Mobilising memory:
Anzac commemoration in Australia and New Zealand, 1965-2015

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Abstract

This thesis is a comparative and transnational history of Anzac Day over the past fifty years. Although the 'revival of Anzac' has been interpreted as an enduring cultural expression of the trauma of the First World War within a national framework of identity and memory, this thesis suggests something different. Between 1965 and 2015, Anzac Day was transformed from a narrowly civic institution – premised on imperial, racial, and family ties – to a broad state project by which late-twentieth-century governments have reordered political citizenship. By examining personal, institutional, and textual interactions within and between Australia and New Zealand, we can see the antecedence of state structures and institutions in war commemoration. This process is detected in three crucial stages: the emergence of new political and cultural elites from the 1960s to 1980s; policies and performances of statehood through state cultural projects at the seventy-fifth anniversary of Anzac in 1990 and the repatriations of the Unknown Soldier (1993) and Unknown Warrior (2004); and finally, indigenous-state relations centred on the contest and collaboration of indigenous memories of war and violence since 2005. In making these transnational connections, this thesis re-envisions the history of the twentieth-century 'memory boom' and Anzac revival, exploring how reconfigured narratives of nationhood forged changes in the revisiting and reiteration of private and collective remembrances, structured by the needs and preoccupations of the contemporary state.

To Alan and Elizabeth Light

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This doctoral thesis has a single author's name on the cover, but it is the fruit of collaboration and communities.

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Contents

List of figures (In order of appearance.)

Roses and poppies on the Tomb of the Unknown Warrior following the 70th Anniversary commemorations of the Battle of El Alamein on 23 October 2012. Andy Palmer, Manatū Taonga.

Tomb of the Unknown New Zealand Warrior, National War Memorial, Wellington. MCH: Andy Palmer, Manatū Taonga.

The Pukeahu National War Memorial is lit up with the figure of a soldier to mark the centenary of the First World War, 2014. MCH.

A poster promoting the Chunuk Bair memorial service at Gallipoli - hosted by Judy Bailey and Julian Wilcox with Wena Harawira reporting from the Gallipoli peninsula. Māori Television.

The painting of the Poppy and text for the 2016 Anzac Day Broadcast. Māori Television.

Artwork features General Godley at the NZ Division horse show, photographed by Henry Armytage Sanders, 1917. Auckland Museum.

INTRODUCTION.
RETHINKING THE HISTORY OF ANZAC DAY IN AUSTRALIA AND NEW ZEALAND, 1965-2015

Introduction: the Anzac Centenary and foundational histories

On Anzac Day, April 25, 2015, over ten thousand Australian and New Zealand citizens attended the dawn service at Anzac Cove, joined by their heads of government, members of the British royal family, and a large number of international dignitaries, to mark the Centenary of Anzac. In his dawn service speech, Australian Prime Minister Tony Abbott spoke of how the experience of Gallipoli 'forged modern Australia and New Zealand', with the 'founding heroes' of the two nations 'splashing out' together on that fateful dawn 100 years ago.[1] 'Now we gather in the cold and dark before dawn', Abbott continued, 'wondering what to say and how to honour those whose bones rest in the hills and in the valleys above us and whose spirit has moved our people for a century'. New Zealand Prime Minister John Key reciprocated this sense of a joint-history, referring to the 'Anzac bond'.[2] 'Gallipoli is also a byword for the best characteristics of Australians and New Zealanders, especially when they work side by side in the face of adversity'. The two prime ministers espoused a shared history, a shared foundation myth: Australia and New Zealand as Anzac nations.

At the 2015 dawn service, Both prime ministers, joined by the presence and emotional affectation of ten thousand pilgrims, and anointed by representatives of the British Crown, invoked 'Anzac' a historical sensibility. Australians and New Zealanders shared, it seemed, an imagined connection across space and time, forged into a singular formation of military heritage. Century-old violence was linked to the contemporary nation and its future. These claims of a shared national memory of the Gallipoli campaign, presented as unanimous and intuitive, were in fact carefully managed by the political and financial commitment of both governments to an unprecedented array of commemorative programmes. According to the Federal Government's Centenary Program, the role of the Australian government was to 'ensure that the Anzac Centenary is commemorated in a very special way' that reflects 'the values and qualities that [Australians] link inextricably to the name, "Anzac"'.[3] To achieve

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[1] Tony Abbott, Prime Minister of Australia, '2015 Gallipoli Dawn Service', 25 April, 2015: https://www.aph.gov.au/About_Parliament/Parliamentary_Departments/Parliamentary_Library/pubs/AnzacDay2016/Speeches

[2] John Key, Prime Minister of New Zealand, 'Speech at Dawn Service in ANZAC Cove in Gallipoli', *Scoop,* 26 April, 2015: http://www.scoop.co.nz/stories/PA1504/S00333/john-keys-speech-at-dawn-service-in-anzac-cove-in-gallipoli.htm.

[3] *ANZAC Centenary: 100 years in the making,* Anzac Centenary Advisory Board, January 2013: http://www.anzaccentenary.gov.au/sites/default/files/documents/acab_report.doc; also see, *How Australia may*

this ‘special commemoration’, the government orchestrated educational and cultural programs totalling some $325 million of state and federal tax dollars.[4] Expenditure was coordinated by a dedicated federal Anzac Centenary minister. The Anzac Centenary was as much about projecting Australia globally today as it was a remembrance of past dead. In addition to the $10-million ‘Australian Remembrance Trail’ constructed along the Western front, the Sir John Monash Interpretive Centre near Villers-Bretonneux, completed in 2018, is the largest Australian cultural institution to be built on foreign soil.[5] As the federal program states, ‘[t]he Centenary is not simply about what happened a hundred years ago, as if it were past and gone’, rather ‘[Australians] fought then on a global scale to defend the values we shared with many other nations and this commitment continues today'.[6]

The New Zealand Centenary Programme, although on a lesser scale than its Australian counterpart, was the largest commemoration in the country’s history.[7] Funding from Creative New Zealand and New Zealand on Air for the creation of hundreds of war-themed plays, exhibitions, television programmes and events around the country was close to $15 million.[8] Local governments funded hundreds of thousands of dollars’ worth of cultural projects, while another $17 million was allocated by the Lottery Grants Board. The largest government project for the centenary was Wellington's $120-million renovation of the Pukeahu National War Memorial Park, along with $330,000 spent digitising the Auckland Cenotaph database. While the official centenary goes for four years, most of these projects reached the public in 2014 and 2015 – a very condensed time frame to see hundreds of war-related cultural works, and reflecting a commitment to the imaginative space of Gallipoli as the apex of the Great War itself. Emblematic of this change in New Zealand cultural memory was a further $5 million dedicated to a new Gallipoli exhibition at the National Museum of New Zealand Tongarewa Te Papa, an unprecedented commitment to military heritage for an institution whose traditional curatorial strengths have been located in natural and ethnographic histories, along with Auckland Museum’s *Pou Kanohi*.

Both centenary programmes appealed to the ‘spirit of Anzac’ and a national memory of war, underpinned by specific state commitments and imaginatively anchored in the space of Gallipoli. The ‘spirit’ encompassed the national values of citizenship such as self-sacrifice, valour, ‘mateship’, and service; in politics, media, sport, the work of the emergency services, and public policy.[9] Furthermore,

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commemorate the ANZAC Centenary, The National Commission on the Commemoration of the Anzac Centenary, March, 2011, and the Australian government’s response to the Advisory Board report, published in April 2013: http://centenaire.org/sites/default/files/references-files/govt_response.pdf.

[4] James Brown, ***Anzac’s Long Shadow: the Cost of our National Obsession***, Melbourne, Black Inc Books, 2014, 10-13. Factoring in estimated private and corporate donations, that sum rises to half a billion dollars.

[5] Department of Veterans’ Affairs, ‘Sir John Monash Centre’, 2014: https://www.dva.gov.au/commemorations-memorials-and-war-graves/office-australian-war-graves/current-projects/sir-john-2.

[6] *ANZAC Centenary: 100 years in the making,* Anzac Centenary Advisory Board.

[7] WW100, ‘New Zealand’s First World War Centenary Programme – The programme overview July 2014’: https://ww100.govt.nz/sites/default/files/files/WW100%20-%20Information%20Sheet%2001%20-%20Jul%2014%20-%20V1_1.pdf.

[8] ‘Govt spends $20m on WWI arts and culture’, *Stuff* 19 April, 2015: https://www.stuff.co.nz/national/last-post-first-light/67781872/govt-spends-20m-on-wwi-arts-and-culture.

[9] Graham Seal, *Inventing ANZAC: The digger and national mythology*, St Lucia, University of Queensland Press, 2004.

the Anzacs at Gallipoli were linked with the contemporary defence forces when the Australian and New Zealand governments announced that the two nations would engage in joint military operations against Islamic State.[10] Abbott and Key affirmed 'their wish to ensure Australia and New Zealand's unique shared heritage and Anzac legacy is used as a catalyst for further cooperation, peace-building and the promotion of democracy, human rights and the rule of law into the future'.[11] Previous Australian and New Zealand military cooperation in Afghanistan, East Timor, and the Solomon Islands was cited as having 'kept faith with the original Anzacs'. John Blaxland, a Senior Fellow at the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre (ANU), noted the irresistible pathos that '[t]he centenary of Anzac will see the great grandsons of Anzac involved as bit-players in a fight against a Middle-Eastern supposed caliphate'.[12] The emotional and rhetorical power of a modern Anzac military expedition to the Middle East, to the backdrop of the centenary programmes, is descriptive of the Anzac phenomenon; the political sanction and unanimous social acceptance of war experience as foundational to concepts of nationhood, intertwined with Australian and New Zealand identity and the projection of global roles.

In the Australian and New Zealand governments' investment in the centenary celebrations, we can glimpse the changing patterns in symbolism, ritual, and language of Anzac Day, and the transformation of the role of the state, over the past fifty years. The state centenary programmes promoted Anzac as a national memory, the most important experience of the past in the present. Although Anzac Day itself had been first practiced in 1916 and established in state and federal law in Australia and New Zealand as a site to celebrate the actions of the Australian New Zealand Army Corps (ANZAC) at the Gallipoli landing (later expanded to commemorate military service since the Boer War), the Anzac centenary offered a narrative of national affinity and a stimulus for cultural renewal.[13] This built on two decades of war commemoration that transcended left-right political divisions. The Bob Hawke and Paul Keating Labor Governments made war commemoration central to broader economic and foreign policy objectives. This 'commemorative diplomacy' was extended – and heightened – under the conservative Liberal Government of John Howard.[14] New Zealand Prime Minister Helen Clark embraced a similar vision, aligning closely with the Howard Government on cultural and defence policy. A recurrent theme was the idea that Australia and New Zealand stake an equal place in the site of Gallipoli as a moment of national founding, which in turn energises contemporary Tasman relationships. The centenary programmes relied on networks of state actors –

[10] Audrey Young, 'Tony Abbott: NZ "splendid sons" of Anzac in Isis fight', *New Zealand Herald*, 20 April, 2015: http://www.nzherald.co.nz/nz/news/article.cfm?c_id=1&objectid=11435429.
[11] Tony Abbott, Prime Minister of Australia, 'Interview with Scott Bevan', ABC News, 24 April /2015, Transcript, 24392; 'Joint Statement by Prime Ministers Hon Tony Abbott and Rt Hon John Key', 1 March 2015, Beehive, Press Release.
[12] John Blaxland, 'Daesh and the unintended consequences of a modern Anzac force', *WA Today*, March 4, 2015: http://www.watoday.com.au/comment/daesh-and-the-unintended-consequences-of-a-modern-anzac-force-20150304-13un71.html.
[13] Ian McGibbon (editor), *The Oxford Companion to New Zealand military history,* Auckland, Oxford University Press, 2000; Christopher Pugsley, *The ANZAC experience: New Zealand, Australia and empire in the First World War*, Reed,. Auckland, 2004.
[14] Commemorative diplomacy invokes the foundational work of Matthew Graves, most recently focusing on 'memorial diplomacy' and the uses of the past in international relations. See Matthew Graves, *Memorial Diplomancy: The International Politics of the Past*, London, Palgrave Macmillan, 2018.

government, cultural institutions, defence forces, and others – dedicated to the perpetuation of war memory linked to the organising of citizenship through national values. In this way, Anzac offers a cultural relationship through political axis: a global dialogue of post-imperial, national confidence.

This thesis interrogates the clear overtures to the 'Anzac Bond' at the 2015 centenary and the understanding of a shared experience of national founding at Gallipoli. It questions whether, historically, Anzac has resonated in similar ways in Australia and New Zealand. The branding of the Centenary programmes themselves suggest differences between Australian and New Zealand state contexts. The Australian symbol claimed the whole ANZAC noun, and thus the whole site of recognition, as Australian (*Fig. 1*). In contrast, the New Zealand 'WWI 100' logo was more general and less grandiose, suggesting a broader, pluralist war memory.

Figures 1. The Anzac 100 (Australia) and the WW100 (New Zealand) centenary logos. Courtesy Anzac Centenary / MCH

The Anzac state: heritage and historiography

What is remarkable in the centenary programmes is not the government orchestration of a diplomatic commemorative event but rather the deep claims reaching into the fabric of everyday life, reordering and restructuring notions of history, memory, and identity, in such a way to render these actions as seemingly apolitical. As Stuart Hall notes, 'foundational myths, are by definition, transhistorical: not only outside history, but fundamentally a-historical. They are anachronistic and have the structure of a double inscription; their redemptive power lies in the future, which is yet to come'.[15] We glimpse this 'double inscription' in Anzac as not simply a founding moment – a historically contingent moment in time – but the enduring national spirit and a claim on past, present, and future in a perpetual remembrance: as Key intoned, 'we remember'. Moreover, Anzac 2015 is a transnational project which suggests a re-enchanted nationalism, premised on continuity with the state past and predicated on the globalised space of Gallipoli. [16]

[15] Stuart Hall, 'Thinking The Diaspora: Home-Thoughts from Abroad', *Small axe: A Caribbean Journal of Criticism*, 6, 1, (1999): pp. 1–24, p. 4. Also see: Stuart Hall, 'The West and the Rest: Discourse and Power', in Stuart Hall and Bram Gieben, eds., *Formations of Modernity*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1994, pp. 222–237.
[16] Brad West, *Re-enchanting Nationalism: Rituals and Remembrances in a Postmodern Age*, New York, Springer-Verlag, 2015.

Although often used in Australia and New Zealand as a synonym for government, here 'state' refers to the organising political principle that brings together and gives a logic of direction to those things we call the economy, society, and government. 'The state' expresses the overall coherence of those parts – the sense of unity and continuity – to the national community. As Margaret Wilson observes, '[t[he state has continuity beyond the transience of governments or even bureaucratic institutions that are also subject to change', and one of its distinguishing characteristics is that 'it represents the public authority to make and implement decisions that affect … the organisation of society'.[17] The nation is imagined and felt through the collaboration of the public and government. Its very pervasiveness makes it a difficult thing to analyse. In this way, the state is as much a mentality, a condition, a state of being, as it is an assembly of political, cultural, and economic parts. Max Weber's classic definition of the state – that which wields the legitimate use of violence – takes on a different meaning in Anzac commemoration as that which commands the legitimate *remembrance* of violence within a national schema. A 'state cultural project' is understood as the state generation of shared understandings and meanings for the purpose of citizenship, bounded, affected, and located through a negotiation and recognition of cultural relationships.[18]

Thinking in terms of the state goes beyond dichotomies of 'top-down' and 'bottom-up' histories of commemoration.[19] Since the 1960s, Anzac commemoration has been radically transformed from an institution defined by personal and social networks of remembrance to a state cultural project.[20] This distinct period of change around commemoration ran parallel to the social, cultural, and economic reinvention of the postcolonial liberal state: a radical shift in relationships between citizens and state, in an attempt to re-found state national legitimacy at time when the old bulwarks of race and empire had failed and the very basis of Australian and New Zealand societies was called into question.[21] Histories of colonisation and nation-building intersected in political and cultural narratives which called into question the legitimacy of violence, within and without the nation-state and its founding.[22] Although Anzac Day is premised on the experience of total and global war in the early twentieth century, and its legacy of mass violence, changes in commemoration in fact represented a cultural and social disjuncture in the fragmenting project of Western modernity at the turn of the twenty-first century. The crucial phase in this process of adjustment began with respective constitutional crises; the dismissal of the Whitlam Labor Government in 1975, and the major currency crisis of the outgoing

[17] Margaret Wilson, *The Struggle for Sovereignty: New Zealand and Twenty-First Century Statehood*, Bridget Williams Books, Wellington, 2015, p. 16
[18] George Steinmetz, 'Culture and the State', in George Steinmetz, ed., *State/culture: state-formation after the cultural turn*, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1999, pp. 8–9.
[19] See the introduction in T. G. Ashplant, Graham Dawson, and Michael Roper, eds., *The Politics of War Memory and Commemoration*, Routledge, London, 2000.
[20] Marilyn Lake and Henry Reynolds, 'Introduction: What have you done for your country?' in *What's Wrong with Anzac?* , Sydney, New South Book, 2010, p. v.
[21] Ernesto Laclau, *Emancipation(s)*, Verso Books, London, 1996, 44; Anne Marie Smith, *Laclau and Mouffe: the Radical Democratic Imaginary*, London, Routledge, 1998, p. 165, 167–168; Jurgen Habermas, *Legitimation Crisis*, translated by Thomas McCarthy, London, Beacon Press, 1975.
[22] Judith Keene, 'Where Are the Bodies? A Transnational Examination of State Violence and its Consequences', *The Public Historian*, 32, 1 (2010): pp. 7–12.

Muldoon National Government in 1984. This process was continued with the 1988 bicentenary of white settlement in Australia and the sesquicentennial anniversary of the signing of the Treaty of Waitangi in New Zealand in 1990.[23] James Curran and Stuart Ward observe the linkage between the end of empire and the mental landscape of identity that emerged in the 1970s and 1980s, a psychological language of 'identity crisis' itself, peculiar to Australia, New Zealand, and other postcolonial nations.[24] As outlined by Antonio Gramsci, an organic crisis – when 'the old is dying and the new cannot be born' – constitutes a specific social circumstance in which dominant ideologies and hegemonies can be radically reshuffled.[25] Anzac Day was not exempt from such negotiations; indeed over the 1970s and 1980s its rituals served as both vehicle and site for hegemonic re-articulations as multiple narrative systems competed to establish or retain their own control of meaning in the commemoration.[26] It was not merely symbolic that the 'Anzac nations' would reappraise their relationship at a time when both were examining their pasts and contemplating their futures: Anzac Day, and its cultural production, would become a crucial site of this experience. Gallipoli represented an imaginative transformation of the state, which accorded with the emerging political economy of cultural industry, and so became a powerful cultural site of state myth.

Central to the changes in Anzac was the instability of categories of national identity in Australia and New Zealand. Against social anxiety and disintegration, the state myth articulated at the Anzac centenary was a sentimental cultural place-making. The Canadian government has followed a similar trajectory, with the First World War battle of Vimy Ridge becoming the seminal celebratory moment in a Canadian foundational history and the object of unprecedented government financial support at a time when the settler narratives of the state have been increasingly cast in postcolonial unease.[27] One of the most famous Canadian poems about the First World War, Alden Nowlan's 'Ypres 1915', deals essentially with a veteran's experience of looking at forgeries of official war art – mediations of war experience into inadequate cultural memory – while trying to find a way to remember the war as someone who is 'sometimes I'm not even sure that I have a country'.[28] Nowlan's poem – 'It makes me feel good, knowing / that in some obscure, conclusive way / they were connected with me / and me with them' – expresses the power of war commemoration to act against these postcolonial anxieties and reorder groups towards official sentiments of affinity. Similarly, in his contribution to the new *Cambridge History of Australia*, 'The history anxiety', Mark McKenna situates the Anzac phenomenon in a broader trajectory of historical consciousness which he highlights as the 'sense of impermanence, fragility and anxiety concerning the past' felt in Australian society over three centuries of white settlement, heightened by the incongruity of a 'new' settler society living in an ancient country having

[23] Alan Burnett and Peter Jennings, 'The Future of Australia/New Zealand Relations', *The Australian Quarterly*, 61, 1 (1989): pp. 33–49.
[24] James Curran and Stuart Ward, *The Unknown Nation: Australia After Empire*, Melbourne, Melbourne University Press, 2010, p. 17.
[25] Antonio Gramsci, *Selections from the Prison Notebooks of Antonio Gramsci*, translated by Quentin Hoare and Geoffrey Norwell Smith, London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1971, pp. 275–276.
[26] Suzanne Gillham, 'From Memory to Myth: the Resurrection of Anzac 1960- 2000', B. A. (Hons) Thesis, University of Sydney, 2000, p. 7.
[27] Ian McKay and Jamie Swift, *The Vimy Trap or, How We Learned To Stop Worrying and Love the Great War*, Toronto, BTL Books, 2016.
[28] Alden Nowlan, 'Ypres 1915': http://www.macleans.ca/general/11-11-08/.

displaced an ancient people.[29] 'The idea of Australia as a land without history has proved remarkably resilient', McKenna notes, reflecting Ann Curthoy's salient observation that 'the project of colonisation, and later nation-building, is inherently and self-consciously historical'.[30] In articulating this notion of 'history anxiety', McKenna develops his argument that the Anzac legend enabled Australian public discourse to move the foundational narrative of the Australian nation offshore and thus 'circumvented the dilemmas of building a foundational story from the history of settlement on Australian soil' with its attendant decades of divisive debate over the history of Indigenous displacement and discrimination.[31]

The changing role of the state in Anzac commemoration, the transnational shaping of this change, and the paradoxes and disjunctions inhered in the post-imperial project of Anzac are the principal themes of this thesis. It explores the way in which commemoration has been shaped by personal, institutional, and textual interactions across and between the Anzac nations to buttress the emergence of a radically different Anzac Day, wielding sentimental heritage in a globalised cultural nationalism. The introduction sets those themes in context and signals what is elaborated in the chapters to follow. The crucial structural changes in Anzac are explored in chapters 1-3, which moves chronologically from 1965 to 1990. Chapters 4-6 explore the emergence of the state Anzac project, between the 1990 and 2005 anniversaries of the Gallipoli landing. The final chapters draw together thematic strands in a discussion of indigenous-state relations in Anzac commemoration from 2005 to 2015.

Claims of heritage reflect a cultural discourse and mental world of the state and its contiguous management of violence as distinct from historical analysis. State initiatives which invoke 'the spirit of Anzac' legitimise a specific narrative of the national past and vision of citizenship, identity, and foreign policy in Australia. Notions of civil religion, militarisation, trauma and victimhood, and intersections of historical consciousness with the constitutional arrangement of citizenship, are constituent elements of the state configuration of Anzac located in the nexus of 'military heritage'. The currency of the word 'military heritage' in media and government policy highlights how war memory is conceptualised as something that needs to be protected, demarcated, and sacralised as a precious national treasure. As Frank Bongiorno writes, to discuss Anzac is to consider the 'entire culture around military commemoration and war remembrance that links Australian national identity to military endeavour'.[32] 'Anzac's inclusiveness', Bongiorno further notes, 'has been achieved at the price of a dangerous

[29] Mark McKenna, 'The history anxiety'. In Alison Bashford, Stuart Macintyre, eds. *The Cambridge History of Australia: Volume 2: The Commonwealth of Australia*. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge-New York, 2013. Pp. 561–580.
[30] Ann Curthoys, 'History and Identity', in Wayne Hudson and Geoffrey Bolton, eds., *Creating Australia: Changing Australian History*, Allen and Unwin, Sydney, 1997, pp. 116–131, 131.
[31] Also see, Mark McKenna, 'Anzac Day: how did it become Australia's national day?', in Henry Reynolds and Marilyn Lake, eds., *What's Wrong with Anzac?*, New South Books, Sydney, 2010, pp. 110–134.
[32] Frank Bongiorno, 'Anzac and the Politics of inclusion', in Shanti Sumartojo and Ben Wellings, ed., *Nation, Memory and Great War Commemoration*, Bern, Peter Lang, 2014, pp. 81–97, 82. Prime Minister Tony Abbott's 2013 appointment of former Chief of the Australian Defence Force Peter Cosgrove as Governor-General was well timed for the centenary, reiterating the powerful link between Anzac Day, the military, and state.

chauvinism that increasingly equates national history with military history, and national belonging with a willingness to accept the Anzac legend as Australian patriotism's very essence'.[33]

'Military heritage' also speaks to the problems of myth and emotional affectation of the Anzac centenary, embedded in 'revival' narratives of Anzac. Rahman Haghighat highlights the way in which we do not 'reminisce a historical memory or rehearse it in the social theatre unless it has a significant, emotional raison-d'etre'.[34] The Anzac spirit is a 'cultural trait', originally precipitated by a historical event but viscerally emotional. Scholars suggest that as our culture becomes increasingly temporary, immediate, and emotionally unstable, emotion and identity become closely entwined. Moreover, this is crucial in the reordering of relationships within the political and cultural framework of society; the political institutions of the state, government, and laws, as well as structures of economy and kinship which are crucial to its stability and continuity. As Bruce Lincoln notes, at once expanding and contesting Roland Barthes' definitions of myth and ideology, society is 'bound together by the officially sanctioned sentiments of affinity that coexist with, and partially mask, the disintegrative and most often officially illicit sentiments of estrangement'.[35] 'Ultimately, that which either holds society together or takes it apart is sentiment', Lincoln argues, 'and the chief instrument with which such sentiment may be aroused, manipulated, and rendered dormant is discourse'.[36]

Anzac has become the central means by which we relate to each other in public instances of ritual. This organising aspect of commemoration is like the brief lifting of the veil on the way Anzac is fundamentally configured by the Australian and New Zealand settler state – that is, a praxis of the modern state, inflected by the experience of colonisation and relations with Indigenous peoples. The framework of memory in the space of Anzac, in its productions of knowledge, language, and image specific to Australia and New Zealand, is something I have come to refer to as **'**the Anzac state**'**, or more correctly, states, as the two ideological spheres or partners of the Anzac myth which operate in parallel, often overlapping, supporting each other, but with distinct constitutional and institutional arrangements related to place.

The thesis' analysis of Anzac is comparative and transnational. It builds comparisons by providing, for the first time, an expanded study of postwar Anzac commemoration in New Zealand. A central problem in Australian scholarship is the elision of New Zealand. The tendency to 'tack' New Zealand onto the end of the Anzac narrative risks homogenising Anzac Day experience in Australia and New Zealand and assumes that New Zealand shares in the political-cultural phenomenon of Australian Anzac identity.[37] Both Philippa Mein-Smith and Mark McKenna have presented studies which show

[33] Bongiorno, p. 83.
[34] Rahman Haghighat, *Historical Memories in Culture, Politics and the Future: The Making of History and the World to Come*, Oxford, Peter Lang, 2014, p. 1.
[35] Bruce Lincoln, *Discourse and the Construction of Society*, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2014, 8.
[36] Lincoln, p. 9.
[37] The emphasis on homogeneity rather than difference is an assumption that Giselle Byrnes calls 'the indivisible nature of power and its relationship with constitutional "boundness" which 'underwrites the dominance of the nation'. Giselle Byrnes, 'Rethinking national identity in New Zealand's history', in *Concepts of Nationhood: A Symposium to Mark the Centenary of the Proclamation of Dominion Status*, 2007, republished online in the *New Zealand Journal of History*: https://nzhistory.govt.nz/files/documents/giselle-byrnes-national-identity.pdf.

the usefulness of New Zealand as a point of comparison with the Australian context.[38] Mein-Smith demonstrates how different nationalisms, and political, social, and cultural disparities between Australia and New Zealand have provided the context for divergent scripts of remembrance and meaning enacted in Anzac Day rituals since the First World War.[39] McKenna extended his analysis of the relationship between Anzac and government policy through a comparative study of Australian Anzac commemoration and the development of Anzac state identity in New Zealand, drawing on Graeme Hucker's work on the role of the Helen Clark Labour Government.[40] Clark's time as prime minister (1999-2008) aligned closely with Howard's (1996-2007), and like Howard's, was marked by a similar interest in war commemoration as a means to building a unique cultural heritage for New Zealand. Both McKenna and Mein-Smith point to a tradition of pluralist war memory in New Zealand, part of a 'mosaic of memory'; that is, one part of a national founding, of which Anzac Day is a placed alongside the meeting of Europeans and Māori in the Treaty of Waitangi. McKenna, most recently, relates the Anzac resurgence to the Australian state's ongoing ambiguity towards indigenous sovereignty and makaratta (treaty-making).[41]

Determining how war memory has changed from pluralist to a singular national-state project in the course of the Anzac revival, especially in the crucial period of 2005-2015, is the central aim of this thesis. Such a discussion is limited, however, by wider historiographical problems; mainly, a general lack of scholarship around the revival of Anzac Day in New Zealand. The 'memory boom' and growing popularity of family history, with the rise in the number of New Zealand tourists visiting Gallipoli, have all been discussed in the context of the parallel Australian phenomenon.[42] There is certainly not the extensive scholarly discussion around Anzac as a significant political and cultural development. Scholars such as Ian McGibbon, Christopher Pugsley, and Jock Phillips have contributed to writing 'New Zealand back into the Anzac legend'.[43] Helen Robinson outlines the decline of Anzac Day in New Zealand between the 1940s and 1960s and how it had become a platform for contemporary judgements by the 1990s.[44] Robinson was mainly interested in how commemorative activities derive their meaning from contemporary issues rather than from the historical events which they purport to commemorate. Michael King's *Penguin History of New Zealand*, which remains a popular history of New Zealand, earmarks Gallipoli as important in the national narrative; yet sociologists and anthropologists largely ignore the phenomenon of Anzac outside of the civic-religious paradigm.[45]

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[38] Also see James Bennett, 'Man Alone and Men Together: Maurice Shadbolt, William Malone and Chunuk Bair', *The Journal of New Zealand Studies*, 13, (2013): pp. 46–61.
[39] Philippa Mein-Smith, 'The 'NZ' in Anzac: different remembrance and meaning', *First World War Studies*, 7, 2, (2016): pp. 193-211.
[40] Mark McKenna, 'Keeping in Step: The Anzac "Resurgence" and "Military Heritage" in Australia and New Zealand', in Sumartojo and Wellings, 151-167; Graeme Hucker, 'A Determination to Remember: Helen Clark and New Zealand's Military Heritage', *Journal of Arts Management, Law, and Society*, 40, 2 (2010), 105-118.
[41] Mark McKenna, 'Moment of Truth: History and Australia's Future', *Quarterly Essay*, 69 (2018), 69.
[42] For a summary of this scholarship, see Jim McKay and Brad West, 'Gallipoli, Tourism, and Australian Nationalism', in Toby Miller, ed., *The Routledge Companion to Global Popular Culture*, Routledge, New York and London, 2017, pp. 436–447.
[43] Christopher Pugsley, *The Anzacs at Gallipoli: a story for Anzac Day*, Reed, Auckland, 1999; Jock Phillips, *To the memory: New Zealand's war memorials*, Potton & Burton, Nelson, 2016.
[44] Helen Robinson, 'Lest we forget? the fading of New Zealand war commemorations, 1946-1966', *New Zealand Journal of History*, 44, 1 (2010): pp. 76-91.
[45] Tracey McIntosh, and Teresia Teaiwa, *New Zealand Identities: Departures and Destinations,* Victoria University Press, Wellington, 2005.

This is reflected in the absence of any substantial analyses of the similarities and differences between Australia and New Zealand Anzac commemoration. No scholarship analyses in a sustained fashion the ways in which Australian commemoration has influenced New Zealand attitudes and policies, and vice-versa.

The absence of a comparable Anzac scholarship in New Zealand reflects the different priorities among New Zealand historians and, more broadly, the different role history plays in the formation of New Zealand identity and society.[46] This suggests that the New Zealand state narrative articulated in 2015 has to be located in transnational interactions. A transnational methodology seeks to understand the way in which formations such as nation and culture are shaped and enacted across and between imaginative and territorial boundaries. The circulation of people, institutions, and texts is what gives the nation its appearance of substance, yet it also – paradoxically – brings it into question. This is certainly poignant in the construction of Anzac, which, by its nature, implies a transnational military heritage. The importance of the 'transnational' in Anzac commemoration was first ventured by Roger Hillman, in 'A Transnational Gallipoli?', the author considering representations of Gallipoli by British and Turkish writers, and in Australian film.[47] More recently, *History Australia* offered a series of articles exploring different national memories of Gallipoli – Indian, Turkish, New Zealand – in global context.[48] *Exhuming Passions* (2011) and *Labour and the Great War* (2014) represent new global approaches to war commemoration, through analyses of class, politics, and emotion.[49] The 2011 volume is important as a comparative study of Australian and Irish historical remembrance, and as part of a wider trend in scholarly attention on Great War remembrance outside of strictly Australia. Anzac scholarship needs this approach, as Ann Curthoys notes, to refigure the meanings of culture and build a transnational historical culture which does not forget the power of the local, the specific, or indeed the national.[50]

We therefore see the transnational interactions of individuals, institutions, and texts in the formation of a new state configuration of Anzac. These frameworks also help to unsettle the potential reinscription of national narratives through the transnational, centring the state rather than an antecedent national culture, as has been Nepia Mahuika's critique.[51] McKenna reiterates the visceral role of the state in this process of creating history, recounting how narratives of founding represent a 'deep yearning for continuity and deep past' in a rootless settler society. This is especially pertinent considering how settler societies such as Australia and New Zealand developed during the 'zenith of the modern nation-state' of the mid-nineteenth and -twentieth centuries, and the attendant emergence of national

[46] See for example: Michael Belgrave, *Historical Frictions: Māori Claims and Reinvented Histories*, Auckland, 2005, p. 1.
[47] Roger Hillman, 'A Transnational Gallipoli?', *Australian Humanities Review*, 51 (2011): pp. 25–42.
[48] Peter Stanley, 'Remembering Gallipoli in a Global Context: India', *History Australia*, 12, 1 (3026), 43–48
[49] Katie Holmes and Stuar Ward, *Exhuming Passions: The Pressure of the Past in Ireland and Australia*, UWA Press, Perth, 2012; Frank Bongiorno, Raelene Frances, and Bruce Scates, *Labour and the Great War: the Australian Working Class and the making of ANZAC*, Australian Society for the Study of Labour History, Sydney, 2014.
[50] Ann Curthoys, 'We have just started writing national histories and you want us to stop already?', in Antoinette Burton, ed., *After the Imperial Turn: Thinking with and through the nation,* Durham, Duke University Press, 2003, pp. 70–89, 86.
[51] Nepia Mahuika, 'New Zealand History is Māori History: Tikanga as the ethical foundation of historical scholarship in Aotearoa New Zealand', *New Zealand Journal of History*, 49, 1, (2015): pp. 5–30.

histories. In Europe, nationalist ideology was based on the notion that a 'national people' was brought together by a common cultural myth – language, religion, customs – which then provided the basis for a political community.[52] In Australia and New Zealand, the state existed before or at least in conjunction with the formation of a cultural myth. The currency of indigenous identity and concepts in public legal institutions such as the Treaty of Waitangi and the Waitangi Tribunal, the suprahistorical body established by the New Zealand Government to determine and negotiate Māori land claims, projects a kind of 're-founding'; reorienting the nation back towards the Pacific and away from the (post)imperial metropole.[53] Clearly, we are concerned with the relationship and role of history in society and state. The state prefigures the national.

The thesis explores the public debate and language of Anzac ideologies in New Zealand and Australia, analysing changing patterns of commemoration and those wider currents of society: identity, meaning, and the contemporary demands of history. This thesis therefore makes a significant contribution to New Zealand Anzac scholarship and a long-overdue comparative study of Australian and New Zealand Anzac Day, but also links developments in Australian and New Zealand historiographies, an approach which is yet to be widely adopted, despite the rich rewards it offers. Accordingly, each of the thesis' three thematic and chronological sections entails looking at 'flash points' of contest and conflict around hegemonic renditions, as well as considering the successes and failures of state projects around Anzac; the imagined as well as actual, the dead-ends policies, as well as those brought to fruition; to facilitate exploring beyond the paradigmatic nation-state.

Regimes of memory and 'the Anzac revival'

The difficulty in recalling or giving space to the 'Anzac State' recalls Jay Winters' recent work *War Beyond Words*, in which he explores how knowledge and feeling are mediated through language, varying between local and national communities; imagery with its thematic, spatial, and temporal variations; and frameworks of memory, which render the reality of war inaccessible to all except its original participants.[54] The exercise of the power of the past on the present is the predominating property of memory itself.[55] Memory, it has been said, brings the past into the present, but it does so under its own terms. Scholars of memory have referred to the way in which this process entails a shift from communicative memory, that of lived experience, to cultural memory, that of imagined experience.[56] Why some experiences enter cultural memory, and not others, is central to understanding the importance of what Winter refers to as 'memory regimes', the structures of the past in the present.

[52] John Lie, *Modern Peoplehood*, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 2004, p. 99.
[53] Miranda Johnson, 'Burdens of Belonging: Indigeneity and the Re-founding of Aotearoa New Zealand'. *New Zealand Journal of History*, 45, 1, (2011): pp. 102–112, 111. Also see: Miranda Johnson, 'Reconciliation, indigeneity, and postcolonial nationhood in settler states', *Postcolonial Studies*, 14, 2, (2011): pp. 187–201.
[54] Jay Winter, *War Beyond Words,* Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2017, pp. 1-6.
[55] Bill Schwarz, *The White Man's World, Aftermath of Empire,* Oxford University Press, 2011, p.13.
[56] Jan Assmann and Aleida Assmann, 'Collective memory and cultural identity', *New German Critique*, 65, (1995): pp.125–133. Also see Jan Assmann, 'Communicative and cultural memory', in A.Erlland and A.Niinning eds., *Cultural memory studies: An international and interdisciplinary handbook*, De Gruyter, Berlin, 2008, pp. 109–118.

The ‘Anzac revival’ is a memory regime that transforms the pluralist threads of war memory into a unified hegemonic narrative and renders invisible its various ideological displacements.[57] Thinking about the relationship between history, memory, and the constitutionality of the state – namely, of settlement – is a way to disturb, and destabilise the ‘twin pillars’ of contemporary Anzac ideology, the narrative of the ‘Anzac revival’ and its instantiation through a body of scholarship. That Anzac has taken on new political and social prominence is perhaps not wholly surprising, given that settler identity has always been a process of transplanting British bodies, dispositions, and above all institutions.[58] The sense of continuity and timeless tradition is part of the construction of collective memory in commemoration: a unified national identity, reconciled with its past, with a clear set of civic values by which to meet the future. Although the ‘fall and rise’ of Anzac Day, as Jenny McLeod puts it, implies a return to, renewal of, or continuity with social and cultural formations premised on a shared experience of war, the Anzac Centenary represents a globally unprecedented state commitment to understanding war memory within a national framework.[59] This transformation has constituted a ‘nationalisation’ of Anzac Day and Gallipoli. Such a term, with its state, corporate, and institutional implications, is helpful for understanding the origins and trajectory of Anzac commemoration: how power, legitimacy, and conflict relate to each other and how they relate to the politicisation of social categories such as nation and ethnicity. As Andreas Whimmer notes, it is the relational – the network of political alliance – which determines what is politically salient and the focus of popular identification, providing ‘principles of legitimacy’, that is, who should rule over whom and what obligations and benefits should accrue.[60]

Anzac scholarship is a dialectic between official and revisionist histories, which reiterate the myth by enacting Gallipoli as a site of memory, assuming an audience already familiar and interested in the story, and in its repetition, indexing the Anzac story’s importance and acting as an instrument by which that importance is reasserted and renewed.[61] Efforts by scholars to ‘purify’ the Anzac legend of its overt political, militaristic, and commercialist uses are a kind of revision and modification that merely reinforces, in Bruce Lincoln’s words, ‘that a great deal is at stake and [that] one gains control over the narrative by controlling the way it is told’.[62] Conservative commentators in Australia refer to the criticism of Anzac myth-making as ‘a new front of the history wars’.[63] *Quadrant*’s Mervyn Bendle writes that historians are out of touch, frustrated by the fact that the Australian public has seemingly

[57] Jay Winter, *War Beyond Words*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2017, pp. 1–6.
[58] D. Stasiulis and R. Jhappan, ‘The fractious politics of a settler society: Canada’, in D. Stasiulis and N. Yuval-Davis, eds., *Unsettling settler societies: Articulations of gender, race, ethnicity and class*, SAGE Series on Race and Ethnic Relations, London, 1995, pp. 95–132, 97.
[59] Jenny Macleod, ‘The Fall and Rise of Anzac Day: 1965 and 1990 Compared’, War & Society, 20, 1 (2002), 149-168.
[60] Andreas Whimmer. *Waves of War: Nationalism, State Formation, and Ethnic Exclusion in the Modern World*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2013, pp. 13–14.
[61] Bruce Lincoln, *Between History and Myth: Stories of Harald Fairhair and the Founding of the State*, Chicago University Press, Chicago, 2014, pp. 104–110. Peter Stanley and David Graham’s ‘Honest History’ project, railing against the perceived political and commercialist uses of Anzac, while retaining the essential nobility of remembrance: to separate the ideal from the caricature. See Peter Stanley, *Bad Characters: Sex, Crime, Mutiny, and Murder in the Australian Imperial Forces,* Melbourne, Murdoch Press, 2011.
[62] Lincoln, *Between History and Myth*, p. 105.
[63] Mervyn F. Bendle, ‘Gallipoli: second Front in the History Wars’, *Quadrant*, 1 June, 2009: https://quadrant.org.au/magazine/2009/06/gallipoli-second-front-in-the-history-wars/.

returned to its fundamentally conservative values and rejected the new urban nationalism of the anti-war generation.[64] As the federal Centenary committee prepared to draw up plans for the commemorations, the *Australian*'s 2013 Anzac Day editorial exhorted the committee's members to 'ignore the tortured arguments of the intellectuals and listen to the people, the true custodians of this occasion'.[65] Although tempting to dismiss the notion of 'a second front in the history wars' as mere rhetorical play, the use of such a phrase is nonetheless a telling indicator of the importance Gallipoli holds in the national imagination and the project of academic history in Australia – in particular, historians pressed into the service of state making, either confirming or denigrating the national project.

In this revisionist synthesis, the focal point of discussion, Anzac, is reinforced through each consecutive conflict and debate – reinforcing its importance and its narrative of revival and endurance, rather than its destabilisation. '[I]f we understand nationalism as a political ideology that plays a role in the legitimisation of sovereignty in the modern era whilst at the same time politicizing "culture", Ben Wellings notes in his 2012 essay on English nationalism, 'then we can understand how national narratives provide an ideational means by which the state is linked with its citizens'.[66] This echoes Anthony Smith's argument that 'nationalism should be viewed not just as a political ideology, but as a politicised form of culture one that is public and popular, and ''authentic''.[67] Such redemption recalls Charles Taylor's seminal work around the ethics and ideals of 'authenticity' which define the conditions of modern liberal agency in the postwar world.[68]

This paradigm of 'revival' has shaped Anzac scholarship as a search for national sentiment, beyond empire, religion, or race. The foundational text of this Anzac scholarship was Ken Inglis' 'The Anzac Tradition', published in 1965.[69] The article was a consequence of Inglis' participation in the fiftieth anniversary RSL/RSA cruise to Gallipoli and set him on a scholarly trajectory culminating some thirty years later in *Sacred Places* (1998) in which he surveyed the formalised religious language, inscribed on monuments and symbolic forms of speech, and declared Anzac a civic religion. In doing so, he positioned the significance of Anzac Day as a search for sacred, transcendent truth in an increasingly secular, post-Christian society.[70] Inglis' influence on Anzac historiography is paradigmatic, equivalent to that of Charles Bean in the formation of Anzac legendarium, and his corpus of work itself 'something of a monument in the Australian publishing landscape'.[71]

In the thesis' opening chapter, we will consider the place and multiple meanings of Anzac Day in 1965, and Inglis' role in shaping its historical understandings. As the relevance of Anzac Day was

[64] Bindle.
[65] *The Australian*, 25 April, 2013.
[66] Ben Wellings, *English Nationalism and Euroscepticism: Losing the Peace*, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2012, chapter 1.
[67] Anthony Smith, *Nationalism: Theory, Ideology, History*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2001, p. 131.
[68] Charles Taylor *Ethics of Authenticity,* Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1992.
[69] Ken Inglis, 'The Anzac Tradition', *Meanjin*, 24, 1, (1965): pp. 25–44.
[70] Ken Inglis, *Sacred Places: War Memorials in the Australian Landscape*, Miegunyah Press at Melbourne University Press, Melbourne, 1998. Also see, K.S. Inglis and Jock Phillips, 'War memorials in Australia and New Zealand: A comparative survey', *Australian Historical Studies,* 24, 96, (1991): pp. 179-191.
[71] Graeme Davison, 'Ken Inglis: threads of influence', *History Australia*, 14, 4, (2017): pp. 516–529.

increasingly called into question among the publics of Australia and New Zealand, Ken Inglis, in his role as a historian and one of two journalists accompanying the pilgrims, revived and extended the nationalist project of Bean and constructed what might be described as an official canon of Anzac: its character popular, secular, and essentially Australian, within a story of emerging nationhood. We will therefore consider the 1965 pilgrimage in the historiography of Ken Inglis; a snapshot of Anzac Day in 1965, its audience, ritual, and meaning in elite cultural discourse; and finally, a broader consideration of patterns of remembrance in the postwar period.

This search for identity, affinity, and sentiment has been produced by the very scholarship trying to explain the origins and nature of the change in Anzac Day. Much of this scholarship situates the active remembering and forgetting of the experience of the Great War in a largely popular, collective response to the social and cultural magnitude of the war itself. The 'bottom-up' approach framed by Winter and others has provided many Anzac scholars with a grammar of memory, trauma, and loss, by which to situate the Anzac phenomenon as a resurgence or revival in war memory. Bill Gammage's *The Broken Years* (1974) played a key role in initiating this new social history of the war within Australian historiography, systematically drawing on the diaries and letters of Great War soldiers in order to depict 'the horrors of war', and stressing that his work was an 'emotional history' rather than a military one.[72] The emotive focus on the pervasive horror and sadness of war history has been a prominent feature of subsequent Australian histories, including Inglis' aforementioned *Sacred Places*, as well as Les Carlyon's *The Great War* (2007) and Marina Larsson's *Shattered Anzacs: Living with the Scars of War* (2009).[73] Bruce Scates' *Return to Gallipoli* (2006) faithfully recorded extensive interviews with pilgrims to Anzac Cove, 'the true custodians of this occasion', dutifully cataloguing the emergence of a symbolic and ritual language but failing to interrogate the context in which those forms of language and modes of storytelling are recorded.[74] Joan Beaumont's *Broken Nation* (2014) is heavily framed by the literature on the social and cultural legacy of the Great War.[75]

Chapter Two reveals this structural change from elite cultural discourse to a 'bottom up' focus on youth and returned servicemen's voices. In the period from 1965 to 1987, Anzac Day became a site of protest, as distinct but related movements – student, anti-war, feminist – used Anzac Day as a platform to critique specific contemporary issues such as the Vietnam War, sexual violence against women, and war commemoration itself. Anzac Day during the periods 1967-1972 and 1977–1987, in particular, represent valuable case studies owing to the unusually direct interactions between protest groups and their audiences, and the appropriation of existing ritual and language of remembrance. Discourse around who could or could not participate in Anzac Day formed hegemonic interregna, with

[72] Bill Gammage, *The Broken Years: Australian Soldiers in the Great War*, Sydney, Penguin Books, 1975, p. 112.
[73] Inglis *Sacred Places*; Les Carlyon *The Great War*, Sydney, Picador Australia, 2007; Marina Larsson, *Shattered Anzacs: Living with the Scars of War*, Sydney, UNSW Press, 2009.
[74] Bruce Scates, *Return to Gallipoli: Walking the Battlefields of the Great War*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2006, pp. 6–8.
[75] Joan Beaumont, *Broken Nation: Australians in the Great War*, Sydney, Allen and Unwin, 2014.

the protest actions ultimately transforming Anzac Day as a cultural site in which the Australian and New Zealand publics became the central object of Anzac commemoration.

The sentimental appeal of Anzac and its narrative of national foundation and redemption is crucial to the political utility of Anzac while making it difficult for historians to critique. Stuart Ward and Mark McKenna highlight the particular mythologising flowing from the publishing house of the Australian War Memorial.[76] Bruce Scates observes the way in which Anzac Cove is seemingly a site 'charged with meanings' and situates 'the way the sordid reality of death in war is ennobled, sanctified, reified, forgotten' in local, national, and global contexts: the rise of Anzac pilgrimage within 'commercial and political imperatives within Australia', the memory boom (drawing on Winter's seminal formulation), the experience of expatriation, 'the wanderlust of the young', and shifting political fashions over the past hundred years.[77] This thesis builds on this discussion to address whether this profound emotional investment in the Anzac legend is discovered 'on site' or transplanted from Australia; or as McKenna and Ward put it, the extent to which 'meanings are "made in Australia" and unpacked in Turkey, not embedded in the landscape waiting to reveal themselves to Australian pilgrims'.[78]

This process – imaginative and actual – forms a thread of analysis from Chapter Three onwards. During the 1980s, Anzac Day became the theme of a range of film, television, and theatre productions. These typically simplified various elements of the Anzac myth and shifted the orbit of commemoration to the historical context of the Gallipoli campaign itself, both in terms of presenting a narrow nationalist paradigm and also focusing on specific sites such as the Nek and Chunuk Bair. The most prominent of these was Peter Weir's *Gallipoli* which, released in 1981, has been treated by historians as a key text of resurgent Anzac identity in the 1980s. The third chapter aims to work against the dominance of cultural nationalist interpretations of the motivations and timing of Weir's *Gallipoli*, by situating the film in its context amid a varied field of competing approaches to war memory and history, especially in New Zealand. The reception of *Gallipoli* in New Zealand, and its influence on the development and impact of Maurice Shadbolt's theatre production, *Once on Chunuk Bair*, and its 1992 film adaptation, show how these cultural productions opened up the place of Gallipoli to new expressions of identity. We will explore these productions' connections and contexts within local and global frameworks of cultural hegemony, and institutional links to the state and mentalities of the Cold War and the commodification of history as spectacle. The next section explores the state project of Anzac which emerged in 1990, following this cultural process. Chapter Four shows that the Bob Hawke Labor Government's promotion of the seventy-fifth anniversary, as a state cultural project, was a pivotal moment. The site of Gallipoli itself was transformed imaginatively, hermeneutically sealed as a tourist space by cultural production within the state order.

Another key line of scholarship on Anzac to date relates to 'cultural trauma'. Notions of trauma, loss, and the impact of war on society have always been a feature of Anzac scholarship, drawn from

[76] Mark McKenna and Stuart Ward, "It was really moving, mate": The Gallipoli Pilgrimage and Sentimental Nationalism in Australia', *Australian Historical Studies*, 38, 129 (2007): pp. 141–151. See for example, Carolyn Holbrook, *Anzac: The Unauthorised Biography*, Sydney, New South, 2014.
[77] McKenna and Ward, p. 143.
[78] Scates, 'Return to Gallipoli', p. 116.

Winter's influential concept of collective memory. Inglis identifies changing understandings of grief that seek 'closure', the replacement of words about heroism and valour with those of victimhood and trauma in his early exploration of Anzac as civic religion. Gammage had explicitly rejected the label 'military history' for *The Broken Years*, stating that his chief motivation was 'to show the horrors of war'. Titles such as Stephen Garton's *The Cost of War: Australians Return* (1996), Joy Damousi's *Living with the Aftermath: Trauma, Nostalgia and Grief in Post-War Australi*a (2001), Marina Larsson's *Shattered Anzacs: Living with the Scars of War* (2009), and Peter Stanley's *Lost Boys of Anzac* (2014), show the breadth of literature on the subject.[79] Christine Twomey locates the 1980s as the key period of cultural change that catalysed Anzac Day's return to national prominence, explaining its revival through new interest in the 'traumatic' impact of war experiences.[80] Twomey casts the changing patterns of language, symbolism, and ritual in Anzac as a 'reinvigoration', arguing that the imperial-civic vocabulary of manhood, glory, and heroism failed to create an emotional-personal identity. Trauma on the other hand, 'through the very breadth of its definition', is something universal to human experience: 'It could have been me' is a sentiment often expressed in surveys of people 'moved' by the stories of suffering and death, which suggests this conflation of the personal and the historical.[81]

Chapters Five and Six situate this key idiom of trauma, following the thread developed in Chapter Three, in the politics and performance of the repatriations of the Unknown Australian Soldier (1993) and the Unknown New Zealand Warrior (2004). Although separated by nearly a decade, both installations contained a paradox. Here was an imperial institution – the traditional cult of the fallen – intended to represent bodily the postcolonial nation; a therapeutic healing of collective cultural trauma, initiated by the institutional presence of the Australian War Memorial and the office of the Prime Minister. A comparison of the Australian and New Zealand Unknowns with the global context of Indigenous repatriation strategies seeking the return of ancestral remains from overseas jurisdictions – drawing on the cases of Yagan's head in the 1990s and Māori toi moko over the 2000s – reveals the complex politics of legitimacy and authority derived from the act of bodily interment. The 'Unknown Anzacs' in this way bookended a vital period of commemorative practice, as Anzac remembrance became more fully oriented towards the state and was reformulated as the key definitional frame of citizenship and historical consciousness at the turn of the century.

This thesis traces the themes of history, memory, and identity, through chapters that focus on the institutions, political and intellectual elites, and publics engaged in their contest and production, through comparative and transnational lenses. In the postwar liberal state, this entails a concentration of cultural capital around military heritage that is a conceptual framework for this management of actual and symbolic violence. This thesis explores state acts of institutions and structures through

[79] Stephen Garton, *The Cost of War: Australians Return*, Oxford University Press, Melbourne, 1996; Joy Damousi, *Living with the Aftermath: Trauma, Nostalgia and Grief in Post-War Australi*a, Cambridge University Press, 2001; Larsson, *Shattered Anzacs*, and Peter Stanley's *Lost Boys of Anzac,* New South Books, Sydney, 2014.
[80] Christine Twomey, 'Trauma and the Reinvigoration of Anzac: An argument', *History Australia,* 10, 3 (2013): pp. 85–108.
[81] McKenna, 'Keeping in step', p. 155.

what Pierre Bourdieu calls appearances of the national.[82] Two theoretical frameworks are required to analyse the personal and institutional networks in the specific cultural field of Anzac commemoration: the transformation of state institutions, and the role of public intellectuals in this process. The 1980s was a vital period of economic liberalisation which restructured politics and the institutional fabric of the state. The transition from welfare state to market state reflected 'the transformation of the state, which shifts the locus of its legitimacy from the nation to the individual or, more precisely, to the maximising of individual welfare and the opening up of possibilities for individual self-expression'.[83] In the making of memory in societies, this is a shift from collectives (at many levels) to individual.[84] This means engaging consumers of state services in the production of those services; making citizens producers of the state Anzac project, and seemingly divesting its enactment of politics. This removal of political responsibility is vital to understanding the changing state configuration of Anzac. The emergence of the Australian War Memorial since the 1980s as a powerhouse of Australian military research and Anzac nation-building is an exemplar of this. The war memorial formed a central institutional framework, in its multiple complex roles as research centre, archive, temple, and tomb.

This transformation of the Australian War Memorial underscores the role of individuals, especially historians, in reiterating war memory, as well as the particularity of state institutions. As Winter notes, 'sites of memory are created not just by the nations but primarily by small groups of men and women who do the work of remembrance; without their work, collective memory could not exist'.[85] Hegemonic processes can be physical and operative, as well as linguistic. Gramsci noted how the 'organic intellectuals that every new class creates alongside itself and elaborates in the course of its development' assists in the emergence of that social group. In the case of Anzac, we see historians active alongside curators and creative professionals from film studios and the Australian War Memorial, to Māori Television. Intellectuals operate between civil society, 'the ensemble of organisms commonly called "private", and that of 'political society' or the state.[86] They comprise the 'hegemony' which the dominant group exercises throughout society' as well as the direct domination or command exercised through the state and juridical government. 'Ordinary' people, conversely, give 'spontaneous consent' to the 'general direction imposed on social life by the dominant fundamental group'.

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[82] Pierre Bourdieu, 'Rethinking the State: Genesis and Structure of the Bureaucratic field', in George Steinmetz, ed., *State/culture: state-formation after the cultural turn*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1999, pp.. 53–75.
[83] Philip Bobbitt, *Terror and Consent: The Wars for the Twenty-First century*, Allen Lane, New York, 2009, p. 85.
[84] These genealogies suggest the way in which the individual has become the crucial arbiter of memory and experience. The sentimentalism of affinity in Anzac state making therefore entails a distinct individuation of war memory. An example of this was Sam Neill's recent television series, ANZAC: Tides of Blood, produced in time for the centenary of Anzac. Neill traces the history of Anzac memory and commemoration since 1915, structured as a personal journey in which he explores the experience of his great uncle who fought at Gallipoli and later perished on the western front. Although Tides of Blood was very much critical of militarism and the mythologising of the Anzac legend, the inevitable conflation of the individual soldier with the nation and contemporary Australians and New Zealanders (represented in Neill, a citizen of both nations), pervades the entire program. *ANZAC: Tides of Blood* (Screen Australia, New Zealand on Scree, New Zealand Film Commission, 2015). The documentary was released, tellingly, in Australia under a different title – *Why Anzac with Sam Neill*.
[85] Jay Winter, *Remembering War: The Great War Between Memory and History in the Twentieth Century*, New Haven, Yale University Press, 2006, 136.
[86] Gramsci, p. 12.

In this way, Anzac has become the setting in which identities and social relationships are located and imagined, in what Bourdieu expresses as a 'field' – a frame by which we can notice actors, their actions, and structures – capable of forming *habitus*, through the language, ritual, and forms of public Anzac commemoration.[87] Bourdieu shows the complexity of talking about identity, precisely because actors imitate, observe, and respond to what other actors in the field are doing; as well as the structural context of the modern state. Importantly, this includes institutional policies – of war memorials, museums, and government departments – invested in the linking of citizenship to military heritage on Anzac Day. The emphasis on institutions and intellectual elites varies in each chapter, as does the particular utilisation of comparative and transnational methods. In doing so, this thesis broadens the scholarship on Australian and New Zealand Anzac commemoration, while also contrasting the national contexts and the inflection given to war memory in each place by political and constitutional circumstance. We will explore the successes and failures of state initiatives, and the role played by individuals as well as institutional structures.

An important contribution of this thesis is to broaden our understanding of how Australian and New Zealand societies have sought to come to terms with the end of empire – and its cultural pillars of race and nation – and changes in the state in the late twentieth century. Rather than focusing on the experience of the war, and extrapolating this to contemporary trauma, the thesis argues for a deeper analysis; one which goes to the very structures of state making in Australian and New Zealand settlement. The thesis' final chapters – seven and eight – explore Indigenous participation in Anzac commemoration in Australia and New Zealand. The politics of reconciliation represent 'the insertion of [indigenous] histories into national imaginaries', as Faye Ginsburg notes, but it does not relinquish settler pre-eminence.[88] Over two chapters, we will focus on formations of indigeneity and the establishment and expansion of Indigenous media since the 1990s, as part of the 'Anzac revival', exemplified in the state ceremonies of the ninetieth anniversary of the Gallipoli landings in 2005. The chapter compares the federally-funded National Indigenous Television (NITV) with Māori Television, exploring how these broadcasters contested, engaged, and shaped the changing language around Anzac Day as a moment of pride, celebration, and national founding. Differences in programming, policies, and interactions with a broader non-indigenous audience between NITV and Māori Television reflect the 'politics of recognition' inflected by the constitutional and historical contexts of the two 'Anzac nations'. The chapter provides a study demonstrating how we can compare and contrast two sets of television texts, relating the differences and similarities to the national and institutional contexts in which the two sets of texts circulate. Moreover, a consideration of these respective broadcasters relates the distinct constitutional contexts of Anzac in Australia and New Zealand; the former premised on the history and practice of *terra nullius* and the latter the structures of the Treaty. Indigenous perspectives are important in mitigating the way in which the transnational can re-state the national, as well as disrupting the 'nationalising' of histories of violence in Australia

[87] Pierre Bourdieu, *Outline of a Theory of Practice*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1977.
[88] Faye Ginsburg, 'Embedded Aesthetics: Creating a Discursive Space for Indigenous Media', in Lisa Parks and Shanti Kumar, eds, *Planet TV: A Global Television Reader*, NYU Press, New York, 2003, pp. 303–318, 315.

and New Zealand. Indigenous and transnational perspectives disrupt the nationalist paradigm of Anzac and reveal the state cultural project beneath.

CHAPTER ONE.
‘BETWEEN COURAGE AND SLAUGHTER’: SHIFTING NARRATIVES OF ANZAC DAY, 1965

Introduction

It is probable that the fiftieth anniversary of the Gallipoli landing in 1965 would have been a largely unremarkable occasion, were it not for the decision of the Australian Returned and Services League (RSL), in conjunction with the New Zealand Returned and Services Association (RSA), to organise a three-week pilgrimage to Turkey. Over three hundred people signed up: mostly elderly male veterans who had served at Gallipoli, fifty-seven from New Zealand. The itinerary consisted of flights to Athens and a Mediterranean cruise, stopping at Malta and Egypt, culminating in a restaging of the landing at Anzac Cove on Anzac Day. The whole trip cost around £650. Most of the men on the cruise had their expenses covered by RSL sub-branches and associated clubs, supported through a subsidy of £20,000 offered by the Australian Federal Government, and £5,000 from the New Zealand Government for the RSA contingent.

The impact of the pilgrimage was singularly enhanced by the inclusion of historian Ken Inglis as one of two journalists in the official party. Inglis, then teaching at the Australian National University, was contracted by *The Canberra Times* to write a series of stories, with photographs, of the trip. He also published several important journal articles, in the lead up to the pilgrimage and afterwards, which, despite being rejected by *Historical Studies* at the time, remain the main academic sources for the anniversary.[89] In this dual role as historian and journalist, Inglis had an enormous influence on the contemporary depiction of the 1965 pilgrimage and its subsequent historical reading. It is also obvious from his varied reports on the anniversary that the pilgrimage shaped Inglis’ interests in the experience and memory of the Great War, particularly through a national lens, and what he considered the relationship between institutional Christianity and Anzac commemoration.

In the opening chapter, we set up some of the key problems that will be explored throughout the thesis. In the first place, we will identify the changing structure of Anzac Day from its civic foundations to new state cultural mythology. Anzac Day in 1965 as a civic institution was under considerable strain, with declining attendance rates and growing uncertainty as to the meaning of the day. The

[89] Ken Inglis, ‘Letters from a pilgrimage: Ken Inglis’s despatches from the Anzac tour to Gallipoli, April–May 1965’: http://apo.org.au/node/54313. Also see Bruce Scates’ recent reflections on the pilgrimage: Bruce Scates, ‘Letters from a pilgrimage’: reflection on the 1965 return to Gallipoli’, *History Australia*, 14, 4 (2017): pp. 530–544.

RSL/RSA pilgrimage to Turkey would serve mainly to remind the Australian and New Zealand publics that Great War veterans that 'the war generation' was soon to disappear. Second World War veterans displayed less interest in maintaining the ex-servicemen networks, and with them the purpose of Anzac Day as a reunion for old comrades – and the enactment of social and religious hierarchies – and funeral for the bereaved framed by the experience of loss during the war.[90] As Maureen Sharpe has shown, inter-war Anzac Day in New Zealand was defined by language of pride and sorrow, rather than the desire for peace.[91] As the need for a funereal ritual of public mourning declined, debate about the nature of the day indicated the shifting relevance and parameters of remembrance and civic ritual. This affected war commemoration more widely. Helen Robinson notes how in New Zealand, the decline in Anzac attendance had been preceded by the complete and almost immediate collapse of Remembrance Day, or Remembrance Sunday, in post-war New Zealand. As Robinson argues, 'the stagnation of the day in the post-war period suggests that by the 1950s many of the inter-war crowds' motivations had become meaningless, thanks to the impact of the Second World War and the passage of time'.[92] These changes revealed multifaceted anxieties about the falling away of Anzac Day, reflected in legislative change, debate about the meaning of Anzac, and expressed desires for a more pedagogic emphasis in Anzac Day for young people.

Secondly, we will consider the role of the historian in re-shaping narratives of commemoration, by exploring the importance of Ken Inglis in the emergence of a national Anzac historiography. Historicising Inglis' involvement in the 1965 pilgrimage and contextualising the broader trends in war commemoration and the state in Australian and New Zealand postwar societies provides a chance to explore the extent to which we can talk about a 'nationalising' project in Inglis' interpretation of the 1965 pilgrimage – that is, the way in which Inglis sets up a specifically national line of inquiry about 'the one day of the year', at a time when the meaning of Anzac was increasingly unanchored from its foundational cultural system of association and empire.

The presence of Inglis gave weight to the Australian emphasis in the pilgrimage, despite it being an ostensible partnership between the RSA and RSL. This has led to Inglis exerting an unusual influence over Tasman interpretations of the Anzac revival. We will consider the similarities in Australian and New Zealand Anzac commemoration, looking at the way in which unified or parallel approaches to Anzac commemoration up to this point in time would give way to a divergent understanding of Anzac Day in the subsequent decades. In exploring the differences and possibilities of Anzac Day in1965, in Australia and New Zealand, and Inglis' role in shaping a distinctly national historical interpretation of memory and identity, this chapter argues for a more nuanced view of Anzac Day in the 1960s, situating the fiftieth in an unsettled period in which a variety of narratives vied and fragmented; a space for the transformation of Anzac as a state project which in 1965 was far from certain.

[90] Alistair Thomson, 'Anzac Memories: Putting Popular Memory Theory into Practice in Australia', *Oral History*, 18, 1 (1990): pp. 25–31, 28.
[91] Maureen Sharpe, 'Anzac Day in New Zealand 1916–1939', *New Zealand Journal of History*, 15, 2 (1981): pp. 97–114.
[92] Helen Robinson, 'Lest we forget? The fading of New Zealand war commemorations, 1946-1966', *New Zealand Journal of History*, 44, 1 (2010): pp. 76–91, 87.

Ken Inglis and Anzac historiography

It is hard to overstate Inglis' influence on public and academic understandings of Anzac Day in Australia. As Jenny McLeod notes, it was Inglis' work at the time of the fiftieth anniversary that led to the popularisation of Charles Bean, the Australian Federal Government's official war correspondent and historian during the Great War.[93] In 1969, following the Gallipoli pilgrimage, Inglis delivered the John Murtagh Macrossan lecture, titled 'C.E.W. Bean, Australian historian', in which he asserted Bean was not only Australia's most prolific historian but as a determining influence in 'the texture of Australian history' itself.[94] In particular, Inglis emphasised Bean's role in establishing the Australian War Memorial and the way in which his work highlighted the national character of Australia, creating 'a new kind of history' that described 'what really happened' from the view of the common Australian man.[95] These themes were taken up by Bill Gammage and other national historians, and much of what has passed into historical parlance as the 'Anzac Legend' is owed to Inglis' 'rediscovery' of Charles Bean.[96] In light of scholarly critique in the late 1980s of Bean's propensity to in fact distort the war record through his official history and the editing and selection of paintings and photographs in the military collections, in pursuit of his over overwhelmingly nationalist agenda, Inglis' glowing account is terribly airbrushed.[97] Nonetheless, it is one which holds a central place in the military history boom in Australia over the past fifty years.

The valorising of Bean was tied to Inglis' own approach to Anzac Day. Indeed, the comparisons between Bean and himself are accentuated in the 1965 pilgrimage. Like a modern-day Bean accompanying the 'second landing' in 1965, Inglis' despatches dissolved the distinction between historian and historical actor in the Anzac narrative. The clear dawn of April 25, 1965, becomes 'uncannily as in 1915'; the pilgrims themselves the embodiment of 'the Anzac temperament' – laconic, egalitarian, and refusing to tip Turkish barmen because tipping, 'like saluting, belongs to a society divided into masters and servants, not to a land of free men'.[98] This phrase, like many of Inglis', is a close echo of Bean's writings. For example, Bean wrote in his work *War Aims of a Plain Australian*, that Australians 'don't like bowing their knee to either men or doctrines' – a phrasing which also highlights an affinity between Bean and Inglis' own ambivalence towards religious experience in Australian war commemoration.[99] Throughout his account, Inglis grappled with what he perceived as the tension between the personal experience of the pilgrim and their national significance in the

[93] Jenny Macleod, 'The fall and rise of Anzac Day: 1965 and 1990 compared', *War & Society*, 20, 1 (2002): pp. 149–168.
[94] Ken Inglis, 'C. E. W. Bean, Australian Historian', The John Murtagh Macrossan Lecture, 1969. Delivered at the University of Queensland, 24 June 1969, University of Queensland Press, St Lucia, Queensland, 1970.
[95] Ibid.
[96] D. A. Kent, 'The Anzac book and the Anzac legend: C.E.W. Bean as editor and image-maker', *Historical Studies*, 21, 84 (1985): pp. 376–390, 377.
[97] New Zealand military historian Chris Pugsley, for example, has noted how Bean intentionally mislabelled New Zealand and Irish soldiers as Australians, in order to better serve his national narrative. 'Historians open fire on Anzac film', *The Australian*, 22 April, 2010: https://www.smh.com.au/national/historians-open-fire-on-anzacs-film-20100421-szzd.html. Also see: Alistair Thomson, 'Steadfast until death? C.E.W. Bean and the representation of Australian military manhood', *Australian Historical Studies*, 23, 93 (1989), pp. 462–478; John Barrett, 'Historical reconsiderations VII: No straw man: C.E.W. Bean and some critics', *Australian Historical Studies,* 23, 90 (1988): pp. 102–114.
[98] *The Canberra Times*, 27 April, 1965; 27 April, 1965; 15 April, 1965.
[99] C. E. W. Bean, *War Aims of a Plain Australian*, Angus and Robertson, Sydney, 1945, pp. 90–91.

