Māori lens, such as international documentaries, movies and sport, within the marae ātea – the open space between the marae entrance and the whareniui, or meeting house. I argue that non-Māori audiences are then welcome to ‘listen-in’ to content that is made by Māori, for Māori from within the heart of a metaphorical whareniui. Some of this content ‘talks-in’ to Māori audiences but other content both ‘talks-in and talks-out’ to all audiences. It is this content that can metaphorically pull viewers into the whareniui to ‘listen-in’ to the indigenous voice and potentially draw its viewers into understanding and supporting many of the issues that face Māori.

The ability of Māori Television to challenge ‘mainstream’ Eurocentric normativity was discussed by all the participants throughout the research. My findings demonstrate some of the ways that a Māori voice ‘talking-in’ on Māori Television exposes its audiences to counter narratives to the ‘mainstream’ representations of Māori. Māori Television content has the potential to make its migrant audiences



aware of issues of historical injustices, the inequalities experienced today by Māori, and to challenge common stereotypes participants had adopted from ‘mainstream’ discourses.

The broadcaster’s representation of the Māori experience of colonisation can also resonate with migrants of similar experiences in their own backgrounds. In comparison to ‘mainstream’ media, my research found that by offering Māori realities of New Zealand colonial history, Māori Television can potentially facilitate a better understanding of the complexities of migrant experiences of colonisation in their ‘home’ cultures, and Māori experiences of colonisation in Aotearoa/New Zealand. This suggests that for many of the migrants in this study, Māori Television also had a pedagogical function.

## 13.5 Discussion and Recommendations

### 13.5.1 The Māori Language

Participants were motivated to learn te reo for a number of reasons. Te reo is an official language of New Zealand and some participants thought it was a cultural requirement to learn the language on arrival. The extent of monolingualism in New Zealand was a surprise for some participants because they came from multilingual backgrounds where speaking different languages and dialects is a part of everyday life. Learning te reo words and phrases from Māori Television helped them feel more connected to New Zealanders who use te reo in the everyday lexicon of ‘mainstream’ New Zealand. Exposure to te reo on Māori Television also encouraged participants to practice what te reo words they knew and to learn new ones. New migrants should not be underestimated as a source of support in te reo revitalisation efforts. For example, de Bres (2008) identified some of the desired outcomes of Māori language promotional campaigns and the principal campaign of Māori Language Week, as being correct pronunciation of te reo, and learning words and phrases. However, these outcomes could also be potentially met amongst migrant audiences by the 365 days of the year Māori Television is viewed by non-Māori audiences. According to a Te Māngai Pāho commissioned report, the fact that one in four non-Māori view Māori Television programming on a weekly basis (Te Māngai Pāho 2015b, p.13) suggests that Māori Television could be promoted to migrant audiences within the overall language revitalisation strategy of Te Mātāwai. The effect of such a proposal should be considered as positive attitudes to te reo by migrants may contribute to an increase in the long-term support of language revitalisation initiatives.

Some Māori Television content also facilitated participants’ gaining an understanding of the impact of colonisation on te reo and why the language needs to be revitalised. Participants became more aware of the relationship between the normalisation of te reo and what Rewi and Rewi (2015) call the ‘assertion of indigeneity’ in Aotearoa New Zealand. They observed that the normalisation of the language on Māori Television is a direct contrast to majority ‘mainstream’ programming and that there

is little opportunity to use te reo in wider society. Indeed, Māori broadcasting is arguably the most visible evidence of Māori political initiatives in the revival of te reo Māori (Smale, 2016) and to some extent my findings suggest migrants that who view Māori Television can experience an unsettling of the nation's dominant discourses through engagement with te reo Māori. Migrants' interest in learning te reo may also mean they engage, consciously or not, with ideological issues such as national identity and belonging.

There are also some parallels between my findings and other non-media research about New Zealanders learning te reo. Huygens (2011) found Pākehā learning te reo promoted ideas about what decolonisation can mean and Hepi (2008) suggests the concept of Pākehā identity that involves a relationship with the language and culture of Māori can become the basis for a shared national identity. Hepi's conclusion is based on analysing what happens when Pākehā New Zealanders learn te reo Māori and how that contributes to their bicultural identity. Te Huia's (2016) research on a similar theme of Pākehā learning te reo also found that Pākehā became more aware of discrimination toward Māori. While these studies relate to Pākehā learning te reo, my research has also demonstrated how migrants learning te reo could lead to a shifting of how they engage in political discourses concerning the nation. Cross-cultural encounters using te reo between Māori and all tauwi in the context of a multicultural nation could shift ideas about how national identity is constructed. As Conversi suggests:

[Nations] could be identified with, and build their cultural core around a shared common language, [because this] places them in an advantageous position in a modern world where it seemed to be the most stable element amongst the chaos of continuous and unpredictable cultural change. (Conversi, 2012, p. 65)

Although Conversi is arguing for one language, his argument could be extended to apply to New Zealand's two main languages, English and te reo Māori in much the same way as Castilian Spanish and Catalan are co-official languages in Catalonia. The State has already signalled this potential when it declared te reo Māori as an official language, although its implementation as a functioning and widely used language has remained vexed. There is the possibility of legislative requirements for compulsory learning but, according to Fishman (1991, 1997), successful long-term adoption of a minority language in a country depends on a mix of real political will together with cultural support. Among the better known and successful examples where a minority or indigenous language has been promoted for use by the dominant population are those where political intervention and legislation has more actively supported and promoted the move. Examples include the use of Catalan in Catalonia<sup>134</sup>

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<sup>134</sup> Spanish and Catalan became co-official languages in the 1983 Catalan Linguistic Normalization Law.

