Transnational Grass-Roots Relationship Building:

How Norms and Compassion in Japanese Civil Society Influence the Burmese Diaspora's Homeland Development.

Yuko Nagamine

A thesis submitted in fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of

Master of Arts in Development Studies, the University of Auckland, 2020.

ABSTRACT

In contemporary global governance, narratives of "partnership" between donors in the Global North and aid recipients in the Global South characterize these relationships as equal. Yet, recent ethnographies reveal that hierarchical relationships and structural inequalities between the Global North and South remain unresolved. The emergence of non-state actors from the Global South, diasporas, signify different forms of aid relationships from North-South relationships, while obscuring the involvement of the Global North. On the one hand, bilateral donors, multilateral agencies, international development banks, and migration scholars celebrate diasporas as new development agents due to diaspora remittances: In 2016 the Official Development Assistance (ODA) contributed $142 billion, whereas diaspora remittances reached $466 billion. On the other hand, literature has scarcely addressed how the involvements of the Global North affects diasporas' homeland development by examining relationships between diasporas and their host societies.

This research explores the Burmese diaspora's transnational engagements and Japanese norms and helpers' compassionate practices in Japan as a case study to examine the South-North partnership. The theoretical framework of governmentality and insights from the anthropology and sociology of humanitarianism are employed to examine sovereign powers. Voices both from the Burmese diaspora and Japanese benefactors are obtained via participant observation and semi-structured interviews. Burmese transnational development initiatives in Japan are not influenced by their Japanese benefactors due to the Japanese/foreigner binary. This differentiation resists assimilation of Burmese individuals while allowing the Burmese diaspora its ideological autonomy. However, the Burmese diaspora disseminates Japanese discipline and values, reflecting postcolonial relationships between Burma/Burmese and Japan/Japanese. Considering partnerships not only requires analysis of power differentials but also the historical, political, social, and economic contexts that both sides maintain.

ACKNOWLEDGMENT

First of all, my sincere gratitude is due to Burmese and Japanese participants in Tokyo who taught me and inspired me with lots of insights. I am grateful for our continued friendship that supported me during my fieldwork and encouraged pursuing this after returning from the field. I really enjoy our conversation and exchange of ideas. Without you, this research would have been impossible.

I cannot thank my supervisor, Jesse Hession Grayman enough. I appreciate your understanding and flexibility that allowed me to stay in the field as much as I needed. I gained confidence as a researcher through this opportunity. Thank you for your time to read and edit my writing, along with your encouragement, the words of wisdom and critical feedback. I am also full of gratitude to the Art Student Center, the Department of Development Studies and its head, Andreas Neef, for supporting me with administrative requirements.

Many thanks to my professional proofreader, Deane Howden, for his careful work. Another huge thanks to my friends, Stephen McIntyre, Yumiko Watanabe, Chigusa Kogawa, Lin Kyaw Kyaw, Nang Voe Tip, Rui Saraiva, Saki Yamamoto, Ayako Kouno, Akari Suzuki, Kyoko Shibata, Khun Khun, and Mie Mie Kyaw who introduced me to the Burmese world in both Japan and Burma/Myanmar, which provided me valuable insights and lessons through many hours of critical discussion.

Finally yet importantly, I am forever in your debt, Matt, my husband and Aria, my girl. Your financial and moral support made my long journey to my master's degree possible. Matt, I appreciate your endless encouragement and trust in my ability to complete this journey alongside your working commitments and fatherhood. Aria, thank you for overcoming new challenges in Tokyo, and drawing and coloring happily beside me when I was occupied with my work. I am so proud of you both. Without you, this would have not been realized.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Abstract ii

Acknowledgement iii

Table of Contents iv

List of Abbreviations viii

CHAPTER 1: Introduction **1**

1.1 Global Governance: the Site Where Issues of Inequality Lie 1

1.1.1 Japan's Unique Bilateral Relationship with Burma/Myanmar 1

1.1.2 Partnerships 2

1.1.3 The Investigation of this Study 3

1.2 Research gaps 4

1.3 Research questions 6

1.4 Approaches 7

1.5 Chapter Overview 8

CHAPTER 2: Background Knowledge **11**

2.1 Burmese Lives in Japan 11

2.1.1 Burmese Migration in Japan 11

2.1.2 The Exclusion of Rohingya Muslims 13

2.2 The Legacy of the Second World War 15

2.2.1 The Influence of the Japanese Military 15

2.2.2 Japanese Aid 16

2.2.3 "Burma Lovers" 17

2.3 Chapter Conclusion 18

CHAPTER 3: Transnationalism, Diaspora, and Development **19**

3.1 Transnationalism 19

3.1.1 The Emergence of Transnationalism 19

3.1.2 Diaspora and the Idea of Homeland 20

3.2 Transnationalism in Development Discourse 22

3.2.1 Remittance-Development discourse 22
3.2.2 Collective Remittances 23
3.2.3 Neglected Aspects in Development Discourse 24
3.3 Burmese Diaspora's Transnational Engagements 25
3.3.1 Political Remittances 26
3.3.2 Social Remittances 27
3.3.3 Collective Remittances 28
3.3.4 Burmese Transnational Activities in Japan 28
3.4 Transnationalism-Assimilation Nexus 30
3.4.1 Diasporas' Transformation in Assimilation 30
3.4.2 Assimilation, Whiteness and Entitlement 31
3.4.3 Civil Society as Space of Improvement 33
3.5 Chapter Conclusion 34

CHAPTER 4: Theoretical Frameworks 35
4.1 Governmentality and Biopolitics 35
4.1.1 Sovereignty and Michael Foucault 35
4.1.2 Bare Life and Sacred Life 37
4.2 Anthropology/Sociology of Humanitarianism 38
4.2.1 Governed Bodies by Morality 38
4.2.2 Moral Sentiments 40
4.2.3 Enlightenment and Racialization 41
4.3 Chapter Conclusion 42

CHAPTER 5: Engagement with Japanese Literature 43
5.1 Rootedness of Contemporary Migration in Japan 43
5.1.1 Foreigner as *Others* 43
5.1.2 Oldcomers and Newcomers 44
5.2 Governing Apparatuses: Border Control, *Tabunka-kyosei*, and Japanese Activists 45
5.2.1 Politics of Border Control 45
5.2.2 From *Kokusaika* to *Tabunka-kyosei* 47
5.2.3 The Japanese/foreigner Binary 48

5.2.4 Boundary Making Processes by Japanese Activists 49
5.2.5 Japanese Activists and Japanese-ness 50
5.3 Chapter Conclusion 51

CHAPTER 6: Research Design and Methods 53
6.1 Methodological Approach 53
6.1.1 Epistemology 53
6.1.2 Data Collection 53
6.1.3 Ethical Considerations 55
6.1.4 Data Analysis 56
6.2 Fieldwork 57
6.2.1 Prior to the Fieldwork 57
6.2.2 Procedures: the Initial Stage 58
6.2.3 Procedures: the Second Stage 59
6.2.4 Procedures: the Final Stage 60
6.2.5 Participant Recruitment 61
6.2.6 Situating the Self as a Researcher 63
6.3 Analytical Processes 64

CHAPTER 7: Research Findings and Analysis 65
7.1 Burmese Diaspora's Transnational Engagements 66
7.1.1 Collective Financial Remittances 66
7.1.2 Collective Financial Remittances and Political Remittances 71
7.1.3 Collective Financial Remittances and Social Remittances 75
7.1.4 Social Remittances 80
7.2 Japanese Interaction: How and Why 83
7.2.1 Types of Support and Their Desires for Change 83
7.2.2 Their Obligation to Burma/Myanmar 87
7.2.3 "I Am Not Giving but Receiving" 89
7.3 Burmese Ideas and Practices: Negotiated or Not 91
7.3.1 No Transformation 91
7.3.2 Their Ideas are Transformed 96

CHAPTER 8: Discussion **100**
8.1 Improvement: What It Facilitates 100
8.2 Improvement: What It Neglects 103
8.3 Improvement: What It Resists 105
8.4 Improvement: What It Conceals 107

CHAPTER 9: Concluding Remarks **110**
9.1 Summary 110
9.2 Implications 111
9.3 Limitations 113
9.4 Future Research 114
9.5 Final Thoughts 115

APPENDICES **116**
Appendix 1: Ethics Approval Letter **116**
Appendix 2: Ethics Amendments Approval Letter **117**
Appendix 3: Participant Information Sheet **120**
Appendix 4: Participant Consent Form **122**
Appendix 5: Interview Questions **124**

BIBLIOGRAPHY **125**

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

APCC	Asian Pacific Children's Convention program
AUN	The Association of United Nationalities in Japan
BRAJ	Burmese Rohingya Association in Japan
BRSA	Burma's Refugees Service Association
CBOs	Community Based Organizations
ICRRA	Immigration Control and Refugee Recognition Act
INGOs	International Non-Governmental Organizations
IOM	International Organization of Migration
JMCC	Japan Myanmar Culture Center
MJBE	Myanmar Japan Bridge Education
MOFA	Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan
NPOs	Non-Profit Organizations
ODA	Official Development Assistance
OKO-Japan	Overseas Karen Organization in Japan
PIS	Participant Information Sheet
PFBJ	People's Forum on Burma in Japan
UN	United Nations
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
US	United States
ZAJ	Zomi Association in Japan
ZCC	Zomi Christian Church in Japan

CHAPTER 1.
INTRODUCTION

1.1 Global Governance: the Site Where Issues of Inequality Lie

1.1.1 Japan's Unique Bilateral Relationship with Burma/Myanmar[1]

At the United Nations (UN) International Court of Justice in December 2019, Burma/Myanmar's de facto leader Aung San Suu Kyi pleaded defense of the ethnic cleansing committed against Rohingya Muslims by the military in 2016/2017. Since the genocide in 2016 and 2017, more than 900,000 have fled to refugee camps in Cox's Bazaar, Bangladesh (UNHCR, 2019). It was shocking news for those who condemned it as genocide, particularly the Western governments, media, and the UN, who accused Aung San Suu Kyi of taking no political action to resolve the issue (Fergal, 2017; Los Angeles Times, 2018).

In contrast, Japan defended Aung San Suu Kyi stating that no genocide was committed in Rakhine state, becoming the first country to express support for Burma/Myanmar (Lwin, 2019). Moreover, Abe Shinzo, the Prime Minister of Japan, has assured continuous bilateral support for Burma/Myanmar's transition to democracy, as well as the development of the country including the conditions of Rakhine state (Aung, 2019; Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, 2019). Although Abe has asked Aung San Suu Kyi to respond appropriately to improve the situation in Rakhine state, the Japanese government never uses the term Rohingya nor human rights violations against them.

---

[1] In this thesis, Burma/Myanmar is used to refer to the country in general. The military regime changed the name of the country from Burma to Myanmar in 1989. I use both intending to underplay the issue of naming that reinforces the division in positioning ourselves whether or not to support the state violence.

1.1.2 Partnerships

Japan builds and maintains its relationship with Burma/Myanmar differently than Western liberal democracies. However, Japan usually sides with the Global North, like other wealthy nations in the aid space where power disparities are identified between the Global North and South[2]. The inequalities manifested in the classic bilateral aid form have been identified as problematic in matters of global governance. The ideology of partnership has been introduced aiming at transforming North-South relationships to egalitarian donor-recipient relationships. The major contestation is whether donors' domination is delegated to recipients as equal allies or remain hierarchal (Abrahamsen, 2004; Crawford, 2003; Mallarangeng & Tuijl, 2004).

Recent ethnographic studies have unpacked the power relations in development and humanitarian partnerships undertaken by transnational actors funded by the Global North represented by Non-Profit Organizations (NPOs) and International Non-Governmental Organizations (INGOs). For example, Brown (2015) illustrates that the sovereign entitlement of Kenya to serve its population is negotiated due to the financial abilities of their partners, the United States' (U.S.) funded NGOs, to deliver health services in the country. New forms of governance are emerging due to the involvement of non-state actors from the Global North in occupying the states' role in the Global South (Brown, 2015).

In the context of Burmese and Japanese[3], shared labor between Burmese trainees and Japanese aid workers provided at an agricultural training center operated by one of the oldest Japanese INGOs in Burma/Myanmar exemplifies how the unequal North-South relationship is

---

[2] This creation of the Global North and South stems from the postmodern imaginaries portraying the West as the dominant power holders and the rest as dominated by others (Hall, 2006).

[3] One of the oldest Japanese NGOs has operated in Burma/Myanmar since 1996 (Watanabe, 2014). Recently, Japanese NGOs in Burma/Myanmar undertook development/humanitarian projects not only aimed at sustainable development and disaster recovery assistance but also involved refugees' repatriation and rehabilitation of the disabled (AAR Japan, 2019; Japan Platform, 2015; Terra People Association, 2019).

managed and maintained. The “muddy labor” develops collective intimacy by unmaking individual subjects that obscure unequal relationships, while simultaneously managing to re-inscribe these inequalities, thereby hindering any efforts to resolve their unequal relationships (Watanabe, 2014, p. 649). Therefore, it neglects individuality and geopolitical contexts existing between Burmese and Japanese to build solidarity (Watanabe, 2014).

1.1.3 The Investigation of this Study

This thesis employs an ethnographic approach to explore Burmese diaspora’s homeland development initiatives shaped in relation to Japanese civil society’s norms and compassion. Inquiries of this research are located in two spheres: one exploring Burmese diaspora’s ideas and practices about their homeland development[4], and the other exploring how their Japanese benefactors are involved with Burmese diaspora’s development efforts.

This thesis contextualizes the association between these two culturally distinct entities from the Global South and North (Burmese and Japanese) as a matter of global governance in the development sphere. I focus on the narrative of change emerging from the space of civil society to examine “power” of the Global North in shaping development discourse in the Global South. Power is examined through the lens of governmentality and anthropology/sociology of humanitarianism. The gaze in much development literature in global governance is directed to *others*, the Global South, without much critical examination of the Global North. In employing the postcolonial thinking of Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak (2012), this thesis attempts to reverse the gaze back to the Global North, to do *homework* in Japan before doing *fieldwork* in Burma/Myanmar.

[4] This thesis identifies diasporas’ transnational engagements as homeland development initiatives. This is due to their intention to facilitate and influence change in their homeland.

1.2 Research Gaps

Diasporas[5] are celebrated as *new development actors* by political science scholars, international development institutions, and bilateral donors with burgeoning interests on remittances (Sinatti & Horst, 2015). Remittances sent by diasporas have become larger when compared to the volume of disbursement of Official Development Assistance (ODA). In 2016, remittances to Lower-Middle-Income Countries reached $466 billion whereas ODA was $142 billion (Development Initiatives, 2017; World Bank, 2018). Therefore, remittances are reconceptualized as *a development panacea* in the context of aid effectiveness (Faist, 2008; Sørensen, Hear & Engberg-Pedersen, 2002). This new attention toward diasporas as development actors for their homeland signals a departure from the traditional governance of Global North and South aid relationships. However, the interest given to remittances by scholars, international development agencies, and bilateral donors is limited to financial remittances[6] and the narrative of "agents of change". This narrow conceptualization of transnationalism as financial remittance[7] assumes that remittances overcome underdevelopment in the Global South where emigration is most likely to occur (UNDP, 2009). Attention needs to be paid, not only to identify other remittances such as social and political remittances but also to examine the connection between these remittances (Boccagni, Lafleur & Levitt, 2016).

The power imbalances that inevitably emerge between diaspora communities and their host societies are specific, embodied instances of the unequal relationships between the Global South

[5] For the definition of diasporas, I refer to Adamson and Demetriou (2007) who define diasporas as individuals who sustain ties to their homeland along with their specific identities (e.g. national, cultural or religious) across state borders, and who are capable of formulating their collective agendas through transnational networks and frameworks. Although many transnational practices are channeled through organizations (Guarnizo, Portes & Haller, 2003), this study does not exclude individuals who are engaged in transnational activities. Individual actors are synonymous with organized diasporas in terms of their ties to their homeland and their intentions to impact people or places of their origin.
[6] Financial remittances include both individual remittances and collective remittances.
[7] The narrow interpretation of transnationalism in the development sphere is provided in 3.2.1.

and North where sovereign powers are exercised. Existing literature describes diasporas meeting new ideas through their immersion in their host countries which in turn shape the self of diasporas as "vectors of modernity" (Lacroix, 2013, p. 1,028). Moreover, Burmese diaspora's transnational engagements are negotiated by the civil society in their Western host societies (Oo, 2006; Williams, 2012). The transformation and the negotiation in diasporas' transnational engagements is due to the power of the Global North associated with the notion of *improvement* in which their interventions in the Global South are justified (Pigg, 1992). Civil society amplifies the voices of the exploited to improve their poor circumstances (Seckinelgin, 2002). The notion of improvement derives from a governmentality logic that simultaneously associates with a humanitarian logic to help vulnerable populations (Malkki, 2015). On the other side of the same coin, diasporas are likely to receive some help from host communities to actualize diasporas' desires and ideas. Therefore, the notion of compassion is entangled with diasporas' transnational engagements. How Burmese diaspora's transnational practices are fostered in the notion of improvement and compassion in the Japanese civil society space is at stake.

In Japan, insufficient research has been conducted to investigate what kind of relationships Japanese benefactors and their foreign beneficiaries maintain. The Burmese diaspora is placed as second-class citizens due to their statelessness or racial/ethnic discrimination as foreigners or *gaikoku-jin*. The focus on the relationships between Japanese helpers and their foreign recipients is restricted to inquiries into achieving multicultural co-living (*tabunka-kyosei*) without asking what it means for the host society to help foreigners.

Scholarship on Burmese transnational engagements in Japan has merely directed attention to their political transnational activities (Banki, 2006; Banki, 2013; Hitomi, 2007; Tanabe, 2010). This may be attributed to the scarce attention paid to diasporas' transnational engagements as a

development matter. In the discourse and practices of international development in the Japanese aid space, the aspect of remittances is left untouched due to the narrow perception that development experts assist development of the Global South, not recognizing diasporas as facilitators of development in their homeland. Moreover, transnationalism in Japan does not indicate diasporas' homeland development. Some migration scholars examine migrants' transformation in the context of social mobility in Japan, and others explore the contribution of migrants in facilitating change in the homogenized Japanese society (Higuchi, 2016; Morimoto et al., 2013; Takenoshita, 2007). The scarce attention paid to Burmese diaspora's development efforts in Japan as well as the involvement of Japanese individuals with Burmese diaspora's transnational engagements suggest opportunities for new research.

1.3 Research Questions

1. What are the transnational engagements that Burmese diaspora communities and individuals in Japan undertake to develop their homeland?
2. In what ways do Japanese host communities and partners perceive and get involved in the Burmese diaspora's transnational engagements?
3. How and to what extent, if at all, do the norms and compassionate practices of Japanese civil society impact the formation of Burmese diaspora's homeland development?

To fill the research gaps, this thesis employs a qualitative, ethnographic approach and thematic analysis to explore development and humanitarian efforts carried out by ten Burmese (5 Burman, 2 Chin, 1 Shan, 1 Karen, 1 Rohingya) and support provided by nine Japanese participants, obtained via participant observation and semi-structured interviews during twelve months' fieldwork in Tokyo.

1.4 Approaches

Since migration studies tend to identify *the impact* of migration, it results in *cause and effect* analyses (Boccagni, Lafleur & Levitt, 2016). Moreover, scholarly work addressing transnationalism is inclined to take a positivist approach in focusing on its utility in development. Taking this inclination into account, this study takes a multi-disciplinary approach to include migration studies, anthropology, sociology and postcolonialism in analysis.

Multi-disciplinary approaches enable addressing transnationalism as the phenomenon explored in development studies while adding more breadth and depth in investigating global governance. Development is deeply associated with culture which does not exist in a vacuum (Gardner & Lewis, 2015). Anthropology and sociology critically examine culture by focusing on social structure and processes while examining meaning and perceptions about specific social phenomena (Stolley, 2005). Anthropologists and sociologists also provide a world view derived from the perspective of disempowered communities. It is undertaken by deconstructing dominant assumptions to reveal different understandings (Metcalf, 2006). Therefore, anthropologists and sociologists tend to forgo analysis of individual abilities and wills, approaches frequently taken by economists or psychologists. Analysis of global governance systems from these perspectives shed light on the global inequality that preserves power structures and impedes equal relationships from flourishing in North-South relations.

In Burma/Myanmar, there has been a transition to democracy since 2010[8], and stability in the country has been achieved in most areas of the nation[9]. The number of donors and partners has

---

[8] The government was transformed from an army dominated system to a military-backed civilian government in 2011 (Aung-Thwin, 2013).

[9] Although Burma/Myanmar has been in the process of transition to democracy since 2010, pronged internal conflicts are ongoing between the military and ethnic insurgents in Kachin, Arakan and Shan states where people face forced displacement and undeniable military abuses (Human Rights Watch, 2019). The influence of the army is still present owing to the fact that 25 percent of the seats in parliament are appointed by the military written in the constitution in 2008. The constitutional change is regarded as one of the key political movements to democratization.

increased from 29 to 85 between 2011 and 2015 (Carr, 2018). It is an appropriate time to devote attention to development in Burma/Myanmar. This thesis provides a different perspective from the conventional bilateral, multilateral, as well as NGOs-led forms of development from the Global North. While I highlight the governance of aid between the Global North and South, I also privilege non-Western aid relationships which remain relatively unexamined in English language scholarship.

By no means does this investigation intend to condemn the intentions of civil society to do justice in Japan, but rather carefully examines the consequences of these good intentions. This study partly follows Malkki (2015) in suggesting that inquiries about humanitarian intentions to help distanced others should begin with historical, cultural, and political analyses of ourselves who are in the Global North, as well as people's beliefs about themselves. Therefore, this thesis encourages self-reflection in the process of considering *others* in the postcolonial imaginary. This opens debate about how those who are from the Global North can become involved with the Global South, without getting caught up with the idea of help, in the name of improving humanity.

1.5 Chapter Overview

Chapter 1 has provided the rationale behind this research to focus on Burmese diaspora's transnational engagements and the involvement of their Japanese partners as a global governance issue that requires attention. I have identified research gaps formulated as three research questions, while also stating approaches to address them.

Chapter 2 outlines the background knowledge of Burmese lives in Tokyo, Japan. The explanation of refugee recognition in Japan is also provided. It then discusses the historical interaction between Japan and Burma/Myanmar since the Second World War.

Chapter 3 engages with transnationalism in the development sphere and explores literature addressing Burmese diaspora's transnational engagements particularly at the Thai-Burma/Myanmar border and in Japan. The literature on transnationalism and assimilation identifies the notion of improvement as crucial to examine the power relationships between diasporas and host communities.

Chapter 4 offers governmentality discussed with biopolitics to explore how ideas of improvement are entangled with sovereign power which reduces humanity to de-politicized bodies. The anthropology/sociology of humanitarianism shows that benefactors' aspiration for compassionate practices to improve humanity, derived from Enlightenment thinking, prevents benefactors from achieving equality with disenfranchised bodies.

Chapter 5 engages with Japanese migration literature which discusses the space of multicultural co-living (*tabuka-kyosei*). It illustrates how *tabuka-kyosei* segregates foreigners from Japanese nationals while preserving national interests, thus resembling the rationales of the state's practices of border control. Burmese communities and their Japanese benefactors in Tokyo are embedded in these processes. This chapter contributes to enrich the discussion in English-language scholarships of transnationalism, development, and humanitarianism by providing non-English literature and perspectives constructed in Japan.

Chapter 6 first addresses underpinnings for the qualitative methodology of participant observation and semi-structured interviews while laying the groundwork for thematic analysis used in this study. It then explains the procedures I took during the twelve months of fieldwork in Tokyo, Japan. I also describe the data analysis process.

Chapter 7 presents the research findings and my interpretation of the data. It first describes Burmese diaspora's homeland development that embodies their desires to educate, protect, and

enhance the welfare of their fellows neglected as a consequence of the military regime in Burma/Myanmar. It next focuses on Japanese benefactors' urge to transform Burma/Myanmar adversely affected by the Burmese junta while obligated to resist the Japanese political act of ignoring the historical and political relationship between Japan and Burma/Myanmar. Transformation of the Burmese diaspora is not identified in the relationships with their Japanese partners although Japanese norms significantly influence Burmese diaspora's homeland development.

Chapter 8 reflects the findings and exploration of chapter 7 discussing how the notion of improvement derived from Japanese norms is entangled with Burmese diaspora's transnational engagements in facilitating political effects while neglecting some aspects of development in Burma/Myanmar. This chapter also delves into how the very same idea of improvement is not translated into Burmese assimilation by Japanese benefactors, and how their compassionate practices conceal the unequal social positioning between the Burmese diaspora and Japanese helpers. It is legitimated by the Japanese/foreigner binary that maintains national interests.

Chapter 9 summarizes the research findings, implications and limitations. Further scope of research and final thoughts are presented at the end to conclude the thesis.

CHAPTER 2.
BACKGROUND KNOWLEDGE

This chapter describes how Burmese asylum-seekers have settled in Tokyo, with the explanation of visas they hold. Secondly, I delve into the relationship-building processes between Japan and Burma/Myanmar via Japanese imperialism, later Japanese aid and friendship formed in the civil society space.

2.1 Burmese Lives in Japan

2.1.1 Burmese Migration in Japan

In 1988, an uprising against the Burmese junta[10] resulted in forced migration out of the country. They traveled through Thailand, South Korea, Malaysia, and Singapore before reaching Japan without authorized legal status (Hitomi, 2013). The first generation arrived in Japan in 1989 most of whom carried tourist visas and became over-stayers after three months. The first generation formed “little Yangon” in Nakai in the 1990s that moved to Takada-no-baba towards the end of the 1990s (Badauk, 2019). Since then, “little Yangon” offers comfort to many Burmese. Not only are Burmese restaurants available, but also beauty salons, massage shops, free papers, a library, and grocery shops that sell Burmese spices and vegetables. Some of them are accessible via social network sites established by Burmese individuals in rural areas of Japan (Murohashi, 2019). By the end of the 1990s, Burmese communities in Japan became active. For example, the Thingyan water

[10] A coup d'état led by Ne Win in 1962 caused the military government to be established. They aimed at *real* independence from foreign influences via rejecting foreign cultures and external funding sources. In 1974 Ne Win founded the Burma Socialist Program Party calling for the Burmese ways to shift to Socialism where many private businesses once owned by foreigners were converted into state-owned businesses. The deterioration of the economy led to the decision of the government to demonetize the currency in 1985 that resulted in students’ protest against the government at Rangoon University in 1988. I refer to Aung-Thwin (2013) for the historical account.

festival has been held annually since 1991 to celebrate the Burmese New Year in April (Badauk, 2019).

The types of legal status held by Burmese asylum-seekers are as refugees, *zairyu-kyoka*[11], designated activities permit, provisional release visas[12], and provisional stay visas[13]. Refugee status is granted in alignment with the Refugee Convention that provides protection with access to settlement support and travel documents, while *zairyu-kyoka* merely serves as the residence permit with the right to bring their families. It is granted for those who did not qualify for refugee status but were approved attributed to the need for humanitarian consideration[14]. The segregation of entitlements among asylum-seekers derived from unclarified screening has contributed to the disparities between Burmese asylum-seekers (Hitomi, 2013; Kajimura, 2014; Tanabe, 2010). Unclarified processes of refugee recognition has resulted in tensions of rivalry and jealousy in competing over a small legal space for refugee recognition in Japan (Banki, 2006). Special permission for designated activities has increasingly been granted since 2005, which authorizes them certain income-generating activities without any other entitlements offered to refugee status or *zairyu-kyoka* (Kajimura, 2014).

The first Burmese was granted refugee status in 1995 with support from a Japanese NGO formed by lawyers (Hitomi, 2008). Since then, 331[15] Burmese were granted refugee status and 1,773[16] were approved of *zairyu-kyoka* out of 7,764 applicants (Japan Lawyers Network for Refugees, 2018). As of June 2018, 24,471 Burmese reside in Japan (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of

[11] *Zairyu-kyoka* is a special residence permission approved by the Ministry of Justice.
[12] Those who are provisionally released from detention without any legal status.
[13] The purpose of this visa is to stabilize those who were undocumented when they apply for the refugee status (Ministry of Justice, 2019). They have no legal permission to work.
[14] The fact that it is determined by the Ministry of Justice created a large unspecified space about how each case is addressed. Individuals with strong ties to Japan, unfamiliarity of homeland culture and language, families with children past elementary school are most likely to be granted this permission (Yoshinari, 2007).
[15] 117 from 1982 to 2005, 0 from 2006 to 2010, 41 from 2011 to 2015, and 1 from 2016 to 2018.
[16] 152 from 1982 to 2005, 1,209 from 2006 to 2010, 403 from 2011 to 2015, and 9 from 2016 to 2018.

Japan, 2019). Burmese refugees and ones with *zairyu-kyoka* together make up of 53 percent of the refugee population in Japan[17]. There is no clarified official explanation for this trend although Yamamura (2015) argues that the numbers of refugees reflect Japan's good bilateral relationship with Burma/Myanmar, rather than their refugee-ness. Yamamura's (2015) claim stems from the teaching materials at the Ministry of Justice which describes the decision-making processes for accepting refugees, stating that Japan accepts asylum-seekers originating from close allies.

In 2010, the Japanese government accepted a call from the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and granted 86 Karen refugees from the Mae La camp, Thailand as an attempt of a third country resettlement scheme over five years (Treviranus & Osanami, 2015). It was undertaken to offset criticism by the international community in the 2000s and in compliance with human security, a major principle of the Japanese ODA (Takizawa, 2015). However, the government came under fierce criticism for their self-centered ideas to reduce the cost of accepting the refugees. It not only was embodied as an inflexible criterion that prioritized refugees' integration potential rather than their humanitarian needs, but also resulted in poor integration support in settlement (Simone, 2012; Takizawa, 2015).

2.1.2 The Exclusion of Rohingya Muslims

In Burmese society in Japan, Burman[18] are the majority ethnic group. There is no qualitative data that informs the numbers of ethnic minority groups[19], indicating the essentialization of Burmese ethnicity based on their nationality. An example of solidarity between Burmans and ethnic minorities was identified when they fought together against the Burmese junta in 2007 (Hitomi,

[17] The population of refugees and ones with *zairyu-kyoka* in Japan is 3,927 from 1982 to 2018.
[18] I use the term Burman to refer to the majority ethnic group in Burma/Myanmar.
[19] I employ the term ethnic minorities to refer to non-Burman, although I specify their ethnicity when it is clearly stated.

2013). This Burmese organization led ethnic groups to describe themselves as people from Burma/Myanmar, although ethnic minorities generally identify themselves as their ethnicity (Kajimura, 2014).