Anzac legend. Stylised as living 'temples of the Anzac spirit', Inglis' veterans decried the lack of ceremonies and proper ritual throughout the pilgrimage.[100] At Anzac Cove, 'as at other ceremonies on the journey', Inglis informs us, 'some men experienced a sense of flatness, of things having been done inadequately'.[101] This portrayal differs from other contemporary accounts of the pilgrimage: *Age* journalist Geoffrey Hutton, with little appreciation of Bean's narrative, praised the lack of ritual on the pilgrimage as indicative of a private, personal pilgrimage, without military ceremony or the liturgy of a national civil religion.[102] The varieties of meaning around remembrance are flattened in Inglis' account, and there is a decided hesitancy to criticise the commemorative project of the pilgrimage. Instead, it is reconfigured in national terms. In this, we again see the echoes of Bean. Where Bean wrote his *Official History* asking 'how did this nation react to the supreme test of war?' making war experience integral to the emergence of Australian nationhood, and vice-versa, Inglis observed that April 25, 1915 was 'the consummation' of the Australian nation.[103] This would become a longstanding preoccupation of his scholarship. His book *The Australian Colonists* (1974) explored the ceremonies and rituals whereby the European settlers constructed a public culture and became a staple of undergraduate history readings in the 1980s.[104] Anzac was fixed in a wider trajectory of Australian national development. In an eloquent and nuanced ethnographic mode, Inglis rendered the 1965 pilgrimage in sympathetic and sentimental terms, acting as a key interlocutor of the social networks of the returned service organisations, and the changing cultural meanings of Anzac in the postwar world. Inglis' role reflects the difficulties faced by any historian who examines the Anzac myth as part of a current of memory they did not create, and therefore contribute to the reification of the very narratives of the past they seek to bring into question. Although Inglis was reflective of his role in the pilgrimage, he was unable to separate his interest in Bean, a specifically national meaning of Anzac remembrance, and his role as journalist and chronicler of the 1965 pilgrimage. The line between history that examines the Anzac myth and its connection to national identity, and history that repeats the myth, was very much crossed.

Peter Simkins has suggested that the mid-1960s British academic interest in the Great War was stimulated by the fiftieth anniversary of the war, not least because it marked the opening of the British official records of the conflict for research.[105] In Australia, the fiftieth anniversary was also an important juncture in Australian historiography, led by Inglis who reshaped academic approaches to Anzac Day with his portrayal of the 1965 pilgrimage. In doing so, Inglis indicated something of the transformation Anzac commemoration was to undergo in the course of the following half-century. The fact that his articles were rejected by his contemporaries in the academy, instead being published in

[100] Ken Inglis, 'The Anzac Tradition', *Meanjin*, 24, 1 (1965): pp. 25–44.
[101] Ken Inglis, 'Return to Gallipoli', *Australian National University Historical Journal*, 3 (1966), pp. 43–62.
[102] Geoffrey Hutton, 'Gallipoli: as seen by Turks', *The Age*, 21 April, 1965.
[103] As quoted in John Lack, K. S. Inglis, and Jay Winter, *Anzac Remembered: Selected Writings by K. S. Inglis*, Melbourne University Press, Melbourne, 1998, p. 2.
[104] Ken Inglis, *The Australian Colonists: an exploration of social history, 1788-1870*, Melbourne University Press, Melbourne, 1974.
[105] Peter Simkins, 'Everyman at War', in Brian Bond, ed., *The First World War and British Military History*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1991, pp. 290–314.

the more literary *Meanjin*, shows us that this entangled relationship between myth, ideology, and historiography was not inevitable and underscores Inglis' profound influence.

In 1998, John Lack collated and edited *Anzac Remembered*, a collection of Inglis' key essays published in honour of his contribution to Anzac historiography. In his preface, Lack highlighted Inglis' importance in giving credibility to military history in Australia, and the pivotal role of the fiftieth anniversary in this transformation. '[I]t was extraordinarily exciting on the eve of Anzac Day', Lacks noted, 'to find in the feature pages of the Melbourne *Age* Ken Inglis' moving observations on the national day which had been part of my life for as long as I could remember, but whose meaning had been assumed and therefore only imperfectly understood.'[106] The 'meaning' of Anzac Day, a 'zeitgeist' given structure in Inglis' historiographical legacy, is the notion that the Gallipoli campaign was 'the consummation' of Australian nationhood.

The paradigm of nationalism has since dominated Australian historians' interpretations of the Anzac myth and attitudes to war remembrance in general. This has produced a historiography that while at times analysing the establishment and growth of the Anzac legend, for the most part, as Scott Worthy notes, 'provides an intellectual, academic justification for its continued repetition in society'.[107] A constant restating of the Anzac myth reinforces the popular conception that Anzac and nationalism are closely linked; a tendency towards nationalist historical teleology apparent elsewhere in Australian historiography.[108] The obsession of Australian academic history with one particular national myth, in either claiming it or deconstructing it, finds little comparison in other Anglophone historiographies. There was a significant spike in interest around the history of Armistice Day in British historiography during the 1980s and 1990s, in the wake of the new cultural histories and the theme of invented tradition more specifically. Works such as Dan Todman's *The Great War: Myth and Memory* and Adrian Gregory's *The Silence of Memory: Armistice Day 1919-1939* remain excellent, but represent what was a short-lived dalliance.[109] Lack's complaint that Inglis' legacy to Australian history has gone unremarked shows this was not a straightforward process in Australian historiography. Historians have also cast their eyes elsewhere. The refashioning of Anzac as the crucible of historical consciousness, either contested or supported, is very much influenced by Inglis' active hand in shaping the 'national' reading of Anzac memory.

New Zealand Anzac historiography provides an interesting contrast. Inglis' role as a kind of retrospective official historian in the 1965 anniversary revealed much about the differences between Australian and New Zealand attitudes towards Anzac commemoration in 1965. No academic or journalist, as part of the official party or otherwise, provided commentary on the pilgrimage from a New Zealand perspective. This was reflected in the content of Inglis' subsequent dispatches – New

[106] Lack et al, p. 1.
[107] Scott Richard Worthy, 'Communities of remembrance: the memory of the Great War in New Zealand 1915-1939', MA Thesis, University of Auckland, 2001, pp. 8–9.
[108] See, for example, the debate between Neville Meaney and historians of Australian nationalism, Marilyn Lakes and Christopher Waters; Neville Meaney, 'The problem of nationalism and transnationalism in Australian history', *History Australia,* 12, 2 (2015), pp. 209–231.
[109] Dan Todman, *The Great War: Myth and Memory*, Hambledon and London Press, London, 2005; Adrian Gregory, *The Silence of Memory: Armistice Day 1919–1939*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1994.

Zealand was repeatedly downplayed or left off in the coverage. Accordingly, the 1965 pilgrimage played very little role in the coverage of the fiftieth anniversary in New Zealand. The *New Zealand Herald* published accounts of the dawn landing of the Australian veterans and depicted the pilgrimage as an Australian affair, despite the limited RSA involvement.[110]

Moreover, the disparity between New Zealand and Australian media investment in the fiftieth anniversary echoed the 1915 Gallipoli campaign. The New Zealand Government had initially refused to finance an official correspondent to accompany the New Zealand Expeditionary Force.[111] Bean, aligned with the Australian Government, was very committed to history-making and nation-building through war journalism, and aimed to compose an official history. In contrast, Malcolm Ross, the eventual appointee of a reluctant New Zealand government, arrived several months after the beginning of the campaign, published very little, and had no hand in writing the official history of the New Zealand contingent.[112] In the person and career of Bean on the other hand, we can see the need for the Australian government to institutionalise military heritage as the history of the nation, through the official histories and the War Memorial, and the close linkage between state, military, and history in 'the consummation' of the nation.

Inglis offered his own comments on this difference between Australia and New Zealand, comparing Bean's official history and the *Official History of the New Zealand Effort in the Great War*, four anodyne volumes written by military staff in the 1920s. Inglis emphasised the Australian history as official and national, whereas the New Zealand accounts were popular, informal, and written as an accompaniment to the British official history (and therefore having an imperial tone). Inglis asserted this as evidence of 'the lower temperature of nationalism on that side of the Tasman'.[113] However, this belies the efforts of Keith Sinclair and other nationalist New Zealand historians to make of Anzac commemoration the kind of vaunted national myth perpetuated by Bean and Inglis, writing for example *A Destiny Apart: New Zealand's Search for National Identity* in 1983 with 'the texture' of a nationalistic, popular vision of Anzac nationhood.[114] When New Zealand historians have examined the remembrance of the Great War, the paradigm that has dominated their interpretations has been nationalism; exemplified in Roberto Rabel's insistence that 'nationhood has been the great theme of our war histories'.[115] Nonetheless, it is clear that Sinclair's approach lost energy as Australian and New Zealand historiography diverged, interestingly around this junction of the fiftieth anniversary.

The 50th anniversary: Anzac Day, 1965

[110] The particular details indicate that the *Herald*'s reports were probably based on Geoffrey Hutton's despatches.
[111] Ron Palenski, 'Malcolm Ross: a New Zealand failure in the Great War', *Australian Historical Studies*, 39, 1 (2008): pp. 19–35. Also see Allison Oosterman, 'The Appointment of New Zealand's First Official War Correspondent – Malcolm Ross', *When Journalism Meets History*, (2003): pp. 127–133.
[112] Palenski, p. 21.
[113] Inglis, 'C.E.W. Bean, Australian Historian', p. 50.
[114] Keith Sinclair, *A Destiny Apart: New Zealand's Search for National Identity*, Allen and Unwin Press, Wellington, 1986, p. 77.
[115] Roberto Rabel, 'War history as public history: Past and Future', in Bronwyn Dalley and Jock Phillips, ed., *Going Public: the Changing Face of New Zealand History*, Auckland University Press, Auckland, 2001, pp. 55–73, 55.

In New Zealand, the national fiftieth commemoration centred on a special jubilee service held in Wellington. Seven hundred veterans (including eighty Gallipoli veterans), members of the armed forces, and school cadets, marched in an afternoon parade to the Citizens' War Memorial service, conducted by the Roman Catholic Archbishop McKeefry.[116] The Governor-General Sir Bernard Fergusson gave the main address, while the Deputy Prime Minister Jack Marshall represented the Holyoake National Government. Fergusson lauded the significant numbers of veterans as 'magnificent', promising it would be the centrepiece of his telegram to the Queen. The commemoration was understood as symbolic of imperial relationships, rather than a founding moment of the nation. The high turnout of veterans was also a feature in the wider Wellington region. In the Lower Hutt and Wainuiomata, hundreds of veterans marched in special commemorative jubilee parades. Given that the fiftieth anniversary was a Sunday accompanied by torrential rain, this presence was significant.

The special service was organised jointly by the Dominion RSA, with the local Wellington RSA, and the Gallipoli Veterans Association. The RSA Executive Council explicitly sought to avoid a service of 'national character', instead naming it the 'capital city and Wellington District Jubilee Parade and Service'.[117] This was reflected in the decision to hold the service at the Citizens' War Memorial, as opposed to the National War Memorial. As well as being accessible, the Citizens Memorial reflected the emphasis on local RSA identities and networks, as well a distinction between civic and 'the national' public. In contrast to Inglis' nationalising project underway on the 1965 pilgrimage, Anzac was simply not understood in precise national terms. The fiftieth was instead marked by webs of civic institutional connections. The special service focused on returned servicemen, accompanied by civic representatives including the Governor-General, deputy prime minister, city councillors, diplomats, military leadership, Australian expatriates in the Wellington AIF Association, church leaders, and finally, next of kin.[118] This was not a public ceremony insofar as the public were seen as a primary or indeed necessary presence; members of the public attended as a show of support and to witness the ceremony but not participate in it or instil it with national meaning. The presence of the New Zealand-based AIF associations also reflected the fluid and transnational shaping of Anzac, which acted as the voice of Australian interests in New Zealand public debate.

However, the emphasis in Wellington on the veterans as the core of the remembrance varied regionally. Some 3,000 people attended the ceremonies in Christchurch. [119] In Auckland, no special events were organised to mark the anniversary, and estimates of some 2,500 people attending the established dawn service at the Auckland Cenotaph indicated a commemoration 'smaller than in earlier years and quieter', as the *New Zealand Herald* report put it.[120] This included around 500 returned servicemen, of whom only a dozen were Gallipoli veterans. Nearby in Orakei, a bronze

[116] *Evening Post*, 26 April, 1965.
[117] 'Meeting of the organising committee minutes', 5 February 1965, Ceremonials and Celebrations, 1964–1973, ABFK 7494 W4948/71 35/1/2 1, Archives New Zealand (ANZ), Wellington.
[118] Mitchell to Holyoake, 15 March 1965, Ceremonials and Celebrations, 1964–1973, ABFK 7494 W4948/71 35/1/2 1, ANZ, Wellington.
[119] *The Press*, 26 April, 1965.
[120] *New Zealand Herald,* 26 April, 1965, p. 14.

plaque inscribed in Māori and dedicated to Māori servicemen of the First and Second World Wars, unveiled at the Interdenominational Chapel on the Marae grounds, was the sole act of commemoration.[121]

In contrast, the anniversary was marked in Rotorua by a special parade of some 950 Gallipoli veterans, drawn from across the central North Island.[122] The returned servicemen were received in the Rotorua sports ground by the city's Mayor, A. M. Linton, who conferred on them the freedom of the City of Rotorua. The ceremony was followed by a prayer service and reunion dinner. A sapling taken from the seed of the famous Lone Pine was planted by Victoria Cross winner C. R. G. Bassett in the memorial drive near Lake Rotorua. This was indicative of a marked trend around Anzac Day in 1965: local communities that engaged in the commemoration were entirely veteran-related, organising special reunions for the veterans themselves, rather than seeing the anniversary as a significant national moment for the wider public.[123]

Communities and organisations differed in emphasising the anniversary through the lens of Gallipoli. The *Evening Post* made a point to write that Anzac Day is not exclusively about Gallipoli, but rather a day for 'remembrance of all those who have died in the nation's wars', in keeping with the 1949 broadening of the *Anzac Day Act* to include the war dead of the Second World War and the Boer War.[124] Nonetheless, the newspaper recognised that 'the Gallipoli men' had a special claim on Anzac Day in the fiftieth year since the landing.[125] The *Radio Listener* dedicated its entire April volume to the occasion.[126] New Zealand National Radio featured programming in the week leading up to Anzac Day which focused on the fiftieth anniversary of Gallipoli. On the day itself, the National Radio Programme featured *Gallipoli*, starting in the morning and ending with a late night programme titled *Anzac Plus Fifty*.[127] Although clearly named for the special anniversary, *Anzac Plus Fifty* consisted predominantly of stories from the Second World War and the Korean War, interspersed with music and Bible verses.[128] These included a former POW of a Japanese camp; German New Zealanders who had suffered backlash during the war; the chaplain of a refugee camp; a Quaker conscientious objector imprisoned by the New Zealand government during the war; and several severely disabled veterans. The main reference to Gallipoli came from Turkish radio recordings that gave the Turkish perspective on the landing as 'a just cause which ended in the triumph of justice'.[129] On television, all channels featured an evening Gallipoli segment which consisted of footage of local commemorative services and parades. *Te Reo o te Māori*, the evening Indigenous news segment included eyewitness accounts of Māori on Gallipoli, with songs composed in their honour, as well as stories of the Māori

[121] *New Zealand Herald,* 24 April, 1965.
[122] *Evening Post*, 26 April, 1965.
[123] The army, navy, and air forces were present at the major metropolitan services – Auckland, Wellington, and Christchurch – whereas regional centres had solely the army. See: minutes of the principal personnel officers' committee PPO 65 M3, 9 February, 1965, Ceremonials and Celebrations, 1964–1973, ABFK 7494 W4948/71 35/1/2 1, ANZ, Wellington.
[124] *Evening Post*, 24 April, 1965, p. 20.
[125] Ibid.
[126] *Radio Listener*, 15 April, 1965.
[127] *Anzac Plus Fifty: People at War*, 25 April, 1965.
[128] Ibid.
[129] Ibid.

Battalion in Italy during the Second World War.[130] These interviews explored the local and personal experiences of the war, rather than a national understanding.

This focus on the voice of the veteran and their remembrance was also a feature of Australian domestic commemoration. The emphasis on Gallipoli was more apparent, with the RSL promoting the anniversary as 'the birthday of the ANZACS', that is, the first men to enlist in the AIF.[131] The federal government announced the issuing of special commemorative stamps for the fiftieth anniversary, featuring Simpson and the Donkey.[132] In Melbourne, the afternoon service at the Shrine of Remembrance saw the largest number of ex-servicemen march, some 32,000, since the inter-war period; the year before, the official figures had put attendance at 20,100.[133] Four mounted light horsemen Gallipoli veterans led the parade. [134] Officials said 'the important half-century anniversary', and the perfect weather, had contributed to the estimated crowd of 40,000 people lining the streets to cheer the parade.[135] The dawn service had been more lightly attended, mainly by veterans. In recognition of the anniversary, Gallipoli veterans were invited to file past the memorial and place a paper flower in remembrance. Local commentators proclaimed that 'the spirit of Anzac burns as brightly as ever'; however, this was in reference to the comradeship of the veterans, rather than any wider national dimension.[136] High attendance by veterans, and their prominent place in dawn and afternoon ceremonies, was a common theme across other states. The Adelaide dawn service and street march, conducted by Protestant ministers, had the largest attendance since the end of the war.[137] In regional New South Wales, small towns had significant attendances: 400 veterans marched in the Bourke; 300 in the Fairfield parade, augmented by 200 schoolchildren.[138] Some 1,600 veterans marched in Canberra along Anzac Parade, along with 1,400 active servicemen. A special Anzac contingent of eighty from Gallipoli, including six New Zealanders and one New Guinean, was given prominence in the ceremony.

As in New Zealand, reunions were the mainstay of local community commemorations throughout Australia. Newspapers were filled with pages of Anzac reunion details and arrangements.[139] This was a policy promoted by the RSL and its supporters, wielded for political and financial leverage to improve working and welfare conditions for veterans. The limited numbers of letters to the editor were solely directed towards promoting greater public support for veteran pensioners. One at the time of the anniversary, for example, was entitled 'Pittance for Old Anzacs'.[140] Airlines NSW declared free return travel for original Anzacs wishing to attend the Sydney commemorations from regional

[130] *Te Reo o te Māori*, 25 April, 1965.
[131] *The Age*, 23 April, 1965, p. 4.
[132] *The Canberra Times,* 9 January, 1965, p. 22.
[133] *The Age,* 21 April, 1965, p. 2.
[134] Ibid.
[135] *The Age*, 26 April, 1965, p. 2.
[136] Ibid.
[137] *The Advertiser,* 26 April, 1965.
[138] *Western Herald*, 30 April, 1965, p. 5; *The Fairfield Broadcaster*, 27 April, 1965.
[139] *The Age,* 22 April, 1965, p. 7.
[140] *The Age*, 22 April, 1965, p. 2.

towns.[141] Collections were taken up at some Anzac services for distressed ex-servicemen.[142] Similarly, in New Zealand, the RSA's Poppy Day had become mandatory in workplaces and schools over the early 1960s. This was despite the fact that the number of volunteers able to sell poppies was declining, requiring in 1965 the Department of Veterans' Affairs to give staff time off to volunteer. The RSL launched a special appeal in 1965, in the days before April 25, asking for donations to support veterans and widows from the world wars. Businesses were asked to make cash donations, purchase laurel wreaths for display, and to promote the wearing of 'Anzac star' badges, and to exhibit Anzac Day posters in support of the appeal.[143] The Anzac Star donations supported the RSL's welfare projects building villages of flats for elderly returned servicemen and war widows. [144] A pull-out section of the *Sunday Telegraph* featuring the War Memorial in Sydney's Hyde Park on its cover devoted the majority of its coverage to practical welfare policies for veterans.[145] A reunion lunch for ex-prisoners was also held in Sydney.[146] These measures emphasised the need to assist veterans, without invoking a national remembrance, and had been the marked trend of the post-war period. The meeting of 'the boys of the old unit' was the embodiment of the Anzac spirit, according to *The Age* editorial on Anzac Day in 1954.[147] The role of the Australian public was to observe, respectfully and with gratitude, rather than participate.

The emphasis on the person of the veteran was echoed in the newspaper coverage of the major civic ceremony of the fiftieth anniversary in Australia. A crowd of 14,000 (one-sixth of the capital's population) gathered to hear the Queen's message read by the Duke of Gloucester, at the Australian War Memorial service In Canberra.[148] As well as reiterating the imperial relationship, newspapers differentiated between the public who 'witnessed' the ceremony, and the actual participants in the remembrance, ex-servicemen, with *The Canberra Times* declaring that it was about 'the veterans and their day'.[149] Elsewhere the *Times* reported that a record crowd of more than 16,000 'tourists', from all over Australia, attended the Anzac ceremonies.[150] This distinction of veterans from ordinary citizens, or tourists, at Anzac Day in 1965, even as it created the public space in which such distinctions were performed, reflected a long-standing theme of interwar Anzac commemoration. Stanton Hope's 1934 account of the *Duchess of Richmond* 'pilgrimage-cruise' to Gallipoli was widely read by New Zealand and Australian audiences. Hope distinguished between 'tourists' who, for example, complained about the weather and poor roads and 'the men on pilgrimage', who would not complain because 'they will recall too vividly the agony of the long dragging marches'.[151] This was a distinction between mere

[141] *Western Herald*, 26 March, 1965, p. 8.
[142] *The Valley Hill Times*, 30 April, 1965.
[143] *The Age*, 22 April, 1965, p. 6.
[144] *The Age*, 23 April, 1965.
[145] 'Repatriation benefits. Advisers guide ex-servicemen', 'RS.L. Anzac Tribute', *Sunday Telegraph*, 25 April, 1965. See also: '50 years since landing', *Sunraysia* (Mildura), 22 April, 1965, and 'Meaning of Anzac', *Bendigo Advertiser*, 24 April, 1965.
[146] *The Biz*, 21 April, 1965.
[147] *The Age*, 28 April, 1954.
[148] *The Canberra Times*, 15 March, 1965.
[149] Ibid.
[150] *Canberra Times*, 27 April, 1965.
[151] Stanton Hope, *Gallipoli Revisited: an account of the Duchess of Richmond pilgrimage-cruise*, W.W. Stanton Hope, London, 1934, 19. For an example of New Zealand reports, see: 'Gallipoli Pilgrims Greeted by Turks', *Evening Post*, 27 July, 1934, p. 15.

civilian tourists and pilgrims who as ex-servicemen had memories of the place in wartime. 'The veterans do not falter', blazoned the *New Zealand Herald* in 1965, echoing the Queen's message that by 'remembering their courage… we can draw strength to face the problems of our own time'.[152]

The celebration of these soldier-citizens and their role as civic exemplars and arbiters of Anzac memory was heightened as the image of the veteran was increasingly one of infirmity and decline. In Bourke, in rural New South Wales, Rev. N. J. Gough addressed the Anzac ceremony, saying 'we could count upon the fingers of one hand the number of original Anzacs in our midst today'.[153] 'Time has an odd trick of screening our memories', Gough declared, 'causing us to relegate to the back of our minds things that are most dear to us'. In this sense, the fiftieth became a means to express a new sense of melancholy and loss at Anzac Day, which folded the decline of the war generation into the fragmentation of political, social, and racial consensus of White Australia and Fortress New Zealand. Paradoxically, the anniversary emphasised the place of the veteran at the centre of the remembrance but also heightened their growing absence; a cultural arrangement of war experience to memory, and eventually history through the scholarly work of the likes of Inglis. An ABC news package, interviewing people walking in the streets of Mascot Sydney and aired in the week leading up to Anzac Day in 1965, reiterated these concerns.[154] The ABC journalist asked members of the public whether Anzac Day marches should be discontinued. 'Should the day continue without the original Anzacs', mused the ABC journalist. The responses ranged from concern for the strain placed on the elderly men marching in parades, to complaints that the returned servicemen were given too much recognition: all were very much focused on the needs of the returned servicemen as the audience and participants of Anzac commemoration.[155]

The emergence of these myriad public voices hinted at a growing crisis around the meaning of Anzac Day. The ACT branch of the RSL had proposed to the Menzies Liberal Government that a special Anzac medal be created for the fiftieth anniversary and awarded to surviving Gallipoli veterans. The proposal was supported by the Labor Party which requested a Government Bill. However, this was refused, on the basis that too long a time had lapsed between the war and there were too few veterans to justify the special medal. Moreover, Menzies asserted that the New Zealand Government would not support the creation of a Gallipoli medal, saying that it was 'not a matter on which Australia should take independent action'. [156] Clearly, whether the public would intervene to entrench in civic remembrance this declining memory was up for debate. Seen as a commemoration, united with New Zealand and empire, this debate concentrates Anzac Day 1965 not as a national remembrance, but a civic-private one; which had less contemporary relevance with the decline of the last veterans.

[152] *The Canberra Times*, 26 April, 1965.
[153] *The Western Herald*, 26 April, 1965.
[154] 'Should Anzac Day marches continue?', *ABC News*, Australia: ABC. The clip was recently published online: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YZXekvN-dws.
[155] Such news stories – aired on the national broadcaster – also suggested a changing technological context of memory.
[156] *The Canberra Times*, 17 March, 1965, p. 13. The New Zealand archives show no indication as to whether this was an official New Zealand government policy, or simply a convenient excuse given by Menzies.

Menzies' comments also suggested ways in which the Australian and New Zealand publics perceived each other's relationship with Anzac Day. In particular, there was a significant trans-Tasman dimension to New Zealand Anzac commemoration. Australian officials held prominent places in ceremonies, in the major cities but also in smaller regional centres. This was due in part to the incorporation of the dawn service (an Australian innovation) following the Second World War as part of New Zealand Anzac Day ritual.[157] In fact, it was the established tradition that the Wellington dawn service be organised under the auspices of the Australian Imperial Forces Ex-Servicemen's Association (in conjunction with the Wellington RSA). However, in 1965, this was changed so that the Australian Federal Minister for National Development, David Fairbairn, led the official laying of wreaths and pronounced the Anzac dedication.[158] Auckland followed the precedent of Wellington, with Major-General L. E. Beavis becoming the first Australian to lead the dawn parade in Auckland. This was organised to align with the special anniversary, very much placed in a trans-Tasman space.

Australian newspapers consistently portrayed New Zealanders as deeply committed to Anzac commemoration in the lead up to the fiftieth. Commentators marvelled at the apparent interest in 1965 as a special anniversary and painted an idyllic picture of a country basking in glorious unity. *The Age,* for example, reported that on Anzac Day in New Zealand, 'in the streets of the capital and in cities and towns and lonely country villages, war veterans will march in salute to the men of Anzac and will remember the fallen in religious services', noting how Australian veterans were to be special guests and give the address at the Auckland cenotaph.[159] This was reciprocated in some instances: New Zealand veterans living in Australia were invited to school ceremonies awarding Anzac Day essay prizes.[160] The *Age* and similar reports emphasised the apparent unity of New Zealand's commemoration, and its willingness to incorporate Australia. Symbolic enactments included the planting of four young pine trees, descendants of the famous 'Lone Pine' of Gallipoli, planted at Anzac Day ceremonies across New Zealand's north island – Tauranga, Gisborne, Mt Maunganui, and Rotorua. These were in fact seedlings from the pine tree planted on Canberra's Anzac Parade. Lone Pine was not associated exclusively as Australian, but rather as more broadly 'Anzac', and suggests a more fluid understanding of the symbols and landscape of Gallipoli than would be the case in subsequent decades.[161]

These Australian accounts of trans-Tasman commemoration looked wistfully at the loss of vigour in state and federal Anzac Day services and reflected anxieties about domestic Anzac Day, rather than an accurate portrayal of New Zealand commemoration. On both sides of the Tasman, the recurring theme in Anzac Day ritual and newspaper coverage was the linking of the commemoration of the Anzacs' achievements with the status of veterans, their welfare and central role in the act of remembrance. To an extent, this reflected the personal remembrance of the veterans, but more so the formulation of the ex-servicemen organisations, endorsed by political and cultural elites. However,

[157] Graham Seal, "… and in the morning …": adapting and adopting the dawn service', *Journal of Australian Studies* 35, 1 (2011): pp. 49–63.
[158] 'Anzac Day', *Journal of External Affairs*, April (1965): pp. 12-15
[159] *The Age*, 22 April, 1965, p. 6.
[160] *The Canberra Times*, 11 May, 1965.
[161] *The Age,* 23 April, 1965, p. 7.

the meaning of Anzac Day articulated around the fiftieth anniversary was far less coherent, reflecting the growing crisis around the relevance and meaning of commemoration in the post-war era.

The culture of Anzac Day – focused on and organised by veteran associations, its meaning articulated by political and religious leaders – necessarily reflected elite social hierarchical relationships. These were the civic-imperial webs of Australian and New Zealand in the immediate post-war period – intact but rapidly unravelling in the decolonisation of the British world. Elite cultural media such as the *Sydney Morning Herald* and *Age*, increasingly vied with the Packer newspaper empire, to provide coverage of Anzac Day that was directed towards a largely conservative audience, many of whom were themselves veterans of the world wars.[162] Speakers at Anzac commemorations were prominent military, religious, or civic leaders, whose speeches were broadcast through radio and television. The expensive nature of recording and archiving at the time means that, for the historian, sources are limited to 'big names' – the likes of Freyburg, Fergusson, and Bassett – which necessarily tend towards an elite account of Anzac Day in 1965 and its official narratives. These sources are nonetheless useful insofar as we can detect the growing confusion, defensiveness, and need to justify Anzac commemoration in the face of an increasing awareness of its decline.

The fiftieth anniversary was therefore an uneasy remembrance. Uncertain as to the nature of the commemoration, *The Age* noted that 'Gallipoli means either ecstasy or depression to a great many and will continue to do so as long as there are men and women alive who experienced it' and 'to those who were untouched by it, it has become a legend and one likely to be embodied for all time in the Australian way of life'.[163] The *New Zealand Herald* portrayed the jubilee of Gallipoli as a celebration trapped between 'courage and slaughter', having earlier editorialised Anzac Day as 'symbols for fruitless valour, bitter defeat, and unexpected victory'. [164] The struggle to find a coherent commemorative grammar was further indicated in the way newspapers emphasised the successful withdrawal from Gallipoli, rather than the failure and tragedy of the landing. The *Radio Listener* dedicated the entirety of its coverage to the end of the campaign: emphasising the ingenuity of the retreat; the cunning of the Allied troops, in fooling the cautious Turks; the bombardment by British warships; and killing Turkish soldiers 'with the taste of victory fresh in their mouths' as 'a bitter postscript to defeat'.[165]

The fact that the fiftieth fell on a Sunday meant that many speakers attempting to articulate the meaning of Anzac Day were religious leaders, giving the anniversary a clear religious intonation. In Victoria, for example, where the day was not marked as a state holiday, Anzac services were held primarily through the churches. The Sunday service at St Paul's Cathedral was remade as an Anzac ceremony, with the head of the Victorian RSL, Norman Smith, and Governor Sir Rohan Delacombe playing central roles in the liturgy.[166] Presiding Archbishop Frank Woods in his sermon preached how 'if you want to see into the heart of Australia now, don't go to Bondi Beach or Hayman Island, but

[162] J. Henningham, *Institutions in Australian Society*, Oxford University Press, Melbourne, 2000, p. 282.
[163] *The* Age, 26 April, 1965, p. 4.
[164] *New Zealand Herald*, 26 April, 1965, p. 1; 24 April, 1965, p. 6.
[165] *Radio Listener*, April, 1965.
[166] *The Age*, 23 April, 1965, p. 8.

come and spend Anzac Day with us'. Similar messages were articulated outside of Melbourne. The Reverend Kenneth W Prentice at Christ Church, Hawthorn, preached that 'whatever the military value of the Anzac landings, something happened in us as a nation which lives on as an inspiring and unifying spirit' – an eternal covenant of the nation, which Prentice compared to the Mosaic law laid down by God upon the Israelites in the Exodus story. In Box Hill, reflecting bourgeois 'middle-brow' concerns, Methodist Church leader Rev. Trevor Byard contrasted the shameful penal origins of the nation with the 'prideful heritage' of Anzac Day; Gallipoli veterans having 'blazoned Australia's name in the world's hall of fame'. [167] In Wellington, where it was the turn of the Catholic Church to lead the service, Archbishop McKeefry voiced similar anxieties. These speakers lacked a confident and coherent verdict on the significance of Anzac Day outside a veteran commemoration.

Perhaps the most interesting recurring comments regarding Anzac Day in 1965 were the doubts expressed as to whether it would long continue to be marked. *The Age* wrote that 'Anzac lives', despite its apparent abandonment by the new generation.

> Though the great bulk of the community might not be conscious of it, the spirit that was born at Gallipoli and nurtured through all the long years since then makes its contribution still to the shaping of the character and outlook of our people.

The 'spirit of Anzac' was here evoked as a military tradition, but with little bearing on the life of the majority of Australians. This was widely admitted. *The Mirror* in Sydney questioned, '[w]ill Anzac Day be as meaningless to future generations as Trafalgar and Waterloo, once so cataclysmic, have become today?', blaming the RSL for making the occasion too narrowly focused on returned servicemen.[168] In fact, the decline in attendance had been a feature of Anzac commemoration since the end of the Second World War in both countries. In 1946, 30,000 flocked to attend the first Anzac Day of the new peace at the Auckland War Memorial ceremony.[169] A larger venue was required in Christchurch, to cater for the turnout. However, numbers rapidly declined. In Auckland, for example, attendance at the citizens' service had dropped to 5,000 by 1948. The relatively smaller gathering of 2,500 people attending the Cenotaph in 1965 was therefore indicative of the significant collapse of New Zealand Anzac Day commemoration more generally. Although Stephen Clarke asserts that this decline can be explained by the growing popularity of the dawn service, as Helen Robinson notes, the decline in daytime attendance of Anzac Day was not compensated in an increase in dawn service attendance, in Auckland, Wellington, or Christchurch. [170] Furthermore, as well as generational differences being a factor in declining public attendance, there was also a significant decline in RSA membership from a peak of over 136,000 in 1947 to just under 93,000 in 1953.[171] From the early

[167] *The Age,* 26 April, 1965, p. 4.
[168] *Mirror*, 25 April, 1965
[169] *New Zealand Herald*, 26 April, 1946.
[170] Stephen J. Clarke, 'The One Day of the Year: Anzac Day in Aotearoa/New Zealand 1946-1990', MA thesis, University of Otago, 1994, p. 73.
[171] N.P. Webber, *The First Fifty Years of the New Zealand Returned Services Association 1916 to 1966*, New Zealand Returned and Services Association (NZRSA), Wellington, 1966, p. 6.

1950s, the RSA complained of declining numbers of both returned servicemen and the general public attending Anzac Day commemorations.

Contemporary commentators understood the decline was understood in varying ways. Some saw the decline as inevitable as old soldiers died and the memory of the war faded; for others, it was an expression of ingratitude to the war dead among young people. Suggestions that the fiftieth anniversary, having fallen on a Sunday, be moved to Monday so that parades and ceremonies would not conflict with church-going Australians were perceived as an attack on the RSL. One disgruntled RSL official warned against 'a large body of unsympathetic feeling against the RSL, much of it inspired by the uncompromising attitude which the League maintains on behalf of the rights of returned men whose claims upon an ungrateful community have been so easily forgotten'.[172] As in the ritual of Anzac Day itself, the veteran was wielded to protect RSL privilege. The 'ungrateful community' was a common theme, framed more generally around complaints of lethargy in culture and society. Amidst the growing public anti-Vietnam War sentiment, RSL leaders keenly felt that the dynamism and energy from protests against the war, especially with the change in Australian Labor Party policy, contributed to a growing sense of 'a house divided', in contrast with the unity of the war period. Similarly, in New Zealand, the 'Pilgrimage of Memories' by American veterans of the Second World War galvanised the RSA's support for Holyoake and his government's position on the war. The National Executive, paying close attention to the writings of the New Zealand Communist Party, urged even further Government action: 'unequivocal support should now go beyond oral and moral support into active support'.[173]

This revealed shifting political contexts of war memory, imbued with the acute emotional appeal of social crisis. The predominant mood was 'one of indifference and even apathy', warned the 1965 *Sydney Morning Herald* editorial, the government having failed to 'arouse the nation as a whole to an awareness of the danger or to a sense that we as a people have reached a most critical stage in our affairs which calls for a united national response'.[174] This was typified in the debate around Alan Seymour's stage play *The One Day of the Year*. Originally written in 1958, the play was rejected by the Adelaide Festival of Arts for its perceived indecent disparagement of Anzac Day, and was only performed in an amateur production by the Adelaide Theatre Group the following season. [175] However, by 1961, the controversy around the play had exploded, leading to its staging at the Threat Royal Stratford East in London. The play's transformation into 'controversial work of theatre in Australia', in the years leading up the 1965 anniversary reiterated the crumbling civic consensus around Anzac Day. [176]

These concerns invariably invoked dubious youth. Newspapers were filled with veterans decrying how 'the young people have forgotten all that we did', and that 'the holiday will be the only thing to make

[172] *The Canberra Times*, 9 April, 1965.
[173] Minutes of National Executive Council meeting, February, 1965, NZRSA, Wellington.
[174] *Sydney Morning Herald*, 27 April, 1965.
[175] *Sydney Morning Herald*, 25 March, 2015.
[176] *The Guardian*, 24 March, 2015.

them remember the Anzacs now'. [177] In 1964 Major General Lindsay Inglis, speaking at the Auckland citizens' service, explained what he saw as the purposes of Anzac Day: commemoration of all who had served in the armed forces, and an opportunity to remember the dead. He explained that the first had increased importance because most young people now had no experience of war, and so ceremonies such as Anzac Day were necessary to inform them of the sacrifices of those who had served. He also argued that since the vast majority of young people could not have known anyone killed in war, and as it is impossible to mourn someone you have never met, their remembrance was a tribute rather than an act of mourning. In an interview with Ken Inglis during the Karadeniz cruise, the national secretary of the RSL, Mr A.G. Keys, stated how '[w]e believe the events at Gallipoli should be impressed on the imaginations of young Australians, so that they will know the sacrifices others have made to keep our country free and independent'.[178] This articulation of a new audience of youth was tied directly to the post-war world, one that has been little understood in the context of Anzac commemoration and the construction of new meanings around history and memory. These shifting narratives between tribute and mourning, expressing 'fear and trembling' and painful resignation at the passing of the Anzacs while retaining its structure of memory provided the means by which the meaning of Anzac might be open for re-inscription.

Changing attitudes towards Anzac Day were reflected in legislation. In 1949, a new *Anzac Day Act* had been passed in New Zealand, dedicating the day to the dead of both world wars, in addition to the Boer War, and retrenching the ban on 'mondayising'; that is, the granting of days in lieu when it fell on a Saturday and Sunday. The Act required that April 25 be observed 'as if it were a Sunday'. Local councils banned virtually all organised leisure on the day. Discontent was triggered in 1953 when Anzac Day fell on a Saturday and the week's sport, especially racing and rugby, as well as other forms of entertainment were disrupted. This became a recurrent theme when Anzac Day fell on a Saturday again in 1959. Other proposals, such as moving Anzac Day observation to the nearest Sunday, or that the observance of the day should be restricted and the ban on organised recreation limited to the morning, were discussed and ultimately discounted.

Even as the RSL/RSA pilgrimage made its way to Anzac Cove for the fiftieth anniversary, the RSA Dominion Council was preparing to submit a proposal that the *Anzac Day Act* be amended yet again.[179] It proposed that the government amend the Act to allow sport and entertainment in the afternoon, with Anzac Day Trusts set up to prevent commercialisation of the day.[180] One idea was to promote evening films relating to Anzac Day in cinemas around the country on April 25. Sport and other respectable entertainment in the afternoon would fix 'the old, dour and inward-looking image

[177] *Evening Post*, 26 April, 1964.
[178] *Canberra Times,* 24 April, 1965.
[179] Clarke, pp. 92–94.
[180] Holyoake to Mitchell, June 8, 1964, Ceremonials and Celebrations, 1964–1973, ABFK 7494 W4948/71 35/1/2 1, ANZ, Wellington. The idea of the Trust would ultimately be rejected as unwieldy - its administration and the inconvenience and frustration that would inevitably arise because of differing public and business attitude to this form of licensing. Instead, the law would allow businesses to operate after 1pm as if it were a standard Saturday afternoon. See: W. Hutchings, 'Anzac Day - Afternoon Activities', Secretary of Defence, 4 March, 1967, 35/1/2, Ceremonials and Celebrations, 1964–1973, ABFK 7494 W4948/71 35/1/2 1, ANZ, Wellington.

that Anzac Day observances have come to assume'.[181] The significance of Anzac Day continued to be undermined, even in the context of the special fiftieth anniversary. The Mayor of Hamilton in his speech at fiftieth anniversary dinner suggested that Anzac Day be replaced with a day 'on which all worked and gave their wages for the day to a fighting fund for the eradication of fear, famine, ignorance and evil'; rather than a military commemoration.[182] Some suggested that the existence of two war commemorations in the annual national calendar, Anzac Day and Remembrance Day, was excessive. If the dead of both wars were to be mourned, then surely Remembrance Day would suffice, commentators intimated.

The demise of Remembrance Day in New Zealand is an indication that war commemoration was increasingly detached from its civic and funereal purpose. It was no longer sustained by what author Joan Aspinall-Oglander called 'the pathos of the headstones', when she visited Gallipoli during the interwar period, the account of which had been widely republished in New Zealand newspapers – including on the eve of the fiftieth anniversary.[183] When Remembrance Day was 'Sundayised' (moved to the nearest Sunday) and swiftly declined in public relevance, attempts were made to broaden participation at the Wellington's citizens' war memorial by removing restrictions against non-RSA personnel, to allow various senior politicians, consular and armed forces representatives to also lay wreaths. The government refused requests by the RSA to transfer the Day back November 11, stating that the public would not be interested, regardless of the form or date of the commemoration.[184] The need to decentre the veterans was argued by newspapers in Australia and New Zealand; paradoxically, the 1965 commemorations indicated a retrenching of veterans as the arbiters of memory at Anzac Day.

Indeed, the law change reflected the direct policy of the Government to distance itself from war commemoration and ensuring that Government involvement was limited to the Ministry of Defence under Dean Eyre. The extent of government involvement in the pilgrimage at all was only an outcome of the promptings by Australian Government under Robert Menzies. Menzies offered a discount for New Zealanders wanting to travel with the Australians.[185] In response, Holyoake approved a government grant of £5,000 for the RSA as well as helping coordinate RSL pilgrims travelling from New Zealand on Tasman Airways. Indeed, the government saw its primary role was to secure these favourable airline arrangements. Holyoake was also urged by RSA President Hamilton Mitchell to make a public statement in support of the pilgrimage.[186] Some correspondents complained that the government's financial support was insufficient – one letter in the *Dominion Post* stated that the treatment accorded Anzac survivors was 'mean and shabby' compared with the full Government backing for the contingent sent to attend the 1954 coronation of Queen Elizabeth, which included 175

[181] *Press*, 13 November, 1933, p. 10.
[182] *New Zealand Herald,* 26 April, 1965.
[183] *New Zealand Listener*, 15 April, 1965, p. 3.
[184] Robinson, pp. 81–82.
[185] Office of the Prime Minister, CM(64) 21, 4 June 1964, Ceremonials and Celebrations, 1964–1973, ABFK 7494 W4948/71 35/1/2 1, ANZ, Wellington.
[186] Holyoake to Mitchell, 8 June, 1964, Ceremonials and Celebrations, 1964–1973, ABFK 7494 W4948/71 35/1/2 1, ANZ, Wellington.

ex-servicemen and women, two of whom travelled from Western Samoa and the Cook Islands.[187] A government-commissioned stamp for the 1965 anniversary was derided as tokenistic, with others suggesting the awarding of a special Anzac Star would be a more appropriate gesture. The fact that such critique came at a time when the state was seeking to revise the legal framework of the day gives it added importance.

The Government reiterated its determination to steer clear of the pilgrimage, having handed over the grant money to the RSA. The contribution of the New Zealand government to the RSA/RSL initiative was envisaged as a 'starter' for encouraging the public of New Zealand to show their appreciation'.[188] The RSA instead established an application process by which veterans could apply for assistance with fares. Although no official comment was made, the Minister of Lands Ralph Hanan, off the record, expressed his unease about the RSA process for distributing the travel aid, describing it as 'a little odd'. Applicants were asked to indicate how much they could put up themselves; applications were then vetted through the local RSA branches as to whether a particular applicant could really afford the trip or was the 'sort of person' who should be helped.[189] This shows us some important differences between the context of 1965 and subsequent changes in Anzac commemoration. The 1965 Pilgrimage was rather a 'private initiative of the Australian RSL, with whom the RSA subsequently associated themselves with'. The cabinet decision made it clear that the grant was being given to the RSA to use as they saw best, 'to enable ex-servicemen who ought to take part to join the Pilgrimage if they would not otherwise be able to do so'.[190]

After receiving complaints through Parliamentarians on behalf of veteran constituents that the RSA application process was leading to uneven assistance, the Minister of Defence was quick to point out that 'the proposed pilgrimage is not a Government-organised project, but is an initiative taken by the RSA in collaboration with the [RSL]'.[191] Refusing to intervene in what was an internal RSA manner, Eyre rejected what he called 'a government takeover of a private initiative' by an organisation of ex-servicemen to 'mark the achievements and sacrifices of former companions'.[192] Exasperated, he went on to note that the New Zealand Government policy had 'substantially reflected the Australian decision', showing the way in which the Australian Government lead the agenda on Anzac commemoration.[193] The cabinet was warned to limit further government involvement.[194]

[187] *The Dominion*, 17 July, 1964.
[188] The lack of RSA action was viewed as reflecting an Executive Council largely made up of Second World War veterans, without an appreciation for the First World War focus.
[189] 'MN 314/3/1', Ceremonials and Celebrations, 1964–1973, ABFK 7494 W4948/71 35/1/2 1, ANZ, Wellington
[190] 'CM (64) 21', Ceremonials and Celebrations, 1964–1973, ABFK 7494 W4948/71 35/1/2 1, 6, ANZ, Wellington.
[191] Letters requesting government help include: Dobbie to Minister of Lands, 20 July 1964; Minister of Defence to Connelly, 17 July, 1964, Ceremonials and Celebrations, 1964–1973, ABFK 7494 W4948/71 35/1/2 1, ANZ, Wellington.
[192] Hughes to the Ministry of Defence, 3 October, 1972, Ceremonials and Celebrations, 1964–1973, ABFK 7494 W4948/71 35/1/2 1, ANZ, Wellington.
[193] Draft letter of 17 July, 1964, Ceremonials and Celebrations, 1964–1973, ABFK 7494 W4948/71 35/1/2 1, ANZ, Wellington.
[194] Cabinet memo RJ EOP, 20/7/64, 1/5/8, Ceremonials and Celebrations, 1964–1973, ABFK 7494 W4948/71 35/1/2 1, ANZ, Wellington.

Rather than being focused on the Gallipoli pilgrimage, the Government was more worried about requests for rail subsidies for the Gallipoli veterans meeting in Rotorua for the special fiftieth anniversary reunion.[195] Part of the problem was that the Gallipoli Veterans Association was organised in local bodies. This emphasis on local associative webs hindered the means by which the state could, in the phrase of the Minister of Railways John Alpine, 'rationally support' the reunion.[196] In this rational support, we can see how the logic of the state to rationalise, 'nationalise' and extend itself - as would be the case towards the end of the 1960s as these associative webs increasingly fragmented with old age and the decline of civic society. Another example of the decentralised nature of New Zealand returned service organisations in the post-war period was that, in addition to the RSA/RSL pilgrimage and the Gallipoli Association reunion in Rotorua, the New Zealand Expeditionary Force main body (to which the Gallipoli Association was theoretically connected) gathered in Auckland for their golden jubilee celebrations. The NZEF main body had been given half-return rates on rail services.[197] Furthermore, the need to navigate government bureaucracy to secure railway subsidies provoked the Gallipoli Veterans Association to formulate a national structure: the 1965 anniversary in this way was a trigger for new national frameworks, rather than arising from them. An additional complication was the Government's fear that supporting the rail travel subsidies for the Gallipoli Association veterans would involve itself in a web of politics and complications by intervening in what might have appeared to be a rival form of fiftieth anniversary celebrations. Although in practical terms the Gallipoli Association reunion did not clash with the RSA/RSL fiftieth pilgrimage (pilgrims had to fulfil a high standard of medical fitness, which resulted in only around seventy applicants), it was nonetheless a symbol gesture of the diffused civic landscape of commemoration.[198] There was no 'national' project here.[199]

It was this fight – and the prospect of even more issues would arise as the actual departure of the pilgrimage drew closer – that the government was determined to emphasise the indirect nature of its role in the project. However, it was precisely in this resistance that we see the differences in 1965 and say the Coronation in 1953, or the 2015 Centenary. 'The pilgrimage is not comparable to the coronation arrangements in 1953', Holyoake stressed, 'when New Zealand joined other Commonwealth governments in participating in an elaborate occasion organised by the British government as such.'[200] Indeed, the 1965 pilgrimage throws into focus government policy in the 1960s in respect to the role and place of war commemoration. In advice given to the prime minister in relation to the various possible stances the government could take in response to the anniversary, chief among them was the concern about setting precedents for government involvement in

[195] See the long discussion – involving the Ministry for Rail – in 'Note to the Minister of Defence', 26 July 1964, Ceremonials and Celebrations, 1964–1973, ABFK 7494 W4948/71 35/1/2 1, ANZ, Wellington. Holyoake was invited to attend the Rotorua reunion. Shaw to Holyoake, 30 June, 1964.
[196] 'Memo: John McAlpine, Minister of Defence', 21 August, 1964, Ceremonials and Celebrations, 1964–1973, ABFK 7494 W4948/71 35/1/2 1, ANZ, Wellington.
[197] *Ibid*.
[198] MD 314/3/1, EO(P) 3/8/1964, Ceremonials and Celebrations, 1964–1973, ABFK 7494 W4948/71 35/1/2 1, ANZ, Wellington.
[199] 'New Zealand Gallipoli Association - celebrations in 1965'; Hunn to McAlpine, 13 August, 1964, Ceremonials and Celebrations, 1964–1973, ABFK 7494 W4948/71 35/1/2 1, ANZ, Wellington.
[200] 'Anzac Day pilgrimage 1965', Briefing to the Minister of Internal Affairs, Minister of Land, Ceremonials and Celebrations, 1964–1973, ABFK 7494 W4948/71 35/1/2 1, ANZ, Wellington.

commemoration. Facing the prospect of decades of Second World War unit and association reunions, this was a considerable fear. The military services were similarly hesitant to contribute to the fiftieth commemorations.[201] Anzac was about returned servicemen's participation. 1965 was marked by clearly competing visions and attitudes of war commemoration and its relevance in modern society.

Conclusion

Ken Inglis finished his account of the 1965 anniversary cruise with a reflection on a nation not yet fully at ease with how Anzac fitted into a modern Australia. 'For the pilgrims on the Karadeniz', Inglis wrote, 'Gallipoli is indeed Australia's holy land. How far, on this Anzac Day, they are representative of their countrymen at home is perhaps easier to judge in Sydney or Melbourne or Canberra than on the pilgrim ship'.[202] In hindsight we can see these words as an inauguration not simply of Inglis' own scholarly interest in Australian war commemoration, but of the narrative of the Anzac 'revival' itself. Inglis called for historians to commit to the national project, 'knocking holes in the walls between the academy and popular consciousness', meaning a critical engagement with the national project centred on this 'sacred tradition' of Anzac. Historians and politicians have subsequently taken on the assumptions and frameworks of Inglis in interpreting and justifying the uses of Anzac in public discourse.

Indeed, Inglis' 1965 commentary has itself undergone a revival. To coincide with the 2015 Anzac centenary, the Swineburne Institute republished Inglis' 1965 letters in an online collection.[203] Like a soldier writing home from the front, these 'Letters from a pilgrimage' were held to be precious and important – their inclusion in the fabric of the Centenary, so heavily fixed on the 'living voices of the past' through first-hand accounts, invoking a sense of historical authenticity. Honest History, the joint project of Australian scholars Intended to purify the Anzac myth of its commercialism and 'Anzackery', cited Inglis' letters as proof of subsequent corruption of Anzac memory by vested interests.[204] In the Australian War Memorial's *Wartime* centenary special edition, Inglis, with Kate Arriote, reframed his despatches in academic terms.[205] In this we can see the enduring legacy of Inglis: Anzac tightly coiled with notions of nationhood and a national historiography, and around the pivotal figure of one historian in the collapsing of biography into historiography; in much the same way Henry Reynolds came to be personify the turn to frontier history, and Manning Clark and Geoffrey Blainey in respect to Australian settler history.

However, despite the sense of continuity and pathos embedded in Inglis' 1965 pilgrimage, Anzac commemoration was increasingly fractured and disengaged from the public in 1965, evidenced in the general decline in attendance and the increasing confusion as to the meaning around the day. This

[201] Minutes of the meeting of principal personnel officers committee, 20/6/2, 20 October, 1964, Ceremonials and Celebrations, 1964–1973, ABFK 7494 W4948/71 35/1/2 1, ANZ, Wellington.
[202] Inglis, 'Letters from a pilgrimage'.
[203] Ibid.
[204] 'Ingis, Ken. Gallipoli, 1965', *Honest History*, http://honesthistory.net.au/wp/inglis-ken-gallipoli-1965/
[205] Ken Inglis and Kate Arriote, 'Return to Gallipoli', *Wartime* For further examples of the relationship between the Australian War Memorial and the perpetuation of Inglis' sentimental account of the pilgrimage, see Kerry Neale, 'In the Cold Light of Dawn', *Wartime*, 38 (2007) https://www.awm.gov.au/wartime/38.

was reflected in debate around legislation, attendance, and the different meanings of the fiftieth anniversary. Varying regionally and between Australia and New Zealand, Anzac Day emphasised the remaining veterans, rather than a national memory of the dead. As one Anzac Day speaker demonstrated, the 'voice of the dead' could quickly become utilised and pressed into service of press contemporary agendas, declaring how '[o]ur deaths are not ours / They are yours / They will mean what you make them / We leave you our deaths / Give them meaning'.[206] The 1965 cruise was central to this process. Even as these arbiters of memory were fading and dying, Inglis' narrative of the 1965 pilgrimage was 'reviving' memories of the war.[207] By the fiftieth anniversary the emotional, funereal power of Anzac Day – derived from the massive war casualties which shattered individuals, families, communities, and empires – was receding, and with it the explanatory power of what would follow – the Anzac 'revival' – by the historian. This was at once the collapse and fragmentation of civic Anzac, as well as its transnational shaping of an emerging state policy.

The 1965 pilgrimage, therefore, has two-fold significance for the historian. First, it shows us the transnational project of Anzac commemoration in its essential civic formulation in the immediate post-war period, centred on ex-service, religious, military hierarchies and social relations. This was reflected in limited government collaboration, which directly sought to foreclose the possibility of setting precedents for an extended state intervention in war commemoration. Secondly, we see clearly different historiographical projects being undertaken in this decade. The place of Inglis alongside Bean in the Anzac legend is an almost herculean myth in itself. Inglis, and subsequent scholars supporting his contributions to Anzac historiography, is cast as accomplishing – against an indifferent and myopic academy – the carving out of Anzac commemoration as a significant area of scholarship and of shining importance to Australian national identity, against imperial and local preoccupations. Inglis' thought can be understood in broader trends, making military history a serious concern for Australian academics, and, in fact, enhancing the project of national historiography, that is, unfolding what is unique, special, and distinctive about the Australian nation. It is also interesting to note the way which Inglis' place-making and identity was centred on an actual and imaginative transportation to the international site of Gallipoli. This site provided an ideological canvas for the abstraction of the veteran – reimagining the veteran in a process of experience to national memory – which was more difficult in the contested and fragmentary landscape of the domestic politics of memory.

[206] *Western Herald*, 30 April, 1965, p. 5.
[207] *Canberra Times*, 25 April, 1965.

CHAPTER TWO.
PROTEST AND THE REMAKING OF ANZAC DAY, 1965-1987

Introduction

The idea of the Anzac spirit as a military tradition that began on the beaches of Gallipoli was an enduring one in Anzac Day speeches over the 1960s. The Victorian Governor, Sir Rohan Delacombe, speaking at the afternoon parade on April 25, 1965, told the veterans that the Anzacs 'had established a tradition which Australian fighting forces maintained on many battlegrounds'.[208] Delacombe then alluded to the growing crisis around American intervention in Vietnam, made more emphatic in his declaration that the Anzac tradition meant Australia 'shall protect our own'. Delacombe, a thoroughly imperial man and distinguished military officer, stressed the 'unifying spirit' of Anzac Day, stating how 'with more and more citizens coming from other lands we have [Anzac Day] to bring us together'. Such speeches – aimed at a stultified returned servicemen audience – indicated an increasingly disparate civic Anzac commemoration by the half-century anniversary. The intended centripetal forces of war commemoration and its associative webs of civic society, hierarchical norms and relationships were coming undone in centrifugal energies of the post-war world and the collapsing legitimacy of imperial and racial politics.

Delacombe's call for unity through Anzac commemoration was prescient. The next year, the first Anzac Day of Australia's involvement in Vietnam, a group of women made an unauthorised entry into the Anzac Day proceedings at Melbourne's Shrine of Remembrance. The action of Save our Sons indicated a new era of direct contestation and protest around the meaning and ritual of Anzac Day. In historical narratives of Anzac Day's 'fall and rise', little critical scrutiny has been given to the public actions of activists on Anzac Day in the late 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s.[209] Despite his considerable corpus of work on Anzac as tradition, myth, and memorial, Ken Inglis has relatively little to say regarding contestation of Anzac Day ritual.[210] There is also a complete dearth of this subject in New Zealand historiography. Rather than a unified anti-war movement, actors, interventions, and events were related in a broadly pacifist or feminist agenda to interrogate narratives of war, nationhood, and masculinity at Anzac Day. Loose networks of students, trade unionists, feminists, and others interested groups, articulated a broad array of critiques – of the returned services organisations and

[208] *The Age*, 26 April, 1965.
[209] Jenny Macleod, 'The Fall and Rise of Anzac Day: 1965 and 1990 Compared', *War & Society*, 20, 1 (2002): pp. 149–168.
[210] K. S. Inglis, 'Remembering Anzac', in *Remembering Anzac: Selected Writings of K. S. Inglis*, pp. 228–247; Ken Inglis, 'Kapferer on Anzac and Australia', *Social Analysis*, 29 (1990): pp. 67–73.

the ideological underpinnings of war, for example – in many forms, including rhetoric on banners and posters; costume and movement; songs and chants; and the creation, use and performance of other symbolic elements. Importantly, these various articulations incorporated the traditional rituals of Anzac Day such as the laying of wreaths at a cenotaph or memorial and marching in the parades.

This chapter will analyse the actions of two protest movements centred on Anzac Day during this period. First, we will focus on the peace movement which, drawing from a broad social and political alliance, protested on Anzac Day against the Vietnam War. Australian opposition against the war coalesced around the introduction of the National Service Scheme in 1966, such as the women's group Save Our Sons (SOS) and the Youth Campaign Against Conscription (YCAC), closely aligned with the Australian Labor Party.[211] In New Zealand, major networks included the radical Progressive Youth Movement (PYM) and university student bodies in Auckland, Wellington, and Christchurch, which organised from 1967 to 1975. Secondly, we will consider the public actions on Anzac Day organised by feminist collectives over the period 1977 to 1987. Small groups of feminists from rape crisis centres and collectives attended metropolitan Anzac Day ceremonies to decry rape in wartime. By the early 1980s all of the state capitals had witnessed these interventions: in Canberra, Sydney, and Melbourne, hundreds of marchers were coordinated via Women Against Rape or Anti-Anzac Day collectives. In New Zealand, the most prominent collective, Women's Action Group, had a significant public presence in Auckland and Wellington, part of the wider Women's Liberation Movement (WML). Participation and public visibility tended to fall after 1984, with the last actions apparently occurring in 1987.[212] Though ideologically distinct, these contiguous movements both emerged from the global milieu of student protest movements and riots in the 1960s and 1970s which rejected the modern project, in particular its conformism and rationalism, as the bedrock of human emancipation, and in turn intersected with a larger contextual 'protest wave'.[213]

As Carina Donaldson and Marilyn Lake theorise, it seems possible that anti-war student groups and feminist collectives' broad array of critiques – of returned services organisations, militarism, nationalism, racism, capitalism, patriarchy, economic exploitation of women and rape in war – could have provided multiple opportunities for connection with left-leaning audiences or other groups disenfranchised from Anzac Day and therefore a distinctly different political and cultural consensus at

[211] Jeff Doyle, 'Dismembering the Anzac Legend: Australian Popular Culture and the Vietnam War' *Vietnam Generation*, 3, 2 (1992): pp. 109–125.
[212] I have drawn on a range of scholarship on the feminist critique of Anzac Day and history in the 1980s, see: Catriona Elder, "I Spit on Your Stone" National Identity, Women Against Rape and the Cult of Anzac in Australia, in Maja Mikula, ed., *Women, Activism an Social Change*, Routledge, London, 2005, pp. 71–81; Sabrina Erika, 'Rape: Our Window of Vulnerability. The Sydney Women Against Rape Collective', *Social Alternatives*, 4, 3 (1984): pp. 17–20; Deborah Tyler, 'Making Nations, Making Men: Feminists and the Anzac Tradition' *Melbourne Historical Journal* 16 (1984): pp. 24–33; Susanne Davies, 'Women, War and the Violence of History: an Australian Perspective', in Sandy Cook and Judith Bessant, eds., *Women; Encounters with Violence: Australian Experiences*, Thousand Oaks: SAGE Publications, 1997, pp. 159–176. Sara Dowse and Patricia Giles, 'Australia: Women in a Warrior Society', in Robin Morgan, ed., *Sisterhood is Global: the International Women's Movement Anthology*, Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1984, pp. 63–68; Rosemary Pringle, 'Rape: the Other Side of Anzac Day', *Refractory Girl*, 26, (1983): pp. 31–35.
[213] Angeliki Koufou, 'Art Movements in the 1960s and the Debate about Modernity', *Historien*, 9 (2009), pp. 140–148; Colin Baker, 'Some Reflections on Student Movements of the 1960s and Early 1970s', *Revista Crítica de Ciências Social*, 81 (2008), pp. 43–91.

the turn of the century.[214] These analyses of youth responses to Anzac Day during this period perpetuate classic historical approaches in which youth, or representations of youth, only fall under the purview of historians in so far as they are believed to hold the key to insights about wider society. 'Youth' has been used as a metaphor for social change; not calculable in traditional political terms but invested as the product of social change, its epitome, and portent of future changes.[215] Anzac, in this reading, is located as a site of generational change and transition. Donaldson and Lake frame the protest movements as a generational clash, typified in the controversial theatre production, *One Day of the Year* – a standard trope of Anzac historiography. Penned by ABC writer Alan Seymour in 1960, the play became emblematic of the conflict between the domineering, fascistic politics of the RSL and a burgeoning progressive and urban youth culture in the late 1950s; banned by the Adelaide Festival of Arts Board of Governors for its subversive themes but later produced in Sydney to critical acclaim.[216] The idea of intergenerational conflict echoes some of the contemporary explanations offered at the time for 'student revolt'. Scholars, for example, interpreted student insurgency as a form of intergenerational battle, an Oedipal revolt of sons against their fathers.[217] In Seymour's play, this is theatrically performed in a physical fight between the central protagonist, student activist Hughie Cook, and his father Alf, a veteran and RSL member.

Anzac Day in the 1960s was a discursive field in which discourse – operative as well as linguistic – shaped specific relationships between conceptions of memory, identity, youth, and the public. This chapter seeks to understand the subtle ways that a new Anzac ideological field emerged in the 1980s, and in its epistemic and cultural restructuring, rendered protests dissonant or invisible in public memory, Anzac historiography, and narratives of the Anzac revival. We will explore how contest and consent play out as a primarily discursive process to analyse the public articulations deployed by student groups and collectives on Anzac Day. As a participatory cultural event, Anzac Day provided an unusually direct exchange between protest groups and their audiences. Indeed, many activists denied that their actions were demonstrations, claiming instead that they were legitimate attempts at inclusion in public rites of mourning and commemoration. However, the rhetoric, symbolism and performances that comprised these articulations created boundaries that were ultimately antipathetic to the protestors' intentions. Protest actions on Anzac Day acted in a paradoxical manner: they articulated antagonisms that helped create new orthodoxies antithetical to their political intent, and

[214] K. S. Inglis, 'The Anzac Tradition', in *Anzac Remembered: Selected Writings of K. S. Inglis*, pp. 18–42, 30–31; Inglis, 'Anzac and the Australian Military Tradition', p. 133. This was recently explored in a special issue of *History Australia*: see Kyle Harvey and Nick Irving, 'Introduction: peace and patriotism in twentieth-century Australia', *History Australia*, 14, 2 (2017): pp. 159–168.
[215] Stanley Cohen, *Folk devils and moral panics the creation of the Mods and Rockers*, Routledge, New York, 2011; Megan Ritchie, Shaken, but not stirred? : youth cultures in 1950s Auckland', M. A. thesis, University of Auckland, 1997.
[216] Interestingly, the prominence of *One Day of the Year* is a significant difference between Australia and New Zealand. The closest equivalent in New Zealand literature might be Ian Cross' *After Anzac Day* (1961), which shares similar themes of family dysfunction and generational change, interweaved with the social practice of Anzac commemoration. However, in Cross' work, this is only a pretext to a wider social and cultural comment, rather than pivoting on the role of Anzac Day in New Zealand society. The commemoration is therefore peripheral to the central narrative – not unlike the place of Anzac Day more generally in New Zealand historiography.
[217] Jeff Goodwin, James M. Jasper, and Francesca Polletta, 'Introduction: Why Emotions Matter', in Jeff Goodwin et al, eds., *Passionate Politics: Emotions and Social Movements*, Chicago University Press, Chicago, 2001, pp. 1–24, 4.

which contributed to the reformulation of Anzac identity in the 1980s. Moreover, the prominence and performance of these protest movements has implications for the difference in structure and ideology of Anzac Day between Australia and New Zealand. Ultimately, protest helped define what the public was against rather than for and transformed 'Youth' into the object of Anzac commemoration in the construction of a new cultural hegemony outside of traditional boundaries and associative networks of veteran's communities. Instead, these bulwarks of identity were replaced by 'rituals, demands, and rights' in the shaping of liberal agents as the connectivities of politics and culture in the space of Anzac.[218]

The peace movement, 1967-1971

Like their counterparts in the international movement, Australian and New Zealand opposition to the Vietnam War was based on moral objections to participation in the war, including the weapons and tactics being engaged and their impact on innocent civilians. Anti-war groups mobilised in major towns and cities, with thousands rallying against the war in notable public actions between 1967 and 1975. In Australia, the introduction of conscription was a key focal point for protests, provoking demonstrations, sit-ins, and teach-ins at universities throughout the country. The Moratorium marches, held in 1970 and 1971, aimed to bring an end to Australia's involvement in the war and were especially significant as the largest anti-war demonstrations, drawing on broad sections of Australian society, from middle and working class, to Christian and anarchist groups.[219] In New Zealand, the dominant argument of the protest movement was that the country's involvement in the war was an unnecessary interference in the domestic affairs of another country. Anzac Day in Australia and New Zealand was therefore shaped by the specific political and ideological contours of the respective country's commitment to the war. Protest actions on Anzac Day in the early 1970s in Australia and New Zealand achieved broad acceptance in large part due to the end of conscription and the war itself, symbolised in the election of the reformist Whitlam government, in which Jim Cairns, leader of the Moratorium marches served as deputy prime minister; and in New Zealand, with the election of Norman Kirk and the Third Labour Government.

Protests against the Vietnam War on Anzac Day were shaped by the international context, the myriad political and social vantage points, and the presence of counter protest. Media coverage situated the protests in an international discourse. *The Australian*'s coverage of Anzac Day in 1971, for example, consisted of a front-page photo of a massive anti-Vietnam War rally in Washington D. C., contrasted with a lone digger at the Australian War Memorial.[220] The presence of other protest movements also

[218] Jon Savage, *Teenage: The Prehistory of Youth Culture, 1875-1945*, Penguin Random House, London, 2007, p. xii; Charles Taylor, *Ethics of Authenticity*, Harvard University Press, Cambridge Mass., 1992, p. 44.
[219] Some helpful general works include Ian McGibbon, *New Zealand's Vietnam War: A History of Combat, Commitment, and Controversy*, Exisle Publishing Limited, Auckland, 2010; Brent Coutts and Nicholas Fitness, *Protest in New* Zealand, Pearson Press, Auckland, 2013; Roberto Rabel, *New Zealand and the Vietnam War: Politics and Diplomacy*, Auckland University Press, Auckland, 2005; Jeff Doyle, Jeffrey Grey, and Peter Pierce, *Australia's Vietnam War*, University of Texas, Austin, 2002; John Murphy, *A Harvest of Fear: A history of Australia's Vietnam War*, Allen and Unwin, Sydney, 1993.
[220] *The Australian*, 26 April, 1971.

made for a cluttered field.[221] In 1965, rival protest groups clashed at the Sydney Cenotaph over the war. Students and trade unionists carrying placards reading 'end the war in Vietnam' paraded past the cenotaph chanting and singing. The arrival of a rival group, with placards reading 'This demonstration is a communist front' and 'Leave Martin Place to Anzacs and Boy Scouts' resulted in violent clashes before the intervention of riot police.[222] These various protests contributed to the general sense of youth rebellion, which conflated anti-Anzac Day attitudes with general delinquency – such as ANU students who 'profaned' the spirit of Anzac by participating in a drinking 'sit-in' at the Civic, a local pub popular among students, on the eve of Anzac Day in 1969.[223] These actions took place in public spaces infused with ideological significance such as Canberra, the national capital, Melbourne's War Memorial, and other cultural sites of power and identity, not least the Australian War Memorial itself. Certainly, this intensified the antagonisms between actors – Canberra, for example, had two tertiary institutions, the Australian National University (ANU) and the Australian Defence Force Academy (ADFA), which saw escalating tensions during the 1960s, including vandalism of the respective campuses and personal attacks against students.[224]

The protest actions of anti-conscription groups were less ambiguous. Conscription legislation radicalised anti-war protest.[225] On 25 April 1966, women members of the anti-war group SOS joined the Melbourne Anzac Day parade, wearing sashes and carrying posies with the words, 'Honour the Dead with Peace'. SOS actions on Anzac Day throughout the period consisted of silent vigils during dawn and morning services, joining the parades, and handing out anti-conscription flyers to the public. These actions were synecdochal with Anzac ritual. Similarly, the New Zealand Peace Council decided to organise its own 'war victims remembrance ceremony' in Wellington on 25 April 1972 to imitate the ritual of Anzac Day. Activists laid wreaths at the national cenotaph, sang hymns of peace, and gave speeches on the importance of peace. The Peace Council specifically avoided conflict with the organisers of the official service, however, by waiting until after the morning service had been completed.[226]

These were broadly consensual messages in the public sphere that achieved a broad equivalency in Australian and New Zealand society through incorporation into narratives of peace and mourning at Anzac commemoration. In the case of SOS, this equivalency was specifically gendered. The name 'SOS', an international signal for distress, and the appeal to the parental, and specifically, maternal voice, situated the group in the traditional **mode** of mothers mourning the loss of their soldier-sons. Scholars have shown that in the 1920s and 1930s war widows and other bereaved women such as mothers successfully positioned themselves in Anzac ceremonies as the archetypal mourners.[227]

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[221] See for example, Nick Scott, 'Black-Bans and Black Eyes: Implications of the 1971 Springbok Rugby Tour', *Labour History*, 108 (2015): pp. 145–163.
[222] *Canberra Times*, 18 September, 1965.
[223] 'Spirit of Anzac', *Woroni*, 29 April, 1969.
[224] See *Woroni* 18 March, 1960; 1 October, 1969.
[225] 'Bias looks at a Phoney Protest', *Woroni*, 5 June, 1968; also see, Jonathan Gaul, 'Holt and the emotive conscription issue', *Canberra Times*, 29 March, 1966.
[226] '[Posters promoting peace, and denouncing war.]', 1970-1979, Eph-C-PEACE-1970s, National Library of New Zealand (NLNZ), Wellington.
[227] Less so in New Zealand, however. Important Australian texts include: Erika Kuhlman, *Of Little Comfort: War Widows, Fallen Soldiers, and the Remaking of the Nation after the Great War*, New York University Press, New

SOS posters and flyers played on the juxtaposition of soldiers fighting in Vietnam and mothers fighting at home to end the war (*Fig. 1*). In explaining why they protested on Anzac Day, SOS convenor Joyce Golgerth stated that 'Mothers resist all sorts of pressure to bring up their children as useful citizens, to look forward to useful careers and to be of service to the community'.[228] 'Suddenly their lives are disrupted… they could come home maimed or blinded, or die in a war which has been described as a bottomless pit of violence and horror'. Such groups, historically, were paradoxically complicit in sustaining the memory of war and its celebration, while their demands and campaigns for financial support revealed attempts to shape 'a politics of grief'.[229] . In this sense, the demands of the protest groups could be in some way incorporated because of the historic archetype of the 'bereaved woman' within the rubric of Anzac ritual. The language and actions of the SOS were sublimated to this traditional formula. SOS positioned itself as a legitimate actor in Anzac commemoration as the mothers of the nation's youth, inculcating them with liberal values of citizenship. In doing so, SOS actions emphasised Anzac as a space for this enactment, and the object of commemoration as a preparation of youth – through the immersion of memory and ritual – for political citizenship.



