ANTI MILITARISM AND CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTION

IN THE CONTEXT OF QUEER SUBJECTIVITY

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We certify that we have read this thesis and that in our opinion it is fully adequate, in scope and in quality, as a thesis for the degree of Master of Arts.

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ABSTRACT

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The purpose of the study is to interpret antimilitarism and conscientious objection by queer perspective. Michel Foucault's approach to power, subjectivity and sexuality has an impact on appearing of queer theory. In this context, militarism is addressed as an instrument that is used by bio-power in the process of individual subjectivation through Foucault's conceptualisation regarding power. Antimilitarism is defined as a resistance position against subjectivation technologies of power. Queer analyses shaped through the theory's approach to sexuality provide opportunity to interpret conscientious objection, a form of antimilitarist action, in the context of resistance by referring resistance potentials intrinsic to subjectivation. In this study, in line with these potentials, by emphasising the connections between Ernesto Laclau's theory of hegemony and Judith Butler's performative theory, firstly antimilitarist movement is explained in the context of "counter hegemonic struggle", and later on the practice of conscientious objection is interpreted as a type of performative action with its characteristics pointing out queer subjectivity position. The underlying reason behind this study is to detect the types of perception, and the styles of action that may enable the queerization of antimilitarist movement, and the practice of conscientious objection.

Key words: Queer, Antimilitarism, Conscientious Objection, Subjectivity, Performativity.

ÖZET

QUEER ÖZNELLİK BAĞLAMINDA
ANTİ MİLİTARİZM VE VİCDAN RED

Eroğlu, Yasin Erkan
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Bu çalışmanın hedefi, anti militarizmin ve vicdani reddin queer perspektif ile yorumlanmasıdır. Michel Foucault'nun; iktidar, öznellik ve cinsellik konularına yaklaşımı, queer kuramın ortaya çıkmasında etkili olmuştur. Bu bağlamda militarizm, Foucault'nun iktidara ilişkin kavramsallaştırmasıyla, biyo-iktidarın bireyleri öznelleştirme sürecince kullandığı bir araç olarak ele alınmıştır. Anti militarizm ise, iktidarın öznelleştirme teknolojilerine karşı bir direniş konumu olarak tanımlanmıştır. Queer kuramın cinsellik konusuna yaklaşımı üzerinden şekillenen analizleri, öznelleşmeye içkin direniş potansiyellerine işaret ederek, anti militarist bir eylem biçimi olan vicdani reddi, direniş bağlamında yorumlamaya olanak sağlamaktadır. Bu olanaklar doğrultusunda çalışmada, Ernesto Laclau'nun hegemonya kuramı ve Judith Butler'ın performativite kuramı arasındaki bağlantılar vurgulanarak, öncelikle anti militarist hareket "karşı hegemonik mücadele" bağlamında açıklanmış, sonrasında ise vicdani red pratiği performatif bir eylem biçimi olarak queer öznellik konumunu işaret eden yönleriyle yorumlanmıştır. Bu çalışmanın gerisindeki saik ise, anti militarist hareketin ve vicdani red pratiğinin queerleştirilmesine olanak sağlayabilecek kavrayış biçimlerini ve eylem tarzlarını tespit etmektir.

Anahtar kelimeler: Queer, Anti Militarizm, Vicdani Red, Öznellik, Performativite.

CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION

The term queer, which refers to the slang word "faggot" and means strange, crooked, loony, and weird and others which has been used to humiliate homosexuals since the last quarter of the twentieth century, has been adopted with all its negative meanings by LGBTTI individuals who do not have the normative sexual identities since the beginning of 1990s and the negative meanings attributed to this term have been transformed. The queer movement that embraces this transformation led to the development of queer theory in parallel to the ideas of philosophers such as Eva Kosofsky Sedgwick, Michael Warner, Gayle Rubin and Judith Butler who contributed to the feminist theory with critical interventions. By opposing the heteronormative binary gender system, the queer theory, which aims to point out the negative effects of this system in the social sphere, has expanded its areas of interest in the following years to become a field of radical questioning about not only gender identities but all identity positions. Queer theory's critical attitude on identities, in other words the suggestion of "disidentification", enables us to consider it not as a pure identity position to be adopted by individuals who will oppose inequality/marginalization/trivialization in the society but as a new subjectivity position which is constantly transformed, can be reinterpreted and is the expression of a clarity of identities and a horizon that will emerge with disidentification.

This position which we will describe as queer subjectivity will be evaluated with aspects that we think will contribute to the actions of conscientious objection which is one of the forms of anti-militarist struggle against the effects of militarism on society. In order to make these evaluations, first we will discuss the ideas of Michel Foucault,

who pioneered the queer theory with his analysis of power, explaining the power mechanisms enabling subjectivation of individuals in the historical process. Because "Foucault has shown us that modern power is mainly centered on subjectivity, modern subjectivity is mainly based on sexuality, and sexuality is mainly established within the heteronormative framework" (Özkazanç, 2015, p.97). After explaining Foucault's analysis, the effects of militarism on subjectivation will be discussed through bio-power, which is the conceptual expression of modern power defined by these analyzes.

In the second chapter, Foucault's approach to subjectivation will be compared with the ideas of Judith Butler, one of the pioneers of queer theory. The purpose of this comparison is to point out the missing aspects of the Foucauldian arguments on subjectivation and thus by revealing the potentials of resistance immanent to subjectivation to point out to the ground where we think that queer subjectivity, which we will define as a comprehensive position of resistance, will emerge. In this context, Butler first claims that Foucault's argument that subjectivation is carried out by the "soul" which is a tool of power, is insufficient and "soul" fails to explain the productive effects of oppression and prohibition and suggests using concept "psyche" concept in the psychoanalytic sense instead of "soul" since "psyche" provides a basis for resistance by allowing us to take into account productive effects. Secondly, in the argument that subjectivation is achieved by the materialization of the body under the soul, Butler criticizes Foucault for not examining what is left out in achieving materialization. Butler focuses on the "outside" or unintelligible space" which is the name of the space that enables subjectivation through the logic of "constituent exteriority" but which can never be identified. The indefinableness of this space points to a ground where both the subject and the identity positions can never be completed,

and that queer subjectivity, which becomes an open and productive position to reinterpretations in terms of this indefinableness, will emerge. In this study, we will suggest that the ground that Butler points to could be thought of as the Laclauian hegemonic field. Since no position of identity and subjectivity can be completed in the hegemonic space, it is unsustainable to carry out political activity over a pure identity position. This unsustainability coincides with queer theory's suggestion of disidentification. Therefore, we can state that understanding the political space through hegemony and forms of struggle positioned against domination will present a perspective preventing to fall into the identity politics trap and opposing struggles can be defined through the position of queer subjectivity. Anti-militarism, which is one of these forms of struggle, can also be evaluated in the context of the ideas contained in queer theory. Because the anti-militarist struggle as an expression of the stance against the norms created by militarism can be considered as the common point of many disadvantaged individuals in many fields of struggle, which can be considered as multiple subject positions (feminism, anti-racism, anti-authoritarian movements, etc.), which are excluded from these norm areas. The demands of these subject positions intersect with the demands of the anti-militarist struggle. Queer can be considered both as one of these multiple subject positions and as an inclusive position of productive subjectivity which can articulate the demands of these positions, based on the suggestion of constantly expanding the scope of the field of norm. At the end of the second chapter, the connection between queer and anti-militarism will be evaluated on this line.

In the final chapter, the act of conscientious objection, which is part of the anti-militarist form of struggle, will be handled in the context of queer's productivity,

especially in terms of performativity concept. In this respect, conscientious objection will be reinterpreted both as a concept and a form of action, in line with the suggestion of performative theory and with these reinterpretations, the aspects of conscientious objection pointing to queer subjectivity will be addressed. In addition, in the last part, it is aimed to present examples of conscientious objection practices that we will reinterpret as a form of performative action. Generally speaking, in this study, we aim to conduct a discussion that conscientious objection, addressed with the concepts of hegemony and performativity, can be marked as an important resistance position in terms of queer theory and that the aspects of conscientious objection and anti-militarism that can point to queer subjectivity can be revealed.

CHAPTER ONE

THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN BIO-POWER AND ANTIMILITARISM

I.   Michel Foucault and Subjectivity

Michel Foucault states that the main issue in all his work is to understand the history of the subjectivation of people(Foucault, 2014, p.58). When associating Foucault's main purpose and the perspective he established there with our topic, we will firstly examine which references he has used in explaining his thoughts on the subject and in which aspects he is separated from the reference points he uses.

In his respondent text to the question "What is Enlightenment?" Immanuel Kant has opened the door to a new problematization on critical and contemporary thinking in the history of philosophy according to Foucault. This text can be considered both as

Foucault's reference point in his ideas about the subject and the ground on which Foucault established his subject/power analysis separated from this point positioning his distance to the idea of Enlightenment. The questions that Foucault minds in Kant's responses are as follows: What is my actuality? What does this actuality mean? The reason why these questions are a reference to the conceptualization of the subject is that they provide a basis for Foucault's suggestion to establish an ethical subjectivity that we will address in the following chapters, because they encourage us to think critically about our actuality. In other words, the subject should be understood through the critical, questioning attitude adopted while responding to the question "What is Enlightenment?" and interpret itself through this attitude too. The critical aspect of the question "What is my actuality?" in terms of Kant is that it directs us to understand what is happening right now by our own experiences and minds without the need to accept any other authority. Kant points out that what characterizes the Enlightenment is a process that frees individuals from the status of "immaturity". The "maturation" of the individual in spite of authority can be provided with a critical attitude showing the courage to ask this question. Foucault agrees with this argument and thinks that it is the basic condition for the individual to ask himself this question by going back to himself to be able to stand out from the relations of domination. In this context, the critical-questioning aspect of the Enlightenment can be understood as the starting point of Foucault's suggestions for subjectivity.

Although the two thinkers agree on the necessity of these questions, they differ in terms of their approach to criticism. What makes possible the construction of the critical subject according to Kant is that we have *a priori* categories that allow us to perceive the outside world before we experience it. The external world can be

experienced only after being perceived through these forms and criticism can only be adopted as an attitude as a result of experiences. It is paradoxical according to Foucault, since the enlightenment approach that asserts that the decision on what can be known and cannot be known can be made based on whether things can be experienced or "can not be experienced", presupposes a pre-experience knowledge (a priori categories). According to Kant, these categories as they work through experience make it possible to understand the existence of a universal mind, which enables the individual to escape from the social, local, subjective prejudices, overcome them, and to obtain the objective knowledge of the world and thus to understand an 'autonomous subject'(Urhan, 2010, p. 433). But Foucault, since he does not agree Kant's assumption on the essence, does not agree with the idea that such a transcendental autonomous subject can exist. As long as the assumption that perception forms prior to the experiences is not accepted, the subject begins to lose its perceptibility in the universal, rational, transcendental, compulsory and abstract sense. In this context, Foucault's suggestion is to consider the subject as a product of concrete, historical and contingent conditions. In other words, what makes it possible the establishment of the criticism of the subject in terms of Foucault is not the *a priori* categories as in Kant, but the immanent inquiry of the subject. Therefore, the approaches of the two thinkers to criticism can be summarized as follows: Kant proposes a transcendental critique and Foucault proposes an immanent critique.

The reason why we mind the discussion Foucault carries through criticism with reference to Kant is that we think Foucault's established position in the discussion would facilitate explaining his method, understanding of subjectivity and his ideas on freedom. For example, contrary to Kant, since Foucault thinks that self is not given but

is something established through a continuous relationship and questioning with itself, he concludes that this establishment can be historically different in different places and times and therefore uses the method of genealogy. Genealogy can be considered as a problematization centering the ways in which "self" is transformed into subjects. In this respect, Foucault, in his historical analysis of the process of self's transformation into subjectivation, refuses to accept this establishment to depend on universal rules that will guide our actions and thinks it is not possible to seek such rules. Both archaeological and genealogical studies of Foucault try to reveal that modernity and enlightenment are an illusion of autonomous subject vision and understanding of the self (Urhan, 2010, p. 433). As stated above, as Foucault explains his ideas on subjectivation referring to Enlightenment's critical attitude, he decamps from this reference point he uses due to the transcendentality of the Enlightenment's criticism. Because transcendental thinking by tying the autonomy of the subject to universal rules, makes it harder for us to understand how the self is transformed into the subject within the borders set by these rules and a priori categories. To the extent that it makes it difficult, it limits the emancipation of the subject within the power relationships it is engaged with and its self-directed questioning. Therefore, criticism for Foucault is understood to be an attitude we adopt against ourselves by asking what we are both in the present time and in a particular time in history (Foucault, 2014, p. 11-24). In this context Enlightenment is understood not as a historical period, but as an attitude encouraging us to ask contemporary and critical questions that can open the way for developing new subjectivities in terms of emancipation.

Foucault's suggestion for an immanent critical attitude and his distance to Enlightenment emerging due to such attitude is also linked to its conception of the

relationship between subject and power. The essentialist understanding that addresses "self" as something given, limits knowledge of the self to pre-experience categories and assumes that there are things of which its knowledge is inaccessible within such limits. In other words, we may think that an idea claiming that human things are given also claims that what surrounds human is also given and necessary. Based on this assumption, if we accept that there are things in which we cannot have access to its knowledge, we must also accept that these things have an impact on us. The existence of God, moral principles to be followed can be considered as examples. At this point, a determination relationship arises between individual and things claimed inaccessible. Foucault draws attention to this very relationship and tries to examine the identification and transformation into subject process of the individual but unlike Kant, he does not address neither the individual nor the structures surrounding the individual claimed to have inaccessible knowledge as given and changeless. Therefore, the approach to power and determination differs from that of Kantian in a way that is based on his immanent critical attitude.

> The theme of power, in fact, is encased in two intersecting entailments: One is a conceptual entailment in which Foucault has to jointly articulate with areas of knowledge and its powers; and the other is a historical entailment that gives form to this power in a certain period, more precisely, these power relations that weave and organize the truth (Revel, 2006, p. 95).

In Foucault's first determination axis, we see traces of archaeology and in the second axis we see traces of genealogy method. In this context, instead of evaluating power as an equal to structures, external to the subject, unilaterally determining phenomenon, he addresses it personally establishing the subject, immanent to subject,

a type of multilateral relationship. Foucault's decamping classical conception of power treating power rather a category of relations is a reflection of the immanent critical genealogy method. The genealogy method expands the approach on subjectication analyzes 'the human being both determining power and determined by power and thus subjectivated or transforming himself into a subject" in historical context rather than 'the human being subjectivated due to being determined by power'. Thus the relationship between subject and power is addresses as a relationship established in contingent and historical moments rather than a determination relationship emphasizing the compulsory and universal values in enlightenment approach. With his immanent critical approach, Foucault draws attention to the necessity of the genealogy method that allows us to comprehend the historical background in current power relations of Western culture and subject emerging as a product of such power relations by decamping the classical conception of power that addresses subject and structure as external categories to each other and reads the determination relationship through this externality.

II.   Genealogy

Genealogical is an attempt to know some forms of occurrence, and to make them historical; it is a historical-philosophical questioning, but also a political practice, which tries to pull discourses, areas of knowledge, practises out of dependence and determine the ways in which these discourses, these strategies, these practices with all their diversity create a coherent whole, despite everything, in the name of a historical, epistemic entailment (Revel, 2006, p. 97).

According to Foucault, the historical background of Western culture, which influences the formation of the present subject, includes the *pastoralism* which is a management approach specific to Christian thought. Foucault uses the shepherd-herd metaphor in Christianity to describe the idyllic power that he defines as an individualizing form of power. It is the power relations between the priest as a herdsman and the individuals as a herd following Christian faith. The fact that the historical background that influenced the modern subject was chosen as the Christian pastoralism, for Foucault, has been similar to that of the pastoralism and the modern state, in particular, in terms of their understanding of individualizing management approach.

Foucault states that pastoralism predates the modern stat to the extent that it paves the way for individualization, as he argues that the pastoral form of power does not remain as it is and it has evolved into the current management approach through some crises within itself. The dynamics that put the pastoral power in crisis in the West are explained in detail by Foucault. From these dynamics, we can consider the two basic ones which are reform and scientific revolution that played a role in the process that evolved pastoral power into modern one. The reform, as the greatest behavioral revolution West has encountered, provides a basis for the disintegration of pastoral power through the change in Church authority on conduct of behavior and to take on the *governmentality* dimension defining modern power's quality of conduct of behavior (Foucault, 2013a, p. 169). The scientific revolution, since it impairs the church authority on the rule of the world by divine laws, leads to the development of *reason of state* approach in response to the crisis of pastoralism in order to interpret the authorities of states empowered by the effects of this shock, a plurality of states

(Tierney, 2008, p.95). Along with the crisis of pastoralism, the shepherd-herd game which carries out shaping individual's behavior for salvation in the next world, leaves its place to governmentality to shape people's behavior (individualization) for salvation of the state. In other words, pastoralism begins to aim for providing salvation in this world by moving away from the religious meaning claimed to provide the individual with salvation in the next world obtaining a new form (modern state). The important point here is that a special mechanism called governmentality undertakes the task of organizing behaviors that will provide an individual with salvation in this world, task of organizing to provide salvation of the state.

Along with Kepler, Galileo and Copernicus the credibility of general laws of God thought to prevail on the universe was opened for discussion, which has led disrupting the perception on religion based pastoral power can now govern the universe (Tierney, 2008). In response to this disruption that could be understood as the crisis of pastoralism, in an age when sovereignty began to be in favor of the states, a new administrative reason specific to the states started to emerge. The basic idea underlying this concept called *reason of state* can be understood as taking the state as its center by separating itself from religious references and shifting the entire focus of administration to the world we live by externalizing the idea of a final point when history ends. In this context, it is possible for the reason of state to target state's salvation instead of individual's salvation, and determine individual's subjectivation through policies that will ensure continuity of the state.

With the new administrative reason placing state in its center, it is now necessary to ensure the security of borders and the need for a new tool to regulate individual relations and conditions for people to live together within such borders. This needed tool is the *police* and according to Foucault what the police is responsible for is divided into five: the number (population), vital necessities, health, activities (recruitment, production etc.) of people and circulation of goods produced by these activities. The basic reason for the police and involvement in these five areas is to ensure that people's activities are produced and regulated in a way that gives the state with power (Foucault, 2013a). In this context a situation arises in which the power of state is directly connected to the determination of the circulation of production activities are done in a limited geography by the maximum number of people in whose health problems are solved to ensure they produce for enrichment and compulsory needs are fulfilled. "In general, it is all forms of the coexistence of people with each other, in which the police have to manage and that constitutes its basic object" (Foucault, 2013a, p.285). The important point here is that individuals' simple lives and all relationships surrounding these lives become valuable for the state. All relations established in the process of subjectivation of individuals begin to enter into the interest of the state. The tendency to administer for the police who consider it an obligation to influence all areas of relations, is now based on a positive intervention not on the laws but on the behavior of people (Foucault, Martin, Gutman, & Hutton, 1988, p. 159). What Foucault points out with "a positive intervention on people's behavior" is the norms produced in the new knowledge fields of power relations. Intervention on behavior is made through norms. Since norms determine the relationships individuals have with them, i.e. their subjectivity, they ensure that the individual's behavior to be more effectively tied to the administrative intervention

space than the laws. Analysis of police's administrative reason is also important to interpret the interest directed to the norms from the laws and subjectivities established through newly created norms.

In the relationship established between the police and the individual, state's effort to increase the individual's life force with the goal to increase its power, means a historical breakdown in the political practice of the power according to Foucault. Together with this breakdown, the traditional expression of the sovereign's power over life and death which is *right to kill* is pushed back, and it is suggested that the political power is primarily directed towards keeping alive, increasing life force. In the following section, the analysis will be on the concept of biopower which emerged with the "historical breakdown in political practice of power" as pointed out by Foucault, explaining the transformation of people's bodies into the focus of power.

III.   Bio-Power (Power Over Life)

In order to increase the power of the state, the administrative reason of state, which focuses on individual life and increasing the production of individuals, has led to a very significant transformation in the attitude of the dominant power. According to Foucault, a distinctive feature of this form of dominant power that characterizes the reason of state until the seventeenth century is that it gives the ruler the power of decision over life and death. The use of this power on the ruler's vassals is not absolute and unconditional. The right to kill can be used when ruler's own existence is in danger. The ruler can kill the person who doesn't comply with his laws. Or, when the ruler decides on a war situation, he may also indirectly demand that his vassals' lives are endangered, even if he doesn't directly demand his vassals' death. Foucault defines

the right of the sovereign, who has power of decision over the lives and death of individuals, as *the right to kill or to let them live*. We can consider the sovereign power to have such a right until the seventeenth century as the product of the sovereign's perception of the power mechanism. "Power, in this context was the right to confiscate before anything; this right had its peak through taking over life in order to eliminate it" (Foucault, 2012, p. 97). In other words, the sovereign used the power to confiscate the riches produced by its subjects, to take over the richness of these products, and to eliminate the lives of their vassals when they revolted against it. In this context so called the right over "life and death" in reality was the right *to kill or let them live* (Foucault, 2012, p. 97).

