Urban Refugees and Education in the Contemporary World:

A Case Study of Pakistani Christian Refugees in Bangkok, Thailand

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Abstract

The study of education for Pakistani Christian refugees in Bangkok, Thailand (a developing country) identifies a problematic gap between the type of basic literacy education provided by INGOs (International non-government organisations) and the academic education desired by refugees in order to take them beyond literacy. I build the argument that the persistence of the educational gap can be explained by the location of today's refugees outside the nation-state system. My original contribution to the refugee literature is the thesis that within the lacunae created by the absence of inclusion policies by developing countries for contemporary refugees, an older structure of patron-client relationships has been re-activated. INGOs now operate as patrons and refugees are their clients. The study of the Pakistani Christian refugees in Bangkok is used to illustrate the argument.

The thesis takes a historical sociological approach to establishing the argument. It includes a history of refugees to show that a distinction between migrants and refugees occurred in the post-1970s' decades which changed the earlier pattern whereby refugees often became migrant workers, even citizens, in developed countries. A new pattern has now emerged, one characterised by the permanence of the refugee status. Many refugees now exist in developing countries such as Thailand without access to the rights of citizenship. Their physical location within the nation but outside the nation's socio-political system leads to the symbiotic, yet unequal, patron-client relationship that I theorise in the thesis. That inequality operates as the co-dependency between the INGO providers and the recipient refugees seen in the exchange of social services and in the ongoing educational gap.

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Chapter One - Introduction

The purpose of this thesis is to examine contemporary refugee experiences and educational provision in the urban areas of 'pre-resettlement countries' (or developing countries). An account of Pakistan Christian refugees, one of the largest refugee groups in Bangkok, Thailand (Winter-Villaluz, 2015), is used to theorise the structures, processes, and relationships affecting this provision.

The study identifies and examines the gap between the refugee parents' aspirations for their children to receive academic education and international non-government organisations' (INGOs) provision of basic emergency education (basic literacy), a gap found in the community learning centres in Bangkok. The refugee parents aspire for academic education because they believe that this type of education has the potential to lead to professional qualifications and employment opportunities. The hope is to position their children as desirable migrants rather than as unwanted refugees – making them attractive as permanent citizens in Western countries. However, the INGOs' provision of basic emergency education inhibits this potential.

The study explores the nature of the exchange relationship between the two parties – the refuges and the INGOs - in order to explain the ongoing persistence of the gap between the parents' aspirations and INGO provision. The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) is the main refugee organisation partnering with other INGOs operating in Bangkok. These INGOs established the Bangkok Asylum Seeker and Refugee Assistance Network (BASRAN) in order to provide social services, including education, for the refugee communities. BASRAN represents "a number of organisations and individuals in Bangkok, including the UNHCR, Bangkok Refugee Centre, Jesuit Relief Services, Asylum Access Thailand, a number of churches, grassroots organisations, and devoted individuals who are working directly with the refugee population" (Asylum Access, 2014, n.p). I will use the terms INGOs and providers interchangeably throughout this thesis as the overall term for these organisations.

The study was undertaken at two community learning centres operated by the Action International and Rescue Organisation (pseudonyms – see Chapter Four). It is used to

identify and illustrate the thesis argument that a problematic gap exists between the INGOs' provision of education and the academic education desired by the refugees I interviewed. My participants were refugees who fled Pakistan and who are unable to access schools and higher education institutions in Thailand.

Thesis aim and Argument

The challenge for my thesis was to explain not only the gap between INGO provision and refugee expectations, but also to explain why the gap persists given that INGOs claim to be committed to the interests of refugees. In order to explain this gap, I have developed the thesis argument that the internal socioeconomic problems of pre-resettlement countries situate incoming refugees outside the host nation-state system. The exclusion policies of these countries permit the INGOs to build a structural relationship with refugee communities for the provision of social services, including the exchange of education. I use the concepts of 'patron' and 'client' to theorise the relationship as one that is structurally unequal. 'Patron' refers to the INGO providers whose primary purpose is to provide social services and protection. 'Client' refers to the refugee communities who exist in extra-national conditions. This creates their dependency on the INGOs. The relationship provides ongoing advantages for the organisations but locks the refugees into a permanent recipient status. I claim that theorising the INGO-refugee relationship in this way, as one between patrons and clients, may also provide useful insights into understanding refugee education in the urban areas of other pre-resettlement countries.

Locating providers and refugees within a structurally unequal patron-client relationship which operates extra-nationally enables me to situate the analysis of the Pakistani Christian refugees in the broader geopolitical system rather than limiting the analysis to the Thai context. Therefore, in building my argument, the first aim of the thesis is to situate the Pakistani Christian refugees' experiences in the larger historical and political context in order to identify that the geopolitical forces which shape the provision of social services for contemporary refugees – including education -. This macro-level approach involves examining the policies of Western nations and the UNHCR with respect to refugees social, legal, and political rights (UNHCR, 2015). It also enables a discussion of the migrant-refugee distinction. Who is a 'migrant' and who is a 'refugee'? The former is a desired worker for developed nations, the latter someone who is seen in a dependent state.

The geopolitical analysis is not limited to the present. It recognises the sociological imperative that all social change is historically situated. For that reason, I include a description of the changing nature of refugee experiences from ancient times to the 21st century. The older history prepares the groundwork for my patron-client argument while the more recent history provides the context for the migrant-refugee distinction to be made. That distinction between 'refugee' and 'migrant' was enforced in the post-1970s' decades to change a 'golden era'- from 1945 to 1970 – (Suhrke & Newland, 2001, p. 285) when many refugees became migrant workers and citizens of 'resettlement countries' (the liberal Western countries). Many of today's refugees imagine themselves in the post 1954-1970s way as potential migrants whereas, the INGO providers see refugee populations within the circumscribed refugee status established in the post-1970s decades. The conflicting standpoints about 'migrant' or 'refugee' status from the two parties contribute to the educational gap between the refugee expectations and INGO provision.

The second aim of the thesis is to theorise what type of relationship exists between the INGO social service 'providers' and the Pakistani Christian refugee community. The lack of socio-legal structures and limited access to social services from the Thai government shape the foundation for the relationship between the INGO providers and the Pakistani Christian refugees. Although Thai law allows all children, including refugees, to have access to basic education, the language of instruction, distance from school, and general discrimination impede the refugee parents from enrolling their children in Thai schools. Consequently, the refugee parents enrol their children in community learning centres operated by INGOs. So the relationship operates outside the institutions and policies of the nation, in this case, of Thailand.

It was here in considering that relationship that patron-client theory provided a useful analytical and explanatory tool. According to Eisenstadt and Roniger (1980, p. 44), the patron-client relations offer "a less structured exchange of diverse services and resources" to take place, "while the solidarity between patron and client [is] much weaker" compared to the nation-state system. The patron-client concept enabled me to identify the components of the relationship; components such as unaccountability, power relations, and co-dependency. These enabled me to identify the mechanisms of the inequality between the INGO 'patrons' and the refugee 'clients'. Interestingly, patron-client theory supported my historical approach

as the patron-client relationship has operated since classical times according to various accounts (Roniger, 2015; Eisenstadt & Roniger, 1980). The patron-client relationship is pre- and extra-national so it provides a way to theorise inequality outside of modern national institutions, the very place where many refugees find themselves today; unable to secure citizenship and the rights attached to citizenship status.

My third aim was to examine the relationship between INGOs and the Pakistani Christian refugee community in terms of the provision-expectation gap that I identified in the study at the community learning centres (see Chapter Six). Using the patron-client concept I wanted to know if the ongoing nature of the gap could be explained in terms of the fundamentally different interests which exist between the two parties, and which are structured into the relationship so that there is little chance of mediation. The inequality remains fixed, in other words. The refugees want an academic education for their children, one which they believe will lead to professional qualifications and the possibility of being 'selected' by a developed nation, perhaps to fill a skills shortage as a welcome migrant. This type of education is seen, using Bernstein's words (Bernstein, 2000; Moore, 2013) as the way to 'interrupt' a life trajectory that appears fixed by the circumstances within which individuals find themselves. However, the possibility of 'interruption' is affected by more than the normal constraints experienced by citizens of nation-states. The refugee status itself is determined by these geopolitical forces outside the control of individual nations. The additional constraints experienced by refugees occur within this geopolitical context that, I will argue, is itself responsible for situating refugee populations as either permanent refugees or migrants. I pose the question about whether refugees' aspirations for academic education can be fulfilled in the contemporary refugee context given these supra-national constraints.

In contrast to the aspirations of the refugee parents for an academic education, the basic emergency type education being offered at the Bangkok community centres serves as a mechanism for 'reproduction' (Apple, 1975; 1978). In other words, education offers no way out of disadvantaged conditions and contributes to permanent inequalities. In fact, in the case of the Pakistani Christian refugee students I observed and the parents I interviewed, their circumstances are likely to be worsened by basic education. In the (likely) event that they are repatriated to Pakistan, because that country provides academic education, the returning children will have lost many years of access to academic schooling, thereby increasing their disadvantage in Pakistan.

Other studies, although not numerous in number, have also explored urban refugees' educational experiences in pre-resettlement countries (Dryden-Peterson, 2015; Karanja, 2010a; 2010b). Winter-Villaluz's (2015) study examines how the Pakistani Christian refugees in Bangkok use "social capital to address lack of access to education" (p. v). However, there is a scarcity of research which specifically examines the provision of education by INGOs in terms of its implications for contemporary urban refugees in pre-resettlement countries. I have undertaken an extensive study of the contemporary refugee situation (see Chapters Six and Seven), and I claim that my use of patron-client theory is an original contribution to the refugee education literature particularly within the context of sociology of education (Dryden-Peterson, 2011a; 2011b; 2012; 2015;2016a; 2016b; Karanja, 2010a; 2010b; Winter-Villaluz, 2015; Campbell, 2006; Campbell, Kakusu, & Musyemi, 2006; Grabska, 2006; Jacobsen, 2004, 2006; Landau & Jacobsen, 2004: Landau, 2006; Pavanello, Elhawary & Pantuliano, 2010; Hedman, 2009; Crea. T.M. et.al, 2016; Hammad, 2017; El-Shaarawi, 2015; Hoffstaedter, 2015; Waters & Leblanc, 2005). I claim that my use of patron-client theory is also an original contribution to the refugee literature - related to the UNHCR's program implementation and 'repatriation only' policies (Crisp, 2001; Waters, 2001; Betts & Collier, 2017) - in that it locates the inequality between the INGOs and the refugees in a structural relationship which remains fixed because it is in the interest of the INGOs themselves to maintain the privileging role of 'patrons'.

The providers and the refugees

I will develop the argument in subsequent chapters to show that the provision of social services in Thailand creates a relationship between the Action International and Rescue Organisation and the Pakistani Christian refugee community that demonstrates a complex interplay of conflicting interests. The INGOs' provision does give a degree of security and offers some stability. However, the approach is an ongoing emergency one, consisting of basic services such as literacy programmes about how to function in the Bangkok transport system, for example. There is tension between what is offered and the reality the refugee lives as a long-term resident in the city, a tension serving as a destabilising force in the limited security environment that my participants found themselves in Thailand. What was created in the relationship between the INGO providers and the study participants was a

complex co-dependency. The task I set myself in this thesis was to understand this relationship.

Patron-client theory provides the conceptual tool to show how the social services provided to the refugees are controlled and distributed by INGO providers with implications for each party in the relationship: the providers, the refugees, and the refugee education system more broadly (Freedman, 2015; Donnelly, 1986; Roniger, 1983, 2015; Scott, 1972a; Wolf & Silverman, 2001; Hunt, 2002; Nicols, 2014; Stein, 1984; Eisenstadt & Roniger, 1980; Galt, 1974; Hall, 1974; Foster, 1963). I discuss this theory and how I use it as an analytical and explanatory tool in Chapter Four. My purpose here is to introduce the ideas and how I use them in subsequent chapters to explore how the power and control of the providers operates in the engagement between the INGO and the refugees (Freedman, 2015; Donnelly, 1986; Harrell-Bond, Voutira & Leopold, 1992; Bariagaber, 1999). Despite the providers' claim that they offer resources to interrupt the refugee status, I argue that the patron-client relationship does in fact create a structural unequal relationship between the two parties. The unequal relationship is ongoing because it advantages the providers – the 'patrons'– and disadvantages the refugees. With a combination of inequality, power, and control, the INGO providers and the refugees exchange social resources. This includes the exchange of education between the two parties.

Research Questions

I used the following questions as a 'way into' examining contemporary refugee education, asking:

1. Why does an ongoing educational gap exist between the refugee parents' educational aspirations for their children and INGOs' provision of education in the community learning centres?

2. In what ways do the geopolitical forces influence contemporary refugee situations in pre-resettlement countries, an influence seen in the education for the Pakistani Christian refugees in Bangkok?

3. What kind of relationship is being established between INGO providers and the Pakistani Christian refugees in the education exchange?

Language

The thesis uses the term 'refugee' broadly to refer to displaced people who are forced by persecution and war to flee their country of origin rather than to an institutionalised legal status – asylum seekers or refugees. In contrast, according to the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO, 2017), "migrants are people who make choices about when to leave and where to go" in order to have a better life for them and their children.

I also use two key terms: pre-resettlement and resettlement countries. A pre-resettlement country is a developing country where refugees are living on a temporary basis with limited support from the host nations. According to UNHCR (2019a), 80% of the refugee populations are currently being hosted by pre-resettlement countries where they are being excluded from the benefits of host's nation-state system. In contrast, a resettlement country is a country which has agreed to admit refugees with a permanent residence status. The refugee status in resettlement countries provides refugees and their families "with access to rights similar to those enjoyed by nationals" (UNHCR, 2011, p.3), and also offers them the opportunity to eventually become naturalized citizens. Usually resettlement countries are the liberal Western countries: the United Kingdom, Canada, USA, Germany, Australia, New Zealand, and the Scandinavian nations.

The contemporary context

With rising conflicts and intense persecution in the 'Global South', a large number of people have been displaced from their country of origin and forced to seek refuge in neighbouring countries (Hollifield, 2004). The Global South is a term often used for the developing countries of Africa, South America, and most of Asia. Displaced peoples also include Pakistani minority groups, such as the Christian community in my study, who have had to leave their home country because of growing religious persecution in Pakistan (Gabriel, 2013). According to Winter-Villaluz (2015), more than 11,000 Pakistani refugees reside in Thailand, of whom most are Pakistani Christians. My study selected four Pakistani Christian refugee families representing the Pakistani refugee communities in Bangkok.

Most of the developing countries, including Thailand, are not signatories to the 1951 Refugee Convention and its protocol of 1967. This is because developing countries have budgetary

constraints and can barely provide social services for their own citizens (Hill & Hult, 2016). As a consequence, pre-resettlement countries, including Thailand, are reluctant to integrate refugee communities into their social, political, legal, and economic institutions. The Thai legislation, moreover, does not allow urban refugees to work in Thailand despite the lack of access to the national institutions (Frelick & Saltsman, 2012; TCR, 2016; Winter Villaluz, 2015; Stevens, 2018). The limited provision of social services creates a major problem for Pakistani Christian refugees in terms of protection and social services such as shelter, food, health, and education. However, the aim of this thesis is limited to examining the provision of education to refugees in Bangkok, specifically the gap between the refugee parents' aspirations of their teenagers receiving academic education and the INGOs provision of basic education.

In contrast to today's refugees in pre-resettlement countries, the provision of social services was less of a problem for historical refugee communities, particularly after the Second World War. This is because in the prosperous decades of the 1950s and 1960s the support from resettlement countries and their 'nation-state' system enabled refugees to integrate into the growing economies and to thereby 'interrupt' their marginalised refugee status. By interruption, in this case, I mean refugees often became migrants and then citizens of the host countries, a pathway much less available in the post-1970s' decades. In the post-Cold-War era, however, the open-door refugee policy has been replaced by restrictive policies, where most refugees are being confined to pre-resettlement countries – holding places (Chimni, 2004). The global economic decline from the 1980s with its low demand for unskilled labour and the massive influx of refugees from the Global South were the reasons which induced Western countries to shift the policy (Chimni, 2004). The new refugee policy uses INGOs to deliver social services in those developing countries rather than allowing refugees to integrate in resettlement countries (Mertus, 1998). In the 21st century, more than 60% of refugee populations currently reside in urban areas of the world (UNHCR, 2009b) and although "UNHCR has an Urban Refugee Policy, it offers very little assistance in practice, with most urban refugees no tangible help" (Betts & Collier, 2017, p. 55). The Pakistani Christian refugee community, however, does receive limited support from the Action International and Rescue Organisation. This may include stipend, rations, and basic education through community learning centres in Bangkok such as the one(s) on which I conducted my study.

On the whole researchers have investigated refugees' educational experiences in resettlement countries where refugees have access to public schools and sufficient social resources, but still face various issues (i.e. acculturation, discrimination, racism, language barrier, and bullying (McBrien, 2005; Portes & Zhou, 1993; Rumbaut & Portes, 2001; Kirova, 2001; Mosselson, 2002; Allen & Franklin, 2002; Sinclair, 2002; 2007; Marlowe, 2010; Deng & Marlowe, 2013). There is a considerable literature about contemporary refugee challenges including harassment, discrimination, xenophobia, and exploitation of urban refugees in pre-resettlement countries (Fabos & Kibreab, 2007; Parker, 2002; Sommer, 2001; Campbell, 2006; Grabska, 2006; Hoffstaedter & Koichi, 2015; Jacobsen, 2004 & 2006; Landau & Jacobsen, 2004)).

My study investigates educational provision where there is limited access to public schools. On the one hand the providers such as the Action International and Rescue Organisation justify offering a basic or emergency type of education on the grounds that this will enable the refugees to cope with the daily conditions in which they currently live – conditions that may well last for many years. In contrast, the refugees hold out hope that if they were to receive an academic education, they would have a better chance of re-settlement selection in a developed nation. In addition, if a third option eventuates, that of repatriation to their country of origin (an option that is becoming increasingly likely), then their children will have maintained their academic education and be able to fit back into the school in the districts from which they fled. This education problematic was the reason for my examination of the gap between this basic education provided and the aspirations held by the parents, and also by those refugees who were teenagers. It is a gap that has opened up within the context of the contemporary restrictive policies, policies that have, to a large extent, closed down the possibility for refugees to achieve the status of desirable migrants to developed countries.

Geopolitical context

The geopolitical context within which refugees are placed has been shaped by social, political, and economic forces largely driven by the interests of Western nations. This context has changed over time as the need of these developed nations for workers has changed. I use a historical approach to explain how the changes to the global labour market have affected refugee communities in the fundamental ways.

The changes to the recognised status of displaced people as either migrant or refugee is most clearly seen in the massive displacement of people during and following the Second World War. Western nations, especially the United Kingdom and the United States, established the UNHCR in 1951 in response to such large-scale movement of people across borders and to deal with refugee crises in Europe. By 1967 the organisation expanded its operations to the rest of the world. It is significant for the understanding of the contemporary refugee situation that it was this organisation which established the international institutionalisation of the distinction between 'refugee' or 'migrant' (UNHCR, 2016a).

The post-Second World War economic expansion throughout the 1950s and the resultant high demand for labour blurred the distinction between refugees and migrants with many refugees resettling in Western nations and entering the labour force as desired workers (Long, 2011; Chimni, 2004). Additionally, the political tension between the West and the Soviet Union during the Cold War (1945-1991) also provided a welcoming environment for refugees in the West. However, the oil shock in 1973 led to a rapidly increasing unemployment rate in Western nations (Castle, 1986). The ensuing global economic recession in the early 1980s also contributed in restricting Western governments' recruitment of foreign workers, including refugees (Chimni, 2004). From this time, the economic decline of the West and the end of the Cold War initiated a major shift in refugee policies as the need for labour, particularly unskilled labour, lessened in the tightened economies of the post-1970s' decades. Unskilled refugees in large numbers were now seen as a burden on the labour market and the social systems of Western nations (Toft, 2007).

Between the 1980s and the 1990s, outbreaks of wars and civil conflicts in Asia and the Middle East forced large populations to seek asylum in the West. In response to what were termed 'refugee crises', Western nations secured borders, placed carrier sanctions on major airlines for transporting refugees, designed a refugee determination system – an institutionalised procedure to determine a displaced person status as a refugee or a migrant, and established strict visa policies for the citizens from what were referred to as 'fragile states' and 'failed states (Suhrke & Newland, 2001; Collinson, 1996; Betts & Collier, 2017; Tropey, 2000; Helman & Ratner, 1992). Fragile states are developing nations with weak social, political, and economic structures and without social provision and protection for their

citizens. Similar to fragile countries, there are many countries in Africa, South Asia, and Southeast Asia who became 'failed states' in the mid-1970s. Rotberg (2003) notes:

> Nation-states fail because they are convulsed by internal violence and can no longer deliver positive political goods to their inhabitants. Their governments lose legitimacy, and the very nature of a particular nation-state itself becomes illegitimate in the eyes and in the hearts of a growing plurality of its citizens. (p.1)

Both fragile and failed states became sources of refugee populations in neighbouring countries who longed to reach Western countries. These Western governments responded by taking steps to manage refugee populations from such states. Neighbouring countries in the developing world became known as pre-resettlement countries – temporary host countries for refugees. The shift to this form of management can be seen in three policies. First, the Western countries and the UNHCR resurrected the distinction between 'refugees' and 'migrants', a distinction used in the immediate post-war years (UNHCR, 2016a). Second, Western governments, including the European Union in 2016 and Australia in 2001, signed agreements with pre-resettlement countries (Turkey, Cambodia, Indonesia, Manus Island – Papua New Guinea) to constrain the refugee population to their territories (Boswell, 2003). Third, Western nations and the UNHCR's Executive Committee in 1983 supported the idea of 'repatriation' (Chimni, 2004; Stein, 1986) rather than resettling the influx of refugee populations in developed countries. The marked emphasis on 'repatriation' from pre-resettlement countries to the country of origin was in response to the overstretched social systems of these developing countries being unable to bear the burden of refugee populations in their territories (Stein, 1986).

The establishment of the three refugee policies for contemporary refugees has direct effects on the refugee status. Historically, refugee populations often became migrants. The period after the Second World War is a clear example of this (Bundy, 2016; Cameron, 1997). For contemporary refugees, however, pre-resettlement countries are no longer the first stage to a successful migration to Western nations, but rather have become, for many, a permanent state and for others a place of indefinite duration preceding repatriation. The Pakistani Christian refugees in my study are examples of refugees caught in this bind. They have three options: permanent resettlement in a developed country, remaining in the pre-resettlement country with restricted rights, or returning to their country of origin and facing additional persecution (I discuss this in Chapter Three). The chances of permanent resettlement in a developed

country are slim – "less than 1% of the world refugees' will be lucky enough to get that lottery ticket" (Betts & Collier, 2017, p. 19). The majority of refugees are caught between two unfavourable options; staying in a pre-resettlement country for many years without adequate social provision and protection or repatriation to their country of origin and return to persecution and marginalisation. Repatriation is supported by the UNHCR, resettlement, and pre-resettlement countries because all these stakeholders view refugees as a burden and are unwilling to take on this burden.

International non-government organisations' role

This section provides an introduction to the role of INGOs for urban refugee communities in pre-resettlement countries. Because my thesis examines the relationship between the INGOs and urban refugee communities, particularly Pakistani Christian refugees it is important to establish the role of INGOs. Pre-resettlement countries such as Thailand do not include refugee communities in their social systems. This leaves a vacuum for INGOs to provide social services and protection to refugees in those developing countries. Usually the INGOs are financially supported by Western countries and for two reasons: first, it helps these countries to maintain refugee populations in pre-resettlement countries instead of their own territories (Toft, 2007); second, it is a less expensive option. According to Betts and Collier (2017, p.3), "[f]or every $135 of public money spent on an asylum-seeker in Europe, just $1 is spent on a refugee in the developing world" (these amounts are in US $).

The United Nations Higher Commissioner for refugees is the main organisation providing protection to refugee communities in pre-resettlement countries and attempting to find a durable solution for ongoing refugee crises (UNHCR, 2011; 2014). The protection of refugees means that the UNHCR delivers humanitarian aid to refugees in emergency situations (Crisp, 2001). The UNHCR also has a supervisory role in respect to the implementation of the 1951 Refugee Convention and its 1967 Protocol. The UNHCR, however, tends to offer limited social services and limited financial support for urban refugees in pre-resettlement countries (Betts & Collier, 2017; Koizumi & Hoffstaedter, 2015). As a consequence, the UNHCR has established a close relationship with international refugee organisations (see above) in order to provide social services to the refugee communities (Koizumi & Hoffstaedter, 2015). According to a UNHCR (2014, p. 27) report, "[i]ts operational partners now include more than 740 international and national NGOs".

Given this difference between the aims of the UNHCR and the actual services provided I wanted to know what type of education was provided by the Action International and Rescue Organisation to Pakistani Christian refugees in Bangkok whom I studied.

Educational gap

My study of the educational provision to Pakistani Christian refugees in several Bangkok community centres by the Action International and Rescue Organisation showed the gap which existed between the basic education provided and the academic education desired by the refugee community. Indeed, the gap was more than about vague aspirations that remained unfulfilled. The refugees were very clear about what they wanted for their children. For example, one of the refugee parents said that "he wanted his teenager to receive academic education in order to become a mechanical engineer" (P4, Int., Nov 2017). Yet from the Action International and Rescue Organisation position it appears that any provision was considered beneficial and, thus, only willing to provide basic literacy education.

The issue of the type of education provided is complex. The parents wanted an academic education for their children because they believed that this would lead to the professional qualifications that may turn their children from 'unwanted refugees' into 'desirable migrants'. Academic education contains dualistic features. On one side, this type of education can fulfil the refugee parents' instrumental aspirations. On the other side, I argue that this education is essential for the development of mind enabling refugees to think, understand, challenge, and interrupt their ongoing refugee status. Yet, as I show in Chapters Two and Three, the question of 'refugee to migrant' or 'migrant to refugee' is bound up with larger geopolitical forces and processes. A pessimistic position is that however well-educated and well-qualified one is, if there is no demand for those qualifications, then the first option of settlement in a developed country is not in the offering. However, in the second option outlined above, repatriation, those with academic education may be able to obtain qualifications in their country of origin. Once again, however, this depends upon the degree to which returning refugees will be integrated into the society from which they fled. Yet education is about more than its instrumental purpose. Both a Marxist and a liberal view of education see an intellectual education as important for all people, including marginalised communities. According to Bailey (2010) an academic education is a humanising force:

> Liberal [or intellectual] education, in the sense of its concern for the intrinsically worthwhile, can only become available for all in a relatively wealthy society, that is true, but if a society becomes solely concerned with wealth production and no longer sees education as concerned with ends, then all becomes caught up in a pointless and particularly vicious and alienating circle. A liberal education, then, will be characterized by its capacity to liberate pupils from the pressures of the present and the particular, and it will do this by its concentration upon what is fundamental and generalizable. (p.18)

For writers such as Gramsci (1971) and Bernstein (2000), an academic education enables individuals to recognise and challenge their conditions of existence, even if circumstances prevent them from changing those conditions. I include a fuller discussion about the humanising potential of an intellectual education in the concluding chapter.

Thesis structure – overview of chapters

Chapter Two discusses the history of refugees within the geopolitical context. I begin by examining how historical refugees were included in the nation state system of Western nations in the post-Second World War period. This chapter also explains the development of refugee policies in Europe and how these policies were shaped by three salient perspectives: social, political, and economic. I focus on the refugee history during the British Indian partition between Muslims and Hindus in 1947 in order to describe the marginalized position of Christians in Pakistan.

Chapter Three explains how contemporary refugees are being excluded from the nation-state system of the pre-resettlement countries – new holding places for refugee populations in the 21st century. This chapter first describes the reasons which led the Pakistani Christians to leave their country of origin. I also explore the economic, political, and cultural conditions which directed the international community to make amendments to refugee policies in the post-1970s' decades. The restrictions on refugees' movement to developing countries and the internal socioeconomic conditions meant that INGOs needed to provide social services to refugees in these countries. A lack of accountability and structural unequal power relations between the two parties enables me to theorise the social provision gap with an older patron-client concept.

Chapter Four describes the conceptual methodology of the thesis. I employ the concepts of 'nation-state', 'patron-client', and 'clientelism' and justify the methodology. Clientelism

illustrates the exchange of education between INGO providers and the Pakistani Christian refugees in the community learning centres I observed. These key sociological theoretical concepts provide the methodological tools for an in-depth explanation of the educational gap between the refugee aspirations and the INGO provision. Applying these sociological concepts to create such an in-depth account of Pakistani Christian refugees allows me to justify my argument that refugee populations exist outside the nation-state system within the older patron-client structures of socio-political relations. This chapter also describes the context of my empirical work with the Pakistani Christian refugees and the two INGOs in Bangkok. I include an account of the University of Auckland Human Participants Ethics requirements and cover matters of research reflexivity, research methods, and data analysis.

Chapter Five theorises the provision of education contemporary urban refugees as a problematic social exchange between the INGO providers and refugees. The chapter identifies the gap between the INGOs' provision of basic education and the refugees' desire for an academic education. The provider-refugee relations exist outside the national system and, as a consequence, the INGOs are not accountable to the refugees for the emergency approach of basic education – literacy. The refugee community, however, desire academic education to take them beyond basic literacy to intellectual depth.

In Chapter Six, the idea of the extranational patron-client relationship which is central to the thesis argument is discussed in depth. It begins with a historical overview of the patron-client relationship from the early Greek and Roman periods before identifying the characteristics of the patron-client relationship that existed in the part of the world where the organizations and the refugees of this study belong. My discussion includes an account of the patron-client relationship in the *Biraderi* (brotherhood) system in South Asia, including Pakistan. The purpose of the history is to show that prior to the modern nation-state this type of relationship was a common way to structure and regulate power inequalities between social groups.

Chapter Seven discusses why the education provision gap persists between the refugees' desire for academic education and the INGO provision of basic education. I use the clientelistic mechanism and the contradictory features of patron-client theory to theorise the existence and persistence of a gap between the two unequal socioeconomic parties. Moreover, I ask if the refugees' expectation of academic education can be fulfilled in the contemporary refugee system.

The concluding chapter presents the main argument of the thesis. I explain how both a Marxist and a liberal view of education see an intellectual (or academic) education as an important way for refugees to recognise and challenge their status as unwanted refugees despite the geopolitical context's deterrence.

Chapter Two - Inclusion: the history of refugees

Introduction

The aim of this chapter is to show how refugees were included in the nation-state system in the post-Second World War period. This chapter contains two sections. The first section examines the etymology of the word 'refugee' and how this word has evolved through major historical events, taking its current meaning in the post-1940s' decades. In this chapter I also theorises the concept of 'nation-state' which frames refugee legislation and policies. I also discuss how Western countries began adopting restrictive policies for refugees in post-First World War in the light of Nazi persecution of Jews from the 1930s.

The second section explores the social, political, and economic conditions of Western countries in the post-Second World War period. These conditions were favourable to the inclusion of refugees in the national system of these countries. The favourable geopolitical forces led to the establishment of the International Refugee Organisation (IRO) in 1946 and then to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) in 1951. The existence of UNHCR enabled Western nations to shift their policies from repatriation to resettlement in the post-Second World War period. This meant that refugees were included as desirable migrants, then as citizens, in the institutions of these nations. It was a 'golden era' for refugees (Suhrke & Newland, 2001, p.285).

The IRO and its successor, the UNHCR, were initially established to handle the refugee crisis in Europe only, but from 1967 the organisation extended its operations to the rest of the world in order to manage the increasing numbers of refugees in the Global South (UNHCR, 2010). Below I describe how the social, economic, and political conditions in the British Indian partition of 1947 show how religion played a major role in that refugee crisis. However, before examining the history of refugees, I begin the chapter by discussing the etymology of the word 'refugee' in order to support my claim that major historical events have contributed to shaping the definition of this word. For that reason, my account of these historical events is an important part of the overall building of the thesis argument.

Section I - Who was a historical refugee?

Migration is an ancient and common practice. People have always left their countries of origin to go to foreign lands in search of a better life in the face of famine, civil conflicts, persecution, and war. Indeed, 'refugee' and 'migrant' were still interchangeable terms during the First World War. However, the consolidation of the modern nation-state in the first half of the 20th century with its institution of citizenship saw a differentiation emerging between the two terms.

The English 'refugee' derives from the French word *refugie*, a word which originated in the centuries old word 'refuge' meaning shelter or sanctuary. *Refugie* has a specific meaning and first appeared in the 17th century (Online Etymology Dictionary, n.d.). It was used to refer to French Protestants, also known as Huguenots, who fled France due to the revocation of the Edict of Nantes (1598). The persecution forced approximately 400,000 French Protestants to seek refuge outside France. This historical event formed the meaning for refugee or *refugie* - as someone who is seeking refuge. However, 'refugee' was not a frequently used word at that time and seldom appeared in literature until it was revived during the First World War (Oxford English Dictionary, n.d.). Five million people were forced to leave their home during the First World War (1914-1918) and the Russian Revolution of 1917 and seek refuge in neighbouring nations (Bundy, 2016). These catastrophic events saw 'refugee' being used to mean those who flee their home because of persecution and war.

The Nation-state

Prior to exploring the refugee phenomenon in the early 20th century, I explore the concept of 'nation-state' in its historical context because this concept is fundamental to understanding the history of refugees, especially in the period following the First World War. The refugee organisational structure has been developed in a world where populations are organised with nation-state boundaries (Long, 2011; Keely, 1996). In the ancient world, kingdoms, city states, and empires were the main governing structures. These governing structures had wide porous borders in which monarchies and dynasties had absolute power to rule over their subjects. Populations of these empires usually identified themselves tribally, ethnically, and religiously. Territorial disputes and religious differences were the main sources of war and violence among the various empires in world history. The Treaty of Westphalia (24 October 1648) is usually understood as the key event signalling the fundamental change from

religious to secular authority, one enabling the development of the modern nation-state and the gradual shift from porous to fixed borders.

Social contract theory

The idea of the nation-state and its structuring principles, including governance of peoples within fixed territorial borders originated in the writings of three prominent political philosophers: Thomas Hobes (1588-1679), John Locke (1632-1704), and Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1712-1718). They rejected the necessity of hereditary rulership instead promoting the idea that "humans are, by nature, free, and equal" (Morris, 1999 p.ix).

Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679) held a pessimistic position about human nature. He (1651) wrote that "no arts; no letters; and which is worst of all, continual fear, and danger of violent death; and the life of man, solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short". For Hobbes' the state of nature was not a pleasant position. Hobbes (1651) argues that violence and wars disturbed the tranquillity of human nature by forcing human beings to turn against each other. Hobbes proposed that the violent state of nature could be interrupted:

> When men agree amongst themselves, to submit to some Man or Assembly of men, voluntarily, on confidence to be protected by him against all others. This latter, may be called a Political Common-wealth, or Commonwealth by institution and the former, a Common-wealth by Acquisition. (as cited in Schochet, 1967, p.430)

This idea of mutual agreement between individuals' and authority being located in a peoples' selected assembly laid the foundation for the nation-state concept. John Locke and Jean-Jacque Rousseau subsequently built on Hobbes' idea. Locke (1632-1704) saw humankind as free and equal by nature. The disturbance in this state of nature instigates humankind to constitute "a new artificial community by pooling their powers and resolving to act jointly and collectively to uphold their respective rights and liberties" (as cited in Waldron, 1989 p.5). The newly formed community – by the majority's decision – transfers their power to a state for the protection and the public good.

Similarly, Rousseau (1762) explained the relationships between individuals and state arguing that humans have freedom in the state of nature. But he argued that the absolute authority over fellow humans by coercion is not justifiable. In addition, Rousseau (1762) also suggested that the presence of competition and greed among humans contaminated the state

of nature, resulting in socio-economic inequalities. The complexities in the state of nature require a social pact among humans, so each one of them can preserve and protect their freedom. This argument further led Rousseau (1762) to propose a reciprocal social contract between individuals and the state. According to Carrin (2006, p. 917), in this social contract,"[the] individuals as citizens share sovereign power, but as subjects put themselves under the law of the state".

The social contract suggests that there is an inextricable relationship between 'nation' and 'state'. A nation is basically composed of diverse individuals with the common goals of protection, equality, and freedom. According to Keely (1996), "[a] nation exists when the idea is accepted by the members that they are a group, that they are unique, that the group has a continuity and value worth preserving because of its presumed shared characteristics, however the group conceives of such ties" (p. 1049). In multinational and multi-ethnic or religious societies, the concept of nation needs to be built on political uniformity rather than cultural, lingual, ethnic, and religious grounds to allow for co-existence within the one nation (Hobsbawm, 1996; 2012; Beruilly, 2015; Gellner, 2006). This agreement or contract allows members of different ethnic, linguistic, and religious backgrounds to co-exist within the one nation. In this way individuals' multiple identities lie under the umbrella of political 'national homogeneity' (Hobsbawm, 1996, p.3).

Morgenthau (1973) notes that the nation-state model actually started to thrive after the French Revolution (1788-1799). Within its territories, a national homogeneity was based on political unification which requires a governing body – 'state' – for the preservation and advancement of the nation. According to Keely (1996, p. 1050), "[the] nation ordinarily requires a state to provide internal order and to preserve and defend the nation in external relations, as well as to foster the life of the nation" (Keely, 1996 p.1050). The state preserves national values and develops nationalism by nurturing national language, culture, and national identity (Hobsbawm, 1996).

The nation-building process of the 20th century encouraged states to draw fixed territorial borders for maintaining protection and democratic and economic structures. Indeed, the First World War was a key event in fixing the borders of most nations in Europe?. According to Hobsbawm (cited in Beruilly, 2015, p. 645) "[the] liberal bourgeoise needed a large, constitutional national state with clear boundaries in order for industrial capitalism to

flourish". This formation of international borders, however, restricted the free movement of people – especially with new border security measures taken by each country to control the flow of people (Tropey, 2000).