The Japanese government follows the official usage by the Burmese government such that the term "Muslims in Rakhine state" is used rather than Rohingya in the policy arena (Kasai, 2019). By contrast, the U.S. government and the western media employs the term Rohingya or Rohingya Muslims (The Washington Post, 2018).

Reflecting the situation in their motherland, Rohingya Muslims are not included as members of Burmese communities in Japan (Kajimura, 2014; Tanabe, 2010; Yamamura, 2010). For example, the reaction by Burmans and other ethnic individuals, particularly Arakan Buddhists was extreme when the People's Forum on Burma in Japan[20] (PFBJ) defended Rohingya's claim to be included as Burmese in one of their meetings (Yamamura, 2010).

Historically, the Muslim/Buddhist confrontation was facilitated in Rakhine state as a result of warfare between the Japanese and British at the end of the Second World War: The former armed the Arakan Buddhists while the latter used Muslim forces for a counterattack. Therefore, an ongoing conflict between Arakan Buddhists and Rohingya Muslims is rooted in Japanese imperialism.

In 1974, the Ne Win dictatorship denied Rohingya as one of the ethnic minorities in Burma/Myanmar (Nemoto, 2005). Moreover, the citizenship law composed in 1982 considered Rohingya Muslims as illegal migrants from Bangladesh who settled in Myanmar following the first

[20] PFBJ was one of the first organization that provided a legal help to Burmese asylum seekers. It was led by a lawyer Watanabe and Nemoto, a notable scholar in Burmese history in Japan, and other Japanese individuals including Tanabe, one of the participants. They were active between 1996 and 2011.

Anglo-Burmese War (Seekins, 2017). Although Rohingya claims that their ancestors have been indigenous in Rakhine since the 8th century (Tha, 2007).

2.2 The Legacy of the Second World War

2.2.1 The Influence of the Japanese Military

Scholars argue that the present Burmese junta was modeled on the imperial Japanese army (Tanabe & Nemoto, 2003; Seekins, 2000). In the early 1940s, Japanese secret agents contacted young nationalists and communists including Aung San, father of Aung San Suu Kyi, and Ne Win, who led Burmese Socialism via dictatorship in the 1960s to the 1980s, to fuel their anti-colonial sensibility (Aung-Thwin, 2013). More joined and received training in Japan where the Thirty Comrades was established that later became the Burmese Independence Army, the origin of the present army (Aung-Thwin, 2013). They also aimed at constructing "Burma for the Burmese" while the Japanese regarded them as their little army to reclaim "Asia for the Asians" (Aung-Thwin, 2013, p. 230-231).

Over 10,000 young people were engaged in combat against the British, and the Japanese army seized Rangoon in 1942. Japanese authorities gave limited sovereignty over the Burmese military under Japanese surveillance and interference in the internal affairs, offering rhetoric of independence as a political strategy (Tanabe & Nemoto, 2003). Until the Anti-Fascist People's Freedom League expelled the Japanese force in 1945, people suffered from torture, violence against women, and forced labor (Tanabe & Nemoto, 2003). Japanese imperial gaze was directed to the colonized Burmese, who were at the bottom of the imperial Japanese hierarchy, along with their ignorance to cultural consideration[21] (Tanabe & Nemoto, 2003).

[21] They came into pagodas with shoes on and became naked in front of people knowing the rudeness of it (Tanabe & Nemoto, 2003).

2.2.2 Japanese Aid

The ideology of Japanese aid forms the postwar relationship between Japan and Burma/Myanmar. Japan first made post-war reparations to Burma/Myanmar in 1953. Since then, Japan has continued to provide a large amount of foreign aid to the country, while other Western governments withdrew their assistance during Ne Win totalitarianism between the 1960s and 1980s (Oishi & Furuoka, 2003). Japan persisted with its economic assistance which reached 60 to 70 percent of the total amount of foreign aid received during that period (Nemoto, 2007). Besides, the Japanese government recognized Burma's military regime in 1989 (Seekins, 1992). More importantly, there was no control over how the debt relief grants were used by the military regime post-1988; the junta procured combat vehicles to quell public demonstrations in 1996, despite no aid usage was to be allowed for military use (Seekins, 2000). The Japanese ODA did not consider the human rights abuse of the dictatorship (Tanabe & Nemoto, 2003).

Oishi and Furuoka (2003) argue that Japan's foreign aid is restricted to its commercial interests which have resulted in funding conflict mediation between parties rather than promoting human rights. The demand for mutual benefits without promoting human rights is also attributed to Japan's philosophy of non-interference in the internal affairs of other states (Oishi & Furuoka, 2003). Japan's approach to seek for mutual benefits resembles the South-South cooperation formed through Japan's struggles as a "late industrializer" owing to its defeat in the Second World War (Fukuda-Parr & Shiga, 2016, p. 4). By claiming to gain mutual benefits between nation-states, Japan justifies the neglect of human rights.

2.2.3 “Burma Lovers”

Although the Second World War left scars on many, it contributed to the friendship between the Burmese and Japanese. It is important to trace the historical account of the transformation of their relationships, from colonial relationship to “friendship”, to understand what is overlooked in building their “friendship”.

First, a novel *Biruma-no-tategoto,* or Harp of Burma, at the end of the 1940s played a significant role in reinforcing Japanese passion towards Burma (Tanabe & Nemoto, 2003). It simultaneously romanticized warfare and the expansion of Japanese imperialism while insufficiently illustrating Burmese Buddhism (Tanabe & Nemoto, 2003). Moreover, war veterans appreciated Burmese generosity during their occupation. They established the Japan Myanmar Friendship Association as the first Japanese civil organization to aim at bridging together individuals from both countries (Tanabe & Nemoto, 2003). Japanese diplomats or technical advisers who visited Burma also appreciated the morality of civil servants in their use of war reparations (Seekins, 2000).

This Japanese love for Burma/Myanmar stems from their comfort with shared ethical codes with the Burmese such as having “respect for elders and educated people, strong family ties, and a sense of mutual obligation” (Seekins, 2000, p. 318). In contrast, the Burmese evoke Japanese nostalgia since the Japanese have lost their traditional values in deepened modernity while the Burmese have preserved their virtue (Seekins, 2000). Yet, this appreciation is valued based on the similarity they have rather than for respect of other cultures and customs. Therefore, their “friendship” requires more attention in regard to equalities between the Burmese diaspora and Japanese benefactors.

2.3 Chapter Conclusion

This chapter has delineated Burmese settlement in Japan since 1988 along with the description that Burmese refugees and ones with *zairyu-kyokya* occupy a small legal space in Japan. Historically, Japan has intervened in Burma/Myanmar by the justification of protecting Asia from the West, while enslaving Burmese people under Japanese imperialism. This colonial relationship has been transformed as friendship that requires further attention.

CHAPTER 3.
TRANSNATIONALISM, DIASPORA, AND DEVELOPMENT

This chapter introduces the idea of transnationalism and the political relations between diasporas and the idea of homeland while discussing negligence in development discourse. I next identify Burmese transnational engagements, particularly in Thailand, the Thai-Burma/Myanmar borders and Japan. Finally, I explore the scholarship examining transnationalism along with the framework of assimilation.

3.1 Transnationalism

3.1.1 The Emergence of Transnationalism

At the beginning of migration studies, scholars understood the phenomenon of migration in the context of globalization. They described an interconnected world where people, capital, information, and goods moved beyond national boundaries. Migration scholars attributed the phenomenon of international immigration as merely the economic logic of supply and demand in the international labor market (Massey et al., 1993).

Since the early 1990s, there has been recognition by some anthropologists and sociologists that migration should be analyzed through the lens of transnationalism. This would consider immigrants' cross-border engagements and has opened a new space for exploration in the phenomenon of migration (Basch, Schiller & Blanc, 1994; Ong, 1999; Schiller, 1999). Basch et al. (1994) provides a well-cited definition of immigrants' engagements:

> We define "transnationalism" as the processes by which immigrants forge and sustain multi-stranded social relations that link together their societies

> of origin and settlement. We call these processes transnationalism to emphasize that many immigrants today build social fields that cross geographic, cultural, and political borders (p. 7).

A transnationalism framework enables discussions of processes beyond the borders of a particular state, including non-state actors. Yet, these processes are "shaped by the policies and institutional practices of states" (Schiller, 1999, p. 96). Therefore, transnationalism does not contradict the state-centric paradigm (Lie, 1995). The nation-state continues to be an important analytical consideration of trans-nationality to address questions entangled with nationalism and citizenship (Daswani, 2013; Kearney, 1986).

The new studies of transnationalism featured a methodological change from macro data to ethnographies. Ethnographies reveal the voices and practices of migrants by allowing nuanced views of migration whilst grasping the cultural and political meanings of border-crossing movements (Ong, 1999). For example, Gmelch (1992) brings Caribbean immigrants to the fore in exploring what it means to be Black immigrants in England and North America. It attempts to raise their voice as active decision-makers rather than passive participants whose decisions are manipulated by national migration regulations and the world economy represented by the international labor market (Gmelch, 1992).

3.1.2 Diaspora and the Idea of Homeland

Safran (1991) is the reference point who provided a starting point in diaspora studies. Dispersed Jews are identified as an "ideal type" of diaspora characterized as follows:

> (a) they or their ancestors have been dispersed from a specific original "center" to… foreign regions; (b) they retain a collective memory, vision, or myth about their original homeland…; (c) they believe that they are not fully accepted by their host society…; (d) they regard their ancestral homeland as their true, ideal home where they eventually return…; (e) they believe that they should, collectively, be committed to the maintenance or restoration of their original homeland…; and (f)…their ethno-communal consciousness and solidarity are importantly defined by the existence of such a relationship (Safran, 1991, p. 83-84).

This assumes a correlation between dispersed persons and notions or thoughts about their homeland as inevitable. Diasporas often use essentialist terms such as homeland to provide symbolic figures to easily identify themselves while strengthening their ties between those who are qualified as parts of communities (Sökefeld, 2006).

According to Anderson (1983), the idea of *community* is imagined and utilized to spread nationalism. Print technology and capitalism serve as vehicles to enable human languages to be shared, which in turn shapes *community* imbued with *national consciousness*. This link between the community and national consciousness can also be applied to the context of diasporas. Diasporas form *diasporic communities* that retain their national consciousness of a homeland. Their ethnicity and race signify their homeland, which is highlighted and strengthened in the habituation process in their host countries (Basch, Schiller & Blanc, 1994). By doing so, diasporas pursue nationalist agendas such as national development.

For example, Dominican immigrants get involved in capitalist activities such as investment in property and business in their homeland to support national development (Grasmuck & Pessar, 1991). Another example of the 1911 revolution by the Chinese diaspora illustrates the political transnationalism which sought to restore their *Chinese-ness* (Cohen, 2008). These examples demonstrate that the term diaspora serves as "a claim" and "a category of practice" to formulate their identities in accordance with their homeland (Brubaker, 2005, p. 12).

3.2 Transnationalism in Development Discourse

3.2.1 Remittance-Development Discourse

It is evident that, due to the history and the political formation of diasporas, their engagements with the homeland are involved with political claims. However, some scholars and UN multilateral agencies such as the International Organization of Migration (IOM) erase the political context of diasporas. Rather than employing the term diaspora, they employ immigrants and migrants to capture the multiplicity of networks and communities, while identifying them as someone who necessarily sustains economic ties to their motherland (Ionescu, 2006; Lie, 1995). This depoliticization of diasporas is facilitated and put forward with the keyword *diasporas as agents of change* in the policy discourse since the 2000s.

This term essentializes political formation of diasporas. For example, diasporas' ties to their homeland are racialized and essentialized by European policy-makers and NGOs practitioners that led to assigning them only capacity-building activities and leaving other activities to be addressed by development professionals who are believed to be neutral (Sinatti & Horst, 2015). African Diasporas are homogenized and instrumentalized as mediators between Northern donors and

Southern recipients with assumptions that donors can bypass recipient states via funding diasporas (Turner & Kleist, 2013).

The de-politicization of diasporas reduces their transnational engagements to merely financial remittances. For example, a Nepali case study describes international labor migration as livelihood strategies that enhance financial and social capital, children's education, and knowledge for another migration (Thieme & Wyss, 2005). Moreover, financial remittances are believed to stimulate entrepreneurship, transforming community norms and political conditions (Bakker, 2015; Goldring, 2003, 2004; UNDP, 2009).

3.2.2 Collective Remittances

Diasporas' collective remittances are also addressed in the remittances-development discourse. Collective remittances are understood as a form of "the total giving of a diaspora; back to the homeland, to communities of residence" (Johnson, 2007, p. 8). Collective remittances are distinguished from individual financial remittances because it is "money raised by *a group* that is used to benefit *a group* or community with which it is affiliated" (Goldring, 2004, p. 808). Johnson (2007) stresses that diasporas' rootedness strengthens their determination to their places of origin while the physical distance to the subjected areas enables the ability to address more disputed issues. For example, in Bosnia and Eritrea, the collective remittances sent by refugees in Europe play a significant role in supporting hospital operations providing care for war combatants deprived of any state-led welfare system (Al-Ali, Black & Koser, 2001).

The rationales for sending collective remittances are identical to individual financial remittances to families. Both cases articulate the deprivation of state-based social welfare systems or public services such as education and health in home countries. This stems from the neoliberal

thinking to privilege markets and private-public partnerships to substitute for state expenditures (Caglar, 2006). The notion that makes financial remittances responsible for development neglects structural constrains, power inequalities between entities, and the role of states in forming positive development outcomes (De Haas 2010, 2012; Goldring, 2003).

3.2.3 Neglected Aspects in Development Discourse

As described above, diasporas' transnational contribution is more than what financial capital entails. One of the neglected aspects of remittances in development literature is *social remittances*. It describes social and cultural aspects of their engagements where diasporas are involved with the circulation of norms, practices, identities and social capital as objects of transmission (Levitt, 1998). Diasporas' experiences prior to migration determine their activities in host countries which in turn influence what they transmit back to their places of origin (Levitt & Lamba-Nieves, 2011). For example, Chinese diaspora funded the construction of schools and libraries due to strong Chinese beliefs and respect for education and scholarship rooted in its history and cultural values (Young & Shih, 2003). Not only is the homeland context explored but also the links between financial remittances and social remittances can be identified: The transfer of resources is influenced by values stemming from the cultural and historical context of their homeland.

Another neglected aspect of remittances in development literature is *political remittances*. The term political transnationalism is often employed by scholars in political sciences, though it confines the definition of political remittances to merely "ideas about democratization and practices of political advocacy" (Piper, 2009, p. 218). Development discourse is inclined to reflect this positivist positioning: It tends to discuss the possible *impact* of financial and social remittances in

reinforcing *peace*, *development,* and *democracy* in conflict-affected settings (Sørensen, 2007; Sørensen, Hear & Engberg-Pedersen, 2002).

For the contextualization of diasporas' homeland development, this thesis follows Boccagni, Lafleur, and Levitt (2016) to identify political remittances as a political form of social remittances, since terms such as peace and democracy entail values and attitudes. For example, Bosnian and Eritrean diasporas in Europe advocate for the ideas of democracy, freedom of speech, and tolerance between different ethnic groups by working for TV, radio stations, or newspapers (Al-Ali, Black & Koser, 2001). Moreover, they are active in discussing the construction of the new Eritrean nation in a virtual space (Al-Ali et al., 2001). In this case, their experiences with suffering from violence and conflicts in their homeland contribute to the determination of political remittances. Investigating neglected aspects in diasporas' transnational engagements, both social remittances and political remittances enables analysis of other external factors influencing diasporas' transnational engagements.

3.3 Burmese Diaspora's Transnational Engagements

Burmese diaspora is motivated to go abroad due to the drivers in both political and economic grounds in Burma/Myanmar[22] (Brees, 2010). The scarce literature on the Burmese diaspora's transnational engagement may be due to the small numbers of them living abroad: Three million Burmese reside in Asian countries excluding Burma/Myanmar and two million in Thailand both inside and outside of refugee camps (Egreteau, 2012). The Burmese diaspora is involved with political, social, and financial remittances, although transnational engagements by the Burmese diaspora are often discussed in the realm of democratization of their homeland.

[22] Most of the migration entails both constraints and choices at the same time such that challenges and contests the division between economic and forced migration (Hear, 1998).

3.3.1 Political Remittances

The focus on political remittances is attributed to the conflict-affected nature of Burma/Myanmar that has induced many displaced persons, refugees or asylum-seekers. As a result of an uprising against military regimes on August 8th, 1988, increased numbers of Burmese fled overseas: Some settled in North America, Australia, Japan, and Europe, but most ethnic minorities Shan, Akha, Mon and Karen crossed the border to their neighboring country Thailand, whereas Chin and Kachin aimed for India and Rohingyas to Bangladesh (Egreteau, 2012). For the Burmese diaspora, transnational collective actions are necessary to influence their homeland from abroad, as "changing the political system in Burma is an absolute pre-requisite for their return" (Oo, 2006, p. 233). Lobbying power holders are popular among the Burmese diaspora in Bangkok and cities in the Global North including Tokyo (Banki, 2013; Oo, 2006). The Burmese diaspora in Thailand is engaged in media activism where they disseminate their information through the media "Irrawaddy" and "Mizzima" in Chiang Mai and the Karen Human Rights Group in Mae Sot (Banki, 2013).

To facilitate change from abroad, the Burmese diaspora in the Global North also gains help from the international community such as Western governments, UN agencies and international human rights advocate groups (Oo, 2006; Williams, 2012). This results in restricting the formation of their political remittances in accordance with the norms and values of international communities. For example, advocates abroad did not support the desire of ethnic minorities to become independent from Burma/Myanmar, due to the inclination of the former U.S. President Barack Obama to achieve a unified Burma (Williams, 2012). It is often the case that ethnic minorities advocate for their own social, economic, and cultural rights that aim for greater autonomy, despite Burman desire for civil and political rights which can serve as the basis for democracy (Brees,

2010). Without considering the context, activists abroad promoted gender equality in Burma/Myanmar due to its funding schemes by the U.S. and Scandinavian countries (Williams, 2012). This case of ethnic minorities highlights that their political remittances such as the idea of autonomy are hindered by values of the Global South, while financial remittances to development projects in Burma/Myanmar took a different form than desired. Williams (2012) succeeds in identifying the external forces from the Global North, since Williams (2012) interprets political remittances as values rather than the end result of the Burmese diaspora's political activities.

3.3.2 Social Remittances

Like media activism, the Burmese diaspora in Thailand also gathers and disseminates information about human rights abuses inside the country through interpersonal networks (Maclean, 2004). This is a transmission of human rights values taken as a form of social remittances. In conflict areas like Burma/Myanmar where human rights abuses are embedded in everyday practices, raising awareness of human rights abuses is necessary with the knowledge of what human rights indicate. It is reflected in journalism and photography courses in Thailand funded by the Burmese diaspora in the Thai-Burma/Myanmar borders which aim at raising awareness of human rights abuses (Brees, 2009). Notions of democracy and gender equality were also taught as positively contributing to peacebuilding (Brees, 2009). The connections between collective financial, social, and political remittances can be identified in the courses on journalism and photography. Raising awareness of human rights abuses is also a form of political remittances since it can serve as resistance to the military regime. This case partially demonstrates the characteristics of social remittances as the transmission of values and attitudes derived from the homeland, although how the context of host societies influences the formation of ideas is unclarified.

3.3.3 Collective Remittances

Karen diaspora Community Based Organizations (CBOs) in the Thai-Burma/Myanmar border financed training programs for internally displaced persons and provided humanitarian assistance to victims of cyclone Nargis which occurred in 2008 (Brees, 2010). Health-related training programs have an enormous impact on improving the medical conditions in a country like Burma/Myanmar where state-provided health care is absent (Brees, 2009). Moreover, Karen diaspora CBOs in the Thai-Burma/Myanmar border send collective remittances to aid those who are displaced in the Karen state due to the blockage by the Burmese junta on the Karen state[23] (Brees, 2010). The impact of collective financial remittances is articulated while contextualization of the rationales, their desires to their homeland, and host societies' influences are not provided.

3.3.4 Burmese Transnational Activities in Japan

Burmese political transnational engagements in Japan are well organized as compared to other countries, such as Canada or Australia where there is space for social mobility for migrants that results in devoting their time and effort to their own careers (Tanabe, 2010). Whereas in Japan, they tend to work in hospitality, manufacturing and construction as low-skilled workers which motivates them to participate in hand-made festivals or democratization movements as a means to meet other fellows and relieve their frustration in the settlement[24] (Tanabe, 2010).

[23] This thesis uses "Karen state" to follow literature rather than its official name "Kayin state" renamed by the military regime in 1989.

[24] However, like the Burmese diaspora in other countries, disparities between ethnic minorities and majority Burman remain wide. During gatherings such as Union Day on February 12th held by the Association of United Nationalities in Japan (AUN), values of ethnic autonomy and federalism are emphasized while the dominance of Burman has risen as an issue (Tanabe, 2010). AUN is a political association established in 2004 by Burmese ethnic minorities such as Chin, Kachin, Karen, and Arakan. Rohingya is not included in AUN due to the antagonism by Arakan Buddhists (Kumakiri, personal communication, September 2, 2019).

The 8888-protest held annually at the Myanmar Embassy in Tokyo operates not only to recall what happened on August 8th, 1988, but also serves to preserve their identities as Burmese (Tanabe, 2010). The water festival appears as nonpolitical in celebrating Myanmar New Years, though the main purpose of this event is to collect donations to send to an anti-government organization in the Thai-Burma/Myanmar border (Hitomi, 2007). The water festival is a good case illustrating the links between financial remittances and political remittances.

Banki (2006) claims that limited legal space in Japan causes the unexpected situation where the more the Burmese diaspora legally granted refugee status the less their transnational political acts, due to the narrative of Japanese officials to suppress their protests in exchange for refugee status. Whereas Hitomi (2007) observes that the Burmese transnational political associations in Japan are involved in both political activism and settlement assistance due to their unstable conditions stemming from the lack of legal status. This does not necessarily indicate that transnational space has diminished, but rather they play a new role in resolving settlement issues that arise due to scarce Japanese social assistance to non-citizens (Hitomi, 2007).

In the Japanese context, Burmese transnational engagements are discussed as activities that aim to influence the military regime back home, focused on political remittances. The lack of analyses in other spheres of remittances such as collective financial and social remittances can be identified. Moreover, the involvement of Japanese society in Burmese diaspora's transnational activities has not received any attention.

3.4 Transnationalism-Assimilation Nexus

3.4.1 Diasporas' Transformation in Assimilation

Up to this point, I have discussed that diasporas' ties to their homeland shape transnational engagements. On the other hand, I have also identified that their ideas of the homeland are formed by diasporic communities where their ethnicity and race are strengthened in the process of economic, social, and political integration in the host society. For many decades, migration scholars have assumed that transnationalism and assimilation[25] are incompatible. This is due to their contradictory focus: ties to the homeland in the case of transnationalism versus adaptation processes in the case of assimilation in their host communities (Waldinger, 2017). Also, of significance are the concepts' different theoretical grounds, in which transnationalism as an approach "derives from a Weberian approach focused on the experience of migrants and their behaviors", whereas integration refers to "a Durkheimian conception of society delimited by national borders" (Lacroix, 2013, p. 1,020).

However, recent scholarship in migration studies reveals that transnationalism occurs concurrently with diasporas' integration into host societies (Erdal & Oeppen, 2013; Kivisto, 2005; Lacroix, 2013; Mazzucato, 2008). Indeed, addressing development in homelands and integration in the host societies together leads to a more thorough analysis of migration (Mazzucato, 2008). For example, having a close look at diasporas' identity transformation and their transnational engagements, Lacroix (2013) proclaims that development projects back home are entwined with processes of identity transformation and of integration. Punjabis in the U.K. and Moroccan Berbers in France engage with transnational activities - such as building schools and hospitals - as well as

[25] The terms assimilation and integration are used interchangeably in this thesis to reflect the recent use of the former in examining immigrants' adaptation to and integration into their host society, although the latter is commonly differentiated from the former in Europe as a delineation occupies a middle ground between multiculturalism and assimilation (Erdal & Oeppen, 2013).

income-generating programs. Such involvements signify the re-positioning of their multiple identities with their origin community: “They assert themselves as vectors of modernity within the village, thus bridging the two sides of their identity that of emigrant and that of immigrant” (Lacroix, 2013, p. 1,028). In terms of the relationship between financing of transnational projects and kinds of integration, Punjabis’ prosperous economic integration in the U.K. requires no external support and the relationship, therefore remains informal, whereas Moroccan Berbers in France, due to their less affluent economic status, are socially integrated into French civil society in channeling their funding (Lacroix, 2013). In short, diasporas’ development projects are related to their identities transformed in the process of settlement, and the more vulnerable their economic status is, the more involvement is required with the civil society. Although this case is applicable to understand the relations between diasporas’ transnational collective engagements, identity transformation, and integration, it does not clarify how their desires and thoughts toward development projects are influenced by ideas and practices in host societies.

3.4.2 Assimilation, Whiteness and Entitlement

To explore the diasporas’ transformation, it is imperative to consider assimilation in focusing on its process of making similar. Assimilation is analytically indispensable in migration studies if it is considered as “the process of becoming similar”, absorptive, pointing to “direction of change” (Brubaker, 2001, p. 534). Waldinger (2007) argues that national boundaries are associated with loyalty and belonging, reflected in legal frameworks of rights and citizenship, and facilitating the transformation of foreigners into nationals of an ethnic kind. This is due to assimilation, which entails ethnic change manifesting as “a relational process of making sameness” between minorities and majorities, the matter of social boundaries being entangled with the politics of them and us

(Nagel, 2009, p. 401). Therefore, not only is assimilation involved with the shifting boundaries of identity in an ethnic sense, but it also entails rendering the link between race and boundary-making among groups depending on how groups embody whiteness[26].

Ong's (1996) research on civil society assistance of Southeast Asian immigrants in California, U.S. examines the association between identity formation, sovereignty adhered to whiteness, and the notion of progress facilitated by civil society. By instructing Cambodian and Laotian women in the value of their rights and needs, social workers shape the self of Cambodian and Laotian women like those in the need of improvement (Ong, 1996). The intention of the intervention is clearly to empower them and help them to get out of poverty and domestic violence because that is what normal Americans from the lower class should do (Ong, 1996). Here, forming subjectivities is associated with imprinting American norms, due to the self being shaped in the process of identifying as citizens of the U.S. It also reveals the stereotypes and blame placed upon Cambodian and Laotian migrant women for their lower wages and dependency on social welfare, while leaving white patriarchy unchallenged (Ong, 1996). The state regulates migrants' activities and identities by treating them differently depending on their social boundaries such as ethnicity, class, gender, or nationality[27]. This is a process where the self is produced through boundaries and differences of race and class that results in inequalities between migrants in the U.S. (Lamont & Molnár, 2002). As the case of Cambodians/Laotians migrant women highlights, inequalities and racialization of migrants are reinforced in comparison to the majority of white Americans, thus the

---

[26] Garner (2007) describes that whiteness has been conceptualized as unchecked domination that is normalized thus unmarked, to accumulate social capital according to norms that creates and maintains hierarchies in social relations. It also authorizes to define others.

[27] This can be described as "graduated sovereignty," a term coined by Ong (1999) describing the differentiation of citizens in employing the framework of governmentality. This categorization determines who is entitled to state treatment according to market calculations, which leads to the discrimination of citizens (Ong, 2000). This describes border control, which serves to rationalize the exclusion of unwanted immigrants via the regulation of internal boundaries through the control of citizenship and legal residency (Waldinger & Fitzgerald, 2004).

whitening processes matter in assimilation in the U.S. In Japanese society where racial distinction is not easily identified between the Japanese and the Burmese except Rohingya, the notion of Japanese-ness needs more exploration to identify the power in embodying another kind of whiteness in the process of assimilation.

3.4.3 Civil Society as Space of Improvement

The space of civil society is where undocumented immigrants or disadvantaged diasporas engage in the process of integration. It is the space of non-electoral participation such as lobbying, protesting, contacting the media, or non-profit associations (Marrow, 2005).

Akin to a case analyzed by Ong's (1996) above, Theodore and Martin (2007) identify that the role of civil society groups in Los Angeles, U.S. is to address the social, economic, and political burdens of undocumented immigrants to enhance their well-being. They engage with their clients in social service delivery while also involved with immigrant workers' rights activism, an advocacy to the state intervention in markets (Theodore & Martin, 2007). Their involvements clarify that improvement for the civil society groups indicates fulfilling the immigrants' social needs and providing protection from market exploitation.

A Dutch case illustrating a trading system where asylum-seekers and white Dutch exchange products and services via non-profit and private organizations is another case in which compassion is identified with the narrative of improvement. The trading system is aimed at generating social capital of asylum-seekers by bridging them with white Dutch, thus the system enhances the welfare of asylum-seekers (Smets & Kate, 2008). For Dutch participants, economic-oriented interests are secondary to their motivation, but the ideas of empathy, empowerment, and solidarity are their primary motivation to get involved in these activities (Smets & Kate, 2008).

The case of Cambodians/Laotian migrant women in California (Ong's, 1996) is useful to identify helpers' norms and compassionate practices in civil society that results in facilitating inequalities via enactment of whiteness. The cases of Los Angeles (Theodore & Martin, 2007) and Netherland (Smets & Kate, 2008) do not explain what it entails for the host society to help vulnerable immigrants. For the investigation of whether and how diasporas' transnational engagements are influenced by norms in host societies and helpers' compassionate practices, more focus on these factors will be beneficial.

3.5 Chapter conclusion

This chapter highlighted that development discourses merely pay attention to diasporas' financial remittances and their potential to aid their homeland population instead of the governments. Literature on the Burmese diaspora's transnational engagements is attentive to their social and political remittances from the Thai-Burma/Myanmar border while their other contexts remain scarce. I identified the involvement of Western governments and institutions in the Burmese diaspora's homeland politics although the Japanese host society context does not receive much attention. Scholars discuss that transnationalism can be examined with lens of assimilation, and I identified that norms and compassionate practices in host societies are useful to examine the influences of the host society over diasporas' transnational engagements.

CHAPTER 4.
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORKS

This chapter addresses the theoretical frameworks - governmentality and humanitarianism - that serve as the rationales to answer my research questions. In chapter 3, I described transnationalism to identify diasporas' engagements in their homeland which exceeds the national borders. Scholars of transnationalism are prone to examine national borders merely in a territorial sense, not paying much attention to sovereign power and its political effect on diasporas' transnational engagements. I follow Michel Foucault and Giorgio Agamben's exploration of governmentality discussed with biopolitics to investigate how diasporas are embedded in the political processes of assimilation in their host communities. I also identified in chapter 3 that diasporas are associated with benefactors' compassionate practices and desires for improvement in civil society. In this chapter, I provide anthropological and sociological approaches to humanitarianism to investigate how narratives of compassion and the improvement of humanity is entangled with assimilation of diasporas.