Figure 1. A poster issued by the Save Our Sons movement in 1970. NAA, A6122, 2121, 1, 68. National Archives Australia.

York, 2012; Joy Damousi, *The Labour of Loss: Mourning, Memory, and Wartime Bereavement in Australia*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1999, pp. 365-378. The image of 'the mourning mother' was recently reconstituted in the context of the centenary, see Nellie Godwin-Welch, 'The sorrowing mother', *Voiceworks*, 108 (2017): pp. 82–88.

[228] 'SOS statement' (brochure), NAA A6122 1668, 59, NAA, Canberra.

[229] Damousi, p. 336.

These messages of peace on Anzac Day shaped narratives of Anzac away from military experience in the memory of veterans. The recognition of the civilian victims of war was evident in postwar humanitarian movements, and the political nature of the Vietnam War and the Cold War. The fact that in both Australia and New Zealand, the Vietnam War constituted a major political division in national discourse heightened the contrast to the unified politics of the world wars that relied on popular legitimacy through a language of sacrifice and civic duty, often to the detriment of conscientious objectors and those who sought a negotiated peace.[230] This would play out in debates about economic and social policy. Brian Easton argues that this division also made it clear that there was no 'commonality of national purpose', the interests of the governing elite just did not align with the rest of the population.[231] There was no longer the broad support from the community which had allowed for the success of wartime stabilisation measures.[232]

Public intellectuals also opposed the war. At the Peace, Power and Politics Conference, held in 1968, Sir Jack Hunn, a former New Zealand Secretary for Defence, argued for the idea of qualified alignment for New Zealand as small nation, reflected in the conference statement that 'non-alignment does not mean neutrality, but by avoidance of the cold war [sic] and its rival ideologies, an *independence of policy*'.[233] New Zealand non-alignment would ultimately be expressed in the anti-nuclear policy of the David Lange Government (1984–1989). The possibility of a non-aligned, post-imperial relationship with both Britain and the United States, was significant in both Australian and New Zealand national discourse, if not constituting a political and social consensus. This context provoked a complex and contradictory approach; as Stuart McIntyre notes, 'a fear of communism permeated almost every aspect of public life, at once impelling the government to improve the welfare of citizens and inhibiting the opportunities for critical dissent and creative innovation'.[234]

Within this political and moral debate, peace protests on Anzac Day through the 1960s resonated with the broader discourse around the war and the recognition of the defenders and civilian populations of the enemy state. In 1968, Adelaide members of the Campaign for Vietnam Protest applied for permission and joined the city's parade, carrying a placard 'Lest we forget the Vietnamese'. The *New Zealand Herald* editorial for Anzac Day in 1971, for example, commenting on the Anzac Day protest actions, stated that, 'It is not out of keeping with the solemnity of the occasion to allow young people to pay tribute to the dead and dying in Indo-China'.[235] Protest messages could be comfortably situated provided they avoided attacking the role of Anzac in narratives of nationhood. 'Even to suggest that Anzac services perpetuate a spirit of militarism', the *New Zealand Herald* editorial added, 'manifestly distorts the truth'.[236] This complex interaction indicates the creation of equivalencies within the

[230] James T. Sparrow, *Warfare State*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2011.
[231] Brian Easton, *The whimpering of the state: Policy after MMP*, Auckland University Press, Auckland, 1999, p. 28.
[232] Peggy Koopman-Boyden and Claudia D. Scott, *The Family and Government Policy in New Zealand,* Allen and Unwin, Sydney, 1984, p. 139.
[233] As quoted in Kevin Clements, *Back from the Brink: The Creation of a Nuclear-Free New Zealand*, Allen and Unwin, Wellington, 1988, p.23. Emphasis in the original.
[234] Stuart Macintyre, *A Concise History of Australia*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2004, p. 209.
[235] *New Zealand Herald*, 26 April, 1971, p. 6.
[236] Ibid.

broader hegemonic framing of Anzac Day. Similarly, in Christchurch, in the lead up to Anzac Day, editors of *The Press* commented that a wreath 'to the fallen in Vietnam', respectfully laid alongside wreaths commemorating the dead of two world wars should cause no-one to take offence'.[237]

> But a band of placard-carrying demonstrators asserting a 'right' to a place in an Anzac parade would as surely offend any reasonable standards of good manners and good taste and would justify prompt intervention by the police. There are other occasions and plenty of opportunities for demonstrators to assert their minority views: Anzac Day observances should be spared such indignity.

The pressure for protesters to co-opt the commemoration by closely following traditional Anzac rituals meant that protest messages were formulated in solemn and traditional terms: their actions were cast as 'tribute', expressed as bourgeois values of solemnity, respect, and deference to authority. Indeed, as late as 1969, students writing in *Tharunka*, the University of New South Wales student newspaper, argued that Australian participation in the Vietnam War was a *betrayal* of the Anzac tradition, rather than its perpetuation – the Anzacs who faithfully march on Anzac Day being compelled to degrade their traditions by 'the folly and cynicism' of political leaders.[238] However, once the protest actions contravened boundaries of state authority, they were quickly placed outside national discourse. Clearly radical articulations were more antagonistic. The radical group Students for a Democratic Society laid a wreath at the Sydney Cenotaph the following year, explicitly expressing sympathy for victims of Australian soldiers: 'Lest we forget people who face war, oppression and injustice'.[239] In Perth, student protesters tried to lay a wreath 'to the murdered Vietnamese'.[240] These protest actions were positioned within the space of Anzac, attacking narratives that presumed the rightness of national sacrifice. Radical articulations took on more confrontational actions towards the end of the war: in 1971, the Melbourne Shrine of Remembrance was smeared with 'peace' in white painted letters as the veterans filed past, while in Sydney a timed flare, tied to a wreath, set the wreaths at the cenotaph on fire.[241] These actions expressly rejected inclusion and integration into the prevailing Anzac ritual.

New Zealand's Progressive Youth Movement (PYM) was the most ideologically distinct group to protest on Anzac Day during the period 1967-1972, with autonomous groups in Auckland, Wellington, and Christchurch. Though involving students, PYM rejected many of the non-confrontational tactics and rhetoric of most student groups and drew its membership from the radical Left, emerging from the Radical Activists Conference political coalition in New Zealand. In particular, PYM formed in reaction to growing awareness of atrocities committed in Vietnam and the inability of the broader anti-war movement and its political allies to achieve its objectives. Its 'youth manifesto' reflected its influence

[237] *The Press*, 26 April, 1968.
[238] *Tharunka*, 22 April, 1969.
[239] K. S. Inglis, *Sacred Places: War Memorials in the Australian Landscape*, Melbourne University Press, Melbourne, 1998, p. 379.
[240] *West Australian*, 26 April, 1969.
[241] *Age*, 26 April, 1971; *Sydney Morning Herald*, 26 April, 1972.

and appeal among radical activists of the early 1970s.[242] PYM's original political formation contributed to the antagonisms that its branches provoked in their protest actions on Anzac Day, disrupting ceremonies and vandalising war memorials. The Christchurch branch distributed pamphlets that called for a 'new militancy – in the streets, in the factories, in the universities, in the schools – everywhere', and positioned PYM as 'the vanguard of this country's revolutionary youth' which would unite young people.[243] With a largely male membership, the PYM's militant rhetoric was matched with a penchant for military costume, especially black trench coats and army surplus gear. The end of year supplements featured members armed with hunting rifles (*Fig. 2*).[244] Furthermore, although PYM's Anzac Day actions in New Zealand's major cities were part of a wider programme of activism, they were by far its most public. For example, while the *Dominion* newspaper had consistently avoided covering PYM demonstrations against the Vietnam War in late 1969 (much to the complaint of PYM) – including one protest held outside the South Vietnam Embassy in Lambton Quay, which attracted 400 activists – its coverage of PYM actions on Anzac Day was considerable.[245]

Figure 2. Photo of PYM members as published in the Canterbury chapter's 'end of year supplement'. Canta End of Year Supplement, 1972.

[242] 'Auckland PYM "Youth Manifesto", 1969. It was a toned-down version of a leaflet that was originally written by Auckland anarchists: Barry Lee collection on the Progressive Youth Movement, Auckland Branch, 1969-ca 1972, University of Auckland Library (UAL), Auckland.
[243] 'Wanted – A New Militancy', Christchurch PYM (brochure), 1969, Barry Lee collection, UAL, Auckland.
[244] Canta End of Year Supplement, 1972, Barry Lee collection, UAL, Auckland.
[245] 'PYM attacks newspaper', *Salient*, 24 October, 1969.

This was due in large part to the antagonism which PYM generated. Although the chair of the Christchurch PYM Murray Horton stated that their strategy was to 'provoke and shock more than confront', its programme of actions very much reflected all those elements and intentionally avoided equivalences with student groups and the anti-war movement more broadly.[246] In 1970, three members of the Christchurch chapter approached the Citizens' War Memorial following the morning ceremony bearing a placard with the inscription 'to the victims of Fascism in Vietnam' and a small bunch of flowers, placed on top of the official mayoral wreath (*Fig. 3 & 4*). After the official parade, the Christchurch mayor and Second World War veteran Ron Guthrey ripped up the wreath while other returned servicemen pushed and shoved PYM members who attempted to place a second placard. After police intervention stopped the fight, Guthrey was quoted as saying he would do the same thing again, and that 'dumb long-haired louts who have nothing contribute to our society – who damn everything we have ever fought for – must not be allowed to insult our war dead'.[247] Although reports from *The Press* reported an 'altercation' between protesters and police, personal accounts suggest it was far more violent.[248] Ben Rooney, the chairman of the Christchurch PYM, said the group was 'a little surprised at Mr Guthrey's attempt to instigate a slanging match' and that '[w]e would like to make it clear that we acted with as much sincerity as all the other wreath-layers and that we made no attempt to cause any trouble'. The Christchurch PYM subsequently challenged Guthrey to a public debate, which he turned down.

Figure 3. Christchurch members of PYM lay a wreath to the "victims of fascism in Vietnam" during the Anzac Day ceremony, 25 April 1970. Murray Horton (left) holds the wreath. Canta End of Year Supplement, 1972.

[246] Murray Horton private papers, Christchurch.
[247] *Press*, 26 April, 1970.
[248] Correspondence between author and Barry Lee, 15 September, 2016.

Figure 4. Anzac Day ceremony, 25 April 1970. Murray Horton (left) holds the wreath. Canta End of Year Supplement, 1972.

The contrast between PYM and the non-confrontational anti-war groups, as perceived by media and public, enhanced these antagonisms. Accordingly, when PYM disrupted Christchurch's Remembrance Day commemorations by laying of wreaths to 'the dead and dying of Vietnam' that same year, the confrontation was contrasted with a Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament (CND) silent vigil for peace which 'stood steadfastly by and maintained its dignity'.[249] The influence of the 1968 May Day revolution – apparent in PYM's focus on provoking confrontations with the police – made for a complex relationship with other student and protest groups. The Victoria University of Wellington student publication *Salient* complained that the actions of PYM discredited other student actions, condemning the national organisation as the 'only New Zealand political group whose effective political programme consists entirely of provocation of the police'.[250] Wellington was in fact the least confrontational of the movement's affiliated groups, opting to avoid the official memorial services so as not to legitimise the proceedings. Instead it erected its own mock cenotaph from cardboard and calico in a local inner-city park; dedicated to the National Liberation Front in Vietnam.[251]

Moreover, the notion that PYM represented a new progressive generation was undermined by increasing youth participation at Anzac Day and the reformulation of Anzac as a public holiday that could incorporate fun and frivolity as well as solemnity. The New Zealand Governor-General Bernard Fergusson, commenting at the 1966 Anzac Day, the first of the new law, stated how he disagreed with the perception that 'the rising generation does not care about [Anzac Day]', citing the presence of

[249] Elise Locke, *Peace People: A History of Peace Activities in New Zealand*, Hazard Press, Christchurch, 1992.
[250] *Salient*, 24 September, 1969.
[251] Ibid.

Youth Cadets and Boy Scouts at the parades.[252] Indeed, organisers in Wellington went to great lengths to include school children in the morning services, especially Girl Guides. This was paralleled in Otago, where the RSA reported that 'vitality was the key impression of the second Anzac Day commemorated in Dunedin in its remodelled form', with some 12,000 attending the Anzac Day Gala.[253] The Gala consisted of horse and cycling races, gliding displays, musical parades, and skydiving demonstrations; eighty percent of the profits went to the RSA retirement home and hospice. The contrast between peaceful 'ordinary youth' and PYM 'radicals' played into wider fears of growing delinquency and subversion among university students, especially the ostensible growth of a drug culture on campuses – a major point of public concern.[254] Furthermore, it was precisely the protests that refocused language on Youth and their ostensible support for Anzac Day.

Paradoxically, youth were interpreted as the object and concern of Anzac commemoration, even as they were presented as its social and political antagonists. This was heightened in the official political reactions to the Anzac Day interventions. National Prime Minister Keith Holyoake used media coverage of PYM and similar radical groups to leverage electoral support for the war, framing the activities as an affront to decency and a threat to the moral order for which Anzac troops were giving their lives. In briefing his caucus in early November about a forthcoming by-election in Palmerston North, he urged members to take the offensive in making Vietnam the subject of Parliament's next debate and to 'continue to this attack on the Opposition at the by-election', adding that 'the Progressive Youth Movement was a communist-dominated organisation'.[255] 'This fact', he suggested, 'would be made public at the by-election'. The only national poll conducted about New Zealand's involvement in the Vietnam War, in July 1965, bolstered Holyoake's conviction that the war could be an electoral asset. Seventy percent of the population believed the level of military aid offered by the government was appropriate or should be increased; twenty-three per cent thought it too much.[256] Norman Kirk, then Opposition leader and soon to be Prime Minister condemned the Auckland PYM's decision to lay a wreath on the Auckland Cenotaph and march up Queen Street on Anzac Day 'as an impudent affront to decency and a mockery of the sacrifice made by thousands of New Zealanders to preserve the very freedom the PYM delights is abusing'.

> There is no need for such a march and, if there is an ounce of decency anywhere in the PYM, they would drop their plans at once... the PYM might as well know that the public is sick and tired of them and their antics. Their behaviour is a fertile seed-bed for disorder and one that should be firmly controlled by the appropriate authorities.[257]

The PYM actions on Anzac Day foreclosed broader support from the political left and was deftly used by Holyoake to constrain Labour's critique of the war as unpatriotic. Therefore, when Kirk, as Prime Minister, outlined his government's policy on Southeast Asia focusing on building diplomatic relations

[252] *New Zealand Herald*, 26 April, 1966.
[253] *Otago Daily Times*, 26 April, 1967; *Press*, 26 April, 1967.
[254] See for example: 'Drugs and the universities', *Weekly News*, 1 April, 1966.
[255] Rabel, *New Zealand and the Vietnam War*, p. 161, 360.
[256] Jenny Carylon and Diana Morrow, *Changing Times: New Zealand since 1945*, Auckland University Press, Auckland, 2014; Rabel, *New Zealand and the Vietnam War*, p. 296.
[257] *New Zealand Herald*, 22 April, 1970.

with individual countries such as China, it was to an ex-servicemen's audience at the Dominion Council annual general meeting.[258]

The interactions of protest groups such as SOS and PYM in the ceremonial terrain were further structured by the complex relationship between groups and the Returned and Services organisations. This was particularly the case for the New Zealand RSA. The Association remained the central organising body of Anzac ritual, meaning that the inscription of wreaths had to be authorised by its regional branches. Consequently, local and national government deferred to the regional branches for managing interactions with protest groups. Responding to the Committee on Vietnam protest action at Anzac Day in 1965, the Wellington RSA successfully lobbied the city council the following year to ban 'political demonstrations' outside the Cenotaph on the grounds of preserving the memorial's dignity.[259] In its first year of protest action on Anzac Day 1971, the Auckland Student Union placed a wreath with broadly consensual message – 'In memory of the dead and dying in Vietnam' – in order to be acceptable in the Anzac Day service.[260] Similarly, University of Canterbury students in the same year intending to place a wreath condemning war as 'an instrument of national policy' had instead laid a plain wreath – after the RSA deemed it too controversial. Notably, student activists wore suits to the parade, in contrast with the 'bohemian' style of more radical groups such as PYM (*Fig. 5*)

Figure 5. Confrontation between students and the RSA, before the start of the Anzac commemoration service in Wellington, 26 April, 1971. EP/1971/1799/18-f c. Alexander Turnbull Library.

[258] Extract from a speech by Right Hon. Norman Kirk, Prime Minister of New Zealand, 'New Zealand and South-East Asia: A policy for the Seventies', Dominion Executive Council Records, 12 June 1973, NZRSA, Wellington.
[259] Cooke, p. 133.
[260] *Evening Post*, 27 April, 1970.

Other student groups saw this as yielding the objectives of the movement – to end the country's participation in the war – to the dictatorial concerns of the RSA. Accordingly, the New Zealand University Students Association, which claimed a national student membership, vowed to place a wreath at the national service in Wellington with the Auckland students' original wording, expressing in a press release its regret for 'the long history of human suffering caused by war…. and the continuation of the war in Indo-China'.[261] The assertion of a 'national protest' imbued the Wellington service with a national significance – the NZUSA was acting like their Australian counterparts, drawing an equivalency between the site of commemoration and nationalist discourse. The Association, rather pointedly, unanimously passed a motion that the wreath would be laid with or without the assistance of the RSA, or as the NZUSA spokesperson put it, 'whether people were arrested or not'.[262] The fact that Anzac Day in 1971 fell on a Sunday increased the contrast between the RSA's reverential contemplation and the vehemence of the protest.[263]

The conflict between students and the Wellington RSA intensified after various RSA clubrooms were vandalised with graffiti.[264] The Wellington Committee on Vietnam laid an anti-war wreath at the national service in the same year as the NZUSA with the wording, 'to the dead and the dying in Vietnam'. This was after the Committee, which included three ex-servicemen, had shifted towards a 'hard line' position, initially voting for a more pointed message: 'in Memory of the Victims of My Lai', a reference to the massacre of a South Vietnamese village by American soldiers.[265] However, this brought them into conflict with the RSA which rejected any 'political overtones' in the wording of Anzac wreaths. Student actions on Anzac Day therefore constituted a mixed challenge to the RSA authority, in which protest elements were muted or placed outside of nationalist discourse entirely.

In 1972, the Wellington Labour Representation Committee approached the city council suggesting that local government should be the official organiser of the Anzac Day commemoration, rather the Wellington RSA. The Wellington Association responded that as a 'non-political and non-denominational' organisation it was best suited to running the ceremonies. Indeed, the council continued to defer to the Association in regards to applications for peace groups wishing to lay wreaths. A request from the Organisation to Halt Military Service (OHMS) was denied outright, while the New Zealand Peace Council's 'war victims remembrance ceremony' was approved, after considerable internal debate within the executive. Some vehemently opposed the Peace Council proposal; others argued that the association needed to engage constructively with 'reasonable' groups wanting to participate in Anzac Day. Conciliation was eventually reached towards the end of the war. RSA officials met with students and negotiated a compromise whereby they attended the morning service but laid their wreaths after 1pm, when it was deemed that the RSA's jurisdiction

[261] *Evening Post*, 24 April, 1971.
[262] Ibid.
[263] Cooke, p. 141.
[264] Ibid., p. 142.
[265] For example, see: Patrick Hagopian, *The Vietnam War in American memory: veterans, memorials, and the politics of healing*, University of Massachusetts Press, Amherst, 2009.

ended. Victoria University students marched in the parade, behind the ex-servicemen, carrying banners and making clenched-fist salutes during the minute's silence.

By the end of the 1970s, the structuration of RSA authority at Anzac Day constituted a transformation in the relationship between commemoration, its youth audience, and the state. It was significant that police intervened consistently to prevent the RSA overstepping its powers, and students participated with police protection that delineated the spatial and transgressive boundaries of the ritual. This was, of course, in part because the RSA membership was increasingly aged, and could not be relied to fulfil the necessary physical role of regulating crowds, let alone the legal legitimacy to do so. Indeed, the declining national membership and the consolidation of local RSA branches was a central anxiety for the Dominion Executive Council in the 1970s.[266] The expanding interaction of police and protest would define the 1981 Springbok Tour, in which the Halt All Racist Tours (HART) movement clashed with the police in spectacular physical actions that appealed to ideas of confronting state authority and reflected, similar to the relationships between power and knowledge in Anzac Day conflicts.[267] Furthermore, the fact that much of the antagonism between protest on Anzac Day and the RSA was in Wellington is also significant. Like Canberra, and indeed influenced by developments in Australia, Anzac Day in Wellington increasingly took on national significance as the memorial and its rituals were equated with national institutions and values. There was considerable inconsistency on the part of the RSA throughout the country in their dealings with universities and the wreaths they would or would not lay. This was indicative of the RSA's decentralised structure, under which local branches affiliated directly with the Dominion council.[268] By the end of the 1970s, the political decline of the RSA paralleled its increasing fragmentation.

In reality, the actions of Returned and Services' organisations aided the protest actions. Overreactions attracted media interest, strengthened the resolve of some demonstrators, and generally hardened public opinion against the war. Moreover, these actions accelerated the changing role of the state, through the theatre of official government speeches on and around Anzac Day declaiming the social problem of the Youth, and through direct police interventions at commemorations, negotiating the boundaries of inclusion and exclusion. The voice of 'youth' became a special concern. When the National Council of Churches in New Zealand organised a survey of public opinion on the meaning of Anzac Day in 1971, and invited representatives of young people to participate, including PYM, the Council was expressing not only a new public interest in Anzac Day – outside of veterans – but also the way which 'Youth' themselves were now invested as key participants and receptors of remembrance.[269] The peace cause would ultimately be adopted by successive Labor and Labour governments, starting in 1972 when the Whitlam government declared it would oppose further United States interventions in the Southeast Asian and Pacific regions. The campaigns against the war on

[266] Dominion Executive Council Records, 1967-1977, NZRSA, Wellington.
[267] See for example, Michael M. Roche's relatively old but excellent, 'Protest, Police and Place: The 1981 Springbok Tour and the Production and Consumption of Social Space', *New Zealand Geographer*, 53, 2 (1991): pp. 50–57.
[268] Cooke, pp. 113–114.
[269] Gnanasunderam to Nathan, 9 August 1971, Barry Lee collection on the Progressive Youth Movement, Auckland Branch, 1969-ca 1972, UAL, Auckland.

Anzac Day forced the issue of legitimacy on Anzac Day. In doing so, these reshaped established boundaries of memory, politics and protest.

The women's liberation movement, 1977-1987

In the 1970s, Feminist protest on Anzac Day emerged in the broader milieu of the peace movements. Targeting the ostensible patriarchal tendencies of Anzac mythology, feminist actions, mostly organised through university collectives, coalesced around the issue of historical and contemporary sexual violence against women during wartime and on the 'home front', as part of a wider critique of society and assertion of women's rights in public life. This included lobbying for changes in laws, aimed at highlighting the issue of rape within marriage, removing stigma around rape, and improving victims' ordeals at trials.[270] Feminists had been long involved in the loose network of political and religious groups which made up the peace movement. Indeed, many women had been radicalised by their experiences, especially among SOS and student groups. The protests in turn formed part of the cultures of the student collectives, as activists wrote poetry, articles, and songs which 'commemorated' the collectivist actions from previous years. This appropriation of commemorative language and ritual was in part ironic but was also the assertion of feminist narratives in national discourse. *Tharunka* often conflated the Women Against Rape (WAR) actions as a kind of participation in war.[271] However, the women's liberation movement which emerged in the 1970s developed a distinct feminist activism which, though contiguous with the peace movement, articulated ideological differences in the analysis of gender and violence. Many feminist activists chafed at the actions and structures of the anti-war movement which often confirmed stereotypes of women as 'backroom labour' and 'ladies auxiliaries' supporting male activists.[272] These tensions influenced feminist protests on Anzac Day during the period. When on April 25, 1978, following the example of Australian feminists, seven women dressed in black placed a wreath bearing the women's liberation symbol as part of the morning service at the Auckland cenotaph, the press release accompanying the action articulated an ideological departure from the peace movement. 'In war women do not count; women are never remembered as activists or victims of war. The Women's Liberation Movement remembers them today.'[273] It was this critique that dominated Anzac Day protests for the next decade.

The first public action of the Women Against Rape collectives occurred at the 1977 Anzac Day commemoration in Canberra. Following the morning ceremony, a group of women placed a wreath with a ribbon and the words 'In memory of women raped in war' at the Australian War Memorial. The following year, Sydney activists attended the Martin Place morning service, wearing black T-shirts with the words 'In memory of women raped in war' printed on the front and 'Women Against Rape' on the back. As the group entered the Martin Place plaza, it was immediately stopped by the police and forced to move to the side to wait until the authorised marchers had passed.[274] Four representatives were permitted to participate in the ritual by placing a blank wreath on the cenotaph while the

[270] *Canberra Times*, 8 October, 1975; *Tharunka*, 26 May, 1976; *Canberra Times*, 14 September, 1976.
[271] See for example, *Tharunka*, 1 May 1978, p. 4; and 28 May, 1979, p. 14.
[272] Kay Goodger, *Up from Under*, June 1971, pp. 141–143.
[273] *Salient*, 24 April, 1978.
[274] *Tharunka*, 1 May, 1978.

remainder of the contingent was restricted to standing behind the barriers.[275] This was a significant change in the performance: members of the public were typically allowed to approach the wreaths, even placing their own wreaths or flowers. This pattern, reflecting that hegemonic processes are operative as much as rhetorical, both coercive and consensual, was repeated throughout the period. A similar pattern emerged in New Zealand, when in 1979 at the Wellington morning ceremony, two women who attempted to lay a wreath with the words 'For our sisters, dead and raped' were prevented by the RSA due to its 'political overtones'. The feminist actions therefore brought into question the boundaries of authority, participation, and officiality – what Seal calls the 'interplay of official and unofficial'.[276]

The experience of Canberra and Sydney indicated that the central demand of the feminist collectives – that the public acknowledge that rape occurs during war – could at least be partially incorporated into narratives of Anzac Day. Silent vigils, wreath laying and non-confrontational processions were eventually permitted and – to an extent – accepted if not condoned by a proportion of participants and spectators.[277] This limited success can perhaps be attributed to the collectives' means of articulation, which were predominantly – and deliberately – synecdochical within the ritual context of the Anzac Day march.[278] For instance, in both Canberra and Sydney, collective members conformed to the traditional practice of marching in close formation behind a single identifying banner, usually declaring 'In memory of all women of all countries raped in all wars'. The stated purpose of the processions was to lay wreaths, posies, or biers in recognition of the suffering of women raped in war. The rhetoric of mourning was also borne out by the groups' performances, symbols and inscriptions: they wore a 'uniform' of black (or variations such as black armbands), observed silences, sang laments and generally processed in a 'dignified' and non-confrontational manner (*Fig. 6*).[279] When some hundred women marched in the Canberra parade in 1981, Women Against Rape spokespeople reassured media that they 'planned to march in a quiet, orderly and dignified fashion', behind a single banner saying in several languages "in memory of all women raped in all wars in all countries'.[280]

[275] Ibid.
[276] Seal, 'dawn service', p. 49.
[277] Peter Stanley, 'Anzac Day as It Was Reported', in Michael McKernan and Peter Stanley, eds., *Anzac Day Seventy Years On*, Collins, Sydney, 1986, pp. 13–19, 16.
[278] Elder, "I Spit on Your Stone", p. 75.
[279] Lyn Ariel, SWARC, http://www.radicalfeministvoice.com/9SWARC.pdf> Erika, 'Rape', p. 19; Joyce Stevens, 'Women Mourn Rape in War on Anzac Day - 175 Arrested', *Tribune* (Sydney), April, 1983. Stevens' article is featured alongside several images of the armbands worn by some participants at the Sydney 1983 march.
[280] *Canberra Times*, 23 April, 1981.

Figure 6. Anzac Day march, Sydney, 1983. Radicalfeministvoice.com: Lyn Ariel.

Public reaction indicated a number of reasons why some form of protest action was tolerated. Few observers could deny the central tenet that women are raped in war, although obfuscations abounded, ranging from 'there were no women at Gallipoli' through to the admission by an RSL state president that 'Rape does and will occur in war, but Australian servicemen have a pretty clean record in this regard'.[281] Thus the collectives' truism could be conceded because – as Elder has noted – its meaning could comfortably be contextualised outside of nationalist discourse.[282] Elder claims that the group located military rape as occurring outside of the nation, but numerous Women Against Rape materials also pointed to the prevalence of rape within Australian society. Moreover, Davies reminds us that even in 1993 the claims by a Japanese academic that Australian occupying forces raped large numbers of women in Japan after the Second World War provoked a blistering response.[283] Therefore, despite initial antipathy, it seems that by 1983 the Sydney and Canberra collectives had successfully gravitated toward a particular point by which their critique could be accepted in Anzac discourse. Within the rubric of mourning the victims of war, there was a grudging acknowledgement that women who are raped during war also deserved 'appropriate' commemoration. This concession can be traced in changing media depictions, the incorporation of the issue into school curriculum materials, and in the inclusion of rape in war as a significant element of the popular 1987 television

[281] Tyler, 'Making Nations, Making Men', p. 28.
[282] Elder, "I Spit on Your Stone", p. 30.
[283] Davies, 'Women, War, and the Violence of History', pp. 161–162.

miniseries *Vietnam*.[284] There was also support from members of the public, as evidenced in letters to the editor, for example, who argued that the feminist actions only reiterated the significance of Anzac, such as saying that 'women do not wish to disrupt the march but to add to this reminder a presentation of the suffering of many women throughout war history'.[285] Others argued that the collectives were a participation in comradeship and therefore 'very much in tune with the spirit of Anzac Day'. Many also specifically criticised the RSL's insistence on owning Anzac Day and controlling who should be allowed to march in its parades.[286]

Criticisms of RSL control alluded to an important element of Anzac Day protests. In contravening the liminal space of Anzac, protesters' antagonism more clearly defined the authority of the returned services. This was most pronounced in Canberra, where in 1980 three activists were jailed for a month for police obstruction while trying to take part in the Anzac parade (*Fig. 7*).[287] The federal RSL council banned any further participation of women seeking to draw attention to rape in war from the national parade in Canberra, a decision given legal clout by the Federal Police and ACT government through a Public Order regulation which explicitly enacted the parade as an RSL activity and made it unlawful in the territory to give offence to Anzac Day participants. This dispute almost subsumed the collective's premier objective to 'mourn raped women' and was not resolved until Labor was elected in 1983 and repealed the Public Order Act in December of that year. The civil liberties issues at stake in the 1981 and 1982 Canberra actions attracted other participants to the marches, which collective members worried 'threatened to swamp the issue of women raped in war'; the Sydney collective also expressed similar reservations about combining with peace or anti-nuclear movements.[288]

[284] Kathy Jones, *Media Images of Anzac*, New South Wales Department of Education, Sydney, 1983, pp. 26a–27a; with the caveat that the rapists were American rather than Australian soldiers. Doyle, 'Dismembering the Anzac Legend', pp. 118–20.
[285] *Canberra Times*, 25 April, 1981.
[286] Ibid.
[287] *Canberra Times* 26 April, 1980. ACT Judge T. D. Nicholl, a former RSL member, was the presiding judge and subsequently received enormous criticism for the decision.
[288] Dowse and Giles, 'Australia', p. 67; Pringle, 'Rape', pp. 32–33.

Figure 7. Protester in the Women Against Rape in War demonstration on Anzac Parade demands to know the number of the arresting constable. Canberra Times, 1981.

The protest movement allowed the construction and reinforcement of Anzac Day as a site of tradition; placed in stark relief by the 'profane' actions of the collectives. In New Zealand, however, where the wreath laying ceremony remained the centrepiece of Anzac ritual, a more varied, less focused protest action emerged. Feminist collectives, the most prominent being the Women's Action Group, competed with many different groups, including Māori and Pacific groups that engaged in scuffles with war veterans while carrying banners referring to Māori deaths in 'capitalist wars'.[289] This made for a cluttered field of myriad articulations and was reflected in the media coverage. In contrast with Australian media, New Zealand coverage only occasionally dedicated full articles to the protests, with fewer photographs. At one Auckland ceremony, for example, as well as contending with a feminist protest, police requested a demonstrator to lower a placard held high when the National Anthem was played, while another placard reading 'Let East Timor Decide' was confiscated by police from members of the Campaign for an Independent East Timor.[290] In the same year, in Hamilton, 'a minority radical group' painted swastikas and obscenities on the Hamilton Cenotaph.[291] Between the provocative and profane, the actions of feminist collectives were conceived as reflecting the wider 'de-sacralisation' of the Anzac Day, what commentators called 'the 1970s attitude'.[292]

Furthermore, the antagonism generated by feminist actions at Anzac Day in New Zealand was mostly between police and protesters, rather than the RSA. In 1978, a memorial card dedicated to female

[289] *New Zealand Herald,* 26 April, 1979.
[290] *New Zealand Herald*, 26 April, 1978.
[291] Ibid.
[292] *Evening Post*, 26 April, 1980.

victims of war was torn from a wreath at the Auckland Cenotaph by a police constable. The wreath had been laid by members of the Women's Action Group, dressed in black veils, at the mid-morning Anzac Day commemorative service in the Domain. The memorial card read, 'We remember all the forgotten women: all those who died in battle, those raped and mutilated, our sisters who have had their lives destroyed by the wars of this century'. The constable moved to the front of the crowd and pulled the card from the wreath as activists questioned his right to remove it. The officer stated that he was acting on a complaint made by a woman. Commenting that 'ceremonies at cenotaphs are increasingly becoming the scene of emotional interaction between activist groups', Auckland District Chief Borritt stated that '[t]he police have to do their bit to maintain decorum and the right atmosphere'; RSA president J. R. Gardiner, in contrast, said he found nothing offensive in the message attached to the Women's Action Group. This difference was an important development between Australia and New Zealand: the RSA was increasingly decentralised, in contrast to the state and federal structures of the RSL. This suggested a major shift in Anzac commemoration, one in which the direction and maintenance of the boundaries of official and unofficial memory was more increasingly defined and directed by the state, located in state actors and institutions. Protest actions played a vital, if paradoxical role, in this process.

In contrast to the ostensible success of the 'rape in war' narrative, other actions took on increasingly antagonistic roles in Anzac Day discourses. For instance, by the late 1970s the definition of 'victims of war' had broadened considerably and the recognition of women raped during conflict was only one of many competing messages. This was, in part, due to the new social histories of Anzac which informed many subsequent representations, including the rescripting of the veterans' own memories.[293] The first feminist historical critiques of Anzac appeared during this period and were influential for several academics in the collectives, notably Marilyn Lake. The veterans themselves – particularly those recently returned from Vietnam – were also instrumental in depicting returned soldiers as disempowered victims of war.[294] In contrast to preceding RSL campaigns for repatriation privileges, these articulations drove the political agenda of returned servicemen and women increasingly toward the left. The Vietnam veterans' agitation for inquiries into the psychological impact of combat and Agent Orange, for instance, informed wider cultural engagement with war veterans as victims during this period, confirming their generally leftist stance.[295] The Vietnam Veterans Association of Australia forged political links with the Australian Labor Party and the Democrats. Such formative cultural depictions of veterans as victims can also be observed in the novel and 1979 film, *The Odd Angry Shot*, and in the surprising popularity of the 1983 single 'I Was Only 19' by avowedly socialist performers Redgum.[296]

[293] Patsy Adam-Smith, *The Anzacs*, Thomas Nelson, Melbourne, 1985; Bill Gammage, *The Broken Years: Australian Soldiers in the Great War*, Melbourne University Press, Melbourne, 2010.
[294] Stephen Garton, *The Cost of War: Australians Return*, Thomas Nelson, Melbourne, 1996, p. 236.
[295] Clem Lloyd and Jacqui Rees, *The Last Shilling: a History of Repatriation in Australia*, Melbourne University Press, Melbourne, 1994, pp. 359–360.
[296] Doyle, 'Dismembering the Anzac Legend', pp. 113–15. The novel was authored by William Nagle; the film directed by Tom Jeffrey. Redgum, 'I Was Only 19', 1983: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Urtiyp-G6jY.

In the context of Anzac Day, it is possible that these competing expressions of victimhood led to an acceptance within Anzac discourse around a broadly pacifist narrative. One barrier to bridging this gap was the significant element of protest rhetoric articulated in feminist actions, despite the claims by Sydney and Canberra collectives that their aim was to participate rather than to demonstrate. Such protest elements included carrying political placards; distributing polemical flyers; occasional defacement of memorials; singing songs with protest associations such as 'We Shall Overcome' or containing confrontational lyrics such as 'Though I come to lay this wreath/I spit on your stone'; utilising the women's symbol containing a clenched fist; and other overtly militant depictions.[297] These protests around victimhood were clearly antagonistic. This was particularly apparent in the divergence between the veneration of the ailing, vanishing Anzacs and feminist actions. The juxtaposition of media coverage of feminist activism and images of ailing old men, many maimed, framed the articulations in a way sympathetic to the elderly veterans. One *New Zealand Herald* editorial described how 'memorials have been desecrated, services interrupted, and old soldiers insulted' in order 'to publicise quite incongruous causes'.[298] Significantly, this was contrasted with the 'many young people seen of late taking part in the rites of remembrance'. Media constructed feminist actions as lacking decorum or as mere attention seeking. As immortalised in one *New Zealand* cartoon (*Fig. 8.*), these narratives framed youth actions as self-obsessed and opposed to sacrifice for the common good.

[297] Women Against Rape, 'Press Release from Women Against Rape' 2 38/29/01, 1976; also see 2 38/36/01, 1977-1979; VWLLFA 38, University of Melbourne Archives (UMA), Melbourne. *Reveille* (Sydney), September/October 1981, p. 23; Erika, 'Rape', p. 19; Inglis, 'Men, Women, and War Memorials', p. 119.
[298] *New Zealand Herald*, 24 April, 1984.



Figure 8. Anzac Day cartoon by unknown artist. New Zealand Herald, 1986.

In Australia, these juxtapositions were made overt in statements suggesting, for instance, that confrontational protests could lead to deaths within the thinning ranks of ageing ex-servicemen, accentuating their status as 'victims'. In addition to the visible decline in numbers of veterans marching, the installation of war graves for veterans rose from 2,200 annually in the early 1980s to approximately 10,000 per year at the end of the decade.[299] This demographic shift can also be traced in the sudden increase in 'Last Post' notices in the NSW RSL's newspaper, *Reveille*, over the same period.[300] In a cultural space where many spectators sought meaning in the rites of Anzac Day, such contrasts were polarising. Likewise, despite the open ructions between the RSL and Vietnam veterans through this period – and the increasing willingness of the political left to embrace veterans as victims – the collectives seem not to have garnered support among potential march participants.[301] The schism between military veterans ultimately gave way to political and symbolic reconciliations such as the Vietnam welcome home march of October 1987.[302] Culturally, the building up of new veteran discourse served to perpetuate the traditional signification of war memory as the domain of

[299] Hobbins, 'Protest as Paradox', p. 23.
[300] Stanley, 'Anzac Day as It Was Reported', p. 17; Lloyd and Rees, *The Last Shilling*, p. 353.
[301] Garton, *The Cost of War*, p. 239; Lloyd and Rees, *The Last Shilling*, pp. 359–360.
[302] Doyle, 'Dismembering the Anzac Legend', pp. 121–122; Thomson, *Anzac Memories*, p. 198.

military rather than civilian experience.[303] Therefore, while the commemoration of women raped in war tended to dissolve once the collectives ceased participating in Anzac Day, by the late 1980s sympathy flowed for 'ordinary men' affected by war in television miniseries such as 'ANZACS', 'Vietnam', and 'Sword of Honour', as well as in songs performed by left-leaning musicians such as Hunters and Collectors and Midnight Oil.[304] This was a pronounced shift in the emerging youth culture of the 1980s, contemporaneous with Anzac's public embrace of a new kind of veteran – the victim of war's horrors which has become a central trope in the public discussion of Anzac.

Broader gender issues raised by feminist collectives on Anzac Day remained marginalised throughout the decade. Despite the eventual acknowledgement that the rape of women in war merited commemoration, the deeper message that informed feminist actions from the outset – that rape is symptomatic of patriarchal hegemonies – rarely gained cultural currency.[305] The same can be said for the protest that Anzac Day itself was a profoundly masculine ritual that perpetuated patriarchal institutions. This critique, present in many of the actions, was most prevalent within the Melbourne and Wellington interventions from 1983 onwards. Arising as it did from existing feminist movements and anti-rape groups, the self-identification of the collectives as 'Women Against Rape' (and its frequent contraction to 'WAR') was clearly in conflict with the prevailing masculine tradition of Anzac Day.[306] Moreover, appeals to universal sisterhood perpetuated gendered antagonisms.[307] The war memorial in the Wellington suburb of Brooklyn was vandalised with the words 'women against male wars' in purple paint. Indeed, while ostensibly seeking inclusion and recognition of women within Anzac Day rites, a significant number of collective materials were directed exclusively to women and planning meetings were sometimes listed as 'women only'. While they did assist in forming rhetorical and political links to other women's groups, these gendered signifiers ultimately restricted wider connections, particularly with men.

Broader gender messages such as 'Rape is war against women' or 'Oppose male power and war for profit' did not connect significantly with Anzac Day marchers or audiences. Such articulations – when they did provoke a response – tended to be rebutted by claims that other forums such as International Women's Day would be more appropriate.[308] Moreover, they were overtaken by events. In addition to the inclusion (or co-option) of the Women Against Rape actions within Sydney and Canberra ceremonies, the proportion of women participating in the official marches also rose considerably from the late 1970s. This stemmed both from RSL attempts to redress shrinking membership and from ongoing agitation by women's service groups and the War Widows' Guild for greater recognition of

[303] Garton, *The Cost of War*, pp. 230–231.
[304] Davies, 'Women, War, and the Violence of History', p. 174; Elder, "I Spit on Your Stone", pp. 80–81; Doyle, 'Dismembering the Anzac Legend', p. 115.
[305] 'Anzacs under Fire Again', *Sun*, 26 April, 1984; 'Defiant Women Plan Own Anti-Anzac Action', *Age*, 25 April, 1984.
[306] 'Subject File – Anzac Day, 1981–1986', State Library of Victoria (SLV), Melbourne. See for example, *WOMB Women Of Melbourne Broadsheet*, 1 38/07/03, 1983-1984, *Women's Liberation Newsletter*, 1 38/07/03, 1979; VWLLFA 38, UMA, Melbourne; and *Worker's Newsletter* (New Zealand), for a New Zealand comparison, 1 38/14b/04, 1982-1983, UMA, Melbourne.
[307] Elder, "I Spit on Your Stone", p. 76.
[308] *Reveille*, July/August, 1983, p. 6.

their wartime sacrifices.[309] Returned Servicewomen had attended the NZRSA conference for the first time, as a distinct group, in 1960; mostly nurses who had serviced during the Second World War.[310] At the same time, media also noted that women comprised a significant proportion of the crowds. These reports were also quick to emphasise that many members of youth organisations and other young people were among those who attended the services, amidst growing attendance by the mid-1980s generally.[311] Thus, despite the persistence of many traditions in the ceremony which perpetuated a specific vision of masculinity, it was undeniable that Anzac Day no longer excluded women. This dramatic demographic shift resulted in a strengthening of the connection between ex-servicemen and women while further marginalising specifically feminist articulations. In 1986, the Melbourne *Age* ran a considerable section on the role of women in war for its coverage of Anzac Day, suggesting a strongly inclusive position.[312] Liz Reed, for example, has detailed the ways in which women were specifically co-opted into the 1995 *Australia Remembers* commemorative campaign.[313] The central image of the campaign was a returning soldier greeting wife and children. Although perpetuating classic imagery of the women's role in war as supporting the central role of men – as keeping 'the home fires burning' and mourning the war dead – it was nonetheless an inclusive gesture.

Unlike the Auckland, Sydney, and Canberra actions, the Melbourne Anti-Anzac Day Collective openly celebrated women's interventions as protests. From 1983 onwards their very name – and theirs banner proclaiming 'Abolish Anzac Day' and chants such as 'What do we want? Anzac Day out' – flagrantly defied integration into the proceedings. In 1984 the spokesperson for the collective, Adrian Howe, said to the media, 'We just want our protest to be seen and heard by as many people as possible'.[314] The collective's stance was further symbolised by their deliberate march away from the Shrine of Remembrance over the years 1985-1987, and stickers distributed to members of the public calling for the abolition of the commemoration.[315] Beyond this, the collective's confrontational actions were viewed as 'militant' and contrasted both with the group's anti-militarist rhetoric and the non-violent tactics adopted in other capitals. A similarly 'militant' form of protest developed in Wellington. In 1980, a 'squad' of women in their early 20s identifying themselves as 'lesbians' disrupted the dawn parade and the mid-morning laying of wreaths at Wellington's Cenotaph.[316] Wearing military style black costumes and berets, the protesters chanted during the minute of silence, 'Women died, we

[309] Philip Briant and Phil Thomson, *Warriors, Welfare and Eternal Vigilance;* Broadcast: May 1982, 2 sound cassettes. A series of four radio documentaries which examines the history and role of the Returned Services League in Australian life.
[310] Cooke, p. 130. The greater inclusion of women was in part out of necessity; women members increasingly acted as office bearers in the late 1970s as fewer and fewer volunteers committed to the Association.
[311] *Evening Post*, 26 April, 1979.
[312] *Age*, 25 April, 1986.
[313] Liz Reed, *Bigger than Gallipoli: war, history and memory in Australia*, University of Western Australia Press, Perth, 2004, pp. 7–8, 74–76, 174.
[314] Adrian Howe, 'Anzac Mythology and the Feminist Challenge', in Joy Damousi and Marilyn Lake, eds., *Gender and War: Australians at War in the Twentieth Century*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1995, pp. 302–310.
[315] *Age*, 25 April, 1985. A series of stickers produced by the Melbourne Anti-Anzac Day Collective in 1986, *'*Subject File - Anzac Day', SLV, Melbourne. For images of these protests, see Jan Bassett, 'Women and Anzac Day, Melbourne', in Michael McKernan and Peter Stanley. Eds., *Anzac Day Seventy Years On*, Collins, Sydney, 1986, p. 11–4. 67.
[316] *Evening Post*, 26 April, 1980.

care, women were raped, we are angry'. The group returned during the wreath laying ceremony with a mock coffin, inscribed 'in memory of millions of women raped and killed by soldiers'. The antagonistic physical contravention of the ritual was contrasted with groups of Wellington peace activists who had been holding an all-night vigil as 'silent, respectful, but prominent observers' and did not attempt to lay any wreath. RSA president Sir Hamilton Mitchell stated in his address that contemporary New Zealand there was not only an external threat 'which should be brought under our control' but an 'internal threat' as well and called for dedication to its destruction. These tactics and, in the case of the Melbourne group, their declared separation from other Women Against Rape actions further diminished chains of equivalence that had existed across the women's movement, and the potential for feminist articulations to be incorporated into the reformulation of Anzac Day during this period.[317]

Conclusion

Conflict on Anzac Day during the period 1967-1987 arose from largely radical and confrontational approaches. Radical groups such as the New Zealand Progressive Youth Movement and the Anti-Anzac Day Coalition in Melbourne rejected equivalences with other protest groups and articulated specific antagonisms; dissolving, in the public construction of their actions, the separation between the person of the fallen soldier, remembrance, and the war they were fighting. This was of course the political intent of radical groups: within their ideological frame, soldiers were not distinct from the apparatus of the capitalist, patriarchal states – a sentiment expressed in the 1966 hit single 'Universal Soldier'.[318] Such radical points of view contributed to the hegemonic consensus that formed in the 1980s, providing the heterodoxy to an emerging post-imperial orthodoxy of remembrance. Within the framework of cultural hegemony and Anzac as a discursive ideological field, radical anti-Anzac Day articulations participated in the structuration of Anzac commemoration. Narratives formulated by nationalist political and military leadership such as Keith Holyoake and Bernard Fergusson placed radical antagonism outside of the orthodox. Anti-Anzac Day protests therefore provided fertile ground for the new social histories that emerged in the 1980s would rehabilitate the old image of soldiers as a symbol of the left; in turn dissolving the distinctions between attitudes towards the 'ordinary soldier' and the wars they fought. Some contemporary observers called the youth protests expressions of the 'Anzac spirit', rejecting 'fascist' social control, nationalist militarism, and imperialist foreign policy located in archaic and overbearing conservative government and military leadership, and in the institutions of the returned services organisations. The antagonism of groups such as WAR and PYM, however, paradoxically served to consolidate new orthodoxies that resisted critical appraisal of Anzac Day. By defining so emphatically what they were against, the anti-Anzac Day groups contributed to building frontiers that unwittingly closed off their critiques from wider engagement.

Two broad factors were influential in fashioning the commemorative landscape in which the protest movements operated. First, the experience of these two movements was clearly gendered. Anti-war protest could be incorporated into the framework of Anzac Day, when stripped of its militarist

[317] Smith, *Laclau and Mouffe*, p. 162.
[318] Donovan, 'Universal Soldier', 1965: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=UC9pc4U40sI.

elements; shown in the mixed reception of SOS, whose members, formulated as mourning mothers, could be comfortably situated in the tradition of Anzac Day. These wars of manoeuvre indicated the emergence of consensus after the conclusion of the Vietnam War, around which masculine voices of co-option or confrontation could be more easily incorporated. On one hand they were situated outside discourse through construction of youth as delinquent or radicals. On the other, they were subsumed into new pacifist equivalences as veterans. Both these broad equivalences coalesced around distinct institutional boundaries of Anzac Day; especially the returned and services' organisations and the state in Australia and New Zealand. In both cases, masculine voice was simultaneously that of critique and authority. It was this disengagement from the anti-war movement which shaped the women's movement in the late 1970s; whether synecdoche or rejection, feminist actions on Anzac Day negotiated with masculine intermediaries in the returned and services' organisations and the police as an institution of the state.

The second was chronological. The peace movement achieved broad equivalence at Anzac Day as the war became increasingly unpopular. In both Australia and New Zealand, the end of the war foreclosed further critique of Anzac Day and narratives of national militarism – linking military service, military preparedness, and the 'spirit of Anzac'. Nonetheless, this ideological structure had been undermined and ultimately dissolved by a shift towards humanitarian discourse; evidenced in the civilian victims of wars, the abolishment of compulsory military training, and the politics of non-alignment in the Whitlam and later Lange governments. In particular, the politics of the left had settled squarely against the war. By the time of the feminist actions, however, in the aftermath of the war, new narratives around soldiers as victims emerged. This was a confluence of factors: the veterans themselves became politically active, joining with a broadly leftist political agenda; and promoted and supported emerging awareness around the negative impacts of war thus entrenching the fresh-faced teen soldier of Redgum's 'I was only 19' as a victim of war. In New Zealand, the impact on the RSA contributed to its decline and fragmentation, so that feminist actions over the next decade interacted – and conflicted – with the police. This reflected narratives of legitimacy and masculinity, and required state intervention in the formation and practice of Anzac in an unprecedented way.

Furthermore, a significant feature spanning many of the actions was the physical restrictions imposed upon feminist groups at almost every Anzac Day march. Even the apparently benign processes that accompanied 'permission' to participate included spatial and performative restrictions such as when and where to assemble and march, and what form and in which manner symbols such as wreaths or banners could be deployed. While these accounts generally accentuate the conflict inherent in arrest procedures, the deeper point is that considerable legislative, judicial and police powers were brought to bear on feminist interventions throughout the decade. As Davies astutely observed, the prevailing discourse of Anzac Day – as a war commemoration – revolves around conflict and therefore tended to perpetuate a language of confrontation.[319] Therefore, the inclusion of peace groups and feminist collectives in Anzac Day rituals was not simply a negotiation over competing visions of

[319] Davies, 'Women, War, and the Violence of History', pp. 175–176.

commemoration but was achieved within a framework predicated on the potential for physical violence.

Ultimately, anti-Anzac Day actions helped reformulate Anzac Day in the post-war period. Control of the 'new' Anzac Day that emerged in the 1980s passed from the traditional institutions such as the Returned and Services' organisations and churches to become defined as a pluralist and populist narrative. This was a direct consequence of the protest movements on Anzac Day. Protests further linked the infrastructure of the state with Anzac Day and reinforced it as an object of active citizenship in the visceral experience of the 'profane' actions against war remembrance. In this sense, feminist actions were subsumed and elided in the new cultural space of Anzac, the vanguard of which can be situated in the release of Peter Weir's *Gallipoli* (1981).[320] In 1972, when a feature project based on Seymour's *One Day of the Year* was put to the then Australian Film Development Corporation by Tony Buckley and Mike Thornhill, the AFDC rejected it on the grounds that the story was 'out of date'.[321] It was this emerging relationship between youth, cultural nationalism, and Anzac commemoration that we will consider in the next chapter.

[320] Macleod, 'The Fall and Rise of Anzac Day', pp. 163–5; Pavils, 'Anzac Day', p. 95; Seal, 'ANZAC', p. 142; Thomson, *Anzac Memories*, pp. 192–193.
[321] *Filmnews*, 1 November, 1981.

CHAPTER THREE.
CULTURAL NATIONALISM AND SPECTACLE: ANZAC IN THE 1980s

Introduction

Protest and critique of war commemoration were foreclosed towards the end of the 1980s as politicians, journalists, and scholars increasingly marked the 'resurgence' of Anzac Day. Speaking at Wellington's National Memorial in 1989, after nearly a decade of this process, New Zealand Governor-General Paul Reeves declared that, '[f]or New Zealanders the tragedy [of Gallipoli] gave birth to a new and tender nationalism that in the 1980s and into the 1990s will be increasingly assertive as we consider our traditional connections, as we explore this region of the South Pacific, as we compete in the rough and tumble of alliances'.[322] As Reeves alluded to, 1980s political debate centred on the alignment and configuration of Australia and New Zealand in relation to the United States and the Cold War order – specifically through the ANZUS Treaty – that provided a dramatic backdrop to new cultural engagement with national war experience and memory. Observers pointed to changing public attitudes in the growing number of people attending ceremonies on April 25 and the burgeoning cultural content around Gallipoli and war experience generally. The period saw an explosion of film, television, and theatre based on Anzac that entailed a new visual engagement with battlefield landscapes and war memory. This was reinforced by popular literature, school curricula, museum exhibitions, and the inclusion of photographs alongside first-person accounts of war experience in newspapers: an intersection of history, memory, and spectacle which foreshadowed the new contours of war commemoration at the turn of the century.

New Zealand's television programming in the week leading up to Anzac Day 1982 is instructive on this point.[323] As there were only two channels, the documentaries and films commanded considerable television audiences. Opening the week was *Operation Jericho*, a documentary by Ian Johnstone who went to Europe to 'capture the dramatic story about the New Zealand-led air attack on Amiens prison in February 1944'. Another documentary, *Conflicts,* combined the talents of the New Zealand Army Band and former *McPhail and Gadsby* scriptwriter Chris McVeigh to create a 'musical history' of the century's major wars. Johnstone and McVeigh, prominent figures in New Zealand television's 'golden age', made the war genre a key part of their repertoire of 'local content for local audiences'. Nostalgia imbuedthe entire programme, reflecting the way writers and filmmakers traded on wider social tastes for wartime culture as a new sentimental currency.[324] Finally, *Kaleidoscope*, a popular and award-

[322] *Evening Post*, 25 April, 1989.
[323] Juliet Hensley, 'What to Watch', *Evening Post*, 23 April, 1982, p. 2.
[324] *Evening* Post, 23 April, 1982.

winning arts series, featured ‘an original Anzac memorial’, with a behind-the-scenes look at Maurice Shadbolt's stage play *Once on Chunuk Bair*, which was to premiere on the eve of Anzac Day.

The *Kaleidoscope* episode was a meeting of art, the war genre, and creative industry. *Once on Chunuk Bair* – Shadbolt's first stage play – dramatised the actions of New Zealand troops, especially the Wellington Battalion, on the Gallipoli Peninsula at the battle of Chunuk Bair, one of the pivotal moments in the campaign's August Offensive. Describing the play as a ‘powerful drama’, *Kaleidoscope*'s Jeremy Payne lauded how ‘Maurice Shadbolt aims to show not only the human cost of war, but also how a sense of nationalism emerged among the New Zealanders who fought there so bravely’, contrasting the ‘poignant illustration of the futility of war’ with ‘a tribute to heroism’.[325]

The premiere of Shadbolt’s play, its timing – the year 1982 – and Payne’s claim to national identity were highly significant. The idea of ‘an original Anzac memorial’ was recognisable to New Zealand audiences as an explicit contrast with another ‘war memorial in celluloid’ released only nine months previously: the 1981 film *Gallipoli* directed by Australian Peter Weir.[326] It is a trope of Anzac historiography to point to Weir's *Gallipoli* as the central cultural landmark of the Anzac ‘revival’.[327] Daniel Reynaud refers to *Gallipoli* as the most impactful war film in any period and ‘the most complete rendering of the modern Anzac myth’.[328] Critics propose that Weir's commercial and artistic success entailed repackaging old themes of the Anzac Legend. The centrality of white masculine figures in the characters of Archy Hamilton (Mark Lee) and Frank Dunne (Mel Gibson), the linkage between sport, war experience, and mateship, the rugged landscape of the bush, are all situated in the contemporary anxieties around identity in the context of post-imperial Australian society, especially through the film's didactic anti-British sentiment. This link between Anzac and nationhood is reinforced by the fact that *Gallipoli* was the second film produced in Australia to obtain a major release in the United States (the first being *Mad Max* in 1980); the high volume of schoolchildren all over the country who were taken to see it as an expression of remembrance; and the direct causal link scholars have drawn between the 1982 Anzac Day crowds in Australia and the success of the film.[329] Similarly in New Zealand, television critics asked whether Anzac Day would hold greater interest with a broader range of age groups in 1982 with the recent success of the ‘Australian film’.[330]

Many of the hundreds of scholarly works analysing *Gallipoli* (far outstripping any other Australian film) – and much of the film's deployment in narratives of the Anzac revival – situate the motivation behind and timing of *Gallipoli* in the currents of a popular, cultural nationalism. Louis Althusser notes that an ‘epoch's consciousness of itself’ is expressed in a culture's organic law, lore, and textual

[325] Jeremy Payne, *Kaleidoscope,* 1982, TVNZ, Auckland.
[326] *The Age*, 12 August, 1981
[327] For example,: M. Haltof, ‘Gallipoli, mateship, and the construction of Australian national identity’, *Journal of Popular Film & Television*, 21, 1 (2004), pp. 27–36; R. Morris, “Growing up Australian”: renegotiating mateship, masculinity and “Australianness”, in Hsu-Ming Teo’s *Behind the Moon’, Journal of Intercultural Studies*, 27, 1–2, (2006), pp. 155–166; Graham Seal ‘ANZAC: the sacred in the secular’, *Journal of Australian Studies*, 91 (2007), pp. 135–144.
[328] Daniel Reynard, *Celluloid Anzacs: The Great War through Australian Cinema*, Victoria Australian Scholarly Publishing Melbourne, 2007.
[329] Richard Leonard, *The Mystical Gaze of the Cinema: The Films of Peter Weir*, Melbourne University Press, Melbourne, 2009, pp. 164-165.
[330] *Evening Post*, 23 April, 1982.

manifestations.[331] Film texts such as *Gallipoli* are significant not simply as symbols by which to read into a historical period, but as ideological devices for inculcating social and political realities in a given societal context – in this case, cultural nationalist interpretations of *Gallipoli* as an expression of a new 'inclusive' Anzac Day rather than its older 'exclusive' form defined by imperial, racial, and civic hierarchies. Curran and Ward identify the 'new nationalism' of the 1960s and 1970s as a critical phase in the transition of Australia to a post-imperial nation, a process characterised by vacillation and confusion, on account of the paucity of 'viable, popularly sustainable alternatives' as much as popular desire to replace the old imperial symbols and structures.[332] A similar phenomenon took root in other British communities around the world including New Zealand.[333]

This interpretation of Weir's *Gallipoli*, and the Anzac revival itself, as an expression of 'new nationalism' has in turn influenced how we think about Shadbolt's *Once on Chunuk Bair* and contemporary histories of Anzac myth and identity. In his 2012 comparative study of the two cultural productions, James Bennett argues that Shadbolt's stage play and Weir's film mirror strongly divergent national preoccupations with history and culture in the 1980s, writing that 'one acknowledged colonial conflict and the relationship between two peoples in the founding of a nation while the other played up the bush as central to the national imaginary, in the process undergirding the historical narrative of *terra nullius*'.[334] These institutional connections are the comparison of *Gallipoli* with the 1991 film adaptation of Shadbolt's play, simply called *Chunuk Bair*. Unlike Weir's film, which received the backing of a production company part-owned by media magnate Rupert Murdoch, *Chunuk Bair* was made by a first-time director, Dale Bradley, and was brought to the big screen on a shoestring budget without any support from key national screen agencies, the New Zealand Film Commission and New Zealand on Air. 'Yet for all of these apparent advantages', Bennett writes, '*Gallipoli* is also a highly sentimental, romanticized and, at base, less honest rendition of Gallipoli mythology than is *Chunuk Bair*.'[335] The key difference between the two film texts is seemingly the difference between a romantic and realist treatment of Gallipoli. Bennett casts *Chunuk Bair* as more favourable because Shadbolt's grittier work, with its grime and expletives, deploys – in his mind – a fairer and more authentic vision of 'what actually happened'. Both *Gallipoli* and *Once on Chunuk Bair* draw powerfully on the role 'voices from below' approach of social history and, in his analysis, Bennett consistently contrasts 'the hegemonic top-down official narratives (inscribed in the official published histories and on war memorials) and the unofficial or counter-narrative version that emerged so strongly in soldiers' diaries and letters'.[336]

Post-war cultural nationalism in Australia and New Zealand was energised by a historicist project of returning to 'what really happened' in an attempt to access – and affirm – the authenticity and

[331] Louis Althusser, 'Contradiction and Overdetermination', translated by Ben Brewster, Penguin Press New York, 1969, p. 108.
[332] James Curran and Stuart Ward, *The Unknown Nation: Australia after Empire*, Melbourne University Press, Melbourne, 2010, p. 8.
[333] Curran and Ward, pp. 247–255.
[334] James Bennett, 'Man Alone and Men Together; Maurice Shadbolt, William Malone and Chunuk Bair', *Journal of New Zealand Studies*, NS13 (2012), pp. 46–61.
[335] Bennett, 'Man Alone', p. 56.
[336] Bennett, pp. 47–48.

ordinariness of popular experience. This chapter explores the way in which this ideological project was, in fact, co-opted into the formation of a new state myth. It does this through two distinct sections. In the first section, we will discuss *Gallipoli* as a text with a particular ideological structure reflecting not a revival of social memories of the war, but the state context of the Cold War within an American cultural and political system. We will consider the film's ideological displacement and internal contradictions, and the public response of Australian and New Zealand audiences, particularly the impact on the arrangement of returned servivemen's memories. *Gallipoli* became 'the Australian film' by functioning as universal myth, dehistoricising and depoliticising the nature of Australian settlement, at a time when historians were reappraising the foundations of Australian statehood.

In New Zealand, changing economic and political realities entailed asserting a national cinema against Australian claims on Gallipoli, as its imaginative landscape became a key marker of national identity. In this way, *Chunuk Bair* as a text and project can only be understood as a response to the ideological work of *Gallipoli*. Although Bennett considers Shadbolt's text representative of 'divergent national preoccupations', *Once on Chunuk Bair* was produced as a conscious reaction to the success of Gallipoli and its imaginative power. In the second section, we will situate Shadbolt in broader individual and institutional networks around 'the New Zealand story' that attempted to produce a new national memory of the campaign and the experience of men fighting in the NZEF. We will consider the limits and failures of this project leading into the 1990s. Both these texts and the cultural and intellectual projects they represented operated in a complex political and economic milieu. This included growing economic ties between Australia and New Zealand through the Closer Economic Relations agreement, the shift from a welfare state to a market state; and a divergent political trajectory, in particular around the ANZUS Treaty with the United States.[337]

Rather than being markedly different, *Gallipoli* and *Once on Chunuk Bair* shared a distinct genealogy linked to the changing configuration of the state and a shared need to connect nationalism with war experience through an epic, emotive spectacle. Bourdieu's essential point that power in a capitalist society is cultural in form, even if economic in end, can also be understood in these changing constitutional mentalities.[338] These cultural productions perpetuated state narratives with important implications for contemporary society. As Marcia Landy puts it, 'the investment in the past is related to the power to name, to determine what counts as history, and hence to identify differences between dominance and exclusion'.[339] The cultural productions around Anzac – film, television, and theatre – in the 1980s represent not simply the popular triumph of Anzac, but an example of the transformation of history into spectacle; the negotiation of the meaning of history through the deliberate blurring of the boundaries between historiography and dramaturgy, as Charlotte Caning notes.[340] Both *Gallipoli* and *Chunuk Bair* relied on historians to imbue the dramatic productions with historical verisimilitude,

[337] Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 'NZ-Australia Closer Economic Relations (CER)': https://www.mfat.govt.nz/en/trade/free-trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements-in-force/nz-australia-closer-economic-relations-cer/.
[338] Pierre Bourdieu, 'The Forms of Capital', in J.G. Richardson, eds., *Handbook for Theory and Research for the Sociology of Education*, Greenwood Publishing Group, Westport, Conn., 1986, pp. 241–258.
[339] Marcia Landy, *Cinematic Uses of the Past*, University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis-London, 1996.
[340] Charlotte Caning, 'Feminist Performance as Feminist Historiography', *Theatre Survey*, 45, 2 (2004): pp. 227–233.

therefore validating their interpretation of the campaign and its commemoration. This panorama of cultural production around war experience and commemoration in the 1980s was fundamental to the trajectory of remembrance heading into the seventy-fifth, ninetieth, and centenary anniversaries of Gallipoli – all major state performances in 1990, 2005, and 2015 respectively.

In both cases, this was a reconstructed national memory, mediated through the heightened emotional spectacle of film, given historical valence but removed from critique. *Gallipoli* provided a depoliticised and dehistoricised commodity in this local-global nexus which shaped new understandings of Australians' relationship to the past, each other as constitutional citizens, and the state. This triumph of spectacle signifies, as Debord put it, the 'autocratic reign of the market economy'.[341] Spectacle becomes a stand-in for social relations, that is, not so much a collection of images but a social relation among people, mediated by images.[342] Debord observed that spectacle actively alters human interactions and relationships. The sentimentalisation of war experience and the privileging of family connection is reduced to the psychometrics of the market state, in which human personality is concentrated on the consumption of a limited number of desirable goods. Personal identity is mediated through consumer images.

***Gallipoli:* context and connections**

Explanations of cultural nationalism as the underlying factor in the Anzac 'revival' and its filmic landmark *Gallipoli* remain influential. Reflecting on changes in Anzac commemoration before a group of historians in 2013, Bill Gammage noted the apparent change from an exclusive to inclusive Anzac Day since the 1980s and pointed to Weir's *Gallipoli* as crucial in this process. According to Gammage, the film represented the 'stirring' of a new, hopeful nationalism when released to critical acclaim in 1981.[343] Although admitting that the release of his own book *The Broken Years* in 1974 shaped growing interest in 'individual stories not events', Gammage stated that this focus was strengthened immeasurably by Weir's film, focusing as it did on two young men. The film's audiences of hundreds of millions swamped the some 30,000 copies of the relatively popular *Broken Years*.

