

Neutrality, restoration and restraint: the Congress system at work after 1815

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When Paul Schroeder called the Congress of Vienna agreement signed in 1815 the most successful peace treaty of all time, he did so with an eye to explaining the contours of the European great power system that evolved through the nineteenth century. In that system, as Schroeder explains, the political equilibrium between the great powers was maintained in order that no one power – be it Russia, France, Prussia, the Habsburg Empire or Great Britain – would dominate. For Schroeder, the key to the ‘concert system’ or ‘Congress system’ (two terms that are largely interchangeable, although historians love to debate them) was more than a willingness to meet and discuss common concerns professed among the powers. It also reflected widespread acceptance that Europe’s crises should be stage-managed collectively.¹ Hedley Bull described the inclination as a ‘custodial duty’ professed by the great power monarchies over the rest of Europe and as acceptance of the idea that the avoidance of war between these monarchies would benefit them all.² The concert system relied on the recognition of their common interest in maintaining the balance of power. The Congress of Vienna thus developed, as Andreas Osiander describes it, a ‘system-consciousness’ and acknowledged that the stability of one power depended, in part, on the stability of another.³ These principles underwrote the restoration period and influenced European relations until the outbreak of the First World War in 1914.

In many respects, uncertainty drove the compromise agreements settled at Vienna in 1815. In ‘restoring’ Europe to the monarchies, the leaders who met at the Congress of Vienna looked both backwards and forwards: they aimed to preserve the legitimacy and right to rule of the aristocratic landed classes, who had dominated the pre-1789 era, yet also acknowledged the social and political changes that had affected Europe since the French revolution. Above all, they considered the people as politically dangerous and needing careful oversight. In 1815, it made complete sense that the best way to protect the stability of the (re-)established monarchies, was to keep these states from going to war with each other. At any rate, twenty-five years of almost continuous warfare showed them that warfare was costly and calamitous, that it might encourage another Napoleon Bonaparte, or (worse) inspire the people to clamour for further revolutionary change. Restoration aimed at avoiding revolution and thus at limiting war.

The statesmen and women in Vienna worked hard to reinstate their version of continental stability.⁴ They micromanaged the revision of the map of Europe, carefully assigning new territorial boundaries and off-setting competing interests. They also acknowledged the importance of war avoidance. In the aftermath of the Vienna settlement, in the period historians describe either as ‘restoration Europe’ or ‘revolutionary Europe’,⁵ warfare remained a legitimate foreign policy option. But it was a carefully considered option. Carl von Clausewitz’s influential work *On War* (1832) summed up the considerations best: war might be a political act and, as such, perfectly legitimate, but it was a political act with unpredictable results.⁶ Therefore, in the restoration period, the choice to not go to war and to proclaim neutrality was equally valid. Neutrality, in fact, offered the European monarchies an ideal tool to manage the continental equilibrium.

This chapter focuses on the utilisation of the concept of neutrality as a tool of great power diplomacy. It argues that the Congress of Vienna settlement legitimised neutrality as an

effective means to manage the international system and affect international relations. The Congress, in fact, launched an 'age of neutrality', offering up war avoidance as a legitimate foreign policy option for small and large states alike.⁷ In so doing, the Congress of Vienna marked a decisive break with the early modern past. For while neutrality featured prominently in the early modern period and throughout the wars fought between 1789 and 1815, it always did so as a highly contentious concept. After 1815, neutrality underwrote the stability of international relations. It was the first time, in the history of Europe at least, that principles of restraint and moderation came to dominate the ways in which the great power monarchies related to each other and neutrality offered them a useful tool to manage those relationships.

Before 1814, neutrals had little recognised legitimacy in time of war, even if an increasing number claimed that legitimacy for themselves. After 1815, however, neutrality became embedded in the international environment in a number of key ways; firstly, as a means to stabilise the territorial equilibrium in Europe; secondly, as a foreign policy option that aimed at restricting and restraining the spread of war when it did occur; and lastly, as a powerful opportunity for non-belligerents to maximise their access to the open seas, to trade routes and to markets in time of war. If the restoration period (1815-1849) marked a shift from the early modern to the modern world, one of its key impacts was on the global economy, evidenced by the move from a closed-economic system dominated by the principle of mercantilism to an open-economic system dominated by the principle of free-trade liberalism. Neutrality played a key hand in enabling the meteoric rise of Europe's industrial economies after 1815 and in Britain especially. Neutrality then helped to birth the modern age.

