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Shifting Relations New Zealand and China since 1949

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Abstract

The current Comprehensive Strategic Partnership between New Zealand and China is a contrast to the relationship between the two countries before the mid-1990s. From 1972 a steady increase in trade and political contact ensued, yet prior to diplomatic recognition China was condemned as hostile by New Zealand leaders. From the mid-1990s, interaction intensified with significant increases in trade, political contact, people-to-people links and a number of diplomatic firsts over subsequent decades. This thesis explains how these shifts occurred – uncovering the causal factors in the development of New Zealand-China relations from 1949 to 2019. Using a mixture of process tracing and general theory, this thesis argues New Zealand and Chinese interests converged in the 1990s after both countries embraced tenets of neo-liberal economics. This is supported via ideational shifts. In contrast to the Western-oriented relationships of its past, closer engagement with China emphasises New Zealand's identity as an independent-oriented, small trading nation. China's governing legitimacy, once entirely based in socialist ideology, is now underpinned by both economic modernisation and nationalist sentiment. While this has seen China become a responsible stakeholder in the world system, it has also dictated leaders defend challenges against territory and sovereignty, at times conflicting with New Zealand's commitment to liberal, democratic values. Further development between New Zealand and China is dependent on how China balances these two pillars of legitimacy, and how New Zealanders and New Zealand leaders respond.

Note on Transliteration and Naming

To keep the integrity of meaning, several words and phrases in Mandarin Chinese are presented alongside an explanation in English. Simplified characters, rather than traditional or pinyin, have been used to align with practice in mainland China. The translation is either provided through the attached reference or from this author. For much the same purpose, te reo Māori has been used in several instances. An English translation often accompanies the use of te reo Māori, yet where phrases are commonly referred to in New Zealand, such as 'Te Tiriti o Waitangi', no translation has been provided.

Noting no consistency on how Chinese names are rendered in Western academia, I have followed the method of transcribing the full name in my reference – e.g. Mao Zedong is written in its entirety. Western names have followed the traditional approach of 'last name, first name' where applicable.

Preface and Acknowledgements

I left New Zealand for an extended period in early 2015. I was astonished at the number of people I met that did not even know New Zealand was a country or assumed it was a part of Australia. It became immediately apparent that my home was an incredibly small, isolated nation that had little direct importance in the day-to-day lives of those who lived outside of it. As a small trading island far from any markets, New Zealand is dependent on its relationships with others. I spent two days in China on my return and had little way to compare it to my rural South Island upbringing. Considering the unquestionable growth of China on the world stage, understanding the differences between our two countries, as well as what has led us to cooperate, would be vital for a better way of life for many New Zealanders in the future.

I would like to extend thanks to my supervisor Stephen Noakes. His guidance on assumingly basic matters proved invaluable. Before I even decided to do this thesis, he inspired a passion in me that told me I had the capability to do one. Even now, two years later, I can see him doing this for other students. James To and the Asia New Zealand Foundation for introducing me to the staff at the New Zealand Embassy in Beijing, who helped guide this research subject. My colleagues at the NZCTA – YA. Auntie Janette and Uncle Lee for letting me live in their spare room for the most part of writing this thesis. My Mandarin teacher Margaret Lee. My mum for her constant, relentless support. My brother Alex for inspiring me to persevere when I did not understand something, regardless of how difficult it may seem. Elzanne Bester was an invaluable sounding board throughout the process. Alex Kuch and Adam Waters for showing me that real learning and connection happens outside of the office. Crystal Tawhai for her te reo expertise and helping with translation. Katie Coluccio for her proofreading and the recommendations she provided. Finally, I'd like to thank Yulia Vonn for her guidance.

I dedicate this thesis to my late father Paul.

Liam Finnigan
June 2019

Acronyms and Abbreviations

AIIB	Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank
ANZUS	The Australia, New Zealand, United States Security Treaty
APEC	Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation
ASEAN	Association of Southeast Asian Nations
BRI	The Belt and Road Initiative
BRICS	Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa
CCP	Chinese Communist Party
CER	The Australia–New Zealand Closer Economic Relations Trade Agreement
Comintern	The Communist International
CPNZ	Communist Party of New Zealand
CPTPP	Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership
CR	The Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution
EEC	European Economic Community
FDI	Foreign Direct Investment
FPP	First Past the Post Voting System
FTA	Free Trade Agreement
GATT	General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
GLF	Great Leap Forward
GMD	Guomindang of China
IMF	International Monetary Fund
MFAT	New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade
MZT	Mao Zedong Thought
NAFTA	North American Free Trade Agreement
NZ	New Zealand
NZCCRC	New Zealand Contemporary China Research Centre
NZCFS	New Zealand China Friendship Society
PACER Plus	The Pacific Agreement on Closer Economic Relations
PLA	Chinese People's Liberation Army
PM	Prime Minister
PRC	People's Republic of China
ROC	Republic of China
SCO	Shanghai Cooperation Organisation
SCS	South China Sea
SEATO	South-East Asia Treaty Organisation
SEZ	Special Economic Zone
UK	United Kingdom
UN	United Nations
UNCLOS	United Nations Conventions on the Law of the Sea
US	United States of America
USSR	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
WTO	World Trade Organisation

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Introduction

In April 2019 Prime Minister Jacinda Ardern met with President Xi Jinping and Premier Li Keqiang on her first state visit to China. Leaders discussed the importance of strengthening economic ties and reiterated their shared commitment to the “Comprehensive Strategic Partnership”, a term used since 2014 to describe New Zealand and China’s relationship.¹ Since official relations began in 1972, trade, high-profile visits, and people-to-people links steadily increased until the mid-1990s when interaction started a process of rapidly increasing intensity. Over the last decade in particular, two-way trade has more than tripled reaching \$30 billion in 2018.² Not only is China now NZ’s top trading partner but the largest supplier of international students and the second highest for tourists.³

Considering China’s asymmetry with New Zealand in almost all major aspects, the importance of the relationship to Chinese leadership is seen in other forms. Since Jiang Zemin in 1997, every Chinese President has made an official state visit to NZ, which has been reciprocated by every NZ Prime Minister who has served a full term since Robert Muldoon first went in 1976. A trend of firsts between the two countries began in 1997, where in exchange for trade, China has received support for international integration and a space to trial new economic mechanisms.

¹ New Zealand Government, ‘New Zealand China Relations Advanced’, Release, The Beehive, 1 April 2019, <http://www.beehive.govt.nz/release/new-zealand-china-relations-advanced>.

² Statistics New Zealand, ‘Goods and Services Trade by Country: Year Ended December 2018’ (Wellington, New Zealand, 4 March 2019), <https://www.stats.govt.nz/information-releases/goods-and-services-trade-by-country-year-ended-december-2018>; Statistics New Zealand, ‘New Zealand’s Two-Way Trade with China More than Triples over the Decade’, 3 February 2018, <https://www.stats.govt.nz/news/new-zealands-two-way-trade-with-china-more-than-triples-over-the-decade>.

³ Statistics New Zealand, ‘International Visitor Arrivals to New Zealand: March 2019’ (Wellington, New Zealand, 05 2019), <https://www.stats.govt.nz/information-releases/international-travel-march-2019>; New Zealand Ministry of Education, ‘2017 Export Education Levy: Full-Year Statistics’, February 2019, <https://www.educationcounts.govt.nz/statistics/international-education/international-students-in-new-zealand>.

In 1997 NZ was the first nation to agree to China's ascension to the World Trade Organisation (WTO) and in 2004 the first nation to recognise China's market economy status. In 2004 and 2008, NZ was the first developed nation to enter into and then conclude Free Trade Agreement (FTA) negotiations with China. The fifth first came in 2016 when NZ became the first developed nation to enter into FTA upgrade negotiations with China. We are likely to see a sixth with the conclusion of these negotiations.

Recent decades mark prosperous and increasing interaction between NZ and China. This is a distinct contrast to the first decades after the formation of the People's Republic of China (PRC). The New Zealand Defence Force and People's Liberation Army (PLA) saw active conflict against each other in Korea. China's strategic support for North Vietnam opposed NZ, who joined the US in an anti-Communist alliance. Trade was minimal and political contact was non-existent. Only a handful of New Zealanders had any experience or connections within China. It took 23 years for NZ to recognise the People's Republic, voting 11 consecutive times against the Albanian-sponsored resolution to replace the exiled Republic of China (ROC) at the United Nations. While NZ recently took a catalytic role in China's WTO ascension, they vehemently opposed their inclusion in the United Nations throughout the 1960s.

These events reflect ebbs and flows in relations between New Zealand and China — a shift from military enemies in the 1950s to Comprehensive Strategic Partners in the 2010s. With particular emphasis on recent decades of prosperous interaction, the relationship is well known, has been written on extensively in academia and is prominent in political rhetoric. The aim of this thesis is not to map this observation. It would add little to the discussion rather than a contemporary update. Rather, I argue the transformation from enemy to partner has not been given significant analysis. This thesis seeks to explore what accounts for this shift.

I suggest this transition happened across three phases from the establishment of the PRC in 1949. 1949-1971, no formal relationship existed; 1972-1993, a steady increase in political contact and trade; and

1994-present, a concentration of interaction. Using a mix of process tracing and general theory I analyse the main actors, institutions and ideational factors which either promote or discourage closer interaction between New Zealand and China in each phase of relations. In doing so, this thesis traces the development of the relationship, proposing a causality model for the current state of prosperous and intensive connectivity. The picture that emerges sees both countries in the 1990s finding each other in alignment towards neo-liberal goals after economic reform, seeking multilateral engagement and a wide array of partners to foster domestic development. Ideational shifts also explain deeper engagement. While independence for NZ as a small trading nation is emphasised in the NZ-China relationship, China's pursuit of national rejuvenation, a pillar underpinning its governing legitimacy, is largely fulfilled via economic means. I will introduce how this argument builds in each phase below, which corresponds to the major chapters within this thesis.

Elder and Green refer to the first period of the relationship as “the wasted years”, which lasted from 1949 to 1971.⁴ Diplomatic recognition did not extend to China and no formal interaction existed. The relationship was marked with tension and outright condemnation by some New Zealand leaders, who were more focused on fostering ties with the United States and the United Kingdom, the providers of NZ's military and economic security. Internally, the New Zealand Government followed a Keynesian system promoting state intervention to protect against fluctuations in the world economy.

After a short-lived alliance with the USSR, China moved into self-imposed isolation to foster the socialist restructuring of society, though still sought international recognition and promoted external socialist revolution. While the economic systems in both countries were not conducive to enable large-scale trade with each other, ideology saw the two in direct opposition.

⁴ Chris Elder and M.F. Green, ‘New Zealand and China’, in *New Zealand and China: The Papers of the Twenty-First Foreign Policy School 1986*, Foreign Policy School (Dunedin, N.Z.: University of Otago, 1986), 16–65.

The second phase falls between 1972-1993. Following China's reopening to the West, diplomatic relations were established with NZ and a steady increase in trade, people-to-people links and high-profile visits ensued. Both nations focused on internal economic and social restructuring which prioritised a wider search for external markets. Deng's 改革开放 'reform and opening up' in 1978 was met with the neo-liberal policies of the Fourth Labour Government from 1984. Though this did not result in an immediate substantial increase in economic connectivity, these reforms laid the foundation which enabled closer interaction in the following decades.

While in China there was a transition away from Maoist ideology to active governance, NZ began to reassess its Western allegiances amidst a growing national consciousness. The Māori resurgence and anti-nuclear movement pushed New Zealanders to see themselves as something different in their relations with others than they had previously: a bicultural nation independent from past Western affiliations. Made evident after the Tiananmen Square protests, differences in views over human rights became the first major barrier to further development since recognition yet did little to deter continuing interaction. China and New Zealand had established a relationship that voiced opposition yet prioritised cooperation and mutually beneficial exchange.

The final period of analysis is the contemporary period beginning in approximately 1994. Both Deng's Southern tour in 1992 and the National Government's trade policy in 1993 emphasised widening economic interaction with external players. From 1992 Jiang recontinued Deng's modernisation programme, establishing the neo-liberal policies as a norm followed by Chinese leadership ever since. In Jim Bolger's case, while he initially furthered the reforms of his predecessors, from 1993 he withheld further domestic restructuring preferring to foster external markets for economic development. Both China and New Zealand found themselves in common alignment seeking a wide array of bilateral partners as well as entry and active participation in regional and multilateral organisations. From the

mid-1990s the two nations embarked on a process of increased interaction, culminating in the five firsts and the Comprehensive Strategic Partnership of 2014. The 2008 NZ-China FTA became the catalyst for arrangements with other nations, which both NZ and China negotiated in rapid succession.

For the first time in its history, New Zealand has a major trading partner so different in language, culture, history, ideology and political systems, not just from itself, but from any key historical relationship. As one commentator notes, New Zealand leaders seek ontological security in engagement with China, which reaffirms its identity as a small, trade-dependent nation.⁵ While I also argue our affinity to the UK and US is mitigated in interaction with China, and in consequence, a NZ identity is promulgated, I conclude that independence is also emphasised in the relationship.

Notably, China is not driven by the same socialist ideology to the extent it was in its past. Its current pursuit of national rejuvenation, largely seen in Xi's China Dream, underpins governing legitimacy demanding a peaceful external environment and continued economic development. With a renegotiation of the NZ-China FTA currently underway, and recent rhetoric from both leaders committing to the Comprehensive Strategic Partnership, this trend of deepening interaction is likely to continue.

The current level of engagement between NZ and China comes from a joint commitment to international integration following neo-liberal reform and has seen the two embark on the five firsts and Comprehensive Strategic Partnership of 2014. While this suggests a unique trend of closer interaction, the current relationship comes from a congruence in each country's wider foreign policy paradigm emerging in the 1990s. Yet ideational considerations also underpin the relationship.

⁵ Jason Young, 'Seeking Ontological Security Through the Rise of China: New Zealand as a Small Trading Nation', *The Pacific Review* 30, no. 4 (4 July 2017): 513–30, <https://doi.org/10.1080/09512748.2016.1264457>.

The current pursuit for national rejuvenation is highlighted as a driver of foreign policy in China, stemming from its past history as the victim of national humiliation. Although China's return to great power status will primarily be facilitated via economic development, nationalism has since replaced Mao Zedong Thought as the dominant ideology of the CCP, a crucial aspect of party legitimacy. While certain aspects of China's nationalism promote benevolence and enhance soft power, prompting Chinese leaders to be more constructive in world affairs, it also demands that leaders be more assertive in protecting national image and territory. In recent years China has become more aggressive in the South China Sea (SCS), constructing military outposts in the area and disputing the United Nations Conventions on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) ruling regarding the Spratly Islands. I conclude that future engagement with NZ is dependent on how leaders balance the pursuit of economic development with nationalist ambition.

Similarly, NZ promotes itself as a bicultural nation independent in its foreign relations, yet also holds what Jason Young asserts as an identity as a good international citizen.⁶ This has promoted leaders to voice concern when they do not agree with Chinese actions, seen in recent decades regarding human rights and violations of international law in the SCS. While this has done little to deter closer engagement, I argue that deepening relations with China is dependent on how New Zealanders and New Zealand leaders balance these two aspects of their identity in response to further challenges.

The thesis is structured as follows. I firstly explain my methodology before canvassing dominant literature. The following chapters correlate to the three dominant periods in the relationship. I conclude by summarising the causal factors in what either facilitated or prevented closer engagement in each period, before assessing dominant trends and future implications.

⁶ Ibid.

Methodology

I use a mix of process tracing and general theory to identify causal mechanisms and prominent sequences in the NZ–China relationship since 1949, leading to a small-n, cross-case and within-case comparison. My cases are chosen from dominant international relations (IR) theory which also emerge in the NZ-China literature as explanations for my dependent variable, deepened NZ-China relations. These are rational choice, institutionalisation, and ideationalism. Seawright and Gerring call these styles of cases “influential”, as they aim to check general assumptions of a causal relationship.¹ As these cases align with IR theory, each holds general assumptions towards deepened NZ-China engagement. Therefore, my cases act as independent variables and are tested for causality against my dependent variable. I will discuss these cases as well as the process of measuring and defining my dependent variable in the next chapter. These tests for causality, as James Mahoney highlights, seek to answer: was variable X a cause of Y in time Z; yet are part of a larger framework of process tracing.²

Collier defines process tracing as “an analytic tool for drawing descriptive and causal inferences from diagnostic pieces of evidence — often understood as part of a temporal sequence of events or phenomena”.³ Process tracing is used in its ability to trace causal mechanisms, an intervening step leading to an outcome, between an independent variable and the dependent variable.⁴ This “enables the researcher to make strong within-case inferences about the causal process whereby outcomes are

¹ Jason Seawright and John Gerring, ‘Case Selection Techniques in Case Study Research: A Menu of Qualitative and Quantitative Options’, *Political Research Quarterly* 61, no. 2 (1 June 2008): 303–4, <https://doi.org/10.1177/1065912907313077>.

² James Mahoney, ‘The Logic of Process Tracing Tests in the Social Sciences’, *Sociological Methods & Research* 41, no. 4 (1 November 2012): 570–71, <https://doi.org/10.1177/0049124112437709>.

³ David Collier, ‘Understanding Process Tracing’, *PS: Political Science & Politics* 44, no. 4 (October 2011): 824, <https://doi.org/10.1017/S1049096511001429>.

⁴ Derek Beach and Rasmus Brun Pedersen, *Process-Tracing Methods Foundations and Guidelines*, UPCC Book Collections on Project MUSE (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2013), 1; Mahoney, ‘The Logic of Process Tracing Tests’, 272.

produced, enabling us to update the degree of confidence we hold in the validity of a theorized causal mechanism”.⁵

To Mahoney, its foundation is in descriptive analysis of causation and change via within-case analysis.⁶ This method enables the empirical benefit of qualitative research. Drawing from what Beach and Pederson call account and trace evidence, my causal tests are grounded in historical events, speeches, government publications, press releases and also include a wide array of secondary research and analysis.⁷

However, process tracing also enables data set observations typical of quantitative research.⁸ Sequences and patterns are produced from identifying the causal mechanisms in each time period, which can then be subject to further analysis. As I have two subjects, NZ and China, I structure each series of tests in two parts, the first half assessing data pertaining to NZ, the second pertaining to China. This is necessary as my independent variables — rational choice, institutions and ideational factors — draw from two different data sets. The ideational beliefs of China, for example, are not the exact same as those held in NZ and require separate analysis.

With $n=3$ in my small- n comparison, three temporal sequences, and two subjects of analysis, I have 18 data points of causal inference. This, along with my findings, is represented in Table 1 at the end of this chapter. I supplement my within-case comparison, which identifies causal mechanisms pertaining to each nation’s deepening of the relationship, with cross-case comparisons arising from the data, which should reveal the causal mechanisms of a deepening relationship when compared between both

⁵ Ibid.

⁶ James Mahoney, ‘After KKV: The New Methodology of Qualitative Research’, *World Politics* 62, no. 1 (January 2010): 125–31, <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0043887109990220>; Collier, 823.

⁷ Beach and Pedersen, 99–100.

⁸ Collier, 823.

subjects, NZ and China. This is what Beach and Pederson call sequence and pattern evidence, revealed through the evaluation of statistical patterns and examining the spatial and temporal chronology of events.⁹ I report on these findings in my concluding chapter.

My dependent variable, the deepened diplomatic and economic relationship between New Zealand and China, is tested against independent and intervening variables. These are broad and deserve thorough explanation.

Rational Choice Variables

These are mostly, but not limited to, the major actors in defining policy. In New Zealand's case this analysis primarily focuses on the Prime Minister. During the period from 1949-1971, however, no diplomatic interaction existed. Emphasis is given to other key NZ actors who were involved with China.

A further exception to this structure is Roger Douglas in Chapter Two. He emerged as an integral figure in the Fourth Labour Government's neo-liberal reform programme, yet it is difficult to distinguish his motives from the reforms themselves. Therefore, significant explanation regarding his role is incorporated in the institutional section of Chapter Two.

The nature of the Chinese state makes it difficult to separate the role of core leader from institutions or dominant ideology, as often these are driven by the leader himself. This is perhaps the biggest shortfall of using this method. While internal processes and state-led ideologies are tested for causality, and subsequently the leaders' motivations in enacting these policies, in testing rational choice the leader is often compared to his predecessors and successors amidst analysis of his own personal situation. The integration of the leader in other aspects of Chinese society was mitigated in doing so but could not be

⁹ Beach and Pedersen, 99-100.

removed entirely. In all except the case of Zhou Enlai, who was integral in conducting China's foreign policy under Mao, analysis is directed towards the motives and beliefs of the core leader.

Institutional Variables

These are broad and many. They include internal factors: the economic and political structure of each nation; or more specifically, the arrangement of party, government, what the dominant economic processes were and how they were enacted. The role of the public and military are also considered to be major internal institutions.

Similarly there are many external considerations. Firstly, military and economic agreements with other nations. These are both formal; written treaties with other nations, and informal; norms of processes developed over time. China's relationship with the USSR, North Korea and the United States, as well as, New Zealand's relationship with the United States and United Kingdom are all intervening variables.

They also include international institutions; the United Nations, the World Trade Organisation, and various smaller interregional organisations and agreements: ASEAN, the SCO, the CPTPP, BRICS, among others.

Ideational Variables

China's endorsed, state-driven ideology is explored alongside nationalist sentiment; often these are intertwined. These include Marxist-Leninist underpinnings of the Communist Revolution, and the official ideologies of each leader: Maoism, Dengism, Jiang's Three Represents, Hu's Harmonious Society and Scientific Outlook on Development, and Xi's China Dream. Further, identity, history and culture are looked at from a nationalist framework, embodied in the narrative of the century of humiliation and the rejuvenation of China's great power status.

New Zealand comes from a vastly different socio-historical and cultural background to China. A former British colony, sentiment towards the UK as the mother country dominated post WWII. Joint antipathy towards Communism factored into the relationship with the US. This is underpinned by New Zealand being Western, sharing liberal values with many other nations. However, as dependence on the US and UK waned, anti-nuclear sentiment and commitment to biculturalism grew, meaning New Zealand's identity began to morph into what I label, an 'independent-oriented, trade-dependent nation'. Anti-Chinese sentiment is also considered a factor in this relationship.

There are additional drawbacks to using this method. The inherent power symmetry between NZ and China make causal intent unclear from China in reference to NZ. Where NZ has specific policies and regular high-profile commentary regarding China, outside of state visits this is not frequently reciprocated. Direct causation of a deepening relationship from China is more often inferred than a direct cause. Further, 1949-1971 is not characterised by a deepening relationship. Therefore, it is necessary to adapt Mahoney's original formula to account for the causal factors in inhibiting deeper relations: is variable X a cause *in enabling or preventing* Y in time Z. This is used for each test, not solely in Chapter One. Further, small-n comparison is a practical way to measure causality, yet as I have shown, my independent variables are drawn from dominant theory and are broad in their application, as are the intervening variables. This makes it less likely to ascertain direct causality, or more specifically, which intervening variable within my independent variable dominates causality. The nature of this thesis limits further exploration and could be subject for further research. However, as Mahoney argues, the process tracing method, in combining pre-existing generalisations with temporal and spatial observations, can deduce causal inference.¹⁰ Despite some shortcomings, the method provides a justified framework to answer my research problem.

¹⁰ Mahoney, 'The Logic of Process Tracing Tests', 570.

Table 1. Did the independent variables enable (e) or prevent (p) deeper engagement between New Zealand and China?

	Independent Variables					
	Rational Choice		Institutions		Ideational	
	NZ	China	NZ	China	NZ	China
Chapter 1: 1949 – 1971	N	Y (p)	Y (p)	Y (p)	Y (p)	Y (p)
Chapter 2: 1972 – 1993	N	Y (e)	Y (e)	Y (e)	N	N
Chapter 3: 1994 – 2019	N	Y (e)	Y (e)	Y (e)	Y (e)	Y (e)

Note: Y = yes; N = no

Literature Review

In 2018, the Executive Director of the New Zealand China Council claimed “these are amongst the best of times for the New Zealand China relationship”, echoing calls from Chinese Academic Professor Han Feng, who in 2012 asserted “Sino-New Zealand relations have been defined as the best in history, a win-win cooperation model between the West and China”.¹ This chapter canvases recent literature on the New Zealand-China relationship to define exactly what the relationship is, while highlighting dominant IR theories for systematic explanations.

I use the term Comprehensive Strategic Partnership to explain the current level of deepened engagement, the term used by both the NZ and Chinese Governments to define their relationship. The literature overwhelmingly supports liberal institutionalist explanations of this partnership. NZ and China have found economic success in recent cooperation, while also becoming increasingly connected via political, social and cultural links. The scholarship also suggests realism motivates Chinese leaders. China’s growing assertiveness in the South China Sea, a voice of reform in international institutions, and claims of political influence in NZ, amongst others, suggest China as an aggressor challenging the current global order. As these explanations largely contradict the institutionalist thesis, I argue they are an unlikely cause of the comprehensive strategic partnership. Ideational considerations are a more likely explanation for China’s seemingly aggressive actions. Stemming from a century of subjugation from foreign powers, the pursuit of national rejuvenation motivates China to act as a responsible global power, yet to also viciously defend its territorial claims. From New Zealand’s side, ideational factors have only recently emerged as an explanation for this partnership and are underdeveloped in the wider

¹ Stephen Jacobi, ‘Dancing with the Dragon’, *New Zealand International Review* 43, no. 3 (June 2018): 20.; Han Feng, ‘The Growing Relationship’, in *Forty Years On: New Zealand-China Relations, Then, Now and in the Years to Come*, ed. Chris Elder (Wellington: Victoria University Press for the New Zealand Contemporary China Research Centre, 2013), 21

literature. Through engagement with China, New Zealand is able to emphasise its identity as a small trading nation and a good international citizen. In analysing the literature, I also propose independent choice as another guiding paradigm.

Since 2014 both Chinese and New Zealand leadership have defined the relationship as a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership, emerging from “deepening mutual trust and understanding, and the expansion of practical cooperation and exchanges”.² Both sides committed to closer integration across a broader framework: furthering the dialogue and contact between various levels of government; increasing flows of goods and services, education, and tourists between the two countries; while also committing to cooperation in agriculture, defence, piracy, crime and climate change, amongst others.

To the New Zealand Contemporary China Research Centre (NZCCRC), this partnership has come from a consistent, bipartisan strategy where “strong political relations are a platform for growing trade and economic links, positive people-to-people exchanges and cooperation with China in regional forums”.³ The NZCCRC elaborates on this definition in a 2018 document appraising NZ’s involvement in China’s Belt and Road Initiative: “New Zealand has built on its relationship with China through diplomacy, business and people to people engagement, as it has with other important partners. It has promoted trade, regional cooperation, multilateral engagement, defence and security dialogue, educational and scientific linkages and developmental cooperation”.⁴

² New Zealand Government, ‘Joint Statement between New Zealand and the People’s Republic of China on the Establishment of a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership’, 21 November 2014, <http://www.beehive.govt.nz/release/joint-statement-between-new-zealand-and-people%E2%80%99s-republic-china-establishment-comprehensive>.

³ New Zealand Contemporary China Research Centre, ‘New Zealand’s China Policy: Building a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership’, July 2015, 4.

⁴ Jason Young and Jake Lin, ‘The Belt and Road Initiative: A New Zealand Appraisal’ (Wellington, New Zealand: New Zealand Contemporary China Research Centre, August 2018), 26.

The broader literature tends to confirm the above definition. While there are various links, the picture that emerges suggests the relationship is primarily based on economic connectivity.⁵ Since China's WTO ascension, and especially since the NZ-China FTA, there has been a rapid increase in the flows of foreign direct investment as well as goods and services.⁶ Besides trade, the number of Chinese students and tourists have been frequently cited as a significant addition to New Zealand's economy.⁷ These have also been met with increased interaction in other areas, including education cooperation, high-level ministerial visits, and a myriad of social and cultural connections.⁸ As one commentator has noted, "New Zealand's multiple connections with China are more diverse than at any other time in our history."⁹

This aspect of the relationship closely aligns to Keohane and Nye's analysis of complex interdependence, an aspect of liberal institutionalism. To liberal institutionalists, economic processes and international political institutions influence state behaviour, rather than solely material power capability.¹⁰ This environment provides sets of rules and norms which mitigate the conditions of anarchy, promoting

⁵ Scott Bowman and Patrick Conway, *China's Recent Growth and Its Impact on the New Zealand Economy*, Treasury Working Paper 13/15 (Wellington, New Zealand: The Treasury, 2013), 1; Tim Beal and Yuanfei Kang, eds., *China, New Zealand and the Complexities of Globalization: Asymmetry, Complementarity, and Competition* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016), 2–3; Huang Xiaoming and Jason Young, *China and the World Economy: Challenges and Opportunities for New Zealand*, China Research Centre Discussion Paper ; 13/01 (Wellington, New Zealand: New Zealand Contemporary China Research Centre, 2013), 84; Yuanfei Kang, 'Bilateral FDI Relations Between China and New Zealand: General Trends, Driving Forces and Perceptions', in Beal and Yuanfei Kang, 141; Jason Young, *Investing in the Economic Integration of China and New Zealand*, China Papers (Wellington, N.Z.); No. 22 (Wellington: Victoria University of Wellington, New Zealand Contemporary China Research Centre, 2009), 3.

⁶ Charles Burton and Stephen Noakes, 'Forging Free Trade with China: The Maple Leaf and the Silver Fern', *Pacific Affairs* 89 (December 2016): 842, <https://doi.org/info:doi/10.5509/2016894839>; Beal and Yuanfei Kang, 7–8; Tim Beal, 'The Flowering of the Relationship', in Beal and Yuanfei Kang, 105–107.

⁷ NZCCRC, 'New Zealand's China Policy', 60–63; Zhang Yuanyuan, 'Substantial Progress', in *Forty Years On*, ed. Chris Elder (2013), 24.

⁸ Yuanfei Kang, 'China's Economic Growth and Its Influence on New Zealand', in Beal and Yuanfei Kang, 24; NZCCRC, 'New Zealand's China Policy', 6–8; Jason Young, *Investing in the Economic Integration of China and New Zealand*, 3; Han Feng, 21.

⁹ Yuanfei Kang, 'China's Economic Growth and Its Influence on New Zealand', 24.

¹⁰ Robert O. Keohane, ed., *Neorealism and Its Critics* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986) 18; G. John Ikenberry, 'The Rise of China and the Future of the West. (Cover Story)', *Foreign Affairs* 87, no. 1 (1 February 2008): 29–30; Joseph S. Nye, 'Neorealism and Neoliberalism', *World Politics* 40, no. 2 (1988): 237, <https://doi.org/10.2307/2010363>.

cooperation and providing opportunities for mutually rewarding exchange.¹¹ Keohane and Nye argue that while states are the dominant actors in world politics, there are multiple others which connect societies, including non-governmental elites, multinational corporations, and other national, regional and international organisations.¹² States do not act as one unified body, nor are they the only units acting in the world system; the world is becoming increasingly more interconnected.¹³

Because there are multiple actors, there are multiple issues of interest between states, with the rising number of international institutions facilitating cooperation.¹⁴ To Keohane and Nye, these are “the rules and procedures that define the limits of acceptable behaviour on various issues”, and they are also the organisations that embody rules and norms.¹⁵ They are the routine patterns of behaviour of and in between actors, and may or may not have a formalised structure. Trade rules and norms are facilitated through the World Trade Organisation, while the United Nations legitimises international conflict. With NZ and China, this can be seen in the five firsts and subsequent rapid increase in interaction.

Institutions promote cooperation as they reduce transaction costs and help mitigate the uncertainties of anarchy.¹⁶ If NZ and China abide by the rules of the WTO, they gain access to each other’s markets and resources while reducing physical barriers and tariffs.¹⁷ There is benefit in cooperation, regardless if one nation benefits more than another. Absolute gains are more important than relative gains.¹⁸ Further,

¹¹ Robert O. Keohane, ‘Neoliberal Institutionalism: A Perspective on World Politics’, in *International Institutions And State Power: Essays in International Relations Theory*, ed. Robert O. Keohane (Westview Press, 1989) 10-11; Richard Ned Lebow, ‘The Long Peace, the End of the Cold War, and the Failure of Realism’, *International Organization* 48, no. 2 (ed 1994): 269, <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020818300028186>.

¹² Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, *Power and Interdependence*, 3rd ed. (Longman, 2001), 21.

¹³ *Ibid*, 3, 21; Thomas J. Christensen, *The China Challenge: Shaping the Choices of a Rising Power* (W. W. Norton & Company, 2015) xx.

¹⁴ Keohane and Nye, *Power and Interdependence*, 21-23.

¹⁵ *Ibid*, 290.

¹⁶ Keohane, ‘Neoliberal Institutionalism: A Perspective on World Politics’, 5; Robert O. Keohane, ‘Theory of World Politics’, in *Neorealism and Its Critics*, ed. Robert O. Keohane (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986), 166.

¹⁷ Keohane, ‘Theory of World Politics’, 186.

¹⁸ Keohane, ‘Neoliberal Institutionalism: A Perspective on World Politics’, 10-11.

military force and anarchy are not as likely as realism assumes.¹⁹ As China learnt after Tiananmen, institutions provide detections and punishment for disobedience.²⁰ When there are high levels of economic connectivity between nations the use of force carries a high cost. The existence of nuclear weapons also helps to mitigate the chances of major conflict.²¹

For small states such as New Zealand, institutions provide a significant reduction in costs and can act in a way in which their size would not generally permit in an anarchic world. Under UNCLOS, New Zealand has the fourth largest maritime economic area in the world, vastly disproportionate to its geographic size or economic capabilities. NZ also has been the recipient of WTO challenges for trade access to Japan, Australia and the US. Under a realist paradigm, this would be inconceivable. The protection measures attributed to small states provide significant incentive to join the liberal rules-based world order. While there are significant material benefits for NZ resulting from direct trade, the validity of the rules and norms are strengthened if China is included in them. It naturally follows that NZ would support China's ascent to the WTO and recognise its market economy.

With authors aligning China's economic success with international integration, China also benefits from these institutions.²² China's ambition to join the WTO suggests that any nation willing to assist would have been welcomed by Chinese leadership. NZ here is notably unimportant as the catalyst. However, choosing an FTA with NZ above other nations is more difficult to explain. In both relative material gain and wider international integration, there was little immediate benefit for China in the agreement.

¹⁹ Keohane and Nye, *Power and Interdependence*, 21-22.

²⁰ Daniel W. Drezner, 'Bargaining, Enforcement, and Multilateral Sanctions: When Is Cooperation Counterproductive?', *International Organization* 54, no. 1 (ed 2000): 74, <https://doi.org/10.1162/002081800551127>; Keohane, 'Theory of World Politics', 166.

²¹ Keohane and Nye, *Power and Interdependence*, 24.

²² Xiaoming Huang and Young, 2.; Guiguo Wang, 'China's FTAs: Legal Characteristics and Implications', *The American Journal of International Law* 105, no. 3 (2011): 516, <https://doi.org/10.5305/amerjintelaw.105.3.0493>; David Zweig and Chen Zhimin, eds., *China's Reforms and International Political Economy*, (London: Routledge, 2007) xvi.

Some have suggested an FTA was signed with NZ because our trade is so unimportant.²³ That NZ has a small economy makes it manageable for China to trial a new process with a Western nation, one which it could then replicate with other countries.

Liberal institutionalism provides several suggestions contributing to the China-NZ relationship. Both NZ and China benefit from the rules and norms of international institutions. By cooperating under these rules, it strengthens their validity and discourages disobedience from them. What NZ gains in relative material benefit, China gains in absolute terms. NZ's small stature is a benefit for China to trial new initiatives at minimal cost.

However, this thesis contrasts with the views of a University of Canterbury academic who has claimed NZ is the target of a Chinese influence campaign to further the political and economic agenda of the PRC. This is done so by "coopting local elites, securing access to strategic information and resources, and manipulating public discourse".²⁴ To Anne-Marie Brady, NZ is under pressure to make political concessions in exchange for economic benefit. With increased interaction, New Zealand's political system and sovereignty is at risk.²⁵

Brady's claims strongly align with a realist interpretation of the relationship. Cooperation with NZ is secondary to facilitating relative gains. Noting the dominant asymmetry in the relationship, Brady suggests that China supplements what it is not receiving in material benefit through a united front campaign to co-opt political elites and public discourse. This helps explain why NZ has been hesitant to voice concerns of China's actions in the South China Sea or take a more assertive stand against human rights in bilateral dialogues.

²³ Chris Elder, *Forty Years On*, 31; Burton and Noakes, 845.

²⁴ Anne-Marie Brady, 'New Zealand and the CCP'S "Magic Weapons"', *Journal of Democracy* 29, no. 2 (10 April 2018): 68–9/ 74, <https://doi.org/10.1353/jod.2018.0026>.

²⁵ *Ibid*, 68–75.

Realist theory dominated the field of international relations for most of the 20th century.²⁶ Drawing from Kenneth Waltz's structural analysis of the world system, modern neo-realists believe the distribution of material capabilities under conditions of anarchy influence state behaviour and their willingness to work together. Cooperation is limited as states are cautious of the intentions of others in their pursuit of survival.²⁷ Neo-realists share several fundamental assumptions about international politics.

Firstly, states are the primary actors in this system.²⁸ To Waltz, a centralised and hierarchic structure emerges domestically through agents who have "formal relations of super- and subordination" as well as those that have "system-wide authority".²⁹ Internationally there is no differentiation between states as to the functions they perform, only in their capabilities to perform them.³⁰

Secondly, without an overarching central authority, states exist in anarchy.³¹ To Waltz, "each [state] is the equal of the others. None is entitled to command; none is required to obey. International systems are decentralized and anarchic".³² Anarchy does not mean a constant struggle of violence. Rather, as states may use force at any time, the threat of violence is always present.³³

²⁶ Keohane, 'Theory of World Politics', 158.