The displacement of people is usually caused by deteriorating relationships within a nation and the inability or refusal of the state to protect all its citizens (Hein, 1993). Rata (2014a, p. 81) argues that these three components of the modern nation-state "the nation, the state, and the citizen" need to remain in balance. Displacement occurs when the state cannot provide the protections of citizenship to all its people, particularly those from religious and ethnic minorities. Pakistan is an example of a modern nation-state which provides not only insufficient protection but also restricts the freedom and equality of Pakistani religious minorities with blasphemy laws (Gabriel, 2013; Khan, 2003; Saeed, 2007). According to Khan (2003), the Pakistani government does provide limited democratic participation to its religious minorities however in last few decades, Pakistani authorities have often been unable to protect vulnerable Pakistani Christians against terrorist attacks and stop violence against religious minorities more generally (Gabriel, 2013). All the refugee participants in my study said that it was both Pakistani religious minorities such as Ahamdi (a Muslim denomination ostracised by mainstream Islamic groups), Hindus, and Christians. The notion of state protection to a nation's citizens – a political concept within social contract theory – also requires an understanding of the refugees' situation historically.

Political Perspective

The aim of this section is to explore how the refugee phenomenon is a political issue rather than to frame the refugee crisis as a humanitarian crisis. Loescher (1997, p. 511) argues that "the refugee problems of the 1920s and 1930s were political, as they are today." The state of being a refugee, or refugeehood, indicates the absence of political rights and protection provided by their state. This means that a state cannot provide the required protection of life, property, and freedom to its citizens.

The lack of protection in war, natural disasters, and persecution by authoritarian governments has forced citizens to seek refuge outside their countries. Long (2011) argues "[r]efugees are those who are unjustly expelled from their political community" (p. 232) but differing views are held about the role of protection and persecution in creating refugeehood (Price, 2009;

Shacknove, 1985; Ardent, 1967). Shacknove (1985) argues that refugeehood is more likely caused by a lack of protection than persecution. On the other hand, Price (2009) and Ardent (1967) suggest that refugeehood is in fact directly related to persecution, because citizens have unrecognized political rights. It is more likely to be a combination of inadequate protection and persecution which contributes to people seeking refuge outside their country of origin. One of the refugee participants in my study noted:

> *On one side, we face persecution in the hands of Islamic radical groups [such as Taliban] and on the other side the Pakistani government failed to provide us protection. They do not even treat us as the citizens of Pakistan. (P 3, Int., Oct 2017)*

The effect of this lack of protection in the originating country can also be experienced in the country which hosts the refugees. These people have no political rights in the host countries, a situation which puts pressure on the international community to find solutions that recognise the political issues in both originating and receiving countries. International refugee organizations have adopted three possible solutions: repatriation, local integration, and resettlement (Chimni, 2004; Long, 2011; Karatani, 2005). According to Long (2011), the core to solving the refugee crisis relies on the notion of restoring the refugees' status as citizens (p.233) whether in their country of origin or in the host nations.

Institutionalisation of the refugee phenomenon

In 1921, the League of Nations (LN) established the High Commissioner for Refugees and assisted Russian, Bulgarian, Armenian, and Turkish refugees. The LN defined the Russian refugee as: "any person of Russian origin who does not enjoy or who no longer enjoys the protection of the Government of the [Union of Soviet Socialist Republics] USSR and who has not acquired another nationality" (LN as cited in Fortin, 2000, p. 548-9). The LN similarly defined an Armenian refugee as:

> any person of Armenian origin formerly a subject of the Ottoman Empire who does not enjoy or who no longer enjoys the protection of the Government of the Turkish Republic and who has not acquired another nationality. (as cited in Fortin, 2000, p. 549).

These definitions of refugees suggest that the absence of national protection was the main criterion in determining the refugee status of a specific group. The idea of 'protection' refers to providing refugees' citizenry rights of the host nations on a temporary basis. Thus, the LN protected refugees by issuing a Nansen passport allowing the refugees to move freely in 28 countries. This passport allowed Eastern European refugees to work and legally reside in the

host nation, until the restoration of peace and stability in their countries of origin. After the restoration of peace and stability, many refugees were reluctant to leave their host countries, but since the refugees placed budgetary constraints on the host nations' social services (Gatrell, 2014) these nations generally? forced them to return back to their country of origin.

The LN solution to the refugee crisis in the 1920s was criticised because it protected a specific group rather than determining the refugee or migrant status individually (Goodwill-Gill & McAdam, 2007). The organisation only focused on providing legal assistance to refugees but did not address the refugee crisis itself (Metzger, 1996). In fact, the international community at that time was unable to develop a refugee policy which had the capacity to solve the crisis of large numbers of stateless people moving across regions which were establishing settled nation-state borders. Instead, they promoted the notion of 'repatriation' as the panacea for refugee crises in Europe.

Repatriation

Long (2011, p.232) argues that "[t]he logic of repatriation reinforces the organization of political space into bounded nation-state territories". Refugees' repatriation stems from the theory of *patria* which refers to two distinct components, physical location and the collective identity of a group. Repatriation is not only connected to territory but also to patria-as-community. Repatriation is basically the restoration of refugee groups' ethnic or religious identity through its political recognition of the refugee group in these terms (Long, 2011). Refugee organisations however, tend to focus on refugees' repatriation to their country of origin in a territorial way rather than on the political restoration of a group.

Repatriation was one of the key strategies used to solve the refugee crisis in the early 20th century. For example, in 1913, the Turkish and Bulgarian governments approved the voluntary citizens exchange programme (Marrus, 1985). In 1919, the Greek and Bulgarian governments' agreement, in the protocol to the Treaty of Neuilly, also included a voluntary population exchange programme (Hirschon, 2003). The population exchange agreement, the Convention of Lausanne in 1923, between the Greek and Turkish governments also provided a legal ground for 1.5 million refugees to repatriate (Hirschon, 2003). Despite the series of agreements of voluntary population exchange, coerced repatriation was in fact imposed on individuals.

The first voluntary refugee repatriation aimed to restore citizenship and political rights was organized in Soviet Union by the League of Nations (LN) Higher Commission of Refugees between 1922 and 1923 (Long, 2011; Karatani, 2005). However, the LN's intention of repatriation was focused on "high politics of European security" (Long, 2011 p.237) rather than on restoring citizen rights to refugees. The Russian government favoured repatriation as the way to build a strong Soviet Union. Nansen's representative in Moscow expressed in a report that "technical experts, men of science and commerce are essential for the development of Russia's agriculture, industry, and commerce" (Gorvin, 1924, as cited in Long, 2011, p.237). Academically educated citizens were wanted to contribute to research and development projects in the new Soviet Union. But academic education was also essential for refugees to gain control of their lives and enable them to have more choices to become a desirable migrant. I argue in the later part of my thesis that academic education remains important for contemporary refugees in order to liberate them from their challenging conditions. Despite the Soviet government emphasis on repatriation, the process only attracted 6000 Russian returnees (Long, 2011; Karatani, 2005). A large number of Russians displaced in the First World War refused to repatriate from the Western Europe to Soviet Russia (Karatnai, 2005), contributed to the refugee problems in the inter-war period.

The Nazi state's persecution

The systematic persecution of German Jews following the Nuremburg legislations in 1935 stimulated anti-Semitism, racial tension, and also restricted the Jewish community's citizen rights in the Nazi state. Explaining this refugee crisis, Simpson (1938) claimed, as cited in Long (2011, p.238), that the main problem was the racist national and systematic exclusivity which forced Jewish refugees to leave Germany. Repatriation was not a political solution because of the following reasons. First, the absence of citizenship rights in Germany for Jews made it impossible for the international community to repatriate them. Second, Nazi legislations and policies would not permit Jewish identity and political rights to be restored in Germany. Lewin (2005) notes that:

> Many [German Jews] hoped to go to the United States or other countries [Canada, France, Holland, Australia, and New Zealand], but Britain was the only country willing to accept such massive numbers of refugees, in part because their new Jewish Refugee Committee guaranteed their support. (p.136)

Despite the US commitment to freedom and democracy, the US had restrictive immigration policies toward refugees at this time?? (Bat-Ami Zucker, 2010), and in some cases refused refugees to enter to the country. Lanchin (2014) reports:

> On 13 May 1939, more than 900 Jews fled Germany aboard a luxury cruise line, the SS St Louis. They hope to reach Cuba and then travel to the US – but were turned away in Havana and forced to return to Europe, where more than 250 were killed by Nazis. (n.p.)

Restrictive policies

Although Germany's neighbouring countries (such as Belgium, Denmark, Switzerland, France, and Holland) accepted German Jewish refugees, they also had restrictive immigration policies for the refugees, which made it difficult for them to reach a first asylum country. Thompson (1939) as cited in Haddad (2008, p. 99) noted that "[i]t became a common experience for a refugee to find himself on a frontier, trapped between a country that had spat him out and a country that would not let him in".

In 1939, Jewish refugees were unwanted (Marrus, 1985) and the perilous border crossings were only one of the challenges. For example, Danish immigration only permitted entrance to those refugees who "carried a visa to a third country or had very close family links to Denmark" (Runitz, 2010 p.55). Swiss authorities also had stricter policies including closing their border to Jewish refugees (Ludi, Caestecker & Moore, 2010). Loescher succinctly summarised the Western nations' refugee policy:

> there was a broad consensus in almost every industrialized nation, particularly during the Great Depression that national interests were best served by imposing and maintaining rigid limits on immigration; that international cooperation on refugees had to be limited by tight fiscal constraints and the need to employ one's own citizens; and that no particular foreign policy benefits would be gained from putting political and moral pressure on refugee-generated countries or from accepting their unwanted minority groups or dissidents. (1997, p.512)

The restrictive immigration policies made it difficult for the German Jewish refugees to cross the international borders. Lack of food and severe weather conditions posed additional challenges for the refugees on the way to first asylum countries (Beaglehole,1988; Lewin, 2005). Arseny Tarkovsky (1907-1989) captured the refugee pre-arrival experience in the following poem:

Refugee

Translated from Russian by Philip Metres and Dimitri Psurtsev in 2015

You granted me some salt for the journey,
Sprinkled so much white it made me crazy.
Holy Kama winter, you burn like light.
I live alone as wind in a winter field.

You're stingy, mother. Just give me
A little bread. The silos are rife with snow
That I can't eat. My bag is heavy:
A stone of sorrow for a slice of calamity.

The frost is consuming my feet.
Who needs me? I'm a refugee.
You don't care whether or not I breathe.

What should I do among your pearls
And the chill wrought silver
On the black Kama, at night, without a fire?

- November 13, 1941

On arrival, the refugees were also excluded from the social, political, and economic structures of Western European countries and were "herded into 'reception centres' – school, stadiums, racetracks, camps, an abandoned factory – with little food, bedding, toilet facilities, or medical care" (Lewin, 2005, p. 136). The exclusion from the rights of citizenship created many challenges for refugees and meant that their arrival in the country was filled with uncertainty about their acceptance in host countries as well as containing hope for a better life.

The escalation of Nazi persecution and the annexation of Austria in 1938 forced Jews from German-occupied Europe (Germany, Austria, Poland) to seek refuge in Western European countries. The influx of refugees encouraged these countries to revisit their immigration policies for Jewish refugees. The United States and the United Kingdom governments,

however, were concerned that an excessive international cooperation might intervene in "their migration policies, especially their rights to select immigrants in accordance with their own standard" (Karantani, 2005, p. 526). As a consequence, both the governments were not in favour of international cooperation and particularly unsupportive of the ILO's leading role in migration. With the lack of effectiveness of the LN and ILO's structural plans, the US and the UK took several initiatives to resolve the refugee crisis in 1938. Thus, an "[i]ntergovernmental Committee on Refugees (IGCR) was established outside the LN with a view to developing opportunities for permanent resettlement" (Karatani, 2005, p.527). The establishment of the IGCR served two purposes. First, this initiative showed US citizens' their government's engagement in solving the refugee crisis. Second, this move demonstrated the US government's willingness to cooperate with the liberal Western European countries. However, the IGCR settlement policies did not halt refugees' difficulties. In 1939, refugee men and women were also separated in different detention centres, with many of the men sent to Australia, New Zealand, and Canada on ships (Lewin, 2005). On the way to these countries in crowded ships, guards abused men by stealing their belongings and throwing their immigration documents overboard (Seller, 2001). During that time, many children were also separated from their parents or guardians (Stroja, 2017; Ahaern, Loughry, & Ager, 1999; Lewin, 2005). The refugees' difficulties did not come to an end on arrival to the shore of those countries.

Jewish refugees – 'enemy aliens'

Jewish refugees tended to face additional challenges integrating into the host nation with some Western Christian countries not willing to accept Jewish refugees into their communities (Beaglehole, 1988). They were labelled as 'enemy aliens' (Lewin, 2005, p. 136) and often did not receive a welcoming environment from the local communities and authorities (Beaglehole, 1988; Lewin, 2005). Sometimes the refugees were viewed as a threat to local communities' livelihood (Loescher, 1997). The outbreak of the Second World War posed additional challenges for the German Jewish refugees in particular to integrate with anti-semitism being added to anti-German feeling in a number of Western countries. Lewin notes the early Jewish refugees' experiences in British detention centres:

> Prison wardens didn't understand why these people had been arrested; one commandant said he never knew so many Jews were Nazis. (2005, p.136)

The enemy aliens' classification also directly affected the refugees in New Zealand society. The authorities restricted refugees from serving in the armed forces and communication departments (Beaglehole, 1988). Jewish refugees from the German-occupied Europe, who arrived in Canada, were also incarcerated in detention centres and forced to wear prison uniform. The Canadian Jewish community protested against the inappropriate treatment of refugees and in response, the Canadian government relaxed the strict policies towards Jewish refugees and included the refugees in the social and economic structures of the country. The change of policy meant that the refugees were entitled to labour opportunities, education, and health services (Lewin, 2005). In the UK the refugee integration process began as early as the 1940s. Lewin (2005) reports:

> In July 1940 Britian published a "White paper" which listed eighteen categories of internees who could apply for release, and by February 1941 half the Isle of Man internees were gone. Some joined the British army or the Pioneer Corps, which built roads and military bases and cleaned bombing rubble. Australian and Canadian internees were released later because their governments did not distinguish between Nazis and ordinary German citizens but by the end of 1942 most camps were closed. (p. 137)

This integration was a way forward for a small portion of the refugee population in Canada, Australia, and New Zealand. In contrast, millions of Eastern European refugees remained in Western European countries where they were less likely to be included in the host countries' social and economic structures. Raff (1988) and Connor (2017) indicated that the Second World War forced 12 million refugees from the East of Germany to seek refuge in the West of Germany. In response to the ongoing refugee crisis in the 1940s, Karatani (2005) notes:

> the US government held a conference in Bermuda in 1943 to revitalize the dormant IGCR [Intergovernmental Committee on Refugees]. In addition, the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA) was established in the same year to promote and oversee, this time, the repatriation of the millions of 'displaced people' [or refugees] under Allied control. (p. 527-528)

Eastern European refugees, however, refused to return to their country of origin (Sjoberg, 1992; Karantani, 2005). The UNRRA failed to handle the issue and the IGCR did not have sufficient funds to solve the problem during the Second World War (Karatani, 2005).

Section II – From the 1945s to the 1970s

The purpose of this section is to explore the social, political, and economic conditions from the 1945s to the 1970s in the West. The post-Second World War period initially posed many challenges for Western European countries. Economic stagnation, high unemployment rates, and a shortage of food supply and housing were rife in these nations (Stephen & Miller, 1998; Isaac, 1952; Raff, 1988). According to Isaac (1952) and Stephen and Miller (1998), economic stagnation was one of the main challenges for Western countries, especially at the time when they had to rebuild their infrastructures.

Economic conditions

In spite of the growing numbers of refugees and requests for resettlement help on humanitarian grounds, the major resettlement destinations – the US, Canada, Australia, and some Western European countries – revisited their economic and political positions and then shifted their refugee policies accordingly (Karatani, 2005 p. 522; Beaglehole, 1988; Stroja, 2017). The shift blurred the distinction between refugee and migrant populations (Karatani, 2005). In this section, I use the term refugee/migrant because they were refugees when they arrived but then they were seen as migrants.

On June 1945, the US Secretary of State said:

> The truth of the matter is that Europe's requirement for the next three or four years of foreign food and other essential products – principally from America – are so much greater than her present ability to pay that she [Europe] must have substantial additional help, or face economic, social and political deterioration of a very grave character. The remedy lies in breaking the vicious cycle and restoring the confidence of the European people in the economic future of their own countries and of Europe as a whole. (as cited in Farese, 2017, p. 1004-5).

This speech shows a genuine concern from the US government towards Western European countries' economic future after the war. As a result, an economic recovery plan – commonly known as the Marshall Plan - was designed for Western Europe. "The Marshall Plan comprised [US] $13 billion over four years, equal to around [US] $150 billion at purchasing power parity in 2017" (Farese, 2017, p. 1005). A percentage of Marshall Plan funds were also used to build housing for millions of refugees, who saw themselves as migrants (Grunbacher, 2012). Between 1948-1951, the Marshall plan partially contributed to changing the economic and security situation and the rebuilding of Western Europe (Reynald, 1997). Mayne (1973

p.132) evaluated the Marshall plan and described it as “great leap forward”. The economic plan essentially laid a strong foundation for the future success of Europe as well as enabling the US strategic influence in Europe from that time, especially with the establishment of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO).

At first, this massive influx of refugees was considered a burden, but due to the economic revival in Western Europe (1950s-1960s) and high demand for unskilled workers in factories, “the burden proved to be a blessing” (Cameron, 1997, p. 330). The economic recovery on such a massive scale provided an opportunity for refugees to locally integrate into Western Europe and to be seen more as migrants rather than refugees. “With migration routes available, prospective migrants had little incentive to present themselves as asylum seekers [or refugees]” (Surhrke & Newland, 2001, p. 287). Thus, a large population presented themselves as migrants rather than asylum seekers or refugees.

The economic boom in the 1950s and 1960s increased the demand for labour in the West. Western nations adopted an ‘open door policy’ (Chimni, 2004; Hollifield, 1992; 2004; Surhrke & Newland, 2001) for unskilled workers, including migrants and refugees. Western European nations, particularly France and Germany, exhausted the local supply of unskilled labour and therefore sought guest workers from Southern European nations and Turkey (Miller & Martin, 1982). As a result, many refugees became ‘guest workers’. The refugees perceived themselves as migrants who will become citizens, but the host governments viewed them as temporary workers. Alongside Western European countries, the United States also started a guest worker programme (*bracero*) to recruit Mexican agriculture worker from 1942 to 1964 (Calavita, 2010).

After spending many years in the host nations, post-War migrants gradually integrated into their host societies, especially as children were born into the new countries. According to Beaglehole’s account of refugees in New Zealand (1988, p. 2), those immigrating from Europe were “grateful to be in New Zealand”. They contributed significantly to their new country despite encountering varying degrees of opposition in acquiring employment and business opportunities (Beaglehole, 1988). Many ‘refugee-migrants’ of this time eventually became naturalized citizens of the host nations (Seller, 2001; Beaglehole, 1988). Their social integration was directly related to the economic climate with the post-Second World War economic boom requiring migrant workers to satisfy the labour markets’ demands. The

economic boom attracted many migrant workers who could otherwise be easily classified as refugees. The following section sheds light on the economic conditions which played an integral part in classifying refugees as migrants and in assisting them to settle in the new society.

The economic contribution of the refugee/migrant was not only restricted to providing an unskilled labour force. Educated refugees, who arrived to the West in the 1940s, also made huge contributions to the growth of the Western economies. On arrival in resettlement countries, many refugees were confined in detention centres (see above section). Some of them were highly educated and worked as scientists, lawyers, teachers, and physicians in their countries of origins. Despite the hardships and unwelcoming treatment, the refugees showed resilience, consistency, patience, and even held on to the significance of knowledge. During that time, the refugees established schools for their children, debate fellowships, technical schools, and refugee camp universities in order to maintain the high standard of academic knowledge. Lewin (2005) described some the academic subjects taught at these institutions:

> Visiting professors and detainees taught psychology, physics, mathematics, philosophy, thermodynamics, chemistry, Middle Eastern Studies (Arabic, Hebrew, and Zionism), Greek, Latin, Spanish, English, accounting, bookkeeping and shorthand, Chinese cultural studies, German literature, Cicero, Goethe, Homer, the "Irish Problem," town planning, and American short stories. (p. 137)

The teaching of academic subjects in the refugee detention centres both during and after the Second World War prepared people who were initially considered to be refugees for the opportunities awarded to migrants; a change in status made possible by the expanding economies of the 1950s. The relaxation of the restrictive policies allowed the refugees to use public resources, including educational institutions. Many refugees took advantage of the opportunities and enrolled in public universities in the resettlement countries (Lewin, 2005). As a result, the economic recovery with employment opportunities, combined with the academic background of a number of refugees enabled this group to be seen more likely as welcome migrants rather than burdensome refugees leading to citizenship.

Institutionalised response

The economic boom and political stance of liberal Western countries led these countries to establish a new organisation, the International Refugee Organisation (IRO), in 1946 to resettle the remaining refugees and displaced persons inside Europe (Holborn, 1956). The US government ensured that the IRO favoured the Western mandate rather than that of the Soviet Union, who wanted their citizens to repatriate and participate in rebuilding the country. The IRO took the following steps. First, the IRO constitution did not attach the 'refugee' term to a specific group. Instead, the refugee definition was connected to the persecution of individuals on the basis of race, religion, nationality, or certain political viewpoints (Sjoberg, 1992). Second, the IRO was established as a specialised agency of the UN and had selective membership criteria. This policy in fact excluded the Soviet Union, but included 'other peace-loving states' (IRO Constitution, article 4). The IRO's expensive operational cost forced the US government – the biggest financial supporter - to explore ways to minimise their financial responsibility, but concomitantly to maintain dominance (Karatani, 2005). Thus, the US government stressed the need to establish a new organization with more limited operational and functional cost. The UNHCR was established in 1950 and replaced the IRO. Its main purpose was to focus on refugees' legal rights with the international organizations and governments controlling the resettlement of refugees through negotiation (Loescher, 2001) in the way the UNHCR had a limited operational role and constantly required partnerships with host nations to protect refugees in those nations.

The 1951 Refugee Convention of UNHCR adopted the definition of the IRO and also incorporated the idea of a refugee as someone facing persecution and protection. According to the 1951 Refugee Convention and its 1967 Protocol the term refugee refers to any individual who:

> owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinions, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence …, is unable or, owing to such a fear, is unwilling to return to it. (UNHCR, 2010 p.3)

This institutionalized definition focuses on two key concepts: persecution and protection. The UNHCR (2010) however, emphasised the idea of persecution as the yardstick to determine if an applicant for refugee status is a refugee or a migrant. This definition was created for the

post-Second World War refugees. However, the definition is still being used for the 'refugee status determination' process to determine if someone is a refugee or migrant. This is a crucial distinction, I will discuss in detail in the following chapter. A migrant is someone who can freely move from one country to another in search of better work or living conditions while, a refugee is forced to move from a home country in order to seek protection from wars and persecution.

The distinction between refugees and migrants in the UNHCR Convention appears vague, a vagueness attributed to the situation immediately post-WWII. However, the movement of masses of refugees and migrants after the Second World War did lead international agencies to establish terms that distinguished between refugees and migrants. This distinction served the Western governments, including the United States, and international organizations' mandate in different ways. First, the distinction provided a reason to restructure and terminate the pre-war refugee organizations, (Karanti, 2005, p. 518) and in turn justified establishing new organizations and systems. Second, it supported the US government's main objective which was to constrain "international influence over national migration and refugee policies as much as possible" (Karatani, 2005, p. 517). This was driven by the US government's refusal to allow international interference in their restrictive and selective immigration refugee policy.

Refugee policy shift and citizenship rights

Initially, the post-Second World War era saw the establishment of different organizations intended to resolve the refugee issue with repatriation serving as the core objective of various refugee organizations. In 1945, the Yalta Agreement committed the US and the UK to repatriate Soviet citizens to Russia, regardless of the refugees' consent (Long, 2011). The Russian government ordered Soviet citizens to return to their homeland. Those who refused to repatriate were labelled as traitors and those who did often faced persecution on arrival. This occurred within the context of political tension between the East and the West. The Russian government strategy towards refugees induced liberal Western governments to shift their policies of repatriation to resettlement and local integration. This led the idea that an origin state may not be a better place for its citizens to enjoy political and citizenship rights (Cohen, 2006 p. 87), signaling a shift in refugee policies.

The Soviet Union and the liberal-democratic governments in the West had different views about citizenship rights. The Soviet Union viewed citizenship as the agreement between citizens and the state in which the state has an absolute authority over its citizens. The Soviet viewpoint was that "[a] refugee was essentially unrepatriable because they had been rejected by the state" (Long, 2011 p. 239). According to Hein (1993, p. 46) "the world population is increasingly divided into citizens protected by their state and people who are not members of a functioning nation-state" (Hein,1993 p.46). On the other hand, the West supported the notion of individual autonomy regarding the consent of citizens to repatriation as one of the core principles of the citizenship right. Accordingly, refugees were seen as unrepatriable because they had the political right to escape an unjust authoritarian regime.

In 1946, the constitution of the International Refugee Organisation (IRO) rejected the Soviet Union's view of repatriation. The IRO constitution was built on the Western political view of voluntary repatriation (Nathan-Chapatot, 1949). As a consequence, IRO operations focused on resettlement instead of the existing repatriation policies (Hadaad, 2008; Peters, 2001). But before the suspension, the organization resettled one million refugees and only repatriated 73,000 refugees (Loescher, 2001). The shift in refugee policy from repatriation to resettlement in either pre-resettlement or resettlement countries led to refugees integrating into host nations and often being seen as migrants in the buoyant economy of the post-war decades.

The establishment of the IRO and its infrastructure entirely focused on the refugee crisis in Europe (Betts & Collier, 2017). But the international community had limited engagement in the refugee crisis in other parts of the world, including the refugee crises after the 1947 partition of British India. The following section discusses the massive movements of displaced people crossing international borders of newly formed states – India and Pakistan.

The partition of India and Pakistan

In 1947 the British government transferred the political and administrator authority of British India to India and Pakistan. The division of British India was designed on a religious basis between Islam (Pakistan) and Hinduism (India). The nation-state building concept in the sub-continent region was founded on religious backgrounds compared to Europe where religion

was not a standard for inclusion in the new secular nations. Using religion as a standard laid the foundation for future persecution.

After transferring governance authority to the newly established states, the British authorities left both to deal with a myriad of problems. One of the immediate challenges of the states was to handle the movement of displaced people travelling across the newly fixed territorial borders of India and Pakistan (Oberoi, 2005). The movement of people across India and Pakistan was regarded by some as an exchange of population rather than a refugee crisis (Schechtman, 1949; Talbout, 2009; 2011; Oberoi, 2005). Others regard this displacement as a refugee movement because, first religious persecution forced the displaced people to seek refuge in either Pakistan or India (Talbot, 2009; 2011) and, second, the displaced people also lost the protection of a state.

The refugee crisis beyond the European territorial borders was seen as out of the scope of the IRO until the 1967 and thus the International Refugee Organisation did not provide any social services for the refugees. Whether the displaced people outside Europe were refugees or migrants, the displaced people were not geopolitically important for the liberal Western European countries (Oberoi, 2005). Since the partition of British India was founded on religious grounds, I argue that the religious identity was the key factor for host countries, especially Pakistan, to ensure the inclusion of Muslim refugees in their national institutions and the rejection of other religious groups.

This unprecedented movement of people was extremely violent. According to Jeffrey (1974), tens of thousands of civilians from Muslim, Sikh, and Hindu backgrounds became the victims of religious violence. The religious violence began in 1946 in Calcutta, one of the largest cities in India, where approximately 4,000 Hindus and Muslims lost their lives. Escaping religiously driven persecution during the partition forced approximately 7 million Muslim refugees to travel towards Pakistan, while nearly 8 million Hindu and Sikh refugees entered India (Oberoi, 2005). Mulana Adul Kalam (1967), the Congress Muslim leader, held Lord Mountbatten, the last Viceroy of British India, accountable for completely underestimating the riots, bloodshed, and massive influx of refugees caused by immediate partition. In reality, there were many other factors which also contributed to the massive influx of refugees and intensifying the violence: existing religious tensions, lack of administrative controls, and a

political heterogeneity between the All-India Muslim League and the Indian National Congress (Battes, 2011). According to Pandey (2001), the newly established Indian and Pakistan states failed to provide protection to refugees moving across the newly formed borders.

The limited support from the British Raj for the refugee crisis placed extra pressure on India and Pakistan. Both countries were not prepared to include refugees in their national institutions (Oberoi, 2005). The US, the liberal Western countries, and the IRO concomitantly did not offer much support for the refugee crisis but local aid agencies along with government intervention did provide limited support for the partition refugees (Rey-Schyrr, 1988). Overall, with such limited support and the absence of preparation to accommodate large numbers of people, both governments had to go out of their way to assist the "penniless and empty-handed" (Rahman & Van Schendel, 2003, p.572).

Despite the limited support from the IRO and Western countries, both governments established transit refugee camps on a temporary basis to provide food and medical aid to the refugees. Talbot (2011) argues that the provision of social services was also based on "old caste and gender hierarchies" (p.115). Regardless of the inequalities in the social services, the governments could not support the influx of refugees for a lengthy period due to their own limited financial means. The economic burden of refugee provision led the Pakistani government to initiate new settlement programmes for the refugees so they could start contributing to the newly formed nation containing limited financial resources for citizens, let alone refugees. Battes (2001) notes that:

> [At] the division of India, Pakistan won a poor share of the colonial government's financial reserves – 23% of the undivided land mas, it inherited only 17.5% of the former government's financial assets. Once the army had been paid, nothing was left over for the purposes of economic development. (p.5)

Economic issues

The Pakistani government took several strategic measures in order to include refugees in the labour market (Oberoi, 2005). First, it established vocational and technical training centres for Muslim refugees to learn medicine, agriculture, and engineering (Peshkin, 1963). Second, the Pakistan Refugee Rehabilitation Finance Corporation was established in 1948. The

purpose of this corporation was to provide loans and grants for skilled refugee workers to start their own businesses. Third, the government also initiated scholarship programmes for the higher education of refugee students. However, the Muslim refugee migration created economic difficulties for the Christian community in rural areas of the country. According to Gabriel (2013), Muslim refugees replaced Pakistani Christian workers and as a result created unemployment for the Christian community. The massive influx of Muslim refugees extended the marginalised status of the Christian community in Pakistani society.

Social integration

Muslim refugees were welcomed and accepted in villages, towns, and cities by the local communities. In November 1949 the Pakistani government formed committees in various townships to allot land to the refugees, on a similar scale to the land which they had left in India (Oberoi, 2005). The allotted land was within city limits rather than in remote areas. This government initiative provided a way forward for the Muslim refugees to integrate into the fabric of Pakistani society. Despite challenges, the social integration of the Muslim refugees in Pakistani society was not as difficult as that occurring in other parts of the world, especially in Europe. First, the refugees and local communities shared the similar socio-cultural, traditions, and religious values, and second, there was no language barrier between the local communities and refugees. They both spoke Urdu (which later became the Pakistani National language).

Political concerns

The Indian and Pakistani governments invoked legislation to provide citizenship for refugees (Oberoi, 2005). In April 1950, the Prime Ministers of India and Pakistan signed an agreement to provide equal citizenship to all the minorities residing in their nations. After the agreement both governments restricted the flow of refugees across their international borders. Despite the formation of Pakistan on religious grounds with an overwhelmingly Muslim majority, the founder of Pakistan, Mohammed Ali Jinnah, held the vision of a secular Pakistan. He spoke at the Karachi Club:

> If you change your past and work together in a spirit that every one of you … is first, second and last a citizen of this State with equal rights, privileges, and obligations, there will be no end to the progress you will make. We should begin to work in that spirit, and in the course all these angularities of the majority and minority, the Hindu

> community and the Muslim community – because even as regard to Muslim you have Pathans, Punjabis, Shias, Sunnis, and son on – will vanish. To my mind, this problem of religious differences has been the greatest hindrance in the progress of India. Therefore, we must learn a lesson from this. You are free; you are free to go to your temple you are free to go to your mosque or to any other places of worship in this State of Pakistan. You may belong to any religion or caste or creed – that has nothing to do with the business of the State. (On August 1947)

Jinnah's speech (1947) assured the Pakistani religious minority leaders, including Christian leaders, that they would have equal citizenship rights and a secular state to protect them, encouraging most to support Jinnah's vision of a secular state. However, in later years Pakistan deviated from this vision, when the Pakistani government introduced major amendments to the constitution (in 1956, 1962, and 1973) which led the country to become an Islamic state rather than a secular one.

Conclusion

The history of refugees from the 1930s to the 1940s shows that initially refugees were excluded from the national structures of the West. However, the economic boom and high demand for labourers in Western nations after the Second World War provided more relaxed immigration policies for displaced peoples and blurred the distinction between a refugee and a migrant. This was the 'golden era' (Suhrke & Newland, 2001 p. 285) for refugees. The generally expanding global labour market and the UNHCR initiatives specifically promoted resettlement policies for refugees in Western nations. As a consequence, millions of refugees and migrants resettled in those nations where, as citizens, they had access to the national institutions, including school, colleges, and universities, enabling them to meet their educational aspirations. The following chapter turns specifically to the experiences of Pakistani Christians who, following persecution in Pakistan, have become refugees in Thailand.

Chapter Three – Exclusion: contemporary urban refugee phenomenon

Introduction

This chapter examines how contemporary urban refugees are being excluded from the national institutions of pre-resettlement countries with reference to the Pakistani Christian refugees in Bangkok. First, I describe the reasons for Christian Pakistanis leaving Pakistan including political exclusion, blasphemy laws, religious radicalisation, and inadequate protection from the Pakistani government. These have all contributed to this group leaving Pakistan with an expectation that soon they will be included in the nation-state system of Western countries. The refugees see themselves according to the post-Second World War understanding of a refugee, as someone able to become a migrant and in turn a citizen of a Western nation. Second, I examine why most refugees are now being confined to pre-resettlement countries rather than resettlement in Western nations. I explore the economic, political, and cultural context in the West which led to key policy shifts concerning refugee status determination, repatriation, and other restrictive measures (Mertus, 1998). These restrictive policies have led refugees to being confined to pre-resettlement for decades.

Thirdly, I argue that most pre-resettlement countries face financial difficulties in delivering social services to their own citizens, a situation which has led to refugees being excluded from such provision (Waters & Leblanc, 2005). I analyse how the INGOs instead are left with the provision of social services to refugees in those countries, provision which is often limited (Betts and Collier, 2017). I argue that such limited social services provided by INGOs is embedded in an extra-national power relationship – the patron-client one – which lacks accountability and permits these organisations to provide restricted social services to the refugees. This structural power relationship creates a gap between the INGO provision and the refugee expectations of social services, including education. Prior to explaining the refugees' exclusion from the national institutions of the pre-resettlement, I first discuss how Pakistani Christians are being excluded from their own nation-state system on religious grounds.

Exclusion

Pakistan is a pluralistic society which contains diverse ethno-linguistic and religious groups (Malik, 2002) founded according to Jinnah, on his vision of "a progressive, democratic, and tolerant society, which, while retaining a Muslim majority, would give equal rights to its non-Muslim citizens" (Malik, 2002, p. 6). However, more than 90% of the country's population are adherents of Islam. The remaining population consists of Christians, Hindus, Sikhs, Bahais, Jains, and Parsis. Pakistani Christians, the target group of my study, are the second largest minority in Pakistan and make up 1.59% of the Pakistani population with approximately 2.5 million people (Gabriel, 2013).

The vision of a secular, pluralist, and democratic state was undermined by Zulifqar Ali Bhuto, the Fourth President of Pakistan, in the 1973 Constitution which defined Pakistan as an Islamic state. According to Rais (2005, p. 448), "Islam was at the heart of the political struggle for the creation of Pakistan and has remained at the centre of post-Independence political discourse". Malik's study (2002) describes:

> The Objective Resolution, once again, became the Preamble of the Constitution. The occupants of the two highest offices in the country – the President and Prime Minister – were required to be Muslim. This was a reiteration of Pakistan being a Muslim-led state with minorities having no chance of assuming leading roles. (p. 16)

The closure of the highest offices to Pakistani religious minorities proposes "a second-class citizenship" with limited political rights for these groups (Malik, 2002, p. 16). Presidential Order No. 8 of 1984 established separate constituencies and representatives for non-Muslim citizens. This created an explicit segregation between Muslim and non-Muslim citizens and further excluded the religious minorities from the political structure.

In the preceding chapter I discussed the philosophical idea of the modern nation-state as built on political universalism rather than social, cultural, and religious categories (Hobsbawm, 1996; Beruilly, 2015; Gellner, 2006) However, the shift from secularism to religious categorisation as Pakistan's political structuring principle meant that groups such as Pakistani Christians were excluded from full citizenship status.

Blasphemy laws

In 1977, General Zia-ul-Haq overthrew the government of Zulifqar Ali Bhutto but consolidated the exclusion of religious minorities. According to Rahaman (2012, p. 306), "General Zia's tenure proved to be a turning point for the Islamization of Pakistan" in which his regime amended blasphemy laws in such a way that these laws could easily be used against religious minorities, including Christians. Rahman's study (2012) describes the laws as:

> **Section 295 B (added in 1982) reads:**
> Whoever wilfully defiles, damages or desecrates a copy of the holy Koran or an extract there from or uses it in any derogatory manner or for any unlawful purpose shall be punished with imprisonment for life.
> **Section 295 (C) (added in 1986) reads:**
> Whoever by words, either spoken or written, or by visible representation, or by any imputation, innuendo or insinuation, directly or indirectly, defiles the seared name of the Holy Prophet (peace be upon him) shall be punished with death or imprisonment for life, and shall be liable to fine. In time the lesser punishments for crimes under Section 295 (C) were removed leaving only capital punishment for it. (p. 306)

These laws put religious minorities in a constant state of trepidation. "The overwhelming evidence shows that they have become tools of harassment in disputes, used to eliminate rivals – in say fights over property – to take revenge and to intimidate minorities instead of inculcating sensitiveness towards the feelings of other religions" (Rahman, 2012, p. 307). For example, Shahbaz Bhatti, the Federal Minister for Minority Affairs, raised questions about the blasphemy laws and desired some changes in order to protect religious minorities from the misuse of these laws. Sadly, on 4 March 2011, he was assassinated outside his residence in Islamabad. In 2011, Salman Taseer, the Governor of Punjab, was also assassinated by his own bodyguard because he also suggested some amendments to the laws. The same method of persecution was used against one of the refugee participants in my study:

> *Some of our business competitors accused us that we had committed blasphemy and threatened to file a blasphemy case against us [pause]. We had to flee the country and seek refuge in Bangkok.* (P 2, Int., Oct 2017)

According to Rahman (2012, p. 311), "The minorities of Pakistan [including Christians] are suffering at the hands of the state as well as the society as a result of the legal Islamization of the state and the radicalization of sections of the society in the country".