In aligning the success of Weir's *Gallipoli* with the emergence of the new social histories, Gammage demonstrates not only that the cultural medium of film is one which far outstrips the audience of academic history, but also the contribution historians themselves have made in establishing the new political and social consensus around Anzac. Gammage's emotional rendering is one example. The years directly preceding the release of *Gallipoli* were marked by an explosion of historical publication.[344] Some of this was the republication of classic Australian history texts, perhaps most significantly, the revised edition of Charles Bean's *The Story of Anzac*, with a new introduction by Ken Inglis.[345] Indeed, this publication reflected the general re-engagement with histories of the AIF and the

[341] Guy Debord, *The Society of the Spectacle*, translated by Donald Nicholson-Smith, Zone Press, New York, 1994, thesis 125.
[342] Debord, thesis 4.
[343] Bill Gammage, 'Re-thinking Anzac', MCH Panel, NGA, 7 May 2013.
[344] Ged Martin, 'The explosion in Australian historical publication', *The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History*, 12, 1 (1982), pp. 94–105.
[345] C. E. W. Bean, *The Story of Anzac from the Outbreak of War to the End of the First Phase of the Gallipoli Campaign, May 4, 1915*, University of Queensland Press, Brisbane, 1981.

campaign influenced by the protest movements of the 1970s.[346] The works of Gammage, as the film's historical consultant, and Patsy Adam-Smith whose book *The Anzacs* was published a decade later in 1991, emphasised the experience of the ordinary individual soldier in the Gallipoli campaign and were enormously influential in shaping the work of Weir and his screenwriter David Williamson. These works emerged in the context of debate around oral history in Australian history, representing either new and innovative histories or what Patrick O'Farrell condemned as 'unmediated voices'.[347] Historical truth (and therefore the historian's job), O'Farrell argued, 'is not primarily about what happened or how things were, but about how the past has been recollected'.[348] There was also an increasing number of journalists publishing popular histories of Gallipoli and war experience, above all Jonathan King and Les Carlyon, who were influential among an emerging strata of film auteurs and writers.[349]

This was a new engagement between history and popular productions in film and television. Reynaud compares **'**conservative' and 'radical' treatments of war memory in the 1960s and 1970s but misses the 'settling logics' which underpin them, especially the emerging strains of an 'inclusive' Anzac Day.[350] Television was the first medium to reflect changes around the representation of Anzac, with two documentary series in the 1960s. In 1961, Channel 7 produced the series *Anzacs*, which consisted of twenty-six episodes of thirty minutes each, covering both World Wars. The ABC produced Bean's campaign narratives *The Anzac Story* in 1965 – eight episodes of thirty minutes – coinciding with the fiftieth anniversary pilgrimage.[351] Television dramas also tended to articulate a 'conservative' interpretation of the Anzac story, emphasising the tropes of military prowess and heroism.[352] *Report from Gallipoli*, produced by the ABC in 1977, captured most of the traditional attitudes towards the Anzac story expressed in commemoration.[353]

Programming on commercial networks was aimed at the widest possible audience in order to attract advertising dollars, avoiding controversy with traditional narratives, but also demanding less knowledge of the military campaigns from the public. In this way, the emerging 'Australian content' from the private sector relied on American Hollywood forms; while public producers like ABC and SBS (in 1980) adopted European themes and styles.[354] A spate of war films pushed Anzac to the periphery of their narratives, such as *Battle of Broken Hill* (finished in 1978, but released in 1982), *The Odd Angry Shot* (1979) set in the height of the Vietnam War, and *Break of Day* (1976), directed by Ken

[346] See, for example, the *Canberra Times* Anzac Day editorial in 1986, pp. 8-9; situated alongside articles about nuclear disarmament groups.
[347] Patrick O'Farrell, 'Oral History: Facts and Fiction', *Quadrant*, 23, 148 (1979): pp. 4–8.
[348] Ibid., p. 6.
[349] Jenny Macleod, 'Beckham, Waugh and the Memory of Gallipoli', in John Crawford and Ian McGibbon, eds., *New Zealand's Great War: New Zealand, the Allies & the Great War*, Auckland University Press, Auckland, 2007, pp. 146–47.
[350] Reynaud, p. 145.
[351] *The Anzac Story,* ABC, 1965.
[352] Reynaud, p. 148.
[353] *Report from Gallipoli*, ABC, 1977.
[354] Elizabeth Jacka and Susan Dermody, *The Imaginary Industry: Australian Film in the Late Eighties*, AFTRS Publications, Sydney, 1998, p. 39.

Hannam.[355] Perhaps most famous in the pre-*Gallipoli* era was *Breaker Morant* (1980), 'the first film to offer the easy chauvinism of defining Australian identity against a negative British image', expanding thematically on *Report from Gallipoli* had done in 1977 and foreshadowing the themes of Weir's film.[356]

The convergence between the academy, film, and Anzac commemoration emphasised the unity and connection of the nation. These works explored the origins of white Australia, drawing on the canon of bush literature and Anzac histories, even as these were increasingly dissolved in the global economics of the late Cold War period. They increasingly shifted from the experience of war to its social and political context, conflating war experience with the development of the nation. There was also an apparent 'marginalisation' of the Anzac myth, situated on the periphery of these films, except for non-commercial ABC productions. Indeed, the various genres – documentary, drama, and feature film – all drew on a grammar of historical truth even as they simplified the complex political, social, and cultural realities of war, in order to reach audiences for whom historical content vied with entertainment value. This, along the conflation of the Gallipoli campaign with the proxy conflicts of the Cold War, expressed a 'moderate' or 'middle-ground' new conservative-liberal consensus. In this way, these television and film productions represented not so much a 'revival' or re-engagement with war experience and its memory, but in fact a shift away from this historicity – in the returned and services associations and documentary-styles of Anzac consumption – and towards deified histories. This was the immediate context of Weir's *Gallipoli*. Indeed, it was unsurprising that one of the many motivations put forward by Peter Weir and actor Megan Williams for their involvement in the film was that they saw Anzac-related film and television as sources of reliable information to fill their lack of knowledge about the Great War.[357] As consecutive Labor and Coalition governments funded the film industry, these productions articulated new patterns of recognition: investment and major film distributors continued to influence Australian cinema towards mainstream, tasteful, artistic stories which appealed to the 'neutral majority'. There was a direct connection between 'historical productions' which took the legitimacy of the Australian state as their theme, and the economic reforms which defined the 1980s.

Gallipoli was tied to the emergence of forms of history outside the academy, its 'popularisation' linked to new social histories, and the revival of Australian War Memorial; all of which informed the actions of these artists and their 'audience'. This contextual analysis, however, does not provide the full answer to the question of why *Gallipoli* became 'the Australian film' and the most potent expression of the Anzac myth. Television series, documentaries, and 'war films' such as *Breaker Morant* articulated a range of narratives of the national past and the national future. In this cultural flux, however, *Gallipoli* was depoliticised, dehistoricised, and excised of class and racial politics. *Gallipoli* resonated in the

[355] *Battle of Broken Hill*, Sagittarius Film, 1981; *The Odd Angry Shot*, Samson Productions & Australian Film Commission, 1979; *Break of Day*, Clare Beach Films, 1976.
[356] *Breaker Morant*, South Australian Film Corporation, 1980; Reynaud, 182. Kenneth G. Ross, *Breaker Morant*, Edward Arnold, Melbourne, 1978. Like Shadbolt's *Once on Chunuk Bair*, *Breaker Morant* was adapted from a stage play of the same name, written by Kenneth G. Ross and first performed in 1978. The script was almost immediately converted into the screenplay for Beresford's film.
[357] 'Peter Weir on Gallipoli: "I felt somehow I was really touching history", *Literature/Film Quarterly*, 9, 4 (1981): http://www.peterweircave.com/articles/articlej.html.

emerging public sphere because of its mythic function in transcending, reconciling, and depoliticising the foundation of the state.

The central narrative of the film is the journey of the protagonist, Archy Hamilton, and his friend, Frank Dunne, towards the Gallipoli campaign. Characterisation is based on their motives for joining the war. Archy is a sentimental and naive supporter of the empire; Frank the Irish-Australian rogue who loyally follows his mate and eventually enlists. Other characters express their desire to travel, to escape the drudgery of work, and their response to anti-German wartime propaganda. The deployment of anti-British sentiment, an issue much discussed in the scholarship, is central to these characterisations – and the imaginative power of the film – because it removes the complicity of the characters, especially the national *arch*etype of Archy, from the futile wastage of the war and imperial politics. In contrast to the naivety and innocence of the Australian characters, we have the pompous arrogance of British commanders whose willingness to throw Australian troops into the 'meat grinder' of modern warfare, as an 'essential diversion', represent the evils of imperial greed and hubris which drove the war. Because the film pivots on the equivocation of individual with the nation, the Australian nation is absolved in the process from the experience of the war. Ultimately, this displacement of national/imperial, Australian/British, innocence/guilt, is reflected in the geographical displacement of the film which, though named *Gallipoli*, spends only the last thirty minutes located on the peninsula.

Gallipoli was promoted as a rediscovery of historical experiences such as Lone Pine and the Nek within a national memory. Agency and intention are, however, absent. The film's characters are instead overtaken by twentieth-century mass violence and the bureaucratic machinery of the war state. A sense of predestination, an element completely out of place in a film which purports to be historical, imbues the entirety of the film, especially the final scene in which Archy is graphically riddled with machine gun bullets.[358] Richard Leonard notes how the requiems of the soundtrack anticipate the slaughter. [359] As the film moves towards this final moment, neither the generals nor the audience express surprise at its impending reality; rather they have internalised the nationalist logic of the film and its 'memory'. Indeed, Archy himself is resigned to this fate, choosing to swap out his place with Frank as the messenger. This fatalism is expressed in the repeated and unconvincing Hellenic imagery of the film, mooring the characters in some kind of continuity with an Arcadian past.[360] The finality of Archy's death, without a reaction or sense of continued existence among the other characters of the film, is a fundamentally materialist, secular, and bloodless response to the realities of war experience.

The film's unconvincing classical aesthetic in the construction of a national cultural memory is an extension of the film's tenuous historicity. One of the extraordinary omissions of the film is the portrayal of characters with a history. Archy and Frank are lone individuals with little or no sense of community; with no personal culture and little education; and with few religious ties or family

[358] Peter Fraser, *Images of the Passion: the Sacramental Mode in Film*, Praeger, Washington D. C., 1998, p. 18.
[359] Leonard, p. 106.
[360] Or as Henry Plociennik in his review put it, their 'appointment with destiny in the trenches of Gallipoli', *TV Listener*, 9 July, 1981; Jonathan Rayner, *Contemporary Australian Cinema*, Manchester University Press, Manchester, 2000, p. 133; *The National Times*, 2 August, 1981.

attachments. Indeed, the peculiar individual resonance in *Gallipoli* is reflected in the film's paradoxical relationship to notions of mateship. Although scholars have pointed to mateship as a central theme of the movie – the celluloid creation of the bush myth translated to Anzac Cove – it, in fact, departs from these historical roots in very specific ways.[361] In the film, the character Frank Dunne leaves his group of mates – Snow, Billy, and Barney – who might have represented the bond of work and class, for the solitary friendship of Archy. In this way, Weir departs from the collective mateship of Bean, and asserts an individuality more comfortable in the political and social milieu of the 1980s, one in which the social capital of community was diminished in favour of individual relationships of consumption.

The disconnect from community and relationships whether mateship or family, reinforces the film's stark individualism. Archy, raised on Kipling and *Boy's Own*, escapes the demands and expectations of his running trainer Uncle and authoritarian father, the constraints of domesticity and tradition. This was detected by several commentators at the time of the film's release in 1981. Critic John Carroll complained that 'the present younger generation having little sense of purpose – its fathers found nothing worth passing on. They lost confidence in the values of their fathers and failed to kindle a sense of community for the new generation'.[362]

> Here was *Gallipoli*'s telling insight – on the role of fathers. When there are no fathers worth emulating the culture becomes negative, turning against all values and especially those of the immediate past.

Although Carroll's point is somewhat over-wrought (much like *Gallipoli* itself), it offers a telling insight into the perceived crisis in Anzac Day's shift from its imperial to post-imperial form, increasingly centred on new horizontal relationships of individual and state. The idea that at Anzac Day we 'praise famous men, and our fathers that begat us', is disconnected with this new landscape of myth.[363] A brief shot of the isolated selector's cottage, a long stretch of desert, and a country athletics carnival stand in for the lack of historical background. We have the paradox of an 'historical' film stripped of any but the most elemental historical context, given the ahistorical quality of archetype and myth.

The stripping away of adolescent innocence has, of course, been used by 'new nationalism' scholars as a representation of the process of maturation, writ large at the level of the nation. This is especially reinforced by Weir's interviews, where he says that he was 'just trying to tell it like it was, to create the feeling of what it was really like to be there' – linked in turn to the attempts to 'authenticate' the film through historical details. This 'empiricist fallacy' is an atomistic view that the whole is an accumulation, an adding up of the parts.[364] Military historians have typically responded to the film's nostalgic innocence with counter-narratives of, for example, the aggressive racism, promiscuity, and disorderliness of the Australian forces in Cairo – often summarized in the 'Battle of the Wazzir' in which brothels were burned down and prostitutes murdered by drunk Anzac troops – to show a

[361] Amanda Lohrey, 'Australian mythologies – Gallipoli: Male Innocence as a marketable commodity', *Island Magazine*, March (1982): pp. 29–34.
[362] John Carroll, *The Age Monthly Review*, 1, 7 (1981), p. 8.
[363] Inga Clendinnen, 'The History Question: Who owns the past?', *Quarterly Essay*, 23 (2006), p. 1.
[364] Lohrey, p. 30.

grittier, more 'authentic' narrative of the Anzacs. The idea that these cultural texts 'tell it like it is', rather than articulate a specific view of history and the state, is a problematic fantasy, one which lacks self-reflexivity but in the context of the post-imperial reconstruction of Anzac Day proves a potent one.

Indeed, the 'empiricist fallacy' committed in *Gallipoli* – its claim to be non-partisan, presenting an authentic view, by drawing on social histories in which the truth speaks for itself – is important in the depoliticisation of the Anzac myth. Rather than asking why this particular image is presented – key to the process of historical inquiry and historical understanding – the film privileges a concern with small details and an 'absence' of politics. This is best illustrated in the key difference between *Breaker Morant* and *Gallipoli*. While both deploy an anti-British dialogue, Beresford's film draws on the politics of class and a critique of war as an extension of imperialist policy, in a way completely absent from Weir's. Indeed, the effective classlessness of the characters in Weir's film is an extension of an apolitical individual innocence. The Vietnam War film, *The Deer Hunter* (1978), by Michael Camino, provides a contrast to this deployment of masculine innocence in Weir's film. *Deer Hunter* follows a similar storyline of two country boys fighting out of misplaced patriotism. As Sandra Hall notes in her review of *Gallipoli*, a distinct difference from Weir's approach is that Camino did not leave his character's innocence intact, instead pushing them 'towards recognition of the aggressive element in human nature' which makes it apparent that their participation is complicity in the atrocities of modern mass violence. Weir, on the other hand, never goes this far, instead rendering in narrative form the notion that 'those led to sacrifice themselves out of youthful ignorance are more interesting – even more noble – than those who confront the contradiction in themselves'.[365]

The paradox of a depolitical and ahistorical Anzac film in the 1980s coheres to the broader engagement with history and the foundation of the state in the lead up to the Bicentenary, related to changing nature of citizenship. Rayner talks at length about the 'symbolic distances' in Weir's films: the gap between past and present, historical fact and accepted legend, and documentary and stylized dramatic narrative.[366] In fact, in the case of *Gallipoli,* the effectiveness of the film is not distance but the collapse of differences – history fused with the national – situated in the film's exalted individuality. Weir's film is less a work of imagination than projection. The collapse of distinctions between history and drama, aligned with the total identification of the state with the individual person, can be linked to key elements of the experience of the Cold War and the way it inflected the trajectory and mentality of the state. The reformulations of the figure of the soldier in the 1980s, textualised in *Gallipoli*, runs precisely counter to this discourse; that they are not the perpetrators of war, but its victims; not actors, but innocents, *acted upon* by the forces of a technocratic modernity.

Although often situated in terms of Australian content and 'new nationalism', *Gallipoli* trades on distinctly American generic characteristics of the post-war cultural milieu, rather than traditional notions of the Anzac legend. Jane Tompkins, in her famous analysis of the Western in American literary and film culture, notes that classic interpretations of the genre as 'the conflict between industrial and agricultural America and the resultant nostalgia of the past', as Richard Etulain put it,

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[366] Rayner, p. 136

are a *mode* of historical explanation that extends the mentality of the Western rather than deconstructing it.[367] A similar critique can be laid against Anzac scholarship and *Gallipoli*. Cultural nationalist interpretations, extending the mode of history embedded in *Gallipoli,* assert notions of erasure and realist narratives of Gallipoli, which extend its secularity, its mythic function, and its commodification of masculine innocence. In explaining his motivations for embarking on the film, Weir opined that 'in our country, we had no Wilfred Owen, no Robert Graves, no Sassoon, no Great War poets who could tell us about the lost generation'.

> It took us a great deal of research, including many conversations with these old veterans, to realise we did lose our own flower of a nation. It was in fact the only all-volunteer army in the First World War. A special kind of man went. Sure they were adventurers, but a very simple kind.[368]

Gallipoli entwines collective national innocence with a personal and individual innocence, with the Anzacs becoming brave adventurers, and constructs a highly marketable commodity. Weir gives his audience the sanitised version, while reinforcing the individual and market-centred logic of the Australian re-settlement in the 1980s. The sentimental reinvention of the Anzacs underpins the new engagement with Anzac Day in the 1990s, especially with the rise of Gallipoli tourism, through which young Australians and New Zealanders participate in this journey or adventure. Newspaper reviews portraying the film as an adventure story were common. The film was '[l]ess a war movie than a historical account and tale of friendship and adventure, the story of young Australians who find excitement and death', according to the *TV Listener* review and similarly in *Movie*, '[n]ot a war film but an everlasting tribute to the likes of Frank and Archy and to the courage of the human spirit'.[369]

The year 1981 also saw an explosion of media coverage of 'first person experiences' of the campaign, alongside detailed accounts of the campaign in both Australia and New Zealand. In this media coverage, Gallipoli, *Gallipoli*, and Anzac Day became synonymous. We can see how influential the film was for New Zealand audiences in one *Evening Post* interview with Cecil Manson, a British expatriate who fought at Gallipoli with the British army.[370] Though Manson landed at Suvla Bay, he goes to great length to describe the 'utter confusion at Anzac Cove, as the recent film *Gallipoli* shows', The visuals were reinforced in the narrative by Manson referencing 'runners' between commands and units on the frontline – the central dramatic device of Weir's film. In a way that was typical of interviews and depictions of the campaign throughout the 1980s, *Gallipoli* frames Manson's experiences: the folly of the British command 'drinking tea' while the Anzacs sacrifice their lives; the triumph of Weir's spectacle; the 'historical film' collapsing into history itself. These articles weaved the film's imagery with biographical accounts, and a cathartic process by which Manson and other authors would come to terms with their experience as soldiers.[371] Second World War veteran, Buzz Kennedy, wrote in his regular column in the *Australian* describing the 'incredibly young Australians' who made

[367] Jane Tomkins, *West of Everything: the Inner life of Westerns*, Oxford University Press, New York, 1990, p. 7.
[368] 'Interview with Peter Weir', *Cineaste*, 11, 4 (1982), p. 42.
[369] *TV Listener*, 9 July, 1981; *Movie*, 3 May, 1981, p. 33.
[370] *Evening Post*, 26 April, 1983.
[371] *Evening Post*, 22 April, 1982.

up his comrades during the war as 'carbon copies of Archy and his mates… good-natured, remarkably naive, not very well informed about why we were going to war'. He then applauded the film for portraying 'participation in war by not preaching about the war'; 'it does not damn or condemn', except 'a thousand politicians on their platforms or parsons in their pulpits'.[372] This cliché of veterans' memories was a cultural formulation of war experience into war memory, redacted and folded into the film, so that at the premiere, 'memories of the battle at Gallipoli… came flooding back for older members of the crowd milling around the theatre'.[373]

The distinction between 'national' and 'political history' and these changing relationships of the individual and state return us to constitutional structures and the emerging market context of the state and cultural production in the 1980s. The economic context of neoliberal reforms, instigated by respective Labor and Liberal governments, shifted the film industry towards the international market. The 1980s was therefore marked by a greater emphasis on local films that would compete on the international market, especially in the United States. Certainly, *Gallipoli* resonated with Australian and New Zealand audiences. The film was, of course, promoted by the Murdoch press: *Australian* reviewer Evan Williams proclaimed that Weir's purpose was more original, daring, and important than a great battlefield epic, 'it is to explain what Gallipoli and the First World War meant to Australia's history and our understanding of ourselves'. Elsewhere, Weir's film was interpreted as 'the war message that stunned a nation' and 'the appalling slaughter of fine youth', linked to the war journalist Keith Murdoch, Rupert's father, who had criticised the British authorities for their bungling during the campaign.[374] But it was its international success – specifically, in American cinema – that ensured *Gallipoli* achieved valence as a national film. The 'Australian film' can only be understood in its success in the American market as acceptance in a wider cultural *Americana*. Weir was considered to have made the successful transition from Australian industry to Hollywood, through *Witness*, *Gallipoli*, and other films: 'a new cultural hybrid integrating at the level of national specify, two national cultures (one of global proportions, the other more local) through a process of mental bricolage'.[375] This was reflected in the decision to send the film to American distributors, rather than the traditional audience of the European Cannes film festival.[376] Weir himself recognised the new focus on films in national cultures, saying in an interview how 'a great deal of unnecessary focus is placed on films and filmmakers today. They have become public commodities. They are endlessly discussed.'[377]

As Michael Featherstone observes, 'the globalization of the market was in many ways an Americanization'.[378] This produced national narratives tied to constitutional and historical changes in a kind of consumer nationalism. Indeed, Friedman notes the ways in which groups in various national contexts handle consumer commodities and tourism through a variety of strategies to re-constitute

[372] *The Australian*, 10 August, 1981.
[373] *Weekend Australian*, 8 August 8, 1981; Sydney *Morning Herald,* 8 August, 1981.
[374] *The Weekend Australian Magazine*, 14 August, 1981.
[375] Ulf Hedetoft, 'Contemporary Cinema: Between Cultural Globalisation and National Interpretation', in Mette Hjort and Scott Mackenzie, eds., *Cinema and Nation*, Psychology Press, London, 2000, pp. 255–288, 282.
[376] *Sydney Morning Herald,* 11 July, 1981.
[377] *The National Times*, 2 August, 1981, 10.
[378] Mike Featherstone, 'Genealogies of the Global', *Theory Culture Society*, 23, 2-3 (2006): pp. 387–392, 388.

identity.[379] The paradox of this process of localisation and globalisation is constitutive of the same trend: cultural fragmentation and modernist homogenisation, within which consumption becomes a cultural strategy of self-definition and self-maintenance. As John Bevan-Smith notes, the foundational idea of Australia and New Zealand as having achieved national consciousness through the experience of the Gallipoli campaign, is 'all part and parcel of the legitimising grand narratives deployed by settler societies, the teleologies of which are always already oriented towards the realisation of their civilising projects and the fulfilment of their idealised selves in "the not-yet-now".'[380] The nature of the state as 'the not-yet-now' is expressed in the enchantment of violence inherent in the cultural forms of Anzac; including its ritual and the post-imperial re-founding of Australia and New Zealand: a Habermasian crisis in which state sovereignty has lost much of its explanatory power, even if it has lost none of its power of organisation. In this way, the film text of *Gallipoli* is symbolic of the legitimation provided through Anzac; simultaneously sustaining, entrenching, and negating the process of individualisation. History is replaced with spectacle because the state is supreme, and ultimately, the power of these cultural forms was the re-centering of the state/citizen as the protagonist of history. The spectacle alters human interactions and relationships, through the artifice of the human body – spectacle was, as Debord notes, not so much a collection of images but a mediation of social relations through images.

Once on Chunuk Bair and 'the New Zealand story'

As in the case of Weir's *Gallipoli*, *Once on Chunuk Bair* was imbued with a nationalist agenda by Maurice Shadbolt. The notion of a more 'realistic' nationalism is deeply embedded in Shadbolt's text. In the *Kaleidoscope* interview, Shadbolt stated a similar commitment to historicity as Weir and Gammage, saying 'all the characters are in some way based on men who fought at Gallipoli'; composite characters based on soldier's diaries, letters, autobiographical accounts, military documents and many books about the campaign. Ian Hamilton's message to the troops, for example, is verbatim from the official records. Shadbolt thus claimed that 'if the play makes a statement, it is one from all the materials I've explored' – an explicit claim to what had been implicit in Weir's 'empiricist' text – and crucial to claiming the spontaneous assent of the popular. Ormond Burton's 1935 book *The Silent Division: New Zealanders at the Front, 1914-1919* had drawn attention to the heroics at Chunuk Bair and its potent connection with national identity, some fifty years before. Burton wrote that 'every man on that ridge knew that the thin line of New Zealand men was holding wide the door to victory… how men were to die on Chunuk [Bair] was determined largely by how men and women lived on the farms and in the towns of New Zealand'.

The play and its 1992 film adaptation drew on reinterpretations of the campaign supported by collaborations with military historians; notably Christopher Pugsley's 1984 book, *Gallipoli: The New Zealand Perspective*, and that historian's passionate input as a key consultant to the production.[381]

[379] Jonathan Friedman, 'Being in the world: Globalization and Localization', in Mike Featherstone, ed., *Global Culture: Nationalism, Globalization and Modernity*, SAGE Publishing, London, 1990, pp. 311–328.
[380] John Bevan-Smith, 'Lest we remember/"Lest we forget": Gallipoli as exculpatory memory', *Journal of New Zealand Studies*, NS18 (2014): pp. 2–22.
[381] Bennett, 'Man Alone', p. 56.

Puglsey's work represented a distint historiographical operation, drawing on transnational cultural developments and helped, as J. M. Wilson puts it, 'springboard a revived parallel understanding of the myth in New Zealand'.[382] In fact, as we will see, this was not so much a revival but an invention of a national memory of Gallipoli, shaped by the needs of a post-imperial milieu.

James Bennett extends Gammage's notion of a cultural nationalism, from 'stirring' in Australia, to New Zealand, at the time of Weir's *Gallipoli*, saying how Weir as a cultural producer 'was stirred to make his landmark feature film as a reaction against a tradition of Anzac shrouded in the rituals of Empire and Britishness that had so disaffected him and many of his contemporaries'.[383] Although producing a considerable range of novels, short stories, and plays over the course of his life, Shadbolt turned to war experience to explore notions of national identity in the 1980s, beginning with his now-famous play and extending his approach with *Voices of Gallipoli* (1988), a documentary of interviews and stories with surviving Anzacs.[384] Shadbolt saw his work as a direct response to *Gallipoli*, a kind of historiographical corpus, in which competing interpretations of the campaign were acted out. *Chunuk Bair* was his answer to 'the Australians' magnificent debacle at Lone Pine and the Nek'.[385] Shadbolt drew heavily on Robert James Rhodes's *Gallipoli* (1965), which claimed that 'the Australian mythology about Gallipoli has often been neither objective nor fair'. This bias, Shadbolt argued, was fuelled by Alan Moorhead's 'deeply flawed and grievously over-praised account' of the campaign.[386] In this way, rather than being an anti-war play, Shadbolt described it as specifically nationalist and, moreover, revisionist. He found the campaign 'was a very painful and tragic process of self-discovery' and 'yet there was nothing in our national culture about Gallipoli'.[387] The stage play was to be 'a living memorial', with Shadbolt telling the actors at the start of rehearsals: 'you are not doing this for the Mercury Theatre, not for Maurice Shadbolt or Ian Mune, and not, I hope, for yourselves. You are doing it for the New Zealanders who remain on Gallipoli.' This sense of 'presentness' – talking about dead, who 'remain' forever entombed at Gallipoli as the national fallen – is employed as a corrective dialogue to the dominant work of Weir while participating in the same nationalising process; that is, an attempted reconstruction of the individual in a national memory of war.

Shadbolt also makes this equation of national innocence with the individual innocence of the soldier, and the experience of Chunuk Bair as 'one that had long since been erased from national consciousness through a collective amnesia'. Accordingly, we can see how their works extend a specific mode: both *Gallipoli* and *Chunuk Bair* entwine collective national innocence with a personal and individual innocence, with the Anzacs becoming brave adventurers. The theme of *national innocence* is reflected in Shadbolt's stage play, although with different inflections to Weir's film owing

[382] J. M. Wilson, "Colonize, Pioneer. Bash and slash": Once on Chunuk Bair and the Anzac myth', 34, 1 (2016): pp. 27–53, 3.
[383] Ibid., p. 49.
[384] For a bibliography of Shadbolt's published work up to this time, see Murray Gadd, 'A Bibliography of Maurice Shadbolt: 1956-1980', *Journal of New Zealand Literature (JNZL)*, 2 (1984), pp. 75–96.
[385] In Michael Neil's introduction to the 1983 edition of Maurice Shadbolt, *Once on Chunuk Bair*.
[386] What Jenny Macleod called 'superb but doubtful history' – Jenny Macleod, *Reconsidering Gallipoli*, Manchester University Press, London, 2014, p. 218.
[387] Philip Mann, 'Maurice Shadbolt the Dramatist: On the Dramaturgy of *Once on Chunuk Bair*', in Ralph Crane, ed., *Ending the Silences: Critical Essays on the Works of Maurice Shadbolt*, Hodder Moa Beckett, Auckland, 1995, pp. 130-146, 131. Also see: Shadbolt, *Voices of Gallipoli*, pp. 8–9.

to the fact that the play opens on the slopes of Gallipoli, and relates the characters' motivations for enlisting to the audience through the course of the battle; rather than depicting their actual enlistment, training, and transportation. *Chunuk Bair* traded on similar anti-British sentiment to *Gallipoli* – although Bennett is quick to point out its restraint.[388] The rehabilitation of William Malone, depicted in the play and film through the composite character of Major Connolley, and therefore the rehabilitation of New Zealand's national 'stirring', pivots on the character's refusal of Johnston and Temperley's order that the Wellington Battalion advance on the summit of Chunuk Bair in what amounted to a suicide order. The refusal represents the contestation of the supposed futility of command, resonating with progressive critiques of the war as a total waste of life, but also the individual and national innocence which Shadbolt was determined to reproduce.

Contemporary observers noted the growing interest in Anzac Day in New Zealand in reaction to the success of *Gallipoli*. Images of Mark Lee and Mel Gibson appeared alongside New Zealand newspaper editorials, supplements, and articles commemorating Anzac. To coincide with the film, John Wadham, the Auckland Museum's war collection curator, arranged a display of material associated with the Gallipoli campaign; including rifles, bayonets, and jam tin bombs as well as medals and photographs.[389] Newspapers and magazines published material on the Anzacs, especially personal accounts which emphasised the 'horrors of Anzac' that transformed 'men into beasts' – the innocence of a nation struck down by British incompetence – inflecting both war memory and the film's reception. Indeed, such was the film's popularity that the *Evening Post* editorial in the lead-up to Anzac Day 1982 stated that, 'many of the younger people in the audience could have been forgiven for gaining the impression that Australia fought the Gallipoli campaign by themselves, but of course, the N Z in the middle of Anzac stands for New Zealand'.[390]

Shadbolt, Pugsley, and historians such as Michael King wrote with the purposes of establishing as 'national' the personal experience of soldiers at Gallipoli and other battlefields. The underlying assumption was that 'asserting New Zealand's perspective' was recovering an obscure and hidden history. Bennett tells us that 'Shadbolt was all too aware' of this need to project a national voice. In fact, this acute awareness was a response to the critical changes in – and dissolutions of – social and cultural life in the 1980s. Prior to the release of *Gallipoli*, *New Zealand Herald* and other newspapers emphasised the Anzac Day as a 'reminder of an old partnership' which 'bound New Zealanders and Australians together in courage and tragedy'.[391] In 1981, this 'comradeship in arms' emphasised geographical proximity and 'a common historical and cultural heritage' predicated on common values, interest, and aspirations.[392]

The film was a text project situated in a broader context shaped by the state's need to assert a distinct corporate identity. In this way, the 1980s inaugurated the 'New Zealand perspective' within Anzac; a reaction to changing environments and Australian approaches. Even as public engagement with

[388] Bennett, 'Man Alone'.
[389] *Auckland Institute and Museum News*, No. 9, March (1982).
[390] *Evening Post*, 23 April, 1982.
[391] The editorial said Anzac 'must form a part of the pattern of the future"; *New Zealand Herald*, 24 April, 1980
[392] *New Zealand Herald*, 24 April, 1981.

Anzac Day increased, through attendance at ceremonies and through key creative works such as Weir's film and Shadbolt's play, its rhetoric and ritual was dominated by the polemics of ANZUS, government nuclear policy, and 'the rough and tumble of alliances' as Reeves put it. In this sense, far from being a unifying moment, Anzac commemoration became a key battleground as government, church, and military leaders attacked or defended the nuclear policies of their respective governments. Indeed, over the course of the decade, Anzac Day also saw increasing number of politicians speaking at dawn and morning services, fewer religious and other community leaders – part of the increasing alignment of state and individual. In both countries, this hinged on the acceptance of nuclear-armed or nuclear powered naval vessels in territorial waters.[393] In New Zealand, the issue became entwined such that Lange announced New Zealand's withdrawal from ANZUS on Anzac Day in 1989. This was a largely symbolic gesture – the United States had withdrawn its commitments when Labour had announced its anti-nuclear policy in 1986 – but nonetheless underscored Anzac Day as a site of political and moral debate. In Australia, debate around the country's role in ANZUS was limited to how the country's uranium exports should be restricted to non-military uses.[394] The near-absence of political dispute around ANZUS was due to the full support of the ALP under the leadership of Hawke, who was determined to cleave a new post-imperial relationship tied to the ascendancy of the United States, and a fragmented anti-nuclear movement.[395] The ANZUS debate became the political form of the thread traced in Weir and Shadbolt's construction of innocence and individuality, and indeed, the ANZUS debate on Anzac Day was situated precisely at the nexus of the same process; localisation and globalisation, fragmentation and homogenisation, in the experience of the late Cold War.

This divergence of government policies only reinforces the importance of cultural-intellectual elites. Shadbolt's interpretation and eagerness to be the 'Homer of [New Zealand's] tribal memory' was supported by collaboration with military historian Chris Pugsley, whose *Gallipoli: The New Zealand's Story* (1984) formed a broader historiography which culminated in the exhibition of the same name. **'**Gallipoli: the New Zealand story**'** exhibition opened at Waiouru Army Museum by Chief of Defence, Leonard Thornton in 1984, and sponsored by the New Zealand engineering firm Cable Price Downer.[396] The exhibition coincided with the launch of the book of the same title by Pugsley, published by Hodder and Stoughton, and a television documentary on 22 April 1984 on TV One by Doc Williams – also narrated by Leonard Thornton. Pugsley's was the first critical work on the

[393] Between 1977 and 1987, Australian ports received nearly 100 visits from US nuclear-powered warships, compared to only a half a dozen visits to New Zealand territorial waters. During the same period, New Zealand public opinion was increasingly in favour of banning these visits, with opposition rising from thirty-two to seventy-two per cent. Parliamentary Inquiry, 'Visits to Australia by nuclear powered or armed vessels: Contingency planning for the accidental release of ionizing radiation', Commonwealth of Australia 1989. Malcolm Templeton, *Standing upright here: New Zealand in the nuclear age*, Victoria University Press, Wellington, 2006, p. 105; Gerald Hensley, *Friendly fire: Nuclear politics and the collapse of ANZUS, 1984–1987*, Auckland University Press, Auckland, 2013, pp. 83–84

[394] Joseph A. Camilleri, *ANZUS: Australia's Predicament in the Nuclear Age*, Palgrave Macmillan, Melbourne 1987, p. 197, 230.

[395] Ewan Jamieson, *Friend or Ally: New Zealand at Odds with its Past*, Brassey's Publishing, Sydney, 1990, pp. 111–117; Jonathan Strauss, 'The Australian Nuclear Disarmament Movement in the 1980s', in Phillip Deery and Julie Kimber, eds., *Proceedings of the 14th Biennial Labour History Conference*, Australian Society for the Study of Labour History, Melbourne, 2015, pp. 39–50.

[396] Promotional material, Eph-D-MUSEUM-1984-01, 1984/1985, National Army Museum (NZNAM), Waiouru.

campaign to be written from ‘a New Zealand viewpoint’. The exhibition displayed the only Victoria Cross won by a New Zealander at Gallipoli, awarded to Cyril Bassett for ‘his extreme bravery under fire on the slopes of Chunuk Bair’. The exhibition reflected all the major elements in post-*Gallipoli* Anzac commemoration: the idea of asserting ‘New Zealand's special role’, centred on Chunuk Bair, in contrast with the Australian contribution and other imperial narratives.[397] Although there are only scant records of the exhibition left, with the original curator having moved to Europe, the considerable number of clippings in the Army Museum archives suggest the influence of the *Gallipoli* film.[398]

The exhibition and the documentary were an interesting intersection of emerging personal and institutional networks. The project was explicitly linked to Weir. Updating the Waiouru Army Museum staff on the progress of the ‘New Zealand story’ documentary, researcher Colleen Hodge wrote how ‘our film, like the Australian feature *Gallipoli*, is proving to be a slow and expensive project. However, we’ve great faith in our “sources”.[399] This entailed building a national archive of memory, by gathering a large collection of diaries, letters, and various official records relating to Gallipoli, which would then be deposited with the Army Museum.[400] TVNZ, the documentary’s producer, advertised in local and national newspapers in New Zealand, and the RSA *Review*; as well as contacting overseas Gallipoli ex-service groups in Australia and the United Kingdom.[401] Allan Martin, the TVNZ director-general, in the initial press release, stated that ‘[o]ur aim is to produce a film which will be referred to again and again in years to come’.[402] There was some media interest in the project; however, journalists consistently misdated Gallipoli as ’1918’ suggesting limited knowledge of the campaign.

‘The New Zealand story’ was a ‘nationalising’ of veterans’ memories whereby personal and family memory were translated into a national framework. The ‘national’ focus specifically intended to omit Australian soldiers. For example, offers of help from AIF ex-servicemen, or their families, living in New Zealand, were politely declined as ‘falling outside of the scope of the documentary’. J. O. C. Smith, killed in the battle of the Somme, was probably the first New Zealand-born soldier to land at Anzac Cove, as part of the AIF dawn landing. However, he was not included in the documentary which emphasised ‘New Zealand-recruited troops’, such as the Auckland Battalion which landed later in the morning of April 25.[403] This was a conscious reaction to Weir’s ‘brilliant film’, as Pugsley called to it, drawing on the Australia director’s research in relation to the Gallipoli battlefield.[404] The fact that this also reflected corporate identity and rationales – the documentary had limited funding based on producing ‘New Zealand content’ for TVNZ – reinforced its credentials as a cultural nationalist project.

[397] *Evening Post*, April 24, 1984.
[398] Correspondence with NZNAM.
[399] Hodge to Wilson, 30 March 1983, Eph-D-MUSEUM-1984-01, 1984/1985, NZNAM, Waiouru.
[400] Hodge to Malthus, 9 May, 1983, Eph-D-MUSEUM-1984-01, 1984/1985, NZNAM, Waiouru.
[401] Stretton to Banner, 26 August, 1982, Eph-D-MUSEUM-1984-01, 1984/1985, NZNAM, Waiouru.
[402] *New Zealand Herald*, 14 April, 1982; (Press Release) TVNZ, 22 March, 1982. Also see: *Timaru Herald*, 30 March, 1982.
[403] Robinson to TVNZ, 13 February, 1983; C. Hodge to I. J. Robinson, 23 February, 1983, Eph-D-MUSEUM-1984-01, 1984/1985, NZNAM, Waiouru.
[404] ‘Gallipoli - research notes’, p. 4, Eph-D-MUSEUM-1984-01, 1984/1985, NZNAM, Waiouru.

There were further limits to this national project. Chief of these was the lack of a national war records collection. Instead, researchers relied on veterans and families to send materials for copying to TVNZ and providing a network of references for other interviews that had already been recorded. A series of programmes produced and aired on 1ZB called *The Diggers Sessions* and interviews with Rod Talbot recounting a full history of the campaign was an important resource.[405] This was a distinct contrast to the institutional power of the Australian War Memorial which provided a centralised war record. Bill Gammage had been able to draw on the network of scholars and archives in Canberra, dedicating his thesis to 'a man I never met, CEW Bean'.[406] The lack of a similar institutional presence was acutely felt in the making of the New Zealand documentary. No film crew was attached to the New Zealand Expeditionary Forces, as in the case of the AIF, so that 1980s reconstruction of a 'New Zealand' narrative came to rely heavily on Australian footage of Australian soldiers. The resulting 300 veterans interview, as well as the collection of materials – diaries, letters, and manuscripts much of which had been, 'in private hands and undocumented' – were all donated to the Army Museum and nationalised through the structure of the documentary.[407] Pugsley was aware of the limits of these oral sources. He noted how the veterans talked 'in purely personal terms, most of them through rose tinted spectacles' with 'their stories are almost impossible to verify'. 'At best what we'll get is some glimpse of what it felt like to be a New Zealand soldier on Gallipoli', Pugsley concluded.[408] In saying this, Pugsley recognised the methodological problems of the project, before swiftly 'nationalising' this war experience. In this sense, we see the peculiarities of the 'New Zealand story' at once circulating in the transnational networks of imperial and Tasman institutional archival networks, while simultaneously attempting to close off those circulations through a national project of memory.

Described when it was screened as 'one of the most important documentaries that TVNZ had made', William's *Gallipoli: New Zealand's story* became a standard feature in later Anzac Day programming. Each rescreening was given greater poignancy as each year it was announced that more of the various men interviewed had died. In expressing his motivations for making the documentary, Williams said how it was 'simply because there was so little on record about the New Zealand side of the campaign', reflecting in part the way in which the imaginative landscape of Weir's film dominated conceptions of Gallipoli.[409] The documentary was intentionally shown on Anzac Day, in the late morning for people to watch after the morning ceremony, in anticipation that they would then watch *Gallipoli* in the evening. Television guides declared these two features provided 'an excellent backgrounder'. *Gallipoli: the New Zealand story* in its various media was a multi-pronged project: museum, academy, theatre, and cinema were all joined in seeking a new spectacle of history and memory.

[405] Talbot to TVNZ, 14 April, 1982; Hodge to Talbot, 6 May 1982; Eph-D-MUSEUM-1984-01, 1984/1985, NZNAM, Waiouru.
[406] Gammage, thesis, pp. iv–v.
[407] Martin to Fleming, 29 November, 1982, Eph-D-MUSEUM-1984-01, 1984/1985, NZNAM, Waiouru.
[408] 'Gallipoli - research notes', p. 3. Eph-D-MUSEUM-1984-01, 1984/1985, NZNAM, Waiouru.
[409] As quoted in 'Background - Gallipoli: The New Zealand Story', TVNZ: https://www.nzonscreen.com/title/gallipoli-the-new-zealand-story-1984/background

Within this national-global framework, we can better understand the development of the 'New Zealand perspective' in the 1980s as a commodification of spectacle which transformed public discourse around war memory and history. The focus on Chunuk Bair was of course, directly related to *Once on Chunuk Bair* and the way in which Shadbolt's play was a reaction to *Gallipoli*. The film adaptation *Chunuk Bair* visually extended this recreation and commoditisation of the connection between myths of 'man alone' and the nation's hardy, rural heartland, as per Burton's work. Indeed, as in Burton's account, it seemed that Chunuk Bair had all the best elements for myth-making. As the apex of the failed campaign, the battle put New Zealand at the centre of the narrative, the magnificent summit of defeat. That Kemal Mustafa himself had supposedly led the raid to retake the strategic hill also added to the dialogical drama. As Thornton narrates in the opening lines of the *New Zealand's Story* documentary, 'for a time, it was as if the whole balance of the war was in the hands of these men'.[410] Shadbolt's play also impacted on the geographical descriptions of the campaign, with careful attention to the famous soldiers who fought there. Colonel Malone filled the central heroic posture, reimagined as a national hero who delivers a stirring and distinctly nationalistic speech on the Chunuk Bair summit.[411] Anzac editorials and accompanying exposes on the campaign, invariably mentioned Chunuk Bair; reflecting the imaginative power of the play**.** The key tropes were the victory of the Wellington Division; Kemal's role in its recapture; and the rehabilitation of Malone. Following the release of *Chunuk Bair* and Pugsley's work, calls were made for a posthumous VC for Malone, a 'born and bred New Zealander and true-blue', as one letter to the *New Zealand Herald* put it.[412]

Pugsley subsequently sought to institutionalise the emerging national myth of Chunuk Bair. Riding the success of his book, he called for the government to change Anzac Day from April to August 8, to mark the battle of Chunuk Bair. 'April 25 was Australia's day', Pugsley writes in *Gallipoli: the New Zealand Story*, because Australian troops led the dawn assault planned by the British, that '[i]f New Zealand has a day and a dawn service it should be August 8, commemorating when New Zealanders suffered their single costliest day in battle and captured Chunuk Bair; losing more than a thousand men in the process'.[413] 'Anzac Day means much more to the Australians', Pugsley continued, and the landing at Anzac Cove 'was planned and largely fought as Australia's day'. New Zealanders, in contrast, 'have never been confident or prepared to subject themselves to such open self-examination'. Anzac was similarly a symbol of nationalism 'too large for most New Zealanders to absorb'. Yet like Shadbolt, Pugsley argued that the 'New Zealand perspective' at Gallipoli was a more authentic one than the Australian experience; '[u]nlike the New Zealander, the Australians went to war to live out a myth they already believed.' In this way, he unoriginally claimed that New Zealand society today was moulded by that experience, saying that 'we are the sum of what they did, what they found and what they lost'. 'It was', Pugsley concluded, 'the loss of innocence'.

[410] 'They saw the narrows', Eph-D-MUSEUM-1984-01, 1984/1985, NZNAM, Waiouru.
[411] See for example, *Evening Post*, April 24, 1984, p. 24.
[412] M. L. Shackleton, *New Zealand Herald,* April 27, 1984.
[413] Christopher Pugsley, *Gallipoli: the New Zealand Story*, Penguin Press, Auckland, 1990. Pugsley would recapitulate his thesis in the 2016 work *The Anzac Experience: New Zealand, Australia and Empire in the First World War*, Reed Publishing Auckland, 2016.

The role of historians writing a national experience into the history of the Gallipoli campaign was determined in part by the contours of Shadbolt's play and release of the subsequent film adaptation. However, the interplay between the play/film, and New Zealand military scholarship, was part of a reaction to the Australian shaping of Gallipoli memory. The idea of a New Zealand myth, newly minted by Shadbolt and Pugsley, supported by Thornton, reflected the link between Shadbolt's play and his *Voices of Gallipoli*, and this project's reinscription of veterans' memories: the strong conviction that Gallipoli marked a decisive turning point for New Zealand, in which masculine innocence was lost to the machinations of empire. Ultimately, this rested on spectacle, rather than an authentic history; exemplified in the use of the character of Malone/Connolly. The play foregrounds the composite character of Colonel Connolly who is motivated for 'love of country', rather than the love for his spouse and his religious beliefs documented in Malone's own diaries and letters. This discrete realignment of Malone/Connolly shows how the 'counter-narrative' – of social histories and the assertion of 'New Zealand's perspective' – represented a new official narrative; one which tries to understand individual experience within the dialectic of official/revision in a national story in which war experience is a critical turning point. What *Once on Chunuk Bair* offered was an alternative myth and, within the cultural dominance of *Gallipoli,* a counter-myth which placed New Zealand centre-stage.

In the language of 'the New Zealand Story', we see the transposition of spectacle to discourses of folklore. This reflected the new currency of nostalgia as social mediation which encompassed novel cultural forms of Anzac remembrance by the end of the decade. Whereas Anzac Day coverage had previously been limited to listing the programme of ceremonies, an editorial, and coverage of the speeches given at rituals the day after, Australian and New Zealand newspapers in the late 1980s began to produce featurettes and lift-outs, in which Gallipoli dominated, pushing the Western Front and other theatres of the war to the periphery or omitting them altogether.[414] We also see the broader context of New Zealand television programming at the beginning of the chapter. Significantly, Chunuk Bair became a centre piece in these narratives following the success of the 'New Zealand's story' campaign.[415] The *New Zealand Herald*, for example, published the excerpts of the diaries of Ted Baigent, a twenty-one year old who enlisted with the 1st Canterbury Infantry Battalion, landed on the first day, and took part in the assault on Chunuk Bair.[416] In this sentimentalising of war experience and the privileging of family connection, we can see how in the collapse of distinctions between individual and state, history and spectacle, past and present, as the individual person becomes the fulcrum of history: family history becomes the incarnation of the national myth, and of all history. This condition, according to Debord, is the 'historical moment at which the commodity completes its colonisation of social life'.[417] Through the experience of the historical film, Weir and other filmmakers posit the viewer as the consummation of the historical gaze, the all-seeing, all-knowing. The 'New Zealand story'

[414] It is not clear whether this was a feature unique to Gallipoli or reflected the changes within media generally, in terms of competitive lift outs / in which case Anzac is simply a vehicle not a driver.
[415] *New Zealand Herald*, 24 April, 1985.
[416] *New Zealand Herald*, 21 April, 1989.
[417] Debord.

project was a ‘nationalising’ and ‘naturalising’ of memory in an unprecedented way; even if it fundamentally failed to achieve the public valence of Weir’s Gallipoli as a cultural text.

Conclusion

The Anzac centenary in 2015 was a dialogue with modes of remembrance developed over the course of a century as much as it was an ostensible commemoration of events which took place in 1915. Given the rich array of cultural productions during the 1980s, it is unsurprising that much of this dialogue has been renewed with the period’s key texts; state remembrance affirming its own genealogy. As *Gallipoli* was shown across travel hostels in Canakkale and Istanbul throughout the course of the centenary**,** Doc Williams’ *Gallipoli: the New Zealand Story* was taken off some dusty shelf at the TVNZ archives and shown as part of the entertainment in the lead up to the dawn service on April 25. Alongside the slick productions of the Australian War Memorial, replete with the voices of Bean, Inglis, and Gammage, Leonard Thornton was looking especially dated. ‘Back home’, the New Zealand Theatre Company’s production of *Once on Chunuk Bair* sought to combine the educational with the dramatic and commemorative. Working with the government, the theatre encouraged school students to attend and published a ‘schools pack’ which explained the context of the play and framed the interpretation of the battle of Chunuk Bair as a moment of national significance in a way that would have certainly been applauded by the late Maurice Shadbolt. This ‘educational’ focus was reinforced with special performances during school hours and also an interactive ‘Question & Answer’ session with the actors at the end of the play, to talk about the significance of the play in the life of the nation.[418]

The idea that the actors themselves had become the voices of these dead men, secular evangelists to a new generation, might have been deemed inappropriate or even scandalous under the old imperial form of Anzac Day. This was the cultural reformulation of Anzac, the dissolution of historical truth in an alchemy of spectacle and emotion, tied to the process of individuation inhered in the changing configuration of the state and the constitutional order of the late Cold War period. The individual is a consumer of historical spectacle and thus its ultimate arbiter, shifting the object and audience of Anzac commemoration from the veteran to the public. Moreover, it entrenched the shift in commemorative participation and reception to the public, and the image of the youth. Weir’s *Gallipoli* was the most visible expression of this shift within a national framework. Wier’s film identified ‘Australia’ with images of innocent youth, opposed by repressive authority and doomed by forces beyond any visible source of control.[419] In this way, the success of *Gallipoli* in the 1980s aligned with the dominance of ANZUS and the new international order of *Pax Americana*; confirming the modern narratives of the state and enhancing them in the dissolution of the constitutional individual. *Gallipoli* offered a similar freedom from contradictions and ambiguities. The film textualised the changing nature of culture and history, extending Anzac backwards and forwards in time, to define and

[418] Mark Howells, ‘Once on Chunuk Bair: Education Programme’, Imagine Theatre: http://www.imaginetheatre.co.nz/uploads/3/9/2/2/39225847/maurice_shadbolt_-_once_on_chunuk_bair_-_education_pack.pdf.
[419] See postscript in *Film News,* 1 November, 1981, p. 11.

universalise the individual and state – the function of myth – to become a new site of memory. This national memory, as distinct from the collective memories, was not sustained in local groups of remembrance but rather in the state.[420]

In this way, we can situate *Gallipoli* in broader trajectories than a putative nationalist revival. The film was a crucial hegemonic text of an emerging state Anzac project, one which shaped transnational understandings of Anzac memory and identity, as seen in the work of Shadbolt, Pugsley, and Williams. Both cultural productions operated in a curatorial epistemic; fashioning a national archive of memory and identity, performed in the imagined space of the Gallipoli peninsula, just as Bean had begun in 1915 and Inglis continued in 1965. Moreover, both Shadbolt and Weir's works were an attempt at a place-making project constitutive of the settler experience. This entailed imagining space, and claims to legitimacy and authority in this imagining, imbued with the meaning and presence of social images. As in Weir's formulation, this could take on a spiritual and emotional significance; suitable to the post-imperial Americana of the market state. The attempted 'New Zealand perspective' through the nationalist space of Chunuk Bair, however, had only limited success in the fragmentary context of 1980s. Therefore, when we consider the impact of Shadbolt's stage play, set against the wider context of Weir's film, we can see that though a specific nationalist narrative did emerge around 'New Zealand's perspective', this was a radical departure from previous understandings of Anzac in New Zealand and reflected the contours of commemoration in the 1980s more than the historical conditions of 1915. And like Australia, this change was instigated not by the public but artists, historians, and other intellectuals who sought to forge a new foundation for settlement in the face of a crisis of postcolonial historical consciousness.

[420] Jay Winter, 'Film and the Matrix of memory', *American Historical Review*, June (2001): pp. 857–864, 864.

CHAPTER FOUR.
‘AN AUSTRALIAN CORNER OF TURKEY’: GLOBAL IDENTITIES AND STATE CULTURAL PROJECTS - GALLIPOLI, 1990

Introduction

Following the end of the Second World War, the Australian and New Zealand Prime Ministers Ben Chifley and Peter Fraser, along with ministers, diplomats, and First World War military heroes Lord William Birdwood and General Bernard Freyberg, attended an Anzac Day ceremony at the Whitehall cenotaph (*Fig. 1*). Shrouded in the sombre declarations of imperial loyalty and sentiment, the context of the ceremony was the 1946 Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Conference and the grim (and ultimately futile) task of building the post-war British world.[421] The conference was famous for being the last of the ‘Old Dominions’ meetings, in which only the Prime Ministers of the Dominions – encoded white – attended, before its opening up to newly independent members of the British Commonwealth.[422] The 1946 meeting was a vision of imperial and racial loyalties and structures within a framework of social hierarchies of civil society – represented in the likes of Birdwood and Freyburg – in the imperial metropole of London. This was the civic-imperial formulation of Anzac, diffused through social, racial, and religious hierarchies of empire.

[421] *Times,* 26 April, 1946, p. 4.
[422] Neville Meaney, ‘Britishness and Australia: Some Reflections’, in Carl Bridge and Kent Fedorowich, eds., *The British World: Diaspora, Culture and Identity*, Frank Cass, London, 2003, pp. 121–135, 133; also see, Neville Meaney, ‘Britishness and Australian identity: The problem of nationalism in Australian history and historiography’, *Australian Historical* Studies, 32, 116 (2001): pp. 76–90.

Figure 1. 'Gallipoli and Anzac Day in London'. Australian Prime Minister Chifley, Evatt, Beasley, Lord Birdwood, General Sir Bernard Freyberg, New Zealand minister Mr Nash, at the Cenotaph, 1946. Courtesy Archives New Zealand.

The 1946 meeting provides a useful contrast with the post-imperial place-making of Anzac in 1990. That year, for the seventy-fifth anniversary of Gallipoli, Australian Prime Minister Bob Hawke became the first leader of government to attend an official ceremony at the Gallipoli peninsula, at Ari Burnu or, as it had been officially renamed in 1985, Anzac Cove. The commemoration built on the Fraser Liberal Government's 1980s re-branding of Australian identity which excised imperial British values from the national image in favour of multiculturalism, centred on the 1988 Bicentenary.[423] Whereas 1988 was marked, however, by a domestic celebration contested by indigenous activists, 1990 was located in the international space of Gallipoli. Gone were the military brass and imperial timbre of 1946 in this postcolonial remembrance. In its place, 1990 offered an unprecedented, distinctly national memory, supported by government agencies, media, and an enthusiastic public.

Scholars have long noted the significance of the Hawke commemorative moment and its partnership with the Turkish Government. Less understood is the crucial role played by the Gallipoli 75 Taskforce. The Taskforce, established by the Hawke Government to orchestrate the official pilgrimage and a range of policies around the anniversary, was an example of a state cultural project in action. In the context of settler societies, the effect of cultural projects is culture at the service of enactments of statehood, which is never formed or finished, but a continuous act of resettlement. As Ben Wellings

[423] Ward and Curran, *Unknown Nation*, p. 26.

theorises, globalisation has not diminished these national projects but rather given nationalism a heightened urgency in the politics of reassurance.[424] The seventy-fifth anniversary of Anzac in 1990 shows how rather than simply perpetuating the historic civic form of Anzac, revived and resurgent in a global digital age, these were state projects laying claim to cultural place-making and relationships. Although these in fact built on a long commemorative tradition, dating back to the Lausanne peace treaty of 1923 which effectively ceded the old Anzac area to the British Empire, these cultural projects reflected the breakdown of those old imperial relationships and claims and need for new ones.[425]

Largely absent in Anzac scholarship is the transnational impact of the commemoration and its vastly different implications in New Zealand. The seventy-fifth commemoration was dominated by Australian prerogatives and priorities.[426] 'The New Zealand story' had failed to engage the state and public in narratives of memory located in the cultural geography of Gallipoli, especially Chunuk Bair. The RSA, with some government funding, was the primary organiser of the seventy-fifth anniversary. Instead, the New Zealand state made the 150th anniversary of the signing of the Treaty of Waitangi, also in 1990, its chief concern. The government's own state project, the 1990 Commission, intended to articulate a political and cultural narrative of national unity based around New Zealand's international role. The government's attempt to 'return' to the site of Waitangi was significant. The Lange Labour government had instigated a 'policy of retreat' in1984, moving official national celebrations to Wellington. Māori protest, on the other hand, had moved into the courtrooms and negotiations of the Waitangi Tribunal, which brought together iwi leadership in emerging organisations such as the Federation of Māori Authorities (FOMA), established in 1986, and the National Māori Congress, in 1990.[427]. The sesquicentennial, like the failures of the 1988 Bicentenary in Australia, provoked a flash point for fundamental challenges to the constitutional mentality of the New Zealand state – coming off the back of a major historiographical reappraisal of the Treaty by historians over the past two decades.[428]

This chapter outlines the government programmes around both anniversaries in 1990, juxtaposing the successful transplantation of cultural politics to the imaginative and actual space of Gallipoli with the fragmenting domestic politics of place around Waitangi and the sesquicentennial of the Treaty. The success of the Australian project of Gallipoli 75 was an acute contrast to the collapse of the New Zealand 1990 Commission and the opening up of Waitangi as a place not of state performance and enactment but public dissent and unsettlement through indigenous voices. Rather than re-enacting a

[424] Ben Wellings, 'Lest You Forget: Australian nationalism in a global era' in S. Sumartojo and B. Wellings, eds., *Nation, Memory and Great War Commemoration: Mobilizing the Past in Europe, Australia and New Zealand* Peter Lang, Oxford, 2014, pp. 45–59; Tom Sear, 'Uncanny Valleys and Anzac Avatars: Scaling a Postdigital Gallipoli', in R. Frances and B. Scates, eds., *Beyond Gallipoli: New Perspectives on ANZAC*, Monash University Press, Melbourne, 2016, pp. 55–82, 57.
[425] Bill Gammage, 'The Anzac Cemetery', *Australian Historical Studies*, 38, 129, (2007), pp. 124-140; also see, John McQuilton, 'Gallipoli as contested commemorative space. The Peninsula and Australia', in Jenny Macleod, ed., *Gallipoli: Making History*, Frank Cass, London-New York, 2003, pp. 149-165.
[426] The exception to this is Jock Phillip's chapter '75 Years since Gallipoli' in Atholl Anderson et al„ eds., *Towards 1990: Seven Leading Historians Examine Significant Aspects of New Zealand History*, GP Books, Wellingon, 1988, pp. 103–108.
[427] *NZ Listener*, 29 July, 1989; 'hijacked by a Lower Hutt hui', *The Dominion*, 7 April, 1989.
[428] Frank Bongiorno, *The Eighties: the Decade that Transformed Australia*, Black Inc., Sydney, 2017, pp. 10–12.

post-imperial Gallipoli landing, the 1990 commission organised a royal visit in which Queen Elizabeth II met with descendants of rangātira (chiefs) who had signed the Treaty in 1840. Protest became part of the proceedings when the Anglican prelate Whakahuihui Vercoe, in a now famous speech, called the Queen's visit a moment to commemorate and commiserate the compact between two peoples.[429] This comparative study provides an insight into the divergence of state policy around Anzac between Australia and New Zealand; before the convergence in the 2000s through the Howard and Clark governments. It was precisely the state attempts to articulate a cultural relationship, and an underlying commercialism and state-centred approach that provoked dispute around the 1990 project and undermined the Commission's narrative of an authentic national identity in the celebrations. The pivotal year of 1990 revealed the potentialities of a new cultural geography of Gallipoli and opened the door to a transnational shaping of global identity in Australia and New Zealand through state cultural policies.

The Hawke Government and the seventy-fifth anniversary of Gallipoli, 1990

On Anzac Day 1990, Bob Hawke became the first Australian Prime Minister to be present at the Anzac Cove dawn service, joined by an unprecedented array of international leaders. New Zealand was represented by its head of state, Sir Paul Reeves, the Governor-General, and Prime Minister Jim Bolger. In his speech at the dawn service, Hawke declared how 'this place Gallipoli is, in one sense, a part of Australia', because of the courage, devotion, and ingenuity of the Anzacs – 'these hills rang with their voices and ran with their blood'.[430] This was a mixture of claims to space, place, and lineage; all tied with the legitimacy and authority of the Australian state – a global projection of identity made possible by the presence of Hawke, his official delegation, and the thousands of Australian 'pilgrims' who joined him. If previously in this thesis we have explored how 'pilgrim' was a title specially reserved for those who had previously experienced battlefields as soldiers, the new discourses of identity now located this in the bodies of young Australian expats, wrapped in Australian flags, for whom this experience was translated to the cultural relational and effect of citizenship.

Hawke announced his intentions to participate in the public ceremony at Anzac Cove in February 1990, saying he looked forward to the special commemoration, 'where Australian survivors will join British comrades and their former Turkish foes'.[431] Accompanying the unprecedented official government delegation on the ten-day trip would be an Australian youth contingent (later joined by a smaller New Zealand one) funded by Legacy, sixty returned-servicemen, and a dozen or other representatives consisting of war widows, nurses, and others.[432] The youth contingent attended as part of a wider educational strategy that included school teaching resources disseminated through the

[429] William Renwick, 'The undermining of a national myth: the Treaty of Waitangi 1970-1990', *Stout Centre Review*, 1, 4, (1991): pp. 3–15, 8.
[430] Speech by the Prime Minister Robert Hawke, Dawn Service, Gallipoli, 25 April, 1990.
[431] *Age,* 2 February, 1990. This was amidst the possibility that he would announce the date for the next federal poll shortly afterwards and thus land the seventy-fifth in the middle of an election campaign. Indeed, the election would eventually be called for March 28th. Hawke was leading approval polls over Andrew Peacock by 40-50 percent at the time; *Canberra Times*, 15 February, 1990.
[432] *Tuggerong Valley View*, 7 February, 1990; *Western Advocate,* 4 January, 1990.

Australian War Memorial. This package was also used by the New Zealand government which had neither the resources nor the compunction to organise its own materials. This is a familiar story: prior to the 2000s, the New Zealand Government continued to play a very minor role in Anzac commemoration – even being left out of Hawke's 1990 speech which privileged the emerging Australian and Turkish state relationship.

The Gallipoli 75 Task Force, entrusted with ensuring the success of the elaborate state ceremony, organised an array of state activities that would only be matched by the centenary programme in 2015. This included writing pen portraits of those travelling with Hawke; the creation of a personalised medallion that was presented to all Gallipoli veterans; extensive marketing of the project – ties, scarfs, t-shirts, and so forth – through Australia's major department stores and Department of Veterans' Affairs social clubs; regular workshops to provide a network through the state offices of the Department; and coordinating flights for Gallipoli veterans now living outside of Australia so they could attend an Anzac Day service 'back home'. The central aim of the Taskforce was to establish Anzac as synonymous with the state. As Ben Humphrey's stressed in the background memo written for the federal cabinet, 'Government support for the Gallipoli visit should be commensurate with the importance of Anzac in the minds of Australians'.[433] Humphrey's formulation revealed a double-inscription in the anniversary. Anzac and the state would be synonymous.

The inclusion of the veterans was an important symbol in the 1990 pilgrimage. The Australian government announced in June 1989 that it was seeking veterans to attend. The Task Force organised a nationwide search for First World War veterans to go on a pilgrimage to Gallipoli, placing advertisements in newspapers and contacting ex-service organisations.[434] This was a very different approach to the 1965 pilgrimage when the RSL played the central organising role. Sixty were chosen from 300 applications, announced by the Department of Veterans' Affairs and assisted in the selection by the War Widows Guild and Legacy, a charity established in 1925 to support families – especially children – of deceased war veterans. Attempts were made to represent all the states (although there were no applicants from the territories).[435] Death and ill health reduced the final number to fifty-seven. In addition, the chosen delegation was joined by two artists, Clifton Pugh and Bryan Westwood, appointed as Official Artists as if the pilgrimage was a military campaign; an ideational link made clearer when it was declared they would paint 'the same subjects' as the official First World War artists, seventy-five years later.[436] The inclusion of the veterans was cast by the Federal Government as central to the celebrations. However, this was contested as tokenism as the government was preparing to dissolve government ownership of the Concord Repatriation Hospital.[437]

Indeed, the seventy-fifth is interesting precisely because the veterans played a new role as the national face and voice of the pilgrimage, supporting the central figure of Hawke. Some of the

[433] Cabinet submission 6589, NAA: A14039, 6589, p. 8.
[434] 'News Release', Ben Humphreys Ministry of Veterans Affairs, June 29, 1989, file 89/41. M3850, 204, NAA, Canberra.
[435] *Canberra Times*, 13 February, 1990.
[436] 'Artists to join Gallipoli Pilgrimage', Press release, Department of Veterans' Affairs, 18 January, 1990, file 89/41. M3850, 204, NAA, Canberra.
[437] *Geraldton Guardian*, 16 January, 1990.

veterans had attended the fiftieth anniversary pilgrimage. Unlike the 1965 cruise, however, there was enormous media attention given to the 1990 celebrations. Seven media groups travelled on the plane with Hawke, joined by around a hundred print and electronic media from Australia, in addition to thirty from the Australian News Bureau in London. Print media ran special feature articles in the two weeks preceding Anzac Day. The ABC also planned a thirty-minute documentary 'The Boys who Came Home', a feature on the logistics of the pilgrimage. The broadcaster also covered the services at Anzac Cove, the dawn and international ceremonies, and other programming for all Australian and New Zealand networks. This coverage also doubled for Indian and Turkish television networks. The 1990 celebrations were the biggest media undertaking in Turkish history.[438]

Australian newspapers were particularly interested in the Gallipoli veterans attending the ceremony. Stories of colourful war experiences, such as Sam Thompson's, were featured widely. Thompson served at Gallipoli and then Malaya during the Second World War, eventually being captured by the Japan in the Changi POW camp and forced to work on the infamous Burma railway. In a tidy genealogy of remembrance, Thompson was one of the men who pulled General Bridges off the battlefield when he was wounded and later died - the only soldier repatriated and buried in Australia.[439]

Comparisons between the fiftieth and the seventy-fifth were inevitable. Media noted that the British were not officially represented in 1965. Some Australian veterans complained about the celebratory tone of 1990, as opposed to the 'dignity' of the 1965 cruise. News Limited journalist Frank Devine stated '[i]t seems to me that the only way the significance of the approaching Gallipoli festivities can possibly be useful is if they contribute to the final exorcism of a debilitating myth'. [440] Devine challenged the popular account of god-like Anzacs storming to glory in the accounts of Ellis Ashmead Bartlett, the British correspondent in 1915, as well as Inglis' narrative of stoic Anzacs attending the fiftieth anniversary pilgrimage. Devine referenced Maurice Shadbolt's *Voices of Gallipoli* as an antidote to these earlier accounts; 'unlocking terrible nightmares and unvarying bitterness' which had otherwise been hidden by the official line of the RSL and the work carried out by Inglis. Devine was conflicted, however; elsewhere he asserted that in spite of the state's 'myth-making', the seventy-fifth anniversary was not a day for 'abandoning the men around whom, willy nilly, the myth was woven'. In response, the National Secretary of the RSL, Ian Gollings, denounced Devine's comments as a 'cruel assault on the facts', suggesting Devine had allowed 'his cynicism to influence his objectivity'.[441] Gollings instead asserted that the overwhelming majority of ex-servicemen were supportive of the fiftieth anniversary pilgrimage and the Gallipoli 75 Taskforce

This episode is important in helping us understand the shifting language of remembrance around the veteran in the 1990 anniversary. The veterans accompanying Hawke provided legitimacy; the celebratory rhetoric could play out because, as media around Devine's comments suggest, the presence of the veterans obscured the essentially state narrative. Debate about the extent to which

[438] 'Meeting on Friday; March 10, 1990, file 89/41. M3850, 204, NAA, Canberra.
[439] *Illawarra Mercury*, 20 January, 1990, p. 6.
[440] 'Assault on the Gallipoli myth', *Reader's Digest*, (date unknown) 1990.
[441] Ibid.

veterans' voices should be given priority also highlighted the vital role of media. Newspaper accounts published widely on the macabre experience of the campaign in an unprecedented way. One account told of 'the screams of agony and death … muffled under the incessant rain of machine-gun and rifle fire'.[442] In another account, men became 'victims of a hopeless battle on some godforsaken ground on foreign soil on the other side of the war'.[443] This dramatic rendering of the campaign reflected discourses of memory at the seventy-fifth; trauma and futility of war, flung into a vain imperialist war.[444] In the months leading up to the anniversary, the *Melbourne Herald* ran a regular four-page spread on the landing incorporating veterans' stories. *The Australian* editorialised that the 1990 commemoration at Anzac Cove was the 'event of the decade'. A live two-hour television presentation which promised to 'look at the meaning of the Gallipoli campaign of the First World War' was beamed from Gallipoli to Australia by Channel Seven, going to air as Hawke and official contingent arrived on the peninsula. The host claimed that 'it will be a moving and an unforgettable experience for those who are there and, I hope, for the Television audience watching the coverage'. He decried that 'not only are succeeding generations forgetting Gallipoli and the Anzacs but, even worse, they are not aware of the significance in the first place'.[445] This was a peculiar mix of 'screaming agony and death' narratives alongside a national spectacle and celebration of unprecedented international attention. Indeed, *Australian* editor Greg Sheridan argued the day should be changed, rather than celebrating an imperial military failure – a proposal which received a range of supporting and opposing comments.[446] Importantly, such media coverage built on the work by the government's own press office. The Department of Veterans' Affairs' produced a monthly newsletter dedicated to 'Gallipoli 75', culminating in a souvenir colour edition recording the activities of those veterans selected to travel to Turkey. The newsletter outlined the way in which the veterans, in facing obstacles of the campaign with courage and determination, provided 'a model for generations of Australians', defining the 'the Australian character'.[447] Veteran memory was re-situated in these emerging narratives.