²⁷ Joseph M. Grieco, *Cooperation Among Nations: Europe, America, and Non-Tariff Barriers to Trade* (Cornell University Press, 1990), 1.

²⁸ Ibid, 3 ; Kenneth N. Waltz, *Theory of International Politics* (Waveland Press, 2010); Robert Gilpin, 'The Richness of the Tradition of Political Realism', in *Neorealism and Its Critics*, ed. Robert O. Keohane (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986), 305; Stephen M. Walt, 'The Progressive Power of Realism', *The American Political Science Review* 91, no. 4 (1997): 932, <https://doi.org/10.2307/2952177>.

²⁹ Waltz, 81, 88.

³⁰ Ibid, 93.

³¹ Gilpin, 304; Grieco, 'Cooperation Among Nations', 20-1; John J. Mearsheimer, *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics* (Norton, 2001), 30; Stephen M Walt, 'US Grand Strategy after the Cold War: Can Realism Explain It? Should Realism Guide It?', *International Relations* 32, no. 1 (1 March 2018): 7, <https://doi.org/10.1177/0047117817753272>.

³² Waltz, 88.

³³ Ibid, 102.

Thirdly, survival is the underlying motive of states, acting as a pre-requisite to achieving other goals.³⁴ As Waltz argues, “states have to do whatever they think necessary for their own preservation, since no one can be relied on to do it for them”.³⁵ Anything a state attains, be it security, wealth or prestige, is due to the efforts of the state itself. In this anarchic environment, each is responsible for their own fate and must act by self-help.³⁶

States act to increase their material capabilities, largely via economic and military means to best guarantee their survival. Cooperation is limited under these conditions. Even if both states gain in mutual-cooperation, there is fear over the actions and intentions of other actors. Increased capabilities could be used “to implement a policy intended to damage or destroy” other states.³⁷ To Joseph Grieco, “the fundamental goal of states in any relationship is to prevent others from achieving advances in their relative capabilities”.³⁸ Realists believe relative gains are more important than absolute gains; states will always question who is gaining more in a relationship.

However, anarchy and self-help lead states to cooperate under certain conditions. While states move to increase economic and military strength, they also increase alliances with others.³⁹ Waltz contends that weaker states balance with rising states as they can gain more from them.⁴⁰ In light of a challenge states “bandwagon” with the stronger state.⁴¹

Taking these claims, we can assume both NZ and China are in a relationship to benefit themselves, yet cooperation is secondary to facilitating relative gains. As a small island nation dependent on trade,

³⁴ Ibid, 104-5; Grieco, '*Cooperation Among Nations*', 21; Mearsheimer, *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics*, 31.

³⁵ Waltz, 109.

³⁶ Grieco, '*Cooperation Among Nations*', 21.

³⁷ Waltz, 105.

³⁸ Joseph M. Grieco, 'Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation: A Realist Critique of the Newest Liberal Institutionalism', *International Organization* 42, no. 3 (ed 1988): 498, <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020818300027715>.

³⁹ Waltz, 118.

⁴⁰ Ibid, 118.

⁴¹ Ibid, 126.

strong ties with China help mitigate New Zealand's economic vulnerabilities. This not only explains NZ's relationship with China, but also its relationship with many other great powers, including the UK, US, EU and Japan. Following from Thucydides, NZ is doing what it must to survive – increasing wealth through trade. Economic gain motivates New Zealand to cooperate in an anarchic system.

Evidence supports that relative to China, New Zealand has made substantial economic gains in this relationship. While two-way trade between the countries tripled between 2008-2018 reaching \$30B, China's gross GDP is 115 times larger than NZ's when measured against purchasing power parity.⁴² As Tim Beal asserts: "China is of crucial importance to New Zealand, that importance is not reciprocal. New Zealand is of very limited significance to China."⁴³ There does not seem to be any relative advantage through trade to benefit China in this relationship in anywhere near the capacity it benefits NZ. This suggests China is making gains in other areas, leading support to Brady's thesis.

Further, the growing NZ-China relationship is congruent with a rise of China in world affairs. Waltz argues that states "at a minimum, seek their own preservation, and at a maximum, strive for universal domination".⁴⁴ Enhancing economic capability is prioritised domestically in order to increase military strength, while externally, moves are made to strengthen and enlarge alliances.⁴⁵ Realism suggests with closer ties, NZ is aligning with China as a balance against the US in a challenge for hegemony.

Recently John Mearsheimer has argued China's rise will bring an intense security competition. Power is currently being sought to balance against the US, and the two will lead orders that will compete with each other in the economic and military realms. Cold War-esque military alliances will be a core part of

⁴² Statistics New Zealand, 'New Zealand's Two-Way Trade with China'; Tim Beal, 'New Zealand and the Complexities of Globalization', in Beal and Yuanfei Kang, 206, https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-137-51690-9_7.

⁴³ Beal, 'New Zealand and the Complexities of Globalization', 212-3.

⁴⁴ Waltz, 118.

⁴⁵ Ibid.

this process.⁴⁶ Some have also argued of a growing “assertiveness” in China’s territorial disputes.⁴⁷ A willingness to flex growing military capabilities supports Waltz’s balance of power theory.

However, realism does not explain NZ’s actions. Along with China, New Zealand has increased economic and diplomatic interaction with many of the world’s nations, including the US. Bandwagoning does not explain why NZ speaks out against China’s violations of international law, nor its criticisms against the US-led invasion of Iraq or the Australian refusal to allow UN human rights inspectors to visit amongst concerns of its treatment of asylum seekers. Considering NZ’s multitrack trade policy, while promoting regional and international cooperation, great power alignment does not explain NZ’s interaction with other nations.

Regarding China, several authors question the validity of China’s assertiveness.⁴⁸ China is able to protect its core interests, yet wishes to minimise political cost to maintain positive ties with the US and regional stakeholders.⁴⁹ While China may be seeking increased presence and influence in other countries, it is unlikely to do so if it means threatening the peaceful external environment which facilitates economic modernisation. That economic integration has already shown de-escalations of conflict with Japan over the Diaoyu Islands, China’s rise steers towards liberal co-operation, not realist conflict.⁵⁰ While it is impossible to definitively claim China is not priming NZ as a member of an anti-US alliance in a bid for

⁴⁶ John J. Mearsheimer, ‘Bound to Fail: The Rise and Fall of the Liberal International Order’, *International Security* 43, no. 4 (April 2019): 7–50, https://doi.org/10.1162/isec_a_00342.

⁴⁷ Michael Yahuda, ‘China’s New Assertiveness in the South China Sea’, *Journal of Contemporary China* 22, no. 81 (1 May 2013): 446–59, <https://doi.org/10.1080/10670564.2012.748964>; Carlyle A. Thayer, ‘Chinese Assertiveness in the South China Sea and Southeast Asian Responses’, *Journal of Current Southeast Asian Affairs* 30, no. 2 (June 2011): 77–104, <https://doi.org/10.1177/186810341103000205>.

⁴⁸ Alastair Iain Johnston, ‘How New and Assertive Is China’s New Assertiveness?’, *International Security* 37, no. 4 (5 April 2013): 7–48; Yan Xuetong, ‘From Keeping a Low Profile to Striving for Achievement’, *The Chinese Journal of International Politics* 7, no. 2 (1 June 2014): 153–84, <https://doi.org/10.1093/cjip/pou027>.

⁴⁹ Joel Wuthnow, *Chinese Diplomacy and the UN Security Council: Beyond the Veto* (London, United Kingdom: Routledge, 2012), 2, <http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/auckland/detail.action?docID=1105872>.

⁵⁰ Min Gyo Koo, ‘The Senkaku/Diaoyu Dispute and Sino-Japanese Political-Economic Relations: Cold Politics and Hot Economics?’, *The Pacific Review* 22, no. 2 (3 June 2009): 205, <https://doi.org/10.1080/09512740902815342>.

hegemony, the evidence suggests this is not the case. Liberal institutionalism better explains China's motivations for deeper engagement with NZ.

Both realism and liberalism help explain the behaviour of states through the material distribution of power in a system of anarchy. The failure of these theories to explain the dissolution of the Soviet Bloc and collapse of the Soviet Union helped give rise to constructivist theory.⁵¹ Constructivists seek explanations to international relations through social factors rather than material structure, giving prominence to shared ideas, history, culture and norms which then influence identities, interests and state behaviour.⁵² Similar considerations impact the deepening of relations between NZ and China.

To Alexander Wendt, "material resources only acquire meaning for human action through the structure of shared knowledge in which they are embedded".⁵³ Nuclear weapons held by North Korea or ISIL, hold a different meaning than 100s held by Great Britain, France, or even New Zealand. While the material object would remain the same, the meaning given to those objects is developed through subjective beliefs and the perceived identity of actors.

⁵¹ Thomas Risse-Kappen, 'Ideas Do Not Float Freely: Transnational Coalitions, Domestic Structures, and the End of the Cold War', *International Organization* 48, no. 2 (ed 1994): 18, <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020818300028162>; Richard Price and Christian Reus-Smit, 'Dangerous Liaisons?: Critical International Theory and Constructivism, Critical International Theory and Constructivism', *European Journal of International Relations* 4, no. 3 (1 September 1998): 264-5, <https://doi.org/10.1177/1354066198004003001>.

⁵² John Gerard Ruggie, 'What Makes the World Hang Together? Neo-Utilitarianism and the Social Constructivist Challenge', *International Organization* 52, no. 4 (1998): 856; Sheri Berman, 'Ideas, Norms, and Culture in Political Analysis', ed. Ronald Inglehart et al., *Comparative Politics* 33, no. 2 (2001): 246, <https://doi.org/10.2307/422380>; Alexander Wendt, 'Anarchy Is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics', *International Organization* 46, no. 2 (1992): 394; Emanuel Adler, 'Seizing the Middle Ground: Constructivism in World Politics', *European Journal of International Relations* 3, no. 3 (1 September 1997): 322-3, <https://doi.org/10.1177/1354066197003003003>.

⁵³ Alexander Wendt, 'Constructing International Politics', *International Security* 20, no. 1 (1995): 73, <https://doi.org/10.2307/2539217>.

Shared ideas determine the identities and interests of actors. Ideas and identity, rather than the distribution of power, influence behaviour and interaction.⁵⁴ To Wendt, anarchy does not dictate the structure of the international system, it “does not predict whether two states will be friends or foes, will recognize each other's sovereignty, will have dynastic ties, will be revisionist or status quo powers, and so on”.⁵⁵ Anarchy is what states make of it.

Finally, ideas and beliefs, along with the identities and interests of actors, are in a constant process of reciprocal interaction and adaptation. States, norms and institutions are not static but are being continually revised via this process.⁵⁶ Communist ideology propelled mass action through Mao's tenure, yet failed to resist calls for democratic reform in Tiananmen Square. Similarly, NZ anti-nuclear sentiment in the 70s and 80s led the Fourth Labour Government to deny ship visits from the US as they would not confirm the presence of nuclear weapons. However, a ship visit from the USS Sampson in 2016 failed to elicit the same response from the NZ public. Ideas, beliefs and identities are not fixed.

To first understand the motivation to cooperate, under constructivist theory we must first assess the ideas, norms and identities held by actors. When applying this to China, modern identity comes from a historic blend of Confucian values, Maoist doctrine and a more recent belief in a liberalised market system.⁵⁷ This fusion of values is marketed by Chinese leadership as “socialism with Chinese

⁵⁴ Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink, 'Taking Stock: The Constructivist Research Program in International Relations and Comparative Politics', *Annual Review of Political Science* 4, no. 1 (1 June 2001): 391, <https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev.polisci.4.1.391>; Price and Reus-Smit, 'Dangerous Liaisons?', 260.

⁵⁵ Wendt, 'Anarchy Is What States Make of It', 396.

⁵⁶ Price and Reus-Smit, 260; Finnemore and Sikkink, 391; Ruggie, 856.

⁵⁷ Jeremy Paltiel, 'Hinges and Latches on the Open Door: The Normative Parameters of China's WTO Accession', in *China's Reforms and International Political Economy*, ed. Zweig and Chen Zhimin, 132.; Huiyun Feng, *Chinese Strategic Culture and Foreign Policy Decision-Making: Confucianism, Leadership and War* (Routledge, 2007), https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203088906_i; John K. Fairbank and Merle Goldman, *China: A New History* (Cambridge, USA: Harvard University Press, 2009), 51, <http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/auckland/detail.action?docID=4642417>; Suisheng Zhao, 'The China Model: Can It Replace the Western Model of Modernization?', *Journal of Contemporary China* 19, no. 65 (1 June 2010): 419, <https://doi.org/10.1080/10670561003666061>.

characteristics”.⁵⁸ Formally, China was the dominant cultural, political and economic force in East Asia. The English translation of the word ‘China’ loses the stature which asserts the nature as being the centre of civilisation, 中国, ‘the middle kingdom’. At the subjugation of foreign powers, China experienced a century of humiliation, losing this dominant position. This aspect of China’s past helps fuel China’s identity today, as a nation that has been treated unjustly and had its sovereignty and territory exploited by other great powers.⁵⁹

While economic prosperity and political preservation are significant concerns for the CCP domestically, international foreign policy focuses on the return to great power status.⁶⁰ President Xi focused on this during the 19th Party Congress in 2017:

The original aspiration and the mission of Chinese Communists is to seek happiness for the Chinese people and rejuvenation for the Chinese nation. The aspirations of the people to live a better life must always be the focus of our efforts. We must keep on striving with endless energy toward the great goal of national rejuvenation.⁶¹

Improving the livelihoods of the Chinese people is a key to national rejuvenation, making economic development a central aspect of China’s return to great power status.

⁵⁸ Xi Jinping, ‘Secure a Decisive Victory in Building a Moderately Prosperous Society in All Respects and Strive for the Great Success of Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era’ (Report delivered at the 19th National Congress of the Communist Party of China, 18 October 2017), http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/special/2017-11/03/c_136725942.htm.

⁵⁹ Suisheng Zhao, ‘Foreign Policy Implications of Chinese Nationalism Revisited: The Strident Turn’, *Journal of Contemporary China* 22, no. 82 (1 July 2013): 536, <https://doi.org/10.1080/10670564.2013.766379>; Anne-Marie Brady, *Making the Foreign Serve China: Managing Foreigners in the People’s Republic* (Rowman & Littlefield, 2003), 249; Peter Hays Gries, *China’s New Nationalism: Pride, Politics, and Diplomacy*, 1st ed. (University of California Press, 2004) 45, <http://www.jstor.org.ezproxy.auckland.ac.nz/stable/10.1525/j.ctt1pq06f>.

⁶⁰ Yong Deng and Fei-Ling Wang, *China Rising: Power and Motivation in Chinese Foreign Policy* (Lanham, US: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2004), 14. <http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/auckland/detail.action?docID=1501699>; Zhao, ‘The China Model’ 540; Michael D. Swaine et al, *Interpreting China’s Grand Strategy: Past, Present and Future* (Santa Monica, United States: Rand Corporation, The, 2000) ix-x.; Yong Deng, ‘China’s Struggle for Status’, Cambridge Core, April 2008, 2. <https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511790768>.

⁶¹ Xi Jinping, ‘Secure a Decisive Victory’, 0.

There are two trends within the scholarship as to how this nationalism impacts cooperation between China and other nations. Firstly, in response to challenges to China's territorial integrity, this nationalism fuels assertiveness and aggression.⁶² In China's maritime disputes, and issues concerning Japan, Taiwan and Tibet, assertiveness is a significant factor.⁶³ When President Xi notes a primary goal of the party is the "building [of] a strong military in the new era ... to build the people's forces into world-class forces that obey the Party's command, [and] can fight and win", future aggression becomes more than a possibility, but a threat to challengers.⁶⁴ This nationalist sentiment fuels China's building and militarising islands in the South China Sea, as well as rejecting the UNCLOS ruling that China has no legitimate claim to the Spratly Islands. China sees these areas as its own and is justified to neglect international ruling. Xi promises to use military force for any direct challenges on its territory in the future. Speaking at the prospect of Taiwanese separatism, Xi asserts China "will never allow anyone, any organization, or any political party, at any time or in any form, to separate any part of Chinese territory from China!"⁶⁵

The second strand of thought acknowledges nationalism fuelling a benevolent and responsible China in world affairs. Building prestige and gaining high international status is one pathway to achieve national rejuvenation.⁶⁶ Joshua Kurlantzick argues China has been pursuing a "Charm Offensive" after Tiananmen Square, employing a global strategy of cooperation, public diplomacy, aid and trade to improve its

⁶² Swaine et al, x; Michael Yahuda, 'China's New Assertiveness in the South China Sea', 446; Zhao, 'Foreign Policy Implications of Chinese Nationalism Revisited' 535; Dingding Chen, Xiaoyu Pu, and Alastair Iain Johnston, 'Debating China's Assertiveness', *International Security* 38, no. 3 (2013): 176.

⁶³ James Reilly, 'Harmonious World and Public Opinion in China's Japan Policy', in *'Harmonious World' and China's New Foreign Policy*, ed. Sujian Guo and Jean-Marc F. Blanchard (Lexington Books, 2008) 212; Kai Quek and Alastair Iain Johnston, 'Can China Back Down?: Crisis De-Escalation in the Shadow of Popular Opposition', *International Security* 42, no. 3 (2017): 36.

⁶⁴ Xi Jinping, 'Secure a Decisive Victory', 16.

⁶⁵ *Ibid*, 51.

⁶⁶ Yong Deng, 'Better Than Power: "International Status"', in Yong Deng and Fei-Ling Wang, 67.; Hongying Wang, 'National Image Building in Chinese Foreign Policy', in Yong Deng and Fei-Ling Wang, 74; Avery Goldstein, *Rising to the Challenge: China's Grand Strategy and International Security* (Stanford University Press, 2005), 12; Joshua Kurlantzick, *Charm Offensive: How China's Soft Power Is Transforming the World* (Yale University Press, 2007).

image. China now can portray itself as a benign, peaceful and constructive actor in the world.⁶⁷ Even considering China's aggression, many actors have strengthened military, economic and diplomatic relations with China.

Such techniques are evident of soft power, what Joseph Nye defines as:

[T]he ability to get what you want through attraction rather than coercion or payments. It arises from the attractiveness of a country's culture, political ideals, and policies. When... policies are seen as legitimate in the eyes of others ... soft power is enhanced.⁶⁸

Under this model, increased ties with New Zealand could be part of China's soft power strategy to build prestige and increase outside perception of it as a responsible, cooperative partner. While a peaceful external environment is fundamental for economic development, China's Peaceful Development strategy attempts to mitigate the threat of China's increased presence in global affairs, as well as improve its reputation and attractiveness to others. To become a great power again, or 大国, China needs to make friends, not enemies.⁶⁹

Bringing this ideational framework to New Zealand, identity stems from being a settler colony founded on a partnership between Māori and the British. New Zealand is a small island in the South Pacific far from any markets, meaning "[t]rade is essential to New Zealand's high standard of living".⁷⁰ Protests in the 1980s over race relations, the instalment of a Government Tribunal to assess Crown breaches under Te Tiriti o Waitangi, and the NZ Government ensuring the Treaty is protected in international trade agreements, shows the relationship between Māori and Pākehā as an essential aspect of contemporary

⁶⁷ Kurlantzick, 16.

⁶⁸ Joseph S. Nye, *Soft Power: The Means To Success In World Politics* (PublicAffairs, 2009), x.

⁶⁹ Kurlantzick, 37-45.

⁷⁰ Stephen Hoadley, *New Zealand Trade Negotiations* (Wellington: The New Zealand Institute of International Affairs, 2017), 1.

NZ.⁷¹ A bicultural focus contrasts to the British-oriented identity of the past, with ties to the UK gradually loosening over the 20th century. Along with the breaking of ANZUS in the 1980s, NZ no longer has the world's major superpower as an ally.

New Zealand shares liberal democratic values with many other nations, with aims to "pursue principles of democracy, the rule of law and human rights".⁷² China's authoritarian political system naturally contrasts to New Zealand's liberal values, and at times, has led to disagreements amongst leadership regarding China's treatment of citizens. However, New Zealand since 1972 has been a supporter of the one-China policy, and despite a break in relations after Tiananmen, differing values have done little to mitigate interaction between the two countries.

Recent commentary suggests that the relationship with China extends beyond material considerations. Jason Young argues New Zealand leaders seek ontological security in relations with China, which supports our identity as a "good international citizen" and a "small trading nation".⁷³ The NZ Government's four-track foreign policy objectives are seen to achieve these goals.⁷⁴ By supporting the rules-based system, increasing bilateral relationships with other nations and being an active member in international organisations, NZ is fulfilling its role as a good international citizen. By diversifying its economic portfolio, NZ is using its identity as a small trading nation to mitigate vulnerabilities.

⁷¹ New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 'Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP): Māori Interests', New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, accessed 16 July 2018, <https://www.mfat.govt.nz/en/trade/free-trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements-concluded-but-not-in-force/cptpp/maori-interests/>.

⁷² Murray McCully, 'Promoting the New Zealand Brand', *New Zealand International Review* 42, no. 4 (7 August 2017): 2–5.

⁷³ Jason Young, 'Seeking Ontological Security through the Rise of China'. 513.

⁷⁴ MFAT, 'MFAT Annual Review 2015/16', New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, accessed 16 July 2018, <https://www.mfat.govt.nz/en/media-and-resources/ministry-statements-and-speeches/mfat-annual-review-201516/>.

Besides Young's analysis, ideational considerations explaining the NZ-China partnership are severely underdeveloped in the literature. Since NZ lost its privileged economic connection with the UK, military alliance with the US, and begun to assert itself as a distinct bicultural nation, several commentators have claimed New Zealand to be following an "independent" foreign policy.⁷⁵ Notably, this is a term frequented by politicians from Norman Kirk to Jacinda Ardern.⁷⁶ In highlighting the prevalence of "independence" in the wider scholarship, I seek to build on Young's analysis to further explain NZ's actions.

As Merwyn Norrish notes, New Zealand cannot be truly independent in foreign policy. New Zealand is dependent on trade and the rules of engagement, so it must cooperate with others to secure its interests. To Norrish, independence is not so much a material factor, but an aspect of identity.⁷⁷ Foreign policy decisions are now reached based on NZ's national interests, less influenced than in the past in following the lead of others. Malcolm McKinnon adds to this definition, noting independence became a principle for New Zealand leaders in asserting anti-nuclear policy in the ANZUS dispute, "something to

⁷⁵ NZCCRC, 'New Zealand's China Policy', 7; Robert Ayson, 'The South China Sea and New Zealand's Foreign Policy Balancing Act', in *Power Politics in Asia's Contested Waters: Territorial Disputes in the South China Sea*, ed. Enrico Fels and Truong-Minh Vu, Global Power Shift (Cham: Springer, 2016), 503; Malcolm McKinnon, *Independence and Foreign Policy: New Zealand in the World Since 1935* (Auckland [N.Z.]: Auckland University Press, 1993); Michael Bassett, 'James Brendan Bolger: An Early Assessment', *Dominion*, December 1997; Wayne Mapp, 'An Independent Foreign Policy', *New Zealand International Review* 41, no. 6 (December 2016): 6; Colin James, 'Norman Kirk, Robert Muldoon, David Lange, and Helen Clark - and John Key', *Political Science* 60, no. 2 (1 December 2008): 95–101.

⁷⁶ Malcolm McKinnon, 185; David Lange, 'New Zealand's Security Policy', *Foreign Affairs* 63, no. 5 (1985): 1019; Helen Clark, 'New Zealand's Foreign Policy' (Speech, 2 October 2007), <http://www.beehive.govt.nz/speech/oxford-union-new-zealands-foreign-policy>; John Key, 'Finding a Way in a Changing World', *New Zealand International Review* 37, no. 5 (October 2012): 10; Radio New Zealand, 'Prime Minister Jacinda Ardern on Huawei: UK and US Won't Influence New Zealand Decisions', *RNZ*, 19 February 2019, <https://www.rnz.co.nz/news/political/382824/prime-minister-jacinda-ardern-on-huawei-uk-and-us-won-t-influence-new-zealand-decisions>.

⁷⁷ Merwyn Norrish, 'Introduction', in *New Zealand in World Affairs: 1972-1990*, ed. Bruce Brown (Victoria University Press, 1999), 16–17.

be defended, rather than attained".⁷⁸ Independence in the 1970s and 1980s became a source of nationalism which New Zealanders had previously attached to Britain.⁷⁹

The prevalence of independence in the literature and in political statements, despite NZ being firmly dependent on the international system, assumes the term has become an aspect of NZ's identity affirmed through interactions with others rather than an explanation of material reality — an identity marker which reinforces NZ as an entity separate from its British heritage or US affinity. This is emphasised in the Comprehensive Strategic Partnership. As the five firsts are frequently referred to by government agencies, political commentators and leaders, NZ obtains more than the material benefit emerging from them. In being first, New Zealand's foreign policy is emphasised as a choice independent from other powers. I build on Young's argument claiming engagement with China reinforces NZ's identity as a small, trade-dependent nation and good international citizen, in proposing New Zealand is also independent oriented.

There are three major claims within recent NZ-China literature explaining the current level of engagement. The scholarship is dominated by support for liberal institutionalism, with other commentators noting realist and ideational considerations as alternative and additional reasons. Realism is more likely to explain the lack of cooperation in 1949-1972 than today. NZ bandwagoned with the UK and US to maintain economic and military security, which contrasts with NZ's current multitrack trade policy and trend of speaking against major powers when they violate international norms.

Similarly, the growing economic portfolio of China and its positive cooperation with many of the world's nations lends support to a liberal institutionalist explanation for the NZ-China partnership, though is

⁷⁸ Malcolm McKinnon, *Independence and Foreign Policy*, 300.

⁷⁹ *Ibid*, 12.

underpinned by its pursuit for national rejuvenation. I seek to prove both liberal institutional and ideational factors in the following case studies within this thesis.

However, the succeeding analysis lacks a unitary agent model. The drastic change in foreign policy post-Mao shows the personality of the leader plays a central role in policy making.⁸⁰ The preceding literature also highlights that various NZ leaders, among other actors, were prominent in enacting a pro-China policy. Therefore, I will also look at rational choice explanations behind the NZ-China partnership.

David Snidal defines rational choice theory as “a methodological approach that explains both individual and collective (social) outcomes in terms of *individual goal-seeking under constraints*”.⁸¹ The goal-seeking of relevant actors, in this case, the major actors in facilitating the NZ-China relationship, are explained via “the goals they seek, and their ability to do so”.⁸² Goals can be self-regarding, material, and ideational. To Quackenbush, “[t]his approach is grounded in the basic assumption that actors make rational choices in an attempt to reach their most preferred outcome. In addition, rational choice assumes that outcomes are the result of choices made by actors.”⁸³ If states are the dominant actor in the international system, they are presided over by individuals who make key policy decisions.

The subsequent chapters are split in two to analyse both subjects, NZ and China, yet are further divided to correspond with each of the three variables: rational choice, institutionalisation and ideationalism.

⁸⁰ Qingmin Zhang, ‘Towards an Integrated Theory of Chinese Foreign Policy: Bringing Leadership Personality Back In’, *Journal of Contemporary China* 23, no. 89 (3 September 2014): 902, <https://doi.org/10.1080/10670564.2014.882566>.

⁸¹ Duncan Snidal, ‘Rational Choice and International Relations’, in *Handbook of International Relations*, ed. Walter Carlsnaes, Thomas Risse, and Beth Simmons (London: SAGE Publications Ltd, 2013), 87, <https://doi.org/10.4135/9781446247587>.

⁸² *Ibid*, 87.

⁸³ Stephen Quackenbush, ‘The Rationality of Rational Choice Theory’, *International Interactions* 30, no. 2 (April 2004): 101, <https://doi.org/10.1080/03050620490462595>.

Chapter One 1949-1971: The Wasted Years

New Zealand

Choosing Security over Recognition

Prime Minister Peter Fraser was only in office for three months after the formation of the PRC. He opposed recognising the new China due to the aggressive nature of the Communist Revolution and that it would require NZ to break ties with the Republic of China.¹ Diplomatic recognition was delayed 23 years but was an issue debated by Fraser's three successors: National's Sidney Holland (1949-57), Labour's Walter Nash (1957-60) and National's Keith Holyoake (1957, 1960-71). For each of these leaders, establishing diplomatic ties with China was secondary to security considerations.

To Holland in 1950, there was fear of the communist spread and another world war.² Holland sought security through the Commonwealth and seeking closer ties with the United States, signing the ANZUS military agreement in 1951. Recognition of China competed with these objectives. After the UN requested combat assistance in the Korean War, Holland committed the NZ military. This support did not cease after China entered the war in October 1950. In 1956, Holland emphasised the alliance with the US over Chinese recognition. Recognition was a risk that would cause the "displeasure of our friends" the USA, threatening the security guarantees of the ANZUS treaty.³

¹ Elder and Green, 46.

² Sidney Holland, 'Formulation of Foreign Policy: Extracts from a Statement by the Right Honourable S. G. Holland in the House of Representatives, 2 November 1950', in *New Zealand Foreign Policy: Statements and Documents, 1943-1957*. (Wellington: GovtPrit, 1972), 237-40.

³ Elder and Green, 50.

Despite the 1953 Labour policy promising to recognise Communist China and support its admission into the United Nations, Nash followed a similar stance to Holland when he entered office in 1957.⁴ To Nash, “a recognition by New Zealand does not warrant precipitate action, and a final decision will be taken only after the fullest consultation with our allies and other friendly countries”.⁵ In a 1960 meeting with US President Eisenhower, Nash advocated neutrality for Taiwan while recognising China and its bid for UN representation. For Eisenhower, this was not an option. Communist China on the Security Council could lead to US withdrawal.⁶ Nash, like Holland, was unable to find a consensus between US goals and recognition of China.

PM Holyoake was also hesitant in recognising the PRC at the expense of the ROC. He wanted good relations with both nations. From 1961, NZ along with Australia and the US repeatedly voted against Albanian-sponsored resolutions to replace the ROC with the PRC at the United Nations. In Wellington, Holyoake upgraded the ROC Wellington Consulate to Embassy status while also declaring Communist China had not demonstrated acceptance of UN values and should not be accepted into the organisation.⁷ By 1971 Holyoake had lightened his position on PRC recognition. He declared that NZ should seek better relations with the PRC, but still wished to maintain relations with the ROC.⁸

Like his predecessors, it is likely Holyoake did not wish to upset the United States. Committing NZ troops to Vietnam to preserve the ANZUS agreement shows the strength of the relationship at this time. To Holyoake there were also correlations between Taiwan and NZ impacting his decision: “a small country

⁴ Keith Sinclair, *Walter Nash* (Auckland) : [New York]: Auckland University Press ; Oxford University Press, 1976), 295.

⁵ Walter Nash in New Zealand Parliament, Parliamentary Debates. First Session, Thirty-Second Parliament. 21 January to 31 January 1958, vol. 315 (Wellington, N.Z.: GovtPrinter, 1958), 217, <https://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=uc1.32106019841722;view=1up;seq=225>.

⁶ Keith Sinclair, *Walter Nash*. 331.

⁷ Barry Gustafson, *Kiwi Keith: A Biography of Keith Holyoake* (Auckland, N.Z.: Auckland University Press, 2007). 271.

⁸ Keith Holyoake, ‘New Zealand and China: An Article by the Prime Minister the Right Honourable Sir Keith Holyoake’ (Ministry of Foreign Affairs; Wellington, 28 May 1971), 9-10.

should not be abandoned in the face of the demands of a great power. This is why the Government is resolved to maintain our existing ties with Taiwan and to uphold its right to its accepted place in the international community".⁹ To Holyoake security was more than maintaining ANZUS, security was having global support as a small nation against a great power.

For Holland, Nash and Holyoake, security was a primary concern and maintained through being an active member of the anti-communist Western alliance. Despite Nash promising PRC recognition, and Holyoake warming to the decision, fear of losing ANZUS protection restricted their ability to do so. Realist logic dominated during this time. Informal recognition of the PRC was left to other NZ actors: CCP member Rewi Alley; The Communist Party of New Zealand headed by Vic Wilcox; and members of the New Zealand Friendship Society.

On Rewi Alley's 80th birthday in 1977, Deng Xiaoping praised "Comrade Alley" as a friend of China.¹⁰ For over 50 years Alley devoted himself to the cause of the Chinese revolution and people, earning their respect. High praise from the incoming leader of the CCP reveals the privileged place Alley held in China. Alley established this position through humanitarian work in the 1930s, industrial organisation during the Japanese War, creating education centres and writing prolifically to support the Communist cause. He is perhaps best known in China for his work within the Chinese Industrial Cooperatives Movement, also known as Gung Ho and Indusco, which aimed to boost industrial production and give economic resistance in the war with Japan.¹¹ At one stage Alley was running over 3000 small co-operative factories

⁹ Ibid, 11.

¹⁰ Anne-Marie Brady, *Friend of China - The Myth of Rewi Alley* (Routledge, 2003), 152.

¹¹ Wilfred G. Burchett and Rewi Alley, *China: The Quality of Life*, Pelican Books (Harmondsworth ; Baltimore: Penguin, 1976), 54.

in sixteen provinces across China, overseeing 300,000 workers. At the time, Alley was managing one of the world's largest industrial initiatives.¹²

After the formation of the PRC, Alley took a step back from industrial organisation and began a life as a writer and traveller. A primary objective of Alley's writings was "to bring an understanding of China to people abroad".¹³ The common people of China who organised themselves to push for a better livelihood inspired his actions. Communism to Alley helped changed the cry of the "defeated and hopeless" – from 没有办法 "There is no way!" to 有办法 "We have a way!".¹⁴

While aligning with the Communists, Alley was not in total agreement with all CCP practices. He wrote that the "ultra-left extravagance of 'The Great Leap Forward' cost China dearly".¹⁵ Uneconomical practices of iron smelting instead of tending to crops contributed to severe drought and famine. He also condemned the chaos and cynicism spread by "The Gang of Four" and after their dissolution, praised the "revolutionary dynamism... being restored to the people."¹⁶ A strong supporter of Chinese Communism, his motivations were grounded in humanitarian needs. Ideology took a subsidiary place to the livelihoods of the Chinese people:

I have never lent myself to anything except the cause of the common people. I wanted, without giving any false impressions, to express the truth as it appeared to me.... The function of a person like me is to make clear how the Chinese people are building a new world by taking advantage of the creative and productive power of their hundreds of millions. I am primarily interested in the people.¹⁷

¹² Ibid.

¹³ Rewi Alley, *Rewi Alley : An Autobiography* (Beijing; Auckland, N.Z.: New World Press, 1997), 259.

¹⁴ Ibid, 331.

¹⁵ Ibid, 275.

¹⁶ Ibid.

¹⁷ Ibid, 254.

During the Sino-Soviet split, the Communist Party of New Zealand (CPNZ), headed by Vic Wilcox, was the only Communist party besides Albania to side with Beijing over Moscow. There are several possible explanations for the CPNZ's actions. R.H. Brookes argues the split was ideological. The CPNZ allied itself with China as it had a natural left-leaning bias, accentuated by its small size and the departure of right-leaning members of the party.¹⁸ Similar factors in Great Britain and Australia's Communist branches did not, however, provide the same results.

Both Anne-Marie Brady and Herbert Roth argue Rewi Alley was involved in shifting Wilcox's allegiances to China. Brady notes Alley was in frequent contact with Wilcox and the CPNZ, and Alley's pro-PRC articles featured prominently in their publications.¹⁹ Other than establishing a connection, Brady fails to provide any evidence of Alley's specific role in Wilcox's shift to Beijing. Roth also notes Alley played a significant role, but he acknowledges the ambiguity of what exactly this role was.²⁰ While Alley may have played a factor in bringing these two communist parties together, the evidence is ambiguous as to what exactly this may have been.

After the CPNZ announced its support for the CCP however, there was a dramatic increase in contact between the two organisations. The CCP provided substantial incentives and reward for the CPNZ's support: subsidising party activities, sending CPNZ officials and their families to China and providing free medical care and services.²¹ Vic Wilcox's speeches in support of the CCP were translated into Chinese and widely promoted. Brady notes that during the 1960s and 70s, Wilcox was "one of the most well

¹⁸ R. H. Brookes, 'The CPNZ and the Sino-Soviet Split', *Political Science* 17, no. 2 (September 1965): 23, <https://doi.org/10.1177/003231876501700201>.

¹⁹ Anne-Marie Brady, 'New Zealand-China Relations: Common Points and Differences', *New Zealand Journal of Asian Studies* 10, no. 2 (2008): 6.

²⁰ Herbert Roth, 'Moscow, Peking and N.Z. Communists', *Politics* 4, no. 2 (1969): 168–185, <https://doi.org/10.1080/00323266908401167>.

²¹ Brady, 'New Zealand-China Relations' 7.

known foreigners in the PRC” and regularly met with Mao and senior leaders on his visits there.²² With many nations in the world still not recognising the PRC as the legitimate rulers of China, the Sino-Soviet split further alienated Beijing. The CPNZ benefited from material incentives in siding with the CCP.

While a significant player in China, the CPNZ was hardly a significant player in NZ. At its peak in 1942, membership was 1500, with this number dropping significantly by 1952.²³ The party failed to win any seats in parliament and was never in any serious contention to win against National or Labour candidates. The New Zealand Government assessed the CPNZ to have no security threat and appealed to SEATO members to cease required surveillance and reporting on the organisation.²⁴

In the absence of diplomatic ties, the NZCFS provided an unofficial bridge between NZ and China before 1972. In 1952, Rewi Alley wrote to those in NZ who had been sympathetic to Gung Ho urging political support. Where those in NZ had supported Alley’s causes financially, Alley felt from 1949 “the best way for friends overseas to help the Chinese people is to put all their efforts into maintaining and furthering ... these friendly relations”.²⁵ The society was formed in 1952 with the major aim to “press for the recognition by the New Zealand Government of the new People’s [Republic of China]”.²⁶ Other goals included “clear[ing] the mists of ignorance and provid[ing] accurate information leading to mutual understanding and mutual respect between our two peoples”.²⁷ Membership was open to all who desired friendship with China.