Radicalisation

In addition to the blasphemy laws, after the terrorist attacks on the United States on 11 September 2001, the ensuing invasion by the United State and its close allies' forces (the UK, Canada, and Australia) increased the radicalisation in Afghanistan and Pakistan. As a result, the Taliban, a militant group which operates in both countries, carried out a series of terrorist attacks on Pakistani religious minorities' worship places (Thames, 2014; Craig & Khan, 2013). Since that time a large number of Pakistani Christians have been forced, by their predicament, to leave their homeland and seek asylum in different countries. According to Palmgren (2013, p. 21), "[f]leeing conflict, persecution or other dire circumstances in their home countries, refugees, asylum seekers, and other 'forced migrants come to Bangkok in search of asylum within a regional context of neglect and insecurity". However, "a majority of them opt for Thailand, which offers cheap airfare and easy access to [a] tourist visa" (Ali, 2014, n.p). Zohra Yusuf, Chairperson of the Pakistani Human Rights Commission , asserted that "it is unfortunate and sad that the minorities are leaving the country as they are being persecuted" (Ali, 2014, n.p).

All these factors led to Pakistani Christians leaving Pakistan to seek refuge elsewhere with the expectation of acceptance by Western nations. However, the large number of refugee movements to the West in the late 20th century led these countries to control the global flow of refugees by restricting them to pre-resettlement countries (Gammeltoft-Hansen & Tan, 2017; Hollifield, 2004; Chimni, 2004; 1998; Toft, 2007; Mertus, 1998; Weiner, 1995). My purpose is to identify the economic, political, and cultural conditions in the West in order to critically analyse how these conditions contributed to the restructuring of refugee policies. Later in the chapter, I argue how such global refugee policies have affected the provision of social services to displaced peoples, including that of education.

Economic conditions

The 1970s to the 1990s was a time of declining economic prosperity, one of the key reasons for Western nations wanting to change their refugee policies. Beginning with the oil crisis in 1973-1974 these nations changed their immigration policies from accommodating unskilled foreign workers, including refugees, to policies requiring skilled foreign workers who could contribute to a host country's economy (Suhrke & Newland, 2001; Hollifield, 2004). The

ensuing economic downturns from the 1980s saw a halt in the West's worker recruitment schemes. Unskilled foreign workers were encouraged to return to their country of origin. However, many refused to leave because they considered themselves migrants who would eventually become citizens. Moreover, they recognised the economic downturns and high unemployment rate in their country of origin, mostly developing nations with little or no social service provision, were more severe than in the West (Miller & Martin, 1982; Rogers, 1985). Siebert's (1997) study found that the ongoing economic crises from the 1970s to the 1990s also drastically increased the unemployment rates in Western nations:

> In the European OECD [Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development] countries, the unemployment rate has moved up from 2.6 percent in 1970 to nearly 11 percent in 1996, ratcheting upward in the 1970s and the early 1980s and again in the mid-1990s. The long-term unemployment rate (relating to those who are unemployed for one year and more) also rose? sharply from 0.9 percent in 1979 to 6.6 percent in 1994. (p. 37)

At that time, the rising unemployment rates in the West struggled to offer labour opportunities for these countries' own citizens. The massive influx of refugees only added an extra pressure on host countries' labour markets (Dullien, 2016), exacerbated by refugees' willingness to work long hours for low salaries. Controlling the flow of refugees into the West was driven in fundamental ways by the need to manage a country's labour market.

The economic downturn also affected the provision of social services in Western countries. For example, Sihvo and Uusitalo (1995) investigated the connection between the economic condition and public support in Finland and found that the economic downturn from the 1970s to the 1990s decreased public expenditure on social services involving health and education. The provision of social services to refugee populations on top of the citizens' rights created difficulties for the overstretched social structures of these countries, a problem only increasing as new conflicts in the Middle East forced many refugees to illegally enter Western countries (Suhrke & Newland, 2001; Toft, 2007). These refugees exhausted the capacity of many social services (Hollifield, 2004) and "in some cases threaten to undermine the economy" (Toft, 2007 p. 144).

Given these economic conditions, Western nations were increasingly concerned about the cost of maintaining refugees in their territories. According to Betts & Collier (2017), it is less expensive for resettlement countries to maintain refugee populations in pre-resettlement

countries (see Chapter One). This led the West to preferring that large refugee populations remained in pre-resettlement or developing countries.

Political context

The end of the Cold War in 1989 shifted the political interests of Western nations from resettling the Eastern bloc refugees in their territories to repatriation. Simultaneously, there was an increasing influx of refugees from the Global South. The movement of these large diverse refugee populations "transformed the politics of Western Europe, giving rise to new social movements and political parties demanding a halt to immigration" (Hollifield, 2004, p. 896). Right-wing political parties promoted immigration policies designed to restrict the movement of refugees to Western European countries (Messina, 1996). Chimni (1998, p. 351) notes that the European public perception of refugees as "white, male, and anti-communist" shifted drastically when the refugees from the Global South started to arrive in Western Europe. Toft (2007) recorded the extent of these large refugee movements:

> Starting in 1984, for example, a rush of asylum seekers from Iran fled to Europe through Turkey. The alarm this rush provoked (similar in kind to that provoked by the 1987 Marie Boat Lift "refugees" from Cuba) led to a significant tightening of the regime for permitting refugees to settle in Europe, North America, and Australia. (p.143).

Cultural issues

The large diverse refugee movements from the 1980s were seen as a threat to secular Western European nations. Beside the socio-political diversity other factors such as language barriers, religious identities, and cultural backgrounds were all perceived as alien to Western European values. Toft (2007 p. 144) reports that Western nations were concerned that refugees, "especially those not speaking the languages of a host country – would undermine local, social equilibria, leading to tension at best, and violence at worst". According to Hobsbawm (1996), learning a host country's language is a cornerstone for nation-building and this had been considered essential for the post-Cold War refugee populations in order for them to integrate into Western nations. However, attitudes toward language and religious integration started to change from the 1980s and 1990s, especially when integrating refugee populations from different religious identities became a concern to liberal Western governments. For example, the public image of Muslim refugee populations was that they "pose a threat to civil society and to the secular (republican) state" (Toft, 2007 p. 896). Kepel (1998 as cited in Hollifield, 2004, p. 896) argues that the lack of integration of Muslims into Western society

might lead to a radical form of Islam. With the negative public perception in Western nations, it became extremely difficult for Muslim refugees to assimilate into local cultures. Kymlicka (2002) acknowledges the assimilation problem of migrants and refugees and therefore proposed:

> So we need to replace the idea of 'benign neglect' with a more accurate model which recognizes the central role of nation-building within liberal democracies. To say that states are nation-building is not to say that governments can only promote one societal culture. It is possible for government policies to encourage the sustaining of two or more societal cultures within a single country. (p. 347)

During the 1980s, liberal Western societies moved towards 'multiculturalism' as a political approach to accommodating the different cultures and religions of migrants and refugees. 'Multiculturalism' refers to a socio-political ideology which believes that different cultures, races, and ethnicities should preserve their distinctive values within societies, yet maintain respect and tolerance for each other (Lewis & Craig, 2014; Kymlicka, 1995; 2002). Despite the commitment to multiculturalism as the perceived solution to assimilate refugee and migrant populations in the Western societies, Lewis and Craig (2014, p. 21) argue that multiculturalism has "separated [British] minority ethnic groups from mainstream society". The separation between minorities and mainstream societies increases a religious radicalisation among Muslim youth, especially in the liberal Western countries (Poynthing & Mason, 2008).

The religious radicalisation of Muslims threatens the secular and liberal values of the West (Hollifield, 2004; Lewis & Craig, 2014; Poynthing & Mason, 2008). The terrorist attacks on 11 September 2011 in the United States and 7 July 2005 in England led Western nations to revise their multicultural policies (Kundnani, 2002; Abbas, 2004; McGhee, 2008). Abbas (2007, p. 288) argues that the British government has introduced "a monocultural politico-ideological project" in order to integrate British Muslim migrants and refugees in the society. The terrorist attacks further complicated refugee movements across Western nations' borders because these nations feared that terrorists might be included among refugee populations (Juma & Kagwanja, 2003). These security concerns contributed to the West introducing increasingly restrictive policies in order to control the flow of refugee populations.

Hathaway (1992 as cited in Gammeltoft-Hansen & Tan, 2017, p. 30) reports that "developed states have introduced a range of policies to deter or prevent migrants or refugees from

arriving at their territory or accessing their asylum systems". The West's restrictions on refugees were "seen as evidence of a? double standard and send a clear message that international obligations towards refugees no longer hold" (Hargrave, Pantuliano & Idris, 2016, p. 1). According to Hollified (2004, p. 905), "[m]uch will depend on how migration is managed by the more powerful liberal states, because they will set the trend for the rest of the globe".

Refugee Status Determination

In 1977, the UNHCR's Executive Committee, one led by Western nations, introduced the refugee status determination process to control the refugees' movements. 'Refugee status determination' is an "administrative process by which governments or UNHCR determine whether a person seeking international protection is considered a refugee under international, regional or national law" (UNHCR, 2018a, n.p.). Immigration agencies in the various resettlement countries have the responsibility for carrying out the refugee status determination process (Suhrke & Newland, 2001) in order to verify if an applicant or refuge seeker is a legitimate refugee. The UNHCR's refugee status determination process has no specific guidelines (Jones, 2009) and Alexandar (1999) argues that "UNHCR practice is far from 'best practice' and it does not provide a good model" (p. 255). Instead the process contains inconsistencies from one context to another (Kagan, 2003) and even varies from one country to another. For example, Jones (2009) identifies that refugee status determination acceptance rates varied for Iraqi refugees "between 0% in Greece and 81% in Sweden" (p. 53), despite the fact both of these countries are parts of the European Union.

Usually, the refugee status determination process allows an applicant to submit their application, have access to an interpreter, and undergo an interview with a UNHCR' representative. But the process does not provide any legal assistance, especially in Asian countries – including Thailand. Jones (2009) argues that "the South presents a series of unique challenges, including the frequently expatriate nature of staff and the lack of formal legal qualifications and training of representatives" (p. 54). This suggests that the UNHCRs' employees or representatives have inadequate legal qualification and training, especially in the Global South. Western countries, however, do provide independent legal assistance to refuge seekers in their territories. Alexandar (1999, p. 264) notes that the "UNHCR has not made available publicly its own guidelines or procedural rules for the conduct of refugee

status determination, and in many areas the substantive criteria applied by UNHCR are unclear." For example, the UNHCR does not provide a written response or reason to refugees in case of refusal of the refugee status determination process (Jone, 2009). Hoffsatedter (2015) reports that "[r]efugees complain that refugee status determination is slow and also report unprofessional behaviours from case officers and translators" (p. 190).

The Pakistani Christian refugees I interviewed usually applied to the UNHCR office in Bangkok with an expectation that they will soon be moved to one of the resettlement countries. The office required the refugees to be screened by the UNHCR's representatives. All the refugee participants in my study said that the UNHCR's Bangkok office has a shortage of staff members with interview dates scheduled for 2-3 years after the application. The refugee status determination process may even take up to five years depending on the number of applications. All the participants in my study also said that the UNHCR office in Bangkok has been denying the Pakistani Christians' asylum applications quite frequently. One of my refugee participants said *that "apart from some Pakistani Christian refugee families the UNHCR office in Bangkok has been mostly refusing refuge applications of the refugee families"* (P3, Int., Oct 2017). With reference to the interview procedure itself, another participant who was interviewed by a UNHCR representative, said:

> *the refugee status determination process was an intimidating process where I did not have any legal assistance and the UNHCR representative interviewed me for approximately four to five hours* (P 1, Int.1, Oct 2017).

Along with the interrogative nature of the refugee status determination interview those Pakistani Christian refugees who are uneducated also found it difficult to provide evidence to the UNHCR representatives, often because of their unfamiliarity with the legal terms. Moreover, without work authorisation and with the limited provision of social services many refugees in pre-resettlement countries find themselves in worse circumstances than those they fled. Their socio-economic status and inadequate knowledge of international refugee laws make it easier for UNHCR representatives to identify the Pakistani Christian refugees as economic migrants. Moore (1988) describes the intention behind refugee status determination:

> Finally, there is the distinction made between 'real' or 'economic' refugees. In some instances, this became a device whereby governments could deny access to its rights of asylum by claiming that individuals had fled from economic disadvantage rather

than actual persecution. (p. 256)

Labelling refugees as economic migrants by using the refugee status determination process justifies the West's restrictive refugee policies. As a consequence, many refugees are confined to pre-resettlement countries where they exist without rights.

From resettlement to repatriation

The West found a durable solution for the increasing refugee crises in repatriation (Chimni, 2004; Long, 2011; Salmon, 1991; Toft, 2007; Hein, 1993; Waters, 2001). Chimni (2004) pinpoints two key phases which show the shift from resettlement to repatriation. The first phase lasted from 1945 to 1970 (see Chapter Two) when the solution was to resettle refugee populations in Western nations. However, the West changed its resettlement policies in the late 1970s and 1980s. According to Chimni (1984), the second repatriation phase began in the mid-1980s and may be divided into three different periods. First, from 1985 to 1993 voluntary repatriation was seen as the durable solution for refugee crises. Second, in 1993, voluntary safe return of refugees to their country of origin was introduced by geopolitical forces as the durable solution. Finally, "the doctrine of imposed return was aired by UNHCR [in 1996] to draw attention to constraints which could compel it or accept the reality of involuntary repatriation" (Chimni, 2004, p. 55). For example, the Tanzanian government used military force in 1996 to involuntarily repatriate 500,000 Hutu refugees. The Tanzanian government justification was that militants were using refugee camps to terrorise Hutu refugees (Toft, 2007; Waters, 2001). However, Betts & Collier (2017, p. 8) critique repatriation as a durable solution arguing that in recent years, "fewer than two percent of the world's refugees received access to one of the durable solutions".

Most of the Pakistani Christian refugees in Thailand have the option of either staying in Bangkok or returning to Pakistan given that resettlement in the West is unlikely. In 2015, the Pakistani refugee population in Bangkok reached 11,000 (Winter-Villaluz, 2015). However, a humanitarian aid worker, who contributed to my study, said that:

> *the number of Pakistani Christian refugees has been decreasing here [in Bangkok] because of the UNHCR and the Thai government restrictive policies towards them. I think now we have 2 to 3 thousand refugees.* (P 7, Int.2, Nov 2017)

The Pakistani refugees are scattered throughout Bangkok and therefore, it is difficult to know the exact number of specifically Christian refugees among them.

Restrictive measures

In addition to the refugee status determination procedure, Western nations took several steps to control refugee movements from the Global South to their borders in the mid-1970s. Firstly, these nations introduced a sophisticated passport system for citizens and secured their borders in order to control refugee and migrant movement (Tropey, 2000). Secondly, those countries also initiated strict visa policies, especially for refugees from failed and fragile states. The weak governance structures of the developing nations tended to create refugees as people fled violence in their regions (Suhrke & Newland, 2001). Thirdly, Western nations placed carrier sanctions on private airline companies and forced them to reject boarding refugees and asylum seekers without visas for their destination countries (UNHCR, 1991; 1995; Suhrke & Newland, 2001). Lastly, Western nations also extended their restrictive refugee policies by cooperating with pre-resettlement countries and refugees' countries of origin (Gammeltoft-Hansen & Tan, 2017; Boswell, 2013). For example, the European Union offered 3 billion Euros of aid to the Turkish government in exchange for the protection and provision of social services to refugees in their country. Another example of this cooperation is called the Bali Process which occurred between the Australian and Indonesian governments in order to restrict refugee boats from reaching Australian coasts (Kneebone, 2014).

These restrictive measures to some extent alleviated the refugee flow into the European and other Western nations' borders. But, "the [refugee] crisis is far from over" (Kugiel, 2016, p.41). Desperate refugees, however, found alternative and extremely dangerous ways – the Mediterranean Sea routes – to reach the Greek and Italian coasts. Sadly, many refugees have been losing their lives in attempts to enter the European Union via sea routes (Fargues & Bonafanti, 2014). However, small refugee populations are willing to take that risk. The Western nations' refugee policies basically attempt to restrict refugees to reside in pre-resettlement countries – holding places – on a temporary basis although an average refugee spends nearly two decades in these countries (Betts & Collier, 2017).

Such restrictions contributed to limiting Pakistani Christian refugees' movement to pre-resettlement countries in a number of ways. Firstly, Western governments have strict visa policies for fragile states, including for Pakistan. Secondly, Pakistan does not have adjacent borders with resettlement countries, which include and provide social services to refugees through their national institutions. Thirdly, Pakistani Christian refugees – one of the most marginalized groups – have insufficient financial resources to show thousands of dollars in their bank account as a guarantee that they will return to Pakistan after the study or visit visas to the West. One of the refugee participants in my study said that *"it is extremely difficult for us to obtain visas for Western countries"* (P2, Int, Oct 2017).

In contrast, Pakistani Christian refugees can easily obtain tourist visas for Sri Lanka, Malaysia, and Thailand and the airfare to these pre-resettlement countries is less expensive (Ali, 2003). All the refugee participants in my study said that they managed to obtain Thai tourist visas and plane tickets by selling a few valuable belongings in Pakistan and some refugees even borrowed money from their friends and family members. They assumed that they may have to reside in Thailand for a short period of time and then the UNHCR would resettle them in one of the resettlement countries. A refugee participant in my study said, *"we were expecting to be in Bangkok for few months"* (P1, Int., Oct 2017). However, the reality is different than what the refugees were hoping for from the INGOs. Those I interviewed have been living in Bangkok for more than five years and are still waiting for the resettlement to Western countries.

The following section of this chapter uses the work of Mertus (1998) to identitfy a number of paradigm shifts and also discusses the ways in which the geopolitical forces have shifted the refugee paradigm. Mertus (1998) illustrates the paradigm shifts between the sending and receiving state during Cold War and post-Cold War periods:

Cold-War paradigm

Sending States	Receiving States
- the uprooted leave their country of origin	- receiving states consider those entering for asylum (and temporary safe haven)

- refugees leave in order to receive asylum
- the uprooted go to states with which they have ideological affiliations (and to nearby safe areas)

- aid is delivered to refugees in host countries or in asylum countries
- cold-war strategy gives receiving states an incentive to accept those with whom they have ideological and geopolitical affiliations/interest
- although NGOs [non-government organisations] and GOs [government organisations] may facilitate this process, states are the main actors

(Mertus, 1998, p. 62)

The new refugee [or post-Cold-War] regime

Sending States

- the uprooted remain within an internally displaced
- those that cross state lines remain in a nearby state (usually a traditionally "sending-state")
- aid is delivered within the country of origin and in safe areas near the borders

Receiving States

- measures are undertaken to contain refugee flows and to restrict asylum (and to offer temporary safe haven)
- receiving states (which increasingly are not countries of traditional asylum) work together and trans-sovereign actors – NGOs [or INGOs] – to deliver humanitarian aid and development support.
- cross linkages appear between NGOs in receiving and sending states

(Mertus 1998, p. 63)

The above summary shows that traditional Western nations are no longer considered as receiving countries for the majority of refugees where they would be included in the nation-state system and offered a path to citizenship. The current receiving countries, however, are pre-resettlement countries.

Exclusion in pre-resettlement countries

Western nations' restrictions on refugee movements have increased the number of refugees in the pre-resettlement countries. To date, 80% of refugee populations reside in pre-resettlement countries compared to 70% almost 20 years ago (see Edwards, 2016; UNHCR, 2019a; 2019c; Gammeltoft-Hansen & Tan, 2017; Dryden-Peterson, 2016a; Betts & Collier, 2017). The large

refugee population puts extra burden on these countries limited financial budget and overstretched social services. These countries often struggle to provide social services to their own citizens. Consequently, refugee populations are placed outside the host country's social, political, and legal structures. In a similar way, the refugee participants in my study are being excluded from the national structures of Thailand.

I examine why refugees are excluded from the social, cultural-religious, and economic issues, and the political, and legal systems of these countries. An account of the Pakistani Christian refugees is used to explain refugees' exclusion from Thailand national systems.

Social provision

Several reasons contribute to limited or no social provision to refugees by pre-resettlement countries. I argue that these reasons are financial constraints, 'low-human development index' (see below), massive influx of refugees, geographical location, and the protracted nature of refugee crises. I discuss each of these aspects in turn.

Pre-resettlement countries are poor countries and the majority of their populations live below the poverty line (Buscher, 2011). According to Buscher (2003), 42% of refugee populations reside in pre-resettlement "countries whose GDP per capita is below USD 3,000. Such countries are ill-equipped to receive the refugees and are, more often than not, unable to keep pace with their own urban planning and development needs" (p. 18). As a consequence, most pre-resettlement countries exclude refugees from their social provision system on a permanent basis. In fact, pre-resettlement countries are unable to uplift their citizens out of poverty because of debt crises. Hill and Hult (2016) note that:

> Many of the world's poorer nations are being held back by large debt burdens. Of particular concern are the 40 or so "highly indebted poorer countries" (HIPCs) which are home to some 700 million people. Among these countries, the average government debt burden has been as high as 85 percent of the value of the economy, as measured by gross domestic product, and the annual costs of serving government debt consumed 15 percent of the country's export earnings. Servicing such a heavy debt load leaves the governments of these countries with little to invest in important public infrastructure projects, such as education, health care, road, and power. (p. 29)

With debt crises and financial limitations, these countries seem to have limited options for allocating funds for the social provision to their citizens let alone to refugees. For example, for the last three decades, while Pakistan has hosted millions of Afghan refugees, the

Pakistani government struggles to provide social services to its citizens. According to a Human Rights Watch report (2017), Pakistan does not have enough schools for its children - "over 5 million primary-school-age children are out of school" (n.p.). Moreover, Pakistan has one of the worst healthcare systems in the world and the Pakistan government spends only 0.9 percent of its gross domestic product on healthcare projects (Malikani, 2016). The lack of resources in pre-resettlement countries affects the social provision to refugee communities residing in those countries. For this reason, Betts and Collier (2017) report that:

> With democratization, debt crises, and the 'Structural Adjustment' programme of the 1980s and 1990s through which the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank imposed economic liberalization and cuts in government spending across much of the developing world, host governments became increasingly constrained in their ability to allocate scarce resources to non-citizens. (p. 41)

Given the limited budget, the quality of life in pre-resettlement countries is low. Anand and Sen (1994) have developed a human development index to measure the quality of life in different countries. The index measures three key factors representing the quality of life in a country: "(1) life expectancy at birth (2) the proportion of literacy among the adult population, and (3) the logarithm of the gross national product (up to the level of the internationally fixed poverty line)" (Anand & Sen, 1994, p. 3). According to a United Nations Development Programme's report (2017), most of the pre-resettlement countries have a low 'human development index'. The index shows that average citizens of pre-resettlement countries face many challenges in order to meet the basic necessities of life. Refugee populations in pre-resettlement countries are usually considered the most marginalised group and often they are deprived of social services (Campbell, 2005; 2006). Hammad's (2017 p. 124) study shows that "64% of Jordanian families' social services, health and education, are being affected by large populations of urban refugees". The low human development index and scarcity of social services pose difficult conditions for refugee communities in pre-resettlement countries (Al-Akash, 2015).

Often refugees are perceived as an economic burden on pre-resettlement countries' economies and their social services (Betts & Collier, 2017). An example in another context is the Kenyan government's consideration of Somali refugees as an economic burden, but Campbell (2006) found that the refugees in fact contribute to the host economy. Hovil's (2007) empirical study with Sudanese refugees in Uganda revealed that refugees play an integral role in the host economy. Many researchers have reported that the economic

contribution of Congolese refugees in Nairobi may change the perception of urban refugees to that of being an asset to the host nations (Dryden-Peterson & Hovil 2003; Jacobsen 2005; Landau & Jacobsen 2004; 2006; Machiavello, 2004). However, this is not the case in Thailand because the country neither provides social services nor authorises refugee communities to work in their territory.

The massive influx of refugee populations has led pre-resettlement countries to introduce restrictive policies for non-citizens. For example, in 1988, the Kenyan government initially had generous policies for a small number of refugees. However, by 1992 the refugee population in Kenya exceeded 400,000 which forced the government to take restrictive measures such as social provision and protection (Campbell, Kakusu, & Musyemi, 2008). In a similar way, the collected data of my study shows that in 2011 the Thai authorities turned a blind eye towards a small number of Pakistani Christian refugees seeking provisional refuge in Bangkok. From 2014, the Pakistani Christian refugee population started to increase in Bangkok (Winter-Villaluz, 2015) and a humanitarian aid worker, one of the participants in my study, said: *"after the rapid increase in the Pakistani Christian refugee population in Bangkok, the Thai authorities have adopted strict policies for them"* (P 7, Int.2, Nov 2017). The strict policies include discrimination, harassment, and incarceration.

The geographical location of pre-resettlement countries, however, leaves these countries with few options especially when the massive influx of refugees keep pouring across their borders. Regardless of the non-signatory status of the Refugee Convention, these countries have had no choice other than hosting most refugees in refugee camps and urban areas (Buscher, 2003; Betts & Collier, 2017). In the 1980s and 1990s, pre-resettlement countries allowed the UNHCR to build refugee camps in remote places and provide social services to refugee populations. Betts and Collier (2017) note:

> Several of them – countries like Iran, Ethiopia, and Jordan – have been repeat hosts over decades. These havens are not atypically generous: they are simply located in a 'rough neighbourhood (p. 13)

The protracted nature of refugee crises is another reason why pre-resettlement countries do not provide public services to refugee populations. According to a UNHCR report (2015) 6.7 million refugees live in pre-resettlement countries for a long period of time. It also suggests that refugee situations are lasting for more than two decades. For example, Myanmar refugees have been residing in the refugee camps along the Thai-Myanmar border for the last

40 years (Frelick & Saltsman, 2012). The protracted Burmese refugee crisis did not convince the Thai government to integrate the refugees in their socio-political and economic fabric (Zeus, 2011).

The length of time refugee populations spend in one place puts constraints on the over-stretched public services of pre-resettlement countries for an indefinite period. Given the protraction and insufficient refugee burden-sharing programmes from the international community, pre-resettlement countries usually seem reluctant to design sustainable policies for refugee communities (Landau, 2006).

Cultural, religious, and economic issues

Cultural, social, and religious ties between refugees and local communities provide some assistance for refugee populations in the host countries (Al-Akash, 2015; Hammad, 2017; Kritikos, 2000). For example, Briant and Kennedy note (2004) that "[r]efugees from Arab states are often able to integrate better socially within Egypt, partly because of cultural and religious similarities and partly because they do not face the same degree of racism that black Africans experience" (p. 438). The collected data of my study shows that the Pakistani Christian refugees face additional racism in Bangkok as compared to Cambodian or Burmese refugees. For example, one of the refugee participants of my study said that *"our Thai neighbours call us khag* [a coloured person in the Thai language] *and do not like to associate with us."* (P 3, Int., Nov 2017). In contrast, in my fieldwork, I observed that the refugees put less effort into learning the Thai language. Most of them cannot even communicate in Thai except greetings and simple sentences.

Pre-resettlement countries usually have a high unemployment rate and limited labour markets (Kritikos, 2000). With limited labour opportunities, often local communities in these countries perceive refugee populations as competitors because refugees are willing to work long hours for less salary in developing countries (Hammad, 2017; Grabska, 2006; Campbell, 2005; 2006). A humanitarian aid worker, one of the participants in my study, said that *"many Pakistani Christian refugees work illegally for long hours with no benefits and low salary"* (P 7, Int., Nov 2017). Moreover, the massive influx of refugees in urban areas contributes to increasing food, fuel, and rental cost in the urban areas of pre-resettlement countries (Crisp, Janz, Riera, & Samy, 2009). The increasing cost of living in urban areas further segregates the refugee populations from local communities because they blame refugees for inflation. As a consequence, the social perception of refugees in pre-resettlement countries makes it

extremely challenging for the host governments to accommodate refugees in their economic policies. Betts and Collier (2017) highlight the challenges for host governments, for example:

> Kenya illustrates just how hard it is to persuade Southern host states to offer opportunities for self-reliance. Westerners often forget that host states in the South – especially democracies like Kenya – also face challenges of political sustainability not entirely distinct from those in Europe. Kenyan politicians are extremely reluctant to consider self-reliance or even increased socio-economic participation for refugees. (p. 150)

Thailand for example has been hosting Burmese refugees for the last four decades. But the Thai government never considered issuing work permissions for refugee communities so they can contribute to the Thai economy (Frelick & Saltsman, 2012; Stevens, 2018; Winter-Villaluz, 2015; TCR, 2016). The exclusion of refugees from economic policies also exists in the urban areas of Thailand. One of the refugee participants of my study said:

> *despite being involved in illegal work, the Pakistani Christian refugee community needs to rely on INGOs for social provisions such as education and health.* (P3, Int., Oct 2017)

Political exclusion

Refugees do not hold any political rights so cannot access social services in pre-resettlement countries where they seek protection (Long, 2011). Often the host nations may view the massive influx of refugees within their territorial borders as a threat to internal order and democratic structures (Long, 2011; Hein, 1993; Betts & Collier, 2017). Ardent (1967) notes that individuals who become refugees lose the legal and citizenship rights of their originating state and they are also being excluded from the political system of pre-resettlement countries. Pre-resettlement countries not only exclude refugees from their economic policies but also place them outside of the political system. On the other hand, the INGOs are supranational entities, and although their mandate is to provide social services and protection, they are not part of the national structures of pre-resettlement countries. However, recent studies propose local integration as a viable solution for long-term refugees in pre-resettlement countries: Jordan, Kenya, Uganda, and Egypt (Hovil, 2007; Jacobsen, 2001; Campbell, 2006; Dryden-Peterson & Hovil, 2003). The local integration solution proposes that refugee populations be included in the political structures of the host countries. Campbell, Kakusu and Musyemi (2006) use the example of urban Congolese refugees' self-reliance leading to their local integration to support for this idea. Simultaneously, other research finds that local integration holds ongoing negative view towards giving political and legal rights to urban refugees

(Dryden-Peterson & Hovil, 2003; Jacobsen, 2001). Most of these countries are not signatories to the 1951 Refugee Convention and thus do not have a history of providing a citizenship path for refugees (Al Akash, 2015) compared to Western nations.

The lack of legal and political recognition for refugees is problematic; "In many countries, a UNHCR-recoginsed refugee is still considered 'illegal' by the government, and durable solutions remain elusive" (Alexander, 1999 p. 285). For example, similar to urban refugees' situation in Thailand, "official local integration of urban refugees has not gained much momentum in Kenya, as the State firmly maintains that all refugees should reside in camps, waiting for repatriation or resettlement" (Campbell et al., 2006). According to Betts & Collier (2017, p. 8), "[m]ost host countries refuse to consider permanent local integration" as a durable solution for refugee crises.

Memisoglu and Ilgit (2017) note that pre-resettlement countries do not grant citizenship to refugees because granting this political right is considered a threat to the national security of those countries. An exception was Tanzania, a pre-resettlement country which granted citizenship to refugees before the 1990s, but later changed its policy and placed restrictions on providing citizenship to refugees (Chaulia, 2003; Mandal, 2003). Instead, these countries allow refugees to reside in their territories – as guests – temporarily. For example, Turkey, one of the leading refugee-hosting countries, and a signatory of the 1951 Refugee Convention and its 1967 protocol, only provides a temporary guest status to refugees (Ozden, 2013). Steven (2018) notes that Thailand does not provide any political rights to refugee populations. Significantly the NGOs which serve as providers are not in a position to offer the legal and political status which is fundamental to refugees no longer being refugees leaving that status behind; that is, by acquiring citizenship. Usually, the host governments' temporary refugee policy constrains refugee communities from integrating into the local population.

Several reasons are involved in this exclusion. First, local communities are often organised on an ethnic, racial, and country of origin basis which creates tension for newcomers, especially for the newcomer refugees (Buscher, 2003). Second, nationalism in host societies poses many barriers for refugees to integrate into those societies, regardless of similar ethnic, cultural or political identities (Stein, 1986). Thirdly, pre-resettlement countries' perceptions

are that Western countries provide insufficient financial support to developing countries for taking care of massive refugee populations in their territories (Bailey, 2004; Crisp, 2001; Sommer, 2001). For example, Goodwin-Gill and McAdams' (1996) study found that the government of Uganda discourages assimilation as a viable solution for refugee communities. Instead the government ensures that refugees continuously remain in limbo. Similarly, Pakistani Christian refugees have been living in Bangkok for more than five years without assistance from the Thai government. Stein (1986) and Hovil (2007) also argue that one of the key issues of refugee crises is that pre-resettlement countries have no durable solutions to the crises. Instead, placing refugee communities in limbo provides some assurance for pre-resettlement countries that the refugee will repatriate rather than permanently integrate into the social and political structures. The findings of my study show repatriation is considered to be the durable solution for the Pakistani Christian refugees because neither the UNHCR nor the Thai government wants the refugee community to stay in Bangkok.

Legal rights

The lack of social provision and political exclusion has lead the pre-resettlement countries to further restrict legal support for refugee populations (Campbell, 2005; Campbell, 2006; Bailey, 2004). Most pre-resettlement countries such as Pakistan, Thailand, Sri Lanka, India, Jordan, and Lebanon do not have legislation that includes these populations in the legal system. Rather, these countries have ad hoc policies which leave refugee populations vulnerable and insecure.

Recently, Turkey has passed refugee laws in order to accommodate millions of Syrian refugees in its territories on a temporary basis (Memisoglu & Ilgit, 2017). The Turkish government has updated its refugee laws for several reasons. Firstly, Turkey wants to become a member of the European Union, and therefore the country was required to transform its refugee policies (Memisoglu & Ilgit, 2017). Secondly, the European Union assured guaranteed financial support for the Turkish government in exchange for restricting massive refugee populations from entering European Union borders. Lastly, the Turkish state worked with INGOs to collaborate and share the burden of protecting and providing social services for over 3.5 million Syrian refugees (UNHCR, 2017).

Similarly, in South Africa and Egypt, refugees have the legal status to reside in urban areas (Grabska, 2006; Landau, 2006) but despite the refugee laws and legal status in South Africa,

Landau's (2006) study found that refugee laws do not make a huge difference in helping refugees to access job markets and social services, neither does the legal status protect them from discrimination. Briant & Kennedy (2004) found that refugees have limited legal protection from the Egyptian government until the UNHCR recognises them. Such inadequate legal protection places urban refugees in a vulnerable position in pre-resettlement countries.

I have discussed in Chapter One how "Thailand does not recognize refugees as having any special status under its domestic laws" (Asylum access, 2009, p. 2) and the absence of legal status and immigration framework puts refugees in a vulnerable position.. Stevens' (2018) study found that:

> It is clear that the lack of legal status continues to be main source of insecurity for Bangkok's refugees. It prevents them from working, finding adequate housing, and accessing services like healthcare. Funding and resource constraints make it impossible for UNHCR, NGOs, and other groups to provide refugees with more than a basic livelihood. The lack of a legal status is an impediment to self-reliance. (p.13)

A humanitarian aid worker, and participant in my study, said:

> *the refugees are not allowed to work here which forces them to work illegally at Indian restaurants, construction sites, and food delivery businesses to international schools and organisation offices in Bangok* (P7, Int.1, Oct, 2017).

The absence of a legal framework for Pakistani Christian refugees has two key consequences: employment exploitation and harassment. First, for example, one of my participants noted that *"the Pakistani Christian refugee men are being exploited by Indian owners paying less salary for long working hours"* (P 5, Int, Nov 2017). However, recently the Royal Ordinance on Foreign Workers Management introduced additional penalties for employers for hiring individuals without proper documentation. The new policy on undocumented workers, including refugees, means that employers will be fined up to 800,000 Thai Baht – approximately NZ $ 36,890 (Auethavornpipat, 2017). The Thai authorities harass refugee communities because of lack of a legal framework. Frelick and Saltsman (2012) report that:

> Camp refugees who venture out of the camps are regarded by the Thai government as illegal aliens and are subject to arrest. Thai police or paramilitaries regularly apprehend camp residents and either return them to camp if the refugees pay sufficient bribes or send them to one of the Thailand's Immigration Detention Centres and then deport them to Burma. (p.4)

One of the participants in my study noted that *"many urban refugees are being harassed by the Thai authorities who ask them for bribes and if they could not pay bribe they usually send them to IDC [Immigration Detention Centre]"* (P5, Int.2, Nov 2017). In fact, the absence of refugee legal rights creates difficulties for them while dealing with the Thai authorities. Simultaneously, additional penalties have discouraged employers from hiring the refugees at their restaurants. The absence of legal status and supplementary restrictions mean that Pakistani Christian refugees have limited work opportunities and they are required to rely on INGO providers.

Overall, limited social provision, cultural-religious and economic issues, political exclusion, and legal rights for refugee populations in pre-resettlement countries create the need for external providers who may have the potential to offer social provision and protection. Chatty and Mareet (2013, p. 11) argue that refugees are considered "liminal" because "they fall outside the system of nation tied to territory". Refugees' exclusion from the national system puts refugee communities on the fringes of society. The INGOs usually take responsibility from the pre-resettlement countries to provide social services and protection. The Thai government excludes refugee communities, including the Pakistani Christian refugees, from its national system (Stevens, 2018) which creates a vacuum for INGOs to deliver social services to refugee communities creating a relationship between providers and recipients that is then open to the older, extra-national patron-client system.