Such coverage further reflected the way in which the seventy-fifth was an essentially Australian project. The Seven Network and the ABC live coverage, made possible through a joint arrangement through Turkish Television (TRT), was accompanied by the dual two-hour evening program covering the history of the Gallipoli campaign and Australia's involvement in the 1990 commemoration.[448] This was a telling conflation: the Australian Federal Government involvement in 1990 was imagined as equivalent to, a re-enactment and extension, of Australian involvement during the campaign, precisely imagining the 'Australian experience' in war and remembrance in the performance of the state.

TRT's involvement inserted a significant Turkish voice in the celebrations. The *Melbourne Herald*'s multi-page coverage of the campaign featured personal stories of both Australian and Turkish veterans. One article opened with an extensive interview with Adil Ozsahin, the last living Turkish

[442] *The Australian*, 27 January, 1990.
[443] *Age*, 21 February, 1990.
[444] *South East Advertiser*, 24 January, 1990.
[445] *Daily Telegraph*, 14 February, 1990; *Melbourne Sun*, 14 February, 1990.
[446] *The Australian*, 27 January, 1990; *The Australian*, 8 February, 1990.
[447] Ben Humphreys, 'Gallipoli', Department of Veterans' Affairs, January, 1990, M3850, 204, NAA, Canberra.
[448] 'Gallipoli 1990: Second Report [based on Trip to Europe 13-31 October 1990]', Attridge and Quinn.

veteran of the Gallipoli invasion. Ozsahin is depicted as grappling 'with the question of how he felt about killing Anzac soldiers and answers that his duty was to fight for Turkey'. In a dramatic finish, as the veteran recalls the memories of bloody battles, 'he slowly stands up and bent with age walks from the room – too tired for more, or too disturbed.'[449] This scene of a veteran expressing the dialogic relationship between Australia and Turkey, alluding to the violence, before being elided in a narrative of trauma for which remembrance offered redress, was a trope of Australian 1990 coverage. Coverage was replete with stories of veterans recounting stories, only for them to disengage from conversations. This was a careful management of violence in the celebratory narrative of the state project. Invariably, these articles finished with Ataturk's ode to the dead. 'The Turkish eyes that saw the Anzacs land', as one editorial put it, were now the 'eyes' now witnessing and enacting Anzac memory in 1990.[450]

This was an Australian-Turkish dialogue. The seventy-fifth anniversary was 'another Australian invasion on its way to Turkey', in the words of one Turkish commentator, with 'the most Australians gathered on the now silent Gallipoli battlefields since the landing in 1915'. Thousands of Australian tourists were expected to join the official party. In 1987, around 450 Australian expats attended the dawn service at Anzac Cove, increasing to 1,100 in 1988, and 3,000 in 1989. Nine thousand were now estimated for the 1990 dawn service. This was a consequence of the 1980s cultural engagement with Anzac (Chapter Three) but also the deft public relations of Gallipoli 75. Media depicted these as 'mostly young people', 'standing shoulder to shoulder with the surviving diggers who created the Anzac legend'. This language of youth was embedded in a contradictory narrative of young peoples' participation at Anzac. Some commentators expressed anger and concern about the apparent decline at domestic Anzac services. Queensland RSL President Bruce Ruxton, however, crowed that 'young people are showing more interest than ever', commenting on the 'volume of inquiries from families about a grand-or great-grandfather'. In a link to the growing tourism of the Gallipoli peninsula, Ruxton observed that 'what affects most Australians who visit Gallipoli is that it is part of Australia. You get a feeling that what you are walking on is yours'. [451] 'It is an eerie quietness', Ruxton concluded, 'that draws young people'.

Far from quiet, the international commemoration in 1990 was clamorous, as state agents, veterans, and the media combined to fill the commemorative field with a range of assertions about the meaning of Anzac. This was essentially dialogical: the Australian state project was underpinned by claims of the 'respect for Australia that runs through the Turkish people themselves'. As one pilgrim stated, 'No matter where you are in Turkey, if you're Australian you are on a higher level than most'. [452] 'The Turks like us: they feel they have some bond'. Turkish travel agents, such as Turkish-Australian travel agent Steve Ozeran whose Ocean Tours travel agency acted for Turkish Airlines, turned that bond into business. Ozran was reported as 'using the special relationship between the two countries to spearhead a drive to attract Australian tourists to Turkey for Anzac Day', positioning himself and his

[449] *Melbourne Herald*, 9 February, 1990; *Courier Mail*, 12 February, 1990.
[450] 'Sentimental journey back to "hell", in *Melbourne Herald*, (date unknown) 1990.
[451] *Canberra Times*, (date unknown) 1990.
[452] *Courier Mail*, (date unknown) 1990.

company as interlocutors of the Anzac spirit, 'conscious of a common respect between the Australian and Turkish people that grew from the mutual tragedy of Gallipoli'.[453] Similar tour packages were offered by Australian travel agencies. Twelve-day packages were available for two groups to join Hawke and the official contingent; while a third was an 'Anzac tour of Vietnam' – pitched 'not just for ex-servicemen but also for families or other interested people'.[454]

These tourism packages, media coverage, and state press strategies also emphasised, through veterans' voices, the national founding narrative coalescing around the seventy-fifth celebration. Gallipoli was, according to a *Daily Telegraph* reporter, 'a battle many believe was the making of Australia as a nation'.[455] The campaign was variously a 'day written in blood', the 'saga of epic courage', 'a day in Australian history that will never be forgotten'; all 'binding a young nation called Australia forever'.[456] Anticipating the performance of the Unknown Australian Soldier three years later, this transportation was redressing the trauma of the past, 'purging the nightmare with [the] comradeship' of the 1990 pilgrimage. The 'eerie quietness' of Gallipoli, in Ruxton's terminology, was in fact marked by a broad cultural discourse and a new place-making project underway by the state. This was tied to the presence of statesmen such as Hawke but also the pilgrimage itself: the veterans and youth whose touring of Gallipoli enacted the state commemoration even as it laid claim to the soil of the peninsula ringing 'with the voices and blood' of the Anzacs.

The 'noise' of commemoration reiterated the contrast between New Zealand and Australian approaches to Anzac. As the New Zealand 1990 Commission attempted to negotiate public commemoration of the 150th anniversary of the Treaty, the RSA was left as the sole promoter of the seventy-fifth. The RSA organised a school essay competition, reinforced by a RSA-produced educational package, *Gallipoli: the muddle that moulded a nation*, which consisted of a fifteen-minute video and classroom resource booklet. Other 1990 celebrations included festivals, concerts, and exhibitions, and the creation of the 'man and donkey' statue installed on the forecourt of the National War Memorial. A national reunion of Gallipoli veterans was organised in Rotorua and Gisborne.

New Zealand state involvement was limited to organising the official delegation of New Zealand Prime Minister Jim Bolger (elected in August 1989) and Governor-General Sir Paul Reeves. In Australia, the RSL collaborated with state agencies; above all, the Minister for Veterans' Affairs who was responsible for coordinating the Gallipoli 1990 visit and establishing a steering committee, consisting of officials from the ministries of Defence and Foreign Affairs, the Australian War Memorial, and veterans' groups. The Task Force was aided by the Turkish Government's establishing of an equivalent group to operate in tandem; all centred on Anzac Day. Neither of these groups included New Zealand representation, although New Zealand's High Commission in Canberra was able to keep Wellington informed of developments. Indeed, although New Zealand's Ministry of Foreign Affairs sought to organise some joint events, such as official functions at Gallipoli and Istanbul, these were overridden by the Australian government which preferred to lead its own functions. One example

[453] These articles were written by the journalist Steve Levitt, in *The Age* over March 1990.
[454] *Advertiser*, 10 February, 1990, p. 28.
[455] *Daily Telegraph*, 16 February, 1990.
[456] *Sydney Morning Herald*, 18 February, 1990.

of diplomatic side-lining of the New Zealand government was the displacement of a special function organised by the New Zealand Governor-General, by a dinner in honour of Hawke.[457] The 1990 Lone Pine and Chunuk Bair services on the peninsula were themselves held at the same time – due to concerns that the large crowds could not be accommodated – leading to further delineation of 'national' commemorations.

Australian claims to the Gallipoli landscape and the elision of New Zealand was summed up in the Gallipoli 1990 Plaques Project. The project consisted of the installation of ten bronze information plaques at key sites on the Gallipoli Peninsular. The plaques were the brainchild of a Melbourne dentist, Ross J. Bastiaan, who published a book in 1988, *Images of Gallipoli*, during the writing of which he noticed the lack of information guides for visitors to the peninsular.[458] Celebrated as 'a voluntary two-year task to enable visitors to understand the significance of the Anzac National Park at Gallipoli', Bastiaans' is an interesting example of a project dedicated to the new imaginative geography of Gallipoli and reflects the new visual engagement of Anzac as discussed in Chapter Three. Bastiaan stressed that no profit was sought in the project; rather, his 'intention has been solely to help others understand the importance of this *small part of Australia in Turkey*' (My emphasis).[459] The project took two years of private fundraising and negotiations and was intended to coincide with the seventy-fifth celebrations – with Hawke unveiling the Lone Pine plaque during the wreath-laying ceremony on Anzac Day. The plaques themselves were written in four languages – English, Turkish, French, and German – which reflected a presumption of national interest, given the fact that the German government did not want anything to do with the 1990 commemorations. In an appropriate symbol of the neoliberal state, each plaque was sponsored by private corporations; Coca-Cola, for example, sponsored the Hill 971 plaque. Bastiaan also wrote a booklet explaining each of the plaques and its historic relevance.[460] The text of the plaques emphasised the Anzac experience in the campaign, though some did mention joint-actions with French and British units.

The plaques quickly became a source of contention. The claims to this 'Australian geography' elided New Zealand narratives around sites such as Chunuk Bair. Bastiaan belatedly contacted the New Zealand High Commission in Canberra about organising a New Zealand third party sponsorship of a plaque. The High Commission, in turn, hastily sought to have the New Zealand government sponsor the Chunuk Bair plaque; in this case, with the New Zealand coat-of-arms cast on the bronze, rather than the major corporate sponsor, Qantas. Despite the New Zealand government's complaint that Bastiaan had not consulted earlier, the initial response was positive: it was hoped that Qantas would swap with the Quinn's Post plaque, the company having claims to representing New Zealand connections as well (The latter site was one with connections for both Australians and New Zealanders).[461] But Qantas reneged on its agreement to sponsor the Quinn's Post plaque and the

[457] LT PT 13/1905; 1/3/4/1 Gallipoli 1990, General Administration, Organisation and Management, ABFK 7560 W5130/6 1113/2/2 1, ANZ, Wellington.
[458] Ross J. Bastiaan, *Images of Gallipoli: Photographs from the Collection of Ross J. Bastiaan*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1988, p. 204.
[459] 'The unveiling of a plaque at Lone Pine', Hollway to Bastiaan, 29 January, 1990, NAA: M3850, 204, NAA, Canberra.
[460] 'Gallipoli 1990 Plaques Project', 6 March 1990, G1990 TF, NAA: M3850, 204, NAA, Canberra.
[461] 'Gallipoli Plaque at Chunuk Bair', 16 March 1990 - CBA 1599, TORW 15/03/90, AAAC 7873 W5084/19, ANZ,

New Zealand government subsequently withdrew its interest.[462] The whole imbroglio became public when Hawke unveiled the Lone Pine plaque, while there was no prime ministerial unveiling at Chunuk Bair. The New Zealand Government press secretary diverted media queries by pointing to the existing monument as sufficient and, while applauding the initiative, stated tersely that 'there has been no government involvement in the project'.[463]

The plaque project, while a minor problem, underscored that the 1990 commemoration was an Australian-Turkish project. The Turkish Government's interest in 1990 was equal parts economic and ideological. As part of preparing for the visit, the Turkish government embarked on a significant diplomatic effort, with the first visits of a Turkish Government minister to Australia and New Zealand taking place over the late 1980s. A 'Memorandum of Intent' to form closer economic relations was signed in the anniversary year with the New Zealand government. The memorandum was largely pushed by the Turkish Government, and, strongly worded, was only just shy of an outright agreement; indicative, as an internal memo of the New Zealand Ministry of Agriculture observed, of 'how serious [the Turkish government] are about economic cooperation with [New Zealand].[464] This coincided with the renovation of Moa Point in Wellington as a Turkish Memorial, duly renamed Ataturk in recognition of the Turkish Government formally recognising Anzac Cove in 1985. The Memorial was, in the official ministerial briefing, 'to honour the spirit of Anzac born at Gallipoli' as well as 'the heroism and self-sacrifice' of the Turkish forces in the Gallipoli campaign.[465] Moa/Ataturk Point also provided opportunities to imagine links between Wellington and Chunuk Bair – the peninsula 'bearing a striking resemblance to the stark geography of Anzac Cove' and indeed was used as a training ground for the Wellington infantry prior to their departure for Egypt in 1914. All of these ceremonies coincided with joint meetings of New Zealand, Australian, and Turkish trade and defence ministerial delegations in 1988 and 1989.[466]

Australia similarly used the 1990 celebrations to forge new international relations. Ben Humphreys, the Australian Minister for Veterans' Affairs' and chief architect of the Hawke pilgrimage, travelled to Turkey to discuss its government arrangements for the commemoration. The United Kingdom sought to downplay its participation, as well as the chances of Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher's attendance.[467] The Defence Attaché, engaging in discussions with Australian and New Zealand officials, prefaced their comments by noting that 'the Gallipoli campaign did not loom as large in British history as it did in either New Zealand, Australia, or Turkey' and that this would be reflected in the role the United Kingdom played in the seventy-fifth anniversary celebrations. A notable difference in national structures of memory, the United Kingdom government did not have a precedent for

Wellington.
[462] 'Gallipoli: Plaque at Chunuk Bair, 20 March 1990, 20/0258Z GLC, AAAC 7873 W5084/19, ANZ, Wellington.
[463] 'Chunuk Bair - Gallipoli: Plaque', 23 March, 1990, AAAC 7873 W5084/19, ANZ, Wellington.
[464] Agriculture Memorandum of Understanding between New Zealand and Turkey, 3 April, 1990, AAAC 7873 W5084/19 1990/1/6/3, ANZ, Wellington.
[465] 'Co-ordination - Unveiling of Memorials – Ataturk', 1990/1/6/3, AAAC 7873 W5084/19 1990/1/6/3, ANZ, Wellington.
[466] Memo, Joint Trade and Defence Ministerial delegation in April 1989, 23 Feb 1989, Ministry of Defence; Quigley to Boag, 3 March, 1989, AAAC 7873 W5084/18 1990/1/1/2/1, ANZ, Wellington.
[467] 'Bob Hawke regarding the meetings he has had with Mrs Thatcher in the United Kingdom', 1989, NAA: M3658, 1324305, NAA, Canberra.

sending veteran groups to Gallipoli.

The international scope of the remembrance was a direct consequence of the Gallipoli 75 Taskforce. Indeed, New Zealand's limited engagement with the seventy-fifth was only instigated after Humphreys offered to send an official to New Zealand to discuss the logistics of the Australian plans and how the New Zealand government might cooperate, through ministerial, military, and veteran representation at Gallipoli. Humphreys also stated that the Australian Federal Government would be establishing a committee on the 1990 Gallipoli commemorations.[468] Humphreys' visit was followed by a host of proposed joint 'Anzac' projects. The 'Tribute to Anzac' was organised by private sector company McCoughlin Group, who had organised the Brisbane Commonwealth Games. The Games were organised outside of direct state control so that the McCoughlin 'did not have to act as a good citizen', as the Group's CEO put it.[469] It was an exemplar of the neoliberal state in which social responsibility is outsourced to third party agencies, reducing interactions to the commercial. Other efforts for bilateral activities included reciprocal representation at each other's local Anzac ceremonies, an exhibition of works by Australian and New Zealand war artists, and joint telecasts of the Anzac Day services on both sides of Tasman – including the satellite link with the coverage of events at Gallipoli. Perhaps most significant was the idea of establishing a New Zealand memorial in Canberra on Anzac Parade which, although early plans were drawn up, would come to fruition under the Clark Government, being repurposed as a 'gift to the Australian people' on the centenary of Federation.

The New Zealand 1990 Commission and the sesquicentennial anniversary of Waitangi

The New Zealand Government policies towards the seventy-fifth reflected a commitment to traditions of an older civic Anzac. This was evident in the decision to send the Governor-General, rather than the Prime Minister, as the nation's chief representative alongside Hawke. At a speech at the official welcoming function in Istanbul in the days before the April 25 dawn service, Reeves' speech privileged New Zealand's sesquicentennial as the central founding moment in the anniversary year. Anzac Day was 'a solemn day of national remembrance', and a strong bond created between New Zealand and Turkey, based on the respect and admiration for each other's involvement at Gallipoli'.[470] 'You have an ancient history', Reeves in his speech directed at the 'Turkish people', while 'New Zealand is a comparatively young country still grappling with its identity'. The Government was committed to the 150th, with its busy schedule of state events, relegating Gallipoli to a relatively junior status.[471]

1990 was a challenging year for the New Zealand government with commemorations, celebrations, a general election, and the Auckland-hosted Commonwealth Games taking place against the backdrop of political fragmentation, economic uncertainty, and racial tension. To mark the 150th anniversary of the signing of the Treaty of Waitangi, the Lange Labour Government established the New Zealand

[468] 'Gallipoli 1990: Anzac Day ceremonies', 01/09/89, 814, AAAC 7873 W5084/19, ANZ, Wellington.
[469] John Cole, *Shaping a City: Brisbane, 1925-1985*, William Brooks Queensland, Brisbane, 1984, p. 112.
[470] 'Speech in reply by His Excellency the most reverend Sir Paul Reeve Governor-General of New Zealand', 22 April, 1990, in 'Miscellaneous - Media Clippings', ABLD W3778/26, ANZ, Wellington.
[471] Palmer to Hawke, 15 December, 1989, 1/6/3, ABLD W3778/133 139, ANZ, Wellington.

1990 Commission to organise nation-wide events in addition to supporting community projects and several other commemorations – the foundation of the city of Wellington and Auckland, for example. The Commission was invested with $20 million, in addition to $2 million of funding from the National Lottery Board. The Commission chair, Internal Affairs Minister Michael Bassett, was optimistic about the outcome of the 1990 celebrations. 'A sense of national pride and community spirit will re-emerge', he said in the official launch of the Commission, citing a recent survey showing that three-quarters of New Zealanders thought that the 1990 commemorations would have a positive effect on the country. 'There's a strong ground swell out there of people who are tired of stress and conflict, and of listening to prophets of doom saying that the country is going down the gurgler'. [472] These anxieties reflected the context of disruptive processes of economic liberalisation under the 1980s market reforms. Immediate comparisons were drawn by government and media with the Australian Bicentenary. The New Zealand version was billed as a much more modest affair in comparison, a more 'community focused' event in contrast to Australia's 'razmataz' according to the Commission's wording.[473]

Bassett's framing of the Commission's role hinted at the political reality of New Zealand heading into the new century and was an unconvincing claim to national unity. Indeed, Bassett tried to escape the 'politicisation' of the Commission and the 1990 celebrations. 'We are not political', Bassett declared on national radio.[474] The first nationwide promotional campaign, launched in April of 1989, however, attempted to establish political consensus around the commemoration, with the Commission's four patrons Governor General Sir Paul Reeves, Prime Minister David Lange, leader of the Opposition Jim Bolger, and Te Arikinui Dame Te Atairangikaahu (the Māori Queen). The campaign depicted the signing of the Treaty as the central focus of the celebrations.[475] This was despite the fact that Lange had declared, in a speech to the Labour Party two month previous, that the Treaty was not a unifying symbol, but rather 'one that was being dragged through political or legal arguments' – a symbol of injustice or guilt that Māori and Pākehā wished they'd never heard of it.[476]

There was considerable public uncertainty about what to emphasise in the commemorative landscape intended to be 'a year of nationhood'. Ultimately, the Commission decided to avoid the Treaty and questions of New Zealand culture and identity through the 'Living Treasures' project. The Commission asked various European countries, Japan, and the United States, to send citizens of cultural importance to New Zealand as special guests during the sesquicentennial.[477] The living 'gifts' would then be honoured guests in a calendar of national and local events. For example, the American author Alex Haley represented the United States and travelled across New Zealand during the month of March 1990. Haley met with New Zealand writers, delivered talks to the Writers Guild, Māori writers and artists, and joined in broader community events like fun runs, regattas, even visiting the Māori Queen. The international Living Treasures were reinforced by public notices calling for ideas for

[472] Michael Bassett, Minister of Internal Affairs, 'Media statement', May 17, 1989, AAAC 7873 W5084/19, ANZ, Wellington.
[473] Ibid.
[474] 2YA Checkpoint, 12 May 1989, ABLD W3778/26, ANZ, Wellington.
[475] *Te Iwi*, April, 1989, 10; *Te iwi*, May, 1989.
[476] *Evening Post*, 18 February, 1989.
[477] *New Zealand Herald*, 8 December, 1989.

projects that could be funded through the Commission.[478] They would also be the basis of a special TVNZ programme consisting of twelve half-hour documentaries on each of the guests.[479] The government hoped the series would then be distributed around the world as a tourism promotion for New Zealand. The project was lauded by Deputy Prime Minister Geoffrey Palmer as the first venture of its type in the world, intended 'to stimulate young New Zealand talent'.[480] The Commission also placed advertisements in daily newspapers asking people to nominate friends and relatives to be invited to New Zealand by the Prime Minister for 1990, with eventually 38,000 responses. The journeys of international visitors and expatriates was intended to culminate in a Royal visit by Queen Elizabeth, announced in late 1989.

The 'Living Treasures' project was an attempt to present New Zealand nationhood at the domestic and international level. It required negotiations and interactions with other nations, while enhancing the country's cultural life. This political, economic, and diplomatic strategy embedded in the anniversary celebrations was reflected in the considerable United Kingdom-based 1990 programme organised by New Zealand expatriates such as Dame Kiri Te Kanawa with royal patronage from Princess Diana.

As in the case of the Gallipoli 75 project, the 1990 Commission had a special educational policy focus. Schools were encouraged to plan studies of New Zealand culture and heritage over the course of the year – helped by an educational resource kit that was distributed by the 1990 Commission.[481] The kit, titled 'Belonging here, Toi taketake', outlined curriculum ideas as well as projects for participating in the 150th celebrations, such as the staging of mini-Commonwealth Games, Treaty studies and re-enactments, marae visits, native tree planting, and speech contests. The kit explained that '1990 provides the potential for students, teachers, parents and caregivers to come together as a school community to explore and appreciate our cultures and heritage, and to discuss issues such as the place of the Treaty of Waitangi in schools'; with the Commission appointing teacher and student 1990 coordinators throughout the country. The school project reflected the state's contradictory attempts to establish a narrative of the Treaty, while simultaneously disavowing its politicisation and its complexity as a symbol of national unity. In one interview, Bassett expressed amazement at 'the number of definitions and perceptions around the Treaty', stating that the Commission's job was to 'ensure that the Treaty is made clear'. The wrongs of the past would be left behind through a process of 'harmony and healing'.[482]

The Living Treasures suggested an uneasy relationship between Māori and the state. As in the case of Australia's Bicentenary, this was further contextualised in a broader and vaguer sense of New Zealand's emerging social fabric under multiculturalism. The Living Treasures reflected a hackneyed Eurocentrism, with the majority being from Europe. When the Chinese Ambassador to New Zealand

[478] *Hauraki Herald*, 10 June, 1989. The celebrated horticulturalist John McGready bred a special rose, 'Aotearoa-New Zealand', to be presented to the Queen at Waitangi *Northern Advocate*, 2 December, 1989.
[479] *New Zealand Herald*, 18 December, 1989.
[480] *Bay of Plenty Times*, 16 December, 1989.
[481] Media release, 'Schools' Activity Encouraged for NZ 1990', 24 July, 1989, ABLD W3778/26, ANZ, Wellington.
[482] 2YA Checkpoint, 12 May 1989, ABLD W3778/26, ANZ, Wellington.

approached the Commission, proposing a number of potential Living Treasures from China, Bassett politely declined.[483] This European-bias became the source of public criticism. In an editorial titled 'Treasuring the obscure', the *Evening Post* criticised the 'living treasures', puzzling about 'their relevance to this young country's attempts to come to terms with its history and place in the South Pacific'.[484] Others criticised the programme as 'too high brow', portraying Michael Bassett as an elitist out-of-touch 'culture vulture'.[485]

In his editorial for the *Listener* in February 1990, Andrew Mason questioned the language of celebration around Waitangi Day, in light of debates surrounding the Treaty.[486] 'Sacred covenant or fraud?', Mason asked, 'Founding document or Victorian relic? Pact of partnership or symbol of disunity?', noting that 'in the confused and divided of 1990… these conflicting views could all be regarded as valid interpretations… The debate is intense and often angry'. He concluded that 'the treaty is certainly a major thread in the fabric of the nation but at times it almost seems the fabric cannot hold'.

If Waitangi Day was a site of critical comment, the 'social fabric' was increasingly frayed in the Waitangi 1990 project, undermined by trenchant media criticism. Bassett and the Commission sought to restore a national media narrative and curtail public criticism of its obscurest international focus by bringing on Radio New Zealand (RNZ) as the principal sponsor of the anniversary. The Commission's media release announcing the official sponsorship of RNZ said that 'given the enormity of our role in encouraging every New Zealanders to take part in New Zealand 1990 and to contribute to the year's objectives, the role of Radio New Zealand is paramount to our success'.[487] RNZ was, in the words of the *New Zealand Herald*, 'part of the country's history' with a responsibility 'to reflect the New Zealand identity' (One RNZ producer hoped that the debate would, at least, lead to more people listening to ordinary Māori voices).[488] In the context of the liberalisation of the public media sector, this appeal to 'the local' reflected a quaint and confused reflection of a public broadcasting service facing threats from commercialisation. Despite these claims to identity and national healing, complaints of a flaccid and non-descript narrative of New Zealand identity embodied in the 'Living Treasure' was a vital context to the collapsing of Pākehā legitimacy. This represented the problems of a postcolonial project of settler place-making in a local space of identity.

This disconnect between iwi, media, and government prevented the formation of state narrative. Reflecting the fragmenting consensus around the commemoration, media asked whether '1990 [will] be a year of celebration or a year of deep division in New Zealand?' – 'a massive birthday party, or a troubled episode in New Zealand's race relations?'[489] The growing ambivalence among Pākehā over the Commission's narrative was mirrored in Māori reaction to the 1990 project. As part of its plan to include Māori in celebrations, the Commission made funds available for iwi to build and then crew

[483] Memo from Peking to Wellington, 24/3/7/9 - 20/07052, GCEC, ABLD W3778/26, ANZ, Wellington.
[484] 'Treasuring the obscure', *Evening Post*, 16 December, 1989.
[485] 'Miscellaneous - Media Clippings', ABLD W3778/26, ANZ, Wellington.
[486] *Listener,* 5 February, 1990.
[487] 'Media release', New Zealand 1990, 18 May 1989, ABLD W3778/26, ANZ, Wellington.
[488] *New Zealand Herald*, 15 May, 1989.
[489] 'Miscellaneous - Media Clippings', ABLD W3778/26, ANZ, Wellington.

Waka Taua (war canoes), with the idea that these would form a massive fleet for the Queen's arrival at Waitangi for the 150th anniversary.[490] The waka were cast as projects for revitalisation, stimulating and promoting the use of traditional carving skills among iwi craftsmen, while remaining iwi property and therefore permanent investments in local communities.[491] The symbolism of the waka, funded by the Government and built by iwi, was intended to be one of unity - reflected in calls to 'paddle one canoe' during the 1990 anniversary.[492] The Commission funding was, however, inadequate and the waka required additional fundraising. A joint Māori-Pākehā committee was formed in the Hawke's Bay to organise donations to support the carving of Ngāti Kahungunu's canoe - what would be the largest in the fleet assembled for the 150th anniversary.[493] Enthusiasm for the waka projects also differed by region. The confederation of nine Nelson and Marlborough tribes, Te Runanganui o Te Tau Ihu o Te Waka a Maui, sought Nelson City Council sponsorship of $40,000 for the twin-hull canoe, noting that the Waka Taua was 'not designed to be an exclusively Māori project', but would involve training young Pākehā and Māori in the construction and crewing of the waka.[494] The Council, however, refused, preferring 'a project that improves harmony, that involves everyone [and] which is going to last for the next 150 years'.[495]

As in the local waka projects, the Commission's attempts to create national unity fractured under the tensions of national claims. Manawatu Museum Director Mina McKenzie, for example, argued that Māori think 'biculturalism and the Treaty still need to be sorted out properly before we can celebrate 1990', asserting local identities and histories as more important than national narratives. McKenzie cited the Rangitane Chief Te Peeti Te Awe Awe as one historical example – a chief who wanted to bring Pākehā and Māori together to establish a new settlement in what became Palmerston North. Another Rangitane woman said that 'what we want to celebrate or not is a personal matter, and we certainly don't want 1990 to be full of controversy', agreeing that the commemorations should be at the level of the community, rather than something for national focus on the Treaty and Government.[496]

In July 1989 the Waiariki District Māori Council announced that it was boycotting the 1990 celebrations and called on other District Councils and the New Zealand Māori Council to join the protest. Sir Graham Latimer, as Chairman of the New Zealand Māori Council, was asked to lead a group of Māori leaders in presenting a protest to the Queen against long delays in resolving Treaty disputes. This was to be a 'positive protest' aimed at getting the government to honour its obligations, or else 'continue to drag Aotearoa down in history, as the oppressors'.[497] Latimer, however, rejected the boycott, saying that it would jeopardise Tribunal negotiations: 'Māoridom can't afford to panic'.[498] The Māori Queen's and Tainui's support for the 1990 Commission, was a similarly pragmatic political

[490] '1990 waka transportation', 28 November, 1990, 1/4/2/1, ABLD W3778/8, ANZ, Wellington..
[491] *Auckland Star*, 8 June, 1989.
[492] For various iwi, see *Northland Age*, 26 April 1989; *The Dominion*, 24 May 1989; *New Zealand Herald*, 16 May, 1989; *Hawke's Bay Tribune*, 15 May 1989; *Otago Daily Times*, 10 April 1989
[493] *Herald Tribune*, 15 August, 1989; *Hawkes Bay Tribune*, 22 August 1989.
[494] *The Nelson Evening Mail*, 1 August, 1989.
[495] *The Nelson Evening Mail*, 9 August, 1989.
[496] *Tribune*, 11 June, 1989.
[497] 'Miscellaneous - Media Clippings', ABLD W3778/26, ANZ, Wellington.
[498] 2YA radio, 31 August, 1989, ABLD W3778/26, ANZ, Wellington.

strategy, as the Waikato iwi entered negotiations with the Crown over its historic land claims. For many iwi, the sesquicentenary was an opportunity to shore up community support for Waitangi Tribunal claims. Taranaki iwi Te Atiawa, for example, held hui to discuss how to mark the anniversary. A spokesperson called 1990 a 'special' and 'landmark' year, as Taranaki's land claims would be heard by the Tribunal. A national hui of Māori leaders was held at Ratana Pa in 1989 to talk about the anniversary and Māori aims.[499]

The commission's work was further undermined by the government's marked ambiguity towards the site of Waitangi itself. There was an obvious relationship between Waitangi's historic significance and narratives of national founding, with a visit by the Queen and the re-enactment of the debates and signing of the Treaty in 1840 funded by the Commission. Legislative changes over the past two decades already suggested the state's ambiguity about its role in Waitangi. The *Waitangi Day Act* of 1960 established 6 February as a national day. The Kirk Labour Government renamed it 'New Zealand Day' and made it a public holiday; only for the next National government to change it back to 'Waitangi'.[500] The restoration of the Waitangi Treaty House had been kickstarted in 1987 by a Lottery Board grant of $650,000. The works on the house were needed to prevent deterioration and restore its historical authenticity. The neglect of the house was an appropriate symbol of the national attitude towards Waitangi and the Treaty, a irony not lost on contemporary commentators.[501]

However, Tai Tokerau, the iwi in whose traditional lands Waitangi is located, was expected to cover costs of the celebrations at the Treaty grounds itself. This would involve catering for 6,000 over the four days in the lead up to 6 February, including a single sitting of 2,500 with the Queen and the crews of the waka fleet. Latimer was concerned Tai Tokerau would be blamed if the commemorations failed, saying how 'it makes things very difficult when you can't even put a deposit on an order because there is no money'.[502] Elsewhere, he saw the Treaty celebrations as a chance to revitalise Northland, having suffered after the economic reforms.[503] These and similar comments were disseminated widely through Māori and Pākehā media; the 1990 commission, however, was adamant that Waitangi was not within its purview, and doubled-down on refusing to fund anything related to the Northland commemorations. Meanwhile, the narrative of the 1990 Commission splintered. The chief executive of the 1990 Commission, Don Hutchings, emphasised the Treaty as a commemoration, not a celebration – 'we are not yet in the position with the Treaty to say that we can celebrate it'. He suggested that the Commission leave Waitangi Day activities to local iwi.

The government's attempted retreat from Māori opposition and the politics of place was not successful. Growing political agitation intersected with the broader context of the Auckland Games.[504] Māori activists such as Syd Jackson were already leading the protest against the Games, describing

[499] *The Daily News*, 15 August, 1989.
[500] Helen Robinson, 'Making a New Zealand Day: The creation and context of a national holiday', *New Zealand Journal of History*, 46, 1 (2012), pp. 37–51, 44.
[501] *Northern Advocate*, 8 June, 1989.
[502] *Northern Advocate*, 21 August, 1989; *The Chronicle*, 21 August, 1989.
[503] 'United for 1990, says Sir Graham', *Northern Advocate*
[504] Duncan Ivison, Paul Patton, and Will Sanders, 'Introduction', in Duncan Ivison, ed., *Political Theory and the Rights of Indigenous Peoples*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2000, pp. 3, 10.

Māori athletes as collaborators echoing the nineteenth-century term kūpapa or Māori loyal to the Crown during the wars of the 1860s. They promised to extend their protest to Waitangi, arguing that in both cases 'Māori should not be involved in any party to celebrate 150 years of oppression'.[505] In a *Metro* article titled 'Te Karanga o te iwi, what the Treaty means to me', Jackson wrote that 1990 would mark 'the fact that for a century and a half we have suffered the degradation and indignity of gross exploitation and oppression by whites'. Jackson targeted the failures of the Lange government, now continued under Palmer, to accept the radical political implications of the Treaty and instead hide behind a language of 'Treaty principles' to entrench Pākehā political power as the autocratic senior partner. He reiterated his call for non-collaboration as Māori had done in the past.[506] According to Jackson, Labour had prioritised its economic policies over biculturalism which had impacted Māori disproportionately. In a salient critique, Jackson claimed the failing project of the 150th had resulted in 'the government getting the worst of both worlds'. 'Many Māori have been antagonised', Jackson concluded, 'because they have gained little of tangible benefit [and] many Pākehā have been antagonised by all the bicultural rhetoric'.[507]

In light of Jackson's critiques, we can understand how the 1990 Commission and Auckland Commonwealth Games were part of a wider framework of creative reinvention by the New Zealand Government. Both the Commission's work and the Games were intended to represent New Zealand stepping into the new millennium – not unlike the symbolism of the Sydney Olympics a decade later. In this case, the Games entailed reaching back into the disintegrating comforts of the pioneer and imperial past in a post-imperial rendering of the Commonwealth networks. Neither of these projects escaped historical tensions. Writing in *Metro* in March, Māori activist Matiu Tarawa foreclosed the recovery of the imperial narrative by arguing that 'wars [were] created to protect the wealth and resources of powerful nations, like Britain' – calling for a total boycott of the games, 'against the political power games' and 'British sovereignty now clutching at straws'.[508] Purposely referring to the 'Empire Games', Tarawa condemned 'a corrupt system loaded with injustices that destroy the family structures and deprive us from true democracy and a better way of life.' The 1990 Commission represented a failure to escape the historic basis of settlement in empire and the lineages of Pākehā identity. Similarly, the editors of the independent Māori magazine *Te Iwi o Aotearoa* argued that the $2 million in community grants would 'sway' Māori to support the anniversary, whereas those who want to question this narrative will be locked out of the funding. Instead, the editor of *Te Iwi* mused, '[l]et the celebrations or non-celebrations bring us closer together'.[509] This was similarly argued by Coral Jones, a Hakatere Māori committee member, who said 'people have been sucked in by the publicity of the 1990 Commission, because they have a lot of money, a lot of people are going for it - they see it as a form of advertising for the things they are doing.' 'Unless you have a debate on the treaty with good facilitators', Jones concluded, 'you will continue talk like that'.[510] Jones' and *Te Iwi*

[505] *New Zealand Herald*, 3 August, 1989.
[506] *Metro*, August, 1989, 164.
[507] Ibid., 165.
[508] *Metro*, March, 1989, 16.
[509] Ibid.
[510] *Ashburton Guardian*, 29 December, 1988.

were suspicious of an underlying commercialism in the 1990 project, which undermined the Commission's narrative of an authentic national identity in the celebrations.

The tension around the 150th commemoration was exacerbated by the failure of the 1990 Commission to respond in any adequate way to Māori critique. Commentators argued that one way of stopping the prospect of a large-scale protest would be for the Commission to come out with a strong position on the Treaty rather than sitting on the fence.[511] Instead, the Commission attempted to continue the pantomime of an 'apolitical' commemoration, with Hutchings arguing that the '1990 should not become bogged down in the past' and criticising the 1980s as a 'divisive decade'.[512] These comments only spurred opposition. Two new Auckland coalitions – the Māori He Taua and non-Māori Auckland Treaty Action Coalition – were formed in response. The Coalition urged the government to state clearly its Treaty commitments and start implementing some of the Waitangi Tribunal recommendations, citing the 'huge number in New Zealand who support the Treaty' and arguing that the government needed to start listening to the people.[513]

In July 1989 Minister Bassett and the 1990 Commission reacted to the critique by announcing the decision to bring more Māori representation onto the Community Committee which allocated the $2 million of local project grants. This was cited by Bassett as aiming to contribute to 'a wider understanding of what 1990 meant to the community'. No Māori had been represented previously because the committee did not understand the Māori protocols around inviting iwi to send a delegate to meetings.[514] The Commission rushed to emphasise Māori involvement, pointing to the twenty-one waka taua and some sixty other projects relating to iwi and Māori history. These included the publication of the final volume of *Ngā Mōteatea*, a collection of Māori literature, Sir Apirana Ngata's poetry, maps, compilations of Māori travels, whakapapa, and whaikorero.[515] Yet these projects and the language of the Commission's reaction only underlined its inability to control the growing narrative of the 1990 anniversary as itself a failure.

The 1990 commemoration was a state cultural project marked by a crisis of historical consciousness and increasingly abandoned by public intellectuals. This growing sense of unease and uncertainty came to a head in a live debate on national radio between Pākehā academics C. K. Stead, celebrated novelist and emeritus professor of English from the University of Auckland, and Margaret Orbell, an expert in classical Māori language and literature.[516] The debate – which centred on questions of cultural heritage and identity – reflected the way in which the contestation of the 1990 eroded its celebratory language and its legitimacy as a state project. In a varied and acrimonious exchange, Stead stated that, 'Pākehā society is becoming resistant to a lot of things Māori because they're having them forced on them all the time, and they feel a kind of artificiality, a kind of insincerity is being asked of them, and they resent it.' Stead referred to 'an element of guilt mixed up in it',

[511] *New Zealand Herald*, 3 August, 1989.
[512] *Te Iwi*, May, 1989.
[513] *New Zealand Herald*, 3 August, 1989.
[514] *Whakatane Beacon* 25 July, 1989.
[515] *The Press*, 5 June, 1989.
[516] 2YA Insight, 18 June, 1989, ABLD W3778/26, ANZ, Wellington.

complaining of the 'official ethos inhibiting Pākehā from speaking about what they think' amid fears that Pākehā might lose their culture, speaking to the anxiety of the post-1980s in 'the consciousness of Pākehā New Zealand'. Stead rejected the view that Pākehā settler culture was inadequate in assisting in their identifications with this land – 'a way of relating to one's environment which belongs to our own past, which is gone'; localised in a Wordsworthian attitude to landscape – 'in which the old binding alignment to the parent culture is gradually stretched and broken and set aside, and a new independent consciousness comes into being'. While conceding that part of this anxious 'consciousness' was the damage done to Māori culture and society, Stead questioned whether Pākehā needed to be bicultural in the sense of sharing in Māori language and custom, calling Māori 'a Stone Age' culture and arguing that biculturalism is driven by guilt, rather than an appreciation of both traditions.

While agreeing that Pākehā discussion around the 1990 anniversary was marked by ambiguity and silence, Orbell opined that this contributed to 'a subtle apartheid in many areas of New Zealand life… an unconscious feeling that Europeans, Pākehā, represent culture, civilisation, and that Māori represent nature - the opposite of civilisation.'[517] Orbell argued 'there is no conflict between the two traditions', instead suggesting that the expansion of Māori literature in the school curriculum, for example, would be a way to resolve Pākehā anxiety – an 'increased understanding of culture identification with the country itself'. The silence coming from Pākehā on engaging with Māori was therefore the source of 'a terrible insecurity, one much deeper than people would normally admit to or realise'. As Obell noted, the notion that New Zealand was a 'young country' was an erasure of Māori history.

The debate between Stead and Orbell over the need for a 'New Zealand consciousness' and its uncertain foundations reveals the paradoxes and fault lines running through the 1990 project. Stead's position reflected a broader approach by Pakeha academics of an older generation. Keith Sinclair, invited by the *Times Literary Supplement* to write an explanation of the anniversary for a British audience, cleaved to crumbling narratives of the nation's proportional race relations – 'far from perfect, but still much happier than in Australia, South Africa, or Canada' – and rejected bicultural society as being eclipsed by the new multiculturalism of the 1980s.[518]

The ambiguity towards pioneer and multicultural 'threads' reflected the changing face of history in New Zealand through new engagement with public history. Early New Zealand history had been located in government-supported writing of the centennial histories, the war histories, and the state-funded reference works. Sinclair, Oliver, and others had begun the work of a 'national historiography'. However, the 1990s triggered a number of public history projects including the Dictionary of New Zealand Biography, which articulated an independent voice and built on the work of the Tribunal.[519] This suggested that a positive portrayal of the Treaty and nation was possible. Other 1990 projects included a festival of indigenous film, supported by New Zealand film commission and MASPAC,

[517] 2YA Checkpoint, 8 May, 1989, ABLD W3778/26, ANZ, Wellington.
[518] *Times Literary Supplement*, 2 February, 1990.
[519] Claudia Orange, *The Treaty of Waitangi*, Bridget Williams Books, Wellington, p. 228.

linked to the impact of the Te Māori exhibition in the Met on raising Māori profile.[520] The carving of a Gateway to the East Coast in Opotiki, a district with a large Māori community was funded by the Commission, as were the restoration of Māori Land Court records, reflecting the way in which these legal repositories of New Zealand's bicultural and bilingual past – even as the Land Court was an instrument of colonial settlement – nonetheless made possible the recovery of the histories in public memory.[521]

These presented something of a catch-22 for the Labour Government heading into 1990. The Stead-Obell debate was framed as being between 'those who say [the Government has] gone too far on the Māori thing', and 'those who say the government was doing so little'.[522] An example of the former was formation of the One New Zealand Foundation – an organisation opposed to the place of the Treaty in New Zealand's constitutional framework and whose members would later support Don Brash's 2005 divisive 'kiwi or iwi' campaign and the Hobson's Pledge movement in 2016.[523] The Commission lamely tried to deflect these fundamental divisions. Bassett admitted that, as in the case of the Australian Bicentenary highlighting the plight of Aboriginal peoples, 'so New Zealand's commemoration will put the spotlight on our race relations record'.[524] This, he argued, had led to 'a much better understanding… to establish proper rights in Australia'. In an interview a few days later, he affirmed that 'I think the opportunity for Māori here is so much greater, because of the Treaty itself. I meant that's a binding document, our founding document'.[525]

In this context seeking to promote a sense of citizenship, of participation and belonging within the community, what was meant to be a celebration of 150 years of settlement was riven with uncertainty about New Zealand as a Pacific nation – marked even in the language of how to talk about Māori and Pacific people in the first place. The growing intensity of the debate over the significance of New Zealand's Māori heritage reflected the massive political and social changes enacted by Māori activism since the 1980s. This political agitation shifted discourse away from the rights of Māori people, to their culture, language, and other taonga, towards a discussion of what significance these things should have for non-Māori living in New Zealand.[526] As evident in the Stead-Obell debate, questions whether Pākehā should learn Māori custom and culture, reflected the way in which Māori claims to place were brought to the fore, simultaneously collapsing the cultural and political linkages which had historically been used to define Pākehā authority and belonging. Fundamentally, the 1990 celebrations failed to reconcile the nation's racial, legal and political divisions, even as the Commission attempted to move the nation forward through flaccid cultural projects. These failures were in turn failures to legitimise the postcolonial state and its regime of biculturalism.

[520] *Te Iwi*, May 1989
[521] *Evening Post,* 18 July, 1989.
[522] 2YA Checkpoint, 8 May 1989; 2YA, 12 May, 1989, ABLD W3778/26, ANZ, Wellington.
[523] "Anti-separatist" campaign launched against "Maori favouritism" ahead of 2017 election', *Stuff,* 28 September, 2016; http://www.stuff.co.nz/national/politics/84742581/antiseparatist-campaign-launched-against-maori-favouritism-ahead-of-2017-election.
[524] 2YA, 12 May, 1989, ABLD W3778/26, ANZ, Wellington.
[525] Checkpoint May 12 1989, ABLD W3778/26, ANZ, Wellington.
[526] 2YA Insight, 18 June, 1989, ABLD W3778/26, ANZ, Wellington.

Conclusion

In the uneasy postcolonial milieu of the late twentieth century, one feature of the Auckland Commonwealth Games suggested a way to move beyond the anxieties of Pākehā historical consciousness. The promotional campaign for the Games, 'Join Together', centred around an epic television advertisement directed by Lee Tamahori, the celebrated Māori director whose oeuvre included *Once Were Warriors* (1994). 'Join Together' imagined the 'stirrings' of the Games' spirit in the mud of the Western Front in 1917. Behind the lines, soldiers from various nations of the British Empire – New Zealand, Australia, Canada, South Africa, and the United Kingdom – laid bets to see who is the fastest: 'I got a couple of bob that says you're not the fastest man in Belgium', says the New Zealand soldier as he challenges the fastest man in Bendigo to a race. After racing they pledge to 'do this again sometime', so that a nationalised experience of war becomes the foundation for the political and cultural web of the post-imperial Commonwealth. Featuring one of New Zealand's best-known actors at the time, Bruno Lawrence, the advertisement promoted New Zealand's creative talent as well as its claims to a honourable military heritage outside of the complexities of Pākehā-Māori relations, and instead foregrounded a global dialogue of identity.

The Gallipoli 75 project operated in an emerging cultural geography of Gallipoli, supported by the Turkish Government, and also overwhelmingly enacted meaning and social relationships through the veterans and youth. Unlike the flaccid 'Living Treasures', however, the anniversary of Anzac, as an act of international transportation and imagining, could draw on a new international affectation. The failure of the Living Treasures project to achieve strong public support, to fire public and international interest, only enhanced the effectiveness of war commemoration as a diplomatic and state projection in the logic of the New Zealand government. This fragmenting state project around Waitangi and the Treaty was increasingly diminished in favour of Anzac commemoration. The seventy-fifth anniversary of the Gallipoli campaign in 1990 provided a crucial year, in which the failures of the 1988 Bicentenary and the dislocation of the economic reforms were surmounted with a new direction of war commemoration. The success of the Gallipoli 75 taskforce was reflected in the transformation of state attitudes and habits towards Anzac commemoration leading into the 1990s. This was a process that began internationally at the seventy-fifth celebrations, with the new central role of the Prime Minister further confirmed by the entwining of ideas of national unity with the national interest, sacralised in the Anzac legend, and which would be brought back to Australia in the Unknown Soldier project (Chapter Five). Moreover, it established a number of possibilities: Gallipoli was a global space for articulating narratives of nationhood, beyond the social and political claims of national territory. Moreover, this place-making project was enabled by a unified political narrative, supported by media, and deploying symbolic actors of veterans and youth. This constituted a global dialogue of identity through state networks and market relations that crucially divested Gallipoli of its imperial connections with a new post-imperial national identity.

An important moment in the 1990 Commission was the turning towards Australia as a dialogic partner in which mutual celebrations of nationhood could be safely maintained and affected. The Government discussed, internally, whether there should be funding for a New Zealand Anzac Memorial in

Canberra, for example, noting that it was 'conscious by its absence in the circuit of memorials in the Australian National Capital'. The plan was shelved – a plaque was laid as a placeholder instead – due to time constraints but also remaining disparities between Australian and New Zealand international relations. Peace groups in New Zealand asked whether Australian and New Zealand defence arrangements could continue to be close heading into the new decade.[527] This suggested an entanglement of state policies, as this seemingly divergent political trajectory was mirrored by closer economic relations. More complex still, state policies around nationhood would slowly shift from Waitangi to Anzac Day's orbit over the following decade: to the point that some people were advocating for Anzac Day to become 'New Zealand Day'.[528] Although ultimately rejected by the RSA and the Government, the proposal suggested the heralding of a new period of state commemoration, the scope of which we will look at in the next chapters.

[527] Graeme Pirie, 'Anzac Day 1990 - 75th anniversary of Gallipoli landing', 29 May 1989, ABLD W3778/133 139, ANZ, Wellington.
[528] 'RSA wants Anzac Day kept as it is', *New Zealand Herald*, 2 May, 1996; 'Anzac Day to stay as is says Bolger', *Evening Post*, 26 April, 1996.

CHAPTER FIVE.
‘HE IS ALL OF THEM, AND HE IS ONE OF US’: THE UNKNOWN AUSTRALIAN SOLDIER, 1993.

Introduction

In 1993, the remains of an unknown Australian soldier killed during the Great War were exhumed from a French cemetery and transported to Australia, to coincide with the seventy-fifth anniversary of the armistice. On Remembrance Day (November 11) the casket with the soldier's remains was borne on a gun carriage along a symbolic route through Canberra, flanked by Great War veterans and a full military guard to the Australian War Memorial where a new tomb had been cut in the Hall of Memory (*Fig. 1.*). In 2004, the New Zealand government undertook a similar campaign to repatriate an anonymous New Zealand soldier who had died during the same war. The Unknown New Zealand Warrior followed a similar itinerary to the Unknown Australian Soldier: paraded through the streets of Wellington to the Pukeahu National War Memorial, having lain in state at Parliament House – much like his Australian counterpart had in the Old Parliament of the federal capital – and installed in the Memorial’s forecourt with the eighty-fifth anniversary of the armistice and the ninetieth anniversary of Gallipoli (2005) in mind (*Fig. 2.*).

Figure 1. The funeral procession of the Unknown Australian Soldier, Anzac Parade, Canberra, 11 November 1993. ABC.

Figure 2. The funeral procession of the Unknown New Zealand Warrior, Lambton Quay, Wellington, 11 November 2004. Dominion Post.

Scholars have asked why these repatriations were undertaken nearly a century after the cessation of the war, and the extent to which we can think of these as joint formations within the trajectory of the 'Anzac revival'.[529] Michael McKernan, historian and former deputy director of the Australian War Memorial, admitted in 2013, on the twentieth anniversary of the Unknown Australian Soldier's interment, that '[I]t's a very unusual thing to take a man who's been buried for at least seventy-five years and dig up his remains and bring him back to Australia' – New Zealand's warrior even more so.[530] Indeed, the Australian and New Zealand tombs, interpolated by the Unknown Canadian Soldier in 2000, seemed to prove wrong George L. Mosse's prediction in 1990 that the cult of the fallen war dead would not survive the pressures of modern society.[531] Instead, Anzac scholars such as Ken Inglis have located the 'new' Unknown Soldier of 1993, alongside increased attendances at Anzac Day commemorations and government subsidies for memorial restoration projects, as demarcating the decline in Anzac Day's contested nature and the emergence of a national consensus around war remembrance.[532] Stephen Clarke applies a similar framework for understanding the lack of public contestation within the context of New Zealand commemoration, taking for granted that New Zealand would follow Australia's trajectory in pursuing its own unknown project.[533]

Certainly, both tombs were conceived of in terms of national development. New Zealand journalist Andrew MacDonald wrote that, '[t]here's little doubt that the return of New Zealand's Unknown Warrior marks an important step in the country's growth as a nation'.[534] Similarly, Brendon Kelson, Director of the Australian War Memorial at the time of the entombment, stated that the Unknown Soldier was 'part of Australia becoming a nation in its own right'.[535] The use of national symbols throughout the process of exhuming, repatriating and then interring the Unknowns, underpinned this national development.[536] For contemporary observers, the repatriation of the respective Unknown Anzacs was a national act, the fruition of an enterprise of nation-building since the end of empire. Secondly, this national progress was articulated through a powerful language of trauma and healing. The media and public responses emphasised the terrible loss of the war, and the ritual of the entombment as coming to terms with the grief caused by this loss, drawing on the changing discourse of victimhood around Anzac Day since the 1980s.[537] In this understanding, the return of the Unknowns was a response to the physical, psychological, and cultural trauma of the Great War. The *national* war experience had come to rest in this *national* tomb: the return of 'The Unknown' as a cathartic act, healing the wounds of the nation.

The dual grammar of nationhood and trauma pointed to the third vital element underpinning the

[529] K. S. Inglis, 'The unknown Australian soldier', *Journal of Australian Studies*, 23, 60 (1999): pp. 8–17; Gareth Phipps, 'Bringing Our Boy Home: The Tomb of the Unknown Warrior and Contemporary War Remembrance', *The Journal of New Zealand Studies*, 10, (2011), pp. 159–184.
[530] 'What do we know about Australia's Unknown Soldier?', *ABC*, 11 November, 2013.
[531] George L. Mosse, *Fallen Soldiers: Reshaping the Memory of the World Wars*, Oxford University Press, New York, 1990, p. 22.
[532] Inglis, 'The unknown Australian soldier'.
[533] Stephen Clarke, *After the War: The RSA in New Zealand*, Penguin Books New Zealand, 2016, pp. 269–270.
[534] New Zealand Herald, 12 March, 2004.
[535] As quoted in 'What do we know about Australia's Unknown Soldier?', *ABC News*,11 November, 2013.
[536] *Canberra Times*, 2 November 1993, p. 3. *The Press*, 6 November 2004.
[537] Christina Twomey, 'Trauma and the reinvigoration Anzac: an argument' *History Australia*, 10, 3, (2013): 85–108, 91.

repatriations: the Unknowns as distinctly *state* projects. Despite the organic, popular qualities of the repatriations, these were initiatives driven by a network of state agencies, centred on the Australian War Memorial, which first proposed the Unknown Soldier, under the direction of Brendon Kelson. The War Memorial oversaw the exhumation – Kelson being personally present at the gravesite – and underlined the entire ritual. Celebrated as 'the most significant commemorative event in the history of the Memorial since it opened on Armistice Day 1941', the entombment marked the War Memorial's transformation into the most influential cultural institution in Australia under the Bob Hawke-Paul Keating Labor Governments; housing the greatest symbol of the nation itself, the Unknown Soldier.[538] The precedent set by the Australian War memorial was vital in securing Helen Clark's support for the Unknown New Zealand Warrior, which united her dual role as cultural minister and head of the New Zealand government. Both Unknowns were supported by public intellectuals. In the case of Australia, in addition to Don Watson, a trained historian and Paul Keating's speechwriter, historians Michael McKernan and Ken Inglis were among those who lent academic credibility to the repatriation. Historically-trained journalists like Andrew Jackson, joined by Ian McGibbon and Jock Phillips as official historians of the Clark Labour Government, were similarly important in New Zealand. Finally, the Office of the Prime Minister itself was central in both Australia and New Zealand; reflecting the transformation of the Prime Minister into a sacred post-imperial 'interpreter of the nation', as Mark McKenna observes.[539]

While scholars have studied these respective military repatriations, there has not been an analysis of the Unknown projects as a connected process within a state-centred transformation of Anzac. It is precisely the state and its constitutive management of violence that provides the unifying conceptual framework. Both Unknowns were seminal in the imaginative transformation of commemoration into a postcolonial enactment of nationhood. This argument will be developed across two chapters. Chapter Five explores the way in which narratives of national identity and cultural trauma, embedded in explanations for the Anzac revival itself, are fundamentally about the state. This is evidenced in the institutional and individual networks that shaped the post-imperial logic of the Unknown repatriation to Australia. The transformation of the experience of veterans to state memory was materialised in the Australian War Memorial and the body of the Unknown himself. This took place within a transformation of the Australian War Memorial, so that its director could declare in 2013 the institution as 'the heart and soul of the Australian nation'.[540] In the second place, the funeral and entombing was a performance of claims of space, place, and bodily affect, in the moral voice of the Australian Prime Minister. Chapter six explores the transnational shaping of the Unknown New Zealand Warrior, and also provides a comparative study to explore how indigenous imaginaries, while being fundamentally obscured in the Australian context, disrupted the New Zealand state narrative. The transnational shaping of the repatriation campaigns further demonstrates the particular way in which the Australian

[538] Statement by the Prime Minister, The Hon P. J. Keating MP, Canberra 18 October 1993, PM 115/94, NAA, Canberra.
[539] Mark McKenna, 'Keeping in Step: The Anzac "Resurgence" and "Military Heritage" in Australia and New Zealand', in *Nation, Memory and Great War Commemoration*, pp. 151–167, 160.
[540] *The Australian*, 17 December, 2013.

Anzac project exerts a powerful influence over the New Zealand context.

The analysis developed in these chapters brings together various threads of argument developing in this thesis around the transformation of Anzac over the 1980s and 1990s; the global transportation of bodies to territory in claims of memory, history, and identity, within a cultural relationship of political citizenship – centered on the state. The 'Unknown Anzacs' were situated in the immediate context of governmental cultural policy, the 'sinews' of state connecting institutions to everyday habits of life, tied to the organising of citizenship. This was exemplified, rhetorically, in the central motif of Keating's eulogy at the funeral of the Unknown Soldier; 'He is one of them; he is all of us'. This was echoed, if less famously, by Clark, as 'he was one of us'.[541] Keating's words were later inscribed permanently on the wall of the Hall of Memory and the tomb itself, becoming the central narrative of the event and the 'Rosetta Stone' for interpreting the meaning and symbolism of the Unknown Soldier.

In both cases, the therapeutic language of trauma abjured 'politics' even as it obscured the irreducible political objective of repatriation – the reforging of national unity. European traditions of Unknown tombs had historically foregrounded the funereal, providing a physical body to stand in for the many individual absent bodies in public ceremonies of mourning and in the family's private grieving in the immediate aftermath of the Great War. Removed from this context, the Unknowns in Australia and New Zealand, through the narrative of 'national healing' some eighty years later, were enacted primarily as a stimulus for cultural renewal, instigated by social democrats to the backdrop of the post-neoliberal state.[542]

The 1990 seventy-fifth anniversary and 2005 ninetieth anniversary therefore bookended a period of dramatic change in Anzac commemoration, in which the Unknowns played a central material role as overtures to a new global identity. In a transnational dialogue of liberal democratic societies, the national act to entomb an unknown soldier was configured as the sacralisation of the ordinary distinctions of liberal citizenship. Australia and New Zealand, along with Canada, shared policies and processes around the rituals and procedures of repatriation, negotiating with international authorities such as the Commonwealth War Graves Commission. The performance of state authority was clearest in the deliberation, negotiation, and public ceremony that accompanied the Unknown Australian Soldier and the Unknown New Zealand Warrior. Historians and politicians were acutely aware of their own function in constructing the narratives of the state, investing in its textual manifestation, the Unknown tomb, as a representation of what Althusser termed the 'epoch's consciousness of itself'.[543] The entombing of these human remains was first and foremost a spectacle before it was historical. If the seventy-fifth anniversary of Anzac in 1990 represented a shift in the

[541] Prime Minister Hon Paul Keating MP, 'Remembrance Day 1993: Commemorative Address', 1993, https://www.awm.gov.au/commemoration/speeches/keating-remembrance-day-1993; Prime Minister Hon Helen Clark MP, 'Address by the Prime Minister at the St Paul's Cathedral Memorial Service for the Unknown Warrior', 2004: http://rsa.org.nz/about/nws2004sep/Unknown_Warrior.htm.
[542] William Davies, *The Limits of Neo-Liberalism: Authority, Sovereignty and the Logic of Competition,* University of London Press, London, 2016; Jonathan Derbyshire, 'Actually existing neo-liberalism: notes on William Davies' Limits of Neo-Liberalism', *Renewal: a journal of social democracy*: http://www.renewal.org.uk/articles/the-limits-of-neo-liberalism.
[543] Louis Althusser, **'**Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses (Notes towards an Investigation)', in Ben Brewster, ed., *Lenin and Philosophy and Other Essays,* Monthly Review Press, La Pensée, 1970, p. 108.

focus to the global place of Gallipoli to remove domestic concerns, then the seventy-fifth of the armistice would bring this bodily transportation to the 'heart of the nation'.

Institutional contexts and the Australian War Memorial

The Australian state has a long and complex relationship with the idea of a national tomb. In fact, the Unknown Soldier was not the first repatriated body of an Australian soldier from the Great War. In September 1915, the body of Major-General Sir William Throsby Bridges was transported to Australia. Bridges, commander of the Australian forces, had been wounded at Gallipoli and died on a hospital ship on the way to Egypt. The return of his body reflected his high rank and social status. Like the Unknown Soldier seventy-five years later, Bridges was buried in Canberra, the newly-minted federal capital, after a solemn procession; the tomb later declared 'a national monument' by the Anglican Archbishop who presided at the ceremony (*Fig. 3*).[544] Sir Ronald Munro Ferguson, the Governor-General of Australia, was also present. The Bridges family, Australian military leaders, and many contemporary commentators hoped that Bridges would be 'known to Australians through the future centuries'.[545] Before the end of May, the New South Wales Department of Public Instruction had reproduced Ellis Ashmead Bartlett's and Charles Bean's reports of the Gallipoli landing for use in schools, featuring a black-bordered portrait of Bridges as its frontispiece. Bridges had come 'to personify, if only for a time, Australia's baptism in blood and the achievement of the landing at Gallipoli'.[546]

[544] K. S. Inglis, *Sacred Places: War Memorials in the Australian Landscape*, Miegunyah Press, Melbourne, 2008, p. 75.
[545] Ziino, 'Mourning and Commemoration in Australia', p. 3.
[546] Ziino, p. 3.

Figure 3. The burial of Major General Sir William Throsby Bridges, Canberra, 3 September 1915. AWM P10797.002. AWM.

Ken Inglis situated Bridges' burial and memorialisation as the beginning of the nationalist tradition of Anzac, therefore tying the desire for a national tomb to the same impulse to make of Anzac a national founding myth.[547] However, despite the efforts of military elites to establish Bridges' tomb as a national memorial, this was largely a private act; one underlined by the grief of the Bridges family and others who knew Bridges personally. Indeed, the story of Bridges is exceptional precisely because it ran counter to imperial policy which emerged in the interwar period banning the repatriating of any war dead. This signified the way in which the citizen-soldier became primarily defined in relation to the state – their sacrifice was a national one, and therefore outside the purview of particular families and communities, even those who have had the financial means to return their war dead. Indeed, the egalitarian language masks the normative horizon of the modern state and its ubiquitous claims to moral authority. The circumstances of Bridges' death – his dying on a hospital ship, rather than a battlefield – was important in enabling his body to be returned. But his burial was also an expression of bourgeois middle-class civil society, entwined as it was with the customs governing social status and military hierarchy. Bridges' repatriation and burial had all the characteristics of the civic form of Anzac commemoration and reflected a war experience understood in social, familial, and imperial scales.[548]

[547] Inglis, *Sacred Places*, pp. 73–76.
[548] The ongoing ambiguity of Bridges' tomb was reflected in his virtual absence from the Centenary commemorations. A lone *ABC* article noted the hundredth anniversary of his death and entombing in Canberra:

Bridges' subsequent disappearance from collective memory has perplexed historians for whom war commemoration is configured by nationalism or cultural trauma. Indeed, the case represented a kind of institutional amnesia for the Australian War Memorial; though its tourist guide books since the 1950s listed Bridges in its pantheon of Australian military heroes, calling him the 'father of the AIF', the fact that he is buried in Australia was completely omitted – only that he was 'mortally wounded' at Anzac Cove.[549] The apparent failure of this 'national tomb' has therefore been interpreted respectively as a sign of immature nationalism and as an inability of contemporary Australians to properly grieve for the war dead; a failure, as Bart Ziino put it, 'to become an enduring focus for the grief of individual Australians'.[550] The implication of the work of historians such as Inglis and Ziino is that the 1993 Unknown Soldier fixed or resolved this failure, providing a kind of national healing of a collective cultural trauma.

Despite the civic qualities of the memorialisation, however, the state was noticeably absent in Bridge's entombment. Subsequent discussions in the 1920s about the possibility of repatriating an unknown soldier, akin to the memorials in Britain and France, demonstrated how grief continued to be understood in terms of local and imperial identity rather than a national one. New South Wales, Victoria, and Queensland all proposed establishing their own unknown soldier tombs. In 1933, the Paddington-Woollahra Sub-branch of the RSL carried a resolution that a body be brought back from Gallipoli and buried in Hyde Park, in Sydney – completely disconnected from any vision of Canberra's war memorial as a national-state monument.[551] Ultimately, however, the federal RSL decided against a national unknown soldier, instead establishing as official policy 'that the sentiment of the Empire was expressed in the burial in London'.[552] This decision was reinforced by the practical challenges in exhuming and transporting the remains of a soldier from a European battlefield, and a complete lack of political will and state support for an act entangled with civic and imperial relationships.

Henry Treloar, the celebrated first director of the War Memorial after its inception in 1941, had publicly argued against the exhumation of an unknown Australian soldier from a European battlefield, ostensibly on the similar basis of imperial sentiment. However, as Inglis has pointed out, this was in fact an act of self-preservation on the part of the War Memorial. In a private note to Charles Bean, Treloar explained that '[t]he big danger in my opinion is that if the proposal to bury an unknown warrior at Canberra be considered apart from the future of the Australian War Memorial it may become the basis of the Commonwealth memorial'.[553] Politicians would make the unknown soldier not a part of the national memorial but a substitute for it. This would be 'disastrous to the future of the Australian

'Anzac centenary: Anniversary of the death of Major General William Throsby Bridges', *ABC News*, 18 May, 2015: http://www.abc.net.au/news/2015-05-18/major-general-william-bridges-wwi-death-centenary/6476904.

[549] See the Australian War Memorial Guidebooks from 1941 to 1959; for example, *Guide to Australian War Memorial*, Hastead Press, Sydney, 1941.

[550] Ziino, p. 17.

[551] *Newcastle Morning Herald*, 23 August, 1933, p. 6.

[552] Martin A. Crotty, '25 April 1915 Australian troops land at Gallipoli: Trial, trauma and the "birth of the nation", In Martin A. Crotty and David Andrew Roberts, ed., *Turning points in Australian history*, University of New South Wales Press, Sydney, 2009, pp. 100-114; RSL papers NL MS 6609/2655B, NLA, Canberra.

[553] As quoted in Ken Inglis, *Sacred Places*, pp. 320–322.

War Memorial', Treloar wrote.[554] In a 1973 review, following a campaign by individual RSL members, the possibility of repatriating an unknown was again raised.[555] Various reasons were deemed to count against it: the changing of the Australian War Memorial from a cenotaph into a mausoleum, and the prospect of disturbing a grave half a century after the end of the First and Second World Wars would be deemed completely inappropriate – and most importantly, the refusal by the government to intervene in the matter.[556] The institutional independence of the Australian War Memorial, both in terms of structure and direction, the strong deference to the Returned Service League and other ex-service organisations; and public opinion all acted as a bulwark against the establishment of a specifically national unknown tomb and recognised the need to allow the past to remain undisturbed.

In February 1993, however, the War Memorial Council – in conjunction with the Office of the Prime Minister and Ministry of Veterans' Affairs – prepared to announce its most significant public campaign since its postwar renovations: the decision of the Australian state to seek the repatriation of an unknown soldier currently under the care of the Commonwealth War Graves Commission. What had changed in the internal debate of the war memorial and its relationship with the federal government to enable the repatriation in 1993? Although the government would promote the narrative of the project as a national response to the trauma of the war seventy-five years earlier, we can understand a confluence of personal, historical, and institutional factors, guided by the deliberate internal policymaking and politics of the Australian War Memorial and federal government.

The first factor was a network of historians within the institutional filigree of state commemoration. Indeed, a careful consideration of the Unknown reveals historians' substantial roles in developing, naturalising, and legitimising the project. In 1990, the Australian War Memorial sought proposals from its staff about how to mark the fiftieth anniversary of its opening in 1941. A number of different initiatives were proposed: renovations of some of the exhibitions, and a publicity and fundraising campaign, among others. The War Memorial's chief historian, Ashley Ekins, however, took the opportunity to make a bold proposal that the War Memorial should make a commemorative project central to its anniversary celebrations: a tomb of an unknown soldier.[557] The proposal is a classic starting point for scholars, being seen as the key trigger in the 1993 project.