Neutrality as a tool of territorial equilibrium

The main principle guiding the reconfiguration of the map of Europe at Vienna was to balance power and to avoid contentious issues that might lead to a military conflict. This meant that all of the governments in attendance had to be willing to compromise some of their vital interests. At the very least, it ensured that they had to be willing to buffer their competing interests and accept a common purpose (namely, to protect the monarchical system). There were many ways in which this was done, including by establishing small or medium-sized sovereignties that kept the great powers geographically separated from each other. For example, the newly established Kingdom of the Netherlands (including present-day the Netherlands, Belgium and Luxembourg) aimed at buffering Prussia from France and protecting the security of the Channel and North Sea for the British. Likewise, the creation of a German Confederation of States to replace the collapsed Holy Roman Empire confirmed the existence of a loose alliance of nearly forty independent principalities and independent cities, including Prussia and Habsburg-ruled Austria. Each state was a sovereign entity, which acknowledged the existence of common economic and political interests across the Confederation. The Confederation's members met at regular intervals to discuss these, without binding any obligation on each other. Their existence ensured that the political interests of Prussia and Austria were balanced off and kept both these powers geographically separated from France.⁸

A more decisive way to buffer came in the form of the neutralisation of states and territories by great power agreement. While neutralisation had been used as a means to deal with contentious regions and questions in the early modern period,⁹ it was in the early nineteenth century that it was systematised as a tool of congress diplomacy and as a way of protecting the powers from going to war with each other. The Congress of Vienna neutralised three key

territories: Switzerland, the city of Cracow and the tiny region of Moresnet. Each was neutralised for different reasons, but their collective neutralisation spoke to the willingness of the monarchies at Vienna to compromise and to defuse potentially explosive issues.

The Swiss cantons had a long history of neutrality that pre-existed the 1815 agreements.¹⁰ At Vienna, however, these cantons were drawn together into a sovereign state, a republic, that would not be able to take part in any future wars. The neutralisation of Switzerland aimed at keeping the competing interests of the cantons (some of which were aligned with or ruled by powerful European monarchs) from affecting European politics or upsetting the geo-strategic balance of power. Switzerland was acknowledged as a volatile region, a hotbed for revolutionary ideas and liberal tendencies. As a vital trade and banking hub, Switzerland's neutralisation also spoke to easing the economic relationships across the continent. In neutralising Switzerland, then, the powers at Vienna looked to stabilise central Europe.

Of course, keeping Switzerland neutral was a harder task. Cantonal loyalties were challenged by the federalisation of the country, which came to the fore during the 1847 and 1848 revolutions when the federal government used military force to suppress rebellions in seven cantons that wished to secede.¹¹ After 1849, however, the federal government managed to keep control over the Swiss cantons, albeit with a few crises along the way, and project a stalwart and neutral foreign policy. It was supported in these actions by the rest of the European powers, most of the time. Neutrality underpinned Swiss national identity from 1849 on, underpinning its international reputation as a nation of bankers, humanitarians and internationalists.

The neutralisation of Cracow was less successful. The city was neutralised during the 1814-1815 Vienna deliberations and placed under the protection of the Russians, Prussians and Austrians. All three powers coveted the city and hoped to keep it out of their rivals' control. In neutralising Cracow, however, they hoped to keep each other from maximising these advantages. Still, they also imposed a condition on Cracow's neutrality, namely that the city could not harbour dissidents from neighbouring countries. In the end, the revolutions of the late 1840s swept through Cracow as it did through the rest of eastern Europe. The Habsburgs used the opportunity presented at the end of the civil unrest to incorporate the city into its empire.¹² While both France and Britain protested the development, in the midst of the upheavals of 1848, they were not in a position to force the situation.

The example of Cracow highlights how contentious neutralisation could be if not all the partners to the agreement committed fully to the terms. Yet Cracow presents only one of three failed neutralisation treaties in the period 1815-1914: the end to the neutralisation of the Black Sea in 1871 (which was neutralised at the end of the Crimean War in 1856) was the second, and the German invasion of Belgium and Luxembourg in August 1914, the third. This last act brought with it the First World War and the entire collapse of the European concert system. It came, however, at the end of almost a century of successful neutralisation policies.