Nil accountability

The supranational organisations usually operate beyond the regulations of the nation-state system (Najam, 1996) raising questions regarding INGOs' accountability processes (Kramer, 1981; Cernea, 1988; Tendler, 1982). This is because "decision making at levels beyond that of the nation-state is an unavoidable reality" (Balgescu & Lloyd, 2006, p.11). Several studies examine the mechanism for INGO accountability and found that humanitarian aid organisations have strong and clear accountability structures to satisfy donors and governments (Jordan, 2005; Murtaza, 2012; Balgescu & Lloyd, 2006; Ossewaarde, Nijhof & Heyse, 2008; Cavill & Sohail, 2007). However, "NGO accountability is weakest to the communities", including refugees, whom they provide social services. (Murtaza, 2012, p.123). Balgescu and Lloyd note:

> The fact that affected communities often lack the power to make demands on INGOs means that accountability relationships with them are often seen to be weak. (p.18)

Najam (1996) for example, argues that INGOs' accountability often has often been "confused with much narrower and short-term concepts of project evaluation and monitoring" (p. 340). He suggests that INGOs' accountability needs to be focused on three groups: patrons [donors/governments], clients [refugees/marginalised groups], and INGOs. His study examines INGOs accountability by using "functional accountability (accounting for resources, resource use, and immediate impacts) and strategic accountability (accounting for impacts that an INGO's actions have on the actions of other organisations and the wider environment)" (Najam, 1996, p. 351). The findings of his study show that INGOs have high functional and medium strategic accountability to patrons, governments, and funding agencies, while INGOs have low to nil functional and nil strategic accountability to clients, including refugees. In terms of internal accountability, Najam's study illustrates low functional and low strategic accountability within the organisational structures of INGOs. This discussion implies that INGOs have limited functional and strategic accountability and therefore the INGO-refugee relations require another type of relationship.

My study concentrates on the INGOs' accountability relationship with refugee communities in pre-resettlement countries apropos the provision of education. The Pakistan Christian refugee-INGO relationship does not operate under the umbrella of the nation-state concept because neither the Pakistani Christian refugees nor the INGOs are a part of the Thai national system. As a consequence, INGO-refugee relations are founded on inadequate unaccountability compared to that built into the systems of modern nations, particularly the legal systems. This unaccountability to the refugees themselves can be reflected in the limited provision of social services.

INGOs provision

The development of the INGO-refugee relationship outside national systems of accountability drives both parties to establish and engage in the older pre-modern nation-state patron-client relationship. This has major implications for the provision of social services. Haysom (2013) notes that by using patronage networks, refugee communities usually establish an informal system for their protection and for accessing social services from the

INGOs. Due to the lack of accountability by providers and given the powerless status of refugees, I argue that patron-client theory is the apposite tool to theorise the relationship and its effects on the provision of social services, including education. I will discuss in detail the INGO-refugee relational effects on the provision of education in Chapters Seven and Eight of this thesis.

A number of research studies have identified the relationship between powerful INGO providers' and vulnerable refugees' in terms of unequal power relations (Bariagaber, 1999; Calhoun, 2010; Gale, 2006; Harrell-Bond, Voutira & Leopold, 1992; Freedman, 2015). According to Freedman (2015 p. 116), "the nature of aid given out develops a patron-client relationship within which powerful and competent aid workers distribute aid to the 'helpless' refugees". Donelly (1986) explored a business partnership between Hmong refugee women and American teachers selling the refugee women's needlework. She used patron-client theory to explain the unequal business relationship between refugee women and their American teachers. In the contemporary refugee situation, a few pre-resettlement countries allow refugee communities to engage in business activities or use limited public resources. I have discussed earlier how the refugees' exclusion from Thai national institutions leaves the refugees reliant on INGOs for protection and social services (Stevens, 2018; Frelick & Saltsman, 2012). In the next section I explore the INGO provision in pre-resettlement from the 1980s to present, in order to understand, a gap between the INGO-provision and the refugee expectations concerning the social services.

Refugee camp model

In the 1980s and 1990s, refugee camps were established by the UNHCR and the host governments to accommodate refugees on a temporary basis. The primary purpose of the refugee camp model is to provide "temporary shelter, assistance, and protection until they[refugees] are voluntarily repatriated to their country of origin, locally integrated in the host state, or resettled to the third state" (Janmyr, 2013 p. 3). Often the pre-resettlement countries establish refugee camps in remote areas so as to segregate the refugee population from host societies (Agier, Nice, & Wacquant, 2002; Betts & Collier, 2017). For example, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 forced millions of refugees to seek asylum in Pakistan (Kronenfled, 2008) which resulted in the Pakistani government having to establish 379 refugee camps to accommodate 3 million refugees (Khattack, 2007). Located in remote areas the camps were basically built to provide assistance to refugees, while simultaneously

segregating them from local populations. Additionally, the international refugee organisations also supported the notion of refugee camps because it was easier for the organisations to manage refugee populations in remote areas rather than urban areas. But the protracted existence of these camps raises many concerns for the refugees and the host countries in the Global South. Unemployment, inadequate rations, limited post-primary education, and freedom of movement present challenging situations for refugees' expectations (Verdirame, 2011; Betts & Collier, 2017). Refugees want to be included in the social, political, and economic structures of the host countries and desire freedom of movement. Verdirame (2011) in fact argues that the existence of refugee camps is unlawful because the host governments place restrictions on the refugees' movement. A UNHCR (2006, p.84) report accepts that refugee camps are "unnatural, closed environments which can leave refugees vulnerable to manipulation and exploitation". The refugees themselves are not satisfied with the refugee camp model because this model does not lead to their expectations of inclusion in the nation-state system as citizens.

To date, Thailand has nine refugee camps located close to the Thai-Myanmar border, and hosts 110,000 refugees in those camps (UNHCR, 2014). With the assistance of INGOs, the Thai government strictly manages the refugee camps. Frelick and Saltsman (2012) report on the Thai refugee policy:

> Thailand has not accepted the idea that any refugees, Burmese and other, have the right to work, move, and contribute to the Thai economy or that foreigners who present themselves as workers might also have fled persecution or conflict and be fearful of return. That, however, is the reality for refugees in Thailand. (p.4)

In recent years, growing refugee populations in the Middle East and consequently limited UNHCR financial resources have further depleted the Thai-Myanmar refugee camps' budget (Malaver , 2016). The refugee camp model has not met the Myanmar refugee expectations for social mobility and accredited education for their future generation. Frelick and Saltsman (2012) found that the shortage of rations, limited work opportunities, and restricted educational experiences are creating additional challenges for the Burmese refugees in camps.

Refugee education in camps

A few studies focus on refugee children's educational experiences in refugee camps in pre-resettlement countries and highlight that, usually, the refugees have access to education, but with limitations (Carpeno & Feldman, 2015; Demirdjian, 2012; Al-Hroub, 2014; Oh & Van der Stouwe, 2008; Dryden-Peterson, 2011a). Al-Hroub (2014) explored school dropout in Palestinian refugee camps from the standpoints of the students, teachers, parents, and administrators. His study shows that many factors are involved in this, including the socio-economic status of parents, scarcity of extracurricular activities, the difficulty of a curriculum in English, and parents' lack of involvement. Besides all these factors, corporal punishment was also identified as one of the key contributors. Although being banned it is still practised. Demirdijan (2012) notes that schools in refugee camps in Thailand often have poor infrastructure, limited and untrained teachers, inadequate teaching material, are overcrowded, and have large class sizes.

In a UNHCR report, Dryden-Peterson (2011b) noted that the quality of education in camp settings is not up to the standard as set by the UNHCR educational strategy 2010-2012 for refugee education. Firstly, the ratio between the number of students and teachers is recommended to be 40:1 (UNHCR, 2009a), but in reality, among Afghan refugee camps in Pakistan, it is closer to 70 students per teacher. Secondly, the goal is to have more than 80% of trained teachers who have completed a minimum of 10 days of training, but the percentage of trained teachers vary from 12% to 100%, depending on the host nation's educational policies for refugees. Thirdly, refugee education in camp settings is not accredited and therefore, refugee education is often not recognised by the educational institutions in pre-resettlement or resettlement countries (UNHCR, 2009a)..

There have been several studies in the literature examining the educational opportunities for refugee children in Thai camps (Carpeno & Feldman,2015; Frelick & Saltsman, 2012; Purkey, 2006; Oh & Van der Stouwe, 2008). Recently, Carpeno and Feldman (2015) reported some positive initiatives from INGOs. These include: i) the curriculum design which recognised the cultural identity of the Karen people and ii) traditional teaching practices are being replaced by modern teaching approaches. Despite these positive initiatives, the study also identified some challenges such as the high rate of teacher turnover, low salaries for teachers, and insufficient resources. According to Frelick and Saltsman (2012) INGOs budget cuts for education in the camps lead to a 50% reduction in teachers' salaries and an increase in tuition fees for refugee children, despite their parents not being allowed to work. The study

also raised concerns about inexperienced and under-trained teachers. Purkey (2006) identified the unfriendly environment generated by the Thai government's refugee laws and policies affecting Myanmar refugee education in camps along the Thai-Myanmar border. He notes that the refugee community in the Thai camps faces many challenges to provide unaccredited education for young people who desire higher education.

The refugee camp "model is so inadequate that refugees are moving onwards of their own accord" (Betts & Collier, 2017, p. 55). This suggests that there is a gap between the INGO provision and the refugee expectations for social services. Thus, most contemporary refugee populations prefer to live in urban areas in lieu of an incarcerated existence, ongoing dependence, and limited provision from the INGOs. Pakistani Christian refugees, however, do not have an option to reside in refugee camps because the Thai-Myanmar refugee camps were only built to accommodate the ethnic minorities from Myanmar (Malaver, 2016). As a consequence, Pakistani Christian refugees' only option is to reside in the urban areas of Thailand (Palmgren, 2013; Winter-Villaluz, 2015; Stevens, 2018).

Refugees' in urban areas

Currently more than a half of the refugee population reside in the urban areas of pre-resettlement countries (see Chapter One). As a result, Betts & Collier (2017, p. 55) report that in recent years "75% of Syrian refugees reside in urban areas" of the pre-resettlement countries, particularly in Jordan, Turkey, and Lebanon. This led the UNHCR (2009b) to establish an urban refugee policy:

> For the purpose of being considered for assistance in an urban area, an urban refugee is an individual of urban background in the country of origin and who is not part of a prima facie caseload. A refugee of rural background – for whom, in the country of asylum, the option of a rural settlement which offers an opportunity for self-sufficiency does not exist, may exceptionally be considered for assistance in an urban area. Irregular movers do not qualify for consideration for assistance in urban areas. (p. 2)

The urban refugee policy places most of the responsibility on urban refugees, and therefore provides minimum support to the refugees. In the last decade, UNHCR (2009b) amended their policy and recognize urban areas as a "legitimate place for refugees" and urban settings offer some advantages for the refugees (p.3). Pittaway (2015) summarises the UNHCR's urban refugee policy which states the following as procedures that should be followed??:

1. providing reception facilities
2. undertaking registration and data collection
3. ensuring that refugees are documented
4. determining refugee status
5. reaching out to the community
6. fostering constructive relations with urban refugees
7. maintaining security
8. promoting livelihoods and self-reliance
9. ensuring access to health care, education, and other services
10. meeting material needs
11. promoting durable solutions
12. addressing the issue of movement (p.173)

Despite the national and supranational differences, the UNCHR's urban refugee policy is connected to the host governments' legal and political system because the INGOs are required to follow the host governments' legal and political systems. "In refugee situations, the UNHCR Representative or most senior UNHCR official in the country has an important role in direct advocacy with high-level government authorities" (UNHCR, 2019a, n.p.). But the UNHCR's policies do not ensure the sufficient provision of social services required by refugees in pre-resettlement countries. Refugee expectations are that urban areas offer better opportunities and living conditions for them

Advantages of urban areas

Urban areas have been attracting more than a half of the global refugee population for several reasons. First, urban refugees can use their education and skills for employment purposes in the urban areas despite the restriction on refugees' employment by the host nations (Crisp, Janz, Riera, & Samy, 2009; Jacobsen, 2004; Sommers, 2001). Second, the urban milieus provide prospects for the refugees to engage in business activities in these countries. Generally, urban refugees' contribution to the host nations' economy influences the authorities to turn a blind eye on their activities (Campbell, 2006; Grabska, 2006; Jacobsen, 2004; 2006; Landau & Jacobsen, 2004). Third, the refugees' decision to settle in the urban areas prevents their complete dependency on the limited social services, freedom of movement, desperation, and boredom in refugee camps. Fourth, the urban areas may offer better access to education, health, and accommodation options for the refugees compared to

refugee camps (Campbell, 2006; Jacobsen, 2006; Sommers, 2001; Macchiavello, 2004; Hammad, 2017). Last, the urban areas also provide prospects of social networking prospects for refugees up to and including employment opportunities (Palmgren, 2013). Some of the above-mentioned benefits are also available for urban refugees in Thailand.

Despite the social, legal, political, and work restrictions on the refugees I studied, the educated ones work for INGOs and also provide private tutoring to international school students in Bangkok. The refugees usually receive a limited stipend from the INGOs, but mostly the stipend is insufficient to meet the fundamental necessities of life in the urban area. A refugee participant in my study said that *"a few educated Pakistani Christian refugees provide private tutoring services and earn handsome monthly earnings"* (P 2, Int, Oct 2017).

According to Malaver (2016), most of the uneducated Pakistani Christian refugee men work in Indian restaurants in Bangkok, while women prepare Indian-Pakistani food to sell in the international schools, INGO offices, and churches. These income-generating activities provide extra cash for the Pakistani Christian refugee families. With growing refugee crises in the other parts of the world, urban refugees in Thailand are no longer entitled to a small stipend from the UNHCR, with the exception of single mothers and refugee families with special needs children. The data of my study shows that a few INGOs (i.e. Action International and Rescue Organisation) do still offer a limited stipend to their refugee volunteers and single mothers. One of the refugee parents (P 4, Int.1, Nov 2017) said that *"they receive 3500 THB (175 NZD) per month, but our family minimum expenses are about 8,000-10,00 THB (375 – 465 NZD)".*

Given the limited provision from the INGOs, a few refugees seek financial assistance from their immediate family members working in the Western nations. For example, in Nairobi, Campbell, Kakusu, & Musyemi (2006) report that Congolese refugees receive remittances from family members in order to meet their basic necessities of life. A refugee participant in my study also said that *"we receive financial support from our relatives residing in the Middle East"* (P 2, Int. Oct 2017). The financial support enables the refugees to enrol their children into the Mother Pride International School, which teaches an academic curriculum. However, most of the refugees cannot afford to send their children to private international

schools. Apart from the limited opportunities in urban areas, these countries also hold a number of disadvantages for urban refugees.

Disadvantages of urban areas

Urban areas also present various social challenges for refugee communities. Several studies have revealed that xenophobia, discrimination, harassment, and exploitation of refugees' vulnerable situations are common occurrences in pre-resettlement countries (Campbell, 2006; Campbell, Kakusu, & Musyemi, 2006; Grabska, 2006; Jacobsen, 2004, 2006; Landau, 2004, 2006; Pavanello, Elhawary & Pantuliano, 2010; Hedman, 2009; Crea. et al., 2016; Hammad, 2017; El-Shaarawi, 2015). For example, Pavanello, Elhawary, and Pantuliano (2010, p. 27) report that Kenyans' xenophobia towards Somalians has been increasing for years.

Previous studies have also shown that despite linguistic, cultural, and social similarities, urban refugees suffer social exclusion, discrimination, and verbal abuse in the urban settings of Jordan, Kenya, and Pakistan (Pavanello, Elhawary & Pantuliano, 2010; Kronenfeld, 2008; Hammad, 2017). Agier, Nice, and Wacquant (2002, p. 337) argue that urban refugees' "suffering of exodus is then added [to]the frustration of an impossible resocialization". Urban refugees not only face mistreatment from local communities but also from the hands of local authorities. In urban settings, local authorities often harass, arrest, and detain urban refugees and threaten them with deportation (Briant & Kennedy, 2004; Grabska, 2006; Campbell, 2004; Hovil, 2007; Campbell, 2005; Jacobsen, 2004; Kagwanja, 1998; Verdirame, 1999). Campbell (2005) notes that abuses from Kenyan authorities pose serious challenges for low-income urban refugees who are unable to provide bribes to the authorities. A comment by one of the refugee parents of my study noted such occurrences:

> *Thai authorities – especially police and immigration – intentionally harass us [refugees] in public areas and sometimes raid refugee apartments in order to extort bribes from poor urban refugees.* (P 3, Int. 2, Nov 2017)

The limited work opportunities, unequal pay scales between citizens and refugees, and increasing inflation in urban areas (Hammad, 2017; Alix-Garcia & Saah, 2009) usually limit refugees to meeting the basic necessities of life. Pittaway (2015) found that urban refugees face inadequate housing, forced child labour, exploitation at the work place, and almost no provision of social services. As a result, urban refugees can hardly afford rent in the outskirts or slums of the urban areas. All the refugee participants in my study said that they cannot

even afford a one room apartment's monthly rent. During my fieldwork I also observed that the apartments had poor living conditions with serious health and safety risks. These social, political and economic challenges place urban refugees in the most marginalized group in the host societies. Hoffstaedter (2015, p. 3) notes that urban refugees are "more marginalized as they are left without access to services and protection" since most of the pre-resettlement countries do not offer social services and protection, including Thailand.

Refugees education in urban areas

Refugee communities often face difficulties in accessing to education – particularly in urban areas. Despite the growth of refugee populations in urban areas, "there is little evidence of tangible organisational commitment by UNHCR to guaranteeing the right to education for refugee children" (Dryden-Peterson, 2011b, p. 6). According to UNHCR (2016b), among the overall world refugee population, only 50% of refugee children of primary school age are in school, 22% are in secondary school, and only 1% are in higher educational institutions. However, there is no available data on what percentage of urban refugees are enrolled in primary, secondary, or higher education institutes, because in cities "not all refugees are registered with UNHCR, especially in urban areas" (Dryden-Peterson, 2015, p. 6).

In 2012, the UNHCR's educational strategy discussed the challenges faced by urban refugees as the UNHCR sought to improve education in urban areas. Refugee education in urban areas is similar to that in the refugee camps, however, there are additional challenges. These include i) rigorous educational registration procedures in pre-resettlement countries, ii) unavailability of certificates from the country of origin, iii) distance from schools, iv) school uniform and materials, v) and lack of livelihood to support the cost of schooling. The report also recognised that urban refugees require quality or academic education rather than basic education and pinpoints ample obstacles to achieving this such as high enrolment rates, scarcity of trained teachers, unwelcoming environment, and inadequate teaching materials. UNHCR (2012) pledges to ensure quality learning in primary and secondary education through teacher training and building a strong relationship with partners (Ministries of Education at national levels). However, several countries do not allow urban refugees to integrate into their educational system. In that situation, urban refugee children are more likely to engage in child labour, sexual exploitation, and drugs (UNHCR, 2012). All the

refugee parents in my study report that long distances from Thai language and public schools, the language barrier, discrimination, and harassment are some of the challenges they face in accessing education for their children.

As a consequence, INGOs provide access to education to the refugees through community learning centres in Bangkok. For the provision of social services, including education, INGOs have established relationships with the refugees that I describe as patron-client relations (see Chapter Seven). But the INGO providers do not place education on their high priority list and use the basic emergency approach only. In Chapters Six and Seven, I conceptualise the unequal relation between INGO providers and the refugees in terms of the patron-client theory in order to explain the ongoing inequalities in the INGO-refugee relations. These inequalities can be seen in the provision of basic education which reproduces the permanent disadvantages for refugees and perpetuates the marginalised refugee status (Galt, 1974).

Refugees, on the other hand, view education as a vehicle to fulfil their hopes and dreams for a better future (Hakami, 2016). According to Dryden-Peterson (2011b, p. 6),"[e]ducation is one of the highest priorities for refugee communities". Despite the challenges in pre-resettlement countries, refugee communities are not only hoping to survive but also maintiain dreams and aspirations for their future generations to attain high-status employment through education (UNHCR, 2016; Delgado-Gaitan, 1994; Burde, 2005; Carpeno & Feldman, 2015). Refugees regard educations a high priority because they see their future in education rather than the "broken global refugee system" focusing on emergency approaches (Betts & Collier, 2017).

Little is known about the education in community learning centres in urban areas in pre-resettlement countries. The Pakistani Christian refugees I report on in this research provides a case study of this phenomenon. My intention is to explore the education provision gap between the refugee parents' aspirations of academic education and INGOs' provision of basic education in order to explain why the gap exists and persists for the refugees. This gap maintains inequalities and the reproduction of the refugee status.

Conclusion

Overall, I have shown in this and the previous chapter that refugees are being excluded from full citizenship rights and protection by their own countries and thus desire inclusion in Western nations. This has been the case for displaced peoples in the post 1945 decades.

However, changing economic, political, and economic conditions meant that Western countries adopted restrictive refugee policies which place refugees in holding places in pre-resettlement countries. These developing countries have financial and other challenges with respect to delivering social services to their own citizens let alone to refugees. This leaves INGOs to provide social services and protection to fill the provision gap. It creates an INGO-refugee relationship, which exists outside the regulations of the nation-state, leading to the older patron-client one. However, this is a relationship without systems of accountability and is characterised by the provision of limited social services to refugees. My intention is to explore the provision of education and how and why an education approach gap exists and persists between the two parties. The following chapter explains the conceptual methodology I used to theorise the existence and persistence of the gap through INGO-refugee relations in terms of patron-client theory.

Chapter Four- Conceptual methodology and study design

Introduction

The chapter discusses a realist conceptual methodology which informs the thesis argument and the design of my empirical study, a study discussed in the second section. The study is built on and utilises a number of key sociological concepts including 'nation-state', 'patron-client', 'clientelism', and 'academic knowledge'. These key sociological concepts provide the methodological tools for an in-depth explanation of the education provision gap between the refugee parents' aspirations and the INGO provision. Applying the sociological concepts in the Pakistani Christian refugee context justifies my argument that the refugees exist outside the nation-state system within an older patron-client relationship.

Features of conceptual methodology

A realist conceptual methodology is used to examine the geopolitical structures and processes involved in the refugee system and to theorise the provision of education to the Pakistani Christian refugees in Bangkok, Thailand. Realism begins with the ontological belief "in a world that exists independently from our knowledge of it" (McPhail & Lourie, 2017, p. 3). This realist approach differs from an interpretivist approach in that it utilises key concepts to move beyond the interpretation offered by the empirical data. Although an interpretivist approach is often used in educational research, a conceptual methodology was selected because of its strength in moving beyond a specific context to producing generalizable knowledge (Lourie, 2014; Maton & Chen, 2016; McPhail & Lourie, 2017; Rata, 2012). By using a conceptual methodology, especially drawing on the concepts of 'patron' and 'client' I am able to generalise my findings to other refugees in similar situations where a clientelistic relationship operates outside of the nation-state framework of social and political relations. This theorising has enabled me to build the argument that the patron-client relationship exists in the refugee context in pre-resettlement countries. It applies to people caught in a position where it is almost impossible to move forward to a first world country and difficult to return to the country of origin without the fear of greater harm.

A realist approach acknowledges four key features utilised to explain a phenomenon: i) concepts, ii) causation, iii) fallibility, and iv) judgemental rationality (McPhail & Lourie, 2017). First, theoretical concepts have a central position because theoretical concepts have

the ability to explain "the social meaning of events and explore causes and processes that are hidden in the phenomenon itself" (Rata, 2012, p. 58). For example, in this research the collected data from the participants and other sources does not and cannot reveal the covert causes, structures, and processes of the provision of education for the refugees I studied. As a consequence, I develop and use the concepts of 'patron-client theory' and 'nation-state' to explain and understand the phenomenon. These concepts have been touched on already and are discussed further in subsequent sections.

Second, identifying the causal mechanism, social structures, and operations which lead to the phenomenon under investigation are vital aspects in this approach. The realist approach in fact starts from locating the problem in the collected data and then progresses to identifying the mechanisms and structures in a phenomenon (Shipway, 2011). That identification occurs using concepts which led from identifying the underlying structures to explaining them. I began by examining the data collected from observations and interviews with refugee families and the providers of education in the community centres in Bangkok to identify the deeper problem of the ongoing irreconcilable gap between the refugees' aspirations and the INGOs provision. I placed the analysis of this inequality within historical and geopolitical forces of the global labour market to identify how refugee movements are controlled. This approach also enabled me to understand the type of education provided to the refugees.

The third characteristic of the realist approach is the concept of fallibility. Following Popper (1978), McPhail and Lourie (2017) note:

> Realism holds that our explanation is fallible but that through processes such as public scrutiny in knowledge production (peer review for example) and the achievement of science we are able to make progress towards understandings and explanations that closer to the truth than others. (p. 5)

The above-mentioned theoretical tools and their effect on the educational provision for the Pakistani Christian refugees arguably provide the 'best fit' explanation for explaining the symbiotic relationship between the providers and the refugees. The reason I claim the explanation to be the best fit is because of "the degree of fit or approximate truthfulness in relation to reality" (McPhail & Lourie, 2017, p. 5). However, my explanation does not claim to be the truth, but rather says that it is always available for revision - a provisional truth in other words.

Finally, a realist approach suggests that the degree of validity and reliability of a theoretical explanation is based on "its explanatory power" (McPhail & Lourie, 2017, p. 13). Intellectual communities have the power to decide the validity and reliability of an explanation, a process called judgmental rationality (McPhail & Lourie, 2017). I use main concepts of 'patron-client' and 'nation-state' in building the thesis argument. I argue that the use of patron-client theory to understand the educational provision for contemporary refugees is a useful way for sociology to generate a richer explanation of how the refugee movement is being organized on a global scale. The concept of the nation-state enables me to set up the extra-nation context which itself produces the socio-political vacuum filled by patrons and client. This is, I claim, the original contribution of the thesis to the growing refugee crises in the urban areas of pre-resettlement countries.

The procedure of disengaging knowledge from its producer and connecting it with specialized academic fields or theoretical concepts provides a means for the knowledge to be generalized (Rata, 2017b). For example, I apply the empirical study using the patron-client theory to explain the relationship between INGO providers and the Pakistani Christian refugee community. The patron-client theoretical concept, however, can be separated from the Pakistani Christian refugee experiences in Bangkok and used to explain the contemporary refugee situation more broadly. The separation suggests that the patron-client concept is generalisable. Durkheim (1912/2001 as cited by Rata, 2017a) noted the generalisability of concepts or theories. In this thesis generalisability enables patron-client theory to be used to explain other urban refugees' situations in pre-resettlement countries. The following section explains each of the theoretical concepts used in this study, the specific concepts which enable such generalisation.

Geopolitics and the nation-state

The concept of the 'nation-state' is essential for understanding the geopolitical refugee system and refugees' position in pre-resettlement countries (Long, 2011; Keely, 1996; Hein, 1993). This concept is based on the two salient concepts: first, 'nation' refers to social groups representing different ethnic, linguistic, and religious identities with a common political principle (Hobsbawm, 1996; 2012; Beruilly, 2015; Gellner, 2008); second, 'state' refers to a political organisation which establishes and preserves the legal and political rights of its

citizens and also maintains relations with other sovereign states (Keely, 1996). The combination of nation and state creates a legitimate and accountable governing system. The nation-state concept is a widely accepted political model in the modern geopolitical system. In the nation-state concept, "[c]itizens belong; all others are aliens" (Keely, 1996, p. 1051).

The dynamics of nation-state constitution adds to the refugee 'production' (Keely, 1996; Long, 2011). Keely (1996 p. 1046) suggests that three main factors contribute to creating refugees within nation-state boundaries: if a nation-state "contains more than one nation; the populace disagrees about the structure of the state or economy; or the state implodes due to the lack of resources". In the case of Pakistani Christian refugees' country of origin, Pakistan contains more than one 'nation' or social group but he Pakistani national identity is based on a predominant Islamic religious identity (Islam, 1981). That religious national identity's yardstick excludes a small numbers of religious minority groups, including Pakistani Christians. The exclusion from national identity, the lack of protection from the Pakistani state, Pakistani blasphemy laws, and persecution from the hands of religious extremist forces drive the Pakistani minority groups – including the Pakistani Christians - to seek refuge in pre-resettlement countries (Khan, 2003). Most Pakistani Christians – to seek refuge in Sri Lanka, Malaysia, and Thailand. These countries, however, do not provide any political rights to refugee populations (TCR, 2016). In Chapters Two and Three, I used the nation-state concept to theorise the relationship between the Pakistani government and Pakistani minority groups – including the Pakistani Christian community. Moreover, I also used the nation-state concept to theorise the Pakistan Christian refugees' status in Thailand.

From the end of the First World War up to the Second World War, Western nations responded to refugee crises by returning the refugees to their country of origin (Bat-Ami Zucker, 2010). The Great Depression in the 1930s and the low demand for labour led to those countries reinforcing their national boundaries as legitimate political entities (Long, 2011; Keely, 1996; Chimni, 1998). However, in the Cold War period following the Second World War the major global players, particularly the United States and the United Kingdom, shifted refugee policies from 'repatriation' to integration policies. This enabled large numbers of displaced persons to settle permanently in developed countries and created the ongoing expectation that refugeehood led to settlement in such countries. The Cold War between the

West and the East created a conducive milieu for Eastern refugees to settle in Western countries.

The Western European economic boom of the post-war period generated a huge demand for labour. In the post-war era, refugee populations in Western Europe reached up to 40 million (Cameron, 1997) compared to 25.9 million refugees at present (UNHCR, 2019a). People displaced by the war and the Soviet control of Eastern Europe were valued for their role in reconstructing Western Europe. As a consequence, millions of Eastern Europeans sought asylum in neighbouring nations and all of them were resettled (Marrus, 1990, p. 54). Significantly, the distinction between refugee or migrant at that time was blurred because of the high labour demands.

However, the oil-shock in 1973, the economic downturn in 1980s, the end of Cold War, and the low labour demand forced Western countries to shift their refugee policies from open door to restrictive policies (Chimni, 2004). I argue that the geopolitical need for labour was the reason for resettling Second World War refugees in Western liberal countries and for re-defining them as migrants rather than humanitarian consideration (Chimni, 1998; 2004; Cameron, 1997). However, in the 1980s and the 1990s the economic downturn and lessening demand for unskilled labour, especially from the Global South, meant a shift in policies to maintaining refugees in the pre-resettlement countries on a temporary basis. Chimni (2004) reports:

> Shorn of euphemistic verbiage the new approach stated that since refugees from the South were now making their way to the North, and since there was at present no shortage of labour, it is time to rethink the solution resettlement in other than the limited Cold War context. (p. 58)

As a result, pre-existing international refugee organisations, including the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, developed policies to maintain refugees in developing countries. By the 1990s, the geopolitical refugee emphasis was on ‘repatriating’ the refugees to their country of origin in order to maintain the nation-state system of control over who could enter the nation and be granted citizenship (Toft, 2007; Chimni, 1998; 2004; Loescher, 1996; Long, 2011). The next section discusses the policy of ‘repatriation’ in order to explain how the current reality of repatriation policies affects refugees locked into pre-resettlement countries today.

Repatriation

The policy of 'repatriation' stems from the Roman concept of *patria* – fatherland, motherland, or homeland. According to Long (2011, p 234), "[t]wo distinct notions of patria can be found implicit in the political theory relating to refugee repatriation": physical location and the collective identity of a group. This suggests that the process of refugee repatriation is considered to be a way to restore the relationship between political institutions and a political community within the framework of nation-state despite the fact that conditions in which a social group lived led to them becoming refugees in the first place. According to Toft (2007) "[r]epatriation means the return of refugees to their country of origin" (p. 147).

In different periods international refugee organisations have viewed repatriation as a durable solution either forced or voluntary for refugee crises. After the First World War, the League of Nations High Commission for Refugees focused on repatriating Eastern European refugees to their country of origin in order to solve refugee crises (Long, 2011). As noted earlier in this chapter, the outbreak of the Second World War, the Cold War between the West and the Soviet Union, and the economic boom of the post-war decades meant that refugee policies moved from repatriation designed to resettle refugees to the Western liberal countries rather than repatriating these people to the country of origin from which they have fled. Chimni (2004) identifies two distinct phases in the post-war decades. In the first phases from 1954 until 1985, Western nations promoted resettlement, however, voluntary repatriation was also an acceptable solution during this phase time. Throughout the second phase from 1985-1996 the idea of voluntary repatriation was first promoted as a viable solution by United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees to refugee crises. But in September 1996, the Director of UNHCR's Division of International protection, Dennis McNamara, introduced the idea of imposed return. Since then, "the doctrine of imposed return has been advanced to carve out what are viewed as unavoidable exceptions to the standard of voluntary repatriation" (Chimni, 2004, p. 55).

The policy of involuntary repatriation has changed the contemporary refugee landscape. In Chapter Three of this thesis, I discussed the policy of repatriation to theorise the refugee policy shifts in the history of the global trends. Repatriation places the Pakistani Christian refugees in a difficult situation where they have only two options: to stay in Bangkok with

limited social services or to return to their country of origin. If they stay in Bangkok, they will face discrimination from local communities and Thai authorities, and scarcity of resources. And if they return to Pakistan, they will re-enter the persecuted minority status and experience discrimination, even fear for their lives.

For those who stay in Bangkok, the refugee community's access to education is limited to the community learning centres operated by INGOs. Although the Thai government permits all children, including refugee children, to receive 15 years of basic education in Thai public schools (Save the Children, n.d ; UNHCR, n.d.), the language of instruction, distance from schools, and discrimination are some of the main reasons for the refugee participants in my study not achieving this for their children. Despite the public education to refugee children, the Thai government does not provide any other social resources to the refugees. In fact, INGOs providers are the ones who offer limited social services to the Pakistani Christian refugees in Bangkok. This establishes a symbiotic relationship despite the unequal socio-economic status between the two parties.

Patron-client theory

This theory is the main methodological tool in my explanation of the Pakistani Christian refugees' experiences in relation to social services, including education, in Bangkok. The patron-client relationship is formed between individuals or groups who have different socio-economic status in stratified societies. This relationship is based on the fact that patrons have control over resources, and clients can only have access to those resources through patrons' favour or support (Foster, 1963; Galt, 1974; Wolf & Silverman, 2001; Nicols, 2014). As a consequence, the clients engage with patrons in "a largely instrumental friendship" (Scott, 1972a, p. 92). In return for patronage, clients are required to show loyalty, obedience, and offer services to patrons on demand (Scott, 1972a). These relations exist in two types: dyadic or triadic relations. The *dyadic* relations comprise a single patron and several clients. In complex societies or large organizational operations, patrons and clients are connected by brokers or mediators establishing *triadic* relations (Eisenstadt & Roniger, 1980). My study identifies the complexity of relations between the INGO providers and the Pakistani refugee community as triadic relations. I discuss these in detail in Chapter Five in order to show that, despite the ideal of a mutual relationship, one promoted by the refugee organisations, the

contradictory features in the patron-client relationship maintain inequalities in the relationship.

Maintaining Inequalities

The presence of inequalities in patron-client relations is acknowledged by researchers (Roniger, 1983, 2015; Scott, 1972a, b; Stein, 1984; Wolf & Silverman, 2001; Galt, 1974; Nicols, 2014; Foster, 1963; Aizenshtadt, Eisenstadt, & Roniger, 1984). Some anthropological studies found that this relationship may have beneficial qualities of solidarity, social advancement, and alleviation of inequalities (Eisenstadt & Roniger, 1980; Redfield, 1973; Wolf & Silverman, 2001). Yet, Galt (1974) and Stein (1984) note that the patron-client relationship provides stability in the short-term emergency situation, but for the long-term this relationship is dysfunctional and perpetuates inequalities. The inequality feature and its beneficial factors have not been examined in earlier studies. Scott (1972a) suggests the main difference between the patron-client relationship and any other relationship is that it has "greater calculation of benefits and the inequality that typifies the patron-client exchange" (p. 95). My study investigates whether this patron-client relationship does in fact alleviate or maintain inequalities in the provision of social services, especially in education. Does the patron-client relationship provide ongoing advantages for the INGO providers or for the Pakistani Christian refugee community?

The inequalities between providers and refugees exist in two different phases of the relationship. First, prior to engaging in the relationship, the providers and refugees' socio-economic statuses are already unequal in relation to their wealth, social connections, and access to social services (Roniger, 2015). Second, the refugees are in a vulnerable position in the pre-resettlement countries where they do not have any legal, political, and social rights (Harrell-Bond, Voutira & Leopold, 1992). According to UNCHR (2002), refugees should have legal, economic, and social rights in the host nations, but such rights are not certain nor easily accessible. Only a nation-state can provide political, legal, social, and economic rights for its citizens that are enforceable. Patrons who are outside the legal framework of the nation-state do not have 'rights' to provide or enforce.

Although the patron-client relationship presents itself as a beneficial relationship for clients (Nichollas, 2014; Stein, 1984; Galt, 1974; Foster, 1963; 1965), it is in fact based on

"inequality and hierarchy" (Roniger, 2015, p. 604). The inequality feature exposes the patron-client relationship as a possible source of mistreatment (Scott & Marshall, 2009) for the marginalized; mistreatment which may occur to the refugee communities residing in pre-resettlement countries (Harrell-Bond, Voutira & Leopold, 1992). Usually, providers have control over alleviating or maintaining the inequalities between refugees and themselves. However, the empirical data in my study suggests that providers are inclined to maintain inequalities. They provide limited resources, including basic education, to refugee communities by using their own personnel in Bangkok, something which creates a self-interest in continuing such provision. An example of such self-interest is when INGO providers can reduce their operating costs and the cost of supporting their infrastructure rather than increasing funding for the refugee needs. In case of education it is cheaper to provide basic literacy education than to provide the academic education which requires specialist teachers and resources.