(Woolard, 1989), French in Quebec,<sup>135</sup> (Fishman, 1991) and the Welsh language in Wales<sup>136</sup> (Segrott, 2001; Te Rito, 2000). In these places, the link between the cultural nature of language and national identity has been successfully joined with political will and the resources required to make language revitalisation a reality.

However, the challenge in New Zealand is to promote language learning on Māori Television amongst all audiences, and to convince ‘mainstream’ broadcasters to schedule more Māori programming that includes te reo and is commercially viable in prime time, such as the very popular comedy drama *Find Me a Māori Bride*. Māori programming on both ‘mainstream’ and Māori Television is going some way to achieving widespread cultural support in the long term through improved understanding of te ao Māori. Te Māngai Pāho’s 2015 research has shown that “Māori programming, and Māori Television specifically, continues to play an important role in terms of both providing opportunity and, more importantly, helping to improve both te reo ability and understanding of Māori culture” (TNS Conversa, 2015, p. 27). It is therefore timely that greater recognition is given to migrants from a range of geographical and ethnic backgrounds as receptive, engaged and supportive audiences of Māori Television.

### 13.5.2 The Treaty

My research on migrant participants’ understandings of the Treaty has been informed by a limited amount of academic research relating to migrant (Omura, 2014) and Pākehā (Huygens, 2007; Black, 2010; Campbell, 2005) engagement with Treaty education. I have focused on Māori Television’s ability to harness broadcasting and on-demand digital technologies to voice its assertion of tino rangatiratanga through its representation of the Treaty throughout much of its programming, both on Waitangi Day and more generally. An analysis of participant responses demonstrated there was a shared understanding of how ongoing breaches of the Treaty by the State have resulted in the current situation of social deprivation experienced by many Māori.

Māori Television’s ability to present a Māori history and context to its content shifted participants’ ideas about the ‘nation’. Their shift in attitudes as a result of learning about Māori history has parallels with many other studies that have reported a major shift in attitudes by Pākehā towards indigenous people from engaging with a Māori world and the Treaty (Mitalcfe, 2008; Brown, 2011; Meredith, 1998; Black, 2010; Huygens, 2016, 2011, 2007). However, while these studies suggest that for Pākehā, engaging in te ao Māori and the Treaty can lead to Pākehā agency in decolonisation, it cannot be

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<sup>135</sup> French became the sole official language in Quebec in legislation passed in 1977 by the first ever Parti Québécois government in Canada.

<sup>136</sup> The Welsh Language Act 1993 was passed by the government in the UK with the aim of establishing the equal place of Welsh and English in the public sector.

assumed that migrant engagement with understanding a Māori world is the same. More research is needed to understand the similarities and differences between migrant and Pākehā engagement with the Treaty and the way different groups construct their own narratives in relation to the Treaty. For example, Pākehā understandings of decolonisation are based on the realisation of their implicit role in the violence of colonisation and the ongoing advantages they have gained, while migrants' narratives are based on an awareness of how the maintenance of Māori disadvantage leads to economic, social and political advantage for migrant groups (De Souza, 2011). Migrants, as De Souza suggests "are implicated in the ongoing colonial practices of the state" (De Souza, 2011. p.227).

Huygens argues that individuals engaging with the history of Māori and Pākehā are challenged to re-examine notions of what constitutes justice. Learning more about the Treaty has the potential to lead to greater migrant participation in civic debates where common concerns are deliberated from a basis of 'decency and fairness' (Huygens, 2007, p. 198). Māori Television's ability to insert Māori history and the intertwined nature of Māori and Pākehā relationships into its content can have the effect of disrupting settler colonial discourses. As Turner (2007) argues, indigenous history "constitutes the real threat, and disturbance, to the nation-state and national identity" (Turner, 2007, p. 99). Based on participants' responses, Māori Television content, informed by a Treaty discourse, does have a pedagogical role to play in its contribution to both the indigenous public sphere and wider public sphere.

### 13.5.3 Cultural Connections

I have taken a similar approach in my study to international media scholars such as Bredin (2010), Liebes and Katz (1990), Gillespie (1995), Manekar (1999) and Keown (2012) in their studies of cross-cultural interpretation and television. As with many other audience researchers, they have based their analysis on Stuart Hall's coding/encoding model where media producers encode productions with cultural messages and audiences actively negotiate (or decode) meanings (Croteau & Hoynes, 2003; Liebes & Katz, 1990; Livingstone, 1998; Siapera, 2010). These researchers have concluded that cultural context exerts significant variability in terms of how audiences take meaning from media texts. Hence, it was inevitable that participants in my study would have been influenced by their own personal experience, socio-cultural background, critical resources and ideological beliefs in the way they have interpreted Māori Television content. Nevertheless, participants could, without naming specific Māori concepts, draw comparisons between the representation of the cultural values of whakapapa, whanaungatanga, kōrero, mauri, wairoa and kaitiakitanga, and with what they believed to be similar values within their own culture.