But as we mentioned above, as the reason of state primarily is directed towards letting people live and increase the life force, the power to *keep alive or throw to death* replaces the former right to *let them live*. Because the power mechanism has located the individual's life to its center since it considers increasing the products of individuals' vital activities parallel to the increase in state's power, thus the right to kill began to shift towards reproducing and strengthening vital forces in line with the power's needs. The transformation that Foucault describes as "historical breakdown in the political practice of power" is due to this shift corresponding to the needs of power. Hence, from the seventeenth century onwards, power mechanism takes the body, which is the place where the individual produces by adding labor, in its center. "For the first time in history, undoubtedly, the biological finds its reflection in the political" (Foucault, 2012, p. 101). Thus, it is asserted that the era of bio-power began characterizing the inclusion of body in the accounts and strategies of the power. The intervention of the power, which Foucault calls as bio-power, in society is conducted

in two different ways derived from two different conceptions of the body. The first is the *anatomo-politics* of the human body treating body as the individual body and functioning to ensure its discipline, and the second is *bio-politics of population* treating the body as species-body which is the body of human species ad functioning to regulate and audit the population. In this way we can say that the individuals ensured the continuity of power relations in the process of subjectivation by attributing special importance to the body and used bio-power technologies to determine subjectivity in this continuum.

1. Anatomo-politics (Disciplinary Power)

Anatomo-politics, the first element of power technologies called as bio-power by Foucault, set human bodies as individuals as its target. The anatomo-politics of the human body is the power technology applied in institutions such as the army, various educational institutions and workshops to train the body in order to improve the human talents and strengths and hence their productivity (Ecevitoğlu, 2012, p. 264). In this context, anatomo-politics directed at disciplining the body to increase physical productivity can be associated with the disciplinary power explained in detail by Foucault in his book titled *Birth of Prison*. Even though disciplinary power has made bodies its target to make them *obedient and productive*, its goal is to influence individuals' conscience and behavior too. Because a power technology that can influence the conscience of individuals or the consciousness of the individuals they establish with them, will also determine their subjectivity and reach the level of directing all their behaviors. In this way, both bodies are made obedient and productive to achieve maximum efficiency, and this power technology conducted on bodies will be internalized by individuals. So, the individual will start to be transformed into a

subject with his obedient and productive body, who internalizes obedience and productivity. In order to explain in the following chapters, we examine the relationship between disciplinary power and individual's subjectivation, which is a contingent relationship; in other words we can begin to examine how disciplinary power pursues the goal of influencing conscience and behavior after stating that this relationship does not mean that authority enables the authority to make the individual fully obedient through domination.

The way that disciplinary power takes an effect on the behavior of individuals is the normalization of the "abnormal" that are considered incompatible with the social order. In this sense, we can argue that the aim of disciplinary power is the normalization of society. Along with the rupture in the political practice of power, the orientation towards to keeping alive from killing and the norm from the laws starts to settle down in the historical context through normalization. Because "The law is limiting and its weapon at its extreme is death. However a power whose object is life needs regulatory and surveillance mechanisms ensures this regulation and surveillance through the norms it creates" (Foucault, 2014, p. 17). In this context, it may be useful to talk about the importance of the approach of disciplinary power to the individual body. First of all, power places the body of the individual as an object of knowledge in the political field. In other words, the subject of power is understood as the object of knowledge (Smart, 1988, p. 71). At this level, disciplinary power technology functions with the tendency to detach the individual from its "self", transform it into a measurable and computable object of knowledge, and determine its subjectivity. All these calculation and measurement practices are used in the creation of knowledge areas that refer to subjective experiences to be established within the framework of

norms. Examples of these subjective experiences are madness, disease, and guilt. The knowledge produced by humanities such as medicine, psychiatry, psychology, criminology, etc. provides a basis for defining the subjective experiences that are intended to normalize society. Thus, disciplinary power has access to an opportunity to regulate a system in which it can separate and isolate people who are criminals, mad, sick and exhibit all behaviors that it can describe as perverse from "normal" people. The way disciplinary power functions by institutionalizing various subjective experiences through subjective experiences produced in the spiral of knowledge/power and isolate people with these experiences from other people, needs to take a step further in terms of realization of normalization. This step, which Foucault examines in detail in his book, *The Birth of Prison,* can be expressed as shifting the focus of disciplinary power from the body to the soul of individuals.

In his work Foucault interprets the purpose behind the transition from the public physical punishment to the method of secret punishment as an attempt to normalize the prisoners regarded as abnormal. But the important point here is that the issue is not limited to prisoners and prison. Secret punishment can be thought as the power increasing its surveillance over individuals by making itself invisible, and normalization can be thought as individuals with increased surveillance over them internalization their behavior according to the norms created by the power without the need for a pressure mechanism. The internalization mentioned here can be understood in the context of the effect of power on the soul.

Disciplinary power tries to reach its goal of normalization with three basic tools: *hierarchical observation*, *normalizing judgment* and *examination*. The essence of the

hierarchical observation technique is based on "Seeing as Unseen" and the aim is to enable individuals to continuously control each other through hierarchical structures. Although there is a *president* at the top of hierarchy, the president does not need to be seen to demonstrate the effect of his/her power because the power "sees" each individual through the hierarchy established from the lowest to the top step. In other words, the whole structure constantly produces the power. Wwe can see the traces of hierarchical observation from the chain of command in the military camps in particular to the management mechanisms in the factories and to the location of beds in the dormitories. The second instrument, the normalizing judgment is the attempt to regulate the "inaccurate" behavior of the prisoner through normalization rather than suppressive punishment, in order to maintain the functioning of the power. Examination "combines the hierarchy techniques for surveillance with normalizing judgment techniques" (Foucault, 1992, p. 231). Foucault states that a normalizing view is a surveillance that allows for qualification, classification and punishment (Foucault, 1992, p. 231). At this level, examination can be understood as a special way for power to continuously testing the subject connected to the knowledge through normalization and reproduce itself through the discipline created by the testing.

Along with these three mechanisms, disciplinary power, after institutionalizing the subjective experiences formed by previously established knowledge fields and structuring the areas of isolation with normal/abnormal distinction through these institutionalized experiences, also covers the last stage which we can call the internalization of norms. Thus, it is asserted that anatomo-politics which operates through the regulation of bodies' manners and productivity, is directed towards the space of the soul.

Punishment techniques applied in the public domain through practices such as physical torture and executions targeted the body of the prisoners (Foucault, 1992). However, with the concealment of the visibility of the punishments from modern age onwards, surveillance based control and normalization practices emerged, and these practices have led to the expansion of the area where disciplinary power is felt. The expansion of power into the social sphere has led individuals shape their behavior on the norms created by power, and exhibiting behavior that do not conform to these norms which are also defined as crimes are perceived as crimes against the society rather than the power. In this way punishment along with the disciplinary power has gained a humanitarian dimension. The humanization of punishment can be considered as people having internalized the framework of the norms that defines the definition of 'crime' and the fact that anatomo-politics that targets their bodies now affects their souls too. Foucault summarizes the practice of punishment of the disciplinary power that provides its continuity through body and soul:

It is a question of situating the techniques of punishment - whether they seize the body in the ritual of public torture or execution or whether they are addressed to the soul - in the history of this body politic; of considering penal practices less as a consequence of legal theories than as a chapter of political anatomy. (Foucault, p. 28)

Foucault argues that the disciplinary techniques of normalization operate not only in prisons but in the whole of the society as a prison network. In this context, the panoptic model that Foucault claims to aim at organizing people's everyday lives becomes important. With the panoptic model, en environment is designed in which

people are seen by the power but cannot see the power. In this environment, the individuals who cannot be a subject of communication with the power become objects of knowledge created by the power (Foucault, 1992, p. 252). The disciplinary power mechanism functioning like a panoptic model enables its continuity by determining the subjectivities of the individuals it makes into a object of knowledge. Thus, anatomo-politics establishes normalization by shaping individuals through discipline at institutions such as school, prison, army, hospital, factories etc. The importance of this power technology in terms of subjectivation is that it sets the normalized society into a space where individuals define themselves, in other words their subjectivity.

2. Biopolitics of Population and Security

Biopolitics of population is the power technology that develops as the second element of policies according to which power over life takes human beings as species body. According to Foucault, along with this second power technology that developed as of the mid-eighteenth century, "abundance, birth and death rates, health level, life expectancy and all conditions that may affect them have gained importance" (Foucault, 2012, p. 99). Undertaking the responsibility for all these happens through a series of interventions and regulatory control rather than discipline and surveillance. Disciplinary power is based on body politics whereas the object of regulatory power is the population (Foucault, 2013b, p. 246-251). It should be noted here that Foucault did not envision a legal or political entity (for example the whole group of individuals) by "population"; what he had in mind was rather an independent biological body (Lemke, 2013, p. 57).

Biopolitics, which is founded on prevention of the risks emerging from the existence of the population addresses as a biological body and providing continuity of the social wealth created by this existence, is operated together with the security technologies that aim at the social body to continue its existence. At this point, it is important to emphasize the distinction between disciplinary power and security technology. While disciplinary power aims to determine subjectivities through the internalization of the norms its creates, security technology starts with calculating the norms generated norms by the work of statistical methods and examines the interaction of the normalities it finds as a result of its calculations. The aim of security technology in calculating normalities is to prevent the risks that may occur against "population" in different situations and build its policies according to different risk situations. Therefore we can think that the security technologies have a utilitarian approach to the body, and disciplinary power has an instrumental one. In this context, a situation arises where disciplinary power denies abnormalities, and security technology needs such abnormalities to be able to calculate new normalities. "Security does not deny abnormalities; on the contrary it needs the abnormal to function. Part of the population should be "disposable". In other words, it requires disposable, destructible bodies instead of editable bodies" (Gambetti, 2008). In his lectures of 1976, Foucault explains how this disposability functions in the form of racism:

> But racism does make the relationship of war - "If you want to live, the other must die" - function in a way that is completely new and that is quite compatible with the exercise of power. On the one hand, racism makes it possible to establish a relationship between my life and the death of the other that is not military of warlike relationship of confrontation, but a biological-type relationship:" The more inferior species die out, the more abnormal individuals are

eliminated, the fewer degenerates there will be in the species as a whole, and the more I - as species rather than individual - can live, the stronger I will be, the more vigorous I will be. I will be able to proliferate"(Foucault, p.255).

But two years after Foucault explained that security technologies and biopolitics were run on the population through racism, in his lectures in 1978-1979 he elaborated his views on the population in detail and addressed the general working framework of biopolitics as liberalism (Foucault, 2008, p. 22). For Foucault, the linkage of population with security technologies and becoming the object of administration functions through liberalism, the general framework of biopolitics. In this regard, biopolitics represents a special and dynamic clustering that characterizes liberal administration" (Lemke, 2013, p. 71). The new normalities together which biopolitics aim to produce anomalies with a computational, pragmatic approach begin to be shaped according to the dynamics of the liberal economy. In this respect, "It is not an anomaly that the small fish is swallowed by the big fish, those who cannot stand competition going bankrupt, the weak being exploited but it is the 'normal' of the liberal economic mentality"(Gambetti, 2008, p. 7). Thus, we can argue that biopolitics aim to determine the subjectivity of individuals through social body which is biologically confined to economic dynamics within but not through the bodies expected to comply with certain norms as in the disciplinary power.

IV. Bio-Power and Militarism

In this chapter, the instrumental relationship between militarism and the bio-power, which emerged as of seventeenth century starting to include human body especially and social body as a species into the accounts and strategies of the power, will be

mentioned. In this context, first an explanation will be made on Foucault's concept of dispositive, and then the issue of bio-power's instrumentalization of militarism over the dispositive which will try to define as "recruitment" will be discussed. The reason we think that there is an instrumental relationship between the two phenomena is that the armies both have been used as a tool in the establishment process of the states and become a tool to ensure continuity in the system of states. Since the reason of state operating for the salvation of the state in ensuring continuity of power relations has the tendency to produce the discourses that will determine subjectivity along with the institutional structures it has established to reach its goal, we can argue that the state will find it insufficient to ensure the continuity of the existence of the state by instrumentalizing the army as an "institution". Because, in addition to the army as an institution, the reason of state sets its target on requital of "discourses" created via this institution in the social sphere. We can assume that this goal can be achieved through the regulation of the society via militarist discourses and practices. The militarism that emerged in this context will become an important tool for the bio-power in the discipline and regulation of society. Foucault explains the concept of dispositive as follows:

> …is fully a heterogeneous whole, consisting of discourses, institutions, architectural forms, regulatory decisions, laws, administrative measures, scientific statements, philosophical, moral and philanthropic propositions, shortly everything to be said and unquestionably said. These are the elements of dispositive. Dispositive itself is the network of relations that can be established these elements (Foucault, 2005, p. 119).

Thus, Foucault collects discourses and institutions, in other words, discursive practices and non-discursive practices under the notion of dispositive (Kolos, 2015, p.

174). In addition, "institution" is defined as everything that functions as a system of restraint in a society and which is not an utterance, in short, the whole of the non-discursive field at the social level (Foucault, 2005, p. 123). Foucault illustrates the "imprisonment dispositive" as an example to explain the concept. What is provided with this dispositive is that first the category of "delinquent" was determined and then this category was rendered as functional in line with political and economic objectives.

With reasoning on the relationship between the bio-power and militarism, it can be thought that there may be a "recruitment dispositive" that affects the dynamics of this relationship. In parallel to Foucault's explanation on "imprisonment dispositive", what is provided with "recruitment dispositive" can be explained as follows: first the category of "individual eligible for military service" was determined, and then this category was made functional in line with political and economic purposes. In addition to that, if prisons are given as an example for the non-discursive practice included by the imprisonment dispositive, ie the institution, then the army can be given as an example for the non-discursive practice included by the recruitment dispositive, ie the institution. On the other hand, we can say that the discursive practice of both dispositives is the –delinquent or eligible for military service- subjective experiences created through the norms produced in the spiral of knowledge/power. Also in the discursive practice of these two dispositives, it is possible to see the traces of disciplinary power that aims to determine subjective experiences by internalizing the norms it produces. Likewise, in non-discursive practices of two dispositives, ie their institutions, the influence of regulatory power can be traced which functionalizes normalities by calculations. The goals of the regulatory power include establishing categories of crime according to norms in

prisons, location of criminals in different locations as a result of these normality calculations and generating an economic income by putting some of these criminals to work. On the other hand, it coincides with the functions of regulatory power as characteristics of individuals (occupational status, educational level etc) are classified in barracks by the order-command system and they are utilized through their characteristics. In short it is possible to think that bio-power with its disciplinary and regulatory elements utilizes "recruitment dispositive" which we define with its discursive and non-discursive practices as an administrative tool. In parallel to Foucault's description on the imprisonment dispositive, we can now re-emphasize our idea of the functioning of disciplinary power mentioned in the previous chapter through the similarity we have built with recruitment dispositive with these similarities in brackets: Disciplinary power operates in the whole society with the claim of normalization not only in the form of the army (prison) but also militarism (prison network). In line with this thought, we can begin to explain the normalization technologies applied by bio-power by making militarism its tool and the norm areas in which bio-power has tendency to determine.

1. Militarism as an Instrument for Normalization

Militarism means to educate civilians, the society as a whole with its women starting from childhood, in the framework of 'military values and norms', calling on them to act in this framework, expelling the military out of the military and making it a general 'lifestyle' (Belge, 2012, p. 150).

1.1. Citizenship

According to Foucault, the military service institution, from the 18th century onwards, differs from its functioning structure on the principal of voluntary service on

paid basis and becomes a functioning structure on the principle of compulsory service based on the definition of citizenship (Foucault, 2013a, p. 176). When the nation-states established in the continuation of this process emerge, a new understanding of military service appears: armies of the citizens. Therefore, the imperial armies based on mercenary military service are replaced by armies of citizens based on conscription (Altınay & Bora, 2008, p. 140). Military service becomes one of the requirements of being a citizen and covers the duty of citizenship, which we can think of as the most comprehensive legal category for the subjectivity of the individual, by including military service in its own definition. Not it is bound by rule on the legal ground for individuals being responsible for being a subject of a nation to fulfill their military services. Thus, the apparatus of power establishes a direct link between being a citizen and military service by instrumentalizing militarism and militarism goes into the tendency to determine the norm of citizenship which we can think of the most comprehensive legal category of an individual's subjectivity against the state. Citizenship is now loaded with a normative sense of necessity to serve as a soldier in the army when deemed necessary. Thus, we can think that the armies to be formed with these individuals are both a result and an instrument of nationalization.

According to Foucault this operates in parallel to disciplinary power's administrative logic. In this context, it is possible to think that the army institutions that operate through the recruitment dispositive aim to create *obedient and productive bodies* that speak the same language, wear the same uniform, and say the same march (Altınay&Bora, 2008, p. 141). The disciplinary power mechanism producing norms working with the aim of internalizing these norms, starts to have subjectivising effect from the soldier's body to his soul just like the case of the inmate. Military service

becomes a political and moral attitude (Foucault, 2013a, p. 198). Thus, the relationship a person builds with himself/herself, in other words his/her subjectivity is determined over military service. Soldiers "sacrificing themselves for the motherland with heart and soul" can be understood in this context.

Considering the use of military service by power mechanism as a means of citizen creation, we can argue that the impact of modern armies cannot only be understood limited to barracks, but the impact bio-power has created by "recruitment dispositive" has spread across the society beyond military institutions.

Thus, we can see that the area determined by the disciplinary power has started to shift from "disciplined soldier" to "disciplined society". "Disciplined society" which we can think of as the aim set by militarism begins to be established by the instrumentalization of recruitment dispositive by power relations. In other words, the relations established between the disciplinary power –soldier are established on a more comprehensive scale in parallel to it between the disciplined society-militarism.

1.2. Gender

Compulsory military service is not only a practice for 'defense of the country' but also is a practice determining the citizenship relationship between men and women with the state (and differentiating since women are not soldiers)... So a strong link is built between masculinity-state-military service, and first order citizenship through military service being 'the most sacred duty' has been granted to men. Women have two different positions in this construct: *blessed motherhood* (especially soldier's mothers) and militancy in exceptional cases (Altınay & Bora, 2008, p. 144).

27

The fact that individuals eligible for compulsory military service are usually men does not mean that the citizenship norm only functions through men. This citizenship norm first defines a "normal" of masculinity and thus defines masculinities that it can consider "abnormal" too. The definition or norm of "men eligible for military service" serves to define other norms and anomalies that are not directly related to masculinity by setting a framework of being a man and social gender norms are then formed by a heteronormative framework.

For example, in the context of compulsory military service, gays being defined as "men non-eligible for military service" and practice of unfit for service report appear as an anomaly determined by normality created by being a male eligible for military service. Thus, the masculinity norm, which is determined by the citizenship norm, which militarism is inclined to determine, includes gay male individuals within the scope of its normative definition. Moreover, we can argue that the normative space drafted by the recruitment dispositive constitutes the normative limits of the ideal body by producing information whether the body is healthy or not. Health tests for admission into military service, determination of the ratio between height and weight, the assessment of the eligibility of individuals for military service over age can be considered as examples. Measurements and evaluations of this power mechanism on normative limits of the body can be considered as an expression of the attitude of biopower directly placing the body as its target by instrumentalizing militarism.

Militarism, on the other hand, attempts to determine the normative definitions of femininity in addition to determining the norm of masculinity. According to Ayşegül

Altınay, compulsory military service is an application that determines the relationship between men and women with the state. "That's how a strong connection is established between masculinity-state-military service; first order citizenship through military service which is 'the most sacred duty' is granted to men" (Altınay A. G., 2008, p. 116). Women have two different positions in this construct: "blessed motherhood" (especially soldier's mothers) and militancy in exceptional cases. (Altınay A.G., 2005). That is, the blessing of the mother as a woman depends on her child being blessed with his military duty as a man and the expectation of this sacred duty from women only in exceptional cases is a sign that hierarchy has been established between men and women through sanctity. Other ideal femininity norms based on the masculinity norm produced by militarism include examples such as being a submissive wife, a devoted mother, Republican woman specific to Turkey (as in the case of Sabiha Gökçen) (Altınay A. G., 2008, p. 113). In this context, we can argue that with a Foucauldian approach, militarism operates declined to determine the subjectivities in a heteronormative framework by guiding the relations of consciousness established by individuals with themselves over gender.

1.3.Nationalism

The tendency of militarism to determine the fields of norms transcends the limits of its impact on the areas of citizenship and gender and requires us to consider highly complex relations. Rubina Saigol makes important determinations in terms of understanding how militarism over desire and unconscious levels affects re-produced and intertwined norm fields within phenomenon related to gender, nation-state, violence or nationalism.

The nation-state, as a form of legitimized violence, inscribes itself on the mind at both the conscious and unconscious levels. This is done through imagery that has immense evocative power through its associations with other objects that are invested with desire. The desire for objects of love is displaced on to the nation-state, which becomes a highly erotic entity. It becomes the object of desire, the subject of poetry and song and it comes to be eulogized in the mass media, textbooks and public monuments. A complex and intricate relationship develops between the predominance of military values, love and desire for the nation-state and gender ideology. This relation is articulated through the construction of the nation state as mother.(Saigol, 2004, p.231)

According to Saigol's construct, the nation-state, which is constructed as an object of desire, is made visible on the basis of gender norms by defining the subject of desire as the male and the female as the object. In this construct, the desire for masculinity is defined as having, admiring, loving, protecting and fighting against enemies when necessary.