Maintaining inequalities facilitates two outcomes. First, it perpetuates the refugees' dependency on providers. Second, this ongoing dependency sustains the providers fund-raising projects. For example, in response to the providers' selective patronage, the refugees are required to show docility in allowing patrons to use their photos, stories, or videos for reporting and fundraising purposes. Providing evidence of assisting the urban refugees in miserable conditions may also boost providers' reputations. This contribution may lead to increased funding to the providers.

Provider-refugee relations have unequal socio-economic status and this can be seen in the exchange of resources – including education (Harrell-Bond, Voutira & Leopold, 1992; Donelly, 1986; Freedman, 2015). I argue that the social exchange of education is influenced by the inequalities in provider-refugee relations. In all ways, the vulnerable urban refugees are unable to offer an equal exchange or services to providers. This suggests that the social exchange in provider-refugee relations is built on inequalities. My interest is in how this relationship maintains those inequalities and what implications this feature has on the type of education currently provided in the community centres in Bangkok that I studied.

Power-structured relationship

Multifaceted inequalities and the ongoing provision of social services establish the patron-client relationship as a power-structured relationship. The relationship can be theorised as

comprising two main structures: vertical and horizontal. In the vertical hierarchical structure, a patron has power and control over a number of clients (Abercrombie & Hill, 1976). The vertical structure is usually created when the socio-economic status between patrons and clients is wide and hereditary values are also active in that society (Scott, 1972a). On the other hand, the presence of a narrowed socio-economic status and power gaps with active democratic societies generates a horizontal structure in the patron-client relations (Scott, 1972b). The horizontal structure offers a slightly more equal relationship between patrons and clients.

The evidence of my study (see Chapters Six & Seven) shows that the provider-refugee relationship in Bangkok exhibit the vertical hierarchical structure with providers controlling the distribution of social services to the refugees. In contrast, the relationship among provider organizations is presented as a horizontal structure in the language cooperation and mutual understanding founded on signed memoranda of understanding between the organizations such as UNHCR, Bangkok Refugee Centre, Jesuit Refugee Services, Asylum Access, and a number of grassroots organisations (Asylum Access, 2014). The mutual agreement shows that there is an understanding between the INGOs, however, this is not the case when it comes to the provider-refugee relations. For example, a participant in my study said that "NGOs have mutual understanding and meet once a month to discuss the refugee situation in Bangkok" (P 5, Int.2, Oct 2017). These protocols establish a more symmetrical relationship between the providers. In contrast, the providers and refugees' relations involve an asymmetrical relationship. Powerful providers and susceptible refugees engage in flexible transactions without any signed agreement with limited benefits to the refugees (Roniger, 1983; 2015; Wolf & Silverman, 2001) including food rations, basic education, and a limited stipend of 3500 Baht (175 NZ $).

The power-structured relationship places providers in a position of power over the provision of social services, something I observed in my study of the basic education provided in the community learning centres in Bangkok. Roniger's study (2015) showed that the patron-client relationships have "the persisting impact on the hierarchy networks" (p. 603). Firstly, providers have a hierarchical position from which they have control over all the resources with limited accountability (Najam, 1996). The hierarchal structure places refugees on the bottom of this relationship with ongoing dependence and patronage. As a result, the providers

make all the decisions regarding education. During my fieldwork, I observed that a providers' meeting about refugee education only involved providers. The refugee community had no representation in the meeting.

The Pakistani Christian refugee parents expect that their children have access to academic education in the community learning centres. One of the refugee parents in my study said that *"we want our children to receive academic education so they can gain better opportunities"* (P 4, Int., Oct. 2017). The Action International and Rescue Organisation, on the other hand, provide basic education. The refugee community desire for academic education because it is context-independent knowledge and it can assist the refugee teenagers to continue their education in Pakistan at the time of repatriation. In contrast, the community learning centres I studied only provide basic education which is context-dependent knowledge and it cannot be used outside of the context (Young, 2008). The provision of education is considered to be one of the most efficient developmental strategies to reduce inequality among marginalized groups, including urban refugees (Collier & Gunning, 1999; Easterly & Levine, 1997; Schultz, 1999). However, in the case of Pakistani Christian refugees in Bangkok, the INGO providers in my study used an emergency approach which focuses on meeting minimum standards despite a mandate to offer a quality education by the UNHCR (UNHCR, 2018b).

Basic Education

Given the refugees' aspirations for education, a quality education involves a type of knowledge and skills that has the potential to provide better socioeconomic opportunities for their children although whether or not this potential can be realized depends upon what happens next for refugees. In Chapter Eight I discuss whether the refugee parents' aspirations can be fulfilled in the contemporary world where the shift from refugee to migrant status is extremely restricted. But even if such a shift were possible, my study findings show that the INGOs providers do not provide the knowledge and skill with which the refugees can interrupt their refugee status.

The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, the main international refugee organisation, promotes an emergency approach in education in order to stabilize the refugee crisis in the short term then require the quality one (UNHCR, 2012). As a result, UNHCR partnering organisations (see Chapter One) have adopted the emergency approach to

providing education to refugee communities in Bangkok. But while the emergency approach is meant to be short term only, some providers maintain it in the long term and do not shift to providing quality education; providers continuously use the same strategy (Galt, 1974; Stein, 1984). For example, the refugee community in my study has remained in the Bangkok area for more than five years, yet the providers still use an emergency approach which focuses on basic literacy and numeracy skills – basic education. A refugee parent in my study said, *"our children have been only learning English language for the last five to six years"* (P 1, Int., Oct 2017). The refugee parents also want their children to learn academic subjects instead of entirely focusing on a basic literacy education. Specialised teachers, who teach academic subjects, are not employed by the community learning centres in Bangkok because they are more expensive. For example, a specialised teacher could cost 15,000 – 20,000 Thai Baht (755 – 1000 $ NZ) per month to the Action International and Rescue Organisation. In contrast, the ongoing emergency approach is the less expensive option for the INGO providers. The providers optimise the benefits to themselves by using a number of strategies such as employing volunteer teachers for a couple of hours a week or by hiring untrained teachers from the refugee community itself for 4,000 – 5,000 Thai Baht (200-250 $ NZ).

I argue that maintaining the patron-client structured relationships and inequalities go hand in hand because this combination preserves ongoing dependence, control of resources to providers, power of decision-making to providers, greater advantages for the providers, and ongoing disadvantage for the refugees. Most importantly, the type of academic education desired by the refugees is not provided, despite this being the quality education the providers claim to offer (UNHCR, 2009a). In the next section, I discuss the advantage of 'academic education' to argue that this type of knowledge has the potential to strengthen refugees' disadvantageous position whether in the pre-resettlement country or in their country of origin after repatriation.

Academic education

An academic education is based on academic subjects such as Chemistry, Physics, Mathematics, Languages, Biology, and History which are drawn from their disciplinary bases in the Natural and Physical Sciences, the Social Sciences, the Humanities, and the Arts. This type of education needs specialised and trained teachers. In contrast, the INGO providers in my study mostly filled those positions by volunteers who can only provide education in Thai

and English literacy at a very basic level. Because a basic emergency type of education does not require trained teachers the volunteer teachers have neither a degree in specialised knowledge (for example English language, Physics, Chemistry, Mathematics, Computer Sciences, Arts, History) nor any teaching certification. All the refugee parents wanted that their teenagers to receive an academic education. They knew that if their teenagers continued to receive an academic education – something begun in Pakistan – then in the case of repatriation or resettlement they are more likely to attain high-status employment, and become desirable migrants or even to have greater protection against the discrimination experienced by other groups. All the refugee parents I spoke to wanted their children to become doctors, engineers, pilots, and lawyers.

Features of academic education

I argue that 'academic education' enables vulnerable peoples to understand and perhaps challenge their conditions of existence. This is the case because academic education is 'context independent knowledge'. Academic knowledge is mde distinct from everyday knowledge because of its abstraction from immediate experiences. Bernstein (2000) and Young (2008a; 2008b) refer to the difference between 'context dependent knowledge' and 'context independent knowledge'. Context dependent knowledge is the type of knowledge found in basic education and in everyday experiences (Young, 2008b. Context independent knowledge' is found in academic subjects and is conceptually-based which means it develops the ability of abstract thinking in students. The purpose of context dependent knowledge is to enable an "individual to cope in the world that he or she is a part of" (Young, 2008b, p. 14). For example, one of the teachers in my observation at a community learning centre was teaching the refugee students how to find a route on a Bangkok Train System map. I observed that the refugees were bored with the lesson because they already knew about the train system. Moreover, an educational consultant in my study said that *"Jesuit Refugee Services in Bangkok only teach the Thai language to refugee students based on their everyday life experiences"* (P 5, Int., Oct 2017). This is supported by Dryden-Peterson who found` that (2015, p. 12) "[r]efugee children spend a disproportionate amount of time learning languages while often falling behind in age-appropriate academic content". I found that the community learning centres, where I undertook my study, focused on that type of context-dependent knowledge.

The inherent 'power' of context independent knowledge is the conceptual structure "that is not tied to particular cases and therefore provides a basis for generalizations and making claims to universality" (Young, 2008b, p. 15). I argue that the generalisation and universalisation features of context independent knowledge are salient for refugee education because this type of knowledge is not limited to any particular context. For example, all the refugee parents in my study told me that, prior to arriving to Thailand, more than half of the Pakistani refugee students (from 9 to 13 years old) were learning such knowledge. They studied Physics, Chemistry, Biology, Humanities, History, and Mathematics. The parents in my study constantly asked about access to academic knowledge and skills for their children. The international schools such as KIS International School, NIST International School, International Community School, and Ekamai International School responded to these requests by donating used academic books and computers to the community centres rather than providing specialist teachers. An educational consultant in my study said that *"we have started the community learning centres because international schools [in Bangkok] do not offer admission to refugee children in their schools"* (P5, Int.1, Oct 2017). But all the refugee parents I spoke to said that KIS international school offers a full scholarship for one refugee student in an academic year. But because the community learning centres provide basic education they are the only option for the rest of the refugee parents despite the fact that the context-independent knowledge (or academic education) will enable teenage refugees to continue their education in their country of origin (a likely event) or a resettlement country.

Functions of academic education

The refugee parents in my study showed a clear preference for academic education. They believed that professional qualifications would lead to better employment and ultimately lead to their children becoming desired migrants. The core function of academic education is the development of the rational mind (Bailey, 2010) and according to Hirst (1969, p. 150), "the fundamental relationship between knowledge and the development of mind is of central educational significance".

Although the parents have an instrumental view of academic knowledge they understand intuitively that this type of knowledge contains something which has the potential to liberate their children from "the present and the particular" (Bailey, 2004) with an intellectual education enabling its learners' to 'think the unthinkable' (Bernstein, 2000, p. 30). In other

words, "[i]deology trades on the force of the present and the particular; liberal education draws, or should draw, on the longer memory and the wider imagination, on the universal and the humanistic, on the genuinely intellectual advances in knowledge and understanding properly to be shared by all humankind" (Bailey, 2010, p.168). Rata (2016, p. 3) also argues that intellectual education "may enable individuals to be liberated from their localised condition of existence with the associated restrictions of class, caste, religion or gender status" including the refugee community. Apple (2009) argues for the significance of intellectual education, by taking a Gramscian view. He identifies how the intellectual nature of academic knowledge can enable oppressed peoples, including refugees, to think, challenge, and change their existence, he notes:

> One thing that we should not do is automatically assume that we must unlearn all that we know. When Gramsci (1971) argued that one of the tasks of a truly counter-hegemonic education was not to throw out 'elite knowledge' but to reconstruct its form and content so that it served genuinely progressive social needs, he provided a key to another role 'organic intellectuals' might play (see also Apple, 1996; Gutstein, 2006). Thus, we should not be engaged in a process of what might be called 'intellectual suicide'. That is, there are serious intellectual (and pedagogic) skills in dealing with the histories and debates surrounding epistemological, political, and educational issues involved in justifying what counts as important knowledge. These are not simple and inconsequential issues and the practical and intellectual/political skills of dealing with them have been well-developed. However, they can atrophy if they are not used. We can give back these skills by employing them to assist communities in thinking about this, learn from them, and engage in the mutually pedagogic dialogues that enable decisions to be made in terms of both the short-term and long-term interest of oppressed peoples. (p. 248-249)

A Gramscian view and the humanistic, liberal view (Bailey, 2004) both acknowledge the role an intellectual education can play in enabling marginalised people such as these refugee teenagers to generalise, think, and create in order to understand and to challenge the contemporary refugee conditions of existence. This is despite the geopolitical structures and processes which prevent them from challenging those conditions. I will discuss this liberating potential in detail in the concluding chapter.

Section II - Study design

This section describes the design of my empirical study which investigated the provision of education to the Pakistani Christian refugees by two INGOs that I refer to respectively as

Action International and Rescue Organisation. I undertook the fieldwork for this study in Bangkok from October to November 2017 in the two INGO educational community centres.

The empirical study supports the conceptual methodology in building my thesis argument that the internal socioeconomic conditions of pre-resettlement countries place refugee communities outside of the nation-state system. The excluding policies of the host countries allow the INGOs to build an older patron-client structural relationship for the provision of social services, including the exchange of education in the community learning centres. According to Rata (2014b, p. 347), sociological concepts provide a methodological link between what happens at the global level "with events at the national level and at the level of practices". The empirical study of the Pakistani Christian refugees has enabled me to identify the problem as it was experienced by the study participants and move to its theorising with the application of the key concepts 'patron-client' and 'nation-state', but I have also been able to use the study as an illustration of the type of education provided to refugees at similar learning centres in pre-resettlement countries which take a basic education approach (Ali, Briskman & Fiske, 2016) . So although my study is a small-scale account of one group of refugees, the conceptual methodology provides the means with which to generalise to other refugees receiving basic education in pre-resettlement countries.

Qualitative research methods were selected to examine and theorise the ideas about education held by the refugee community and the INGOs. This is because the "qualitative paradigm affords a flexible approach for exploring and deriving meaning from such data, which is likely to contain complex issues" (McPhail, 2012, p.12). The existence and persistence of an educational gap between the refugee parents' aspirations and the INGOs' provision was identified as the thesis problem. My aim is to justify the identification of the gap as the thesis problematic by showing how the interests of each party are captured in the gap. The identification enabled me to explain the research problem theoretically by locating those interests in the differential power relations conceptualised according to a patron-client relationship.

Research motivation

I am a member of the Pakistani Christian community and I am able to provide emic perspectives of this community. I can fluently speak and write Punjabi, the mother tongue of

Pakistani Christians, and Urdu, the Pakistani national language. Additionally, I worked with the Pakistani refugee community from 2011 to 2014 in Chiang Mai, Thailand, where I assisted refugees to access social services, including education. Therefore, I am aware of some of the educational challenges that are faced by the refugee community. However, I also have an etic perspective of this refugee community because I have not been a refugee in any pre-resettlement country. Nevertheless, my experiences provided me with the motivation to want to understand the Pakistani Christian refugee experiences. Despite the motivation to undertake the study being grounded in my own experiences, the study itself is a sociological one. Both the investigation and the analysis use conceptual tools, particularly the two main concepts of 'patron-client' and 'nation-state' to analyse the experiences of a group of refugees. For the empirical study, interviews and observations were used to collect the data from providers and the refugees (Donnelly, 1986). Reflective field notes and refugee education policy documents were also used as data and analysed according to the emergent themes of 'exclusion' and 'provision' (see Chapters Two & Three)

The study

The empirical component of the thesis is a single case study identifying and investigating the educational gap between the refugee parents' aspirations for their children's education and the INGOs' provision of education. Pakistani Christian refugees are a part of more than a half of the global refugee population residing in the urban milieus of pre-resettlement countries (Betts & Collier, 2017; UNHCR, 2009b; 2009c; 2013; 2018a). According to Yin (2004), the case study research method is "an empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context; when the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident" (p.13). My study investigates the provision of education to contemporary refugees' in such a real-life context in order to identify the phenomenon. Zainal (2007, p.4) notes that "case studies not only help to explore or describe the data in real-life environment, but also help to explain the complexities of real-life situations which may not be captured through experimental or survey research".

The existence and persistence of an educational gap between the refugee parents' aspirations and the INGOs' provision was examined by using an embedded design. This design includes multiple units of analysis within a case (Yin, 2004). Thus, the study design includes multiple research methods: semi-structured face-to-face interviews from the two parties, document

analysis of refugee education reports, and reflective field notes. In addition I conducted observations of two community learning centres, an INGO meeting, and refugee community events in Bangkok. I discuss these research methods in detail below.

Ethics

Ethical issue were a serious concern in my research because Pakistani Christian refugees are one of the most marginalised communities in Bangkok. They face discrimination, xenophobia, harassment, and exploitation. I approached several Thai organisations before undertaking the research since these organisations already engage with the urban refugee communities in Bangkok with the approval of the Thai government. After receiving a support letter from the Haven Foundation (pseudonym), I applied to the University of Auckland Human Participants Ethics Committee prior to the commencement of the empirical study in 2017. Approval to undertake the research was received in March 2017. The ethics documents are in Appendices.

Given the legally compromised situation of the urban refugee community and also for personal ethical reasons (Briant & Kennedy, 2004), I have used pseudonyms for the participants, international refugee organisations ('Action International' and 'Rescue Organisation') and their personnel, and community learning centres' names ('Bright' and 'Shine'). The location of the centres has also been altered. The reason for doing this is to de-identify these organisations. However, I cannot guarantee anonymity because the organisations are still actively involved in providing social services, including education, to Pakistani Christian refugees. This was made clear in the participant information sheet (PIS) forms (see Appendix - A)

The Haven Foundation (pseudynom) assisted me in recruiting participants. This placed a degree of influence on the potential participants. In order to mitigate this, I asked the recruiters to emphasise that the research was voluntary. I also emphasised this when I met with those who indicated an interest in being a participant in my study. Indeed, the question of influence becomes important when, as I theorised the findings, I recognised the way that 'influence' is a factor in the patron-client brokerage relationship. Ensuring that the refugee interviews gave informed consent was important. On a few occasions, I had to translate the consent form for the refugee participants in order to ensure that my participants understood

the content of the form before signing it. I acknowledge that this may be seen as influencing the refugees or as building trust between the refugee parents and me.

In order to minimise the risk to the participants, who are Pakistani Christian refugees in transition to a final settlement country, I needed to acknowledge the particular vulnerabilities they face in Thailand. It was imperative that only refugee families who had a legal status to reside in Thailand and who also have had a refugee identification card, which is issued by the UNHCR, were included in the study. Having this status affords them some level of protection against any unforeseen attention from the authorities.

Data collection

Interviews

Interviews are basic data collecting methods in qualitative research (May, 2011; Bryman, 2004). The purpose of the interviews was to find out about the provision of education from the refugees and the INGO employees' perspectives. In my fieldwork, I conducted semi-structured interviews with four sets of refugee parents (both the mother and father), two educational consultants (one refugee and one from Rescue Organisation), two teachers at the community learning centres, and one humanitarian aid worker from Action International. The semi-structured nature of the interviews enabled the participants "to answer more on their own terms than the standardized interview permits, but still provide a greater structure for comparability over that of focused or unstructured interview" (May, 2011, p. 135).

All the interviews were conducted face to face. This enabled me to not only collect the verbal responses, but also pay attention to the body language of my participants (Oates, 2015). For example, although the refugee participants permitted me to record their interviews. I noticed from their body language that they were not comfortable with sharing their educational experiences and aspirations with me. I jotted this down on my reflexive field notes and also discussed this problem with an employee of Haven Foundation. The employee explained to me that the refugee is required to go through a series of long and intense interviews with UNHCR and other INGOs for the refugee status determination and social services. Given such experiences with interviews, it is not surprising that an interview can be stressful. During the following interviews, if I noticed that the refugee participants were not feeling comfortable, I immediately turned off the recorder and started taking written notes only. This

seemed to lessen the stress as the interviewees came more relaxed.

Conducting interviews with the two key parties, the refugee community and the INGO employees, was directly helpful to examining the educational gap. The interviews provided me with information about the role of education in the lives of the refugee community and also provided deep insight into the type of aspirations they had for education. Interviewing the INGO employees also helped me to understand their standpoint with respect to the provision of basic education in the community learning centres operated by the Action International and Rescue Organisation.

Observations

Observations were also used as a means to gain insight into the view of education from the Pakistani Christian refugees and from the INGOs employees. The observations lasted from one hour to five hours where I participated in the both parties' activities and events. My observation in a community learning centre was "recorded as field notes" and later was narrated in the form of a vignette. According to McPhail (2012, p.18), vignettes "bring the reader as close as possible to being in the class and experiencing the essence of the lesson".

The purpose of a series of observations in the two community learning centres, the INGO meeting, and in the refugee community activities, was to find a "connection or a lack of connection between espoused theory" and practice (McPhail, 2012, p. 17). The observations assisted me to see the nature of the relationship between the refugee community and the INGOs employees and most importantly gave insight into how they discuss and negotiate their relationship and how they deal with differing views about education.

Reflective field notes

Throughout my data collection, I took notes of my thoughts, along with ideas for future observations. I noted questions which arose from occurrences during the interviews and observations. The notes helped me to clarify my thoughts as I became increasingly aware of an educational gap between the refugee parents' aspirations and the INGOs provision. It was this growing awareness – from the interviews, observations, and reflections – that led me to the thesis research problematic, that is, why is there such a persistent gap between the educational objectives of the two parties?

Policy document analysis

In addition to the collection of data from the participants, I also used key INGO policy documents in explaining the provision of education for urban refugees in pre-resettlement countries. The documents include practical guidelines of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR, 2009a; 2018d), UNHCR reports, education approaches, and minimum education standards set by the UNHCR for urban refugees in pre-resettlement countries. The documents describe and justify the provision of basic education although it is referred to as 'quality education' (UNHCR, 2009a)

Data analysis

According to McPhail (2012) "A methodological imperative of the research process is used to construct a logical chain of evidence from the data to its interpretation" (p. 19). I began by translating my collected data from the refugees in Urdu and Punjabi to English and employed a translator to check my data translation. The next stage was to identify themes in the data. This analysis was driven by "the influence of thematic categorisation derived from the research questions" (McPhail, 2012, p. 19). The themes I identified in the data are first, the status of the refugees in relation to the nation-state system, and second the educational gap between the refugee parents' aspirations and the INGO provision.

The inductive reasoning and the iterative approach enabled me to engage with the data in a way which led to deep theorisation (Corbin & Strauss, 2008). These approaches were initiated by "open coding, deriving and developing concepts inductively from data" (McPhail, 2012, p. 19). The thematic headings of national *exclusion* and INGO *provision* began to emerge from the categorisation procedure. I used the first interview "as 'sorting bin' for the data from subsequent interviews" (McPhail, 2012, p. 19). Importantly, the thematic analysis is just a method to make sense of your data and "does not prescribe methods of data collection, theoretical positions, epistemological or ontological frameworks" (Braun & Clarke, 2013 p. 178). This was something I needed to create and is what gives the thesis argument its originality. I constructed a theoretical framework using concepts which link to the themes. The two main themes drawn from the data are the excluded status of refugees in pre-resettlement countries and the subsequent relationship of the refugees to the INGOs who provide the social services not provided by the nation. Exclusion and provision were then

theorised using the concepts of patron-client and nation-state, thereby creating the thesis argument which connects the theory to the data-derived themes to the data itself and gives my thesis coherence.

Chapter Five - An educational gap in an extra-national system

Introduction

This chapter presents the findings from my empirical study – the interviews, observations, and analysis of documents. There are two sections which use the themes of 'exclusion' and 'provision' to frame the discussion of the findings. Section one identifies the gap between the refugee parents' aspirations for their children and the INGO provision of the education, provision that exists outside a national education system. The findings show that the refugees desire an academic education for their children because they believe that this type of education has the potential to lead to professional qualifications and will enable their children to continue education in other locations including developed countries and in Pakistan if they are repatriated. In other words, the parents hold out hope that education will interrupt their refugee status whether they go to a resettlement country or are repatriated to Pakistan. In contrast, the Action International and Rescue Organisation are only willing to provide basic literacy education and claim that this type of education can assist the refugee community in Thailand and in other locations. The INGOs justify their provision of education with reference to UNHCR policy documents which focus on providing basic emergency education to urban refugees in pre-resettlement countries (UNHCR, 2009a).

Section two discusses how the provision of education to the refugees exists outside of the nation-state system. An account of the Pakistani Christian refugees is used to illustrate what living outside national institutions is like in terms of their daily schooling experience. Central to my analysis of refugee education is the finding that, despite the exclusion of refugees from the benefits and protection of a nation-state system, the refugees see themselves in terms of the conditions which existed in the post-1940s to 1970s era. This was a time when refugees were allowed to be included in the national institution of Western countries. Even today, they continually hold out hope for inclusion. The INGO providers, on the other hand, take a post-1970s approach for the provision of education characterised by ongoing exclusion. Repatriation is the expected outcome rather than inclusion into the resettlement countries. The educational gap between the refugees' aspirations and the INGO provision which my study identified is explained as a consequence of this deep-seated difference in the way the future is imagined.

An educational gap: aspirations and provision

In spite of the marginalised refugee status in Bangkok, the Pakistani Christian refugee community maintain aspirations for their children's education in the community learning centres. This has been noted by others. According to Dryden-Peterson (2011b, p. 6), "Education is one of the highest priorities for refugee communities". One of the refugee participants in my study noted:

> *As far as I am concerned, I would put education on the top of everything. I know food is important for the nurturement of our body. But still, I would say that we can survive with less food and any other basic necessities of life but not without a quality education.* (P 1, Int., Oct 2017)

The quality education in the above quote refers to an academic education not to the UNHCR term 'quality education' which does in fact actually mean a basic education. The basic education fulfils the refugees' basic literacy needs and enhances their everyday living experiences in the pre-resettlement country (see Chapter Five). In terms of professional qualifications, one refugee parent said, *"I want my daughter to be a doctor and my son to be an engineer"* (P 2, Int., Nov 2017). Another refugee parent noted, *"I always wanted my son to become a fighter pilot"* (P3, Int., Oct 2017). A Pakistani educational consultant said, *"I cannot wait for the day when my daughter will graduate from a medical college"* (P5, Int., Oct 2017). The refugees view academic education as the silver lining for their future generations. They believe that this type of education opens up the potential for their children to continue this type of education in multiple locations, to obtain high-status employment, and to interrupt their refugee status (Burde, 2005; Hakami, 2016; Winter-Villaluz, 2015; Dryden-Peterson, 2015). In fact, all the refugee participants in my study had aspirations for their children to obtain professional qualifications and become mechanical engineers, scientists, computer programmers, professors, doctors, and lawyers.

Although in a different location, the UNHCR itself (2016, p. 7) has captured this deeply-held desire in a report where an eight-year-old refugee girl in Liberia said: "When I grow up I want to be a doctor to help my family and all of the sick people, so I have to study a lot to become a big woman". This child already understood that professional qualifications require dedication to academic education. According to Froy and Pyne (2011), an academic education is prerequisite for professional qualifications. The refugees in my study were well

aware that international schools in Bangkok teach academic subjects, but most of the refugees could not afford the tuition fees for such schools. According to one of the refugee parents in my study:

> *We want our teenagers to enrol in international schools where they can learn different academic subjects like Biology, Physics, Chemistry, Mathematics, English, Humanities, Social Studies, Computer, Arts. But unfortunately, that is not the case in the community learning centres. We cannot afford international schools' tuition fees. I work as a volunteer, where I receive a limited stipend and we can only send our teenagers to the community learning centre. (P1, Int., Oct 2017)*

Save the Children (n.d), a humanitarian aid organisation, notes that "Thai law stipulates that all children, regardless of their nationality or legal status, have the right to 15 years of free basic education, but implementing this strong legal framework has not been successful". The observation extends to refugee children. Despite the legislation, the refugee communities have limited access to Thai public schools, especially in urban areas. The gap between the Thai laws and their implementation effectively excludes refugee communities from national institutions including education ones. An education consultant, a participant in my study noted:

> *Technically these Pakistani children can go to Thai schools. But they must speak Thai. So, the UN cooperated with BRC [Bangkok Refugees Centre] and the Catholic Relief Agency to create a six-month language program to get the kids just prepared enough so that they can go to the school and begin functions in Thai schools. But there were limited seats and not a lot of Thai schools that were willing to offer it. So, it doesn't look like an option available to most of the refugee community. Because a lot of their parents still don't think that they'll be here long enough. They don't want their kids in a Thai school. They want their kids to learn English. (P6, Int., Oct 2017)*

None of the refugee parents in my study sent their children to the BRC or Catholic Relief Agency. One of my refugee participants noted that *"it takes us one and half hours each way to reach the BRC"* (P2, Int., Nov 2017*).."Even if the children could access the programme often refugee children face discrimination and derogatory behaviour from Thai classmates"* a humanitarian aid worker in my study said (P 7, Int.2, Nov 2017).

The lack of access to public and international schools led the refugee parents to enrol their children in informal schools in Bangkok (MacLaren, 2010; Winter-Villaluz, 2015). The

community learning centres I studied are these types of schools. The urban refugee communities are scattered in the suburbs of Bangkok and this has led the refugee communities and INGOs to establish small scale community learning centres in their apartment buildings (Winter-Villaluz, 2015; TCR, 2016). A humanitarian aid worker who participated, in my study, commented that *"we have ten to twelve community learning centres for the refugee community in Bangkok"* (P 7, Int.1, Oct 2017). My study explores the provision of refugee education in a couple of those learning centres.

Regardless of the refugees' expectations of the academic education, 'Action International' and 'Rescue Organisation' only provide basic literacy education in the two community learning centres. According to one of the participating education consultants in my study:

> *The refugee parents demand that we should provide academic education because they want their children to become doctors or engineers. We have inadequate resources to teach academic education in our learning centre, but we are trying our best. (P5, Int., Oct 2017)*

In my fieldwork, I attended an INGO meeting which had representatives from the Action International and Rescue Organisation. There were also representatives from three different international schools in Bangkok. I did not see any refugees in the meeting. None of the INGO representatives referred to the refugee parents' educational aspirations. Rather the meeting agenda was to explore the way in which the INGOs and international schools in Bangkok would provide reading material to the Pakistani Christian refugees in the community learning centre. Waters and Leblanc (2005, p.130) note that "planning is often done 'for' refugees by external actors like the host country, United Nations (UN) relief agencies, and nongovernment organisations, rather than 'with' refugees".

INGO education strategies

Refugee education strategies place INGOs as responsible for delivering refugee education in urban areas, but the INGO personnel are often reluctant to take full responsibility for providing education. An education consultant who took part in my study noted:

> *They [Pakistani Christian refugees] got themselves together, they located a place to open the learning centre, and later they went to a second place which was much better and they were able to grow the centre … they [the refugees] also assumed that*

> *I would take charge, which I was totally unprepared for and not willing to do. So, I kept insisting that I was a consultant and they would have to run the show (P 6, Int.1, Oct 2017).*

Refugee communities in other urban locations such as Indonesia and Thailand have also started their own community learning centres (Winter-Villaluz, 2015; Ali, Briskman & Fiske, 2016). Another participant, a humanitarian aid worker, had a different view about the community learning centres in Bangkok: "I believe it was an effort from the INGOs at the request of the [refugee] community" (P 7, Int.2, 2017). Whether or not the community learning centres were established by the INGOs, I argue that they put the responsibility on to the vulnerable refugee community in order to show that their role is to provide limited support for the refugees' initiative (Najam, 1996).

Winter-Villaluz (2015) notes that refugee education is "usually a patchwork of fragmented options: unaccredited and inconsistent core subject classes, language skills courses, and vocational classes offered by community members, NGOs, and local and international organizations" (p. 12). But regardless of the actual limited support for education, the UNHCR's (2012) Education Strategy for 2012-2016 sets six ambitious action plans:

(i) More children will learn better in primary education.
(ii) Schools will protect children and young people.
(iii) More young people will go to secondary school.
(iv) More young people will follow higher education courses.
(v) Education will be available at every age.
(vi) Education will be part of emergency responses. (p. 5)

The Educational Strategy 2010-2012 for refugees defines quality refugee education as one that "satisfies basic learning needs and enriches the lives of learners and their overall experiences of living" (UNHCR, 2009a, p.22). Accordingly, "[q]uality education is the anchor that will keep children in school, encouraging their persistence through to the end of primary school and their transition to secondary school and beyond" (p. 10). This very general view of 'quality education' by the INGOs, a view held by the Action International and Rescue Organisation, is limited to teacher training, primary education, and non-formal basic education but without reference to the academic education needed for higher education. Basic literacy education does not have the potential to prepare the refugee children for higher

education (Wright & Plasterer, 2012) so it is unsurprising that a UNHCR (2018b; 2018c) report shows that only 1% of refugee youth attends universities.

Basic education versus academic education

According to Sinclair (2002; 2007), the provision of basic education in refugee crises is based on a humanitarian aid response. Betts and Collier (2017), however, note:

> A response designed for the short-term emergency phase of a crisis too often endures over the long term. Today over half of the world's refugees are in 'protracted refugee situations' and for them the average length of stay is over two decades. (p. 19)

In Bangkok, the INGOs focus is on providing basic literacy education to the refugee teenagers for an extended period of time. Basic education focuses on English because the refugee community see greater value in learning English than Thai because they do not see themselves residing in Bangkok on a permanent basis. It could also be argued that the learning of Urdu should be essential for the refugee children, given that the INGOs and the host government actively promote repatriation. The volunteer teachers in the community learning centres, however, were focusing on teaching English – their native language. Besides the English language, the refugee community also wanted their children to have access to other academic subjects. One of the participating education consultants, who is a curriculum developer at one of the prestigious international schools in Bangkok, said:

> *So, one of my big pushes and that's personal as well as professional, is that I want to get those kids hooked on reading, so that when they have nothing, or if they have something to do, they will pick up and read because they want to, not just because the teacher assigned it. And so, one of the things we worked at was providing a pretty substantial library of free reading books, not just textbooks, so that kids would learn to go to the shelf and enjoy themselves; because that in itself creates a stronger learning disposition. (P 6, Int.1, Oct 2017)*

While this emphasis on reading sounds encouraging, it is rather vague in intent. There is no suggestion that the 'stronger learning disposition' will be directed towards academic study. It is more a reading-for-leisure approach. The basic literacy content I witnessed the refugee children working on was limited to their daily experiences (i.e. how to ride a Bangkok Train System or Metropolitan Rapid Transit). This type of content is 'everyday knowledge'. Young (2017, p. 3) argues that "[t]he reason we have schools is precisely because experience has its limits". In contrast, academic subjects are strongly classified subjects in which distinct

knowledge and approaches to knowledge production are developed (Bernstein, 2000). I will discuss the importance of academic education in more detail in the concluding chapter.

One of the other reasons for the refugee parents desire for academic education is that most of the teenagers in the families I interviewed previously had access to this type of education in Pakistan. At the community learning centres I studied, all the teenagers were Christians and most of them were from Punjab where they had been enrolled at private schools run by the Church of Pakistan. Two refugee parents told me that their teenagers attended the Beaconhouse School System, one of the most prestigious school systems in Pakistan, and also St. Anthony High School. Both of these schools offer academic education in English and Urdu and prepare students for General Education Certification and Advance Level examinations and Pakistani matriculation examinations (Cambridge International Examination, 2017; Beaconhouse, n.d.). In these examinations, students are tested in Mathematics, Physics, Chemistry, Biology, Pakistan Studies, History, Arts, Humanities, and *Islamyat* (Islamic Studies). Regardless of the religious distinction between Christians and Muslims, *Islamyat* is compulsory for all students in the Pakistani matriculation examinations. All students are required to pass those examinations in order to enrol in colleges and universities.

It was clear from my interviews and observations that community learning centres do not provide access to academic subjects. The likely event is repatriation to Pakistan and the returnee children will have lost many years of academic education. One of the refugee parents said:

> *For the last six years, they have not been attending a regular school. If we have to go back home, I am worried that my children may not be able to re-enter in the Pakistani education system. (P2, Int., Oct 2017)*

Thus, the lack of academic education during their years as refugees will increase their disadvantage in their country of origin. Given the geopolitical context in the contemporary refugee situation, repatriation is most likely the only solution for refugee communities, an outcome I have discussed thoroughly in Chapter Three. Indeed after living in Bangkok for five to six years, more than half of Pakistani Christian refugees have already returned to Pakistan. A humanitarian worker in my study said, *"the number of Pakistani refugees has decreased from 11,000 to roughly 3,000"* (P7, Int.2, Nov 2017). This is then the likely fate

for the refugee community I studied. There are important implications for education in this. The Pakistani education system requires students to achieve a certain level of academic education which is clearly not being provided at the community learning centres. This makes the provision of basic education in Bangkok extremely worrisome for most of the Pakistani Christian parents and students within the likely context of repatriation.

After receiving many requests from refugee parents, all the INGO participants in the study said that they have donated used academic books and also provided online access to the curriculum of their international schools in Bangkok. A refugee participant in my study said Katherine (pseudonym) *"provided us books and online resources for our children"* (P1, Int., Oct 2017). However, the INGO provision of online resources and books is being offered to the teenagers without any pedagogical support and, thus, cannot fill the educational gap. Katherine, a volunteer teacher in the community learning centre, said, *"I am not a certified teacher and cannot teach academic subjects"* (P 8, Int., Nov 2017). Additionally, one of the humanitarian aid workers interviewed said, *"the community learning centres do not have brilliant academic teachers, I think the refugee parents need to take responsibility of their children's education"* (P 7, Int.2, Nov 2017). One of the refugee parents, in desperation even said, *"I wish I could teach my children advanced level Mathematics and Science subjects by myself"* (P 4, Int.1, Oct, 2017). The inability of the INGO untrained teachers and the refugee parents to teach academic subjects creates a huge knowledge gap in the refugee children's education. All the refugee parents I interviewed noted that, as a consequence, their teenagers spent most of their time watching movies and playing online games on their phones, tablets, and in some cases laptops. They were unable to use either online education resources or the donated academic texts.