²² Ibid.

²³ Ibid.

²⁴ Ibid.

²⁵ Alistair Shaw, ‘Telling the Truth About People’s China’ (Ph.D Thesis, Victoria University of Wellington, 2010), <http://researcharchive.vuw.ac.nz/handle/10063/1332?show=full>), 83.

²⁶ *Fifty Years of Friendship: A Short History of the NZ China Friendship Society* (Auckland, N.Z.: Graphic Publications, 2002), 5.

²⁷ Shaw, 83.

Motivations of some of the early members were ideological. Former President, Bill Willmott, notes that many of the founders “wanted to publicise the achievements of the socialist countries”.²⁸ While Alley’s involvement in the organisation links it with the CCP, his appeal to former contributors to Gung Ho also suggests socialist sympathy. Alistair Shaw notes that many of the foundation’s members were either part of or aligned with the CPNZ.²⁹ What differed the members of the NZCFS from the CPNZ was the focus on friendship, education and mutual understanding.

Domestically, members campaigned for this cause through public meetings, panels of speakers, letters to MPs and newspapers, showing films and exhibitions.³⁰ Bilateral connections with China manifested in sending and hosting various delegations between the two countries. In 1952 the NZCFS was the first NZ delegation in the new China, attending the Beijing International Conference for Peace. In 1956 the organisation hosted the visit of a Chinese Classical Theatre Troupe in Christchurch, Wellington and Auckland. The following year the filmmaker, Ramai Hayward, was invited to the PRC along with members of the NZCFS and gifted Mao a kahu huruhuru on behalf of King Korokī.

Throughout the 1960s, membership increased, more leaflets were produced, and there was regular interaction between the NZCFS and the Chinese Government – specifically, the People’s Association for Cultural Relations and Friendship with Foreign Countries. There were various tours to China in 1964, 69, 70, 71 and 72.³¹ The NZCFS gained its primary goal of Chinese recognition with the election of Labour in 1972 yet continued to increase connectivity throughout the 1970s and still is an active organisation in 2019. Though in practice, the myriad of contemporary connections between New Zealand and China have diminished the once privileged place this organisation had as a pioneer in the relationship.

²⁸ *Fifty Years of Friendship*, 5.

²⁹ Shaw, 8, 81-3.

³⁰ Elder, *Forty Years On*, 31.

³¹ *Fifty Years of Friendship*, 11-13.

Socialism without Doctrines

Political reforms in the mid-20th century strengthened the NZ Government's ability to make law and administer policy while reinforcing the accountability of political leaders to the public. There were little to no barriers present in the NZ political system preventing the Government from pursuing closer relations with China, yet no political leader enacted a pro-China policy during this time. While I have argued military security with the US and maintaining relations with the ROC were a higher concern than Chinese recognition to NZ leaders, despite structural difficulties for new parties gaining entry into Parliament, the electoral process shows a relationship with China was not a significant priority for the NZ public. Mostly continuing the commitment to social welfare of the First Labour Government, every New Zealand Government during this time prioritised socio-economic security via an agreed set of processes. New Zealand was a Keynesian welfare state with an economy based on the export of a small variety of agricultural products to one external market: Britain. While increased interaction with China was not a priority at this stage, socio-economic systems were not readily conducive to facilitate a relationship.

With the Statute of Westminster adopted in 1947 and the abolition of the Upper House in 1950, the NZ Government had more autonomy and control to make laws and enact policy. Under First Past the Post (FPP), every election resulted in a single majority Government giving the ruling party the ability to introduce legislation through a majority in the House of Representatives and enact it through its control of Cabinet and the wider Executive. This swift legislative process led future Prime Minister Geoffrey Palmer to call New Zealand, "the fastest lawmaker in the west".³² These reforms would have made it easier to create a pro-China policy with no barriers for the Government within the legislative or

³² Geoffrey Palmer, *Unbridled Power?: An Interpretation of New Zealand's Constitution and Government* (Wellington ; New York: Oxford University Press, 1979), 70.

executive branches of Parliament. As I have argued, relations with China were secondary to other considerations for NZ leaders. The electoral process itself shows it was not a priority for the NZ public.

Under a representative democracy, the New Zealand Government is held accountable to public scrutiny via the opposition in Parliament, the media, and holding elections every three years. The 1956 Electoral Act strengthened this system, placing limitations on the election process which could not be amended without a 75% majority vote in Parliament. To future PM Jack Marshall, these measures placed the electoral system above party politics or the will of Government itself.³³ In theory, Parliament and Government should voice the dominant issues of the masses. In making the electoral process more difficult to adjust, the Government was made more accountable to the public.

There are two reasons within the political process supporting a lack of cooperation with China. Firstly, noting the Government is held accountable to the public, a lack of public support for recognising China meant that it was not an issue that necessitated a direct address. Even under Nash's pro-PRC policy, security dominated the decision-making process. Recognising China was always a subsidiary concern. In opposition to US wishes and breaking official relations with the ROC, recognition would be unlikely without overwhelming public support. While Holyoake was more inclined towards Chinese recognition in the early 1970s, Norman Kirk's Government only did so after UN ascension and the US accepting the One China policy. As I will argue in my next chapter, US rapprochement with China relaxed NZ's position, suggesting Chinese recognition would have been unlikely if Labour held government for more than three years during this period, and National would have been more likely to recognise China had they held power after the 1972 election. External processes over internal party policy dominated the recognition decision.

³³ Neill Atkinson, 'New Zealand Politics 1935 to 1984', in *New Zealand Government and Politics*, ed. Janine Hayward, Sixth edition. (Melbourne, Australia: Oxford University Press, 2015), 21.

An alternative systematic explanation is made through FPP. This system largely favours two parties and makes it difficult for minor parties to gain representation in Parliament.³⁴ The failure of the Social Credit Party to win any seats in parliament from 1954-1963 despite regularly receiving over 7% of the vote, reinforces a vote for a minor party under FPP to be “wasted”.³⁵ Even with public support, there are structural barriers for a minor party to enter a position to enact change. This may have been a factor in a pro-China political party, the CPNZ, failing to receive more than .4% of the vote during this time.³⁶ While a more likely explanation would be a lack of public support, FPP showed a structural impediment to ideas proposed outside of the two major parties.

Labour, National and the majority of the NZ public agreed that preserving socio-economic security was a significant priority post-WWII and all agreed mostly on set processes to achieve this.³⁷ Military security against the nuclear threat was obtained via the ANZUS treaty, with NZ broadly supporting US foreign policy and military operations. This follows the trend of having a major military partner for protection, which NZ found in the US when Britain could not guarantee military assistance during WWII.

Domestically, from 1949 the National Government accepted the structure of the welfare state which Labour had spent the previous 14 years implementing. The Government guaranteed social security in employment, low-cost housing, education, health care, and various financial benefits for those unable to work.³⁸ Economically, NZ followed a Keynesian system assuming state intervention necessary to provide the best returns and protections for workers.³⁹ To promote the growth of domestic manufacturing, the Government controlled imports and capital flows via a process of licensing and tariffs. Subsidies and tax

³⁴ Raymond Miller, *Democracy in New Zealand* (Auckland, New Zealand: Auckland University Press, 2015), 160-1.

³⁵ Ibid, 160.

³⁶ Robert Chapman, *New Zealand Politics and Social Patterns: Selected Works* (Wellington [N.Z.]: Victoria University Press, 1999), 61.

³⁷ Barry Gustafson, ‘New Zealand Politics 1945-1984’, in *New Zealand Politics in Transition*, ed. Raymond Miller (Auckland, N.Z.: Oxford University Press, 1997), 3.

³⁸ Chapman, 60.

³⁹ Brian S Roper, *Prosperity For All?: Economic, Social and Political Change in New Zealand Since 1935* (Southbank, Vic.: Thomson Learning, 2005), 129-131.

benefits were used to encourage production in manufacturing and agriculture, while the state also provided many jobs directly and via infrastructural development schemes.

New Zealand's economy was heavily dependent on the production and export of a limited selection of agricultural products to the sole market of Britain. In 1961, 51% of NZ's total exports went to Britain, with two-thirds of these being from four commodities: butter, cheese, mutton and lamb.⁴⁰ With NZ having the capacity to supply Britain's high demand for these products since as early as the 1880s, NZ's export arrangements had been firmly entrenched.⁴¹ Despite social inequalities being a notable feature of society in the 1950s, alongside the Keynesian economic policy, this arrangement was rather successful. New Zealand held one of the world's highest standards of living in the world, having the fourth highest income per capita.⁴² There was little need to seek trade with other nations.

This changed with Britain's bid to join the European Economic Community (EEC), revealing the fragility of NZ's export market dependent on one destination. The UK was not solely the primary market for NZ; it was the world's major consumer of NZ's main exports. In 1961 the UK accounted for 72% of world butter consumption and 80% of world mutton and lamb consumption, having roughly eight times more imports than the next biggest import destination.⁴³ Any alternative market would have to be newly developed as there was no significant demand for NZ products elsewhere.

Naturally, the UK's decision to seek entry into the EEC was met with considerable anxiety in NZ. The UK would have to adhere to the community's trade rules denying NZ the unrestricted access to the British

⁴⁰ Richard Kennaway, *New Zealand Foreign Policy, 1951-1971* (Wellington [N.Z.] : London: Hicks Smith ; Methuen, 1972), 82.

⁴¹ Jim McAloon, 'New Zealand Since the War', in *New Zealand Government & Politics*, ed. Raymond Miller, 5th ed.. (Melbourne ; Auckland [N.Z.]: Oxford University Press, 2010), 32.

⁴² Hoadley, *New Zealand Trade Negotiations*, 21; Kennaway, *New Zealand Foreign Policy, 1951-1971* 82; Roper, 133

⁴³ Kennaway, 81.

market. Attempts to diversify NZ's trade portfolio during the 1960s were met with only marginal success. While an FTA was signed with Australia in 1965, the resulting arrangement became one of managed trade, rather than a widening of tariff and quota reductions.⁴⁴ The agreement did act as a precursor to the more robust Closer Economic Relations (CER) agreement in 1983, boosting Australia to become NZ's largest trading partner, though the immediate economic results were negligible.

Further afield, attempts to access the Japanese and US markets were met with protective barriers and production subsidies with little access elsewhere.⁴⁵ The primary strategy for the NZ Government was to lobby decision makers in the UK and EU to continue access for NZ products. The resulting Protocol 18 agreement gave access for NZ butter and cheese to the British market for five years in decreasing quantities. NZ officials continued negotiations with the EEC throughout the 1970s and 80s for prolonged access but struggled to find a consistent arrangement.⁴⁶ Concerningly, in 1971 trade with Britain was still twice as large as with any other nation with NZ still depending on Britain for roughly 36% of total exports.⁴⁷ With Protocol 18 never meant to be a permanent arrangement and NZ's continued reliance on Britain, there was rising pressure to diversify the NZ trade portfolio during the 1970s.

⁴⁴ Hoadley, *New Zealand Trade Negotiations*, 137.

⁴⁵ *Ibid*, 21.

⁴⁶ *Ibid*, 31-5.

⁴⁷ *Ibid*, 21; Kennaway, *New Zealand Foreign Policy, 1951-1971*, 33.

A Western Nation

In the 1950s and 60s, the New Zealand Government ensured military security through the US in the ANZUS agreement and economic security in a Keynesian system dependent on the UK as an export market. This led NZ leaders to consider the policies of the US as a priority in international affairs, delaying PRC recognition and ensuring NZ commitment in Vietnam. Similarly, British interests influenced NZ commitment to Malaya and NZ's verbal support during the Suez crisis. New Zealand's interests were dependent on a robust relationship with the US and UK, making other concerns secondary to great power politics. Unable to ensure its own economic and military security, NZ bandwagoned with two major powers, clearly following a strand of Waltzian realism. Yet if we conclude that NZ's position was solely in the material search for security, we disregard the ideational undercurrents of these two relationships. There was a shared history, culture and identity with the UK and a similar set of liberal anti-communist values held with the US. Naturally, these contrasted with the ideology of socialist revolution and help explain why NZ sought like-minded allies.

From the mid-1800s the colony of NZ was frequently heralded as "Britain of the South".⁴⁸ Although NZ in the 1950s had lost its colonial and dominion status, the white Pākehā majority were predominantly British descendants or immigrants themselves.⁴⁹ They brought with them not only political and legal institutions but a distinctly British culture, language, values, social attitudes and allegiance to the Crown.⁵⁰ Westminster sovereignty was removed in 1947, yet was not without opposition. Frederick

⁴⁸ Keith Sinclair, *A Destiny Apart: New Zealand's Search for National Identity* (Wellington, N.Z.: Allen & Unwin in association with the Port Nicholson Press, 1986), 16.

⁴⁹ Katherine Smits, 'Politics of Biculturalism', in *New Zealand Government & Politics*, ed. Raymond Miller 5th ed., (2010), 66; Claudia Bell, *Inventing New Zealand: Everyday Myths of Pakeha Identity* (Auckland, N.Z.: Penguin Books, 1996), 6.

⁵⁰ P.J. Gibbons, 'The Climate of Opinion', in *The Oxford History of New Zealand.*, ed. Geoffrey Rice, William Hosking Oliver, and B. R Williams, 2nd ed.. (Auckland, N.Z.: Oxford University Press, 1992), 308.

Doidge, MP for Tauranga, spoke at lengths against the bill to adopt the Statute of Westminster in 1947, highlighting sentimental over material reasons as his primary concern: "We are proud of the granite strength of our loyalty, proud of our British heritage enshrined as it is in the British Throne. With us, loyalty to the Motherland is an instinct as deep as religion".⁵¹

A close affinity to the "Motherland" remained.⁵² British history, geography and literary traditions dominated the NZ education curriculum in the 1950s, the flag retained a British emblem and many of the country's youth begin a pilgrimage to the UK rather than to other nations.⁵³ Queen Elizabeth, whom Claudia Bell calls a "motherly" figure, remained the country's monarch and was enthusiastically supported by many New Zealanders.⁵⁴ Framed photographs of her majesty in homes was not uncommon; she enjoyed large crowds on her royal tours to New Zealand and eager listeners to her Christmas Day speeches, with her 1953 address coming from Old Government House at the University of Auckland. Naturally, New Zealand still held an imperialistic fervour in congruence, rather than in competition with, a growing New Zealand identity.⁵⁵ In these social conditions, it does not seem out of place for strong British and Commonwealth support. Despite no formal military guarantees, PM Holland repeatedly echoed Peter Fraser's wartime support of Britain in the Middle East in 1951, Malaya in 1955 and the Suez Canal in 1959: "Where Britain goes, we go. Where Britain stands, we stand".⁵⁶

The campaign to retain British exports and access to the EEC in the 1960s reflects the NZ-UK affinity extended beyond an economic relationship. While the material value of exports to Britain was

⁵¹ Frederick Doidge in New Zealand Parliament, *Parliamentary Debates: First Session, Twenty-Eighth Parliament. October 17 to November 27, 1947*, vol. 279 (Wellington, N.Z.: E.V. Paul, Government Printer, 1948), 538, https://books.google.co.nz/books?id=NzHWgxM_6TYC&dq.

⁵² Kennaway, *New Zealand Foreign Policy, 1951-1971*, 49.

⁵³ Bruce Jesson, "To Build a Nation," in *New Zealand Government & Politics*, ed. Raymond Miller, 2nd Edition (Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 2001), 10 ; Bell, *Inventing New Zealand*, 6.

⁵⁴ Bell, *Inventing New Zealand*, 22.

⁵⁵ Keith Sinclair, *A Destiny Apart*, 108.

⁵⁶ Kennaway, *New Zealand Foreign Policy, 1951-1971*, 37; Malcolm McKinnon, 113-4.

substantial for NZ, they were negligible to the British and even more so to the EEC. A realist interpretation supports Britain neglecting NZ interests to enter the EEC, while a liberal institutionalist would suggest NZ would have alternative markets to pursue, which was attempted with ambivalent results. While the material benefit to Britain in retaining NZ products was negligible, they came to represent the value of the British-NZ relationship in a post-colonial setting. The NZ Government conducted a mass campaign in Britain highlighting the serious economic consequences for NZ while pleading the NZ-UK relationship, particularly NZ's wartime contribution. The major claim was that Britain was willingly choosing to neglect the Commonwealth.⁵⁷

Britain agreed to protect NZ's "vital interests" as a precondition of entry in return for NZ refraining from the public condemnation of Britain.⁵⁸ This suggests a positive relationship with a supportive Commonwealth member became a high priority to Britain alongside the substantial economic benefits of EEC membership. Further, NZ leaders realised that while they lacked hard-power capabilities, they could influence international outcomes by imploring persuasion, identity and moral values. While power considerations were mostly dependent on material capabilities, this case study further enforces the ideational factors which underpinned the NZ-UK relationship in the 1950s and 60s.

Ideational reasons are far less easily used to explain the NZ-US relationship, though they do exist. Both nations are English-speaking liberal democracies who fought as allies during World War II. The US was NZ and Britain's strongest wartime ally with some 200,000 soldiers posted to NZ during the war.⁵⁹ The US in the Pacific Theatre was also NZ's defence against the Japanese. Clearly the relationship was born out of wartime necessity and joint ideological opposition to fascism. After the war, communism became

⁵⁷ Hoadley, *New Zealand Trade Negotiations*, 23.

⁵⁸ *Ibid*, 24.

⁵⁹ Edwin H. Simmons, 'Reviewed Works: United States Forces in New Zealand, 1942-1945. by Denys Bevan; Brief Encounter: American Forces and the New Zealand People, 1942-1945. by Jock Phillips, Ellen Ellis', *The Journal of Military History* 58, no. 2 (1994): 41, <https://doi.org/10.2307/2944045>.

the growing threat against liberal Western democracies which again found the NZ and US in common opposition.

In NZ this had domestic roots in various workers movements yet became a major international issue in the 1949 election shaping foreign policy for the next two decades.⁶⁰ This anti-communist mentality in 1950 was best summarised by Sidney Holland:

The great trouble in the world today, the great threat to the world, is the spread of communism, and we do ourselves no justice, and we our country no good, by hiding our heads in the sand and pretending this threat does not exist...Communists promote strife; they prosper on poverty and misery; they refuse to co-operate, they stimulate invasions.⁶¹

Government opposition to Communist China came in various forms: Peter Fraser withheld diplomatic recognition due to communist aggression, NZ sent military involvement to Korea and Vietnam, and there was verbal opposition to the Taiwan Strait Crises, the Tibetan Uprising of 1959 and the Cultural Revolution.⁶² Until the late 1960s, Holyoake was firmly against Chinese communism, and enthusiastically supported an ANZUS council communique in 1967 claiming:

The most dangerous threat to the security of the world continues to come from Peking's brand of militant Communism and from communist armed aggression and subversion in South-East Asia. The focal point of this threat is the aggression by North Vietnam against the Republic of Vietnam.⁶³

A personal statement from the PM followed in 1968 echoing the fears of an aggressive China, claiming the nation to be "reunited, militant and dedicated to the remoulding of its neighbours".⁶⁴

⁶⁰ Malcolm McKinnon, 69-77 .

⁶¹ Holland, 238.

⁶² Elder and Green, 50; Malcolm McKinnon, 159.

⁶³ Malcolm McKinnon, 158-9.

⁶⁴ Richard Kennaway, 'The Wider Asian Pacific Context', in *Beyond New Zealand. II, Foreign Policy into the 1990s*, ed. Richard Kennaway and John Henderson (Auckland [N.Z.]: Longman Paul, 1991), 46.

However, Malcolm McKinnon suggests that NZ anti-communist sentiment was not the guiding ideology in foreign policy as much as it was for the United States. It was “more a shallow plant in respect of international relations”.⁶⁵ While stopping the communist spread justified NZ contributions in Korea, Malaya and Vietnam, as well as joining the SEATO alliance, NZ was initially reluctant to commit troops to Vietnam and did not want to limit SEATO to solely communist threats.⁶⁶ The Vietnam War was the first significant issue separating National and Labour over defence and also resulted in public protests. Further, both Nash and Holyoake visited the USSR and were sympathetic to PRC recognition under a two-China solution.

This raises several considerations. Firstly, NZ’s anti-communist sentiment was not the overarching doctrine dictating its international relations. This ideology was not as important a motivator in the international sphere in the late 1960s as it had been previously, or at least not as crucial to NZ as it was to the US. Significantly, NZ lacked anything resembling the US’s McCarthyism and was seen to follow calls against communism with the UK and US rather than lead them.

Secondly, NZ held other ideational concerns. A commitment to dual recognition shows NZ’s affinity with other small states. Keith Holyoake claimed in 1971 that as a matter of principle of being a small state, NZ should support Taiwan against subservience to a great power.⁶⁷ Further, even considering NZ’s dependency on the UK and US, there was a strong commitment to multilateralism. Despite voting against the same resolution, NZ extended recognition to the PRC only after the international community had confirmed a two-China policy would not be possible, something which the US did not do until 1979.

Thirdly, it suggests that NZ commitment to US defence interests, predominantly containing communism in the 50s and 60s, was a prerequisite to a defence partnership. Elder and Green take a 1970

⁶⁵ Malcolm McKinnon 125-8.

⁶⁶ Ibid.

⁶⁷ Holyoake, 9–11.

government department paper, which stresses that New Zealand policy “stems directly and entirely from our alliance with the United States” and rebut the belief that New Zealand interests determined New Zealand policy”.⁶⁸ US interests were the major consideration of NZ foreign policy.

Embedded anti-Chinese opinion in NZ cannot be discredited as a lingering factor against the PRC as well. New Zealand society and government held substantial anti-Chinese sentiment towards early Chinese immigrants. From 1881, NZ implemented several anti-Chinese immigration laws, including the infamous poll tax, with some elements of these laws lasting well into the 20th century. Until 1966, for example, New Zealand citizens with Chinese heritage had to apply for permits to re-enter the country, an application not required of other New Zealand citizens.⁶⁹ In the late 19th and early 20th centuries, this sentiment was supplemented by anti-Chinese associations actively promoting deportation and a common belief that Chinese immigrants were immoral, dishonest and dangerous, their presence threatening to degenerate the British settlers.⁷⁰ Political statements from 1949-72 however reflect ideological fear over cultural opposition. The aggressive Chinese revolution and its military support in Korea and Vietnam exacerbated anti-Communist tensions likely overriding any cultural prejudice, yet these cannot be entirely discredited.

Where a common identity underpinned the UK relationship, anti-communist interests defined the relationship with the US. In lieu of a common identity, following the US position was essential to maintain a security relationship, regardless of the importance NZ placed on communist ideology. As I will argue in Chapter Two, US interests would become increasingly divergent from NZ in the 1970s and 80s. With the UK joining the EEC, Britain’s economic interests had already begun to diverge. The Waltzian bandwagon was beginning to waver from its course.

⁶⁸ Elder and Green, 56.

⁶⁹ Helene Wong, *Being Chinese A New Zealander’s Story* (Wellington: Bridget Williams Books, 2016), 85.

⁷⁰ Keith Sinclair, *A Destiny Apart*, 91–93.

China

Mao in Charge

Mao Zedong was an integral figure in the PRC which he ruled until his death in 1976. Having risen in the 1930s and 40s to the leader of the Chinese Communist Party, he successfully mobilised the peasant base in a guerrilla war against Japan. After expelling Chiang Kai-shek's Guomindang (GMD) to Taiwan, Mao proclaimed the Chinese people had finally "stood up".⁷¹ He had fulfilled one mission of the CCP in making China an independent, free and for the most part, territorially unified state.⁷²

From 1949 he sought the complete socialist upheaval of society which would facilitate his vision of a new China – economically prosperous, free from external political interference, espousing a new egalitarian culture.⁷³ As his presence was dominant in all case studies under analysis, I will show in the following sections how Mao's commitment to building a socialist society became detrimental to governance, communist ideology, and ultimately, the wellbeing and lives of the Chinese people; dominant barriers to amicable relations with NZ. I will firstly explain his capabilities and motivations behind his vision. Internally, as Roderick MacFarquhar argues, Mao was both a nationalist and a socialist, yet he was a socialist first.⁷⁴ Externally, I argue the opposite. While he proclaimed world revolution, his

⁷¹ Mao Zedong, 'Opening Speech at the First Plenary Session of the CPPCC (September 21, 1949)', in *The Writings of Mao Zedong, 1949-1976* (Armonk, N.Y.: MESHARPE, 1986), 5.

⁷² Chen Zhimin, 'Nationalism, Internationalism and Chinese Foreign Policy', *Journal of Contemporary China* 14, no. 42 (February 2005): 40, <https://doi.org/10.1080/1067056042000300772>.

⁷³ Mao Zedong, 'On New Democracy', in *Selected Works of Mao Tse-Tung*, vol. 2 (Pergamon, 1965), 340, <https://doi.org/10.1016/B978-0-08-022981-2.50028-4>.

⁷⁴ Jiang Yihua and Roderick MacFarquhar, 'Two Perspectives on Mao Zedong', in *A Critical Introduction to Mao*, ed. Timothy Cheek (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 350–51, <https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511781476.016>.

decisions were more focused on strategic choice, allying with nations who recognised China's national sovereignty and authority over Taiwan while opposing those who did not.

As head of the CCP, and from 1954 the Central Military Commission, Mao had amassed enough control across almost all aspects of Chinese society to dictate governing paradigms and ideological direction. His capabilities to influence and dictate almost all aspects of Chinese society cannot be overstated. Once Mao was decided on an issue, he faced little to no opposition.⁷⁵ This was fuelled by a cult of personality which portrayed him as "a mystic, almost superhuman figure who liberated the Chinese people from feudal and imperialist oppression and created a new era of socialist equality and opportunity".⁷⁶

Evidently a nationalist, it was the writings of Marx and Lenin which gave Mao a systematic explanation for China's subjugation from other nations. To Mao, China's feudal economy and oppressive landlord class had hindered socio-economic development, which was then exploited by foreigners through capitalism and imperialism.⁷⁷ Economic backwardness had exacerbated the differences between the proletariat and bourgeoisie. Internally, traditional sources of social identification based on networks of relationships overshadowed class identity and nationalist sentiment, which Mao saw as necessary to motivate the people to effective action.⁷⁸ Socialist revolution aimed to eradicate economic backwardness and traditional Confucianism, which had left China susceptible to subjugation.

Today he remains a deeply polarising figure.⁷⁹ He is remembered as a revolutionary hero, leading the CCP in defeating Japan and reuniting the Chinese nation after a century of humiliation. His political

⁷⁵ Kenneth Lieberthal, *Governing China: From Revolution Through Reform*, 2nd ed (New York: WWNorton, 2004), 208.

⁷⁶ Robert Weatherley, *Politics in China since 1949: Legitimizing Authoritarian Rule*, Routledge Contemporary China Series ; 11 (New York, NY: Routledge, 2006), 33.

⁷⁷ Mao Zedong, 'The Chinese Revolution and the Chinese Communist Party', in *Selected Works of Mao Tse-Tung*, vol. 2 (Pergamon, 1965), 308-10, <https://doi.org/10.1016/B978-0-08-022981-2.50025-9>.

⁷⁸ Lieberthal, 61.

⁷⁹ Timothy Cheek, *A Critical Introduction to Mao* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010).

theories still guide the CCP, his face adorns the currency and is hung above Tiananmen Square.

However, his economic policies in the Great Leap Forward (GLF) which caused tens of millions of deaths and the mass terror of the Cultural Revolution (CR) are prominent stains on his legacy. The party sought to rectify these faults in blaming Mao after his death.⁸⁰ This bifurcated perception of Mao is perhaps best described by Chen Yun, a colleague and Politburo member who recalled in 1979, “Had Mao died in 1956, his achievements would have been immortal. Had he died in 1966, he would still have been a great man. But he died in 1976. Alas, what can one say?”⁸¹

In foreign relations, there is also division between rhetoric and actual practice. His adherence to socialism, particularly the “proletarian-world revolution” against international capitalism and imperialism promotes a united front of socialist states.⁸² This is best seen in the alliance with the USSR and the campaign to Resist U.S. Aggression and Aid Korea. Yet the Sino-Soviet split and eventual rapprochement with the US in the late 60s and early 1970s undermined such a commitment. That many communist nations sided with the USSR over China dismissed the validity of Mao’s claim to lead the Comintern, despite verbal support for external revolution and third-world insurgencies throughout the 50s and 60s. In practice China’s foreign policy stems from Mao’s 1949 proclamation to the world claiming the CCP as “the sole legal government representing all the people of the People’s Republic of China”.⁸³ While he wished to establish diplomatic relations with other nations, it was on the condition that all parties respected each nation’s “territorial integrity and sovereignty”.⁸⁴

⁸⁰ Communist Party of China, ‘Resolution on Certain Questions in the History of Our Party Since the Founding of the People’s Republic of China: Adopted by the Sixth Plenary Session of the Eleventh Central Committee of the Communist Party of China on June 27, 1981’,

<https://www.marxists.org/subject/china/documents/cpc/history/01.htm>.

⁸¹ Mark T Fung, ‘The Final Chapter of Mao’s Legacy?’, *SAIS Review* 20, no. 2 (2000): 276, <https://doi.org/10.1353/sais.2000.0038>.

⁸² Mao Zedong, ‘On New Democracy’, 343-4, 369.

⁸³ Mao Zedong, ‘Proclamation of the Central People’s Government of the PRC (October 1, 1949)’, 10–11.

⁸⁴ *Ibid*, 11.

This priority is best explained via Mao's changing relationship with the US, whose criticism is well documented. In 1949 Mao referred to the US as "dogs of imperialism", similar rhetoric espoused when the US opposed China in the Korean War, began policing the Taiwan Strait in 1950, signed a Mutual Defence Treaty with the ROC in 1954 and throughout the 1960s.⁸⁵ However, before the formation of the PRC, Mao was ambivalent if not favourable towards the US. In an interview with Edgar Snow in 1936, he suggested he would like to work with the United States against fascism.⁸⁶ Similarly, in a meeting with the American diplomat John Service in the mid-1940s, Mao claimed the US and China "can and must work together" to help China industrialise.⁸⁷ In 1945, he even expressed the desire to visit Washington.⁸⁸ This attitude shifted after the US supported the Nationalists in the Chinese Civil War.

It is likely the US decision steered Mao towards the Soviets, who provided economic support and recognised China's claims over Taiwan. While Mao sought an alliance with the USSR in 1949, this was as much a strategic choice as an ideological one. After recognising their claims over Taiwan, the USSR provided substantial economic support to China. During the 1950s the USSR provided \$1.3B in aid projects to China, including delivering over 166 industrial plants and providing over 10,000 Soviet

⁸⁵ Mao Zedong 'Opening Speech at the First Plenary Session of the CPPCC', 4; Mao Zedong, 'U.S. Imperialism Is The Most Ferocious Enemy Of The World's People "No. 2-3-1964, Pp. 2-3, Peking Review, No. 2, 164"'. Statement in support of the Panamanian people, Hung-Ch'i, 12 January 1964. https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/mao/selected-works/volume-9/mswv9_11.htm.; Mao Zedong, 'American Imperialism Is Closely Surrounded By The Peoples Of The World'. Declaration in support of the people of the Congo (Leopoldville), 28 November 1964. https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/mao/selected-works/volume-9/mswv9_30.htm.; Mao Zedong, 'A New Storm Against Imperialism. Peking Review, April 19, 1968, Pp. 5-6'. Statement in Support of the Afro-American Struggle Against Violent Repression, 16 April 1968, https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/mao/selected-works/volume-9/mswv9_80.htm.

⁸⁶ He Di, 'The Most Respected Enemy: Mao Zedong's Perception of the United States', *The China Quarterly*, no. 137 (1994): 148.

⁸⁷ Michael Yahuda, *Towards the End of Isolationism: China's Foreign Policy After Mao* (New York: St Martin's Press, 1983), 54.

⁸⁸ *Ibid.*

technicians to support economic development. Over 8000 Chinese workers and 7000 students then went to the USSR for training and education.⁸⁹

While differing interpretations of Marxism-Leninism can explain the Sino-Soviet split, protecting China's recently gained political and economic independence can also explain Mao's decision to sever ties. In the late 1950s, Mao had embarked on the Great Leap Forward in an attempt to bolster the Chinese economy. To Zhu Tianbao, this was to prevent becoming dependent on the USSR, a risk to developing countries who ally with much larger nations.⁹⁰ Attempts by the Soviets in 1958 to construct a long-wave radio station in China and establish a cooperative Sino-Soviet navy fleet were met with scepticism and anger by Mao.⁹¹ Mao saw the Soviet's proposition for joint military ventures as a direct threat to China's sovereignty. Economic and military independence became necessary for national independence, despite a common socialist affinity.

Mao's focus on the preservation of territory and sovereignty was the dominant factor inhibiting relations with other nations, including New Zealand. Agreement with the PRC over its status, particularly over Taiwan, was a prerequisite to any other positive engagement, regardless of Mao's ideological pursuit for world revolution. To New Zealand, as to the rest of the world, diplomatic relations came at the cost of recognising China's territorial claims and respecting China's authority to conduct its own affairs. In the 1950s and 1960s, Mao's attainment to these policies led to isolation in the UN and with many other nations.

⁸⁹ Klaus Knorr, *The Power of Nations* (New York: Basic Books, 1995), p. 179 cited in Zhu Tianbiao, 'Nationalism and Chinese Foreign Policy', *China Review* 1, no. 1 (2001): 1–27.

⁹⁰ Zhu Tianbiao, 5.

⁹¹ Zhihua Shen and Danhui Li, *After Learning to One Side: China and Its Allies in the Cold War*, Cold War International History Project Series (Washington, D.C. : Stanford, Calif.: Woodrow Wilson Center Press ; Stanford University Press, 2011), 151-5.

Mao's authority was absolute in controlling foreign affairs, yet he delegated the majority of diplomatic interactions to his Premier and Foreign Minister Zhou Enlai. Once Mao went to Moscow in 1949 and opened the way for official negotiations, he sent for Zhou to work out the terms of the treaty and facilitate its signing.⁹² Similarly, when Nixon mentioned to Mao that the two could cooperate in working with other nations, Mao was said to reply: "They should be discussed with the premier. I discuss the philosophical questions."⁹³ Throughout the 1950s and 1960s, Zhou travelled extensively acting as the primary intermediary between China and other nations while Mao remained in China working on domestic affairs, intent on creating his socialist revolution.

Zhou's foreign policy held that China should be "resolving all international disputes through peaceful negotiations... [and practising] peaceful coexistence and peaceful competition among all different systems".⁹⁴ This notion of "peaceful coexistence" developed into a fixed set of principles which Zhou used as the basis of China's foreign policy. These principles are: "mutual respect for territorial integrity and sovereignty, non-aggression, non-interference in each other's internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful coexistence".⁹⁵ While these embody and elaborate on Mao's foreign policy interests, it is essential to note that there are no requirements to adhere to socialist principles or reject democracy or capitalism. China is open to dealing with all governments regardless of their political leaning.

Zhou's travels served several other purposes. Firstly, to counter the negative image held towards Communist China as a hostile entity. A violent revolution put the Communists in power, they willingly

⁹² Paul Wingrove, 'Mao in Moscow, 1949–50: Some New Archival Evidence', *Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics* 11, no. 4 (1995): 327-322, <https://doi.org/10.1080/13523279508415293>.

⁹³ Ross Terrill, *Mao: A Biography* (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1999), 393.

⁹⁴ Shu Guang Zhang, 'Constructing "Peaceful Coexistence": China's Diplomacy toward the Geneva and Bandung Conferences, 1954–55', *Cold War History* 7, no. 4 (1 November 2007): 511, <https://doi.org/10.1080/14682740701621846>.

⁹⁵ *Ibid*, 513.

entered into war against the US, and pressured other nations to renounce relations with the ROC, a victim of PRC aggression. In New Delhi, Zhou had to publicly declare the CCP did not endorse exporting socialist revolution – a point he had to reiterate at the 1954 Geneva Conference.⁹⁶ Peaceful coexistence enabled Zhou to promote a benevolent China to counter the conception of a violent socialist nation.

Zhou was also crucial in advancing China's position amongst the Third World. At the 1955 Asian-African Bandung Conference, Zhou sought common ground with those also suffering the economic effects of colonialism. In the years following this conference, Zhou made several official tours of Asia, Africa and South America, eventually promoting an aid programme in Africa in 1964.⁹⁷

While there was an ideational affinity between China and the Third World, there were practical benefits for Zhou's decision to pursue relations. During the 1950s, many countries still held relations with the ROC while the US was pursuing a policy of China containment. Active diplomacy can foster international recognition which enhances the legitimacy of the PRC. Further, China was still unable to join the United Nations. In an institution where each nation has one vote, focusing on gaining more partners could be the key to entry.

Chinese foreign policy, born from sovereignty and political independence remained absolute to Zhou and Mao. Zhou actively campaigned for new allies rather than relenting these principles to the USSR or the United States. After the original choice to ally with the Soviet Union, Zhou said to an American emissary, "we shall lean to one side, but how far depends on you".⁹⁸ While they stopped leaning on the Soviets, Zhou was happy to keep relations with any nation as long as the principles of independence and

⁹⁶ Ibid, 519.

⁹⁷ Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China, 'Premier Zhou Enlai's Three Tours of Asian and African Countries', accessed 26 August 2018, http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/ziliao_665539/3602_665543/3604_665547/t18001.shtml.

⁹⁸ Yahuda, *Towards the End of Isolationism*, 27.

sovereignty were adhered to. To those that insisted on opposing the PRC, Mao was prepared to wait one hundred years before they changed their mind.⁹⁹ Guarantee of supporting Chinese sovereignty was absolute. With the international community voting the PRC in to the UN in 1971, and Nixon signing the Shanghai Communique the following year, the world had come to accept the PRC as the legitimate China and relaxed their position towards Mao's claims over Taiwan. For New Zealand it did not take one hundred years to alter their stance, it only took twenty-three.