When Germany invaded Belgium in 1914, it also invaded a tiny snippet of land situated on the border of Belgium, the Netherlands and Germany, with the enticing name of Moresnet (present-day Kelmis, Belgium). In 1815, Moresnet housed a profitable zinc mine of strategic interest to Prussia and the Netherlands.¹³ The mine was so profitable that neither power would give up a claim to it. In order to solve the stand-off, the Vienna treaty stipulated that the mine and the 260 inhabitants of the 3.37 square-kilometre territory of Moresnet would

exist outside sovereign rule. Both the Prussian and Dutch monarchies would administer the territory and make laws for its population, but could only do so by agreement of the other. The mining company would administer the zinc distribution (and profits) to the advantage of both states. Even though Moresnet citizens were stateless and the territory became a haven for smugglers, distilleries and crime cells, its neutralisation presented a suitable solution.

The neutralisation of Switzerland, Cracow and Moresnet at Vienna show up how important the alleviation of rivalry was for the great powers in 1815. That principle sat at the heart of concert diplomacy after 1815. Neutralisation was, in fact, used repeatedly during the ensuing century to solve other geo-strategic rivalries both within and outside Europe, including in the Greek islands during Greece's independence struggles in the 1820s (the Ionian islands would be permanently neutralised in 1863), during the Egyptian crises in the late 1830s and early 1840s (the decision went nowhere but the Suez canal would be neutralised in the 1880s) and as a means of sending peacekeeping troops into Schleswig-Holstein in 1849.¹⁴ When Luxembourg split from the Netherlands in the 1860s, it too was neutralised by great power agreement.¹⁵

Of these new agreements, the most important and most successful was the neutralisation of Belgium. When Belgium seceded from the Netherlands in the 1830s during a bitter civil war that lasted almost the entire decade, the European great powers were not able to leave Belgium to its own devices. The new kingdom was too weak to protect itself against the ambitions of its great power neighbours (and the Dutch). The Treaty of London, initiated in 1830 and formalised in 1839, thus, neutralised Belgium by mutual agreement of the European powers. They agreed that if any one of them invaded, all the others would come to Belgium's assistance. In so doing, they hoped to keep Belgium and north-western Europe safe from war and free from the competing claims of the Prussians and French in particular.

None of the powers expected Belgium's neutralisation to succeed. The territory, a prime industrial region and one of Europe's main exporters of armaments, offered too many attractions. Yet Belgium weathered the vagaries of great power politics for nearly eighty years.¹⁶ Its neutralisation was remarkably successful.¹⁷ It survived the 1848 revolutions with its neutrality intact and its commitment to constitutional monarchy protected.¹⁸ Much like Switzerland, Belgium too came to embrace its neutrality as an essential part of its national identity, although domestically neutrality remained a contested idea.¹⁹

Of course, neutralisation was not an easy solution. It required commitment from all powers to the agreement and was only sustainable if they also maintained a high degree of trust in the willingness of the others to keep their word. That commitment, as is clear from the examples of Cracow and the Black Sea, was not always present. Yet aside from Cracow, the neutralisation agreements initiated during the restoration period were remarkably successful: most of them weathered the 1848 revolutionary storms and only failed when the entire nineteenth-century international system collapsed during the First World War.

Limiting wars and war avoidance: the permanence of neutrality

One of the un-looked for consequences of the neutralisation agreements initiated during the restoration period was the existence of a number of governments who had to consider their neutrality as a permanent condition. These governments had a difficult task in working out how to manage their foreign affairs and their non-belligerency had to be accommodated by the great powers as well. Both Belgium and Switzerland worked extremely hard to carve out

a place for their neutral voice and agency in the European political order: they did so by advocating for clearer delineations of their rights and obligations in time of war and peace and by balancing an impartial foreign policy when possible. Not surprisingly, all the great powers maintained sizeable diplomatic representation in these states.

The respect given to the neutrality of Switzerland and Belgium by the great powers also legitimated the existence of neutrality as a viable foreign policy option for other countries. By recognising permanently neutral states, neutrality became a permanent feature of the international system. The great powers further systematised neutrality by adopting neutrality repeatedly themselves as a voluntary foreign policy at a time when others went to war. Neutrality became such a stable foreign policy choice that many populations attached it to their national identities and internationalist values.²⁰ In the latter part of the century, Denmark, Finland, Norway, Sweden and the Netherlands also toyed with the possibility that they might be permanently neutralised by great power agreement.²¹ They accepted the custodial duty of the great powers as effective and binding.