4.1 Governmentality and Biopolitics

4.1.1 Sovereignty and Michael Foucault

The notion of borders indeed signifies sovereignty or state apparatus engaged with global capitalism. The theory of realism in international politics is dominant in analyzing sovereignty as types of authority ranging from tyranny to democracy (Humphrey, 2004). However, Michel Foucault (2006) attempts to displace inquiries of sovereignty and legitimacy with that of governmentality which he refers to as various forms of authority within society exercised through

regulations, institutions, and apparatuses. States do not hold the power, but instead, sovereign legitimacy is inscribed within bodies that consequently become subjects (Humphrey, 2004).

Foucauldian biopolitics is often applied to describe population control while also deployed to explain the improvement of human conditions. People's lives and discipline are manifested as "liberal modes of governing that stress processes of self-regulation" (Baele & Lemke, 2008, p. 48). This is a process of population control that attributes the process of *producing individuality* to serve as a basis for population monitoring technology (Nilsson & Wallenstein, 2013, emphasis in original). This process of producing *individuality* links to Foucault's ideas of *subjectivity* that directs attention to the self.

Governmentality compels individuals to modern ideas of improvement and disciplines them to efficiently achieve the growth of societies (Scott, 2005). Discipline includes the configuration of individuals' desires and beliefs that shapes habits, aspirations, and motivations. Political strategies consider the population as "an object for politics, as something that can be transformed, that can be optimized, on which one can intervene, which can be used to achieve certain ends" (Baele & Lemke, 2008, p. 48). Therefore, individuals are objectified to be educated and disciplined while they must be unique and recognizable to be able to attract the relevant audience (McCormack & Salmenniemi, 2016).

According to Foucault, the government not only aims to improve the human condition but also "allow to die" (as cited in Fassin, 2001, p. 3). In other words, individuals insufficiently affirmed to the values of liberal states are risking death with a justification to do so. Therefore, there is a clear boundary between lives that are encouraged and discouraged, enacted through regulations and policies. Although it is the regulation of their bodies and actions, it does not unfold as coercive, as this is undertaken as an effort by the government to improve the overall wellbeing of the

population (Li, 2007). As described in 3.4.1, diasporas are transformed in the process of settlement in their host countries. Governmentality and biopolitics are involved with this process of diasporas' reformation while the politics of social boundaries is also at stake for their conversion (Fassin, 2011b). In other words, the boundary-making practices of lives is undertaken parallel to the enactment of inclusion and exclusion, entangled with the process of assimilation. The Burmese diaspora is subjected to governmentality to improve themselves through regulations and discipline in Japan, though how this process is associated with assimilation of the Burmese diaspora in Japan, and with which kind of governing apparatuses they are involved remain unclear.

4.1.2 Bare Life and Sacred Life

In contrast, Giorgio Agamben examines sovereignty as the system of juridical orders in which "law refers to life and includes it by suspending it" and "the relation of law to life is not application but abandonment" (1998, p. 21). This not only interprets sovereignty as being comprised of juridical orders but also links public law and the notion of life that entails rejection. States neglect certain bodies located outside of its sovereignty as merely biological entities while neglecting its political interests (Agamben, 1998).

Agamben (1998) describes this as biopolitics that separates *sacred life* from *bare life*. *Sacred life* signifies "life that may be killed but not sacrificed" (Agamben, 1998, p. 55). It is in the sovereign sphere in which "it is permitted to kill without committing homicide and without celebrating a sacrifice" in a religious ritual (Agamben, 1998, p. 55). In contrast, *bare life* denotes a life whose political aspect is stripped down such that only its physical and basic status is considered. In other words, citizens are merely the subject of physical being rather than political entities whose interests do not exceed biological needs. By so doing, "bare life remains included in politics in the

form of the exception, … as something that is included solely through an exclusion" (Agamben, 1998, p. 10). Therefore, sovereign power is exercised to include de-politicized bodies while its political interests are neglected. The exclusion of Rohingya in Tokyo described in 2.1.1 evokes this notion of inclusion of de-politicized bodies. Their participation in other Burmese transnational political activities are restricted. The ways in which Japanese norms are entangled with Rohingya's bare life, and how their bare life affects their remittances to the Burmese population back home are subjected to inquiry.

4.2 Anthropology/Sociology of Humanitarianism

4.2.1 Governed Bodies by Morality

In the previous section, I described that bare life and governing practices shape the self of populations either by reinforcing the notion of improvement or stripping down their political interests. This section provides background to contribute to the analysis of how the Burmese diaspora is subjected to Japanese benefactors' urges to help them, thus impacting their transformation.

Malkki (1996) [28] argues that Hutu refugees in the camp in Burundi are de-historized by humanitarian administration and become universal humanitarian subjects. Although they have their own ethnic histories and perceptions about the ethnic conflicts, their politicized bodies are stripped down to be merely victims of conflicts, thus decontextualized and silenced through humanitarian practices (Malkki, 1996).

The same is true for undocumented foreigners in France. Fassin (2001) claims that undocumented immigrants are required to appeal their misfortunate bodies to the French public in

[28] Although Malkki (1996) does not directly apply the notion of bare life to her examination, she clearly describes the depoliticized effect of humanitarian practices.

begging their legal entitlements, rather than the claim of their human rights. Undocumented immigrants are not only perceived as deserving of compassion but also criminalized and condemned, due to the illegality that adheres to their undocumented-ness. This signifies two sides of the same coin: the regimes of care and the regimes of surveillance and policing (Ticktin, 2011). In this fashion, suffering bodies are governed by those who aim to save and protect them, embracing bodies from the Global South in the hierarchal structure where they are placed as second citizens (Ticktin, 2011).

This is due to humanitarians' compassionate practices that intersect with the power structure clarifying the authority of givers over recipients. Throop (2012, p. 160) claims that "it is always a higher-status individual who ideally feels compassion for a lower-status individual's plight". Likewise, Berlant (2014) stresses that "compassion is a term denoting privilege: the sufferer is *over there*. You, the compassionate one, have a resource that would alleviate someone else's suffering" (p. 4, emphasis in original). It is often individuals placed in a position of authority who are entitled to express compassion for another's suffering (Throop, 2012).

To fully understand the enactment of authority on benefactors, Malkki (2015) suggests shifting our focus from the beneficiaries to the benefactors for the investigation of "the neediness of the helpers" (p. 8). Malkki (2015) provides a Finnish example of gifting "aid bunnies", knitted objects shaped as bunnies, intended to assist those in need in the Global South, but used as a means to combat Finnish social isolation by connecting the self to a larger society. Humanitarians' desires to help beneficiaries de-politicize the issues of inequality and exploitation while leaving structural issues untouched (Malkki, 2015).

The entanglements between bare life and morality are also identified as the humanitarians' evaluating practices as "politics of life" termed by Fassin (2007, p. 500). Moral judgements serve as

rationales to select who is legitimate to be saved and who is free to risk lives in emergency situations (Fassin, 2007). Saved bodies are illustrated as individuals from the Global South and risky bodies are typically the aid workers coming from the Global North, identifying the link between the legitimacy of life-saving activities and racial inequality.

Benton (2016) furthers Fassin's politics of life by arguing that white superiority serves as a basis of humanitarianism such that racial bodies are undervalued in the social hierarchal structure. In other words, valuing practices of humanitarian actions are *preconditioned* by racial inequality while bodies are dismantled to merely biological elements in humanitarian narratives (Benton, 2016). Since these de-politicized bodies are from the Global South, their victimhood is condemned by the barbaric practices of where they have originated, attributing their low level of civilization as the root cause of their victimhood (Ticktin, 2011). The racialization derives from the scarce attention paid to the political, historical, and economic inequalities between the Global North and South. It also ignores the role those in the Global North have played in reinforcing these inequalities (Ticktin, 2011).

In this section, I identified that humanitarians use the notion of compassion over human rights while they enact evaluating practices via racialization of recipients. These findings are useful in examining how Japanese benefactors address Burmese refugees and asylum-seekers, and how Japanese humanitarian practices transform the Burmese diaspora and their homeland development.

4.2.2 Moral Sentiments

Humanitarian practices identified in the previous section can be described by anthropological and sociological scholarship on humanitarianism[29]. In particular, the notion of

[29] For the definition of humanitarianism, I apply Barnett (2011, p. 10) who suggests that humanitarianism indicates "the growing organization and governance of activities designed to protect and improve humanity".

moral sentiment reveals what is highlighted on the one hand and what is overlooked on the other hand in the meaning of humanity.

Moral sentiments are a type of emotion that shows concern for the misfortune of others. Not many people would think that emotions such as compassion matter in the analyses of international development. This assumes that personal feelings are addressed in the body of knowledge or expertise of psychology, which Fassin (2011a) terms psychologization. This suggests that socio-political issues are increasingly addressed as non-political. He claims that “the social question has been turned into a moral question” that requires more philanthropical organizations rather than state institutions (Fassin, 2008, p. 335). This suggests that structural and historical issues are neglected while using morality to address socio-political issues.

4.2.3 Enlightenment and Racialization

The politics of compassion derives from the Enlightenment thinking that is shaped in the context of civilization. During colonial times, the colonizers and missionaries brought education and medical care to the colonies for the betterment of lives of the colonized (Calhoun, 2010). This is due to the Enlightenment rationality that considers only certain types of existence. That is, the Eurocentric model of the individual who is well educated and healthy as a result of improvement. In the colonial period, the colonized bodies were articulated as vectors of diseases with the rhetoric of differences as blame, which led to creating the links between unclean practices of non-white subjects and uncivilized population in the late 1900s (Greene et al., 2013; Anderson, 1995). Simultaneously, this logic by colonizers subordinated the colonized as inferior and racial others (Narayan, 1995). Colonial discourses establish hierarchal relationships between the civilized white colonizers and the primitives.

Moral sentiments and the Eurocentric rationalities derived from colonialism can be contrasted to the ethos of Japanese colonization. It will be beneficial to examine how Japanese colonizing practices link to Japanese benefactors' compassionate approaches, and how the justifications of Japanese civilization influence Burmese diaspora's transnational engagements.

4.3 Chapter Conclusion

This chapter provided the theoretical account on how identities, desires, and attitudes of the population are shaped by a sovereign power, rather than considering bodies as separate entities from the political sphere. Biopolitics de-politicize individuals to bare life in excluding illegitimate bodies such as non-citizens, the subjects of help. Benefactors aim to resolve unequal relationships with beneficiaries, although it is caught up with the narrative of improving humanity derived from Enlightenment thinking. Paying attention to benefactors' desires to help opens up a discussion on the legitimacy of benefactors. These points raised here are used for analysis in chapters 5, 7, 8 and 9.

CHAPTER 5.
ENGAGEMENT WITH JAPANESE LITERATURE

This chapter provides a critique of the Japanese literature that discusses migration and multicultural co-living (*tabunka-kyosei*) while making it available to English readers. The Japanese scholarship discusses how Japanese nationals maintain relationships with foreigners in Japan. Since scarce literature addresses the relationships between Burmese communities and their Japanese helpers in Tokyo, the discussion of migration studies in Japan is useful for this study. This chapter describes how *tabunka-kyosei* is entangled with Japanese-ness that not only resonates with national interests and border control but also migration scholarship and activism on migrant issues.

5.1 Rootedness of Contemporary Migration in Japan

5.1.1 Foreigner as *Others*

In Japan, immigrants[30] are called foreigners (*gaikoku-jin*) rather than migrants or diasporas. Not only does the state use this term but also civil society groups and scholars involved with these individuals. Those identified as belonging to other ethnicities and cultures are included as *foreigners*[31] rather than naturalized as Japanese nationals[32] (Kashiwazaki, 2013). On the one hand, this is due to the absence of national integration policies that embodies the ways in which national government addresses foreigners, not to accept foreigners as immigrants but as short-term laborers

[30] For many, the term immigrants (*imin*) still refers to those who emigrated to Hawaii and Latin America since the 1990s. In this thesis, I use the term foreigners, immigrants, migrants, and refugees interchangeably, although the term diaspora refer to the definition I discussed in chapter 1.
[31] The numbers of those who originated from different nationalities staying in Japan increased to 2637,251 in 2019 recorded as the highest, which consists of two percent of total population of Japan (Ministry of Justice, 2019).
[32] Through the legal process of naturalization, foreigners can obtain citizenship or nationality in Japan. However, it requires fulfilment of the following conditions: five years of consecutive residence, an age of twenty years or more and of full capacity according to the law of his or her native country, good moral conduct, property or ability enough to lead a financially independent life, renunciation of previous nationality, and no current or previous membership in organizations that advocate the overthrow of the Constitution or of the government of Japan (Ministry of Justice, 2008).

(Akaishi, 2018; Kondo, 2011). On the other hand, it is due to activism undertaken by *zainich* Koreans[33] who fought for Japanese entitlements while remaining as foreigners to resist assimilation[34].

5.1.2 Oldcomers and Newcomers

Japanese scholarship often separates the context of foreigners in Japan in two different contexts. *Zainichi* Koreans and Taiwanese are categorized as "oldcomers[35]" describing the context of those who arrived prior to the end of the Second World War. Those who came to Japan since the late 1970s are called "newcomers" such as the boat people who fled from the Vietnam War, *Nikkei*[36], and migrant workers from other Asian countries (Kondo, 2002). The Burmese diaspora is categorized as newcomers. Although this study directs attention to the Burmese diaspora in Japan, I also describe the context of oldcomers. The context of oldcomers is necessary to understand newcomers since the latter is rooted in the former. The rationales of both border control and civil society's management to segregate good immigrants from bad outsiders is evidenced in the treatment of both groups.

Issues surrounding oldcomers can be understood as the continued struggles from Japanese imperialism similar to the hardship that indigenous peoples Ainu from Hokkaido and the Ryukyus from Okinawa[37] endured (Izawa, 2010). For example, citizenship granted to oldcomers was

---

[33] *Zainichi* Koreans were brought to Japan from 1910 until the end of the Second World War when South Korea was under Japanese rule. Some stayed in Japan after the war while many went back by the effort of the Japanese government and the Red Cross in 1959 (Morris-Suzuki, 2007).
[34] Gradually, rights of *zainichi* Koreans were granted between the 1950s to 1980s while their employment at local governments started to be more common in the 1990s (Iwasawa, 1998).
[35] This thesis follows Japanese scholarship written in English which uses "oldcomers" to refer to *zainichi* Koreans and Taiwanese.
[36] They are decedents of those Japanese *imin* in the 1990s (De Carvalho, 2003).
[37] Those who are from Hokkaido and Okinawa used to be included as citizens of the great empire of Japan, but no longer integrated as Japanese until the central government assimilated Ainu in 1898 and incorporated the Ryukyus in

rescinded in the post-Second World War era. Categories of ethnicity, race, and heritage were given higher importance than the social reality of their residency in the process of rebuilding the country (Asakawa, 2013). Importantly, this was undertaken simultaneously as the establishment of the Migration Control Ordinance[38] that segregated *good* foreigners, that of skilled migrants, from *bad* outsiders, that of communist activists in the eyes of Americans (Morris-Suzuki, 2005). Government attention to newcomers tends to be associated with labor shortages and international relations including acceptance of refugees. The attention to newcomers led to promote *kokusaika*, Japan's internationalization in the late 1980s, and multicultural co-living, *tabunka-kyosei*[39], in the 2000s. The relationships between Burmese communities and their Japanese helpers can be understood in the narrative of *tabunka-kyosei*.

5.2 Governing Apparatuses: Border Control, *Tabunka-kyosei*, and Japanese Activists

5.2.1 Politics of Border Control

To understand how the state manages foreigners through discipline and regulations, and how it links to *tabunka-kyosei,* it is beneficial to trace the history of the Immigration Control and Refugee Recognition Act (ICRRA). Since Japan joined the Refugee Convention in 1981, the Migration Control Ordinance was renamed ICRRA[40].

1879 (Lu, Menju & Williams, 2005). They not only faced cultural assimilation but also exploitation from forced labor (Lummis, Kan & Kayano, 2009).

[38] The Migration Control Ordinance was the former act to regulate border control. It has been renamed as the Immigration Control and Refugee Recognition Act, though not much has been changed (Morris-Suzuki, 2005). An in-depth description follows in 5.2.1.

[39] *Tabunka-kyosei* is interpreted as either multicultural co-living, multicultural coexistence, or multicultural living-together depending on the author. Kondo (2015) argues that the term is closer to intercultural policy than multiculturalism in its meaning, although the direct translation is multicultural living-together.

[40] The ICRRA had three major iterations: the 52 regimes, the 82 regimes and the 90 regimes (Kondo, 2015). The numbers reflect years when they were enacted.

The earliest version[41] was composed under the influence of the U.S. immigration bureau in 1951 that served as a foundation of the ICRRA. It was the time when Japan relinquished their colonies while the U.S. General Headquarters (GHQ) led reconstruction of the nation, and the ICRRA was a political product of the Cold War. The border control system was derived from the threat of socialism, which welcomed highly skilled labor but prohibited the entry of *destructive communists* affected by the representation of those *zainichi* Koreans who were regarded communists (Morris-Suzuki, 2005). The basic ideas of Japan's immigration control have not changed since then. ICRRA is often considered as the root cause of issues with undocumented immigrants in Japan today (Morris-Suzuki, 2005).

The 82 regimes opened the door to those refugees who fled the Vietnam War. It also facilitated the narrative of *kokusaika* and the debate of whether to unfasten strict migration control (Kondo, 2015). A labor shortage was caused as a result of Japan's bubble economy in the 1980s which attracted foreign workers, leading to the large inflow of *Nikkei* and Asian workers in the 1990s and 2000s (Yamanaka, 1993).

Three loopholes can be identified in the 90 regimes: the front door to *Nikkei* manifested as unrestricted access, the side door to cheap labors from Asia embodied as trainees' visas, and backdoors to undocumented foreigners (Kondo, 2015). Burmese communities in Tokyo, which grew at the end of the 1980s as described in 2.1.1, are also included in this space. The estimated numbers of over-stayers decreased from between 100,000 to 300,000 in the early 1990s to 60,000 in 2014 due to the crackdown on undocumented residents (Kondo, 2015).

As can be seen, the history of the ICRRA illustrates its preoccupation merely with border control (Morris-Suzuki, 2005). It also enables an examination of the politics of boundary-making

[41] This is called the 52 regimes.

that were enacted via border control: The 52 regimes resulted in the exclusion of oldcomers, the 82 regimes facilitated the narratives of internationalization and the 90 regimes met halfway the desire for cheap labor and the obsession for border control.

5.2.2 From *Kokusaika* to *Tabunka-kyosei*

Together with border control, *kokusaika* and *tabunka-kyosei* also serves as a governing apparatus. *Kokusaika* aimed at exposing Japanese nationals to foreign influence while inviting foreign workers and international students to gain international competitiveness (Hara, 2010). Yet, the ultimate objective of *kokusaika* was to promote national interests, and it also strengthened homogenization of Japanese-ness (Iwabuchi, 1994). I argue that although the narrative *kokusaika* was transformed to *tabunka-kyosei*, the underpinning logic has not changed. Newcomers are imagined as *gaikoku-jin*, a homogenized group comprised of foreign nationals by the national and local governments (Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications, 2006). Moreover, Kashiwazaki (2013) claims that *tabunka-kyosei* is based on ethnocultural homogeneity among Japanese while essentializing foreigners. It is akin to the claim by Iwabuchi (1994) described above. Therefore, *tabunka-kyosei* inherited the ideology from *kokusaika*, in maintaining national interests.

The distinction between these narratives is that *tabunka-kyosei* links migration to reproduction and settlement (Suzuki, 2014). As such, it is not a coincidence that *tabunka-kyosei* emerged simultaneously as the population has declined since 2005[42]. This point also reveals national interests in which *tabunka-kyosei* facilitates; to foster *good* foreign population or integrate good outsiders for national growth. Therefore, the notion of *tabunka-kyosei* justifies the rationale by

[42] Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communication (2006) created a model plan for the promotion of *tabunka-kyosei* in 2006.

the Immigration Bureau to segregate good immigrants from bad foreigners in border control (Akashi, 2018; Hara, 2010).

5.2.3 The Japanese/foreigner Binary

The narrative of *tabunka-kyosei* is constructed on Japanese privilege based on the homogenized notion of "Japanese" and "foreigners." *Others* are rendered visible in the unmarked Japanese dominance (Takezawa, 2009). Yet, scholars also essentialize Japanese and foreigners in a nationalistic gaze. For example, Shiobara (2011) frames the issues of social exclusion and poverty in Japan as deprivation of social capital of minorities, thereby suggests enriching transnational social capital to combat issues with undocumented immigrants. Yet, it merely reproduces the essentialized dichotomy in *tabunka-kyosei*, majority/minority binary. By doing so, Shiobara (2011) neglects undocumented-ness and discussion of how rights of both citizens and non-citizens are demanded.

The Japanese/foreigner binary is rooted in the *zainichi* Korean activism. *Zainichi* Koreans desired to maintain their identities as Koreans such that have campaigned to regain their Japanese citizenship rights while rejecting naturalization to Japan (Chung, 2010). Since then, the Japanese/foreigner binary has served as a mean to resist outsiders' assimilation to Japanese culture (Takaya, 2017). Yet, this othering process does not contribute to resolving the structural issues between Japanese and foreigners (Hara, 2010; Takaya, 2017).

The notion of Japanese-ness to essentialize Japanese as one ethnicity derives from history. Japanese ethnocentrism was achieved via the interpretation of Japan as an island that contains one single ethnicity who can only be the citizens of Japan (Oguma, 1995). This myth of Japanese ethnic homogeneity is formed and consolidated in the search for an identity from the loss of the Second

World War (Lummis, Kan & Kayano, 2009). It was undertaken as the state's attempt to legitimize the Japanese ways of thinking and behaving in the context of resisting the occupation by the U.S. (Lummis et al., 2009). Indeed, the construction of the binary relationship between Japanese and others coincided with the process of state rebuilding in the postwar period.

Japanese migration literature addresses outsiders as a homogenized category. Therefore, the influence of governing apparatus of *tabunka-kyosei* together with Japanese-ness on the Burmese diaspora is unclarified.

5.2.4 Boundary Making Processes by Japanese Activists

Civil society groups[43], heavily represented by Japanese activists, have been working for migrant related issues since the 1980s (Befu, 2009). In particular, they have advocated the term *tabunka-kyosei* in seeking foreign minorities' rights while achieving dialogue between Japanese and ethnic minorities (Akashi, 2018; Shiobara, 2010). They register as NPOs[44], while some remain unincorporated as NGOs[45] due to their ideologies and strong resistance to the government (Shipper, 2006). Japanese groups registered as NPOs have played a role in representing the voices of unauthorized immigrants by gaining partnerships with local governments, while also withdrawing financial support to undertake migrant support projects (Shipper, 2010; Yamamoto, 2007).

Those who remain as NGOs tend to aim for legalizing undocumented foreigners via applying for *zairyu-kyoka* (special residence permission). Although this is usually practiced by the

[43] Civil society groups diverge from faith-based organizations, community workers' unions, women's support groups, medical NGOs, lawyer's association NGOs, and concerned citizens groups (Shipper, 2006).
[44] NPOs are registered under the "law to promote specified non-profit activities" commonly referred as the NPO law enacted in 1998. They are able to apply for state funding and occasionally have a contract with governments (Befu, 2009).
[45] NGOs in Japan are unregistered and out of reach of the state in terms of its purposes and organizations (Befu, 2009).

state[46], the practice undertaken by civil society groups resembles the justification identified in border control. For example, one of the groups achieved this permission to 21 over-stayers in 1999, supported by academics who organized symposiums, media activism and petitions (Yoshinari, 2007). Although it was a success, this was undertaken via the careful selection of undocumented foreigners between those who were dedicated and no records of forced evacuation (Yoshinari, 2007). This is due to the legalization not pursued as right but the blessing from authority, in which the determination is inevitably based on the Japanese ethics and norms (Takaya, 2017). Therefore, social boundary-making practices of inclusion and exclusion are enacted as segregation justified by Japanese norms.

Japanese activism is prone to assist undocumented foreigners. Therefore, literature on Japanese benefactors assisting newcomers does not address documented immigrants. The Burmese diaspora includes both documented and undocumented members of the Burmese population. As such, the rationales for Japanese benefactors to help the Burmese diaspora may differ from what has been discussed.

5.2.5 Japanese Activists and Japanese-ness

In the narrative of improvement, unprivileged immigrants are understood as the ones to provide lessons learned for Japanese citizens to alter the exploitative system of the country. For example, when Kurdish asylum-seekers organized a 72-day sit-in in front of the UNHCR in 2004,

[46] The Immigration Bureau justifies the selection of good immigrants and the rejection of bad foreigners via border control. Another good example lies on the third country settlement project, where those Karen refugees who assimilated like Japanese were rewarded as *good* refugees (Kubo, 2014). Due to a rigid independent personhood that refugees are moulded into, the government scheme regards those who are out of social welfare and capable of contributing to national productivity in urban settings as beneficial (Kubo, 2014).

Japanese benefactors articulated their nationalistic views and entitlement on the issue of undocumented-ness: “Only Japanese can change Japan” (Shindo, 2009, p. 228).

Moreover, Japanese activists persuaded Kurdish asylum-seekers to stop their demonstration, by pointing out their poor strategy to sit in front of the UNHCR office while expressing compassion towards them (Shindo, 2009). Japanese helpers believed that it would impede them from receiving better treatment by the state while generating the risk of longer detention (Shindo, 2009). They follow the Japanese norm to avoid confrontation with authority while proceeding through peaceful dialogues (Shindo, 2009). This unintentionally sustains national interests by discouraging refugees from demanding their rights.

The nation-wide advocacy group for immigrants utilizes the foreigner category as a collective identity along with *tabunka-kyosei*. This is due to the view that the foreigner category enables an alliance among various migrant groups while also proving useful for demanding the rights of non-citizens (Kashiawazaki, 2013). As a result, advocacy not only produces the Japanese/foreigner binary, it also insufficiently brings the issue of jus sanguinis[47] to the table while overlooking the root cause of undocumented-ness or stateless-ness (Kashiwazaki, 2013).

Japanese scholars reveal negative connotations attached to the Japanese/foreigner binary. It needs attention in how Japanese helpers address Japanese-ness to Burmese diaspora.

5.3 Chapter conclusion

This chapter has shown that the Japanese literature tends to address the contexts of oldcomers and newcomers separately although I examine the two contexts together as a continuous trajectory that should be understood as part of Japan’s larger postcolonial context. Similar to the

[47] The term jus sanguinis is used frequently by scholars who focus on citizenship issues. In countries where nationality law employs the principle of jus sanguinis, a child’s citizenship is determined by that of his or her parents.

ways in which oldcomers, Ainu, and Ryukyus were disfranchised by the empire of great Japan, the government employs its rationales of border control to newcomers, excluding undocumented or unskilled foreigners. The Japanese/foreigner binary is used for resisting assimilation in *tabunka-kyosei*, though the structural issues between Japanese and *others* and undocumented-ness rarely receives attention due to the national sentiments *tabunka-kyosei* reinforces. Japanese benefactors' evaluating practices are entangled with this national interest to either accuse undocumented foreigners by not embodying sufficient Japanese-ness or helping good outsiders in obtaining *zairyu-kyoka* to integrate into Japanese society.

CHAPTER 6.
RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODS

This chapter discusses the methodological framework and the analytical framework employed in this thesis. A description of the actual processes that I went through in acquiring data in the field as well as the procedures in the analysis will follow.

6.1 Methodological Approach

6.1.1 Epistemology

The interests of this thesis rest on the exploration of the meanings that both Burmese and Japanese participants employ in their engagements either in transnational development activities or in their relationship-building. This is constructionist epistemology that considers the meanings and perceptions as constructed rather than uncovered as truths (Crotty, 1998). This epistemology aligns with the anthropological view that "processes, people, problems, and places are culturally imagined and socially produced" (Holland & Leander, 2004, p. 130). Anthropologists use qualitative methods such as ethnography to offer complex textual descriptions while identifying intangible components of social reality such as social norms or power structures (Mack et al., 2005). This thesis employs the ethnographic data collection methods of participant observation and semi-structured in-depth interviews in answering research questions.

6.1.2 Data Collection

Participant observation is a process where researchers are immersed in a social context in which participants are involved in learning about the particular events and situations from the perspective of the participants. In the process of engaging with subjects, ethnographers uncover

"what goes on, who or what is involved, when and where things happen, how they occur, and why things happen" (Jorgensen, 1989, p. 2). By doing so, researchers intellectualize things seen and heard from the participants' viewpoint while authorizing themselves to interpret the subjects' point of view (Bernard, 2017). Ethnographers need to be aware of their positionalities in respecting participants as *cultural others,* to take into account participants' agencies in knowledge creation (Holland & Leander, 2004).

Participant observation is remarkable for the examination of sociocultural contexts of patterns, relationships, and the organization of people and events (Jorgensen, 1989). Traits of participant observation allow fieldworkers to obtain in-depth insight and nuanced understanding of the study population (Kvale, 2007). Consequently, researchers understand the terms and interpretations used in certain contexts (Marshall & Rossman, 2016). Moreover, it contributes not only to interpret data collected via other methods such as interviews but also help form interview questions to elicit proper answers that better reflect the interviewers' views (Mack et al., 2005). Participant observation can also be used in the recruitment and selection of subjects, as it contributes to rapport-building in allowing for potential participants to become familiar with the researcher (Bernard, 2017).

Distance between the researched and the researcher is identified as an issue to be addressed. The negotiation of the distance between both parties is discussed in the realm of rapport-building, a process of building relationships of trust between researchers and participants. Its importance is often underlined in ethnographies to ensure methodological rigor that determines the quality of data (Bernard, 2017). However, the issue is how to balance the distance of *too close* and *too far*, as the best data often "come at the expense of participants revealing something deeply personal about themselves" (Guillemin & Heggen, 2009, p. 292). The rapport-relationship is compared to

friendship, though in rapport-relationships participants trust researchers to inform their honest feelings and beliefs, while they also trust that researchers will do them no harm (Glesne, 1989). In this regard, rapport-building merges into the sphere of ethics.

Interviews seek to acquire the narratives of the participants' lived world towards certain phenomena through their own interpretation (Kvale, 2007). However, interviews need to be understood as reality constructing processes rather than reality per se (Yao et al., 2003). Interviews are regarded as types of formal conversations with a clear power imbalance between the researcher and the subject (Kvale, 2007). Nevertheless, in-depth interviews allow flexibility between the researcher and the researched (Legard et al., 2003). This is due to the openness of in-depth interviews: The direction of the conversation is not restricted to predetermine yes-no questions but rather based on a set of open-ended questions. It allows space for the participants to deepen a specific theme when needed, for the breadth and depth of interviewees' perceptions (Bernard, 2017). This also enables the balancing act between interviewer and the interviewee: The former is considered as a student and the latter as an expert to counterbalance the power of the researcher (Mack et al., 2005).