Constructing a New Society – the Socialist Transformation of China

Under the guidance of the CCP, Mao sought the complete social, political and economic restructuring of Chinese society to generate mass support for his party, create effective forms of governance, facilitate prosperity and guarantee international security. This section will detail the internal institutions defining Chinese society during this time. While centralised planning enabled mass economic and social change, ideology and attempts to solidify the party state through subservience to Mao undermined the administrative processes. Internationally, Mao's choice to lean to one side limited major foreign cooperation to the USSR in the 1950s, before following a self-imposed policy of self-reliance throughout the 1960s. Consequently, China had limited interaction with the outside world, looking inward to implement socialist revolution.

The political organisation of Mao's China followed the Soviet model. State-owned enterprises and collective units dominated economic production, and the bureaucracy followed the "nomenklatura" system of organisation.¹⁰⁰ The party was responsible for selecting government officials, while party

⁹⁹ Shu Guang Zhang, 525.

¹⁰⁰ Zheng Yongnian, *Contemporary China: A History Since 1978* (Hoboken, UK: John Wiley & Sons, Incorporated, 2013), 4-5 <http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/auckland/detail.action?docID=1119534>.

groups within various government agencies were responsible for directing all administrative work. Party groups would be appointed by a party committee at a higher level, and consequently, report to that party group rather than an independent administrative body. This system allowed supervision from a top-down approach and effectively allowed the party to rule from within government administration. As Kenneth Lieberthal shows, the socialist model concentrates power in the apex of leadership, imposing few real constraints on the top 25-35 people, apart from each other.¹⁰¹ The restraints on the core leader are even less. The CCP became the key entity of control within China, with Mao at its helm. Holding the top positions in the party, government and military, he had amassed the most power in modern Chinese history, bolstered by his status as a war hero, a media-fuelled cult of personality and a network of loyal supporters.¹⁰²

Under this level of organisation, the party could implement mass-scale economic and social programmes. Economically, centralised planning focused on state control of major industry and collectivised the peasant population to maximise rural agricultural and small-scale production. The USSR helped develop the industrial sector while rural households moved to agricultural collectives and eventually to people's communes. Socially, Mao wished to change how people thought about key issues and relationships, generate enthusiasm amongst the populace and to solidify party rule.¹⁰³ Mobilising the masses via revolutionary campaigns became a tool for party control.

Often these campaigns targeted political opponents of the CCP and party officials deemed a threat by Mao. Over time the party disintegrated into one that was less focused on economic output but more an authoritarian regime focused on ideology, the central position of the party state within China, and the

¹⁰¹ Lieberthal, 148-9, 207-9.

¹⁰² Weatherley, 8.

¹⁰³ Lieberthal, 64-8

central position of Mao within that system.¹⁰⁴ Early campaigns targeted GMD sympathisers within China and opportunists participating in tax evasion, bribery and corruption.¹⁰⁵ The Anti-Rightist Campaign in 1957 opposed intellectuals that had previously criticised Mao during the Hundred Flowers Campaign, with Minister of Defence Peng Dehuai labelled a “rightist” and purged from the party for voicing his concerns during the GLF.¹⁰⁶ The CR gave Mao a precedent to dislodge Liu Shaoqi as his successor, promote and then purge Minister of National Defence Lin Biao, criticise Deng Xiaoping’s “capitalist” tendencies, and allow swarms of China’s youth to attack party members. To avoid being victim to Mao, many party officials had to echo whatever Mao wanted and said.¹⁰⁷ After the failures of the GLF, mass mobilisation via revolutionary campaign rather than economic benefit became the focus of the CCP, who at its helm was a paranoid megalomaniac focused on creating a culture of subservience to him directly.¹⁰⁸

The political attack on rightists undermined the attempts to fix growing concerns of the GLF, reinforcing the political and economic instability of the institutions themselves.¹⁰⁹ Mao’s institutions came with an extremely high human cost.¹¹⁰ Land reform addressed the immediate problem of inequality amongst China’s poor, yet state owned enterprises and collectivisation eliminated profit motives for individuals’ labour. Centralised planning did not give any incentive for lower level party officials to report economic outputs to their superiors accurately. Party members tended to exaggerate reports so that by the time figures were relayed back to the central leadership they were grossly inflated.¹¹¹ In a system of regular political criticism, it was safer to promote support of centrally planned initiatives than to criticise their

¹⁰⁴ Zheng Yongnian, 9.

¹⁰⁵ Weatherley, 30.

¹⁰⁶ Lieberthal, 108.

¹⁰⁷ Zheng Yongnian, 13.

¹⁰⁸ Lieberthal, 62.

¹⁰⁹ Ibid, 108.

¹¹⁰ Zheng Yongnian, 1.

¹¹¹ Lieberthal, 106.

effectiveness. Naturally, with the lack of an independent press, there was no means to contradict these figures, with the state assuming they could continue high procurement with little cost.

Further, an emphasis on high industrial production from unskilled workers not only produced subpar raw materials but drew communes away from agricultural procurement. Many trained workers that would have been crucial to the successful implementation of this development model, such as engineers, economists and scientists, were victims of the anti-rightist campaign and could not assist. Mao prioritised peasant cadres rather than intellectuals in many state appointments.¹¹² While bad weather exacerbated problems with agricultural procurement, the deaths of an estimated 20 million people during the GLF are a direct result of ineffective governmental policy.¹¹³

Even with Zhou Enlai seeking ties with developing nations, and the affinity with other Communist states, institutions gave priority to internal process rather than promoting interaction with the world system. The choice of Mao to lean to one side not only drew China into the Korean War and had it labelled a hostile actor by the UN but gave a reason for the US to reverse its policy on Taiwan. The Korean War fuelled the US containment strategy of Soviet-based communism, prompting the US to enter the Taiwan Strait blocking a CCP invasion.¹¹⁴ The US, in turn, gave aid and protection to the GMD Government recognising it as the sole legitimate government of China, a position it did not relax until the 1970s. Mao's Soviet alliance became the key catalyst for the long-standing one China policy, isolating it from representation in the UN and a major factor impeding relations with NZ. However, after the Sino-Soviet split, China further retreated internally, pursuing a policy of self-reliance to minimise dependence on

¹¹² Lieberthal, 102.

¹¹³ Richard T. Phillips, *China Since 1911* (London: Macmillan, 1996), 197.

¹¹⁴ Chengyi Lin, 'The Legacy of the Korean War: Impact on U.S.-Taiwan Relations', *Journal of Northeast Asian Studies* 11, no. 4 (Winter 1992): 40; Chen Jian, *China's Road to the Korean War: The Making of the Sino-American Confrontation*, U.S. and Pacific Asia (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994), 220.

other nations.¹¹⁵ Internationally, Mao wanted only to engage with others on his own terms, internally he sought the same goal.

Continuing the Revolution

In removing material incentives for citizens and accountability measures for top leadership, Mao and the CCP relied on revolutionary nationalist and Marxist ideas to mobilise the population and legitimise rule. The fundamental goals were simple; the Party vanguard would guide the removal of imperialist, feudal and capitalist elements in China and transform the country into an independent, prosperous, egalitarian and classless Communist state.¹¹⁶ Mao Zedong Thought (MZT) became the dominant ideology embodying these ideals, a replacement to the traditional Confucian values which, to Mao, were a barrier to mass mobilisation which had left China vulnerable to external aggression.¹¹⁷ While the National Revolution had succeeded in 1949, by the late 1960s, the Socialist Revolution was more focused on transforming the consciousness of the people than governance. Mao's policies became increasingly radical in encouraging revolutionary fervour, justifying mass terror, legitimising purges of Party leaders and promoting revolutionary rhetoric to the Third World. Following many liberal scholars interpretations of MZT, revolutionary ideals, particularly the notion of armed struggle, became increasingly counterproductive to internal state-building and external diplomacy.¹¹⁸ While domestically Mao

¹¹⁵ Lieberthal, 76-77.

¹¹⁶ Mao Zedong, "On New Democracy," 342-4; Mao Zedong, "The Chinese Revolution and the Chinese Communist Party," 308-10.

¹¹⁷ Lieberthal, 61.

¹¹⁸ Xiao Yanzhong, "Recent Mao Zedong Scholarship in China," in *A Critical Introduction to Mao*, ed. Timothy Cheek (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 277.

supported revolutionary ideology at all costs, externally, rapprochement with the US shows nationalism was valued more than global revolution.

To Mao, foreign imperialism caused economic exploitation and political oppression while making China a “colonial, semi-colonial and semi-feudal society”.¹¹⁹ While Mao Zedong Thought became the official guiding policy of the CCP during the First Plenum of the Seventh Congress in 1945, it was born from nationalist sentiment arising from the previous one hundred years, becoming a driving force in the early 20th century.¹²⁰ The Boxer Rebellion emerged as an anti-colonial and anti-foreign uprising, while the loss of territory to Japan after the Treaty of Versailles drove the May Fourth Movement in 1919. Further, Sun Yat Sen’s nationalist principle, developed both against imperialism itself and the failure of the Qing Government’s reaction to imperialism, fuelled the 1911 Revolution and found common ground with the Communists.¹²¹ The Century of Humiliation, predominantly the development of nationalist consciousness, cannot be understated as a driving factor for the Chinese people. While it predated the emergence of MZT and support for the CCP, it compelled China’s ironclad position over Taiwanese independence and sovereignty. In this instance, Chinese nationalism helped morph international norms of diplomatic interaction and rules of UN membership.

John Lieberthal argues that while Mao Zedong Thought was born out of nationalism, it was given a systematic explanation through Marxism-Leninism; a sentiment shared by several others.¹²² Timothy Cheek, for example, argues Mao Zedong’s “On New Democracy” justified imperialism as being the highest form of capitalism, making sense of China’s subjugated history while giving “Chinese readers a

¹¹⁹ Mao Zedong, ‘On New Democracy’., 342-4

¹²⁰ Chen Zhimin, 36.

¹²¹ Mao Zedong, ‘On New Democracy’, 361

¹²² Lieberthal, 61.

sense of purpose, hope, and meaning”.¹²³ Maurice Meisner argues Marxism provided an alternative system that rejected the failures of the passive Confucian culture, which had allowed imperialism to flourish, as well as explaining the foreign domination of China.¹²⁴ Arif Dirlik argues it enabled several Chinese classes to form a united front in a people’s war for national liberation against imperialism and their capitalist allies within China, landlords and the “comprador bourgeoisie”.¹²⁵ China, as Dirlik proposes, was drawn to socialism as it provided an alternative to capitalist subjugation, but also “the possibility of entering global history not as its object but as an independent subject”.¹²⁶ The strength of this strain of thinking is evident as a strong independent China still fuels contemporary Chinese sentiment.

The Second Sino-Japanese War enabled both the GMD and Communists to capitalise on anti-imperialist thought, yet the Communists gained massive support within the populace defeating the GMD in 1949. This suggests that MZT resonated with the Chinese people, not solely nationalism. To a large extent, Mao’s military strategies relied on mobilising the Chinese peasantry against urban forces. While the Nationalists were fighting for major cities, the CCP concentrated efforts in the countryside against isolated enemy units, which to one commentator, established local legitimacy for the CCP as “defenders of the Chinese peasantry against the national enemy”.¹²⁷ Further Communist support followed as the CCP pursued class-based socio-economic policies that rewarded the peasantry and taxed the wealthiest

¹²³ Timothy Cheek, “Mao, Revolution, and Memory,” in *A Critical Introduction to Mao*, ed. Timothy Cheek (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 9, <https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511781476.003>.

¹²⁴ Maurice Meisner, *Mao’s China and after: A History of the People’s Republic*, Transformation of Modern China Series (New York : London: Free Press ; Collier Macmillan, 1986), 18.

¹²⁵ Arif Dirlik, “Mao Zedong Thought and the Third World/Global South,” *Interventions* 16, no. 2 (March 4, 2014): 249, <https://doi.org/10.1080/1369801X.2013.798124>.

¹²⁶ *Ibid*, 236.

¹²⁷ Joseph W. Esherick, “Making Revolution in Twentieth-Century China,” in *A Critical Introduction to Mao*, ed. Timothy Cheek (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 60.

families. Ideological resonance, military and administrative successes, combined with prolific corruption in the GMD-administered areas, enabled Mao Zedong Thought to gain traction.¹²⁸

As I have previously argued, the transition to a socialist society required an upheaval of economic and political institutions. I have also touched on various campaigns that sought to eliminate the distinctions made over the division of labour and private production. Land reform initiatives sought to break down the landlord and peasantry classes, while the communes of the GLF sought to merge major aspects of barriers arising from divisions in class: industry and agriculture, rural and urban, and an attempt to prevent the separation of the intelligentsia from the general masses.¹²⁹ Mass campaigns were used to promote order and production, and facilitate socialist institutional changes, yet also carried a strong ideological component. The Three-Anti and Five-Anti campaigns, for example, stressed issues arising from personal profit, such as corruption, bribery and tax evasion, while the Anti-Rightest Movement sought out dissidents who favoured capitalism and spoke out against the Government during the Hundred Flowers Campaign. Ultimately, Mao Zedong Thought prioritised a continued revolution of internalised culture which superseded structural changes. In this aspect, the ideology is best thought of as an attempt to change the consciousness of the masses away from the habits, culture, ideas and customs of pre-1949 China, which enabled imperialist subjugation.¹³⁰

To Mao, despite establishing a Leninist-style political and economic system, China was still under constant threat from ideological forces which could lead to the reversal or abandonment of the socialist revolution, and subsequently, the restoration of capitalism.¹³¹ These threats were multiple. Internally,

¹²⁸ Cheek, 'Mao, Revolution, and Memory', 9-10

¹²⁹ Maurice Meisner, "Leninism and Maoism: Some Populist Perspectives on Marxism-Leninism in China," *The China Quarterly*, no. 45 (1971): 21.

¹³⁰ Paul Healy, "Misreading Mao: On Class and Class Struggle," *Journal of Contemporary Asia* 38, no. 4 (November 1, 2008): 546, <https://doi.org/10.1080/00472330802309419>.

¹³¹ Graham Young, "Mao Zedong and the Class Struggle in Socialist Society," *The Australian Journal of Chinese Affairs*, no. 16 (1986): 41, <https://doi.org/10.2307/2158775>.

“class struggle” and “rightest opportunism” dominated Mao’s rhetoric. Externally, “imperialism”, highlighted mainly through the United States, and the “revisionism” of the USSR were also seen as threats. As Mao claimed in 1957, ideological threats required constant action:

Bourgeois and petty-bourgeois ideology, anti-Marxist ideology will continue to exist for a long time...[Despite] the basic victory in transforming the ownership of the means of production...we have not yet won complete victory on the political and ideological fronts... We still have to wage a protracted struggle against bourgeois and petty bourgeois ideology.¹³²

To Mao, violent struggle over harmony was the key to completing the Socialist Revolution, which became increasingly prevalent as a justification for inducing panic and terror.¹³³ As he argued in 1969, "If it is forever calm and peaceful, mistakes are bound to occur. To break through and then seek balance is dialectics. Only in this way can we inspire the initiative of the masses, advance socialist construction... surpass the target."¹³⁴ From a liberal institutional position, I have already argued that excesses of the GLF and CR undermined Mao’s attempts at party building and day-to-day administration. Under a Maoist interpretation, these excesses were necessary to destroy class consciousness. Mao’s call to “bombard the headquarters” undermined the Party itself but sought to erode the kind of revisionism that Mao saw in the USSR and the newly formed bureaucracy.¹³⁵ This same argument can be made to justify the disaster of the GLF, however, it seems Mao’s ideology outgrew the man himself. The failure of the GLF led Mao to stand down from State Chairman and perform a self-criticism. Similarly, ideologically driven zealots led Mao in 1967 to readdress targets of the CR as he felt their excesses had gone too

¹³² Mao Zedong, ‘Speech at the Chinese Communist Party’s National Conference on Propaganda Work (March 12, 1957)’, in *Quotations from Chairman Mao Tse-Tung*, [1st ed.]. (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1966), 19.

¹³³ Healy, 551; Lieberthal, 68-70.

¹³⁴ Mao Zedong (1969), quoted in Richard Levy, “Understanding China’s Socialist Revolution: The Role of Ideology,” *Modern China* 3, no. 4 (1977): 493.

¹³⁵ Cheek, ‘Mao, Revolution, and Memory’, 11

far.¹³⁶ While in 1969 he had to call in the military to restore order. Regardless, as Maurice Miesner highlights, to guarantee the “essential social and ideological prerequisites for socialism” Mao chose to sacrifice economic and political development.¹³⁷ Strong adherence to Marxist ideology pursued above all else marks Mao’s domestic tenure. Destruction of embedded social ideals was needed to construct a classless socialist society.

From a rational choice perspective, Mao leant to the USSR due to strategic choice. The USSR was the only major power to offer China financial and developmental assistance while recognising their claim over the ROC. Under an ideational perspective, Communist ideology underpins this alliance and close ties with other nations in the 1950s. China also quickly recognised Hanoi and committed its military in North Korea. Its major foreign alliances in the 1950s sharing the same Marxist-Leninist ideology, similar political-economic structures and supporting for the Comintern.

In the late 1950s Mao began to see his closest ally and benefactor, the USSR, as an ideological threat. To Mao, Khrushchev was leading the USSR down “revisionism”, broadly defined by Graham Young as an “ideological system in opposition of socialist revolution”.¹³⁸ After Khrushchev’s secret speech and inability to promptly quell uprisings in Czechoslovakia and Hungary, Mao became dissatisfied at the USSR’s commitment to Marxism-Leninism and as leaders of the Comintern.¹³⁹ This was exacerbated by border disputes and USSR military initiatives in China arousing nationalist sentiment. Further, Soviet rapprochement with the US ran counter to Leninist claims of the necessity to fight international

¹³⁶ Anne-Marie Brady, “Red and Expert: China’s ‘Foreign Friends’ in the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, 1966-1969,” in *China’s Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution: Master Narratives and Post-Mao Counternarratives*, ed. Woei Lien Chong, World Social Change (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2002), 120-1.

¹³⁷ Miesner, ‘Leninism and Maoism’, 28

¹³⁸ Graham Young, 54.

¹³⁹ Lorenz M. Luthi, *The Sino-Soviet Split: Cold War in the Communist World* (Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2008), 2, <https://hdl-handle-net.ezproxy.auckland.ac.nz/2027/fulcrum.wd375x01q>.

imperialism, the purpose of the International Communist Movement.¹⁴⁰ However, if we consider MZT as an ideational attack on class consciousness, Khrushchev's de-Stalinisation would undermine Stalin's attempts at the same, regardless if Stalin's tools were mass purges and violent suppression.

Chen Jian, in contrast, proposes that Mao used the USSR as a target to fuel domestic mobilisation.¹⁴¹ Naturally, this has some substance as Mao had previously found an enemy in imperialists and counter-reactionaries as a motivation technique for the masses. MZT distinguished itself from the Soviet model in focusing on the revolutionary potential of peasants over industrial workers. The Sino-Soviet Split came to public knowledge in 1960, giving support to the idea that the GLF, a peasant-based initiative, diverged too far from the Soviet's interpretation of Marxism-Leninism. However, as the peasantry were a primary revolutionary force before the Sino-Soviet Treaty, it is unlikely the cause of the split, although it did exacerbate tensions.¹⁴² Regardless, the Sino-Soviet split shows the commitment Mao held towards ideology. Upholding his interpretation over Marxism-Leninism proved more important than a strategic alliance with the USSR. As Mao had no significant allies who shared the same ideology, this further enhanced China's isolation in the 1960s.

While Zhou Enlai prioritised "peaceful cooperation" throughout the 1950s, in contrast, Mao in the 1960s made fighting imperialism and supporting world revolution the key components of China's foreign policy. A 1963 People's Daily article articulates China's position:

Workers of all countries, unite; workers of the world, unite with the oppressed peoples and oppressed nations; oppose imperialism and reactionaries in all countries; strive for world peace, national liberation, people's democracy and socialism; consolidate and expand the socialist camp; bring the proletarian world revolution step by step to complete victory; and establish a new world without imperialism, without capitalism and without the exploitation of man by man.

¹⁴⁰ Ibid, 163.

¹⁴¹ Chen Jian (2001), quoted in Luthi, 8.

¹⁴² Luthi, 15.

This, in our view, is the general line of the international communist movement at the present stage.¹⁴³

Such sentiment was pushed further by Lin Biao in 1969:

All countries and people subjected to aggression, control, intervention or bullying by U.S. imperialism and Soviet revisionism, let us unite and form the broadest possible united front and overthrow our common enemies!¹⁴⁴

There are specific examples of Mao supporting revolution in the Third World in the early 1960s, but from 1965 he claimed that world revolution was in decline and the CCP would be the vanguard to lead it.¹⁴⁵ This moves the CCP's aims away from solely internal socialist transformation confirming the pursuit of complete international change, aiming for the eradication of world classes and states.¹⁴⁶ Noting that traditional Maoism promotes armed struggle, it seems that China was endorsing global violence, directly in contrast to its position of peaceful coexistence.¹⁴⁷ With the world's two strongest powers seen as ideological enemies, an international united front would be the best chance to withstand the hostile international environment. Ideology had been a domestic tool for mass mobilisation, and the CCP was trying the same tool externally.

In the 1968 Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia and 1969 Sino-Soviet border disputes, the USSR moved from being an ideological threat to a genuine security threat. Beijing had spoken more harshly over the

¹⁴³ The People's Daily (人民日报), 14 June 1963, quoted in Chen Zhimin, 43.

¹⁴⁴ Lin Biao, quoted in Alexander C. Cook, 'Third World Maoism', in *A Critical Introduction to Mao*, ed. Timothy Cheek (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 288–312, <https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511781476.014>.

¹⁴⁵ Anne-Marie Brady, 'Red and Expert', 97; Mao Zedong, 'American Imperialism Is Closely Surrounded By The Peoples Of The World', Mao Zedong, "U.S. Imperialism Is The Most Ferocious Enemy Of The World's People: January 12, 1964,".

¹⁴⁶ Brady, 'Red and Expert', 100.

¹⁴⁷ Tang Shiping, 'From Offensive to Defensive Realism: A Social Evolutionary Interpretation of China's Security Strategy', in *China's Ascent: Power, Security, and the Future of International Politics.*, ed. Robert S. Ross and Zhu Feng, 1st ed, Cornell Studies in Security Affairs Ser (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2015), 153.

Czechoslovakian invasion than any other nation. Meisner believes this is due to China's inherent belief in respecting national sovereignty.¹⁴⁸ This supports the theory that China, while supporting localised Communist groups, would have been unlikely to directly attack another nation under revolutionary reasoning. However, the Soviet threat led to China warming relations with the US, followed by UN membership; a process of opening up to the world. Although revolutionary rhetoric and support did not die out until Mao himself did, when relations opened up with the West, revolutionary ideology did not play as active a role in foreign policy.¹⁴⁹

In explaining this, either Mao realised revolutionary ideology was not as effective as an international mobiliser as it was domestically, or ideological difference became subsidiary to genuine security threats. It is also possible the notion of a common enemy was only a tool for mass mobilisation rather than a genuine ideological threat. Although the threat of US imperialism was still real to CCP leaders, it was less of a threat than the Soviet military. Another option is still likely: nationalism became a higher priority than fostering international Marxist-Leninism. With many nations siding with the USSR after the Sino-Soviet Split, China had retreated further into isolation and was experiencing what I would call 'self-imposed ideological subjugation'. If a core component of MZT realised an independent China, the CCP did not share any affinity with the First or majority of the Second Worlds. When the CCP could not obtain recognition from the Third World, it started pushing external revolution. When China re-established contact with the US, the UN and much of the West also warmed to China and recognised the PRC's position over the ROC, submitting to its nationalistic claims. Notably, the revolutionary rhetoric subsided substantially as China established more normal diplomatic relations with the world. China did not need international revolution when it had international recognition.

¹⁴⁸ Ibid, 399.

¹⁴⁹ Brady, 'Red and Expert', 126

Chapter Two 1972-1993: Rogernomics and 改革开放 ‘Reform and Opening Up’

New Zealand

Transforming New Zealand’s Foreign Policy

The Norman Kirk Labour Government (1972-74) made swift measures to recognise the PRC as the legitimate government of China in December 1972. In doing so, Kirk established a relationship where the two nations would seek areas to cooperate, though this would largely be driven through trade, a pattern followed by all his successors. Seen in the actions of Bill Rowling (1974-75), Robert Muldoon (1975-1984) and David Lange (1984-89), a trend also began of speaking out where NZ did not agree with China. Issues regarding Chinese support for Communist insurgencies in South East Asia, atmospheric nuclear testing, and eventually human rights, being the major points of concern. However, diverging views and open protest did little to diminish continued diplomatic and economic interaction. Despite a consensus on how to engage China, amidst economic difficulties and domestic protest, NZ leaders were divided in other areas of foreign policy which dominated decision making.

Like Holyoake, Kirk was reluctant to recognise China at Taiwan’s expense. Unlike his predecessors, however, the interests of NZ’s allies were not always his key priority. To Kirk, “co-operation with other nations does not necessarily mean subservience or submission: we are seeking friends, not masters.”¹

Kirk’s decision making is grounded in a desire for a New Zealand-oriented foreign policy:

¹ Norman Kirk, *Towards Nationhood; Selected Extracts from the Speeches of Norman Kirk, M. P.* (Palmerston North: New Zealand Books, 1969).

From now on, when we have to deal with a new situation, we shall not say, what do the British think about it, what would the Americans want us to do? Our starting point will be, what do we think about it?²

Let us proudly cultivate a sense of nationhood and stand up for ourselves in international political and trade circles, not acting in a spirit of independence merely for the sake of asserting ourselves, but to protect our own interests, both political and commercial.³

Kirk recognised China as a major power in the Pacific. A small country such as New Zealand needed to have political representation in order to conduct relations with all major powers in the region.⁴ This is what also prompted Kirk to reinstate the Soviet ambassador in NZ. While Nixon's visit to Beijing signalled that relations with China would not endanger relations with the US, Kirk's decision came in light of the PRC being admitted to the United Nations. Kirk wished to keep official relations open with Taiwan, proposing a trade mission to both the PRC and ROC in 1971, yet the UN decision made it clear the international system had accepted Beijing over Taipei. The PRC would not tolerate dual recognition. The UN resolution provided a "clear decision" for Kirk on the matter of a one-China policy.⁵ The Government quickly moved to establish ties with Beijing, sending a diplomatic mission headed by Joe Walding in 1973. In the same year, a Chinese delegation went to NZ, official embassies were established, and the nations signed their first official trade agreement.

Rather than seeing this as purely an economic opportunity, according to a former NZ ambassador to Beijing, economics was not even a consideration for Kirk.⁶ Leading up to the election Kirk made it clear that it was "just nonsense" that China, with several hundred million people, was not recognised by the

² Norman Kirk (1973), cited in, Malcolm McKinnon, 185.

³ Kirk, *Towards Nationhood*, 10.

⁴ Norman Kirk, *New Zealand in the World of the 1970s: A Statement. 22 December 1972* (Wellington: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1973), 5.

⁵ David McCraw, 'Norman Kirk, The Labour Party and New Zealand's Recognition of The People's Republic Of China', *New Zealand Journal of Asian Studies* 4 (2002) 54.

⁶ *Ibid*, 58-9.

United Nations.⁷ It is clear that Kirk was pursuing a morally based foreign policy, made more evident through other actions during his time in office. Amongst popular public opinion, Kirk withdrew NZ soldiers from Vietnam and Cambodia, officially recognised Hanoi in 1973 and lifted the trade embargo on North Vietnam. Kirk cancelled the proposed tour by the South African rugby team amongst protest over its apartheid policies. He was also paramount in protesting French nuclear testing in the Pacific, taking France to the International Court and sending two New Zealand Navy Frigates into the test area.

As John Henderson argues, while Kirk was given credit for the shift to a more independent foreign policy, and Lange for establishing an anti-nuclear NZ, it was Kirk's successor Bill Rowling who was the one who navigated both considerations.⁸ Rowling continued the anti-nuclear policy and sponsored a resolution at the United Nations for a Nuclear-Free Pacific Zone against the wishes of the US, UK and Australian Governments, an example of small state independence. He also emphasised that Labour's anti-nuclear policy was not anti-American, attempting to gain movement within ANZUS, rather than refuting the agreement.⁹ In regards to China, he was critical of atmospheric nuclear testing and the support for insurgency movements in South East Asia but also expressed the importance NZ held to the relationship, noting a high-level visit would be necessary to develop this further.¹⁰ However, it was left to Robert Muldoon, who in April 1976 just several months after being elected into office, became the first New Zealand prime minister to visit the PRC.

⁷ Norman Kirk (1971), cited in, David McCraw, 'Norman Kirk, The Labour Party and New Zealand's Recognition of The People's Republic Of China': 50-51.

⁸ John Henderson, 'Bill Rowling', *Political Science* 60, no. 2 (1 December 2008): 83, <https://doi.org/10.1177/003231870806000208>.

⁹ Ibid.

¹⁰ John McKinnon, 'Breaking the Mould: New Zealand's Relations with China', in *New Zealand in World Affairs: 1972-1990*, ed. Bruce Brown (Victoria University Press, 1999), 333-34.

Muldoon, a conservative, had campaigned on representing “the ordinary bloke”. To former National Party President Sue Wood, this is what he thought of as New Zealand.¹¹ Muldoon’s tenure characterises the last vestiges of Keynesian economics, with massive government spending to maintain the welfare state. A former soldier in WWII, he prioritised New Zealand’s traditional allies and distrusted the Soviet Union, claiming their actions “point not to defence but to imperialism and aggression”.¹²

If Kirk had a morally aligned foreign policy emphasising independent choice from other nations, Muldoon pursued a foreign policy which focused on pragmatic trade, military security and great power alignment. A clear distinction from his Labour predecessors, Muldoon claimed moral considerations in foreign policy to be “sanctimonious humbug”.¹³ Amidst enormous protest, Muldoon welcomed the South African rugby team to tour, re-allowed ship visits from the US, supported Britain in the Falkland Islands, withdrew New Zealand’s support for the Nuclear-Free Pacific Zone and minimised protest against French testing in the Pacific amidst trade concerns. His views against the Soviet Union, while giving affinity to the Chinese, emphasised the importance Muldoon placed on the US relationship. Muldoon believed it was only the US who could stop Soviet imperialism in the South Pacific.¹⁴

During his visit to Beijing, Muldoon protested against China’s atmospheric nuclear testing but found common ground regarding the threat of the Soviet Union,¹⁵ with the latter topic discussed in much more detail with Premier Hua Guofeng. Muldoon told Hua that there was “little to disagree with” China

¹¹ Marcia Russell and John Carlaw, ‘Fortress New Zealand’, *Revolution* (New Zealand: NZ On Screen, 1996), <https://www.nzonscreen.com/title/revolution-1-fortress-new-zealand-2009>.

¹² Malcolm McKinnon, 197.

¹³ Barry Gustafson, *His Way: A Biography of Robert Muldoon* (Auckland, Auckland, N.Z.: Auckland University Press, 2000), 215.

¹⁴ Malcolm McKinnon, 197.

¹⁵ Gustafson, *His Way: A Biography of Robert Muldoon* 226-9.

regarding the Soviet Union, particularly Hua's view that the Soviet Union had become "the main hotbed of a world war... [,] on the road of expansion and in the offensive position".¹⁶

Besides security, as Muldoon aptly put it, New Zealand's "foreign policy is trade. We are not interested in the normal foreign policy matters to any great extent. We are interested in trade."¹⁷ Since recognition with China, there had been a rapid increase in bilateral trade with Muldoon seeing the potential for this to continue. The two countries acknowledged a commitment to trade with the signing of a most-favoured national trade agreement during Muldoon's first visit.

Muldoon's successor David Lange brought in an economic policy promoting market reform and announced that New Zealand would be nuclear free. The nuclear-free policy extended to banning visits to New Zealand ports from ships that were nuclear armed, powered or capable. While still committed to the ANZUS treaty, unlike Muldoon, Lange saw nuclear weapons as NZ's most significant security threat, arguing they hold no moral defence and their existence is a greater threat to NZ than conventional warfare.¹⁸ Under this policy, the Lange Government declined a port visit by the USS Buchanan in 1985 and passed anti-nuclear legislation in 1987. The US responded by suspending its commitments to New Zealand under the ANZUS Treaty, effectively ending the alliance between the two nations.

Lange's decision reflects genuine security concerns, yet he was forced to balance between popular anti-nuclear sentiment in NZ and a US unrelenting to accommodate NZ in their policy to 'neither confirm nor deny' nuclear capabilities. In the end, Lange chose to succumb to domestic over external pressure. He created a narrative that emphasised the decision to be one of an independent New Zealand, a small

¹⁶ Ibid, 228.

¹⁷ David McCraw, 'From Kirk to Muldoon: Change and Continuity in New Zealand's Foreign-Policy Priorities', *Pacific Affairs* 55, no. 4 (1982): 647, <https://doi.org/10.2307/2756845>.

¹⁸ Lange, 'New Zealand's Security Policy'. David Lange, *A Selection of Recent Foreign Policy Statements by the New Zealand Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs, Rt. Hon. David Lange.*, Information Bulletin (New Zealand. Ministry of Foreign Affairs) ; No. 11 (Wellington, N.Z.: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1985), 15. David McCraw, 'Idealism and Realism in the Foreign Policy of the Fourth Labour Government', *Political Science* 53, no. 2 (December 2001): 32, <https://doi.org/10.1177/003231870105300202>.

nation able to assert its interests in opposition to a much larger nation. As stated in Lange's address at the Oxford Union Debate in March 1985, failure to follow US policy would be met with consequence:

We have been told by officials in the United States... we are to be made to pay for our actions... We are actually told that New Zealanders cannot decide for themselves how to defend New Zealand but are obliged to adopt the methods which others use to defend themselves... to compel an ally to accept nuclear weapons against the wishes of that ally is to take the moral position of totalitarianism, which allows for no self-determination.¹⁹

Even though the US threatened economic sanctions, these were never enforced. It is possible, yet unlikely, economic sanctions could have changed the direction of Lange to uphold the anti-nuclear policy. Lange did admit that threats by the French Government to block access for NZ produce to the European market led to him to move offshore the agents responsible for bombing the Rainbow Warrior.²⁰ This decision was under the agreement the agents would still be held accountable and confined to an island on French Polynesia. Yet after two years they were acquitted and welcomed back to France. Noting the public support for the anti-nuclear policy, it is unlikely Lange would have succumbed to French pressure if he knew the agents would be released. It was always a regret of his after leaving office.²¹

This marked a turning point for New Zealand foreign policy. Where New Zealand's interests directly contrasted with a much larger ally, NZ leaders chose to emphasise independence, prioritising internal over external pressures. Independent choice led to more independence in security. Apart from a short period after WWII, NZ for the first time in its history did not have a military agreement with a dominant superpower. Realist logic had failed.

¹⁹ Lange, *A Selection of Recent Foreign Policy Statements*, 20-21.

²⁰ David Lange, *My Life* (Auckland, N.Z.: Viking, 2005), 223.

²¹ *Ibid.* 222-3.

By 1988 China had become New Zealand's fifth biggest export market, there were regular reciprocal political visits, and expanding educational, cultural and scientific exchanges.²² Like Muldoon, Lange nurtured the relationship with China. By 1989, he had already visited China once, wanting to "explore ways in which [NZ] can expand and deepen [its] co-operation".²³ Lange still felt he needed to advance NZ's interests in the nation despite steady growth between the two countries.²⁴ One strategy was to re-emphasise the contributions made by Rewi Alley to China and the NZ-China relationship. After recognition of the PRC, Alley's personal connections with CCP leadership were always seen as beneficial to NZ leaders. He often accompanied diplomatic missions. Lange spent time at Alley's Beijing home during his eight day visit to China in 1986, and Lange praised him extensively after Alley was made a Companion of the Queen's Service Order in 1985, "New Zealand has had many great sons, but you, Sir, are our greatest son."²⁵

In the wake of the Tiananmen Square protests, New Zealand ceased ministerial contact with China until September the following year and condemned the CCP along with a large portion of the international community. Acting Prime Minister Geoffrey Palmer "expressed horror and repugnance at the action by the Chinese authorities" with Lange commenting that subsequent actions by Chinese officials as "barbaric".²⁶ Despite China growing in economic importance to NZ, the aftermath of Tiananmen show human rights in China as a concern for Lange and Palmer which could impact the functioning of the relationship.

²² New Zealand Ministry of External Relations and Trade, 'Political Crisis in China', *New Zealand External Relations Review*. 39, no. 3 (1988): 54.

²³ MFAT, 'China-NZ Relations', *New Zealand Foreign Affairs Review*. 36, no. 1 (1986): 16.

²⁴ Lange, *My Life*, 220.

²⁵ David Mahon, 'Afternoons with Rewi Alley', *North & South* 1 (October 2013): 50–57. Quoted in Stephen Noakes and Charles Burton, 'Economic Statecraft and the Making of Bilateral Relationships: Canada-China and New Zealand-China Interactions Compared', *Journal of Chinese Political Science*, 7 February 2019, <https://doi.org/10.1007/s11366-018-09602-x>.

²⁶ New Zealand Ministry of External Relations and Trade, 53-4.

To John McKinnon, the resumption of the relationship was justified as there was no recurrence in violence, martial law had been lifted, detainees had been released and the Chinese were aware of New Zealand's concerns.²⁷ Minister of Trade Jim Sutton expressed these concerns in person, yet emphasised that NZ would rather continue to seek areas of mutual benefit with China. With NZ being the first nation to resume ministerial visits,²⁸ concerns over human rights may not have any lasting impact other than an official expression of concern.