The ability for participants to develop a sense of cultural affinities between their own culture and Māori culture was also enhanced by their capacity to affectively engage with Māori Television content. I have

argued that the ‘flow’ of content on Māori Television, imbued with the discourses of an ontological world view of relatedness and emotional repertoires (Hoskins, 2017) has the potential to be harnessed into affective engagement with its audiences. A number of Māori scholars have argued that a Māori world view is based on an ontology of interrelatedness (Barlow, 1991; Durie, 1997; Henry & Pene, 2001); Hoskins, 2017), and it is this world view that is inherent within Māori Television’s on-screen presence. Participants viewing this content experienced an emotional response which resulted in feeling included and welcome to ‘listen- in’ to content. In many cases they felt a sense of belonging to more than a monocultural Pākehā world. Audience theories developed by Kavka (2008) and Gorton (2009) concur with the ability for television content to invoke emotion and belonging. These findings indicate that there is a relationship between Māori produced content on Māori Television and viewers’ emotional engagement and sense of belonging. However, more audience theory needs to be developed to recognise the place of emotions in reception studies.

#### 13.5.4 Māori Television and Migrant Issues of Identity and Belonging

Underpinning the experiences of the migrants in the study were the cultural challenges they all faced, in varying degrees, as they attempted to find new identities in Aotearoa New Zealand. Pearson’s (2014) model of ‘national identification’ and the model of ‘acculturation’ by Berry et. al. (2006) point to the variety of migrant experiences in their negotiation of ‘fluid’ identities between ‘home’ and the ‘host’. This became relevant for some participants as they re-negotiated their sense of identity after recognising the ‘host’ society as both Māori and Pākehā. This negotiation can often be thought of as a contradictory process, with migrants adapting to their ‘host’ community, on one hand, at the same time as strengthening bonds to their original traditions on the other (Mata-Benítez & Gomez-Estern, 2013). All ethnic minorities might not have the same challenges, but to some degree all migrants face negotiations of identity with a ‘host’ nation, where the ‘host’ nation in Aotearoa New Zealand is often understood as a Pākehā nation (Kukutai & Rata, 2017). However, I have suggested in this study that for some participants, the gulf between ‘home’ and ‘host’ can be bridged by finding commonalities between a migrant’s home culture and that of Māori.

Māori Television’s intention is for its range of programming to contribute to te reo being “valued, embraced and spoken by all New Zealanders” (Māori Television, 2016b, p. 3). Many of this study’s participants found that engaging in language learning through Māori Television content enhanced their journey of acculturation into a nation that also is informed by a Māori world view. Learning te reo helped some participants feel like they belonged because they could adapt more readily to Māori cultural contexts within the workplace, or understand the everyday use of te reo words in the vocabulary of New Zealanders. Visibly different ethnic minority participants also found that learning

te reo words, pronouncing them correctly and practising sentences, helped build positive ‘relational encounters’ with Māori.

My research has also investigated whether there might be similar outcomes for my study’s participants to those of Omura (2014) in terms of knowledge of the Treaty contributing to a sense of belonging, building new integrated identities and supporting more positive relationships with Māori. Despite having no purposive or formal Treaty Education, some participants engaging in Māori Television content, informed by the discourse of the Māori text of the Treaty, found they could critically reflect on the Treaty as framed by the ‘mainstream’. This led to a re-positioning of self and identity in relation to the ‘host’ nation being both Māori and Pākehā which led some participants to also relate to the Treaty as being inclusive of all New Zealanders. The security gained from feeling such a sense of place - a key aspect of the Treaty - is “crucial to psychological and social well-being” (Liu et al., 2014, p. 200). Māori Television could be viewed in a similar manner because of its commitment to be an inclusive broadcaster.

Given the above theories about identity formation, I now turn to discuss what role, if any, the media can play here. Madianou (2005) and Dhoest (2012) note that media in itself does not create the negotiation of identity. Rather, media should be seen as representing a contribution to the many resources that provide information for a migrant in their construction of ‘fluid’ identities. It is also important to be reminded that participants’ critical engagement with discourses about identity and belonging is within the context of a cultural background that “foregrounds or privileges certain interpretations (of media representations) ... especially when it involves the self and identity” (Siapera, 2010, p. 173). However, amidst these overlapping influences on ‘identity’, what is important to consider is the extent to which Māori Television equipped, or enabled, the participants to engage in everyday face-to-face encounters with Māori. In other words, what did they ‘do’ with their ‘passive’ learning of te reo and the Treaty, their experience of a cultural connection and new sense of belonging gained through viewing Māori Television content?

### 13.6 The Potential for Māori-Migrant Relationships

While Māori Television is not a panacea to positive intercultural relationships between Māori and migrants it is not insignificant that many of the participants in my research found they could initiate cross cultural encounters because they were able to talk about Māori Television content, use some te reo words, or confront their own limiting attitudes due to fear-based indigenous stereotypes. The strength of these stereotypes was revealed by one PRC Chinese participant, Angel, who talked about how she no longer feared Māori and had the confidence to sit with Māori at the same table in a crowded café table. Angel’s experience demonstrates the powerful impact of Māori Television in reversing negative stereotypes. Mihili, from Sri Lanka, was aware of negative attitudes within her own

community towards tangata whenua and spoke about encouraging new migrants from her 'home' country to watch Māori Television because she assumed the negative sentiments they expressed about Māori originated from 'mainstream' media and attitudes. Rahul spoke of encouraging international business colleagues to view Māori Television in order to understand the Māori economy. Charlie, from the PRC and Jenny from Fiji both created and strengthened friendships with Māori at work through practicing te reo they had learned on Māori Television. These types of comments suggest that engaging in this study and viewing Māori Television has enabled participants to 'do' something with their televisual encounter with te ao Māori.