'Protector' and 'strong' man can not be built without an exact contrary category, which is a 'weak' woman 'in need of protection'… The bonds of the subject that desires– the male protector- with the desired object (the nation-state) are so passionate that the the images of defense and war have central importance, and are seen everywhere and anytime (Saigol, 2004, p. 240-242).

On the other hand, this bond, which is established for the state through the subject-object duality of desire, serves to build the normative interpretations of nationalism and the concept of enemy. "Thanks to the counter complimenting construction of masculinity and femininity, militant nationalism is instilled into citizens, citizens feel empowered by joining the nationalist victories of the state at the level of imagination"

(Saigol, 2004, p. 240). In this context, the norm we point out as the normative meaning attributed to nationalism is militancy. Because militarism categorizes the relationship between people with concepts of friend-enemy (Toker, 2012, p. 202). In such categorization, as the consciousness relationship of the individual established with him/her is defined through the citizenship norm, the commitment of the individual to the state of which he/she is a citizen causes him/her to position other state citizens as the enemy and unreliable. Thus, militarist understanding makes sense of the enemy concept in a normative framework that will be used to define the non-nation.

> The ideological framework of creating a homogeneous society shaped by friend-enemy categories and the fear of feeding this society against any other is ensured by nationalism. Nationalism is the ideology of militarism as it is an ideological framework enabling societies, which are "unified" under a militarist state organization, taking its character and identity from a reality that the state carries and imposes, to internalize the attitude of exclusion, denial and gradual destruction of the other, non-uniformed and demands of distinction. Given the fact that world-wide welfare nationalism is added to nationalisms based on national, racial, cultural self definition, it is clear that neoliberal expansionist politics is nationalist in its essence, and it will support any nationalism for a militarist world order (Toker, 2012, p. 203).

In this context, we can argue that the nationalism framed by militarism not only creates warlike and hostile attitudes that are fed into those that are non-nation, but also that these hostile attitudes will manifest themselves in the ethnic, sexual, religious and cultural differences among the citizens of the same state. Because every normalization activity to be carried out on the path of creating a homogeneous "we", which is the target of militarism, has to tend to erase the particular differences of the people in both

the state and other states and to define the relationship between these differences in the form of friend-enemy relationship.

At this point, we have outlined the norm areas of which we believe bio-power claims to determine by instrumentalizing militarism as citizenship, gender and nationalism. Therefore, we can say that we can conceptualize militarism as a power mechanism, in which these norm areas and normative organization of all areas that may be connected to such intersect. Thinking through militarism while attempting to analyze the disciplinary and regulatory power technologies that the bio-power implements on both social level and the human body, can enable us to carry out important analysis in many different areas affecting the body and social body including the examples we mentioned above. An analysis made on the line through which we studied these effects can shed light on our understanding the effects of militarism on subjectivation, in parallel to Foucault's relational approach to power in order to analyze the dynamics of determination of the processes of subjectivity of individuals. In this context, we can argue that the effect of militarism as an instrument of disciplinary power on subjectivation is in a way that obstructs the autonomy of individuals with the aim of creating *obedient and productive bodies*. But this may not mean that the autonomy of the individual becomes impossible even if the individual lives in a militarist society. Because Foucault underlines that the power relations established between the authority and the individual are contingent; in other words they don't require a compulsory domination relationship, and we cannot mention that individuals are totally determined by the "structure". From the standpoint of our subject, Foucault's approach can be interpreted as follows: Militarism can act in a way that obstructs the autonomy of the individual but does not completely take away the

autonomy of the individual. The power clustered around militarism should be considered as a type of relationship that established the subject, subject immanent, and is multilateral. Since one side of this relationship is an individual, we can say that individuals have the potential to transform the established power relations to be directed at their own autonomy against the power mechanism obstructing their autonomy. In the following chapter, evaluations will be made on the place of the potential individuals have in queer theory, and at what points this place is separated from Foucault's ideas and the resistance potential queer theory provides against militarism which acts in a direction preventing the gain of autonomy.

CHAPTER TWO

QUEER SUBJECTIVITY AND ANTI-MILITARISM

I.   Michel Foucault&Judith Butler on Subjectivity

As Judith Butler puts forward her ideas about subjectivation, she sets her starting point on Foucault's arguments that regulatory power produces subjects controlled by power, that power is not only externally imposed, but acts as normative and regulatory means that enable the creation of subjects (Butler, 2014, p. 38). In the previous chapter, we talked about the biopower analysis of how the modern power, through its disciplinary and regulatory elements, makes the human body exclusively and the social body (type-human) in general as its administrative objective, creating certain norms in the spiral of knowledge/power to develop society regulating strategies according to these norms. In this chapter, in addition to the Foucauldian commentary on power technologies, which instrumentalizes "soul" through biopower strategies, fictionalizes the soul as the body's prison, and asserts that the body is materialized

under the soul, two points will be touched upon which Butler thinks missed out in this commentary.

Butler first argues that "soul" which Foucault claims that it enables the imprisonment and shaping of the body as an instrument means of power, should be treated as "psyche" as he believes that the soul fails to explain the producing effects of oppression and prohibition. Thus, Butler introduces a new dimension to Foucault's analysis of subjectivation, establishing the distinction of soul-psyche and revealing a psychoanalytic explanation of the producing effects of prohibition and normalization.

On the other hand, Butler finds that the Foucauldian argument, which claims that the body is materialized under the soul, is incomplete. Because, according to Butler, Foucault does not ask questions about what limits the field of materialization and what is excluded to enable materialization. We hope that the ideas of Butler, which we will explain under the title of *Materialization* and *"Outside"* will be beneficial to be able to mark the point where she parts ways from Foucault, to think of the way in which she considers materiality as the construction in line with the understanding of queer subjectivity, and to be able to analyze the relationship between materialization and sexual-difference phenomena.

1. Soul-Psyche Difference

As we mentioned in the first chapter, anatomo-politics, an element of power over the life that emerged with the historical rupture in the political practice of power, has focused on disciplining the body in order to increase the productivity of human through various institutions and is identified with disciplinary power that sets human

body as its target as explained in detail by Foucault in *The Birth of the Prison*. In addition to aiming at producing *obedient and productive bodies*, disciplinary power also conducts activities such as directing behaviors, producing norms, and thus determining subjectivity. In plainer words, we can say that disciplinary power proceeds its aim to educate the bodies with a special mechanism enabling the internalization of the created norms. Foucault names this mechanism which has a special importance in the subjectivation of the human being, functioning as an instrument of power that produces and shapes the body, *soul* and establishes his conception of the correlation between human-soul-body as follows:

> The man described for us, whom we are invited to free, is already in himself the effect of a subjection much more profound than himself. A "soul" inhabits him and brings him to existence, which is itself a factor in the mastery that power exercises over the body. The soul is the effect and instrument of a political anatomy; the soul is the prison of the body.(Foucault, 1992, p.30)

According to Foucault's statement, the existence of man is understood according to his subordination, and human beings can only exist by being subjected by power. In other words, human beings are both a principle of their own subordination and the result of subjugation. (Butler, 2005a, p. 84). Soul is the sovereignty instrument of power that operates on the body. So, soul provides the status of existence within power as an instrument of establishing sovereignty. In this context, the soul acts as a means of subordination and carries human into existence. Thus, the soul functions both as an instrument of power and a result of power that carries human into existence. Considering human being carried into existence in parallel to Foucault's analysis as a

process of subjectivity of human beings, we are confronted with two different meanings of subjectivity complimenting each other.

There are two meanings of the word "subject": subject to someone else by control and dependence, and tied to his own identity by a conscience and self knowledge. Both meanings suggest a form of power that subjugates and makes subject to (Foucault, 2014, p.19).

Butler, in her work *The Psychic Life of Power* addresses this condition of subjectivity as Foucault draws attention to, as both being a subject and the process of subordination occurs together and analyzes it as paradoxical nature of the subject matter of the prisoner. "The concept of subjectivation has a paradox within itself: *assujettissement* indicates both being a subject and process of subordination; so the individual only experiences state of autonomy only by being subject to power and this subordination implies a radical dependency" (Butler, 2005a, p. 82). According to Foucault, disciplinary power targets the body while conducting the activity of subjectivation of individuals and uses soul as means to reach body for that purpose. In other words this activity of prison conducted on the body occurs by forcing the prisoner to observe an ideal, a behavioral norm and model of obedience. Butler perceives *soul* used by Foucault to define this imprisoning effect on the body, as a normative ideal ingrained in the prisoner (Butler, 2005a, p. 82). In this context, the soul is an imprisoning effect and a normative ideal ingrained in the prisoner so that is exists (subjectivates). Therefore we can think that the soul functions like a prison. In other words, the prison put into action as an institution by the disciplinary power to enable subordination of the prisoner, starts to function like the soul designed by power in order to establish sovereignty on the body and an instrument of subjection. The

impact of prison on the inmate and the impact of the soul on the body coexist. Thus, the task of internalizing the norms produced by the disciplinary power that sets the body to its goal is carried out through soul and the subjectivation is ensured. The subject of subjectivation of the individual through subordination can be understood in this context.

According to Foucault, since the soul is an imprisoning effect, the prisoner is subject to a more fundamental subordination than that caused by the spatial captivity of the prison (Butler, 2005a, p. 84). Butler asks the question of how the soul defined by Foucault creates a deeper subordination than the state of imprisonment itself, and proposes to compare the soul conceptualized as the frame of imprisonment to psyche in the psychoanalytic sense and defines psyche as follows:

> The psyche is precisely what exceeds the imprisoning effects of the discursive demand to inhabit a coherent identity, to become a coherent subject. The psyche is what resists the regularization that Foucault ascribes to normalizing discourses. Those discourses are said to imprison the body in the soul, to animate and contain the body within that ideal frame, and to that extent reduce the notion of the psyche to the operations of an externally framing and normalizing ideal (Butler, 2005a, p.85).

Although Foucault argues that the soul creates a deeper subordination than the imprisonment himself, Butler claims that beyond the soul, dependency through subordination can be understood by the notion of psyche. Although Butler criticizes the relationship between power and subject from a Foucauldian perspective, still criticizes Foucault for not examining a deep (psychic) commitment of power with the subject. This subordination explained by Butler with the concept of *passionate*

commitments takes place during the psychic functioning of power, and Butler asserts that this commitment to subjugation is the most insidious doings of power (Butler, 2005a, p. 14). In this way, power can even exploit the desire to survive. For example; the individual against the power can be considered as a child against their parents. Just as the child's primitive passion, which arises in dependency to his or her parent in order to survive, leaves the child vulnerable to being subordinate against the parents, the individual facing power also prefers to exist as a subordinate rather than not exist at all with the desire to survive. In Butler's ideas of subjectivation, the argument that subordination implies a radical dependence is understandable in this context. According to the this conception of subjectivation in the process of psychic functioning of power; "A person's desire for his or her subordinate conditions will ultimately lead to his continuity as a person himself/herself" (Butler, 2005a, p. 17). In this context, the important point can be explained as follows: subordination according to Foucault emerges as a result of an imposition, Butler addresses it as something desirable, and Butler examines the psyche that gives birth to desire (Çam, p. 8).

On the other hand, Butler points out that the concept of the psyche, which she considers to be a more comprehensive explanation of the depth of subordination to power than the soul, should be referred also to explain the producer effects of restraint and prohibition (Butler, 2005a, p. 85). In this context, Butler refers to a psychoanalytic critique of Foucault and, based on a poststructuralist commentary by Lacan, asserts that it is valid that a constant state of resistance is against the subjectivation of power over the idea of the "absence" of subject. "This resistance establishes the incomplete and lacking character of any endeavor seeking to produce the subject through

disciplinary means, but it also fails to articulate the dominant notions of productive power" (Butler, 2005a, p. 87).

At this point, we can comment on the distinction between soul and psyche in parallel to the explanations made by Butler with a psychoanalytic approach: The psyche, according to the concept of soul, is a more comprehensive concept in terms of both explaining the depth of subordination and comprehending the producer effects of the prohibitions and formations of power. In this context, thinking of the individual being the principle of his/her own subordination by means of the psyche rather than the soul can enable us to conduct a deeper analysis of subjectivation. Since psychoanalytic explanations of psyche show that it resists normalization, "essentially", the psyche cannot be reduced to the soul a normative ideal that is ingrained into the prisoner. According to commentary by Butler through psychoanalysis, suppressing desire does not only preserve what it suppresses, it spreads it again and makes it the founder of culture. According to commentary by Butler through psychoanalysis, suppressing desire does not only preserve what it suppresses, it spreads it again and makes it the founder of culture. So suppression begins to produce other involuntary things. In this context, Foucault merely explains that the suppression of desire is only the production of what it suppresses, but Butler focuses on the productive impact of suppression. In this context, Foucault merely explains that the suppression of desire is only the production of what he suppresses, but Butler focuses on the productive influence of suppression. In our opinion, what we may call expansion or reproduction, enlargement, or dissemination may be read as the concepts on which Butler's political interest in writing the text and the idea of resistance is based. According to Butler, resistance takes its power from this growth, so the production transcends the

regulatory objectives that produce it. For example, sexologists who classify and pathologize homosexuality could inevitably create the conditions for mobilization and expansion of gay cultures. Thus, due to the existence of the psychic structure that resists normalization against the normalization practices that determine subjectivation, there is a possibility of permanent resistance. In these respects, we may argue that by enriching Foucault's analysis of subjectivation by the the soul-psyche distinction, Butler points to a non-prescriptive field of resistance towards the possibility of the subject being autonomous.

2. Materialization and "Outside"

Butler criticizes Foucault for failing to adequately examine the "outside" that limits the scope of materialization, finding the argument –about the subjugation of the body under the soul- discussed in *Birth of the Prison*. Butler, to create this critical line first follows Foucault's ideas about how to understand the relationship between matter and meaning, and then reveals her position by referring to the similarities between Irigaray and Plato to explain her ideas about "outside" that limits the field of materialization.

Butler suggests that Foucault's reference to the notion of the soul he addressed as an instrument of power that produces and shapes the body, should be read a rerun of an Aristotelian formulation in which the soul is understood as the form and principle of the matter of the body (Butler, 2005a, p. 89). "In a sense, the soul acts a *diagram* equipped with power that produced and executes the body itself" (Butler, 2014, p. 52). For Butler, there is no body outside the power, according to this formulation, because the material substance of the body - in fact matter itself - is produced within and in relation to the investment of power (Butler, 2005a, p. 89). In this context, we can

begin to explain Butler's understanding of the establishment of materiality through the connection she established between Aristotle and Foucault.

We can argue that the point that Butler was trying to reach while discussing the two thinkers together was to show the interconnection between matter and meaning. Thus, the *substance-form* dichotomy Aristotle has established through this line becomes considered as parallel to matter-soul, body-soul or power relations-body dichotomy Foucault has put forward to explain subjectivity. Butler believes that Foucault has added a contemporary interpretation to Aristotelian terminology and executes his discussion by referring to the soul-body distinction. So, he analyzes how the soul-body distinction works in Aristotle and in Foucault separately. As we mentioned above, the soul for Foucault is an instrument of power in which the body is formed and shaped, and the soul acts as a *form* that produces and shapes the body itself. This concept of form comes from Aristotle. According to Butler, the notion of Aristotelian form is historicizable in terms of the culturally variable rules of formativity and intelligibility. "To perceive the form of bodies as a historically contingent connection point of domination/discourse reaches a point similar to what Foucault describes in *The Birth of the Prison* as the "materialization" of the inmate's body" (Butler, 2014, p. 52). In this respect, the body is never something that is positioned outside the relations of power. There are the power relations that materialized the body by giving a new meaning to it. Materialism points to the consequences of power, even is the power itself. The most fundamental thing that power does is to *materialize* "things". Therefore, we may think that power establishes "things" in the context of a problematic or establishes them *as if they have* some existence and potential. The logic of reducing the body to the "essence" is hidden here. According to Butler, in both of

two thinkers, matter and meaning (or intelligibility) can be understood as one and the same thing. In other words, we cannot talk about matter at all anything other than the forms establishing intelligibility or power relations. To sum up, Butler argues that, in view of the perception that materialism is constructed with a meaning other than the matter, the matter cannot be separated from meaning and that we cannot think of materialism outside meaning. The important points here are that with the emphasis of Butler on intertwinement of matter and meaning; it causes a questioning on materialism is a historical construct, body and matter cannot be accepted as data, cannot be reduced down to an essence and how this construct is established by leaving out what. In other words, if matter and meaning are intertwined and one does not determine the other one-way, we can think that this field (materialization) is determined by exclusion of something. This kind of reasoning can be comprehended referring to Irigaray's ideas.

Butler, after emphasizing the inexorability between matter and meaning, states that Foucault left something out in this construct and should be criticized for not asking the question of what restricts the field of materialization, and from this point she begins to question the *unintelligible space*. The unintelligible space can be thought of as the place outside the materialization ared between matter and meaning (Butler, 2014, p. 39-56). Butler begins to argue that field of materialization can be established by a field of compulsory externality (unintelligible space) and at this very point she refers to Irigaray's ideas (Butler, 2014, p. 29). In this context, Irigaray's aim is to show how dual contrasts are related to exclusion and to investigate how the external one in the exclusion actually establishes the inside. In this respect, we must state that Irigaray defines two types of *femininity* to make sense out of "outside" (Butler, 2014, p. 62).

The first femininity is a place established in the phallogocentric system of thought and opposed to the male. The second feminity is the name of the field that must be excluded for the operation of the dual contrast economy. So this is the feminine, external and constitutive principle. According to Irigaray, the exclusion of feminine occurs in the formulation of the matter (materialization) and Butler precisely connects Irigaray with Plato from this point of view.

There are two kinds of materialism in Plato. First, it is a place that is set up in the phallogocentric economy, the place opposite the form. The second is the name of the field that must be excluded for the matter-form dichotomy to operate and nonthematizable materiality. The second understanding refers to the constituent exterior of Platonic thought and this "matter" is something that must be excluded in order to enable this economy internally coherent (Butler, 2014, p. 61). The *receptacle/chora*, which is referred to as what is excluded in Plato, returns to the operation of the system as an inconsistency and disorder. The *receptacle* mentioned here, according to Butler, satisfied what Irigaray refers to as *feminine*. In this context, according to Irigaray feminine is both a formless and incoherent thing, and a female body in the phallogocentric economy. The unintelligible space is conceptualized as femininity and it is emphasized that materialization is established through femininity. As we will explain in the following section, Butler, by enriching Irigaray's ideas on unintelligible space with a critical intervention, will put forward the political argument on the formation of subjectivity. In explaining the background on which this argument is based, we can state that Butler, to put her own ideas forward, first explained Foucault's ideas with reference to Aristotle, and then handled Irigaray's ideas with reference to Plato to explain the points that Foucault had left incomplete. The

reference to Irıgaray is to be understood directed at the target for the establishment of queer subjectivity.

We can argue that Butler's reasoning that materialization is founded through "outside" has three important implications that allow her to explain her own thought. In our opinion, Butler's way of thinking through this line of thinking enables to build the ground for both to her criticism of feminism, to develop ideas on the field of norms by considering both the concepts of gender and sexual difference on their approach to materialization, and also to develop a political sense of queer subjectivation by expanding the idea of founding outer space (female) which she finds insufficient with Irigaray. According to Butler, "feminism" has an understanding of the fact that the foundation of materiality has been executed with a meaning imposed on the "outside" of the matter onto it, and in parallel to this understanding, feminists base their political arguments on the materialism of the female body. But a deconstructive approach to materialism undercuts the feminist approach that constructs its political argument through the materialism of gender (female body), emphasizing that materialism does not occur with a meaning that is imposed on itself from outside itself because the matter and the meaning are not external to each other since the beginning.

In other words, as long as materialism is marked as a construction that can be understood through the interconnection of meaning with matter, the matter cannot be accepted as data, so as feminists have understood, as a substance in itself, women cannot be accepted as data and the body and matter become irreducible to an essence. In this context, referring to Irigaray, Butler argues that materialism is constructed in

the phallogocentric order based on sexual difference and that materiality of it built through dual opposites originates in a gendered way anyway. The idea of gender's materiality is criticized over the idea of the matter's sexuality. In other words, Butler criticizes the feminists who advocate the materiality of gender (the female body as a substance in itself) because they think that the substance they accept as data (the female body) spontaneously marks a gender, and claims that the body cannot be minimized to an essence. By moving her criticism one step further that matter is not conceived through a construction based on sexual difference, Butler thinks that as long as this construction mechanism does not exist, the binary contrast system is repeated and a contribution is made to this system. In this context, feminism's definition of subjectivity set to represent the female body, cannot go beyond repeating the mechanisms of domination reinforcing the dual contrasts established on women, let alone liberating women. Because, these mechanisms of domination have been built on the basis of dual contrasts that have been enabling the construct of the matter from the very beginning. A feminist approach, which accepts the logic of dual contrast as data from the beginning reducing the body to essence should be criticized according to Butler. "In my opinion, the assumed universality and unity of the subject of feminism is actually sabotaged by the constraints of representative discourse in which it operates" (Butler, 2012, p. 147).