Neo-Liberal Reform of the Fourth Labour Government

The consensus over foreign policy and the welfare state of the previous decades became stressed during the 1970s and 1980s. NZ lost privileged access to its major trading partner in 1973 and its primary military ally in 1987. NZ was no longer bandwagoning with major powers to ensure security. Realist mentality was waning. Simultaneously, the NZ Government's protectionist policies, while designed to provide shelter from foreign competition of labour-intensive industries, were unsuccessful in navigating the new international climate of rapid travel in information, people and capital. Notably, China's exports during the 1980s was dominated by precisely the type of large-scale labour-intensive industry the NZ Government was trying to shelter its producers and manufacturers from. From 1984, NZ made radical moves to deregulate markets, severely reduce the role of the state in NZ society and embrace, rather than resist, the world economy. Realist thinking had given way to NZ leaders accepting NZ as one actor in a more comprehensive global system. While direct economic results with China were marginal, the 1984 reforms opened the NZ economy, precipitating closer interaction in the following decades.

²⁷ John McKinnon, 255.

²⁸ Ibid.

The reversal in support for the nuclear issue and the Springbok Tour between consecutive governments shows a more divisive foreign policy than held before. Notably, this fray did not intrude into the New Zealand-China relationship. From Kirk's recognition, each government supported increased ties and further trade, with notable increases in the trade portfolio and high-level visits from 1972. This suggests that since recognition, party policies and political leaders have converged on NZ's position regarding the PRC despite diverging over other foreign policy concerns. While there are notable exceptions in regards to human rights, particularly the Tiananmen Square Massacre, the increase in connectivity shows a generally positive attitude towards China from NZ governments.

One explanation is that recognition coincided with British entry into the EEC. Closer ties with China reflect the structural need for NZ to diversify its trade portfolio. This was met with some success. The 1970s and 80s saw some manufactured products, mainly farming equipment, as well as horticultural produce, fish and forestry become notable additions to the traditional and limited export portfolio of meat, wool, butter and cheese.²⁹ Further, NZ found some success in diversifying export destinations away from Britain to Japan, USA, USSR, Australia, EEC, Iran as well as China. By 1985 exports to Britain had dropped from 36% of total exports in 1970 to only 9%, with Australia, Japan and USA all holding roughly 15% of exports each.³⁰ NZ governments had recognised that trade dependency on one destination was not sustainable and had sought measures to counteract this.

However, despite success in trade diversification, the 1970s and early 1980s were marked by extremely poor economic performance. Two oil crises throughout the 1970s contributed to a global trend of inflation and unemployment amongst developed nations, yet New Zealand fared much worse off than

²⁹ Keith Sinclair, *A History of New Zealand*, Rev ed.. (Auckland, N.Z.: Penguin Books, 2000), 325.

³⁰ Ibid.

the OECD average.³¹ By 1982 annual inflation had been above 10% for the previous eight years and was sitting at roughly three times that of the UK, Britain or Japan.³² Concurrently, NZ had a rampant foreign deficit accruing in part from overseas borrowing. The situation meant that per capita income for New Zealanders, once one of the highest in the OECD, had dropped to one of the lowest in the organisation.³³

To some, the heavy protection of the welfare economy made NZ the most regulated state outside of the Communist bloc.³⁴ This suggests a link between Keynesian economics and the relatively poor performance of NZ amongst the OECD. Several commentators argue protectionist measures had counter-productive effects when flows of capital, people and information could now move globally at a rapid pace.³⁵ Substantial state intervention and high expenditure became self-destructive for NZ when the world economy was becoming more connected and interdependent.

Government subsidies were given to manufacturers and producers to buffer against fluctuations in prices, while import licenses and tariffs protected from foreign competition. While this practice was intended to protect exporters and manufacturers, this inhibited the flow of labour and capital to its most productive uses.³⁶ Workers were discouraged from adapting to more efficient practice, meaning

³¹ Derek Quigley, 'Economic Reform; New Zealand in an International Perspective', *The Round Table* 85, no. 339 (1 July 1996): 310–11, <https://doi.org/10.1080/00358539608454318>; Malcolm Bale and Tony Dale, 'Public Sector Reform in New Zealand and Its Relevance to Developing Countries', *The World Bank Research Observer* 13, no. 1 (1998): 103; Michael Bassett, *The State in New Zealand, 1840-1984: Socialism Without Doctrines?* (Auckland, N.Z.: Auckland University Press, 1998), 324.

³² Bassett, *The State in New Zealand, 1840-1984*, 366-7; Lewis Evans et al., 'Economic Reform in New Zealand 1984-95: The Pursuit of Efficiency', *Journal of Economic Literature* 34, no. 4 (1996): 1860.

³³ Bale and Dale, 103.

³⁴ Colin James, 'The Policy Revolution: 1984–1993', in *New Zealand Politics in Transition*, ed. Raymond Miller (Auckland, N.Z.: Oxford University Press, 1997), 13; Bassett, *The State in New Zealand, 1840-1984: Socialism Without Doctrines?*.

³⁵ Bassett, *The State in New Zealand, 1840-1984*, 17, 369-374; Satendra Prasad, 'Labour and the Internationalization of New Zealand', in *Global Humanization: Studies in the Manufacture of Labour*, ed. Mike Neary, Employment and Work Relations in Context (London ; New York: Mansell, 1999), 12-17; Colin James, 'The Policy Revolution: 1984–1993', 14; Stephen B. Blumenfeld, Aaron Crawford, and Pat Walsh, 'Globalisation, Trade and Unionisation in an Open Economy: The Case of New Zealand', *International Employment Relations Review* 8, no. 1 (2002): 72. Jim McAloon, 35.

³⁶ Prasad, 17.

products were less competitive internationally. When sheep prices fell in the early 80s, the Government supported farmers with large subsidies. Rather than adapting to the state of the market, many farmers aimed to produce more lambs as the Government, rather than the market, provided financial reward for doing so.³⁷ The result led to an oversupply of lambs with many being made into fertiliser. These inefficiencies were notable throughout many industries. Domestically made consumer goods, for example, were of little variety and often of inferior quality than available elsewhere.³⁸ The Government further compounded these issues in its focus on providing social welfare and employment rather than encouraging productive enterprise.

Direct employment was supplied in the extensive network of government infrastructure. Yet many state enterprises were unproductive, running at a loss and needing direct taxpayer support to operate.³⁹ Epitomised in Muldoon's "Think Big" initiative, a huge development project which promised and failed to solve unemployment and high energy costs.⁴⁰ Where it could not supply direct employment, the Government committed to social welfare. A national superannuation initiative was introduced to give a large portion of the average wage to those aged over 60, regardless of income or employment status. It has been hailed the "most expensive piece of legislation in New Zealand history" by one critic.⁴¹ Against low economic performance and high foreign deficit, high government spending was unable to contain inflation and unemployment levels. Although such policies aimed to support NZ's most vulnerable by focusing on employment rather than developing capital, they created an inefficient and self-destructive economic situation. Responding to these measures, and against the wishes of the Treasury, Muldoon implemented a freeze on wages and prices in 1982. With government spending still high, the deficit

³⁷ Keith Sinclair, *A History of New Zealand*, 333

³⁸ Russell and Carlaw, 'Fortress New Zealand'; Evans et al., 1883.

³⁹ Bassett, *The State in New Zealand, 1840-1984*, 373; Bale and Dale, 104.

⁴⁰ Russell and Carlaw, 'Fortress New Zealand'.

⁴¹ Keith Sinclair, *A History of New Zealand.*, 326

grew considerably and inflation pressures still rose.⁴² When Labour took power in 1984, four weeks after a snap election decision, the NZ economy was in financial crisis at risk of breaking into hyperinflation as soon as the freeze was lifted.⁴³ Immediate economic reform was needed to prevent disaster.

To many observers, the failure of the NZ Government to adjust to the economic situation in the 70s and early 80s was the primary cause of the financial crisis and demanded immediate financial adjustment.⁴⁴

To Paul Pierson, this would be akin to acknowledging the path of Keynesian economics had revealed itself higher than the cost of adjusting.⁴⁵ Considering the pace and extent of the reforms, Aberbach and Christensen note this is too simple an explanation. Neo-liberal beliefs already existed in several sectors. The Reserve Bank had previously been supportive of deregulation, the Treasury was promoting liberal reform to the deaf ears of Muldoon in the early 1980s, while Finance Minister Roger Douglas had written on free-market philosophies in 1980 which featured extensively in his 1981 shadow budget.⁴⁶

The economic crisis in 1984 gave Douglas and other supporters of reform within Cabinet, Treasury and the Reserve Bank a “window of opportunity” to implement already held neo-liberal beliefs at a radical pace.⁴⁷ It is hard to doubt Douglas being a radical reformer. Another window of opportunity surfaced after the stock market crash in 1987. Douglas wished to extend the reform agenda which put him in opposition with Lange. Lange and Douglas’ differences in opinion over the extent of the reforms led to internal strife within the party and Lange’s eventual retirement. Without gaining long-term support for

⁴² Bassett, *The State in New Zealand, 1840-1984*, 367.

⁴³ *Ibid*, 327-3.

⁴⁴ *Ibid*, 366-7; Colin James, ‘The Policy Revolution: 1984–1993’, 14; Blumenfeld, Crawford, and Walsh, 72; Quigley, 312; New Zealand Treasury, ‘Economic Management: Briefing to the Incoming Government 1984’ (New Zealand Treasury, 1 July 1984), 309, <https://treasury.govt.nz/publications/bim/economic-management-briefing-incoming-government-1984-html>.

⁴⁵ Paul Pierson, ‘Increasing Returns, Path Dependence, and the Study of Politics’, *The American Political Science Review* 94, no. 2 (2000): 251–67, <https://doi.org/10.2307/2586011>.

⁴⁶ Joel D. Aberbach and Tom Christensen, ‘Radical Reform in New Zealand: Crisis, Windows of Opportunity, and Rational Actors’, *Public Administration* 79, no. 2 (2001): 410-414, <https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-9299.00262>.

⁴⁷ *Ibid*.

his views, Douglas was integral in setting up the ACT party as a sole vehicle for his free-market policies. The economic situation before the fourth Labour Government necessitated change but it was Douglas who ensured it was done so at a rapid rate.

It is difficult to confirm the reforms of the Fourth Labour Government as a success. Corporatisation and privatising the state sector resulted in mass unemployment and put the welfare state under extreme pressure, promulgated by the many farmers and manufacturers who were directly impacted by the removal of subsidies and tariff licences. The cost to the state in benefits was higher in 1990 than it had been in 1983.⁴⁸ Further, while the protectionist measures of Muldoon stalled rather than prevented economic fluctuations, the reforms opened NZ to the full brunt of international trends. The 1987 stock market crash severely impacted NZ markets with long-term effects on share prices.⁴⁹

On the other hand, inflation eventually came under control, and the Government enabled a competitive working environment. Several authors note that in the decade after the reforms, the NZ economy was more robust and flexible to adapt to international markets, unemployment began to fall, inflation was managed, GDP growth began to rise and there were several budget surpluses.⁵¹ The state of the economy was in critical condition in 1984 and adjustment was a necessity, despite the resulting unemployment. As Geoffrey Palmer has claimed, “you can’t have social justice if you have no economy”.⁵²

⁴⁸ Evans et al., 1877-88.

⁴⁹ Marcia Russell and John Carlaw, ‘The Great Divide’, *Revolution* (New Zealand: NZ On Screen, 1996), <https://www.nzonscreen.com/title/revolution-the-great-divide-1996>.

⁵¹ James E. Alvey, ‘Economic Reform in New Zealand (1984-1999): A Retrospective’, *Policy* 16, no. 1 (March 2000): 62; Jack H. Nagel, ‘Social Choice in a Pluralitarian Democracy: The Politics of Market Liberalization in New Zealand’, *British Journal of Political Science* 28, no. 2 (April 1998): 230, <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0007123498000155>.

⁵² Marcia Russell and John Carlaw, ‘The Grand Illusion’, *Revolution* (New Zealand: NZ On Screen, 1996), <https://www.nzonscreen.com/title/revolution-the-grand-illusion-1996>.

There is a consensus among academics that eradicating restrictions on trade has led to a more open New Zealand economy. Removing foreign exchange controls and quotas, as well as reducing tariff barriers and subsidies have enabled an economy which is more open to trade and capital flows.⁵³ This has expanded the range and availability of consumer goods in NZ. Similarly, removing subsidies for manufacturers and producers opened markets to international competition. While in the short term this resulted in unemployment and business failure, in the long term it encouraged innovation and productivity to respond to international trends, making businesses more competitive.⁵⁴ This has also enabled the Government to direct investment to efficient production rather than supplying wages.

An OECD report in 1994 measuring openness as a ratio of imports and exports to GDP revealed that there was a 42 per cent increase in NZ's openness level from 1983-1993.⁵⁵ Congruently, the UK had dropped from 50% of total exports in 1963 to 6.5% in 1992. Australia had increased from 4% to 19.3% across the same period.⁵⁶ By 1995, 35% of NZ's total exports and six out of the top ten markets were located in Asia. Post-reform, there were fewer trade barriers within NZ, and there was a wider distribution of partners. Undeniably, NZ had opened up. The direction it had opened was the Asia-Pacific.

⁵³ Evans et al., 1883.

⁵⁴ Stephen Britton, 'Recent Trends in the Internationalisation of the New Zealand Economy', *Australian Geographical Studies* 29, no. 1 (1 April 1991): 5-6, <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-8470.1991.tb00705.x>.

⁵⁵ Evans et al., 1883.

⁵⁶ Prasad, 20.

He Tipu te Whaakaro ō Ngā Tangata ō Aotearoa - A Growing National Consciousness

Kirk, Muldoon and Lange all declared NZ's identity as belonging to the South Pacific.⁵⁷ Military and economic ties with Australia had increased, there was a growing Polynesian population, and NZ had increased its commitment to the Pacific Islands. There is a distinct shift away from the British and US-centred mentality that had dominated NZ decision making in previous decades towards a focus on geographical location. Structural changes loosened dependence on these nations which necessitated New Zealand prioritise its own interests; Britain joined the EEC, and the US reduced its commitment in South East Asia, lessening the communist threat. Yet a resurgence in the role of Māori and overwhelming anti-nuclear sentiment further distinguished NZ's identity and dominant values as something different to other Western nations. The anti-nuclear stance in particular led to confrontation rather than cooperation with France and the US. On the other hand, NZ and China established a working relationship despite differing values and open protest against nuclear weapons, communist insurgencies and from 1989, human rights. NZ was becoming less aligned with the US and UK, embracing its geographic location, bicultural identity and anti-nuclear values.

Regardless of NZ's history as a loyal colony and Commonwealth member, the UK increasingly prioritised economic interests over any sentiment to NZ. Protocol 18 symbolised the UK commitment to helping NZ's precarious economic situation after EEC ascension. Yet in guaranteeing market access in declining quantities, the measure was only temporary. This had repercussions in the political relationship.

Holyoake, for example, agreed not to verbally condemn British entry, suggesting it was a feasible option otherwise. Kirk, though British born, was generally unhappy with how the UK handled the

⁵⁷ John Henderson, 'New Zealand and Oceania', in *New Zealand in World Affairs: 1972-1990*, ed. Bruce Brown (Victoria University Press, 1999), 267–8.

Commonwealth. The economic consequences of EEC entry for NZ and inaction against white South Africa are two prominent examples.⁵⁸ Significantly, NZ support for Britain in the 1982 Falklands War was not reciprocated when France claimed responsibility in 1985 for bombing the Rainbow Warrior in Auckland Harbour. France threatened economic sanctions in the EEC unless the two French agents were returned. Britain, New Zealand's long-time supporter against international aggression and sponsor in EEC negotiations, refused to intervene or condemn France's actions.⁵⁹

That Britain would support a fellow member of the EEC over a current Commonwealth member suggests European association was of more importance than sentimental ties with NZ, a shift from what had led to Protocol 18. While Muldoon's positive support for Britain is reminiscent of the "Where Britain goes, we go" mentality of the 1940s and 1950s, EEC ascension and particularly the British response to the Rainbow Warrior, reflect the reality of NZ's relationship with Britain in the 1970s and 1980s. The NZ-UK affinity could only provide temporary economic solutions and did not guarantee support against international opposition. NZ commitment to Vietnam, the first NZ military deployment without British involvement, reinforced NZ's defence arrangements laid elsewhere. The protective qualities of a mother were noticeably absent from the mother country. The British affinity was not as strong as it once was and failed to provide significant material benefit or international political support.

While the relationship with the UK is based on a shared identity, culture and history, the relationship with the US was born out of war time necessity and strengthened through military alliance. Defence and joint opposition to communism underpinned the relationship, with protecting ANZUS being the basis of NZ security policy since 1951. The agreement was initially questioned through major civil protest and bipartisan opposition to the Vietnam War but was stressed in the waning belief NZ was at risk of direct

⁵⁸ Malcolm McKinnon, 185.

⁵⁹ Lange, *My Life*, 223.

military attack.⁶⁰ The Cold War détente in the 1970s did much to dispel fears over a major global war, as did nuclear deterrence. The NZ Government in 1985 highlighted that any serious direct threat to NZ's security was unlikely. There had been no perceived threats for the 40 years prior to 1985, and there were none foreseeable in the future.⁶¹

The re-evaluation of the communist threat which followed US withdrawal from Vietnam and rapprochement with China aided this perception. Towards the end of the Vietnam War, it became clear that Communism was only a tool in an indigenous national movement, and external intervention had been overestimated.⁶² As Ian McGibbon argues, the notion of an aggressive China was shattered and SEATO was made redundant.⁶³ NZ had shifted from condemning the militant actions of China to establishing a diplomatic relationship, though concern over communist insurgencies still existed.⁶⁴ With the 1969 Guam Doctrine encouraging US allies to take greater responsibility in their own defence, removing the anti-communist and defence foundations of ANZUS left the relationship without a solid foundation.

Internally, a renaissance of Māori identity and Crown recognition of rights under Te Tiriti o Waitangi further emphasised NZ's identity as something separate from the UK. For most of its history, NZ was unequivocally "British", underpinned by the common belief and government policy that Māori would gradually assimilate into Pākehā society.⁶⁵ Māori protest activism throughout the 1960s and 1970s

⁶⁰ Ian McGibbon, 'NZ's Defence Policy', in *New Zealand in World Affairs: 1972-1990*, ed. Bruce Brown (Victoria University Press, 1999). 115-7.

⁶¹ Richard Kennaway, 'The ANZUS Dispute', in *Beyond New Zealand. II, Foreign Policy into the 1990s*, ed. Richard Kennaway and John Henderson (Auckland [N.Z.]: Longman Paul, 1991), 72.

⁶² Richard Kennaway, 'The Wider Asian Pacific Context', in *Beyond New Zealand. II, Foreign Policy into the 1990s*, ed. Richard Kennaway and John Henderson (Auckland [N.Z.]: Longman Paul, 1991), 46.

⁶³ McGibbon, 115-7.

⁶⁴ John McKinnon, 233.

⁶⁵ Smits, 66.

challenged this notion, raising issues over past and present alienation and subjugation.⁶⁶ The Government's response moved away from assimilationist policies to promote bicultural ideology.⁶⁷ This included administrative responses in the public service to be more responsive to Māori needs and values, legislative responses to promote Māori culture, and institutionalisation of the Waitangi Tribunal in attempt to rectify injustices against Māori by the Crown.⁶⁸ Pākehā attitudes began to shift as greater prominence of Māori culture and identity came to the forefront of NZ daily life.⁶⁹ The resurgence of Māori culture and identity stressed NZ as a bicultural nation, rather than solely a former British colony. Prominently, in the declining importance of both ideological and great power conflict a younger generation of New Zealanders saw nuclear weapons rather than traditional conflict as NZ's greatest security threat.⁷⁰ While every NZ leader since Kirk has emphasised some form of opposition to nuclear weapons, Muldoon prioritised the ANZUS agreement over adherence to strong public opposition to US ship visits. Consequently, anti-nuclear sentiment contributed to the collapse of his government. A Labour-introduced anti-nuclear bill in 1984 gained the support of one of Muldoon's National MPs, threatening his government's majority. Muldoon's response was to call a snap election, with Labour campaigning and winning the election on their anti-nuclear policy. Subsequently, Lange's government denied entry to the USS Buchanan and became the first nation to pass anti-nuclear legislation in 1987.

⁶⁶ Ranganui Walker, 'Maori People Since 1959', in *The Oxford History of New Zealand.*, ed. Rice, Oliver, and Williams, 2nd ed., 512-2; Graeme Dunstall, 'The Social Pattern', in *The Oxford History of New Zealand.*, 476-8.; Juan Tauri and Robert Webb, 'The Waitangi Tribunal and the Regulation of Māori Protest', *New Zealand Sociology* 26 (2 July 2011): 23.

⁶⁷ Tauri and Webb, 24.

⁶⁸ Ibid; Janine Hayward, "'Flowing From the Treaty's Words", *The Principles of Te Tiriti o Waitangi*', in *The Waitangi Tribunal: Te Roopu Whakamana i Te Tiriti o Waitangi*, ed. Janine Hayward, 1st ed. (Bridget Williams Books, 2004), 29, <https://doi.org/10.7810/9781877242328>.

⁶⁹ Smits, 66-7.

⁷⁰ Kennaway, 'The ANZUS Dispute', 74.; McGibbon, 114

This raises several points. Firstly, anti-nuclear sentiment was a dominating social force in NZ throughout the 70s and 80s directly impacting government policy. Stephen Hoadley uses survey data to note that foreign policy concerns are rarely salient issues amongst New Zealanders, and subsequently, fail to regularly impact foreign policy.⁷¹ Regardless, anti-nuclear mentality shows the public has the capacity to do so, despite a lack of continued trends. Interestingly the invitation by the Key Government to host US ships in 2016 did not stress the need to confirm the presence of nuclear weapons and failed to elicit a similar reaction from the public. Anti-nuclear mentality amongst the New Zealand public peaked in the 1980s and is mostly confined to this era.

Secondly, it tested NZ's long-term alliances and associations resulting in international isolation. Support from the US was dependent on following its interests in foreign policy. This had been true since ANZUS was first signed in 1951. When NZ emphasised its own interests, NZ became an antagonist rather than an ally with a different viewpoint. The breakdown of ANZUS shows the relationship did not have a strong foundation; an alignment of values was necessary for cooperation, or more accurately, dissidence against US values would not be tolerated. This is also true with France, while other Western nations acted indifferently, as Lange recalled in 1996:

I knew [the Rainbow Warrior] ... was the end of any New Zealand commitment to the so-called Western Alliance... [T]he overwhelming silence from Great Britain... [Australian Prime Minister Robert] Hawke never said a word. Ronald Reagan pretended total indifference. We never had a peep out of those people we were allegedly in a Western Alliance with. Those people that fought for democracy.⁷²

Thirdly, it pushed New Zealand to focus on a more independent foreign policy. For the first time in its existence, NZ had no official alliance or agreement with the world's major superpower. Security concerns were not the dominant priority for NZ, resulting in pursuing domestic ideals rather than

⁷¹ Stephen Hoadley, *The New Zealand Foreign Affairs Handbook*, 2nd ed.. (Auckland [N.Z.]: Oxford University Press; New Zealand Institute of International Affairs, 1992), 151.

⁷² David Lange in Russell and Carlaw, 'The Grand Illusion'.

bandwagoning with a major power. Waltzian realism had faltered. Incoming PM Jim Bolger's push to Asia in the early 1990s further reflects a lack of commitments in Europe and North America. In developing values inherent to New Zealand, as a bicultural, independent anti-nuclear nation, leaders began to prioritise geographic location and growing economic trends rather than any past affinity with other nations.

China

Power Transition – Prioritising Governance

As I have argued, diplomatic relations with the PRC were conditional on accepting the nation as the only legitimate ruler of China. In 1971, the United Nations recognised these claims and expelled the ROC from the organisation. The US followed in 1972 by signing the Shanghai Communique which recognised Taiwan as an internal Chinese matter.⁷³ In the nine months following, New Zealand was amongst a group of nations to formally recognise the PRC. 1971-1972 realised a primary foreign policy goal for Mao Zedong: international recognition as a nation and recognition in claims over Taiwan. Despite normalising relations with the West, Mao still saw China as susceptible to foreign threats, particularly the USSR. Amidst the internal disorder of the CR, Mao's foreign policy had shifted from the 1960s where he considered China as "the political center of world revolution".⁷⁴ While this rhetoric did not disappear, it became secondary to Mao's Three Worlds Theory; aiming to mobilise both domestic and foreign

⁷³ Meisner, *Mao's China and After*, 408.

⁷⁴ *Ibid*, 399.

peoples in an international struggle against the world's two superpowers.⁷⁵ After Mao's death, Deng Xiaoping removed these policies. The Maoist fervour for collective action became secondary to economic development.

As late as 1970, Mao had urged the people of the world to "Unite and Defeat the U.S. Aggressors and All Their Running Dogs!"⁷⁶ Two years later, the Shanghai Communiqué promised the normalisation of relations between the US and China, called for the progressive withdrawal of American forces from Taiwan, and "pledged both sides not to seek hegemony in the Asia-Pacific region and to oppose any country or group of countries which sought to do so".⁷⁷ To Mao, the agreement mitigated the threat of American imperialism in Asia. As he said to Nixon in 1972, "the question of war between China and the U.S. doesn't exist at present".⁷⁸

Yet if Mao hoped a warmer relationship with the US would provide strategic support against the USSR, this went unfulfilled. With over one million Soviet troops along the Sino-Soviet border and allegations of threats to destroy Chinese nuclear capabilities, Mao reportedly urged Henry Kissinger to forge a coalition of nations with China to contain the Soviets, or "commonly deal with a bastard".⁷⁹ The imperialist tendencies of the Soviets in Eastern Europe become increasingly clear to Mao: "Soviet policy

⁷⁵ Kazushi Minami, 'Re-Examining the End of Mao's Revolution: China's Changing Statecraft and Sino-American Relations, 1973–1978', *Cold War History* 16, no. 4 (1 October 2016): 361, <https://doi.org/10.1080/14682745.2016.1218473>; Chen Zhimin, 45–46.

⁷⁶ Joseph Y. S. Cheng, 'Mao Zedong's Perception of the World in 1968–1972: Rationale for the Sino-American Rapprochement', *Journal of American-East Asian Relations* 7, no. 3 (1 January 1998): 259, <https://doi.org/10.1163/187656198793646040>.

⁷⁷ Yahuda, *Towards the End of Isolationism*, 40.

⁷⁸ Mao Zedong, 'The Question of War Between China and the U.S. Doesn't Exist at Present (February 21, 1972)', in *Mao Zedong on Diplomacy*, 1st ed (Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 1998), 451.

⁷⁹ Chen Zhimin, 45; Kazushi Minami, 362.

is a feint to the east and attack in the west... You must watch out for the Soviet Union...it intends to gobble up Europe”⁸⁰.

Soviet containment did not align with the US policy of Soviet détente. Instead, Mao’s foreign policy in the 1970s followed his Three Worlds Theory. While initially formulated in discussion with Zambian President Kaunda, Mao’s theory was presented to the United Nations by Deng Xiaoping:

[T]he world today actually consists of three parts, or three worlds, that are both interconnected and in contradiction to one another. The United States and the Soviet Union make up the First World. The developing countries in Asia, Africa, Latin America and other regions make up the Third World. The developed countries between the two make up the Second World.⁸¹

The Second World suffers from “superpower control, interference, intimidation, exploitation, and the shifting of economic crisis”.⁸² Under this paradigm, China is a Third World nation with New Zealand being a developed country in the Second World. Hegemonic competition between the US and USSR is the First World.

It is likely Mao saw a united front via his Three Worlds Theory as a method of control, an extension of his domestic policies in which the masses were mobilised against a given enemy — a way to enforce ideology in legitimising rule after warming with the US, a regular target of propaganda over the previous twenty years. Under Mao, the CCP frequently promoted a united front against a common enemy, gaining support after uniting with the GMD against Japan then against both the GMD and the US before liberation. The US were “dogs of imperialism” in 1949 and the 1950s, and the Soviets were “modern

⁸⁰ Mao Zedong, ‘Soviet Policy Is a Feint to the East and Attack in the West (July 10, 1972)’, in *Mao Zedong on Diplomacy*, 1st ed (Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 1998), 452.

⁸¹ Cook, 296-7.

⁸² *Ibid*, 297.

revisionis[ts]" in the 1960s and 70s.⁸³ In this instance, the Three Worlds continues Mao's united front strategy.

A secondary explanation for Mao's theory would be as an extension of the five principles of peaceful co-existence. It was during the 1970s when many nations developed diplomatic relations with China. Mao sought to continue the affinity it had created with Third World nations throughout the 1950s and 60s. Increased aid spending during this time reinforces this. By placing the USSR and US on a plane of their own, it creates an affinity between China and the many nations who had recently recognised the PRC. This is true of New Zealand, with Prime Minister Muldoon reiterating his distrust of Soviet ambitions and policies before and during his visit to China in 1976.⁸⁴

However, in the 1970s Mao was far from the revolutionary hero he once was. As Michael Yahuda has claimed, he was not heavily involved in foreign policy in his final years.⁸⁵ He had little activity in the internal affairs of the country compared to previous decades, neither siding with, nor criticising the Gang of Four as they continued to influence the decision-making apparatus in a power struggle with more conservative leaders. Muldoon also notes the frailty of Mao on his visit. The leader could not move unaided and only spoke in short grunts which his interpreters had difficulty understanding.⁸⁶ Muldoon was the last foreign leader to see him alive. As I will show in the next section, the governing apparatus and economic development was severely hindered by Maoist ideology, in particular its capacity for mass social mobilisation. A technique that had worked effectively for Mao in the war was not as effective in governing his new state. In the 1970s he was simply adjusting the same techniques he had used for the bulk of his life, their declining effect mimicking the aging fragility of the man himself.

⁸³ Mao Zedong, 'Proclamation of the Central People's Government of the PRC (October 1, 1949)', 4; Chen Zhimin, 43.

⁸⁴ Malcolm McKinnon, 197.

⁸⁵ Yahuda, *Towards the End of Isolationism*, 66- 67.

⁸⁶ Gustafson, *His Way: A Biography of Robert Muldoon*, 227.

Like Mao, Deng Xiaoping was a committed socialist, joining the CCP as a teenager. He fought alongside Mao in the party's early years and was active within the party leadership under Mao. Starting from the 3rd Plenum of the 11th Central Committee in December 1978, he implemented his own style of socialism with Chinese characteristics and even after the end of the Cold War praised the inevitability of Marxism:

I am convinced that more and more people will come to believe in Marxism... Feudal society replaced slave society, capitalism supplanted feudalism, and, after a long time, socialism will necessarily supersede capitalism. This is an irreversible general trend of historical development.⁸⁷

Also like Mao, Deng was a fervent supporter of Chinese independence and sovereignty, basing relations on the five principles of peaceful co-existence. Deng was the architect of the One China, Two Systems paradigm and negotiated with British PM Margaret Thatcher the return of Hong Kong to China in 1997. Speeches through the 1980s show Deng pursuing the PRC's claims over Taiwan, claiming reunification as "an irresistible trend, [which] sooner or later... will become a reality".⁸⁸

However, Deng and Mao had different interpretations of how to implement socialism. Particularly evident during the Cultural Revolution, Mao's adherence to socialist ideology to obtain the people's loyalty was inconsistent with Deng's belief that Marxist-Socialism was a practical tool to achieve prosperity, rather than the sole path to modernisation. Deng had seen the poverty caused under the Great Leap Forward and had been victim to the political persecutions against class revisionism during the Cultural Revolution. The class struggle for Deng, while necessary, should "never damage the political stability and unity necessary for socialist modernization."⁸⁹

⁸⁷ Deng Xiaoping, *Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping Vol. 3* (Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 1994), 240, <http://archive.org/details/SelectedWorksOfDengXiaopingVol.3>.

⁸⁸ *Ibid*, 52.

⁸⁹ Quoted in Kazushi Minami, 373.

Using Mao's slogan to "seek truth from facts", Deng began a transition of legitimacy for the CCP. To Deng, "Economic development is at the core of... [socialist modernisation]; it is the basis for the solution of our external and internal problems."⁹⁰ While he still made it clear the Party was adhering to Marxism and Mao Zedong Thought, to "take class struggle as the central task" was no longer the driving principle of the party.⁹¹ Economic reform became the path to achieve socialist modernisation and improve the livelihood of the Chinese people. By using Mao's rhetoric, Deng began to shift the legitimate basis of CCP rule from Marxist ideology to providing economic gain.

Socialism no longer became the same drive for national unity as it had under Mao; to Deng it was even secondary to economic prosperity, independence and sovereignty:

A patriot is one who respects the Chinese nation, sincerely supports the motherland's resumption of sovereignty over Hong Kong and wishes not to impair Hong Kong's prosperity and stability... We don't demand that they be in favour of China's socialist system; we only ask them to love the motherland and Hong Kong.⁹²

Deng's views over socialism are often incorrectly associated with his black and white cat theory: "it doesn't matter if a cat is black or white, so long as it catches mice".⁹³ While this line came out from his support for a 1962 farmland housing experiment, it shows how he values pragmatism. He had seen how ideology alone had been unable to transition the PRC from a socialist to a communist state and was willing to take the truth from these facts and try another path.

Externally, Deng realised he needed a peaceful and cooperative environment to facilitate modernisation at home. War was not as immediate a threat as economic concerns: "it is possible that there will be no large-scale war for a fairly long time to come and that there is hope of maintaining world peace ... we

⁹⁰ Deng Xiaoping, 'Opening Speech at the 12th CPC Congress of the CPC, (September 1, 1982.)', in *Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping (1975-1982)* (Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 1984), 394.

⁹¹ Kazushi Minami, 372.

⁹² Deng Xiaoping, *Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping Vol. 3*, 47.

⁹³ Barry Naughton, 'Deng Xiaoping: The Economist', *The China Quarterly* 135 (1993): 496.

have changed our view that the danger of war is imminent”.⁹⁴ Like he had done so domestically, Deng took a pragmatic approach and reverted the support for “war and revolution” and “opposing imperialism”, which dominated much of Mao’s foreign policy and replaced it with a call for “peace and development”.⁹⁵

Deng was integral in normalising cooperative relationships around the world. In 1979 diplomatic relations were formalised with the US and Deng became the first PRC official to visit Washington in the same year. Deng formed economic ties with Japan and Western European states while the relationship with the Soviet Union gradually improved. It was under these conditions that China joined the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. China began to embrace a system of complex interdependence which gave it almost immediate economic results. Between 1979 and 2013 China’s GDP rose from US\$177 billion to over US\$9 trillion.⁹⁶ The success of these reforms was immediately evident.

This shift also resulted in Deng dropping support for revolutionary movements in the Third World as well as with the Communist Parties of Albania and New Zealand. Deng’s dictum on foreign policy in the early 1990s has been attributed as “observe carefully, secure our position, handle the rest of the world calmly, bide our time, perfect hiding our capacities, and desist from claiming leadership”.⁹⁷ The foreign policy focus was primarily on development, peace and cooperation with other nations, rather than

⁹⁴ Deng Xiaoping quoted in Qingmin Zhang, ‘Towards an Integrated Theory of Chinese Foreign Policy: Bringing Leadership Personality Back In’, *Journal of Contemporary China* 23, no. 89 (3 September 2014): 914, <https://doi.org/10.1080/10670564.2014.882566>.

⁹⁵ John W. Garver, ‘China’s U.S. Policies’, in Yong Deng and Fei-Ling Wang, 202.

⁹⁶ Marc Lanteigne, *Chinese Foreign Policy: An Introduction*, Third edition., 48. (Abingdon, Oxon ; New York, NY: Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group 2016, 2016).

⁹⁷ Deng’s 24 character strategy in Chinese “冷静观察,稳住阵脚,沉着应付,韬光养晦,善于守拙,决不当头” never appeared in a single document. The Chinese Foreign Ministry sourced the dictum from two of Deng’s earlier talks and attributed the strategy to him in the 1990s. See below: Steve Tsang and Honghua Men, ‘Megatrends of the Xi Decade’, in *China in the Xi Jinping Era*, ed. Steve Tsang and Honghua Men, The Nottingham China Policy Institute Series (Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2016), 337, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-29549-7_13. Dingding Chen and Jianwei Wang, ‘Lying Low No More?: China’s New Thinking on the Tao Guang Yang Hui Strategy’, *China: An International Journal* 9, no. 2 (17 September 2011): 196–197. Xuetong Yan.

exporting an assertive foreign policy. This policy focus became even more paramount in the 1990s after the Tiananmen Square protests. Images of the CCP murdering its own citizens spread throughout the world, followed by international condemnation. The subsequent economic and political sanctions threatened the stable external environment Deng needed for his reform programme, which he pushed extensively in his Southern Tour in 1992.

As I will argue, Deng's policy of economic reforms helped enable closer China-NZ economic relations in the 1990s and 2000s. At the death of Deng in 1997, NZ Prime Minister Jim Bolger proclaimed NZ to have personally benefited from China's market policies and opening up.⁹⁸ To Bolger, New Zealand along with the international community had benefited due to the role of Deng Xiaoping.

China Opens up

When Mao passed away in 1976, he had presided over China's central administrative and political apparatus for almost three decades. While there was steady GDP growth with a significant increase in industrial output, economic progress was undermined by lacklustre performance in the agricultural sector, inefficient production practices, self-imposed isolation, and the socio-political turmoil of mass campaigns. Fractional infighting amongst core leadership and the absence of a clear succession path from Mao reinforced that the Leninist system could not run as an autonomous political apparatus. By 1976, many Chinese were still living in extreme poverty and had become disillusioned with the legitimacy of the CCP.⁹⁹ Deng's push for economic modernisation in 1978 shifted the focus from ideological dogma to economic performance. Domestic reform and opening China to the world economy

⁹⁸ New Zealand Government, 'Death Of Deng Xiaoping', The Beehive, 20 March 1997, <http://www.beehive.govt.nz/release/death-deng-xiaoping>.