The experience of participants' affirming encounters and interactions with Māori also confirms that understanding migration from a migrant perspective acknowledges migrants' agency in their interactions with people and institutions. Wise (2018) describes the importance of 'multicultural encounter and coexistence' as a way for migrants in ethnically diverse societies to manage difference. Difference might not always be seen as affirming but, as Chadwick (2008) argues, the experience of difference should be focused on an individual's positive experiences from relationships because these experiences can be closely linked to a sense of belonging and participation in society. Social identity theory suggests that an individual's positive relational experiences can also be linked to feelings of belonging because being connected to people can be associated with levels of feeling accepted by meaningful social groupings and communities (Chadwick, 2008; Fagan, 2016). My participants felt they could either initiate or respond to relational face-to-face encounters between themselves and Māori because of a confidence they felt from gaining understandings about Māori issues and cultural concepts from Māori Television. In turn, according to social identity theory, participants' positive encounters with tangata whenua demonstrate the potential for migrants to negotiate a more integrated identity and a sense of belonging. Māori Television had become for my participants one of the resources in the 'mediascape' (Appadurai, 1990, 1996) or the 'common communicative spaces' (Madianou, 2005) where viewing the nation is informed by the Treaty.

In the year I began to write up my findings I became aware of Avril Bell's (2015) work and realised that my research about migrant-Māori relationships could be analogous to her results. Bell's research concerning face-to-face encounters between Pākehā and Māori contributed to what I already knew about the concept of Pākehā identity and how it could be changed to one that involves a relationship with te ao Māori as a result of Pākehā engagement with te reo (Hepi, 2008) and the Treaty (Black, 2010; Campbell, 2005; Huygens, 2007, 2016). Bell (2015) uses the term 'decolonising conviviality' to refer to the face-to-face encounters between her Māori and Pākehā participants and the potential for reconstituted or different relationships when Pākehā relate to Māori *as* Māori, i.e., where Māori cultural difference is both respected and fundamental to the engagement. In her ethnographic research,

she studied the significance of everyday face-to-face encounters across lines of ethnic difference between Pākehā and Māori in a building and construction project. Although her study was about Pākehā-Māori relationships, what is significant is how relationships by Pākehā with Māori were created by interactions with Māori where Māori cultural difference was fundamental to the engagement.

My research has parallels with Bell's (2015) because it shows that when migrants (such as Angel, Mihili, Rahul, Jenny, and Charlie discussed above) view Māori *as* Māori on Māori Television and then subsequently meet Māori *as* Māori, a form of 'decolonising conviviality' can arise. In other words, the migrant – Māori relationship can be re-examined and transformed. While my research is vitally grounded in a nation informed by the Treaty, it is also redolent of research in Europe, Singapore and Australia by both Vertovec (2007, 2009) and Wise (2009, 2018). Their research within multicultural environments found that encounters across such differences as language, music, food, urban spaces and architecture can create fusion and hybridity and 'spaces of inclusion' for ethnically diverse societies.

Bell (2015) similarly encourages an ethic of face-to-face encounter that acknowledges and preserves difference. However, unlike Vertovec and Wise, her research is within the context of the decolonisation of settler colonial discourses. She describes the encounter by suggesting that:

The encounter across cultural difference, despite its risks, always also offers opportunities that may positively transform Māori relationships with others. There are no guarantees to the outcome of such encounters; they can lead to arguments and hostility but are also fundamental to the positive possibilities of everyday decolonizing. And in terms of everyday decolonisation in Aotearoa New Zealand, it is highly relevant that the face-to-face encounter is highly valued within Māori culture. (Bell, 2015, p. 1180)

Bell's (2015) work does not include new migrants, but what is relevant here is that the experiences of my participants opened up the possibility for transformed migrant-Māori relationships - as demonstrated by respectful cross-cultural encounters by many in my research. To some extent, Māori Television did provide my participants with some of the prerequisites for positive relational possibilities, such as a more open attitude towards te ao Māori, an interest in practising language skills with Māori work colleagues and/or a desire to discuss issues relevant to Māori with Māori and an increased confidence to engage across axes of difference.

While this cannot be achieved entirely by viewing Māori Television, my study has found that an increased understanding of te ao Māori from viewing Māori Television was a contributory factor for my participants in creating the possibility of positive relational encounters. These encounters, if they are self-reflective, can inform narratives of identity and a sense of belonging (Gergen & Gergen, 2006; Kraus, 2006). However, it is unknown how long such attitudes continued. What is important is that



‘positive relational encounters’ are integrated into an individual’s narrative biography and ‘sorted ... into an ongoing ‘story’ about the self’ (Giddens, 1991, p.54).

However, as Bell (2015) also reminds us, there are no guarantees to the outcome of positive relational encounters. Inter-ethnic conflict may arise when different groups perceive themselves as competing for limited resources or state policies create divisions (Putnam, 2001). Also, Ward and Masgoret (2006) argue that participation in cross-cultural encounters must be cooperative and voluntary for there to be positive outcomes. While my study participants displayed a more positive attitude and openness to te ao Māori after viewing Māori Television, further research is needed to test whether these findings can be reproduced in wider encounters between migrants and Māori.