At this point, it should be noted that Butler also defines herself as a feminist, and she requests that her criticism of feminism should be understood as constructive criticism as a suggestion for feminism to overcome the logic of sexual difference. We can argue that Butler's advisory criticism is shaped by her ideas based on the field of norms. In this context, it can be considered that another meaning of understanding that

materialism is established as a construction is to grasp that matter or body is normatively established without being reduced to essence. If the matter is normatively established, then the body, which we consider as matter, is also established in a normative manner. In this respect, Butler addresses "gender" as the *regulatory norm*, which has an important role in the establishment of the body, with reference to Foucault (Butler, 2014, p. 38). The materiality of the body can be thought of as the materiality of this norm (Butler, 2014, p. 9). The important point here is to analyze how this logic of sexual difference, which is thought to determine the norm, if we consider "gender" as the norm. The logic of sexual difference refers to the dual contrast established in the context of female-male and reduces the female and the male body to essence. In other words, this logic *materializes* the bodies of men and women ans establishes them "as if they had" a gender all along. But if we can comprehend the gendered body as a result of normativity rather than a self, it opens a space for us to think outside of the matrix forced by the logic of sexual difference, and the possibility of covering the different sexuality forms of this space is opened for discussion (Butler, 2012, p. 224). In other words, if we can "reinterpret" the logic of sexual-difference, we may have the opportunity to extend the scope of regulatory norms (genders) covered by this space. In this context, the mechanisms of domination established through the logic of sexual-difference and dual contrast begin to disintegrate. Thus, both women as subjects of feminism, and those involved in gender categories that fall outside the categories of women-men to be included in the scope of norms can be freed of the risk of exclusion of the system. Butler's advisory criticism on feminism becomes understandable in that context.

If there is a normative dimension to this work, it consists
precisely in assisting a radical resignification of the symbolic

46

domain, deviating the citational chain toward a more possible future
to expand the very meaning of what counts as a valued and valuable
body in the world (Butler, 2014, p.37).

Butler begins to lay the foundations of a politically queer sense of subjectivity, arguing that the idea of constituent exterior space in Irigaray's thinking is inadequate after criticizing the feminists whom she believed had attached to the space of dual contrasts on expansion of the spaces of norms by explaining that the body in this space is established with a construction that cannot be minimized to essence. The critique that there is an obsession with sexual differences also makes it compulsory to think that this dual contrast is created by exclusion of another domain. Butler criticizes feminists on failing to take the space into account which Irigaray has conceptualized as this "other place"(female), and Irigaray since Butler thinks this "other place" fails to explain all the exclusions that build the interior. In this respect, Butler points out that it is problematic to address the founding exterior space as female. The first reason for this is the risk of disregarding different versions of gender disciplines, which are the policies of specific stages of the history of power since this style of femininity is constructed ahistorically (Mansfield, 2006, p. 114). Because, every regime of truth can establish its own exterior. The second reason is the risk of ignoring other exclusions that establish the inside if the constituent "exterior" is called female. For example, if we think about the concept of *chora* as in Plato, Butler is positioned closer to the idea of this constituent "exterior" remains multiple and undefined at a level to be able to explain the positions of not being a woman, not being an animal, not being a slave etc. In this respect, she argues that there is not single exterior, that every dissenting discourse produces its own exterior, and that no discourse can completely cover the exterior (Butler, 2014, p. 82-83).

Thus, we will argue that Irigaray critique of the way in which Butler's constituent externality is understood has four important results that we consider to be the basis of a political queer sense of subjectivity. Firstly, the multiple (not just feminine) and unidentifiable description of the constituent exterior leads to the conclusion that this space cannot be limited to the question of the normative or sexualities that do not exist. This means that a re-evaluation of the exclusion of all subjectivity or identity positions is necessary. The second result is that Butler suggests privately protecting the exterior which she argues that it cannot be covered in any possible way (Butler, 2014, p. 83). This means that there is a claim that the uncertainty attributed to the exterior has a productive feature. The productivity referred here can be read as the production and shaping of new forms of subjectivity that will be revealed with the claim of representing the ambiguity of the exterior. As we will discuss in the next section, Butler proposes the theory of performative politics in order to expand the field of norms in the context of shaping the subjectivity. Thirdly, we can argue that productivity is perceived in a hegemonic relationship between particular-universal subjectivity or identity positions (Özkazanç, 2014, p. 87). This means that the field that makes performativity possible is marked as a hegemonic field. We can think of the structure of the hegemonic field via Butler's two different ways of perceiving the subject position's "incompleteness".

(I) as the failure of any particular articulation to describe the population it represents; (2) that every subject is constituted differentially, and that what is produced as the 'constitutive outside' of the subject can never become fully inside or immanent (Butler, Laclau, & Žižek, 2009, p. 12).

The hegemony we refer here can be conceived as an ongoing form of relationship between the particular position attempting to represent any identity position of the subject and the claim of universality that proposes to include the thing that is produced as the constituent exterior of the particular position. Finally, Butler's way of understanding performativity through the understanding of hegemony enables us to consider the queer concept as a new form of political subjectivity (queer subjectivity) among particular-universal positions. We aim to explain the concept of queer subjectivity, which we will lay foundations for in the following section, through the concepts of hegemony, performativity and disidentification.

II.   Queer Subjectivity

The concept of hegemony, which we will try to outline in this section, shaped by Laclau and Mouffe re-arguing Gramscian notion of hegemony, appears as an expression of a tense and continuous relationship that is thought to be developed between particular and universal (Laclau, 2012, p. 30). In this context, firstly; we will try to address how the particular and universal, which we use to explain the concept of hegemony, is understood, why it is believed that there is a relationship between them, and what the basis is for this relationship. Then, we will touch upon the basis provided by the thing that establishes the basis of possibility for the hegemonic relationship to Butler's suggestion on "protecting the outside", the space that this ground opens to the performative politics, and the possibility that queer subjectivity, which we will describe as the subject of the performative politics, emerges in the hegemonic space as a popular nomenclature.

1. Hegemony

When explaining the understanding of hegemony, we can begin by first mentioning how the concepts of particularity and universal are understood. Laclau and Mouffe were inspired by Ferdinand de Saussure's work on language in explaining these concepts. Simply put, Saussure argued that language is a system of differences and that each term under this system has gained meaning only through its difference than the other terms. Laclau and Mouffe claimed that this model could be adapted to all social experiences (Gilbert, 2012, p. 211). For example, the word cat (kedi in turkish) is meaningful only because it differs from other words (yedi, sedir, ivedi) and classifies the world of small mammals to keep animals like cats apart from other animals (mouse, dog, rabbit). On the other hand, we may think that different words are used for cats in different cultures, and there may be a culture that does not distinguish between cats and dogs, for example. Thus, what makes the meaning of the term cat is the system of differences that we speak of (Gilbert, 2012, p. 212). What we think of cats in our example can also be considered for the social identities and positions of subjectivity according to Laclau and Mouffe. So, what a man actually is, is related to our ideas of what a woman, animal or child is, and the definition of what a man is, thus is possible thanks to our definitions of what it is not. Therefore, each identity position also obtains a meaning in terms of its difference to other identities within the system. The particularities we mention here are the identity positions that take place separately within the system of differences. This opinion is at the same time positioned against the essentialist conception that any identity position or subjectivity has a meaning in itself and is anti-essentialist.

50

On the other hand, particularities are identical in the sense that they are different from other particulars in the system. "But this time, the identity/oneness of each entity is split as a constituent: On the one hand each difference, while expressing itself *as a* difference, on the other hand, *cancels* itself out as a difference in the equivalence relation with all the other differences of the system" (Laclau, 2012, p. 97-98). This means "cancellation" of particularities. Thus, each particular has to direct the claim of difference to the boundary of the self-framing system and turn to the claim of exceeding the boundary that "cancelled" itself becoming universal. "In order to be able to assert particularity for itself, it needs to resort to something special in excess of that particularity" (Laclau, 2012, p. 23). The universality we speak of can be understood as the transcendent position of these particularities.

In this case, a situation occurs in which each particular refers to a universal to make a meaning for itself. According to Laclau, these universal positions are empty signifiers and it is imperative that they exist so that any identity or subjectivity can mean something. This obligation counts for an answer given to the question of why there is an assumption of a relationship existing between the particular and the universal. The relationship between the particular and the universal can be comprehended through semiotics in the following manner:

> Each signifier constitutes a sign by attaching itself to a particular signified, inscribing itself as a difference within the signifying process. But if what we are trying to signify is not a difference but, on the contrary, a radical exclusion which is the ground and condition of all differences, in that case, no production of one more difference can do the trick. As, however, all the means of representation are differential in nature, it is only if the differential

51

nature of the signifying units is subverted, only if the signifiers empty themselves of their attachment to particular signifieds and assume the role of representing the pure being of the system - or, rather, the system as pure Being - that such a signification is possible. (Laclau, 2012, p. 99)

What Laclau refers to the one that is non-concrete signifier in this quote, is that it is empty signifier or universal and the existence of empty signifiers is understood as the true condition of hegemony. In other words, hegemony is established in the context of this obligatory relationship between the particular and the universal and politics owe its continuity to this relationship. "Politics is possible only and only because the constituent impossibility of the society can represent itself by producing empty signifiers"(Laclau,2012,p.107).

The argument that politics was established through empty signifiers is parallel with Butler's idea that subjectivity is established through constituent externality. The space of blank signifiers can be understood as the constituent exterior space. Because what Laclau means from the empty signifier –which is parallel with Butler's ideas- is an indeterminate, unstable and incompassable external space that system needs to have intelligibility. According to this conception, it is impossible to understand the exterior, which the system needs to maintain its existence, as a single place, given that each particular refers to a universal to interpret itself. If, through this line of thought, Butler's critique of Irigaray is remembered, the questioning of whether there is not a single exterior, and therefore it is needed to reconsider that status of all excluded subject positions, once again establishes itself through the conception of hegemony. From this point of view, in order to understand hegemony better, we can start to question what the basis is for the relationship between particular and universal.

According to Laclau's approach, we can argue that this basis can be thought through the concepts of unfixity/incompleteness of the society and hegemonic articulation. The internality-externality tension that exists between particularity-universality, and the understanding that each particular is splintered by a universal logic, emerges from the fact that social identities and subjectivities cannot have an incomplete character. "The fact that no whole has been completed indicates that we can no longer accept the proposition of 'society' as a stitched and self-defined unity as an analysis base" (Laclau & Mouffe, 2012, p. 179). This proposition refers to the unfixity of the society.

All social identities are relational due to their incompleteness and unfixity has become a condition for them. This unfixity creates the first leg of the basis for the relationship between particular and universal. Because, if there were no unfixity, the particulars would settle for defining themselves within the difference system and would not tend to represent the universal, so that we would not be able to talk about a hegemonic relationship. At this point, we can state that the foundations of the understanding indicating the unfixity of the society are shaped by adoption of Lacanian formulation, which recognizes the human subject (collectively or individually) as established with an immanent deficiency (Gilbert, 2012, p. 224). On the other hand, Butler thinks that the understanding of the unfixity of the society, can be explained by referring to a poststructuralist interpretation of Lacan, which asserts the incompleteness of the subject. But unfixity is not sufficient to fully explain the ground that establishes the possibility of the relationship between the particular and universal. In other words, neither absolute fixity nor absolute unfixity is possible (Laclau & Mouffe, 2012, p. 179).

The impossibility of an ultimate fixity of meaning implies that there have to be partial fixations - otherwise, the very flow of differences would be impossible. Even in order to differ, to subvert meaning, there has to be a meaning. If the social does not manage to fix itself in the intelligible and instituted forms of a society, the social only exists, however, as an effort to construct that impossible object. (Laclau & Mouffe, 2012, p. 181).

The hegemonic articulation, which s the other level that constitutes the basis of the particular-universal relationship, can be understood through the impossibility of an absolute unfixity. The concept of hegemonic articulation refers to a situation that allows temporary instabilities in the system of differences. These temporary instabilities correspond to the second leg, which is the basis of particular-universal relationship, allowing particulars to express themselves within the hegemonic space. At this point, we can now touch upon the connection between concepts of unfixity and hegemonic articulation, which we have explained as the conditions of possibility of the particular-universal relationship, with Butler's proposition for a special protection of the exterior. In the previous section, we have stated that this proposition by Butler, which emerges as a result of criticism of Irigaray, was shaped by the assertion that it was a productive feature of the unfixity ascribed to the exterior. In this context, firstly, we can underline that the unfixity concept in the theory of hegemony provides a basis for Butler's proposition on protection of the outside. Because, the outside can only protected within the measure of its unfixity and is incompassable. Secondly, we can draw attention to the productive nature of unfixity. At this point, what we mean by productivity can be understood as the production potential of new subjectivations (to be explained as queer subjectivity) to represent the unfixity of the outside. On the other hand, hegemonic articulation can be considered as the concept that would

provide the basis for the new subjectivities that will be produced by performative politics, and identity positions that can be united around this politics, to express themselves by building temporary instabilities. More specifically, performative politics may be organized in the form of hegemonic articulations to extend the scope of the norms field, provided that outside is protected in a special way.

In the following section, we will touch upon the ideas that these subjectivities can be produced by performative politics. In our opinion Butler understands this productivity though the hegemonic relationship between the particular and the universal. In other words, the production of a subjectivation within the power relations is readable from the perspective of hegemony depending on the performativity. "Butler sees a great similarity between Laclau's theory of hegemony and his own theory of performativity. In both theories, a similar approach has been developed for both conception of power and the opportunities for social transformation" (Özkazanç, 2015, p. 30). In the following section, we will touch upon the political implications of the understanding of hegemony, which affects the theory of performativity, and in this context, the idea of queer subjectivity.

2. Performativity

Butler shapes the theory of performance through this political conception. According to this political conception, it is unsustainable to pursue a policy of pure identity or subjectivity, since no identity within the hegemonic field can remain pure because of its claim to universality. On the other hand, if we leave aside the claim of purity of subjectivity (identity) and understand politics as an ongoing phenomenon in the hegemonic field, then the position of each identity and subjectivity becomes the

field of perpetual clarity or comprehensibility. In this context, Butler will explain performativity as a key concept that enables re-interpreting and reconstructs subjectivity.

In the previous section, while explaining Butler's ideas about subjectivity, we have stated that she considers Foucault's thinking on subjectivation as the starting point. The reason for this reminder is that we think Butler appropriates the understanding of subjectivity through the power relations providing it via internalization of the norms produced in the spiral of knowledge/power but Butler's perception of the norm of normalization, which she does not share in this understanding, will help us explain her conception of performativity. In other words, we can argue that Butler's original approach to the character of norms in analyzing power relations facilitates explaining performativity which enables both reinterpretation and constructing subjectivity urity of subjectivity (identity) and understand politics as an ongoing phenomenon in the hegemonic field, then the position of each identity and subjectivity becomes the field of perpetual clarity or comprehensibility. In this context, Butler will explain performativity as a key concept that enables re-interpreting and reconstructs subjectivity.

In her work titled Undoing Gender, Butler develops her ideas about the norms we think will help explain the concept of performativity by analyzing the dual character of norms. It is meaningful to think of this dual character together with the dual character specified to the phenomenon of power in The Psychic Life of Power. Just as power is also something we rely upon to exist as well as having the quality to be the founder of the subject with its limiting/exclusionary characteristics, norms are the things that limit

us all the time as well as being what we need to make our existence more comprehensible (Butler, 2004, p. 40-56). Butler thinks that we cannot have comprehensibility above all norms, as she thinks that we don't have a condition of existence above power. But this situation should not be thought of as claiming an impossible political agency too. Indeed, in light of her critical attitude, Butler will point to ways of expanding the scope of norms, and within such enlarged scope, will open the door ajar where we can talk about a new political agency.

On the one hand, when it is considered as prerequisites for the comprehensibility of our lives and a livable life, opposing the norms may lead to vital risks. On the other hand, the same norms can trigger violence against those what they leave out of their value system because of their limited characteristics. In this context, we can say that Butler's aim is to look for ways to deal with these norms without being directly exposed to violence. In this respect, Butler sets out to explore how we can handle normas as an alternative rather than the existing versions of norms. Addressing norms in an alternative manner can be considered in parallel with the criticism directed at the binary gender system. As Butler argues that gender is set up with performativity in *Gender Trouble*, and that it is something that cannot be naturalized /presumed, she emphasizes that norms are also constructs completely open to change and transformation which is in parallel with the criticism made on this binary gender system. According to this construct, sexuality can be considered both as an area related to the operation of the norms and with their undoing. So, if gender is something that is done, then undoing it can be considered as a solution to the problem to disrupt the negative impacts of norms created by gender. However any undoing in this sense can take away the livable life of the human being due to the characteristics

of norms mentioned above. The main issue is to look for ways to undo the norms and address them in an alternative way without falling into such risk. For Butler, we can argue that the solution to this problem lies in the concept of performativity which she often emphasized.

According to the performative theory, the idea of a norm as a norm depends on its repeatability, and a norm can only be considered as the norm only if it can be repeated in the same way (Austin, 1975). However, according to the principle of performativity, we can say that norms cannot be repeated in the same way, and therefore we cannot speak of norm ontologically, since it is inevitably impossible to repeat something in the same way, as seen in the gender issue (Butler, 2007, p. 4).

Thus, we can argue that the norms are also made and that they have a character open to being undone. But, according to Butler, the aim of transformative politics should not only undo the norm but also expand their scope by repeating them in creative ways. The importance of performativity in terms of the approach on norms and Butler's political attitude can be understood in the context of these creative repetitions. Because, only to the extent when the scope of norms can expand through the performative actions, the lives of those who are excluded from the norms can be made livable and comprehensible. As a practical example of Butler's approach to norms, it is important to look at her ideas on gay marriage in terms of making the subject understandable. Butler does not have a clear line on this subject, meaning that she does not clearly state whether gays should marry or not. In her view, the real question that needs to be answered is why we are forced to think in such a dilemma. Her attitude shows that she doesn't think through the norms, and has a perspective to

push their limits. There are certain rights and conveniences due to being married. But Butler thinks that what causes gays to lose their rights is not the marriage but a heteronormative society including marriage too, which in this context emphasizes the necessity of conducting a discussion that transcends marriage, exceeding norms. She suggests questioning heteronormativity. But this does not mean she is against gay marriages either because she emphasizes that marriage as a norm can also be reconstructed with creative repetitions. In this context, what needs to be done is to exclude all rights being allocated to marriage and to think about policies which would increase the viability of all within or outside of marriage. In this respect, we can say that Butler has an approach that considers norms as the object of performative politics, and that she thinks it is necessary not only to enable undoing of norms, but also reconstruct with creative repetitions in the context of including the lives which are excluded.

We will argue that such a questioning has important implications in terms of our approach to subjectivity. Because an insight that extends from Foucault to Butler which claims that subjectivity is created through the internalization of norms opens a door for us to think that subjectivity can also evolve, to the extent that it explains to us that norms can be transformed through performance and creative repetitions. Thus, the possibility arises for thinking on the idea of a new subjectivity based on the expansion and undoing of the norms. This expansion and undoing occur in a performance-based manner and lays its foundation on a special insight on the idea of hegemony. Because the hegemony conception reveals that the particular subjectivity that internalizes any norm cannot be protected in a pure way and will always try to define itself with the tendency to expand itself with the claim of universality. In this context, the tendency

of subjectivity to expand from particular to universal provides a basis for performance-based expansion of the norm area.

However, as we mentioned above, the concept of performativity has a function not only in the reinterpretation of subjectivity but also its construction. Butler argues that we can grasp the construction of subjectivity and power through linguistic practices within the framework of performativity. According to this view, the performing a performative action is only possible with the expression of a discourse. The state of being a subject can only be sustained by repeating the conditions provided by the power "bestowing" this situation to the subject (Görgülü, p. 5). Hence, both the subject and the power call themselves into being through the repetition of the linguistic practices referred here. In this context, it can be said that Butler dealt with performativity both to understand the formation of existing subjectivities and to reinterpret these subjectivities with the aim of expanding the scope of the norms. In other words, it can be thought that one goal in suggesting the concept of performativity is to carry out an analysis of subjectivity and power, and that the other goal is to propose a performative politics of subjectivity.

We can say that Butler's work titled *Excitable Speech* in this regard includes explanatory ideas both to comprehend the performativity of discourse and thus understand the construction of subjectivity, and also establish the relation of performativity with politics (Butler, 1997). At this point, we have to state that while explaining ther performativity of discourse, Butler based her ideas on the work in which Austin explains that performativity is a practice based on discourse. In addition, Butler frequently refers to the notions of illocutionary and perlocutionary in the work

of Austin, which we will explain in the course of establishing the relationship of performativity with politics (Austin, 1975, p. 94-109). In the work titled *Excitable Speech*, the relationship between performativity and politics is established in the context of the hurtfulness of language, and in this context, a critique of the hate speech discourse is initiated. Because hate speech discourse has been producing an incorrect performativity in terms of Butler's political position and the performativity of this discourse must be criticized for creative politics.