6.1.3 Ethical Considerations

My ethical approval was gained at the University of Auckland Human Participants Ethics Committee in minimizing ethical issues that may be caused in the research process. I prepared the Participant Information Sheet (PIS)[48] written in both Japanese and Burmese to seek the participants' understanding of the purpose of the research. Informed consent[49] was sought before the interviews to ensure that the decision to participate was voluntary.

[48] The PIS can be found in Appendix 3.
[49] Participant consent form can be found in Appendix 4.

In the PIS, I described that participants were not required to respond to any questions that they did not wish to answer. I also informed them about the termination of interviews upon request as well as their right to withdraw from the research at any time. Six years of data storage and the security of the data are explained. Assuring confidentiality is also described in the PIS, although I explained that anonymity is technically impossible to protect in qualitative research since their gender, age, and ethnicity may be used in analysis. I sought their pseudonyms before the interviews to protect participants from potential risk. All participants except two Japanese and one Burmese participants opted to be analyzed using their own names. The interviews were conducted using English with two Burmese participants. Japanese language was used with the other eight Burmese participants. Their interview extracts are translated to English by the author. To avoid any misinterpretation of their narratives and beliefs, editing of the transcript is offered as an option. Receiving research findings is also optional for those who are interested in others' involvements.

The power relationship was not evident between me and the participants since most of them are male, older with more life experience, and established careers. Also, most of them have resident status. My positionality as a masters' student also helped to find adequate power balances with the participants. The geopolitical relationship of the researcher as a visiting Japanese who resides in New Zealand and the interviewees as Burmese living in Japan did not adversely influence our relationships but instead motivated some to participate in the research.

6.1.4 Data Analysis

Due to my constructionist theoretical perspective and the qualitative data, thematic analysis is employed in analyzing the data. It is a process of exploring the patterns of meaning emerging from the data via a coding process (Ezzy, 2002). This method is "a way of identifying what is

common to the way a topic is talked or written about and of making sense of those commonalities" (Braun & Clarke, 2012, p. 57). It is well suited to my constructionist theoretical perspective, since thematic analysis clarifies researchers' perspectives and agencies in determining themes as part of the reality constructing processes (Braun & Clarke, 2006). In this regard, it is analyst-driven while considering the analysts' positionalities, assumptions, and interests rather than placing themselves outside of the process in forming themes.

The development of a codebook is useful in identifying themes in assigning the text into categories, patterns, and associations in the observed meaning (Guest, MacQueen, & Namey, 2011). In developing codes, approaches differ from an inductive rather than a deductive approach. This thesis takes the former referring to "a bottom-up approach driven by what is in the data" (Braun & Clarke, 2012, p. 58). In identifying themes, the organization of data is a conceptual matter rather than technical one that does not have concrete rules, although finding commonality, differences, and relationships between data are beneficial (Gibson & Brown, 2009). Braun and Clarke (2006) suggest six steps in carrying out analysis: (a) familiarizing yourself, (b) developing initial codes, (c) looking for themes, (d) evaluating themes, (e) defining themes, and (f) writing the report.

6.2 Fieldwork

6.2.1 Prior to the Fieldwork

Before returning to Japan, I visited Burma/Myanmar for three weeks to understand the Burma/Myanmar context. I conversed with the staff of a Japanese NGO based in Shan State. Together with my Burmese friend from Auckland, I devoted myself to temple-associated volunteer work, a part of culture in Burma/Myanmar. I also socialized with Burmese individuals who currently reside in New Zealand via Sunday visits to a Buddhist temple in Auckland.

6.2.2 Procedures: the Initial Stage

I was in the field for 12 months from October 2018 to September 2019. I worked part-time while raising my daughter and doing my fieldwork. It was the second visit since I last went back in 2015 that brought me a fresh view of Japan, almost as a foreigner rather than a Japanese. In particular, I previously only spent two years from 2007 to 2009 working in Tokyo, while I spent the rest of my life between Okinawa[50] and New Zealand. Indeed, the foreign view was not new to me. What is mentioned in my field notes about Japan is the rigid rule-bounded practices in public spaces that entailed much documentation, particularly at the beginning of residence in Tokyo. The feeling of surveillance among people to regulate each other in the context of "politeness" is also acknowledged in my field notes: transgressing personal space, refraining from talking to strangers, staying quiet on trains with emphasis placed on parents with children, and not helping others for the sake of "respecting their autonomy".

Before I entered the field, I had no contacts in Japan that could have been an asset to my research. I first contacted a Japanese anthropologist Chika Watanabe in Manchester whose expertise was Japanese aid in Burma/Myanmar. She kindly introduced me to the Japanese aid worker T in Shan state. T visited Tokyo in October and asked me if I could come to see the movie *Passage of Life* (Fujimoto, 2017), a story of a Burmese undocumented family in Japan that premiered during my fieldwork. At the theatre, she introduced me to the producer of the movie whom I exchanged contacts with to ask whether he knew about any social events that were happening related to the movie. Fortunately, he informed me of a movie-related event in which many Japanese gatekeepers

[50] Okinawa used to be a kingdom separated from Japan, and also part of the U.S. in the post Second World War era until its reversion to Japan in 1971.

were concentrated. As a result, it opened the door to building social networks that were essential for my fieldwork.

I carried around my business cards everywhere I went. It is a necessary tool for building social networks in any social scene in Japan. It was useful to introduce my unique positioning as a Japanese master's student who resides in New Zealand. I printed 100 business cards at the beginning, and 100 exchanged business cards are left with me at the end of my fieldwork. This speaks to how much attention I paid to meet people and building social networks.

6.2.3 Procedures: the Second Stage

Forming a social network was a learning process for me. There is very little written about the Burmese population in Japan that I could obtain via web pages before I arrived, as most of the Japanese books are printed as hard copies. Therefore, I had scarce knowledge about the context. I asked some of the gatekeepers that I met at the movie-related event to inform me of any upcoming assemblies, parties or study groups associated with Burmese culture, Buddhism, refugee issues/statelessness, and immigration, of which I attended as many as possible. For example, I participated in a talk event held by the Stateless Network that shared life experiences of the first and second generation of Kachin Burmese ethnic minority in Japan (Stateless Network, 2018). These events served as the entry to the field.

Through participating in these events, I became acquainted with the people and the context of both Burmese and Japanese potential participants. However, I could only meet Japanese who were also interested in similar topics. The only place I met many Burmese individuals was group-hangouts via a temple network in Tokyo. My daughter and I participated in a large Buddhist gathering and yoga lessons operated in the Burmese language. Bringing a child to these events was

well received by the Burmese Buddhists. I eventually found out that their criteria are not met as the study population[51], yet it was a good opportunity to learn about the Burmese context in Japan.

6.2.4 Procedures: the Final Stage

My social network contributed to identifying the study population and the sites that they gather around *little Yangon* in Takada-no-baba, Tokyo: the Burmese restaurant G[52], the Japan Myanmar Culture Center (JMCC), Overseas Karen Organization in Japan (OKO-Japan), and Burma's Refugees Service Association (BRSA). I also identified the Burmese Rohingya Association in Japan (BRAJ) as another site to meet the study population. It is located in Tatebayashi, Ibaragi, two hours by train from Takada-no-baba, in which a large number of Rohingya Muslims inhabit. They live separately from other Burmese including ethnic minorities.

Although I became acquainted with these organizations, I was never a full participant of any specific groups. As ways of expressing my desire to be involved, I not only showed my interests in their activities by attending their meetings or events they organized but also paid the initiation fees and sponsorship fees to support their projects. The insider perspectives by belonging to a group were considered beneficial, although I moved between groups while distancing myself as an outsider, based on learning experiences of boundary-making practices by Burmese groups: Heavy involvement with one Burmese group meant to lose the chances of establishing relationships with other Burmese groups. Japanese supporters are aligned with their Burmese friends and each Burmese group is clearly divided from another mainly determined by their ethnicity. One time, I encountered an issue where I introduced myself to a Japanese lady L who belongs to a Shan group. I

---

[51] Burmese Buddhists were not engaged with transnational activities formed as homeland development projects in Burma/Myanmar.

[52] Restaurant G is owned by a Burmese participant Soe where the movie-related event mentioned earlier was held. G holds a space for the Sunday Japanese language program O in which I participated twice.

brought up the name of a Burman man S as a friend of mine. I felt a distance from her and later found that the Burman male S had some issues with the Shan group. The Japanese female L has never been friendly to me since then. A Japanese person I met at a social gathering told me: "What is important for Burmese is the social network they have, not a sense of community". I considered this way of group formation as an opportunity to ensure the diversity of participants.

6.2.5 Participant Recruitment

I conducted 19 interviews in total: 10 Burmese participants, and nine Japanese participants. I met 12 participants including both Burmese and Japanese via events and meetings organized by the groups mentioned in 6.2.3 and 6.3.4. Seven participants were recruited using the snowball method[53].

Burmese participants were identified as the study population when I learned that they have engaged in transnational activities manifested as homeland development projects[54]. Burmese diaspora's transnational political activities in Japan embodied as protests against the military junta have already been examined by Hitomi (2007). Therefore, this thesis addresses other transnational activities undertaken by the Burmese diaspora, although political remittances sent by the Burmese diaspora is also included in the analysis if the Burmese participants send other kinds of remittances along with their political remittances.

Japanese participants are identified as those who help or are involved with these Burmese participants. Therefore, I first conducted interviews with Burmese participants and then recruited Japanese participants who were engaged with these Burmese participants.

[53] Two Japanese participants were introduced by the Burmese participants, and five Burmese participants were introduced by the Japanese participants and gatekeepers.
[54] It is linked to the definition of diaspora I utilize in 1.2.

I aimed to reflect the diversity of the study population by recruiting participants with different social backgrounds in their ethnicity, gender, and age. The breadth of Burmese ethnic diversity is apparent, the participants diversified from majority Burman to include ethnic minorities such as Chin, Shan, Karen, and Rohingya. The coverage of their ages is also ensured, as they range in age from thirty to seventy years old. However, males are overrepresented in both the Burmese and Japanese study populations where only four females participated. This may be due to patriarchy among Burmese participants, and Burmese male participants who associate with Japanese male partners.

At the initial stage of the fieldwork, I failed to build a connection with a gatekeeper of an ethnic group comprised of many refugees. This derived from my misunderstanding about how majority-Japanese are perceived by ethnic minorities. For this gatekeeper, I looked as if I was entitled to ask for her help due to my positionality as Japanese. The impression may be attributed not only to my lack of rapport-building but also insufficient understanding of her context of research fatigue, constantly asked for permission to study her group. It was an insight that taught me to earn their trust and knowledge about their context before talking about my research.

On the other hand, rapport-building was much easier with Japanese gatekeepers. One of them introduced me to a couple of Burmese participants when she became interested in my research topic. The fact that I am also a Japanese mother contributed to our bonding as mothers.

Towards the end of my fieldwork, I had a sense of achievement as a researcher. In the beginning, one Burmese participant had distrust of me, though later he became friendly and began to show his trust at the end of my fieldwork. He revealed that his distrust was overcome as I started to be involved with other members of the study population. His rationale was that if others can trust

me so could he. He praised my efforts to conduct interviews with both Burmese and Japanese gatekeepers to learn about Burma/Myanmar[55].

6.2.6 Situating the Self as a Researcher

Although I am a citizen of Japan and describe myself as Japanese in this thesis, I do not identify myself as Japanese but Okinawan. This is not only due to my attachment to the place in which I was born and raised, but also I have been identified as Okinawan by other Japanese individuals and institutions. I was chosen to study abroad for a year at a high school in Minnesota, U.S. sponsored by the government[56] where I practiced my English. I also gained my first employment in Tokyo due to my Okinawan ancestry[57], and it was where I first experienced racial discrimination by Japanese peers. This stems from the perception towards Okinawa/Okinawans as a place/people that need improvement derived from its history, cultural distinction, and racialization. Therefore, I also identify myself as a minority who has experienced a form of assimilation into Japan. My positioning as Okinawan may have improved my access to research participants and rapport-building, as I often introduced myself to participants as Okinawan rather than Japanese. Some participants knew the political context of Okinawa and showed some empathy, but some did not, though most of them seem to understand that I am not positioned as a majority.

6.3 Analytical Processes

[55] He was willing to let me use one of the rooms that they use for their activities to conduct my interviews. I brought participants more than once. It was a perfect place for interviews not only because people knew the location but also it was very quiet.

[56] It is the national scholarship established by Keizo Obuchi who was the secretary of the Okinawan Development Agency from 1979 to 1980.

[57] The president of the company had a specific connection to and concerns about Okinawa. He always regarded me not as Yuko Nagamine but a lady from Okinawa.

After I came back to New Zealand, I first transcribed the interviews and developed codes. In the process of identifying the themes, I searched for similarities and differences in the codes that correspond to my three research questions. In analyzing themes, I aimed at drawing some insights by employing the theoretical frameworks that I introduced in chapter 4. I also explored themes associated with my findings in the Japanese literature examined in chapter 5 to yield the discussions that follow in chapters 7 and 8, and the implications of my research findings in chapter 9.

CHAPTER 7.
RESEARCH FINDINGS AND ANALYSIS

This chapter responds to my research questions posed at the outset of this study. Each section corresponds to research questions 1, 2, and 3.

1. *What are the transnational engagements that Burmese diaspora communities and individuals in Japan undertake to develop their homeland?*
2. *In what ways do Japanese host communities and partners perceive and get involved in the Burmese diaspora's transnational engagements?*
3. *How and to what extent, if at all, do the norms and compassionate practices of Japanese civil society impact the formation of Burmese diaspora's homeland development?*

In the first section, I describe nine Burmese transnational engagements in Japan, which fall into the categories of remittances: financial, political, or social. Eight Burmese belong to groups[58] and two Burmese are individually engaged with their homeland. The second portion explores the motivation of the Japanese individuals who participate in Burmese diaspora's transnational activities, having a close look at the notion of change and their compassionate practices. Data is acquired from nine Japanese participants who are involved with five Burmese initiated organizations BRAJ, BRS, JMCC, MJBE, and OKO-Japan. Finally, the third section investigates whether Burmese ideas of homeland development have shifted owing to the life experiences and norms in Japan or involvements with their Japanese partners, while considering the relationships between the Burmese diaspora and Japanese participants.

[58] Two Burmans belong to BRSA. Therefore, this thesis describes nine transnational engagements although I conducted interviews with 10 Burmese participants.

7.1 Burmese Diaspora's Transnational Engagements

7.1.1 Collective Financial Remittances

Six Burmese groups are involved with collective financial remittances[59], in which three merely remit financial assistance to their homeland. Heymar, a female Buddhist Burman with a permanent visa and 24 years of living experience in Japan, a head of the Japan Myanmar Culture Center (JMCC), has remitted financial assistance to her motherland since she and her husband Ochiai established JMCC in 2002. Ochiai is a former high school teacher involved with Burma/Myanmar since 1994. Ochiai provides not only teaching advice to Heymar but also logistical support to actualize what she wishes to accomplish via JMCC. JMCC is not an association focused on financial remittances to Burma/Myanmar, but rather concentrates on introducing Burmese culture to Japanese people. However, Heymar reveals that Cyclone Nargis was the starting point of their collective financial remittances (personal communication, March 29, 2019). From 2008 to 2009, JMCC visited Ayeyarwady delta, the affected area of Cyclone Nargis[60] which occurred in May 2008 and assisted survivors in procuring daily necessities by donations collected in Japan, a total of 25,420 USD (JMCC, 2019). In 2018, JMCC's donation went to an orphanage and a facility for the visually impaired in Meiktila for 200,000 kyat, around 130 USD (JMCC, 2019). Between 2003 and 2005, JMCC provided around 2,100 USD[61] to a volunteer association H, established by a Buddhist monk in Meiktila, Heymar's hometown. H is where Heymar learned not only English and Japanese but also took on the philosophy of her mentor. Therefore, H is a parent organization of the

[59] Although participants used kyat, US dollars and yen to describe how much money they received or remitted, I use USD to help readers to easily grasp the amount of money. When they describe in yen, I calculate 100 yen to 0.9 USD, and when they explain in kyat, I write in both kyat and USD with the calculation of 1 USD to 1,500 kyat.
[60] Cyclone Nargis hit the south of the country over two days, and more than 2.4 million people and a total of 37 townships were affected (IFRC, 2011).
[61] The donation was collected in a charity concert of May Sweet, a famous female Burmese singer, held in Tokyo in February 2003 where Heymar was one of the concerts' executive committee members.

JMCC. Since January 2019, JMCC has started a two-year scholarship program[62] directed to support T, a female high school student in her 10th grade[63] with financial difficulties. JMCC asked K[64] to choose someone who is raised by a single parent while also achieving higher standards at school and aspires to continue studying to make their dreams come true (Ochiai, personal communication, September 13, 2019). The scholarship is handed to K every six months when JMCC visits Burma/Myanmar. Kameyama, one of the Japanese participants, engages in JMCC's scholarship program and has visited the student T once in August 2019. He is a self-financed photographer who has visited and focused on Burma/Myanmar since 2005. Kameyama receives Burmese language lessons at JMCC once a week and perceives JMCC as a point of contact for the Burmese community in Tokyo.

Kon, a female Christian Chin in her forties with *zairyu-kyoka* staying in Japan since 1991, is a member of the Zomi Christian Church in Japan (ZCC). The Zomi[65] Christian group is comprised of 90 Christians and engaged with collective financial remittances through the church network. Since 2000, ZCC has been involved with irregular collective financial assistance to respond to natural disasters (e.g. Cyclone Nargis) through the church network. ZCC remitted 2,700 USD to disaster-affected areas in Chin state. A church-affiliated youth group shipped 100 kilos of used clothes to her local churches twice in 2015. Every month, ZCC sends financial remittances to three locations: a local Zomi church, a church-run orphanage in Yangon, and Zomi medical university students. ZCC financially supports a local Zomi church to enhance their missionary work in places

[62] JMCC notified their plan on starting a scholarship program at the annual presentation day in December 2018. Seven Japanese donors including the author participate in the program that collects 24,000 yen, around 200 USD per person over two years.
[63] In Burma/Myanmar, the education system is based on the UK system. In March, at the end of 10th grade, students take the University Entrance Examination, in which the scores of the exam determine which course students are entitled to be enrolled. Medical schools demand the highest exam scores (Kirkpatrick & Hlaing, 2013).
[64] K also learned at the volunteer association H. He now has his own temple school in Meiktila.
[65] Chin people shape different identities with their own distinct languages deriving different tribes: Asho, Cho, Khuami, Laimi, Mizo and Zomi (Sakhong, 2003).

where few religious activities are undertaken. ZCC sends about 540 USD per month to an orphanage in Yangon. The church-affiliated women's group provides a monthly scholarship to a Zomi medical student for 230 USD. Regarding the Japanese involvement, Kon used to gain help from Kumakiri though he is not involved with their transnational engagements. At present, ZCC only has a contact with a Japanese Church who rents ZCC one of their rooms and sponsors the Zomi pastor with a Religious Activities Visa. They do not also engage in ZCC's transnational practices.

Shin and Lar, male and female Burmese Buddhists in their fifties belong to Burma's Refugee Serving Association in Japan (BRSA). Shin has lived in Japan for 28 years and is now on provisional release, and Lar holds a resident visa and has inhabited Japan since 2006. BRSA was established in March 2008 by some Japanese, including Kumakiri, and Burmese asylum-seekers who met through issues surrounding detention[66]. BRSA employs the slogan "Burmese asylum-seekers and Japanese together build a safety net for democratization" and aids Burmese asylum-seekers. In October 2012, BRSA passed a resolution to initiate "support projects in Burma" to facilitate Burma's democratization and peace-building, although they have undertaken some support to their homeland since the beginning (e.g. donation of 8,000 USD to Cyclone Nargis) (BRSA, 2013). The projects demonstrate BRSA's philosophy of "helping each other", also indicating their commitment to Burma/Myanmar's progress in democratic changes (BRSA, 2013). In February 2013, the President Kumakiri visited several community-based organizations in Burma and

[66] Kumakiri (2008) interviewed Moe who served as one of the board members from 2008 to 2012. Moe revealed that some Burmese asylum-seekers including himself felt the need of having a group that assists Burmese asylum-seekers, since there were no organizations to support them despite many Burmese transnational political associations in Japan (Kumakiri, 2008). In the interview, Moe also revealed that Otaki and other Japanese individuals were the ones that helped them the most rather than other Burmese people (Kumakiri, 2008). Moe felt that Burmese people should help each other, serving as a core principle of BRSA.

conducted interviews while also passing out donations[67] from BRSA, a total of 4,000 USD to nine groups[68] determined by board members (BRSA, 2013). Although BRSA is no longer functioning as an organization due to a low number of participants, Shin and Lar still come to meetings once every two months and suggests remitting to a Burmese anti-government activist N[69], because he is doing good for the people and society (Shin & Lar, personal communication, September 29, 2019). As a description of their Japanese helpers, the current chairperson Fujiyoshi not only participates in BRSA meetings every two months, but also requests provisional release of those detained Burmese. Fujiyoshi first made friends with Burmese asylum-seekers at a restaurant in Tokyo in 2012. Kumakiri not only was involved with BRSA as a founder[70] but also initiated OKO-Japan together with some Karen refugees. He was attracted by the Karen when he met them in 1996. Since then, he has helped over 200 cases of Burmese ethnic minorities in their applications for refugee status.

The three groups described so far commonly send financial remittances to respond to natural disasters. Their transnational practices are based on their religious beliefs. Heymar explains:

> If I treat someone nicely, then I'll be treated nicely by someone else. The generosity goes around and circulates. We, the donors, expect to receive something back. In my case, I receive mental fulfillment by donating to someone, so I don't lose anything. Burmese people often donate to temples on their birthdays. They believe that they wouldn't have been born as humans if they weren't lucky, so celebrate being born as humans and donate to temples to make themselves even more lucky (personal communication, March 29, 2019).

Shin describes a story about a man and Buddha to explain why they remit:

> We, the givers, also receive some good things if the recipients, e.g. N, does good things to people or society. We believe in this famous story. Once upon a time, Buddha told a guy that he was going to die, but he didn't. He asked why, and Buddha told him that he didn't

[67] Kumakiri visited Burma since the members of BRSA are asylum-seekers and political exiles. His airfare was paid by BRSA and he also received around 1,200 USD allowance for his 11 days trip to Burma.
[68] The nine groups Kumakiri visited include three orphanages run by monks, three social development local organizations, and three local political groups.
[69] N is involved with community development where he builds schools and digs wells in small villages. He used to belong to the Burmese Army.
[70] Kumakiri resigned his position in 2016.

> die because he built bridges and planted trees where he lives. Buddha told people that if you do good things and help people, Buddha prolongs your life. That's why we send money to people in Myanmar (personal communication, September 29, 2019).

Religious beliefs also motivate Kon as a Christian to help people in her motherland:

> **Kon**: In Christianity, giving is a very basic thing. We naturally search for things achievable when we hear people suffering back home.
> **YN**: Do you send money to people back home because you feel happy when they say thank you, or is it more like a responsibility you feel to your homeland?
> **Kon**: It's not that we want them to be thankful. Neither is it responsibility. We feel good if the money helps them. It's natural in my community (personal communication, September 16, 2019).

The financial engagements by JMCC and ZCC are embodied as a monthly scholarship focused on improving individuals' education. I asked why money is important, and both JMCC and ZCC mentioned that without financial support these students cannot achieve their goals, although they have a bright future in front of them. Kon highlights the future benefit for Chin people:

> **Kon**: In Chin state, medical care is underdeveloped. To support this medical student, we expect that he will work for Chin state after schooling. We send scholarship with a hope that Chin state will develop more.
> **YN**: What do you mean by development?
> **Kon**: If this Zomi student comes to work in Chin state, it'll be good for us. It's rare for doctors to work in Chin state. Chin state is located in the mountains and there's nothing there, so no one wants to go. So, Chin sick people cannot be properly treated in Chin state… So, they need to go to Kale, Mandalay, or Yangon to receive treatment that costs so much money… If we have more Chin doctors working in Chin state, the medical level of Chin state will be improved (personal communication, September 16, 2019).

Although these three organizations give donations to people back home based on their religious beliefs, they simultaneously expect their own personal mental fulfillment, well-being and advancement of their homeland from their involvement. They identify insufficiencies in their communities in education and health. To resolve it, they financially assist students and activists with talents, since they are working hard to "improve" themselves and their communities.

Therefore, the link between financial means and the notion of improvement is embedded in their religious practices.

7.1.2 Collective Financial Remittances and Political Remittances

Out of six Burmese groups involved with collective financial remittances, two organizations also engage with political remittances. One is Lin, a male Christian Karen in his fifties with a resident visa of 28 years of living in Japan. He is Secretary-General of the Overseas Karen Organization (OKO) Japan established in 2006. OKO-Japan remitted 450 USD to a clinic and 230 USD to an orphanage both at the Thai-Burma/Myanmar border[71] in 2012. It was the year when Lin participated in an annual conference held by the Karen National Union[72] in Thailand. In 2018, OKO-Japan provided 900 USD to the IDP camp in Karen State. They received funding from their performance at an annual refugee festival held by the Foundation of the Welfare and Education of the Asian People[73], which was used to buy children winter clothes in the IDP camp. OKO-Japan sends a total of 1,900,000 kyat, 1,266 USD to a youth volunteer group based in Ayeyarwady delta in 2018 and 2019 in responding to natural disasters. OKO-Japan also offered 450 USD to the Burmese activist N[74] in 2016 when Kumakiri visited him in Burma/Myanmar. Their political remittances are manifested as protests against the military regime. They meet once every two months and discuss issues with the military government. For example, they demanded a release of a Karen political prisoner O[75] by protesting in front of the Myanmar Embassy in Tokyo on

[71] The clinic and orphanage were established by some Karen individuals.
[72] The Karen National Union is a political organization that has a strong ideological influence not only on Karen people in general but also the governance of Karen refugee camps in Thailand (Mcconnachie, 2012).
[73] Since January 1982, the Welfare and Education of the Asian People annually holds "the Festival for Resettled Refugees in Japan" to both giving awards to refugees who *successfully* settled in Japan and deepening Japanese' understanding towards refugees residing in Japan (FWEAP, 2017).
[74] This is the same activist to which BRSA sends remittances.
[75] O is a politician, democracy activist, and human rights defender. The police detained her when she held a protest at the 69th Karen Martyr's Day on August 12th in front of Yangon Town Hall and Maha Bandoola Square (Nura, 2019).

September 26th[76]. They also participated in demonstrations organized by AUN on December 12th to demand change to the 2008 Constitution[77].

The other participant involved with both financial remittances and political remittances is Aung, a male Rohingya Muslim in his fifties with Japanese citizenship since 2015 and 28 years of living experience in Japan, vice president[78] of Burmese Rohingya Association in Japan[79] (BRAJ). He established Aung-tin Peace School in the refugee camp located at Cox's Bazar in Bangladesh in January 2018, during his second visit to the camp[80] (Nakamura, 2018, May 15). 400 children from five years to middle school age learn Burmese language, English, Mathematics, and the Koran. BRAJ provides basic food such as rice and oil to 1,000 households, dug 30 wells, and built 50 toilets in the camp, in addition to establishing a primary school named Darul Aman School where the same subjects are taught as Aung-tin Peace School (BRAJ, 2019, June). Aung, together with members of BRAJ, also send political remittances. In 2018, BRAJ submitted a petition to MOFA in asking to pressure the Burmese government in protecting Rohingya's human rights (Jomo Shimbunsha, 2018, September 14). BRAJ organized a protest in front of MOFA to express objection to Japanese ambassador Maruyama who informed overseas media that there was no genocide in Rakhine state (NHK News Web, 2020). Aung plays a role as a spokesman of BRAJ, having been invited to meetings, workshops, TV shows organized by Japanese universities and media numerous times to draw public attention to the Rohingyas' situation. By doing so, he calls for both the Japanese government and individuals to support Rohingya. Aung also assists Japanese professionals, journalists, and politicians by either introducing guides or accompanying them to the

---

[76] I also participated in their protest on September 26th.
[77] The 2008 constitution appoints 25 percent of the parliament seats to the military.
[78] As of January 2020, he was Secretary-General when I interview him in April 2019.
[79] Some of the mission of BRAJ is to regain Burmese citizenship, a safe repatriation, international interventions to Arakan state, to bring all parties involved with Rohingya genocide to the International Court of Justice (BRAJ, personal commination, April 1, 2018)
[80] His first visit was October 2017, two months after the second massive persecution by the military regime.

camp when requested. For example, he assisted Shimbata, a Japanese self-supported photographer when he visited the refugee camp at Cox's Bazar twice in February and September in 2018. Shimbata has visited Burma/Myanmar more than 10 times since 2010, and visited Rohingya's village in 2015. Moreover, Aung escorted Tada, a female producer of a Japanese entertainment firm M, to the camp in December 2018 and March 2019 for her preliminary study on behalf of her company M to consider the kind of assistance they can provide to the refugees. The agency M undertook a social project entitled Act Against AIDS from 1979 to 2019 to hold charity concerts to collect funds for AIDS patients, and Act Against AIDS is transformed as Act Against Anything from 2020[81]. Rohingya refugees were chosen as one of their project recipients. Tada only met Aung twice in 2018 and 2019 in the refugee camps and does not have regular contacts with Aung.

Financial remittances and political remittances by both the Karen organization and the Rohingya association are sent due to their struggles with the Burmese military regime. Both groups sent financial means to refugee camps near the Thailand and Bangladesh borders seeking to support their people who are persecuted. Simultaneously, political remittances to Karen and Rohingya are sent to resist the military regime. This indicates their ethnic fellowship and the division between Burmese people according to ethnic lines. Aung articulates this point very clearly:

> My mind has changed since 2012. It's clarified that Aung San Suu Kyi takes no political action to Rohingya although she's gained power. I had always acted for Aung San Suu Kyi for achieving democracy in Burma. Unfortunately, the issues with Rohingya has been massive since she took power. And sadly, 2012 saw a genocide against Rohingya. Since then, I feel like this: "We had worked so hard. If nothing changes, I act for Rohingya" (personal communication, April 14, 2019).

[81] Tada informed that AIDS used to be an incurable disease, but in Rumania children no longer become infected by AIDS. The young AIDS patients the entertainment company M helped are now grown up and attend a vocational training school that M built for them. Tada considers that Act Against AIDS has exercised their part in fighting against AIDS, although Japanese artists' passion for tackling social issues encouraged M to continue the movement as Act Against Anything from 2020.