In the proposal, Ekins prefaced his arguments with reference to several pieces of scholarship. The

[554] Indeed, when the design for the Canberra memorial was made public in 1938, via a large model erected in the Melbourne Exhibition Hall, media noted the remarkable basilican dome and the four niches in the design intended to hold statues. Amidst speculation discussion as to whose statues would sit in these niches, Treloar made no mention of the fact that the design had left the hall under the dome intentionally empty for the possibility of a future tomb. *Smith's Weekly*, 8 January, 1938. Also see note in AWM371, 93/1219, NAA, Canberra.
[555] In 1970, a motion was carried by the 55th national RSL congress requesting that the Commonwealth Government approve the interment of the remains of 'an Australian unknown warrior', within the precinct of the Memorial. 'Burial of unknown warrior: background', Australian War Memorial, Proposal for the creation of a Tomb of the Unknown Soldier, AWM371, 93/1219, AWM, Canberra. Also see: 'Unknown Warrior Burial of in "Australia", Australian War Memorial, NAA: A431, 1947/138, NAA, Canberra.
[556] 'Burial of unknown warrior - brief notes', February 1973, AWM publications relating to the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier', 1993, AWM371 93/1733, NAA, Canberra.
[557] Ashley Ekins, 'Proposal', 6 June 1991, Proposal for the creation of a Tomb of the Unknown Soldier, AWM371 93/1161, NAA, Canberra.

first was an article published by Bill Gammage in April 1991.[558] Gammage repeated a comment he had made at a conference at the Australian War Memorial in 1990, writing that '[i]t will be interesting to see whether, after the last Anzac has joined his mates, that empty space at the centre of the Australian War Memorial's Hall of Memory will be occupied by … the grave of an unknown soldier'.[559] As we saw in the last chapter, the Hawke 1990 project was also important in radically redefining the cultural memory and geography of Gallipoli on an Australian-Turkish axis. Ekins then referenced the work of Ken Inglis, whose corpus is familiar to readers of this thesis. Inglis imagined the work of Charles Bean in establishing the War Memorial as a site of transmuting colonial nationalism into Australian patriotism.[560] The final historical work referenced by Ekins was Michael McKernan's institutional history of the Australian War Memorial, *Here is their spirit*, the title of which referred to Bean's famous line: 'here is their spirit in the heart of the land they loved and here we guard the record they themselves made'.[561] Ekins asserted that while the second clause of Bean's statements are true, the first was not. 'Many feel that the Australian War Memorial is devoid of the spirit of the 102,000 Australians who have died in wars', he explained, and that 'the tomb of an unknown soldier would provide a solemn and inspirational focal point for visitors to the Hall of Memory while also giving physical substance to that "spirit". Although failing to recognise that a large proportion of the first AIF was, in fact, British-born, Ekins' assertion was a claim on the legitimacy and authority of the national dead, whose hearts and spirits would be centred not on their families, churches, or local communities generally, but on Canberra, the federal capital, and the Australian War Memorial. The Hall of Memory was never a neutral 'empty space' as Gammage calls it, but a vision of the nation, past, present, and future, in the exigencies of the emerging state Anzac project.

This triangulation of Gammage, McKernan, and Inglis is important, and provides insight into the scholarly milieu that affected the War Memorial's plans in the late 1980s. Far from being an organic 'zeitgeist' or 'spirit', historical support for Ekin's Unknown initiative was the product of a collaboration of these historians, who sought quite specifically to resituate War Memorial at the heart of the Australian nation. Indeed, Inglis would complete the circle by writing, in 1999, his article on the Unknown Australian Soldier applauding Ekins' address as prescient of the national mood.

At the centre of these historians' critique was the statue of a male figure, sculpted by Raymond Ewers and installed in 1959 as the centrepiece of the Hall of Memory. The Ewers statue had long baffled Inglis and other historians. 'Not an embodiment of the nation at large', Inglis wrote in his 1999 reflection, 'not a symbol of mourning or sacrifice, but a representation of the serviceman himself'.[562] Inglis, Ekins, and others, juxtaposed the privileged, exclusive experience of the Returned Serviceman with national, popular, and inclusive memory. This attempt to wrest control of war memory from the servicemen, and by extension, the RSL – an affront to Inglis' and other historians' nationalist project

[558] Bill Gammage, 'Anzac's influence on Turkey and Australia', *Journal of the Australian War Memorial*, 18 (1991), p. 19.
[559] Gammage, *Broken Years*, p. 247.
[560] K. S. Inglis, 'A sacred place: the making of the Australian War Memorial', *War & Society*, 3, 2 (1985), p. 100.
[561] Michael McKernan, *Here is their spirit: a history of the Australian War Memorial 1917-1990*, University of Queensland Press, St. Lucia, 1991.
[562] Inglis, 'The unknown Australian soldier', p. 15.

around Anzac – is vital to understanding the context of the Unknown in the 1990s and provides a clear example of the relationship between ideology and scholarship. Inglis opposed the Ewers-RSL axis which represented what he saw as the hierarchical challenge to an increasingly inclusive Anzac Day and the repatriation as a liberal democratic project remembering the ordinary Australian character, a position duly endorsed in the Memorial's institutional history by McKernan. This constituted a material restructuring of cultural memory within a national frame we have been exploring in this thesis.

This complex mesh of scholarship, ideology, and policy is difficult (perhaps impossible) to untangle in any complete way. The attempt nonetheless yields a number of insights into the naturalising and legitimising of state projects through public intellectuals. Inglis played a prominent role in the Directing Committee that was formed to plan and ensure the success of the Unknown Project in time for the seventy-fifth anniversary of the armistice. In February 1993, Inglis joined the committee that would eventually consist of himself, the Australian War Memorial directors, representatives of the federal government (including the Australian War Graves) and the military.[563] He was also chosen as the person to introduce the project to the War Memorial's staff, through an official lecture on the history of unknown soldier tombs. As a scholar working on commemoration in Australia and preparing the manuscript for his seminal *Sacred Places*, Inglis was deemed to be 'the best person to introduce the concept to staff and introduce the thinking behind the concept'. Kelson prefaced the lecture with a brief statement on behalf of senior management to justify the tomb as enhancing the memorial and ensuring 'the ongoing relevance of the commemoration of war into the Twenty First century'.[564] This was in recognition of that fact that, as Richard Reid put it in his briefing to Brendon Kelson, some staff 'have difficulties in understanding why we have decided to embark on this project'.[565] In his address, titled 'An emblem of the "plain man"', Inglis linked the unknown project to the French and British 1920s unknowns; and the national symbolism inhered in the act of repatriation.[566] In fact, this was also a strategic way for Brendon Kelson to introduce the concept, before having to answer questions about the cost, design, and impact on the pre-existing structure – Inglis was neither in a position to answer these kinds of questions, nor were staff inclined to discuss 'internal matters' in front of an outsider guest.[567] In this way, Inglis provided vital preparatory work for the project, foreclosing possible objections from staff whose view of the war memorial were defined by military and civic understandings of war memory.

Inglis' involvement in the Directing Group was key to giving the Unknown project a focused narrative to shape public imagination. He, was deeply concerned with ensuring that the public be directed in how to respond to the commemoration.[568] Indeed, his chief opposition to the Ewer's statue was that it

[563] Reid to Heggen, 19 January 1993, 'Directing Group', AWM371 93/1219, NAA, Canberra.
[564] 'Briefing notes: Inglis, Unknown Soldier', 24 February, 1993, AWM 93/3/1583; Reid to Kelson and McKernan, 29 January, 1993, AWM371 93/1219, NAA, Canberra.
[565] McKernan to Kelson, 'Proposal for the creation of a Tomb of the Unknown Soldier', AWM371 92/1780, NAA, Canberra.
[566] See also Ken Inglis papers, File 162. Bundle of three indexed subject files titled: 'Anzac Day', 1990s - Acc98.147, NLA, Canberra.
[567] 'Note to Anne-Marie Schwirtlich, AWM 24/2/93, NAA, Canberra.
[568] 'Report of the Directing Group Meeting, Jan-Oct', 'Directing Group', AWM371 93/1219, NAA, Canberra.

rendered the Hall of Memory a space in which visitors were not 'told' how to respond. In a special meeting between Inglis, Kelson, and project manager Reid to discuss the possible inscription on the tomb, Inglis stated the wording should be simple and to the point, in order to direct visitors' thinking about the tomb.[569] During the discussion of what interdenominational and inter-religious prayers would be said during the service and committal, Inglis considered a moment of silence, annotated in the official programme a good idea as it 'provided people with information about how to use the silence, and that it would be used for their own thoughts' - reflected in the final wording that outlined the short period of silence as allocated for Australians 'in terms of their own religious beliefs to join in silent prayer as he is buried'.[570] In the same meeting, he stressed the importance of a narrator for the ceremony as 'an essential feature of the event'.[571] Another example of Inglis' influence was his argument that the role of the Australian Defence Force should be understated in the funeral to ensure 'the public mood feel more like that sense of national community spirit, engendered by the Australian tradition of commemoration'.[572] This was a direct shaping of war memory; Inglis was enacting in ideational and practical terms the central thesis of his book. It also revealed the inherent tension between a military funeral for a soldier, and the national act in which the nation itself was the primary focus (One suggestion to resolve this tension was to have a low-key funeral, with customary invited guests, and the entombment added as the normal ceremony).[573] Furthermore, throughout the meetings of the Directing Group, Inglis' comments seemed to reflect his personal and professional dedication to the nationalist project of Charles Bean. Accordingly, he promoted the use of Bean's writings and reflections as much as possible in shaping the language and various commemorative elements – providing a genealogy of remembrance embedded in the Unknown. Although Jay Winter suggests we are participants in a commemoration outside of our control, Inglis is an example of a very deliberate actor in the commemorative process.[574] In 1994, reflecting on the first Anzac Day after the repatriation, Inglis celebrated how the custodians of the War Memorial had made a 'profoundly significant gesture when they removed from the Hall of Memory the huge overbearing statue of a servicemen'.[575] In this description, Inglis portrays himself as the distant observer of a process he shaped and had been very much invested in.

The effect of these historians was therefore to naturalise and legitimise the project and foreclose oppositional narratives from within and without the Australian War Memorial. The historical narrative was to have an organic quality, like the ceremony itself – so that 'all sense of stage management should be lost in the minds of participants and beholders' in the 'spectacle of such dignity and apparent simplicity'.[576] The fact that Ekins promoted the project as part of the fiftieth anniversary

[569] Notes from Meeting with Professor Ken Inglis ANU, 2 March 1993, 'Directing Group', AWM371 93/1219, NAA, Canberra.
[570] Report of the Directing Group Meeting, 14 September 1993, 3b, 'Directing Group', AWM371 93/1219, NAA, Canberra.
[571] Report of the Directing Group Meeting, 7A, 'Directing Group', AWM371 93/1219, NAA, Canberra.
[572] *Ibid*.
[573] Report of the Directing Group Meeting, 18 May, 1993, 'Directing Group', AWM371 93/1219, NAA, Canberra.
[574] Jay Winter, 'Foreword: Historical remembrance in the Twenty-First Century', *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, 617, 1 (2008): pp. 6–13.
[575] *Canberra Times*, 23 April, 1994.
[576] Reid to McMahon, AHC, London, 28 July 1993, Negotiations with Commonwealth War Graves Commission, AWM371 93/1222, NAA, Canberra.

programme of the War Memorial was important, reflecting the reinvention of the War Memorial over the 1980s by an 'entrepreneurial leadership' under Kelson and McKernan which had won growing political and financial support from the federal government.[577] The War Memorial, established by act as a corporation in 1980, had been restructured in the post-market reforms as an expression of Australia's newly confident creative cultural sector.[578] The act also established the war memorial as a statutory authority within the Ministry of Veterans' Affairs', with the director directly responsible to the minister. The governing council was to be responsible for the conduct and control of the affairs of the Memorial, relating to the Memorial's three programmes: the National Collection, Public Programs, and Corporate Services. The changing role of the Australian War Memorial needs to be understood in relation to the intensification of the state of the 1980s; part of the economic changes enacted through the Hawke and Keating governments that entailed new concepts of political citizenship. Like other policies around creative cultural industries, the Unknown project was an act of participation in a globalised institutional network of commemorative practice, linked to the positioning of a national cultural identity.

The Hawke Government's decision to transfer ministerial responsibility for the War Memorial from the Minister for Arts, Heritage, and Environment to the Minister for Veterans' Affairs was an unprecedented step, globally. Never before had a nation's institutional tribute to its war dead been folded into a department the equivalent of Veterans' Affairs. The act was contested by the International Council of Museums, which saw this as a further infringement on the independence of the Memorial as a library and research facility. The Chairman of the Australian National Committee, N. J. Flanagan, argued that 'there might be a case that the maintenance of such a symbol could be with the Prime Minister's Department, the Department of Defence, or the Department of Veterans' Affairs', but only if the 'memorial to the nation's fallen was simply a cenotaph, a shrine or a tomb of an unknown soldier, as is the case in all other countries.'[579] If this happened under the War Memorial's current structure, Flanagan argued, it would become 'the outsider' among Australia's cultural institutions, as 'matters of common concern to all the institutions' would be decided not internally but down the road in Parliament House. Flanagan's concerns were prescient: the interment of the Unknown in 1993 consummated the reconceptualising of the War Memorial as the tomb of the national dead and the spiritual heart of the nation itself. Its professional staff continued to work on a day-to-day basis in relation to the National Library and National Gallery, but within a totally different ideological framework. Opposition to the change in ministerial powers under Hawke was softened by the fact that the War Memorial retained its independent statutory authority. This was unsurprising given the privatisation of social responsibility, the delegation of regulatory powers to third-sector agencies, and the corporatisation of public services and assets, under the economic reforms. Furthermore, the loss of autonomy was smoothed over by the prospect of increased financial support.[580] The Hawke Government was also aided by the endorsement of the RSL. The president of

[577] Inglis, 'The unknown Australian soldier', p. 15.
[578] *Australian War Memorial Act 1980, Commonwealth Consolidated Acts* (AustLII), 1 January 1980.
[579] *Canberra Times*, 31 January, 1985, p. 2.
[580] The war memorial was awarded a substantial increase in funds by two million dollars, together with an increase in the number of staff of some thirty people, in the Malcolm Fraser Liberal Government's 1982 budget.

the RSL argued that the War Memorial would benefit from closer institutional support from the Prime Minister, specifically with increased financial support (of which the RSL received private assurances from Hawke himself).[581] Part of the RSL's rationale was that the War Memorial was a veteran-focused institution and therefore should be financed alongside repatriation hospitals, defence homes, and ex-service personnel pensions.

The Unknown was part of the war memorial's broader strategy of self-preservation. Ekins referred to the war memorial *evolving* 'in order to remain relevant to successive generations in a multicultural society', echoing Michael McKernan's statement that 'the memorial is not lifeless thing'.[582] Indeed, Ekins' work was closely tied to McKernan's institutional history which was an enactment of this 'entrepreneurship' as much as its record. As we explored in Chapter Three, the notion of an urban progressive creative class – in this case embedded in state cultural agencies rather than the film industry – was tied to the economic reforms of the market state. Such a scheme would enrich the meaning of the Hall of Memory and advertise the whole memorial. In this consumer strategy, the difference between tourists and pilgrims blurred as fewer visitors had direct experience with war. Instead, visitors were encouraged to venerate the *national* dead and imainge their deaths as a *national* sacrifice. This ultimately meant that the Australian nation itself was the key object of commemoration, rather than the personal experience of war.

The Unknown tomb in this way represented the reinvention of the Australian War Memorial itself. 'Since it was opened in 1941', Ekins concluded in his proposal, the Memorial has lacked a symbolic point of significance, 'a place which tangibly reflects the spirit of sacrifice commemorated in its museum galleries and on the Roll of Honour'.[583] The Tomb would therefore provide a focus for this reinvention of the Australian War Memorial as Australia's leading cultural institution. To enhance this narrative, the War Memorial worked closely with the federal government to ensure that the act of entombing the Unknown Soldier would stand alone in the seventy-fifth commemoration of the war's ending. There would be no other narratives to confuse the ceremony of interment as anything other than a kind of communal farewell to the Anzacs. This symbolism was made acute in the public consciousness as the number of Great War survivors increasingly dwindled; a central trope of media language in the lead up to the seventy-fifth anniversary of the armistice. The tomb of the Unknown Soldier would be the climax of a state-orientated tribute to the Anzacs as the centre of Australia's founding myth, and the War Memorial as the designated space of this tribute.

The period between the announcement of the War Memorial's intention to seek the repatriation and the final confirmation of the funeral itself was a volatile one, in which narratives competed. Indeed, such was the focus on the War Memorial that returned service groups felt the need to write to Kelson to remind him that members of the RSL had, in fact, pushed for a tomb in the 1960s and 1970s.[584] In response, Kelson asserted the War Memorial's tomb was a distinctly 'national project' and stressed that as it would commemorate all military personnel throughout Australian military history it would

[581] *Canberra Times*, 16 July, 1991.
[582] Ekins, 6 June, 1991.
[583] Ekins, 6 June, 1991.
[584] Faulkner to Jorgenson, Chatswood RSL, AWM371 93/1219, AWM, Canberra.

assist in the War Memorial's role of commemoration.[585] This seems a sharp reply to what was a simple letter by a handful of RSL members in support of the project. As public awareness grew so did the potential for backlash. Indeed, despite the claims to an organic process, responding to the demands of a national public, it is remarkable how cautious the War Memorial Council was about seeking the interment. McKernan himself had suggested caution in approaching the idea of the tomb (he had not opposed it, contrary to popular media accounts).[586] In asserting its own historical project in an unsettled space, the War Memorial may have quickly have found itself competing with alternative visions of national and historicised spaces.

It was very important that the war memorial was able to sideline as much as possible any historical-ideological claims on the body of the Unknown that the RSL might have. Any competing narratives to the memorial's claim of a national tomb might slow down the building process, delay the project, and therefore reduce its emotional and political impact. In a show of institutional strength, Brendon Kelson, in his official notice to the national RSL president Alfred 'Alf' Garland, stated that while he was aware of historic arguments and positions taken by the RSL against an unknown, 'times and circumstances have changed'. 'Arguments that were once advanced against a tomb … have been completely overtaken or have lost any strength they might one time have had', he explained.[587] This post-imperial crowing closed off any challenge by RSL authority by claiming the War Memorial's initiative was grounded in 'a change of heart' in the public. Kelson's letter to Garland was a mere courtesy notice. Accordingly, RSL involvement in the project was reduced to the ceremonial – having been placed outside the Directing Committee – and its influence was further curtailed by the decision by the War Memorial Council to approach directly a number of veterans seeking their support. Prior to going public, Kelson had 'sounded out' the opinion of sixteen ex-servicemen living in New South Wales and the ACT. This was on the recommendation of Inglis who fully supported Kelson when he began the initial discussions around the possibility of the tomb project. It was Inglis who also advised 'neutralising' sculptor Ray Ewers as a source of contention and focal point for veterans' and public criticism. In an interesting sign of the relationship between scholars and institution in the forging of war commemoration, Inglis was encouraged to complete his *Sacred Places* in time for armistice day 1993 – with financial support from the Australian War Memorial in the form of a sizable pre-order of the book to be sold through the War Memorial's shop over the course of the Armistice anniversary.

The project also meant curtailing the authority of the Commonwealth Graves Commission. The official approach of the War Memorial committee was deferential to the custodianship of the Commission. Internally, however, the project managers were derisive of the Commission's role as largely administrative. The Australian High Commissioner in London, R J Smith, wrote to Brendon Kelson stating that 'it seemed to me that it was inconceivable that the Australian Government would be approaching the Commission cap in hand to ask its approval to carry out this proposal', when 'in my view it was the Commission's job to work out a basis on which this could be done'.[588] Smith and

[585] Freeman to Kelson, 16 September, 1993, AWM371 93/1219, AWM, Canberra.
[586] *The Australia*, 7 October, 1995.
[587] Kelson to Garland, 25 November, 1992, AWM371 93/1219, AWM, Canberra.
[588] Smith to Kelson, 17 September, 1992 AWM 87/0604, AWM371 93/1222, AWM, Canberra.

Kelson feared that the Commission would put off the repatriation, as had happened to the Canadian and South African governments when they had expressed interest in similar projects a decade earlier. Indeed, when the idea was first broached in July 1992 by Alan Heggen, head of Australian War Graves and member of the Directing Group, the Commission was very reticent. In what was, overall, an attempt to dissuade the Australian government from pursuing the repatriation, the Commission chair cited the fact that the Westminster Unknown Warrior original had not been in the custodianship of the Commission but was rather a unilateral decision by the British and Dominion governments to remove a body not yet placed in a final cemetery.[589] In effect, it was entirely different to the national framework being put forward by the Australian state. Similarly, the Commission retained the belief that the Imperial unknown was very loosely British and therefore plausibly that of a Dominion soldier (This was certainly reflected in the epitaph of the Unknown, which stated the body was 'of British blood'). Perhaps most importantly, the Commission was hesitant about creating international precedents, having turned down the request by the Fijian government to repatriate the body of Sefanaia Sukanaivalu, Fiji's sole VC winner, who died in action in 1944. Accordingly, the Australian government sought to secure Canadian and South African support on the Commission's representative committee, lobbying on the basis that a successful Australian repatriation project would set a mutually beneficial precedent. Kelson himself had already embarked on an informal mission to talk with various authorities about the possibility of the return to Australia of the body of an unknown soldier from a French battlefield, traveling to Germany, France, Belgium, the United Kingdom, and Israel.[590] This ensured that the repatriation was a national act which elided the historical background of the imperial AIF and its volunteers. This international context of the project was important, sifting through imperial relationships effectively to create a national state claim, against a backdrop of post-imperial global relations.

This negotiation of international politics was 'brought home' to the domestic context. It was important, in Kelson's view, that the Unknown was the sole focus of the seventy-fifth, if it was to reach maximum public impact. This entailed a further diminishment of veterans' authority. An anniversary trip had been planned by a large group of veterans, through the Department of Veterans' Affairs, for Armistice Day 1993. Kelson was quick to contact the DVA – once the decision had been made to pursue the Unknown project – to point out that a veterans' pilgrimage to France for Armistice Day could be something akin to the international attention of 1990, and therefore a threat to the national project of the Unknown and its centring on the War Memorial. It was agreed that the pilgrimage be shifted a few months earlier to August/September. This was met by public criticism. Minister of Veterans Affairs, Ben Humphreys, came under fire for an apparently fussy intervention by the government, with people arguing that it should be the veterans' decision, rather than that of the state. In an interview with radio host Alan Jones, Humphrey tried to displace this criticism by stating that the reason was to protect the

[589] CWGC to Alan E Heggen, 15 July 1992, P133/1 REC 15, Tomb of the Unknown Soldier - Negotiations with Commonwealth War Graves Commission, AWM371 93/1222, NAA, Canberra.
[590] The trip to Israel was significant; as well as meeting Jewish museum representatives, Kelson was interested in the (failed) repatriation project of the Israeli government to return Palestinian Jews who fought and died in Italy during the war.

health of the elderly men facing the cold European November.[591] When asked whether there would be anything special for the veterans on November 11, after some attempt to obfuscate, Humphrey admitted that the Unknown repatriation was being sought – the first public confirmation of the project by the government.

The Humphreys-Jones interview in March 1993 reflected the formation of institutional frameworks vital to the Unknown project and the shaping of its public narrative, enfolding national aims and the language of cultural trauma. In a significant interview with Michael McKernan on the 2CN Morning Show, the announcer stated how 'Many a tear will be shed on November 11 this year when Australians will be able to grieve as a nation for all its war dead'.[592] McKernan was asked whether the removal of the Ray Ewers statue could 'be a bit of a controversial move', to which he replied with a flat 'no'. McKernan then laid claim to the history of seeking the return of the Unknown, asserting the Australian War Memorial as the only place to which it could come. The slow process of getting one over the course of a century was because 'Australians lost the sense of their own history' and, by extension, that the War Memorial would bring the country back to its senses – by becoming the fulcrum of Australian history and its key cultural institution. The War Memorial would be the 'focus and heart of commemoration', McKernan said, admitting that it hoped to 'grab the national attention' at the entombment. This claim on Australian history came at a seismic time, being a direct allusion to the contest around Australian history which had been opened up by the 1988 Bicentenary and Henry Reynold's 1989 book, *Dispossession; Black Australia and White Invaders*. Myriad claims were enfolded in the Unknown project, so that the experience of the War Memorial was the experience of the nation. 'The tomb of the Unknown soldier', McKernan concluded, would 'provide that purpose and also be a suitable and dramatic climax to the experience of the Memorial's whole commemorative area'.[593] At the interment in November, McKernan suggested that the War Memorial itself was now 'very much in touch with Australia's own history' and that the tomb would in some way attend to the ruptures of the war that persisted.

There were a number of potential threats to the developing narrative. Kelson was quick to disavow politics following accusations that the tomb was a pro-republican statement.[594] Several prominent members of the RSL questioned the decision to exhume a body in the first place: such a disturbance, seventy-five years after the fact would surely be sacrilege. Perhaps most hotly contested was the decision to call the new icon of the nation the Unknown Soldier rather than the British term, Unknown Warrior. It is clear that the project's scholars and the government, at the outset, had agreed to the language of the 'unknown soldier'. In the early discussions between interest groups and public, however, different wording was used by different groups, reflecting different threads of war commemoration. The navy objected to the use of the word 'soldier', erasing war casualties at sea and in the air. The president of the Naval Association, Commodore Norbert Clarke, argued 'soldier' clearly

[591] Alan Jones interview with Minister of Veterans' Affairs Ben Humphreys, 4 March 1993, 20E, (transcript), Tomb of the Unknown Soldier - Media and Community involvement, AWM371 93/2021, NAA, Canberra.
[592] Interview with Michael McKernan, 17 May 1993, 2CN, Tomb of the Unknown Soldier - Media and Community involvement, AWM371 93/2021, NAA, Canberra.
[593] Michael McKernan, 'Talking points', 18 May 1993, AWM371 93/2021, NAA, Canberra..
[594] *Melbourne Herald*, 12 April, 1993; *Canberra Times*, 6 March, 1993.

represented the land army. Kelson responded by arguing that the word 'warrior' would not have been appropriate since Australia was never a 'warrior nation', and the word 'soldier' had an honest flavour.[595]

Support for an ‘Unknown Warrior’ reflected the importance placed on social and military hierarchies and traditions within war memory. This, of course, flew in the face of Kelson and Keating’s ‘national symbol’ of the soldier-citizen that would provide the symbolic and ideological body of the Australian character, within the state project of Anzac [596] Indeed, when we think about this wording in light of concerns about a military funeral rather than a national public ritual, we can see the tensions align with old civic versus state practices of war commemoration. It was the final collapsing – a process begun in the 1990 Hawke pilgrimage – of the civil-imperial Anzac into the state. There was some continued resistance. When the War Memorial commissioned a special postcard to be sold in the lead up to the entombment, the designer was contacted by the Naval Association and informed that the text could be changed from ‘soldier’ to ‘warrior’, which War Memorial officials strenuously denied.[597] Various alternatives were discussed – for example, the compromise wording of the ‘Tomb of the Unknown Australian’, proposed by General Grey, or another which emphasised ‘an Australian son is resting, returned to the land of his birth’ – were eventually voted down by the council.[598] The Unknown Australian Soldier it would be. This was an exercise of statehood closed around a specific vision of war memory: in foreclosing the possibility of the ‘warrior’, the War Memorial was foreclosing the possibility of alternative ideological threads of commemoration, and the lineage of imperial and local ways of understanding the experience of the war.

This process was therefore about managing the RSL and limiting its ability to influence the project within a framework of national memory. Although the RSL national body eventually supported the tomb, the Victorian RSL state council passed the motion in July 1993 that it ‘totally opposes the concept of an Unknown Soldier grave being established within the confines of the Australian War Memorial’. The motion was carried unanimously and sent to the War Memorial.[599] Asserting the importance of the returned service personnel in ensuring the dignity of the Australian ‘unknown warrior’, the National Executive ‘expressed strongly’ its desire that the Pallbearers be the national president of the RSL, the Naval Association, VC winners, and other men of military rank.[600] There were also complaints about whitewashing the religious elements of the repatriation.[601] Although military chaplains would play an important role in the ceremony, the fact that it would take place between Old Parliament and the Hall of Memory reflected the secular, state character of the commemoration.[602] The RSL attempted to make various overtures to the empire. Towards the end of

[595] *Canberra Times*, Friday 22 October 1993, p. 13
[596] MacDougall to Kelson, 22 June, 1993, and reply 23 July, CNS 749/93, AWM371 93/2021, NAA, Canberra.
[597] ‘Telephone enquiries’ (Transcript), 8 September 1993, AWM371 93/2021, NAA, Canberra.
[598] Report of the Directing Group Meeting, 14 September 1993; Latimer to Kelson, 26 July, 1993, AWM371, 93/1219, NAA, Canberra.
[599] Deighton to Healy, RSL, 7 June 1993, AWM371 93/2021, NAA, Canberra.
[600] ‘Official Pallbearers’, Garland to Keating, 11 November 1993, AWM371 93/1608, NAA, Canberra.
[601] Hall to Beaurepaire, Chair of the Australian War Memorial Council, 5 September 1993, AWM371 93/1608, NAA, Canberra.
[602] Hall from Kelson, 16 September 1993, AWM371 93/1608, NAA, Canberra.

the project, the RSL national executive passed a resolution requesting that the tomb slab should incorporate the Australian flag on the design, a claim not simply to national identity but tied also to the Australian ensign with its British traditions.[603] In another assertion of imperial ties, ACT RSL President James Cullen argued that 'God Save the Queen' was 'the only Anthem his spirit will recognise' – a request Kelson was able to dodge by selecting the neutral funeral hymn 'The Lord is my shepherd'.[604] To try to insure against the possibility that the funeral would become a platform for Keating to push an explicit agenda of the Republic, the RSL asked for the Prime Minister to invite the Queen – a gesture that, even if symbolic, Keating politely declined to make.[605] These engagements on language, symbolism, and funeral rites, shifting the imperial and local to the national, were extended to the funeral procession itself. The RSL was placed as a 'national organisation' and requests by sub-branches to be recognised within the formal ceremony were denied. This was part the 'nationalising' logic of the state.[606] It was further emphasised by the War Memorial's refusal to include objects of local significance in the funeral - instead asserting that items had to have 'national significance'. In this management of the RSL, we can see the thematic claims of the Unknown project, as an ideological rearrangement of war experience to cultural memory within the state - through the transformation of the Australian War Memorial as a key cultural experience of statehood.

The muting of veterans' voices in the debate around the entombment of the Unknown Soldier signified the shift away from the RSL to the state as the primary custodian of the Anzac spirit and its public maintenance. The discarding of the Ewers statue was the most significant example of the hegemonic cultural project of the repatriation. The Ewers statue was deemed an inadequate centrepiece within the controlled environment of the War Memorial and its careful balance of colour and light and modelled surface (*Fig. 4.*) It offered a contested narrative, asserting the social hierarchies of the returned-servicemen which suggested the civic formulations of Anzac commemoration, now collapsed under the new state Anzac project. No approval was sought from local heritage agencies for the removal of the statue located under the apse and the insertion of a sarcophagus.[607] There was no attempt to protect this heritage site or its connections with non-state actors, such as the RSL.

[603] Healy to Kelson, 8 September, 1993. Kelson cited the 'tight schedule' - Kelson to Healy, 20 September, 1993, AWM371 93/1608, NAA, Canberra.
[604] Cullens to Kelson, 15 August, 1993; reply 23 August 1993, AWM371 93/1645, NAA, Canberra.
[605] RSL to Keating, 28 June, 1993, AWM371 93/1645, NAA, Canberra.
[606] Kelson to Keys, 12 August 1993 – Keys to Kelson, 5 August, 1993, AWM371 93/1369, NAA, Canberra..
[607] Thompson to Llewellyn, 2 July 1993, AWM371 93/113 271 2840; Garce to RSL; 28 June 1993, Australian War Memorial, 93/1068; Australian Heritage Commission Report, 3 June 1993; Memo to Brendon Kelson, 8 October 1993, Directing Group, 1993, AWM371, 93/1219, NAA, Canberra.

Figure 4. The Ewers statue, now *situated in the War Memorial Gardens. AWM.*

Once McKernan and Kelson secured the support of the sculptor himself and promised to move the statue to a new location in the War Memorial grounds, there were few objections to its removal. [608] Chopped in half and left languishing in storage, it was eventually unveiled for the fiftieth anniversary of the end of the Second World War, with a new plaque stating that it once stood in the Hall of Memory. What has not been commented on is the fact that the Ewers statue was part of a 'trinity' of statues, soldier, airman, and sailor. Removing the soldier only reinforced the Tomb as primarily related to the army. Indeed, after the removal of Ewers statute, the RSL proposed that a new statue be commissioned, one of a soldier standing in a guard posture in the Hall of Memory to watch over what would be the tomb of its fallen comrade.[609]

The design competition for the tomb in the Hall of Memory was underway during this process of negotiating the public debate around the wording, location, and propriety of the Unknown project. The Directing Committee approached five architecture firms. The winning firm, Tonkin-Zulaikha-Harford,

[608] Kelson to Beaurepaire, 16 May, 1993; Beaurepaire to Miller, 26 May, 1993, AWM371 93/1369, NAA, Canberra.
[609] Witheridge to Latimer, 20 July, 1993, AWM371 93/1369, NAA, Canberra.

had designed the Vietnam War memorial on Anzac Parade. The architectural brief itself revealed a number of ideological concerns of the War Memorial's leadership. While emphasising a relative freedom of design, it contained a number of stipulations including concern about the religious symbolism. It was to be a symbol of national loss, meaning that it could not glorify war experience or depict it in a negative light and it must echo the commemorative elements encountered and harmonise with existing features of the Hall of Memory. As material constructions, the designs reveal possibilities of futures and alternative narratives, and functions in the ideological contours of the Unknown tomb. The Bligh-Voller design, for example, required the tomb to be built into the Hall of Valour below – creating a connection between valour and memory, the heroic image of the soldier with 'the feelings awakened by the tomb'.

The internal process leading to the selection of the tomb design is indicative that the erasure and replacement of the Ewers statue was nearly as important as the tomb itself. Despite the public narratives that the Unknown Soldier was the centre of the project, the winning design by the architecture firm Tonkin-Zulaikha-Harford was actually chosen more for its proposed renovation of the apse space. The statue would be removed and replaced with four pillars of wood, steel, marble, and glass (constructed with locally-sourced materials) representing the four elements – earth, air, fire, and water. These, in turn, were meant to align with the 'Four Freedoms': the freedoms of speech, religious practice, from want, and from fear. In the original plan, the pillars were to be sandblasted with words and phrases to encourage contemplation and reflection; chosen by the War Memorial historians, poets, military personnel, and the designers themselves.[610] In the design brief, the column sculpture was to be envisioned as 'a row of totems', invoking variously the heat of the sun, the souls of the dead, change and transfiguration, and the life-force of God. The estimated cost of $80,350, for around half the project, was to be topped up with sponsorship from Australian industry.[611]

The 'Four Freedoms' discourse reflected a distinctly American inflection to the language of commemoration in the War Memorial. Part of the classic idiom of liberal democratic citizenship, the 'Four Freedoms' had been part of Roosevelt's justification in 1941 for ending American isolationism in the lead up to its entry into the Pacific war.[612] The translation of this discourse to the Australian War Memorial was therefore very interesting. It reflected the contemporary political context, in which the Hawke-Keating Government was seeking to draw closer to the market and security axis of the United States and also offered a reconceptualisation of Australian military experience. In much the same way that the Unknown project was intended to be a post-imperial expression of Australian statehood, so narratives of war experience would be no longer embedded in imperial and racial narratives of the First World War but for defence of American-aligned freedom and liberal democracy. This also resonated with the unknown 'soldier', a nomenclature shared with the United States' national tombs.

The Tonkin design consisted of a simple marble slab at floor height, slightly raised, with a chasm

[610] These would be eventually dropped due to time constraints and complexity. Memo to Brendon Kelson, 4 August, 1993, AWM371 93/1369, AWM, Canberra.
[611] Reid to Tonkin, 30 April, 1993; Note from Richard Reid, 31 March, 1991, AWM371 93/1369, NAA, Canberra..
[612] David M. Kennedy, *Freedom from Fear: the American people in depression and war, 1929–1945*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1999, pp. 427–434.

dividing the ‘sacred’ tomb from the ‘profane’ floor – a claim of the state and the obligations of the individual citizen. The heavy gold leaf inscription which – going through a number of iterations – would eventually declare ‘An unknown Australian soldier who died in the war of 1914-1918’ (*Fig. 5.*).[613]The overall effect of the design was that the visitor, standing at the door to the Hall of Memory, was met by the tomb, before their eyes being lead to the pillars and then up to the dome above (*Fig. 6.*).

Figure 5. The Tomb of the Unknown Soldier at the Australian War Memorial, 11 November 1993, ABC / AAP: Andrew Taylor.

[613] Tonkin-Zulaikha-Harford to Raffety, ‘Tomb Slab Inscription’, AWM371 93/1369, NAA, Canberra.

Figure 6. Visitors to the Tomb of the Unknown Australian Soldier in the Hall of Memory at the Australian War Memorial, Canberra. Note the 'Four Freedom' column sculpture in the apse area. AWM.

The funeral of the Unknown Soldier and the shaping of the public national imaginary

The design and construction of the tomb was a national project. When Kelson and the War Memorial team took possession of Unknown Soldier in France, the body was declared to be finally in 'Australia's care'. This reflected the power of the repatriation project: the national claim on this body by the War Memorial – in turn imbued with national legitimacy – and now brought back to be buried, confirmed state claims to the territory of Australia. This was energised by an emotional public, supported by a massive communication effort and national telecast.[614] When the War Memorial media coordinators contacted ABC producer Vaughan Hinton, they appealed to the way in which 'the concept of the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier carries with it an emotional power that no-one fully understood'. The ABC was brought in relatively late in the project, which meant that the media coverage was more constrained that the War Memorial had hoped. Nonetheless, the ABC filmed the handover of the coffin containing the remains from the Commonwealth Graves Commission into the Australian War Memorial's care at the Australian Memorial at Villers-Bretonneux, in France; the lying-in-state of the coffin under the Menin Gate at Ypres; the official arrival in Sydney; and the handover to the domestic flight to Canberra.[615] The ceremonies in Canberra were broadcast live – the parade, the funeral, and entombment – with the footage of the transportation from France and laying-in-state being screened in a series of short background segments.[616] As the War Memorial press kit stated, 'it was hoped that a national telecast would bring 'about deeper understanding of the symbolic importance of the Unknown Australian Soldier'.[617]

In the lead up to the repatriation, the War Memorial was very conscious of public response to what was the most important state commemoration *within* Australia. The Unknown's central narrative, therefore, revolved around the question of why, seventy-five years after the war, the state had now decided to establish its own tomb. The War Memorial put considerable focus on a strong media campaign. This included building communications with 900 service organisations; coordinating with schools; ensuring television coverage by the ABC; engagement with national, regional, and capital city newspaper and radio editors as well as ACT tourism.[618] The *Canberra Times*, on the day of the funeral, featured an article titled 'What people ask about the entombment'. Written by staff of the Australian War Memorial, the article explained 'the facts surrounding such a sensitive and important matter as the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier', to 'ensure maximum public understanding, endorsement and participation.' Not only does this article reveal the direct hand of the War Memorial in shaping the media's language around the funeral, it is also descriptive of the state-driven nature of the commemoration. Questions such as 'Why did Australians ask for repatriation of the remains now, so

[614] McPherson to Hinton, 9 June, 1993, AWM371 93/1369, NAA, Canberra.
[615] Shrimpton to Hill, 2 June 1993; Shrimpton to Kelson, 18 June 1993, AWM371 93/1369, AWM, Canberra.
[616] ABC-TV, 11 November, 1993; Memo to Brendon Kelson, 29 June, 1993. Costs were around 140,000. Some complaints about the reticence and also lack of funding allocated by the ABC - complaints that it had already planned to broadcast the 1994 Gay and Lesbian Mardi Gras. Memo to Brendon Kelson, 19 July, 1993. A lack of coordination between departments meant that the interment was only available live on ABC and not shared with other media until the evening bulletins. Memo to Richard Reid, 23 August, 1993, AWM371 93/2021, NAA, Canberra.
[617] 'The Tomb of the Unknown Australian Soldier - press kit', AWM371 93/2021, NAA, Canberra.
[618] Kelson to Richardson, 17 July 1993, AWM371 93/1226, NAA, Canberra.

long after the two World Wars?' framed the entombment of the Unknown Soldier as the nation asking for the return of its dead. Paradoxically, the writers emphasised that 'creating a tomb of an unknown Australian soldier … has no other purpose' than 'ensuring that all Australians and other visitors can reflect on the … loss and sacrifices involved in war': it was promoted as transcending the state, while articulating a higher sense of national belonging and coming to terms with personal grief.[619] Government sources also tried to play down the nationalistic undertones of the decision.

The War Memorial's locale in the Department of Veterans' Affairs was vital to the successful control of the public narrative and response to the Unknown project. The personal relationship between the War Memorial and the Keating Government was reflected in the meetings of Michael McKernan, Don Watson, and Charles Wright (AWM council member) who were all close colleagues. Keating was kept closely informed of developments from the initial proposal. Keating wrote to the state premiers inviting them to be official mourners in the funeral and calling for a two-minute silence at 11am on Armistice Day. A minute of silence at Eastern Summer Time would unite the whole nation together with the entombment. Historian Jacqueline Rees, who had just published a history of the RSL, wrote that the entombment was 'an event of great national significance' which would bring the focus of the nation on Canberra.[620] When Kelson updated the Prime Minister on the progress of the project in July 1993, Keating emphasised the importance of the national broadcast and that he, rather than the Governor-General, should deliver the eulogy.[621] If the support of the government and the War Memorial was lacking in previous instances, it was now fundamental to the 1993 project.

The Prime Minister's role in the funeral of the Unknown would be unambiguous. As the chief pallbearer and eulogiser, Keating was centre stage throughout the ceremony, the voice of the nation and the narrator of its foundational myth. Keating's now famous eulogy at the funeral of the Unknown Soldier articulated the central narrative of the ritual: the creation of the tomb as an embodiment of the Australian war dead and therefore the Australian state. By declaring in his eulogy, 'He is all of them. And he is one of us', Keating was making vital distinctions of modern life; the relationship between citizen and state. He articulated a dehierarchical, inclusive commemoration: the heroes of the war were 'not the generals or politicians' but 'the soldiers and sailors and nurses' who taught ordinary Australians the importance of endurance, courage, boldness, and resilience – 'to believe in ourselves, to stick together'. This emphasis on the triumph of 'ordinary people' was reflected in the clipped prose of the speech itself: simple, practical, without rhetorical flourishes.

The distinctions between the audience and the Anzacs, between Australians and the ideal of citizenship to which they must aim, were rooted in a moral ontology of the state. Keating spoke of 'triumphs against the odds, of courage and ingenuity in adversity' and 'of free and independent spirits whose discipline derived less from military formalities and customs than from the bonds of mateship and the demands of necessity'.[622] These moral distinctions, as expressed by Keating, delineated the

[619] 'What people ask about the entombment', *Canberra Times*, 11 November, 1993.
[620] *Canberra Times*, 18 September 1993, p. 3.
[621] The Governor-General would instead be named 'Chief Mourner'; 'Report of the Directing Group Meeting', 27 July, 1993, AWM371 93/1219, NAA, Canberra.
[622] Keating, 'eulogy'.

citizen from the non-citizen: providing the higher moral order reducible to the state and political citizenship. In this sense, the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier was a liminal space in which these distinctions were enacted; it was the Anzacs who 'proved that real nobility and grandeur belongs not to empires and nations but to the people on whom they, in the last resort, always depend'. In the eulogy, Keating transformed the Anzac legend into a summary of these moral distinctions of the citizen in relation to the state and 'what it means to be Australian'.[623] This reinforced the nationalist discourse of the entombment, drawing powerfully on the idea that identity could be forged through war and grief.

Yet, '[t]his Australia and the Australia [the Unknown Soldier] knew are like foreign countries'. The body of the unknown soldier was something of a time-capsule of legitimacy linking - and projecting - the state backward in time. Yet, paradoxically, as Keating noted, this claim was made in the face of radical social, political, and cultural transformations of Australia in the face of decolonisation, economic reforms, and the tumultuous politics of recognition which had undermined the old political relationships in Australian public discourse. Moreover, Keating's agenda as Prime Minister was precisely a reconstruction of statehood, the further liberalising the economy and more directly addressing the history of Indigenous dispossession as Hawke had failed to do. Therefore the ceremony of the Unknown Soldier became symbolic of the imaginative power of the Prime Minister, reflecting the important role of modern speech-acts as philosophical, ideological, and political invention.[624] It also reveals the link between the historical awareness of Keating's speech and the role played by Don Watson as the prime minister's speech writer and a trained historian. Watson brought 'a historian's knowledge of human nature and detachment from his task' as James Groves describes. This reiterates the importance of groups of intellectuals who can articulate the imaginative landscape of the dominant ideology.[625].

The repatriation of the Unknown Soldier, intended to signal the independence of the Australian nation, its people and identity, from old imperial connections was tied to the reconstruction of the state in a globalised network of market state economies. As the remains of the Unknown Soldier were exhumed from Adelaide Cemetery, Keating was berating the French government for its protectionist lobbying in the Uruguay Round of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), which would eventually close in 1994. France had repaid Australian blood sacrifice on its battlefields during the two world wars with selfish trade policies, Keating argued. Asked by journalists while at Paris International Airport, before boarding 'the Spirit of Remembrance' to accompany the symbol of the nation to his final resting place, whether 'something that happened in a war years ago' should be exploited 'in the context of the current trade negotiations', Keating responded that:

> Well, I think it's more than fair that, when a nation's interests are threatened and other nations answer the call, in such a way... I mean, for Australia we lost, we sent to this war and lost

[623] Ibid.
[624] Peggy Noonan, *What I Saw at the Revolution: A Political Life in the Reagan Era*, Ivy Books, New York, 1991, p. 67
[625] James Groves, 'The Contribution of Don Watson as Paul Keating's Speechwriter', C*anberra Bulletin of Public Administration*, (2002), pp. 47–49, 47.

> nearly ten per cent of our population. That's like losing nearly two million people today. I mean, that's sacrifice on a scale almost unheard of …European politics are now becoming very, very self-centred and very selfish… And I think this kind of self-centredness in the biggest thing of all that affects the world most greatly now, in trade has, I think, got to come to an end.[626]

It seemed the Anzacs were fighting for favourable GATT negotiations as much as freedom, democracy, and the Australian way of life**.** The fact that the figure of Australian dead during the First World War had been closer to one per cent did not matter. The French Foreign Ministry responded with a statement saying that it was regrettable Keating had made his remarks 'in a place where the comradeship of arms between the French and Australians who died in the cause of liberty was being commemorated'.[627] The use of Australian military experience as a diplomatic weapon was not new; Billy Hughes had asserted the place of Australia in the Versailles conference, not on behalf of five million Australians living in 1918, but '60,000 dead' – which he used as leverage to protect White Australia. Keating's comments also built on the global projections of the Australian state begun in Hawke's seventy-fifth commemorative project.

The narrative of a new Australian nationhood represented in the interring of the Unknown Soldier and reinforced by the global role of the Prime Minister was given moral dimensions by the language of the interment itself. It was precisely this role that marked the difference between Bridges and the Unknown Soldier. Shortly before the ceremony on Remembrance Day 1993, commentator John Lahey claimed that this 'mighty national symbol' should help Australians to 'pour out ancient grief and unite in pride'.[628] Inglis, observing the ceremony, acknowledged that we cannot 'assume ... that all the grief induced in 1914-1918 has gone', describing the funeral as 'a kind of communal farewell to the Anzacs'.[629] The *Canberra Times* declared the Unknown Soldier 'at rest, at last', describing how 'the slow mournful journey' of the funeral procession along Anzac Parade was accentuated by 'the hypnotic gait of the slow march' – a means of progress that defies time and forces a pause to reflect on war and mortality; spatial and moral dimensions of the internment.

In this way, the Unknown Soldier, intended to be a historicised site, was developed through a powerful 'ahistorical remembering', with the language of immediacy and spectacle giving a sense of the spontaneous and popular while taking precedence over the distance from the past essential to historical understanding. The War Memorial was transformed into the symbol of unity in the nation. On the tenth anniversary of the internment, Kelson – no longer constrained by the need to downplay overtly nationalist themes – stated that the Unknown Soldier was 'part of Australia becoming a nation in its own right'.[630] This was very much the intention behind the symbolism and ritual of the funeral.

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[626] Transcript of Interview with the Prime Minister, the Hon. P. J. Keating, M. P., Villers-Bretonneux, France Wednesday, 22 September, 1993, AWM, Canberra.
[627] *Canberra Times*, 25 September, 1993.
[628] *Age*, 2 November, 1993, p. 2; *Time Australia*, 22 November, 1993, p. 52.
[629] K. Inglis, 'The Rite Stuff', *Eureka Street*, 4, 1 (1994): pp. 23–7, 26; Inglis, 'The unknown Australian soldier', p. 15.
[630] 'What do we know about Australia's Unknown Soldier', ABC, 11 November, 2011: http://www.abc.net.au/news/2013-11-11/what-do-we-know-about-australias-unknown-soldier/5081574.

The tomb 'changed the character of the memorial', Kelson stated, giving a focus to the Hall of Memory.

> He's somewhere on that Roll of Honour in the cloisters. He ties it all together - the events, the exhibitions, the whole story of remembrance of that war - and of course he stands for Australians who have fallen in subsequent wars and will fall in future wars.

The Unknown Soldier was the embodiment of the nation, and by the act of entombment, healed the fallen dead and the very structure of the War Memorial itself. This was the ultimate conflation of those who died in war with the 'story of remembrance' – Anzac as the founding myth of the state.

At the ceremony of the Unknown Soldier, the Great War veterans marched alongside the bearer party. But in this new, wholly state commemoration, these veterans were swamped and diminished as the Prime Minister took centre stage (*Fig. 6)*. They were instead called upon to articulate, 'one last time', the (new) moral place of Anzac in the state. As one veteran dutifully responded, '[w]e have had our time. We are finished. But it is important that the kids know that they are living in the best place there is in the world.'[631] That the entombment of the Unknown Soldier was about placing the War Memorial as the heart of the nation, rather than providing historical understanding for the war and sympathy for veterans was demonstrated in the Memorial Council's response to criticisms of the repatriation campaign.[632]

This was the universal reimagining of the state's project around the Unknown Tomb. The Unknown Soldier, however, reflected the paradox of reconciliation: the seeking of healing was the foreclosure of possible futures. Indigenous perspectives which could have threatened the reconstruction of national unity were completely absent from the funeral of the Unknown Australian Soldier. The Aboriginal flag was not included in the collection of standards raised around the War Memorial and throughout the federal capital for the entombment. That same week, a Western Australian politician controversially dismissed Indigenous Australians as 'uncivilised' on national radio.[633] All this reflected the public assumption, implicit in the ritual and language of the entombment, that the Unknown Soldier was a white settler Australian. In this rendering of the national body, 'white' was a kind of silence written into how Australians knew the past and how they saw the land - evocative of Stanner's 'great Australian silence'.[634] It is this elision of indigenous narratives of place that we will explore in the next chapter.

[631] *Canberra Times*, 12 November, 1993, p. 6.
[632] Complaints that the ritual would place the military leadership centre stage, 'the brass', rather than the common soldier, were ignored.
[633] 'Aborigines call for recognition of their people's sacrifice', *Canberra Times*, 12 November, 1993.
[634] Katrina Schlunke, *Bluff Rock: Autobiography of a massacre*, Perth, Fremantle Arts Centre Press, 2005, p. 234; W. E. H. Stanner, 'The Great Australian Silence: Stanner after the dreaming', Boyer Lecture Series, ABC, 1991.

Figure 6. World War I veteran, Robert Comb, sprinkles soil brought from the Windmill site, Pozières, over the coffin of Australia's Unknown Soldier, 11 November 1993. Department of Veterans' Affairs.

Conclusion

In this thesis we have been exploring the transformation of Anzac into a state project for the purposes of providing a unifying myth and affinity of sentiment. The Unknown Australian Soldier places the political transformation of Anzac commemoration earlier than the Howard Government, instead locating it in the Hawke-Keating Governments and the re-making of the Australian War Memorial as the central cultural institution of the state. The way in which this transformation of the cultural institutions of the state, inhered in the repatriation, would come to have an increasingly broader national meaning was evident in the subsequent decades. Two years later, the 'Australia Remembers 1945-1995' program was launched to commemorate the end of the Second World War. As Liz Reed notes in her seminal analysis, *Australia Remembers* was the most comprehensive state management of national mythology in Australian history which, through a range of educational materials and state ceremonies, evoked the memory of the past as part of the process of imagining the nation.[635] As Richard White summarised, the program was a commemoration which 'exploited nostalgia, turned memory into spectacle, marginalised women and indigenous Australians in the very act of recognising them, and brilliantly appropriated the memories of "ordinary people".

Similarly, themes of healing, patriotism, and military heritage, in conjunction with the expanded moral presence of the Prime Minister in state ritual and speech, defined the Anzac government policies of John Howard. As the Opposition Leader in 1993, Howard had declared the entombment 'a national

[635] Reed, p. 39.

occasion to unite all Australians in remembrance and pride'.[636] 'We honour them', he continued, 'for the values they defended, for the courage they showed, for all they achieved and for the way in which they did so.' In light of this chapter, while Howard's personal politics were important in extending the narrative of state-founding in war experience through the ninetieth anniversary of Gallipoli in 2005, there was considerable continuity in the performance and language, if not the focus, of Anzac commemoration. Howard did not merely facilitate the return of Gallipoli as the centre of the national political mythology, in speech and ritual, but rather played off the global and local place-making of the previous decade. Howard's personal style, conservative politics, and geopolitical agenda as an ally of the United States and United Kingdom in the 'global war on terror' enjoined the expanded moral role of the Prime Minister to a direct military platform; welcoming home returning troops, the heirs of the 'Australian military tradition'. In this sense, although the entombment of the Unknown Australian Soldier could be interpreted as a renewed 'cult of the fallen', it is better understood as the re-enchantment of nationalism and an intensification of the state in the social and cultural life of Australia since the 1980s.

We see clearly the rhetorical and moral groundwork laid by the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier. The entombing of the Unknown Australian Soldier was a powerful assemblage of state institutions, people, and national narratives. This was underpinned by the powerful enfolding of the Australian War Memorial as research centre, cenotaph, mausoleum, and reliquary of the pride of Australian military heritage, and enabled by the explosion of newspaper and media coverage of Anzac Day after 1993.[637] Speaking at a Remembrance Day service at the War Memorial in 2013, 20 years after this process that started with burial of the Unknown Soldier, now former Prime Minister Paul Keating recapitulated some key themes of his 1993 speech while also seeking to revise its emphasis on war as a foundational experience of Australian nationhood. In light of Howard's commitment to Gallipoli, Keating instead celebrated a progressive national history, located not at Anzac Cove, but 'through the processes of our federation to new ideas of ourselves', which valued – among other things – equality, fairness, and a sense of inclusive patriotism.[638] These had been given substance through the experience of Australian soldiers at Flanders and Gallipoli, crucially divested of any entanglements of empire and race. 'For whatever claims Britain and its empire had on those who served and died on the Western Front and at Gallipoli', Keating stated, 'the primary claim remained Australia's'. This was the essential act of the 1993 repatriation, to claim the body of the dead within a new post-imperial national cosmology. Yet, in another paradoxical speech, Keating attempted to step back from this sentiment that his government had been fundamental in creating. This revision merely emphasised the way in which the memorial now stood at the central of a reconfigured story of national redemption – not in the defence of empire, race, and settlement, but the Australian nation and its values in the 21st century. The true meaning of service and sacrifice, it seemed, and the meaning of Anzac was belief in Australia, and the Australian public's 'responsibility in continuing to improve it'. This was

[636] *Canberra Times*, 12 November, 1993.
[637] Richard White, as quoted in Reed, p. 41.
[638] 'Remembrance Day commemorative address;, AWM, November 11: https://www.awm.gov.au/commemoration/speeches/commemorative-address-11-november-2013

precisely the state myth of Anzac, that bound citizens together through a shared sentiment, and which gave legitimacy and direction to the contemporary state.

CHAPTER SIX.
‘THE GREAT PAIN WE FEEL / IS FOR YOU WHO WERE OUR FUTURE’: THE UNKNOWN NEW ZEALAND WARRIOR, 2004.

Introduction

The establishment of the Tomb of the Unknown Australian Soldier was a management of place, violence, and white silences projected across space (domestically and internationally) and time (into the past, present, and future). Indigenous Australian claims could be comfortably demarcated and diffused within state policy. Instead, it is the Australian War Memorial, imbued with the moral authority of the Unknown body, that has taken up residence at the heart of the rituals of state. Writing in 2010, Rachel Buchanan proposed a similar complication in the project of the Unknown New Zealand Warrior in 2004. In her *Parihaka Album*, recounting her family’s entangled histories of place and dislocation during the wars of New Zealand settlement, Buchanan notes the way in which ‘memories of these complicated foundational wars, including war stories associated with the site on which the [Unknown] tomb has been built, nibble away at this elegant new memorial, diminishing its mana and power’.[639] This draws to light forgotten histories and the need to examine the cultural agendas at work in national remembrances. The contest of place and memory at the Pukeahu National War Memorial reveals an arrangement of public affectation in narratives of trauma and loss, which, far from being organic and popular, are enclosed within a state project of postcolonial legitimation and identity formation.

The social and political functions of the Unknown repatriations in 1993 and 2004, residing within a political language and paradigm of redress and healing, are evocative of another vital context of the late twentieth century: the ‘politics of reconciliation’. Penelope Edmonds argues that notions of reconciliation emerge ‘most powerfully in the realm of public performance and [are] bound up in a culture and economy of affect, expressing the desire for virtuous compact, unity and redemption under the sign of nation’.[640] These affective performances take us into the space of imagination as we seek to create mythic covenants, but they also call on the violent past. Of course, Edmonds was not

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[639] Rachel Buchanan, ‘Naming the Unknown Warrior’: http://pukeahuanthology.org/stories/contesting-histories/naming-the-unknown-warrior/.

[640] Penelope Edmonds, ‘Introduction: Performing (Re)conciliation in Settler Societies’, in Penelope Edmonds, ed., *Settler Colonialism and (Re)conciliation*, Cambridge Imperial and Post-Colonial Studies Series, Palgrave Macmillan, London, 2016, p. 23.

talking about reconciliation through national tombs but rather reconciliation as a feature of the internal colonialism of late liberal settler democracies, post-frontier societies, where the state seeks to incorporate Indigenes within the idea of one nation, and where Indigenous people are often legally configured as non-sovereign in their own territories.[641]

Over the 1980s and 1990s, Indigenous peoples within and beyond Australia and New Zealand undertook initiatives to do precisely the same as the state projects of the Unknowns: repatriate human remains from domestic and international institutions and return them to their own land. These were bodies, not of those who had died in defence of empire as in the case of the Unknown Anzacs, but in a different context of state violence; mainly, colonial violence, coercion, and appropriation. These parallel repatriation projects had begun locally in the 1950s by Māori and Indigenous Australian activists, but took on domestic and international momentum after 1970s, as demands for control, accountability and recognition of Indigenous ownership of the past gained greater public prominence, if not acceptance. By the end of the twentieth century, these projects came to public prominence. These efforts were subsequently either supported or contested by New Zealand and Australian governments. Indigenous repatriation collaborated in and contested the same managements of space and lineage as the cultural policy of the Unknowns; sharing the capacity to navigate and generate new relations across local, national, and global contexts.

Building on Chapter Five, this chapter investigates public affectation in the repatriation of unknown bodily human as a crucial venture in the transformation of Anzac Day into a state project. This is in part a transnational analysis, looking at how the Australian institutional and political context influenced the New Zealand Unknown warrior. A comparative lens is also used to explore the limitations of the New Zealand project and its failure to secure a position of absolute state legitimacy around a national war commemoration. State authority was fragmented by local memories of the war and Indigenous histories of place, throwing into stark relief the hegemony of the Australian Anzac formation. The comparison is particularly useful in showing how the Australian Unknown successfully managed national claims and place-making, eliding potential alternative threads of cultural memory relating to frontier war in the formation of Australian settlement. The New Zealand state attempted a similar project under the Clark Government's ostensible post-neoliberal social democrat agenda and was influenced by the Australian precedent. The differences in tone and texture of national tombs reveal the way in which repatriation offers specific visions of past, present, and future, mediated through different authorities and institutional networks; casting in relief definitions of heritage and its importance for the maintenance of cultural and political identity within the ideological formation of the Unknown Anzacs.

Postcolonial and historical perspectives interrogate how racial and state violence are implicated, referenced, and ultimately obscured in the construction of national narratives.[642] The use of the bodies of colonised peoples, scientifically measured and then used to justify narratives of settlement, is

[641] Edmonds, p. 23.
[642] To draw on a framework employed by Walkowitz and Knauer, in *Contested Histories in Public Space: Memory, Race, and Nation*, p. 2.

perhaps the most egregious example of state violence against bodies and its erasure of the violent past.[643] Moreover, the restitution and reparation for the damage done to Indigenous communities and families is a complex and difficult undertaking that, as Judith Keene writes, entails 'not only the physical bodily recovery but also that of the history of the people and of the land of those who had been lost.'[644] Although Buchanan argues that the Tomb was the latest iteration of cultural colonisation within the logic of the settler state, I suggest that Indigenous voices were a key part in disrupting the national project of the Unknown and prevented its eclipse into a national memory of war. The assertion of iwi authority through the repatriation of toi moko was manifested in the way that Te Papa, and its support for a bicultural image of the nation, remains the central cultural institution of the New Zealand state rather than the Pukeahu War Memorial. The New Zealand Unknown project therefore reflected a more significant cultural discussion around the significance of repatriation in asserting a specific vision of territorialisation.

The Unknown New Zealand Warrior and the transnational project of Anzac

As in the case of Australia, the New Zealand government had long debated the merits of entombing its war dead in a national shrine. Within a year of the armistice being signed, the concept of a New Zealand tomb was raised in parliament by Waitomo MP William Jennings, who asked the cabinet to consider bringing home the remains of 'one of our boys', having himself lost a son at Gallipoli.[645] Although no official reasons were given, the cabinet declined the suggestion. Presumably this was, as Gareth Phipps suggests, because the Westminster tomb was deemed as serving this purpose.[646] Furthermore, in the immediate post-war period, such a venture would have been likely very expensive. No other Dominion had yet established their own tomb. In the late 1920s, the idea of a Tomb for the Unknown Warrior surfaced again when the Auckland Cenotaph was being developed however this too was deemed to be unnecessary.

Significantly, it was the Returned Services Association (RSA) that reintroduced the idea of a tomb following the end of the Second World War. Christchurch RSA president D. W. Russell called for two unknown warriors to be brought back, one for each of the world wars, and buried in a proposed Hall of Memories at the Pukeahu National War Memorial. This was part of a wider campaign to secure government support for the completion of the War Memorial, which up to this point had been a piecemeal affair. However, the cost of the RSA proposal, estimated at around £250,000, proved prohibitive and development stalled (the Hall of Memories was eventually completed in 1964).[647] Despite support for a tomb from prominent members of civil society, such as newspaper editors and military leaders, the lack of state support meant the project for an Unknown tomb floundered.[648] As

[643] Judith Keene 'Introduction', *The Public Historian*, 32, 1 (2010), pp. 7–12.
[644] Keene, 'Introduction', p. 11.
[645] New Zealand Parliamentary Debates (NZPD), 1921, 192, p. 213.
[646] Phipps, p. 161.
[647] Dominion Executive Council Records, New Zealand Returned and Services Association (NZRSA), Wellington.
[648] For example, *Ashburton Guardian* 12 November,1921, and *Evening Post* 14 November, 1921.

Gareth Phipps notes, it is unclear whether this enquiry generated any real public interest.[649] By this time, many communities in New Zealand had built their own war memorials and the government had allocated £100,000 for a national war memorial, the first stage of which was built in 1932.[650]

The place of the RSA and the National War Memorial differed considerably to that of their Australian counterparts in the RSL and the Australian War Memorial. The RSA and RSL pursued diametrically different approaches to an Unknown tomb and these were ultimately reflected in the ritual of the entombment itself. In 1993, Australian veterans were a backdrop to the central state actors, a supporting cast to legitimise the narrative of state-founding and political mythology. In 2004, in Wellington, RSAs from eight districts brought mementos representing their area to leave with the warrior in the tomb. These momentos reflected a tradition of decentralised, community remembrance, and was evident in items presenting the regional branches: a piece of Oamaru stone, Ohai coal, a Bluff oyster, soil from the Murihiku, Haast greenstone, a Speight's beer bottle cap, a bottle of Hokonui Whisky and some Sgt Dan Creamoata, a brand of porridge. These were local symbols that echoed the social networks of remembrance that characterised Anzac commemoration up until the 1960s..

As in Australia, military historians played an important role in preparing the state project of an Unknown tomb. In 1999, Ian McGibbon recommended that the Department of Internal Affairs investigate the possibility of repatriating the remains of a New Zealand unknown soldier as a high-profile millennium project. McGibbon argued that 'following the successful commemoration of the Boer War' and the unveiling of Australia's Tomb of the Unknown Soldier in 1993, an unknown New Zealand soldier would be 'a visible and dramatic way of honouring and remembering the nation's war dead'.[651] McGibbon was bolstered by a letter in the RSA *Review* from national president Pat Herbert calling for public discussion about the possibility of a repatriation. The fact that Canada followed Australia's lead in 2000, as a millennium project, added weight to this argument - a national Tomb would 'bring New Zealand into line with its senior Commonwealth partners'. McGibbon brought up the idea again in 2001 at the launch of his guide to New Zealand battlefields on the Western Front; this time, with Prime Minister Helen Clark among the audience.[652]

The New Zealand Military History Committee was formed in the mid-1990s to facilitate public engagement on the nation's military heritage and it provided a lynchpin for military historians' influence of government policy around the repatriation. Its first conference was held in 1995 on the theme of 'New Zealand in the Second World war', followed by another on 'New Zealand in the South African War' in 1999. The 'Zealandia's Great War: New Zealand and the First World War' Conference was to be held July in the lead up to the Unknown interment, with keynotes from a range of academics from European universities, including Annette Becker, esteemed historian of la tombe du soldat inconnu. In 2003, the committee consisted of Ian McGibbon, NZDF Historian John Crawford,

[649] Phipps, p. 181.
[650] Phipps, p. 182.
[651] McGibbon to Acting General Manager, Heritage Group, 11 November 1999, Department of Internal Affairs, Ministry of Culture and Heritage (MCH), Wellington.
[652] Ian McGibbon, *New Zealand Battlefields and Memorials of the Western Front*, Penguin Press, Auckland, 2001; Phipps, p. 162.

independent historian Peter Cooke, and Stephen Clarke, RNZRSA Historian. Clarke was a scholar well situated in the promotion of the RSA in New Zealand history, having undertaken research around the RSA for his Honours and Masters projects for which he sought RSA funding, before being appointed as the Association's official historian. The 2003 Conference was supported by the NZDF, the Ministry of Defence, the Ministry of Culture and Heritage, and other agencies. The RSA used the conference to bolster its own flagging public profile, providing sponsorship for Chris Pugsley, on the basis that he would undertake work on behalf of the RSA. The Committee provided an academic backbone to the Unknown Project. With an eye to posterity, approval was given for a history of the process, to be coordinated by Pugsley as Chief Historian.

Like the Hawke-Keating Governments, the support of Helen Clark's Labour Government for a state repatriation project aligned with its broader agenda of a domestic and global reinvention of statehood. As well as benefiting from the international precedent, Clark was committed to an agenda of creative cultural identity embedded in post-neoliberal social democracy that sought to restore confidence in social and community institutions. Clark said the Tomb would be 'a tangible monument for those who lost family members overseas' and would 'remind current generations of the sacrifice of New Zealanders in overseas conflicts and peacekeeping operations'.[653] The media reaction was uniformly celebratory. The *Evening Post* declared that the act was belated, since 'Canada and Australia, who have moved more rapidly away from the shackles of Britain than New Zealand, have in the past seven years repatriated unknown First World War soldiers to tombs in their homelands'.[654] Clark subsequently declared the Tomb to be 'an enormous gain to our cultural and historic heritage' and 'a significant national memorial we can all be proud of'.[655] The state decision to repatriate the remains of the Unknown Warrior ninety years after his death was therefore situated in a psychological language of trauma and healing. This language created a sense of an organic, popular, and natural act of the grief-stricken nation, despite sharing in the artifice and the public affectation of the Australian Unknown. The theme of reconciliation and healing was one that resonated with media and public; 100,000 people lined the streets of Wellington to watch the parade of the Unknown Warrior in what remains the largest civic service in New Zealand history.

This dual language of social recovery and celebration situated the Unknown in Clark's 'cultural recovery' agenda, which involved the reconstruction of New Zealand identity through government investment in creative industries, such as film and tourism, to build New Zealand's brand as a progressive and innovative nation. The language of 'recovery' is important – displaying continuity with previous liberal state policies, while also trying to come to terms with the fragmenting experience of neoliberalism and biculturalism. War commemoration, and the Unknown in particular, would be the centrepiece of this new projection of the state. The trauma of postcolonial statehood was transmuted to the war experience and memory. 'Celebration' was also key here: although the mood of the repatriation was funereal, the sentiments of the project affirmed a sense of military heritage and

[653] Helen Clark, 'Address at Memorial Service for Unknown Warrior', 11 November 2004: http://www.beehive.govt.nz/speech/address-memorial -service-unknown-warrior.
[654] *Evening Post*, 25 April, 2002.
[655] *The Dominion Post*, 24 November, 2015.

sacrifice that underpinned national unity.

The project began in September 2002 with the coordinating committee meeting for the first time. It was comprised of representatives from an array of state agencies, primarily the Ministry of Culture and Heritage, the Defence Forces, and Te Puni Kokiri, the principal advisor on Government-Māori relationships and on policy affecting Māori wellbeing.[656] The committee was responsible for advising the prime minister on the development of the war memorial and the ceremonies around the repatriation. The committee was committed to a 2003 Armistice deadline but stressed the need to manage the project carefully and centrally due to the sensitivity surrounding the exhumation of the Unknown's remains by the Commonwealth Graves Commission.[657] The presence of Te Puni Kokiri reflected a commitment to a bicultural image of the nation. Te Puni Kokiri representative, Eru Manuera, who was also a member of the RSA and the 28th Māori Battalion Association, requested that there be Māori input in all stages of the project. When Cabinet met the next month, a media strategy, request for publicity funding and the initial brief for designers were already being circulated.

The project required the displacement of the RSA by the Ministry of Culture and Heritage which, as in the case of the Australian precedent in 1993, reflected the changing role of the state in commemoration**.** Stubbs, as project coordinator, addressed a meeting of the RSA executive on the redevelopment of National War Memorial to accommodate the Tomb, and provided outlines of key dates and events. Although the RSA National Executive Council endorsed the design, this was only a symbolic gesture – the design had already been selected by the committee and approved by the Prime Minister.[658] Clark's selection took place in the context of the RSA's growing problems over collapsing membership. In a February 2003 meeting of the National Executive Council, Arthur Fletcher District, President of Waikato-King Country-Bay of Plenty, expressed concern for the continued viability of Local RSAs with fewer than 500 members. The RSAs were struggling due to aging membership, difficulty in finding entertainment, drink driving regulations, and a lack of financial viability – or that 'many elderly members believe that 1960s prices should prevail'. This lead to the development of guidelines for struggling local RSAs. The Unknown repatriation indicated the RSA's primary role in the 2000s: providing support and legitimacy to state actions. This was helped by the more decentralised, regional identity of the RSA compared to its Australian RSL counterpart.