In the first part of the book, Butler speaks of two specific words of speech to provide the basis for her criticism of hate speech discourse: Illocutionary and perlocutionary. Illocutionary words are the words used typically by a sovereign which are thought to have taken effect as soon as they are said. An example of this is that the marriage officer says "I declare you husband and wife". Perlocutionary is the word which has the effect that occurs after the word is stated with a space between the word and its effect. The so-called progressive left-wing circles, which use the argument of hate speech discourse, see these expressions as illocutionary, and when these expressions are used, they argue that these expressions establish the group as the inferior (as a secondary) who have hurt them. So these illocutionary words, which create a powerful effect as soon as they are used, determine the condition for sublaternality for the related group and social relations are established by these expressions as static and hierarchical. Injury or victimization of the related person/group is also caused by the position of the person/group; in other words the person/group is injured because they take offence in this discourse. The reason why language can be so hurtful is that it is our fragile structure, which, as we can recall from Althusser, requires language to exist and connects our existence to being

addressed by the other (Butler, 2005a, p. 102-125). But Butler does not agree with the progressive left circles, and argues that hate expressions cannot be considered as illocutionary, and even any word cannot be considered as illocutionary. Because it is an alternative for the person not to take defense in these expression to whom the word is addressed, it can be considered that the effect mentioned does not occur when this alternative occurs, ie, the occurrence of injury or subalternity and being established as the secondary. We may think that the hierarchy among people and the social structure is established through these expressions and that they are reproduced by repeating them, but in this context we should equally consider that the social structure will be established in a different way if these expressions are not repeated or if the person to whom these expressions are directed does not participate in repetition. The relationship between performativity with politics and the social structure as pointed out by Butler can be understood through this context too. Specifically, the occurrence of the injury at the time the expression is said to originate entirely from a performance and precisely because of this injury establishes the reality of domination. What is meant here by reality is the social structure. In other words, the result of the act is the social structure itself and not just the domination/injury established on the person. In this context, illocutionary cannot be mentioned because it is the social structure itself that enables the word to be effective here, so when anybody uses that word, this effect can only be created only by referring to the mechanisms of the social structure on which it is based. Therefore we cannot talk about a word (illocutionary) that is effective as soon as it is stated. For example, without the sovereignty ascribed to it previously by the social structure, the fact that a marriage officer says "I declare you husband and wife" does not have an effect.

Butler, after explaining it to the circles who constitute a discourse about hate speech by establishing the duality of illocutionary-perlocutionary how such a duality cannot be established, and hence criticizing them for taking a political position with erroneous performativity, the dose of his criticism increases a little bit more, and claims that hate speech discourse is actually the strategy of attributing sovereignty to the word and this strategy is an action that repeats what we think the state does. In this context, "illocutionary" may be considered as the words of the sovereign, and the powers that were once attributed to the state interestingly begins to be attributed to words in a time when the state began to lose its sole sovereign character. We can say that according to Butler, this approach of progressive circles has created two important political problems. Firstly, with such power attributed, the harmfulness of hate expressions becomes absolute, and in contrast to the expectations of progressive circles, the hurting power of expressions is reinforced. Second, we would be attributing power to the state indirectly since we demand from the courts the punishment of those who use these expression or prohibition of hate expressions as well as attributing such power to the word. This is a logic that calls too much state intervention, and the empowerment of state power in this way has the risk of advancing against the progressive movements itself. As a result, sovereignty attributed to the word becomes an obstacle to political agency. In this book, Judith Butler elaborated her views on the criticism of performative politics and how it should be in many cases, from the structure of power that concealed its racist approaches resting on the feminist arguments to the discussion of censorship and pornography. This performative politics can be achieved through a creative, innovative, disruptive struggle requiring continuous reinterpretation.

At this point, we hope that we have clarified how subjectivity is established being based on performativity, how this setup is so related to social structure and hurtfulness of the language, and how performative politics can lead to a new political subjectivity by organizing in accordance with the extension of the norm scope of performative politics, and the context in which this political subjectivity can be shaped by hegemony. This new understanding of political subjectivity, which we will define as queer subjectivity, will be explained through its dimensions, which denote a popular-hegemonic formation in the Laclauian sense, after the concept of disidentification, which we will explain in the following section.

3. Disidentification

> This form of power is exercised on the lived reality of daily life, classifying individuals into categories, designating them according to their particular individualities, binding them to their identities, imposing upon them a law of truth that must be acknowledged and that others must recognize (Revel, 2014, p.11).

The concept of disidentification discussed in this section will be regarded as an attitude against "normalization" which Michel Foucault points out in his analysis of subjectivation. In addition to this, we will state that queer theory has a special importance in terms of disidentification in parallel to the Foucauldian approach. In this context, it is important to note that the reason we use this concept is both to object to the common understanding related to reading the queer theory as an identity policy specific to LGBTs, and also to underscore that it is not possible to deny completely any identity without disidentification.

The word disidentification refers to a process and "occurrence" as of its establishment. The reason we use the word occurrence is because of Butler's approach to identities. Because, according to Butler, identities are not natural and essential, they are established with a number of performances as we mentioned above. Performance is the repetition of norms that do not correspond to any ontological reality. In other words, the identity established with performance is a non-original imitation. In our opinion, it is necessary to understand disidentification as a process that involves occurrence rather than something happening just like adopting identity is not just something that happens. But at this point, it is necessary to underline that the process of occurrence addressed through the conception of hegemony, which we have explained through concepts of unfixity and uncertainty, which prevents the process of occurrence from reaching a final point. In other words, there is no basis attributing any a priori privilege to a particular position or an identity, which are interpreted within the system of differences, over other particular positions (Laclau, 2013, p. 87). Each particular position within the system can only interpret itself in the extent to which the distinctive nature of the interpretation unit is broken down, ie to the extent that each particular position attempts to represent a universal or empty signifier outside the system (Laclau, 2013). The fact that particulars refer to empty signifier claiming universality is due to the existence of an uncertainty surrounding the system outside for the system to establish its own inner structure and the particular positions are made disabled through incompleteness. This conception of hegemony points to the continuous (during occurrence) nature of disidentification or adopting identity. At this point, we have mentioned that identity has emerged with the repetition of the norms produced in the power / information spiral and that each identity continues its claim to be different with the tendency to enter into the process of occurrence by referring to a

empty signifier outside the system. In this way, we mark that identity is a phenomenon that can be understood by continuity rather than by inactivity. So, what kind of occurrence does disidentification point to? What kind of occurrence would disidentification be pointing to if it does not indicate the formation of a different identity?

According to Butler, as an example of identity meant here, gender is the result of the sedimentation of norms (Butler, 2012, p. 229). Sedimentation is achieved through the repetition of established norms about identity over time. However, due to the state of psyche which resists the normalization and the situation that makes it impossible to repeat something the same as suggested in the theory of performativity, it is not possible to achieve a pure identity by repeating the norms over time. The result is that the norms that constitute the identity can be repeated in different ways.

If norms can be reproduced in different ways, or if they can be resignified in the words of Butler, then it is possible to say that the identity that these norms have determined can be transformed into another identity. However, this indicates the formation of another identity but not disidentification. On the other hand, in her book *Bodies that Matter*, Butler argues that addressing resignification as an activity to extend the scope of the norms çalışmalarındaki can be considered as the normative dimension in her works (Butler, 2014, p. 37). Thus, if resignification activity is carried out with the aim of expanding the scope of the norm, the expansion in the norm which determines the identity causes the coercion of the existing meanings that the identity carries, and the inability to maintain the claim of purity. Because the expansion within the norm tends to expand the existing meaning of identity. What we mean by

disidentification is this process of occurrence by which an identity has to abandon the claim of purity. With the abandonment of purity claim, identities become the domain of continuous interpretability and openness. The disidentification we have dealt with in this context, rather than pointing to the occurrence of a different identity, allows us to think of a horizon where it is impossible to be identified.

In the performativity section, we have stated that the identity-shaping norms also provide the livability and comprehensibility of the person. Since rejecting identity in this respect would mean the rejection of norms too, being outside of an entire norm would cause vital risks and put the person at risk of not being perceived. Therefore, it is risky to consider disidentification as an activity that is completely to be out of the norm space. In other words, while thinking on a horizon where it is impossible to be identified, the aim is neither to point out the formation of a different identity, nor to reject the identity altogether. This insight corresponds to Butler's suggestion that there should be some uncertainty about what the identities indicate (Butler, 2007, p. 4). In this context, in terms of the understanding of the intersection of hegemony and performativity approaches mentioned above, disidentification can be thought of as a tool that allows us to take and leave the identity strategically. In other words, rather than addressing disidentification as a complete rejection of identity, we can grasp it as a strategic move that will be put in place in order to displace and resignify the existing meanings of the identity that the power is constructed to provide domination. In parallel to the analysis of power by Foucault and Butler, we can argue that the way in which power entails domination passes through the practices of normalization of the individual and thus their subjectivities are determined. Disidentification actually emerges as an expression of the stance against this normalization tendency of power.

In this context, if we consider disidentification as a tool of strategically taking and leaving the identity, "taking" identity will correspond to the counter-hegemonic struggle put forward in the conception of hegemony, and "abandonment" of the identity will correspond to the resignification we mentioned in the theory of performativity. Therefore, we can state that the suggestion on disidentification will be dealt with together with the theories of hegemony and performativity that we mentioned in the previous sections.

We have also suggested that queer theorists attach a special importance to disidentification. In this context, we can think that the objections queer theory has on identity can be understood in three stages where it positions itself. Firstly, especially in view of the arguments detailed in the book *Gender Trouble*, in terms of queer theory, disidentification is an objection primarily to woman's identity as feminism structures it. In this respect, the queer view objected to the continuity that is believed to exist between biological sex-gender-desire, and argued that the feminist subject defined by the female identity is subject to disintegration, cannot be completed, and therefore policies cannot be produced through the female subject (Butler, 2012, p. 50). Thus, many queer theorists initially attacked the normalization of the concept of femininity, which had been the source of the cohesion of the subject of feminism (Preciado, 2013, p. 331). Second, we can argue that the queer point of view can be read as an expression of an objection against gender identities other than heterosexual identities defined as femininity and masculinity. As an example of this objection, the statement by Beatriz Preciado can be considered, in which she states that queer policies, in contrast to "feminist" or "homosexual" policies, are not based on neither natural identities (male/female) or a definition of practices (heterosexual/homosexual), but are

based on a plurality of bodies opposed to the regimes that built them as "normal" and "abnormal" (Preciado, 2013, p. 330). In addition, in his book, Fear of a Queer Planet, one of the most important queer theorists, Michael Warner asserted that queer could become critical by defining itself against "normal" rather than heterosexuality (Yildiz, 2014, p. 397). Therefore, in terms of disidentification, it is worth noting that queer theory cannot be considered as an identity policy specific to LGBTs, contrary to common understanding. Third, we can think that the queer point of view is not only concerned with sexual identities, but can be read as an expression of an objection to all identity positions. This position of objection can be understood in the context of Judith Butler's ideas on materialization and formation of subjectivity positions through the outside. As mentioned above, Butler, with her criticism of Irıgaray, claimed that there can not be a single outside that establishes the positions of identity and this constitutive outer space cannot be understood by a reference to a sexual identity category.

On the other hand, a questioning made through Butler's analysis requires reconsideration of the status of all excluded subject positions, and this questioning shapes itself through the conception of hegemony. In this context, Butler's proposal for disidentification can be understood as the displacement of all the identity positions established by more than one outside but at the same time the realization of the lives of all the subjectivity positions by expanding the scope of the norms that make up these positions. In order to expand the scope of norms, we can point out that in particular, the excluded identity positions will be given a partial priority, in other words, carrying out a temporary identity policy activity with reference to the out-of-norm positions in order to expand the norm, has the aim of expanding the boundaries of the norms, not

to emphasize the identities. In this respect, disidentification will become conceivable as a tool to propose a special way of taking and abandoning identity.

The contribution of the hegemony theory to this idea is that it establishes the possibility for temporal constants, which will be organized against the domination of the power in the hegemonic area, to constitute a chain of equivalence through hegemonic articulation. We can underline that the temporal constants to be established in this context are taken as excluded subjectivity positions. But according to Laclau, even against the domination of power, it is ultimately impossible for the counter-hegemony to be carried out through excluded positions because, according to hegemony conception, each excluded position will fall into the equivalence chain due to the differential nature of the signification unit and leave itself to the representation of a empty signifier through this logic (Laclau, 2012, p. 99). The tendency of positions or particulars to constitute themselves with a reference to a empty signifier also indicates the formation of a popular position in the conception of hegemony. According to Laclau, this formation is shaped by the demands put forward by the excluded positions, and as a result, the new formation will be loaded with a meaning that exceeds the meaning expressed by all demands. The unification of the plurality of demands in a chain of equivalents will lead to the construction of a popular identity, which is a qualitatively more than the sum of the equivalence rings of the equivalence chain in simple terms (Laclau, 2013, p. 95).

Alev Özkazanç argues that this popular subjectivity position, which can be considered as something more qualitatively than the sum of equivalence rings, can be shaped around the queer name. Because the attitude developed by queer theory on

social norms enables us to reevaluate the social identity through sexual identities, to run a power analysis by examining identity positions constituted through dual oppositions, and to think through a background on the formation and reshaping of subjectivities from the point of view of all identity positions. In this respect, the queer, with its proposition for both the private protection of the outside and the continuity of a permanent uncertainty of the outside, can be considered as the empty signifier that cannot be ultimately determined or an open-ended definition of a popular-hegemonic subjectivity formation that will be the expression of the positions to be gathered around this empty signifier. Özkazanç suggests that this popular-hegemonic formation and productive uncertainty infested on the name of queer should be evaluated in two dimensions:

First of all, we can detect the existence of a tense relationship between universal and particular both "inside" queer, and also between queer and "outside". First, we can consider the level seen superficially as "inside queer". If we take queer in the strict sense, which is LGBTTI, we can see that there is a constant tension between each particular position and identity and among others and within each identity. We can see that this debate among the particular identities is particularly concentrated among gay and lesbians, as well as gay-lesbians and transgender identities. Thus, each particular identity is divided into two between its unique demands and the universal implication it articulates in the chain, and this tension continues in each particular identity. Second, there is a similar tension of particular-universal in the relationship between "particular" positions such as queer and feminism or racism and militarism, anti-capitalism, or anarchism. Each of these positions (I mean, of course, those attracted to the attractiveness of the queer name) can be divided among their universal reasoning adopted through their positioning against the "enemy" (what this outside

71

actually is uncertain) to struggle with jointly, and being "particular" positions; or they can be productive in their competence to fill that void of the universal (not individually but as an articulating principle) (Özkazanç, 2014, p. 88).

In this study, this popular-hegemonic position, which we propose to consider as queer subjectivity, will be considered as a resistance position against the domination and normalization techniques of the mechanism of power. The emergence of this position as a resistance position is directly related to the hegemonic articulation capacity of struggle areas to be established together by the non-normative particular positions, which are determined by the normalization techniques of the power mechanism. That is, queer subjectivity, which we describe as the hegemonic subject that emerged with the claim of being the empty signifier of society's unfixity, can only become a resistance position against normalization as long as it calls for the excluded against normalization, and establishes chains of equivalence that can represent these excluded ones. In this context, queer can be comprehensible as a resistance position which we can explain as the expression of a resistance to the autonomy of the excluded sexual identity positions "inside queer"(LGBTTI), and a proposal on the autonomy of the excluded particular positions other than the sexual identities, and also the expression of the competition of the particular positions "outside queer" (anti-militarism, racism, feminism etc) that will be presented to fill in the void of the universal. Therefore, when approached through the conception of hegemony, we need to point out that queer subjectivity, which turns into empty signifier and emerges with the claim to be an indicator of the absent completeness of society, always comes from "outside" and always turns to include the "excluded" (Özkazanç, 2014, p. 88). In this context, we can read disidentification, which is the suggestion of the queer point of

view, as a form of political positioning where "excluded" can realize with their performative actions to extend the scope of norms against the normalization technologies. In the following section, this position of this political subjectivity, which we will consider in the context of a resistance practice, will be addressed with the aspects of the power analysis of queer theory calling on anti-militarism as a stance against the practices of normalization of militarism, which runs to obstruct the autonomy of individuals.

III. Anti-Militarism and Queer

In the first chapter, we stated that we could evaluate militarism as a means of disciplining the society through the "recruitment dispositive" of bio-power. In this way, militarism as a means of bio-power emerges as the expression of a normalization technology on the individual body by constructing a "disciplined soldier", and also a normalization technology on the social body by constructing a "disciplined society" through various administrative techniques. In this context, we can consider anti-militarism as a political attitude towards the normalization technologies of bio-power. The queer point of view, due to its attitude to normalization, in our opinion, has a considerable potential in terms of creating different perspectives, which will enrich the political attitudes needed by this movement, and will enable the creative interpretation of the anti-militarist movement in line with the proposal of performative theory.

At this point, in order to facilitate the explanation of the connection between the queer perspective and anti-militarism, we will briefly try to point out the contribution of the theories of hegemony and performativity to anti-militarism. The theory of hegemony allows us to explain the ground of struggle for particulars against

normalization by the notion of "counter-hegemonic struggle", and to define subjectivity and a resistance position through the inclusiveness of a popular-hegemonic formation by the plurality of demands pointed out by this ground. This resistance position, which we define as queer subjectivity, can be considered as an expression of assigning new horizons of this new struggle, as long as its stands against all forms of domination opposed by antimilitarism, and to the extent that it can represent the plurality of demands created by the resignification of the antimilitarist struggle and the opposing stances. The theory of performativity creates the possibility of providing a methodological contribution to the execution of the forms of actions of conscientious objection and civil disobedience which we will explain as the visible actions of the anti-militarist movement. The methodological contribution to be presented by the theory of performativity enables individuals, who will take a political position against the normalization techniques of militarism, to conduct their actions by identifying attitudes to be creative, subversive repetitions of normalization forms and resignificatison. In this respect, the practice of conscientious objection will be resignified as an anti-militarist political attitude where queer subjectivities can organize and conduct performative forms of action against militarism.

In order to facilitate the understanding of our ideas about the position of queer subjectivity, which may become evident by the formation of the ground for "counter hegemonic struggle" against the normalization techniques of militarism, we can first say that it is useful to remember the norm areas, which militarism, that we regard as a system of norms, tends to determine, which we have dealt with in the first chapter. In this section, we will talk about the kind of counter-stances that the queer perspective can be articulated onto the anti-militarist struggle that we define as an expression of

the stance against normalization, and the context in which this articulation can queerize the anti-militarist struggle.

1. Anti-Militarism against Normalization

In the first chapter, we have conceptualized militarism as a mechanism of power where normative regulation of certain norm areas (citizenship, gender and nationalism) and all the areas that may be related to them (health, violence, nation-state etc) intersect. The anti-militarist struggle can be interpreted as a political activity to be conducted against all the normalization and domination practices caused by the intersection points mentioned.

> In other words, anti-militarism is one of a chain of criticisms that that fully contradicts domination of sexism, heterosexism, authority, hierarchy, capitalism, nation-state and nature in terms of domination relations that hold the society together …On the other hand, it is also possible to say the opposite since feminist movements, lgbtt struggles, certain non-nation-statist heterodox, socialist, communist movements standing against capitalism, state, nationalism, hierarchy and authority, autonomist Marxist, anarchist, anarcho-communist and anti-authoritarian movements, and political ecologist movements against the domination of nature include anti-militarism as a common intercept (Kızıltuğ, 2011, p. 194).

Thus, to think of anti-militarism as a common point of all the political movements and struggles mentioned above also makes it possible to think of these movements as multiple subjects in the context of anti-militarism (Kızıltuğ, 2011, p. 195). In our opinion, queer can be considered as one of these multiple subject positions that imply anti-militarism as an expression of stance against domination and normalization. In the

following section, first of all, we will discuss the aspects of queer that allows the interpretation of the anti-militarist struggle in a creative repetition in its narrow meaning (with the approach to sexuality), and then the aspects of queer that can queerize anti-militarist movement in its broad sense (with its approach to ethics, hegemony, disidentification, mourning, vulnerability).

1.1.Queerization of Anti-Militarism

The Broken Rifle, a magazine by War Resisters' International (WRI), which is an international anti-war organization, published its August 2012 issue with the title of Queer & Antimilitarism, and included in this issue the important determinations of why anti-militarism needs queer politics (Andersson, 2012, p. 1- 3). The topics and positions which are described under the main headings in the magazine implying anti-militarist struggle from the queer perspective can be listed as follows; Anti-heterosexism, politicization of the excluded groups, attitudes towards hate speech, attitude towards legitimation of killing, anti-norms, the hegemonic struggle of margins and the criterion of valuableness of life (Andersson, 2012, p. 2). In our opinion, the first four of these topics can be used to interpret the anti-militarism with an creative repetition in the narrow sense of queer (sexuality approach), and the last three can be used to demonstrate a systematic narrative in order to point out that the content of the anti-militarist struggle can be enriched and the new horizons can be defined in the broad sense of queer. Our aim in this section is to address the issues that we think through which queer can queerize anti-militarism in the narrow and broad sense of queer. The assessments to be made through these issues will be discussed together with the contributions we think both hegemony and performativity theories will offer

to the anti-militarist struggle, as well as the aspects of the position, which we explained as queer subjectivity, focusing on enriching and extending anti-militarism.