The key to the stability of the Congress system was the principle of restraint: the willingness not only to avoid war but also to negotiate and mediate suitable solutions to international crises. The Congress system depended on successful ambassadorial meetings and requests for multilateral discussions and solutions.²² It also depended on the expectation that governments would eschew war if at all possible. Neutrality then became the default foreign policy position for most European countries. This is not to suggest that the restoration period was an 'age of peace'. There were plenty of wars conducted within and outside Europe between 1815 and 1849.²³ Rather, it is to suggest that warfare within Europe became less likely after 1815, and when it did occur it was usually circumscribed by the interests of the non-participating, neutral powers, many of which were great powers.

There were several consequences of this shift to neutrality. The first was that neutrality became a vibrant part of European politics. States could and did choose for neutrality in ways that did not happen in the early modern period and neutrality politics underpinned the conduct of most wars of the time. As a result, there was also a professed need to find agreement to what the requirements of neutrals in time of war were. Where before 1815, neutrality law was highly contested, after 1815 neutrality law became standardised (although it was never fully standardised and some key issues, such as those around blockade and contraband, continued to cause problems). Nevertheless, one of the reasons historians describe the nineteenth century as a 'golden age of international law' was due to the agency of the European powers to find agreement on the law of war and neutrality.

Another consequence of the shift was the adoption of neutrality as a long-term foreign policy option for states. Neutrality offered security to small- and medium-sized European countries, like the Netherlands and the Scandinavian kingdoms, who saw in neutrality an opportunity to protect their security at home and grow their economic and industrial empires outside of Europe. By the middle of the century, then, neutrality existed as a valid foreign policy position for all European governments. There were three types of neutral state: permanently neutral states (like Switzerland and Belgium), voluntary long-term neutrals (which included the United States of America) and occasional neutrals (who declared their neutrality when others went to war). In all the wars of the century, barring the Crimean War of 1853-1856, there were more great power neutrals than belligerents. There were also numerous neutral small powers. Be they voluntary or permanently neutral, all of these states looked to protect their non-belligerency and their rights to access the global economy.

Economic opportunism: neutrality as a catalyst for the industrial revolution

The age of limited war brought into being in 1815 enabled Europeans to look outwards. It also ensured that the European economies could prosper. No longer dictated to by the wartime economic controls of the Napoleonic period nor immobilised by fear of military attack, merchants, entrepreneurs, bankers and industrialists looked to maximise their gains from the new peacetime environment. After 1815, Europeans settlers moved out of the continent, colonising the 'New World' in unprecedented numbers.²⁴ They could do so in part because the seas were peaceful and free.

The peacetime conditions of the restoration period also presented an incredible catalyst for private investment in new industries, new technologies and new markets. The industrial revolution took off after 1815, bringing with it extraordinary pressures on European social, economic and political structures. It also globalised the European economy and increasingly made the economic viability of many of European states dependent on their access to the global economy: to trade routes, ports, markets and sources of foreign labour and raw materials. The industrial revolution forged ahead after 1815 and in Europe, it thrived on peace.

It also thrived on security that a future war would not interrupt access to these trade routes, ports, foreign labour, raw materials and markets. It is no surprise then that the political concept of free-trade liberalism came to dominate the political ambitions of the rising middle classes throughout Europe. Free-trade liberals advocated for the rights of each individual to access the global economy unfettered by restrictive taxes, trade embargoes and local laws. These same liberals were at the forefront of political change within Europe during the restoration period: they challenged the protectionist policies of the aristocracy and drove forward plans for the establishment of constitutional monarchies and the opening up of national and imperial economies. The German Customs Union of 1833 (*Zollverein*) was one such initiative, as was the repeal of the Corn Laws and Navigation Acts in Great Britain in the 1840s.²⁵

For liberals, neutrality offered protection for their global economic enterprises. Even if their country went to war, the neutrality of other states would keep vital economic highways open and their businesses thriving. And if enough powers agreed, the rights of neutrals to trade and to access the open seas unmolested could be formalised. The move to confirm the international law of neutrality was in part driven by these economic motives. As the British liberal magazine, the *Economist*, explained the advantages of neutrality in 1855: 'it permits trade to be carried without apprehending the invasion of armies'.²⁶ It also kept the world's ports open and commerce flowing.²⁷

Of course, peace in Europe also enabled ambitious Europeans to look outwards. The acquisition of formal and informal empires advanced apace during the restoration period. Perhaps the greatest tragedy of the nineteenth-century European age of 'limited war' was that it enabled a highly successful age of 'industrial imperialism' and with it the conquest of the non-European world. While many historians claim that a drive for empire did not interest Europeans until the later decades in the century (particularly during the 1870s and 1880s conquest of Africa), there is plenty of evidence to suggest that Europeans spread their influence, their capital, their people and their ideas into the world in the restoration period. The whole nineteenth century was, as Phillipa Levine rightly states, a century of 'imperial

gain and aggrandisement'.²⁸ Much of that activity aimed at profit. A lot of it was violent and destructive.