### 13.7 A Māori Pākehā Multi-ethnic Nation of Superdiversity

It is these convivial relational encounters that offer the most potential for migrant-Māori relationships in a nation informed by the Treaty, but experienced, in Vertovec’s (2007) terms, as a multi-ethnic nation of ‘superdiversity’. Although these findings are provisional, they indicate that Māori Television contributes to facilitating the opening of pathways for migrants to build connections with Māori. It is these encounters that can lead to culturally creative responses to questions of ‘where do I fit in?’ and what does it mean to be a citizen, in the sense of being a member of Aotearoa New Zealand? Such responses have the potential to spawn a number of innovative migrant narratives of identity and belonging – one where the indigenous/migrant relationship is present. For example, in an Auckland stage production entitled *Swabhoomi – Borrowed Earth* (2017), the writers consciously wove into the story Indian tauwiwi connections with tangata whenua as a way to speak about the tensions of giving away attachments to their homeland to make way for a sense of belonging to a new country. In the play a new sense of belonging was portrayed as being created by finding Indian/Māori connections. A study by Zalipour and Athinque (2014) provides another example. They investigated diasporic audiences engaging in their own cultural cinema produced in a New Zealand and found that such media offered a platform to promote dialogue between migrants and wider society. These examples demonstrate the ability of the migrant voice to disrupt the ways in which the Pākehā host nation manages the images, discourses and identities associated with migrancy and reflect, as Vertovec (2009, 2018) notes, a counter to the inability of many migrants to engage in civic participation.

While it is difficult to attribute participants’ insights and cultural connections directly to their viewing of Māori Television, it is useful to turn to Lorna Roth’s discussion about the Canadian Aboriginal Peoples’ Television Network (APTN). She suggests that for indigeneity to survive there is no alternative but for indigenous media to try and build bridges of cultural understanding with non-aboriginal audiences. In a specific Aotearoa New Zealand context this means, as many Māori and some Pākehā assert, that the Māori text of the Treaty should inform the building of bridges between Māori

and all others. My findings build on, and add to, existing research from Australia and Canada (Bredin, 2010; Meadows et al., 2007; Meadows, 2010; Roth, 2005, 2013) about the ability of indigenous broadcasting to foster greater cultural understanding “over the airwaves” (Roth, 2005, p. 172) with its non-indigenous audiences. I have theorised that indigenous broadcasting provides resources, as discussed in this thesis, that can enable some of its diverse multi-ethnic non-indigenous audiences to make unforeseen connections with Māori by engaging in convivial face-to-face encounters in a nation of ‘superdiversity’.

### 13.8 Research Limitations

Some caution is required not to overstate the findings of this research. Firstly, although Māori Television has the ability to create a space for indigenous images and stories and to make visible the social and political change required to shift Māori/Pākehā power relationships (Smith, 2016), there are no guarantees that the broadcaster’s migrant audiences will support such changes because, as I will discuss shortly, audiences are not homogenous. Secondly, it may be difficult to realise the political potential of Māori Television because pre-existing attitudes or predispositions towards pluralism or cultural relativism may influence the relationship between watching Māori Television and recognising counter narratives to the ‘mainstream’. For example, a level of interest in engaging in Māori Television may come from an individual’s own experience of living in diverse communities or in the interests of cosmopolitan transnationalism.

As Fabrigar, McDonald and Wegener, (2014) conclude, an individual’s pre-message attitudes and their motivations to consider an alternative view, can pre-determine their ability to interpret and re-evaluate their position to an attitude. Hence, “arguments compatible with one’s pre-message attitudes are accepted, whereas arguments incompatible with one’s pre-message attitude are undermined” (Fabrigar et al., 2014, p. 99). Stone (2015), specifically referring to news and current affairs audiences, also reiterates the complexities of trying to understand what individuals within audiences bring to their viewing experience. He says, “it directs us to ask how those inner-worlds of people (in audiences) are linked-in to the various pressures and influences emanating from the salient institutions, organisations and broader contextual fields they inhabit” (Stone, 2015, para 16).

Of note is that the participants in this research demonstrated a prior interest in social justice related to indigenous and minority rights. This shared common factor overrode any apparent differences in age, social status, gender or occupational status. The exception were the PRC participants whose motivation for involvement in the project was curiosity about learning more about Māori through Māori Television. These PRC participants’ willingness to be involved in the research demonstrates an exception to the observations by Omura (2014), Yin (2013) and Wang (2016) that many migrants from the PRC are uninterested in indigenous concerns and are unwillingly to engage with a Māori world.

It is significant that those migrants who were involved in this research shared similar characteristics. Those who facilitated snowballing the initial online survey and were keen to view Māori Television for two months and join a focus group, or were willing to be interviewed, were all individuals who were curious to know more about Māori history and culture and could articulate their insights and new understandings of an indigenous world after viewing Māori Television. I am confident that the triangulation methodology employed allows me to make generalised comments based on the participants' shared experiences of viewing Māori Television. Hence, interpolation of my findings onto wider groups of migrants who also arrive with a curiosity and willingness to engage in Māori culture and history has some validity. It needs to be noted however, that given the complexities of understanding what audiences bring to their interpretative worlds, there is not a direct cause and effect relationship between viewing Māori Television and audiences becoming more supportive of a Māori world and its concerns.

It also needs to be acknowledged that there are many migrants who are generally ambivalent about learning the history of tangata whenua or engaging with Māori culture. They come to New Zealand to improve their lives and are not concerned with such issues of cultural integration or Treaty politics. For many migrant groups, supportive and extended communities within their like-minded minority ethnic group, together with extensive social media applications and specialised multi-platform minority ethnic media, provide for most information and cultural needs. For such individuals there is no interest in watching Māori Television. Therefore, I am unable to include migrants with this profile in my discussion of migrant engagement with Māori Television.

### 13.9 Recommendations for Further Research

1) Barclay's communications marae as it stands makes an important contribution to existing research on indigenous media around the world. As a theoretical framework it provides an approach for the study of indigenous media in a broader international context. Further research in nations with indigenous media, such as Finland, Canada and Australia could reveal the relevance of the communications marae as a means to draw non-indigenous audiences into an indigenous space as a means to 'build bridges of cultural understanding'.