1.1.1. Queerization in the "Narrow" Sense

First, we can take a look at the opposition to heterosexism. Militarism functions through the heterosexist dual norm system as it sets a normative framework of masculinity for by creating the category of "individual eligible for military service", builds femininity as the counter category of masculinity for the functioning of this framework, and the normative gender field, which is defined through femininity-masculinity, defining homosexual individuals as "abnormal". Queer analysis aim to constantly question these heteronormative roots on which militarism is based. Thus, the critical interrogation, which is the source of the repetition of militarism, places the queer in a position to resignify anti-militarist struggle and anti-militarism in a creative repetition. By this way, a space for anti-militarist struggles will be opened to be queerized and take a comprehensive opposition stance against militarism and the heteronormative roots on which militarism is based. Secondly, we can refer to the politicization of the excluded groups. If we take queer in the narrow sense as LGBTTIs, we can argue that these individuals lose their perceivability to the extent that they are excluded from the social norm areas, and the political actions of queer individuals who lost their visibility in the social sphere slipped through the cracks and that their voices were not heard. In this context, we think that the field of anti-militarist struggle, which we define as an intersection of multiple subject positions, can provide the political visibility needed by queer actions. On the other hand, we can think that the active participation of queer individuals in anti-militarist actions will create the opportunity to co-operate and politicize with other excluded groups

positioned against militarism. This opportunity may lead to anti militarization of queer actions, and also can lead to to queerisation of antimilitarist struggle by gaining queer sensitivities in an environment where the excluded groups are politicized together. Thirdly, it is important for both the queer and the anti-militarist movement that the queer perspective is articulated in the anti-militarist struggle against attitudes to be adopted towards hate speech. Because LGBTTIs are attacked by armies and governments all over the world, hate crime rates rise in militarist societies and marginal groups are constantly restricted in these societies (Andersson, 2012, p. 2). At this point, if we think about it in terms of hegemony theory, we can say that together with LGBTTIs, all marginal movements can create a chain of equivalence against the domination of power so that it will be possible to create positions of resistance through "counter hegemonic struggles". In this context, a plurality of anti-militarist demands that emerged as a result of the pressure created by militarism constitutes the basis of the counter-hegemonic struggle. Thus, in a militarist society, we can talk about the hate speech discourses that women, blacks, different sexual, ethnic and religious minorities are exposed to may have the potential to create a counter-hegemonic struggle by articulating a plurality of demands in the chains of equivalence in the context of attitudes towards these discourses. Since LGBTTIs are one of the groups most exposed to hate speech in militarist societies, they have a high potential to articulate their demands with anti-militarist demands, and in this way they may cause the queerization of anti-militarist struggles. Fourth, queer policies, in their attitude to legitimizing death and killing, develop attitudes toward life and comprehensibility in the face of the militaristic system's war culture, which justifies killing and violence. The practice adopted for the status of homosexuals in the army named as Don't Ask, Don't Tell, which was in force in the United States, can be considered as an important

one in terms of militarism finding modern solutions to present the army as a reflection of "open society" which reveals the objectives of regulating for killing and legitimizing it in modern society. In summary, this practice prohibits individuals in the army from asking questions about their sexual orientation and thus paving the way for homosexuals to perform military service without specifying their sexual orientation. But the important point here is that this application implicitly contributes to the concealment of comprehensibility for homosexuals. According to Andreas Speck, Don't Ask, Don't Tell acts as an illusion for us to think that the army is no longer homophobic and contributes to the militarization of queer lifestyles (Speck, 2011). Queer theory, with its constant emphasis on life, nonviolence and comprehension, will propose to take a stand against the legitimacy of killing by analyzing the tactics of militarism for "modernizing" itself over the armies. In this way, queer can open up a space for the queerization of the anti-militarist struggle by providing a perspective that allows homosexual individuals to question the regulations they might face in the "modern" armies thanks to its approach against legitimization of killing. This proposal of queer theory will be evaluated in the following section over Judith Butler's approach to war.

1.1.2. Queerization in the "Broad" Sense

Up to this point, we have touched upon the issues that we consider to contribute to the anti-militarist struggle in the narrow sense of the queer. Now we can touch upon the points that we think that queer politics can enhance the anti-militarist struggle and point to new horizons through the issues of the anti normality, the criterion of valuableness of life, and the hegemonic struggle of the marginals.

First of all, we can begin by stating that anti normality, which is the suggestion of queer theory, provides the ground for the interpretation of queer's anti-militarism with a creative repetition.

Because, besides being a phenomenon related to armies and war, militarism can also be explained as a system of norms, as we mentioned in the previous chapter. This system exists by recreating our daily life and society through influencing different norm fields. Queer power analysis can be considered as a political tool to combat these norms. For example, queer liberation does not intend to achieve equality in a militaristic and patriarchal system, its aim is to go beyond logic that leads to the continuation of the power system by different names and to create a permanent future (Andersson, 2012, p. 1). In this context, the tendency to tackle the norm fields will not only offer the possibility of an objection to the forms of sexual identity but a possibility of resignifying the anti-militarist struggles against the normalization tendencies of militarism in a broad sense from the queer perspective, to the extent that it is an expression of the objection to all normative identity fields. We can point out that queer theory reacts to militarism and its normalization tendencies, which we describe as the expressions of the normative system that creates the culture of war with its heterosexist and patriarchal aspects. In this context, the propositions of queer to extend the scope of the norm field, which we mentioned in the previous section, place the queer in a position where we can enrich the anti-militarist struggle and resignify through norms. From this position, we can state that the path is cleared for anti-militarist movements to be owned by all the positions excluded from the norm scope and to take a stance against the mechanisms of domination which determine this scope.

Secondly, we will touch upon the subject of the criterion of valuableness of lives. In our opinion, it is possible to read militarism as a norm system that determines which lives are worthless or not, is utilized to establish a hierarchy between "races". In order to establish this hierarchy, militarism has to idealize a homogeneous "us". In this context, those among "us" and those who are not are separated through the friend-enemy duality. Thus, taking a decision of war against the "enemy" who is not "us" is located on the ground of legitimacy. Another meaning of this is the devaluation of the lives of group members against whom a war is started through the established normative dualities. In her book Frames of War, Butler claims that the criterion determining which lives are valuable and which are not are norms or frameworks. According to this understanding, in order for a life to be considered as valuable, it must first be defined within certain frameworks of life practices. Frameworks or norms are the first condition that the individual can be comprehended, as we have already mentioned in the previous sections. In other words, in order to be able to talk about the value of individuals' lives, first of all, those individuals must be identifiable and comprehensible. Considering that the framework of militarism related to human relations is established by creating a friend-enemy duality, we can say that militarism primarily categorizes individuals on ethnicity, sexuality, religions etc so that they can be comprehensible, and then may decide that the lives of the individuals it has classified under the categories of enemy are worthless.

However, even if this normative system allows us to regard some lives as worthless, it cannot prevent us from feeling that we are in a vulnerable position, no matter which side of the violence we are on (friendly or hostile). Feeling that we are

inevitably vulnerable, according to Butler, does not necessarily cause emergence of feelings full of fear and grief for individuals exposed to violence (Butler, 2005b, p. 9). "One thing that is gained by our injury is the intuition of the existence of people that my life is dependent on and the people I do not know and maybe I will never know. This basic dependence on anonymous others is not a condition I can eliminate with my own will" (Butler, 2005b, p. 10). In other words, the sense of vulnerability suggests that there is a basic dependence between us and all the people described as the other or the enemy. Butler believes that through this dependency, a transformative and ethical political understanding can be produced and she paves the way to base her understanding of ethical politics by attaching special importance to the concept of "mourning". In this context, we can describe mourning as a feeling that we experience with the loss of someone we value. Is there a situation in which we need to mourn the loss of someone we do not value (the other)? In other respects, it may be more meaningful to formulate this question as follows: Is there a reason for us to regard the life of another (the other) as valuable?

The act of mourning will have a political meaning with the assumption that we have a fundamental dependence to the other on which we cannot resist. In other words, answering the questions correctly depends on developing an understanding of the frameworks what make others as others. If what creates dependence on others is our common vulnerability, even if we cannot eliminate the situation of vulnerability, developing an attitude towards frameworks that establish the environment of violence may allow to minimize the effects of vulnerability. What expose the other to violence are the frames that allow us to regard his life as worthless, and the same frameworks lead us into a position open to violence. In our opinion, the way to avoid this is to

creative repetitions for these frameworks to develop a new ethical understanding that will recognize and value others' lives. This understanding of ethics becomes meaningful by ensuring comprehensibility for all the positions of subjectivity that are open to violence since they are excluded from the norm, to see the lives of these positions comprehended as valuable and to mourn the losses of all these lives. Thus, when we reach a thought that can mourn every death and see every life as worthy, we can begin to move away from the vicious circle of violence created by militarism, and there is a reason that is embodied as the demand for non-violence to regard someone else's life valuable.

In order to establish an ethical understanding of politics, the special importance attributed to the concept of "mourning" to acquire a meaning on the grounds of the demand for nonviolence, will also enable, in our opinion, adaptation of this political understanding at its utmost level that by the subject positions are highly open to violence. The state of being open to violence is a result of the defining "others", who are excluded from the norm, as others who are not worthy of mourning for. In this respect, the tendency of militarism to determine the fields of norms opens a door for it to identify those too who are "not worth mourning for". We can argue that the anti militarist struggle can be resignified through this queer ethics approach established in the context of vulnerability-mourning-norm-violence-politics.

Because the concepts of mourning and injury, which Butler has rediscovered, both provide a comprehensive explanation of the state of openness to violence for all the multiple subject positions that intersect within the anti-militarist struggle, and also provides a significant basis for the non-violence demands of anti-militarism, with the

guidance it provides towards mourning for the other and regarding the life of the other as worthy and valuable. We can follow the traces of the political reflection of the ethical understanding put forth by Butler in the following statements by Butler:

> I propose to consider a dimension of political life that has to do with our exposure to violence and our complicity in it, with our vulnerability to loss and the task of mourning that follows, and with finding a basis for community in these conditions... but I think it furnishes a sense of political community of a complex order, and it does this first of all by bringing to the fore the relational ties that have implications for theorizing fundamental dependency and ethical responsibility (Butler 2005b, p. 35-38).

It should be noted that this conception of the community, which Butler meant, led us to explain the hegemonic struggles of marginals, which is our final title. At this point, the term marginal refers to positions of subjectivity that are pushed out of the norm. The hegemonic struggle is the expression of a political proposal for these groups to act together.

> There's a long-standing opposition to the military from queer communities and other marginalised groups. These groups have since long realised that the military is not acting in their interests. Now other parts of the antimilitarist movement needs to recognise this tremendous antimilitarist activism and join with all groups struggling for peace and justice(Andersson, 2012, p.1).

What we care about at this point is to answer the question of how marginal groups can be articulated onto each other in the context of anti-militarism. How should we comprehend the basis required for articulation that we think will raise the struggle?

What kind of proposal of hegemonic struggle by queer theory can open the space for queerization of the anti-militarist struggle?

In our opinion, the greatest contribution that queer theory can make in order to queerize the basis of anti-militarist struggle can be deducted from its attitude towards identity politics. Butler expresses her understanding of the struggle ground mentioned above through her approach to mourning-violence-politics phenomena and her approach to disidentification as follows:

> If certain lives are deemed worth living, protecting, and grieving and others not, then this way of differentiating lives cannot be understood as a problem of identity or even of the subject. It is rather a question of how power forms the field in which subjects become possible at all or, rather, how they become impossible. And this involves a critical practice of thinking that refuses to take for granted that framework of identitarian struggle which assumes that subjects already exist, that they occupy a common public space, and that their differences might be reconciled if only we had the right tools for bringing them together (Butler, 2015, p. 48).

In this context, the hegemonic struggles of the marginals we have dealt with in the context of the anti-militarist struggle to be conducted over questioning the state of violence framed by power, not over identities, is consistent with proposals by Butler. In other words, we can state that the contribution of this approach of queer perspective to anti-militarism has prevented the anti-militarist struggle from falling into the trap of identity politics. For example, the fact that people who are obliged to compulsory military service are generally men can bring about a male-dominated situation in the anti-militarist struggle to the extent that it results in a way that conscientious objection,

which is one of anti militarism's visible forms of action, is attributed to men. Or, the normative hierarchies created among ethnic identities based on the norms set up by militarism can bring disadvantaged ethnic identities into a dominant position in the anti-militarist struggle. The queer point of view, through its suggestion of disidentification, on the one hand, suggests that all these identity positions should not be dominating through their identities in the struggles (anti-militarist 'hegemonic struggles' in terms of our subject matter), and on the other hand argues that counter hegemonic struggles to be established among all these identity or subjectivity positions will move the horizon of the struggle forward. In this context, we can think that by moving the horizon of the struggle to an advanced point, queer subjectivity, which we have described as the form of popular-hegemonic subjectivity in Laclauan sense, may be formed and this formation may appear as a position to re-signify the anti-militarist struggle. In our opinion, the paragraph that Butler has stated her ideas on alliances supports our argument:

With Laclau and Mouffe, I would continue to argue that antagonism keeps the alliance open and suspends the idea of reconciliation as a goal. What might keep an alliance together is different from the question of what keeps an alliance mobile. What keeps an alliance mobile is, in my view, the continued focus on those formations of power that exceed the strict definition of identity applied to those included in the alliance. In this case, an alliance would need to stay focused on methods of state coercion (ranging from immigration tests to explicit torture) and on the invocations (and reductions) of the subject, nature, culture, and religion that produce the ontological horizon within which state coercion appears necessary and justified. (Butler, 2015, p.136)

We can put forward the assertion that we suggest by putting Butler's thinking together with the conception of hegemony as follows: The position of queer subjectivity, which we think can be defined in the formation process of "keeping the alliance alive", has the potential to become "universal" or "empty signifier", in which it attempts to represent each of the multiple subject positions (particular positions) intersecting within the anti-militarist struggle. This potential, which we think queer subjectivity has, can be explained by the approach of Özkazanç as in follows:

> As we know, the hegemonic subject, which becomes a empty signifier and emerges with the claim to be the signifier of absent wholeness of society, has always come from the "outside". The piece, which claims to be everything, is the one that was nothing before. Of course "queer" similarly points at what is outside (Özkazanç, 2014, p. 88).

This possibility that transforms queer subjectivity within the anti militarist struggle into a "universal" and "empty signifier" is also readable through the ethical understanding that Butler has conceptualized over mourning and nonviolence. What we care about here is the potential that is provided by counter hegemonic struggle, which will become firmly fixed in the mourning act, to the formation of popular subjectivity (queer subjectivity) of hegemonic politics by putting forward the relational ties of the positions of anti-militarist struggle that will be united with the demands of nonviolence. Thus, queer subjectivity, together with this potential it has, can be understood as the expression of a position that invites anti-militarism, which we define as a "non-queer" position above, through its particular-universal tensions, to its own field of attraction.

At this point, we touched upon the areas that we think both queer could queerize the anti-militarist struggle in the narrow sense, and those that we thought queer could be able to resignify the anti-militarist struggle in the broad sense, as well as the possibilities of calling the popular subjectivity position that we thought might indicate the horizon of the anti-militarist struggle. In the following section, we will try to evaluate the practice of conscientious objection, which is considered as one of the anti-militarist actions, through the performativity approach of queer theory. Since the practice of conscientious objection as a position of resistance to militarism may also be regarded as an expression of the stance taken against militarism's subjectivation/normalization techniques, it has the potential to imply the agency of the subject. In order to explain a new understanding of subjectivity to be built around this potential, we will first touch upon the subject's possibility of agency, and then the aspects of this possibility that we think can be shaped by queer subjectivity. In this context, conscientious objection as a form of anti militarist act that may open the space for this possibility of agency, which we think can be reshaped by queer subjectivity approach, will be evaluated through the performativity approach by queer theory.

Our main goal in making this assessment would be to try to justify our intuition that conscientious objection practice can be constructed as a performative transformative action, based on our ideas of queer subjectivity.

CHAPTER THREE

AGENCY CAPACITY OF THE SUBJECT AND QUEER APPROACH ON CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTION

In this chapter, conscientious objection, one of the forms of action of the anti-militarist struggle, will be re-interpreted as a performative form of action that we believe will contribute to the anti-militarist struggle. For this purpose, an assessment will be made of the agency capacity of the subjects in power relations, and it will be emphasized that this agency capacity can be revealed by performative actions against the norm areas created by militarism. It should be noted that the agency referred here is a position of resistance that differs from the "autonomy of the subject", which Foucault suggests can be achieved by "the ethic of care for the self". In the Butlerian sense, what we mean by agency is that it refers to the performative construction of the subject, and in the context of conscientious objection, this construction will occur through subjects manifesting performative actions in the hegemonic struggles against the normalization techniques of militarism. Second, conscientious objection will be resignified in terms of both as a form of concept and the mode of action, in line with the recommendations of performative politics, after commenting on the short history of conscientious objection in order to comment on the agency capacity of subjects within the militarist society. Our aim in interpreting conscientious objection with creative repetitions is our opinion that these interpretations will lead to a space for the performative actions that we think will allow the agency of the subjects. In the last section, examples of "practices of conscientious objection as a form of performative action" will be discussed which we think will enable us to base our opinion.

I. Agency Capacity of the Subject

Before addressing the potential of subjects to provide their agency within power relations, we must state that Foucault sets power relations apart from the state of domination (Foucault, 2014, p. 245). Because, the possibility of the agency of the subjects becomes fully conceivable with Foucault's approach on concept of power. According to the thinker who states that he does not understand a political structure, a government or a dominant social class when "power" is mentioned, but power inevitably exists in all human relations. The relations of power that can be grasped as a relationship in which a person tries to direct someone else's behavior are active, contingent relations and they are not invariably given (Foucault, 2014, p. 235). In this context, we can indicate that every established power relationship can change and reverse. In this environment where the parties to the relationship are likely to constantly direct each other's behaviors, each subject must be somewhat free, in order to establish this relationship. In a situation where each subject has a certain degree of freedom, one cannot determine the other, and in other words, domination is no longer in question. Foucault explains this situation as follows:

> If one of two people becomes completely under the control of
> the other, and his thing becomes the object of infinite and limitless
> violence upon him, there are no power relations here. There must be
> at least a certain level of freedom on both sides to implement a
> power relationship. Even when the power relationship is completely
> out of balance, even when we can say that one has all the power over
> the other, any power can only be applied on someone else when
> there is a possibility open for that person to kill himself, jump
> through a window or kill the other. This means that there is a
> possibility of resistance in the relations of power, because there

would be no power relationship without the possibility of resistance (Foucault, 2014, p. 236).

In defining the relations of power, the idea that power can only be applied to free subjects does not mean that subjects are already free or an agent. But what is important here is that defining freedom as a precondition for power opens up the path before an ethical questioning. According to this understanding that Foucault defines as "the ethic of care for the self", freedom perceived as the ontological condition of ethics. Autonomy then can be understood as the expression of the tendency to direct the construction of an ethical subjectivity through the genealogy method which Foucault uses to question the processes in which humans turn into subjects. In the part where we discuss the elements of genealogy, we can ask the question of "Why this kind of thinking (genealogy) can be considered as a political practice?" based on Judith Revel's definition of genealogy. We can answer this question as follows: Foucault presented the conditions for constructing the subject as an ethical subject through the method of genealogy. In this context, genealogy can be considered as a political practice, as long as it suggests a questioning (one's own questioning) that creates the conditions for the idea of resistance against authority. If freedom is a prerequisite for power, and free subjects have the possibility to change and reverse the power relations they are involved in, or, as it can be understood from the genealogy method, if the subjectivities constructed as immanent to the power relations are determined contingently in different knowledge/power systems in different periods of history, then an environment in which the subjectivities of subjects can be constructed in a different way by questioning, where subjectivities can construct themselves as ethical subjects and autonomous subject positions can be formed. What defines the subject position, which we address as an ethical or autonomous subject here, and gives

it a political meaning can be considered as the individual's self-determination of the consciousness (subjectivity) which an individual establishes with himself and the possibility that the individual can avoid being an object of knowledge for power relations being able to resist the subjectivation modes imposed on him.