While OKO-Japan almost exclusively provides financial and political remittances to Karen people, Lin also articulates sentiments to other Burmese individuals due to their suffering:

> **Lin**: We send money to help people back home. I feel sorry for them.
> **YN**: Why did you remit to the activist N?
> **Lin**: He works hard for deprived people in Myanmar.
> **YN**: But he's not Karen. Is that fine with you?
> **Lin**: Yes, it's fine. I'm Karen but we don't only support Karen. We're all human beings. We're compassionate about helping impoverished people regardless of their ethnicity or nationality.
> **YN**: Are Rohingya the same?
> **Lin**: Yes, I can see them suffering. I also feel bad for them. I don't think that Karen are the only ones disadvantaged. There are many Burmese who are in need (personal communication, September 26, 2019).

I later found that donations to N collected by OKO-Japan was facilitated by Kumakiri's visit to see him in 2016 (Lin, personal communication, February 10, 2020). Therefore, if Kumakiri did not ask for donations, it may not have been collected. This illustrates their ethnicity-focused practices.

The difference between OKO-Japan and BRAJ is that BRAJ asks Japanese involvement from both individuals and the government in their transnational engagements. OKO-Japan is politically involved with their homeland without asking for help from the Japanese government or society[82]. In January 2019, the Japanese government provided additional humanitarian assistance to the Rohingya refugee camp for 3.6 billion yen, 34 million USD through multilateral agencies such as UNHCR and IOM (TRT, 2019). The support to Rohingya could indicate opposition to the Burmese government. Aung comments on that "this government support can be attributed not only to BRAJ but also Rotary Club, NGOs, media, journalists, university academia, students, and many other individuals (personal communication, April 14, 2019). There is a significant difference between Karen and Rohingya in terms of donors' attention: The bilateral donors regard persecution

[82] Kumakiri is the only Japanese regularly involved with OKO-Japan.

of Karen as historical and no longer occurring such that humanitarian assistance towards them has been declining (Naing, 2017). Moreover, the focus of a Japanese government-funded project was the facilitation of Karen refugees' repatriation to Burma/Myanmar (Japan Platform, 2015). Therefore, the trend of international aid is also reflected to the ways in which host societies react to diaspora's transnational engagements.

7.1.3 Collective Financial Remittances and Social Remittances

There are two Burmese participants involved with financial remittances and social remittances. One is Soe, a Burman in his fifties with *zairyu-kyoka* residing in Japan since 1991. He is the head of the Myanmar Japan Bridge Education[83] (MJBE). He was active in sending political remittances to Burma/Myanmar at Burma Youth Volunteer Association until 2011. A documentary entitled *Life in a Foreign Land: Burmese in Japan* was released in 2012 that captures Soe's life story in Japan as an asylum-seeker and an anti-government activist. Soe underlines in the documentary that "I do politics for people's well-being" (Doi, 2012). Soe also has collected financial means via the Chin Baung Group held 23 times over seven years since 2005 and sent 481,000 yen, 3,800 USD to a clinic at the Thai-Burma/Myanmar border with Hirata. Hirata, in his seventies, met Soe via PFBJ in 1997 where he taught the Japanese language to Burmese attendees. They have saved 900 USD that will soon be sent to the clinic (Hirata, personal communication, February 25, 2020). Recently, Soe has transmitted two social remittances to his homeland: school songs and participatory learning. He also donated musical instruments[84], a form of financial

[83] A Japanese male K came to Soe's restaurant and asked him to conjointly undertake the school song projects. K watched a TV show about Soe's return after 25 years of exile. In the show, Soe said that he would build an education center once he returns to Burma/Myanmar.
[84] Soe purchases musical instruments paid by donation to MJBE. Soe also received used recorders from some Japanese volunteers.

remittances, to enable teachers to play songs for children. In 1994 in Tokyo, Soe heard children singing at a Japanese primary school. Soe was attracted by it and found that it was school songs. After asking his Japanese friends about this, he found that Japanese schools have their own songs in which the name of the area and philosophy of the schools are inserted, and some Japanese grown-ups recall their school songs (Mainichi Shimbun Sha, 2018, May 12). He makes melody and invites locals to participate in writing lyrics that have characteristics of each area, either its sceneries, popular spots, or traditions. For example, the wishes for freedom in Burmese society is written in one of his songs (Mainichi Shimbun Sha, 2018, May 12). He has sent six songs to schools mainly in Yangon since 2018. For participatory learning, Soe partners with Takao and has organized a workshop for the Burmese teachers every March since 2018. Takao is a university professor who specializes in Japanese language education. He was introduced by one of Soe's Japanese helpers in 2014 when Soe was looking for a teacher who could teach the Japanese language to his Burmese friends every Sunday. Soe asked Takao to do a workshop underpinned by Takao's teaching practices to facilitate student participation, which is the aim of the workshop as agreed by both Soe and Takao. Soe is passionate about transforming Burmese current public education that provides teacher-centered learning by merely focuses on memorization. Soe highlights that in order to change education for the next generation, there needs to be spaces where teachers can learn how to teach differently, serving as the foundation for Soe's idea of "train the trainers". The second workshop was held for two days in Karen state in March 2019, which was the space where the Japanese teacher (Takao) shared his experiences with Burmese teachers. Takao asked Burmese teachers to show how they learned the Burmese classical story of two businessmen which commonly appears in textbooks. The story is about two businessmen, one is a vicious man and the other is an honest man, where the former dies due to his anger and the latter makes a profit and

becomes happy. It teaches students the ethic of good and bad, although there is no space for other interpretations. Therefore, Takao suggested Burmese teachers bring some questions with no right answers to the class. Takao employs the term sharing, to place both Japanese and Burmese teachers on the horizontal level rather than the hierarchal grounds where Japanese are placed higher than Burmese. Moreover, Burmese teachers can consider different aspects and learn by participating in activities, rather than merely listening to Japanese teachers.

Another Burmese who sends financial and social remittances is Lian, a male Christian Chin in his thirties with a student visa since 2014. He studies political science and receives a scholarship[85] that covers the cost of master's and doctoral programs at the Waseda University since September 2014. He is also a member of ZCC, the Zomi Christian group as well as a Chin community group Zomi Association in Japan[86] (ZAJ). Before coming to Japan, Lian found exercise equipment in many cities in Burma/Myanmar such as Mandalay and Mawlamyine although there was none in his township. Lian proposed ZAJ the idea of exercise tools and initiated the project in 2015. His thinking was that in his township residents had nothing to help them enjoy and relax outside of the church, so they wasted their time. The tools not only become a landmark for the town but also makes the space beneficial for the people rather than applying it for market use. After two years of a preparation period, ZAJ built athletic equipment in two townships, Tedim and Tonzang, costing around 350 USD that officially was handed over to the townships. Moreover, ZAJ donated 500 USD to Zomi Siamsin, a student group in Chin state for holding their annual seminar[87] in 2017.

[85] Waseda University provides a full tuition fee waiver scholarship exclusively for Burma/Myanmar. They provide scholarship for master's and Ph.D. programs for 5years or Ph.D. programs for 3years (Waseda University, 2020).
[86] ZAJ was founded in 2010, which is focused on social empowerment particularly to help youth. They collect 80 USD monthly fee per person to support their projects (Lian, personal communication, March 7, 2019).
[87] The youth group organizes annual seminars for three days in different townships. The seminar provides job training, education including the sessions about leadership and political awareness. At the seminar, university students teach high school students. Some of the students receive free medical check-ups at the seminar (Lian, personal communication, March 7, 2019).

Out of ZAJ, Lian is also active in sending his own social remittances. One is a public speech in Chin state and the other is writing articles and disseminating it in Chin language. He published a book in 2015 about things he learned in the Philippines[88] and Japan, and in 2016 he gave a speech at villages in Chin state with 10 copies of his book sold immediately after his speech. Lian has published many web articles in Chin language on three websites based in Norway, Malaysia and the U.S.

Soe and Lian both use financial means to actualize their own ideas and values. Their ideas are to promote the welfare of Burmese citizens by building exercise tools and having a space for the arts at school. Both Soe and Lian attribute the reasons for their social remittances to the military regime initiated by the Ne Win dictatorship during the 1960s to 1980s that neglected the social welfare of its people. For Soe, who has been involved with political transnationalism since 1988, transforming the politics of his homeland has been on top of his agenda, although recently his attention has been paid to education in changing people impacted by the prolonged dictatorship:

> **Soe**: What I want to do is to change education in Burma… I've researched and thought about how to change Burma… Songs and education. Arts. It can change people's mind… I love listening to songs, I can be relaxed [when listening to music]. We can come up good things when relaxed.
> **YN**: Do you mean that the society cannot be better if people are full of stress?
> **Soe**: Yes, I think so. Society is made up with individuals. The society becomes a good one if individuals are good. Japan is a good country as compared to Burma, because there're more good individuals and good things in Japan… So, we need to educate children. The simplest thing is to sing, they can sing because they can speak.
> **YN**: Are there any musical class at schools in Burma?
> **Soe**: No, it is going to happen soon.
> **YN**: Were there no music class from before?
> **Soe**: Yes, we had it until the Ne Win dictatorship period.
> **YN**: Does it mean to deprive of people's enjoyment?

[88] Lian has also completed his master's degree specialized in gender and development studies from a university in the Philippines before he came to Japan.

> **Soe**: Yes. There were music class when I went to a primary school (personal communication, September 3, 2019).

I asked Lian whether there are any links between the exercise tools and empowerment that he desires for his homeland:

> **Lian**: Setting up such kind of tools is impossible without engagement with the government… This improves their awareness levels of officers and leaders. The reason why we could not have such things while other townships have, is [lack of] political awareness of the leaders. Mayors and administrators lack ideas.
> **YN**: Why do you think they're not interested?
> **Lian**: The military dictatorship [has been] so strong for many decades. [There is] no one there to think and come up with ideas. Their concern is military, not the people. [They say] "according to the rules, I have to finish this." [This derives from] fear of the leaders. It stops them to think outside of the box (personal communication, March 7, 2019).

The distinction between these two Burmese is that Soe transmits ideas that he learned from Japanese practices and the involvement of Japanese individuals including donations from Japanese people, whereas Lian has international spaces to engage and facilitate his ideas by comparing his township to other larger cities in Burma/Myanmar. Donations were also collected by his own ethnic persons that enabled his ideas to be realized. Both are interested in politics although their perceptions of improvement diverge: Soe aims to transform individuals' mind whereas Lian seeks to address inequalities between townships by transforming individuals in power. This is due to their different social positioning and ideas of communities. Soe is Burman and Lian is Chin. Chin state has been Burmanized since the Ne Win totalism and still is neglected by the military regime (Moe, 2019). Lian resists discrimination against Chin people, and desires to contribute to his own people with his ability (personal communication, March 7, 2019).

7.1.4 Social Remittances

In addition to Soe and Lian, two Burmese individuals send social remittances. Interestingly, both are involved with media advocacy. Han, a Burman in his forties, with a dependent visa of his wife's work visa living in Japan for 10 years, spread Japanese customs and lifestyles via social networking services (SNS) such as blogs, YouTube, and Facebook as a means to educate people in Burma/Myanmar. For example, on his YouTube account, Han posts his short video that captures the "how Japanese wait in line" before riding on the bus. Han believes that this kind of patience is good to share with the people of Burma/Myanmar where no one is interested in such moral practices. Han expresses this Japanese rule as fairness, where the elderly and disabled are not disadvantaged by some cruel macho individuals. Due to the tolerance shared by every passenger, the elderly and disabled can also ride on the bus safely without being pushed. Han also conducts interviews and produce videos of Burmese successful individuals who reside in Japan as model cases for other Burmese. For Han, *successful* individuals indicate Burmese who have graduated from Japanese schools and are working in Japanese companies.

Thant, a Buddhist Shan in his thirties, with a student visa since 2015, also uses his SNS accounts to provide "philosophical education" to people in Burma/Myanmar. For example, Thant streams some live videos of his hiking trips to share with Burmese individuals on how Japanese people maintain the environment (e.g. waterfalls) to be as clean as possible, owing to their appreciation for nature and *good behaviors*. When he found no trash around the waterfall, he expressed in his video that "the responsibility is not only the government or caretakers but every individual" (Thant, personal communication, February 19, 2019). Thant is a fully funded doctoral student at the Waseda University[89] studying political science and works part-time at NHK, the

[89] Thant also receives the same scholarship as Lain, Waseda's special scholarship programs exclusively for students from Burma/Myanmar.

national broadcasting corporation. He translates radio programs into the Burmese language. He has a minute to add his comments in connecting Japanese ideas to Burmese individuals. One time, Thant attempted to propose a greater focus on individual agencies to *make* 2019 a better year rather than to *wish* for the year. Another time Thant made comments about *Kyushoku*[90], a Japanese school meal system, to claim how important it is to centralize systems like this to eliminate socioeconomic disparities between students. Thant also made a radio program in 2017 that interviewed Burmese children who participated in Asian Pacific Children's Convention[91] (APCC) programs in Fukuoka as junior ambassadors. Thant provided children in Burma/Myanmar messages of how these Burmese junior ambassadors improved themselves, including their English, interpersonal and communication skills. APCC provides "grass-roots intercultural exchange programs designed for children to learn to become global citizens who can respect and understand others with the OMOIYARI spirit" (APCC, 2020). *Omoiyari* is a Japanese term for empathy that describes "ability and willingness to feel what others are feeling to vicariously experience the pleasure or pain that they are undergoing and to help them satisfy their wishes" (Lebra, 1976, p. 38).

Han and Thant both identify Japanese morality, such as waiting in line and maintaining clean environment, and transforms the Japanese discipline into messages to "educate" individuals in Burma/Myanmar:

> **YN**: In Myanmar, do you have Buddhist lessons to teach to think about others?
> **Han**: Yes, we do. But there're many people who don't follow it.
> **YN**: Why do you think it is?
> **Han**: That's because people are not educated due to the military regime. That's why people only think about themselves, but not others. The more uneducated individuals, the more

[90] *Kyushoku* is a state-run lunch system introduced in the 1950s to avoid children's dietary deprivations at the post war years. Parents pay 2 USD a meal with the local government's contribution. Eliminating children's choice regarding menu and packed lunches helps not only contributing to nutritional balance but also conceals inequalities in the children's socioeconomic background that may be noticeable in packed lunches (McCurry, 2019).
[91] Thant participated in APCC programs as a junior ambassador of Burma/Myanmar when he was 11 years old. This was his first experience in Japan.

> society gets worse. If we have more educated people, there'll be more good things in society (Han, personal communication, December 7, 2018).

In contrast, Thant believes in the potential of Burmese individuals:

> **Thant**: I also want to give them [the message]: "We also have certain values in Myanmar, don't think that we are inferior." … We just need to take it out and utilize it. I try to remind those basic things, which I think are very important.
> **YN**: You're saying that people don't acknowledge these values?
> **Thant**: I think they're forgetting… You look at Japan and we feel like Japan's really superior. We're always thinking that Japan and other rich countries are better, maybe in a sense, yes. They look perfect. Yet, we have certain good things in Myanmar… I just want to say: "Don't feel inferior, and try your best" (personal communication, February 19, 2019).

At the same time, Thant also asks the Burmese to be receptive to Japanese disciplines, because of the intimacy between Burma/Myanmar and Japan:

> **Thant**: In Japan, there're many good examples for Myanmar people… As compared to other [Western] countries, Myanmar and Japan has a good relationship as Asian countries. In terms of finance, people-to-people relationship, images, projects, and everything… We have a good impression on Japan.
> **YN**: So, they don't like America?
> **Thant**: Ah, America's also [a good example], but [it's] too Western to compare to. They'll think that Japan's closer, they can relate to more (personal communication, February 19, 2019).

Although Han and Thant have distinct views on their Burmese fellows, their emphasis is on learning from other *successful* cases in Japan, a country in the Global North. Burmese individuals are often subjected as ones that need improvement, particularly the improvement of humanity. It facilitates oneness where Burmese want to become like Japanese based on the intimacy Burmese develop with Japanese. Watanabe (2019, p. 74) claims that "oneness resembles the multiethnic Pan-Asian aspirations of the early 20th century" that justifies Japanese influence on other Asian populations. Transnational practices undertaken by Han and Thant indicate that a Japanese value of

omoiyari contributes to justify not only the notion of the improvement of humanity but also the Japanese influence over other Asian countries and people.

7.2 Japanese Interaction: How and Why

7.2.1 Types of Support and Their Desires for Change

I identify two kinds of support that Japanese individuals are involved with: financial support and technical support. All participants are concerned about Burma/Myanmar, although there is a clear boundary between ones facilitating change in Burma/Myanmar with their efforts and ones merely expressing their concerns.

Three Japanese participants are commonly involved with Burmese diaspora's transnational engagements via financial means: Kameyama participates in the JMCC's scholarship program, Hirata organizes the Chin Baung Group[92] to remit to the clinic at the Thai-Burma/Myanmar border while also paying a membership fee to MJBE directly used as a donation to Soe's school song project, and Tada plans with her company M to financially support the orphanage in the Rohingya refugee camp run by a Korean pastor. Kameyama produces his photo exhibitions three times a year and self-published two books. Burma/Myanmar provides Kameyama recognition and differentiation from other photographers, and Burmese people taught him many things including their charm as subjects. Kameyama links his gratitude towards Burma/Myanmar to financial assistance:

> When I think of the best ways to return the favor to Myanmar, it's money. I always repay to Myanmar some of the money I receive from sales of my books. I think it's the simplest way to describe why I get involved with Myanmar… Japanese people are biased about donation. I want to inform other Japanese that donation is a form of repayment to the money you receive, so it's not that complicated (personal communication, September 21, 2019).

---

[92] Hirata and his wife Hideko invited other Japanese people to their house parties to introduce the Burmese culture and collect donations, while in their garden they grow a Burmese plant, Chin Baung, for sale.

Whereas Tada reveals that their intention to financially support Rohingya was initiated from their business-oriented thought to attract foreign tourists in Japan while raising abandoned children from Asia to serve foreign tourists:

> At first, our president talked about Syrian refugees. Japan doesn't accept much refugees, right? We start from there… We want people from overseas to come to see our entertainment. He hopes that immigrants work in Japan to support us when foreign tourists visit Japan. Unfortunately, Japan has strict rules for immigrants and refugees… Other thing is that grown-ups will be harder to adjust to Japan including acquisition of Japanese language, customs and morality, as compared to children who absorb everything quickly… It'll be so much trouble if we have to separate children from their parents, or parents come to Japan with them, as we hear so many stories about foreigners making troubles in communities due to cultural differences. It's quite difficult to understand each other, but orphans in refugee camps are by themselves, so our president started talking about hosting them in Japan… This is just his big imagination, and I suggested, "let's bring them from Asia instead of Syria." … We understand that it's not that simple, but at least we use the same keyword "orphans" (personal communication, September 12, 2019).

Tada's openness in telling me a story that is easily evoked as trafficking and forced labor suggests that Japanese humanitarian imagination neglects the rights discourse in the Japanese civil society space or *Minkan*. It is a third sector that does not confine the space only to NPOs and NGOs but also includes private businesses as a complete picture (Imada, 2014). The involvement of businesses in addressing social issues appears as inevitable particularly when their engagements require financial means. However, it becomes problematic when the rationales of business overlook the voice and rights of the vulnerable population.

The cases of Kameyama and Tada illustrate that involvement by financial means allows the space for diverse desires for Burma/Myanmar to be expressed, although it may be different from what diaspora expects. Financial Assistance is probably the easiest way to engage in Burmese transnational practices, although it barely leaves space for other participants to suggest ideas in their

transnational engagements since the use and the intention is already set by the Burmese diaspora. Therefore, the Burmese diaspora's ideas and values are more prone to be preserved.

Six other Japanese individuals provide the Burmese diaspora technical support. Takao, Tanabe, and Shimbata articulates their desires to facilitate change or betterment both in Burma/Myanmar and Japan. Takao suggests change to teachers in Burma/Myanmar with Soe:

> In Myanmar, the answers were always determined by the military because it was authoritarian. It would be inconvenient for the military regime if citizens started to be critical about it. It could not be helped before, but now we can show that there're also some questions with no right answers. The workshop starts from there (personal communication, October 1, 2019).

Takao also situates their workshop in a historical context between Japan and Burma/Myanmar, which motivates himself to do what he can do.

> There are many things that had occurred between Japan and Myanmar historically. I'm surprised when I hear some Japanese veterans saying that they're glad to see Burmese warmly welcoming them… Have they forgotten about what Japanese did to Myanmar through language education? … I don't position myself to say that I don't have responsibilities as a Japanese language teacher… Why the Myanmar education system remains as this current form? This should link to what Japan's done to Myanmar. I want to maintain a mental image that this workshop is undertaken within this historical context (personal communication, October 1, 2019).

Takao refers to Japanese imperialism that used Japanese language to promulgate Japanese culture while facilitating assimilation of the colonies into Japan (Otmazgin, 2012).

Another example is Tanabe, a freelance journalist in his seventies, and a former NHK Burmese newscaster. He writes about the historical and political relationship between Japan and Burma/Myanmar to Japanese readers (Tanabe & Nemoto, 2003). He is probably the most well-known Japanese among Burmese communities in Japan attributed to his ability to speak Burmese. Tanabe studied the Burmese language at a national university influenced by his father's experiences in Burma. Tanabe's father fought in the Second World War and became one of the "Burma

lovers"[93]. Tanabe provides translational support from Burmese to Japanese for court documents and in meetings at Burmese gatherings. He also helped Soe with the Japanese language when Soe planned to invite Japanese professors to join him in holding a teachers' conference in Yangon (Tanabe, personal communication, August 13, 2019). For Tanabe, helping Burmese indicates transforming Japan as well:

> Helping Burmese contributes to making Japan a more democratic country. I mean *tabunka-kyosei*[94]. Japan needs to achieve real *tabunka-kyosei*, not merely as a slogan… Japanese people need to understand why they are here, what their purposes are, and how they are doing (personal communication, August 13, 2019).

Tanabe also reveals his wishes for Burmese individuals to learn the historical relationship between Japan and Burma/Myanmar:

> For example, I want them to critically examine what the Japanese period means in their history. Moreover, history in the postwar period, how war reparations from Japan was used, how international aid after the reparations was, and the relationship between Japan during the Ne Win period… I sometimes encounter Burmese persons who perceive Japan as "a good wealthy country with generous people." But it's not necessarily true… Japan also had a period when there were fascists (personal communication, August 13, 2019).

Shimbata is involved with media activism where he displays photos of Rohingya villages in his exhibitions and calls for attention to Rohingya and their suffering via his own SNS platforms, while also writing in his SNS accounts about Aung's public speech and protests organized by BRAJ on their behalf[95]. Shimbata also brings Japanese journalists and NGOs to Aung when requested[96].

[93] "Burma lovers" are those Japanese who fell in love with Burmese hospitality during and after the World War Second, which is described in depth in 2.2.3.
[94] The English translation of *tabunka-kyosei* is multicultural co-living. It is explained in more detail in 5.2.2 and 5.2.3.
[95] Shimbata reveals that Aung often invites him to his speech expecting that Shimbata writes about what Aung said. One time, Shimbata could not come, so Aung asked another person B to come to his speech. However, B only took photos and did nothing else. Aung called Shimbata and talked about his speech on the phone and asked Shimbata to write about it on his SNS platforms with photos taken by B.
[96] Many Japanese individuals have contacted him via his SNS accounts (Shimbata, personal communication, August 17, 2019).

Shimbata's comments suggest Japanese' ignorance of people like Rohingya who are a minority in Japan:

> Once they became aware of Rohingya, they'll think about what they can do for Rohingya… The misunderstanding about Rohingya will be reduced… I think it's good if understanding of Rohingya starts from Tatebayashi city where many of them reside. I want locals to be conscious about Rohingya as the same Asian individuals living near us, not someone else in the TV news (personal communication, August 17, 2019).

Burma/Myanmar holds a special place for Shimbata, and change in Burma/Myanmar does not indicate a resolution to "the Rohingya crisis" but rather the hope for a better Myanmar:

> After all, the most fascinating thing about Myanmar is people, although the same people also bring issues. You only find temples for tourist attractions in Myanmar, right? I find it fun to interact with Burmese people. I want Myanmar to be a happier country… I believe in them, they're peaceful individuals. We are also Asians, so we have similarities. They feel the same about Japanese (personal communication, August 17, 2019).

It strikes me that the Japanese participants do not engage Burmese diaspora to improve the Burmese individuals or communities but rather be involved with Burmese diaspora for the mutual benefit, common desire to transform Burma/Myanmar. However, improvement is always narrated with the clear-cut binary between the Burmese and the Japanese while homogenizing both parties. This is one form of the Japanese/foreigner dichotomy described in 5.2.3.

7.2.2 Their Obligation to Burma/Myanmar

Before I conducted interviews with the Japanese participants, I presumed that Japanese participants are obligated to assist the Burmese diaspora in their transnational engagements supported by compassion felt by the Japanese participants. However, all of them are obligated to inform Japanese society within the cultural, historical and political context in which Burmese are embraced. For example, Kameyama is compelled to remind Japanese individuals about Japan's intervention to Burma/Myanmar in the Second World War:

> Someone needs to dredge up miserable memories of the war since it's easily faded… I recently discovered that my origin as a Japanese who engages with Myanmar starts from there, so I felt the urge to record it as photography… I feel that informing Japanese society about the history of Myanmar and the Japanese military's involvements such as the battle of Imphal is necessary… Japanese virtue of obscurity, lack of transparency[97] has not changed ever since (personal communication, September 21, 2019).

Some participants also felt the impulse to commit to the Burmese context due to their encounter with Burmese individuals. For Shimbata, his passion for Rohingya was triggered by local Burmese individuals:

> I met an Arakan Buddhist who's compassionate about his Rohingya classmates[98], he wanted foreigners to see their situation in the IDP camp and let the world know about this. He brought me inside of the camp… Until then, I was just having a good time in Myanmar while taking beautiful photos. He took the risk and let me get inside of the camp. It sparked my urge to inform Japanese people about imprisoned Rohingya through my photos… I saw them over the gate. They have been imprisoned for over seven years now… I cannot ignore them (personal communication, August 17, 2019).

Fujiyoshi, also attributes his commitment to the fact that they met:

> We're in a form of relationship, so if we don't respond to their situation, then it indicates abandonment of them. It's impossible to be involved without taking note of others' feelings if we met as human beings… It was fate that I met Burmese refugees (personal communication, September, 29, 2019).

In contrast, Tada stresses the importance on doing something rather than delving into the political context in which Rohingya refugees are embedded:

> We're excited that we can do something for them… We have a study group to discuss what we can do for Rohingya refugees. We learned that the relationship between Myanmar and Bangladesh is complicated, and both nations have their own political circumstances. We often reach the conclusion that we cannot do anything, but I suggest that we have our own ways to help them such as saving orphans. I say, "let's not get too caught up with politics

[97] Kameyama refers to the Japanese government that obscured the responsibility for the Fukushima nuclear accident in 2011. He also alludes to Japanese-ness failing to address problems while also unable to solve the inadequate ways of addressing the issues.

[98] Although the Buddhist hostility against Rohingya is articulated in mass media (Hunt, 2017), Shimbata claims that Arakan Buddhists were peacefully co-inhabiting with Rohingya in Rakhine state before 2012 (personal communication, September 21, 2019).

> but think about what we can do."… We cannot help them in granting their Burmese citizenship or facilitating their safe repatriation. We may need to consider giving a message to fight against the military regime, but it's not what we are supposed to do as an entertainment agency, we have other ways to contribute to the refugees (personal communication, September 12, 2019).

The Japanese historical and political intervention in Burma during the Second World War urges the Japanese participants to resist a political act of *forgetting* or *ignoring*. This can be understood as resistance to bare life by Agamben described in 4.1.2. Kameyama, Shibata, and Fujiyoshi aim to improve humanity by regaining political aspects of Burmese individuals stripped down by both the Japanese government and the Burmese military regime. At the ground level, as Shimbata and Fujiyoshi illustrate, compassion to Burmese individuals is expressed as a human relationship that should not be disregarded.

7.2.3 "I Am not Giving but Receiving"

I also had an assumption derived from the literature in anthropology/sociology of humanitarianism that Japanese' desire to be involved with Burmese diaspora's transnational practices is to help Burmese diaspora as givers. However, most of the Japanese participants mention that they are *receiving* rather than *giving*. For example, Tanabe and Fujiyoshi consider their engagements with Burmese diaspora as a learning opportunity. Tanabe articulates:

> We learn from them more than we teach them. I used to tell them that "Japan does not have independence day", "we never fought for democracy." Japanese are insolent, we've done nothing but proudly saying that we have democracy (personal communication, August 13, 2019).

Fujiyoshi has mixed feeling about his learning journey with Burmese refugees:

> I think many things when we face Burmese refugees. It's interesting but also worrisome… BRSA provides opportunities for me to delightfully learn and think about their issues on the one hand, and creates deep concern about them, on the other hand (personal communication, September 29, 2019).

Kumakiri expresses that getting involved with Burmese diaspora's transnational engagements benefits them in making connections in Burma/Myanmar:

> The good thing about BRSA was that members had connections with prominent Burmese individuals like the activist N… When I went with him, I learned about villagers' daily lives by spending time with them… If I went there as a practitioner of an INGO, they would've changed how they treated me. They treated me like their friends because I'm friend with their fellows (personal communication, September 2, 2019).

Tada links their response to the Rohingya crisis as chances for them to gain insights that may lead to better performance for their artists.

> **Tada**: It's important for us to visit and witness how refugees live in the camp, a place we only have seen in the news. It broadens our perspective to different ways of living, a life in a refugee camp with limited water and food.
> **YN**: Does it impact your business?
> **Tada**: Yes, it influences artists to facilitate their imagination of people through the screen (personal communication, September 12, 2019).

Moreover, Tada inadequately understands the resistance by Rohingya and the meaning of preserving their identities as Rohingya, due to the focus on addressing the issue:

> **Tada**: We don't know the answer to what Rohingya should do. Of course, it'd be best if Myanmar accepts them as citizens so that they can return home to regain happy lives there, but they cannot… I don't know the proper answer to the situation, but I think they can become good Bangladeshis.
> **YN**: Do you think that Rohingya should identify themselves as Bangladeshis?
> **Tada**: Do you have any other good ideas? I asked Aung the same question, and he responded firmly that "we remain as Rohingya." I wonder how other 900 thousand refugees in the camp think about that. Because they have no hopes, dreams or home to go back to (personal communication, September 12, 2019).

While Tada's inquiry is interesting, Tada speaks on behalf of the voiceless refugees. This is a classic humanitarian speech that merely serves to re-inscribe inequalities between humanitarian and survivors. Whereas voices of refugees are not heard, humanitarians have the power to report the

crisis and form resolutions derived from the humanitarians' point of view (Fassin, 2007, 2011a; Malkki, 1996).