2) As part of my research I was made aware anecdotally of the negative representation of Māori in minority ethnic media. In focus group discussions some of my participants reflected that these representations influenced their initial attitudes towards Māori, but that after viewing Māori Television content they felt more supportive and positive towards Māori issues and concerns. Exploring the representation of Māori in minority ethnic media was beyond the scope of my study, but my research has identified the need for further investigation in this area. One study by Liu (2009) reveals the largely

negative representation of Māori in local Chinese language news media in New Zealand, however it is timely that Liu's study is updated. Also, there have been no studies focussed the representation of Māori in local Indian media, when Indian migrants represent a significant ethnic minority group in New Zealand.

I now turn to discuss some specific recommendations for further research as it relates to Māori Television. Some of these recommendations may also have relevance for other indigenous broadcasters as they seek new funding models and greater audiences.

### 13.9.1 Attracting Migrant Audiences to Māori Television

Māori Television's major concern is to protect and promote the revitalisation of 'te reo Māori me ngā tikanga Māori', and strategies that increase audience numbers, such as attracting migrants who support the ambitions of the broadcaster, should be considered by the broadcaster. I am not suggesting that resources be redirected towards attracting migrant audiences, but rather that the importance of targeting the migrant audience is recognised, such as in the coverage of news and current affairs about Māori/migrant engagement, for example, in the area of business relationships. Māori Television content has the potential to engender migrants' supportive attitudes towards Māori issues at the same time as offering resources for negotiating identity and belonging. The challenge will be to attract funding initiatives to disseminate Māori Television content to migrants in different formats such as social media platforms.

I recommend just two strategies that the broadcaster could consider in attracting more audiences. Firstly, Māori Television could increase its migrant audiences without detracting from its primary language and cultural focus by providing, within its own digital platform, a digital portal of content of interest to migrants. This portal of content could have multiple functions such as providing an understanding of Māori language and culture, viewing examples of Māori/migrant relationships, and informing participation in civic society. The provision of such a specialised resource for migrant audiences could be seen as part of Māori Television's overall strategy of promoting and revitalising language and culture because it is "focusing content for specific audiences that engage[s] them in te reo" (Māori Television, 2017b, p. 13) . Hence, Māori Television's digital capabilities could be harnessed to reach larger migrant audiences. Already, as my research has demonstrated, considerable use of Māori Television's on-demand service was made by participants to view programming. This suggests the service is user friendly amongst such audiences. Extra resources would be needed to package content for a digital portal of content for migrant audiences, however, such initiatives should be supported from organisations concerned with migrant integration.

Secondly, offering free content to differing minority ethnic broadcast and online media could improve the potential for individuals of different ethnicities to improve their cultural understanding of te ao Māori. Such a suggestion could be seen as advocating for the screening of Māori produced content outside the communications marae, in a similar fashion to Māori produced content being broadcast at off peak times on ‘mainstream’ television. However, returning to Roth (2005), she reminds us “there is no alternative to [cultural] bridge building .... social transformation requires struggle in the sense of engagement with one’s opponents” (Roth, 2005, p, 172). In some senses there is no alternative but for media organisations within the indigenous public sphere to try and draw migrants into an understanding of te ao Māori because, as Roth (2005) points out, “no single oppressed group can possibly win significant structural change on its own” (Roth, 2005, p. 172). To this end, Māori Television programming, publicly funded by Te Māngai Pāho and NZ on Air, should be made available to the audiences of minority ethnic media De Brett (2009) contends that re-versioning of content for multiple purposes not only increases the reach of publicly funded programming but also helps maximize the value of the public investment. Re-versioning of Māori Television content especially for migrant audiences could involve packaging together items from news, current affairs and documentaries of Māori/Indian or Māori/Chinese cultural or economic connections, or subtitling te reo language learning programmes such as *Korero Mai* with majority migrant languages. Māori Television is currently exploring the use of ‘iframe’ (used to insert content into a website from another source, in this case from Māori Television), which can select and provide news articles of interest/relevance for Māori to a specific region, iwi, event or topic (Māori Television Statement of Intent 2016-2019). ‘iframe’ could easily be adapted to provide content to non-Māori minority ethnic media. Academic and chair of the Pacific Media Centre Advisory Board, Camille Nakhid, also says that minority ethnic media potentially could do more to engage with Māori as it has a tendency to reinforce the status quo in terms of the relationship between ‘mainstream’ and any particular minority ethnic group (Pacific Media Centre, 2014). Offering free indigenous content to minority ethnic media and their social media platforms could be seen as one such solution.

Thirdly, research is needed to understand what scope there is for other organisations concerned with new settler issues, such as the Refugee Migrant Centre, to harness Māori Television content for use on its website and to what extent relevant content about Māori issues or Māori /migrant relationships could be incorporated into their settlement and educational programmes.

Initiatives like these would need public funding. Government agencies such as the Department of Immigration, the Department of Ethnic Communities or the independent Human Rights Commission may see these proposals as being within their sphere of interests. The promotion of formal Treaty education programmes and watching Māori Television should also be seen as basic information provided by the Department of Immigration in its new settler information website.