Although the INGOs' aim is to assist the Pakistani Christian refugee students to re-enter the education system of their destination country the INGO providers continue to use the emergency approach of basic education. They justify this by saying that refugee communities have had traumatic experiences and an emergency approach can help them to recover and rebuild their lives. But my study shows that this justification is not assisting the refugee community to either obtain professional qualifications nor the continuation of the education begun in their country of origin that will be needed in the most likely event of their repatriation.

Emergency approach

The INGO providers' policies advocate an emergency approach to providing all social services, including education, to refugees (Crisp, Talbot, & Cipollone, 2001; Morgan, Mohammad & Abdullah, 2010; Freedman, 2015; Stein, 1984; Galt, 1974). The emergency approach is embedded in the UNHCR's repatriation only policy and thus wanted refugees to repatriate instead of integrating them into the pre-resettlement countries (Waters, 2001; Crisp, 2001; Betts & Collier, 2017). Additionally, this approach provides justification for providers to use limited funds and meet minimum standards in refugee crises. The NGOs' education provision and strategies are in fact built on an emergency response because refugee communities are usually victims of wars and persecution (Karam, Monaghan, & Yoder, 2017). According to Sinclair (2007), the aim of education in emergencies is to:

- Provide a sense of normality
- Restore hope through access to the 'ladder' of education
- Support psychological healing from traumatic experiences through structured social activities in a 'safe space'
- Convey life skills and values of health and prevention of HIV/AIDS, gender equality and prevention of gender-based violence, conflict resolution, peacebuilding, responsible citizenship and environmental awareness
- Provide protection for marginalised groups – minorities, girls, children with disability, out of school adolescents – often at risk of exploitative or unsafe work such as prostitution or recruitment by militia (p. 52-53)

This emergency approach in INGO-refugee relations is useful in stabilising the refugee education for a short time (Galt, 1974; Stein, 1984), particularly when the refugees' education is being disrupted for a short period of time. But for the long term, the emergency approach cannot enable the alleviation of inequalities and vulnerabilities for refugees (Galt, 1974; Stein, 1984). Betts and Collier (2017) argue that this humanitarian emergency response to refugee crises is a failure and advocate for a development approach, one that can fulfill urban refugee communities' real educational needs. Wright & Plasterer (2012) note that the provision of higher education should be planned through the framework of development rather than the emergency approach. It would help refugees to move into higher education or professional qualifications, and, as I argue in the concluding chapter, also enable such marginalised people to acquire the intellectual means by which they can critique and challenge their disadvantage.

The emergency education approach focuses on psychological healing, safety, life skills,

health issues, and, gender equality (UNHCR, 2012). This may well be useful for the refugee teenagers for a short period of time, but it has considerable limits for the teenagers in the long run. There are two problems. Firstly, in my field work, I observed that the teenagers already have competent reading and speaking skills in English acquired in Pakistan. These skills could not be excluded by the untrained and uncertified INGO teachers in the centres. Two of the American volunteer teachers I observed were nurses with no previous teaching experience. Two other teachers I interviewed at the community learning centres said they do not have any teacher training and cannot teach academic subjects. The inability of those referred to by the INGOs as 'teachers' to teach academic subjects contributes to the on-going emergency approach I observed. Indeed, those Pakistani Christian refugees, I interviewed, had been receiving education via the emergency approach for more than five years.

With no durable solution for refugee crises (see Chapter Three), INGOs do not place academic education on top of their priority list for the following reasons. First, academic education is more expensive and requires additional financial resources such as hiring specialised teachers and learning materials. One of the participating education consultants said, *"specialist teachers are available, but due to limited resources we cannot provide salaries to those teachers"* (P5, Int.1, Oct 2017) Second, the INGO providers can easily manage the provision of basic education through part-time volunteer teachers. A volunteer teacher, a participant in my study, said:

> *As a facilitator, I help the refugee children to enhance their English literacy skills for a few hours in a week. I also have other responsibilities with my organisations. (P 8, Int., Nov 2017)*

Despite the more expensive nature of academic education, secondly, I observed that basic education was based on the teenagers' limited everyday experiences. This included lessons based on shopping, attending church services, and visiting Bangkok's National Museum and the Grand Palace in Bangkok as well as studying the Bangkok transport system which I mentioned above. The aim of basic education is to encourage the refugee children to share their experiences in order to build social relationships. Both teachers in my study said that the teenagers have had traumatic experiences and, therefore, they focus on meeting the teenagers' psychological needs in their classroom such as gaining confidence, feeling comfortable, and sharing their experience with others. While the students' psychological wellbeing is undoubtedly important, it should not exclude their cognitive needs. Both matter.

In order to capture a picture of a community learning centre in action, I have created a vignette which draws on my observations. The following vignette is based on my fieldwork conducted between October and November in 2017.

Bright learning centre

Not long after arriving in Bangkok I received a phone call form a Director of the community learning centre inviting me to visit their centre. On the morning of the visit, after showing the address to my taxi driver and describing my destination in broken Thai language, the driver took me to the location. Two American volunteer teachers met me at the entrance of a timeworn apartment building where the learning centre was located. There was a church sign at the front. A narrow staircase led to the learning centre on the fourth floor.

Fourteen teenagers and two volunteer teachers were crammed into a small room. I sat on a stool by the front door. The room had two medium sized tables, two bookshelves, stools, and opposite the front door, a small window overlooked the neighbourhood of the Bangkok suburb.

The day I visited the centre, the teachers worked from their own lesson plans along with a religious book. The focus was on reading and conversational English. On one side of the classroom, one teacher was working with six teenagers, both boys and girls, encouraging them to talk about their experiences riding the Bangkok Train System. The other teacher worked with the remaining students on their reading skills using a biography of a Pakistani missionary, Sadhu Sundar Singh, from the teacher's book and descriptions of the Cold War from handouts. The session lasted about two hours. In one group of readers seven students were required to share their book while seven students in the other group had individual handouts. In both groups on the reading side of the room, teachers worked on vocabulary from the readings and encouraged teenagers to share their experiences by asking questions. After a long pause, a few students shared their experiences, but some students kept whispering to each other during the question and answer sessions. It included informal student-to-student and teacher-to-student interactions with random

topics. Throughout I could hear conversations among students in Urdu and Punjabi. Some kept looking at their cell phones. The teachers finished the school day at noon.

After class, I went to the back of the room and started to look at the books on the bookshelves. They were academic books about Chemistry, Physics, History, Biology, and Mathematics with the labels of prestigious international schools in Bangkok. I asked both teachers if they used those books in the classroom, but they replied that those books were for students to read by themselves.

Section II – Exclusion and provision of education

This section is an account of the Pakistani Christian refugees' experiences in Bangkok to show what the exclusion from the national institutions looks like in terms of the provision of social services to the refugees, especially with respect to education. My collected data shows the refugees still see themselves from the 1945s to 1970s' period when Western nations opened the national institutions for refugees and even permitted them to become citizens. One of the refugee parents noted:

> *We are waiting for a call from the UNHCR, and I think they will move us to Canada. There we will have the necessities of life [including education], and hopefully, we will become Canadian citizens after a few years. (P 3, Int., Oct 2017)*

In other words, the refugee community view their existence in Bangkok as a short-term transitional point before entering a Western nation. In contrast, the INGO employees take the post-1970s decades approach – repatriation – for the provision of social services, including education to the refugees in the community learning centres.

Exclusion

The exclusion of refugee communities from the national institutions of pre-resettlement countries places them in the hands of INGOs who become the social service providers in those countries (see Chapter Three). All refugee parents in my study understand that they are being excluded from the Thai national institutions because of their refugee status in the country. For example, one parent told me *"we have limited existence in Bangkok with no social, political, and legal rights. Honestly, we are nobody in this country"* (P3, Int., Oct 2017). The exclusion of the refugees from the national institutions means that they do not

have access to protection or social services as enjoyed by the Thai citizens. Another participant, an education consultant and an INGO employee, said, *"they [the Pakistan Christian refugees] do not even exist"* (P6, Int., Oct 2017) in Thai society. This comment sums up the refugee community's social, political, and legal status, and ongoing excluded status in spite of their more than five years' existence in the country.

The Pakistani Christian refugee community is not only being excluded from national institutions but in addition they are not allowed to work in Thailand. For the refugee participants of my study, the exclusion from the labour market was such a massive challenge for their access to the basic necessities of life. One parent said:

> *We have volunteer visas which allow us to only work with non-profit organisations in an exchange for a small stipend, and basically, we are living hand-to-mouth. The problem is that the Thai government does not provide us open work permits where we can get regular jobs and earn a sufficient income. But we still consider ourselves lucky because, most of the Christian refugees are illegally staying and working in the country. (P4, Int., Nov. 2017)*

A humanitarian worker noted:

> *"The [illegal] refugees are hardly getting by with the unauthorised work. They are not even able to pay their monthly room rent. Some of them are behind on their rent payments … in those conditions providing quality [academic] education is a very distance dream" (P7, Int.1, Oct 2017).*

The exclusion from the national institutions leaves refugees with only one option which is to send their children to the community learning centres. During my observations of the refugee community events, I noticed that most of the refugees engaged in long discussions about the refugee resettlement procedures to Canada, the United States, and other European countries, apart from the UNHCR procedures (see Chapter Three). They told me that a few families had moved to Canada through a private sponsorship programme. This motivated them to continue hoping for entry to a Western nation. One of my refugee participants said that *"Thailand does not provide citizenship and we desire new citizenship for our teenagers"* (P 4, Int. Nov 2017). Another parent noted *"we wish to resettle in Western countries because they provide social services and citizenship to refugees"* (P 3, Int, Oct 2017). It was very clear from the refugees I interviewed that they believe their children will need an academic type of education when they finally reach a Western country and they expect the INGOs to provide

this type of education and to assist them to reach a Western country. Yet as an education consultant I interviewed commented:

> *Well, the main aspirations we were exposed to, all of them expected that Bangkok would be a transit stop. They did not realize that they'd be here for years on end. And so, their initial aspirations took a while in terms of just moving on. It took a while for them to realize, but they always hoped that they could get their kids enough education while here, so wherever they went next, their kids would be officially recognised as having had some education they could keep going. (P6, Int., Oct 2017)*

This is one of a number of comments from the INGO employees I interviewed which shows that they are aware of the gap. Despite this, the INGOs maintain their commitment to providing basic education. They know that Pakistani Christian refugees cannot stay in Bangkok for an indeterminable period of time, something noted by one of the education consultants:

> *The UN [United Nations] and the Thai government cooperation are very tenuous. Because neither the UN nor the Thai government nor the Pakistani people, none of these people, want them to be here [Bangkok] for the long-term. So, I really question the solution that is geared towards long-term, when none of them want them [the Pakistani Christian refugees] here for a long-term. (P 6, Int.1, Oct 2017)*

The knowledge that the refugee community will not be included in the Thai national institutions is used by the INGOs to justify their focus on basic emergency literacy education. At one INGO meeting I attended the INGO employees spoke of basic literacy education as an efficient learning tool for refugee children. One employee, who spoke at the meeting, said that having access to reading material or basic literacy education will enable the refugee children to enter their next educational settings, no matter where they go next, with positive momentum. In fact, the INGOs' decision of providing basic literacy education was not based on any sort of needs analysis. I will discuss this in detail in Chapter Eight where I address my research question. Why does an ongoing educational gap exist between the refugee parents' educational aspirations for their children and INGOs' provision of education in the community learning centres?

Conclusion

My study findings show a persistent educational gap between the refugee parents' expectations to have access to academic education for their children and the INGO provision of basic literacy education. I conclude that the educational gap exists because the refugees see themselves according to the golden era (Suhrke & Newland, 2001 p. 285), a time when refugee communities were included in the system of Western nations. In contrast, the INGOs see the refugees from a post-1970s perspective when their role is to maintain the refugees in pre-resettlement countries on an emergency basis and to promote repatriation. The next chapter moves from the empirical study discussed in this chapter to a discussion of my theoretical tool. In order to theorise the ongoing gap that I found between the refugees' educational aspirations and the INGOs' provision of education I need to embed the analysis in firstly, the unequal power relationship which exists between the parties, and secondly, to identity this inequality as a structural feature of a power relationship which exists outside the nation-state system and its regulatory controls. I use the concept of patron-client theory as the explanatory tool. In the next chapter I describe the structures and features of the theory along with an historical overview of this theoretical concept. This historical content of patron-client power relations is required to support my argument that this older, pre-modern nation-state social structure re-surfaces in situations like the INGO-refugee one where the parties are not included in the regulatory mechanism of the modern state.

Chapter Six - Patron-client concept

Introduction

The purpose of this chapter is to theorise the relationship between the INGOs and the Pakistani Christian refugees in order to explain the impasse concerning education in the community learning centres in Bangkok. I use the theoretical concept of patron-client (Roniger, 1983; 2015; Scott, 1972a; 1972b; Eisenstadt & Roniger, 1980) to explain the structures and features of power relationships which have existed historically and argue that these features can be seen operating today in the INGO-refugee relationship in Bangkok. My purpose in establishing the patron-client concept and 'clientelism' as an analytical and explanatory tool is to understand the relationship between the INGOs and the refugees and how this unbalanced power relationship has affected the type of education provided for the refugees, an education which is not the academic one they desire for their children.

The chapter contains two sections. The first section describes the patron-client ties, structures, and an exchange mechanism called 'clientelism' in order to explain the ways in which these aspects exist in the INGO-refugee relationship. The second section discusses an historical overview of the patron-client relationship and its features with a focus on the countries from where the INGOs and the Pakistani Christian refugees of my study come. The purpose of the historical discussion is to embed the understanding of today's patron-client relationship in its older form in order to show that many of the key features can be found today in the relationship between INGO providers and refugees.

The exclusion of the refugees from the national institutions of Thailand (see Chapter Three) puts the INGOs in a 'patron' role where they are the ones who provide social services, including education, to the refugees in Bangkok. The refugees become 'clients' as they enter into a relationship with the Western based INGOs (patrons) for the provision of social services. My study involves Action International and Rescue Organisations (pseudonyms) which are actively working with the refugees. Significantly the patron-client relationship is a commonly practised relationship in the Global South (Scott, 1972a; Neher, 1994). It exists between 'patrons' of high socio-economic status and 'clients' of low socioeconomic status and between those who offer protection and those needing protection. Indeed, the English

word ‘patron’ is derived from Latin *patronus* meaning “a lord-master or protector”. A client is “one who leans on another [patron] for protection” and resources (Etymology Dictionary, 2018, n.p).

The relationship between INGOs and refugees exists outside the legal and political structures of the nation-state (see Chapter Three), structures which provide social services and protection for those with citizen status. My intention is to show that, in the absence of nation-state protection and social services, the older form of patron-client relationship has been revived and now structures the INGO-refugee as unequal parties. This is the case with the Pakistani Christian refugees and INGOs I studied in Bangkok who illustrate the features of patron-client interaction. Prior to explaining the patron-client relationships’ structures, types, and features, I begin by presenting Scott’s (1972a) definition of the patron-client relationship;

> *The patron-client relationship – an exchange relationship between roles – may be defined as a special case of dyadic (two-person) ties involving a largely instrumental friendship in which an individual of higher socioeconomic status (patron) uses his own influence and resources to provide protection or benefits, or both, for a person of lower status (client) who, for his part, reciprocates by offering general support and assistance, including personal services, to the patron.* (p. 92 italics in the original text)

The patron role is to protect clients from other powerful patrons and deliver resources to their clients, especially in the difficult times such as illnesses, funerals, famines, floods, and storms. In return, clients are expected to offer personal services, loyalty, and obedience. The movement of resources from patrons to clients provides greater advantages to patrons, primarily in terms of maintaining their influence and public reputation in society (Roniger, 2015). Regardless of the instrumental nature of the relationship, the foundation of the patron-client relationship is built on inequalities, flexible social exchanges, imbalanced power relations, and movement of resources from patron to clients in return for services.

Patron-client theory

There have been several studies in the literature reporting the structures in patron-client relationships in the socio-political systems of both ancient and contemporary societies (Nicols 2014; Scott 1972a; Roniger 1983: Eisenstadt & Roniger, 1980). Patron-client theory conceptualises the relationship into two types: dyadic and triadic (Foster, 1963, 1965; Roniger, 1983; 2015; Scott, 1972a, 1972b; Wolf & Silverman, 2001; Galt, 1974; Nicols,

2014). Dyadic relations were generally established between a patron and several clients in small villages or towns in ancient societies (Bloch, 1961; Powell, 1970; Silverman, 1965,1967; Roniger 1983; 2015; Saxebol, 2002; Bourne, 1986; Wolf & Silverman, 2001; Scott, 1972a). More recent literature examines patron-client relationships in large corporations and organisations today. These are seen to be connected through complex relations of patrons, brokers, and clients (Roniger, 2015; Najam, 1996). Such more complex relations are called triadic relations.

INGO-refugees relationships

I noticed that the INGOs and the refugees are directly connected to each other as in dyadic relationships. But to complicate matters, the relationship between the two parties also exists as a triadic relationship where they are connected via brokers. For example, one of the refugee participants noted *"if we need help, we usually ask our Pakistani brothers [brokers] to share our needs with INGO leadership"* (P 2, Int., Nov 2017). Usually, the brokers are a part of the Pakistani Christian refugee community but are distinguished by their higher education degrees and have fluent English language fluency. These qualifications enable the refugee community leaders to play a mediator role in connecting the refugees or clients to the INGO providers. This suggests that the refugee community leaders concomitantly act both as clients and brokers at a specific time, a complexity I represent in Figure 6.1b below.

Patron-client structures

Scott (1972a) develops the concept of patron-client further and identifies three types of patron-client structures: cluster, pyramid, and network. The first structure involves a patron who is directly tied to many clients. Scott (1972a) categorises this structure as a '*patron-client cluster'* (see Figure 7.1[a]). The patron-client cluster is organised traditionally by ethnicity, religion, or caste, but in modern society this cluster is based on occupation or social status (Saxebol, 2002) and is usually established between non-kin groups (Scott, 1972a). The patron-client cluster directly connects a patron to *many* clients.



Figure 6.1

The second structure involves a vertical downward extension of the patron-client cluster while still focusing on one patron and their clients and is referred to as a pyramid. In both of these types, there is a vertical and hierarchical relationship between a patron and clients. The extension is usually initiated by a mutual agreement between a patron and those clients who operate as brokers. These clients/brokers play a vital role in introducing new clients to their patrons. (see Figure 7.1[b]). Scott (1972a), however, did not use the concept of a broker or mediator in his explanation of the patron-client pyramid, particularly in the Southeast Asia political structure although other writers do acknowledge the function as a brokering role (Roniger, 1983; 2015).



Figure 6.2

The third structure encompasses one or more patron-client pyramids in which two or more patrons cooperate with each other for their own benefits. Scott (1972a) calls this a patron-client network which comprises overall patron-client links in a particular community or

organisation (see Figure 7.2) The patron-client network contains horizontal and vertical relationships between multiple patrons, brokers and clients (see Figure 7.2). Patrons often have equal socio-economic status and therefore they have horizontal relationships compared to vertical hierarchical relationships established between patrons and clients (Scott, 1972a, p. 96).

Patron-client relationships are theorised by Scott (1972a) as structured either vertically or horizontally. A vertical hierarchical structure is developed when the socio-economic and political status between a patron and clients is vast with ascriptive hereditary characteristics that are also functional in that particular society (Scott, 1972a). In the vertical hierarchal structure, often the patron has power and control over the clients. In contrast, a horizontal structure is created when there are narrowed socio-economic and political structures between patrons and clients. The horizontal structures offer a slightly more balanced power structure. However, as base the patron-client relationship is in fact a power relationship where patrons hold authority and power over social, legal, and economic resources.

INGO-refugee structures

The contemporary refugee situation in Bangkok relates to neither to the patron-client cluster nor with the patron-client pyramid but may be considered a network type. First, many INGO providers rather than a single one are involved in the provision of social services to refugees. Secondly, the Pakistani Christian refugee community does not have direct access to INGOs. I have described earlier how the refugees have to ask for assistance from refugee leaders who may later take their problem to the providers. Thirdly, patron-client cluster and pyramid structures often exist in small villages, with close knit communities, on an intergenerational basis rather than urban areas like Bangkok.

Roniger (1983) notes that contemporary societies are multifaceted and thus establish a patron-client network rather than a patron-client cluster or pyramid. Neher (1994) reports that "[i]n urban areas, patron-client ties are more specialised and impersonal, and a client will arrange to have more than one patron so as to meet multiple needs" (p. 950). Despite the relationship among INGOs, the refugee leaders, and the refugees, the patron-client pyramid structure is insufficient to explain the INGO-refugee relational nexus, especially when numerous INGO providers are involved in delivering different social services to the refugees in Bangkok. The refugees require more than one INGO provider in order to meet the

necessities of life because providers deliver the social services to the refugees according to their capacities and specialities (education, health, food, or stipend).

For these reasons I regard the relationship between the INGOs and the refugees as a patron-client network. The different INGOs in the patron-client networks have regular monthly meetings and collaborate with each other. In Chapter One I described how the UNHCR and its partner organisation collaborate with each other and established the Bangkok Asylum Seeker and Refugee Assistance Network (BASRAN) in order to provide social services to the Pakistani Christian refugees in Bangkok. The Action International and Rescue Organisation, the organisations I studied, were a part of this network. In contrast, INGOs often do not arrange meetings with the refugees. All the refugee participants in my study said that the Pakistani refugee community members are usually not invited to INGOs' meetings. This was supported by my fieldwork where I was invited to a meeting organised by providers that did not have any representation from the Pakistani refugee community; even brokers were not invited to the meeting. This suggests that providers and the refugee community have a vertical relationship where INGOs maintain the decision-making power by excluding the refugees from meetings for key discussions regarding refugee education. The powerless refugees have limited options other than to accept the INGOs' provision of basic education through the community learning centres.

Scarcity

Roniger (2015, p. 603) notes that "PCR [patron-client relations] are motived by the search for access to scarce resources, be that land, water, sources, employment, a loan, schooling opportunities, or medical services". Often clients' access to the resources is only possible through channels provided to them by powerful patrons. Otherwise, clients continue to suffer from the inadequate provision of social services. This is also the case with the Pakistani Christian refugees who have limited access to formal schooling. They can neither send their children to the BRC (Bangkok Refugee Centre) nor can they afford high tuition fees at international schools in Bangkok. This enables the use of 'clientelism' or 'patronage' (interchangeable terms), the situation as one between patron and client. For most their only option is to send their children to the community learning centres run by the Action International and Rescue Organisation. I theorise this power relationship as one of unequal social exchange or 'clientelism' an exchange which evokes the patronage of the INGOs towards the refugees.

Clientelism

According to Belshaw (1965) various types of social exchange have a significant value in holding societies together. Given the scarcity of resources to vulnerable clients, an exchange of goods and services or 'clientelism' takes the central role in the patron-client relationship in which patrons are the ones who control the access to resources while clients can only have access to those resources through this 'clientelism' exchange. Roniger (2015) notes that:

> Patron-client relations (PCR) involve asymmetric but mutually beneficial, open-ended transactions based on the differential control by individuals or groups over the access and flow of resources in stratified societies. Patrons provide selective access to resources they control or place themselves or the clients in a position from which they can divert resources in their favour. In exchange, the clients are supposed to provide resources and services, while sometimes boosting the patron's reputation. (p. 603)

In my study, education can be understood as a type of clientelistic exchange between the INGOs and the refugees. Although the refugees want an academic education for their children the INGOs have the power to provide basic literacy education only. In the next chapter I theorise the clientelistic exchange tool as an explanation for the educational expectation-provision gap between the two parties. The purpose in this chapter however is to build the thesis argument by showing that the education gap is embedded in unequal power relationships between the INGOs and the refugees, a gap which can be seen in the clientelistic exchange of education in the community learning centres.

According to Eisenstadt and Roniger (1980, p.51), "the crux of patron-client relations is indeed the organisation or regulation of exchange or flow of resources between the social actors". The clientelistic exchange simultaneously contains two types of concurrent but different forms of social exchange: 'specific' (instrumental) and 'generalised' (expressive) exchange (Eisenstadt & Roniger, 1980; Burns, 1973; Homans, 1961; Blau, 1964; Emerson, 1972). Instrumental forms focus on maintaining economic and political resources while societal exchange services establish and maintain trust, solidarity, and protection.

A specific exchange is a market-like exchange where two social actors have mutual interests and agreements about terms and conditions before the exchange of good and services. The term 'generalised exchange' was first developed by anthropologist Marcel Mauss (1872-1950) when he used the term to distinguish a gift exchange from market-like exchanges. In

contrast to market exchange, the generalised exchange is based on mutual understanding between the social actors without any contract or time framework.

Specific exchange

Several writers have analysed social exchange in dyadic relationships (Homans, 1961; Blau, 1964; Emerson, 1972; Burns, 1973; Mauss, 2002). Anthropologists and sociologists view a specific exchange as a market-like exchange between two groups where each party has contractual obligations (Homans, 1958; Blau, 1964; Emerson, 1972). Homans' (1958) explanation of specific exchange also includes psychological behaviours between two persons who exchange favours or assistance in performing a task of mutual interest. He argues that behaviour exchange between individuals continues because each party views the others' behaviour as reinforcing.

Expanding on Homan's theory, Blau's (1964) study put forward an economic model of specific exchange focusing on rewards in market relationships. According to him, in the economic model, buyers and sellers agree upon a fixed amount of payment before the exchange. However, he notes that social behaviour exchange does not have a fixed understanding in advance. Blau (1964) noted:

> Processes of social association can be conceptualized, following Homans' lead, "as an exchange of activity, tangible or intangible, and more or less rewarding or costly, between at least two persons". Social exchange can be observed everywhere once we are sensitized by this conception of it, not only in market relations but also in friendship and even in love … as well as in many social relations between these extremes of intimacy. (p. 88)

In other words, Blau suggests that any behaviour or rewards (social and economic) that expect return or response can be categorised under the specific or market-like exchange. Burns (1973) summarises the key points of specific exchange:

(i) Social behaviour can be explained in terms of rewards, where rewards are goods or services, tangible or intangible, that satisfy a person's needs or goals.
(ii) Individuals attempt to maximize rewards and minimize losses or punishments.
(iii) Social interaction results from the fact that others control valuables or necessities and can therefore reward a person. In order to induce another to reward him, a person has to provide rewards to the other in return.
(iv) Social interaction is thus viewed as an exchange of mutuality rewarding activities in which the receipt of a needed valuable (good or service) is contingent on the supply of a favour in return (usually immediate). (p. 188-189)

The INGO- refugee relationships in my study relate to specific exchanges because both parties have mutual interests and they have propensity to maximise rewards and minimise losses. The INGOs maximise their reputation and future funding opportunities while minimising their operational costs. The refugees, on the other hand, desire to maximise the quality of provision and minimise their powerless refugee status. The INGOs deliver social services, including education, to the refugees and expect them to be involved in fundraising activities (photos, videos, and stories) because these activities maximise the INGOs' reputation and increase project funds. The INGO focuses on minimising operational costs in pre-resettlement countries by providing less than adequate social services on an emergency basis. For example, Action International provides 4,000 THB (200 NZD) per month to a refugee family while their minimum monthly expenses are approximately 10,000 THB (500 NZD). Additionally, the INGO employees may require the refugees to be involved in their organisational events such as cooking and meeting arrangements. One of the refugee participants in my study said:

> *The INGO employees provide us a monthly stipend and sometimes ask us to cook food for the detainees in the Immigration Detention Centres [in Bangkok]and for organisation meetings without paying us extra money. (P 3, Int., Oct 2017)*

The refugees, on the other hand, desire sufficient social services rather than accept the ongoing scarcity of resources. Given the unequal socio-economic status between the two parties, the refugees are not in a position to balance the relationship except by those services. A refugee parent in my study notes that *"we are unable to pay tuition fees, but we help our friends [providers] in other ways"* (P1, Int., Oct 2017). Here the other ways referred to the household chores (such as babysitting, gardening, and cooking) and fundraising activities. However, one of the participating humanitarian aid workers disagreed with this saying that *"the refugees often get paid for their services"* (P7, Int.2, Nov 2017).

The social exchange of education is also based on a reward system. The refugees' aim is to gain rewards from the INGOs so their children can have access to academic education in the community learning centres or international schools. For example, a refugee parent in my study said: *"we want the INGOs to provide academic education for our teenagers"* (P1, Int., Oct 2017). All the refugee parents had expected that the international schools, which are also

members of the Bangkok Asylum Seeker and Refugee Assistance Network (BASRAN), would enrol their children in their schools on a full scholarship. However, the INGO employees and the international schools were not interested in enrolling them in the international schools. All the INGO employees told me that they were only willing to provide basic education via the community learning centres. This shows that there is an expectation-provision lacuna between the two parties.

The specific exchange type, however, is unable to fully explain the INGO-refugee exchange relationship because this relationship does not have a formal agreement or timeframe as expected in specific exchange. The existence of the non-formal agreement and open-ended timeframe between the INGO-refugee relationship is more like "what Durkheim has called the pre-contractual segments of social life" (Durkheim 1933 as cited in Eisenstadt & Roniger, 1980, p. 52). Durkheim (1933) explains pre-contractual norms and rules as fundamental social facts. He notes:

> There are certain ways of mutual reaction which, finding themselves very conformable to the nature of things, are repeated very often and become habits. Then these habits, becoming forceful, are transformed into rules of conduct. The past determines the future. In other words, there is a certain sorting of rights and duties which is established by usage and which becomes obligatory. The rule does not, then, create the state of mutual dependence in which solidary organs find themselves, but only expresses in clear-cut fashion the result of a given situation. (p. 366)

Founded on pre-contractual norms, the INGO-refugee relationships have established unequal co-dependency relations. I now turn to the generalised exchange of social provision initiated from the INGO providers to the refugees in order to understand the clientelism between the INGO-refugee relationships.

Generalised exchange

My argument is that the generalised exchange of social provision between INGOs and the refugees is based neither on contractual nor legal frameworks. Instead, the generalized exchange is established on informal understandings requiring commitments from the social actors, especially from the refugee community of low socio-economic status. In terms of the exchange of education, the refugees are unable to pay tuition fees at the community learning centres so they are required to show loyalty, obedience, and an obligation to the INGOs who

control the provision of education. A refugee participant noted that *"we are required to participate in community services otherwise they [INGO providers] may not provide free education to our children"* (P4, Int., Nov 2017). Eisenstadt and Rongier (1980) note that:

> The exchange of gifts is distinct from the usual 'specific' market exchange in that it is seemingly nonutilitarian and disinterested. But at the same time, it is highly structured and, being based on elaborate rules of reciprocity, which nevertheless differ from those of utilitarian, specific market exchange. (p. 52)

The expressiveness of generalised exchange such as a promise of loyalty, trust, obedience, and respect seem to explain the INGO-refugee relationship. The relationship is founded on the same expressive values embedded in the patron-client relationship. It is neither contractual nor legal. In contrast to a specific exchange, the generalised exchange does not abide by the stipulations of material or favour return and in specific timing between the social actors. Sahlins (1965) notes:

> the expectation of a direct material return is unseemly. At best it is implicit. The material side of the transaction is repressed by the social … the counter is not stipulated by time, quantity, or quality, the expectation of reciprocity is indefinite … Receiving good lays on a diffuse obligation to reciprocate when necessary to the donor and /or possibly for a recipient. The requital thus may be very soon, but then again it may be never. (p. 147)

However, given the INGO-refugee relationship, the generalised exchange goes some way to explaining the provision of social services and protection, but it does not provide a complete explanation. The clients' refusal of services may end further INGO-refugee transactions of social services, including education. A refugee participant said, *"one time we did not allow the INGO employees to take our photos and from that point, they do not visit us and deliver social services to us"* (P2, Int., Oct 2017). The ability to end further transactions in the INGO-refugee relationship tends to display specific exchange rather than generalised exchange because the specific exchange is structured with time restrictions. Roniger (2015) notes:

> A package deal allowing for more than a restricted balanced, or market exchange is built in within PCR [patron-client relations], which has been identified as connected to generalized exchange. This determines expectations of entering more embracing attachments, often couched in terms of commitments, even though some PCR are very ambivalent in this respect. It brings agents to value or decry clientelism both as an instrumental means to a calculated end and for their own sake. (p. 604)

The combination of specific and generalised exchanges in the clientelistic exchange is built on the contradictory features in the patron-client relationship which more likely contribute to the expectation-provision gaps between the INGOs and the refugees. According to Roniger (2015), the clientelistic exchange involves contradictory features such as friendship, reciprocity, hierarchy, unequal power and control, and favouritism. The following section discusses an historical overview of the patron-client relationship and its contradictory features in ancient societies from where the INGOs and the refugees of my study originate.

Section II - Historical overview of the Patron-client relationship

The purpose of an historical overview of the patron-client relationship is to show how the contradictory features of clientelism has historical origins. Its existence in pre-modern nation-state era is significant for my argument that this form of social-power relationship has been revived for the INGO-refugee relationship which, like those of the past, exists outside contemporary national systems. I argue that this extra-national socio-power relationship can be seen today in the INGO-refugee relationships in Bangkok. This is the consequence of both parties being outside the resourcing and protection of national legal and social regulatory systems. The INGOs operate under the auspices of the UNHCR while the refugees exist in a stateless limbo, ensuring that they are beholden to whoever provides at least a degree of protection and sufficient resources to live. In addition, the account of patron-client relationships historically also shows how this form of socio-political arrangement was within the wider context of the management of migratory labour. Contemporary refugees may also be seen as migratory labour. As I showed in Chapter Two in the post-war period until the 1970s, they were a desired source of labour. However, in the economic contraction of the post-1970s' decades, refugees are no longer viewed in terms of their labour potential, although they continue to see themselves in that way, something that was very clear in my study. But once placed outside the nation-state, as is now the case, the management of migratory people reverts to this older form of political control.

The patron-client relationship between powerful patrons and vulnerable clients is well documented historically from as early as the early Roman period (Wallace-Hadrill, 1989; Nicols, 2014; Roniger, 1983). During that time, the controls of the patron-client relationship were also used to manage migratory workers and to maintain the power structures and inequalities of the host region. By the Middle Ages in Europe, the political commentator,

John of Salisbury (1115-1180), recorded that the patron-client system was celebrated during the papacy of Adrian IV (1100-1159 AD). In subsequent centuries until the modern nation-state era the principle of patron-client relations was a central feature in the system of servitude in Europe, commonly known as serfdom or feudalism (Freedman, 2010; Scott & Marshall, 2009; Cannon & Crowcroft, 2015). An example of patron-client relations *is the mezzadria* system developed between landowners and tenants in central Italy (Silverman, 1965;1967). The patron-client relationship was not confined to Europe but was a widespread method of social and political organisation. It influenced the Hindu caste system and existed in ancient South Asian societies, including Pakistani societies (Islam, 2001; Alavi, 1972; Neher, 1994).

Patron-client relationships in Roman Empire

A number of studies have found a strong presence of patron-client relationships in the ancient Roman Empire (Scott & Marshall, 2009; Wallace-Hadrill, 1989; Roniger, 1983; Nicols, 2014; Johnson & Dahedek, 1989) with Dionysius of Halicarnassus, a historian, providing evidence of these relationships and its significant influence throughout the empire (Drummond, 1989). Despite the different historical eras, features found in Roman relationships can be observed today. The account of the Roman era identified specific features that operate today in the INGO-refugee relationships. These include power-structured relationship and inequalities, I have described these features in Chapter Four. For that reason and because of the extent of the Roman influence, it is worthwhile describing patron-client relationships in that era.

By the early first BC, patron-client relationships were embedded in the social fabric of the Roman society (Johnson & Dandeker, 1989). It was a personal social relationship established between *patricians* (patrons) and *plebians* (clients). Glezer (1969, as cited in Wallace-Hardill, 1989) notes the existence of personal connections in the early Roman society:

> The entire Roman people, both the ruling circle and the mass of voters whom they ruled, was, as a society, permeated by multifarious relationships, based on *fides* and personal connections, the principal forms of which were *patrocinium* in the courts and over communities, together with political friendship and financial obligation. These relationships determined the distribution of political power. To maintain their rights citizens and subjects alike were constrained to seek the protection of powerful men … (p. 68)

The patron-client relationship in Roman society, however, contained paradoxical features. On one side, the *patricians* (patrons) and *plebians* (clients) relationships had positive characteristics: personal relationship, *fides* (trust), loyalty, reciprocity, protection, and voluntary nature – with limitations though (Garnsey & Woolf, 1989). On the other side, inequalities, social constraints, and reproduction and maintenance of inequality were some of the crucial features of the patron-client relationships (Durmmond, 1989; Wallace-Hadrill, 1989; Johnson & Dandeker, 1989). Beside the personal connection between powerful patrons and weak clients, both parties had unequal socioeconomic status and were also engaged in reciprocal exchanges of social services (Saller, 2002; Millet, 1989).

Likewise, the INGO-refugee relationships in Bangkok show trust, loyalty, and a voluntary nature especially from the refugee side. On the other side, the INGOs claim to provide suitable social services, including education, as well as protection. I argue that the clientelistic exchange of education with all those contradictory features of patron-client relationships generate inequalities, maintain power-structures, and reproduce the refugee status. In other words, the provision of basic education in the community learning centres locks the refugees into a permanent refugee status (see Chapter Two and Six).

In early Roman society, the *patricians* were the ruling class who acted as priests, magistrates, and judges while, on the other hand *plebians* were the working class and worked as farmers and craftsmen (Wallace-Hadrill, 1989). The socio-economic distinction between both parties expressed the unequal power relations. The patron-client relationship was not only developed among Roman citizens of upper and lower socio-economic positions, but migrants also became clients of Roman patrons (Roniger, 1983; Alfoldy, 2014).