The thought that *doing something is better than nothing* is common in humanitarian practices (Malkki, 2015), though I also interpret it as a business-oriented concept focused on delivering their performance, which can be easily evaluated by their employees and customers. In Tada's context, this results in neglecting the context that religion spreads in the camp. They plan to support a Christian pastor while ignoring the context that most Rohingya are Muslim. This is not to suggest that they should be assisting the majority while neglecting the minority Rohingya Christian, but rather to identify their lack of awareness of the potential political struggles among Rohingya in assisting the Christian minority in the camp.

7.3 Burmese Ideas and Practices: Negotiated or Not

7.3.1 No Transformation

Out of seven Burmese groups and two individuals, five groups identify that their ideas on the transnational engagements have not changed since they came to Japan. Although their practices have not been altered, the Burmese diaspora has acknowledged the influence of Japanese norms.

I described in 7.1.1 that JMCC's philosophy originated from H, a volunteer organization run by Heymar's mentor. One of their main activities is financial assistance for students with financial difficulties. JMCC also engages in the same kind of activity, providing a scholarship for students with hardships. Therefore, it seems that Heymar's ideas in her transnational engagement have not been affected by living experiences in Japan nor her Japanese helpers including Ochiai or Kameyama. Heymar reveals that:

> JMCC is like being in Myanmar. It's been 16 years since I've opened JMCC. I'm the naked emperor there. I'm not thinking about anything (personal communication, March 29, 2019).

Heymar highlights the values of Burma/Myanmar by critically examining Japan:

> Myanmar has its own good points and so does Japan… They have their own customs and culture, and the same is applied to Japan… Japan is a civilized society, everyone has to be punctual, and everything needs to be exactly how it's supposed to be, so losing our humanness. Whereas in Myanmar, people live like humans. In that sense, I think that a real freedom exists in Myanmar, in their mind. Japanese people are bound by many things (personal communication, March 29, 2019).

Simultaneously, she also admits that the Japanese have a better way to enhance themselves on which their scholarship program is based:

> **Heymar**: Japanese people only think about themselves. That's both good and bad. For example, they make strategic life plans since they're kids. They follow the steps according to their career plans, I think that's really good.
> **YN**: How do you think it helps Burmese people?
> **Heymar**: In Myanmar, people need to think about their families. For example, the oldest ones typically give up their schooling so that their younger siblings can go to school. I think they should have their own life plans.
> **YN**: Does your scholarship program derive from this kind of thinking?
> **Heymar**: Yes. I'd be happy if it triggers that (personal communication, March 29, 2019).

Ochiai supports Heymar's ideas on scholarship and expresses his pleasure in helping the student T:

> I'm simply grateful that we could financially support T. If she continued to be restrained by financial difficulties, she would need to stop studying and start working… We believe that money provides the most useful means for the beneficiaries… What is most needed by T now is financial assistance that could afford the necessities for her life (personal communication, September 13, 2019).

Another Japanese supporter, Kameyama, unveils that he decided to support JMCC's scholarship program without inspection:

> I haven't heard how the idea of the scholarship program has evolved… Heymar and Ochiai are running the program, so I left it up to them without any doubts… I totally trust how the money is spent (personal communication, September 21, 2019).

It is clear that Japanese participants do not intervene but are inclined to reinforce Heymar's ideology of the scholarship program. Heymar identifies a Japanese way to self-improvement that provides a rationale to run its scholarship program.

Similarly, Aung claims that his ideas to support Rohingya refugees in Bangladesh while influencing homeland politics have not changed. He stresses that the intention of his involvement is to protect Rohingya's human rights. For him, the conditions in which their human rights are protected indicates fulfillment of basic needs and realization of safe living conditions back home:

> **Aung**: Lack of food, houses, toilets, and water. That's hard.
> **YN**: Are human rights protected if basic needs are fulfilled?
> **Aung**: Yes.
> **YN**: Is it enough to only fulfill basic needs?
> **Aung**: No, but it's OK for now.
> **YN**: Do you think it's OK if Rohingya can live sufficiently in the refugee camp?
> **Aung**: It'd be best if they could repatriate safely. There'll be no problem if they can have the proper ID cards[99], no hate speech, and safe living conditions including schooling and employment back home. We have no desire to be independent (personal communication, April 14, 2019).

Aung praises Japan for allowing no hate speech against Rohingya:

> **Aung**: I think Japan is a good country as compared to Myanmar. No hate speech, no strict rules regarding religious practices, and you can work as you wish. Refugee regulations are rigid but there's freedom here… Although I've heard that many foreign kids were bullied, my son has never been bullied at school.
> **YN**: Do you want to do the same in Myanmar?
> **Aung**: Yes, we'd be happy if we could do the same in Myanmar.
> **YN**: What kind of thing should Myanmar learn from Japan?
> **Aung**: Awareness against ethnic cleansing… Every individual lives in peace without any issues in Japan, and that applies to both Japanese and foreigners… It'd be best if we could achieve this kind of peace in Myanmar.

[99] ID cards, commonly referred to among Burmese individuals, officially called the Citizenship Scrutiny cards, displays not only your name, date of birth but also your ethnicity and religion (Aung, 2007). Aung identifies that discrimination towards Rohingya originated on the ID cards and is a root cause underpinning the Rohingya crisis (personal communication, April 14, 2019).

His interpretation of peace is an achievement of conditions where human rights are protected in a safe environment with no hate speech, which he learned by reflecting on the values he identified in Japan. Yet, he neglects minority of Rohingya, Rohingya Christians. Aung always instructs me that Rohingya are Muslims. However, Rohingya Christian also reside in the refugee camp who have been the target of discrimination by Rohingya Muslims (Adams, 2020). It could be due to his unawareness of religious minority issues, or no intervention by Japanese individuals to redress inequalities attributed to religion. Whatever the circumstances are, no claims by Rohingya Christians are identified in Japan. As described in 7.1.2, Aung has gained much help from the Japanese government and individuals including journalists and NGOs. After the news about the persecution on Rohingya Christian on February 13, Shimbata reveals:

> I was surprised to find the news about the persecution of Rohingya Christians since members of BRSA including Aung did not share this with me. This must be a sensitive issue for them (personal communication, February 14, 2020).

Regarding their relationship, Aung and Shimbata both describe each other as friends, but Shimbata is indebted to Aung for his help and aspired to return the favor:

> Aung has been really good to me, so I want to help him. I can visit Myanmar whereas Aung and other Rohingya cannot. I can also visit Bangladesh while others cannot. It doesn't mean that I do this instead of them, but I can be like a messenger. I'll be grateful and get motivated if they appreciate my move (personal communication, August 17, 2019).

As can be seen, Shimbata does not suggest a change to Aung but instead appreciates his assistance without questioning what Aung has neglected.

Shin, a Burmese member of BRSA, claims that his ways of helping his homeland have not been altered since he came to Japan. Shin reveals his thoughts on their Japanese supporter Fujiyoshi:

> He's a leader of BRSA. We need him because we need Japanese people to hand our donation to the activist N. Fujiyoshi can also be a sponsor of those detained Burmese in Japan (personal communication, February 11, 2019).

Kumakiri once attempted to persuade members of BRSA, mostly comprised of Burman, to undertake their activities together with Rohingya:

> Originally, we aimed at supporting all refugees regardless of their ethnicity or nationality. When I was president, I asserted in meetings that this was the time to do things that have not been achieved by other Burmese organizations in Japan, that is to build solidarity with Rohingya. I brought up this agenda a couple of times, but it didn't go well (personal communication, September 2, 2019).

Kumakiri also utilized a Japanese strategy to persuade group members to conform to the group identity in supporting all refugees regardless of their ethnicities and nationalities. However, this strategy did not work with constituents of BRSA who showed an unwillingness to cooperate with Rohingya. Eventually, Kumakiri gave in to Burmese resistance, with a realization that he cannot impose Japanese ways, since BRSA is a Burmese organization (personal communication, September 2, 2019).

Kon and Lian, both from Chin state, belong to ZCC and ZAJ. They clarified that they do not have much contact with Japanese individuals, and their ideas of transnational engagements have not changed. They both identified one of the Japanese norms, imposing discipline, and translate it as a learning lesson for Chin individuals back home. Kon highlights good points about Japan:

> Japan is a safe country with amazing discipline. People are punctual, polite and follow rules. They also work hard. Burmese people need to learn from Japanese (personal communication, September 16, 2019).

Moreover, Kon wishes for Chin individuals to be independent like Japanese people while she also financially assists them:

> **Kon**: Chin people receive assistance from overseas though they need to do their best. I think it's important to have this kind of attitude in life. They shouldn't wait until the help comes from others… They should learn these ideas from hard-working Japanese.
> **YN**: But you still financially support the people back home?
> **Kon**: Yes, even they work hard, their pay is incomparable to our wages. It's important that we help them but it's not good if they depend on us (personal communication, September 16, 2019).

Lian also identifies the notion of self-sufficiency in Japanese discipline, and interprets it as independence from the government:

> **Lian**: Japanese people are diligent, very polite, and punctual. They don't talk on the phone on trains. They don't want to disturb other people.
> **YN**: This idea of "don't disturb others," does it encourage people to be independent?
> **Lian**: In a way. It's to work for yourself. You don't ask others to help you. In Chin culture, it can be very messy. We should be like here.
> **YN**: When you think about establishing a better life in Myanmar, does the idea of self-independent help?
> **Lian**: Yeah. People always ask for the government. If there is anything civil society and community can achieve, we should do it... For example, the government doesn't really invite expertise/specialists in education to our hometown. So, we do it (personal communication, March 7, 2019).

Lian learned ideas about civil society in development studies in the Philippines and strengthened his ideas in Yangon where he taught the role of civil society (personal communication, March 7, 2019). Japan serves to justify his ideas on independence from the government.

In brief, although most of the Burmese participants have not been influenced by Japanese norms or their Japanese partners, Japanese norms have reinforced their ideas about transnational practices in the name of "improvement".

7.3.2 Their Ideas Are Transformed

Han has been influenced by a Japanese businessman B in his sixties whom he met as a restaurant manager when Han was working as a part-time server in 2012. B now owns a shipping

company and asks Han to work when necessary. Han counts on him to teach him suitable practices in Japan. I asked Han what were the important things he learned from B:

> **Han**: Kindness. If I be kind to him, he gives his kindness back to me. If I do things voluntarily, I can connect to people more.
> **YN**: Does this relate to your ideas of doing things voluntarily for Burmese people?
> **Han**: Yes. If I didn't encounter his compassion, I may not be thinking the same as now. I became a more kind person because of his generosity (personal communication, December 7, 2018).

I inquired of Han the ethics B taught Han:

> For example, manners on trains. You cannot use your phone in disabled seats… We discussed that no one tells you not to do it, but if you respect the rules, it's good. Because what if the person sitting on the disabled seat had heart pacemakers. He may fall down if you use your phones at disabled seats. That's why Japanese made the rule… I think it'll be good for me too if I follow the rules (personal communication, December 7, 2018).

In the previous section, I described how Han has transmitted Japanese manners and discipline to Burma/Myanmar. Han reveals that it derives from his Japanese senior male who instructs Han in compassionate practices. In the case Han describes above, compassion is translated into rules on trains. Therefore, compassion is legitimized as a discipline that serves as a self-governing apparatus to control populations.

In a similar vein, Thant has reflected his homeland to Japan over 20 years having visited Japan five times. His ideas about the betterment of Burma/Myanmar have changed over the years. In particular, Thant stresses the importance of doing things from the recipients' point of view rather than from his desires:

> **Thant**: I suggested my Japanese friend to invest in properties in Myanmar, because it was booming. He told me "of course we know that, it's a good thing that economy is blooming there. But we have enough things here, so let the people in Myanmar do it." I was like, it's so nice to think about other people! It inspired me to think from different perspectives, whether it's really effective or not. It's whether I do things for my own sake or for their sake. That's really important.
> **YN**: What do you think is the difference?

> **Thant**: There's a huge difference there. For example, if I help them for my own sake, then I pay more attention to what I do. “Will I be acknowledged?” “Will I be thankful?”… I stop and think whether it affects them. By doing so, I put them above my intention (personal communication, February 19, 2019).

Thant’s learning on *omoiyari* stems from the APCC program. Thant notes on the impact of APCC:

> APCC is a huge thing to remind me of my *omoiyari* part… We were born with different kind of knowledge… If I were exposed to a dark world, then my dark side will be sharpened. But now, I had many chances to sharpen my good points with *omoiyari*, so APCC is a huge thing in my life to lighten up (personal communication, February 19, 2019).

Thant also identifies himself as a “global citizen”, which is also described in the APCC website as ones that are “able to think of the world beyond national boundaries and desire *world peace* and *co-existence*” (APCC, 2020). Therefore, the influence of Japan for Thant derives from a program that provides message of *omoiyari* for building peace in the world. However, neither Thant nor APCC critically examine the structural and racial issues that the term *omoiyari* or *co-existence* may preclude among individuals or communities in the Global North and South.

Soe also states that his ideas have been transformed by living experiences and his reflection of Burma/Myanmar to Japan:

> I learned the ways of thinking, wider perspectives in this society that has freedom. My ideas have been shifted due to the things I learned in Japan. Japan is a field where I practice my skills whereas Burma is where I perform what I’ve acquired in Japan (personal communication, September 3, 2019).

Among many lessons, he has reflected Japanese politics and has realized that people can facilitate change:

> **Soe**: I think the politics is slow. The politics will follow the change in accordance with the development of *Minkan* space.
> **YN**: Do you think *Minkan* level can facilitate change to politics?
> **Soe**: Yes. Some interest groups are necessary to watch politics… Politicians come to each of us to ask to vote for them. I’m not saying that it’s good or bad but we need to understand

> why they do that. *Minkan* level has power. People need to know that they have power, otherwise they cannot change anything (personal communication, September 3, 2019).

Soe's idea that transformation occurs from below is akin to Lian's claim to suggest Burmese people to be more independent from the government described in 7.3.1. The difference is that Soe identifies civil society space in the Japanese context whereas Lian does not. Therefore, Soe's emphasis on transformation from below does not eliminate business ideologies that may disregard the notion of human rights, as discussed in 7.2.1.

Soe's idea of "train the trainer" has been formed since 2016, two years after Soe met Takao in 2014, due to the Myanmar National Education Law enacted in 2014. Simultaneously, Takao has also shown his ways of facilitating learning at the Sunday Japanese language program O, and Soe understood Takao's teaching style as useful for transforming Burma/Myanmar. This bonded Soe and Takao with trust in initiating the project as partners:

> I met and talked to Takao about his teaching methods, which was aimed at making one think. I said I want to do this in Burma. The timing was right (Soe, personal communication, September 3, 2019).

> Soe asked me "do you want to do this with me?" and I quickly responded "yes, let's do it!" (Takao, personal communication, October 1, 2019).

In summary, Han, Thant and Soe identify that their ideas have been transformed by Japanese individuals and ideologies. The ideologies that they digest are compassion, *omoiyari*, and bottom-up development manifested as student participation in class.

CHAPTER 8.
DISCUSSION

This chapter engages with the research findings described in chapter 7. It critically examines and discusses how the notion of improvement is entangled with the Burmese diaspora's homeland development and the involvement of Japanese benefactors.

8.1 *Improvement*: What It Facilitates

The Burmese diaspora transnationally engages with their homeland via financial, social, and political remittances based on an identification of deficiency in their motherland. This illustrates that scarcity links to the need for improvement. Improvement entails "change" which indicates betterment or modernity. Since 1962, the Burmese military junta has restrained the country from foreign influence while generating internal conflicts, particularly aggressiveness towards ethnic minorities. Therefore, when things became available to people that were previously unattainable, it was considered an improvement.

This can be described as the notion of modernization. In the post-Second World War period[100], the narrative of modernity became a driver used to convince traditional societies that they should transition to modern ones. Rostow (1959) attempted to prevent the spread of communism in developing nations by asserting that a rigid set of transformational stages were required in order to develop and become industrialized and capitalized similarly to the U.S. Development studies as a discipline looks at this notion carefully, but is burdened with the notion of development as progress,

---

[100] Reconstruction from the war indicated modernity when the U.S. initiated the Marshal Plan to aid in the reconstruction of Western Europe after the war (Jacoby, 2007).

or the processes of change in societies (Harris, 2014). Since the Burmese diaspora is in a modernized country Japan, they not only compare their homeland and host society, but also contrast themselves with people back home. Diaspora with access to great resources realizes that they can help those who are living in a resource-scarce country. Shin articulates this point:

> Since I came to Japan, I started to have feelings for people of Myanmar (personal communication, September 29, 2019).

Resources are not limited to materials; attitudes such as diligence and compassion are intertwined with modernization theory that corrects perceived backwardness. Kon, Lian, and Soe highlight the Japanese work ethic as something that Burmese individuals should learn from the Japanese. The Japanese attitude of diligence is valued higher while positioning Burmese individuals lower due to their lack of education derived from living under the military regime. Han and Thant illustrate that the level of institutionalized compassionate practices determine the degree of modernization of a country/people. This hierarchy is created to place those who are eager to improve humanity above those who do not chose to do so. In this regard, compassion is entangled with governmentality when describing the emergence of a global humanitarian order that resembles an "empire" of humanity (Barnett, 2011, p. 8). In this theoretical underpinning, Japan/Japanese are placed higher as compared to Burma/Burmese consolidating Japanese influence on Burma/Myanmar in the space of global governance.

Omoiyari represents Japanese culture since many Japanese individuals identify *omoiyari* as a Japanese core value (Lebra, 1976; Travis, 1998). It is not coincident that Japanese empathy resonates with its sovereign power to exert influence over Asian populations. The Japanese narrative during the Second World War "*Japan protects Asia from the West*" also utilizes the notion of compassion as a justification to interfere in Asia.

The ACPP program in which Thant participated exemplifies the recent global order in creating "world peace" that Japan aims to facilitate in the name of *omoiyari*. World peace is narrated as embodying "co-existence" between individuals around the world. The metaphor of "co-existence", *kyo-sei*, performs a similar function to the Japanese colonization concept "co-prosperity", *kyo-ei*, of "The Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere". In Japanese, "*kyo*-" indicates oneness or intimacy. Oneness is rooted in Buddhist thought that facilitates the expansion of the self by taking others in to create one large self, *taiga,* making no distinctions whether friend or enemy (Kondo, 2007). Therefore, the use of "*kyo*-" obscured the colonial relationship despite brutal violence on the colonized. As described in 1.1.2, intimacy building efforts between Burmese and Japanese serve to obscure and maintain their unequal relationships (Watanabe, 2014). In the postcolonial context, the term "co-existence" is applied without addressing structural inequalities between Japanese and other Asian nations/people while exercising the power to *forget* these inequalities. The governing apparatus directs attention away from power imbalances in the global space by emphasizing *omoiyari*, empathy that is hard to contest.

Furthermore, the use of cultural values such as *omoiyari* is not new as a method of Japanese diplomacy in Asia. Japan has used its culture as a strategy to formulate its diplomacy (Otmazgin, 2012). Japanese culture-based diplomacy reflects the soft power discourse that renders other people/nations more receptive to the Japan's position in the global space through the dissemination of Japanese culture and values (Nye, 2004). Not only pop-culture but also "traditional culture, language education, intellectual exchange and people-to-people exchange programs have been the key tools employed" to exert soft power (Iwabuchi, 2015, p. 420). Modern pop-culture of Japan has been well received by young people in Taiwan and Hong Kong who passionately consume Japanese pop culture such as animation, comics and TV dramas in the process of becoming similar to a large

pan-Asian imaginary (Iwabuchi, 2001). I am not the first to claim that Asians disseminate Japanese culture, though Han and Thant's account is an important finding in the development sphere to identify Japanese cultural diffusion, not directly coming from Japan/Japanese but via diaspora or the colonized. The Burmese diaspora helps Japan to maintain its power in the global space by influencing their peers in the name of *betterment* of Burma/Myanmar. This resonates with Japanese civilization promoted in Taiwan, South Korea, and China in the 1920s. Japan was positioned as taking on a duty to civilize Asia, and the Japanese civilizing mission was aimed at enhancing the reputation of Asia in the gaze of the world (Lee, 1989). Therefore, social remittances by the Burmese diaspora can be understood as their assimilation into Japanese norms. Social remittances also serve as governing apparatus that make populations in Burma/Myanmar similar to the Japanese in the postcolonial context.

8.2 *Improvement*: What It Neglects

In countries like Burma/Myanmar where the government removes itself from distributing resources, diaspora becomes responsible for allocating assets to people back home. International and multilateral agencies including the World Bank and the United Nations Development Program celebrate diaspora's agencies to contribute to their homeland development (World Bank, 2018; UNDP, 2009). However, the Burmese diaspora's remittances are not a panacea for the development of Burma/Myanmar: Diaspora is constrained by the idea of community. Their places of origin strengthen their ties with people who belong to their communities in Burma/Myanmar. Financial assistance provided by Heymar, Kon, Lin, Lian and Aung is directed to their communities based on ethnicity or religion. Income disparities between urban and rural areas[101] as well as inequality in the

[101] Ethnic minorities often inhabit rural areas.

sphere of health and education are identified (Thein & Akita, 2019; World Bank, 2017; Zaw et al., 2015). The Burmese diaspora's financial remittances exacerbates the divide existing between people and regions with the intention to help *their own people*.

The Burmese diaspora's practices based on their social positioning also divide people in Burma/Myanmar in class formation. Heymar and Kon articulate their desire to help those who are ambitious in realizing their dreams by providing scholarship. This rationale to support ones with aspiration is also entangled with the notion of improvement. Kon's desire to improve the health service of Chin state clearly illustrates this point. Improvement is an ideology where biopolitics is exercised as population control in regulating certain kinds of people to enhance lives while neglecting others who are not motivated to improve themselves (Li, 2007). It creates a class hierarchy between people based on the notion of biopolitics to segregate individuals based on aspiration and connection to resources, and the Burmese diaspora is involved with this governing process.

The lens of race is also significant in transnational practices by the Burmese diaspora. Walton (2013) uses a metaphor of whiteness, or white privilege to describe institutionalized dominance by Burman in Burma/Myanmar of which the dominance by Burman is invisible[102]. It also applies to the Japanese context where cooperation between Burman and ethnic minorities is identified (Kajimura, 2014). It is often ethnic minority groups that conform to Burman practices, as the case of OKO-Japan to remit to the activist N clarifies, not vice versa. Moreover, exclusion of Rohingya by Burman in their practices in Japan merely reflects their homeland politics, as not serving to resolve the persecution of Rohingya in Burma/Myanmar. A Burman male participant Shin claims that:

[102] Walton's use of whiteness is similar to what I argued in 3.4.2 that whiteness indicates normalized dominance that creates and maintains hierarchies in social relations (Garner, 2007; Ong, 1996).

> Rohingya aren't people of Myanmar. The Burmese military didn't facilitate ethnic cleansing, but they killed some people in Rakhine state to eradicate spies there… There're some Bengalis[103] who disclose the military's insider information. They also killed some of the Burmese polices. That's where the issue was initiated (personal communication, February 7, 2020).

No Burmese participants are involved with gender issues in their transnational practices. It does not mean that there is no gender issues in Burma/Myanmar. Patriarchal practices along with community-based Buddhist values in Burma/Myanmar create a social order that strips power from women (Nwe, 2009). Lian, who studied gender and development in the Philippines, identifies patriarchy in everyday practices though it does not reach his ideas of homeland development. The reason why gender issues do not receive much attention by the Burmese diaspora in Japan may be related to the link between masculinity and displacement derived from the Burmese diaspora's nationalistic imaginaries about homeland (Farahani, 2012).

8.3 *Improvement*: What It Resists

Whereas Japanese norms or culture such as *omoiyari* legitimize the Burmese diaspora's transnational practices, Japanese benefactors' compassionate practices do not influence Burmese communities' homeland development. This is a significant finding that can be contrasted to the existing case in the U.S. examined by Ong (1996) addressed in 3.4.2. Ong (1996) discusses that whiteness is associated with American norms asking recipients to improve, justified as compassionate practices towards Southeast Asian women. Most Japanese benefactors show respect for the Burmese diaspora and their homeland development projects. Kameyama's trust of JMCC and Shimabata's gratitude to Aung are good examples illustrating that Japanese helpers do not intervene in practices undertaken by Burmese participants. Kumakiri's failed attempt to advance

[103] Bengalis is a discriminatory term commonly used by Burmans to refer to Rohingya.

BRSA's pursuits by cooperating with Rohingya illustrates that the Burmese diaspora feels safe to have their ideological autonomy in resisting influence by Japanese helpers. These clear boundary-making are attributed to the Japanese/foreigners binary that Japanese activism utilizes in a strategy to resist assimilation into Japanese culture as described in 5.2.3. The case of Burmese and Japanese relationships also shows that this dichotomy offers a benefit for *others* in Japan.

Contradictory to other Japanese literature, the Japanese/foreigners dichotomy allows Japanese benefactors to reflect their dominant ideas deriving from Japanese-ness. For example, Kumakiri reflects his dominant positioning in Japan:

> I was born in the central part of Japan as male… So my opinions aren't different from ones of majorities. Listening to these ethnic minorities will help alter my boring point of view (personal communication, September 2, 2019).

By doing so, Burmese people or the country of Burma/Myanmar becomes assets they receive. Takao, Kumakiri, and Shimbata appreciates their opportunities to engage with Burma/Myanmar because they can reflect on dominant Japanese ways. Tanabe and Fujiyoshi enjoys their learning processes facilitated by the Burmese diaspora. This is interesting when compared to the very same idea, the notion of progress, employed by the Burmese diaspora. Japanese benefactors desire to change Burma/Myanmar, though they do not consider Burmese/Burma inferior to Japanese/Japan.

To emphasize that they are receiving rather than giving, they reinforce the notion of reciprocity. The Japanese notion of reciprocity is the culture-bounded concept of *on*. "*On* is a relational concept combining a benefit or benevolence given with a debt or obligation thus incurred… It is not a discrete object but is embedded in the social relationship between the donor and receiver" (Lebra, 1976, p. 91). Japanese partners not only happily receive benefits generated from the Burmese diaspora but also provide financial and technical support to the Burmese diaspora's transnational engagements as a means to repay the assets they gained. In a relationship of

on, *ongaeshi*, repayment of *on*, is required. Once *on* is generated between entities, it "compels the receiver-debtor to repay *on* in order to restore balance" (Lebra, 1976, p. 91). Japanese participants' emphasis on the act of receiving reverses positioning of Burmese and Japanese; placing donors as Burmese and recipients as Japanese. They attempt to offset the power relations between Japan and Burma/Myanmar rooted in their historical and political relationship.

Since the Burmese diaspora is to initiate homeland development projects, and Japanese participants are to repay rather than to eagerly facilitate support underpinned by compassionate practices, their assistance serves to reinforce the Burmese diaspora's ideologies, the improvement of their homeland. The military regime has violently affected many lives in Burma/Myanmar, so there is no space to contest whether individuals should be against the Burmese junta or not. The only choice left to Japanese individuals is whether to *ignore* or *engage* with the history and contemporary context of Burma/Myanmar. Once they are determined to engage with the Burmese diaspora and issues in the country, they also facilitate other Japanese to be involved with Burma/Myanmar for the *betterment* of the country.

8.4 *Improvement*: What It Conceals

However, this Japanese/foreigner binary has another side to the same coin. It entails homogenization of ethnicities with national lines which reveals governmentality exercised to conceal diversity both in Burma/Myanmar and Japan. Homogenization reinforces Japanese-ness and Burmese-ness while rejecting other entities that do not conform to dominant cultures and customs. In Burma/Myanmar, 135 ethnic groups are officially recognized, and in Japan, racial others, Ainu and Ryukyus, are marginalized as well as those of foreign origin. As discussed in 5.2.3, the Japanese/foreigner binary serves as an apparatus to reinforce Japanese-ness while preserving

national interests in the realm of *tabunka-kyosei*. Likewise, the Japanese/Burmese dichotomy directs attention away from the political discourse of Japanese aid, Japanese cultural diplomacy to Burma/Myanmar or structural inequalities between Japanese and Burmese. Therefore, it unintentionally maintains national prosperity. In fact, Tanabe informed me that he had been cautious about Burmese refugee status, since it would lead to creating suspicion and jealousy among them (personal communication, August 13, 2019). This is due to the small and indefinite Japanese legal space for refugee recognition described in 2.1.1. It is understandable that their entitlement is a taboo issue. Yet, rendering it inaccessible results in overlooking structural issues between the Burmese diaspora and Japanese helpers. Japanese helpers' act of reverse positioning to place Burmese as donors and Japanese as recipients described in 8.3 does not redress their inequalities but rather perpetuate their inequalities by resolving their power balance on a relationship level, leaving structural inequalities unaddressed.

It is not coincident that Tada's humanitarian imagination dismantles political aspects of Rohingya into merely biological entities by neglecting an aspect of human rights. This is due to the interpretation of humanitarianism in Japan which translates the act of alleviating suffering into achieving stability between respective parties. In Japan, owing to social obligation, individuals are not afforded autonomy in expressing their emotions, but rather one is expected to control and master their feelings "because it is social relationship, not one's own emotions, that counts" (Lebra, 1976, p. 16). This social burden underpins the notion of belongingness that provides identification of individuals deriving from their blood ties, geographical ties and company ties (Lebra, 1976). This belongingness manifests itself as collectivism or desire for the feeling of oneness (*ittaikan*) with individuals' attachment to the groups with which they belong.

Due to belongingness, Tada shaped their discussion by restricting ideas to conform to her company's identity as an entity offering amusement and relaxation to people, in carefully avoiding conflicts between nation-states. This act of convincing other group members to conform to Tada's request is identified as a Japanese strategy based on their shared group identity (Lebra, 1976). Consequently, their humanitarian imaginaries are limited to resolutions only available from their perspectives. Tada's choice to speak on behalf of the voiceless, Rohingya refugees, validates that the aim to stabilize society leads to neglecting voices or rights of the disenfranchised.

CHAPTER 9.
CONCLUDING REMARKS

This chapter summarizes the study by first outlining results and implications deriving from this research while recognizing limitations. It also identifies scope for future research, and concludes with final reflections upon this research.

9.1 Summary

This thesis begins by claiming the need for research in investigating the power relation between Japan and Burma/Myanmar as a matter of global governance. This study focuses on the Burmese diaspora and Japanese benefactors in Japan to examine governmentality manifested in the relationship-building processes between them. To examine whether, to what extent, if at all, the Burmese diaspora's homeland development is influenced by Japanese norms and benefactors' compassionate practices, data are obtained via qualitative methods from nine Burmese diaspora's transnational practices and nine Japanese helpers' involvements.