⁹⁹ Lieberthal, 119-120; Ning Wang, 'The Chinese Economic System Under Mao', *Man and the Economy* 2, no. 2 (2015): 157, <https://doi.org/10.1515/me-2015-6002>.

proved a financial success yet caused widening social inequalities and stressed issues of corruption, inflation and again, government legitimacy. To Deng, the benefits of the 1980s had outweighed these costs contributing to him pushing further with reforms in 1992 and further integrating China into the world economy.

Even considering the catastrophe that was the GLF, it is difficult to label Mao's policies as economic failures. Under Mao, between 1952 and 1975, GDP averaged 6.7% annual growth while the economy underwent a massive transformation from an agrarian base to a relatively industrial one.¹⁰⁰ Between 1952 and 1977, industrial production grew at an average annual rate of 11.3%, with astronomical increases in the production of steel, coal, electric power, crude oil, chemical fertiliser and cement.¹⁰¹ A testament to the scale of the transformation is China began producing aeronautics, nuclear weapons, ballistic missiles and ocean liners. The national income had risen fivefold over roughly the same time and China had become one of the world's top six industrial producers.¹⁰² Amidst a hostile international environment, Mao succeeded in establishing an industrial economy with almost no outside assistance. He planted the base which his successors were able to take advantage of through market reforms.

However, Mao's economic system is plagued with considerable flaws. Despite relative success, by 1976 the country was nearing economic crisis. The average growth rate of national income had dropped to 2.3%, with total production growth at 1.7%.¹⁰³ The rural sector showed extremely poor results, with annual agricultural output increasing at only 2.3% throughout Mao's tenure.¹⁰⁴ This was compounded

¹⁰⁰ Ning Wang, 174.

¹⁰¹ Meisner, *Mao's China and After*: 436-7.

¹⁰² *Ibid*, 438.

¹⁰³ Tony Saich, *Governance and Politics of China: Third Edition* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), 66.

¹⁰⁴ Meisner, *Mao's China and After*: 437-8.

with 70% of the labour force working in this industry.¹⁰⁵ Economic gains in heavy industry came from procuring and using raw resources rather than a focus on improving productivity and efficiency in the workplace.¹⁰⁶ Issues of waste, inefficiency, overstaffing, and petty corruption were not uncommon. Government-set quotas, for example, did not incentivise continued production once quotas were reached.¹⁰⁷ Further, high output numbers were often prioritised over marketability and the quality of goods. The result was high industrial output but low-quality goods and undermotivated workers. Extensive government control over the economy reduced effective labour practice.

Further, the autarkic policy of Mao meant that access to foreign technology and education was limited. With the attack on intellectuals and education systems during the Cultural Revolution further restricting innovation as well as research and development, to one critic, China suffered from “technological backwardness”.¹⁰⁸ To others, autarky led to economic isolation and was a major source of economic deficiency under Mao’s China.¹⁰⁹ The USSR notwithstanding, trade was minimal and there was little benefit of foreign investment or aid from other nations.

I have previously argued power is concentrated towards the top few dozen of the party, culminating ultimately in the authority of the informal position of core leader. Political processes in China rely on the leader at the apex of the system, rather than through a formalised structure of decision making through set positions. To Lieberthal, that Deng was able to become Paramount Leader in 1978 despite Hua Guofeng holding various top positions “demonstrates that power in the CCP resides in informal

¹⁰⁵ Loren Brandt, Chang-tai Hsieh, and Xiaodong Zhu, ‘Growth and Structural Transformation in China’, in *China’s Great Economic Transformation*, ed. Loren Brandt and Thomas G Rawski (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 684.

¹⁰⁶ Lieberthal, 124.

¹⁰⁷ June Teufel Dreyer, *China’s Political System*, Eighth edition, Pearson new international edition.. (Harlow, Essex United Kingdom: Pearson, 2014), 163.

¹⁰⁸ Meisner, *Mao’s China and After*, 438.

¹⁰⁹ Chen Zhimin, 47; Loren Brandt and Thomas G Rawski, eds., *China’s Great Economic Transformation* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 6.

connections, prestige and command, rather than formal positions themselves”, a problem Deng never rectified.¹¹⁰ During the Tiananmen protests, and after his official retirement, he and a group of party veterans dictated the official reaction, rather than named party leaders.¹¹¹ His 1992 Southern Tour further showed his ability to directly influence policy outside of a formal position within the CCP. The significance of this process cannot be overstated as it indicates the decisions, relationships and factional fighting of the inner leadership dramatically affect the successful functioning of the Chinese state, questioning the validity of the CCP as a governing body. This was epitomised in the failure of the political apparatus to effectively govern and operate during the Cultural Revolution.

Firstly, that Mao called Red Guards to “bombard the headquarters” of established authority and attack the capitalist roaders who had penetrated the party, questioned the effectiveness and legitimacy of party rule itself. The message read that the party could not protect from within its own ranks and those within it could not be trusted. Party members had to prove their loyalty and commitment to the revolution by submitting to self-criticism and revolutionary youths. One of Mao’s reasons for starting the CR was to rejuvenate a sense of revolution within China’s youth. However, the cost came with attacking the legitimacy of the CCP itself. After the most violent years of the CR, while some had still held their faith in Mao and the party intact, many blamed the country’s leadership for the drastic impact on people’s lives, careers and relationships.¹¹²

Secondly, political infighting exacerbated by the lack of a transparent process for succession overwhelmed the governing functions of party and administration. Radicals, led by Mao’s wife Jiang Qing, controlled the propaganda and cultural organs of the party, producing mass ideological campaigns to put pressure on a group of moderates, led by Zhou, Deng and veteran economic planner Chen Yun,

¹¹⁰ Lieberthal, 158.

¹¹¹ Saich, *Governance and Politics of China: Third Edition*, 80.

¹¹² Dreyer, 113.

who controlled the executive branches of government and sought economic modernisation. The conflict undermined normal paths for decision making, settling disagreements and the capabilities of the political system itself, while also reinforcing the position of Mao above the political apparatus.¹¹³ It is likely Mao let the conflict continue as he saw benefits to both sides. A stagnant economy meant some form of economic modernisation was needed. However he was unwilling to forego the ideological vigour of mass campaigns and the mobilisation of the people that came with it.

Lastly, the PLA assumed a stronger presence. They served an administrative function as part of Revolutionary Committees, organisations formed along with old cadres and revolutionaries to fill the void of party structures. These functioned as government bodies until the end of the CR, calling into question the validity of the party as a guiding administrator.¹¹⁴ The increased prevalence of the army in the country's administration may have been a factor in Mao purging Lin Biao in 1971. Regardless, the PLA was crucial in removing Jiang Qing and her accomplices after Mao's death, exuding a stronger presence in China.

With the support of a group of like-minded leaders, Deng was able to displace Hua Guofeng in 1978 and begin the radical economic transformation of China. The system was in crisis after the Cultural Revolution. The economy was stagnant, particularly in the agricultural sector, and Mao had swept away the institutional processes that rewarded officials and workers who complied with the central government.¹¹⁵ Many had lost faith in the party. The new leadership sought to bring the economy back to life and restore faith in the political system. This was done via several tactics. Firstly, most of the recent economic problems were blamed on the Gang of Four and the discredited radicals of the Cultural

¹¹³ Lieberthal, 120.

¹¹⁴ Saich, *Governance and Politics of China: Third Edition*, 56-7.

¹¹⁵ Barry Naughton, 'A Political Economy of China's Economic Transition', in *China's Great Economic Transformation*, ed. Loren Brandt and Thomas G Rawski (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 93.

Revolution. This involved a highly publicised trial of Jiang Qing and her associates in 1980 and a party resolution in 1981 laying “chief responsibility” with Mao himself.¹¹⁶ Revolutionary committees were disbanded, class labels were removed internally, and there was a break in the revolutionary rhetoric of China’s external relations. Radical Maoist ideology was downplayed to promote economic pragmatism.

Secondly, domestic reforms focused on economic modernisation by encouraging production and reducing inefficiency. Labour was reallocated on a mass scale from the agricultural sector to manufacturing and services, while market forces and personal incentives were introduced.¹¹⁷ The authority of many state-owned enterprises were de-centralised, and there was an effort to revive the private sector.¹¹⁸ The Government loosened its economic control in the belief that the market is a more profitable and efficient system.

Thirdly, China opened up to the outside world. Rectifying China’s “technological backwardness” required knowledge of modern technology, which could only be acquired through purchase, or training from abroad. Education in foreign universities was encouraged. A wider search for export markets, foreign investments, and high-quality consumer goods were made through joining the World Bank, the IMF, setting up four Special Economic Zones (SEZs), and relaxing the quantitative planning initiatives on imports and exports.¹¹⁹ The immediate success of the SEZs led to 14 extra areas being opened up for investment along China’s coast in 1984. While the Government still restricted trade in the 1980s through a system of high tariff licences, quotas and subsidies, which were not reduced significantly until WTO ascension, there was a rapid and significant expansion in the number of Chinese firms that were granted

¹¹⁶ Communist Party of China, ‘Resolution on Certain Questions in the History of Our Party Since the Founding of the People’s Republic of China’.

¹¹⁷ Brandt, Chang-tai Hsieh, and Xiaodong Zhu, ‘Growth and Structural Transformation in China’, 683.

¹¹⁸ Dreyer, 154.

¹¹⁹ Dreyer, 70.

trading rights.¹²⁰ The 12 government-controlled firms in 1978 which had trading access had expanded to 12,000 by 1995.

As is highlighted by Bell and Feng, there is a consensus amongst scholars that domestic considerations primarily drove the reforms, and the structural impact of the international political economy was given little consideration.¹²¹ The authors also highlight that external pressures can shape domestic choices due to the particular costs and benefits associated with the choices made. This suggests that while domestic factors initially drove the reforms, the immediate economic benefits from increased trade and FDI interaction became a substantial factor in continued reform and further integration in the world political economy, given further validation through Deng asserting the reform agenda after a series of economic and political sanctions after Tiananmen. In his Southern Tour in 1992 Deng declared the reform program “cannot be altered for a hundred years”.¹²² After the success of the previous decades, external conditions by 1992 had become a more significant factor contributing to CCP decision making. Forced isolation had economic consequences; China pursued further integration in the international system.

Seeking Truth from Facts and the Decline of Ideology

After the death of Mao, criticism of his policies and that of his successor Hua Guofeng forced a reassessment of their socialist foundations. As I have argued, Deng was a seasoned Communist who introduced economic reform to China’s modernisation programme, removed class struggle as the key

¹²⁰ Lee Branstetter and Nicholas Lardy, ‘China’s Embrace of Globalization’, in *China’s Great Economic Transformation*, ed. Loren Brandt and Thomas G Rawski (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 634-5.

¹²¹ Stephen Bell and Hui Feng, ‘Made in China: IT Infrastructure Policy and the Politics of Trade Opening in Post-WTO China’, *Review of International Political Economy* 14, no. 1 (1 February 2007): 51, <https://doi.org/10.1080/09692290601081343>.

¹²² Jack W. Hou, ‘Economic Reform of China: Cause and Effects’, *The Social Science Journal*, Chinese Economy: Issues and Challenges, 48, no. 3 (1 September 2011): 423, <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.soscij.2011.06.009>.

priority and appropriated Maoist ideology to not only justify capitalist elements within China but to legitimise his leadership and that of the CCP. In this sense, Deng's "socialism with Chinese characteristics" is more a tool for political and economic control than a guiding principle of the party, supported by liberal scholarship claiming economic pragmatism led to a "decline of ideology".¹²³ As Deng explained to foreign dignitaries in 1987, "Poverty is not socialism".¹²⁴ Communism could not be obtained without an appropriate level of development. Regardless of his long-term ambition, the introduction of a market undermined the Marxist and Maoist foundations of the CCP which culminated in calls for democratic reform in 1989. The CCP reaction to Tiananmen and continued pursuit of the socialist path shows ideology still playing a significant role in Chinese society. However, I conclude socialism has dropped in importance from the Mao era, working instead as an ideology of development.

Early in his rehabilitation, Deng sought to readdress the ideological fervour of MZT, separating what Mao had said from the "integral whole" of his ideology.¹²⁵ In "seeking truth from facts" and "practice [as] the sole criterion of truth", the Party kept MZT as a guiding principle yet was able to justify its criticism. The most prominent came from the party document, "Resolution on Certain Questions in the History of Our Party Since the founding of the People's Republic of China" where "Left errors" were blamed for both the GLF and CR.¹²⁶ "Class struggle" and the subsequent "continued revolution under the dictatorship of the proletariat" were officially criticised. To the Party, Mao was incorrect in assuming the

¹²³ Josef Mahoney, "Ideology, Telos, and the 'Communist Vanguard' from Mao Zedong to Hu Jintao," *Journal of Chinese Political Science* 14, no. 2 (June 2009): 149, <https://doi.org/10.1007/s11366-009-9046-x>.

¹²⁴ Deng Xiaoping, 'To Uphold Socialism We Must Eliminate Poverty', (Excerpt from a talk with Premier Lubomir Strougal of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic.), 26 April 1987), <http://english.china.org.cn/english/features/dengxiaoping/103350.htm>.

¹²⁵ Deng Xiaoping, 'Mao Zedong Thought Must Be Correctly Understood as an Integral Whole - July 21, 1977. Excerpt from a Speech at the Third Plenary Session of the Tenth Central Committee of the Communist Party of China', in *Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping (1975-1982)* (Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 1984), 55–60.

¹²⁶ Communist Party of China, 'Resolution on Certain Questions in the History of Our Party Since the Founding of the People's Republic of China'.

revolution was threatened by growing internal bourgeois and revisionist forces, thus making his pursuit against class struggle and constant revolution invalid. Radical ideology was dropped.

To several authors, deradicalising Maoism runs parallel to the declining importance of ideology. Jie Chen, for example, argues the anti-Mao campaign took aside dominant ideology from the ruling apparatus resulting in a crisis of faith amongst the populace.¹²⁷ Bo Zhiyue shows Deng prioritised pragmatism over ideology; any debate over whether a policy was socialist or capitalist was pushed aside to pursue reform and opening up.¹²⁸ Tony Saich also claims that moving away from class struggle towards economic development caused an “ideological decay” within China.¹²⁹

Naturally, there are structural issues in combining market capitalism with a socialist doctrine, questioning the validity of having a socialist system. Socialism assumes progressive reductions in socioeconomic inequality which market capitalism tends to exacerbate.¹³⁰ Further, private enterprise contradicts any communal or state ownership model. The counterargument is justified in re-applying classical Marxism. Russia and China lacked the industrial base which Marx and Engels based their original theory on. Therefore, as is highlighted by Maria Hsia Chang, “socialism could only be the product of a fully-developed economy in that a primitive economic base could hardly support the advanced productive and distributive relations of socialism”.¹³¹ This gives an ideological justification, above purely pragmatic reasons, for employing a market economy. As Deng noted in 1979:

¹²⁷ Jie Chen, ‘The Impact of Reform on the Party and Ideology in China’, *Journal of Contemporary China* 4, no. 9 (1 June 1995): 26, <https://doi.org/10.1080/10670569508724221>.

¹²⁸ Bo Zhiyue, “Hu Jintao and the CCP’s Ideology: A Historical Perspective,” *Journal of Chinese Political Science; Dordrecht* 9, no. 2 (Fall 2004): 34, <https://doi.org/http://dx.doi.org.ezproxy.auckland.ac.nz/10.1007/BF02877001>.

¹²⁹ Tony Saich (1994) in Mahoney, 149.

¹³⁰ Maurice Meisner, ‘The Deradicalization of Chinese Socialism’, in *Marxism and the Chinese Experience: Issues in Contemporary Chinese Socialism*, ed. Arif Dirlik and Maurice Meisner, Political Economy of Socialism (Armonk, N.Y.: MESHARPE, 1989), 353.

¹³¹ Maria Hsia Chang, “The Thought of Deng Xiaoping,” *Communist and Post-Communist Studies* 29, no. 4 (1996): 382, [https://doi.org/10.1016/S0967-067X\(96\)80022-5](https://doi.org/10.1016/S0967-067X(96)80022-5).

Without expanding the productive forces, making our country prosperous and powerful, and improving the living standards of the people, our revolution is just empty talk.... What we want is socialism in which the productive forces are developed and the country is prosperous and powerful.¹³²

Where Mao saw the production of relations — class struggle — as the means to develop China, Deng saw the forces of production themselves as the prerequisite.¹³³ Despite such a justification, China was not purely economically socialist. Socialism only became an attainable goal after adequate development.¹³⁴ Deng's strain of socialism was different from Mao's. Economic pragmatism morphed socialist ideology away from revolutionary rhetoric as the method to achieve national rejuvenation and great power status. Deng labels this as "socialism with Chinese characteristics", and later as a "socialist market economy". Chang calls this socialism purely a "developmental nationalist ideology".¹³⁵

In shifting away from radical Maoist policies, naturally, there is justification in claiming ideology was less prominent in China. MZT was removed as a weapon in political campaigns to justify chaos under class struggle. A return to day-to-day governance without continued social, economic and political disruption reveals ideology having less impact under Deng than Mao. Socialism was also challenged by the problems inherent in introducing capitalist elements within China; the reforms opened China to growing inflation and exacerbating inequalities in the 1980s. The apparent failure of international socialism in the fall of the Communist bloc posed a further challenge. Public opposition to the CCP culminated in a direct challenge to the state in the Tiananmen Square protests. Vocal calls for democracy were

¹³² Deng Xiaoping, 'We Can Develop a Market Economy Under Socialism' (Excerpt from a talk with Frank B. Gibney, Vice-Chairman of the Compilation Committee of Encyclopaedia Britannica, Inc. of the United States, Paul T. K. Lin, Director of the Institute of East Asia, and others, 26 November 1979), <http://www.china.org.cn/english/features/dengxiaoping/103388.htm>.

¹³³ Maria Hsia Chang, 382.

¹³⁴ Arif Dirlik, 'Postsocialism? Reflections on "Socialism with Chinese Characteristics"', in *Marxism and the Chinese Experience: Issues in Contemporary Chinese Socialism*, ed. Arif Dirlik and Maurice J. Meisner, Political Economy of Socialism (Armonk, N.Y.: MESHARPE, 1989), 363.

¹³⁵ Maria Hsia Chang, 386.

supported in mirror movements internationally. Official rhetoric expressed Tiananmen as an ideological debate between socialism and capitalism, with the crackdown as necessary to the survival of the 1949 revolution.¹³⁶ With calls for democracy, ideology was still relevant, yet socialism as a guiding principle was challenged.

Despite challenges to socialist credibility and its ideological legitimacy, the PRC has always maintained it is a socialist state committed to following Marxism-Leninism and MZT.¹³⁷ As socialism under Deng transitioned to a developmental ideology, and pure socialism became an ambition rather than a diagnosis, the PRC was and still is claiming itself as socialist in name and identity without the equivalent social and economic structure.

As Dirlik suggests, the historical vision of the CCP justifies historical socialism despite it having no direct relevance.¹³⁸ Under this aspect, the CCP continues to call itself socialist due to its previous role as a vanguard, promoting communism as the tool for national rejuvenation. Under Deng, socialism has morphed to include economic modernisation, which will act as the tool to bring rejuvenation. In this sense there is a continuity in both historical socialism and socialism with Chinese characteristics; they are both used as a tool to promote development and as an identity marker in opposition to Western values and systems. Regardless, the Tiananmen Square protests show that Deng's adaptation of socialism was not enough to dissuade calls for democratic reform or maintain popular support of the CCP.

¹³⁶ Yan Sun, *The Chinese Reassessment of Socialism, 1976-1992*. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995), 4.

¹³⁷ Deng Xiaoping, 'Uphold the Four Cardinal Principles - March 30, 1979', in *Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping (1975-1982)* (Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 1984), 166–95.

¹³⁸ Arif Dirlik, 'Postsocialism? Reflections on "Socialism with Chinese Characteristics"', 363.

Chapter Three 1994-2019: Five Firsts and the Comprehensive Strategic Partnership

New Zealand

Bolger Sets the Scene

Jim Bolger served as Prime Minister from 1990 to 1997, with Jenny Shipley serving as PM until the end of National's term in 1999. Bolger met with Jiang Zemin in New York in 1995, at the APEC leaders meeting in Vancouver in 1997 and during two official visits to China in 1993 and 1997. Under Bolger, trade with China, Hong Kong and Taiwan increased by 173%.¹ In 1997, NZ became the first Western nation to agree to the bilateral terms of China's ascension into the WTO. While Bolger continued the high-level visits started by Muldoon and had more presence with the Chinese leadership than any other of his predecessors, closer interaction with China was a natural outcome of Bolger's external trade policy towards Asia, rather than an isolated effort to increase ties. Even despite the specific China-oriented policies of his successors, increased interaction with China in subsequent decades flows from Helen Clark (1999-2008), John Key (2008-2016) and Jacinda Ardern (2017-Present) all largely conforming to the trade strategy set out by the Bolger-Shipley Government. While voicing protest is still a facet of the relationship, Key's government was notably taciturn in its criticism. In contrast, Clark and Ardern's governments were more assertive in expressing concern over human rights and China's actions in the SCS. In all cases, concern and protest has again done little to deter closer engagement.

¹ New Zealand Government, 'The National Governments Foreign Policy Open and Internationally Engaged', The Beehive, 19 September 1996, <http://www.beehive.govt.nz/speech/national-governments-foreign-policy-open-and-internationally-engaged>.

To Bolger, domestic success would be the result of a successful trade strategy.² Initially, his government further pursued neo-liberal reforms of privatisation, market deregulation, welfare cuts and tax reductions in part to better adapt to the international market. The public backlash of his reforms and the consequent fall in the 1993 election meant Bolger had to concentrate on an outside in, rather than inside out approach to facilitating economic growth.

This trade strategy began with successfully concluding GATT, as a “strong multilateral trading system offers the best conditions for vigorous economic growth across the board”.³ His government supplemented this strategy through seeking alternative trade arrangements: “my country is willing to explore options for freeing up trade more rapidly than is possible in a very wide grouping, providing all ultimately have the option to participate”.⁴ To Bolger, this meant a focused shift towards Asia.

In 1993 the Bolger Government launched the “Asia 2000” programme to increase knowledge and engagement in Asia by implementing education, business and cultural strategies.⁵ The Government strengthened diplomatic representation in Beijing, Kuala Lumpur, Singapore, Seoul and Hanoi, and set goals with APEC members to establish FTAs within the bloc, acting as a precursor to the many FTAs NZ conducted in the following decade. This strategy naturally led to increased contact with China.

Prime Minister Shipley followed Bolger’s commitment to growing international connections and seeking alternatives to the WTO. Notably, she was the first female, and first New Zealand, chairperson of APEC

² MFAT, “‘State of the Nation’ An Address by Prime Minister J Bolger to the Auckland Chamber of Commerce, Auckland, 27 January, 1994’, *New Zealand Foreign Affairs and Trade Record* 2, no. 7 (January 1994): 19.

³ MFAT, ‘, *New Zealand Foreign Affairs and Trade Record* 2, no. 2 (July 1993), 38.

⁴ MFAT, “‘Asia 2000’ A Speech by Prime Minister J Bolger to the Asia 2000 Seminar, Wellington, 16 July, 1993’, 39.

⁵ David McCraw, ‘New Zealand’s Foreign Policy in the 1990s: In the National Tradition?’, *The Pacific Review* 13, no. 4 (January 2000): 587, <https://doi.org/10.1080/095127400455332>.

in 1999. At the Auckland meeting, she initiated talks with China, Singapore and Chile. To Shipley, these talks were the birth of negotiations for the China FTA and CPTPP.⁶ The Bolger-Shipley Government showed a pragmatic approach to capitalise on New Zealand's open market economy. It was the birth of a bipartisan strategy in trade negotiations, where successive governments would pursue both multilateral and bilateral trade deals.

Prime Minister Helen Clark pursued what she termed an "independent foreign policy... influenced by Norman Kirk".⁷ Every decision was "always [made] on the basis of principle, that you felt there was something that needed to be done.... We would say, 'What's the right thing to do'"⁸. Clark prioritised international human rights, multilateral trade platforms and bilateral trade agreements.⁹ While inheriting a morally aligned foreign policy from Kirk, she embraced the pragmatic trade policy of her successors.

Under Clark, FTAs were signed with Singapore (2000), Thailand (2005), as well as with Brunei, Chile and Singapore under the P4 in 2006. The Clark Government initiated trade negotiations with Hong Kong (2001), ASEAN (2005) and the Gulf Cooperation Council (2007). During an APEC meeting in 2001, Clark approached President Bush about the possibility of a trade deal with the US, which the US agreed to begin negotiating in 2002.

With NZ in 2004 becoming the first Western country to enter into FTA discussions with China, and in 2008, the first to successfully conclude such an agreement, Clark was mainly following the course set by the previous government. Clark's reiterated support for China's entry into the WTO not only had

⁶ Guyon Espiner and Tim Watkin, *The 9th Floor: Conversations with Five New Zealand Prime Ministers* (Wellington, New Zealand: Bridget Williams Books and Radio New Zealand, 2017) 159-160.

⁷ Helen Clark in Espiner and Watkin, 232-3.

⁸ Espiner and Watkin, 179

⁹ Helen Clark, 'New Zealand Foreign Policy: Pushing the Big Ideas', *New Zealand International Review* 25, no. 4 (1 July 2000), <http://link.galegroup.com/apps/doc/A63735219/AONE?sid=googlescholar.: 5>

President Jiang Zemin expressing in 2001, of the “broad prospects for bilateral economic cooperation [with New Zealand]”, but hailed Clark as “an old friend”.¹⁰ Considering the two only had one recorded meeting before this, the symbolism of this friendship reflects NZ’s recent support to China for WTO ascension and commitment for future cooperation.¹¹

Naturally, Clark’s priority on human rights placed it in contradiction with China.¹² Clark’s Foreign Minister Phil Goff had commented on several occasions for China to enter into a dialogue with the Dalai Lama and had raised concerns over the treatment of the Tibetan people.¹³ Noting human rights in Tibet are still a salient issue, after accepting a visit to the region by the CCP, Goff’s concerns were likely validated rather than appeased. While Clark and Goff raised their humanitarian concerns with China, they did not become a condition of bilateral negotiations. Although the Government prioritised human rights and publicly voiced concerns, it was not willing to sacrifice trade with China in protest.

John Key’s government continued the momentum from the previous government’s trade policies: “the basic principles of New Zealand’s foreign policy have not altered... The government’s focus, outside of building better relationships internationally, is economic growth.”¹⁴ FTAs were negotiated with rapid pace: Malaysia (2010), ASEAN (2010), Hong Kong (2011), Taiwan (2013) and South Korea (2014).

Negotiations also began on PACER Plus, and FTAs with the EU, the Pacific Alliance, the Russia-Belarus-Kazakhstan Customs Union, while New Zealand ratified the Trans-Pacific Partnership in 2017.

¹⁰ The People’s Daily (人民日报), ‘President Jiang Meets New Zealand PM’, 21 April 2001, http://en.people.cn/200104/21/eng20010421_68231.html.

¹¹ China Daily (中国日报), ‘China and New Zealand Relations’, *Chinadaily.Com.Cn*, 21 August 2009, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/hellochina/newzealandambassador2009/2009-08/21/content_8598670.htm.

¹² David McCraw, ‘New Zealand Foreign Policy Under the Clark Government: High Tide of Liberal Internationalism?’, *Pacific Affairs* 78, no. 2 (2005): 219

¹³ *Ibid*, 221.

¹⁴ Key, ‘Finding a Way in a Changing World’.

In the case of the Taiwan FTA, formally called the Economic Cooperation Agreement with the Separate Customs Territory of Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen and Matsu, it is understood that China tacitly allowed an FTA after blocking an earlier attempt at an agreement by NZ officials. The continued adherence to the One China policy, while clearly contrasting to NZ's early support for Taiwan in the first phase of NZ-China relations, demands NZ's relationship with Taiwan be satisfactory to the Chinese Government. As such, NZ does not maintain formal diplomatic relations with Taiwan. At the time of the Taiwan agreement, NZ was the only country to have concluded separate FTAs with China, Hong Kong and Taiwan, another first achievement.

The NZ-China relationship continued with a heavy trade emphasis. Key noted in 2010 the "New Zealand relationship with China is unquestionably and unashamedly an economic relationship".¹⁵ As part of the NZ Inc initiative — a series of plans to strengthen economic, political and security relationships with various countries — the Government released its China Strategy in 2012. The main goals in the relationship were to:

- 1) Retain and build a strong and resilient political relationship with China.
- 2) Double two-way goods trade with China to \$20 billion by 2015.
- 3) Grow services trade with China (education by 20 percent, tourism by at least 60 percent, and other services trade) by 2015.
- 4) Increase bilateral investment to levels that reflect the growing commercial relationship with China.
- 5) Grow high-quality science and technology collaborations with China to generate commercial opportunities.¹⁶

¹⁵ John Key, 'New Zealand in the World: Prime Minister John Key Outlines His Government's Approach to International Affairs', *New Zealand International Review* 35, no. 2 (1 November 2010): 3.

¹⁶ MFAT and New Zealand Trade and Enterprise, 'Opening Doors to China: New Zealand's 2015 Vision', February 2012, <https://www.mfat.govt.nz/assets/NZ-Inc-strategy/NZ-Inc-China/NZInc-Strategy-China.pdf>, 16.

Of the five goals, four concentrate on economic benefit, with only one focusing on the political relationship. While “an excellent political relationship [with China] is the foundation which everything else must be built... The strategy is built around developing the trade and economic links between New Zealand and the People’s Republic of China”.¹⁷ Pragmatic economic payoff was the critical driver for Key to develop diplomatic ties further.

In the years following this statement, Key entered into the Comprehensive Strategic Partnership in 2014, pledging further cooperation and engagement between the two countries. In 2015, NZ became a member of the Asian Infrastructure Bank and negotiations were made with President Xi in November 2016 to upgrade the current NZ-China FTA. Under Key’s successor, Bill English, a non-binding Memorandum of Arrangement was signed in 2017 promoting NZ development on China’s Belt and Road Initiative.

Key’s government chose to downplay views on humanitarian issues and its support for international law when placed in contention with China. This first instance was during the Dalai Lama’s visits to NZ in 2009 and 2013. During these visits, neither Key, nor any of his ministers, met with the spiritual leader.¹⁸ This is in comparison to Key meeting him in 2007 as leader of the opposition, or when Clark and her ministers met with him in 2002.¹⁹ In 2009 Key’s government was in FTA talks with China and 2013, it was pursuing its economically focused China policy. Similarly, in 2016 when China publicly denounced the UNCLOS tribunal ruling on the validity of its claims in the SCS, NZ chose to publicly declare its support for international law, rather than condemn China by name.²⁰ If a political relationship was to underpin the

¹⁷ Ibid , 2.

¹⁸ NZCCRC, ‘New Zealand’s China Policy’, 20–21; Martin Kay, ‘Key Won’t Meet Dalai Lama’, Stuff, 25 November 2009, <https://www.stuff.co.nz/national/politics/3075509/Key-won-t-meet-Dalai-Lama>.

¹⁹ McCraw, ‘New Zealand Foreign Policy Under the Clark Government’, 222

²⁰ New Zealand Government, ‘NZ Comment on South China Sea Tribunal Ruling’, The Beehive, 13 July 2016, <http://www.beehive.govt.nz/release/nz-comment-south-china-sea-tribunal-ruling>.

prioritised economic relationship, Key's government was less willing to confront China in international disputes.

Following the trend for NZ's leaders post-1990, Jacinda Ardern prioritised trade liberalisation early in her tenure, continuing the commitment to upgrading the China FTA, as well as negotiating and signing the CPTPP in March 2018. She acknowledged that trade was an essential part of external engagement as "better market access for our exporters and growing New Zealand businesses internationally are critical parts of our economic strategy".²¹ However, in saying, "how we develop and pursue [our] trade agenda also matters" she alluded values may play a more prominent role than for her National predecessor in decision making.²² This places her foreign policy trajectory on a similar plane to Clark.

In a speech in 2018, Ardern promised that the interests of New Zealand's small and medium-sized enterprises, Māori and women would be prioritised in new trade negotiations with other countries.²³

Other dominant areas of foreign policy were: disarmament, pursuing the rules-based international system and climate change. Channelling the ideational policies of Kirk and Lange, Ardern has directly compared her foreign policy to the two leaders in claiming "climate change is my generation's nuclear-free movement".²⁴

Ardern has already noted that a stronger attitude to ideational concerns may put NZ in contention with China. Admittedly, the relationship is still considered "one of our most important and far-reaching international relationships", with the two sharing a common view on "regional security, combatting

²¹ Jacinda Ardern, 'Speech to New Zealand Institute of International Affairs', (Speech, 02 2018), <http://www.beehive.govt.nz/speech/speech-new-zealand-institute-international-affairs-2>.

²² Ibid.

²³ Ibid.

²⁴ Isobel Ewing, 'Jacinda Ardern: "Climate Change Is My Generation's Nuclear-Free Moment" | Newshub', *Newshub*, 28 August 2017, <https://www.newshub.co.nz/home/election/2017/08/jacinda-ardern-climate-change-is-my-generation-s-nuclear-free-moment.html>.

climate change or promoting a new generation of progressive and inclusive free trade”.²⁵ She promised to be more vocal where the two do not “see eye to eye”, primarily, human rights, nuclear weapons and China’s refuting international law in the South China Sea.²⁶

These concerns were voiced in the 2018 Defence White Paper, highlighting that an “increasingly confident China... uses military, coast guard, and fisheries to act in support of its maritime claims” and has constructed and enhanced military bases on artificial islands in the South China Sea.²⁷ Further, “there is the possibility that a new set of multilateral priorities may emerge, potentially to the detriment of values-based agendas, such as human rights, arms control and non-proliferation efforts”.²⁸ It should be noted that the Defence Minister responsible for this paper, Ron Mark, is a member of NZ First, the junior partner in the current Government. This, and subsequent calls critical of Chinese actions by NZ First leader and Minister of Foreign Affairs, Winston Peters, could be interpreted as a junior coalition partner attempting to push its own policy agenda, or assert itself against an apparently weak PM. Although it also could reflect a conscious decision within the Government to designate NZ First as the vehicle to express concern with China, providing Labour ministers an avenue to deflect Chinese flack in trade negotiations or in the public forum. Regardless, the actions of the current Government are a distinct contrast to the previous Government who failed to name China after the UNCLOS ruling and reiterate China as anything more than a “strategic partner” in its 2016 Defence White Paper.²⁹

²⁵ Jacinda Ardern, ‘China Business Summit’, The Beehive, 14 May 2018, <http://www.beehive.govt.nz/speech/china-business-summit>

²⁶ Ibid.

²⁷ New Zealand Government, ‘Defence White Paper 2018’, accessed 10 July 2018, <http://www.nzdf.mil.nz/corporate-documents/strategic-defence-policy-statement-2018.htm>.

²⁸ New Zealand Government.

²⁹ New Zealand Government, ‘Defence White Paper 2016’, accessed 10 November 2017, <http://www.defence.govt.nz/assets/Uploads/defence-white-paper-2016.pdf>, 33.

The Chinese Government expressed concern through its ambassador in Wellington, NZ's ambassador in Beijing, and officially through its Foreign Ministry spokesperson Hua Chunying.³⁰ Hua pressed New Zealand to “view the relevant issue in an objective way, correct its wrong words and deeds and contribute more to the mutual trust and cooperation between [the] countries”.³¹ Besides this sentiment, there have not been any direct political consequences, nor any further statements by Ardern or the NZ Government critical of China's position. Admittedly, the relationship is still considered key by Ardern, a point also highlighted in the Defence Paper. Yet it shows Ardern is more willing to assert NZ's values rather than be a quiet advocate for international rules in points of difference. To Ardern, the relationship “is resilient enough... to raise differences of view”.³²

This resilience was again tested in late 2018 and early 2019 after the Government recommended to New Zealand telecommunications provider Spark against partnering with Huawei in a proposed 5G network upgrade. Postponing of the NZ-China Year of Tourism opening, the turn-around of an Air NZ flight to Shanghai, the delayed visit of Ardern to China and travel warnings to NZ have been interpreted as signs the relationship was in a period of instability. Yet there were never any talks of a reduction in trade or cancellation of the FTA upgrade. With a highly publicised state visit in April 2019, including the recommitment to the NZ China Comprehensive Strategic Partnership and the official opening of the NZ-China Year of Tourism in late March, it shows concerns were mostly speculative. If NZ leaders are critical of China's human rights or violations of international law, as the current Labour Government has shown,

³⁰ Laura Walters, ‘China Fires Back at NZ, Calls Remarks on South China Sea and Pacific Politics Wrong’, *Stuff*, 10 July 2018, <https://www.stuff.co.nz/national/politics/105387818/china-fires-back-at-nz-calls-remarks-on-south-china-sea-and-pacific-politics-wrong>.

³¹ Hua Chunying, ‘Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Hua Chunying's Regular Press Conference on July 9, 2018’ (The Embassy of the People's Republic of China in New Zealand, 9 July 2018), <http://www.chinaembassy.org/nz/eng/mfasr/t1575371.htm>.

³² Ardern, ‘China Business Summit’.

or they choose to downplay these aspects, as the former National Government has done, it has not affected the trajectory of increased interaction and continued trade.