Migration was a common practice in ancient times with writers using terms “foreigner” or “migrants” usually with reference to workers. Indeed, the word ‘refugee’ does not appear until the 20th century (see Chapter Two). Alfoldy (2014 p. 9) reports that “’[a]ccording to some later writers, such as Livy (1.56.1) and Pliny (NH, 35.154), it was foreigners, in particular migrant Etruscans, who practiced the crafts in early Rome and gave the Roman their manufacturing capability”. Foreigners or migrants, however, usually voluntarily attached themselves to patrons for instrumental purposes such as legal protection and to acquire socio-economic resources. In return, patrons were able to use migrants for personal services and to enhance their public reputation. This is similar to my study where the

participants I interviewed sought the provision of social services and protection from INGOs in volatile and hostile circumstances they frequently encountered in Bangkok. In response (and as I described in the previous chapter), the INGOs use the refugees for fundraising activities and in some cases for household chores such as babysitting, cooking, and gardening. Wallace-Hardrill (1989) notes the significance of a patron for 'newcomers' to acquire the full understanding of how systems work:

> Certainly, in the historical period of Rome continued to expand by the admission of newcomers. The patron stood as sponsor to the new citizen, commonly providing him with his own gentile name. The patron was an essential channel for access to knowledge within Roman society. Republican Rome operated largely through a body of orally transmitted custom. The individual cannot operate a system without knowledge of how it works, and until in the late republic of Greek influence transformed Roman knowledge, it was only through consultation of the patron that the newcomer could learn the Roman way. (p. 76)

In a similar way, albeit in a very different historical period, my study data shows that the Pakistani Christian refugees do not have knowledge of international refugee laws and geopolitical refugee shifts, especially in the post-1970s period, to take part in the systems which will determine their fate. A refugee participant said that *"we do not know about refugee laws, but our brother is helping us"* (P2, Int., Oct 2017). In contrast, international refugee organisations' personnel, or 'providers', do have knowledge of international refugee policies and laws (see Chapter Six). With inadequate knowledge, the refugees are entirely dependent upon INGOs and their personnel for protection and provision in Thailand.

Besides the massive knowledge gap, the social distinction between *patricians* and *plebians* in early Roman society was so far apart that they could not engage in equal relationships. As a consequence, *patricians* and *plebians* developed the patron-client relationship so as to socially interact with each other. Similarly, and despite being two millennia apart, the social, cultural, and economic distinctions between INGO providers and refugees in Bangkok also have this huge social gap. They cannot relate to each other in an equal relationship, further pushing them towards a patron-client relationship as a way to not only establish service and protection mechanism, but also provide the means of social interaction. It is an unequal social relationship. In my fieldwork, I observed that INGO employees' social events such as parties and meetings did not have any representation from the refugees. The two parties do not mix

socially. However the well-educated brokers had limited social interaction with INGO employees in relation to the delivery of social services.

In spite of the inequalities between the parties with distinct socio-economic positions, Roman society used the language of friendship, loyalty, and trust for both *amici* (friends with equal status) and clients. By using such language, the Romans showed politeness and also concealed the obvious social distinctions between a patron and his clients (Rich, 1989). The word 'client', however, "carried connotations of social inferiority" (Saller, 1989 p.52). But for migrants, the patron-client relationship in Roman times offered socio-economic resources and hope for their uncertain future, features which mitigated against the reality of inequality and social inferiority.

In my study, both parties use familial language like brothers and sisters to lessen the obvious fact of the socioeconomic gap, but, in reality, they are far apart from each other, and they do not understand each other. The INGO-refugee relationship depends heavily on the assistance of powerful providers who control the resources. The power to provide or withdraw the funds is in the hands of one party alone and yet the very source of their funds is because 'clients' exist. Without refugees the INGOs are not funded. Despite the unequal relationship it is one of co-dependency. The unequal co-dependency relationship between refugees and INGOs encourages both parties to use familial language when referring to each other.

In Roman times, the unequal nature of this relationship, however, did not restrict patrons from developing ties with clients. In fact, a patron's power and control were measured by the number of his clients in the Roman society (Wallace-Hadrill, 1989). Van Dam (1985) notes that Paulinus of Pella, a Gallic aristocrat, in recalling his previous position in Roman society after the Visigothic invasions said, "my house was happy and prosperous … and when the display of my rank was very important, [it was] magnified and bolstered by deferential crowds of clients" (p.151). This statement shows the Roman patron's desire for collecting clients was because the relationship bolstered patrons' public image and power. In contrast, Cicero, a Roman politician and lawyer, noted that the Romans viewed "it as bitter as death to have accepted a patron or to be called clients" (Off.2.69 as quoted by D'Arms,1986, p.95). Yet the scarcity of resources led the clients to seek a personal relationship with a patron.

The role of reputation as a key feature in the patron-client relationship is also significant in the revival of the relationship amongst INGOs and refugees in the contemporary world. INGOs' large supranational operations across the globe present their public image to Western societies. An positive reputation supports the providers in raising funding for projects like the community learning centres in Bangkok I studied.

Patrician-plebeian relations

According to Wallace-Hadrill (1989, p.72), "Dionysius of Halicarnassus saw in the patronage [or clientelism] instituted by Romulus an instrument of social control, that kept the population in subjection to the ruling class". This suggests that the patron-client relationships played a significant role in the reproduction of the social structure of Roman society. Similarly, the ways in which INGO-refugee relationship functions as one of patron and client can be seen as a structuring mechanism to maintain inequalities and power-structures.

In terms of maintaining inequalities and power-structures in patron-client relationships, Cloud (1989, p. 206) observes that it was "reasonable to assume that some patrons provided their clients with food of a lower standard than that eaten by themselves". In a similar way, although in a different time period, this difference in resource provision also exists. One of the refugee parents of my study said

> *"A refugee organisation only provides five kilograms of atta (wheat flour), daal (lentils), one kilogram of cooking oil, and six packets of two hundred millilitres of milk for our family of five on a monthly basis"* (P 4, Int.1, Nov 2017).

In fact, all the refugee participants in my study said that they receive a very limited amount of food from the INGOs – all the time. According to Roniger (1983), the prolonged nature of the patron-client relationship in Roman times created a co-dependency relationship between patrons and clients. This is also the case in the INGO-refugee relationships, but this co-dependency relationship provides ongoing advantages for INGOs and ongoing disadvantages for the refugees.

Ancient Greek societies and patron-client relationships

Patron-client relationships, in one form or another, also existed in the ancient Greek society (Gallant, 1991; Millet, 1986) with Gallant (1991). Greek society provided an ideal socio-

political environment for this type of relationship to flourish. According to Gallant (1991), this ideal socio-political environment included weak governance, restricted access to social resources for citizens, and social inequalities. Finely and Finely (1983), however, suggest that patron-client relationships only existed between aristocrats and peasants in the rural areas of Greece. This restriction to rural areas is explained by Millet (1989) who discusses the existence of patron-client relationships before the democratic revolution of 462 B.C. He suggested that the Greek classical period's (500-330 BC) advancement to political democracy dissolved patron-client relationships in Athens. The establishment of institutions replaced the direct relations between individuals which is the central feature of patron-client relationships (Moutsios, 2018). The centrality of institutions to the new forms of socio-political relationships which replace the patron-client one as a society's structuring mechanism supports my thesis that patron-client relationships exist outside of systems regulated by institutions. This is the claim I am making in the case of the INGO-refugee relationship today, a relationship which is primarily characterised by its existence outside of the nation-state structure.

Arnaoutoglou (1994) notes that classical Athenian society appears to be free from patron-client relationships. Like Moutsios (2018), Arnaoutoglou's argument is based on the role of institutions as the replacement for the earlier socio-political arrangements. He says:

> There were no institutionalised obstacles for the citizens involved in commerce or the cultivation of land. Almost every Athenian owned a plot or land for subsistence farming. Nevertheless, the unequal distribution of wealth in Athenian society generated inequalities, but these were not allowed to hamper, at least overtly, the exercise of the rights of the Athenian citizen. (p. 11)

This makes it clear that Athenian citizens had equal access to socio-political and legal institutions and therefore did not require clientelism. Interestingly, and in support of the role of institutions in replacing the patron-client relationship is Arnaoutoglou's (1994) comment that "clientelistic links were more likely to have been developed between citizens and metics (a foreigner with limited citizenship rights) or foreigners" (p. 17). This means that the advancement of political democracy could not accommodate foreigners in Athenian society. As a result, foreigners (clients) existed outside the democratic system and therefore the patron-client relationship was activated in order to have access to social, political, and economic resources.

Despite the gap of over two millennia, it is reasonable to compare the period of Classical Greece with its legal and political institutions, with today where refugees are excluded from state institutional protection. The refugees in my study are an example of those who must seek protection from outside the institutions of the nation-state. They have been residing in Bangkok without any citizenship rights. The exclusion from the social, political, legal, and economic systems of Thailand leaves them no choice but to rely on the INGOs for the provision of services, including education.

Patron-client relationships in the Medieval period (5th – 15th A.D)

In the Medieval period, the patron-client relationship was established in religious institutions in order to provide social, legal, political, and economic resources to clients. In the 12th century, patron-client relationships were accepted and celebrated in the Roman Catholic Church. However, John Salisbury (1115-1180 AD), a political thinker, criticised the Roman Catholic Church for being directly involved in the patron-client system. He reports that (as cited in Nederman, 1990) "it was said by many that the Roman Church, which is the mother of all churches, presented itself not so much like a mother as like a stepmother of the other" (p. 132). In response, Pope Adrian IV (1100-1159 AD), the head of Roman Catholic Church, defended the church stance with respect to the patron client system. Salisbury (as cited in Nederman, 1990) recorded a story of Pope Adrian IV:

> It happened that all the members of the whole body conspired against the stomach, as if against that which by its voraciousness exhausted the labours of all. The eye is never filled to capacity with sights nor the ear with sounds, the hands persist in their labours, the feet put on callouses by walking, and the tongue moderates usefully between speech and silence. In short, all the members keep watch over the public advantage and, in comparison to the concern and labour of all, only the stomach remains at rest, and while all share the many things which are obtained by their labour, the stomach alone devours and consumes everything. What more? They agreed that they would abstain from their labours and destroy through painful starvation this parasite and public enemy. This was suffered on the first day; on the following day it was more annoying. On the third day it was so pernicious that nearly all showed signs of faintness. (p. 135)

In the above story, Pope Adrian IV attempted to explain to Salisbury with the analogy of a body comparing patrons as the stomach providing nutrients to all body parts. However, Greek philosophers often compared political leadership with the head and brain, but Adrian emphasised that the church leadership should be compared to a stomach. He admitted that

patrons can be voracious and greedy, but he thought these features were essential for the common good in society. The vulnerable groups, including foreigners were recipients of the Roman Catholic Church's clientelism during the Middle Ages.

The Pakistani Christian refugees to some degree view INGOs as benevolent institutions because of their ongoing support and protection in Bangkok despite the limitations of social services. However, the INGOs have advantage in providing the social services where they focus on maintaining low operational costs. This can be seen in the provision of basic education through uncertified volunteer teachers who can only teach English – their native language. I will discuss this in detail in the following chapter.

Jajmani System

Although in a different geographical location and time period, ancient Indian societies, particularly Hinduism, had a similar power-structure relationship and were distributed into four hierarchical castes: *brahmins* (priests), *kshatriya* (fighters), *vaisya* (farmers), and *shudra* (artisans). People who were not part of the caste system performed degrading jobs: leather tanning, sweeping the streets, and cleaning animal waste. The hierarchical caste structure restricted the social interaction between the members of high and low caste groups (Tandon, 1997). As a consequence, upper and lower caste members established an economic relationship – a '*jajmani'* system - between them.

The *jajmani* system has similarities to the patron-client system in terms of distinct socio-economic positions of involving parties, hierarchical structures, social inequalities, and symbiotic relationships. However, the *jajmani* system's hereditary and religious aspects differentiate this system from the patron-client system. According to McClintock (1992), 80% of Pakistani Christians reside in Punjab. Kolenda (1963, p. 11) notes that "*jajmani* system is a system of distribution in Indian villages where by high-caste landowning families called *jajmans* are provided services and products by various lower castes [*kamins*]such as carpenters, potters, black smiths, watercarriers, sweepers, and laundrymen". For the services and products, the landowning families (patrons) compensate the lower castes with food items (Piliavsky, 2014).

Before converting to Christianity, most of the Pakistani Christians were members of lower caste. For lower caste Hindus, "conversion was one of the avenues for escaping the oppressive caste system" (Gabriel, 2013 p. 20) and interrupting the patterns of marginalisation, but in fact these expectations were not fulfilled. After the partition of India and Pakistan in 1947, the influx of Muslim refugees into Pakistan replaced Christian and Hindu workers from the labour market (Gabriel, 2013). Despite the conversion from Hinduism to Christianity, the marginalised status of Pakistani Christians was perpetuated in the newly formed Muslim state – Pakistan - which excluded religious minorities from the nation-state system (Asimi, 2010).

Biraderi System

Researchers note that the *jajmani* system, however, is almost absent among Muslim populations of South Asian (Alavi, 1972; Marriott, 1960; Islam, 2001). Alavi (1972) reports that social structures of Muslims of West Punjab are built on the '*biraderi*' rather than the caste system. The term *beriadri* is derived from a Persian word meaning 'brotherhood' (Korson, 1979, p. 174). Most of the Pakistani Christian refugees, participants are from the province of Punjab. Punjabi Christians are aware of their distinct religious identity, but their socio-cultural structures are similar to Muslim communities. Islami (1983) reports:

> The Christian minorities found in Pakistan are not ethnically and socially distinct from their Muslim neighbours in their respective localities. They are equally Punjabi, Sindhi, Baluchis, or Pathans, speaking the same languages. On the social level, they dress similarly; their customs at marriages, births, funerals, and festivals are almost the same; their family and community structures are very similar. (p. 387)

The similar socio-cultural structures - especially the *biraderi* system – also exist among Punjabi Christian communities. The *biraderi* system usually offers "security and shelter" from a hostile world, particularly for Pakistani Christian communities. The system, however, has not been providing sufficient support for the marginalised Christian community in Pakistan. As a consequence, Pakistani Christians are compelled to use the patron-client relationships outside of their *biraderi* system in order to receive favours and access to social services in the government offices, given that corruption is a deep-rooted problem in Pakistani society (Javaid, 2010). The final section outlines the existence of patron-client relationships in India in the 18th and 19th century.

Patron-client features in *biraderi* system

The biraderi system uses familial and friendship language but this system has hierarchy and invisible power-structures embedded in the system as does the patron-client one. During the British Raj in India (1849-1947), patron-client relations were accepted and encouraged by the British colonial state (Talbot, 1988). A scarcity of resources during and after the Second World War further increased the influence of patron-client relationships. As a consequence, in the pre-partition period, Muslim leaders claimed that Hindu and Sikh government officials were distributing rationed goods to their own religious communities and clients instead of Muslim communities (Talbot, 1980). The patron-client relationships continued to flourish after the formation of Pakistan in 1947.

As I noted in Chapter Two, the partition of India resulted in millions of refugees entering India and Pakistan. In fact, refugees who entered Pakistan faced many challenges posed by the existing patron-client networks. Ansari (2005) reports that Pakistani *zamindars* (landlords or patrons) confiscated evacuees land (people who sought refugee status in India) after the partition instead of sharing it with vulnerable refugees. Additionally, Pakistani government officials took advantage of refugees, especially those who were not engaged in patron-client networks, Chatta (2012) notes:

> Within four months of creation of [the] rehabilitation scheme [for refugees], the extent of official corruption had reached such a sordid level that the issue was discussed at the West Punjab Assembly in the first week of January 1948. A member declared on the floor of the House that: 'Tahsidars [district officer] and other revenue officers are openly taking bribes from the refugees. (p. 1195)

As a result, refugees were compelled to seek clientelism from local Punjabi patrons. Many Muslim refugees even started to work in the farmland of local landlords (Gabriel, 2013). The patron-client relationships were not only established among Muslim communities, but Punjabi Christian communities also actively participated in this relationship. McClintock (1992) notes that patron-client relationships also exists within the Pakistani church. Often Pakistani Christian leaders and patrons use their authority to provide resources and employment opportunities to their clients. In return, clients are expected to provide "active support in any power struggle" (McClintock, 1992, p. 352) within Pakistani Christian institutions. This means that Pakistani Christians are familiar with patron-client relationships from their country of origin.

Conclusion

Overall, I argue that the patron-client relationship and its features were predominately accepted and operated in ancient societies and these features can also be seen today in the INGO-refugee relationships in Bangkok. The evidence from the key characteristics of the INGO-refugee relationships show that built-in power structures and control over resources provide ongoing advantages for the providers and disadvantages for the refugees. The following chapter argues that the contradictory features of the patron-client relationships are embedded in the clientelistic exchange of education, and these features contribute to the persistence of the educational gap between the INGOs and the refugees.

Chapter Seven – the education provision gap

Introduction

The aim of this chapter is to explain why the education provision gap persists between the refugees' expectations for academic education and the INGO provision of basic education. The chapter contains two sections. The first section uses the clientelistic tool and the contradictory features of patron-client relationships in order to explain the persistence of the educational expectation-provision gap in the community learning centres. The second section asks if refugee parents' aspirations for academic education can be fulfilled in the contemporary refugee situation.

I argue that the refugees view the clientelistic exchange of education in relation to a specific or market-like exchange where they want academic education for their children. In contrast, the INGOs see the exchange more like a generalised or 'gift-giving' exchange where they are not constrained by any terms or conditions, and therefore emphasise providing basic literacy education to the refugees. The clientelistic tool and the embedded contradictory features in the INGO-provider relationship contribute to maintaining inequalities and power-structures which allow the persistence of the gap between the two parties with respect to the type of educational provision.

Some anthropologists and sociologists have noted that patron-client relationships have beneficial features of social mobility and may alleviate inequalities between patrons and clients (Wolf & Silverman, 2001; Roniger, 1983; 2015; Shore, 2016). However, Galt (1974) and Stein (1984) suggest that while patron-client relationships provide stability in the short term, the relationship perpetuates inequalities in the long term. The existing literature has a dearth of studies explaining how and in what ways the patron-client relationship maintains inequalities but those that do place inequalities as the result of the control of resources.

Clientelistic exchange in education

I have discussed in the preceding chapter that the clientelistic tool contains both specific and generalised exchanges and noted that these exchanges exist in the INGO-refugee relationship in the community learning centres I studied. I found that the refugees view the exchange of education as specific exchange where they want their children to receive academic education

in exchange for services and loyalty compared to tuition fees in their country of origin. For example, one of the refugee parents noted:

> *Here [in Bangkok] we expect our children to go a regular school from 9am to 3pm and learn all the subjects. But the community learning centres only teach a basic literacy education for a few hours a day. We are worried about our children's education, but what can we do, we cannot afford private schools. (P2, Int., Oct, 2017)*

In my field work, some refugee families, who were receiving remittances from their relatives from Western or Middle Eastern countries, told me that they were sending their children to Mothers Pride International School (MPIS) because the school offers special tuition discounts for refugee or asylum seeker families. The school's curriculum focuses on English, Mathematics, Science, Computer Science, History, Geography, Art, Music, Thai, Foreign Languages, and Sports (MPIS, n.d.) but not all the refugee families can afford to send their children to this school, especially when they are struggling to buy food and pay their monthly rent. A teacher in one of the community learning centres said that *"with a lack of resources we cannot teach them like a proper school"* (P 8, Int., Nov 2017), while the refugees ask for proper academic education.

In contrast, the INGOs view the exchange of education as a generalised exchange. This type of exchange is not required to fulfil any refugees' demands or any terms or conditions compared to a market-like exchange. The INGO employees in my study place education at the bottom of an emergency response. A humanitarian aid worker, a participant in my study, noted:

> *The INGOs have a mindset that their role is to respond to desperation and human misery. So, the response starts with food, water, primary health, and then basic education. This is a passive response to relief. I think the ideology behind the emergency approach is that something is better than nothing. (P7, Int.2, Nov 2017)*

With this ideology, the INGOs have provided basic literacy education to the refugees in the community learning centre on an ongoing basis since 2011. The refugees, on the other hand, hold different views in regard to the importance of education believing that their children should have access to academic education. Besides the emergency approach, the INGOs are reluctant to provide academic education because they want the refugees to repatriate. A humanitarian aid worker, a participant in my study, justified the INGOs position for the provision of the basic education, by saying:

> *I think what happens in Bangkok is that you do not want the Pakistani community to be here, but if we offer them proper academic education, they are not going to leave from here. In fact, neither the Thai government nor INGOs are interested in doing that. It is fair to say that the refugees' existence is an intermediate step in the whole system. So, there is no interest in establishing a highly organised structure around education if the entire point of this step is to move refugees around then we just need to provide literacy education. If we would have a country like Canada, which is a resettlement country, then it makes sense to build up complex and highly demanding structures for education. (P7, Int.2, Nov 2017)*

According to this interpretation of the provision, academic education may impede the refugees repatriating to their country of origin. It explains the emphasis by the INGOs on the generalised exchange of basic literacy education as a way to lock the refugees into a permanent unstable refugee status.

Clientelistic features

In addition to the opposite viewpoints regarding the exchange of education, the contradictory features of the patron-client relationship are also embedded in clientelism. These contradictory features in this hierarchical relationship maintain inequalities and power-structures by using the emergency approach and therefore, ensures that the educational gap persists between the two parties.

Friendship and hierarchy

The clientelistic mechanism simultaneously contains friendship and hierarchy between the two socioeconomically unequal parties. This was demonstrated in my study by the use of familial language – brothers, sisters, uncles, and aunties (see Chapter Six). The parents referred to the teachers or volunteers as brothers and sisters. All the INGO employees in my study also referred to refugees as friends. Regardless of the language, one of the refugee parents said:

> *They [INGO employees] deliver us food rations and teach our children, but most of the time they do not talk to us. I do not think that they even know our names. (P 3, Int., Oct 2017)*

A humanitarian aid worker in my study used an insightful metaphor to explain the relationship between the INGOs and the refugees, noting, *"there is an [socio]economic gap between the INGO and the refugees. It is more like water and oil, it does not mix together"* (P7, Int.2 Nov 2017). According to Autesserre (2014, p. 249), "for social, economic, and

security reasons, they [INGO employees] tend to socialise among themselves". This absence of interactions makes it difficult for the INGOs to understand the refugees' expectations for an academic education.

The majority of INGO employees in the study were from Western societies. They were unfamiliar with the social, cultural, and language skills of the refugee community. Indeed, the INGO employees were reluctant to learn about the Pakistani Christian refugees because they knew that the refugees would be living in Thailand for a short period. The uncertainty in the Pakistani refugee situation may have restricted the INGO employees from learning about at least some of the socio-cultural customs and Urdu, the Pakistani National language. Instead the INGOs use English-speaking brokers from the refugee community to manage exchange of social services – including education.

The volunteer teachers in the community learning centres I studied were not interested in knowing about the refugees' expectations, a factor in their commitment to basic education provision. An INGO employee, a participant in my study, noted that those untrained teachers in the community learning centres often see themselves as part-time volunteers:

> *They do not get involved. They do not know who the refugees are. They don't know their names. They do not care about their stories. They do not care about their [the refugees] educational aspirations. (P7, Int.2, Nov 2017)*

In addition to this half-hearted approach, the INGOs require the refugees to accept their terms and conditions despite the unwanted basic education being provided. According to Roniger (2015), the "client is not only expected to provide his patron with specific resources but must also accept the patron's control over his access … to market and public goods" (p. 604). The hierarchical INGO-refugee relationship in the clientelist exchange of education generates the expectation and provision gap between the two parties. The INGOs' provision of basic education did not, however, stop the refugees from continually requesting an academic education.

In Chapter Three I describe how the refugees exist outside the nation-state system and have inadequate options to receive social services. In terms of education, the refugees have limited access to public education in Thailand. The language barrier and the distance from the public schools leave the refugees with the option of enrolling their children in the community

learning centres often located close to their apartments. Besides these limitations, the refugee parents' desire an academic education for their children. In contrast, the INGOs appear to be concerned more for their public reputation, in maintaining low operational costs, and in securing future funding for the community learning centres. Despite the very different interests involved from each party, the INGO-refugee relationship is a symbiotic relationship, containing relational and instrumental bonds between them (Roniger, 1983, 2015: Scott, 1972a; 1972b; Eisenstadt & Roniger, 1980). Each one needs the other.

Since the INGO-refugee relationships simultaneously contain friendship and hierarchical power relations, the INGOs hold the dominant position and therefore, they are the ones who decide what type of education will be beneficial for the refugees. Regardless of the refugee expectations for academic education, the INGOs are only willing to provide basic literacy education in the community learning centres for the pragmatic reasons (public reputation, low operational cost, and future funding). First, the provision of basic literacy education can be easily managed by uncertified volunteer teachers with minimum resources. Second, this favours INGOs because they are not required to establish a regular school setting and hire specialised teachers. By doing this, the INGOs maintain low operational costs. Lastly, all the INGO employees of the Action International and Rescue Organisation in my study said that they have been running their community learning centres for more than five years. This means that the INGOs have been able to secure funding for their personnel and infrastructure and build their public reputation during these years. The consensus of the INGOs and their funders is that basic literacy education is valuable for powerless refugee communities. But, in fact, as I argue above, basic literacy education locks the refugees into a permanent refugee status. Moreover, after repatriation, this type of education will create a problem for the refugee children in terms of re-entering in the Pakistani education system which requires an advance level of academic knowledge from students. One of the refugee parents said:

> *We cannot afford international schools and have limited options so, our children have to learn the basic literacy education in the community learning centre. (P2, Int., Nov 2017).*

In that symbiotic relationship, the both parties are dependent on each other. I argue that the degree of dependency is also one of the key factors in determining the persistence of the provision gap.

High versus low dependency

Limited access to Thai public schools and restricted work authorisation (see Chapter Three) means the refugees are highly dependent on the INGO provision. One of my refugee participants told me that *"we cannot survive here [in Bangkok] without the INGO provision"* (P3, Int., Oct 2017). This also refers to education. In return the INGOs also depend upon the refugees' services such as providing photos, videos, and stories for fundraising activities. The accounts from the refugees are used to maintain the INGOs' reputation, important in securing ongoing funding. Each INGO employee I spoke to said that in 2011 the INGOs welcomed a few refugee families and provided sufficient resources to them. At that time, the INGOs and the refugees, both exhibited high dependency on each other. One of the participants in my study said:

> *the first wave of Pakistani refugee families arrived in Bangkok in 2011-2012 and we [providers] generously met the needs of the refugee communities. Most of those refugee families were able to resettle in developing nations after 6 to 8 months. The second and third refugee movement occurred in 2013-2014 when hundreds and thousands of Pakistani Christian refugees arrived in Bangkok, and they are still residing in Bangkok. (P 5, Int.2., Nov 2017).*

The inception of the Syrian Civil War in 2011 and persecution of Rohingya forced millions of refugees to seek refuge in neighbouring countries. The plight of those refugees drew media attention. In the 21st century, social media is highly influential in ensuring that INGOs hastily respond to refugee crisis (Waters, 2001). The recent crises diverted the INGOs' efforts towards much larger Syrian and Rohingya refugee populations. The Pakistani Christian refugee population increased in 2013-2014 C.E., but the diversion of INGOs' focus created low dependency on the refugees I studied. As a consequence, the INGOs are only willing to provide limited resources, including basic education.

Favouritism

Two refugee families in my study, who operate as brokers or mediators between the INGOs and the refugees, have their children enrolled in the international schools on full scholarships. The refugee families told me that they often assist the international schools and the INGOs to run their projects for the Pakistani refugee communities in Bangkok. The international schools are also part of the Bangkok Asylum Seeker and Refugee Assistance Network

(BASRAN) and sometimes provide computers, used books, and online resources for the refugee children in the community learning centres. The international schools offer the academic education demanded by most of the refugee parents although it is only provided to those operating as brokers, something which indicates a degree of favouritism. One of the broker families said, *"we are so thankful for our friends for giving us full tuition fee scholarship for our children"* (P3, Int., Oct 2017). An INGO employee provided a differing view for the enrolment of a few refugee families in the international schools, He said:

> *In my opinion, a few refugee families can enrol their children in international schools in Bangkok. For example, I have access to more than 40 refugee families in which maybe 4 children who were able to attend international schools. The rest are studying in the community learning centres. The reason those children are in the international schools because their parents do not have passive behaviour as others. The parents constantly seek new opportunities and ask their friends for assistance. (P7, Int.2, Nov 2017)*

Most refugee families told me that they were not able to access scholarships in those international schools. Their only option was to enrol their children in the community learning centres. Despite this favouritism shown towards the brokers, a couple of refugee parents I interviewed still showed a degree of trust in the INGOs for the provision of education. One of the refugee parents noted:

> *We have been surviving here [in Bangkok] for the last six years, at least our brothers and sisters are helping us whatever ways they can. (P 2, Int., Oct 2017)*

Maintaining inequalities

Because the genesis of the exchange relationship is established on the inequalities between the two parties, the presence of inequalities can be seen in the INGO-refugee relationships' exchange of education and theorised as a patron-client relationship. The INGOs choose to provide the basic literacy education in the community learning centres, a decision which maintains inequalities between the two parties. I have argued that the Action International and Rescue Organisation provide a basic education because it enables them to maintain cheap operational costs. A refugee participant said "*INGOs do not want to hire specialised teachers because of high salaries"* (P3, Int., Oct 2017).

The provision of the basic education through uncertified volunteer teachers is beneficial for the INGOs especially when the Thai government and the UNHCR focus on repatriation. The

basic education not only locks the refugees into the permanent refugee status but also perpetuates inequalities between the two parties.

Power relations

According to Harrell-Bond, Voutira, and Leopold (1992), the INGOs hold power and control over refugee populations in the exchange for goods and services. This is also the case in the INGO-refugee relationships where INGOs contain power and control over the provision of the basic education. Neher (1994) theorises that "[p]ower stems from imbalances of obligations, so that if individuals have few resources at their command but have great needs, a person who can supply the needed resources attains power over the recipient" (p. 950). and this can be seen in the provision of education in the community learning centres I studied.

Section II - Refugee parents' aspirations in contemporary refugee situation

Given the existence and persistence of the education provision gap, I explore the refugee aspirations for academic education in the contemporary refugee situation, where they are excluded from the Thai national education system. My account of the Pakistani Christian refugees shows the aspirations for an academic education (see Chapter Six) despite the fact that only a basic education is provided by INGOs, one which focuses on literacy, in particular, uses the refugees' everyday experiences in the pre-resettlement country as the main educational resource. In order to critique the type of education which focuses on everyday experience and to provide an argument in support of the refugees' desire for academic education I theorise everyday experiential knowledge as context-dependent. In contrast, academic education is theorised as the type of context-independent knowledge which uses disciplinary concepts with which to investigate and explain the world (Bernstein, 2000).

The context-independent nature of academic education can be used to justify the parents' valuing of academic education, as that type of education offers a degree of hope for their children's future. This is the case whether they end up in a Western nation (a most unlikely destination as I have explained earlier) or in the more likely event of repatriation to their country of origin. I examined shifts to the refugee situation, both historical and contemporary (see Chapters Two and Three), to understand the refugee parents' aspirations for academic education and to ask if these aspirations can be fulfilled in the contemporary world. Based on

my analysis of the history of refugees – especially since the 1970s – I argue that refugees desire for better employment opportunities and to leave their refugee status behind depends on the wider geopolitical forces which create and regulate the global labour markets. It is this labour market demand rather than having an academic education which really determines the future of those who took part in my study as well as for refugees in other parts of the world. However, the refugee parents' aspirations for an academic education for their children is still important, even in this context of the labour market determination. The context-independent features of academic education would at least enable their teenagers to continue their education whether back in Pakistan or in the West. In contrast, an education which is limited to learning about daily life in Bangkok is not going to provide them with the academic subjects that are independent of social context and therefore provide greater intellectual power.

Academic versus basic education

The refugee parents' desire for an academic education for their teenagers is justified because this type of education is transferable to other locations, including in their country of origin. One of the refugee parents in my study said: *"Science, Social Studies, and Mathematics are the only subjects that will help the teenagers to readjust in the Pakistani education system"* (P 3, Int. Oct 2017). The provision of an academic type of education is important for the refugee teenagers because, after repatriation, the returnee teenagers are required to take the Pakistani Board of Intermediate and Secondary Education examination on academic subjects, otherwise, the teenagers cannot continue their academic journey in Pakistan (See Chapter Six). However, Dryden-Peterson (2015) argues that refugee communities in pre-resettlement countries often face "limited and disrupted educational opportunities" (p. 6) which is the case of the Pakistani Christian refugees in Bangkok (see Chapter Six).

The refugee children in my study have been receiving experience-based education of the context-dependent type which is not transferable to future locations either in Pakistan or to resettlement countries in the West. Academic subjects such as Chemistry, Biology, Mathematics or Physics, in contrast are transferable to other countries.

Given the uncertainty in the contemporary refugee phenomenon and the provision of education, Figure 8.1 shows the refugees' current location (Thailand) and potential locations

(Pakistan or a resettlement country). The overlapped area in the figure represents the place of academic education in all three locations, that is, such context-independent knowledge or academic education is transferable to other education systems. For example, computer software engineers study the same knowledge whether in Thailand or any other Western nations.

The place of academic education



Figure 7.1

Context-independent knowledge

The differentiation of knowledge (or education) into context-independent knowledge and context-dependent knowledge is a useful way to identify the transferability of academic knowledge (Young, 2008a). Context-dependent knowledge is limited to an individual's everyday life experiences at any given time. In contrast, context-independent knowledge is a type of knowledge which is not tied to any particular group status or geographical context. Rata (2016, p. 2) notes that academic education is 'powerful' because of its 'specialized and differentiated nature' and 'transcendent and emergent properties'. The potential lies in its context-independent nature and as the means of thinking about concepts that are beyond immediate experience. It can be generalisable and then universalizable. In fact, the power of academic education comes from this capacity (Rata, 2016; Moore, 2013; Young & Muller, 2013). Popper (1978) suggests that abstracted concepts can be separated from the specific context of their production. The separation of concepts from the immediate context occurs because concepts are generalisable and can be applied to other contexts. That generalisability

paves the way for the universalisation of academic education. The generalisation and universalisation of academic education enables a refugee community to continue their academic journey in current or future locations.

Basic education, on the other hand, is built on context-dependent knowledge, the type acquired from everyday experiences from others in the same group. The teenagers in my study were limited to discussing shopping and visiting Bangkok tourist attractions. Such context-dependent knowledge does not provide transcendent properties of being able to generalise and universalise, something I refer to above. Instead the ongoing refugee status is reproduced as the students learn only about what is immediately available to them.

Geopolitical context

In Chapter Two I discussed in detail how, in the post-World War I period, Western nations had restrictive refugee policies for refugee communities, where they also faced unwelcoming circumstances (Beaglehole, 1988; Lewin, 2005; Marrus, 1985; Ludi, 2010; Runitz, 2010). The Great Depression in the 1930s and the low demand for labour led Western nations to establish restrictive refugee policies. At that time, even those refugees who were well-educated including scientists, lawyers, teachers, physicians were detained in camps for fairly lengthy periods of time. However, in those camps, refugees established technical schools, debate clubs, fellowships, and study groups to benefit the younger generation (Lewin, 2005). The aim was to ensure that the standard of education the refugees had achieved in their country of origin was not lost. Their children were being prepared for a time when the world situation improved and the global labour market would soften its restrictive policies. At such a time, the refugees would be ready for the jobs that were to open up, leaving behind their refugee status and becoming valued migrants. The Second World War and the prosperity of the 1950s and the 1960s did in fact lead to this shift from unwanted refugee to desired migrant employee.

The new open-door policy enabled well-educated refugees to take advantage of those new policies and to acquire high-skilled employment. Their integration into the nation-state system gave them access to national institutions, including colleges and universities. The history of refugees shows that the geopolitical context and the global labour market were the driving forces in interrupting refugee status and in attaining employment. My argument, of

course, is that academic education is the pre-requisite for attaining high-skilled professional employment, but it is not the only determining factor.

The contemporary refugee situation should be understood in the larger global context. The expansion of UNHCR's operation to the rest of the world from 1967 was to provide social services through INGOs to refugee populations in neighbouring developing countries rather than allowing them into Western countries. A central policy concerning refugees today is to restrict these populations to pre-resettlement countries and provide social services to them through INGOs. In Chapters Six and Seven, I explained the relationship between the refugees and the INGOs in terms of the gap about what type of education is valued by using patron-client theory. This theoretical tool enabled me to explain the ongoing nature of the gap between providers and refugees. It also explains the provision of basic education as playing a vital role in maintaining inequalities between the two parties.

Using this theorising of the findings of my Bangkok study I argue that the refugee parents' aspirations for academic education – particularly high-status employment and the interruption of the refugee status – cannot be fulfilled merely by this type of education. Any interruption to refugee status, especially through employment opportunities is determined by larger political and economic forces driven by the requirements of global capitalism. At present these forces are behind the restrictive policies for contemporary refugees. The refugee situation is somewhat similar to the 1930s, the period I describe above. Both periods are characterised by the exclusion from national institutions of host countries (see Chapters Two & Three).

In Chapter Three I discussed the problem faced by refugees who are not allowed to work in pre-resettlement countries. It is a situation that, for the Pakistani Christian refugees I interviewed leaves them with limited work options. An academic education will not help them to obtain high-status employment in such a situation, private tutoring and volunteering work that a well-educated refugee can hope for in the pre-resettlement countries, having been excluded from legal employment.

Several research studies' findings show that educated refugees also face difficulty in securing high-status employment in resettlement countries. Krahn, Derwing, Mulder, and Wilkinson (2000) studied refugees who were well educated and held managerial positions prior to their

arrival in Canada. The study's "results show that they experience much higher rates of unemployment, part-time employment, and temporary employment than do Canadian born individuals" (p. 59). This is because the refugees were unfamiliar with the Canadian labour market and had limited English language skills and unaccredited qualifications. In another study, Bloch (1999) examines the position of refugees in the British labour market and explores the ways in which refugees face difficulties in gaining access to employment. Her study's findings show that refugees experience high levels of unemployment and those who were employed were only able to secure low level jobs despite the high level of academic qualifications and skills. This suggests that the refugees' aspirations for academic education to obtain high-status employment might not be fulfilled in Western countries.