Consider as an example, the rise of Great Britain. The industrial revolution turned this island nation into the nineteenth century's superpower. With ready access to coal, a sizeable merchant marine protected by the formidable Royal Navy, and a pre-existing blue water empire, Britain was able to maximise its advantages and dominate the globe. Its people populated the planet, its bankers invested in new ventures (including cross-continental railway routes in the Americas and Eurasia, sheep and dairy farms in South America and Australasia, mines and plantations around the world), its entrepreneurs established new communication networks, built new factories and opened up new ports. By 1850, London was the financial capital of the world. Meanwhile, Britain had also become the 'factory of the world', turning the plethora of materials it received from across the seas into manufactured goods that fed the consumer needs of its own population and of other rising economies within and outside its empire and the European continent.

These developments had a decisive impact on the social and political make-up of British society. It also had a fundamental impact on communities around the world, in some cases changing them forever. British expansionism in the restoration period relied on protecting its security at home and their merchant marine's access to the open seas. What would become known as the *Pax Britannica* in the aftermath of the Crimean War was effectively already in place during the restoration period, namely as a foreign policy commitment to neutrality. After 1815, Britain kept out of European wars if at all possible and protected its on-going voluntary neutrality in Europe by vouchsafing its global economic and imperial enterprises. When it did go to war, it did so in aid of these globalising and imperial ventures. The first Opium War, fought by the British in China between 1839 and 1841, for example, aimed at forcing the Qing dynasty to accept greater access for British merchants to China's domestic economy, including in the unrestricted sale of opioids to the Chinese people. And even when Britain went to war in Europe (as it did during the Crimean War, a conflict that erupted at the end of the restoration period), British economic policies in that conflict looked first and foremost to protect open access to the seas, to its colonial settlements, to India and to sources of essential materials, which by this stage included the gold mined in Australia and New Zealand.

Britain was not the only European state that profited from an on-going position of neutrality. Belgium prospered throughout the century as a prime industrial and trade hub, becoming one of the primary armaments suppliers for the continent. By 1850, Belgium had one of the best performing industrial economies. The other long-term neutrals in Scandinavia and the Netherlands also prospered from their on-going access to the global economy: the Netherlands expanding its East and West Indian empires through the century. Outside Europe, the growth and prosperity of the United States was also aided by neutrality. The Monroe Doctrine, adopted in the 1820s, aimed at keeping the United States firmly focussed on its regional interests. Outside the Americas, then, the United States remained firmly committed to a policy of voluntary long-term neutrality, keeping it from going to war for many decades.

The end of 'restoration Europe' and the rise of neutrality

The 1848 revolutions brought about fundamental political change in Europe. It signalled that the restoration experiment initiated in 1815 at Vienna to restore control of the continent to the

aristocracies could not be sustained. However, where the Vienna settlements may have faltered in 1848 and 1849 on the domestic front, many of the diplomatic principles of the concert system bloomed after 1849. The tone of moderation that typified the relationship of the European powers in the first half of the nineteenth century continued to influence European diplomacy in the second.²⁹ The application and adoption of neutrality as a tool to manage that diplomacy blossomed alongside.

In fact, the principle of neutrality became so firmly embedded in international affairs that during the Crimean War the right to privateering was abolished and the belligerent powers looked to protect neutral trade and the right for all to access the open seas. The Declaration of Paris of 1856 formalised these radical departures from early modern warfare practices, foregoing many of the rights belligerents had jealously protected before 1815, including the right to restrict and capture neutral shipping.³⁰ The Declaration protected the freedom of the seas and opened them up for the movement of people, goods and capital in time of war and peace. The Declaration of Paris was, as Olav Riste describes, the ‘most remarkable’ of milestones and separated, as C.H. Stockton framed it, the world of war from the world of commerce.³¹ In so doing, it formalised what had been standard practice in European diplomacy since 1815.