The practice of autonomization of the subject, which Foucault suggests as "the ethic of care for the self" with reference to Ancient Greek thinking, is shaped around the basic command: "Worry about yourself!" (Foucault, 2014, p. 226). In other words, the possibility for the autonomization of the subject is connected with a questioning attitude towards itself. In the first chapter, we have talked about the critical attitude Foucault had adopted when embracing the questions as in "What is my actuality? What is the meaning of this actuality?" that is the legacy of the enlightenment thought as a reference to Kant. The critical position in which Foucault is positioned in these questions is close to the subject that he thinks can be reached by a method of criticism not immanent to its own autonomy, not the transcendent autonomous subject which differs from Kant. In this context, it can be asserted that the subject's possibility of autonomy is possible by adopting an attitude constantly questioning his own actuality, and by thinking about the power relations, which subjectifies him through the method of genealogy. Thus, we can talk about the possibility of resistance against authority for the subject who performs his relationship of consciousness built with him in a critical-questioning manner.

The first part of our study can be read in the form of an effort to explain the determination of subjectivity within the power relations that transform people into subjects from the very beginning. The genealogy method we have dealt with in this

context has opened the door to the ability to consider the establishment of a different subjectivity setup in terms of both explaining the subjectivation technologies of power relations, and also showing that these relations can be established contingently in different historical contexts. So we can also think that the agency of the subject, which is what is meant with a different subjectivity, may be possible in the discipline society that Foucault referred to in his book The Birth of Prison, and in the militarist society, which we claimed can be thought of together with the discipline society in the previous chapter. Conscientious objection, to the extent that there is an attitude against authority, can be conceived as a refusal of militarist society to which the disciplinary power aims to create through the "recruitment dispositive". In other words, conscientious objection can be thought of as an attitude to the subjectivity that the disciplinary power tries to determine by internalizing the norms it creates. The reason we care about this attitude is that we think that the practice of conscientious objection can be understood as an expression of a stance against the whole of a society established in the broad sense of military service, not an attitude towards military service. Therefore, the practice of conscientious objection can be read as an expression of a resistance against all of the manhood-femininity norms, ethnic identity categories, the norm producing institutions / discourses of the authority, the forms of exploitation that operate on the body that bio-power aims to shape through instrumentalization by militarism, in short, all forms of subjectivity bio-power targets to shape for the purpose of increasing economic dynamics on the human body and the social body.

Foucault did not specifically address the issue of conscientious objection in his writing, but expressed the following on rejection of military service in his lecture at College de France on 1 March 1978:

Refusing to be a soldier and to spend some time in this profession and activity, refusing to bear arms, appears as a form of conduct or as a moral counter-conduct, as a refusal of civic education, of society's values, a refusal of a certain obligatory relationship to the nation and the nation's salvation, of the actual political system of the nation, and as a refusal of the relationship to the death of others and of oneself (Foucault, 2013a, p.176).

Based on this point, it can be argued that the rejection attitude, according to Foucauldian approach on conscientious objection, is considered to be an ethical counter-attitude based on the *ethic of care for the self,* and excluding the *reason of state*.

On the other hand, we can state that Butler is fed by the analysis of power carried out by Foucault over genealogy method in establishing the relationship between subjectivation and normalization (internalization of norms). In this context, Butler proposes to address the attitudes that will be developed against the techniques of subjectivation of power, along with the attitudes to be developed against normalization techniques as she looks into the field of norms differentiating from Foucault. In the second chapter, we have explained the approach of queer theory to the attitudes to be developed towards normalization through the concepts of hegemony, performativity and disidentification. In our opinion, the approaches of queer theory to these concepts allow us to determine the direction of Butler's thought, differentiating from Foucault's thinking in the context of resistance, if her particular interest in explaining the formation of norms is marked. More specifically, we can argue that Foucault does not refer to hegemonic articulation in the context of resistance, attached special

importance to performativity as in Butlerian thinking, and did not point to the productive effects of disidentification.

At this level, according to Butler, resistance can be realized with an attitude against normalization, in our opinion to be more comprehensive, attaching special importance to all the positions of subjectivity that are excluded from the field of norm, rather than a philosophical questioning activity (the ethic of care for the self) that the subject carries out. This attitude is interpreted by the performative actions to expand the field of norms and the suggestion of disidentification. In this context, the point we want to draw attention to is that in queer theory, the idea of the resistance or the agency of the subject is addressed through the hegemonic struggles established by the excluded groups together rather than the philosophical questionings of the individuals. Butler's approach to struggles and emancipation can be understood from this chapter in her speech Queer Order and Anti-War Politics "Another reason why we are here is to remember that no minority, who has been discriminated against, cannot be free without all minorities being liberated" (Butler, 2011). In other words, according to Butler, the agency of a subject in the position of a minority can only be made possible by the hegemonic struggles carried out by all the subjects in the position of a minority, so that these struggles can be conducted on the basis of the counter-hegemonic struggle that we mentioned in the previous chapter. In our opinion, Foucault's approach on conscientious objection can be understood through the ethics of care for the self while Butler perceived conscientious objection as one of the struggle positions we have mentioned. In this way, the possibility for a subject with conscientious objection to acquire agency will only be available as long as this subject questions and resignifies the normative field that also affects other multiple subject positions, in

other words, to the extent that it contributes to "hegemonic struggles". In the following section, after referring to the short historical background of the practice of conscientious objection, the discussion will be on the aspects of the agency position, which we claim the subject with conscientious objection can achieve through questioning the norm areas, corresponding to the formation of queer subjectivity. In addition, if it is necessary to mention it already, the fact that the conscientious objector to be conceived as a queer subject requires the resignification of conscientious objection as both a concept and a form of action. In the next section, we'll explain these resignifications.

II.   A Short History of Conscientious Objection

> Viewed historically, in the beginning conscientious objectors were religious dissidents who justified their disobedience of secular laws on the basis of their obedience to the laws of God and consented to state repression instead of risking isolation from their religious community (Bröckling, 2008, p.70)

The emergence of conscientious objection for faith-based reasons is supported by the following statements by Moskos: "Modern conscientious objection was first observed in America. Because pacifist religious beliefs were important for the British colonial settlers in North America, and the ideas of individualism, freedom of conscience and religious tolerance were important" (Moskos, 2005). In this historical context, the main motivation of conscientious objectors was their own religious reasoning, rather than objecting to the rules of the state established to ensure the continuity of the militaristic society founded on the basis of war. Therefore, the attitude of conscientious objectors in that form was readable as an expression of a

bond between the act of rejection and the faith rather than an attitude that prioritized the prevention of wars.

In the period from the late nineteenth century to the twentieth century, this bond between conscientious objection and faith began to loosen, and then it was resolved (Bröckling, 2008, p. 71). In addition to the unraveling of this bond, as conscription and secularism emerged the secularization of conscientious objection began to take place, so that the political meaning of the acts of refusal expanded with the participation of conscientious objectors reacting for other reasons than the religious ones. "Conscientious objection, in parallel to this individualization and secularization process, has been politicized by both the state authorities and the pacifist and anti-militarist groups" (Bröckling, 2008, p. 71). An example of this politicization would be the effect of anarchism. "A distinct pacifist movement that developed in Europe in the 19th century took its inspiration from anarchism. "The refusal to serve in this tradition was based on the principle of rejecting the legitimacy of the claim for state's rights over citizens" (Zürcher, 2008, p. 59). While this political expansion of the meaning of conscientious objection led to the emergence of anti-militarism, which involved multiple positions with an absolute attitude to war, according to Bröckling, the process coinciding with the period between the two world wars, led to the crushing of conscientious objectors with the rationalization of war. Because, for example, the development of the atomic bomb in the process following the technological developments in this period allowed an absolute war to be possible that did not require the absolute mobilization of society against war. In other words, these developments enabled the war to continue with the participation of a few volunteers who were trained to use technical equipment.

On the other hand, as a result of the destruction caused by the conditions of war and the escalation of the anti militarist struggle which developed an attitude towards this destruction, the state authorities began to make regulations on conscientious objection and reinterpret the rejections by developing political attitudes in accordance with the logic of administration. In our opinion, the two important results of the approaches of the states regarding conscientious objection respectively are the emergence of the public servants and eliminating the environment of non-conformity initially expected to be created in the army order by the groups that are considered to be out of the norm by assigning these individuals, who are members of these groups, with conscientious objection right. Since the states provided legal regulations allowing exercising the compulsory military service as a public service, these states were facilitated to provide social security services without transferring any special financial resources (Bröckling, 2008, p. 75). In this way, public servants have become an element that eases the economic burden of the state. Another result relates to groups that are considered non-norms or to be harmful to the military order. In order to give an example to this situation, Bröckling states that it is noteworthy that the section on the freedom of conscience and faith are in the same article in the regulation of the German Constitution on conscientious objection and in this way, it is possible for religious minorities and persons who may be "harmful" to the army order not to perform military duty.

> The positioning of conscientious objection within the same clause as freedom of faith and conscience indicates the intention to protect religious minorities, such as Jehovah's Witnesses, and so on, from criminal prosecution..It was observed that legalized conscientious objection was very suitable to the military structuring needs of the

time..Keeping potential 'insurgents and the weak' outside the barracks from outset seemed to make more sense than attempting to make effective soldiers out of them through intense, and perhaps futile, efforts. Arms, transportation and communication systems were too sensitive and expensive to be handed to unwilling and therefore unreliable personnel. As a fundamental right, conscientious objection served as a filter that kept away those who could be ' sand in the wheels' of the military (Bröckling, 2008, p.74).

III.   Queer Approach on Conscientious Objection

In this section, in which we aim to evaluate the question of conscientious objection through the performativity approach of queer theory, basically conscientious objection will be considered together with the resignification, which is the suggestion of the performativity approach. More specifically, we can state that the main objective in this chapter is resignification, or in other words queerization of conscientious objection as both the concept and the mode of action. In line with this goal, first of all, before going into the resignifications, we will mention the conceptions to be avoided on the meaning of conscientious objection, and the concept of performative politics (resignifying militarism) repeating power relations, which we believe that these conceptions can produce. Afterwards, the forms of conceptions and modes of action towards queerizing the conscientious objection will be explained. In this context, the resignification of conscientious objection will allow us to consider it as an important mode of action that opens the way to the formation of queer subjectivity that we think will create the opportunity for the subject with agency.

1. Conceptual Queerization of Conscientious Objection

1.1. Insights that may be Obstacles to Queerization

1.1.1. Signification by the State

The first understanding to be avoided on the conception of conscientious objection in our opinion is to address the practice of rejection in a way that the state legitimizes it. As pointed out in the historical context, the states, by introducing conscientious objection into a legal scope, have added a political meaning to the issue in accordance with the requirements of the military structuring of the period. If we need to think considering the civil servant, which is the first of these significations, prevailing the individuals who do not want to take part in the army to do public service carries the risk of attenuating the attitude of conscientious objection against militarism, which is an expression of objection to all aspects of society that is founded based on war. Thus, the notion of public service, which addresses the short-term individual interests of the objectors (the idea that I would do public service rather than serving in the army) may lead to the absorption of the political meaning of conscientious objection by individualizing it. On the other hand, since the attitude of the states in the historical process, by including conscientious objection into the legal scope, functioned so that groups that are considered as non-normative (ethnic, religious, sexual minorities, etc.) and individuals who may potentially give damage to the army, are not held responsible for the compulsory military service, this attitude, serves both to reproduce the limits of the normative field, which denotes the marginality of the "marginals" determined by the knowledge/power spiral, and to reproduce the militarist understanding on providing the salvation of the institution of the army.

In this context, adopting and repeating the political stance of the state, which will lead to a resignification of conscientious objection, produces counter-performativity for queer politics running to expand the scope of the norm. Therefore, we can state that such an orientation of the meaning of conscientious objection developed by the state authorities should be avoided in terms of queer policies, which propose to mark the anti-militarist struggle as a position of resistance by expanding the norm field.

1.1.2. Compulsory Military Service

The second understanding to be avoided regarding the conception of conscientious objection can be considered as an attempt to address the issue only through the opposition of compulsory military service. We will argue that such an understanding will have three negative consequences in the struggle for resistance against militarism. The first of these is the risk of narrowing the area of struggle in a way that gives privilege to men. "...the conscientious objection carries a risk of re-creating patriarchy that is immanent to militarism, and heroize male objectors due to the fact that military service is a legal requirement for men alone" (Altınay A. G., 2008, p. 129). As stated, this will lead to the consolidation of militarism, as it carries the risk of reproducing patriarchy immanent to militarism. "Questioning militarist values and practices (eg military service) to the extent that they are identified with masculinity requires questioning the concept of dominant masculinity" (Altınay A. G., 2008, p. 132). Therefore, even in political actions against militarism, which is constructed as one of the most important tools of patriarchy, we can say that there is a risk of male domination immanent to these actions. The queer perspective, fed through the feminist literature, provides a wealth of arguments that can contribute to the resignification of conscientious objection by questioning this risk area and criticism of heterosexism

against understandings which perceives conscientious objection over gender in the context of compulsory military service to re-produce militarism/patriarchy. Thus, it will become possible to define conscientious objection, except for men as a mode of action, as an inclusive position of resistance that allows it to be adopted by people with different sexual orientations, such as women, homosexuals, transgender individuals. The conscientious objection of women or homosexuals in this level, although not held liable to compulsory military service, becomes understandable as an effective political resistance position in the context of their objection to militarism, which reproduces the heterosexist order and thereby leading them into a disadvantageous situation in this order of things. From this point of view, if we comprehend queer through LGBT individuals in the narrow sense, then, objecting statements below by Mehmet Tarhan, Turkey's first gay conscientious objector, is noteworthy to see how transforming queer perspective can be among conscientious objectors:

At that time, I was close to the circle of conscientious objectors but here was a situation: As I was a faggot objector, I was a phony objector. There was no other gay objector before me as we know of. During the time when I was announce my objection, the women objectors were discussed whether it is possible. İnci Ağlagül was going to announce with me, they convinced her not to on the way. Then, in 2004, she announced it. Here it was, I was still a bit objector since I had a weeny. Between you and me, they said "You would still be discarded as unfit". That is what many male objectors did to female objectors too. That's why I had thought about the female objection issue a lot (Öğünç, 2013, p. 65).

Another negative result of conscientious objection to be understood through compulsory military service can be understood in the context of the professionalism trend of the armies, which we underlined in the section on the historical process.

"…more and more states are no longer seeking the source of military personnel in compulsory military practice. 20 out of 47 European states now have a professional army" (Bröckling, 2008, p. 76). Considering that the trend of professionalism will continue in this way, despite militarism changing its form, since the need for compulsory military service decreases, the rejection act faces the risk of loss of meaning in the context of the act of conscientious objection. Because when the compulsory military service is eliminated, the situation that objectors object will be eliminated too. In other words, the act of conscientious objection becomes inconceivable as an expression of opposition to militarism, and is squeezed into the issue of compulsory military service and loses its political meaning. In this context, the professionalization tendency of the armies corresponds to an improved form of the instrumentalization of the militarism by bio-politics. In the first chapter, with reference to Foucault's ideas, we have stated that the new norms that the biopolitics aim to produce together with its utilitarian approach calculating the anomalies are shaped according to the dynamics of the liberal economy. If we read the professionalisation of the armies through the state attitude that regulates the legal scope of conscientious objection, we can argue that this attitude functions to reproduce the defined normality, and to keep the potential "marginals", who are considered non-normative and may damage the technological equipment, away from the army by "rewarding" them with the right to conscientious objection in order to protect the material resources of the institution of the army. Thus, bio-politics, besides contributing to the maintenance of efficiency of economic dynamics, determines the anomalies by placing the social body on its target. Therefore, this technology, which we have described as the advanced form of biopolitics instrumentalizing militarism, now aims to determine the subjectivity of individuals through the social body biologically condemned to the

economic dynamics they are involved in rather than bodies that are expected to comply with certain norms, as in the case of disciplinary power. In other words, the economic efficiency that is expected to emerge to the extent that it cannot be achieved by the compulsory military service begins to be provided through professional armies. The point we want to underline here is the risk of depoliticisation of obejction actions in an environment where biopolitics instrumentalizes militarism in a multidimensional manner by targeting the social body, in the event that conscientious objection is understood through conscription. The queer perspective has the potential to function as the basis for the opposition of depoliticization of conscientious objection actions with its attitude as it demonstrates a political conception towards the expansion of the scope and norms, and a questioning against all normative fields that bio-politics computes and determines to maintain domination.

The third negative consequence of understanding conscientious objection through compulsory military service is the risk of objection act to lose its political meaning and be shaped through individuality and morality, which we will question at a more philosophical level. In order to address militarism from a queer perspective, in our opinion, it is important to conduct a questioning about whether conscientious objection is a political or moral action. Because the act of conscientious objection, which can be defined as the expression of an opposition to militarism, will be considered successful as long as it can transform the phenomenon it opposes, this success must be realized as a political and collective agency beyond the relief of the objector's conscience. However, the conscience is seen as an expression of value based on the subjective definition of the individual in the philosophical sense (Toker, 2012, p. 220). In other words, any action based on conscience is disabled with morality rather than being

political. What we mean by political is not the descriptions about the subjectivity of the individual, but the values that characterize society. In this respect, conscientious objection is a mode of action which the individual puts forward in order to protect his/her self, moral integrity and value. For example, the conscientious objector expressing willingness not to participate in the war due to his own moral values, or to not to perform compulsory military service, indicates that he is not an individual against war, but merely wishes not to fight and is not willing to perform compulsory military service. It cannot be concluded that the conscientious objector in this case is involved in a political action against militarism. Because, anti-militarism requires adopting an attitude against all institutions of the society founded based on war, beyond the rejection of compulsory military service or non-participation in the war. In this context, the attitude to be described as a state of political action may be anti-militarist struggle. Therefore, understanding the issue of conscientious objection through compulsory military service is an attitude that should be avoided, as it may lead this issue to be limited to morality and individuality, and lose political meaning.

1.2.Insights Enabling Queerization

In this study, since we aim to reveal the transformative role of conscientious objection and resignify it in line with the proposals of the queer perspective, we will discuss the insights that we think will allow us to consider conscientious objection as a form of performative action. In this context, the insights we think may enable queerization of conscientious objection will be explained as follows: law-justice tension, conception of mourning-nonviolence-vulnerability, conception of hegemony, and proposal for disidentification.

1.2.1. Law-Justice Tension

It may be useful to look at Nilgun Toker's definition of conscientious objection before addressing the tension between law and justice:

> Conscientious objection, based on the decision not to comply with the law which means 'the general good' of the society and not to fulfill the obligation required by this law in order to protect the individual's own self and moral integrity in cases where the individual's value or his 'good' does not coincide with the collective value or 'good' of the society, is the expression of a subjective, individual attitude actually due to this nature (Toker, 2008, p. 80).

But if we keep in mind the fact that the legal one may not always be fair, we point out that there is a tension between the individual good and the common good, and that this tension coincides with the tension between the law and the justice we are talking about. So, there may be a conflict between the individual's obligation to obey the law and his moral obligation to protect his own value in case of a conscientious objection. In this case, assuming that a law that would break the moral integrity would not be fair, and the positive law would assume it this way, then conscientious objection should become a law to be adopted in accordance with the principle of justice. At this point, we can argue that a law which does not match the moral values of the conscience mentioned above can be problematized in terms of the principle of justice. But it should not be forgotten that this law can be problematized in accordance with the principle of justice that the law should carry, not based on conscience (Toker, 2008, p. 84). Therefore, conscientious objection, as its name implies, is a conscience-based action, but since even a conscience-based action makes the tension between law and justice visible, this action becomes inappraisable just with its moral dimension

and is politicized. However, for moral reasons still, there is a risk of an objection to the law to fall to the paradigm of conscientious objection we have mentioned above. This risk arises from the law (or the mechanism of power) accepting only the moral value of the demand, in which case we cannot talk about the transformative effect of conscientious objection. So, the law can also protect the moral integrity of the individual, but may also absorb the political transformation potential of the objection act. Thus, conscientious objection cannot be regarded as anti-militarism. Because, anti-militarism requires a political agency that is exactly expected from the objection act. Since we are trying to resignify the matter with a queer perspective, we must point to the performative transformative potential of conscientious objection. Toker argues that this transformativity can go beyond the individual and the moral, and can interpret and realize conscientious objection through the concept of civil disobedience in a collective and political context. In other words, we can state that we can reach the performative meaning of conscientious objection by establishing the link to it to civil disobedience. "As opposed to conscientious objection, civil obedience is the name of a non-subjective, collective attitude, as it is an 'objection' defined in the tension of legality and legitimacy, where civil obedience can be defined in the declaration of a law that is against human dignity, would not be fair and legitimate" (Toker, 2008, p. 85). At this point, it is necessary to think whether there is a possible political relationship between conscientious objection and civil disobedience. The political relation that we refer will correspond to our attempt of resignifying conscientious objection based on the understanding of civil disobedience. So, if we address and resignify conscientious objection act in terms of the possibility of showing 'evil' and making it visible to the society albeit in moral terms, we can also argue that it carries a politically transformative potential that can open up a field to debate and criticize the

107

law and state policy, and expose law-justice tension. The transformativity we refer to can be understood in this context and the practice of conscientious objection becomes conceivable in terms of queer theory. Any different repetition to reveal the law-justice will allow us to address conscientious objection in a queer perspective.