### 13.9.2 More Indigenous-produced Programmes on ‘Mainstream’ Prime Time

As noted earlier, indigenous and ‘mainstream’ broadcasting is arguably the most visible evidence of Māori political initiatives in the revival of te reo Māori (Smale, 2016). Participants in my research recognised that in the long term, support for the revitalisation of ‘te reo Māori me ngā tikanga Māori’ amongst all New Zealand also requires the naturalisation and normalisation of te ao Māori within the nation. Currently, all Māori programming on ‘mainstream’ broadcasters’ schedules is for non-prime time audiences (except for the 30 minutes’ TV One news programme, *Te Karere*). For this to change, research based on ‘mainstream’ audiences is needed to find content that is both commercially successful at the same time as normalising te ao Māori. Indigenous cultural revitalisation cannot occur through Māori Television alone and one of the challenges is to convince ‘mainstream’ broadcasters to schedule more Māori programming that is commercially viable on prime time, such as the very popular Māori Television comedy drama *Find Me a Māori Bride*. In fact, more Māori content on ‘mainstream’ may be what audiences want. According to Te Māngai Pāho’s 2017 audience survey of Māori media, nearly 40% of non-Māori surveyed agreed that Māori programming should be increased on ‘mainstream’. Whether or not these audiences view non-prime time Māori content such as ThreeNow’s *Hui*, or TVNZ’s *Marae* and *Morena*, the survey indicates that those non-Māori surveyed would support these types of programmes on prime time.

While Te Māngai Pāho funds these programmes on the basis that content “demonstrates a tangible impact on Māori language and Māori cultural outcomes” (Te Māngai Pāho, 2015, Para, 12), I would also suggest that it needs to consider funding more content that contributes to the normalisation of te ao Māori amongst ‘mainstream’ audiences such as TVNZ’s one-off prime time series *Moving out with Tamati*. My research did recognise that ‘mainstream’ and indigenous television cannot be totally responsible for Māori cultural regeneration. However, broadcasting Māori content across all potential digital formats can make an important contribution to facilitating more supportive attitudes to the revitalisation of te ao Māori by, and for, all New Zealanders.

### 13.10 Concluding Remarks

My findings highlight possibilities and potential outcomes for migrant engagement with te ao Māori. The research has demonstrated that viewing Māori Television has enabled most of my migrant participants to not only develop more supportive attitudes towards Māori and their concerns, but to also address issues of identity and belonging through engagement with te ao Māori. The study also found that participants gained more confidence to engage in face-to face encounters with Māori. While there is a wide chasm of difference between the social and historical context concerning Pākehā and Māori relationships and that of migrant and Māori relationships, my findings are also consistent with other academic studies concerning Māori and Pākehā engagement with te ao Māori. In addition, there

are studies that demonstrate the ability of multicultural spaces to bring people together and negotiate difference while other research also demonstrates the importance of face-to-face contact in the creation of relationships of ‘decolonizing conviviality’. These studies gesture towards the need to identify and provide resources that enable migrants and Māori to communicate across spaces of difference.

The broadcaster’s ability to also have a pedagogical function became apparent as it engendered a curiosity in many participants to know more about Māori history and the context of Māori-Pākehā relationships. Because so little research investigates migrant voices in New Zealand and their journey of navigating a place to call ‘home’ in Aotearoa that is in relation to Māori and the Treaty, this research augurs well for Māori Television to be used as a resource for opening up migrants’ engagement with, and support of, indigenous issues and concerns.

# Appendices

## Appendix 1

### Māori Television and migrants survey snowball version

1. This survey is for migrants who are interested in taking part in the first stage of a PhD study designed to explore whether common themes emerge from migrant's experiences of viewing Māori Television. Please click the following link to read the [Participant Information Sheet](#). This information lays out the conditions to enter the draw for the ipad touch and information about possible future involvement. This study has been approved by the University of Auckland Human Participants Ethics Committee for 3 years, Reference Number 25/11/13/9910.

I have read the participant information sheet

2. After reading the above information I will not be completing this survey because:

It does not apply to me

I do not have time

It does not interest me

Other (please specify)

3. I have lived in New Zealand for:

Under 5 years

Between 5 and 10 years

Over 10 years

4. What country do you come from?

5. How would you describe your ethnicity?





6. How would you rate your abilities in the English language in the following?

	<b>Poor</b>	<b>Average</b>	<b>good</b>	<b>very good</b>	<b>Fluent</b>
<b>Speaking</b>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
<b>Writing</b>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
<b>Listening</b>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
<b>Reading</b>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

07. What non-work related media do you use in a typical day?

	<b>One hour or less</b>	<b>Three hours or less</b>	<b>Six hours or less</b>	<b>Nine hours or less</b>
<b>Radio</b>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
<b>Internet</b>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
<b>Social Media</b>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
<b>Newspapers</b>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
<b>Television</b>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

08. What are the names of the radio, television, newspaper or social media and internet sites that you mostly use? (Include media in your own language)

Radio	<input type="text"/>
Television	<input type="text"/>
Newspaper	<input type="text"/>
Social Media	<input type="text"/>
Internet	<input type="text"/>

09. In a typical week how many hours of New Zealand Television (TV One, TV2, TV3, Prime) do you watch?

- 10 hours or more
- 5-9 hours
- 1-4 hours
- less than 1 hour
- None.

10. What programmes do you watch on New Zealand Television? (TV One, TV2, TV3, Prime)

(**A little** - less than one hour a week, **Moderately** - between one -five hours a week, or **Mostly** – over six hours a week).

	<b>Not at all</b>	<b>A little</b>	<b>Moderately</b>	<b>Mostly</b>
<b>News and current affairs</b>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
<b>Documentaries</b>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
<b>Drama</b>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
<b>Lifestyle and Entertainment</b>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
<b>Sport</b>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
<b>Language learning</b>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
<b>Waitangi and Anzac Day</b>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

11. In a typical week how many hours of Māori Television do you watch?

- 10 hours or more
- 5-9 hours
- 1-4 hours
- less than 1 hour

None. Skip to Q. 18

12. What programmes do you watch on Māori Television?

(**A little** - less than one hour a week, **Moderately** - between one -five hours a week, or **Mostly** – over six hours a week).