From the Crimean War on, neutrality became the bedrock on which many European states built their economic and imperial foundations. Neutrality offered the ability to avoid becoming involved the wars of others without losing the right to access to the global economy, its communication networks and diplomatic mechanisms. After 1850, Europe’s governments could choose their wars carefully, betting on the desire of their neighbours to remain uninvolved. Small states could vouchsafe their security by adopting long-term neutrality policies. As a result, industrial economies thrived and empires grew. Europe could thus dominate the world.

¹ Paul W. Schroeder, *The Transformation of European Politics 1763-1848* (Oxford, 1994), particularly after p. 477; Paul W. Schroeder, ‘International politics, peace, and war, 1815-1914’ in T.C.W. Blanning, (ed.), *The Nineteenth Century. Europe 1789-1914* (Oxford, 2000), pp. 158-209.

² Hedley Bull, ‘Order vs. Justice in International Society’, *Political Studies* 19/3 (September 1971), pp. 269-83.

³ Andreas Osiander, *The States System of Europe 1640-1990. Peacemaking and the Conditions of International Stability* (Oxford, 1994), p. 186.

⁴ Brian Vick, *The Congress of Vienna: Power and Politics after Napoleon* (Cambridge MA, 2014); David King, *Vienna 1814* (New York, 2009); Glenda Sluga, ‘Women, Diplomacy and International Politics, Before and After the Congress of Vienna’ in Glenda Sluga, Carolyn James (eds), *Women, Diplomacy and International Politics since 1500* (New York, 2015), Chapter 7.

⁵ Martin Lyons, *Post-Revolutionary Europe 1815-1856* (Houndsmills, 2006), especially pp. 1-21; Schroeder, *Transformation*, pp. 579-593; Eric Hobsbawm, *Age of Revolution, 1789-1848* (London, 1996).

⁶ Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*. Translated by J.J. Graham (London, 1873). Original: *Vom Kriege* (Berlin, 1832).

⁷ The contours for this chapter's argument are largely derived from Maartje Abbenhuis, *Age of Neutrals. Great Power Politics 1815-1914* (Cambridge, 2014) and Maartje Abbenhuis, 'Most Useful Tool for Diplomacy and Statecraft: Neutrality and Europe in the "Long" Nineteenth Century, 1815-1914', *International History Review* 35/1 (2013), pp. 1-22.

⁸ Paul W. Schroeder, 'The Lost Intermediaries: The Impact of 1870 on the International System', *International History Review* 6/1 (1984), pp. 1-27.

⁹ For which: J.H.W. Verzijl, *International Law in Historical Perspective*. Volume 10 (Leiden, 1968), pp. 23-24; M.W. Graham, 'Neutralization as a Movement in International Law', *American Journal of International Law* 21/1 (January 1923), pp. 74-94.

¹⁰ Georges Perrin, *La Neutralité Permanente de la Suisse et les Organisations Internationales* (Paris, 1964), p. 15; A. Suter, 'Neutralität, Prinzip, Praxis und Geschichtsbessein' in M. Hettling, M. König, M. Schaffner, A. Suter, J. Tanner (eds), *Eine kleine Geschichte der Schweiz. Der Bundesstaat und seine Traditionen* (Frankfurt am Main, 1998), pp. 133-188.

¹¹ Joachim Remak, *A Very Civil War: The Swiss Sonderbund War of 1847* (Boulder CO, 1993).

¹² C.J. Bartlett, *Peace, War and the European Powers, 1814-1914*. (New York, 1996), p. 43.

¹³ L. Malvoz, *Het Neutraal Gebied van Moeresnet (1816-1919)* (Np, 1991).

¹⁴ Abbenhuis, *Age of Neutrals*, pp. 53-62; W. Bennett Munro, 'The Neutralisation of the Suez Canal', *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 17 (May 1901), pp. 13-34; W.D. Wrigley, *The Diplomatic Significance of Ionian Neutrality 1821-1831* (London, 1988); W.D. Wrigley, 'The Neutrality of Ionian Shipping and its Enforcement during the Greek Revolution (1821-1831)', *Mariner's Mirror* 73/3 (1987), pp. 345-360.

¹⁵ M. Juno, *Die Neutralität des Grossherzogtums Luxemburg* (Luxembourg, 1951); Daniel H. Thomas, *The Guarantee of Belgian Independence and Neutrality in European Diplomacy 1830s – 1930s* (Kingston, 1983), p. 198.