Two Burman groups and a Chin association send collective financial remittances based on their religious beliefs and desires for promoting diligence and self-reliance in Burmese/Burma. Similarly, a Burman male and a Shan man send social remittances to educate their fellows back home by disseminating Japanese values such as self- sufficiency and empathy, *omoiyari,* associated with the notion of improvement. This facilitates class formation, privileging those with aspirations while neglecting others, justifying Japanese influence over the Burmese population. This also reflects a global hierarchy placing Burmese individuals lower while positioning Japanese citizens higher. Karen and Rohingya organizations are involved with sending both collective financial remittances and political remittances. Likewise, a Burman association and a Chin group engage

with collective financial remittances and social remittances. These projects stem from persecution by and resistance to the Burmese junta. Influencing homeland politics from abroad and helping their own people seems inevitable due to the authoritarianism in the country. Yet, it reinforces the existing ethnic and religious divide in Burma/Myanmar.

Japanese norms and culture are identified as consolidating the Burmese diaspora's desires for homeland development, while the Japanese/foreigner binary enables Burmese' ideological autonomy in resisting assimilation. This derives from Japanese participants' weight on the act of receiving rather than giving to the Burmese diaspora. This is the benefit of maintaining the Japanese/foreigner binary. However, Japanese-ness that *tabunka-kyosei* reinforces helps to sustain national interests while concealing political issues manifested in racialized differences and the class structure between dominant entities and marginalized *others*.

9.2 Implications

In this thesis, I have discussed relationship-making processes between the Burmese diaspora and Japanese benefactors embedded within political issues derived from historical, social, and political circumstances of both Burma/Myanmar and Japan. I explored the contradictions in building equal partnerships between unequal parties, the former as a wielder of power in Asia, and the latter as the *other* that Japan once colonized.

Most of the Japanese participants achieve this by maintaining the Japanese/foreigner binary to leave some space for Burmese self-determination. This led me to question whether the Japanese should distance themselves from issues in Burma/Myanmar as *their* issues. Chances are, many people would provide the justification to intervene. There is almost a worldwide consensus to get involved with righting wrongs. Not only do bilateral donors persist in providing international aid,

but also INGOs and philanthropists are engaged with underdevelopment and vulnerable populations around the world. Their rationales are, because there is injustice, inequality and brutality in the Global South, we in the Global North need to *fix* it. This resembles the Enlightenment thinking described in chapter 4.2.3. The Enlightenment notions promoted civilization through colonization, and upheld ideals of humanity as educated and clean (Greene et al., 2013). This imposes the need of education and health care as welfare to improve humanity. Since civilization and colonization originated from a homogenized Eurocentric model, other ways of thinking are required to make a space for renewed analysis.

Takao is the only Japanese participant that provides input or intervenes on the Burmese diaspora's transnational engagements. By doing so, Soe and Takao have established a partnership. This indicates that the process of building partnerships entails intervention from both parties. What remarkable about Takao is that he is critical of what the Japanese colonialism in Burma/Myanmar entailed for the people, and how it has affected Burma/Myanmar in multiple ways. Therefore, he distances himself from compelling Soe to embody Japanese-ness, that is what Japan once imposed upon the colonized. In reflecting upon this, I argue that any intervention or any relationship building requires not only the consideration of power relationships between each other but also an examination of the social, political and historical context that each side bears. Forming partnerships between Japanese and Burmese individuals requires un understanding of Japanese imperial history in Burma/Myanmar, and how that history forms the current social, economic, and political context.

Yet, I do not suggest going through history and social context between Japan and Burma/Myanmar when Japanese individuals engage with the colonized or marginalized *others*. Instead, I suggest the notion of *unlearning*, introduced by a postcolonial theorist Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak. A process of unlearning facilitates self-reflective practices by individuals in

the Global North to reflect on their “privilege as a loss” (Spivak & Harasym, 1990, p. 9). The idea is “to retrace the history and itinerary of one’s prejudices and learned habits (from racism, sexism and classism to academic elitism and ethnocentrism), stop thinking of oneself as better or fitter, and unlearn dominant systems of knowledge and representation” (Kapoor, 2004, p. 641). This is to discontinue oneself from correcting, teaching, theorizing, developing, colonizing, appropriating, using, recording, inscribing, and enlightening *others* (Kapoor, 2004). This could indicate refraining from desires for mastery and domination (Spivak & Harasym, 1990).

The first step Japanese can take is to critically examine the Japanese dominant customs and thinking by learning Japanese history from the colonized point of view. It could lead to opening a space to question what Japanese-ness indicates while examining what the processes of meeting national interests overlooks. Self-reflection by the Global North from the perspectives of the Global South is a step forward in achieving equal relationships in the global sphere.

9.3 Limitations

There are two shortcomings that may have influenced the interpretation of the findings of this research. The first limitation is my positionality as a Japanese woman who does not comprehend the Burmese language. In 6.2.6, I described that my positionality as an Okinawan who studies in New Zealand may have contributed to access and rapport building with the research populations. Yet, I was always outside of Burmese communities due to my positionality as Japanese, and inability to speak the Burmese language. I had to rely on the Japanese language to understand Burmese communities in Tokyo. Burmese participants were native speakers of neither Japanese nor English. However, the languages used in the interviews were Japanese and English for both Burmese and Japanese participants. Therefore, Burmese participants may not have articulated

their ideas and thoughts to their fullest. Moreover, though I tried my best, there may be some misinterpretation when I translated Japanese transcripts into English.

The second limitation is the issue with the representation of the target population. Data was only collected from 10 Burmese, and nine Japanese participants, such that the findings of this research may not be representative of the Burmese diaspora in Tokyo involved with transnational practices in their homeland. Moreover, this study is focused on the Burmese population residing in the Tokyo area, although there are more Burmese in other cities in Japan that may engage with their homeland financially, socially, and politically. More breadth of data could have been achieved if I was able to access more Japanese institutions, such as Fukuoka city, which organized the APCC, and Waseda University, which provides scholarships to Burmese students.

9.4 Future Research

There is enormous scope for further research in exploring the relationship between Burmese and Japanese. The same examination in other nation-states in the Global North can be beneficial in contrasting the research findings from this study to deepen the understanding of how the involvements of their host societies affect Burmese perceptions and practices. It would be fruitful to examine how the Burmese diaspora's development projects in Burma/Myanmar identified in this thesis are implemented and received by recipient communities, to investigate in depth what the Burmese diaspora's homeland development indicates for the people in Burma/Myanmar. Future research can also delve into Japanese benefactors' involvement with other Burmese who do not engage with homeland development. Such projects could be compared to this study in identifying the differences in how Japanese helpers build relationships with Burmese individuals.

9.5 Final Thoughts

To become involved with Burma/Myanmar as a Japanese female, I engender to put myself into an unstable space where justifications are required in engaging with issues in Burma/Myanmar. I rationalize my involvement because I was born in Japan, a former imperial power across Asia and a continuing intervener in Asian affairs. And yet, my standpoint is arguably closer to the colonized due to my origin as Okinawan. Japan has colonized Okinawa and the Japanese government allows foreign military forces to occupy the island. However, I am not here to correct Japan but rather carefully engage with Japanese politics to open a space for critical discussion and examination of Japan's influence over other Asian nations and their populations. Reflecting upon one's political context at home rather than someone else's political context in the Global South is another way to facilitate change.

APPENDIX 1. ETHICS APPROVAL LETTER

Research Office
Post–Award Support Services

The University of Auckland
Private Bag 92019
Auckland, New Zealand

Level 10, 49 Symonds Street
Telephone: 64 9 373 7599
Extension: 83711
Facsimile: 64 9 373 7432
ro-ethics@auckland.ac.nz

UNIVERSITY OF AUCKLAND HUMAN PARTICIPANTS ETHICS COMMITTEE (UAHPEC)

30-Aug-2018

MEMORANDUM TO:

Dr Jesse Hession Grayman
Development Studies

Re: Application for Ethics Approval (Our Ref. 021818): Approved

The Committee considered your application for ethics approval for your study entitled
The idea of 'help' affecting the global circulation of money, ideas, and norms: A perspective from Burmese diasporas in Japan.

We are pleased to inform you that ethics approval has been granted for a period of three years.

The expiry date for this approval is 30-Aug-2021.

If the project changes significantly, you are required to submit a new application to UAHPEC for further consideration.

If you have obtained funding other than from UniServices, send a copy of this approval letter to the Activations team in the Research Office at ro-awards@auckland.ac.nz. For UniServices contracts, send a copy of the approval letter to the Contract Manager, UniServices.

The Chair and the members of UAHPEC would be happy to discuss general matters relating to ethics approvals. If you wish to do so, please contact the UAHPEC Ethics Administrators at ro-ethics@auckland.ac.nz in the first instance.

Please quote Protocol number **021818** on all communication with the UAHPEC regarding this application.

(This is a computer generated letter. No signature required.)

UAHPEC Administrators
University of Auckland Human Participants Ethics Committee

c.c. Head of Department / School, Development

c.c. Studies Mrs Yuko Nagamine

Additional information:

1. Do not forget to fill in the 'approval wording' on the Participant Information Sheets, Consent Forms and/or advertisements, giving the dates of approval and the reference number. This needs to be completed, before you use them or send them out to your participants.

2. At the end of three years, or if the study is completed before the expiry date, please advise the Ethics Administrators of its completion.

3. Should you require an extension or need to make any changes to the project, please complete the online Amendment Request form associated with this approval number giving full details along with revised documentation. If requested before the current approval expires, an extension may be granted for a further three years, after which a new application must be submitted.

APPENDIX 2. ETHICS AMENDMENTS APPROVAL LETTER

Office of the Vice-Chancellor
Office of Research Strategy and Integrity (ORSI)

The University of Auckland
Private Bag 92019
Auckland, New Zealand

Level 11, 49 Symonds Street
Telephone: 64 9 373 7599
Extension: 83711
humanethics@auckland.ac.nz

UNIVERSITY OF AUCKLAND HUMAN PARTICIPANTS ETHICS COMMITTEE (UAHPEC)

09-Mar-2020

MEMORANDUM TO:

Dr Jesse Hession Grayman
Development Studies

Re: Request for amendment of Ethics Approval (Our Ref. 021818): Amendments Approved

The Committee considered the amendment(s) requested to your ethics approval for the project entitled **The idea of 'help' affecting the global circulation of money, ideas, and norms: A perspective from Burmese diasporas in Japan..**

Approval was granted for the following amendments on 09-Mar-2020:

1. Change project title from: 'The idea of 'help' affecting the global circulation of money, ideas, and norms: A perspective from Burmese diasporas in Japan.'
to: 'Transnational grass-roots relationship building: How norms and compassion in Japanese civil society influence the Burmese diaspora's homeland development.'

2. Adding a new organisation to assist with recruitment of Burmese asylum seekers (BRSA, a Non-Profit Organisation assisting Burmese asylum-seekers).

The expiry date for your ethics approval is **30-Aug-2021.**

Completion of the project: In order that up-to-date records are maintained, you must notify the Committee once your project is completed.

Amendments to the project: Should you need to make any further changes to the project, please complete a new Amendment Request form giving full details along with revised documentation. If the project changes significantly, you are required to submit a new application to UAHPEC for approval.

The Chair and the members of the Committee would be happy to discuss general matters relating to ethics approvals. If you wish to do so, please contact the UAHPEC Ethics Administrators at humanethics@auckland.ac.nz in the first instance.

Please quote reference number **021818** on all communications with the UAHPEC regarding this application.

(This is a computer generated letter. No signature required.)

UAHPEC Administrators
University of Auckland Human Participants Ethics Committee

c.c. Head of Department / School, Development Studies
Mrs Yuko Nagamine

APPENDIX. 3 PARTICIPANT INFORMATION SHEET (PIS)

Development Studies
HSB 201E, 10 Symonds St
Auckland 1010
New Zealand
64 9373 7999

The University of Auckland
Private Bag
92019 Auckland,
New Zealand

PARTICIPANT INFORMATION SHEET

Project title: Transnational Grass-Roots Relationship Building:
How Norms and Compassion in Japanese Civil Society Influence the Burmese Diaspora's Homeland Development.

Student Researcher: Yuko Nagamine
Principal Investigator: Dr Jesse Hession Grayman

To potential participants,
My name is Yuko Nagamine. I am currently enrolled in the research master's program in Development Studies, Master of Arts in the University of Auckland.

I would like to invite you to participate in this research.
This research aims to obtain a deeper understanding of Burmese diaspora in Japan, in particular their transnational engagement that intends to develop or aid their people or country. The question of whether their ideas of transnational engagements have changed since they have started to live in Japan will be the focus of the investigation. This study also examines how Japanese norms and moral practices in the Japanese civil society influences Burmese diaspora's transnational engagements.

You have been selected as a potential participant because you are one of Burmese diaspora living in Japan or Japanese individuals who have been involved with their homeland development. Your participation is voluntary, so you can decide to remain being interviewed or withdraw at any time without a reason.

Project Procedures
An interview will be conducted about 30 minutes to 90 minutes depending on how much you would like to share your experience. The travel time will be dependent on where you would like to meet with the researcher. You will not need to respond to questions that are hard to answer. If the interview causes any discomfort, the interview will be paused and the researcher will ask whether you wish to withdraw from the research. In case you need assistance or referral for mental support services because of the mental discomfort caused by the interview, the information is provided below.

Data storage/retention/destruction/future use
The audio recording and the electric formatted transcripts will be kept for the period of six years in the Principal Investigator's drive which is a password protected and backed up by the University of Auckland security system. All physical copies of data such as Consent Forms will be stored inside a locked cabinet of the Principal Investigator's secured office. Both electronic and paper-based data that are kept in the Principal Investigator's drive will be destroyed after six years. The interview will be recorded for the accuracy of the data but it is optional. You as a participant has the right to have the device turned off at any point. After the interview, the transcript will be sent to you. If there are any issues, you can make changes and/or add comments within seven days. Third parties including the NPOs will not view the data.

Right to Withdraw from Participation
You have the right to withdraw from this research at any time without giving a reason. In addition, you as a participant have the right to remove your data from the research up to two weeks.

Anonymity and Confidentiality
The data related to your experience will only be reported. Your name will be used with your permission, otherwise pseudonym is employed to assure confidentiality. Your gender, age and ethnicity may be used for the purpose of analysis. All data both electronic and physical will be kept in secure places and will be deleted after six years.

Mental support services
TELL (Tokyo English Life Line) : 03-5774-0992 Opening hours : 9:00 – 23:00
Jhelp.com (emergency assistance services) : 0570-000-911 Open 24 hours

Contact Details
The researcher : Yuko Nagamine, ynag050@aucklanduni.ac.nz
Principal Investigator : Dr Jesse Hession Grayman, j.grayman@auckland.ac.nz

For any concerns regarding ethical issues you may contact the Chair, the University of Auckland Human Participants Ethics Committee, at the University of Auckland Research Office, Private Bag 92019, Auckland 1142. Telephone 09 373-7599 ext. 83711.
Email: ro-ethics@auckland.ac.nz

Approved by the University of Auckland Human Participants Ethics Committee on August 30, 2018 for three years. Reference Number 021818

APPENDIX. 4 PARTICIPANT CONSENT FORM

Development Studies
HSB 201E, 10 Symonds St
Auckland 1010
New Zealand
64 9373 7999

The University of Auckland
Private Bag
92019 Auckland,
New Zealand

CONSENT FORM

THIS FORM WILL BE HELD FOR A PERIOD OF 6 YEARS

Project title: Transnational Grass-Roots Relationship Building:
How Norms and Compassion in Japanese Civil Society Influence the Burmese Diaspora's Homeland Development.

Student Researcher: Yuko Nagamine
Principal Investigator: Dr Jesse Hession Grayman

I have read the Participant Information Sheet, have understood the nature of the research and why I have been selected. I have had the opportunity to ask questions and have had them answered to my satisfaction.

- I agree to take part in this research.
- I understand that I am free to withdraw my participation at any time, and to withdraw the data from the study within two weeks of the interview.
- I understand that the interview will be stopped at any time when necessary.
- I understand that I can request assistance in contacting support services if necessary.
- I agree / do not agree to be audio recorded.
- I wish / do not wish to receive a transcript of my interview for editing.
- I understand that I can make changes and/or add comments to the transcript within seven days.

- I wish / do not wish to receive the summary of findings.
  Please provide your email address if you wish to receive the research findings.

  ____

Name: _________________________

Signature: _________________________ Date: ____________

Approved by the University of Auckland Human Participants Ethics Committee on August 30 for three years.
Reference Number 021818

APPENDIX. 4 INTERVIEW QUESTIONS

Development Studies
HSB 201E, 10 Symonds St
Auckland 1010
New Zealand
64 9373 7999

The University of Auckland
Private Bag
92019 Auckland,
New Zealand

INTERVIEW QUESTIONS

Project title: Transnational Grass-Roots Relationship Building:
How Norms and Compassion in Japanese Civil Society Influence the Burmese Diaspora's Homeland Development.

Research Questions for semi-structured interviews with Burmese participants:

- What are their transnational activities?
- What is the purpose of their homeland development?
- What does homeland development mean for them?
- Have their transnational practices changed since they started to live in Japan?
- If so, what has influenced their ideas of homeland development?
- Is it related to how they were assisted by Japanese benefactors or the activities of Japanese civil society?
- Have the relationships with Japanese helpers, Japanese ways of doing, or their feelings towards the Burmese diasporas influenced how diaspora's thought of what needs to be done at their homeland?
- What is 'homeland' for them? What do they think of Myanmar as their mother land?
- What do they think about the relationship with Japanese individuals/groups?

Research Questions for semi-structured interviews with Japanese participants:

- Why and how do they help Burmese diaspora?
- What does 'help' mean for them and how it shapes their activities?
- What has influenced their ideas of help?
- What do they think of Burmese transnational activities?
- How do they think about their assistance? Do they think that they have contributed to the Burmese diaspora's activities and homeland development efforts in Burma/Myanmar?
- What do they think about their relationships with the Burmese diaspora?

BIBLIOGRAPHY

AAR Japan. (2019). *Activities in Myanmar.* https://www.aarjapan.gr.jp/english/where_we_work/myanmar/

Abrahamsen, R. (2004). The power of partnerships in global governance. *Third World Quarterly*, *25*(8), 1453-1467.

Adams, B. (2020). *Christians Abducted, Attacked in Bangladesh Refugee Camp. Authorities Should Ensure Safety of All Refugees.* Human Right Watch. https://www.hrw.org/news/2020/02/13/christians-abducted-attacked-bangladesh-refugee-camp

Adamson, F. B., & Demetriou, M. (2007). Remapping the boundaries of state and national identity: Incorporating diasporas into IR theorizing. *European Journal of International Relations*, *13*(4), 489-526.

Agamben, G. (1998). *Homo sacer: Sovereign power and bare life*. Stanford University Press.

Akashi, J. (2018, March). *Tabunka-Kyosei. Yunyu-Sarenakatta Tabunka-Shugi to Nihon-gata Shakai-Tougou [Multicultural Co-living. Multiculturalism that was not imported to Japan and the Japanese style of integration].* [Paper presentation]. Cultural Dialogue and Translation Conference, Tashkent, Uzbekistan.

Al-Ali, N., Black, R., & Koser, K. (2001). Refugees and transnationalism: the experience of Bosnians and Eritreans in Europe. *Journal of Ethnic and Migration studies*, *27*(4), 615-634.

Anderson, B. (1983). *Imagined communities*. Verso Books.

Anderson, W. (1995). Excremental colonialism: Public health and the poetics of pollution. *Critical Inquiry*, *21*(3), 640-669.

APCC. (2020). *What's APCC?* https://www.apcc.gr.jp/e/#cnt06

Aung, T. T. (2007). An introduction to citizenship card under Myanmar citizenship law. *The journal of the study of modern society and culture*, *38*(1), 265-290.

Aung, N. Y. (2019). *Abe reassures State Counsellor of support.* Myanmar Times. https://www.mmtimes.com/news/abe-reassures-state-counsellor-support.html

Aung-Thwin, M. (2013). *A history of Myanmar since ancient times: Traditions and transformations*. Reaktion Books.

Arakaki, O. (2016). *Refugee law and practice in Japan*. Routledge.

Badauk. (2019). *Tokyo no Myanmar [Myanmar in Tokyo].* https://badauk.com/tokyo_myanmar/

Baele, S., & Lemke, T. (2008). An interview with Thomas Lemke. *Emulations-Revue de sciences sociales*, *4*(1), 46-51.

Bakker, M. (2015). Discursive representations and policy mobility: how migrant remittances became a 'development tool'. *Global Networks*, *15*(1), 21-42.

Banki, S. (2006). The triad of transnationalism, legal recognition, and local community: shaping political space for the Burmese refugees in Japan. *Refuge: Canada's Journal on Refugees*, *23*(2), 36-46.

Banki, S. (2013). Urbanity, Precarity, and Homeland Activism. Burmese Migrants in Global Cities. *Moussons,* Advance online publication*.* https://doi.org/10.4000/moussons.2325

Barnett, M. (2011). *Empire of humanity: A history of humanitarianism*. Cornell University Press.

Basch, L., Schiller, N. G., & Blanc, C. S. (1994). *Nations unbound: Transnational projects, postcolonial predicaments, and deterritorialized nation-states*. Routledge.

Befu, H. (2009). Nihonni-okeru Gaikoku-jin to Shimin-Shakai no Mondai [Issues with foreigners and civil society in Japan]. *The Journal of International Cultural Hall, (20)*2, 22-31.

Berlant, L. (2014). *Compassion: The culture and politics of an emotion*. Routledge.

Benton, A. (2016). Risky business: race, nonequivalence and the humanitarian politics of life. *Visual Anthropology*, *29*(2), 187-203.

Bernard, H. R. (2017). *Research methods in anthropology: Qualitative and quantitative approaches.* Rowman & Littlefield.

Boccagni, P., Lafleur, J. M., & Levitt, P. (2016). Transnational politics as cultural circulation: Toward a conceptual understanding of migrant political participation on the move. *Mobilities*, *11*(3), 444-463.

Bornstein, E. (2009). The impulse of philanthropy. *Cultural Anthropology*, *24*(4), 622-651.

Bornstein, E. (2012). *Disquieting gifts: humanitarianism in New Delhi.* Stanford University Press.

BRAJ. (2019, June). *Activities by the Burmese Rohingya Association in Japan* [Poster presentation]. We are made stateless. Rohingya on the border, Tatebayashi, Gunma, Japan.

Braun, V., & Clarke, V. (2006). Using thematic analysis in psychology. *Qualitative research in psychology*, *3*(2), 77-101.

Braun, V., & Clarke, V. (2012). Thematic analysis. In Cooper, H. (Ed.), *APA Handbook of Research Methods in Psychology* (pp. 57- 71). American Psychological Association.

Brees, I. (2009). Burmese refugee transnationalism: what is the effect? *Journal of Current Southeast Asian Affairs*, *28*(2), 23-46.

Brees, I. (2010). Refugees and transnationalism on the Thai–Burmese border. *Global Networks*, *10*(2), 282-299.

BRSA. (2013). *Biruma Kokunai-Shien Project Houmon-Houkoku [Report on the visit to Burma for the support projects].* http://brsajp.blogspot.com/search/label/ビルマ国内支援プロジェクト

Brubaker, R. (2001). The return of assimilation? Changing perspectives on immigration and its sequels in France, Germany, and the United States. *Ethnic and racial studies*, 24(4), 531-548.

Brubaker, R. (2005). The 'diaspora'diaspora. *Ethnic and racial studies*, *28*(1), 1-19.

Caglar, A. (2006). Hometown associations, the rescaling of state spatiality and migrant grassroots transnationalism. *Global Networks*, *6*(1), 1-22.

Calhoun, C. (2010). The idea of emergency: Humanitarian action and global (dis) order. In Fassin, D., & Pandolfi, M. (Eds), *Contemporary states of emergency. The politics of military and humanitarian interventions* (pp. 29-58). Zone Books.

Carr, T. (2018). *Supporting the Transition: Understanding Aid to Myanmar Since 2011.* The Asia Foundation. https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/Understanding_Aid_to_Myanmar_Since_2011_-_Asia_Foundation_2018.pdf

Chung, E. A. (2010). *Immigration and citizenship in Japan*. Cambridge University Press.

Cohen, R. (2008). *Global diasporas: An introduction*. Routledge.

Crawford, G. (2003). Partnership or power? Deconstructing the partnership for governance reform in Indonesia. *Third World Quarterly*, *24*(1), 139-159.

Crotty, M. (1998). *The Foundations of Social Research: Meaning and Perspective in the Research Process.* Allen & Unwin.

Daswani, G. (2013). The anthropology of transnationalism and diaspora. In Quayson, A., & Daswani, G. (Eds.), *A companion to diaspora and transnationalism* (pp. 29-53). John Wiley & Sons.

De Carvalho, D. (2003). *Migrants and identity in Japan and Brazil: the Nikkeijin*. Routledge.

Dean, M., & Nagashima, M. (2007). Sharing the burden: the role of government and NGOs in protecting and providing for asylum seekers and refugees in Japan. *Journal of Refugee Studies*, *20*(3), 481-508.

De Haas, H. (2010). Migration and development: A theoretical perspective. *International migration review*, *44*(1), 227-264.

De Haas, H. (2012). The migration and development pendulum: A critical view on research and policy. *International Migration*, *50*(3), 8-25.

Development Initiatives. (2017). *Aid spending by Development Assistance Committee (DAC) donors in 2016.* Development Initiatives. http://devinit.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/04/aid-spending-by-Development-Assistance-Committee-DAC-donors-in-2016.pdf

Doi, T. (Prod.). (2012). *Life in a Foreign Land: Burmese in Japan.* [DVD]. Urayasu Documentary Office.

Egreteau, R. (2012). Burma in diaspora: a preliminary research note on the politics of Burmese diasporic communities in Asia. *Journal of Current Southeast Asian Affairs*, *31*(2), 115-147.

Erdal, M. B., & Oeppen, C. (2013). Migrant balancing acts: understanding the interactions between integration and transnationalism. *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*, *39*(6), 867-884.

Ezzy, D. (2002). *Qualitative analysis: Practice and innovation.* Allen & Overy.

Fair, C. C. (2005). Diaspora involvement in insurgencies: Insights from the Khalistan and Tamil Eelam movements. *Nationalism and Ethnic Politics*, *11*(1), 125-156.

Faist, T. (2008). Migrants as transnational development agents: an inquiry into the newest round of the migration–development nexus. *Population, space and place*, *14*(1), 21-42.

Farahani, F. (2012). Diasporic masculinities. *Nordic Journal of Migration Research. 2*(2), 159-166.

Fassin, D. (2001). The biopolitics of otherness: undocumented foreigners and racial discrimination in French public debate. *Anthropology today*, *17*(1), 3-7.

Fassin, D. (2007). Humanitarianism as a Politics of Life. *Public culture*, *19*(3), 499-520.

Fassin, D. (2008). Beyond good and evil? Questioning the anthropological discomfort with morals. *Anthropological theory*, *8*(4), 333-344.

Fassin, D. (2011a). *Humanitarian Reason: A Moral History of the Present.* University of California Press.

Fassin, D. (2011b). Policing borders, producing boundaries. The governmentality of immigration in dark times. *Annual Review of anthropology*, *40*, 213-226.

Fergal, K. (2017). *The Rohingya crisis: Why won't Aung San Suu Kyi act?* BBC. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-41187517

Flowers, P. R. (2012). From kokusaika to tabunka kyōsei: Global norms, discourses of difference, and multiculturalism in Japan. *Critical Asian Studies*, *44*(4), 515-542.

Foucault, M. (2006). Power, Right, Truth. In Goodin, R. E., & Pettit, P. (Eds.), *Contemporary political philosophy: an anthology* (pp.503-510). John Wiley & Sons.

Fujimoto, A. (Director). (2017). *Passage of Life* [Film]. E.x.N K.K.

Fukuda-Parr, S., & Shiga, H. (2016). *Normative framing of development cooperation: Japanese bilateral aid between the DAC and Southern donors* (JICA-RI Working Paper No. 130). JICA Research Institute. https://www.jica.go.jp/jica-ri/publication/workingpaper/jrft3q00000063lo-att/JICA-RI_WP_No.130.pdf

FWEAP. (2017). *The Foundation for the Welfare and Education of the Asian people held "the 38th Festival for Resettled Refugees in Japan", in another name, "A Festival of Love and Appreciation".* http://www.fweap.or.jp/english/2017/11/12/the-38th-festival-for-resettled-refugees-in-japan/

Garner, S. (2007). *Whiteness: an introduction*. Routledge.

Gibson, W. J. & Brown, A. (2009). *Working with qualitative data*. Sage Publications.

Glesne, C. (1989). Rapport and friendship in ethnographic research. *International Journal of Qualitative Studies in Education*, *2*(1), 45-54.

Gmelch, G. (1992). *Double passage: The lives of Caribbean migrants abroad and back home*. University of Michigan Press.

Goldring, L. (2003). *Social and political dimensions of individual and collective remittances.* York university.

Goldring, L. (2004). Family and collective remittances to Mexico: A multi-dimensional typology. *Development and change*, *35*(4), 799-840.

Grasmuck, S., & Pessar, P. R. (1991). *Between two islands: Dominican international migration*. University of California Press.

Greene, J., Basilico, M. T., Kim, H., & Farmer, P. (2013). Colonial medicine and its legacies. In Farmer, P., Kim, J. Y., Kleinman, A., & Basilico, M. (Eds.), *Reimagining global health: an introduction* (pp. 33-73). University of California Press.

Guarnizo, L. E., Portes, A., & Haller, W. (2003). Assimilation and transnationalism: determinants of transnational political action among contemporary migrants. *American journal of sociology*, *108*(6), 1211-1248.

Guest, G., MacQueen, K. M., & Namey, E. E. (2011). *Applied thematic analysis.* Sage Publications.

Guillemin, M., & Heggen, K. (2009). Rapport and respect: negotiating ethical relations between researcher and participant. *Medicine, Health Care and Philosophy*, *12*(3), 291-299.

Hall, S. (2006). The West and the Rest: Discourse and power. In Maaka, R., & Andersen, C. (Eds.), *The indigenous experience: Global perspectives* (pp. 165-173). Canadian Scholars' Press.

Handlin, O. (1973). *The Uprooted: Enlarged*. Little, Brown & Co.

Harriss, J. (2014). Development Theories. In Currie-Alder, B., Kanbur, R., Malone, D. M., & Medhora, R. (Eds.), *International development: ideas, experience, and prospects* (pp. 35-49). Oxford University Press.

Hear, N.V. (1998). *New Diasporas: the Mass Exodus, Dispersal and Regrouping of Migrant Communities.* Taylor & Francis.

Hennink, M., Hutter, I. & Bailey, A. (2011) *Qualitative Research Methods.* Sage Publications.