The project was, of course, heavily influenced by the Unknown Australian and Unknown Canadian Soldiers. This influence was reflected in the state orchestration and ceremonial arrangements. The New Zealand Government's formal application to the Commonwealth War Graves Commission requesting the repatriation was a word-for-word copy of the Canadian procedure, which also informed the New Zealand ceremonies.[659] The coordinating committee, for example, intended for the New Zealand Unknown to visit the Menin Gates in Belgium in the day between the exhumation and

[656] 'Tomb of the Unknown Soldier, Minutes - Final copy', 13 September 2002, MCH, Wellington..
[657] *Ibid*.
[658] 0/3/2 NEC agenda 24 - 15-16th April 2003, MCH, Wellington.
[659] New Zealand's application to request the repatriation more or less identical to the Canadian formula C08939/BRU, 20 Jan 2004; REC 15/2, 21 October 1998. Also, the Canadians had copied Australia: Jean-Yves Bronze to AWM, 7 April, 1997. MCH, Wellington.

departure on the flight to New Zealand – a conscious imitation of the Canadian ceremony. Stubbs, as head of the coordinating committee, was also in regular contact with the Australian War Memorial, asking for input.[660] The events in Canberra and Ottawa were regarded as 'hugely influential', reflected not only in the ceremonies but also the language of nationhood and cultural trauma which imbued the ministerial briefings keeping Clark informed of the project's process.[661]

Moreover, the transportation of the Unknown represented a global action of the New Zealand state. Special attention was paid to the prime minister's visits to London and Paris in 2003, when Anzac Day provided an excellent opportunity for publicising the Tomb project. Clark intended on making the announcement at the Anzac Day service at Westminster Abbey - deemed appropriate, as the site of the imperial Tomb of the Unknown Warrior, and also complementing John Howard's announcement of an Australian War Memorial in London's Hyde Park. The aim was to include Bright Williams, New Zealand's last surviving WWI veteran, at the Westminster service and all other publicity events around the project stages - such as the ground breaking ceremony and, of course, the installation itself (Williams, however, died in February 2003). These international efforts were reciprocated by the French Government, eager to heal postcolonial wounds in the Pacific and rehabilitate post-nuclear free New Zealand-French relations. When Clark visited France on the same trip, the French Government praised the expected entombment as 'strongly symbolic, positive, and highly visible outcome' and a renewal of French-New Zealand relations.[662] Indeed, the French hoped that Clark would oversee the exhumation of the body itself - six months before the transportation. This was rejected on the basis that keeping the body out of the ground for six months was undignified and, as well as posing security risks with potential tampering, would not be acceptable under tikanga (Māori philosophical practices). Furthermore, this took the self-promotional politics of the repatriation too far: it risked looking like a cynical publicity stunt to raise the prime minister's profile.[663]

As in the case of the Unknown Australian Soldier, the ministry team developed media narratives with key messages and themes. Publicists were engaged to run a publicity campaign around the project, with the aim of preparing the public and the narratives around the repatriation at all stages - beginning with the handover ceremony in France. This included the development of a special Tomb logo and phrase, educational packs, and an essay competition for school students in conjunction with the Department of Veterans' Affairs and the NZDF. TVNZ was briefed about the Tomb so that it could be mentioned in its Anzac Day coverage. Reflecting the state context, the publicity was coordinated centrally from the Prime Minister's Office and the Ministry for Culture and Heritage, in the person of Brodie Stubbs and one of the prime minister's press secretaries. The Tomb was presented as a national focus of remembrance for those who sacrificed their lives in the service of New Zealand. It was described as a symbol of unity and national identity, which would link all generations of New

[660] Stubbs to Gower, MG 4/7, MCH, Wellington.
[661] Canadian context especially interesting as the NWM Carillon was intended as a sister instrument to the Peace Tower Carillon at the Parliament Buildings, Ottawa, Canada. See *The Tomb of the Unknown NZ Warrior, Conditions for the Design Selection Process*, Ministry of Culture and Heritage, Wellington, 2003, p. 4, MCH, Wellington.
[662] C00159/PAR, FRA/NZ/2/7/1 - 27 November 2002, MCH, Wellington.
[663] 'Tomb of the Unknown Soldier - Handover ceremony' (email), 2 December, 2002, MCH, Wellington.

Zealanders and provide a place for war veterans to pay tribute to their comrades. As for the Unknown Warrior, he was first and foremost a New Zealander coming home and his remains represented and honoured all New Zealanders who were lost to their families through war. The fact that his identity was unknown meant that he could symbolically represent all New Zealand war dead, regardless of ethnicity or religion. In terms of design, the Tomb was to be a distinctively New Zealand memorial, incorporating symbols, language and materials that reflected national identity.

As the 2003 deadline for the Unknown loomed, the design process and ceremonial arrangements became increasingly streamlined. In December 2002, Clark, as Minister for Arts and Culture, called for expressions of interest for the tomb design. The idea of having the remains tour the country, including major metropolitan and regional centres, was scrapped as logistically unwieldy and a security concern. Early requisites in the design brief, such as specific Māori proverbs as part of the design or that the New Zealand state heraldry be included, were discarded. Negotiations between Massey University and the Wellington Tenths Trust, representing Te Āti Awa, both stakeholders in the area of the National War Memorial, were slowly brought to a completion.[664] Studio of Pacific Architecture was commissioned by the Ministry to redevelop the National War Memorial to accommodate the tomb.[665] The design for the tomb itself would be selected by way of a public competition, with the final design to be announced on Anzac Day in 2003. The selection panel comprised of Andre Renton-Green as Chairman of the War Memorial; Studio Pacific architect Evzen Novak; a representative of the Defence Forces; and a Māori and non-Māori artist or curator.

The ministry received fifty-five expressions of interest for the design of the Tomb, nine applicants were shortlisted by the selection panel and asked to provide a more detailed design proposal for the Tomb, due in March 2003. The winning Tomb design by Robert Jahnke was approved in April 2003, with an agreed Māori inscription, ‘E kore e warewareia tā tau’ (lest we forget). Jahnke's winning design, a pyramid-shaped tomb that incorporated Māori and classical patterns, was announced as the winner shortly after. Jahnke’s description of the design connected the vertical lines of the War Memorial’s Carillon, ‘a directional pointer towards the tower’ and therefore emphasised that as the central feature of the War Memorial.

> I’ve deliberately used stone as a medium to reference Aotearoa New Zealand and territories beyond our country. South Island pounamu acknowledges New Zealand as the homeland of the Unknown Warrior, while imported black granite acknowledges the land from which the Warrior will be returned from.

This was a crafted narrative – edited by the Ministry of Culture and Heritage leadership team – and one which made political and moral claims on the Unknown’s body, locating his ‘home’ in New Zealand.[666] The emphasis on the Carillon was also interesting as it appealed to the international context of commemoration: the War Memorial’s Carillon was intended as a sister instrument to the

[664] Cabinet paper; Wilton to the coordinating committee, 11 November 2002; HER 717/3; Stubb to Eru Manuera, 5 December 2002, MCH, Wellington.
[665] Statement by Prime Minister, The Hon Helen Clark MP, December 2002, MCH, Wellington.
[666] OCS 3E, ‘Winning design unveiled for Tomb of the Unknown Warrior’, 14 April, 2003, MCH, Wellington.

Peace Tower Carillon at the Parliament Buildings, Ottawa, Canada.[667] In this way, the New Zealand project resembled the Australian programme, shaped by its institutional and performative elements. The monumentalism of Jahnke tomb and its overture to a unified space of memory, in continuity with the past, present, and future nation, expressed a national narrative of healing, in the institution of the Pukeahu War Memorial, with the support of a committed cadre of military historians.

The Jahnke design, however, involved remodelling the National War Memorial's forecourt and steps, demolishing the original staircase, pool, and walls, and removing dozens of seventy-year-old native pohutukawa trees (*Fig. 1*). The pohutukawa were described as a 'living memorial', being linked to wider public plantings in Wellington at the time, and the layout of the trees reinforced the form of the overall site layout. For this reason, the tomb design attracted immediate criticism from civic groups concerned with its size and invasiveness. Members of the Professional Historians' Association of New Zealand/Aotearoa (PHANZA) complained that the removal of the formal entrance of the War Memorial was a major alteration to a historic building, one proposed to be undertaken without any kind of public consultation.[668] Despite the Wellington City Council's response that the steps and forecourt fell outside the boundaries of the main edifice and were therefore not heritage listed, further public protest followed. Anzac Day returned to its familiar site of protest as posters campaigning against the renovation appeared on the steps of the War Memorial in time for the televised services. The Ministry ignored the protest, leading to the formation of the Serious About Heritage Society (SAHS) which lodged an appeal in the High Court against the council's decision, arguing that the steps and forecourt should have been included in the heritage listing.

[667] 'The Tomb of the Unknown NZ Warrior, Conditions for the Design Selection Process', p. 4, MCH, Wellington.
[668] T. Nightingale, 'Not So Sacred Ground – the National War Memorial', *Phanzine*, 9, 1 (2003), pp. 4–5.

Figure 1. The Pukeahu National War Memorial, prior to its 2015 renovations. Note the pohutakwa trees. MCH.

The government, confident that it would secure court approval, indicated to contractors that they could begin their preparations for the forecourt development, erecting safety barriers and site offices.[669] A plethora of cultural and educational productions in the state programme around the Unknown were already under development - a New Zealand Post commemorative envelope to mark the establishment of the Tomb; a school student poetry competition to mark the occasion (with the winner printed in the souvenir programme); a resource kit for schools consisting of a commemorative booklet and video; an Army Museum special exhibit; and others - reflecting the shaping of the state narrative of the repatriation. Poems commissioned for inscription on the exterior of the Tomb canopy aimed to celebrate New Zealand service personnel across all wars in the past present and future while incorporating secondary themes of loss, sacrifice, grief, and returning home.[670] The NZDF was a key stakeholder, working with the Ministry of Culture and Heritage to raise public awareness of the Tomb project and connect it to the appreciation for New Zealand's war service in general – past, present,

[669] For example, the press release from Massey university: http://www.massey.ac.nz/~wwpubafs/2003/press_releases/15_05_03.html.
[670] April 30, 2003, minutes. Vincent O'Sullivan would eventually compose the poem, 'Homecoming – Te Hokinga Mai', to read at the interment ceremony: https://www.mch.govt.nz/pukeahu/park/national-war-memorial/tomb/homecoming.

and future. Conversely, great pains were taken to avoid any mention of the Iraq War in relation to the Tomb.

The PHANZA/SAHS legal action was successful, with the resource consent being overturned and the Ministry was forced to submit a new application. Completion of the new tomb precinct was therefore delayed until November 2004. A consultation process was opened with non-state organisations, such as PHANZA, the New Zealand Institute of Architects and SAHS to seek a new design that achieved the tomb without interfering with the existing site of the War Memorial.

The acrimonious debate about the design and installation of the tomb reflected a more disputed field of remembrance than presented in state narratives. The tomb redesign severely undercut the state programme while also leading to disputes about which state agency would cover the costs of the court action. The quantity surveyor's report, needed to establish the validity of the project moving forward, revealed a $400,000 shortfall in the project budget. The NZDF requested that this be covered by the Ministry of Culture and Heritage. Funding which would have gone towards various supporting projects was redirected to the redesign, causing many of them to fall beyond the purview of the 2003 financial year for Heritage Services. The public outreach around the Unknown New Zealand Warrior as a state project was therefore not as extensive as planned. Much of this funding would be used for the London Memorial, reflecting the wider international idiom of commemoration at play here in the logic of state cultural policy. Moreover, the PHANZA and Serious About Heritage actions showed that, as well as reflecting a degree of poor planning, the state struggled to exert legitimacy in seeking the Tomb project. The fragmented debate contrasted with the tightly controlled unity of the Australian Soldier state project. No one contested the demolishing of the Australian War Memorial's Hall of Memory, with its imposing but historic veterans' statue. The fact that the Jahnke design was now deemed 'inappropriate from a heritage perspective' – a phrase heavy with significance – was indicative of the way the state reparation projects sought to conflate history with military heritage. PHANZA's court action reflected that in New Zealand society this conflation was at least up for debate. Indeed, even the naming of the Hall of Memory, versus the Hall of Memories, reflected the contested nature of the latter: a recognition of multiple ways of remembering, a decentralised, fragmentary approach - which reduced the state's ability to assert control over the site. The role of PHANZA is interesting as an expression of the emergence of public history as an important voice in New Zealand society. The role of the Waitangi Tribunal, emergence of new histories of violence and place through Treaty settlements, and Indigenous histories entering public memory through Treaty discourse, reflected the impact of public history in a way largely absent in Australia.[671]

Iwi involvement in the project was another significant consequence of the constitutional context of the New Zealand state. The Wellington Tenths Trust, an entity of Te Āti Awa, took a leadership role in the project on behalf of Māori, supported by local iwi such as Ngāti Toa. The Tenths Trust is an interesting example of the state's engagement with Māori through the formation of iwi legal entities,

[671] Michael Belgrave, 'Jackals of the Crown?: historians and the Treaty claims process', in Bronwyn Dalley and Jock Phillips, *Going Public: the Changing Face of New Zealand history*, Auckland University Press, Auckland, 2001, pp. ? – ?.

which connected and interacted with neoliberal state agencies. The role of Te Āti Awa was significant later in the ensuing debate post-PHANZA complaint. As original owners and kaitiaki (custodians) of the land, Te Āti Awa was seen as having the greatest interest and concern in preserving the historic significance of the site; confident that the renovation of the forecourt does not impinge on it. This reflected the inclusion of tangata whenua into the ambit of a state project to provide legitimacy to fend against alternative sources of authority such as PHANZA. This suggests the complexity of the bicultural state: here the state was using Indigenous authority to further the state project against rival claims.

The ground-breaking ceremony was therefore marked by a recognition of Indigenous claims to the place of the Pukeahu National War Memorial. Several karakia, a Te Mauri blessing, and other components such as 'generic religious elements' (meaning Christian) were cited by the coordinating committee. Stones collected from three rivers in Taranaki were buried at the Tomb site as part of the blessing – to symbolise Te Āti Awa links to Taranaki and Wellington, and confirming the mana of the site. Following the site blessing, the stones were placed in storage until the interment during which they were buried with the Unknown Warrior. At the exhumation, four representatives of Te Āti Awa attended to fulfil the protocol of a karanga and karakia, and to collect soil from the area.[672] This changing involvement of iwi was reflected in the developing language of the inscription for whatever would be the final design; such as E kore ia e warewaretia, 'our unknown warrior' and kia Maumahara tonu tatou kia raou, 'We will remember them'.

The dispute over the tomb design also resulted in uncertainty about the National War Memorial as the appropriate or preferred final site of the Tomb. It challenged the singular state authority of the repatriation and divided the government's approach. Stubbs suggested to the committee that the monument be constructed and classified as an alteration to the War Memorial, to avoid public consultation. Others opened up a debate about whether Anzac Day was the appropriate 'national' day or not; Remembrance Day's pedigree as a centralised military-state ritual would be better suited to the state repatriation project. Anzac Day in contrast, in the early 2000s, was conceived of as being something that many regions carried out with distinctive traditions, while also being more specifically focused on the Great War. In fact, Clark preferred Remembrance Day for the installation, as the anniversary of the armistice and end of the war, but recognised that Anzac Day had greater public recognition. One option was for the tomb to be built at the rear or near the front of the Hall of Memories of the National Memorial. Recalling D. W. Russell's proposal following the Second World War, the original design of the War Memorial's Hall was intended to incorporate an Unknown tomb. Indeed, the Hall of Memories had been widened to provide for the two tombs – one from each of the world wars. The statue of the grieving family would now be looking over the tomb of the Unknown (*Fig. 2*). The symbolism would have also suited the narratives of family and cultural trauma being healed through the repatriation. The major concerns raised against this, however, were that an unknown tomb would ruin the overall balance of the original design, as well as shift the focus of the memorial from commemoration of all those who served to only those who died. Furthermore, the

[672] Although CWGC policy was not to allow non-CWGC staff at exhumations.

possibility that visitors might walk over the grave due to the limited space was also considered insensitive.

Figure 2. Wreath in front of the Mother and Children sculpture in the Hall of Memories at Pukeahu National War Memorial Park., 2016. Courtesy Office of the Clerk, Parliament of New Zealand.

Debates over alternative sites and days reflected the performance of the repatriation. Where the body was interred carried moral and political significance and would shape public reception of the tomb. State agencies attempted to guide the discussion. Following the court action, Stubbs and the committee recommended dropping the original plan for the tomb, which was now 'inappropriate from a heritage perspective'. With Jahnke's original plan abandoned, the ministry proposed three alternatives, all of which required a simpler and more conservative Tomb design. In a letter to Clark advising her on ways to move forward, Stubbs argued that as 'the tomb must be a symbol of unity and national identity', it would be 'inappropriate and self-defeating if it became a symbol of controversy and decisiveness'.[673]

The dispute around the tomb revealed the paradoxes inhered in the state project of the Unknown Warrior. Other sites for the tomb, such as Parliament House and the Auckland War Memorial Museum, were considered but ultimately dismissed. The decision to not use the Hall of Memories balanced competing interests, not all of which were reducible to the state. Although the New Zealand coordinating committee followed the Australian precedent closely in many other ways and despite

[673] Letter to Clark, 18 November, 2003, p. 2, MCH, Wellington.

having ostensible ownership over Hall of Memories, the state did not achieve a settled or unified narrative. The radical renovation of the Pukeahu War Memorial was therefore made more difficult. In this sense, we can think of Pukeahu as a historicised space of diffused state authority and failed attempts to shape public affectation. The original design of the War Memorial, intended to share a boulevard running through Wellington city, akin to Anzac Parade in Canberra, was never completed (*Fig 4*). This is, in obvious, contrast to the Australian War Memorial, which following the 1980s had been embedded in the Department of Veterans' Affairs and through the directorship of political appointees like Kelson, served state purposes and narratives. This was deeply linked to the formation of Canberra itself as a space of federal and national authority.

Figure 3. Gummer & Ford. [National War Memorial, Dominion Museum and Art Gallery]. 1930. Architectural perspective drawing. GF12, Gummer & Ford Collection, Architecture Archive, University of Auckland Libraries and Learning Services, Auckland.

Another contested aspect of the Unknown Warrior was the naming of the tomb itself. While the United States, Australia, and Canada had repatriated an Unknown Soldier, New Zealand chose to commemorate an Unknown Warrior. Comments by members of the RSA indicated that there was opposition to this choice of nomenclature, with some arguing that the term 'warrior' sounded too aggressive and was more commonly associated with indigenous identity – reiterating historic essentialised narratives of Māori as a warrior caste.[674] However, with no formal objection made by the RSA, the recommendations of the New Zealand Defence Force (NZDF) – arguing, as their Australian counterparts had, that the term 'warrior' better represented the three military services – prevailed. It

[674] Others objected to warrior on the basis that it had different connotations to the traditional British warrior, evoking the rugby league team of the same name, was as more aggressive than 'soldier', which might have included medical corps. Warrior was also deemed as too grand for New Zealand's 'down to earth' character; the Ministry supported the RSA view, internally.

does not seem that the symbolic link between the British Unknown Warrior and a New Zealand Unknown Warrior was ever a concern; speaking perhaps to a perennial theme of New Zealand Anzac narratives which preferred to contrast New Zealand with Australian practices, rather than British. In this sense, the contrast between the Unknown Soldier and Unknown Warrior was not incidental.

This demonstrated the unsettled nature of the commemoration. The debate raised the question of authority in the commemoration, of which groups controlled the narrative and the commemorative space of the Wellington Memorial. This did not occur in Australia where it was the War Memorial, working closely with the office of the Prime Minister and the Department of Veterans' Affairs, which instigated the design and renovation of the Hall of Memory. The Australian process and ceremony of burial was envisaged as a unifying act of the nation. The limited debate around the naming of the 'Soldier' to the exclusion of sailors and airmen was curtailed by Brendon Kelson as divisive and unnecessary because 'the decision had been already made'. This was contradictory: his comment, of course, showed that there was unsettlement and the success of the project relied on scholarly and institutional supports. The concerns of RSL members who objected to the exhumation as sacrilege were similarly dismissed. The Australian interment was intended to be an act as monolithic as the Turkish marble of the tomb itself.[675]

Having failed to meet one deadline, the Clark Government approached Pacific Architecture for its own internal design process. Designed by the artist and sculptor Kingsley Baird, the new tomb was classically shaped with Pākehā and Māori iconography, and built into the forecourt steps of the War Memorial. The words of a karagana, a ceremonial call, were inscribed on the base of the tomb in English and te reo Māori (*Fig. 4*). These were engraved in a way that the cut became increasingly shallow; symbolic of words, air, and breath fading away. The tomb was emblazoned with the text, 'He Toa Matangaro No Aotearoa / An Unknown New Zealand Warrior'. The Australian-imported black granite of the tomb was inlaid with crosses of Takaka marble, representing the comrades of the Unknown Warrior, and the bronze lid with pounamu or greenstone in the design of the Southern Cross (*Fig. 5)*. According to its designer, Kingsley Baird, the tomb 'is an expression of the nation's memory and a cross-cultural language of remembrance [that] combines Māori and Pākehā ritual, symbolic, and visual elements…to express remembrance specific to New Zealand's contemporary identity'.[676] This was a more muted claim to national remembrance; the karanga – a composition of a number of war poems as well as traditional motifs of mourning and departure – referred to 'Te mamae nei a te pōuri nui / Tēnei ra e te tau' ('The great pain we feel, Is for you who were our future') was as much a claim on the national past, present, and future, as Keating's 'he is all of them, he is one of us', cloaked in a heavy language of loss.

[675] In December 2002, the language of 'soldier' had been dropped in favour of warrior, following cabinet approval. The term warrior was deemed more inclusive of the three branches of the armed forces: 'Tomb of the Unknown Soldier, Minutes - Final copy', 13 December, 2002, MCH, Wellington.
[676] Kingsley Baird, 'The Tomb of the Unknown Warrior Te Toma o Te Toa Matangaro': http://www.kingsleybaird.com/index.php?sid=5.

Figure 4. Roses and poppies on the Tomb of the Unknown Warrior following the 70th Anniversary commemorations of the Battle of El Alamein on 23 October 2012. MCH: Andy Palmer, Manatū Taonga.

Figure 5. Tomb of the Unknown New Zealand Warrior, National War Memorial, Wellington. MCH: Andy Palmer, Manatū Taonga.

Fundamentally, the Baird design reflected a sculptural approach to the tomb rather than the monumentalism of the Jahnke design or the Tomb of Unknown Australian Soldier. The Tomb was situated in a liminal space, located neither in the Hall of Memories of the Pukeahu National War Memorial or as part of a grand redevelopment, but between the Carillon and the public boulevard beyond. It was also more naturalistic and tangible – subject to the wind and the rain, to children clambering on it, and skateboarders using it as a launching pad, as well as a solemn place of contemplation. This lack of unity between these elements spoke of the fragmentation of the overarching state project and myriad voices.

The Unknown Soldier entwined nationhood with an emotional grammar in the institution of the Australian War Memorial. The placing of the Unknown Soldier in the Hall of Memory was symbolic of the healing of the nation itself; its history unified and made complete in the heart of the War Memorial. The media's language around the event reflected these themes. The New Zealand ritual had important differences. Little attention was paid to the specialist team which – led by Culture and Heritage Ministry operations manager Brodie Stubbs – chose, exhumed, and repatriated the remains of the Unknown Warrior in France (Indeed, the original repatriation proposal had envisaged a Minister of the Crown to be in attendance). A more diverse, less symbolically unified group of people, including veterans and families, attended the exhumation ceremony. The remains were placed in a casket, handed over to Defence Chief Air Marshal Bruce Ferguson, an honour guard and a Māori cultural party, and placed on a special RNZAF Boeing 757 flight. Unlike Australia's 'Spirit of Remembrance' Qantas jet, it was deemed that an Air New Zealand flight would be commercial and therefore an inappropriate form of transportation. After a Māori welcome, the casket was carried up Parliament's steps into the old Legislative Council Chamber where Governor- General Dame Silvia Cartwright, Prime Minister Helen Clark and other dignitaries laid wreaths.

The repatriation of the Unknown Warrior was therefore a crowded commemorative field, in contrast to the solitary voice of Keating, in which civic figures such as the Governor-General spoke alongside the Prime Minister, the Returned Services Association (RSA), and Indigenous leaders. The final resting place of the Unknown Warrior, the Pukeahu National War Memorial, had in no way been certain in 2003. Even after the decision to repatriate an unknown soldier was announced by the Clark government, there was considerable debate as to where the tomb would be situated and what it would ultimately look like. In contrast to the central role of the Australian War Memorial, site of the funeral and tomb, the New Zealand ritual reflected the traditional Christian rites of burial, with the funeral taking place at Wellington's Anglican cathedral and the specific act of interring eventually at the National War Memorial.

These various interests reflected a more decentralised approach where the state struggled to assert a unified narrative around the entombment. This was a demonstration of the prominent role of the veteran in New Zealand's ceremony, not merely symbolically but also with considerable moral and authorial agency in inscribing meaning in the ritual. Whereas the Australian ritual had abstracted the

Unknown Soldier into a material symbol of the Australian state, laden with national meaning, in New Zealand the symbolic gesture remained grounded in the experiences of veterans. This difference could be summarised at least symbolically in the ultimate decision to call the Unknowns 'soldier' and 'warrior' respectively: soldier conveyed an implicit desire to depart from the British tradition and the state institution of the military, and the affectation of the 'Ordinary Man' as the embodiment of the nation; warrior, more traditional, indicated a greater comfort with British connections, recalling the old civic forms of Anzac remembrance, and a discursive field of commemoration. The Australian performance, by comparison, was more matter-of-fact, at least in its official projection.

The themes of the tomb design were reiterated in the address by the Prime Minister at the memorial service on Armistice Day. Clark declared that we are 'here today to honour a warrior who has lain for close to 90 years in foreign soil, and who has now been called back to serve his country once more'. However, both the context of the speech (the memorial service) and its symbolic framework (an address among several on Armistice Day) contrast significantly with Keating's 1993 eulogy, which was both ritually and symbolically about the prime minister as the moral voice of the nation. Clark's was a less unified, more ponderous speech. It is considerably longer, at times lapsing into a kind of bureaucratic language - such as stating that the entombment was 'about incorporating in our nation's memory all that which has led us to where we are today'. Certainly, it has not been remembered or popularised as a 'national speech', lacking the resonance of Keating's, even as Clark declared of the Unknown Warrior that 'he was one of us'. Indeed, in comparison with Keating's seminal phrase 'he is all of them / he is one of us', there was a greater sense of historical understanding in Clark's speech. Whereas the present tense of Keating's phrase reinforced the moral lesson of the Anzacs, the relationship between the citizen-audience and the state-actor, as 'Australia's story' – past, present, and future – Clark framed the Unknown Warrior and the war he died in as only a part of New Zealand's history, 'one of the foundations of today's society'. Nonetheless, this was a clear attempt to summon nationhood through the act of interment in a shared language of national redemption and global identity.

The more contested narrative of nationhood based on war experience was further submerged by much of the speech's focus on grief and healing. 'The Tomb of the Unknown Warrior', Clark pondered, 'symbolises the very personal tragedies New Zealanders have endured in our engagement with war overseas'. Seeking to understand 'the sheer terror of being in combat, the raw yearning for home and loved ones, and the profound courage of going on and on with each moment reducing the likelihood of ever seeing loved ones again', Clark also focused on the 'impact war has had on New Zealand families'. She cited the story of a Takaka mother who lost three sons at the battle of Passchendaele. For this reason, Clark spent considerable time talking about the Commonwealth War Graves Commission and how its 'worldwide task embody the spirit of co-operation, peace, and healing'. Clark framed the act of entombing the Unknown Warrior as one of reconciliation and healing, of the national grief, as Keating had done in 1993, but also of the personal, and global, obscuring the dialogical narrative of national founding.

As in the case of Keating and the Unknown Australian Soldier's funeral, the personal style and

approach of Helen Clark, Prime Minister of New Zealand from 1999 to 2008, contributed significantly to the particular shades of the New Zealand state commemoration. The Helen Clark Labour Government in guiding New Zealand Anzac commemoration aligned closely with Australian Prime Minister John Howard's approach and was shaped by the Hawke-Keating commemorative programme. 'Our creative people', Clark said in 2000, 'help to define us as a nation, and that through them we express our unique national identity'.[677] War commemoration would be a key part of this 'cultural recovery' policy.[678] In her joint role as Prime Minister and Minister of Culture and Heritage, Clark oversaw the renovation and establishment of an unprecedented number of international war memorials; most prominently, the Canberra memorial, and the New Zealand memorial in London's Hyde Park. 'Cultural recovery' was also expressed in national reconciliation projects, such as the pardoning of soldiers executed during the Great War, and the 2008 Crown apology to Vietnam War veterans and their families for treatment by the government and public after the war, in part due to the deep divisions that the war provoked. Clarks 'cultural recovery' agenda was in this way a project of 'nation-building', bringing together historians, creative industry, artists, and museum curators in 'building the spirit of New Zealand and in understanding the forces that shape New Zealanders', as Clark put it in an interview following the repatriation.[679] The force of the past shapes the spirit of the present. Older narratives of a joint sacrifice in a joint citizenship were renovated for a new century, in the ironic twist that Clark was part of the generation who had protested on Anzac Day.

Graham Hucker argues that it was Clark's interest in her family's involvement in the Great War, and the traumatic consequences the war had on family members, that underpinned her commitment to promoting war commemoration, and therefore locates Anzac identity in familial and local memory.[680] However, his argument is hampered by a sentimental view of Clark's legacy, drawing heavily on her autobiographical writing without interrogating the self-reflexive legacy-building in which Clark engaged. In this way, Clark shares many of the similarities of the Hawke-Keating Prime Ministerships, one understood as a kind of mediator of public grief and the public desire for a supposed closure through family histories of the war. Media, historians, state sources, and Clark herself constructed a narrative around the person of the Prime Minister as a kind of embodiment of New Zealand commemoration, in a very different way; emphasising a 'softer' mosaic, the tragedy of war and its impact on families, woven into the voice of the Prime Minister as Minister for Culture and Heritage.[681] In this dual role, Clark embarked on a very intentional commemorative policy that constructed a state narrative of national founding which underlined the Labour government's foreign policy imperatives. We can see here the way in which Clark and Keating were not radically different: however, it was the constitutional arrangements and contested spaces of memory shaped their success.

The 2004 installation of the Unknown Warrior signified a dramatic transformation in state and popular

[677] Jonathan Boston, *Left Turn: The New Zealand general election of 1999*, Victoria University Press, Wellington, 2000); Brian Edwards, *Helen: Portrait of a Prime Minister*, Exisle Publishing, Auckland, 2001.
[678] Michael Volkerling, 'The Helen Clark Years: Cultural Policy in New Zealand 1999-2008', *Journal of Arts Management, Law, and Society*, 40, 2 (2010): pp. 95–104.
[679] *New Zealand Herald*, 2 December, 2003.
[680] Graham Hucker, 'A Determination to Remember: Helen Clark and New Zealand's military heritage', *Journal of Arts Management, Law, and Society*, 40, 2 (2010): pp. 105–118, 110.
[681] McKenna, 'Keeping in Step', p. 133.

attitudes towards commemoration over the previous decade. The New Zealand government had barely reacted to the fiftieth anniversary of the Second World War, as Liz Reed notes in her important study of the *Australia Remembers 1945-1995* program.[682] Comparing the respective remembrance of the Dominions (Australia, Canada, and New Zealand), the New Zealand program was actually instigated by the then Australian Minister for Veterans' Affairs, Con Sciacca, who bemoaned the lack of a New Zealand programme. In contrast to the expansive and tightly state-managed program in Australia, *New Zealand Remembers* focused on funding local community programs and refurbishing parts of the National War Memorial. The programme, Reed notes, avoided instrumentalising the anniversary for contemporary national purposes, in stark contrast *Australian Remembers*.[683] Indeed, rather than being a conscious decision to avoid a nationalist project, I would suggest this reflects the way in which Anzac commemoration in New Zealand was not yet a state configuration, but retained its essential if exhausted civic formulation. By 2004, we can see a significantly different state strategy, shaped by the Australian Unknown project. Yet, even with the Clark Government's commitment to a revamped idiom and practice of state war commemoration, the context of the Unknown Warrior cultural policy was inflected by Clark's personality and its institutional framework, located in the Ministry of Culture and Heritage, with competing claims by heritage groups, iwi, the National War Memorial, and veterans groups.

The fragmentary nature of the Unknown Warrior funeral and entombment reflected the debate that had taken place around the planning and performance of the tomb. State authority over the site of the Pukeahu National War Memorial was decentralised, and further diffused in the bicultural image of the nation. This would be reflected throughout the Centenary when artistic and public initiatives were projected – literally – onto the face of Pukeahu (*Fig. 6*). Far from being the unitary site of the Australian War Memorial – which resulted from a collaboration of military historians, the War Memorial leadership, and the Federal Government – Pukeahu was a space subjected to 'myriad faces', alternative claims to New Zealand's historical heritage, and open to re-inscription by changing public artistic and civic discourses. This also suggests differences between the Australian and New Zealand state and the foundational myths of settlement.

[682] Reed, pp. 67–68.
[683] Reed, p. 69.



Figure 6. The Pukeahu National War Memorial is lit up with the figure of a soldier to mark the centenary of the First World War, 2014. AFP: Marty Melville.

Toi Moko and the Te Papa Karanga Aotearoa Programme

As in the case of Australia, the period since the 1970s has been defined by efforts by Māori to achieve social, political, and cultural representation. In New Zealand, the passing of the Treaty of Waitangi Act enshrined the Treaty as the founding legal document of the nation, and extended the powers of the Waitangi Tribunal to investigate historic infringements against the Treaty, such as land disposession.[684] Legal and cultural recognition was expressed in policies of biculturalism that recognised Māori values and traditions were recognised as having equal weight to European settler traditions.

An important international landmark in this process was the 1984 Te Māori exhibition at the Metropolitan Museum of Art in New York. Curated by Māori intellectuals, Te Māori (literally, the Māori) presented a positive image of Māoritanga, or Māori culture, projected by Māori themselves. The exhibition was described as owing 'its existence to the wisdom of the Elders and people of the Māori tribes of New Zealand, who have agreed to the journey of their ancestors' treasures (taonga) far from their homelands' - challenging the role of national institutions, such as museums, as primary custodians of the nation and its management of Indigenous peoples.[685] At the same time, across the Tasman, the Strehlow collection, an important collection of Indigenous Australian artifacts (most of which were secret-sacred items), as well as audio tiles, photographs, and field research notes collected by the Strehlow Research Foundation was hidden – possibly dispatched overseas – to avoid possible seizure under the *Aboriginal and Torres Strait (Interim Protection) Act* which gave the Australian federal government considerably increased powers in matters concerning the protection of Aboriginal heritage, particularly in relation to sacred sites and sacred objects.[686] If the Strehlow case was indicative of the complex arrangements Indigenous Australians faced in negotiating the postcolonial landscape of 1980s Australia, than Te Māori suggested a different domestic and international context for Māori.

The most evocative example of Māori agency was the reclaiming and returning of köiwi tangata (Māori and Moriori skeletal remains) and toi moko. This began with national and regional museums in the 1960s and 1970s, and later internationally, as a number of iwi repatriated ancestors from Maria Island in Tasmania and the Imperial Natural History Museum in Vienna, later burying them in ancestral lands.[687] In 1988, the Māori Council, a statutory body of tribal elders, sought an injunction in England to prevent the auction of a toi moko eventually returned home and buried in Te Tai Tokerau (Northland).[688] These were independent initiatives by iwi and hapu (tribes and descent groups) – not

[684] See Miranda Johnson, *The Land is our History: Indigeneity, Law, and the Settler State*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2016.
[685] Pacific Arts Association, 'Te Māori: Māori Art from New Zealand Collections at the Metropolitan Museum of Art, New York, September 11, 1984 - January 6, 1985', *Pacific Arts Newsletter*, 20 (1985), pp. 33–36.
[686] Lissant Bolton, 'Conference of Museum Anthropologists 6', *Pacific Arts Newsletter*, 20 (1985), pp. 32–33.
[687] Te Herekiekie Herewini and June Jones, 'A partnership approach to repatriation: building the bridge from both sides', *Tuhinga*, 27 (2016), p. 4.
[688] Juniper Ellis, *Tattooing the World: Pacific Designs in Print and Skin Book*, Columbia University Press, Columbia, 2008, p. 53.

simply symbolic of indigenous authority, but its exercise within and beyond the state.

The return of toi moko was a reassertion and reconstruction of indigenous histories, through the repatriation process and the restoration of toi moko to their proper cultural and spiritual purpose - as memorials of past warriors. Traditionally, these warriors may have been revered ancestors or reviled enemies captured after important battles. Te moko or tattoo express belonging to whakapapa (genealogies) that link extended whanau (family), hapu, and iwi, to the land – for example, the ancestral mountain or river – and ultimately the spirit world itself.**[689]** A growing demand for the selling of toi moko following European settlement led to a market for mokomokai, heads of slaves tattooed and preserved for the purpose of trading.[690] The act of violence which literally separated toi moko from human bodies was extended when the heads and moko designs were removed from the living traditions and identities that give them meaning, by European colonial appropriation and circulation through global trade networks.[691] Speaking of the power of spiritual and cultural treasures, which would include moko and toi moko, Māori anthropologist Hirini Moko Mead declared that 'for the living relatives the taonga [treasure] is more than a representation of their ancestor; the figure is their ancestor and woe betide anyone who acts indifferently to their tipuna [ancestor].'[692] Moko embody the living connection between people and their cultural and genealogical ancestors; viewed in this light, failure to acknowledge the connection creates a further act of violence.**[693]**

With changing museum practices and growing support for the repatriation movement in New Zealand over the 1990s, iwi gathered at national hui (meetings) to seek resourcing and establishment of a programme supported by the New Zealand government.[694] This culminated in the government mandating the Museum of New Zealand Te Papa Tongarewa to develop a formal programme for the repatriation of Māori ancestral remains from international institutions to iwi and led to the establishment of the Karanga Aotearoa Repatriation Programme in 2003, concurrent with the Ministry of Arts and Heritages project to repatriate the Unknown Warrior.[695] The guidelines for the programme emphasised the government's role to be one of facilitation – it did not claim ownership of ancestral remains; no payment would be made to overseas institutions; and Māori were to be involved throughout the repatriation process, including determining, where possible, final resting places; all according to the protocols of tikanga Māori.[696]

In May 2004, Te Papa received a toi moko repatriated from the Ethnographic Museum in Buenos

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[689] Ibid, p. 55.
[690] Scholars suggest that the decline in popularity of male moko at that time was due to a general desire to not have one's head become an item of commercial sale: see Christian Palmer and Mervyn L. Tano, 'Mokomokai: Commercialization and Desacralization', Prepared Report, International Institute for Indigenous Resource Management, Denver, 2004.
[691] Ellis, p. 65.
[692] Hirini Moko Mead, *Te Toi Whakairo: The Art of Māori Carving,* Reed Press, Auckland, 1995, p. 237
[693] Ellis, p. 65, 73.
[694] Herewini and Jones.
[695] Te Papa, 'The Karanga Aotearoa Repatriation Programme / Te Kaupapa Whakahokinga mai a Karanga Aotearoa': https://www.tepapa.govt.nz/about/repatriation/karanga-aotearoa-repatriation-programme; Te Herekiekie Herewini, 'The Museum of New Zealand Te Papa Tongarewa (Te Papa) and the Repatriation of Köiwi Tangata (Māori and Moriori skeletal remains) and Toi Moko (Mummified Māori Tattooed Heads)', *International Journal of Cultural Property*, 15 (2008), pp. 405–406
[696] Te Papa, 'The Karanga Aotearoa Repatriation Programme'.

Aires, Argentina. In this case, the Museum's Director, Dr Jose Perez Gollan, accompanied the toi moko onto Te Papa's Marae in a small ceremony.[697] In subsequent years, Te Papa delegations including senior elders travelled to the jurisdiction of the repatriations, along with programme coordinators chosen for their knowledge in tikanga (Māori philosophical and customary practices). Absolute deference was given to the observance of the Māori delegation and protocol.

Karanga Aotearoa acted as a kind of reimagined relationship between Māori and Pākehā and a recognition of the events and relations associated with collecting human remains and artefacts in the past manifesting the irrevocable entanglement of these relationships in contemporary New Zealand.[698] Configured in terms of bicultural policy, repatriation was, in this context, perceived as an integral part of building relationships between Te Papa as a Crown agency and iwi - now conceptualised according to an ideal of reciprocity, in which the envisaged common goal was 'the dynamic perpetuation of culture and identity'.[699]

The repatriations entailed developing new bicultural categories at Te Papa and other New Zealand museums which recognised the toi moko not as material artefacts but as the remains of persons. Te Papa, for example, developed two wahi tapu (sacred areas) explicitly separated from other collection storage areas. Any further research on the toi moko required iwi permission and they were to be returned and cared for by their descendants once their ancestral land had been identified.[700] In 2014, the programme made its largest repatriation. The remains of 107 Māori and Moriori, including 35 toi moko, were formally handed back to Māori after an agreement was reached between Te Papa and the American Museum of Natural History. Māori Television described the transportation as 'a spiritual call … extended to these sacred treasures, some of which have resided in alienation for nearly 200 years in America.'[701]

The Unknown Warrior was therefore uniquely informed by both the repatriations of indigenous bodily remains, as well as the Unknown Soldier, as a bicultural state project within the ideological formation of Anzac commemoration. This was first and foremost seen in the naming of the Unknown as *Warrior*, a term with historic significance to depictions of Māori as a martial race, and secondly in the ritual and design of the Tomb itself.[702] Māori leaders were consulted as part of the repatriation process,

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[697] Te Papa, 'Repatriation of Toi Moko to Te Papa', *Scoop*, (21 May 2004): http://www.scoop.co.nz/stories/CU0405/S00126/repatriation-of-toi-moko-to-te-papa.htm?from-mobile=bottom-link-01

[698] Nicholas Thomas, *Entangled Objects: Exchange, Material Culture and Colonisation in the Pacific*, Harvard University Press, Cambridge and London, 1991.

[699] Peter Tapsell, 'Partnership in museums: A tribal response to repatriation', in C. Fforde, J. Hubert, and P. Tumbull, eds. *The dead and their possessions: The repatriation in principle, policy and practice,* Routledge, London, 2002, pp. 284–292, 290. Also see: Paul Tapsell, 'Marae and tribal identity in urban Aotearoa/New Zealand', *Pacific Studies*, *25*, 1/2 (2002), pp. 141–171. This had a flow on effect to other important museums, such as the Auckland War Memorial Museum, see: Auckland War Memorial Museum Annual Plan 2003/2004: http://annualreportarchive.aucklandmuseum.com/bundles/awmmreports/pdfs/aim_ann_report_2003-2004.ocr.pdf

[700] Te Papa, Guidelines.

[701] Ibid.

[702] It should be noted this is a deeply problematic image. See, Brendan Hokowhitu, 'History and masculinity', in J. O'Brien, & C. Anderson, eds., *Sources and Methods in Indigenous Studies*, Routledge, London, 2017, pp. 195–204. For a history of the use of 'warrior' in commemorative language; Vincent O'Malley, *The Great War for New Zealand: Waikato 1800-2000*, Bridget Williams Books, Wellington, 2016, especially chapters 1-2.

attending the exhumation as the Unknown Warrior, and performing a powhiri as the casket arrived in New Zealand. The repatriation of the Unknown Warrior took account of pre-political spiritual realities. The funeral took place not in the secular space of the War Memorial, but the Wellington Anglican Cathedral under traditional rites of Christian burial. [703] This was in contrast with the pretensions of the secular state represented in the Australian Soldier and its ceremony.

Kingsley Baird's design for the new tomb reflected the cultural and institutional context of both the Unknown and toi moko repatriations. Iwi representatives on the working committee for the Unknown Warrior recommended that the warrior be disinterred from an area where the Māori Pioneer contingent is known to have served; and that the Ministry approach Māori leaders to inform them of the project and its progress.[704] Mickey Apiti of *Marae* had expressed interest in covering the project for Māori audiences; further publicity was provided by the Te Puni Kōkiri magazine, *Kōkiri Paetae*. The ground breaking and hiki tapu (blessing) at the Pukeahu War Memorial was coordinated by kaumatua John Tahuparae. Tangata Whenua were present throughout the exhumation and transportation to New Zealand, including at the transfer from the plane to the hearse at Wellington Airport. A Māori ceremony at the exhumation was deemed essential early on in the planning stages. The presence of a kaumatua and kuia at the disinterment was exceptional, given that absolute anonymity - even of the location of the grave - and strict policies of the Commonwealth War Graves Commission to not have any non-essential officials at any exhumations. The Māori Affairs Minister was also part of the ministerial delegation at all the ceremonies connected with the Tomb of the Unknown Warrior. Te Puni Kokiri also requested that the selection of remains should be done carefully to ensure that Māori feel represented by the tomb. Although noting there was no way of knowing the ethnicity of the body, Te Puni Kokiri was of the view that the site remains were selected from must be an area where Māori fought and died so that there was at least a possibility that the body may be Māori. Indeed, suggestions that all Māori dead oversea, from all wars, should be repatriated to New Zealand – the Unknown was seen as solving this in some way by providing a substitute.[705]

The request for a mass repatriation programme was interesting because, as the ministerial briefing notes, the context of the First World War engagement was very different for Māori in the Second World War. The Māori Pioneers in which most Māori served was not heavily involved in fighting on the Western Front, being limited to construction rather than combat. Fewer Māori were subsequently killed and none who were had unknown graves. There were also the complications around the fact that some iwi had refused to volunteer. Waikato Māori in particular opposed conscription, with many facing imprisonment. One possible resolution was to have the Commonwealth War Graves exhume a body from any cemetery in Europe, and to not mark the place from where the remains were removed, to create a kind of double anonymity and thus the possibility that the remains could therefore be from

[703] The committee refused to incorporate a religious service at St Paul's Cathedral into the funeral or provide funding for a special service - see, Richard Reid, 5 July 1993, External peripheral activities AWM371 93/1368, AWM, Canberra..
[704] 'Tomb of the Unknown New Zealand Warrior', BR2002/142; 7 May 2002, Minister for Culture and Heritage, Wellington, MCH, Wellington.
[705] Briefing to Clark, 11 December, 2001, p. 3, MCH, Wellington.

the site of any engagement from either the First or Second World War. Although the committee ultimately decided against this – to even consider it was radical enough – such a degree of anonymity entailed a disruption of the settler place-making narrative and would have made the Unknown even more removed from its performance of state power. These protocols around tikanga and bodily remains at an institutional level of the New Zealand state reflected the way in which Māori repatriation over the 2000s influenced the state project of the Unknown, affecting its imaginative and operative powers in settling postcolonial nationhood, in the implicit possibility that the Unknown was a Māori or Pākehā.

Conclusion

Despite taking place over a decade apart, the repatriations of the Unknown Australian Soldier and Unknown New Zealand Warrior shared a language of trauma healing the nation; the territorial claim on the body of the dead soldier, and through this projection, on the place of the Tomb; all within a state performance. These elements are key to understanding the broader institutional imaginary of war commemoration that has become an integral dimension of the state's diplomatic and political idiom, internationally and domestically. The journeys of these unknown bodies constituted a re-enchantment of nationalism, heralding a new geopolitical order, the supersession of empire by autonomous, postcolonial nationhood, based on the liberal principles of social democracy energised and made meaningful by the Anzac spirit. With this in mind, we can cast the whole state project of Anzac in quite different terms than the narrative of nation-building to which it pretends; throwing into clearer relief, the entanglements of history, memory and identity, as well as the continuities and discontinuities, within Anzac as a joint ideological formation in Australia and New Zealand.

The Unknowns can be understood as transnational examinations of state violence. The bodies of the Unknowns were simultaneously the 'product' of state violence – casualties of the Great War – and its obscuring: their return became the enactment of identity and memory foregrounded in the emotional spectacle of the healed nation. This is, as we have seen, inflected by the distinct formations of the Australian and New Zealand state, so that the settled space of the Australian War Memorial – the institution *par excellence* of the Anzac state – is contrasted with the contested place, history, and memory of Pukeahu. Indigenous claims on the land therefore informed and were informed by the imaginaries of the Unknown repatriations. The fragmentation of Australian and New Zealand state within the dynamics of market and security in the post-war order and decolonisation that had collapsed national legitimacy and its claims on territory, were renegotiated in the politics of reconciliation and biculturalism. It was this that informed the Unknowns; not an expression of popular grief owing to the war, but a state-centred exercise. As an imaginative spectacle, its power lay in the claims to territory: the reaching back into the past to imagine the identity of these dead men as a 'son of the soil'; the act of exhumation itself; and finally, the soil in which the soldiers were lain.

Differences between the symbolism and themes of the Unknown Soldier and Unknown Warrior can be understood in part as the varied implications of a sacralised Prime Minister and the modality of state commemoration. In Australia, the Unknown Soldier inaugurated a period of intensification of

Anzac in cultural and political terms, manifested in the Howard government. In New Zealand, the Unknown Warrior was the final stage in a complex development of this, reflected in the 'softer', more fragmented construction of Anzac under the Clark Labour government, overlaid with the bicultural discourse of national founding at Waitangi. Central to this was Clark's dual role as cultural minister and head of the government. These broad differences can be understood in the role of the Australian War Memorial in strengthening and investing, to an unprecedented extent, in the state commemoration of Anzac in Australia; supplementing the expanded moral and spatial powers of the Prime Minister as a guarantor of authority through the body of the Unknown Soldier. It was the institution of the war memorial which projected the organic quality of the ritual, ensuring the spontaneous consent and legitimacy of the ordinary people which the Unknown was intended to embody.

CHAPTER SEVEN.
‘FOR LAND, CULTURE, COUNTRY’: NATIONAL INDIGENOUS TELEVISION, ‘FORGOTTEN WARRIORS’, AND THE AUSTRALIAN ANZAC REVIVAL

Introduction

The annual Redfern Anzac Day Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Black Diggers March in 2015 was the largest in the event’s seven-year history. Thousands of Indigenous and non-Indigenous Australians lined the streets of the inner-city Sydney suburb, as participants – serving military personnel or veterans, or their relatives – spoke of their pride at having the feats of indigenous Diggers, ‘those who were often forgotten when they returned home from war’, recognised by the public.[706] Lance Corporal Natalie Rose Whyte, serving with the Royal Australian Army Ordnance Corps, was pleased to see Anzac remembrance galvanising the local community. ‘I have been involved in the march pretty much nearly every year and since being in the military I have been a part of Anzac Day commemorations in various ways’, she said in an interview. ‘I think the march is important because it pretty much gets everyone of all types together ... I think the day has grown from the indigenous perspective; Anzac Day is something that everyone remembers and respects’.[707] Community representatives such as Redfern resident Ebony Allen similarly said the march offered her a way to better connect with her indigenous heritage, noting that the ‘march is really important for the community because there are not many things out there that specifically look at the contributions of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander servicemen and women during the war’.[708]

The Black Digger March evinced an indigenous commemoration of war in which, as Whyte put it, ‘all types’ – Indigenous and non-Indigenous alike – could experience community and relationships. This centred indigenous stories and ways of belonging, spiralling out to encompass the whole community – connecting past, present, and future. In this, the March in 2015 reflected seismic changes in the

[706] ‘March of respect keeps growing’ *Central*, 29 April, 2015, p. 9.
[707] ‘NITV, Natalie Whyte, Redfern ANZAC Day 2015’, YouTube: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=SptcqyNiHFw.
[708] ‘March’, *Central*.

recognition of indigenous soldiers in the First and Second World War over the 1990s and 2000s, expressed in a range of historical and cultural productions. As in the case of the 2015 March, these expressed various 'scales' for understanding military experience – the familial, local, and imperial, as well as the national – and imagined indigenous and non-indigenous people relating to each other in a shared history and shared social and cultural relationship, to 'renovate the national': the cultural, social, and political redemption of the Australian nation.

Central to this intersection of commemoration, memory, and the public, was National Indigenous Television (NITV). It was NITV that provided the institutional, technical, and personal infrastructure to broadcast, promote, communicate, and disseminate – in traditional print media and on social media – the March's central message of recognition and reconciliation. NITV journalists interviewed participants, while photographers and videographers streamed the performances and ceremonies – engaged in the conscious shaping of this public space, according to the conventions of a public media service.

In Australia and New Zealand indigenous broadcasters such as NITV and Māori Television have played an increasingly important role in disseminating narratives of war experience, through the promotion of stories of 'forgotten' Indigenous soldiers. Over the next two chapters, we will explore the post-2005 commemoration of Anzac Day through a consideration of indigenous cultural production. In Australia, as Miranda Johnson notes, 'the absence of treaty history means that the translation of indigenous pasts into public history has not occurred.'[709] While in New Zealand, Māori Television has built on the institutional presence of Māori military recruitment through the Māori Battalion, in Australia, NITV programming relied on decades of cultural-historical productions around recovering 'forgotten warriors': Most important was the documentary, *The Forgotten*, directed by Glen Stasiuk and aired on the ABC in 2001.[710] Funded by the Australian Institute of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Studies (AIATSIS), *The Forgotten* tells the stories of Aboriginal soldiers who fought and died in the Australian military and the honour they felt representing their nation despite facing prejudice and exclusion from citizenship. As a documentary made by Indigenous people, covering much of this material for the first time, *The Forgotten* was a vitally important work which helped to shape the contours of Indigenous media engagement with Anzac in the subsequent decade.

Within the national framework of NITV, 'forgotten warriors' became a matrix for imagining and relating non-indigenous and indigenous peoples in a reconciled public space. This chapter explores this shaping of war memory in Australia through NITV's Anzac Day programming over the past decade. NITV programming provides discrete television texts by which to explore the political and cultural relationships embedded in the state Anzac project, but also to give space to those Indigenous voices which contest and collaborate in this renovation of the nation-state.

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[709] Miranda Johnson, 'Making History Public: Indigenous Claims to Settler States', *Public Culture*, 20, 1 (2008): pp. 97–117, .98.
[710] *The Forgotten*, Paul Glen Stasiuk/BlackRussian Productions, 2002. For a full list of Indigenous productions, see *The Black List*: *Film and TV projects since 1970 with Indigenous Australians in key creative roles'*. in which Stasiuk's is the only documentary in relation to Indigenous war commemoration: https://www.screenaustralia.gov.au/getmedia/a321de20-911c-448b-8afa-f29bc82f16e6/Black-list.pdf.

It also provides a study into the potentials and problems of recovering indigenous stories of war within the framework of national sacrifice. Canadian and First Nations scholar Timothy Winegard argues that remembering 'forgotten warriors' threatens to historicise Indigenous war experience as Indigenous peoples evolving into full citizenship by joining the 'White Man's war' and leaving behind their 'primitive culture'.[711] This 'forgotten warrior' genre – in Winegard's view – becomes symbolic and expressive of Indigenous peoples putting aside the 'primitive' and donning 'the khaki' as a good citizen of the nation, in a way which privileges settler narratives. Winegard invites us to consider the complexities of Australian and New Zealand Anzac commemoration, as well as the limitations of histories of indigenous war experience that, as in the case of Winegard's scholarship, rely on official government archives to reconstruct indigenous war experience and in doing so, privilege the very structures that marginalised indigenous people and excluded them from citizenship and the public space in the first place.

Rather, in looking at changes in the treatment of Anzac commemoration in NITV's programming from 2006 to 2015, I aim to demonstrate something different. James Bennett notes that media such as film, documentary, and television more readily accommodate the 'narrative strategies and forms' of Indigenous oral histories than traditional historical scholarship. I am interested in the ways indigenous television bypasses traditional historiography to shape Anzac memory and identity.[712] Centring indigenous media production in this analysis overcomes the limitations of Winegard's critique, while showing ways in which indigenous Australian media shapes the memory of violence in Australia. As John Hartley and Alan McKee note, an Indigenous public space offers possibilities for new notions of citizenship, arising from an emphasis on culture and identity belonging to place, rather than based on rights and obligations to the state.[713] NITV in this period contested and collaborated in national frameworks of war memory and foundational histories, to express indigenous historical knowledge: connections between past, present, future, for the renewal of indigenous identity.

NITV institutional and constitutional context

NITV's Anzac programming was shaped by its historical and institutional development. NITV can be situated in the changing landscape of Indigenous media since the early 1980s; tied directly to the Reconciliation movement and changing state policies around Indigenous cultural production. *Out of the Silent Land,* the 1984 federal government inquiry into the media needs of Aboriginal communities – affirmed by the Royal Commission into Aboriginal Deaths in Custody in 1991 – recognised that the negative portrayal of Indigenous people in the media affected Indigenous people's self-perception, public opinion, and in turn public policy.[714] Although Reconciliation policies led to small-scale,

[711] Timothy C. Winegard, *Indigenous Peoples of the British Dominions and the First World War*, Cambridge University Press, New York, 2012, p. 8.
[712] James Bennett, 'Lest we forget black diggers: recovering Aboriginal Anzacs on television', 38, 4, (2014): pp. 457–475, 458.
[713] John Hartley and Alan McKee, *The indigenous public sphere: the reporting and reception of indigenous issues in the Australian media, 1994-1997*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2000, 31.
[714] Department of Aboriginal Affairs, *Out of the Silent Land,* Australian Government Publishing Service, Canberra, 1984; Elliott Johnston, *Royal Commission into Aboriginal Deaths in Custody, National Report*, Australian Government Publishing Service, Canberra, 1991: http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/other/IndigLRes/rciadic/.

community-based broadcasting such as the highly successful, Indigenous Community Television, which produced local content for hundreds of remote Aboriginal communities, it was not until 2005 that the Howard Liberal Government – responding to the concerted effort of Indigenous media professionals – focused on the development of a 'national' television channel.[715]

Initial funding of $48.5 million over four years was allocated in the expectation that the new national service would operate as a single organisation, cannibalising remote and other community programming and infrastructure within its schedule to avoid duplication of management, content, and technical facilities.[716]

What aspired to be Australia's third public service broadcaster, akin to an Indigenous ABC, instead became a 'content aggregator', governed by the Special Broadcasting Service (SBS) – the specialist broadcaster established in the 1980s by the Malcolm Fraser Liberal Government, to provide a space for specialist content within an increasingly diverse Australia.[717] In 2012, SBS received new federal government funding dedicated to relaunching NITV as a free-to-air channel.[718] As the name suggested, the 'National Indigenous Television' would be screened across the nation, gathering audiences under an Indigenous vision of country and culture. NITV's inception in this way consummated a shift from 1980s policy in which remote Indigenous Australians were seen as threatened consumers, to a more hopeful presentation of them as people with stories to tell the rest of Australia.

Introducing a public service broadcasting model over an existing, and by most accounts innovative, grassroots sector caused significant tension within the Indigenous media sector.[719] The controversy surrounding the launch of NITV demonstrates how, as Ellie Rennie observes, 'the three tiers of broadcasting – commercial, public service ('national') and community – are difficult to manage in the Indigenous context'.[720] The dismantling of this 'Indigenous sector' (a term used by Tim Rowse in 2002) under the Howard government's Northern Territory intervention — which effectively put an end to the strategy of self-determination — exacerbated the issue. Finally, in 2012, SBS received 158 million dollars in federal government funding, $15 million of which would be dedicated to relaunching NITV as a free-to-air channel.[721] The NITV mission set by the board drew on the charters of traditional

[715] Imparja Television (established in 1986) became the first commercial TV network to be owned and operated by Indigenous people anywhere in the world. See Ellie Rennie and Daniel Featherstone, "The Potential Diversity of Things we call TV": Indigenous Community Television, self-determination, and NITV', *Media International Australia*, 129 (2005): pp. 52–66.
[716] Ellie Rennie, 'Making it on your own: Australian Indigenous television', *Metro Magazine,* 158 (2008): pp. 104–107, 104.
[717] Stuart Cunningham, 'Under great pressure, a diamond is being formed: the SBS over time', *Media International Australia*, 133 (2009): pp. 15–18; Belinda Small, 'Narrating Community: Multiculturalism and Australia's SBS Television', *Journal of Communication Inquiry* 26, 4, (2002): pp. 391–407.
[718] 'New Indigenous TV channel for SBS', *TV Tonight*, 9 May, 2012: http://tvtonight.com.au/2012/05/new-indigenous-tv-channel-for-sbs.html.
[719] Featherstone, p. 62
[720] Rennie, p. 104; Rijavec to Coonan, 12 July, 2007: http://bronzewing.cdu.edu.au/pipermail/csaa-forum/attachments/20070716/12f2dbbc/attachment.objhttp.
[721] '$158m funding boost for SBS', *TV Tonight*, 2012: http://tvtonight.com.au/2012/05/new-indigenous-tv-channel-for-sbs.html; 'New Indigenous TV channel for SBS, *TV Tonight*, 2012: http://tvtonight.com.au/2012/05/158m-funding-boost-for-sbs.html; 'SBS – but wait there's more…', *TV Tonight*, 2012: http://tvtonight.com.au/2012/05/sbs-but-wait-theres-more.html.

public service broadcasters such as the ABC and the BBC, aiming to provide television 'that informs, entertains and educates Indigenous and other audiences about Australia's Indigenous people and customs and issues of interest to Indigenous Australians'.[722] The board emphasised that the new organisation would serve urban Indigenous populations and mainstream Australian audiences, not just remote communities.

NITV operated within the tensions of this institutional framework**.** If remote indigenous media was less concerned with such imagery, NITV's claiming a national broadcast space according to the conventions of public service meant its content had to negotiate traditionalist/progressive binaries in public and academic expectations. In the context of diverse Aboriginal and Torres Strait Island nations and languages, NITV would operate as another English language channel according to conventions of public broadcasting within the structure of the SBS.

NITV Anzac Day programming 2005 to 2015.

Anzac commemoration was far from a main priority in the initial years of NITV's formation. Producers instead adhered closely to the familiar territory of local indigenous content, focusing on cultural stories, initially carried only by cable and satellite providers, along with some limited over-the-air transmissions in certain remote areas. Cultural content was based around indigenous art (including music), sport, and traditional ceremonies, featured in either the NITV news bulletin or productions such as the serial *Culture Warriors*.[723]

The broadcaster's commemorative content instead focused on the Redfern Black Diggers march which had started in 2007. This coverage consisted, in its first years, of a series of news bulletin reports, and then in 2008, for the first time, a live broadcast. This covered the Welcome to Country at The Block in Redfern, followed by the highlights of the March to St Saviour's Church for the closing ecumenical service. The live broadcast was hosted by Lola Forrester and featured interviews by a 'roving reporter' Paula Maling and panel expert David Huggonson – curator of the 2000 exhibition *Too Dark for the Light Horse*. The broadcast was compartmentalised into six short stories about Indigenous veterans, five of which would be narrated by Australian musician Jimmy Little. Huggonson stressed that 'it is very important the younger members of the Aboriginal community and the general Australian public recognise the contribution that the Indigenous population of this country has made to the defence of this nation in every war since the Boer War'.[724]

NITV Anzac programming changed with the SBS restructure in 2010.[725] This also tracked with the growing public discussion around Anzac as a significant site of national citizenship and celebration. NITV programming focused on discrete content packages, building on the 2007-2008 focus on

[722] 'About NITV', *SBS*, 25 June, 2015: http://www.sbs.com.au/nitv/article/2015/06/25/about-nitv.
[723] The NITV News Bulletin started in February 2008, initially beginning with five minutes of news, later expanded to a fifteen-minute and finally a half-hour bulletin.
[724] 'Black Diggers Anzac Day March On NITV', *Deadly Vibe*, 24 April, 2008: http://www.deadlyvibe.com.au/2008/04/black-diggers-anzac-day-march-on-nitv/.
[725] 'NITV: Launch Day', TV Tonight, December 5, 2012: http://tvtonight.com.au/2012/12/nitv-launch-day.html; Tim Bradley, 'NITV free to air Promo', YouTube: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YAkOY3_RUJk.

specific stories of Indigenous soldiers. The episode *Anzac Harry Allie*, for example, screened in 2011 as part of the NITV's *Living Black* series, one of the first NITV programmes, focused on showing the variety of Indigenous experience in Australia.[726] Anzac was viewed as one part of that, described as offering 'a chance to reflect on the Indigenous contribution to Australia's wartime effort'. The episode shared the language of Australian remembrance, celebrating those who 'made the ultimate sacrifice for our freedom'.[727] The programme was based around an interview with the titular Harry Allie, an Air Force Warrant Officer until his discharge in 1989. The interview emphasised enlistment as a positive story, linked to family tradition as Harry's uncles and aunties had served in the Second World War. The armed forces were portrayed as providing an opportunity for self-improvement and making friends. The interview was interspersed with various indigenous and non-indigenous commemorations, such as the Redfern Black Diggers march. Scenes of participants, waving Aboriginal flags, during smoking ceremonies, were linked to the youth by Harry's narration. A mentor of Indigenous youth in later life, he talked about the importance of Anzac Day as 'a day of equality, especially for our young people, especially for women'. Reflecting the emerging connections of indigenous media commemoration, Allie was a key organiser of the Redfern Black Digger march.

By 2011, we can detect a significant shift and a new direction in NITV Anzac Day content. One of NITV's first commissioning editors and Channel Manager, Tanya Denning-Oman, a Birri and Guugu Yimidhirr woman, stated that the intentions of NITV's new Anzac Day broadcasting was 'to ensure the stories of our First Nations were not forgotten in this year's moment of Australian recognition and commemoration'.[728] NITV content was therefore to mark a discrete space in the commemorative landscape, orientated towards Indigenous audiences and foregrounded in the language of the Anzac revival. NTIV therefore bookended its Anzac coverage with the aims of providing an 'indigenous lens' within the site of recognition at Anzac Day. This was a conscious engagement with Indigenous content on Anzac Day, as more than discrete cultural performances.

Accordingly, we see a widening of Anzac programming in 2012. This consisted of the screening of particular documentaries, well as broadening content on general programmes, such as *Awaken*, *Living Black*, and the NITV news bulletin**.** *Living Black* dedicated a major episode to the theme of Indigenous recognition, 'A Spirit Returns', joined by *Awaken* episode 'The Anzac Legend and Legacy*'.*[729] These programmes focused on interviewing Indigenous families about family members who had served in the world wars. The subject of 'A Spirit Returns' was Frank Archibald, a Gumbayniggirr man who died fighting on the Kokoda Trail during the Second World War. The episode recounted his family members' fundraising campaign for a trip to Papua New Guinea to visit his grave, to bring some of the soil of his tribal lands and perform a traditional smoking ceremony. Frank was the only member of the family not buried in Australia, and the ceremony would guide his spirit home. This

[726] *Living Black - Anzac Harry Allie*, NITV, 2011.
[727] This would become an important part of Orman-Denning's tenture as Channel Manager. See 'Tanya Orman-Denning: 'It is vital that Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people see themselves positively reflected in the media' , SBS, October 18, 2017: https://www.sbs.com.au/nitv/article/2017/10/13/tanya-orman-denning-it-vital-aboriginal-and-torres-strait-islander-people-see.
[728] 'Profile - Tanya Denning-Orman', NITV: http://www.nitv.org.au/fx-story.cfm?sid=EA03540F-B96B-4736-E539CA3FB0D96160.
[729] *Living Black – A Spirit Returns*, NITV, 2012; *Awaken – Anzac Legend and Legacy*, NITV, 2012.

story featured a rehearsal of the ceremony with Indigenous elder Michael Garrett reading the ritual words in the Gumbayniggirr language, overlaid with a narration by the NITV reporter, Dan Conifer, explaining its significance. We see the performance of an Indigenous culture and cosmology foregrounded in the implicit evocation of the 'spirit of Anzac'. The episode weaved the language of the dislocation and loss of war with its reconciliation through indigenous ways of being and knowing. Moreover, the creation of this content was important as these episodes would be replayed in subsequent years, as well as being syndicated online for other news sites.

Another clear thematic development was the interviewing of veterans alongside men and women currently serving in the ADF, carving out an Indigenous presence within Australia's military heritage. Interviews with people including Lance Corporal Rosie Whyte were followed by feature articles and videos about army life, how to enlist, and the kinds of career opportunities military experience provides. These were typically discussed as stories of 'the forgotten', based on the personal experiences and thoughts of war veterans of family members, and linked Indigenous war service with Australia's 'military tradition' from both World Wars, as well as contemporary conflicts as in the case of East Timor.

This programming, however, continued to centre the production and promotion of Indigenous content. The theme of coverage in April 2012, for example, was 'Grow'. This enclosed war remembrance within the aims of the Reconciliation Barometer project, the biennial study on public attitudes towards reconciliation.[730] In 2013, NITV coverage affirmed Anzac Day as a site of recognition and a celebration of a 'positive self-image' of Indigenous peoples. The war experience of Indigenous men and women was a way of encompassing Indigenous Australians more generally in the life of the nation, to 'show that we did actually represent our people and the whole of Australia' (as the by-line of the programming put it).

In the NITV rationale, just as white Anzacs founded the nation and its promises of political citizenship through the landings at Gallipoli, so too did 'Black Diggers' act as founding pioneers, paving the way, in this case, for the efforts by Indigenous peoples seeking recognition and equality. This indigenising of the Anzac narrative was particularly present in the 2013 programming which memorialised Indigenous soldiers fighting for land, culture, and country – a reimagining of the mantra, 'for God, for King, and for country', simultaneously reworking the 'scale' of war experience and the project of commemoration. This reflected the policy framework of NITV that focussed on delivering 'Indigenous content' through oral and visual storytelling reconnecting indigenous peoples with Indigenous ways of thinking and belonging.

This centred on screenings of Glen Stasiuk's *The Forgotten*. The NITV program guide described how Stasiuk's documentary questioned 'the motives of these Aboriginal soldiers and their experience in the Australian Armed Forces – further exploring that indeed, Aborigines and Islanders showed that the "digger legend" – one of the most profound and positive of Australia's self-images – encompasses

[730] *Reconciliation Australia Annual Review 2012–13,* Reconciliation Australia, Canberra, 2013.

black Australians as well'.

The effectiveness of this approach was reflected in the response from NITV viewers. One online viewer stated how *The Forgotten* documentary gave Anzac Day 'a whole new meaning' for themselves, continuing that as '… a proud Aboriginal woman in the Twenty-first Century', problems are easier to tackle [sic] knowing that many brave Indigenous men gave their lives and served to secure a better future for past, future generations and me'.[731] Non-indigenous viewer Amie Crande stated how 'I don't usually pass comment on television shows however I thought this was an exceptional program at a very appropriate time'.[732]

The use of Anzac to understand and reconstruct Indigenous genealogies was a central part of *The Forgotten*'s focus on telling Indigenous stories and framed later NITV coverage. Family accounts identified contemporary and historic identity and solidarity, especially through presenting 'The Forgotten' through the reality of the traumatised soldiers who were denied rights upon their return; as part of a wider struggle for dignity and legal rights in Australia by Indigenous peoples.[733] Such stories focused on Indigenous men who returned from the Great War physically and mentally broken. A major source of stories were interviews with families, talking about the uncles, fathers, and brothers who came back from war 'completely different people'.