¹⁶ The best overviews of Belgium's place in continental diplomacy are: Thomas, *Belgian Independence*; R. Coolsaet, *België en zijn Buitenlandse Politiek 1830-2000*. Revised edition, (Leuven, 2001).

¹⁷ R. Albrecht-Carrié, *The Concert of Europe 1815-1914* (New York, 1968), pp. 11-12; M. Rendall, 'A Qualified Success for Collective Security: The Concert of Europe and the Belgian Crisis, 1831', *Diplomacy and Statecraft* 18 (2007), pp. 271-95; Schroeder, *Transformation*, p. 678.

¹⁸ Thomas, *Belgian Independence*, pp. 95-120; A. de Ridder, ed., *La Crise de la Neutralité Belge de 1848. Le Dossier Diplomatique* (Brussels, 1928).

¹⁹ Coolsaet, *België*, especially pp. 129-135.

²⁰ Remco van Diepen, *Voor Volkenbond en Vrede: Nederland en het Streven naar een Nieuwe Wereldorde, 1919-1946* (Amsterdam, 1999), pp. 16-17; N. van Sas, 'Between the Devil and the Deep Blue Sea: The Logic of Neutrality' in Bob Moore, Henk van Nierop (eds), *Colonial Empires Compared: Britain and the Netherlands, 1750-1850* (Aldershot, , 2003), pp. 33-44; O. Elgström, 'Do Images Matter? The Making of Swedish Neutrality 1834 and 1853', *Cooperation and Conflict* 35/3 (2000), pp. 243-244; Sven Widmalm, 'A Superior Type of Universal Civilisation: Science as Politics in Sweden, 1917-1926' in R. Letteval, G. Somsen, S. Widmalm (eds), *Neutrality in Twentieth-Century Europe. Intersections of Science, Culture and Politics after the First World War* (New York, 2012), p. 65.

²¹ S.E. Cooper, *Patriotic Pacifism: Waging War on War in Europe 1815-1914* (Oxford, 1991), p. 56; Jukka Nevakivi, 'Finnish neutrality' (p. 33) and Pertti Luntinen, 'Neutrality in

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²² M.S. Anderson, *The Ascendancy of Europe 1815-1914*. Third edition (London, 2003), p. 5; F.R. Bridge, R. Bullen, *The Great Powers and the European State System 1814-1914*. Second edition (Harlow, 2005), p. 4.

²³ Michael Geyer, Charles Bright, 'Global Violence and Nationalizing Wars in Eurasia and America: The Geopolitics of War in the Mid-Nineteenth Century', *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 38/4 (1996), pp. 619-657.

²⁴ James Belich, *Replenishing the Earth: The Settler Revolution and the Rise of the Anglo-World 1783-1939* (Oxford, 2009).

²⁵ A. Howe, 'Restoring Free Trade: The British Experience' in D. Winch, P.K. O'Brien (eds), *The Political Economy of British Historical Experience 1688-1914* (Oxford, 2002), especially p. 207; A. Howe, 'Free Trade and Global Order: The Rise and Fall of a Victorian Vision' in Duncan Bell (ed.), *Victorian Visions of Global Order: Empire and International Relations in Nineteenth-Century Political Thought* (Cambridge, 2007), pp. 26-46.

²⁶ *Economist*, 16 June 1855, p. 649.

²⁷ H. Doe, 'The Long Reach of the Small Port: Influences and Connections in Small English Ports in the Nineteenth Century' in A. Gestrich, M.S. Beerbühl (eds), *Cosmopolitan Networks in Commerce and Society* (London, 2011), pp. 133-150.

²⁸ P. Levine, *The British Empire: Sunrise to Sunset* (Harlow, 2007), p. 85.

²⁹ Cf Chris Barber, 'Nineteenth-Century Statecraft and the Politics of Moderation in the Franco-Prussian War', *European Review of History* 21/1 (2014), pp. 1-17.

³⁰ Jan Lemnitzer, *Power, Law and the End of Privateering* (London, 2014).

³¹ Olav Riste, *The Neutral Ally: Norway's Relationship with Belligerent Powers in the First World War* (Oslo, 1965), p. 18; C.H. Stockton, 'The Declaration of Paris', *American Journal of International Law* 14 (1920), p. 357.