In the third and most likely option, given the current emphasis on repatriation, the refugees will return to their country of origin. In that case an academic education may assist them to attain employment which aligns with their educational level. However, for the refugees in my study, the possibility to make use of an academic education in the Pakistani labour market will depend on the refugees' integration into their home country, a country which they previously fled for reasons (see Chapter Two) that may still be unresolved.

Conclusion

Refugee communities have hopes and aspirations for academic education because this type of education contains the type of context-independent knowledge which can be studied in multiple locations. It also has the potential to be used in increasing the likelihood of employment. However, refugees' expectations of obtaining high-status employment and of becoming desirable migrants as a result of their academic education are unlikely to be fulfilled because these aspirations are in the long run determined by the geopolitical context, particularly by the requirements of the global labour market. This pessimist view suggests that academic education will not make much difference in the lives of refugees. However, in the next concluding chapter, I describe how both a humanist and Gramscian Marxist view of education values intellectual development for its own sake and for the way in which it enables people, especially those in marginalised communities to understand and to challenge their existence. This is despite the restrictions placed on such groups by wider political-economic forces, and in the case of the refugees I studied, by the provider-refugee relationship which is structured to maintain inequalities and reproduce their refugee status.

Consequentially, the educational gap between the refugees' aspirations for the academic education and the INGOs' provision of the basic education persists throughout this relationship.

Chapter Eight – Concluding remarks

Introduction

This concluding chapter draws together the argument of my thesis. The aim of my study was to understand urban refugees' educational provision in the community learning centres in Bangkok operated by the Action International and Rescue Organisation. An account of the Pakistani Christian refugees was used to explore the contemporary refugee situation in the 21st century. The purpose of my study was not only to identify the education provision gap between the two parties, the refuges and their providers, but also to theorise why the gap persists when the refugees ask for academic education. Although INGOs claim to be committed to the betterment of urban refugees through literacy education in the community learning centres I researched, my study found that the gap exists and persists because INGO-refugee relationships contain and maintain unequal power relations through a patron-client relationship, and the basic literacy education provided locks the refugees in an ongoing refugee status. In other words, the provision of education reproduces the refugees' powerless status.

The refugees, on the other hand, desire academic education to acquire professional employment and to become citizens of Western nations. I have discussed this Chapter Seven that the refugee aspirations from academic education contain instrumental nature and might not be fulfilled because those aspirations are determined by larger political and economic forces driven by capitalism's requirement. Therefore, in this concluding chapter, I propose that the provision of academic education is essential for urban refugees to think, understand, and challenge their existence.

Overall, I have argued that the education provision gap is connected to the shifts in the post-1970s' decades created by the internal socioeconomic conditions of geopolitical forces (Western countries) where they restricted contemporary refugees to pre-resettlement countries. The shift ended the 'golden era' a time when refugees became migrants and then citizens of Western nations.

The socioeconomic challenges and overstretched social services of pre-resettlement (or developing) countries excludes refugees from nation-state regulations (Waters & Leblanc,

2005). The exclusion allows INGOs to establish a structurally unequal relationship with refugees in order to provide social services, including education, without the accountability procedures usually found in national systems (Najam, 1996; Jordan, 2005; Murtaza, 2012; Balgescu & Lloyd, 2006; Cavill & Sohail, 2007). Situating the Pakistani Christian refugees in the broader historical and political context enabled me to identify a structural political system with an unequal power relationship and no accountability processes. The quest for theorisation led me to explain the INGO-refugee relationship by using an older patron-client theory. Interestingly, I found that the features of the patron-client relation not only existed in historical times but also can be seen in extra-national relationships between INGO-refugee relations, especially in the provision of education in the community learning centres. I claim that my explanation of the education provision in the community learning centres through the patron-client concept is my original contribution to literature.

I found that the INGO-refugee relationship is built on the unequal power relations and remains fixed. Both parties have differing viewpoints regarding the purpose for the provision of education. The refugees want academic education for utilitarian reasons (see above). The INGOs are willing to provide basic literacy education on an emergency basis provided by uncertified teachers while maintaining low operational costs and reinforcing repatriation, the solution of refugee crises in the 21st century. In other words, the post-1970s' decades use the emergency approach in education. This approach comes from the UNHCRs' repatriation only philosophy (Waters, 2001; Crisp, 2001; Betts & Collier, 2007). It does not reflect a reality where refugees often reside in pre-resettlement countries for more than twenty years. Therefore, I have established the argument that the shift in the geopolitical context – including the global labour market, patron-client relationships in the INGOs' program implementation, and the provision of basic emergency education maintain inequalities and reproduce the refugee status which provides a greater advantage for INGOs and ongoing disadvantage for the refugees.

Given the permanent inequalities maintained by the basic education, the refugee parents' expectations are that access to academic education is essential for their teenagers to avoid disruption of academic education, to attain high-status professional employment, and to interrupt the ongoing refugee status by becoming desirable migrants and then citizens of Western countries. In the previous chapter, I discussed how academic or intellectual education has the potential to avoid the disruption of education for the refugee teenagers.

However, the historical and contemporary refugee context shows that an academic education is unlikely to assist the refugees to acquire high-status professional employment and to interrupt their refugee status even if they had access to it. The pessimistic view is that academic education will not make any difference in the lives of urban refugees residing in limbo in pre-resettlement countries. In other words, having an academic education will further frustrate the contemporary refugees. The exclusion and inclusion in the nation-state system is decided by geopolitical forces instead of higher academic education.

Regardless of this pessimistic viewpoint, I propose that academic (or intellectual) education is vital for urban refugee communities. A Gramscian Marxist view and a humanistic view of education both argue that intellectual education provides the means for refugee communities to think, understand, and challenge their existing circumstance even when the structures and procedures are maintaining inequalities and reproducing the refugee status. My study found that this is the case for urban refugees in pre-resettlement countries. To conclude I firstly discuss the Gramscian Marxist view of intellectual education, and why it is vital for refugee communities to acquire such an education.

Gramscian Marxist view

Mayo (2008) shows how intellectual education is pivotal in Gramsci's work. "One might argue that education, in its wider context and conception, played a central role in his overall strategy for social transformation since, in his view, every relationship of hegemony is an educational one" (Mayo, 2008, p. 419). This means that intellectual education does hold a key value in challenging the existing social structures and procedures which keep inequalities and divisions among human beings. Gramsci's (1971 as cited in Winch & Gingell, 1999, p. 127) "work on [academic] education suggests that it provides skills necessary for adult independence and the intellectual tools with which to develop alternative forms of proletarian common sense". Apple (2015) also built his argument on the Gramscian idea of 'common sense' when he noted:

> This is one of the reasons that over the past two decades I have focused a good deal of my attention on a Gramscian-inspired project that is best thought of as 'understanding and interrupting the Right. I have argued that if you want to counter the Right's hegemonic project look very carefully at how they became hegemonic. What did they do? How did they do it. (p.174)

This implies that the refugee community should acquire the intellectual, critical tools embedded in academic education which will enable them to think and understand the contemporary urban refugee situation, and then explore alternative ways of challenging the geopolitical refugee systems. Gramsci (1992) argues that intellectual education needs to be a type of counter-hegemonic education because this type of education deals with epistemological, social, political, and educational issues on a deep level and this is why it is a 'powerful knowledge'. Apple (2009, p. 248) emphasises the importance of intellectual education for oppressed peoples by noting that "we should not be engaged in a process of what might be called 'intellectual suicide'". In this view it is essential for the Pakistani Christian refugees, including the broader urban refugee communities, to acquire an intellectual education in order to think, understand, create, challenge, and change the geopolitical refugee system and the provider-refugee relationship reproducing the refugee status and maintaining inequalities through the basic education.

Humanistic view

In addition to the Gramscian Marxist standpoint, a liberal humanistic view of education also considers that intellectual education enables oppressed individuals (in this case refugees) to think beyond their marginalised situation. Bailey (2010) notes:

> Education can obviously be of a kind that will entrap or confirm a young person in the limiting circumstances of his birth, or it can be of a kind that will widen his horizons, increase his awareness of choice, reveal his prejudices and superstitions as such and multiply his points of reference and comparison. Whether or not an education or part of an education is to be judged as general and liberal can be determined in a rough kind of way by its likelihood of having the second rather than the first of these consequences. This is one meaning of what it is to liberate a person, by means of education, from the restrictions of the present and the particular. (p.16)

This is because education from a humanist perspective focuses on developing rationality, autonomy, empowerment, creativity, sensitivity, and a concern for humanity (Veugelers, 2011, p.1). In this approach, the development of rational mind needs to be built on humanistic social values. Veuglelers (2011) denotes that:

> The critical-radical tradition shows that possibilities for flourishing, learning and living a human life are not equally distributed in the world. Individual development is embedded in a social world of unequal social and political relations. Changing

> possibilities for flourishing and empowerment should enhance the possibilities for learning and development for all, in particular people with less social and political power. (p.2)

I conclude that the education provision gap exists and persists between the refugee parents' aspirations for academic education and the INGOs provision of basic education. The shifts in the geopolitical context, the global labour market, and the provider-refugee relationship are all contributing to maintaining inequalities and reproducing the refugee status. Despite these ever-present obstacles, it is essential for the refugees to yearn for and acquire academic education because this type of education will provide them with the ways in which they will challenge their existence as unwanted refugees.

I close this thesis by echoing Bourdieu's (2003, p.11) profound reminder that our intellectual journeys are vital, but they "cannot stand aside, neutral and indifferent, from the struggles in which the future of the world is at stake". It is hoped that my intellectual journey, one captured in this work, is a contribution to this struggle.

Appendices

Appendix A: Participant information sheet and consent form for Humanitarian aid worker

School of Critical Studies in Education (CRISTE)
Sheraz Akhtar, PhD Researcher

EDUCATION AND SOCIAL WORK

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The University of Auckland
Private Bag 92601, Symonds Street
Auckland 1150, New Zealand

PARTICIPANT INFORMATION SHEET
(HUMANITARIAN AID WORKER)

Project Title:
Urban Refugees and Education in the Contemporary World: A Case Study of Pakistani Christian Refugees in Bangkok, Thailand.

To the Aid worker,
My name is Sheraz Akhtar, I am a PhD candidate at the Faculty of Education and Social Work of the University of Auckland. In my doctoral dissertation, I am going to research about Pakistani Christian refugee adolescents' educational experiences in Thailand. My research will attempt to understand their everyday educational experiences in their family homes and community learning centres.

In order to conduct the research, I am inviting you to be my research participant as a humanitarian aid worker. To participate in this research, you will be asked to partake in three interview sessions and provide counseling and encouragement to the refugee families upon their request. During the first interview session, for about one hour, you will be asked some questions in a semi structured format (please see attached interview questions). In the second interview, you will further elaborate on your responses from the first interview session. The third, final, session will function as a debriefing session in which I will provide you with a general impression of what I've observed and also to validate your statements before finalization.

The second and the third session will each run for approximately 30 to 45 minutes. To help me in attaining the information details, I will use an audio recorder for the interviews and will

notify you when the recorder is ‘on’ or ‘off’. Each time before beginning a session, you will be asked for your verbal consent regarding the interview process. You are allowed to refuse to record; in this case, I will use manual note taking method with a pen and paper.

The interviews will not be systematically transcribed, although I may use some statements as direct quotes. Due to complexity and, relative short period of data collection, I will not be able to share the complete observation field note with you. However, you will be individually provided with a debriefing session regarding my general findings and impressions. This opportunity will also be used to check and get some feedback from you as well. All the collected data will be used for my thesis and other publications (articles, conference papers, and presentations).

For the purpose of confidentiality of your information, you will be assigned a pseudonym and your distinctive profile. However, due to a small sample size of Pakistani Christian community, there is a small risk that you might still be identified.

The collected data will be electronically saved, as a password-protected file, in my laptop and also at the server of the University of Auckland for the period of four years. At the final stage of my thesis, I am happy to provide you a translated executive summary of my thesis and a full thesis in English will also be made available upon request.

If you are interested to participate, as a teacher, you will require to sign a consent form (see annex 1). You are also allowed to withdraw your data or yourself from the research without having to state a reason at any time. However, due to limited time, geographical distance and logistical matters, data previously collected from the interviews and observation will still be used by my research. In case you feel any discomfort due to my research activity, you can always discuss it with me or feel free to approach your school manager.

As an expression of gratitude for your participation in my research, I would like to give you a souvenir from New Zealand.

Thank you very much for your time and help in making this study possible. If you have any questions, kindly contact me via the contact details below.
Thank you for your kindness and help and I am looking forward to meeting with you in person!

Yours sincerely,
Sheraz Akhtar
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Faculty of Education and Social Work
The University of Auckland, New Zealand.
Email: s.akhtar@auckland.ac.nz
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Phone Number: +64 9 6238899 Ext. 46303

Attachment 1: Consent form
Attachment 2: Interview Questions

Contact Detail and Approval Wording
For any queries regarding to ethical concerns you may contact the chair, The University of Auckland Human Participants Ethics Committee, the University of Auckland, Research Office, Private Bag 92019, Auckland 1142, New Zealand. Tel. 09 373 7599 Ext. 87830/83761. Email: humanethics@auckland.ac.nz

APPROVED BY THE UNIVERSITY OF AUCKLAND HUMAN PARTICIPANTS ETHICS COMMITTEE ON …….. for six years, Reference Number: 018666

ANNEX 1: CONSENT FORM
THIS FORM WILL BE HELD FOR A PERIOD OF FOUR YEARS

Project Title: Living in Limbo: Pakistani Christian Refugee Adolescents' Educational Experiences in Thailand

Names of Researchers

- Sheraz Akhtar, PhD Candidate, Field Researcher
- Dr. Ritesh Shah, Senior Lecturer, Main Investigator
- Associate Prof. Elizabeth Rata, Co-Investigator

Contact Email Addresses of the Researchers

- Sheraz Akhtar: s.akhtar@auckland.ac.nz
- Dr. Ritesh Shah: r.shah@auckland.ac.nz
- Associate Prof. Elizabeth Rata e.rata@auckland.ac.nz

I have read the Participation Information Sheet (PIS), and I have understood the nature of the research and why I have been selected. I have had the opportunity to ask questions and have them answered to my satisfaction.

- I agree to take part in this research.
- My participation is voluntary.
- I understand that I will be interviewed.
- I understand that I may have to provide counseling and encouragement sessions to the refugees upon their request.
- I understand that my statements will be analyzed and employed in Sheraz Akhtar's PhD thesis or his publications
- I understand that I am free to withdraw my participation at any time without providing a reason, and to withdraw any data traceable to me at any time prior to the completion of fieldwork.
- I agree/disagree to be audio recorded during the interview.
- I would like to receive a summary of findings, which can be emailed or sent to me at this address:

Name: _____

Signature: _____ **Date:** _____

Approved by the University of Auckland Human Participation Ethics Committee on …….. for four years. Reference Number: 018666.

SEMI-STRUCTURED INTERVIEW QUESTIONS
(Refugee Organization's Representative/Aid Worker)

Session 1: Approximately 1 Hour

1. Could you please describe the current situation of the refugee families in Thailand?
2. In which areas are your organization assisting the refugees?
3. How do you see the role of education in the lives of refugee adolescents?
4. What are the available learning opportunities for the refugee adolescents?
5. What is the role of a community learning center in the lives of Pakistani refugee adolescents in Thailand?
6. Do you think that the refugee community's educational needs are being met through the community learning centers?
7. Do you think that the international educational policies for refugees are being practiced in the PCRAs educational experiences?

The interview questions may be re-tailored and posed differently depending on your initial response. As an interviewer, my role will be to gather information about Pakistani Christians' educational experiences and it may require some additional explanation.

Session 2: Approximately 30-45
The researcher will read the main points and summary of the previous interview to the parents and will require some further explanation

Session 3: Approximately 30-45
The researcher will read the summary of the previous interview and will also describe the amended information. The third session may also require some additional explanation and changes about 1 & 2 session. The researcher will also pen an individual reflection in the form of short personal description.

Appendix B: Participation information and consent form for heads of family

School of Critical Studies in Education (CRISTE)
Sheraz Akhtar, PhD Researcher

EDUCATION AND SOCIAL WORK

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Auckland 1150, New Zealand

PARTICIPATION INFORMATION SHEET
(Heads of Family)

Project Title:
Living in Limbo: Pakistani Christian Refugee Adolescents' Educational Experiences in Thailand

To Family head,

My name is Sheraz Akhtar, I am a PhD candidate at the Faculty of Education and Social Work of the University of Auckland. In my doctoral dissertation, I am going to research about Pakistani Christian refugee adolescents' educational experiences in Thailand. My research will attempt to understand your teenager's everyday educational experiences in their community learning center and your family homes.

In order to conduct the research, I am inviting you and your family to be my research participants. To participate in this research, you will be asked: to make sure that all your family members (including the adolescents) agree to participate; to provide accommodation and meals for me inside your home for 8-10 days; to be observed for a period of 8-10 days; and to participate in interview sessions is explained in the following paragraphs.

Prior to the observation, I will visit your family to personally meet all members of your family and discuss any concerns you/your family might have. It is very important to see that all of your family-members can only participate in this research on a voluntary basis. They also need to be aware regarding my presence and activities. During my 8-10 days stay, you will not be asked to provide me with special facilities or to perform activities beyond what you usually have or do. My stay with your family will allow me to informally communicate with your family members, to be involved in their routines (e.g. shopping for groceries in a market, help with chores, take the children to schools). My observation will take approximately 70-90 hours for a period of 8-10 days. I will manually jot down my

observation by using pen and paper or my laptop. In this case, no audio or video recording will be specifically used during the process. Through my observations, I hope that I will be able to understand the educational experiences of your adolescent-aged children in Thailand.

In addition to the observations, I would like to have three interview sessions with you and your spouse or partner. For about one hour, you will be asked some questions in a semi structured format during the first interview session. In the second interview, you will further elaborate on your responses from the first interview session. The third, final, session will function as a debriefing session in which I will provide you with a general impression of what I've observed and also to validate your statements before finalization. The second and the third session will each run for approximately 30 to 45 minutes. To help me in attaining the information details, I will use an audio recorder for the interviews and will notify you when the recorder is 'on' or 'off'. Each time before beginning a session, you will be asked for your verbal consent regarding the interview process. You are allowed to refuse to record; in this case, I will use manual note taking method with a pen and paper.

The interviews will not be systematically transcribed, although I may use some statements as direct quotes; meanwhile, the observation notes will be converted into field notes. Due to the complexity and, relative short period of data collection, I will not be able to share the complete field notes with you. However, you and your family members will be individually provided with a debriefing session regarding my general findings and impressions. This opportunity will also be used to check and get some feedback from you and your family members. All the collected data will be used for my thesis and other publications (articles, conference paper, and presentations).

For the purpose of confidentiality of your information, you and your family members will be assigned pseudonyms and your distinctive profiles. However, due to small sample size of Pakistani Christian community, there is a small risk that you and your family might still be identified.

The collected data will be electronically saved, as a password-protected file, in my laptop and also at the server of the University of Auckland for the period of four years. At the final stage of my thesis, I am happy to provide you a translated executive summary of my thesis and a full thesis in English will also be made available upon request.

If you are interested to participate, as the head of family, you will require to sign a consent form on the behalf of your family household, which will also express the approval of your family as a whole unit (see annex 1a). As an individual participant, you and any other family members who and interviewed, will require to sign a separate consent form (see annex 1b). You and your family are allowed to withdraw your data or yourself from the research without having to state a reason at any time. A withdrawal of any member of your family will automatically withdraw your entire family from my research. However, due to limited time, geographical distance and logistical matters, data previously collected from your family will still be used by my research. In case you feel any discomfort due to my research activity, you can always discuss it with me or feel free to approach the church leader.

As an expression of gratitude of your family participation, I would like to contribute to your grocery and electricity bills in the form of approximately 1550 Thai Baht (60 NZ$). Additionally, I will also provide some 'thank-you gifts' in the form of school supplies to your

adolescents and some souvenirs from New Zealand as well. In the case of withdrawal, during the fieldwork, you will still receive grocery and electricity bills.

Thank you very much for your time and help in making this study possible. If you have any questions, kindly contact me via the contact details below.

Thank you for your kindness and help and I am looking forward to meeting with you in person!
Yours sincerely,
Sheraz Akhtar
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Faculty of Education and Social Work
The University of Auckland, New Zealand.
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Address: The University of Auckland, Faculty of Education; Office: N452 Epsom Campus; Auckland, New Zealand
Phone Number: +64 9 6238899 Ext. 46303

Attachment 1a: Consent Form – Family Head
Attachment 1b: Consent Form – individual Family Member to be interviewed
Attachment 2: Interview Questions
Attachment 3: Schedule of Observation

Contact Detail and Approval Wording
For any queries regarding to ethical concerns you may contact the chair, The University of Auckland Human Participants Ethics Committee, the University of Auckland, Research Office, Private Bag 92019, Auckland 1142, New Zealand. Tel. 09 373 7599 Ext. 87830/83761. Email: humanethics@auckland.ac.nz

APPROVED BY THE UNIVERSITY OF AUCKLAND HUMAN PARTICIPANTS ETHICS COMMITTEE ON …….. for six years, Reference Number: 018666

ANNEX 1a: FAMILY HEAD CONSENT FORM
THIS FORM WILL BE HELD FOR A PERIOD OF FOUR YEARS

Project Title: Living in Limbo: Pakistani Christian Refugee Adolescents' Educational Experiences in Thailand

Names of Researchers

- Sheraz Akhtar, PhD Candidate, Field Researcher
- Dr. Ritesh Shah, Senior Lecturer, Main Investigator
- Associate Prof. Elizabeth Rata, Co-Investigator

Contact Email Addresses of the Researchers

- Sheraz Akhtar: s.akhtar@auckland.ac.nz
- Dr. Ritesh Shah: r.shah@auckland.ac.nz
- Associate Prof. e.rata@auckland.ac.nz

I have read the Participation Information Sheet (PIS), and I have understood the nature of the research and why I have been selected. I have had the opportunity to ask questions and have them answered to my satisfaction.

- All individual members of my family agree to take part in this research.
- Their participation is voluntary.
- I understand that there will be observation in my house for 8-10 days and some family members will be interviewed.
- I understand that Sheraz Akhtar will stay with us for a period of 8-10 days.
- I understand that the observations and interviews will be analyzed and employed in Sheraz Akhtar's PhD thesis or his publications
- I understand that I am free to withdraw my participation at any time, which will also withdrawal all my family members from, without providing a reason. However, the data that has been gathered beyond the withdrawals can still be used by this research.
- I understand that the data will be kept for four years.
- I would like to receive a summary of findings, which can be emailed or sent to me at this address:

Name: _____

Signature: _____ **Date:** _____

Approved by the University of Auckland Human Participation Ethics Committee on …….. for four years.
Reference Number: 018666

ANNEX 1b: CONSENT FORM – INDIVIDUAL FAMILY MEMBER TO BE INTERVIEWED
THIS FORM WILL BE HELD FOR A PERIOD OF FOUR YEARS

Project Title: Living in Limbo: Pakistani Christian Refugee Adolescents' Educational Experiences in Thailand

Names of Researchers

- Sheraz Akhtar, PhD Candidate, Field Researcher
- Dr. Ritesh Shah, Senior Lecturer, Main Investigator
- Associate Prof. Elizabeth Rata, Co-Investigator

Contact Email Addresses of the Researchers

- Sheraz Akhtar: s.akhtar@auckland.ac.nz
- Dr. Ritesh Shah: r.shah@auckland.ac.nz
- Associate Prof. e.rata@auckland.ac.nz

I have read the Participation Information Sheet (PIS), and I have understood the nature of the research and why I have been selected. I have had the opportunity to ask questions and have them answered to my satisfaction.

- I, as a family member, agree to take part in this research
- My participation is voluntary.
- I understand that I will be interviewed in three sessions with the last session as debriefing session.
- I understand that there will be observation in our house for 8-10 days.
- I understand that Sheraz Akhtar will stay with us for a period of 8-10 days.
- I understand that my statements will be analyzed and employed in Sheraz Akhtar's PhD thesis or his publications
- I understand that I am free to withdraw my participation at any time without providing a reason, and to withdraw any data traceable to me at any time prior to the completion of fieldwork.
- I understand that the data will be kept for four years.
- I agree/disagree to be audio-recorded during the interview sessions.

Name: _____

Signature: _____ **Date:** _____

Approved by the University of Auckland Human Participation Ethics Committee on …….. for four years.
Reference Number: 018666

SEMI-STRUCTURED INTERVIEW QUESTIONS
(PAKISTANI REFUGEE PARENTS)

Session 1: Approximately 1 Hour

1. How is your life in Thailand and how would you describe your experiences of adjusting into Thailand?
2. What kind of challenges had you faced or are still facing in Thailand?
3. How do you view education? And what does it mean to your family?
4. How would you describe the educational experiences of your children in Pakistan, and presently in Thailand?
5. How do you see the role of education in the lives of your adolescents?
6. What are the current educational experiences of your children?
7. Which factors are shaping their educational experiences?
8. How do you see the quality of education which has been delivered to your adolescent in the community learning centre?
9. Do you think that the current learning opportunities are meeting the educational needs of your children?
10. Do you help your children to do their homework or other learning activities?

The interview questions may be re-tailored and posed differently depending on your initial response. As an interviewer, my role will be to gather information about Pakistani Christians' educational experiences and it may require some additional explanation.

Session 2: Approximately 30-45
The researcher will read the main points and summary of the previous interview to the parents and will require some further explanation

Session 3: Approximately 30-45
The researcher will read the summary of the previous interview and will also describe the amended information. The third session may also require some additional explanation and changes about 1 & 2 session. The researcher will also pen an individual reflection in the form of short personal description.

Appendix C: Participant information sheet and consent form for Manager/Education Consultant

School of Critical Studies in Education (CRISTE)
Sheraz Akhtar, PhD Researcher

EDUCATION AND SOCIAL WORK

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ORGANIZATIONAL INFORMATION SHEET
(Manager: Request for Community Learning Centre Participation)

Project Title:
Living in Limbo: Pakistani Christian Refugee Adolescents' Educational Experiences in Thailand

Dear School Manager,
My name is Sheraz Akhtar, I am a PhD candidate at the Faculty of Education and Social Work of the University of Auckland. In my doctoral dissertation, I am going to research about Pakistani Christian refugee adolescents' educational experiences in Thailand. My research will attempt to understand their everyday educational experiences in their family homes and community learning centres.

I am writing to invite you to be a part of my research. To participate as a school manager, you will be asked: (1) to grant me permission to collect my research data from your centre, specifically the conduct of classroom observations, evaluate the learning content, and also examine refugee children's educational experiences and needs; (2) to invite parents to a meeting so I can inform them about their children's involvement in my research; (3) to invite teachers to a meeting where I can inform them about their involvement in my research, and to ask for volunteers to participate in three interview sessions with me.

To conduct the observation, I will be present in your centre and, especially, in the classrooms to listen and to watch some learning sessions delivered by you and your teachers. I will not interrupt the educational process or ask you and your teachers to do activities that you don't usually do in the classroom. The total observation will take approximately 16 hours, distributed to: 2 to 2 ½ hour a day, five days a week within two weeks. During my observations, I will take some notes using pen and paper, or a laptop. No audio or video recording will be utilized during my observation.

With the observations, I would also like to interview two teachers from your centre. For about one hour, they will be asked some questions in a semi structured format and will have three interview sessions with me. Just to clarify that I will not be able to share any collected data from the observations and interviews with you in order to protect teachers' confidentiality. Additionally, it is very important for my research to recruit volunteer teachers, therefore I would like you to kindly not compel anyone to participate or withdraw from this research. I will appreciate your understanding and cooperation during the research process.

The collected data will be used for my thesis and also for other publications (articles, paper, and presentation). Due to the complexity and, relatively, a short period of data collection time, I would not be able to share the complete observation field notes with you. The interviews will also not be transcribed unless for some specific quotes.

For the purpose of confidentiality of your information, you will be assigned a pseudonym as well your centre. Any details which might make it easy to identify your centre's location or characteristics will be eliminated from the research. However, due to small sample size of Pakistani Christian community, there is a small risk that you and your family might still be identified. The collected data will be electronically saved, as a password-protected file, in my laptop and also at the server of the University of Auckland for the period of four years. At the final stage of my thesis, I will also provide you a translated executive summary of my thesis and a full thesis in English will also be made available upon request.

If you agree to have your centre participate in this study, you will have to sign an organizational consent form (see annex 2). You are also allowed to withdraw your data or yourself from the research without having to state a reason at any time.

With your capacity as a school manager, your withdrawal will automatically withdraw your entire community centre and also the teachers from my research. However, due to limited time, geographical distance and logistical matters, data previously collected from your centre will still be used in my research. In case you feel any discomfort due to my research activity, you can always discuss it with me or feel free to approach the church leader.

As an expression of my gratitude for your community centre's participation your centre will receive approximately 2500 Thai Baht (100 NZ$) worth of school supplies.

As for your teachers' participation, I would require two teachers who are familiar with your learning centre. Their participation will only be finalized after I meet with them in person, to explain and to discuss issues that might arise during the process.

Thank you very much for your time and help in making this study possible. If you have any questions, kindly contact me via the contact details below.

Thank you for your kindness and help and I am looking forward to meeting with you in person!

Yours sincerely,
Sheraz Akhtar
PhD Candidate
School of Critical Studies in Education

Faculty of Education and Social Work
The University of Auckland, New Zealand.
Email: s.akhtar@auckland.ac.nz
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Attachment 1: Consent Form
Attachment 2: Interview Questions
Attachment 3: Observation Schedule

Contact Detail and Approval Wording
For any queries regarding to ethical concerns you may contact the chair, The University of Auckland Human Participants Ethics Committee, the University of Auckland, Research Office, Private Bag 92019, Auckland 1142, New Zealand. Tel. 09 373 7599 Ext. 87830/83761. Email: humanethics@auckland.ac.nz

APPROVED BY THE UNIVERSITY OF AUCKLAND HUMAN PARTICIPANTS ETHICS COMMITTEE ON …….. for six years, Reference Number: 018666.

ANNEX 1: CONSENT FORM – COMMUNITY LEARNING CENTER'S MANAGER/EDUCATION CONSULTANT
THIS FORM WILL BE HELD FOR A PERIOD OF FOUR YEARS

Project Title: Living in Limbo: Pakistani Christian Refugee Adolescents' Educational Experiences in Thailand

Names of Researchers

- Sheraz Akhtar, PhD Candidate, Field Researcher
- Dr. Ritesh Shah, Senior Lecturer, Main Investigator
- Associate Prof. Elizabeth Rata, Co-Investigator

Contact Email Addresses of the Researchers

- Sheraz Akhtar: s.akhtar@auckland.ac.nz
- Dr. Ritesh Shah: r.shah@auckland.ac.nz
- Associate Prof. e.rata@auckland.ac.nz

I have read the Participation Information Sheet (PIS), and I have understood the nature of the research and why I have been selected. I have had the opportunity to ask questions and have them answered to my satisfaction.

- I agree to give permission to conduct research at my Community Learning Center (for refugee children)
- I authorize the field researcher, Sheraz Akhtar, to conduct classroom observations for 16 hours and have three interview session with volunteer teachers.
- I understand that the field researcher will not share any collected data, from observations and interviews, with me in order to protect teachers' confidentiality.
- I agree that I will not compel anyone to participate or withdraw from this research.
- I understand that I am free to withdraw for this research at any time without providing a reason for it; my withdrawal will also automatically withdraw my Community Learning Center from this study.
- I would like to receive a summary of findings, which can be emailed or sent to me at this address:

Name: _____

Signature: _____ **Date:** _____

Approved by the University of Auckland Human Participation Ethics Committee on …….. for four years.
Reference Number: 018666

Appendix D: Participant information sheet, consent form, and interview questions for teachers

School of Critical Studies in Education (CRISTE)
Sheraz Akhtar, PhD Researcher

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Auckland 1150, New Zealand

PARTICIPATN INFORMATION SHEET
(Teachers)

Project Title:
Living in Limbo: Pakistani Christian Refugee Adolescents' Educational Experiences in Thailand

To Teachers,
My name is Sheraz Akhtar, I am a PhD candidate at the Faculty of Education and Social Work of the University of Auckland. In my doctoral dissertation, I am going to research about Pakistani Christian refugee adolescents' educational experiences in Thailand. My research will attempt to understand their everyday educational experiences in their family homes and community learning centres.

I am writing to invite you to be a part of my research. In the data collection procedure, I would like you (1) to allow me to observe your classroom, (2) evaluate the learning content, and (3) to participate in a three interview sessions.

To conduct the observations, I will be present in your class to observe your teaching sessions. I will not interrupt the educational process or ask you to do activities that you usually don't do in your classroom. The observations will take approximately 16 hours, distributed to: 2 to 2 ½ hour a day, five days a week within two weeks. During the observations, I will take some notes by using pen and paper, or a laptop. No audio or video recording will be utilized during my observations.

In addition to the observations, I would also like to have three interview sessions with you. For about one hour, you will be asked some questions in a semi structured format during the

first interview session (please see attached interview questions). In the second interview, you will further elaborate on your responses from the first interview session. The third, final, session will function as a debriefing session in which I will provide you with a general impression of what I've observed and also to validate your statements before finalization.

The second and the third session will each run for approximately 30 to 45 minutes. To help me in attaining the information details, I will use an audio recorder for the interviews and will notify you when the recorder is 'on' or 'off'. Each time before beginning a session, you will be asked for your verbal consent regarding the interview process. You are allowed to refuse to record; in this case, I will use manual note taking method with a pen and paper.

The interviews will not be systematically transcribed, although I may use some statements as direct quotes; meanwhile, the observation notes will be converted into field notes. Due to complexity and, relative short period of data collection, I will not be able to share the complete observation field note with you. However, you will be individually provided with a debriefing session regarding my general findings and impressions. This opportunity will also be used to check and get some feedback from you as well. All the collected data will be used for my thesis and other publications (articles, conference papers, and presentations).

For the purpose of confidentiality of your information, you will be assigned a pseudonym and your distinctive profile. However, due to a small sample size of Pakistani Christian community, there is a small risk that you might still be identified.

The collected data will be electronically saved, as a password-protected file, in my laptop and also at the server of the University of Auckland for the period of four years. At the final stage of my thesis, I am happy to provide you a translated executive summary of my thesis and a full thesis in English will also be made available upon request.

If you are interested to participate, as a teacher, you will require to sign a consent form (see annex 1). You are also allowed to withdraw your data or yourself from the research without having to state a reason at any time. However, due to limited time, geographical distance and logistical matters, data previously collected from the interviews and observation will still be used by my research. In case you feel any discomfort due to my research activity, you can always discuss it with me or feel free to approach your school manager.
As an expression of gratitude for your participation, you will receive some souvenirs from New Zealand.

Thank you very much for your time and help in making this study possible. If you have any questions, kindly contact me via the contact details below.

Thank you for your kindness and help and I am looking forward to meeting with you in person!

Yours sincerely,
Sheraz Akhtar
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School of Critical Studies in Education
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The University of Auckland, New Zealand.
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Attachment 1: Consent form
Attachment 2: Interview Questions
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Contact Detail and Approval Wording
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APPROVED BY THE UNIVERSITY OF AUCKLAND HUMAN PARTICIPANTS ETHICS COMMITTEE ON …….. for six years, Reference Number: 018666.

ANNEX 1: CONSENT FORM
THIS FORM WILL BE HELD FOR A PERIOD OF FOUR YEARS

Project Title: Living in Limbo: Pakistani Christian Refugee Adolescents' Educational Experiences in Thailand

Names of Researchers

- Sheraz Akhtar, PhD Candidate, Field Researcher
- Dr. Ritesh Shah, Senior Lecturer, Main Investigator
- Associate Prof. Elizabeth Rata, Co-Investigator

Contact Email Addresses of the Researchers

- Sheraz Akhtar: s.akhtar@auckland.ac.nz
- Dr. Ritesh Shah: r.shah@auckland.ac.nz
- Associate Prof. Elizabeth Rata e.rata@auckland.ac.nz

I have read the Participation Information Sheet (PIS), and I have understood the nature of the research and why I have been selected. I have had the opportunity to ask questions and have them answered to my satisfaction.

- I agree to take part in this research.
- My participation is voluntary.
- I understand that I will be interviewed for approximately 3 hours.
- I understand that I will be observed during my classroom sessions for 16 hours.
- I understand that my statements will be analyzed and employed in Sheraz Akhtar's PhD thesis or his publications
- I understand that I am free to withdraw my participation at any time without providing a reason, and to withdraw any data traceable to me at any time prior to the completion of fieldwork.
- I agree/disagree to be audio recorded during the interview.
- I would like to receive a summary of findings, which can be emailed or sent to me at this address:

Name: _____

Signature: _____ **Date:** _____

Approved by the University of Auckland Human Participation Ethics Committee on …….. for four years. Reference Number: 018666.

SEMI-STRUCTURED INTERVIEW QUESTIONS
(Community Learning Centres' Teachers)

Session 1: Approximately 1 Hour

1. How do you like teaching at the community learning centre?
2. How would you describe the educational experiences of Pakistani Christian refugees in the community learning centres?
3. In your viewpoint, which factors are shaping their educational experience in Thailand?
4. What kind of challenges do you face while teaching to refugee children?
5. What are the educational needs of the refugee children?
6. Are the current learning opportunities and curriculum meeting their educational needs?

The interview questions may be re-tailored and posed differently depending on your initial response. As an interviewer, my role will be to gather information about Pakistani Christians' educational experiences and it may require some additional explanation.

Session 2: Approximately 30-45
The researcher will read the main points and summary of the previous interview to the parents and will require some further explanation

Session 3: Approximately 30-45
The researcher will read the summary of the previous interview and will also describe the amended information. The third session may also require some additional explanation and changes about 1 & 2 session. The researcher will also pen an individual reflection in the form of short personal description.

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