An Open and Pragmatic Trade Strategy

The end of the Cold War was met with a global decline in the threat of immediate interstate conflict and a rise in non-traditional security threats which required international cooperation, such as drug trafficking, terrorism and environmental concerns.³³ Simultaneously, the collapse of the Socialist Bloc gave credence to Francis Fukuyama's End of History thesis, proclaiming liberal democratic systems as the "final form of human government".³⁴ Many state-driven models of economic development had failed, precipitating a global turn towards market economics and international trade.³⁵ There was a global proliferation of economic integration on multilateral and regional platforms, prominently seen in NAFTA, the EU and WTO, as well as in bilateral trade agreements. The global shift enhancing multipolar economic activity was simultaneous with rapid increases in global transportation capabilities and communication technology.³⁶ Despite the unquestionable military and economic dominance of the US, the bipolar system of the Cold War had been replaced with multipolar cooperation and economic intensity.

Under these conditions, NZ and China began rapid propulsion in economic connectivity. From 1990 to 2015 China moved from receiving 1% of NZ's total exports to over 20%, and from 1997 NZ and China

³³ Norrin M. Ripsman and T. V. Paul, 'Globalization and the National Security State: A Framework for Analysis', *International Studies Review* 7, no. 2 (2005): 199–200.

³⁴ Francis Fukuyama, *The End of History and the Last Man* (New York: Maxwell Macmillan Canada, Inc., 1992), xi, <http://archive.org/details/TheEndOfHistoryAndTheLastMan>.

³⁵ Paul G. Buchanan, 'Lilliputian in Fluid Times: New Zealand Foreign Policy after the Cold War', *Political Science Quarterly* 125, no. 2 (2010): 259–60.

³⁶ *Ibid*, 259–60.

begin their trend of firsts.³⁷ NZ recognised and supported China's economic integration and in return was privy to favourable trade deals. Such motivation suggests the two nations hold an exclusive economic arrangement, espousing concerns that China has replaced both the US and UK as a dominant partner with NZ bandwagoning on China's economic rise. However, propelled by domestic reform and uninhibited by the membership of any trade bloc, New Zealand pursued a trade and foreign policy that has further integrated it into the international environment. Increased interaction with China is simply a continuation of this policy, with the two aligning in pursuit of external economic and multilateral integration.

The push towards a more open global market was favourable to New Zealand as the liberal reforms of the 1980s had shifted the economic focus away from internal development to foster international trade and competition.³⁸ NZ leaders saw an opportunity to capitalise on the change in the external environment while also addressing a concern for being a small economy left out of rising economic blocs in North America and Europe.³⁹

From the early 1990s, the NZ Government focused on a multi-track trade policy and continued support for international rules and norms, a direction which has driven NZ's foreign policy with limited adjustment for almost three decades. A 1993 report by MFAT lists four tracks in detail: continued unilateral liberalisation, bilateral trade agreements, regional economic groupings and multilateral trade.⁴⁰ By 2017, MFAT expressed a slight realignment in their "Foreign policy pillars" yet the major tenets remained the same: supporting international rules, active membership in regional and

³⁷ Robert Scollay, 'New Zealand's Evolving Response to Changing Asia-Pacific Trade and Economic Currents Since 1989', in *New Zealand and the World: Past, Present and Future*, ed. Patman et al., (New Jersey: World Scientific, 2018), 125.

³⁸ Jason Young, 'Seeking Ontological Security through the Rise of China', 516.

³⁹ *Ibid*, 518.

⁴⁰ MFAT, *New Zealand Trade Policy. Implementation and Directions: A Multi-Track Approach*. (Wellington, N.Z.: Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 1993).

international architecture, a network of strong bilateral relationships, and a diversified portfolio of export markets and relationships.⁴¹ As Paul Buchanan argues, almost all of NZ's foreign policy prioritised trade, "because without a vigorous import-export orientation, the New Zealand economy would stagnate and die".⁴²

Clearly NZ leaders remembered an over-reliance on one economic platform came with too much risk. Unilateral liberalisation flowed from the reforms of the 1980s and were solidified as a norm with the changing government in 1990. After an almost 20-year hiatus from the Australian CER in 1983, NZ concluded the NZ-Singapore Closer Economic Partnership agreement in 2001 and rapidly pursued FTAs with other WTO members, 16 as of 2018.⁴³ The Singapore deal followed a collaboration with Chile and Brunei in the P4, which preceded the eventual CPTPP agreement involving 11 nations in the Asia Pacific, while there has been continued involvement in regional arrangements, such as APEC and PACER Plus. While FTAs provided immediate economic benefit, NZ leaders supported international and regional organisations as a way to strengthen the rules-based system, and to amplify NZ's own influence.⁴⁴

A strong focus on trade naturally underpins NZ's commitment to international law, rules and norms, as without a rules-based system, small countries such as NZ would be susceptible to the unconstrained economic and military might of much larger powers.⁴⁵ If international law enables smaller states the same rights and obligations as larger states, it elevates their capabilities while reducing that of the larger. It acts as a mechanism to enhance economic opportunities and protection for NZ, despite

⁴¹ MFAT, 'Briefing for Incoming Minister of Foreign Affairs' (Wellington: New Zealand Government, October 2017), 8, <https://www.mfat.govt.nz/assets/MFAT-Corporate-publications/briefing-for-incoming-minister-of-foreign-affairs-2017.pdf>.

⁴² Buchanan, 265.

⁴³ Robert G. Patman and Iati Iati, 'Introduction: New Zealand and the World: Past, Present and Future', in *New Zealand and the World: Past, Present and Future*, ed. Patman et al., (2018), xxv–xlvi.

⁴⁴ MFAT, 'Briefing for Incoming Minister of Foreign Affairs', 8.

⁴⁵ Ibid.

relatively small size and limited hard power capability. As a small state, NZ is acting fairly typical in its support for the rules-based system, as it is a major benefactor.

Such benefits are in NZ's involvement in the GATT/WTO. A 1993 Government trade document places the highest importance on multilateral trade under the assumption "if everybody lowers barriers to trade more or less simultaneously, new export opportunities will arise at the same time as import competing pressures may force adjustment at home. That makes sense politically, socially and economically".⁴⁶ As a member of the Cairns Group, NZ benefitted substantially in the 1994 Uruguay GATT round, which began to liberalise trade in agriculture and has since successfully resolved seven disputes with WTO members as the principle complainant.⁴⁷ These include lifting lamb tariffs in the United States and gaining access for NZ apples in Australia, nations with much stronger hard-power capabilities.

NZ's multilateral support extends further than economics. Being a founding member of the League of Nations, NZ has been a traditional supporter of international organisations. With the dissolution of ANZUS, NZ was for the first time in its history without the world's major superpower as an ally. Support for international rules and norms took an extra precedent and were prioritised at times over economic partners and traditional allies. NZ has served twice on the Security Council since 1993 and has actively contributed to collective security efforts in peacekeeping. NZ actively condemned the US-led invasion of Iraq as it had not been authorised by the UN Security Council, with PM Clark expressing "profound regret" that "close friends" had acted this way.⁴⁸ On top of his open criticism of human rights violations in China, Phil Goff was overly critical of the US not paying an outstanding UN bill and criticised the Australian Government for threatening non-cooperation with UN human rights investigators.⁴⁹

⁴⁶ MFAT, *New Zealand Trade Policy*, 30.

⁴⁷ Patman and Iati Iati, xxxiii.

⁴⁸ David McCraw, 'New Zealand Foreign Policy Under the Clark Government': 225.

⁴⁹ *Ibid*, 224-5.

Closer connection with China has risen from NZ's foreign policy paradigm from the early 1990s which has prioritised wider integration in the world economy, a refocus towards Asia, and an independent stance following a cooling in relations with traditional allies. In an era promoting trade liberalisation, NZ already had a domestic push in liberal reform. As NZ was not a member of other trade blocs, it was not met with significant barriers, or consequences by others, in pursuing a closer economic relationship with China.

The specific points of closer interaction tend to align with NZ's overall foreign policy. Firstly, we have NZ Government initiatives which aim to increase political, economic and social ties with China. The first such government-wide initiative came in the 1985-1986 China Coordinated Approach.⁵⁰ The programme aimed to enhance the relationship with China in regards to scientific, cultural, political and other contacts and tended to mirror the aims of the Asia Refocus in the early 1990s, the subsequent building of the Asia 2000 Foundation in 1993, the NZ Inc China Strategy in 2012, and the designated New Zealand China Council.

Secondly, of the five firsts, the FTAs show direct economic benefit for NZ, while the remaining support China's external economic integration. In 1997, NZ agreed to China's ascension to the WTO and in 2004 acknowledged China's Market Economy Status, a major barrier to FTA ascension. In return, NZ was fast-tracked for trade negotiations, which were informally agreed to at Auckland APEC 1999 and formally commenced in 2004. While NZ would directly benefit from bilateral trade, to the NZCCRC, the institutions themselves would be stronger if all major countries took part.⁵¹ NZ would benefit from Chinese membership in the WTO, as this would enhance the validity of the organisation's rules.

⁵⁰ NZCCRC, 'New Zealand's China Policy', 16-18.

⁵¹ Ibid.

There is nothing fundamentally different about NZ's economic strategy with China than with other nations. Under the same trade diversification strategy, NZ has an increased presence in regional and multilateral architecture and pursued bilateral networks with many countries. There have also been steps to warm relations with the US with the signing of the Wellington and Washington declarations, working together on the TPP, and reallowing US frigates to NZ in 2016. NZ has sought closer economic and political ties with both China and the US while criticising both when they violate international law, though this can be passive. NZ is not choosing between major powers. Supporting China's multilateral ascension and conducting bilateral FTAs directly benefits NZ's economic prosperity and support for the rules-based system. Closer interaction with China is merely an opportunity that aligns with NZ's foreign policy goals with little cost.

An Independent Nation

The preceding decades reassessed several aspects of New Zealand's identity. Relationships with traditional allies, Britain and the US, had transformed and receded in significance. Internally a Māori resurgence propelled the importance of Te Tiriti o Waitangi, alongside an identification that New Zealand was a bicultural nation in partnership between two societies, not merely a former colony or "Britain of the South". Similarly, the rise in both Polynesian and Asian immigration started to give New Zealand a demographic that reflected where leaders had shifted their foreign policy focus and self-defined location — the Asia-Pacific. By the 1990s it was clear that NZ saw itself and its relationships with other nations differently than it once had. Self-promoted pragmatism and independence were more important than shared ideology, culture, history and language in building relationships with others, though New Zealand remains committed to the liberal Western values and rules-based international system. As one commentator concludes, New Zealand's identity as a "good international citizen" and

“trade-dependent nation” guided policymakers in its shift to Asia, enhanced through closer engagement with China.⁵²

As I argued in the preceding chapter, the Māori renaissance reemphasised NZ as a bicultural nation, further contrasting from its UK heritage. However, over the last 30 years it has become clear there are still issues on how this bicultural identity works in practice. Despite recognition of Te Tiriti o Waitangi, it took a change in government to settle historical ownership of the foreshore and seabed. Similarly, grievances against the Crown regarding land seizures by members of Ngāi Tūhoe culminated in a highly publicised raid in 2007. Tūhoe eventually settled seizures through the Waitangi Tribunal, yet an independent police enquiry claimed that actions towards members of the local community during the raid were “unlawful, unjustified and unreasonable”.⁵³ Further, Don Brash’s 2004 Orewa Speech criticised the “privileges” of Māori in race-based legislation.⁵⁴ The speech’s popularity showed this was a view still maintained by at least some New Zealanders.

The specific place of Māori within NZ society is not universally agreed upon, although it is a far change from the traditional perspective seeking assimilation into the settler society. Despite some ambiguity, the place of Māori has generally been accepted, and with it, the acknowledgement that NZ is a nation built on a partnership between Māori and Pākehā. This is perhaps best worded in the 1991 Waitangi Tribunal report on Ngāi Tahu claims. Within, the principles of the Treaty had been accepted as “part of the fabric of New Zealand society, of the way in which New Zealand thought about itself”.⁵⁵

⁵² Jason Young, “Seeking Ontological Security Through the Rise of China”: 513-530.

⁵³ Mike Watson, ‘Urewera Police Actions “Unlawful, Unreasonable”’, Stuff, 23 May 2013, <https://www.stuff.co.nz/national/8706058/Urewera-police-actions-unlawful-unreasonable>.

⁵⁴ Don Brash, ‘Nationhood’ (Speech at the Orewa Rotary Club, 27 January 2004), <http://www.scoop.co.nz/stories/PA0401/S00220.htm>.

⁵⁵ William Hosking Oliver, *Claims to the Waitangi Tribunal* (Wellington, N.Z.: Waitangi Tribunal Division, Dept of Justice, 1991), 81, Back.

The recent influx of Asian immigrants has further challenged the traditional Anglocentric concept of what a New Zealander is and, like the popular discourse against the role of Māori in NZ society, has also been met with considerable push back. Eerily reminiscent of the institutionalised immigration laws from a century prior, populist sentiment from Winston Peters against Asian immigrants helped propel his New Zealand First party into office in the 1996 election.⁵⁶ Foreign direct investment has also been a big issue, with one Labour Party member targeting home buyers with Chinese-sounding last names in 2015.⁵⁷

This vigilant anxiety towards Asia was given agency in the Chinese Government by Anne-Marie Brady in 2018. Brady argued NZ was the target of a “concerted foreign-influence campaign by the People’s Republic of China... [which] aims to further the political and economic agendas of the ... [CCP] by coopting local elites, securing access to strategic information and resources, and manipulating public discourse”.⁵⁸ These claims further suggested the CCP had infiltrated NZ’s security network leaving NZ the “soft underbelly” of the 5 Eyes Intelligence Community, current NZ MP Jian Yang as a double agent for the Chinese state, and perhaps most prominently, the integrity of NZ’s political system and its actual sovereignty is at critical risk of the PRC’s political influence activities.⁵⁹

Events since Brady’s report suggest any high-level interference in the NZ political system unlikely. Firstly, the Government Communications Security Bureau revealed an element of Huawei hardware as a security risk to the upcoming 5G roll out which potentially blocked the Chinese firm’s involvement. Secondly, a stronger worded 2018 Defence White Paper was criticised by the CCP with the

⁵⁶ Raymond Miller, ‘The New Zealand First Party’, in *New Zealand Politics in Transition*, ed. Raymond Miller (Auckland, N.Z.: Oxford University Press, 1997), 170-1.

⁵⁷ 1 News Now, ‘Twyford’s “racist”, “cynical” Chinese Property Buyer Statistics de-Bunked’, *TVNZ*, 11 July 2015, <https://www.tvnz.co.nz/one-news/new-zealand/twyford-s-racist-cynical-chinese-property-buyer-statistics-de-bunked-q00964>.

⁵⁸ Anne-Marie Brady, ‘New Zealand and the CCP’S “Magic Weapons”’, 68.

⁵⁹ *Ibid*, 68–75.

recommendation for NZ to “correct its wrong words”.⁶⁰ While it is suspicious that Brady’s office and residence had been broken into and research equipment stolen, a police investigation involving the New Zealand Security Service failed to find any leads in the investigation of this crime.⁶¹ Any speculation that such tampering was at the hands of the CCP lacks substantial evidence. Further, PM Ardern has openly claimed she has not received any information of concern regarding national security.⁶² Either Brady’s claims of political influence lack support, or they have enough substance that some or all levels of police, security agencies and cabinet have been infiltrated. Considering the Huawei decision and 2018 Defence Paper, the former is more likely.

The domestic support for Brady, including an open letter by a group of academics supporting academic freedom, and being a finalist for New Zealander of the Year, shows domestic backing for her claims.⁶³ As I have argued, this sentiment flows from concerns over Asian immigration and FDI, yet can be traced back to the anti-China mentality of the poll tax and the anti-communist mentality of the Cold War. With 2017 survey data from the Asia New Zealand Foundation revealing many New Zealanders know little about Asia, it gives credence that public fear is concurrent with a lack of knowledge regarding China.⁶⁴ While historical and contemporary concerns have failed to materialise, they have not yet dissipated from the New Zealand consciousness.

Perhaps one reason behind this trend of concern towards Asia is the vast differences between our traditions, cultures and histories. With China, our values do come into competition, most explicitly in

⁶⁰ Hua Chunying.

⁶¹ Matt Nippert, ‘Police Fail to Crack Case of Burgled China Scholar Anne-Marie Brady’, *New Zealand Herald*, 12 February 2019, sec. New Zealand, https://www.nzherald.co.nz/nz/news/article.cfm?c_id=1&objectid=12202755.

⁶² Gia Garrick, ‘Anne-Marie Brady: “It Shouldn’t Have to Be like This”’, *Radio New Zealand*, 27 November 2018, <https://www.radionz.co.nz/news/national/376871/anne-marie-brady-it-shouldn-t-have-to-be-like-this>.

⁶³ New Zealand Herald, ‘New Zealander of the Year 2018: The Nominations’, 27 December 2018, <https://www.nzherald.co.nz/indepth/news/New-Zealander-of-the-year-2018/>.

⁶⁴ Asia New Zealand Foundation, ‘New Zealander’s Perceptions of Asia 2017 Survey’ (Asia New Zealand Foundation, May 2018), <https://www.asianz.org.nz/our-resources/reports/new-zealanders-perceptions-of-asia-2017-survey/>.

regards to human rights, freedom of speech, and in some instances, international rules and norms. I have already shown that human rights were of concern after Tiananmen Square and were raised by Foreign Minister Goff prior to FTA negotiations. In the first case, NZ was the first to restart high-level ministerial visits, in the second, Goff's visit to Tibet likely confirmed his concerns rather than appease them. In both cases, New Zealand raised its concerns, yet carried on pursuing closer ties regardless.

Some have taken closer ties with China to mean NZ is sacrificing particular values.⁶⁵ Former Green Party co-leader Rod Donald protested that "No country should put the economy ahead of human rights and environmental standards."⁶⁶ Yet there still has to be a congruence of some values for any cooperation to manifest. NZ is a supporter of international rules and norms, which reinforces our identity as a small trading nation and a good international citizen.⁶⁷ I would further argue that as a small trading nation, we gained a reputation for trialling radical neo-liberal economic policies first instilled after the reforms in the 1980s and 90s.⁶⁸ This is further emphasised in the five firsts, as well as NZ's pioneering development in the Singapore FTA and driving the CPTPP.

As noted by a Foreign Affairs and Defence Select Committee in 1986, China was attracted to the independent foreign policy within New Zealand, as it offered a positive testing ground for new initiatives.⁶⁹ The five firsts imply a distinction for NZ's engagement with China which contrasts to previous foreign policy. Notably, the fact that NZ is the first Western nation to enter these agreements emphasises independence rather than traditionally following the foreign policy of our allies.

⁶⁵ David McCraw, 'New Zealand Foreign Policy Under the Clark Government': 222-3; Brady, 'New Zealand and the CCP'S "Magic Weapons"'; Andrew Butcher, 'What Does New Zealand's Changing Demography Mean for Its Place in the World?', in *New Zealand and the World: Past, Present and Future*, ed. Patman et al, (2018), 88-90.

⁶⁶ McCraw, 'New Zealand Foreign Policy Under the Clark Government':222-3.

⁶⁷ Jason Young, 'Seeking Ontological Security through the Rise of China'.

⁶⁸ Alvey, 64; Nagel, 224.

⁶⁹ Jason Young, 'Seeking Ontological Security through the Rise of China', 522.

Further, the willingness of China to embark on closer economic relations naturally aligns with our identity as a small trading nation. To Jim Bolger, the shift towards Asia was focused on inclusivity, as the validity of international rules and norms increases if all major players abide by them.⁷⁰ In this case, NZ is also fulfilling its position as a responsible international citizen, as facilitating, promoting and engaging China's interaction with non-traditional allies, regional bodies and international institutions increase the legitimacy of these interactions and thus the international system as a whole.

As I have noted regarding the reaction to human rights violations, NZ voices concern and then continues quickly with closer interaction. This suggests that leaders are balancing between being a good international citizen whenever China violates international law, and a small trading nation when it sees it has fulfilled its commitment to the former. This precarious balance of values is evident in the switch in tone between National and Labour Governments following the UNCLOS ruling in the SCS. If China were to more seriously dispute international law in the future, it is less clear how NZ will negotiate this terrain. What is clear, however, the ideational policies over the last 30 years are a distant change from the Anglo-centric and anti-communist mentality NZ held 70 years ago.

⁷⁰ Ibid, 523–24.

China

Leaders Make Their Mark

In the fallout of Tiananmen Square, Paramount Leader Jiang Zemin (1989-2002) inherited a China that faced severe social and political instability. A party that had implemented liberal economic reform for over a decade did not have the same ideological force it had under Mao. Economic success, not Marxist ideology, legitimised CCP rule. With Deng still playing an active role in influencing policy and many believing Jiang a transitional leader, Jiang's leadership was directly tied to the economic policies of his predecessor.⁷¹ The immediate success of Deng's recommended policies, led Jiang, Hu Jintao (2002-2012) and Xi Jinping (2012-Present) to agree on the methods for continuing economic development: promoting market forces at home in congruence with peacefully integrating further into the international system, finding in New Zealand a partner with similar goals who was eager to cooperate. Above advancing the livelihood of the Chinese people, each leader has made additional efforts to improve social stability. Jiang and Hu reasserted ideology to counterbalance issues rising from reform, such as corruption, inequality and China's growth in world affairs, while Xi has promoted the CCP as the harbinger of China's national rejuvenation and solidified himself as its central figure. Despite liberal economic modernisation, China's leaders are not showing any signs of dismantling authoritarian rule. Post Tiananmen, Deng and Jiang disagreed on how to overcome the legitimacy crisis facing the CCP.⁷² As Robert Kuhn argues, Jiang initially "believed in socialism's core tenets of state ownership and central planning and ... generally agreed with his conservative colleagues that reforms should be measured and

⁷¹ Robert Lawrence Kuhn, *The Man Who Changed China: The Life and Legacy of Jiang Zemin*, 1st ed. (New York: Crown Publishers, 2004), 3; Willy Lam, *The Era of Jiang Zemin* (Prentice Hall, 1999), 12-13.

⁷² Yiu-chung Wong, *From Deng Xiaoping to Jiang Zemin: Two Decades of Political Reform in the People's Republic of China* (Lanham, Md.: University Press of America, 2005) 218-9.

unhurried".⁷³ Deng thought this response would disrupt the economic momentum from the past decade. Continued economic success was critical for the survival of the CCP. In his Southern Tour in 1992, Deng vehemently pushed further economic reform, encouraging bolder experimentation, and to "not act as a bound-feet woman".⁷⁴ Deng would not let ideology replace economic progress as the dominant feature of CCP leadership. If reform and opening up led to raised productivity, an increased standard of living, and elevating the strength of the nation, Deng considered the actions socialist. Adhering to his black and white cat theory, Deng prioritised pragmatism over ideology.

Following Deng's Southern Tour, Jiang endorsed Deng's accelerated reform and opening to the outside world at the 14th Party Congress in 1992.⁷⁵ Between 1992 and 1996 GDP rose by 12.1 per cent on average.⁷⁶ In 1997 Deng Xiaoping Theory of "reform, opening up and modernisation" was institutionalised as a guiding principle of the party. This shift suggests Jiang felt threatened by Deng's criticism in 1992. Inaction on Deng's suggestions could have encouraged further criticism, jeopardising his position as Party Chairman.⁷⁷ The immediate success of these reforms in 1992 solidified his switch in focus. In following Deng's policies, Jiang was leading China to economic success.

Using Deng's reform and opening up as a guiding principle, Jiang committed to improving relations with developed countries throughout the 1990s. To Jiang, under the "principle of equality and mutual benefit, [China] should conduct extensive trade, economic and technological cooperation and scientific and cultural exchanges with all countries and regions to promote common development".⁷⁸ China

⁷³ Kuhn, 22.

⁷⁴ Zhong Shiyou, 'Fresh Impetus from Deng's Message', *Beijing Review* 35, no. 15 (13 April 1992): 4.

⁷⁵ Jiang Zemin, 'Accelerating the Reform, the Opening to the Outside World and the Drive for Modernization, so as to Achieve Greater Successes in Building Socialism With Chinese Characteristics', (Report, 12 October 1992), http://www.bjreview.com.cn/document/txt/2011-03/29/content_363504.htm.

⁷⁶ Jiang Zemin, 'Hold High the Great Banner of Deng Xiaoping Theory for an All-Round Advancement of the Cause of Building Socialism with Chinese Characteristics into the 21st Century - Report Delivered at the 15h National Congress of the Communist Party of China on September 12, 1997', *Beijing Review* 40, no. 40 (6 October 1997): 12.

⁷⁷ Kuhn, 215.

⁷⁸ Jiang Zemin, 'Hold High the Great Banner of Deng Xiaoping Theory', 30.

sought to join the GATT/WTO, and did so in 2001; it cooperated with the US against terrorism at the UN; and China was an active member of APEC. Under APEC, Jiang met with Shipley in Auckland in 1999. Both leaders agreed on the need to open up and build relations. Noting Jiang's inclination towards traditional socialism, if Deng did not go on his Southern Tour, nor had Jiang not been as fearful for his leadership position, it is difficult to ascertain whether the reform and opening up programme would have continued.

In the early 2000s, his ideological addition to the CCP was expressed via "Three Represents" with the CCP aiming to represent "'advanced productive forces', 'an advanced culture' and 'the fundamental interests of the overwhelming majority of the Chinese people'".⁷⁹ While this shows the party has "broadened the foundation of its rule from proletariat to all Chinese people",⁸⁰ adding to Deng Xiaoping Theory, economic modernisation was further emphasised as a guiding principle.

By the time Hu Jintao became paramount leader in 2002, China had become an "economic miracle" achieving nearly 10% annual GDP growth since 1978.⁸¹ The success of Jiang and Deng's policies led to an overall decline in poverty and benefited many Chinese. The consequence of such rapid growth appeared in increasing socio-economic inequalities, exacerbated between provinces and between rural and urban areas. Economic policies tended to favour the coast, and social policies tended to favour cities.⁸² From 1998 to 2000, China's GINI coefficient rose from 0.386 to 0.458, above the internationally accepted levels of inequality.⁸³ Hu inherited a China with widening income and development gaps, rising unemployment, corruption issues and challenges to public order. The socialist market economy did not

⁷⁹ Li Li, 'China's Constitutional Amendments and Their Implications', *China Report* 41, no. 1 (February 2005): 79, <https://doi.org/10.1177/000944550504100106>.

⁸⁰ Ibid.

⁸¹ Alok Ray, 'The Chinese Economic Miracle: Lessons to Be Learnt', *Economic and Political Weekly* 37, no. 37 (2002): 3835–37.

⁸² Ibid, 3842.

⁸³ Guillaume Giroir and Philip Liddell, 'Socioterritorial Fractures in China: The Unachievable "Harmonious Society"?', *China Perspectives*, no. 3 (71) (2007): 83–91.

benefit everyone equally. Hu aimed to address the rising social issues of a market economy, prioritising a Harmonious Socialist Society in tandem with a Scientific Outlook on Development, continuing the past policy of economic modernisation. Simultaneously, China was becoming more prevalent on the world stage. Hu promoted a Harmonious World and “peaceful rise” in attempt to mitigate fears of China’s new-found status.

To Hu, like Jiang, social discontent threatened political stability. A harmonious socialist society is one where under

democracy and the rule of law, equity and justice, honesty and fraternity, vigor and vitality, stability and order, and harmony between man and nature... all people do their best, find their proper places in society and live together in harmony, so as to provide a favorable social environment for development.⁸⁴

Hu made visits to rural China and implemented social security initiatives to those below the poverty line.⁸⁵ These initiatives included health insurance subsidies, allowances to urban unemployed, support for migrant labour workers as well as the construction of low-cost housing on a massive scale. In promoting social and moral reform as an ideal, there is a shift from the development-at-all-costs approach under Jiang. Hu recognised that economic development was needed to improve material well-being, yet the underlying goal was social equity. One could not be achieved without the other.

From 2005, Hu aimed for a “harmonious world” in foreign affairs.⁸⁶ Hu embraced multilateralism, realising economic and political cooperation was mutually beneficial. Nations should cooperate under the United Nations Charter and international law, while also recognising others’ independence and sovereignty. With Hu as its leader, China moved from the world’s sixth to second largest economy.⁸⁷

⁸⁴ Hu Jintao, ‘Hold High the Great Banner of Socialism with Chinese Characteristics and Strive for New Victories in Building a Moderately Prosperous Society in All Respects’ (Beijing Review, 15 October 2007), http://www.bjreview.com.cn/document/txt/2007-11/20/content_86325.htm.

⁸⁵ Manoranjan Mohanty, “‘Harmonious Society’: Hu Jintao’s Vision and the Chinese Party Congress”, *Economic and Political Weekly* 47, no. 50 (2012): 13.

⁸⁶ Hu Jintao.

⁸⁷ Xinhua News Agency, ‘Scientific Outlook on Development Becomes CPC Theoretical Guidance’, 8 November 2012, http://www.china.org.cn/china/18th_cpc_congress/2012-11/08/content_27041783.htm.

Economic success, as well as successfully navigating the 2008 Global Financial Crisis, hosting the Beijing Olympics and Shanghai Expo, and more assertively making claims over its territory in the South China Sea, further show China's increased presence in world affairs.

A realist argument assumes that a rising economic state would seek guarantees to protect its interests. This explains China's rising military and assertiveness in territorial disputes with its neighbours. A rising China would be cause for threat to the current world order. However, much like Harmonious Society is an attempt domestically to offset the consequences of material gain, Hu's Harmonious World and "peaceful rise" are moral attempts to mitigate these effects.

Harmonious World was not used in any of NZ's political statements during FTA negotiations. The timing of the concept with the FTA suggests NZ fits into Hu's vision, particularly, the notion of nations being able to work together despite their differences. However, the absence of the term in any political statements suggests the deal held strategic value. Hu visited NZ in 2003 and signed a Trade and Economic Cooperation Framework agreement with Helen Clark, a precursor for FTA negotiations which began the following year. The FTA again shows China's push to reform and open up, this time under the policy of Scientific Development.

In mid-November 2012, days after being elected as the General Secretary of the Central Committee, Xi Jinping outlined his vision for "the great renewal of the Chinese nation", achieved via two milestones: the Deng-like economic push "to complete the building of a moderately prosperous society in all respects" in 2021, and the "dream of great renewal... [through] building an affluent, strong, civilized and

harmonious socialist modern country [by 2049]”.⁸⁸ Xi’s dream promotes “an era that sees China moving closer to center stage and making greater contributions to mankind”.⁸⁹

Xi differs from his predecessors in several aspects. It took until Deng’s death for Dengism to be constitutionalised, and Jiang’s retirement for the Three Represents to be incorporated, the term only being first introduced in 2000. While Hu introduced his development theory one year into his presidency, it took until 2012 for Harmonious Society to be written into the constitution. For Xi, he noted his ambition within days of coming into office, repeating it frequently in major speeches since.⁹⁰ Willy Lam claims this, as well as breaking an unwritten rule of publishing works during his presidency, shows an assertiveness in leadership not seen since Mao and Deng.⁹¹

While economic development is not a unique policy, neither is using the narrative of national rejuvenation which Hu and Jiang frequently referred to. Xi’s China Dream stands out from his predecessor’s goals as it seeks to re-legitimise a dominant ideology in party narrative. It notes a change from Deng’s “bide our time” policy. The Three Represents and Harmonious World proclaimed opening up and reform, further integrating China into the world system. The China Dream however, asserts China as a global player and dominant state in that system.

To achieve his dream, Xi has aimed to improve the governing ability of the CCP as the primary harbinger towards national rejuvenation. Xi heralded the CCP as the chief proprietor of “transforming the poor

⁸⁸ Xinhua News Agency, ‘Xi Jinping Pledges “Great Renewal of Chinese Nation” China National People’s Congress’, Web site of the National People’s Congress (NPC) of the People’s Republic of China, 21 April 2014, http://www.npc.gov.cn/englishnpc/NPCChina/2014-04/21/content_1860240.htm.

⁸⁹ Xi Jinping, ‘Secure a Decisive Victory’, 9.

⁹⁰ Zheng Wang, ‘The Chinese Dream: Concept and Context’, *Journal of Chinese Political Science* 19, no. 1 (1 March 2014): 1, <https://doi.org/10.1007/s11366-013-9272-0>.

⁹¹ Willy Lam, ‘Xi Jinping’s Ideology and Statecraft’, *Chinese Law & Government* 48, no. 6 (2 November 2016): 410, <https://doi.org/10.1080/00094609.2016.1241098>.

and backward old China into an increasingly prosperous and powerful new China".⁹² Xi, like those before him, pushed for the party to be the vehicle responsible for China's economic prosperity and rescue from humiliation. The China Dream narrative directly nominates the CCP as the ones who can provide the dream to the Chinese people. Ideological legitimacy for the party, rather than solely economic prosperity, is a goal for Xi.

Amid a political scandal involving Chongqing Communist Party Chief and Politburo standing member Bo Xilai, Xi pursued a party-wide corruption campaign impacting over 100,000 officials between 2012 and 2016.⁹³ While previous leaders have claimed corruption as a threat to party legitimacy and governance, this campaign had a double positive for Xi. Notably, several top party members that were persecuted had ties to previous leaders. The corruption campaign gave substantial support and influence to Xi through various pro-Xi factions.⁹⁴ The vote in early 2018 to remove term limits on the presidency suggests Xi sees himself as the ideal person to lead the Party. He can now seek this dream indefinitely.

The Rise of China

After Deng's Southern Tour, China committed to integrate into the international system through enhanced regional and multilateral engagement. China began enthusiastically participating in UN peacekeeping operations in the 1990s, reversing a long-standing policy that such an action was violating the sovereignty of other nations. As of 2011, China is the largest P5 supplier of UN peace forces.⁹⁵ China

⁹² Xi Jinping quoted in South China Morning Post, 'Xi Jinping's Speech at the Unveiling of the New Chinese Leadership', 15 November 2012, <https://www.scmp.com/news/18th-party-congress/article/1083153/transcript-xi-jinpings-speech-unveiling-new-chinese>.

⁹³ Kerry Brown, 'The Anti-Corruption Struggle In Xi Jinping's China: An Alternative Political Narrative', *Asian Affairs* 49, no. 1 (2 January 2018): 2, <https://doi.org/10.1080/03068374.2018.1416008>.

⁹⁴ *Ibid*, 6-7.

⁹⁵ Miwa Hirono and Marc Lanteigne, 'Introduction: China and UN Peacekeeping', *International Peacekeeping* 18, no. 3 (1 June 2011): 243, <https://doi.org/10.1080/13533312.2011.563070>.

supported regional forums with APEC and ASEAN while showing clear signs of wishing to join GATT and the WTO. Further, there were increased efforts in fighting international drug and human trafficking as well as joining forums against climate change. Undeniably, China wanted to be a part of the current global order.

Eventual WTO ascension in 2001 followed a process of bilateral and multilateral negotiations that confirmed China adhered to various principles of non-discrimination, market opening, transparency and predictability, undistorted trade and preferential treatment for developing countries.⁹⁶ The international obligations undertaken by China promised to continue and intensify the process of economic reform, which saw the Government reduce aspects of the socialist market, though substantial elements of state intervention were allowed to remain. For example, while dual pricing systems and certain restrictions on trading, such as tariffs, dumping measures and subsidies were reduced or phased out to allow more open access and fairer trading, price controls on some key commodities remained in place. Simultaneously, there was further reduction of the state in the economy to promote market forces, though in practice, large state-owned enterprises continued to dominate key aspects of the economy. State-owned banks, for example, controlled a majority share of the financial sector and provided preferential finance to other state-owned enterprises. Though going through a process of deregulation, the Chinese state still wanted exert control over several aspects the economy.

To reach the WTO, China needed the support of other nations to validate the extent of its liberalisation paradigm. As noted, NZ played a vital role in this, concluding a bilateral agreement in 1997 to become the first nation to agree to China's ascent. Even despite the decision to sign an FTA with NZ, the economic benefits of direct trade with NZ would be negligible to China. The agreements show NZ holds political value for China as a developed market economy willing to support access to international

⁹⁶ Deepak Bhattasali, Li Shantong, and Will Martin, eds., *China and the WTO: Accession, Policy Reform, and Poverty Reduction Strategies*, Trade and Development Series (Washington, DC: World Bank, 2004), 1-5.

organisations and a low-risk opportunity to trial new economic policy. In this instance, NZ was a beneficial choice because our trade is so minimal. The success of the agreement supported signing deals with much larger economies afterwards, with ASEAN, Australia and South Korea being notable examples.

The economic reforms in the 1990s further shifted China away from the Leninist system of self-generated growth to promote market forces from both within and outside. However, this willingness to integrate into the global economic system also shows the influence of external factors on internal processes. This is supported in the relaxation of Chinese leadership to engage in human rights dialogues with other nations after Tiananmen Square. Since 1991, China has published white papers on human rights regarding their development within China and has since committed to protecting human rights in the CCP National Congress.⁹⁸ This is supplemented by China being an active member in various UN human rights initiatives, including signing covenants on international human rights, being a member of the UN Human Rights Council and engaging in regular dialogues on human rights with the EU and US. It was under this same engagement which prompted leadership to invite Foreign Minister Goff to Tibet after human rights concerns in 2001.

Despite the disparity between China's engagement in human rights dialogue and actual domestic implementation, there has still been a change in China's engagement in support for international human rights, which goes alongside engagement in international norms and rules. With FDI being a driver of growth leading up to 1989, the economic and political sanctions after Tiananmen revealed the dependency of China's economy on the external environment.⁹⁹ Deng's policy to hide capabilities

⁹⁸ Jiang Na, 'China as an "International Citizen": Dialogue and Development of Human Rights in China', *China: An International Journal* 14, no. 2 (18 May 2016): 158-9.

⁹⁹ Jia Qingguo, 'Learning to Live with the Hegemon: Evolution of China's Policy Toward the US Since the End of the Cold War', *Journal of Contemporary China* 14, no. 44 (1 August 2005): 397, <https://doi.org/10.1080/10670560500115036>.

precipitated Hu's peaceful rise, but both policies promote a peaceful external environment to minimise the threat of a rising China, and maximise economic integration and domestic development. Outward support of international rules and norms became a key to enforcing this, a policy still in effect.¹⁰⁰

However, the CCP has been selective in which international norms to adapt in its reform processes.