1.2.2. Mourning-Nonviolence-Vulnerability

Judith Butler, in her interview *Antigone's Claim*, states that through the aforementioned law-justice tension, we can read Antigone's act as a war critique, Antigone is a female character in Greek mythology, and is punished for burying and mourning her brother Polyneices, who died for breaking the law despite the fact that her uncle, the King banished her. At the same time, Antigone is a character not allowed to speak since not considered a "citizen". Butler cares about the story of Antigone, who opposes the king's commandment, despite being pushed out of discourse and forbidden by law. Because Antigone, both represents a "totally naked woman" facing the reason of man, and the individual rebelling against the law as well as allowing debating justice against the law by breaking the routine on whose deaths can be mourned for (Butler, 2008). In this context, we can state that Butler hailed Antigone as a figure that opened up a space for us to read politics through the concepts of mourning and nonviolence as we mentioned in the section above. On the other hand, Antigone, despite its all-out and excluded positions, acts as a model for conscientious objectors with her resistance attitude, mourning for the deaths prohibited by the law and taking into account the consequences of this action.

In this respect, the demand of conscientious objectors can be considered as a demand for justice against the law. The space opened by the Antigone example also

allows us to rethink our vulnerability, according to Butler, in an environment of violence (eg, militaristic society) produced by law or power mechanisms. In this environment, justice can be demanded with the recognition of the vulnerability of our lives, and a deed of mourning the deaths of all those with positions outside the norm. With this attitude, Antigone reminds us of the vulnerability of life and presents an example of functioning anti-war politics and the anti-militarist struggle over vulnerability. The point we want to emphasize here is the contribution of queer theory's conception of mourning and nonviolence to our resignification of conscientious objection as a resistance position through these concepts. In this way, conscientious objection, together with the meanings that we think could be attributed to it by the queer theory; will become the expression of a position of resistance that we can resignify on an inclusive theoretical basis over the concepts of vulnerability, mourning and nonviolence. "To think of Antigone's claim today, as Butler suggested requires thinking of her as an opponent of war who struggles for fragile lives such as immigrants, paperless, those affected by poverty, the global economy, and religious minorities and who oppose the arbitrary and mighty arm of the power (Yıldız, 2014, p. 408).

1.2.3. Hegemony

In addition to this, while we consider conscientious objection from a queer perspective, we think that we can resignify "excluded" groups as a position of resistance within their counter hegemonic struggles. At this point, what is meant with excluded are the positions of subjectivity that are pushed out of the norm areas established in the militarist society through the power relations. Struggles will emerge when these positions of subjectivity come together to form counter hegemonic

struggles, which we have stated in the theory of hegemony. If we recall the argument that the bio-power carries out the subjectification activities by instrumentalizing militarism, and read conscientious objection as an attitude against these subjectification activities, we can say that the act of conscientious objection cannot be limited only as being anti-war, anti-conscientiousness or anti-militarist, but can also be understood as an attitude against the subjectivation techniques of bio power to influence all of the norm areas. In this context, conscientious objection appears as a position of resistance against all the subjectivation techniques that the bio power aims to achieve by targeting the individual and the social body. In the second chapter, we have stated that militarism functions not only over creating the norms to construct a war-based society, but also in tendency to determine all norm areas to ensure domination such as citizenship, masculinity-femininity, homosexuality and nationalism. On the other hand, we have pointed to the formation of a situation in which attitudes producing domination towards these normalization/subjectivation practices can be adopted by feminist, anti-capitalist, anti-nationalist, anarchist etc struggle fields and articulated onto each other in the form of counter hegemonic struggles. It is possible to read each of these forms of struggle as the attitudes towards bio-power technologies for the autonomization of the positions of subjectivity excluded from the normative field. On this very line, conscientious objection can be considered not only as an appearance of anti-militarism or anti-militarist struggle, but also as a concept and mode of action for questioning the whole of the normative field. The attitude towards questioning the norm areas, in our opinion, will emerge as a result of the resignification of conscientious objection with a queer perspective. Because, objectors, as all other excluded positions were exposed to, are exposed to the techniques of normalization of biopower, the theory of hegemony, together with the

demands that all these positions will form, point to the organization of a struggle against normalization and the horizon of this struggle. In the previous chapter we have described this horizon, which is pointed out by hegemonic politics, as queer subjectivity. In this context, conscientious objection can be resignified as a position of resistance within the hegemonic area pointing to the formation of queer subjectivity and can be articulated onto the alliance of other excluded positions.

1.2.4. Disidentification

In another respect, we can state that there are valid reasons for resignification of conscientious objection through the proposal of disidentification of queer theory. In this context, keeping biopower's dispositive of recruitment in mind, we can cite the first article of the Military Service Law of the Republic of Turkey to set an example to our subject: "All men who are citizens of Republic of Turkey are obliged to complete military service in compliance to this law" (Military Service Law (1111)). As can be seen in this example, it is required for an antecedent identification process to occur for this obligation for the state to hold individuals as obligated to military service. The first of these identifications is being Turkish, which is "ethnic" identity based on the definition of citizenship, and the second is masculinity as a gender identity. These identities also enable the subjectivation of individuals. So, we can say that biopower must identify individuals in order to recruit them. Conscientious objection, as we have mentioned above, to the extent that it is considered as an expression of an attitude by biopower against subjectivation technologies, becomes comprehensible as a disidentification attitude towards biopower.

111

In our opinion, the conscientious objector's rejection of military service imposed on him, when considered together with the proposition of queer theory, may transform conscientious objection into a more comprehensive practice of resistance, as the objector rejects the identities (ethnic, sexual, etc.) imposed on him. In the section on hegemony, we mentioned that there could not be a natural basis to legitimize a political act. Here, what natural basis refers was explained as a position of identity in itself. In this line, we can conclude that conscientious objection actions cannot be legitimized on the basis of identity positions (being male, being Turkish, etc.) considered natural. In other words, if the political actions of conscientious objection are carried out through identity positions considered as natural, we can say that it will be closed into itself, fall into the trap of identity policy and lose its transformative potential. In order to eliminate this risk, queer's criticisms of all identity positions, including the criticism of heterosexism, provide suggestions that can reveal the transformative potential of actions. Because queer perspective does not points its attention to the differences of identity positions in "the self", but the plurality of these differences, and focuses on a new horizon of resistance that will emerge from this plurality. For example, this tendency towards pluralism is defined as the policy of queer multitudes with the expressions of Beatriz Preciado, and to carry out this policy requires the deontologization of the subjects. "The policy of queer multitudes originates from a critical position towards all the normalizing and disciplinary influences that constitute the identity and the effort of deontologization of subjects of identity politics" (Preciado, 2013, p. 332).

On the other hand, if we cannot legitimize the actions of conscientious objection over a natural identity position, that is, if there is no natural basis to do so, we can

112

argue that this form of political action can be legitimized by a built-up position and its transformative potential can be revealed. The built-up position at this point can be conceived as queer subjectivity. The construction of queer subjectivity will take place during the process of hegemonic political struggle, in which the particularities come together as they attempt to represent the universal. To put it more clearly, in order for this position (queer subjectivity) to be formed, a certain political struggle position (conscientious objection), must set a new horizon through performative actions by destroying the identity constantly. For conscientious objectors, we can state that this horizon can be treated as queer subjectivity. In this context, we believe that addressing conscientious objection as a suggestion of disidentification by resignifying it through the proposition of queer perspective, will contribute to its transformative potential.

2. Queerization of Conscientious Objection as a Form of Action

In this section, we will look at the forms of performative action in which conscientious objection will reveal the transformative potentials of the subject's agency.

2.1. Conscientious Objection Practices as a Form of Performative Action

2.1.1. Declarations on Objection

The first one is the performative action, which begins with the decision to not carry out the compulsory military service and is based on the repetition of this act. What makes this act a performative one is, firstly, that the individual establishes himself as a conscientious objector subject by resignifying his subjectivity, and by objecting all subjectivation modes imposed on him by the power mechanism. For example, conscientious objectors undertake creative repetitions of the mode of subjectification

of power by demonstrating that being a man, being a citizen, having a particular ethnic identity would not be enough to define themselves as a military subject, and that the duties and responsibilities imposed on these subjectivation modes can be replicated in a different way. As we mentioned in the second chapter, performativity is the action that both constructs and resiginfies subjectivity. In addition, "The realization of a performative action is possible with the expression of a discourse" (Görgülü, p. 5). In this context, the second thing that makes the act of objection performative is the expression of the objection which are the declarations on objection. Third, the act of conscientious objection, which has a meaning in the repetition of non-conduction, has an effect on the resignification of certain concepts (law, justice, etc.) by drawing attention to a tension in the political sphere. This effect is due to the performativity of the action, which is constantly repetition of the action. As we mentioned in the previous section, even if conscientious objectors opposed the law, their actions may include demand for justice. Therefore, we can think of conscientious objection acts as repetitions to reveal the law-justice tension. Thus, conscientious objectors, with their performative actions, they constantly remind the society of this tension and create a doubt that the legitimate may not be fair and serve the re-signification of the law.

2.1.2. **Perfomartive Actions against Militarist Representations**

The second example we will describe as the performative forms of action for conscientious objection is the touristic and artistic activities carried out on transforming military representations. These activities are performative actions aimed at drawing attention to the architectural structures that are the reflection of the militarist structure and a number of representations that produce the culture of martyrdom and to reinterpret the meanings of these representations with creative

innovative repetitions. We can follow the traces of these activities held under the name of Militourism festival in different cities of Turkey at different times in the context of performative politics in the paragraph below which summarizes these activities:

For example, Gülhane Military Medical Academy (A case of apples was dropped for analysis for unfit, apples were subjected to eye and taste control by police officers accompanying us on the grounds that they could contain hazardous material) which issues unfit/fit reporthomosexual military candidates in Istanbul asking or a video recording of the homosexual relationship for these reports, thus having the largest gay porn archive, and Selimiye Barracks next door where opponents were kept during military coups and subjected to intense tortures as well as Military Prisons of Mamak in Ankara and Şirinyer in İzmir, the big train stations in the three cities, which are the starting points of militarism (the importance of military and imperial elements in the construction of these train stations during the military coup periods is explained and a concert was held), the major military regions including NATO-owned barracks in the same three cities, the military equipment manufactures or suppliers as well as companies owned by the army in Turkey (weapons in a can are left at a company's can store owned by the army), war cemeteries (one of them was in the region where the Kurds were forced to migrate because of the war), military museums and regions where national heroic monuments are (where the real identity of a memorial was revealed, who was called a civilian national hero, but was actually an agent-provocateur) were visited, and then then the borders on the world map with antimilitarista/conscientious objectors coming from other countries were dismantled, street demonstrations were held including street festivities and theatre plays; performances

in which war, army and organized violence were questioned
(Başkent & Atan).

2.1.3. Mothers of Conscientious Objection

Third, we will try to consider conscientious objection as a performative form of action, which we believe can be shaped through the identity of "motherhood". What is meant here is that the act of conscientious objection is performed through the maternity position. The reason why we care about motherhood is the view that mothers have a significant potential for resistance in the context of militarism. "For the armies, mothers are potential opponents to rebel when their sons are killed, and thus they are a threat to war effort (Gedik, 2011).

> "Because mothers, when they act against the system with the loss of their sons, they activate the public conscience too. This finds a great resonance in society and the unquestioned structure of the militarist system begins to break" (Demir, p. 4).

But we can argue that this potential that the mothers carry for resistance is recognized by the mechanism of power. Because the states, if it is required to consider through a Foucauldian perspective, in order to break the potential for the risk of this resistance, place the mothers, who lost their children during the military duty, in the category of "mothers of martyrs" in the spiral of knowledge/power, sanctify the grief of the mothers and allow the militarist system to be reproduced through the position of motherhood. At the same time, the motherhood of martyrdom is readable as a activity of subjectivation of mothers by bio-power. In this case, the fact that mothers are conscientious objectors can be understood as an expression of an attitude towards the activity of subjectification by the power. "For this reason, militarist practices need

mothers to be on their side; otherwise, the politicization and mobilization of mothers poses great danger for the continuation of the system and the legitimacy of military actions" (Demir, p. 5). In this context, it should be noted that; the reason why we treat motherhood as an identity is not to point to its biological aspect, but to conceive of motherhood in the form of a position created by the subjectivation of power. The mothers' embracing of the attitude of conscientious objection can be read as a performative action, from a queer perspective, which points to the disidentification of motherhood identity. Therefore, the first thing that makes this action performative is the resignification of maternity as a position of anti-war subjectivity towards subjectification activity on motherhood. Secondly, mothers' realization of the act of conscientious objection can be read as a creative/subversive repetition of motherhood position. Because, mothers, as women defined by the heterosexist system, are the individuals who have the potential to overthrow the femininity norms defined by this system (in the sense that they are the complementaries of the dominant masculinity and they are the breeders of the healthy soldiers of the army), and thus will be able to open space to overthrow the current meanings of female identity through their performative actions which we defined over conscientious objection. Third, understanding mothers as the most mournful of the loss of their children in public opinion enables us to evaluate their conscientious objection performance together with the proposition of mourning and nonviolence of the queer perspective as it points to the constituent aspect of mourning act. In this respect, the conscientious rejection performances of mothers could open up a space for eroding and resignification of the normative frameworks of power that frame which lives are worthy and which deaths can be mourned for.

117

2.1.4. Women of Conscientious Objection

Finally, we will consider the practice of women's rejection as a performative form of action that will queerize conscientious objection. The objection to women to be conscientious objectors is related to the fact that they are not obliged to compulsory military service anyway. However, women are open to be affected by the military obligation because they can be spouses, siblings or mothers of men who are liable for military service. Therefore, the openness to this effect provides a basis for women to become conscientious objectors. In this context, we can state that there are no obstacles to defining women as conscientious objectors.

Thus, since the objection of women is the expression of an attitude against conscientious objection only in the context of compulsory military service, it obtains a performative meaning that queerizes conscientious objection both as a concept and a mode of. On the other hand, the objection of women can be understood as an attitude to militarism, which is an extension of the male-dominated system that makes women secondary, and an attitude towards the normalization techniques of bio power, and can be considered as a queer attitude in this sense. In addition, women performing conscientious objection can be perceived as an ethic attitude in the queer sense, as it points to militarist society established by "recruitment dispositive" carrying not only them but also their relatives (wives, siblings, children, etc.) to a fragile position. On the other hand, when women announce their conscientious objections, they also open the way for conscientious objection to be embraced by positions of identity and subjectivity other than men, thus contributing to the formation of queer subjectivity, which can be shaped by the disidentification of the movement, by preventing the struggle for conscientious objection from falling into trap of identity politics. In this

respect, the performative acts of objection of women is readable as an attitude that queerizes the anti-militarist struggle in terms of establishing a position of hegemonic struggle against the normalization techniques of militarist society in the movement of conscientious objection. Finally, to the extent that the conscientious objection of women is an expression of the objection to the heterosexist gender norms in which militarist society tends to determine, we can say that it can be read as a performative form of action in the context of creative repetition of the femininity norm the system refers to.

In this chapter, we tried to evaluate the practice of conscientious objection, one of the visible forms of action of anti-militarist struggle, through the theory of performativity theory of queer theory. In making this assessment, firstly, after discussing the short history of conscientious objection, a discussion was carried out to reveal the political meaning of this practice.

From the conclusion we have drawn from our discussion, after pointing out the aspects that should be avoided to understand this form of action, in order to address the practice of conscientious objection from a queer perspective, examples that we think will lead to resignification of conscientious objection as a concept and a form of action have been mentioned. In general, in this context, conscientious objection can be considered as a position of resistance among the positions of queer struggles when considered together with the hegemony and performance theories of the queer perspective, and to the extent that this position of resistance is an expression of the stance against the subjectivation techniques of bio-power, it implies an opportunity towards the agency of the subject. At this point, this is not an agency in the sense of

being outside of the relations of power or being influenced by the mechanism of power. The queer perspective provides emancipatory political proposals for subjects to live together with their "differences" and expanding the scope of norms and increasing comprehensibility. In this context, we think that the agency of the subjects can be realized through performative actions that will provide a stance against the modes of subjectivation/normalization that power constructed to establish domination and acceptance of multiple subject positions with their "differences". Therefore, the agency we have pointed out through the queer perspective is not a process in which individual attitudes are carried out, but a process in which multiple subjectivity positions reveal their political attitudes towards the fields of norm. In this process, the subject is expected to continually expand the normative area that frames identity positions with through performative actions. In this respect, conscientious objection, as mentioned above, is a form of action that is open to performances and resignifications. On the other hand, the productive effect of the attitudes of conscientious objectors to the field of norms and the performative actions towards disidentification is that they contribute to the formation of the "ambigious" resistance position, which we refer to as queer subjectivity. In this respect, we can argue that the path to the agency of the subject can be opened to the extent that conscientious objection is resignified as a concept and follow the suggestions of performative politics as a form of action, as a result of the political attitudes of individuals who are objectors that contribute to the formation of queer subjectivity.

CONCLUSION

In this study, first of all, based on Michel Foucault's analysis of the power, following the explanation of an approach on the processes that subjectivates individuals, the effects of the form of power, conceptualized as bio-power, on the body and the social body of individuals are evaluated in the context of the construction of subjectivity. It has been pointed out that subjectivity, through the approach in which we consider power as a relational concept, is established in a contingent manner within the power relations. Thus, it is pointed out that different subjectivities may appear in different power relations.

Secondly, militarism is considered as an instrument used by bio-power to achieve subjectivation and this instrumentalizing mechanism is tried to be explained with the help of Foucault's dispositive (mechanism) concept. In this context, the mechanism used by power relations to construct subjectivation through militarism is defined as "recruitment dispositive". Dispositives in short, are mechanism consisting of discursive (norms) and non-discursive (institutions) elements regulating the relationships between these elements by the logic of power. The non-discursive element or institution of conscription dispositif is considered as the army and the discursive element as subjective experiences produced through norms. In this respect, the subjective experience produced by the power mechanism is explained as the category of "the individual eligible for military service", and how through this category, power has the tendency to determine subjectivity through the norms that it sets by drawing normative frameworks related to masculinity, citizenship, sexual identities, etc. It was mentioned that the formation of subjectivity was carried out by

internalizing these norms by individuals. In this context, it has been pointed out that disciplinary power, not only with the army, but in the form of militarism, within the framework of norms that surround the whole of society, determines the subjectivity. In other words, militarism is defined as a means of normalization.

In the second chapter, it was discussed how Judith Butler finds missing aspects in statements by Foucault that subjectivation was provided by internalization of norms, and by pointing to these missing aspects, it was pointed out the resistance ground that we think would contribute to the formation of a new subjectivity with the potential of resistance of the subjects in the face of the domination of power. This ground was first expressed as an area that allowed the resistance of subjects against normalization due to the nature of the psyche that resisted normalization as Butler suggests using the concept of "psyche" instead of "soul" against Foucault in order to define the means of power for subjectivation. Butler argued that the productive effects of the repression and prohibition of power can be explained by the concept of the psyche rather than the soul. On the other hand, Foucault's interpretation that subjectivation is provided as the soul is materialized under the body was criticized according to Butler for failing to question what limits the borders of materialization. In order to fill this deficiency, Butler pointed out that there was an "area of incomprehensibility" outside the area of materialization and claimed that this area constantly remained uncertain providing subjectivation. The uncertainty of this area also points to the existence of a productive mechanism that opens the door to new forms of subjectivity. This productive uncertain area, which Butler has highlighted, is readable in our opinion as the place where the resistance ground is shaped, in which queer subjectivity will emerge as a special position.

In the following section, Butler's argument that subjectivation was achieved by the "area of incomprehensibility", was evaluated by Ernesto Laclau's hegemony theory. The theory of hegemony, in which particular or subject positions are interpreted through the system of differences surrounding them, arguing that the continuity of the subjectivities established within this system is carried out with each position realizes itself attempting to represent the "unfixity area" outside the system differences is in parallel with the views of Butler attributed to the productive uncertain field in terms of its approach on uncertain area ensuring the continuity of subjectivation. The position of queer subjectivity, which we claim to be formed through this field, can be manifested in a process in which the demands of all positions that are in opposition to the normalization techniques of power can be articulated and this articulation will be constructed through opposition to normalization. These articulations are evaluated over equivalence chains and counter hegemonic struggle concepts constructed by the hegemony theory.

Anti-militarism, on the other hand, has been addressed with the aspects that allow the formation of queer subjectivity as a field of struggle where the demands of all the multiple subject positions (feminism, anti-nationalism, anti-authoritarian movements, etc.) that are opposed to militarism, which we define as a norm system which is an instrument of domination. The contribution that we think queer would provide to the anti-militarist struggle was addressed through the aspects of the position of queer subjectivity signifying resistance, which we argued could be formed by the productive uncertainty inflicted on the part of the queer articulating these multiple subject positions.

In the final chapter, conscientious objection, one of the forms of action of anti militarist struggle, is resignifed as a performative form of action which we believe will contribute to the anti militarist struggle. As a result of these resignifications, to the extent that conscientious objection is perceived both as a position of struggle within queer politics, and also as a field where performative politics can be conducted, it is addressable as a field of struggle that allows the formation of queer subjectivity, which will be manifested by the articulation of political demands against normalization.

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