NITV made this language of 'the forgotten' central to its Anzac Day coverage in the lead up to the Anzac Centenary. The documentary *Anzacs: Remembering Our Heroes - The Forgotten Warriors*, depicted Indigenous soldiers who returned home to face discrimination, disenfranchisement, and systemic racism. [734] Particular emphasis was placed on the role of Indigenous soldiers in defending the Thursday, Goods and Horn Islands – along Australia's northern coastline – as the frontlines of Australia's defence in the Second World War, and therefore Indigenous peoples as the guardians of Australian security as well as being custodians of its most ancient culture. These stories of the 'forgotten warriors' were implicitly linked to contemporary struggles for recognition. In this way, the episode depicted Black diggers as emblematic of wider discrimination against Indigenous people. Crucially, this also provided an acceptable way for white Australians to comprehend and recognise historic wrongs against Indigenous Australians – within the site of Anzac Day rather than Australia Day.

Luke Briscoe, reflecting on the development of NITV coverage over the decade in 2016, stated how 'It is widely understood that ANZAC Day signifies what it is to be an Australian … but if Australia is to achieve reconciliation, the nation needs to recognise the roles played by Indigenous ANZACs in those events'.[735] NITV commemorative programming and special online content was therefore 'paying tribute to the military efforts of the Indigenous peoples of Australia'; emphasising forgotten stories of

[731] NITV ANZAC Day 2013, SBS, 2013.
[732] NITV 'NITV commemorates Anzac Day', Facebook, April 25, 2013: https://www.facebook.com/NITVAustralia/
[733] An example of how this narrative strategy has influenced non-indigenous media coverage of indigenous military experience, see ABC Local Radio PM programme, 'Indigenous soldiers who hid their identity to serve: the untold story', 31 December, 2014.
[734] *Anzacs: Remembering Our Heroes — The Forgotten Warriors* (SBS, 2014).
[735] Luke Briscoe, 'NITV ANZAC Focus', SBS, June 24, 2015: http://www.sbs.com.au/nitv/article/2015/04/06/nitv-anzac-focus.

'Black Anzacs', and specific programmes such as *Awaken* looking at the sacrifice of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander servicemen and women. Briscoe concluded that NITV's coverage was 'a burning reminder that Australia still needs to pays its formal respects to the Indigenous ANZACs'. While negotiating its early placement as a specialist national broadcaster, NITV expressed distinct indigenous historical knowledge and epistemologies, that provided a framework for acknowledging emerging discussion of indigenous military tradition, beyond victimhood and a dynamic expression of indigenous history – beyond dichotomies of erasure through settlement, or its eclipse into a monolithic violence, both of which centre settler narratives.

The depiction of Indigenous Australian martial prowess was itself an important and powerful narrative, contrasting with stereotypes of Indigenous Australians as passive, child-like victims of the 'fatal impact' of colonialism. This was a crucial underpinning to the aims, language, and narrative structure of *The Forgotten* documentary which recounted warrior stories, such as Noongar warrior Yagan and the Kalkadoon resistance in Queensland, as the foundation of the indigenous contribution to Australian military expeditions. Before the national coverage of NITV, this implicit construction of Indigenous Australians as capable warriors was explicitly linked to the resistance against early colonialists, and therefore Indigenous culture as having a warrior tradition which predates Gallipoli – located in the frontier wars. 'The spirit of the Kalkadoon', for example, was a story which formed the focus of *Koori Mail* coverage of Anzac Day in the 1990s and 2000s. The Kalkadoon nation, located in Queensland, fought against colonial forces in the 1880s; the culmination of which was a pitched battle between some 600 warriors of the Kalkadoon nation surrounded by a heavily-armed, punitive colonial force in 1884, at Battle Mountain, in northern Queensland.[736] This was also a crucial underpinning to the language and logic of *The Forgotten* documentary. In an article titled 'Warriors then … Warriors still', Stasiuk writes how Aboriginal people 'displayed and exuded rare courage and fighting qualities' throughout colonial history, while 'retaining their culture, identity, and sense of self-worth'.[737] Stasiuk recounted warrior stories, such as Noongar warrior Yagan, and Pemulay of the [people], the foundation of the indigenous contribution to Australian military expeditions.[738] In this rethought foundational story, Indigenous Australian military contributions were premised not on the Anzac tradition, born at Gallipoli, but a pre-existing indigenous way of being – a contribution made more significant given the social conditions and racial discrimination they experienced.[739] *Koori Mail* articles in the early 2000s similarly emulated and inverted the language of the 'Anzac spirit', aligning the remembrance of the Kalkadoon with Anzac Day. Attendees 'proudly listened to and read the comments of our media of the heroic exploits of our warriors on foreign soils'.[740] The 'foolhardy but no less heroic attack on the Turks at Anzac Day' was compared to Battle Mountain, 'when the Kalkadoons proved they could stand up and attack in the face of withering fire in the best tradition of

[736] Lisanne Gibson and Joanna Besley, *Monumental Queensland: Signposts on a Cultural Landscape*, University of Queensland Press, Brisbane, 2004, pp. 51–54.
[737] G. Stasiuk, 'Warriors then...Warriors still: Aboriginal soldiers in the 20th century', in Andrew Gunstone, ed., *History, Politics & Knowledge: Essays in Australian Indigenous Studies*, Australian Scholarly Publishing, Melbourne, 2008, pp. 191–205.
[738] Ibid., 191–192.
[739] Ibid., p. 195.
[740] *Koori Mail*, 21 May, 2008.

their Anglo-Saxon attackers.' Its anniversary was therefore a reversal of the 'Anzac spirit' - the Kalkadoons' heroic action 'was in the best Anzac tradition', the *Koori Mail* writer stressed, adding that 'it may be fairer to say that our troops in Gallipoli performed in the best Kalkadoon tradition', asserting Indigenous pre-eminence in the life of the nation.[741]

Anzac Day was being recast as a site of reconciliation. 'Forgotten warrior' stories emphasised how racial discrimination did not exist in the trenches, only for black diggers to face oppression upon returning to Australia. This presented a simple formula: Indigenous war experience deserved to be recognised alongside white Australian military service, which in turn formed the basis of the equality of peoples in modern Australia. Speaking at the 2005 dawn service at the unofficial monument to Indigenous military personnel in the foothills of Canberra, just outside of the Australian War Memorial, indigenous elder Kelton Pell stated how '[e]ven in times of darkness and injustice – even when they could not vote or hold citizenship of their own land – Aborigines fought alongside their comrades of all races and earned a fighting reputation as fine as any Australian'.[742] These narratives of Indigenous peoples joining their white comrades in war imagined at once a specific Indigenous lineage of experience and service and also the relationship of equality between black and white subjects in the framework of the national and service to the state. Other examples of this language were included in coverage of Black Diggers marches: **'**Anzac Day means a great deal,' said one Veteran, 'not only for those people who gave their lives for our freedom, but hopefully in the future it will also have a unifying effect by bringing more of our veterans and their families forward to take their rightful place'. Similarly, '[going to war] was something that I always wanted to do... it gave me equality with my non-Indigenous colleagues and I was recognised as a citizen of Australia'.[743]

Frontier Violence and the Anzac Centenary

This coverage by Indigenous media, with support from historians, shows us the potential for Indigenous Anzac coverage to inscribe new meanings over the site of Anzac Day. It indicates one of the central paradoxes of increasing Indigenous participation in Anzac commemoration more widely, located around the remembrance of specific historic conflicts between Indigenous people and colonial forces. We see the tension between local memories of colonial violence and state structures of commemoration unfolding in the NITV coverage. In its role as national broadcaster, NITV's coverage of these themes was both highly important – enhanced by precisely its stature as 'national' – and extremely fraught, situated in the political economy of the SBS and Federal Government funding. In the 2011 and 2012 programming, for example, documentaries about the Frontier Wars were featured only after the official Anzac Day programming was finished. This was a tacit placing of colonial violence outside of the space of Anzac coverage, and therefore outside of the structures of state commemoration and memory. In this we can conceive something of what Brendan Hokowhitu calls 'the condition of being postcolonial' – the problems entailed in state-funding for Indigenous media

[741] *Koori Mail*, 8 December, 2005; *National Indigenous Times*, December, 2005.
[742] *Koori Mail,* 30 April, 2005.
[743] *Koori Mail*, 7 May, 2001.

entities, in producing an Indigenous episteme or world-view.[744] NITV and the cultural texts we have been exploring operate in the space of the 'silences' of Australian Anzac commemoration and historical configurations of 'terra nullius'.

In the lead up to the Anzac Centenary, NITV publicity releases about the scope of its coverage showed a reluctance to refer to Frontier Wars as part of Anzac Day coverage itself; explicitly stating that its coverage is of 'Australia's military efforts in every war Australia has fought in since 1901 to 2015'.[745] This was a more specific boundary of commemoration than had ever been previously defined. Stories of Indigenous dissent during the wars, however, could be included within this ambit of story-telling. One programme in 2014 depicted disruptions of Indigenous communities during wartime; such as the story of Guugu Yimithirr people of North Queensland who were forcibly removed from their land during the Second World War.

This ongoing challenge was seen in vivid terms in NITV's coverage of the 2015 Frontier Wars March in Canberra, during which NITV journalist Myles Morgan was harassed by ACT Police for filming confrontations between police and march participants.[746] NITV was accused by police of failing to provide 'fair and equitable coverage' required by Australian taxpayers. The implication was that by covering the Frontier Wars remembrance, NITV is falling short of what is fair and equitable.[747] This collision of indigenous and state-centred stories of war in NITV programming is at the heart of the trade-off in state-funded Indigenous media participation in Anzac commemoration. The political culture of Anzac commemoration is coercive. As seen in the constraints placed on the physical inclusion and exclusion in the Canberra march, this coercion is linguistic and operative; demarcating what is considered official and what is heterodox; what is 'fair and equitable coverage' when it comes to Anzac Day – what, in effect, supports the narrative of pride and celebration and what does not. Anzac Day, as a site of recognition and reconciliation, is an incomplete re-founding.

Conclusion

The broad programmatic framework of NITV's Anzac Day broadcasts, as well as the particular documentary texts, accommodated a multiplicity of voices and connections beyond the paradigm of the national in the first decade of NITV's programming. The programming situated war experience in local, family, tribal, and imperial contexts, redrawing geographies of memory through connections to Asia and the Pacific; giving space to the voices of families and women; and suggesting deeper histories of frontier violence and indigenous warrior traditions – all of which centred indigenous stories. Moreover, through this centring of 'forgotten warriors', NITV shaped a particular memory of war as the reconciliation of indigenous and non-indigenous people; enfolded into indigenous relationships and ways of knowing, through the presentation of cultural relationships, so that the

[744] Brendan Hokowhitu, 'Haka: Colonised Physicality, Body-logic, and Embodied Sovereignty', in Laura R. Graham and H. Glenn Penny, eds., *Performing Indigeneity: Global Histories and Contemporary Experiences*, University of Nebraska Press, Lincoln and London, 2014: pp. 273–304, 273.
[745] *NITV ANZAC Day 2015*, SBS, 2015.
[746] 'NITV journalist intimidated by Canberra police on Anzac Day', *Sydney Morning Herald*, 30 April, 2015.
[747] 'NITV makes formal complaint against ACT police over alleged intimidation of journalist at Anzac Day protest march', ABC, 29 Apr 2015: http://www.abc.net.au/news/2015-04-29/nitv-to-make-formal-complaint-after-journalist-harrassed/6431536.

revival of Anzac and memory of 'forgotten warriors' was the enactment of the renovated nation. In this way, the Australian nation was enclosed within the Indigenous country. As National Museum of Australia curator Nathan Sentence observes, Aboriginal notions of 'country' extend beyond territoriality to encompass sky, land, and sea; and simultaneously the reconception of time and space, encompassing past, present, and future.[748] The tensions around frontier violence and its place in a national indigenous media context suggests the constitutional limits of recovering 'forgotten warriors'. Indigenous media remains peripheral to the public, with NTIV acting as a specialist interest media within SBS, rather than the deep abiding heart of the Australian nation.[749] This reiterates the way in which the state configures war commemoration. Anzac acts as a state myth. Anzac scholarship which does not recognise this context cannot move beyond national teleologies of Anzac memory. In this way, we can see how commemoration is shaped by the constitutional contours of state making.

[748] 'Ep0: Exploring the gaps between us and the past', *History Labs*, 28 May 2018: https://historylab.net/ep0-exploring-the-gaps/.
[749] McKenna, 'Moment of Truth', p. 12.

CHAPTER EIGHT.
NŌ TĀTOU TE TOTO / THE BLOOD WE SHARE: MĀORI TELEVISION, 'THE PRICE OF CITIZENSHIP', AND THE RESHAPING OF NEW ZEALAND WAR MEMORY

Introduction

In 2010, as head of the New Zealand Defence Forces and prior to his appointment as Governor General the following year, Sir Jerry Mateparae delivered the annual ANZAC Address on Māori Television.[750] Inaugurated in 2007 with the aim of inviting a distinguished Australian or New Zealand citizen to speak on the theme of the 'Anzac spirit', the address was the centrepiece of Māori Television's Anzac Day programming. After presenting a synopsis of the 'Gallipoli story' – the landing and its place as the most powerful narrative of nationhood at the turn of the twenty-first century – Mateparae spoke of 'fundamental differences' in Australian and New Zealand attitudes towards Anzac commemoration. The key difference between Australian and New Zealand Anzac Days was brought into focus in each nation's contemporary military cultures as an embodiment of national identity. Mateparae contrasted the respective welcomes a visitor can expect upon arrival at Australian and New Zealand military bases, at home and around the world. While lauding Australian attitudes of relaxed and generous 'fair dinkum' hospitality, he singled out the Māori pōwhiri as the key distinction in the New Zealand context. The pōwhiri**,** as part of the protocol for bringing visitors onto a marae, is implicitly a challenge, in which manuhiri (visitors) go from being strangers, whose motives and allegiances are unknown and untested, to friends, protected and welcomed as part of the military community, perhaps preceded by haka. 'There is nothing more inspiring', Mateparae stressed, 'than a whole contingent in the haka, asserting their presence'. This was a shared taonga (treasure), centred on Māori experiences of the First and Second World Wars, now spiralling out to encompass the whole of the New Zealand Defence Forces and the nation itself.

Mateparae expressed an understanding of the 'Anzac spirit' in a particular modality of commemoration; not so much the positioning of discrete Māori cultural performances, but an experience of a cultural relationship through the shared taonga of the New Zealand Defence Forces.

[750] 'ANZAC 2010 address: Lt. General Jerry Mateparae', Māori Television, 25 April 2010.

The project of Anzac citizenship was infused with the centrality of Māoritanga (the Māori worldview) in the New Zealand state. The significance of this relationship in 2010 becomes especially clear in the context of the ANZAC Address itself: Māori Television. The Māori Television Service was established in 2003 as a state-funded Indigenous media producer. Between 2004 and 2005, Māori Television developed a live, all-day broadcast of Anzac Day. The broadcast was an unprecedented media commitment to Anzac commemoration, streaming Anzac services across New Zealand and Gallipoli, and providing a programme of documentaries, film, live music, and theatrical performances; as well as panel discussions with historians, military personnel, and politicians. The ANZAC Address itself was one way that Māori Television, in shaping the message of Anzac, became one of its major proponents and stakeholders as part of its competing demands to be an avenue of Māori cultural revival while also appealing to a general audience in a competitive global media environment.

This chapter argues we cannot understand changes in the cultural memory of war in New Zealand without reference to Māori Television and the Anzac Day broadcast. We will explore how Māori Television's Anzac broadcast contributes to a rethought relationship of citizenship and memory, through the reinterpretation of the state's institutional enlistment and organisation of Māori soldiers, during the First World War as the Te Hokowhitu a Tū / Māori Pioneer contingent and the 28 (Māori) Battalion during the Second World War. Over the course of Māori Television's Anzac Day coverage from 2005 to 2015, the Pioneer contingent and the Māori Battalion – and by extension, the institution of the Māori Battalion Association – came to replace the RSA as the primary image and voice of veterans, personifying 'the spirit of Anzac', and therefore the legitimate 'vessel of memory', within the New Zealand Anzac state project. A key aspect of this process was the researching, writing, and publication of the official history of C Company 28 (Māori) Battalion, *Nga Tama Toa: The price of citizenship*. Written by public historian Monty Soutar, *Nga Tama Toa* was a collaboration with veterans and whānau, supported by other Māori scholars, the Ministry of Culture and Heritage, and public archives.[751] The project was spurred by the collection of oral histories in the 1980s of Māori Battalion veterans and Tainui Stephen's documentary *March to Victory* in 1990. Both Soutar and Stephens contributed to the production of the Anzac Day broadcasts, first as consultants and experts, then later as presenters. These works also invoked the wishes of Sir Apirana Ngata, the koro (father) of the Māori Battalion, that the war experiences of the Battalion be recorded for posterity, not by an official government history, but by 'one of their own', that is, someone from the rohenga tipuna (ancestral land) of Ngāti Porou iwi (tribe). It is through these institutional and textual connections that the relationship between the defence forces and national identity is expressed.

In the postcolonial state Anzac project, this notion of citizenship won through a shared military experience – originally used by Ngata to argue for Māori and Pākehā commitment to Empire – entails the reconceptualisation of Anzac as a space by which Māori and Pākehā relate and act in a joint statehood, expressed powerfully in Māori Television's theme for its 2016 Anzac Day coverage, 'Nō Tātou te Toto' - 'the blood we share'. This reimagining of the Māori Battalion is crucial to understanding the new cultural relationship evinced by Mateparae in his 2010 Address. It also

[751] Monty Soutar, *Nga Tama Toa: The price of citizenship,* Bateman, Wellington, 2004.

provides a case study of the individual, institutional, and textual interactions that shape the cultural memory of war. Film and documentary – staples of the Anzac Day broadcast – more readily accommodate Indigenous oral histories and narrative strategies. The Anzac broadcast therefore bypasses a crucial problem in historical projects constructing or recovering indigenous experiences of the First World War through archives made up of documents created and privileged by non-indigenous people. The frameworks of the Broadcasts over the past decade are particular instantiations of indigenous orality and relationships, providing a medium of collective memory that creates a critical link between the past and social identity in the present.[752] The Service not only recast tropes and narratives of Anzac Day in bilingual and bicultural understandings but also radically re-centred the state Anzac project from its axis as a national project, to instead being a dynamic expression of indigenous globalisation since the nineteenth century.

Nā Rātou, Mō Tātou / 'Let us honour them together': The development of the Māori Television Anzac Day broadcast

The *Māori Television Service Act* was passed in 2003 to provide the framework for an independent Māori television channel, after decades of considerable lobbying. According to the Act, the Service would provide 'high quality, cost effective television ... which informs, educates, and entertains a broad viewing audience, and, in doing so, enriches New Zealand's society, culture and heritage'.[753] The Anzac Day broadcast was an early part of this provision. Māori Television would be an innovative and willing cooperator in the state's refashioning of New Zealand identity through the linking of innovative media with war commemoration in the lead up to the ninetieth anniversary of the Gallipoli landing in 2005. The broadcast also signalled that Māori Television was not going to be a producer of special interest content, but instead stake a claim on the vital heart of the national imagination.

The proposal for a live, full-day Anzac broadcast was an ambitious project. Public and commercial broadcasters had until now only provided limited programming on Anzac Day. In the early 1990s, Anzac Day coverage consisted of evening news bulletins and current affairs programmes. Radio programming remained dedicated to dawn and morning ceremonies.[754] In 2001, broadcaster Sue Scott (unsuccessfully) campaigned for a minute of silence at 10 am on Anzac Day across all radio stations and television channels. The 2004 broadcast was developed as a special programme with funding from government agencies Te Puni Kokiri and Te Mangai Paho (the service having been launched less than a month before). In 2005, the broadcast centred on the ninetieth anniversary Anzac celebrations led by the Howard and Clark governments, with its emerging state narratives and emphasises. The Anzac Day programming became the service's flagship broadcast, with innovative programming and expertise, while reaching record audiences of Māori and Pākehā – marked by the rapid expansion to the full-day live broadcast, from 5:50 am to 11:30 pm. Its success was ultimately reflected in a thirty-seven percent growth in average cumulative audience in the 2007 broadcast,

[752] William Guyun, *Writing History in the Film,* Routledge, New York, 2006, p. 178.
[753] *Maori Television Service Act*, 2003, 8.1.
[754] *Holmes* , April 25, 1991, One News at 6; Television New Zealand, 2004.

reaching more than one and a half million New Zealanders each month by 2009.[755] A second channel, Te Reo, launched in March 2008, was developed to cater to the needs of fluent speakers and second language learners. Māori Television added website television to its range of broadcast platforms in 2009.

Viewers were welcomed by well-known Māori broadcasters who established the inaugural full-day programming as a high-quality and professional production which could claim a broader Pākehā audience concurrent with Māori interests. Presenters and guests spoke interchangeably in te reo (Māori language) and English. Māori Television's position as the voice of the nation was seen most clearly in the 2006 *Nā Rātou, Mō Tātou* programme. The theme of 'Nā Rātou, Mō Tātou' – 'let us honour them together' – portrayed an indigenous and non-indigenous national audience, with 'together' – 'tatou' – being used to express a very intimate way of speaking, reflecting the claim to national unity (*Fig. 1.*). This was reflected in a number of production elements that presented a bicultural project; with Māori joining Pākehā voices, faces, and narratives of war experience. Gallipoli was a cultural space in which images of the nation were more open to reinscription, as demonstrated by the state projects around the seventy-fifth and ninetieth anniversaries in 1990 and 2005, and now provided a way for Māori Television to reimagine – in indigenous terms – this cultural place-making through its role as the state broadcaster.

Figure 1. A poster promoting the Chunuk Bair memorial service at Gallipoli - hosted by Judy Bailey and Julian Wilcox with Wena Harawira reporting from the Gallipoli peninsula. Courtesy Māori Television.

The broadcasts built on a network of film and documentary production tied to the emergence of a Māori creative sector over the 1980s and 1990s. Films like Wiremu Grace's *Turangawaewae*, Taika

[755] 'Briefing to the Incoming Ministers of Māori Affairs and Finance'; Māori Television, 2008: https://www.tpk.govt.nz/documents/download/182/tpk-mtsbim-2008-en.pdf; 'Māori Television marks Fifth on air anniversary', *Throng*, April 13, 2009: http://www.throng.co.nz/2009/03/Māori-television-marks-fifth-on-air-anniversary/.

Waititi's *Tama T*ū, and others films in the 2006-2007 programming, suggested a longer history of Māori war memory outside state commemoration, interested in autobiographical and biographical accounts of the war. These Māori film projects asserted Māori authority and autonomy: Waititi's *Tama T*ū was described as depicting the Māori Battalion as 'soldiers who owed no allegiance to a flag but fought and died in their thousands because they were warriors at heart'.[756] Pākehā and Māori audiences were entertained with dramatic films related to war experience. War trauma was overcome through finding turangawaewae (belonging) – an appropriate metaphor for Māori Television's emerging position as interlocutor of national identity.

Kotahi Te Wairua / 'One spirit': the Māori Battalion and 'the price of citizenship'

The 2005 and 2006 broadcasts suggested an emerging focus on the institutional experience of Māori recruitment during the world wars, in particular the Māori Battalion. The programming created a juxtaposition between the President of the Māori Battalion Association and the RSA National President. The appearance of RSA president John Campbell at the end of the 2005 programming consisted of a brief statement of congratulations to Māori Television for the success of its first full broadcast. Rewarding Māori Television's strategy in appealing to this base of Pākehā viewers, Campbell's statement indicated a tacit shift as authority was handed over to Māori Television as the state broadcaster. The President of the Māori Battalion Association on the other hand was given an extensive interview. Subsequent programming was dedicated to coverage of the Battalion Association's annual reunion. In 2006, this was held in Te Tai Tokerau (Northland). Viewers were offered an explanation of the Battalion's structure along tribal allegiances. Images of the elderly Māori Battalion veterans were overlaid with historic footage of their departure from and return to their local marae as 'sons of the god of war'. Scenes of veterans weeping at grave sites – 'remembering those who had failed to return' – with a musical backing track, presented a sympathetic narrative of wounded and aged veterans.[757] The replacement of the RSA with the 28 (Māori) Battalion as the voice of veterans was reinforced by the changing image of the NZDF in the person of Jerry Mateparae as Chief of the Defence

The Association provided a network of community which became a more focused expression of military heritage, at a time when the RSA was declining. The success of the Māori Battalion Association was therefore twofold: in the first place, it asserted the mana (prestige) of Battalion members; and secondly, it was a flexible association which incorporated wider relationships of family and iwi into its membership. Indeed, by the 2000s, many of the Association members marching in parades were in fact family of original Battalion members; often daughters. In 2007, Māori women in Sydney successfully argued for their inclusion in the George Street parade schedule, despite the strict rules about non-military personnel, which suggests that the Māori Battalion as an institution has come to exert a special authority in trans-Tasman Anzac commemoration. The fact that many of these

[756] 'Tama Tū press kit', 2006: http://tamatu.co.nz/media/2006+Press+kit+Tama+Tu.doc.
[757] These documentaries appeared alongside other earlier documentaries that promoted alternative readings of the wars, such as *War Stories Our Mothers Never Told Us*, Gaylene Preston Productions, 1995.

women were interviewed as part of the Māori Television coverage further enabled a way for the Battalion to be viewed through the context of whānau and iwi as much as warriors in a national war effort (The effectiveness of a broader membership was eventually copied by the RSA, which launched its own national association for 'all New Zealanders' in 2014).[758]

This emerging project around the Māori Battalion Association built on the foundational documentary *Māori Battalion - March to Victory*, produced by Tainui Stephens and first released in 1990. The documentary was fundamental in shaping the imagination, language, and collective remembrance of Māori and ultimately the New Zealand public – providing a cache of interviews and footage which was used throughout Māori Television's Anzac Day broadcasts. Stephens was an important figure with long-standing ties to the Māori media sector. He was a co-executive producer when the Anzac Day broadcast won the 2007 Air NZ Screen award for Best Event Broadcast. Reflecting on the making of *March to Victory* in 2008, Stephens stated how 'the Māori Battalion presents us with one of the great stories of our country', and 'when we made the documentary we knew we were dealing with a tragic and noble, but vital part of our Nation's story. We treated it seriously and aimed beyond recording the mere facts of the war of these men - to trying to capture how they felt about it.'[759] The documentary told the stories of five men who served with the unit and emphasised the role of Sir Apirana Ngata who argued that Māori involvement in the war effort was 'the ultimate price' for the privilege of imperial citizenship. The 'ultimate price' was reflected in the high death toll for the Battalion, with over two-thirds of the 3,500 thousand soldiers injured or killed, and its impact on postwar Māori communities.[760] Produced to mark the fiftieth anniversary of the Battalion's formation, *March to Victory*'s timing in 1990 also aligned with the sesquicentennial commemorations of the signing of the Treaty of Waitangi and the seventy-fifth anniversary of the Gallipoli landing, while being only two generations removed from World War Two. Resituated in the Māori Television coverage of the mid-2000s, the documentary depicted the Battalion volunteers as originating in a warrior tradition, 'in harmony with the land' and 'trained in the art of war'. Indeed, it was Stephen's hope that the documentary would shape the identities of young Māori. This 'retrieval' of memory framed the tone and intent of the documentary and concluded with claims to contemporary respect, recognition, and citizenship. The 'price of citizenship' narrative was reiterated in a number of other ways in the all-day broadcasts. The emphasis on family duty, tribal honour, and return reflected a broader understanding of war than the soldiers' experience. The 'huge cost of citizenship' for Māori was balanced, however, with the positive experience of the military as an institution of equality, with Pākehā and Māori working and fighting side-by-side.

Stories of the Māori Battalion connected the constitutional and institutional context of Māori Television to narratives of state-building around Anzac. Both Māori Television – the fruition of the Treaty partnership and its recognition of te reo as taonga under the obligations of the Treaty – and the Māori

[758] 'RSA launches new national association', RSA, October 5, 2014: http://rsa.org.nz/News/RSA-launches-new-National-Association
[759] 'Director's reflections', NZ on Screen, October 1, 2008: https://www.nzonscreen.com/title/Māori-battalion---march-to-victory-1990/background.
[760] 'A perspective', August 19, 2008: https://www.nzonscreen.com/title/Māori-battalion---march-to-victory-1990/background.

Battalion, as a unique institution of Indigenous recruitment from both world wars, reflected the previously ambiguous place of Māori in the constitutional life of the nation, now shaping its central institutions of remembrance. These broad components of the first stage of the Anzac Day broadcast suggested different threads of memory and identity being woven into the Anzac revival – shaping and being shaped by the new ideational context. Indeed, the centrality of the Battalion Association was confirmed in a number of key criticisms of these inaugural broadcasts. Some Pākehā viewers complained that this emphasis on the Battalion was an overstatement of Māori involvement. As one online commentator put it, 'The only problem with the Māori Television coverage is that they think the Māori Battalion won the war on their own'. Conversely, the omissions and limitations of the coverage were also noted by Māori scholars who argued that the celebration of the Māori Battalion Association did not address the way Māori soldiers were treated after the war, being denied land under soldier settlement schemes and subjected to assimilationist government policies, while also erasing the fact many iwi faced persecution and imprisonment for refusing to join the war effort.[761] Instead, these difficult narratives were submerged beneath the construction of a unified nation.

Kanohi ki te kanohi / 'face to face': Māori structures of memory and the Anzac Centenary

Subsequent broadcasts focused on the respective four companies of the Battalion. These documentaries were produced in consecutive years and followed a typical pattern; a short narration of the Battalion's history and reputation, with a series of interviews from surviving members. Historical continuity was established with Te Hokowhitu a Tu, while stories of soldiers' traditional lands and places of belonging articulated Māori as tangata whenua; reinforced by pictures of Battalion members overlaid onto marae whakairo (carving). These company documentaries operated under similar methods and epistemologies to *Nga Tama toa*, emphasising whānau and women's voices, and exploring the impact on these communities but also the Battalion as a means to revitalise Māori communities in the present. National claims were matched by an explicit foundation of tikanga, with presenter Julian Cox stating how 'a deeper understanding of time and memory can help us understand the events that shape us as a people'. The 2009 and 2012 programming focused on D Company, or 'Ngāti Walkabouts'. *Nga Morehu Hoia O Te Rua Tekau Ma Waru* depicted the reunion of A Company – 'the gumdiggers' – at Orakei in 2010, while *Hitler and the Gumdiggers*, directed and produced by Tainui Stephens, focused on Ngapuhi stories.[762] *Nga Uri o Ruku te Kapa* focused on B Company, 'the Penny Divers', in 2014.[763] In the same year, *Te Marutunaote Tangata: The Commanders* connected the Battalion to the Centenary by the fact that its leadership had begun their military careers during the First World War.[764] The centrepiece of the 2013 broadcast was *The Final*

[761] Sue Abel 'Māori Television, Anzac Day, and Constructing "Nationhood", in Brendan Hokowhitu and Vijay Devadas, eds., *The Fourth Eye: Māori Media in Aotearoa New Zealand,* University of Minnesota Press, Minnesota, 2013, pp. 201–215.
[762] *Nga Morehu Hoia O Te Rua Tekau Ma Waru,* Māori Television, 2010; *Hitler and the Gumdiggers,* Māori Television, 2010.
[763] *Nga Uri o Ruku te Kapa,* Māori Television, 2014.
[764] Maori Television ANZAC Day 2014; *Te Marutunaote Tangata: The Commanders,* Māori Television , 2014.

Hui: 28th Battalion Association, a Māori Television report from the final hui (meeting) of the Battalion Association held in December, 2012.[765] In light of dwindling numbers of surviving veterans of the 'legendary battalion', the decision was made to 'tidy up the whare [house]' and close the Association. This involved giving back full authority of the Association to the veterans themselves, rather than associate members (family members who had helped run the Association), and rewriting the constitution. The symbol of the Association's leadership, a greenstone were (club), was entrusted to the Waiouru Army Museum. The aim was 'to leave something behind for the mokopuna, and future generations'. This legacy was in part the website as a cache of stories, but also the cultural and familial relationships that these stories offered.

The histories of C Company were particularly pronounced owing to the influence of Soutar's work. In studio discussions about the Battalion and the oral history project, Soutar emphasised how *Nga Tama Toa* was not his personal project but one based on the advice, amendments, and ultimately the endorsement by iwi – not just the soldiers themselves – so that, as he put it, it was imbued with the ethos of Ngāti Porou. The editing of parts of the book had resulted in a lengthy, fifteen-year collaborative community process. The history of the Company, and the Battalion, was therefore a way of writing the history of the iwi. Soutar also discussed the institutional networks of production which supported the project, as well as the preeminence of the Battalion in veterans' discourse. Māori Television producer Derek Fox had been a key support in the project's development, as had the RSA. 'It was above them', Soutar said of the RSA – that is, a sphere of Indigenous experience which they could not claim as a Pākehā association – 'but they had still wanted to support the project'.[766] The website and database itself had been collected and constructed by Te Papa and Te Puni Kokiri, but, as Soutar was stressed, would be managed by whānau, hapū, and iwi.

The lead up to the 2015 Centenary was framed by this structure of memory. The 2014 programming focused on the sixtieth anniversary of the battle of Monte Cassino - a key vesture in the Māori Battalion's battle honours. In 2015, the Centenary broadcast was anchored in two documentaries. *Nga Ra o Hune: The Days of June* rectified the broadcast's neglect of colonisation to tell the story of Waikato-Maniapoto men who were arrested for resisting conscription during the First World War.[767] *Days of June* was paired with the central evening programme, *Shovels and Guns*, narrated by Soutar. The culmination of ten years of the Māori Television Anzac Day broadcast, *Shovels and Guns* depicted the experience of the Māori contingent at Gallipoli, focusing on men such as Roger Dansey who had mixed Māori and Pakeha ancestry. The dramatic centre of the story was the assault on Chunuk Bair, the Ka Mate haka ringing through the hills 'like the gates of hell had opened'. Ultimately, in Soutar's narrative, the importance of the contingent was the precedent set for the institutional and hierarchical structures of the Māori Battalion some thirty years late. Both *Days of June* and *Shovels and Guns* represented the changed vantage-points of Māori Television's Anzac Day coverage, from a tentative support of the Anzac project to an assertive indigenous space, within narratives of 'the price

[765] *The Final Hui: 28th Battalion Association,* Māori Television, 2013.
[766] Maori Television ANZAC DAY, 2010.
[767] *Nga Ra o Hune: The Days of June*, Māori Television, 2015; *Shovels and Guns,* Māori Television, 2015.

of citizenship'. The distinct Māori narration suggested a non-linear commemoration and memory. In Māori ancestral thinking, space-time is a spiral. Standing in the present, one can spin back to the Kore (Void), where the first burst of energy unleashed the winds of growth and life, and out into the future.[768] In this concentric framework of time, reciprocal exchanges and meetings have power to build upon existing relationships. In this case, the relationship between past, present, and future in the Māori Battalion is a spiral of relationships and genealogies, backwards, connected to wars of settlement and the First World War, and forward, shaping the national future.

He Huihuinga Tangata, He Hokinga Mahara / 'Together, We Remember': Oral histories of the Pacific, Women, and Colonial Violence

Karen Fox has noted some tensions between the transnational historical project and the writing of Indigenous histories that strive to remain grounded in the local.[769] As in the case of NITV's coverage of Papa New Guinean war memory, Māori Television's broadcast shows the potential for an indigenous broadcaster to achieve a broader storytelling, outside of national frameworks. The initial focus on the Battalion and Anzac Centenary allowed emphasis on alternative voices, such as women and Pacific soldiers, as well as discussion on colonial violence. Through concepts of whakapapa, programming shared oral histories which told stories of the war's impact from localised family stories, rather than grand national narratives. The centring of the Māori Battalion, the Association, and the indigenous historiographical projects, in the Māori Television broadcast gave space to oral histories outside of traditional Pākehā conventions of the academy and historiography. For example, the oral history project, 'Nga Reo o te Tairawhiti', was featured as part of the 2010 broadcast. Hosted by Kotuku Tibble, the project was 'made for the iwi by the iwi' and described as 'an authentic collection of distinctive korero from around the motu'; in this case, an interview with prominent figure Hone Kaa of Ngāti Porou and Ngāti Kahungunu descent.

Māori Television provided a space for specifically Pacific memories of war, outside of Pākehā frames of reference. This was in part reflected in the coverage of Pacific services, such as Tonga and Rarotonga. Stories of the Pacific Islands, such as the NZEF invasion of German Samoa in the Great War placed war memory in a Pacific space. The Māori pioneers, in the 2009 broadcast, became a key framework to understand relations between Māori and Pacific people, This was in part tied to the fact that the Contingent also included Niuean and Cook Island men. Many Samoans were recruited as boarding students at Te Aute College. More broadly, the broadcast – centred on the kaupapa of the Māori Battalion – bypassed traditional scholarship which privileges a national experience of war and had struggled to incorporate disparate experiences of war and home fronts. Other segments looked at the some six hundred volunteers from Tonga, Niue, and Rarotonga, who formed the New Zealand

[768] Anne Salmond, *Tears of Rangi: Experiments Across Worlds,* Auckland University Press, Auckland, 2017); also see, Te Maire Tau, 'I-nga-ra-o-mua', Journal of New Zealand Studies, 10 (2011): pp. 45–62.
[769] Karen Fox, 'Globalising Indigeneity? Writing Indigenous Histories in a Transnational World', *History Compass* 10, 6 (2012): pp. 423–439.

Rarotongan Company as New Zealanders with Pacific, Māori, and Pākehā identities.

The 2010 programming of 'Our Pacific' was another example of this indigenous historiography that privileged oral and family genealogies. Similarly, the documentary *Nga Toa O Te Moana-Nui-A-Kiwa: Warriors of the Pacific* (2011) examined the crucial role of the Solomon Islands in defending the Pacific from Japanese invaders.[770] These segments focused on the Pacific war as a way to relocate New Zealand identity in the Pacific, narrating the battles of the Coral Sea and Midway. Rather than focusing on the military history, however, 'Our Pacific' told the stories of Kanak (New Caledonia) and Solomon Islanders.[771] Chief John Goldie, the paramount chief of Mono Island gave an extensive interview on the impact of first Japanese and then Allied occupation of the Solomons. Goldie described 'working alongside the war' – accommodating both Japanese and Allied soldiers while remaining neutral. This was an assertion of Pacific self-determination. Through Goldie's and other men's and women's interviews, the arrival of the New Zealand troops to the Islands was described as forging a close relationship between the people of New Zealand and Mono Island, a 'sharing of blood' in a common Pacific history. 'The sharing of blood' was linked to the contemporary, through interviews with NZDF troops stationed in the Solomons as part of the Ramsay mission, described as 'a new generation of New Zealand soldiers' sharing in this Pacific lineage. More importantly, the Pacific oral histories suggested connections not with a European past, but a Pacific future, in which Māori affirmed relationships and meetings with Te Moananui a Kiwa (the Pacific Ocean). Crucially, this flowed from the shared experience of the Battalion, fixed as the centre and structure of this memory now reconnecting New Zealand to its deep Pacific past and future: Māori connections to Pacific paradigms otherwise incomprehensible to the New Zealand nation-state.[772] Although it is not explicitly spelled out, Māori Television programming suggests cultural networks and relationships to place outside of strict national territoriality.

The legacy of the Battalion Association also provided a space and frame by which to situate the stories of women and families, outside of military experience. In *Amoiha Te Mauri*, literally 'Uphold the legacy', veterans' interviews were followed by whānau, especially daughters and granddaughters.[773] In this way, Māori Television did not privilege veterans' voices by delineating soldier and family, in a way seen in Pākehā representations of the RSA, for example. The 2014 programming 'Morena Whānau' emphasised the family and social ties of soldiers, which framed the impact of the war itself. In 2015, this focused largely on stories of the C Company and an interview with Hinemoa Awatere, the author of *Awatere - A Soldier's Story* about her grandfather Arapeta Awatere.[774] Arapeta, or Pita Awatere, had been awarded the Distinguished Service Medal during the war, serving as a local Politician, but later dying in prison having been convicted of murder in the 1976. *A Soldier's Story* was in the vein of Patricia Grace's *Tu:* a war biography about family and the legacies of war and trauma,

[770] *Nga Toa O Te Moana-Nui-A-Kiwa: Warriors of the Pacific*, Māori Television, 2011.
[771] 'Our Pacific', Māori Television, 2010.
[772] Alice Te Punga Somerville, *Once were Pacific: Māori Connections to Oceania*, University of Minnesota Press, Minnesota, 2012, pp. 213–214.
[773] *Amoiha Te Mauri*, Māori Television, 2010.
[774] Arapeta Awatere, *Awatere – A Soldier's Story*, Huia Press, Wellington, 2002.

written by a female author.[775] Similarly, the documentary *The Black Legacy* depicted the journey of Māori singer Whirimako Black to Monte Cassino, to understand the battle in which her father, Stewart Black, fought and which affected him, physically and mentally, for the rest of his life.[776] The title of the programme was a play on 'the black legacy' as both a reference to the whakapapa of the Black family, and the trauma of the war. The family called the documentary 'a journey of discovery of their father', and how the experience of the Battalion shaped his character as a father and a grandfather. This was particularly evident in memorialisations of the life of Moana-Nui-a-Kiwa Ngarimu, an Ngāti Porou and Te Whanau-a-Apanui soldier who was awarded the Victoria Cross posthumously while serving in the Māori Battalion. The documentary *Ngarimu VC* (1993) was screened as part of the 2013 broadcast, telling the story of Ngarimu's childhood and upbringing in East Coast, his enlistment, and heroic action leading to the VC.[777] The documentary was followed by a second segment, 'The Whānau Remembers'.[778] This consisted of older footage from 1993 of Tiwai Reedy's interviews with Ngarimu's sisters, discussing their memories of their brother 'who never came home'. Alongside VC winner Charles Upham, Ngarimu provided a bicultural image but also contextualised war experience not in national narratives, but rather local worlds of family and hapū.

This broadening of war memory to encompass Pacific and women's voices was extended to narratives of violence before the First World War that centered tangata whenua experiences of empire and war. As discussed previously, the structure of the Anzac Day broadcasts around the relationships and meetings of the Māori Battalion suggested non-linear commemorations and memory. This allowed for discussions of colonial violence and war, without problematising national narratives of the war. Panel discussions of Tainui Stephens, Damian Fenton, and Monty Soutar gave space for historical discussions on the reasons for enlistment, the militarisation of early colonial society through the territorial and cadet systems, and the fact that many Pākehā were first-generation immigrants, returning home to Europe. 'Māori in WWI' provided an overview of Māori participation. This consisted of alternating between telling the recruitment of some 2,000 Māori during the Great War, and Māori Pioneers in particular. Against the national narrative of the war, Soutar talked at length about Māori opposition to enlistment, especially among iwi with historic grievances against the crown and still suffering from the New Zealand Wars. Theirs was 'a very different world', as Stephens put it in which Pākehā thought of them as 'a dying race'.

This also reshaped the public language around the New Zealand Wars. At the 150th anniversary of Gate Pā, one of the closing battles of the Waikato-Tuaranga War, now Governor-General Jerry Mateparae drew on the language of Gallipoli remembrance and state military heritage in a universalist projection of state authority – past, present, and future – to frame the cultural memory of wars of settlement. Wedged between the anniversaries of Anzac Day and the battle of Monte Cassino, in which the Māori Battalion gained its greatest military honours, Mateparae 'acknowledge[d] the New

[775] Patricia Grace, *Tū*, Penguin Books, Auckland, 2004.
[776] *The Black Legacy*, Māori Television, 2015.
[777]*: Ngarimu VC,* TVNZ, 1993; *Māori Television ANZAC Day 2013*.
[778] *Ngārimu V.C.: The Whānau Remembers,* Māori Television, 2013.

Zealand Wars as an integral part of this nation's story'. Yet it was Gallipoli which 'resonates powerfully in our national consciousness'. To Mateparae, the qualities of 'the Anzac spirit' – courage, commitment, comradeship and compassion – and Ataturk's spirit of reconciliation are equally applicable to Gate Pā. 'In years to come, as we give greater acknowledgement to the conflicts which occurred within New Zealand', Mateparae concluded, 'I believe sites like Pukehinahina and people like Puhirake, Taratoa and Heni Te Kiri Karamu will also come to embody the quality of our national esteem – our collective mana - and have a greater meaning for all New Zealanders', before closing with a rendering of Ataturk's famous ode in Te Reo.

Conclusion: Nō Tātou te Toto / 'The blood we share'

In 2016, as the Centenary of the First World War continued a pace, Māori Television launched its latest programming theme: Nō Tātou te Toto / 'the Blood we share'. The Service's press release, announcing the new branding, stated, '[i]t's been 101 years since blood was spilled at Gallipoli, but for Māori Television that blood has provided the foundation for a new campaign to show the war is a history all of Aotearoa shares, despite our own personal histories'.[779] These personal, national, and global histories were interpolated through the Anzac Day broadcast. Māori Television produced *The Blood We Share,* a short documentary that involved finding two descendants – one Māori and one Pākehā – of soldiers who served at the Somme and asking them to donate blood in honor of 'those who have come before'. Pita Pirihi and Stefan Tarr 'answered the call', and the coming together of their two histories was represented symbolically in a painting of an Anzac poppy (*Fig. 3*).

Figure 3. The painting of the Poppy and text for the 2016 Anzac Day Broadcast. Courtesy Māori Television.

[779] 'Maori Television recreates past, bringing together New Zealanders to celebrate Anzac Day', Maori Television, April 27, 2018: http://stoppress.co.nz/news/Māori-television-recreates-past-bringing-together-new-zealanders-celebrate-anzac-day.

Nō Tātou is emblematic of the way Māori media has established itself as a key space of Anzac memory and identity. As we have seen, this was not simply an assertion of Māori presence within a particular site, but marked by a very conscious shaping of Anzac state commemoration, during the period of 2005 to 2015, by indigenous media producers. The first decade of the Anzac Day broadcast was 'a weighty Anzac kaupapa [mission]', as Wena Haupiri put it; the price of citizenship. The 'spirit of Anzac' was interpreted as a kaupapa that spreads beyond the shores of Gallipoli, to other wars that have shaped the history of Aotearoa New Zealand. 'We honour the dead, and those who came home', Harawira stated, as 'another way for us to define ourselves as a nation'.[780] As an intergenerational project built up from oral histories of the war and its consequences, the Anzac Day broadcasts centred the local worlds of whānau, hapū, and iwi. Interpreted through relationships to place and family, the war was experienced through the cultural and religious traditions of military service, duty, and obligation under the Treaty of Waitangi, of the Māori world. This reinforces Nepia Mahuika's argument that histories in New Zealand are better understood in the ontological worlds of hapū and iwi; in the case of *Nga Tama Toa* of Ngātiporoutanga (Ngāti Porou worldview).[781] The Māori Television Service is a network for understanding how the globalising experience of the First World War has been recorded and narrated, as well as the way in which the production of History shapes the cultural memory of war. The distinctly Māori history decentres teleologies of national development as New Zealand's war memory is encompassed by Māori historical concepts and narratives. The 'price of citizenship' is indicative of the way in which Māori Television has reinvented Anzac coverage, simultaneously creating a new form of engagement, while also reacting to the changing dynamics of Anzac citizenship extending the state context of war experience and its memory a century after the signing of the armistice.

[780] Maori Television ANZAC Day 2015.
[781] Nepia Mahuika, "Closing the gaps": From postcolonialism to Kaupapa Māori and beyond', *New Zealand Journal of History*, 45, 1 (2011): pp.15–32.

CONCLUSION.
ANZAC NATION: MOBILISING HISTORY, MEMORY, AND IDENTITY IN AUSTRALIA AND NEW ZEALAND

Pou Kanohi is the Auckland Museum's first dedicated war memorial space aimed at educating young people about the First World War. The exhibition depicts how the war was experienced from multiple perspectives, presenting key events through an illustrated multimedia timeline, enhanced with objects and immersive interactive experiences. The exhibition begins its narrative with an invitation to young visitors to 'experience an unimaginable journey'. Nothing better encapsulates the paradoxes, ambiguities, and circularity of contemporary war commemoration than the idea of experiencing or imagining 'the unimaginable'. 'Pou Kanohi', literally 'the face of the post', can be interpreted as a territorial marker, perhaps decorated with a ancestral figure, staking our claim on whakapapa and place, but also a claim of whakapapa and place *on us*. This was represented in the exhibition's promotional brand, in which contemporary images of cartoons and young people were transposed over a 1917 photograph of General Godley, commander of the NZEF (*Fig. 1)*. In this way, *Pou Kanohi* offered young people a double-inflection: an opportunity to imagine the unimaginable, the past, through an emotional spectacle interpolated through the present and into the future: the object (in Gramsci's terms) of the gentler educative, or 'prize-giving' activities of the state.

Figure 1. Artwork features General Godley at the NZ Division horse show, photographed by Henry Armytage Sanders, 1917. Auckland Museum.

This thesis traces the emergence of this post-imperial memory centered on Anzac nationhood, a radical transformation of former practices of remembrance around Anzac configured by the needs and structures of the contemporary state. Anzac Day operates, in its imaginative and emotional registers, as a state myth: identifying and relating citizens to themselves and each other, and providing legitimacy and continuity to the structures of governance. Part of this claim is the effect of natural memory: it is organic that we should remember Anzac and that we should invest our young people to remember, as in the case of *Pou Kanohi*. This is not to suggest that there are not myriad or alternative memories of war in Australia and New Zealand. Rather, in the public memory of Anzac, local world networks of memory have been subsumed into the state cultural project, so that in the Centenary, Gallipoli is imagined as a site of foundational myth; inscribing a specific national memory on the landscape and on the practices of the state. This transformation can be fixed between two poles, imperial and post-imperial, in the making and remaking of postcolonial states.

Returning to the beginning of this thesis, the Anzac Centenary in 2015 projected a shared national memory in the place of Gallipoli in Australia and New Zealand. However, it is clear from this thesis that this convergence of ‘Anzac nationhood’ in the Australian and New Zealand states belies divergent, though at times intersected and entangled, histories of Anzac commemoration. In part, this means recovering the stages of convergence. In the 1990s, state policies towards Anzac commemoration changed when first the Australian and then the New Zealand states sought postcolonial cultural recovery through a re-engagement with war memory through a national lense.

The ‘Anzac revival’ describes this process of emergent Anzac statehood, a post-imperial attempt to come to terms with the logic and anxiety of settler societies. The revival is a narrative of remembrance, drawing on the past to establish a normative and teleological relationship in the present.

In Australia, the role that Anzac plays in society and politics is that of an effective system of cultural production and political consensus. The circularity of war memory is part of its political and ideological attachments. The 1990 anniversary of Hawke’s Gallipoli 75 state project, the transformation of the Australian War Memorial as the central cultural and heritage institution of the state (the ‘heart and soul’ of the Australian nation), and the repatriation of the Unknown Soldier in 1993, are all stages in the formation of this system. This thesis therefore places this crucial period of development in the Hawke-Keating governments, a decade earlier than Anzac scholarship which focuses on the work of the Howard liberal government. The logic of the state myth was not a causal linkage to the events of Gallipoli, leading to the Australian present, but rather an emotional spectacle of national belonging, unhinged from historical interpretation, and yet bodily and materially located in the site of the Unknown Soldier. In this way Anzac remembrance in its state context – and this thesis’ scope of analysis – is not about the reconstruction or reinterpretation of events of the First World War, but a specific narrative of remembrance from the ever-changing vantage-point of the present. Or in other words, this is not about the enduring legacies of ANZAC as a military corps, but ‘Anzac’, the invention of a narrative nexus that stands in for a national memory of the state.

The Australian project set up a number of key influences in the transnational shaping of Anzac commemoration. The WW100 Centenary programme, the renovation of the Pukeahu War Memorial, and the Te Papa *Scale of our War* exhibition all signify the transnational shaping of Anzac commemoration: the way in which the imaginative spectacle of Gallipoli offers an emotional register of belonging. We cannot understand the convergence of Gallipoli memory in New Zealand, without acknowledging the fundamental importance of the Australian state project. It seems unlikely that a sustained national-state memory of Anzac would be possible without the transnational circulation of individuals, institutions, and texts in the Tasman world.

However, within these projects, we see vital differences in tone and texture, shaped by the institutional, constitutional, and historiographical. The New Zealand state project was configured by distinct constitutional and institutional structures, as well as distinct historiographical operations in academia and public: in the space of Waitangi. If, as in this thesis, ‘Anzac’ has become a metaphor for a system that rationalises and renders as heritage the complex process of legitimation in public culture (through a synthesis of remembering and forgetting of alternative memories of settlement and violence) than Waitangi - or more properly discourses of Treaty and biculturalism – acts as a matrix of public memory and history. The process of Treaty negotiation and settlement in the Waitangi Tribunal has generated a public culture that more readily accommodates the possibilities of local histories and worlds of memory and belonging. The converse of this is also true, reiterating Miranda Johnson’s seminal argument that in Australia, the absence of a constitutional structure of indigenous-state

relations has meant that indigenous history has not translated to public memory. Instead, national culture has been tightly coiled around a national memory of Anzac. New Zealand's public is more diffuse. In this thesis, this diffusion has been described in various ways: as fragmentary memory, a multiplicity of public memories, as a decentered memory.

This can be better understood through comparison, vindicating the comparative approach of this thesis. In Australia, we have a vast and complex interaction in the formation of national memory. Individuals such as Ken Inglis, with his scholarly forebear in Charles Bean, fixed the Australian national story in the 'Anzac tradition'. Although Inglis and a later generation of historians such as Bill Gammage saw themselves as giving voice to a war memory hidden by imperial and racial hegemonies – critiquing a fossilised legend – they were participating in the post-imperial anxiety of national belonging and thus became crucial intellectual agents of this project. This was as much institutional as it was personal: we could not have this historiographical project, without the institutional structures of the national archives and collections, and the national spaces and imagination of the federal public. In this way, the setting up of a national-state memory of the war, rising from the ruins of empire in the postwar period, was related to historiography and state making in Australian settlement. As has been a repeated theme of this thesis, the writing of history has been a vital and conscious part of Australian settlement, expressed in the official war histories of Charles Bean and the dedicated national collection of war relics and artwork, enabled by the constitutional silences, erasures, and forgettings of the Australian state. This process came to fruition in the post-imperial search for identity, when the Australian state turned to institutions such as the Australian War Memorial as a basis for refounding relations to place and citizenship.

In New Zealand, we can see how these institutional, constitutional, and historiographical projects were very distinct. Although we can draw a clear institutional thread between the likes of Bean, Inglis, the Australian War Memorial, and the Unknown Soldier, as the story of a particular national memory of war transplanted and extended to a state context, no such line can be drawn in New Zealand's war memory. Instead, the story of the making of a national war memory is one of failures, mishaps, and indifference, and perhaps most importantly, of reaction to Australian national memory. Malcolm Ross was the unenthusiastic correspondent of the NZEF who fell into obscurity. There was no institutional rationality in the interwar and postwar period that combined national monument, archive, museum, and – ultimately – tomb in New Zealand. Instead, the fragmented development of the Pukeahu War Memorial reflected a less powerful state, a preference for local networks of commemoration, and a comfort with the imperial idiom and imaginaries of the interwar world. 'The New Zealand story' as a historiographical project which reacted to Australian claims on Gallipoli in the 1980s, ventured by Christopher Pugsley and Maurice Shadbolt, was undermined by a lack of institutional supports and a contested public culture. Professional historians were more interested in the debate about interpretations of the Treaty than the production of a national memory of Gallipoli. This limited project was best summarised in the 1990 plaques project in which the New Zealand government's 'claim' over the naming and belonging of Chunuk Bair was ultimately displaced by the corporate sponsorship of the Australian air carrier Qantas.

Partial uniformity was achieved in the Anzac centenary; building on the success of the Unknown Warrior. Even so, the processes of the repatriation, the rituals, practices, and objects of remembrance, disrupted the state narrative. This 'mosaic of memory' reveals a plurality of war memory in New Zealand, but also a plurality of public memories, which have centered not on Gallipoli but on Waitangi, and a national story of encounter between Māori and Pākehā. If this has been a contested and uneven public dialogue it has been nonetheless a stubbornly persistent one. If Australian state myths operate in the silences and absences of settler violence; then the New Zealand state operates in the deployment of a visible Māori Treaty partner. These two contrasting histories are evident in the indigenous media coverage of the Anzac revival. NITV asserted the centrality of forgotten Indigenous Australian soldiers, against the silences of federal Australia, as a segment of the Australian Anzac public. Conversely, Māori Television's Anzac broadcast consisted of reclaiming the central constitutional role of Māori through the 'price of citizenship', building on the constitutional presence of Māori military enlistment. This simple binary between absence and visibility is an apt summary of the distinctions of Australian and New Zealand Anzac commemoration.

The crucial point in this thesis is that none of the 'Anzac revival' was a pre-determined trajectory of national myth and memory. Despite Inglis' assertion and postimperial renovation of the 'Anzac tradition', and its careful maintenance through revisionist dialectic by Australian scholars, the 'revival' of Anzac – the transmutation of war experience into a state foundation myth – was neither organic nor certain. This is clearest in the 1965 anniversary, the formative experience of Inglis' historiographical project around Anzac. Anzac Day in 1965 held an important but varied place in Australian and New Zealand societies, with multiple meanings. The fiftieth provided a space of discussion on Anzac Day for political and social elites. This discussion, far from showing a trajectory of national memory, centered on the figure of the returned servicemen. The 1965 RSL and RSA cruise was viewed as such: not a national tour, but a private pilgrimage. This followed logically from the fact that these men were the primary object of Anzac remembrance; they were the ones who had experienced the campaign. Both the Menzies and Holyoake governments in Australia and New Zealand pursued policies that, supporting the RSL and RSA, sought to foreclose a presiding role of government in commemoration: it was not the role of the public or government to perpetuate or sustain memory. Rather, this was memory at the service of veteran communities. The complex public discussion of the meaning of Anzac broadly coalesced around recognition of this privileged place of the returned servicemen. The debate over liberalisation of law and custom revealed multifaceted anxieties of the postwar period – the end of empire and its cultural and economic bulwarks – but also the acknowledgement that Anzac remembrance had a lifespan that did not necessarily extend beyond the 'vessels of memory' of the returned servicemen. In this way, we can historicise Inglis' own historiographical operation, as well as showing the shifting political and social context of this project.

The important transnational moment of the protest movements of the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s has been largely missed by scholars. If Inglis laid some important intellectual foundations for the work of

memory agents, it was protest movements that reshaped notions of participation and reception in the public culture of Anzac Day. Both the peace movement, from 1966 to 1975, and the public actions of feminist collectives, over the period 1977-1987, organised on Anzac Day to advance specific critiques of public culture, politics, and society. These interventions triggered a number of structural changes in Anzac commemoration. In the vacuum of meaning – the 'hovering gap' between experience and memory – from the decline of returned servicemen, Anzac Day protests acted in a paradoxical manner: they articulated antagonisms that helped create new hegemonies antithetical to their political intent. Ultimately, protest helped define what the public was against rather than for. The object of Anzac Day became the public, and in particular the youth. Moreover, protests linked the rituals and regulation of Anzac Day to the infrastructure of the state, through the interventions of police, and reinforced commemoration as an object of active citizenship in the visceral experience of the 'profane' actions against war remembrance. In this sense, anti-war and feminist actions were subsumed in a new public cultural audience in an emerging relationship between youth, national memory, and Anzac commemoration, which reflected changing entanglements of post-imperial foreign policy.

The protests also indicated a number of technological, cultural, and political circumstances shaping memory and identity. In the first place was the changing mediation of social relations through mass media, and secondly, in the entanglements of governments' investment in identity making - a project that was economic, political, and cultural in the changing configurations of neoliberal state making. These came to the fore in the 1980s when government and a new generation of historians and artists aligned in a search for post-imperial national identity. The constitutional was again joined with the historiographical. Post-war cultural nationalism in Australia and New Zealand was energised by a historicist project of returning to 'what really happened' in an attempt to access – and affirm – the authenticity and ordinariness of popular experience.

This scholarly and ideological project was part of a broader political and cultural formation of a new state myth. Peter Weir's *Gallipoli w*as a text with a particular ideological structure reflecting not a revival of war memories, but the changing configuration of the state. The film's ideological displacement and internal contradictions shaped the public response of Australian and New Zealand audiences, particularly impacting on the arrangement of returned servivemen's memories and their social mediation. The *experience* of Gallipoli transmuted in the 1960s to a public *memory* was mediated through the spectacle of national cinema. Spectacle became a stand-in for social relations, that is, not so much a collection of images but a social relation among people, *mediated by images*. In this way, *Gallipoli* became 'the Australian film' by functioning as universal myth, dehistoricising and depoliticising the nature of Australian settlement, at a time when historians were reappraising the foundations of Australian statehood: an intersection of creative intellectual elites with state investment in the shaping of a post-imperial national public.

In New Zealand, changing economic and political realities entailed asserting a national cinema against Australian claims on Gallipoli, as its imaginative landscape became a key marker of national identity. A commemorative counter-strategy coalesced around Chunuk Bair as 'New Zealand's story',

in a creative and historiographical operation by individuals such as Maurice Shadbolt and Christopher Pugsley. Shadbolt's *Once on Chunuk Bair* was produced as a conscious reaction to the success of Weir's *Gallipoli* and its imaginative power. The institutional networks that emerged around 'the New Zealand story' attempted to produce a new national memory of the campaign and the experience of men fighting in the NZEF. Rather than being markedly different, *Gallipoli* and *Once on Chunuk Bair* shared a distinct genealogy linked to the changing configuration of the state and a shared need to connect nationalism with war experience through an epic, emotive spectacle. The attempted 'New Zealand perspective' through the nationalist space of Chunuk Bair, however, had only limited success in the fragmentary context of 1980s. Therefore, when we consider the impact of Shadbolt's stage play, set against the wider context of Weir's film, a nationalist narrative was a radical departure from previous understandings of Anzac in New Zealand and reflected the contours of commemoration in the 1980s more than the historical conditions of 1915. And like Australia, this change was instigated not by the public but artists, historians, and other intellectuals who sought to forge a new foundation for settlement in the face of a crisis of postcolonial historical consciousness.

This panorama of cultural production around war commemoration in the 1980s – transformation of memory into spectacle, blurring historiography and dramaturgy – was fundamental to the trajectory of remembrance heading into the major state performances in 1990, 2005, and 2015; respectively, the seventy-fifth, ninetieth, and centenary anniversaries of Gallipoli. Crucial to this process was the Gallipoli 75 Taskforce, established by the Hawke Government to orchestrate the seventy-fifth anniversary. The 1990 commemoration shows how rather than simply perpetuating the historic civic form of Anzac, revived and resurgent in a global digital age, these were postcolonial state projects laying claim to cultural place-making and relationships.

Far from being a global 'Anzac' Identity, the 1990 commemoration was dominated by Australian prerogatives and priorities. This reflected different institutional and constitutional structures which shaped the cultural memory of the war in New Zealand. 1990 also marked the 150th anniversary of the signing of the Treaty of Waitangi by the British Crown and Māori. New Zealand historians and artists ignored state and public in narratives of memory located in the cultural geography of Gallipoli, especially Chunuk Bair, and instead focused on the critique of the New Zealand state's colonial history. The sesquicentennial, like the failures of the 1988 Bicentenary in Australia, provoked a flash point for fundamental challenges to the constitutional mentality of the New Zealand state. The success of the Australian project of Gallipoli 75 was an acute contrast to the collapse of the New Zealand 1990 Commission and the opening up of Waitangi as a place not of state performance and enactment but public dissent and unsettlement through indigenous voices.

The role of the RSA as the primary organiser of the seventy-fifth anniversary of Gallipoli was continuous with the legacy of 1965. The RSA was the primary stakeholder in war commemoration, with the state's role largely limited to civic representation in the figure of the Governor-General. In

contrast, in Australia, the success of the Gallipoli 75 taskforce was reflected in the transformation of state attitudes and habits towards Anzac commemoration, with the new central role of the Prime Minister further confirmed by the entwining of ideas of national unity with the national interest, sacralised in the Anzac legend. The few remaining Anzac veterans who accompanied Hawke in 1990 were repurposed to legitimise the state project.

The pivotal year of 1990 revealed the potentialities of a new cultural geography of Gallipoli and energised the transnational shaping of global identity in Australia and New Zealand through state cultural policies. Moreover, it established a number of possibilities: Gallipoli was a global space for articulating narratives of nationhood, beyond the social and political claims of national territory. Moreover, this place-making project was enabled by a unified political narrative, supported by media, and deploying symbolic actors of veterans and youth. This constituted a global dialogue of identity through state networks and market relations. An important moment in the 1990 Commission was the turning towards Australia as a dialogic partner, along with the Turkish government, in which mutual celebrations of nationhood could be safely maintained and affected.

In the politics and performance of the repatriations of the Unknown Australian Soldier (1993) and the Unknown New Zealand Warrior (2004), this process was 'brought home'. Although separated by nearly a decade, both installations contained a paradox. Here was an imperial institution – the traditional cult of the fallen – intended to bodily represent the postcolonial nation; a therapeutic healing of collective cultural trauma, initiated by the institutional presence of the Australian War Memorial and the office of the Prime Minister. A comparison of the Australian and New Zealand Unknowns with the global context of Indigenous repatriation strategies seeking the return of ancestral remains from overseas jurisdictions – drawing on the cases of Yagan's head in the 1990s and Māori toi moko over the 2000s – reveals the complex politics of legitimacy and authority derived from the act of bodily interment. Within this postcolonial framework, we can see how these acts of repatriation expressed imagined worlds and – through the body of the dead – the figures, forms, and images of social relationships. The movement of the Unknown bodies brought hidden relationships in the unsettled polities of postwar Australia and New Zealand into view and rendered them material in the nation. The transportations also revealed state involvement in violence and death, including the role of the state as perpetrator along with its responsibilities to victims and their communities. This management of past violence and memory simultaneously creates the state while showing its constitutive instabilities. The 'Unknown Anzacs' in this way bookended a vital period of commemorative practice, as Anzac remembrance became more fully oriented towards the state and was reformulated as the key definitional frame of citizenship and historical consciousness at the turn of the century.

The effect of cultural projects is culture at the service of enactments of statehood, which is never formed or finished, but a continuous act of resettlement. This instability is a constitutive element of a national cultural memory. As historian, Geoffrey White notes, representing war history as a national

memory is likely to be an unstable and unfinished process; as 'unfinished histories' of militarism, empire, and sacrifice, jostle alongside each other.[782] This instability and open-endedness of commemoration was evident in indigenous media coverage of the Anzac revival. The federally-funded National Indigenous Television (NITV) with the Māori Television Service contested, engaged, and shaped the changing language around Anzac Day as a moment of pride, celebration, and national founding. Differences in programming, policies, and interactions with a broader non-indigenous audience between NITV and Māori Television reflect the 'politics of recognition', inflected by the constitutional and historical contexts of the two 'Anzac nations'. The two sets of television texts relate the differences and similarities to the national and institutional contexts in which the two sets of texts circulate.

Returning to the dawn service at Anzac Cove in 2015, the ostensible shared project of nationhood was, in fact, a far more uneven production with an uneven history. The entertainment and story-telling leading up to the dawn service was indicative of the Australian influence. The programme was framed by references to C E W Bean's letters, dispatches, and diary entries to provide a month-by-month timeline of the campaign, interspersed with slick government-funded documentaries celebrating the Royal Australian Navy and other Australian contributions. The sole New Zealand feature consisted of the 'New Zealand's story' documentary. Dated and second-hand, the documentary manifested both resonances and dissonances in Anzac memory, and indicated a quieter commemorative voice, trying to claim a small space against the Australian national project.

Moreover, in the subsequent three years of the First World War centenary, Anzac Day attendance at Gallipoli rapidly declined. In 2018, registrations for the commemoration, in comparison to the 2015 centenary, had virtually collapsed. 'Have we lost our desire to commemorate this most important moment in our military history', shrilled radio broadcaster Chris Smith, 'have we forgotten Gallipoli?'[783] Such a glut of remembering and apparent forgetting over the centenary is indicative of the state pivot to Gallipoli. If 2015 is indeed a high point then the staid claims of perpetual remembrance may not endure much longer. The 'unfinished' process of national memory in fact needs constant maintenance; narratives meant to stabilise state institutions and secure political order are themselves profoundly unstable. Without the injection of state commemoration, Anzac reverts to quieter and more local networks of remembrance.

A wager which underwrites the promise of history as an imaginative practice is that it can free up from mere 'pastness' and make speakable what was once unspeakable. This thesis is concerned with visions of past, present, and future, embedded in national-state projects. Historians have played a crucial role in this process, imagined as the search for a national story of belonging. Nepia Mahuika argues that historiography in New Zealand has tended to situate the settler and the settler's search for a putative belonging, as the central action of historical narrative, even in ostensible postcolonial

[782] Geoffrey M. White, *Memorializing Pearl Harbor: Unfinished Histories and the Work of Remembrance,* Duke University Press, Durham, 2016.
[783] *Daily Telegraph,* 23 January, 2018.

deconstructions of the nation.[784] This is a critique that could be easily extended to Australian historiography. The entanglement of the historian in ideology and state building is clearly not unique to the context of Anzac myth. However, it does invite a particular reflection of the contemporary place, product, and practice of History, necessarily engaging with debates about the relevance of this discipline in increasingly instrumentalist environments of the academy and broader society. History's power also lies in showing what is unfamiliar and unsettling, as much as it is shoring up familiar narratives of heartland and belonging. As Bruce Lincoln urges, the best historical practice is cautious in its hermeneutical claims to truth-telling and comfortable with its fragmentary narration.[785] In joining developments in Australian and New Zealand historiographies, this thesis makes no claims to a universal grand historical narrative, nor a revision of the Anzac revival. It instead seeks to show how war history as a national memory is, despite appearances, unstable, and historical critique an unfinished process. At a time when both Australian and New Zealand states are revisiting questions of the 'national', violence, and the public – whether it be the question of frontier war and makaratta in Australia or debates about 'nationalising' Rā Maumahara Day of Commemoration in New Zealand – this thesis reveals the potentials, problems, and limits of state investment in and management of violence and memory, at once limited and malleable but not reducible to the nation-state.

[784] Nepia Mahuika, 'New Zealand history *is* Māori history: Tikanga as the ethical foundation of historical scholarship in Aotearoa New Zealand', *Journal of New Zealand History*, 49, 1 (2015): pp. 5–30, 6.
[785] Bruce Lincoln, *Between History and Myth*, p. 114.

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