Hara, T. (2010). Tabunka-Kyosei Wo-Meguru-Giron-de Bunka-wo Donoyou-ni Kataru-noka? [How can we narrate culture in the discussion of Tabunka-Kyosei?] In Iwabuchi, K. *Tabunka-Shakai no Bunka wotou [Interrogating the culture in the context of multicultural society]* (pp. 35-62). Seikyu-sha.

Higuchi, N. (2006). Taminzoku-Shakai no Kyokai-Settei to Ethnic Business [Boundary making of multi-ethnic society and ethnic businesses]. *Report on National Museum of Ethnology, 64,* 33-43.

Hitomi, Y. (2007). Biruma-kei-Nanmin no Seiji-Soshiki no Keisei to Tenkai [Formation and development of political organizations by Burmese refugees]. *Modern Sociology*, *20*, 1-18.

Hitomi, Y. (2008). Nanminka-toiu Senyaku: Betonamu-kei Nannmin to Biruma-kei-Nanmin no Hikaku-Kennkyu [Strategies for Seeking Asylum: A Comparative Study of Vietnamese and Burmese Refugees in Japan]. *The Annual Review of Sociology, 21*, 107-118.

Hitomi, Y. (2013). Zainichi-Biruma-kei Nanmin no Iju-Katei [The migration process of Burmese in Japan]. In Yoshihara, K. (Ed.), *Gendai-ni-Okeru Hito-no-Kokusai-Idou. Asia-no Nakano Nihon [Border crossing in the modern world: Japan in Asia]* (pp. 247-259). Keio-Gijuku University Press.

Holland, D., & Leander, K. (2004). Ethnographic studies of positioning and subjectivity: An introduction. *Ethos*, 32(2), 127-139.

Horst, C. (2008). The transnational political engagements of refugees: Remittance sending practices amongst Somalis in Norway: Analysis. *Conflict, Security & Development*, *8*(3), 317-339.

Humphrey, C. (2004). Sovereignty. In Nugent, D., & Vincent, J. (Eds.). *A Companion to the Anthropology of Politics* (pp. 418-36). John Wiley & Sons.

Hunt, K. (2017). *How Myanmar's Buddhists actually feel about the Rohingya.* CNN. https://edition.cnn.com/2017/09/19/asia/myanmar-yangon-rohingya-buddhists/index.html

IFRC. (2011). *Myanmar: Cyclone Nargis 2008 Facts and Figures.* IFRC. https://www.ifrc.org/en/news-and-media/news-stories/asia-pacific/myanmar/myanmar-cyclone-nargis-2008-facts-and-figures/

Imada, T. (2014). *Gaisetsu Shimin-Shakai-Ron [Overview of civil society in Japan].* Kinokuniya-Shoten.

Ionescu, D. (2006). *Engaging diasporas as development partners for home and destination countries: challenges for policymakers*. IOM. https://www.iom.int/sites/default/files/our_work/ICP/IDM/MRS26.pdf

Iwabuchi, K. (1994). Complicit exoticism: Japan and its other. *Continuum*, *8*(2), 49-82.

Iwabuchi, K. (2001). Uses of Japanese popular culture: Trans/nationalism and postcolonial desire for Asia. *Emergences: Journal for the Study of media & Composite cultures*, *11*(2), 199-222.

Iwabuchi, K. (2015). Pop-culture diplomacy in Japan: Soft power, nation branding and the question of 'international cultural exchange'. *International Journal of Cultural Policy*, *21*(4), 419-432.

Iwasawa, Y. (1998). *International law, human rights, and Japanese law: the impact of international law on Japanese law*. Oxford University Press.

Izawa, Y. (2010). Newcomer no Taiken. Oldcomer no Kioku [Experiences of newcomers and memories of oldcomers]. In Watado, I., & Izawa, Y. (Eds), *Taminzoku-ka-shakai Nihon [Multi-ethnic Japan]* (pp. 15-25). Akashi-Shoten.

Jacoby, T. (2007). Hegemony, modernisation and post-war reconstruction. *Global Society*, *21*(4), 521-537.

Japan Lawyers Network for Refugees. (2018). *Nanmin-Nintei-Shinsei-Su Oyobi Nintei-no-Suji. [Numbers of Refugee application and transition of refugee recognition in Japan.]* Japan Lawyers Network for Refugees.

Japan Platform. (2015). *Reintegration Assistance Program for Refugees. IDPs of Myanmar 2013-2015.* https://www.japanplatform.org/programs/pdf/2013-2015_JPF_myanmar_program.pdf

JMCC. (2019). *Shien-Katsudou [Our assistance to Myanmar].* https://jmcc.jp/shien/

Johnson, P. D. (2007). *Diaspora philanthropy: Influences, initiatives, and issues*. Philanthropic Initiative & Harvard University. https://www.cbd.int/financial/charity/usa-diasporaphilanthropy.pdf

Jomo Shimbunsha. (2018, September, 14). Kikan-Yobikake-de. Gaimushou ni Youbousho [BRSA submits petition to MOFA for safe repatriation]. *Jomo Shimbun*, p. D3.

Jorgensen, D. L. (1989). *The methodology of participant observation.* Sage Publications.

Kajimura, M. (2014). *Nihon-teijuh Biruma-jin no Henyou [Transformations in minority-majority ties of people from Burma in Japan].* (Doctoral dissertation, Tokyo University). U Tokyo Repository. https://repository.dl.itc.u-tokyo.ac.jp/?action=pages_view_main&active_action=repository_view_main_item_detail&item_id=6577&item_no=1&page_id=28&block_id=31

Kapoor, I. (2004). Hyper-self-reflexive development? Spivak on representing the Third World 'Other'. *Third World Quarterly*, *25*(4), 627-647.

Kasai, T. (2019). *Nihon-Seifu-ha Naze Rohingya to Yobanai-noka [Why the Japanese government doesn't call them Rohingya?].* Harbor Business Online. https://hbol.jp/192998

Kashiwazaki, C. (2000). Citizenship in Japan: Legal Practice and Contemporary Development. In Klusmeyer, D. B., & Aleinikoff, T. A. (Eds.), *From migrants to citizens: membership in a changing world* (pp. 434-474). Carnegie Endowment.

Kashiwazaki, C. (2013). Incorporating immigrants as foreigners: Multicultural politics in Japan. *Citizenship Studies*, *17*(1), 31-47.

Kearney, M. (1986). From the invisible hand to visible feet: anthropological studies of migration and development. *Annual review of anthropology*, *15*(1), 331-361.

Kent, G. (2006). Organised diaspora networks and homeland peacebuilding: the Bosnian world diaspora network as a potential development actor. *Conflict, Security & Development*, *6*(3), 449-469.

Kirkpatrick, R., & Hlaing, H. L. (2013). The Myanmar university entrance examination. *Language Testing in Asia*, *3*(1), 1-14.

Kivisto, P. (2005). *Incorporating Diversity: Rethinking Assimilation in a Multicultural Age*. Paradigm.

Koinova, M. (2010). Diasporas and international politics: utilizing the universalistic creed of liberalism for particularistic and nationalist purposes. In Bauböck, R., & Faist, T. (Eds.), *Diaspora and transnationalism: Concepts, theories and methods* (pp. 73-89). Amsterdam University Press.

Kondo, A. (2002). The development of immigration policy in Japan. *Asian and Pacific migration journal*, *11*(4), 415-436.

Kondo, A. (2011). Migrant Integration Policy in Japan. *Meijo Law Review*, *61*(1), 3-30.

Kondo, A. (2015). Migration and Law in Japan. *Asia & the Pacific Policy Studies*, *2*(1), 155-168.

Kondo, Y. (2007). *Borantia-no Testugakuteki-Bunseki [Philosophical analysis of Volunteer].* Hiroshima University. https://ir.lib.hiroshima-u.ac.jp/files/public/2/21046/20141016140133744449/Volunteer_kondo_yoshiki.pdf

Kubo, T. (2014). Nanmin-Ukeire no Itosezaru-Haijo [Unintentional exclusion in the process of accepting refugees]. *The Journal of Social theory and dynamics*, *7*, 117-133.

Kumakiri, T. (2008). *Zainich-Biruma-Nanmin Tasukeai-no-Kai (Interview) [Interview with Burma's Refugee Serving Association in Japan].* Burma Borderlines News. http://cyberbbn11.blogspot.com/search/label/1.%20 在日ビルマ難民たすけあいの会（インタビュー）

Kvale, S. (2007). *Doing interviews.* Sage Publications.

Lacroix, T. (2013). Collective remittances and integration: North African and North Indian comparative perspectives. *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*, *39*(6), 1019-1035.

Lam, D. (2019). *Tokyo's 'Little Yangon': Once a safe haven, now a home.* The Japan Times. https://www.japantimes.co.jp/community/2019/08/11/issues/tokyos-little-yangon-safe-haven-now-home/#.XfbhWad7G00

Lamont, M., & Molnár, V. (2002). The study of boundaries in the social sciences. *Annual review of sociology*, *28*(1), 167-195.

Lebra, T. S. (1976). *Japanese patterns of behavior.* University of Hawaii Press.

Lee, S. (1989). The foreign ministry's cultural agenda for China: the boxer indemnity. In *Duus, P., Myers, R. H., & Peattie, M. R. (Eds.), The Japanese informal empire in China, 1895-1937* (pp. 272-306). Princeton University Press.

Levitt, P. (1998). Social remittances: Migration driven local-level forms of cultural diffusion. *International migration review*, *32*(4), 926-948.

Levitt, P., & Lamba-Nieves, D. (2011). Social remittances revisited. *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*, *37*(1), 1-22.

Lie, J. (1995). From international migration to transnational diaspora. *Contemporary Sociology*, *24*(4), 303-306.

Li, T. M. (2007). Governmentality. *Anthropologica*, *49*(2), 275-281.

Los Angeles Times. (2018). *U.N. genocide advisor: Myanmar waged 'scorched-earth campaign' against the Rohingya.* https://www.latimes.com/world/la-fg-myanmar-rohingyas-20180313-story.html

Lummis, C.D., Kan, N., & Kayano, T. (2009). *Kokka to Identity Wo-To [Interrogating nation-states and identities].* Iwanami-Shoten.

Lu, C., Menju, T., & Williams, M. (2005). Japan and " The Other": Reconceiving Japanese Citizenship in the era of globalization. *Asian Perspective*, *29*(1), 99-134.

Lwin, N. (2019). *Japan Backs Myanmar's Claim That No Genocide Occurred in Rakhine State.* The Irrawaddy. https://www.irrawaddy.com/news/burma/japan-backs-myanmars-claim-no-genocide-occurred-rakhine-state.html

Mack, N., Woodsong, C., Macqueen, K, M., Guest, G., & Namey, E. (2005). *Qualitative research methods: A data collector's field guide.* Family Health International.

Mainichi Shimbun Sha. (2018, May 12). Myanmar Sokoku-no Shouchuu-Gakkou ni Kouka-wo. Nanmin-no Dansei-ga Katsudou [A refugee man working for making school songs to his homeland Myanmar]. *Mainichi Shimbun.* https://mainichi.jp/articles/20180512/k00/00e/040/280000c

MacLean, K. (2004). Reconfiguring the debate on engagement: Burmese exiles and the changing politics of aid. *Critical Asian Studies*, *36*(3), 323-354.

Malkki, L. H. (1996). Speechless emissaries: Refugees, humanitarianism, and dehistoricization. *Cultural anthropology*, *11*(3), 377-404.

Malkki, L. H. (2015). *The need to help: the domestic arts of international humanitarianism*. Duke University Press.

Mallarangeng, A., & Tuijl, P. V. (2004). Partnership for governance reform in Indonesia: Breaking new ground or dressing-up in the emperor's new clothes? A response to a critical review. *Third World Quarterly*, *25*(5), 919-942.

Marshall, C., & Rossman, G. B. (2016). *Designing qualitative research.* Sage Publications.

Matsuo, T. (2010). Toinaosareru-Nihonjin-Sei [Japanese-ness reconsidered]. In Watado, I., & Izawa, Y. (Eds), *Taminzoku-ka-Shakai Nihon [Multi-ethnic Japan]* (pp. 240-260). Akashi-Shoten.

Marrow, H. B. (2005). New destinations and immigrant incorporation. *Perspectives on Politics*, *3*(4), 781-799.

Mazzucato, V. (2008). The double engagement: Transnationalism and integration. Ghanaian migrants' lives between Ghana and the Netherlands. *Journal of ethnic and migration studies*, *34*(2), 199-216.

Massey, D. S., Arango, J., Hugo, G., Kouaouci, A., Pellegrino, A., & Taylor, J. E. (1993). Theories of international migration: A review and appraisal. *Population and development review*, *19*(3), 431-466.

McConnachie, K. (2012). Rethinking the 'refugee warrior': The Karen National Union and refugee protection on the Thai–Burma border. *Journal of Human Rights Practice*, *4*(1), 30-56.

McCormack, D., & Salmenniemi, S. (2016). The biopolitics of precarity and the self. *European Journal of Cultural Studies*, *19*(1), 3-15.

Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan. (2019). *Prime Minister Abe Meets with the State Counsellor of Myanmar.* https://www.mofa.go.jp/s_sa/sea1/mm/page4e_001109.html

Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications. (2006). *Tabunka-kyosei no Suishin-ni-Kansuru Kenkyu-kai-Houkokusho [A report on promoting multicultural coexistence].* Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications. http://www.soumu.go.jp/kokusai/pdf/sonota_b5.pdf

Ministry of Justice. (2008). *The Nationality Law.* http://www.moj.go.jp/ENGLISH/information/tnl-01.html

Ministry of Justice. (2019). *Heisei-30-Nen-Ni-Okeru Nanmin-Ninteishasuu-tou ni Tsuite [The numbers of refugee status granted in 2018].* Ministry of Justice. http://www.moj.go.jp/content/001290416.pdf

Moe, D. T. (2019). Burman Nationalism and Ethnic Identity: Toward an Ethnic Postcolonial Theology of Resistance and Reconciliation in Myanmar. *Black Theology*, *17*(1), 69-88.

Morawska, E. (2003). Immigrant transnationalism and assimilation: a variety of combinations and the analytic strategy it suggests. In Joppke, C., & Morawska, E. (Eds.), *Toward assimilation and citizenship: Immigrants in liberal nation-states* (pp. 133-176). Palgrave Macmillan.

Morris-Suzuki, T. (2005). Reisen to Sengo-Nyukan-Taisei no Keisei [Cold War and the formation of Japanese border control in the postwar period]. *Zenya*, *1*(3), 61-76.

Morris-Suzuki, T. (2007). *Exodus to North Korea: Shadows from Japan's Cold War*. Rowman & Littlefield.

Murohashi, H. (2019). *Nihon-no-Ikoku: Zainichi Gaikoku-jin no Shirarezaru-Nichijou [Foreign space in Japan: Unknown lives of foreigners].* Shobun-sha.

Nakamura, S. (2018, May 15). Rohingya-no-ko ni Gakkou. Bangladesh Nanmin Camp [A school to Rohingya Children in the refugee camp in Bangladesh]. *Yomiuri Shimbun,* p. 18.

Naing, S. Y. (2017). *Donors Cut Financial Support to Refugee Camp Workers.* The Irrawaddy. https://www.irrawaddy.com/news/burma/donors-cut-financial-support-refugee-camp-workers.html

Narayan, U. (1995). Colonialism and its others: Considerations on rights and care discourses. *Hypatia*, *10*(2), 133-140.

Nemoto, K. (2005). The Rohingya issue: a thorny obstacle between Burma (Myanmar) and Bangladesh. *J Burma Stud*, *5*, 1-19.

Nemoto, K. (2007). Between democracy and economic development: Japan's policy toward Burma/Myanmar then and now. In Ganesan, N., & Hlaing, K. Y. (Eds.), *Myanmar: state, society and ethnicity* (pp. 96-108). ISEAS Publishing.

Nye, J., (2004). *Soft power: the means to success in world politics.* Public Affairs.

NHK News Web. (2020). *Zainichi-Rohingya Nihon ni Jinken-Hogo de Myanmar heno Hatarakikake-Uttae. [Zainich Rohingya's appeal to Japan in pressuring Myanmar for the protection of human rights.]* NHK. https://www3.nhk.or.jp/news/html/20200116/k10012248461000.html

Nilsson, J., & Wallenstein, S. O. (2013). *Foucault, biopolitics, and governmentality.* Södertörn University.

Nura, K. (2019). *Judgment on Karen Martyr's Day organizer Naw Ohn Hla case on Oct 2*. Mizzima. http://mizzima.com/article/judgment-karen-martyrs-day-organizer-naw-ohn-hla-case-oct-2

Nwe, A. (2009). Gender hierarchy in Myanmar. *Rays*, *10*, 131-139.

Oguma, E. (1995). *Tanitsu-Minzoku-Shinwa no Kigen [The origin of the myth of single ethnic nation].* Shinyo-Sha.

Oishi, M., & Furuoka, F. (2003). Can Japanese aid be an effective tool of influence? Case studies of Cambodia and Burma. *Asian Survey*, *43*(6), 890-907.

Ong, A. (1996). Cultural citizenship as subject-making: immigrants negotiate racial and cultural boundaries in the United States. *Current anthropology*, *37*(5), 737-762.

Ong, A. (1999). *Flexible citizenship: The cultural logics of transnationality*. Duke University Press.

Ong, A. (2000). Graduated sovereignty in south-east Asia. *Theory, culture & society*, *17*(4), 55-75.

Oo, Z. (2006). Exit, Voice, and Loyalty in Burma: The Role of Overseas Burmese in Democratising their Homeland. In Wilson, T. (Ed.), *Myanmar's Long Road to National Reconciliation* (pp. 231-262). ISEAS Publications.

Otmazgin, N. K. (2012). Geopolitics and soft power: Japan's cultural policy and cultural diplomacy in Asia. *Asia-Pacific Review*, *19*(1), 37-61.

Pigg, S. (1992). Inventing social categories through place: Social representations and development in Nepal. *Comparative Studies in Society and History, 34*(3), 491–513.

Piper, N. (2009). Temporary migration and political remittances: The role of organizational networks in the renationalization of human rights. *European journal of East Asian studies*, *8*(2), 215-243.

Portes, A. (1995). *The economic sociology of immigration: Essays on networks, ethnicity, and entrepreneurship.* Russell Sage Foundation.

Rostow, W. (1959). The Stages of Economic Growth. *The Economic History Review, 12*(1), 1-16.

Safran, W. (1991). Diasporas in modern societies: Myths of homeland and return. *Diaspora: A journal of transnational studies*, *1*(1), 83-99.

Safran, W. (1999). Comparing diasporas: a review essay. *Diaspora: A Journal of Transnational Studies*, *8*(3), 255-291.

Sakhong, L. H. (2003). *In Search of Chin Identity: A Study in Religion, Politics and Ethnic Identity in Burma*. Nias Press.

Seckinelgin, H. (2002). Civil society as a metaphor for western liberalism. *Global society*, *16*(4), 357-376.

Seekins, D. M. (1992). Japan's Aid Relations with Military Regimes in Burma, 1962-1991: The Kokunaika Process. *Asian Survey*, *32*(3), 246-262.

Seekins, D. M. (2000). Japan's "Burma Lovers" and The Military Regime. *Asian Perspective*, *24*(4), 315-334.

Seekins, D. M. (2017). *Historical Dictionary of Burma (Myanmar)*. Rowman & Littlefield.

Schiller, N. G. (1999). Transmigrants and nation-states: something old and something new. The US immigrant experience. In Hirschman, C., Kasinitz, P., & Dewind, J. (Eds.), *The handbook of international migration: The American experience* (pp. 94-119). Russell Sage Foundation.

Schiller, N. G., Basch, L., & Blanc, C. S. (1995). From immigrant to transmigrant: Theorizing transnational migration. *Anthropological quarterly*, *68*(1), 48-63.

Scott, D. (2005). Colonial governmentality. In Inda, J. X. (Ed.), *Anthropologies of modernity: Foucault, governmentality, and life politics* (pp. 23-49). Blackwell Publishing.

Shindo, R. (2009). Struggle for citizenship: interaction between political society and civil society at a Kurd refugee protest in Tokyo. *Citizenship Studies*, *13*(3), 219-237.

Shiobara, Y. (2010). Rentai-to-shiteno Tabunka-Kyosei ha Kanou-ka? [Can Tabuka-Kyosei build solidarity?] In Iwabuchi, K. (Ed), *Tabunka-Shakai no Bunka-wo-tou [Interrogating the culture in the context of multicultural society]* (pp. 63-85). Seikyu-Sha

Shiobara, Y. (2011). Ekkyou-teki Sgakai-Kankei-Shihon no Soushutsu-no-tameno Gaikokujin-Jumin-Shien [Supporting foreign residents for creating trans-cultural social capital: toward multiculturalism as social inclusion]. *Journal of law, politics, and sociology*. *84*(2), 279-305.

Shipper, A. W. (2006). Foreigners and civil society in Japan. *Pacific Affairs*, *79*(2), 269-289.

Shipper, A. W. (2010). Contesting Foreigners' Rights in Contemporary Japan. *NCJ Int'l L. & Com. Reg.*, *36*, 505-556.

Simone, G. (2012). *Refugee groups slam Japan's struggling resettlement plan.* The Japan Times. https://www.japantimes.co.jp/community/2012/07/17/our-lives/profiles/refugee-groups-slam-japans-struggling-resettlement-plan/#.XgEXUKeB200

Sinatti, G., & Horst, C. (2015). Migrants as agents of development: Diaspora engagement discourse and practice in Europe. *Ethnicities*, *15*(1), 134-152.

Smets, P., & Kate, S. (2008). Let's meet! Let's exchange! LETS as an instrument for linking asylum seekers and the host community in the Netherlands. *Journal of refugee studies*, *21*(3), 326-346.

Sökefeld, M. (2006). Mobilizing in transnational space: a social movement approach to the formation of diaspora. *Global networks*, *6*(3), 265-284.

Sørensen, N. N. (2007). *Living across worlds: Diaspora, Development and Transnational Engagement.* OIM. https://publications.iom.int/system/files/pdf/living_across_worlds.pdf

Sørensen, N. N., Hear, N.V., & Engberg–Pedersen, P. (2002). The migration–development nexus evidence and policy options state–of–the–art overview. *International migration*, *40*(5), 3-47.

Spivak, G. C. (2012). *Outside in the teaching machine*. Routledge.

Spivak, G. C., & Harasym, S. (1990). *The post-colonial critic: Interviews, strategies, dialogues.* Psychology Press.

Stateless Network. (2018). *Stateless network continuous seminars 8th "Issei and Nisei of between ~ Kachin mother pacification's and daughter Senjatoi's narrative of Burma."* https://stateless-network.com/?p=2010

Suzuki, E. (2014). Jinkou-Seisaku toshiteno Gaikokujin-Seisaku [Foreigner policies as population policies]. In Ishihawa, S., Suzuki, E., Fujimaki, H., & Miyajima, T. (Eds), *Naze Ima Imin-Mondai Ka [Why migration issues now?]* (pp. 15-20). Fujiwara-Shoten.

Takaya, S. (2017). *Tsuihou to Teikou no Politics [Politics of Deportation and Resistance].* Nakanishiya-Shoten.

Takezawa, Y. (2009). Jo- Tabunka-Kyosei no Genjou to Kadai [Introduction: The current situation and issues of multicultural coexistence]. *Social Anthropology, 74*, 86-95.

Takizawa, S. (2015). Pilot Refugee Resettlement Program: Japan Experience. *Focus*, Advance online publication. https://www.hurights.or.jp/archives/focus/section3/2015/12/pilot-refugee-resettlement-program-japan-experience.html

Tanabe, H., & Nemoto, K. (2003). *Biruma-Gunji-Seiken to Aung San Suu Kyi [Burmese military regime and Aung San Suu Kyi].* Kadokawa-Shoten.

Tanabe, H. (2010). Biruma-Jin Diaspora-Ha-Ima [Burmese diasporas now]. In Komai, H., & Shutou, M. (Eds), *Tonan-Minami-Asia no Diaspora [Diasporas from South and Southeast Asia]* (pp. 112-135). Akashi-Shoten.

Terra People Association. (2019). *Annual Activity Report. 2018.4-2019.3.* Terra People Association. http://terrapeople.or.jp/site_files/file/annual_report/2018annual.pdf

Tha, T. B. (2007). *A Short History of Rohingya and Kamans of Burma*. Kaladan News. https://www.burmalibrary.org/docs21/Ba_Tha-Kaladan-News&Network-Myanmar-2007-09-13-A_Short_History_of_Rohingya_and_Kamans_of_Burma-en.pdf

The Washington Post. (2018). *Myanmar is now erasing the Rohingya's very name.* https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/myanmar-is-now-erasing-the-rohingyas-very-name/2018/06/16/e3f66986-6f40-11e8-bf86-a2351b5ece99_story.html

Thein, A. T. Z., & Akita, T. (2019). Education and expenditure inequality in Myanmar: An analysis with the 2006 and 2012 Household Income and Expenditure Survey in an urban and rural setting. *Regional Science Policy & Practice*, *11*(1), 55-70.

Theodore, N., & Martin, N. (2007). Migrant civil society: New voices in the struggle over community development. *Journal of Urban Affairs*, *29*(3), 269-287.

Thieme, S., & Wyss, S. (2005). Migration patterns and remittance transfer in Nepal: A case study of Sainik Basti in western Nepal. *International Migration*, *43*(5), 59-98.

Throop, C. J. (2012). Moral sentiments. In Fassin, D. (Ed), *A Companion to Moral Anthropology* (pp. 150-168). Wiley-Blackwell.

Ticktin, M. I. (2011). *Casualties of care: Immigration and the politics of humanitarianism in France*. University of California Press.

Treviranus, B., & Osanami, S. T. (2015). *A Socio-Economic Review of Japan's Resettlement Pilot Project* (Research Paper No. 276). UNHCR. https://www.unhcr.org/research/working/558a5a4a9/socio-economic-review-japans-resettlement-pilot-project-barbara-treviranus.html

Turner, S., & Kleist, N. (2013). Introduction: Agents of change? Staging and governing diasporas and the African state. *African Studies*, *72*(2), 192-206.

Travis, C. (1998). Omoiyari as a core Japanese value: Japanese-style empathy. In Athanasiadou, A., & Tabakowska, E. (Eds.), *Speaking of emotions: Conceptualisation and expression* (pp. 55-81). Walter de Gruyter.

TRT. (2019). *Nihon-Seifu ga Rohingya-Zoku ni Tsuika-Shien [Additional humanitarian assistance to Rohingya by the Japanese government].* https://www.trt.net.tr/japanese/ri-ben/2019/02/27/ri-ben-zheng-fu-garohingiyazu-nizhui-jia-zhi-yuan-1153124

UNHCR. (2019). *Refugee response in Bangladesh.* https://data2.unhcr.org/en/situations/myanmar_refugees

UNDP. (2009). *Human Development Report 2009. Overcoming barriers: Human mobility and development.* UNDP. http://hdr.undp.org/sites/default/files/reports/269/hdr_2009_en_complete.pdf

Waldinger, R. (2007). Transforming foreigners into Americans. In Waters, M. C., Ueda, R., & Marrow, H. B. (Eds.), *The new Americans: A guide to immigration since 1965* (pp. 137-48). Harvard University Press.

Waldinger, R. (2017). A cross-border perspective on migration: beyond the assimilation/transnationalism debate. *Journal of ethnic and migration studies*, *43*(1), 3-17.

Waldinger, R., & Fitzgerald, D. (2004). Transnationalism in question. *American journal of sociology*, *109*(5), 1177-1195.

Walton, M. J. (2013). The "wages of Burman-ness:" Ethnicity and Burman privilege in contemporary Myanmar. *Journal of Contemporary Asia*, *43*(1), 1-27.

Waseda University. (2020). *AO Admissions Examination of Special Scholarship Programs Exclusively for the Republic of the Union of Myanmar.* https://www.waseda.jp/inst/admission/en/scholarship/myanmar/

Watanabe, C. (2014). Muddy labor: A Japanese aid ethic of collective intimacy in Myanmar. *Cultural Anthropology*, *29*(4), 648-671.

Watanabe, C. (2019). Intimacy beyond love: The history and politics of Inter-Asian development aid. *Anthropological Quarterly*, *92*(1), 59-84.

Williams, D. C. (2012). Changing Burma from without: Political activism among the Burmese diaspora. *Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies*, *19*(1), 121-142.

Wimmer, A., & Schiller, N. G. (2002). Methodological nationalism and beyond: nation–state building, migration and the social sciences. *Global networks*, *2*(4), 301-334.

World Bank (2017). *Myanmar Living Condition Survey 2017.* (Poverty Report 03). World Bank. http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/921021561058201854/pdf/Myanmar-Living-Condition-Survey-2017-Report-3-Poverty-Report.pdf

World Bank (2018). *Migration and remittances. Recent Developments and Outlook* (Migration and Development Brief 29). World Bank Group. http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/907921534404019026/pdf/129443-BRI-PUBLIC-Knowledge-Note-Add-Series-Migration-and-Development-Brief-29.pdf

Yamamoto, K. (2007). Hisei-ki-taizaisha wo Sasaeru Shakai-Undou no Takamari [The rising of activism supporting undocumented immigrants]. In Watado, I., Suzuki, E., & A.P.F.S. (Eds.), *Zairyu-Tokubetsu-Kyoka to Nihon no Imin-Seisaku [The special residence permission and Japanese immigration policies]* (pp. 150-158). Akashi-Shoten.

Yamamura, J. (2010). *Nanmin heno Tabi [Journey to refugees].* Gendai-Kikakushitsu.

Yamamura, J. (2015). *Nanmin kara Manabu Sekai to Nihon [Japan and the rest of the world from refugees' point of view].* Kaihou Shuppansha.

Yamanaka, K. (1993). New immigration policy and unskilled foreign workers in Japan. *Pacific Affairs*, 72-90.

Yao, A., Legard, R., Keegan, J., Ward, K., C., Nicholls, C, M., & Lewis, J. (2003). In-depth interviews. In Ritchie, J., Lewis, J., Nicholls, C. M., & Ormston, R. (Eds.), *Qualitative research practice: A guide for social science students and researchers* (pp. 177-208). Sage Publications.

Yoshinari, K. (2007). Zairyu-Tokubetsu-Kyoka to A.P.F.S. In Watado, I., Suzuki, E., & A.P.F.S. (Eds.), *Zairyu-Tokubetsu-Kyoka to Nihon-no Imin-Seisaku [The special residence permission and Japanese immigration policies]* (pp. 159-173). Akashi-Shoten.

Young, N., & Shih, J. (2003, May). *The Chinese diaspora and philanthropy.* [Paper presentation] Harvard University Global Equity Initiative, Cambridge, MA, United States.

Zaw, P. P. T., Htoo, T. S., Pham, N. M., & Eggleston, K. (2015). Disparities in health and health care in Myanmar. *The Lancet*, *386*(10008), 2053.