Joshua Cooper Ramo's 2004 analysis of a "Beijing Consensus" placed China in distinct contrast to the democratic, liberal systems held by most Western nations, though as other commentators note the two systems share many traits.¹⁰¹ While the state sector has reduced capabilities in the economy, the dominance and centrality of the CCP governing apparatus remain supreme, refuting the notion that democracy naturally flows from a capitalist market. With Deng's attempts to loosen the connections between Party and state reversed by his successors, the authoritarian nature of Chinese politics is unlikely to change.¹⁰² Under Hu, official slogans calling for the separation of the Party in other aspects of Chinese society were dropped, while under Xi there has been an increase in cross-appointments between Party and government, as well as in economic and social groups. The eradication of term limits, amongst other reforms, has increased Xi's capabilities within this system as well as the centrality of CCP authority.¹⁰³

This model of authoritarian rule mixed with a liberal market has reaped massive economic rewards. As of 2019, China is the second largest economy in the world, a position it has held since 2010. More than 500 million people have been lifted out of absolute poverty with a substantial drop from 84% of the

¹⁰⁰ New Zealand Government, 'Prime Minister Meets with Chinese President', The Beehive, 1 April 2019, <http://www.beehive.govt.nz/release/prime-minister-meets-chinese-president>.

¹⁰¹ Scott Kennedy, 'The Myth of the Beijing Consensus', *Journal of Contemporary China* 19, no. 65 (1 June 2010): 461–77, <https://doi.org/10.1080/10670561003666087>.

¹⁰² Kjeld Erik Brødsgaard, 'China's Political Order under Xi Jinping: Concepts and Perspectives', *China: An International Journal* 16, no. 3 (2018): 1-17.

¹⁰³ Ibid, 1.

population in 1981 to 13% in 2008.¹⁰⁴ On top of this, the quality of life in China has improved with the establishment of a large educated and prosperous middle class of roughly 300 million in 2012.¹⁰⁵ The ratio of foreign trade to GDP rose from 12.6% in 1980 to a record high 67% in 2005 before declining to just under 50% in 2012.¹⁰⁶ In the same year, export and import dependence were both over 20%, making China the world's largest exporter and second largest importer.¹⁰⁷

More recently, China has moved from merely participating in world systems to being a significant voice, and in some instances actively seeking change. In the aftermath of China's relative success in the 2008 Global Financial Crisis, the Western-dominated G7 and G8 grew to incorporate China and other growing economies. China, working with other economically emerging countries in the BRICS group, voiced concern of the operating paradigm of the World Bank and IMF, noting several mechanisms favoured the founders of these organisations rather than the current realities of the world political economy.¹⁰⁸ After arguing that their relative economic size did not equate to equal representation and voting rights, the group was successful in gaining an increase in voting rights for developing nations.¹⁰⁹ China still wishes to see further reform; of particular concern is the informal agreement that the US and EU appoint the directors of each organisation.¹¹⁰

An actual push for reform within these institutions has been supplanted by China driving global initiatives and institutions. In an effort to "complement existing multilateral development banks" China

¹⁰⁴ Timothy R. Heath, *China's New Governing Party Paradigm: Political Renewal and the Pursuit of National Rejuvenation*, Rethinking Asia and International Relations (Farnham, Surrey, England ; Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2014), 13-14.

¹⁰⁵ Ibid.

¹⁰⁶ Tony Saich, *Governance and Politics of China: Fourth Edition* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015), 338.

¹⁰⁷ Ibid.

¹⁰⁸ Michael A. Glosny, 'China and the BRICs: A Real (but Limited) Partnership in a Unipolar World', *Polity* 42, no. 1 (2010): 118, <http://dx.doi.org.ezproxy.auckland.ac.nz/10.1057/pol.2009.14>.

¹⁰⁹ Lye Liang Fook, 'China and Global Governance: A More Active Role on a Selective Basis', *China: An International Journal* 15, no. 1 (9 March 2017): 223.

¹¹⁰ Oliver Stuenkel, 'Emerging Powers and Status: The Case of the First BRICs Summit', *Asian Perspective; Seoul* 38, no. 1 (March 2014): 93.

has set up alternatives in the BRICS Bank, Asian Development Bank and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB).¹¹¹ The Shanghai Cooperation Organisation founded in 2001 is an economic alliance much like BRICS, yet also acts as a political and security alliance with regional partners. These initiatives run alongside the BRI, which while promoting infrastructure and global connectivity, will cement China's economic influence with many of the world's nations. The 69 nations committed to the project, NZ included, have all signed bilateral agreements with China, which lacks a distinct multilateral forum and mechanism for the development of this project. Human rights aside, China is disregarding international law and norms in the South China Sea through active military engagement against fishing vessels, constructing artificial islands and refuting the UNCLOS ruling in 2016. Under Xi, there has been a definite change from the hiding capabilities and biding time strategy of Deng Xiaoping.

The external forces which have helped shape China's economic reform and positive bilateral, regional and multilateral engagement are only one side of a reciprocal process. The substantial growth of the Chinese economy has propelled China to a significant global player able to influence the rules of the system. However, rather than posing a direct challenge there are clear signs of cooperation. For example, the AIIB has co-financed its first round of infrastructure loans with other development banks that it would otherwise compete with, such as the World Bank and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development.¹¹² Similarly, despite the lack of a dispute resolution mechanism in the BRI, the option to use WTO mechanisms still exists. A further effort to mitigating concern at the recent BRI Forum in April 2019 showed Xi agreeing with world leaders of the importance of transparency when implementing BRI projects. There are high levels of interdependence between China and the world economy, and as an integral stakeholder in the current global order, China would unlikely pose a

¹¹¹ Lye Liang Fook, 215.

¹¹² Lye Liang Fook, 226.

challenge with a rival system.¹¹³ While China is mostly working within the rules to achieve its objectives, it is showing it can and will shape those rules.

As I will argue in the next section, when China is forced to choose between its core national interests and that of international rules and norms, it will likely choose the former. This explains its actions in the SCS, as international law directly contradicts its perception of territory. However, this is not too dissimilar from other powers. The US-led invasion of Iraq for example, went against international law in acting without Security Council clearance. Though these two examples are an exception against the now-established norm of supporting the rules-based system, great powers have the capabilities to do as they see fit, and they exercise this on occasion. While we see China holding more influence in shaping international norms, it is unlikely we will see a change in China's view of the SCS. It is likely, however, we will see China further integrating into the world economy and having a stronger presence in current and new multilateral organisations. Continued engagement with NZ aligns with these motivations.

The Pursuit of National Rejuvenation

Leading into the 1990s the CCP was facing a legitimacy crisis. The collapse of the Eastern Bloc challenged the validity of China's communist base, leading Francis Fukuyama to claim Western liberal democracy as the final evolution of human government.¹¹⁴ Domestically, rising unemployment, inequality, inflation and rampant corruption revealed widespread dissatisfaction with the CCP and culminated in calls for democratic reform in the Tiananmen Square protests. While waning support for Marxism-Leninism MZT can be traced back to the ultra-leftist policies of Mao, this sentiment was compounded through Deng's

¹¹³ Zheng Yongnian and Lim Wen Xin, 'The Changing Geopolitical Landscape, China and the World Order in the 21st Century', *China: An International Journal* 15, no. 1 (9 March 2017): 16.

¹¹⁴ Fukuyama, xi.

market reforms and campaign against class struggle and constant revolution. By 1990 the party lacked any strong official ideology, leaving no long-term moral guidance for the people to withstand economic hardship or any justification to rule in failing to provide material benefit to its people.¹¹⁵

As several commentators note, from the late 1970s, the Party's legitimacy began transitioning from an ideological base in socialist values to a performance-based party through providing tangible gain to its people.¹¹⁶ With Deng's Southern Tour reaffirming the CCP's commitment to further economic modernisation, a policy that each generation of leadership has vigorously pursued, and the CCP making conscious efforts to transition itself from a revolutionary vanguard of the proletariat to a governing party for all the people,¹¹⁷ this suggests performance indicators rather than ideology are still the primary source of legitimation for the CCP.

While I agree that performance indicators have become the dominant source of legitimacy, I argue ideology is still a major source of support and credibility for the CCP. Though this has changed from radical Maoism, since Deng we have seen an adaptation of ideology to facilitate strategic goals, most clearly seen in the transition from a socialist to a market economy. Yet since Tiananmen Square there has been clear evidence of an increase in both state-led and popular nationalism, officially endorsed ideology from each era of leadership, a re-emphasis on the importance of Marxism-Leninism MZT and the pursuit of socialism in official rhetoric, though this is mostly devoid from policy implementation. All suggest that economic performance alone is insufficient to justify CCP rule and that ideology, built on

¹¹⁵ Jie Chen, 25–29.

¹¹⁶ Ibid, 27; Hongxing Yang and Dingxin Zhao, 'Performance Legitimacy, State Autonomy and China's Economic Miracle', *Journal of Contemporary China* 24, no. 91 (2 January 2015): 71-73, <https://doi.org/10.1080/10670564.2014.918403>; Heike Holbig, 'Remaking the CCP's Ideology: Determinants, Progress, and Limits under Hu Jintao', *Journal of Current Chinese Affairs* 38, no. 3 (8 October 2009): 42.

¹¹⁷ Heath, xii.

historical foundations and adapted to address contemporary strategic goals, is a strong aspect of CCP legitimacy. I will address each in turn.

Firstly, governance and economic performance alone are an insufficient explanation for current CCP rule. As Timothy Heath suggests, the CCP would fail to suffice as a ruling party if it lacked any other purpose beyond providing competent governance.¹¹⁸ Relying on economic performance is also problematic, most clearly in failing to provide material gain would undermine the CCP as a governing party. Despite unprecedented growth over previous decades, some economists argue such high rates are not sustainable in the long term.¹¹⁹ Considering that Premier Wen Jiabao claimed at the 2007 National People's Congress that "[t]he biggest problem with China's economy is that the growth is unstable, unbalanced, uncoordinated, and unsustainable", this is an issue identified by the Party and can explain various initiatives by the leadership to maintain high levels of growth.¹²⁰ Hu's Scientific Development sought domestic innovation, acknowledging an overreliance on China's manufacturing and export market, while Xi's BRI promotes global infrastructure at significant cost to develop trade. In contrast, successful economic growth has led David Shambaugh to highlight a "middle income trap" where future growth is highly restricted by the needs of China's growing middle class, unlikely to be met without significant state reform.¹²¹ This indicates that if the CCP relied on economic performance alone, there are certain risks to legitimacy in both economic success and failure.

¹¹⁸ Ibid, 127.

¹¹⁹ Jun Zhang, 'China's Transition in Its Growth Stage Will Become Steadier: A Talk with Barry Naughton', in *End of Hyper Growth in China?*, ed. Jun Zhang (New York: Palgrave Macmillan US, 2016), 3, https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-137-53718-8_1; Holbig, 43.

¹²⁰ Kai Guo and Papa N'Diaye, 'Is China's Export-Oriented Growth Sustainable?', IMF Working Paper (Asia and Pacific Department - International Monetary Fund, August 2009), 3, <http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu.ezproxy.auckland.ac.nz/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.584.3384&rep=rep1&type=pdf>

¹²¹ David Shambaugh, 'Contemplating China's Future', *The Washington Quarterly* 39, no. 3 (2 July 2016): 121–30, <https://doi.org/10.1080/0163660X.2016.1232639>.

While I have previously discussed enhanced efforts at domestic governance and economic modernisation, post-Tiananmen the CCP simultaneously launched a national patriotic education campaign to fill the ideological vacuum left from reform. The goals of this campaign were defined as: “rejuvenating China’s national spirit, strengthening the unity of all people of different ethnic groups, reconstructing the sense of national esteem and dignity and building the broadest possible coalition under the leadership of the CCP.”¹²² Aspects of China’s long history and culture were emphasised and the Century of Humiliation narrative was implored to promote national unity and protecting sovereignty. Economic backwardness was also noted as a factor in the Century of Humiliation, a likely push to support the economic modernisation programme. The people were urged to unite under the CCP as the protector of the Chinese nation.¹²³ In essence, the campaign redefined the legitimacy of the CCP to permit their rule based on a non-communist ideology.¹²⁴

To Suisheng Zhao in 1998, this campaign was the cause of a considerable rise in popular nationalism.¹²⁵

In international opposition against Tiananmen, intellectual property rights disputes, trade deficits and confrontations with Taiwan, the state had portrayed China as a victim being unfairly targeted and restricted by others from rising as a great power.¹²⁶ Even against the backdrop of widespread corruption and poor socioeconomic conditions, many Chinese rallied behind the Government when China’s international position was at stake.¹²⁷ Public outcry over the US bombing of the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade, the visit of the Taiwanese President to Cornell University and the E-P3 plane crash over Hainan show popular dissatisfaction with the US. Anti-Japanese sentiment is also evident in mass protests

¹²² Suisheng Zhao, ‘A State-Led Nationalism: The Patriotic Education Campaign in Post-Tiananmen China’, *Communist and Post-Communist Studies* 31, no. 3 (1 September 1998): 296, [https://doi.org/10.1016/S0967-067X\(98\)00009-9](https://doi.org/10.1016/S0967-067X(98)00009-9).

¹²³ Chen Zhimin, 49.

¹²⁴ Suisheng Zhao, ‘A State-Led Nationalism’, 288.

¹²⁵ *Ibid*, 300.

¹²⁶ Suisheng Zhao, ‘Foreign Policy Implications of Chinese Nationalism Revisited’.

¹²⁷ Suisheng Zhao, ‘A State-Led Nationalism’, 299.

against the whitewashing of the wartime atrocities in Japanese textbooks and highly publicised visits by Japanese officials to the Yasukuni Shrine.

In addition to nationalism, each leader has pursued a specific ideology that builds on the established canon. Since Deng Xiaoping Theory was written into the constitution in 1997, there have been distinct additions to the constitution pursued alongside Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong Thought, as well as the joint commitment towards socialism, albeit with Chinese characteristics. However, each ideology stretches further away from its Marxist and Maoist origins.

Jiang's Three Represents, more specifically, his third represent calling for the party to represent "the fundamental interests of all the people", steers away from the CCP's vanguard past as the dictatorship of the proletariat.¹²⁸ As private entrepreneurs were welcomed into the party, a group integral to China's economic development, revolutionary history and socialist dogma were discarded. Similarly, Hu's Scientific Outlook on Development sought the creation of a Harmonious Society which promised to balance economic growth with social and ecological development.¹²⁹ While this addresses socioeconomic deficiencies, it redefines the priorities of the party to address the needs of all its citizens, regardless of class origin.¹³⁰ Further, the harmonious aspects of the vision echo aspects of Confucian balance, a fundamental contradiction to the constant struggle of Mao.

Xi's Chinese dream, which will facilitate the "rejuvenation" of the Chinese nation, differs from his two predecessors' visions as it seeks to alter China's place in the world.¹³¹ Alongside the ambitious BRI as a means to facilitate this dream, economic gain and nationalistic fervour are mixed to cover both the performance and ideological foundations of CCP legitimacy. The notion of "rejuvenation" alludes to

¹²⁸ Heike Holbig and Bruce Gilley, 'Reclaiming Legitimacy in China', *Politics & Policy* 38, no. 3 (June 2010): 406.

¹²⁹ *Ibid*, 406-7.

¹³⁰ Gunter Schubert, 'One-Party Rule and the Question of Legitimacy in Contemporary China: Preliminary Thoughts on Setting up a New Research Agenda.', *Journal of Contemporary China* 17, no. 54 (February 2008): 196, <https://doi.org/10.1080/10670560701693153>.

¹³¹ Xi Jinping, 'Secure a Decisive Victory', 25.

when China was the middle kingdom and now intends to return to this past glory. Similarly, the BRI echoes China's past maritime prowess and as a key destination and facilitator of the original Silk Road.

As a party founded on the pursuit of communism, this aspect is still adhered to in official rhetoric yet is not given any immediate practical consideration ahead of the more realistic goal of national rejuvenation.¹³² It seems ideological legitimacy is built on both continuity and adaptation, following the canon of historical ideology justifies the current leadership, while creating new ideology addresses contemporary strategic goals. This also reflects Deng using Mao's "seeking truth from facts" to contradict Maoist economics in pursuing market reform.

On the one hand, a re-emphasis on ideology from the early 1990s has successfully provided an alternative sense of legitimacy for the CCP. Efforts to instil nationalism via a patriotic education campaign have mobilised the populace while each leader has pursued an updated ideology to add to the canon. Xi was the first to notably blend nationalist ambition as a great power to an obtainable ideological vision. However, this rebranded form of legitimacy also pressures the Party to protect the Chinese nation in light of challenges by other nations and even international law. This was recently asserted against NZ with an Air New Zealand flight bound for Shanghai having to fly back to Auckland mid-flight after failing to remove a reference to Taiwan in official documentation. With the evidence of protest against the US and Japan, there is a trend of popular nationalism exacerbating tension with other nations, increasingly contrasting with China's peaceful rise strategy. As China's military capabilities have grown, the CCP has been more assertive in protecting its territorial claims in the South and East China Sea. With Xi's Dream projecting China's return to great power status, it is less likely to resist any future challenge to its territory.

¹³² Heath, 61.

As the Party learnt from Tiananmen, a lack of strong ideological support can encourage popular dissidence, necessitating current leadership to assert itself over territorial integrity. However, if the party fails to substantiate on economic goals, its performance legitimacy will also quickly falter.¹³³ With a stable external environment crucial to ensure the CCP's performance-based legitimacy, and protecting territorial claims a necessity for its ideological base, the Party needs to strike a balance between these two pillars to maintain domestic support.

¹³³ Holbig, 43.

Analysis & Conclusion

In analysing trends and patterns that emerge from the preceding case studies, this chapter traces the NZ-China relationship, proposing a causality model to explain the shift from military enemies in the 1950s to Comprehensive Strategic Partners in the 2010s. In presenting this model, I reassert the principal findings from the previous case studies before analysing the explanatory power of my independent variables towards my dependent variable, the current level of deepened engagement between NZ and China. Again, my independent variables are rational choice, institutionalism, and ideationalism. I conclude in highlighting how this thesis adds to the wider literature as well as discuss the future implications this research has uncovered for the NZ-China relationship.

Different ideological views saw the two countries in opposition for 23 years. State-promoted economic growth limited the need to seek a trading relationship with each other, as did NZ's reliance on the British market. The mitigation of the Communist threat by the US, and China being welcomed into the UN, relaxed both the ideological and institutional barriers that had previously prevented a relationship. From 1972, NZ and China were no longer enemies.

Until the mid-1990s, there was nothing categorically different about NZ and China's relationship than what they each had with other nations. Kirk's government had made efforts to warm to the USSR and North Vietnam, showing indifference to Communism, while Muldoon was willing to increase NZ's presence with Japan, showing China was only one option amongst the Asian states with which to grow a relationship. In China's eyes, NZ was only one of many countries that had wanted to increase interaction after recent recognition.

Yet in loosening government control of the market and opening to the world economic system, reforms in both countries mirrored the other in purpose and function. With the declining importance of ideology in China, a similar echo of shifting ideational priorities dominated New Zealand. Any Western affinity held no authority amidst growing social concerns, trading isolation and mitigated security threats. New Zealand was transitioning from a Western nation to an independent bicultural one in the Asia-Pacific. Not yet partners, NZ and China were in a period of institutional and ideational change that would define their interactions in the next decades.

The contemporary picture flows from this period of change in the 1970s and 1980s, confirming joint commitment to international integration after reform, supported through ideational shifts. In the wake of isolation from traditional markets and allies, NZ deregulated its market to better navigate the international economy. This necessitated that NZ prioritise external engagement in whatever capacity it could, pre-empting Bolger to implement a multi-track trade policy with a focus on undeveloped markets in Asia – finding in China an eager partner with similar goals.

I have argued that ideational factors behind NZ's actions are an undeveloped aspect of contemporary scholarship. There has been little research preceding Jason Young's 2017 analysis confirming that NZ leaders seek ontological security through interaction with China. In tracing the transition from NZ's colonial, anti-Communist affinity to an independent-oriented, trade-dependent nation, the preceding case studies build on this area of research as an alternative explanation to material considerations.

In China, leaders since Deng Xiaoping have prioritised economic modernisation via domestic liberalisation and external integration. Becoming a norm following his Southern Tour in 1992, these goals aligned with Bolger's 1993 trade policy, also pursued by successive NZ governments. China's state-based legitimacy, once solely based on ideational considerations, is now underpinned through economic gain. This necessitates China complies with international organisations that facilitate interaction, such as

the WTO and UN, and explains economic intensity with a wide array of partners. This is a pattern unlikely to change.

Today the CCP balances its material-based legitimacy with fulfilling its historic duty as a socialist state; adhering to its past as the vanguard to return China to great power status. Under Xi, these two pillars have morphed into a single policy, the China Dream, promoting China as a responsible, active global member in an attempt to enhance not only economic development, but its status and prestige amongst the world's nations. Deeper engagement with NZ fulfils these goals.

The transition from enemies to partners has happened gradually over three phases in the past 70 years. In most cases, leaders on both sides are motivated by forces outside of their control. This suggests that the NZ-China relationship will continue to deepen regardless of who is in office, but may be susceptible to institutional or ideational shifts. Following Paul Pierson's theory of increasing returns, noting the growing trend of economic, political and social intensity between NZ and China, a break in the current institutional arrangement is unlikely to occur without a dominant catalyst.¹ The following section analyses my independent and intervening variables in the three periods of the relationship to explain the causes and barriers of deeper engagement between NZ and China.

The Wasted Years

There are two categories of NZ actors in this sequence: prime ministers, and a small number of people and organisations. While Rewi Alley and Vic Wilcox interacted with PRC leadership, and the NZCF campaigned for recognition, all were limited in their capacity to influence major decisions. Therefore, they were restricted in the capacity to enact substantial change in the NZ-China relationship regardless of their prominent positions.

¹ Paul Pierson, 'Increasing Returns, Path Dependence, and the Study of Politics'.

NZ leaders were also constrained in their interaction with China. Regardless of who was in office, or their attitude towards the PRC, I conclude the position of leaders were not a dominant barrier to further engagement. Despite Labour advocating recognition in the 1950s, Walter Nash was unable to implement this policy after coming into office. Similarly, although Keith Holyoake was vehemently anti-China during the Vietnam War, he was more willing to accept them towards the end of his tenure, though he was reluctant to do so if it meant withdrawing support for the ROC.

In both cases, I argue protecting the ANZUS treaty, and consequently aligning with the US' China policy, dominated the considerations of leaders at this time. With recognition coming after the UN resolution to replace the ROC with the PRC in the organisation, despite NZ voting against this, international norms were also a consideration.

Economically, with attempts at diversifying the trade portfolio in the 1960s met with only marginal success, NZ decision-makers focused on lobbying the UK and EU for continued access to the British market. Further trade with China was not prioritised as Britain was not only the major importer of NZ's exports, it was the world's largest consumer. Institutional arrangements with the US and UK were the dominating factor behind external relations during this sequence, yet were supported through ideational affinity. It was due to the Commonwealth identity that Britain lobbied on NZ's behalf to guarantee Protocol 18 with the EEC. NZ cultivated this relationship first rather than prioritising other markets.

The affinity with the US was supplemented by a strong liberal ideology which conflicted with China's pursuit of external socialism. The New Zealand Defence Force faced the PLA in Korea, while the strategic alliance with Vietnam continued the ideological conflict. Despite strong support against Communist aggression by NZ leaders, it began to wane with NZ's support for the Vietnam War. The anti-Communist policy was largely drawn from the US' containment policy, which propelled New Zealand's actions.

Regardless, as ideology motivated these conflicts, liberal democratic values posed a barrier to constructive interaction with China.

Besides limited cooperation with the USSR, China was autarkic, preferring to focus on the socialist restructuring of society. In encouraging revolutionary fervour, justifying mass terror, and legitimising purges of Party leaders, Mao Zedong Thought became increasingly counterproductive to external diplomacy and internal governance. The political and economic instability of the 1950s and 60s meant mechanisms that could have facilitated a stronger trade and political relationship with NZ were mostly incapacitated from doing so. In China's case, these were driven through Mao's socialist ambition.

Zhou's policy of peaceful coexistence attempted to mitigate the hostilities arising from the Chinese Revolution, yet it did little to diminish Holyoake's claims of militant communism from Beijing. Military conflict aside, NZ leaders were hesitant to recognise China at the expense of the ROC, an unnegotiable prerequisite to any relationship. Socialist and nationalist sentiment were a major barrier to amicable relations with NZ.

Rogernomics and 改革开放

Sporting links with South Africa and the extent of NZ's commitment to being anti-nuclear show a clear division between NZ leaders and their parties regarding foreign policy. With each leader since 1972 eager to further ties with China, a consensus emerged in how NZ should maintain the relationship. A steady increase in trade and people-to-people links, which grew alongside state visits, show division in other areas of foreign policy did not extend to China.

Disagreements over atmospheric nuclear testing, support for Communist insurgencies and since Tiananmen, human rights, have done little to restrain an increase in connectivity or mostly positive attitude towards China from NZ governments. Despite an official break in relations after Tiananmen,

New Zealand was quick to reengage diplomatic and economic contact, suggesting that despite differing views, a working relationship is given higher priority. The major actors in NZ, therefore, were not the causal factor in deepening relations.

Structural changes in both New Zealand's external arrangements and domestic environment prioritised trade with non-traditional partners and emphasised a more independent NZ identity. The consideration of major powers became subsidiary to domestic issues. Internally, heavy state intervention had contributed to hyperinflation and stagnation of the NZ economy, which precipitated the neo-liberal reforms of the Fourth Labour Government. The removal of foreign exchange controls, and reduction of both subsidies and tariffs enabled a more open economy. Though this was met with mass unemployment and high cost in maintaining social welfare, it enabled NZ to be more flexible in adapting to international markets, a natural precursor to closer relations with China in the following decades.

Similarly, structural changes emphasised a growing New Zealand identity that contrasted with the British and Western affinity of the 1950s and 60s. The Māori renaissance promoted a New Zealand that contrasted to its colonial roots, which Britain chose to ignore after the Rainbow Warrior incident. It is also difficult to imagine the US dismissing its obligations under ANZUS without the catalyst of growing anti-nuclear sentiment in NZ. This threatened the Muldoon government's majority and led to the introduction of anti-nuclear legislation in 1987. Under Lange, independence from other nations became a point of pride.

Though these factors did not provide immediate deepening of the relationship with China, they encouraged further connection in the following decades. NZ was not tied to British trade links, nor a part of any direct arrangement with the US, therefore it was able to pursue its interests unhindered by major partners. As its interests were primarily in advancing its trade agenda, China provided such an

opportunity. Structural changes in this sequence, which were supported by growing independence in foreign policy, were the precursor to closer ties with China in the following decades.

In China, Deng Xiaoping was central in transitioning the CCP away from a revolutionary vanguard to a governing party. In doing so, he reverted Mao's support for class struggle, revolutionary movements and opposing imperialism, to developing peaceful relations externally and undertaking radical economic modernisation at home. The reform and opening up paradigm encouraged a capitalist market while allowing foreign investment in China, met with both incredible economic success and a decline in the importance of socialist ideology. Deng's support for closer engagement saw China join the World Bank, IMF and open 18 SEZ by 1984. He reinforced constructive partnerships to grow trade, rather than support socialist revolution at home or abroad.

As I have shown, despite differing views on human rights, nuclear weapons and communist insurgencies, ideology did little to prevent closer relations between New Zealand and China. While Mao's antipathy towards the USSR found alignment with Muldoon, the only formal agreement between the two was regarding trade. Ideology can be dismissed as a cause of closer relations with NZ in this aspect, made more evident through the ideological vacuum left after Mao's death. Not only was Maoist fervour and its capacity for mass mobilisation removed, but capitalist forces also contradicted traditional socialism. Amongst corruption, unemployment and growing inequality, the CCP faced its largest-ever legitimacy crisis with public demonstrations for democracy in Tiananmen Square.

In prioritising economic integration and opening up to external markets, the reforms themselves, and Deng Xiaoping as their catalyst, were the primary precursors to intensive interaction with NZ from the 1990s despite having little immediate impact on the relationship. Trade and people-to-people links between NZ and China had only been steadily increasing since 1972. However, their success promulgated Deng to further advocate for economic modernisation and international integration on his

Southern Tour in 1992 and have since been followed by all his successors. Prioritising multilateral and bilateral trading platforms led to closer interaction with NZ in the following decades.

Five Firsts and the Comprehensive Strategic Partnership

New Zealand governments since Jim Bolger have all agreed on the major tenets of foreign policy, supporting the rules-based international order while advancing trade via multilateral and bilateral engagement. This multi-track trade policy has emphasised a wider search for markets in various forms, ranging from a trilateral engagement with Singapore and Chile, association with multilateral institutions such as the WTO and APEC, and FTAs with individual countries. Interaction with China, including specifically targeted government initiatives, have only been one aspect of this process.

The primary division under this paradigm has been the extent NZ governments protest or speak against China's violations of international law, most recently seen in the shift in tone between National and Labour Governments over China's actions in the SCS. Besides official rhetoric, it did nothing to minimise the extent of connectivity. This is also true of human rights, which since reopening economic and diplomatic pathways after Tiananmen, have had little impact on the trend of deeper engagement. Such disagreements are not unique to China, as leaders have protested against Australia and the US when they have acted against international norms. This evidence suggests that voicing concern is enough to appease New Zealand's commitment to international law. A healthy trading relationship is given priority over continued protest. Different views over human rights and international law, therefore, are not a barrier to continued engagement.

Ideational considerations also explain deeper connectivity. Since the UK joined the EEC and the US ceased ANZUS obligations, Te Tiriti o Waitangi has been reinstitutionalised and NZ society has embraced itself as a bicultural nation independent in foreign policy. Relations with other countries, China included,

is now not dependent on shared history, language, culture or ideological beliefs. As Jason Young notes, the handling of differences, promoting internationalism and the search for a secure economic partner reinforces the ideational basis of New Zealand's engagement in China.²

Following Young's analysis, engagement with China reaffirms NZ's ontological security as a small trading nation and good international citizen. I follow the paradigm that NZ is currently an independent-oriented, small trade-dependent nation. With China as a major trading partner that is substantially different in ideology, culture, language and history, NZ identity is emphasised as independent from our historical and cultural affinity to the UK. However, the identity as a good international citizen dictates NZ speak out against violations of international law, but as we have seen, expressing concern is enough to appease this.

Similar to New Zealand leaders, Chinese counterparts have all prioritised external economic integration via bilateral and multilateral avenues, relaxing state control over the economy to better respond to international markets. The success of the initial reforms has promulgated each subsequent leader to continue this policy, promoting new initiatives to further economic development. Considering the material basis of CCP legitimacy, this is a trend unlikely to change.

Jiang Zemin promoted extensive trade, and economic and technological exchange, became more active within APEC and sought to join the WTO, and was supported by NZ in doing so. His ideological contribution emphasised the importance of advanced productive forces within China. Hu's Scientific Outlook on Development builds on this canon. The FTA with NZ allowed a trial space in a small Western economy unaligned with major trading blocs, preceding replications with larger nations soon after.

² Jason Young, 'Seeking Ontological Security through the Rise of China', 522.

Similarly, Xi's China Dream and the BRI project follows the same trend of international integration as his predecessors.

NZ helped with WTO ascension and enabled a low-risk trial zone for Western FTAs, yet current engagement is more a part of China's global economic liberalisation programme than a unique relationship. China is one of New Zealand's top trading partners, but so are many other nations, including Australia, Japan, Russia and the US – economies that add significantly more material value to China's development. With Deng's Southern Tour occurring alongside Bolger's Asia-focused, multi-tracked trade strategy, China and New Zealand aligned in their neo-liberal goals in the mid-1990s.

While the preceding chapters largely confirm already established liberal institutional explanations for the development of NZ-China relations, this thesis contributes to the larger body of work in explaining the underdeveloped ideational factors which motivate external interaction in both countries. Several authors have noted the decline of ideology as a driving factor in Chinese national and international affairs, yet this thesis has argued nationalism as a dominating factor behind governing legitimacy. This ideology not only propels peaceful and profitable cooperation with other nations, yet demands assertive challenges against territorial and sovereign claims. For New Zealand, this thesis has highlighted a shifting identity where New Zealand no longer sees itself as a colonial outpost in the Pacific but a distinctly bicultural nation separate from past affiliations with Britain or the US. Foreign policy decisions are now based on New Zealand's own interests rather than following the policies of great powers. This thesis has also shown the explanatory power of particular variables in the current level of engagement between NZ and China. Yet in doing so this research adds to the larger body of work in explaining what factors continue to impede deeper engagement.

Dominating Trends and Future Implications

I have argued that New Zealand leaders are motivated by forces outside of their control. Great power politics of economic and military allies, the Communist threat, anti-nuclear beliefs of the public, international law and norms, and the need for healthy trading relationships have defined interaction with China since 1949. This suggests that NZ's China policy is unlikely to change dependent on which leader or political party is in office. Adapting to structural changes in traditional relationships, the world economy and international norms, supported by a clear ideational shift as a more independent nation, has culminated in the trajectory of NZ's foreign policy since the early 1990s.

I have also argued that the role of the core leader in China is the integral driver of China's institutional and ideological systems. Notable differences between Mao and post-Mao periods reinforce that the leader can dramatically alter China's internal functioning and external interactions. However, since Deng there has been a consensus on the importance of market forces to China's development. Similar to NZ realising that a productive economy cannot be provided solely via internal mechanisms, constructive relationships with other nations, and the organisations that facilitate them, have been crucial and underpin China's current modernisation strategy and governing legitimacy. With each leader promoting economic modernisation as official state ideology, this is unlikely to change dependent on who is in office.

Ideational considerations have also manifested over the last 30 years which are reaffirmed with state-to-state interaction. In both nations, they have gone through a process of change. The economic development of China's official ideologies since Deng Xiaoping Theory naturally align with NZ's identity as an independent-oriented, trade-dependent nation. Economic modernisation in China is key to propel China to great power status and fulfil its goal of national rejuvenation. Here, NZ and China have converged, resulting in the five firsts and the current Comprehensive Strategic Partnership.

However, this research has uncovered times where China's nationalist ambition and authoritarian system contrasts with New Zealand's commitment to international law and liberal values. As NZ is a small state dependent on trade, it not only explains the recent flurry of economic intensity but also when NZ leaders disagree with China's violations of human rights or international law. If NZ is reliant on the rules of engagement, it is integral that these are upheld by China. These findings are hardly surprising and confirm existing scholarship.

While nationalist ambition has recently seen China promote a Charm Offensive to increase soft power and prestige, the same ideology dictates the CCP assert itself where it does not agree with international norms or sees challenges to its territory and sovereignty. This ideology has deep roots in its history, political aims, and culture, and has since replaced socialism as the ideational backing behind the CCP. Attempts at reforming current institutions, creating its own, anti-US and Japanese protest, and asserting territorial claims in the SCS are part of this process. The nationalist aspect of legitimacy contrasts with NZ's commitment to international law and identity of being a good international citizen, promulgating NZ leaders to voice concern. While conflicting values have done little to deter from deeper connectivity since the relationship first began in 1972, identity, beliefs, history and ideology are the historic and contemporary causes of disagreement between NZ and China and may pose future challenges. Continued deepening connectivity with NZ will be dependent on how the CCP navigates nationalist ambition with economic development.

Though I have shown NZ prioritises economic considerations over differing ideational concerns, it is less clear how these would be balanced should future complications arise. Neither the possibility of Taiwanese separation, nor its impact on the NZ-China relationship, has been a subject of analysis for this thesis yet could alter the current trajectory of interaction. Xi's rhetoric from the 19th CPC National

Congress suggests military action as a potential response to separation that may demand NZ leaders take a more assertive reaction to uphold their identity as a good international citizen:

Any separatist activity is certain to meet with the resolute opposition of the Chinese people. We have the resolve, the confidence, and the ability to defeat separatist attempts for “Taiwan independence” in any form. We will never allow anyone, any organization, or any political party, at any time or in any form, to separate any part of Chinese territory from China.³

We have seen through the case studies presented here that New Zealanders have little knowledge of China and that domestic anti-China sentiment is balanced with calls for further engagement, something that has not changed substantially from 1949. Before 1972, Communist threat rhetoric balanced calls for recognition. Contemporary commentary suggests closer engagement is a threat to NZ sovereignty, contrasting calls for further economic engagement seen in the work of the NZCC proposing NZ as a link between Latin America and China in the BRI.⁴

Leaders have managed to mitigate ideological differences so far in the relationship. If these differences are exacerbated due to outside forces, it will not only force NZ leadership to reassess their values but may cause a rise in anti-China mentality from the NZ public. The Springbok Tour and anti-nuclear movement show the public can impact foreign decision making, despite the absence of a continued trend.

The decisions of NZ and Chinese leadership are shaped through economic development and fostering deeper integration in the world system. This is now an established norm and is unlikely to change irrespective of which NZ or Chinese leader is in office. Additionally, there are multiple ideational factors shaping decision making in each country which underpin interaction with each other. These are not

³ Xi Jinping, ‘Secure a Decisive Victory in Building’, 51.

⁴ New Zealand China Council, ‘Building the Southern Link Conference’, New Zealand China Council, accessed 24 May 2019, <https://nzchinacouncil.org.nz/events/building-the-southern-link-conference/>.

fixed. Currently, NZ balances its identity as an independent-oriented, trade-dependent nation with its identity as a good international citizen. Further deepening of the relationship between NZ and China is thus dependent on two major factors: how Chinese leadership navigate economic modernisation with nationalist ambition, and how New Zealanders and New Zealand leaders respond to this.

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