	Not at all	A little	Moderately	Mostly
<b>News and current affairs</b>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
<b>Documentaries</b>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
<b>Drama</b>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
<b>Lifestyle and Entertainment</b>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
<b>Sport</b>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
<b>Language learning</b>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
<b>Waitangi and Anzac Day</b>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

13. Can you name your three most watched programmes on Māori Television?

14. Why do you watch Māori Television? Please choose your four main reasons.

- For entertainment
- News and current affairs from a Māori perspective
- To learn something about New Zealand that I cannot find on other channels
- To learn some Māori language
- To see the landscape of New Zealand
- The English is easier to understand than in other media

- The subtitles make it easier to understand
- I can relate to the cultural values shown
- I generally see people other than white New Zealanders
- There is little advertising

Other (please specify)

15. How often do you watch Māori Television through its internet on-demand service?

	<b>Never</b>	<b>Sometimes</b>	<b>Often</b>
<b>On Demand</b>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

16. Who do you talk to about the programmes you watch on Māori Television?

- I don't talk about what I watch
- I talk with my friends and family
- I talk about programmes at work
- I use social media to talk about programmes

17. What did you talk about with your friends, family or work colleagues about the last programme on Māori Television you viewed?

⏪
⏩

18. What do you think the Treaty of Waitangi is ?

⏪
⏩

19. Do you watch Waitangi Day celebrations on Television?

- On Māori Television
- On Mainstream Television
- On both Māori and Mainstream Television
- I prefer to attend the celebrations in person
- I'm not interested in watching Waitangi Day on TV
- I'm not interested in Waitangi Day
- I don't know what Waitangi Day is

20. To what extent do you think that Māori are respected in New Zealand?

- Not at all
- A little bit
- Somewhat
- Quite a bit
- A tremendous amount

Other (please specify)

21. If you watch Māori Television has your viewing experience changed your perception of Pakeha in New Zealand?

- Not at all
- Very little
- Somewhat
- Quite a bit
- A tremendous amount

Other (please specify)

22. Finally we would like to ask you a few questions about yourself.

What is the highest level of education you have completed?

23. Which of the following best describes your current occupation?

- Education and Training
- Managerial/Business and Financial Operations
- Office/Clerical and Sales
- Computer and ICT
- Architecture and Engineering/Mechanical
- Hospitality/ Service and Healthcare Occupations
- Legal
- Medical
- Arts, Design, Entertainment, Sports, and Media Occupations
- Outdoor Occupations
- Transportation Occupations

Other (please specify)

24. Which category below includes your age?

- 17 or younger
- 18-20
- 21-29
- 30-39
- 40-49
- 50-59
- 60 or older

25. What is your gender?

Female

Male

26. Would you be willing to be involved in focus group discussions about some of the above questions in the future?

Yes I would like to be involved in helping with further research for this project

No I do not wish to be contacted about being involved in this research

37. You have now completed this survey and as a token of appreciation you are now invited to enter a draw for an ipad. Could you please provide your name and telephone or mobile contact details in the box below so we can contact the winner. Also if you have indicated in the above that you are willing to be involved in further research and meet our research criteria, we will contact you in due course.

## Appendix 2

### Facebook Groups and Interview Guideline Questions

The purpose of this group is to discuss the following guideline questions within the context of Māori Television viewing:

- 1) To what extent does the programming help you understand a Māori perspective on issues and concerns?
- 2) To what extent does watching Māori Television help you understand the language; te reo Māori?
- 3) To what extent can you distinguish distinct cultural values in the programming you are viewing?
- 4) Can you relate to these values?
- 5) Does this make a difference to your life?
- 6) Are you interested in Māori Television's stories of people and places in New Zealand?
- 7) As a migrant does the programming you are viewing make you feel you belong to New Zealand and what programmes make you feel this?
- 8) To what extent do you see a difference between the coverage of Māori issues and concerns by mainstream television and Māori Television?
- 9) Other than language, do you think Māori Television has distinctive qualities when compared to mainstream television?
- 10) To what extent do you think there is a difference between official recognition of Māori culture in New Zealand and the day to day reality for Māori in New Zealand society?
- 11) To what extent do you think Māori Television is inclusive of other cultures?



## Appendix 3

### Post- Facebook Discussion Focus Group Questionnaire

1) In the course of this study how many hours per week did you typically watch Māori Television on-air and on-demand.

On Air \_\_\_\_\_

On Demand \_\_\_\_\_

2) What programmes did you tend to watch on Māori Television?

(**A little** - less than one hour a week, **Moderately** - between one -five hours a week, or **Mostly** – over six hours a week).

	Mostly	Moderately	A little
News and Current Affairs			
Documentaries			
Drama			
Lifestyle and Entertainment			
Sport			
Language learning			

3) Can you rank (from 1- 7, with 1 being your most favoured ranking), the following list of ideas about what viewing Māori Television programming offered you as a member of the audience?

Entertainment

To understand or learn about New Zealand from a Māori perspective

To learn some Māori language.

The English on mainstream television is often too fast so watching Māori television and subtitles makes it easier for me to understand.

I enjoy non Anglo-Celtic perspectives through international documentaries and festival films.

To learn more about New Zealand, its history, Māori culture and the landscape

I like the on-screen presentation of Māori Television, the titles, the music, the presenters, the advertisements because it makes me feel more comfortable

Other \_\_\_\_\_

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